[Senate Hearing 107-236]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-236
THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 6, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
Edwin K. Hall, Staff Director
Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 3
Gailani, Fatima, Advisor, National Islamic Front of Afghanistan.. 48
Gouttierre, Thomas E., Dean of International Studies and Director
of the Center for Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska,
Omaha, NE...................................................... 37
Haass, Hon. Richard N., Director of Policy Planning Staff and
U.S. Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan, Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Responses to additional questions for the record............. 58
Helms, Hon. Jesse, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, prepared
statement...................................................... 5
Rocca, Hon. Christina, Assistant Secretary for South Asian
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Wellstone, Hon. Paul, U.S. Senator from Minnesota, prepared
statement...................................................... 25
(iii)
THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN
----------
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:38 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Wellstone, Boxer, Helms, Lugar,
Hagel, Chafee, Allen and Enzi.
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. I say to the
witnesses, both panels, that the Senate schedule is obviously
going to intervene and interfere, as it usually does here.
We have two very distinguished panels of witnesses, the
first representing the administration and then a second panel.
We are going to, I am told, although I never believe it until
it happens, have two to three successive votes beginning at 11
o'clock, which if that were the case we would have to recess
for probably 20 minutes in order to be able to get those votes
in. But sometimes they announce that and it does not occur, as
I know Richard and Christina know, having worked here and know
this place.
Let me begin by thanking my colleague Senator Wellstone for
suggesting and pushing we have this hearing. Our timing
apparently--as my father used to always say, still says, better
to be lucky than good. We were a little worried, Richard, I was
a little worried, calling you up here while things were still
in train might confuse things. But I am glad it worked out.
The past few weeks have been eventful indeed. The success
of the war effort in Afghanistan has caused some considerable
celebration, has silenced some skeptics, at least temporarily--
you never totally silence them--and has been celebration, not
just here, but in Kabul and also throughout the region.
I want to applaud the administration, our coalition
partners, and above all the men and women we have out there who
are still as we speak fighting and some dying.
Yesterday we received a stark reminder just how tough this
is--I know my friend from Nebraska knows firsthand what it is
like--when three Americans were killed and 19 were wounded.
Pray God that will be the end of that, but it is not likely
that will be the case in my view. So our thoughts and prayers
are with the families of the wounded and killed.
But it also reminds us that this war is not over. Not
only--we keep talking about a second stage here, that we are
preoccupied with what we are going to do, if we do anything, in
Iraq or Somalia or anywhere else in the world. I think there is
a second or third stage in Afghanistan yet to go. The next
stage in Afghanistan is to complete our mission of wiping out
al-Qaeda in that country, as well as capturing and-or killing
Osama bin Laden, and our military has got a very hefty order
and hefty job cut out for them there.
But then we have to get to what we want to talk about in
this hearing, and that is once Kandahar, which it appears as
though reports are may be ready to surrender the Taliban and
once, God willing, we succeed in our mission regarding al-Qaeda
and bin Laden, what then?
I have been impressed from the outset by my discussions
with the President of the United States, my personal and
private discussions with him, how he has, as long ago as the
day or 2 days after our campaign started in Afghanistan, had
already begun the process with the two people in front of us of
trying to figure out what we do after the fact. So this is not
something that the administration is just thinking about as we
sit here now, and I give the President great credit for that,
and his willingness to talk about, although we do not use the
word, the phrase, any more, ``nation-building,'' talk about
putting in place a situation, a circumstance that there can be
some stability in a country that has been ravaged by war and
drought and famine for a long time and to put their neighbors
at ease that there is a prospect for this occurring, for if we
do not we are in real trouble.
We have to facilitate the creation of the regime--Mr.
Chairman--that adequately represents all the Afghans, women as
well as men, Pashtuns and Tajiks and Uzbeks and Hazaras. They
all have to be part of the deal, and we have to help lay that
foundation so the Afghan Government does not slide back into
warlordism and anarchy that existed in the past. As I said, we
have to do it in a way that calms down the neighbors, who do
not have the same interests as one another do.
Now, I am going to forego the rest of my statement and just
suggest that the news out of Bonn seems--it exceeded my
expectations, the decisions they reached, and it stretches
slightly my faith that we will be able to do it on the ground.
I imagine the news was not greeted with enthusiasm in Kabul,
but who knows.
So what we are going to want to talk about is where you are
now, where the administration thinks we have arrived in terms
of a new government, and also a question that cannot remain
unanswered very long, is what sort of security framework are we
prepared to try to help put in place. For I for one think one
is urgently needed. I do not think there is any other
substantive steps, whether political or humanitarian, that are
going to be likely to be able to be taken on the ground without
a robust, combat-ready force able and fully authorized to
establish safety and stability in Afghanistan.
The headlines in all the major papers today are full of
stories relating not only to the success in Bonn, but also to
the desperate circumstance for refugees, displaced persons in
Afghanistan, particularly northern Afghanistan, discussion
about whether or not the Friendship Bridge will be opened and,
if it is, is there safe passage. The bottom line of all this is
it seems to me that--and this is what I want to talk about
today--is there is little prospect of meeting the next stage of
needs in Afghanistan without a security force on the ground.
Turkey has indicated again--the Secretary has indicated to
us previously--Turkey has indicated again today that they are
ready to send forces. I am told that Indonesia and Bangladesh
may as well be prepared to do that. Or it may be a UN-approved
coalition of the willing drawn partly from NATO countries.
Our first panel has been following and affecting
developments both in Afghanistan and in Bonn, where
negotiations appear to have yielded fruit. I look forward to
their report on the progress toward establishing both a lasting
political agreement and a truly effective security framework.
Only in a secure environment can we make real progress toward
reconstructing Afghanistan.
When I say reconstructing, I know folks back home in my
state think we are talking about rebuilding some--this is not,
we are not rebuilding Sarajevo or Sofia. We are trying to do--
our goal from my discussions with the President, and I assume
it is the same, are to be in a position where there is
education in the schools for girls and boys alike, where we are
going to be digging wells and irrigation canals and paving
roads, establishing medical clinics, and clearing up the most
heavily land-mined country on earth. We are not building
palaces or large and great parliamentary buildings. We are just
trying to get this place back to the point where there is a
prospect of the ability to govern, and you need to be able to
communicate to govern.
All this, though, is going to take a lot of money,
according to the Secretary General. He indicates the cost will
be more than $10 billion over 5 to 10 years, and I have heard
similar estimates from officials at the World Bank and a
variety of private NGO's and some within the administration.
Now, President Bush has been clear on the need for American
leadership here. There is a task, though, that is not only
ours. It is a task for the world community. But the United
States has been leading. I expect it will continue to lead, and
I would suggest it has to lead or this is not going to get
done.
The world's attention is now focused on Afghanistan, but it
will not be for long. If the President's pledge is to carry
real weight, it needs to be fleshed out right away. How much
money is the United States willing to commit, for what
programs, and where will the funds come from?
I for one am committed to helping the President keep the
promise he so generously and wisely made. The future of
Afghanistan is and must be in the hands of the Afghan people
themselves. But we must do all we can to lead the world to
assist Afghanistan in the task of rebuilding their country,
their society, and their lives, so that we do not end up on the
short end of the failure that occurs in Afghanistan if it were
to occur again.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
The past few weeks have been eventful ones, indeed. The success of
the war effort in Afghanistan is a cause for celebration and has
silenced some skeptics--at least temporarily, as you never totally
silence them--not just in Kabul or Washington, but all through the
region. I applaud the Administration, our coalition partners, and above
all--the brave men and women of the military who are still, as we
speak, fighting--and some, dying.
Yesterday we received a stark reminder of just how tough this is:
Three American soldiers were killed, and 19 were wounded, in combat
near Kandahar. I pray that it will be the end of that, and our thoughts
and prayers are with the families of the wounded and killed.
It also reminds us that this war is far from over. We keep talking
about a second stage, and we're preoccupied with what we're going to
do--if we do anything--in Iraq or Somalia or anywhere else in the
world. But I think there's a second and third stage yet to come in
Afghanistan. The next stage is to complete our mission of wiping out
al-Qaeda and capturing or killing Osama bin Laden. And then, we have to
get to what we're here to discuss today in this hearing.
I've been impressed from the outset in my private discussions with
the President of the United States how he--as long ago as two days
after the campaign started in Afghanistan, he had already begun the
process, along with two of our witnesses today, to figure out what we
were going to do after the fact. So this is not just something that the
Administration is thinking about as we sit here now--and I give the
President great credit for that, and his willingness for us to put in
place a circumstance allowing some stability in a country that has been
ravaged by war and drought and famine for a long time, and put its
neighbors at ease. For if we don't we are in real trouble.
We must facilitate the creation of a regime that adequately
represents ALL Afghans--women as well as men, Pashtuns and Hazaras as
well as Tajiks and Uzbeks. We must help lay the foundations of a stable
government, so that Afghanistan does not slide back into the warlordism
and anarchy of the past.
The news out of Bonn exceeded my expectations, and stretched
slightly my faith that we will be able to bring about stability on the
ground. What we will want to talk about today is where the
Administration thinks we have arrived in terms of a new government in
Afghanistan, and what sort of security framework we are prepared to
help put in place--for I, for one, think such a framework is urgently
needed.
All the major papers today are full of stories relating not only to
the success in Bonn, but also to the desperate circumstance for
refugees and displaced persons within Afghanistan, particularly in the
north. The bottom line of all this is there is little prospect of
meeting the next stage of needs in Afghanistan without a multi-national
security force on the ground. Turkey indicated again today that they
are willing to send forces, and Indonesia and Bangladesh may be
willing, as well. Or it may be comprised of a United Nations
``coalition of the willing'' drawn partly from NATO countries.
Our first panel has been following developments both in Afghanistan
and in Bonn, where negotiations appear to have yielded fruit. I look
forward to their report on progress towards establishing both a lasting
political agreement and a truly effective security framework.
Only in a secure environment can we make real progress toward
reconstructing Afghanistan. We are not rebuilding Sarajevo or Sofia.
Our goal is to be in a position where there is education for girls and
boys alike, where we're going to be digging wells and irrigation
canals, paving roads, establishing medical clinics, and clearing up the
most heavily land-mined country on earth. We're not building palaces or
great parliamentary buildings, we're just trying to get this place back
to the point where there's a prospect of the ability to govern.
All of this, though, is going to take a lot of money. According to
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, it will cost more than $10 billion,
over the course of perhaps 5-10 years. I've heard similar estimates
from officials in the World Bank, a variety of private NGOs, and the
same within the U.S. Administration.
President Bush has been clear on the need for American leadership
here. This is a task for the world community--but the United States has
been leading, it will continue to lead, and I would suggest that it has
to lead, or this is not going to get done.
The world's attention is now focused on Afghanistan--but it won't
be for long. If the President's pledge is to carry real weight, it
needs to be fleshed out right away. How much money is the U.S. willing
to commit? For what programs? And where will the funds come from?
I, for one, am committed to helping the President keep the promise
he so generously--and wisely--made.
The future of Afghanistan is, and must be, in the hands of the
Afghan people themselves. But we must do all we can to lead the world
to assist the Afghans in the task of rebuilding their country, their
society, and their lives.
The Chairman. I yield to my friend Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. All of us
appreciate your scheduling this significant hearing. We hold a
lot of hearings that could be postponed, but this one need not
be postponed, it must not be.
Before we begin our consideration of the political
questions before us today, I sort of feel obliged to express
our appreciation to our military and homeland defense forces.
They are serving the American people well and I am proud of
them and I know everybody in this room is. From the Capitol
Police on the corner of First and C to the Marines outside of
Kandahar, they are giving heart and soul to their country and
America's values.
This has been going on a long time in this country and I
suppose as long as this country exists it will be going on from
time to time.
Now, we are here today, as you have indicated yourself, Mr.
Chairman, to discuss the political future of Afghanistan or,
perhaps more realistically, the political future of
Afghanistan--question mark, is it going to continue. Now, one
of the reasons Osama bin Laden is in Afghanistan today is
because the United States--and let us be candid about it--the
United States walked away from victory after the fall of the
Soviet occupation. The massacres and counter-massacres that
followed the Soviet departure made the Taliban look appealing
to the Afghan people.
Now that victory is in hand again, we are back to status
quo ante bellum: the same players, same power vacuum, same
rivalries. The Bush administration and the United Nations
knocked heads to force the factions to agree. This was in
Germany this week when they got together. But how are we going
to continue to make them agree? Who is going to do it?
Some have suggested we need a peacekeeping force in
Afghanistan, to which there is a one-word answer and it is
pronounced ``Somalia.'' Anti-Taliban warlords are already
fighting each other for control of the liberated areas of
Afghanistan. The Russians wasted no time landing a contingent
in Kabul, or ``KOB-ble,'' as some pronounce it. The Iranians as
usual will be up to no good, and the Pakistanis have interests
that may or may not necessarily coincide with us in
Afghanistan.
So these two folks and the others to follow you are the
experts, and I personally appreciate your being here and I
appreciate you being willing to testify.
Now, how can we enfranchise the Afghans and disenfranchise
the busybodies in the region who made such a mess of the place?
That is to be determined. How do we use all the goodwill we
have won by freeing the people of Afghanistan without being
trapped in another fruitless nation-building nightmare? Boy,
you sure do have your work cut out for you, and I look forward
to hearing what you are going to do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Helms follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Jesse Helms
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your scheduling this significant
hearing.
Before we begin our consideration of the political questions before
us today, I feel obliged to express our appreciation to our military
and homeland defense forces. They are serving the American people well
during this time of crisis.
I'm proud of the men and women serving our country. From the
Capitol police on the corner of First and C to the Marines outside
Kandahar, they are giving heart and soul for their country and
America's values.
We are here today to discuss the political future of Afghanistan,
or, perhaps more realistically, the ``political future of Afghanistan--
question mark.''
One of the reasons Osama bin Laden is in Afghanistan today is
because the United States walked away from victory after the fall of
the Soviet occupation. The massacres and counter-massacres that
followed the Soviet departure made the Taliban look appealing to the
Afghan people.
Now that victory is at hand again, we're back to status quo ante
bellum--same players, same power vacuum, same rivalries.
The Bush Administration and the United Nations knocked heads to
force the factions to agree in Germany this week. But how are we going
to make them continue to agree? Who's going to do it?
Some have suggested we need a peacekeeping force in Afghanistan, to
which there is a one-word answer: Somalia.
Anti-Taliban warlords are already fighting each other for control
in liberated areas of Afghanistan. The Russians wasted no time landing
a contingent in Kabul; the Iranians, as usual, will be up to no good.
And the Pakistanis have interests that may not necessarily coincide
with ours in Afghanistan.
You folks are the experts: How can we enfranchise the Afghans and
disenfranchise the busybodies in the region who have made such a mess
of the place? How do we use all the goodwill we have won by freeing the
people of Afghanistan without being trapped in another fruitless
``nation-building'' nightmare?
You have your work cut out for you, and I look forward to hearing
your observations.
The Chairman. Mr. Chairman, if you will excuse the attempt
at humor here, I was telling Richard, who you and I know, all
of us know very well, have known for a long time, have great
respect for, I said: Congratulations. I said: You have got your
work cut out for you. I said: It reminds me of that story of
the guy who jumps off the ninetieth floor of a building and the
guy on the fiftieth floor sees him going by and yells out and
says: How are you doing? He says, he responds back: So far, so
good.
But I have more optimism. Richard, it was a joke, only a
joke.
With that, let us move on to our witnesses. We have two
very distinguished witnesses from the administration:
Ambassador Richard M. Haass, Director of Policy and Planning
Staff of the Department of State; and Christina Rocca, who is
the Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs of the
Department of State, who is an old hand around here, and we are
delighted to have her back.
I might note parenthetically that I personally appreciate
the access and cooperation I have had when I have had
questions, and particularly you I have been bugging, Christina,
since it is your area of the world, and I appreciate it very
much. You have been very helpful.
However you would like to proceed, however you would like
to do it, please.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTINA ROCCA, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON DC
Ms. Rocca. I will go first. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Helms. Move your microphone so we can hear you.
Thank you.
Ms. Rocca. Is that better? There we go.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee: It is
my privilege to appear before you today with Ambassador Haass
to discuss the political situation in post-Taliban Afghanistan.
I will be brief and restrict my remarks to providing an overall
perspective on the political situation, as well as the current
state of our provision of humanitarian assistance. Ambassador
Haass will cover reconstruction and security matters.
Mr. Chairman, as we speak American troops are in combat on
Afghan soil and the United States is engaged in three closely
linked efforts: to isolate and destroy UBL's al-Qaeda
organization and its affiliates, both in Afghanistan and
elsewhere; to decapitate the Taliban regime that harbored al-
Qaeda and other terrorist groups; and to assist the people of
Afghanistan to restore freedom, prosperity, and good governance
to their country.
The elimination of bin Laden and his associates from
Afghanistan will be followed by a longer, internationally
supported process that aims to rebuild and bring lasting
stability to the war-torn country to prevent it from being safe
haven for terrorists in the future. Ousting the Taliban
leadership and helping the Afghan people form a broad-based
representative government are high priorities in this process.
These tasks will not be easy, as you have said, and we
recognize that, especially given the ethnic and regional
divisions within Afghanistan that Senator Helms referred to. It
is not for us, however, to choose who rules Afghanistan. It is
not for us to choose who rules Afghanistan, but we will assist
those who seek a peaceful nation free of terrorism.
Well before September 11, the United States had been
working with the United Nations, with a number of other
governments, and with the Afghan factions and with Afghan
groups outside their home country to develop a process of
national reconciliation through a traditional Afghan grand
council, or Loya Jirga. Together with our partners in this
initiative, we developed a set of guiding principles for a
successor government that continue to have meaning. It should
be broad-based and representative of Afghan's diverse ethnic
and religious groups. It should preserve the unity and
territorial integrity of the country. It should protect the
human rights of all its citizens, including women. It should
not pose a threat to any of its neighbors or near neighbors,
and it must not harbor international terrorists or export
illegal drugs.
I am pleased to be able to report today that Afghanistan's
future is looking brighter than it has in many years. December
5 marked the conclusion of the U.N. talks in Bonn, which
succeeded in pulling together Afghan groups with widely
differing views and agendas and coming up with a framework for
an interim government in Afghanistan, as well as a place for
the long-term future of that country. We recognize that there
is much hard work still to be done.
The international community is reviewing ways to support
the Interim Authority and the process leading to establishment
of a permanent, multi-ethnic, broad-based, gender-inclusive
government. There are meetings this week in Berlin separate
from the Bonn talks and later this month in Brussels and these
will focus attention on this important issue.
Afghanistan's neighbors also play a critical role in
helping support this process. They are front line states for
terrorism, narcotics, and refugee problems emanating from
Afghanistan and their role in backing the transition will be
very important.
During this time of crisis, we have been most grateful for
the support we have been receiving from the countries in South
and Central Asia. Many have become key partners and joined a
wider coalition of nations committed to stopping terrorism in
its tracks. Pakistan has taken on a crucial role in support of
our war in Afghanistan. One should not underestimate the
serious political risks President Musharraf took in doing so.
His bold position at such a critical juncture in international
history will be remembered and recognized for a long time to
come.
India's immediate and generous offers of cooperation also
have been greatly appreciated by this administration. India has
also suffered from Taliban-inspired terrorism and we recognize
not only its offers of support to the coalition, but also their
generous plans to provide humanitarian assistance to the Afghan
people.
Tajikistan has provided staging areas for humanitarian and
other operations which serve as crucial launching points for
humanitarian assistance deliveries into Afghanistan.
Turkmenistan has set up a humanitarian depot and the U.N. is
flying in food shipments for further delivery to Afghanistan.
Iran has been helpful by allowing the use of its port Bandar a
Abbas for transshipment of wheat to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
and Tajikistan for onward delivery to Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan
has also made staging areas available for humanitarian
assistance.
Finally, Uzbekistan has provided staging areas for
humanitarian and other assistance and they are working on
opening the Termez Bridge. U.S. forces are inspecting the
bridge and, if sound, it could be used to deliver much-needed
humanitarian assistance to the region of Mazar-e Sharif and we
are optimistic that it will be open very soon.
Mr. Chairman, each of these states is well aware that it
has everything to gain from a secure, prosperous, and stable
nation on its borders.
In the long run, we expect that the outcome of the Afghan
political discussions will be a central authority of some sort
in Kabul with control over specific issues of national concern,
complemented by a decentralized administrative system which
delegates some decisionmaking authority and control of
resources to regional centers. This is likely the only
politically viable solution in a country marked by regional and
ethnic tensions, which unfortunately have increased during the
20-plus years of conflict.
We plan to continue to provide directly to the Afghan
people through the U.N. and accredited NGO's, and at some point
it will be realistic to discuss the possibility of providing
multilateral assistance to a representative Afghan Government
and to local governments and councils. This type of economic
assistance will give local governments and councils a stake in
the rebuilding and economic wellbeing of the nation as a whole.
Targeting assistance will also assist in reintegrating
women into Afghan economic and political life. Under the
Taliban, women and girls in Afghanistan were the victims of
serious and systematic abuses. The Taliban's unacceptable
treatment of women will leave a mark on Afghanistan's long-term
development. The U.N. reports that female literacy is
approximately 4 percent versus 30 percent of males. The Taliban
has also significantly reduced women's access to health care,
with resultant negative lasting consequences for maternal and
child health.
We are pleased that the Bonn talks included Afghan women
and that the Interim Authority will include several women,
including a vice chairman who will handle women's affairs and
the minister of public health. This is an important step for
Afghan women and one that we strongly support.
In the past, women were a vital part of Afghan society.
Having them back playing important roles in Afghanistan's
public life, in government, schools and hospitals will help to
rebuild Afghan society.
Obviously, some of our goals for a stable, secure
Afghanistan will be reached more quickly than others. In the
mean time, we also remain focused on the severe humanitarian
crisis facing us in Afghanistan and we must continue to provide
the Afghan people with basic necessities. Let me provide you
with a brief snapshot of where we now stand with regard to
humanitarian assistance.
I know you have heard this before, but we believe it bears
repeating that prior to September 11 the United States was the
world's single largest donor of assistance to the Afghan
people, and the complex humanitarian crisis currently gripping
Afghanistan started several years ago, coincident with the rise
to power of the Taliban.
On October 4, President Bush announced that the United
States would make available an additional $320 million for
humanitarian programs, underscoring the message that the United
States would come to the aid of the Afghan people. On November
20, Secretary Powell and Secretary O'Neill launched the
international planning effort for the rehabilitation and
reconstruction of Afghanistan. As the Secretary stated, our
message to the Afghan people is that we will not leave them in
the lurch.
The humanitarian situation remains very serious, though.
There is still considerable insecurity in many parts of the
country, which inhibits the ability of the humanitarian
agencies to do their work. In particular, no food convoys have
entered Afghanistan through the important Quetta-Kandahar
corridor for the past 3 weeks and the international relief
agencies have not had access to some 60,000 internally
displaced Afghans under Taliban control in Spin Boldak.
In the north, the critical logistics hub at Mazar-e Sharif
is not open due to the insecurity in the area. Concerns over
security have also delayed the opening of the essential land
supply route from Uzbekistan, which I mentioned earlier, but
which we do hope will be resolved soon.
Finally, winter is descending. The U.N. assessment is that
between 5 and 7.5 million people are extremely vulnerable and
in need of international assistance. The relief community, led
by USAID and the World Food Program [WFP], has done an
outstanding job getting food and other supplies into the
country under very difficult circumstances. WFP reports that it
achieved its overall target of 52,000 metric tons of food in
November and it set the ambitious goal of moving 100,000 tons
in December. In November UNICEF completed its polio vaccination
campaign for 5 million children.
UNHCR has continued to work with Pakistan to allow refugees
to enter and to be accommodated in new camps where they can
receive international protection and assistance. The numbers
arriving in Pakistan have been relatively small, some 135,000
since September 11, and with the success of the opposition
forces there are already spontaneous refugee return movements
occurring, especially from Iran.
Against this backdrop, there are a vigorous assessment and
planning actions under way for the rapid expansion of
humanitarian assistance where and when security permits. The
U.N. has reestablished its presence in Kabul, Herat, and
Faizabad and convoys are able to reach those locations. The
international donor community is reviewing the integrated U.N.
relief strategy for the winter at a meeting this week in Berlin
that I mentioned earlier. Donor pledges, some $800 million in
total, will cover the requirements presented in the U.N. plan.
In 2 weeks in Brussels, the steering group for the
reconstruction will meet to set the course and start the
resource mobilization effort, endeavoring to integrate planning
for recovery and rehabilitation work with the existing
humanitarian strategy. This effort will also aim to establish
the interface between the Afghan Interim Authority and the U.N.
and international financial institutions.
The road to peace and prosperity in Afghanistan will be
long and difficult. We must all work toward this goal, not only
for Afghanistan but for the region and the rest of the world.
Thank you for your attention.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Rocca follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christina Rocca, Assistant Secretary for
South Asian Affairs, Department of State
Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, it is my
privilege to appear before you with Mr. Haass to discuss the political
situation in Post-Taliban Afghanistan. I will be brief, and restrict my
remarks to providing an overall perspective on the political situation
as well as the current state of our provision of humanitarian
assistance. Mr. Haass will cover reconstruction and security matters.
Mr. Chairman, as we speak, American troops are in combat on Afghan
soil and the U.S. is engaged in three closely linked efforts: to
isolate and destroy UBL's al-Qaeda organization and its affiliates,
both in Afghanistan and elsewhere; to decapitate the Taliban regime
that harbored al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and to assist the
people of Afghanistan restore freedom, prosperity and good governance
to their country.
The elimination of Bin Laden and his associates from Afghanistan
will be followed by a longer internationally-supported process that
aims to rebuild and bring lasting stability to the war-torn country to
prevent it from being a safehaven for terrorists. Ousting the Taliban
leadership and helping the Afghan people form a broad-based,
representative government are high priorities in this process. These
tasks will not be easy, especially given the ethnic and regional
divisions within Afghanistan. It is not for us to choose who rules
Afghanistan, but we will assist those who seek a peaceful nation free
of terrorism.
Well before September 11, the United States had been working with
the United Nations, with a number of other governments, with the Afghan
factions, and with Afghan groups outside their home country to develop
a process of national reconciliation through a traditional Afghan Grand
Council, or Loya Jirga. Together with our partners in the initiative,
we developed a set of guiding principles for a successor government
that continue to have meaning:
It should be broad-based and representative of Afghanistan's
diverse ethnic and religious groups.
It should preserve the unity and territorial integrity of
the country.
It should protect the human rights of all its citizens
including women.
It should not pose a threat to any of its neighbors or near
neighbors.
It must not harbor international terrorists or export
illegal drugs.
I'm pleased to be able to report that today, Afghanistan's future
is looking brighter than it has in many years. December 5th marked the
conclusion of the U.N. talks in Bonn which succeeded in pulling
together Afghan groups with widely differing views and agendas and
coming up with a framework for an interim government in Afghanistan, as
well as a plan for the long term future of that country.
On December 22, the Interim Authority will begin handling
the day-to-day conduct of the affairs of state for the next six
months. All armed groups shall come under the command and
control of the Interim Authority.
The Interim Authority will consist of an Interim
Administration presided over by a Chairman and includes five
Vice Chairmen and 23 other members, a Special Independent
Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga, and a
Supreme Court of Afghanistan. Its membership will reflect the
ethnic, geographic and religious composition of Afghanistan and
women.
The Interim Authority will cooperate with the international
community in the fight against terrorism, drugs and organized
crime and will maintain peaceful and friendly relations with
neighboring countries.
All actions taken by the Interim Authority shall be
consistent with the relevant Security Council resolutions,
particularly concerning counterterrorism.
An Emergency Loya Jirga will be convened within six months
by former ex-King Zahir Shah. The Loya Jirga will decide on a
Transitional Authority to lead Afghanistan until election of a
fully representative government.
A Constitutional Loya Jirga will convene to adopt a new
constitution within eighteen months of the establishment of the
Transitional Authority. The international community is
reviewing ways to support the Interim Authority and the process
leading to establishment of a permanent multi-ethnic, broad-
based, gender-inclusive government. There are meetings this
week in Berlin, separate from the Bonn talks, and later this
month in Brussels that will focus attention on this important
issue. One of the challenges will be security. While the Afghan
delegations in Bonn recognize that the responsibility for
providing security and law and order throughout the country
resides with the Afghans themselves, they have asked the
international community to help establish and train new Afghan
security and armed forces.
Afghanistan's neighbors play a critical role in helping to support
this process. They are frontline states for terrorism, narcotics and
refugee problems emanating from Afghanistan. Their role in backing the
transition will be very important.
During this time of crisis, we have been most grateful for the
support we are receiving from the countries in South and Central Asia.
Many have become key partners and join a wider coalition of nations
committed to stopping terrorism in its tracks. Pakistan has taken on a
crucial role in support of our war in Afghanistan. One should not
underestimate the serious political risks President Musharraf is taking
to do this. His bold position at such a critical juncture in
international history will be remembered and recognized for a long time
to come.
India's immediate and generous offers of cooperation also have been
greatly appreciated by this Administration. India has also suffered
from Taliban-inspired terrorism and we recognize not only its offers of
support to the coalition, but also their generous plans to provide
humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people.
Tajikistan has provided staging areas for humanitarian and other
operations, which serve as crucial launching points for humanitarian
assistance deliveries into Afghanistan.
Turkmenistan has set up a humanitarian depot, and the UN is flying
in food shipments for further delivery to Afghanistan.
Iran has been helpful by allowing the use of its port Bandar a
Abbas for transshipment of wheat to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan for onward delivery to Afghanistan.
Kyrgyzstan has also made staging areas available for humanitarian
assistance. Russia's EMERCOM (emergency relief organization) is
transporting wheat shipments overland from Kyrgyzstan directly into
Afghanistan.
The Uzbeks have provided staging areas for humanitarian and other
assistance and are working to open the Termez bridge. U.S. forces are
inspecting the bridge and if sound, it could be used to deliver much-
needed humanitarian assistance to the region of Mazar-e Sharif. We are
optimistic that the Uzbek government will open the bridge soon.
Regionally, the U.S. is cooperating with the UNDCP (United Nations
Drug Control Programme) and Afghanistan's neighbors to build national
and regional capacities to counter the Afghan drug trade. As much as
half of the quantity of illicit drugs produced in Afghanistan are
consumed in Afghanistan and its neighboring states.
Mr. Chairman, each one of these states is well aware that it has
everything to gain from a secure, prosperous, and stable nation on its
borders.
In the long run, we expect that the outcome of Afghan political
discussions will be a central authority in Kabul with control over
specific issues of national concern complemented by a decentralized
administrative system which delegates some decision-making authority
and control of resources to regional centers, likely the only
politically viable solution in a country marked by regional and ethnic
tensions which unfortunately have increased during twenty plus years of
conflict. We plan to continue to provide aid directly to the Afghan
people through the UN and accredited NGOs. At some point soon it will
be realistic to discuss the possibility of providing multilateral
assistance to a representative Afghan government and to local
governments and councils. This type of economic assistance will give
local governments and councils a stake in the rebuilding and economic
well-being of the nation as a whole.
Targeting assistance will also assist in reintegrating women into
the Afghan economy and political life. Under the Taliban, women and
girls in Afghanistan were the victims of serious and systemic abuses.
As the Taliban solidified their political power base, they intensified
their control of women using the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue
and Suppression of Vice (PVSV) to enforce their radical beliefs. Under
the rule of the Taliban, the humanitarian situation for all Afghan
people, and particularly the most vulnerable of them--women and
children--continued to deteriorate.
Prior to the Taliban, a limited but growing number of Afghan women,
particularly in urban areas, worked outside the home in nontraditional
roles. There were female lawyers, government officials and doctors in
Kabul. Following the Taliban takeover of Kabul in 1996, they began to
enforce a series of ultra-conservative social strictures, many of which
had a severe impact upon women and diminished their status in society.
Taliban rules restricted women's basic rights--freedom of expression,
movement and participation in society. The impact of Taliban
restrictions on women affected economic and social conditions, most of
all in urban areas which had significant numbers of educated and
professional women. The Taliban also eliminated opportunities for
girls' education. This practice will leave a mark on Afghanistan's
long-term development--the U.N. reports that female literacy is
approximately 4 percent versus 30 percent for males. The Taliban also
significantly reduced women's access to health care with resultant
negative lasting consequences for maternal and child health.
We are pleased that the Bonn talks included Afghan women and that
the Interim Authority will include several women, including a Vice
Chairman who will handle women's affairs and a minister of public
health. This is an important step for Afghan women. In the past, women
were a vital part of Afghan society; having them back playing important
roles in Afghanistan's public life, in government, schools and
hospitals, will help to rebuild Afghan society.
Obviously, some of our goals for a stable, secure Afghanistan will
be reached more quickly than others. In the meantime we must also
remain focused on the severe humanitarian crisis facing us in
Afghanistan and we must continue to provide the Afghan people with
basic necessities.
Let me provide you with a snapshot of where we now stand with
regard to humanitarian assistance. I know you have heard this before,
but we believe it bears repeating, that prior to September 11, the
United States was the world's single largest donor of assistance to the
Afghan people. And the complex humanitarian crisis currently gripping
Afghanistan started several years ago, coincident with the rise to
power of the Taliban.
On October 4, President Bush announced that the United States would
make available an additional $320 million for humanitarian programs,
underscoring the message that the United Sates would come to the aid of
the Afghan people. On November 20, Secretary Powell and Secretary
O'Neill launched the international planning effort for the
rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. As the Secretary
stated, our message to the Afghan people is that we will not leave them
in the lurch.
The humanitarian situation remains very serious. There is still
considerable insecurity in many parts of the country, which inhibits
the ability of the humanitarian agencies to do their work. In
particular, no food convoys have entered Afghanistan through the
important Quetta-Kandahar corridor for the past three weeks, and
international relief agencies have not had access to some 60,000
internally displaced Afghans under Taliban control at Spin Boldak. In
the North, the critical logistics hub at Mazar-e Sharif is not open due
to insecurity in the area. Concerns over security have also delayed the
opening of the essential land supply route into Afghanistan from
Uzbekistan, which would utilize the Friendship Bridge at Termez.
And winter is descending. The UN assessment is that between 5 and
7.5 million people are extremely vulnerable and in need of
international assistance. The relief community, led by USAID and the
World Food Program, has done an outstanding job getting food and other
supplies into the country under very difficult circumstances. WFP
reports that it achieved its overall target of 52,000 metric tons of
food in November and has set an ambitious goal of moving 100,000 tons
during December. In November, UNICEF completed its polio vaccination
campaign for 5 million children. UNHCR has continued to work with
Pakistan to allow refugees to enter and to be accommodated in new camps
where they can receive international protection and assistance. The
numbers arriving in Pakistan have been relatively small--some 135,000
since September 11. And with the success of the opposition forces there
are already spontaneous refugee return movements occurring, especially
from Iran.
Against this backdrop, there are vigorous assessment and planning
actions underway for the rapid expansion of humanitarian assistance
when and where security permits. The UN has reestablished its presence
in Kabul, Herat, and Faizabad, and convoys are able to reach those
locations. The international donor community is reviewing the
integrated UN relief strategy for the winter at a meeting this week in
Berlin. Donor pledges--some $800 million in total--will cover the
requirements presented in the UN plan. In two weeks, in Brussels, the
Steering Group for the reconstruction effort will meet to set the
course and start the resource mobilization effort, endeavoring to
integrate planning for recovery and rehabilitation work with the
existing humanitarian strategy. This effort will also aim to establish
the interface between the Afghan interim authority and the UN and
international financial institutions.
The road to peace and prosperity in Afghanistan will be long and
difficult. We must all work toward this goal not only for Afghanistan
but for the region and the rest of the world.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. HAASS, DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING
STAFF AND U.S. COORDINATOR FOR THE FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Haass. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to
have this opportunity to testify before the Committee on
Foreign Relations in my capacity as U.S. Coordinator for the
Future of Afghanistan. In the interest of time, what I suggest
is I simply summarize my prepared remarks and we can put the
longer statement, if you would like, in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, it will be placed in the
record.
Ambassador Haass. Our aims in Afghanistan are well known.
We seek an Afghanistan that is free of terrorists, that no
longer is a source of poppy, and that allows its citizens to
return home and live normal lives in which opportunity comes to
replace misery. Today we can all take considerable satisfaction
in how much progress we have made toward the realization of
these goals. I say this fully aware of all that remains to be
done.
Moreover, it is difficult to exaggerate the difficulties
still before us. Still, Mr. Chairman, I view the future with
some confidence. This stems first and foremost from the great
success of the coalition's military operations.
The second reason for guarded optimism is the behavior of
the Afghans themselves. What we have witnessed recently could
not be more different from what took place when the Mujaheddin
defeated the Soviets in 1989. Today Northern Alliance soldiers
are acting with discipline. Reprisals and atrocities appear to
be notably absent. Moreover, we have seen at Bonn a remarkable
demonstration of Afghans coming together to forge a common
political future.
The third reason for my relatively upbeat assessment today
is the behavior of Afghanistan's neighbors and others with
influence. Countries appear to understand that restraint is
necessary if a stable Afghanistan will materialize. We are
seeing less of the historic ``great game'' and more cooperation
for the greater good.
The fourth and final reason for my optimism today is the
attitude of the international community. In 1989, in the wake
of the Soviet military withdrawal, much of the international
community decided to limit their involvement in Afghanistan out
of respect for the strong Afghan tradition of independence from
foreigners. This time around, the help will be there.
Future success, though, will depend on translating this
potential situation into actual accomplishments. As you have
just heard, Assistant Secretary Rocca focused on the political
and diplomatic and humanitarian questions. What I would like to
do is turn to questions of reconstruction and security.
Beginning with reconstruction, the challenge is to move as
expeditiously as possible along the humanitarian continuum from
relief and recovery to actual reconstruction projects. Already,
a number of international meetings have been convened toward
these ends and a conference at which donors will pledge
assistance is to gather in Tokyo in January.
These meetings will take place under the co-chairmanship of
a steering committee consisting of the United States, Japan,
the European Union, and Saudi Arabia. The nature and scale of
the effort will be determined not simply by the generosity of
the donor countries, but also by Afghanistan's needs and its
absorptive capacity. The necessary detailed asssessments are
being conducted right now by the U.N. Development Program, the
World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank.
Although the planning for Afghanistan's recovery and
reconstruction is necessarily in its early stages, a good many
of the principles which will inform it can already be
articulated. First, the effort will be comprehensive, ranging
from so-called quick impact projects to longer term and larger
undertakings. In this, resettlement of refugees and the
internally displaced will be an ongoing priority.
Second, a second priority will be to discourage the
production of poppy. This will likely require a focus on
alternative economic development as well as eradication and
border control.
Another priority, one already mentioned by my colleague,
will be improving the situation of and prospects for girls and
women. To deny them a role, a significant role, in
Afghanistan's future would be equivalent to drawing a line down
the middle of the country and simply ignoring all the people on
one side of that line.
Recovery and reconstruction must be done with, not to, the
Afghans. This requires involving women in the planning and
development of the project, involving the Afghan diaspora, and
involving elements of civil society who have remained in the
country.
Reconstruction needs to be an Afghan mainly, but not an
Afghan only, endeavor. Afghanistan's neighbors are more likely
to support and cooperate with international efforts to promote
Afghanistan's stability if they participate in and benefit from
the process.
Last, recovery and reconstruction will require a sustained,
generous effort by the international community. We are clearly
looking at a total of many billions of dollars over many years.
It is both right and necessary that the United States be
prepared to do its share. The administration looks forward to
consulting with this committee and with the Congress as our
planning on the scope and scale of what we do becomes more
refined.
Let me turn now to the military and security front. The
immediate challenge is to continue to prosecute the war
successfully against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Again, this is
something that will be accomplished by the U.S.-led coalition
together with Afghans themselves.
Let me turn now more specifically to security arrangements.
The agreement just signed in Bonn calls for an international
security force to help Afghans provide near-term security in
Kabul and the surrounding areas. The signatories to the
agreement also ask the international community to help train a
pan-Afghan security force. There are, though, a number of
questions still to be determined about an international
security force, including its mandate, its size, its
capability, its composition, command arrangements, and the
precise area of deployment. These and related issues are being
discussed among U.S. officials, the Afghan Interim Authority
once it is formed, the United Nations, and potential troop
contributors.
One thing, though, is critical. Such a force must do
nothing that would in any way inhibit the coalition from
carrying out the primary objectives of ridding Afghanistan of
terror.
Mr. Chairman, let me end my remarks with just a few
principles. First, despite the optimism that you have heard, we
do not harbor unrealistic goals of perfection for Afghanistan.
But we do believe it is both desirable and necessary to work
with Afghans and others in the international community to make
Afghanistan viable.
Second, the role of the international community is and will
remain critical, yet it must remain limited. This is not
Cambodia, it is not East Timor. Afghanistan is not to be a U.N.
or international trusteeship. Many of the details of the future
of Afghan society, economy, and its political system must be
devised and implemented by Afghans themselves. They will have
the principal and final say about how to blend the traditional
and the modern, the central and the local, the national and the
tribal.
Third, we need to be clear about our time horizons. The
U.S.-coalition effort will not be ended until its mission is
complete. Then, however, coalition forces will be prepared to
depart. This is as it should be. But we should not be thinking
about exit strategies when it comes to assisting the Afghans
with their political, economic, and security challenges. An
engagement strategy is what is needed.
Fourth, we need to be prepared for tactical setbacks.
Attacks by individuals or small groups of terrorists or Taliban
sympathizers could continue for months or even years. Some
disagreement and even infighting among the Afghans themselves
is to be expected. Not everyone is going to endorse the
emerging order. Eradicating drugs will be an ongoing challenge,
as will persuading Afghans to give up their arms. Yet, these
and other challenges should not preclude what has the potential
to be a strategic trajectory of progress.
Last, it is important we keep in mind just why it is we are
involved in Afghanistan. We want and need to succeed because we
do not want to contemplate having again to deal with the
consequences of a failed pariah country. At the same time,
history and conscience argue for doing a great deal to give the
people of Afghanistan a new lease on life. What we have now is
a historical rarity, a second chance to do right by ourselves
and by others. American foreign policy at its best combines the
strategic and the moral. Afghanistan is an opportunity to
demonstrate just this.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions and
comments.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Haass follows:]
Prepared Statement of Amb. Richard N. Haass, Director of Policy
Planning Staff, Department of State and U.S. Coordinator for the Future
of Afghanistan
Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify
before the Committee on Foreign Relations in my capacity as U.S.
Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan.
Our aims in Afghanistan are well known to the American people and
this Committee. We seek to bring about an Afghanistan that is free of
terrorists, that no longer is a source of poppy, and that allows its
citizens--including an estimated five million refugees and an unknown
number of internally displaced persons--to return to their homes and
live normal lives in which opportunity comes to replace misery.
Today, nearly three months after the horrendous attacks of
September 11, and some two months after coalition military operations
in Afghanistan commenced, we can all take considerable satisfaction in
how much progress we have made towards the realization of these goals.
I say this fully aware of all that remains to be done. Moreover, it
is difficult to exaggerate the difficulties still before us.
Afghanistan and its people have experienced more than two decades of
occupation and war. An entire generation has grown up knowing little
but violence. Economic mismanagement and drought have added to the
hardship. As already noted, millions of Afghans are either refugees or
displaced. Millions of Afghans, including most girls, have been denied
the chance to go to school. When you add to this the political and
religious intolerance that was at the core of Taliban rule, you have a
picture of suffering that is extraordinary.
Still, I view the future with some confidence. This stems first and
foremost from the great success of the coalition's military operations.
The Taliban regime no longer exists; its remnants along with those of
its al-Qaeda backers are reduced to a last stand in Kandahar and to
hiding in caves. This military victory is the basis for all else that
we may try to accomplish in Afghanistan.
A second reason for guarded optimism is the behavior of the Afghans
themselves. What we have witnessed recently could not be more different
from what took place when the Mujahadeen defeated the Soviets in 1989.
Then, civil war and reprisals were the norm; the ultimate result was
the Taliban. Today, Northern Alliance soldiers are acting with
discipline; reprisals and atrocities appear to be notably absent.
Moreover, we have seen at Bonn a remarkable demonstration of Afghans of
all stripes--insiders and exiles, northerners and southerners, Pashtuns
and Tajiks and Hazaras and Uzbeks, men and women--coming together to
forge a common political future. There is no better proof than the
``Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the
Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions'' just reached in
Bonn.
A third reason for my relatively upbeat assessment is the behavior
of Afghanistan's neighbors and others with influence. Again, the
contrast with the past is telling. One reason for Afghanistan's trials
and turmoil during the last decade was the competition between and
among outsiders for influence on the inside. This time, countries
appear to understand that restraint is necessary if a stable
Afghanistan--one that denies sanctuary to terrorists, one that doesn't
export drugs, one that can take back refugees, one willing to live in
peace with its neighbors--will materialize. This, too, was demonstrated
at Bonn. We are seeing less of the historic ``great game'' and more
cooperation for the greater good.
A fourth and final reason for my optimism today is the attitude of
the international community. In 1989, in the wake of the Soviet
military withdrawal, much of the international community, including
ourselves, decided to limit their involvement in Afghanistan. The
reasons were not arbitrary; to the contrary, one motivation was to
respect the strong Afghan tradition of independence from foreigners.
Yet Afghanistan clearly needed help to deal with its political,
economic and security-military challenges. This time around, the help
will be there.
Future success, though, will depend on translating this potential
into accomplishments. This will require continued, sustained effort in
three areas: the political/diplomatic, the humanitarian/economic, and
the military/security.
the political/diplomatic front
The U.S. Government has for some time sought to promote a viable,
broad-based, and representative Afghan political alternative to the
Taliban. We knew that helping to create such an alternative was both
desirable--it would help persuade Afghans to shift their allegiances
away from the Taliban--and necessary, as the world needed an Afghan
partner to work with on matters ranging from relief and recovery to
reconstruction and security.
Towards this end, we have been active diplomatically. Much of this
has been done in collaboration with and support of the United Nations.
U.S. officials (including Ambassador James Dobbins, who led our
delegation in Bonn) have promoted our aims in Afghanistan at meetings
of the 6 plus 2, the Geneva initiative, in multilateral fora, and in
countless bilateral meetings with Afghan parties, other governments,
and representatives of international organizations. Diplomacy has made
a difference.
Much of this effort culminated over the past ten days in Bonn. The
results of the Bonn meeting of the representatives of what were the
four principal Afghan opposition groups are impressive by any
yardstick. A broad based, representative government is in sight.
Assisted by the able chairmanship of Lakhdar Brahimi, the Special
Representative of the UN Secretary General for Afghanistan, the
delegates agreed to a political road map charting Afghanistan's
political course for the next two to three years and beyond. At the
start of this road map is the creation of an Interim Authority, a 30
person institution (to be chaired by Hamid Karzai) that will on
December 22 come to be the sovereign representative of Afghanistan.
This body will provide a partner for the entire international community
as it endeavors to enhance Afghanistan's security and provide
humanitarian and economic assistance for the country's recovery and
rehabilitation. What will follow within six months will be the
convening (by former King Zahir Shah) of an emergency ``Loya Jirga,'' a
large council of many of Afghanistan's key citizens. This gathering
will lead in turn to a transitional administration and a second Loya
Jirga to decide constitutional matters. At the end of the process a
legitimate Afghan government is to emerge through processes designed to
give the Afghan people a real voice and vote.
relief, recovery, and reconstruction
As just noted, prospects for political progress are predicated in
significant part on an improving humanitarian and economic context.
This has been the case for some time. Indeed, the international
community, with the United States in the lead, has provided generous
amounts of relief to the people of Afghanistan over the past several
years. The liberation of the country's north, the area of most severe
humanitarian crisis, has eased the plight of the people, and further
improvements in the security situation there will have dramatic impact.
Although we still have a great deal to accomplish, it is now possible
to envision an end to the era when relief dominated efforts by the
international community toward Afghanistan.
By definition, relief is just that--a stop gap. The challenge is to
move as expeditiously as possible along the humanitarian continuum to
recovery and reconstruction projects. Already, a number of
international meetings have been convened toward these ends, including
a meeting of senior officials convened in Washington on November 20 by
the United States and Japan. A second meeting of senior officials is
scheduled for mid-December in Brussels, and a conference at which
donors will pledge assistance is to gather in Tokyo in January. These
meetings will take place under the co-chairmanship of a steering group
consisting of the United States, Japan, the European Union, and Saudi
Arabia.
The nature and scale of the effort will be determined not just by
the generosity of the donor countries but also by Afghanistan's needs
and absorptive capacity. The necessary detailed assessments are being
conducted by the United Nations Development Program, the World Bank,
and the Asian Development Bank.
Although the planning for Afghanistan's recovery and reconstruction
is necessarily in its early stages, a good many of the principles which
will inform it can already be anticipated.
The effort will be comprehensive, ranging from so-called
quick impact projects (demining, local road rehabilitation,
provision of seeds, renovation of water supplies, reopening
schools, etc.) to longer term and larger undertakings in the
areas of agriculture, household and light industry,
infrastructure modernization, education, and health.
Resettlement of refugees and the internally displaced will be
an ongoing priority.
Another priority will be to discourage the production of
poppy. This will likely require focus on alternative economic
development as well as eradication and border controls.
Also a priority will be improving the situation of and
prospects for girls and women. Not only do girls and women
constitute an estimated 55-60% of the country's population, but
they were denied educational and employment opportunity in the
Taliban era. To deny them a significant role in Afghanistan's
future would be equivalent to drawing a line down the middle of
the country and ignoring all those on one side of the line.
Recovery and reconstruction must be done with and not to
Afghans. This requires involving not only women in the planning
and implementation of these efforts but involving also the
Afghan diaspora in addition to elements of civil society who
have remained in the country.
Reconstruction will be an Afghan mainly but not an Afghan
only endeavor. Afghanistan is more likely to improve if the
immediate region also fares well economically. In addition,
Afghanistan's neighbors are more likely to support and
cooperate with international efforts to promote Afghanistan's
stability if they participate in and benefit from the process.
Last, recovery and reconstruction will require a sustained,
generous effort by the international community. We are clearly
looking at a total of many billions of dollars over many years.
It is both right and necessary that the United States be
prepared to do its share. The Administration looks forward to
consulting with this Committee and the Congress as our planning
on the scope and scale of what we will do becomes more refined.
the military and security front
The immediate military challenge is to continue to prosecute the
war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This entails bringing about the
liberation of Kandahar, the last remaining Taliban stronghold, and then
rooting out al-Qaeda and Taliban forces wherever they may be hiding.
Again, this will be something accomplished by the U.S.-led coalition in
conjunction with Afghans.
Security arrangements also need to be made and implemented for
liberated areas, especially Kabul. The agreement signed in Bonn calls
for an international security force to help Afghans provide near-term
security in Kabul and the surrounding areas. The signatories to the
agreement have also asked the international community to help train a
pan-Afghan security force. The United States military involvement in
Afghanistan will continue to be focused on our primary objective of
destroying al-Qaeda and routing out the Taliban.
There are a number of questions still to be determined about an
international security force, including its mandate; size; capability;
composition; command arrangements; and precise area of deployment.
These and related issues will be discussed among U.S. officials, the
Afghan Interim Administration, the UN, and troop contributors. One
thing is critical, however, it must do nothing that would in any way
inhibit the coalition from carrying out the primary objective of
ridding Afghanistan of terrorism.
guiding principles
Mr. Chairman, as already stated, the United States and the
international community face considerable challenges before we can be
sure we have made Afghanistan a country free of terrorists and drugs.
It will take time and resources to help Afghans create a society in
which the citizens of Afghanistan can return home to a life of
security, economic opportunity, and greater freedom. We do not harbor
unrealistic goals of perfection, but we do believe it is both desirable
and necessary to work with Afghans and others in the international
community to make Afghanistan a viable society.
The role of the international community is and will remain
critical. Yet it must remain limited. This is not East Timor.
Afghanistan is not to be a UN or international trusteeship. Indeed,
many of the details of a future Afghan society, economy, and political
system must be devised and implemented by Afghans themselves. They will
have the principal and final say about how to blend the traditional and
the modern, the central and the local, the national and the tribal.
We need to be clear about our time horizons. The U.S.-led coalition
effort will not be ended until its mission is completed. Then, however,
coalition forces will be prepared to depart. This is as it should be.
But we should not be thinking about exit strategies when it comes to
assisting the Afghans with their political, economic, and security
challenges. An engagement strategy is what is needed.
We need to be prepared for tactical setbacks. Progress will not
always be linear. Attacks by individuals or small groups of terrorists
or Taliban sympathizers could continue for months or years to come.
Some disagreement and even infighting among the Afghans is to be
expected; not everyone is likely to endorse the emerging order.
Eradicating drugs will be an ongoing challenge, as will persuading
Afghans to give up their arms. Yet these and other tactical challenges
should not preclude what should be a strategic trajectory of progress.
Last, we must keep in mind why we are involved in Afghanistan. We
want and need to succeed, in part because we do not want to contemplate
having again to deal with the consequences of a failed, pariah
Afghanistan. At the same time, history and conscience argue for doing a
great deal to give the people of Afghanistan a new lease on life.
What we now have is an historical rarity--a second chance--to do
right by ourselves and others. American foreign policy at its best
combines the strategic and the moral. Afghanistan is a chance to
demonstrate just this.
Thank you. I look forward to your comments and questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I have been told, ladies and gentlemen, the votes have been
postponed until 11:40 and it may be only one vote then, so we
may be able to move this. In order to accommodate that, why do
we not have the first round 5 minutes, and let me begin with
you, Mr. Ambassador.
The Secretary General asked to meet with Senator Helms and
myself, Senator Lott, and some others in my office last week to
discuss, among other things, the security side of this
arrangement. Let me say as a preface, I am fully aware, and I
think my colleague will sustain that I stated flatly to the
Secretary General that any security force that was put in place
would not, could not, and would not be allowed to in any way
interfere with our actions relative to prosecuting our efforts
against al-Qaeda and Mr. bin Laden, no matter what it took.
I indicated to him, I think Senator Helms will recall, that
I could not speak for everyone, I know everyone in the room
agreed, but I thought I spoke for a vast majority of Democrats
as well as Republicans in that regard.
But, having said that, it seems as though you have a bit of
a dilemma here. The pressure--``pressure,'' wrong word. The
concern from the Defense Department and other places,
legitimately, of having a multilateral force in place that we
could end up stumbling over or having to coordinate with
relative to al-Qaeda and bin Laden is a reasonable concern. But
it seems--and this is an observation, may not be accurate--it
seems to have slowed up what--let me put it another way.
If we already had bin Laden in custody and al-Qaeda had
been eliminated, I would be dumbfounded if we would not have by
now already had a security force in place. So it seems to me
that the security force being put in place, which is obviously
necessary--in today's New York Times in section B, there is a
schematic map of the area still controlled by or impacted on by
the Taliban.
Obviously, Mazar is an area where--I did not think the
reason why we were not using the Friendship Bridge was the lack
of its capacity to sustain vehicles crossing it, although that
is a concern, but the lack of the capacity to sustain the
safety of those folks once they cross the bridge.
So there is this competing dilemma here. When we spoke at
some length with Kofi Annan, he indicated that there were three
alternatives that he had discussed. One was a blue-helmeted
operation; the second was a total indigenous force; and the
third was a coalition of the willing led by the United States,
not having anything to do with blue helmets.
He thought that the second of the two--I do not think I am
putting words in his mouth; I think that what he said--the
second of the two is the only real alternative. When we asked
him about Turkey and Bangladesh and other Islamic nations, he
said that his clear view was that they were willing, and
smaller countries--and Turkey has a serious military
capability--and smaller countries were willing to participate
as long as, he said, some of the big guys were there, primarily
us, but also the Brits, the French, the Germans, and they have
offered.
So that is a long preface to a relatively short question.
How do you--talk to us about this timing element, if that is
any part of getting security on the ground to get the aid in
place, because specifically the discussion about why Pashtun
leaders were not willing to go to Kabul, in addition to not
wanting to walk into the circumstance where they would have
their fate settled politically because it would not be done at
Bonn, there was a security concern as well.
So talk to me about this relationship and what kind of
security force you are envisioning or thinking about. My time
is up.
Ambassador Haass. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have been
weighing a lot of these same tradeoffs ourselves, as you might
expect, over the past few months. One of the key things in the
timing, in addition to obviously having the military situation
reach a point where you could even contemplate a role for an
international security force, was also having an Interim
Authority to work with. We needed a representative, legitimate
Afghan partner to discuss this, and that will be in place, we
expect, by December 22. Indeed, we needed something like Bonn
to actually produce someone to talk to in the intervening
period.
The general options are as you suggest. A blue-helmeted
force seems out of the question for the foreseeable future.
Blue-helmeted forces are there for peacekeeping. At the moment
there is no peace to keep.
The Chairman. We are talking about a force for enforcement,
are we not, as well as peacekeeping?
Ambassador Haass. I think we are talking about something
more than a traditional peacekeeping force here. I think we
have to be realistic. But again, how much more and where I
think are important questions. I think there is a spectrum
here, that we have to be careful about where it is we feel
comfortable with ourselves going and where we want to put
certain limits.
But I think again everyone understands that this is not
appropriate for a traditional U.N. blue-helmeted force, which
tends to work in a consensual environment, usually has very
little capability, and so forth. Everyone understands that is
not called for.
An indigenous force, a so-called pan-Afghan force, is
envisioned by the Bonn agreement. It is everyone's goal
ultimately. The problem is we just cannot get from here to
there as quickly as we would like to. You simply do not have
the political basis and the coalition and the experience.
So what we therefore need is a gap-filler essentially
between where we are now and when a pan-Afghan force could
assume the role of security in Afghanistan. I think there you
are looking at some sort of an international security force, as
it is called in the Bonn agreement. It is endorsed by the
United Nations, but it does not report to the United Nations,
an important distinction.
We obviously have to work out questions of command
arrangements, coming back to the first principle that nothing
it does could in any way hobble or interfere with the
operations of the coalition. We have got to still look at
questions of its geographic coverage, whether it is simply
limited to Kabul or it goes beyond. There is obviously
questions of composition. I take your point that it will need
some capable questions.
But these are exactly the questions we are wrestling with.
These are not unilateral for us to decide. It is something that
we are working out with potential troop contributors, with the
United Nations, and with the Afghans themselves, because if you
read the Bonn agreement carefully, if this force came into
Kabul it would be preceded by the withdrawal from Kabul of all
Afghan forces. So this is very much a friendly, if you will,
transition from the existing situation to something else.
The Chairman. I hope we do not discuss it too much and I
hope we do not rely too much on their input and I hope we exert
our influence very firmly and soon, because our experience in
similar circumstances has been when we do not it does not work
well.
But I thank you very much. I yield to the chairman.
Senator Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, do I not recognize you? Have I not seen
you on the Senate floor a time or two with a fellow named
Brownback?
Ms. Rocca. I believe that is correct, Senator.
Senator Helms. We miss you.
Ms. Rocca. Thank you.
Senator Helms. I hope you are enjoying your work.
Last week the United States Ambassador to Pakistan toured a
Pakistani textile factory and while there she said--and let me
quote her: ``The patriotic thing to do if you are an American
is to buy Pakistani products, because the stronger the partner
we have here in Pakistan is a stronger partner against terror
in Afghanistan.'' I have got the article here where she said
that.
Now, perhaps she is unaware that there are two sides to
that story. Like old Shoeless Joe used to say, ``it ain't
necessarily so.'' The United States textile and apparel
industry last year lost more than 60,000 jobs, including, if
you will forgive me, 20,000 in North Carolina. These are people
whose children serve in our police forces and our military and
they pay taxes and so forth, but they are not qualified to take
the jobs that are made possible by Research Triangle Park
further east in North Carolina, and they are out of work
because, simply said, there is nothing else for them to do.
I hope that the statement by Ms. Chamberlain does not
represent the view of this administration and I am going to
make inquiry of the President about it.
Do you have any view on that?
Ms. Rocca. Senator, I believe Ambassador Chamberlain's
comments were made in the context of our efforts to show
support to General Musharraf and to recognize the sacrifices
that Pakistan has been enduring as a result of the war. This is
a war which we would have much greater difficulty winning
without Musharraf's strong and bold support and it is in that
context that she made those comments.
That said, obviously we appreciate the situation in the
U.S. textile industry and we are committed to working with the
Congress to ensure that our support for Pakistan is done in a
manner which will minimize the impact on the textile and
apparel industry.
The Chairman. I think she just forgot you are still here.
Senator Helms. Well, I hear that and I do not mean to
offend you, but that is the same song and dance I hear from the
administration all the time. They do not give--and not only
this administration; prior administrations.
These people do not have anything to do, and they have been
hard-working people whose jobs were ripped away from them by
the close of textile mills.
Now, let me see. I want to ask you something, sir. Without
second-guessing the parties on their choices for the interim
government of Afghanistan--you cannot hear me?
Ambassador Haass. I am sorry?
Senator Helms. I am not going to second-guess anybody
regarding the choices for the interim government of Afghanistan
and I do not think you are, either. But I do wonder whether any
of the individuals involved have the nationwide stature inside
Afghanistan to keep the government together. I want to know how
you assess the prospects for stability there.
Ambassador Haass. You are asking, Senator, one of the most
basic questions and it is something I come out I suppose with
guarded optimism. Depending on the day, I either emphasize the
word ``guarded'' or I emphasize the word ``optimism.'' I am not
going to stand up here or sit here and be a Pollyanna and say
it is going to be smooth sailing. It is not.
But the reasons that I do have some optimism is that I do
see the Afghans themselves showing that they have learned from
their mistakes of the past. The fact that something like Bonn
could happen is in itself an accomplishment. The fact that we
have not seen the sort of reprisals in cities that are
liberated that we saw in the early nineties I think shows some
progress. The fact that the neighboring countries and others
who have significant influence essentially worked behind the
scenes at Bonn to make it happen at least suggests that they
understand that if they try to get maximal influence for
themselves everyone else is going to do the same and no one is
going to benefit.
The fact that the international community is willing to put
lots of resources this time around and not walk away, as you
yourself referred to in your statement. So again, I am not
going to predict an easy road. I am not even going to predict
success. But I do think there are some reasons to think that
there is probably the best chance in modern history to set
Afghanistan on a relatively stable and successful path that you
or I have ever seen. That, as a policymaker, it gives us
something to work with and it obviously gives us, I think, a
challenge that is not so ambitious that it is simply
unrealistic.
Senator Helms. Very quickly, you heard the chairman discuss
Kofi Annan's coming to his office and we talked. Do you believe
that a U.N. force is going to be necessary there?
Ambassador Haass. Sir, I do not believe a U.N. force, if
you mean a force that reports to the United Nations, is
desirable. I do think, though, we will need an international
security force.
Senator Helms. Comprised of whom?
Ambassador Haass. Pardon me?
Senator Helms. Comprised of whom?
Ambassador Haass. I think we need some capable countries,
some serious countries. We are looking at them. It could be
several countries in Europe. Members of NATO have expressed an
interest or a willingness in participating or even leading such
a force. Several Arab or Islamic countries could also be a part
of such a force.
It would have to be done in a way, again, that no way would
interfere with what General Franks and the coalition are doing.
It could possibly even report to the coalition so you did not
have a separate line of command arrangements, something you
said. I think any such force has to go in with its eyes wide
open. Afghanistan is probably going to suffer from a
significant degree of lawlessness, as well as pockets of
foreign Taliban and al-Qaeda resistance, for some time to come.
So any such force needs to have the capability so it can more
than hold its own in that kind of a stressful environment.
Senator Helms. We better plan on what you are saying.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you should be optimistic and
the reason to be optimistic is look at Afghanistan on the 5th
of September and look at it on the 5th of December. That is
enough of a reason. You should take some pride as well in the
work you have done.
Our subcommittee chairman for this area, Senator Wellstone.
Senator Wellstone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank both of
you. We much appreciate your work.
I would ask unanimous consent that my full statement be
included in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
Senator Wellstone. And I am not going to read it.
Let me just try to get both questions out to both of you
and then each of you respond. I want to go back to Senator
Biden's map. The headline also here in the New York Times is
``Refugees Are Dying as Aid Goes Unused.'' There are six
million Afghans that are at risk in the north because the
humanitarian assistance is not reaching them.
I wanted to, I guess, be critical in the question that I am
going to put to you. It seems to me that we can dither around
with a lot more sort of meetings and discussions and we can at
least target the supply routes which are actually critical to
delivering the humanitarian aid. We are not talking about blue
helmet. I think Senator Biden is saying the same thing. It can
be a multinational force with the blessing of the U.N.
I guess between the banditry and the snow--actually, some
of us have raised this question going back to October, and I
think for months actually we have been focused on this. So I
guess I want to--and I know that the administration to a
certain extent has been pushing back on this idea. But I just
want to say to you, I do not think we have much more time, and
in fact I do not think time is neutral at all and if we do not
get this done then it is going to be too late.
So I want to try and maybe have more discussion with you on
this, because it is not as if this has not been the question we
have been raising over and over again.
Then the second point that I want to mention is this whole
question of reconstruction. We were talking earlier, Mr.
Chairman, both to Richard and Christina and I was saying that I
am glad that we have an opportunity to talk about political and
economic reconstruction. But it has been a decade of neglect,
and I think the United States in partnership with the
international community has got to be willing to make a multi-
year, multi-national, multi-billion dollar effort to rebuild
Afghanistan.
I think Senator Biden mentioned this. We have promised that
we would lead the way. The United Nations--according to the
United Nations, the bill for reconstruction will be in excess
of $10 billion, and other estimates say $12 to $15 billion. So
far we have pledged $320 million and that is for humanitarian
relief, and we have made no specific commitment so far for
reconstruction and recovery.
I would be interested in, how much money do you see the
United States contributing to the world effort for Afghan
reconstruction? Those are the two questions.
Ambassador Haass. Senator, on the question of security, if
you read the Bonn agreement, the annex that is devoted to the
international security force, I think the first sentence is
relevant here. Let me just quote it: ``The participants in the
U.N. talks on Afghanistan recognize that the responsibility for
providing security and law and order throughout the country
resides with the Afghans themselves.'' That is key.
If there is an international security force, again I think
you are looking at it either possibly just in Kabul,
conceivably it might go to one or two other population centers.
But we are not talking about occupying Afghanistan. We have got
a country here the size of Texas and that sort of occupation is
a recipe for trouble. It would not do the international
security force or the Afghans any good.
The bulk of the security has to come from essentially
Afghan forces reporting to the central government as part of
this new national army that is going to be built. As Christina
said in her testimony, this is one of the ways in which there
is going to have to be a balance between what is done at the
capital and what is done in a decentralized fashion around the
rest of the country.
But there is no way that an international security force
can provide point defense for every aid convoy or every
international worker in every square inch of Afghan territory.
That would simply spread it too thin. That is where training
the Afghans and hopefully getting them up to a level of
professional competence has a real potential to make a
difference. That is also where consent in Afghanistan is going
to make a difference. We are hoping that the Afghan forces are
not challenged to a degree where lawlessness becomes the rule
rather than the exception.
Just very quickly on the reconstruction area, the numbers
are necessarily vague about the scale of the effort. People are
throwing around a lot of numbers. I would not put a whole lot
of stock in them yet. Until you do a serious needs assessment,
until you really look at the question of sequencing, of
absorptive capacity and so forth, I do not think the numbers
are terribly meaningful and specific, though you are
essentially right, we are talking about a large amount of money
over multiple years.
The United States will do its share. What exactly that
share is is obviously going to depend upon the whole, and we
are just not at the point yet where we are prepared to say this
many dollars in this package of legislation. But it is
something that we are beginning to refine and it is something
we will do with the Congress as we get farther along.
Senator Wellstone. In 20 seconds: I did not say that we
could put together a force that would provide security for
every single truck on the ground. I said earlier that we can
target the supply routes that were critical. Frankly, I do not
think right now we can rely on Northern Alliance or Afghan
forces to do this, and we do not have a lot of time.
So I cannot quite understand your pushing back on the idea
of some kind of international force coming in and targeting the
actual supply routes which we know are critical. Otherwise, you
have got around six million people--and I will go back to the
headline today, which I do not think is melodramatic:
``Refugees Dying As Aid Goes Unused.'' That is really what I am
talking about. I do not think we have met that challenge. I do
not know why.
Ms. Rocca. Senator, just very briefly, I will just add to
what my colleague here said that we are of, taking into account
what Ambassador Haass said about not being able to provide the
security in the manner in which one would--which would make the
assistance, the humanitarian assistance, efficient, we are very
much aware of the problem. We are working very closely with the
WFP to find ways. There are people on the ground working for
WFP who have experience in these matters and who are working
very hard to find ways around the problems, and we are working
closely with them.
[The prepared statement of Senator Wellstone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Paul Wellstone
I want to thank all of you for participating in today's hearing as
I know many of you have been involved in a week of difficult but
extraordinarily important negotiations in Bonn, Germany. I am grateful
to you for being here today to share your perspective on that process
and what lies ahead for Afghanistan.
The agreement reached in Bonn yesterday offers the best hope for 25
million Afghans who have suffered enough. They deserve a rest from
endless suffering and war. They also deserve generous reconstruction
assistance from the international community and a decent government at
home.
The causes of the Afghan tragedy include nearly all the horrors
that stalk failed states: meddling and invasion by neighboring states,
internecine warfare leading to a takeover by brutal fanatics, the
oppression for the majority of the population--women--and finally the
Taliban's fateful decision to host international terrorists.
The cures for Afghanistan's agony are less obvious, but one is
clear. The rival political and ethnic groups must take the historic
opportunity that emerged yesterday in Bonn and make a genuine
commitment to the peaceful sharing of power and to establishing a
government broad and effective enough to meet the basic needs of the
people. The same small-minded factionalism that originally left the
country vulnerable to backward mullahs, greedy warlords, and predatory
neighbors continues to pose a threat to the country now.
Two others things are clear: The United States and its coalition
partners must dither no longer and send in a multinational force to
ensure humanitarian access in Afghanistan. Six million Afghans are at
risk in the north because humanitarian assistance is not reaching them.
From the beginning of this conflict, I have said that the military
effort will not be successful unless the humanitarian effort restores
order and meets basic survival needs. This effort cannot wait for all
hostilities to cease. Nor can the millions of Afghans wait, whose very
survival are at risk.
Taliban units may be largely defeated and dispersed, but there is
no area in Afghanistan that is entirely secure. The main supply routes
for humanitarian assistance are blocked by local banditry or the onset
of winter. Consequently, we need an immediate deployment of a
multinational force with a mandate to increase humanitarian access to
vulnerable Afghans.
Second, we must move quickly and decisively on a long-term
commitment to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The people of
Afghanistan have endured 23 years of war and misery, and the conflict
has threatened international stability, and placed enormous burdens on
their limited means. The Bush Administration has said that it will not
let Afghanistan descend into chaos. But talk is not enough--it must act
with the commitment of significant resources. We must show Afghans that
our commitments are not hollow. We must show them that we are not going
to give up on them this time, and turn our backs on them as we did
before. We must show genuine solidarity and real generosity now.
It is time to reverse more than a decade of neglect. The United
States, in partnership with the international community must be willing
to make a multi-year, multi-national and multi-billion dollar effort to
rebuild Afghanistan.
Our reconstruction effort must focus on education, particularly
girls' education, which has proven to give the greatest return to each
assistance dollar. Creation of secular schools will also break the
stranglehold of extremism, and allow both boys and girls to make
positive contributions to the development of their society. It must
also focus on rebuilding basic infrastructure--repairing shattered
bridges and roads, removing land mines, reconstructing irrigation
systems and drilling wells. We must also rebuild the shattered health
infrastructure by establishing basic hospitals and village clinics.
The Afghans have been through enough hell. They deserve to live in
a society where they can feed their children, live in safety and
participate fully in their country's development regardless of gender,
religious belief or ethnicity.
Thank you.
The Chairman. As they say in this business, I associate
myself with the remarks of my friend from Wisconsin, and I
suspect Chancellor Schroeder would, too.
Senator Wellstone. Minnesota.
The Chairman. Minnesota. I beg your pardon.
Senator Wellstone. This has been going on for 11 years.
The Chairman. I am the Senator from Maryland. I yield to
the Senator from Wisconsin--no, to Senator Lugar from Indiana.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Haass, some historians who have tried to
describe governance in Afghanistan have suggested that at best
there was only a small central government, but largely a
government of tribes or entities that loosely got together in
various ways. I mention that simply because clearly the work
that you and others are doing is remarkable in the Bonn
conference, in thinking through some central government and
some way it might relate to each of the various forces that
came together in Bonn and some that did not.
I am just wondering, as you take a look in the intermediate
term, quite apart from the long term, essentially Afghanistan's
fate will probably be more of a function of its proximity to
Russia and Pakistan and Iran, maybe to some extent Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan, in other words their neighbors. All of these states
share a desire for a friendly, stable, or at least non-hostile
situation there, and have been prepared in the past to take
steps to try to ensure that that was the case through injection
of their own influence.
Now, it is being suggested, not necessarily by yourself or
the administration, that the United States has a role here
militarily, and likewise we certainly are working very hard in
a humanitarian way, but we affirm that we are not nation-
builders. We do not want Americans on the ground there in any
sense of permanence as a security force or a governance force.
You are testifying that other nations who are volunteering
for this process want to know that large countries--like the
United States--are going to be there. But I just think that at
some point the critical issue will be what role does the United
States really see for the situation, because otherwise despite
our best protestations now, we will drift away in terms of our
influence on the situation, and others who are the neighbors
will in fact take control.
This may not lead to a situation that is as catastrophic as
the Taliban, but we could meet 10 years from now and say we
made a bad mistake. We won the war, but we left, not as
abruptly perhaps as before, but we were out the door even as
the war was ending.
I just wonder the extent to which you and your colleagues
are trying to think this through as to how the United States
has any influence in addition to the neighbors. The Russians
already by coming back in have indicated they certainly
understand their situation, and I wonder whether we understand
ours.
Ambassador Haass. I think we do. There is a dilemma here.
It is the typical Goldilocks case. We want to do enough, but
not too much. We want to do enough to basically realize our
goals in Afghanistan, to put it crudely, so we do not have to
do what we have just done again in several years. On the other
hand, we do not want to get involved in the sort of intrusive
nation-building which would be resented by Afghans or resisted
by them ultimately, and we should not get involved in
activities to the exclusion of other members of the
international community.
For example, the reconstruction effort; it should not be a
mostly U.S. effort. There is every good reason in the world why
the bulk of the resources ought to come from other countries.
The United States has clearly carried out the bulk of the
coalition effort. In that phase, the United States has done the
lion's share of the world's work.
I would see us staying involved politically and
diplomatically, supporting the efforts of Lochdar Brahimi, the
Secretary General's Special Representative, doing what we can
do in various fora, working with the six immediate neighbors of
Afghanistan, working with the Russians, the Indians, and others
with influence to try to create a context in which we can
hopefully mute the internal competition and jockeying.
On the question of a security force, again I think the bulk
of the contributors will come from capable countries on the
outside. Again, several European countries have indicated their
willingness to do that. The United States will consider taking
on a modest role to help enable such a force, to facilitate it.
Senator Lugar. Let me just interrupt for a second before my
time is up. Will such indirect leadership work, as opposed to
our simply saying, these things do not work, without us taking
control and managing it?
Ambassador Haass. Maybe it is a question of language, but
we have been accused of many things here and indirectness is
not normally one of them. On the other hand, though, we do not
want to make this an American enterprise, because it is not. It
is first of all for the Afghans themselves. Second of all, the
U.N. has a key role, as you know. Third, the six neighbors have
a key role, as do some other countries which have historical
involvement there.
The United States is doing an enormous lot. As Christina
mentioned, we have taken the lead on the humanitarian side. We
have obviously done the lead on the coalition effort, military
effort against al-Qaeda and against the Taliban. We are one of
the co-chairs of the reconstruction effort and will contribute
to that generously, I would expect. We were one of the prime
movers behind the success at Bonn and we are going to stay
involved diplomatically. And we will consider what, if any,
role we could usefully take within the context of an
international security force, keeping in mind again that the
bulk of the security effort will have to be Afghan and that
this force is essentially a gap-filler.
So I would say that is quite a sizable role, Senator. But
at the risk of sounding contradictory, it is sizable, yet still
limited. I think that is the constant challenge here, to avoid
doing too little and too much.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Thank you for coming this morning and for sharing your
thoughts with us. Thank you, also, for allowing us to pursue
some of these issues. I want to pick up from where Senator
Lugar left off regarding the role of nations now engaged in
Afghanistan. If I recall, in both of your testimonies this
morning, you referenced Iran. Senator Lugar talked about the
roles of Russia and Iran, and other neighbors.
I would like to get your sense in a little more detail,
specifically, on what Iran has been doing, or not doing, to
assist the United States and our coalition.
Ambassador Haass. Senator Hagel, Iran, as you know, is one
of the six bordering countries on Afghanistan. It has played a
large role in several areas of this, of this question. One is
diplomatic. It is a member of the so-called Six Plus Two Group,
which is the United States, Russia, and the six immediate
neighbors. We had several meetings in New York of this group
quite recently.
Iran was one of the countries that sent observers to Bonn,
was one of the countries that worked behind the scene. We have
also exchanged messages through the Swiss with the Iranians
about steps that they could take.
I would simply say that by and large the Iranian role
diplomatically has been quite constructive, that they have a
lot of influence with the Northern Alliance or United Front and
to the best of our knowledge they have used that influence
constructively in trying to bring about the sort of compromise
that we saw at Bonn.
Second, as Christina referenced, the Iranians have helped
in the humanitarian area. They are host to an awful lot of
refugees. They have facilitated humanitarian assistance. As I
think Secretary of State Powell has mentioned, the Iranians
have suggested their willingness to help if, for example, U.S.
pilots ever got into trouble over their territory.
So I am not saying we see everything eye to eye here. On
the other hand, I do think the pattern of Iranian behavior here
I think deserves to be labeled constructive.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Madam Secretary.
Ms. Rocca. He covered it comprehensively. I do not really
have much to add other than the fact that they have been
playing a very positive role in this endeavor.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
I also would appreciate your take on the Russians. The
Russians now have a military presence in Afghanistan. From what
I understand, it came somewhat as a surprise to us. I am also
interested in your take on the Russians' diplomatic efforts in
Iran. Mr. Ambassador?
Ambassador Haass. Senator, I just spent a few days in
Moscow this past week consulting with the Russians about their
role in Afghanistan. I would say diplomatically that for the
most part we are pulling in the same direction. It was not
always agreement on some of the tactics, about the role, say,
of some of the individuals or groups. But again, I think the
bottom line was good and the goals that we set out, that
Assistant Secretary Rocca articulated, about what it is we all
want in Afghanistan, those are shared.
They too, from what we can see, have used their influence
behind the scenes both at Bonn and elsewhere to help. So, while
we have not always agreed 100 percent on every tactic, again I
think it is impressive. It is yet another reminder that the
cold war is quite distant, that the United States and Russia
have found ways to cooperate when their strategic interests are
essentially aligned.
I think the Russians also want to demonstrate through their
modest troop presence in Kabul that they still have a special
role there, that they still have some influence there. But I
would not see it as much more than that. I do not see it as a
threat or something to the natural evolution of a more positive
security situation there.
Senator Hagel. Do you believe the appearance of Russian
troops in Afghanistan was just a breakdown in communication
between our two countries? Or was it intended to be a surprise,
or how do you read it?
Ambassador Haass. Senator, I just do not know all the
details, the tick-tock of exactly what happened just before the
Russian troops arrived. If you would like, I can look into that
and get back to you on that.
[The following information was subsequently supplied:]
CENTCOM personnel, who were coordinating air drops within
Afghanistan, confirmed that they had last minute notification,
which they passed on to CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, that the
Russian planes were inbound to Bagram, Afghanistan. Acting
Russian MFA Director for Third Asia Gleb Ivanschentsev
confirmed to Embassy Moscow officials on November 27, 2001 that
twelve IL-76 aircraft landed in Bagram, on November 26,
carrying a load of 200 tons of humanitarian supplies and
equipment. Ivanschentsev said that a few dozen Russian troops
wre ingaged in the humanitarian flights, providing logistical
support to EMERCOM (the Russian emergency management
organizations, similar to FEMA) personnel in Russian diplomatic
and humanitarian efforts, including the establishment of a
hospital and humanitarian ``base'' in Kabul.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Madam Secretary.
Ms. Rocca. It is our understanding that it was just sort of
a disconnect, which they quickly reassured us that the contents
of those planes were humanitarian assistance and we got back on
track afterwards.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. If I may follow that, when I was out of the
room taking a call it may have been answered. If it has--but
there were Russian press reports indicating it was about
Chechnyan rebels, that the reason they had forces in there was
to be able to determine whether among the al-Qaeda-related and
Taliban-related forces there were Chechnyans who were on their
list, and that is why they were in place.
Ambassador Haass. Well, based on what we know, there are
clearly Chechens in Afghanistan and there are al-Qaeda in
Chechnya. Whether that was specifically part of the Russian
function, I have seen no evidence linking that, because, as
Assistant Secretary Rocca said, the rationale that we have seen
was totally related to the humanitarian.
The Chairman. I know that was the rationale offered. I just
wondered if you had any evidence to respond.
Ambassador Haass. I have seen no behavior that would
suggest, for example, in order to have determined, for example,
that there were Chechens there, it would have required a
different sort of behavior than we have seen.
The Chairman. I am not questioning it. This was a Russian
press report, a Russian press report.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I was amused when we sat down and somebody made a comment
about reconstruction. The Senator, my seatmate here, said:
``Reconstruction is a bad word in Virginia.'' This is 140 years
after the Civil War. So the goal of having the Northern
Alliance and ex-Taliban living in peace shows the formidable
task in front of us.
I do have a question following up on Senator Hagel and
Senator Lugar's line of questioning. Assistant Secretary Rocca,
you gave us a geographic tour of the area, going through
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan. Although the People's Republic of China does have
only a remote, not a very lengthy border with Afghanistan, what
is it's role? Have the Chinese been involved? Were they at
Bonn? Or is the U.S.-Sino relationship still influenced by the
incident with our airplane, and there is not really any
involvement from the People's Republic of China?
Ms. Rocca. No, Senator. I actually met with the Chinese
Foreign Minister, Vice Foreign Minister, just last week and we
had a long discussion about Afghanistan. Primarily their view
is the same as ours. They have the same goals that we do. They
also want to see a broad-based, broadly representative
government, and a country that is at peace and that no longer
exports drugs or terrorism.
The narcotics aspect and the terrorist aspects are
obviously very high on their agenda, as it is on all the
surrounding countries. They have a large humanitarian program
which they have been actually implementing. They have been
sending things through Pakistan into northern Afghanistan. So
they are active in providing humanitarian assistance, and they
are supportive overall of what we are trying to achieve and
what the international community is trying to achieve there.
They were not in Bonn as far as I know.
Senator Chafee. What do you make of them not being in Bonn?
Ms. Rocca. The representatives in Bonn were essentially,
the foreign representatives, were the surrounding countries,
the Six Plus Two countries, as well as the countries that had
played host to various exile groups of Afghans.
Senator Chafee. They are one of the six.
Ambassador Haass. I would not make much of it. The Chinese
played an active role in the Six Plus Two. They have also got a
lot of influence through the U.N. Security Council. They
obviously also consult particularly closely with the
Pakistanis, who were in Bonn. So I would not make anything of
it.
Senator Chafee. I'm wondering what they are thinking in
Beijing, what are they thinking about this whole situation?
Ambassador Haass. I think for the Chinese the interests are
not simply about Afghanistan, I agree entirely with what
Assistant Secretary Rocca said, but it is also about what this
means for the U.S.-Chinese relationship. We have had
consultations with the Foreign Minister and others since
September 11 and the President was in Shanghai subsequent to
September 11, and essentially looking at ways in which
counterterrorism cooperation could potentially increase.
I think the Chinese are essentially, like a lot of other
countries, trying to figure out what this means, not simply
what we are doing in Afghanistan, but what we might do beyond
that, and what that might mean from their national interests as
they see them. I think that, if you will, along with the narrow
consideration of Afghanistan--I think they are really looking
at where American foreign policy is going and again what
consequences it might have for China.
Ms. Rocca. If I could just add to that to bring in also,
they also have a terrorism concern, an indigenous terrorism
concern, some of which emanated from Afghanistan. So they have
a very clear interest in essentially meeting the same--
supporting the goals that we are all trying to achieve there.
Senator Wellstone [presiding]. Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I first want to commend you all. In particular, I want to
commend President Bush, the secretariats of Defense and
secretariats of State for everything you have done in this
effort. The military has done a great job. The help from the
Uzbeks, also enlightened Pakistani leaders, all have helped our
just cause.
This war is not over, but in the midst of it I also want to
commend the American people for their generosity and caring in
trying to get humanitarian aid into an area where obviously
outsiders have not been welcome at all. So while there may be
some difficulties, which we all hate waste, we are trying to
help people, and I think people ought to look at our heart and
our will and our desire to help out in humanitarian aid. I know
that you and all of us want that to be done. But I want to
commend the intent and also recognize how difficult that is in
this particular situation while a war is still going on.
This war on terrorism is far from over. Indeed, the war is
going very well in Afghanistan, but Osama bin Laden has not
been captured in any way whatsoever. Al-Qaeda still exists. The
leaders of the Taliban, those repressive leaders, are still
involved.
Now, beside all that, here is our goals. I was looking--I
always like to have guiding principles or goals, and what we
want to do is to help the many diverse people in Afghanistan
constitute a representative confederation or federation. We
have to advocate certain principles or precepts that are the
foundation of it and really for successful self-government.
When you look at--you have to ensure certain rights and a
structure. I was just thinking, with all this tragedy there is
a brighter future. You both talked about it. This is actually
positive in the long run for Afghanistan. The idea of setting
up new governments is something we did years ago, and once
again we need modern day James Madisons or George Masons
involved in constituting these governments.
But note all the new governments that have been set up in
say the last 10 years: Poland; the Czech Republic, they split
with the Slovaks amicably; Hungary, Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Slovenia, the Baltics, Armenia, Georgia, the Ukraine,
and Belarus.
Now we have a new opportunity for a better and brighter
future. I think that the key is to allow all the people from
all the regions, the diverse groups, to have their own
representatives.
In Secretary Rocca's statement on page 2, talking about the
key, I agree with you completely. No. 1, it should be broad-
based and representative of Afghans' diverse ethnic and
religious groups. It should preserve the unity of territorial
integrity of the country and should protect the human rights of
all its citizens, including women.
I agree with what you said, Ambassador Haass, and with your
sentiments that the Afghan people should be controlling their
own destiny. Those are basic principles for us, but need to be
applied to this situation, the diverse situation in
Afghanistan.
Now, with all of these, all the groups and factions
involved in the agreements in Bonn, (a), how do you believe or
where do you see the sincerity and the commitment to these sort
of principles out of these various factions? And (b), what
commitments to human rights practices is this interim
government taking? And what role will women--this will be a key
thing. This is not just ethnic; it is also gender equality.
I think it is good that there are two women given positions
in this interim cabinet. But beyond that, where do you see the
commitment and sincerity of this interim government for these
principles, as well as in particular the rights and
opportunities for women, because I think in the long run that
is going to be key. Beyond the security will also be the
education of a population so that it can seize the
opportunities of the world and actually live a more prosperous
life with better human rights.
Ms. Rocca. Senator, these are very good questions and with
Afghanistan's past the answers are not necessarily clear if one
is going to take the past as a guide. However, as Ambassador
Haass said in his statement as well, they are getting a second
chance. What we took out of, what we read into the spirit of
the Bonn agreement is that there is a real yearning for peace
and stability and rehabilitation among the Afghan people, and
that the representatives in Bonn were representing that
feeling.
The Bonn agreement has a few things in it which I would
just like to read to you because they are quite remarkable, and
the fact that these people, that this group is signing onto
this I think is a very good sign: ``The Interim Authority
shall, with the assistance of the United Nations, establish an
independent human rights commission, whose responsibilities
will include human rights monitoring, investigation of
violations of human rights, and development of domestic human
rights institutions. The Interim Authority may, with the
assistance of the United Nations, also establish any other
commissions to review matters not covered in this agreement
along these lines.
``The members of the Interim Authority shall abide by a
code of conduct elaborated in accordance with international
standards. Failure by a member of the Interim Authority to
abide by the provisions of the code of conduct shall lead to
his or her suspension from that body. The decision to suspend a
member shall be taken by two-thirds majority of the membership
of the Interim Authority on the proposal of its chairman or any
of its vice chairmen.''
These are remarkable statements and, as I said, it
indicates where they want to go and what the intent is. We are
optimistic that they will take advantage of this second chance.
They are certainly speaking along--the Foreign Minister, so-
called, of the Northern Alliance has said on numerous occasions
and was actually saying at the beginning of the Bonn
conference: We are getting another opportunity; this is our
chance not to fail; we failed in the past. That spirit is
pervasive right now.
On the issue of women's rights, there were two women at the
conference. One of the ministries is going to be run by a
woman. There is actually going to be--instead of the Ministry
of Vice and Virtue, which was engaged in repressing women, we
have got a ministry for women that is going to be run by a
woman. I think that also indicates commitment, as does the fact
that one of the vice chairmen of the Interim Authority will be
a woman.
These are all very good signs. We intend to work with the
U.N. to keep them to these commitments and to remind the
international community and remind the Afghans that this is
what they signed up to and this is extremely important for the
future and the rebuilding of Afghanistan.
There is also talk--and I will let you, Richard, expand on
this----
Senator Helms. I am sorry, we are going to have to close
this down because we are way overtime on the vote over on the
floor. Let me thank both of you for your testimony today.
Senator Wellstone. Mr. Chairman, if you want, Senator Biden
said that he would come right back. I can stay while we start
the next witness, just to keep it going.
Senator Helms. Well, the vote is almost over now.
Senator Wellstone. Then there will be a brief break and
then we will hear from the second panel.
Senator Helms. So what you are asking is to be kept open?
Senator Wellstone. We can start----
Senator Helms. Is that satisfactory to you two?
Senator Wellstone. Well, let us just take a break. Let us
just go vote.
Ambassador Haass. Do you want us to remain or do you want
to go to your second panel?
Senator Wellstone. Second panel. Is that all right with
you, second panel?
Senator Helms. I do not understand the answer. Will your
schedule permit you to stay further? Now, we have a second
panel who have been waiting.
Ambassador Haass. We are at your mercy, sir.
Senator Helms. I think I shall let the chairman decide
this. I know what I would do if I were chairman still, but we
got jeopardized several weeks ago and I am no longer the
chairman.
We will stand in recess and Senator Biden I am sure will be
back in a few minutes.
[Recess from 11:59 a.m. to 12:03 p.m.]
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. I apologize
for the confusion. I just wanted to ask one more question of
the witnesses. I will not hold them long and I will not hold
the second panel, on which at least one member has a time
constraint, on the second panel.
The one question I have is, there have been reports--and
for either one of you to answer. There have been newspaper
reports and other reports that Chancellor Schroeder, as we all
know, took a political chance and survived a vote of no
confidence in terms of his commitment to participation in our
effort in Afghanistan, including the use of German forces,
which was unprecedented since World War Two.
There are further reports that he and-or his government was
somewhat miffed, once that decision had been made, essentially
being told: No, not now; maybe later we can use your help in
terms of forces. I know for a fact our French friends, which is
not unusual, were a little miffed about our unwillingness to
have them participate with their ground forces.
Can you tell me a little bit about both those issues? Is
there contemplation on our part to take advantage of the German
offer, and what is the status of the French commitment with
regard to committing forces on the ground for a security force?
Ambassador Haass. Senator Biden, I just returned yesterday
from India, but en route there my first stop was in Berlin,
where I had consultations with the German Government last week
about this and other questions relating to Afghanistan. You are
right, there has been a lot of debate. I think there are people
within the German Government who look favorably on the
possibility of their contributing forces.
At least to me, I did not pick up any sense that they were
miffed. When the question was up, I simply said our thinking
has not reached the point of determining exactly what we think
is going to be necessary in terms of size, composition,
mandate, and the like. We first needed an Afghan partner to
work with.
But we have made it clear, in answer to your second
question as well, to lots of countries that we welcome our
allies----
The Chairman. You say we need an Afghan partner to work
with. We went in without an Afghan partner. We agreed to
provide humanitarian aid. Had things not progressed as they
have, we would still be trying to get humanitarian aid into
areas notwithstanding the fact that we had no Afghan partner of
any consequence to do it, would we not?
Ambassador Haass. It is a different situation, though. The
situation on the ground has obviously progressed far. But more
important, politically we do not have the luxury now of simply
thinking about prosecuting the war, though that is our
priority. We also are looking toward the future, and we want to
set up a pattern of relationship with the Afghans where, among
other things, an international security force is not resisted,
it is not seen as a hostile force, where they cooperate with us
on facilitating humanitarian supplies reaching people, where
the reconstruction effort does not waste money and essentially
lubricates our efforts to keep national consensus and keep a
modicum of stability.
So I think at this point it is important to work with the
Afghans because we do not want, now that they themselves see
that they have largely, with the coalition's help, rid
themselves of the Taliban and the large foreign dimension of
the Taliban, we do not want Afghan nationalism in any way to
literally or figuratively train its guns on the United States
or any other member of the international community.
Just very quickly to answer, complete the answer on the
other part of it, we have made it clear all along that we look
forward to military contributions to the coalition as this
process evolves. The countries you are talking about--Germany,
France, Britain, Turkey--these are exactly the kinds of
countries who would clearly have the capacity and may well have
the willingness to contribute capable forces to an
international security force.
Again, I have not detected that people are miffed for the
most part. It is just simply that we could not get ahead of
ourselves with that force, given the situation on the ground
and the evolution of the political situation.
The Chairman. As I said, I do not want my last question to
be read as my being critical of your effort, because I think
you have done a good job. I hope, from my perspective, if we
reach the point, which you have been able to avoid, that we
reached 7 days ago and you have overcome, where the former
President sitting in Kabul nixed a security force being put in
place, that we would tell him: You have no choice, you have no
choice. Because if we decide to do this by consensus we will
not only be, in my humble opinion--I realize the Balkans are
different than Afghanistan, but I would suggest that there is a
bit of a lesson to be learned between the differences how we
moved in Bosnia and how we moved in Kosovo, and I hope--at any
rate.
Ambassador Haass. Could I say one thing on that, Senator? I
do not think anyone what watched what the U.S. team at Bonn led
by Jim Dobbins did would describe it as passive.
The Chairman. No, it was not there. No, no, no, no, no.
That is why I said you succeeded, except the guys there do not
have the rifles. The guys there have the political capability
so far. Now, they may very well--this may all translate. I am
not suggesting that--I said at the outset, I think you did a
first-rate job.
All I am saying to you, if you get to the point, if it gets
to the point where that political consensus that was arrived at
in Bonn falls apart because the guys with the rifles back on
the ground conclude they do not like the deal, they should
understand they are at the other end of our bullets next time.
This should not be something done, in my humble opinion, other
than firmly. And you have been very firm. I just, I had a
moment of brief concern when the response by the former
President about the presence of the security force was mixed
and, although I had hope and some expectation you would be able
to resolve that in Bonn, I was--I am just saying, had you not
been able to resolve it and it had to be resolved, there is no
possibility in my view--unsolicited advice and take it for what
it is worth, which is not much. There is no possibility of our
long-term goals being able to prevail in Afghanistan without
there being security forces on the ground in control of access
for aid as well as access to localities. That is the only point
I wish to make.
Ambassador Haass. I agree. But it is our goal that the bulk
of that security function as soon as possible be carried out by
Afghans themselves.
The Chairman. That is where you and I have--that is where I
think you are being mildly Pollyannaish and I am not as
optimistic as you. I hope we both agree--but I do not disagree
with the premise that the day comes that it is an Afghan force,
just like I look forward to that unified military in Bosnia
that I am still waiting for, I will herald the moment and the
day.
At any rate, I thank you both very much. Christine, if you
want to add anything, but the question has been answered. I
thank you very much.
Ambassador Haass. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Mr. Thomas Gouttierre, the dean of
International Studies and director of the Center for
Afghanistan Studies, University of Nebraska in Omaha, Nebraska;
as well as Ms. Gailani, an advisor to the National Islamic
Front of Afghanistan, from Providence, Rhode Island. I welcome
you both here.
I find I have to tell the Senator from Nebraska I am
increasingly relying upon Nebraska, the University of Nebraska,
these days. As the chairman of the Criminal Law Subcommittee
yesterday, I had a professor, a colleague of yours from the
University of Nebraska, who did a first-rate study and the only
intensive study, 5-year study on the efficacy of the crime bill
and the COPS bill, and was thorough, and now here I am seeking
Nebraska's input again.
Mr. Gouttierre. This is good.
The Chairman. This is good for me. I do not know about
Nebraska, but it is good for me.
I welcome you both. I am told one of you has a time
constraint. I think you, sir?
STATEMENT OF THOMAS E. GOUTTIERRE, DEAN OF INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES AND DIRECTOR OF THE CENTER FOR AFGHANISTAN STUDIES,
UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA, OMAHA, NE
Mr. Gouttierre. It is I.
The Chairman. Dean, well, why do you not, with the
permission of Ms. Gailani, proceed first.
Mr. Gouttierre. Thank you for your comments about Nebraska.
I know you are talking about my colleague at the University of
Nebraska at Omaha, Sam Walker. He is a very outstanding fellow.
I am pleased to be back. I have rarely had a Senate hearing
like this, and I have been attending these and giving
presentations on Afghanistan since the early seventies, where
there have been so many people in agreement on so many things.
That is very heartening. I do not say this in any way lightly
because I think it really means very good things for both the
United States and Afghanistan.
The Chairman. There is an old expression attributed to
Samuel Johnson: ``There is nothing like a hanging to focus
one's attention.''
Mr. Gouttierre. That is true, exactly, and that is what
happened.
I am just going to therefore make some comments which I
think will be in many ways a reiteration of some of the
statements made by your first panel and some of the comments
that were picked up by Members of the Senate as well. First of
all, let me just reiterate that, and I agree with what you have
said, we need to be as forthright and forthcoming with the
reconstruction campaign as we have been with prosecuting the
military campaign of this war on terrorism. The United States
has to be the leader and it must be perceived as so.
In response to one comment talking about the possibility of
being intrusive, I think that Afghans are not so concerned
about the United States being intrusive at this stage. Let me
be very clear in saying that. Afghans are more concerned about
us meeting their expectations, and we have not in the past
decade.
The Afghans do see us as their friends and supporters.
Afghans are not xenophobic. I think this is one of the myths
that exists about Afghans. Afghans just do not like to have
people invading their territory, raping their women, or
stealing their property. If you are good friends with them--
you cannot find more loyal and devoted friends, people who are
very excellent in being able to deal on an equal level with
other people.
So I feel this is not only Afghanistan's window of
opportunity; this is also the United States' window of
opportunity. We have a real shot at advancing our whole
position, our U.S. foreign policy interests in the region, in
the Muslim world, and around the world. I certainly do not
think this will be as expensive as what we will need to spend
if we do try to do it on the cheap and fail. We have had
experiences in Afghanistan in doing that.
We need to recognize that this is a sound investment in our
own future. I agree with Senator Wellstone in his comments on
that. Our share needs to be the share of one setting the
appropriate and effective example.
There is a historical precedent with the United States
working like this in Afghanistan, dealing with Afghans in this
type of development. I think that is something that should give
us again a lot of encouragement. When I lived there in the
sixties and seventies, the United States was very, very much
involved with other nations in helping the Afghans develop. The
development that occurred then went on after the last Loya
Jirga. You know, we are talking now about convening another
jirga. That one constructed the liberal, as it is called, or
the progressive constitution of Afghanistan which went into
effect in 1964.
During that period there was a lot of development going on
in Afghanistan. It was still a poor country, but women were
essentially not wearing veils, girls were going to school like
boys, there were women who were ministers of cabinet and
members of parliament, and Afghanistan essentially was trying
to move itself from being an absolute monarchy to a
constitutional parliamentary monarchy.
So Afghans harken back to those things. That is why the
former King, Zahir Shah, remains such a symbol of hope for most
Afghans. It is very important that we remember that there is
this historical precedent. We are not dealing with a situation
where we have to begin from nowhere.
There is the problem, of course, that so much of
Afghanistan has been destroyed. In the sixties and seventies we
were building upon development efforts that had been begun in
the forties and fifties, as well. Now Afghanistan is going to
be much more difficult to rebuild, to develop, and to
reconstruct.
There is one thing that we need to remember about
insulating Afghans from the meddling of their neighbors. They
all have their own agendas. It is important, as Ambassador
Haass mentioned, that we work with them, the so-called Group of
Six Plus Two, because, if we have them working with us, it is
probably more advantageous than having them working against us.
I was the U.S. member of the United Nations Special Mission
to Afghanistan (UNSMA) in 1996 and 1997 when that same Six Plus
Two was really a formula for disaster. So I think it really
requires a very, very active role by the United States, kind of
serving as a safeguard, because each of these six has its own
agenda and they have been famous and successful in meddling----
The Chairman. They are not the same agenda.
Mr. Gouttierre. Not the same agenda, and it is not the
agenda of the Afghans.
I think one of the things that is very heartening from the
Bonn meetings is that without these other six meddling, in a
sense, the Afghans, some of whom had difficulty getting
together in the past because of the meddling, were able to do
things that nobody really expected to happen quite so quickly.
We do not need any more Wahabi or Daeobandi fifth column
movements or others like that in Afghanistan.
Our role is going to be very, very important in that
regard, and I appreciate what you just said in the very last
comments you had because I think that was suggestive of that
particular role. So Six Plus Two perhaps has a role, but it
needs to be very, very clearly different from when Pakistan
could sabotage it, as it did, and when others could follow
thereafter in doing the same thing. We need again to try to
insulate the Afghans from the meddling that has often proceeded
from that.
Concerning the security forces, one of the things we keep
hearing is that they need to be solely Muslim. Any Afghan with
whom I have talked said that should not be the case. They
really seek the best possible peacekeeping forces, and I agree
with Richard Haass. I also agree with you that it will probably
require perhaps an introduction maybe of monitors, if not
necessarily helmets, and that they might lend credibility to
any internal forces. I think it would be advisable if it could
be a combination of some international and some internal,
although I do not know exactly how that could be or should be
composed at this stage.
Now, I would like to just say a few things about what type
of reconstruction. There needs to be an emphasis on community-
based programs of basic health, basic education, basic
infrastructure reconstruction, basic manpower training for men
and women, and also literacy. I envision places where Afghans
can gather together in a kind of one-stop shop in their
villages and regions to engage, while they may be going after
some of their other needs, in some of the constructive citizen
education efforts that the Afghans are going to need in setting
up dialogs.
Remember, it has been 28 years since the Afghan's have had
a representative form of government, 28 years since the King
was overthrown by his cousin in a revenge coup. So it is going
to be difficult. They have had 28 years of regional power lords
trying to exercise their control. So we need to help them find
ways to have a dialog for reconstruction, and I think this
might all be done through these community-based efforts. If you
see pictures of Afghanistan, a country which I remember as
very, very scenic, very beautiful, it is seen as a country
today that looks very destitute because it has been so
rubblized, and also has experienced 4 years of drought in
addition to 23 years straight of warfare.
Finally, I would like to address how much will it cost.
Whether it is $10 billion or $20 billion, I think it will be a
bargain for us. It will be a bargain for us in terms of our
interests in that part of the world, it will be a bargain for
us in terms of our interests in the Muslim world, and it will
be a bargain around the whole world as the world takes a look
to see how we do sustain our promises and commitments. I think
we are very much on display in this particular thing.
So if I may, I beg your forgiveness here. I want to add one
thing that I think is a very appropriate element to closing
this out. Afghans are always referred to as warriors. They are
successful warriors, but they like to think of themselves as
poet-warriors. My favorite poem from one of the great Persian
poets, whose name----
The Chairman. You are talking about the Irish or the
Afghans?
Mr. Gouttierre. No, this is not the Irish, but they are
alike. They are alike in the love of poetic expression.
This is from the Gulistan of Shaykh Muslihudin Sadi. I am
going to read it in Persian, in honor of my Afghan friends,
many of whom have died, or who are now struggling, and then I
will translate it. This will display how Afghans treasure
friends and what we mean to them as their friends. It is short.
It goes:
[Reads in Persian.]
The Chairman. You do not have to translate. I got it.
Mr. Gouttierre. Oh, good. I know you guys from Wisconsin do
very well on that.
The Chairman. We do, we do.
Mr. Gouttierre. I followed your earlier exchange.
The Chairman. It is the cheese.
Mr. Gouttierre. Yes, right. Boy, you are full of that
today.
The Chairman. You are about to be cutoff if you make
another comment like that.
Mr. Gouttierre. ``One day at bath, a piece of perfumed clay
was passed to me from the hand of a friend. I asked the clay:
Are you musk or ambergris, because your delightful scent
intoxicates me? It answered: I am but a worthless piece of clay
that has sat for a period with a rose. The perfection of that
companion left its traces on me, who remains that same piece of
earth that I was.''
This is how Afghans express how important to them
friendship is and what friendship can do to them. They see us
right now as the rose. I think we can be also the clay and see
them as the rose. Let us hope that we truly do what we have
promised to do, so that we can see Afghanistan become what I
think we all want it to become in our interest as well as in
their own.
I thank you very much for having me here before your
committee.
The Chairman. Well, if you do not mind, since he has to
leave, could we postpone, and I am going to yield to my friend
from Nebraska to be able to question the dean.
Did you go to the University of Nebraska?
Senator Hagel. Yes.
Mr. Gouttierre. The campus in Omaha, where I work.
The Chairman. Now is your chance. Now is your chance to get
back.
Senator Wellstone. Would the Senator from Nebraska give me
just 10 seconds, since I did not realize we had the votes and,
I want to apologize to both of you, I have to leave in a couple
minutes, and I will read what you said and get back to you. I
apologize.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thanks for pointing out my
academic career, not one to be emulated.
The Chairman. Well, it was by me, though. It was by me.
Mr. Gouttierre. Chuck, we are proud of you.
Senator Hagel. Tom, thank you very much. I have always
believed in your judgment and solid understanding of life and
your insightful appreciation for what we are doing here, and I
am very proud of you and all at the University of Nebraska at
Omaha who have contributed to a better understanding of this
issue all over this country.
This is a complicated issue, as you know, and your
colleague Ambassador Tomsen, who you know, Mr. Chairman, who
came to the University of Nebraska at Omaha from his last post
as our Ambassador to Armenia, distinguished foreign service
career, and he along with Mr. Gouttierre has really developed a
clear perspective on this issue.
I might add as well, you have not hesitated to point out
where in your opinion we have drifted a bit as we have worked
our way along through this treacherous path. One that I want to
get to here in a question, you may have seen a story in the
Omaha World Herald today which quotes you and Ambassador Tomsen
in AP reports and stories, of your strong support of the result
so far of the Bonn meetings and the outcome last night in what
now is in place and what will play out here for at least the
next few months.
If I have missed some of this in the first part of your
testimony, Tom, because of the vote, I apologize. But I would
be interested in getting maybe a little deeper sense from you
of how you think the process plays out from here. I know you
are very supportive of the individuals, Mr. Karzai who has been
selected to lead this effort. Anything that you would like to
embroider around on this specific area would be helpful.
Thank you.
Mr. Gouttierre. Thank you, Chuck, Senator Hagel. I
appreciate that. You are right, I am enthusiastic. I am
enthusiastic because I know so many of these people, know them
to be very quality people. One of them, for example, the
proposed Minister of Finance, has U.S. graduate degrees in
finance and economics, and has had experience working at the
World Bank. He and his sister helped to teach me Persian when I
was a Peace Corps trainee back in the early 1960's.
Hamid Karzai, the Prime Minister, or Chairman of the
interim government, is an individual I have known for 15 years.
He is a very sophisticated, moderate nationalist and an
individual who I know is dedicated to bringing all the parts of
Afghanistan together. He does not see himself just as a
regionalist. That bodes well for Afghanistan.
I could go down the list. Some of them are connected even
now with the University of Nebraska at Omaha and some have
worked with us on USAID, State Department-funded projects
during the war with the Soviet Union. So I have a lot of
respect for them, because most of them are professionals, they
are technocrats, in addition to their political connections.
I am particularly pleased with the nomination and the
appointment of Sima Samar, the woman who is the Minister of
Womens Affairs, the Deputy Chairman. I have known her for many
years. She is an exceedingly courageous woman who has worked
against incredible odds to hold education programs for Afghan
women in the country as well as in refugee camps. We have been
proud from the University of Nebraska at Omaha to work with
her.
I could go on and I will not do that. What I will do is say
this. I appreciate what you said, Senator, about the role that
the United States might take in a situation like you were
describing with Ustad Rabbani, who has been the President in
the past. I have known him since 1969. His interests are more
regional and religious than national. What Ambassador Haass
indicated Ambassador Dobbins and others were doing in Bonn as
well as Afghan members of his own group, cautioning him to step
back, is very important.
Again, let me reiterate what I said here before. The
Afghans right now see us as their friend. They count on friends
very heavily. They do not see us as intrusive. They see us as
those who have helped them to rid themselves of the terrorists
and the Pakistani volunteers and the Pakistani military, which
they did not want in their country.
I think it is very important that we remember that, and we
need to avoid disappointing our friends. Remember, in the last
two big wars, the cold war and the war on terrorism, the big
wars, the Afghans were our allies. They lost over a million in
the last big battle of the cold war. Who won that war? We did.
Who lost it? The Soviet Union. Who were the victims? One
million Afghans dead, one and a half million Afghans severely
wounded, 7 million Afghan refugees.
We have talked here in this meeting today about the fact
that we kind of dumped them in the nineties. Now again, they
are our allies in this war, the first campaign in this war on
terrorism. They are our friends. Let us show them how Americans
can also be friends. Let us uphold the ideal of that poem that
I read, just as I know the Afghans will, given the chance.
Thank you for that question.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
The Chairman. Professor Gouttierre.
Mr. Gouttierre. Tom.
The Chairman. You are a real sophisticated guy and you know
what is significant in Afghanistan and I know you must have a
sense of what is going on politically here. There is a debate
that--I cannot say with certainty. I can tell you, after 29
years being here, there is a debate within the administration,
among the Members of Congress, as to what our role really
should be when it gets down to the detail.
Everybody is going to say, you said there is great
agreement, and there is. It is interesting, and I am really
pleased the President early on--I cannot remember whether Chuck
was with me or not, but a couple of us were down with the
President and he asked what should be done, and one of my
colleagues had said to me in a different context: You know, he
said--and I repeated it. I said: Mr. President, when World War
Two started, we were getting beaten and Roosevelt had the
foresight to assemble a group of men in the basement of the
White House and say: Tell me what we do, how we reconstruct
Europe.
People said: Wait a minute; we have not even--I mean, we
are still getting beaten in battle after battle, and you are
asking us to put together a plan for the reconstruction of
Europe.
I said: Mr. President, that is what you should be doing
now, put together a plan for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
He not only welcomed it, he had indicated he had already been
thinking about it and he had begun it.
Without identifying the party, after one long meeting with
the President asking me very pointed questions, not because of
my particular prowess here but just because I guess I represent
sort of the leadership of the other side of the political
equation here on the foreign policy equation, asking me and us
finding ourselves very much in agreement, and as I went out a
very prominent member of the White House followed me down the
hall and said: Are you going to stop and talk to the stakeout,
the press where they wait for us when we walk outside. I said:
I do not have to.
He said: No, we want you, to show that we are talking, it
is bipartisan; but I hope you will not mention nation-building.
I said: You mean what the President talked to me about for the
last hour and 20 minutes? He said: Yes, yes, that is what I
mean. I said: No, I will not mention nation-building.
The point is there is a real struggle here to define how
you cut the political knot the President faces. Like Democrats
face on the center-left, there is one faced on the center-right
now. That is: OK, we are not going to nation-build because
Clinton did that and we spent 8 years beating the living
bejeezus out of him for doing that, so we are not going to do
that, but we have got to be in there with both feet or we know
nothing is going to happen.
So this is going to get tricky. This is going to get
tricky. One of the things that I want to ask you, just a broad
question. I am going to make a statement and then you tell me
whether--take off from the statement any way you feel that is
appropriate.
I cannot envision any realistic prospect of us meeting the
goal which you have heard articulated by Democrats,
Republicans, administration and Senate, which is that we want a
stable Afghanistan where all the ethnic groups are represented,
where women, who represent close to 60 percent of the
population, over 55 percent of the population, where women--and
I can see someone saying 65. Well, I know it is over 50 and I
hear 55, 60, now 65. Anyone for 70? But a super-majority of the
population.
We all say these things, and you say the Afghan people are
our friends and care about us and like us and look for us to
lead. My experience with being deeply involved in another part
of the world where there were deep divisions based upon
originally tribal backgrounds, although with a patina of more
sophisticated, only the patina, though, of more sophisticated
institutions, is that they are fully aware that in the near
term they are not likely to be able to resolve the really hard
questions, and they want somebody they trust coming in and in
effect laying down the law when they cannot agree.
Second, it appears to me that the Six Plus Two is not a
workable solution. Ask my friend right here who spent time in
Afghanistan during that period that you were there realizing it
does not work--it did not work. Let me put it this way: It did
not work, not likely to work.
So I guess my question is--and we all say we want and need
to deal with the six-plus million people who may be seriously
physically injured and-or die as a consequence of not getting
enough nutrition. All the goals are the same. Everybody states
they have the same goal. Is there any way the near-term and
long-term goal in your view can be met without very specific
U.S. leadership?
In a speech written for me by the gentleman behind me on my
immediate right, before the administration asked for the $320
million in aid, I went to the floor and suggested we commit a
billion dollars right then and there to show our good faith, to
actually deliver it, to deal with taking up the immediate need,
which we did not know would not last all winter, to take care
of the entire ticket, which we could afford to do. That in my
view would then generate genuine response from other countries.
I will conclude by saying this: I cannot think of any time
that I have been in this committee where on matters relating to
the aftermath or the ongoing physical conflict in a country
where anything has been resolved without U.S. leadership. I
cannot think of one, not a single one. That leadership has been
that we usually have forces on the ground. We want to run the
show; you usually have to have somebody with an American flag
on his arm on the ground. When it talks about aid, we have to
come with the first down payment. When it talks about political
stability, we have to be the one in there doing it.
Talk to me for a moment about what is the U.S. role, not in
this broad generic sense about, well, we have to lead. Give me
some insight as to how much of the nitty-gritty are we
responsible for putting together in these various political,
economic, emergency aid as well as rebuilding as well as
dealing with the physical security.
Mr. Gouttierre. I can tell you are not going to hear me
disagreeing with the thrust of your statement. I think one of
the things we need to do when we look at Afghanistan is to set
aside this cliche which the phrase ``nation-building'' has
become. It is like, ``is this going to become another
Vietnam?'' Let us throw these things out.
The Chairman. I agree with you.
Mr. Gouttierre. It is silly, stupid posturing.
But we cannot escape the fact that we are going to have to
help the Afghans rebuild their nation. That does not mean we
have to be nation-building. They have to build their nation,
but we have to help them rebuild their nation. It has to be
very, very aggressive action.
I am apprehensive about the conference in Tokyo in January.
I think it is a good thing, but every time we go to those
conferences we get together and we say: Now, what are we going
to do? As soon as we say that, the United States is first
saying, and the Afghans will know it, we are trying to do it on
the cheap and we are not trying to do it in the same forthright
way that we conducted the military campaign.
It is good that it is co-chaired by the United States,
Japan, EU, and Saudi Arabia. But we need to go in and say: Hey
guys, we are putting down $10 billion and we need to rebuild or
help rebuild, reconstruct Afghanistan. If we do not do it that
way, you are right, I do not think it will get done.
Again, $10 billion, $20 billion, it is a sound investment
in terms of our foreign policy interests in that part of the
world and throughout the Muslim world. It is also a sound
investment in the kind of global world we want for our children
and grandchildren. Let us face it, we cannot have it if there
is instability in Afghanistan that spreads into Pakistan and
Central Asia and continues on in the Persian Gulf.
So not to go on, but just to confirm what I said earlier, I
am not going to disagree with your thrust. I believe it firmly.
The Afghans are not concerned right now that we are trying to
impose America upon them. They are concerned that we do 1989
again and we kind of drop them.
They want us to be their friends----
The Chairman. Everyone I have spoken to, except
occasionally my collective staff, I got the same response you
said here today: They are not looking for an all-Muslim force.
Mr. Gouttierre. No, they are not.
The Chairman. As a matter of fact, I am getting the
opposite.
Mr. Gouttierre. Just the opposite. They want the opposite
and they will tell you that. I am sure Fatima will say the same
thing. The Afghans want the best peacekeeping force for the
future of Afghanistan. They want the friendship that we have
provided in the past.
I lived there 10 years. I never heard an anti-American
statement ever in those 10 years. I coached basketball teams
and I was successful and I did not even have players yelling at
me in opposition in that regard. The Afghans understand what a
good friend can be. They are hoping and dreaming and praying
that we have learned ourselves from our mistakes this last 10,
12 years, and that we see this as our window of opportunity, as
well as their window of opportunity.
The Chairman. Knowing how seriously Nebraska takes its
sports teams, I will not ask you whether you were there to
recruit.
Mr. Gouttierre. Well, I would recruit for the Afghan
national basketball team, which I would like to coach once
again, and also the University of Nebraska at Omaha hockey
team, which is a division one hockey team and is ranked
nationally right now.
The Chairman. I know, I know, I know, I know.
Mr. Gouttierre. You opened the door.
The Chairman. I know, I know. And I am not even from
Colorado.
Look, let me ask one last question and then yield the rest
of the time to my friend from Rhode Island. Our next witness is
from a respected--is respected in her own right, but from a
very respected family as well, and a Sufi family. The Wahabis
and others have been the more radical, represented the radical
elements.
Tell me a little bit about, which we have not talked much
about, how much of the division that exists between and within
Pashtun and the other three major ethnic groups is a reflection
as much of a division based upon Islam as much as it is
geography? How much of a role is this going to play as this
gets played out in Afghanistan?
Mr. Gouttierre. I remember Islam when I was living in
Afghanistan as essentially a positive force. What was the case
in Afghanistan, although nobody would officially admit to it,
is that there was a kind of separation of church and state at
that time, that the real state was led by the khans and that
the church, led by the mullahs in a sense, was really in that
traditional arrangement subservient to the secular state. I
think it was a healthy arrangement. That is because it was not
an extreme period. Extreme periods tend to bring people moving
more to fundamentalists.
You have talked about Fatima Gailani's extended family and
one of those moderate traditional leaders is from that family
and takes a look in a moderate, constructive, progressive way
for the role of women and others.
The Chairman. But how much does that represent? What I am
trying to get at is----
Mr. Gouttierre. I am getting to that, and that is this.
There is a difference in Afghanistan in that not all Muslims
are Sunni. There is probably more than most Sunnis would admit
in the Shia sect, probably somewhere in excess of 20 percent.
One cannot really know right because past censuses are not
valid at the moment.
But in any case, it will be very necessary for the Afghans,
when they draw up their future, to draw it up in such a way
that that minority Shia population does not feel that, because
there has been a decision to take a Hanafi or Sharia form that
is based on the beliefs of the Sunni majority, that they are
again going to be discriminated against, as they were in the
past. That is an issue.
Right now the most important and significant, the immediate
future issue, is the impact over the last 20 years of extreme
crises in Afghanistan, which has tended to move people toward a
more conservative, actually more fundamentalist form of Islam
in Afghanistan. If Afghans see opportunity, if we help
Afghanistan, Afghan citizens, to feel that there is hope to
work among themselves, they are very practical people. I always
found them, though good Muslims, not to be extreme when I lived
there.
In a traditional form of society and government, they would
naturally evolve again to a more practical approach to Islam
than this extremist stuff we have seen. To a degree, we have
seen some of that discredited by the last 10 years in
Afghanistan, particularly the last 5 years, with the intrusion
of Osama bin Laden and the Arabs who were trying to enforce
extremism through this Ministry to Promote Virtue and
Extinguish Vice. Afghans are aware of these things.
But again, we are talking more about the urban Afghan who
came into play with this than the rural Afghans. In many ways,
they continue to go on in some ways with their lives as they
have for decades and centuries. It is the urban areas in
Afghanistan that really do drive the reconstruction and the
development of that country.
In Afghanistan, you have heard about all these, the
Pashtuns, the Farsiwans, Tajiks, the Aimq and the Hazaras, et
cetera, the Uzbeks. The one population that nobody talks about,
and it is my favorite population, is the Kabuli Afghan. This is
the Afghan who came, no matter what the ethnic group, to Kabul
decades ago and they became Kabulized. They became
intermarried. They became Afghanistan's melting pot.
That is what was bringing progressive life, a progressive
form of life, reform, development, education in Afghanistan. It
was not imposed. It was offered as a resource. People came to
Kabul for that. We have to help the Afghans to be able to
reconstruct that resource. I think that is very, very
important.
Like other Kabuli Afghans, Fatima's family will say that it
descends from a lineage that goes back to the Prophet Mohamed.
Others will say they are Pashtuns from Kandahar. But many of
them have never lived there. They have lived in Kabul and for
all intents and purposes, like the King, who speaks Persian,
not Pashto--he is a Pashtun--they have been Kabulized. That was
the driving force for Afghanistan's development and it was a
driving force to bring a melting pot of Afghans together. That
is what we have to hope returns as part of the whole
reconstruction process.
The Chairman. Some would argue that was a driving force for
the splintering of Afghanistan as well, though, is it not?
Mr. Gouttierre. Well, that is another story. One has to
harken back to the politics of the sixties and the seventies.
The splintering began when a member of the royal family staged
a coup in revenge because he had been bounced out 10 years
earlier.
The Chairman. I am trespassing on your time.
Mr. Gouttierre. You do not want to go back through that
kind of history.
The Chairman. No, I do, but I am going to ask you to maybe
come back at some point so we can go into more detail on this
aspect of Afghanistan, so we educate this body more. People
here have one vision of Afghanistan. The idea that women held
office, that women had responsible positions, that women were
totally integrated, that women were educated and went to the
university is something that is sort of counterintuitive to
Americans now because of all that they have been exposed to.
So when we say we want to reconstruct and we want women in
society, I have Delawareans say to me: Well, wait a minute; let
us not go overboard here. They should be, but look, I am not
sending my son over there for you to reconstruct and modernize
a country. And I say: No, no, no, no; all I am trying to do is
get Afghanistan in a sense back to where it was in the sixties
and early seventies, and they will take care of it from there
themselves. And people go: What? You mean to tell me--so we
have an education process under way.
But now I have gone way beyond my time and I have
trespassed on our next witness, but, most importantly at the
moment, on my colleague's time. So the rest of the time is
yours and then we will excuse you, dean.
Mr. Gouttierre. Thank you.
Senator Chafee. So what is the status, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. The status is you have as much time as you
want to question the dean, who is going to then go catch a
plane, and then we are going to hear from----
Mr. Gouttierre. No, he is going to go to another hearing.
The Chairman. Well, if I knew that I would not dismiss
you----
Mr. Gouttierre. In the Rayburn Building.
The Chairman [continuing]. Because no other hearing could
possibly be as important as this hearing.
Mr. Gouttierre. That is true. That is why I stayed.
The Chairman. Fire away.
Senator Chafee. I have heard and admired your testimony and
I look forward to hearing from the Rhode Islander next.
Mr. Gouttierre. I would like to close with a statement
relating to the women of Afghanistan, and I know that Fatima
will make important statements about the status of Afghan
women. I was the first male to coach an Afghan girls basketball
team and to set up and organize a girls high school basketball
league.
As the head of the Fulbright Foundation in Afghanistan, I
was the first one to be successful in persuading the Afghans to
send Afghan girls on AFS programs. During the war with the
Soviets, we had teacher training programs for women even when
we were being threatened and the women were being threatened by
the Arabs and others in Pakistan in the refugee camps. I could
not agree more with those who have said that the education, the
training, the equality for women in Afghanistan is key, very,
very key, and I believe that from the bottom of my heart.
I have lived with these people since 1964 and I feel women
are the ones who have been the most severe victims of these
last 28 years of improper rule in Afghanistan. So maybe I will
conclude with that and thank you very much for the time you
have given me today.
The Chairman. I thought you were going to say that you
coached Ms. Gailani and she could play in the WBA. I thought
you were going to tell me that.
Mr. Gouttierre. I did not coach her.
Ms. Gailani. But my classmate was with you.
Mr. Gouttierre. That is right, Fatima. That is right,
Fowziah Usman. By the way, she was 6 foot 1 and she was a
center on my team, and I will tell you they were hell on
wheels, and they learned how to play basketball from their
brothers.
The Chairman. Thank you for your commitment and sticking
with it, and we will continue to rely on you as a resource.
Mr. Gouttierre. Thank you.
The Chairman. Ms. Gailani, I thank you very much for your
indulgence and I am very interested and anxious to hear your
testimony. We have as much time as you have.
STATEMENT OF FATIMA GAILANI, ADVISOR, NATIONAL ISLAMIC FRONT OF
AFGHANISTAN
Ms. Gailani. Thank you. Thank you very much for inviting me
here. I would like to start by saying that the people of
Afghanistan are really sorry and hurt the way the Americans
were hurt by the September 11 incident, the same way we are
hurting when our country is bombed by our own friends.
The only way that will console us on what happened in
September is that we achieve something in Afghanistan and get
rid of the terrorists forever and an explanation for the people
of Afghanistan, those who were directly bombed and hurt and
lost loved ones that here it was necessary, but here I give you
peace and stability, a normal life.
Twenty-three years of war in Afghanistan brought lots and
lots of misery upon our country. From the underground
irrigation systems to schools, hospitals, roads, everything,
everything, our forests, national forests were destroyed. Also,
women's situation in Afghanistan. They became corpses all of a
sudden, slowly but all of a sudden during the Taliban.
The conference in Bonn did open a window for women. It was
good--although I heard two people, but there were five women
present in that meeting, three in the capacity of delegates and
two in the capacity of advisors, and I was one of the advisors.
This conference gave us hope, especially the opening
speeches. When Mr. Qanooni started his speech I thought, my
God, we do not have any problem; maybe in 3 days time we will
pack up and go home, because he was so flexible. He claimed
that there was nothing they wanted, all they wanted is peace
and stability and forming an interim government which will be
really broad-based.
When the negotiations started, I was a bit scared, because
first we had a problem over the presence or not presence of
peacekeeping forces in Afghanistan. We had a good 2 days spent
on that. With the exception of the delegation of the Northern
Alliance, the three other delegates, they were absolutely firm
upon it that without peacekeeping forces, an independent force,
in Afghanistan, the government cannot work. I want to add upon
that that women could not have a normal life, because we had
experiences even with Northern Alliance.
Then negotiating, we had meetings room to room and without
a visa, without an airplane, from Peshawahr we were going to
Cyprus, from Cyprus to Rome. These were the rooms, our offices.
One was called Peshawahr, the other Cyprus, and Northern
Alliance, and Rome. So we were just in a matter of a few steps
entering from Rome to Cyprus, from Cyprus to Peshawahr.
We solved lots of problems. Then we were told by the
Ambassador Brahimi that we had to come up with a list of
government. He emphasized that these people would have to be
competent, educated, and also, if possible, not belong to any
of the political organizations. If a competent person happened
to be one of the organizations, that is fine, but otherwise we
should try not to have them there.
The result was--I am telling you the truth--I was a bit
shocked. Seventeen seats went to the Northern Alliance out of
30. I had hoped maybe five very important posts and then ten
altogether. But 17? So it would have been better if we had had
the meeting which had happened in Rome, the Northern Alliance,
and the office of the ex-King, 50 then, 50 that. It would have
been even better.
Why should you bother with us being there and not even
offer anything, which we deserved, because the only mistake we
have done is that we put our arms down when the war against the
Soviet Union finished and we did not participate in the civil
war.
During the civil war when you define the government----
The Chairman. Would you define for the record what you mean
by ``we''?
Ms. Gailani. The majority of the people who did not
participate in the civil war. We were not with the Mujaheddin--
we were not with the Taliban, we were not with the Northern
Alliance. We were the Mujaheddin or people who were civilian
refugees who did not take sides.
Some of our very strong Mujaheddin preferred to put down
their forces and accept what was coming from the initiative of
the United Nations, something very similar to what we have
today. But then unfortunately some of our friends had a coup
and we know what happened.
Well, anyway, I have criticism upon this list. I wish it
was better than that. I wish the Northern Alliance had
introduced a few women. We have two women in this government,
one introduced by Rome, the wonderful lady that Dr. Gouttierre
talked about, and the other one, who is also a surgeon, who was
introduced by us, who is also a very remarkable and capable
woman. But no women from the Northern Alliance, although they
had 17 seats. Our organization, the Peshawahr Group so it is
called, out of three seats we gave one to a woman.
But in spite of all that, I still have hope. I really have
hope that this government will succeed. Mr. Qarooni is a very
capable person. Also, I know a few other people from the
Northern Alliance. We were colleagues during the jihad, and I
have every faith that they will be very successful in their
job.
Also, Mr. Karzai, whom I have never worked with, but I have
heard that he has a strong personality and indeed he is a
Pashtun who does not want to belong only to his own part of
Afghanistan, but he wants to be shared by everyone.
Now we come to the situation of women. This is the only
opportunity we have to take women back where they used to be,
as the Senator said. We want to go back to the democracy time.
I am the generation of the democracy time. When I was at
school, I was 100 percent sure that every door will be open for
me, any opportunity, any seat, as long as I train myself and I
educate myself to be worthy of that seat. I had taken it for
granted, and you know that I was mistaken.
This time we want guarantees for peace in my country, but
above all support for women and eventually a democracy. The
subject of democracy was not mentioned by any of the panelists.
I strongly believe that the Afghan people can have democracy.
We always say that the Afghan people have their own mind. If
you have a strong mind, then democracy is the answer.
I believe that 10 years of democracy in Afghanistan did
work. I remember that my parents were reading newspapers and
magazines, Western magazines and newspapers, commenting that,
how wonderfully these people go to the ballot boxes, as if they
have done it all their life. Because this is a want of any
human being, of course they wanted to go to the ballot boxes.
When we have democracy, I have no fear for women's status
and I have no fear for ethnic, religious minorities in
Afghanistan, because no matter how extremist one person is, his
idea will be worth only one vote.
Now, what provisions should we have for women in the
future? As much as I am grateful for lots of women activists in
the West to support us, they were the only ones who raised
their voice when the governments had forgotten us or they did
not have time for us, but I am also cautious that the Western
feminism cannot work in Afghanistan.
Even if--I am a secularist. When I go, which eventually I
want to be in the parliament hopefully. When I go and ask
people to vote for me, if I tell them that I have a secular
ideology, these women will not vote for me, let alone men.
But during the democracy of Afghanistan from 1963 to 1973,
we proved that an Islamic constitution can give these
opportunities for women to have equal right of education, equal
right of work with the same pay for the same job, and equal
opportunity of political participation. I remember I was maybe
9 or 10 that they were working upon how could they pay equal
pay for men and women, and I remember a jurist said that when
the wife of the Prophet, who was a cobbler, was making shoes,
were her shoes made by her half price of a shoe that was made
by a man? Of course they said no. Then they said, then why a
teacher should take half price or a female doctor or so on?
So at that time in France women were fighting for having
equal pay. We had it. When we had women in the senate, in
Switzerland women could not vote. We do not want or ask for
stars. We want what we had and we want what we deserve.
I strongly believe that some of our women who are financed
or whatever by the Western sort of feminism should be a little
bit cautious, the American friends and the Afghan friends,
because the situation is so delicate. If we harm this process
even a little bit, it could create big problems. I believe that
I have enough evidence in Islam that we could support all these
rights for women from the Islamic way.
Yes, the Bonn process was not perfect--I close by this--but
I accept it and I would like to see this as an opening door for
all of us. I do not believe that--some people say women were as
tokens there. They were strong women and they were committed.
One thing that we had no problem in Bonn, it was women's
issues. Maybe only 10 minutes spent on it, because they all
agreed, which is very good.
So I say it again: Do not forget us, because if you forget
us we will have another problem and that problem will harm lots
of people outside Afghanistan's boundaries. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Out of courtesy to my friend from Rhode Island, maybe I
will let him begin, since you are in Rhode Island these days.
Senator Chafee. First of all, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
choosing such a distinguished witness, a woman who brings a
compelling perspective and ability to comment on recent events
in Afghanistan and how that nation can prosper in the future.
So thank you.
I am curious about the rise of fundamentalism across the
Islamic world not just in Afghanistan with the Taliban. What do
you believe are the root causes of Islamic fundamentalism?
Ms. Gailani. In Afghanistan it is a totally different
matter. I was a student in Iran when the Iranian Islamist
revolution started. I believe that, I strongly believe that,
lack of having healthy political parties in our country pushes
us to underground politics. At that time it used to be Islam
and communism and now it is just Islam.
We are educated, whether if it is in Arab countries, in
Afghanistan, or anywhere. The way that we are educated really
is Western education. When you learn all that, then you need to
express it. When you express it, you need parties to express
upon. So if you do not have these opportunities, then you go to
extremism.
I remember during--before democracy in Afghanistan, there
were two underground parties, the Islamists and the Communists.
They were really working hard. They were trying to recruit
people from big families, influential rich families. This is
exactly what the Islamists are doing now in the Muslim world.
This is exactly what is happening.
I remember that I was sent by my father to come here 18
years ago to show our worry about recruiting these non-Afghans
in jihad. Most of these people were quite rich, well off
people. I tried so hard to convince people here that we do not
need foreign fighters, we have enough fighters; we just need
defensive weapons.
I think in the other countries it is really lack of
expressing their politics. In Afghanistan what we see with the
Taliban, it is an imported product. Afghanistan became a nest
for all kinds of nasty people, and some of our Arab friends did
not help that very much, because they would say to these
naughty boys: Take this toy, go and play in my neighbor's yard;
leave me have my siesta. That other yard was our country.
In Afghanistan the war between the rivalry of Wahabism and
Shi'ism was fought. The supremacy--the rivalry between the
regional supremacy of Iran and Pakistan was fought. Any war
anyone had in that region was fought inside Afghanistan. The
same thing, the Taliban or al-Qaeda or whatever came in
Afghanistan, not because the people of Afghanistan wanted it.
It became as a nest for these people.
Senator Chafee. I suppose that question could be answered
in weeks and months.
The Chairman. Well, I think it is a pretty good answer. I
know you do, too.
Senator Chafee. A complex question. You mentioned the rise
of Western influence, and you spoke about the delicate balance
and possible resentment of Western influence in the country.
Whether that will galvanize further fundamentalism is, in my
view, one of the challenges for the West.
Ms. Gailani. I do not have a fear from that at all.
Actually, again we are lucky that we did have the experience of
those 10 years of democracy. I heard it from one of our quite
hard-liner Muslim Mujaheddin leaders--by the way, I studied
during the civil war--I had the choice between having a nervous
breakdown or studying something else, so I studied Islamic
jurisprudence. When he heard that I was studying this, he said:
That is wonderful, but I tell you one thing, that the
constitution that we had in Afghanistan, it was the best
mixture of Islam and modernity. It was created by the best
jurists we had in Afghanistan plus a French expert in law and a
very big share from Al-Azar University from Egypt.
The person who was behind that constitution, Mohamed Musa
Shafiq, was a jurist, happened to be the last Prime Minister of
the ex-King and he proved to be the most modern and the most
progressive Prime Minister we had. Professor Gouttierre has
written a beautiful chapter in a book about him, that because
he was successful, because democracy was working, because Islam
and modernity showed such a strong bond, the coup happened in
Afghanistan, first with the front, President Daoud, and then a
Communist coup.
So I have no fear of any other backlash. Just give us
democracy and you will see that we will show you wonders.
Senator Chafee. I applaud your confidence in democracy, I
really do.
The Chairman. Well, I applaud your courage. I will be
brief. You state the conundrum, Islam and modernity. You talk
about them, as everyone else does, as if they have to learn to
live with one another and they are not one and the same, that
Islam has had difficulty absorbing modernity, becoming modern,
and democracy is associated with modernity, with modern.
The thing that I always find, the conundrum I always find
myself when I listen to Islamic experts like my friend Jonah
Blank behind me, who is a former Harvard professor of
anthropology and a student of Islam and a professor, is that on
its face, that conundrum, that democracy is not in the eyes of
those what do not understand, or maybe understand, Islam is
inconsistent with Islam. It has been something that has not
been embraced very many places.
So the concern I think raised by Senator Chafee as I read
it is a concern that I have. There are three things which you
seem to have said today. One is that all agree that there must
be a society in Afghanistan at least open enough to accommodate
different views and political outlets for people's views,
extreme or otherwise, and that it must embrace women in terms
of being full participants, but it must not do it the Western
way, it must do it the Islam way.
My question to you is is not democracy per se the Western
way, or is it consistent with Islam? Because one of the things
that--as a Christian and a Catholic, I went to a religious
school. When you misbehave in school, the religious teachers,
the nuns, would make you stay after school and be disciplined.
The way you were disciplined was writing on the blackboard a
number of times something you were supposed to absorb.
Senator Chafee. Did that ever happen to you?
The Chairman. It happened to me quite often, quite often.
One of the things that I used to have to write, I can
recall writing it 500 times while I could hear everyone else
out on the playground playing baseball while I was writing
this, it went like this. It said: The road to hell is paved
with good intentions, because I would find myself saying, why
did you speak up in class, Mr. Biden, and I would say: Well,
sister, I was trying to settle that argument behind me. And she
would say: You may have had a good intention, but you are
paving your own road to hell here, not literally but
figuratively.
We have good intentions right now. The women on this
committee, the women in this body, who are very much part of
Western feminism, have very good intentions to help women in
Afghanistan. One of the hardest things that is going to occur I
think is us figuring out how we help without interfering.
How much of an impact on the deliberations in Bonn that
resulted in all agreeing that women would have a place in the
new government was a consequence of a dicta coming from this
administration saying: By the way, there is no alternative
here; you must include women. How much of it was a consequence
of that versus just a spontaneity among the players?
Because, as you know much better than I, it was not only
the Taliban that has mistreated women. The Northern Alliance
when it held power, many elements of that coalition treated
women with alarming brutality. Some groups imposed restrictions
hardly less extreme than the Taliban, and rapes and sexual
slavery and so on.
So how much of it was a consequence of a Western power
imposing a dicta on all of you assembled and how much of it was
just pure spontaneity, love and generosity?
Ms. Gailani. It all came by force, and I am happy it did.
During the time of jihad, I was the only woman in the Afghan
politics, not because other women did not know and could not
achieve better than I did, but only because I had a religious
family behind me and a father what wanted to show that it was
all right. Because he was a religious leader, he was not
questioned.
We tried so hard, we tried so hard to bring more women in
the politics of the Mujaheddin. We did not succeed because at
that time, if you remember, in spite of our struggle, the trend
was that help whoever has the biggest beard and the biggest
turban. That was the fancy of the Western countries, especially
here, unfortunately.
We were totally marginalized, only because in the eye of
the Western countries, especially here, we looked Western. They
forgot that they have friends in Afghanistan, strong friends.
They looked for higher people and those higher people happened
to be the most radical of the Islamists we saw in the country.
I still do not know why you have done that, and I am happy
that it has stopped and you helped us to stop it. Yes, the
situation of women in Bonn was forced upon all of us. We
welcomed it. Our organization could not bring any women because
we had only 3 seats and we had 15 organizations and parties and
Mujaheddin tribesmen under the umbrella that my father has now
and we did not know how to push a woman. So I virtually pushed
myself in this conference as an advisor.
Those people that had 11 seats, the King brought 2, which
was very good, and the North brought only 1.
The Chairman. There's another Western expression that seems
appropriate here: Be careful what you wish for, for you may get
it. I am not being facetious when I say that. In a democratic
Afghanistan, do you believe that women will be represented? I
know they represent more than a majority of the population. Do
you think that the participation of women, who I would think
after 20-some years might be understandably less courageous
than you and understandably more reluctant to engage in what we
saw on the television, whether it is true or not--and let me
make it clear to you, I do not profess to be an expert on your
country. I am chairman of this committee, the most vaunted
position in foreign policy in our government other than in the
administration.
I have spent my academic and my political career mastering
strategic doctrine and U.S.-Soviet relations and ``the Middle
East'' as it relates to the Palestinian-Israeli struggle and
Europe generally, et cetera. But I do not profess to have an
expertise.
But what I observed on the international broadcasts were
when the Taliban was driven out of Kabul men flocking to barber
shops in resistance to shave off their beards, but none of that
happening in rural areas; women still wearing burkas in rural
areas, whereas in Kabul women defiantly demonstrating that--it
is like there is a mantra in a child's fable, ``Ding-dong, the
witch is dead.'' Everybody can come out now. Well, ding-dong,
the Taliban has gone, I can take off my burka.
But that did not happen other places. So I guess what I am
asking you is--and I realize it is asking you to be a bit of a
fortuneteller--is how long do you think it will take and what
circumstances have to exist to provide an environment where,
even if there is a democracy, women will feel the confidence to
come forward without fear of being raped, molested, beaten,
subjected to indignities, and-or just shunned?
Ms. Gailani. I challenged once a representative of the
Taliban on radio BBC that I am going to study Islamic
jurisprudence, and I did it. Now, Senator, I challenge you that
in a democratic Afghanistan, you choose the area, I will go and
compete in an election with any man, against any man you
choose.
The Chairman. Hey, I will manage your campaign. I am for
you, kid. I am with you. I can tell you are a winner. I do not
have any doubt about that. But all kidding aside, how do you
get women?
Ms. Gailani. I am not kidding. I am very serious about
that.
The Chairman. I know you are.
Ms. Gailani. In the past in Afghanistan, we had four women
in the first parliament. Only one was from Kabul. The three
others, they were nominated from their own villages, from
provinces, and they won.
The Chairman. I do not doubt that. All I am saying is that
you have had more than 2 decades of misery and subjugation and
brutality that women have been the victims of.
Ms. Gailani. We had brutality not only upon women. We had
brutality, period.
The Chairman. I know that. But I am just focusing on that
for the moment.
Ms. Gailani. This is an artificial environment that in
Afghanistan today we live. This is an artificial Afghanistan
you see. As I said earlier, every battle was imported in
Afghanistan by those people who were greedy to find some money
and brought these things.
I assure you, if we pave the way, which I said paving the
way has to be from the Islamic point of view--we should have a
radio. We should have a radio with programs that women should
know about their rights. Men should know--men are ignorant. It
is not just because women are ignorant.
The Chairman. All of us.
Ms. Gailani. In Afghanistan.
The Chairman. No, here as well occasionally.
Ms. Gailani. Men are ignorant of the rights of their wives,
sisters, and brothers, as much as they are ignorant of their
own rights within Islam. So we need these, whether you call it
propaganda, whether you call it enlightenment, whatever you
call it, whatever you like. I do not care, as long as we have
these programs that will talk to the nation, talk to the
people, to tell them that as a Muslim how could they live a
democratic life and how as a Muslim they could give opportunity
to the women because this is an order from God.
The Chairman. To use your phrase, I would love to have an
opportunity, when you have the opportunity, to spend some time
with you and my staff and some of my colleagues in an informal
setting in my office to discuss just that.
I will end where I began my questioning with the professor,
where I ended my questioning with him. I asked him how much, as
you recall, 20 minutes ago I asked him, how much of the
divisions that exist on public policy within Afghanistan are
reflective of adoptions of different versions of Islam as
opposed to their tribal lineage, and how do they intersect.
I have tried my best, and I have a long way to go, through
Jonah Blank and others on my staff who are scholars on and
relating to Islam, as well as those who are practitioners, to
educate myself more about Islam. As my mother would say, a
little bit of knowledge is a dangerous thing. I have a little
bit of knowledge and I suspect maybe a little bit more than a
little bit of knowledge.
But there are such interesting parallels between the bitter
and bloody and divisive fights that exist within Christendom
among Christians over the interpretation of the Bible, that I
see from the historical perspective the same thing occurring
from the fourth caliph on within your religion.
So what I need to be educated more about, and I hope there
are members of this administration who I have respect for what
they are attempting to do, attempt to school themselves on how
much of a part the different readings of the Koran which result
in different sects, whether it is Sunni or Shia, whether it is
Sufi, whatever iteration of Islam is the most predominant,
because, as you point out, you are able to, capable of, and
willing to debate any member of the Taliban, who is probably
Wahabi or some other version of Islam different than your
version of Islam, on what the Prophet meant when he spoke and
what he wrote down.
We call that in the West, as you know, a religious debate.
There is a famous American jurist named Oliver Wendell Holmes
who said the following. He said: ``Prejudice is like the pupil
of the eye; the more light you shine upon it, the more tightly
it closes.''
I have found as a student of Western religions--and I mean
that seriously; theology is my avocation--that there are very
few debates about religion that are resolved based on logic.
They should be resolved based on logic. I will conclude with
one example. Even within Protestant sects of Christendom, there
are wide variations, not resulting in jihad, but wide--even the
definition of what is meant by ``jihad'' is disagreed among
you--wide differences between, let us say, Episcopalians and
Pentecostals on how you read certain, the same paragraph from
the same Bible.
There are disagreements about whether or not the way to
read the Bible is with an educated person translating it, in
effect, for you or take it literally. I am always reminded of a
phrase in the Christian Bible talking about, and it goes
something like this: It is as difficult for a rich man to get
to heaven as it is for a camel to get through the eye of a
needle.
There are very deeply devout, honorable, decent
fundamentalist Christians who believe that is literal, the
Bible said that. Most educated theologians point out to you
that there is a gate in the wall of Jerusalem, referred to as
the `Eye of the Needle,'' that camels had to get down on their
knees to be able to get through, and the reference in the Bible
refers to that a rich man has greater obligations than a poor
man because he has been given more, and to those who have been
given much much is expected in Christendom, and so the
interpretation is that a rich man better not just enjoy his
riches himself, he should make them available to his fellow
man, otherwise he will have difficulty getting to heaven. But
taken literally, it means a rich man can never get to heaven,
because no man can get through the eye of a needle.
You have the same kinds of divisions within Islam in terms
of interpretations of parts of the Koran. So it gives me hope
that you are pursuing equity and democracy within your country.
It gives me pause and concern to think that you must do it
through Islam, not because I am critical of Islam, but because
those kinds of in effect religious debates are seldom if ever
resolved.
It took Western Europe 500 years of bloodshed to finally
resolve that they could live together. That is part of my
concern, and I need to be educated and maybe you would help
educate me.
Ms. Gailani. Senator, I did not mean that we should give
them theology education and come to the philosophy of Islam. In
Afghanistan we have Sunni Hanafis and Shia Jafadis and
Ismailis. The Ismailis, as we know, they are open to all sorts
of democracy and modernization and all.
In the fiq, in the jurisprudence the majority of people
have in Afghanistan and the Jafadi jurisprudence, we are very
close. We are not that far away. The translation or
interpretation of Koran, there are very few places that people
differ, very few. But those things that we need inside
Afghanistan today to open these three doors for women--
education, education is the first order of God to Prophet, to
read, learn the knowledge of pen, writing. Not Wahabi nor Shia,
Sunni, whoever, could argue that.
The Chairman. But they do. They say you should not be
educated. Am I not correct?
Ms. Gailani. They say it because they count on the
ignorance of people and they proved that they could do it so
far.
Incidentally, I will tell you that the last debate I had
with Taliban, again on BBC, or maybe Voice of America, he asked
me very politely, with all my religious titles, that, would you
disagree that the honor of a woman should come before
education? I said: It is not up to you or up to me to decide
which comes first, which comes second; I have no courage to
talk on God's word, which says the first thing comes, before
praying, before Ramadhan, before anything. I said: Would you
have the courage to say such a thing? The poor man was quiet.
How could he say that, no, I have a better way than God has? So
he had to be quiet, because they count upon women's silence.
The Chairman. Maybe you should manage my next campaign. You
are very good. You are very good.
Ms. Gailani. So these are the things. When it comes to
work, I would say the wife of the Prophet was working as a
teacher, one of them, cobbler, or whatever; was he doing
something bad? Did the Prophet allow her to do something which
was not honorable? Could they say anything against it? They
cannot.
When we come to the question of voting and being elected,
Isaiah was a politician. The Prophet or any of the caliphs,
when they took the power, they had to ask men and women for
consent. We have evidence in the Koran.
So if we could guarantee these three things, I will tell
you, Senator, that upon that I will build a lot.
The Chairman. Well, I am confident you will, and I would
argue that the honor of a woman cannot be met without allowing
her to be educated.
But having said that, you are obviously very educated, very
sophisticated, and very charming. We appreciate the fact you
have taken the time to be here. We have learned from you. I
have learned from you, and we will call on you again if you
would be willing.
Thank you, and I wish you all the good luck in the world.
Just remember, some day when you are Prime Minister and you are
told by your secretary that there is a guy named Biden in the
outer office with his granddaughter who wishes to meet the
Prime Minister, you will not say, ``Joe who?''
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:32 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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Additional Questions Submitted for the Record
Responses of Hon. Richard N. Haass to Additional Questions for the
Record Submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question. How much money do you anticipate the United States
contributing to the world effort for Afghan reconstruction?
Answer. Afghan reconstruction will require a sustained, generous
effort by the international community. The United States should
contribute to the reconstruction effort at a level that will allow us
to have influence over the process, but that also recognizes the
substantial contributions we have made as the leading donor of
humanitarian assistance and in prosecuting the war against terrorism.
We will not know the full magnitude of the needs until the World Bank,
UNDP and ADB report on the status of needs assessment missions they are
conducting, the preliminary results of which will be available for a
conference in Tokyo in January 2002. Even then, we will need to
carefully scrutinize these numbers to ensure that the estimates are
realistic and that the absorptive capacity exists to effectively use
foreign aid. Nonetheless, we expect that the significant needs for
Afghan reconstruction will be upwards of $1 billion a year for five-to-
ten years. We calculate that we will need to contribute meaningfully to
this effort in order to have sufficient weight to guide the process in
ways that serve our interests.
Question. Where do you anticipate money for Afghan assistance
coming from? Will any funds come from a supplemental appropriation
requests, or will they be taken from existing allocations?
Answer. We believe existing resources will be sufficient to allow
the United States to contribute in response to the most immediate
assistance needs at a level that maintains our credibility, encourages
contributions by other countries, and ensures ourselves a seat at the
table as decisions are made regarding reconstruction. For the longer
term, we will need to await both the results of the full needs
assessment and the scale of support from other donors before
determining what resources we are prepared to make available to support
the reconstruction effort. The Administration intends to engage the
Congress on issues related to funding these longer-term requirements
for Afghanistan's reconstruction.
Question. Without a supplemental request, any dollar spent on
Afghan relief means one less dollar for some other country. Which
countries or programs might face reductions in order to fund the
President's pledge?
Answer. Afghanistan's reconstruction is fully consistent with the
strategic interests and humanitarian values of the United States. This
reconstruction effort should not and need not undercut our other
priorities, relating to counterterrorism or American foreign policy
more broadly.
Question. Are we still fully committed, whether directly or through
our allies, to establishing security for the distribution of
humanitarian aid?
Answer. The Bonn Agreement calls upon the international community
to deploy an international force to Kabul to ``assist in the
maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas. Such a
force could, as appropriate, be expanded to other urban centers and
other areas.'' Thus, the mission of the international security
assistance force (ISAF) will be first and foremost to help maintain
security in Kabul and environs. The Bonn Agreement recognizes that the
responsibility for providing security and law and order throughout the
country resides with the Afghans themselves; we expect that the ISAF
will work with the Afghans to take primary responsibility for
establishing security for the distribution of humanitarian aid.
Question. What is the U.S. Government position on deployment of an
international security assistance force in Afghanistan? What role do
you see U.S. forces playing in any international security unit?
Answer. The United States strongly supports the deployment of an
international security assistance force (ISAF) in accordance with the
Bonn Agreement. We are working with the British, the UN and Afghans to
establish and deploy such a force. The United States will support the
ISAF by providing lift, logistics, C3I, and access to Bagram until the
Kabul airport can be readied.
Question. What sort of timescale do you envision for a security
force deployment? Are we talking weeks or months? Is there a risk that
if we delay too long, the facts on the ground might already preclude
any serious international role?
Answer. The ISAF will have an initial presence in Kabul by the time
the Interim Administration is established on December 22. It will take
a few weeks beyond that date before it can come up to full strength,
but will do so as quickly as possible.
Question. How would you describe Russia's actions over the past few
weeks? We've seen the introduction of between 90 and 200 Russian troops
to Kabul--is this a positive development? Is Russia playing a
constructive role, or is it taking positions that could complicate the
formation of a stable government?
Answer. Russia is playing a constructive role in Afghanistan and is
supporting the formation of a stable government there. To the best of
our knowledge, the small Russian military presence in Afghanistan is
related to humanitarian assistance and not military operations. This
includes the airlifting of humanitarian equipment on military cargo
planes. The Russians are engaged, as are many countries, in the
provision of humanitarian assistance including medical supplies and
facilities. We welcome Russian humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.
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