[Senate Hearing 107-876]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-876
MINE DISASTER AT QUECREEK
=======================================================================
HEARING
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
OCTOBER 21, 2002--JOHNSTOWN, PA
__________
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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
TOM HARKIN, Iowa PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
HARRY REID, Nevada MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin CONRAD BURNS, Montana
PATTY MURRAY, Washington RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota LARRY CRAIG, Idaho
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
JACK REED, Rhode Island MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
Terrence E. Sauvain, Staff Director
Charles Kieffer, Deputy Staff Director
Steven J. Cortese, Minority Staff Director
Lisa Sutherland, Minority Deputy Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education, and Related Agencies
TOM HARKIN, Iowa, Chairman
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
HARRY REID, Nevada JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin LARRY CRAIG, Idaho
PATTY MURRAY, Washington KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana TED STEVENS, Alaska
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia MIKE DeWINE, Ohio
Professional Staff
Ellen Murray
Jim Sourwine
Mark Laisch
Adrienne Hallett
Erik Fatemi
Bettilou Taylor (Minority)
Mary Dietrich (Minority)
Sudip Shrikant Parikh (Minority)
Candice Rogers (Minority)
Administrative Support
Carole Geagley
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Opening statement of Senator Arlen Specter....................... 1
Statement of Hon. Mark S. Schweiker, Governor of Pennsylvania.... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Statement of David E. Hess, director, Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Protection....................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Statement of David D. Lauriski, Assistant Secretary of Labor,
Mine Safety and Health Administration, Department of Labor..... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Statement of Edward Yankovich, Jr., president, District 2, United
Mine Workers of America........................................ 34
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Statement of George Ellis, president, Pennsylvania Coal
Association.................................................... 36
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Statement of Joseph Main, administrator, Department of
Occupational Health and Safety, United Mine Workers of America. 49
Prepared statement........................................... 50
Statement of Howard Messer, professor of law, University of
Pittsburgh School of Law....................................... 55
Statement of David Rebuck, president, Black Wolf Coal Company.... 58
Prepared statement........................................... 59
Statement of Mrs. Harry Mayhugh, wife of a miner................. 65
Statement of Mrs. John Phillippi................................. 65
Statement of Ronald J. Hileman................................... 66
Statement of Douglas L. Custer................................... 76
MINE DISASTER AT QUECREEK
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MONDAY, OCTOBER 21, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human
Services, and Education, and Related Agencies,
Committee on Appropriations,
Johnstown, PA.
The subcommittee met at 9:30 a.m., at the Public Safety
Building, fourth floor, Hon. Arlen Specter presiding.
Present: Senator Specter.
opening statement of senator arlen specter
Senator Specter. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, the
U.S. Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health, Human
Services, and Education will now proceed with this hearing on
the mine disaster at Quecreek.
Senator Tom Harkin, chairman of the committee, and I in my
capacity as ranking member, decided that this should be a field
hearing in Johnstown, because it is close to the site of this
incident, and to give as many people as possible in the area an
opportunity to be present and to participate in this hearing.
The Quecreek mine disaster occurred on Wednesday, July 24
of this year at 8:45 p.m. There was then a worldwide vigil led
by Governor Mark Schweiker of Pennsylvania. The eyes and the
ears of the world were on nine miners trapped in Quecreek some
300 feet below the surface, approximately 25 stories down where
an estimated up to 77 million gallons of water had poured into
the mine.
The incident occurred, according to preliminary reports,
from the so-called Saxman mine which had been mined 40 years
earlier. The maps were incomplete and the water poured in.
As people all over the world watched, hope was very thin
for the nine trapped miners. Nine other miners had been able to
fortuitously escape. Then on Saturday, July 27 at 10:15 in the
evening, the first miner was rescued and eventually all nine
miners were brought to safety ending at 2:45 a.m.
Governor Schweiker, who is here today as our lead witness,
was at the scene really to inform the people around the world
who were hanging on every detail that the miners had been
saved, which was truly a miraculous event.
There has been extensive publicity on this issue. There is
an article in yesterday's Pittsburgh Tribune-Review which sets
the stage in a succinct way, and I'm going to quote from a
couple of the paragraphs:
Days before nine miners sloshed through bone chilling water in a
desperate dash to save their lives, they warned bosses their tunnel was
`wet and getting wetter' and expressed serious concerns about the
strength of a `soft' ceiling in the Quecreek Mine.
The miners revealed harrowing details of their final days toiling
in a crumbling mine: roof bolts holding off a tunnel collapse were
pinned to an increasingly soupy ceiling of thin shale. Icy water ``was
gushing'' around the steel nails ``like a shower.'' And as the water
edged closer to the spit of dirt dividing them from drowning, they
tacked a tarp across the tunnel to avoid looking at what they thought
was a bleak, wet death.
The Tribune-Review article goes on to raise certain
questions. Raising concerns whether the corporation, which we
will hear from later, played as the Tribune Reviewed called it,
``Russian roulette'' with their lives by giving incomplete and
misleading mine maps to the Government. That's a question which
we will be inquiring into.
[The information follows:]
[From the Tribune-Review, October 20, 2002]
Miners Sensed Danger Before Disaster
(By Debra Erdley and Carl Prine)
Days before nine miners sloshed through bone-chilling water in a
desperate dash to save their lives, they warned bosses their tunnel was
``wet and getting wetter'' and expressed ``serious concerns'' about the
strength of a ``soft'' ceiling in the Quecreek Mine.
On the eve of public hearings into the Somerset County mine
disaster, the miners revealed harrowing details of their final days
toiling in a crumbling mine: Roof bolts holding off a tunnel collapse
were pinned to an increasingly soupy ceiling of thin shale. Icy water
``was gushing'' around the steel nails ``like a shower.'' And, as the
water edged closer to the spit of dirt dividing them from drowning,
they tacked a tarp across the tunnel to avoid looking at what they
thought was a bleak, wet death.
Another bombshell: They lacked a vital tool--a horizontal driller--
designed to let them peek into unseen water-and gas-filled chambers.
According to the miners, it wasn't even on site.
On July 24, as their watch hands arced past 9 p.m., the continuous
mining tractor took one bite of coal too many. Suddenly, 18 men on two
crews were swallowed up by 77 million gallons of frigid flooding,
forced to stumble for higher ground in a frantic race against a rising
black tide from the neighboring abandoned Saxman Mine.
Nine made it 25 stories up to join a daring rescue orchestrated by
federal and state experts, who later termed the mission to save Randy
Fogle, Mark Popernack, Tom Foy, Blaine Mayhugh, John Philippi, John
Unger, Ron Hileman, Robert Pugh and Dennis Hall ``a miracle.''
But seven of the nine rescued miners fear these same agencies--the
U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration and the state Department of
Environmental Protection--might be overlooking damning clues into what
went awry at Quecreek. Indeed, the regulators themselves could have
botched the life-saving permitting and inspection processes.
They also question whether Mincorp, a Delaware holding company
controlling the Quecreek coal fields, played ``Russian Roulette'' with
their lives by giving incomplete and misleading mine maps to the
government.
``I want some answers,'' Hall said.
Nicknamed ``Harpo'' by his crew, the lanky coal car operator with
three decades of underground experience phoned a nearby nine-man crew
that water was coming their way and that his men were already trapped.
His warning saved their lives.
He hopes that by speaking out now he can stop other miners
nationwide from piercing poorly mapped mine tunnels, called ``voids.''
Mines dripping with water are not uncommon, he said, but sometimes an
increasing daily deluge points to potentially deadly problems.
He said miners should be given the best possible information before
they make life-or-death decisions underground.
``Somebody was damned sure responsible for what happened to us, all
of us. Somebody was responsible for not obtaining the right maps and we
feel compelled to find out who that was. This never should've happened,
and I'm damn lucky to be alive,'' Hall said.
``We trusted them. We thought we weren't that close to another
mine. We had no idea we were so close to a void in the maps. And we
damned sure would have done the precautions if we'd known.''
Popernack and Fogle have not spoken publicly on the issue. But
Hall, who is represented by Pittsburgh trial lawyer Howard Messer,
joined his attorney and six other miners in calling on Republican Gov.
Mark Schweiker to redirect a committee researching shoddy mine maps to
discover instead exactly what went wrong in July.
That appears unlikely.
``It's irresponsible of Mr. Messer to go to the commission and
demand details of what happened at Quecreek when he knows very well the
commission was not formed for that purpose,'' said Schweiker spokesman
David LaTorre, who insists a ``separate DEP investigation will provide
the answers the families are looking for.''
``This is the standard policy of conducting an investigation,''
LaTorre said. ``Once the investigation is complete, all aspects of that
investigation will be made public. It is disappointing to Gov.
Schweiker and others in the administration that critics out there throw
blind accusations that nothing is being done. No one is closer to those
mining families than Gov. Schweiker.''
While that could be true, the governor has spent less time with the
miners than their employer's lawyer, who sat through the miners'
private interviews with federal and state investigators and was offered
the chance to question them.
``Why is this so secret?'' Messer countered. ``What is it about all
the information they have collected that can't be shared with public? I
think a grand jury is necessary.''
Mincorp officials continue to insist Black Wolf Coal Co. hired and
controlled the Quecreek workers, that Black Wolf was a separate
contractor led by a former Mincorp executive, and that Mincorp was
unaware the miners had complained of safety conditions.
Mincorp's subsidiary, PBS Coals, had an exclusive contract to
purchase 100 percent of Quecreek's coal. But marketing director Tim
Phillips said no executive knew about increasing flooding in the
Quecreek chamber--even though that would have sliced production.
``You're talking about operation things we know nothing about,''
Phillips said.
Black Wolf officials declined to comment on the miners' concerns.
Former workers from the closed Saxman mine and other nearby shafts said
they alerted company officials about voids in the maps that could lead
to gas or water tragedies. During public permitting hearings in 1999,
41 neighbors, including chemists, farmers and former miners, vainly
urged regulators to nix the controversial Quecreek project.
investigation controversy
Since the miners' rescue, Quecreek's government investigations have
proven equally controversial. In July, Schweiker promised he'd play a
``maximum'' role in a future public probe to determine exactly what
went wrong and why. But two months later, his original goals had
changed.
In September, Schweiker tasked his blue ribbon commission--the lone
panel conducting open meetings--with finding ways to prevent accidents
caused by mine voids. Drawn from industry, labor, government and
academia, the commission met in places as far away as Pottsville, and
quickly distanced itself from Quecreek specifics.
Commission organizers claimed they couldn't find meeting places in
Somerset. Miners in attendance grumbled about the panel's increasingly
bookish discussions.
Prodded by disgruntled miners, the nine-member panel agreed to
conduct a public meeting Tuesday in Somerset to include their testimony
in the final study. The commission gave the miners several questions to
answer with their lawyer.
Messer hopes to spark public debate about the commission's goals.
He worries federal and state probes already are compromised by coal
industry insiders and agency self-interest.
He points to an increasingly cozy relationship among DEP's Bureau
of Deep Mine Safety, federal inspectors and company officials. Once
assumed to be separate investigations, the federal and state probes
became so indistinguishable that both MSHA and DEP agents joined to
interview the Quecreek miners.
Both have ``skeletons'' to hide, according to Messer and the
miners.
DEP regulators approved the original permit and conducted recent
inspections that might have overlooked problems. MSHA overseers signed
off on ventilation and site safety plans, and also inspected the shafts
in July, one week before the disaster.
Scott Roberts, DEP's mineral resources chief, said his staffers
loaned to the MSHA investigation were actually ordered by federal
directors not to discuss the probe with him.
While many federal accident probes rely on confidential testimony,
this one featured at least one company lawyer present for every
interview. At one point, a coal company attorney was even offered the
chance to question the Quecreek miners. That angered outside safety
experts and lawmakers.
``One of the reasons we think public hearings are better is, with
closed hearings, you have the miners sitting there with no
protection,'' said Joe Main, safety director for the United Mine
Workers. ``We don't believe management peering over the miners'
shoulders is right when the management that is peering . . . may be
found guilty of some infraction in the end.''
more criticism
U.S. Senator Paul Wellstone, a Minnesota Democrat who chairs a
committee overseeing federal mining laws, castigated state and federal
handling of the Quecreek disaster.
``Like every MSHA accident investigation, this one needs to find
the particular causes in a timely and publicly open way so workers and
the community can see that the government is on their side and
accountable,'' Wellstone said.
``At the same time, this was the country's third catastrophic coal
mining accident in two years. ``The agency's job is also to find and
explain any systemic causes of these repeat disasters. There are always
specific conditions, but I don't think we can let the industry or the
agency off the hook when accidents keep happening.''
Federal and state investigators are now scrambling for answers to
the miners' latest disclosures. Told Thursday that Quecreek's crews
didn't have an auger in their section to find deadly gas or water
chasms, DEP officials couldn't locate in their paperwork whether they
already knew that--or not. ``If they could have been in the position to
drill, there should have been drills there to drill with,'' Main said.
``And if drills weren't available, why weren't they?'' State and
federal watchdogs declined to discuss what investigators have
discovered, but they have long defended the lack of public hearings.
As early as August, U.S. Department of Labor mining chief David
Lauriski defended his secret probe. He said a public hearing wouldn't
yield any new clues. DEP spokesman Dennis Buterbaugh agreed. He said
Friday that his agency was determined to ``get to the bottom of this''
and that state investigators were ``working every day'' on a difficult,
``time-consuming'' probe.
``We've tried to be thorough in our investigation. We certainly
want to get it done as soon as reasonably possible.'' Meanwhile, some
of the miners want their story told before the governor's panel shuts
down. They insist the public should learn that crew leader Randy Fogle
was a hero, and that he pressed management to vacate the sloshy section
days before the disaster.
Last week, Fogle and Mark Popernack were on the Hollywood set of
the Disney television movie about the Quecreek rescue and could not be
reached for comment.
Previously, Popernack and some of the other miners had suggested
Quecreek was a ``completely dry mine'' and that they would willingly
return to work underground.
Senator Specter. Other questions were raised about DEP
regulations which had approved the original permit and
conducted inspections and the issue is whether they were
sufficiently thorough. MSHA oversees and signed onto a
Ventilation and Site Safety Plan and also inspected the shafts
1 week before the disaster, and that too will be a matter for
our inquiry.
The Secretary of Labor has responsibility under Federal
statutes to inspect the mines, deep mines, four times a year
and surface coal mines at least two times a year. For those who
have had the opportunity to go into a mine as I have on a
couple of occasions in connection with my Senate
responsibilities, it is an awesome, harrowing experience to go
25, 30 stories down--Governor Schweiker is nodding, he's been
there--to ride in a car where you have no room to sit up
straight. The miners perform a very important function in our
country, they provide energy for our needs and their safety is
of paramount concern. Too often these mine disasters occur.
One of our inquiries will be directed at the U.S. Congress
itself and the Senate and this subcommittee as to whether we
have funded adequately.
Each year for the past decade plus we have increased mine
safety as we have moved along. We have been in touch with
United Mine Workers--the president of the State Association
will be here today--and in touch with the Miners Association.
This is an inquiry of the utmost importance and we intend to
find out what the facts are, identify the cause of the incident
and take whatever steps are necessary to be as sure as we can,
that there is no recurrence.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARK S. SCHWEIKER, GOVERNOR OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Specter. We're joined today by Pennsylvania's
distinguished Governor, Mark Schweiker, who took the oath of
office on October 5 when Governor Ridge went off to be the
Federal official on Home Land Security. Governor Schweiker
comes to this position with a very distinguished record in
public service and in business, he had been a Commissioner in
Bucks County, and held key positions at Merrill Lynch and
McGraw Hill. Governor Schweiker holds a bachelor's degree from
Bloomsburg University and a master's degree from Rider
University.
Governor, I want to compliment you again on your holding
vigil and being the spokesman and keeping things together at a
very, very difficult time. We look forward to your testimony.
Governor Schweiker. Thank you, Senator Specter, and I would
mention that as you referenced the significant dates in the
summer. The miners and their families, who are literally behind
me, will never forget those dates and I share that sentiment.
I do appreciate the opportunity to testify today before
your Committee.
First, I'd like to thank everyone who responded and worked
tirelessly to save nine very brave men. Through this I was able
to witness firsthand the enduring hope and spirit of this great
country. In particular, I would like to thank Dave Lauriski,
who is also sitting behind me, of MSHA, and Dave Hess, my
Secretary of Environmental Protection is to my right.
The rescue of nine Pennsylvania miners from the Quecreek
mine in Somerset County brought together all Pennsylvanians and
inspired a Nation. Those 3 days also motivated me to make sure
that an event like this never happens again. By now you know
the outcome of that final night. We went nine for nine, saving
all the miners who were trapped, a true miracle.
The day after the rescue I announced the formation of a
special commission to investigate the causes of the Quecreek
mine accident. I also tasked this commission to research better
methods to determine the exact location of abandoned mines and
to improve general mine safety. Dr. Raja Ramani, Professor
Emeritus of Mining and GeoEnvironmental Engineering at the
Pennsylvania State University, was charged with leading the
panel. Dr. Ramani has more than 40 years of experience in
mining as a recognized expert in mine design, operation and
safety practices. The Commission will review existing mine
procedures and make a comprehensive set of recommendations on
how to improve mining operations and safety. I look forward to
receiving Dr. Ramani's report shortly in mid November.
My goal is to make sure Pennsylvania continues to be a
national trailblazer in mine safety. Pennsylvania laws
concerning mining in the Commonwealth go back as far as 1870.
Pennsylvania enacted the first major mining laws in the
anthracite region in 1891 and in the bituminous region in 1893.
In fact, the 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act was
written with the Pennsylvania mining laws as a guide.
Over the last 4 years, Pennsylvania established a record
for the fewest number of underground mining fatalities in
history for a 4-year period. While Pennsylvania ranks fourth in
the Nation in coal production, we account for only 8 percent of
mining fatalities. Nationally, for the fourth consecutive year,
workers' lost-time accidents have also decreased. Now these
milestones can be attributed to the Bureau of Deep Mine Safety
in partnership with industry, labor and MSHA and especially to
the workers mining Pennsylvania's coal each day.
However, the events of Quecreek reminded us all that our
commitment to safety will always remain an ongoing task. The
commission I established is only the first step toward
improving mine safety. We must make sure that all existing mine
maps are available to the relevant State agencies and the maps
must be centrally warehoused and digitized in order to ensure
their preservation and, importantly, their access. These
necessary actions will be expensive and will require State and
Federal investment. Digitizing thousands of mine maps, for
example, will take several years. Technology and staff expense
will be great. But we cannot afford to wait.
In addition to establishing the commission, I took action
to safeguard the lives of coal miners in Pennsylvania by
ordering bituminous deep mine operators to submit updated
information on where water-filled mine voids are located. No
one can afford to rely on old maps. My order requires
bituminous mine operators to positively identify voids ahead of
where they are mining if they are within 500 feet of a water-
filled mine void. This new requirement more than doubles the
previous 200-foot requirement.
I will demand that every possible precaution be taken to
keep our brave miners safe. To that end, my administration
pledges to vigorously, to vigorously enforce all mine safety
regulations.
As you know, Senator, Dave Hess, my Secretary of
Environmental Protection, is here and is seated on my right and
will delve into some of the specifics of what his department is
doing in this important regard.
prepared statement
In closing, the miners who work in Pennsylvania's vast coal
reserves are some of the most courageous people I know. It is
the responsibility of all of us, the Commonwealth, the Federal
Government and coal companies, to ensure a safe work place for
our miners. In Quecreek, Providence smiled on us, now we must
persevere and make sure Pennsylvania's mines are the safest in
the world. We owe it to the 18 miners who barely made it out of
Quecreek alive. We owe it to their families who suffered with
fear and despair for 77 hours, and we owe it to every miner who
puts his life on the line when they go to work to support their
loved ones.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'm happy to answer any
questions you may have at the appropriate time.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Governor Mark S. Schweiker
I appreciate the opportunity to testify today before the Committee.
First, I would like to thank everyone who responded and worked
tirelessly to save these men. I was able to witness first hand the
enduring hope and spirit of this great country. In particular, I would
like to thank Dave Lauriski, who is sitting behind me, and Dave Hess,
my Secretary of Environmental Protection. Both of you are primarily
responsible for the success of that rescue operation.
The rescue of nine Pennsylvania miners from the Quecreek Mine in
Somerset County brought together all Pennsylvanians and inspired a
nation. Those three days motivated me to make sure that an event like
this never happens again. By now you know the outcome of that final
night--we went nine for nine, saving all the miners who were trapped. A
true miracle.
Pennsylvania has been and continues to be a trailblazer in mine
safety. Pennsylvania laws concerning mining in the Commonwealth go back
as far as 1870. Pennsylvania enacted the first major mining laws in the
anthracite region in 1891 and in the bituminous region in 1893. The
1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act was written with the
Pennsylvania mining laws as a guide.
Over the last four years, Pennsylvania established a record for the
fewest number of underground mining fatalities in history for a four-
year period. Pennsylvania ranks 4th in the nation in coal production
and we account for only 8 percent of mining fatalities nationally. For
the fourth consecutive year, workers lost-time accidents have also
decreased. This milestone is attributed to the Bureau of Deep Mine
Safety in partnership with industry, labor, and MSHA, and especially to
the workers mining Pennsylvania's coal each day.
However, the events of Quecreek reminded us all that ours is an
unfinished task. Mine safety is not a destiny to be arrived at but a
continuous journey.
On July 24th, eighteen employees of the Black Wolf Coal Co. were
working the Quecreek Mine. Just before 9:00 p.m., nine of the crew
operating their Continuous Miner broke through to the water-filled
Saxman Mine, abandoned by the Saxman Coal and Coke Co. in the late
1950's. The miners mistakenly believed, based on faulty maps, that they
had 300 feet of barrier remaining when the breakthrough occurred.
Millions of gallons of water rushed in, flooding the mine. The crew
at the breakthrough warned a second group of miners closer to the
entrance of the rapidly rising water. Those miners were able to escape
as the water flooded in, knocking many of them off their feet. The
remaining nine miners were quickly forced to find the highest point of
the mine to escape the rising water.
The miners were trapped in the far reaches of the mine--about 8,000
feet from the mine entrance and 250 feet below the surface. Our
challenge to bring the miners to safety and these men back to their
families had begun. It was a race against time.
During my first meeting with the families, as I was leaving to
return to the site of the rescue operation, I literally had moms and
dads and wives grabbing my arm saying, ``Bring my son up,'' and ``Bring
my husband home.'' I realized this was about rescue, not recovery. This
was about bringing them back up, and we determined to do just that.
The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection first
received word of the accident at 9:30 p.m. Richard Stickler, director
of the department's Bureau of Deep Mine Safety, and Joe Sbaffoni, chief
of the Division of Bituminous Mine Safety, immediately began to devise
the first rescue efforts.
Joe Sbaffoni coordinated with mine officials who provided him with
estimated elevations of where the breakthrough occurred and the high
point in the mine where the miners may have sought escape from the
rising water. Working with that information, department staff provided
elevation figures, underground survey points and ground-level
coordinates to engineers who used GPS equipment to determine where to
drill a 6-inch air hole.
On July 25th, at 12:50 a.m. a drilling rig arrived on scene and by
2:50 a.m. began drilling an air hole. By 5:00 that morning, the air
hole reached the miners. Rescue workers tapped on the drill three times
on the surface, and miraculously the miners tapped back nine times
telling us that all nine miners were alive. The compressed air pumped
into the hole created an air pocket that helped hold back the water
while the water pumping continued.
That evening equipment arrived to begin drilling a 36-inch rescue
shaft that later became known as Rescue Shaft #1. Early on the morning
of July 26th the 1,500 pound drill bit broke at a depth of 105 feet.
Another drill was set up to drill Rescue Shaft #2, two feet away from
the first.
We were concerned about the possibility that the miners could
suffer from ``the bends'' once they were brought to the surface. We
called on the U.S. Navy, and they responded by transporting nine
hyperbaric chambers, a portable hyperbaric stretcher and personnel to
the scene.
By late evening on July 26th, drilling resumed on Rescue Shaft #1.
Final rescue plans began to take shape with help received from CONSOL
Energy of Washington County, PA--an award winning team that specializes
in mine rescue--staff from DEP, the federal Mine Safety and Health
Administration and the Black Wolf Coal Co.
At 10:13 p.m. on July 27th Rescue Shaft #1 broke through to the
chamber. Communications equipment was lowered into the mine, and at
approximately 11:00 p.m. verbal contact was made with the miners.
Amazingly, they were in relatively good spirits. They requested ``snuff
and food.''
At 12:30 a.m. on July 28th, rescue workers lowered the cage into
the shaft with food, blankets and other supplies. At 1:00 a.m. the
first miner was brought to the surface, and by 2:45 a.m. the last miner
had been safely taken out. All were taken for medical observation and
treatment and only one miner suffered from the slight case of ``the
bends.'' He received treatment in the hyberbaric chamber. By mid-week
all nine had been released from the hospital and returned to their
families.
We kept our promise. We brought them home. It was a team effort in
all respects. The Commonwealth's response teams included the Department
of Environmental Protection, the Pennsylvania Emergency Management
Agency, the Pennsylvania State Police, the Pennsylvania National Guard,
the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and the Pennsylvania
Turnpike Commission.
We are also grateful for the outside assistance that ensured a
successful rescue. Pennsylvania's efforts were assisted by the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and the Mine Safety and
Health Administration, and numerous emergency workers from the area.
Governor Bob Wise of West Virginia called and offered his support,
and it was drilling equipment from his state that successfully drilled
Rescue Shaft #1. We also received the help and support of
Pennsylvania's Congressional delegation in coordinating federal
resources and response. Private organizations from West Virginia,
Maryland and New Jersey donated pumps to assist in the rescue effort.
Now we must do our part, both in Pennsylvania and across America,
to ensure an accident like this never happens again. Our miners and
their families need to know that they are going into the safest
possible working environment.
The miners who work in Pennsylvania's vast coal reserves are the
mining industry's most important resource. The economic impact that
mining provides this Commonwealth is immense. The combined direct and
indirect economic benefits from coal mining exceed $11 billion. Without
our miners, this would not be possible, and it is the responsibility of
the Commonwealth to ensure a safe workplace for them. This time
Providence smiled on us, and we were able to return nine for nine. Now
we must persevere and make Pennsylvania's mines the safest in the
world.
The day after the rescue, I announced the formation of a special
commission to investigate the causes of the Quecreek Mine accident. I
also tasked this Commission to research better methods to determine the
exact location of abandoned mines and to improve general mine safety. I
named Dr. Raja V. Ramani, Professor Emeritus of Mining and
GeoEnvironmental Engineering at the Pennsylvania State University, to
lead this panel. Dr. Ramani has more than 40 years of experience in
mining and is a recognized expert in mine design, operation and safety
practices.
The Commission will review existing mining procedures and make a
comprehensive set of recommendations on how to improve mining
operations and safety. I look forward to receiving Dr. Ramani's report
in mid-November.
Specifically, the commission will make recommendations regarding
each of the following:
--The best engineering practices to be used in the design and layout
of modern mines that are adjacent to abandoned mines.
--The regulatory policies and permit review procedures for permitting
mines adjacent to abandoned mines.
--The practices and procedures of mine operations to detect mine
voids.
--The training of mine workers who operate mines adjacent to
underground mines.
--The inspection and compliance of the mine operations with the
approved mine plans and operating requirements.
--The rescue and response procedures, including policies for sharing
information with families of miners affected by the accident.
To date the commission has held two meetings. The first was here in
Johnstown on October 3rd, followed by a hearing on October 9th in
Pottsville. The commission will host a hearing again tomorrow in
Somerset and will meet with the Pennsylvania Coal Association and the
United Mine Workers of America on Wednesday, also in Somerset.
On August 28th, I took action to safeguard the lives of coal miners
in Pennsylvania by ordering bituminous deep-mine operators to submit
precise information on where water-filled mine voids are located. We
will no longer rely on old maps.
My order requires bituminous mine operators to positively identify
voids ahead of where they are mining if they believe they are within
500 feet of a water filled mine void. This new requirement more than
doubles the current 200-foot requirement and provides miners with the
extra margin of safety they need to deal with this unknown.
Mining companies must provide the accurate information we're
looking for, or we will not permit them to continue to mine. I don't
ever want to see another community go through what the good people of
Somerset County were forced to endure for 77 hours. If we can't rely on
maps, then we have to take every precaution possible to keep our brave
miners safe.
We stand ready to work with the federal government in ensuring that
our mines are safe, and that when accidents do happen, emergency
response and rescue efforts on both the state and federal levels are
well-coordinated and well-executed.
Pennsylvania and the federal government must work together to make
sure that all existing maps are readily available. Production records
and mine maps must be archived and stored properly so that they are not
vulnerable to deterioration over time.
Scanning mine maps into a digital format will provide the access
needed by federal and state regulatory officials, mining operators and
the public. Due to the thousands of mining maps in existence, this
effort may take years and will only be successful with the cooperation
and financial backing of the federal government.
I would further note that increased federal funding is needed to
improve safety training for miners as well as technical training for
the Bureau of Deep Mine Safety.
As you know, Dave Hess, my Secretary of Environmental Protection is
here and will delve into some of the specifics of what his department
is doing in this regard.
Thank you Mr. Chairman and I am happy to answer any questions you
may have.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Governor Schweiker.
We will reserve the questions until we hear from Mr. Hess.
STATEMENT OF DAVID E. HESS, DIRECTOR, PENNSYLVANIA
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Senator Specter. David Hess was confirmed by the Senate of
Pennsylvania as Director of the State Department of
Environmental Protection (DEP) on May 21 of last year. He
previously served as deputy director of DEP and executive
director of the Senate Environmental Resources and Energy
Committee. He received a bachelor's from Shippensburg and a
master's degree from the University of Illinois.
Mr. Hess, our practice in the subcommittee, both here and
in Washington, is 5 minutes on the opening. To the extent
witnesses can keep within that time, we would appreciate it.
All written statements will be made a part of the record. We
look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Hess. Senator Specter, thank you very much for the
opportunity to testify, and we have submitted a written
statement.
I really appreciate the opportunity and your work in trying
to get to the bottom of Quecreek and to help State and Federal
agencies respond to accidents like this and prevent them in the
future. Right now, as Governor Schweiker said, there are
several different investigations going on of this particular
accident. Investigations by MSHA, Mine Safety Health
Administration and DEP are designed to determine whether there
have been any violations of law or requirements. If laws and
safety rules are violated, Governor Schweiker has directed us
to impose the maximum penalties and sanctions possible against
those responsible as a deterrent to future accidents.
If DEP's own requirements need to be changed, they're going
to be changed, because nothing is more important than the
safety of the miners. We anticipate that our accident report,
at least the draft, will be available at the beginning of
November in time for the Governor's special commission to
review as part of its activities.
There's also investigation going on by Attorney General
Mike Fisher at the request of the Somerset District Attorney
and as the Governor mentioned the special commission is looking
at the broader issue of how to locate mine voids.
The commission's very first action was to go to Quecreek
for an underground visit to the site of the breakthrough and
extend an invitation to those individuals directly affected,
the nine rescued miners sitting behind us, to present their
perspectives on the accident.
I would like to elaborate on two points that the Governor
raised in his testimony. One is on the rescue and the
successful efforts there, and the second one, preventing
accidents like this from happening in the future.
The Quecreek Mine response was the largest mine rescue
mobilized in Pennsylvania in over 25 years and it was truly a
team effort. It required a coordinated response from everyone
involved, the miners themselves, State, Federal, county and
local government, local emergency and fire rescue resources and
expertise and equipment from private industry.
The success of the Quecreek rescue was no accident. It was
built on advanced planning by the mine operator and rescue
team, safety training and practice that in some cases started
years before the accident.
Four key factors were critical to the success of the rescue
teams. Specific mine safety and communications plans for each
mine that involved training and safety requirements for miners
and up-to-date mine maps showing where the mine was operating
at the time, regular safety training for the miners themselves,
regular mine training for the mine State and Federal rescue and
safety teams, and expertise and equipment provided by the
special medical rescue team, the so-called SMRT Team.
Pennsylvania is also one of the few States that requires a
series of formal certifications for mine workers before they
enter or operate certain equipment in a mine to make sure they
are aware of safety requirements.
Each year mine operators and State and Federal rescue teams
hold training exercises to put their knowledge and skills to
the test. Ironically, just a few weeks before the Quecreek
accident, State and Federal officials held one of their regular
tabletop exercises to test for rescue and response procedures.
There is a tremendous pride in what these teams do because
they know the life of a fellow miner is dependent on how well
they do a job. The rescue itself was directed by a small group
of individuals from DEP, MSHA, the SMRT Team and the coal
company at the incident command center, they developed the
strategies and directed the resources for the rescue effort.
Regular and frequent reports to the families of the miners
first, before the media, was an ironclad rule established by
Governor Schweiker and should be part of any future rescue
efforts. Regular briefings of the media to give accurate
accounts of rescue efforts was also an important part of our
response and in some cases helped us get resources like large
pumps that became part of the rescue effort.
Governor Schweiker's personal involvement in the rescue
effort, by authorizing special resources and giving straight
talk to the families of the miners, was another element
critical to this successful rescue.
The techniques used in the rescue have literally helped
rewrite the book on how rescues like this were done. At the
same time we all know because of our experience at Quecreek we
can do things better and faster, if we have a next time.
We can't rely on maps alone to keep miners safe, we need
layers of protection, better mine maps, better mine designs and
better mining techniques in the mines to achieve the only goal
we have in this program, which is protecting the lives of mine
workers. That starts with the mine application, the design of
the mine and in this case we know that something went wrong,
because the mine map that we had on our files did not show the
correct information on where the voids were.
However, a later map that was found, that was turned in by
the daughter of an inspector for the old Department of Mines
and Mineral Industries, did show that more mining was done in
the Saxman Mine than was initially reported. Again, the
investigations will get to the bottom of those issues.
prepared statement
Governor Schweiker's direction to us is clear. Our
investigations are to go where the information leads us to
assure the safety of the thousands of men and women in
Pennsylvania who work in our mines every day.
I would be happy to answer any questions that you might
have.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of David E. Hess
Senator Specter I want to thank you for this opportunity to join
Governor Schweiker in presenting testimony today. The Department of
Environmental Protection greatly appreciates your willingness to take
on the issue of how to prevent another Quecreek Mine accident in the
future using the lessons we learned in Somerset County.
In addition to the review by this Subcommittee, there are now four
separate investigations being conducted of the accident and the general
issue of mining close to mine voids. These investigations will result
in assessing legal responsibility for the accident and making
recommendations on how to prevent an accident like this in the future.
Two investigations by executive agencies--the federal Mine Safety
and Health Administration (MSHA) and the DEP's Bureau of Deep Mine
Safety--will look in detail at the causes of the accident from the time
Quecreek Mining first applied for a permit until the water broke
through from the flooded Saxman Mine and the miners were rescued. These
investigations will seek to determine if any laws were violated or if
there were faults in the permitting process or safety procedures by the
holder of the mine permit, the mine operator or in DEP.
If laws and safety rules were violated, the Governor has directed
us to impose the maximum penalties and sanctions possible against those
responsible as a deterrent to future accidents. If DEP's own procedures
need to be changed, we will change them because nothing is more
important than miner safety.
These investigations involve extensive, individual interviews with
each of the miners, company officials and engineers for both Quecreek
and Saxman mines, rescuers and DEP and MSHA staff past and present and
extensive searches of mine records for both mines. We anticipate our
draft report on the accident will be completed by the beginning of
November and be available for public review at that time.
At the request of Somerset County District Attorney Jerry Spangler,
Attorney General Mike Fisher began an investigation of the accident in
August to determine if there are any criminal law violations
surrounding the accident.
The fourth review is being conducted by the Governor's Special
Commission on Abandoned Mine Voids and Mine Safety which is looking at
the broader issue of how to locate and safely avoid water and other
hazards presented by mining into abandoned voids.
The Commission's very first action was to go to Quecreek for an
underground visit to the site of the breakthrough and extend an
invitation to the individuals most directly affected--the nine rescued
miners--to present their perspective on the accident.
The Commission has already finished two of its three public
hearings and is due to report its findings to the Governor by November
15.
I would like to elaborate on two key points from Gov. Schweiker's
comments: why the rescue was a success and the steps already being
taken to prevent an accident like this from happening in the future.
the rescue
The Quecreek mine response was the largest mine rescue mobilized in
Pennsylvania in over 25 years and was truly a team effort. It required
a coordinated response from everyone involved--the miners themselves,
state, federal, county and local governments, local emergency and fire
rescue resources and expertise and equipment from private industry.
The success of the Quecreek Mine Rescue was no accident, it was
built on advanced planning by the mine operator and rescue teams,
safety training and practice that in some cases started years before
the accident. Four key factors were critical to the success of the
rescue team--
--Specific mine safety and communications plans for each mine;
--Regular safety training of miners;
--Training mine, state and federal rescue and safety teams; and
--Expertise and equipment supplied by the Special Medical Rescue
Team.
Each mine is required to have a safety and communications plan that
anticipates potential mine hazards and provides miners the training to
prevent and survive these hazards. Part of the safety and
communications planning is a requirement to have continuously up-to-
date maps of mined areas so we know where miners are working.
Pennsylvania is one of only a few states that require a series of
formal certifications for mine workers before they can enter or operate
certain equipment in a mine to make sure they are aware of safety and
other procedures.
The rescued miners have said the safety training they received
helped them in several ways, first to warn the other miners to leave
the rapidly flooding mine, how to share resources and protect
themselves underground and to understand what rescuers above ground
would be doing to rescue them. Training includes live action sessions,
workshops and the computer based Mine Emergency Response Interactive
Training Simulation known as MERITS.
Each year mine operators, state and federal rescue and safety teams
hold training exercises to put their knowledge and skills to the test.
Ironically, just a few weeks before the Quecreek accident, state and
federal officials held one of their regular ``table top'' exercises to
test rescue and response procedures.
Every year there is also a state and national competition of mine
rescue teams to see who's the best. There is tremendous pride in what
these teams do because they know the life of a fellow miner is
dependent on how well they do their job.
The expertise provided by the Special Medical Rescue Team was
critical in this rescue because of the cold, wet and high air pressure
conditions surrounding the miners. Pennsylvania started the SMRT Team
in 1982 to develop not only the knowledge, but also the special
equipment needed for these kinds of rescues.
But it was the coordinated training and practices that helped us
deal rapidly with issues as they, surfaced because key players knew
their roles.
The rescue itself was directed by a small group of individuals from
DEP, MSHA, the SMRT Team and the coal company at the incident command
center. They developed the strategies and directed the resources for
the rescue effort.
Regular and frequent reports to the families of the miners first,
before the media, was an ironclad rule established by Governor
Schweiker, and should be part of any future rescue efforts. Regular
briefings of the media to give accurate accounts of rescue efforts was
also an important part of our response and in some cases helped us get
resources, like huge pumps, that became part of the rescue effort.
Governor Schweiker's personal involvement in the rescue effort by
authorizing special resources and giving ``straight talk'' to the
families of the miners, was another element,critical to this successful
rescue.
The techniques used in this rescue have literally helped rewrite
the book on how rescues like this are done.
At the same time we all know, because of our experience at
Quecreek, we can do things better and faster, if we have a next time.
preventing future accidents
We can't rely on maps alone to keep miners safe: We need layers of
protection--better mine maps, better mine designs and better mining
techniques in the mines--to achieve the only goal we have in this
program--protecting the lives of mine workers.
Hazards associated with abandoned water filled mines are not new in
Pennsylvania or anywhere else. In fact Pennsylvania mining law since
the late 1800s had a requirement to look ahead of where mining was
occurring to find voids. The 1961 state mine safety law put in a more
specific requirement to drill ahead once mining got within 200 feet of
where they think a mine void exists.
When we get an application for an underground coal mine, the
operator must submit 23 different application modules that cover topics
such as: ownership and compliance information, hydrologic information,
erosion and sedimentation control, reclamation plans, details of
adjacent mines and extensive mapping requirements for existing and
proposed mining activity. Any mining maps submitted to DEP must contain
the seal of a registered professional engineer attesting to their
accuracy.
During the permit review we look carefully at maps of the planned
area of mining and for adjacent mines at least 1,000 feet away from the
new mine. DEP and the federal Office of Surface Mining have
repositories of thousands of old mining maps that are supposed to show
the location of old mine workings. However, many maps are still in the
possession of educational institutions, consultants and private
collections since there is no legal requirement for copies of all maps
like this to be turned over to the state.
We also solicit comments from over 14 agencies Pennsylvania Fish
and Game Commissions, Bureau of Historic Preservation, PENNDOT, U.S.
Army Corp of Engineers and municipal officials. Testimony of citizens
at public meetings or hearings is also important. Ultimately, a permit
application is reviewed by our engineers, hydrogeologists, mining
specialists and compliance specialists to make sure we have the most
accurate information possible before any decisions are made.
In the case of the Quecreek Mining permit, it appears part of a
more recent map of the adjacent Saxman Mine found by investigators
shows clearly that more coal was removed at the point of break through
than was shown on the official mine maps submitted by the Quecreek Mine
and that DEP had on file for the mine.
The more recent map was found at the Windber Coal Heritage Museum
among papers donated to the Museum by the daughter of a now deceased
former inspector for the old state Department of Mines and Minerals who
inspected the Saxman Mine in the early 1960s.
By law all bituminous mine operators have to submit final maps of
their underground coal mine workings under the seal of a registered
professional engineer or surveyor before they cease operations. And all
mine inspectors are required to turn over any files or maps they have
in their possession when they retire. Obviously in this case something
went wrong and we will know more when our investigation is complete.
In addition to maps, the Governor's Special Commission is now
reviewing several promising new technologies that will help us address
the question of finding mine voids so we don't have to rely on old
maps. Everything from using robots to map underground mine voids, to
special forward looking geophysical sensors to pick up underground
features and new ground imaging techniques are being considered.
But finding where we think the voids are will only be part of the
solution and only one layer of protection.
In August, Governor Schweiker directed DEP to have coal operators
more than double this warning distance to 500 feet as an added
precaution before the formal investigations make their recommendations.
Nineteen bituminous and twelve anthracite mine operators have been
complying with this requirement. DEP's Bureau of Deep Mine Safety also
sent special advisories to all deep coal mine operators requiring them
to review their mining plans and maps as another interim step.
Again, we believe the investigations now underway will help us
develop the new mining techniques we can apply to making mines even
safer and provide another layer of protection.
Governor Schweiker's direction to us is clear--our investigations
are to go wherever the information leads us to assure the safety of the
thousands of men and women in Pennsylvania who work in our mines every
day.
For more information on the Quecreek Mine Rescue, visit
www.dep.statepa.us (directLINK ``Quecreek'').
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Mr. Hess. Governor
Schweiker, you made the comment about digitizing the thousands
of mine maps and there may be a need for some Federal funding.
Could you elaborate on just what you have in mind on that item?
Governor Schweiker. Well, it potentially and likely is a
complicated process. It involves labor and hours of labor as
well as, you know, the fancy technology processes that are now
available in the world of information technology for it to be
complete, ultimately to be helpful to operators and miners and
Government.
The term, you know, is digitizing, and in and of itself
represents a complicated step, but it can be done, but it's
going to require some expense. Our estimates, and it's a wind
chill figure, Senator, that can perhaps go higher and maybe
would go lower, but we suspect it could be as much as $3\1/2\
million.
As we contemplate, and this is to the heart of your
question, as we contemplate how we could finance that, and
certainly the Commonwealth, here in Pennsylvania, is going to
help to some extent. But I'm told that within the Department of
Interior in the Federal budget is a sum of money relevant to
reclamations of mines. Perhaps with a little research, and I
certainly know that both you and your staff are savvy folks,
maybe there is an opportunity to identify and access some of
that funding, and together we would have the prospect of
financing this important step of creating dependable maps that
can be quickly accessed through modern means.
Senator Specter. Governor Schweiker, the Federal Government
stands ready to be of assistance to you. Congressman Murtha had
taken the lead on inserting $2 million on the current
Appropriations Bill to assist on the Quecreek matter.
We have increased funding for MSHA from $191 million in
1993 to approximately $261 million this year, substantially in
excess of the inflation rate. And coal mining safety and health
has also been increased. So Congressman Murtha who is on
Appropriations on the House side and I on the Senate side are
ready, willing and able to be of assistance to you.
Mr. Hess, you made a comment about what Attorney General
Fisher is doing on the grand jury investigation and a spokesman
for the Attorney General, Sean Connolly, is quoted as saying,
``We will follow the evidence wherever it leads, if our
investigators uncover criminal wrong doing, we will hold those
individuals responsible.''
There has been a report, albeit a preliminary report, that
the company did not have adequate maps, which I think is
probably fairly evident, and the critical question that arises
is, what efforts the company made to have accurate maps, and
was there any element of deliberateness in misleading the
miners as to what those risks were?
Mr. Hess. In terms of the Attorney General's investigation,
he's doing, they have an environmental crimes unit and they're
doing that investigation with that particular unit at this
point from my understanding.
On the map issue, one of the things that our investigation
and MSHA is getting to the bottom to is what maps were there,
what maps were part of the permit process at the time the
permit was originally issued to the Quecreek Mine. There was an
additional map as a result of the joint investigation we've
been doing, found at the Windber Museum, that was not turned in
apparently by the inspector of the Saxman Mine in the 1960s.
We're developing and nailing down the specific timeliness.
Senator Specter. There was a map from the 1960s which was
not turned in?
Mr. Hess. That is correct.
Senator Specter. Who failed to turn it in?
Mr. Hess. We're nailing that down, but it appears that the
inspector, who is now deceased, had that more recent map as
part of his papers, and those papers were donated to the
Windber Museum.
Senator Specter. We're going to hear from Mr. David Rebuck,
president of the Black Wolf Coal Company, later today. But what
was the obligation of the coal company to have accurate maps?
Mr. Hess. The coal company is required to identify any
abandoned mines whether they're filled with water or not within
1,000 feet of where they plan to put their new mine. That map
containing information on where the old mines are and where
they want to put the new mine must be something that has a seal
from a registered professional engineer on it indicating, and
by that seal saying that that information was accurate.
Senator Specter. Was the information accurate?
Mr. Hess. Obviously the information was not accurate,
because the miners thought they were at least 300 feet away
from the water-filled mine void; they obviously were right next
to it.
Senator Specter. Should not Black Wolf Coal Company have
done more to ascertain the accuracy of those maps?
Mr. Hess. The Black Wolf Coal Company is the contract miner
for the Quecreek Mine Company, Quecreek holds the actual
permit, so there is actually several different entities
involved in this particular operation.
Senator Specter. Black Wolf is the mining company?
Mr. Hess. Is the contract mine company, they do the actual
mining.
Senator Specter. What is the legal obligation of a contract
mining company to ascertain the accuracy of the maps?
Mr. Hess. The original permit and the accuracy of the maps
would have been the responsibility of Quecreek Mining because
they are the ones that provided the information to our agency
to get the original permit. There obviously is a responsibility
on Black Wolf and the Quecreek Mining Company to assure the
safety of the miners and follow through with all the safety
requirements.
Senator Specter. Well, I can see the obligation of
Quecreek, the owners of the mines as you articulated, but you
say the Black Wolf Coal Company has a responsibility as well to
be sure that the mines are accurate?
Mr. Hess. They have a responsibility in their specific
mining plans, how they go about mining the particular seam of
coal they're in, to comply with all the safety requirements.
One of the things that, you had mentioned this in the
introduction, one of the things that the investigation was
looking at was what were the warning signs that were in the
mine before that breakthrough occurred and were they heeded,
did people pay attention to those warning signs.
Senator Specter. What were those warning signs?
Mr. Hess. The warning signs would have been any indication
of water coming through from say, an unknown location more than
usual.
Senator Specter. There were plenty of indications of that,
weren't there?
Mr. Hess. There were some indications. Again the
investigation will nail down specifically, based on interviews
with the miners, interviews with the coal company, the power
inspector, what those indications were, where they looked at
those, where water was coming in and should they have reacted
differently.
Senator Specter. Was the fact that water was coming in
communicated to the company?
Mr. Hess. Again, based on the information from the miners,
that information was communicated to the company. Again, our
detailed investigation will nail down that precise sequence of
events, and that will be ready at the end of this month.
Senator Specter. Was that information from the miners which
went to Black Coal also communicated to Quecreek?
Mr. Hess. I cannot answer that question.
Senator Specter. Who can?
Mr. Hess. Again, part of the investigation that our staff
is doing with MSHA will nail down the precise sequence of
events and that report will be out the end of this month, the
beginning----
Senator Specter. You have interviewed the miners who passed
that information on to the coal mining company, haven't you?
Mr. Hess. Yes, our staff and my Safety and Health
Administration.
Senator Specter. What did they tell you, did they tell you
that they notified Quecreek as well as Black?
Mr. Hess. My understanding is, and again, they did notify
the Black Wolf Coal Company. I don't know at this point without
conferring with staff whether there was any other
communications.
Senator Specter. Well, would you please confirm with your
staff and let the subcommittee know?
Mr. Hess. I would be happy to do that. And again, all those
details will be in our draft report at the end of this month.
Senator Specter. Mr. Hess, the reports are that your
regulators approved the original permit; is that so?
Mr. Hess. That is correct.
Senator Specter. What is involved in the approval of the
original permit by DER?
Mr. Hess. When the, an application comes in, it has at
least 23 different sections, everything from who the mining
company is and what their past compliance record is to the map
that I mentioned that shows where old mining has occurred near
or under the new mine, where they want to mine as far as the
new, new operation, and also other background information on
where ground water is, geology and so forth.
All that comes in, that is, goes through an extensive
review process that often takes more than a year to look at and
verify things like the map information to the best of our
ability, and also asked the public for comments, asked local
government for comments, and other agencies as well. It's a
fairly extensive review process.
Senator Specter. When you talk about an extensive review
process from your department for the approval of original
permits, do you take a look at the issue of mapping? You have
the Saxman Mine adjacent and it is a common practice, we are
told, to have an adjacent owner encroach upon underground mines
and nobody can find out about it. They take away the coal, it
doesn't belong to them, and it impacts on the safety of the
adjoining territory.
So my question to you is what did your department do about
trying to ascertain the accuracy of the maps?
Mr. Hess. Well, mining next to old mines is nothing new in
Pennsylvania, we have a 125 year history of mining.
Senator Specter. So you're on notice that that could be a
problem?
Mr. Hess. Exactly. As the Governor had mentioned, we have
mining laws that go back many, many years to address that
particular issue. Because we know there is not only a hazard
with water, but we know that there is a hazard with bad air and
other conditions that could affect the safety of the miners.
What we do typically in a case like this is go back and
verify to the best of our ability from our archives of over
10,000 mining maps that we have and from other sources the
veracity of the information. Did, the registered professional
engineer or surveyor who put that information on that map, did
that person do that accurately? That's a key consideration.
Because obviously, we don't want a repeat of what happened
here.
The record in this regard has been fairly good, but one is
too many, and that's why through the Governor's special
commission, we want to identify new techniques. Because as I
mentioned, this is an issue where we want layers of protection,
not just one map. For example, the special commission has
already identified technology that could be put on mining
machines that looks forward of where they are mining without
drilling to identify voids. These are the kinds of layers of
protection that we need.
Senator Specter. Mr. Hess, is it adequate to authenticate
the maps when there is reason to believe that the adjacent
owner may have moved beyond the adjacent owner's property and
gone into the adjacent property so that the map would be
misleading?
Mr. Hess. The assumption in these cases, because there are
a lot of old mine workings, is that you want the best
information, the hardest information possible on where those
adjacent mines are and where those voids are. We don't start
with the assumption that some of these maps are valid on their
face, we do detective work to the best of our ability.
Obviously in this case, from where the preliminary
investigation shows, a more recent map that was held by the
mine inspector, and who is unfortunately now deceased, had more
information on it. Had we had that map, obviously things would
be different at this point.
Senator Specter. Well, it seems to me that when you have an
approval of a permit and you know that the practice is for
adjacent property owners to encroach, that the maps would not
be accurate, but there is an obligation to go beyond and to
ascertain what those facts are. Especially in a context where
you have evidence of leakage which is transmitted to Black Wolf
Coal Company; do you agree?
Mr. Hess. And that's part of the layers of protection.
Senator Specter. Do you agree?
Mr. Hess. I agree, because that is part of the layers of
protection that I was speaking to. You don't just rely on the
map. This problem is going to be solved by a couple different
things, including looking for those warning signs, new
technology as you're mining that looks ahead, and other steps
that are going to assure the safety of the miners.
Senator Specter. Are you familiar with the technology which
is being developed by Carnegie Mellon? After this incident I
visited Carnegie Mellon and they have a radar gun which can go
into the mines and flush out where the boundaries really are.
Governor Schweiker, you're nodding in the affirmative, do
you care to respond to that?
Governor Schweiker. I'm certainly not someone who is deeply
schooled in the elements of that technology. It certainly is
relevant, I don't think the conclusion has been drawn that that
will, that it would be a great help given the unique condition,
the existing cavern below in Quecreek. It certainly is
fascinating, but I think they've got quite a distance to travel
before it's going to be genuinely helpful.
Senator Specter. Governor Schweiker, I think you're right
about that, but as you noted, it's a start. Mr. Hess, to what
extent has your department received that Carnegie Mellon
technology?
Mr. Hess. The Carnegie Mellon technology, as the Governor
said, I think it is promising, it is a robotic technology that
would send a robot into certain areas.
I think after they have talked with our staff, there are
safety requirements and other things that need to be made, but
there are also other technologies that have come to light
because of the Governor's special commission that would
actually put a geophysical sensor on the front of a piece of
mine, the continuous mining equipment that is frequently used
in room-and-pillar miners to help locate voids ahead of the
mine.
Again, I think these are promising things and I think the
Commission is going to be very helpful in identifying which
ones may have promise and which ones need further development.
Senator Specter. Is there any technology you're looking at
beyond that which is suggested by Carnegie Mellon?
Mr. Hess. Yes, in fact of the Governor's Commission at
their hearing in, in anthracite country just 1 week ago heard
from this additional developer of that piece of equipment that
is put right on the mine equipment itself.
We have quite, we have had quite a few contacts directly
that we referred to the Commission on these new different
technologies, including other technologies, imaging
technologies where you can locate voids from the surface.
Again, many of them show promise and that's something that
the special commission is helping us sort through.
Senator Specter. Mr. Hess, beyond the issue of permitting,
your department also conducts inspections. What inspections
have been conducted of this Quecreek Mine?
Mr. Hess. The Quecreek Mine was on, in fact our regular
inspection schedule, we at least get there monthly for
inspections.
Senator Specter. When had you been there immediately prior
to July 24?
Mr. Hess. I do not have the specific date, but it was just,
I believe within the last, within a few weeks before that.
Senator Specter. What did the inspection show?
Mr. Hess. Again, I don't have the inspection report in
front of me, we'd be happy to get that to you.
Senator Specter. Why don't you have the inspection report?
That is obviously a pertinent matter for this hearing.
Mr. Hess. We can certainly provide that for you. The
history of the Quecreek Mine has been that it has been a safe
mine, it has been operated safely. They have had a couple of
typical kinds of violations in terms of minor roof falls and
some other things that happened in a mine of that sort.
Characteristically, though, in terms of this mine it has been a
relatively safe mine.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Governor. Thank you
very much, Mr. Hess. We would appreciate it if you would
provide us with the prior inspection. We would like to know on
the prior inspection whether any of the miners were interviewed
about water leakage and about any of these safety factors, and
we would also like the specifics on what the miners had said to
Black Wolf, to Quecreek with respect to the notice which they
had specifically about these problems.
Mr. Hess. We will also provide the Committee with our draft
full report as well.
Senator Specter. When can we get that?
Mr. Hess. It should be available as I mentioned--
Governor Schweiker. Later, November.
Mr. Hess. The first week in November.
Senator Specter. Again, Governor, congratulations on the
vigil.
Governor Schweiker. Well, I thank you for that remark.
Senator Specter. It was very reassuring for people around
Pennsylvania, including Arlen Specter, and I think people
around the world.
Governor Schweiker. We did talk, and I remember your
supportive remarks and the attempt at making contact because it
was a busy time for all us.
Senator Specter. I called you, I didn't want to bother you
but I thought there was something more that you could relay,
but it was reassuring. The Governor is the man to be on the
scene.
Governor Schweiker. Senator, I can tell you that I'm often
asked about that decision, and I don't think any of us, whether
we hold office and have rank or may be an observer, that one
would visit 200 family members in that volunteer fire company
hall as I did, as Dave and I both did when I first got there,
and would not depart, knowing that we just witnessed high
anxiety, as you might expect, and just the tremendous feeling
of pressure and urgency, that you would not depart.
The folks behind me, who are dear people, and of course an
entire region that ultimately came to know some time after the
weekend, I don't think we knew it at the time, that it would
become an international story that no one with any compassion
or concern would have departed, especially if he had an
opportunity to effect a complete rescue.
As I said before that, you know, they needed to know that
their Governor was going to stick it out and to that end we did
stick it out, and I thank the Good Lord in that, the remarkable
ingenuity and labor of so many people in helping us complete
the rescuing.
As I tried to make clear in my remarks, Senator, you know,
the miners themselves, let's not forget there were nine
additional men who had gotten out, was because of Dennis Hall's
phone call where he said the water is coming, get out. They are
able to fight through the onrushing water to get out. But the
nine down below, I suspect in my life I will never again meet
more determined people with a remarkable reservoir of
perseverance. I mean they are just, you would want your kids to
meet them as I did. For all those reasons we prevailed.
Senator Specter. The symbolism of your presence was very
important. President Bush of course came to talk to the miners
in early August.
On a somewhat lighter note on a very, very heavy subject,
but for the historical record, when did you change your shirt?
Governor Schweiker. I didn't think that was going to come
up here.
Senator Specter. You're under an obligation to answer that.
Governor Schweiker. I should tell you, Senator, and
certainly I know this is an important and serious gathering of
information to be arranged and discovered, that my wife did
call me on that historic Saturday early in the morning and I
had only gotten about two hours sleep at that point and she
knew I was going to go off quickly and early that morning. She
called, and I said thanks for calling, it was about 5:00 in the
morning. She said, you know, people are saying that you all are
doing a good job. And I said, well, thank you. She goes, she
went on to say, but they're also saying you're wearing the same
thing every day, are you going to be changing your shirt
sometime soon? So in that regard I did go out and buy another
shirt.
But anyway, it was a remarkable experience for all and a
soul-changing experience for all. To that end, I think folks
who had their soul affected are greatly appreciative of your
inquiry here and helping us as advocates for them in getting to
the bottom of it, so to speak. Thank you.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Governor Schweiker.
Thank you, Mr. Hess.
STATEMENT OF DAVID D. LAURISKI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
LABOR, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Senator Specter. Our next Witness is Mr. David Lauriski,
confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Seventh Assistant Secretary
of Labor for Mine Safety and Health on May 9th, 2001. Mr.
Lauriski was the General Manager of Energy West Mining Company,
served as chairman of the Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining,
was a board member of the Utah Mining Association, served as
chairman of the Coal Mine Safety Committee and the Chairman of
the Safety Commission for the Utah Coal Operators. A certified
mine safety professional, he attended the Utah State University
and the College of Eastern Utah.
Welcome, we look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Lauriski. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I'm pleased to
appear before you today to discuss the work of the Mine Safety
and Health Administration to promote miner safety and health. I
have a written statement and request that it be included in the
record.
It's a great pleasure to be near the site of the recent
Quecreek Mine in the company of some of our distinguished
partners in that rescue, and in particular Governor Mark
Schweiker. Our cooperative effort there showed what we can
accomplish when we worked together. This rescue was one of our
proudest accomplishments but one that could not have been
successful without that cooperative effort.
We're now investigating the Quecreek Mine and working with
the Pennsylvania Bureau of Deep Mine Safety. MSHA investigators
have examined the mine, selected records and interviewed
witnesses and we're now developing a complete picture of what
happened. When they reach their conclusion we will publish a
full report, of which I will provide you a copy.
Meanwhile, we are already taking steps to prevent similar
accidents. We have conducted a risk assessment at mines across
this country to determine the potential for a similar
breakthrough, and we're working closely with mine operators on
the precautions they need to take to prevent a similar
occurrence.
We have a task force reviewing the availability, accuracy
and quality of old mine maps and next week we will hold a
technical symposium in Charleston, West Virginia on methods to
accurately identify the extent and perimeter of coal mining
operations.
At Quecreek the whole community worked as a team. After
Quecreek, MSHA must devote equal dedication and teamwork for
the prevention of accidents that cause death, injury or
illness. That is our mission, a mission prescribed by the Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977.
The same team of MSHA professionals who gave their best to
save the miners at Quecreek, also work every day with hundreds
of other safety and health specialists to prevent accidents
among the Nation's 350,000 miners at some 14,000 mines.
The mining industry and MSHA can look back on a record of
tremendous advances in safety and health; however, beginning in
the mid 1990s, safety improvements reached a plateau. This
accords with the law of diminishing returns. From its creation
MSHA has focused mainly on enforcement to create and maintain a
safe and healthy physical environment, and this undeniably has
achieved tremendous results.
At some point, however, it has become more difficult to
achieve significant improvements simply through concentrating
on the same thing, enforcement. No one is satisfied that we
have done all that we can do. Doing more of the same, operating
under old assumptions will not necessarily bring further
improvements to get us to the next level of safety performance.
We need to maintain safety and maintain enforcement, but it
is clear that we need to supplement it with other approaches as
well. The Mine Act provides us with a broad range of tools
along with enforcement to improve health and safety in mines.
We need a balanced approach, what I call the MSHA Triangle of
Success. The three sides of that triangle are enforcement,
education and training, and technical support, all of which
include the component of compliance assistance. All three are
necessary for further progress.
I have said over and over: On my watch there will be no
less enforcement, I have kept that pledge. In the Nation's coal
mines, the completion rate for mandatory inspection has
remained constant as with previous years. In 2001 we spent more
inspection hours per coal mine than ever before. Also in 2001
MSHA issued more citations and orders than in the years before.
We have seen a long-term decline of significant and
substantial violations at mines. Some have interpreted this as
a sign of lax enforcement. I would like to deal with that right
now.
Significant and substantial violations are those with
reasonable likelihood to produce a serious injury or illness.
As the mining industry's nonfatal days loss incidence rates
decreased, the percent of these types of violations decreased
in parallel; that is exactly what we would and should expect.
Many mine operators have corrected the most serious hazards,
this is reflected in the lower injury rate.
What we have here is further evidence that the Mine Act is
working, but we also see the plateau that I have discussed.
Again, it shows that we need a new approach, a balanced
approach.
In applying the MSHA Triangle of Success, we're also
responding to a critical need for compliance assistance. Most
mine operators want to have safe and healthful work places and
want to comply, but some need help due to lack of resources and
due to the volume and complexity of these Mine Act regulations.
We need to recognize this, recognize their need for
assistance and offer the help they need. For instance, our
safety, health and compliance specialists now work with mine
operators and miners to identify system weaknesses that may
lead to accidents. And we are providing more user-friendly
training materials and more on-site training. We opened a new
Office of Small Mine Safety. We are making new training
materials on our web site available in Spanish, and we use data
to focus our efforts.
This year the majority of fatal accidents occurring in the
metal and nonmetal sectors have occurred during maintenance,
repair and construction activity. We are now conducting an
outreach program to help operators and miners prevent these
accidents.
prepared statement
We're starting to see results, Senator. Despite some
setbacks last year, the mining industry is in its safest year
on record. We continue to strengthen our work force through
hiring, through training and more effective management of
resources. We expect even greater progress in the months and
years to come.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks and I'm
happy to answer any questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of David D. Lauriski
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to
appear before you today to discuss the ongoing efforts of the Mine
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) to promote miners' safety and
health. It is especially gratifying to be here in Johnstown, near the
site of the recent rescue of nine miners at the Quecreek mine. It is a
pleasure to be in the company of our distinguished partners in that
effort--Governor Schweiker and Mr. Hess. Another of our partners, Mr.
Rebuck, will appear on the next panel.
I have spent virtually all of my life and career associated with
the mining industry and I can tell you that I never before experienced
the range of emotion that came with that event. I was concerned about
the welfare of the trapped miners. I was prayerful that we could reach
them and confident that we would. I was elated when we heard the
miners' voices and knew they were safe. I was proud of the level of
expertise shown by MSHA's safety and health professionals and the
teamwork they exhibited. I was honored that we were part of a team that
included the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, local governments, the mine
operator, miners and the many volunteers who gave their time and effort
to rescue the trapped miners. And I will never be able to express the
emotion I felt when the ninth miner arrived safely at the surface. As
all of us worked through the days and nights in the drizzling rain, we
never lost hope.
Those who participated on the team at Quecreek were people who had
a stake in the mission of our agency--to protect the health and safety
of the Nation's more than 350,000 miners working at approximately
14,000 mining operations. Our stakeholders include miners, mine
operators, labor organizations, industry organizations, equipment
manufacturers, State agencies and others. As at Quecreek, we must all
work as a team, as partners, to identify the causes of accidents and to
take corrective action.
quecreek no. 1 mine
The Quecreek No. 1 Mine, operated by Black Wolf Coal Company, began
production in March 2001. On July 24, 2002, at 9:40 p.m., officials at
the Quecreek No. 1 mine notified MSHA that water was rushing into the 1
left section and that 9 miners were unaccounted for. MSHA staff
immediately issued an order under Section 103(k) of the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977 (Mine Act) to ensure the safety of the
miners. When MSHA issues such an order, the mine operator is required
to obtain MSHA approval, in cooperation with the appropriate State
representatives, for any plan to rescue or recover miners or to return
the mine to normal operations. Three MSHA officials from the field
office here in Johnstown, along with Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
staff, arrived at the mine about 10:45 p.m. MSHA technical support
staff arrived at about 1:00 a.m.
In the course of the next three days, some 50 MSHA employees
directly participated in the rescue, with many more working behind the
scene. Our Mine Emergency Operations staff arrived bringing the MSHA
Command Center. This is a bus-type vehicle that serves as a temporary
on-site MSHA headquarters. It is equipped with several types of
communication equipment, a conference area, and normal office equipment
(fax and copy machines, etc). During a mine emergency, the Command
Center is staffed around the clock by appropriate enforcement and
technical personnel. MSHA employees worked with the State and the
company to approve rescue plans. We used a seismic detection system to
help detect the pounding signals produced by the trapped miners. And we
called in mine rescue teams to enter the mine in the event it was
necessary.
A drill rig was set up to drill a 6\1/2\ inch borehole to be used
in an attempt to establish communication with the miners. Starting in
the early morning hours of July 25th, the drilling progressed until
5:06 a.m. when the 6\1/2\ inch borehole broke through into the mine in
the 1 left section. We were elated to hear tapping on the drill steel
from underground. Later that morning, nine taps were again heard from
underground and we were hopeful that the tapping meant all nine miners
were alive. Throughout the rest of that day and the next day, pumps
were put in place to pump water out of the mine. A large drill rig
arrived on site to begin a large-diameter borehole that could be used
as an escape shaft. At 10:16 p.m. on July 27, the escape drill hole
broke through into the 1 left section of the mine. A communication
system was lowered into the mine and we learned that all 9 miners were
alive and in reasonable condition. Food and water were then lowered
using the MSHA rescue capsule. I am sure most of you have seen pictures
of the rescue capsule and know what it looks like. It was lowered by a
crane and had a TV camera mounted on the bottom to provide continuous
video of the borehole. Thirty years ago, a similar capsule was used to
rescue two miners from a silver mine fire in Idaho. The present capsule
was constructed after that. For 30 years, MSHA has maintained the
capsule as part of our mine emergency equipment. We began to bring the
miners up, one at a time, in the rescue capsule At 2:45 a.m. on July
28, we pulled the last miner through the rescue shaft.
maps of abandoned mines
While our investigation of this accident is ongoing, I can draw no
final conclusions about the cause. However, there have been questions
about the accuracy of the map of the abandoned Saxman mine, adjacent to
the Quecreek Mine, on which the mine operator, Black Wolf, relied. The
Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 contained the first
Federal requirement that a mine operator which permanently closes or
abandons a coal mine must file with MSHA a certified up-to-date copy of
the mine map. This requirement was carried over to the 1977 Mine Act
and remains today. Some States have similar requirements that predate
the 1969 Act and my colleagues can explain the Pennsylvania
requirements. After receiving the final map, MSHA evaluates it to
assure the map's depiction of elevations and closed-end developments of
mine workings are accurate. MSHA retains the map at the district office
and sends a copy of the map to the Office of Surface Mining of the U.S.
Department of Interior. The Saxman mine, adjacent to Quecreek Mine, was
abandoned prior to the 1969 Coal Act and, therefore, MSHA had no copy
of their final map.
maps for new mines
MSHA requires that all new mines submit a mine ventilation map for
approval before beginning operations. The map must be drawn or
certified by a registered engineer or surveyor. The map must show all
known mine workings that are located in the same coalbed within 1,000
feet of existing or projected workings, and the locations of all known
mine workings underlying and overlying the seam to be mined, noting the
distance between the workings. The map must also show the dip of the
coalbed to allow for proper evaluation of mine drainage. When an
advancing working place approaches within 200 feet of any mine workings
of an adjacent mine located in the same coalbed, MSHA requires that the
operator drill boreholes into and in advance of the working face. The
200-foot requirement provides a margin of safety to detect mine voids
not shown on maps. Black Wolf Coal Company fulfilled its obligation to
submit this map at the time of start-up. The map on the day of the
accident did not indicate that mine workings at the Quecreek mine were
within this 200-foot zone. We are examining Quecreek Mine records and
maps as part of our investigation. You may be aware that our
investigators located at a local museum what appears to be a portion of
an old map of the Saxman Mine. The map differs from the map of Saxman
Mine held by Black Wolf. Our investigators are studying this map and
comparing it to the actual workings.
inundations
MSHA is addressing the issue of inundations from abandoned mines.
We have conducted a risk assessment of mines throughout the country to
determine the potential for similar breakthroughs. We immediately
issued an order to our field staff to focus on mines with a potential
for breakthrough and to work with individual mine operators to ensure
that necessary steps are taken to protect against these types of
incidents. We have established a task force of MSHA personnel who are
working with other interested parties to review the availability,
accuracy and quality of old mine maps. Next week we are sponsoring a
national symposium on Geotechnical Methods for Mine Mapping
Verification. We will gather miners, mine operators, academia, and
State and Federal personnel to discuss the most current technology and
safe work practices to avoid the hazards associated with abandoned
mines and inaccurate mine maps. Geotechnical equipment companies will
display the latest technology at the symposium. We are hoping that, by
working together, we can identify technology that could be useful. In
any case, old maps, many inaccurate, are what the industry has to work
with to identify abandoned mines. We will soon have a Public Service
Announcement asking that people turn in any old mine maps they might
have. We will also review MSHA safety standards and practices to
identify any appropriate changes.
There is another aspect of the problem of abandoned mines I would
like to address. Every year, dozens of people are injured or killed
while exploring or playing on mine property. There are over 14,000
active mine sites and there may be as many as 500,000 abandoned mines
in the Nation. Last year, at least 31 children and adults died in
recreational accidents on mine property. These deaths were the result
of drownings, falls down abandoned mine shafts, and overturned ATV
equipment. Hazards in underground abandoned mines include deep vertical
shafts, horizontal openings supported by rotting timbers, unstable rock
formations, lethal concentrations of deadly gases, water, and the
presence of unused or misfired explosives. Both children and adults
like to explore the tunnels and shafts, unaware of the inherent
hazards. MSHA coordinates a national public awareness campaign to warn
the public about the dangers of exploring and playing on mine property.
More than 70 Federal and state agencies, private organizations,
businesses and individuals have become active partners in the campaign.
Over a 2-week period each Spring, we deliver safety talks in schools
throughout the country to educate children about the importance of
steering clear of these sites. I am proud that we have this partnership
program and know that we are saving children's lives.
jim walter resources no. 5 mine
Just ten months before the Quecreek accident, explosions at Jim
Walter Resources Number 5 underground coal mine in Alabama killed 13
miners and injured 3 others. This tragic event touched the mining
community deeply and continues to resonate throughout the mining
industry. We are close to completing our investigation of that accident
and writing the final report. Our investigation team will identify any
and all facts that will assist us in preventing this type of disaster
from occurring in the future. If appropriate, we will take enforcement
action to address any deficiencies found during the investigation. Some
stakeholders expressed concerns about MSHA practices at that mine prior
to the accident. As a result of that concern, I have assigned an
internal review team to investigate the quality of our management
processes and procedures, including enforcement activities at the mine
and the MSHA district in which it is located. The internal review, like
the accident investigation, is continuing. I can assure you that any
deficiencies identified will be fully addressed and corrected. Because
of the ongoing investigation and review, however, I am not at liberty
to discuss the particulars of that accident.
balanced approach
There have been tremendous advances in safety and health in the
mining industry over the past 30 years. However, beginning in the mid-
1990's, statistics show that continued improvement reached a plateau
and we have seen no further significant reduction in nonfatal accident
rates. I met with a significant number of our stakeholders to discuss
this and to hear their concerns and views on how we can make mining
safer. My staff met with hundreds more stakeholders. During these
meetings, we heard concerns about MSHA's one-dimensional approach: The
Agency has historically emphasized the enforcement mechanism embodied
in the Act, focusing on physical conditions in the workplace. The Act,
however, provides us with a broad range of tools, such as education and
training--compliance assistance--and technical support, in addition to
enforcement. I believe the increased use of these additional tools will
take us from the current plateau to the next level of improved safety
performance. But let me be clear about one thing: Enforcement will
continue to be a key component of our efforts and we will not lessen
those efforts, as some have suggested.
While the mining industry has increased productivity and improved
technology, the Agency has not significantly changed its business
strategy since enactment of the Mine Act in 1977. Following our
stakeholder meetings, we devised a management plan that will meet the
challenges of the 21st Century and help move the mining industry to a
new level of safety and health. The plan focuses on more collaboration
with stakeholders, assistance to the industry in preventing accidents
and illnesses, and improvements in our internal practices to enhance
mine safety and health performance. I took this plan back to our
stakeholders with the challenge for them to work with us to get to the
next level of safety. And I asked for their commitment to work
collectively with us to reduce accidents and illnesses. To this, they
have agreed.
enforcement
MSHA continues to actively enforce the Act. Last year, we completed
98 per cent of the mandatory four inspections per year at each
underground coal mine and two inspections per year at each surface coal
mine. But because some mines are open only part of the year, or because
mines close before the end of the year, we will never reach 100 per
cent statistically, though we still will have met our obligation. Over
the years, the coal industry has contracted; the number of mines has
significantly decreased. While coal production increased to a record
level in 2001, overall coal consumption declined by 2 percent. The
additional production was used to replenish depleted stockpiles that
resulted from 2 years of declining coal production during which coal
consumption had increased.
MSHA must adjust its resources to reflect this decrease in the
number of coal mines. In fiscal year 2002, MSHA began to ``right-size''
its workforce to respond to the decline. The budget for fiscal year
2003 provides for us to continue adjusting to the reduced number of
coal mines, yet provides us with sufficient resources to continue to
meet our inspection obligations.
While the number of coal mines has decreased, there has been an
upsurge in activity in the metal and nonmetal mining industry,
especially in the crushed stone and sand and gravel sectors that supply
the construction industry. There appear to be a number of reasons for
this increase. For instance, the Transportation Equity Act provided
funding for a significant number of new highway construction projects.
Reduced interest rates have put home ownership within the reach of many
citizens who otherwise would not have been able to afford to own their
own home. Housing starts are up to meet this demand. These factors and
others have resulted in the number of metal and nonmetal mines and
miners steadily increasing over the past several years to meet the
demand for construction materials and other products. In response to
this increase, over time, we have been increasing the number of staff
assigned to the metal and nonmetal program.
We recognize that we have had less success in completing the
mandatory number of inspections in this industry than in the coal
industry. Not only has there been an increase in the number of mines,
the increase has been mostly in the aggregate industry, which has
always been seasonal in nature. Completing mandatory inspections at
seasonal mines is difficult. For example, a rock crushing operation may
open to build a portion of a road.
The operation would then be counted as a mine and we would schedule
an inspection. However, when we arrive to make the inspection, that
portion of the road may have been completed and the operation shut
down. On paper, we have failed to conduct a mandatory inspection. In
spite of the problem with seasonal mines, we hope to improve the
inspection completion rate in fiscal year 2003. The budget requests
increasing the number of FTE assigned to the metal and nonmetal
program.
In response to stakeholder comments, we have been conducting pro-
active inspections. We have developed mine profiles that highlight the
problem areas of any given mine. Our safety, health and compliance
specialists concentrate on those areas or activities that are most
likely to cause injuries or create health problems. We have trained
these specialists to focus on overall safety and health matters and to
identify system weaknesses that may lead to accidents. These weaknesses
may involve violations of existing regulations or factors not covered
by regulations.
We are making progress. Calendar year 2001 was our safest year in
history. We had a record-low number of fatalities in the mining
industry. For the coal program, although the number of fatalities has
increased in recent years, we remain convinced that as our initiatives
are fully implemented, substantial improvements will be achieved. In
fact, as of today, the calendar year-to-date number of coal fatalities
is significantly below the levels of the previous three years.
We have analyzed the causes of this year's fatal accidents in the
metal and nonmetal industry and have found that 59 per cent are a
result of maintenance, repair or construction activities. As a result,
we are currently conducting a two-week industry outreach program to
specifically focus attention on the hazards present in these activities
and to assist mine operators in implementing preventive practices. MSHA
safety, health and compliance specialists are visiting mines to provide
mining personnel with information on fatal accidents, best practices,
and hazard awareness and recognition.
Earlier, I mentioned the plateau we reached in the mid-1990's when
the nonfatal days lost injury rate (or NFDL) flattened. At about the
same time, we saw a reduction in the number of significant and
substantial (or S&S) violations at mines. S&S violations are those that
have a reasonable likelihood to produce a serious injury or illness. As
the NFDL injury rate decreased, the percentage of S&S violations
decreased at about the same rate. That is exactly what we would expect
to occur. Many mine operators have corrected the most serious hazards
and this is reflected in the lower injury rate. This reflects the basic
philosophy of the Mine Act--the declining number of serious violations
correlates with the rate of decline in serious injury rates.
As I said earlier, we are concerned about this flattening of the
injury and fatal incidence rates. However, the traditional enforcement
scheme is no longer bringing a reduction in these rates. We must do
more. The agency must utilize additional approaches. We must use our
other tools. To do otherwise would be to accept the status quo; and
accepting the status quo is NOT something we should be willing to do.
training and education
As I stated earlier, we must use all the tools of the Mine Act to
bring further reductions in accidents and illnesses. Our stakeholders,
from the individual miner at the mine to the CEO of a corporate mine
operator, have told us that training for the mining industry is crucial
to the success of our program to reduce accidents and illnesses. We are
responding to their call for more user-friendly training materials for
mine operators and miners. They also called for more on-site training
where safe practices related to specific problems can be demonstrated.
Our safety, health and compliance specialists are now providing such
training when they uncover system deficiencies at mines. We are also
exploring innovative approaches, such as web-based learning, DVDs, and
the use of simulation devices. We continue to analyze accidents to
determine patterns or trends so we can identify problems, find
solutions, and create awareness through training and education.
Secretary Chao recently announced a major new compliance assistance
initiative to help employers better understand and meet their
responsibilities to protect workers. We know that the vast majority of
mine operators want to comply but are often hampered by the volume and
complexity of Mine Act regulations. If we are to get to the next level
of safety, we need to recognize industry's cry for assistance and give
them the help they need, not just to comply with regulations, but to
have a broader view of how to identify and prevent hazards, and to
provide miners with safe and healthful workplaces. We need partnerships
where we share abilities and information. For example, we are
developing materials on Best Practices culled from industry, labor,
academia, and MSHA experience for use at all mines. Most importantly,
we must assist mines with poor performance or limited resources.
In support of the Administration's initiative, we in MSHA have
developed a Compliance Assistance Plan that sets out the specific steps
we are taking to improve our outreach to mine operators and miners.
Compliance assistance can mean different things to different people. We
use the term broadly to identify concepts and accident prevention
activities such as education and training, accident and violation
analysis, hazard identification, root cause analysis, technical
support, and access to information. Access to information means the
information is readable, easily understood, and written in plain
language the reader understands--in other words, user-friendly. Because
we know that there are increasing numbers of Spanish-speaking workers
in the mining industry, we have translated numerous best practices
cards, student and instructor guides, entire training programs, and
handout materials. All of the materials on our website are now
available in Spanish.
Our web site, www.msha.gov, provides access to a multitude of
resources for compliance assistance. In 2001, there were over 55
million ``hits'' on the MSHA web site, excluding those by agency
employees. On the web site, we have posted a list of the 20 standards
most often cited by major commodity and mining type and are beginning
to post information on safe practices for each of those. On the web
site, miners and mine operators can find safety tips, accident
investigation reports, hazard alerts and bulletins, and single source
pages as well as access to MSHA's Data Retrieval System.
Compliance assistance is always needed when new regulations are
issued. I believe that the assistance should be rendered before the
regulation becomes effective so that everyone is aware of their
obligations and knows how to comply ahead of time. Our new final rule
on hazard communication took effect on September 23, 2002, for mines
with more than five miners. Prior to that date, we held 15 National
Roll-Out Meetings and about 100 supplemental local meetings to give
each of those mine operators the opportunity to learn how to comply
with the rule. The rule will become effective on March 21, 2003, for
mines with five or fewer miners. We are preparing to provide on-site
compliance assistance to those mines before that date.
small mines
Operators of small mines face unique challenges in protecting their
workers. In metal and nonmetal mining, about one-half of all mines
employ five or fewer miners. In the coal industry, nearly one-fourth
employ five or fewer miners. Small mines typically have fewer resources
to devote to safety and health and often lack the expertise to
implement accident prevention programs. Small mines have higher
fatality rates. In calendar year 2000, mines with five or fewer
employees had a fatal incidence rate four times greater than the rate
at operations employing 20 or more. To bring small mines to the next
level of safety, we are developing a Small Mine Initiative. We have
established an Office of Small Mine Health and Safety in our
Directorate of Educational Policy and Development.
The Office will coordinate a national program to assure compliance
at small mines and to give compliance assistance. The staff will
determine the special needs of small mine operators and help develop
programs to address those needs.
regulations
When developing regulations, we assess the impact of the
regulations on all mines, and on small operators in particular. We will
review existing regulations to determine applicability to current
mining practices and to identify those that create an undue burden on
small mine operators. Let me give you an example of what I mean.
I spoke with a mine operator in the bluestone industry who was the
only miner at his operation located in the back yard of his home.
MSHA's rules require that each mine have a stretcher to be used to
transport injured miners. He asked me why he had to have a stretcher if
there was no one to carry him out on the stretcher. My answer to him
was that this was a prime example of a well-intentioned rule that was
not flexible and which needs to be reassessed to allow alternate
methods of complying with the intent of the rule, while maintaining
equal safety and health protections. This is but one example where a
one-size rule does not fit all.
MSHA has published several important final rules recently. The
hazard communication rule, an information and training rule, will
reduce injuries and illnesses related to chemicals in the mining
industry by increasing miners' and mine operators' awareness of
chemical hazards. The high-voltage longwall rule allows a mine to use
current technology without the need to petition the Agency for a
modification of a standard. This rule recognizes that advanced
technology, already in widespread use in the mining industry, can be
used safely when it meets stringent requirements.
We are working on rules that will address the continued risks
associated with exposure to respirable coal mine dust. These rules
would provide for verification of a mine operator's dust control plan
to ensure it works effectively under typical mining conditions.
Additionally, MSHA is considering a proposed rule that would allow the
measurements of respirable coal dust taken during a single shift, in
lieu of several shifts, to be used to determine the atmospheric
condition to which a miner is exposed. These two rules would work in
tandem to control coal mine respirable dust levels in mines and reduce
miners' exposure to this extreme health hazard.
The Office of the Inspector General recommended that we take
regulatory action on asbestos to address three issues. They recommended
that we lower the existing permissible exposure limit for asbestos,
change the analytical method we use to quantify and identify fibers in
our asbestos samples, and address take-home contamination from
asbestos. We issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in March
of this year requesting information and data from the public to assist
us in our deliberations. We held seven public-meetings on asbestos and
solicited written comments. The public comment period closed in July.
We are examining all of the testimony and written comments as we move
forward in our decision-making process.
In January of 2001, MSHA published a final rule addressing the
health hazards to underground metal and nonmetal miners from exposure
to diesel particulate matter. The rule requires the use of approved
equipment and establishes a concentration limit for DPM in the mine
atmosphere. Some provisions of the rule were challenged in court. We
entered settlement negotiations with the parties. I am happy to report
that an agreement was reached and the legal challenge has been stayed
pending implementation of the agreement. Pursuant to the agreement,
MSHA delayed the effective date of one provision and clarified others.
The interim concentration limit went into effect as scheduled and MSHA
is providing compliance assistance for one year. Also, as part of the
settlement agreement, MSHA has published an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on several provisions.
Another rulemaking currently in process would provide a simplified
compliance alternative for conducting methane tests during roof bolting
in underground coal mines. The proposed rule is based on a joint
recommendation by industry and labor organizations. We think this is an
example of stakeholders working together to improve the rulemaking and
compliance process.
We have just proposed a rule that would allow us to accept testing
and evaluation of certain mine equipment by independent laboratories.
We are also working on a proposed rule on the use of belt entry
ventilation for coal mines that recognizes that improved technology,
such as new atmospheric monitoring systems, may make it possible to
safely use this type of ventilation.
These are the rules on which we intend to concentrate our
resources. These are our priorities.
technical support
Our technical support staff includes experts on ventilation, roof
support, dust control, electricity, ground stability, structural
analysis, impoundment stability, mine fires and explosions, and
chemical exposure. While mine operators provide rescue teams, MSHA
gives technical assistance to the operators during mine emergencies.
You saw our technical support people in action during the Quecreek
rescue. Many parties drew on their expertise in the decisions on where
to locate the miners, where to drill the boreholes, and the many other
decisions that were critical during the successful rescue effort. Mine
rescue is just one of the many ways we give technical assistance. These
same individuals are creating partnerships with other government
agencies, equipment manufacturers, mining companies, and trade and
labor organizations to more effectively identify and evaluate
technological solutions to mining hazards. We are also identifying new
technologies to address emerging hazards.
conclusion
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I am very honored to be able to lead
the Mine Safety and Health Administration. MSHA staff care deeply about
the safety and health of America's miners. You witnessed this at
Quecreek. Our stakeholders also care deeply. No one is satisfied that
we have done all we can do to reduce accidents and illnesses. But we
have reached a plateau and, according to the Law of Diminishing
Returns, doing more of the same, operating under the old assumptions,
will not necessarily bring further improvements or get us to the next
level of safety. We have examined our way of doing business and devised
the new management plan for the Agency that will emphasize enforcement,
but will add to it by increasing training and education, compliance
assistance, and technical support. I am confident that, working with
our stakeholders, we can get to the next level of safety.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy
to respond to your questions.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Mr. Lauriski. I will
begin by asking you about the adequacy of the funding for MSHA.
The appropriation in 1993 was $191 million, and in 2002 $253
million and the Senate has put in its Appropriation Bill which
Senator Harkin and I took the lead on, almost $262 million; is
that adequate?
Mr. Lauriski. Well, I think it is, Senator, I think it is
adequate in the sense of how you apply those resources. What we
need to consider is where we put our best efforts to get an
adequate return on an investment. One of the things we talked
about since I've been here is making sure that we allocate our
resources in areas where we make a difference, and that's in
the field.
Senator Specter. The MSHA overseers signed off on the
ventilation and site safety plans, when did that occur, Mr.
Lauriski?
Mr. Lauriski. Well that, the ventilation plan would be
every 36 months, I assume we're talking about Quecreek now?
Senator Specter. I'm talking about Black Wolf, Quecreek,
I'm talking about this incident.
Mr. Lauriski. There would have been an initial filing with
the Agency to look at their ventilation and roof control plans
along with other plans that are required by regulations.
Senator Specter. You are talking about the general rule,
but how about specifically, do you know?
Mr. Lauriski. Specifically, it would have happened on
several occasions.
Senator Specter. It would have happened? I want to know if
it did happen?
Mr. Lauriski. Yes, sir, it happened.
Senator Specter. Do you have those records?
Mr. Lauriski. Yes, we have those records.
Senator Specter. What date was that inspection carried out?
Mr. Lauriski. The last time we were at the mine was just a
week before the accident, but the plans you're talking about
would have been every 6 months from the beginning of the
inception of the mine.
Senator Specter. I was about to come to the inspection, but
I wanted to start with the overseers signing off on ventilation
and site safety plans; when did that occur?
Mr. Lauriski. Sir, I'll be happy to get that for you, there
is an approved plan that would be in our office that would show
that.
Senator Specter. Mr. Lauriski, why didn't you bring that
with you to this hearing?
Mr. Lauriski. Chairman, I didn't know that would be
something you would want to know about, but I will certainly
have that available.
Senator Specter. Of course, the subcommittee is interested
to know what the safety plan was, that is the purpose of the
hearing.
Mr. Lauriski. Yes, sir, I understand that, sir. There are
several plans that are required by the coal company to be filed
with the agency, including the ventilation plan.
Senator Specter. Do you know what the safety plan said?
Mr. Lauriski. It would say what----
Senator Specter. No, I don't want to know what it would
say, I want to know if you know what it did say?
Mr. Lauriski. No, I do not.
Senator Specter. We're going to have to have another
hearing.
Mr. Lauriski. I do know that it would say what the minimum
requirements of the standards are and what additional standards
the company would take in certain instances.
Senator Specter. What are the minimum requirements of the
standard?
Mr. Lauriski. In ventilation it would be a minimum
requirement to have 12,000 cubic feet of air, for example, at
the last open cross-cut. It would be the requirement to have
bolting on a spacing pattern, either 4 or 5 feet, the size of
the bolts that would go into the roof. There would be training
requirements that would be submitted too, the kinds of training
that the mine operator had to apply that meet the standard,
such as new miner training, annual retraining, those sorts of
things would be in all these plans. There are guidelines that
are provided by our standards.
Senator Specter. That is the generalization, but as you
say, you cannot tell me what happened here?
Mr. Lauriski. Not specifically.
Senator Specter. That's the requirement; you cannot tell me
specifically what occurred on this situation?
Mr. Lauriski. Again, Senator, I'm a little bit confused,
because the plans themselves are prescribed by law to be filed,
and there are items within the regulations that the operator
must submit within that plan that we would then take a look at
improving. Included in that would be the amount of air that
would be available, the types of bolts that would be used for
control of the roof, the kinds of, again, training.
Senator Specter. What kind of bolts would be required?
Mr. Lauriski. The operator could use a bolt that would be
adequate to maintain the roof if either through a----
Senator Specter. Wait a minute, I know it would be
adequate, but what?
Mr. Lauriski. Probably in this case they used resin bolts.
Senator Specter. Mr. Lauriski, it's not adequate, not
sufficient for you to tell me probably. I want to know what was
done, I want to know what the inspection showed, I want the
specifics here. There are a lot of requirements which were not
followed, it happens all the time, that is why you have
congressional oversight. We need to get down to the specifics
as to what happened here.
There are reports here that the bolts were inadequate,
there was a thin veneer, inspection was made a week before,
what did the inspection show? Have there been any reports of
flooding, of water coming in?
Mr. Lauriski. Those questions I can answer, Senator.
Senator Specter. Okay, if you can answer them, fine.
Mr. Lauriski. I can answer those questions.
Senator Specter. The question is, what were the facts as to
water coming in?
Mr. Lauriski. The week before we were there, there was
nothing abnormal that our inspector reported seeing; however,
the inspector had visited the mine when the mine was getting
ready to go under a stream channel. He asked the mine operator
to submit a plan for dealing with any water that may come into
the mine as a result of crossing under that bed.
Senator Specter. Why did he ask the owner to submit a plan
for water; was there some indication that there was a water
problem?
Mr. Lauriski. There was an indication that they were going
to cross under a bed of water that was in a stream, a creek, if
you will, so that there was an assurance that the mine operator
was taking adequate precautions to deal with crossing under
that bed during the mining process.
But with respect to what they physically saw at the mine
the week before this incident, they saw nothing abnormal,
either in the first left section or the second left section.
That's the report.
Senator Specter. They saw nothing abnormal?
Mr. Lauriski. Nothing abnormal.
Senator Specter. Did you review the report yourself that
they concluded there was nothing abnormal?
Mr. Lauriski. I have spoken with the inspector and I have
spoken with the supervisors of the office that offered the
reports.
Senator Specter. My question was, did you look at the
reports themselves?
Mr. Lauriski. I have not, but that is part of the
investigation material that our investigators will gather for
this accident.
Senator Specter. But we are conducting an investigation
here, Mr. Lauriski, that is why we would like to have the
firsthand information.
Mr. Lauriski. Senator, that is being told to me directly by
the officials in the district which the mine is located by the
inspector himself.
Senator Specter. I appreciate that, but hearsay is not as
good as seeing the record, and talking about the record is not
as good as having the subcommittee look at the record, so would
you please provide the record to us?
Mr. Lauriski. Absolutely.
Senator Specter. Had you had any indications of the mapping
being inadequate?
Mr. Lauriski. At the time of the accident, no, we did not.
Subsequent to the accident during our investigation, we did
uncover at a museum, the Windber Museum, near here, a map that
appears to be, a portion of the map that shows something
different than what the mine operator's map showed.
Senator Specter. Even in addition to the map, as we covered
with Mr. Hess, it is a common occurrence for adjacent owners to
move in or take coal from an adjacent property. So whatever the
mine map showed, wouldn't necessarily be adequate. To what
extent does your Department as MSHA take into account the
encroachment of adjacent coal miners?
Mr. Lauriski. We have very similar regulations to those of
Pennsylvania. Mine operators are required, when they file their
map, to include indications of approaching any old abandoned
mine within 1,000 feet. That would be part of their mine
mapping requirements, so they would have to show those
boundaries. As they mine toward those boundaries, if they
approach within 200 feet of those boundaries, they have to
begin a very rigorous drilling process ahead, not only straight
ahead, but at 45 degree angles across the working areas where
they are cutting.
Senator Specter. Is that 200 feet requirement adequate?
Mr. Lauriski. Yes, that is one of the things we are looking
at, Senator. To make sure, we are conducting rigorous
investigation to see, is that something that we need to look
at, is it adequate or is it not adequate? It has been in place
since 1969. I believe that the founders of the Mine Act
recognized the seriousness of the problem, there are literally
thousands of these abandoned mines across this country.
Senator Specter. That's an act of Congress?
Mr. Lauriski. An act of Congress.
Senator Specter. We can change it.
Mr. Lauriski. I understand.
Senator Specter. But we are not, we would like to have your
judgement on it.
Mr. Lauriski. We are going to be looking very closely at
that.
Senator Specter. We may become experts or we may not,
depending on what we find, but you are an expert now. What is
your conclusion?
Mr. Lauriski. My conclusion is not there yet. Until I see
the investigation report in terms of what we found and what all
of the facts were in this case, I have not reached that point
yet.
We have an issue here where we have a map that appears to
be different from the map that the mine operator was using to
show those boundaries. That map appears to be consistent with
what we saw in the mine itself where the breakthrough occurred.
We need to understand what if any precautions were being taken,
what the actual distances were between what the mine map showed
from the operator versus what the old Saxman Mine showed. Then
we have already undertaken a risk assessment of all these
processes across this country. And once we have the ability to
see this investigation, we'll take a very close look at our
regulations to determine whether or not they are adequate. If
they are not adequate, Senator, we'll change the rules.
Senator Specter. Do you need an act of Congress to do that?
Mr. Lauriski. No, we do not. We can do that from a regular
perspective.
Senator Specter. When do you expect to formulate your
judgement? You have got a lot of mining going on every day.
Mr. Lauriski. We hope to have a report within the next
month to 2 months. They are very close right now.
Senator Specter. Are there Federal criminal statutes which
apply to this kind of a situation?
Mr. Lauriski. Certainly they could. If we found that there
was reckless disregard or there was knowing conduct, that could
be something that could be referred to----
Senator Specter. Or false maps?
Mr. Lauriski. Or false maps.
Senator Specter. Or failing to take precautions knowing
that there was water leakage?
Mr. Lauriski. Anything where we could determine that there
was a failure on the part of an operator, a knowing failure or
a reckless disregard, could in fact put the case toward
criminal prosecution.
Senator Specter. Have you notified the U.S. Attorney with
jurisdiction of this matter to take a look?
Mr. Lauriski. Not at this point, not until we finish our
investigation. Our investigation will determine whether there
were infractions to the regulations and it will determine the
level of those, the negligence on the part of the mine
operator. If any of those infractions meet the standard for
notification, we will then do that.
Senator Specter. Well, shouldn't the U.S. Attorney be
apprised of an early date to take whatever steps the U.S.
Attorney thinks appropriate by way of empaneling a grand jury?
I think you ought to notify--never mind, Mr. Lauriski, I'll
notify the U.S. Attorney. I think the U.S. Attorney ought to be
in on this matter. The U.S. Attorney has a lot of authority in
convening a grand jury, on subpoenaing the witnesses, on taking
testimony.
Well, okay, Mr. Lauriski, you're not prepared to make any
recommendations today. How soon do you expect to have those
recommendations, you say a month or two?
Mr. Lauriski. We hope that we'll have a completed report
within 1 month or 2.
Senator Specter. On behalf of the subcommittee, may I
request that you do that as early as possible?
Mr. Lauriski. Yes, sir.
Senator Specter. Let us know. If you find the need for
regulations, how long does it take you to promulgate
regulations? There are a lot of procedural steps you have to go
through, that is a time-consuming process, even after you come
to the conclusion that you want these regulations.
Mr. Lauriski. That is correct.
Senator Specter. How long will it take?
Mr. Lauriski. Normally at the outside, if you bypass the
advance notice process, we could be talking 12 to 18 months to
put a rule through. If there were evidence that the situation
was grave enough, we could enact an emergency temporary
standard, but that's something we will a take a very close look
at, that could move this process faster.
Senator Specter. Mr. Lauriski, I hope it's possible on your
schedule for you to stay for the conclusion of the hearing. We
hope to hear from some of the miners yet today who may be in a
position to shed some light on some of the questions you are
considering; can you stay?
Mr. Lauriski. Sure.
Senator Specter. Thank you. We now move to panel III. Mr.
Ed Yankovich, Joseph Main, Howard Messer, George Ellis, David
Rebuck.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD YANKOVICH, JR., PRESIDENT, DISTRICT
2, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA
Senator Specter. Our first witness will be Mr. Ed
Yankovich, President of District 2 of the United Mine Workers
of America since 1989. Mr. Yankovich represents nearly 25,000
active and retired miners in Pennsylvania, New York, and
Western Maryland. He previously served as a member of the Labor
Counsel Advisory Committee for the AFL-CIO. Graduate of the
California University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Yankovich, thank you
for joining us today.
Mr. Yankovich. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Specter. Any prepared statement will be made a part
of the permanent record and we look forward to your testimony,
sir.
Mr. Yankovich. I want to begin by thanking Senator Specter
for the opportunity to speak before the Subcommittee today on
behalf of the United Mine Workers of America.
I would also like to express our heartfelt thanks to the
Senator for his long serving commitment to ensuring that proper
laws and safeguards established by the Mine Health and Safety
Act are enforced protecting miners in this Commonwealth and our
entire Nation.
I will not detail the United Mine Worker's position as to
the changes that should be considered to the applicable
provisions of the Act to prevent potential disasters from
occurring similar to this summer's events at Quecreek Mine in
Somerset County. Joe Main, who is the Director of Safety for
the United Mine Workers of America International Union, will
testify in this hearing addressing our position on this matter.
I would like to take time here today to salute the bravery
of all 18 miners who escaped a tragic death thanks to the
divine intervention of God.
The nine men who were trapped for 77 hours proved to our
Nation and the whole world the steadfastness of spirit, the
compassion of humanity, and the bonds of brotherhood that
miners all over the world possess, in facing the daily dangers
of our chosen occupation.
I would hope that the goal of this subcommittee is to bring
to light efforts that can be made and provisions that can be
established to prevent such an occurrence from ever happening
again.
I would also like to add that our concerns over health and
safety of our Nation's miners goes beyond Quecreek. The recent
mine disaster in Alabama that killed 13 miners, and 3 years of
increased coal mining deaths in our Nation's mines, shows there
are serious health and safety problems. It also identifies the
fact that an increase in the enforcement of the Mine Safety and
Health Act is needed.
Many miners, as well as myself, are concerned about the
current direction of MSHA. In addition to actions to weaken the
enforcement of the Mine Act, there are attempts to cut the
Agency's enforcement budget. I urge that your committee
seriously examine these concerns.
In conclusion, I'm compelled to commend Senator Specter
again. Through his efforts during administrations of both
parties, he has been steadfast in demanding that the budget
cuts in the funding of MSHA not be permitted. I know that he
once again faces this challenge in light of this accident.
prepared statement
Safety in our Nation's mines should be the first and
foremost focal point given priority consideration by all of our
branches of Government. To cut funds and weaken the agency's
ability to do so is not acceptable to the United Mine Workers
of America, nor should it be to any person who enters our
Nation's mines to make a decent and honest living.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Mr. Yankovich.
Mr. Yankovich. You're welcome, sir.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward D. Yankovich, Jr.
I want to begin by thanking Senator Specter for the opportunity to
speak before this Subcommittee today on behalf of the United Mine
Workers of America. I would also like to express our heartfelt thanks
to the Senator for his long serving commitment to ensuring that proper
laws and safeguards established by the Mine Health and Safety Act are
enforced, protecting miners in this Commonwealth and our entire nation.
I will not detail the United Mine Workers of America's position, as to
the changes that should be considered to the applicable provisions of
the Act to prevent potential disasters from occurring, similar to this
summer's events at the Quecreek mine in Somerset County.
Joe Main, who is the Director of Safety for the United Mine Workers
of America International Union, will testify later in this hearing,
addressing our position on this matter. I would like to take time here
today to salute the bravery of all 18 miners, who escaped a tragic
death, thanks to the divine intervention of God. The nine men who were
trapped for 77 hours, proved to our nation and the whole world, the
steadfastness of spirit, the compassion of humanity and the bonds of
brotherhood that miners all over the world possess, in facing the daily
dangers of our chosen occupation. I would hope that the goal of this
Subcommittee is to bring to light efforts that can made and provisions
that can be established to prevent such an occurrence from ever
happening again.
I would also like to add that our concerns over the health and
safety of our nation's miners goes beyond Quecreek. The recent mine
disaster in Alabama that killed thirteen miners and three years of
increased coal mining deaths in our nations' mines, shows there are
serious health and safety problems. It also identifies the fact that an
increase in the enforcement of the Mine Safety and Health Act is
needed. Many miners, as well as myself, are concerned about the current
direction of MSHA. In addition to actions to weaken the enforcement of
the Mine Act, there are attempts to cut the Agency's enforcement
budget. I urge that your committee seriously examine these concerns.
In conclusion, I am compelled to commend Senator Specter again.
Through his efforts during administrations of both parties, he has been
steadfast in demanding that budget cuts in the funding of MSHA not be
permitted. I know that he once again faces this challenge, in light of
this accident. Safety, in our nation's mines, should be the first and
foremost focal point, given priority consideration by all of our
branches of government. To cut funds weakening the Agency's ability to
do so is not acceptable to the United Mine Workers of America, nor
should it be to any person who enters our nation's mines to make a
decent and honest living.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE ELLIS, PRESIDENT, PENNSYLVANIA COAL
ASSOCIATION
Senator Specter. We turn now to Mr. George Ellis, president
of the Pennsylvania Coal Miners Association. Prior to taking
this position, Mr. Ellis was a member of the Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association and the executive director of the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives' Mines and Energy
Management Committee, and a graduate of King's College in
Wilkes-Barre, the heart of coal country.
Welcome, Mr. Ellis, and we look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Ellis. Thank you, Senator, and good morning. You have
my complete testimony so I'll try and summarize what I think
the high points are.
One of the things I do want to start off with, though, is
the commitment that PCA member companies have to safety is
paramount. PCA, PCA members, our coal companies do not play
Russian roulette with their workers' safety. The evidence
indicates that that is the case. While mining inherently is a
dangerous job, our companies' commitment to safety is
paramount, among all mining factors.
Both the State and Federal laws have served to focus the
attention of industry and miners on the prevention of hazardous
conditions that lead to major disasters. One clear purpose of
the law was to develop a safety culture within the mining
community designed to ensure, not only compliance with
standards, but also to emphasize the importance of risk
analysis in reducing or minimizing the causes of accidents.
These laws, coupled with Federal and State regulators
working in tandem with mine operators and their employees, and
the tremendous advances that have been made in mining
technology, have unquestionably been effective in reducing the
frequency of accidents and fatalities in Pennsylvania's coal
mines. This is evidenced by the trend line illustrated on the
attached chart to my testimony.
As Governor Schweiker and Secretary Hess said, both the
Lost Time Accident Frequency Rate and the Fatal Accident
Frequency Rate have decreased in Pennsylvania over the past
decade as overall coal production increased by 25 percent.
While a single fatality is one too many, our commitments to
workers' health and safety is equal to any other coal producing
State or Nation.
Indeed, prior to Quecreek, Black Wolf's safety lost time
advisory, lost time accident frequency rate was zero. It was
our understanding that the purpose of this hearing was to
discuss mappings and rescue efforts, so I prepared my testimony
for that.
I do want to talk about July 24, though, obviously, when
nine very brave coal miners became trapped underground at the
Quecreek Mine. For the next 78 hours America and the world
watched as a team of able rescuers relentlessly struggled to
bring these men to the surface, which is certainly a profile in
courage and valor and a testament to the skill and
determination of both the rescuers and those that they saved.
From the beginning, DEP, MSHA and Black Wolf Company
officials emerged as the triumvirate heading the rescue effort.
DEP and MSHA, two deeply ingrained safety cultures that at
times appeared to be on a collision course, set aside their
rivalries, integrated operations at a designated command center
and managed and coordinate the response. Together with company
officials, they marshaled their considerable skills and
resources and collectively evaluated the situation and made the
correct decisions that ultimately lead to the rescue of the
trapped miners. It was an extraordinarily unified effort that
was as remarkable as it was successful.
As you begin to analyze the events that led to the
accident, it is important to understand the comprehensive
statutory and regulatory requirements already in place
governing the mine. Generally speaking, PCA believes that the
current State and Federal requirements for the mapping of
mines, and for the retention of maps, are adequate. It is the
accessibility of old maps that is the problem.
The current standards for mapping abandoned mines appears
to be sufficient and the current buffer requirements provide an
additional layer of safety to account for potential
inaccuracies. What is lacking, though, is a central repository
for maps, and the most important recommendation that can be
made is for the State or Federal Government to gather all the
available maps, plot them on a uniform coordinate system and
place them in a computerized central repository that is readily
accessible to agencies, operators, employees and the public. On
the State level, Representative Bob Bastian moved to introduce
legislation this week that will provide $4 million for this
effort.
In addition to approving the collection, storage and
archiving of mine maps, we also ask that you consider and
address the limited resources available to support mine rescue
teams. These are critical responders to mine emergencies and
sufficient funding should be allocated to sustain their
efforts. In addition, NIOSH should be encouraged to continue
its research on mine emergencies and development of training
materials to address such emergencies.
Finally, there is a significant concern about the prompt
payment of vendors who respond to mine emergency situations.
While we laud the recent efforts of Congress to include a $2
million line item in a Defense Appropriation Bill to help
defray the rescue cost, we also recommend that you consider
establishing a continual fund to ensure timely payment to the
vendors who participate in a mine rescue.
Once the arrangements are worked out between the carrier
and the company, then the State or Federal Government could
collect its money, recover its expenses there.
We also recommend that a centralized database of vendors is
developed on both the State and national levels to facilitate
rescue efforts.
prepared statement
The rest of my testimony, Senator, really highlights, sets
out the comprehensive State and Federal regulatory requirements
on mapping and submission of maps. I don't know how much more
time I would have, but I'd be glad to answer any questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of George Ellis
Good Morning. I am George Ellis, President of the Pennsylvania Coal
Association (PCA).
Seated with me is David Rebuck, President of the Black Wolf Coal
Company, Joseph Yuhas, counsel for Black Wolf, and R. Henry Moore of
Buchanan Ingersoll, P.C., counsel to PCA on mine safety issues. We
appreciate this opportunity to provide comments on the Quecreek Mine
accident.
PCA is a trade organization representing surface and underground
coal operators that produce three-fourths of the bituminous coal
annually mined in the Commonwealth and over 90 percent of the coal
produced by underground mining methods. In addition, it represents
companies whose existence depends in whole or in part on a robust coal
industry by providing essential services, ranging from engineering and
consulting to financial, insurance and the sale of mining equipment.
The Association's mission is to advance the mining and use of the
state's most abundant and economical energy resource in an
environmentally responsible manner through sound legislative and
regulatory policies and judicial decisions.
Pennsylvania ranks fourth among the states in the annual production
of bituminous coal. Last year we mined 85 million tons and directly
employed over 8,000 workers. Using conventional multipliers, the
Pennsylvania coal industry has a combined direct and indirect economic
benefit in excess of $11 billion.
Over 90 percent of Pennsylvania's coal production is used to
generate electricity. Last year, coal accounted for more than half (51
percent) of the electric power generated nationally and 59 percent of
the power produced in Pennsylvania.
While coal mining, inherently, is a dangerous job, PCA member
companies' commitment to safety is paramount among mining factors. We
closely follow the sage maxim that a safe mine is a productive mine and
a productive mine is a safe mine.
The state and federal safety laws have played a significant and
longstanding role in fostering occupational safety and health in our
mines.
These acts have served to focus the attention of industry and
miners on the prevention of hazardous conditions that lead to major
disasters and loss of life. One clear purpose was to develop a safety
``culture'' within the mining community designed to ensure not only
compliance with regulatory standards relating to the physical
conditions of the mine but also to emphasize the importance of risk
analysis in reducing or minimizing the ``causes'' of accidents.
These laws, coupled with federal and state regulators working in
tandem with mine operators and their employees and the tremendous
advances that have been made in mining technology, have unquestionably
been effective in reducing the frequency of accidents and fatalities in
the state's coal mines.
This is evidenced by the trendlines illustrated on the attached
charts. Both the Lost Time Accident Frequency Rate and the Fatal
Accident Frequency Rate have decreased in Pennsylvania over the past
decade as overall coal production increased by 25 percent. While a
single fatality is one too many, our commitment to workers' health and
safety is equal to any other coal producing state or nation.
It is our understanding that, among other things, the purpose of
the hearing is to discuss mapping of abandoned mine adjacent to active
workings, the coordination of Federal, State and Local rescue efforts
following the Quecreek Mine inundation; and the adequacy of Federal
funding for the mine-related emergencies. We will address a number of
these issues in our testimony.
On July 24th, nine very brave coal miners became trapped
underground at the Quecreek Mine in Somerset County. For the next 78
hours, American and the world watched as a team of able rescuers
relentlessly struggled to bring these nine men to the surface. This
profile in courage and valor was a testament to the skill and
determination of both the rescuers and those they saved.
From the beginning, DEP, MSHA and Black Wolf company officials
emerged as the triumvirate heading the rescue effort. DEP and MSHA, two
deeply ingrained safety cultures that at times appear to be on a
collision course, set aside their rivalries and historical turf
battles, integrated operations at a designated Command Center
(initially near the mine portal then later at the rescue site) to
manage and coordinate the response. Together with company officials
they marshaled their considerable skills and resources and collectively
evaluated the situation then made the correct decisions that ultimately
led to the rescue of the trapped miners. It was an extraordinarily
unified effort that was as remarkable as it was successful.
As you begin to analyze the events that led to the accident, it is
important to understand the comprehensive statutory and regulatory
requirements already in place governing mining activities. The
following includes a discussion of the current statutory, regulatory
and policy guidance requirements relating to mine maps for bituminous
underground mines and which regulate mining near adjacent workings, as
well as mine permits and planning requirements and rescue and response
procedures.
Generally speaking, PCA believes that the current state and federal
requirements for the mapping of mines and retention of the maps are
adequate, but the accessibility of old maps is the problem. The current
standards for mapping abandoned mines appear to be sufficient and the
current ``buffer'' requirements provide an additional layer of safety
to account for potential inaccuracies. What is lacking, though, is a
central repository for maps; and the most important recommendation that
can be made is for the state or federal government to gather all the
available maps, plot them on a uniform coordinate system and place them
in a computerized central repository that is readily accessible to the
agencies, operators, employees and the public.
On the state level, Representative Bob Bastian of Somerset County
has proposed legislation that would appropriate $4 million to DEP for
the conversion of some 10,000 underground mine maps to GIS (Geographic
Information System) data and images. The funding 2 would include all
drilling and geophysical surveying activities necessary to accurately
locate the entire extent of mine workings. Sixty-three other State
House members have joined Representative Bastian as sponsors of the
legislation and the Representative intends to introduce the measure
this week.
In addition to improving the collection, storage and archiving of
mine maps, we also ask that you consider and address the limited
resources available to support mine rescue teams. These are critical
responders to mine emergencies and sufficient funding should be
allocated to sustain their efforts. In addition, NIOSH should be
encouraged to continue their research work on mine emergencies and the
development of training materials to address such emergencies.
Finally, there is a significant concern about prompt payment to
vendors who respond to mine emergency situations. While we laud the
recent efforts of Congress to include a $2 million line item in a
defense appropriations bill to help defray the rescue costs, PCA
recommends that the state or federal government establish a continual
fund to insure timely payment to the vendors who participate in a mine
rescue. Further, PCA recommends that a centralized database of vendors
be developed on both the state and national levels to facilitate rescue
efforts.
permit requirements
Current statutory and regulatory permit requirements for maps
The Pennsylvania ``permit'' mapping requirements are set forth in
the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act (``BMSLCA''),
52 P.S. Sec. 1406.1, et seq. Section 5(a) of the BMSLCA, 52 P.S.
Sec. 1406.5(a), imposes a requirement that each applicant for a
subsidence permit, which would include all bituminous underground coal
mines, must submit a ``map or plan of the scale and in a manner in
accordance with rules and regulations of the Department . . . showing
the location of the mine or mining operation, the extent to which
operations presently have been completed, and the extent to which
mining operations will be conducted under the permit being requested .
. .''
The mapping requirements of Section 5 are implemented by
regulations administered by DEP's McMurray District Mining Office
during the permit application process. Specifically the applicant must
provide information on: (1) the type of mining, surface or underground;
(2) name of mine, permit numbers or other identification; (3) the coal
seams or other mineral strata mined; (4) the extent of the coal or
other minerals removed; and (5) the location and elevation of impounded
water in the mine workings either overlying, below or within the permit
area. If this information is not available the applicant shall outline
the efforts to obtain it. 25 Pa. Code Sec. 89.141(c)(1)-(5).
The area covered by the above informational/narrative requirement
is the ``permit area,'' which is defined as ``The mine and surface
areas where underground mining activities occur.'' 25 Pa. Code
Sec. 89.5. See also, definition of ``underground mining activities,''
which broadly defines such activities. 25 Pa. Code Sec. 89.5.
More importantly, the applicant is required to submit a ``general
mine map,'' which must show, inter alia, ``the location and extent of
known workings of active, inactive or abandoned, underground or surface
mines, including identification of the coal seams mined and location of
mine openings to the surface within, above and below the proposed
permit area and adjacent areas.'' 25 Pa. Code Sec. 89.154.
The area covered by this mapping requirement is larger than the
area covered by the information/narrative requirements of
Sec. 89.141(c)(1)-(5) because it requests mapping on the permit area
and ``adjacent areas,'' which is defined as ``land located outside the
permit area, where air, surface or groundwater, fish, wildlife,
vegetation or other resources protected by this chapter may be
adversely impacted by mining and reclamation.'' 25 Pa. Code Sec. 89.5.
``The permit application, including all required maps, are
generally available for inspection and copying at DEP's McMurray
District Mining Office. 25 Pa. Code Sec. 86.35. In addition, applicants
must provide public notice that they have filed an application. 25 Pa.
Code Sec. 86.31.''
current state guidance
In addition to the regulations, DEP's ``guidance'' on permit
applications further refines the informational/mapping requirements
relating to adjoining active or inactive mines. The instructions for
completing Module 6 of the permit application relating to
``environmental resources'' provides that the applicant must submit
Environmental Resource Maps, which show the area above and adjacent to
the mining activity. At a minimum, the map shall include all areas
within 1,000 feet beyond the permit boundary unless otherwise directed
by the Department. The map must be no smaller than 1"=500', and be
prepared by a registered professional engineer, registered professional
land surveyor or a registered professional geologist. The ``Module 6.3
Map'' must, inter alia, outline other active, inactive and abandoned
mine workings (surface, auger and underground), above, below or within
1,000 feet laterally of the underground permit area. See,
Sec. 6.3(e)(7) of Module 6.\1\
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\1\ It should be noted that some of the mine mapping requirements
are ``local.'' For example, several provisions of the Municipal Code
authorize local municipalities to create a Bureau of Mine Inspection
and Surface Support, which can request mine maps from mines operating
within its boundaries. See, e.g., 53 P.S., Part V, Chapter 81, Article
XXII (relating to Third Class Cities) and 53 P.S., Part VI, Chapter 91,
Article XI (I) (relating to Boroughs). In addition, there is a separate
``mine map'' requirement relating to Allegheny County, which requires
mine maps to be filed with the County Commissioners. See 52 P.S.
Sec. 1408 (relating to Counties of the Second Class).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, all bituminous underground operators are required to
file in the Recorder of Deeds Office of the county where mining will
occur, an updated mine map every six months. This map shows the
location of adjacent mines in relationship to mining that is projected
to occur during the next six months. 25 Pa. Code Sec. 89.145(b).
The information that is submitted on the location of abandoned mine
workings is based on the information available to the operator. There
are no uniform procedures for obtaining this information and,
certainly, no single source. Invariably, operators rely on a variety of
sources to obtain old mine maps, including the federal Greentree
Repository, DEP's McMurray and Uniontown offices, universities'
libraries, the county courthouse, the owner of the mineral estate and
other coal companies. While operator's engineers cannot always
``certify'' the location of the abandoned workings if the survey data
is not available (and those who do certify the maps are attesting to
the accuracy of the work they performed), in our experience it is the
availability of the final maps of abandoned mines that is the biggest
problem not the accuracy of otherwise available maps.\2\ In this
regard, it is crucial to recognize that ultimately a ``good map'' of
the old Saxman Mine was found. It is not that reliable maps do not
exist, it is that there is no surefire central place to obtain them.
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\2\ This may not be true in the anthracite portion of Pennsylvania.
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In addition to a review of the maps during the permitting process,
where there is more of an environmental focus, further reviews
confirming the accuracy of the mapping of active workings for
subsidence purposes occur at the time of mining and are conducted by
state mine inspectors as part of their routine inspections of
underground mines. This provides inspectors with another opportunity
for validating the accuracy of mine maps.
Please keep in mine as you examine issues relating to the accuracy
of active mine mapping or the accuracy of the mapping of mines closed
since the early part of this Century, that Pennsylvania operators,
since 1911, have been required to prepare a ``final'' map on each mine
closed. (See Section 240 of the Mine Act, 52 P.S. Sec. 701-240, the
provisions of which have been in effect since at least 1911.) Thus,
there is no need to impose ``new'' permit mapping requirements. There
is, however, a need to make maps easily and readily available.
Finally, current requirements provide that the mine maps prepared
as part of the permit application process must be available for public
inspection and copying at DEP's McMurray District Office and before an
application is filed each operator must publish a ``public notice''
informing the public that an application has been filed and can be
reviewed. 25 Pa. Code Sec. Sec. 86.31 and 86.35. As noted, at least
every six months ``updated'' mine maps are recorded in the Recorder of
Deeds Office. Thus, there is no need to impose ``new'' permit
requirements relating to public access to mine maps.
state mine safety provisions
Current statutory requirements
In addition to the statutory requirements that are ``permit''
related, there are additional mapping requirements imposed by the
Bituminous Coal Mine Act of 1961 (``BCMA''), 52 P.S. Sec. 701-101, et
seq. which are appropriately designed to assure the accuracy of mine
maps at the time most crucial to mine safety--when active mining
actually approaches adjacent workings. In this regard, PCA submits it
is crucial to recognize that requiring maps to be ``certified'' when a
permit is issued, years before mining near adjacent workings will
occur, is not the answer. The time to determine if ``good'' maps exist
is at a time appropriately prior to when actual mining will occur, when
the goal should be to obtain good, reliable, current information.
Reliance should not be placed on ``stale'' data. These mine safety
related mine map requirements include: (i) a requirement that the
superintendent of each bituminous coal mine maintain an accurate mine
map showing, inter alia, the location of adjoining mines, 52 P.S.
Sec. 701-235; (ii) a provision authorizing mine inspectors to require
accurate mapping of an adjoining mine when the working of another mine
are within 1,000 feet of the adjoining mine, 52 P.S. Sec. 701-236; and
(iii) a requirement that when a mine has been abandoned for a period of
one year a map of the abandoned working be prepared and sent to the
BDMS, 52 P.S. Sec. 701-240.
In addition, the general mine map is required to be reviewed every
six months. 52 P.S. Sec. 701-238. A true copy of the map is kept at the
mine office, typically in the foreman's room, and it is available to
the mine inspector and the miners who work in the mine and/or an
authorized representative of the miners. 52 P.S. Sec. 701-237.
In addition to being available at the mine, every six months an
operator is required to furnish the state inspector responsible for its
mine with a copy of the updated map. This map includes projections of
anticipated mining for the next six to twelve months, providing the
inspector the time to check the maps to ensure no intersection with
abandoned mines. 52 P.S. Sec. 701-239. The maps are maintained by the
state inspector and there are provisions that address the issue of what
happens to the map when the inspector is no longer responsible for the
mine. 52 P.S. Sec. 701-239. In practical application, the inspector
assigned to a mine will request, and receive, updated maps more often
than every six months.\3\
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\3\ Section 239 of the BCMA indicates that the maps will be
exchanged between operators of adjacent active mines but requires
consent of the operator to permit production of the maps to outside
parties. That provision appears to have been superseded by federal
requirements about the availability of maps to the public under BMSLCA
and the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (``FMSHA''). See,
e.g., 30 U.S.C. Sec. 801, 30 C.F.R. Sec. 75.1203.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As previously discussed, Section 240 of the BCMA requires an
operator to submit a certified map to the Department when a mine has
been abandoned for a year or more. 52 P.S. Sec. 701-240. This
requirement, along with most other provisions of the BCMA, has been in
effect since at least 1911. Prior to the creation of DEP, the maps
would have been submitted to the Department of Mines, one of DEP's
predecessor agencies. Section 241 of the BCMA, permits an inspector, if
he believes a map is inaccurate, to require a survey of the mine at the
operator's cost. Again, the issue is not whether good maps exist--the
issue is developing a system to assure that all available maps are
readily accessible to mine operators, their employees and
representatives, the State and the public.
In addition to the mapping requirements, Section 224(b) of the BCMA
requires underground probe drilling to occur whenever mining is within
200 feet of an adjacent mine. It further requires boreholes to be
drilled to a distance of at least 20 feet in advance of the face (as
measured at the end of the cut). This last provision has not kept pace
with certain contemporary mining practices. For example, a number of
mines in Pennsylvania have obtained approval to take ``deep cuts'' when
they are mining with continuous miners. Traditionally 20 foot cuts have
been the norm because that is the distance from the operator's
compartment on a continuous miner to the front of the miner. Deep cuts
typically exceed the length of the miner and, depending on roof
conditions, may result in cuts 40 feet in depth from the last row of
permanent roof supports to the face.
When ``good maps'' are not readily available the answer should not
be a requirement for operators to drill holes from the surface in a
particular pattern in an attempt to locate adjacent abandoned workings.
This procedure is not an effective way of locating abandoned mine
workings. It depends on the driller hitting the mined out areas, as
opposed to coal pillars, and recognizing them as voids, as well as
recognizing that water encountered is, in fact, mine water, rather than
an aquifer. In Quecreek's case, such drilling may have missed the
narrow extension from the body of the mine workings that the miners
actually encountered.
The State has also granted at least five variances under Section
702 of the BCMA to permit horizontal drilling (Section 702 is the
operator's only mechanism to use an alternative method or technology to
a specific requirement of the state's safety law). This type of
drilling is done at the operator's initiative. Because horizontal
drilling may be more effective in certain cases than the type of
drilling required by Section 224(b), it is likely that any operator
subject to the Section 224(b) requirement who can feasibly conduct such
drilling will seek a variance.
However, the 702 process is protracted and extremely cumbersome. To
illustrate the time and effort needed to secure a variance under
Section 702, I submit for the record, correspondence from one of PCA's
member companies that chronicles the process that it had to follow to
receive a variance to permit horizontal drilling. To ease this
burdensome requirement and make this provision of the law applicable to
contemporary mining technology, PCA has prepared a draft amendment
(attached) to Section 224(b) to allow horizontal drilling without going
through the Section 702 variance approval process.
State enforcement provisions
Pennsylvania coal mines are rigorously and frequently scrutinized
by State mine inspectors. Although State law requires quarterly
inspections of mines that liberate methane, it does not mean an
inspector's presence at the mine is limited to four days a year.
Indeed, with the recent consolidation and concentration of the mining
industry, there are now fewer underground coal mines than at any point
in Pennsylvania's history. Without a corresponding reduction to the
State workforce, this means that many mines have an inspector assigned
to them on a full time basis. This results in as many as 150-200
inspection shifts a year from a state mine inspector, not including the
number of inspection days that may result from state electrical
inspections.
An inspection shift means one inspector at a mine for all or part
of a shift. Typically, an inspector spends four to six hours
underground in the active mining areas taking methane and gas readings,
checking roof conditions and ventilation controls and looking for
potential hazards.
State mine inspectors are able to keep track of the extent of
ongoing mining on a timely basis and to observe the conditions in the
active sections. By focusing their attention on areas of active mining,
inspectors are able to correlate what they observe in the mine with the
continually updated maps, required by the Mine Act to be on file in the
mine office, to verify accuracy. Inspectors can (and should) even walk
the perimeters of soon to be sealed areas to verify the mapping, and if
any inaccuracies are found, they can be immediately corrected.
BDMS is allowed, at the inspector's discretion, to request an
updated map from the operator. BDMS' Uniontown office also makes such
requests from time to time and maps are then provided.
If a BDMS inspector believes that an operator has not complied with
the statutory requirements, he can force compliance. This is normally
done through the issuance of ``compliance orders'' requiring compliance
within a specified time period. They also have the authority to issue
immediately effective withdrawal orders if they believe mine conditions
present so great a hazard that delay in correcting the conditions might
cause loss of life or serious personal injury. 52 P.S. Sec. 701-121.
The system is in place to assure that accurate maps are prepared.
What is needed is a system to cause all available maps to be centrally
located and easily accessible.
Post-Quecreek actions by the state
In the aftermath of the Quecreek accident, DEP took a number of
steps to determine if other active underground coal mines, at least in
the short-term, are at risk of ``breaking through'' to abandoned voids.
DEP's McMurray and DMS offices reviewed maps of permitted
underground coal mines to determine their accuracy. According to the
Department, 34 of the 54 permitted underground coal mines were in some
way adjacent to an abandoned working. The maps of these mines were
examined to determine if mine pools exist in the abandoned section that
could submerge the adjacent mine with water if breached.
The intent was to try to define the universe of mine polls within
abandoned mines through an inventory and fixing their exact locations
and proximity to active workings.
In addition, DMS sent out an advisory to all underground operators
urging them to review their mining plans and maps as a precaution after
the Quecreek accident. Referring to Quecreek and the consequences of
inaccurate maps of abandoned mine workings, the directive stated that:
``Each mine operator should immediately review their mining plans
and assure that the required `Barrier Pillars' are in place. Any
questionable areas need to be identified and appropriate safety
precautions implemented. Inspectors with the Bureau of Deep Mine Safety
also review plans submitted by any mine operator who has active
workings within 1,000 feet of an abandoned mine.''
These actions led to the issuance of orders to operators of 19
underground bituminous coal mines to ensure that abandoned adjacent
workings are properly identified and defined. This order provides that
when mining is within 500 feet of a ``charted mine working'' (defined
as one that is known to exist and which is shown on an existing map)
the operator must provide DEP with ``credible evidence'' of the
location of such workings. This requirement, which is not currently
applicable industry-wide, is in addition to the mapping requirements
imposed by the Mine Act and 25 Pa. Code Chapter 89, as interpreted by
DEP's permit module instructions.
The Department and Governor's office view this as an interim step
and is looking for guidance on more permanent action from a special
panel that the governor convened to review certain aspects of the
Quecreek incident.
In addition, MSHA is conducting a national symposium in Charleston,
West Virginia on October 29 to discuss application of state-of-the-art
technology as a means to help prevent an accident like the one that
occurred at Quecreek.
msha
Applicable MSHA standards
In addition to the numerous State ``permitting'' and mine safety
related mapping and operational requirements the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Administration (``MSHA'') also imposes various mapping and
operational requirements relative to adjacent workings. 30 C.F.R.
Sec. 75.1200 requires each operator to maintain a mine map showing all
adjacent workings within 1,000 feet and all mines above or below the
mine, as well as water pools above the mine.\4\ 30 C.F.R. Sec. 75.1200-
1 further requires the Section 75.1200 map to show areas within the
mine where water has been dammed or held back within the mine.
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\4\ This provision was contained in the Federal Coal Mine Safety
and Health Act of 1969 as well as FMSHA, 30 U.S.C. Sec. 862. No such
federal requirement appears to have existed prior to that in the
Federal Coal Mine Safety Act of 1952, Public Law 552, Ch. 877.
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30 C.F.R. Sec. 75.1203 requires the operator to make its mine map
available to state and federal mine inspectors, miners and their
representatives, operators of adjacent coal mines, and persons owning,
leasing or residing on the surface of such mines or adjacent surface
areas. That map must be updated with temporary notations and is
typically posted in the foreman's office at the mine. According to
informal MSHA policy, such updating must be done within 24 hours,
although in practical effect it occurs after the shift on which the
mining occurred. These requirements have been in effect since 1969.
Further, 30 C.F.R. Sec. 75.1204 requires the filing of a map when an
operator closes a mine or idles it for 90 days. The map is to be filed
with the Secretary of Labor, is required to be certified, and be
available for public inspection.
In addition 30 C.F.R. Sec. 75.372(b)(3) and (4) require an operator
to submit a ventilation map which shows overlying and underlying mine
workings and any mine working within 1000 feet. Those maps are required
to be updated every 12 months. Although surveys are not conducted,
these maps are closely reviewed by MSHA personnel on an on-going basis
through inspections specifically intended to verify the accuracy of the
maps.
30 C.F.R. Sec. 75.388 requires probe drilling when mining is within
200 feet of any adjacent mine working unless it can be examined. In
order to use horizontal drilling under the federal standard, an
operator must seek approval from the District Manager. 30 C.F.R.
Sec. 75.388(g).
Federal enforcement
The requirements of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977,
(``FMSHA''), 30 U.S.C. Sec. 801 et. seq., and the regulations
promulgated under it are enforced by regular inspections of
Pennsylvania mines. MSHA is required to inspect underground mines in
their entirety four times a year. 30 U.S.C. Sec. 813(a). If mines
liberate methane, additional spot inspections are required, the number
depending on the amount of methane liberated. 30 U.S.C. Sec. 813(i).
MSHA also responds to complaints by miners whenever they are made in
accordance with Section 103(g) of the federal law or are anonymous
``code-a-phone'' type complaints. 30 U.S.C. Sec. 813(g).
For larger mines, this means that there is a federal inspector at
the mine almost every weekday. The larger mines in Pennsylvania have as
many as 500 ``inspection days'' a year. In 2000, the latest year for
which PCA has data from MSHA, two Pennsylvania mines had over 3,500
MSHA on-site inspection hours, four mines had over 3,000 such hours.
While the number of mines has declined over the last several years, the
number of federal inspectors has remained constant. This has resulted
in an increase in the inspector presence at the mines.
These inspectors focus their attention primarily on the active
mining areas. For example, spot inspections done every 5 days in some
mines are conducted almost exclusively in the areas of active mining.
They are readily able to observe mine conditions as mining advances and
correlate it to the mine mapping that is done. If this is not the case,
it can easily be remedied.
MSHA inspectors also have enforcement authority which they
routinely exercise. They can issue citations which carry civil
penalties of up to $55,000 and which require abatement within a
specified time. They can issue immediately effective withdrawal orders
if abatement is not accomplished within a specified time, if an
``imminent danger'' exists, if a ``pattern of violations'' exists, if a
miner has not received the required training, or if certain
preconditions related to the operator's negligence, known as
``unwarrantable failures'' exist.
training
The State has no training specific requirements under the BCMA,
although it does provide training assistance and oversees certification
of mine officials. MSHA, however, has extensive training requirements.
It requires 40 hours of training before an underground miner begins
work. 30 C.F.R. Sec. 48.5. It requires 8 hours of annual refresher
training. 30 C.F.R. Sec. 48.8. It requires ``task'' training if a miner
operates equipment that he has not previously operated or if the new
job he is to perform is not part of his regularly assigned duties. 30
C.F.R. Sec. 48.7. The new miner training and annual refresher training
include ``hands-on'' training in the use of self contained self
rescuers, training on the mine's escapeways, and barricading. See, 30
C.F.R. Sec. 48.5 and Sec. 48.8. Such training also includes many other
topics, such as roof control.
Once the State and federal investigations of the Quecreek Mine
accident conclude, those lessons learned about mining near impounded
water, including an identification of precursory conditions or early
warning signs that would indicate potential hazards, should be
incorporated in the MSHA required annual refresher training.
With respect to training, PCA urges careful review and restraint.
While we recognize that the type of inundation which occurred at
Quecreek had very serious consequences, the accident was not the result
of a lack of training. A review of accident histories indicates there
are other, at least as significant, hazards to miners which result in
injuries on a far more frequent basis. PCA members direct their non-
mandated training efforts towards avoiding these types of hazards. PCA
believes far more significant benefits can be derived by focusing
training on the type of injuries that are common to our industry, such
as roof falls, strains and sprains. We are not suggesting that training
on the issues associated with inundations is unnecessary. On the
contrary we recognize the need for such training. However, we believe
that such training should be situation-specific and mine-specific. To
adopt an across-the-board requirement for additional inundation
training would divert training resources from subjects that are of more
consequence to the majority of miners.
The Quecreek rescue may also present an opportunity for
improvements to emergency response procedures. In this case, the rescue
was accomplished as a result of a very prompt response to the
breakthrough by the miners underground and by excellent communication
and coordination among the agencies and the operator on the surface. We
would suggest that this presents several opportunities for sharing what
was learned among emergency responders, particularly in emergencies
where there are multiple agencies involved.
After other mine emergencies, NIOSH has developed training tools to
help in response to future emergencies. For example, they have
developed a short training program known as ``The Emergency
Communication Triangle,'' to help facilitate communication in an
emergency. The Quecreek miners appeared to have utilized such
principles especially in their communication to the miners who escaped.
In addition, NIOSH has conducted research on emergency response and
management issues by interviewing miners who escaped mine fires and
this research has helped the agency prepare additional training tools.
In this instance, it might be appropriate and useful the for Bureau to
conduct such research with respect to how events evolved underground as
well as in the command center. While such research would not be
specific to inundation, it would have broad applicability to mine
emergencies in general.
rescue and response procedures
PCA's members prepare themselves for an emergency in a number of
ways. MSHA requires operators to establish mine rescue teams or to
enter into arrangements which insure the availability of at least two
teams while miners are underground. 30 C.F.R. Sec. 49.2. A number of
PCA's members maintain mine rescue teams. Some of PCA's members provide
personnel to the state maintained mine rescue team.
The cost of establishing and maintaining a team is significant,
about $250,000 per year. MSHA requires 20 hours of initial training and
40 hours of annual refresher training. Many mines exceed that by a
large margin, some mines hold 35-40 practices for their rescue teams
each year. For a team of 10 members, this is a significant cost in
terms of wages alone, at an average of $150/miner/shift. Mine rescue
equipment costs $6,000 per apparatus and most of the inventory in
Pennsylvania will have to be replaced by 2006 because parts are no
longer being made to equip the current apparatus. For an operator that
has a 10 member team, that cost alone will be $60,000.
But such preparation does not end with the establishment and
training of mine rescue teams. Many PCA members who maintain teams also
participate in mine rescue contests and in mine emergency problems that
have been conducted in conjunction with the BDMS and MSHA. These
exercises have included mock drills and role-playing, and have proven
to be extremely valuable training and evaluation tools.
Unfortunately, this important resource is dwindling at an alarming
rate. At an MSHA public meeting at the Beckley Mine Academy in March,
it was reported that at the 1985 National Mine Rescue Contest, there
were 106 rescue teams, 28 first aid teams and 62 bench participants. At
the last National Contest in 2001, there were 38 rescue teams (-64
percent), 15 first aid teams (-46 percent) and 37 bench competitors
(-40 percent).
It is PCA's belief that this Commission should recommend that
Pennsylvania utilize monies received as state grants from MSHA to
subsidize rescue teams both for large and small operators. It already
assists small operators in using such grants to obtain mine rescue
apparatus. It should also expand the use of such grants to assist in
paying the wages of rescue team members as well as the purchase of
equipment for both large and small operators.
PCA members also have in place emergency preparedness plans. These
plans cover such issues as the responsibilities for notification of
appropriate government agencies, mine and corporate officials and
emergency services.
The difficulty with the use of such plans is that much of what
occurs in the event of a major mine accident such as a fire, or
explosion, must be accomplished as the event unfolds. Most of the
preplanning that occurs is intended to establish the parameters of
notification of management, the agencies, and the miners, recognizing
that hard and fast rules cannot be readily applied to every mine-
specific situation.
The interaction of the mine personnel with the agency personnel may
be determinative of the outcome of an accident. MSHA has the authority
to issue orders, known as 103(k) orders, which order withdrawal of
miners and essentially control access to the mine for rescue purposes.
Because of this authority and because of the need for interaction
between state and federal agencies and mine management and the
representative of the miners, it is on occasion difficult to have
decisions made and executed in the time frames necessary for effective
rescue.
vendors
In every mine emergency, vendors, such as drillers and equipment
companies, are asked to respond in an expedited fashion without the
luxury of purchase agreements or invoices. In mine emergencies, the
operator may have mine emergency insurance but usually it has a large
deductible. The mine emergency may destroy an operator's ability to
render prompt payment. In some instances, the state or MSHA may have
requested the supplies or equipment. All of this may make it difficult
to resolve payment issues after the emergency passes. PCA would suggest
that the State or Federal government establish an ``emergency fund''
out of which vendors may be promptly paid while the agencies, the
operators and the insurance company resolve payment issues. The state
in turn could then seek repayment from the operator or the insurance
companies. This would prevent vendors who may be small companies from
incurring a huge cost burden which could be an impediment to
volunteers.
One area that might assist in an emergency is maintenance by the
state of a vendor database. Some operators maintain such a list, but it
would be a useful tool in emergencies. MSHA and the National Mining
Association are considering developing such a database. Such database
would have to include ``after hours'' contact numbers and be easily
accessible and updated regularly. It seems to us it would be
appropriate for the state to devote resources to such a database.
conclusion
The current mine map requirements imposed on bituminous underground
coal operators are adequate. There is not a need for new statutory,
regulatory or policy requirements relating to mine maps or permitting.
The focus should be on assuring that the existing requirements are met
and latest maps of abandoned mines are accessible in a central
location.
Similarly, the existing operational requirements relating to mining
near ``adjacent'' mines appear to be adequate. Again the focus should
be on assuring that accurate information concerning the location of
adjacent workings is available.
It is our recommendation that the following steps be taken:
1. That a central repository be established for mine maps in the
Commonwealth consistent with its existing authority.
2. Copies of any and all mine maps of existing mines shall be
placed in such repository. The BDMS and DEP would collect in such
repository copies of mine maps that have been submitted to DEP or BDMS
for mines that have ceased to operate. DEP and BDMS would also obtain
from MSHA copies of any and all maps of abandoned mines in the
Commonwealth that have been submitted to it. DEP and BDMS will seek out
other sources of maps of abandoned mines from existing operators, state
mine inspectors, former state mine inspectors, museums, universities'
libraries, the former U.S. Bureau of Mines or any other source that
might provide information.
3. That such information be placed into a computerized mapping
system available to operators and state and federal agencies.
4. That grant money be available to mine operators for
establishing, maintaining and training mine rescue teams and for
purchasing required equipment.
5. That an emergency fund be established for the purpose of
reimbursing vendors who provide services in a mine emergency in a
timely fashion.
6. That NIOSH conduct a study of the response underground and at
the command center at Quecreek and develop training to assist in miner
emergencies.
7. That DEP develop an accessible database of vendors who may be
utilized in mine emergencies.
Senator Specter. How much more time do you have? The red
light has been on for some time, but go ahead.
Mr. Ellis. I'll take as much as you will give me.
Senator Specter. Take as much as you need, Mr. Ellis, these
are very important subjects.
Mr. Ellis. I appreciate it. On the State level there really
is two different laws that regulate mining, in general. One is
the Bituminous Mine Subsidence Act, the other is the Bituminous
Mine Safety Law. The Subsidence Act, and we're just, for this
hearing since I thought the purpose was just on addressing
maps, and I'm just talking about the mapping the requirements,
we must submit a general map that shows the location of the
mine for mining operation and the extent to which operations
have been completed and the projected operations. Then there,
under section five, we also have to designate the location and
elevation of impounded water in mine workings, either
overlying, below or within the permit area.
Among other things as part of the permit process,
applicants are also required to submit a general mine map. This
among other things must show the location and extent of known
workings of active, inactive or abandoned underground surfaced
mines.
It further requires mapping on the permit areas in the
adjacent areas, again, which I define as land located outside
the permit areas, so it would take care of the adjacent areas.
There is also a guidance on how we go about doing this, and
at a minimum, our map has to include all areas within 1,000
feet beyond the permanent boundaries, and our Module 6.3 of the
permit application has to outline----
Senator Specter. You think the map ought to go 1,000 feet
beyond the known boundary?
Mr. Ellis. At the time of permit we have to, we have to
identify all these features and locations.
Senator Specter. How would that have related to the
incident at Quecreek, had that 1,000 foot addition been in
place, would this incident have been avoided?
Mr. Ellis. Unfortunately, Senator, the problem as I see it
with Quecreek was the accessibility of the final map as I go
later on to show.
Senator Specter. How much later on do you show that?
Mr. Ellis. I'll shut up and try to answer some of your
questions, because I think I know where you're coming from.
Since 1911, coal operators in Pennsylvania have been required
to submit a final map of their operations when it closes, okay.
That's been on file since 1911.
Senator Specter. But how good is a map, Mr. Ellis, if an
adjacent owner will take somebody else's ground so that you
don't know what the dangers are?
Mr. Ellis. Senator Specter, it is not, bootleg mining I
grant you occurred at times in the 1930s and 1940s, but it is
not a common occurrence that you seem to imply.
Senator Specter. Bootleg mining now is not a common
occurrence?
Mr. Ellis. That's correct. Right now, yes. Okay.
Senator Specter. Do you agree with that, Mr. Yankovich?
Mr. Yankovich. At this point in time, do I think, it
depends on the company, Senator, it depends on the size of the
company. I believe that the larger companies tend to be more
cautious and tend to be more careful about what they do. But as
far as small companies who--actually there is less, there is
less inspections done in smaller mines than there are in larger
mines, so if it could occur, it would occur there as opposed to
larger mines.
Senator Specter. Well, it seems to me that it is a
potential problem of enormous magnitude when you can't check on
it underground because there is no mechanism. That's something
we want to get into, but obviously here at Quecreek--maybe you
disagree with this, Mr. Ellis--here at Quecreek, the map was
inadequate because there had been, as you call it, bootleg
mining; correct?
Mr. Ellis. That's, that's the speculation. However, there
was also a final map of Quecreek that was correct and that was
in the State inspector's hands.
Senator Specter. Would that final map have disclosed the
bootleg mining?
Mr. Ellis. My understanding is that, yes, it did, that the
final map actually showed that the pillar of coal that Black
Wolf thought it was mining, a sizable portion of that was not
there.
Senator Specter. How would that map have shown it? Somebody
would have to go down into the mine to see the bootleg coal
mining. If you have a map which delineates the property, you
wouldn't expect the adjacent owner to be encroaching on
property which was not his.
Mr. Ellis. You're assuming it was bootleg mining. If the
facts, and see, the other problem we have, Senator, is that----
Senator Specter. I am not assuming that, that has been the
report. Is that report inaccurate?
Mr. Ellis. What's that, that there was bootleg--I haven't
heard----
Senator Specter. That adjacent owner, the Saxman Mine, had
moved beyond the line which was theirs and which was not
disclosed in the map.
Mr. Ellis. The mapping that this company had, my
understanding is that a final map of that mine was made
available to the State mine inspector and that did show the
worked out sections, the sections that Black Wolf thought they
were actually mining, that sizable portion was gone.
Senator Specter. We will come to that. There is some
disagreeing witnesses behind you, the miners, they are shaking
their heads in the negative. But that is why we have the
hearing, we are interested in what you have to say and we are
interested in what others have to say. We will find the facts,
and we will make the factual determination.
Mr. Ellis. We certainly stand ready to help you with those.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH MAIN, ADMINISTRATOR, DEPARTMENT OF
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY, UNITED MINE
WORKERS OF AMERICA
Senator Specter. I would like to call now Mr. Joseph Main,
the administrator of the United Mine Workers of America,
Department of Occupational Health and Safety, since 1992.
Responsible for oversight of mine accident investigations and
mine inspections since 1998. He served on the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention Federal Advisory Committee on
Mine Health Standards. Mr. Main testified before this
subcommittee on July 22, 1992 at a hearing regarding coal dust
monitoring.
Mr. Main, it's nice to see you again. We've had a number of
hearings on mine safety, and regrettably, we are having one
today. Thank you for coming, and we look forward to your
testimony.
Mr. Main. It is a pleasure, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of the
United Mine Workers and the miners who are represented across
the country, I want to take the opportunity to thank you for
holding this hearing today and asking some of the tough
questions that really need to be asked here.
Senator Specter. We just started on tough questions.
Mr. Main. I think that once a better picture of what's
going on gets laid out, I think there will be some more
questions that really need to be asked.
I would start off my testimony this morning, I'm going to
try to be very brief. No, there is not adequate funding of MSHA
as a start. Second, with regard to some previous testimony that
was submitted for the record, there is some major disagreements
with regard to the direction that MSHA, the leadership of MSHA
is moving this agency when it comes to what we believe needs to
be done to protect the miners. We have raised a number of those
issues directly with the agency and some involved enforcement
of the mine law here in the State of Pennsylvania, which I will
not get into today, but it is a troubling problem that, I think
you know that point in time in the role of the Mine Act, we are
taking, of course, this very, very mine.
With regard to Quecreek, and I will start there and talk
about the state of affairs on the national level last, but one
thing, I think that all of us recognize that that was a
miracle, that nine miners were pulled out of the Quecreek Mine.
A lot of my buddies who I work with on mine rescue were there
at the mine and I, like many others, sat on the sideline
watching as the rescue efforts unfolded, and I would have to
tell the miners they had some of the best that has been around
to carry out that job. We just recently served together in
Alabama at a mine disaster.
I would like to take the time to pass on appreciations to
Governor Schweiker, whose efforts brought to bear resources we
would all like to have seen in rescue efforts in the past, that
really I think helped the rescue process work.
But having said that, we are now to the questions of what
went wrong with Quecreek, and I think there are a lot of
questions that need to be asked. The public and the miners all
deserve a clear accounting of what went wrong.
How did so many miners get in a situation that their lives
were placed at so much risk? How did the coal company get so
close to a large uphill underground lake of water and cut into
it, jeopardizing those miners' lives? What signs did the
company have about the closeness of the underground lake as the
mined toward it? What was the seepage, or was the seepage to
the coal seam a warning in advance? Did the company have
advanced warnings as they mined closer to those old workings?
What did the pre-shift and on-shift examinations that the mine
operators are required to conduct each day at that mine show to
report the conditions the miners were in? What did the public
hearings that was held to allow the permitting of the Quecreek
Mine to begin with show? We've heard that there has been a
number of public citizens show up at those hearings that raised
concerns in advance of the approval about the large body of
water and potential of the mine mapping being inaccurate. Those
are all records that we think are pertinent.
prepared statement
Were the maps wrong at Saxman? Were the maps wrong at
Quecreek? Those are all fair questions that we believe have to
be answered to get to the truth of why so many miners were put
at risk.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph A. Main
In late July, the nation watched as rescuers scrambled to reach
nine miners trapped in a coal mine 240 feet below the earth's surface
in south western Pennsylvania. The real life drama played out for more
than three days as Americans, from coast to coast, were glued to their
TV's and radios praying for the miners to be found alive at the
Quecreek Mine.
Families of the trapped miners gathered in anguish at the
Sipesville firehouse near the Somerset mine, awaiting word on the fate
of the missing miners. It was a scene reminiscent of accidents that far
to often tragically strike coal mining towns across the country. As the
nation nervously awaited word from the rescue site, minutes turned into
hours and hours into days with hopes for the rescue of miners fading
fast. Water pumps, large drill rigs and rescuers rushed to the scene to
save the miners. After three days of exhaustive efforts, prayers were
answered when the miners were all found alive. Many called the survival
and ultimate rescue a ``miracle'' as the nine-trapped miners were
pulled from the jaws of death. The nation witnessed this coal mining
catastrophe in the malting come to an end. They experienced the
enormous dangers miners face daily. They better understood the
importance of mining safety laws--along with the need for stringent
enforcement.
From the moment millions of gallons of water rushed into the
Quecreek mine from the old Saxman mine workings, questions were raised.
What went wrong? How did so many miners' lives get placed at such a
high risk? How did the coal company get so close to such a large uphill
underground lake of water and cut into it, jeopardizing miners lives?
What signs did the company have about the closeness of the underground
lake as they mined toward it? Was there seepage through the coal seam
to warn them? Did the company have advance warnings as they mined close
to the old workings? Were the mining maps wrong from the old Saxman
mine? Were the maps for the Quecreek mine accurate? What information
was available on the massive amount of water embodied at the higher
elevation? What did the company know about the conditions in the
adjacent mine and when did they know it? There is much to be examined
in the wake of the Quecreek accident.
Answers to these questions are still illusive as federal
investigators conduct inquiries. Unfortunately, the information the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) has been
collecting on the accident is currently shielded from the public. It is
not known what information will be shared with the public on the
accident or when that will happen. Like other recent investigations of
mining accidents, MSHA's investigative process is beginning to raise
questions.
On the heels of the Quecreek accident, the UMWA quickly called upon
MSHA to conduct a review of mining operations nation-wide in order to
assess similar dangers. We called on MSHA to launch inspections to
identify mines that have a potential for inundations. While
investigations into Quecreek were ongoing, the UMWA called for
additional safeguards to protect miners where the boundaries of coal
barriers could not be verified and potential inundations exist. That
included requirements for larger coal barriers and earlier drilling to
take place until permanent solutions are found. We felt this was a
prudent safety policy. The current federal law that calls for drilling
only 20 foot holes, maintaining ten feet ahead of mining (which leaves
only a 10 foot barrier of coal between the miners and potential lakes
of water) as a mine gets within 200 feet of where a mine operator
thinks a barrier exists is inadequate protection for miners! The
Governor of Pennsylvania agreed and ordered drilling to begin 500 feet
from the suspected boundaries.
The capability exists to drill more than 20 foot holes ahead of
coal faces where miners are working so that mined out areas can be
detected. Some mine operators have been drilling holes for hundreds and
thousands of feet horizontally in coal mines. Some of these mines are
in Pennsylvania. Although mine operators drill the long holes to drain
methane gas in coal blocks, some do it to detect mined out areas of
abandoned coal mines. As Quecreek points out, drilling holes well in
advance of mining can and should be required for detecting faulty
boundaries. In the end there must be verification of boundaries or
large coal blocks to be in place as barriers separating old workings.
Additionally, more scrutiny must take place in mines to detect early
signs of water seepage from abandoned mines. Based on information
available, the barrier between Quecreek and the old Saxman mine was
mined up to a razor thin barrier when the water broke through. With the
lake of water at a higher elevation one would have expected pressure to
have caused water with the stagnant mine odor to seep in to the
Quecreek, giving some warning.
The near disaster at Quecreek has also placed a national spotlight
on coal mine health and safety--and rightfully so. Some were shocked to
learn that 42 coal miners were killed on the job last year and that the
number of coal miners killed on the job had risen each year for the
last three years. Many were also surprised to learn that the United
States had just suffered the worst coal mine disaster in nearly two
decades when a mine explosion ripped through the Jim Walter Resources
#5 Mine in Brookwood, Alabama last September. That mine disaster, which
killed 13 coal miners, came in the shadows of the September 11, 2001
attacks on America. (Although investigations into that disaster are
ongoing, findings thus far have identified numerous flaws in MSHA's
enforcement of the Mine Act.) In one short moment in time many
Americans learned that something was terribly wrong with coal mine
health and safety.
The response to this troubling safety record is more than
disturbing. In the face of three years of increases in coal miners'
deaths and the worst coal mine disaster in 17 years, the Bush
Administration sent a budget proposal to Congress urging cuts in
federal coal mine enforcement. Instead of putting more police on the
beat to increase enforcement of the mine safety laws and curb mining
deaths--they called for cuts in coal mine enforcement personnel. We do
appreciate the recent actions of the Senate Appropriations Committee in
proposing funding increases to correct these problems. We, however,
found that to only be the beginning of actions to undercut protections
for miners. In December of 2001, MSHA announced that they halted action
on a number of important health and safety rules aimed at increasing
protection for miners. Rules responding to; surface haulage accidents
(the number one killer at surface mines); flaws in use of Self
Contained Self Rescuer devices; and standards requiring use of
continuous respirable coal mine dust monitors to prevent the black lung
disease, were among those eliminated.
The Administration's budget also called for an end to the highly
successful ``miners choice'' chest x-ray program. This program had the
support of Congress and miners, which improved miner participation in
chest x-ray programs to identify the black lung disease. It also
provided surface miners with chest x-rays. Who will no longer have
chest x-rays available to them. MSHA recently inflicted even more
damage on the efforts to end black lung disease with policy changes in
the enforcement of the respirable coal mine dust standards. In July,
the Agency implemented policies contrary to past congressional support
that neutered MSHA mine site enforcement of the coal mine dust
standards. The policy reduced the number of MSHA dust sampling
inspections from six to four a year. They also barred inspectors from
using any of the four samples to cite mine operators for over
compliance. MSHA inspectors would only use those as targets for follow-
up sampling--and the operator could expose miners to dust levels well
in excess of the current standard before compliance dust sampling
inspections would be triggered. These policies are contrary to logic,
needs of miners and findings of Congress.
The actions to eliminate health and safety standards that would
increase protection for miners did not end after Quecreek. On September
26, 2002, MSHA announced the withdrawal of action on ``Air Quality,
Chemical Substances and Respiratory Protection Standards''. Those
standards have been in the works for some time to upgrade the levels of
chemicals and harmful agents coal miners have to breathe. The current
standards are three decades old and allow miners to be exposed to
chemicals and agents that are now recognized as unhealthy. Prior to
this announcement, MSHA abruptly withdrew action on rules that would
require conveyor belting in mines that would not catch fire as quickly
as older belting--ending years of work on standards to reduce fires
that far too often threaten miners lives.
As Quecreek unfolded it was believed the Agency would change
course. That was wrong! Not only have we have heard no calls by the top
levels of MSHA to ``beef up enforcement of the Mine Act'' since
Quecreek, we have instead heard calls for the Agency to move more
toward co-operation with mine operators. As the Administration's
proposed budget cuts in coal mine enforcement continues to be embraced
by the Agency, they continue to shift even more coal enforcement
resources toward compliance assistance programs. While compliance
assistance has its place, it should not be at the expense of policing
the nation's mines. The Agency is also reinforcing the shift in the
approach toward compliance assistance by changing the name of those
that police the nation's mines. With an administrative stroke of a pen
the Agency is finalizing plans to eliminate the ``coal mine inspector''
created by Congress in 1969. They are preparing to give them to a less
enforcement-orientated title--Health and Safety ``Compliance Assistance
Specialists.'' That sends the wrong message! Complaints about actions
to weaken enforcement are becoming far too common as the direction of
MSHA shifts. As we seek information from MSHA to investigate the
complaints being raised, delays and stonewalling has increased. A
number of complaints have been filed with MSHA over delays or refusal
to provide Freedom of Information requests.
When one assesses the leadership of the Agency it is easy to see
why MSHA is becoming an agency favoring mine health and safety policies
urged by the very industry being regulated. That is because the mining
industry has become a hiring hall for the top policy and career jobs in
the Agency. Currently; the Assistant Secretary for MSHA, the two Deputy
Assistant Secretaries for MSHA, the Assistant to the head of MSHA, the
Chief of Health and the Chief of Safety for Coal all came from the
corporate levels of the mining industry. With coal miners historically
being one of the most often killed workers in this country, it is
understandable why they do not take kindly to turning over their health
and safety to the company bosses.
In closing, we urge Congress to; Assure that a thorough
investigation of the Quecreek accident takes place--with increased
protections so other miners will not be placed in similar jeopardy;
Reverse the funding cuts sought by the Bush Administration, including a
beefing up of coal mine enforcement, restoration of the ``Miners
Choice'' chest x-ray program and restoring MSHA's coal mine dust
enforcement program; Act to reverse the current course which is
undercutting the enforcement of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act;
Move to restore regulatory actions on health and safety rules that
affect miners; And send a strong message to the leadership of MSHA that
Congress intends that the Mine Act be fully enforced and standards in
the nation's mines be improved. We would also urge Congress to examine
the process of filling top agency positions in MSHA. Thank You.
Senator Specter. What do you think, Mr. Main, do you have
enough to venture a judgement?
Mr. Main. I have enough to venture certain judgements, some
unfortunately we do not. One of the reasons for that is that
the State and Federal investigators that are putting most of
the stuff together are doing that behind the scenes and a lot
of that information has not been put out to the public.
Senator Specter. I think it's important for investigations
to be concluded. When they're done behind the scenes, there are
quite a few comments and concerns about not having public
hearings. That's one of the congressional oversight functions
on the State level as well, Mr. Ellis knows, he worked for the
State House of Representatives, to have public hearings and
disclose the facts and allow the public dialogue. Whenever you
raise a question during public dialogue, people hear it and
come forward with more information. That's the way to encourage
more fact finding, by having matters in the public dialogue. If
you have them all concealed and then you file some long report
that gathers dust, it doesn't really aid in the process.
So when I ask you about a judgement, I use the word
carefully. I'm not interested in speculation or guessing, I'm
interested here professionally, you've been at this a long
time, and my question to you is do you know enough to have a
judgement?
Mr. Main. On certain things I do have, and on the public
hearing issue, yes, we do. We came out early in support of the
public hearing. The last one that was done in a situation like
this actually was here in Pennsylvania, it was following the
Coca Cola Tunnel disaster where miners cut into water and nine
miners were killed.
Senator Specter. When was that?
Mr. Lauriski. That was in 1977 in Western, or in Eastern
Pennsylvania.
We saw the dimensions of what was going on here and we've
had a number of problems with the way the investigations have
been conducted in the past and raised a lot of concerns about
those, and we were one of the ones on the forefront calling for
a public hearing to get to the bottom of that so the facts
could get out and the public could see open faced what was
going on.
Unfortunately as we sit here now, we are barred from many
of those facts. We are on the sidelines, so to speak, this is
not a mine that we represent, but on the sidelines trying to
collect information.
Senator Specter. No, you are not, Mr. Main, you are on the
playing field.
Mr. Main. We are trying to get on the playing field.
Senator Specter. We are going to get those facts from the
investigation, in the public domain as well.
Mr. Main. The questions that I posed I think were all
important ones that we are hopeful that the investigators were
asking. We don't know that; but those are the ones that should
be within the framework of the questions raised, and what was
the inspector's findings when they were last in those mines?
Those are very, very important.
We need to keep in mind every mine operator's company is
required to, every shift, before they send miners into an area
of the mine workings, inspect that mine and to make sure that
the conditions are safe. What we read yesterday in the papers
was very disturbing to me, it confirms some of our suspicions,
Senator, that there was advanced warnings. But given some
certain facts here, was there enough facts----
Senator Specter. What facts do you know, Mr. Main, if any,
on advanced warnings? Because that's a critical point.
Mr. Main. There is some that we unfortunately are unable to
ask questions about, because a record has not been developed.
Was there citizens that showed up at the public hearings that
laid out concerns about a large body of water that the mine
operator would be mining next to? Was there concerns about
inaccurate maps? Was there advanced warnings as they mined into
that, was that things that the company would need to ask before
this tragedy occurred?
The question about the mine mapping, I think everyone has
agreed that we have had so many problems with the mapping in
this country that we've got to fix that problem. We need to
figure out a way to have the most accurate maps. But in this
case I understand that they had production records that may
have been available to show that they were still producing coal
at the old Saxman Mine well after the mining had, the mapping
had ended in the mine. I think the mapping ended in the 1950s,
they were still mining into the 1960s. I mean, production
records would have given someone an indication had they looked
at that.
Senator Specter. Production records of Saxman?
Mr. Main. Yes, that there was still mining at the time of
the map.
Senator Specter. We'll look into that.
Mr. Main. There is a number of questions along those lines.
The law currently as it is written, that requires the drilling
in advance with the 200 feet, is inadequate, and there is a
long list of accidents that have occurred, many since the Mine
Act passed, where miners were killed because they mined into
areas from either inrush of water or dangerous gases and were
killed. I think the Governor of Pennsylvania had it right when
he called for an immediate extension of that distance to 500
feet. We urged them to take similar approaches and to increase
those boundaries, figure out what they have got in mines----
Senator Specter. 500 feet and up?
Mr. Main. At this stage I feel a lot more comfortable with
500 feet than I do 200 feet. But there is some other
technologies and things that may even enable us to expand that
more.
Senator Specter. Is 500 feet enough?
Mr. Main. At this stag I'm not willing to say that that is
enough.
Senator Specter. Let us know.
Mr. Main. The reason I'll say that is that we have mines in
Pennsylvania that is drilling hundreds and thousands of feet,
some of them to detect voids, we talk about a standard that
only has us drilling 20 feet, and that is 10 feet ahead of the
actual coal face into the plot. It tells us that the knowledge
you were using in the mines is outdated, we can drill a lot
deeper holes than there are now.
In conclusion, I just have to say that with regard to the
Mine Safety Act, we have encountered numerous problems,
attempts to cut the budget, cut out the dust program that we
talked about in 1991, I'm not sure if you are aware of this but
there has been some major cutbacks in the enforcement program
that your Committee gets support for over the years. We really
don't have MSHA out doing dust inspections at coal mines
anymore, only target inspecting that may lead to follow-ups.
We have a concern about the folks who are running this
agency leading a path away from the Mine Act. And we recently
just found out there is attempts on their way to eliminate the
famous Coal Mine Safety Inspector Title, that those we now have
be called Health and Safety Analyst of some sort, and no longer
be Coal Mine Inspectors--be Compliance Assistance Analysts.
We're moving the resources in enforcement as we cut back more
to mine safety, or I mean to compliance assistance.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Mr. Main.
STATEMENT OF HOWARD MESSER, PROFESSOR OF LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH SCHOOL OF LAW
Senator Specter. We turn now to Howard Messer, Esquire,
counsel for seven of the nine miners who were trapped in the
Quecreek Mine. Mr. Messer has been a professor of law at the
University of Pittsburgh School of Law since 1986. Past
President of the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association, and
graduate of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
Thank you for joining us, Mr. Messer, and we look forward
to your testimony.
Mr. Messer. Thank you for giving me permission to speak
with you today, Senator. With all due respect to everybody
that's testified here today, I think I have a different
viewpoint of the calamity that could have happened at Quecreek
than most other folks.
The reason we're here today and the reason we're talking
about mine safety in Pennsylvania is because of all these men
behind me. The nine miners that walked out of that mine were
saved by a phone call from Dennis Hall, as you already have
mentioned. The other nine miners were trapped there for 77
hours.
The other thing we shouldn't forget here is that there are
a number of family members, all of the wives sitting in fire
halls in Sipesville and Shanksvillle, and I'm not sure of
everywhere else, but everybody was up, had as much emotional
connection with this event as the miners had. As the Governor
stated, it was an extremely emotional time.
But what we're here to find out is what could have made a
difference. As you pointed out, what could have made a
difference is understanding what I think is a backward
understanding of what could have given safety to these men.
The simple fact is that there is encroachments on a lot of
leases in Western Pennsylvania and throughout the State. It is
widely accepted among coal operators in Western Pennsylvania,
with all due respect to Mr. Ellis, that they know about
possible encroachments, they don't always occur, but there is
always that possibility. Therefore, what we have to conclude is
that all the mine maps are wrong, that unless we have a way in
which defined accurately what a mine map must entail or doesn't
have, we are on a wild goose chase.
There is a very simple--and I would offer to you, and I'm
not a mining engineer, there is a very simple way in order, I
believe, to define and to implement an excellent review of all
mine maps and upgrade them all. For example, in this situation,
it would have been very simple for Black Wolf, or Quecreek,
whoever owns this coal, to locate the Saxman Mine and the part
that was contiguous to their property. Obviously, that is the
most important element. Where was Saxman Mine in relation to
Quecreek?
Once you determine that and once you accept that there may
be an encroachment, then you have to drill for it. You should
not place the risk of finding the water on the miners, you
should place the risk of finding the voids and the water on the
people that mine the coal. These men go into a coal mine for
$15 an hour and risk their lives. It should be imperative for
the State and the Federal Government to have the burden of
proof on defining these voids and mines, not making the miners
do it themselves by horizontal drilling or some other way.
There might be a misconception that the miners did not know
that they were approaching a mine full of water. They knew that
they were approaching a mine, they were not told and not
advised that mine had been flooded and there was 77 million
gallons of water sitting there.
It is very important, and I would request your
consideration for the fact that we need open hearings here.
Senator Specter. Mr. Messer, was it known that the adjacent
mine had this tremendous quantity of water?
Mr. Messer. Yes, sir, in fact some of the homes that were
sitting on top of the mine were getting their house water from
the water in the mine. So that in the community, not only in
the community, but in the mining--to the DEP and others, they
certainly knew that the water was there. Somebody had to be
treating it, it had to be coming out of somewhere else as well.
I mean, there had to be notice of that fact.
Senator Specter. In addition to the homeowners as you
describe them above the mines getting their water----
Mr. Messer. Yes, sir.
Senator Specter [continuing]. Was there other evidence that
the mine had water?
Mr. Messer. I can't answer that question because I have not
been privy to any of the investigations being done by any of
the governmental bodies.
Senator Specter. When the homeowners got the water, they
must have had it treated in some way, they could not use it as
it came from the Saxman Mine could they?
Mr. Messer. I don't know, I can't tell you that, but it
clearly proves the water was there. Whether it was good water
or bad water, I can't tell you, but it shows that the water was
there.
Senator Specter. Proceed, please.
Mr. Messer. I have been faced in my representation of these
men and their wives and families with a, what I consider to be
an inadequate attempt to make them privy to the facts of what
happened to them. In order for me to get their statements from
MSHA, I had to sign a confidentiality agreement that I would
not release any of the information in those statements to
anyone, including this committee.
Senator Specter. Which statements were those?
Mr. Messer. The ones the miners themselves made to MSHA. As
you know when you give a statement to the FBI or a client gives
a statement to the FBI, the lawyer is entitled to a copy of the
statement. It seems to me the miners should have the same
benefits.
Senator Specter. Are you saying the miners gave statements,
they then wanted a copy of the statement and they were denied
it unless you as their lawyer agreed to keep it confidential?
Mr. Messer. That's correct. And I had to sign that
confidentiality agreement and return it to MSHA before they
would furnish me with those statements.
In addition, even after they knew that I was representing
at least five of the miners at that point, a meeting was called
at the premises of Black Wolf Mining, where, by the way, all of
the investigation work and interviews had taken place, to tell
the miners about the mine map that was discovered in the
museum.
I requested permission to attend with my clients this
meeting that was called by their employer and to be attended by
MSHA, and I was denied access to that meeting by MSHA and
indicated that at that point I would be a trespasser.
Senator Specter. Who was present at that meeting?
Mr. Messer. The representatives of Black Wolf, the
representatives of the Department of Environmental Protection
and MSHA. And I believe all the miners were invited to attend
as well.
Senator Specter. Did the miners attend, any of the miners
attend?
Mr. Messer. Yes, they did.
Senator Specter. But you as counsel----
Mr. Messer. I was not permitted to attend. The reason for
that, and I don't want to dwell on it anymore, the reason I
feel that these men and women need legal representation is
obvious, they are not sophisticated and they haven't been
trained to understand what the process is or the procedures
are, and the least we can do is afford them the rights that we
afford criminals charged with crimes, which is counsel to help
them move through and understand this process.
Senator Specter. You think they ought to have at least as
many rights as criminals?
Mr. Messer. Yes, sir.
Senator Specter. May the record show the miners and their
wives are smiling at that analogy.
Mr. Messer. Let me say lastly, Senator, that there aren't
many of us that came to work today, and I'm working and so are
you and many of the other ladies and gentlemen in this room are
here because they're working, but they do not walk into their
place of employment expecting a governmental agency or their
employer to protect them from personal injury. Most of us do
not on a daily basis risk our lives to do our jobs. Contrary to
what most of us do, these miners risk their lives every day to
mine coal. They go into the mine and they must rely, they do
not have any other resource, but to rely upon the Federal
Government through MSHA, the State government through the
Department of Environmental Protection and from their employer
to protect them from unforeseen events or known events or
suspected events or possible events. They have to trust and
have confidence that the information that they are given will
protect them.
So this Commission, this Committee that you are in charge
of, must understand that this isn't an ordinary circumstance.
We could have lost 19 men, and it all may be due to the fact
that somebody should have just said, close this section off and
get out, it is just too dangerous.
Senator Specter. Mr. Messer, the whole world knows that
this is no ordinary matter and that these men could have
perished. There are many others in mines every day, even as we
speak who are undertaking these risks. And our purpose of being
here is not only to praise these men but to try to prevent an
occurrence with others.
Mr. Messer. We thank you, because I think we found out more
information today than any of the hours of hearings we have sat
through up to this point.
STATEMENT OF DAVID REBUCK, PRESIDENT, BLACK WOLF COAL
COMPANY
Senator Specter. And we have just begun. Our next witness
is David Rebuck, President of the Black Wolf Coal Company and
Superintendent of the Quecreek Mine. Previously Mr. Rebuck had
been president of Rox Coal, Inc. and executive vice president
of Mincorp Inc. Mr. Rebuck received his bachelor's degree from
Penn State University and his master's degree from the Indiana
University of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Rebuck, at the outset, as a matter of fairness,
although I'm sure you have counsel who has advised you, there
is a possibility that whatever you say could be incriminating
both as to civil and potential criminal liability. There's no
requirement of warnings such as Miranda warnings, you're not in
custodial interrogation, but just as a matter of fairness, I
want to alert you to that. Although I am sure you have had
counsel and you know what you are about to do. For the record,
I want to say those few words.
Thank you for joining us and to the extent you wish to
testify, we would appreciate it.
Mr. Rebuck. Thank you, Senator Specter. My testimony really
deals with the rescue itself, and I would present it to you as
part of the record.
I would like to publicly thank all the many people,
businesses, agencies who assisted in the rescue of the nine
miners here at Quecreek. There was an overwhelming number of
people that contributed to the success of the rescue operation.
Many donated their time, equipment, supplies and expertise.
Companies throughout not only Somerset County and Pennsylvania
but actually from all over the country provided manpower,
equipment, supplies, technical advice and support.
Governor Schweiker delivered invaluable leadership and
inspiration to the rescue crews and to the miners' families.
Secretary Hess, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection, mine safety professionals from Pennsylvania's
Bureau of Deep Mine Safety, they were all instrumental to the
successful rescue effort.
Secretary Lauriski, the Mine Safety and Health
Administration, personnel from Johnstown field office, MSHA
District 2 Office, the engineers and scientists from MSHA Tech
Support, MSHA's Mine Emergency Unit were all available to
provide expert resources and guidance. There were many other
State and Federal agencies involved.
In particular, I must recognize the efforts of the
Pennsylvania State Police. Sergeant Madigan and troopers from
Somerset Barracks responded early to the situation and
controlled the rescue sites, they established family quarters
at Sipesville Fire Hall and they helped escort equipment and
supplies to the site.
Our local government representatives and staffs,
Representative Murtha, State Senator Richard Kasunic, State
Representative Bob Bastian and you and your staff, Senator
Specter, were available to provide any assistance.
Our local community provided support by the hundreds,
through local fire departments, emergency medical units,
Sipesville Fire Department Ladies Auxiliary, counselors,
churches, community organizations, neighbors and individuals
who made offers to do whatever was needed.
Closest to my heart is our own Quecreek Mine Team Members
and other coal miners throughout our area who volunteered their
time. They worked relentlessly in difficult conditions in the
mine pit or in the cornfield to reduce the level of water in
the mine. These hardworking men toiled generally out of sight
of the public eye, but certainly without their efforts the
rescue would not have been a success.
I would also like to mention the nine miners that are to
our left over here, they had escaped the mine that night and
were determined to stay and assist in the rescue efforts,
whatever their assigned duties. These miners are here today and
it is their unselfish spirit to succeed in the rescue that
exemplified all who participated.
These men along with other members of our staff were the
very first responders to the accident and their decisions and
actions in the initial hours of the rescue effort were
instrumental in successfully completing the mission.
I especially appreciate the faith and determination of the
rescued miners and their families.
prepared statement
Senator Specter, there is not enough words to express my
sincere appreciation for the dedication of the hundreds of
people that were involved in this rescue. If it were possible I
would like to thank each one individually, but I appreciate the
opportunity you gave me here today.
Ultimately, I thank God for his Divine guidance throughout
the rescue operation, only through His help was the miracle in
the mine achieved. I hope and pray that God will continue to
bless everyone. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Rebuck
Thank you, Senator Specter, for inviting me here to offer comments
today. My name is David Rebuck. I am President of Black Wolf Coal
Company and Superintendent at the Quecreek Mine. I am a life long
resident of Pennsylvania and have served in our state's mining industry
for over 27 years. I have a BS degree in Mining Engineering from the
Pennsylvania State University and a Master of Business Administration
degree from the Indiana University of Pennsylvania.
The Quecreek Mine is owned by Quecreek Mining, Inc., a subsidiary
of PBS Coals, Inc. Black Wolf Coal Company is the contract operator at
the Quecreek Mine. A partner, Charles ``Chuck'' Hankinson, and I
established Black Wolf Coal Company in 2001 specifically to operate the
Quecreek Mine and to eventually grow from there. At present, the entire
revenue for Black Wolf Coal Company is derived from operations at
Quecreek.
Chuck and I constitute the entire staff of the company along with
the Quecreek mine team members. All staff functions one would normally
associate with larger companies, such as engineering, accounting, legal
and other services, are provided to us by vendors. You can imagine
being a smaller company involved in an undertaking with the magnitude
of the Quecreek rescue that we desperately needed the help and
assistance of many others, which, thankfully was received.
Today I would like to publicly thank the many people, businesses
and agencies who assisted in the rescue of the nine miners at the
Quecreek Mine.
An overwhelming number of people and businesses contributed to the
success of the rescue operation. Many donated their time, equipment,
supplies and expertise. Companies throughout not only Somerset County
and Pennsylvania, but actually all over the country, provided manpower,
equipment, supplies, technical advice and support.
Governor Mark Schweiker delivered invaluable leadership and
inspiration to the rescue crews and the miner's families. Secretary
David Hess, the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection and
the mine safety professionals from Pennsylvania's Bureau of Deep Mine
Safety were instrumental to the successful rescue effort.
Asst. Secretary David Lauriski and his Mine Safety and Health
Administration (MSHA) team, with personnel from the Johnstown Field
Office, the MSHA District 2 office, the engineers and scientists from
MSHA Tech Support and MSHA's Mine Emergency Unit provided expert
resources and guidance.
Many other state and federal agencies provided worthy assistance.
In particular I must recognize the efforts of the Pennsylvania State
Police. Sgt. Patrick Madigan and troopers from Somerset Barracks
responded early and controlled the rescue sites, established the family
quarters at Sipesville Fire Hall and escorted equipment and supplies.
Our local government representatives and staffs--Rep. John Murtha,
State Senator Richard Kasunic, State Rep. Robert Bastian and you and
your staff, Senator Specter--were available to provide any assistance
required.
Our local community provided support by the hundreds through local
fire departments, emergency medical units, the Sipesville Fire
Department and Ladies Auxiliary, counselors, churches and community
organizations, and neighbors and individuals who made offers to do
``whatever was needed''. The words of hope and encouragement from
individuals throughout the world which were passed on to us, helped us
maintain positive morale.
Closest to my heart is our own Quecreek Mine team members and other
coal miners throughout our area who volunteered their time. They worked
relentlessly in difficult conditions in the mine pit and in the
cornfield to reduce the level of water in the mine. These hardworking
men, under the supervision of our Mine Foreman, Joe Hoffman, and Chuck
Hankinson, who also is the mine's Chief Electrician, toiled generally
out of sight of the public eye, but certainly, without their efforts
the rescue would not have been a success.
I want to mention the nine miners who had escaped from the mine
that night and who were determined to stay and assist in the rescue
efforts whatever their assigned duties. These miners are in attendance
today--Larry Summerville, Joseph Kostyk, Ronald Schad, David Petree,
Ryan Petree, Wendell Homer, Frank Stewart, Douglas Custer, and Barry
Carlson--and their unselfish spirit to succeed in the rescue
exemplified all who participated.
These men along with Dave Keller, our Safety Director, Dave
Harclerode, Mine Clerk, Joe Yuhas, and Joe Gallo of PBS Coals
Engineering, were the very first responders to the accident and their
decisions and actions in the initial hours of the rescue effort were
instrumental in successfully completing the mission.
I especially appreciate the faith and determination of the rescued
miners and their families throughout their ordeal. I especially want to
thank Quecreek miners Doug Custer, James Weiland and Leroy Lehman and
later John Weir of PBS Coals who were unfailing with their assistance
in communicating with the families.
Senator Specter, there are not enough words to express my sincere
appreciation for the dedication of the hundreds of people involved in
this rescue operation. If it were possible I would thank each person
individually. So to all I would ask to please accept my sincere and
heartfelt thanks on behalf of the nine team members, their families and
all involved with Black Wolf Coal Company and the Quecreek Mine.
Ultimately, I thank God for His divine guidance throughout the rescue
operation. Only through His help was the ``Miracle in the Mine''
achieved. I hope and pray that God will continue to bless everyone.
Senator Specter. Thank you, very much, Mr. Rebuck. I'm
interested to know the corporate structure. Quecreek is a
subsidiary of PBS Coals, Inc.; is that correct?
Mr. Rebuck. That's correct.
Senator Specter. Black Wolf is the contractor for Quecreek?
Mr. Rebuck. That's correct. We are the contract operator at
the mine.
Senator Specter. Black Wolf is the contractor for Quecreek,
Mincorp Inc. and Mincorp----
Mr. Rebuck. Mincorp is the parent company, PBS Coal is the
subsidiary and Quecreek Mining is a subsidiary of PBS Coal.
Senator Specter. Your resume lists you as an official of
Mincorp?
Mr. Rebuck. Former.
Senator Specter. Former. You're not an official of Mincorp
now?
Mr. Rebuck. That's correct.
Senator Specter. Do you speak only for Black Wolf or do you
speak also for PBS?
Mr. Rebuck. I speak only for Black Wolf Coal Company.
Senator Specter. To the extent you wish to comment, Mr.
Rebuck, did Black Wolf know that there had been encroachment by
Saxman into Black Wolf's land?
Mr. Rebuck. We did not.
Senator Specter. To the extent you wish to comment, what
efforts did Black Wolf make to ascertain the accuracy of the
maps which you were using?
Mr. Rebuck. We accepted the maps that was on our approved
permit.
Senator Specter. Accepted what maps?
Mr. Rebuck. The maps as indicated on the permit
application.
Senator Specter. Do you accept what Mr. Messer has said
about the frequency of encroachment by adjacent mine owners
like Saxman onto Black Wolf's land?
Mr. Rebuck. I was not aware of any encroachment. I have not
seen any encroachment at all.
Senator Specter. Aside from not being aware of any
encroachment, to the extent you wish to comment, were you aware
that it was a practice or a common practice to have such
encroachment? Here to lay all the cards on top the table, Mr.
Rebuck, I'm asking you to the extent you want to comment
whether you had a duty of inquiry. If you know it, that is one
thing, and you testified you didn't know it.
Mr. Rebuck. That's correct.
Senator Specter. The second level of responsibility arises
on a duty of inquiry, if you know that it is a common practice
to encroach, then there may be a duty of inquiry on the part of
Black Wolf. So my question to you, again, to the extent you
wish to answer, did you know that it was a common practice to
have encroachment?
Mr. Rebuck. I do not know that it is a common practice for
encroachment.
Senator Specter. Have you ever heard of encroachment, to
the extent you wish to answer?
Mr. Rebuck. I've heard all kinds of rumors, but I have
never actually encountered any encroachment since I have been
in the mines.
Senator Specter. With respect to the water, were you aware
of the information Mr. Messer testified to, that the homeowners
above Saxman were getting the water from that property?
Mr. Rebuck. I am now, sir, yes.
Senator Specter. But had you been prior to July 24?
Mr. Rebuck. On the night of July 24, after the accident
occurred, I was aware, yes.
Senator Specter. How about prior to July 24, to the extent
you wish to answer?
Mr. Rebuck. I cannot say for sure if I was.
Senator Specter. Might have?
Mr. Rebuck. I might have.
Senator Specter. Might have?
Mr. Rebuck. I do not know.
Senator Specter. Think about it for just a minute, Mr.
Rebuck, to the extent you want to answer. What leads you to say
you might have? What is going through your mind that leads you
to that statement?
Mr. Rebuck. Because I do know that now and I'm not sure if
I did know that before or if this was afterward.
Senator Specter. Mr. Rebuck, you were the Superintendent of
Black Wolf, Quecreek, and to the extent you wish to answer, did
you know that there was significant leakage of water into the
Black Wolf Mine?
Mr. Rebuck. There was not significant leakage of water into
the Black Wolf Mine.
Senator Specter. There was not?
Mr. Rebuck. No, sir.
Senator Specter. There had not been any complaints by any
of the miners about the leakage of water, to the extent you
wish to answer?
Mr. Rebuck. Not that I'm aware of; we did have water.
Senator Specter. You say you did have water.
Mr. Rebuck. Yes, and that condition has been throughout the
entire mine, not only in this particular area. So when there
are reports of roof water and they are investigated and they
are discussed, the conditions that were in that mine did not
lead me to believe that we were approaching water from an
abandoned mine.
Mr. Ellis. Senator, could I interject something here?
Senator Specter. No, but you may in a minute.
Mr. Ellis. Okay.
Senator Specter. You say you did know there was water
there?
Mr. Rebuck. Water where?
Senator Specter. In the Quecreek Mine.
Mr. Rebuck. Yes, sir, that is common throughout.
Senator Specter. Common practice, but what you are saying
is, to the extent you wish to answer, you didn't know it was
excessive or dangerous water; is that what you are saying?
Mr. Rebuck. That's correct.
Senator Specter. We are going to take a break for just
about 5 or 10 minutes, because I'm going to want to talk to the
miners before we proceed with the hearing, so I thought I would
just give you a notice that in just a few minutes we are going
to take a break.
Mr. Ellis. Could I just put something on the record?
Senator Specter. Mr. Ellis, you may.
Mr. Ellis. Thank you. This line of questioning about----
Senator Specter. If anybody has a comment they want to
make, we have gone over on the red light, I even turned the red
light off, because while the rules are for 5 minutes, this
matter is of sufficient importance to take whatever time it
takes. So if anybody has something they want to say, feel free
to interject. Go ahead, Mr. Ellis.
Mr. Ellis. On this issue of whether or not there were
recursary conditions. Much of the questions seem to be coming
from a news article that appeared yesterday. I just, for the
record, the State select panel that Governor Schweiker convened
that is conducting public hearings, 2 weeks ago had the State
mine inspector responsible for Quecreek testify before them,
and he said that there were no early indicators or warning
signs that would lead him to believe.
Senator Specter. Who testified to that?
Mr. Ellis. The State mine inspector who was responsible for
inspecting Quecreek, he was there within at least a week before
the accident happened. He definitively told the panel that
there were no precursory conditions or early indications that a
breakthrough was imminent, so----
Mrs. Mayhugh. He said it was dry, too, and it wasn't. This
inspector said it was dry. I was there.
Senator Specter. We'll give you a chance to testify in just
a minute, but I want to hear what you have to say. May the
record show that a lady with a baseball cap and a red jacket--
--
Mrs. Mayhugh. Mrs. Mayhugh.
Senator Specter. Mrs. Mayhugh.
Mrs. Mayhugh. Mrs. Mayhugh, everybody knows me.
Senator Specter. Mrs. Mayhugh. We are going to give you a
chance to testify, but I think in the interest of order, we
will go to the front row. But you will have a full chance to
say whatever you want to.
Mr. Rebuck, you have heard the testimony of Mr. Messer. Is
there anything you would like to comment on or disagree with?
Same chance with you, Mr. Messer. You heard the testimony of
Mr. Rebuck; anything you would like to comment on or disagree
with?
Mr. Messer. Obviously, we have conflicting testimony of the
indicators of mine water problems, but I'm not sure that my
further answer on that is possible since I have agreed in a
confidentiality agreement not to disclose information.
Senator Specter. Well, Mr. Messer, I have grave doubts as
to the validity of the confidentiality agreement, it sounds
like a contract of adhesion to me. If you were bound by
confidentiality, I don't think it would govern a Senate
hearing. It wouldn't govern a Senate hearing, but I'm not going
to pressure you on it.
Mr. Messer. My response, Senator, is very simple, that
there were indicators of severe water problems in this mine. My
understanding is from sources independent from the miners
themselves that these particular concerns have been relayed to
the operators of the mine. So I can only say that based upon my
investigation there were enough factors present here to cause
an alert and an investigation to, into the location of these
voids.
I mean, it's, I have not seen it physically yet, but
apparently there is a ventilation shaft located within 50 to
100 yards of the place these men were rescued, and the only
ventilation that that shaft could have provided was to the
Saxman Mine, and that would be the encroachment, because that
ventilation shaft was on property that was not part of the
Saxman lease.
I mean, there are a lot of factors here that we can, you
can always say that this is what the Government requires me to
do and I did it and that is the end of it. But what I think Mr.
Rebuck is essentially saying is that once Quecreek got the
permit, we relied upon everything Quecreek did and we took that
information and then we started the mine. I don't think that
anyone else applied for a permit other than Quecreek, certainly
Black Wolf did not.
Senator Specter. Mr. Messer, this subcommittee has
oversight jurisdiction over MSHA and I have the confidentiality
agreement and we will pursue that. I don't think it's an
appropriate thing that you were asked to do and I don't think
it is binding, but I can understand the constraints you feel. I
won't press you to go beyond the confidentiality agreement.
That does not stop any of the miners from telling this
subcommittee anything they wish to as long as they don't show
us the statement. They are not barred from their own
recollections in response to questions which the subcommittee
will ask.
We are going to take a very brief recess so that I can talk
to the miners about the testimony which has been given already
in an effort to find out what more they can add to this record
at this time.
Does anybody else have a comment? Mr. Ellis, you want to
make comment?
Mr. Ellis. No, I already made it, thank you.
Senator Specter. Mr. Main?
Mr. Main. Yes, I would just like to echo a problem
explained by Mr. Messer. We have had a lot of difficulties with
regard to the investigative process, we have had to sign
confidentiality agreements, we were even barred from getting
some of our own statement about mine disaster, even when the
mining, that testimony be given to us. So there is a lot of
problems. I just handled this.
But I think Quecreek represents just a tip of a bigger
problem with respect to the Mine Safety Act. We would encourage
your committee to look deeper into the many problems of mine
safety.
Senator Specter. Mr. Yankovich, you can have the last word
if you want.
Mr. Yankovich. Just outside the facts that I think we made
light here today, but there was probably a lot of tell-tale
signs that was not taken into regard by the mining company at
this point in time, from what I can see, and they should have
been.
Senator Specter. We are going to recess for just a few
minutes. If the miners and their wives will go to the
conference room I will be there.
The hearing will now resume. I have just been talking to a
number of miners, some of whom got out early and some of whom
were trapped. A number of them have stated their interest in
testifying. So at this time I would like for Mr. and Mrs. Harry
Mayhugh to step forward, Mr. and Mrs. John Phillippi to step
forward, Mr. Robert Hileman to step forward, Mr. Frank Stewart
to step forward, and Mr. David Petree to step forward.
Those are the individuals who have stated an interest in
testifying, and if there are any others who would like to
testify, simply tell Bettilou Taylor or one of my staffers and
we will hear you.
Mrs. Mayhugh, we are going to start with you because you
were the one that spoke up. So we will give you a chance to say
first what was on your mind and why you spoke up. As I said at
the time, I thought it would be a good idea to have you speak,
but I have a lot of people, and we need an orderly process, it
is better to have you at the witness table. We are all
interested in what you have to say. So the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF MRS. HARRY MAYHUGH, WIFE OF A MINER
ACCOMPANIED BY:
MRS. JOHN PHILLIPPI, WIFE OF A MINER
RONALD J. HILEMAN, MINER
HARRY B. MAYHUGH, JR., MINER
FRANK E. STEWART, MINER
JOHN R. PHILLIPPI, MINER
RYAN S. PETREE, MINER
DOUGLAS L. CUSTER, MINER
Mrs. Mayhugh. We were just wondering why when you do go to
a meeting or something in the paper, it is always no comment or
they don't have that information on file. We should be entitled
to know all the details as they come about them.
When you find a map and they have their representative
present, why shouldn't ours have been allowed to be there
either?
I just want to make sure it's being run fairly the whole
way with both sides, the mines and the miners, and I don't
think it has been.
Senator Specter. Mrs. Mayhugh, I think you are entitled to
know. There is something to be said for conducting an
investigation and finishing it so you hear from all parties,
but I do believe that there is a duty on the part of public
officials to disclose the critical information as promptly as
possible. One of the reasons this hearing is being held
publicly is to bring it out.
Some people don't want to say, you can understand that, for
a while, but I believe that regarding an incident from July,
considering this is October----
Mrs. Mayhugh. Yeah, how long do they have to keep denying,
saying we don't have that information?
Senator Specter. It is something that is a great public
interest and public concern and there are many miners who are
underground who could benefit from what we are learning.
We have one other wife who signified an interest in saying
something, so we'll go to the ladies first, Mrs. Phillippi, and
hear from you.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF MRS. JOHN PHILLIPPI
Mrs. Phillippi. You were talking about all the money that
you give for these inspectors in the mines. If they're doing
their job, why did this happen? Isn't that what their job is,
to protect these men? You know, aren't they supposed to inspect
and know? You know, shouldn't someone have seen this? They were
there the week before. Where did he go, what part of the mine
was he in?
And there was water, because I know because my husband came
home every night and his feet were froze. I know when he works
in water and I know when he doesn't, I know.
Somebody is responsible for this, we just want to know who
and what happened, and it can't happen again. This was a
horrible, horrible ordeal. And I would never want someone
else's wife to have to sit there and not know for 3, almost 4
days, whether your husband's alive or dead. Whose job is it to
make sure that the mines are safe and why wasn't it done, if
there was inspectors there the week before? They talk about not
having money but you're talking about billions of dollars, and
you've given them more money and more money. If we don't do our
jobs, we lose them; don't we?
Senator Specter. Mrs. Phillippi, you are right, if we do
not do our jobs we do lose them. You raised very good questions
and those precisely are the questions we are going to answer.
What happened on the inspection the week before, what happened
with the safety plan, what happened with the encroachment, what
happened with the water. Those are all relevant questions and
fortunately your husband was one of those who was trapped and
got out, one of the lucky nine.
Mrs. Mayhugh, your husband was one of the lucky nine who
got out also.
Mrs. Mayhugh. And my father.
Senator Specter. And your father. Who is your father?
Mrs. Mayhugh. Tom Foy. So it is my whole world down there,
and yeah, I want answers.
Senator Specter. So you were lucky twice.
Mrs. Mayhugh. I am very lucky twice.
Senator Specter. Those are the questions we're going to
seek to have answered.
Let me turn now to Mr. Ronald J. Hileman. Mr. Hileman, I
talked to you shortly after the incident, I called you up and
got you on the phone.
Mr. Hileman. Right.
Senator Specter. Your phone must have been ringing off the
hook.
Mr. Hileman. Yes, it was.
Senator Specter. I thank you for taking the call and I
thank you again.
Mr. Hileman. Thank you for having us here.
Senator Specter. Mr. Hileman, in your own way, tell us what
happened.
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF RONALD J. HILEMAN
Mr. Hileman. It started just like any other day, I mean,
just an ordinary shift. You know, when we hit the water----
Senator Specter. Could you pull the microphone just a
little closer to you, please?
Mr. Hileman. Right there?
Senator Specter. That's fine.
Mr. Hileman. There was a lot of questions answered here
today that I think, you know, we never had the chance to do
before. But they're saying that was a dry mine; it wasn't. The
mine was very wet from the very beginning.
Senator Specter. Do you think the owners knew that?
Mr. Hileman. Well, the roof, when we first started in, that
mine's roof was dry, we was getting water in on the bottom, we
had some washouts. That could have been coming from the Saxman
Mine, I don't know, I am no mining engineer, I'm just a coal
miner, I have no idea.
But there was a good many washouts on the bottom when we
first started that mine, the roof was dry, it was sandrock. As
we progressed in further, we run out of sandrock roof, we went
into slate roof, and that's where we started having our water
problems.
We went around a fault that we had hit previously to this,
and where that fault, I don't know if that had anything to do
with the Saxman Mine or not.
Senator Specter. Did you or do you know if any of the other
miners told the company, Black Wolf, about the water
conditions?
Mr. Hileman. The company knew about the water conditions.
From the time we started first left section, we had water in
the roof.
Senator Specter. When you say the company knew about it,
why do you say that?
Mr. Hileman. We all, as far as our foreman, our boss, face
boss, I mean, he knew, and I'm sure he told them.
Senator Specter. Who was your foreman?
Mr. Hileman. Randy Fogle.
Senator Specter. He knew?
Mr. Hileman. He knew that there was quite a bit of water in
the roof. I was the bolter, that's what puts the pins in the
roof and that's where we were seeing, again, quite a bit of our
water problem from the roof.
Senator Specter. With respect to this issue of encroaching,
Saxman coming over into land which really wasn't theirs----
Mr. Hileman. Right.
Senator Specter [continuing]. What is your view of that?
Are you familiar with the encroachment problem?
Mr. Hileman. From what I was told there was encroachment
from the old Saxman Mine.
Senator Specter. When did you learn about that
encroachment, was it before July 24?
Mr. Hileman. No, since July 24 is when I was made known.
Senator Specter. You're a miner and you wouldn't
necessarily be familiar with it, but to the extent that you
are, had you heard about encroachment as a common problem?
Mr. Hileman. Oh, yeah, I've heard about it quite a
different--some of the old timers. I live in a small town there
just out of Somerset, Gray, almost all them small towns around
the area was coal mining towns, Quecreek itself, Gray, Jerome,
they all, that's how they sprung up, because of the old mines.
Senator Specter. So the encroachment is when a mining
company goes into an adjacent land which is not theirs to mine
the coal. It's pretty hard to detect that and you can't see
that.
Mr. Hileman. Exactly, they have to find a way. The old
timers there in Gray told me lots of times about how they mined
coal, they knew they crossed their boundaries and everything,
you know, they knew it. The roof was good, the bottom was good,
the coal was there, well, let's take a little, what's stopping
them?
Senator Specter. Take a little or take a lot?
Mr. Hileman. Sure, take a little, take a lot, take a whole
lot, who knows. It's down under there, nobody sees. And, you
know, I've heard about it quite often.
Senator Specter. When you knew about that encroachment, did
that concern you that there might be a safety problem because
the maps would be inadequate?
Mr. Hileman. It concerned me, yes, at that time, but you
put your life in the Federal, State, and company's hands when
you're under there, they are the ones that is supposed to keep
you safe. Right?
Senator Specter. That's right.
Mr. Hileman. That's what your agencies are made for.
Senator Specter. That's right. You ask me a question, I
will answer your question, that's right. I'm glad to answer a
relevant question. Anybody who was underground as long as you
were, I will answer your question.
Would you care to comment about the experience generally? I
know you're under contract to Disney for a movie, I don't want
to get into any of your proprietary rights, but do you care to
comment about what it was like underground there for all those
hours?
Mr. Hileman. Anybody that's never been underground don't
really know what it's like. I could sit here for hours and try
to----
Senator Specter. Mr. Lauriski wishes to depart for other
commitments. I understand, Mr. Lauriski, and we excuse you at
this time and we will be in touch with you later.
Go ahead, Mr. Hileman.
Mr. Hileman. Like I was saying, nobody that's ever been
underground really don't understand what it's like to be under
there. It's a hidden profession, nobody can drive down the road
and see what we do every day. Very few people know what we do.
It's a hard way to make a life, but we all have done it for so
long we did it.
Senator Specter. How long have you been a coal miner, Mr.
Hileman?
Mr. Hileman. 27 years. As far as the accident itself, I had
started to say that it was just a normal shift, we started in,
worked 3:00 to 11:00 shift that evening. And it was like at
8:45 that evening our shift was pretty much so over. I run twin
boom bolter, I was the operator, Mr. John Unger was the helper
on the machine, we was in number 4 entry bolting.
A few hours into the shift there, like I said about 8:45,
Tom Foy come over past and said, we hit some water. At that
time I didn't know how bad, how much or anything else. So we
proceeded down No. 4 entry until we got to the feeder. That's
where most of us met. We could look over into No. 6 entry and
see that there was a lot of water coming in. It was, the seam
in there is approximately around 50 inch, 48 to 50 inches high
and the water was, it was up within probably a foot of the roof
at that point.
Senator Specter. How did you feel?
Mr. Hileman. At that point I, you know, I never dreamt that
we would be trapped, I figured we could get out, one way or the
other, you know. In the 27 years I never went through anything
like this, I never, never dreamt that we would do something
like, you know, to be caught in such a situation.
But we proceeded down No. 4 entry to try to get out that
way. The water kept getting higher and higher, it was very
wild, very swift river.
Senator Specter. You say it was within a foot of the
ceiling?
Mr. Hileman. Right.
Senator Specter. How much higher could it get and still
have that air space?
Mr. Hileman. You still have that air space until it's to
the roof, you know, I mean, you still got room to breathe as
long as the water isn't to the roof.
Senator Specter. What was the highest the water got?
Mr. Hileman. It completely went to the roof down further,
down in the mines. We were mining on an elevation there, steep
incline, not a steep incline, but a gradual incline. The bottom
part of the mines filled up with water first.
Senator Specter. When the water went to the roof, where
were you?
Mr. Hileman. At one of the highest elevations in the mines,
the highest elevation.
Senator Specter. So you had a little breathing room?
Mr. Hileman. Right, but it choked off the air from the
outside. The mines runs on an exhaust fan.
Senator Specter. It shut off the air from the outside?
Mr. Hileman. Right, exactly, it choked it off.
Senator Specter. So you were able to breathe, but barely?
Mr. Hileman. Barely. At that point we was all gasping for
air, you couldn't breathe through your nose, you couldn't get
enough air in. Some was throwing up due to the bad air that was
coming out of the Saxman Mine. It was very hard to breathe.
Senator Specter. You were trapped for more than 3 days,
from 8:45 on July 24 the Wednesday through Saturday July 27 at
10:15?
Mr. Hileman. July 28.
Senator Specter. July 28?
Mr. Hileman. Yes, I come out around 2:15, yes, in the
morning, 2:15 a.m.
Senator Specter. On July 28?
Mr. Hileman. Right.
Senator Specter. But you first had a knowledge that you
were going to be rescued about 10:15 at night on Saturday the
27?
Mr. Hileman. Yes, I guess, I'm not sure on that, I don't
know the exact time on that.
Senator Specter. Did you ever give up hope?
Mr. Hileman. Oh, sure, there was different times, I didn't
think we was coming, there was different times, through the
whole ordeal there was ups and downs, you know, our hopes was
up, our hopes was down.
Senator Specter. What got your hopes up? I can understand
what got your hopes down, but what got your hopes up?
Mr. Hileman. When we was running out of air we had
proceeded to start building some flood walls to try to hold the
water back from the highest elevation where we was trapped at.
During that, they had drilled a six-inch air shaft down
through, into an intersection, where we was working to build
the walls, which that was a good sign, they were bringing fresh
air to us, and they knew pretty much where we was, that was a
good sign.
Senator Specter. How did you feel when you got out?
Mr. Hileman. Words can't express that. I mean, if you've
never been faced in a life and death situation then you
wouldn't know what I was talking about. I mean, I take 1 day at
a time, I just enjoy life more.
Senator Specter. Mr. Mayhugh, we heard from your wife
testifying. Do you think that it was known that there had been
encroachment and that the maps were unreliable and that water
was a problem?
Mr. Mayhugh. Yeah, I definitely know.
Senator Specter. Tell me why you say you definitely know.
Mr. Mayhugh. Well, we was on our death bed down there. And
at the time Randy Fogle, our boss, he told us 2 weeks prior to
this he talked to Dave Rebuck and wanted to pull out of there
because the conditions were bad.
Senator Specter. Who was it who said that?
Mr. Mayhugh. Randy Fogle. Randy proceeded to say he talked
to Dave 2 days before this, Mr. Rebuck, and Dave Rebuck said he
was scared that we was getting up in there. So why would you
say he was scared up in there if he thought we was 300, 400,
500 feet from the mine? Randy Fogle didn't tell us this until
we were on our death bed. Not all of us heard it, but at least
three or four heard the comment that he made.
Senator Specter. Mr. Fogle, what was his position?
Mr. Mayhugh. He was our face boss, or section foreman.
Senator Specter. He was not one of the 18 in the mine, or
was he?
Mrs. Mayhugh. He was.
Mr. Mayhugh. He was.
Mrs. Mayhugh. He was the one that----
Mr. Mayhugh. He was the one that told us when we was on our
death bed, when we thought we only had an hour to live, I don't
know if he wanted to clear his conscience or what it was, but
he told us that.
Senator Specter. Mr. Fogle, though, is not here today?
Mr. Mayhugh. No, he isn't.
Senator Specter. Mr. Fogle told you that he told Mr.
Rebuck?
Mr. Mayhugh. 2 weeks prior he wanted to pull out because he
was loading a load of coal, the water was bad.
Senator Specter. How long before July 24 did Mr. Fogle say
he told Mr. Rebuck?
Mrs. Mayhugh. Two weeks prior to July 24. Then as I said,
Mr. Fogle, when we was on our death bed he told us 2 days prior
to the accident Dave Rebuck said that he was scared that we was
up in there. So why would you say that?
Senator Specter. Mr. Rebuck said what again?
Mr. Mayhugh. That he was scared that we was mining up in
there.
Senator Specter. Mr. Rebuck was concerned that you were
mining up in there?
Mr. Mayhugh. Yes, that's what Randy Fogle told us.
Senator Specter. How long have you been in the mines, Mr.
Mayhugh?
Mr. Mayhugh. 5\1/2\ years, sir.
Senator Specter. How long have you been married to Mrs.
Mayhugh?
Mr. Mayhugh. 10 years.
Senator Specter. Children?
Mr. Mayhugh. Two.
Senator Specter. What are your future plans, are you ever
going to be a miner again?
Mr. Mayhugh. No, definitely not. Another thing, okay, our
company was going off in 1957 and they proceeded to mine up
until 1964 at the Saxman Mine, so how can anyone issue a map or
whatever knowing that there was, what, 6, 7 years of extra
mining in there and say to their best knowledge that 1957 map
is accurate? I mean, it don't take a rocket scientist to figure
out in 7 years you can load a lot of coal out.
Senator Specter. So they used a 1957 map and they were
mining at least until 1964?
Mr. Mayhugh. That's the map that they've been talking about
during the hearing.
Mrs. Mayhugh. The one they found.
Mr. Mayhugh. The one they found at the Windber Museum, and
it was dated 1957, so they did 6, 7 years mining prior to 1964.
Senator Specter. Are you familiar with this encroachment or
bootlegging issue?
Mr. Mayhugh. No. They showed us the map that they found or
whatever, and if they would have had the accurate map, we would
have never cut into it because it looked like the old Saxman
mapping was accurate.
Senator Specter. That the map was inaccurate?
Mr. Mayhugh. That the new one they found was accurate. We
would have never cut into the one that we cut into if they had
the upgraded map.
Senator Specter. Mr. Stewart, you had a comment about that?
Mr. Stewart. He said that new map was accurate and that's
not even accurate. Because when they looked into that hole it
showed a lot more than what that map showed.
Senator Specter. When you say the new map, what was the
date of that map?
Mr. Stewart. 1964.
Senator Specter. But that map was not accurate either?
Mr. Stewart. No.
Senator Specter. Why do you say that, sir?
Mr. Stewart. When the inspectors looked into that hole
where they cut through, there was a, where they cut into was a
rut driven off to the main, that one main there. Plus where
they looked up through there was a great big opening, and
according to the map there was roof stripping and that was all
mined out.
Senator Specter. Mr. Stewart, you were one of the miners
who got out early?
Mr. Stewart. Yes.
Senator Specter. Tell us what happened with your group.
Mr. Stewart. I was the foreman of that----
Senator Specter. Pull the microphone a little closer to
you.
Mr. Stewart. I was a foreman of the other crew that night.
At that time we started around 8:00, I did my preshifting in
that section that night and I had to do all the outlying area
preshifting there.
So I proceeded to left section, left my crew there and told
them what needed to be done and that there. I proceeded down
No. 5, 5 main to make my examination. And I come to 1 left
intersection there and I was heading up into 1 left and I was
probably about one third of the way up into that section where
the accident happened, and I was going up to the common entries
which leads to No. 5 entry.
I stopped there and checked the first pump and the intake,
the pump in the intake was No. 7 entry. So I stopped there and
I crawled through a man door, walked across No. 6 entry to No.
7 entry, I still can remember putting a date on there at 8:50,
and could hear this noise and that there. The noise kept
getting louder and louder and louder.
Senator Specter. What kind of a noise was it?
Mr. Stewart. It was just like a big grumbling sound.
Senator Specter. Water coming?
Mr. Stewart. At first I thought it was a scoop coming down
through, it was making like a noise, then all the sudden it got
louder. When I put the date on the date board at 8:50, the man
door that I came through slammed shut. So I knew there was
something up then.
I walked over to the No. 6 entry, when I got over there the
noise was so loud, it's hard to describe.
All of the sudden this big forced air came back over me and
almost knocked my helmet off my head. I thought there was an
explosion up in that section. I figured I was done then,
because it would take all the oxygen out of the air.
Senator Specter. You say you figured you were done?
Mr. Stewart. Yes.
Senator Specter. You mean done for?
Mr. Stewart. Yeah, I figured I would be dead right there
because it would take all the oxygen out of me.
So when I looked up, I seen all that water coming at me. I
hurried up and run to that man door, and I got it open, I
jumped through it.
As soon as I, as soon as I got through the man door I
slammed it shut and there was discharge that goes through that
wall right there. And all that water come down through sucked
that line through right now. All the water started coming
seeping through the wall right there.
So I hurried up and jumped on my golf cart and I got it
turned around and I went down over the hill as fast as it would
go. I knew I didn't have much time but I stopped at the belt
drive and I was calling for my guys to get the hell out of
here, to let them know what happened.
Senator Specter. You say to your guys; how many men were
there?
Mr. Stewart. There was eight on my other crew.
Senator Specter. You were the nine who escaped at that
time?
Mr. Stewart. Yes. But I kept calling, I called and I was
calling for these other guys to see what happened. I kept
calling and calling and the outside guy got on there and said
they already got ahold of these guys.
When he said that all that water was coming down, right
there is a big dip right in there. I knew if I didn't get out
of there, I would be trapped. So I had to hurry up and jump on
the golf cart again.
I went flying out around there and later on Larry
Summerville said that he seen me flying out around there and he
said he was only a second behind me and when he got there it
was already flooded to the roof. He thought that I was
underneath all that.
So I went down to the 5 main, I was calling my guys and
calling and calling and calling and nobody would answer. So
pretty soon Larry Summerville came through the intake wall, he
kept yelling, he said Chad and I made it, Chad and I made it.
He said the other guys behind me, he said, I don't think they
made it. If you would have seen the look in his eyes that
night, it looked like you seen a ghost.
So we started talking for a little bit and we hollered
outside to go and get ahold of the mine foreman and the owners
and all that to tell them what happened.
Probably about a minute or so later we heard voices down
around the corner. We walked down around here and got the rest
of my crew out. They said they come through there, the first
travel way, it was already flooded shut, they couldn't get
through and they had to keep backing up and find an intake. And
he said when they come through here, a couple of guys, that's
when I talked to Pete, and the other guys had to grab them, the
water was up to their neck then.
We kept talking there for a while and we figured we better
get out of there, because we didn't know how far the water was
behind, it went upgrade.
So we got outside and both doors was hanging wide open, the
doors into the common entry that normally stay closed, but the
force of that air must have forced those doors open.
We stayed outside, kept waiting and kept waiting for the
other guys to come out, these other nine trapped guys, and we
waited for probably 10, 15 minutes, figured we better get out
in case something happens.
So we went up to the main office, shower house there and
that's where we spent probably till about 4:00, 5:00, 6:00 in
the morning trying to help out with whatever we could do.
Senator Specter. How did you feel when you got out?
Mr. Stewart. I think I was just numb, I didn't know what I
felt, I think we all was numb. I think we were just glad to be
alive.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Mr. Stewart. Mr.
Phillippi, we heard from your wife. How long have you two been
married?
Mr. Phillippi. 10 years.
Senator Specter. How long have you been a miner?
Mr. Phillippi. 12\1/2\ years.
Senator Specter. Children?
Mr. Phillippi. Yes, one, a boy, 12.
Senator Specter. Does your wife give you a hard time for
being a coal miner?
Mr. Phillippi. She does now, I ain't going to be one
anymore.
Senator Specter. Did she before?
Mr. Phillippi. No, she, she was pretty okay with it, we
thought we could trust.
Senator Specter. Are you a native of the area of Somerset?
Mr. Phillippi. Yes, I am.
Senator Specter. Go to school there?
Mr. Phillippi. Shade Central City.
Senator Specter. Are you going back into the mines?
Mr. Phillippi. No, I couldn't do that to my family again.
Senator Specter. You don't have to now that you got the
Disney contract do you?
Mrs. Phillippi. That's not enough to live on now, think
about that.
Senator Specter. Mrs. Phillippi, what did you say?
Mrs. Phillippi. That's not enough to live on, think about
that.
Senator Specter. Isn't it?
Mrs. Phillippi. Not to raise a 12 year-old.
Senator Specter. Maybe Mr. Messer will get you a new deal.
Mrs. Phillippi. We're pretty young, you know, we're the
youngest two couples. The other guys, our kids have a long way
to go raising them.
Senator Specter. I'm sorry to hear that's not enough to
live on.
Mrs. Phillippi. I wish it was.
Senator Specter. Maybe the next contract----
Mrs. Phillippi. It will pay for college.
Senator Specter. What do you plan to do, Mr. Phillippi?
Mr. Phillippi. I ain't decided right at this time till I
get some things straightened out.
Senator Specter. Are you thinking about being a Mr.
Goodwrench?
Mr. Phillippi. I'd like to be a GM man.
Senator Specter. You got a hat on that says GM Goodwrench
service. Do you get a premium for being on television wearing
that hat?
Mr. Phillippi. No, I didn't even get a truck yet.
Senator Specter. Mr. Mayhugh, what's the New York Fire
Department, Police Department doing for you, wearing an NYPD
hat?
Mr. Mayhugh. We was just up in New York and I picked the
hat up.
Mr. Phillippi. Mr. Specter, I would like to thank you for
keeping this public because everybody needs to know about this
because I'm afraid if it's hidden, they're going to sweep it
under the table, things are going to be hidden and they're not
going to know what happened.
Senator Specter. Mr. Phillippi, nobody's going to be
sweeping this under the table.
Mr. Phillippi. So it doesn't happen again, I'm glad you're
with us. And as far as--this company was aware of water.
Senator Specter. Why do you say that? You say the company
was aware of the water. Why do you say that?
Mr. Phillippi. Because I was a miner operator and previous
to this 2, 3 weeks, we were loading a lot of coal. Production
cut into half, cut halfways, we slowed way down, the problem
was there's water coming out of the roof, the bolters couldn't
drill to keep up, everything was sloppy wet, they know the
problem, we told them. I just, it's unbelievable that they can
sit there and lie about it.
Senator Specter. Well, I can see how you feel about that,
Mr. Phillippi. It's a very emotional situation when your life
is put at risk as yours was. Mr. Petree.
Mr. Petree. Yes, sir.
Senator Specter. Where were you when all this happened?
Mr. Petree. Well, let me put it this way. I want to get one
thing straight first. These people here----
Senator Specter. Get it straight on mike, will you, please?
Mr. Petree. These people here are saying----
Senator Specter. Now wait a minute, we have got to get it
straight. Mr. Hileman, you can change seats with Mr. Petree.
Mr. Hileman. Yes.
Senator Specter. We have got to have a transcript of this.
I have already been asked if you will get a copy of the
transcript, and the answer is yes. We have a court reporter
here from the Senate, who is taking all this down. Anybody who
wants to get a transcript can get a transcript. But the only
way I can get you a transcript, Mr. Petree, is if you speak
into the microphone; okay?
Mr. Petree. Okay.
Senator Specter. Go ahead.
Mr. Petree. The only thing I want to, I was one of the nine
that escaped, okay. And I hear people talking, like I heard one
gentleman said that we walked out of that mine, which we did.
Some people, I read in the paper, we ran out of that mine,
which we didn't. We struggled the whole way out of that mine
that night. Our lives was in jeopardy too, I mean, we was
scared. I prayed going out of there because I didn't think I
was going to make it.
Like they said, that some of the guys got their feet swept
out from under them. My one buddy he got his feet swept out
from under him, I grabbed ahold of him, I might have saved his
life, I'm just hoping I did.
But a lot of people think that we ran out of that mine, we
was cowards, we ran home. But we stuck it, we stayed for hours
and hours and hours to save these guys, we stayed and pumped
for hours.
So, I mean, I just--if it had gone down in history that we
ran out of that mine, it ain't going to get it, because we
almost died and we struggled getting out of the mine.
Senator Specter. What do you think about the issue of the
company knowing about the water danger?
Mr. Petree. Well, just like these guys said that we, we was
down in seconds, we had water in the roof too. So, I mean, I
don't know if that mine came down that way further, I don't
know, and we was hitting water in the roofs. So it was wet down
there. I mean, I don't know whether the maps shows down that
way or not.
Senator Specter. Mr. Custer, we haven't heard from you yet.
Do you want to change places with Mr. Petree so you can speak
into the microphone? And we'll put you in the transcript.
Has anybody made the bad pun that it was almost Custer's
Last Stand?
SUMMARY STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS L. CUSTER
Mr. Custer. Nobody would be that ignorant.
Senator Specter. Well, there's always one in the crowd. We
have got to have a moment or two of lightness, this is the
heaviest hearing I've ever been to and I've been to a lot of
hearings.
Mr. Custer. That's the type of guy I am. Hello, my name is
Doug Custer, and I'm just a common man. I've had 26 years of
mining experience. This was a disaster and that's all we can
say about it, it's an unfortunate mishap. As miners we're
trained to ventilate, deal with bad air, deal with water, this
mine is considered a damped wet mine, but we have faith and
trust in the Department of Protection, MSHA Miners and the
company which we work for.
The biggest question is that there are two maps that's
supposed to be sealed and assigned to repositories in
Harrisburg and wherever else, and it seems like this was not
done. I think the law was passed in 1961 where there has to be
closure maps.
Senator Specter. You think those maps were inadequate?
Mr. Custer. I think, you know, we'll let the
investigation----
Senator Specter. You think the company knew about the maps
being inadequate?
Mr. Custer. The company, when they applied for the permits,
they do everything that they can do to their knowledge, and
they were, you know, everybody----
Senator Specter. So you think they operated in good faith?
Mr. Custer. I think, yes, I think they did.
Senator Specter. How about the mine inspectors, what do you
think about that?
Mr. Petree. They're straight shooters. If you're doing
something wrong, they're going to----
Senator Specter. Both Federal and State?
Mr. Custer. Exactly, they do their job to the best of their
ability, we do our job to the best of our ability. We have the
right to a safe work place, we depend on the DEP, we depend on
MSHA, we depend on the mine management, you know, we all work
together. This whole rescue operation was a team effort, you
know, you can't pinpoint it on some surveyor, you can't
pinpoint it on a higher-up in the State, or a higher-up in
MSHA.
I had a speech, but I blew it because I speak from the
heart, you know. There are just so many questions that need
answers for us. And that this mine accident doesn't happen
anyplace else in the United States or even in the world, you
know. I almost lost nine of my best friends down there and when
this happened, you know, when we had to go over the intake, you
know, the water was probably about 18 inches high when we was
riding the main trip out, we went over to the intake. And to
see that roll and to see the water in there, we had no idea
what we were going into.
We got down on our hands and knees because you had to, it
was probably about 34, 36 inches high right there. It was
either get down and get wet or you're not coming out alive. It
is as simple as that. That is what we had to do. Every miner
here did what they had to do to save themselves and save
everybody else.
When we got outside we waited and waited and waited, and we
went up on the hill. Because, you know, once the belt sensor
stopped saying that there was a dangerous condition, we knew
that there wasn't anything we could do right then and there in
the pit, we had to go up onto the hill. We were still in wet
clothes, soaking wet. When we were escaping, my friend Joe
Kostyk and I, we were more or less the leaders of the pack
making sure that everybody was coming through. When that water
was coming through, it sounded like Niagara Falls. I mean the
water was so swift that it picked me up, Joe up and a number of
guys off our feet. And it took my hat off, my glasses off and
it was cold, you know.
But we had no idea what was taking place, we just got the
word to get out of the mine, water is on its way. And I even
joked, I said, all right, we got an early quit. We had no idea
that this was as massive as it was.
We stayed there, we stayed at that mine for 14, 16 hours
after this ordeal, I was sent over with the families, and that
was probably the hardest thing that I ever had to do other than
bury my dad.
Like I said, there is so many questions that need
addressed. Why weren't the closure maps submitted, you know?
And when did the mine close? The time differences of the map,
it's so coincidental that a month before this accident happened
that they find something down in Windber Museum, you know,
somebody's not doing their homework.
You know, like I said, I'm just a common man, I depend on
DEP and MSHA and company officials. I'm not here to drag
anybody down, you know, everybody has a job to do and thank God
that everything took place the way God wanted it or this would
have never happened.
Senator Specter. Mr. Custer, we will do our best to answer
those questions. Anybody else have anything they would like to
add?
Mr. Stewart. I would just like to add, know why the State
never had those two maps, the final maps at that mine that, in
their possession?
Senator Specter. Why they didn't have the maps?
Mr. Stewart. The owner of that mine was supposed to submit
two final maps at the Saxman Mine.
Senator Specter. We'll try to find the answer to that. Mr.
Hileman, do you have one last comment?
Mr. Hileman. Yes. One thing, one of the gentlemen said here
a little earlier, this same type of accident happened in 1977
in an anthracite mine. How many times does it got to happen
before they do something? There was nine lives claimed at that
one, there could have been 18 here. They're still not doing
anything, you know.
Senator Specter. The object of our inquiries will be to see
to it that something is done and the Appropriations
Subcommittee is prepared to fund what is necessary to provide
for mine safety, that is our job.
I want to thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen, for
coming.
Mr. Phillippi. Mr. Specter, one other thing. I would like
to know how could a permit be issued off of a 1957 map whenever
it is known that they mined that in there till 1962, 1963, or
1964? I mean, that's 5 years of mining where nobody knowed
where we was going. And, you know, how can you say, well, okay,
yeah, 1956, years, and you're just going to not know where it's
at and send us guys in there without knowing what's there?
Senator Specter. Mr. Phillippi, we will pursue that
question as well as the question as to the mine officials
knowing about the water, knowing about the danger, staying in
on the mine. Those are all questions which will be answered on
this matter. Mr. Mayhugh, do you have another statement?
Mr. Mayhugh. It's just to thank everybody. I mean, I
figured this would be the best time, because I mean we've got
letters from all over the world, the United States, how much
this really affected people. I mean, they sent us cards and
Psalms and I would just like to thank everybody for their
prayers that they had for all 18 of us miners.
Senator Specter. Thank you all very much. I want to thank
the city council, this is the Anthony C. Priscella Chamber. I
thank staff and all those who have been here, and it's been a
very, very informative hearing.
I said a few moments ago, it's a very heavy hearing, but
because of what happened to the 18 of you and your wives and
families, and what happened to the entire community, it's
certainly odd that all of this would have happened 13 miles
from Shanksvillle where Flight 93 went down on September 11,
and less than a year later on July 24 this occurred. But these
are important questions to be addressed by the Federal
Government, which our subcommittee will do, and by the State
government. There are people who will have to answer for what
happened here, on the maps and the warnings. To what extent
there is liability that will have to be determined when we
review the record. Of even greater importance, to prevent a
recurrence, and we will work on that.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
Thank you all very much for being here, that concludes our
hearing.
[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., Monday, October 21, the hearing
was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]
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