[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DISRUPTING TERRORIST TRAVEL:
SAFEGUARDING AMERICA'S BORDERS
THROUGH INFORMATION SHARING
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INFRASTRUCTURE AND BORDER SECURITY
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERRORISM
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 30, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-60
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
_____
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
David Dreier, California Barney Frank, Massachusetts
Duncan Hunter, California Jane Harman, California
Harold Rogers, Kentucky Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Sherwood Boehlert, New York Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Joe Barton, Texas York
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Mac Thornberry, Texas Ken Lucas, Kentucky
Jim Gibbons, Nevada James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Kay Granger, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Pete Sessions, Texas Ben Chandler, Kentucky
John E. Sweeney, New York
John Gannon, Chief of Staff
Stephen DeVine, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
Thomas Dilenge, Chief Counsel and Policy Director
David H. Schanzer, Democrat Staff Director
Mark T. Magee, Democrat Deputy Staff Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
______
Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security
Dave Camp, Michigan, Chairman
Kay Granger, Texas, Loretta Sanchez, California,
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Ranking Member
Don Young, Alaska Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Duncan Hunter, California Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Lamar Smith, Texas Barney Frank, Massachusetts
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Robert W. Goodlatte, Virginia Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Ernest Istook, Oklahoma York
John Shadegg, Arizona Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Mark Souder, Indiana Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
John Sweeney, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Christopher Cox, California, Ex Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Officio Jim Turner, Texas, Ex Officio
(II)
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism
Jim Gibbons, Nevada, Chairman
John Sweeney, New York Karen McCarthy, Missouri, Ranking
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Member
C.W. Bill Young, Florida Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Harold Rogers, Kentucky Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Barney Frank, Massachusetts
Lamar Smith, Texas Jane Harman, California
Porter Goss, Florida Nita M. Lowey, New York
Peter King, New York Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
John Linder, Georgia Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
John Shadegg, Arizona Columbia
Mac Thornberry, Texas James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Christopher Cox, California, Ex Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Officio Jim Turner, Texas, Ex Officio
(III)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Dave Camp, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Michigan, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Infrastructure
and Border Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Subcommittee on Infrastructure and
Border Security................................................ 20
The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Nevada, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Counterterrorism............................................... 4
The Honorable Karen McCarthy, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Missouri, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Intelligence and Counterterrorism.............................. 24
The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Select Committee on
Homeland Security: Prepared Statement.......................... 2
The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Select Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 36
The Honorable Robert E. Andrews, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey................................... 26
The Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the State
of Washington.................................................. 42
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island................................. 34
The Honorable Nita M. Lowey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York.......................................... 31
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of North Carolina............................... 28
WITNESSES
Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, Assistant Secretary for
Information Analysis, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable C. Stewart Verdery, Jr., Assistant Secretary,
Border and Transportation Security Policy and Planning,
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Professor Lawrence M. Wein, Graduate School of Business, Stanford
University:
Oral Statement................................................. 38
Prepared Statement............................................. 40
FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable C. Stewart Verdery, Jr. and Lieutenant General
Partrick Hughes Responses:
Questions from the Honorable Christopher Cox................... 49
Questions from the Honorable Dave Camp and the Honorable Jim
Gibbons...................................................... 52
Professor Lawrence M. Wein Responses to Questions:
Questions from the Honorable Dave Camp and Chairman Gibbons.... 68
DISRUPTING TERRORIST TRAVEL:
SAFEGUARDING AMERICA'S BORDERS THROUGH INFORMATION SHARING
----------
Thursday, September 30, 2004
House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Infrastructure
and Border Security,
and the
Subcommittee on Intelligence
and Counterterrorism,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 1:05 p.m., in
Room 210, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Dave Camp
[chairman of the Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border
Security] Presiding.
Present from Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border
Security: Representatives Camp, Dunn, Sanchez, Dicks and
Pascrell.
Present from Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Counterterrorism: Gibbons, Dunn, McCarthy, Langevin, Dicks,
Lowey and Andrews.
Mr. Camp. The joint hearing of the Subcommittee on
Infrastructure and Border Security and the Subcommittee on
Intelligence and Counterterrorism will come to order. The
subcommittees are meeting jointly today to hear testimony on
the Department of Homeland Security's efforts regarding
terrorists' disruption of travel. The purpose of this hearing
is to look at the recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission
report and examine DHS's efforts to obtain, analyze and
disseminate terrorist travel information.
On the first panel we have General Patrick Hughes, who is
the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis, and Assistant
Secretary Stewart Verdery from the Border and Transportation
Security Policy Office. And on the second panel we will hear
from Professor Lawrence Wein from Stanford University, who will
provide an overview of research he has done regarding the US-
VISIT program. And I would like to officially welcome all of
our witnesses.
I ask unanimous consent that Member opening statements be
included in the hearing record, and encourage members of both
subcommittees to submit their opening statements for the
record.
[The information follows:]
Prepared Opening Statement of the Honorable Christopher Cox, a
Representative in Congress From the State of California, and Chairman,
Select Committee on Homeland Security
Let me begin by commending Chairman Camp and Chairman Gibbons for
working collaboratively to address the critical issue of terrorist
travel and information sharing. I also would like to welcome and thank
Assistant Secretary Hughes and Assistant Secretary Verdery for
appearing before the panel today.
Over the past 18 months, DHS has implemented several reforms to
strengthen our Nation's borders and improve information sharing--from
enhancing the National Targeting Center to strengthening relationships
with state and local law enforcement. Further, President Bush continues
to provide strong leadership to strengthen our collective security,
with the creation of the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), and now the National
Counterterrorism Center. Although these reforms have made us safer,
there is still more work to be done. Currently, Congress is considering
a wide range of legislative proposals and will soon deliver a set of
reforms designed to further facilitate information sharing between our
intelligence and homeland security agencies, and to strengthen our
security here at home.
The 9/11 Commission report helped to energize the current debate in
these chambers about homeland security and information sharing within
our intelligence communities. The Commission's report focused
significant attention on the issue now commonly referred to as
``terrorist travel.'' The 9/11 Commission Report urges us to address
the issue of terrorist travel with the same vigor and focus that we are
brining to terrorist financing.
I wholeheartedly agree and am glad to see that Speaker Hastert's 9/
11 Commission recommendations implementation bill incorporates many
significant provisions relating to terrorist travel, some of which were
proposed by this Committee.
While limiting access to money hinders terrorists' ability to carry
out a mission, combating terrorist travel, especially into the United
States, will significantly disrupt our enemy's ability to move
operatives into position to launch an attack. Today, we will examine
how DHS currently is organized to address this critical issue, and
discuss how the Department should move towards further implementation
of the Commission's recommendation in this area.
In discussing the issue of terrorist travel, the Commission stated,
``For terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons.
Terrorist must travel clandestinely to meet, train, plan, case targets,
and gain access to attack. To [terrorists], international travel
presents great danger, because they must surface to pass through
regulated channels, present themselves to border security officials, or
attempt to circumvent inspection points. In their travels, terrorists
use evasive methods, such as altered and counterfeit passports and
visas, specific travel methods and routes, liaisons with corrupt
government officials, human smuggling networks, supportive travel
agencies, and immigration and identity fraud.''
Combating terrorist travel will require a multi-faceted approach
that will reach across several DHS components and agencies. Potential
terrorists may interact with the U.S. Government at an embassy or
consular office overseas, a Border Patrol agent if they cross between
ports-of-entry or are stopped at an interior checkpoint, a U.S. Customs
and Border Protection inspector at our land and air ports-of-entry, and
the U.S. Coast Guard on our waters and at our sea ports-of-entry.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Every encounter presents an opportunity for our front-line DHS
personnel to disrupt terrorist travel. The ever-changing and developing
intelligence and information related to terrorist travel techniques,
documents, and trends needs to be effectively incorporated into the
daily activities of our front-line DHS personnel, and we will discuss
today how to make that happen as effectively as possible.
In addition, international efforts also are required to effectively
combat terrorist travel, and will involve our DHS personnel located
overseas, working hand in hand with their State Department
counterparts. If a terrorist's ability to travel is limited before
reaching our borders, our homeland security will be strengthened and we
will move closer to winning the War on Terrorism.
We need to continue to tear down the walls and improve sharing of
information in order to make continued progress in homeland security.
Success in this struggle depends upon good information getting to the
right people at the right time.
I look forward to your testimony this afternoon, and thank you for
your appearance today.
Mr. Camp. And because this is a joint hearing, Members will
be recognized based on order of appearance. And having said
that, I will submit my opening statement for the record.
[The information follows:]
Prepared Opening Statement of the Honorable Dave Camp, a Representative
in Congress From the State of Michigan, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Infrastructure and Border Security
Disrupting terrorists in their efforts to enter into and freely
travel within the United States is a critical part of fighting the War
on Terrorism. The 9/11 Commission Report highlighted the flaws in U.S
border and immigration laws that the 9/11 hijackers exploited. Many of
these gaps have been addressed since September 11th, yet the Commission
stressed that terrorist travel must remain a specific focus of security
efforts.
I hope to stress with this hearing that DHS must continue to
develop and expand its ability to analyze terrorist techniques,
patterns, indicators, and trends to enable front line personnel to
identify, intercept, and disrupt terrorist seeking to travel to the
United States.
One thing that is very apparent is that DHS has a very wide range
of resources and capabilities to disrupt terrorist travel. However, it
is unclear to me how well all of these resources are utilized and
coordinated. There is the National Targeting Center, the Fraudulent
Documents Lab, Benefit Fraud Units, various BTS and Coast Guard
intelligence offices, and Information Analysis Division. And that's
just to name a few. With resources spread across the department, one of
the concerns I have is making sure that there is a dedicated focus to
ensure that terrorist travel detection remains a priority and that
there is Department-wide coordination effort.
There is no doubt that combating terrorist travel will require a
multi-faceted approach across all DHS components and several other
Federal agencies. Potential terrorists may interact with the U.S.
Government at an embassy or consular office overseas, a border and
immigration inspector, or a TSA screener as they seek to travel within
the U.S.
Each of these encounters presents an opportunity to detect
terrorist travel. In addition, numerous pieces of information are used
throughout this process, including visas, passports, travel plans, and
intelligence reports. Given these various pieces of information and
encounters with potential terrorists, this information needs to be
integrated across the Federal government to create a current threat
picture that can be used to identify and stop terrorist travel.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today as they seek to
address these very important issues.
Mr. Camp. And at this time I would recognize Mr. Gibbons.
Chairman of the Intelligence and Counterterrorism Subcommittee
is now recognized for any opening statement he may have.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Chairman Camp. And to our
guests today, welcome. General Hughes, it is great to see you
back before us. And, Assistant Secretary Verdery, thanks very
much for your presence here as well today. It is an important
hearing we are going to have today and I know that your
testimony is very valuable, and I, like Chairman Camp, am going
to follow his lead and put my opening statement into the record
so that we can move along quickly and expeditiously so that we
don't take more of your time.
I know that you are both facing immense challenges right
now, and it is an exceedingly important job, and we look
forward to hearing your testimony today.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I will submit my testimony for
the record.
Mr. Camp. All right. I think at this point--are there any
other opening statements?
All right. I think at this point we will go to our
witnesses, and I again like to thank them for being here.
General Hughes, we will begin with you. We have received your
written testimony, and we will ask that you briefly summarize
in 5 minutes your statement. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL PATRICK HUGHES, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, INFORMATION ANALYSIS, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
General Hughes. Thank you very much, and good day, Chairman
Camp and Chairman Gibbons and distinguished members of the
committee, joint committees I guess.
As you know, the Department of Homeland Security was
envisioned, formed and is now in operation. President Bush's
decision to establish the Department has enabled us to unify
our diverse resources into one team to prevent terrorism in the
whole land, to ready ourselves against our enemy, and to ensure
the highest level of protection for our country and the
citizens we serve.
Through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, among other
things, we are charged with integrating relevant information,
intelligence analysis and vulnerability assessments to identify
threats, to inform preventive priorities and to support
protective measures. We are doing this in partnership primarily
with Federal partners and State and local governments,
agencies, and other organizations that we find at the State and
below level, and with our partners in the private sector.
The Office of Information Analysis, which I represent, is
the heart of intelligence at the Department of Homeland
Security. It is responsible for accessing and analyzing the
entire array of intelligence related to threats against the
homeland and making that information useful to our Federal
partners, first responders, and anyone in the United States who
can use that information and has the right to receive it. IA
provides a full range of intelligence support to the Secretary
and DHS leadership and to all of our components. Additionally,
IA assures that the best intelligence information available
informs the administration of the Homeland Security Advisory
System.
In order to perform these duties, we must receive
intelligence from a number of sources, including not only the
United States Intelligence Community and our State, local,
territorial, tribal and private sector partners, but also from
Department of Homeland Security entities with intelligence
capabilities. The large amount of information we coordinate
includes reporting from the United States Secret Service, the
United States Coast Guard; the Border and Transportation
Security Directorate; Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
including the Federal Protective Service and the Federal Air
Marshal Service; Customs and Border Protection; the
Transportation Security Administration; the Office of
Citizenship and Immigration Services; and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency; 180,000 plus persons on the ground
throughout the country acting as eyes and ears, enforcers, and
workers, and policymakers in some cases in order to protect the
country.
We represent a primary element of the United States
Intelligence Community, a powerful source of information and a
powerful capability in order to use the information we have to
protect our citizens. We have a sense of purpose, and we have
embarked on what has likely never been done before with regard
to information fusion: to fully understand the threat and the
conditions that make that information useful at a utilitarian
level for such a broad range of officials from city mayors to
Border Patrol agents, to airport screeners, to critical
infrastructure operators, to the cop on the beat.
This concludes my oral statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions you have today, and I am looking forward
to our interaction. Thank you.
Mr. Camp. Thank you very much.
[The statement of General Hughes follows:]
Prepared Statement of Patrick M. Hughes
Good morning Chairman Camp, Chairman Gibbons, and distinguished
members of the Committee. I am privileged to appear before you today to
discuss information sharing and collaboration, and the role of the
Office of Information Analysis (IA), within the Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP) of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS).
In the aftermath of 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security was
envisioned, formed, and is now in operation. Standing up the
Department, the largest reorganization of government in fifty years,
has been a great undertaking. Many employees of DHS have assumed new
responsibilities, and all have put in long hours to ensure that while
our strategies may change to meet the terrorist threat, our course as a
nation will remain constant. President Bush's decision to establish the
Department has enabled us to unify our diverse resources into one team,
to ready ourselves against our enemy, and to ensure the highest level
of protection for our country and the citizens we serve.
Through the Homeland Security Act of 2002, IAIP, and consequently
IA, is charged with ``integrating relevant information, intelligence
analyses, and vulnerability assessments (whether such information,
analyses, or assessments are provided or produced by the Department or
others) to identify protective priorities and support protective
measures by the Department, by other executive agencies, by State and
local government personnel, agencies, and authorities, by the private
sector, and by other entities.'' In addition, Section 892 of the
Homeland Security Act and Executive Order 13311 establish the Secretary
of Homeland Security as responsible for information sharing across the
Federal government and with State, Tribal, and local government, as
well as private sector security responsible for protecting the nations
critical infrastructure. The Secretary has delegated this to the Under
Secretary for IAIP.
IA is the heart of the intelligence effort at DHS. It is
responsible for accessing and analyzing the entire array of
intelligence relating to threats against the homeland, operational
reporting from across DHS and State and local law enforcement, and
assimilating disparate operational and intelligence information, making
that information useful to federal partners, first responders, State,
territorial, tribal, local, and major city governments, and the private
sector. IA provides the full-range of intelligence support to the
Secretary, DHS leadership, the Undersecretary for IAIP, and DHS
components. Additionally, IA ensures that the best intelligence
available informs the administration of the Homeland Security Advisory
System.
In order to perform these duties, IA must receive intelligence from
a number of sources, including the United States Intelligence Community
(IC), particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation- the primary
interface with law enforcement entities around the country, and our
afore mentioned State, territorial, tribal, local and private sector
partners, but also from all DHS entities with intelligence capabilities
as well as DHS operational entities. The large amount of information IA
coordinates includes reporting from the United States Secret Service
(USSS), the United States Coast Guard (USCG), the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate (BTS), Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) including the Federal Protective Service (FPS) and
the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). In addition, IA interfaces with our
colleagues in the Infrastructure Protection (IP) Office of the IAIP
Directorate to achieve one the cornerstones of the Department of
Homeland Security, to deliver threat-informed vulnerability and risk
assessments regarding our critical infrastructure, to our constituents
and customers--notably the private sector that holds most of our
nation's critical national infrastructure. We are an integral part of
the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) effort to monitor and
communicate on all matters of homeland security interest 24X7. We also
relate directly to the Integrated Staff element of DHS, the operations
directorate that is responsible for planning and developing operations
concepts and orders to DHS components and to our partner organizations.
We attend all IC and White House collaboration and coordination
meetings, including many that are accomplished by secure video
teleconference. Our involvement in information sharing and
collaboration includes all of this and more.
Information sharing and collaboration is not a one-way street. In
addition to receiving information from these entities, IA delivers the
intelligence it coordinates to our partners as appropriate. This
requires IA to share information and collaborate at all levels, from
the Federal Government and IC members to local officials and DHS
entities that in turn provide threat information to their associates on
the front line. DHS component organizations not only provide support to
IA and to their associates, they also serve as a conduit through which
relevant information can pass to DHS and the rest of government and
information and warnings can be shared with stakeholders within their
areas of responsibility--thereby increasing the practical benefits
derived from intelligence analysis.
IA analysts have access to the most classified and highly sensitive
national intelligence from the Terrorist Threat Integration Center
(TTIC) (whose responsibilities will eventually be assumed by the
National Counterterrorism Center--NCTC), the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the National
Security Agency (NSA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the
Department of State (DoS), and other national-level agencies regarding
international and domestic terrorist threats. This information is
received formally through IA analysts' connections to the Joint
Worldwide Intelligence Communications Systems (JWICS), TTIC Online, the
IA Automated Message Handling System (AMHS), the Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN), and a variety of other formal and informal
(i.e., analyst-to-analyst) mechanisms that contain such intelligence.
This information from other agencies is augmented by our own internal
reporting from DHS components.
From Border and Transportation Security (BTS) reports regarding
individuals of interest trying to enter the United States illegally, to
USCG reports regarding suspicious activity near critical infrastructure
points, intelligence from DHS components that IA analyzes provides
invaluable perspective and insight for the entire Federal Government.
Such reports are provided to IA through the same methods the IC uses-
the physical presence of DHS component liaison officers within both IA
and the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) and communication
between analysts and leadership. In fact, the presence of
representatives of 26 separate Federal and local representatives within
HSOC provides a perspective and collaboration capability which is very
valuable. Additionally, coordination within DHS is aided by regular
meetings of the intelligence chiefs of each entity, lead by the
Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis (ASIA).
Information moves into and out of IA in the form of a number of
different documents. Many are familiar with the Homeland Security
warning products that communicate valuable threat information to such
varied audiences as the public, first responders, and infrastructure
owners. Homeland Security Information Bulletins provide a means to
communicate information of interest to the nation's critical
infrastructures that does not meet the timeliness, specifics, or
significant thresholds of warning messages. They are designed to
provide updates on the training, tactics, or strategies of terrorists.
Similarly, Homeland Security Threat Advisories identify a threat
targeting critical national networks or key infrastructure assets and
provide a means for DHS to communicate threat information to all DHS
customers ranging from the IC to the general public. This information
stream is augmented by other products, such as Special Assessments and
Studies, Homeland Security Intelligence Articles, and Red Cell reports,
which offer alternative or conceptual analysis. Additionally, Homeland
Security Information Messages (HSIMs) are a valuable tool used to
expeditiously communicate newly acquired, uncorroborated threat
information to U.S. government agencies, state and local Homeland
Security Advisors, and the private and public sectors. The HSIM
contains a preliminary analysis of threat information received by DHS
from the intelligence community, law enforcement community, private or
public sector and have information that has not been fully evaluated.
In addition to these products, IA employs a variety of reporting
mechanisms to communicate with both IC members and the intelligence
offices of DHS operational components. Intelligence goes to DHS
component entities and the IC primarily through DHS Intelligence
Information Reports (IIRs) and Homeland Security Intelligence Reports
(HSIRs). The IIR quickly releases select raw intelligence reporting
from DHS components to the IC, Federal Law Enforcement, and others as
appropriate in a unified and recognizable format via the Automated
Message Handling System (AMHS). Similarly, a HSIR provides DHS
operational elements a vehicle to report case and potential terrorist
information to DHS headquarters. It is a final report, containing a
compilation of information where some processing or analysis has
occurred and should stand alone as a semi-finished product. Lastly,
information is shared and coordination occurs through the IA Executive
Morning Brief (IAEMB), which is shared at the daily morning
intelligence update and through the twice-daily Secure Video
Teleconference (SVTC), as well as through direct analyst-to-analyst and
leadership communication.
It is IA's singular focus on the protection of the American
homeland against terrorist attack that is unique among its IC partners.
This focus provides invaluable information and assistance not only to
State, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector officials that
receive accumulated threat information, but also to DHS components that
use the information, trends, and indicators to inform and prepare
operators and decision makers on the front line. The relationship IA
has with the HSOC, BTS and other DHS entities translates into
continuous information sharing and collaboration that provides a unique
threat picture to those who are vital to protecting the homeland.
The Department of Homeland Security is a prime example of how
changes have been made within the Intelligence Community, the
counterterrorism community, and the law enforcement community to work
more cohesively as well as more collaboratively, to assure information
is shared as fully and completely as possible. This represents a
dramatic change from conditions as they existed before September 11th,
2001. DHS plays a central role in the counter-terrorism and homeland
security effort as we continue the work of communicating intelligence
and information to our partners in the federal government as well as
with the State, territorial, tribal, local, and private sector
officials charged with protecting the people and infrastructure of this
country.
Building up IA, increasing our information capabilities, and
coordinating intelligence information sharing and collaboration across
the entire federal government are monumental tasks. We have
accomplished much in a short period of time and we continue to press
forward to strengthen our capabilities and our ability to support the
overall DHS mission set. In order to better facilitate this effort the
Department of Homeland Security has formed the DHS Information Sharing
and Collaboration (ISC) Program, appointed a Director, and formed a
staff including representation from all internal components. We are a
participating member of the larger national effort to improve and
enhance information sharing and collaboration and to integrate ISC
concepts and capabilities into the changing intelligence community (IC)
environment under the various transformation efforts brought forth by
the 9-11 Commission and by earlier and subsequent Administration and
Congressional action. The DHS ISC Program has already begun the work of
assessing the ``here and now,'' of envisioning and forming a future
Information Sharing Architecture, and is engaged in building the
business plan which will guide and govern efforts to construct the
appropriate enterprise architecture to empower full and complete
sharing throughout the entire Homeland Security environment. One of the
major DHS programs the ISC Program now collaborates on is the Homeland
Security Information Network (HSIN)-an overarching network for the
Department to provide information exchange and real time collaboration
between federal, state, local, tribal, and major city authorities.
Using this network, federal, state, and urban area homeland security
advisors are able to communicate with each other and with DHS. As a
direct result of ISC Program efforts to cooperate and work jointly with
other Federal partners, DHS and the Department of Justice (DOJ)/FBI
have established the first ever capability to share information between
the HSIN/Joint Regional Information Exchange System (HSIN/JRIES), the
Regional Information Sharing System (RISSNet), Law Enforcement Online
(LEO), and will soon be joined by the Criminal Information Sharing
Alliance Network (CISANet). Through this technology demonstration
project, Sensitive But Unclassified products of each department and
network are posted to other networks thereby allowing users on any of
the systems to see and use the products from the other organizations.
Many of the efforts we are undertaking are technical in nature, but
the primary effort is not merely technical but rather one of changing
policy and procedure to motivate and empower necessary technical change
in order to achieve our goals of functional interoperability and
information transparency in order to accomplish the information sharing
and collaboration mission. However, it must be noted that intelligence
analytic tools such as link and nodal analysis tools, very dynamic
search engines tailored for the intelligence data base environment,
analytic workstations configured to empower the analysts in their work,
and numerous other technical aids and capabilities. . .are key to our
information sharing and collaboration success.
We have accomplished much at DHS and in IA since our inception and
we are on course with our partners and colleagues to continue to
achieve. I firmly believe the American people are more secure and
better prepared than before September 11, 2001 directly because of the
advent of the Department of Homeland Security. We are fully connected
to the U.S. Intelligence Community and well informed. We are more fully
integrated into the workings of the domestic security structure. We are
connected with law enforcement. We have working analysts poring over
the detail of intelligence and law enforcement reporting to discover
the hidden patterns and concealed threads of terrorist activity and the
manifestation of other threats to America from crime with national
security implications and from other disasters and threatening
conditions that come our way. We have a sense of purpose and we have
embarked on what has likely never been done before with regard to
information fusion. . .to fully understand the threat and the
conditions to make that information useful at a utilitarian level for a
broad range of officials from city mayors to border patrol agents to
airport screeners to critical infrastructure operators to the cop on
the beat.
Chairman Camp, Chairman Gibbons, and Members of the Committee, this
concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any
questions you may have at this time.
Mr. Camp. Mr. Verdery, you have 5 minutes. We have your
written statement, and if you could summarize it, that would be
helpful.
STATEMENT OF C. STEWART VERDERY, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY POLICY AND PLANNING,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Verdery. Of course.
Chairman Camp, Chairman Gibbons and other members of the
committee, thank you for the chance to be here today to join
with General Hughes to testify about the efforts of the
Department of Homeland Security to analyze and disrupt the
travel of potential terrorists.
The 9/11 Commission noted that, and I quote, ``targeting
travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists as
targeting their money. The United States should combine
terrorist travel intelligence operations and law enforcement in
a strategy to intercept terrorists, find terrorist travel
facilitators and constrain terrorist mobility''. The
administration and this Department concur with this
observation, and we have implemented a number of successful
programs to deny terrorists the ability to travel freely into
the U.S., identify potential travel facilitators, and constrain
their mobility.
This is a complex multiagency undertaking, and we are
working in close collaboration with our interagency partners on
this important task. We are reviewing how travel documents are
produced and reviewed so we can better detect altered and
fraudulent ones; improving and expanding watch-lists; and
exploring ways to share data with our foreign counterparts that
can help identify and thwart terrorists, and, of course, these
efforts are designed to protect and respect the civil liberties
and privacy of U.S. Citizens and residents, and of our
visitors.
I believe General Hughes in his written testimony ably
described the role of Information Analysis Section of DHS in
participating in the Intelligence Community. It is absolutely
critical that actionable intelligence and actual information be
provided to the front-line components of DHS, whether it is an
inspector at a port of entry, a Federal air marshal, an
aviation screener or a criminal investigator, and that
capability is robust and improving.
The BTS Directorate is current operations unit is
responsible for ensuring a continuing productive relationship
between the intelligence arms of BTS--Customs and Border
Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and TSA--and
IAIP. BTS analysts are assigned to IA, and there is a daily
exchange of information between BTS agencies, IA and, of
course, the Coast Guard. BTS analysts conduct follow-up
research involving BTS incidents of interest and the
Intelligence Community, and we have essentially set up a two-
way street of information sharing where our components receive
information immediately through IA, and IA is immediately
alerted to significant operational activity.
Let me focus briefly on some of the programs we think are
really disrupting the patterns of terrorist travel. And I will
focus on the National Targeting Center, US-VISIT and our
efforts to find fraudulent travel documents.
The National Targeting Center, operated by DHS's U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, working with numerous Federal
agencies, provides tactical targeting and analytical research
support for passenger and cargo targeting in the air, sea and
land operations in inbound and outbound environments.
NTC develops tactical targets, potentially high-risk people
or shipments that should be subjected to additional scrutiny by
CBP personnel, from raw intelligence, trade, travel and law
enforcement data via the Automated Targeting System (ATS). The
NTC supports DHS field elements including our container
security personnel in 25 countries around the world, our visa
security officers in Saudi Arabia, the CBP officers at ports of
entry, and the Border Patrol, and is also working to support
the pilot Immigration Security Initiative (ISI) operating in
two airports in Europe to work on vetting passengers before
they leave for international flights.
During the heightened threat period last December and
throughout the winter, NTC played a pivotal role in analyzing
advance passenger manifest information related to several
international flights of interest that were deemed to be at
risk in order to secure those flights. DHS is committed to
improving the current collection of manifest information over
the coming months by standardizing formats, requiring departure
information for outbound flights and finalizing crew manifest
requirements, and these requirements will build on the
passenger name record, or so-called PNR, data used for
screening passengers. I personally served as the lead
negotiator for the U.S. in our successful negotiations with the
European Union that now allow that data to be transferred from
Europe to DHS for analyzing incoming passengers.
The US-VISIT program is a continuum of identity
verification measures beginning overseas with the visa issuance
process operating at 206 nonimmigrant posts, 115 airports and
seaports of entry. Secretary Ridge deserves great credit for
moving ahead with biometric components of this system ahead of
schedule.
And just to briefly summarize, as of the first 9 months of
operation, we have now detected 838 individuals identified by
the biometrics alone at ports of entry as subject to a watch-
list information or other lookout, and about a third of those
have had adverse action taken against them, being refused entry
or being arrested. In addition, today, September 30th, is the
first day the travelers in the Visa Waiver Program are being
enrolled in US-VISIT.
The Commission's report noted that terrorists use altered
and counterfeit travel documents to evade detection. Just
yesterday I toured the ICE forensic document lab in northern
Virginia. We have accumulated 130,000 legitimate and forged
travel identification documents. They are accessible in
seconds. The analysts at FDL develop hundreds of document
alerts. They are sent to border inspectors, have the capability
for front-line inspectors to have real-time review of suspect
documents, and provides forensic investigation support and
training. And I would encourage all Members interested in this
issue to travel to northern Virginia to take a look at the FDL.
It is truly a unique resource.
Hopefully during the question-and-answer period we can talk
a little bit about lost and stolen passport issues. We are
addressing those through Interpol, through technology
development and through our review of the Visa Waiver
countries. This is a critical, critical program to secure those
documents.
Terrorism attacks in Asia, Europe and elsewhere are vivid
reminders to us that terrorism is an international threat that
cannot be conquered alone. We understand we must engage in a
global effort each day through collaboration, information
sharing and ongoing dialogue to bring the weight of our
collective law enforcement intelligence capabilities to bear
against those who seek to do us harm.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here. I will look
forward to your questions.
Mr. Camp. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Verdery follows:]
Prepared Statement of C. Stewart Verdery, Jr.
Chairman Camp, Chairman Gibbons, Ranking Members Sanchez and
McCarthy, and other distinguished members, I am pleased to be here
today to testify about the efforts of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) to analyze and disrupt the travel of potential
terrorists. I am especially pleased to be joined by my colleague,
Assistant Secretary Patrick Hughes, from DHS's Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate (IAIP).
The 9/11 Commission noted that ``[t]argeting travel is at least as
powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting their money. The
United States should combine terrorist travel intelligence, operations,
and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists, find
terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility.'' The
Administration and DHS concur with this observation and have
implemented a number of successful programs to deny terrorists the
ability to travel freely into the U.S., identify potential travel
facilitators, and constrain the mobility of known and suspected
terrorists.
This is a complex multi-agency undertaking, and DHS works in close
cooperation with its interagency partners on this important task. DHS
works cooperatively with our colleagues at the Departments of State and
Justice and the intelligence community to improve our ability to
identify terrorists without impeding legitimate trade and travel.
We are reviewing how travel documents are produced and reviewed so
that we can better detect altered and counterfeit documents, improving
and expanding watch lists and how they are vetted, and exploring ways
to share data with our counterparts that can help identify and thwart
terrorists. These efforts are also designed to protect and respect the
civil liberties and individual privacy of U.S. citizens, residents, and
visitors.
I would like to focus today on our creation and use of the National
Targeting Center (NTC) to identify both potential terrorists and
patterns of terrorist travel, our US-VISIT biometric screening system
which helps to fix the identities of individuals entering and departing
the U.S., and our efforts to detect fraudulent travel documents. As
described more fully in Assistant Secretary Hughes's testimony, I will
also briefly address how we analyze and pass intelligence information
to and from our border officers.
National Targeting Center
The NTC began around-the-clock operations on November 10, 2001,
providing tactical targeting and analytical research support for anti-
terrorism efforts. The NTC is primarily staffed by DHS's Customs and
Border Protection (CBP). The NTC staff consists of CBP Officers and
field analysis specialists who are experts in passenger and cargo
targeting for air, sea, and land operations in the inbound and outbound
environments. The NTC develops tactical targets--potentially high-risk
people and shipments that should be subject to additional scrutiny by
CBP personnel--and it develops these targets from raw intelligence,
trade, travel, and law enforcement data.
The NTC has access to over 20 critical anti-terrorism and law
enforcement databases, including the Terrorist Screening Data Base
(TSDB) maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), and receives
strategic intelligence daily from CBP's Office of Intelligence, our
IAIP Directorate, and other law enforcement and intelligence entities.
The NTC includes representatives from ICE, the FBI, the intelligence
community, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), US-VISIT,
the Department of Energy, the Department of Agriculture, the Food and
Drug Administration, and the United States Coast Guard.
NTC supports DHS field elements, here and overseas, including
Container Security Initiative (CSI) personnel stationed in 25 countries
throughout the world, the Visa Security Program, and CBP Officers at
all of our ports of entry, as well as between the ports through support
to CBP's Office of Border Patrol. NTC also supports the Immigration
Security Initiative, currently operating at Schiphol Airport in
Amsterdam and Warsaw, Poland, where teams of CBP officers are deployed
to work with local authorities in preventing the onward movement of
people identified as presenting a security threat to the carrier or
passengers on international flights destined to the U.S.
During the period of heightened alert last December, the NTC played
a pivotal role in analyzing advanced passenger information system
(APIS) manifests related to several international flights that were
determined to be at risk, in order to ensure that passengers on board
did not pose risks to the flights.
The NTC uses the Automated Targeting System (ATS) to identify and
target high-risk passengers and cargo entering the United States. ATS
permits the NTC's trained personnel to process advance passenger
information, to recognize anomalies and ``red flags'' and to determine
which individuals and shipments should be given greater scrutiny at our
ports of entry.
DHS is committed to improving the current collection of passenger
manifest information over the coming months by standardizing entry
information formats, requiring departure information, and finalizing
crew manifest requirements.
The United States and the European Commission signed an
international agreement on May 28, 2004 permitting CBP to access
passenger name record (PNR) data to be used for screening passengers. I
personally served as the lead for the U.S. interagency team which
negotiated for over one year until we succeeded in establishing a
mutually acceptable legal framework to allow CBP to receive PNR data
from the airlines that carry passengers between Europe and the United
States. In 1996, the European Parliament and Council issued a ``Data
Protection Directive'' that set forth detailed requirements for the
utilization and sharing of personal data. Prior to our resolution of
these issues with the Commission, airlines found themselves in a
position where they could be subject to fines from EU member states if
they provided PNR data to the United States.
PNR information is just one of many tools used by CBP to fulfill
its mission. PNR data is an essential tool allowing CBP to accomplish
its key goals: (1) PNR data helps us make a determination of whether a
passenger may pose a significant risk to the safety and security of the
United States and to fellow passengers on a plane; (2) PNR data
submitted prior to a flight's arrival enables CBP to facilitate and
expedite the entry of the vast majority of visitors to the United
States by providing CBP with an advance and electronic means to collect
information that CBP would otherwise be forced to collect upon arrival;
and (3) PNR data is essential to terrorism and criminal investigations
by allowing us to link information about known terrorists and serious
criminals to co-conspirators and others involved in their plots, as
well as to potential victims. Sometimes these links may be developed
before a person's travel, but at other times these leads only become
available days or weeks or months later. In short, PNR data helps CBP
fulfill its anti-terrorism and law enforcement missions and allows for
more efficient and timely facilitation of travel for the vast majority
of legitimate travelers to and through the United States. At this time,
CBP is receiving PNR data, which is enabling us to link information
about known terrorists.
Over the course of our negotiations, both sides worked together to
reach a workable solution that outlines the type of data that may be
transferred, the period of time it can be retained, and the purposes
for which it may be used. Additionally, the final arrangement includes
requirements for aggressive and important passenger redress mechanisms,
including a channel for direct access by European Data Protection
Authorities to the Chief Privacy Officer at the Department of Homeland
Security on behalf of European citizens.
While this agreement was signed by the EU and the Secretary of
Homeland Security in May, matters related to the agreement are
currently being challenged by the European Parliament before the
European Court of Justice. We are, nevertheless, confident that the
agreement is legally sufficient and will improve the safety of air
passengers.
In addition, CBP continues to work on a version of ATS that, for
the first time, will be able to identify potentially high-risk
passenger vehicles and travelers at our land border ports of entry. The
new version of ATS will also increase the amount of government data
that the system can access and analyze and enable us to train more
people on the use of the system.
These, and many other U.S. intelligence analysis capabilities, are
being used to help exploit terrorists' vulnerabilities as they travel
and to learn more about their activities and methods. In addition to
our ongoing efforts to target terrorist travel to, from, and within the
United States, the Administration is seeking, on both a bilateral and
multilateral basis, to promote similar efforts by other responsible
governments, and to provide those governments with relevant terrorist-
related information.
US-VISIT
Prior to the terrorist attack on September 11, Congress twice
mandated the creation of an electronic entry-exit system. Following the
events of September 11, Congress added the requirement that the entry-
exit system focus on biometric technology as a means to verify the
identity of foreign travelers. DHS established the US-VISIT program,
and began implementing US-VISIT, as required, at 115 airports and 14
seaports of entry on January 5, 2004. In accordance with direction from
the Secretary, US-VISIT incorporated biometric technology into US-VISIT
even though biometrics were not statutorily mandated by that date.
US-VISIT enhances the security of our citizens and visitors;
facilitates legitimate travel and trade; ensures the integrity of our
immigration system; and protects the privacy of our visitors.
In addition to developing an integrated system that records the
arrivals and departures of travelers and uses biometric technology to
combat fraud, DHS is designing US-VISIT to: (1) provide information to
CBP Officers and consular officers for decision making purposes; (2)
reflect any pending or completed immigration applications or actions;
(3) identify nonimmigrant overstays; and (4) provide accurate and
timely data to appropriate enforcement authorities. US-VISIT is working
to accomplish these objectives.
US-VISIT represents a major milestone in enhancing our nation's
security and our efforts to reform our borders. It is a significant
step towards bringing integrity back to our immigration and border
enforcement systems. It is also leading the way for incorporating
biometrics into international travel security systems.
US-VISIT is a continuum of security measures that begins before
individuals enter the United States and continues through their arrival
and departure from the country. Enrolling travelers in US-VISIT using
biometric identifiers allows DHS to:
Conduct appropriate security checks: We conduct checks
of visitors against appropriate lookout databases, including
the TSDB, and selected criminal data available to consular
officers and CBP Officers at the ports of entry, including
biometric-based checks, to identify criminals, security
threats, and immigration violators.
Freeze identity of traveler: We biometrically enroll
visitors in US-VISIT--freezing the identity of the traveler and
tying that identity to the travel document presented.
Match traveler identity and document: We biometrically
match that identity and document, enabling the CBP Officer at
the port of entry to determine whether the traveler complied
with the terms of her/his previous admission and is using the
same identity.
Determine overstays: We will use collected information
to determine whether individuals have overstayed the terms of
their admission. This information will be used to determine
whether an individual should be apprehended or whether the
individual should be allowed to enter the U.S. upon her/his
next visit.
The DHS and Department of State (DOS) together have created a
continuum of identity verification measures that begins overseas, when
a traveler applies for a visa, and continues upon entry and exit from
this country. The system stores biometric and biographic data in a
secure, centralized database and uses travel and identity documents to
access that information for identity verification and database checks.
206 nonimmigrant visa-issuing posts and 118 immigrant visa issuing
posts capture finger scans and digital photographs of foreign nationals
when they apply for visas, regardless of their country of origin. This
process will be implemented at all 207 visa-issuing posts worldwide by
October 26. In addition, today is the first day that nationals from
Visa Waiver Program (VWP) countries will be enrolled in US-VISIT when
they travel to the United States.
At assigned U.S. border points of entry, designated visitors are
required to provide biometric data, biographic data, and/or other
documentation. This data is checked against various databases, which
US-VISIT has successfully integrated and which contain visa issuance
information, terrorist (through the TSDB) and criminal watchlists, and
immigration status information. That information allows a CBP Officer
at the border to verify the identity of the traveler and to determine
whether the foreign national is a public threat or is otherwise
inadmissible. In its first 9 months of operation, DHS processed over
8.9 million foreign national applicants for admission through US-VISIT
at its air and sea ports of entry. During that period, 838 individuals
were identified by biometrics alone as being the subject of a watchlist
lookout. After a careful examination of all the relevant facts, DHS
elected to take adverse action in approximately 33 percent of those
cases where an individual was identified--such action included arrest
or refusal of entry into the United States.
Examples of US-VISIT Success
For example, At Newark international airport, an international
traveler appeared for inspection. Standard biographic record checks
using a name and date of birth cleared the system without incident.
However, a scan of the traveler's index fingers, checked against the
US-VISIT biometric database, revealed that the traveler was using an
alias and was, in fact, a convicted rapist. Additionally, he had
previously been deported from the United States. US-VISIT's search
disclosed that the individual used at least nine different aliases and
four dates of birth. He had previously been convicted of criminal
possession of a weapon, assault, making terrorist threats, and rape.
CBP Officers at JFK International Airport processing a passenger
through the US-VISIT procedures found that the individual was using an
alias. Further information uncovered two arrests for aggravated
trafficking of drugs, a subsequent failure to appear, and visa fraud.
The traveler had used this fraudulent visa to enter the United States
over 60 times without being detected by standard biographic record
checks, the last time only 11 days earlier.
Recently, a traveler with four aliases, three social security
numbers, and a criminal history going back to 1990, tried to enter the
United States. He was not admitted because a comparison of his
fingerscans against the US-VISIT biometric watch list determined that
he had previously been deported from the United States.
US-VISIT, as well as the student tracking system SEVIS, has
developed mechanisms to facilitate the lawful and appropriate use of
entry-exit data by law enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau
of Investigation to enhance their ability to investigate terrorist
travel patterns.
Secure Flight
On August 26, DHS unveiled the concepts underlying our new Secure
Flight program designed to improve security for domestic flights by
improving the use of terrorist screening information. Under Secure
Flight, TSA will take over responsibility for comparing PNR information
of domestic air passengers to a greatly expanded list of individuals
known or suspected to be engaged in terrorist activity--a function
currently administered by each airline individually. The move will help
reduce the number of false alerts caused by the current outdated
system.
When in place, following the completion of a pilot program and
consideration of any issues that arise, and after the completion of a
rulemaking, Secure Flight will help move passengers through airport
screening more quickly and decrease the number of individuals selected
for secondary screening--while fully protecting passengers' privacy and
civil liberties.
This new system will implement a key recommendation of the 9/11
Commission for the government to continue improving the use of `no-fly'
and `automatic selectee' lists by using the terrorist screening
database maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center.
Significant progress has already been made by the U.S. Government
by providing greatly expanded No-Fly and Selectee lists to airlines to
conduct checks on their own computer systems under the current
prescreening program. New names are being added every day as
intelligence and law enforcement agencies submit persons for
consideration. As Secure Flight is phased in, TSA will be able to check
passenger records against sensitive watch list information not
previously available to airlines.
Secure Flight differs from earlier enhanced prescreening systems by
focusing screening efforts on identifying individuals known or
suspected to be engaged in terrorist activity, rather than using it for
other law enforcement purposes. As with previous proposals, the new
program will also include a redress mechanism through which people can
resolve questions if they believe they have been unfairly or
incorrectly selected for additional screening.
The development of the program will be as publicly transparent as
possible without compromising national security. Testing and eventual
implementation will be governed by strict privacy protections including
passenger redress procedures, data security mechanisms, and limitations
on use.
Privacy-related documents and a proposed order compelling the
submission of historical PNR data from the airlines to TSA for testing
the Secure Flight program were released for public comment and
published in the Federal Register on September 24. The notice addressed
the purpose of the testing and set forth the limited purposes for which
the information collected will be used in Secure Flight.
Alien Flight Students
On October 5, 2004, TSA will assume the responsibility from the
Department of Justice for the Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP)
program and conduct security threat assessments on all non-U.S.
citizens who apply to receive flight training from an U.S. flight
school.
Flight schools are required to submit training information, such as
the type of training the candidate is requesting, and biographical
information, including full name, passport and visa information.
Applicants must also provide their fingerprints.
All non-U.S. citizens who apply to U.S. flight schools will now
have to undergo a security threat assessment regardless of the size of
aircraft in which they wish to train. Previously, only students wishing
to fly aircraft of 12,500 pounds or more underwent threat assessments.
Another significant change is that flight schools will be required to
submit a candidate's photograph to TSA when the candidate arrives at
the flight school to help ensure the person who was cleared by TSA is
the person who actually receives the flight training.
Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center
In July, DHS and the Departments of State and Justice established
the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center. The center is housed at the
State Department and includes the participation of intelligence
agencies.
The Center analyzes and disseminates information, and provides
related support to law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, foreign
assistance, and other entities that take action against the threats of
human smuggling and trafficking and against criminal support for
terrorist travel.
The Center is another measure that the Administration has taken to
improve our ability to analyze and disrupt terrorist travel, and we are
optimistic about its possibilities.
Deterring the Use of Fraudulent Documents
The Commission's report noted that terrorists use altered and
counterfeit travel documents to evade detection. In the border and
immigration enforcement arenas, biometric identifiers are tools that
help prevent the use of fraudulent identities and travel documents. The
purpose of the biometric identifier is to verify a person's identity in
order to run criminal history checks and to ensure that an individual
cannot apply and/or be granted benefits under different names.
Biometric visas issued by the DOS to travelers to the United States
allow one-to-one matches, to verify that the person presenting the visa
is the person who was issued the visa, and one-to-many matches, to
ensure that the bearer is not the subject of a biometric lookout or
enrolled in the system under another name. Like the biometric visa
process, US-VISIT enrollment fixes a person's identity. When a VWP
traveler enrolls in US-VISIT, the person's fingerprints will be
electronically linked to the passport, thus preventing another person
from using that passport by freezing identities at the border and
ensuring that the person is not enrolled under another name.
CBP Officers must use their expertise to recognize and block the
fraudulent use of many types of identification documents presented by
applicants for admission at our ports of entry. For example, there are
more than 240 different types of valid driver's licenses issued within
the United States, and more than 50,000 different versions of birth
certificates issued by U.S. States, counties, and municipalities.
While advances in technology allow our dedicated and hardworking
CBP Officers to examine and validate documents presented for reentry,
that same technology also enables the perpetrators of fraud to produce,
relatively inexpensively, high-quality fraudulent documents. Forgers
and counterfeiters can produce high-quality fake birth certificates and
driver's licenses with off-the-shelf software programs and materials
that are difficult to detect without sensitive instruments and
sufficient time to examine them.
Our CBP Officers are also charged with detecting look-a-likes or
impostors who attempt to use valid documents which belong to another
person. This is one of the fastest growing phenomena in travel document
abuse. Document vendors solicit genuine, unaltered documents and match
them up with ``look-a-likes.'' DHS's Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) has developed a training program to detect impostor
documents, which it has conducted for both U.S. and foreign immigration
and border officers around the world.
Equipment costs money, and taking the time to examine thoroughly
and in-depth every one of the approximately 460 million identity
documents presented at our over 300 land, sea, and air ports of entry
would be an enormous undertaking with potentially serious secondary
effects. And, even were we to do this, this effort would only permit us
to detect fraudulent documents, not, legitimately issued documents that
are based on fraudulent identity.
The Administration continues to improve efforts in the area of
identification security. Last month, the President signed Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-12 (HSPD-12) to set a common
identification standard for Federal employees and contractors. HSPD-12
mandates the expedited, public, and open development of a uniform
standard for Federal employee and contractor identification that
ensures security, reliability, and interoperability; closes security
gaps and improves our ability to stop terrorists and others from
accessing or attacking critical Federal facilities and information
systems; and improves efficiency among Federal agencies through more
consistent systems and practices.
Secure identification is a priority for the United States. As noted
by the 9/11 Commission, birth certificates, drivers' licenses, and most
other forms of identification have traditionally been issued by State
and local governments, not the Federal Government.
At the Federal level, we are working closely with our State and
local partners to find ways to strengthen the standards used to issue
documents that people use to establish their identity without creating
a national identity card. DHS has supported the efforts of the American
Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) in looking at the
security of drivers' licenses and strongly supports the States in their
endeavors to improve the security of these documents.
Lost and Stolen Passport Data
DHS is addressing security challenges posed by lost and stolen
passports together with our colleagues in the Department of State, who
are responsible for the U.S. passport system, and our foreign
counterparts.
CBP complies with the section of the Enhanced Border Security and
Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 which requires that lost and stolen
passport data be entered into lookout systems within 72 hours. CBP
incorporates lost and stolen passport information into its systems to
aid in the detection and interception of persons using lost and stolen
documents.
Across the globe, international border control authorities continue
to seek timely and accurate information concerning the validity of
travel documents presented at consular posts and their borders. In most
cases, countries are able to recognize the misuse of their own
documents, but because of concerns about the use of personal data, many
nations remain reluctant to share data on lost or stolen travel
documents with other governments or international agencies.
We are making progress in our efforts to encourage international
cooperation in this area. For example through the efforts of the
Departments of State and Justice, the U.S. has provided over 300,000
records of lost and stolen passports to the Interpol's lost and stolen
document database, which is available to border authorities worldwide.
We hope that many more of our international partners will join us in
this effort.
We are working with our colleagues at the Department of State to
exchange of information with the Government of Australia on lost and
stolen passports. We expect that an agreement--the first of its kind
will be concluded shortly. Efforts are also under way internationally
to enhance such exchanges of information. At the June 2004 G8 Summit in
Sea Island, G8 partners agreed to a U.S. proposal to start providing
information on lost and stolen passports to the Interpol database by
December 2004. This will allow participants access to real-time
information on lost and stolen international travel documents. We want
to advance this effort beyond the G8 and encourage all countries to
submit relevant information to the Interpol database. We are promoting
a comparable initiative among the APEC countries to
developRegional Movement Alert System.
Additionally, the U.S. is initiating a study to assess a technology
concept that could further address this concern. The Enhanced
International Travel Security (EITS) concept would use distributed
databases as a mechanism to allow real-time exchange of the basic
information needed--i.e., a ``yes'' or ``no'' response--to assess the
validity of a document without requiring visibility into the actual
data used for that determination. The approach would be similar to the
one already used worldwide by the banking industry to support ATMs.
Developing better systems for international sharing of information, and
expanding participation to more countries will improve our ability to
identify and screen travelers before they enter our country.
In addition, as DHS conducts the required reviews of countries
participating in the Visa Waiver Program, each country has provided
detailed information about lost and stolen passports, their law
enforcement response to such incidents, and efforts made to tighten
distribution and document security processes. How a country handles
this key issue will be an important factor in how DHS, working with
interagency teams, determines whether VWP countries shall remain
eligible for the program. These reviews are due to be completed in
October.
Integrating Intelligence Information
DHS has developed sophisticated methods for identifying and
targeting potentially high-risk cargo and passengers through the
effective use of strategic intelligence. This intelligence is gained
through a close relationship between our bureaus, ICE, CBP, and the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), our IAIP Directorate, the
U.S. Coast Guard's intelligence program, and the intelligence
community. As a result of these relationships, we are able to review,
analyze, and integrate information that resides in multiple government
databases, various watch lists, and advance information received
directly from travelers, airlines, and shippers.
BTS's Director of Current Operations is responsible for ensuring a
continuing productive relationship between the intelligence arms of our
BTS agencies--CBP, ICE, and TSA and IAIP. BTS analysts are assigned to
IA and there is a daily exchange of information between the BTS
agencies and IA. BTS and the Coast Guard have also exchanged personnel
to enhance data sharing.
The BTS analysts primarily conduct follow-up research concerning
BTS incidents of interest to IA and the intelligence community. This
relationship provides a two-way street of information sharing, where
the component representatives are immediately alerted to significant
information received through IA channels and IA is immediately alerted
to significant operational activity.
BTS intelligence representatives attend multiple, daily, meetings
with IA where significant intelligence information is discussed. This
includes intelligence derived from other elements of the intelligence
community and law enforcement entities.
BTS agencies send daily reports to IA about significant incidents
encountered by BTS agencies. These incidents are usually associated
with a watch listed individual intercepted at the border, a subject on
the no-fly list attempting to board an aircraft, or information
alleging potential terrorist-related activity gained from an
investigation.
BTS also works with IA to vet intelligence bulletins, reports, and
assessments and to jointly assess relevant information. BTS ensures
that intelligence is shared between intelligence analysts and
operational personnel. BTS seeks to ``operationalize'' the intelligence
we receive to ensure that the intelligence is incorporated into
targeting and other decisions on an ongoing basis. For example, we may
institute more targeted secondary inspections of travelers from regions
that intelligence suggests warrant additional scrutiny, send priority
leads based on intelligence to investigators in the field, or reassign
Federal Air Marshals.
ICE has created a Threat Analysis Section (TAS) to identify and
address potential vulnerabilities relative to the national security of
the United States. The TAS establishes associations between individuals
or groups linked to potential national security threats, develops
profiles based upon relevant investigative and intelligence reporting,
and produces actionable leads for field offices.
In addition, TSA's Transportation Security Intelligence Service
(TSIS) produces a daily intelligence summary and a weekly suspicious
incidents report that is shared with Federal Security Directors Federal
Air Marshals, and state, local, and industry transportation
stakeholders.
Conclusion
We have made much progress to deny terrorists the ability to travel
freely into the U.S., identify potential travel facilitators, and
constrain the mobility of known and suspected terrorists. In addition
to the initiatives described above, we are working aggressively with
our international partners to improve standards for travel documents,
enhance aviation safety and port security, and speed the exchange of
terrorist identifying information. The bombings in Madrid, the recent
hostage crisis in Beslan, Russia and the Australian Embassy bombing in
Jakarta also serve as vivid reminders to us that terrorism is an
international threat that cannot be conquered alone. DHS understands
that we must engage in a global effort each day, through collaboration,
information sharing and ongoing dialogue to bring the weight of our
collective law enforcement and intelligence capabilities to bear
against those who seek to do us harm.
I would be happy to answer any questions you have at this time.
Mr. Camp. Thank you both for your testimony.
General Hughes, given your extensive experience in
intelligence and your understanding of this threat to our
homeland, which, since 9/11, we have been focused on very
intensely, how do you characterize our efforts to track
potential terrorists attempting to enter the United States? How
would you particularly--you know, in comparison to pre-9/11?
Mr. Hughes. Well, I think it is much improved; for one
thing, the fact that we have standing watch-lists as a tool
which we did not have before. The fact that we have a variety
of registration techniques and much better overwatch on travel
documentation, the issuance of passports and visas and certain
knowledge provided by the travelers in many cases about who
they are and what they intend to do in their travel is a big
change. That does allow us to begin to have knowledge of them
earlier in the process than we used to. I think the Department
of State may have had that information, but it wasn't
integrated into the intelligence and law enforcement and
security communities in a way that it is now.
When they reach our borders, of course, as Stewart was
discussing here, the U.S. visa--excuse me--the US-VISIT
program, the enhanced Customs and Border Protection mechanisms
at the border when they seek passage into our country, and the
knowledge that we have about them combined is a very powerful
tool, and indeed we are--as opposed to tracking them, in many
cases we are interdicting them earlier. We are interdicting
them in some cases before they get on an airplane. Occasionally
that system fails. When they reach our border, generally we
know who they are, and we are finding them.
I will say that we have some additional capability from the
past in the illegal border-crossing context. We know quite a
lot about activities to our Southwest border and Mexico, and
some information concerning along the Canadian border, perhaps
a little bit less in the case of Canada because of the
construct between our two countries. But that is a very
powerful tool. We can in many cases anticipate movement, and we
often do interdict persons on those two borders because we knew
something about them. We knew they were staging or a group was
planning to travel or something like that. It is not perfect,
and I don't wish to communicate to you it is by any means, but
it is better than it used to be.
And the last thing I would like to mention to you is the
term "tracking" is very interesting. We have not only this
foreknowledge or preknowledge of their activities in many
cases, but we are then able to amass this knowledge in a
cumulative way in databases that did not exist before. This is
an invaluable tool and critical to our future success in this
regard. The identification and registration in these databases
of these people is vital, and we weren't doing that in the
robust way that we are now doing it.
Mr. Camp. I appreciate that, and I think we all agree that
we have been working toward putting together a really strong
system in place to apprehend terrorists trying to enter the
United States. But it seems to me the more we strengthen our
policy at ports of entry, it is also more likely that
terrorists may try to infiltrate the country simply by walking
across our border. You know, Time Magazine recently had a
fairly chilling article on this issue and the human smuggling
operations and the efforts like that.
What is the Department doing--and this may be something the
Assistant Secretary would like to comment on as well. What is
the Department doing to strengthen our capabilities to prevent
illegal crossings, and how can we use intelligence information
to target and detect potential terrorists who may be trying to
enter our country in that fashion?
Mr. Verdery. Well, the short answer is a lot. And at some
point I would like to follow on to what General Hughes talked
about in terms of our overseas efforts, and especially on the
visa side and US-VISIT.
In terms of the southern border, the enforcement
capabilities are growing by leaps and bounds, but it is
obviously a very difficult problem. In recent years, we have
increased the number of Border Patrol agents. We have increased
the use of advanced technology, UAVs, sensors, lighting, motion
detection and the like. We have put the necessary number of
prosecutors and asylum adjudicators and the like on the ground,
as well as advanced aircraft deployment. All this, though, does
demonstrate this is a difficult issue with the amount of
traffic across the border.
Under Secretary Hutchinson has launched the Arizona Border
Control Initiative, ABC, which is really trying to bring
operational control to certain sectors in Arizona and has
resulted in huge increases in the number of apprehensions in
that sector. But that, of course, has then put pressure on
other sectors who have had to respond with efforts such as the
Los Angeles Airport Initiative to try to keep migrants from
being moved into LAX and then flown into other parts of the
country.
We also have to look at our legal authorities, and that is
why we put into place the expedited removal program to turn
around third-country nationals quickly who don't have asylum
claims; and the interior repatriation program, to fly Mexicans
back into the interior of the country to try to break the cycle
of people being just returned across the border. But over the
long haul, we, of course, need to improve the entire spectrum
of apprehension capability, detention capability, removal
capability. It is a long-term project that we all have to
concentrate on.
General Hughes. May I just comment on the intelligence
piece of this answer? In this open environment, it is important
for me to tell you that especially with Canada and Mexico, but
also with some other countries that are involved, not in
crossing the border illegally as in walking across, but the
illegal border crossing activity can be facilitated from afar
through the use of illegal documentation and false identity.
And we do have better and growing cooperation with both Canada
and Mexico and with other countries in that regard. Once again,
in an open environment I probably wouldn't like to get into the
details, but I can look you directly in the eye and tell you
that it is better than it was. It needs to get better than it
is, and we are working on that part of this activity.
Mr. Camp. All right. Thank you. Thank you both very much.
And at this time the Chair would recognize the Ranking
Member of the Border and Infrastructure Subcommittee Ms.
Sanchez to inquire.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
gentlemen for being before us.
I think the last few weeks in particular, the Department of
Homeland Security has had some pretty negative press with
respect to borders and air; borders, I think, because Time
Magazine, I believe, was one that has that little picture of
something being pulled apart and talked about, how much we
really do need to do with respect to our borders. And it really
did highlight the northern border, which, of course, we all
know is much more open than even the southern border. But I
think the other incident that happened was the incident of
Yusuf Islam, who everybody in this room probably knows as Cat
Stevens. He had--you guys returned him to England after he
arrived in the United States because his name was on the watch-
list.
I think this episode highlights several problems with our
current policy, and I sort of want to go through them so I
understand what happened. I think America wants to know what
happened and what we are going to do to fix this.
First of all, he was allowed to board the plane, and I
guess while he was en route, you guys found his name on a
watch-list. I guess the question is why would you--why wouldn't
we be checking it before we got a supposed dangerous person on
the plane, because maybe he could have blown it up as we were
trying to figure out who he was? So the question is why do we
have such a huge security gap in the Visa Waiver Program that
allows travelers participating in the Visa Waiver Program to
get on a plane without first being run through the watch-list
check? And why doesn't DHS check the names of passengers on
international flight against the terrorist watch-lists before
the flights take off? And if you can't do it to all passengers,
can you at least do it for the vast majority of passengers who
buy international tickets at least an hour in advance?
Mr. Verdery. I think I will take that one, Congresswoman.
The Cat Stevens episode does exemplify a current weakness in
the way international travelers come to this country. As you
know, we do not have people stationed overseas except for a
couple of selected airports, as I mentioned, and or the
Immigration Security Initiative. And essentially the airlines
are currently our response overseas to enforce the watch-lists.
And so when a person such as this individual is on a watch-
list, it is the airlines' responsibility to compare the
manifest against the watch-list and make those no board
determinations.
In this case there was an error made. We recognize this
weakness and have announced as part of the Secure Flight
Initiative For Domestic Travel that the international realm
will be enhanced by a proposed rule to be announced later this
year to require that manifest information be supplied to us in
advance of wheels up, so before the plane takes off. Now, this
would be a very complicated endeavor. It will not only change
the way booking patterns are made, especially connecting
flights from overseas travel, but it would provide much greater
security for us to be able to run those watches ourselves
through the National Targeting Center before the plane takes
off, and hopefully these types of situations will be much less
likely to occur.
You asked about the Visa Waiver Program. Again, the watch-
list check that is done now is no different whether you are
from a visa waiver or non-visa waiver country. This same error
could occur with the airlines enforcing the system. So that is
not the issue in this case. There is a visa waiver issue we can
discuss at another time.
We do have the ability, and this happened during the
heightened threat period in the winter, if there is a plane
under a certain threat, we can essentially hold the plane on
the tarmac and run the checks, and that is what was going on.
But that is not a tenable solution for all international
travel, and that is why we were going to move with this
proposed rule to try to get this information ahead of time. It
is also why we went to such great lengths to get the PNR, kind
of back-up information about your travel agent, the people you
are flying with, your bags, and your frequent flyer number from
the Europeans under this agreement, so we could use that
investigative tool both to find people and also to clear people
if there is a potential hit.
Ms. Sanchez. You held him for 33 hours. You held his
daughter for 33 hours also, because they ended up going off
together. After 33 hours you sent him back to England. In 33
hours you couldn't figure out who this guy was? I mean, such a
famous person? I am trying to figure out what kind of a system
are we using to figure out what is going on here. And did you
tell the British authorities? Why would you put him on a plane
if he was such a dangerous person? Did you put him on chained;
you know, shackled? I mean, what is the process?
Mr. Verdery. Well, there is a lot of different issues
involved in the situation. I mean, there is the `should he have
been allowed on the plane' issue. There, is the `what should
the plane have done while it was in midair'; and then there is
`how was the individual who actually makes it to our country
who is on a no-fly list or a watch-list treated'? They are all
separate issues, and all need separate analysis.
But in this case, we feel that he was treated
appropriately. He should not have been allowed on the plane,
and we had to return him when he arrived in our country after
the appropriate booking.
So we need to continue to work on these processes, but we
feel that proper procedures were followed once we recognized
that he had been allowed to board. And again, that demonstrates
all the more why we need to make these decisions ahead of time
before the person boards the plane.
Mr. Camp. All right. Thank you very much.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
At this time the Chairman of the Intelligence and
Counterterrorism Subcommittee Mr. Gibbons may inquire.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And, General Hughes, again, welcome. And I have read your
testimony and wanted to ask a series of questions, if I may,
because I think it will sort of hone itself down to or distill
itself down to a point where I think we are going to get to the
heart of the issue here, which is information analysis.
As you stated in your testimony, information analysis is
really at the heart, I think, of good intelligence efforts, and
absolutely, if you don't have good analysis, no matter how good
the collection is, the result is going to be flawed. So my
question is, is when you have several other Department--or
components within the Department of human--or homeland defense
that maintain distinct intelligence units, what kinds of
control do you have as the head of the information analysis
over these other intelligence offices? Is there a need for a
structured relationship between IA and these offices? If there
isn't one, should there be one? And tasking; describe for me
the tasking ability of IA to these other offices in order that
you get the right information to make a decision, from your
standpoint.
General Hughes. Well, the answer, sir, I think, is--I will
start from the back and go forward here. The capabilities
resident in all of organizations that I enumerate in my oral
statement are impressive. They all produce what I would call
organizational intelligence. They are focused on their
organizations. The Secret Service, as an example, is
exclusively focused on the missions and matters at hand for the
Secret Service, and they are very closely held and are not
broadly applied for very good reasons. Conversely, perhaps the
United States Coast Guard, a member of the U.S. Intelligence
Community in its own right, it is a bona fide member and has
its own budgetary line and its own identity, has a very broad
set of capabilities akin to any other armed force. And I will
just describe one more example, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, which is--in large measure operates in a
clandestine manner and is a very capable organization in the
human intelligence context, all of those and others that I
won't take the time to enumerate, together, taken together,
find their way into the national Intelligence Community through
their own conduits and through the Department of Homeland
Security. Depends on the circumstances, the nature of the
reporting, but virtually everything of departmental and
national interest comes to us at some point.
I believe we have a value added in regard to the analysis
of all of that information. We are able to put it together,
assemble it in one place, cause it to become synergistic in
nature.
The answer to the last part of your question, sir, we can
task anyone inside the Department of Homeland Security in the
name of the Secretary, and we do.
Mr. Gibbons. Is there a structured relationship between you
and these other intelligence agencies?
General Hughes. Yes, there is. We have an agreement among
us which has been verified by the Secretary and by their
individual organizational leaders that IA is the departmental
organization that gives some form to the structure. We meet
every 2 weeks formally in the Homeland Security Intelligence
Group context, and we exchange information among us and between
us. We also have coparticipation in many meetings, and
interaction every day exists between us in automated form, like
telephone and, in many cases, face-to-face meetings that occur
because we interact.
Mr. Verdery. Congressman, if I could just add on this from
the BTS perspective. And that is one of the points of having
the Border and Transportation Security Directorate as an
umbrella over these large operational components, CBP, ICE,
TSA, which have their own headquarters. They are operating
around the country, around the world. BTS is at headquarters
with IA, so there is constant interaction between General
Hughes' operation and the BTS headquarters operation; and also
to coordinate, because we recognize that the activities,
intelligence or otherwise, between the BTS components are so
linked, especially between ICE and CBP, because essentially
Congress broke INS and Customs in half and stuck the
investigators with the investigators and the inspectors with
the inspectors. But those links between the two to bring front-
line activity back to the investigative realm has to be
maintained. And that is one of the large purposes of the BTS
Directorate is to make sure that link continues, along with
getting the intelligence from headquarters out to the field.
Mr. Gibbons. Well, Secretary Verdery, let me ask you this:
You just talked about having 838 apparent hits on your watch-
list, with one-third receiving some sort of adverse action,
either arrested or rejected for entry due to the biometrics
program that you have got. What are you doing today to enhance
the current capability of biometrics? In other words, are you
looking at new technologies that are out there so that we don't
get, as Ms. Sanchez said, an inadvertent hit because of the
inability either to not have the information that was properly
there, or to have a poor biometric system that doesn't do what
we expect it to do? What programs, what pilot efforts have you
got going? What research and development--are you reaching out
to the private sector to do this?
Mr. Verdery. Well, sir, the VISIT system which you
referenced is obviously a fingerprint-, finger-scan-based
system. Secretary Ridge, the Attorney General, and the
Secretary of State made the decision to base it on fingerprints
largely because that is how we have people listed in criminal
databases, and also in terrorist watch-lists in many cases.
That is what makes us able to find people, and it has worked
extremely well. I think the turnaround time is running about 6
seconds from a systems perspective.
Mr. Gibbons. There are also other systems out there that
could be supplemental to the fingerprint systems that could be
very helpful.
Mr. Verdery. There are. VISIT is always looking at trying
to find repetitive or back-up systems that would enhance the
biometrics, such as the facial recognition. Part of the
biometric passport which will be coming on line throughout next
year will be part of the VISIT system. We have to deploy
readers to read those biometric facial recognition parts of the
passport and build that into the database. We are looking at
other biometrics, whether it is iris or the like, and that can
be built in on top of that.
Now, a very important thing, the President issued HSPD 11,
Homeland Security President's Directive 11, last month, which
requires our Department to go through a screening review of all
things across the government, including biometric screening
processes, to harmonize them to come up with the best
biometrics, the best screening procedures to make them
consistent. That review is ongoing right now with a biometric
subgroup.
Again, the other thing I should mention, our Science and
Technology Directorate, not represented here, is putting in an
incredible amount of effort on next-generation biometrics,
working with our operational entities like US-VISIT.
Mr. Gibbons. Well, at some point I would like to talk to
you personally about these systems and look forward to that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
And at this time the Chair recognizes the Ranking Member of
the Intelligence and Counterterrorism Subcommittee Ms. McCarthy
to inquire.
Ms. McCarthy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a question for each one of you. I will take Mr.
Verdery first. I appreciate that you said that we are not under
the practice of holding planes when we are checking watch-
lists. I happen to agree with you on that. But in a journey I
made during the recess period, I learned that Australia has a
system now where they do that investigation when the individual
buys the ticket. And I wonder if we are moving in that
direction on this legislation in the House, sponsored by our
Ranking Member, to encourage that. Would you give us your
thoughts?
Mr. Verdery. Yes, ma'am. As I mentioned, we have announced
that we are planning to promulgate a draft rule that would
require that advance manifest information be supplied before
the plane takes off so that we can do the vetting at the
National Targeting Center before the plane gets into the air.
And so that is something that will be coming down the pike.
And I will say, to be candid, it is not an easy solution,
because if you talk to airports, airlines, the way that the
changes have had to be made to how people book flights, the way
people connect on flights will be immense. There will be costs
here both in terms of inconvenience to passengers, the way
airports are structured and the like. We support it, we think
it is the right way to go, but it is something that has to be
managed very carefully to make sure we don't kill off the
travel industry in the process.
Ms. McCarthy. Well, it hasn't killed off the travel
industry in Australia, so I think there is probably a good
model for you out there. And people who are bargain shopping
are generally buying their tickets ahead of time, and that
should be of assistance in your efforts as well. I think it is
only Members of Congress that don't know when they are getting
on a plane.
Mr. Verdery. It is of assistance, but, of course, when you
are talking about millions of incoming travelers, even if you
have a 1 percent error rate where you know you are talking to
the travel agent on the phone and you say your name or an
address or a phone number, and they mistype a key or a number,
that then ends up with the kind of false hits that you try to
avoid. So that is why the system right now is based on the
information on your passport that is swiped electronically at
the desk at the check-in counter so there aren't errors, or
very rarely, in that kind of information taking. You take it
off the phone, off the Internet, you end up with more errors.
Ms. McCarthy. Well, I have every faith that you will figure
this out and will do an even better job than Australia.
General, does DHS or TTIC or any of the other intelligence
agencies have an office devoted specifically to terrorist
travel? The information sharing that is going on in other
countries, I was on a trip with Member Dunn, who chaired the
trip to Ireland, to Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland
and England, and one of the examples we learned there was that
a--of a police officer in Northern Ireland investigating an
incident uncovered information that, when shared with others in
the Republic of Ireland, in the South, and with Great Britain
led to the discovery of the cell that funded the Bali tragedy
and others. So they, albeit they are all in one compact series
of islands, are doing that information sharing.
How are we doing on information sharing not just within our
own country, but within those other strategic countries that
are so important to our mutual success?
General Hughes. That is a good question, but it is broader
than the Department of Homeland Security. I will go ahead and
answer it on behalf of the many other colleagues.
The U.S. Intelligence Community, at a variety of levels,
especially the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of
State's intelligence organs, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the
Department of Homeland Security, we all exchange information
with other countries. It is not perfect in some cases. And the
reasons are we have to go forward with information that can be
released and placed at risk in the other countries' realm. We
do have mechanisms to do that, such as tear lines and
sanitization, where you take out the source's methods that we
use to get the information. But it is a very robust activity
and ongoing.
I think there was kind of an interior question there that
you asked, and that is how are we doing with regard to the
travel, terrorist travel focus? The Transportation Security
Administrations intelligence organisms, there are two or three
different pieces to that, do overwatch terrorist travel in a
professional sense. And in my organization, as part of our
Strategic Intelligence Division, we have a culmination of
liaison officers and devoted analysts who work part time or
whole time on the issue of terrorist travel. Indeed, I would
probably say each and every day, my time is devoted in some
measure to the issue of persons who we have encountered in the
travel process who are connected in some way with terrorism. It
is of vital importance to us.
Ms. McCarthy. Mr. Chairman, if I might pursue very, very
briefly.
Mr. Camp. Very briefly. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
Ms. McCarthy. Yes, sir.
Are you sharing this--is there a clear sharing with other
countries?
General Hughes. Yes.
Ms. McCarthy. Thank you.
Mr. Camp. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Andrews may
inquire.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
testimony of the witnesses.
Our goal, our policy, is to reach a day when every person
attempting to gain entry in the country can be affirmatively
identified so we know who they say they are. When will we reach
the day where every port of entry into the country has
biometric reading capability?
Mr. Verdery. Well, if you are talking about the US-VISIT
biometric reading capability, that has been deployed to the
major seaports. There are some smaller ones that have not been
brought on line. That will be coming down the pike throughout
the coming months and years. In addition to that gap, we are
deploying at the land borders, at the 50 largest land borders,
at the end of this year and the smaller ports of entry
throughout next year. So US-VISIT is not a complete system by
any means, but the Secretary, I think, took the bold step of
deploying it in stages, because no one had been able to do this
because no one--
Mr. Andrews. I understand. You want to do it right rather
than fast. But we want to do it right and fast. So what
percentage of people coming into the country today do not have
their IDs biometrically read?
Mr. Verdery. Well, I am trying to remember. The
overwhelming number people who come in this country are coming
via the land border, and the larger percent of that from
Mexico. Now, most people coming from Mexico are Border Crossing
Card holders. I would have to get the numbers for you, but my
sense of it is at least probably a third of the individuals
coming in are coming in as Border Crossing Cardholders, coming
back and forth all the time. Those people have gone through a
background check similar to a visa, so they have been checked.
Anybody who has gone through a visa has been checked. And now
starting today--
Mr. Andrews. When you say checked, you mean read through a
biometric reading?
Mr. Verdery. If you apply for a visa now, you will go
through a biometric check at the time of the visa interview and
then again with US-VISIT at the port of entry to see if
derogatory information has been received in the meantime or if
you forged your document. And again, as of today, literally
today, Visa Waiver travelers who don't have a visa are now
being checked biometrically at the port of entry, at the
airports and seaports.
Mr. Andrews. I know that it is not a totally knowable fact
to know when the day will come when every port of entry has
biometric reading capability, but when do you think the day
will come?
Mr. Verdery. Well, again, the most difficult one will be
the smaller land ports of entry, which is by statute required
by the end of 2005. These are the outposts in the middle of
nowhere, so to speak. So that is the backdrop of the last date
where things would be fully employed.
Mr. Andrews. And is that going to happen?
Mr. Verdery. I believe it will, yes. We are committed to
have the big ports of entry with that capability in secondary
at the end of this year, building out in the primary lanes of
entry throughout next year.
Mr. Andrews. So this will include by sea, by air, by land?
Mr. Verdery. Air is complete right now for entry, and the
seaports largely complete. There are a few gaps. Land this year
and next.
Mr. Andrews. Now, let's talk a bit about biometric quality.
Dr. Wein, or Wein--I am sorry if I mispronounce his name--is
going to testify later this afternoon that he has concluded
that a very, very small number of the readings are reliable,
and he has made a suggestion that if we shift the technology
for the fingerprint reading to read 10 fingers instead of what
we read now, we can dramatically increase reliability, I
believe, to over 90 percent from in the forties or fifties
where it is now.
A, do you agree with his assessment? And B, if you do--if
you don't, what is wrong with his assessment? And if you do
agree with his assessment, do you think that we should make the
rather modest technological change that is proposed to try to
plug the hole?
Mr. Verdery. All I have seen is his testimony for this
hearing, which doesn't have the technical back-up that you
might expect. I understand he has a study that will be released
in the coming days, which I would expect that our team,
especially the US-VISIT Office, would want to look at very
carefully.
As I understand it, it is not that the majority are
unreliable. It is that a small minority are unreliable if they
have certain characteristics of their fingerprint. I honestly
feel a little uncomfortable talking about in open session as to
how to defeat the system, to be honest. But--
Mr. Andrews. But certainly we could generically say that
there are people trying to beat the system, and there are ways
to do it, right? So do you agree with his conclusion that those
of--a significant plurality, I guess, of those who try to beat
the system can do so now.
Mr. Verdery. I don't agree with that, and I don't believe
our US-VISIT biometric experts do either. I don't pretend to be
a biometric expert, but I don't believe they would agree with
that in the way it has been presented.
Now, to go to your question you asked earlier about the 10-
print. I think we do agree that in a perfect world, a 10-print
solution, if it didn't take any more time and any more costs,
would be preferable. But at a port of entry, at a visa issuance
window, there is a big difference between putting a 10-print
reader and a 2-print reader out in a primary lane or at a very
crowded consular office. And so the marginal gain between 10-
print and 2-print we have decided to date is not worth it
because it would have held up deployment of a system that is
working every day, as we speak, to find people you would not
want coming into this country.
Mr. Andrews. I have to say I am concerned about that answer
because it is my understanding that NIST looked at this study
and believes that his--the professor's conclusions were
conservative; that, in fact, the error rate may be higher. And
remember that although the vast majority of people trying to
get entrance do not in any way try to alter their fingerprint,
I would assume that it is a pretty fair conclusion that a
significant number of people that we are actively trying to
keep out might want to alter their fingerprint. So it is a
small part of the universe, but a very crucial part of the
universe.
Let me also ask you this. It follows up with Mr. Gibbon's
question. What mechanism is in place to move forward in
biometric technology for things other than fingerprint, like
eye scan? Do we have the flexibility to test those
technologies, and, if so, what are we doing?
Mr. Verdery. Well, we are actually testing the iris scan,
if that is what you mean, right now in a different program, the
Registered Traveler Program that TSA is operating at five
airports around the country, including Reagan National, both
fingerprints and iris scans, as a way to verify people who have
been preenrolled in a Registered Traveler Program. And so we
are working on the iris scan from that end.
As I mentioned, the facial recognition technology that will
be built into international passports, will be required of Visa
Waiver travelers next year. We are building in the capability
to read that into our document readers at ports of entry. And
so we are looking at the systems to provide redundancy and the
like.
But again, the backbone of the system, from our point of
view, has to be the fingerprint because that is the way our
criminal records are characterized; that is how we are able to
find people very quickly with very low error rates, people who
should not be admitted to this country.
Mr. Andrews. Thank you very much.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
Mr. Pascrell may inquire.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, 98 percent of over 281 million visitors
annually enter our country and are inspected. That means that
millions of travelers entering the country are entering without
being checked against any intelligence database that could help
identify a potential terrorist or even a convicted criminal.
I am interested--when we talk about terror, General, and I
want to know if you agree with me, I am talking not only about
those people who wish to bring explosives into this country or
to come into this country to wreak havoc on our citizens and
our property, and I am talking about those people who are
transporting drugs across our border. I see that terror every
day in my district, throughout this Nation. And I know that
drug trafficking in the United States has a lot to do with the
funding and the assisting of terrorist groups and
organizations. What do you see and what do you do about drug
interdiction? And how do you see they are both connected?
General Hughes. Well, thank you very much for the question.
Perhaps Assistant Secretary Verdery would like to comment after
I do.
Personally, I am not positive about the figures you quoted,
but I grant you that there are people who successfully get into
the country with drugs and who are terrorists who may come in
with some capability. That certainly is true. I think it is a
very small percentage compared to what it was.
We have actually been extremely successful in interdicting
drug shipments, and indeed in the past 2 weeks, we have
interdicted huge multiton, ship-borne movements of cocaine in
the Pacific, which you may have read about in the newspapers.
Aside from that, on our land borders and in air crossings,
it is pretty common for us to now interdict any kind of
carrying of such material, either terrorist-related material or
drug materials, through the air bridge.
The land bridge, as we mentioned, poses a significant
problem for us. We are trying to do our best to control that,
and there are a lot of issues there I can talk to you about,
but I think we are making progress. We are on the right track.
But I don't know whether that is a good answer for you, but
I will summarize it. Maritime is a huge problem, but we are
being successful at interdicting, and that is often based on
good intelligence. The air bridge is pretty secure
comparatively for both terrorist activity involving material
and narcotics trafficking. Small amounts probably arrive here
and there. The land borders are an issue, and we are working
hard to secure them.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Verdery, would you respond to that
question, please?
Mr. Verdery. Sure. I think, as General Hughes mentioned,
the numbers on drug seizures are up quite dramatically, whether
it is by sea with the Coast Guard or over land at our ports of
entry or the Border Patrol. We have seen no degradation of the
drug mission in this Department. In fact, it has been enhanced
by the additional capabilities being brought to bear. I would
be happy to get you those figures on that.
We do recognize, of course, that the means by which people
are able to enter the country on the land border could
facilitate a terrorist looking for the same type of entry. That
makes it all the more important--
Mr. Pascrell. Well, my point--excuse me for interrupting.
My point is that there is no difference in the terrorists. What
is the difference? If you are bringing drugs into this country
to kill our children and our citizens who are stupid enough to
use it, you are--what is the difference between that kind of
terrorism and the terrorism that the President has been talking
about over the last 3 years? What is the difference?
Mr. Verdery. I take the point. We want to do both. We want
to fight the counternarcotics mission and also what I was
referring to as more of international terrorism, which I think
is a term of art.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, would you agree with my statement that
the terror of drugs in this country is just as horrible, just
as terrible as the terror which is brought into this country of
those who wish to bring explosives or to kill our citizens or
to damage our property?
Mr. Verdery. I wouldn't want to rank two horrible outcomes.
They are both horrific.
Mr. Pascrell. We both agree then.
Mr. Verdery. Yes. But I think the capabilities that are
being brought to bear against the terrorism threat as I define
it, kind of international terrorism, Al-Qa'ida and the like, is
having significant impact on the drug enforcement mission also,
whether it is the One Face at the Border Initiative, getting
our Customs inspectors and immigration inspectors cross-
trained, enhanced Border Patrol missions, advanced technology
on the border. We are seeing increases in picking up people,
picking up drugs, all those kinds of things on the border.
The last point I have to make is that this demonstrates all
the more reason for the President's Guest Worker Initiative,
because we have got to figure out a way to get the overwhelming
majority of people who are crossing the border legally, who are
not criminals, who are not trafficking drugs, who are not
terrorists, who want to work, we have to be able to have a way
for them to walk, to come back and forth to those jobs through
the ports of entry where they can be vetted for security
reasons and essentially pull the wheat and the chaff, separate
them. Terrorists are not going to be able to walk into a port
of entry. And so if we can get the guest workers who are here
to work coming back and forth through ports of entry,
regularize that, it would make our border enforcement mission
much better.
Mr. Pascrell. Let me make myself clear. I didn't make
myself clear then. There are 22,000 Americans that are killed
every year in the United States due to illicit drugs. It would
seem to me, just an observation, a perception, that we do not
have the commitment to interdicting those drugs and ending this
horror on the streets of our communities. And we know the
tragedy of 9/11. The Commission spelled it out, made some
recommendations. Some we have included in legislation
conveniently, and some we have left out.
You don't have enough people to do your job. I don't care
what you tell us today. You don't have enough people to do your
job. So you are the messenger. I understand that. It is not you
personally that I am--
Mr. Verdery. If I could just--I mean, there is a commitment
from the Department, from the Secretary, from Asa Hutchinson,
the Under Secretary, former head of the DEA, our Deputy
Secretary, our operational heads such as Commissioner Bonner
and our Counternarcotics Office to see this mission forward.
And as General Hughes mentions, the numbers bear out that we
are doing it. Are drugs getting in? Of course. This is never a
100 percent solution. But we have seen a robust increase in the
amount of drugs that are interdicted in the source zone, at the
ports of entry and the like, and we need to ramp it up. But we
are doing the job.
Mr. Pascrell. I just wanted to bring something to your
attention, that is, on the Border Patrol. We are talking about,
in 2011, there were 9,700, almost 9,800 Border Patrol. There
are 10,839 today. How can you sit there and tell this
committee--being the messengers, how can you sit there and tell
this committee that by adding the small amount of Border
Patrol, that you are even touching the surface of this serious
problem.
You know that there are more drugs coming into this country
than ever in the history of the Nation. You don't have enough
people to do the job. We are doing this on the cheap, and we
are doing this for what the reason?
I don't know why we are holding this hearing today, I
really don't. We need to act and we need to act yesterday. And
that was the whole message of the 9/11 Commission, we need to
act yesterday. And we need to do it in a very tangible way,
rather than simply having committee upon committee, everybody
gets a piece of this, and nothing is being done.
There is terror in our streets, and there is terror from
drugs in this country that are moving freely. You know it and I
know it. Just as serious as the lunatics that are out to try to
kill us--just as serious.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
And before I recognize Mrs. Lowey, the purpose of this
hearing is to look at terrorist travel. We have separate
committees in this House that deal with narcotics, and there
are some Members that are on both committees, like Chairman
Souder who has done a great deal of work in this area.
So I appreciate the gentleman's line of questioning, but
this hearing, in fairness to our witnesses, is about terrorist
travel. And I realize--
Mr. Pascrell. I am talking about terrorist travel, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Camp. I realize, by your definition, but we have
separate committees--
Mr. Pascrell. That is why I asked the question.
Mr. Camp. But we have separate areas that are also working
on this.
So, with that, I would recognize the gentlewoman from New
York, Mrs. Lowey, to inquire.
Mrs. Lowey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, good to see you again. Tuesday's New York Times
reported, based on the findings of an FBI inspector general
report, that 3 years after the September 11th attacks, more
than 120,000 hours of potentially valuable terrorism-related
recordings have not yet been translated by linguists at the
FBI.
My judgment, this is absolutely outrageous, not to mention
dangerous, particularly for the residents of my home State of
New York which is referenced in intelligence reports time and
time again.
In my judgment, we can collect all of the intelligence we
want, but if we let it sit on a shelf and collect dust for 3
years, it won't do us any good. We are here today, in part, to
review the progress being made by the Department in the area of
information sharing.
And perhaps, Secretary Hughes, could you just tell me what
this report indicates to you, and what you are doing about it?
General Hughes. It indicates to me that we--and actually I
guess I will use a little bit of history here--we haven't
solved the problem we have had for many years, where similar
kind of records have been found throughout the intelligence
community, not just at the FBI, but at the National Security
Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency and the former office
that I held, the Defense Intelligence Agency. We are
overwhelmed, in fact, many times by the volume of material.
We do have some screening mechanisms to go through this
material and highlight to us the issues of interest that are in
them, rapidly, key word search, as an example of anything that
can be digitized. That is not the only--
Mrs. Lowey. Secretary Hughes, if I may, but I know that my
time is fast disappearing. You are the Assistant Secretary,
Information and Analysis. I may not get to my next question
about border security. But it is 3 years after 9/11.
I have three children, I have seven grandchildren; I want
to know what you or others who have similar responsibilities
are doing about this now? This is an embarrassment. It should
be an embarrassment to you, to Secretary Ridge, to the FBI.
What are we doing about it now?
General Hughes. I don't think I can answer your question. I
don't know what we are doing about it now, outside of being
equally outraged, as you are, about the report. I don't
actually know if the report is completely accurate.
But let's assume that it is for a minute. What I intend to
do is to ask questions about it in the appropriate forum and to
seek full detail, and then search for ways to solve this
problem. I am sorry if it seems like I was talking on anything
something that wasn't related. But, indeed, it is related,
ma'am.
We have had these problems for 20 years or more. And we are
likely to have them in the future. The volume of information
and the number of people to deal with it is in great imbalance.
I apologize for giving you that answer.
Mrs. Lowey. No, I appreciate your honesty, sir. But I just
want to say, as someone who sits on Appropriations, I know
the--in addition to this committee, I know the billions that we
are spending. We spent billions organizing this Department of
Homeland Security.
I had real concerns that instead of dealing with issues
like this and replacing incompetent people with competent
people, we have been moving chairs around. Some people aren't
even in their offices yet. So I just wanted to send a very
strong message that if my first responders--my police, my fire
fighters--are going to be getting plans in place to deal with
emergencies and the FBI doesn't even have all of these urgent
messages interpreted--as you know, before 9/11, part of the
problem was they couldn't get the messages to the right people;
and I am not even talking about other issues that our first
responders have. But if we can't get these messages interpreted
in a timely way, we might as well just all say, Give up, save
the money, put it into our schools, put it into our health
care, the Department of Homeland Security is just not doing
what it should.
And I hate to be so strong, because I know you are working
so hard. But I just hope that if I am sending my strong message
to you, it is gotten, and you can report back to me and to the
committee as soon as possible with a plan that is going to
address this.
Mrs. Lowey. I don't know if we are going to have a chance
to ask other questions, but Solomon Ortiz, my colleague, has
been asking a lot of question about the gangs, the illegal
immigrants that have been coming over the border.
Unfortunately, the head of counterintelligence at the CIA,
never heard about that.
So I hope, Mr. Chairman, you all have heard about it. He
didn't know about it, and so there seems to be a real problem
of people in one office not communicating with people in other
offices. And I hope, Mr. Chairman, if we have another round, we
can deal with that, because that is truly a major issue in
border security. Thank you.
General Hughes. May I give one brief answer?
One of our--
Mrs. Lowey. I am talking about the catch-and-release issue.
General Hughes. I understand--and the gangs. My point that
I was going to make is, one of our primary databases is called
VGTOF it is the Violent Gangs and Terrorist Activities or
Terrorist Organizations Database.
We combine the two in at least one database and look at
them with equal vigor for lots of reasons. And part of the
reason is, we believe, I strongly believe, there is a
connection. So MS13 from El Salvador or Honduras here in the
United States and Al-Qa'ida somewhere else, I believe does have
a relationship that is important for us to understand.
May I just close by saying, I share your passion, and I
will do my best, ma'am.
Mrs. Lowey. Mr. Chairman, I think it is just important to
remember, and I know if we get to another round, that the
problem here is that these illegal immigrants are released
under their own recognizance.
And I have a feeling that they might not all be home just
knitting with their families or cooking dinner. And I think it
is an amazing issue that many of my colleagues have spent a lot
more time focusing on, and I was just going to bring it up
today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Verdery. If I can have a brief minute to respond. But
you mentioned that there were catch and release. That is
obviously a concern of ours, because there is an imbalance
between the number of people who are picked up, who are
scheduled for deportation, and the amount of beds we have.
Now, within that imbalance, ICE has gone to great lengths
to prioritize people who have been found to be involved with
criminal activity, violent criminal activity, or are non-
Mexican. So we are trying to prioritize amongst our bed space
to keep the violent felons in custody until they are deported,
as well as trying to improve the deportation system itself to
get more people through the system, whether it is through
repatriation, getting people back to countries that won't take
them.
We are trying to move more people through so we have less
catch and release.
Mrs. Lowey. Maybe you should have more bed space.
But, Mr. Chairman, I won't take any more time.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin may inquire.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. Andrews, who is
clearly on the same wavelength addressed my question in large
part, but I do want to follow on, if I could, and just explore
a little further where we are, how close we are in terms of
having a robust system that is as close as possible to 100
percent effective when it comes to biometric scanning of
fingerprints.
What are you doing to get us to that 100 percent level, and
in terms of a time frame, at what point can you give assurance
to the public that we are as close as we are going to get, that
it is a 100 percent accurate scanning system?
Mr. Verdery. Well, if you think of--
Mr. Langevin. If I could, in addition to that, are we
giving equal attention in terms of the technology that is
deployed to airports, ports of entry and land border crossings,
particularly in light of the fact that there are some that
suggest that Al-Qa'ida would prefer a port of entry as opposed
to some of the other methods coming in?
Mr. Verdery. Well, thank you for that question, sir.
Again, VISIT is being deployed in fairly well-identified,
discrete increments: Increment 1, January 5 of this year,
airports and seaports. It is now 100 percent at airports, so
every international traveler, with the exception of diplomats
and a couple of other minor categories, basically 100 percent
are vetted biometrically at the port of entry, at airports.
Seaports are close to 100 percent for entry. Land borders,
we will put US-VISIT capabilities in secondary processing by
the end of this year at the 50 biggest ports, the very heavily
trafficked ones, and at the smaller ports of entry by the end
of next year, by 12/31/05.
The VISIT capability on primary, because essentially when
your cars are driving through you are talking about primary,
will be deployed throughout 2005 at the big ports of entry and
2006 for the smaller ports of entry.
In terms of how are we deploying it, we recognize there is
no way to make everyone get out of a car at primary, with
literally millions of people coming through. So we are going to
be going with a radio frequency technology solution, so that
the biometric information is pulled off your travel document as
you are going through the port of entry ahead of time, so that
the inspector can see the information, see if there is a
potential problem while there is still time for a law
enforcement response or other necessary action. And that same
solution will be deployed on exit, so there is an exit at the
port of entry, as well as for land.
I think I mentioned the airport exit solutions will be
deployed this year, and throughout next year there will be a
universal airport and seaport exit.
So I think the bottom line for airports and seaports, you
are looking at near 100 percent coverage by the end of next
year; land ports, 2006.
Mr. Langevin. What about the accuracy of the technology
itself? As Mr. Andrews was--brought up, Dr. Professor Wein's
findings indicate that the technology itself in some cases may
be as low as 52 or -3 percent in terms of its accuracy. You
feel it is higher.
But, clearly, it is not at 100 percent. So what steps are
you taking to get us as close to 100 percent accuracy as
possible? And how long before you have confidence that it is
100 percent accurate when the technology is used?
Mr. Verdery. Well, what we found in the 9 million or so
people who have been enrolled in US-VISIT this year is that the
accuracy is quite high. The false positive rate is less than 1
percent. And those people are resolved usually very quickly, in
a couple of minutes in secondary, where a fingerprint appears
to be a match against a watch-list, but is not. There also are
small numbers of individuals whose fingerprints cannot be taken
for medical reasons or other reasons.
The issue that was raised by the witness in the second
panel is, I think, a little bit different than that. It is a
question of, if you are trying to defeat it, how easy is it to
essentially try to rig the system. And again I don't feel real
comfortable talking about that in open session. I would be
happy to come in and talk to you privately about that.
But in terms of the overwhelming majority of individuals,
it is working extremely well, in the 99 percent range.
Mr. Langevin. My time is almost up, so quickly I would like
to ask this.
I still am constantly baffled by the sheer number of
different databases and lists available for determining who
requires extra screening and who should or should not be
flying. And I can't believe that we still don't have one
complete and integrated list that can be effectively used for
our Border and Transportation Security infrastructure to thwart
terrorist travel.
So can you provide some more detail as to what your goal is
in terms of streamlining those lists and ensuring that they are
used effectively? And can you tell me exactly when that goal
will be met?
Mr. Verdery. Well, the watch-listing effort is being led by
the Terrorist Screening Center established by the President
last year. The terror screening database is what is accessed by
our frontline people, whether it is the TSA screener or an
airline in terms of enforcing the "no-fly" list. So essentially
we do have a common set of watch-lists that are now used,
depending on the program.
So the problem we have, and the reason you see these
stories in the paper of people being flagged inappropriately,
and the like, is not so much a problem with the list, it is a
problem with the implementation of the list. Right now, it is
being run by each of 77 different airlines differently.
Essentially, your person that is checking you in is essentially
acting as the watch-list enforcement person.
We recognize that is not a tenable solution. That is why we
have proposed a Secure Flight program to bring that
responsibility within the government's sphere, within the TSA.
But to do that, we have to get information from the passenger,
via the airlines, in time to make that determination.
So we have issued an order to compel data for testing of
the system. That will be followed on by an order compelling
data to make the system go live, so that we can handle this and
leave airlines with the responsibility of trying to enforce
these lists. It will be based on the Terrorist Screening
Center's coordinated watch-list.
Mr. Langevin. Can you give a time frame? Can you assure the
public out there that we are not going to see these kinds of
stories in the paper where we have got different lists that
don't pick up accurately the people that should not be flying?
Mr. Verdery. Secure Flight, I believe, is due to become
operational in the spring, post-testing; that is when you will
see the transition from the airline-based system to the
government-based system.
Will it be 100 percent? No. Because there are so many air
travelers, there will be false hits. If we have somebody on our
watch-list whose name is Bill Jones, there will be other people
named Bill Jones who are flying, and we have to resolve those
types of potential hits.
I am always amazed at how many similar names there are,
when they sound like a common name; but you put the entire
American people and our international travelers out there
flying, you are going to have those types of hits that have to
be resolved. That is why we are working on Secure Flight.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
The ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Turner, is
recognized, if he would like to inquire.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think the first thing I would like to talk about is this
problem we have on the border with the catch-and-release
practice that is ongoing. Do we have a figure available,
Secretary Verdery, that would tell us what it would cost us to
end that practice?
Mr. Verdery. A figure on how much it would cost to detain
every person who is apprehended until they are deported?
Mr. Turner. Yes.
Mr. Verdery. I do not have that in front of me. It would be
quite large.
Mr. Turner. Has there been any consideration of some
temporary detention facilities that would enable us to halt
that practice?
Mr. Verdery. Well, there are temporary facilities used on
occasion. That is what we have done in Arizona where we have
gone in and enhanced the resources.
We recognize there has to always be a balance of the
prosecutorial resources, the detention resources, the removal
resources. And if you end up with an imbalance, you essentially
haven't done any good, because you can't get people through the
system appropriately.
So there has to be essentially a continuum. So, in that
case, we have put more temporary space in Arizona.
Mr. Turner. I am told by some of the Border Patrol people
that I visit with that the catch-and-release practice fairly
quickly has become well known among those who are engaged in
human smuggling. And so we are likely to have seen an increase
in efforts to come across our unprotected borders as a result
of the fact that it has become known that if you are from a
place other than Mexico, you have about a 50 percent chance of
being released on your own personal bond if you come into our
country.
And I would suspect that we could at least make some impact
upon the movement of illegal immigrants from places other than
Mexico if we had some effort--made some effort to try to stop
that practice.
Mr. Verdery. Well, regarding the announcement that we had
recently of the new use of expedited removal, it points out the
need for that. It essentially is going to say, if you are from
a country other than Mexico and picked up between a port of
entry and you do not have an asylum claim, you are going to be
held, whether it is a couple of days, a short period of time.
You are going to be flown back, you are not going to be put
into the system taking up a bed for months, even years. We can
move people through more quickly.
Again, I have our detention numbers: 108,000 in 2001,
113,000 in 2002, 145,000 in 2003. We had 130,000 in 2004
through June, so I think we are on track to have quite a bit of
increase from last year. But, again, there is no shortage of
people in this regard.
Mr. Turner. The Border Patrol people that I visit with say
that they have received no instruction from the Department
regarding how this new expedited deportation process is going
to work, no indication of what kind of training the Border
Patrol agents will be receiving, no indication of when this is
going to be implemented.
We have a program here that you have announced, but there
doesn't seem to be much understanding among the rank and file
about how it is going to work or where you are getting the
money to pay for it. Could you help enlighten us on that?
Mr. Verdery. Well, it is operational in two sectors, in
Tucson in Arizona and Laredo in Texas. So if you are not a
Border Patrol agent in those two sectors, then you probably
wouldn't have been trained, because it is not being applied. In
these sectors, training has been completed. I have to get back
to you on exactly how many people, but the training has been
provided.
There was a month lag time between the announcement and
when it became operational, so they can get their proper
training, to make sure we are abiding by our asylum
requirements under international law.
In terms of the funding, this is a money saver in the long
haul. It is going to move more people through, and will be a
deterrent effect against the migrant flow that you mentioned.
And if I might just mention one other thing while I have
the floor, a very important announcement from last week is that
we have now integrated at the Border Patrol stations the IDENT
and IAFIS fingerprint systems, which were formerly separate
systems developed by the Justice Department. We have integrated
work stations available at all Border Patrol stations so that
if Border Patrol picks somebody up, they can not only check it
in IDENT, which has information about prior illegal crossings
and immigration information, but also against IAFIS, which has
all of the criminal database from FBI and other sources.
So we will have an end to that situation where people were
picked up for a crime in one State, and then Border Patrol
didn't know about it. We have already had a number of successes
of violent criminals being found. Of course, that means those
are the types of people we are going to detain. They are not
going to be part of a catch-and-release policy, so to speak,
but will be the priority people that will take up those beds.
Mr. Turner. Do you have the capability to access the FBI
database to know who they may have on their database when
people come to Border Patrol stations?
Mr. Verdery. That is exactly what I was just talking about;
the IAFIS system is what FBI operates. So, yes, if Border
Patrol picks somebody up, they are now run against IAFIS to see
if there is a prior criminal record. we had promised that was
going to be deployed in 70 percent of the Border Patrol
stations by the end of this year, and we will have beaten that
by going to 100 percent as of last week.
Mr. Turner. Do you feed information back to the FBI
regarding people that you picked up? do you feed records into
the same database that you receive information from?
Mr. Verdery. They have access to IDENT through the US-VISIT
program. And we have actually just announced an enhanced access
by FBI to do searching through IDENT, whether it is the Border
Patrol information you mentioned, or the entry-exit information
through US-VISIT. They do have access to that. We are enhancing
that.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
We have another panelist that we would like to hear from.
I want to thank both General Hughes and Assistant Secretary
Verdery for being here this afternoon. And this would conclude
your testimony before this subcommittee today. Thanks again for
being here.
Mr. Camp. The next panel will include Professor Wein. I
want to thank Professor Wein for coming all of the way from
California to testify at this hearing. Professor Wein can come
and take a seat at the table. Thank you.
We have your written testimony. If you could briefly
summarize your statement in 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR LAWRENCE M. WEIN, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF
BUSINESS, STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Mr. Wein. Good afternoon, Chairmen Camp and Gibbons,
Ranking Member Turner and members of the House Select Committee
on Homeland Security. I am honored to appear before you today
to discuss a serious but repairable vulnerability in the
biometric identification performance of the US-VISIT program.
The implications of our findings are disturbing enough that
last week I briefed members of the Homeland Security Committee,
staff from the Office of the Vice President, and analysts at
the General Accounting Office, and program managers at the US-
VISIT program.
On the surface, the biometric identification of the US-
VISIT program appears to be highly effective. A NIST May 2004
report estimates that the chances that a terrorist who is on
the watch-list--when entering a port of entry, the chances that
we catch them and have a watch-list hit is 96 percent, while
maintaining a false positive rate, that is the probability that
someone like you or me would nonetheless set off a watch-list
hit, maintaining that probability at a mere 3 in 1,000.
So what is the problem? Well, the devil is in the details.
It turns out that the software systems also report and
determine the quality of each image. And the software has a
very difficult time in accurately matching images that have
poor quality.
And the premise of our study is that terrorist
organizations, such as Al-Qa'ida, will exploit this
vulnerability by choosing U.S.-bound terrorists who have
inherently poor image quality, such as worn-out fingers or
deliberately reduced image quality. Why is this?
First, all of the information is public; it is on the NIST
database; two, Al-Qa'ida has a large pool of terrorists from
which to choose; and three, we know they are sophisticated
enough. Indeed, given the intricacies of the planning of the 9/
11 attacks, I think our assumption is not only prudent but
realistic.
So using publicly available information from the NIST Web
site, we developed and analyzed a new mathematical model that
includes red-teaming. First, the U.S. Government chooses a
biometric strategy, essentially the rules that decide how you
determine if a watch-list hit happens. So they choose a
strategy to maximize the chances of catching a terrorist,
subject to maintaining moderate congestion at the ports of
entry under current staffing levels.
Then the terrorist tries to defeat this system by choosing
his or her own image quality to minimize his or her chances of
getting caught. And the results are sobering. The currently
implemented strategy has only a 53 percent chance of detecting
a terrorist at U.S. points of entry, compared to the overall
level reported in the NIST report of 96 percent.
Again, the deterioration, down to a coin flip here, is due
to the fact that the terrorist is allowed to exploit the
vulnerability in the biometric system.
We have two main results. The first result is that instead
of using a one-size-fits-all decision rule for who gets a
watch-list hit, we derived different rules for different image
qualities. And by doing so, we were able to increase the
detection probability from 53 percent to 73 percent. So from
essentially a coin flip, up to almost three-quarters. This is a
minor software fix.
Over the next few days, I will give a detailed mathematical
paper to people at NIST, to people at the US-VISIT office, and
this should be implemented as soon as possible.
Now, even if we increased inspector staffing levels
significantly, we can't really get over the three-quarters
level, over the 75 percent chance. But now here is our second
result. If we take 10 fingers at visa enrollment, and then have
the opportunity at ports of entry to use more than two fingers
for the people with the poor image quality, then we can
increase our detection probability all of the way up to 95
percent without increasing the false positive rate.
Although switching from a two-fingerprint to a 10-
fingerprint system may be costly and certainly would be
disruptive, there is simply no excuse for a $10 billion program
to not achieve a 95 percent performance level, particularly
given the potentially grave consequences of allowing a
detection--allowing someone, a terrorist, to cross the border.
If slower two-finger matching algorithms cannot in the
immediate future approach this 95 percent detection probability
for poor quality images, then the US-VISIT program should be
reconfigured with 10-fingerprint scanners as soon as possible.
Thank you. And I look forward to taking your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Wein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lawrence M. Wein
Good afternoon, Chairman Cox, Ranking Member Turner, and the
Members of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security. I am
honored to appear before you today.
I am the Paul E. Holden Professor of Management Science at the
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University. I teach operations
management to MBA students, and perform research in the areas of
operations management, medicine and biology. At their essence, many
homeland security problems are service operations problems: Just as
McDonalds needs to deliver hamburgers in a rapid and defect-free
manner, the US Government needs to quickly deliver vaccines and
antibiotics after an attack and to safely prevent nuclear weapons and
terrorists crossing our borders.
Since September 11, 2001, I have used mathematics to analyze a
variety of homeland security problems in bioterrorism (effective
responses to terrorist attacks using smallpox, anthrax or botulinum
toxin) and in border security (evaluating ways to detect nuclear
weapons coming through ports). These analyses have led to policy
recommendations, several of which the U.S. Government has adopted.
Today, I am here to discuss the results of a study I conducted at
Stanford University with Ph.D. student Manas Baveja that examined the
ability of the US-VISIT program to accurately match the fingerprints of
visitors at ports of entry against a watchlist that contains the stored
fingerprint images of suspected terrorists. The implications of our
findings are disturbing, so much so that last week I briefed members of
the Homeland Security Council, staff members from the Office of the
Vice President, analysts from the Government Accounting Office (GAO)
and officials from the Department of Homeland Security.
On the surface, biometric identification of the US-VISIT Program
appears to be highly effective. A May 2004 NIST study, entitled
``Matching Performance for the US-VISIT IDENT System Using Flat
Fingerprints,'' predicted that the likelihood that US-VISIT would flag
a terrorist whose fingerprints are stored on the biometric watchlist is
96%, while simultaneously limiting the false positive probability,
i.e., the likelihood that a visitor not on the watchlist would
nonetheless generate a watchlist hit, to 3 in 1,000.
So what's the problem? It turns out that the devil is in the
details: The biometric software also computes the quality of each
fingerprint image, and it is very difficult to accurately match poor-
quality images. Our study stems from the belief that terrorist
organizations can exploit this observation by choosing US-bound
terrorists that have either poor image quality (e.g., worn out fingers)
or deliberately reduced image quality (e.g., surgery, chemicals,
sandpaper). The relevant data is publicly available on the NIST web
site, and we know Al-Qa'ida has the sophistication to understand this
and has a large pool of potential terrorists to draw from.
Using publicly available biometric data from NIST, we developed and
analyzed a novel mathematical model that allows red-teaming: First, the
government develops a biometric strategy to maximize terrorist
detection for a given inspector staffing level, and then the visiting
terrorist attempts to defeat the biometric system by choosing the image
quality to minimize his chances of getting caught.
The results are sobering: the currently implemented strategy has
only a 53% chance of detecting a terrorist during US entry, compared to
the overall value of 96% mentioned earlier. The detection probability
is reduced to essentially a coin-flip because the terrorist is allowed
to exploit the vulnerability in the biometric system.
The good news is that our study pointed to possible solutions that
our nation can implement. Rather than using the current one-size-fits-
all rule for generating watchlist hits, we derived different rules for
different levels of image quality and improved the likelihood of
detecting a terrorist from 53% to 73% without increasing the false
positive rate.
Unfortunately, our study predicts that increasing staffing levels
of US Custom and Border Protection inspectors would offer only modest
benefits, and could increase the 73% detection by only an additional
5%. Given that US-VISIT runs millions of watchlist checks each year,
this is an unacceptable security risk.
Fortunately, our nation has a second solution it can rely upon.
Instead of using a software system that scans two index fingers, we
found that that allowing additional fingers to be tested from people
with worse image qualities achieves a 95% detection probability,
without increasing the primary plus secondary inspection workload
associated with legal visitors.
Finally, the government's investment in biometrics at ports of
entry for detecting terrorists should be assessed in light of the
detection probability required to deter terrorists from crossing at an
official port of entry. The deterrence value of a fingerprint system
depends on the terrorists' perceived likelihood of successfully
entering the US between the ports of entry, e.g., along the US-Mexico
border. While this detection rate has been estimated to be
approximately 25% in a recent Time Magazine article, it appears that
Al-Qa'ida prefers to enter the US at ports of entry.
To summarize, there is a serious but reparable vulnerability in the
biometric identification system of the US-VISIT Program, which is our
last line of defense for keeping terrorists off U.S. soil. A minor
software modification that allows the watchlist rule to vary with image
quality can increase detection from 53% to 73%. I have provided details
to officials who oversee the US-VISIT operations, and this should be
implemented as soon as possible. The use of more than 2 fingers for
low-quality images can achieve a detection probability of 95%. Although
switching from a 2-fingerprint to a 10-fingerprint system may be costly
and disruptive, there is no excuse for a 10-billion dollar program to
settle for performance below this level. Indeed, our results are not
inconsistent with the warning in the November, 2002 NIST report that a
2-finger search was not sufficient for identification from a large
watchlist. If slower 2-finger matching algorithms cannot approach 95%
detection for poor-quality images, then the US-VISIT Program should be
reconfigured with 10-fingerprint scanners as soon as possible.
Our recommendations hinge on the assumption that terrorist
organizations as sophisticated as Al-Qa'ida will eventually attempt to
defeat the US-VISIT system by employing terrorists with poor-quality
fingerprints. In light of the meticulous planning that went into the 9/
11 attacks, I believe this assumption is not only prudent, but
realistic.
Thank you, and I look forward to responding to your questions.
Mr. Camp. Thank you very much. We just had, last week, a
demonstration of some of the technology available in
biometrics, and they didn't have exactly the same rates.
I think the way you look at your data is a little different
than theirs. But I understand your concern is that people
intentionally deface their fingerprints and then--on a two-
finger scan system, that is not that hard to do, and they will
circumvent.
Now, in theory, if there is a bad read or an inability to
read a fingerprint, there should be diversion to secondary
screening at that point under the system. But my question is
more about alternative biometrics.
I have seen some demonstrations on facial scans. I am not
sure that 10 fingers is really the best direction that we
should go. It is almost landline versus wireless in terms of
telecommunications. But it seems to me that this facial reading
has a much higher rate of accuracy, which is in sort of the
development stage.
As you referred to, there are other biometrics, such as eye
scans. Can you comment on those and give us some information on
what you--
Mr. Wein. Yes. The operative word you bring up is
``development.'' These are in the development phases. I have
worked on port security also with Stephen Flynn on some of
these issues. It is a hard problem, because you have all of
this technology that may provide a silver bullet, but it may
take 5 or 6 years. But the terrorists aren't going to wait 5 or
6 years to sneak a nuclear weapon into the country.
NIST has done quite a bit of analysis on face biometrics,
and they claim for large-scale identification of the size we
are talking about here, it simply is not a feasible option. The
iris and eyes--I have read up on all of these, and some of them
sound promising; they may be ready in several years, they are
not ready for prime time. Either they have too many false
positives, people don't like to have various parts of their eye
scanned and so forth. So, whereas, it may not be viewed as
wireless technology, taking 10 fingers clearly will help a lot.
Indeed, my recommendations are not inconsistent with what
is reported from the NIST way back to November of 2002, that
two-finger methodology is simply not adequate to do large-scale
identification.
Mr. Camp. Well, it seems if you could deface--
Mr. Dicks. Would you yield just for a second?
I think you were here. We had a meeting here, and they came
up and told us that two fingers gave us 95 percent reliability.
And you are saying that is not true, because there are
quality problems associated with two fingers or any fingers,
and that is why you should do 10, in order to get the higher
reliability; is that not correct?
Mr. Wein. The 95 percent is averaged over the entire
population. The overwhelming amount of the average population,
like you and me, we are not attempting to defeat the system.
Part of the reason we are putting this program in place is
to stop terrorists from coming into the country. It would be
naive to think that these people are not trying to defeat the
system.
An insignificant fraction of people have naturally worn-out
fingers, have naturally poor image quality. It is on the order
of 5 to 10 percent.
Mr. Camp. If I could reclaim my time, my point was, we did
have a higher number. I think he is looking at it a little
differently.
But, second, if you can deface two fingers, you can deface
10, and we ought to be looking at other means--my point is
that.
US-VISIT is just one of the items that we have to try to
disrupt terrorist travel. We also have, you know, this other
biometric capability. We have the watch-lists that we just had
an extensive discussion on. There are inspectorinterviews.
There is secondary screening. There is actual real intelligence
that has helped disrupt this.
So this is just one of the many items that we are looking
at in terms of how we disrupt terrorist travel.
Mr. Wein. I think it is important on many of these homeland
security problems to move forward in two ways. One is,
operationally we need to get things in place that are
effective, and get them in there quickly, because Al-Qa'ida and
other terrorist organizations are not going to wait.
And second, we need to keep an eye towards the future of
trying to find better technologies, be they biosensors, be they
radiation detectors, be they biometrics, to help us on the 5-
to-10-year time line.
Mr. Camp. The last point is that the additional
fingerprints, from what we understand now, would take a great
deal of additional time. To get in this 45-second or 50-second
window at the booth is very important in terms of not
disrupting travel for those citizens who are not trying to do
us harm. So it is a balance there.
Mr. Wein. My analysis is conservative. I am assuming each
finger takes 5 seconds. So if you did 10 fingers, it is going
to take you 50 seconds rather than 10 seconds that it currently
does.
Mr. Camp. Well, it takes longer than 10 seconds with two
fingers, because of the entire process. But I understand your
point.
Mr. Wein. Right.
Mr. Camp. We are not there yet in terms of speed.
Mr. Wein. Right. But, MITRETEK and NIST and have proposed
the four-finger slap. And, indeed, they think they can do this
quite quickly, more like doing it in 10 seconds rather than in
50 seconds. And, indeed, I have been told ergonomically that
you can actually get better prints from the slap, because your
fingers are more stable.
Mr. Camp. Thank you. My time has expired.
And I would at this time recognize the ranking member of
the Border and Infrastructure Subcommittee, Ms. Sanchez, to
inquire.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Professor. I am trying to understand what
you were telling us.
Are you saying that over a large range of people, an end
sample being almost infinite, or 200 million, or whatever we
have in the United States, that if we look at all of our
fingerprints, we have a 95 percent good match, but if we are
taking a look at a much smaller number, these people who we
think are terrorists or would happen to be on a list, that
because we think that they might deform their fingers in some
way or something, that the percentage would therefore be lower?
I am trying to understand how you get down to the 50
percent.
Mr. Wein. Right. The 95 percent that they give us is over
everyone. But it turns out, on the order of 5 percent, let's
just say, people have poor image quality.
For the most part, this is naturally poor image quality,
people who have worn-out fingers either genetically, or they
have scrubbed floors all of their life or whatever. Al-Qa'ida
has a large pool of terrorists to choose from to come into this
country. There are pictures on the NIST Web site of what a low-
image-quality finger looked like.
Ms. Sanchez. So they can select those people who they think
are low-image people to put into the pool of people we would be
concerned about?
Mr. Wein. Right. So they don't even have to deliberately
deface their fingers with sandpaper or chemicals or surgery or
whatnot. They can simply choose people for their U.S.-bound
missions who have poor image quality.
Ms. Sanchez. You said, if we took these 10 fingers at the
visa processing--when we were processing the visa, that it
would take about a minute a person?
Mr. Wein. Well, we would take the 10 fingers at enrollment,
so we have the 10 fingers. We wouldn't need to use all 10
fingers, except for the people with bad image quality. We would
have that information when they show up at port of entry, Oh,
this is a person who has bad image quality. We are going to use
8 or 10 fingers here at the port of entry.
What you can do at port of entry is take 10 fingers from
everyone, so that everything else can be blind to both the
operator and to the visitor of how many fingers you use to
actually try to figure out if they are on the watch-list.
Ms. Sanchez. OK. I just wanted that clear for my own
information. Thank you, Professor.
I will yield back my time.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
Mr. Gibbons may inquire.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wein, thank you for being here. Appreciate your
testimony. As you know, the State of Nevada for many years has
had biometrics within their gaming industry that uses massive,
large-scale recognition of large crowds to be able to single
out a selected individual based on facial recognition features.
And I am sure that their system, while not perfect, could be an
ancillary or additional check for a person coming through
either the screening at a port or, at the same time--
But let me ask a completely different question that goes to
this quality image that we talked about. How much of the
quality is outside of the control of the Department of Homeland
Security? I mean, you talked about the characteristics of the
fingerprint,but is there a quality issue with the machine, a
quality issue with the training, a quality issue with the
software?
How much of it is outside of their control, and therefore,
what portion could be corrected by going back and doing, like
you said, software versus the quality image of having a bad
series of fingerprints?
Mr. Wein. That is a very good question. We asked ourselves
that in the process of this research.
Unfortunately, the available data from NIST doesn't exactly
answer that question. But we do have an analysis that is quite
technical--I won't go into it now--but it suggests that the
great majority of this is inherent in the fingers and is not
operational noise due to sweat and dirt and finger pressure and
things like that.
I do think it is important to train the operators to keep
the operational noise or environmental noise as small as
possible by, you know, cleaning the fingers and cleaning the
surfaces where they are putting the fingers and making sure
they are holding their fingers steady and things like that.
In talking with the US-VISIT people last week, it sounds as
if good operations processes are in place. So I think US-VISIT
is doing all they can on the image quality problem--I mean on--
in reducing, on getting rid of the operational noise. And most
of it is simply inherent in the people; that is why we really
need to make these fixes I recommended.
Mr. Gibbons. OK. Let me go back to the issue of other
biometrics, particularly facial recognition. Is facial
recognition enhanceable by increasing the number of points on a
face from today's standard--I guess what is it, 14 or something
like that?
What if the facial recognition capability were 200 points
on a given picture of a given face? Is the likelihood or
accuracy of that biometric far greater?
Mr. Wein. I can just tell you that my analysis, and what I
will distribute in the next few days to the government, cites a
paper from NIST that says for large-scale identifications, that
is, one-to-many matching for a large watch-list, facial
biometrics is inadequate to even help on the problem. It just
isn't feasible at this point in time.
Mr. Gibbons. Do you know why they say that?
Mr. Wein. The data is there. I would have to go back and
look at the paper to give the reasons. They mostly do a
statistical analysis, look at this, and conclude that the
facial recognition cannot help. It certainly is great for
verification one-on-one, are you who you say you are, but when
you are comparing it to all of the millions of people on a
watch-list, it is simply--
Mr. Gibbons. Is it because of the computer technology where
we have to sort through a large, massive database in order to
have sufficient evidence, or time or recognition features that
would allow for a more accurate determination of who the
individual is with something like that?
Mr. Wein. As I understand it from reading, there is a lot
more noise involved in taking someone's picture, the lighting,
the shadows, the angle, things like that, than there is on a
finger. That is why there are many more false positives.
And when you start thinking about a false positive, when
you are comparing against hundreds of millions of people, you
are getting back to the John Doe that the assistant secretary
was talking about. There are just too many John Doe's on the
watch-list.
Mr. Gibbons. It just seems to me that if we can control the
quality of the fingerprint, we can control the quality of the
photograph.
Mr. Camp. Would the gentleman yield?
With the new facial recognition, the lighting is not as
important as in past times. So there is some new technology
there that really gets around that problem.
Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Chairman, my time is up.
Mr. Wein. NIST has decided--has said that facial
recognition has gotten much better in the last few years, but
it still cannot help on the problem of large-scale
identification. Maybe in 5 years, hopefully, but not now.
Mr. Camp. The gentleman from Texas, the ranking member of
the full committee may inquire.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Professor, the NIST scientists that our staff has talked to
say that, if anything, your numbers are very conservative, that
the quality of the fingerprint images in the terrorist watch-
list is even worse than what you are talking about.
So it seems to me that you are telling us something that is
very, very troublesome. And I don't know how much worse they
think it can be than your 50 or 52 percent number.
Did they give you any indication? Have you talked to them
about what they think about this?
Mr. Wein. I only talked to one person from NIST who was
present when I briefed the program managers from US-VISIT last
week.
It is true that NIST has said over and over again in their
papers, which are publicly available on the Web site, that the
test databases they use, in some sense are much cleaner than
the true operational databases that we are using to try to
catch terrorists. And, indeed, there is going to be lower image
quality in general on the real databases than there is on these
test databases.
Obviously, at this point in time, they are not sharing
those numbers with me, so I can't say what the magnitude of
that is. But I would agree with their assessment that my
numbers are conservative and are painting, if anything, an
optimistic view of the current operation.
Mr. Turner. I mean, this is quite disturbing. We are
talking about a program that was announced and estimated to
potentially cost the taxpayers $10 billion to put in place. And
you are saying, even by your numbers, the chances of catching a
determined terrorist may be only 52 percent.
Mr. Wein. Yes. And, you know, one good thing is that a
chunk of that, you can get maybe from 50 to, 70 or in real
terms, maybe 40 to 60 or whatever by just a few lines of
software code. So that is part of the silver lining here.
But, yes, I do want to just reiterate that a program this
expensive and this important with the implications of allowing
terrorists into this country, given that there is an existing
fix that we can do that doesn't involve--well, it does involve
some retrofit--I realize there are space constraints at the
ports of entry. But this seems like a no-brainer, that we have
the 10 fingers available, we can get it, and let's do it.
Mr. Turner. And so that fix, moving to 10 fingers and
changing the software, would move it up to where we might have
a 75 percent chance of catching a terrorist that was
determined--
Mr. Wein. Yeah. I think that is conservative. I would think
it would be higher than that.
But, again, one would really have to almost, you know, look
at the true database, and probably people with security
clearances--and I don't know if it is NIST or people at the US-
VISIT--would have to run the final numbers. But I think we
would get in the 90's.
Mr. Turner. You know, we have had a large number of Members
of Congress raise this question about why US-VISIT is based on
a two-fingerprint system, rather than a 10. Some have suggested
that even going to four would be a substantial improvement.
Do you understand and could you shed any light on why it is
that the Department chose to stay with its two-fingerprint
system, which apparently is much less effective in
accomplishing our objective?
Mr. Wein. To be honest, the last few years I have focused
on other catastrophic terrorist events, namely, smallpox,
anthrax, botulinum toxin and port security. So I have only been
working on this problem for the last few months. I was not
engaged in this problem at the time these decisions were going
on. So I would guess other people in this room would have
better answers to that.
I would--I think I will stop there.
Mr. Turner. All right. My time may be up.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
Mr. Dicks may inquire.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you very much.
We have pointed this out to them, going all the way back to
the time when they were selecting contractors. And I don't know
why this--for some reason, they went for two, because it was
easier and faster, I think.
This is something we pointed out to them; and I think they
misled the committee, Mr. Chairman. I think the witnesses that
were here misled our committee by not pointing out this problem
with the unrecognizable or poorly done fingerprints.
I agree with you, I think terrorists are going to pick that
up and understand that. So, I think we have to go to a 10-
fingerprint system.
I have checked with some of the best experts in the world
on this, and they all agree. In fact, NIST recommends a 10-slap
fingerprint image stored in type 14.
You know, I think Congress--I think we have put in the
reports recommending to them that they do this, that they
compete it and have a competitive system. They didn't do it. I
think it has something to do with the contractor, frankly.
But having said that, we have only got 3 minutes and 40
seconds. Tell us a little bit about these other issues. We know
about this one. We know this is a mistake.
Tell us--you mentioned port security. Give us a couple of
seconds on that.
Mr. Wein. I have worked on the port security problem with
Steve Flynn. I think, A, that is a much more important problem
in the sense--it is one thing to let a terrorist into the
country; it is another to let highly enriched uranium or a
nuclear weapon into the country.
B, to their credit, I think it is a lot more difficult
problem, the technology isn't all there.
C, I think they have been dropping the ball on this
problem, and Steve Flynn and I have briefed Commissioner
Bonner's entire staff. They have put all of their eggs in the
ATS basket, and we are currently testing 5 percent of the
containers; the other ones can waltz through the system.
It is easy for a terrorist to bypass one layer of security,
particularly given the manifest rules that are in place. And we
really need to do-100 percent passive radiation testing, and we
need to do a fair amount of active testing in the sense of an
x-ray or gamma ray imaging to look for shielding.
And we also need to spend money now to to find a way to
detect highly enriched uranium, which is very difficult to
catch with existing equipment.
Mr. Dicks. You mentioned a few others, anthrax and some
other ones.
Mr. Wein. For anthrax, I have an op-ed in the Washington
Post, a paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences. As a result of that, your area here, Washington,
D.C., if a big attack occurs, the postal workers will help
distribute antibiotics throughout the area. Hopefully, this
program will go nationwide.
That was a direct result of our op-ed. I am currently
funded by HHS to help them decide how, if and when to deploy
the next-generation anthrax vaccine. My work on smallpox was
instrumental in affecting the Bush administration's post-attack
strategy for vaccination.
Mr. Dicks. We still don't have enough people vaccinated,
though, do we? The caregivers, isn't that still a problem?
Mr. Wein. Yes. The implementation of the front-line worker
vaccination had a number of problems with it. And, you know--
Mr. Dicks. They still haven't been corrected, have they?
They still don't have enough people vaccinated, do they?
Mr. Wein. I think this--I think it is dead in the water at
this point, until we have another terrorist attack, to be
honest.
Mr. Dicks. In other words, to get more people vaccinated,
the caregivers, we are going have to have a catastrophic event
in order to convince everybody to do that? Is that what you are
saying?
Mr. Wein. It may not have to be catastrophic, but I think
we need another event.
Mr. Dicks. Because nobody is paying attention? Is that what
you are saying?
Mr. Wein. No, it is not because no one is paying attention.
It is because--it is several reasons. It is the risk
communication, about what is the risk of--if I give the vaccine
to the frontline worker, what are the chances of them dying or
having a serious incident?
It is the perception of, is there really smallpox out
there--the whole weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, issue.
And it is a complicated problem.
Mr. Dicks. Well, again, I am troubled by this, Mr.
Chairman, that we have had a series of these hearings. I
commend the majority for having these hearings, but I think it
is pointed out again and again and again, the deficiencies in
this homeland security program.
And I don't know how we can, in the Congress, get people's
attention in the executive branch that we have got to do more
on these issues from port security, anthrax, the fingerprints
for the US-VISIT program. I mean, there are all of these
problem areas that haven't been addressed.
It is one of the things that has shocked me, frankly, in my
service here in this Congress for 28 years. I have never seen
something of this importance treated this way by the executive
branch.
I commend the committee for having the hearings, because at
least we have a chance to present the information to the
American people. But we can't seem to get anybody to do
anything about it.
Mr. Wein, I appreciate your going around and meeting with
all of the officials. I hope that they will respond to your
very lucid presentation of this gap in the fingerprinting
program. I commend you for your good efforts, and please keep
them up.
Mr. Camp. Thank you.
That concludes our questioning. There being no further
business, again I want to thank the subcommittee members and
our witnesses for being here today.
The Chair notes that some members may have additional
questions for this panel, which they may wish to submit in
writing. Without objection, the hearing record will remain open
for 10 days--
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Camp. --for Members to submit written questions to
these witnesses and to place their responses in the record.
[The information follows:]
FOR THE RECORD
Please note: Assistant Secretaries Verdery and Hughes have departed
DHS. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and Planning Elaine Dezenski
submits on behalf of A/S Verdery, Matthew Broderick, of the Homeland
Security Operations Center, submits on behalf of A/S Hughes.
Questions for the Record from Chairman Christopher Cox
1. Although the interagency charter for the Human Smuggling and
Trafficking Center between the Departments of Homeland Security, State
and Justice was just signed this past July, the 9/11 Commission's
report itself referred to this center as having produced,
``disproportionately useful results.'' The Commission staff believes
that the collective interagency effort of the Center holds great
promise to become one of the most important resources to combat
terrorism and terrorist travel.
Q02133: Please describe for the Committee how the Department is
currently working with the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center and
more importantly, what formal plans does the Department have and what
steps has it taken to ensure that DHS does its part in ensuring this
center reaches its full potential?
Answer: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) supports the
Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC) in a variety of ways to
enhance border security efforts:
DHS has signed an interconnectivity agreement that
provides HSTC personnel with access to critical DHS data
systems to facilitate efficient information sharing;
DHS procured necessary equipment to provide the HSTC
with secure communications capabilities and provides the
necessary systems support;
Immigration and Customs Enforcement has assigned full-
time staff to the HSTC that serve as subject matter experts in
the areas of human trafficking, terrorist mobility and human
smuggling. DHS is also committed to providing full time
participation in the HSTC from other DHS components such as the
United States Coast Guard (USCG), Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), and Information Analysis.
DHS utilizes the HSTC to convene important interagency
coordination meetings, and to coordinate select initiatives.
DHS also utilizes the products produced by the HSTC to inform
the policymaking decision process.
DHS' commitment to the HSTC is long-term. DHS holds three seats on
the HSTC Steering Group; Acting Under Secretary Randy Beardsworth is
the DHS co-chair representative for the Steering Group, Elaine
Dezenski, Acting Assistant Secretary BTS Policy and Planning, and
Michael Garcia, Assistant Secretary of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, serve as members on the Steering Group for the HSTC. This
group oversees and provides policy and administrative oversight of the
HSTC, and to make sure that it is operating in a manner consistent with
Constitutional liberties and national security requirements. Through
this interagency Steering Group, DHS works with our partner agencies to
ensure that the HSTC is fully supported by DHS, including personnel,
fiscal resources, and information.
(B) Q02134: What specific budget authority and personnel resources
does DHS plan to provide the HSTC?
Answer: In effecting the HSTC, DHS is more fully utilizing existing
governmental facilities that have been associated with monitoring the
flow of illegal persons, cargo and conveyances into the country. DHS is
currently reviewing the resource requirements for the HSTC and
anticipates that it will finalize both the operations funding and
personnel requirements in the very near future. Currently there are 6
ICE agents/analysts staffing the Center full time and the USCG has 3
individuals on a part-time basis.
Additionally, the Director of the HSTC is a Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Supervisory
Special Agent.
(C) Q02135: How is the DHS Office of Information Analysis sharing
information with the HSTC? And how is DHS as a whole going to share
information with the Center?
Answer: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Information
Analysis (IA) analysts have daily or near daily interaction with the
management and staff members of the HSTC during which they discuss
cables of mutual interest and collaborate on tasking and production.
Cable traffic flagged by IA personnel is sent to the HSTC via SIPRNET
(Secret Internet Protocol Router Network; the DoD-operated SECRET level
network), as are all products classified SECRET and below that contain
references to alien smuggling and terrorist mobility. If there are
documents at a higher classification, IA will share hard copies with
properly cleared HSTC members, and/or encourage HSTC to obtain the
documents by other means. Once the HSTC is equipped with JWICS (Joint
Worldwide Intelligence Communications System; the DoD-run TOP SECRET/
Sensitive Compartmented Information system), all appropriate documents
will be shared electronically. Information identified by HSTC staff is
shared with IA in a similar fashion. Similar procedures are followed
for information sharing between the HSTC and other enforcement and
intelligence entities within DHS. HSTC personnel are able to access
message traffic and finished production via connectivity to their
parent organization systems and other online data repositories.
2. My staff had several meetings with the 9/11 Commission staff
responsible for writing the terrorist travel portion of its report. And
although not specifically articulated in the 9/11 Commission Report,
its staff has pointed out in discussions with this Committee's staff
combating terrorist travel will require ``specialists'' who are located
at all ports-of-entry and that these specialists must have the ability
to contact the intelligence community directly to obtain up-to-the
minute classified information that could be used to combat terrorist
travel.
Q02136: Please comment on this recommendation of Commission staff
and indicate what concerns and roadblocks you see which might prevent
this from occurring.
Answer: CBP worked diligently after release of the 9/11 Report to
examine their findings and recommendations and make use of the report
within CBP. Some of those recommendations will be incorporated into CBP
practices and enforcement posture. By example, CBP is devoting
extensive resources to training to make frontline officers more
cognizant of the threat posed by terrorists and their weapons. To
further this field level training, CBP's Office of Intelligence has
placed an intelligence analyst at the Terrorist Mobility Group at the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) to be aware of the trends
and techniques and assist CBP with knowledge of these trends and
methods to identify and defeat them. \1\ We are participating in Joint
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) squads. We are nearly completing
installation of a Special Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) at
the CBP National Targeting Center, with access to classified materials,
to be able to support field enforcement--first and foremost,
identification of terrorists and their weapons. Moreover, we work each
day to apply whatever intelligence is derived from the Intelligence
community into appropriate actions by field officers, in a manner
consistent with the classification and sensitivity of the information.
Our concerns would be more pedestrian--the length of time to obtain
clearances for employees, which are needed to help work through the
ever-growing volume of intelligence and classified material and the
need for training employees to think and work as intelligence analysts
do.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ On December 6, 2004, the NCTC undertook all responsibilities
assigned to the TTIC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When CBP officer encounters a possible terrorist, they are required
to contact the CBP National Targeting Center (NTC) and relay all the
specifics of the individual for further review. In all cases where the
NTC cannot discount the individual is a match to the terrorist, the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) is contacted. The TSC has complete and
full access to all of the derogatory information associated to the
record and passes it back to the NTC when appropriate. The passing of
information is only limited to the clearance level of the NTC officer
and the security level of the communications into the NTC. The NTC, in
turn, will relay enough information back to the port of entry (POE) for
the front line officer to make appropriate decisions. The TSC will also
contact the FBI Counter Terrorism Watch (CTW) with information on the
encounter. The CTW acts as the operational arm for the TSC and will
relay operational instructions to CBP. They can also dispatch the local
Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and have the ability to pass
classified information to the cleared JTTF members.
There are two limitations to getting classified information to the
POE. The first issue is the clearance level of CBP personnel in the
field is rarely above the SECRET level and most derogatory information
today is at the Top Secret and Code Word levels. The other issue is the
lack of a secure communications path to the ports and how to get
classified information to a non-SCIF environment. Two possible
solutions are to make the NTC SCIF operational and/or to rely on the
clearance levels of the JTTF teams. The JTTF approach is already in
place and appears to be working.
3. As you are already aware, ICE's Forensic Document Lab is the
only Federal crime lab dedicated almost entirely to the forensic
examination of documents and has been doing so since 1978-and
specializes in the identification of fraudulent visas and passports.
Besides the FDL's role as the leading resource on fraudulent passports
and visas to other Federal agencies, including the FBI and Department
of State, the FDL's Library houses the largest known repository of
known genuine travel documents. I have two questions related to the
FDL,
(A) Q02137: Since the FDL is the leader in such documents, what
concerns do you have that both the Department of State and the
Department of Justice, both consumers of the expertise and resources
available through the efforts of the FDL, may be planning to set up
their own capabilities in the identification of fraudulent documents?
Answer: At present, we are not aware of any initiatives by either
the Department of State (DOS) or Justice to develop their own
capabilities in the identification of fraudulent documents. Several
years ago, however, the DOS expressed an interest in establishing such
a capability. When the Forensic Document Lab (FDL) learned of this, FDL
representatives initiated a meeting with DOS officials to express their
concern over the potential duplication of effort and unnecessary
expenditure of resources. The FDL reiterated its willingness to provide
forensic and operational support to all DOS entities. Subsequently, the
DOS decided that its plan represented duplication of effort, and rather
to continue to utilize the FDL's unique resources and expertise.
Central to the FDL's forensic and field operations support
functions is its exemplar library, which presently contains more than
120,000 known genuine travel and identity documents and other resource
materials from every country of the world. The library, the largest
known collection of its kind and continually growing, represents a 25-
year effort by FDL staff which would take enormous time and resources
for another agency to replicate. A far more feasible and cost effective
approach would be to dedicate additional resources to expand the FDL
library and extend its availability to more federal, state, and local
user agencies.
Q02138: And do you think that instead of duplicating efforts in
other Federal agencies that instead more resources should be dedicated
to the FDL and it expanded in light of the new importance being placed
upon the disrupting of terrorist travel?
Answer: DHS agrees with the view of the 9/11 Commission Report that
``targeting travel is at least as powerful a weapon against terrorists
as targeting their money.'' DHS has devoted additional attention and
resources to the analysis and disruption of terrorist travel. CBP has
created the Fraudulent Document Analytical Unit (FDAU) to analyze the
travel of suspected terrorists and the documents they use. CBP
coordinates closely with ICE and the FDL so that the unparalleled
experts at the FDL can forensically examine suspect documents, issue
any necessary alerts, and modify the training in fraudulent document
recognition that FDL offers accordingly. DHS believes that the FDL is
the leading government entity in the identification of fraudulent
travel documents and it would not be a prudent use of resources for
other government agencies to seek to replicate the expertise that FDL
already provides so well.
(B) Even with the FDLs limited resources and current staff of only
51, it impressively provides training to not only the agencies within
DHS, (ICE, CBP, CIS, and the USCG), but also to other Federal agencies
(State, Justice, IRS, SS Administration) and to state and local law
enforcement and they can barely keep up with the requests for training
currently.
Q02139: Please describe for the Committee how the Department plans
to build upon the expertise of this office and enhance its ability to
provide necessary training-including ongoing training-to DHS and other
Federal agency personnel?
Answer: ICE is working to develop a strategy to establish an
operational entity within the FDL to provide proactive, high quality
training in fraudulent document recognition, specifically tailored to
the needs of students from a wide variety of domestic and foreign law
enforcement organizations, intelligence agencies, and private sector
employers. In addition, the FDL would provide training courses and
material to formally certify Document Instructors for DHS and other
federal, state, and local agency personnel. The FDL would also develop
training modules and presentations for use by ICE offices overseas in
implementing outreach programs to educate and liaison with foreign
enforcement agencies. The outreach materials would focus on document
fraud and threat awareness training, and acquaint foreign officials
with FDL capabilities and access protocols.
Questions from Chairman Dave Camp and Chairman Jim Gibbons
1. Q02140 How is classified information disseminated to front line
border and consular officials?
Answer: In the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, classified
information is reviewed by a team of intelligence analysts for
information pertaining to terrorists attempting to enter the country or
smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States. When
appropriate, the analysts request a downgrade of information from the
originating agency to put into the Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU)
system that is available to the front line officers. This information
could be as simple as the name of a person or as complex as performing
analysis of various pieces of information to put into an intelligence
alert or report, a trend analysis, or a threat assessment which again
is entered into the SBU system.
Currently if classified information needs to be sent to the field,
it is secure faxed or, if possible, verbally conveyed by way of STU/
STE. CBP completed installation of the Homeland Secure Data Network
(HSDN) in 24 offices in Calendar Year (CY) 04 for secure communications
up to the Secret level.
The National Targeting Center (NTC) and Terrorist Screening Center
(TSC) work together to identify and vet potential terrorists intending
to travel to, or ship cargo to the U.S. and prevent them from entering
or endangering the U.S. The NTC is a resource to CBP field officers for
coordination and communication. It is also one of the TSC's largest
customers for requesting additional identification of internationally
traveling personnel or cargo that may have terrorist ties.
The NTC has the unique mission to provide a centralized
communication point for all CBP field officers and a coordination
center for all CBP Office of Field Operations anti-terrorism
activities. This presents other agencies with the benefit of having a
single point of contact (the NTC) for communicating anti-terrorism
information and it ensures a coordinated, managed approach toward
focusing CBP resources that is accountable across all levels of CBP.
2. The National Targeting Center (NTC), located in U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) both
screen people and cargo using multiple databases.
Q02141: How do these centers work together and how do they
distinguish their unique missions?
Answer: The NTC and TSC work together to identify and vet potential
terrorists intending to travel to, or ship cargo to the U.S. and
prevent them from entering or endangering the U.S. The NTC is a
resource to CBP field officers for coordination and communication. It
is also one of the TSC's largest customers for requesting additional
identification of internationally traveling personnel or cargo that may
have terrorist ties.
The NTC has the unique mission to provide a centralized
communication point for all CBP field officers and a coordination
center for all CBP Office of Field Operations anti-terrorism
activities. This presents other agencies with the benefit of having a
single point of contact (the NTC) for communicating anti-terrorism
information and it ensures a coordinated, managed approach toward
focusing CBP resources that is accountable across all levels of CBP.
It also has the added benefit of having entities knowledgeable
about CBP operations conveying specific information regarding anti-
terrorism efforts that is specific and germane to the operating
environment.
The TSC is the clearinghouse for all encounters with known or
suspected terrorists and as such is a significant resource for the
National Targeting Center. Additionally, the NTC is the research center
for CBP field officers for all potential terrorist or terrorism
identifications. The NTC researches all terrorist field alerts and will
contact the TSC for any additional classified derogatory information
that may not be readily available to CBP field officers. By
centralizing this capacity, clean, secure lines of communication and
roles can be established between the TSC and NTC. Through this process
the TSC can contact the FBI Counter Terrorism Watch (CTW). The CTW, in
turn, can dispatch the local Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and
ensure an FBI case exists on the individual. In cases where an FBI case
does not already exist, the National Joint Terrorism Task Force is
contacted and they initiate a threat assessment on the subject. All
information collected from the encounter is pushed back to DHS, FBI,
NCTC and member of Intelligence Community (IC) for further analysis.
The CTW coordinates the appropriate response through the NTC and they
serve as the conduit for getting the appropriate information directly
to the CBP field officers.
a. Q02142: Do these centers work with the Human Smuggling and
Trafficking Center (HSTC)?
Answer: DHS can not speak for the TSC; however, the National
Targeting Center is CBP's centralized anti-terrorism communication and
coordination center for CBP's Office of Field Operations. As such, they
routinely exchange available information with other agencies and their
operations centers.
b. Q02143: How does the Department of Homeland Security envision
these centers roles and responsibilities changing once the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is created?
Answer: CBP sees the role of the NTC becoming even more significant
once the NCTC is created. There will continue to be a need for CBP to
centralize its anti-terrorism communication and coordination with its
field assets. The need for the NTC will continue to be vital for
managing effective and efficient communications from external sources
and passing it down to CBP field officers, as well as, collecting
information internally from CBP field officers and passing it up to
external sources. A side benefit from this accountability process is
that the NCTC or other centers are not responsible for knowing how to
best communicate information to CBP field officers in and between over
300 ports, or have telephone lists.
3. Homeland Security requires a strong international security
policy. The Department of State is the face of the U.S. Government
overseas and is our first line of defense, through the visa review
process, against potential terrorists entering the United States.
Q02144: How does DHS share information with State Department?
Answer: State's Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS)
receives over 3 million watch-listings from DHS systems, including the
Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS).
In the context of visa security specifically, State Department
shares visa applicant and adjudication data with the Visa Security
Program, and the Visa Security Program shares the results of its
reviews with State. State also provides watch-listings and lost and
stolen passport information to TECS (over 850,000 records).
USCIS' Office of Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) meets
on a monthly basis with DOS' Office of Fraud Prevention Programs to
discuss cross cutting issues. In addition, FDNS is drafting a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with DOS's Visa Office (VO) on data
sharing. Pursuant to the MOU, USCIS will obtain access to DOS'
Consolidated Consular Database (CCD) and certain reports and systems
accessible through the CCD and DOS will be granted access to certain
USCIS databases.
During the visa application process, biometric and biographic
information collected by consular offices is queried against selected
databases via an electronic interface with US-VISIT. At the POE, the
inspecting office can verify biometric and biographic information
provided by the travel against the DOS visa information through US-
VISIT.
Q02145: Are there common training programs regarding terrorist
indicators and fraudulent documents?
Answer: In the context of visa security specifically, the Visa
Security Program is developing a training program for consular officers
that will address numerous issues relevant to effective consular
adjudication of visa applications, including terrorist indicators and
fraudulent documents. These trainings will leverage training material
that is included in the Program's training curriculum for Visa Security
Officers. The FDL does provide fraudulent document training to State
and other agencies and will continue to do so.
4. Is the following available to DHS personnel including front line
agents? If it is, what agency provides this information?
(A) Q02146: The number and type of fraudulent documents used broken
down by country over the past month, quarter, or year?
Answer: CBP collects information on fraudulent documents in several
ways. One source is through its statistical collection Form G-22
Inspections Workload Report provided by the ports of entry. The Form G-
22 data provides only the number of various types of fraudulent
documents intercepted, but does not provide the country of origin. In
January 2005, CBP established the Fraudulent Document Analysis Unit
(FDAU), now the collection point for fraudulent documents confiscated
at the ports. The FDAU collects additional categories of statistics, to
include the number of passports, country of origin, and the nationality
of the person who presented the document, and conducts regular analysis
of fraud trends and significant interceptions which will be
disseminated to DHS front line agents. The FDAU expects to have data
ready in these categories by July for the first six months of this
calendar year. The United States also intercepts other fraudulent
travel documents in addition to passports, including Mexican border
crossing cards and U.S. permanent resident cards. The FDAU expects to
disseminate statistical information on fraudulent travel documents to
the ports and others every six months.
(B) Q02147: Information regarding stolen and fraudulent passports
and documents acquired from collection activities abroad?
Answer: It is crucial that component frontline CBP officials
receive information regarding lost, stolen and fraudulent passports (or
other travel documents). CBP systematically receives reporting from the
Department of State and other federal agencies regarding lost and
stolen passports and fraudulent documents. This information migrates to
CBP Inspectors via electronic interface through the Treasury
Enforcement Communications System (TECS) and the Consular Lookout and
Support System (CLASS). Additionally, the DHS Office of Information
Analysis (IA) and other Intelligence Community (IC) members
periodically produce and disseminate lengthier pieces of unclassified
finished intelligence for line agents. Such products may address
trends, such those pertaining to lost and stolen passports, or may be
crafted as specific hands-on guides. There are ongoing initiatives to
improve the speed at which classified data is made available to line
agents at the UNCLASSIFIED level. For example, IA is working with the
IC to establish a standard whereby the pertinent portions of classified
information concerning lost and stolen passport information will be
automatically downgraded so that the information can immediately be
sent to CBP's National Targeting Center. This would allow the frontline
officers to more quickly query the Interagency Border Inspection System
(IBIS) database to ascertain if the passport is from a lost/stolen
batch or known fraudulent document. The FDL's Operational staff
provides seven day a week (and Holidays) assistance to CBP field
personnel regarding fraudulent documents. The Operations staff has
access to the largest collection of foreign and domestic travel and
identity documents in the world. They also have access to the Image
Storage and Retrieval System (ISRS--photos, fingerprints and signatures
from tens of millions of ``green cards'' and Employment Authorization
cards), DOS's DataShare (database of photos and biographical data from
millions of U.S. non-immigrant visas and U.S. passports), EDISON (image
database of passports of every country in the world and other DHS
databases. The FDL officers themselves have many years experience in
examining travel and identity documents. The operations staff develops
and disseminates Document Intelligence Alerts, Document Reference
Guides and Fraudulent Document Briefs. They also develop and conduct
fraudulent document training for CBP officers. As part of the
Department's work in this area, the DHS Privacy Office is working
collaboratively with other program offices to research the pragmatic,
policy and privacy protection issues related to a distributed model for
the exchange of passport-related data (lost, stolen, identity
verification) where participating governments would control access to
the personal information of their travelers and be able to verify
travelers and travel documents of others in real time.
(C) Q02148: On site resources at high traffic ports of entries to
assist agents in identifying fraudulent documents or terrorist
indicators on documents?
Answer: Most high traffic ports of entry have the EDISON system on
site. This is a computerized database containing images of travel
documents and their security features from all countries. The system is
used for comparative purposes when examining questioned documents.
Altered and counterfeit documents are also contained in the database
for reference.
Ports have on site training staff and reference documents to assist
Officers in identifying fraudulent documents or terrorist indicators.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Forensic Document Laboratory
(FDL) provides all ports with immediate assistance in document
verification through their Intelligence Officers. The FDL produces and
distributes Document Alerts to the ports illustrating recent fraudulent
document interceptions.
The Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Fraudulent Document
Analysis Unit (FDAU), as it comes on line, will provide both strategic
and tactical information to ports of entry regarding recent trends of
document abuse identified through an analysis of document interceptions
at ports of entry. This information will enable CBP officers to be on
the alert for new patterns of fraud.
5. Q02149: What is the Department doing to deal with the problem of
altered and counterfeit passports and visas?
Answer: The FDL's Operational staff provides seven day a week (and
Holidays) assistance to all DHS personnel, other federal agencies,
foreign immigration/border control authorities, State and local police
and DMV and Social Security personnel in all matters relating to
fraudulent documents. The Operations staff has access to the largest
collection of foreign and domestic travel and identity documents in the
world. They also have access to the Image Storage and Retrieval System
(ISRS--photos, fingerprints and signatures from tens of millions of
``green cards'' and Employment Authorization cards), DOS's DataShare
(database of photos and biographical data from millions of U.S. non-
immigrant visas and U.S. passports), EDISON (image database of
passports of every country in the world and other DHS databases. The
FDL officers themselves have many years experience in examining travel
and identity documents. The operations staff develops and disseminates
Document Intelligence Alerts, Document Reference Guides and Fraudulent
Document Briefs. They also develop and conduct fraudulent document
training for all DHS personnel, other federal agencies, foreign
immigration/border control authorities, State and local police and DMV
and Social Security personnel (FDL's longstanding relationships) The
FDL has continually participated in international working groups and
conferences for over 20 years. The FDL was instrumental in the creation
of the International Immigration Fraud Conference (IFC) which is
comprised of 20 Western European and North American countries) that
meet annually to exchange information on document fraud, fraudulent
document training and document examination equipment. The FDL has also
participated in Interpol's Fraudulent Document Working Group that
develop minimum standards for passports. The FDL chaired the Security
Working Group to develop minimum standards for U.S. driver's licenses
and identification cards mandated by the Intelligence Reform Act of
2004.
We are working well with our international and interagency partners
on improving standards for travel documents, aviation safety, port
security and the exchange of watchlist information. The appropriate and
secure use of biometric identifiers will assist in all these efforts.
We use biometric identifiers as tools to help prevent the use of
fraudulent travel documents and identities so that we can be more
confident and secure about our admissions and screening decisions. DHS
has conducted a review of the use of biometrics to ensure that we are
coordinating the implementation of biometric technology across the
Department. In the international arena, we are working closely with our
European counterparts in the G-8, the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) and other international fora to discuss how to
advance biometric methodologies, both in chip technology and electronic
readers, by establishing standards to ensure global interoperability.
The most notable success in our efforts is the creation of US-
VISIT, a biometric entry-exit system. This system not only allows the
Department to know who has entered the United States, but also captures
a photograph and scans of index fingers to prevent the use of
fraudulent identities to circumvent detection and employs biometric
visa data shared by the US Department of State. In addition, the US-
VISIT data is shared with law enforcement and intelligence agencies as
appropriate. Other initiatives undertaken by the Department include the
promulgation of regulations to ensure that passenger data is collected
and provided to law enforcement agencies for screening purposes,
including efforts to target terrorists through the National Targeting
Center; participation in the G8 Lyon Roma group focusing on terrorism;
setting passport issuance standards and fraud prevention.
Q02150: How is the Department working with other federal agencies
to deal with this problem?
Answer: The Department utilizes the resources of the Forensic
Document Laboratory to ensure that information about fraudulent
documents is disseminated to appropriate agencies within and outside
the Department. Distribution of ``Document Alerts'' based on
information obtained from intercepted fraudulent documents will be the
major ports of entry throughout the United States, ICE, CBP, and CIS
offices, Federal law enforcement training centers, various law
enforcement intelligence services, the US Department of State, the US
Secret Service, and the US Federal Protective Service. When
appropriate, alerts will also be sent to the Social Security
Administration, relevant Department of Motor Vehicles, and several
transportation trade organizations such as the International Civil
Aviation Organization, National Maritime Organization and International
Council of Cruise Lines. The widest distribution of information on
altered/fraudulent travel document is essential to addressing the
problem.
6. Q02151: Describe in detail the technologies and training methods
the Department is using to detect terrorist indicators on travel
documents.
Answer: In the context of visa security specifically, the Visa
Security Program is training its officers in terrorist indicators and
document evaluation. The Program is leveraging the resources of ICE
Forensic Document Laboratory (FDL). CBP and the FDL have created a
train the trainer session that has brought in more than 300 CBP
Officers into the FDL for a 3-day intensive training session. They stay
another day and are given the material they will take back to the port
in order to teach an 8-hour course. This course is currently a
prerequisite to some of our cross training efforts, such as our Anti-
Terrorism Passenger course and Unified Primary. As of November 5, 2004,
more than 4566 Officers have participated in this 8-hour course. In
addition, using advance passenger information, the National Targeting
Center accesses a variety of databases to identify travel and document
patterns which might indicate terrorist connections.
Q02152: Again, how is the Department coordinating its efforts with
other federal agencies?
Answer: In the context of visa security specifically, the Visa
Security Program coordinates closely with State. At posts where Visa
Security Officers are deployed, the VSOs work closely with consular
officers; share information about fraud documents, fraud schemes, and
terrorist activity and indicators; and provide training to enhance
consular officers? ability to recognize those during the consular
adjudication process. The VSOs also work with the law enforcement and
intelligence communities at post and share information to support their
efforts.
The HSTC is utilized by DHS to convene important interagency
coordination meetings, and to coordinate select initiatives and has
signed an interconnectivity agreement with the HSTC that allows HSTC
personnel, including non-DHS personnel, to access DHS information
systems. DHS has also provided information technology resources to
provide secure communications capabilities to HSTC personnel. Equally
important, however, numerous agencies are able to communicate directly
with the HSTC's staff on a daily basis on a wide range of policy,
intelligence, and operational issues that impact our efforts to secure
the homeland.
7. Q02153: Is the training provided to our front line border
personnel sufficient?
Answer: Together with the FDL, we have created a train the trainer
session that has brought in more than 300 CBP Officers into the FDL for
a 3-day intensive training session. They stay another day and are given
the material they will take back to the port in order to teach an 8-
hour course. This course is currently a prerequisite to some of our
cross training efforts, such as our Anti-Terrorism Passenger course and
Unified Primary. As of November 5, 2004, more than 4566 Officers have
participated in this 8-hour course.
Q02154: Or do we need a terrorist travel specialist at our ports-
of-entry who can provide this information but also protect classified
information?
Answer: The trainers described above, however, are not only
equipped to teach this single course, but now have the materials and
technical experience to teach additional port specific material. These
are the technical experts and this pool of personnel will continue to
expand, with the continued help of the FDL.
As noted, CBP will establish a complementary function at selected
field locations to ensure that there will be a specialist available to
ports of entry at all times. This unit, and the field specialist, will
work closely with the CBP Office of Intelligence and the intelligence
community as a whole to ensure our front line border officers have the
best and most up-to-date information available to safeguard the United
States.
Q02155: Do all the front-line personnel who need clearances to
utilize current threat information in their activities have the
appropriate clearances?
Answer: All appropriate front-line personnel who need clearances
have them or are in the process of obtaining the required clearances.
8. Q02156: What is the Department doing to uncover clandestine
travel among terrorists?
Answer: The Department has instituted a number of initiatives
designed to target clandestine travel by terrorists. As noted in the 9/
11 Commission Report, targeting terrorist travel is a powerful weapon,
and constraining terrorist travel is part of the Department's overall
strategy. As part of this effort, we are working well with our
international and interagency partners on improving standards for
travel documents, aviation safety, port security and the exchange of
watchlist information. The appropriate and secure use of biometric
identifiers will assist in all these efforts. We use biometric
identifiers as tools to help prevent the use of fraudulent travel
documents and identities so that we can be more confident and secure
about our admissions and screening decisions. DHS has conducted a
review of the use of biometrics to ensure that we are coordinating the
implementation of biometric technology across the Department. In the
international arena, we are working closely with our European
counterparts in the G-8, the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) and other international fora to discuss how to advance biometric
methodologies, both in chip technology and electronic readers, by
establishing standards to ensure global interoperability.
The 9/11 Commission Report also advised that the Department needed
to look even more closely at our aviation security initiatives and give
special attention to improving each of the layers of the security
system. The improvements in the layered approach include using
biometric identifiers as well as using airline passenger data
appropriately--both passenger name record (PNR) data and advanced
passenger information system (APIS) data, which are screened against
law enforcement databases by the National Targeting Center.
The most notable success in our efforts is the creation of US-
VISIT, a biometric entry-exit system. This system not only allows the
Department to know who has entered the United States, but also captures
a photograph and scans of index fingers to prevent the use of
fraudulent identities to circumvent detection employs biometric visa
data from US Department of State. In addition, the data is shared with
law enforcement and intelligence agencies as appropriate. Other
initiatives undertaken by the Department include the promulgation of
regulations to ensure that passenger data is collected and provided to
law enforcement agencies for screening purposes, including efforts to
target terrorists through the National Targeting Center; participation
in the G8 Lyon Roma group focusing on terrorism; setting passport
issuance standards and fraud prevention; continuation of the National
Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS) for special interest
travelers; and the use of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information
System or SEVIS to monitor the activities of foreign students.
Additionally, the Department is actively working with the FBI and the
Department of Justice, which already provides terrorist and criminal
fingerprint data to US-VISIT to allow FBI access to data collected by
US-VISIT at the ports of entry. Through these and other efforts, and
the sharing of data with the appropriate agencies, the Department is
working diligently to uncover clandestine travel by terrorists.
DHS has coordinated improvements to security in the maritime arena
by its implementation of a layered system of screening vessel arrivals
to the U.S. Since 9/11, the USCG has been added as formal member of the
Intelligence Community, created Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers on
the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, begun fielding Field Intelligence
Support Teams in major U. S. ports, created the National Vessel
Movement Center, and created the Coastwatch Program at the Intelligence
Coordination Center in Suitland, MD. All of the programs are
interagency coordinated efforts to bring together federal, state, and
local agencies with a role on the protection of maritime assets an
infrastructure. They all play significant roles in screening and
collecting intelligence information on arriving ships, crew, and
passengers that enter the U.S.
In addition, the services and unique expertise of HSTC personnel
directly supports the Commission's call for enhanced connectivity
amongst law enforcement and intelligence entities. This enhanced
connectivity will improve the U.S. Government's effectiveness in
combating terrorism, as well as supporting an enhanced worldwide focus
on travel and identity document fraud. Furthermore, the HSTC's
interagency environment provides the opportunity to apply this approach
to the serious problems of human trafficking and human smuggling.
For the first time, the HSTC brings together federal agency
representatives from the policy, law enforcement, intelligence, and
diplomatic arenas to work together on a full-time basis to achieve
increased progress in addressing the problems of human smuggling, human
trafficking and clandestine terrorist mobility. Additionally, the HSTC
has access to several interagency, national, and international
databases that contain information relative to human smuggling and
human trafficking that may not be readily available through other
sources. This combination of on-site expertise and accessibility to
sensitive information provides the U.S. Government and foreign allies
with a unique opportunity to more effectively identify and dismantle
smuggling and trafficking organizations, and terrorist travel
facilitators by working together to attack these threats on multiple
fronts.
9. Q02157: How is the Department developing techniques to counter
the evasive methods terrorists use to travel?
Answer: The Department is actively involved in developing
techniques to counter evasive methods used by terrorists to travel.
Through the use of biometrics and the US-VISIT program, the use of
fraudulent identities to enter the United States can be effectively
countered. Through US-VISIT, and in conjunction with the Department of
State's Biometric Visa Program, the Department has created a ``virtual
border'' as a line of defense against entry by terrorists. Travelers
seeking visas are screened against biometric and biographic watchlist
to identify criminals, terrorists, and immigration violators. DHS is
also working internationally to counter terrorist travel by
participation in the G8 Lyon Roma group targeting terrorism and the use
of fraudulent identification documents. In addition, the Department is
in the process of implementing the legislative mandate of Section 428
of the Homeland Security Act. The Department will deploy experienced
DHS law enforcement officers to U.S. embassies and consulates. These
officers will perform in-depth investigative reviews of high risk visa
applicants, conduct training programs for Department of State consular
officers, initiate investigations, conduct homeland security law
enforcement liaison, and research and disseminate intelligence.
The Department is also home to the Forensic Document Laboratory,
the premiere fraudulent document laboratory in the world. It maintains
an extensive library of travel documents, as well as trained forensic
experts and intelligence officers who provide expertise throughout the
Department.
For aviation travelers, the department collects advance passenger
information system data (APIS) otherwise known as manifest data, which
is screened against law enforcement data bases and watch-lists. For
specific flights, the Department also collects and vets passenger name
record (PNR) data which may contain more detailed information about the
passenger's itinerary. In addition to using passenger date, DHS has
also piloted the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) through which small
teams of CBP Immigration Advisory Officers with strong immigration
backgrounds are assigned to foreign airports to work with host country
officials to identify potentially high-risk or inadmissible passengers
before they board planes bound for the United States.
DHS recognizes that there is no single solution to prevent
airplanes from being used as weapons of terrorism. The improvements in
the layered approach include using biometric identifiers to deter visa
fraud, sharing lost and stolen passport information through Interpol,
promoting a global standard for machine readable passports, using
airline passenger data appropriately, expanding no-fly lists, screening
domestic and international passengers against no-fly lists, including
more travelers in US-VISIT, boosting airline security utilizing Federal
Air Marshals on international flights of concern, hardening cockpit
doors, and offering voluntary programs for arming pilots on passenger
and cargo planes for domestic flights.
Through the collection and dissemination of information, through
the use of biometrics, and new approaches and technology such as US-
VISIT, the Department is constantly seeking out ways to detect and
counter the evasive methods used by terrorists to travel.
In addition, the HSTC staff is collecting, correlating, analyzing
and disseminating domestic and international information on clandestine
terrorist travel on a continual basis. These activities include:
Daily SECRET cables from select U.S. government
sources via DOS Cable Xpress.
Daily notices of activities, items of interest, and
intelligence from domestic, overseas and foreign sources.
National and foreign fraudulent document alerts.
Consular fraud notices and intelligence alert
bulletins.
Foreign law enforcement reports, notices and alerts.
Foreign government periodic reports on:
Immigration
Identity and travel document fraud
Terrorism
National Security
The HSTC will support and exchange information with the NCTC and
other U.S. agencies and organizations active in the war on terrorism,
trafficking in persons and human smuggling. It will also coordinate
feedback amongst the various diplomatic, law enforcement, and
intelligence agencies.
10. International coordination is essential to prevent terrorists
from traveling into our country.
Q02158: What is the Department doing to coordinate with the
international community to prevent terrorist travel?
Answer: The 9-11 Commission Report stated: ``The U.S. government
cannot meet its own obligations to the American people to prevent the
entry of terrorists without a major effort to collaborate with other
governments. We should do more to exchange terrorist information with
trusted allies, and raise U.S. and global border security standards for
travel and border crossing over the medium and long term through
extensive international cooperation.'' The bombings in Madrid, the more
recent hostage crisis in Beslan, Russia and the Australian Embassy
bombing in Jakarta also serve as vivid reminders to us that terrorism
is an international threat that cannot be conquered alone. DHS
understands that we must engage in a global effort each day, through
collaboration, information sharing and ongoing dialogue to ensure that
our efforts are informed, coordinated, and effective.
As part of this effort, we are working well with our partners
bilaterally and within multilateral organizations to improve standards
for travel documents, aviation safety, port security and the exchange
of watchlist information.
The Department is working closely with our the international
partners in the EU as well as with Canada, Mexico and other foreign
governments to ensure that developments and initiatives in border and
transport security are discussed, coordinated, and clarified before
they are implemented.
We are taking such steps every day. For example, together with our
colleagues in the Department of State, DHS is addressing security
challenges posed by lost and stolen passports. Through the efforts of
the Departments of State and Justice, the U.S. has provided over
300,000 records of Lost and Stolen passports to the Interpol's lost and
stolen document database, which is available to border authorities
worldwide. We continue to encourage our international partners to join
us in this effort. Additionally, the US is initiating a scoping study
to assess a technology concept that helps address this concern. The
Enhanced International Travel Security (EITS) concept, which has been
addressed in the G-8 context, uses distributed databases as a mechanism
to allow real-time exchange of to the basic information needed- i.e., a
``yes'' or ``no'' response--concerning the validity of a document
without requiring visibility into the data that allows that
determination. The approach would be very similar to that already used
worldwide by the banking industry to support ATMs. Developing better
systems for international sharing of information, and expanding
participation to more countries will improve our ability to identify
and screen travelers before they enter our country.
Another area on which we are working to make significant
enhancements involves the Visa Waiver Program and US-VISIT. DHS, with
the assistance of Department of State, is in the process of completing
the country evaluations required under the Visa Waiver Program statute.
These reviews involve site visits to each of the participant countries.
Overall, the cooperation of the VWP countries' governments has been
exceptional. Additionally, on September 30, 2004, we began processing
nationals from VWP countries through in US-VISIT. The Department
engaged in multiple forms of outreach to ensure the countries and their
citizens were prepared for the expansion of the program.
To address possible risks, prior to flight departure, the
Department has piloted the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) in Poland
and the Netherlands and is exploring other locations to expand this
program. Host countries have shown support for this reciprocal program
that has CBP officers assisting in examining travel documents and
screening the flight manifests to make determination of whether
passengers are adequately documented or likely to be found inadmissible
upon arrival in the United States. Such efforts save the air carriers
from penalties and providing an extra layer of security prior to
departure.
Since the establishment of the Department, the leadership of DHS
has worked to establish and enhance the critical international
relationships and partnerships with foreign counterparts. Coordinated
efforts and continuous dialogue have proven vital to pursuing the DHS
mission, whether it be through well-established legacy agency dialogues
with Mexican and Canadian neighbors, the new Joint Contact Group
meetings with United Kingdom officials that examine issues relating to
all aspects of Homeland Security, the continuous discussions with
European Union (EU) and the EU Member States. In addition, Department
officials engage with foreign partners within the various international
fora such as ICAO, World Customs Organization (WCO), International
Maritime Organization (IMO), the G-8, Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe and many others.
DHS has also connected the Canadian Government Operations Center,
the United Kingdom's Civil Continingincies Secretariat, National
Security Advice Center, to the Homeland Security Information Network.
This network provides 24/7 connectivity, at the SBU level, from each of
these locations to the Homeland Security Operations Center.
Q02159: How is the Department working with our neighbors, in Canada
and Mexico in particular, to devise a coordinated anti-terrorist travel
strategy?
ANSWER: The Department values the strong partnership of the
Governments of Canada and Mexico in securing international travel.
While the work plans with our neighbors are similar in many respects,
they are also tailored to the specific capacities and realities of each
government. We are proceeding on two bilateral tracks rather than a
trilateral track at this time although there is strong potential for
convergenceSec. the future.
On December 11, 2001, the U.S. and Canada signed a Smart Border
Plan originally containing 30 concrete initiatives to secure the
infrastructure, flow of people, and flow of goods and to share
information. A few short months later in March 2002, the U.S. and
Mexico signed a 22-point Border Partnership Action Plan organized under
the pillars of secure movement of goods, secure movement of people, and
secure infrastructure. Together with our neighbors we recognized that
our current and future prosperity--and security--depend on borders that
operate efficiently and effectively under any circumstance.
General
Progress is steady and many of the initiatives have already been
implemented or are near completion. In other cases, on-going processes
are required. Others, like our cooperation on human smuggling and
trafficking, are ongoing activities that continue to be strengthened as
we deepen our relationships. Some goals will require many years and
extensive investment before they are in place. In some cases, such as
the electronic sharing of information, the process is itself the goal.
Still in other cases, long-term investment, political will and effort
will be necessary to achieve the goal.
APIS
Of particular note is the progress in sharing advanced passenger
information. Currently, Canada and Mexico require international air
carriers to send electronically manifest information for commercial
flights destined to their countries. We are vetting the APIS data
against relevant databases and have already developed with Canada a
means to exchange bulk and individual records. Additionally, Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) has developed common risk-scoring
algorithms with its Canadian colleagues as well as a mechanism to
resolve hits. Under the U.S.--Mexico Smart Border Action Plan, the GOM
transmits APIS data to CBP. Commercial air carriers transmit API data
to the GOM as required by law. The Mexican API data is retransmitted by
the GOM to CBP via the existing CBP APIS infrastructure. In May 2004,
the GOM designated Centro de Investigacion y Seguridad Nacional (CISEN)
as the lead point of contact for the Mexican APIS program.
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET)
In support of the Canada-United States Smart Border Declaration and
Action Plan for creating a secure and smart border, Integrated Border
Enforcement Teams (IBETs) seek to identify mutual national security
threats and combat illicit cross border activity. IBETs are multi-
agency field level groups of law enforcement officials dedicated to
securing the integrity of the Canada/United States border while
respecting the laws and jurisdictions of each nation. The IBET mission
is to enhance border integrity and security at our shared border by
identifying, investigating and interdicting persons and organizations
that pose a threat to national security or are engaged in other
organized criminal activity.
Across the northern border, 15 regional IBET locations have been
established and are currently active. Each IBET has a local Joint
Management Team (JMT) to incorporate national policies and formulate
local investigative priorities of the regional team. The JMT is
predicated on the needs and involvement of its participating agencies.
IBETs are not ``firehouses'' waiting for something to occur but
rather operate as intelligence driven enforcement teams comprised of
federal, state/provincial and local law enforcement personnel to
address terrorism and other forms of criminality in the context of the
border. The teams are multidisciplinary in nature and work in an
integrated land, air, and marine environment along or near the
Canadian/United States border while respecting the jurisdiction of each
nation.
The IBETs were developed to be ``intelligence driven'' units. The
concept of the Joint Intelligence Teams is to develop an inter-
connectivity of intelligence by co-locating ICE Intelligence Analysts/
Intelligence Research Specialists and Special Agents with Intelligence
Analysts/Officers representing the other participating core member
agencies. The intelligence officers will be responsible for the
collection and collation of information and its dissemination to the
field, other IBETs, as well as to their respective Headquarters
entities.
Cargo Screening
Tremendous progress has been made in securing commercial traffic--
both rail and truck. By 2005, it is expected that 100% of rail cargo
entering the U.S. from Canada and Mexico will be screened using Vehicle
and Cargo Inspection Systems (VACIS) and other appropriate
technologies. The benefits derived from our northern and southern
border FAST programs speak for themselves. For example, 92% of
commercial traffic on the US-Mexico border is via the FAST lanes at the
seven largest ports. We have aggressive expansion plans for FAST along
the southern border and are studying additional dedicated FAST lanes at
some of the busiest crossings between the U.S. and Canada.
The Department, through CBP, has developed with Canada a Joint
Targeting Initiative to review and research bills of lading and
manifests necessary to target high-risk containers destined for North
America. Additionally, CBP and Canada will embark on a common Container
Security Initiative, leveraging resources at select locations abroad.
Passenger Enrollment Systems
Low-risk, pre-enrolled travel programs for visitors and other non-
commercial travelers are another example of ways to leverage technology
and bilateral cooperation to achieve the mutual goals of enhanced
security and facilitated through-flow of known border crossers. We
continue to expand and upgrade the NEXUS and SENTRI programs at our
land borders while ensuring continuous compliance monitoring. Further,
we will test a NEXUS Air program with Canada at the Vancouver
International Airport.
Visa Policy
Visa policy plays an essential role in our layered defense strategy
that prevents known high-risk travelers from entering North America. To
this end, we are working with Canada and Mexico to identify
commonalities, gaps and areas. For example, since September 11, Canada
has imposed a visa requirement on nationals of 12 countries, including
Saudi Arabia and Malaysia. We are studying ways to converge visa-
screening procedures and to exchange visa information.
Information Sharing
Both before and since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
the State Department, with DHS and other interagency partners, has
spearheaded efforts to coordinate the exchange of biographic terrorist
screening information. With the specific authority granted to the
Secretary of State by the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 to establish
agreements with foreign governments on exchange of visa screening
information, we are seeking to negotiate more robust information
exchange agreements.
On June 12, 2003, the Secretary of State authorized negotiations on
an agreement for the systematic exchange of broader visa screening
database information with Canada and approved a draft executive-level
agreement to do so. At the same time, he gave blanket authorization to
pursue such an agreement with any other willing country, using the
effort with Canada as a model. In accordance with the new guidelines of
the Homeland Security Act, the State Department sought the cooperation
of DHS and subsequently the newly formed TSC. In January 2004, the
State Department opened negotiations with Canada aimed at reaching such
an agreement. The negotiating team, which includes representatives of
State, DHS and the TSC, is addressing the policy, legal and technical
issues involved.
The HSPD-6 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the Integration and
Use of Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism of September
16, 2003 was signed by the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland
Security and the DCI. The MOU requires the obtaining of terrorist
screening information from our foreign partners ``in a manner
consistent with each government's laws,'' and, as necessary, ``to
provide operational support to the participating governments.'' It also
established the guidelines for operation of the TSC and the transfer of
State's TIPOFF database to the TTIC. The TIPOFF Program, founded in
1987, was the first federal program focused on the identification of
known and suspected terrorists to prevent their entry into the United
States. On November 17, 2003 the TTIC,\2\ under the authority of the
DCI, assumed responsibility for TIPOFF and for collecting all
information the U.S. Government possesses related to known or suspected
terrorists, with the exception of information on purely domestic
terrorists. TIPOFF contains more than 175,000 records on terrorist
identities as of mid-August 2004 and serves as a screening and analytic
resource to the U.S. Government. On December 1, 2003 the Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC) was established, under the administration of the
FBI, to consolidate the U.S. government's approach to screening for
terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ On December 6, 2004, the NCTC undertook all responsibilities
assigned to the TTIC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The TSC facilitates terrorist screening exchange arrangements with
two trusted partners--Canada and Australia. An agreement with Canada
was established and implemented on May 23, 1997, and with Australia on
April 12, 2000, through which sensitive but unclassified biographic
screening data elements derived from the Terrorist Screening Data Base
(TSDB), were made available to both countries. Terrorist screening data
provided to TIPOFF by Canada and Australia is included in the Consular
Lookout and Support System (CLASS) used by the State Department to
screen visa applicants in the Integrated Border Inspection System
(IBIS) used by DHS to screen travelers seeking admission into the
United States, and by other federal, state, and local law enforcement
through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). HSPD-6 also
tasked the Department of State, in conjunction with the TSC, to expand
the sharing of terrorist identifying information with other countries
and to begin with our partners in the Visa Waiver Program. This effort
has been initiated and significant progress is being accomplished.
Similarly, we are working within the Administration to determine
the appropriate bilateral exchange of the No Fly and Selectee Lists
currently used by domestic and international airlines transporting
passengers in, to, or from the United States to conduct passenger
prescreening. We continue to monitor the status of domestic legislation
in Canada that would further enhance aviation security including the
exchange of passenger information on domestic flights that may fly over
U.S. airspace.
Transportation Security
Member States in the International Civil Aeronautics Organization
must meet the 100% hold-baggage screening standard by January 2006.
This standard will make the global aviation system even more secure and
will help reduce the possibility of acts of terrorism on our air
carriers. The Department is pleased that our neighboring governments
are sharing information to help meet this goal.
US-VISIT
DHS implemented US VISIT at 115 airports and 14 seaports starting
on January 5, 2004. The land border solution is being designed to be
fast and easy, but also secure. The Department is committed to the dual
goals of enhanced security and facilitated legitimate travel. Through
US-VISIT, and in conjunction with the Department of State's Biometric
Visa Program, the Department has created a ``virtual border'' as a line
of defense against entry by terrorists. Travelers seeking visas have
their fingerprints vetted against a biometric watchlist to identify
criminals, terrorists, and immigration violators We have worked closely
with officials from Canada and Mexico to develop an effective and open
communication mechanism to exchange ideas and address concerns about
how US-VISIT utilizes technology, how it may affect border communities,
and how to manage public relations. Shared infrastructure, biometrics,
data privacy and protection are all issues of common interest. The
Department looks forward to continued bilateral dialogue as US-VISIT
expands to the 50 largest land border ports by December 2004 and all
land ports by December 31, 2005, and as we assess and build upon
technologies and management concepts being tested or already deployed
from the various departure pilots.
11. Constraining terrorist mobility should be a broad, long-term
DHS goal.
Q02160: What initiatives does DHS have underway and what have you
identified as future goals or developing capabilities?
Answer: CBP has a number of initiatives underway in support of
DHS's long-term goal of constraining terrorist mobility. To highlight a
few:
Deploying Immigration Advisory Officers
The Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) is a CBP effort to prevent
terrorists from entering the United States. Under IAP, small teams of
CBP Immigration Advisory Officers with strong immigration backgrounds
would be assigned to the major ``hub'' airports around the world to
identify potentially high-risk or inadmissible passengers before they
board aircraft bound for the United States. Through these efforts, CBP
is better positioned to address the worldwide threat of terrorism.
CBP initiated an IAP pilot at Amsterdam's Schiphol airport on June
26, 2004 and a second effort began at Warsaw's Chopin Airport on
September 15, 2004. The IAP teams in both foreign locations have
established similar passenger processing methods. Typically, airline
security officers or government border guards review passenger
documents and if there are any anomalies with the document or the
passenger, they request assistance from the IAP Officer. IAP officers,
based on targeting information or observation, may ask to see a
particular passenger. Based on the review of the passenger's documents
and responses to questions, the IAP officer may recommend to carriers
not to board individuals who have documentary deficiencies or who may
be otherwise inadmissible.
Additional sites will be identified based on intelligence
information, funding, and approval by the Department of Homeland
Security and host countries.
Deploying Integrated IDENT/IAFIS
The Automated Biometric Identification System and the Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IDENT/IAFIS) program was
established to integrate the IDENT database with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification
System (IAFIS). The Integrated IDENT/IAFIS terminal provides
simultaneous access to biometric-based criminal and immigration
violator information for DHS agents in the field. In FY2004, DHS
assumed the responsibility for funding and completion of phase 1 of the
project--the nationwide deployment of IDENT-IAFIS workstations was
transferred from the Department of Justice to the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). DHS immediately began accelerating the
deployment of the integrated capability and has now completed
deployment of the integrated system to all 140 operational Border
Patrol stations, and 216 Port of Entry and ICE locations. DHS will
complete deployment to all remaining Ports of Entry and ICE locations
by December, 2005.
Numerous other initiatives being pursued by CBP include continuing
to enhance the automated targeting system, continuing to aggressively
pursue smart box container technology, increasing Container Security
Initiative (CSI) participation, Free And Secure Trade (FAST), internal
law enforcement partnerships, deploying radiation portal monitors, and
deploying additional imaging technologies to the ports. Future goals
and developing capabilities include our Automated Commercial
Environment system (ACE) which is currently restructuring what
information is required for international transactions, how that
information is processed, and employing technology and business
partnerships with other agencies to identify their international data
requirements, and how to best integrate these requirements through an
international trade data system (ITDS).
Questions for the Record from Chairman Dave Camp and Chairman Jim
Gibbons
(1) Q02161: What is the current process for DHS agencies to share
information and intelligence they gather in their day-to-day activities
with the DHS Office of Information Analysis?
Answer: Each Department of Homeland Security (DHS) component
employs several methods to share information with the DHS Office of
Information Analysis (IA). Standardized, daily reporting is the
principal method for sharing information. This regular reporting is
supplemented by spot reports, alerts, and informal notifications via
email, phone or fax to provide timely notice to IA, and to DHS in
general, of emergent threats and other events of interest. The Homeland
Security Operations Center (HSOC) is the focal point for this
information exchange. IA personnel staff the HSOC on a 24X7X365 basis.
This team, under the leadership of the Senior Intelligence Analyst,
reviews all component reporting and works directly with both the Senior
HSOC Watch Officer and all parts of the IA organization to ensure
timely distribution of information throughout IA and to provide front
line, first phase intelligence analysis to the HSOC.
Most DHS components provide their reports to the HSOC via email at
all classification levels (Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU), Secret
(S), and Top Secret/Special Compartmented Information (TS/SCI)). These
reports are automatically filed in designated folders accessible across
DHS Headquarters for easy access and archival management. The U.S.
Coast Guard submits reports in the form of Information Intelligence
Report messages to the DoD's Automated Message Handling System (AMHS)
and Web Intelligence Search Engine which are both guarded at DHS. In
addition, the Coast Guard develops and displays a wealth of information
on its Common Operational Picture (COP), and which provides real-time
information to the HSOC. That information available through HSOC and
through the COP is provided to DHS Office of Internal Affairs (OIA).
The following is a listing of reports by agency:
BTS
Daily Operations Report
* BTS components ICE, CBP, and TSA also provide their own reports:
ICE
Homeland Security Intelligence Report
Significant Activity Reports
ICE daily operational summary
ICE Spot Reports
Daily Intelligence Summary
CBP
Homeland Security Intelligence Report
CBP Spot Reports
CBP daily operational summary
Intelligence Assessment
Intelligence Alert
Weekly Matrix
TSA
Daily intelligence Summary
Homeland Security Intelligence Report
Transportation Security Operations Center Spot Reports
Suspicious Incident Report
FAMS
Daily Intelligence Brief
Weekly Assessment
USCG
Coast Guard Incident Reports
Spot Reports
Field Intelligence Reports (via AMHS)
Intelligence Information Reports (via AMHS)
Common Operational Picture
Daily Intelligence Summaries
Routine and ad hoc Intelligence Production
USSS
USSS Intelligence Division/Operations Branch-Daily Operations Report
Federal Protective Service
Daily Operations Log
Spot Reports
Information Bulletins
Incident Reporting via the FPS Portal
This system also supports reporting from DHS affiliates in the
National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC). NICC participants
are given reporting criteria and email addresses to provide information
to the HSOC for further distribution to IA analysts.
The IA staff in the HSOC distributes information through several
methods. The report is captured in a running log with the source of the
report, the facts as reported, derivation of information gaps, and
actions taken to exploit the information against all available
databases and subject matter experts to determine terrorism nexus /
emergence of threat. External watch officers are often contacted as the
information is received, and queried for support in evaluating the
threat against their resources. The text of the report is also sent to
the HSOC Senior Watch Officer and IA analytic staff via email. If the
nature of the information suggests an imminent threat, key IA leaders
are notified by phone / pager.
While this process is the primary path of information from
components to IA analysts, the same email storage and DoD message
systems are available directly to analysts and desk officers with
appropriate security clearance. The SIA serves as the primary conduit
of information into IA, providing global coverage of all of the over
1500 messages received by DHS daily and ensuring broad distribution of
that information on a 24X7 basis, but IA analysts have identical access
to the source information for their topic areas to support easy access
and rapid analytical response. This process is depicted in the example
diagram below:
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Additionally, the DHS Request for Information (RFI) and Tearline
process facilitates the sharing of information not only within DHS, but
also with members of the Intelligence Community (IC). DHS's Web-based
Pantheon system will help expedite and streamline the information
sharing process. DHS IA also manages the DHS tearline program that
currently helps facilitate information sharing within the IC, DHS,
State & Local Government, and the private sector. In response to DCID
8/1, DHS IA has developed a four phased tearline reporting
implementation plan which will greatly enhance the ability to share
information.
(2) Q02162: Does IA currently have specific personnel devoted to
developing a complete threat picture based on information it receives
from BTS agencies and the Intelligence Community?
Answer: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of
Information Analysis (IA) currently has two analytical units. One
focuses on current intelligence and the other on broader trends and
developments. Within the analytic unit focused on current intelligence,
there is a branch focused on fusing current intelligence and homeland
security reporting, to include DHS Border and Transportation Security
(BTS) reporting, with the contextual picture provided by the unit
analyzing broader trends and developments. The product of this fusion,
along with the near real time input from the Senior Intelligence
Analyst in the Homeland Security Operations Center, is a complete
threat picture. Additionally, BTS component intelligence activities, as
well as representatives from the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC)
maintain a presence in IA to facilitate sharing their respective
understanding of the current threat picture.
It is the responsibility of IA analysts to be cognizant of and
apply knowledge of the broader threat context as derived from all
sources of Homeland-related threat information to analyses of their
specific accounts or programs. Specific divisions within IA that are
focused on information derived from or pertaining to BTS naturally
possess a greater macro and micro understanding of this information. It
is also the responsibility of senior analysts and managers within IA to
ensure all-source fusion is taking place.
Q02163: Is this information integrated with intelligence and
reporting from other agencies?
Answer: Yes. Please refer to the above (Q02162) and Q02166.
(3) In addition to the Office of Information Analysis (IA) within
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), several other components
within the Department maintain distinct intelligence units. These units
located within the Border and Transportation Security Directorate (BTS)
and the U.S. Coast Guard serve the demands of their respective offices.
Q02164: How does IA work with their respective DHS intelligence
components to share border reports?
Answer: Please refer to Q02161.
Q02165: How is this information shared across the Department, with
IA, and with the larger Intelligence Community?
Answer: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of
Information Analysis (IA) utilizes both formal and informal processes
to share information across the Department, within IA, and with the
larger Intelligence Community. IA conducts and or participates in
several daily and weekly meetings/teleconferences. The primary purpose
of these events is to discuss and disseminate information/intelligence
and assign taskings for further analysis.
The following meetings are of significant importance in the IA
information sharing process:
Information Analysis Morning Executive Brief (IAMEB)--
daily Monday through Friday brief that is attended by numerous
agencies from DHS to include IA, IP, HSOC, USSS, BTS,CBP,ICE,
TSA, State & Local as well as the FBI, State Department and the
Intelligence Community.
Daily Secure Video Teleconference--IA participates in
the daily secure meeting hosted by the National Counter
Terrorism Threat Center.
Homeland Security Terrorist Threat Intel Group
(HSTTIG)--Bi-monthly meeting of the DHS Intelligence component
leaders.
Formal products are produced in a variety of formats to accommodate
the different security handling and information requirements of our
diverse audience, which ranges from private sector firms and
institutions to members of the Intelligence Community.
The department produces a wide variety of formal products
including:
Homeland Security Information Advisories;
Homeland Security Information Bulletins;
Homeland Security Assessments and Studies;
Homeland Security Intelligence Articles (HSIA);
Homeland Security IAIP Red Cell Session Reports;
Homeland Security Intelligence Reports;
Daily briefings such as the Information Analysis
Morning Executive Brief;
Intelligence Information Reports (via DoD message
handling system).
Information Advisories (IAs) provide a means for DHS to communicate
threat information to all DHS customers ranging from the intelligence
community and law enforcement to the general public at large.
Advisories incorporate intelligence or information identifying a threat
targeting critical national networks or key infrastructure assets that
contains actionable incident information. The Advisory may suggest a
change in readiness posture, protective actions, or response, as well
as, relaying newly developed procedures that, when implemented, would
significantly improve security or protection.
Information Bulletins (IBs) report information of interest to the
nation's critical infrastructures that does not meet the timeliness,
specificity, or significance thresholds of Information Advisories. IBs
are designed to provide updates on the training, tactics, or strategies
of terrorists and may include: statistical reports, monthly, quarterly,
or semi-annual summaries, incident responses or reporting guidelines,
common vulnerabilities and patches, and configuration standards or
tools. In addition, preliminary requests for information on symptoms,
events, or social engineering being observed by constituents may also
be communicated through a bulletin.
Homeland Security Assessments and Studies provide an assessment or
study for a specific event or location and are directed at a specific
audience. Assessments are typically 2 5 pages, while Studies offer a
more in-depth coverage of the subject and are typically 10 20 pages in
length. These come in various forms including: Threat--particular event
related; Special--study of threats to infrastructure / security;
Executive--summary assessments; and Joint--author sponsorship by DHS
and another concerned organization.
Homeland Security Information Articles (HSIAs) are classified,
timely, all-source intelligence products that assess, clarify or
consolidate new intelligence with previously reported information.
HSIAs are an analytic production process that begins with new
intelligence or threat information often expanding upon previously
reported intelligence and threat assessments. The information is not
limited to raw reporting and may contain finished analysis. The HSIA is
authored by IA-C and/or IA-D analysts on an as-needed basis and is
intended for various internal DHS audiences and the Intelligence
Community.
IAIP Red Cell Reports provide alternative assessments intended to
provoke thought and stimulate discussion. Red Cell products enhance DHS
analysis by engaging a community of outside experts from government,
industry, and academia to provide an alternative perspective on
threats/vulnerabilities facing the homeland. Emphasis will be is on
examining issues from a terrorist mindset, focusing on innovative and
unconventional targets and tactics. The analytic Red Cell program
brings together DHS and outside experts on a regularly scheduled basis,
and can also stand up ad-hoc red cells in response to immediate needs.
Distribution is generally limited based on topic.
Homeland Security Intelligence Reports (HSIRs) allow DHS
operational components a vehicle to report case and potential terrorist
information to DHS Headquarters. The final report contains a
compilation of information with preliminary processing or analysis by
the reporting agency supported by research using locally available
databases and domain expertise of the component analysts.
Information Analysis Morning Executive Brief (IAMEB) provides daily
situational awareness on homeland security issues. The brief is a daily
compilation of preliminary/ in-depth analytical perspectives on
significant recent and developing issues affecting homeland security
and DHS. The IA-C briefing team develops the IAMEB with input from IA-D
as warranted, and briefs it to key IAIP personnel each weekday morning.
The IAMEB is then modified as appropriate and disseminated. Appropriate
versions of the IAMEB are sent internally throughout DHS and the
Intelligence Community.
DHS Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) are produced by IA to
publish information gathered by DHS components in the format most
familiar to IC and DoD consumers. IA has partnered with DIA to allow
direct publication of DHS IIRs into the standard DoD message handling
system. Currently, DHS authors' component reporting in this format,
however, components will begin production on their own to directly
inject the information into the IC in the near future.
Homeland Security Information Message (HSIM): Designed to
communicate uncorroborated threat information to U.S. Government
agencies, State and Local Homeland Security Advisors, and/or the
private/public sector, in an expeditious manner. Information has not
been fully evaluated. No specific actions are recommended. Should
further information become available, it will be disseminated as a more
comprehensive Information Bulletin, Advisory or Memorandum.
This information is provided as directed in Section 201, Homeland
Security Act of 2002. Additionally, IA is in constant informal
communication with other Intelligence agencies and other non-
intelligence organizations, directly communicating information via
liaison, phone, fax or e-mail. We rely heavily on representatives of
the various agencies, both inside and outside DHS, to facilitate
communication with their parent organizations. These experts provide
not only a conduit for information, but also are valuable resources
during the development and vetting of products.
(4) Q02166: Does IA have the ability to analyze imagery and other
forms ofSec. telligence that is gathered on our borders?
Answer: Analyzing and consuming all-source intelligence analysis is
at the core of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of
Information Analysis (IA) mission. However, IA does not literally
analyze imagery, with the exception of a small contingent of imagery
analysts working within the Coast Guard who provide analysis of
maritime events that impact a wide variety of USCG missions. However,
for the most part, IA relies on the analysis of the National Geospatial
Intelligence Agency (NGA) and other organizations that possess literal
imagery analysts. This analysis is incorporated into IA evaluations and
assessments pertaining to border issues. As a member of the U.S.
Intelligence Community, NGA maintains multiple representatives within
IA who very ably assist with various imagery requirements. Most
notably, NGA has played a key role supporting DHS Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) Directorate efforts relating to
critical infrastructure protection, and has supported IAIP's mission to
National Security Special Events and other significant functions. Other
border-related information derived from the IC or BTS is funneled to
DHS via established electronic systems and incorporated into IA's
assessments.
(5) Terrorist travel intelligence runs across broad federal, state,
and local agency lines.
Q02167: How is the Department leveraging its assets to best utilize
current terrorist travel information from within DHS and other partners
in the Intelligence Community?
Q02168: What is it doing to improve the exchange of information?
Answer: One of IA's OMB Milestones is to ``Establish and resource a
DHS reports officer capability to report information from field and
component organizations on potential threats to the Homeland.'' IA is
staffing positions, developing procedures and training, and
implementing a plan to deploy reports officers to the field. These
reports officers' primary responsibility is to write and disseminate
reports of intelligence value based on DHS component operational
information. IA's intent is to model this effort on successful reports
officer programs of long standing in the Intelligence Community and to
review the newly developed program at the FBI for lessons learned in a
start-up enterprise.
Lawrence M. Wein Responses to Questions from Chairman Dave Camp and
Chairman Jim Gibbons
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Select
Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittees on Infrastructure and
Border Security and Intelligence and Counterterrorism hearing on
September 30, 2004, entitled ``Disrupting Terrorist Travel:
Safeguarding America's Borders through Information Sharing.'' I am
pleased to answer your questions.
Question 1: You make the point in your testimony that the more
fingerprints captured, the less important image quality is. However, if
I'm a terrorist I can just as easily ruin or impair all 10 of my
fingerprints as I can just two. How do you make the assumption that 10
prints are essential?
Answer 1: First, approximately 5-10% of terrorists have poor image
quality in the absence of any deliberate impairment. Given Al-Qa'ida's
large pool of terrorists, it can simply choose US-bound terrorists that
have inherently poor image quality. Second, approximately five times as
much work, pain, etc. is required to impair 10 fingers rather than two
fingers, although your point is well taken that terrorists who are
capable of deliberately impairing two fingers can certainly
deliberately impair 10 fingers. Regarding your main question, the
bottom line here is that you get a limited amount of information out of
a fingerprint with poor image quality, and you get approximately five
times as much information from 10 poor-quality fingerprints as you do
from two poor-quality fingerprints. We do not assume that 10
fingerprints are essential. Rather, we solve an optimization problem
that allows for the possible use of up to 10 fingerprints, and find
that it is optimal to employ 10 fingerprints from visitors with poor-
quality fingerprint images. That is, the use of 10 fingerprints for
visitors with poor image quality is not an assumption of our analysis,
but rather a product of our analysis. Returning to the earlier issue,
using 10 fingerprints allows five times as much information to be
captured from visitors with inherently, or deliberately, poor image
quality, which leads to a much higher detection probability.
Question 2: What factors are involved in order to capture a quality
image? (i.e., capabilities of the machine, software, screener training,
and physical characteristics of the fingers).
Question 3: It seems that if US VISIT is capturing quality images,
the matching problems you outline in your testimony will largely be
addressed. In your estimate, how much of the ability to capture a
quality image is outside of DHS's control?
Answers 2 and 3: While all the factors you mention in Question 2--
along with environmental factors such as humidity and dirt--impact
image quality, our analysis of the data in Figure 11 of the NISTIR 7110
report (this analysis appears in Appendix I of a report we distributed
to various parts of the US Government, including analysts at NIST and
managers of the US-VISIT Program) suggests that most of the image
quality is inherent in the physical characteristics of the person
(i.e., some people have inherently worn-out fingers), and hence is
outside of DHS's control. However, a definitive answer to this question
requires an analysis of NIST data that is more detailed than the
summary statistics in Figure 11 of NISTIR 7110; I requested this
additional data from NIST analysts on June 2, 2004, but they never
responded to my request.
Question 4: You concluded in your testimony that capturing
additional fingerprints would not take additional time because you
average the screening time between primary and secondary. Your findings
combine the time in primary and secondary into a mean time. I am
concerned that your findings don't fully weigh the cost of delaying
travelers at a port of entry. What are you recommending exactly--that
10 fingerprints are captured during primary inspection at the port of
entry or at some other point in the screening process?
Answer 4: We are also concerned with traveler delay at ports of
entry. Unlike most previous biometric research, our analysis includes a
constraint that the total mean (primary plus secondary) screening time
per visitor be fixed at its current value. Queueing theory, which is
the field of mathematics that analyzes waiting lines (see our report
for a reference to a specific paper) implies that mean delay at ports
of entry will not increase if the mean (primary plus secondary)
screening time per visitor is not increased, under the assumption that
there is some flexibility in the workforce (i.e., a small fraction of
the inspectors are trained in both primary and secondary screening).
Hence, we are taking traveler delay into full consideration. Regarding
your final question, our recommendation is that 10 fingerprints be
captured during visa enrollment from all during their next visit to a
port of entry, and these 10 prints could replace the 2 fingerprints
that were originally captured during enrollment. Our exact
recommendation at the ports of entry is to take 10 fingerprints from
enrollees with poor image quality, but only two fingers from the
enrollees with good image quality. Using this information to match
against the watchlist, we predict a detection probability of 95% with
no increase in mean traveler delay. Of course, if different numbers of
fingerprints are captured from different people, there is the issue of
managing the perception of differential treatment (i.e., different
numbers of fingers for different people). However, image quality is an
objective measure that does not explicitly take into account age,
gender, race, country of origin, etc., which may mitigate this concern.
Question 5: I am concerned about the additional burden and time
delay of taking 10 fingers from all travelers. Did you assess what the
added value would be of taking 10 prints from all enrollees with poor
image quality, as a subgroup of all visitors?
Answer 5: This question was essentially answered in Answer 4, but I
will repeat the answer here. We are also concerned with the time delay
of taking 10 fingers from all travelers. In fact, in our analysis, 95%
detection probability at the port of entry (with no increase in
traveler delay) is achieved by taking 10 fingerprints from enrollees
with poor image quality, but only two fingers from the enrollees with
good image quality; note that we would know an enrollee's image quality
from their prints taken at the time of enrollment. Of course, if
different numbers of fingerprints are captured from different people,
there is the issue of managing the perception of differential treatment
(i.e., different numbers of fingers for different people). However,
image quality is an objective measure that does not explicitly take
into account age, gender, race, country of origin, etc., which may
mitigate this concern.
Thank you for your interest. Please let me know if I can be of any
further help.
Mr. Camp. The gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to ask the chairman
if he would allow me to place in the record a NIST 2002 report,
which concluded that the addition of the additional fingerprint
slap system that I believe you were referring to, Professor,
the time required to capture those fingerprints would be
insignificant.
It goes to the heart of the issue that Mr. Dicks raised,
because I think we all have the impression that we didn't use
the 10-print system because it takes too much time. And I would
like for this report to be placed as part of the record of this
hearing.
Mr. Camp. Without objection, the NIST report may be placed
in the record.
[Retained in the committee file.]
Mr. Camp. There being no further business, the hearing is
now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]