[House Hearing, 108 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] OPEN FOR BUSINESS: ENSURING EMPLOYEE AND CUSTOMER SAFETY AT THE FORMER BRENTWOOD POSTAL FACILITY ======================================================================= HEARING before the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ OCTOBER 23, 2003 __________ Serial No. 108-107 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house http://www.house.gov/reform U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 91-921 WASHINGTON : 2004 _______________________________________________________________________ For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800, DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut TOM LANTOS, California ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland DOUG OSE, California DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio RON LEWIS, Kentucky DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri CHRIS CANNON, Utah DIANE E. WATSON, California ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER, NATHAN DEAL, Georgia Maryland CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania Columbia MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee JOHN R. CARTER, Texas CHRIS BELL, Texas WILLIAM J. JANKLOW, South Dakota ------ MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont (Independent) Peter Sirh, Staff Director Melissa Wojciak, Deputy Staff Director Rob Borden, Parliamentarian Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk Philip M. Schiliro, Minority Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on October 23, 2003................................. 1 Statement of: Reid, Myke, assistant legislative director, American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, accompanied by Corey Thompson; and Richard Collins, assistant to the national president, National Postal Mail Handlers Union, accompanied by Cynthia Vines...................................................... 92 Ungar, Bernard L., Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office; Keith Rhodes, Chief Technologist, Center for Technology and Engineering, Applied Research and Methods; Janet Heinrich, Director, Health Care and Public Health Issues; R. Davis Layne, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor; Thomas Day, vice president of engineering, U.S. Postal Service; and Jerry Lane, manager of Capital Metro Operations, U.S. Postal Service............................................. 11 Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: Collins, Richard, assistant to the national president, National Postal Mail Handlers Union, prepared statement of. 106 Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 121 Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia: Letter dated November 20, 2003........................... 75 Prepared statement of.................................... 3 Day, Thomas, vice president of engineering, U.S. Postal Service, prepared statement of............................. 43 Gordon, Theodore, District of Columbia Department of Health, prepared statement of...................................... 67 Lane, Jerry, manager of Capital Metro Operations, U.S. Postal Service, prepared statement of............................. 57 Layne, R. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, prepared statement of................. 33 Norton, Hon. Eleanor Holmes, a Representative in Congress from the District of Columbis, prepared statement of....... 9 Reid, Myke, assistant legislative director, American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, prepared statement of.............. 95 Ungar, Bernard L., Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement of...... 13 OPEN FOR BUSINESS: ENSURING EMPLOYEE AND CUSTOMER SAFETY AT THE FORMER BRENTWOOD POSTAL FACILITY ---------- THURSDAY, OCTOBER 23, 2003 House of Representatives, Committee on Government Reform, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:30 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis (chairman of the committee) presiding. Present: Representatives Tom Davis and Norton. Staff present: Peter Sirh, staff director; Keith Ausbrook, chief counsel; Jack Callender, counsel; Robert Borden, counsel/ parliamentarian; David Marin, director of communications; Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Brien Beattie, deputy clerk; Shalley Kim, legislative assistant; Corinne Zaccagnini, chief information officer; Rosalind Parker, minority counsel; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk; and Cecelia Morton, minority office manager. Chairman Tom Davis. Good afternoon. The committee will come to order. Ms. Norton will join us shortly. Before we proceed with opening statements, the Postal Service and the American Postal Workers Union have asked to videotape today's hearing, and without objection, the Postal Service and the American Postal Workers Union should be allowed to record today's hearing, subject to the requirements of House Rule XI, including the prohibition to the use of video coverage as part of some campaign material. We're here today to discuss the cleanup and the reopening of the U.S. Postal Service's Joseph Curseen, Jr. and Thomas Morris, Jr. Processing and Distribution Center on Brentwood Road in Washington, DC. We all remember the terrible events of October 2001, when the dedicated postal employees of the Brentwood Processing Center joined the front lines in the war on terrorism. Tragically, two workers, Joseph Curseen and Thomas Morris, lost their lives to anthrax, which passed through the building in letters addressed to Senators Daschle and Leahy. Two other postal workers were infected and the building has remained closed to this day. In July 2001, the Subcommittee on the District of Columbia held a hearing on the Postal Service's plan to clean and reopen the facility, an effort which at that point was just beginning. Now, with the cleanup complete and reopening scheduled for next month, we're following up on that hearing. The Postal Service, in consultation with scientists and experts from various Federal and local agencies, conducted the largest anthrax decontamination using chlorine dioxide in our Nation's history. This hearing will examine the conduct of the cleanup, the manner by which the Postal Service determined the building was safe to reoccupy and how well the Postal Service communicated with its workers. Let me reemphasize that last point. Over the next few months, the Postal Service will be asking its employees to reenter the building where two of their colleagues were killed by an invisible airborne germ. It goes without saying that they're afraid. A partial cure for their fears is complete, open communication about the cleanup and about their options. Yesterday, we learned that a suspicious package found in the Greenville, SC Air Mail Facility was confirmed to contain ricin, a deadly plant toxin. Although it appears that no ricin escaped the package, the facility was shut down for environmental testing last night. This was a developing situation, so I don't expect to hear the full story in this hearing but how the Postal Service handles the situation in Greenville will certainly show how well they have learned the lessons of Brentwood. I am also certain that the news of the Greenville incident will weigh heavily on the minds of postal employees around the country in the coming days and weeks, so we need to be certain that appropriate time and resources are aimed at answering whatever questions or concerns they may have. We have two panels of witnesses today. On the first panel are Bernard Ungar, a frequent testifier here from the General Accounting Office, who has been examining the Postal Service's communication with its employees. We have Thomas Day, the Postal Service vice president of engineering, and Jerry Lane, the president of Capitol Metro Operations, both of whom have been intimately involved in every aspect of the cleanup and its reopening; Davis Layne from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and Theodore Gordon, of the District of Columbia Department of Health. OSHA and the D.C. Department of Health helped plan the cleanup and participated in the Environmental Clearance Committee, which reviewed the cleanup. On the second panel, we have Dick Collins of the National Postal Mail Handlers Union, and Myke Reid of the American Postal Workers Union. Together they represent most of the craft employees who will be returning to this facility. I want to thank everybody for coming, especially in light of the schedule change. In addition to these witnesses, the National Association of Letter Carriers and Councilman Vincent B. Orange of the District of Columbia were invited to testify but unfortunately couldn't attend today's hearing. Without objection, their written testimony will be included and placed in the record as Ms. Norton had requested. I also understand that Keith Rhodes and Jan Heinrich with GAO are to be here. We'll swear them in because we may be asking them questions. I'll now recognize the distinguished Delegate from the District of Columbia, Ms. Norton. [The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.001 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.002 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.003 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.004 Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Chairman Davis. When I approached Chairman Davis to ask about a hearing on the Curseen-Morris Postal Facility, formerly known as Brentwood, be held prior to its reopening, he readily agreed. My good friend Tom Davis has my sincere gratitude for today's hearing. This is the second conventional hearing on Curseen-Morris and the first full committee hearing since anthrax was discovered in the building, resulting in two tragic deaths and serious illness to two employees and subjecting other employees to a medical regimen, including the drug Cipro. Last year, I requested a field hearing concerning this facility. It was held July 26, 2002, to bring the Congress to the community and encourage attendance by residents and employees at a time when there was still uncertainty and rumors concerning health and safety matters. However, today's hearing is appropriately before the full committee and here in the Congress itself. Curseen-Morris is responsible for congressional mail and all mail to Federal buildings in this area, as well as mail to residents, businesses and others in this city and region. Moreover, despite the independence of the Postal Service, Congress has the ultimate responsibility to ensure that postal facilities here and around the Nation are not exposed to bioterrorism. I said at last year's hearing that before employees or the public returned to Curseen-Morris, I would request a hearing to investigate whether reentering a building where there had been two tragic deaths as well as illnesses to employees posed any risks. At that hearing, I asked the CDC to conduct an epidemiological or similar study to compare the health of workers from Brentwood with the health of workers who have never worked in an anthrax-contaminated facility. In addition, along with a Member of the Senate and a Member of the House who does not serve on this committee, I requested a GAO report on the anthrax episode from its origins to its effects. I say again that I believe in order to reassure employees, public officials should be the first to enter the buildings before employees are asked to return to work, and I am pleased that postal and union officials have said they want to be part of a reentry. The job of decontaminating a 632,000 square foot facility, where 2,400 employees worked has no precedent anywhere in the world of which I am aware. We have an obligation today to learn whether the Postal Service has done it right, to try to determine whether such an event could occur again, and to learn how to prevent any such reoccurrence here or elsewhere. The new proposed irradiation facility on the property also raises new issues that require explanation. Besides the paramount issue of safety and security for human beings in this virtually new facility, we will be interested to learn if the witnesses can lay to rest such matters as the invidious comparison some have made between the Hart and Brentwood cleanups and the delay in closing the facility. I hope that today's hearing will provide enough information to allow us to put behind us one of the most serious and tragic episodes in American workplace history. However, let us never forget Joseph Curseen, Jr., and Thomas Morris, Jr., the employees who died at the old Brentwood facility. In renaming the building for these dedicated employees and family men, both born and raised in the District, where the facility is located, we will be reminded of our obligation to make this and every other workplace in our city and our country safe from bioterrorism. I thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, and I welcome today's witnesses. [The prepared statement of Hon. Eleanor Holmes Norton follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.005 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.006 Chairman Tom Davis. Well, thank you very much. We will now move to our first panel. If you would rise with me, it is our custom to swear in witnesses. Raise your right hands. [Witnesses sworn.] Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. I think you know the rules of the committee. Your entire statement is in the record. We try to keep the testimony to 5 minutes. We have questions formed, Ms. Norton and I, in terms of what we want to ask you, but you can highlight that in the 5 minutes. When your light turns orange, it means 4 minutes are up and, when it turns red, 5 minutes. If you could start to summarize at that point and, Mr. Ungar, we'll start with you and we'll move right on down. STATEMENTS OF BERNARD L. UNGAR, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; KEITH RHODES, CHIEF TECHNOLOGIST, CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY AND ENGINEERING, APPLIED RESEARCH AND METHODS; JANET HEINRICH, DIRECTOR, HEALTH CARE AND PUBLIC HEALTH ISSUES; R. DAVIS LAYNE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; THOMAS DAY, VICE PRESIDENT OF ENGINEERING, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE; JERRY LANE, MANAGER OF CAPITAL METRO OPERATIONS, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE; AND THEODORE GORDON, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH Mr. Ungar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ms. Norton. We are certainly pleased to be here to assist the committee in looking at the reopening of the Curseen-Morris mail facility at Brentwood. As you indicated this morning, Mr. Chairman, I'm accompanied by Keith Rhodes and Janet Heinrich, who are experts in the various fields in our office related to this issue, and also by Jay Bryant and Jack Melling from GAO, who can help answer questions if you get into some real technical topics. The tragic events that unfolded in October 2001 at Brentwood were indeed unfortunate. A key lesson that was learned in that experience is that there is a high risk of the mail being used intentionally as a conduit for hazardous substances to cause harm, whether it is intended for a postal employee or someone outside the Postal Service. Accordingly the Postal Service, public health agencies, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and others must be prepared to manage and deal with this risk and to address these kinds of incidents when they occur. What I would like to do in my short summary this afternoon is just focus on one key area in which a significant lesson was learned, and that's in the area of communication with employees. This was a very problematic issue back in the fall of 2001, especially at the Brentwood facility. A lot of the information that was provided to the Brentwood employees changed over the course of time due to changing--largely due to changing public health knowledge of anthrax and its implications during that period of time. Unfortunately, much of the information that was given to Brentwood employees in October 2001 turned out to be, at least initially given to these employees, turned out to be incorrect. This incorrect information, along with what the employees at Brentwood would regard as a delay in the Postal Service's closing of the facility generated a considerable amount of employee distrust of management and concern. The problems at Brentwood obviously make it clear, at least the problems that occurred back in 2001, that accurate and clear information to employees is critical, now even more so than before. Unfortunately, recently, the Postal Service informed the employees who are likely to return to Brentwood that, on the one hand in a more fortunate sense, the facility is safe. It has been looked at. The decontamination effort has taken place, the various public health and other authorities have looked at the test results, assessed the decontamination and decided and determined after review of all that information that the facility is safe, and we certainly have no information to the contrary. On the other hand, unfortunately, the Postal Service also told employees that there is absolutely no risk in returning to the facility and that the facility is 100 percent free of anthrax contamination. According to the Postal Service, unfortunately, this was an inadvertent communication that had not fully been reviewed throughout the Postal Service, and the real dilemma here is that one cannot say, according to CDC and other authorities, that there is absolutely no risk in returning to the facility and that we can be 100 percent sure that there is no anthrax in the facility. While it's likely to be very little, if any, there and it's likely not to be a major or a significant risk, nonetheless, one cannot say that there is absolutely no risk. We have discussed this issue with the Postal Service, and it has agreed to very quickly and promptly provide corrected information to the employees who may return, and this is important because the Postal Service has given these employees a choice as to whether to return or go to a different facility, and it will obviously be important that they have full and correct information before they return. With that, Mr. Chairman and Ms. Norton, I would like to conclude my summary statement. [The prepared statement of Mr. Ungar follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.007 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.008 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.009 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.010 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.011 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.012 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.013 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.014 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.015 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.016 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.017 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.018 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.019 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.020 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.021 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.022 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.023 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.024 Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. Mr. Layne. Mr. Layne. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's leadership in protecting workers from anthrax exposure and our role in preparing for the reopening of the Curseen and Morris Processing and Distribution Center. OSHA's mission is to ensure safe and healthful working conditions for America's working men and women. Protecting workers from biohazards, such as anthrax, is a critical part of OSHA's role and the Nation's domestic preparedness and emergency response efforts. Now, under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, it is the employer's responsibility to protect the health and safety of its workers. In 1998, an amendment to the OSH Act broadened the definition of an employer to include the U.S. Postal Service. OSHA has been working alongside USPS since the investigation into the deaths at the facility from inhalation anthrax spores began. OSHA joined USPS at its Joint Command Center shortly after it was established to provide a unified approach to sampling tests and decontamination for all USPS facilities and to coordinate those sampling and subsequent response actions with key stakeholders. OSHA also provided technical support to the Incident Command Center established by the USPS for the Curseen and Morris Center decontamination. Members of OSHA's Health Response Team, with specialties ranging from analytical microbiology to building ventilation, had been onsite at various times throughout the last 2 years, advising the USPS. In fact, the USPS air sampling plan was developed with OSHA's assistance. Our staff reviewed safety and health plans and worked with the USPS and its contractors on training procedures for the use of personal protective equipment, such as respirators. In addition to technical support, OSHA even ensured that employers at the site were involved in the remediation effort to provide a workplace free of hazards to their employees by ensuring compliance with applicable OSHA standards. As final plans were made to fumigate the building with chlorine dioxide gas, OSHA joined the USPS at its Joint Information Center to enhance communications about the decontamination work. OSHA staff also made presentations at town hall meetings, reminding postal employees of their right to file complaints about Brentwood's unsafe or unhealthy working conditions directly with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Following the decontamination in March 2003, OSHA sent a letter to the Incident Commander at the Curseen and Morris Center, expressing the agency's concurrence with the conclusion of USPS safety and health staff that remedial efforts had successfully eliminated any significant risk of anthrax disease for its occupants of this building, thus allowing workers to enter the building without respiratory protection for most of the activities. These conclusions were based upon sampling results and analysis, as well as assessment of safety and health plans formed by OSHA's certified industrial hygienists. As postal employees return to Curseen and Morris, OSHA will continue to respond to any safety and health complaints filed by its employees, as well as to requests from USPS and its contractors. The agency is also prepared to investigate accidents or any other hazardous situation that occurs at the facility. We also have broadened our outreach and informational activities to help employers and workers address threats of biological and chemical hazards. We developed and continued to refine sampling methods for detecting anthrax spores in the air and on large surfaces such as floors and walls. We created a Web-based ``e-tool'' that provides training and information about anthrax and also increased our expertise in dealing with threats and other incidents of national significance. We will soon complete our own national emergency management plan for OSHA's national and regional office personnel as well. Since September 11, 2001, we have become aware of new threats to workers' lives from acts of terrorism and the use of biotoxins as weapons of mass destruction. OSHA is continually evaluating and making changes to its programs to respond to this new threat. Postal workers have been on the front line in this war against terrorism and it is our responsibility to provide all the help that we can in protecting their lives. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Layne follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.025 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.026 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.027 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.028 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.029 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.030 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.031 Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. Mr. Day. Mr. Day. Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you today about the Postal Service's planned reentry into the Curseen- Morris Processing and Distribution Center here in Washington, DC. With me today is Jerry Lane, the manager of Capital Metro Operations. I believe today's hearing is a reflection of your commitment both as individuals and as a committee to the cooperative process that will return this facility to safe and productive use for our employees and for the Brentwood community. It has been a challenging 2 years, but we have achieved our goal, the successful decontamination of the Curseen-Morris facility. While we are pleased we have come this far, we cannot forget the awful events that set this process in motion. Joseph Curseen, Jr. and Thomas Morris, Jr. tragically lost their lives. Many others suffered terribly when they became infected with anthrax. They will never be far from our minds, and that is why the planning processes and technology that we relied upon to decontaminate the Curseen-Morris facility could only be the best and it had to be done right. It became apparent very quickly that we would be writing the book on this subject, and it was a book on a grand scale, a scale of 17 million cubic feet to be precise, but we had a great deal of help from experts in the military, government and private sector. Our partners included the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, District of Columbia Department of Health, U.S. Environment Protection Agency, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, as well as our three contractors, Ashland, Sabre, and Shaw. Of course, the generous help of Congress and the administration in making $762 million available to the Postal Service to respond to the anthrax attack was also a critical part of the success. The process of reclaiming the Curseen-Morris facility actually began on October 21, 2001, when it was closed. While our primary focus was the safety of our employees, we also had to address operational issues such as the disposition of the 1 million pieces of mail that remained at the building. We arranged for the irradiation of this mail at contractor sites in Ohio and later New Jersey before it was returned to Washington for processing and delivery. Once the mail was removed from the building, we completely sealed it and developed a thorough decontamination plan. Qualified contractors began cleaning known contaminated surfaces in the building. Pumping and mixing stations were constructed for the chlorine dioxide that would be used for the decontamination. Scrubbers were used to remove the chlorine from the building and backup systems were put in place. We tested every element of our gas manufacturing, delivery, and scrubber system to ensure they operated properly. Safety was the watchword. An expert Environmental Clearance Committee was formed in July 2002 to provide an independent evaluation of our cleanup and testing efforts to determine if we could ultimately reoccupy the building. That decision would not be made by the Postal Service. Committee members included representatives--and I want to go through the list because they were of great help to us, although there are several to mention here--but they included the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner of the District of Columbia, The Centers' for Disease Control and Prevention National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, the U.S. Army Center for Health, Protection, and Preventive Medicine, the Occupational Health and Safety Administration, the District of Columbia Department of Health, the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, and the University of Minnesota School of Public Health all participated as ECC members. On December 14, 2002, fumigation began. We established and maintained a temperature of 75 degrees Fahrenheit and a relative humidity of 75 percent within the building. This was necessary so any anthrax spores would be receptive to the neutralizing ability of the chlorine dioxide gas. Chlorine dioxide was then pumped into the building until we reached a concentration of 750 parts per million, and we maintained that concentration level for 12 hours. Afterwards, sampling results confirmed that the fumigation process was successful. We used more than 6,000 surrogate spore strips to ensure that the chlorine dioxide permeated the facility. All of the surface samples and aggressive air samples showed no growth. By February 26, 2003, members of the Environmental Clearance Committee were able to enter the building without personal protective equipment and agreed, ``The fumigation of the Curseen-Morris facility met the criterion that the U.S. Postal Service and the District of Columbia established for a successful fumigation effort.'' That standard was no spore growth. On May 30, 2003, the ECC concluded the fumigation was successful and we began restoring the building. The restoration is now near completion. More than 600 tons of debris has been removed. The entire facility has been cleaned and painted, the medical unit replaced, restrooms rebuilt, electrical and telecommunications wiring replaced, cafeteria kitchen renovated, mail processing equipment renovated and rebuilt, ceiling tiles replaced, employee lockers installed, safety and emergency systems modernized, repaired or replaced, heating ventilation and air conditioning systems upgraded, the retail area and the office space has been modernized. And finally, I would note, Delivery Bar Code Sorter #17, the machine that processed the letters for Senators Daschle and Leahy, the most contaminated spot in the building, no longer exists. It was dismantled, removed, and shredded. We assigned a full-time safety professional to the facility to ensure a safe and healthy working environment for our employees and contractors renovating the facility and, in conjunction with OSHA, we implemented an aggressive post- fumigation, transitional sampling program with particular attention to many areas that were disturbed by construction. More than 1,000 wet-wipe surface samples have been taken, dried filter units located throughout the building have been sampling air around construction areas, and that sampling also includes the use of high-efficiency, particulate air filters. Every sample has tested negative for anthrax. These test results are made available to employees every day. We will continue testing when operations resume at the facility, using air sampling in mail processing areas. A sophisticated sampling system will provide rapid onsite DNA analysis of air samples. If Baccillus anthracis is detected, the building will be evacuated, local health and public safety officials alerted, so we can quickly take appropriate action to protect those employees who may have been inside. I'd also note, given the events of the last day or so in Greenville, SC, we have a well-established nationwide process for dealing with suspicious mail. Last Wednesday, an employee at the Greenville, SC Airmail Facility Annex did what she had been trained to do: she recognized a letter that looked suspicious; she notified her supervisor. The letter was isolated and contained. Local officials were contacted, as well as the FBI. The HAZMAT team responded and removed the suspicious letter from the building. When we were contacted by the CDC and the FBI to let us know that they in fact found ricin through their testing, we then took the next steps for 24 hours to close the facility, bring in medical officials to speak with all those employees that would be at the facility. I would point out that the entire process is a demonstration of how seriously we take these matters and how well the process can work when employees are trained and know what to look for. Right now, mail for delivery to Federal Government offices in the District of Columbia continues to be irradiated. Last week, we announced a proposal to locate a mail irradiation facility in Washington. The preferred site is on the property of the Curseen-Morris Processing Center. A local facility would reduce costs, improve delivery time and minimize logistic and security requirements. We will work closely with the community and its elected representatives as we develop this proposal. I am pleased to report that on September 19, the Environmental Clearance Committee concluded, ``. . . the remediation was successful, that rigorous sampling was unable to find any residual viable spores, that workers can safely return and that normal service to the public can safely resume.'' I certainly welcome this finding. Mr. Chairman, as we prepare to restore operations to the Curseen-Morris Processing and Distribution Center, our memory of those days guides what we do today. We will continue our efforts to explore the latest technology and process solutions to protect our employees, our customers and the mail. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your time and interest in learning more about our efforts to reenter the Curseen-Morris facility and would be pleased to answer your questions. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Day follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.032 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.033 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.034 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.035 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.036 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.037 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.038 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.039 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.040 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.041 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.042 Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. Mr. Lane. Mr. Lane. Good afternoon, Chairman Davis and members of the committee. Chairman Tom Davis. Your microphone I don't think is on.You have a button there. There we go. Mr. Lane. I'll try it again. Good afternoon, Chairman Davis and members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to speak with you today about the efforts of the Joseph Curseen, Jr. and Thomas Morris, Jr. Processing and Distribution Center. In October 2001, the U.S. Postal Service, its employees, and its customers, became victims of a series of unprecedented and insidious acts of bioterrorism. As a result, the Curseen- Morris facility has been closed since October 21, 2001. This facility is a major mail processing and distribution center for the Washington, DC, area. Despite losing their primary mail processing center, Capital District employees continue to provide mail service to the residents of the Washington, DC, area, at among the best service levels ever. At the time the facility was closed, I was the Capital District manager. My office was in the Brentwood Road facility, so I understand anxiety and uncertainty and the concern that these attacks caused my employees. These are my coworkers. Their safety and health and the public's safety has been and will continue to be our paramount concern. We also worked closely with the Centers for Disease Control and the District of Columbia Department of Health to assist their efforts to provide medication to all employees. During the weeks following the anthrax attacks, public health officials were uncertain about the extent of the exposure and risk, so we supplied our employees with protective masks and gloves. We worked very hard to reduce the impact of the facility's closing on our employees. We quickly moved operations to alternative locations. Employees were struggling with new routines for getting to work, so we provided no-cost transportation to bring employees to these locations for the first 3 months. We continue to reimburse employees who drive beyond their normal route or who take public transportation to get to these temporary locations. We understood that communications was key. We made a point of communicating actively and cooperatively with everyone in every way involved, including the District of Columbia Government, our employees, their unions, and local residents and businesses. We participated in numerous town hall employee meetings, sent out community-wide mail links, provided toll- free numbers for additional information, posted current information on the USPS Web site, and held weekly coordinated information sessions. Those employees who returned to work at the Curseen-Morris Processing and Distribution Center we offered a fit test for a mask. The use of these masks is strictly voluntary. We understand that some employees may prefer the added sense of security they provide. We established an extensive communication plan to ensure that all employees are aware of all aspects of the cleanup and aftermath of the Curseen Processing Distribution Center. As part of the communication plan, we had been providing our maintenance employees who had returned to the facility with daily safety talks, daily sampling reports, and employee publications on specific information about the process. There was also an open door policy with an onsite safety professional for any safety and health concerns that employees have voiced or immediately addressed. There has been a lot of information out there, and we want our employees to know what we know, when we know it, so the communication plan also established communication facilitators at all locations on all shifts who are responsible for disseminating stand-up talks, gathering questions, and maintaining the Curseen-Morris update bulletin boards. But sometimes employees want to ask questions of the experts, so we have had a number of employee town hall meetings as well. Our communication plan also included many other ways of providing employees with timely and accurate information. We provide right-to-know forms at the time clocks. Employees can mail the forms in and receive prompt replies to their questions. We established an 800 number where calls are returned within the next business day. A special number was also established for deaf and hard-of-hearing employees. We have held biweekly telecoms with all unions to keep them informed of the progress on the facility. We have given local unions two private tours of the facility to show them the progress of the restoration. As Tom Day mentioned, the restoration of the building includes a new medical facility which will have a 24-hour doctor and nurse available. We have held a number of focus groups with employees to discuss their concerns and anxiety about returning, and we will continue to have employee assistance counseling programs available to monitor employee's stress and anxiety. We will also be providing briefings, training, and publications on employee stress as we reoccupy the facility. We'll work closely with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to develop a site-specific health and safety plan designed to ensure our employees' safety at the facility throughout the restoration and reconstruction. We have established a multifunctional team, including private sector expertise, to implement a human resource plan. This plan would ensure that all Curseen-Morris employees are provided with the information, tools and training they need to feel safe and be productive when they return. With this in mind, we have agreed with our national unions to accommodate all requests for permanent reassignment to other facilities. Our schedule calls for the administrative staff to return to work in late November. We anticipate retail and limited mail processing operations to follow within weeks. At the end of the day, we want this facility to be the best, the safest, and the finest representation of the men and women who worked there for so many years. A reentry committee, with employee and union representation, is planning a reentry ceremony which will also serve to dedicate the building in honor of Joseph Curseen, Jr. and Thomas Morris, Jr. We recognize this facility's importance to the local community. Now that the Environmental Committee has concluded that the fumigation was successful and employees can safely return, we look forward to reopening the facility and restoring it to its critical role of serving the people of Washington, DC, and the Nation. Thank you, Chairman Davis and the committee, and I'll be happy to respond to any questions. Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Lane follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.043 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.044 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.045 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.046 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.047 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.048 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.049 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.050 Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Gordon. Mr. Gordon. Good afternoon, Chairman Davis, and Honorable Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton. My name is Theodore Gordon. I'm the senior deputy director for environmental health science and regulation for the District of Columbia Department of Health. On behalf of Mayor Anthony Williams and Mr. James Buford, the director of the Department of Health, we appreciate the opportunity to present testimony on the reopening of the U.S. Postal Service's Joseph Curseen, Jr. and Thomas Morris, Jr. Mail Processing Distribution Center, formerly known as Brentwood. With me today are key staff involved in the decontamination and reoccupation of the Curseen-Morris facility. As has been previously noted, in October 2001, letters containing anthrax spores sent to the Hart Senate Office Building also contaminated this postal facility. Mr. Chairman, the Department of Health has collaborated since October 21, 2001 to carry out the process of decontamination of the Curseen-Morris facility. Our comments will focus on providing an update of the role of the Department of Health in the decontamination of this facility. As you know, this is the largest chlorine dioxide fumigation process undertaken in the country. The process has three steps. The first step is prefumigation planning, the second step is chlorine dioxide fumigation of the facility, and the third step is postfumigation and cleaning and reoccupancy. Very early in the process, we at the Department of Health assembled the Brentwood Scientific Advisory Committee and charged it with assessing whether the work done at the facility was done according to applicable Federal and District of Columbia regulations and science. This included specialists in the fields of microbiology, engineering, medicine, epidemiology, toxicology, and environmental health. The committee included members of the postal union and community members from ward 5, where the facility is located. The Honorable Vincent Orange, Sr., councilmember for ward 5, council of the District of Columbia, also served as a member of this committee. The Department of Health contributed to each of the ward 5 community meetings convened by the U.S. Postal Service and participated in each postal worker technical information meeting. The Brentwood Scientific Committee provided advice to the Postal Service, with a strong commitment to reduce the risk of decontamination at the facility and to ensure the safety of the public. The major technical issues of concern to the Department of Health from the beginning are, one, effectiveness of the decontamination; two, the proper chlorine dioxide dosage; three, the postfumigation sampling protocols; and, four, shutdown authority and reoccupancy clearance. In this regard, we have collaborated with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, EPA, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Armed Forces Radiobiology Institute to review the results from the following: the Sampling and Analysis Plan; the wall cavity sampling demonstration plan; the ambient air monitoring plan; the line 17 fumigation remedial action plan; the negative pressure plan testing plan; the scrubber tests, including carbon bed test; and the remedial action plan. The Department reviewed and advised the Postal Service on the air dispersion modeling plan and issued several permits for testing and operation of boilers, air handling units, and negative air pressure systems. We were onsite during all phases of the fumigation with the Environmental Protection Agency to monitor the air in the surrounding neighborhoods. In order to provide an independent evaluation to cleanup and testing efforts undertaken by the Postal Service in the Curseen-Morris Processing and Distribution Center in July 2002, the Department of Health agreed to partner with the Postal Service and experts from CDC, EPA, NIOSH, OSHA, and the American Armed Forces Radiobiology Institute, in establishing the Environmental Clearance Committee. The goal of the ECC has been to evaluate results for remediation to ultimately provide a recommendation for reoccupancy. I might point out that the D.C. Department of Health set a clearance standard at the onset before this entire process of non-detection. There was no anthrax prior to October 2001 and we will not permit anyone to occupy this building if we find any results of anthrax through our testing process. We have been successful in achieving that objective. The ECC consists of experts from the various technical disciplines representing a variety of Federal and local agencies and academia. A representative from the Department of Health and the Environmental Protection Agency served as co- chairpersons for the ECC. Their deliberations have involved a number of steps and stages, numerous meetings, technical briefings, consultations, recommendations, and subgroup reviews that have been used to evaluate technical issues. The ECC members also visited the facility for a walk-through on February 26 and September 5, 2003. In closing, the Department of Health believes that the science and technology available has been used to identify and kill active, live anthrax spores at the Curseen-Morris facility. The Department remains steadfast in its commitment that the facility is safe for reoccupancy. We recommend reoccupancy of this building, and that the risk is absolutely minimum. Thank you for the opportunity to come before you and discuss this important effort. We'd be happy to answer any questions. Thank you. Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.051 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.052 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.053 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.054 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.055 Chairman Tom Davis. I gather from the testimony that everybody feels comfortable about the new building, but nobody can say it's 100 percent safe; is that fair? Anybody want to raise their hand and say it's 100 percent safe? OK. Have all of you been through the building? Have all of you been through the building? Mr. Day. I've been in the building. Chairman Tom Davis. Ms. Norton and I would like to go through the building before it opens and we'd like you all to join us. We need to feel it's safe. I would like to see the facility anyway, it's a tremendous effort, and we'd like you to join us next week in doing that. Before I get to the cleanup of the building, I want to ask--I'm not sure who to address this to--but my understanding is this goes to yesterday's incident in South Carolina. My understanding is that the envelope that was found to contain ricin was indeed labeled ``ricin'' on the exterior; is that correct? Does anyone know? Mr. Day. I can speak to what I know, Mr. Chairman. The letter was addressed, as I understand, to DOT. It pertains to a dissatisfaction with some recent rules that DOT has passed in regards---- Chairman Tom Davis. Right, I understand. Possibly it was a disgruntled worker or something. Mr. Day. And it was labeled that way and indicated it was ricin as a content, as part of the threat. Chairman Tom Davis. And it gets that. But the facility wasn't immediately closed upon it being labeled ``ricin'' was it? Mr. Day. No, it was not. Chairman Tom Davis. Now, if someone had called in and said, ``there's a bomb threat,'' would the facility have been closed immediately or would we have stopped and looked at it? Mr. Day. We have different procedures, depending upon the threat. Just to give you some frame of reference, we've had over 20,000 suspicious substance incidents in the Postal Service over the course of the last 2 years, so better than 30 incidents per day on average, so quite---- Chairman Tom Davis. You would never get the mail out if you had to stop. Mr. Day. The protocol does not call for a shutdown. It does call for an isolation of the suspicious item and then the notification of local officials, which was done in this case. Chairman Tom Davis. OK. How much did the cleanup of the Curseen-Morris facility cost? Mr. Day. Mr. Chairman, we don't have a final number to date, and this also involves the testing, the cleanup, and the refurbishment. I would put the estimates in the $120 to $130 million price range. Chairman Tom Davis. Now, how much did Congress appropriate extra for that, do you know? Mr. Day. It was part of a total appropriation. We received the $762 million in three pieces. There was an additional $175 million that the President provided to the Postal Service as an immediate response to the anthrax attack, which was quite quickly spent on testing, masks, gloves, all of that. So the $175 millioin went rather quickly in the initial response in the fall of 2001. The additional appropriation came in two parts, an initial $500 million, followed by a supplemental for an $87 million appropriation. The cleanup costs were embedded in that total of $587 million. We were required by Congress to develop an emergency preparedness plan and gave our cost estimates as to what the $587 million would be spent on. Those cost estimates have changed dramatically since the plan was first submitted in March 2002. We updated it recently and we'll update it again. Chairman Tom Davis. I mean, one of the concerns in this committee is the Postal Service basically has its own enterprise fund, and we'd like to keep it that way. Obviously, for incidents like this, it shouldn't be the ratepayers. It is a terrorism threat and it ought to come from the general fund, and we would be interested in looking at this and seeing if we are putting this cost back on ratepayers or if this is general government. And we have these arguments all the time. Mr. Day. Mr. Chairman, we concur. We believe this is a unique circumstance that should not be borne by the ratepayer; that is, a response to a terrorist action is much more of a national issue than a specific Postal Service ratepayer issue. And in fact we have an appropriations request for the fiscal year 2005 budget to help us to complete the full deployment of the technology to provide protection to employees and customers. Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. Let me ask a question of GAO. In your opinion, what's the most important thing the Postal Service needs to do to respond effectively to an emergency like this? Mr. Ungar. Well, first of all, to take the appropriate action to close the facility or evacuate the facility if that's what is appropriate under the circumstances, to notify appropriate authorities, and at the same time communicate with employees, making sure that it provides clear and accurate information, the best that it can. Chairman Tom Davis. Do you think communication has improved between the employees and the Postal Service as a result of this? Mr. Ungar. Mr. Chairman, yes, it seems to have improved based on what we have seen. I think a number of lessons were learned back in 2001. I think this most recent example I mentioned in my summary statement would indicate there's the opportunity for continuous improvement and being particularly careful in communications with the employees who are slated to return to Brentwood to recognize the sensitivities of what happened in 2001. Chairman Tom Davis. Let me ask our OSHA rep, is there any health risk associated with long-term exposure to any residue of agents used in the decontamination piece of this? Mr. Layne. Mr. Chairman, you're talking about the chlorine dioxide exposure? There is nothing there that is recognized that should be a concern to the employees. Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Mr. Gordon, has the District of Columbia been reimbursed for the costs that you incurred during the cleanup of the facility? Mr. Gordon. Not to my knowledge, Chairman Davis. Certainly, it's not just the Department of Health, it is the police department and other agencies that participated in this process. We were providing that information to Doctor Ghandi so that he can provide an adequate listing to the Postal Service. Chairman Tom Davis. If you could get that to Ms. Norton and to me at the committee, we would be very grateful for that. Mr. Gordon. Very good. [The information referred to follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.056 Chairman Tom Davis. There shouldn't be a cost, I think Ms. Norton agrees with me, a cost to the city in a case like this. Has your Department's response to biohazards changed since the anthrax? Mr. Gordon. Oh, certainly. I mean, since the whole anthrax event. As you know, we've not only been involved in the decontamination, but we provided the antibiotic therapy for approximately 17,000 people, the majority of which were from the postal facility. Our response in dealing with these kinds of circumstances has changed dramatically and certainly this has been a best management practice for us as we move forward. As Tom Day indicated, we have kind of written the book on this. Let me say this: the collaboration which existed between these Federal agencies I think is unique in history. We came together, we clearly defined the problem, and we focused on resolving that problem in what I would characterize as a superlative manner. I'm not saying this is a rubber stamp, but I'm saying the scientists and the engineers came together and we focused and we worked hard to do and apply the science in this country, and I think that is what we achieved. Chairman Tom Davis. Has there ever in history been an issue before where anthrax was sent through the mail? Mr. Gordon. Not to my knowledge, no. Chairman Tom Davis. Anyone? So you really live and learn, basically. OK. Let me ask the Postal Service, can the equipment that you're planning to install now detect hazards other than anthrax? Would it detect ricin, for example? Mr. Day. Mr. Chairman, it can detect other biological hazards. The system that we worked to develop with our suppliers is capable of multiple threat detection. It obviously was developed initially for anthrax, but it is capable, and we are working toward multiple threat detection. Ricin is not a biohazard. It is actually a toxin. It's actually a protein. If there is residual DNA content from the castor bean from which it is produced from, you can sample for that DNA content. However, a purified form of ricin, which is truly where the threat comes from, is not detectable by this kind of PCR-based DNA analysis. Chairman Tom Davis. Now, we're going to hear testimony later from the American Postal Workers Union that the biohazard detection equipment you're planning to install is not going to be used on presorted mail. I guess because pre- sorted mail has an identifiable sender, terrorists would generally be deterred from using it. Is that the rationale, in terms of costs and cost benefits? Mr. Day. Mr. Chairman, as part of our emergency preparedness plan there is a vulnerability threat and consequence management assessment we perform. That's a classified document, so we have not put it in the public domain. We went through and assessed 162 scenarios, and when you go back and look at biological threats such as anthrax, presorted mail, mail produced in bulk quantity, while not impossible to contaminate, is highly improbable and an impracticable vector for attack. It would be virtually impossible to do a targeted attack, and the method by which you would do it would likely contaminate the facility where the mail was produced and affect those employees. And you also have the issue that you already pointed out of a known shipper. So there are a number of reasons why, although possible, that is not a very practicable way to do it. Chairman Tom Davis. Thanks. I also understand that the employees have asked for medical and mental health professionals to be onsite when employees return. Does the Postal Service have a position on that request? Mr. Lane. Yes. Yes, Chairman. In fact, we have plans to have 24-hour doctors and nurses available to them. Chairman Tom Davis. Onsite, or just available? Mr. Lane. Onsite. Chairman Tom Davis. OK. What kind of training do employees receive for responding to an emergency like a bioterrorist attack? Obviously, when you look at this incident you have to refocus your orientation and your training. Are they getting additional training, now? Mr. Day. Nationwide, yes. We have defined protocols. We have always had hazardous material response teams, typically from within our maintenance crafts of employees that have been available to deal with this, particularly at our processing centers, but there's been an increased focus on what to look for in suspicious mail items. And again I would point out, with over 20,000 reported incidents over the last 2 years, we obviously have employees who have been trained to and do pay attention. Again, the most recent incident that was reported in the media yesterday was the direct result of an employee who was paying attention and did the right thing. Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. Those are my questions. Ms. Norton. Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Chairman Davis. We really need more information about how you would handle a contaminated item that wasn't labeled. We congratulate you on dealing, apparently expeditiously, with ricin. It certainly helps restore our confidence. But, of course, it says ``ricin'' right on the label; so it's not hard to detect by the Postal Service, when obviously someone was trying to let you know that it was something dangerous, and you had to see if it was dangerous at all, and you found out it was dangerous. Suppose the ricin had not been labeled. How would it ever have been detected? Mr. Day. Let me first point out that, again, with the number of incidents we have had, the overwhelming majority are not because it's labeled as anthrax, ricin, or anything else. Ms. Norton. Have you found ricin before? Mr. Day. No, we have not. The fact is that our employees have been trained on some of the specific things to look for on what might be suspicious. Ms. Norton. Have they been trained to look for ricin? Mr. Day. They're trained to look for suspicious things coming out of the envelope or mail piece and what the characteristics might be. Ms. Norton. Did this come out of the envelope? Mr. Day. Excuse me? Ms. Norton. Did the ricin come out of the envelope? Mr. Day. No. I would tell you that if it wasn't labeled, other than the fact that it didn't have postage on it--which obviously would have brought our attention to it--and the way it potentially was addressed, there was nothing about the way it was made up or anything spilling out of it that would've brought it to our attention. Ms. Norton. If it had continued as an envelope, at first the Postal Service and the CDC thought that anthrax couldn't come through the envelope, and of course the facility wasn't shut down. Can ricin come through the envelope? And, if it does, what happens? Mr. Day. Ricin is one of the---- Ms. Norton. Maybe I should ask Mr. Gordon as well to chime in here. Mr. Day. I can just tell you from our threat assessment ricin is possible, but it is viewed as one of the impractical means to be sent through the mail. But it is possible. Ms. Norton. Well, it was sent through the mail this time, Mr. Day, so I'm not talking Brentwood as a hypothetical here. Mr. Gordon. Congresswoman Norton, it is possible, but it is very improbable that you would have the same type of dispersion and distribution that you would have with anthrax spores. Ms. Norton. Suppose some came through an envelope? Could it harm an individual? I mean, can you inhale it? I'm just trying to find out what the threat is there when you don't know what the substance is. Mr. Gordon. I think through an envelope the risk is much more minimal. Ms. Norton. Than with anthrax? Mr. Gordon. Absolutely. Ms. Norton. How does it poison people? What are its symptoms? What does it do to you? Mr. Gordon. It's a protein process. It can affect the central nervous system, it can affect the lungs, it can cause cardiopulmonary distress on someone who may have some clinical problems. Ms. Norton. So normally would you breathe it or would it have to get on your body? Mr. Gordon. You could breathe it and/or skin absorption. There are three pathways: inhalation, skin absorption, and ingestion. Those are the three pathways from which it could cause problems. Ms. Norton. But you think pretty much it would have to get out of the envelope? Mr. Gordon. Yes and you'd have to have what we characterize as a substantial bioload and exposure, like we did with anthrax, and I don't think you have ricin as the type of substance that has the same dispersion capability as anthrax. Ms. Norton. Mr. Gordon, who has anthrax? Who has access to ricin in this country? Mr. Gordon. Who? Ms. Norton. I mean, do laboratories have it? Is it a prohibited substance so it's hard to get ahold of? Is it easy to get ahold of? Mr. Day. Congresswoman Norton, from what I understand, ricin is produced from the castor bean. The technology required to refine the ricin from the castor bean is not overly sophisticated. However, getting it into a weaponized form is a bit more of a challenge, so it is not a controlled substance. It is something which a person with a level of knowledge, not overly sophisticated, could produce from a castor bean. Ms. Norton. I suppose now that we've had this tragic episode involving anthrax there are all kinds of precautions that have been taken here. But, very frankly, the President and Congress and Federal officials now are perhaps as much concerned about substances that haven't yet come into the mails. We are concerned about bioterrorism. So I've got to ask you about other toxins and chemicals and things like--you know, we got the bejesus scared out of us about smallpox until we found that it perhaps caused more harm than not to try to vaccinate everybody. But I would like to ask you about other substances that may come through the mail and whether the--quite apart from anthrax, whether you're prepared for other substances that may come in the mail, just as ricin has come through the mail just this week. So what in the world--how are you prepared? Mr. Gordon. I'd like to just give some clarity to your earlier question and give you some additional information. Ricin is a chemical. It is not a bacteria. Anthrax is a bacteria which is microscopic and went through the envelope itself because of its porousness. Ricin is a chemical compound that is derived through various methods, very rudimentary, as Tom Day has indicated. You would have to have a substantial amount of this chemical for someone either to inhale or ingest in order to become a major risk factor. Ms. Norton. So more than anthrax. Mr. Gordon. Substantially more than anthrax. There are no bioloads, Congresswoman Norton, for anthrax. In other words, one of the difficulties and challenges that we had and why we set a nondetect level for Brentwood is, there is no exposure dose ratio set in the United States for anthrax. A person who may be exposed to 1 or 10 spores can contract the disease versus 100 spores. So, therefore, the standard of nondetect is what is important. Ms. Norton. Mr. Day, you're aware that a woman who--an employee who worked within feet of one of the employees who died found a suspicious letter that had powder in it, came to supervisors and spoke about it. It turned out to be false positive, but she was turned back. I want to know, if somebody came with such a letter today-- I mean, she's very fortunate it wasn't that, because she knew somebody was ill; and there are all kinds of concerns that were raised that there were some supervisors who reprimanded employees when the numbers went down immediately following the incident, but nothing has been found. People were reassured to go back to work, get your work done. I want to know what happens when somebody comes with maybe a false positive and says, ``this envelope looks to me like it could contain something.'' And we know that the chances are, you know, 99.9 percent perhaps that it won't, but I want to know what if she has in hand something, what the Postal Service says to that employee. You and Mr. Lane tell me, whoever is in the best position to tell me what your regulations now tell me should happen. Mr. Day. We have a defined process and procedure on how to handle such an event. First of all, I would point out the first part, that we have told employees and hopefully they will follow, is that they wouldn't have it in their hand. Ms. Norton. So what would they do? Mr. Day. If they have a mail piece that is suspicious or has powdery substances coming out of it, they are to identify where it is and notify a supervisor or manager. Ms. Norton. Now is this training that has now been given in Brentwood and to postal employees throughout the United States what you're just telling me? Mr. Day. That training has been provided over the course of well over a year. The process has been defined, employees have been trained. Ms. Norton. So ``don't touch it'' is what they're told. Mr. Day. ``Do not touch. Notify, isolate and notify local authorities.'' The Postal Inspection Service becomes involved as well as local officials. Again, we have had over 20,000 incidents Postal Service- wide in the course of the last 2 years. We've experienced some level of facility shutdown as we've dealt with suspicious items. Ms. Norton. Thank you very much. Now I'm concerned about information that is beginning to emerge about the slow close-down, the delayed close-down; and, of course, the Postal Service has said, well, you know, ``the CDC made me do it.'' Would you rely on the CDC today? You know, ``we went to the scientists, and they said it wasn't necessary,'' is what we were told over and over again. Would you rely on the CDC today or would you close down a facility even without CDC or other scientific affirmation? Mr. Day. Congresswoman, we must rely upon public health and medical experts. The example of the Greenville, SC, situation-- I, along with other senior managers in the Postal Service, were involved in telephone conversations with Homeland Security, the CDC and the FBI. We jointly made that decision. We must---- Ms. Norton. Did they look at the substance first? Mr. Day. Excuse me? Ms. Norton. Did they test the substance first? Mr. Day. They came to us and let us know that they had trace amounts of ricin. We then had a discussion about--as they indicated to us, they found the trace amounts, but the vial was sealed. We had a discussion about what was prudent to do. Ms. Norton. So, you know, once again they said, ``look, you know, it's sealed. We haven't had time to test it.'' But---- Mr. Day. We jointly reached the conclusion that we needed to close the facility, get public health people there talking to employees and test the facility. Ms. Norton. How soon after the discovery was the facility closed? Mr. Day. The discovery, we found it last week. CDC came back to us with the positive results in the last 24 hours. That's when we reacted, when we had a result. Ms. Norton. So you found it last week. You didn't know--of course, they said it was ricin. Last week on what day? Mr. Day. It was last Wednesday, the 15th, I believe. Ms. Norton. And it was closed down when? Mr. Day. We closed it down yesterday. So a week. But right the same day that we were notified that we had some result that indicated there was a problem, up to that point it had been removed from the facility, and nothing had been indicated. It was just like many other incidents we had. Ms. Norton. So you waited until it was tested? Is that why you waited that long? Mr. Day. You have to. You have to get a result to understand what you've got. Ms. Norton. Well, that's exactly what the CDC said. Look, you know, I'm concerned. That concerns me. The thing said ``ricin.'' I could understand if you had an unidentified envelope. The thing said ``ricin.'' It could have been a prank, but what is this almost a week that you waited to close down the facility? I mean, that's of some concern. I don't know if there's overdependence on scientific experts as there was in CDC--as there was a dependence on CDC or what. But let me--you seem to have--and I think I am going to ask you to look far more closely at what you do, particularly if you have a labeled matter. Now I don't want to indicate that every labeled matter--but, apparently, even in your conversations they told you there was residue. There appeared to be residue there, and you didn't close it. Oh, that didn't happen until a week later. Mr. Day. We found out yesterday what they had sampled. We had nothing prior to that. Ms. Norton. Except the label. Mr. Day. Just--and, unfortunately, Congresswoman, we get things sent through the mail that have any number of anonymous hoaxes written on them. That, unfortunately, is too commonplace. Ms. Norton. OK. Mr. Day, I'm going to assume from what I heard from Dr. Gordon that what is generally known about ricin would mean that knowing only that this was labeled ricin, knowing what at least he informs us about the nature of ricin and its ability to contaminate far less than anthrax, that may have been a reasonable decision not to shut down for that period of time. I'm really not trying at all to show you didn't do the right thing. I am trying to be reassured and to reassure members of the public and the employees that we are today using the best we have. Now I have a question about your own policies and regulations. Four days after the anthrax letter was opened on Capitol Hill--and the date I'm looking at is October 19, 2001-- the Postal Service apparently issued a policy, a written policy. As I am informed, it stated that the discovery of a suspicious or unopened envelope should trigger the shutdown of equipment and evacuation, cordoning off the area. That's what your own regulation said. Now you were aware that the Daschle letter had passed through that facility on October 15th, so responding by the 19th you had new regulations. That's very good. That's a quick response in writing. However, the facility itself was not shut down. In fact, it was kept running 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and there were 2,000 employees in that building, approximately. To me, this says you weren't following your own regulations, despite the fact that a letter had been found here and everybody knew that letter went through Brentwood. I want to know, in light of that, in light of your own written response, why there was a delay in shutting down that facility, given what you knew about that letter, that Daschle letter on Capitol Hill. Mr. Day. Yes, ma'am. Let me just clarify. What we put out on October 19--and I don't specifically remember that date or what was issued that day, but I can tell you there were existing policies in the Postal Service, something which I specifically remember. Because a year and a half prior, as a district manager in southeast New England, we had gone through a simulation of an anthrax event. Ms. Norton. So you had existing policies plus a new policy. The one I'm interested in is the one that says, ``shut down the place; cordon off the area.'' Mr. Day. But let me be clear on what the policy was and what we knew on how this worked. On October 19, the examination policy and the clarification spoke to shutting down the facility where the letter was found. The concept of a trail of contamination was not known on the 19th. The letter in question, the Daschle letter, was in the Hart building, which was shut down; that's in full conformance. We didn't have the concept--history now tells us much differently, and our policies have changed to reflect that, but what we didn't know on the 19th was that there was a trail of contamination that went back upstream. Ms. Norton. Well, wait a minute. You did close--you did know enough, apparently, to close the Trenton postal facility-- -- Mr. Day. The Trenton postal facility. Ms. Norton [continuing]. And you certainly knew enough to close the Capitol Hill mail facility. One's an upstream. Capitol Hill is a downstream. Yet, Brentwood, which is midstream, remained open on the 19th, the 20th, and part of the 21st. Why shouldn't we conclude that Brentwood was treated differently from these other facilities, and why was it treated differently, if you were so quick to close down upstream and downstream and here's Brentwood in the middle of it and not closed down? Mr. Day. Take it on either end. In Trenton, on October 18, you have the first incident of a postal employee, a letter carrier, who was diagnosed as suffering from cutaneous anthrax. In dealing with local public health officials in the State of New Jersey, specifically Dr. Ed Bresnet, a decision was made. Given the specific known issue of an employee of the Postal Service with cutaneous anthrax, that facility was closed. Ms. Norton. How many hints do you need? Mr. Day. Unfortunately, we did not---- Ms. Norton. This person had anthrax. He's upstream. Mr. Day. No. No. That's not upstream. That is at the source. That's where it occurred. And in turn, again, working with local public health officials, we had not yet come to that conclusion. That was not the advice I think Mr. Ungar---- Ms. Norton. Had not yet come to the conclusion that it could travel. Mr. Day. That we had this path of contamination. Ms. Norton. That what? I'm sorry. Mr. Day. There is a path of contamination. Ms. Norton. First of all, what did we learn about that employee at that time? The postal carrier? Mr. Day. Up in New Jersey? Ms. Norton. Yes. Mr. Day. That specific carrier was suffering from a case of cutaneous anthrax. Ms. Norton. OK. He had it. Mr. Day. She had it, yes, at that facility; and so there was advice from local public health officials to close Trenton, NJ. We were responsive to what public health officials advised us to do. In New Jersey, on the 18th, given that case, we closed. When Mr. Morris, Mr. Curseen, Mr. Richmond were diagnosed over the course of the weekend of the 20th and 21st then, in turn, public health officials said we needed to close. We did that. We did not know that on the 19th. Ms. Norton. All right. Again, once you get--I don't know what to tell you, Mr. Day, but if there are deaths around me, I then begin to look very closely at what had been the existing knowledge. And I recognize that was--that's a postal carrier who had a letter, right? We believe he had the letter. Now we believe that somebody--we now know at least two people in Brentwood had a letter. Again, I don't find it hard to connect these dots. Mr. Day. Not on the 19th, though, Congresswoman. The only death as of October 19 was Mr. Stevens in Boca Raton, FL, at AMI. Then you had a series of cutaneous anthrax cases that took place in New York City in the newsrooms of several network TV stations as well as the New York Post. So when you look at the dates, on the 19th, you do not have, other than the first employee in Trenton, NJ, a case of anthrax. The first cases diagnosed here in the Washington area occurred over the course of the weekend, the 20th and 21st. Ms. Norton. Mr. Day, what I'm looking at is that people who handled mail clearly got anthrax, ergo, somebody in Brentwood has handled mail, and yet Brentwood is not closed. Moreover, the Capitol Hill facility, downstream, was closed. Why? They handled mail. But so did somebody in Brentwood, and perhaps more people than we know. Mr. Day. But that's at the end of the stream where you've got the mailroom and Senator Daschle's administrative aide. You're at the end of the trail, and that's why that's closed. Congresswoman, I agree with you totally. In hindsight, again, we would have done this. It wasn't known at the time. If that's what CDC or anyone else had advised us was the right thing to do, we would have done it. We did it in New Jersey. When public health said ``close,'' we closed. Chairman Tom Davis. And you won't do it again. Mr. Day. Absolutely. I think we all understand how anthrax and biohazards can come out. Our process and protocol calls now for when detection occurs we will shut down the facility and work with local public health. Ms. Norton. Just let me say why I am still dissatisfied. When--because there had been anthrax deaths occur--that occurred in people who had handled mail, or anthrax, if not deaths. Because people had gotten anthrax from handling mail, because mail had clearly been handled in the Daschle office and, therefore, in the Brentwood office seems to me that, regardless of where the scientific folks are, give them time to figure it out, but you have enough real live evidence, quite apart from any analysis, that there may be danger in a particular facility where people have handled anthrax. That's what I want to be assured of, that if, in fact, people can connect those dots, you will not do what you did with the CDC. ``We waited for them, our hands are clean, and we did what the scientists told us.'' I'm looking for some fail check, and I tell you the best fail check I can think of: ``Somebody got sick in a facility that handled this.'' I don't want to know anything else except will somebody get sick here who is handling the very same substance? Now I would ask that the Postal Service consider what I am saying. I'm not talking about not depending on the scientific evidence. I understand that can take time. I'm saying, depending on real evidence that, by analogy, could likely apply to this facility, even though it isn't in this facility. I hope I am clear, and I'd like to know if the Postal Service is willing to consider this chain of--this chain problem I'm talking about where you have to figure it out even though you don't have the substance tested. Mr. Day. Congresswoman, I would tell you--let's speak to a real-world example where we learned our lesson. We established new protocols, and we implemented them. This past year at the Federal Reserve here in Washington they reported to us back in January that they had a preliminary positive on a piece of mail at the Fed for anthrax contamination. We, in fact, specifically reacted to it. We knew the trail of mail that would have followed. We went to the V Street facility where we process government mail. That facility was closed. I personally was involved with the notification to the public. Jerry Lane personally notified the employees. We shut down the facility, we got it tested, we made sure we took care of it. Ms. Norton. What about Brentwood, in that instance? Mr. Day. Excuse me? Ms. Norton. What about Brentwood? Did it go through Brentwood? Mr. Day. No, it did not. We followed the trail. It was processed at the V Street annex. So that's not theory, that's a real-world case---- Ms. Norton. Well, I just gave you a real-world case, and you have not satisfied me with respect to that real-world case. I congratulate you on the real world and, as you say, we have learned our lesson. I do want to know whether or not we are also dealing with an analytic process whereby you have to do what the physicians do. Physicians often diagnose without having the scientific evidence. They have to put it together, and that's essentially the kind of process I'm asking you also to use. Mr. Ungar. Mr. Ungar. Ms. Norton, I just wanted to mention that our testimony today was based on our work at Brentwood, which was part of a larger review we were doing of the Postal Service and other authorities' reactions to the incidents in 2001 in several major postal facilities. And as part of that review, what we would like to do is take a look at the revised postal guidance for dealing with these situations to see whether it would indeed cover the type of situation that occurred back then. So we do hope to report on that within the next few months. Ms. Norton. I very much appreciate that, because, you know, I'm hearing a little bit of fighting the last war here. We've got to think proactively of ``what if'' and we have to look specifically for a very different situation than we found. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for taking this time, but I wonder if I could have the time to pursue this matter further. Chairman Tom Davis. Of course. Without objection. Ms. Norton. I am now concerned--I now want to be--I now want to ask you about other substances. Because CDC has long- existing regulations going back to 1980, as I understand it, and included anthrax. There must be--for example, anthrax, if you're sending it lawfully, must be in a three-layered packaging and the rest. It's all quite correct, scientifically correct. We know that researchers--we know this renowned scientist who was just arrested and is being investigated because he just carried stuff with him, so we know that, you know, that researchers may just be becoming aware of what you're supposed to do; and many have obviously not been following these regulations in one form or fashion. But I am concerned, Dr. Gordon, that these regulations--these CDC regulations said that, even if taped and sealed--and the Daschle letter was quite visibly taped and sealed--there still would probably be a leak of anthrax. Yet we were told nobody knew that, even though these regulations from the CDC said you'd better, you know, seal all this stuff up because, even if you do, there could be a leak. Why didn't--I mean, they claimed not to know--the Postal Service claims not to have known, and here in their own regulations they warn that a layered envelope all buttoned up could leak. How did this occur? Mr. Gordon. Well, certainly I can only give you-- theoretically, anthrax, as you may or may not know, is a ubiquitous organism that is commonly around us. It's in the soil; it's out there. The difference between the anthrax that went through the mail service processing area is that this stuff was man-prepared. It was a highly refined type of anthrax that literally defied gravity in terms of its dispersion capability. Ms. Norton. So that's what they had in mind when they said it would probably leak even if it was taped and sealed. Mr. Gordon. That's correct. And being as highly refined as it was, certainly, the--I don't think anyone anticipated that the porousness of the envelopes were such that it could come through the envelope. It's our understanding---- Ms. Norton. Then why did the regulations say that, even if taped and sealed, it would probably leak anthrax? Mr. Gordon. Well, that's something, Congresswoman, you're going to have to ask CDC. It doesn't make much sense, other than that the porousness of the envelope would leak it, being highly refined it would leak even that much more. And that's exactly what happened. It came through the envelope, and when it hit the dusting machines with the air, it aerosolized it, and it distributed it throughout the Brentwood facility. Your question is excellent. Why it wasn't thought of before, I don't know. It's one of the issues that we raised with the Department of Health--Dr. Walks and I raised it--that it would be common for us to understand that bacteria that highly refined would come right through that. Ms. Norton. Well, they understood it enough to put it in their regulations, but they didn't understand it enough to tell the Postal Service. Let me go further and move on. I need to know how you know, if you do, Mr. Day, that there is no risk to employees from the new irradiation facility that will be located, as I understand it, on the Brentwood grounds. Mr. Day. Let me say a few words about irradiation. I would preface it by saying that when you get into a very specific scientific discussion I'm not aware of really anybody that would describe anything as no risk, 100 percent certainty, zero risk. Ms. Norton. You're right. There's always risk. There's risk in breathing just air. So I'm not talking--I'm trying to be reasonable, Mr. Day. Mr. Day. There is, however, because of---- Ms. Norton. I mean, even the GAO leaves us with the fact that--everybody protects their butt, and if they say 100 percent then they are afraid somebody will come back and say they found 1/10th of 1 percent. Mr. Day. And that's the issue. So no one claims no risk. Low risk, however, I think is reasonable. Irradiation technology has been around for decades. It's been used for food processing, medical sterilization, it's got a number of industrial uses; and so it is well known, well understood. The ability to properly build a facility that is as low risk as anyone possibly can build one is well understood. The facility we currently use in New Jersey, is owned and operated by IBA, Ion Beam Applications actually, a firm out of Belgium. The facility is one that I've driven by many times. I've been into it. It's immediately adjacent to Route 295 in New Jersey. There are literally thousands upon thousands of vehicles that drive by that facility within 100, 150 feet. Irradiation is understood. The procedures to make it safe are understood, and it's well regulated. Ms. Norton. It's not unlike the facility in New Jersey where we now send mail to? Mr. Day. It would be custom-designed for the particular aspect of irradiating mail. The facility in New Jersey had a more industrial use although we put mail through it. This facility will be built just for mail. But, most importantly, what you have with irradiation is very thick concrete or steel walls or some combination that prevent any of that irradiation from being harmful to anyone outside the facility. Ms. Norton. And this is located in a remote corner of the facility of the area. Mr. Day. It's located in the most remote corner. For those familiar with the site, if you're looking at the front of our building where the retail is, it would be off to the left, to the left of the auto auction facility that's across the street from us, bounded somewhat by New York Avenue and with all of the train tracks behind it. So it's on the most remote portion of our property away--the farthest away from any residence. So it's quite a distance away from any residential properties. Ms. Norton. Will OSHA be testing this facility---- Mr. Layne. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Norton [continuing]. This irradiation facility? Mr. Layne. Yes. We are prepared to continue on with our work with USPS to address any concerns that employees have about unsafe or unhealthful working conditions, and all of those will be evaluated. We're currently still working with the USPS and evaluating all the samples that they're getting, and so we will continue to work with them to address any potential unsafe or unhealthful working conditions. Ms. Norton. Today, Mr. Lane, Mr. Day--I don't know who can answer this question--who would have the final say on closing down Brentwood in this city? Mr. Day. If we were---- Ms. Norton. How's the chain of command work? Who makes that call? Mr. Day. Ultimately, it remains with the agencies of the Postal Service. We certainly seek the advice of other agencies such as CDC. We work with Homeland Security in the case of South Carolina where there's some aspect that might suggest terrorism. I can tell you, as we deploy our new technology there is a predetermined protocol that the new system we are putting in place, that if we get a confirmed result from that it, in fact, has found the DNA structure of anthrax, it's not really a decision. The protocol just flat out says we close down. We remove the sample; we take it to a certified CDC lab for final confirmation. So we have a facility that's closed, a facility that has the machinery shut down, the employees taken out; and then if we get a confirmed result we're working with public health to follow a medical protocol. So it's very defined, it takes decisionmaking upfront. It's all decided by the protocols. Ms. Norton. You wanted to say something on that, Mr. Gordon. Mr. Gordon. Yes. From the District of Columbia's standpoint, if we felt that a postal facility or any other facility located in our community represented an immediate public health threat, we would request that the Mayor declare a public health emergency; and we would then move forward to request the facility's closure. Ms. Norton. One of the great concerns here has been information, and I know how much work you have done on the communication issue. But I have a question for Mr. Layne in that regard because of OSHA regulations. Because OSHA regulations don't require--we're dealing here with a nationwide--potentially nationwide problem, and the OSHA regulations don't require the disclosure to workers of contamination or of the test results of contamination, I don't understand how that is appropriate. As I read your regulations, they allow management 14 days to communicate potentially deadly contamination to workers. Mr. Layne. That is the existing requirement under 29 CFR 1910.1020, which is our access to Medical Records Standard; and that's the regulation as it exists now. Certainly, under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, if employees believe that there is some condition that--or information that should be made available to them, they can contact the local office, but the responsibility for providing a safe and healthful workplace lies with the employer under the Occupational Safety and Health Act. Ms. Norton. Yeah, but they're going to look to that regulation. Mr. Ungar. Mr. Ungar. Yes, Ms. Norton. We identified this dilemma in the review that we recently completed at the Wallingford Connecticut facility, and we did make a very explicit recommendation to OSHA to take a look at that regulation because of the very issue that you just raised, that an employee has to ask for the information first. In response, OSHA did agree to relook at that regulation. We haven't heard from OSHA yet whether they are going to change it, but they did agree to revisit that regulation. Ms. Norton. Mr. Layne, are you in the process of revising these regulations now based on the experience? Mr. Layne. Yes, ma'am. We are evaluating the regulation based upon the recommendation from the GAO, and we responded back in July 2003 that's exactly what we are doing. Ms. Norton. Well, when can we expect revised regulations, Mr. Layne? Mr. Layne. I don't have that answer for you. I'll be happy to answer you, provide a response later. I don't have the answer to that. Ms. Norton. Would you provide a response to the chairman within a week so that we know when your goal is? I didn't ask you when you have--when is your goal to come forward with regulation. That is something I'm asking you to give the committee. Mr. Layne. Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, there is a very detailed process about rulemaking that has to go through a very public---- Ms. Norton. Are you in the process of rulemaking now? Mr. Layne. We're responding to the GAO report. We're looking to see what is the best way to make the regulations. Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Layne, she just wants an approximation. You can go back and review it in a week and give us a ball park. Mr. Layne. I don't have an answer for you right now. Ms. Norton. I can understand you might not have it sitting right here. You see, the way in which the government works, it's perfectly reasonable for an employer, including the Federal Government, to look at your regulations, to decide whether or not the employer is doing the right thing. After all, the employer is not sure. He doesn't want to panic employees. And yet he knows that his union or his employees are going to say, ``Why didn't you tell me?'' To avoid recrimination, you may want to look at giving more discretion to the employer. You may want to look at a shorter timeframe. But all we need to know is when you expect the process to have something. And I'm sure that your agency sets goals for when they want to do something, recognizing that those goals cannot always be kept. Mr. Layne. Yes, ma'am, we will. Ms. Norton. Thank you very much. Now I--Mr. Gordon, D.C. General is closed. It was, of course, indispensable at the time because it was set up almost immediately to receive people who got Cipro and to handle people's--at least initially, their health concerns. What would happen today if we had an episode? Where would people go? Mr. Gordon. We would still be prepared, if necessary, to operationalize D.C. General Hospital. While the hospital hasn't been operated, as you know, we have our health care safety net unit there. The rest of the facility's integrity has been maintained. It's not a situation that is crumbling down around our knees. We would operationalize D.C. General Hospital. We would also--we do have other alternative sites as part of our emergency response plan that we could provide to you. Ms. Norton. What are those sites, please? Mr. Gordon. I would prefer to provide that to you under separate cover because of the very nature of bioterrorism and where we would operationalize---- Ms. Norton. Well, they already know about D.C. General. So what are you keeping from us all? Mr. Gordon. Well, certainly we would have access to the Armory there. The Office of Emergency Management, the Department of Health is prepared to set up emergency medical tech operations on property adjacent to D.C. General Hospital and other locations throughout the city as part of our emergency response plan. We feel that we're very capable now to respond to these types of events. Our experience has been enormous, as you know, operationalizing D.C. General Hospital; and treating 17,000 people is not an easy task. I was there. But I can also tell you that there are a lot of other parts, such as mental health counseling, that went on from our mental health department. The Postal Service's participation in working with Postal Service employees and helping them get through their tremendous effort was absolutely superb. We couldn't have done it without Postal's coordination and assistance and other offices of the Federal Government. And based on those lessons and how we operated, certainly we feel comfortable if we had to operationalize and treat we could do that in rapid deployment. Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, I only have one more question. I do want to say this. At that time, D.C. General was open. It wasn't opened as a full-fledged hospital. That was open. So I'm talking what you saw even though the whole facility is in mothballs now you could get right back up. Because you know what? We're going to hold you accountable for that. Mr. Gordon. Well, we have--that's one of the reasons why it's not been torn down or is crumbling around our knees. We have the facility; we have chairs and tables and stuff that are still there. It hasn't been ravaged. We've maintained appropriate maintenance on the building. Ms. Norton. OK. And it's got electricity and all that stuff. Mr. Gordon. There's electricity in the building. Ms. Norton. All that good stuff. Mr. Gordon. You must understand, Congresswoman, this facility is contiguous to a number of buildings and the power sources supply also not only D.C. General but the D.C. Jail and other facilities that are located on that campus. So we cannot individually isolate and deprogram. Again, while it's been mothballed and we are not investing a lot of money other than maintaining it on a limited capital basis, if we had to operationalize to deal with an emergency situation we certainly would do it. Ms. Norton. My final question is, who is monitoring the health of the employees who were in Curseen-Morris at the time and what are the results of whatever studies or monitoring that is being done? Mr. Gordon. It is my understanding--and Tom Day can add more to this--but through Dr. Michael Richardson, our chief medical officer, Dr. Richardson is involved in the monitoring of those employees along with CDC. It's my understanding that CDC has primacy; and they coordinate with Dr. Richardson, who is our chief medical officer, with relationship to followup complaints of those employees. And their coordination is also with Dr. Reid, who is the chief medical officer for Postal Service. Mr. Day. I would concur with that. That is what's happening. I would tell you, on a more personal level, having spoken at a number of employee town hall meetings here in Washington as well as up in New Jersey with the employees at both facilities, our employees want that, and they deserve it. However, there's a level of mistrust that has kicked into this. CDC has had to use a contractor to help them to do the monitoring, and to a large extent they use telephone surveys. I've personally spoken with employees who say, ``Why aren't they doing a better job to monitor my health?'' And I asked them--I said, ``Well, were you contacted by the telephone survey?'' The answer is yes. Well, ``What did you tell them?'' ``Well, I didn't want to talk to them.'' We're having a problem to get employees who deserve and want this tracking and treatment if necessary, but most importantly tracking to understand the methodology that CDC needs to employ to do it. So there is a level of mistrust unfortunately that's crept in there. And we're trying to get our employees to understand, yes, CDC is doing this, they are monitoring. They have done a number of reports, but, as you get contacted by this contractor that CDC is using, please communicate with them and let them know what's happening if you have any---- Ms. Norton. Have you seen any improvement in the responses from employees based on---- Mr. Day. I don't have any quantitative data to tell you whether it's gotten better or worse. Anecdotally, I still hear from employees who raise the question but then admit to you they---- Ms. Norton. Is it because CDC--they hear the name CDC? Is that why? Mr. Day. I think there's an expectation that an M.D. is literally going to come to your doorstep and give you a physical exam and that's what the monitoring is, as opposed to CDC trying to monitor a population of people and talk to them periodically through this telephone survey and understand if there's any symptoms that would indicate a problem. Ms. Norton. Mr. Lane. Mr. Lane. Yes, Congresswoman. We also have an Employee Assistance Program that is, around-the-clock, doing surveys and having counseling sessions with those employees to determine, you know, what their requirements are; and we constantly followup through that process as well. Ms. Norton. Thank you very much; and thank you very much for your indulgence, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. I will dismiss this panel. I thank you very much for being here. I will look forward to having you accompany Ms. Norton and I when we walk through the facility before it opens. And I think, Mr. Layne, you've got a week to try to get us some information on that. Mr. Layne. Yes, sir. Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. We'll just take a 2-minute recess as we switch panels. Thank you. [Recess.] Chairman Tom Davis. We are ready to move to our second panel. I just appreciate everybody's patience in staying with us, and hopefully the first panel has provoked some comments we'll get. I understand we have Dick Collins, the assistant to the president of the National Postal Mail Handlers Union, accompanied by Cynthia Vines; and Myke Reid, assistant legislative director of the American Postal Workers Union, AFL- CIO, accompanied by Corey Thompson. Thank you both for being here with us. What I would like to do is swear all four of you in. Have we got everybody? All right. We'll just wait a second. We appreciate everyone being with us today, and I know this is very, very important to your membership. You're the front lines. I just want to say that Ms. Norton and I both very much appreciate the work that you're doing and hazards that you could potentially encounter any day. So we look forward to your testimony. As soon as we get Mr. Collins, we'll swear everybody in in one fell swoop. I'll tell you what I can do. I can start over here. Mr. Reid, I can start with you; and if I swear you all in right away--I'll start with you, and then when Mr. Collins comes in I'll swear him in. We can move ahead. [Witnesses sworn.] Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you, and thanks again for bearing with us and being with us. Now you can proceed. Try to stay within 5 minutes, but we're not real tight on time today, so if you feel you need to take more time we can give you more. We have read your testimony. Thank you. STATEMENTS OF MYKE REID, ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO, ACCOMPANIED BY COREY THOMPSON; AND RICHARD COLLINS, ASSISTANT TO THE NATIONAL PRESIDENT, NATIONAL POSTAL MAIL HANDLERS UNION, ACCOMPANIED BY CYNTHIA VINES Mr. Reid. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Congresswoman Norton. My name is Myke Reid. I am the legislative assistant director of the American Postal Workers Union, which represents approximately 330,000 clerk, maintenance and motor vehicle craft employees of the Postal Service nationwide. I am testifying today on behalf of APW President William Burrus, who is out of town to attend a national APW conference. I am joined by APW Safety and Health Specialist Corey Thompson, who is available to answer any questions of a scientific or technical nature. When the anthrax crisis arose in October 2001, the terrorist attacks of September 11 were still vivid, and our Nation was reeling. On October 5, 2001, a tabloid newspaper employee in Florida became the Nation's first inhalation anthrax fatality from a terrorist act. Ten days later, anthrax- contaminated mail was discovered in Senator Tom Daschle's office on Capitol Hill. Brentwood postal worker Thomas Morris died on October 21, and the facility was immediately shut down. Joseph Curseen, another Brentwood employee, died the following day. We have certainly traveled a long road to get to the point where we are finally anticipating the reopening of the Morris-- or the Curseen-Morris facility, which has been renamed to honor the two fallen postal workers. Yesterday's announcement that a piece of mail in Greenville, SC, contained the deadly poison ricin highlights the importance of the concerns we are discussing today. The deaths of Curseen and Morris and the closing of the Brentwood facility were only the beginning of a long and difficult period for postal workers. Some are still suffering ill effects from the exposure, and many still bear emotional scars. For 2 years they have had to dramatically adjust to the disruption of their work life while struggling with the mental turmoil wrought by the attack. I must say that, by all accounts, they have endured these hardships and remain dedicated to their mission. As the anticipated reopening approaches, workers are asking the question, ``is the facility safe for me to return?'' While there was cooperation between management and labor in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, there also have been serious breaches. The Environmental Clearance Committee cleared the facility for reoccupancy on September 19, yet this information was not provided to the union until October 20. While we were relieved to learn that the facility is deemed safe by the experts, we are troubled by the delay in sharing this information. Five months ago, APW President Burrus testified before the House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations about the handling of the anthrax contamination at the southern Connecticut processing center in Wallingford. While there was no question that the amount of anthrax present in the Wallingford facility was sufficient to cause death, contamination was described to employees as being in trace amounts. A GAO report issued last April notes that the Postal Service requested, and the investigation team agreed, that the USPS would be the sole party responsible for communicating test results and other information to the workers at the Connecticut facility. Still, the Postal Service withheld information about the level of contamination from its workers, despite a formal request made in January 2002, by local union officials. The Wallingford situation was one of the most egregious violations of postal workers' rights in the 2 years since the anthrax incidents began, and it is why we are troubled by the recent breakdown in communication. It appears that the lessons learned were quickly forgotten. The Mail Security Task Force, a working group of postal and union officials formed immediately after the anthrax attacks, has been holding discussions for some time about the decontamination of the Washington, DC, and Hamilton, NJ, facilities and the timetable for reopening the Curseen-Morris facility. The Postal Service has presented an outline--but few details--on plans for reopening the facility to workers. The USPS has been communicating an overview of its reopening plans to workers through work-floor talks, through letters mailed directly to their homes, and through a variety of postings at facilities where Brentwood Road employees temporarily have been working. We appreciate the increased communication, in spite of the lack of specifics. The issue of whether individual employees will be required to return to work at the Curseen-Morris facility was resolved through an agreement between the Postal Service and the APWU. It provides that employees of the facility would be given one opportunity to indicate whether they wish to return to that facility or prefer to be reassigned to another facility. Much has been done over the past 2 years, both to bring the Curseen-Morris facility back online and to ensure that other facilities are safe and made safer. We would especially like to commend the USPS efforts led by vice president of engineering Tom Day to decontaminate the Brentwood Road facility and for his involvement in the development of the biological detection systems. Overshadowing much of the progress in decontaminating the facility, however, is the fact that little has been accomplished to prevent a similar incident in the future. The mail processing and collection system is complex, and the installation of Biological Detection Systems [BDS], and HEPA filtration equipment provide only limited protection against exposure. Because more than 50 percent of all letter mail is processed in presort mailing houses and bypasses the BDS, this equipment cannot be considered an adequate early warning system. And it must be remembered that at this time the BDS system tests only for anthrax. Furthermore, the Biological Detection System may provide for a rapid response in treating workers but only after there has been an attack. Detection would occur only after a contaminated piece of mail has entered the system--only after workers have been exposed. Sounds grim, and it is. Because postal workers are very dedicated to their jobs, they will continue to perform their duties. But they need more than a report suggesting that a workplace is safe to enter. They deserve to know that the responsible parties are dedicated to ensuring their safety and that progress is being made expeditiously. We urge the Postal Service to follow the recommendations of the Environmental Clearance Committee to continue monitoring the work environment after the facility is reopened. We urge the responsible parties to be especially sensitive to the needs of the employees of the Brentwood facility and to make every effort to accommodate them. Again, we'd like to thank the chairman, Congresswoman Norton and Ranking Minority Member Waxman for these hearings; and we would be happy to answer any questions you might have following this testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement of Mr. Reid follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.057 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.058 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.059 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.060 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.061 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.062 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.063 Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Collins, I need to swear you in. Could you just raise your hand? [Witness sworn.] Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you very much. You can proceed. Thanks for being with us. Mr. Collins. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am Richard Collins, assistant to the national president of the National Postal Mail Handlers Union. On behalf of the 50,000 union mail handlers employed by the U.S. Postal Service, including hundreds of mail handlers who work at the Curseen and Morris processing and distribution center, I appreciate the opportunity to testify about the reopening of that facility. I am accompanied here today by Cynthia Vines, who serves as the branch president for the Mail Handlers Union at that facility. Sister Vines has done fantastic work on behalf of the mail handlers at that facility, and she is intimately familiar with many of the matters at issue in this hearing today. The recent incident at the Greenville, SC, airmail facility reminds us that mail handlers and all postal workers continue to fight to protect the public from potentially lethal hazards. As you noted on the radio this morning, Mr. Chairman, when the headlines disappear and the news coverage vanishes, our members remain on the job and on the front lines of defense against terrorism and biochemical hazards. We must all work together-- the unions, the Postal Service, the community, and Congress--to adapt to this new world in which we live. As you said this morning, Congress must spend the money to protect postal workers and the public; and the money needs to be spent wisely. The lives of all postal employees depend on it, and this must be our paramount concern. This includes not only ensuring that the Curseen-Morris facility is free of anthrax but also making sure that the employees are emotionally ready, willing and able to move back into the facility. To this end, the Mail Handlers Union has been an active participant in the Mail Security Task Force, established by postal management and including representatives of all unions and employee associations, which has been meeting regularly since October 2001, to ensure that all reasonable measures are being taken to prevent any further infection from anthrax or other biological agents. We also have been active supporters of the efforts to obtain sufficient congressional funding for the clean-up efforts both here, at Curseen-Morris and at other postal facilities along the eastern seaboard. We particularly appreciate the efforts made by the members of this committee and fervently hope that the Congress will continue to provide complete funding for the costs imposed on the Postal Service because of the anthrax attacks and their aftermath. Turning to the present situation at Curseen-Morris, again, our primary concern must be the health and welfare of the postal employees who work at Curseen-Morris and who for the past 2 years have been scattered around in neighboring postal facilities. To meet these concerns, the employees at Curseen- Morris must know that the facility is safe. First, the employees at Curseen-Morris must know that all levels of government and postal management have done everything possible, using the best available science and technology, to ensure that the Curseen-Morris facility is fully decontaminated. To this point, each and every scientific study conducted about Curseen-Morris and each and every environmental sample taken at Curseen-Morris have demonstrated that the facility is ready to be reopened. Several representatives of the Mail Handlers Union, including me, have toured the facility both in June of this year and most recently on October 8, 2003, to ensure that the facility is clean and clear of anthrax. Second, the employees at Curseen-Morris must be kept fully informed about the latest developments, including information about the actual clean-up, so that there is no misinformation disseminated and so that the rumor mill is not allowed to operate. It is my understanding that the employees have received routine safety talks about the reopening of the facility, that the Postal Service has been mailing copies of these talks to affected employees, and that the Postal Service currently is trying to arrange a tour of the facility for employees prior to its official reopening. While communications with employees generally have been good, there is a need to do additional training on the emergency protocols that will control after the reopening of the facility. Third, the employees at Curseen-Morris must know that they have a choice on whether to return, so that employees who are experiencing particular fear or anxiety can choose not to return to Curseen-Morris without any loss of pay or economic benefits. The Mail Handlers Union and the Postal Service recently signed a memorandum of understanding that grants each mail handler who previously worked at Curseen-Morris, but who does not want to return to that facility, an opportunity to transfer to a nearby location. That transfer will be accomplished pursuant to the longstanding rules that govern voluntary transfers, as negotiated in Article 12 of our collective bargaining agreement. Fourth, the employees at Curseen-Morris must know that when they return to Curseen-Morris they will be carefully monitored for any illness or other adverse side effects, whether physical or emotional, especially during the first few days and weeks after the facility is reopened. The Postal Service's testimony on that point was that the medical unit would be staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. But what was not said at the microphone was that was going to be for a 30-day period, and we believe that 30-day period should be extended. Fifth, the employees at Curseen-Morris must know that the reopening of Curseen-Morris is not the end of our concerns but rather another starting point from which the Postal Service will take all steps that are necessary and use whatever technologies are available to ensure that postal employees and the mail that they process remain safe. Sixth, the employees at Curseen-Morris must know that their elected representatives, meaning their union representatives at the local level, will continue to be active participants in the process that leads up to and follows the reopening of the Curseen-Morris facility. If these general guidelines are followed, we believe that the reopening of Curseen-Morris can be accomplished smoothly and successfully. All the participants must work together to ensure the safety and well-being of the employees at Curseen- Morris. Anything less would increase the fear and anxiety of these employees who have already suffered too much. There are just a few concerns that I would mention to you, Mr. Chairman. We have heard about the offer by the Postal Service to do fit tests and provide masks to people and attempt to provide some level of reassurance and ease their anxiety. But we believe that if the facility is clean this may generate more fear than it calms. In meetings with management, representatives of this union suggested that very fact to the Postal Service officials; and apparently they had some prior commitment or promise that these masks would be provided. There's also concern about the biodetection systems that are to be placed in the Curseen-Morris facility. As of now, it is my understanding that there are operational questions left unanswered by the Postal Service as to whether or not originating mail will be processed in the Curseen-Morris facility. Originating mail is the collections mail or the anonymous mail for which the biodetection systems were primarily designed. These machines are placed on individual, automatic, facing and sorting machines that are operated by mail handlers in such a way as to isolate individual pieces of mail as they go through the last pinch point to take air samples that can then be tested for the presence of DNA that might match an anthrax profile. If that originating mail does not return to that facility, there is no set plan in place to address the concerns of the employees as to how they will be protected from any other possible contamination from anthrax- laced mail or mail that contains any other biological agents. We've been told that there is consideration being given to placing free-standing units around the facility and taking random air samples, but we have yet to hear the final completed plan, and there's great concern as to whether or not that plan will be adequate. And, finally, the training that was mentioned earlier; it has been the experience of the Mail Handlers Union in the Curseen-Morris Facility that most of that training has been handled through safety talks and stand-up talks on the floor where employees are gathered around in a group and told what to look for in terms of characteristics of mail pieces and the types of things that might indicate a potential problem. We would like to see the Postal Service move away from the paper training, and do some actual SITREPs, and let people come into an area where a piece of mail that is--simulates a suspicious package or mail piece is placed, and take them right through the drill. And we would like that training to be done in the presence of the supervisors from that facility so that everybody in that facility gets the same message at the same time, so that if an incident occurs, we will not have to deal with a supervisor who is not familiar with the protocol or perhaps misunderstood a protocol. We would like everybody to get the same message at the same time. We think that is critical. With that, I thank you for your time and the opportunity to testify here today. I would be happy to answer any questions. Chairman Tom Davis. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Collins follows:] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.064 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.065 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.066 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.067 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 91921.068 Chairman Tom Davis. It is real clear that communications are critical in these areas from the very beginning to the end. It hasn't gone as good as it could, even in the aftermath. That is fair to say, both of you? Mr. Collins. Yes. Chairman Tom Davis. You are obviously a very critical part of this equation. As you look at the existing protocols, you heard the previous panel talk about the existing protocols and Ms. Norton go into excruciating detail about differences in the changes in these protocols. Are you satisfied with the existing protocols or do you have additional suggestions for the Postal Service, in terms of handling hazardous packages and letters? Mr. Collins. I believe the Postal Service has some of the best written protocols in the Federal Government. They need to learn to follow them. Mr. Thompson. I would agree. There are some protocols which constantly need modification because things do change and more information becomes available. The implementation of those protocols out into the various number of facilities needs considerable improvement. Chairman Tom Davis. And training is a key part of that as well. Mr. Thompson. Training, not only about the protocols for the folks who are actually working, but of the supervisors and managers; definitely, that needs to be included. Chairman Tom Davis. How about, when it is identified or identifies a potential threat, how should that be communicated? Are you comfortable with the way it is done now, like in South Carolina? You don't want to be alarmist about things, if you have an indication. On the other hand, you want to make sure that people who might be endangered know that. Are we comfortable with that? Mr. Thompson. I think that at this point in time, we are still trying to gather evidence or information, if you will, on what occurred in South Carolina. We know that there was a suspicious envelope discovered on the 15th. And it was the 22nd when the actual test results came back. That is quite a lag of time. Had there been a contamination at that facility with the material that we are dealing with, I think we would be talking about something totally different than a suspicious package and it being identified at a later date. So I think that protocols and understanding those protocols, we are still looking into that particular incident. I know with thousands of suspicious packages and envelopes that are found on a regular basis that-- -- Chairman Tom Davis. Therein lies the problem. If you can't react to anything, or have more people, do you close it down and the like? Mr. Thompson. I think you can react to everything. What you do, though, in those circumstances in handling them may take in various considerations. Chairman Tom Davis. Let me ask you each: In your respective unions, what percentage of the employees are going to return to the Brentwood area facility, under your agreement, and how many are we anticipating will go elsewhere? Do you have an idea? Mr. Reid. We do not know. Ms. Vines. I can't give you a definite number. Chairman Tom Davis. You may not know until the date? Ms. Vines. Exactly. Chairman Tom Davis. We would appreciate getting that. I would be interested to know what that would be at the appropriate date. Do you think they have made adequate accommodations for members who are fearful of returning for one reason or another? Ms. Vines. I do think so, yes. Chairman Tom Davis. Have you been talking to your local representatives in South Carolina at this point? Mr. Reid, do you want to tell us about any communication you have had with them, how they are feeling at this point? Mr. Reid. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Our union has five regional coordinators that operate throughout the country. And our southern regional coordinator, who is responsible for Greenville, SC and with that local, I have been in contact with the local. So, yes, we have been in touch with them. Chairman Tom Davis. As I understand your testimony, they are still feeling their way through how this was handled, and the consequences. It is really too early to make a determination or judgment. Is that fair? Mr. Thompson. Yes. Mr. Reid. Yes, sir. Chairman Tom Davis. Do you have any thoughts on the Postal Service's proposal to locate an irradiation facility at the Curseen-Morris Processing Center, either one of you? Ms. Vines. We have some concerns. I believe that if they must have an irradiationsite, that it should not be onsite with the employees. And most employees feel the same way. Chairman Tom Davis. OK. Mr. Thompson. I think we are still investigating. They are in the permit phase now. We have asked for copies of the initial investigation from the Postal Service. It is--it again is too early to make a determination. We haven't really gotten feedback from a tremendous number of employees that are out at that site at this point in time. Chairman Tom Davis. You know, it looks like, hearing the testimony from the previous panel, that everybody thinks they have done everything they can to make sure this facility will be safe. But you saw, nobody is willing to step forward and say it is 100 percent safe, which gives us some concern. That is why Ms. Norton and I want to walk it with them, and try to give some level of comfort to workers who may be coming in. What is your level of comfort at this point? What are your workers' levels of comfort? Mr. Collins. Well, Cynthia and I have both been through it. So we are hoping it is at least 99.9 percent clean. Chairman Tom Davis. You are still here to tell about it. Mr. Collins. I went through there in June. At that time there had been contractors working in the building for a couple of months without personal protective equipment. And to my--at that time in June, we were told that nobody had suffered any ill affects from that exposure. Chairman Tom Davis. I guess the question is, we are dealing with something that we haven't had to deal with before, so nobody is willing to swear up and down that it is foolproof. Mr. Collins. The people that knew about it in October 2001 wouldn't talk about it. These are the people from Ft. Detrick. Chairman Tom Davis. Is that right? Mr. Collins. Ft. Detrick is the weapons facility where the Army---- Chairman Tom Davis. I am surprised that they wouldn't talk to you about it more frankly. Mr. Collins. I actually helped to develop some of the early protocols, and there was a doctor there from Ft. Detrick. And many times we asked questions and we were simply told that we could not be given that answer because of national security. Chairman Tom Davis. There is still no closure on the underlying case, as I understand it either, which also makes everybody feel nervous. Whoever sent that letter could do it again. Mr. Collins. Absolutely. Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Reid, anything to add to that? Mr. Reid. No. I was just thinking if we were guaranteeing that and returning to the Curseen-Morris facility, we were going to say that, then a light fixture would fall from the ceiling and hit somebody. So there is--there is just no way to guarantee safety. But, with the irradiation facility that is being planned and discussed at Brentwood, we actually have a different position. The Postal Service has announced a position to staff that facility with the contract employees. And we would actually be concerned that if there is going to be mail processed in that facility, we would like it to be by postal workers. Chairman Tom Davis. Employees? Mr. Reid. Absolutely. Chairman Tom Davis. I like that kind of candor. It is refreshing to hear it. Ms. Norton, any questions? Thank you very much. It has been very illuminating for Ms. Norton and for the committee. I hope we have a successful opening and, for the employees that are fearful, that we can accommodate them in line with the agreements that you have reached with the Postal Service. Thank you again for the job that you and your members are doing. Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a few questions. I was interested in your response, Mr. Reid. I was concerned that the irradiation facility had been contracted out. It is not that postal employees were doing the irradiation before, but I am aware that in New Jersey, postal employees take the mail to the facility, and of course postal employees take the mail out. And while I commend you instead of running from the facility, especially in a government that is contracting out everybody except their grandmother, wanting the facility to be serviced by postal employees. I mean, after all, these employees are going to have to handle this mail, perhaps almost immediately. After we in the Congress don't get our mail for weeks now, and the whole point of moving it to Brentwood is, of course, to shorten that time. I was--I will be very concerned about my own residents. But, I am going--I must say that when I hear that the facility here is going to be considerably more safe than the one in New Jersey, because it is being constructed to--it is being tailored, if I was in the union, I would try to get those jobs is what I am saying, rather. All your people are going to be in Brentwood. And some balance here has to be kept in the age of weapons of mass destruction. I mean, I am confronted all of the time in the Congress by people who want to shut down everything. We can make everything safe. Nobody will have any jobs, tourists won't come to Washington or to anyplace else. We will all be locked down. Though we have been tough on the Postal Service, I don't want to leave the impression that for the first time in the history of mankind, everybody is entitled to 100 percent assurance that nothing will ever happen to them. I do have just a few questions. I don't know if it was you, Mr. Reid, or you Mr. Collins who testified about this delay in sharing the information that the building has been cleared. I don't recall it--to be maybe a month before you knew that. Did you ask for an explanation for the time lag? What was the explanation given? I would have asked them had I thought about that when they were here. Mr. Thompson. We just received the information, the letter the other day. Prior to--well, was prior to--at our meeting for the work force. We haven't had time to ask why the delay? Ms. Norton. Our concern would be all of the discussion about communication, yet there kind of--what--the word, the operative words to me are cleared. So if they were holding the information because they weren't sure, that is one thing. But, according to your testimony, it was cleared. And then there was a month lag in telling people. Well, that is good news there was a month lag. But, suppose there had been bad news? Would it take--would there be a gap in time as well? The communication issue has been vital here. And so we need to know. We will have--Mr. Chairman, it seems to me we ought to ask the Postal Service why did it take a month if they cleared the facility-- that is good news--when they get that news out so that we don't have these lingering doubts among employees that something was being held back, even after the facility has been cleared? Mr. Reid. To answer that Congresswoman, we think, had these hearings not been scheduled for today we might not still have it. Ms. Norton. You say you don't have it? Mr. Reid. We do have it now. But we got it 3 days before today's hearing. So there is a feeling that had the hearings not been scheduled for today, we still might not have received the report. Ms. Norton. Well, we will find out. You perhaps all heard testimony, I have been very concerned about monitoring health and had pressed CDC. Now, we heard testimony just before you came forward that they are calling employees that don't want to talk. They think maybe they are bringing trouble onto themselves, doctors coming in, they may fear for their jobs. I don't know what the reason is. I want to ask you, inasmuch as I am sure you want their health monitored, whether it is-- monitoring is necessary, or why you think employees are reluctant to talk on the phone to people who are trying to do the kind of surveys that you initially to know if you have a health problem among subjects. Mr. Thompson. Within the--I believe there are--you are speaking about the CDC monitoring the health of employees? What I have heard from employees is, first of all, they didn't know what the call was. They have been inundated with a number of requests for information. They felt, many of our members, had spoken of feeling like guinea pigs as part of studies, and they really did not get a good understanding of what this contractor was asking them for. So, in many cases, folks just said, ``I am not talking to anybody about this; who are you?'' And then it was the, ``I am not going to talk to you.'' It wasn't a good introduction of, ``This is the CDC; we are monitoring this.'' Ms. Norton. Did the contractor consult with the union? Mr. Thompson. No. Ms. Norton. You contract this stuff out, they just do it. Mr. Thompson. Neither did CDC. Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, this is something that--a question I would like to have submitted to the CDC. We will work with the committee on this question. It seems to me that if you are going to go to employees after that terrible tragedy to ask them about their health, the facility isn't open, one of the first things you would say: ``We have consulted with your representative in preparing these questions. The purpose of these questions is to assure that your health continues to be good, or if it is not good that we learn of it in time to be helpful,'' rather than--sounds like people going through a checklist. And, you know, I am not sure that I would answer those if you called me. Before you get the words out of your mouth, I would hang up the phone before I even know what you want because of these people who bother you with phone calls. So I believe that is a very serious communication problem. It is I who press the CDC to say, ``we want to know if employees have doubts.'' We--they don't know if, for example, there will be remaining problems that don't come--that don't come until later. We know that the problem with a causal effect, you know, what causes what. But we, at least, have to make sure that this experience informs us so that we learn from it. It is tragedy if we don't learn anything from it, if we don't learn how to help these employees. I think, I am not sure what in the world we are going to do with it except regret it. You testified, I think it was Mr. Collins, about simulated training. And for the first time I think you explained that there was paper training going on. And I assumed once we heard the word ``training,'' that somebody was sitting down with some folks and showing them how to do things and seeing responses from them and saying, what are your questions? You are telling me that kind of training is not going on? Mr. Collins. The HAZMAT training that was referred to by the Postal Service is annual training, that is something that the people that go in and actually take that mail out or assess it or work with the first responders get trained on. But people on the floor get safety talks. Ms. Norton. There is a distinction here between mail handlers on the one hand, then, and the postal workers on the inside? Mr. Collins. There are differences in the jobs that are performed. But, we are all---- Ms. Norton. But you, of course, are the first line of--you, the mail handlers, are the first ones to get ahold of the mail. So they---- Mr. Collins. We take it off the trucks and we move it inside. We do the first cull inside the building and prepare it for the distribution functions. Ms. Norton. Your training would be different in any case. I understand that, but--because you are doing a different job. But you say that with the HAZMAT training, that is simulated training, where you actually do something and see somebody do something, a paper trial. Mr. Collins. Let me see if I can clarify exactly what I did mean for you. The HAZMAT training, there are individuals in the facility, members of the American Postal Workers Union, they come out of the maintenance branch, to get hands-on training on how to respond to a hot piece of mail or a suspected hot piece of mail. When I speak to the problems that are experienced by the mail handlers, who work the letter belts and cull that mail to prepare it for preparation, and quite possibly, I believe, mail that is worked on belts by members of the American Postal Workers Union, when that mail is out in the open in the distribution process or in preparation for the distribution process, that is when you find a suspicious mail piece. And the people who are working those belts don't get actual training on identifying a mail piece, they get shown a poster or they are given a stand-up talk, or what the Postal Service calls a safety talk. They will be told what types of characteristics to look for on that mail piece, perhaps a stain from a leaking container inside that envelope, or perhaps a parcel with an inordinately large number of stamps on it, or a parcel that is addressed by hand with no return address. Those are all the types of characteristics that people are told to look for. And then they are told to leave that mail piece alone and go and get their supervisor. But, all too often when that happens, a supervisor will walk over, simply take that piece of mail, take it off the floor, or tell the employee, ``don't worry about it, toss it over there in the bin, let's keep moving.'' We have had those type of situations in the wake of the anthrax attacks at Curseen-Morris. We have had those types of problems across the country. We have brought them to the Postal Service's attention. They have gone out and attempted to remediate their training with their supervisors to avoid similar occurrences. But, that is what I meant when I said they have some of the best written protocols. Ms. Norton. But they have not instituted simulated training as a result of those? Mr. Collins. No. That is what I was talking about. If you take the supervisors, you take the employees, you put a piece of mock-up mail on that letter belt, everybody gets the training. You bring in the safety specialists, you bring in all of the supervisors, you bring in the employees and everybody gets that training, so if it does happen in real life, nobody says: ``Why don't you go to the bathroom. I will take this over.'' Those are the types of things that we are up against. Ms. Norton. Mr. Reid, again, were the people who are handling mail on the inside the same people who are given written instructions? Mr. Thompson. It is the same. We get a stand-up talk which may be included with any other item non-safety related. There is no training program. I get the opportunity, when we see them, to review the training programs from the post office. And there isn't one that I have seen that specifically says that it is titled or provides training for biohazards or detection or how to take care of yourself. Ms. Norton. That is not acceptable. That is just not acceptable. We are going to have to followup with the Postal Service. First of all, they are leaving themselves open to liability, in my considered legal judgment, once you have had the kind of thing to happen, and you then issue some paper to thousands upon thousands upon thousands. First of all, have they read it? You issue a piece of paper. And, I am not suggesting there ought to be a test, you know, on this paper. But, I am suggesting that you have an obligation to make sure that training--I do not regard reading regulations as training, not after an incident like this has occurred. I might in some circumstances. That is a followup matter that we should have, in my judgment, for the Postal Service. I just have a couple more questions. That is a very important issue it seems to me, especially for people about to go back. I don't think it would take a great deal given their explanation of how it occurs. But, it does seem to me that you would want to see people do it, if for no other reason, than to impress upon them how you are supposed to handle such mail, particularly since we are not talking about anthrax. We don't know what in the world we are talking about. These masks, we keep hearing about these masks. I assume that people do--a lot of folks don't want to wear any mask all day, have a mask on. So I don't know how to handle this matter that we hear of from time to time about the masks don't fit and, you know, there was guys--Mr. Collins, you testified was it, that people have concerns about them? Mr. Collins. It has caused anxiety. They are being told on the one hand that the facility is clean and clear. We believe that to be the truth. Then, they are saying, ``if you are not comfortable with that, we will provide these N-95 filtering face pieces so that you don't feel too insecure or anxious about performing your duties.'' Ms. Norton. So do people wear those masks? What do you think should help with those masks? Well, if people--do people wear them at all? Is it really necessary to wear a mask constantly at work? It does seems to me that it might be something like between a rock and a hard place on this one. Mr. Collins. These masks were provided after a great deal of discussion on the--at the mail security task force, and distributed around the country in the fall of 2001. There were two types of masks. One was an N-95 and one was an N-100. And they were named as such because the N-95 is supposed to filter out 95 percent of the particulates in a range of 3 to 5 microns diameter. And the N-100 was something like 99 percent effective in that same range. And that was protection that was provided when we didn't know if there was widespread contamination in the Nation's mail. And in the wake of the anthrax contamination at Brentwood in 2001, these masks went out and people wore them for a short period of time, and then very much dropped back onto the comfort zone that we are all guilty of as human beings and stopped wearing them. Mr. Thompson. I think that it is true. They were developed, and it was done on a voluntary basis. It was--also, gloves were provided at the same period of time for folks to wear with the uncertainty of what could come through, such as the incident in South Carolina. The opportunity for our members, and our members, there are a number of them that do wear masks. There are a number of them that do wear gloves. They wear them for their own personal protection. Until such time as other protections, through administrative control or engineering controls can be provided to workers that handle mail, they have to have some type of a protection, and those are provided, the gloves and masks, which are considered personal protective equipment. They aren't the first choice, but they are a choice. And the issue of whether or not to provide fit testing for masks, if you wear a mask, it should fit the best possible way. And, in conversations with the Postal Service, the program at the Curseen-Morris facility is for those who choose to do that. All postal employees can wear gloves and masks. That has been established since very early in the process with anthrax. The issue of fit test is for those that want to. Ms. Norton. I can see the problem there. You--I am not sure there is much more that you can do about it. I have two more questions. One has to do with the Biological Detection System that is described in Mr. Reid's testimony. And that is said to provide only tests for anthrax. And of course, 50 percent of your mail, according to this testimony, is processed in presort mail houses, in any case. First of all, is the biological detection system in place in Curseen-Morris? Ms. Vines. No. Mr. Collins. No. It is not. Nor will it be in place by the time that employees go back into the facility. Mr. Collins. It is my understanding, again, that there are operational considerations for the Postal Service to determine whether or not they are going to run the uncanceled mail. And the Biological Detection Systems that were produced, were originally produced with the intention of protecting that particular portion of the mail stream. If they do not put a canceling operation in the Curseen-Morris facility--we just learned earlier this week for the first time of plans to try to protect that facility with a series of those machines placed about the facility in a freestanding manner. But, we have grave---- Ms. Norton. Biological Detection Systems? Mr. Collins. Yes. We have grave concerns about their efficiency because they weren't engineered to perform random testing or random air sampling in the facility. They were specifically designed to be placed on those canceling machines, the automatic facing canceling system. These machines are placed at the very last set of rollers, the very last pressure point where the mail is essentially whittled down to a very single letter before it enters that machine so that the stamp can be canceled. It was done that way for the purpose of ensuring that every single letter that gets processed has a chance to be sampled in the event that there is anthrax in that envelope. That when those rollers come together and pinch that envelope, and create that little puff of air that we probably all saw on the news a couple of years ago, that sampling device, this Biological Detection System, has the opportunity to take a sampling of that air so that the air can be sampled and tested and run against what is essentially a library of DNAs to determine if anthrax was present in any of the envelopes that were tested during the sampling period. The sampling period is intended to be roughly 1 hour. We were told that every hour a vial will be processed to check for the presence of anthrax against the DNA in the mail that has been processed in that time period. Ms. Norton. Mr. Thompson. Mr. Thompson. It is--you know, Dick had just said that we just found out that there may be the possibility that the machinery that biological detection equipment was designed to operate on may not even end up at the Curseen-Morris facility. And that there was a proposal to have a free-standing piece of equipment which had the same scientific principal. The concern raised---- Ms. Norton. But you don't know whether that is going to be in there or not, the free-standing machine. Is that--are they going to be in there for sure? Mr. Thompson. We don't know that for sure. It is still being evaluated. The Postal Service hasn't determined that yet. Ms. Norton. They may not be useful because they are not attached to the machines? Mr. Thompson. Well, that is very well true. They may not. The difficulty comes in--there has been a 2-year process in developing this equipment, with folks from NIOSH and folks from other agencies doing testing to determine the best way for this equipment to work on a piece of equipment. Now, to just try to apply the analytical theory to a free- standing machine leaves a tremendous amount of sample collection, sample design, whether or not it can sample a sufficient amount of air, how often and so on. It leaves a lot of scientific principles unanswered. And until it is tested, I think that we are trying to apply it to something which doesn't have good enough theory behind it. Ms. Norton. It looks like a jerry-built mechanism. Mr. Chairman, again, I appreciate your indulgence. I just want to say to these witnesses, your testimony has been very important. We got good testimony, it seems to me from the Postal Service, from the scientific authorities. But, there is new and important information that came out because of your very vital testimony, I thank you for coming forward. Chairman Tom Davis. I also want to thank you. It has been very revealing to us as we move ahead with jurisdiction over those issues. And again, congratulations to the men and women that work for you. They are doing a good job. We want to give them every protection and make sure that the protocols are in place, the equipment is in place, the training is in place, as we move to reopen the facility in the Brentwood area and that we meet your concerns. So thank you very much. This committee stands adjourned. [Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] [The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. 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