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**INVESTING IN HOMELAND SECURITY: CHALLENGES
FACING STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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CONTENTS

Opening statements:	Page
Senator Collins	1
Senator Lieberman	4
Senator Levin	11
Senator Coleman	29
Senator Carper	36
Prepared statement:	
Senator Voinovich	43

WITNESSES

Hon. Carolyn C. Kilpatrick, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan	7
Hon. Mitt Romney, Governor, State of Massachusetts; on behalf of the National Governors' Association	8
Hon. Kwame M. Kilpatrick, Mayor, City of Detroit, Michigan	13
Arthur W. Cleaves, Director, Maine Emergency Management Agency	16
Mark J. Stenglein, Commissioner, Board of Commissioners, Hennepin County, Minnesota	19

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Cleaves, Arthur W.:	
Testimony	16
Prepared Statement	60
Kilpatrick, Hon. Carolyn C.:	
Testimony	7
Kilpatrick, Hon. Kwame M.:	
Testimony	13
Prepared Statement	55
Romney, Hon. Mitt:	
Testimony	8
Prepared Statement	45
Stenglein, Mark J.:	
Testimony	19
Prepared Statement	63

APPENDIX

Questions and Responses for the Record from:	
Hon. Romney	70
Hon. Kilpatrick	72
Mr. Cleaves	76
Mr. Stenglein	79
City of Detroit Action Plan for Homeland Security, Background Paper, April 4, 2002, submitted by Senator Levin	90
Mayor Dick Murphy, City of San Diego, California, prepared statement	103
Larry Naake, Executive Director, National Association of Counties, prepared statement	106
County of Arlington, Virginia, prepared statement	115

**INVESTING IN HOMELAND SECURITY:
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LOCAL GOVERNMENTS**

THURSDAY, MAY 15, 2003

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m., in room S-128, The U.S. Capitol Building, Hon. Susan M. Collins, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

Present: Senators Collins, Coleman, Lieberman, Carper, and Levin.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. Somehow pounding the gavel very loudly when you are right across from me seems redundant this morning.

I want to welcome everybody to the Committee on Governmental Affairs as we continue our efforts to strengthen homeland security grant programs for States, communities and first responders. This is third in a series of hearings that the Committee has held as we seek to craft legislation to make sure that we have the right process and procedures in place to help our States, communities and first responders respond to the challenges of homeland security.

This hearing originally was scheduled to be held in the Dirksen Building in our Committee Room, but late last night, in a stroke of bad luck for us, the Senate scheduled 12 back-to-back votes, so the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee was kind enough to let us use this magnificent room. As Governor Romney has pointed out, this is a room where money decisions are made, so perhaps it is appropriate that we meet here today.

Much of the burden for homeland security has fallen on the shoulders of State and local officials across America, especially our first responders, the firefighters, police officers, and ambulance crews on the front lines. They are meeting this challenge and responding with innovative strategies. Instead of facilitating these new ideas, however, the fragmented Federal Homeland Security grant programs and their confusing regulations are a maze in which innovation often gets stifled.

Hearing the experiences of State, local and county leaders here today will help the Committee better understand the size and complexity of this maze. Listening to their ideas will help in our efforts to straighten it out and make a reasonable path.

Earlier this year I met with officials of Maine's Emergency Management Agency, including Director Art Cleaves, who joins us here today. Time and time again I heard from Mr. Cleaves, as well as from others, that the rigid structure of many homeland security grant programs frustrates their efforts to help first responders secure communities across our States. I believe that all States should have more flexibility in how they spend Homeland Security dollars to make sure they are designated for where they are most needed.

To allow flexibility in Homeland Security funds that have already been appropriated but remain unspent, Senator Lieberman and I, along with other Members of the Committee, have introduced legislation that authorizes the Department of Homeland Security to grant waivers, allowing States to use funds from one category, such as equipment, for training or other purposes. I am pleased to be joined in this effort not only by the distinguished Ranking Member of this Committee, but by several other of my colleagues.

The current lack of flexibility is not the only confusing path that State and local officials are forced to navigate; for lack of coordination among the various Federal grant programs is another. At our last hearing with Secretary Ridge, I announced a series of principles for legislation that I will introduce to provide a map that will better connect our front line protectors with the funding they need.

Today, Senator Russ Feingold and I are introducing another key piece of our effort to streamline the process. Our legislation will create an inter-agency committee that will be charged with eliminating duplication in planning requirements, simplifying the application process, and helping States and localities promote interoperability of their equipment.

Federal programs both within and outside of the new Department of Homeland Security provide much-needed support. Unfortunately, these programs often have overlapping goals, requirements, and regulations. Our legislation will promote better coordination among these programs and eliminate these redundant requirements.

I do have a lengthy statement this morning that in the interest of time and given the unusual circumstances we find ourselves in, I am going to submit for the record, so that we can hear from our important witnesses today.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Collins follows:]

OPENING PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS

Today, the Governmental Affairs Committee continues its efforts to strengthen homeland security grant programs for States, communities, and first responders. I welcome our distinguished panel of State, local and county officials who will discuss the challenges they face as they work to protect our communities.

Much of the burden for homeland security has fallen on the shoulders of State and local officials across America, especially our first responders—the firefighters, police officers and ambulance crews on the front lines. They are meeting this challenge and are developing scores of innovative strategies. Instead of facilitating these new ideas, however, the fragmented Federal homeland security grant programs and their confusing regulations are a maze in which innovation often gets lost.

Hearing the experiences of the State, local and county leaders here today will help the Committee better understand the size and complexity of this maze. Listening to their ideas will help in our efforts to straighten it out.

When I met with officials of Maine's Emergency Management Agency, including Director Art Cleaves who joins us here today, they told me that the rigid structure

of many homeland security grant programs frustrates their efforts to help first responders secure communities across our State. I believe all States should have more flexibility to spend homeland security dollars where they are most needed.

To allow flexibility in homeland security funds that have already been appropriated but remain unspent, I have introduced legislation that authorizes the Department of Homeland Security to grant waivers allowing States to use funds from one category, such as training, for another purpose, such as purchasing equipment. I am pleased to be joined in this effort by Senator Carper, Senator Lieberman, Senator Voinovich, Senator Coleman, and many others who serve on this Committee.

But the current lack of flexibility is only one confusing path that State and local officials are forced to navigate—the lack of coordination among the various Federal grant programs is another. At our last hearing with Secretary Ridge, I announced a series of principles for legislation that I will introduce to provide a map that will better connect our front-line protectors with the funding they need.

Today, I am introducing another key piece of that legislation. It will create an interagency committee that will be charged with eliminating duplication in planning requirements, simplifying the application process, and helping States and localities promote interoperability of their equipment.

Federal programs, both within and outside the Department of Homeland Security, provide much-needed support to ensure a basic level of equipment and training among first responders. Despite having overlapping goals, these Federal programs lack the very coordination that we ask of our States and communities.

For example, communities can access funding for interoperable equipment—from computers to fire hoses—through five different Federal programs, including the FIRE Act, COPS, the bio-terrorism program, FEMA's Emergency Management Performance Account, and ODP's State homeland security grant program. Despite the unified goals of these grants—to purchase interoperable equipment—Federal agencies are under no requirement to coordinate the grant process. As best as I can tell, for the most part, they have not.

My legislation will make sure that Federal agencies help, not hinder, State and local efforts to promote interoperability by collecting information regarding State and local initiatives and developing coordinated plans to provide needed technical assistance.

Compounding the problem, within the maze of Federal programs there is a mountain of paperwork. State and local officials are forced to complete separate emergency plans for different Federal agencies and redundant application forms for the fragmented grant programs. Many States have been forced to complete more than five separate homeland security plans. While the information requested by each homeland security plan is similar, States and communities are often forced to reinvest the wheel from one emergency plan to the next.

Maine, for example, at the request of the Department of Justice and the Centers for Disease Control, undertook a coordinated emergency preparedness assessment in 2000. In 2002, Maine updated its assessment of both its emergency management structure and its bioterrorism preparedness.

Despite this comprehensive assessment, I am told that Maine will not be able to use this information to satisfy requirements of the upcoming Homeland Security Plan requested by the Office of Domestic Preparedness. They will be forced to complete yet another assessment answering many of the same questions phrased in slightly different ways.

Answering the same question five different ways does nothing to protect against weapons of mass destruction. Filling out paperwork five different times takes resources that could be used to hire more first responders. More paperwork may make Washington feel safer, but it does nothing to protect Maine's cargo ports, its borders or its people.

My legislation will promote the same kind of coordination among Federal agencies that we often require of our States and localities. It will require Federal agencies to build a clear, well-marked path that will lead our first responders to the funding that enables them to do what they do best: Prepare for and respond to emergencies.

Today's hearing will provide the Committee with information to better assess whether the current structure of grant programs is getting the job done. The witnesses will describe the obstacles in our grant programs that my legislation seeks to remove.

I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses here today, so we can build a stronger and better homeland security partnership in the months and years ahead.

Chairman COLLINS. I now will turn to the distinguished Ranking Member of the Committee for any comments he might wish to make.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Senator Collins, Madam Chairman. Thank you for holding these very valuable hearings on how we can reform and re-engineer the Federal Homeland Security programs to meet the needs of States, localities and the first responders and preventers, who protect us.

Madam Chairman, I appreciate what I would describe as your characteristic leadership and nonpartisanship in focusing the Committee on how we can improve programs that really are vital to the security of the American people.

I also want to thank our distinguished witnesses, and thank you for calling Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick of Detroit as one of the witnesses. As the presence of Congresswoman Kilpatrick attests to, Mayor Kilpatrick, one might say, comes to public service genetically, and with a proud family tradition. He has done a great job in the early chapters of his service as Mayor of Detroit, and is really a rising star among America's mayors, so I want to welcome both the Congresswoman and the Mayor.

Earlier this week, our Nation was reminded that despite the success of the war in Iraq, the war against terrorism has not been won. All Americans, of course, pray for the families of those killed and injured by this latest act of cowardice and evil in Saudi Arabia. These terrorists will never relent in their hatred for America, and so we must never falter in our fight to defeat terrorism overseas, and to protect our people from it here at home. The attacks underscore the fact that the Federal Government's first responsibility under the Constitution is to provide for the common defense.

Today in the face of this terrorist threat, that means more than building a mighty, well-equipped and well-trained Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard. It means strengthening the shared security of our 50 States and their counties, cities, and towns, as well as our territories. Today the readiness of our firefighters, police officers, and public health professionals is every bit as important to the national security as the readiness of our soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Homeland security cannot be done on the cheap. It takes serious money to employ, train, and equip top-flight first responders, to buy new biometric security systems, install information-sharing networks, develop biological and chemical testing, and treatment capabilities, to improve security around water plants and airports, to revamp aging seaports and protect chemical and nuclear plants. These tough jobs and countless others cannot be accomplished with wishful thinking or a magic wand. They cannot be accomplished by placing an unfair share of the burden on State and local governments who are already facing the worst fiscal crisis in decades without helping our State and local leaders.

And, Madam Chairman, I know you agree with me that we, in the Federal Government, have to do more to fulfill our responsibility, and that challenge we face is clearly to improve the way we distribute funds to the State and local governments. We need to

make them flow faster. We need to cut unnecessary red tape and provide greater flexibility and make sure that the programs are adequately coordinated. That is why I am proud to be a cosponsor with you of the legislation to provide State and local officials with some of the ability to move Federal funds between accounts when it is necessary.

I want to talk very briefly about the money that flows to the State because I do believe we are inadequately responding to State and local needs now. I am going to put my full statement in the record, but I have submitted a proposed budget increase of \$16 billion for next year for homeland security, much of which would go straight to States and localities, and that is after review and consideration by State and local officials and others. This included \$7.5 billion above the President's \$3.5 billion for first responders, including \$4 billion in funding to ensure that our first responders could do something as basic as communicate with one another in a crisis, which we saw they were unable, tragically, to do on September 11.

I also believe that we, in the Federal Government, need to help pay salaries and overtime for local first responders, who are carrying out now a national responsibility. The fiscal crisis facing State and local governments has forced one in four cities, I am informed by the National League of Cities, to lay off police officers in the past year, which creates, of course, a double danger, threatening our homeland security and the fight against domestic crime at the same time.

I am proud to stand with a bipartisan coalition of Senators, which I am pretty sure includes the Chairman, to support the SAFER Act, which would help communities across the country hire some 70,000 firefighters nationwide over the next 7 years. We are in a war, and we should be strengthening our front line troops, not eroding them. So this is a very important hearing which underlines the fact that fixing the way these programs operate is critically important. But then we have also got to fund them adequately, and that is what it means today to fulfill our constitutional responsibility to both provide for the common defense, ensure domestic tranquility and build a more perfect union.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Senator Lieberman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN

Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for holding these very valuable hearings on how we can reform and reengineer Federal homeland security programs to meet the needs of States, localities, and the first responders and preventers who protect us. Madam Chairman, I appreciate your leadership and bi-partisanship in focusing the Committee on how we can improve programs that really are vital to the security of the American people. I also want to thank our distinguished witnesses for being with us today.

Earlier this week, our Nation was reminded that, despite the success of the war in Iraq, the war against terrorism has not been won. All Americans pray for the families of those killed and injured by this latest act of cowardice and evil in Saudi Arabia. These terrorists will never relent in their hatred for America—so we must never falter in our flight to defeat terrorism overseas or in protecting our people here at home.

The attacks only underscore the fact that one of the Federal Government's first responsibilities under the Constitution is to provide for the common defense. Today, in the face of the terrorist threat, that means more than building a mighty, well-

equipped, and well-trained Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard. It means strengthening the shared security of our 50 States and their cities and towns, as well as our territories. Today, the readiness of our firefighters and police officers and public health professionals is every bit as important to our national security as the readiness of our soldiers, sailors, and airmen.

And homeland security cannot be done on the cheap. It takes serious money. To employ, train, and equip top-flight first responders. To buy new biometric security systems, install information sharing networks, and develop biological and chemical testing and treatment capabilities. To improve security around water plants and airports. To revamp aging seaports and protect chemical and nuclear plants. These tough jobs and countless others can't be accomplished with wishful thinking or a magic wand. And they cannot be accomplished by placing an unfair share of the burden on State and local governments who are already facing the worst fiscal crises in decades.

Madam Chairman, I am convinced that we in the Federal Government have to do much more to fulfill our responsibility.

One challenge we face is clearly to improve the way we distribute funds to State and local governments. We need to make the funds flow faster, cut unnecessary red tape, provide greater flexibility, and make certain that programs are adequately coordinated. Madam Chairman, I am pleased to co-sponsor your legislation to provide State and local officials with some of the ability to move Federal funds between accounts when it is necessary. That's a smart and long-overdue reform.

But this is more than just a red tape problem. It's also a red ink problem.

Across the country, States and localities are being spread thinner than ever at the moment they can least afford it. Homeland security and healthcare costs are rising. Deficits are growing. But the economy isn't. I must say, it makes no sense to me that, as we lose jobs and struggle to meet our national needs, the Bush Administration's top priority is to push for billions of new tax cuts that won't improve the economy but will shortchange homeland security and other urgent needs.

I have called for \$16 billion in funding for homeland security in the next fiscal year above and beyond the President's request, much of which would go straight to States and localities. This includes \$7.5 billion above the President's \$3.5 billion for first responders, including \$4 billion in funding to ensure that our first responders can do something as basic as communicate with one another in a crisis.

It is simply unacceptable that in most States and regions, including right here in the Washington, D.C. region, local police officers, fire fighters, paramedics, and other emergency personnel responding to an attack cannot talk to one another. America has some of the most advanced communications technology on the planet, yet 20 months after September 11, we're still struggling with something as urgent and basic as this. That doesn't speak well to the administration's priorities.

I also believe that we in the Federal Government need to help pay salaries and overtime for local first responders. The fiscal crisis facing State and local governments has forced one in four cities to lay off police officers in the past year, according to the National League of Cities. That is creating a double danger—threatening our homeland security and the fight against domestic crime at the same time.

I am fighting to restore law enforcement grants cut by the Bush Administration, and am proud to stand with a bipartisan coalition of Senators to support the SAFER Act, which would help communities across the country hire some 70,000 firefighters nationwide over the next 7 years. We are in a war. We should be strengthening our frontline troops, not eroding them.

Those are just two critical priorities among many. And both underline the fact that fixing the way these programs operate, while important, is just one part of the solution. Our States and localities also need more support. More funding. And more leadership from the President on down. That's what it will take to fulfill our Constitutional duty to provide for the common defense and build a more perfect union.

Thank you.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

I now am going to turn to our colleague, Congresswoman Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick, who represents the 15th District in Michigan. She is here in a dual capacity today, and we are very pleased to ask her to introduce one of our distinguished witnesses, who happens to be her son. I know the Congresswoman is on a tight schedule, so I am going to turn to her first so that she can excuse herself and return to the other body.

TESTIMONY OF HON. CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for your leadership and your colleagues' bipartisan spirit as we rebuild and secure our Nation together. Thank you very much for your leadership.

And, Mr. Ranking Member, always on point. Thank you for all that you do as a team, as a Senate, as the upper body of our Congress.

Senator LIEBERMAN. You are on record now.

Ms. KILPATRICK. Every now and then we say that when we want something and come to you to ask. [Laughter.]

So I certainly want to acknowledge your hard work. Thank you, Senator Lieberman, for helping to get us on the agenda. I think it is most important that we, as policy makers, listen to people out in America, so that we actually do what is right to best serve them, and thank you very much.

I additionally want to thank you for our working together. Last night Secretary Ridge announced \$700 million in his next round of grants. We are very happy that the City of Detroit was able to get a portion of that. I want to thank everyone for our bipartisan effort.

It is my distinct pleasure to present to you a gentleman who needs no introduction, who is certainly known by all of you, and a new energy, a new source in our part of the world to rebuild the City of Detroit and its nearly million people.

This young man I have known before he took his first breath. He is a young lawyer, and former Democratic leader of the Michigan House of Representatives, now the Mayor of the City of Detroit, let me present my son, Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much. We are going to start with the Governor, but I did want to give you the opportunity to introduce your son.

Ms. KILPATRICK. Thank you very much.

Chairman COLLINS. I would note that I think as a result of our last hearing with Secretary Ridge, that both Boston and Detroit got funding this round, so I think we have had an impact.

Senator LIEBERMAN. What about New Haven? [Laughter.]

Chairman COLLINS. We are working on Portland and New Haven, right.

First today, as I introduce our distinguished panel, and it really is a great panel that reflects the perspectives of State, county, city and emergency management officials. I think this diverse panel will give us the broad range of perspectives that we are looking for.

First I want to welcome Governor Mitt Romney of Massachusetts, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. His experience as Co-Chair of the National Governors Association Task Force on Homeland Security will certainly provide a valuable perspective to this Committee. As the former President and CEO of the Salt Lake Olympic Organizing Committee, he will also assist our Committee in learning about what is perhaps the most effective Federal, State and local homeland security effort in recent memory.

We have already had the Mayor of Detroit, Kwame Kilpatrick, introduced to us by his distinguished mother, and we are very much looking forward to hearing the perspective of a mayor of a

major city. We thank you for being here too. I know that you have done a lot of work on the issue of homeland security and we look forward to hearing your testimony.

It is always a pleasure for me to extend a warm welcome to Art Cleaves, who is the Director of Maine's Emergency Management Agency. One of my colleagues on this Committee has commented that somehow I manage to have a witness from the State of Maine at virtually every hearing, but that is because the State of Maine has so much to offer to the rest of the Nation.

I have relied on Art's advice on numerous homeland security issues. In fact, it was he who first pointed out to me the lack of flexibility in States being able to transfer funds from one category to another. He has been down there on the front lines and really understands the nuts and bolts issues that are facing officials at the State, local and county level.

Finally, since I was in Minnesota just Monday with our colleague, Norm Coleman, for a field hearing on homeland security, it is a great pleasure to introduce Mark Stenglein, who is a Commissioner from Hennepin County, Minnesota. Did I pronounce that correctly? I learned how when I was out in Minnesota.

I am very happy today that we will hear from a county official. A lot of times we focus on the local and State level, and do not pay enough attention to the counties, so we appreciate having your perspective as well.

Governor, we are going to start with you, and again, thank you for your effort to be here today.

TESTIMONY OF THE HON. MITT ROMNEY,¹ GOVERNOR, STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION

Governor ROMNEY. Thank you so much, Madam Chairwoman. It is good to be here with you, Senator Lieberman, and Senator Levin. I feel like it is coming home for me because I have my neighboring States to the north and south represented, and the State of my birth also represented, so I am very comfortable here.

Let me begin by saying thank you for the work which you are doing in crafting legislation, filing legislation, which brings as the Chairwoman has indicated, greater flexibility to the process of the grant system in our homeland security effort, and also a streamlining of the grant process which is being provided by the Federal Government. That flexibility and streamlining I believe is key.

As you have noted, I come on behalf of the National Governors Association and my Co-Chair, Governor Ruth Ann Minner of Delaware. We have been working together over the past several weeks as we have taken on this new responsibility, and look forward to working with you.

I think this morning, rather than reading through my testimony, I might ask that you include my written testimony in the record, and I might summarize for you some thoughts that are taken from that.

First, I think there are two key points that I would like to provide, and that is that in our view, investing resources in homeland

¹The prepared statement of Governor Romney appears in the Appendix on page 45.

security based upon a comprehensive and integrated plan is essential. Second, perhaps drawing on the comment that was made by Senator Lieberman with regards to a term I had not heard before, but not just first responders, but preventers as well, maximizing our investment in the prevention of terrorist acts is also something which I think should be a high priority in thinking about how we allocate our resources. We think about prevention. We think about intelligence, gathering intelligence communication. We think about as well hardening the various targets that might exist in a locality or in a State, and we also think about operational security.

So I would like to focus a couple of thoughts with regards to those two issues, maximizing the efforts going to prevention, as well as investing our resources based upon a comprehensive and unified plan.

I had the experience, Madam Chairwoman, as you indicated, to have spent some time helping to organize the Olympic Winter games. I recognize that by virtue of doing so, that security and terrorist issues were going to become a major part of that task. I had not recognized how large a part of that task they would be. More than 15 percent of the budget of the Olympic Games was spent on security, some \$300 million, actually more than that, was associated with our security program at the Olympic Winter Games. That spending was overwhelmingly directed based upon a comprehensive plan. The planning process literally took years. In checking this morning with my colleague, our estimate was that some 5 years were spent by law enforcement professionals putting together a comprehensive plan to secure a number of venues, not even an entire city or State, but just a number of venues, against terrorist attack. Of course, the Olympics had been the target of attacks in the past. And by applying those resources against a comprehensive plan, we were able to, I believe, provide a much higher degree of security from potential terrorist acts than if we had just sent money out to the various localities, communities, States, and counties that were associated with the Olympic Games. The alternative to allocating resources by plan is to provide resources by population or by geographic territory or something of that nature.

I am just fearful that the differences between municipal needs, municipal responsibilities are so dramatic that if we allocate money based on population or based on geography, as opposed to being allocated based on a formulated plan, that we will severely restrict our capability to provide for the security of our citizens.

I look at my own State, and just thought this morning I have a large number of cities and towns in Massachusetts. We have 351 cities and towns in a relatively geographically small State, and they are very different. Even though the populations for several might seem the same, the needs from a security and terrorist prevention effort are dramatically different. One of our towns—I will take three that are about the same size—one has a nuclear power plant in it. Obviously, that presents a degree of difficulty that is different from another that is just a simple residential community. And another, which houses two LNG tanks and a tank farm for jet fuel and other sources of fuel. So the needs of those different communities are quite dramatically different. At the same time, one might say: Gee, given all of these differences and needs, perhaps

the Federal Government could allocate money, not to States, but rather allocate directly to these different municipalities and make its own assessment of the needs of each one of these different cities and towns. But with 351 different cities and towns, the process of literally scoring on the Federal basis, not just the differences between States, but the differences between all the cities and towns, would become an overwhelming responsibility. I believe therefore it is critical for us to allocate the funding to the States and task the States with the responsibility of not only creating a unified plan, but making sure that it involves the participation of all those who have stakes in the outcome of that effort.

Let me also note that with regards to this planning process, that my experience with the Olympics is that it is only effective if it involves the widest range of people who are helping prepare it. Yes, we have professionals who knew something about planning, but our effort was led by Federal participation, State involvement and local participation as well. Working together, a plan was created that had a high degree of credibility and support across the widest range of participation.

Let me also turn for just a moment to the topic of prevention, and making sure that as we think about allocating our resources, that prevention is very high on our list. Thinking about response and first responders is of course critical. Senator Lieberman's comments about thinking about preventers, I think, is just as critical. When we think about the funding that we allocated through our Olympic experience, the overwhelming majority was allocated towards the effort of assuring prevention of a terrorist act of one kind or another.

The heart of that is intelligence. In our case the FBI led the State and local efforts with regards to intelligence. State and local authorities were given primary responsibility for gathering information and gathering data, but surveillance and analysis was held by the FBI. As they managed that process and worked with us, they were able to assign responsibility so that we didn't have duplication across the three levels of government or four levels of government, including our counties, and at the same time were making sure that the party responsible for the particular action had the highest degree of expertise in carrying out that function. I note the FBI played a superb role in managing our intelligence effort at the games and continues to play a very critical role in the work which we do now. As a governor, I could not be more pleased than I am with the work of the FBI in helping coordinate the efforts in planning and the intelligence work which goes on to protect our Commonwealth.

Let me note second with regards to my experience there, that training played a key role in the prevention programs, training to help, if you will, first preventers know how to gather intelligence and what they were looking for, perhaps with the license of a person who they stopped on the highway, and looking at that license in a way that would assess potential terrorist implications, understanding how to communicate with one another, how to survey potential threats.

Let me go from training to the area of hardening sites and operational security. In that regard the Secret Service played the key

role. It led in the effort of looking at each one of our venues and aspects of our community and found ways to secure those venues, to harden those venues, if you will. Their expertise in providing to us templates, suggesting distances for barricades, fencing options, gating options and so forth, were absolutely essential. If we had instead relied upon our expertise as Olympic planners or local law enforcement, we would not have begun to have the kind of capability that the Secret Service provided to us. They were again key to our being able to create the kinds of robust and complete plans that we were able to put together.

I would therefore continue to urge that our focus remain on prevention, and that we draw in Federal, State and local authorities in creating these prevention plans, that we also allocate resources largely based upon those plans, and that we assure that the dollars are going against the targets and the efforts that are integral parts of the plan which have been created on this local, State and Federal level.

Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much, Governor.

I am now going to ask my colleague, Senator Levin, to call on the mayor from the largest city in—I think Detroit is the largest city in Michigan.

Senator LEVIN. By far.

Chairman COLLINS. By far. While I go vote, and I will return shortly.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. It is a joy to recognize my mayor, and recognize his mother. We talk about the mayor's energy. We, who have served in the Congress, who have served with you, know where he gets a great deal of that energy and vision from. So, welcome to you, Congresswoman Kilpatrick.

Mayor Kilpatrick.

[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN

I am pleased to welcome to the hearing today the Mayor of Detroit, Kwame Kilpatrick, and I thank the leadership of this Committee for inviting him and for holding this hearing. Prior to my Senate days, I was a member of the Detroit City Council so I know firsthand how hard it can be to deal with the Federal bureaucracy; to get the information needed to apply for funds; and then to be denied the funds you asked for when you need them.

In my travels around Michigan this year, a number of local officials have described difficulties in dealing with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Recently, the Mayor of Adrian, Michigan, Samuel Rye, spoke of problems he was having both in reaching and obtaining information from the DHS. At a May 9th meeting of city and town managers in the Upper Peninsula in Michigan, the manager of Sault Ste. Marie, Spencer Nebel, asked which of those in attendance had actually received homeland security funds. The answer he got was no one, despite the Upper Peninsula's great need for communications equipment. As a former city official, I understand the frustrations of these local officials, and I share with them the frustration that the DHS isn't making it any easier for them.

For 6 months now, I and others have been urging DHS to set up an 800 number for grant information as well as a one-stop grant process for State and local officials. There is still no 800 number and no one-stop grant process. At the May 1 hearing, Secretary Ridge admitted that the DHS Office for State and Local Coordination could and should, but still does not, provide local officials with a single point of entry for obtaining DHS grant information. That central clearinghouse for grant information needs to happen. In addition to a central grant office, the Michigan Home-

land Security Director, Col. Mike McDaniel, wants to hold a series of forums around the State of Michigan to educate local fire and police departments on available grants. This is another area where the DHS Office for State and Local Government Coordination could provide assistance, and I hope it will join in this effort.

A related issue is making sure that, once allocated, Federal dollars flow quickly to the States. In the FY 2003 budget, Michigan is supposed to receive \$42 million overall and another \$15 million from the 2003 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations bill, but so far, 8 months into fiscal year 2003, Michigan has received only \$15 million. Those funds need to get where they are supposed to go.

Additional frustration relates to the funding formula now used in allocating the basic Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) grants issued by DHS. The current formula does not distribute money to localities with the greatest needs. Instead, the ODP grants are distributed under a formula that provides a mandatory minimum amount of funds for every State and, only after that minimum is met, provides additional funds to States facing the greatest terrorist threats. The result is that the formula disproportionately funds smaller States at a higher per capita rate than the larger States. For example, why should Wyoming receive more funding per capita than New York for first responders? Experts have indicated that this funding formula is flawed, and Secretary Ridge has said that he is working on altering it. Hopefully, he will act soon and prior to the distribution of 2004 funds.

And then there are the new special DHS grants to high risk urban areas. These grants are also funded out of ODP, but they are not distributed according to a fixed formula. Instead, they are awarded at the discretion of the Secretary based, in part, on classified information. The first round of these grants doesn't add up in terms of threats. Detroit is the largest U.S. border crossing for trade with Canada or Mexico. In fact, Canada is our largest trading partner with over \$1 billion worth of goods and services crossing the border every day. More than 40 percent of that trade passes through the Michigan-Ontario border. Detroit has already been the site of several anti-terrorism probes, and it is a microcosm of all the complex issues that require a balancing of civil liberties and security needs. Detroit produced in April 2002, a Homeland Security Strategy that laid out the city's vulnerabilities, provided a 10-point action plan, and won praise from Secretary Ridge as a model for other cities.

But a good action plan is not enough to get the job done. Detroit needs resources if it is to protect its population. Yet, much to the dismay of Mayor Kilpatrick and myself, when the DHS issued the first round of grants to protect high risk urban areas, Detroit wasn't on the list. That exclusion is difficult to understand in light of Detroit's vulnerabilities and concrete plan to move forward. At a Committee hearing on May 1, Secretary Ridge said that DHS had decided to disperse the high-threat urban area grants in larger sums to fewer cities instead of smaller amounts to more cities, and that more at-risk cities would be getting these funds. Governor Ridge offered to share the classified threat analysis information used for the grants, and I look forward to reviewing it.

On top of all this, there is another problem that is also briefly referenced in the Mayor's testimony—the fact that the Administration's 2004 budget request is actually providing lower overall amounts of funding to first responders than last year. Let's take a look at the big first responder picture:

First Responder Funds

Program	FY 03	FY 04 Admin Request	FY 04 Senate Budget Resolution
ODP Office of Domestic Preparedness (DHS)	3,289	3,558	3,558
Fire Grant Program (DHS)	745	0	0
Total	4,034	3,558	3,558

The primary first responder programs are ODP and the Fire Grant Program that funds local fire departments. When you add the totals, the result is a 1-year funding decrease of \$476 million. When I asked Secretary Ridge about this at the May 1 hearing, he admitted that there was an overall decrease.

On top of that decrease, the Administration is proposing huge cuts to our tried and true local law enforcement programs. Three grant programs for local police show what's happening: In 2003, the COPS program—the same program about which Attorney General John Ashcroft, said “Since law enforcement agencies began partnering with citizens through community policing, we've seen significant drops

in crime rates”—was funded at \$929 million, but in 2004 the Administration requested just \$164 million for this program, an 82 percent decrease. In 2003, the Byrne Grants for first responders were funded at \$651 million, but in 2004 the Administration requested zero; and the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant Program was funded at \$400 million last year, but in 2004 the Administration requested zero dollars. The question is how and why the Administration is requesting less funding for first responders at a time when the same Administration insists that communities like Detroit gear up to defend the homeland.

All today and all this week, the Senate is voting on proposals for billions of dollars in tax cuts, most of which go to the upper 10 percent of citizens. To pay for its tax program, the Administration has proposed to cut government funding, including for much needed programs like homeland security. It's a mistake. To prevent or react to a terrorist incident, our government personnel need resources. Our first responders need radios that can communicate with each other. Our hospitals need medical training, supplies, and data systems to track injuries. Our cities need well-thought out plans to protect citizens. None of that can happen if homeland security needs are shortchanged to pay for tax cuts.

Local officials are on the front lines of homeland security. Recently, I took part in a Detroit town hall meeting that examined the complexities involved with homeland security issues, and at which Mayor Kilpatrick greatly enhanced the dialogue between the community and its elected officials about what needs to be done. The Mayor showed not only his knowledge of the city and the careful balancing of interests that need to take place, but also a determination to meet the homeland security challenges facing his city. The experiences of local officials like Mayor Kilpatrick in working with the new DHS can help show us the gaps in the programs and begin to get them working. I look forward to hearing about his experiences on the front lines.

**TESTIMONY OF THE HON. KWAME M. KILPATRICK,¹ MAYOR,
CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN**

Mr. KILPATRICK. Thank you. Madam Chairman, thank you very much and thank you Ranking Member Lieberman, and Senator Levin, my main man. People talked about feeling at home—and I heard the Governor say that he feels at home here. There could not be anyone who feels more at home than me because my mommy is here. [Laughter.]

But I do want to talk about homeland security from two different perspectives, one as the Mayor of the City of Detroit, and the other as a member of the U.S. Conference of Mayors Advisory Board and Co-Chair, along with Betty Flores of Laredo, Texas, of the Cities and Borders Task Force.

Detroit is the largest city in Michigan. I want to give a couple specifics about Detroit before I go into the homeland security issue. The city is on a major waterway and comprises 40 percent of the border between U.S. and Canada. It is the global headquarters of the largest corporation in the world (General Motors sits right on our international waterway) and the other two large auto makers also have homes there, Ford and Daimler Chrysler. We have one of the largest convention facilities in the country and several professional sports arenas right in the downtown core area. We have a regional airport to which we just added a \$1.4 billion new terminal, and Detroit faces some serious security concerns with all of these.

Some believe that to attack domestic issues and domestic problems, we need to have a one-size-fits-all approach. I want to wholeheartedly disagree with that view. I believe that we need to look at the uniqueness of each city and really target that uniqueness and figure out how we can fund the things that cities need. While

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Kilpatrick appears in the Appendix on page 55.

LA may need one thing or Chicago may need one thing; Detroit may need another. One city may need HAZMAT equipment or gas masks, while the City of Detroit may need a technology foundation or telecommunications dollars.

I believe that Detroit was the first city in the Nation to deliver a comprehensive strategic homeland security package and plan to then-Governor Ridge, now Secretary Ridge. And since the release of that strategy, we have worked to implement each one of the 10-point items we identified as essential to protecting the citizens of Detroit.

One was to appoint a full-time local Homeland Security director. We have done that, and now he is partnered with all of our agencies inside the City of Detroit, and has developed a full homeland security plan. Our focus and mission in the City of Detroit is to be able to respond to every day activities in public service, so we are able to respond to an emergency, a chemical or biological weapon threat, or weapons of mass destruction threat. We believe that our health departments, for instance, need to be able to counsel people for drug intervention as easily as they need to be able to counsel people in the event of a large emergency. So, we need to make sure that those systems actually work.

We have also begun to do incredible work on our radio systems interoperability, and we do not believe that should be done in a vacuum. We hear often of counties wanting to do their own system or States wanting to do their own systems. We believe now, more than ever, that efforts need to be coordinated so all of us are able to talk to one another in the event of an emergency. I applaud the efforts of some counties taking the lead and some States taking a lead in those efforts. It has to be done in the era in which we are living so all of us are able to talk to one another. Detroit has done a lot of great work in upgrading our system and we will be fully operable by the end of this year.

Detroit is a very diverse community, as many of you know. We have the largest Arab population anywhere outside of the Middle East. We have the largest Iraqi population anywhere outside of the Middle East. I believe that Detroit is a microcosm of what people can do when we do communicate. Many of the people in this Nation did not even know that because we did not have many of those large problems that people saw across the country. But we did have the sweeps and we did have the opportunity to share information among our local police officers, our local firefighters, all the Federal agencies that were working inside the City of Detroit, and the Iraqi, Arab and Caribbean communities. We believe that is something that we can learn from.

Additionally, we established a citizens corps in Detroit, which is a volunteer program, and we asked people to submit their names, numbers, addresses, so that they can volunteer in the event of emergencies. Thousands of people have called and registered for this. We held a town hall on March 24, 2003. More than a thousand people came to that meeting. We wanted to show them the homeland security outfits of our police department. Senator Levin and Senator Stabenow both participated in that town hall meeting. It was an excellent opportunity to alleviate some of the fears that were in our community. We conducted a poll after the town hall

meeting, and Detroiters felt more comfortable. A thousand people came to the facility at the State fairgrounds, and many more saw it live on television and felt so much better after that opportunity.

From a national perspective, I agree with many things that the governor said in his comments, but this is one place where governors and mayors actually differ in how homeland security is funded. I wholeheartedly agree that cities need to sit at the table with their State Governments and figure out how we coordinate homeland security funding. But when an emergency happens, there will be a local police officer and a local firefighter, who will be the first in and the last to leave. I want to make sure that point is strongly made and emphasized. The dollars need to follow where the activity is. We can no longer politicize this issue, especially on a State level, and if this has to have some legislative debate, then it becomes partisan, and homeland security dollars cannot become political and partisan, and often that is what happens in State capitals around this country. On behalf of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, we are advocating that uniqueness is looked at on the local level and in funding in that manner.

So in closing—and this is a long closing—I am not a Baptist preacher, but I do have long closings. The City of Detroit, as I mentioned before, we are on an international waterway and local police officers have been protecting that border for a long time. As a matter of fact, between September 11, 2001 and December 31, 2001 we spent nearly \$3 million in overtime reassigning officers. In 2002, we spent just over \$10 million with the local police officers reassigned to patrol our borders and to deliver national security to all of us in the United States of America. With the efforts of Senator Levin, Senator Stabenow and the outstanding leadership of Congresswoman Kilpatrick, through the Omnibus Appropriations Bill, we were able to receive some funding to be reimbursed for that activity. But, we are constantly running up those bills as well to continue to provide that security.

We need help from the Federal Government. Obviously, any decision made at the border has a direct impact on the economic well being of my city and this country. In Detroit we are the home of just-in-time delivery for the manufacturing industry. Many of us remember after September 11 the two- and three-mile backups at the border that essentially stopped the American economy. We need your help. And that is why State and local governments need to be included in planning future border security efforts.

I want to stress once again, as I finish my remarks, that local police officers, local fire departments, will be the first to arrive and the last to leave.

I thank you for this enormous opportunity to speak directly to you today, and I look forward to working with the Chairman and Ranking Member of this Committee, Senator Levin, and all of the distinguished Members of the Governmental Affairs Committee. Thank you.

Senator LIEBERMAN [presiding.] Thank you very much, Mayor Kilpatrick. I am delighted that you could be here. I said some great things about you before you came in. Somebody said to me, in Washington that you know you are doing well when people say great things about you when you are not in the room. [Laughter.]

And you are doing very well, and your testimony has been very helpful today, and I look forward to the question period.

Mr. Cleaves, it is an honor to call on you and welcome your testimony now.

**TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR W. CLEAVES,¹ DIRECTOR, MAINE
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY**

Mr. CLEAVES. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. Senator Levin, and distinguished Members of the Governmental Affairs Committee, I am Art Cleaves, Director of Maine Emergency Management Agency. Our office is also the Homeland Security Coordination Center for the State of Maine.

In addition, our office administers all FEMA grants in the State and all Office of Domestic Preparedness grants beginning with the program's inception under the Department of Justice.

Maine is largely a rural State and may be thought of less at risk from terrorist activities than the more urban areas. However, our long coastlines and international border have unique vulnerabilities. We have a great responsibility in the State for ensuring that our citizens remain safe. We have a unique opportunity and a responsibility that we feel keenly about, to act as a sentinel for our neighbors to the South and to the West. We will never forget that two of the September 11 hijackers began their deadly journey in our State.

Since before September 11 those of us in the profession of emergency management have been working closely with the Federal Government on fielding terrorism preparedness and weapons of mass destruction preparedness programs. On September 11, however, awareness was tragically awakened of the critical need of these programs. Our office, as I am sure every Member of Congress, was overwhelmed with requests for funds to support planning, training, equipment, and personnel costs.

In addition, there were requests to reimburse States and communities for what were perceived as national security costs, dollars expended by the States and the local governments to help respond to a national threat.

I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate and thank the Congress for the passage of the 2002 State Homeland Security Grant Program Part II. This is a giant step forward, not just the resources it provides the States, but also for the flexibility in the implementation it gives us. In addition to our ability to reimburse cities and towns for actions taken during Operation Liberty Shield and in future events is something I think we have collectively wanted to do since September 11. It will be with great pleasure that Governor Baldacci is able to distribute these funds to the local communities.

With the package just fielded, we are afforded flexibility in the amount of the award that can be used for equipment, planning, training, exercise, or administration. We are also permitted to use the training dollars, if needed, to reimburse overtime personnel costs required for successful training and exercise. This flexibility is welcome beyond words, and for more than what it will do in al-

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Cleaves appears in the Appendix on page 60.

lowing us to achieve preparedness goals. It demonstrates how responsive this Committee and the Congress, as a whole, has been to the feedback on the effectiveness of these grant programs. It bodes well for our collective ability to be able to serve our citizens well into the future. We must always be willing to look at what is working and then fix what is not working.

We also appreciate and support S. 838, introduced by Senator Collins, which creates a process whereby the States can request to reallocate funds received pursuant to appropriations of the State Homeland Security Grant Program among all four categories of equipment, training, exercise, and planning. This will give us the opportunity for flexibility in all the grants we are currently administering, and in Maine's case it will allow us to use all of our allocation and not have to return a portion that will otherwise remain unspent.

I am totally supportive of the guidelines that dictate 80 percent pass through of the ODP grant funds to local communities. It is after all the local communities who bear the brunt of that first response. We have not adequately addressed their needs, and we must do so. But without reducing direct aid to the communities, I think in the future we will need to look at those cases where supporting programs at the State level will benefit communities in an efficient and cost effective manner. Let me reiterate. I do not support sacrificing any direct pass through programs in order to increase State capability, but there are times when increasing these capabilities achieves a direct benefit for the local communities. As we look at the structure of future fielding possibilities, I think we need to be able to identify and support those opportunities.

Please allow me to address a couple of other concerns we have, one being the efficient coordination of grants from the Federal level. In Maine, when we first began to administer the FEMA's Terrorism Consequence Management Planning Assistance, TCMPA, that is 100 percent terrorism funding program that started before September 11, and the Department of Justice, now the ODP funds, it was immediately obvious that we needed to supply an in-state coordination that was not present within the Federal Government.

We put together an interagency team of county and local members to develop our homeland security strategy and to guide the grant-making process.

Today, a number of funding streams are gathered at the mantel of the Department of Homeland Security. But there are others that are not. There are funds available from HHS, CDC, EPA, Department of Transportation, and probably other Federal sources of which I am not yet aware. We could create 50 full-time jobs across the States, tracking Federal homeland security grants. How much more efficient it would be if the Federal Government agencies could better coordinate their grant opportunities, ensure that there was no redundancy in these precious resources, and even support each other in publicizing these opportunities.

I think we are doing a good job in Maine coordinating our State agencies and using the grants to complement each other, not duplicate each other's efforts. And I could stop being concerned right now. But as a taxpayer, I think we could do a better job at coordi-

nating that can be done from the top. I am not advocating that all funding opportunities be relocated to the Department of Homeland Security. It is absolutely appropriate that Federal agencies with particular missions work directly with their State. But the Department of Homeland Security and other Federal departments can use the bully pulpit afforded them as sources of funding to encourage States to coordinate all efforts of all State departments involved in homeland security. The best bang for the buck can be achieved by building capability for homeland security incidents on the backbone of all-hazard emergency management capability, which has as a basic tenet cooperation and coordination among all agencies.

Last, I would like to address the grant application process itself. My agency administers the Emergency Management Performance Grant, EMPG, and the Office of Domestic Preparedness grants. We find that both models have merits. The EMPG model is one that we find extremely flexible and easy to work with. Annually, we submit a strategic plan containing long-term goals and objectives and broad strategies that we use to achieve these goals. We also submit detailed work plans we use to track annual activities, and FEMA approves that plan, as well as the budget we submit. We report quarterly on our spending activities and the achievements at the strategy level. With our final report, we compare our accomplishments with our goals of the year. We identify our significant accomplishments and those areas that remain to have more work done. We are held accountable both fiscally and programmatically, but we are allowed flexibility in the design of the overall program. And that is for the whole State.

We use a similar process to manage EMPG grants at the county level, and we monitor their progress against their goals. This is the model we would like to see all grants follow. Indeed, we could envision an EMPG program platform expanded not only to include matching funds that would help us build our base emergency management capability, but also the 100-percent grants made available to address homeland security.

With the Department of Homeland Security now in place, we have a great opportunity to improve program coordination. With the all-hazards approach that has been the foundation of emergency management and the existing programs in the mix, we have the people and experience in administering grants effectively and efficiently and the infrastructure to support them. The relationship is already in place that connect Federal, State, and local governments in preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation, and that is working every single day. As the Department continues to evolve, we have a solid base to build on.

Senator Collins, I thank you very much for this opportunity to testify today.

Senator COLLINS [presiding.] Thank you very much, Mr. Cleaves.

First, let me apologize to the mayor for missing his oral testimony, but I did read your written testimony and I look forward to asking you questions. As you can see, we are doing a tag team here to try to keep the hearing going. So we are taking turns voting and chairing.

Commissioner, we look forward to hearing your statement.

**TESTIMONY OF MARK J. STENGLEIN,¹ COMMISSIONER, BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS, HENNEPIN COUNTY, MINNESOTA**

Mr. STENGLEIN. Well, thank you. Thank you, Chairman Collins. And I am very far from home, but everybody has made me feel quite at home. The table I am used to sitting around has a 7-, 5-, and 4-year-old, so it is quite a different atmosphere here. But I bring you greetings from the State of Minnesota, the Upper Midwest.

I would also like to thank Senator Lieberman and the two Senators from my State, Senator Dayton and Senator Coleman, and Members of the Committee where they may be.

My name is Mark Stenglein, and I am a county commissioner from Hennepin County in Minnesota. Hennepin County is the most populous county in Minnesota with over 1.1 million residents. Hennepin County is charged with helping to maintain the health, safety, and welfare of one-quarter of the State's population, and I am honored to have the opportunity to testify before you today. I will also note that the National Association of Counties has submitted testimony for the Congressional Record as well. I would also like to personally thank Senator Coleman for his invitation to testify this morning.

Since the attacks of September 11, Hennepin County has been preparing for the day that everyone hopes will never come again. We have begun the difficult task of assessing our current preparedness planning and assets. We have continued to seek cooperation and collaboration with other units of government. And, finally, we have sought the resources necessary to achieve our goals.

First, I would like to give you a brief summary of where we currently stand in our assessment and planning stages.

Hennepin County has assessed our vulnerabilities at all levels. We have upgraded our emergency preparedness plans, reassessed our evacuation procedures for all county buildings. We have made structural improvements to "target harden" our facilities and infrastructure and added additional security measures at our citizen service centers to enhance the safety of our employees and the public.

Hennepin County is the keeper of records for millions of Minnesotans. We issue everything from birth certificates to death certificates, passports, and driver's licenses. We must provide access for our citizens so they may conduct their business in a convenient and safe manner. County facilities that were once designed for easy public access must now be reconfigured. Security measures must be retrofitted to ensure safety for our employees and citizens—all while keeping the delicate balance between safety and service.

Another area of intense focus is our hospital. Hennepin County operates the Hennepin County Medical Center, known as HCMC. HCMC is the only public hospital in the metropolitan region and the only hospital in the downtown core with a Level I trauma facility. When it comes to serving the citizens in a time of crisis, we are it. It is a tremendous responsibility that we take very seriously. That is why HCMC has been leading the smallpox vaccination program for area hospitals and is also the lead agency for biological

¹The prepared statement of Mr. Stenglein appears in the Appendix on page 63.

and chemical decontamination units. We have also developed a mutual aid compact involving 22 hospitals in the metropolitan region. HCMC is also a global admitting hospital designated by the CDC.

We have begun planning for continuity of government and the continuation of operations in the event of a tragedy. The continuity of government and the continuation of operations is essential. Clearly identified roles and responsibilities allow our first responders, emergency coordinators, and administrators to carry out emergency plans with precision and without hesitation.

Hennepin County has not focused all of its efforts internally. We have also sought to partner with the Federal Government, the State of Minnesota, neighboring counties, and municipalities. These partnerships define where we are headed in preparing for an emergency. One example of this cooperation was a joint venture with the City of Minneapolis on an emergency preparedness training program, sponsored by FEMA, at Mount Weather, Virginia. City and county leaders, including myself, along with emergency personnel at all levels, conducted training operations under differing scenarios. This hands-on approach to learning highlighted our strengths and outlined our weaknesses, providing us with a blueprint for improvement.

Our cooperation does not end there. The Hennepin County Sheriff continually meets with city police chiefs, State and Federal law enforcement officials, emergency management planners, and other security first responders to share information. Firefighters meet with EMS personnel to discuss tactics and scenarios to ensure that emergency plans are developed consistent within all disciplines.

Another example of cooperation is the county-wide advisory group formed to recommend and prioritize how to best use scarce economic resources. Representatives from police, fire, EMS, sheriff's office, public health departments, and the hospital meet to provide information and insight related to emergency preparedness planning. Each representative knows how her or his respective agency needs to respond in a moment of crisis. The challenges to respond in a crisis increase under the threat of terrorism or biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction.

Hennepin County has also partnered with local entities such as the Minneapolis Airports Commission and the Metropolitan Council on the preliminary design study of a secure cargo facility near our international airport located within our county. We believe that a consolidated regional distribution center for air cargo will streamline the security screening process of the thousands of tons of cargo leaving Hennepin County and Minnesota each year. This regional distribution center will also impact the local economy and maintain the balance between security and the economic impacts of delay.

Working together, we are able to share ideas and concerns. We have worked hard to identify and prioritize equipment and training needs. Most importantly, we have moved from an independent approach to a shared, regionally-centered approach. We are breaking down many of the old barriers to cooperation. We have made tremendous progress in uniting behind best practices and ensuring that we are doing all we can to protect and serve our residents.

Last, I am going to talk about the kinds of help we need in order to be successful.

We need money.

Should I say that again? We need money.

We lack the training and equipment to prepare or respond to a radiological attack. A “dirty bomb” would have a devastating impact. We agree with the Hennepin County Sheriff that the concept of a regional law enforcement response team may be necessary to effectively operate in hazardous or contaminated areas. Resources are required to coordinate such an endeavor.

More funding is needed for specialized equipment. There is virtually no capability in Hennepin County or the State of Minnesota for heavy urban search and rescue. It would take nearly 48 to 72 hours to call in such equipment. By then it may be too late.

We require funding so we can prepare, so we can plan, so we can train, so we can test ourselves, so we can assess and reassess, and so we can repeat the process until we have got it right.

Thus far, Hennepin County has received supplemental funding for the county and local communities to update plans for terrorism. We are currently utilizing a grant from the Department of Justice for first responder equipment. Resources have been slow to reach local governments, and we are just now in the process of applying for the 2003 Homeland Security grant intended for equipment and exercises.

Hennepin County strongly supports the current formula of the Homeland Security Department, Office of Domestic Preparedness grant program. That formula requires 80 percent of the money awarded to States be directed to local units of government.

Hennepin County also believes that the Emergency Management Performance Grant, EMPG, program funding needs to be increased. This is the program that facilitates and coordinates emergency planning and exercises. EMPG funding is essential for all local emergency planning programs. Local planners need the flexibility offered through the EMPG program.

We must keep in mind that disasters originate at the local level. Local responders are the first to arrive at a disaster scene. Those horrific first hours of September 11 are etched in our memories forever; local responders bore the brunt of that horror.

Counties are willing participants in emergency preparedness. We pledge to work with all agencies on a national, State, and regional level. Hennepin County is staffed with hard-working, dedicated individuals willing to do all they can to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of our citizens. We ask that you help provide us the tools necessary to make that a reality.

Madam Chairman, Members of the Committee, I sincerely thank you for the opportunity to testify here.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much, Commissioner.

The commissioner put it very bluntly. He said, “We need money.”

Mr. STENGLEIN. I said it twice.

Chairman COLLINS. I would like to ask all of our witnesses today your advice on how best to allocate that money. Regardless of the level of funding for Homeland Security, if the funds aren’t getting to the people who need them most, if they aren’t based on a formula that takes into account the threat, whether a State is a border State, whether it has major institutions or nuclear plants, etc.,

then no matter how much money we invest, we may not accomplish the goal of making our Nation safer.

And you represent four different perspectives, so starting with the Governor, I would like to ask your advice, as the Committee drafts legislation, on the issue of how do you best and most effectively allocate the funding?

Governor ROMNEY. Well, the funding, I think we would all agree, should go to the individuals who are the first-line preventers and first-line responders. That is going to be overwhelmingly at the city and town level. Some States have counties and, therefore, county government may participate in that, may have law enforcement; other States don't, therefore they would not. Some States have very extensive involvement of the State police in this effort; others don't. So you would have a wide range of differences between who those first responders and first preventers might be, but that is where the money ought to go. And that is why I think the direction that has been pursued in the past, which money is flowing through to those first responders and first preventers is the right way to go.

I would underscore what the Chairman has said, however, which is that money ought to go not just based on how many people there are in a location or what the geographical size is but, rather, what is the potential risk in a particular area. What kind of targets are there? What kind of access and availability is there to terrorist infiltration in the area? What kind of threat might exist from other sources, whether domestic or foreign, is something which has to be considered in where the funds would flow.

And it would be conceivable for the Federal Government to say we are going to do that kind of scoring, if you will, on the unique qualifications, I think as the mayor indicated, or the unique circumstances of each city and town in the country. But you would have tens of thousands that would have to be scored that way. I think the preferable matter would be to have the respective States carry out that scoring and do that on the basis of the integrated plan which they and the localities would create.

I mentioned that we have a city that has a nuclear facility in it, and one might say, oh, they obviously should get a lot of money then in that city to take care of that nuclear facility—except in our case the nuclear facility is not protected by the city or town. The protection entirely comes from the State Police and the National Guard. So, according to our plan, the funds should flow there.

On the other hand, the city I mentioned that has the LNG tanks and the jet fuel tanks is entirely protected by local law enforcement. The State Police plays no particular role in that community. And, therefore, the funds should flow in that direction in that particular community.

So I would underscore, let's flow the money where it is needed, that is, to the first responders and the first preventers. That is overwhelmingly going to be the cities and towns and counties, depending on the nature of the structure of the governmental entity in a particular State. But let's make sure it flows in a way which is consistent with a plan which has been created by all of those parties, Federal, State, and local working together, and then make sure that the individual uniqueness, as the mayor has indicated, of a particular community is factored into that assessment.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much, Governor.

Mr. Mayor, I know in your written testimony you have said that, until very recently, Detroit had received very little by way of homeland security funding. What is your advice to us on allocating the funding?

Mr. KILPATRICK. Well, thank you for asking that question, Madam Chairman. I would say I agree almost in whole with the Governor. I think we all agree that the money should go directly where it is needed most, and it should be based on a needs assessment, not based on population. And we should talk about where the health labs are that are doing the testing for the chemical or biological weapons. We should talk about where the Level I trauma centers are in our State. We should talk about the border security in a city like the City of Detroit and look at those unique qualifications of cities and towns and figure out how that money is allocated.

I think that is where the big debate comes and how it comes to those cities. I think mayors in this country have to have a direct relationship with the Federal Government. Being a former legislator, I truly agree that if all things were equal, and there was a fair assessment of scoring, and things went into our State capitals and came out fairly, that would be the best way to do it. But we all know, just like Portland in Oregon and Detroit in Michigan and Boston in Massachusetts, we are the giant sucking sound. And oftentimes we are politicized when we are trying to do good things for our city that also protect the entire State. Detroit is 46-plus percent of the GDP of the State of Michigan, and a lot of people don't like that. You know, it gets political in State Houses, State legislatures, and even many governors' offices.

So cities and mayors across this country in the 319 metro areas that make up 86 percent of the gross domestic product of this country are saying we need the money to come directly to cities because those local firefighters—I mean, when we have to pick up the phone and say there is an emergency, we don't call the county fire department or the State fire department.

On the border every single day are our Detroit police officers, and that money is coming directly out of general fund dollars that would pay for more crime fighting in neighborhoods. So we need that money to come directly to the city. Legislative bodies represent people all over the State and they are there to fight for their constituencies. Oftentimes they don't look at the direct issue of how we protect our entire State. It is more of how do I get money to my hometown.

So I think the dollars should be allocated directly to cities based on a needs assessment put together by the Federal Government's relationship to those cities. I said in my testimony, Los Angeles may need something different than the City of Detroit. In the City of Detroit, we have gone out and purchased a thousand HAZMAT outfits because we thought that would be a concern. We don't need any more of those, so we don't need money for HAZMAT. We need flexibility in spending so we can go out and say what we need is technology infrastructure; what we need is to do some work on our tunnel or our bridge crossing; or we need to improve our seawall so there is better access and better security measures there.

So we need a direct relationship with the dollars, or it will be politicized in a State like Michigan. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much. Mr. Cleaves.

Mr. CLEAVES. Thank you, Senator. I wouldn't dare to sit here and disagree with a governor or a mayor at all. [Laughter.]

But I would stress a couple of points, I think, that are very important.

To this point, there hasn't been any money distributed to the States that we could get to the community except for the supplemental that just went through. That is the first money we have seen at the State level that can actually be flowed down to the local communities. And the other thing that I would underscore is that at the State level we have visibility of all the planning, and in order to coordinate it so that one city, one community doesn't duplicate what the next community has, i.e., I would point out that Portland, Maine, doesn't have its own HAZMAT team today and it relies on volunteers from four neighboring communities. They are building that capability, but we see at the State level all of this regional planning coming together so we could put together one strategic plan for the whole State.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Commissioner Stenglein.

Mr. STENGLEIN. Well, it is very difficult, Madam Chairman, to come at the end of such esteemed and honored people who have some very good answers. Each unique community has their own needs, and the reality is that the people that sent us here are just counting on government to do it: "They will take care of it." We are the "they." And in Hennepin County, as an example, our hospital is a public hospital. There are hospitals that are private hospitals. They don't operate on capacity, they don't worry about capacity. They are always filling it up all the time, where our hospital, we have to maintain capacity all the time.

So, again, the uniqueness of each area—and as Governor Romney pointed out, depending on how difficult an area is to secure, could mean various parts of a problem that hopefully our elected people are coming to you and bringing the wants and needs.

Senator Lieberman was very accurate when he said that the war is within our borders now. The next 101st Airborne could be the Detroit Fire Department. It is very true, and they need those resources right away. Not saying that everything needs—it is incumbent upon us to coordinate all things. If the National Guard has a lot of HAZMAT suits in a locality, they should become available without question.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you.

Governor Romney, you mentioned the importance of a plan, and that is an issue that the Committee is also looking at. I wonder if you could share with us more about your experience in coordinating in your role with the Olympic Committee. It is my understanding that you came up with a single plan. I would like to know how important that was to the success of your effort and how you involved Federal, State, and local officials. Because, really, what you have done in many ways in that capacity is a model for what we need to do, in my opinion, for Homeland Security.

Governor ROMNEY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. It was a very interesting experience because, initially, as you might imagine,

with the award of the Olympic Games and the prospects of literally billions of dollars coming to the State of Utah, there were a number of law enforcement agencies that thought this was going to be the Holy Grail. We would have all the money necessary for equipment, for communications, and for security, and so we had police departments, city police departments, county sheriff's police, as well as the State Police, all creating their own plans. And much as planning has been done so far in our Nation, for many States planning is every city puts together their own plan, we staple it all together and bind it and say here is the statewide plan.

That would have not held us in good stead. I remember early on in my experience receiving a visit from the State Police, suggesting that they really needed an additional helicopter and couldn't we make that part of the security program for the Games. There was a sheriff in one of the rural counties that said they would love to have a mobile command center and couldn't we make that part of the overall plan.

And what we found is that the cities and towns, the county, and the State each had their own vision of what they needed. But the only security program that was highly effective was one which was planned together with the cities, the towns, the county, looking at, if you will, a theater-wide strategy for providing security.

I don't know as much about all the communities seated at this table as I do about the one in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake City itself is a relatively small population and geographic center with many, if you will, suburbs around it. Having a plan for Salt Lake City alone, without encompassing those communities around it, wouldn't have been effective. And having each one of them develop their own plans with their own communications systems, their own mobile command centers and so forth would not have been efficient or effective. That is what happened in the Atlanta Games. That is how the Atlanta Games were planned, and we had a terrorist incident there.

What we moved toward was a program where the local authorities, the State authorities, and the Federal Government sat down and worked together on a multi-year basis to create a truly comprehensive plan with no holes, where assignments were made, and where we said, for instance, OK, we only need one mobile command center, not one for each community. We need a communications system which is interoperable, and, therefore, cities and towns, we are not going to give you the money to go out and buy whatever you want. We are going to create a systemwide setting, and we put in place with Senator Bennett's help—a Member of this Committee—a communications program that covered all of the police and fire in the greater community.

This kind of interoperability was only possible given the fact that there was a statewide plan and a theater-wide plan that was developed.

Chairman COLLINS. Pardon me. I have to go.

Governor ROMNEY. That is fine. Thank you.

Chairman COLLINS. Please complete your comment.

Governor ROMNEY. You have to go vote. That is fine. Thank you.

I would note that what we have found as we have gone about the work of planning for our own community—and I have here with me

today my Secretary of Public Safety, who was formerly the police chief in Arlington County, the home of the Pentagon, who is experienced in saying how do you create a plan which is robust enough to prevent terrorism and also to respond to terrorism, unless you do so on a regional basis where interoperability and efficiency are high priorities. And that is something which we are increasingly able to do on a State basis. This stapling together of all the cities' and towns' plans and calling it a State plan just doesn't make sense. And, therefore, it has been critical from our standpoint to insist on the monies we have received—we have now passed through the State Government more than 95 percent of the homeland security funds that have been appropriated since 1999. But when people came to us and said, gee, we would like this project, we said we will only approve projects that are part of a regional plan. With 351 cities and towns, we don't want 351 plans. We want regionality, with the City of Boston working together with the City of Chelsea and the City of Revere, which are right next door, which happen to house these LNG and volatiles tanks, making sure that we have a system that encompasses both.

So I am, following on the Chairman's question, a strong believer in creating that plan with all parties and making sure that the funding is being allocated according to that plan. And I agree with the mayor. We don't want to have this as a political process, whether at the Federal or the State or the local level. It really has to be a plan based upon the specific needs and roles of the different parties.

Senator LIEBERMAN [presiding.] Thank you. I was thinking I feel like I am in the old Johnny Carson show where you hear the answer before you hear the question. [Laughter.]

It was a good answer.

Governor ROMNEY. Senator, I was asked with regards to the Olympic experience the nature of the planning process that we had undertaken and how that worked. And just to repeat a small piece, we began with each locality putting together their own plan and trying to cobble them together, and it was impossible. What we ended up with was a planning process which was city, State, and Federal, where the Federal played a very important role in helping us to build templates to tell us what needed to be done area by area. And that is really what made all the difference.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate your answer, Governor. I thank you.

Let me raise another question going to the relationship between the Federal Government and the local governments with regard to funding, and it is the question of whether because of your efforts in response to the terrorist threat or a response to a national problem, whether we should be directly funding personnel at the State, county, and local level?

Now, to some extent in a different context, the domestic anti-crime context, we made this decision in the 1990's when we created and funded the so-called COPS program, but this proposal which I mentioned, which Senator Collins and I and others are cosponsoring, called the SAFER Act, would basically take the COPS idea and move it to firefighters, and we would fund, directly fund additional firefighting personnel based on the conclusion that fire de-

partments are being required to bring on and train additional personnel to deal with terrorist threats.

There is some disagreement about this. Governor Ridge was before the Committee a couple of weeks ago and said that he thought there was—I believe I am doing him justice, that he thought there was probably an argument for funding overtime of personnel, particularly based on Federal determinations of higher alert levels, but not to pick up personnel costs.

So I wonder if I could ask you how you feel about us assuming some personnel costs at your levels of government based on a conclusion that those costs are necessitated by the national threat of terrorism. Yes, Mayor, do you want to start?

Mr. KILPATRICK. Yes. Senator, that speaks directly to the individual uniqueness of each community in this country. And on behalf of Detroit, the only time we have received any homeland security money has been directly from the Federal Government. The supplemental appropriation gave our State \$15.9 million. The City of Detroit was provided \$369,000 of that—2.5 percent. It was given out in a way that everybody gets some money instead of a real needs assessment on what is needed in our State.

When you have \$1.4 billion of trade coming across your waters every single day; when you have the largest corporation in the world sitting on your riverfront, when you have local police officers performing the job of national security; there has to be another conversation.

So I believe that the COPS program, and additional personnel are things that we should look at. But it should be done on a formula basis even from here. The individual COPS grants just allow local communities to hire police officers or firefighters. On behalf of Detroit, I am willing to submit what we actually need as far as homeland security, so that we can be evaluated fairly in a way where we get exactly what we need. I know mayors across the country would do the same.

We put together this homeland security plan. We have outlined from each department what they actually need to deliver public service, every single day, because I don't believe that emergency response will ever work unless you are delivering services that way every day. If you are trying to jump into a good communications system when an emergency happens, it won't work. If you are trying to energize your health department when an emergency happens and it doesn't work on a day-to-day basis, it won't work.

So we have spent a lot of time really getting our house in order to make sure that we can deliver basic public services, communicate with our citizens and bring our telecommunications and interoperable systems together with everyone so it works every day.

I agree wholeheartedly with the governor—the comments he made when he spoke about the Olympics. These plans can't be piecemeal, and that is why I believe that so much money is being wasted when it comes to our State, because we want to give money to this plan or to that plan instead of forcing the regions around the State of Michigan to get together and deal with this in a comprehensive form. When you have a million-plus people in downtown Detroit for the fireworks display, those are Detroit police officers

there. We get mutual aid from county sheriffs for those events. When the Red Wings—not this year—win the Stanley Cup (but that is a usual happening around the City of Detroit), and a million people come downtown, those are local police officers.

So, we have these agreements where we can work out regional things on a fund basis, and we want to drive everyone to sit down and talk about a real comprehensive plan. And I believe that with a direct relationship with local governments, an allocation of COPS dollars or COPS-formula-type dollars in homeland security would especially work for cities like Detroit that have become so politically charged in legislatures, in our legislature in Michigan. But it is always the big city—New York in New York, L.A. in California—it is always that big political thing that prevents the dollars from doing the most good for the citizens of that State.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mayor, for that thoughtful and helpful answer.

Mr. STENGLEIN. Just briefly, Senator?

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. STENGLEIN. On the surface, that sounds like a great idea because, you are right, the police and firemen are the first line of defense. But we have to be very careful, because when the police dollars went away, it was devastating to some cities because cities relied on those dollars and spent money that should have probably gone into public safety elsewhere.

So my only caution is, if that happens, to be very careful in how it is allocated to the cities.

Chairman COLLINS. Governor or Mr. Cleaves, would you like to answer that question?

Governor ROMNEY. I would be happy to. I will need to speak on my own behalf as opposed to the National Governors' Association.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Sure.

Governor ROMNEY. Because I am sure that from their standpoint any money would be greatly appreciated. [Laughter.]

So I don't want to draw them into my own remarks, but I would say that certainly there is justification for the Federal Government playing an ongoing role in funding virtually any effort it wished to fund relating to homeland security. The Federal Government has a responsibility for defending the homeland, for national security, for national defense, and this clearly falls within that range.

I would note, however, that our own experience at the Olympic Games was that the Federal Government rule, if you will, that we applied was that the funding would be provided for overtime only and that Federal support came for overtime, not only for those officers involved in the direct security effort but for those officers who were left at home that had to carry out overtime responsibilities because of those officers we had drawn away. So it was a pretty robust program.

In this circumstance, I think we have an unusual setting, and that is that the homeland security challenge has been unanticipated and unplanned for. And cities and towns and the States have not put in place a structure for being able to deal financially with this sudden post-September 11 financial crisis. And, therefore, the prospect of receiving some support or reimbursement for not only

equipment but also personnel I think is appropriate in these kind of unplanned, unanticipated emergencies.

Going forward, that is an issue that we will be happy for any largesse that comes our way.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Cleaves.

Mr. CLEAVES. My answer will be very brief.

Senator LEVIN. May I interrupt you just one second? Mayor Kilpatrick has to leave because of his schedule this morning and he is late for an appointment at HUD. And I am wondering whether or not we could excuse him, unless there is a question that any of us have—and I know I have a quick one, too. Senator Coleman I guess is our acting Chairman, so I will look at Senator Coleman. But if we could excuse the mayor, it would be very helpful, after a question or two. And I would ask the understanding of our other witnesses.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Cleaves, did you want to finish briefly?

Mr. CLEAVES. Yes, sir. Very briefly.

Senator LIEBERMAN. People from Maine are very much to the point. [Laughter.]

Mr. CLEAVES. We absolutely need funds with training flexibility because we don't have the police officers or the fire officials to adequately train today. So we can't even cover shifts. So, absolutely, money with flexibility for their training.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. Did you want to ask a question?

Senator LEVIN. I think Senator Coleman is probably our acting Chairman, so let me ask Senator Coleman—

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN

Senator COLEMAN. Well, as an ex-mayor, I did want to get the mayor's response, and actually from others. But while the mayor is here, I was always a great believer in direct funding to the cities and was oftentimes concerned as dollars went to the States that they never found their way down, and you have indicated that in your testimony about the supplemental.

My concern, though, is that not every city needs to have a robot bomb dog. Small cities don't. Have you thought about a regional approach? What do we do to make sure dollars get to you that you need in a more focused way, and whether at the State level that works fine, or a regional approach? How should we look at this?

Mr. KILPATRICK. I believe that there are several things that you should force us to do regionally, and when I got into office, Detroit had always been—had friction regionally. We brought everyone to the table. We now for the first time, I believe, in Detroit's history have a great working relationship with Oakland County and with Macomb County. We have brought all of our hospital systems in the entire southeastern Michigan region together. We meet about our planning now, and we are doing exactly what the Governor outlined.

It has taken us a while to get here. People are still scrambling because, yes, this is new. Homeland security is new. You still have some people saying they want their own interoperable system, which is kind of oxymoronic, you want to have your own interoperable system. But we are working out some of those issues.

But you are right, there are some cities that receive funding from the State that absolutely cannot use it to do any furtherance of homeland security or hometown security for us in Michigan. So, I believe that there should be some parts that come directly to the local government. We are kicking up people to supervise now, and you are taking them out of the line ranks because you have got your good people leaving.

So that is a big issue, but there are some concerns—the hospital funding, health care funding, Trauma I centers—where are they in the region? That should be regionally allocated, I believe, and there are some places that we should sit down and talk about how we deliver applications here together.

I think that the perfect example is transportation funding when you talk about bringing together regional systems around this country to get the biggest bang for transportation funding. I think something like that can happen when we talk about homeland security.

Senator COLEMAN. I will hold off in getting a response from the others, and I will recognize Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Just one question. First of all, the mayor has made reference to the action plan that he and the city have adopted relative to homeland security. And, Mr. Chairman, this is really a very visionary plan. It was done I think perhaps first in the country, and I would like this to be made part of the record of the hearing today.¹

Senator COLEMAN. Without objection.

Senator LEVIN. And my question is basically this: I also am a former local official. I was president of the City Council in Detroit, and we had—

Mr. KILPATRICK. I wish you were there now, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. And I understand the local perspective, too. It is essential, as the mayor said, that we not only have this regional effort put together to avoid handing out money to local communities that might not need it and to avoid duplication and waste, but you have got to have the local input at that table, as the mayor said. You have got to have a seat at that table. And it seems to me that is the challenge for us, to guarantee the local input at the same time we try to achieve the regional output or the regional outcome.

So I don't know if the mayor has a comment on that, but I just want to thank the mayor for this visionary plan, and I thank all of our witnesses for allowing me to interrupt you so I could get our mayor out of here to the commitment he has. Thank you.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Senator Levin. And, Mayor, if you have to leave, you are excused, we appreciate your testimony.

Mr. KILPATRICK. Well, thank you, Ranking Member Lieberman, Senator Coleman, and distinguished Members of the Committee. I apologize for having to leave, but as a mayor, HUD just threatened us for taking \$46 million from us for something that happened in 1988 when I was a senior in high school. [Laughter.]

¹ City of Detroit Action Plan for Homeland Security, Background Paper, April 4, 2002, submitted by Senator Levin, appears in the Appendix on page 90.

So I have to go over to HUD to try to save \$46 million so I can keep my job. I apologize, but thank you for the opportunity.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mayor, thanks for being here. I just think not only based on your ability, your intelligence, your commitment, but on your size, I would never threaten you. [Laughter.]

Mr. KILPATRICK. Thank you very much.

Chairman COLLINS [presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Mayor, for being with us today.

Mr. STENGLEIN. I think regionalism is—you are absolutely right, Senator Coleman. As you well know, Minneapolis and Hennepin County, the county has a crime lab, the city has a bomb squad, and we share, we interact. I don't know if other major metropolitan areas have a Met Council type planning agency, but regionalism like that on a seven-county—because we are within a compressed area enough that we can share resources, and it is absolutely incumbent upon us to work on sharing resources.

Senator COLEMAN. Madam Chairman, if I can continue?

Chairman COLLINS. Yes.

Senator COLEMAN. The question I had asked, I would actually be interested in—and I appreciate that. One comment, by the way, before the other responses, and I want to make it—Commissioner Stenglein, it is a pleasure to have you here. We talked about the COPS program and the money going away. The “going away” doesn't mean it is because the program is gone. The “going away” is because the money is phased to go away.

Mr. STENGLEIN. Right.

Senator COLEMAN. And what we are seeing in Minneapolis, Minnesota, right now is a situation where, because of financial difficulties of the city, we have the prospect of potentially laying off cops. In St. Paul, I hired ten folks in the COPS program, but had a long-term payment plan. And if you don't, that is the danger that you face. So I presume when you said going away—

Mr. STENGLEIN. Exactly. It is important that those positions are guaranteed or the payment stream like you did to keep them going.

Senator COLEMAN. I appreciate that.

Governor, I would be very interested in your perspective on regional approaches.

Governor ROMNEY. Thank you. I think Mayor Kilpatrick and myself would underline the same observations. One is that each city and town has a very unique circumstances or set of circumstances that they have to deal with as it relates to terror and security and that assessing those is essential to deciding what level of funds and what level of resources are necessary in a particular area.

Second, the only effective plans can be done on a regional basis. You can't put plans together on a citywide basis. Now, perhaps in some States, they only have three cities and that encompasses the entire population, you could do that. In our State, we have 351 cities and towns, so you can't do that. It has to be done regionally. And I don't know how you do something on a regional basis which takes into account the unique differences between cities and towns unless it is being done by the State. I don't know how you encompass regionality and pulling together regions unless the State is playing a lead role in doing so.

We could say we would like the Department of Homeland Security to create regions across the entire country, but the Department of Homeland Security has enough difficulty just dealing with 50 different States and their differences. But to say now you are going to take States apart and figure out their regions and get them to work together, put together plans, I just don't think is possible.

That is why I look to our Secretary of Public Safety, as a former police chief, and say let's make sure and create plans that are regional, that account for the differences and the unique elements of the respective communities within that region, and let's remove the politics. And I guess that was the question, I think, that the mayor had said, gosh, this could be political. You could have a State Government decide to hang onto the money or give it to their friends instead of the communities that need it.

I don't know how much that occurs in his State. I certainly don't believe it happens in our State. I believe this is an issue, homeland security, which is amenable to pretty clear objective criteria of targets and risks and who is playing which responsibilities, and the money should flow on those bases.

If someone really felt that the process had become too political, I guess one could ask the Department of Homeland Security to review the plans of the respective States to make sure that they are comprehensive and are fairly scored and are fairly encompassing the risks of the communities within that State. That is if someone felt it were out of bounds. But I do believe that regionality and uniqueness of circumstances forms the basis of how we have to carry out our homeland security effort.

And I would note again, just underlining that Olympic experience, that something that Senator Levin mentioned was that we have to have the localities as part of this process. You don't want to have a group of State employees and appointed officials putting together the plans of security. My experience, again, with the Olympics was that when we asked the State folks to come up with a plan, it wasn't right. When we asked the Feds to come up with a plan, it wasn't right. When we asked the localities to come up with a plan, it wasn't right.

The way the plan worked is by having all come together on a multi-year basis to create a unified plan where, in fact, the FBI played a lead role in intelligence, the Secret Service a lead role in terms of operational security and the hardening of our sites, and that kind of comprehensive planning process involved localities is an essential part of creating a regional plan which recognizes those uniquenesses.

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Cleaves.

Mr. CLEAVES. Senator, I couldn't say it any better than Governor Romney just did. Maine built its strategy around regionalization, and it involved paper companies with HAZMAT teams, and we continue to do that. And the only way you can achieve true efficiency and effectiveness is through regionalization. We stress that from the State level. We have got the emergency management grant process that we could follow that teaches building that, and an e-map, an assessment through emergency management that allows you to measure the progress of each of those regions as you build them.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you for that response.

Mr. Cleaves, I want to follow up with you on a point that you made in your testimony. You talked about that you receive homeland security funds from a variety of different agencies and that each agency requires a separate emergency management plan and each has a separate grant program that requires a separate application.

I assume that that paperwork involves duplicating work that you have done for one agency but doing it on a new form and responding in little different ways. Is that correct?

Mr. CLEAVES. Absolutely, Senator.

Chairman COLLINS. Is that a problem? Does that divert time away from higher priorities? Do we need to try to streamline the process so that you have one plan?

Mr. CLEAVES. Yes, please. Senator, we have to give plans to FEMA currently, and the Department of Justice or ODP grants, each one containing different strategies, slightly different. Same overall strategy for the State of Maine but different forms to fill out.

Shortly after September 11, we had to divert our crews to finish the ODP grant that we were working on so we could get at the money for the first responders to provide equipment for them. So we diverted help from one area in order to fill out these grants. So if we could have one strategic plan for the whole State, and as a matter of fact it would be ideal if it encompassed the Bureau of Health so CDC and HRSA money would also be under one total plan for the State. That would be ideal for us. One time and one computer input, please.

Chairman COLLINS. In view of the circumstances today I am just going to ask one final question but we may have some additional ones for the record, and I am going to give Senator Levin an opportunity to see if he has some additional ones. I do want to say that all of your written testimony will be put in the hearing record as well.

My final question, and I will start with you, Governor, is would it be helpful to have a single entity within the Department of Homeland Security that is knowledgeable about all the homeland security grant programs both inside and outside of the Department, so that you could have a single point of contact, sort of one-stop shopping, if you will, for homeland security?

Governor ROMNEY. I think that principle is so attractive that I wish it could apply to all agencies of the Federal Government. I think one of the great challenges we have at the State, and I am sure at the municipal level as well, is trying to find where to go to obtain support or financial help as necessary to carry out the missions of State Government. And particularly in an area as important as homeland security, having a place where one could apply for help and guidance would be remarkably valuable.

I salute the work of Secretary Ridge. He is creating a remarkably successful program. We have had a chance to meet on a couple of occasions now and each time I am impressed with what is being accomplished there. The work to create some templates, if you will,—and by that term I mean some guidance as to what types of action we might want to carry out at a particular threat level for

a particular type of potential target. Those kinds of templates are highly valuable to us.

So, likewise, receiving support for making a single point of access to homeland security for grant purposes as well as for other informational purposes would be highly valuable.

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Cleaves, would that be helpful for a small State like Maine to have that single point of contact?

Mr. CLEAVES. Yes, Senator, I certainly do agree with that. That would be very helpful to us. I would suggest that if that were to occur that the individual or individuals would be located at the one homeland security center where the governor has access to that. That, in our case, is Maine Emergency Management. It would be collocated so that we could more effectively work all the programs.

Chairman COLLINS. Commissioner?

Mr. STENGLEIN. Madam Chairman, echo 100 percent. Yes, it would be. It would be wonderful.

Just to follow, when I first became a commissioner—and I am a business guy—to follow Federal health care funding is an absolute maze. Hopefully we do not get into that problem with security funding because, the bottom line is, our residents depend on us to keep them safe. So the most we can streamline this with one entity, one agency here, the better off for everybody.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. This seems to be 4M day here. We have got Massachusetts, Michigan, Maine, Minnesota. I do not know how Delaware got in here?

Governor ROMNEY. Governor Minner.

Chairman COLLINS. Very good.

Senator LEVIN. On this issue that Senator Collins has raised, I have raised this central point question in a slightly different way with Governor Ridge a number of times. In Senator Collins' bill is a very important provision about that central point of contact. It should be presumably, or what it is going to be is the office for State and local coordination in the Secretary's office. But that has not been done and the bill is very helpful in that regard to promote it.

But I would also urge Governor Ridge to have an 800 number where State and local governments can call in the meantime. Just one place where you can call for information. He is committed to creating that number. It has not yet been created, but I want to let you know that Senator Collins and all of us here are very conscious of the dispersal or the dispersion of information even about grants and other needs at the department. So the 800 number commitment has been made by Governor Ridge.

My second point really is a question. Is there any overall number in your States, dollar figure, for the extra cost of homeland security since September 11? Would you be able to tell us in your States or your local communities—does a number exist in any of your States or local communities, this is what you were spending on security prior to September 11. This is what our expenditures are since September 11. Governor, let me just ask you first, perhaps.

Governor ROMNEY. Let me respond to your first point first, the 800 number, and then the second. I would note that our ability to access information from homeland security has been remarkably

good, both through the White House, Ruben Berellas, who does intergovernmental affairs in the White House, gets us to the right place quickly. We likewise, through both of undersecretary contact and through Governor Ridge himself have been able to get superb information. I have no complaints there. I do not always like the answer, but I love the communication and we have been very pleased there.

Senator LEVIN. I do not think that is true with a lot of local governments. It is shared more so with State Governments.

Governor ROMNEY. I am sure that is the case. I cannot possibly read all the figures to you, but I have just been handed here a summary of our spending on security associated with preventing terrorism and responding to potential terrorist acts since September 11. That is something we will be happy to provide to the Committee in great detail.

Senator LEVIN. The extra amount—

Governor ROMNEY. The extra amount of spending. I am given a total here of approximately \$53 million is the cost to our State and municipalities associated with additional spending post-September 11.

Senator LEVIN. Per year?

Governor ROMNEY. That would be in total since September 11. The numbers are getting better and better. When Secretary Ridge contacted us with the most recent declaration of the Orange level of threat he said, I would like you to collect community by community and statewide what your true incremental costs are.

For instance, in the community I mentioned that has the LNG facilities, I spoke with the mayor there. He said, we would like to consider putting on—and I will not give you the exact number, but we would like to consider putting on additional patrols to circulate in that area. I said, what will it cost? He said, it is \$100,000 in additional overtime to protect that, per week. I said, go ahead. We will stand behind you on a State basis. We did that with a number of localities, again, according to our statewide plan. We add those numbers up and can look on a weekly basis. At the State police level we were spending about \$250,000 incremental overtime during Code Orange that we do not spend otherwise. This was to protect our tunnels, our bridges, and certain other key targets.

So we calculate the number, gather the number and \$53 million is the round figure. We can provide that on a pretty detailed basis.

Senator LEVIN. Does Maine have a figure?

Mr. CLEAVES. I cannot give you that figure, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. For the record, if you could try.

Mr. CLEAVES. What I can tell you is that from the Maine Emergency Management agency, we have chased the figures every time and there is a difference between should have and could have. What the folks want to do, municipal officials wanted to do, they were not able to do, so many of the communities ran a great risk. We went from Portland, Maine all the way to Caribou and Fort Kent trying to assemble those costs, but all we got back was a lot of, this is what we would have done. So a lot of holding our breath out there right now.

Senator LEVIN. Madam Chairman, that is a very important point and I would ask the governor also to submit the need figure as well

as what you actually spent above your previous amount, because Mr. Cleaves' point is critically important in that regard, too.

Mr. STENGLEIN. I could not agree more. There is a need level that everybody will say, oh my gosh, I cannot believe you did not do that even though you should have done that but you did not have the resources. In Hennepin County it is in the low millions. That may be a small number for the folks who deal with numbers out here, but for us it is a large amount. The exact number will be forthcoming.

Our courthouse was built to access the public. There are 32 entrances and it is very difficult to screen 32 entrances. Then there was the cost of closing down a public garage which generated revenue for us too. We had that closed down for 8 months. Now it has reopened again.

Senator LEVIN. Which is a cost.

Mr. STENGLEIN. Sure it is. If opportunity cost.

Governor ROMNEY. Senator, might I add a comment as well with regards to our spending and the \$53 million? Following September 11, a significant portion of our security spending was designed to reassure the public that we were doing something. But not all of that spending was really essential to actually securing various sites. We had, for instance, State troopers at the entrance to major tunnels, the entrance to which was a 55-mile-an-hour, eight-lane highway. There is not much the trooper was really going to be able to do if there were to be some kind of a terrorist attack at that tunnel other than to communicate to the public that we were there and caring.

So we spent a lot of money to be visible and to show that we were concerned. How much was absolutely essential to protecting that asset is something which we would also need to calculate.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. I am going to pass on my other questions just because of the circumstances.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Carper.

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Madam Chairman. To our witnesses, welcome.

Where are you from, Mr. Stenglein?

Mr. STENGLEIN. Minneapolis, Hennepin County.

Senator CARPER. Welcome. Maine; is that correct?

Mr. CLEAVES. Yes, sir.

Senator CARPER. And Massachusetts?

Governor ROMNEY. Correct.

Senator CARPER. As an old governor, I welcome you. I have not had the privilege of meeting you, but welcome today. I always thought it was a privilege to be Governor of Delaware and I wish you great success in your responsibilities.

Senator Collins, who usually leaves the room when I am about to speak— [Laughter.]

Thank you for carrying on while I go vote.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER

Senator CARPER. Senator Collins and I introduced legislation last month—we try to introduce a bill a month. We introduced a bill last month that says, let us address a little bit the flexibility of the first responder monies as they come to States. I think there are

four categories that you can be spend your first responder dollars in.

I think one is for planning, one is for training, one is for exercises, and I think the other is equipment purchases. The current program is rather restrictive as to how those monies can spent. The bill Senator Collins and I have introduced gives States the option, if they want to, to ask for a waiver from the Secretary of Homeland Security that would allow them to spend their first responder money more flexibly. Not to create a fifth or sixth or seventh pot, but to move money back and forth between those four.

I do not know if you are aware of that legislation, if you have any thoughts as to whether it might be a good or a bad idea. I do not know if any of the organizations that you are part of, including the National Governors Association might have a view on it that you could share with us.

Governor ROMNEY. I cannot share the National Governors Association view of the specific legislation because I am not really authorized to speak on behalf of all the governors on that matter. I will speak as one of them, however, and anticipate that the other governors would agree. That is that the principle of flexibility is something which they would very much applaud.

The constraints occasionally of programs or funding which come from Federal programs can be challenging and can suggest that money needs to be spent in a way that may not be consistent with the comprehensive plan which has been developed by the State, the region or the municipality. Being able to have a mechanism to approach the Secretary of Homeland Security and ask for a waiver to spend money in the four categories but according to our plan I think would be a very positive step.

I am concerned about the fact that municipalities and State Governments facing tough economic circumstances will look to take money to solve budget problems elsewhere. Homeland security money should, of course, be directly towards solving homeland security needs. So there need to be strictures and guidelines which are applied. But the principle of flexibility within those different categories is one which I think is consistent with safeguarding the public's money and providing for homeland security.

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Mr. Cleaves.

Mr. CLEAVES. Senator, very specifically, in our State, under the ODP grant process that we are currently working with, we are allocated \$1 million in exercise money for this year. We cannot train, we cannot exercise, so I cannot get from point A to point B. So what Maine is facing is the return of \$1 million unspent and still leaving needs that are unmet in terms of training. It is the cost for overtime, flexibility is what we really need.

Senator CARPER. Thank you.

Mr. STENGLEIN. Senator, I think the need for flexibility is pretty obvious. Earlier, the Mayor of Detroit brought up an excellent situation in that if they have a bunch of HAZMAT suits and they get money to buy HAZMAT suits, it is unfortunate that they do not need any more HAZMAT suits. So we need the ability to move the money around.

Senator CARPER. What we have in mind is permission to move money from one of the four categories to another. It would be in

order to allow them not just to meet their individual needs but to be consistent with their emergency management plans. There would have to be some rationale to the movement.

All right, good. Thanks. Thanks very much. Is anyone in the room from the National Governors Association? Do we have anybody who is from the NGA? Welcome. I thought if the NGA could share with this Committee, with Senator Collins and myself, a view of the legislation that would be most appreciated. Thank you very much.

Senator COLEMAN. Senator Carper, Senator Levin asked the question—I did not hear all the answers but I would direct it to you, governor, about increased homeland security costs post-September 11. I was a mayor on September 11, and afterwards with the whole set of things we had to do. But one of the things that troubled me as a Mayor was that I would have my department heads and fire department come in, and I would have a list of all sorts of needs. I did not need to increase the number of firefighters in St. Paul in order to deal with September 11.

So as that question is asked, the question I have, again, wanting the money to be well spent, and wanting to be focused, who should assess the needs? Who assesses whether Bangor, Maine needs certain equipment, whether Minnetonka, Minnesota, a small town, has needs? How do we do that so in the end when we get a response as to here are the increased security costs, we have a sense of confidence that the security costs are in fact September 11 related in different perspectives, not simply, we have a lot of needs and in this environment, this is an opportunity then to have all those needs met? Who should be responsible for that kind of assessment? I will start with you, governor.

Governor ROMNEY. Thank you. I would not have an answer for that had I not gone through this experience with the Olympics. Here we had a setting where we knew we were a potential target for terrorism. The Olympic Games have been terrorized at least twice before resulting in a loss of life. So we began a process several years before the games beginning to plan for what the security would be at our various venues and so forth.

The legislation which created the designation of a national special security event came very much to our benefit. That is that the Federal Government was tasked with providing specific guidance in helping us construct a security plan for the Olympic Games and for the community in which the games were being held.

What that meant was that, for instance, when it came time to decide what we are going to do at our basketball arena, that instead of asking the local Salt Lake police or the sheriff of Salt Lake County or the State police to develop a plan to protect the basketball arena during the Olympic Games, instead we were able to work with the Secret Service and they said, these are the parameters. This is a template, if you will, of how to protect a facility which is a potential target, which will potentially be hosting heads of State, against a terrorist attack.

They provided us with the specifics; the number of feet we needed to have barricades, distance from the facility. How we dealt with the media trucks and cables and so forth that might be in the facility. The level of search that would be necessary for people coming

in the facility. They really provided the guidelines. Then we at the local level and the State level, working with them, applied them to the specific circumstances of the physical plant we were looking at.

So in creating those plans on a regional basis or a city basis, I look to a similar model, which is the Department of Homeland Security, which now I understand has the Secret Service within it, provides to us a series of, if you will, broad guidelines or templates saying that when you reach a Code Orange state, or a Code Red state, or a Code Yellow state, then these are the parameters that we think should be applied for a nuclear facility, these are for a major tunnel, a major bridge, these are for major buildings, these are for gatherings of individuals. These are the types of things that you should have in place. This is the amount of HAZMAT capacity you should have based on population. So they provide, if you will, some overview guidelines.

We take those guidelines and on a State basis, working with our localities, we apply them region by region, city by city, town by town. I would then anticipate that the Federal Government will look at those and say, yes, looks like you did a pretty good job. You are not over-politicizing, you are not taking care of your friends, you are doing the right job statewide, and now we have a plan which is consistent not only within our State but consistent across the Nation, and has associated with it the funding requirements of that plan as well.

Senator COLEMAN. So you see a very clear Federal role providing some kind of template, almost so that the specifics get dealt with at the local level?

Governor ROMNEY. Exactly. We do that, for instance, with nuclear facilities today. Prior to the September 11 circumstance, as I understand it, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission lays out, if you will, a series of guidelines for how a nuclear facility is to be protected. Those guidelines are interpreted and managed differently in different States. But the Federal Government does provide some direction.

With regards to our planning for the Olympics, the help of, in this case the Secret Service in laying out the protection of physical facilities was very helpful. The help of the FBI in giving us direction on intelligence and who should play which role, and how the local authorities would gather data and funnel that to the Federal authorities or State authorities was something they had done before, they managed for us. So they played a very important role in doing that.

Had we been left to our own devices we might have cobbled something together in the manner that it happened in Atlanta, where there were gaping holes between plans of the different municipalities and the State and the Federal Government. So a far more comprehensive plan was established by having all parties work together with extensive Federal involvement.

Senator COLEMAN. I would be very interested in the other—particularly a more local perspective coming from the commissioner, but Mr. Cleaves.

Mr. CLEAVES. Senator, thank you. I am concerned about a template that you describe from the Federal level because it cannot be a cookie-cutter approach. All local municipalities need to know

what mutual support is available left and right, and they know that. So the planning group needs to include the local, then a regional level, and State level, and then not to forget the Federal partners. In Maine we have formed an antiterrorism task force—

Senator COLEMAN. You actually have a joint Federal task force, you have that model in Maine?

Mr. CLEAVES. Yes, we do. We have a model that the U.S. Attorney chairs along with us at the emergency operation center. We meet frequently to look at the plans and pull—one of the things that we found most out of sync was that the Federal departments that support our coastline or our borders were not interwoven on a daily basis with the State departments or the local government entities. At meetings sometimes, but not interwoven so that you know operational details on a daily basis. It also includes the FBI.

So that is working well for us. But it has got to include from the local level up so they know what both Federal and State capabilities are, so you will know what that response is. That is the most effective and efficient way to do it.

Senator COLEMAN. Commissioner Stenglein.

Mr. STENGLEIN. Senator, are you asking with specificity what person would be in charge of that? I think that is what you are looking for.

Senator COLEMAN. I am trying to figure out who should do the assessment. I am sitting at my level and we hear that—the question from Senator Levin was, tell us about your increased cost. We have to assess. Folks need more money. My concern is, who is assessing whether those are truly homeland security costs? I need to have more confidence based on my own experience as a mayor where a fire chief coming in wanting increased firefighters, increased all this stuff and I am sitting there—I have got to tell them, that is not related to September 11. So who should do that kind of assessment that will allow policymakers at this level to have confidence in needs so that we can make judgments about needs?

Mr. STENGLEIN. Senator, speaking from the perspective of Minnesota and the county form of government we have there, St. Paul has different needs than White Bear, as you well know. White Bear does not have a River Centre or an Excel Center. The person closest—I believe firmly in keeping those decisions and those realizations as close to the residents as possible. The elected sheriff in each town, in each county, is a good person to turn to for that. As you well know, back in Minnesota with the 800 MHz communication process, those sheriffs and the counties have gotten together. CRIMNet is another great example, taking a front end device of technology through joint powers boards and pulling it together to understand that.

The exact assessment needs to come from as close to the people. I think the elected sheriff in each county is a good person to turn to.

Senator COLEMAN. And the Federal role in that?

Mr. STENGLEIN. The Federal role in that, clearly we definitely depend on the Federal role to give us guidelines on how to protect a power plant, how to protect a tunnel, how to protect bridges, air-

ports, these sorts of things. The expertise coming from the Federal level, we should not duplicate that at the State level at all.

Senator COLEMAN. The question, I think was a very good comment made about the joint task forces, which I know in Minnesota are very strong. Do they have a role to play in this?

Mr. STENGLEIN. Yes.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman. You have been very interested in this issue and I was pleased to join you earlier in the week in Minnesota where we could hear from other officials and that was very valuable as well.

I want to thank all of our witnesses for their extraordinary patience with the unusual circumstances of this hearing today. It was very valuable to us. And I want to thank my colleagues for keeping the hearing going. Last night, at one point we thought of trying to postpone the hearing, but then we realized we could not find you to tell you that. I am glad that we decided instead to go forward because we do want to act on legislation within the next few weeks.

I am sure that we will be in touch with you for drafting the bill to get additional advice, but your testimony today has been extraordinarily helpful. Again, I want to thank you for your patience as we have run back and forth from the floor to vote. So thank you very much.

The hearing record will remain open for 15 days. I want to thank my staff for their hard work on this hearing as well. We look forward to working with you to strengthen the partnership among the Federal, State, county and local governments as we all work toward the goal of strengthening our homeland security. So thank you and this hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH

Good morning and thank you, Madam Chairman.

Madam Chairman, I commend you for your continued leadership and dedication to ensure that our State and local governments have a forum in Congress to discuss the challenges they face in securing our homeland. Protecting Americans from further acts of terrorism is the top national priority. It is an enormous task that involves the cooperation of hundreds of thousands of dedicated local, State, and Federal employees who guard the ports and borders of our country, gather and analyze intelligence, investigate leads, make arrests, and respond to assist the victims of terrorist attacks.

It is clear that terrorism has changed the way we govern at the Federal, State, and local levels. As a former mayor and governor, I understand what it takes to make hard choices in tough economic times. Therefore, I am extremely attentive to the fact that our States are facing their worst economic crisis in 50 years. State legislatures across the country are attempting to balance their budgets through challenging and unpopular mechanisms, such as raising taxes or cutting services. Unfortunately, the Federal Government is not in the position to offer a great deal of financial assistance, as we are faced with our own tough budget decisions.

However, Madam Chairman, I strongly believe the Federal Government could offer better structural solutions to help the States and localities improve the delivery of homeland security services. For instance, there is one homeland security grant program, administered by the Office of Domestic Preparedness, which is based on a pre-determined formula that does not provide the States any flexibility when disbursing funds.

Furthermore, the General Accounting Office recently noted that there are at least 16 different grant programs for the Nation's first responders. These grants are currently provided through two different directorates of the new Department of Homeland Security, and through the Department of Justice, and the Department of Health and Human Services. This is a clear example of how fragmented the homeland security grant process is. Madam Chairman, I am afraid this fragmentation is causing confusion and an administrative burden for State and local officials, a situation Congress specifically intended to avoid in creating the new Department. One of the main reasons for creation of the new Department was to consolidate, coordinate, and streamline homeland security functions and to provide for homeland security more effectively.

Fortunately, Senator Collins introduced two legislative solutions to alleviate these problems and I am pleased to co-sponsor both bills. The first bill would give States the flexibility to use Office of Domestic Preparedness grant money from one category of funding, such as training, for another purpose, such as equipment. The second bill would move the Office of Domestic Preparedness from its current location in the Border and Transportation Security Directorate to the Office of State and Local Government Coordination. This organizational shift should establish a centralized location within the new Department of Homeland Security to help our first responders identify and apply for important grant funding.

At the Federal level, we also must make a concerted effort to ensure that funds are distributed to the States and localities in a timely manner. In fact, I recently discussed this issue with the Dale Shipley, Director of the Ohio Emergency Management Agency. I was astounded to learn that Ohio did not receive the FY 1999 and FY 2000 funds for homeland security until March 2002. Remarkably, as of April 17, 2003 only 88 percent of the FY 1999 funding was spent.

In May 2002, my State of Ohio received the FY 2001 funding and as of December 2002, just 49 percent of those funds were spent. Unfortunately, the process did not improve for FY 2002, as funding was not distributed until October 2002, one year

after the beginning of the fiscal year. As of December 2002, only 11 percent of the money was spent.

Today, I am interested in hearing if our witnesses are encountering similar problems and, if so, what solutions they propose. At the end of this process, I am hopeful that we can ease the strain caused by the disjointed homeland security grant process. My goal is to go back to Dale Shipley, and the Mayors of the six largest cities in Ohio, who recently contacted me about their homeland security challenges, and tell them that we are making the grant process clear, efficient and responsive to their needs.

Madam Chairman, thank you for your leadership on this issue, and I look forward to an engaging discussion with our witnesses.

Governor Mitt Romney
Testimony Before the
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
“Investing in Homeland Security: Challenges Facing State & Local Governments”

Madam Chair:

I appreciate this opportunity to testify before the Senate Government Affairs Committee and thank you and Senator Lieberman for the thorough review you are conducting on this most important issue. The attacks of September 11 forced government at all levels – federal, state and local – to rethink how we do the day-to-day job of protecting our citizens. Changes that would normally take decades of thoughtful consideration and review have been done in a matter of months. Yet we all realize that these are but the first steps. Much more remains to be done both by government and by the private sector as businesses incorporate post-9/11 thinking into their operational and financial plans. Therefore, it is appropriate that Congress assess the lessons learned to date, ensure that there is consensus at every level of government on both the degree of progress made and the most critical next steps, and establish a framework for future actions and funding. I commend you and the members of this Committee for the commitment you have made to this task.

On that note, I want to personally lend my support to your proposals to move the Office of Domestic Preparedness under the direct supervision of Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge and to provide maximum flexibility in the expenditure of federal homeland security funding. The latter is a welcome recognition of the varied and unique challenges that states face on the homeland security front.

I would also like to express the appreciation of all the nation’s Governors, and of our citizens, for the work that Secretary has done. After his long and distinguished service in Congress and as governor of Pennsylvania, it might have been tempting for Secretary Ridge to return to private life. But, instead, he heeded President Bush’s call to help protect all Americans from the terror and grief we experienced on September 11.

Clearly, the President chose the right man for the job. Secretary Ridge's performance has been stalwart. As a former governor, he understands the challenges we face and has done everything possible to provide us with the tools to overcome these challenges.

Recently, Governor Ruth Ann Minner of Delaware and I were asked by the National Governors Association to serve as "co-lead Governors" on Homeland Security issues. In this role, we will work with our nation's Governors to develop recommendations and consensus positions on a number of the key issues under discussion in this arena. Our goal is to provide a single point of contact for the Congress. As a first step, we intend to conduct a survey of our nation's Governors in order to understand: the homeland security issues they deem most critical; the difficulties or challenges they face as they seek to improve state-wide homeland security plans; their funding challenges; and the top areas of non-financial assistance they need from the new Department of Homeland Security. We will use this information to conduct a series of meetings with Governors over the next few months and provide to you, Madam Chair, and your colleagues a perspective on both our progress and challenges facing our states.

My testimony this morning will focus on only three areas that the Governors believe are key to ensuring that we invest our homeland security dollars and resources wisely. These are:

- Investing resources based on comprehensive and integrated statewide plans.
- Maximizing the investment in intelligence gathering and analysis
- Providing a multi-year framework for homeland security planning.

First, we believe it is critical that homeland security funding and resources be applied against comprehensive and integrated statewide plans. Frankly, this is the only way that our nation's citizens can be assured that we are getting the maximum impact from the billions of dollars we are investing annually in Homeland Security. You have all heard the anecdotes that are beginning to circulate – of communities side-by-side that purchase incompatible radio equipment and cannot talk with each other when responding to multi-jurisdictional emergencies. Or of the rural community that I

understand requested homeland security funds for a new fire truck, despite the fact that they had neither roads on which to operate it nor a building in which to house it. Unfortunately, if we who are responsible for overseeing the expenditure of homeland security funding are not careful, those stories will become legend. The reality is that almost every state and community in this country is in fiscal crisis this year yet, like the federal government, we are all choosing to provide the necessary funding and resources for homeland security. But, recognizing how tight dollars are, I believe you will find that all Governors and municipal officials are eager to ensure that we get at least a dollar's return in additional security for every dollar we spend. And the most critical step to maximizing our resources is developing integrated statewide plans and channeling virtually all homeland security funding through these plans.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security, signed by President Bush on July 16, 2002 articulates a comprehensive vision for the common defense of the nation. The nation's Governors are very supportive of the strategy because they recognize that to effectively combat terrorism in this country requires a fully collaborative partnership between federal, state and local governments. However, for these plans to truly be effective, they must not simply be a compilation of individual plans as a package. We need to bring all jurisdictions together to develop an integrated plan for public safety – one that maximizes the resources on hand and provides a detailed framework for training, operations and equipment.

As most of you know, I was the CEO of the 2002 Salt Lake Olympic Games, which has been described by many as a model for an integrated, comprehensive public safety plan. Although there are aspects of that planning process that would be hard to duplicate in all fifty states, it nevertheless provides a strong example of the difference between a coordinated plan and an integrated plan.

Interestingly, the decision for Salt Lake to pursue a fully integrated federal, state, local and private sector security plan for the Games was a result of the security planning process for the Atlanta Olympics. The Atlanta planning process followed what was until

then a traditional format. Each of the affected jurisdictions – federal, state and local – developed individual plans for the activities within their jurisdiction – law enforcement, fire, and emergency response. Then those plans were meshed into a single whole. Unfortunately, when the plans were pulled together, they didn't mesh well. Several areas had more resources than needed, others were significantly under-funded. Some areas were deemed the responsibility of more than one entity, while other areas were deemed to be no one's responsibility and had been completely left out. Although there was a security plan, in reality it was a hodge-podge of individual plans and there were clearly holes.

The federal government stepped in to assist in filling these holes and to help merge the plans and operations of the individual jurisdictions. But, the lessons learned from this experience were relayed in detail to the Salt Lake team and we decided to try something new. Federal, state and local governments, together with the private sector Olympic Committee, all agreed to come together and jointly develop one plan and use the planning process to work out jurisdictional issues, assess resources available, and agree on a plan that would use the minimum in additional resources to achieve the maximum in security.

And that's what we did. Over a period of several years, an integrated plan was developed that identified all the activities to be done and determined the resources necessary to carry out those activities. In many cases it was the federal government that provided guidance on the standards we were to use – much as we look to the Department of Homeland Security today to provide guidance to states on best practices and standards for securing critical infrastructure.

Then, perhaps most uniquely, the participants identified all the resources each had to put towards carrying out the missions. Federal, state, and local government all participated in this, as did the private sector. Air and ground resources were pooled, communications resources were pooled, IT and dispatch resources were pooled, and manpower was pooled. And when we had thus maximized the use of our existing resources, we were able to clearly articulate to the federal government where we were short in resources and

exactly what we needed those resources to do. Moreover, those resource shortfalls were part of an integrated security plan that the federal government – specifically the Secret Service, FBI and FEMA – had helped to develop.

During the months that the Olympic Security Plan was operational, this integrated planning effort led to an integrated and well-coordinated training program. It also led to more efficient procurement of resources since we were able to use bulk purchasing to the maximum extent possible. And, as you could predict, it then led to a well-integrated operational effort during the Games. Federal, state and local public safety operations merged seamlessly and cooperated closely with the private operations that we were running at SLOC. Not only was this approach operationally superior, but in the world of public safety and counter-terrorism where any gap can be exploited by the enemy, the tight-knit coordination and integration among all security and public safety operations was essential.

We have begun the process of developing an integrated plan in Massachusetts by starting with a “bottoms up” assessment of our state of preparedness and an inventory of our resources. My Secretary of Public Safety, Ed Flynn, has led this effort and it has been conducted across federal, state, and local governments and the private sector. While the assessment has identified a number of positive actions taken to date, it has also identified a number of deficiencies, which must be addressed across our Commonwealth. Working with the federal and local authorities, along with the private sector, we will be strengthening our statewide plan over the next few months by:

- Bringing local officials into the planning process. As the first responders, they must play a key role in developing the statewide plan.
- Requiring regional cooperation among cities and towns. Our state has 351 cities and towns – far too many to operate with individual plans. As our first phase of state-wide planning, cities and towns are required to put forward all requests for homeland security funding as regional requests, detailing regional assets presently available, the structure for regional use of the asset, and certifying the interoperability of the asset where applicable.

- Bringing federal officials into the process. We will look to the federal government to provide “best practices” or “templates” for us in critical areas such as protection of ports, nuclear power plants, chemical plants, LNG tankers, and bioterrorism.

Each of the Governors takes very seriously the responsibility of working with local governments and the federal government in the development of a comprehensive statewide plan. And it is through those plans that we can ensure that homeland security funding is spent only for activities that will have the maximum impact.

For this reason, Governors believe that Homeland Security funding should flow to states, to be distributed in accordance with the statewide plans. This will ensure that funds are spent effectively and efficiently. Without statewide coordination, there is no check on gaps in coverage, incompatible equipment and communications systems, and wasteful duplication. The National Strategy calls for states to develop a plan that sets priorities based on assessment and vulnerability analysis. Therefore it is only logical that funds should be distributed in accordance with those priorities.

Second, we need to maximize our nation’s investment in information and intelligence sharing. One of the primary ways that state and local governments can work to prevent future acts of terrorism is to ensure the effective flow of information among federal, state and local law enforcement. In the months that preceded the attacks of 9/11, agencies were unable to draw a larger pattern out of disparate bits of information contained in separate databases about the activities of terrorists involved in the attack. We will never know whether better data sharing would have helped thwart the attacks. But we do know that terrorists often use traditional crimes such as drug trafficking, money laundering, bank robbery and illegal weapons trafficking to offset the costs and further support their political/terrorist objectives.

In fact, the first indication that a terrorist cell is operating within the United States may be behavior discovered during an investigation by state or local police, following the report

of suspicious circumstances or some type of criminal event. Whether the focus is on stopping drug trafficking or preventing an act of terrorism, rapidly collecting and disseminating solid information about the people who commit crimes and where they commit them is key.

Yet most police, public health entities, parole officers and courts are operating with 20-year old technology. Even though high-speed digital technology is currently available, many police officers still wait long periods to receive basic information about a vehicle or person they stop. Days or weeks may pass before criminal warrants find their way into state databases, leaving dangerous criminals on the street and police without this information. Judges might sentence offenders with outdated information regarding their criminal history records. Investigators in one jurisdiction may be unaware that information regarding an individual under investigation exists in a neighboring jurisdiction.

This must change if we are to be successful in preventing future acts of terrorism.

Another challenge we face in information sharing is ensuring that there is an appropriate exchange of information between the federal government and the state and local officials who may be able to use that information. We recognize that there is information critical to the nation's security that must be guarded at the highest levels. Yet, as mentioned above, it is often state and local officials and responders who can facilitate the apprehension of potential terrorists if they have the necessary information.

Additionally, state and local officials need information if they are to match their response to an increased threat level appropriately to the increased risk. For example, if our nation moves to Threat Level Orange in response to increased risks, then state and local officials need to know if that increased risk is contained to only one region of the country or one type of critical infrastructure. With that information, they can develop an appropriate response. Without it, they have no choice but to take actions that assume that the highest level of threat may be aimed at their region and at the various types of critical

infrastructure in their state. The point here is that every community cannot be equally vulnerable at the same time to terrorism. If information is available, the sharing of that information will ensure that money and resources are not wasted in a region of the country that does not have an increased threat.

One way to address the intelligence-sharing dilemma is for security clearances to be standardized and reciprocal between agencies and levels of government—perhaps within the Department of Homeland Security. There is also a need to process federal security clearances more expeditiously. Some states have waited over a year for vital security clearances for their law enforcement agents. The bottom line is that a more effective liaison must be established between the FBI, CIA, DHS and other national security agencies if we are to maximize our nation's investment in intelligence.

The third challenge the states face as we invest in homeland security is the need for a multi-year framework for homeland security planning. State and local governments are, of necessity, approaching homeland security from both a short and long-term perspective. Short-term we have each taken and are continuing to take the interim steps necessary to ensure that our citizens are protected. In many cases, these actions may not be the most cost efficient, such as temporary use of the National Guard to secure airports while a permanent security force is hired and trained. Yet, the priority of each Governor has been to take the immediate actions necessary to ensure the safety of our citizens.

Even as we take these short-term steps, each of the states, through the comprehensive statewide planning process, is developing a blueprint for homeland security. Among the many areas to be addressed in those plans are:

- A focus on prevention: what actions and investments can we take to ensure that critical information is shared, analyzed and acted upon in a timely manner. What are the appropriate steps for securing our nation's critical infrastructure including the 362 ports nationwide, approximately 168,000 public drinking water systems, 600,000 miles of sanitary sewers, and 200,000

miles of storm sewers? Likewise, how can we protect our food supply from the threat of terrorist attack and build the capacity to trace potential food borne illness outbreaks, food contamination and infectious animal diseases?

- Incident management: Clarification of roles, ensuring that training throughout the state is uniform and coordinated, developing necessary reciprocal agreements both within the state and with surrounding states, ensuring the interoperability of equipment, and ensuring the capacity for disease surveillance and detection exists throughout the state.
- Response: Identification of the training and equipment needed by first responders, plans for escalating response beyond the local jurisdiction to surrounding jurisdictions, state-wide and then beyond the state borders, and identification of medical supplies and personnel and facilities necessary to treat victims of a public health emergency.

Any comprehensive homeland security plan will require several years to be fully implemented. While our nation's Governors and our local officials will take any actions necessary during this time period to ensure the safety of our citizens, we are also focused on moving as rapidly as possible into the implementation of our state-wide plans. In order to do so, ongoing resources must be provided for equipment, training, maintenance, exercises, planning and reimbursement.

In order to effectively develop plans and timetables for implementing those plans, states need a guaranteed funding stream. Quite candidly, without a multi-year funding approach, it is difficult for state and local governments to clearly set priorities. Just as our nation established a multi-year approach to highway funding so states could work with local governments to develop comprehensive plans for transportation, we need a multi-year approach to homeland security funding. If the states know that at least a portion of the funding can be guaranteed each year for expenditure against the plan, we can make better decisions on procurement, better decisions on priorities, and better decisions on training.

Additionally, it is essential that the funding provided through this multi-year approach be flexible. There should not be a “one size fits all” approach because the needs of states are very diverse. Different states have varying vulnerable infrastructure and population density that must be taken into consideration in developing and implementing a plan, and subsequently distributing limited resources.

Let me stress that the Governors fully concur with the intent of Congress that funds provided to the states must be rapidly spent against the statewide plan. We all recognize that we are literally fighting the clock as we establish a comprehensive homeland security effort throughout this nation. Therefore, we have all committed to expediting the release of federal funds in accordance with our state wide-plans. Overall, consistent federal planning guidance and a streamlined process for federal reimbursements will greatly assist this process and allow, in some cases, for accelerated, bulk equipment purchases.

In conclusion, Madam Chair, we can best ensure that we are able to invest wisely in homeland security in this nation if funding is distributed through the states based on a comprehensive and integrated state-wide plan, if information sharing and intelligence sharing between federal, state and local governments is maximized, and if a multi-year program for flexible funding is designed to support the state and local governments.

What’s more, as many states are facing tremendous budget shortfalls, Congress is urged to provide full homeland security funding with no match requirements. I would add that state and local governments are already spending their own funds on homeland security needs not covered by grants and this should be recognized with a “no match” policy on future homeland security appropriations.

Finally, in delivering the first national strategy in July of 2002, President Bush said:

“The National Strategy for Homeland Security is a beginning. It calls for bold and necessary steps. It creates a comprehensive plan for using America’s talents and resources to enhance our protection and reduce our vulnerability to terrorist attacks.”

Madam Chair, the nation’s Governors understand the difficult task and the challenges ahead in protecting the homeland, and stand ready to work in partnership with the President and Congress to meet these challenges.

**Mayor Kwame M. Kilpatrick, City of Detroit
Advisory Board Member and co-Chair of the Cities and Borders Task Force,
United States Conference of Mayors
Testimony Before the United States Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee**

Thursday, May 15, 2003

Introduction

Chairwoman Collins, Senator Levin, and other distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity. My name is Kwame M. Kilpatrick, and I am the Mayor of the City of Detroit, Michigan. I am honored that my state's senior Senator Carl Levin has asked me to come and participate in this important discussion about the role and direction of our nation's homeland security efforts and the central focus of our local frontline, domestic defense against terrorism.

In addition to my position as Mayor of Detroit, the nation's 10th largest city and largest port of entry on our northern border, my statements here today also reflect key concerns of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, where I serve as both a member of its Advisory Board and as Co-Chair of its Cities and Borders Task Force.

How Did We Get Here?

President Bush has declared that we are a nation at war with terrorists. And, as you are well aware, since 9/11 and the anthrax attacks soon thereafter, the role of federal, state and local governments has become much more complex and very much in a state of flux. Today, governments must identify and integrate homeland security needs and responsibilities into day-to-day activities.

We need only to look as far as the involvement of terrorists in traditional criminal activity to realize that counter terrorism is inherently tied to fighting crime every day. Therefore, to improve our homeland security, we need to improve existing technology, infrastructure and business processes so that cities and other localities can not only run more efficiently on a day-to-day basis, but also be prepared in the event of a terrorist attack.

As a nation, we have come a long way since 9/11, but we have not come nearly far enough. We still have a long way to go before we are truly and sufficiently secure in both our liberties and our safety. The nation as a whole still lacks a comprehensive threat and vulnerability analysis. We lack a coordinated, proactive and long-term strategy to lead our nation's homeland security efforts at the local, state and federal levels.

The provisions that guide the use of federal funds should not be structured so that they impede the ability of our nation's mayors to address local homeland security needs. Detroit's priorities may not be the same as those of Los Angeles. Mayors need the flexibility to use the limited federal funds to address those local issues that help city officials most effectively address the national issue of homeland security. For example, immediately following the attacks of September 11, the Detroit Police Department reassigned officers to support the efforts of border security entities who sought our help. Detroit officials made this decision for a number of reasons. First, we felt it was important to support our federal colleagues. Second, any significant slowdown in the movement of people and goods at the border would have had a serious impact on our local economy and our local health care system. Third, by supporting efforts to prevent a terrorist from crossing the border, we would also make our communities safer. We initially absorbed the front-end costs of carrying out this federal responsibility. Regretfully, our early attempts to receive reimbursements for those efforts were denied. We worked aggressively with Senator Levin and our entire congressional delegation to make the funds available in the 2003 Omnibus Appropriations bill.

In addition, while there is funding available, many localities are unaware of the different grants or unclear of the processes in which to apply for the money. Therefore, they are receiving little funding and reimbursement for increased costs associated with heightened states of alert and requests for assistance. And, existing funding for public safety and other domestic needs are being threatened, eliminated or diverted toward response-driven emergency preparedness planning, training and equipment purchases. State and local law enforcement funding alone has witnessed proposed cuts of 42%. And while the Justice Department and the FBI advocate community policing to get citizens involved in crime and terror prevention, the COPS Program is subject to proposed cuts of 85%.

While it is clear that local governments need to work together, we must also recognize that each has its own needs and capabilities. Therefore, we need better communication among all levels of government. We also need better guidance so that state and local governments can prioritize and organize their individual needs in order to work toward the common goal of achieving homeland security.

What Has Detroit Done So Far?

Last year, upon taking office, I made homeland security a top priority for the City of Detroit. It was clear to me that the attacks of September 11 had forever changed the day-to-day role of federal, state and local governments. Accordingly, for the first hundred days of my administration, my top department and agency heads worked together to identify our vulnerabilities and create a plan of action to address this new reality. In April 2002, I released my comprehensive Homeland Security Strategy and 10-Point Action Plan (see appendix A).

Detroit was one of the first cities to deliver a comprehensive strategy to the federal government and in 2002, was recognized as a national model by the

Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge. Since the release of our local strategy (the first of its kind in the nation), Detroit has accomplished many things including:

- Appointing a full time homeland security director;
- Establishing a citywide Homeland Security Council made up of single points of contact within each city agency;
- Conducting a full threat and vulnerability assessment that identifies potential targets within the city;
- Enhancing the physical security around these potential targets;
- Developing a process for constant updating of this threat and vulnerability assessment;
- Beginning enhancement of the emergency and non-emergency phone systems used by the public to contact authorities;
- Beginning efforts to link the radio systems used by first responders;
- Improving information sharing with other federal, state, local and private sector entities so that we can do a better job detecting, preventing and responding to any terrorist threat; and
- Identifying and prioritizing unmet needs for local, state and federal funding assistance.

Over the past year, Detroit has made tremendous progress in improving its ability to protect the people who work in, live in and visit the city from potential acts of terrorism. Still, Detroit's approach acknowledges that the front lines of the nation's war on terrorism are our cities and towns across America. And now, efforts to detect, prevent and respond to terrorism are a part of the day-to-day responsibility of local government. But efforts to stop terrorism need not be carried out at the expense of day-to-day services. In fact, Detroit's approach acknowledges that the communications, information and operational systems used to provide effective emergency and non-emergency service every day are the foundation of its homeland defense efforts. Therefore, as a part of its long-term homeland security efforts, Detroit has made it a priority to upgrade and enhance the telecommunications and information systems and the management practices used by city agencies in an effort to improve day-to-day service delivery. This approach has been replicated by a number of other jurisdictions.

Perhaps most importantly, I have worked to reach out to the diverse communities in Detroit to not only keep the public informed but also to assure them that everything is being done to ensure their safety without compromising their civil liberties. On March 24, 2003, I held a town hall meeting, inviting citizens and city, regional and state officials. More than a thousand people gathered for an open discussion about our homeland security efforts. Our first responders were able to outline the many steps Detroit has taken since I released a homeland security strategy. I have heard from many citizens who tell me that they now feel more secure and prepared.

Riding on the success of our town hall, the city continues to urge citizens to get more involved. We have established Citizen Corps and have generated renewed interest in community groups like our citizen radio patrols.

It is this kind of open communication and cooperation that I believe needs to happen on every level of government in order for homeland security to be successful.

Recommendations: Where We Need To Go

I believe that the City of Detroit's approach is worth further consideration and large-scale adoption as a process. Each city, county or state will come up with its own unique but equally comprehensive strategy, based on its own particular assets and vulnerabilities. These efforts will necessarily lend themselves to development of immediate, short and long-term actions that move entities toward greater integration, efficiency and interoperability.

Accordingly, federal, state and local governments must work aggressively to identify and ensure the protection of those infrastructures and assets that we deem most critical in terms of national level public health and safety, governance, economic and national security and public confidence. This requires a comprehensive, state-by-state, jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction, business-by-business and market-by-market threat assessment and vulnerability analysis of critical infrastructures and assets. It cannot be done in an ad hoc, non-inclusive, reactive or subjective way if it is to provide immediate, short and long-term success in achieving efficient and effective national security and homeland defense. This review will identify critical factors for targeting resources, funding and priorities. As part of that, I strongly believe that ports of entry and border areas must be given priority consideration.

The nation's focus on homeland security cannot be done in a vacuum, separate and apart from day-to-day services. It must be a truly "all hazards" approach and cannot take funding and resources away from traditional public safety, public health and emergency preparedness programs such as COPS, FEMA and OJP-administered grant programs like Edward Byrne Memorial Grants or Local Law Enforcement Block Grants Programs.

Additionally, the federal focus must move beyond airports to include points of entry and exit such as ports, cargo containers/shipping systems, transportation networks (trucks, waterways and rail) and borders. In the first quarter of 2003, approximately 4% of all containers coming through our 360 ports have been inspected. The physical security of such critical components of our global economic system is also still woefully inadequate, including the protection of roads, rails, tunnels, bridges subways, buses and other modes of transportation.

Conclusion

The national homeland security strategy should embrace day-to-day public service delivery systems as the foundation for developing a cost-effective and efficient homeland security infrastructure in these tight financial times. To that end, I propose the following:

- **Cities have their own unique needs based on their specific threat assessments. Therefore, more homeland security funding should flow directly to the local governments.**
- **Local governments need to be directly involved in the analysis of critical infrastructure and assets, threat assessments, strategic planning and the development and implementation of homeland security efforts.**
- **We need more federal direction, leadership and guidance in order to develop, coordinate and implement comprehensive local and state homeland security initiatives.**
- **We need to view the role of localities as more than just first responders. In the future, a police officer with the help from a member of the community may be the first to identify an impending terrorist threat.**
- **State and local governments need to be included in specific planning and implementation of port and border security efforts.**

We must be as swift, decisive and resolute in our dedication to domestic homeland security as we were in Afghanistan and Iraq. As the Senate considers these issues, I urge that you all take my comments on behalf of the City of Detroit and the U.S. Conference of Mayors under serious consideration.

Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today. I look forward to continuing to work with you Madame Chair as well as the Members of the Governmental Affairs Committee.

**Statement of
Art Cleaves
Director, Maine Emergency Management Agency
before the
Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
May 15, 2003**

Good morning Senator Collins, Senator Lieberman and distinguished members of the Government Affairs Committee. I am Art Cleaves, Director of the Maine Emergency Management Agency. Our office is the homeland security coordination center for the State of Maine. In addition, our office administers all FEMA grants in the state, and all Office of Domestic Preparedness grants, beginning with the program's inception under the Department of Justice. Maine is a largely rural state and may be thought of less at risk from terrorist activities than more urban areas of the country. However, with our long coastline and international border we have unique vulnerabilities. We have the great responsibility of ensuring that our citizens remain blessedly safe. We also have a unique opportunity, and a responsibility we feel keenly, to act as sentinel for our neighbors to the south and west. We will never be able to forget that two of the September 11 hijackers began their deadly journey in our state.

Since before September 11, those of us in the profession of emergency management have been working closely with the federal government on the fielding of terrorism preparedness and weapons of mass destruction preparedness programs. On September 11, however, awareness was tragically awakened of the critical need for these programs. Our office – and I'm sure every individual member of Congress – was besieged with requests for funds to support planning, training, equipment and personnel costs.

In addition there were requests to reimburse states and communities for what were perceived as national security costs, dollars expended by state and local governments to respond to a national threat.

I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate and thank the Congress for the passage of the FY 2003 State Homeland Security Grant Program Part II. This is a giant step forward not just in the resources provided to the states, but also for the flexibility in implementation it gives to us. In addition, the ability to reimburse cities and towns for actions taken during Operation Liberty Shield and in future events is something that I think we have collectively wanted to do since September 11, and it will be a great pleasure for me personally to distribute those funds.

With the package just fielded, we are afforded flexibility in the amount of the award that can be used for equipment, planning, training, exercise or administration. We are also permitted to use training dollars, if needed, to reimburse overtime personnel costs required for successful training and exercise. This flexibility is welcome beyond words, and for more than just what it will allow us to do in achieving preparedness goals. It also demonstrates how responsive this Committee and the Congress as a whole have been to feedback on the effectiveness of these grant programs. That bodes well for our collective ability to be able to serve our citizens well in the future. We must always be willing to look at what is working, and fix what is not.

We also appreciate and fully support Senate Bill S. 838, introduced by Senator Collins, which creates a process by which states can request to reallocate funds received pursuant to appropriations for the State Homeland Security Grant Program among the four categories of equipment, training, exercise, and planning. This will give us the opportunity for flexibility in all the grants we are currently administering.

I am totally supportive of the guidelines that dictate the 80% pass-through of ODP grant funds to local communities. It is, after all, local communities who bear the brunt of first response. We have not adequately addressed their needs, and we must do so. But without reducing direct aid to communities, I think that in the future we will need to look at those cases where supporting programs at the state level will benefit all communities in an efficient and cost-effective way. Let me reiterate that I don't support sacrificing any direct pass-through programs in order to increase state capability. But there are times where increasing state capability achieves a direct benefit to the community. As we look at the structure of future funding possibilities, I think we need to be able to identify and support those opportunities.

Let me now address another concern we have, that being efficient coordination of grants from the federal level.

In Maine, when we first began to administer FEMA's Terrorism Consequences Management Planning Assistance (TCMPA) funding (100% funding for terrorism preparedness) and the DOJ, now ODP funds, it was immediately obvious that we needed to supply in-state a coordination that was not present within the federal government. We put together an interagency team with county and local participation to develop our homeland security strategy, and guide the grant-making process.

Today, a number of funding streams are gathered under the mantle of the Department of Homeland Security. But there are others that are not. Funds are available HHS, from EPA, and probably from other federal sources of which I am not yet aware. We could create 50 full-time jobs across the states, tracking federal homeland security grant opportunities and share information with potential grantees within that state. How much more efficient it would be if federal government agencies could better coordinate their grant opportunities, ensure that there was no redundancy in these precious resources, and even support each other in publicizing these opportunities.

I think we are doing a good job in Maine coordinating among our state agencies and using grant funds to complement, not duplicate, each other's efforts. I could stop being concerned right now. But as a taxpayer, I do think a better job at coordination can be done "at the top". I'm not advocating that all funding opportunities be relocated to DHS. It's absolutely appropriate that federal agencies with particular missions work directly with their state. But DHS and other federal departments can use the "bully pulpit" afforded them as sources of funding to encourage states to coordinate the efforts of all the state departments involved in homeland security. The best "bang for the buck" can be achieved by building capability for homeland security incidents on the backbone of all-hazard emergency management capability, which has as a basic tenet cooperation and coordination among all agencies.

Lastly I would like to address the grant application process itself. My agency administers both the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) and the ODP grants. We find that both models have merit. The EMPG model is one that we find extremely flexible and easy to work with. Annually, we submit a strategic plan containing long-term goals and objectives, and the broad strategies we will use to achieve those goals. We also submit a detailed work plan which we use to track activities internally. FEMA approves that plan, as well as the budget we submit. We report quarterly on our spending and activities, and on achievements at the strategy level. With our final annual report we compare our accomplishments with our goals for the year. We identify our significant accomplishments and those areas where more remains to be done. We are held accountable both fiscally and programmatically, but are allowed flexibility in the design of the overall program.

We use a similar process to manage EMPG grants to county emergency management agencies, and monitor their progress against their own goals. This is the model we would like to see all grants follow. Indeed, we could envision the EMPG program platform being expanded to include not only the matching funds that help us build our base emergency management capacity, but also the 100% grants made available to address homeland security needs, and future all-hazard grant opportunities as well.

With the Department of Homeland Security now in place, we have a great opportunity to improve program coordination. With the all-hazards approach that has been the foundation of emergency management, and the existing programs in the mix, we have people experienced in administering grants efficiently and effectively, and the infrastructure to support them. The relationships are already in place that connect federal, state and local governments in preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation every single day. As the Department continues to evolve, we have a solid base to build on.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

United States Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs
Susan M. Collins, Chairman
“Investing in Homeland Security:
Challenges Facing State and Local Governments.”

Testimony of
The Honorable Mark Stenglein
Hennepin County Board of Commissioners
Minneapolis, Minnesota
May 15, 2003

Thank you Chair Collins, Senator Lieberman, the two Senators from my home state, Senators Dayton and Coleman, and Members of the Committee. My name is Mark Stenglein and I am a County Commissioner from Hennepin County in Minnesota. Hennepin is the most populous county in Minnesota with over 1.1 million residents. Hennepin County is charged with helping to maintain the health, safety and welfare of one-quarter of the State's population and I am honored to have the opportunity to testify before you today. I will also note that the National Organization of Counties has submitted testimony for the Congressional record. I'd also like to personally thank Senator Coleman for his invitation to testify this morning.

Since the attacks of September 11th, Hennepin County has been preparing for the day that everyone hopes will never come. We have begun the difficult task of assessing our current preparedness planning and assets. We have continued to seek cooperation and collaboration with other units of government. And finally, we have sought the resources necessary to achieve our goals.

First, I'd like to give you a brief summary of where we currently stand in our assessment and planning stages.

Hennepin County has assessed our vulnerabilities at all levels. We've upgraded our emergency preparedness plans, re-assessed our evacuation procedures for all county buildings. We've made structural improvements to "target harden" our facilities and infrastructure, and added additional security measures at our citizen service centers to enhance the safety of our employees and the public.

Hennepin County is the keeper of record for millions of Minnesotans. We issue everything from birth certificates to death certificates, passports and driver's licenses. We must provide access for our citizens so they may conduct their business in a convenient and safe manner. County facilities that were once designed for easy public access must now be reconfigured. Security measures must be retrofitted to ensure safety for our employees and citizens – all while keeping the delicate balance between safety and service.

Another area of intense focus is our hospital. Hennepin County operates the Hennepin County Medical Center, known as HCMC. HCMC is the only public hospital in the metropolitan region and the only hospital in the downtown core with a Level I Trauma facility. When it comes to serving the citizens in a time of crisis – we are it. It is a tremendous responsibility that we take very seriously. That is why HCMC has been leading the smallpox vaccination program for area

hospitals and is also the lead agency for biological and chemical decontamination units. We have also developed a mutual aid compact involving 22 hospitals in the metropolitan region.

Lastly, we've begun planning for continuity of government and the continuation of operations in the event of a tragedy. The continuity of government and the continuation of operations is essential. Clearly identified roles and responsibilities allow our first responders, emergency coordinators, and administrators to carry out emergency plans with precision and without hesitation.

Hennepin County has not focused all of its efforts internally; we have also sought to partner with the federal government, the State of Minnesota, neighboring counties, and municipalities. These partnerships define where we are headed in preparing for an emergency. One example of this cooperation was a joint venture with the City of Minneapolis on an emergency preparedness-training program, sponsored by FEMA, at Mount Weather, Virginia. City and County leaders, including myself, along with emergency personnel at all levels conducted training operations under differing scenarios. This hands-on approach to learning highlighted our strengths and outlined our weaknesses, providing us with a blueprint for improvement.

Our cooperation does not end there. The Hennepin County Sheriff continually meets with city police chiefs, state and federal law enforcement officials,

emergency management planners, and other security first responders to share information. Firefighters meet with EMS personnel to discuss tactics and scenarios to ensure that emergency plans are developed consistent within all disciplines.

Another example of cooperation is the county-wide advisory group formed to recommend and prioritize how to best use scarce economic resources.

Representatives from Police, Fire, EMS, Sheriff's Office, Public Health Departments and the hospital meet to provide information and insight related to emergency preparedness planning. Each representative knows how her or his respective agency needs to respond in a moment of crisis. The challenges to respond in a crisis increases under the threat of terrorism or biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction.

Hennepin County has also partnered with local entities such as the Minneapolis Airports Commission and the Metropolitan Council on the preliminary design study of a secure cargo facility near our international airport. We believe that a consolidated regional distribution center for air cargo will streamline the security screening process of the thousands of tons of cargo leaving Hennepin County and Minnesota each year. This regional distribution center will also impact the local economy and maintain the balance between security and the economic impacts of delay.

Working together, we are able to share ideas and concerns. We've worked hard to identify and prioritize equipment and training needs. Most importantly, we've moved from an independent approach to a shared, regionally-centered approach. We're breaking down many of the old barriers to cooperation. We've made tremendous progress in uniting behind best practices and ensuring that we're doing all we can to protect and serve our residents.

Lastly, I'm going to talk about the kinds of help we need in order to be successful.

We need money.

We lack the training and equipment to prepare or respond to a radiological attack. A "dirty bomb" would have a devastating impact. We agree with the Hennepin County Sheriff that the concept of a regional law-enforcement response team may be necessary to effectively operate in hazardous or contaminated areas. Resources are required to coordinate such an endeavor.

More funding is needed for specialized equipment. There is virtually no capability in Hennepin County or the State of Minnesota for heavy urban search and rescue. It would take nearly 48-72 hours to call in such equipment. By then it may be too late.

We require funding so we can prepare, so we can plan, so we can train, so we can test ourselves, so we can assess and re-assess, and so we can repeat the process again until we've got it right.

Thus far, Hennepin County has received supplemental funding for the county and local communities to update plans for terrorism. We are currently utilizing a grant from the Department of Justice for first responder equipment. Resources have been slow to reach local governments and we are just now in the process of applying for the 2003 Homeland Security grant intended for equipment and exercises.

Hennepin County strongly supports the current formula of the Homeland Security Department, Office of Domestic Preparedness grant program. That formula requires 80% of the money awarded to states be directed to local units of government.

Hennepin County also believes that the Emergency Management Performance Grant (EMPG) program funding needs to be increased. This is the program that facilitates and coordinates emergency planning and exercises. EMPG funding is essential for all local emergency-planning programs. Local planners need the flexibility offered through the EMPG program.

We must keep in mind that disasters originate at the local level. Local responders are the first to arrive at a disaster scene. Those horrific first hours of 9/11 are etched in our memories forever; local responders bore the brunt of that horror.

Counties are willing participants in emergency preparedness. We pledge to work with all agencies on a national, state and regional level. Hennepin County is staffed with hard-working, dedicated individuals willing to do all they can to ensure the health, safety and welfare of our citizens. We ask that you help provide us the tools necessary to make that a reality.

Madame Chair, members of the Committee, I sincerely thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning.



MITT ROMNEY
GOVERNOR

KERRY HEALEY
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR

THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
STATE HOUSE • BOSTON, MA 02133
(617) 725-4000

Follow-up responses to post-hearing questions for the record submitted by Senator Carl Levin to Mitt Romney, Governor of Massachusetts, to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on May 15, 2003.

1. How much has Massachusetts spent since September 11, 2001 for Homeland Security efforts?

State expenditures for Homeland Security since that time have totaled \$55 million. Of that amount, \$36.2 was for operating costs and \$18.8 was for capital costs. The capital funds were for an equipment grant program to fire and police agencies.

2. How much money did Massachusetts need for homeland security since September 11, 2001?

We recognize that collection of data on the needs at the local level are just in their infancy stages at this time. In order to determine accurately the needs of our local jurisdictions, we will need to develop standards of data collection and analysis. Most cities and towns will indicate that they have spent additional funds for homeland security efforts (in particular, the orange alerts and the general state of alert immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11). However, most of those communities are not able to quantify their expenditures. Mostly, this is because of the difficulty of defining what is additional cost and how that can be accounted for separately.

We believe that more important than estimating a total need for funds, is developing solid strategies for the funds that are made available. And we believe we have done so in developing a competitive grant process that rewards grantees who can demonstrate need and link their equipment request to their need and to their homeland security strategy.

3. How much federal funding for homeland security has Massachusetts received?

As can be seen in the chart below, Massachusetts has received \$102 million for a variety of homeland security programs over the past two years.

Program	FFY 2002 Appropriation	FFY 2002 Supplemental	FFY 2003 Appropriation	FFY 2003 Supplemental	Two-year total
HSGP I			\$ 11,711,000		\$ 11,711,000
HSGP II				\$ 31,020,000	\$ 31,020,000
DOJ Equipment Grant Program	\$ 6,579,000				\$ 6,579,000
Boston Urban Threat Grant				\$ 16,720,000	\$ 16,720,000
MBTA Transit Grant				\$ 3,783,396	\$ 3,783,396
TSA Seaport Grants				\$ 433,651	\$ 433,651
State EOC Grant			\$ 50,000		\$ 50,000
All Hazards Planning		\$ 2,207,168			\$ 2,207,168
Bioterrorism			\$ 28,700,000		\$ 28,700,000
Citizen Corps		\$ 82,972			\$ 82,972
CERT	\$ 352,631			\$ 388,783	\$ 741,414
	\$ 6,579,000	\$ 2,642,771	\$ 11,761,000	\$ 52,345,630	\$ 73,328,601
Annual totals		\$ 9,221,771		\$ 64,106,630	
Grand total					\$ 102,028,601

June 25, 2003

The Honorable Susan M. Collins
Chairman
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
Room SD-340, Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Collins:

I am writing in response to your letter of May 27, 2003 requesting answers to the post-hearing question submitted by the State of Michigan's senior senator, Senator Carl Levin, concerning my testimony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs' May 15, 2003 hearing entitled "*Investing in Homeland Security: Challenges Facing State and Local Governments.*" Attached are the City of Detroit's responses.

I would like to apologize for the delay in my response. Please know that I have been working to provide your committee with a clear picture of the current funding status but due to the recent allocation of Fiscal Year (FY) 2003 funds, this has been a challenge. As you know, most of the federal funding for state and local homeland security assistance was only recently appropriated as part of the FY 2003 appropriations, and grant information on the State Homeland Security Grant Program Part II and the Urban Area Security Initiative Programs is still being established.

Thank you again for providing me with the opportunity to testify before your committee to provide a local, urban perspective on the challenges facing local governments. I hope that the attached responses are helpful to your committee's work assessing state and local needs as well as funding requirements.

If you should have any questions or need additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me or my Director for Intergovernmental Affairs, Mary Blazeovich.

Sincerely,

Kwame M. Kilpatrick
Mayor
City of Detroit

**City of Detroit - Q&A Responses
Governmental Affairs Committee Hearing On
"Investing in Homeland Security: Challenges Facing
State and Local Governments"
May 15, 2003**

Q: What amount of funding has your community, city or state spent since September 11th on specific projects to strengthen homeland security? (Brief project descriptions)

A: The City of Detroit has spent a tremendous amount of city funds since 9/11 to strengthen our ability to prevent, detect and respond to future possible acts of terrorism, as well as to evaluate and build upon our current infrastructure, assets and capabilities. Much of the spending immediately after 9/11 was focused on providing greater police and first responder presence both at the borders and throughout the city to secure critical infrastructure, to ensure economic stability of our transportation and trade routes, and to calm the public. The Detroit Police Department (DPD) and city agencies bore the brunt of these costs by diverting current staff and operational budgets for overtime and homeland security assignments. DPD calculates that the border enforcement alone cost them more than \$11 million from September 11, 2001 through the end of 2002. Additionally, city employees and consultants have worked to evaluate, design, plan and implement a comprehensive citywide Homeland Security Strategy and 10-Point Action Plan that was released in April 2002. The city contracted for \$500,000 with an outside public safety/homeland security consultant to help identify funding, as well as develop, manage, and implement the plan. The city has also purchased interoperability equipment (two units) to enhance its emergency communications by linking currently disparate radio systems at a cost of \$15,000. Additionally, the city has purchased protective and emergency response suits and equipment to outfit its HAZMAT and special response units at a cost of \$125,000.

Q: What amount of funding (over and above your answer for question 1) could your community, city or state have spent since September 11th on needed projects to strengthen homeland security? (Brief project descriptions undertaken if funding had been available)

A: The City of Detroit would have liked to spend additional funds on projects consistent with our Homeland Security Strategy and 10-Point Action Plan that would enhance the monitoring and security of critical infrastructure, resources and assets. In an effort to identify our outstanding needs, the city conducted a citywide agency-by-agency analysis of homeland security related projects and used this analysis to develop our homeland security related earmark request list, which we

have provided to the Michigan congressional delegation for Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004. That is but a portion of the overall requests submitted by our city agencies, as nearly every agency requires new or upgraded physical and technology security; detection and surveillance/monitoring systems; voice and data communications and information sharing systems; additional personnel; and related response equipment. As you know, these costs quickly rise into the hundreds of millions of dollars per year.

We recognize that we cannot finance all that is necessary to boost our community's safety and protect our citizens from potential terrorist plots. The unrealistic costs associated with our city's needs led us to adopt one of the principles underpinning our homeland security strategy - the "dual use" strategy. This approach focuses on using Detroit's existing day-to-day public services delivery systems infrastructure as the foundation for building and enhancing our homeland security. This "dual use" strategy has successfully been adopted by state and local governments and their leaders such as Mayor Brown of Houston, Mayor Hahn of Los Angeles, Mayor Bloomberg of New York City, Governor Romney of Massachusetts and Governor Napolitano of Arizona.

Q: What is the total amount of federal funding your (community, city or) state has received since September 11th for homeland security? (Brief descriptions)

- A: The City of Detroit is not in a position to provide specific figures regarding the federal disbursements to the State of Michigan. However, listed below is a breakdown of funding that has been monitored, received, committed or is pending for the city since 9/11.
- o In 2002, Detroit received approximately \$225,000 from the Centers for Disease Control, which is less than 1% of the \$31 million provided to the State of Michigan. Of the \$225,000 provided to the City, \$100,000 was allocated to hire a bio terrorism coordinator.
 - o Detroit has been informed that the City will receive \$349,000 for equipment plus \$15,000 in exercise monies from the 2003 ODP State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) Part I - approximately 2.3% of the State of Michigan's allocation. In October 2002, Detroit received 2002 supplemental funding of approximately \$259,000 for equipment and exercises.
 - o The State of Michigan has not determined Detroit's share of the 2003 ODP SHSGP Part II funding.
 - o In FY 2002, under the Emergency Management Performance Grants, Detroit received approximately \$32,600 to pay a portion of its Emergency Management coordinator position.
 - o For the FY 2003 Emergency Management Performance Grants, the State of Michigan has not yet disbursed funds to local jurisdictions.
 - o For the 2003 ODP Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) Part II, Detroit has been awarded \$12.2 million, of which it is expected that the State of

Michigan will set aside 20% for administrative purposes, leaving the City with \$9.8 million. As I mentioned in my testimony, should a terrorist attack occur, the local police and fire departments will be the first to arrive and the last to leave. Therefore, homeland security funding should be structured to address the needs of the city. Due to the recent announcement of this funding allocation, city officials are working with ODP to gain direction regarding the use of these funds. I am concerned that instead of allowing the city to address the specific circumstances that led to Detroit being designated by ODP as a high risk urban area, the funding is going to be diluted and used by townships outside of the core area of concern.

- The City of Detroit has been invited to apply for the COPS Interoperable Communications Technology 2003 Program. At this time, the amount of funding that the city may receive is unknown.
- The City of Detroit is completing the long form to receive \$2 million in earmarked funding from the FY2003 USDOJ COPS Law Enforcement Technology Program to improve its communications and information technology infrastructure.
- The City of Detroit is awaiting funding from the FY2003 USDOJ COPS Universal Hiring Program's (UHP) Homeland Security Overtime Program (HSOP) set-aside to reimburse some of its cost associated with overtime costs, and is expecting to receive between \$2-4 million.



JOHN ELIAS BALDACCI
GOVERNOR
MG JOSEPH E. TINKHAM II
COMMISSIONER

STATE OF MAINE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, VETERANS AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
MAINE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
72 STATE HOUSE STATION
AUGUSTA, MAINE 04333-0072

PHONE: 207-626-4503/800-452-8735
FAX: 207-626-4499

ARTHUR W. CLEAVES
DIRECTOR

**Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
Responses to Post-Hearing Questions for the Record**

“Investing in Homeland Security: Challenges Facing State and Local Governments”

May 15, 2003

What amount of funding has your community, city, or state spent since September 11th on specific projects to strengthen homeland security?

Since September 11th, 2001, Maine has spent over \$4.6 million on homeland security projects to strengthen the state’s security and improve readiness for terrorist events.

The Maine Emergency Management Agency has spent or committed to spend \$4,652,000 from the Department of Justice’s Office of Domestic Preparedness (now under the Department of Homeland Security) during Fiscal Years 1999-2002 for use in implementing Maine’s Three Year Statewide Domestic Preparedness Strategy. Funds have been used to purchase Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) kits for police and fire departments and other first responders, as well as decontamination tents and more technical Hospital PPE kits. Funds have also been used to support the Regional Response Teams (RRTs) by providing detection and decontamination equipment, improved communications equipment, and to fund newly created Decontamination Strike Teams. ODP funds have also been utilized to train first responders in proper use of equipment and developing regional and community strategies to deal with homeland security-related events.

Perhaps the most significant improvement to Maine’s homeland security readiness has been the purchase of PPE kits for all police and fire departments and hospitals across the state. More than any other improvement, Maine’s first responders are now better prepared to tackle hazardous materials, chemical spills, and unknown toxins that may be discovered in the state. Furthermore, Maine hospitals have been equipped with decontamination tents to aid in quarantining and cleaning persons affected by chemical and biological agents, and the hospital staffs have been provided with more comprehensive PPE equipment to ensure their safety during long-term exposure related with working in the decontamination tents.

It should be noted that in some cases, such as the Hospital PPE kits, Maine has encountered difficulty procuring enough equipment to properly distribute throughout the state. Vendors have long waiting lists and backorders are common, so that currently each Maine hospital has one PPE kit as a “demonstration” model, while awaiting the remainder of the hospitals’ full complement of 6 PPE kits each.

Additionally, with the help of ODP funds Maine has continually been able to stage mock disasters to train responders and evaluate the effectiveness of our response methods. These exercises are very useful tools for identifying strengths and weaknesses in the State's emergency response capabilities. We have seen encouraging signs that improvements have been made, and have been able to highlight additional areas that could be strengthened.

What amount of funding (over and above that outlined in Question 1) could your community, city, or state have spent since September 11th on needed projects to strengthen homeland security?

MEMA estimates that in times of heightened security alert, additional readiness costs amount to over \$10,000 - \$15,000 per day for the state. For instance, the City of Portland spends nearly \$2,500 per day for heightened security measures at the Portland International Jetport, the Maine Mall, Civic Center, harbor patrols, and other key facilities in the city. Portland also holds monthly HazMat/WMD training exercises at an estimated cost of \$3,000 per session.

But Maine has other metropolitan areas beside Portland to consider in structuring the State's homeland security funding formula. Bangor, Lewiston-Auburn, and Waterville are major population centers, and the State Capitol complex in Augusta requires special security attention. The Bath-Brunswick area (including the Bath Iron Works shipyard and Naval Air Station Brunswick) and the Kittery-Portsmouth, NH area would also benefit from increased police patrols and security presence. Multiplied across the entire state, it is clear that periods of heightened alert incur significant strain on the already-strapped budgets of Maine's municipalities and local governments.

Were funding to be available, Maine would very much like to strengthen security measures and at our airports and seaports, tourist locations, and border crossings. For example, Maine's forest products industry has been hard hit by the closing of traditional border crossings and it is increasingly difficult to maintain the flow of pulp and paper goods back and forth across the border with Canada.

Similarly, Maine's seaports are at risk due to a lack of personnel to adequately inspect cargo coming into the state, and to monitor the thousands of passengers who arrive at Maine's tourist destinations via cruise ship. Indeed, the City of Portland estimates the arrival this coming summer of more than twenty large cruise ships, each with passenger lists of between 700 to 3,500 people. Security for the Scotia Prince, another prominent Portland vessel, requires the inspection of all passengers, luggage, and vehicles disembarking from the ferry.

Other security concerns include several fuel oil tank farms across the state, need for additional metal detectors and security equipment at sporting events and festivals, and better patrol coverage during Fourth of July festivities and other major celebrations. Southern Maine is also ill-equipped to handle a mass exodus from a major population center such as Boston. There simply are not enough shelters and facilities to handle a refugee situation of that magnitude under current conditions.

What is the total amount of federal funding your state has received since September 11th for homeland security?

Maine has received over \$10.3 million for homeland security efforts. This includes the \$4.6 million from FY99-02 mentioned above, plus \$5.7 million in Fiscal Year 2003 monies. Additionally, Maine is expecting to receive \$15.2 million from the FY03 Supplemental State Homeland Security Grant Program.

Funding has come from the previously mentioned ODP grant sources. Maine has been fortunate to receive these much-needed federal funds, however we have been frustrated at times by the strict spending guidelines attached to the grants. Local communities have found it difficult to spend money in the required percentages for equipment, exercises, training, and planning/administration, and often end up with unmet needs in one category and surplus funding in another.

If the guidance for future spending of homeland security funding were left more broad and allowed for local jurisdictions to apply funding where they need it most, Maine could be much more effective in addressing its readiness and protection needs. In a city like Portland, for example, more physical security such as metal detectors and surveillance cameras may be needed, whereas more rural areas of the state may be better served by increasing the amount of funding dedicated to communications gear.

RESPONSE TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HEARING ON "INVESTING IN
HOMELAND SECURITY: CHALLENGES FACING STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS"

ANSWERS SUBMITTED BY:

MARK J. STENGLEIN
HENNEPIN COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

- 1. What amount of funding has your community, city, or state spent since September 11th on specific projects to strengthen homeland security? Please provide brief descriptions of key projects.**

Table 1 is a summary that details the operating and capital budget costs associated with Hennepin County's Homeland Security efforts. Below are summary notes regarding Table 1:

- An estimate of the Operating Budget costs for the period from the 4th quarter of 2001 through the current fiscal year (December 31, 2003) is that we have spent \$5,362,126 (\$1,313,465 spent during 10/01/2001 through 12/31/2002; and \$4,048,661 is anticipated to be spent in fiscal year 2003). Of the total anticipated expenditures for this period, property tax funding accounts for almost \$1 million (\$993,950). The balance (\$4,368,176) is being funded via federal and state grants, or other sources.
- Hennepin County lost approximately \$500,000 in public parking revenue during the period of November 15, 2001 through December 31, 2002 when the Hennepin County Government Center's underground parking facility was closed to the public due to security concerns.
- Hennepin County currently has approximately \$8.2 million in scheduled Capital Budget improvement projects to address Homeland Security concerns. These projects are primarily funded with General Obligation (GO) bonds, with some property tax funding committed to several of these capital improvements. Table 2 outlines expenditures in the Capital Improvement Plan.

Please note that Table 1 does not quantify other existing resources and activities that have been re-deployed for Homeland Security. For example, there are staff costs involved with the establishment of the Readiness Assessment Committee and the meeting and staff work for the Security Planning meetings. Similarly, the County's Emergency Management Division estimates that approximately 60% of all its activities in 2002 were spent on Homeland Security.

TABLE 1: Operating Budget Activities

	Prior Years	Anticipated 2003	Activity
1	\$ -	\$ 75,000	Additional Costs for Property Insurance – Terrorism Coverage Increased costs will largely be funded by property taxes
2	\$ 53,950		Center for Civil Force Protection/Sandia Nat'l Laboratories County contracted with Sandia National Laboratories in 2002 for a training module (Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for Communities); training included methodology, evaluation, targets, risk identification, and response. Contract funded with property taxes.
3	\$ -	\$ 100,000	Smallpox Vaccinations: This is an estimate of the planning and staff costs associated with the implementation of vaccinations for designated County staff (Phase I) and all emergency responders with Hennepin County (Phase II). Community Health and the Sheriff's Office will both be required to commit significant staff time to implement the vaccinations. This initiative will be funded with property taxes.
4	\$ 230,000	\$ 336,546	Public Health Emergency Preparedness Grant (Federal Centers for Disease Control & Prevention/Minnesota Department of Health): This 14-month grant (06/2002 – 08/2003) will fund 4.0 FTEs in the Community Health Department to coordinate, assess and manage public health planning for Bioterrorism, outbreaks of infectious disease, and other public health threats and emergencies.
5	\$ 350,000	\$ -	Property Services 2001/02 Operating Budget: As a response to the 9/11/2001 terrorist attack, the County Board via resolution 2001-781 authorized a contingency transfer (i.e. property tax funding) of \$350,000 to the Property Services Department to expedite and enhance current and planned security efforts. This resolution authorized Property Services to: (1) hire 3.0 additional security officers and 1.0 security supervisor originally scheduled to be hired in 2002; (2) hire 9.0 security officers to replace contract security officers in 2002; (3) hire 1.0 security officer to provide security on 6th Street and the parking ramp; and (4) provide temporary security staffing to the Municipal Building Commission until a security plan has been developed. Also, it should be noted that Resolution 2001-781 directed that the Government Center Ramp discontinued parking as of November 15, 2001. Consequently, parking revenues decreased from \$650,000 in 2000, to \$513,000 in 2001 and to \$270,000 in 2002. With the re-opening of the Government Center Ramp in 2003, parking revenues are anticipated to increase to \$770,000.

6	\$ 40,000	\$72,000	1.0 Emergency Preparedness Coordinator: Via Resolution no. 2002-318, the County Board authorized the Emergency Management Division to hire a new Emergency Preparedness Coordinator. For 2002 this FTE was funded through a re-obligated grant (federal Emergency Management Performance grant). For 2003, this position is being funded by property taxes.
7	\$ -	\$144,000	2.0 Emergency Preparedness Coordinators: Via Resolution no. 2002-666R-1, the County Board authorized the Emergency Management Division to hire 2.0 additional Emergency Preparedness Coordinators for 2003. These positions will provide necessary planning, training, and assistance to County and local municipal governments. These positions are being funded with property taxes.
8	\$ 305,084	\$ -	Domestic Preparedness Grants/US Department of Justice: The County's Emergency Management Division received a \$305,084 grant (period 05/15/2002 - 06/30/2003) for the purpose of purchasing first responder equipment jurisdictions within Hennepin County.
9	\$ -	\$ 250,000	Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Grant: The County's Emergency Management Division anticipates receiving a \$250,000 grant from FEMA that will allow the County to utilize approximately \$40,000 for emergency preparedness planning & training activities. The balance of the grant will be passed on to municipalities within Hennepin County for similar emergency preparedness activities.
10	\$199,000	\$2,496,115	State of Minnesota Department of Public Safety Grants: The State Department of Public Safety is administering 3 grants under 1 application process: (1) a 2002 US Dept of Justice Equipment grant (\$548,146) for use by the County and its municipalities to purchase responder equipment designed to protect critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks (no local match required); (2) a 2002 State of Minnesota Anti-Terrorism Act Equipment Grant (\$597,012) for use by the County and its municipalities to purchase responder equipment designed to protect critical infrastructure from terrorist attacks (25% local match, or \$199,000 ... match was made up front in 2002); and (3) a 2002 State of Minnesota Anti-Terrorism Act Training Grant (\$1,350,958) for use by local governments to obtain and/or provide training to first responders regarding events involving weapons of mass destruction (no local match required).

11	\$ -	\$250,000	Emergency Communications Vehicle: The Sheriff's Office is in the processing of acquiring an Emergency Communications vehicle to aid in coordinating communications among Federal, State, County and Local law enforcement, fire and medical responders to all types of emergencies, including those related to homeland security, acts of terrorism and natural disasters, as well as many other types of situations. The vehicle is likely to be staffed by volunteers from the Sheriff's Mobile Amateur Radio Corp (MARC) Unit, who will also maintain the equipment. The Sheriff will use forfeited funds to purchase the vehicle. CMED has some funding in its depreciation reserves to offset part of the cost, because this is a replacement (however upgraded) for an existing vehicle. There has been considerable discussion to try to use homeland security grant funding for some of the communications and other equipment that will be installed in the vehicle. The conditions of the grant do not allow it to be used to purchase the vehicle itself.
12	\$ 27,500	\$ 275,000	2002 Minnesota Department of Health/Hospital Bio-Terrorism Preparedness Grant: HCMC has been coordinating a compact with 29 hospitals in the 7-county metro area in order to best meet the medical needs of the community in the event of a disaster. HCMC as the fiscal agent for the compact received a \$27,500 Hospital Bio-Terrorism Preparedness Grant (Phase I) in 2002 to hire a communications consultant to develop the needs assessment and process for installing and implementing the 800 MHz All-Hospital Communication Network. The Compact, with HCMC acting as the fiscal agent, will receive a \$275,000 Minnesota Hospital Bio-Terrorism Preparedness Grant (Phase II) to purchase the hardware and install the radio equipment into each of the 29 metro region hospitals. This will create an emergency communication network for hospitals to communicate between each other for coordination during an emergency incident. HCMC is the Regional Hospital Resource Center and is responsible to provide coordination of these activities. The participating hospitals in the compact will provide an in-kind match (personal services) of \$206,283.
13	\$ -	\$ 50,000	US Department of Health & Human Services/Medical Reserve Corp Grant: The Community Health Department, in conjunction with the Medical Center and the City of Minneapolis, has been awarded a 3-year \$50,000 US DHHS (Dept of Health & Human Services) grant to establish and coordinate a volunteer medical group in the community in the event of a disaster.
14	\$ 85,000	\$ -	Hospital Emergency Incident Command System (HEICS): This is a training and educational program to integrate the Medical

			Center's emergency preparedness program, policies and procedures with public safety programs. The Medical Center has identified approximately 50 command positions, and has trained 3-deep at each position. A total of 320 employees are participating in this emergency preparedness training. The Medical Center estimates that they have spent \$85,000 in planning, supplies and staff training.
15	\$ 22,931	\$ -	State of Minnesota Department of Environmental Management Hazardous Material Emergency Preparedness Grant: The Medical Center received a \$9,000 grant to partially fund the costs (total costs were \$22,931) for coordination and the operational activities of a Community Emergency Exercise involving 14 metro hospitals in the spring of 2002.
	\$ 1,313,465	\$ 4,048,661	Totals
Summary of Operating Impacts on Homeland Security			
	\$ 602,950	\$ 391,000	Property Tax Funded Expenditures (Estimate)
	710,515	\$ 3,657,661	State & Federal Grant Funded Expenditure (Estimated)
	\$ 1,313,465	\$ 4,048,661	Total
		\$ 5,362,126	Total Expenditures for Period of 10/01/2001 – 12/31/2003
	\$ 500,000		Est. Loss of Revenues (Gov't Center Parking Ramp 2001 & 2002)

TABLE 2: Capital Budget/5-Year Capital Improvement Projects

	Inception to Date (Spent & Encumbered)	Appropriations through 2003	Total Estimated Budget	Project / Description
				Miscellaneous Security Improvements
1	\$ 47,235	\$ 150,000	\$ 170,000	6 th Street Fencing/Security Lighting
	\$ 8,000	\$ 40,000	\$ 40,000	South Block Security Post
	\$ 16,800	\$ 130,000	\$ 130,000	Security Film
	\$ 50,000	\$ 1,420,000	\$ 1,405,000	Air Intake Modifications – Gov't Center
	\$ 1,200	-	\$ 1,200	X-Ray Training
	-	\$ 182,000	\$ 182,000	Emergency Ops Center – Medina
	-	-	\$ 55,704	MBC Cameras & SOC tie-in
	\$ 123,235	\$ 1,922,000	\$ 1,983,904	The items noted above were added to an existing Security Improvements Capital project (0031627); expanding the scope as a

				result of Homeland Security Initiatives. Projects are being funded by property taxes and general obligation bonds. (Note: MBC is Municipal Buildings Commission & SOC is Security Operations Center)
2	\$ 62,000	\$ 1,485,000	\$ 3,402,000	Government Center Access Card System: The Card Access System was a planned capital project that was moved forward & expanded in scope from as out-year in the CIP as a result of Homeland Security initiatives. This project is being funded by general obligation bonds.
3	-	\$ 55,000	\$ 800,000	City-County Emergency Ops Center The City/County Emergency Operations Center is a new initiative for the continuance of governance during a disaster or major crisis. The project is being funded by general obligation bonds.
4	-	\$ 50,000	\$ 1,967,000	Government Center B-Level Vault This project is primarily a reconfiguration of public lobby space resulting in secured access, cameras and other security modifications. The project is being funded by general obligation bonds.
5	-	\$ 37,500	\$ 37,500	Gov't Center Room A2350 Emergency Management Conference Room This project authorizes the purchase of communication equipment & modifications to an existing conference room. The project is being funded with property taxes.
6				Energy Center Security Modifications (To Be Determined)
7				Vulnerability Assessments (To Be Determined)
	\$ 185,235	\$ 3,549,500	\$ 8,190,404	TOTALS

NOTE: All of these projects are primarily funded with General Obligation Bonds; however, several projects (e.g. Security Improvement Project) are partially funded with property tax dollars.

2. **What amount of funding (over and above your answer for question 1) could your community, city, or state have spent since September 11th on needed projects to strengthen Homeland Security? Please provide a brief description of key projects that would have been undertaken if funding had been available.**

The following (Table 3) is a summary of Hennepin County's identified emergency response cost estimates for capital equipment, training and exercises, an Emergency Operation Center in Minneapolis and related homeland security activities. All items listed are currently unfunded due to limited resources at the state, county and city levels. The justification for each item follows the list.

TABLE 3

Item / Description	Amount
Equipment for Emergency First Responders	
1. Crime Lab Technical Equipment – Hennepin County Sheriff's Office	\$29,002
2. Portacount Plus Fit Tester w/N95 Companion 5 – Hennepin County Emergency Medical Services	\$52,273
3. Motorola radios w/shoulder microphone and chargers – Hennepin County Emergency Medical Services	\$18,252
4. Emergency Response Team Equipment – Hennepin County Sheriff's Office	\$236,276
5. Decontamination/Monitoring Trailer (1) – Hennepin County Fire Chiefs Association	\$42,839
6. Technical Rescue Equipment – Hennepin County Fire Chiefs Association	\$132,219
7. 3M Powered Air Purifying Respirator Hose & Hood Assembly Parts – Hennepin County Emergency Medical Services	\$5,000
8. Radiological Event Monitoring Site – Hennepin County Emergency Preparedness Division	\$100,000
Equipment Subtotal	\$615,861
9. Training/Exercises for Emergency First Responders	\$465,080
10. Emergency Operations Center Facility in Minneapolis	
Building Construction	\$7,000,000
Furnishings and Equipment	\$1,600,000
11. Target Hardening	\$2,500,000
TOTAL	\$12,180,941

NOTES:

Item Nos. 1 – 4 were originally requested for funding under the 2002 State of Minnesota Anti-Terrorism Act Equipment Grant. However, due to budget reductions at the state level, Hennepin County's portion of the grant was reduced.

Item Nos. 5 – 8 were identified as additional equipment needs by the Hennepin County Emergency Preparedness Division when the original state grant application was being prepared, but not included due to known limitations in the grant amount. This equipment would be purchased for use by the County's emergency first responders in events involving weapons of mass destruction.

Hennepin County's portion of the 2002 state of Minnesota Anti-Terrorism Act Training Grant was also reduced due to budget reductions at the State level (Item No 9). The additional \$465,080 has been identified as additional training needs by the Hennepin County Emergency Preparedness Division. This training would be provided to emergency first responders in events involving weapons of mass destruction.

In March, 2002, the Hennepin County Readiness Committee recommended to the Hennepin County Board of Commissioners that funding be approved for the design of an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) at a location near downtown Minneapolis. An EOC is a protected, self-sufficient facility where County government officials can assemble and exercise centralized direction and control of emergency operations in time of disaster or major crisis. Full activation of the Hennepin County EOC would require accommodation of 60 – 90 personnel (county and outside agencies) on site. The County plan is for a well designed and equipped EOC near downtown Minneapolis but sufficiently removed from the Government Center in the event of a disaster involving the Government Center or threats to the downtown area. The Hennepin County Government Center has been identified as one of the most vulnerable public facilities in the Midwest because of the public street that runs directly beneath the building.

Because of the physical relationship of the Government Center and the City of Minneapolis City Hall, we have discussed the joint development of a facility with them. An independent city facility would require accommodations for another 60 – 90 personnel. A joint facility would provide efficiencies that would require space for only 100 – 130 personnel. At this time, a preliminary site has been identified on City property. However, the City has not included funding in their capital program due to budget constraints and the County has only programmed furniture and equipment costs (\$800,000) in a space yet to be defined. Hennepin County and the City of Minneapolis are in the process of determining space and utility requirements for a shared EOC facility. The total cost of a shared facility is outlined in Item No. 10.

Other costs the county has identified in recent evaluation of building vulnerability include \$2.5 million for target (building) hardening (Item No.11).

Significant funding for public health emergency programs is being quantified and will be submitted for next year's appropriations requests

3. **What is the total amount of federal funding your state has received since September 11th for Homeland Security? Please provide brief descriptions of the federal programs that provided these funds.**

Summary of Federal Funds Available for the for WMD Response
 Federal funds for WMD response in Minnesota are available through the Department of Justice, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Transportation, the Public Health Service/Office of Emergency Preparedness, and the Department of Health and Human Services/Centers for Disease Control. Following is a table (TABLE 4) summarizing all identified State and Federal funds directed towards terrorism:

Summary of Federal And State Terrorism Funds Available in the State of Minnesota	
Program	Grant Funds
1. US DOJ FFY 1999 State Domestic Preparedness Program	\$949,000
2. US DOJ FFY 2000 - 2001 State Domestic Preparedness Program	\$2,569,000
3. US DOJ FFY 2002 State Domestic Preparedness Program	\$5,631,000
4. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) grants to MDH, Year Three Continuation	\$1,277,544
5. Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program, FFY 2001	\$2,106,462
6. Hospital Preparedness HRSA one time grant to MDH	\$2,155,835
7. Public Health Network CDC one time grant to MDH	\$15,952,086
8. ODP State Homeland Security Grant Program for Fiscal Year 2003 Part 1 and 2	\$ 36,766,000
9. Additional unidentified monies	\$?
Total Funds Available	\$67,406,927

TABLE 4

Following is a breakdown by program of the amounts received for response to a WMD incident, the participants and purpose of the program.

1. **Department of Justice FFY 1999 State and Local Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program** – This program is administered by DEM. This program provided \$799,000 for the purchase of specialized equipment to enhance the capability of emergency services personnel to respond to WMD incidents. An additional \$150,000 was designated by DOJ as planning funds to be used for preparation of the Needs and Capability Assessment and the Statewide Strategy. Of the \$799,000 total equipment funds available, \$598,379 were awarded to local jurisdictions and \$200,620 was used to equipment State agency and contract responders
2. **Department of Justice FFY 2000-2001 State and Local Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program** – This is the second and third year funding for the above program and is also administered by DEM. DOJ required completion of a Needs and Capability Assessment and Statewide Strategy for continued funding. The Assessment and Strategy were completed and approved by DOJ in the Fall 2001. The State strategy allocates \$1,798,300 (70%) to local jurisdictions and \$770,700 (30%) to State agency and contract responders. DOJ guidelines required a minimum \$1,054,400 allocation to local jurisdictions and a maximum \$1,514,600 for State agency response

3. **Department of Justice FFY 2002 State and Local Domestic Preparedness Equipment and Exercise Program** – This is the fourth year funding for this program. The funds are to be awarded in October 2002. Of the \$5,231,000 allocated to Minnesota for equipment acquisition, the State has allocated \$4,184,800 (80%) to local government and \$1,046,200 (20%) to State agency and contract responders. Of the \$250,000 allocated to Minnesota for exercise assistance, \$153,585 will be used to conduct table-top and full-scale exercises in local jurisdictions, and \$96,000 will fund staff to help the state and local governments design, develop, conduct and evaluate WMD terrorism exercises.

4. **Centers for Disease Control (CDC) - Minnesota Department of Health (MDH)** has received Year Three Continuation Funding, totaling \$1,277,544.00, to continue initiatives for public health preparedness and response for Bioterrorism. These programs include the State Health Alert Network (HAN), expanded laboratory capacity (biologic agents), and disease surveillance and epidemiology. MDH is an active participant in the Twin City metropolitan MMRS organization and works closely with DEM in developing plans and procedures for emergency medical response. The following table (TABLE 5) is a breakdown of Year Three continuation funding for existing programs administered by MDH and intended to enhance public health preparedness for Bioterrorism.

Continuation Funding Requests for Public Health Preparedness and Response to Bioterrorism	
Health Alert Network/Training	\$663,960.00
Laboratory Capacity: Biologics	\$209,864.00
Surveillance and Epidemiology	\$403,720.00
Total	\$1,277,544.00

TABLE 5

5. **Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)** – Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program. \$100 million was available in FFY 2001 nationwide. This program provides funding directly to Fire Departments for the purpose of protecting the health and safety of the public and firefighting personnel against fire and fire-related hazards. Grants are awarded for training, fitness programs, vehicles, fire fighting equipment, personal protective equipment, and fire prevention programs. 42 grants were awarded to Minnesota Fire Departments for \$2,106,462.14 in FFY 2001. FFY 2002 funding is reportedly another \$360 million nationwide

6. **HRSA Hospital Preparedness Grant-** To improve the capacity of hospitals, their emergency departments and other associated health entities to respond to bioterrorist attacks as well as to other outbreaks of infectious diseases and other public health emergencies.

7. **CDC Public Health Preparedness and Response** –To help prepare for Bioterrorism, other outbreaks of infectious disease and other public health threats and emergencies.

8. **ODP State Homeland Security Grant Program Fiscal Year 2003-**Homeland Security announced and placed on their website these numbers on 3/10/03. This new program has money in four broad categories: equipment (\$7,071,000, exercise (\$1,768,000), training (\$530,000), and planning (\$707,000). Part two allocation

26,690,000 first responder preparedness (23,131,000) , critical infrastructure protection
(3,559,000)

Additional unidentified monies- From time to time we become aware of other monies that came into the state and were unreported to us. When we are aware of a funding that took place and can identify who received them we add to this list. We cannot assure that every \$ is on this list but we update whenever new information is made available.

City of Detroit
Action Plan for Homeland Security
Background Paper
April 4, 2002

Introduction

Of the many lessons learned from the horrific events of September 11th,¹ one of the most significant is that the federal government² must incorporate state and local authorities as a key element of the nation's Homeland Defense efforts. The "frontlines" of the new domestic war on terrorism are cities and towns throughout America, and therefore local governments have become the focal point of domestic national security planning. As a result, state and local authorities now must include the protection of the nation's economic assets, historical monuments and critical infrastructure as a part of their core public safety responsibility.

Homeland Security and the City of Detroit

The City of Detroit is home to the global headquarters of three of the world's top automakers – a critical part of America's economic infrastructure. The city serves as one of the busiest points of entry for the nation's northern border. Detroit is the largest city in the State of Michigan, has one of the largest convention facilities in the United States, several professional sporting arenas, two major airports, and sits along a major waterway. While Detroit faces many of the same security concerns as other major metropolitan areas, in many ways the city is unique and therefore it faces unique challenges. Today, and for the foreseeable future, efforts to detect, prevent, and/or respond to terrorism are a part of the daily operations of the departments and agencies that make up the government of the City of Detroit.

The city's homeland security efforts will be based on two important principles. First, efforts to protect those who live, work, and visit the city from future acts of terrorism need not be done at the expense of effective day-to-day service. Nor does it require that the city invest millions of dollars for technology and equipment that is only used in the event of a

¹ and the subsequent anthrax attacks

² comprised of military, health and human services, and law-enforcement authorities.

terrorist attack. In fact, the very information technology, communication systems, and business processes that support effective service delivery each and every day provide the foundation for effective efforts to detect, prevent and/or respond to terrorism and other critical incidents.

Second, the city will not compromise its commitment to uphold civil liberties, and to sustain and dramatically strengthen the city's proactive, positive partnership with the increasingly diverse communities throughout the city, the region, and the state. The violation of civil rights – whether through racial, ethnic or some other biased-based profiling – will not be tolerated in Detroit in the name of anti-terrorism, homeland security or any other justification.

Background

Since September 11th Detroit has been operating in a heightened state of emergency operations. Police officers, firefighters, public health officials and others have been working long hours, responding to calls for service, identifying and guarding potential targets, and supporting the efforts of federal agencies at the border.

These efforts have revealed a number of inadequacies within the infrastructure the city uses to provide both emergency and non-emergency service to the public. For example, police, fire, emergency medical technicians and other first responders have difficulty communicating with each other at the scene of an incident because they all use radio systems that operate on different frequencies. Information sharing between agencies operating within the city is at best ad hoc, because key information systems are not interlinked. There is no computerized system that identifies emerging public health problems—whether it is a leaking fuel storage facility or a bio-chemical weapons attack. The city's 9-1-1 emergency telephone system consists of old technology that is subject to frequent breakdowns. The city currently has no way to track work orders—either for police service or general government service—so that it can ensure a rapid and effective response to requests for service.

All of this must change if the City of Detroit is to be prepared to address future threats of terrorism. The city has neither the stamina nor the resources to continue at this level of emergency operations indefinitely. It is no longer in the best interest of the city to continue operating in a purely reactive manner. Instead the time has come for the city to

implement a proactive and information-driven approach to homeland defense.

In order to achieve this, the Office of the Mayor has conducted a review of the technologies and business processes that comprise the city's service delivery infrastructure. Based on the findings of that review and in recognition that the same infrastructure that facilitates the effective delivery of service by government agencies on a day-to-day basis also serves as the foundation for efforts to prevent and/or respond to critical incidents and terrorist attacks, the city has developed a plan of action for correcting these deficiencies. To be successful, it will be necessary for the city to upgrade the information technology and telecommunications infrastructure utilized by city agencies. The present infrastructure – while it may support current IT and communication demands – lacks the necessary redundancy, reliability and capacity to adequately support the homeland security efforts planned by the city. This plan provides a framework for system planning, future technology acquisitions, and prioritizing and coordinating requests for state and federal funding.

Action Items

The following actions will be undertaken by the City of Detroit to address the infrastructure and process deficiencies described above.

Action 1: The city will appoint a Homeland Security Coordinator to manage the implementation of this action plan.

Since September 11th, the city has taken steps to prepare for and respond to future acts of terrorism primarily by updating its “Emergency Response Plan” and the “City of Detroit Emergency and Safety Procedures”³. However, there is no central coordination point linking the activities of individual departments within the city either to each other, or with other state, county, regional and local entities. Furthermore, the city needs a central authority that will coordinate efforts to obtain and maximize the use of federal and state funding support.

The Mayor will appoint a Homeland Security Coordinator who will oversee the implementation of the action plan outlined here. Additionally, the Homeland Security Coordinator will monitor efforts by individual municipal departments to upgrade and re-engineer core

³ the reference guide for city employees prepared by the Emergency Management Department

components of the city's service delivery infrastructure. The Coordinator will integrate the city's homeland security efforts with those of other federal, state, regional and local entities as well as prioritize and manage requests for state and federal funding.

Action 2: The city will develop a comprehensive emergency response strategy.

Detroit is home to the global headquarters of three of the world's top automakers. It serves as a major point of entry for the nation's northern border. It is the largest city in the state, and has one of the largest convention facilities in the United States, several professional sporting arenas, two major airports, and a major waterway. While Detroit faces many of the same security concerns as other major metropolitan areas, in many ways the city faces unique challenges.

The city must—and will—develop a comprehensive citywide emergency response plan that builds upon the existing emergency response plans developed by individual departments and agencies. This comprehensive citywide plan will include an assessment of potential targets for attack, such as buildings, waterworks, power plants, and fuel storage facilities, and a detailed response plan that includes how federal, state, local and private entities will work together to prevent and/or respond to critical incidents. This plan will be updated on an ongoing basis or when a new threat is identified.

Action 3: The Mayor will lead a regional effort focused on establishing a smart, safe, and secure border.

Southeastern Michigan is home to five international border crossings. The flow of goods, services and capital between the United States and Canada is the largest bilateral flow between two countries in the world, now totaling \$420 billion a year. According to the Detroit Regional Chamber of Commerce, a total of \$1 billion in goods crosses the U.S.-Canadian border every day. The automotive industry alone, which relies on the smooth flow of goods for its "just-in-time" delivery schedule, represents more than \$300 million of this daily trade.

The effective flow of commerce across the border is not only a national economic priority, it is a priority from the local perspective as well. Before the attacks of September 11th, 100 tractor-trailer trucks an hour crossed the Ambassador Bridge. After the attacks, that number was reduced to 10 trucks per hour. Slower traffic flow across the border

means that materials needed to keep assembly lines moving arrive late, forcing plants to shut down; it means that the 1,600 Canadian nurses working within the Detroit's healthcare system are having trouble getting to work; it means the city has to re-assign police officers from protecting neighborhoods to assist federal border security efforts (at a cost to the city of \$2.9 million in between September 11, 2001 and December 31, 2001).⁴

The federal government has committed increased law enforcement resources to improve security at the border. Complicating this objective, of course, is the necessity to match increased security with the economic imperative of easing traffic congestion and increasing the flow of legitimate goods over the border. The challenge is to support the free flow of trade while at the same time protecting the nation (and Detroit) from threats of terrorist attacks, illegal migration, illegal drugs and other contraband. Meeting the challenge requires strong leadership focused on bringing government and business leaders together to re-think and re-engineer the way goods are transported across the border.

Recently, the law enforcement and international shipping communities have begun to focus on new border security techniques such as "point-of-origin" security and in-transit tracking of vehicles as potential methods of addressing this issue. This new way of providing for a secure and effective border requires extensive collaboration between public and private sector entities on an on-going basis. The city needs to take a leadership role in ensuring these concepts are applied to the local border.

Therefore the Mayor will organize a regional effort – involving representatives from both the public and private sectors – that will seek to address the challenge of enhancing border operations. As a first step, the Mayor will convene a "Border Summit" in which he will invite public safety, corporate and community leaders from both sides of the border to discuss border related issues and to develop a strategy to make the border more secure, smarter, and more efficient.

Action 4: The City of Detroit will connect the radio systems currently in use by Police, Fire, and EMS and expand the its wireless data infrastructure.

⁴ If continued at the same level in 2002, it is projected that this support will cost the city an additional \$9.6 million.

Historically, first responders have been limited in their ability to work together effectively at the point of service—fire, accidents, natural disasters, search and rescue, etc.—because the communications technology in use does not permit them to talk freely among departments on-scene and share access to crucial information. Responders frequently must carry multiple radios as the only means available for dealing with the problem. The need for this interoperability was clearly demonstrated on September 11th when police and fire departments from Arlington County, Va., Montgomery County, Md., and the District of Columbia responded to the Pentagon terrorist attack, and were unable to communicate with each other using their own radios. In Detroit, police, fire, and other city agencies must rely on a dispatcher relay to communicate during critical incidents because each agency uses different frequencies.⁵

In an effort to resolve this problem, the city will establish a network that will readily link the independent wireless voice and data systems currently used by federal, state, county, local and private entities operating within the city. The network will use a proven technology that has been evaluated by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Washington—Baltimore High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) and a “patching” network will be established supporting both day-to-day public safety operations and the response to critical incidents.

As a first step, the city will deploy a number of cross-band radio connector devices at various locations throughout the city. Once installed, the independent radio systems currently in use by the various public safety systems throughout the metropolitan area will be able to communicate with each other. While it is anticipated that the system design, installation and training activities will take approximately 12 months to complete, the city has begun efforts to obtain one of these “patching devices” for installation in the police department command post so that it can be used in the event of a critical incident.

The city will also upgrade and expand its wireless data infrastructure so that senior officials and other appropriate government personnel can:

- receive, respond to and update service requests;
- be provided “alert” information;

⁵ Currently, there are 43 voice radio frequencies in use in the Detroit metropolitan area for police alone.

- send and receive two-way text messages; and
- retrieve data from city and other key information systems.

It is essential that this wireless data system be designed so as to support daily operations and function during critical incidents when public telephone and cellular networks and the city's private radio systems are overwhelmed due to high demand.

Action 5: The city will upgrade its E9-1-1 system and improve the public's ability to access non-emergency service.

Calls to 9-1-1 will increase dramatically during any critical incident. This could prove devastating to Detroit without a significant upgrade to the current system. Recent reports suggest that the city's E9-1-1 telecommunication system is in need of significant upgrades. The latest flooding incident that forced the temporary relocation of the center also raises concerns as to the dependability of the current back-up system. Furthermore, the current 3-1-1 non-emergency police system lacks the information technology to make it an effective part of the city's efforts to provide service to public. Further, a person in need of social services or healthcare currently must navigate numerous agencies and hundreds of phone numbers to receive care.

Detroit will make it easier for the public to call for help. Not surprisingly, across the nation on September 11th and in the days following, the public sought emergency and non-emergency assistance via telephone. In areas where there was a clearly identifiable phone number where the caller could obtain information and referral support for social service, healthcare, and other non-emergency topics, the public utilized that number. In cases where an alternate number was not clearly distinguishable, the public called 9-1-1.

Therefore, the city will conduct a review of its E9-1-1 system and take the necessary steps to improve this emergency lifeline. As part of this review, the city will consider other ways to make it easier for the public to call for help or information without overloading 9-1-1 lines. Specifically, the city will examine the feasibility of expanding the 3-1-1 police non-emergency number system into a general city service request line thereby making it easier for the public to request service from any city agency. In addition, the Office of the Mayor and the Detroit Department of Health will work with the United Way of Southeastern Michigan and its coalition of health and human service providers to assist in its efforts to deploy a

2-1-1 system for free and easy access to information and referral of health and human services.

As a part of its homeland security efforts, the city will take steps to establish a centralized work order management system that will link every city agency and provide the city with the capability of tracking the quality of service delivery. Once deployed, any service request—whether made by telephone, letter or via the Internet—will be tracked. City employees will receive work assignments via wireless computers, allowing them to remain in the communities they serve for longer periods of time.

This centralized work order management system will:

- document all requests for service received by a department and/or agency;
- electronically forward that service request to the entity(s) responsible for providing the service;
- facilitate multi-agency response;
- assign a tracking number;
- track the cost of providing that service; and
- provide detailed management reports that will allow senior management to evaluate city department/agency performance.

It is envisioned that eventually this work order management system will be linked to other public health and public safety information systems in order to support the city's ability to:

- enhance emergency and non emergency service delivery;
- improve interdepartmental and interagency coordination;
- establish an operational management infrastructure that includes defined performance measures and agency accountability; and
- identify and address emerging critical incidents and other quality of life conditions.

Action 6: The city will deploy an electronic public health surveillance system.

The recent U.S. deaths caused by anthrax exposure illustrate that the threat of bio-terrorism is no longer limited to action movies or books—it is real, it is here, and Detroit needs to be prepared for future attacks.

While the different types of infectious and chemical agents that could be effectively used in an attack on domestic U.S. targets are limited, the effects of such an attack are potentially devastating. The best defense is a strong public health system that uses technology to identify emerging disease and environmental threats.

In all likelihood, the first indication of a domestic biological and/or chemical incident will be subtle and difficult to identify. Initially, primary care physicians, emergency medical personnel, and staff at local hospital emergency rooms located within and nearby the exposed area will begin seeing an increased number of people seeking treatment for flu-like symptoms or other medical issues. Over a several-day period, emergency room doctors—working in both publicly and privately funded hospitals—will record and report (usually using a paper-based system) patient-related information that eventually will generate concern that people have been exposed to biological and/or chemical weapons. State authorities will work with the Center for Disease Control to determine the exact agent utilized, and to support treatment activities. Once the agent and treatment are determined, the Department of Health and Human Services and appropriate state agencies will initiate response procedures that include providing doctors with treatment protocols, and even dispatching physicians and pharmaceuticals.

Detroit health officials and others in the first responder community have already updated many of their protocols on anthrax and other bio-terrorism agents. They have created and disseminated information to municipal workers, other health care entities, and the public but the current business processes and technology preclude the rapid identification of environmental hazards, naturally occurring diseases and biological/chemical exposure as they surface.

Now that terrorism is a palpable threat, it is even more critical that Detroit is prepared to recognize an outbreak of disease, circulate information to healthcare providers, allocate medical resources (antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines, etc), and coordinate local response with federal and military systems.

As part of a comprehensive effort to prepare for future acts of terrorism, the Detroit Department of Health, working with the Detroit and regional medical centers, will take steps to establish a public health disease surveillance system that will assist in the identification and response to both naturally occurring disease outbreak and biological and/or chemical weapon attacks. The city will help establish an Internet based,

secure information system to link emergency, urgent-care, and other appropriate healthcare related entities and facilities so that the city is prepared to:

- recognize an outbreak of disease;
- circulate information to physicians, nurses, county and local emergency medical systems and other appropriate health-care providers;
- support individual efforts to make a rapid assessment of a likely diagnosis; and
- make decisions as to the appropriate allocation of resources (antibiotics, antivirals, vaccines, etc...).

The city will ensure that its disease surveillance efforts are linked with those of the State of Michigan and are consistent with the national standards established by the Centers for Disease Control.

Action 7: Information sharing between federal, state, county, and local public safety and other appropriate entities will be improved.

Improving the city's information technology infrastructure will be a top priority. A key component of any effort to protect the public—whether the threat is from international terrorists, or from homegrown criminals—is the rapid access to information from local, state and federal databases. Currently 38 states and the District of Columbia have begun efforts to create “integrated justice” information systems, linking different components of the criminal justice system (police, courts, corrections). These systems will allow for the rapid flow of information about the people who commit crimes and the places where crime occurs. Law enforcement officials and policy makers will be able identify suspicious and/or unusual trends and develop information-driven strategies that effectively target the conditions that facilitate and the people who are involved in criminal activity. These same systems are an essential component of any organized effort to prevent and/or respond to future critical incidents and terrorist threats.

Accordingly, it will be a priority for Detroit to link the independent information systems used by city, county, and state criminal justice entities to allow for the rapid flow of information about the people who commit crimes and the places where crime occurs. This information

sharing will support efforts by law enforcement to identify suspicious trends and effectively target those involved in criminal activity.

But it is not enough to link law enforcement systems. Public safety information and communication systems must be—and will be—interlinked with those of other city government systems (such as those that support transportation, public health, social service, and public utility related activities). City departments work daily with each other, but often this work is hindered by “stove piped” information systems. Improving the city’s information technology infrastructure to allow for multi-disciplinary, proactive community focused activities, providing predictive analysis capabilities, and links with county, and state agencies will provide a higher level of customer service and defend and protect those who live, work and visit the City of Detroit.

Action 8: The city will take steps to mobilize local communities to work with authorities to prevent future acts of domestic terrorism.

Community residents and public safety agencies are dealing with a new environment of alerts and threats. Each must walk a fine line to ensure heightened awareness without causing unnecessary alarm. Training and the timely flow of information between the government agencies and the public are essential. Building upon existing police neighborhood watch programs and the Mayor’s Neighborhood City Halls (NCH) program, the city will make it a priority to provide information to community members so they can become active participants in the city’s homeland defense efforts.

Action 9: The city will develop comprehensive training programs for healthcare providers, first responders, and other personnel.

The city’s new focus on preventing terrorism requires more sophisticated level of training for first responders, community members, hospital employees and other city government personnel. While some departments have conducted their own specialized training post-September 11, this has not been done on a citywide basis. Further, many cities across the country are testing their training efforts by staging large-scale citywide drills (Denver and San Diego are two examples) which should also be performed in Detroit. Therefore, Detroit will design and deploy a comprehensive training program designed to prepare first

responders, health care professionals, community members and others to address the complex issues associated with homeland defense.

Action 10: The city will develop a prioritized list of projects, events and programs for pursuing additional state and federal resources. The city will seek special security status for upcoming G-8 meeting of energy ministers.

On May 2-3, 2002 Detroit will host an official meeting of the G-8 nations. This meeting will bring together the energy ministers from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and the United States as well as other senior United States and foreign government officials and representatives of the international media.

Since February 2002, Detroit officials have been working with officials from the State of Michigan, Wayne County and other federal and local entities to address the myriad security and logistical issues associated with hosting such an event. As the planning efforts for the G-8 event have progressed, it has become clear that the costs associated with ensuring a safe and secure environment for this type of international event under these circumstances exceeds the resources and fiscal capabilities of the city and its regional partners. Planning for this type of international meeting is complex and, in light of the past disturbances at similar events, the city has made a special request to the Office of Homeland Security for additional federal resources.

Conclusion

The nation is rightly focused on domestic defense and providing our public health, public safety, military, and intelligence communities with the tools, the authority, and the resources necessary to detect, prevent, and respond to all forms of terrorist crime and violence. But protecting our homeland from terrorists need not—and must not—be done at the expense of our core civil liberties and constitutional protections. Proactive, information-driven, law enforcement efforts—supported by rapid, effective sharing and collection of information—eliminate the need to utilize ineffective, random, and reactive enforcement strategies. Furthermore, the best preparation for future acts of terror can be found in the same techniques and technologies that can be used to better protect our neighborhoods from drug traffickers, robbers, and burglars, and to keep our communities healthier.

The city's goal is to deploy information and communications technology and operational strategies that support efforts to provide effective delivery of service by government agencies each day, recognizing that this infrastructure will serve as the foundation for efforts to prevent and/or respond to future critical incidents and terrorist attacks.

Local law enforcement and health personnel provide the first line of defense in protecting critical infrastructure and public health and safety. If an incident should occur, state and local personnel are the first to respond and the last to leave. Therefore it is of paramount importance that the city has a comprehensive strategy to protect its people. Public safety, healthcare workers, aid organizations, corporations, and concerned citizens all played critical roles in healing and protecting this community over the last six months. The City of Detroit will be proactive, harnessing that civic energy to create a prosperous, safe, and democratic city.



DICK MURPHY
MAYOR

Senate Governmental Affairs Committee

**Investing in Homeland Security: Challenges facing
State and Local Governments
May 15, 2003**

**Testimony by:
MAYOR DICK MURPHY
City of San Diego, California**

Chairwoman Collins and Honorable Senators of the committee, on behalf of the citizens of San Diego, I appreciate this opportunity to address the committee and articulate some of the challenges facing San Diego in its efforts to prepare for and respond to terrorist threats.

San Diego Background

San Diego is the nation's 7th largest city with a diverse population of 1,275,100. Despite the comfortable small town atmosphere of the city and its residents, San Diego is a large city and the protection of its residents and critical infrastructure is of utmost importance.

San Diego is a city with potentially high-profile vulnerabilities. Some of those distinctive attributes include: multiple military installations; the San Ysidro International Port of Entry – the busiest border crossing in the nation; regional water and wastewater facilities; a full service maritime port including a substantial military presence; an international airport; large professional sports facilities, major tourist attractions such as Sea World and the San Diego Zoo, as well as other symbolic sites such as the Coronado Bridge.

Of particular note is the City's responsibility for critical infrastructure of national significance. San Diego is not only the home to multiple military installations, but is the sole provider of water and wastewater services to all military installations within the City as well as the provider for naval bases home to three of the nation's aircraft carriers and several nuclear submarines.

Yesterday the City was pleased learn that the Department of Homeland Security announced an \$11.36 million award to San Diego under the Urban Area Security Initiative Grant Program (Part II). Currently our City analysts are trying to ascertain the exact distribution method of this grant. Our preliminary concern is that the funds will be allocated to the State for distribution to San Diego. Under that scenario, the State may have the ability to retain a percentage of the funds thereby reducing the amount the City will have available to provide the appropriate protection for its residents and critical infrastructure.

State Homeland Security Grant Program Distribution Method:

A significant concern for San Diego is the current distribution method of State Homeland Security Grants- Part I (SHSG-Part I). The base plus population distribution to States is not effectively delivering federal funds to large urban cities such as San Diego. Instead, States are determining how to "pass through" the federal funds to the local jurisdictions on a state by state basis with no consistency across the nation. Under California's rules for SHSG-Part I distributions, the Counties control the use of federal funding support, including what amount they retain or pass on to cities.

For example, San Diego is one of 18 cities within San Diego County, but represents approximately 43% of the population. San Diego has the largest most sophisticated police and fire departments in the region, and is the primary first responder and mutual aid provider to a majority of the people in the urban area of San Diego County. These City departments are most likely to be the first to respond to any large scale emergency, should one occur. However, of the current funding allocated to the region by the State, only \$680,491, or 24 % of the region's share was dedicated to San Diego.

Additionally, the City of San Diego has entered into a Joint Powers Agreement with the other 17 cities in the county as well as the County government, to provide hazardous materials response for the entire region. Despite being the only agency with a HazMat team, and bearing lead responsibility for responding to hazardous materials incidents anywhere in the county, the SHSG-Part I program does not require funds be allocated to such an agency for this purpose.

A potential solution for the inequitable distribution plans being adopted across the nation is to support direct federal funding to the largest U.S. cities based on population served, threat/need criteria, and recommend that future State funding account for high-threat metropolitan areas.

The largest U.S. cities have sufficient scale and sophistication to justify direct federal funding. The population of the City of San Diego is larger than Rhode Island and New Hampshire. The current system creates three layers of administrative bureaucracy, which reduces funds ultimately available to service providers and delays expenditure.

Planning/Overtime Expenses:

Another challenge facing cities is the inability to use federal funds for personnel costs such as planning and overtime reimbursement. While some funds have been identified in SHSGP II (2003 Supplemental Appropriations bill), not nearly enough have been identified for planning purposes. In order for public safety agencies to be adequately prepared for a terrorist emergency, funding for the development of response plans, training personnel and exercising the plans is necessary. Once emergency plans have been developed and exercised, public safety entities will have an even greater knowledge of the equipment needed to respond to terrorist incidents.

San Diego is an area with many potential terrorist targets and therefore incurs exceptionally large added personnel costs for heightened security, especially when DHS raises the national threat level to High (Code Orange) or Severe (Code Red). These additional expenses are difficult for cities to absorb, especially given the current budget conditions of cities and the very real threat of addition revenue reductions by the State. California is facing an estimated \$37 billion state budget deficit, and cities and counties are expecting to see a severe reduction in revenues in the near future.


Future SHSG funding should allow the funding to be allocated to personnel expenses and overtime costs for personnel assigned to homeland security functions (planning, training and exercising) and incremental "backfill" expenses of overtime and benefits for others to replace those personnel in regular duties.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, I would respectfully request the committee include the issues I identified above in their recommendations to the U.S. Senate on how to improve the current distribution system. Those issues are:

1. Recognize the unique characteristics in certain large cities and the necessity to identify funding accordingly;
2. Revise the distribution of State Homeland Security Grants to include direct funding for the largest U.S. cities; and
3. Allow planning and overtime expenses to be considered eligible for SHSG funds.

Again thank you Chairwoman Collins and members of the committee for the opportunity to share San Diego's perspective on some of the Homeland Security challenges facing the City.



DICK MURPHY
Mayor
City of San Diego



LARRY NAAKE

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD

**INVESTING IN HOMELAND SECURITY: STREAMLINING AND
ENHANCING HOMELAND SECURITY GRANT PROGRAMS**

MAY 15, 2003

Mayfield Testimony Page 2

Introduction

Thank you Madame Chair Collins, Ranking Member Lieberman, and members of the Committee, for allowing me the opportunity to provide you with a statement for the record regarding streamlining and enhancing homeland security grant programs. I am Larry Naake, Executive Director of the National Association of Counties.

America's 3,066 counties vary in geographic shape, size, population, and in the services they provide, but the one thing that unites them - is that they all play an integral role in protecting their communities. Counties are "first responders" to disasters. Whether it is a fire, a flood, a horrific crash, or an act of terrorism; counties are the primary provider of emergency management planning and administration at the local level.

County public safety, public health, emergency managers, sheriffs, and other workers have always been on the frontlines in the fight to protect the people of America and safeguard our communities. They are responsible for putting out fires, enforcing the law, caring for the injured, organizing evacuations, establishing quarantine areas and informing the public. When a crisis hits, these workers are always the first to respond.

County officials believe it is critically important that emergency preparedness plans be coordinated and rehearsed - vertically and horizontally - among local, state, and federal levels. Similarly, counties have unique responsibilities for effectively coordinating the plans and response actions of their law enforcement, public safety, public health, and

Mayfield Testimony Page 3

other departments that assist in response action. By their nature, counties are inherently “regional governments”.

During the aftermath of September 11th, NACo begin to take major steps to assist counties in these troubling times. In light of the critical role that counties play on the front lines of disaster prevention, preparedness and response, NACo has continued to convene a Homeland Security Task Force to govern our anti-terrorism activities. Our Task Force brings together a wide range of county policy leaders to explore our roles and responsibilities in the fight against terrorism, and to work with the White House, the Department of Homeland Security, Congress, the private sector and other federal agencies to better secure our communities.

There remains much work to be done all across the nation for local governments to improve their level of preparedness, and respond to future incidents – whether natural or man-made. Given the budget shortfalls at both the state and local level, it is even more critical that the federal government assist us in this regard. Since September 11th, State and county governments across the country have responded to the challenge of protecting this great nation, with little technical or financial assistance from the Federal Government. In this statement today, we hope to share our concerns regarding enhancing existing homeland security grant programs.

Mayfield Testimony Page 4

Office of Domestic Preparedness Grant Programs

NACo shares the concern of the Administration and the Senate Government Affairs Committee that current homeland security grant programs need revision. Nonetheless, we strongly believe that any changes to these grant program continue to support a base level of preparedness for all state and local governments. The National Strategy for Homeland Security is based on the principles of shared responsibility and partnerships between federal, state and local governments, the private sector and the American people. Counties support these principles and want to ensure that all communities are prepared to deal with potential terrorist threats. This is truly a “national” strategy, not a “federal” strategy.

Since September 11th, all communities –of all sizes have had to enhance their level of preparedness to deal with potential nuclear, chemical, biological attacks. This has required a great deal of local planning, coordination and investment – with very little federal assistance. Ensuring the health, safety and welfare of our nation’s citizens is essential and the Office of Domestic Preparedness Grant formula must benefit all communities.

High threat Areas

Although NACo strongly feels that all communities must be protected, we also recognize the challenges of “high threat areas”. These areas will need additional resources, and must be defined. Currently, no methodology exists for defining a “high threat area”, and one must be developed in consultation with state and local governments. Funding to

Mayfield Testimony Page 5

such areas has currently been left to the discretion of the Secretary of DHS and has presented many challenges to large counties seeking to obtain funds. In fact, DHS recently provided \$100 million directly to several cities as part of their “Urban Area Security Initiative” grant program. In awarding grants directly to these selected cities, NACo has argued that the Department failed to recognize the ongoing collaboration and division of labor between counties and cities in preparing, preventing and responding to a disaster. Commissioner Stenglein cites this ongoing collaboration in his testimony.

Shortly, ODP will again accept applications for an additional \$700 million that was approved by Federal Government for high threat areas. Responding to disasters is a mutual and collaborative response by all levels of government, and funding to high threat must support this principle.

Regional Coordination and Comprehensive Planning

NACo strongly encourages the committee to revise the existing formula to support comprehensive planning and regional preparedness efforts nationwide. Prevention must remain one of our main objectives. We must remember – terrorists can and will likely strike anytime, and anyplace.

The events of September 11 have demonstrated the importance of regional collaboration in preventing terrorist attacks and responding to events; and any new program should encourage local governments to share resources –especially given the limited federal

Mayfield Testimony Page 6

investment. For instance, in Pennsylvania multiple jurisdictions have joined in a Weapons of Mass Destruction Taskforce – dubbed the “Region 13 Working Group”.

This group was the first Anti-Terrorist Working Group of its kind in the state of Pennsylvania, and was cited as a best practice by the Department of Homeland Security. In fact, this group assisted in the response efforts at the Pennsylvania crash site of Flight 93. Along with the city of Pittsburgh, member counties in Region 13 include: Allegheny, Armstrong, Beaver, Butler, Cambria, Fayette, Greene, Indiana, Lawrence, Mercer, Somerset, Washington, and Westmoreland. Through the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, federal funding has been obtained from the Office of Domestic Preparedness to provide training and equipment to first responders in the event of a terrorist attack or disaster related event. The working group has long maintained and advocated “that regional task forces are the most comprehensive method to address the potential for terrorist events, as evidenced on Sept 11th or the Oklahoma City Bombing, where local resources were quickly overtaken.”

Many counties have supported the concept of regional approaches in preparing their communities from a potential terrorist threat. Counties recognize that the federal treasury cannot reimburse every local government fully for their homeland security related cost, but the federal government does have a critical role to play. A regional approach to preparedness, prevention and response will best allow the resources of multiple jurisdictions to be quickly employed in the event of a terrorist incident and would leverage the federal investment in homeland security.

The diverse makeup of participating levels of state and local governments allows for special expertise to be quickly identified and deployed. For smaller counties and denser areas of the nation – many of which have critical infrastructures in their communities such as nuclear reactors and dams, the benefits of regional collaboration will add to their capacity to respond to all hazards – not just terrorism.

Streamlining the Grant Program

Various grants for homeland security are scattered throughout various federal agencies and have presented significant problems to counties across the nation. In a recent House of Representative Subcommittee hearing on this issue, Paul L. Posner, a Managing Director at the General Accounting Office (GAO) discussed this issue in depth. He stressed “that multiple fragmented grant programs can create a confusing and administratively burdensome process for state and local officials seeking to use federal resources for pressing homeland security needs.” Furthermore, he added that “the fragmented delivery of federal assistance can complicate coordination and integration of services and planning at state and local levels.”

NACo agrees with the observations noted in the GAO testimony, but does not share the view that all programs relating to homeland security be consolidated. In fact, important programs such as the Fire Grants, Byrne Grants, and the Local Law Enforcement Block Grant would be better served to remain apart from ODP. A streamlined system must be

Mayfield Testimony Page 8

created to ensure the efficiency, integration and coordination of services and planning at the state and local level.

Furthermore, NACo supports the existing 80% share of homeland security grants to local governments. Ensuring that this share is maintained will ensure that the grants benefit their intended recipients - local first responders. Also, the committee should continue to ensure funds are awarded to local governments in an expedited process –within 45-60 days of States receipt of funds.

Fiscal Conditions and Match Requirements

Given the budget shortfall at both the state and local level, it is critical that the committee refrain from requiring any significant local or state matches as you enhance homeland security grants. If a significant match is required, the application of many initiatives would only go to those agencies and governments that can fiscally afford the match and not necessarily where the need is greatest.

Conclusion

In closing, we have a long road ahead of us as we work collectively on protecting our nation. Nonetheless, Counties across this great nation have pledged to do whatever is necessary to secure their communities. Counties are on the frontline in protecting our homeland from future terrorist attacks. In the event of a national disaster, an individual will not pick up the phone and dial the Department of Homeland Security, but rather 911.

Mayfield Testimony Page 9

Any changes to homeland security grants must ensure that all communities can be protected, and be made less vulnerable to attacks. Regional approaches to preparedness, prevention and response must be encouraged and will better enable us to protect our nation and ensure interoperability – given the limited federal resources for homeland security. Current fragmented grant programs continue to hinder our ability to safeguard our communities and due to fiscal constraints - local or state match requirements would limit the availability of any homeland security grant program. Local officials remain on the frontline in the fight to secure our nation. In our efforts to implement a National Strategy for Homeland Security, Counties look forward to a sustained partnership with the federal government and our state and other local partners.

**Statement for the Record
Submitted by County of Arlington, Virginia**

“Investing in Homeland Security: Challenges Facing State and Local Governments”

May 15, 2003

On September 11, 2001, the Nation’s attention focused on New York City as airliners dove into World Trade Center. Then, the focus shifted to Arlington County, Virginia, as Americans watched in horror as another airliner struck the Pentagon. With this attack, Arlington County became a front line in America’s War on Terrorism.

Given its experience with responding to the September 11th attack and continued efforts to address threats in the National Capital Region, Arlington County is well-schooled in the challenges local governments face as a result of this new era of terrorism. Therefore, the County is pleased to have the opportunity to provide the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs with its views of the challenges that continue to face local governments in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.

Based upon the lessons learned in the aftermath of the attack on the Pentagon, Arlington County has identified three immediate major challenges facing it and, most likely, other counties throughout the United States – (1) the need to upgrade antiquated communications systems; (2) the need to establish and upgrade emergency operations centers; and (3) the need to strengthen the public health infrastructure and integrate it into the first responder public safety system. To overcome these challenges, however, counties need additional resources. Arlington County appreciates the assistance Congress has already provided, but strongly urges Members to augment the existing Homeland Security grant programs to provide funding directly to local governments, including counties, in proportion to the threats they face. Congress also should provide additional flexibility as to how these funds may be spent to ensure that local governments have access to funding that allows them to cover the additional labor costs resulting from necessary additional

emergency staffing. Additionally, Members should rejuvenate programs, such as COPS, which have provided funding for innovative programs blending law enforcement and technology. Building homeland and national security capacity begins at the county and local level and immeasurably strengthens the security for the Nation as a whole.

Arlington County's Role in National Security

Even though Arlington County, Virginia, is geographically the smallest county in the United States, it is home to 190,000 Americans and several Federal agencies -- most notably, the Pentagon, with a workforce of more than 23,000 military and civilian personnel. It is also home to the new Transportation Security Administration, Defense Intelligence Agency, Drug Enforcement Administration, and numerous other public and private agencies that are critical to the national defense. Also a transportation hub, its easy access across the Potomac River to the District of Columbia makes Arlington the gateway to the Nation's Capital. Every highway and railroad that connects Virginia to the District of Columbia runs through Arlington. In addition, the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, also located in Arlington, welcomes an average of 47,000 passengers daily. Approximately 25,000 people visit Arlington's tourist attractions each day, including Arlington National Cemetery and the Iwo Jima Memorial.

From the moment American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon at 9:38 a.m., and for the succeeding 10 days, Arlington County emergency personnel rose to the challenges presented by this major fire and rescue disaster. During the minutes, hours, days, and weeks following the vicious attack on the Pentagon, Arlington County mobilized its emergency personnel and coordinated efforts with Federal, State, and other local governments. The destruction caused by the attack was immediate and catastrophic. The 270,000 pounds of metal and jet fuel hurtling into the solid mass of the Pentagon is the equivalent in weight of a diesel train locomotive, except it was

traveling at more than 400 miles per hour. More than 600,000 airframe bolts and rivets and 60 miles of wire were instantly transformed into white-hot shrapnel. The resulting impact, penetration, and burning fuel had catastrophic effects to the five floors and three rings in and around Pentagon Corridors 4 and 5. This act of evil cost the lives of 184 innocents and the lives of the 5 terrorists who carried it out.

Lessons Learned from September 11th

Once the immediate terror ended, Arlington County analyzed its response and prepared the “After-Action Report on the Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon” (After-Action Report). This analysis highlighted the County’s strengths and identified several challenges. Overall, the forward-thinking activities of Arlington County Fire Department Chief Plaughter, Assistant Chief for Operations James Schwartz, and Assistant Chief for Technical Support John White set the stage for the heroic efforts of our emergency teams. The Report demonstrated that the security of the Nation’s Capital is inextricably linked to the security of Arlington County.

The lessons learned from this period of national tragedy fall into two categories. First, the After-Action Report identified capabilities that worked very well and contributed significantly to the County’s successful response. These capabilities are models that other jurisdictions can emulate. However, we also learned the County faces several challenges that the County must correct and others should avoid in the future.

Arlington County’s response to the events of September 11th demonstrated the importance of several key factors, including:

- Establishing an Incident Command Post (ICP) and unified command presence;

- Ensuring the management and integration of mutual-aid assets and the coordination and cooperation of agencies at all government echelons, volunteer organizations, and private businesses;
- Implementing a comprehensive emergency management plan that is well thought out, properly maintained, frequently practiced, and effectively implemented;
- Providing employee assistance programs (EAP), including critical incident stress management services for the public safety and county employees; and
- Establishing appropriate training and exercises as part of an aggressive preparedness program that involves other governmental and nongovernmental entities that would be called upon to respond to a terrorist event.

Although proud of its success, Arlington County recognizes that many challenges remain post-September 11th. The After-Action Report noted several of these. Specifically, to ensure it is able to respond appropriately to potential future attacks, the County must:

- Develop fixed and mobile command and control facilities;
- Improve all levels of communications operations;
- Implement policies to eliminate “self-dispatching” and deployment plans that can be implemented quickly;
- Establish logical functions to ensure the appropriate supplies are available when and where they are needed; and
- Improve communication and coordination with emergency medical services, area hospitals, and county employees.

Major Challenges Identified

The most critical recommendations of the Arlington County After-Action Report, as well as other local communities, are those dealing with command and control facilities and communications equipment. Therefore, the County would like to take a moment to explain the reasons these improvements are necessary. Although Arlington County's needs are unique in many ways because of its direct ties to securing the Nation's Capital, the needs highlighted by the County's After-Action Report provide a useful example of what many local governments face in terms of improving critical infrastructure, communication, and coordination equipment.

Upgrading Communications Systems

Upgrading local communications systems is essential to strengthening an area's homeland security capacity. Existing communications infrastructure must link county first-responders with Federal, State, and local authorities, as well as public, private, and volunteer organizations. Arlington County's response to the attacks of September 11th clearly demonstrated that its existing communications facilities and equipment do not meet the new challenges facing Arlington and the National Capital Region. Even though its first-responders performed extraordinarily, almost all aspects of its communications systems – from initial notification to tactical operations – present problems in the post-September 11th world. The hub of Arlington County public safety communications is the Emergency Communications Center (ECC). In emergency situations, the ECC coordinates communications between and among the police department, sheriff's department, fire department, and general county radio users – all of whom provide critical support roles in a major emergency. It also serves as the vital link with the Federal agencies and facilities within Arlington County, including the Pentagon. Yet, the events of September 11th demonstrated that the ECC's existing equipment is not adequate in such situations. For example, cellular telephones provided little value because first responders did not have access to cellular priority services. Radio

channels were initially over-saturated. Inoperability problems among jurisdictions and agencies were rampant. Even otherwise compatible portable radios were sometimes preprogrammed in a manner that precluded interoperability. Pagers, which appeared to be the most reliable means of notification, were not always available or used, and many first-responders, such as firefighters, did not have access to them. Most troubling, there was no installed radio capacity to link communications during the emergency.

No county can afford to repeat the communications problems experienced on September 11th by Arlington County. It is essential for national security that counties and local governments responsible for responding effectively and efficiently to an attack have functioning, interoperable communication systems. Radios, pagers, and other communications devices must not only work, but also have priority channels. Interoperability is crucial to ensuring quick responses to threats not only in the Capital Region, but also across the Nation. In light of these communication challenges, Arlington County has developed a plan to establish a reliable, integrated system that maximizes technological advances. In addition, the County is working to maintain interoperability with the adjoining governmental radio systems and to improve radio communication and dispatching between County departments and agencies. As we understand it, other local communities facing similar challenges some have begun to undertake this process as well.

Establishing/Upgrading Emergency Operations Centers

Maintaining functioning and interoperable communications equipment is not the end of the story, however. Arlington County also learned that it is imperative to have an emergency operations center (EOC) that is the focal point of all county-directed resource support for field operations and coordination among responding parties. Before September 11th, Arlington County -- like many others across the Nation -- had established a bare-bones EOC where offices could continuously

assess the impact of an event on the community, implement mitigating actions as appropriate, and communicate emergency information to the County Board and the public.

However, given the magnitude of the problems that arose out of September 11th and that would like arise during another terrorist attack, it is clear that Arlington County, like other counties, does not have a facility specifically designed and equipped to support emergency management functions necessary to respond to national security emergencies and protect the Federal facilities within its borders. Currently, Arlington County's EOC is located in a conference room in the county government complex that does not provide adequate space and is not configured or properly equipped for that role. There are no provisions for private meetings. The room lacks sufficient space for core emergency management team members, press and VIP briefings, and county leadership meetings.

In addition, computing and communications technology to support the EOC are also seriously deficient. Information sharing, collaboration, and coordination almost exclusively depend on face-to-face interactions, making interacting with the Federal agencies and facilities that the County must protect next to impossible. Although the EOC is equipped with laptop computers and associated peripherals, as well as telephones and televisions used to monitor news and weather, it does not have any installed radio communications. Without an installed radio capacity, the incident commander can only communicate with the EOC through its staff members, some of whom are issued portable radios. More reliable contact with field response forces is needed. The telephone system is also inadequate. On September 11th, the emergency numbers would ring busy with no rollover.

Thus, another challenge facing Arlington County is the urgent need to upgrade its EOC facilities and equipment immediately. The importance of obtaining these improvements is made clearer by recent increases in the National Threat Levels to Code Orange status and the likelihood of

increased terrorist activity in and around our Nation's Capital because of the war with Iraq and other international challenges.

The County is working to establish a new, permanent joint EOC and a new ECC by outfitting unfinished space in the County's most secure and sustainable facility and purchasing the necessary equipment. The new facility will allow for better communication and coordination of emergency activities and responses, as recommended in the County's After-Action Report. In addition, the County seeks to equip the new EOC with appropriate communications and computing devices that are fully integrated and that support the full spectrum of EOC functions, including rostering, automated notification, operations checklists and journals, action tracking, and report generation. Even though these plans are in place, finding the resources to implement them has been an immense challenge.

Covering Operating Expenses

Even though updating equipment and facilities is imperative to local government preparedness, meeting the increased demand placed on emergency personnel also presents an enormous challenge. As the After-Action Report noted, Arlington County's emergency personnel's work schedules dramatically changed during the terrorism crisis. For example, the employees in the sheriff's office moved to 12-hour shifts to ensure sufficient personnel were available. Off-duty personnel were also used to help augment on-duty staff. And, some employees took on new roles while others "backfilled" their positions. The increased overtime required additional scheduling, paperwork, and organization. It directly impacted the well-being of employees, leading to the need for employee assistance programs. More directly, however, the situation required Arlington County to pay employees unplanned overtime both in terms of extra hours worked and additional shifts.

The importance of these critical workers cannot be underestimated. Jay Fiset, Arlington County Board Member and Chairman at that time, said it best when thanking first-responders from Arlington County for their work after the attack on the Pentagon:

The whole world wept tears of pride as these men and women unfurled the Stars and Stripes from atop the Pentagon's roof, an image that will be engraved into American memory from this time forward. To each of you, for your courage and professionalism – and for helping to turn Arlington's darkest moment into its finest hour – we thank you.

Their dedication encompassed the resilience of the American spirit during those dark hours and continues to do so today, even if in a less dramatic way. Emergency personnel remain vigilant, always on guard for a potential threat. Their focus is sharpened each and every time the National Threat Level is increased. During these times, they work extra hours, accept additional assignments, and rise to meet the needs of our communities. We must not short-change them by asking them to protect us without providing them with the overtime pay they deserve.

However, Arlington County, like so many across the country, struggles to find the resources to provide these critical employees with their overtime pay. While Arlington was reimbursed for overtime directly related to its response to the Pentagon, overtime costs from periodic increases in the alert status are not reimbursed. Arlington County encourages Congress to adopt policies that would permit local governments to use Federal Homeland Security grants to cover the cost of overtime and similar expenses when necessary respond to alert levels or attacks. While we understand the importance of ensuring that Federal funds are spent in an appropriate manner, some flexibility is necessary -- in fact, absolutely essential, to allow local governments to cover legitimate costs not necessarily identified as part of the original grant process.

Even more critical is providing on-going funds to support the public safety infrastructure. Arlington is the fire department for the Pentagon and responds over 250 times a year to fire and medical emergencies. Arlington receives no operating support for this service. Given the higher

threats faced today, Arlington has provided four-person staffing and to all Fire engines and two additional medic units with no federal support. Arlington's specialized rescue units for hazmat and technical rescue also need four-person staffing, as do the County's two truck companies; however, the needs outstrip local financial ability.

Likewise the public health infrastructure has been seriously eroded over the past quarter century. The anthrax attacks in Washington overwhelmed the capacity of all local health departments, yet increased federal support to meet this national need has been limited. The current SARS epidemic should be a wake-up call to the health threats we face.

The Need for Federal Funding

Even though the plans are in place to the meeting the challenges highlighted by September 11th, Arlington County like many communities is plagued by an equally difficult challenge – funding these improvements. Achieving the basic capabilities outlined in the After-Action Report is essential to any local community faced with increased threats of terrorism and will require a great deal of resources. Many local governments simply cannot afford to take the necessary steps because the financial resources are not available.

Although Arlington County has been extremely fortunate to receive some Federal funds to support its preparedness efforts, these dollars are not sufficient to meet the urgent needs to develop the County's most important preparedness priorities. The initial Congressional efforts to provide funding to assist local governments can and should be modified to assure that the available aid makes it to those who need it most – local governments on the front lines. Congress can assist local governments in three important ways.

First, Congress should modify the existing formula used to calculate the State Homeland Security Grants. This formula is extremely flawed because it provides more per capita funding to

areas with less risk than to those with higher risk. For example, Virginia – a target of the September 11th terrorists – will receive \$1.80 per capita, while Wyoming will receive \$9.78 per capita. Clearly, those areas with the greatest need and risk should receive the greatest funds. These funds should be distributed based on the risk a community faces, the assets a community must protect (such as Federal agencies, nuclear power plants, and water treatment centers), and other relevant criteria.

Secondly, Congress should provide for a direct funding mechanism for local governments. Federal support for community efforts has primarily focused on funneling dollars through the States. Although a good idea in principle, in practice little money from the initial Homeland Security efforts has reached local governments. We strongly urge Congress to work with local government officials, including county leaders, to develop Federal grants and programs that are targeted directly to these local entities who, as evidenced by Arlington County' response on September 11th, serve as the first responders, coordinators, and communications hubs in the event of terrorist attacks and other emergencies.

Finally, we strongly encourage Congress to restore funding for important Federal programs, such as COPS, which have traditionally served as resources for local governments seeking to develop innovative law enforcement programs. In recent years, the budgets for these programs have been slashed, while the need for them has increased exponentially. Without these programs, it will be even more difficult for local governments to develop the tools and systems necessary to address the challenges they face as a result of the terrorism threat.

Conclusion

These are only some of the recommendations and lessons learned by Arlington County after September 11th. The County hopes that by sharing them with the Committee today, other jurisdictions around the country may benefit from Arlington County's experience, both in preparing

for mass casualty terrorist events and responding to future national security challenges. In addition, we hope that this testimony provides the Committee with a roadmap as to what local communities need in order to respond to a terrorist event.

Based upon its experience in responding to the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon, Arlington County has identified a variety of issues and lesson learned. Most important among the challenges it faces are the need to develop a functioning and interoperable communications system, establishing an improved emergency operations center, and funding necessary overtime pay. Given the financial crisis facing Arlington County and other counties across the country, it will not be possible to achieve these essential capabilities without significant additional Federal funding. Stated simply, the Federal government must invest directly in its county and local governments. Even though States are an integral part of the Nation's homeland security efforts, local governments are on the front lines when it comes to responding to any attack or threat. Therefore, Arlington County believes that Congress should provide direct funding to local governments and ensure that local governments have the flexibility to use these funds, not only for equipment and facilities, but also to compensate emergency personnel for necessary overtime and other increased operating costs associated with increased terrorism threats.

