[Senate Hearing 108-132]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-132
IRAQ STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION:
U.S. POLICY AND PLANS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 22, 2003
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 8
Articles submitted for the record:
``Europeans Say Bush's Pledge to Pull Out of Balkans Could
Split NATO,'' from The New York Times, Oct. 25, 2000, by
Steven Erlanger.......................................... 78
``Bush Would Redefine U.S. Strategy in Europe: Ten Years
After the Cold War's End, A Rethinking of the U.S. Role
in NATO is Long Overdue,'' from the Plain Dealer,
Cleveland, OH, Oct. 27, 2000, by Christopher Layne....... 80
Brownback, Hon. Sam, U.S. Senator from Kansas, prepared statement 11
Responses of Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to additional
questions for the record................................... 82
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared
statement...................................................... 13
Responses of Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz to additional
questions for the record................................... 83
Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska, prepared statement 11
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Pace, General Peter, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Department of Defense, prepared statement...................... 32
Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul D., Deputy Secretary of Defense; accompanied
by: General Peter Pace, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Department of Defense, Hon. Alan P. Larson, Under Secretary of
State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, and Hon.
Wendy J. Chamberlin, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia
and the Near East, U.S. Agency for International Development... 14
Prepared statement........................................... 23
(iii)
IRAQ STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION: U.S. POLICY AND PLANS
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 22, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Brownback,
Enzi, Coleman, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Feingold, Bill Nelson,
and Corzine.
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order. It is a great personal privilege
to welcome today Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace.
We have been looking forward to your testimony and to our
discussion of the status of policies and plans for Iraqi
stabilization and reconstruction. This is the first of several
hearings over the next few weeks that our committee will hold
on Iraq stabilization and reconstruction issues. These hearings
are intended to help the committee perform its oversight
function and to inform the American people, whose support is
necessary for United States efforts in Iraq.
The United States military and coalition forces and the
President and his team, including our witnesses today, deserve
high praise for execution of a brilliant war plan that brought
the combat phase of conflict in Iraq to a decisive and speedy
conclusion. We mourn those who lost their lives in this
conflict. We recognize the extraordinary care taken to prevent
such loss.
In fact, the comprehensive planning that went into the
military campaign that ousted Saddam Hussein's regime was
evident in every aspect of the resounding military victory
declared by President Bush on May 1. This military success,
however, was only the first step in winning the war in Iraq.
Victory is at risk unless we ensure that effective post-
conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq
succeed over the long term.
The measure of success in Iraq that matters most is what
kind of country and institutions we leave behind. Iraq has some
important ingredients for success, an educated population, a
tradition of trade and industry, large reserves of oil to
benefit its people. The achievement of stability and democracy
in Iraq present an opportunity to catalyze change in the region
that can greatly improve United States national security.
Stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq are key to success in this
larger context of the Middle East region and in the global war
on terrorism.
Given these stakes, the United States must make a long-term
commitment to achieving our objectives in Iraq. A sustained
American commitment would heavily influence the political
dynamics of the region and reinforce the credibility of United
States diplomacy around the world. I am concerned that the
administration's initial stabilization and reconstruction
efforts have been inadequate. The planning for peace was much
less developed than the planning for war. Moreover, the
administration has not sufficiently involved Congress and the
American people in its plans regarding the costs, the methods,
and goals of reconstruction Iraq.
Congress has already voted $2.5 billion toward the
rebuilding effort in Iraq, but we have heard estimates before
this committee that the final bill may be over $100 billion.
Now, I believe the process could take at least 5 years. There
is little understanding of the administration's short-and mid-
term plans and priorities to address increasingly urgent issues
such as providing food, water, electricity, and fuel. The
United States and coalition forces are struggling to create a
secure environment to allow civil engineers and humanitarian
assistance workers to do their jobs, but there seem to be
insufficient military and police forces to establish this
security. Given these circumstances, talk of a reduction in
forces by year's end is premature. To restore law and order, we
may need to put more soldiers and marines into Iraq, rather
than draw them down.
There also is uncertainty about the long-term plans for the
transition from military to civilian authority in Iraq, and
increasing fear that vacuums of authority will lead to
sustained internal conflict in Iraq and greater instability
throughout the region. We should not underestimate the ethnic
and religious rivalries of a long-repressed people.
Now, these challenges should be met by a unified command
structure that clearly articulates objectives and shares
transparent plans for political transition, and this committee
is hopeful that the recent appointment of Ambassador Bremer as
the Civil Administrator of the Department of Defense's Office
of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is the first step
in a carefully coordinated, integrated plan for dealing with
Iraq.
In addition, our plans must be clear about the roles of all
forces, agencies, and organizations involved in the
stabilization and reconstruction process. The specific
responsibilities of the Department of Defense, Department of
State, and other agencies must be more clearly delineated. We
also want to hear about the administration's plans for
generating alliance contributions that will reduce long-term
American burdens. Can NATO play a peacekeeping role in Iraq
that would allow for the replacement of United States' units?
The main criteria for involvement of allies in international
organizations beyond the coalition must be their ability to
make contributions that will advance our goals in Iraq.
Secretary Wolfowitz and General Pace, we look forward to
your testimony today to give us confidence that comprehensive
planning is occurring, that our strategy in Iraq is designed to
be a springboard to a greater regional stability and wider
peace in the region. Achieving such ambitious goals will not be
easy, quick, or cheap, and we are engaged in nation building in
Iraq because it is in our national interest.
This is a complicated and uncertain business that requires
both a sense of urgency now, and patience over the long run.
Before I ask our distinguished witnesses to testify. I would
like to add that Hon. Alan Larson and Hon. Wendy Chamberlin are
at the table, and they may be of benefit and of counsel
throughout the hearing today. It was at the specific request of
Secretary Wolfowitz that we wanted to make certain that all
those who might have information today that would be
supplemental were on hand, and we appreciate your presence.
[The opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:]
Opening Statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar
I am very pleased to welcome Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter
Pace. We have been looking forward to your testimony and to our
discussion of the status, policies, and plans for Iraqi stabilization
and reconstruction.
This is the first of several hearings over the next few weeks that
the Foreign Relations Committee will hold on Iraq stabilization and
reconstruction issues. These hearings are intended to help the
committee perform its oversight function and to inform the American
people, whose support is necessary for U.S. efforts in Iraq.
The U.S. military and Coalition forces and the President and his
team, including our witnesses today, deserve praise for the execution
of a brilliant war plan that brought the combat phase of conflict in
Iraq to a decisive and speedy conclusion. We mourn those who lost their
lives in this conflict. We recognize the extraordinary care taken to
prevent such loss. In fact, the comprehensive planning that went into
the military campaign that ousted Saddam Hussein's regime was evident
in every aspect of the resounding military victory declared by
President Bush on May 1st.
This military success, however, was only the first step in winning
the war in Iraq. Victory is at risk unless we ensure that effective
post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Iraq succeed
over the long-term.
The measure of success in Iraq that matters most is what kind of
country and institutions we leave behind. Iraq has some important
ingredients for success--an educated population, a tradition of trade
and industry, and large reserves of oil to benefit its people. The
achievement of stability and democracy in Iraq present an opportunity
to catalyze change in the region that can greatly improve U.S. national
security. Stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq are a key to success in
the larger context of the Middle East region and in the global war on
terrorism.
Given these stakes, the United States must make a long-term
commitment to achieving our objectives in Iraq. A sustained American
commitment would heavily influence the political dynamics of the region
and reinforce the credibility of U.S. diplomacy around the world.
I am concerned that the administration's initial stabilization and
reconstruction efforts have been inadequate. The planning for peace was
much less developed than the planning for war. Moreover, the
administration has not sufficiently involved Congress and the American
people in its plans regarding the costs, methods, and goals of
reconstructing Iraq. Congress has already voted $2.5 billion toward the
rebuilding effort in Iraq. We've heard estimates that the final bill
may be over $100 billion. I believe the process could take at least
five years.
There is little understanding of the administration's short and
mid-term plans and priorities to address increasingly urgent issues
such as providing food, water, electricity, and fuel. U.S. and
Coalition forces are struggling to create a secure environment to allow
civil engineers and humanitarian assistance workers to do their jobs,
but there seems to be insufficient military and police forces to
establish this security. Given these circumstances, talk of a reduction
in forces by year's end is premature. To restore law and order we may
need to put more soldiers and Marines into Iraq, rather than draw them
down.
There also is uncertainty about the long-term plans for the
transition from military to civilian authority in Iraq and increasing
fear that vacuums of authority will lead to sustained internal conflict
in Iraq and greater instability throughout the region. We should not
underestimate the ethnic and religious rivalries of a long-repressed
people.
These challenges should be met by a unified command structure that
clearly articulates objectives and shares transparent plans for
political transition. This committee is hopeful that the recent
appointment of Ambassador Bremer as the Civil Administrator of the
Department of Defense Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance, is the first step in a carefully coordinated, integrated
plan for dealing with Iraq.
In addition, our plans must be clear about the roles of all forces,
agencies, and organizations involved in the stabilization and
reconstruction process. The specific responsibilities of the Department
of Defense, Department of State, and other agencies must be more
clearly delineated. We also want to hear about the administration's
plans for generating alliance contributions that will reduce long-term
American burdens. Can NATO play a peacekeeping role in Iraq that would
allow for the replacement of some U.S. units? The main criteria for the
involvement of allies and international organizations beyond the
Coalition must be their ability to make contributions that will advance
our goals in Iraq.
Secretary Wolfowitz and General Pace, we look forward to your
testimony today to give us confidence that comprehensive planning is
occurring and that our strategy in Iraq is designed to be a springboard
to greater regional stability and a wider peace in the region.
Achieving such ambitious goals will not be easy, quick, or cheap.
We are engaged in nation-building in Iraq, because it is in our
national interests. This is a complicated and uncertain business that
requires both a sense of urgency now and patience over the long run.
The Chairman. I would like to call now upon the
distinguished ranking member of our committee, Senator Joe
Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
General Pace, Secretary Larson. I welcome you all. Let me take
this opportunity to publicly state in front of you, Secretary
Wolfowitz and General Pace, and others what you already know
and what the whole country has attested to, and that is how
brilliantly our military forces performed. Their success is a
tribute to their skill and courage and to the commitment of the
administrations, the last two administrations, in ensuring that
our fighting men and women are the best-trained and the best-
equipped in the world.
Mr. Secretary, I think it is not an understatement to say
that no other member of the administration has been more
identified with the effort to change the regime in Iraq than
you have. You have been a passionate and articulate spokesman
for the view that ending Saddam's regime was a moral as well as
a strategic imperative, and the mass graves discovered since
Iraq's liberation are a terrible testament to the uniquely
barbaric nature of the former regime, and to how right you were
about the moral imperative. It is my hope that the Iraqi people
will never again have to endure such brutality and they can
soon, with God willing, enjoy the liberties that so many of us
take for granted.
But it also is my hope that the administration recognizes
that reaping the strategic dividends of Iraq's liberation--from
sending a message to reluctant States such as Syria, which you
have done well; to spreading democracy in the Middle East,
which is a task undertaken; to shifting the balance in the
region away from radicalism--all depend upon winning the peace.
So does helping the Iraqi people build the kind of future they
deserve. This commitment has focused on the need to win the
peace, and we have as a committee focused on one point in this
effort--and under both chairmanships sometimes we have been
questioned why we focus so much on it--and that is how to win
the peace.
For the last 10 months, since our hearing last summer that
has been the subject of this committee. We have made the simple
point repeatedly about Afghanistan, but sometimes I fear that
it has fallen on deaf ears. What we saw in Afghanistan and
what, unfortunately, we may be seeing again in Iraq is that for
all our success in projecting power, we are less adept at
staying power. We know how to win wars, but, Mr. Secretary,
with all due respect, so far we have not gotten off to as
stellar a start, in my view, in winning the peace.
We cannot afford to defeat rogue States, and I am sure we
all agree with this, to allow them to become failed States
which become breeding grounds for terrorism and instability.
I would like to read from an article in Monday's Washington
Post, which I am sure you all have seen and probably already
been questioned on. Of course the press is always interested in
the dogs that bark more than the dogs that do not, but this is
not an isolated account. Virtually every major news outlet has
published similar reports, and your opening statement, Mr.
Secretary, which we have had a chance to read because you have
been kind enough to submit to us, in part makes reference to
this and takes it on. The Washington Post article I am about to
read from reflects the views of many so-called experts who have
made the same point, but let me quote from the Post:
``Military officers, other administration officials and
defense experts said the Pentagon ignored lessons from a decade
of peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Somalia, and the Balkans
and Afghanistan. It also badly underestimated the potential for
looting and lawlessness after the collapse of the Iraqi
Government, lacking forces capable of securing the streets of
Baghdad in the transition from combat to post-war
reconstruction.''
Continuing the quote: ``Only in the past week did
administration officials began to acknowledge publicly these
miscalculations. They described continued lawlessness as a
serious problem in Baghdad, and called for more U.S. forces on
the ground to quell the wave of violence that has kept American
officials from assuring the Iraqi people that order would soon
be restored.
``How and why senior military and civilian leaders were
caught unaware of the need to quickly make the transition from
warfighting to stability operations with adequate forces
mystifies military officers, administration officials and
defense experts with peacekeeping experience from the 1990s.''
Continuing the quote: ``Defense experts inside and outside
the Pentagon say military planners are clearly influenced by
the Pentagon's belief, expressed by Deputy Secretary Paul D.
Wolfowitz and other senior leaders, that U.S. forces would be
welcomed as liberators. They also point to the Bush
administration's professed antipathy to military peacekeeping
and nation-building as articulated by the President during the
2000 campaign when he charged the Clinton administration with
overextending the armed forces with such missions.
``Defense experts and some military forces also cited the
Pentagon's determination to fight the war and maintain the
peace with as small a force as possible, noting that it
reflected Rumsfeld's determination to use the war in Iraq to
support his vision for `transforming' the military by showing
that smaller and lighter armed units supported by special
forces and air power could prevail on the 21st century
battlefield.''
Later, the article says, ``Officials inside and outside the
administration say the shift in mission should not have been a
surprise. In January, the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, a Washington think tank, published an
`action strategy' for Iraq that recommended that the Pentagon
plan as diligently for the post-war period as for the war. `To
avoid a dangerous security vacuum it is imperative to organize,
train, and equip for post-conflict security missions in
conjunction with planning for combat,' the document states.
``In February, an official from the U.S. Institute of Peace
briefed the Defense Policy Board, an influential advisory panel
on a $628 million proposal developed by the institute and based
on the peacekeeping experiences in Kosovo. It called for
bringing 6,000 civilian police officers, 200 lawyers, judges,
court administrators, and corrections officers into Iraq as
soon as the fighting stops.`Both proposals,' according to
senior administration officials, `were matched by debates
inside the government.' But the Pentagon had no plan for
civilian policing assistance in place and almost no military
police on hand when the fighting stopped in early April.''
Last paragraph: ``Before the war began, General Eric K.
Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, told Congress that `several
hundred thousand' forces would be necessary to stabilize Iraq
after the war. Several days later, Wolfowitz told another
congressional committee that far fewer troops would be needed,
calling Shinseki's estimate `way off the mark.' ''
Well, this is not the first time we are hearing this kind
of thing. The points highlighted in this story were raised
during the hearings that the chairman and I have held since
last July, and it is no surprise. The Deputy Secretary, I am
sure, will have an answer for this, but I am confident you have
come prepared today to address and rebut several of these items
mentioned in the story, and there is no doubt that we are
seeing positive changes in Iraq, that we are making progress,
especially outside of Baghdad, but the overall impression has
begun to take hold, and justifiably, in my view, that there was
either a lack of planning or overly optimistic assumptions, or
both.
I mean, we were honestly surprised by the rise of the
Shiites and the resurgence of fundamentalism. Did we plan for
that? Were we honestly surprised by the lawlessness that
plagues Baghdad? I have to say, Mr. Secretary, in my view there
is a real danger that if we do not recover quickly, the damage
may be irreparable.
The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan was a sobering lesson
to the people willing to pay almost any price for a basic sense
of security, and the longer it takes us to restore law and
order, the more likely it is the Iraqis will turn to extremist
solutions, in my view.
Just as many in Iraq and the region invented the conspiracy
theory that the United States wanted Saddam to remain in power,
they will now begin to believe that we want to see Iraqis
remain in a state of anarchy so that we can control their
riches. We have two competing pressures, I acknowledge. One is
the understandable desire to leave as soon as possible and not
become occupiers. The other is to stay as long as necessary to
make sure that Iraq can stay together and function on its own
without descending into chaos. It is still my view, it has not
changed, that only if we satisfy both of these demands are we
going to be all right.
It would seem to me that the common sense solution remains,
invite in NATO, involve our European allies, involve friendly
nations in the Arab and Muslim world. The good start today with
the Security Council resolution and its changed emphasis. Only
then will we lighten our burden on our forces, spread the risk,
and prevent us from being seen as occupiers, and vastly improve
our chance of success, and yes, getting the endorsement of the
much-maligned United Nations will make it easier, I believe,
for those governments whose people opposed the war in the
beginning and still oppose it to contribute to the building of
the peace, and as I said, I am pleased that the President has
made significant progress at the U.N. today, and that NATO has
said yes to Poland's request for assistance in managing its
sector.
Now, if we could show a little magnanimity in victory
instead of talking about retaliation and limiting contracts
with countries who were not with us in the war, maybe we can
get even more friends in on the peace, for I do not believe
Iraq is some kind of prize. Iraq, just as Afghanistan--and I
cannot say I have seen it yet, but I think Iraq, just as
Afghanistan, the single most important issue, as you all would
agree, I suspect, is security, and if people are afraid for
their lives, if they will not go to work or to school, if
shooting and lawlessness rage, engineers, builders, and
technicians will not be able to make the repairs needed to get
the economy going, the oil flowing and civil servants will stay
away from their offices and doctors from their hospitals, and
the people who drive the buses, run the power plants, and pick
up the garbage are not going to do their job.
And as good as our soldiers are, most of them are not
trained to be police, to control crowds, to capture common
criminals. Where are the military police, the gendarmes? Who is
going to do this job? How could we have failed to learn from
the Balkans about the need to bolster our soldier peacekeepers
with properly trained peacekeepers?
So Mr. Secretary, I read your prepared remarks. I have a
number of questions I want to ask you. I have already taken
longer than I usually do in an opening statement, but I believe
if we had more police, our soldiers would have more flexibility
to perform other critical tasks that we have fallen short of
the mark on, like securing nuclear facilities, where we have
seen looting.
No one is talking about 100,000 police, as you claim in
your statement. We are talking about 10,000. Actually, the
report suggested to you was 6,000, and we should have planned
for it, and if the security situation is still too dicey for
even heavily armed gendarmes, then we need more troops, maybe
even several hundred thousand, as General Shinseki had
indicated early on.
Indeed, I find it a little ironic that you are quoted today
as saying that one of the lessons of the Balkans in terms of
post-conflict situations is to have forces, ``so big and so
strong that nobody would pick a fight with us.'' By your own
testimony, you say that they are still picking fights with us
in Iraq and our land commander, General McKiernan, complained a
week ago that he cannot stabilize a country the size of
California with only 150,000 troops, so I am anxious to hear
what we are going to do from this point on and ask unanimous
consent, Mr. Chairman, that the rest of my statement be placed
in the record as if read.
The Chairman. Your statement will be placed in the record
in full.
I thank the Senator. Likewise, for all Senators who have
them, statements will be placed in the record in full
immediately following the two statements that have just
occurred.
[The statements of Senator Biden, Senator Hagel, Senator
Brownback, and Senator Feingold follow:]
Opening Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Secretary, General Pace: I join the chairman in welcoming you
to the committee.
Let me also take this opportunity to say our Armed Forces performed
brilliantly. Their success is a tribute to their skill and courage--and
to the commitment of the last two administrations in ensuring that our
fighting forces are second to none in training and equipment.
Mr. Secretary, I think it is not an understatement to say that no
other member of the administration has been more identified with the
effort to change the regime in Iraq than you. You've been a passionate,
and articulate spokesperson for the view that ending Saddam Hussein's
regime was a moral as well as a strategic imperative.
The mass graves discovered since Iraq's liberation are a terrible
testament to the uniquely barbaric nature of the former regime.
It is my hope that the Iraqi people will never again have to endure
such brutality and they can soon enjoy the liberties that so many of us
take for granted.
But, Mr. Secretary, It's also my hope that the administration
recognizes that reaping the strategic dividends of Iraq's liberation--
from sending a message to reluctant states such as Syria--to spreading
democracy in the Middle East--to shifting the balance in the region
away from radicalism--all depend upon winning the peace. So does
helping the Iraqi people build the kind of future they deserve.
This committee has focused on the need to win the peace
relentlessly for ten months, ever since our hearings last summer. We've
made the same point, repeatedly, about Afghanistan. But sometimes I
fear it has fallen on deaf ears.
What we saw in Afghanistan, and what, unfortunately, we may be
seeing again in Iraq, is that for all our success at projecting power,
we're less adept at staying power. We know how to win wars, but, Mr.
Secretary, with all due respect, so far we're fumbling the peace.
We cannot afford to defeat rogue states only to allow them to
become failed states, which are breeding grounds for terrorism and
instability.
I'd like to read from an article in Monday' Washington Post, which
I am sure you have seen. Of course, the press is always more interested
in the dogs that bark than those that don't. But this is not an
isolated account. Virtually every major news outlet has published
similar reports. And the many experts this committee has spoken with
have made the same points. But let me quote from the Post:
Military officers, other administration officials and defense
experts said the Pentagon ignored lessons from a decade of
peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans and
Afghanistan.
It also badly underestimated the potential for looting and
lawlessness after the collapse of the Iraqi government, lacking
forces capable of securing the streets of Baghdad in the
transition from combat to postwar reconstruction.
Only in the past week did administration officials begin to
acknowledge publicly these miscalculations. They described
continued lawlessness as a serious problem in Baghdad and
called for more U.S. forces on the ground to quell a wave of
violence that has kept American officials from assuring the
Iraqi people that order would soon be restored.
It goes on to say:
How and why senior military and civilian leaders were caught
unaware of the need to quickly make the transition from war-
fighting to stability operations with adequate forces mystifies
military officers, administration officials and defense experts
with peacekeeping experience in the 1990s.
Defense experts inside and outside the Pentagon say military
planners were clearly influenced by the Pentagon's belief,
expressed by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz and
other senior leaders, that U.S. forces would be welcomed as
liberators. They also point to the Bush administration's
professed antipathy to military peacekeeping and nation-
building, as articulated by the president during the 2000
campaign when he charged the Clinton administration with
overextending the armed forces with such missions.
Defense experts and some military officers also cite the
Pentagon's determination to fight the war and maintain the
peace with as small a force as possible, noting it reflected
Rumsfeld's determination to use the war in Iraq to support his
vision for ``transforming'' the military by showing that
smaller and lighter armed units, supported by Special Forces
and air power, could prevail on the 21st century battlefield.
Later, the article says:
Officials inside and outside the administration say the shift
in mission should not have been a surprise.
In January, the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, a Washington think tank, published an `action
strategy' for Iraq that recommended the Pentagon plan as
diligently for the postwar period as for the war. `To avoid a
dangerous security vacuum, it is imperative to organize, train,
and equip for the post-conflict security mission in conjunction
with planning for combat,' the document states.
In February, an official from the U.S. Institute of Peace
briefed the Defense Policy Board, an influential advisory
panel, on a $628 million proposal, developed by the institute
and based on peacekeeping experiences in Kosovo.
It called for bringing 6,000 civilian police officers and 200
lawyers, judges, court administrators and corrections officers
into Iraq as soon as the fighting stopped.
Both proposals, according to a senior administration
official, ``were matched by debates inside the government.''
But the Pentagon had no plan for civilian policing assistance
in place, and almost no military police on hand, when the
fighting stopped in early April.
Before the war began, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, the Army chief
of staff, told Congress that ``several hundred thousand''
forces could be necessary to stabilize Iraq after a war.
Several days later, Wolfowitz told another congressional
committee that far fewer troops would be needed, calling
Shinseki's estimate ``way off the mark.''
This isn't the first time we're hearing this. The points
highlighted in this story were raised during hearings that the Chairman
and I have held since last July. There's no surprise here.
Mr. Secretary, I'm confident that you have come prepared today to
address and rebut several of the items mentioned in this story.
And there is no doubt that we are seeing positive changes in Iraq--
that we're making progress, especially outside of Baghdad.
But the overall impression has begun to take hold--and
justifiably--that there was either a lack of planning or overly-
optimistic assumptions, or both. I mean, were we honestly surprised by
the rise of the Shiites and the resurgence of fundamentalism. Did we
plan for it? Were we honestly surprised by the lawlessness that plagues
Baghdad?
I have to say, Mr. Secretary, in my view, there is a real danger
that if we do not recover quickly, the damage may be irreparable.
The Taliban takeover in Afghanistan was a sobering lesson that
people are willing to pay almost any price for a basic sense of
security.
The longer it takes for us to restore law and order, the more
likely it is that Iraqis will turn to extremist solutions.
Just as many in Iraq and the region invented the conspiracy theory
that the United States wanted Saddam to remain in power, they will now
begin to believe that we want to see Iraq remain in a state of anarchy
so that we can control its riches.
We have two competing pressures in Iraq. One is the understandable
desire to leave as soon as possible and not become occupiers. The other
is to stay as long as necessary to make sure that Iraq can stay
together and function on its own without descending into chaos.
It is still my view--it has not changed--that the only way to
satisfy these competing demands is to share the burden with others.
It would seem to me that the common sense solution remains. Involve
NATO. Involve our European allies. Involve friendly nations in the Arab
and Muslim world. It will lighten the burden on our forces, spread the
risk, prevent us from being seen as occupiers, and vastly improve our
chances of success.
And, yes, getting the endorsement of the much-maligned U.N. will
make it easier for governments whose people opposed the war to
contribute to building the peace. I'm pleased we've made good progress
on a new U.N. resolution, and that NATO has said yes to Poland's
request for assistance in managing its sector.
Now, if we would show a little magnanimity in victory instead of
talking about retaliation and limiting contacts with countries that
were not with us in the war, maybe we can get even more friends in on
the peace. Iraq is not some kind of prize.
In Iraq, just as in Afghanistan, and, Mr. Secretary, I can't say
I've seen it yet--security is the single most important issue. Security
should be our number one priority. Everything follows from that.
If people are afraid for their lives, they won't go to work or to
school. If shooting and lawlessness reign, engineers, builders and
technicians won't be able to make the repairs needed to get the economy
going and the oil flowing. Civil servants will stay away from their
offices and doctors from their hospitals. The people who drive the
buses, run the power plants and pick up the garbage won't do their
jobs.
As good as our soldiers are, most of them are not trained to be
police--to control crowds--to capture common criminals. Where are the
Military Police--the gendarmes--who know how to do this? How could we
have failed to learn from the Balkans and Haiti about the need to
bolster our soldier peacemakers with properly trained peacekeepers?
Mr. Secretary, I read your prepared remarks. You argue that the
situation in Iraq is profoundly different than the situation in the
Balkans or Haiti because the enemy, while largely defeated, is still
capable of killing Americans. As a result, you conclude, our emphasis
has to be on soldiers, not police in Iraq. With all due respect, this
is not a zero sum game. We need both.
If we had more police, we'd free up more soldiers to take on the
remnants of the enemy.
If we had more police, our soldiers would have more flexibility to
perform other critical tasks where we've fallen short of the mark, like
securing nuclear facilities where we've seen looting. No one is talking
about ``100,000'' police as you claim in your statement. We're talking
about maybe 10,000 and we should have planned for it. And if the
security situation is still too dicey for even heavily armed gendarmes,
then we need more troops--maybe even the ``several hundred thousand''
that General Shinseki proposed. We're pretty close to that number now.
Indeed, I find it a little ironic that you are quoted today as
saying that one of the lessons from the Balkans in terms of post-
conflict situations is to have forces ``so big and so strong that
nobody would pick a fight with us.'' But in your testimony, you say
they are still picking fights with us in Iraq. And our land commander,
General McKiernan, complained a week ago that we can't stabilize a
country the size of California with only 150,000 troops.
Finally, Mr. Secretary, I was glad to read in your statement that
you believe we must be in Iraq for the long haul. You remind us that
we're still in Bosnia 8 years after Dayton--and rightly so--and that
the stakes in Iraq are even greater and the tasks more difficult. I
agree. I only wish that the President had made this clear to the
American people ahead of time--something I asked for repeatedly in the
many months leading up to the war. I wish that the President would tell
the American people now that we are going to be in Iraq for years and
it is going to cost us tens of billions of dollars.
No foreign policy, no matter how well conceived, can be sustained
without the informed consent of the American people. And they have not
been informed.
There are many other critical issues, including where we are in the
search for weapons of mass destruction and what we're doing to support
the creation of an interim Iraqi government that is seen as legitimate
by the people of Iraq, not a U.S. puppet. But let me leave it at that
for now and thank you both, again, for being with us today.
______
Prepared Statement of Senator Chuck Hagel
Thank you, Chairman Lugar for calling this and subsequent hearings
on Iraq Reconstruction. Let me begin by fully associating myself with
your op-ed on this subject in today's Washington Post.
I would like to take the opportunity offered by the appearance
today of Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and General Pace to express my
respect and appreciation for the spectacular performance of our Armed
Forces in Iraq. War is never an easy option, and American men and women
have taken great risks and made great sacrifices in meeting our initial
objectives in Iraq. Our men and women in uniform have the respect and
admiration of all Americans.
We are now in the business of ``nation building'' in Iraq. The
complexities of Iraq--its size, its culture, its geography, its
demography--make nation-building there one of the greatest challenges
this country has ever faced. We are only at the beginning of a process
that Chairman Lugar estimates could take at least five years. I agree.
That the American military would defeat Saddam Hussein's regime was
never in doubt. What was in doubt was what comes next in Iraq and how
we manage a transition to stability and democracy in such a complicated
region of the world.
The sudden change in the structure, mission, and personnel at the
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) in Iraq
indicates that we may have underestimated or mischaracterized the
challenges of establishing security and rebuilding Iraq. This is an
area of great unknowns and uncertainty. No one can accurately predict
the future.
I encourage the Bush Administration to continue to reach out to the
United Nations and our NATO and Arab allies to work with us as partners
in this immense task of rebuilding Iraq. President Bush and Secretary
Powell have achieved a major diplomatic success with today's vote at
the United Nations. Our interests are well-served by UN engagement and
legitimacy. NATO also has taken steps to get more involved in security
in Iraq. We need to encourage them to do more. America cannot, and
should not, bear this burden alone.
Iraq cannot be considered in a vacuum. Without progress on the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process; new confidence-building measures in
the Persian Gulf, and real steps toward political reform and economic
development in the Arab world, our efforts in Iraq and throughout the
Middle East will be frustrated and fail.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman for calling this hearing today. I
look forward to the testimony of our distinguished witnesses.
______
Prepared Statement of Senator Sam Brownback
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing on the
status of activities in this post-conflict stage of Operation Iraqi
Freedom. I must first begin by congratulating the President on today's
resounding victory in the United Nations Security Council on lifting
sanctions. I hope members from this committee soon will be able to
visit Iraq to survey the country and to provide support to the Bremer
administration for the enormous task that is now just beginning to
unfold. I especially hope we are able to visit the southern Shi'a areas
of Iraq where I understand we are having notable successes.
I hear many reports from the field and while it is not a perfect
picture, I believe much is being achieved by our many able-bodied
soldiers, diplomats and others on the ground. There has been much
criticism from my colleagues about the purported events transpiring in
this newly liberated country.
First, I would like to begin by talking about the threat Iran poses
to America's security and our efforts to bring security and stability
to Iraq and Afghanistan.
I want to call the committee's attention to some important
revelations that have come out in this week's news regarding Iran. From
the May 21st, New York Times--the headline: ``U.S. Suggests Al Qaeda
Cell in Iran Directed Saudi Bombings'' and the L.A. Times, the
headline: ``U.S. Ends Talks with Iran Over Al Qaeda Links.''
Mr. Chairman, these headlines say it all. To say that we can not
trust the Iranians is perhaps the understatement of the year. I know
many on this committee have hoped that we could reach some type of deal
with the so-called reformers in this country--but it is obvious that
this is not only impossible, but that trusting in such an approach is
extremely dangerous for U.S. security.
The NY Times quotes a senior Bush administration official as saying
that ``The United States has `rock-hard intelligence' that at least a
dozen Oaeda members, including Mr. Adel [the organization's security
chief] had been 1directing some operations from Iran'.'' Furthermore,
the article goes on to cite a senior Saudi official confirming the view
that it is Adel--who is in Iran, who directed the Riyadh attack.
The Iranian regime is a terrorist regime. A longstanding truism of
American foreign policy has been that you can not and should not
negotiate with terrorists. I hope that the current revelations will put
an end to the dangerous desires by some to make a deal with these
tyrants.
What examples have you seen of Iran's meddling in the
reconstruction of Iraq?
In clear violation of Iran's promises, we have heard reports
that the Iran is sending numerous agents into Iraq to stir up
the Shiite community. What is being done to combat this?
If we do not confront Iran--it seems that by removing Saddam
Hussein and the Taliban, we have merely paved the way for
export of the Islamic Revolution? Could you address the
importance of confronting Iran on the nuclear, terrorist and
human rights abuses--as it relates to our ability to ever
achieve long-term stability in Iraq?
I would like to extend to my colleagues the question of what their
expectations are for moving forward in Iraq, whether on reconstruction,
political transition or security? Sadly, I think many of us have
wrongly pointed to already existing difficulties and blamed a lack of
immediate solution on the President. I would point out to you that it
took us quite a while to establish a constitution to govern our own
country after we liberated ourselves. We should not be so arrogant as
to expect instant gratification on these matters.
In the southern Shi'a cities, the children are in school, people
are being fed and are making much headway with very little. The
expediency with which we have deployed a civilian administrator is
validation of the success of the post-conflict operation.
Many have beat-up on General Garner and claimed that he was being
sent back home with his tail between his legs. That is not the case and
to my knowledge, the pre-supposed expectation by many that he would
stay indefinitely in Iraq was not part of the plan--in fact, he was
told that he had no obligation to deploy and his leadership of the
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) would be
for a specific task for a short period.
The Bremer team is just now on the ground. I hope Deputy Secretary
Wolfowitz will highlight the successes, but I certainly hope he will
give us an unvarnished view of the things transpiring on the ground. I
hope he emphasizes the twenty-five year theft by Saddam Hussein of the
resources, the energy and the vitality of the Iraqi people--that is
clearly our biggest challenge. In his wake are destroyed lives,
decaying and unattended infrastructure, a regime indoctrinated in fear,
and the imagination, traditions and talent of a strong people
suppressed.
In addition, I would hope we are able to look into past human
rights abuse and war crimes, and be able to intercept new violations of
human rights and religious freedom. First, reports have been coming out
of the country of mass graves and rumors have circulated that we are on
the verge of uncovering a massive tragedy--graves that could total in
excess of a million people. I think the scale of the crimes against
humanity are still widely unknown here on Capitol Hill.
Emotions are running high in the country and I understand our
military, at the request of local clerics, has tried to remain out of
sight so as to be sensitive to the families who want to bury their
relatives according to Islamic customs. I am afraid it will soon be
apparent to all of us here that these crimes will be on the scale of
Hitler and Stalin in their brutality and in the number of lives taken.
Currently, I understand Chaldean Catholics, Assyrian and other
religious minorities in Iraq are reporting that they are being targeted
with violence for religious reasons throughout Iraq--in Baghdad,
Basrah, and Kirkuk. Some have been hunted down and murdered, others are
reporting that their homes, factories, and businesses have been burned
or otherwise destroyed. According to a recent LA Times report,
Christian women are reporting threats and intimidation for not wearing
``Islamic'' dress. These Christian communities are 2000 years old and
constitute one of the largest Christian communities in the Middle East.
There are now fears that they could be forced out under such treatment
over the next few months. Their co-religionists are expressing fear and
frustration about an apparent lack of concern by U.S. authorities for
the protection of religious minorities.
Beyond efforts to restore law and order, is the ORHA taking
steps to protect vulnerable religious minorities? What are
they?
Is there anyone in the Bremer administration charged with
monitoring and relating to religious minority groups? Who?
Has the Bremer administration or anyone else in ORHA made
statements specifically aimed at warning dominant Shiite groups
and militants warning them not to attack or harass non-Muslim
minorities?
Noah Feldman, a 32-year-old NYU law professor, has been appointed
by the U.S. Government to head up the drafting of Iraq's new
constitution. Professor Feldman has written a recent book, ``After
Jihad,'' and has made other comments that raise concerns about whether
basic human rights and freedom will be guaranteed in the new
constitution. In his book, it is clear he does not equate democracy
with liberal democracy and seems unconcerned with some basic human
rights and freedoms. He praises Iraq as an ``Islamic democracy'' that
has brought women into the work place and achieved more equitable
income distribution. He was quoted by the BBC as saying, ``that the
separation of church and state, although a central part of the U.S.
constitution might not be appropriate for a country which was
overwhelmingly Muslim.'' He is not one who advocates for religious
freedom or other human rights in his insistence that jihadists be
brought into the electoral process.
Will basic human rights including religious freedom be
guaranteed without qualification for all groups and
individuals, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, in the new Iraq
constitution?
Will the U.S. advocate protection for these basic human
rights in the new constitution and laws of Iraq?
Will Islamic law be a basis for Iraq's new legal system and
judiciary or will it be referenced in the new constitution?
What can be pointed to as a model for ``Islamic democracy''
that Prof. Feldman enthusiastically supports in his book?
Is it out of the question for Iraq to be a secular state or
is it a foregone conclusion that Iraq will be an Islamic state
as Prof. Feldman implied in his BBC interview just before going
to Baghdad?
If it is to be an Islamic state what would the protections
be for Iraq's many religious minorities?
Will the constitution drafting team include any Christian
human rights experts (such as Habib Malik)?
Is there anyone in the drafting team who are expert in
forging human rights guarantees within an Islamic context (like
Khalid El Fadi)?
______
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold
Mr. Chairman, I thank you and Senator Biden for holding this
important hearing, and I thank both of our witnesses for being here
today.
Since last summer, many members of this committee, myself included,
have been asking questions about the nature of the U.S. commitment to
post-conflict Iraq, trying to identify clearly the tremendous needs
that must be met if Iraq is to enjoy stability and cease to threaten
the region in the future. This has gone from a speculative exercise to
a very current one, but what troubles me is that we still have so few
answers. Answers from the administration about the scope of the job,
and the likely requirements in terms of U.S. manpower, resources, and
time, remain vague at best.
Recent press reports give our efforts to date mixed reviews at
best. I am deeply concerned about our failure to account for weapons of
mass destruction and the means to make them. I am also concerned about
the disorder that persists in parts of the country, and about the
shifting American plans and teams involved in what appears to be an
adhoc effort, despite all of the advance warnings about the critically
important reconstruction period.
Unfolding events in Afghanistan have proven the importance of a
robust commitment to security and reconstruction. We do not need more
examples or more reports to convince us that this is a serious business
and that we need to get stabilization and reconstruction right. What we
do need is candor about the commitment that will be required, and
clarity about our priorities in the short, medium, and long terms. And
critically, we need help from the rest of the world.
The men and women of the United States Armed Forces performed
brilliantly in Iraq. We cannot let them down by squandering their
efforts now with a half-baked plan for reconstruction.
The Chairman. Let me indicate that Deputy Secretary
Wolfowitz will present his statement. My understanding is that,
General Pace, your statement will be included in the record in
full, and then we will commence questioning by the Senators at
that point.
Let me just say, as a point of personal privilege, that
Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz is a friend. He has been not
only an able American public servant, but one who certainly
guided my understanding of the Philippines during 1985 and
1986. In his own service in Indonesia it was my privilege to
visit with him and to understand that country through his eyes
and through his witness. I appreciate very much his service to
the country now, and it is a real privilege to have him before
our committee today, and I call upon you, Mr. Secretary, for
your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY: GENERAL PETER
PACE, VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, HON. ALAN P.
LARSON, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, FOR ECONOMIC, BUSINESS AND
AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS AND HON. WENDY J. CHAMBERLIN, ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR ASIA AND THE NEAR EAST, U.S. AGENCY
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Wolfowitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thinking back on
your visit to Indonesia, it seems like eons ago. It was a very
different time in the Muslim world, in that biggest Muslim
country in the Muslim world. A lot has changed, not all of it
by any means for the better, that is for sure.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, your example has
consistently demonstrated that America's security concerns
transcend party or politics. On behalf of the men and women who
serve our country so faithfully and so well, we are grateful
for the support of you and your colleagues in both Houses of
the Congress. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you
today the critical task of stabilization and reconstruction in
Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, we are committed to helping Iraqis build what
could be and should be a model for the Middle East, a
government that protects the rights of its citizens, that
represents all ethnic and religious groups, and that will help
bring Iraq into the international community of peace-seeking
nations. Now that this goal is within sight, Iraq represents
one of the first and best opportunities to build what President
Bush has referred to in his State of the Union Message last
year as, ``a just and peaceful world beyond the war on
terror.''
I would note too, Mr. Chairman, I have heard the President
refer privately to the fact that the challenge of winning the
peace in Iraq is even greater than the challenge of winning the
war, and I think he would share the sentiments that you have
expressed in that regard and your distinguished ranking member
has expressed in that regard.
Mr. Chairman, Saddam Hussein was a danger to his people and
a support to terrorists and an encouragement to terrorist
regimes. His removal from power opens opportunities to
strengthen governments and institutions in the Muslim world
that respect fundamental human dignity and protect freedom,
that abhor the killing of innocents as an instrument of
national policy. Success in Iraq will continue to demoralize
those who preach doctrines of hatred and oppression and
subjugation. It will encourage those who dream the ancient
dream of freedom.
In the last half-century, those ideals of freedom and self-
government have been the most powerful engines of change in the
world. They give us hope for further development in the Muslim
world, a development that will benefit every nation throughout
the world and bring us important allies in the war against
terror. We cannot afford to fail. We cannot afford to allow
Iraq to revert to the remnants of the Baathist regime that now
reigns throughout their country in a desperate bid for
influence and power, or to see that country become vulnerable
to other extremist elements.
As the distinguished chairman of this committee said as
recently as Sunday at Notre Dame, ``Iraq must not become a
failed State and a potential incubator for terrorist cells.''
We cannot and we will not allow such a threat to rise again,
nor can we dash the hopes of the Iraqi people. Make no mistake,
recent efforts to destabilize Iraq in large measure represent
the death rattle of a dying regime. We can defeat them, and we
will.
As Presidential envoy Paul Bremer told me recently in a
telephone conversation, ``If the Baathists have any staying
power, let there be no doubt--we have more.'' We will not stop
our efforts until that regime is dead. Rebuilding Iraq will
require similar time and commitment.
Mr. Chairman, I have just returned from a visit to Bosnia
and Kosovo and Macedonia. My main purpose in those first two
countries was to thank American troops for their dedication and
commitment, and to assure the authorities in the region that
the United States will see our tasks through to completion.
To those who question American resolve and determination, I
would remind them that we are still playing our crucial role in
Bosnia 8 years after the Dayton Accord, many years after some
predicted we would be gone, and we continue to be the key to
stability in Macedonia and in Kosovo. The stakes in Iraq are
even greater than in the Balkans, far greater, but if the
stakes are huge in Iraq, there is no question that our
commitment to secure a peaceful Iraq is at least equal to those
stakes.
Mr. Chairman, I have noted with strong agreement your
statements about the need for America to stay the course in
Iraq. I applaud your determination and appreciate your support
and the support of this committee in helping the American
people to understand the stakes that we have in success and
what we must do to achieve it.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that today is only
67 days since our Marines and Army forces first crossed the
Kuwaiti border into Iraq. It is only 3 weeks since President
Bush announced the end of major combat operations. I underscore
that word major, because I will explain at greater length later
smaller combat operations in Iraq still continue on a daily
basis.
Even though the war has not completely ended, we are
already started on the process of rebuilding that country.
Several months before the war even began, we established the
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in order
to be able to address the post-war tasks. As the title of that
office implies, much of its early planning and focus was aimed
at two disasters that fortunately did not happen, one was to
relieve what was anticipated to be a massive humanitarian
crisis, and the second to halt the environmental damage that
was anticipated from large-scale destruction of the Iraqi oil
fields.
Thanks, I think in large measure to the speedy success of
the military operation, the task we face has turned out to be
very different. There is no humanitarian crisis in Iraq.
However, a great deal of other work remains to be done, most of
it anticipated in ORHA's planning and staffing, work such as
restoring rapidly the functioning of the electric power in that
country and restoring essential medical services. Most of these
problems are not primarily a result of the war, but rather the
result of decades of tyrannical neglect and misrule, where the
wealth and treasure of the country was poured into creating
palaces, building tanks, and procuring weapons of mass
destruction instead of caring for the Iraqi people.
That damage has been compounded by widespread looting in
the aftermath of the Saddam regime, some of it clearly
conducted by surviving elements of the regime for political
purposes. The task before us is more about construction than
reconstruction, the building of a society that was allowed to
rot for more than three decades by one of the world's worst
tyrants.
There is some good news in all of that. The good news is
that the Iraqi people will be able to notice improvements in
their normal lives long before we have reached the full
potential of that country, one of the most important in the
Arab world.
Just a few examples, Mr. Chairman. Before the war, large
numbers, estimates range from 20 to 50 percent of Iraq's
children under the age of five suffered from malnutrition. Only
60 percent of the Iraqi people had access to safe drinking
water. Ten of Basrah's 21 potable water treatment facilities
were not functional. Seventy percent of Iraq's sewage treatment
plant needed repair, and according to UNICEF, some half-a-
million metric tons of raw or partially treated sewage was
dumped in the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, Iraq's main source
of water.
Eighty percent of Iraq's 25,000 schools were in poor
condition, with an average of one book per six students, while
I would note at the same time in every one of the first 100 or
so schools we inspected in Southern Iraq, every one of them had
been used as a military command post and an arms storage site.
Iraq's electrical power system operated at half its
capacity before the war. Iraq's agriculture production had
dropped significantly, and Iraq's oil infrastructure was badly
neglected. It will take time to reverse the effects of
persistent, systematic neglect and misallocation of resources,
but if the task is enormous, even at this very early stage
there are grounds for optimism.
I talked this morning on a secure telephone with Lieutenant
General John Abizaid, the Deputy Commander of Central Command,
one of our most distinguished army leaders. He also commanded
U.S. peacekeeping troops in Bosnia and in Kosovo, and he
reported after his very recent visit to Baghdad that in Iraq we
are already way ahead of where we were in either Bosnia or
Kosovo at a comparable stage in those deployments.
Despite claims that there were no plans for peace
operations in the wake of military operations, Presidential
envoy Bremer and Jay Garner are implementing plans drawn up
long before the war to strengthen and rebuild the country.
Assertions that we were already failing, detailed at some
length in the Washington Post article that the ranking member
read from, assertions that remind me of similar assertions that
the military campaign had taken us into a quagmire just one
week into the war, reflect in my view an incomplete
understanding of the situation in Iraq as it existed before the
war, and an unreasonable expectation of where we should be now.
Security is our No. 1 priority, and our most urgent task in
the post-Saddam Hussein era is to establish secure and stable
conditions throughout the country. Secretary Rumsfeld
reiterated recently, and I quote, ``security remains the No. 1
priority in Iraq precisely because security and stability are
the fundamental prerequisites for everything else we need to
accomplish, essential for providing the basic normal life and
services, and beyond that to create a climate''--and this is
important--``where people for the first time in their history
can express political views in an atmosphere free of rear and
intimidation.''
Much of what I read on this subject suggests what I believe
is a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of the
security problem in Iraq, and consequently a failure to
appreciate that a regime which had tens of thousands of thugs
and war criminals on its payroll does not vanish overnight. The
people who created the mass graves that are now being uncovered
in Iraq still represent a threat to stability that was not
eliminated automatically when the statues came tumbling down in
Baghdad.
I read recently in that same article that unnamed officials
and experts say that the Pentagon ignored lessons from a decade
of peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans, and
Afghanistan. It seems to me that those anonymous sources ignore
the difference between normal peacekeeping operations and the
kind of situation we are in now, which is a combination of
peacekeeping and low-level combat. In just the last 24 hours
alone--I emphasize this is just the report that came in this
morning--in Baghdad, the 3rd Infantry Division raided a Baath
Party meeting and detained nine Baathists in Fallujah, which
continues to be a hotbed of Baathist activity, some of it with
connections to foreign extremists, possibly al-Qaeda. An Iraqi
vehicle attacked a checkpoint in the 3rd Armored Cavalry
Regiment, two enemy were killed and one detained. In the same
area, in the same 24-hour period, three Iraqi snipers engaged
U.S. troops, and in a third incident in the Fallujah, area a
Bradley was disabled by a rocket-propelled grenade fired from a
mosque.
In Baqubah, another town in north central Iraq, again in
just the last 24 hours, the 4th Infantry Division conducted a
raid and captured seven Iraqis and seized 15 million dinars. In
al Kut, a patrol of the 1st Marine Division engaged 20 enemy,
killed two, wounded one, and captured 11. Fortunately, in this
24-hour period there were no U.S. casualties, but that level of
activity illustrates continued hostile activity that we
encounter, much of it apparently associated with elements of
the old regime.
To give you some statistics, in the last 2 weeks there have
been 50 hostile incidents, 37 of them initiated against our
troops. We have had 17 wounded in action and one killed. That
is since the end of major combat activity.
In short, while major combat operations have ended,
American soldiers continue to be shot at almost daily. While we
have made substantial progress in catching the people on the
blacklist, there is still additional work that needs to be
done. We face in Iraq a situation where a substantially
defeated enemy is still working hard to kill Americans and to
kill Iraqis who are trying to build a new and free Iraq because
they want to prevent Iraqi society from stabilizing and
recovering. Bizarre as it may sound, it would appear that their
goal is to create nostalgia for Saddam Hussein. We cannot allow
them to succeed.
We need to recognize that this situation is completely
different from Haiti or Bosnia or Kosovo, where opposition
ceased very soon after our peacekeeping troops arrived. We do
not have the choice in Iraq of avoiding confrontation with
these repressive elements of the old regime. We have to
eliminate them, and we will do so, but it will take time.
This task requires more than just military policemen. There
is a very difficult balance to be struck, particularly in
Baghdad, between providing ordinary civil order forces on the
streets, which we are doing, and being prepared to deal with
snipers and armed bands. CENTCOM is making that transition.
There are now 45,000 coalition military personnel in the
Baghdad area, approximately 21,000 of whom are actively
involved in security operations. In just the last 24 hours
alone, the 3rd Infantry Division has conducted nearly 600
patrols, secured 200 fixed sites, and manned 85 checkpoints.
Again, General Abizaid reports from his recent visit that we
are already seeing much more commerce, many more people on the
street, and much shorter gas lines.
I think of importance in Sadr City, the notorious Shia slum
in Baghdad of more than a million people that used to be known
as Saddam City, that people are already reporting that their
conditions are better than they were before the war. Of course,
that is not hard to do in that part of town. We are making
progress.
In my most recent conversation with Presidential Envoy
Bremer, he reports that while the security situation is
serious, and unfortunately still imposes very severe
restrictions on the ability of U.S. personnel to move freely,
and that is a constraint on our reconstruction effort, Baghdad
more generally is not a city in anarchy. Shops are open and the
city is bustling with traffic. We have gotten some 7,000 Iraqi
police on duty in Baghdad, and reports of looting and curfew
violations and gunfire are decreasing, but one of our principle
challenges is that we have been able to make much less use of
the old Iraqi police force than we had planned. It turns out
that their leadership was hopelessly corrupted by the old
regime, and the policemen themselves seem to have been better
trained to raid people's homes at night than to patrol the
streets.
It is important to distinguish the security situation also
in different parts of the country. Most of the attention,
appropriately enough, is on Baghdad, and there is no question
that the capital is one of the keys to the future of the
country, but we would make a mistake if we saw it as the only
one.
Conditions in other parts of the country are generally
better. For example, in the south, the second largest city in
the country, Basrah, with a population of almost 1.3 million
people, most of them Shia, are overwhelmingly grateful to be
free of Saddam's tyranny, and the city is largely stable. In
Nasiriah, local police are now armed, and the force has grown
to over 600. In Diwaniya, nearly 300 Iraqi police officers have
been hired and the coalition is installing two 911 emergency
phone lines.
In Northern Iraq, the two large cities, Mosel and Kirkuk,
with a combined population of more than 2\1/2\ million people,
are largely stable thanks to the successful efforts of Major
General Dave Petraeus and the 101st Air Assault Division. There
remain some problems in those two cities, most significantly
problems arising out of the property disputes created by
Saddam's policy of Arabization, a kind of slow-motion ethnic
cleansing, but we are taking political and legal measures to
try to address those problems.
We sent a study team led by former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq
William Eagleton, that included distinguished experts from
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Bosnia, countries that have had
experience with these kinds of property restitution problems in
the past, and they will come up with some recommendations of
how we can address those problems by legal means and discourage
the use of force.
Finally, if you would indulge me, Mr. Chairman, I would
like to give a little detail about what I think is potentially
a very important success story in the somewhat smaller city,
although it is still a city of half a million, called Karbala.
Karbala's significance far exceeds its size, because as one of
the two holy cities of Shia Islam, it has enormous potential to
point the direction for Iraqi society, or at least for the Shia
segment of Iraqi society.
There, the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Marines has worked
effectively with local officials to create what are reportedly
excellent conditions of law and order in that town. A political
officer from our embassy in Kuwait visited Karbala recently and
he reported that, and I quote, ``with support from U.S.
military forces, moderate reformers are engaged in an audacious
experiment aimed at building democratic rule in one of Shiism's
two holiest cities.''
In cooperation with civil affairs teams from 3rd Battalion,
7th Marines, they have achieved notable successes, and that
report goes on to note that the infrastructure in Karbala is
largely functioning. Electricity service has returned to pre-
war levels and almost all homes have running water. The three
local hospitals are open, although they admittedly lack basic
medicines. U.S. Marine engineers are repairing local schools,
hospitals, and the water plant.
Most significantly, in addition to fostering the
reestablishment of basic public service, and this, I think, is
particularly important, the Marines have supported the
emergence of a functional, competent provisional government in
Karbala Province that advocates--remember, this is in the heart
of Shia Iraq--that advocates a secular democratic future for
that country.
Significantly, the leadership of this new secular and
democratic local government is a religious figure, Sheikh Ali
Abdel Hassan Kamuna. He is not only a Said, which means a
descendant of the Prophet Mohammed, and a member of a prominent
local tribal clan, but, apparently no contradiction, he is also
a member of the secular intelligentsia.
The council elites contain other senior tribal figures,
including five other Saids, but also representatives of the
secular intelligentsia and business world, including a
university professor, a civil engineer, a merchant, a retired
army colonel, several lawyers, sociologists, and
ophthalmologists. I am going to ask if there are any women
among them, because that would be a good sign of progress, but
I think that is pretty impressive by itself. The religious
intelligentsia is represented by a sheikh who endured 12 years
in Saddam's prisons for his part in the 1991 uprisings.
The fact that a new day has dawned in Iraq was nowhere so
evident as in the recent Arbayeen pilgrimage in the cities of
Karbala and Najaf. For the first time in 26 years, more than a
million Shia pilgrims walked to their holy cities without fear
and without violence.
In judging the success or failure of the military plan for
dealing with the aftermath of the collapse of the regime, one
cannot judge it against the standard of unachievable
perfection. There is no plan that could have achieved all of
the extraordinary speed of this one, and at the same time been
able to flood the country with military policemen. Choices had
to be made. I think we made the choices, the right choices,
choices that saved both American and Iraqi lives and prevented
damage to the environment and to the resources of the Iraqi
people.
Let me just say a little bit about those plans. Starting in
January of this year we recruited Jay Garner to stand up the
Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. To my
knowledge, this is the first time we have created an office for
post-war administration before a conflict had even started. It
was obviously a sensitive matter because we did not want to do
anything that would undercut the efforts to reach a diplomatic
resolution of the crisis presented by Iraq's defiance of U.N.
Resolution 1441. For that reason also, we did not brief key
Members of Congress perhaps in as much detail as we would have
liked.
We should certainly have ensured that Jay Garner briefed
you before he left for the theater. We will work hard to do our
best to remedy those errors, including arranging secure video
teleconferences with Envoy Bremer and Mr. Garner as
appropriate. Having said that, let me also say we picked Jay
Garner because he had demonstrated at other times in his
career, most significantly when he was a commander in the
extraordinarily successful operation in Northern Iraq in 1991,
a capacity for putting organizations together quickly and
energizing them and focusing them on getting practical tasks
accomplished.
Fortunately, as I noted earlier, a great deal of our pre-
war planning turned out not to be needed, because there were no
massive food shortages, there was no massive destruction of oil
wells or gas platforms, and I believe in large measure that is
attributable to the success of the military plan. I would like
to briefly mention some of the features of that plan that I
think contributed to that success.
At the heart of the military plan was the imperative to
defeat Iraq's major combat forces. The emphasis was on speed.
We consciously chose to keep our force size relatively small,
limiting the amount of people and materiel deployed on the
initial thrust into Iraq. This plan gave great flexibility.
Those forces quickly plunged deep into Iraq, bypassing a good
portion of the country in their push to Baghdad. We recognized
that was a choice, and that we would be leaving problems in our
rear.
Despite the fact that Saddam's regime had strategic warning
of an impending attack, because of our speed, coalition forces
were able to achieve substantial tactical surprise. In short,
we began the war with a timetable the regime did not expect,
and we combined it with a speed that made it difficult for the
regime to react and regroup. The enemy was never able to mount
a coherent defense, nor was it able to blow up dams, bridges,
and critical infrastructure or use weapons of mass terror,
perhaps because it was caught so completely off-guard.
As a result, in less than 3 weeks we were in Baghdad, and
with the toppling of Saddam's statue, history's annals tallied
another victory for freedom akin to the fall of the Berlin Wall
or the liberation of Paris.
Our plan worked even better than we could have hoped. For
example, in Baghdad we tried a few armored raids to probe and
shock the Iraqi Army. We had not expected to see resistance
collapse completely as a result, but when those armored raids
actually caused the collapse of Iraqi resistance, we
capitalized on our success and moved into the heart of Baghdad,
a decision that testifies to the flexibility of the war plan as
well as its speed.
Mr. Chairman, not only did this plan achieve its military
objectives, this plan saved lives, American lives and Iraqi
lives. The unprecedented use of precision not only destroyed
the intended military targets, but protected innocent lives and
key infrastructure, and the Iraqi people stayed home. They
understood our military actions were directed against Saddam
and his regime, not against them.
As a result, there is a list of crises we have averted,
successes that are measured as much by what did not happen as
what did. There is no food crisis in Iraq. There have been no
major epidemics. There was not the refugee crisis that many
predicted would destabilize the region. There was no wholesale
destruction of oil wells or other critical infrastructure after
the war began, and the regime did not use weapons of mass
destruction.
Mr. Chairman, let me say a few words about costs, or more
importantly about how we are going to pay for them. The costs
of reconstruction are difficult to estimate, since many of the
problems we face resulted from decades of neglect and
corruption, but there are a number of funding sources that can
help Iraq. First, there is $1.7 billion in formerly frozen
Iraqi Government assets in the United States that the U.S.
Government vested by Presidential order. Second, there is about
$700 million, and the number grows almost daily, in State- or
regime-owned cash that has so far been seized and brought under
our control and is available to be used for the benefit of the
Iraqi people. Third, once Iraqi oil exports resume, and with
the passage of the U.N. Security Council resolution today, they
can resume immediately, the proceeds from those sales will be
devoted entirely to the benefit of the Iraqi people, except for
a 5 percent fund that the U.N. is setting aside for reparations
from past conflicts.
Under the terms of the recently passed U.N. Security
Council resolution, assets from two additional sources would be
placed in the Iraqi Assistance Fund, and there have been public
pledges from the international community of more than $600
million under the U.N. appeal and nearly $1.3 billion in other
offers of assistance for the food, health, agriculture, and
security sectors. Indeed, I believe the passage of the
resolution today is an important watershed in making it
possible to get contributions on both military assistance for
stability operations and on the nonmilitary side for
reconstruction from many countries around the world.
Mr. Chairman, just a few words about the political side,
which in the long run will turn out to be the most important,
although it is not at the moment our most urgent task, but we
continue to work toward the establishment of an Iraqi interim
administration [IIA] which will assume increasingly greater
responsibility for the administration of Iraq.
The IIA will draw from all of Iraq's religious and ethnic
groups and provide a way for Iraqis to begin to direct the
economic and political reconstruction of their country, but the
interim administration's most important responsibility will be
to set in motion a process leading to the creation of a new
Iraqi Government, for example by setting up local elections,
drafting a new constitution and new laws. This is a process
that foreigners cannot direct. It must be a process owned by
Iraqis.
In the final phase of our plan, an Iraqi Government would
assume full sovereignty on the basis of elections in accordance
with a new constitution. Our intention is to leave Iraq in the
hands of Iraqis themselves, and to do so as soon as we can. As
President Bush has said, the United States intends to stay in
Iraq as long as necessary, but not a day longer. To those who
fear that Baathists and Iranians may intervene when we have
left, our message is simple. While we intend to withdraw as
rapidly as possible from Iraqi political life and day-to-day
decisions, we will remain there as an essential security force
for as long as we are needed.
I would also caution that this process will take time, and
it is necessary to get it right. Mr. Chairman, currently 24
coalition countries are providing military support, some of
that publicly, some of it is still private. Thirty-eight
nations have offered financial assistance, totaling now $1.8
billion, and very importantly, a number of countries have made
commitments to providing brigade-size and larger forces for the
stability operation once the U.N. Security Council resolution
has passed, as has just happened.
I would just like, before I conclude, to note that there
have been some very significant successes already as a result
of the efforts of ORHA and our pre-war planning. Some Iraqis
today have more electric service than the past 12 years. For
the first time since 1991, the people in Basrah have
electricity 24 hours a day. When the national grid backbone is
operational later this month, Baghdad will be able to receive
excess power from the north and the south, and with the removal
of U.N. sanctions and the ability to start exporting, we will
now be able to use Iraqi natural gas to produce another 700
megawatts of power.
Primary schools throughout Iraq opened on May 4. Jay Garner
is hopeful that secondary schools and universities will open
soon. We have started emergency payments to civil servants, to
more than a million of them. Privately hired stevedores have
begun offloading operations and put rice directly on trucks.
Currently over 1,500 tons per day are offloaded, and I could go
on with more and more. A great deal is happening. More is
happening every day.
Let me just conclude by mentioning the important subject of
the energy infrastructure. Obviously, one of the keys to
getting Iraq up and running as a country is to restore its
primary source of revenue, its oil infrastructure. As with many
other facets of life in Iraq, this infrastructure had been
allowed to decay to a surprising degree. Fortunately, we
averted the destruction of almost all of the Iraqi oil wells,
and a great deal of repair work is underway to ensure that
operations can safely resume.
While the coalition will be involved at the outset, the
goal is to have production and marketing responsibility in the
hands of a stable Iraqi authority as soon as possible. The
lifting of the U.N. sanctions, which is something we have been
working hard to achieve, the lifting of those sanctions today
not only represents an opportunity for Iraq to start earning
the oil revenues that can help rebuild that country, it also
allows us to relieve shortages of gasoline and cooking fuel,
since the absence of any available storage capacity had meant
the refineries could no longer operate.
Mr. Chairman, let me close by thanking you for holding this
hearing and thanking all the Members of Congress for the
outstanding bipartisan support that we have had since the
beginning of this war, indeed since the beginning of the war on
terror. As I noted in my statement, we are still fighting at
the same time that we are trying to win the peace, and as you
noted in your article today, transforming Iraq will not be
quick or easy. Our victory will be based, as you put it so
well, on the kind of country we leave behind.
The stakes for our country and the world are enormous, and
the continued commitment of Congress and the American people is
essential. I appeal to you and your colleagues for your
continued support and your leadership in this historic effort.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statements of Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz and
General Pace follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: Your example
consistently demonstrates that America's security concerns transcend
party or politics. On behalf of the men and women who serve our country
so faithfully and so well, we are indeed grateful for your support. I
appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today the Defense
Department's perspective on stabilization and reconstruction efforts in
Iraq.
our imperative--winning the peace in iraq: the stakes are enormous
Just as the Department was committed to getting right the plan for
military operations in Iraq, we are equally committed to getting right
the process of helping Iraqis establish an Iraq that is whole, free,
and at peace with itself and its neighbors. We are committed to helping
Iraqis build what could be a model for the Middle East--a government
that protects the rights of its citizens, that represents all ethnic
and religious groups, and that will help bring Iraq into the
international community of peace-seeking nations. Now that this goal is
within sight, Iraq represents one of the first and best opportunities
to build what President Bush has referred to as a ``just and peaceful
world beyond the war on terror.''
Saddam Hussein was a danger to his people and a support to
terrorists and an encouragement to terrorist regimes. His removal from
power opens opportunities to strengthen governments and institutions in
the Muslim world that respect fundamental human dignity and protect
freedom, and that abhor the killing of innocents as an instrument of
national policy. Success in Iraq will continue to demoralize those who
preach doctrines of hatred and oppression and subjugation. It will
encourage those who dream the ancient dream of freedom. In the last
half century, those ideals of freedom and self-government have been the
most powerful engines of change in the world. They give us hope for
further development in the Muslim world, a development that will
benefit every nation throughout the world and bring us important allies
in the war against terrorism.
We cannot afford to fail. We cannot afford to allow Iraq to revert
to the remnants of the Baathist regime that now range throughout Iraq
in their desperate bid for influence and power--or, to see it
vulnerable to other extremist elements. As the distinguished Chairman
said as recently as Sunday at Notre Dame, ``Iraq must not become a
failed state and a potential incubator for terrorist cells.'' We cannot
and we will not allow such a threat to rise again--nor can we dash the
hopes of the Iraqi people. Make no mistake: recent efforts to
destabilize Iraq represent the death rattle of a dying regime. We can
defeat them. And we will. As Presidential Envoy Paul Bremer has told
me, ``If the Baathists have any staying power, let there be no doubt--
we have more.'' We will not stop our efforts until that regime is dead.
Rebuilding Iraq will require similar time and commitment. Mr.
Chairman, I've just returned from a visit to Bosnia and Kosovo, where
my main purpose was to thank our American troops for their dedication
and commitment and to assure the authorities in the region that the
United States will see our tasks through to completion. To those who
question American resolve and determination, I would remind them that
we are still playing our crucial role in Bosnia eight years after the
Dayton Accord, long after some predicted we would be gone, and we
continue to be the key to stability in Kosovo and even in Macedonia.
The stakes in Iraq are even greater than in the Balkans. But if the
stakes are huge in Iraq, there is no question that our commitment to
secure a peaceful Iraq is at least equal to the stakes. Mr. Chairman, I
have noted with strong agreement your statements about the need for
America to stay the course in Iraq. I applaud your determination and
appreciate your support and the support of this Committee in helping
the American people understand the stakes that we have in success.
Mr. Chairman, today marks only day 67 since the start of major
combat operations in Iraq. It is only three weeks since President Bush
announced the end of major combat operations, and, as I will explain at
greater length later, smaller combat operations in Iraq still continue.
Even though the war has not completely ended, we are already started on
the process of rebuilding Iraq. Several months before the war even
began, we established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance in order to be able to address that task.
As the title of the office implies, much of its early focus was on
planning for two disasters that fortunately did not happen: First, to
provide humanitarian assistance to a war-ravaged population, including
the possible victims of large-scale urban fighting, and secondly, to
halt the environmental damage that was anticipated from large-scale
torching of the Iraqi oil fields and to begin the reconstruction of
that vital national asset. Thanks to the speedy success of the military
operation, the task we face has turned out to be very different. There
is no humanitarian crisis in Iraq.
The humanitarian problems of war have been largely avoided, in no
small measure because of the speed with which the campaign was carried
out. However, a great deal of other work remains to be done, most of it
anticipated in ORHA's planning and staffing, work such as restoring
rapidly the functioning of the electric power in Iraq and restoring
essential medical services. Most of these problems are not primarily a
result of the war, but rather the result of decades of tyrannical
neglect, where the wealth and treasure of the country was poured into
creating palaces, building tanks and procuring weapons of mass
destruction, instead of caring for the Iraqi people. That damage has
been compounded by widespread looting in the aftermath of the Saddam
regime, some of it clearly conducted by surviving elements of the
regime themselves. The task before us is more about construction than
reconstruction--the building of a society that was allowed to rot from
within for more than three decades by one of the world's worst tyrants.
The good news in all of this is that the Iraqi people will be able to
notice improvements in their normal lives long before we have reached
the full potential of this country--one of the most important in the
Arab world.
The level of pre-war neglect and repression was as widespread and
as systematic as Saddam's methods of terror. As the uncovering of mass
graves is revealing to a world that should have known before, tens of
thousands of Iraqis have been brutally executed by Saddam's regime.
Families, businesses and even cultures were destroyed, as we saw in
Saddam's brutal attempt to wipe out the Marsh Arabs, an ancient people
with a remarkable culture in southern Iraq. The latter also represents
a horrific act of ecological terrorism, which others are left to fix.
The following list suggests the widespread neglect of what we consider
basic services, but for Saddam many were used as instruments of
control.
Before the war:
Large numbers of Iraq's children under five years old
suffered from malnutrition;
Only 60% of the Iraqi people had access to safe drinking
water;
10 of Basrah's 21 potable water treatment facilities were
not functional;
70% of Iraq's sewage treatment plants needed repair.
According to UNICEF reports, some 500,000 metric tons of raw or
partially treated sewage was dumped into the Tigris or
Euphrates rivers, which are Iraq's main source of water;
80% of Iraq's 25,000 schools were in poor condition; in some
cases, as many as 180 students occupied one classroom--with an
average of one book per six students--while at the same time
every one of the first 100 or so schools we inspected in
Southern Iraq had been used as military command posts and arms
storage sites;
Iraq's electrical power system operated at half its
capacity;
Iraq's agriculture production had dropped significantly;
Iraq's oil infrastructure was neglected.
Obviously, it will take time to reverse the effects of persistent,
systematic neglect. But, if the task is enormous, even at this very
early stage, there are many reasons for optimism. Deputy Commander of
Central Command, LTG John Abizaid, who also commanded U.S. peacekeeping
troops in Bosnia and in Kosovo, reported after a recent visit to
Baghdad that we are already much further along in Iraq than we were in
either of those two places at a comparable stage. Despite claims that
there were no plans for peace operations in the wake of military
operations, Presidential Envoy Bremer and Jay Garner are implementing
plans drawn up long before the war to strengthen and rebuild Iraq.
Assertions that we are already failing--reminiscent of similar
assertions that the military plan had taken us into a quagmire just one
week into the campaign--reflect both an incomplete understanding of the
situation as it existed in Iraq before the war and an unreasonable
expectation of where we should be now.
The situation in Iraq right now is difficult--it's very difficult.
But, it was even more difficult a couple weeks ago, and worse yet a
couple months before that. We continue to make progress in what was
expected to be an extremely difficult situation. As press accounts
continue to report what is wrong, I would say, we don't want less of
these reports, we want more--because we are eager to see revelations in
the press about what needs our attention. And we're interested in the
opinions of a people who are newly free. If the situation in Iraq is
somewhat messy now, it's likely to seem even messier as Iraqis sort out
their political process. But, that is part of self-determination. We
expected this period of uncertainty and our plans anticipated it.
However, there is also a great deal of good news, and it is
important to report that also. I will be discussing some of it later in
my statement, but first let me address what is unquestionably our most
immediate challenge, and that is establishing secure and stable
conditions throughout the country.
SECURITY IS PRIORITY NUMBER ONE
Our most urgent task in the post-Saddam Hussein era is to establish
secure and stable conditions throughout the country. Secretary Rumsfeld
reiterated recently, ``security remains the number one priority in
Iraq'' precisely because security and stability are a fundamental
prerequisite for everything else we need to accomplish in Iraq--to
provide the basics of normal life and services, and beyond that, to
create a climate where people can express political views in an
atmosphere free of fear and intimidation, something that Iraqis have
been unable to do for decades.
Much of what I read on this subject suggests a fundamental
misunderstanding about the nature of the security problem in Iraq, and
in particular, a failure to appreciate that a regime which had tens of
thousands of thugs and war criminals on its payroll does not disappear
overnight. The people who have created the mass graves that are now
being uncovered in Iraq represent a threat to stability that was not
eliminated merely when the statues came tumbling down in Baghdad. I
have read recently that unnamed officials and experts say that the
Pentagon ignored lessons from a decade of peacekeeping operations in
Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans and Afghanistan. It seems to me that those
speaking anonymously ignore the difference between normal peacekeeping
operations and the kind of situation that we are now in.
In just the last 24 hours alone, in Baghdad the 3rd Infantry
Division raided a Baath Party meeting and detained 9 Baathists. In
Fallujah, which continues to be a hotbed of Baathist activity, some of
it with connections to foreign extremists, an Iraqi vehicle attacked a
checkpoint of the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment and two enemy were
killed and one detained. In the same area, three Iraqi snipers engaged
U.S. troops and, in a third incident, a Bradley was disabled by an
rocket propelled grenade fired from a mosque. In Baqubah, again in just
the last 24 hours, the 4th Infantry Division conducted a raid and
captured seven Iraqis and seized 15 million dinars. In Al Kut, a patrol
of the 1st Marine Division engaged 20 enemy, killed two, wounded one,
and captured 11. There were no U.S. casualties in any of these
incidents, but they illustrate the level of continued hostile activity,
much of it apparently associated with elements of the old regime.
In short, while major combat operations have ended, American
soldiers continue to be shot at almost daily. While we made substantial
progress in catching the people on the black list, there is still
additional work that needs to be done. We face in Iraq a situation
where a substantially defeated enemy is still working hard to kill
Americans and Iraqis who are trying to build a new and free Iraq in
order to prevent Iraqi society from stabilizing and recovering. Bizarre
as it may sound, their goal is to create nostalgia for Saddam Hussein.
We cannot allow them to succeed. We need to recognize that this is
completely different from Haiti, Bosnia or Kosovo, where opposition
ceased very soon after peacekeeping troops arrived in force.
In those situations, we could successfully adopt a strategy that
emphasized the intimidating effect of presence, rather than active
combat operations. Indeed, the strategy in both those places was to
minimize the extent to which we got involved in direct confrontation
with any of the local forces. We do not have the choice in Iraq of
avoiding confrontation with the repressive elements of the old regime.
We have to eliminate them, root and branch. We will do so, but it will
take time.
It's perhaps worth noting that the striking exception in that list
of peacekeeping operations is the case of Somalia, where we, in fact,
encountered the enormous difficulties of taking on armed elements
without adequate force and preparation. This task requires more than
just military policemen. There is a very difficult balance to be
struck, particularly in Baghdad, between providing ordinary civil order
forces on the streets--which we are doing--and being prepared to deal
with snipers and armed bands. CENTCOM is making that transition. There
are now 45,000 Coalition military personnel in the Baghdad area,
approximately 21,000 of whom are actively involved in security
operations. In just the last 24 hours alone, the 3rd Infantry Division
has conducted nearly 600 patrols, secured 202 fixed sites, and manned
85 checkpoints. The total number of patrolling battalions in Baghdad
has increased in just the last 24 hours from 22 to 29. Again, General
Abizaid reports from his recent visit that we are already seeing much
more commerce, many more people on the street, and much shorter gas
lines. In Sadr City--the notorious Shi'a slum in Baghdad that used to
be known as Saddam City--the people are already reporting that their
conditions are better than before the war. General Pace will be able to
comment on that in more detail.
We are making progress. In my most recent conversation with
Presidential Envoy Bremer, he reports that, while the security
situation is serious--and still imposes severe restrictions on our
ability to move freely--Baghdad is not a city in anarchy--shops are
open and the city is bustling with traffic. Let me offer some details
about our progress in achieving law and order: In Baghdad, some 7,000
Iraqi police are on duty, and reports of looting, curfew violations and
gunfire are decreasing. However, one of our principal challenges is
that the old Iraqi police are much less unable than we had planned.
Their leadership was corrupted by the old regime and they were trained
to raid people's homes at night rather than conduct street patrols.
It is also important to distinguish the security situation in
different parts of the country. Most of the attention, appropriately,
is on Baghdad, and there is no question that Baghdad is one of the keys
to the future of the country. We would make a mistake if we saw it as
the only one and overemphasized the importance of the capital. For
example, the second largest city in the south, Basrah, with a
population of almost 1.3 million people, most of them Shi'a and
overwhelmingly grateful to be free of Saddam's tyranny, is now stable.
In Nasiriyah, local police are now armed and the force has grown
from 350 to over 600. In Diwaniya, 277 Iraqi police officers have been
hired, and the coalition is installing two ``911'' emergency phone
lines. A USAID DART team (Disaster Assistance Response Team) recently
visited Karbala and according to their recent cable, the ``city is in
the safe hands of the U.S. Marines . . . who have succeeded in
establishing a largely stable and secure environment.'' This is
obviously a good news story, and we're working to replicate it
throughout the country.
Perhaps the single most important factor in achieving a more secure
environment is the active engagement and support of the people of Iraq.
Members of local populations continue to come forward and provide
information about subversive activities and weapons caches.
It is also important to recognize that the situation we face is in
no small measure a result of the success of our military plan, which I
will discuss in more detail, and the speed with which we were able to
collapse the main structures of the regime.
In Northern Iraq, including the two large cities of Mosul and
Kirkuk, with a combined population of more than 2.5 million, Major
General Dave Petraeus and the 101st Air Assault Division have been
largely successful in creating a stable situation. There remain some
problems, most significantly those arising out of the property disputes
created by Saddam's policy of Arabization--a kind of slow-motion ethnic
cleansing--but we are taking measures to address that. We have already
sent a study team led by former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq William
Eagleton and including some distinguished experts from Poland, the
Czech Republic, and Bosnia, which have had experience with these kinds
of problems in the past--to come up with some recommendations about how
these problems can be solved by peaceful legal means and discourage the
use of force. It also remains the case that there still appear to be
some active organized cells of old regime elements in those cities that
are still working to attack us and defeat the coalition effort.
Finally, I would note a possibly very significant success story in
the relatively smaller city of Karbala (population 500,000), whose
significance far exceeds its size. As one of the two holy cities of
Shi'a Islam, it has enormous potential for pointing the direction for
Iraqi society. There, as already noted, the 3rd Battalion of the 7th
Marines has worked effectively with local officials to create what are
reportedly excellent conditions of law and order in this key town. A
political officer from our Embassy in Kuwait visited Karbala recently
and reported that, ``With support from U.S. military forces, moderate
reformers are engaged in audacious experiment aimed at building
democratic rule in one of Shi'ism's two holiest cities. In cooperation
with Civil Affairs Teams from 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, they have
achieved notable successes.'' Karbala's infrastructure is largely
functioning, although problems remain. Electricity service has returned
to pre-war levels, and almost all homes have running water. The three
local hospitals are open, though they lack many basic medicines and
supplies. Marine engineers are busy repairing local schools, hospitals,
and the water plant. The local television station is privately owned
and relatively unbiased.
Most significantly, in addition to fostering the reestablishment of
basic public services, the Marines have supported the emergence of a
functional, competent provisional government in Karbala Province that
advocates a secular democratic future for Iraq. Significantly, the
leadership of this new secular and democratic local government is a
religious figure, Shaykh Ali Abdal Hassan Kamuna. He is not only a Said
or descendant of the Prophet Mohammed and the member of a prominent
local tribal clan, but he is also a member of the local secular
intelligentsia. The council elites contains other senior tribal
figures, but also five other Saids and representatives of the secular
intelligentsia and business world, including a university professor,
civil engineer, a merchant, a retired army colonel, several lawyers,
sociologists and an ophthalmologist. Religious intelligentsia is
represented by a shaykh who endured 12 years in Saddam's prisons for
his part in the 1991 Shi'a uprising.
The fact that a new day has dawned in Iraq was nowhere so evident
as the recent Shia pilgrimage in the city of Karbala. For the first
time since Saddam's regime, more than a million Shia pilgrims walked to
that holy city without fear and without violence, something that had
been illegal for twenty-six years.
It is worth noting the surviving elements of the Baathist regime
target not only our troops but also aim at destabilizing Iraqi society.
There are indications that some of the most serious looting that is
continuing should more accurately be described as acts of sabotage.
They seem specifically targeted at making it more difficult to repair
those facilities such as power plants that are critical to restoring
some of the basic functioning of society.
In judging the success or failure of the military plan for dealing
with the aftermath of the collapse of the regime, one cannot judge it
against a standard of unachievable perfection. There is no plan that
could have achieved all the extraordinary speed of the plan and, at the
same time, have been able to flood the country with 100,000 military
policemen. Choices had to be made. I think that we made choices that
saved both American and Iraqi lives, and prevented damage to the
environment and to the resources of the Iraqi people.
It's also worth pausing for a moment to think about the alternative
if we had simply waited for another decade or two until this regime
collapsed. Setting aside the horrors the Iraqi people would have
suffered in that time and the threat that it would have presented to us
and our friends in the region, the eventual collapse of the Saddam
regime would almost certainly have created a situation of some anarchy.
The difference in what has happened is not only that we ended that
threat and that horror sooner rather than later, but we are now in a
position, working with our coalition partners and with the Iraqi
people, to restore security and stability much faster and more
thoroughly than would have happened in our absence.
PLANNING TO GET IT RIGHT
Starting in January of this year, we recruited Jay Garner to stand
up the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, the first
time, to my knowledge, that we have created an office for post-war
administration before a conflict even started. It was obviously a
sensitive matter, because we did not want to do anything that would
undercut the efforts to achieve a diplomatic resolution of the crisis
presented by Iraq's defiance of UN Security Council Resolution 1441.
For that reason also, we did not brief key Members of Congress in as
much detail as we would have liked. We should have ensured that Jay
Garner had the opportunity to brief you before he left for the theater.
We will work hard to do our best to remedy that situation, including
arranging secure video-teleconferences with Presidential Envoy Bremer
and Mr. Garner, as appropriate.
Having said that, let me also say that we picked Jay Garner because
he had demonstrated at other times in his career, and most
significantly when he was a commander in the extraordinarily successful
Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq in 1991, a capacity for
putting organizations together quickly and energizing them and focusing
on getting practical tasks accomplished. The magnitude of his efforts
goes under appreciated, in part because so much of his energy was
appropriately focused on preparations to handle large numbers of
refugees and to put out extensive oil well fires--neither of which,
fortunately, happened, in no small measure because of the speedy
success of the military plan to which I have now referred several
times. It is ironic, in fact, that we seem to be criticized not only
for lack of planning but also for too much planning when people
complain that we contracted with some corporations--to be able to take
on these tasks quickly.
Let me give you further insight into the extent of our planning. An
interagency Political Military Cell was formed in July of 2002; an
Executive Steering Group was formed just a month later. We began
planning efforts for Humanitarian and Reconstruction issues in the fall
of 2002.
This planning provided the basis for the creation of the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, which formally came into
existence this past January.
Fortunately, a great deal of that planning turned out not to be
needed. And that is, in some measure, because of the military plan.
Allow me to briefly discuss the basis for CENTCOM's plan, and then I
will address some of the crises that were averted precisely because of
that plan.
Military plan: At the heart of the military plan was the imperative
to defeat Iraq's major combat forces. The emphasis was on speed. We
consciously chose to keep our force size relatively small, but packing
a powerful punch, limiting the amount of people and materiel deployed
on the initial thrust into Iraq. This plan gave great flexibility.
These forces quickly plunged deep into Iraq, bypassing a good portion
of the country in their push to Baghdad. Despite the fact that Saddam's
regime had strategic warning of an impending attack, because of this
swift attack, coalition forces were able to achieve tactical surprise.
Beginning the ground war before the major air campaign was another
surprise for the Iraqis, since it broke with the expected model of
Operation Desert Storm.
In short, we began the war with a timetable the regime did not
expect and we combined it with a speed that made it difficult for the
regime to react and regroup. The enemy was never able to mount a
coherent defense; nor was it able to blow up dams, bridges and critical
infrastructure--or use weapons of mass terror--perhaps because it was
caught so completely off guard.
In less than three weeks, we were in Baghdad, and, with the
toppling of Saddam's statue, history's annals tallied another victory
for freedom akin to the fall of the Wall in Berlin or the liberation of
Paris. Our plan worked even better than we could have hoped. For
example, in Baghdad we tried a few armored raids to probe and to shock
the Iraqi Army. We hadn't expected to see resistance collapse in
Baghdad completely as a result. When these armored raids actually
caused the collapse of Iraqi resistance--before the larger force that
was planned for could arrive--we capitalized on our success, and moved
into the heart of Baghdad--a decision that testifies to the flexibility
of the war plan as well as to its speed.
Not only did this plan achieve its military objectives, this plan
saved lives--American lives and Iraqi lives. The unprecedented use of
precision not only destroyed the intended military targets, but
protected innocent lives and key infrastructure. And as a result, the
Iraqi people stayed home; they understood military actions were
directed against Saddam and his regime--not against them.
Crises averted: We can also judge the success of the military
operation in Iraq as much by what didn't happen as by what did:
There is no food crisis in Iraq. Fortunately, we did not
need all the humanitarian assistance stocks we had planned for.
. . . The coalition is working closely with the World Food
Program to reestablish food distribution throughout Iraq.
There have been no major epidemics. The Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is working to
reestablish a Ministry of Health, and we have seen active
cooperation among ORHA, the World Health Organization and the
emerging Iraqi Ministry of Health.
There was no refugee crisis that many predicted would
destabilize the region. Due to the accuracy of the military
campaign, residents felt safe enough to stay in their homes,
contrary to many pre-war forecasts. Those who fled from Saddam
Hussein moved in with friends and relatives in secure areas.
There was no wholesale destruction of oil wells or other
critical infrastructure after the war began. Efforts are
underway to restore oil production as quickly as possible to
provide the Iraqi people with their primary source of revenue.
The regime did not use weapons of mass destruction.
As we continue to study Operation Iraqi Freedom, we will note other
important lessons. Above all, we can be confident that a remarkable
plan combined with the bravery and skill of American Armed Forces
contributed in very great measure to its overall success.
The costs of reconstruction in Iraq are difficult to estimate since
many of the problems we face resulted from decades of the regime
corruption, mismanagement and tyranny. Damage due to the war was
relatively small-scale. There are a number of funding sources that can
help Iraq.
First, there is $1.7 billion in formerly frozen Iraqi government
assets in the U.S. that the U.S. Government vested by Presidential
order. Second, about $700 million in state or regime owned cash has so
far been seized and brought under U.S. control in accordance with the
laws of war, available to be used for the benefit of the Iraqi people.
Third, once Iraqi oil exports resume, those proceeds will be
available for the benefit of the Iraqi people.
Under the terms of the proposed UN Security Council resolution,
assets from two additional sources would be placed in the Iraqi
Assistance Fund. Other countries are called to place in the Fund any
Iraqi government assets, or assets that have been removed from Iraq by
Saddam Hussein or other senior officials of the former regime, held in
their countries. And the remaining balance in the UN's ``Oil For Food''
escrow account is to be turned over to the Fund.
There have been public pledges from the international community of
more than $600 million under the UN appeal and nearly $1.3 billion in
other offers of assistance for the food, health, agriculture, and
security sectors. We anticipate other contributions as well, including
troop contributions to create Multi-National Divisions of peacekeeping
troops.
Finally, Congress has appropriated approximately $2.5 billion for
reconstruction efforts. There are also additional authorities that we
can draw from if needed, such as the Natural Resources Risk Remediation
Fund, which can be used for repairing damage to the oil facilities in
Iraq.
POLITICAL SITUATION
As I mentioned earlier, in the city of Karbala, because the
presence of U.S. Marines has supported the emergence of a functional,
competent provisional government in Karbala province that advocates a
secular, democratic future for Iraq. That's goodnews--an indication, we
hope, of more to come.
If such a sign at the local level is positive, there is cause for
optimism on a national level as well. There has already been an
acceptance of the idea of a unified Iraq among all Iraqis' Kurds,
Arabs, Sunni and Shi'a and members of smaller minorities.
With Presidential Envoy Bremer's order last Friday that banned
senior members of the Baath Party from positions of authority in Iraq,
the people of Iraq can be assured that their way forward will not be
blocked by remnants of the regime that terrorized them for decades.
Baathist remnants and Iranian-oriented theocratic groups constitute, at
present, our main concerns with respect to the political reconstruction
of Iraq. To deal with these concerns, we must encourage the rest of the
Iraqi population to become more politically active and organized. We
are confident that neither group constitutes a large segment of Iraqi
society--they may have a temporary advantage due to their greater
degree of organization, but they can be marginalized as wider and wider
swathes of Iraqi society become involved in the country's political
life.
Iraqi Interim Administration: We continue work towards the
establishment of an Iraqi Interim Administration, which will assume
increasingly greater responsibility for the administration of Iraq. The
IIA will draw from all of Iraq's religious and ethnic groups and will
provide a way for Iraqis to begin immediately to direct the economic
and political reconstruction of their country.
Over time, the ILA will take control of an increasing number of
administrative functions. But the Interim Administration's most
important responsibility will be to set in motion the process leading
to the creation of a new Iraqi government, for example, by setting up
local elections, drafting a new constitution and new laws. This is a
process that foreigners cannot direct; it must be a process owned by
Iraqis. Our task is to create the conditions in which they can
formulate a process and then pick their leaders freely. An Interim
Administration would be a bridge from the initial administration of
basic services to an eventual government that represents the Iraqi
people.
Iraqi government: In the final phase of our plan, an Iraqi
government would assume sovereignty on the basis of elections in
accordance with a new constitution. Our intention is to leave Iraq in
the hands of Iraqis themselves as soon as we can. As President Bush has
said, the United States intends to stay in Iraq as long as necessary,
but not a day longer. To those who fear that Baathists and Iranians may
intervene when we have left, our message is simple: while it is our
intention to withdraw relatively rapidly from Iraqi political life and
day-to-day decisions, we will remain in Iraq as an essential security
force for as long as it takes. But I would also caution that this
process will take time and is also worth getting right.
external political situation: international community, coalition and un
That so many nations came together speaks to the enormity of the
threat posed by a vicious dictator in possession of weapons of mass
destruction. The coalition acted to ensure that a regime that places
little value on the lives of its own people--or those of others--will
no longer be able to possess and pursue-or export--the means of mass
terror. A significant consequence of Saddam's removal is that an
industrious, educated people have reason to believe that representative
government is within their grasp. The men and women of our American and
coalition forces performed their missions with incredible courage and
skill, and we are enormously proud of them.
To help Iraq take its place among peace-seeking nations, the
international community has a responsibility to ensure this vision
becomes a reality. And the coalition is committed to working with
international institutions. To date, coalition partners have
contributed in great measure to the progress described. Currently, 24
coalition countries are providing military support--some of which is
public, some of which is private. Thirty-eight nations have offered
financial assistance that totals more than $1.8 billion. Here are a few
examples of coalition support:
Greece has given some 20 tons of clothing and food;
The Czech Republic has deployed a field hospital to Basra
and has send aid conveys with medicine, drinking water, tents
and blankets;
Spain has a 150-person health team in Iraq, and is helping
repair water and electrical systems;
Lithuania has sent orthopedic surgery specialists to Um-
Qasr.
Jordan has sent two field hospitals and Saudi Arabia and the
U.A.E. have each sent one.
There are many other contributions, and they will be described in
the future. Our continued progress will depend on international
assistance, including that of the United Nations. To facilitate our
goals, we advocate a Security Council resolution that will lift the
sanctions from the Iraqi people, define the UN's role in Iraq, and
encourage the greater international community to participate in
building a free and peaceful Iraq. This support must be geared for the
long haul for, as one Iraqi councilman in Um-Qasr has said, ``it will
take time. People need to understand that we cannot undo years of
Saddam overnight.''
CHALLENGES AND SUCCESSES
We knew that certain systems and services we take for granted here
would not exist in a formerly totalitarian regime. And we also knew
that we could not fully understand the scope of Iraq's needs until we
were in the country and on the ground. One area that did surprise us,
as I mentioned, was the extent of decay in Iraq's overall
infrastructure. The coalition campaign went to great lengths to
preserve Iraq's schools, mosques, hospitals, bridges, dams and roads.
But, it has become clear that the Baath regime did not.
As with any plan, we were ready to readjust and recalibrate when we
could carefully assess conditions. We are doing that, and have begun
addressing Saddam's legacy of destruction and decay. We began by
calling in civilian companies familiar with tackling vast rebuilding
challenges. USAID is developing a contractual mechanism to permit
immediate action by Bechtel for emergency repair of power facilities.
Among other successes we can point to are the following:
The World Food Program has large stocks of food in Iraq and
has plans to bring in each month some 487,000 metric tons;
June's rations are on their way. Although it will be a
challenge to distribute the food, we're working with the WFP
manager at CENTCOM to get it done;
Some Iraqis have more electric service than in the past 12
years. For example, people in Basrah have electricity 24 hours
a day. Only Baghdad suffers from electrical shortages above
pre-war levels. When the National Grid Backbone is operational
later this month, Baghdad will receive excess power from the
north and south;
Primary schools throughout Iraq opened on May 4. Jay Gamer
is hopeful that secondary schools and universities will open
soon;
Emergency civil servant payments have been made to more than
a million civil servants;
Baghdad's water system is at 60% of pre-war levels; in some
places where there is reliable electric power, there are claims
of higher levels of drinkable water than before the war;
Privately hired stevedores began ship off-loading operations
and put rice directly on trucks. Currently, over 1,500 tons per
day are off-loaded.
In a first, the UN will use oil-for-food funds to buy Iraq's
cereal crop.
In Karbala, the DART team reports that 130 school buildings
have been cleared of unexploded ordinance; battalion teams have
begun the renovation of five schoolbuildings.
Energy infrastructure: One of the keys to getting Iraq up and
running as a country is to restore its primary source of revenue: its
oil infrastructure. As with many other facets of life in Iraq, this
infrastructure had been allowed to decay to a surprising degree.
Fortunately, the coalition plan averted the destruction of many of the
oil wells. And a great deal of repair work is underway to ensure
operations can safely resume at oil facilities. While the coalition
will be involved at the outset, the goal is to have production and
marketing responsibility in the hands of a stable Iraqi authority as
soon as possible. Iraqi oil operations are now being run by an Interim
Management Team, led by Thamir Ghadban, who was a senior Oil Ministry
official under the former regime. Ghadban is advised by an American
former oil executive and the former head of Iraq's State Oil Marketing
Organization. The Iraqis have demonstrated in the past their skills in
operating their energy infrastructure in the face of adversity. We are
confident they will do even better now.
The resolution before the UN Security Council will also relieve
shortages of gasoline and cooking fuel. The resolution envisions the
resumption of oil exports, and provides that revenues be deposited in
the Development Fund for Iraq, with transparency provided by
independent auditors and an international advisory board.
Decisions regarding the long-term development of Iraq's oil
resources and its economy will be the responsibility of a stable Iraqi
government. The United States is dedicated to ensuring that Iraq's oil
resources remain under Iraqi control. Iraq's resources--including all
of its oil--belong to all of Iraq's people.
Mr. Chairman, let me close by thanking you for holding this hearing
and thanking all the Members of the Congress for the outstanding
bipartisan support that we've had since the beginning of this war. As I
noted in my statement, we are still fighting a war at the same time
that we are struggling to win the peace. And as you noted in your
article today, transforming Iraq will not be quick or easy. And our
victory will be based, as you put it so well, on the ``kind of country
we leave behind.'' The stakes for our country and for the world are
enormous, and the continued commitment of the Congress and the American
people is essential. I appeal to you and your colleagues for your
continued support and leadership in this historic effort.
______
Prepared Statement of General Peter Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: Thank you for the
opportunity to meet with you today to discuss U.S. policy and plans for
Iraq stabilization and reconstruction. I'd like to first thank you for
your continued support to the men and women of our armed forces. That
support is as critical to our success now in the post-conflict phase as
it was during the conflict, and we greatly appreciate it.
Major combat operations in Iraq have ceased, yet much work lies
ahead as we stabilize the country and help the Iraqis reconstruct their
government and economy.
MILITARY ORGANIZATION
When General Tommy Franks declared the liberation of Iraq, he also
announced the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA).
The CPA temporarily administers the government, pending the people of
Iraq's adoption of a new constitution, and the formation of a new
government under that constitution. As the military commander, General
Franks was the initial head of the CPA, and all coalition forces and
other activities in Iraq, such as the Office of Humanitarian Assistance
and Reconstruction (ORHA), reported to him. Ambassador Bremer is now
the head of the CPA, and General Franks has returned to his
headquarters in Tampa.
Central Command's military organization in Iraq is now Combined
Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7), commanded by Lieutenant General David
McKiernan. All coalition military forces in Iraq are under CJTF-7,
which reports back to General Franks in his continuing role as
Commander, U.S. Central Command.
Secretary Rumsfeld has directed General Franks, as the Commander of
U.S. Central Command, to secure and stabilize the country in direct
support of Ambassador Bremer. Those military tasks include deterring
hostilities; maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity and security;
searching for, securing, and destroying weapons of mass destruction;
and assisting in carrying out U.S. policy.
SECURITY
Today, security is the military coalition's highest priority. The
situation is relatively calm throughout Iraq, with isolated incidents
of anti-coalition activity. We continue to see low-level violence from
Ba'athist remnants and criminals, particularly in Baghdad. The
population continues to provide information on subversive groups and
weapons caches to assist coalition forces in eliminating threats to a
safe and secure environment. We have identified the high threat areas
and are focusing the patrolling efforts there. We are conducting both
fixed site security, as well as roving patrols, day and night.
TROOP STRENGTH
We continue to adjust the mix and number of our military forces to
meet the needs of the current situation. Today, the 3d Infantry
Division, a brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division, the 3rd Armored
Cavalry Regiment, and elements of the 2nd Light Cavalry Regiment are
focused on providing security and stability in Baghdad. In addition,
the 1st Armored Division continues its deployment to Iraq, with all
division personnel now in theater and their onward staging, movement
and integration due to complete on 26 May. We will continue to assess
the situation and adjust the future force structure mix as required.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
I also want to clarify our rules of engagement for these forces.
Some press reports have stated that looters will be shot on sight, and
that is simply not accurate. Coalition soldiers retain their inherent
right to self-defense, and they use that avenue when necessary, and
only when necessary. Simple looting does not warrant shooting Iraqi
civilians. Coalition soldiers will, however, arrest and hold those
caught in criminal acts.
IRAQI SUPPORT
Coalition military forces are vigorously recruiting and training
Iraqi police elements. This is an ongoing process, and our greatest
challenge is the vetting and training of suitable candidates. The
status varies by city, but Baghdad now has over 7,000 police officers
that have been rehired. However, that number is less than half of what
we assess is required for Baghdad alone, and we will continue to work
to recruit and train police officers throughout Iraq.
COALITION SUPPORT
Negotiations and discussions for recruiting and integrating
coalition military forces from other nations continue. While some
countries' domestic sensitivities limit the details that can be
discussed openly, I'm happy to report that Poland, Spain, Italy,
Denmark, Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Ukraine, and Romania have already
agreed to provide forces. As we firm up commitments from these nations,
U.S. Central Command will work with the appropriate country's planners
to coordinate force flow into the theater.
The composition of our military forces in Iraq will change over
time, as heavy combat units are eventually withdrawn and replaced with
less heavily armored forces, more military police, engineers, and the
like. The exact timelines for withdrawal and/or replacement of U.S.
forces has yet to be determined. The presence of U.S. forces, however,
remains event-driven, and not timeline-driven.
The coalition military forces have demonstrated speed, flexibility
and precision throughout this war. They are now working to provide a
secure and stable environment for post-conflict activities, allowing
the people of Iraq the opportunity to make their own decisions
regarding their future. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Deputy Secretary
Wolfowitz. The committee will have a 7-minute-per-member
question period at this point. I will ask the timekeeper to
start the 7-minutes on my questions, but I want to start with
some comments.
I appreciate very much the testimony you have just given.
As you would confirm, we visited 2 weeks or so ago, and my plea
to you was to come before the committee, as you have today,
with a comprehensive statement. To my knowledge this is the
first time that I have been privy to an all-points view of what
is going on in the country. The American people I think will
benefit from the fact you have given us some good news. There
have been remarkable achievements that by and large are
unrecognized.
Likewise, I appreciate very much the thought that, perhaps
through secure television, there could be regular reports to
this committee, and perhaps to other Senators as well. We had
the benefit of progress reports on the war from the Department
of Defense daily up in S. 407, and we appreciate that. Most of
us were there at 8 o'clock in the morning, as you were. The
military came over, which was tremendously important in terms
of instilling confidence in all of us in what was occurring,
and the support mechanisms, I would simply say that was
tremendously important during all of this period.
You could just say, well, this is going to go on for a long
time, these daily briefings, and we understand that. There has
to be a reasonable situation to warrant these briefings, but
there also have to be some ways in which the good news is
conveyed, in addition to the other things you have to say to
some of us, even with our own interpretations.
Tom Friedman of the New York Times has written about the
fact, as you have suggested today, that we have discovered that
the Iraqi people were really beaten down. This is a situation
which was not hopeful and prosperous for anybody except for the
regime. Here you have people who, as you pointed out, have not
had electric power, in some cases, ever, and in other cases not
for quite a long while. This is a really beaten-down situation.
Not only that, but in terms of morale of the people, these
are folks who are not just leaping to take advantage of
political action and volunteering to run in the next election
or take part in the council. A good number of them, obviously
and unfortunately most of the middle class, as I have observed,
are hanging back wondering if Saddam is going to return. If not
Saddam, the Baathist Party types who you have had to battle
sort of day by day are not going to do them in.
This is still a repressive situation in the perception of
many people. The Iraqi people have not only the inconveniences
of lack of power or lack of security, but they are really still
not sure who is in charge. They are not sure about our staying
power and resolve to make sure that the bad people do not
finally return. That can be changed by the President saying, as
he said to many Members of Congress today, stay the course, we
are going to be there as long as we need to be. When that
assurance comes, and you have given it to us again with a lot
of supporting detail, that is tremendously important.
Now, likewise, I appreciate the perception by Mr. Bremer
that the Baathist people are not the ones who are going to
restore democracy or even bring about any vestige of it, and
that they are the enemy. There are people I know within our own
government who have been sort of battling back and forth in
terms of freedom of speech and freedom of all of this, and I
understand that. It is an honest philosophical disagreement,
but here we have got people who are cowed in the country by
recognition that the same types are still around. How do you
develop others? Very tough on the political side, quite apart
from the security arrangements.
Now, once again, we have the right kind of personnel to be
there to do these things--so you have recognized these things,
and I will not reiterate them because I appreciate the
comprehensive statement that you have made, which I hope all of
us will study.
Let me just say a few words regarding the oil situation,
which began to find some clarification in the Security Council.
Secretary Powell is certainly to be complimented in the
remarkable work he has done. He has been supported by you and
the Department of Defense, and obviously the White House.
Collectively that was a very important victory in a short
period of time for all who were the naysayers to come around
and say sanctions will be lifted. The United States, Britain,
and those who fought the war are in charge, we will review it
in due course, exports can happen. Those are very big things.
For those who are always diminishing American diplomacy, you
know, I hope they take notice of this remarkable change.
However, having said that, if you were chief executive of
Iraq oil today, the problem is still there--and you may clarify
this a little bit more for us. Somebody has to deposit the
money, somebody has to disburse the money, and make decisions
as to who it goes to. You have set aside 5 percent for
reparations and past wars, and 95 percent is out there. The
transparency of all of that is obviously important, and
overhanging this is the debt situation.
As you take a look, if you are chief executive of this, how
much do you put into repair of that which is there, and has
been in disrepair even before the damage and looting. How much
do you put in new investment? How much do you allocate to debt?
Now, I had a meeting yesterday with a gentleman who has
been an advisor to Russian rulers as they come and go, and his
suggestion was, as perhaps Secretary Powell found, that the
Russians were deeply interested in contracts. When it comes to
debt, that is maybe something else. He had a lot of experience
with both. They would like a lot of their debt forgiven. So
would a lot of other nations who are involved in this. With
that overhanging problem there, somebody has to be in charge of
the fiscal situation of the country and the allocation of
resources, the business management of it. There cannot be
temporizing, in my judgment, about that. This is a very serious
matter right now in terms of the confidence level that this
money come out.
Now, in doing that, the papers today point out that the
Kurds in the north, are very worried about allocation of these
oil resources for, say, relief of all of the country. They
would say this is ours. Well, once again, we are back into what
does it mean to be an Iraqi? Is there a sense that Iraqis want
to be Iraqis?
Most would say, sure, and the testimony we have had is that
there is a very cultivated sense of that over decades. Still,
we must promote the ability of the Iraqi people to come
together and make compromises, to begin to think as we would
like for Iraqis to think of themselves, as a cohesive society
and country that are prepared to have great diversity in one
government as opposed to a theological tyranny. All of these
things you have thought of, and you must do so every day.
Specifically, on the question of the oil money and the
management of resources, those are not the only revenues. You
have pointed out some others, but I am not sure how many taxes
are being collected of any sort, on the fiscal side, on the
income side. What can we expect and how can people manage that?
In the absence of a legislature, a congress, or a President,
will we make those decisions? Are they being made, or is there
planning in a fiscal sense for the country presently?
Mr. Wolfowitz. If I could say first of all, just very
briefly, your suggestion of having, if not daily, at least
regular briefings up here I think is an excellent one. I am
impressed--Bill Luti who is sitting behind me I think was the
OSD representative of the daily ones we had during the war, and
it did seem to really establish a good pattern of
communication, and maybe daily is too often, but let us work
together and figure out what is the right schedule, because it
helps us, and it is not just to transmit good news. There is
plenty of bad news, too, and we could use help.
The Chairman. Because we need to share, as opposed to being
ultra critical. We must be prepared to be supportive.
Mr. Wolfowitz. And I think it is very important. I notice
this on a transatlantic meeting in Europe over the weekend that
a lot of our allies are reassured when they hear that, in fact,
we intend to stay the course. I do not know why, after what we
have done in Bosnia, they doubt it, but at any rate we need to
say it.
This is an opportunity to do it, and I appreciate that, and
I think you were correct in singling out Envoy Bremer's decree
on de-Baathification. We are hearing already that just the mere
declaration has had a big political impact.
On the key question you brought up about these decisions
about--and there are many decisions, one, there are decisions
about how you get the oil sector up and running and how you
invest to repair it, and I was pleasantly surprised to discover
that we have found an Iraqi, his name I mentioned in my
testimony--Tamir Gadban--and I am told that he had a senior
position in the Oil Ministry despite his refusal to join the
Baath Party. It is pretty remarkable. It also says he must be
extremely competent, because they did not tolerate that in
other people, but he will be running it.
We have an advisory board and an American advisor who will
help him make decisions and give us some guidance as to whether
we think those are the right decisions. Ultimately, for the
time being he is under the authority of the coalition
provisional administrator, who is Ambassador Bremer.
The issues about how the revenues get spent and invested
are again under the authority of the coalition provisional
administration. The key individual under Ambassador Bremer is a
very distinguished American official, a former Deputy Secretary
of the Treasury, Peter McPherson, who was the president, still
is, I guess, he is on leave, from Michigan State University.
We have had some extraordinary Americans volunteer to help
us out there--a former commissioner of the New York police is
going to help us with the police job.
Peter McPherson I guess for the time being is a de facto
finance economics minister for the provisional authority, but I
would also emphasize we are looking for help everywhere we can
get it, and in ORHA right now the current staffing is 617 U.S.
and 471 coalition, about 1,000 people, and about 40 percent
non-Americans, and I am pleased at that 40 percent number. I
have been pushing particularly hard to tap into the expertise,
which I think is substantial, of our friends in Poland and
other Central European countries who have had to undertake this
kind of tricky economic transition themselves and have a better
sense of the tradeoffs than we have, with our experience of
running a functioning economy, but it is a big effort. There
are a lot of decisions to be made.
What I tried to describe, maybe too briefly, in my
statement is, there are two things that have to happen, and
they need to happen in parallel. On the one hand we need to
make sure that the country runs, and it is not that we want
this responsibility, but we know that if we do not take it on,
and with some unity of command and some ability to make
decisions, things will limp.
On the other hand, there needs to be a political process
that eventually produces a legitimate government, and in that
process I think our main function is just to make sure that it
can take place under secure conditions, which is a long way
from where we are now.
Your point about people being afraid is, I think--I mean if
members of ORHA have to worry about traveling in the streets
and the ministries, imagine what somebody has to think about,
not if they are going to the shops in Baghdad. People are doing
that on a daily basis, but if they want to speak up in support
of the coalition, they may get killed. It is still a problem.
So creating secure conditions, and I think also setting the
boundary lines, I think we can say that people who show that
they are not willing to play by democratic rules are not
included in this process, but inside the process I think we
need to let Iraqis make decisions.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin by saying in a sense you are the wrong guy for
me to be questioning, and what I mean by that is, I have known
you for 30 years. One of the things that I am absolutely
convinced about is your absolute conviction that we have to
build a stable country there as long as it takes. I remember
sitting in a couple of conferences on whither NATO, and what
about Bosnia, and I remember you being critical of the
candidate for President then, saying we had to get out of
Bosnia and we had to get out of the Balkans, and during the
last campaign----
Mr. Wolfowitz. Excuse me. The candidate was not saying
that. I am sorry, let us not go into that.
Senator Biden. Well, it is important to go into it for this
reason. One of the things I would like to know is when the
President is going to tell the American people that we are
likely to be in the country of Iraq for 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 10
years, with thousands of forces and spending billions of
dollars, because it has not been told to them yet. They have
not been told. They were not told before we went in, and you
knew we were going to have to stay there, and he knew.
It has not been told to them since then, and we are facing
a $400 billion deficit, and we are going to be left holding the
bag here a year from now when the military and the
administration need considerable input in dollars in Iraq, and
the American people are not going to understand why we are not
spending it on education. Instead we are voting to spend it, as
I will vote to spend it on Iraq, and that is the reason why I
raise the question.
You seem to want it both ways. You ask why anyone would
doubt our resolve. We have been in Bosnia for 8 years, and the
problem is a lot less significant and less difficult in Bosnia
than it is in Iraq. That would seem to compute that we are
likely to be in Iraq for a long time, a long time. If the
problems are so much more complicated, which they are--as you
point out--in Iraq than in Bosnia, then we are going to be
around for a long time. I do not know about you, but my home
constituency does not understand that. They think Johnny and
Jane are going to come marching home pretty soon.
Nobody in this country thinks we are going to be there for
the next 4, 5, 6, 10 or 8 years, like in Bosnia, and so I would
hope the President at some point will make our job of
continuing to support him easier, which I have done every
single step of the way in his effort here, and tell the
American people. When are you going to say that?
Are we not likely to be--and I am asking you. Are we likely
to be in Iraq for at least the next 4 years, in significant
numbers with a significant monetary commitment? Is that likely?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, the problem is, it is very
difficult to predict. It is possible, and it is possible that
things will go faster.
Senator Biden. Is it possible at all, Mr. Secretary, at all
to be out of there in the next 2 years?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Not necessarily out of there, but I do not
know how many forces we are going to need in the next 2 years.
Things are going to be very different 2 years from now than
they are now. As a matter of fact, things are very, very
different in Bosnia now from they were 8 years ago, and let me
be clear, I did not say this is more complicated than Bosnia. I
said the stakes are higher than Bosnia. In some respects, it is
less complicated. It was a functioning country in important
respects. It has enormous resources, which Bosnia did not have.
Senator Biden. It is not functioning now. You point out it
is much more devastated than we thought it was going to be.
There is little infrastructure left----
Mr. Wolfowitz. There are huge problems, but there are huge
resources.
Senator Biden. What are the resources? I just attended the
meeting with oil experts--with Mr. Larson present and with Ms.
Chamberlin present--where the following numbers were, for us
just to get to the point where we are talking about 1 million
barrels per day export, there is going to be a need for a $5
billion investment in the oil fields. To get to the point where
you will buildup production to 5.5 million barrels per day, it
is estimated, by the folks testifying today--and I would ask
either of your colleagues if they disagree with this--7 to 10
years and an investment of $30 to $40 billion in the fields.
Now, nobody I know in the oil business is suggesting that
there are going to be revenues that remotely cover the cost of
rebuilding Iraq coming from those oil fields in the next 3
years. I have not heard anybody. For the record, I would love
you to submit--take as much time as you want--any evidence to
suggest that a significant part of the reconstruction of Iraq
required in the next 3 years will come out of revenues from
Iraqi oil. Would you be willing to do that for the record?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I will be happy to do it for the record.\1\
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\1\ See page 67.
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Senator Biden. OK. Because I have not heard a single person
suggest that yet, not one. And I just wonder when we are going
to start leveling. Look, you want us to continue to support
you. You wonder why our European friends say--how they could
doubt our staying power.
You make this case that somehow this is so fundamentally
different from Bosnia. Well, how about Afghanistan? American
soldiers are still being shot at. Al-Qaeda is still alive and
well. The Taliban did not go anywhere. Those 60,000 forces we
are talking about, they are now living in mud huts all
throughout there. They are not all in Pakistan or into Iran.
They are still there. It is a shambles.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I would not agree it is a shambles. The
problem, if you want to shift to Afghanistan from here----
Senator Biden. No, no, I want to shift to the comparison.
You are suggesting that the reason why you cannot bring in
large numbers of police and why you did not plan on doing that
is because it is implicitly incompatible with the environment
that they are in--what we really need are soldiers there, not
police there--and I am suggesting to you the same situation
exists----
Mr. Wolfowitz. I am saying to you 3 months from now it may
be very different.
Senator Biden. Well, tell me the plans you have--so if it
is different in 3 months you are able to drop in 6,000 police
officers. Do you have a plan?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I will give you the example of Karbala.
There are about 1,000 marines in that city of half-a-million,
and there is effective law and order in Karbala. So that is one
example of how it might work.
Senator Biden. What is being----
Mr. Wolfowitz. I might ask General Pace to address the
issue of where we might be 3 months from now in terms of change
in composition of the force.
Senator Biden. Well, with all due respect, I respect the
general, but his judgment about where we are 3 months from now
is going to be better than most, but still it is going to be a
guess where we are going to be 3 months from now. I want to
know where we are today. That is what I am worried about. I am
not worried about anybody being able to predict 3 months from
now. What I am concerned about is that, look, I met with the
British Defense Minister. What is different in the city that
you acknowledge is the most stable? What are they doing
differently there than we are doing in Baghdad?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Well, they have been there a lot longer.
They are dealing with a population----
Senator Biden. A lot longer. How much longer have they been
there, a week, two, three?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Oh, I think it is closer to a month, but
they are dealing with a city which is very different in its
composition, which is much less friendly to the kind of
Baathist elements we are having trouble with. It is actually--
Basrah is probably comparable to Sadr City, the large
neighborhood in Baghdad, roughly in population, roughly in
ethnic composition, and General Abizaid reports that Sadr City
is largely stable.
We are dealing, particularly in central and north central
Iraq, with armed opposition of some 30,000--I do not know the
exact number, but it is several tens of thousands of people who
were in the four major security organizations that kept an eye
on one another and kept an eye on the Iraqi people. They are
murderers, they are torturers, their goal is to destabilize the
country. Those people are largely eliminated in Basrah. At some
point I think they will be eliminated even in Baghdad, and then
the numbers required to do this kind of work will be a lot
smaller, but it is not a simple police function, it is
something closer to light infantry. General Pace, do you----
Senator Biden. I do not know why we cannot walk and chew
gum at the same time, have police in the city and forces----
Mr. Wolfowitz. Well, we are. I can go back and read you the
statistics I read about how many people are in Baghdad today,
how many of our forces are there. I think it is 21,000 that are
doing patrolling duties and the number of patrols----
Senator Biden. They are not trained to be police.
Mr. Wolfowitz. They are trained to do this--this is not
police work. This is something closer to urban combat, and they
are trained for that. General Pace.
Senator Biden. Looting is not urban combat, but I will come
back to that later.
General Pace. Sir, I would say it is certainly not time-
driven, it is event-driven. We have been in Basrah longer than
Baghdad. We have been in Mosel shorter than Baghdad. Both
Basrah and Mosel are in better condition securitywise than is
Baghdad. Baghdad has, in addition to all its major-city
problems, about 20,000 prisoners, criminal prisoners who were
in jail who were released during the course of the war who have
concentrated a lot of their activities. Just last night, just
the patrols last night----
Senator Biden. But they are thugs, they are not Baathists.
General Pace. They are thugs and they need to be policed,
and about 104 were policed up last night, so it is a
combination of military and police. The police forces are being
recruited. They are being trained, and it was a judgment going
into Baghdad as to whether or not you waited outside the city
to have enough forces that when you went in you could have
complete control of the city and then potentially have the
Fortress Baghdad fight that none of us wanted, or to take
advantage of the opportunity of the speed and precision that we
had, get in there quickly, take it down quickly, not destroy a
city with 5 million people in it, and accept the problem of
having a less secure environment than we would like to have.
So on balance, I would much rather be where I am today, at
the 2-month mark worrying about police action, than at the 2-
month mark still pounding away at a city because we waited too
long.
Senator Biden. In the second round I will point out why I
do not believe that they are incompatible.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. To our
distinguished witnesses, thank you for coming today, and
congratulations on the good work that you and your colleagues
have accomplished so far. Mr. Deputy Secretary and general,
give our best wishes and congratulations and thanks to our
Armed Forces, our men and women who have achieved a spectacular
victory. To our State Department representatives, you had a big
day today at the United Nations, and give Secretary Powell our
best and our congratulations.
As Chairman Lugar pointed out, this was important for
America today, and important for Iraq, and quite frankly
important for the United Nations as we rebuild alliances that
were fractured as a result of Iraq, and strengthen these
institutions that I believe will be critically important to the
outcome in Iraq, as Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz has talked about
today.
Mr. Secretary, you went into some detail in the last part
of your testimony about the political situation and the future
of Iraq, and I paraphrase your comment. I believe you said
something to the effect that that may be overall the most
important dynamic as you stabilize Iraq and do the things you
are doing to secure Iraq, because it will be the political
process, as you note, that determines what kind of Iraq we
have, and that will ripple across the region.
Today's front page of the Washington Post, which you have
seen--and let me quote just quickly a paragraph to set the
question. ``Paul Bremer, chief U.S. civilian in Iraq, said
today that the selection of an interim Iraqi Government is at
least 7 weeks away, prompting aspiring leaders from Kurdish and
returned exile groups to warn that Iraqis are tiring of the 6-
week-old U.S. occupation, and they want swift movement toward
self-rule.''
Yesterday's headlines in the New York Times: ``Iraqi
political leaders warn of rising hostility if allies do not
support an interim Government.'' Would you share with the
committee what we are doing to get to that end? I recognize, we
all do, it is imperfect. It is difficult for all the reasons
you mentioned and others, but I think this is a pretty serious
statement coming from serious allies of ours, the two main
Kurdish leaders who Senator Biden and I met with in December
when we are in Iraq, they are critical to the future of Iraq,
you all know that.
Some of the exiled leaders who you have strongly supported,
Mr. Chalabi and others, obviously are a bit nervous about this.
Can you tell us how we are going to get there?
Mr. Wolfowitz. First of all, let me point out that, as
important as that part is, the most urgent requirement remains
the creation of stable and secure conditions and, in fact,
while it may be the case that some Iraqis and certainly the
gentlemen you quoted are impatient, or at least they want to
say they are impatient, I think on the whole we hear more from
Iraqis who are impatient to make sure that we are doing
something about providing security and providing basic
services, and there is a tension between those Iraqis who want
us to be in charge and who frankly are used to the government
taking care of things for them and those Iraqis who are
impatient to be able to run their own affairs.
I do not think it is an accident that the ones who are most
impatient on the latter point are the ones who have had the
experience of 12 years of pretty free conditions in Northern
Iraq. I know Ambassador Bremer went out there--at the time he
went out we had, as I think also noted in that article, an
expectation that we might be able to stand up an interim
administration as early as the beginning of next month.
He went out there with explicit authority to make his own
judgments about how right the situation was and how prepared
conditions were, and I think his overall judgment, partly based
on the need to focus on this restoration of security and
services, but I believe also his sense that we still did not
have a good enough feel for who were the appropriate people who
could be brought into a group that would adequately represent
the Iraqi people, I think is his reason for taking a little
more time. That is not a lot of time.
And you ask about the process. The process is, in fact, in
some considerable measure focused on intensive consultations
which he has been conducting now with the senior leadership
council that was formed in Northern Iraq just before the war,
including the two principal Kurdish leaders, Talibani and
Barzani, including Mr. Chalabi and Mr. Alawi and two Sunni
leaders who were--I am sorry, Mr. Alawi is one of the Sunnis.
Bakar al Hakim from Syria, who initially opted not to
participate and has since decided he will participate, and we
are looking closely to make sure that his participation remains
within the bounds of legitimate political activity and does not
include the importation of his Badr Corps armed people from
Iran, and finally Mr. Pachachi. That was the core six, and
Ambassador Bremer is consulting with those people about how to
expand their numbers, and we do not have a particular figure in
mind, but to a larger council that would be more adequately
representative of the larger population, and then the question
will be how to get from there to an interim administration.
But let me emphasize that word interim. It is really
important. There is no way in present conditions to have an
Iraqi administration that derives its legitimacy from Iraqi
political processes. There are none. Its legitimacy really
comes from its interim character and the fact that it is really
a bridge paving the way to something that will provide
legitimacy, so the more challenging task will be writing a
constitution, which you can take your guess as good as mine. It
sounds like that is a 6- to 12-month process, and getting
elections organized, and there is going to be some discussion,
I am sure, about whether you would start them at a national
level or, I will give my bias, start working from the local
level up.
I mean, if you have a situation like the one I described in
Karbala, then that is a wonderful opportunity to experiment
with how Iraqis can handle the political process. Obviously,
most areas of Baghdad are not ready for that sort of thing yet,
so I think some local experimentation I believe will be a part
of getting there. It will take some time, but I think the
ingredients for success are--though they have never done it
before, so this is a guess, but I think the ingredients for
success are very good, an educated population--we can argue
about how soon those resources will be available, but one of
the richest natural resource producers in the world.
And finally, and I think this is important in things that
did not happen, unlike Bosnia, while there has been horrible
killing, it has been the regime killing everybody. It is not
one ethnic group killing another ethnic group. A lot of people
expected Sunni-on-Shia violence. I think they were wrong to
expect that. A lot of us were afraid that there would be
Kurdish-on-Turkish, or Kurdish-on-Arab violence in the north,
and while there have been isolated and tragic incidents of that
sort of thing, it has not happened on a large scale, so Iraq
starts, I believe, with more good will among the elements of
the population toward one another than we ever had in the
Balkans. That is a plus.
Senator Hagel. I will followup on some of those on the
second round. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to commend Chairman Lugar for scheduling this
hearing. In view of the confusions, the ambiguities and
contradictions that exist with respect to our policy in Iraq, I
think this hearing was certainly needed. I hope it will be the
first in a series of hearings. I think that may be the
intention. When it comes to this Nation's foreign policy, the
executive and legislative branches play complementary roles,
and neither can properly fulfill its responsibilities when
acting entirely on its own.
Mr. Chairman, I commend you for your tenacity in insisting
on the importance of what you have called interbranch
partnership on the question of Iraq. As you have written in the
op ed piece which appeared in today's Washington Post,
``transforming Iraq will not be easy, quick, or cheap. Clearly,
the administration's planning for the post-conflict phase in
Iraq was inadequate.''
I am concerned that the Bush administration and Congress
have not yet faced up to the true size of the task that lies
ahead or prepared the American people for it, which was, of
course, also a point that Senator Biden made just earlier in
this hearing. And you went on to say, ``the public and Congress
need to know what we are getting into,'' and I fully agree with
that.
Now, Secretary Wolfowitz, before I turn to Iraq, I want to
divert for just a moment. The Economist on May 10--and the
Economist by and large has been very supportive of the
administration's foreign policy--has an article on Guantanamo
in the course of which they say America's handling of the
prisoners at Guantanamo is wrong in principle and a tactical
error in its broader fight against terrorism, and they go on to
question the continued holding of these people. After 16
months, none of those detained at the camp has been charged.
``The claim that America is free to do whatever it wishes
with the Guantanamo prisoners is unworthy of a nation which has
cherished the rule of law from its very birth, and represents a
more extreme approach than the United States has taken even
during periods of all-out war. It has alienated many other
governments at a time when the efforts to defeat terrorism
require more international cooperation and law enforcement than
ever before.''
I gather Guantanamo is under the supervision and
jurisdiction of the Defense Department.
Mr. Wolfowitz. That is right.
Senator Sarbanes. What are your plans with respect to that
situation?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Well, we continue--we pay a lot of attention
to it. We are looking into--frankly, we would like to reduce
the population there as much as possible, and we have made some
releases. It is not an easy process.
I recall a few weeks ago, when we were on the verge of
sending some detainees back to their home countries and the FBI
came up with some information that suggested these people would
be dangerous to release, and we had to hold it up. We are
working with a number of countries to get agreements so that if
there are dangerous characters that need to be detained they
can at least be detained in their home countries, and I think
it is essential to point out that many of these people have
very important information that can help us to prevent other
terrorist attacks, and we are trying to manage the whole
process in such a way that they cooperate with us and tell us
what they know about the planning that they were involved in,
and other terrorists who are still at large.
These people are enemy prisoners of war, and prisoners of
war in a war that was conducted by the most vicious means, and
in violation of all the rules of war. It is a war that is not
over. If anyone has any doubt about that, we got a reminder a
few days ago, and we need to treat them in that way. We treat
them fairly. We treat them humanely. If it turns out that they,
in fact, are harmless, they are released rather quickly. If it
turns out that they are of no intelligence value, but they
remain somewhat dangerous, we try to find circumstances to
detain them longer, and I will take a look at that Economist
article.
I agree with you that it is a matter of concern if our
European allies feel that we are violating basic standards of
fairness, but--and we need to perhaps do a better job of
explaining what we are about, but I think the American people
would have a hard time understanding why we would release
people who have been involved in terrorist plotting against the
United States.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, if, in fact, that is the case, I do
not know that I quarrel with that statement, but is that the
case?
Mr. Wolfowitz. It is the case, otherwise--we are not
holding them because we enjoy it, Senator. We have really tried
to prune that population down, and we continue to work at it,
and where there are people who, in fact, are appropriate to be
brought to some kind of trial, we are looking at military
commissions for that purpose.
Senator Sarbanes. Yes, well, this article says after 16
months, none of those detained at the camp has been charged.
They also make the point that we have been receiving a lot of
complaints from many of the 42 nations, including some of
America's closest allies, whose citizens are being held at
Guantanamo. I gather they are, in effect, held incommunicado.
They cannot communicate either with consular officials from
their countries or with lawyers, is that correct?
Mr. Wolfowitz. They do not have access to lawyers. They do
have access to officials from their own countries I think in
every case, not consular officials. They do not have consular
privileges, but in every case where a country has citizens
there and they want access to them we provided them access.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I would send this article to you,
and I would be interested if you would want to send us up a
written response, and I note again in citing it that the
Economist generally has been very supportive of your position,
so it is not as though this is coming from a source which has
been critical of the administration.
How many U.S. troops are in Iraq now, General Pace?
General Pace. There are 145,000, sir.
Senator Sarbanes. And are we expecting to increase that
number?
General Pace. The number is being increased as we speak,
sir, by about 18,000 with the arrival of the 1st Armored
Division, and then beyond that there are no current projected
deployments.
Senator Sarbanes. So we are going to go up to over 160,000?
General Pace. Potentially, sir, although some of the troops
that are there now, the ones who did all the fighting early, as
General Franks sees the opportunity, when the security
environment allows he will bring home who got there first.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, General Franks is stepping down, is
that right?
General Pace. Sir, General Franks' time as commander there
would normally end around 1 July. I believe the Secretary of
Defense and the President are still discussing how long his
tour will be and who would replace him.
Senator Sarbanes. I gather he is retiring. There is a story
on CNN to that effect. Is that correct?
General Pace. Sir, that is likely, but again it is not
confirmed. The President and the Secretary to my knowledge have
not made a decision, nor have they discussed the final outcome
with Tom, that I know of. That is a likely outcome, sir, but it
is not a decision.
Senator Sarbanes. All right, just to be clear, I am looking
at an Associated Press dispatch here,`` U.S. Army General Tommy
Franks, who planned and commanded the American-led wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan, has decided to retire, Defense officials said
Thursday.''
General Pace. Sir, I am not trying to be cute at all, sir.
The fact of the matter is that before he----
Senator Sarbanes. I was not suggesting that you were trying
to be cute.
General Pace. Before he can retire he has to ask for it,
and the Senate of the United States has to say yes, he may,
neither of which has happened, and then the President and the
Secretary of Defense need to decide who is going to replace
him, and to my knowledge, they have not decided that, so I am
just trying to be accurate, sir.
Senator Sarbanes. My time is up, but I just want to pursue
this point quickly. Being over 160,000 troops, Secretary
Wolfowitz, I would ask you whether you think it was fair to
label General Shinseki's remarks back in February that we would
need roughly several hundred thousand troops in post-war Iraq
as an estimate ``wildly off the mark.''
Mr. Wolfowitz. I would say several hundred thousand is
300,000 or more, and I do not think we are close to that.
Senator Sarbanes. You would say what?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Several hundred thousand to me means 300,000
or more, and I do not think we are close to that.
Senator Sarbanes. If it means 200,000, which is how I would
read it, would you say we are close to that?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Well, I would--several, to me--we are close
to 200,000, but the other point, there are a couple of other
points, Senator, which are important to make. We are looking,
particularly now that the U.N. resolution has passed, at having
some substantial contributions from other NATO allies and,
indeed, from other countries.
Senator Sarbanes. How many?
Mr. Wolfowitz. We do not--we are just starting. There are
countries that have said come talk to us after a U.N.
resolution and we are going to be doing that, and the issue,
too, is one number today, another number a year from now,
another number 2 years from now. I think if you look at the
experience in the Balkans, where we drew down from 60,000 NATO
forces in Bosnia 8 years ago to 12,000 today, you can see a
pretty sharp downward trend.
What concerned me most about that very large number being
out there, and I think most people take several to be three or
more, is the implication that we were going to treat Iraq like
Japan or Germany and occupy it indefinitely, and that, frankly,
is what a lot of our enemies in the Arab world were trying to
say about us, and I thought it was very harmful, otherwise I
would have preferred not to have commented on the whole
subject.
Senator Sarbanes. How many British troops are there?
Mr. Wolfowitz. About 20,000.
Senator Sarbanes. About 20,000.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Yes.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.
Let me just announce that there is a supposition that there
will be roll call votes starting at about 4:15. They may run
back-to-back. What I would propose is that we proceed with the
questioning, because our witnesses' time is very valuable, as
is the time of Senators. I will recognize Senator Chafee. I
will proceed to vote on anticipation that vote can be cast
swiftly and return. In the event I have not, Senator Chafee,
you are in charge until I return, and then you may proceed to
vote and we will try to expedite that.
Senator Biden. That is OK by us, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I understand.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee [presiding]. Well, thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman, and welcome to the distinguished panel. It seems to
me that we have thrown a rock into the pool that is the Middle
East, and just for the sake of my question, if all goes well
with restoring order in Iraq, what is the strategic vision of
the ripples that are now going out from this rock? What is the
strategic vision in the Middle East now?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I would say several things. I think some of
them hopefully will happen even perhaps before some of the
other results are achieved inside Iraq. I think one of the
ripples is a positive impact on the Arab-Israeli peace process,
and clearly we need it. We need to move that process forward. I
think we have credibility, enormous credibility, not that we
did not have it before. We have it more than we did before.
I think the removal of Saddam Hussein as somebody who was
providing $25,000 to every terrorist family is already a sign
that that is having a positive impact. I think a less direct,
but maybe even more important impact is that I think the defeat
of Saddam Hussein has improved the strategic position of Saudi
Arabia, and the events of the terrorist attack of 10 days ago
demonstrate that they need an improved strategic position.
What do I mean by an improved strategic position? I mean,
one, that the Saudis do not have to worry about a hostile
regime to their north that was actively interested in
undermining them, but second, and maybe even more important,
because of the successful operation in Iraq, Secretary Rumsfeld
and his Saudi counterpart 2 or 3 weeks ago now were able to
agree that most U.S. forces could come out of Saudi Arabia.
That gives the Government of Saudi Arabia some freedom it
has not had for 12 years to not be constantly subject to the
charge leveled by Osama bin Laden that they are basing so-
called crusader forces on Arab territory, and hopefully that
also rebounds back into the peace process, because I think one
of the things that was missing in the Camp David and Taba
negotiations in 2000 and early 2001 was that the Saudis and the
Egyptians did not step up to the plate, so those are big
effects.
But finally, I think if we could get to the point where
Iraq can be a model of free representative democratic
government by an Arab standard, not--I mean, Japan's democracy
is different from ours, is different from England's. Iraq's
democracy will be different from Poland's and different from
Romania's, but if Iraq can present an example to the Arab world
that is a positive example, I think, just as we have seen the
power of example operate in East Asia or in Europe, I think it
can operate in the Middle East in the Muslim world.
It is hard to say exactly how. It is not a domino effect.
It is not that Iraq affects the country next door, which
affects--it is not a physical thing. It is a psychological and
political and sort of moral impact, which can be large.
I just met with the Foreign Minister of Morocco, who was
very emphatic about what a positive effect the demise of the
Saddam Hussein regime had on the Arab world, and Morocco is one
of those countries that is making some of the most courageous
steps to try to expand the realm of political freedom and
democracy in that country.
Senator Chafee. Could you elaborate, please, on how you see
this affecting progress between the Palestinians and the
Israelis?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Well, as I said, it removes a factor that
was deeply opposed to progress. In fact, it is not at all
insignificant that when the Arab League organized against Anwar
Sadat's peace efforts 20 years ago, it was led by Saddam
Hussein and it was known as the Baghdad Summit. He has clearly
been openly and probably less openly on a larger scale
financing and supporting terrorism among the Palestinians, and
I suspect also aligning with those people--and this is
important--who, one of the biggest obstacles to peace is not
just the terrorism against Israelis, but the threats that arise
against those Palestinians who want to make progress, so I
think that is a help.
I think, as I said, the ability now of the moderate Arab
countries to step up to the plate more easily is a help, but
without any question, the commitment of the United States, the
commitment of this President, the understanding that we have a
major role to play, and I think that we have credibility in
playing it that we did not have before.
The problem is incredibly difficult, let us not
underestimate it, but I think the stakes are also huge. If 2
years from now, 3 years from now we could have the dual
victories of a successful, prospering, free and democratic Iraq
on the one hand, and a peace between Israelis and Palestinians
on the other, those will be massive victories in the war
against terrorism.
Senator Chafee. Yes, I could not agree more, and seeing as
how my light is still green, could you just reaffirm the
President's commitment to the ``road map'' in these very, very
difficult times as more than ever, with increased terrorist
acts, the pressure to cease the settlements and to get the
parties back talking about adhering to a ``road map''?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator Chafee, you have heard him say it in
public, I have heard him say it in private, and in
circumstances where there was no need to reaffirm his
commitment. He, I believe, has understood from the beginning
that it has got to be a major initiative coming off of a
successful war in Iraq.
Senator Chafee. And my last question would be, there are
those that question that commitment, and I suppose they want to
see something accomplished on the settlement issue. What could
you propose on that?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think I will turn to my colleagues in the
State Department. This is a very tough problem, but I heard
Henry Kissinger put it in a way that I thought captured the
issue rather well. The Palestinians fear that Sharon is only
prepared to grant them a shrunken kind of Bantustan sort of
entity that would not be a State. The Israelis fear the
Palestinians want a State only as a cease-fire and a stepping
stone to the destruction of Israel, and I think both sides need
some reassurance.
The Palestinians need some reassurance, which I think needs
to come from us, that, in fact, the outcome is going to be a
viable Palestinian State, and that obviously means the
elimination of large areas of Israeli settlement activity, or
at least a complete change in their status. At the same time, I
think Israel needs the assurance that this really will be peace
and not just a step on the way to something worse, and as I
said, in this meeting with Europeans on the weekend, I think
Europe needs to step up to the plate in terms of reassuring
Israel. Both sides need reassurance, and outside parties I
think have a big role to play now.
And finally, and I come back to my point about the Saudis,
the Saudis in particular, but moderate Arab States in general,
Egypt is important, could play a big role in part of that
reassurance effort and also in, I think, encouraging the
Palestinians to be reasonable on some of the more difficult
issues.
Senator Chafee. Yes. I will make the one comment that from
visits that I get from Arab emissaries, they represent that it
is just going to be physically impossible in not too long a
time to have the President's vision of a Palestinian State on
the West Bank as the settlements continue, that it is going to
be physically impossible to have that happen.
I will now, since the chairman has given me the authority,
turn to Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. How do you
like the sound of that word, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Chafee. Love it.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much. Let me thank our
witnesses, and I apologize for arriving a little bit late.
I am sorry I was not at Bilderberg this weekend. I gather
from my colleague from New Jersey it was a rather lively
discussion with the Secretary. I will leave it at that. I do
not know if time will permit me to follow two lines of
questioning, but let me proceed if I can. I would like to ask
you to comment on the role of international inspectors, and let
me preface the question with this, if I may.
Generally, we have asked--the United States, we have called
on the IAEA, as I understand it, to play more of a leading role
in condemning Iran for its alleged nuclear weapons program, and
I think that is the appropriate and proper thing to do, yet we
appeared almost simultaneously, at least it does appear this
way, to undercut the IAEA's credibility with Iraq, and let me
tell you why I say that.
The IAEA, as you know, is responsible for carrying out the
U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq under Resolution 1441. Its
inspectors, I think most would agree, have some pretty solid
information of sites, suspected links to nuclear weapons
programs, along with detailed inventories of existing Iraqi
inventories of low enriched uranium and spent fuel stored under
IAEA physical safeguards. Since the end of the war, the United
States has refused to allow the IAEA inspectors to return to
Iraq to verify that no tampering with the safeguards has
occurred.
At the same time, we barred UNMOVIC--if that is how you
pronounce that--teams headed by Hans Blix from Iraq, and this
week, after Mohammed ElBaradei issued an ominous warning that
looted radioactive material may create a, to quote him,
``humanitarian nightmare,'' Secretary Rumsfeld expressed some
flexibility on the possible return of IAEA inspectors.
I wonder if you might describe the current state of
discussions for us between our government and the IAEA, and
their possible return to Iraq, and second, what lay behind this
month-long delay in starting these talks with IAEA? At the very
least, we could have exchanged some notes, I think, on their
detailed knowledge of pre-Iraqi stocks of the low enriched
uranium and spent fuel cells and the like, so you would comment
generally where we are with this, and if you disagree with any
characterization I have made about this, certainly feel free to
respond to that as well.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I honestly do not have the sort of detailed
track record on who said what to whom over the last few weeks.
What I do know now is that--and by the way, I am making an
assumption. I know how difficult it has been just to get
civilians into Baghdad for the reconstruction effort. I mean,
every single new job that we had, especially if it involves
protecting civilians, is another burden on CENTCOM, and that
has come up over and over again in a whole bunch of issues that
have no political overtone to them whatsoever.
In any case, where we are today is that we are--and the
U.N. resolution obviously helps also to eliminate some of the
possible barriers. We are happy to have them come. We are, I
believe, in discussions with them about who would come and for
what purposes, but there is no desire to keep them away, and I
think they do have something useful to contribute.
Senator Dodd. Do you have any idea when that may occur? Are
we going to try and facilitate their return, and tell me about
this latest report that was described as a humanitarian
nightmare. If we have actually lost materials, what can you
tell us about that?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I have seen the same reports that there has
been some looting of sites where people may have picked up
radioactive material. We are not sure who did it, or therefore
why they might have done it. If they did not know what they
were doing, obviously they could have caused themselves a lot
of trouble.
General Pace, can you comment on how many of the sites are
currently secured?
General Pace. Sir, there are 22 known sites, and they are
all secure right now. I am not 100 percent sure of the details
on the health hazard, Senator, but I do know that there are
some containers that were holding yellowcake that were taken by
local people. The yellowcake was dumped out of it and the
containers were being used to hold water, which, of course,
creates a radiological hazard for the people who are drinking
that water. The containers have all been recovered, and there
are medical teams onsite trying to assist with determining
what, if any, contamination the local people contracted.
Senator Dodd. Thank you for that, and any more information
on that, I am sure the Armed Services Committee would be
interested, and we would be as well, I think, in this
committee.
And I do not know if it is the major rationale, one of the
major rationales for taking military action in Iraq was
obviously the weapons of mass destruction, and so I appreciate
the news that we are allowing them to come back in, but it
seems to me it should have been a higher priority to some
degree, given their knowledge, and the possible loss of some of
these materials to terrorist States or terrorist organizations
and groups is disturbing, but I am heartened to know that they
are moving back in.
Quickly again, and I do not know how much time we have
here, but I would like to ask you as well about the looting
that is going on, and what we sort of anticipated here?
Obviously, we have all read the stories about the
archaeological losses, the museums, the libraries. In fact, I
am told that the destruction as a result of looting exceeds the
destruction that was caused by the bombing during the phase of
the war, and I wonder if, No. 1, did we anticipate that this
might be a problem following the collapse of the regime?
I am told that there were warnings that we received from
archaeologists and others that this might occur prior to the
actual commencement of hostilities, and if there were warnings,
why were not they heeded, or at least apparently not heeded,
and I wonder if you might share with us whatever discussion
might have taken place, now that it is after the fact, in
planning for this, to the extent we thought this might be a
problem, and what steps we were going to take to address it.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Let me speak specifically to the museum and
ask General Pace to speak to the larger issue of how the
military planning anticipated this issue.
We had a lot of information from archaeologists about
cultural sites in Iraq which was frankly, to the best of my
knowledge, fed in primarily to our people doing targeting to
make sure that we did not damage those sites mistakenly. The
museum is still a little bit of a mystery, and I do not think
we have gotten to the bottom of it yet, but one member of a
foreign embassy in Baghdad who tried to visit the museum some 3
weeks before the war was told that the museum was closed and
most of the artifacts had been put into storage, and looking
through the doors of the museum it looked to him as though most
stuff had been put away, which would suggest that whatever
happened to it afterwards was something other than a
straightforward looting job.
The good news is that through a combination of rewards and
border controls and just straightforward cooperation from Iraqi
people I am told we have now recovered all but 38 of the
objects, which is a pretty good record, and obviously we would
still like to get the rest of them.
The museum story got, understandably, a special amount of
attention, I think like some of the other--I am not saying
there is not a great deal of random looting. Clearly, in the
initial days some of the looting was by people who were just
furious at the regime, and it was a chance to strike back at
the regime.
The disturbing point which I make in my testimony is, I
think today there is clear evidence that some of the looting is
aimed deliberately at sabotaging reconstruction efforts, that
it has no economic purpose, but it looks to be organized by
Baathist elements supporting the old regime.
General Pace, do you want to comment on the military
planning?
Senator Dodd. Yes, was this anticipated in any way,
general?
General Pace. Sir, this was, and it was in combination with
many things that we tried to plan for. Looting was one, Shia
versus Shia, Shia versus Sunni, Sunni versus Sunni killings was
another, the oil fields being destroyed and how to avoid that
was another, the weapons of mass destruction was still another.
So at the end of the day, when General Franks made his
recommendations to the Secretary and to the President, he had
to balance between a force size that he was comfortable was
sufficient to complete the military campaign, but one that may
not have been sufficient to completely pulse the entire nation
at one time as far as stability was concerned, but on balance,
the fact that the speed of the assault and the accuracy and the
precision of the bombing on balance, the fact that you did not
have the oil fields destroyed, you did not have weapons shot at
neighboring countries, the fact that you were able to quickly
get into Baghdad, that we did not have to bomb Baghdad
mercilessly for days on end, because we were able to get in
quickly with a relatively small force, that outweighed the
concerns of not having initially enough forces on the ground to
prevent things like looting.
Senator Dodd. My time is up, but what I am hearing you
saying, in other words, there was an argument being made as
proposals were put on the table that this debate that we all
read about at the time, the argument over a larger or a smaller
force, that, in fact, the argument for a larger force would
have been, we would be better able to deal with the after-
conflict consequences such as this, but a decision was made for
the smaller force, recognizing that as a result of that we
probably would not be in a position then to deal with some of
the anticipated problems that we should have been----
General Pace. To my knowledge, that was all part of the
fabric of the discussion, and we could still be right now
adding forces into Kuwait, waiting for the attack, if we wanted
to be able to have enough forces to be able to do everything
that we thought we might have to do. Fortunately, we did not
have to do a lot of the things we thought we might have to do.
We ended up having to do the piece with looting, but on balance
militarily the amount of death and destruction that was caused
by going early is so much less than what we would be doing now
had we gone in with a larger force and had we given him time to
think through his defenses. We moved so quickly that he never
was able to react, and because of that we saved a lot of lives
on both sides.
Senator Dodd. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
congratulate the General and the Deputy Secretary, and
obviously our men and women in uniform for a magnificently
well-done job as far as the military use of technology and
precision-guided missiles. While there may be some who might be
Monday-morning quarterbacking, I think it is one of the most
historic changes in warfare. In the previous wars, you would
pummel the population until your combatant would just give up,
and that has not been the case here.
Now, in light of the United Nations resolution's success
today, one of the previous questions raised the point of the
cost associated with long-term reconstruction or rebuilding, or
formation of some sort of a government, whether it is a
federation, confederation, local up, which makes sense. That is
the way our country was founded. It was first the States that
then formed the union from a confederation, then to our
Constitution.
Are we now exploring the option of including willing allies
more actively in mitigating the cost to the United States
taxpayers in this effort of constituting a new government and
bringing the basics to Iraq?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Yes, Senator. We have actually been doing it
even before the U.N. resolution, and maybe ask Alan Larson to
provide more detail, but I think the different forms of
assistance that were pledged were already beginning to approach
$2 billion. The passage of the U.N. resolution also should give
us, or rather give the Iraqis access to frozen assets in a
number of countries.
There is some $12 billion in an escrow account in Paris
under Oil for Food which has got to now be reviewed by the
Secretary General to see--I imagine he will find that some of
those dollars were committed to contracts to buy trucks to
transport tanks and luxurious Mercedes for Baath Party
officials, so I think there is some reallocation that can take
place there, but I think most importantly the U.N. resolution
opens the opportunity for much larger-scale support, including
from the World Bank.
But Under Secretary Larson, do you want to comment?
Mr. Larson. Thank you very much. As Secretary Wolfowitz
said, we have been in active consultation for several weeks now
with both coalition members, but a number of noncoalition
members about the importance of supporting the Iraqi people and
reclaiming the country. There has already been very active
international support for humanitarian relief. There has been
very active support on the part of some countries for other
elements of the program.
At this stage I think we really have cleared the decks to
make a concerted effort internationally. The World Bank and the
United Nations Development Program can be part of that by
setting out a needs assessment that can be part of the
benchmark of needs that can contribute to what Ambassador
Bremer and the team on the ground are sizing up as the
important development needs. We would intend to go forward
very, very quickly now in assembling the international
community to discuss those needs and to solicit contributions
and cash in kind.
Senator Allen. Could you very shortly, because I want to
get on to another point, state what percentage you think the
United States will be contributing to this, and what will other
nations' percentage be? If you do not feel comfortable saying
it, please say so.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I really do not. In a couple of months we
might have a better fix on that.
Senator Allen. OK. Fair enough. We will followup on that.
Mr. Wolfowitz. We are really trying to have the last dollar
come from the U.S. taxpayer rather than the first. That is the
principle.
Senator Allen. As long as you have that good guiding
principle, and I very much appreciate, Secretary Wolfowitz, the
details of the lay of the land right now, some of the
challenges and so forth. Here is where I think we need to go,
and I think the President laid out the guiding principles in
his speech earlier this year at VMI when he was talking about
Afghanistan, and here should be our guiding principles in Iraq
as well.
He was talking about ensuring that the people live in
dignity to create and build and own property, to raise their
children in peace and security. The President went on to say
that dignity requires the rule of law, limits on the power of
the State, respect for women, which is more of an issue in
Afghanistan than necessarily Iraq, but still important in both
countries, private property, equal justice, and religious
tolerance.
Those are the foundational principles of individual rights,
and one of those individual rights is religious beliefs,
peaceful expression, private property, and then a rule of law
where you get fair adjudication of disputes where property and
other God-given rights of individuals are protected, and to the
extent that we can bring out that idea, it is capitalism--you
may say it is on the model, for example, of the Alaska
Permanent Fund, or the concepts that Hernando deSoto talks
about, capitalism for property, where people care more about
their property, title to it, and the country.
When Secretary Powell was here recently I asked him about
these sort of concepts insofar as oil is concerned, that--maybe
it is not exactly like the Alaska Permanent Fund, but as oil
and the fields were protected, as oil starts being produced,
the concept of allowing the people to have a small dividend, it
may be $50, $100, whatever it may be, to show that it is an
asset of the people of Iraq. Have these concepts been
contemplated and are they being formulated? Because when one
looks at a Marshall Plan, whether it was in Europe or whether
it was what General MacArthur was able to do in Japan, those
would be, to me, the models that we ought to be looking at. A
lot of those are based on those fundamental principles of
private property rights and having the people actually own
their government and some of the resources.
Mr. Wolfowitz. We agree with you that those are some of the
most fundamental decisions that have to be taken, and I think--
I am not sure if you were here when I mentioned earlier that
Peter McPherson, who is a former Deputy Secretary of the
Treasury, president of Michigan State University, has taken a
leave of several months to go out there to be the organizer of
that whole effort, and it is huge. I mean, it really requires
rethinking the whole property basis of a State that was
national socialist, I suppose, in the fascist model, and also
we talk often about the advantage of Iraq's oil resources, and
the advantages are huge, but in many ways, oil is a curse as
well because it discourages sometimes the development of other
economic activity, which has got to be the real long-term
health of the country.
So there are big issues there, huge issues. I cannot say
they are sorted out yet, and ultimately, to some extent they
need to be Iraqi decisions, but we would like to make sure that
while we are there and before we leave that we have got it on
the right course, because I agree with you, you cannot divorce
those issues from the other fundamental issues of political
freedom.
I might just say on that point, by the way, you mentioned
religious differences. I was very heartened a couple of weeks
ago I met with a group of U.S. Shia, several Iraqi-Americans
looking like Shia clerics of Najaf or Karbala. One of them is
the representative in North America of Ayatollah Sistani.
Uniformly from all of them the message was, we as Shia do not
believe in religion interfering in the State. What we want is
freedom to practice our religion in Iraq the way we practice it
here, and I must say I found them very sincere in the way they
spoke.
Senator Allen. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I look
forward to working with you in constructing those sorts of
ideas, and to the best you can implement them there. It seems
like some of those Jeffersonian principles at least have taken
root here, and hopefully can take root there in Iraq.
Thank you.
Senator Allen. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Senator Allen.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Deputy Secretary, General, Ambassadors, if this CNN report
is true that General Franks is retiring, he is certainly
retiring after two enormously successful military campaigns, so
he has served us very well, and he happens to reside in Tampa,
Florida.
Mr. Wolfowitz. And he is a great leader.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Secretary, tell us, what is all the
flap as to why General Garner is gone?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, he is not gone.
Senator Nelson. You know what I mean.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Well, I do. Let me say this. When we first
approached Jay Garner in January to organize this Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs it was not even
necessarily with the notion that he himself would go to Iraq,
but from the beginning we said, there is a function we would
like you to perform which is getting a team up and organized to
make sure that the ministries can run properly and basic
services can be delivered, but there is going to be a senior
civilian in charge of the whole operation, and particularly
with a focus on the political side of the process.
That was envisioned from the beginning, and so we did not
appoint Ambassador Bremer because of any dissatisfaction with
Jay Garner. He has been doing a magnificent job and we hope he
will stay for sometime more.
Senator Nelson. Would you like to inform the committee of
anything that you might know in the hunt for Captain Scott
Speicher?
Mr. Wolfowitz. He is one of the important priorities. We
are searching for information about him. I wish I could tell
you that we have found a lot. We have had one trace here and
another trace there, but that seems to be the extent of it. We
are deploying, I think--General Pace, is it right now, or
shortly--something we call the Iraq Survey Group, which is a
team led by Major General Dayton of some 1,500 people focused
on searching for information about weapons of mass destruction,
information about terrorists, documentation of war crimes, and
specifically looking for Commander Speicher, so we will keep--I
think the key to finding almost all of this stuff is going to
be finding Iraqis who will talk to us, and creating the
conditions under which they have the right incentives to talk.
Senator Nelson. Prior to the deployment of this team that
you are talking about, how many people are searching for
Speicher?
General Pace. Sir, I might be able to help on that. Captain
Speicher's whereabouts was a top priority from day one. We have
chased down every lead we have gotten. It is one of the things
we are interrogating our detainees and our prisoners about, so
it is not the number of teams, sir. It is just that every time
we get a bit of information, General Franks and his folks on
the ground send a team to wherever it is to find out, so we are
doing it as quickly--it is not a matter of manpower, sir, it is
a matter of leads, and the interrogation teams have that as one
of their prime objectives when they are questioning people.
Senator Nelson. General, I might offer for you and the
Deputy Secretary to consider, it has been, as you said, a
couple of months, I do not know how many days you said since we
have been in there, and what might be helpful is you, and I
know exactly how many people that we have in there, and I am
concerned that we do not have enough.
I do know that it was clearly a priority for General
Franks, and I have thanked him personally for that, but I think
what you have is some people who have been detailed, that you
might want to get some higher-visibility leadership
specifically tasked with regard to Captain Speicher.
Needless to say, you know, it is a downer every day that we
do not get any information, and I am hoping that that cell
where they found his initials is going to render some kind of
forensic evidence.
Mr. Secretary, how many of the 55 top leaders have we now
in custody?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think the number just went up to 25 or 26.
General Pace. Yes, sir. I think 25 alive, one confirmed
dead.
Senator Nelson. So 26 of the 55 we have accounted for?
General Pace. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. Can you explain to the committee what it
is, the conditions that would allow the remaining 29 to be at
large, Mr. Secretary?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think that it is the same conditions that
allow armed groups, the Baathists to continue sabotaging key
facilities, attacking our people. I assume these folks are
hiding in neighborhoods or areas where for one reason or
another the local residents are prepared to protect them and
shelter them, either out of sympathy or out of fear, or maybe
some combination of both.
In a country that large, I mean, Baghdad is a city the size
of Los Angeles, and to me it is not surprising that it takes
some time to root them out.
I hope that success builds on success, and as more of these
people are detained, and as the population begins to recognize
that the Baathists are being brought under control, that the
fear factor will start to eliminate, and then we will have
people turning these folks in.
Senator Nelson. Including Saddam Hussein?
Mr. Wolfowitz. If he is alive. We do not know.
Senator Nelson. What would you characterize as the level of
cooperation with the President of Syria and the Government of
Syria?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think I should leave that to the State
Department, but let me put it this way, the most destabilizing
activities that Syria was engaged in in Iraq a few weeks ago
have stopped. Beyond that--Al, do you want to----
Mr. Larson. I would just make the very simple statement,
Senator, that when Secretary Powell was there, he had a very,
very explicit conversation about the way in which the world and
the region had changed, and the importance of the leadership
there in recognizing that change and making the right choices,
and it was not just a general conversation, it was very
specific about a number of areas where we have concerns.
At this stage I think we are in the let us wait and see
exactly how they respond to that message.
General Pace. Senator, we are out of time, sir, and I
apologize, but I would be remiss as a military man if I did not
thank you for what you are doing to try to find Captain
Speicher, and your very intense, sustained interest in his
case, sir, and all of us in uniform appreciate the fact that
you are not giving up, and neither are we, sir.
Senator Nelson. And I thank you. The family, of course, is
from Jacksonville, and you can imagine what the family has been
going through, not just recently, but for over 12 years, and,
of course, one of the greatest military principles that you
have as a commander is, you do not leave a downed pilot. You go
and try to get him, and through a series of mistakes we left a
downed pilot.
And then when we asked for prisoners of war we did not even
ask for him. They asked for remains, and of course Iraq did not
have remains, they had the prisoner, and so through one series
of mistakes after another we are where we are, and that is why
I think it is an important principle to follow.
Thank you, general. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman [presiding]. And thank you, Senator Nelson. I
thank you, too, General Pace, for commending our colleague. It
is certainly important.
I am going to recognize Senator Feingold in a moment. Let
me try to explain to the remaining Senators and those of you
who are with us that some compromises were made. Some roll call
votes have been forgone, but one is in process now that was
unavoidable, and we really do not know what the prospects are
for the future, but nevertheless we will have a hiatus, I
think, of that type of activity and our colleagues will return,
but I believe Senator Feingold has voted, as I have, and so we
are here, and I will recognize my colleague, Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, and I
want to thank Secretary Wolfowitz and everybody for staying
here.
Let me first return to a comment that Senator Biden made
when he started his questions, where he talked about the Bosnia
commitment. I remember it well. I voted against the Bosnia
action because I did not believe this idea that the American
people were promised we would be there for 1 year, and it is
really quite something to hear the fact that we have been there
for 8 years cited as a plus. I understand why you say it, but
the problem is that that mission was sold to the American
people on the basis that those men and women would be home by
the Christmas of 1996. I knew it would not happen that way, and
it is funny how these things just sort of get lost in the mist
of time.
Now, I give you credit, you did not give a specific time
commitment with regard to Iraq, but the problem is that the
American people I think were led to believe that it would not
be a terribly long time commitment. I am suspicious, as Senator
Biden is, that this may, in fact, be a very, very long
commitment, and I agree with him that our constituents were not
really prepared for that, and that is how it was sold in part
to the American people.
Speaking of how things are sold, I am struck by the fact
that after 2 hours, well over 2 hours of a hearing that is
about stabilizing and reconstructing Iraq, we have heard quite
a bit about reconstruction, and I do agree with the chairman
that you did give an all-points view of the reconstruction, but
for over 2 hours, until Senator Dodd apparently mentioned
weapons of mass destruction, there was no conversation about
stabilizing that aspect of Iraq. That is why I say this is
about speaking of how things are sold, because there can be no
doubt that the preeminent reason why this Congress voted to
invade Iraq was in order to make sure that Saddam Hussein's
weapons of mass destruction were disarmed and that that country
was stabilized from the point of view of weapons of mass
destruction more than anything else.
So I do think that it matters whether or not we find WMD in
Iraq. Most importantly, it matters because if those materials
were in the country in the first place, and we cannot find them
now, that is a security problem. Where did they go? Whose hands
are they in? So I want to explore some of our efforts to date
in this regard.
Just last week, the New York Times reported that the
nuclear expert for the Army's Mobile Exploitation Team Alpha
was unaware of any U.S. policy as to how to handle radioactive
material that may be found in Iraq, material that could be used
to make a dirty bomb. Does such a policy exist, and has it been
disseminated to the troops on the ground, Mr. Deputy Secretary?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Pete, do you know the answer to that?
General Pace. Sir, the inspection teams that we have had on
the ground are specifically trained to find chemical,
biological, and nuclear, and they know that what they find is
to be handled with the sensitivity that that kind of a
potential weapon has, so it is not to be transported, it is to
be kept where it is until it is determined exactly what it is
as best we can, and then as we determine what it is, we will
determine then how to proceed with its destruction or its
transfer somewhere else, so there are rules that have been
given to those who are searching, on what to do when they find
it, sir.
Senator Feingold. Are you saying this report is wrong,
then, the New York Times is wrong when they quoted the Army's
Mobile Exploitation Team Alpha expert that there was no U.S.
policy on how to handle radioactive material? Is there a
policy?
General Pace. Sir, I am not familiar with that report, and
I am not sure how you are using the word, policy. What I am
saying is, the military commanders on the ground have told
their military folks who are doing the inspections what they
are to do when they find materials that they suspect of being
chemical, biological, or radiological.
Senator Feingold. Let me try to followup with you in
subsequent questions, but let me move on to on May 11, when the
Washington Post reported that the group directing the U.S.
search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is, ``winding
down operations,'' after a host of fruitless missions. A more
recent article reported that three of four Mobile Exploitation
Teams have stopped hunting for WMD, and that all of the site
survey teams are dedicating more and more time to work not
related to the search for WMD.
I would like to know, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, if this
is accurate, why are some of the teams wrapping up, given the
fact that we have actually found very little of the material
that has been catalogued as unaccounted for for many months?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Senator, we are not wrapping up the effort.
In fact, we are stepping it up. We are deploying something much
larger called the Iraq Survey Group, which, as I mentioned
earlier, some 1,500 people specifically organized for this
task. I think the mobile teams--and I will ask General Pace to
correct me if I am wrong--I think the mobile teams are, to some
extent, going to be folded into that effort, but it is going to
be organized and directed at a much more senior level by Major
General Keith Dayton, and we are not dropping the effort. If
anything, we are intensifying it.
But I think the important point to emphasize, too, is that
at the end of the day, I believe the way we are going to have
to get on this stuff is through information provided to us by
people that know about it. That is probably going to be more
fruitful than any number of sites that we can go through and
dig up.
I think someone asked earlier how is it possible for some
of these senior Iraqi leaders to still be hiding, and the
answer is, it is a big country, and there are a lot of places
to hide, and in the case of the weapons of mass destruction
there have been 12 years of conscious, deliberate effort to
hide the program, as indicated, for example, in the mobile
trailers that we have discovered that Secretary Powell spoke
about at the United Nations.
That is why, from the beginning of the U.N. effort, we put
so much emphasis on giving the inspectors unprecedented
authority to take Iraqi scientists and other knowledgeable
people out of the country with their families so they could be
interviewed in circumstances that were free from intimidation,
and I think it is going to remain the key to finding out what
has happened to Saddam's chemical and biological weapons and
his nuclear program, having people who know about it tell us
about it.
Senator Feingold. Well, does each team that is doing this
have one Arabic speaker so the team can read the documents and
signs and understand what they are looking at?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Obviously, linguists are one of the very
important elements of the Iraq Survey Group. I can give you for
the record the exact numbers.
We have also been making a serious effort to recruit
through contractors and other sources Iraqi-Americans, of whom
quite a few hundred are prepared to go out to the region and
help us in a variety of tasks, and one of those they could
obviously be very helpful on is translating documents and
scanning through the large mass of documents.
Part of our problem is just the sheer volume of what we are
collecting. Some of it is valuable and some of it is junk.
Senator Feingold. I am pleased you are making those
efforts, but what I would like to know, and perhaps you would
have to tell me subsequently is, at this point, is there an
Arabic speaker with each of these teams? I guess my time is up,
but I would also submit for the record, Mr. Secretary, I would
like to know what is the plan for securing the top 19 weapons
of mass destruction sites identified by Central Command, and
why were these sites not protected from looting.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The following response was subsequently received:]
plan for securing top 19 weapons of mass destruction sites
The intelligence community in conjunction with USCENTCOM identified
nearly 600 potential Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) sites in Iraq
prior to the beginning of military action. These sites were rank
ordered based upon the likelihood of finding WMD activity. USCENTCOM
ordered CFLCC to secure the top 130 WMD sites as ongoing combat
operations permitted. Site Survey Teams (SSTs) comprised of WMD experts
from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) were embedded in
maneuver units and were tasked to determine whether WMD or evidence of
WMD were present at sites as they were captured and identified. In
accordance with the USCENTCOM plan, security was maintained at sites
with evidence of WMD or requiring further exploitation.
On 11 May 03 USCENTCOM ordered the Combined Forces Land Component
Commander (CFLCC) to secure 22 nuclear sites. Only 2 out of the 22
nuclear sites were among the top 130 WMD sites because most were
historical sites not assessed to have radiological or nuclear sources.
Some sites were looted after they were abandoned by regime
authorities and before combat operations permitted coalition forces to
secure them. It has yet to be determined whether any WMD materials were
removed from these sites.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Senator Brownback.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I
want to thank the panel for hanging in here on a long
afternoon. I appreciate it--although some of you have not been
working as hard as others, but I appreciate very much your
being here.
Let me also say at the outset, as several others have said,
fantastic plan and job. I realize you are still in a very
difficult part of working with Iraq, but the military campaign,
it appeared to me, not one schooled in military arts, but it
appeared to me from outside to be incredibly successful.
I can pass on to you from Jacob Butler's family, he was a
soldier from Kansas who died in action, and I have met and
visited with his family several times--how proud they were of
him and what the country has done, and they wanted me to pass
that along personally to the President, and this is a family
who has given the ultimate, and a soldier who was lost, but in
a wonderful cause.
And I think you also provide the images that we all yearn
to see, and that is of the face of freedom, and that face of
freedom in Baghdad is the same as it is anywhere else in the
world, and it is a beautiful face.
We obviously have plenty of difficulties. I have been in
communication with people on the ground in Iraq. I know some of
the difficulties that you are confronting, and I know you will
work through those as well, although I think it is going to be
a difficult time, as we are getting from this hearing.
If I could, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, yet again all on
you in the questioning, and I apologize that I have been in and
out some, but I wanted to focus on Iran and a statement you
have got in your testimony that has been troubling me in the
meetings that I have been having with different individuals.
You note on page 10 of your testimony that Baathist remnants
and Iranian-oriented theocratic groups constitute at present
our main concerns with respect to the political reconstruction
of Iraq, is what you state, and I have been deeply concerned
about what is taking place in Iran, of the PUSH, the difficulty
that they are creating for us in Iraq.
I do not know the degree in Afghanistan. I understand from
Pakistani officials that the Iranian-backed groups continue to
cause them concern in Pakistan. We had two newspaper reports of
al-Qaeda operatives or headquarter-type figures in al-Qaeda
operating out of Iran, and I would like to hear your thoughts
and comments about, are we going to be able to stabilize the
region and move forward with this much broader, grander vision
of the spread of democracy in the region with the difficulty we
continue to confront from the dictatorial regime that is in
Iran, if you can give us any thinking about that, the problems
it poses to us?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Well, as I did indicate in my statement, I
think that is one of the threats to building the kind of stable
and free and democratic Iraq that we would like to see. I think
that kind of Iraq poses a special challenge to the regime in
Iran in two important respects, and it is a reason why I think
it is an opportunity for us.
I think first of all, just the example of a free and
democratic country next door is one that is likely to inspire
the Iranian people, 75 percent of whom voted for opposition
figures some 5 years ago, but the country is still run by the
people who lost the election. That is part of the problem.
I think also it is important, and it is an opportunity if
we are right in thinking that a significant portion of the Shia
population of Iraq do not welcome the idea of theocratic rule,
and if, as is the case, Iraq is really the heartland of Shia
Islam, then that will be a challenge even to the theological
basis of the Iranian regime.
I think for both those reasons they are not only ambitious
about Iraq, they are kind of fearful about Iraq, and whichever
the motive, we have seen evidence of the willingness to
interfere, and that simply cannot be tolerated. We will do
everything we can to prevent it, and the one good thing in all
of this is my sense is the Iraqi people do not want to be
governed from Tehran, or told what to do by some Persian
ayatollahs when they think, as the Arab Shia, they are the ones
who really ought to be the authority.
So I think we have a certain fundamental political sympathy
on our side, and I think we will have to make sure that the
Iranians do not use other means to try to destabilize the
situation.
Senator Brownback. I really applaud your grand vision and
work in the region that the road to peace is not through
dictatorships but is through democracy, and the spread of that
in the region. I think for the first time in 50 years we are on
a path where you could see us moving toward true peace in a
region where we have had conflict for an enormous period of
time. It is a really tough path, but it is the one that
actually can work. I applaud that.
I have put forward a bill--we have a number of Democrat and
Republican cosponsors--called the Iran Democracy Act, and it
states that it is U.S. policy to support democracy in Iran, and
authorizes the use of funds for outside groups outside of Iran
to broadcast into Iran, these private groups, and broadcasting
messages of freedom and liberty, because it appears to me from
what I am reading and the information we are getting that there
is an enormous push from inside Iran for democracy, for a true
government that represents them, and for a referendum
supervised from outside Iran for a change of regime, for a
change of government there.
I am not suggesting at all a military campaign, but really
more of a campaign to help the people who are inside who
already want to push toward a democratic form of governance. It
seems to me we are going to have trouble stabilizing in the
region, or that we are always going to have an irritant in the
form of Iran, given the nature of this regime that is a lead
sponsor of terrorism in the world today.
Mr. Wolfowitz. I find myself in great agreement, and I
think the important point is, it is the Iranian regime that is
the threat, not the Iranian people. They are a people who
deserve a better government, and I think most of them recognize
that what they got out of that revolution 20 years ago is a
failed situation.
Senator Brownback. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Brownback.
We will have further questioning by members who wish to
question. I will ask just two or three items and then yield to
the distinguished Senator from Delaware.
Secretary Wolfowitz, you mentioned the need for linguists,
and this is a part of my general question. You have mentioned
that Iraqi-Americans might be enlisted. To what extent do we
have personnel in the Department of Defense, Department of
State, or even elsewhere in our government who are really
prepared for administrative situations, nonmilitary, but
technical services that are probably going to be required
either on the financial fiscal level or the democracy-building,
the governmental side, and probably in fair numbers, and with a
certain degree of linguistic ability, so that they are
effective?
One critique of the current situation has been that there
are not enough people, at least with language skills. I am not
in a position to know. Among the 1,000 administrators you
mentioned, 617 from our government and 400-and-some from
others, what kinds of talents are encompassed by that group? It
is a pretty extensive group already, but can you characterize
either what is there, or what kind of training or what kind of
resources are already in this country?
It is a different function from training people we get from
the military academy, or even the Foreign Service situation,
although perhaps both are helpful in this respect. In this
nation-building in which business we are involved, there are a
lot of technical aspects. Particularly if we are to be
successful and to round it out, that would seem to be required.
I am simply curious as to what kind of planning or thought has
gone into the personnel.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Certainly I can say anecdotally that we have
some extremely talented officers and enlisted people. I have
encountered them in Afghanistan and encountered them in
northern Iraq 10 years ago, more recently in Bosnia, where the
division that is carrying out our responsibilities in SFOR
today is the National Guard division mostly from Kansas and
Kentucky, and it is interesting that for the jobs that are
needed in Bosnia, Lieutenant General Kip Ward, who is the
active duty three-star in charge, says the National Guard
people bring some real advantages because they transfer skills
from civilian life into the military situation.
I do think that one should not make the mistake of assuming
all of these tasks need to be done, however, by people in
uniform. And in fact, one of the things that we are trying to
accomplish, and we have a major initiative here before the
Congress now, is to be able to change the military, the DOD
civilian personnel system so that some 300,000 or so jobs that
are currently performed by people in uniform could be performed
by civilians.
Part of that is making it easier to hire civilians into the
Civil Service, and I encountered this recently when I made a
major effort to recruit Iraqi-Americans to help us in Iraq, and
I am happy to say the good news is we have been successful in
getting some 150 people, including a guy who was a medical
school professor at the University of South Florida, another
fellow who is an engineer with Pfizer, very impressive people
who have taken leave or left their jobs to go and help out in
Iraq, but it was too difficult to hire them in the Civil
Service, so they are hired as contractors, and we do an
enormous amount of those work-arounds, because we do not have
the flexibility to hire that I think would be helpful.
I think this challenge of having people who are not only
bilingual but bicultural is enormous. I mean, it is great to
train native-born Americans in these difficult languages, and
we need to do more of it, but we have these huge resources here
in the United States of Iraqi-Americans, Afghan-Americans, you-
name-it Americans who are more than willing to help out, and we
are trying to expand those opportunities. I wish we had a
somewhat more flexible personnel system, because it would be
easier. I can get you for the record some of the numbers and
some of where we would like to get to.
[The following information was subsequently received.]
The response from the Iraqi-American community, and from Americans
who speak Arabic, has been significant. Working primarily with the
community in Dearborn, MI and through our Web site, ``go-defense.com,''
we are in receipt of over 1,300 interest forms from Americans of all
background, but primarily Iraqi-Americans, wishing to assist and
participate in the reconstruction of Iraq efforts. Given the myriad
requirements and tasks before us, these individuals would be performing
a great service to the country for they possess all manner of civilian
skill and language proficiency so necessary to our cause.
We are referring resumes we have received to many hiring sources--
contract and internal. Our experience has been that we need a faster
way to identify requirements and greater flexibility in our ability to
place interested Americans against these requirements. To assist us in
this effort--and more particularly to ensure a fair assessment of each
candidate--we are enlisting the services of a contractor to review and
verify the credentials of interested persons, and compile a source book
for user entities.
We need to arrive at a state where the employment of heritage
speakers in future operations and contingencies is second nature to us.
We have one other initiative to recruit these Americans into our
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) as linguists. The Army is trying a pilot
program for us, and is enjoying initial success. Since beginning in
August, they have contracted 39 soldiers and have, as of mid-September,
455 leads, of which 157 appear to be pre-qualified. Programs such as
these hold the promise of providing access to an important part of
language and cultural expertise.
The Chairman. Well, that is important. I want to hear from
you, Ms. Chamberlin, but will you also just for the record
maybe suggest some legislative language that is going to
expedite this?
This really is a major national security problem as opposed
to simply a hum-drum personnel thing that in the due course of
time we work out, and I think your idea is inspired. If there
are that number of Iraqi-Americans who already have the
language skills, the cultural background, and also the
expertise that is going to help democracy or is going to help a
waterworks run, or all the rest of it, we really need to lay
hands on these. I sympathize with you tremendously that our own
bureaucracy in its own hum-drum way, even while the world is
falling apart, is still working out this and that.
I hope you know that we can be of some help, because
although I am sure that this committee will certainly pile in
behind you to try to get something done. It is very urgent.
Ms. Chamberlin.
Ms. Chamberlin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I know
Senator Brownback would like me to do a little bit of work this
afternoon, so perhaps I can help a bit here with this answer.
We, of course, with USAID are members of ORHA and, in fact, our
USAID Mission Director is double-hatted as the USAID Mission
Director but also as the Director of ORHA, the pillar of
reconstruction.
He is an Arabic speaker. He had been Mission Director in
Jordan at one time, and that is why we recruited him, but that
is not how USAID has tried to address this problem of how do we
reach out for both Americans and people in the region, and
Iraqis who have a lot to contribute to the effort that we are
dedicated to, and in this case it is in the sectors of health,
education, reconstruction and local government.
We have a mechanism where we reach out to the American
private sector. It is a group that we have not really talked
about it very much, but that plays an enormously important role
in ORHA to deliver some of the objectives of ORHA. We do it
through our contracting method. We are quite proud of it, but
we reach out to the American private sector and they in turn
subcontract to Iraqi-American NGOs.
We have several of them that are participating in this
effort and we have, through our contracting, through the
American private sector, they are hiring at this count about,
well, several thousand Iraqi-American citizens in our effort in
several of these sectors, so we are able to expand the pie.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. That is very helpful
information. I just want to conclude by saying I appreciated
General Pace's facts that as many as 18,000 additional military
personnel might join the 145,000 that are there. Likewise, he
added that there will be some troops withdrawn among those that
were involved in the battles early on, and for that matter a
lot of rotation, I guess, given the reserves and the large
dependence on that, but that fact alone demonstrates I think
something that most Americans do not realize, including myself,
that, in fact, additional people in the military are going to
Iraq presently.
There is the general view that a whole rush of people are
coming out, that it is simply a one-way stream, which is
totally inaccurate, but, you know, until you told us this,
maybe others have picked it up somewhere else, we really did
not know, and so I emphasize again our appreciation to you for
sharing this information with us and with others, really,
through this hearing.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Along those lines, I would like to request, if you think it
is appropriate--I think it is in order--that Deputy Secretary
Wolfowitz, in addition to making briefings available to us in a
timely way, which you have committed to do and have done in the
past, and I am confident you will do in the future, that you
either in classified form and/or in open form in writing, give
us your best estimates, because I know Under Secretary Larson
was at this meeting today, on the potential of oil revenue in
Iraq and whether we are really not going to have to take a lot
out of our pocket in order to get whatever has to be done done.
I would like to have the administration's, and I am
confident you have it--best estimate of what the schedule for
oil production is, your timetable, your best estimate. That is,
what will we have up and running in the next month, what do we
expect to have up and running, what is our goal in the next
year, what is our goal the next 3 years, how much investment
will be required to get us there and how much revenue we think
will be produced for the Iraqi people?
It would be very important to know that, because the vice
president, a guy named Mr. Mackenzie from BP-Amoco today cited
the numbers I gave earlier that some total, it is $30 to $40
billion direct investment. People are not going to invest if
there is not security, et cetera. I do not know who is correct,
I do not know what the rule, but I am confident--I would be
dumbfounded if you have not gamed that out already and given
your best estimates. For the record, if you would submit that,
I would appreciate it.
Mr. Larson. We would be happy to do our best to submit
something of that sort.
What I did want to just say very briefly to give a flavor
of it is that I think you had quoted a representative from BP
as talking about the amount of investment that would be
required to get up to 1 million barrels per day of export.
Senator Biden. And then up to 5 billion.
Mr. Larson. Yes. On the first part of that, of course, Iraq
was exporting at various times in the last couple of years a
million barrels a day. In fact, we would go through a little
crisis every now and then when Saddam Hussein would hold his
breath and say he was going to cut us off, so our expectation,
subject to further examination by the Army Corps of Engineers
and the technicians, the Iraqi technicians, is that it is not
necessarily going to take a long time or cost a lot of money to
get up to a million barrels a day or more.
Senator Biden. Well, that is very useful, because I may
have misunderstood, but Mr. Yergin said today and Mr. Mackenzie
agreed--and I may have misheard him or misunderstood him--that
to get there would require an investment of over $1 billion
now, to get to where they were at a million barrels a day.
Now, that may not be correct. If you guys do not know these
numbers, we are really in trouble, we really have a problem, so
I am confident you have a good estimate. But in 2 to 3 years we
are talking about trying to get to 3.5 million barrels a day,
and I am told a minimum requirement to get there would be a $5
billion out-of-pocket investment by a consortium--it does not
have to be by us, but someone has got to invest up to $5
billion. And then they both said, two experts from two
different organizations, that the objective of getting to 5.5
million barrels per day, which they have not had, but have the
capacity to, would be a $30 to $40 billion investment.
I am not an oil man. I have no idea whether those figures
are accurate, but it is very important we know that because
most of our colleagues think--I actually have colleagues
approach me on the floor and say, look, Joe, you guys in
Foreign Relations keep saying we are going to have to put a lot
of money into Iraq. Damn it, why do we not just take the money
and pay for our own troops, too, not only rebuild Iraq, there
is enough money to pay for our troops.
So in case you all do not know it, not only the American
public, but a lot of our colleagues think that once they turn
the spigot on and we are going to be able to do it pretty soon,
they think that man, we do not have much of a problem. That it
is the furthest thing from the truth based on the people I have
gone to and asked independently.
Before this morning's meeting that Wendy, you and I
attended, not one person who has any knowledge of the oil
business I am aware of indicated that is true, so I would like
to know what you all think, because you have to have planned
this. Your Marines and your military guys did something no one
thought they could do. They secured those fields. They did not
get blown up. They are there. You did your job, old buddy. Now
the question is, can we do the rest of the job, and if we do
it, what is it? It is very important for our planning.
Since my time is going to be up, and you do not know the
answer, I am not going to ask you to comment any more, but the
second thing I want to ask before my time goes by is, could you
also provide for the record what the plan is for plussing up
training, if at all, of police forces--not when we are going to
need them, because at some point we are going to need them.
Now, it may be a week, it may be a month, it may be a year,
it may be 2 years. If this were a military operation you would
clearly have in train how you were going to get that number of
military forces whenever you needed them. I would like to know
what the game plan is, what your projections are, who you are
training, who you are going to--whether you are training
indigenous forces, how long it will take, whether you are
looking for our allies and friends who have offered, I am told,
carbinieri and others to participate, what you project, when
you draw down, or when you think it is appropriate, general,
for police presence to be there and what numbers you are
looking at?
What is the game plan? As that old song goes, what is the
plan, Stan? What are you looking to, because we have to be
looking to what kind of money we are going to be being asked to
appropriate down the road here.
And the third thing I would like to know for the record,
what is your expectation, because you have obviously and
understandably--it is not a criticism--had to recalibrate this.
I remember speaking to the Vice President and speaking to the
Secretary in a closed hearing and in an open hearing with the
Secretary about the expectation--a reasonable one and again
this is not a criticism--that there would be an infrastructure
left, once we decapitated the Baath Party operatives within the
police force and within the military, to stand up an indigenous
Iraqi capability. I would like to know what the assessment is
now of that possibility, what the timeframe is, your best
guess, and we understand no one knows for certain, but you have
to have a plan.
I would like you to be willing to share what you at the
outset thought or at least indirectly acknowledged, and you
gave us a good reason, Mr. Secretary. You said, we did not tell
you our plans because we did not begin until January to make
any, because we did not want anyone to think that we had
prejudged that we would go independently, absent the U.N.
participation. I think that is kind of thin, but I will accept
it.
You then told us that General Garner did not come to us
when we asked him to come to us to give us a sense because you
thought it was not appropriate at that time, and events
overtook us, and that you want to rectify that.
I, for one, do not want to be on the other side of that
glass looking in after the fact, being told that our
requirements are something no one told me about, and I will end
by saying there is a Wall Street Journal/NBC poll which goes to
the very first point I raised, because we are going to have a
hard time--I do not know whether this is going to cost us, sum
total, a billion, $20 billion, $60 billion $100 billion more, I
do not know, but in the poll done by NBC/Wall Street Journal,
support or oppose the United States spending up to $60 billion
over the next 3 years, that is $20 billion a year over the next
3 years to rebuild Iraq, 37 support, 57 oppose.
I am confident if we told the American people now what it
takes, they would be prepared to do whatever it takes, which
leads me to the concluding point. I would also think it is
useful if you would, for the record, state, and I will not ask
you to do it now unless you want to, what the stakes are in
Iraq. I have a clear view of what the stakes are in Iraq if we
do not get it right. The chairman and I have both written about
it. My good friend from Nebraska has a clear notion of what he
thinks the stakes are.
I would like to know what the President and the
administration think the stakes are for failure. What is it? We
are not going to fail, but in order for me to convince my
constituency to continue to spend this money, I have got to say
to them--we all have to say to them, if we do not succeed, this
is what will happen. This is what will happen.
So you have stated several times, you must have a notion of
what you think is at stake. What is at stake here? I would like
that in writing for the record. What is at stake?
And so there are my four requests, the oil projections,
police training, if any, the schedule for standing up any
indigenous Iraqis and what is at stake, and I will not try to
take any more of the committee's time. I thank the chair. If we
had time I would ask them to answer them now, but we do not.
The Chairman. I thank the Senator.
[The following information was subsequently supplied:]
OIL PRODUCTION
In the past week, Iraq has been averaging 1.1 million barrels/day
of oil production, which equates to roughly 600,000-700,000 barrels/day
of export. Iraq should sustain 1.5 million barrels/day of production,
and (at least) 1 million barrels/day of export, within one or two
months, barring any major security problems. None of this will require
major investment.
Our goal is for Iraq to reach 3 million barrels/day of output by
the end of 2004, which translates into at least 2.5 million barrels/day
of export. This would return the country to its prewar production
capacity. It is estimated that it might cost roughly $3 billion to
reach that target. The Iraqi Oil Ministry has had plans for years to
reach 6-8 million barrels/day of production, which some analysts
believe will require 7-10 years and at least $30-40 billion of
investment. It is not part of our mission to help Iraq reach those
long-term production targets.
IRAQI POLICE
As you know the Iraqi police service was terribly equipped and
poorly trained. The CPA activity has focused on vetting, hiring,
training and deploying Iraqi police forces and other security forces to
assist in establishing a secure and permissive environment. The CPA has
recalled to duty more than 27,000 police officers, is refurbishing
police academies in Baghdad and Basra, is equipping 26 police stations
in Baghdad, and in May began joint Iraqi-Coalition patrols. After
extensive looting, CPA has had to provide virtually all equipment,
uniforms and office supplies to stand up the police capability. In
Baghdad, 33 police stations and 3 police divisions are now operating 24
hours a day resulting in a dramatic increase in daily patrols.
Rebuilding Iraqi police forces has been a challenge because the
existing force was poorly trained, ineffective, and widely distrusted.
But the creation and training of responsible public safety forces are
indispensable to long-term progress in Iraq. To address the police
situation, former New York City Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik was
appointed to serve as CPA's Senior Policy Advisor overseeing the
police, fire, borders, customs, and immigration organizations. Mr.
Kerik's team recently completed a study that recommended the creation
of a 50-80,000 member Iraqi police force. This force would be trained
and supervised by international police advisors.
The CPA is planning a three-pronged approach to implement the
recommendations of the Kerik Report. First is to re-equip and rebuild
the police force, including the rebuilding and staffing of the three
academies in Iraq. Second is to develop a training course for new
police officers. And third provide a monitoring capability of police
activities in the field and while undergoing training.
A detailed plan with associated costs is in the final stages of
being completed that will meet the four-year goal of having a
professional, fully trained force of 65,000 police in the field. Once
that plan is complete, I will have my staff provide you a briefing.
IRAQI ARMY:
One of the CPA's major initiatives is to establish a New Iraqi Army
that will help provide for the military defense of the country and, as
units become operational, will assume military security duties now
being performed by Coalition forces. The old Iraqi military forces
disintegrated with the collapse of organized military resistance;
virtually all installations and equipment that were not destroyed in
the fighting were looted or stolen.
The CPA formally disbanded the former Iraqi military and security
services and is currently working on the creation of a New Iraqi Army.
The current plan is to build a force of about 40,000 members (roughly 3
divisions) over 2 years as the nucleus of the national armed forces of
the new Iraq. The first battalion begins training this month. A U.S.
company will conduct the day-to-day training under the supervision of a
coalition military assistance training team, which will be commanded by
a U.S. major general and will include officers from the United Kingdom,
Spain, and other coalition countries. This team is leading the effort,
including finalizing recruiting, vetting, and training activities.
It is our intention to build an Iraqi army that has officers who
possess true leadership skills, takes on traditional Army roles such as
boarder defense, and is truly a national force that represents the
demographics of the country. It is our goal to have the first battalion
in October, nine battalions by August 2004 and an additional 27
battalions by mid-2005 for a total force of 40,000 troops.
WHAT'S AT STAKE IN IRAQ?
If we don't succeed in Iraq, we lose the opportunity to----
Provide another example alongside Turkey, Indonesia and
Bangladesh that democracy can succeed in Muslim countries.
Demonstrate a more productive way forward for the Muslim
world, undercutting the appeal of fanaticism.
Show to the region and the world that the United States is
not anti-Muslim.
Show that action by the United States will have a beneficial
effect on countries that we engage in.
Take a key step in combating terrorism, by showing the world
that we will not tolerate regimes with WMD and ties to
terrorism. Our actions prove it is the regime, not the people
who they oppress, that are the target of our actions.
The Chairman. I want to recognize Senator Corzine, who did
not have an opportunity during the first round of questioning.
Senator Corzine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
very much your holding this hearing. I think the
demystification of this whole discussion on stabilization and
reconstruction is something that needs to be vetted to the
American public. It is certainly a question I get in New Jersey
from my constituents regularly, and what we are doing is
basically reading the New York Times or the Washington Post for
information. I think this has been very helpful in addressing
some of the questions.
I also want to join my colleagues in congratulating the
military and Defense and others for the successful prosecution
and liberating the people of Iraq. I think it is a real
testimony to our Armed Forces, and I am particularly happy
today to see the settlement or the agreement with the United
Nations, which I hope will open many doors for shared
responsibility with regard to the issues that we are talking
about today.
I wanted to go to a question that is often framed in a
political context with regard to the rationale of why we went
to this war, but this morning I read the headline in the New
York Times, ``Pre-War Views of Iraq Threat are Under Review by
the CIA,'' and I guess the gist of this is that television has
presented one view, and is that really the view we are
discovering on the ground, and my question as it relates to
weapons of mass destruction is not really whether they were
there, or we have a smoking gun, or any of those issues. It
really goes to what is a deeper concern on my part, and I think
a lot of folks, is the proliferation of these weapons.
I heard some of this in the question that Senator Dodd
raised with respect to the raids, or dissemination of some of
the nuclear materials, but might be even more threatening in
the context of biological and chemical weapons. I am more
concerned, do we feel like we are in a position to say that we
have contained what we expected to see in Iraq, or has it
already proliferated, which is a real question in my mind and a
concern.
I am convinced that there is reason to believe that those
weapons were there, or those efforts were there in place to
develop them, but I think it raises a more serious question,
where are they, and what do we think will happen along those
lines? That is the first question.
The second question is, which really relates to this U.N.
agreement today, and I am pleased to hear that it opens the
door to the World Bank and U.N. Development Corporation and
other elements. How about opening the door to the discussions
on NATO not unlike what we have seen in Afghanistan?
I guess I would stop there. That is probably enough.
Mr. Wolfowitz. OK, I might just say briefly, even before
the U.N. resolution, NATO voted to provide planning support and
other support, mainly just planning support for the Polish
division that is going to be a part of the stabilization force.
Senator Corzine. I was thinking more on the analogy of what
is anticipated in Afghanistan this summer as more of a long-
term----
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think the door is open to that. I was in
NATO in December of last year and listed four tasks which then
we expanded to six, where NATO could help in either the war or
the post-war, and the post-war was frankly highest on my list
of both priorities and expectations, and there are NATO assets,
alliance assets that could be provided, but I think most
importantly that decision to provide the Poles with support
they need I think is a very strong political signal to other
countries that may participate either under a NATO umbrella or
simply as coalition partners.
On your other question, which is obviously a very important
question, it is very hard to answer what is going on in those
things that we still do not know about. I know it is stating
the obvious, but we do not know what we do not know. We are
going to have to get more information from people who are
involved in these programs than we have elicited so far.
I do think that we have cauterized, if that is the right
term--we have stopped one major potential source of chemical or
biological weapons, and that is this poisons lab, as it was
called, up in northeastern Iraq that was under the protection
of an outfit called Ansar al Islam, which seems to be an al-
Qaeda branch organization, and it was connected to a gentleman
named Zarqawi who is still at large, but who is responsible for
the assassination of Mr. Foley in Jordan, who is apparently the
man in charge of the networks that were--I do not know if they
are fully detained, but that have been rolled up in London and
Paris and in Milan.
He continues to be out there. We captured one of his
lieutenants in Baghdad, and that production facility in
Northern Iraq is under our control. I think most of it was
bombed beyond recognition, and a couple of hundred of Ansar al
Islam people were killed and a few were captured.
We do not know what has happened to the weapons of mass
destruction, so I cannot sit here and guarantee you that it has
not slipped out somewhere, or even that it might not be stored
in some other country. There were reports that that kind of
thing was going on before as well, but we believe it is very
important to track this stuff down for just the reasons you say
and try to get it under control so it does not end up in the
wrong hands.
Senator Corzine. Another question for me. Again, this
demystification, I think this is one of the great reasons for
this hearing, Mr. Chairman, is we hear much of a word that I
hardly know how to pronounce or spell, de-Baathification, that
we get news media reports that the coalition is working with
some who may have been supervising the Yabu Gharib Prison.
I think the leadership of the Baghdad University has also
been at least asserted in the press to have Baath Party
leadership associated with it. It sort of is in conflict with
what we hear is policy, and there are other instances of this.
Is it the intent that we will look at each situation in its
specific, or is there a real attempt to change the nature of
that, some 30,000 folks that I hear mentioned in the leadership
that might be important positions in society?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think the reason Ambassador Bremer issued
this very tough and very clear decree, that--as really almost
his first action shortly after coming to Iraq, was the feeling
that is very important to get clarity on just those situations
you describe.
I think the situation in the university and some of the
ministries took place before he got there, before the decree
was issued, and I think there has been some understandable
tension between the desire to maintain efficient functioning of
institutions and the recognition of the need to root out
members of the old regime, and bearing in mind that a lot of
people joined this party fairly innocently, and probably mostly
because they were given no choice, but what his decree singles
out is the so-called full members of the Baath Party which even
have very specific ranks associated with them, and that is
where the 30,000 estimate is, as opposed to a million regular
party members, and those are the people that it focuses on, and
I think we may have to look at further steps, particularly with
respect to those people who are actually guilty of war crimes.
Senator Corzine. In the two specific instances, do you know
if there has been a reversal?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think they were both reversed, and there
have been some other reversals I heard about in recent days.
That decree of his, or order, whatever it is called, clearly
gave a lot of encouragement, and it is exactly what we hoped it
would do to local people, to say, wait a minute, this is going
on, the Americans do not want it, so let us tell the Americans
about it and get it fixed.
Senator Corzine. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Corzine.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. We all are grateful
that you are willing to stay a couple of extra minutes, that
this will be soon complete and you will escape, so thank you.
General, I want to go back to just see if I can get a
clarification on troop strength. I was here when you answered
the questions about the rotation, recent question here about
that issue. I read your testimony. Are we saying--and realizing
this is fluid, and I understand that--that we now, I think you
said have around 145,000 American troops in Iraq. I believe you
said we are bringing in 18,000 additional troops coming from
the 1st Armored Division. Is that right so far? That would put
us up over 160,000.
Then you mentioned that there may be some rotation, I
suspect from the troops, divisions, units that did the heavy
initial fighting, 3rd Infantry Division, 82nd Airborne and so
on, rotating out. Now, does that mean that you think we will be
at a peak at about 163,000, if you are going to put 18,000 in,
rotate some out? Where are we? Can you clarify that for the
committee?
General Pace. I will try to, sir, thank you.
The 145,000 is the number on the ground today. There are
18,000 flowing into theater, and I will have to get back for
the record of how many of those have already gotten in theater
and are already counted in the 145,000, so a portion of the 1st
Armored Division has already moved into Iraq and is probably
already into that 145,000, so I need to come back to the record
with precise numbers.
[The following information was subsequently supplied:]
As of 4 June 2003, 145,000 American troops were deployed in Iraq.
General Pace. When they were ordered forward the intent for
them is that they were going to replace the 3rd Infantry
Division, and that 3rd Infantry Division would come home on
their arrival. Because of the situation General Franks and his
commanders had made the decision no, the 3rd Infantry Division
will not leave yet, the 1st Armored Division will be added to
the forces in theater, and when we, meaning them on the ground,
are comfortable that we have got the right security situation,
then we will rotate home some of the 3rd Infantry Division. So
at the highest number, even if none of the 1st Armored Division
is counted in the 145,000, then you are up around 163,000, but
I think it is probably not that high, sir, maybe 160,000,
155,000 as a guesstimate.
What has also happened is, when the war began there were
about 300,000, 310,000 U.S. in theater. That is about the total
number in theater right now. About 66,000 Navy, Air Force
primarily have come home, and 4th Infantry Division and 1st
Armored Division have been added, so although the total number
of U.S. in theater has remained about the same, the mix of
ground to air and ground to sea has shifted significantly.
Senator Hagel. But in country, in Iraq.
General Pace. And now the number in Iraq has gone from
about 120,000 ground troops when we started the ground campaign
to about 145,000 today, with an additional, guessing, 10,000
out of the 18,000 who are not yet counted.
Senator Hagel. OK, so is it correct to say when that is
fulfilled we are at about 150,000?
General Pace. About that, sir, yes.
Senator Hagel. In country. Do you anticipate more than
150,000 in country in the next 90 days; that we might need it?
General Pace. There are no other troops on orders to the
theater right now to be added to that pile, sir. That does not
mean that they could not be, and the Secretary has stated many
times that if needed, if the commanders on the ground, if
General Franks asks for more, they will be provided, but he has
not asked for more, and, in fact, he has said as early as this
morning he is comfortable with what he has right now as far as
ground troops.
Senator Hagel. So that means you do not anticipate
additional troops in Iraq?
General Pace. That is correct. Do not anticipate in Iraq
additional troops from the United States. We do anticipate that
the U.K. division that is being generated through the Force
Generation Conference they held about 2 weeks ago, and the
Polish division that is being generated as we speak, will be
added to the forces in Iraq, and again, when they arrive, it
will depend on the situation on the ground whether they are
additive or they replace somebody.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
May I go back, Secretary Wolfowitz, on a question I had
asked earlier when I quoted from the Washington Post, and if I
might just take a moment to share with you continuation of this
article, because I wanted to come back on this, and it is this.
About the fifth paragraph into the story it talks about what we
were talking about, Bremer's comments about selection of
interim Iraqi Government 7 weeks away at least, so on and so
on.
About the fifth paragraph down it says, ``moreover, the
interim government's responsibilities are still the subject of
a disagreement between U.S. officials and their increasingly
dissatisfied Iraqi allies.'' Is there disagreement within the
administration on this issue?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Not that I am aware of. I mean I think any
one of us can argue round or flat on this one. There are
considerations for moving quicker, and there are considerations
for taking more time, and that is why the President and
Secretary gave Ambassador Bremer full authority to get on the
ground and make his own judgment of what the situation was
there. I think it is really important to stress that there are
just enormous limits on what judgments any of us can pass
sitting here, I do not know, 8,000 miles away, and much further
distance in terms of knowledge and information about a very
complex society, and that is why----
Senator Hagel. But you would disagree with this story that
there is any disagreement, there is no disagreement within the
administration on this issue you are aware of?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I am sure you can find different views. My
view, which I think is the correct view, is that there is an
extraordinarily capable individual who has been put in charge
to make those judgments, and that is how it should be done.
Senator Hagel. Well, does that, then, lead to some
understanding, better understanding as to why Ambassador Bremer
got there? Was he in the original planning mix?
You went into some detail in your testimony about how much
planning was involved, post-Saddam planning, and all of the
sudden Ambassador Bremer shows up--maybe it was not all of the
sudden. Maybe that was in your plans back in January--and
Ambassador Bodine comes home, other people come home. It
appeared at least to this Senator it was rather an abrupt
switch, or change. That is not the case, or maybe you could
help us understand, or help me understand it.
Mr. Wolfowitz. It is not, and if I could clarify something,
too, that I think was not clear in my statement for Senator
Biden, we did not start the planing in January. We started in
January with setting up ORHA. My recollection is planning
particularly on dealing with possible humanitarian crises and
dealing with possible destruction of oil fields started--I
cannot give you an exact date, my recollection is July or
August, and one of the outgrowths of that planning was, we were
going to need some sort of civilian organization paralleling
the military to do this kind of work, and to get USAID involved
and do contracting and so forth, and that is what led to the
creation of ORHA in January.
And I think I mentioned, maybe when you were not here, that
when we approached Jay Garner about it, we already had in mind
and told him we had in mind a senior civilian administrator
over the whole operation who Garner would--actually, not
Garner, because at that point Garner was setting up the office.
It was not even clear he was going to deploy, and that that
senior civilian would also be the person managing our end of
the political process.
Senator Hagel. But Bremer was in the mix early on?
Mr. Wolfowitz. Not by name, but by position, and----
Senator Hagel. So essentially what happened there that
appeared to be rather abrupt, was all planned?
Mr. Wolfowitz. It was planned, and the effort, it was quite
a systematic one to think about. I mean, the Secretary put
together a list of criteria, then a list of some 50 candidates
and narrowed it down, and then consulted with Secretary Powell
and Condi Rice and George Tenet. They all thought Bremer was a
great choice, took it to the President. I mean, all of that was
a two or three----
Senator Hagel. But there were other people shifted out of
there. I have got some of the names in front of me, but you had
planned to shift some of those people out, too?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I have no idea. You mentioned Ambassador
Bodine. I have no idea whether--my understanding is that the
State Department wanted to reassign her to other things, but--
--
One of the things that Ambassador Bremer has got to do is
both grow and prune that office. I gave you the numbers in
there; some 1,000 people there, U.S. and coalition. I imagine
some of them probably are not needed or are not appropriate,
and on the other hand we probably need more people for other
functions.
Senator Hagel. Although they were not there that long.
But my time is up, so thank you.
Mr. Wolfowitz. But we learned an enormous amount each day
that we did not know before about the situation on the ground.
You know, the standard comment in the military is no plan
survives first contact with the enemy. Believe me, no plan at
all could possibly survive first contact with a complex
civilian society like the one we see in Iraq, so things are
going to change, and it may look abrupt, but it is a conscious
notion that we need, and I might get myself in trouble with
this description, but a senior quarterback out there to call
audibles, because there is going to be a lot of them. And that
is Bremer's job.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the
panel again for their patience.
Mr. Secretary, you said on the first round of questioning
that Iraq could be a model of democracy in the Middle East, and
it might be fair to say that in 1979 in Iran there was a
democratic revolution that brought in a virulent anti-American
government. What would be our position if the Iraqi people
wanted to elect not only an anti-American government, but a
government that was opposed to our friend and ally, Israel?
Mr. Wolfowitz. What took place in Iran 20 years ago was
popular, and if you accept that as democratic, then you are in
a realm of democratic that I do not mean and I do not accept.
Senator Chafee. Well, the----
Mr. Wolfowitz. This is important. I think we have said
repeatedly----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. I think the etymology of----
Mr. Wolfowitz. No, it is more than etymology, I am--it----
Senator Chafee. Demo means people, I believe, in Greek.
Mr. Wolfowitz. No, I know. That is why I constantly say a
free and democratic country. We view, I think correctly, in
this country that democracy is a means to an end, and that end
is individual liberty and individual freedom, and that is why
we do not think of democracy as just elections, not even--you
know, it is more than even just, it is not enough to have one
man, one vote, one time.
It is not acceptable to have a majority tyrannizing a
minority, even if they do it by vote, so there are
institutions, there are standards, there are rules, and I think
that if we can create the conditions where Iraqis really can
express their views freely, I think partly because of the
enormous diversity of that society and partly because it is
hard for me to imagine that the 50 percent of the society that
are women, many of whom are relatively educated by standards of
developing countries, are going to accept any kind of
theocratic tyranny, or that the Kurds or the Turkamens, or for
that matter the Sunni Arabs are going to want to accept a Shia
theocratic State.
There is a lot of pluralism built into that country, and as
I think we have seen in our country, if it is structured
properly, pluralism is a great force for liberty, so I think it
may take some time, but I do not think one should anticipate
the Iranian result in Iraq and, frankly, the Iranian model is a
model of failure at this point, so I do not think it inspires
anybody.
Senator Chafee. So you would say that if there were free
elections, and a theocratic government--we would oppose--there
are conditions on our vision of democracy, is that what you are
saying?
Mr. Wolfowitz. I think there are standards that people who
participate in this political process need to meet. They need
to be committed to protecting the basic rights of the Iraqi
people. They need to be committed to the principle of equal
justice under law. If they are held to those commitments, then
I think they will set up institutions that have a reasonable
chance of success.
There is no guarantee in this world. At some point they are
going to be on their own, and people could abuse things, but I
think we have a better chance here than we have had anywhere in
the Arab world for decades, and I think a lot of Arabs--I
mentioned the Moroccan Foreign Minister. I think there is a
long list, especially of nonruling Arabs, who hope that this
will be a successful model.
Senator Chafee. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Just to followup on the point that Senator
Hagel was making, the reason why some of us are confused is
that 1700 hours, 11 April, 2003, General Garner's staff briefed
my staff and other staffs here and presented us with a chart, a
flow chart of authority, and there is no place on here not only
for Bremer, for any Bremer-like person. Asked specifically who
was going to be over General Garner as Director of ORHA, he
said it was going to be McCarron, the guy on the ground
responsible to Franks, and Franks. And so that is the reason
for our confusion. We are not making this up.
That is why it looked to us like maybe you guys knew it,
but you were a little bit of pea-in-a-shell game with us,
because this is what was submitted by Garner's staff to our
staff in an official briefing as to what the command flow would
be, and so I would hope we do not have that kind of confusion
again as to what you are going to do from this point on,
because that was officially given to us, and I will give you a
copy of it.
That is why we are a little confused. That is why it looks
like a little bit of revisionist history to us. I am sure you
are telling the truth, but understand why--we are not just
looking to pick a fight--it looks like revisionist history
based on not what we just thought, but what we were told as of
that date.
And I remember we had Secretary Powell before us and I
showed him that chart. I had to leave. The Senator from
Connecticut, I gave him the chart. He asked the question on my
behalf during his part, and the response from the Secretary of
State was, this is news to me, and I am paraphrasing, but if
this is what is intended, it will not stand, and we did not
hear anything since then.
And then Garner was out there, and then, quote, from our
perspective, all of the sudden there was this new
organizational head, which I think is a very good idea. But I
do not want the press or the public listening or any of you to
think we are kind of looking frightened. It is a genuine
confusion on our part caused by, as they say in southern
Delaware, by y'all, caused by you guys and we asked from the
administration, and this is, at least speaking for myself, what
I was given. That is the only reason why I state it, because
hopefully we will not go through this from this point on.
General Pace. Senator, I can help with just a small piece
of it, if I may.
Senator Biden. Sure, please. Please do.
General Pace. Just a small piece of it, because you are
correct if you did not have the entire picture, you did not
have the entire picture, and what you see is what you got
handed to you.
I can tell you for a fact that the entire time that this
organization was being talked about, starting back in July or
August and certainly in the January timeframe, when Jay Garner
came on board, that all of us in uniform and out, inside the
Department, understood that the plan was that there would be a
senior civilian who would be picked, because it was important
to not have a general in command in Iraq very long, so clearly
for all of us in the building we knew that that was the next or
preordained step.
The fact that you did not know is a bust on us, sir, and we
need to find out how that happened.
Senator Biden. The reason I mention it, I hope this will
not happen again. I mean, this is important stuff, and again,
there is not a member of this committee--I do not think there
is a single solitary time that has publicly been anything other
than supportive, myself included, of what you have undertaken
before and after in Iraq, and this just makes it difficult.
The second question I have, and if you do not want to
answer it now, you can answer it for the record--there is an
awful lot of speculation, and I think it is just that, that
possibly weapons of mass destruction, at least some biological
weapons from looted departments within Baghdad and Iraq
generally may have gotten in the hand of looters and may or may
not have gotten in the hands of terrorists. Let me be specific.
In the Tuwaitha nuclear site which was looted, there were
deadly materials, I am told, that were taken from that site.
And with our focus on WMD--and I do not want to embarrass, so I
will not mention his name--when the military guy onsite was
asked by an ABC News crew why he did not stop the looting, he
said that he did not have it on his list as a place that
warranted being guarded.
Now, this is a site that the U.N. had investigated, and our
intelligence, I believe, had given the U.N. information a
number of times that this was a a sort of Iraqi CDC. The
looters entered and took live HIV virus, live black fever
virus, and as I said, the young marine lieutenant in charge I
believe told ABC he was never briefed on what was in the
building, which is why he did not try to prevent the looting.
And so the two questions I have, either now or for the
record, classified or unclassified, will be No. 1, was this on
the list--because you said earlier, Mr. Secretary, there was a
list. Everybody knew, the military personnel going into Baghdad
knew the places. They may not have had the ability,
understandably, to guard everyone, but they knew. It was not a
surprise. So was it on the list, No. 1?
No. 2, if it was not on the list, what else was not on the
list that got looted that we are worried about?
And No. 3, what is your classified or unclassified
assessment of what was taken, and whether there has been any
success in tracking down who took, if it is true, HIV virus and
live black fever virus from that facility?
And again--and excuse me, no, there are two different
places. The one place is the equivalent of the CDC in Iraq,
which is the place from which the HIV and black fever virus was
taken, and the other place was the Tuwaitha nuclear site, which
was allegedly looted of deadly materials. I do not have a
listing of the alleged materials that were taken from that
site, radiological material taken from that site, and so there
are two different sites.
Were they--the CDC the young lieutenant said was not on the
list. Was Tuwaitha on the list, and what was taken, to the best
of our knowledge, and what kind of danger does what was taken
pose, if anything was taken, and again, you may want to do that
in a classified forum, which is fine, Mr. Chairman, I believe
by the committee.
[The following information was subsequently supplied:]
LOOTING OF WMD SITES
The International Atomic Energy Agency inspected the sites and
estimates that ten kilograms or less of yellowcake material remains
unaccounted for at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Facility. It is their belief
that this small amount is not a proliferation concern.
Senator Biden. I have several other questions I will not
take the time to ask, I will submit in writing, if I may Mr.
Chairman, and close by saying that afterwards if maybe you,
general, could hang for just a second, I do not want to give
the location, but Mr. Mohammed, the young lawyer who is in this
country now, is credited with saving Private Lynch. I met with
him--he came to my home State--and I and I spent a little time
with him. I presumed to ask him how his family members were.
I received a call today saying that he had been in contact
with them. They are in a certain particular place in Iraq, and
his father has a serious heart artery condition and needs some
help, and I have a location where he is, so I would like to
pass that on to you, and I am sure you will do the right thing
and know what to do, because I do not, for certain.
And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Let me just say for the benefit of all members of the
committee that the record will remain open until the close of
business tomorrow for the members' statements and questions. We
deeply appreciate responses by those who are testifying today,
or by those who are helpful to you in responding to the
questions that have been raised publicly, as well as those
questions that members may submit later today and tomorrow.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, can I ask unanimous consent
with regard to a question I asked--the statement I made to the
Deputy Secretary early on about the candidate Bush saying we
should get out of Bosnia. I submit for the record the newspaper
report. It was on October 25, 2000, quoting Dr. Rice, who was
then his chief foreign policy advisor, and another insert of
October 27 from the Plain Dealer responding to that.
The Chairman. Those will be made a part of the record.
[The articles referred to follows:]
[From The New York Times, October 25, 2000]
Europeans Say Bush's Pledge to Pull Out of Balkans Could Split NATO
(by steven erlanger)
PRAGUE, Oct. 24.--A promise by George W. Bush that, if elected
president, he would negotiate the removal of American troops from
peacekeeping duties in the Balkans and leave such work to the Europeans
has provoked a collective sigh of anxiety and even weariness among
European diplomats, officials and analysts.
These officials said the proposal, as expressed in the Republican
platform, enunciated by Mr. Bush during a presidential debate and
elaborated upon by Mr. Bush's foreign-policy adviser, Condoleezza Rice,
in an interview with The New York Times, could divide the NATO
alliance, undermine the current European effort to increase its
military capacity and question the postwar rationale for NATO's
existence, which has revolved around the Balkans.
Mr. Bush's idea comes at a time when Kosovo, which is run by the
United Nations but patrolled by NATO-led troops, is facing a difficult
and even explosive period with the fall from power of the Yugoslav
president, Slobodan Milosevic. Kosovo Albanians' desires for
independence seem farther away than before, and yet they trust
Washington and American troops more than the Europeans, whom they see
as pro-Serb.
Ms. Rice dug new ground with the idea that the American military
should be reserved for war-fighting, in the Persian Gulf or the
Pacific, while the weaker European forces should concentrate on
peacekeeping at home.
``Dividing NATO into `real soldiers' and `escorts' who walk
children to school is the first way to divide the alliance itself,''
said a senior NATO-country official. ``President Bush decided he liked
allies fighting alongside the Americans in the gulf war--the American
people certainly did.''
When questioned, no NATO government--including the British, French
and Italians--would provide any official reaction, given the prominence
Ms. Rice's comments have been given in the endgame of the American
presidential campaign. The Democratic candidate, Al Gore, supported by
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, moved quickly to use the Rice
comments to try to cast doubt on the fitness of Mr. Bush to be
president.
Any wariness by the allied governments was enhanced by the strong
suspicion--expressed for example by Lord Roper, the British defense
analyst and Liberal Democratic peer--that Ms. Rice intended her
comments politically, to underline the usual Republican charge that, as
he put it, ``the Democrats get Americans involved in long wars.''
Still, the Bush-Rice proposal is not new, but an extension of a
doctrine put forth by Gen. Colin L. Powell under the last Republican
president, Mr. Bush's father. General Powell's belief was that American
troops would essentially be reserved for a real crisis where
overwhelming force could be brought to bear, to ensure victory and
limit casualties.
Ms. Rice also made it clear that any American move would be made
after consultations with European allies, which means, the officials
said, that an American pullout from the Balkans would be highly
unlikely and certainly not soon.
Lord Robertson, the NATO secretary general, has regularly told
visiting American congressmen that the Bush proposal could undermine
the whole idea of ``risk sharing, which is precisely the glue that
holds the alliance together,'' one NATO official said. ``That's where
we went wrong in Bosnia, and having corrected that error, it would be
tragic to go back.''
Nearly all of those interviewed made the same point. In 1992-95 in
Bosnia, European forces were on the ground under United Nations
auspices, while Washington kept out and kept NATO out, while
undermining European proposals for a solution. ``Different
perspectives--being on the ground and not--led to different policy
perceptions,'' one official said. ``The problem in Bosnia was NATO's
absence, not its presence.''
When President Clinton finally committed American forces to Bosnia
and NATO bombed the Serbs there, a peace deal was rapidly signed at
Dayton.
A further problem, the official said, is the bipartisan American
insistence on controlling NATO policy. ``If you're not going to be on
the ground, you can't expect to have your policy preferences prevail,''
he said.
Lord Roper said: ``You can't not be present and want to call all
the shots. Then we really are back to Bosnia in 1992-95. And the
Europeans--and not just the French--will say that this idea of the
Americans doing all the tough work and the Europeans mopping up
afterwards is just another recipe for hegemony.''
The officials and analysts said that another complicated issue is
the role of Russia in the Balkans. The Russians have participated in
peacekeeping in both Bosnia and Kosovo under the aegis of the
Americans, in order not to be taking orders directly from a NATO
general. If the Americans leave, who manages the Russians? ``Washington
will hardly want the NATO relationship with Moscow managed by anybody
else,'' a senior NATO diplomat said.
Another common point expressed was NATO's own reason for existing
after the cold war. The Balkans gave NATO a role, to defeat aggression
and stabilize southern Europe; if the Americans pull out, what use is
NATO?
The bombing war in Kosovo highlighted the gaps in European military
capacity, and the Europeans have since moved to fill them with the
European strategic defense project, which envisages a European force of
up to 60,000 troops ready to move quickly into a Kosovo-hike crisis.
The project is also intended to improve European capacity for troop
transport, electronic warfare, jamming, surveillance and smart-
bombing--just the kind of ``high end'' warfare Ms. Rice suggests the
United States should handle alone.
Washington was initially wary about the Europeans wanting to create
a counterpoint to NATO without the Americans. American officials
continue to stress in speeches that the European project is intended
for crisis management ``where NATO as a whole is not engaged,'' but
after alliance-wide consultation and consensus. French officials, too,
emphasize that the European force would be used as an option after a
NATO consensus, in areas where Washington does not want to be involved
on the ground.
In this sense, there is an opening for the Bush desire to hand over
peace maintenance duties to the Europeans. Already, in Bosnia and
Kosovo, American troops are no more than 20 percent of the total, and
under 15 percent in Kosovo alone. American aid represents no more than
20 percent of what is being provided in Bosnia and Kosovo.
But European officials say that a small presence is different from
no presence at all. And if the Americans do not want to use the 82nd
Airborne to escort children to school, as Ms. Rice said, then surely,
they pointed out, the Pentagon can train some peacekeepers, too.
In Yugoslavia itself, Predrag Simic, an adviser on foreign affairs
to the Serbian Renewal Movement, said that Mr. Bush's proposal is
``another indication of American capriciousness in foreign affairs''
and will only give the Kosovar Albanians a ``new pretext to push for
independence as soon as possible.''
Both Europeans and Americans will eventually withdraw from Kosovo,
Mr. Simic said. ``But Washington has to take responsibility first. If
America took up the Kosovo brief, if it bombed in Yugoslavia, killing
people in the pursuit of its goals and values, then the least America
can do is not abandon the region before it can leave behind a stable
structure, and some sense of security and well-being for the people of
the region. I'd like to believe that the Europeans can do that on their
own,'' he said. ``But I know they cannot.''
Some officials interviewed argued that the risks in Bosnia now are
so low that American troops could leave without any real problems, but
that Kosovo is another matter entirely, given Albanian sensitivities.
But Lord Roper believes that it is Bosnia where Americans must
remain, because the troops are there to enforce an American-negotiated
peace.
One NATO-country diplomat said that the Bush argument for a better
division of labor is a strong one, pointing to the Australian
peacekeepers in East Timor, for example. ``But it is simply not
realistic in the Balkans. The Americans have national interests in
Europe and they play a deterrent role that is irreplaceable. NATO is
not in Kosovo for the Kosovars, but for ourselves.''
______
[From the Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), October 27, 2000]
Bush Would Redefine U.S. Strategy in Europe; Ten Years After the Cold
War's End, A Rethinking of the U.S. Role in NATO is Long Overdue
(by christopher layne)
Foreign policy finally has emerged as a campaign issue, sparked by
the proposal advanced last week by Texas Gov. George W. Bush's top
national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice. Rice stated that one of
the first priorities of a Bush administration would be to have Western
Europeans assume full responsibility for NATO's peacekeeping in the
Balkans. Predictably, the Bush-Rice plan was denounced by Vice
President Al Gore as reckless and proof that Bush is too inexperienced
to be entrusted with the presidency.
But exaggerated, partisan criticism notwithstanding, this proposal
aimed at a new ``division of labor'' within NATO, has considerable
merit. Explaining the plan's logic, Rice stated: ``This comes down to
function. Carrying out civil administration and police functions is
simply going to degrade the American capability to do the things
America has to do'' in regions outside Europe where the United States
has vital security interests.
At one level, the Bush-Rice plan can be seen as just another
chapter in the 50-year saga of NATO debates about ``burden sharing.''
Yet, these repeated calls for Western Europe to do more, so the United
States can do less--for a more rational trans-Atlantic strategic
division of labor--are the proverbial tip of the iceberg. Beneath it
lurk fundamental questions about the often divergent geopolitical
interests of the United States and its European allies; the proper
scope and extent of NATO's role; and how the risks of defending the
alliance's members from external threat should be shared.
Western Europe lacks the ability to keep peace in the Balkans
without American assistance. However, the European Defense and Security
Policy has the more ambitious goal of investing Western Europe with the
military capability to deal on its own with post-Cold War security
threats.
Though professing to welcome EDSP as an instrument to attain a
fairer distribution of the alliance's burdens, the Clinton
administration regards this West European initiative as a threat to
NATO's existence, and has warned the EU strongly that EDSP should not
be used to promote a truly independent Western Europe. The
administration's stance reflects Washington's similar long-standing
ambivalence about Europe.
This fear is not without foundation. In 1965, Henry A. Kissinger,
then a Harvard professor, observed that if Western Europe ever achieved
political and economic unity and strategic self-sufficiency, it would
be for the purpose of advancing its own interests, not America's.
Although this is true, there is nonetheless a powerful argument that,
in the long run, transAtlantic relations would be more stable if based
on Western Europe's independence from, rather than dependence on, the
United States.
If implemented, the Bush-Rice plan, which implicitly is linked to
EDSP's success, would transform the trans-Atlantic relationship--and
NATO--in important ways. The Atlantic alliance's original architects
never intended that the United States would be responsible for Europe's
security in perpetuity. They intended the alliance to be a temporary
shield to allow Western Europe to recover from World War II, at which
point Western Europe would resume full responsibility for managing its
own security affairs.
Ten years after the Cold War's end, a rethinking of the U.S. role
in NATO is long overdue. Historically, America's only strategic concern
in Europe was to prevent a single power from dominating the continent's
resources and using them to threaten the United States. With the Soviet
Union's collapse, this specter of a European hegemony has disappeared.
The continent's post-Cold War security concerns are quite different:
nasty but small-scale conflicts such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo.
Such conflicts do affect Western Europe's interests, but are peripheral
to America's strategic concerns, which increasingly are centered on
East Asia and the Persian Gulf.
The fact is that although Western Europe remains important to the
United States, it is much less so geopolitically and economically than
it was during the Cold War. Beneath official declarations of harmony,
U.S.-West European relations have been fraying for some time. Western
Europe and the United States are locked in a bitter economic rivalry,
and their political interests often clash. Most of all, Western Europe
resents America's cultural and political dominance.
Bush recognizes that the United States needs to exercise its power
with restraint, lest America's current geopolitical preponderance
trigger a geopolitical backlash. Seen from this perspective, the Bush-
Rice plan is the first step toward establishing a new U.S.-Western
Europe relationship based on equality. As such, it should be seen as a
potentially wise and far-sighted act of statesmanship.
The Chairman. I do not want to constrain members from more
questions if you are prepared to ask them, but I think in
fairness to our witnesses, who have been very, very generous of
their time, that we will call the hearing to a conclusion,
with, once again, great appreciation to all four of you.
We thank you, especially Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, for a
very comprehensive and well-prepared, well-researched statement
which all of us need to study and think through. We read it,
and we appreciate having the testimony before we came today,
but it has been fleshed out a lot more in our understanding
during this hearing.
We thank you, General Pace, for your testimony, and
likewise Mr. Larson and Ms. Chamberlin for the contributions
you have made, which have been substantial, to this hearing. We
will be hearing more from the State Department in subsequent
hearings. We look forward to that testimony. As I have already
announced, we will hold a number of hearings on Iraq. We will
try to work with you, Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, on briefings,
or methods of bringing information to us that are useful and
not unduly onerous as far as you are concerned. We will try to
think through on our part about how to set up a process of
dissemination of that material so that it is as useful and
widespread to Senators and their staffs, and therefore their
constituents, as possible.
We thank you very much.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, folks. Appreciate it
very much.
The Chairman. The hearing is adjourned.
Mr. Wolfowitz. Thank you. If I might just thank you for
having this hearing, and repeat what I said at the beginning,
of how much we appreciate the support the Congress has given us
since the beginning of the war on terrorism, including the war
in Iraq, and as all three or all four of you have said in
different ways quite eloquently, the stakes are enormous, our
commitment is large, and we look forward to working with you to
sustain the support of the American people.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 6 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
----------
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record
Responses of Hon. Paul D. Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to
Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Sam Brownback
IRAQ STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
Question 1. Secretary Wolfowitz, beyond efforts to restore law and
order, is the ORHA taking steps to protect vulnerable religious
minorities? What are they?
Answer. The CPA is striving to protect religious minorities through
the establishment of civil order and a representative government that
recognizes and protects minority rights.
Question 2. Secretary Wolfowitz, is there anyone in the Bremer
administration charged with monitoring and relating to religious
minority groups?
Answer. An official in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
charged with oversight of the Ministry of Religious Affairs has the
duty of liaising with religious minority groups. In addition, senior
CPA officials have met with leaders of all Iraq's principal minority
groups.
Question 3. Secretary Wolfowitz, has the Bremer administration or
anyone else in ORHA made statements specifically aimed at dominant
Shiite groups and militants warning them not to attack or harass non-
Muslim minorities?
Answer. During meetings with individual leaders, officials of the
CPA stress the importance of respecting the rights of all, including
minorities. Additionally, the CPA plans to release a policy prohibiting
the incitement of one religious group against another.
Question 4. Secretary Wolfowitz, will basic human rights including
religious freedom be guaranteed without qualification for all groups
and individuals, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, in the new Iraq
constitution?
Answer. Iraqis will draft their new constitution themselves. The
United States will work to ensure that that document will guarantee
basic human rights, including religious freedom.
Question 5. Secretary Wolfowitz, will the U.S. advocate protection
for these basic human rights in the new constitution and laws of Iraq?
Answer. Iraqis will draft their new constitution themselves. The
United States will work to ensure that that document will guarantee
basic rights, including religious freedom.
Question 6. Secretary Wolfowitz, will Islamic law be a basis for
Iraq's new legal system and judiciary or will it be referenced in the
new constitution?
Answer. Iraqis will draft their own constitution. I cannot say what
the outcome will be as the final product will represent a compromise
between Iraqis of widely varying beliefs and ideologies.
Question 7. Secretary Wolfowitz, what can be pointed to as a model
for ``Islamic democracy'' that Prof. Feldman enthusiastically supports
in his book?
Answer. Professor Feldman outlines a theory. However, the policy of
our government is to encourage democracy, regardless of the ethnic or
religious composition of any country. We hope that every nation will
follow the road to democracy that Turkey, South Korea, Mali and Taiwan
have.
Question 8. Secretary Wolfowitz, is it out of the question for Iraq
to be a secular state or is it a foregone conclusion that Iraq will be
an Islamic state as Prof. Feldman implied in his BBC interview just
before going to Baghdad?
Answer. There is no foregone conclusion that Iraq will be an
Islamic state. The constitution that determines the structure of the
future Iraqi government will be the result of compromise between Iraq's
wide range of ethnic and religious groups. Given Iraq's heritage and
diversity, I am confident that even if the constitution makes reference
to Iraq as an ``Islamic state,'' it will protect basic human freedoms.
Question 9. Secretary Wolfowitz, if it is to be an Islamic state
what protections would there be for Iraq's many religious minorities?
Answer. Given Iraq's heritage and diversity, I am confident that
even if the constitution makes reference to Iraq as an ``Islamic
state,'' it will protect basic human freedoms.
Question 10. Secretary Wolfowitz, will the constitution drafting
team include any Christian human rights experts (such as Habit Malik)?
Answer. We will recommend a broad range of experts to the
constitutional convention and its drafting team.
Question 11. Secretary Wolfowitz, is there anyone in the drafting
team who are expert in forging human rights guarantees within an
Islamic context (like Khalid El Fadi)?
Answer. Again, we are recommending a large group of experts to help
draft these human rights guarantees.
______
Responses of Hon. Paul D. Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to
Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Russell D.
Feingold
Question 2. If it is our policy to eradicate terrorist networks of
global reach, then what does it mean when U.S. forces sign a cease-fire
agreement with a designated foreign terrorist organization, as they did
on April 15 with the Mujahedeen Khalq, or MEK? Now we read that the
organization surrendering weapons to U.S. forces in a reversal of the
April 15 decision, but I would like some explanation of that initial
cease-fire agreement decision. How do we make peace with terrorist
organizations? What was the policy process that led to this decision?
Did it involve agencies outside of the Pentagon?
Answer. U.S. policy regarding MEK has always been, and continues to
be, that they are designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO).
The policy of the USG is to eliminate MEK's ability and intent to
engage in terrorist activity and to prevent its reconstitution as a
terrorist organization.
The April 15 cease-fire agreement with the MEK was an interim,
tactical agreement that ultimately led to the MEK falling under the
control of the U.S. forces and being disarmed. We did not make peace
with this or any terrorist organization. The cease-fire agreement did
not involve any agencies outside of the Department of Defense.
Question 3. Secretary Wolfowitz, what is U.S. policy now regarding
the MEK? What are the terms of the agreement by which they surrendered
weapons to U.S. forces? Where is the MEK leadership? Can you compare
the MEK's status with that of any other designated foreign terrorist
organization?
Answer. The MEK group that has fallen under U.S. control is being
disarmed. We have also issued policy guidance to the combatant
commander to screen individual members under the Article 5 of Geneva
Convention to determine their status. After the screening, decisions
will be made on a case-by-case basis regarding parole, etc.
We do not know the whereabouts of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi or
other MEK leaders. USCENTCOM is aware only of the location of Mr.
Mahmoud Baraei, the leader of the group under U.S. Control.