[Senate Hearing 108-167]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-167
BEYOND IRAQ: REPERCUSSIONS OF IRAQ STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
POLICIES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 12, 2003
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 6
Galbraith, Hon. Peter W., distinguished fellow, Institute for
International and Strategic Studies, National Defense
University, Washington, DC..................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Kemp, Dr. Geoffrey, director, Regional Strategic Programs, The
Nixon Center, Washington, DC................................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 20
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Wisner, Hon. Frank G., vice chairman, External Affairs, American
International Group, New York, NY.............................. 25
Prepared statement........................................... 28
(iii)
BEYOND IRAQ: REPERCUSSIONS OF IRAQ
STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
POLICIES
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Alexander, Sununu, Biden, and
Feingold.
The Chairman. The meeting of the Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order. This is the third of a series of
hearings on the post-conflict Iraq situation. During our first
two hearings, administration witnesses identified the needs and
problems in rebuilding Iraq, and outlined the administration's
responses. Those hearings have given the American public and
the Congress insight into the complex decisions involved in
formulating United States policies in post-conflict Iraq.
Today, the Foreign Relations Committee will hear from
expert witnesses from outside the Bush administration. And we
welcome Ambassador Peter Galbraith, from the National Defense
University, a long-time associate of this committee, and, of
course, a former Ambassador; and Dr. Geoffrey Kemp, director of
Regional Strategic Programs at The Nixon Center, who was very
helpful to the committee prior to Iraq, and we look forward to
his comments, especially at this juncture; and Ambassador Frank
G. Wisner, co-chair of the Council on Foreign Relations Task
Force, which recently published the report, ``Iraq: The Day
After,'' an extensive and very important contribution.
Ambassador Wisner is a many-time participant in our hearings, a
long-time friend of all of us. We're delighted that all three
of you are here to share your wisdom this morning.
Each of these experts has a wealth of experience and
knowledge on Iraq, the Middle East region, and United States
foreign policy. We've asked them to examine our policies and
our plans in Iraq from three perspectives.
First of all, how should the United States deal with
domestic issues in Iraq and in other Middle Eastern countries;
in particular, how can we promote the prospects for democracy
or stability or economic reform, all simultaneously? And,
second, what are the repercussions of United States' policies
in Iraq on regional political and economic issues, on
traditional regional alignments, and on the evolving Middle
East peace process in which the President has become very, very
much involved in recent days?
Finally, what is the likely impact of our policies in Iraq
on broader foreign policy concerns, including the war on
terrorism, nonproliferation efforts, generally, and our
relations with the United Nations, our NATO allies, and other
nations?
The ramifications of United States' policies in Iraq go far
beyond the Iraqi people or Iraqi territory. Nations throughout
the Middle East, including regimes that have supported
terrorists, are assessing how the United States and coalition
reconstruction of Iraq will affect their own interests. An
American presence in Iraq that is devoted to achieving
democracy and a healthy economy puts enormous pressure on
states in the region to undertake reform. It improves our
ability to encourage the transformation of repressive
countries, such as Iran and Syria, and to promote the
liberation of minorities across the Middle East. The
achievement of democracy and a sound economy in Iraq could
dispel growing anti-Americanism and dampen Islamic extremism
and terrorism. It could raise expectations in the region for
general economic growth, personal freedom, and women's rights.
By improving the United States' credibility and underscoring
the benefits of participation in a global economy, success in
Iraq could also provide added impetus for a permanent
diplomatic resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
These opportunities will not be realized if we fail in
Iraq. In the worst case scenario, an ineffective or
unsuccessful reconstruction effort could lead to sustained
civil unrest or even open civil war between ethnic or religious
factions. In that event, Middle East states might become more
repressive, more entrenched, their populations more divided and
extremist. Anti-American sentiments already festering could
spread, leading to an increased threat of terrorism.
As we work to reconstruct Iraq, we must prepare for
unintended consequences of our efforts. And this, the committee
has stressed during the chairmanship of my distinguished
colleague, Senator Biden, last year, and during the extensive
discussion of Iraq which we have had this year. If United
States' policies inspire more agitation for democracy in Iran,
for instance, a crackdown by the mullahs might ensue. In Egypt,
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, while reformers may be strengthened,
existing divisions might be intensified, leading to instability
in countries that have long been friends of the United States.
These states already face demographic pressures, stagnant
economic growth, uncertain political succession, and smoldering
regional disputes, which threaten to undercut stability. None
of this, in my judgment, should dissuade us from pursuing the
most aggressive and effective reconstruction and reform agenda
possible in Iraq, but we must be flexible enough to deal with
problems and consequences, and farsighted to see those
consequences throughout the region.
Achieving ambitious goals in Iraq and the Middle East will
require that we act with both patience and a sense of urgency.
We must understand that our prospects for success depend
greatly on what we do in the next several months. Right now, we
are at a critical stage in that reconstruction, and no expense
should be spared to show signs of progress and to demonstrate
our commitment. But we must also keep in mind Deputy Secretary
Wolfowitz's admonition to avoid unrealistic expectations.
Success may not be instant, and we have to be prepared to stay
in Iraq as long as necessary to win the peace. And if the
international community knows that the United States will not
run out of patience in Iraq, we may find it easier to generate
contributions that reduce our burdens and to gain support for
our diplomatic initiatives.
The military victory in Iraq has presented us with a once-
in-a-generation opportunity to help remold the Middle East. We
must speak frequently to the American people about the costs
and benefits of seizing this opportunity. Historically,
Americans have been anxious to disengage from postwar
commitments. This impulse is understandable; but, in the case
of Iraq, we do not have the luxury of disengaging after the
battles have been fought. It would be irresponsible and
contrary to our own national security interests to walk away
from Iraq before it becomes a dependable member of the world
community. We would provide an incubator for terrorist cells
and activity.
The American people know this. A recent poll by the Program
on International Policy Attitudes found that an overwhelming 86
percent said the United States has, ``the responsibility to
remain in Iraq as long as necessary until there is a stable
government.'' And nearly as many, 73 percent, said that pulling
out prematurely, ``would be unwise and immoral.'' As leaders,
the President and Congress must make the case for why we are
risking American lives and spending American resources in Iraq.
We may spar over particular policy decisions, but we must not
let partisanship or inattention undermine the basic United
States' commitment to rebuilding and democratizing the country.
[The opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:]
Opening Statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar
This is the third in a series of hearings on post-conflict Iraq.
During our first two hearings, administration witnesses identified the
needs and problems in re-building Iraq and outlined the
administration's responses. Those hearings gave the American public and
Congress insight into complex decisions involved in formulating U.S.
policies in post-conflict Iraq.
Today, the Foreign Relations Committee will hear from expert
witnesses from outside the Bush administration. We welcome Ambassador
Peter Galbraith, from the National Defense University, Dr. Geoffrey
Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic Programs at the Nixon Center, and
Ambassador Frank G. Wisner, a co-chair of the Council on Foreign
Relations Task Force, which recently published the Report: ``Iraq: The
Day After.''
Each of these experts has a wealth of experience and knowledge on
Iraq, the Middle East region, and U.S. foreign policy. We have asked
them to examine U.S. policy and plans in Iraq from three perspectives:
First, how should the United States deal with domestic issues in
Iraq and in other Middle Eastern countries? In particular, how can we
promote the prospects for democracy, stability, and economic reform?
Second, what are the repercussions of U.S. policies in Iraq on
regional political and economic issues, on traditional regional
alignments, and on the evolving Middle East Peace process?
Finally, what is the likely impact of our policies in Iraq on
broader foreign policy concerns, including the war on terrorism; non-
proliferation efforts; and our relations with the United Nations, NATO
allies, and other nations?
The ramifications of U.S. policies in Iraq go far beyond the Iraqi
people or Iraqi territory. Nations throughout the Middle East,
including regimes that have supported terrorists, are assessing how
U.S. and Coalition reconstruction of Iraq will affect their own
interests. An American presence in Iraq that is devoted to achieving
democracy and a healthy economy puts enormous pressure on states in the
region to undertake reform. It improves our ability to encourage the
transformation of repressive countries such as Iran and Syria and to
promote the liberation of minorities across the Middle East. The
achievement of democracy and a sound economy in Iraq could dispel
growing anti-Americanism and dampen Islamic extremism and terrorism. It
could raise expectations in the region for general economic growth,
personal freedom, and women's rights. By improving U.S. credibility and
underscoring the benefits of participation in the global community,
success in Iraq could also provide added impetus for a permanent
diplomatic resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
But these opportunities will not be realized if we fail in Iraq. In
the worst case, an ineffective or unsuccessful reconstruction effort in
Iraq could lead to sustained civil unrest or even open civil war
between ethnic or religious factions. In that event, Middle East states
might become more repressive and entrenched, their populations more
divided and extremist. Anti-American sentiments, already festering,
could spread, leading to an increased threat of terrorism.
As we work to reconstruct Iraq, we must prepare for unintended
consequences of our efforts. If U.S. policies inspire more agitation
for democracy in Iran, for instance, a crackdown by the mullahs might
ensue. In Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, while reformers may be
strengthened, existing divisions may be intensified, leading to
instability in countries that have long been friends of the United
States. These states already face demographic pressures, stagnant
economic growth, uncertain political succession, and smoldering
regional disputes, which threaten to undercut stability. None of this
should dissuade us from pursuing the most aggressive and effective
reconstruction and reform agenda possible in Iraq, but we must be
flexible enough to deal with problems and consequences throughout the
region.
Achieving ambitious goals in Iraq and the Middle East will require
that we act with both patience and a sense of urgency. We must
understand that our prospects for success depend greatly on what we do
for the next several months. Right now, we are at a critical stage in
Iraqi reconstruction, and no expense should be spared to show signs of
progress and to demonstrate our commitment. But we also must keep in
mind Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz's admonition to avoid unrealistic
expectations. Success may not be instant, and we have to be prepared to
stay in Iraq as long as necessary to win the peace. If the
international community knows that the United States will not run out
of patience in Iraq, we will find it easier to generate contributions
that reduce our burdens and to gain support for our diplomatic
initiatives.
The military victory in Iraq has presented us with a once-in-a-
generation opportunity to help remold the Middle East. We must speak
frequently to the American people about the costs and benefits of
seizing this opportunity. Historically, Americans have been anxious to
disengage from postwar commitments. This impulse is understandable, but
in the case of Iraq we do not have the luxury of disengaging after the
battles have been fought. It would be irresponsible--and contrary to
our own national security interests--to walk away from Iraq before it
becomes a dependable member of the world community. We would provide an
incubator for terrorist cells and activity.
The American people know this. A recent poll by the Program on
International Policy Attitudes found that an overwhelming 86 percent
said the United States has ``the responsibility to remain in Iraq as
long as necessary until there is a stable government,'' and nearly as
many, 73 percent, said that pulling out prematurely ``would be unwise
and immoral.'' As leaders, the President and Congress must make the
case for why we are risking American lives and spending American
resources in Iraq. We may spar over particular policy decisions, but we
must not let partisanship or inattention undermine the basic U.S.
commitment to rebuilding and democratizing Iraq.
The Chairman, It's my privilege to turn now to the
distinguished ranking member, Senator Biden, for his opening
statement.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As is
often stated on the floor of the Senate, I'd like to associate
myself with your remarks, in the interest of time. You've
covered all, or most of all, of what I had planned on saying in
my opening statement, and it will not surprise our witnesses
we're in agreement, you and I, on this subject.
I would like to emphasize just two, maybe three, points.
One is, the poll results you cited are encouraging. I have been
of the view--and you know this well; you share the same view--
the American people are prepared to do whatever they are told
or convinced is in the interest of the United States, including
making sacrifices.
We are going to see more body bags come home. They're going
to come in dribs and drabs, as we both, you and I, predicted
last October. If we have only American uniforms guarding oil
fields, guarding buildings, guarding checkpoints, maintaining
peace and order, it's inevitable. And it's a heck of a price to
pay, but it's an inevitable price to pay.
It's also going to cost us and the world community, God
willing, if we do this right, billions of dollars. There's not
enough oil in Iraq to provide for all of the needs, let alone
the billeting of our troops in that country for the expected
time. And that expected time, of most informed observers, is a
whole lot more than a year, and less than 10. Everybody can
argue in between, but nobody is, any longer, talking about
being able to bring American forces home in the near term.
And which leads me to the primary point that I wish to make
and I hope our witnesses will speak to, and that is that, as I
said, I firmly believe if you tell the American people the
facts, they will do whatever it takes, and they're prepared to
do it. One of the things that this notion about Deputy
Secretary Wolfowitz saying, ``We cannot have unrealistic
expectations''--the American people have no real good
expectation yet, because they have not been told yet, by the
President or others, what is likely to be expected of them,
other than the generic phrase, ``We'll stay as long as it
takes.'' And we're soon going to find, I predict, that an awful
lot of those National Guard units in Delaware and Indiana and
California and Wisconsin and all over the United States, who
are there, who are now being extended for another 6 months and
8 months and 4 months--you're going to find that, in the
neighborhoods back home, people are going to want a broader,
clearer explanation of what is expected and what it's going to
take.
And so I'm going to ask, at some point, not that any of the
three are military experts, but what are the realistic
expectations of how long we are going to be deeply involved,
whether that means with 75,000 forces or where we have now over
160,000 forces, or whether that means with large numbers of
deployed MPs, or whatever it means, just what are we talking
about here? What do these three experts think we're talking
about here, in terms of duration? In broad terms. Broad terms.
I'm not looking for someone to say ``16 months and 4 days,'' or
``9 years and 2 months,'' but just in broad terms.
And the other point that I'd like to make, and I'll cease,
is, before the war, we heard a great deal of discussion about
the so-called democracy domino theory. And I'd like to hear our
witnesses talk about what impact they think will occur in the
region if we handle the situation in Iraq well, as it relates
to democratization in the region, and what is the impact--it's
a version of which you said, Mr. Chairman--if we do not get it
right.
And, most importantly, I'd like to know, from these three
men, who I have an inordinate amount of respect for--I mean,
they've been before this committee, and I count two of them as
personal friends, because I've known them longer and I've known
them more intimately--I'd like to know what you all think
constitutes success in post-Saddam Iraq. What is it? Because we
talk about democratization, we talk about stability, we talk
about--we use a lot of phrases, but I'm not sure what we really
mean by what constitutes success.
For me, the notion of being able to have a democratic--a
liberal, democratic government in Iraq in the near term would
be difficult even if the Lord Almighty came down and sat at the
witness table and told us every single decision to make. I
think it would be difficult, even with divine guidance. But I
do think it's possible to have a stable democracy, to
paraphrase a delegate from Pennsylvania at the Continental
Convention, that ``squints toward democracy,'' one that is more
of a republic, that has a growing and sustained respect for
human rights, for the rule of law, for the marketplace. But I
think that's a pretty tall order, all by itself.
So, in conclusion, I'd like to get a sense, at some point,
from the witnesses, what they think would constitute success in
Iraq. And, again, we have a number of specific questions, all
of us.
I really am grateful to the three of you for being here.
We've called on you many times, and the record should note that
the chairman and I and others on this committee call on you
personally, as well. Poor Dr. Kemp was sequestered in my office
for about 2 or 3 hours this week, my asking his advice. I did
the same with Peter. I've often done it with Frank. And so your
commitment to trying to get this right, across party lines, in
a bipartisan way, is something that is greatly appreciated and
very much needed.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm anxious to hear our
witnesses.
[The opening statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Opening Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses
today.
Last July and August, you and I held a comprehensive set of
hearings on Iraq. One of the panels we convened was devoted to the
subject of the regional context. In fact, Dr. Kemp testified on that
panel.
Clearly, the aftermath of hostilities in Iraq cannot be viewed in a
vacuum. The ultimate success of our efforts to create a stable,
representative government at peace with its neighbors will both
influence and be influenced by the regional environment.
A number of important American interests intersect in the Middle
East--including the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the
war on terrorism, the decades long goal of achieving Arab-Israeli
peace, our nation's dependence on energy supplies, and the glaring
absence of democracy in the Arab world.
For better or worse, the United States is now a Middle Eastern
power. In fact, we are the pre-eminent power. With 150,000 troops in
Iraq and alliances stretching across the region, we have deeply vested
interest in seeing the Middle East evolve in a positive direction.
We look to our witnesses today to help us identify the choices we
face and to offer guidance on the larger strategic focus of American
policy in the region.
Are Iraq's neighbors playing a constructive or destructive role?
What objectives do the Syrians, Iranians, and Turks have?
Could a different U.S. policy toward Iran have an impact on Iranian
actions in Iraq? How would Iran react to an aggressive regime change
policy? How would it respond to a policy of engagement? How will the
composition of the next Iraqi government affect Iranian perceptions and
behavior? More broadly, what should our policy be toward Iran?
How should we conceive of security in the Persian Gulf? Should we
expect to see the military competition between Iraq and Iran continue?
How will the smaller states of the Gulf react to the new reality? Is it
time to think of a new security architecture for the Gulf--if so, what
would be its main elements?
What is the best way to deal with Syria and get it out of the
terrorism business and get it out of Lebanon? Can coercion alone work?
Is there a credible alternative to the present regime in Damascus and
how would that impact our interests?
What is the best approach to take with respect to Saudi Arabia?
What reforms can we realistically expect the Royal Family to take? What
should our long-term posture be with respect to the Kingdom?
Before the war we heard a great deal of discussion of the so-called
``democracy domino theory.'' I'd like to hear what impact our witnesses
think the war has had on regional attitudes toward democracy. What is
the best way to advance democracy throughout the region?
I'd also like to hear the assessment of our witnesses regarding the
reconstruction effort in Iraq. Ambassador Wisner chaired a Council on
Foreign Relations Task Force that produced a first-rate planning
document for post-Saddam Iraq. Ambassador Galbraith, who served on the
Committee staff for several years, was recently on the ground in Iraq
for three weeks. And Dr. Kemp has consulted closely with Europeans and
Arabs on the Iraq issue.
Where in your judgment could we be doing better? Have we done
enough to involve our friends and allies in the reconstruction and
peacekeeping effort? What sort of political process would you design
for the post-conflict transition?
There is a lot of ground to cover and I look forward to your
testimony.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator Biden.
Let me indicate that we'll hear the witnesses in the order
of, first of all, Ambassador Galbraith, then Dr. Kemp, and then
Ambassador Wisner. All of your statements will be made a part
of the record in full, so you need not ask for that to happen.
It will. And each of you may proceed to summarize or
extemporize, but present the ideas that you have in the most
effective way possible. The Chair will be liberal in terms of
the time that's required to do that, because the purpose of the
hearing is to hear you, not to constrain you, but to make
certain that your ideas are fully presented. And then we will
have questioning by the members.
Procedurally, there will be a rollcall vote, I am advised,
on the Senate floor at 11 a.m. So, at that point, we probably
will have completed the original testimony by the witnesses.
We'll be into the questioning period. We'll take a short
recess, so that members may vote, and then come back. We will
ask for your patience during that recess.
It's now a privilege to call upon you, Ambassador
Galbraith, for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER W. GALBRAITH, DISTINGUISHED FELLOW,
INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL
DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Galbraith. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, Senator
Feingold, Senator Alexander, as a former staff member of this
committee, it is, of course, a real honor to be invited back to
testify. I consider that the work I did for this committee in
the 1980s and 1990s, documenting the atrocities of the Saddam
Hussein regime, to have been some of the most important of my
career. And what I talk about today draws on 20 years of
experience with Iraq, as well as a 3-week trip I took shortly
after American forces entered Baghdad, from April 13 to May 2
of this year.
I would note, for the record, that while I'm an employee of
the Department of Defense at the National Defense University,
my views do not necessarily reflect the views of those
institutions.
Operation Iraqi Freedom has transformed Iraq. Even Iraqis
opposed to the American occupation embrace the result--that is
the removal of Saddam Hussein. And, in 3 weeks, I saw many
scenes of joyful liberation. Shi'ites exuberantly marching on a
pilgrimage to Karbala, that had been banned for 27 years; Kurds
posing for family pictures on ruined Iraqi tanks; picnickers
playing soccer in the grounds of one of Saddam Hussein's vast
palaces in Mosul; and ex-political prisoners banging away at
toppled statues of the fallen dictator.
And, everywhere, I saw the evidence of the horror of
Saddam's regime. Men literally digging up corpses with their
bare hands, names inscribed on dank cell walls of people
shortly before being executed, and, everywhere, Iraqis holding
faded pictures and scraps of paper as they searched for loved
ones who had disappeared.
Because of this exceptional record of genocide, murder, and
cruelty, I believe President Bush's decision to remove this
regime from power can be fully justified as a humanitarian
intervention very similar to those the United States undertook
in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s.
Unfortunately, U.S. goals in Iraq have been, in my view,
seriously undermined by the conduct of the immediate postwar
period. This includes the failure to stop the catastrophic
looting of Baghdad, the slow pace of restoring essential
services, and an uncertain and confused approach to postwar
governance.
When the United States entered Baghdad on April 9, it
entered a city largely undamaged by a carefully executed
military campaign. However, in the 3-weeks following the U.S.
takeover, unchecked looting effective gutted every important
public institution in the city, with the notable exception of
the oil ministry.
The physical losses include the National Library, which was
looted and burned--equivalent to our Library of Congress, it
held every book published in Iraq, all newspapers from the last
century, as well as rare manuscripts; the Iraqi National
Museum, where the losses number in the thousands, not as bad as
we originally thought, but still large, and, in value, well
over $100 million; banks; hospitals and public-health
institutions; the universities in Baghdad and Mosul, where it's
not just the equipment and furniture that was gone, but decades
of academic research; and government ministries, almost all of
which were looted and/or burned.
Even more surprising, the United States failed to secure
sites related to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program or
obvious locations holding important intelligence. Ten days
after the Marines took over Baghdad, looters were banging open
safes and setting fires in Iraq's unguarded Foreign Ministry.
Important sites related to Iraq's WMD program, such as the
Iraqi version of the Centers for Disease Control, or the
Tuwaitha Nuclear Facility, were left unguarded and were looted.
There is a remote chance that dangerous biological or
radiological material could end up in the hands of terrorists.
But what is fairly certain is that the United States lost vital
information related to WMD procurement, Iraqi foreign-
intelligence activities, and possible links to al-Qaeda. I have
described this in more detail in my prepared statement.
The looting was both predictable--it happened in 1991--and
at least partially preventable. In spite of meticulous planning
for the warfighting, I saw no evidence of any plan to secure
critical sites. Obviously, U.S. forces could not protect
everything, but even the more limited forces that entered
Baghdad could have protected more.
The looting cost billions in property damage, demoralized
educated Iraqis with whom we will want to work, and undermined
Iraqi confidence and respect for the occupation authorities.
This has complicated the task of the coalition provisional
authority and, in my view, has likely increased the risk to
U.S. personnel in the country.
The fall of Saddam Hussein has left a political vacuum that
the U.S. civilian authorities were slow to fill. General Garner
did not arrive in Baghdad until 13 days after the Marines
entered the city, and did not effectively set up operations for
days after that. Even today, staff of the coalition provisional
authority remain ensconced behind concertina wire in Saddam's
palaces, traveling around Baghdad only with full military
escort.
The lack of preparation and planning, as well as the much-
publicized bureaucratic battles between agencies of the U.S.
Government, have created confusion in the minds of Iraqis, and
undermined confidence in the coalition. Early on, Garner and
his team moved to reappoint prominent Ba'athists to top
positions. Then, on May 16, Ambassador Bremer announced that
all senior Ba'athists were disqualified from top posts.
Similarly, General Garner traveled around Iraq promising that a
representative assembly would soon be named to choose a
provisional government. Ambassador Bremer reduced the Iraqi
participation in the new administration to a small appointed
advisory council. These radical changes in course contribute to
an impression of incoherence.
The first weeks of the U.S. occupation have shown the
limits of American power in Iraq, and the missteps have served
to limit American power in the country.
In my judgment, any occupying power has a relatively short
window before the goodwill generated by liberation is replaced
by anger and frustration at the inevitable lack of progress in
improving the quality of life for the people of the country.
For the reasons outlined above, the United States may have an
especially short window in Iraq.
This, in my view, requires transferring real power to
Iraqis as soon as possible. The problem is, which Iraqis?
The coalition provisional authority should give up the
search for mythical insiders who can help lead Iraq to
prosperity and democracy. Unless we plan on staying in Iraq for
the decade or more needed to develop alternative leadership, we
must work with the leadership that exists. And these are the
former exiles and the Kurdish leaders.
Iraqis, even if exiles and Kurds, will have more local
knowledge than the coalition authorities, enabling them to
avoid some of the more obvious mistakes the Americans have
made. And from the U.S. perspective, it is far better to have
Iraqis blaming their own provisional government for the
inevitable shortcomings of the occupation than for everyone to
be blaming the United States.
The long-term challenge facing the United States in Iraq is
developing a democratic political system while holding the
country together. Decades of dictatorship have contributed to a
crisis of identity within Iraq that cannot be wished away.
While there are many Sunni and Shi'ite Arabs who proudly
consider themselves Iraqi, many other Shi'ites look at
themselves primarily through the prism of their religion.
As an oppressed majority, many feel it is their turn to run
the country on their own. The Ba'ath ideology encouraged Arabs
to think of themselves less as Iraqis and more as part of the
larger Arab nation. Sunni Arabs, now fearful of losing their
historic privileges, may again find pan-Arabism an attractive
alternative to minority status within Iraq.
For the last 12 years, four million Kurds have governed
themselves in a de facto independent state protected by the
United States and Great Britain. With their own elected
parliament and having enjoyed relative freedom and prosperity,
the Kurds have no desire to return to control from Baghdad. For
most Iraqi Kurds, Baghdad is associated with decades of
repression and, more recently, Saddam Hussein's genocide.
With Kurdish replacing Arabic as the language of the
schools in the North, of the media and the government, the
Iraqi identity has largely disappeared in the Kurdish region,
especially among younger people. While Kurdish leaders
understand that independence is not a realistic option,
virtually no Kurd would choose to be Iraqi if given a free
choice. And over the long term, it is, in my judgment, hard to
hold a democracy together where the population of a
geographically defined area overwhelmingly does not want to be
part of that country.
Holding Iraq together by force is not an option. The Kurds
now control the only remaining Iraqi army, the 100,000-strong
Peshmerga, who posses the heavy weapons they have long coveted.
It is unlikely that a future Iraqi regime will have the power
to destroy Kurdish self-government, and inconceivable that the
United States would or could coerce the Kurdistan region into
accepting political arrangements for a future Iraq that did not
include a continuation of much of the current level of self-
government.
The Kurds, after all, were America's second major ally in
the recent war, sustaining more casualties than the British and
compensating for Turkey's non-cooperation by creating the
desperately needed northern front.
If Iraq cannot be held together by force, then the only
alternative is to build incentives for its peoples to form a
voluntary union. Fortunately, the prospect of oil revenue does
provide an incentive for Iraq's diverse peoples to stay
together.
The Iraqi opposition has long supported federalism as the
model for a future Iraq, a position both secular Arab and
Shi'ite religious parties have reaffirmed since the fall of
Baghdad. While there are different views of federalism, it will
clearly be a loose federation. The Kurds look to Canada and
Bosnia as possible models. They will want a single Kurdistan
parliament and government, the power to tax and spend, control
of police, ownership of natural resources--although oil
revenues likely would to be pooled--and the right to maintain a
Kurdistan self-defense force. Like Canada, the Kurds will
insist on equality of the Kurdish and Arab languages, and that
Iraq not define itself as an Arab state.
It is not clear how the Arab parts of Iraq would organize
themselves. Some Shi'ite leaders have spoken of creating a
predominantly Shi'ite province in the South that would, in
essence, be a mirror of the Kurdistan province. Others have
spoken of using the existing Arab governates as a basis for
federalism. It is likely that a future Iraqi federation will be
asymmetric, meaning Kurdistan will have more power than other
federal units. Federalism, especially when combined with
revenue sharing, resolves many of the contradictions of modern
Iraq. In the South, the Shi'ite religious parties may be able
to adopt a more Islamic form of local administration without
imposing it on the aggressively secular Kurds or on all of
Baghdad. Federalism may help ease the fears from Sunni Arabs
about domination from an unholy alliance of Kurds and Shi'ites.
And federalism may persuade the Kurdish people, over time, that
they can have a place within Iraq.
Creating a federation will be complicated. Among the
difficult issues to be resolved will be the boundaries of
different provinces, and particularly how much territory south
and west of the former green line would be included in
Kurdistan. Presumably, this would have to be resolved by local
referendums or censuses. All parties will have to take into
account the interests of other communities who may have their
own demands for self-government, such as the Turkomans,
Assyrians, and Chaldeans. The United States should refrain from
imposing its own views on the outcome and should avoid coercing
any of the parties into accepting political arrangements they
will later regret.
It seems to me that President Bush had it right when he
outlined his vision of Iraq as a place where Shi'ite and Sunni
and the Kurds can get along in a federation. Indeed, in my
view, this is the only way Iraq can long survive.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Galbraith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Peter W. Galbraith, Distinguished
Fellow, Institute for International and Strategic Studies, National
Defense University
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Operation Iraqi Freedom has transformed Iraq. Even Iraqis opposed
to the American military occupation embrace the result--the removal of
Saddam Hussein and his Ba'ath regime.
In three weeks in Iraq beginning April 13, I saw many scenes
exemplifying the joy of liberation. These included:
Shiites exuberantly marching to Karbala to commemorate as-
shoura, an important religious pilgrimage banned for 27 years;
Kurds posing for family pictures on ruined Iraqi tanks;
Picnickers in Mosul playing soccer on the grounds of
Saddam's hundred acre palace, and swimming in his swimming
pool; and
Ex-political prisoners banging away at toppled statues of
the fallen dictator.
Everywhere, there are signs of the horror from which the people of
Iraq escaped. In Mosul, I watched as men dug up bodies with their bare
hands. The forearms of each corpse had been tied together with nylon
rope, and bullet fragments lay nearby in the ground. On this trip, I
had the opportunity to visit prisons and torture centers near Kirkuk
and Baghdad that I heard about from survivors who had escaped in the
1990s. If anything, these places were more horrific than even the
survivors could convey. And every place in Iraq (except for the
Kurdish-governed region), I encountered Iraqis holding faded pictures
and scraps of papers as they searched for loved ones who disappeared
into Saddam Hussein's murder apparatus.
For thirty-five years, the peoples of Iraq endured a regime that
carried out two genocides, the ``anfal'' campaign against the Kurds in
the late 1980s and the destruction of the Marsh Arabs in the 1990s,
that murdered hundreds of thousands of political foes, that routinely
engaged in torture, and that killed upwards of 300,000 Shiites in the
months following the failed 1991 uprising. (Just one mass grave near al
Hillal contains 30,000 corpses.)
Because of this exceptional record of genocide, murder, and
cruelty, I supported President Bush's decision to go to war to remove
Saddam Hussein and his regime from power. I believe the war can be
fully justified as a humanitarian intervention to save lives, very
similar to those the United States undertook in Bosnia and Kosovo in
the 1990s.
A CATASTROPHIC AFTERMATH
Unfortunately, U.S. goals in stabilizing Iraq, and creating
conditions for democracy in that country were seriously undermined by
the U.S. failure to prevent catastrophic looting in Baghdad and by an
uncertain and confused approach to post war governance. While
Ambassador Bremer has clearly brought greater coherence to U.S.
efforts, it may be impossible to recover from the weak start to the
Coalition occupation.
When the United States entered Baghdad on April 9, it entered a
city largely undamaged by a carefully executed military campaign.
However, in the three weeks following the U.S. takeover, unchecked
looting effectively gutted every important public institution in the
city--with the notable exception of the oil ministry.
The physical losses are huge. They include:
The National Library, which was looted and burned.
Equivalent to our Library of Congress, it held every book
published in Iraq, all newspapers from the last century, as
well as rare manuscripts. The destruction of the library meant
the loss of an historical record going back to Ottoman times.
The Iraqi National Museum, which was looted. While the
losses of archaeological artifacts are not as great as
originally feared, thousands of items have been smashed or
stolen. The 34 display pieces stolen include some of the
museum's most valuable items. The 5000-year-old Warqa Vase
contained the first images of religious ceremonies and is
estimated to be worth as much $100 million.
Banks, which were attacked everywhere.
Hospitals and other public health institutions, which were
stripped of medical equipment, medicines, and, in some cases,
patient beds.
Baghdad and Mosul Universities which were stripped of
computers, office furniture, and books. The furniture and
computers are replaceable. Decades of academic research went up
in smoke or was scattered, and is not easily replaced.
Government ministries, which were looted and/or burned. At
the Irrigation Ministry, millions of dollars worth of
hydrologic records may have been lost, a matter of vital
importance in a country known as the land of two rivers. These
losses will certainly complicate efforts to undo one of the
worse crimes of the Saddam Hussein regime, the systematic
draining of the southern marshes. The Ministry of Higher
Education held records of professional qualifications that are
now lost.
The National Theater, which looters set afire nearly three
weeks after U.S. forces entered Baghdad.
Even more surprising, the United States failed to secure sites
related to Iraq's WMD programs or obvious locations holding important
intelligence. As a result, the United States lost valuable information
that related to Iraq's WMD procurement, paramilitary resistance,
foreign intelligence activities, and possible links to al-Qaeda. Let me
provide a few examples:
On April 16, looters attacked the Iraqi equivalent of the
Center for Disease Control taking live HIV and live black
fever. The building had long been considered a highly
suspicious place by both UNMOVIC and UNSCOM, and had been
subject to repeated inspections. It is quite possible that the
building contained evidence relating to Iraq's biological
weapons program, but if that is the case we may now never now.
The Marine Lieutenant who watched from next door as looters
ransacked the building told us: ``I am afraid I am responsible
for Armageddon, but no one told me what was in that building.''
Fortunately, I saw no reason to believe that terrorists were
involved in the theft of biological material, but this cannot
be completely excluded.
The warehouse at the Tuwaitha Nuclear site was left
unguarded and looters took yellow cake and other material that
could be useful for terrorists wanting to make a radiological
weapon, and certainly could make the looters (and their
families) sick.
ABC news found the personnel records of the Fedayeen Saddam
in the basement of Uday Hussein's unguarded house. Uday Hussein
headed the Fedayeen Saddam, a paramilitary group that provided
some of the deadliest resistance to U.S. forces on the way to
Baghdad.
Ten days after the U.S. took over Baghdad, I went through
the unguarded Iraqi Foreign Ministry going from the cooling
unit on the roof to the archives in the basement, and rummaging
through the minister's office. The only other people in the
building were looters, who were busy banging open safes and
carrying out furniture. They were unarmed and not at all
threatening. Foreign Ministry files could have shed light on
Iraq's overseas intelligence activities, on its procurement of
WMD, and on any connections with al-Qaeda. However, we may
never know about these things, as looters scattered and burned
files during the ten days, or longer, that this building was
left unguarded.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE LOOTING
The unchecked looting cost billions of dollars in property damage,
including the damage to buildings and the value of lost property and
equipment. Some of what was lost or destroyed is truly priceless,
including pieces taken from the National Museum and the archival
material destroyed at the library. But the losses are not just
material.
The looting was profoundly demoralizing to the very Iraqi
professionals on whom we need to rely in rebuilding the country.
University professors, government technocrats, doctors, and researchers
are all linked to the looted institutions. Some saw the work of a
lifetime quite literally go up in smoke. The looting also magnified
other problems: the lack of electricity and potable water, the lack of
telephones, and the absence of police or other security.
Most importantly, the looting served to undermine Iraqi confidence
in, and respect for, the U.S. occupation authorities. I have no doubt
that this has complicated the task of the occupation authorities and
increased the risk to U.S. personnel in the country.
COULD THE LOOTING HAVE BEEN PREVENTED?
War causes disruption, and the speed of the U.S. advance to Baghdad
clearly saved Iraqi and American lives. Some of what happened was, in
my view, unavoidable. It is certainly was no surprise that Baghdad's
electricity went out, and I cannot tell if the months-long blackouts
could have been shortened with better planning and more resources.
Similarly, it is no surprise that, with the collapse of the regime, the
police melted away creating a vacuum filled by criminals and
vigilantes. This happens in post conflict situations, and it takes time
to restore law and order.
The failure to protect any important public institution is,
however, inexplicable. The looting was predictable. Exactly the same
thing happened in 1991 in the parts of Iraq taken over by rebels during
the March uprising.
While more troops would have enabled the U.S. to do more, the
looting of the most important sites could have been prevented with the
forces we had on the ground. Government ministries in Baghdad are
surrounded by high walls and solid gates, as are many other important
public institutions. By securing even a few dozen of the most important
places, the U.S. could have prevented a bad situation from becoming a
catastrophic one.
POLITICAL CONFUSION
The fall of Saddam Hussein left a political vacuum that the U.S.
civilian authorities were slow to fill. General Garner did not arrive
in Baghdad until 13 days after the marines entered the city, and then
did not effectively set up operations for days after that.
Further, the initial period was characterized by multiple
missteps--many of which suggested to me a lack of planning. Early on,
Garner and his team decided to reappoint senior Baathists to top
positions. This produced a predictable, and understandable, reaction
among lower echelon officials who had expected American rule would look
radically different from Saddam's.
The initial decision to reappoint judges from the old regime
shocked Iraqis even more. The old judges had administered injustice for
35 years, and with mass graves being uncovered every day, Iraqis
desperately want justice. Even more incomprehensible, the American
official in charge of prisons had apparently begun to consult with Au
al-Jabouri, the warden of Abu Ghraib on how to reestablish an Iraqi
prison system. Abu Ghraib was the most notorious prison in Iraq, and
with the Khmer Rouge's Toul Sleng, probably the most deadly prison in
the world since 1945.
Ambassador Bremer quickly, and rightly, reversed these decisions,
disqualifying high Baath officials from public office. But the initial
appointments--and then the sudden reversal--created an impression among
Iraqis that the U.S. authorities did not quite know what they were
doing.
The handling of the political transition has contributed to the
impression of incoherence. General Garner traveled around Iraq
promising that a representative assembly would soon be convened to name
provisional government. Ambassador Bremer has reduced Iraqi
participation in the new administration to a small, appointed advisory
council. In this case, I think General Garner had the better of the
argument. However, the greater damage comes from the appearance of
uncertainty.
A POLITICAL PATH
The first weeks of U.S. occupation have shown the limits of
American power in Iraq. The missteps have also served to limit American
power in the country.
The United States cannot decide the political future of Iraq,
although can help influence the process. This has a short term and long
term dimension.
In my judgment, any occupying power has a relatively short window
before which the goodwill generated by liberation is replaced by anger
and frustration at the lack of progress in improving the quality of
life of the people of the country. For reasons outlined above, the
United States may have an especially short window in Iraq.
This means transferring real power to Iraqis as soon as possible.
The problem is, which Iraqis?
The U.S. occupation authorities should, in my view, give up the
search for the mythical insiders who can help lead Iraq to prosperity
and democracy. Obviously, there are many talented men and women who
stayed in Iraq through the Baath period, and probably some of them are
committed to liberal democracy. However, given the nature of Saddam's
regime, any such person kept his or her views secret, or was dead.
Except for the Kurdish-controlled region, there are no identifiable
leaders from inside Iraq with democratic credentials.
Unless we plan on staying in Iraq for the decade (or more) needed
to develop an alternative leadership, we must work with the former
exile leaders and the Kurdish leaders. While it easy to belittle the
exiles as ``Saville Row'' or ``armchair'' revolutionaries, I think this
is very unfair. Many are talented individuals, deeply concerned with
the future of their country. They have kept alive the cause of freedom
in Iraq for decades when the international community, and even the
United States, saw Saddam Hussein as a strategic partner, not a pariah.
Iraqis, even if exiles and Kurds, will have more local knowledge
than the coalition authorities. They know enough to avoid some of the
mistakes ORHA made, such as working with the old Iraqi prison
authorities. And, from the U.S. perspective, it is far better to have
Iraqis blaming their own provisional government for the inevitable
shortcomings of the occupation than for everyone to be blaming the U.S.
VOLUNTARY UNION
The long-term challenge facing the United States in Iraq is
developing a democratic political system while holding the country
together. Most people in Iraq do not primarily identify themselves as
Iraqis, and one group, the Kurds, would prefer not to be Iraqis at all.
Iraq is an ancient land but a relatively new state cobbled together
at the end of World War I from three quite different Ottoman
Provinces--largely Kurdish Mosul, Sunni Arab Baghdad, and Shiite Basra.
Throughout its ninety-year history, Sunni Arabs have run the country,
often brutally repressing the non-Arab Kurds and the majority Shiites.
Clearly, this historical domination of the country by one group has
impeded the development of a single national identity.
The Shiites speak of themselves primarily through their religious
identity. While the Shiites are not separatists, many feel their status
as long time victims and as the majority population entitle them to run
the country. This terrifies Sunni Arabs who not only fear the loss of
historic privilege but also retribution. Ironically, Saddam Hussein's
pan-Arab Baath ideology also encouraged Sunni Arabs to think of
themselves not primarily as Iraqis but as a unit of the larger Arab
nation.
The people least accepting of an Iraqi identity are the Kurds. For
the last twelve years, four million in Kurds have governed themselves
in a de facto independent state protected by the United States and
Great Britain. With their own elected parliament and having enjoyed
relative freedom and prosperity, the Kurds have no desire to return to
control from Baghdad. For most Iraqi Kurds, Baghdad is associated with
decades of repression and, more recently, Saddam Hussein's genocide.
With Kurdish replacing Arabic as the language of schools, media, and
government, the Iraqi identity has largely disappeared in Kurdish-run
regions, especially among younger people.
Holding Iraq together by force is not an option. The Kurds now
control the only remaining Iraqi Army--the 100,000 strong peshmerga who
now possess the heavy weapons they long coveted. It is unlikely a
future Iraqi regime will have the power to destroy Kurdish self-
government. It is inconceivable that the United States would--or
could--coerce the Kurdistan Region into accepting political
arrangements for a future Iraq that did not include a continuation of
the current levels of self-government. The Kurds, after all, were
America's second major ally in the recent war, sustaining more
casualties than the British, and compensating for Turkey's
noncooperation by creating the desperately needed northern front
themselves.
If Iraq cannot be held together by force, then the only alternative
is to build incentives for its peoples to form a voluntary union.
Fortunately the prospect of sharing oil revenues does provide an
incentive for Iraq's diverse peoples to stay together.
The Iraqi opposition has long supported federalism as a model for a
future Iraq, a position both secular Arab and Shiite religious parties
have reaffirmed since the fall of Baghdad. While there are different
views of Federation, it clearly will be at best a loose federation. The
Kurds look to Canada and Bosnia as possible models. They will want a
single Kurdistan Parliament and government, the power to tax and spend,
control of the police, ownership of natural resources (although oil
revenues may be pooled), and the right to maintain a Kurdistan self
defense force. The Kurds will insist on equality of the Kurdish and
Arabic languages, and that Iraq not be defined as an Arab state.
It is not clear how the Arab parts of Iraq would organize
themselves. Some Shiite leaders have spoken of creating a predominantly
Shiite province in the South, in essence a mirror image of Kurdistan
Province in the north. Other Arabs have proposed using the existing 14
Arab governates as a basis for federation in their part of the country.
It is likely that in a future Iraqi federation will be asymmetric--
meaning Kurdistan will have substantially more power than the other
federal units.
Federalism--especially when combined with revenue sharing--resolves
many of the contradictions of modern Iraq. In the South, the Shiite
religious parties may be able to adopt a more Islamic form of local
administration without imposing it on the aggressively secular Kurdish
leadership or on all of Baghdad. Federalism may help ease fears from
Sunni Arabs--particularly those in the Baghdad-Ramadi-Tikrit-Samara
heartland--about domination from an unholy alliance of Kurds and
Shiites. Federalism may persuade the Kurdish people, now accustomed to
running their own affairs that they can do so without separating from
Iraq.
The future of Iraq will have to be sorted out with the agreement of
all the relevant peoples--i.e. the Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Shiites. The
United States should refrain from imposing its own views on the
outcome, and should avoid coercing any of the parties into accepting
political arrangements they will later come to regret.
Creating a Federation will be complicated. Among the difficult
issues to be resolved will be the boundaries of different Provinces,
and in particular, how much of the territory south and west of the
former green line should be included in Kurdistan. (Presumably, there
should be local referendums or censuses to decide the matter). All
parties will have take into account the interests of other communities,
such as the Turkomen, Assyrians, and Chaldeans.
President Bush had it right when he outlined his vision of Iraq as
a place where ``Shia, and the Sunni and the Kurds can get along in a
Federation.'' Indeed this is the only way Iraq can long survive.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Ambassador Galbraith.
Dr. Kemp, would you please give us your testimony?
STATEMENT OF DR. GEOFFREY KEMP, DIRECTOR, REGIONAL STRATEGIC
PROGRAMS, THE NIXON CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Kemp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr.
Chairman and Senator Biden, for your kind remarks.
I believe these hearings are very timely. And I just might
add, as a footnote, that I actually worked for this committee,
way back in 1976, as a consultant. And, at that time, the
preoccupation was the implications of the major American
military presence in Iran and what that meant for the region.
So I guess it's familiar territory for me.
I was asked to talk about some of the broader regional
issues stemming from the ongoing situation in Iraq, and I will
do that, but I'd just like to preface it with a couple of
background notes, which I think reflect some of the points
you've all made so far this morning.
I mean, it's interesting to recall that in the months
preceding the Iraq war, when the international debate took
place on the wisdom and the consequences of using military
forces to overthrow Saddam Hussein, one issue on which both
supporters and opponents of the war concurred was that the
United States and its allies would defeat the Iraqi Armed
Forces and that the most difficult problems were likely to
arise after victory. And this prediction was correct. The
short-term glory of a quick, decisive, and remarkably effective
military victory has been replaced by a more sober realization
of America's long-term strategic commitments to the region.
Most troubling of the events, of course, are the problems
of how to reconstitute Iraq's military forces and bring law,
order, and a better quality of life to the citizens of Baghdad,
Basra, and other Iraqi cities. Particularly difficult is the
need to bring responsible Iraqi's into the decisionmaking
process while assuring a balance of representative leaders
within Iraq's diverse population. How to deal with the majority
Shi'a population is probably the most complicated task.
Now, when we go and look at the regional issues and how
Iraq affects that, I think it's important to remember that
there were lots of benefits for Iraq's regional neighbors while
he was in power, because so long as he was in power, he posed
no direct military threat to his neighbors, thanks to U.N.
sanctions and the formidable U.S. presence in the region and
the enforcement of the northern and southern no-fly zones.
Iraq's oil exports were contained by lack of investment and the
U.N. Oil for Food Program. A tight, but by no means foolproof,
embargo on military supplies assured that Iraq's conventional
weapons were not in good condition.
Nevertheless, under these constrained circumstances, Saddam
retained enough internal power to rigidly control his country
and prevent large-scale instability. These conditions suited a
number of neighbors, especially Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Iran,
and Saudi Arabia. Farther afield, traditional rivals of Iraq,
such as Egypt, did not have to share the limelight with the
leader of Baghdad, who was isolated in Arab circles and unable
to exert Iraq's traditional influences on Arab politics. Many
countries, directly or indirectly, profited from the
flourishing black market trade with the Saddam regime. With the
coalition victory, these perks have all ended.
So several realities must be acknowledged at the outset,
particularly when discussing short-term conditions. Until
Saddam and his entourage are found dead or alive, and the issue
of Iraq's WMD is resolved, and the day-to-day conditions of
Iraq is improved, it would be premature to pass judgment on
what has happened since the war, except in the short term.
Postwar scenarios are always messy. And while clearly there was
a lack of foresight and preparation for the aftermath of Saddam
Hussein, perhaps because his army collapsed so quickly, Iraq is
very much a work in progress and, therefore, requires the most
careful scrutiny by the U.S. Congress and the American public;
hence, the reason I'm so pleased you're having these hearings.
This is the time to look at the facts on the ground and
interpret them in a sound and sober manner. No one, anymore,
doubts the effectiveness of U.S. military power in destroying
regimes such as the Taliban and the Iraqi Ba'athists. But the
early mistakes of the administration in handling the postwar
reconstruction need to be fixed quickly.
At this time, post-Saddam Iraq does not look like post-war
Germany or Japan; it looks more like Afghanistan or Bosnia. The
coming months will be decisive in determining whether or not a
brilliant military campaign and faulty postwar policies can be
formulated into a successful outcome.
Now, I'd like to focus on three regional countries and how
they're affected by what's happening in Iraq and the perennial
problem of our European allies.
One country I think it's important to talk about is Syria.
During the first week of the fighting, when things were not
going so well for the coalition, the leader of Syria, Mr.
Bashar al Assad, gave a blistering interview to the Lebanese
newspaper, al Safir, in which he, in effect, called for
guerrilla operations against American occupying forces
equivalent to those conducted against both the United States
and Israel in Lebanon in the 1980s.
However, once the war went well for the coalition, both
Secretaries Rumsfeld and Powell weighed in against Syria,
including a visit by Secretary Powell to Damascus. Since that
time, Syria has remained quiescent. One reason for this is that
the United States has been on record for many months indicating
that Syria's involvement in support for terrorism that kills
Americans, notably its protection of Hezbollah, will eventually
become a target for U.S. wrath. This was put very explicitly by
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in an address to the
U.S. Institute of Peace, on September 5, 2002, when he said, in
effect, ``Hezbollah is part of the A-team, and we will come
after them.''
So Syria, Mr. Chairman, finds itself in a difficult
position, accused of harboring Ba'athist renegades and possibly
storing Iraqi weapons. Syria fears that Iraq could emerge, with
American help, as a powerful challenge to its own influence and
interest in the region; and, therefore, it may have an interest
in destabilizing our presence there. However, the Syrians must
be very careful, for they now have to consider that, on their
border, they have three extremely powerful military
establishments: Turkey, Israel, and the United States. Any
false move by Syria could prove fatal to the Assad regime.
However, Syria, along with its neighbor, Lebanon, will want to
keep the pot boiling, if only because both Syria and Lebanon
have unresolved issues with Israel. In the case of Syria, until
the Golan Heights problem is addressed as part of a formal
agreement with Israel, Syria's interests will lie in non-
cooperation with the United States, but not to the point where
it is likely to attract a military response.
Now, we come to Iran, which I think may be the most
important country at this point in time. Iran has huge stakes
in what is happening in Iraq. It also has the most potential to
influence, for good or ill, how the situation in Iraq emerges.
Of course, there was no love for Saddam Hussein in Iran, and no
tears when his regime was ousted. Iranians are still bitter
about their isolation during the 8-year war with Iraq and the
fact that they were victims of massive chemical attacks.
Nevertheless, as described above, they benefited from Saddam
Hussein's control of the country in his containment. Now they
face a formidable American presence on all their borders. They
are literally surrounded by American military power, whether in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, or Turkey.
Iranians fear both a strong pro-Western Iraq, but also an
unstable Iraq that they do not control. Iran will be under
great pressure from its own nationalists to continue to
exercise a nuclear insurance policy--that is to say, build a
nuclear infrastructure, but not to cross the nuclear threshold
and build nuclear weapons, not, at least, at this point in
time. Iran will clearly be influenced by how the United States
handles the Iraqi military situation and how we deal with the
rebuilding of the Iraqi Armed Forces as they consider their own
security needs. If the United States sets out to provide Iraq
with modern conventional technology, including weapons that
could ultimately have an offensive capability, then Iran will
clearly continue its own strategic modernization and perhaps
cross the nuclear threshold.
However, the most immediate issue for Iran is the future of
the Shi'ite community in Iraq. As the majority group, the
Shi'ites have the power to determine Iraq's future. It would be
quite wrong to assume that Iran controls the Iraqi Shi'ites,
yet they do have strong influence with certain Shi'ite
factions.
Control for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi Shi'ites is
perhaps the most serious problem confronting both the United
States and Iran. Many Iranian reformers--that is to say, those
who want to change the constitution of the Iranian regime
rather than mount a counter revolution--believe that the re-
emergence of Najaf, as a center for Shi'ite learning, will have
a powerful impact on the theocracy of the Iranian revolution
and could strengthen the hands of those who believe that hard-
line Iranian mullahs will have their authority further
undermined if countervailing theocratic voices emerge in Najaf,
voices that are respected and listened to by a growing number
of Iran's more moderate clerics.
Thus, the future of the Tehran regime may be affected by
how the United States manages the Shi'ite question in Iraq. If
it does so in a sensible and effective way, it could achieve
the best of both worlds for Iraq and those in Iran who want
modernization and reform.
For Iran's hard-line mullahs, the coming months will be
crucial for the future of their power base. If events go badly
for the coalition forces in Iraq, with more and more attacks on
U.S. and U.K. soldiers, some Iranians may be tempted to use the
occasion to further undermine the American presence by
participating in terrorism. The effect of this would be to draw
American forces deeper into the occupation of Iraq, and would,
at some point, lead to voices in the United States calling for
massive retaliation against Iran if its sponsorship of such
acts was clear and proven.
Alternatively, if the mullahs decide to be pragmatic and to
follow a wait-and-see policy, then there are those in Iran who
believe that there are opportunities for the United States and
Tehran to address some of their longstanding disputes and for
Iran to reappraise its own foreign policy on matters such as
the Arab-Israeli conflict, its support of Hezbollah, Hamas, and
Islamic Jihad, and even their nuclear program. Were the
Iranians to use the new balance of power in the region to
reassess their relationship with America, this could, indeed,
become one of the great positive outcomes of the war.
But for this to happen, Mr. Chairman, the United States
must adopt a more sophisticated and nuanced policy toward Iran
and stop using simplistic sloganeering, including extremely
unwise and potentially dangerous talk about destabilizing or
overthrowing the regime in Tehran. Such behavior will only
convince the hard-line mullahs that they must resist the
American military presence, and make it difficult for the
reformers, both inside and outside the government and on the
universities and the streets, to push for their own reforms.
Now the question of Israel, Mr. Chairman. Aside from
Kuwait, no country benefited more, in the short run, from the
coalition victory than Israel. Ever since the founding of the
Jewish state in 1948, the Israeli military strategic concerns
focused threats from three primary fronts: Egypt, Syria, and
the East. So long as Iraq was controlled by a hostile leader,
Iraq's military potential could never be ignored by Israel,
particularly since it had engaged in previous Arab-Israeli
wars. The Israeli fear was that if Saddam was not removed
decisively by the United States, there could come a time when
he would be able to reconstitute his weapons programs, the
sanctions would end, and Iraq would, in a matter of years,
reestablish itself as the predominant military power on the
peninsula. This is no longer the case.
Israel now has strategic dominance over all its neighbors
and no longer has to worry about an eastern front. It is the
only nuclear power in the region and has the support and
largesse of the United States. Some Israelis believe, possibly
even Prime Minister Sharon himself, that, for this reason,
Israel must use the victory in Iraq to make bold strategic
decisions about its own future with the Palestinians and its
place in the Middle East.
Last, Mr. Chairman, what about Europe and NATO? All these
scenarios about what's going to happen in Iraq are subject to
the ebbs and flows of the reconstruction and stabilization
program itself. In the worst case, one can imagine a situation
where the United States finds itself deeper and deeper
embroiled in counter-terrorist operations, and U.S. casualties
continue to mount on a daily, if not weekly, basis. Once the
number of U.S. casualties lost in the postwar period exceeds
those lost during the war itself, the political stakes for the
administration will become even greater. How long the American
people will wish to stay in such an inhospitable region without
clear results is anyone's guess, but--and I think this is one
of the reasons you asked us these questions today--the betting
perhaps might be ``not forever.'' On the other hand, if things
go better than expected in Iraq, and a viable leadership
emerges within a year, then, indeed, the contagion effect, the
positive contagion effect, may have benefits for the region and
international security. However, Mr. Chairman, whatever
happens, the United States cannot do it alone--why it is so
important eventually to bring in outside powers, including the
much maligned Europeans.
Despite the hope on the part of some that Europe would just
start meddling in the Middle East, geopolitical realities rule
this out. It is Europe, not the United States, which is
adjacent to the Middle East. The EU is Israel's largest trading
partner. As EU expansion continues, perhaps eventually
including Turkey, its relationship with the Middle East and the
Muslim world will grow ever closer. But this, in turn, could
lead to serious conflict potential, as representative
governments continue to elude most Middle Eastern countries.
Europeans argue, with frequency that we are all familiar with,
that a failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict has a
profoundly negative impact on the political and social
environment in the Middle East, which, in turn, affects the
Europeans directly.
This, finally, brings up the question of NATO and its
potential involvement in Iraq. If the United States and Britain
decide that a broader military presence is required, NATO is
the natural choice, as has been the case in Afghanistan. A NATO
decision to participate would go a long way to repair the
bitter schisms that developed in the period leading up to the
war. However, such a development would invariably mean that key
NATO members, other than the U.S. and U.K., would have to have
a greater say in the management of Iraq. This could be to the
benefit of the United States, which has neither the temperament
nor the will to be a permanent hegemon in such an inhospitable
region of the world.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kemp follows:]
Prepared Statement of Geoffrey Kemp, Director of Regional Strategic
Programs, The Nixon Center
BACKGROUND
In the months preceding the Iraq war, an intense international
debate took place on the wisdom and consequences of using military
forces to overthrow Saddam Hussein. One issue on which supporters and
most opponents of the war concurred was that the United States and its
allies would defeat the Iraqi armed forces, and that the most difficult
problems were likely to arise following victory. This prediction was
correct. The short-term glory of a quick, decisive and remarkably
effective military victory has been replaced by a more sober
realization of America's long-term strategic commitments to the region.
Recent events have provided the wake-up call. First, the new round
of terrorism in Saudi Arabia and Morocco suggests that Al-Qaeda is back
in business. Now it is to be hoped that America's war on terrorism has
been joined by more vigorous efforts by key Arab countries, especially
Saudi Arabia, to engage in closer intelligence and law enforcement
cooperation. Most encouraging are signs that the Saudi government is
prepared to address the problems posed by Islamic extremists in its own
country, including a reevaluation and revision of school curricula and
the funding of Madrassahs in other countries. Further east, the
security situation in Afghanistan remains precarious. President Karzai
is making a valiant effort to extend his authority outside Kabul but
reconstruction programs are woefully behind schedule because of poor
security. Absent a secure environment essential foreign investment will
not materialize and economic conditions will deteriorate. The most
telling statistic is that the opium trade is once again booming with
drug cartels back in business. Perhaps most disturbing are reports that
Pakistani intelligence operatives are once more interfering in a heavy-
handed way in Afghan politics, and warning that the Western military
presence will not go on forever but that Pakistan will remain a
powerful neighbor.
Second, the much-vaunted ``roadmap'' for Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations and an eventual peace settlement is off to a precarious
start. Palestinian rejectionists continue to use terrorism to undermine
Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas's hopes for substantive negotiations with
Prime Minister Sharon. The role of Yasser Arafat remains highly
controversial. The Bush Administration is convinced he will continue to
be an obstacle to peace and are urging European leaders not to meet
with him. The good news is that President Bush seems committed to the
roadmap but what will this mean in practical terms? Will he put greater
pressure on Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to explicitly curtail further
settlement activity in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or will he limit
his intervention to continued pressure to have the Palestinians curb
the violence? If the White House is to be taken seriously, both Israel
and the Palestinians must be persuaded to take painful actions in the
hope of rebuilding trust. The fact that Prime Minister Sharon has
officially endorsed the roadmap is important. The best indicator of
this is the angry response his endorsement has generated within his own
party and within the settler communities.
Most troubling for the administration are the difficult questions
of how to reconstitute Iraq's military forces and bring law, order and
a better quality of life to the citizens of Baghdad, Basra and other
Iraqi cities. Particularly difficult is the need to bring responsible
Iraqis into the decision-making process while assuring a balance of
representative leaders within Iraq's diverse population. How to deal
with the majority Shia population is the most important and most
complicated task. If a moderate Shia leadership emerges that is
supportive of democracy and not an Islamic state, the repercussions in
the neighborhood could be far reaching and could eventually pose a
major challenge to Iran's conservative mullahs. For this reason
hardline elements in Iran will continue to interfere in Iraq and this
raises the risks of a U.S.-Iran confrontation.
From Washington's perspective, the most dangerous scenario would be
successful military or terror operations against U.S. or British forces
in Iraq. This would require the allies to take a tougher line and
deploy additional military forces at the very time Iraq's residual
security forces are in limbo. This, in turn, will undermine hopes for
the speedy establishment of a representative Iraqi regime and the
drawing down of occupation forces.
For the foreseeable future the U.S. will have to sustain a major
military presence in the region if it wishes to protect vital
interests. It will require patience and it will be costly and
increasingly controversial. If the White House handles this mandate
poorly, the Middle East could prove to be a political nightmare for yet
another American president.
REGIONAL WINNERS AND LOSERS
With this background in mind, one way to assess the impact of the
fall of Saddam Hussein on the regional and international environment is
to describe the winners and losers from this event and how they could
change dependent upon the success of the stabilization and
reconstruction programs.
So long as Saddam was in power he posed no direct military threat
to his neighbors, thanks to UN sanctions and the formidable U.S.
presence in the region and the enforcement of the northern and southern
no-fly zones. Iraq's oil exports were contained by lack of investment
and the UN Oil for Food Program. A tight, but by no means fool proof,
embargo on military supplies, assured that Iraq's conventional weapons
were not in good condition. Nevertheless, Saddam retained enough
internal power to rigidly control his country and prevent large-scale
instability. These conditions suited a number of neighbors, especially
Syria, Turkey, Jordan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Farther afield,
traditional rivals of Iraq, such as Egypt, did not have to share the
limelight with the leader in Baghdad who was isolated in Arab circles
and unable to exert Iraq's traditional influence on Arab politics. Many
countries, directly or indirectly, profited from the flourishing black
market trade with the Saddam regime. With the coalition victory these
perks have all ended.
In the short term, the clear regional winners from the ouster of
Saddam Hussein have been Kuwait and Israel. If the U.S. succeeds in
building a stable, pluralistic, humane and economically viable Iraq,
the positive impacts for U.S. regional and global policy will be
considerable. In contrast, if Iraq emerges as an unstable, violent and
ethnically conflicted entity, the outlook for U.S. policy will be grim.
The most likely outcome is probably a mixture of good and bad with
ambivalent implications for the administration's grandiose designs for
changing the Middle East.
Several realities must be acknowledged, particularly when
discussing the short-term conditions. Until Saddam and his immediate
entourage are found alive or dead and the issue of Iraq's WMD is
resolved and the day to day conditions of Iraqis improve, it would be
premature to pass definitive judgment on current policies. Postwar
scenarios are always messy and, while clearly there was a lamentable
lack of foresight and preparation for the aftermath of Saddam Hussein,
perhaps because his army collapsed so quickly, postwar Iraq is very
much a work in progress and therefore requires the most careful
scrutiny by the U.S. Congress and the American public. This is the time
to look at the facts on the ground and interpret them in a sound and
sober manner. No one anymore doubts the effectiveness of U.S. military
power in destroying regimes such as the Taliban and the Iraqi
Ba'athists, but the early mistakes of the administration in handling
the postwar reconstruction need to be fixed quickly. At this time,
post-Saddam Iraq does not look like postwar Germany or Japan; it looks
more like Afghanistan or Bosnia. The coming months will be decisive in
determining whether or not a brilliant military campaign and faulty
postwar policies can be formulated into a successful outcome.
The tasks facing the coalition forces in Iraq are truly formidable.
Security remains the key because without it, nothing else will work.
(For instance, infrastructure cannot be repaired if the moment it is,
facilities are looted.) But security concerns must be balanced against
the priorities of establishing good governance and a justice and
reconciliation process that deals with the horrendous legacy of the
Ba'ath party. This includes the huge problem of Iraq's internally
displaced persons, especially Kurds and Shias, and the growing
resentment of these groups who, as in the case of the Kurds, embraced
the Coalition victory and fought alongside its forces. The Shia
population was less enthusiastic in view of the terrible legacy of 1991
and their perceived abandonment by the U.S.
REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES
Syria
For the last couple of years, prior to the war, Syria's leadership
under Bashar al Assad reestablished close relationships with its
Ba'athist cousins in Baghdad. The bitter personal feud between Bashar's
father, Hafez al Assad, and Saddam has ended and Syria benefited
greatly from trade with Iraq, including the illegal importation of
Iraqi oil through Syria's pipeline. Whether there was any military
cooperation and how extensive it was remains one of the intelligence
mysteries of the war. But the fact of the matter is Syria opposed the
war.
During the first week of the fighting when things were not going so
well for the coalition, Bashar al Assad gave a blistering interview to
the Lebanese newspaper al Safir in which he, in effect, called for
guerrilla operations against American occupying forces equivalent to
those conducted against both the United States and Israel in Lebanon in
the 1980s. Once the war went well for the coalition both Secretaries
Rumsfeld and Powell weighed in against Syria, including a visit by the
latter to Damascus. Since that time Syria has remained quiescent. One
reason for this is that the United States has been on record for many
months indicating that Syria's involvement in support of terrorism that
kills Americans, notably its protection of Hezbollah, will eventually
become a target for U.S. wrath. This was put very explicitly by Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage in an address to the United States
Institute of Peace on September 5, 2002 when he said, in effect,
``Hezbollah's part of the A-team and we will come after them.''
Syria finds itself in a difficult position, being accused of
harboring Ba'athist renegades and possibly storing Iraqi weapons. Syria
fears that Iraq could emerge as a powerful challenge to its own
influence and interest in the region and therefore may have interests
in destabilizing the American presence. However, it must be very
careful for it now has on its borders three countries with extremely
powerful military establishments, Turkey, Israel and the United States.
Any false move by Syria could prove fatal to the regime. However,
Syria, along with its neighbor Lebanon, will want to keep the pot
boiling if only because both Syria and Lebanon have unresolved issues
with Israel. In the case of Syria, until the Golan Heights problem is
addressed as part of a formal agreement with Israel, Syria's interests
will lie in noncooperation with the United States but not to the point
where it is likely to attract a military response.
Iran
Iran is the country that probably has most at stake with what is
happening in Iraq. It also has the most potential to influence, for
good or ill, how the U.S. policies emerge. Of course, there was no love
for Saddam Hussein in Iran and no tears when his regime was ousted.
Iranians are still bitter about their isolation during their eight-year
war with Iraq and the fact that they were the victims of massive
chemical attacks. Nevertheless, as described above, they benefited from
Saddam Hussein's control of the country and his containment. Now they
face a formidable American presence on all borders; they are literally
surrounded by American military power whether in Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq or Turkey.
Iranians fear both a strong, pro-Western Iraq, but also an unstable
Iraq that they do not control. Iran will be under great pressure from
its own nationalists to continue to exercise a nuclear insurance
policy, that is to say, build a nuclear infrastructure but do not cross
the nuclear threshold and build nuclear weapons, at least not at this
point in time. Iran will clearly be influenced by how the United States
handles the Iraqi armed forces and rebuilds them. If the United States
sets out to provide Iraq with modern conventional technology, including
weapons that could ultimately have an offensive capability, then Iran
will continue its own strategic modernization and perhaps cross the
nuclear threshold.
The most immediate issue for Iran is the future of the Shiite
community in Iraq. As the majority group, the Shiites have the power to
determine Iraq's future. It would be wrong to assume that Iran controls
the Iraqi Shiites. Yet they do have a strong influence with certain
Shiite factions. Control for the hearts and the minds of the Iraqi
Shiites is perhaps the most serious problem confronting both the United
States and Iran. Many Iranian reformers--that is to say, those who want
to change the constitution of the Iranian regime rather than mount a
counter revolution--believe that the reemergence of Najaf as a center
for Shiite learning will have a powerful impact on the theocracy of the
Iranian revolution and could strengthen the hands of those who believe
that hardline Iranian mullahs will have their authority further
undermined if countervailing theocratic voices emerge in Najaf which
are respected and listened to by a growing number of Iran's more
moderate clerics. Thus, the future of the Tehran regime may be affected
by how the United States manages the Shiite question in Iraq. If it
does so in a sensible and effective way it could achieve the best of
both worlds for both Iraq and those in Iran who want modernization and
reform.
Iran also has major economic stakes in what happens to the Iraqi
economy. Should the Iraqi oil industry receive massive infusions of
foreign investment to reconstitute its damaged oil infrastructure, Iraq
could, in theory, raise its oil production beyond that achieved during
the past ten years. Dependent upon whether Iraq rejoins OPEC, its role
as a key supplier could influence the pricing policies of OPEC. If Iraq
is as rich in oil as some analysts predict, a time could come in the
next decade when Iraqi production could threaten Iran's own woefully
stretched and under invested oil industry. This could pose a serious
problem for Iran given that its own economic problems require that it
continue to generate foreign currency from oil earnings until such time
as it can develop its huge natural gas reserves, which remain fallow,
thanks to the effectiveness of American sanctions.
For Tehran's hardline mullahs, the coming months will be crucial
for the future of their powerbase. If events go badly for the Coalition
forces in Iraq, with more and more attacks on U.S. and British
soldiers, some in the Iranian regime, particularly in the Ministry of
Security and Information and the Revolutionary Guards Corps will be
tempted to directly interfere and use the occasion to further undermine
the U.S. presence by participating in terrorism. The effect of this
would be to draw the American forces deeper into occupation of Iraq and
would, at some point, lead to voices in the U.S. calling for massive
retaliation against Iran, if its sponsorship of such acts was clear and
proven. The parallel concerns about Iran's nuclear capacity would also
be a factor. the mullahs would have to fear that if they play a
confrontational role in Iraq, they could, themselves, become the
targets of American wrath. Alternatively, if the mullahs decide to be
pragmatic and to follow a ``wait and see'' policy, then there are those
in Iran who believe that there are opportunities for the United States
and Tehran to address some of their longstanding disputes and for Iran
to reappraise its own foreign policy on matters such as the Arab-
Israeli conflict and the support of Hezbollah, Hamas and the Islamic
Jihad. Were the Iranians to use the new balance of power in the region
to reassess their relationship with America this could, indeed, become
one of the great positive outcomes of the war.
But for this to happen, the United States must adopt a more
sophisticated and nuanced policy towards Iran and stop using simplistic
sloganeering, including extremely unwise, and potentially dangerous,
talk about destabilizing or changing the regime in Tehran. Such
behavior will only convince the hardliner mullahs that they must resist
the American military presence and make it difficult for reformers,
both inside the government and on the universities and streets, to push
for their own.
Israel
Aside from Kuwait, no country benefited more in the short run from
the Coalition victory than Israel. Ever since the founding of the
Jewish state in 1948, the Israeli military strategic concerns have
focused on threats from three fronts--Egypt, Syria and the east. So
long as Iraq was controlled by a hostile leader, Iraq's military
potential could never be ignored by Israel, particularly since it had
engaged in previous Arab-Israeli wars. The Israeli fear was that if
Saddam was not removed decisively by the United States, there would
come a time when he would be able to reconstitute his weapons programs,
the sanctions would end and Iraq would, in a matter of years,
reestablish itself as the predominant military power on the peninsula.
This is no longer the case. Israel now has strategic dominance over all
of its neighbors and no longer has to worry about an eastern threat. It
is the only nuclear power in the region and has the support and
largesse of the United States. Some Israelis believe, and possibly even
Prime Minister Sharon himself, that for this reason, Israel must use
the victory in Iraq to make bold strategic decisions about its own
future with the Palestinians and its place in the Middle East.
The three underlying threats to Israel's future (aside from a very
intense and difficult internal struggle amongst Israelis themselves)
are terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and demography. Israel's
formidable military forces cannot stop terrorism and the spread of WMD.
Only the United States and the international community can do this. The
demographic challenge to Israel is stark. Within ten years there will
be more Arabs living in the area between the Mediterranean and the
Jordan River and Israel cannot continue occupation of this territory
and remain a democracy with a Jewish majority which, of course, is the
underlying purpose of Zionism. The fact that Prime Minister Sharon has
talked about ``occupation'' and the possible evacuation of settlements
suggests that this reality has sunk in even to those hardliners in
Israel who for many years pursued a Greater Israel strategy. In other
words, at a time of strategic superiority, with the full backing of the
United States, Israelis are debating whether this is the moment to
finally compromise on the territorial issue and accept the fact there
will be a Palestinian state.
Europe and NATO
All regional scenarios will, of course, be subject to the ebbs and
flows of the reconstruction and stabilization effort in Iraq itself. In
the worst case, one can imagine a situation where the United States
finds itself deeper and deeper embroiled in counterterrorist operations
and U.S. casualties continue to mount on a daily, if not weekly, basis.
Once the number of U.S. casualties lost in the postwar period exceed
those lost during the war itself, the political stakes for the
administration will become even greater. How long the American people
will wish to stay in such an inhospitable region without clear results
is anyone's guess, but the betting would be not forever. On the other
hand, if things go better than expected in Iraq and a viable leadership
emerges within a year, then, indeed, the contagion effect may have
positive benefits for the region and international security. Whatever
happens, the United States cannot do it alone which is why it is so
important to eventually bring in outside powers, including the much
maligned Europeans.
Despite the hope on the part of some that Europe would just stop
meddling in the Middle East, geopolitical realities rule this out. It
is Europe, not the United States, which is adjacent to the Middle East.
The EU is Israel's largest trading partner. As EU expansion continues,
perhaps eventually including Turkey, its relationship with the Middle
East and the Muslim world will grow ever closer. But this in turn,
could lead to serious conflict potential as representative government
continues to elude most Middle East countries. Europeans argue that a
failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict has a profoundly negative
impact political and economic environment in the Middle East.
Immigration, both legal and illegal, from Muslim countries has
become a critical factor in contemporary European politics. Europe has
huge political, economic and strategic stakes in what happens to its
south and southeast. Europeans know that there can be no stability in
the Middle East without the direct and powerful involvement of the
United States. Like it or not Europe needs America's help to manage its
own neighborhood. But America must be sensitive to European, as well as
Arab and Israeli concerns as it presses its agenda on the region.
Without European cooperation, American diplomacy will fail and without
American diplomacy, European hopes for peaceful relations with the
Muslim world will be stymied.
Which brings up the question of NATO and its potential involvement
in Iraq. If the U.S. and Britain decide that a broader military
presence is required, NATO is the natural choice, as has been the case
in Afghanistan. A NATO decision to participate would go a long way to
repair the bitter schisms that developed in the period leading up to
the war. However, such a development would invariably mean that key
NATO members other than the U.S. and the UK would have a greater say in
the management of Iraq. This could be to the benefit of the United
States which has neither the temperament nor the will to be a permanent
hegemon in such an inhospitable region of the world.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Kemp.
Ambassador Wisner.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK G. WISNER, VICE CHAIRMAN, EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS, AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, NEW YORK, NY
Ambassador Wisner. Senator Lugar, Senator Biden, it is a
real pleasure to be here, again, before your committee and to
join two men, who I respect as much as I do, Mr. Galbraith and
Mr. Kemp; and, Senator Alexander, an honor, as well, to be able
to appear before you, I think, for the first time.
I bring to the table today some reflections on the two
subjects that Mr. Galbraith and Mr. Kemp have addressed, on
Iraq and on the region around it. Borne of a number of a number
of years of experience in the region, including my own time in
the diplomatic service, which included a time as Ambassador in
Egypt during the first gulf war, a period of reflection on
nearly two-and-a-half decades of Saddam's persistent attempts
to undermine American interests in the region, repress his own
country, engage in terror and subversion, and commit aggression
against his neighbors, I bring, as well, today, Senator Lugar,
to the table, the reflections that were put together by the
Council on Foreign Relations in two reports \1\ that came out
earlier this year, and both of which I will leave for the
record today.
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\1\ The reports referred to can be accessed on the Council on
Foreign Relation's Website at: http://www.cfr.org
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In my written testimony, I have advanced a number of
contentions about the situation and about American policy. Let
me summarize these in four points.
The first, which I consider absolutely vital as all of us
look at the future in Iraq, is the issue of the maintenance of
law and order; of public security. The United States has done a
number of things right in Iraq. But one has to recognize that,
where we've succeeded, we've made a huge contribution through
the liberation of the country, through feeding its population,
and we're moving rapidly to reestablish its infrastructure.
That said, it is time now to move to involve a broader
international community, as my two fellow witnesses have
pointed out. We've begun to do so by establishing the basis of
international legitimacy with the passage of U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1483. We are already sharing the
humanitarian and stabilization burdens of Iraq, and we're
starting to reach out for financial support. These are
powerfully important directions in American policy, for we
cannot and should not try to bear the burden alone, but broaden
the base to increase the legitimacy of ours and the coalition's
efforts.
More needs to be done to involve the United Nations in the
process that is underway in postwar Iraq. The United Nations is
not only playing the roles I mentioned shortly before, but has
the potential of playing a significant role, as it has
elsewhere, in the process of constituting a politically
sovereign Iraq, a constitutional and political dispensation
that will lead the country forward. It has experience, and we'd
do well to call on it.
It is not wise, in my judgment, for the United States to
rush to judgment or try to impose a political outcome, even in
the interim, on Iraq. It takes time for the communities of the
country, divided as they are, to come together to identify
their leaders to reach some common ground even before the July
deadline is approached. This said, and as the Council on
Foreign Relations reports indicate frequently, restoring Iraqi
sovereignty is absolutely critical. Restoring Iraqi sovereignty
is important, not only to Iraq and the region, but to our
capacity to achieve American objectives in the country; and,
therefore, making clear what we're about is most important.
But I return to my opening contention, public order is
essential; and that has not yet been achieved. Without it,
there is no political or economic progress possible, nor will
there be public confidence in the United States, the coalition,
and our role in the postwar Iraq.
This means the United States is required to assign
sufficient and adequate forces. It means, as well, we must move
rapidly to recruit, train, and deploy Iraqi police,
intelligence, and security services to bolster the peace-and-
order situation.
My second argument is that the United States has yet
clearly to articulate, and must do so, a vision for the postwar
Iraq, a vision important for Iraqis, for the region, for the
world at large, and for the people of the United States. That
vision has a number of components that we need to hear come
together.
The commitment of the United States and the coalition to
see the job through in Iraq for as long as it takes is clearly
one aspect. Another is a commitment to the restoration of
complete Iraqi sovereignty within a political structure that we
would recognize as just, based on democracy, even, to steal
Senator Biden's argument, that democracy is partly achieved and
also ``squints toward the future.'' A federal system of
organization to take into account the disparate communities and
ethnic groups inside of Iraq. A free market, which is in
Iraqi's hands, and Iraqis who control not only their oil, but
other natural resources. A vision of a democracy that shows the
greatest of respect for the dominant religion of Islam, but
allows for the free practice of faith. A vision of democracy
that strengthens Iraq's past bias toward social and gender
equality. A vision that sees Iraq as a unified nation, one free
of weapons of mass destruction. A vision of an Iraq that calls
for peace with its neighborhood, with Iran, Turkey, and the
Arabs.
The absence, Senator Lugar and Senator Biden, of such a
statement, such a clear and articulated statement of American
intentions, leaves Iraqis unsettled, and the region, as well.
My third argument is based on a view that I hold very
strongly, is that the United States will not be able to
complete its job in Iraq, achieve our objectives in Iraq,
unless there is a broader framework of stability in the region.
You cannot treat Iraq in isolation. And, therefore, it is
important, at the same time that we pursue our most important
objectives in Iraq, that we address, as matters of equivalent
priority, the issues that keep the region alight.
The Israel-Palestinian matter is, of course, the one that
comes, first and foremost, to mind. And here, with the
publication of the roadmap based on 242 and 338, the
President's own commitment, we have taken a first and very
important step. But it's rough. As the blood that spilled in
recent days indicates, we are going to have a tough time ahead
of us, and I can only hope that we will treat this matter with
the importance and sustained involvement that it deserves.
Peace, without a determined American involvement, cannot be
achieved--not today, not in the past, not in the future.
I believe that it is also possible to take advantage of the
momentum of the outcome of the war in Iraq to reconfigure our
relationships with other centers of power in the region, as
well as address the region's longer-term issues of political
order and economic progress.
First, in terms of the region's political--of our
relationships with the region's major powers, I put the
question of Iran at the center. It is absolutely right, as
Geoffrey Kemp noted, that, for the first time in our history
and in Iran's, we are near neighbors in Afghanistan, the gulf,
and in Iraq. We cannot afford the luxury of standing back from
Iran, criticizing it from a distance.
We have to recognize that, as neighbors, we have a real and
immediate national interest to attend to, and that we cannot
attend to them without dialog and without engagement. We need
to understand where the Iranians are with regard to the future
of Iraq, Afghanistan, the peace process, terror, weapons of
mass destruction. We need to engage in our interests without
trying to guess what will be the political changes in the
future inside of Iran, which we will only dimly perceive. We
have immediate American interests to attend to.
I also believe the time is right to strengthen ties to the
key pillars of American policy in the Arab world--notably to
Saudi Arabia and to Egypt--not, for any moment, setting aside
the priority we must attach to the war on terror, but to
recognize, in these two countries, the United States has old
and longstanding friends, and their evolution in the future is
of critical national importance to the United States.
Yes, it is important that the United States back democracy
and free markets as the best way out of the stagnation of the
Arab world over the past many decades. At the same time, the
nations of the region, including our old friends, are old
societies with deep and longstanding cultures where change can
occur as long as it's approached carefully and with respect.
I close with an argument, Senator Lugar, that comes back to
the final contention of your opening statement, and that is my
fourth point. It is absolutely clear to me that the United
States has got to be clear about its objectives, the
administration and the Congress, so that the American people
will understand what's at stake in this region in the time that
we will be involved, for we will be involved for a long, long
time to come. We are committed to a region in a manner that is
unparalleled to any American commitment since the one we
undertook in Western Europe after World War II. This will
demand blood, it will demand treasure, it demands a vision and
political engagement of more than just the U.S. Government.
It's a commitment that needs to be articulated, Senator Lugar,
I would argue, as clearly as you made it this morning, by both
the administration and the Congress before it settles fully
into the American conscience, that we are in the Middle East
and we'll be there for some years to come.
Senator Biden closed his remarks with a series of
questions. I can't pretend I can answer all of them in the time
available to me, but I'd like to argue that, in terms of trying
to understand how long and how many American troops will be
involved and what will constitute success, I would suggest that
we be very careful about setting dates and times; but, rather,
be clear about the objectives that we want to achieve. If we're
clear about the objectives that we hope to achieve politically,
the reestablishment of peace and security, regeneration of the
Iraqi economy, and to break those responsibilities, as the
Council on Foreign Relations tried to do in its December
report, into phases, we set objectives that Americans can
understand; and, therefore, the timing becomes a secondary
matter.
We assumed, in our deliberations, that we might be in Iraq
for 3 to 5 years. Dates were much less important than deciding
what objectives we would try to achieve at each step along the
way. I say this, because I watch, as well, the example of the
American involvement in Afghanistan, next door, and I watch,
with concern, that our objectives are not broadly clear and
deeply felt, and, therefore, deeply committed to; and,
therefore, that Afghanistan is, at the moment, slipping through
our fingers. It is profoundly important that we get it right in
Afghanistan and in Iraq if we are to maintain our credibility
as we go forward in this troubled century and face other crises
where we will need friends, allies, financial commitment. If
the United States isn't persistent, clear about where it's
headed, what stages it needs to go through in achieving goals
in Afghanistan and in Iraq, we're going to find it hard to lead
in future crises.
Senator, thanks very much for the privilege of appearing
before you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Wisner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank G. Wisner, Vice Chairman, External
Affairs, American International Group
iraq, the middle east, and u.s. policy: getting it right
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss with you today, Iraq, the
Middle East, and U.S. Policy. As you may know, I have been involved in
two major reports on post-conflict planning. First, I co-chaired with
Ambassador Edward P. Djerejian the Council on Foreign Relations/James
A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy report ``Guiding Principles
for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq.'' I subsequently served as a
member of the Council on Foreign Relations' task force which issued the
report ``Iraq: The Day After.'' In addition, I have visited the region
and spent the last many months meeting with officials from across the
Middle East, Europe, and Asia about what needs to happen next in Iraq
and its neighborhood.
What is clear is that Iraq's future will have significant
consequences far beyond its borders. An unstable chaotic Iraq will
spill its problems across boundaries and draw neighbors in to fill the
power vacuum. A stable democratic Iraq, on the other hand, has the
potential to set a political example for the rest of the region and
become an engine of economic growth. To help Iraq achieve this latter
vision, America must be clear in its goals and steadfast in its
commitment. We must be mindful of regional dynamics, cognizant of the
interests of others and honest about our own limitations.
IRAQ--NEXT STEPS
Establish law and order. The lack of law and order in Iraq
threatens to destabilize the entire region. And it threatens to destroy
the tolerance of the Iraqi population for the continuing U.S.-led
military presence inside Iraq. Rampant violence, score-settling, and
political uncertainty are allowing elements of the old regime to
reconstitute, criminal groups to flourish, and compelling ordinary
citizens to take matters into their own hands. Public security must be
established and services restored for people to return to work and get
Iraq moving again. Without sustained law and order, the loftier goals
that we set for the region will be nothing more than fanciful fleeting
dreams.
A robust, multinational security presence throughout Iraq's main
population centers is required to establish basic security and deal
with holdouts from the Ba'athist regime. Iraq's security forces need
retraining and depoliticization. The task of building a new political
order in Iraq must be shared with the United Nations, and our allies
and partners who maintain constabulary and deployable national police
forces. NATO's support of the Polish-led multilateral security force is
a step in the right direction.
Articulate a vision. The Administration needs to articulate a more
detailed vision for what it wants to foster in post-Saddam Iraq. The
undertaking before us is truly massive, and we need to set realistic,
achievable goals that can be readily understood, accepted, and embraced
by the citizens of Iraq, America and the region.
The long-term goal for Iraq continues to be a sovereign,
democratic, economically vibrant country, at peace with its neighbors
and free of weapons of mass destruction. It will take years to achieve
this, beyond the timeframe of an American occupation. But America must
commit to stay in Iraq long enough to plant the seeds that sets Iraq on
the right course. At local levels, communities should be organized to
facilitate the handing over of political and economic responsibilities.
At the national level, a consensus among Iraq's disparate communities
and those committed to a modern, secular state, respectful of its
religious heritages will serve the country well.
Including others. The U.S. vision must be as inclusive as possible.
Iraq's neighbors have a vital stake in Iraq's success. They are well
aware that chaos in their backyard is troubling on its face, but could
also translate into chaos at home. Our partners in Europe and the
Muslim world can provide much needed security capabilities and help
remove the lingering suspicion that America is set to conquer Iraq.
Over time, international support will allow America to reduce its
profile and restore confidence in our role in the region. Whereas the
Iraqi war divided us; the pursuit of stability can help reunite us,
even though the latter effort may take time.
There also must be active consultations among the U.S., Iraqis,
their Arab neighbors, Iran, Turkey, our European Allies as well as
other members of the Security Council. The goal should be to bring as
many international partners as possible into the effort of rebuilding
Iraq and promoting a more secure Middle East. As we saw in the run-up
to the war, the failure to confront differences and disputes up front,
had disastrous implications for several of our country's most important
relationships and gave rise to outright attempts to thwart our
objectives.
GETTING IT RIGHT IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Setting clear and achievable goals. The defeat and subsequent
collapse of Iraq confirmed America's military prowess. In the aftermath
of the military phase, we have seen ample reason to fear that while we
have won the war, we may lose the peace. Washington's commitment to
improve the lives of Iraqi citizens must remain paramount.
It is essential that we work to prevent the current instability
from infecting the entire region. We must establish clear goals and
work toward realizing them. Such goals would include: achieving success
in, and eventual disengagement from, Iraq; fostering regional stability
(including momentum on the Israeli-Palestinian front, a quiet well-
orchestrated engagement with Iran and a strengthening of relations with
key Arab partners) and promoting freer politics and markets in the
region.
Maintaining momentum toward Israeli-Palestinian Peace. Getting it
right in the Middle East means not just a different Iraq, but also a
fair and just solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. American
presence in Iraq has raised hopes that Washington will commit its good
offices and resources to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This
seemingly endless crisis has come to represent the violent history of
set backs and defeats that Arabs and Muslims have experienced at the
hands of western powers. It has an on-going and crushing psychological
effect on the entire region. The President's visit to the region and
his strong support for the road map is a welcomed recognition of the
need to tackle this vexing problem. The newly launched peace process,
as well as the full involvement of the President is an enormous step.
Considerable determination will be required to maintain momentum.
Still, previous attempts at peacemaking offer two distinct lessons.
First, any new effort must be ``front loaded,'' with steps devised to
end terror and stop settlement construction. Second, American
involvement is necessary, but not sufficient, for peace. The Arabs and
Europeans must be called upon to use their influence, as we begin to
wield ours. Positive statements made by Arab leaders after the U.S.-
Arab Summit at Sharm el'Sheikh are movements in the right direction.
But if this initiative fails to maintain momentum, and stability in
Iraq remains elusive, moderates throughout the region will be further
undermined and we will have lost the few voices that still support
American activity.
Capitalizing on the new political context. The United States is
Iran's ``neighbor,'' in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Persian Gulf, and to
some extent Pakistan. This new political context provides the
opportunity to revisit with Iran some very basic questions such as:
What constitutes stability? What constitutes security?
What role does each side understand the other to be playing?
What role does each side see for the other?
What broad outcomes do we seek on critical areas of
difference including Israel/Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan,
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, etc.
Our interests dictate that we engage Iran now and not await
political change in Iran. Iran is no more prone to revolution than are
other countries. The 1979 revolution was the result of decades of
political organization that brought together key Iranian domestic
institutions such as the clerical establishment, wealthy land owners,
charitable organizations, and eventually the military. Today, such
organized political opposition simply does not exist. Even if sudden
political change were to occur, it is unclear whether a new Iranian
government would distance itself from the policies America finds most
threatening.
Iran's nuclear ambition is supported by a considerable portion of
the population, and there can be no papering over its ties to
terrorism. A clear set of disincentives must be devised to dissuade
such practices. At the same time, such disincentives must be
accompanied by a corresponding set of incentives to foreswear such
activity. Providing only bad and worse alternatives will drive Iranian
leadership to take the very actions we seek to avoid. We risk creating
a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Strengthening our ties with key Arab partners. While America's
world changed dramatically on September 11th, we must remember that the
Middle Eastern countries are facing cataclysmic changes. The second
Intifada that began in September 2000 sparked unprecedented disgust and
rage that is directed at local leaderships, who appear impotent to deal
with both domestic and regional challenges. September 11th, 2001
brought the United States into direct contact with the region, and
``Operation Iraqi Freedom'' of March 2003 tore at the very fabric of
local societies. The recent terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia and
Morocco have put the region further on edge. In other words, the region
is experiencing political whiplash.
Egyptian, Saudi Arabian and Syrian support in fighting terror and
building a more secure Middle East is instrumental. We must prioritize
what we are asking of each country, in order that they can work with
the United States while satisfying the needs of their people. We can
nudge states like Saudi Arabia and Egypt toward change. But we would be
better served by doing so quietly and respectfully. We can not and
should not brook opposition to ending terror and its origins.
Promoting freer politics and markets in the region. America's
rhetoric leading up to the war created considerable expectations.
Instability in Iraq, however, has created cynicism about America's real
motives. The region's leadership and people have both finally
recognized that slow economic growth rates and increasing joblessness
are fast becoming problems of a significant magnitude. The Middle East
Peace Initiative (MEPI) is the right vehicle to help encourage
political and economic participation. However, we have yet to
articulate exactly how MEPI money will be used, how local citizens can
access it, and our benchmarks for success. It would also be useful to
rethink how easing access to the WTO may serve American and regional
national interests.
GETTING IT RIGHT AT HOME
Our goals in Iraq and the region must be understood by Americans
and articulated by the Administration in cooperation with Congress.
There are sacrifices ahead and years of work required. Our forces and
our resources will be stretched beyond anything we have prepared for.
Our intelligence and diplomatic capacities in this region must be
strengthened. Our businesses and civil society institutions must become
more involved. The commitment we have made is tantamount to rebuilding
Europe after World War II. We have done it before. We can do it again.
But we cannot do it on the cheap; and we cannot do it if we become
distracted by other worthy challenges.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador Wisner.
Let me say that the committee will adopt a 10-minute rule
for the first round, and we'll have a second round if that is
necessary. It may well be, given the numbers of questions that
we have for all of you.
I'll begin the questioning at this point.
I'm curious, really, to get an impression from the three of
you, as veterans of the trail, of how our Nation ought to
prepare in the future. We have a work-in-process in
Afghanistan, as you've pointed out, Ambassador Wisner, and
clearly in Iraq. These are different situations from Germany
and Japan, the World War II situation you cited as our last big
challenge. Each of you have pointed out reasons why.
In the case of Iraq, which consists of disparate groups
that were grouped together, perhaps arbitrarily, by history a
few decades ago, can there be a sufficient sense of Iraqi
identity in which Kurds and other groups are prepared to say,
``We are Iraqis''? The same might be the case in Afghanistan.
Certainly, our experiences in the former Yugoslavia, indicates
that in this particular era, the United States has not faced
threats from very large powers, like Germany or Japan or
nation-states of that variety, but, in fact, is dealing with
terrorism by dissident sects of people with different sorts of
issues. That may be part of the history of why certain peoples
came together. We have really a distinctly new set of
challenges.
Now, this committee and others, and the press, are now
replete with the fact that the military operation was superb,
the planning was remarkable. In our testimony, one witness
after another came to say, ``The day after the hostilities
start, law and order will be required. Who will be the
policemen?''--all the things that we're discussing today. These
were not hidden issues.
We were unable, in this committee, to find very much from
the administration about what they were going to do. I would
just say this is sad, in a sense, because the administration,
in my judgment, wasn't well prepared.
So we've been through that. Aspects of this, as Ambassador
Galbraith points out, are very severe. The looting, which was
predictable, is going into hundreds of millions, and maybe
billions, of dollars. Now we ask for a business plan of how we
might begin to recoup, through oil sales or various other
things, money coming back in the door. There are already huge
losses that are very tough for the Iraqi state, huge debts that
have not been resolved. We had, in our last testimony, the
thought that there's a moratorium throughout 2004. Still, we
have hardly settled what the liabilities of this state that
we're trying to work with vis-a-vis the rest of the world are.
Now, this leads me to wonder--we do not have, at least
institutionally, in the United States, as best I can tell, a
training institute or a sophisticated graduate school or any
group of people that think about the hereafter for military
action. We all call upon our government to mesh gears; but, as
a matter of fact, they are equal tasks. People involved in the
military train, they think through scenarios, they work this to
a fare-thee-well. Thank goodness that they do so, in terms of
our security. But what about the hereafter? Who does the
training for this? On an ad hoc basis, we picked up a few
people from various agencies that go out to the Pentagon for
awhile, they go out to Kuwait and, sort of do their best, but
it is still a pick-up game all the way along.
My own view, I suppose, is that the American public, by and
large, supports the military aspect. We understand that
mission. We're prepared to devote funds and training and so
forth, and we understand victory. But perhaps what we have not
tried to think through, and we must, is the so-called nation-
building or peacekeeping or whatever. Here, we have said we're
not involved in this; and, therefore, we have not devoted
resources to it. And when we're forced to do something of that
variety, we try to improvise; and, in this case, not very
successfully. But the fate of not doing it successfully is
likely to be very, very tragic.
So I'm wondering, from your own experience--each of you
have faced this, in a way, because you've had, in your roles in
government, to improvise--please fill in the gaps here. Is
there value in facing up front, as an administration, as a
Congress, the fact that the threats to our country from
instability--from failed states, from incubators of terrorism,
and what have you--are likely, without being able to name names
or know where we're going to head--to lead to a requirement for
a very large number of skilled Americans? Now, add to that the
point you've all made that America should not do it alone. To
what extent should this be a NATO function? For example, should
it be an international function in which we bring together in
preparation, people from several nations, all of whom come
together to share these skills in the same way that, in a rough
way, we've tried to work with NATO partners in military niches
or various things that they do? It just seems to me that we're
at a threshold of an important here that we really have to
make. The failure to make it is likely to lead to either good
luck or bad luck coming from this situation, without any
predictability, and no constituency whatsoever, in the American
public understanding of why we have such people or what we are
about.
Do any of you have any reaction to this general scenario?
Ambassador Galbraith. You've hit on absolutely critical
questions. And the first point I would underscore is the close
connection between getting the postwar right, the nation-
building, and our military resources. Where we don't get it
right, we actually put our troops in danger and we increase our
military commitments. I realize that this committee has been
concerned for decades over our unfortunate tendency to starve
our diplomatic instrument while, we support well our military
instrument, as we should. But somehow we don't see the
connection between the two. And that is absolutely true in this
case.
I think it's unfortunate that, at this point in time,
there's discussion of even closing down the Army's Peacekeeping
Institute at Carlisle, which trains our military people. And
certainly my students at the National War College understand
that peacekeeping is a critical part of what the military does.
They may not like it, but they understand that that is part of
the mission that they have.
The Chairman. This is about to be shut down?
Ambassador Galbraith. I understand that there is discussion
of shutting it down, and some legislation pending to try to
keep it open. That is my understanding. I haven't looked at it
that closely.
I would make just a couple of other points--nation-building
is critical, and it is something that the United Nations does,
and it does rather well. I had the privilege of participating
for 18 months in the mission in East Timor. Now, the United
Nations has many inefficiencies, but, as we can see in Iraq,
nation building is a very difficult and complicated task.
I think it's fortunate, in Iraq, that the United Nations
has chosen Sergio Vieira de Mello, who is absolutely the most
capable diplomat I've encountered. I think he can and should
play a critical role, particularly in the political process,
because I think his persuasive skills will be very valuable.
But the U.N. has resources in the area of justice, of CIVPOL,
and other areas that can be helpful.
A second point I'd make is that we need to rethink how we
do some of these things. There was an evident lack of planning.
People were recruited to go to Iraq at the very last minute,
and so, naturally, they didn't have time to figure out who was
who. And they ended up making some horrendous mistakes. They
actually worked with the head of Abu Ghraib Prison, or at least
consulting with him. This man who ran the most notorious prison
in the world since 1945.
We also have to be prepared to take risks. You cannot
occupy a country and not assume a certain element of risk for
your personnel. It is a dangerous business. You should not take
unnecessary risks, but when some of your civil authorities
never got out of the Republican palace. That's ridiculous.
Ambassador Wisner. Senator, I join Peter Galbraith in--I
think the questions you put before us are really the
challenging ones.
As I think back on the experience of the United States,
over recent years, and the issue that you raise of, ``How do
you go about planning for a postwar period,'' I'm struck, I
think, by the principal fact that it's fundamentally a
political question. It's a political question and it's a
commitment on the part of the United States to doing the job of
nation-building. We actually are quite good at nation-building.
We showed it in Western Europe, in Japan, in Korea. We have a
good track record. At the same time, our history also tells us
that we got very disappointed with the mission of being nation-
builders. It fell into disfavor as a result of the war in
Vietnam, and, of course, during the crisis in Somalia, the very
concept of nation-building took further hits, and it was
politicized in the American environment.
I believe the starting point, therefore, is to look,
frankly, at the kinds of crises, the risks the United States
will be running in this century, and recognize that the
question of nation-building is going to be with us for a long
time to come, and it's part of our political responsibilities,
not only as a nation with interests in the world, but being
clear with our own people about the commitments we're asking
from them.
From that flows, as Peter has just said, a number of
practical steps that one has to take. I recall reading the
history of the last 2 years of World War II, the bloody fights
inside the U.S. Government over what shape nation-building
should take with regard to Germany and Japan, and how far off
the plans in those two regards were from the outcome. One is
always reminded of General Marshall's wonderful statement that
plans never work out the way you think, but you always must
plan. In the Western European context, we worked out very
different arrangements. We have to be flexible. But the
political mindset, that we would stick with it, that we would
have the right people, we would follow policies with broad
principles, all of that made sense, and that we would have the
resources available to be a nation-builder. I believe we know
how to do it. It's a question of establishing the political
priority and a consensus among ourselves the job needs to be
done.
You asked specifically about NATO and the international
dimension, the coalition dimension of nation-building and our
responsibilities in these post-conflict phases. We've all been
talking, during the course of the morning, about the role the
United Nations must play, or NATO or ad-hoc coalitions. All can
play roles, and they're, indeed, playing roles right now in
Iraq.
As we sat down to think about the coming conflict in Iraq,
in New York, at the Council, we all recognized that one of the
toughest problems about the first phase, justifying our
intervention in Iraq, would be where it would leave us when the
war was over, who we would have on our side, what our
legitimacy would be. Getting our diplomacy right struck us as
absolutely important. It couldn't be truer today.
It is possible to get our diplomacy right. I think the
world is, on the whole, prepared to cooperate, to try to share
some of the burdens to create an Iraq that will be more stable,
and accommodate the United States, key members of the
coalition, in their diplomacy, to contribute treasure,
contribute funds, contribute forces. It is important the United
States not only look for that, not to escape responsibilities,
but to involve the world and to legitimize our presence in Iraq
by enveloping it in a stronger international consensus, to get
the level of our profile down so that we are not the targets of
all the criticism and the failures, a point I think Peter made
when he talked about making certain we get Iraqis into office
as quickly possible. The same is true of broadening the base of
the international coloration of our efforts there.
So let me associate myself with your two remarks. We are
nation-builders, we will be nation-builders. We must prepare to
be nation-builders, accept that responsibility. And, second,
it's best done in a coalition framework, an international
framework. We have an opportunity in Iraq to do that.
The Chairman. Dr. Kemp, do you have anything to add?
Dr. Kemp. I have very little to add to what my two
colleagues have said, Mr. Chairman. I mean, I would just stress
that I think, you know, historically, the United States has not
wanted to set up a colonial service, so there are not
institutions that train civilians to go out and manage the rest
of the world, as some countries have done in the past; and that
part of the problem is that, you know, we have extraordinarily
effective military forces who can intervene anywhere in the
world unilaterally, without any support from anyone, apart from
forward logistic bases, but we do not have this backup
capability, which we now see is so essential. And yet other
countries do. Other countries have far more effective
constabulary forces than we do. They are much better suited for
peacekeeping, because they train for it for years.
And the question really is, Do we try to duplicate these
capabilities, ourselves, through building new institutions and
calling them nation-building or peacekeeping, whatever you
like, or do we cooperate? And that seems to me, Mr. Chairman,
that is the fundamental dilemma the United States faces at this
time. It is going to be a unilateral power that essentially
writes its rules and does what it likes, or are we going to
work with others? And if the latter is the case, as I think it
should be, then, indeed, there has to be an understanding that
the upcoming conflicts that we're going to face will have a
front end which we will deal with, because we have the strong
military; and the back end, that we're going to need enormous
support and help for. And, in that regard, I think working
closely with the NATO countries is a good place to start.
I would just conclude that I think what you're pointing out
reflects a deeper problem in the diminishing regional skills
that are now available to many of the institutions in the U.S.
Government. For instance, one of the complaints in the early
days of the occupation of Iraq has been the absence of Arabic
speakers. And if you talk to anyone in the intelligence agency,
much the same thing can be said there. This may have improved
since 9/11, but we clearly still have a long way to go.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
As the three witnesses know, your answer to the chairman's
last question has been a constant drumbeat by the chairman and
me and others in this committee for the last year. I would
offer two observations and then ask some specific questions.
One, I think this town is a reflection, Dr. Kemp, of what
hasn't happened. When the Berlin Wall came down, the
intellectual institutions that were erected over the past 40
years remained, and everyone was looking for a job, in effect.
I'm not being facetious when I say that. We had a whole lot of
Soviet experts, a whole lot of Eastern European experts, a lot
of arms-control experts, a lot of very brilliant people, who,
for 50 years, guided our policy. We did not have the focus of
the most significant minds in this country, in and out of
government, focusing on the region we're now talking about.
There were people who had expertise, but you didn't have entire
think tanks and institutions built around just dealing with
these issues we're now confronting. And it's taken time. I
remember--well, at any rate--so it's taken time. And I hope we
speed it up a little bit.
And Dr. Kemp's comment, that concluding comment, that we
have to--paraphrasing--we have to make a decision about whether
we're going to move unilaterally or not, and that we may be
able to unilaterally handle the front end, but the back end of
the process, we need help.
One of the things that I spent the last 12 months
apparently falling on deaf ears in the administration is, you
can't expect a back end if you don't have some discussion on
the front end. The idea that we can unilaterally decide where
we want to change the world and then, after the fact, go out to
the rest of the world and say, ``Now, by the way, you clean it
up with us, and you take on the major responsibility in doing
that,'' they may do it, because they have no choice because the
chaos that may be left if we don't do it and they're left with
it, but it sure would be a heck of a lot better had we had a
thing called diplomacy at the front end of this process, which
I think was sorely lacking.
Which leads me to a point I want to make for--well,
relative to the last hearing, this hearing, and future
hearings. Speaking only for myself, but I suspect the committee
may share a similar view, when we discuss with you, as we will
today and in the future, why we were so unprepared for the
post-Saddam period, it is not to assign blame. It is not to
say, ``Aha, I told you so. You didn't do what you were supposed
to do. You failed.'' That is not the purpose; at least it's not
my purpose.
The answer to that question as to why we were so woefully
unprepared--although there were some serious successes; the oil
fields are basically intact, people are not starving, there's
not major exoduses, there's not major flight, and there is not
major recriminations that are going on at the moment, so there
are genuine successes--but why were we so unprepared? The
answer to that question is important, not because we need to
assign blame, but to determine whether there is an ideological
impediment to this notion of nation-building that exists among
very important people in this administration.
The people who have been primarily in charge are very,
very, very, bright people, among the most informed and
brightest people I've dealt with in 30 years as Senator. It's
not that they could not have known what the Council recommended
in a number of its areas, including establishing stability and
the need for, on page 3 of your executive summary or on page 5
of the first report to the Council, of establishing law and
order. There's no one in this administration who could have
failed to understand that. They aren't tone deaf.
And what I'm trying to get at, the reason I keep pursuing
this, is--look at Afghanistan. I am not saying anything out of
school. Dr. Rice has said it publicly. When I would meet with
her once a week, back when I was the chairman, we were pushing,
many of us in this committee, for expanding the international
security force beyond Kabul so that there was something other
than that there was a prospect that Mr. Karzai would be
something other than the mayor of Kabul. We talked, in great
detail, about the need for all the aid to go through his hands,
so he had something to disseminate in Herat or something to
disseminate in other parts of the country, that there was some
reason for the warlords needing him.
I remember midway through this debate, after we lost the
debate, and the State Department lost the debate, on expanding
the ISAF and making it more muscular and so on, so forth, Dr.
Rice said, ``There is stability.'' I said, ``Yeah, Ishmael Khan
is in control of Herat.'' She said, ``Yes, there's stability.''
That was a definition of stability. That was the objective. And
then we're told that that country has never been able to be
controlled by a central government.
So what I'm trying to get at here--I want to make sure you
understand the context of my questions--is, I think there's a
great ideological divide here, among the neo-conservatives and
the rest of the administration and many of us, as to what is
doable and what is the objective. Because I can't, for the life
of me, believe that the leading lights in this administration
didn't understand the very things that the Council and each of
you have recommended, ahead of time, as to what were some
glaring deficiencies.
And so that's the context in which I ask the questions
here, is whether or not we're running up against a need for a
change in the predominant thinking of the administration in
order to get the job done, or whether or not there is a
consistency that we only need to tweak a little bit here.
Now, toward that end, let me go specifically to my
questions. The idea of the involvement of NATO, the EU, and the
United Nations--you've all mentioned them being involved, in
one way or another--can any of you be specific with me--other
than in State Department terms, which are bland, impressive,
and have little content terms--of telling me precisely what
role do you look for for NATO? Should NATO forces comprise 50
percent of the, quote, ``occupying forces''? Should they
comprise 75 percent? Should we be sharing, as we did in Bosnia,
having, in a military commander, who was an American, but
making up only 15 percent of--I mean, in Kosovo--making up only
15 percent of the forces? Are we talking about--have we already
met the goal of involving NATO because we've got the Poles and
the Brits there? I'm of the view this administration told me
that we already have NATO involved. So what do you mean by NATO
involvement?
The second question is, what kinds of--I think, again, Dr.
Kemp, you said--you all reflected the same thing that Dr. Kemp
said, which was that there is a need for there to be--this has
to be internationalized more. I assume you mean that in terms
of decisions on governance within Iraq. When I speak to our
interlocutors in France, Germany, even Great Britain, Spain,
Italy, they basically say, ``Look, you want us in on the deal.
We've got to have''--and I think it was your phrase, Dr. Kemp;
I may be mistaken--we're going to have to, in effect, yield
complete dominance on every decision of consequence that's
made. There has to be some input that they have.
And with regard to Iran--and I'll come back in a second
round, because I have some very--with regard to Iran--I had an
opportunity to spend some time with Dr. Kemp, and I've had some
time in the past with Ambassador Wisner, to talk about Iran--
there seems, to me, to be an absolute--and it goes back to this
ideological divide that I perceive that exists in the
administration--an absolute--put it another way----
I believe, if, tomorrow, the reformers prevailed in Iran
and established what we would call a democracy along the lines
of an Islamic state, like Turkey, that that new democratic
government would be unwilling to give up its nuclear capacity,
that it would be unwilling. There's no government I can
perceive in Iran that would voluntarily say, ``You know, we're
in a rough neighborhood here, and the idea of us having the
ability someday to have a nuclear capability is something we're
going to foreswear.''
And so any negotiation with Iran seems, to me--forces any
administration to come face to face with how do you--not
eliminate, but how do you constrain, control, and/or have total
transparency about any nuclear program? And that, to me, from
my discussions with leaders in this administration and in the
last administration, as well, a nonstarter. You cannot start
with that as being something that may end up being at the end
of the negotiation; therefore, no discussion.
So if you could speak to me about any of what I've raised,
and then I'll come back in a second round to pursue--because I
realize what I've asked you cannot be answered in a very
short--pick any piece of it to respond to. I'd appreciate it.
Dr. Kemp. I'll just respond on the nuclear Iran, and maybe
my colleagues will add on the other points.
Senator, this is a critical issue, because I think, first,
we have to be very clear what we mean by Iran's nuclear
program. I mean, at the moment--we'll know more on June 16,
when the IAEA Governors meet to decide whether or not Iran has
violated any of its NPT commitments--but there is an important
distinction between an Iranian nuclear program that includes
all the infrastructure for a full fuel cycle and an Iranian
nuclear weapon.
Senator Biden. Agreed. I meant an Iranian nuclear structure
not an Iranian nuclear weapon.
Dr. Kemp. Right. Well, my argument would be that if Iran
had turned into Turkey, we could live with an Iranian nuclear
infrastructure that was under IAEA safeguards, and Iran had
signed the additional protocol. I think that would be far less
dangerous, for instance, than the current situation we have in
Pakistan, where we have a government that is not under any
safeguards, that is ruled by a military dictator, who could be
overthrown at any time. So I would be more comfortable,
frankly, with a reformed Iran that still had a nuclear
potential, than a regime in Tehran that conducts terrorism and
has not signed the additional protocol.
But, clearly, how the United States thinks about putative
Iranian nuclear capability has to be a function of other things
the Iranian Government is doing in its foreign policy,
particularly terrorism and how it deals with Iraq and
Afghanistan. If they re-configured their foreign policy in a
way that was acceptable to us on those issues, I think we could
be more laid back about the nuclear-infrastructure issue.
Ambassador Wisner. Peter, forgive me, I'm jumping in right
here on the tail end of Geoff Kemp's remarks about Iran and the
nuclear issue.
I think perhaps I see it a bit differently. I agree with
Geoff that what we have before us is an extraordinarily
dangerous situation. The Iranians are developing capabilities
that could one day be weaponized. The question is, Will they
weaponize them, and what will deter them from weaponization?
At the heart of the matter, whether they see eye to eye
with us politically or they do not, or they change their
policies, this problem is going to continue to exist. I think
it's very important, therefore, to focus with the Iranians, in
dialog with the Iranians, on fixing the inspection regime,
increasing the safeguards, going to 93-plus-2, making it clear
that--understanding that we cannot live with a process that
goes to weaponization, that, in the context of progress on
other fronts, we will not be able to turn our back on--the
Iranians will continue to have a capability. But we're going to
live with ambiguity with the Iranians, whatever happens in the
end. And I think the best we can move for at the moment is to
intensify the internationalization, the safeguards, and
introduce 93-plus-2.
As to your first point, I would, frankly, welcome NATO
being, as early as possible, a player in the Iraq front,
starting with logistics and planning functions, moving to
command functions, increasing the numbers of forces, and would
associate with your wish in that regard. But let's not lose
sight of the fact that the objective is to put security in the
hands of Iraqis and to train and equip police and Iraqi
security forces.
Senator Biden. Let's not lose sight of the fact that in
every place we've tried to do that, it's taken years and years.
So anybody who thinks this is going to occur in 6 months or 8
months, I'm willing to bet my career that they're wrong.
Ambassador Wisner. At the rate we turn out Afghan
battalions, you're absolutely right.
Senator Biden. The rate we did it in Bosnia, the rate we
did it in Kosovo, the rate we did it anywhere, it is a very
tough deal.
Ambassador Wisner. True enough. At the same time, if we
don't start now and start with large numbers, we won't reach
the objective. International forces, in short, will not be the
final arbiter of Iraqi security.
The second point----
Senator Biden. On that point, though, let me--international
forces will not be the final arbiter. But can we get to the
final arbiter without international forces?
Ambassador Wisner. No, we have to----
Senator Biden. I mean, and internationalizing the force,
that's really the question now. That's the next piece here,
isn't it?
Ambassador Wisner. I'm fully in agreement. And, therefore,
the role that I briefly outlined for NATO makes a great deal of
sense.
The Chairman. Let me just interrupt you to try to get
perhaps to Senator Alexander before we have a break, in
fairness, so he can get into the situation, because he won't be
coming back.
Senator Alexander.
Senator Alexander. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Biden. I've thoroughly enjoyed the testimony. I just have one
area I want to explore a little bit that Mr. Galbraith got me
to thinking about, and Mr. Wisner, as well.
I want to talk about the Iraqi identity, if there is one.
It seems to me, Mr. Galbraith, that you've suggested that the
two principles that might unite the national identity of Iraq
are basically the principles that unite a university and its
president, which are, No. 1, get our share of the money; and,
two, leave us alone.
I mean, those would be the--and I'm not really being
facetious with that--that we talk about nation-building, and
all of you talked some about, you know, comparisons in history
to that. But we don't have much comparisons in history to this
kind of nation-building, as I think--at least not the ones we
usually think about.
We think about Germany. You mentioned Germany. You
mentioned Japan. You mentioned Korea. But all those are nations
who are nations because of the great principles or conditions
that usually create a nation, and those are almost always the
same. They begin with religion. They usually have to do with
ethnicity. They often have to do with a common language. Then
there are some cultural attitudes. Then there sometimes is a
common enemy. And when all those factors are in play, you have
a nation.
And so one says, ``I'm a German,'' or, ``I'm a Korean,''
or, ``I'm a Japanese.'' And what we forget, as Americans, is if
we move to Germany, we don't become German. If we move to
Japan, we don't become Japanese. If we move to Korea, we don't
become Korean.
And we look at the world in terms of people moving here.
And if a Korean or a Japanese or a German moves here, we expect
them to become Americans. And what makes them Americans? Well,
none of the things I just--not many of the things I just
suggested, because we come from many places, have many
different religions, started out with different languages, and
our ethnicity has really nothing to do with what it means to be
an American. In fact, we deny that it has anything to do with
it.
So in trying to apply our notion of what it means to be a
nation to Iraq, seems to me to be completely impossible, and we
should recognize that to start with. It wasn't a nation to
start with; it was just lines drawn in the sand around three
different kinds of people.
And Mr. Wisner then--after World War I, then Mr. Wisner
then began to state the principles that we might suggest to
them. Now, they're all great-sounding principles--you know,
free market, the--you know, I can think of the things that
unite us: liberty, equal opportunity, rule of law,
individualism, democracy, laissez faire--we might suggest all
that, but it would be as if the French were suggesting it to us
230 years ago.
So the question is, If we were going to--if someone were
going to write, ``We hold these truths to be self-evident,'' in
the new nation of Iraq, I mean, who would do it? Who is the
Washington and Jefferson and Madison? And then what would they
say? Would they say, ``We hold these truths to be self-evident.
Give us our share of the oil money and leave us alone in our
three sections''? Those are the truths. Is there anything else
that unites the Nation of Iraq--are there any principles? Are
there any cultural attitudes?--besides federalism and a share
of the oil money?
Ambassador Galbraith. Senator, I think you've really put
your finger on the central problem of Iraq. It is not a nation-
state, because it's not a single people, not a single nation.
The Arabs are part of a larger Arab community. The Kurds are,
in fact, part of a larger Kurdish community. And there are
other peoples there, as well.
If we were back in 1919 or 1923, I think we might wish to
reconsider the idea of creating Iraq. It has been basically a
failure for most of the people who live there for its entire
history, and this didn't just begin with Saddam Hussein.
But, unfortunately, we're not in 1923; we're in 2003. And
it would be very complicated, and possibly bloody, to redraw
the maps there or to break Iraq up into two, much less three,
states. It would have enormous regional repercussions.
Now, the fact is, it isn't much to hold a state together,
when the only reason to do it is to say that it would be very
messy if it broke up. And, having served in the former
Yugoslavia, I can tell you a lot about those complications.
So the truth is, there isn't much there, and that is why I
strongly recommend a political system that basically allows
each of Iraq's major ethnic and religious communities to have
almost complete self-government within a single internationally
recognized border. We should try to provide an incentive for
them to stick together, which is sharing some very large oil
revenues. Whether that lasts or not, I don't know. And if there
can be a peaceful divorce some point in the future, not in
2003, but in 2013, I don't think that that should necessarily
concern us very much.
I want to touch on one point that's so critical to this.
You talked about a number of things that are absent in Iraq,
like a common language. Islam is the predominant faith, but you
have the two different branches. There is no common ethnicity.
And the issue of the common enemy--well, if you are a Kurd, an
Iraqi Kurd, the main enemy that you have had for 90 years has
been the Iraqi army. And it is the Iraq army, not a foreign
army, that actually committed genocide against the Kurds--an
open and shut case of genocide. And the Iraqi Army engaged in
brutal repression of the Shi'ites.
So if we go in with a vision of nation-building, that we're
going to recreate in Iraq a multiethnic Iraqi state on the
American model, we are really doomed for failure. We should
understand this. Let's accept, for example, that the Kurds will
keep the self government they now have. Let's accept that they
would even retain their own military, at least for the time
being. Because what they worry about is not any foreign
country; it is that there will be a resurgent Baghdad that will
resume the repression to them. And, frankly, if you were in
their shoes, you would feel the same way.
Senator Alexander. What this all makes me think about is,
we correctly celebrate our diversity so much, which is a
magnificent strength of our country, that we tend to forget
that our greater accomplishment is defining a set of principles
and attitudes that creates one--you know, the ``e pluribus
unum'' idea. You know, it is a rare and very difficult thing.
And it seems to me that it would be misguided to try to impose
that idea upon a set of circumstances so dramatically different
than anything that exists here, and certainly for the
foreseeable future.
Ambassador Wisner. Senator, I'd have to agree with that. At
the same time, you don't want to be unnecessarily gloomy. Iraq
may be a new nation of 80 years standing, but it is a very
ancient culture, and the history of communities living side by
side is the more common, rather than communities divided. The
fact of Iraq's history is, it is true of much of the region. I
wouldn't, therefore, say that you cannot create a nation of
communities. But that ought to be the right objective.
At the same time, in setting your objective of allowing the
communities to coalesce, identify their leaders, bring those
leaders together, create the incentives that Peter has talked
about that will tie them together, I would argue that it is
really important to surround them in a framework of democratic
principles.
Now, lest one thinks those democratic principles are alien
to Iraqi culture, Iraqi political culture contains very strong
liberal principles. If you go through the recent experience,
even the dreadful years of Ba'ath rule, respect for women's
rights, women's participation, social objectives were all--have
always been in the forefront of Iraqi political thinking.
Now, I would only argue that you divide matters into two
time zones. One is to get a basic political structure in which
the communities live side by side. That's your first objective,
and that's the realistic first objective. But, second, to
create democratic principles that, over time--and I recall
Senator Biden's statement of ``squinting toward democracy''--
where maturing habits allow you to arrive at a greater set of
democracy. The way I would see it is two different timeframes.
Dr. Kemp. I'll defer, because I think my two colleagues
have answered the question very appropriately.
I would only add that, for a period for 32 years, Lebanon,
which is an equally diverse and complex society, actually did
form a national covenant, and the groups did work together.
But, unfortunately, in 1975, it all came tumbling down. So the
record in the region is not a good one of these societies
living together like this.
The Chairman. Let me intervene at this moment to say that
we do have the rollcall vote proceeding, and the committee will
stand in recess for about 10 minutes until Senators have had a
chance to vote, and then we will return for more questions.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The hearing is called to order again.
Let me ask a question about our public diplomacy in the
area. Each of you have touched upon this, in a way. The thought
has been that, obviously, progress must occur with the Israel-
Palestine question, and perhaps with other questions, for
people in the area, not only of Iraq, but the surrounding
nations, to have a better feeling about the United States,
about our objectives, about who we are and what we are doing.
Many people have been quoting a recent Pew Foundation report
indicating, country by country, the large percentages of people
in that region, but, likewise, in Europe and elsewhere, who
have a dislike for America, for our objectives, for us. Those
percentages appear to have increased during the problems of
hostilities in Iraq. Perhaps in the postwar period, why, things
will improve. They have in Australia, for example, and
anecdotally in some other countries.
Each of you are veterans of that area. What do we need to
do? And does it make a difference? In other words, is it
important that America be liked by more people so that they
have greater confidence? Or do we simply accept the fact, as
some have suggested, that we have tough things to do, difficult
jobs, and we believe we're on the right course of history; in
due course, people will catch up with us. What is your own
judgment about the importance of public diplomacy and public
opinion in Iraq and in the surrounding countries?
Ambassador Galbraith. Mr. Chairman, I think the first point
about public diplomacy is that it is the policies and the
results that matter most. I think, as you know--and I worked on
those issues for this committee--so often, we hear, ``If only
people understood us better.'' But I think the core of the
problem is that people do have an idea about what our policies
are, and they simply disagree with them. In this part of the
world, I think it's obvious that a genuine commitment to
solving the Palestine-Israel conflict, the restoration of Iraqi
sovereignty, a number of these steps will produce results.
I think there are some things that we can do, in the Iraqi
context, that will be very important. One of them is to really
get out the story--and, again, it's not telling a story; it is
just the facts--about what the Saddam Hussein regime was about.
I'm not sure that this should be done by the U.S. Government. I
think this is the perfect thing for an international
commission, like the Bassiouni Commission, which you'll recall
documented some of the crimes in Bosnia and was a precursor to
the International Criminal Tribunal. But that information
should be recorded, a record created, and the people
responsible for massive crimes should be identified. And doing
that will help make the case that what we did in Iraq was, in
fact, the right thing.
I think there's a larger point, which is that--and one that
Senator Biden, I think, was also alluding to--in the whole
process, I think it is important to have respect for the
opinions of others, even if we disagree with them. And I think
sometimes our officials need to realize that statements made
for domestic consumption have ramifications abroad. I'm sorry
to say I think we rubbed the salt unnecessarily in the wounds
with the Germans and the French. I don't think it served any
national interest. And I think this is true of some of the
comments that have been made about post war Iraq. The Iraqis,
for example, were constantly saying to me, ``Is the looting of
our museum your idea of a little bit of exuberance? Of
democracy?''
So we need to be careful in some of our statements, because
in this interconnected world, they have an audience beyond the
domestic one. These things are heard around the world.
The Chairman. Anyone else have a view on public diplomacy?
Ambassador Wisner. I'd perhaps add a couple of thoughts to
Peter's statement. I think that, in addition to the fact that
our policies will decide the framework of public opinion--some
people will like them; others will not; perfectly fair--I would
also argue that, as a core view of the success of the United
States over the past 50 years, I hold to the notion that we
have been successful because we appear to operate within
international norms. We appeared to try to legitimize our
efforts by going through the United Nations, involving
international instances, building coalitions. And while not
everybody agreed with what we were doing or what we stood for
on a given case, a given instance, the fact that the United
States attempted to subject itself to an international--a
framework of international norms, improved our policy. To take
the opposite view that our national interests will override an
international consensus, then I think we open ourselves to huge
doubts about the legitimacy of American efforts.
It does not mean that the United States shouldn't defend
its most essential interests--of course we should--but to, as a
general practice, try to accommodate the broader international
concerns.
The second comment I would make is that one of the reasons
we'll never be fully understood is that people approach
problems with different assumptions. And if you simply talk
about the conclusions, you won't--in the Arab world, there is a
deeply held assumption that the United States wishes to weaken
the Arab world. We weakened it most recently by invading Iraq.
We weaken it by undermining the oil industry. Whatever. There
are many assumptions about malign American purposes.
To come back to a point Geoff Kemp made, we've got to have
people who know those assumptions and, therefore, can engage in
the dialog. And that means a serious strengthening of our
information services.
In the U.S. Government, over the past 10, 15 years, we have
reduced the effectiveness--the numbers, the standing of
officers who are skilled in international communications and--
from a high point in the immediate postwar period to a low
point in the 1990s. I think, in a world in which we've
discovered is much hostility and even questioning of American
policies and purposes, part of the work this committee can
contribute to is to making certain our people speak Arabic,
know the culture of the region, but also are skilled in the
practice of understanding arguments, understanding assumptions,
and, therefore, being able to debate the conclusions on the
same ground that the arguments are being advanced.
Dr. Kemp. Mr. Chairman, I have just two points I'd like to
add to what my colleagues have said.
The Pew report that you cited is, of course,
extraordinarily troubling. But, you know, it's just the last of
many troubling opinion polls we've seen out of the region over
the last 10, 15 years.
There's a certain ambiguity here, because I think that both
that poll and what you actually see in the Middle East reflects
also another component that we should not, in any way,
minimize. That is to say that while public opinion is very,
very critical of the behavior of the U.S. Government, there are
still huge, long lines outside every American embassy in the
Middle East, of people trying to get visas to come to this
country. And so you have the anomaly of fortress America in
downtown Cairo, where Frank was, or out in the boondocks, as in
Kuwait. But, still, the people want to come here. So there's
this ambiguity about America and American policy.
And I think, on the policy issue, I'd just like to
reiterate what my colleague said, that, you know, like it or
not, the Palestine issue is a touchstone for how we are seen to
be handling the broader issue of the region. And it's obviously
not the case that this is the only problem to resolve, after
Iraq. But were we to succeed, were the President to succeed in
bringing about a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, this, I
think, would have enormous momentum for the good.
And, I must say, I was in Europe last week when the
President went to Sharm el-Sheikh and Aqaba, and it was
remarkable how impressed people were that he did seem, at last,
to be taking this burden on himself, rather than deferring to
Secretary Powell. And I think that if we get over this
immediate crisis we're in right now, and the administration
takes the plunge, then I think, ultimately, it could be the
best public diplomacy we could have, other than, of course, a
success in Baghdad.
The Chairman. Sort of doubling back to one of the purposes
of the hearing, at least anecdotally, observers of the
President's visit with the Arab leaders noted that, within the
Arab leadership group meeting with the President, there were
very great strains. Not everybody likes each other. As a matter
of fact, there are a number of problems that, leaving aside the
Israelis and Palestine, per evidence in the meeting, come back
to some of the things we're talking about today. What if some
degree of democracy--human rights, freedom--occurred in Iraq in
this area in which there are some elements of that elsewhere?
It's not totally devoid of those thoughts. At the same time, a
good number of regimes that do not manifest this, that
apparently have a lot of unhappy young people, in particular,
who feel really thwarted at every turn by what they feel are
elderly types, still abound. What does this mean, in terms of
the dynamics? Even as we are busy talking about the Arab world,
the fact is, this is made up, as all of you pointed out today.
There are very sophisticated situations in different countries
at different degrees of development.
Well, you argue as the devil's advocate that the Iranians
see Saddam as certainly a bad ruler, but, nevertheless, as one
who brought stability. It's much the view, for instance, of the
Chinese with regard to the North Korean regime. One reason to
provide a lot of fuel and food and not to withdraw them or use
that leverage is the fear that somehow the regime might
collapse and North Koreans might spill over into China, and
other bad things might occur. The evaluations are often made on
the basis of stability. That is, nothing happens. There's a
containment of the situation.
Now we've upset that. And, at least for the moment, it
would appear that something different is going to emerge in
Iraq that might offer hope, in the best instance, to the best
instincts we would hope of people who might seek freedom.
How do we then work with our old friends in Saudi Arabia,
in Egypt, to name two that are good friends, to understand
what's occurring before strange things happen in those
countries? As the power that can send people everywhere, can we
handle all of the problems that we are called upon to handle?
Do we face a new set of difficulties, not of our own making,
shall we say?
Ambassador Wisner. Senator, really extraordinarily
important questions. I was very troubled, as the debate took
place leading up to the war in Iraq, that somehow, as part of
our justifications and public dialog, there were arguments
being advanced that democracy could be forced down the throat
of Iraq by Americans. I didn't believe it then; I don't believe
it now.
I also don't believe that democracy can be exported, either
from this country to the rest of the Arab world, certainly not
under pressure, not to be seen to be coming out under pressure.
That said, Iraq does give us a terrific opportunity, if we
get it right, to build on some of the liberal traditions that
have existed in Iraq, to have a coalescence of the communities
where there are incentives that bring them together. All of
these will send powerful signals.
But the Arab world, much like the Muslim world, each
country sees its own dilemmas in its own ways. And people are
at various different ends of the world of evolution. A society
like Egypt is extremely sophisticated, has long experience with
political institutions. In the gulf, the experience is much
more recent, merging from tribal societies to modern societies
within one generation.
One must take into account, obviously, these regional
differences. But I believe what happens in Iraq will send a
very powerful signal, and working for the long-term success of
democracy in Iraq is the right American objective.
Second, that our own dialog, diplomatic dialog, with other
nations in the region, including two of the governments that I
believe are key pillars of America's presence in the region,
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, that we care and listen and watch how
they are evolving, how they're taking public opinion into
account. Very important.
I believe our explicit work has to be discrete, respectful,
and work to strengthen institutions in these societies in
Egypt, where you and I met on many occasions. The United States
can do a lot associating itself with the education, the press,
the judicial institutions.
Egypt is changing. All of the Middle East is changing. Our
objective should be to associate ourselves with change and to
not appear to be imposing the pace or content of change, but
nurturing it and furthering it along, and, at the same time,
creating the right image about the United States, addressing
issues that matter hugely to people in the Middle East. The
involvement in the peace process, as Geoff has just
underscored, is critical to our overall image and ability to
promote our thoughts about democratic institutions, a
democratic future, and free markets.
The Chairman. Ambassador Galbraith, I'd like to ask,
because you were in Baghdad, as you pointed out, fairly rapidly
after the military conflict ended. If a member of this
committee, or a delegation of Senators, were to go to Baghdad
tomorrow, what should we ask for? What would be the most useful
intervention on our part? Obviously, the intervention of
Senators in Baghdad, at this particular point, is an imposition
upon everybody. They're busy, and they have lots of things to
do. On the other hand, it is important for us to have some
better understanding and to raise the right questions or offer
the right comments of support. Can you offer any counsel or
advice to Senators of this committee who might be on such a
mission?
Ambassador Galbraith. Travel to Iraq would be extremely
useful for the Senators of this committee and, if I might add,
also the staff. The question is, what is it that you'll be able
to do once you get there? And if the kind of restrictions that
have existed on congressional travel remain, then I would have
some doubts about the wisdom of going from a substantive
perspective. With current restrictions, you could have photo
op, and a chance to cheer the troops, which is very important
to do, but it wouldn't give you a good sense of the scene in
Baghdad.
My sense of the security situation in Baghdad, during the
day, is that it is a place you can go around. And while I was
there, I traveled around without any protection, sometimes by
myself. I went into buildings, as they were being looted such
as the Foreign Ministry. Frankly, the looters were very
friendly.
They lit treaties to show me around, because it was dark.
There was no electricity.
Now, I'm not sure that a senatorial delegation could quite
do that, but I think one absolutely would have to insist upon
being able to get around. I think you should look at the
physical destruction and make some of your own decisions about
some of these issues that I've raised.
I would certainly want to talk to the political leadership,
the former exiles who have established offices there. It is
very interesting to see how people are actually holding court,
who's coming, and the kind of political dialog that's being
undertaken.
Ideally, I would urge you to see some other parts of the
country. I think it would be very useful to do what Senator
Biden and Senator Hagel did, and go up to Kurdistan and meet
with the parliament and get a sense of what is possible. Now,
they certainly have not created a perfect democracy, by any
means, but they have created, against enormous odds, a
pluralistic society, and they did actually manage to hold
completely fair elections. They had the unfortunate problem
that the elections produced a tie, and you know what happened
with a tie in this country; imagine if that happens in your
first election. And then I would also want to go to Karbala or
Najaf and talk to some of the clerics.
But it is my view that you could carry out such an
itinerary with a high degree of confidence in the security.
The Chairman. I thank you for those insights.
Let me note that the distinguished ranking member has just
returned, and I want to recognize him, as I've had the monopoly
of all of you for much more than my allotted 10 minutes.
Let me just comment to the ranking member, after you've
raised questions and answers, it would be my intent to adjourn
the hearing. I've had a good opportunity. I wanted to make
certain that you do, too.
Senator Biden. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I'm sorry I got--there is a dangerous no-man's land for
United States Senators, and that's between the floor and the
elevators, and I was importuned by a number of reporters on
matters that were beyond my competence to respond to, and the
more I told them I didn't know, the more they'd ask questions
and believed I knew something.
At any rate, if the chairman went to any of these issues,
please just let me know, and I will literally read the record.
With regard to the role of the United Nations, if you can,
in as specific terms as you can, had you Ambassador Bremer's
job right now, you're sitting in his spot, what would you
recommend, specifically to the President, about further U.N.
involvement, if you would? If you would. Anyone.
Ambassador Galbraith. My own preference would actually have
been to put all of this under a U.N. mandate. But beyond what
was in the resolution I think there are some discrete things
that the United Nations can do. The most important, in my view,
relates to the area of justice. This really requires
impartiality, and I think that is much more likely to come from
the United Nations or be seen as coming from the United
Nations.
Senator Biden. When you say ``justice,'' you mean a
judicial system?
Ambassador Galbraith. I mean two things. One of them is the
judicial system. So I would bring in the United Nations and
give them the task of vetting judges. In fact, I think,
basically, you have to get rid of all the old Iraqi judges.
They administered injustice for 35 years, and I don't think you
can credibly have a new beginning with people who have done
that.
The U.N. could undertake a process of identifying and
recruiting new judges. There are a lot of capable Iraqi
lawyers, so I think it is doable. I would also let the United
Nations do the documentation of the crimes that took place
under the Ba'ath regime. And, ideally I would have an
international criminal tribunal to try the leading culprits of
the old regime. I know that this administration is not keen on
such things, but it is such an open and shut case of massive
criminal conduct that we really ought to take it to the entire
world. We have a number of the senior leaders in custody and we
ought to try them in Iraq before a U.N.-mandated tribunal.
Incidentally, people complain about these trials as being
long and slow. Indeed I may be testifying later this month in
the Milosevic trial, which has gone on for more than a year.
The fact is that genocide is a very complicated crime, and it's
not like a discrete murder case. In a routine murder case you
may have a perpetrator, a victim, a handful of witnesses and
some gunpowder. In these international tribunals, you have to
prove the murder of hundreds of thousands of people. That is a
very big task, and it's no surprise that this takes a long
period of time. But I think it is important to do that, and
that is a role I would also assign to the United Nations.
There are other things that the United Nations is doing in
Iraq, in the development area and the humanitarian assistance.
Obviously, those kinds of activities should continue. And I
would urge the President and Ambassador Bremer, to take
advantage of the very special skills of Sergio Vieira de Mello.
It was the United States who wanted him in that job. He will be
very good at helping to forge a political consensus. This is
what he's done his entire career.
Senator Biden. Yes, let me stop--and I'm going to ask the
others to come in, too, but let me specifically ask you about
the last point.
``Forging a political consensus'' really means being part
of forging a new government in Iraq, an Iraqi Government. Now,
how does, in the present circumstance, a U.N. representative--
within the constraints of the resolution that he's operating
under now, how does he or any other U.N. personnel get involved
in that process?
One of the things that I have believed is--for a long
time--and I am happily disabused of the notion if it's
warranted that I be disabused of it--is that there are
conflicting, genuinely conflicting, interests here, on our
part. One is to get the heck out as quick as we can, in terms
of being the face of the Iraqi Government. And, two, is making
sure we don't move so fast that we end up leaving a government
in place that does not have any reasonable prospect of
developing into a quasi-democratic institution.
We have several models. We have the model we tried to
pursue in Bosnia, which you are extensively familiar with,
where, when we went to elections quickly, in my view, we
guaranteed that the most extreme nationalists of each of the
competing factions would become the representative of that
portion of the population. No time to develop any new or more
moderate blood, if you will.
We have an example in Kosovo, and we have an example in
Afghanistan, where the world community, under our leadership,
met in Germany with a group of Afghanis, somewhat boisterous
and somewhat contentious, but it resulted in a consensus pick
by the vast majority, at that moment, of the varying factions
within Afghanistan, of a single man, who was going to
transition to a pluralistic government, in time.
I don't know what the plan here is. I don't know what the
mechanism we're looking at here is. And so when you say to me
that we get the diplomatic skills and the negotiating skills of
a particularly talented diplomat assigned by the United Nations
to this process, how does he, or anyone else, get in the game?
Should he be sitting in the room with Bremer? Should they be
now talking about what is the outlying of--and the steps to be
taken to transition to an Iraqi control of Iraq? I mean, how
does this, in mechanical ways, happen?
Ambassador Galbraith. These are extremely good questions. I
think that Sergio Vieira de Mello probably should be playing a
supporting role to what Bremer is doing, and I think it's very
likely that that is what he is doing. In some instances, he
definitely should be in the room. In other instances, he ought
to be tag-teaming with Bremer, meeting with the different
Iraqis, helping in this process of trying to find a consensus.
You've touched on something that I should have talked about
which actually is terribly important, that is, What is the exit
strategy? My view of the process is, first to establish a
provisional government as quickly as possible--accepting your
point of, not wanting to do it too quickly and not wait too
long either--but establish a provisional government as quickly
as possible by some kind of loya-jirga process, which I think
actually worked rather well in Afghanistan, and then move to
elections. And here's another role, I think, for the United
Nations.
The United Nations has a lot of experience in conducting
elections in post-conflict situations and, I think, does it
extremely well. And, again, I think the result is likely to be
more widely accepted if done by the United Nations.
I think the analogy to Bosnia is not a good one----
Senator Biden. I'm not suggesting that any of these are
analogous.
Ambassador Galbraith. No, but----
Senator Biden. I'm just saying the----
Ambassador Galbraith [continuing]. But this is raised
continuously.
The problem in Bosnia was that--it was the product, as you
know, of a peace treaty in which the power, in November and
December 1995, still rested with Tudjman, Milosevic, and the
parties in Bosnia. NATO and the High Representative came in
and, over time, increased their power. And, in that context, I
agree that it probably would have been better for the elections
to have been delayed until more had been done including the
arrest of some of the war criminals.
This is a completely different situation. The coalition has
all the power, and is being blamed for the shortcomings, some
of which are areas where we could do better, and some of which
are inevitable. Turning this over to Iraqis in some kind of
coalition government does make sense, incidentally. The Iraqi's
are looking at a Bosnia type of model with a rotating
leadership in which the three top positions are held by a Kurd,
Shi'ite, and Sunni.
The one caveat I would have is that this provisional
government may have a rough time, and may become quite
unpopular. When the elections are held, the more extreme
elements, and particularly the religious parties, may campaign
against that government because it hasn't delivered. And even
if we had done everything right, it was not going to be able to
deliver. People have very unrealistic expectations in these
circumstances, but I don't know how you solve that problem. I
think the worst alternative is for the United States to
continue to govern Iraq.
Senator Biden. Gentlemen, would you each comment on that
for me?
Dr. Kemp. I have very little to add to what Peter said, and
it's not something I'm intimately familiar with. I would only
suggest that an area where perhaps an international hand, the
U.N. or otherwise, might be advisable at some point concerns,
you know, the central issue of the oil industry and who is
going to control it and how is the money going to flow, because
that is the issue that all the neighborhood is worried about,
and there are all these conspiracy theories that that was the
reason we went there. And, ultimately, how the oil wealth of
Iraq is distributed will make or break all these proposals for
federation or confederation.
So I would argue that some U.N. involvement in the
management of the financing and the oil industry is going to be
important to convince the donors we want to bring into Iraq
from around the world that this is an above-board operation and
that they have nothing to worry about and that there is
transparency.
Senator Biden. Ambassador Wisner.
Ambassador Wisner. Senator, I think the main points have
been made.
Let me go back to a remark of Peter's and focus on it for
just a moment. I think the starting point is to revise our
policy a bit. Of course the coalition is responsible right now
for re-establishing law and order, for setting in place the
essential feeding and infrastructure services, getting the oil
back up and running. But I'd like to think that it would become
the policy of the United States to shift the visible
responsibility toward the United Nations, and that means, at
the moment, that Sergio de Mello, who is a terrifically
capable, smart, man, would begin, in very close consultations
with Mr. Bremer, working through the steps that have to be
taken in the Iraqi political process and assuming a greater and
greater responsibility, to the point that when you move from an
advisory council to an interim government, from an interim
government to a constituent assembly, the U.N. umbrella over
the operation becomes more and more visible.
I argue that because a U.N. umbrella, a U.N. tone, will
bring, in fact, the practical advantages that Mr. Galbraith
talked about, the practical advantages of real experience. But,
more importantly, it legitimizes the political process in the
minds of Iraqis, in the eyes of Arabs, and around the world. It
allows the United States to play its role behind the scene.
We are going to have to be very careful in Iraq that the
wrong people don't emerge in the political process, people we
can't deal with, people who will subvert the very principles
that we believe in and went to war for. But it is better if we
exercise that veto behind the stage, rather than on stage.
Having the U.N. out front is exactly where we ought to be.
So I would argue, basic principle, begin to shift the
responsibility for the political development away from a
coalition and toward a U.N. responsibility.
Senator Biden. Well, my observation is there are only two
places in Iraq where there has been, over the last decade, an
ability for there to develop any political leadership. One has
been in the Kurdish-controlled areas, and Senator Hagel and I
spent some time up there. And it was remarkable, the progress
they made under the no-fly zone, with revenues, let alone the
number of hospitals, schools, et cetera--I mean, literally, the
quality of life--and the mosques and the religious leaders
within the mosques.
And so I don't know any other place in Iraq where you're
likely to find, in the near term, meaning months, indigenous
groups, individuals, or leadership, beginning to flourish or
show the ability to participate. And it seems to me that--well,
I shouldn't--that's my concern about how quickly we transition.
And the second concern is yours, Peter, that unless we
have, in the meantime, in my view, established stability,
order, security, gotten the major infrastructure up and running
and functioning, that whatever that transition--whatever
government you want to call it--when it comes time for
elections, is going to be the whipping boy for the more radical
elements within the country, establishing the very state that
Ambassador Wisner is, by implication, concerned about. We don't
want the wrong people, quote, unquote, end up running Iraq.
We'll not let that happen, and all that we will be viewed as is
having illegitimately dethroned the process that we were
essentially attempting to establish in the first place.
So it leads me to this question. We ought to be able to
walk and chew gum at the same time; I understand that; I'm not
suggesting that we can only do one thing at a time--but is the
most urgent need establishing order--safe streets, the ability
of people--I am told that Iraqi police officers will not show
up at their police stations on duty because they are fearful
that they will be killed on the way, that they will literally--
literally--there is such a lack of sense of safety on the
street that even those police officers that we're trying to
develop and bring back are reluctant to go on post.
And as part of that question, how important is it that we
produce the body? How important is it that Saddam Hussein be
determined, with certainty, to be dead or alive in captivity?
Because there is a stretch of a parallel, Peter. As long as
Kharijites, as long as those boys were wandering the
countryside, in Bosnia, in Srpska, the ability of actually
being able to get anything really done was, I think,
nonexistent.
I realize it's not the same. But if you read the press
accounts of folks on the ground in Iraq, like you were for 3
weeks, the ghost of Saddam Hussein seems to loom very large, in
terms of the chances people are willing to take to begin to
build this new Iraq. And you have Chalabi before your
organization, Frank, up in New York--I think it was in New
York; didn't he speak to the Council?--saying that he's sure
Saddam Hussein is not only alive and well, but that he is
orchestrating and paying for and coordinating these attacks on
American soldiers and the killings that are taking place. And,
if I'm not mistaken, I thought I heard him say, in an interview
yesterday, that he believed that Saddam had this plan in place
from the beginning, that it was not--there was a decided
decision not to resist, in any meaningful way, quote, the
invasion, because he couldn't, and so there was already this
plan--was made at the same time to be able to engage in,
essentially, guerrilla warfare once we were in occupation.
Now, I don't know if that's urban lore or whether it's
real, but how much of that is absorbed in Iraq by Iraqis as
fact? And how does it affect conduct or participation?
Ambassador Galbraith. Well, you raise a lot of issues.
First, I'd like to just come to the point you made about
the two sources of leadership. And you're completely right.
There are the Kurds, and there are the mosques. It was very
apparent to me, going to what was Saddam City, now al-Sadr City
and to Karbala, within a week of the U.S. takeover, that the
mosques had filled the gap. There were armed men on the streets
providing security in Karbala. They were picking up the
garbage. And they were restructuring the school curriculum.
The trouble is if we delay a long time in setting up a
provisional Iraqi government, will another leadership, an
alternative leadership, develop? I'm not sure that that's the
case. And there is the problem, if we go with our favorite
exiles, some of whom--they're talented people; they shouldn't
be belittled--and, incidentally, they stayed with this----
Senator Biden. I am not belittling them.
Ambassador Galbraith. But you've seen the kind of
suggestion that Chalabi is a Saville Row revolutionary. A lot
of these people took significant personal risks, and they
pursued a cause when it basically seemed hopeless. But there is
the question, if you install a provisional government in Iraq
will that strengthen a radical alternative? These concerns are
some of the reasons why, in fact, a federal system is very much
in our interest. If certain parts of Iraq become more
radicalized--such as the south--there will be other parts that
remain in the hands of secular moderates. Kurdistan is clearly
going to be a moderate, secular, very pro-American region. It's
probably the most pro-American place in the world.
On the question of the body, I think, there's a difference
between the Karadzic/Mladic case and the Saddam case. Karadzic
and Mladic were genuine heros to a real constituency in the
Bosnian Serb Republic and, indeed, in Serbia, itself. I think
Saddam is much more a discredited figure, and this comes to the
issue Senator Lugar had raised, I think in your absence, about
public diplomacy. This is another reason why it's so important
that we get the record out about this regime, on the killings
and the corruption--because I think that will serve to further
undermine Saddam's support.
Senator Biden. If I can refine my point slightly, I did not
believe, and do not believe, that Saddam Hussein has a
constituency. I think Saddam Hussein is mortally feared by all
constituencies. And so my question really was, absent producing
the body, and the urban lore that he's alive and well and
coordinating attacks, does that prevent people who disliked
him, hated him, or people who would otherwise be willing to
cooperate and prepare to transition to a new government, does
that keep them on the sidelines out of fear that the man's
coming back?
Ambassador Galbraith. I think the answer to that, largely,
is no. I think it has a limited scope in the so-called Sunni/
Arab triangle, you know, the Fallujah, Tikrit, Samarra, some of
the Sunni areas of Baghdad. But, other than that--and there are
plenty of people who are coming forward in those areas--but,
other than that, I think----
Senator Biden. OK.
Ambassador Galbraith [continuing]. People accept that he is
gone. That was clearly true in the initial period, as we were
advancing toward Baghdad, but I think a lot of that had to do
with what happened in 1991 and a sense that, ``The United
States, here it is, it's encouraging us Shi'ites to rebel
again. Will it let us down again with the horrific
consequences?'' I think people now understand that Saddam is
gone and that the U.S. is there.
Ambassador Wisner. Senator, your first question was, ``Is
law and order the overriding objective?'' I'd like to argue
that, bluntly, yes is the answer; but, ``yes, but.'' And that
is, law and order must be improved--adequate coalition forces
have got to be available, Iraqis brought into positions of
security responsibility, intelligence services, the rest--all
have to be near-term objectives for the coalition.
At the same time, adequate security is linked to politics.
To get a political framework in which the component parts of
Iraq feel that they are going to get a hearing and will be
responsible, will be consulted, will be contributing to the
future of their own country, gives the security forces
legitimacy. We cannot be the government and, therefore, moving
down the road as fast as circumstances permit to create a
political authority seems, to me, connected very directly to
the issue of law and order.
Second, on the----
Senator Biden. Was Bremer right in postponing the
commitment made by Garner about transitioning?
Ambassador Wisner. In my judgment, he was. But what bothers
me is that there now is not a view of where we go next and who
will be involved and what will be the rules of the road. So
we've ended one--we've talked about a short-term--ended one
formula, a short-term interim advisory council. But a point I
tried to make in my opening remarks, the issue of vision, of
where we're going, so that Iraqis understand what the rules
will be, that remains to be set out.
I would add, just quickly, on that point, I'm not totally
discouraged about the sources of leadership in Iraq. It's not
just Kurds and mosques. Iraq is a remarkable country. The depth
of education exceeded that virtually in any other Arab country.
There are substantial numbers of high-quality academics,
professionals, there are people who performed ably in the civil
service. And then there are the traditional elements of Iraqi
power, the tribal structures, not all of which are necessarily
corrupt--were necessarily fully corrupted by the Ba'ath regime.
In short, how you bring these constructive elements to the
table is part of the political process that I would like to see
the U.N. share in.
And I'd just add, as well, that if you talk, as I'm sure
Peter and Geoff have, to Iraqi Shi'a, there are many who say
they see the importance of dividing the mosque and the state,
and that there are intellectuals, businessmen, professionals
who are deeply devout, who could speak on behalf of the mosque,
but are not, themselves, clerics.
I think Iraq, properly consulted, brought forward
carefully, watching who is of real quality and has respect in
the community, could actually produce a leadership that would
do credit to it and to our efforts.
Dr. Kemp. I have very little to add, Senator Biden, except
to embellish your first point. I mean, I think we all said, in
different ways, at the beginning of this hearing, that we do
not want to repeat in Iraq what has happened in Afghanistan.
And, essentially, if, indeed, President Karzai is still the
mayor of Kabul, it is because there is not law and order
outside Kabul, and that, therefore, the security issue,
obviously, has to be the No. 1 priority. Without security, you
cannot rebuild infrastructure, and until you really rebuild
infrastructure, you can't regenerate the economy and get people
work and jobs and be more content.
The situation we do not want to be in is, months from now,
when--if Iraqis are asked, ``Were you better off 6 months ago
than you are today,'' and they answer in the positive, then we
will be in trouble, because if you read the press reports, if
you read an extraordinary report that the International Crisis
Group issued yesterday about the day-to-day conditions in
Baghdad as we enter these summer months, it really is, I think,
quite disturbing. And, therefore, I would say that has to be
Ambassador Bremer's No. 1 priority.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
I have many more questions, but I'll have many more
opportunities, and I won't trespass on your time anymore. Thank
you for very, very helpful testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
I join you in thanking our witnesses. Each of the papers
you presented were really very important contributions, and I
hope that they will have wider circulation than simply the
testimony for this committee today. We thank you for being so
forthcoming in your responses, and we look forward to seeing
you again--if not soon on this issue, on various other areas of
American foreign policy.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]