[Senate Hearing 108-353]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-353
IRAN: SECURITY THREATS AND U.S. POLICY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 28, 2003
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Armitage, Hon. Richard L., Deputy Secretary of State, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 6
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Response to an additional question for the record from
Senator Corzine............................................ 81
Cordesman, Dr. Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC. 53
Prepared statement........................................... 56
Einhorn, Hon. Robert J., senior adviser, International Security
Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, DC................................................. 64
Prepared statement........................................... 66
Hadian, Dr. Nasser, professor of Political Science, Tehran
University and Visiting Professor, Columbia University, New
York, NY....................................................... 38
Prepared statement........................................... 40
Luers, Hon. William H., president and CEO, United Nations
Association of the United States of America, New York, NY...... 28
Prepared statement........................................... 31
(iii)
IRAN: SECURITY THREATS AND U.S. POLICY
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TUESDAY, OCTOBER 28, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 10:23 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart
Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the
committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Brownback,
Alexander, Coleman, Biden, Feingold, Bill Nelson, and
Rockefeller.
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
Let me say at the outset that the committee looks forward
to hearing carefully and respectfully the testimony of each of
its witnesses. In furtherance of this goal, the chair will give
an opening statement, and I will call upon the distinguished
ranking member, Senator Biden, to give his statement. Then I
will ask Senator Biden to recess the committee for 10 minutes
so that members can vote at a time that is now designated at
about 10:35, as the Chair understands the vote. That way we
will all be reassembled to hear together Secretary Armitage's
testimony and hopefully have clear sailing after that point.
After I give my statement, I will depart and attempt to achieve
the voting process so that I can return and make certain that
we are able to truncate the recess as much as possible.
Today the committee is pleased to welcome Deputy Secretary
of State Richard Armitage to review United States policy toward
Iran. Secretary Armitage is a good friend of the committee and
we always look forward to our discussions with him.
Despite some signs of reform in recent years, Iran
continues to pose a serious regional and global security threat
through its active support for terrorism and its continued
efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction in direct
violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Today's hearing is especially timely given the agreement
reached last week by the Foreign Ministers of the United
Kingdom, Germany, France, and Iran. This agreement narrowly
complies with the October 31 deadline set by the International
Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, for Iran to fully disclose the
nature of its nuclear program. By agreeing to accept enhanced
United Nations inspections of its nuclear facilities and to
temporarily suspend its enrichment of uranium that could be
used to make nuclear weapons, Iran hopes to avoid international
sanctions.
The Europeans consider this a significant step toward
ensuring that Iran's nuclear program is benign. Although
Americans are hopeful that this agreement does represent
progress, we should not lose sight of the fact that Iran was
caught red-handed trying to build nuclear weapons through
several methods over a sustained period in violation of its
treaty obligations. After years of Iranian delay, deception,
and denial, this agreement should not lead us to a false sense
of security about the Iranian proliferation threat.
In fact, the head of Iran's National Security Council
reportedly told Reuters that the decision to suspend uranium
enrichment was temporary and would last only as long as the
Iranian leaders believe that it fits their purposes.
It is far from clear that the additional inspections to
which Iran has agreed will prevent Iran from obtaining a
nuclear capability, because they rely on Tehran telling the
truth. The international community must be prepared to take
more effective action.
When confronted with a case as blatant as Iran, the United
States and like-minded allies must use the Security Council of
the United Nations to demand that the violator cease all
illegal weapons activities, dismantle weapons-related
facilities, and submit to super inspections, even tougher than
those imposed on Iraq. Elements should include unfettered
freedom for inspectors, unsupervised interviews of nuclear
scientists and engineers out of the country with their
families, if necessary, and unrestrained aerial surveillance.
Iran may object that such intrusive inspections impinge on its
sovereignty, but this is the price Tehran should be paying to
convince outsiders that for once it is keeping its word under
the Nonproliferation Treaty. By demanding that Iran prove that
it is living up to the NPT, the Security Council would
strengthen that treaty.
Some will object that such strong action may force Iran's
ruling mullahs to walk out of the NPT. But keeping Iran in the
NPT should not be an end in itself. The treaty is useful only
to the extent that its provisions are enforced to prevent
states from acquiring nuclear weapons. If the international
community were persuaded to work together, we would have
substantial leverage over Iran. An Iranian withdrawal from the
NPT would halt the Russian reactor deal and cooperation with
other nuclear suppliers, expose Iran's naked nuclear ambitions
for all to see, and stiffen international resolve for tough
economic sanctions.
In the short run, our allies may be inclined to give Tehran
the benefit of the doubt, partly to avoid a confrontation and
partly to preserve commercial opportunities in Iran. But the
United States should begin laying the groundwork now for a
decisive international response to any additional violations.
Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons is not the only threat it
poses to international security. Iran is a major state sponsor
of terrorism. It continues to support Hezbollah in Lebanon and
to fund Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, who employ
violence and suicide bombers to frustrate the Arab-Israeli
peace process.
Iran remained neutral as the U.S. and coalition forces
removed Saddam Hussein from power. But Iran maintains close
ties with several Iraqi Shiite Islamic factions and appears to
be instigating these groups to undermine coalition efforts to
rebuild Iraq. In addition, Iran claims to have al-Qaeda
terrorists in custody. It is unclear, however, if Iran is
sheltering the terrorists, holding them as leverage to use in
dealings with the U.S., or pursuing another agenda.
The United States is also concerned by the political,
religious, and gender repression perpetrated by the ruling
clerics on their own people. These struggles were highlighted
when Shirin Ebadi, a courageous Iranian woman who has brought
world attention to Iran's human rights violations, received the
2003 Nobel Peace Prize.
President Bush has pursued a policy of containing Iran
while employing selective engagement, as has almost every
American administration for the last 2 decades. Within this
context of containment, the challenges before U.S. policymakers
are how we can change Iranian behavior in key areas, how U.S.
policy can take advantage of opportunities created by reformist
elements within Iranian society, and how we can generate more
support from our allies on issues pertaining to Iran. Our
response to these challenges will help shape the future of the
Middle East and will have significant impact on the outcome of
the global war on terrorism.
Mr. Secretary, we thank you for your participation in this
important hearing, and we are anxious to hear your assessments
in due course.
The committee is also pleased to be joined today by a
second panel of distinguished experts. With us will be
Ambassador William Luers, president of the U.N. Association;
Dr. Nasser Hadian of Tehran University, who is a visiting
professor at Columbia University; Dr. Anthony Cordesman, the
Arleigh A. Burke Chair for Strategy at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies; and Dr. Robert Einhorn, senior
adviser for the International Security Program also at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
We will welcome all of our witnesses during the course of
the hearing, but I call now upon the distinguished ranking
member, Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this
hearing. It is obviously important and extremely timely.
Secretary Armitage, it is a pleasure to have you here. I
always, I know, diminish your reputation when I tell people
that in all the years I have been here in the Senate, there is
no one who I have higher respect for because you always give us
the unvarnished facts as you know them, you say what you know,
you indicate what you do not know, and you are straightforward.
And this is a commodity that is very much desired here both
from the Congress, as well as from the administration.
Iran poses, to state the obvious, a vexing set of
challenges to our security. It also holds the possibility of
evolving in a more positive direction.
It is hard to argue about the geostrategic importance of a
country that shares a long border with Afghanistan, as well as
with Iraq, and sits in the heart of the oil-rich and
politically turbulent region of the world.
We have good reason to be suspicious about Iran. It
continues to actively support, as stated by the chairman,
Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It refuses
to surrender al-Qaeda members who are in custody. It has been
developing a nuclear weapons program, as well as long-range
missile capability, and because it is one of the few countries
with which we have no diplomatic ties and no regular dialog, we
have a tougher time understanding its intentions, a problem
made worse by the obvious internal disputes that are going on.
Yet over the last several years, the reform movement has
sought to alter Iran's policy. It has met with only limited
success because of the hard-line establishment that refuses to
follow the will of the Iranian people. Just this month, the
Nobel Committee, as mentioned earlier, awarded the Nobel Prize
to a courageous Iranian reformer who has been pushing for
democratic change, especially the rights of women and children,
within Iran. This has brought joy and hope to millions of her
fellow countrymen and has raised the question of whether or not
her view is one that is widely held and whether or not there is
any democratic prospect within Iran in light of the control
that seems to be exhibited by the Supreme Leader.
We do have a profound stake in the outcome of this internal
dispute, and we should have a policy of hard-nosed and hard-
headed engagement with Iran to do what we can to promote
positive policies in Iran without kidding ourselves about our
ability to profoundly affect the outcome.
When I was in the seat now occupied by the chairman, I
extended an invitation to meet anywhere, anytime with our
colleagues in the Iranian parliament, as did my colleague,
Senator Hagel. We were told that the offer itself generated the
most intense discussion internally regarding ties with the
United States and that the discussion got very heated.
Reformers in Iran welcomed the invitation while hard-liners
clearly felt threatened and condemned it loudly. I was pleased,
I might note for the record, that Dr. Rice, speaking for the
President, has consistently, repeatedly supported the idea of
this parliamentary dialog and engagement.
In a speech, when I issued that invitation, I recommended
five specific steps.
First, remove regulations that prevent private American
groups from supporting the struggling democratic movement in
Iran.
Second, discuss matters of possible mutual interest such as
Afghanistan and Iraq with Iran.
Third, allow Iran to join the World Trade Organization to
promote positive change.
And fourth, indirectly help Iran on refugees and narcotics
matters where we share common interests.
And fifth, encourage citizens exchange.
Certainly there is a great deal to discuss with Iran. The
Iranian reformers tell us that their interests in Iraq are
identical to ours and that the Iranians were one of first to
recognize the Governing Council in Iraq. Others in the Iran
establishment take a more pernicious view of our presence, and
the question is, should we test Iran to see whether it is
willing to promote stability in Iraq by engaging in
discussions?
In Afghanistan, we can see the same kind of ambivalence.
Iranians in the elective branch of the government worked
closely with our officials during and after our military
campaigns. Others directed their support not to the central
government but to friendly warlords. With the Taliban
regrouping and warlordism on the rise, it makes sense to have a
dialog, it seems to me, with Iran over matters related to
Afghanistan.
At the same time, we have to face the matters on which we
have fundamental disagreement, particularly terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction. Iran's continuing support for
terrorism will impede any improved relations, and its vagueness
about al-Qaeda and the suspects it is holding is downright
dangerous.
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom recently gained an
agreement, as was referenced earlier, from Iran to suspend
nuclear enrichment activities and to provide much more
transparency about its nuclear programs. I will not repeat, but
I concur with the chairman's call for very intense oversight by
the international community of this agreement. Of course,
Iran's pledges will have to be tested, and the chairman who
penned an op-ed piece last week in which he called for super
inspections I think is the way to go. But that is all
predicated on the idea that this Bush policy of containment,
which is not fundamentally different than previous
administrations--containment requires cooperation. Containment
requires cooperation with our allies for it to have any
prospect of bearing fruit.
So I look forward to hearing from you, Mr. Secretary, on
what our policy toward Iran's nuclear program is, what
diplomatic initiatives we have been working on with our allies
in Europe and Russia.
Mr. Chairman, there is much more to be said, but let me
conclude by saying that we do not have the luxury of ignoring
the very real challenges and opportunities that are presented
by Iran even as we find ourselves preoccupied with Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the Israeli-Palestinian situation, the war on
terrorism, and North Korea. That is a lot to have on your plate
when any one of those issues could be all-consuming.
Unfortunately, they are all interrelated and we ignore any one
of them at our peril. But if we handle Iran well, success there
could have a very beneficial spill-over to the other challenges
we face in the region.
Let me say in closing, Mr. Secretary, that the panel that
follows you is a group of very enlightened and informed people.
I hope they are going to be willing to explore with us what the
possibilities are. We have a tendency these days to be somewhat
cabined in our view about what we are willing to discuss and
what kind of chances we are willing to take. I hope we will
have an open discussion without anyone being fearful or
concerned that they may be a little bit too soft or not tough
enough in this era of us having to demonstrate our military
mettle.
There only seems to me to be three options.
One, there is an internal change within Iran that is
beneficial that we may, on the margins with others, be able to
help promote.
Two, we engage in an open dialog with the Iranians and
raise questions that we are generally reluctant to raise
publicly.
Third, we conclude that the only option to a misbehaving
Iran that becomes more radicalized is ultimate confrontation.
Although it does not seem to me to be all that complicated in
what our options are, it is incredibly complicated in what the
possibilities are.
So I am told by the chairman, since we are about to vote,
that I should recess the hearing now for roughly 10 to 15
minutes. Then we will come back and begin with the opening
statement by the Secretary.
Again, Mr. Secretary, it is an honor to have you here. We
look forward to your testimony and I want to thank the second
panel for being willing to devote their time. We are anxious to
hear from you as well.
We will recess now until the call of the chair, which I
expect will be within 10 to 15 minutes, depending on whether
the Senate votes goes off as scheduled.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. The committee is called to order again.
We will be joined by our colleagues, as they complete the
voting process. Senator Alexander has arrived with me, and so
at least the audience is two of us, Secretary Armitage, but we
promise more to come. We are grateful to you, as always, for
coming today and look forward to your testimony. Would you
please proceed?
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will not bore
you with lengthy testimony. With your permission, I will just
put it into the record.
The Chairman. Your full statement will be put in the
record.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you.
I just want to make a few comments. First of all, to echo
what Mr. Biden said in your absence. Your op-ed piece in the
L.A. Times was spot on as far as I can see. When Mr. Reagan
used to say about the Russians, ``trust but verify,'' this is
beyond that now. I think we ought to be skeptical and verify,
and that is the burden of your super inspections regime. I want
to tell you that we all took careful note of it.
I actually lived in Iran during a time which was considered
the good old days back during the Shah. I worked with the
Defense Department at the time. I was struck at the time with a
number of ironies or contradictions that existed in Iranian
society and with Iranians. As I was preparing for this
testimony just this morning, I was writing down some of these
ironies. I will just go through them because they just occurred
to me this morning.
The first is that I do not think you could find more
charming, hospitable people, individually, than Iranians, and
yet as a group, they can be unbelievably ethnocentric. It is
one of those ironies.
They had a revolution in 1979 which was brought about in
very large measure by women. And yet it is women who now suffer
the most under that very revolution from repressive practices.
You have a nation that is awash in natural resources, and
yet the official rate of unemployment is 16 percent, and we all
know it is much higher than that, particularly when you
consider under-employment. The poverty rate is 40 percent.
You have a nation which is the second largest in terms of
gas reserves, and yet they are a net importer of gas because
they cannot or will not make the necessary decisions regarding
infrastructure.
You have got a country which has a bit of a democratic
process, but the neck of that democratic process is being
throttled by unelected theocracies. This leads to an almost
unbelievable cynicism if you look at the turnout for the most
recent municipal elections which was about 30 percent.
You have got a country now which is speaking openly about
the problems in their own society, drug abuse, prostitution,
domestic violence, and yet still has those repressive policies
against women and denies basic human rights to many of their
citizens.
You have got a country which has been, I think, widely
known as the leading state supporter of terrorism and a
government which has a hunger for weapons of mass destruction.
And in that regard, they act as a--pardon the term--rogue
state. Yet it appears that it was fear of being seen in the
international community in rogue terms that actually made them
try to reach out in a recent visit of the three EU ministers
and try to come, at least verbally, to some sort of open
declaration about the length and breadth of their programs.
You have got a country that used to be called Persia, with
69 million people. Yet Persians are on the verge of becoming a
minority in their own country as Azeris and Turks and Kurds and
others increase their own percentage of the population.
Persians are now 51 percent. You have a country as old as time,
and yet of those 69 million people, about 70 percent of them
are under 30.
Finally, you have the most recent irony, and it was
referred to by you and by Senator Biden, a woman who thrived
under the monarchy, was imprisoned under the present regime,
and just recently was awarded the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize,
Shirin Ebadi. A woman who is now giving hope and sustenance, I
think, to the aspirations of the Iranian people.
So in sum, I very much appreciate the opportunity to be
here. This is a fascinating, troubled, and troubling country.
It is full of political and intellectual ferment and
schizophrenia.
So I am delighted to be here, sir. Thanks.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Armitage follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of
State, U.S. Department of State
Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, Members of the Committee, as always,
I welcome the opportunity to appear before this body to discuss the
foreign policy priorities and challenges of the day. I particularly
appreciate this opportunity to discuss Iran, given the high stakes of
this very fluid situation and the importance and influence of U.S.
policy on this matter. I look forward to a dialogue with you.
Iran is a country in the midst of a tremendous transformation, and
I believe American policy can affect the direction Iran will take. This
is a complex situation, but if you will allow a simplification: today
in Iran, there is a struggle between destructive elements of ban's
society and leadership, who want to keep the country mired in a
violent, corrupt, and insular past, and a forward-looking popular
movement, which wants a more engaged and modern Iran to emerge. The
fact that the Nobel Peace Prize was just awarded to an Iranian citizen
is no aberration; rather it is a sign of the sweeping desire for change
across Iranian society. Indeed, all Iranians stand to benefit from a
modern state, one that draws on the strengths of free minds and free
markets. American and international security and well being also stand
to benefit. United States policy is, therefore, to support the Iranian
people in their aspirations for a democratic, prosperous country that
is a trusted member of the international community.
Given the complexities of the situation, it is no surprise that
there is a range of views--including on this Committee--about how to
best implement that policy. That is entirely appropriate. Indeed, a
single, static, one-size-fits-all policy would not be appropriate in
the circumstances. In order to best protect and advance U.S. interests,
our policy needs to be flexible, dynamic, and multifaceted. That is why
the President and this Administration are pursuing a policy that weighs
the full range of options available to us, both through bilateral and
multilateral means. We seek to counter the government of Iran's
negative and destructive policies and actions, while encouraging
constructive policies and actions and engaging in a direct dialogue
with the Iranian people about the freedoms they want for their own
country.
As President Bush noted when talking about Iran last week, not
every policy issue needs to be dealt with by force. Secretary Powell
also noted last week that we do not seek conflict with Iran. We will
continue to pursue nonproliferation and other such control measures as
necessary and we must keep all available options on the table, given
the lack of clarity about Iran's future direction and ultimate
destination. At the same time, we are prepared to engage in limited
discussions with the government of Iran about areas of mutual interest,
as appropriate. We have not, however, entered into any broad dialogue
with the aim of normalizing relations.
There is no question that Iran is engaged in a number of
destructive policies and actions. Our most pressing concerns are Iran's
poor human rights record, nuclear weapons program, as well as chemical
and biological weapons programs, support for terrorism, and
interference in regional politics, particularly in the Arab-Israeli
peace process. These behaviors, along with the government's oppressive
and corrupt centralized economic policy, shake the confidence of the
international community and deny the Iranian people the quality of life
commensurate with the country's rich human and natural resources. These
behaviors also undermine regional stability and have ripple effects
across U.S. and international security. We are taking and will take the
necessary measures to protect U.S. interests.
Across the board, the United States is actively countering such
Iranian activities through a variety of tools, including sanctions,
interdiction, law enforcement, diplomacy, and international public
opinion. When necessary, we will act alone. The United States, for
example, has a broad array of sanctions on Iran. This includes
prohibitions on a range of exports and assistance, particularly to the
military and to the oil industry, strict regulations on economic
transactions, and targeted sanctions against specific entities in other
countries that aid Iran's weapons of mass destruction programs.
We believe, however, that international and multilateral
responses--if sustained--will be especially effective in meeting the
challenges Iran poses to regional stability, disarmament and
nonproliferation regimes, and the rights of its own citizens. As
President Bush said last week, we have confidence in the power of
patience and the collective voice of the international community to
resolve disputes peacefully.
We are working with the international community to effect change in
Iran's abysmal human rights record, for example. According to our own
documentation and to international organizations, the government of
Iran uses torture, excessive and lethal police force, and arbitrary
detention to repress free speech, freedom of association, and religious
freedom, among other abuses. We are actively seeking a resolution on
the human rights situation in Iran in the U.N. General Assembly's Third
Committee or at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.
We believe a united international front is especially critical in
dealing with Iran's clandestine nuclear weapons program, about which
there is widespread concern across the international community. We also
remain concerned about Iran's biological and chemical weapons and
ballistic missile programs. Our efforts to counter these programs
include bilateral discussions with allies and friends, such as
President Bush's meeting with Russian President Putin at Camp David,
where the two leaders agreed on the goal of an Iran free of nuclear
weapons. We consistently have urged our friends and allies to condition
any improvements in their bilateral or trade relations with Iran on
concrete, sustained, and verifiable changes in Iran's policies in this
and other areas of concern. We think it is appropriate, for instance,
that the European Union has conditioned progress in its Trade and
Cooperation Agreement with Iran on movement in these areas.
Our international efforts also include the use of innovative and
established multilateral tools. The Proliferation Security Initiative,
for example, is a new counterproliferation initiative to interdict
weapons of mass destruction-related shipments to and from states and
non-state actors of proliferation concern. The nations involved in this
initiative have singled out Iran and North Korea as countries of
particular concern. We are, of course, also working through the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve critical
international concerns about Iran's nuclear program.
Indeed, our close cooperation with Russia, the European Union, and
a host of other countries has led to two very strong IAEA Board of
Governors' resolutions on Iran. Last week, the French, German, and
British Foreign Ministers traveled to Iran in support of those
resolutions. As a result of that mission, Iran declared its intention
to sign an Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreement with the
IAEA, provide full cooperation to the IAEA, and temporarily suspend
uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities. We welcome this
progress, but as British Foreign Minister Straw said, ``the proof of
the value'' of the European agreement with Iran will depend ``above all
on the implementation of what has been agreed.'' We are waiting to see
if the information Tehran provided the IAEA last week will
substantively meet the IAEA Board of Governors' October 31st deadline
for coming clean on its nuclear program. Our consultations with our
allies on this matter are continuing.
We are also engaged in bilateral and multilateral efforts, from
sanctions to direct appeals, to put a stop to Iran's support for
terrorist organizations, which we believe includes al-Qaida. We believe
that elements of the Iranian regime have helped al-Qaida and Ansar al-
Islam transit and find safehaven in Iran, despite Iran's official
condemnation of these groups. Despite public statements that they would
cooperate with other countries, the Iranians have refused repeated
requests to turn over or share intelligence about all al-Qaida members
and leaders they claim to have in custody. As the President made clear
last week, Iran must change its course on this front; resolution of
this issue would be an important step in U.S.-Iranian relations and we
cannot move forward without this step. We will continue to press this
issue from the highest levels of our government, as well as to
encourage our friends and allies to press the Iranians.
In its support for terrorism, including by arming violent factions,
Iran is interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Iraq,
and especially in the fate of the Palestinian people. Indeed, Iran
continues to be the world's foremost state supporter of terrorism,
offering financial and logistical support to both Shia and Sunni
terrorist organizations, including Hizballah, Hamas, and Palestinian
Islamic Jihad. Through these abhorrent groups, Iran destabilizes the
region and tries to stymie any movement toward peaceful resolution of
the Middle East conflict.
On the other hand, Iran says it wants a stable, unified neighbor in
both Afghanistan and Iraq and despite significant unhelpful
interference, has taken a few steps in that direction. This includes
rhetorical support, by welcoming the end of the oppressive regime of
the Taliban, which exported drugs, violence, and millions of refugees
across the border into Iran. Iran also welcomed the formation of the
Iraqi Governing Council. The Iranians have backed up that rhetoric with
pledges of material support at both the Bonn and Madrid Donors'
Conferences and they continue to cooperate with regional counter-
narcotics and refugee repatriation efforts.
Although we make no conclusions about the nature of Iranian intent,
we have encouraged such constructive behavior by engaging in direct
dialogue on issues of mutual and immediate concern. This dialogue has
been limited in scope and produced some success in the Afghanistan
context. The last such meeting was canceled after the May 12 Riyadh
bombings, however, due to Iran's unwillingness to cooperate on the al-
Qaida issue. The Secretary made clear at the time that we canceled only
a meeting, not the process of discussing these issues with Iran. We are
prepared to meet again in the future, but only if that would serve U.S.
interests. Of course, we can remove any country from the list of state
supporters of terrorism if that country is prepared to take the
necessary steps. We are always prepared to respond if Iran changes its
ways, in particular ceasing its support for terrorism and abandoning
its weapons of mass destruction programs, by making corresponding
changes in our own policies.
An important aspect of ongoing U.S. efforts to influence the
direction of Iranian policy is encouraging the healthy development of
Iran's civil society. We see many signs that the people of Iran want a
different life and a more responsive government, and we believe we can
encourage such developments through direct engagement with the Iranian
public. An estimated 70 percent of the 68 million people in Iran are
under the age of 30, and they are far more concerned about Iran's
chronic unemployment than they are about Iran's past. Iranian displays
of sympathy after the September 11th attacks and polls showing
overwhelming desire for improved relations with the U.S. reflect strong
popular sentiment, as do demonstrations and elections in support of
reform. The government tries to blame any sign of dissent on outside
agitators, but it is clear that the agitation in Iran is a genuine
expression of a homegrown desire for change. Consider that thousands of
ordinary Iranians spontaneously flocked to the airport to greet Shim
Ebadi two weeks ago when she returned to Tehran after the announcement
of the award of the Nobel Peace Prize.
We believe we can encourage the triumph of public resolve by
engaging in direct communication with the people of Iran. We are doing
this through Radio Farda, which operates 24 hours a day, and Voice of
America (VOA) radio and television broadcasts into Iran. VOA has
recently instituted a daily Persian television news program to Iran, in
addition to its two weekly television feature programs. In May, the
State Department brought on line a Web site in Persian and we continue
to explore opportunities to incorporate Iran-related projects into our
broader Middle East Partnership Initiative. Our Education and Cultural
Affairs Bureau also supports cultural, educational, and professional
exchanges.
We know our message is getting through. An average of 3,000 people
already views our Persian Web site every day, for example. It is
challenging to come by concrete measures of the audience for our
television and radio programming inside Iran, but we do have evidence
of a broad consumer base. The United States has no direct diplomatic
presence in Iran, but we do have what we call a ``virtual embassy'' in
the surrounding nations and beyond. Foreign Service Officers talk to
Iranian citizens living and traveling across the region and around the
world, collecting and sharing with us their observations. Based on such
anecdotal evidence and on the direct contacts we get, particularly
through the Internet, we know we have an attentive audience in Iran.
I firmly believe that our strategy will succeed in helping to push
and pull Iran in the right direction, particularly with the close
cooperation of other nations. But it is not up to the United States to
choose Iran's future. Ultimately, I am most hopeful for that future
because it is the people of Iran themselves who are providing the key
impetus for change. Despite living under a regime that limits or denies
its people even basic human rights, Iranians are engaged in a very rich
and lively debate about the kind of society they want for themselves
and for their children. They have made it clear that they want
democratic and economic reform, accountability and transparency from
their government, an end to corruption, religious moderation, and
reintegration with the international community. The Iranian people
should know of our support for their aspirations, but also that the
full rewards of that support will only be realized once their
government ends its destructive external and internal policies. We look
forward to the day when the will of the people of Iran prevails.
The Chairman. Well, Secretary Armitage, you have touched
upon the population situation. You just said that 70 percent of
the population is under 30. Commentators in the United States
point out that many of the people under 30 are often
characterized as being dissatisfied with their living
conditions such as high unemployment, which is higher still
among those who are particularly young and who do not have a
foothold in the society. Yet, as you pointed out, the
democratic process has not proceeded very well. A 30 percent
voting rate indicates the degree of apathy or cynicism about
the situation. For most Americans, we wonder what gives. Many
people in the area who are apparently pro-democracy are polled
with very different reactions.
Contradictions, as you say, abound, but what is likely to
happen in this situation with this kind of population, this
kind of ferment, this desire for democracy, which thus just has
not worked out particularly well? And now we have international
scrutiny because of weapons of mass destruction. These young
people or other adherents for democracy see Europeans, not just
the United States, but also the United Nations, the weapons
inspectors coming in saying you are headed toward the
production of nuclear weapons, and the world does not like
that. How can you foresee the future given these circumstances?
Mr. Armitage. Well, my crystal ball is as muddy as yours,
Mr. Chairman. And I want to apply our standards to this. We
have not lived with that regime since 1979, and I am not sure I
am competent of understanding all the hopes and aspirations,
but I think there are some things we can say. Unless the regime
comes to grips with becoming more transparent, less corrupt,
and more open in terms of giving people a voice, over time
then, this will lead to gigantic dissatisfaction. But I do not
think we can put a time period on that.
Second, I agree with the characterization, if poll data is
to be believed, that people like the United States. I think
what they like about us is what they lack now, the openness of
our country. They like the ability to freely express their
minds on things that peoples in all societies I think, for the
most part, admire.
I would not say, however, they want to be like us. I think
it would be a mistake to say they want to be like us. This was
not the case during the ``good old days'' of the Shah. But we
do share some basic characteristics.
Finally, there are some questions out there that if there
were a different regime--that I think we need to come to grips
with. I do not know how quite to do it. It is something that
perhaps my colleagues here, who will follow me, who are much
more enlightened on these matters, can say. Even if you have a
different regime, I would ask two fundamental questions.
One, is would that bunch, even if democratically elected,
eschew forever weapons of mass destruction? I do not know the
answer to that because there is a sense of a sort of destiny in
what used to be Persia.
And the second question has to do with our ally Israel.
This is the thing that you do not hear very often. You hear bad
news, and we certainly know about the support of Hezbollah,
Hamas, PFLPGC, PIJ from Iran, but you do not hear generally the
so-called reformists talking in more moderate terms about the
right of Israel to exist. These are open questions even under a
different society, and I do not have the answer to them.
The Chairman. We, that is, the United States, have issues
with Iran with regard to weapons of mass destruction and with
regard to the state sponsorship of terrorism, by Hezbollah and
Hamas, for example. Now, as you suggest, perhaps even with a
democratic regime, perhaps even among the young people, they
would still want to produce weapons of mass destruction.
Where is the rest of the world in this situation? We have
had the European intervention, and so obviously they and the
IAEA have taken this seriously. But is the rest of the world as
concerned as the United States is about the weapons program or
about the state sponsorship of terrorism?
Even though we are sympathetic with the democracy that
might arise from the aspirations of the young people, as you
pointed out, at the end of the day, if you still have these
instruments of terror and weapons of mass destruction, this is
unacceptable in terms of the United States' security and a lot
of other people's security.
How are you coming along with diplomatic efforts with
European friends or with the people in the Middle East or with
others who might see a similar threat?
Mr. Armitage. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, on the question of
terrorism, I think we are the one who is leading the charge on
that without question. The closer and more involved you are to
the Middle East, the more concerned you are geographically. Our
European friends have become much more concerned about
terrorism and what can emanate from a state sponsor of the
same.
On the question of WMD, I am quite heartened for two
reasons. We had an interesting discussion and diplomatic
challenge going into the 12 September IAEA Board of Governors
meeting. There were those in the international community who
were more accepting of the word of Iran. I am proud that our
nation hung tough and ultimately got a unanimous verdict out of
the Board of Governors, which I think was a shocking signal to
the Iranians.
Moreover, recently during the trip of the three European
ministers, which we were involved in from the beginning--it was
their idea, but they were staying in very close touch with
Secretary Powell as they moved forward. There were some fears
on our side that perhaps, wanting to have a successful trip,
the ministers might settle for 80 percent rather than 100. But
we voiced those fears with our colleagues. They hung tough, and
they got at least what appears to be on the face of it a good
declaration, one that President Bush called a positive step in
the right direction.
Finally, right now in advance of a full understanding of
the over 200 pages of documents which the Iranians turned over,
we have got my colleague, Mr. Bolton, in Madrid working with
the Spanish. We have got some of the people who used to work
for Bob Einhorn out in Japan and other places trying to build a
coalition, a common understanding, as we approach the 20 and 21
November Board of Governors meeting, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, is it our intent to pursue the nuclear
question with the United Nations and the Security Council if
progress is not satisfactory?
Mr. Armitage. Well, this is one of those several
alternatives that--certainly if progress is not satisfactory,
that is right. But there are questions--you raised them in your
op-ed piece; we raised them in our internal discussions--about
noncompliance more generally. And there are many options that
we could have considered.
Clearly Iran has been in noncompliance. They should be
found that way. But whether you would take the noncompliance
and move them toward to the U.N. Security Council and possibly
sanctions or put them on probation or give them an ankle
bracelet, as they do to people under house arrest, those are
things that we have to consider and consider with our
colleagues in Europe and the nonaligned movement. I think it is
the most important thing, having gotten solidarity thus far, we
have to maintain it.
The Chairman. Now, how much solidarity are you and
Secretary Powell having with the Russians on this question?
This has been an open discussion for a long time. Where do
things stand now?
Mr. Armitage. President Bush and Mr. Putin had a very good
discussion at Camp David. The end result, that is, an Iran free
of nuclear weapons, is something that our Russian friends sign
up to. They are not as enamored of the tactics we use. They
have worked hard to try to make Bushehr more attractive, in
that they have made an apparent agreement with the Iranians
that they would provide the fuel and then take back the spent
fuel so there will not be the possibility of any sort of
reprocessing. That is a step in the right direction. But our
affection for Bushehr is still very much under control because
it seems to me the Iranians have a lot of work to do to prove
their bona fides in the NPT arena.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We will have 8 minutes in this round of questioning, and I
call now on Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you and, Mr. Secretary,
as always, welcome. I am sorry I missed your formal eloquence,
but I did peruse your statement.
The Chairman. It was fairly brief.
Senator Hagel. Was it? Well, then I am not sorry.
Mr. Armitage. But I will not subject you to it again, sir.
Senator Hagel. I wanted the full Armitage projection here.
But, nonetheless, I have lived with disappoints before and I
will have to just accept this, Mr. Secretary. Thank you.
Regime change in Iran. Is that our policy?
Mr. Armitage. No, sir.
Senator Hagel. What is our policy?
Mr. Armitage. Our policy is to try to eliminate the ability
of Iran to carry forward with disruptive policies such as the
development of WMD, such as the abandonment of human rights,
such as repression against minorities, such as religious
repression against the Baha'is and to try to get them to eschew
their state sponsorship of terrorism. In this regard, our
policy is to continue to support openly and publicly the
aspirations of the people of Iran for transparency, anti-
corruption, and democracy.
Senator Hagel. I noted in your written statement, which I
did have an opportunity to look at, you mentioned areas of
common interest where we need to pursue those. I know Secretary
Powell has said on various occasions the same thing and talked
a little bit about possibilities of dialog. And that is the
question. When, where could you envision some official dialog
beginning with Iran?
Mr. Armitage. Let me say that we have had some dialog,
generally under the U.N. auspices. Of course, we carry on a
continued exchange of information through the Swiss who are the
protecting power for us.
Certainly the three things that come to mind immediately
are continued efforts in Afghanistan where, to some extent, we
share some common interests. The second is obviously in Iraq
where, as we have seen--and I will be glad to go into it
later--they are somewhat schizophrenic about our activities.
And third, one that we I think share an almost absolute
commonality of views, is on the question of narcotics. They
have a large and growing product. They are the transportation
route from Afghanistan, or one of them, up through to Central
Europe, and it is something that at the proper time, when we
feel it is in our interests, we could engage them.
Senator Hagel. How would you envision that might happen? I
know we have had, as you noted, some dialog through a U.N.
third party, the Swiss, other approaches, vehicles. And you
might even frame this up a little bit, Mr. Secretary, in recent
experiences we have had with North Korea, how this might
develop or is it worthy of pursuit with Iran?
Mr. Armitage. I think this is an unsatisfactory answer, Mr.
Hagel. I think it is probably something that will be decided at
the time and the place, certainly in consultation with the
President. He is going to want to be involved in this decision.
I think initially my own view is that it should be somewhat
multilateral. We have, I think, recently found the
effectiveness of that approach, and I think we would continue
that at some point in time. We should deal with them, but that
is a decision the Secretary and the President will make. I was
trying to make the point in my opening statement that we are
not opposed to that. We are not saying no. We realize that
there are areas in which our interests can be served by dialog.
Senator Hagel. You mentioned Afghanistan, Iraq, obviously
common interests there, not always parallel or the same as
defined by each of those countries and by us, the United
States. How would you rate the Iranian behavior, cooperation,
intentions, motives today versus earlier in cooperating with
the United States in Afghanistan and in Iraq? Are they
undermining our efforts? Are they playing different tracks?
There was significant evidence early on regarding Afghanistan
that they were helpful. So if you could elaborate on those two
areas. Thank you.
Mr. Armitage. Yes, sir. On Iraq, it is a mixed picture. On
the plus side of the ledger I think would be the almost
immediate acknowledgement and welcoming of the Governing
Council of Iraq. They have good relations with many of them.
Twelve, of course, of the Governing Council are Shia. They
pledged money in Madrid. It is a little confusing how much
because it looks like a bit of tax credits for their
businessmen and maybe some swaps in Iraq, but that is not a bad
thing.
They share with us one absolute common view; they do not
want a bordering state to be one of Sunni extremism. And that
is one that we absolutely share as well.
They have done some other positive things at our urging.
They dismantled some Iranian guard posts, for lack of a better
term, that were on the Iraqi side of the border and moved them
back to Iran.
On the negative side of things, they continue to have some
of their intelligence officers and others come across the
border from Iran into Iraq. We believe that they are intent on
liaising with their own favorite Shia group, the SCIRI, and
they have activities with the Badr Corps, which we frown upon.
Ambassador Bremer from time to time has publicly called for
Iran to cease and desist that type of activity. So it is very
mixed there.
In Afghanistan, it is also quite mixed. On the question of
narcotics, they are dead-on with us. They are suffering a lot,
and they share that view. They did almost immediately, in the
wake of our attack, disavow the Taliban, and at that time they
disavowed al-Qaeda. But we have seen over time that al-Qaeda
has been able to weasel their way back in a bit with the
Iranians for reasons best known only to the Iranians.
The question of the Iranian interference in Harat is a real
one, and the jury is still out on that. I know it is of some
concern to Mr. Karzai and his colleagues.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Have we thought through in any long range scenarios,
strategies the development of regional institutions, the
President's Middle East Partnership Initiative, things where we
could bring Iran into those regional institutions, economic
development, for example, and other common interests that we
could work off of? Have we gotten to that stage? Do you believe
we will get to that stage?
Mr. Armitage. Senator Hagel, I do not think we are at that
stage because you used the term ``long range'' and at least the
way I have lived for the past 3 years, that is about 4 days.
I must say those who want to be in these jobs have the time
to figure out the long range.
But we do have exchange programs, small ones, with Iran. We
do allow students--about 300 of them last year--to come here.
We issued about 7,000 visas last year, some work-related, some
family related, to come here. We do intend to use MEPI on
discrete projects, and we do broadcast quite a bit both via VOA
with TV and radio, and we have got Radio Farda, which is 24
hours a day.
We are quite proud in the Department of State that we have
a Persian Web site. It gets about 3,000 hits a day. Now, that
is not the end of the world, but it is not bad. That is 3,000
people who are interested in what we are having to say. And we
are not propagandizing. We are just putting out what the
President says or what you say at this hearing, those kind of
things, without any editorial comment. And people are getting a
view that there is a lot going on in the world.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Secretary Armitage.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Chafee. Mohammed Ali famously said, when he refused
induction, ``I ain't got a gripe with the Vietcong.''
Here as we analyze what is our gripe with Iran, you say we
seek to counter the Government of Iran's negative and
destructive policies and actions and then later articulate
those destructive policies and actions as human rights record,
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, also interference in
the Arab-Israeli peace process. So obviously this is very
important to our relationship with Iran.
Can you tell us where we are in the Arab-Israeli peace
process?
Mr. Armitage. We have nothing in front of us but the Road
Map. But I think anybody would have to acknowledge that is a
very rutted and bumpy map at present. We are waiting for the
government of Abu Ala to be totally formed. I do not know if it
will be. November 3 is the date it has to be done. Until that
happens and until Mr. Arafat empowers that government to
actually move meaningfully in the security area, then I do not
think we have much reason for optimism.
We stay involved. We have John Wolf's colleagues. Mr. Wolf
is back here consulting with us, but his colleagues are still
active and present for duty, hoping that things will get a
little better. We continue our discussions with the quartet.
This is of enormous interest not only to our President but
also, of course, to our friends in Europe.
Senator Chafee. From the Iranian point of view, obviously
they would be concerned. Nothing is happening. We have no
involvement from what you just said. Ambassador Wolf is not
there. Meanwhile in today's news Prime Minister Sharon is
OK'ing the provision of services to some illegal outposts, a
new break. The Palestinians are naturally objecting
vociferously that this is a break in the Road Map process. Do
we have a position on today's news and what Prime Minister
Sharon is doing? Are we involved at all?
Mr. Armitage. Yes, we are involved in fairly intense
discussions with Israel, with the Prime Minister and his
colleagues, both with the Secretary, who is in very often
contact with his Foreign Minister colleague, as well as Dr.
Condoleeza Rice, who is involved, as you would know, with her
counterparts and colleagues.
We find some of these activities, such as provision of
services to outposts and the development of the so-called
fence, to be very problematic, and it is making it somewhat
more difficult. Having said that, Israel in 2\1/2\ years of
living frightened, and the very real specter of deaths and
horrible maimings of women and children, I think it is
understandable why they are so neuralgic on the issue. If it
were easy, it would have been solved quite a while ago.
If I might, I do not want to leave you with a
misimpression. I think of Iran not only as a present supporter
of terrorism--on the 23rd of October we passed something that
meant a lot to me and that was the Beirut bombing, the Marine
barracks bombing of 1983. People often forget. There are also
embassy bombings that Imad Mugniyah, sponsored by Iran, was
involved in. There are sanctions. There are prices to pay for
that kind of behavior in my view, sir.
Senator Chafee. Yes, I agree with you and I think it would
be naive for anyone to think it would be easy. Of course, not.
It is not going to be easy. The perception I think here and in
the Arab world--and it is not tangential. We are having a
hearing on Iran security. I think it is important. As you say
in your written statement, these are the gripes that we have
with the Iranian Government. They are interfering with the
peace process. But when you look at it from their point of
view, the peace process is disintegrating, and even from your
testimony here, Condoleeza Rice may be over there talking,
Ambassador Wolf's people are there. He is not even in the
region. He is our point person for the Road Map. He is not even
there, and I do not believe that there are any plans to send
him back. It is disintegrating and it is relevant to what is
happening in Iran and the region, Iraq also.
Mr. Armitage. You know, sir, just a technical
clarification. Mr. Wolf is head of the monitoring mission. He
is not the point person for the Road Map, but that is, for
better or worse, Secretary Powell.
I am not sure I understood the thrust of your question. If
the Iranians do not see any motion either--it is the Iranians
who are disrupting through terrorism the ability to have a
meaningful dialog between a government, the Palestinian
Authority, and the Israelis. So if they would cease their
support for Hezbollah who lobbed 60 or 70 mortar rounds in
yesterday, Hamas, PIJ, and PFLPGC, I think that you would
immediately see that a relative quiet would descend on the area
and perhaps we could have the dialog. At least those who are so
keen to have movement toward the Palestinians would then have a
much better leg on which to argue their point of view.
Senator Chafee. I would not dispute what you said about our
abhorrence of some of what is happening on the other side. But
meanwhile, nothing is happening, they might argue, on the side
of Israeli agreements to the Road Map. That is my question to
you. What is happening? What are we doing on that side? From
what I have heard so far, absolutely nothing.
Mr. Armitage. I would respectfully dispute the ``nothing.''
But I think, as I have said, we have had some problematic
actions by the Government of Israel in the wake of no action
and no ability to have the Palestinian Authority unleashed, the
security forces unleashed against those who would conduct
terror.
Senator Chafee. One last question. Is the administration in
favor of a Palestinian state?
Mr. Armitage. Yes, sir. But if I may, it is a state living
side by side in peace and security with Israel. So we are in
favor, but there are some obligations for that Palestinian
state as well.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Chafee.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary, Iran is a hard nut and we have a whole lot
on our plate with Iran. My observation has been that sometimes
the policy of states takes a lot longer to adjust to changes
that have taken place around them than, when viewed from
hindsight, it should have taken.
We have somewhat limited options relative to Iran, although
the options are real and at least one of which is very lethal.
So one of the things that I have been trying to discern is
how much of, in an international sense, the antisocial behavior
of the Iranian Government is the consequence of their feeling
isolated, and from a purely self-interest point of view, the
conclusion is reached that they have to do certain things.
For example, I can remember--I hate to admit it. I was here
when the Shah was there--from the Shah on, Iran has been
seeking nuclear weapons. The idea that the continued pursuit of
nuclear weapons--and I am not saying you are suggesting this--
is part of an extremist Shia Muslim clerical leadership that
somehow is different than has been the instinct of every
government that I have been aware of since I got here in 1973
is somewhat misleading. Now, they may have different designs on
the reasons why they want a nuclear capability.
And one of the things we do not often examine, at least out
loud, is whether or not there is any potential for a grand
security bargain with the Iranians that might serve their
purposes as well as ours. When I say ``their,'' that is even
problematic. Who is ``they''? Because there is this internal
dispute. But one thing everybody seems pretty well set on, from
the ``democratic'' reformers to the ayatollahs, is the desire
for Iran to have weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear
weapons.
So I am wondering. I do not expect a specific answer but a
generic answer. Are there folks at State and Defense, the
National Security Agency that have examined this in the overall
context of U.S.-Iranian relations as opposed to specifically
their initiatives on weapons of mass destruction, their
initiatives with regard to terrorist organizations, their
initiatives with regard to Iraq, Afghanistan, et cetera?
Because if you were sitting in Tehran, whether you are a
democratic reformer or you are the supreme leader, for whom
democracy is antithetical to everything that you believe, there
are certain imperatives. They are at the moment surrounded by
forces that seem somewhat hostile to them. Our assertions have
been very straightforward about the threat we think they pose
to the region and to us. I am not suggesting that justifies any
of their actions.
I am just trying to figure out what are the broad policy
prescriptions that have been debated internally within the
administration other than what seems to be essentially one of
two options: Their first option is to contain them, but
containment only works if we have really wide international
support for that containment. Obviously, the Europeans have
concluded that it is better to take a shot at trusting but
verifying, to use Reagan's phrase, and we will see how tough
that verification is. And in this setting I do not quite
understand what containment, absent their support, gets us.
On the other side of the equation, we always have the
option of the hammer, which is what we did in Iraq, which I
think would probably not generate a lot of U.S. public support
right now.
So what are some of the other dynamics that are in play
internally about--what are some of the big questions you guys
are raising? I am not even looking for the answers. I want to
get a sense as to how you are trying to get your arms around
the problem. And I should say, I do not think a single one of
us up here would suggest, if we were making the decision, we
would know with any degree of certainty exactly how to proceed
either. But I am trying to get a sense of what the nature of
the debate is internally and what questions are being raised.
Mr. Armitage. The nature of the debate, if I may--that is a
great question. I think you have to take each of the elements
separately, first of all. Then you come back to them.
On the question of WMD, I think many of us are informed.
Personally from my own experience, I served in Iran during the
time of the Shah when you were first coming up here, sir, or
right after that. Even at that time, as you correctly point
out, not only were they aspiring to have a nuclear weapon, but
they were trying to have an overwhelming conventional
capability. And they were not surrounded by threats. They were
not. The Russians were working in the north. They were not
surrounded by threats to their society. I believe that many us
feel that there is sort of an innate grandeur still in the
dreams of Persepalis and all of that. So that informs part of
the debate. So the WMD question might be harder than it seems
because it might be more broad in their society.
Now, the question of terrorism is not. This is very, I
believe, sui generis to post-revolution. At the time I think
the Iranian revolutionaries started on this in Lebanon and
through Syria. The Quds force and the IRGC have just gained in
power. In a way they are almost on automatic pilot and very
detrimental. But that is not innate, I think, to Iran or to
Persian society.
Then there is the question of human rights, which is very
interesting, because at the time of the Shah when many people
would say it was the golden era, there was something called
SAVAK. And it would be a very rare Senator, indeed, at the time
who did not vociferously criticize the activities and the
violations of human rights of SAVAK. So those are kind of the
questions we wrestle with.
We find that there is nothing inherently contradictory
about Shia Islam and democracy, and that appears to be what the
Nobel Prize winner is saying as well. So that also informs the
debate. So that is where we are coming from.
The idea of a grand bargain I do not think that is on yet
because I think each one of these questions is answered in a
different way.
Senator Biden. Well, my time is up.
I begin to question how much of their support of terror
relates to keeping us off balance in Iraq and Afghanistan and
the region and how much of it relates to not wanting to see the
emergence of a peace agreement in Israel and an Israeli state
that is secure. But I will come back to that later, if we have
time.
I thank you for engaging that question.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Brownback.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Mr. Armitage, really for your wisdom and your insightfulness
and your great knowledge over years of service. It is quite
instructive. Your answers really give us a lot of history and a
lot of knowledge.
I also want to congratulate you. The President had a great
trip into Asia last week on the issues dealing with North Korea
and building that broad coalition on issues of proliferation.
Hats off. That is a tough issue to pull together, and you guys
really seem like you are getting it moving in nice fashion.
I would say, maybe contrary to some others, on Israel it
looks to me like you are doing what you can in a very difficult
situation where you have heightened terrorist attacks taking
place on the people of Israel that really seek to live in peace
in the region. That is just a very difficult situation.
I am not sure if this model of land for peace that we have
been on now for 10-15 years is the right model to move us
toward peace, but that is a discussion for another day.
I also want to congratulate you on the Sudan, what is
taking place there, where you are very close, it appears, to be
to getting peace on a war that has taken a couple million lives
and has been going on for more than 10 years, and where you
have got religious factions in each area, where you are pretty
close to getting that done, which would be a remarkable thing
in the region and in the world. So you have got a number of
things taking place.
On Iran, I have tracked the Iranian activity on terrorist
activity for the period of time I have been in the Senate,
traveled throughout the Central Asia mid 1990s, late 1990s. The
Iranians were very active in spreading terrorist cells up in
that region at that time and continue to be. I would go into a
number of countries coming out from the former Soviet Union
that had a significant Islamic population, if not majority, and
they were citing to the Iranians and the Saudis as planting
community centers, mosques there, which were fine by them, but
then out of that would come a radical element that would be
organized. They have been at this for some period of time and
continue to be.
There are a number of Iranian democracy advocates in this
country and around the world. I have worked with a good portion
of them. They would note very clearly to you Iran is not a
democracy. You have got a ruling Guardian Council that all the
candidates have to go through. You have, in essence, a
religious ruler over the country. They support a referendum on
Iranian governance and what is taking place within the Iranian
society, and you are hearing more and more calls for that
within Iranian society.
I would hope that we could support as well that call for a
referendum within the Iranian society and note clearly Iran is
not a democracy. We believe in democracy and human rights. I
would hope you could speak to that on the support for a
referendum internally by the Iranian people on the future of
Iranian governance.
Mr. Armitage. Like I think most Americans, and certainly
all of my colleagues at the Department of State, we were
mesmerized by the vision of Shirin Ebadi receiving the Nobel
Prize. We were fascinated by the spontaneity of the
demonstration that greeted her when she returned to Iran.
But I was even more interested in what she had to say. What
she had to say about developments in Iran and democracy--and I
am paraphrasing. I cannot do it with the eloquence--was
basically that if we are going to have meaningful change, it
has to come from within. I think she is on to something. It has
to be something the majority of the people who live under the
system embrace and see as a better way forward for them. If it
is a referendum, then that is fine. But I am not able from the
outside to determine what the proper path exactly is to
transparency, elimination of corruption, whether it is
political corruption or fiscal corruption, et cetera.
I think our best path and our best policy is to be very
forthright in our views about transparency and governance and
human rights, et cetera, not to propagandize, but put out the
information, put it out, put it out constantly because we are
finding, from what I think I called in my testimony virtual
embassies, Iranians who travel around coming in and telling us
they are getting the message. They are hearing it. Rather than
trying to pick winners or losers in this, I do not think that
is something we can do very well from the outside. But I think
our duty, as well as our right, is to put the facts on the
table and call things as we see them about the need for
civilized behavior in the world, et cetera.
But whether it is a referendum or not, I think if that is
what the majority of people want, I am all for it. But I do not
know where they are in their own development. We know there is
intellectual and political ferment. There has not been, other
than those student demonstrations of the summer which were so
horribly and brutally put down, a sort of political activism
yet. I think they have got to come a ways internally before we
will know which direction they want to go.
Senator Brownback. We do know that Iran is a lead sponsor
of terrorism.
Mr. Armitage. The leading.
Senator Brownback. The leading sponsor of terrorism. And
you note, which I found interesting, that that is an aberration
from historical Iranian Persian society. So that is really with
the mullahs that they have decided to go this route. That is
something we find abhorrent and just stand completely against.
Mr. Armitage. Yes, sir.
Senator Brownback. I would also note there is a number of
outside Iranians broadcasting inside and into Iran that are
having their signals jammed at times. I hope the State
Department and our governmental apparatus are working with them
to try to stop the places where that signal is getting jammed
and help them because it strikes me that one of the key things
we can and should provide is information, and that information
helps provide an organizational flow internally in Iran where
they cannot communicate.
I have seen and heard of some of these operations where
they are getting calls from inside Tehran to the radio station
in the U.S. or another place of here is where we can organize
to talk about right now and then broadcasting it back into Iran
because they cannot internally organize without disruption,
violation of human rights, or risking really life and limb
themselves. I would hope we could help more with that
broadcasting and communication ability inside Iran.
Mr. Armitage. My understanding is that--I will not go
through the complete laundry list of what we as a government
broadcast, but it is VOA. I saw some of the correspondents
here. They have got a roundtable with youth, all these kind of
things that we send in. Radio Farda, which is 24/7, a mixture
of news, music, pop, to kind of keep people interested.
The question of private groups broadcasting in, I think our
preference on that is on a case-by-case basis we will support
under the MEPI getting that information in. I am not expert in
these matters, but I know at one time years ago with VOA, we
had to be very careful about who was broadcasting into whatever
country and who might be broadcasting for the diaspora in our
own country. There were at least regulations and I believe
rules about that.
So I got the message and I will look into it for you and
respond.
Senator Brownback. I appreciate that because to me Iran is
a critical country in that region where we are on a stated
policy of trying to drain the swamp and to provide open and
free societies that can grow and prosper. You have got one here
that has an economy that is less than it was during the period
of the Shah over nearly 25 years ago. Clearly I think Iran will
make a vibrant, open, democratic society with quite a
contribution to the world once it throws off the tyranny that
sits on top of it. I hope we can be as supportive as possible
in that process.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Brownback.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your public service. You are
one of the best that we have.
I would like to get you to opine. Given the recent
agreement by Iran to suspend their development of nuclear
weapons, an agreement with the Europeans, what appears to be in
exchange for European economic help for Iran, I would like for
you to interpolate that as to whether or not it would work if
we were to offer economic help in the same vein that the
Europeans have.
Mr. Armitage. I kind of look at this, Senator, as sort of
who needs to go first and who has been hiding the ball. As the
chairman indicated and Mr. Biden indicated, the Iranians have
been caught lying and hiding the ball several times and most
recently during a visit of the IAEA, when there were some
traces of highly enriched uranium found, that gave lie to many
of the things that the Iranians were saying.
So my own view is we are the United States. We are not like
everybody else, and we need to be very cautious and careful
when we make decisions about economic assistance, et cetera,
because you are sending a signal absent some rather basic
agreement on other elements of policy with Iran with which we
have vehement objection, such as the terrorism and things of
that nature that Senator Brownback was saying. So I think I
would be pretty careful.
Regarding the apparent agreement, it appears that the
Iranians have agreed to all the elements of the September 12
Board of Governors' resolution. It is not just an agreement
with the three ministers, though they were the ones who went to
Tehran and received it. The proof of that will be in the
pudding, and we will see.
Dr. ElBaradei will issue a report after he has pored
through the pages, the voluminous documentation. Then we will
be consulting with the international community about the way
forward as we go to the 20th and the 21st of November Board of
Governors meeting.
Senator Nelson. You were talking to Senator Brownback about
the jamming. There was a report that the Cuban Government was
jamming broadcasts into Iran at a time when students were
protesting the oppression by the ruling clerics. What do you
know about that?
Mr. Armitage. We approached the Government of Cuba about
some jamming that was emanating from Cuba. It was not the
Government of Cuba. It was another entity. And it has ceased.
Senator Nelson. Since Iran is such a sponsor and benefactor
of Hezbollah and Hezbollah is clearly an impediment to the
interest of the United States in reaching a peace accord in the
Middle East, plus the fact that there is a substantial presence
of Hezbollah here in the United States, what contacts, if any,
have been with the Government of Iran about their sponsorship
of Hezbollah? And if none, what do we plan in the future?
Mr. Armitage. First of all, there is no need on this issue
for someone to send a private message. Everybody from the U.S.
Senate to successive Presidents have been very clear from the
time of Ronald Reagan on about the Hezbollah-Iranian marriage.
We try to complicate and constrict the ability of Iran to
provide aid and comfort to Hezbollah. We try this by stopping
overflights or trying to jawbone countries into not allowing
overflights when weapons are going to be delivered through
Syria or something of that nature. We do it by trying to stop
flows of money, which is a much more difficult thing because it
can go 360 degrees and still find its way back to Hezbollah. We
work with the terrorist financing resolution at the U.N. to try
to constrict and control Hezbollah's access to funds. It is a
pretty difficult thing.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for your service. It is pretty
inspiring for somebody new like me to be able to listen to
someone like you who has been there a long time, but you are
never talking about yesterday. You are also talking about
tomorrow.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you. You are making me feel like I have
a lot of moss on my tusks.
Senator Coleman. First, if I may, I just want to followup
on the Middle East situation with Israel and terrorism. I share
the opinion of my colleague from Kansas. This is a difficult
situation, and I am sure my colleague from Rhode Island, when
he was discussing concern about what is happening with the
building of some barriers, that there is not an equivalency
between Iran supporting Hezbollah, which is supporting killing,
killing of Israelis, killing of Americans, of allies of
America. I am clear there is no moral equivalency there. Iran
is supporting terrorism. There is no question about that.
The second piece of that then, just to finish the
discussion about the Middle East for a second, that portion of
it, in terms of U.S. policy, our policy is the establishment of
a Palestinian state, but the precondition of that still stands
to what the President said on June 24, that an end to terrorism
is a precondition. Is that correct?
Mr. Armitage. Yes, sir.
Senator Coleman. If I can just followup with a comment that
Senator Nelson raised about the jamming of the signals to Iran.
I had a chance to be in Cuba and the Cubans are very
forthright. They said we did not do it and others did it. You
said other entity. Can you identify who that other entity was?
Was it Iranian officials?
Mr. Armitage. Yes, it was.
Senator Coleman. So the Iranians were jamming the ability
of folks----
Mr. Armitage. And it has ceased.
Senator Coleman. OK. I appreciate that.
Just one other question then. We know about the efforts for
democracy in Iran--the students rise up and they get crushed.
They were crushed brutally a number of years ago. They continue
to be crushed. How do you support democracy? What is it that we
are not doing today that will be more helpful in supporting a
more democratic Iran?
Mr. Armitage. The student riots to which you refer,
Senator, as I understand it, actually came about not in a
search for democracy, but they were demonstrating against the
fact that the universities were going to be privatized and the
tuition would dramatically rise. That developed over some time,
a couple of days, into the need for more openness in society
and democracy, et cetera. Of course, as we indicated, it was
brutally crushed.
I think our job in this, we cannot force something on
people who want it less than we do. As I say, I was very moved
by Ms. Shirin Ebadi's comments about meaningful change has to
come from within. The intellectual and political ferment I
think has to be translated into louder and more demands for
freedoms.
We have heard--it is not a state secret--that recently the
Parliament has passed laws having to do with more judicial
openness, et cetera. Now, these laws were contravened by the
unelected body, the Council of Guardians. But that kind of
expression I think speaks to what is underlying most peoples in
the world, that is, a basic desire to run their own lives.
Our job in this I think is to make, first of all, the facts
available. The facts are both positive facts and negative
facts, positive facts about how countries around the world are
developing their own democracies. For instance, some of the
countries of the former Soviet Union who in relative terms have
come quite far in 10 or 12 years. Also, the negative facts,
that is, how Iran is perceived in the world, why Iranians have
difficulty getting visas, those who are able to travel, when we
talk about corruption, just who is doing what to whom, those
kind of things. So I think that is our job right now, and that
would allow, I think, the political ferment to take hold.
Senator Coleman. Last question, if I have the time, just to
touch upon the issue of Iran and its developing nuclear
capacity. In U.S. policy toward an arming Iran, how do we avoid
the pitfalls of our policy toward North Korea in 1994? How do
you avoid the situation where somebody says that they are going
to negotiate, they are going to sign an agreement, they are not
going to go down this track but then they don't abide by their
agreement? When they have the record that they have had, when
they have certainly, as you indicated, the record of support
for terrorism, we cannot afford to have what happened with
North Korea happen with Iran. How do we avoid those pitfalls?
Mr. Armitage. My own view, it is a good lesson. It is
something that we need to keep our eyes on. I go into this
saying our enthusiasm for Bushehr, for instance, the so-called
civil nuclear reactors, is very much under control, because the
Iranians have not demonstrated their bona fides in terms of the
NPT. The Iranians would say to you that we have an inalienable
right as an NPT signatory to civilian nuclear use. Well, that
is not quite right. They have an inalienable right if they are
living up to all the criteria in the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
which has to do with eschewing nuclear weapons and enriched
uranium and plutonium reprocessing for weapons, et cetera. So I
think we have got to spend some time calling them, making them
live up to their bona fides.
Second of all, I think unlike North Korea, this is a nation
awash in energy, the fourth largest reserves of petroleum, the
second largest in gas. So for them to say they need civilian
nuclear reactors seems to me to be a bit incredulous, and I
think we need to point that out. If there was some interest in
developing the infrastructure of oil and gas and terrorism had
ceased and all that, then that would be a different situation,
and that ought to go ahead at some point in time. But our
enthusiasm for this whole civil nuclear thing is very much
under control for the reasons I mentioned.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Coleman.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, it is good to see you again.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you, sir.
Senator Feingold. Given the close relationship between
powerful elements of the Iranian Government and several
terrorist organizations, it obviously seems to me that Iran is
among the most likely states, if not the most likely state,
that could transfer weapons of mass destruction to terrorist
organizations. I would like you to comment on that.
Why is it we heard so much about this issue with regard to
Iraq and relatively little with regard to Iran?
Mr. Armitage. I think we have in play several different
things. I think they are the leading state sponsor of terrorism
in the world. Their need for the hard currency might be
slightly less than North Korea, something we have discussed up
here more. Some might argue that would make North Korea more
inclined to trade weapons for money.
Having said that, we have both the international regimes,
the NPT and other things, that we apply. We have got also the
Proliferation Security Initiative, in which 11 countries are
now participating, which is a regime that, following
international law, would try to block and stop shipments which
we believe are suspicious in nature or WMD or related
materials. As I say, 11 countries have signed up for that. We
recently exercised it in the Coral Sea.
I think on the question of Iran, as I understand it, their
ability to acquire this weapon--their desire there was no
question of. How far along in their process, in terms of
nuclear, sir, there were some real questions about. I think we
felt that there, first of all, was more time. Second of all, we
were able in the case of Iran to develop an international
consensus. In the case of Iraq, we had a limited international
consensus. But we have had much better luck thus far, and that
is why the President has moved to say that it is not a one-
size-fits-all. We are making some progress, he feels, in
multilateral diplomacy, and we will continue to do so.
Senator Feingold. Has the rift that has developed between
the United States and other Security Council members relating
to our policy in Iraq affected the prospects for international
cooperation and pressure on Iran? And in connection with that,
if you could talk about what specific proactive steps will the
administration be taking in the near term to foster that
cooperation and strengthen multilateral cohesion.
Mr. Armitage. Senator Feingold, thanks to a lot of hard
effort by my colleagues at the Department of State, United
Nations, and the President's jawboning, we got 1511, U.N.
Security Council resolution, unanimously. I think in the first
instance, that is a good sign, that the past is the past and we
are going to move forward.
On the question of Europe, it is quite interesting. I think
many of our European friends--and that is where the trouble was
in the Security Council--find that the prospect of Iran with a
nuclear weapon and, as we know, the delivery systems they are
developing--one, the Shahab, which I think on an unclassified
basis has about a 1,300 kilometer range--is something that
makes the problem theirs as well as ours. I think that is a
good sign.
Now, I indicated earlier, Senator, that my colleague, John
Bolton, and some of his colleagues, Acting Assistant Secretary
Susan Burk and others, are right now out internationally. Mr.
Bolton is in Spain and Ms. Burk was meeting with the Japanese
to try to make sure we keep consensus as we move forward to the
20th and 21st Board of Governors meeting of the IAEA.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Finally, the administration reportedly signed a cease-fire
with the MEK in April, and then it changed its mind. Can you
explain why the administration changed its policy toward the
MEK in such a short period of time?
Mr. Armitage. We should not have been signing a cease-fire
with a foreign terrorist organization. My understanding--and I
think it has been written about--is this was done tactically in
the field by a soldier who was faced with an immediate problem.
Given the fact that this is an FTO, we are in the business of
disarming them from their major weapons, which I am told has
been done, containing them in a rather large area, which takes
a certain amount of person power from the U.S. Army, and we are
classifying them, going through them person by person, to see
those who may have terrorist connections. In my understanding,
a certain number of those do, and we could talk about it in a
closed session. That process is ongoing now.
Senator Feingold. Well, I am pleased to hear your comment
about the impropriety of our signing a cease-fire with a
terrorist organization, something I raised at the time.
Does the ambiguity surrounding U.S. policy toward the MEK
complicate our efforts to demand that Iran act against
terrorist organizations? And what exactly is the status of the
members of this group who are operating in Iraq?
Mr. Armitage. They are contained, as I understand it, by
the U.S. military, primarily the Army, and they have been
disarmed of their major weapons. I do not think all of them
have turned over their sidearms. They are not allowed, as I
understand it, free access in and out of their own camp. There
have been speculations about making these swaps with Iran, et
cetera. As you know, although we may have some real complaints
against terrorists, we also have some real strong views about
how people should be treated. So I think that impedes any
possibility of swaps, et cetera, with Iran because we cannot be
sure of the way they would be treated. But if we find that
people qualify as terrorists under our definition, then they
are going to have to be dealt with in a legal manner.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
You indicated, Mr. Secretary, that the way to support
democracy in Iran is to make the facts available to the Iranian
people. How do you do that if there is not direct engagement
with them? How does that get done? We do it through radio
messages?
And did your counterparts in France and Britain and Germany
convey to you any request for steps that would help them arrive
at last week's agreement? In other words, if so, did we take
any steps? Did we convey via the Europeans or through any other
channels any steps? Was there any discussion about security
assurances? Are our fingerprints on any of that? I do not mean
that as accusatory. I mean in a positive way.
So the first question is, how do we communicate this? And
second, were we contemporaneously informed? Did we have any
input?
Mr. Armitage. We were informed before the trip. When the
political directors went to Iran to sort of set the stage,
Secretary Powell had discussions with some of his colleagues.
John Bolton and I met separately with various German and French
interlocutors--and with the British, we are cheek by jowl
anyway--to make our point clear that we hoped the ministers
would not settle for the 80 percent solution, that they would
settle for 100 percent solution because we felt the only reason
we were at the point where the Iranians were willing to talk
was because of unanimity of views on the Board of Governors.
So to that extent, we were informed. And immediately upon
the completion of the mission, Secretary Powell--his colleagues
informed him. Then laterally we got it through diplomatic
communications as well. We did not offer, to my knowledge, in
any way any sort of security guarantee.
Senator Biden. I will conclude with this, Mr. Chairman. Are
the Europeans asking us for any assistance from us in this run-
up to the IAEA November meeting?
Mr. Armitage. Not to my knowledge. We are, as I indicated,
however, reaching out to them as we develop our own
understanding of what is in those pages to give them the
benefit of our views.
You had another question, Senator.
Senator Biden. How do we get the ``facts''--I think we all
agree--to the Iranian people without engaging them?
Mr. Armitage. Well, we have got about 6 hours a day VOA and
a couple of hours a day TV that goes in. We have got a Web site
and we have got a 24/7 operation called Radio Farda, which we
are told is quite popular because it mixes popular and
contemporary U.S. and Iranian music with news broadcasts, et
cetera. It is not propaganda. It is straightforward.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Mr. Armitage. I was asked even here today by the VOA would
I sit for a one-on-one discussion that just goes to the Iranian
people and just tell them what we think.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Armitage, for
your testimony and for your response to our questions. As
always, it was great to have you.
Mr. Armitage. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a
pleasure as always.
The Chairman. The chair would like to call now our second
panel: the Honorable William Luers, Dr. Nasser Hadian, Dr.
Anthony Cordesman, and the Honorable Robert J. Einhorn.
Gentlemen, we thank you for coming and we thank you for
listening to our first set of questions to the distinguished
Deputy Secretary of State. Each of you have been with us
before, and we appreciate your coming today.
Let me suggest, first of all, that all of your statements
will be made a part of the record, so you need not ask for
permission that that be done. If possible, if you could
summarize your statements in 5 minutes or so, that will allow
for more questioning and dialog with the panel and with
Senators. So I will ask you to proceed, if you can, in that
fashion in the order in which I introduced you, which would be
Mr. Luers first, then Mr. Hadian, then Dr. Cordesman, and
finally Dr. Einhorn.
Mr. Luers.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM H. LUERS, PRESIDENT AND CEO, UNITED
NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, NEW YORK,
NY
Mr. Luers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be back
and I am particularly pleased to see you in the Chair. I have
long had a great respect for your work and I think you----
Senator Biden. Now, wait a minute.
I like you too.
Mr. Luers. I am coming to you, Joe.
I think your decision to have these hearings is very
important and I welcome them. I also have had a lot of
conversations with your two colleagues and have a great respect
for both of them, including Senator Biden in his former
chairmanship.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Mr. Luers. I will be brief. The first thing I would like to
say is I am not an Iranian expert, as the three of you know. My
credentials come today from the fact that I have led a series
of discussions we have been holding in a European country with
Iranians over the last year. They have been regular
discussions. We have had four-plus meetings.
On the U.S. side, participants include former diplomats,
former government officials, and in fact, a number of people
who are real experts on Persia and on Iran. It is a nonpartisan
group.
I would welcome you, Mr. Chairman, Senators Biden and Hagel
or indeed any of the Senators to join these meetings. I think
you would find them enlightening, and you would be more than
welcome.
I will do three things: summarize some of the attitudes
that would be helpful for this hearing, outline a few
particular problems that might be resolved, and then come to a
few recommendations.
First on the attitudes of the Iranians. One of the major
blocks from what we hear, to movement from the Iranian side on
policy is that no matter what the issue, whether it is Iraq,
nuclear, Hezbollah, or a whole range of bilateral issues having
to do with U.S.-Iranian relations, the blockage comes from the
fact that they believe that the United States is not interested
in changed policies, but changed regime. Until they are
satisfied that there is a decision on the part of the United
States to work with this Iranian government in some form, it is
going to be difficult for them to find ways to cede on some of
the issues that are very important to us.
Having said that, I think it is important to say that the
Iranians are also concerned about their own country, the
stagnation, the inability to resolve problems and all the
things that we know about. Yet nobody that I have talked to on
the Iranian side or in the intelligence community in this
country believes that Iran is about to implode. We are going to
be dealing with it for a long time, as it transforms itself. We
have got to decide how to deal with Iran.
Second, the Iranians that we have talked to over the last
year feel more confident about themselves and their stature in
the world community than when we began the discussions. Much of
it has to do with the fact that the United States eliminated
their two principal enemies, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein.
They find themselves also possibly getting a twofer. We
eliminate Saddam Hussein and the Taliban and we so tie
ourselves down in Iraq that we can no longer be a threat to
Iran. That is at least under consideration in their thinking.
Nonetheless, there is the concern about U.S. intentions.
On the nuclear issues, I think what I would say principally
is that I agree with Bob Einhorn. Bob has been a very
professional and really quite brilliant participant in our
discussions, and he has essentially led the discourse we have
had on nuclear questions. I think he will be far more eloquent
on the subject than I can be, and you have his testimony.
I would say one thing, however, on the subject of nuclear.
If we follow your policy line, Mr. Chairman, as laid out in the
Los Angeles Times--and there is strong argument for it--it
seems to me it has to be structured in the context of an
overall strategy. If we end up, as you hint at the end of that
article, that we may have to resort to military force, it seems
to me that doing that outside of the context of everything else
we want from Iran or what we would like to achieve in the
region would carry us in the wrong direction. By taking a firm
stance opposing support for the IAEA's Western European
beginnings of this new discussion on nuclear issues it would
make it very difficult to even have a broad strategy to address
other issues with Iranis.
On Iraq, the Iranians over and over again have indicated to
us a desire to have official discussions with the United
States. Discussions were broken off last summer by the U.S.
Government over concerns that al-Qaeda terrorists operating
from Iran might have been involved in the action against U.S.
targets in Saudi Arabia. I think it was a mistake to have
broken them off, and it is going to be difficult to reinstate
them.
Whatever we learn from the Iranians about Iraq, we will
learn more than we know now. We have had no discussions with
them about Iraq--the most critical element in U.S. policy that
we have had in the last 20 years. They are part of this
neighborhood. They live on the border of Iraq. They are deeply
involved, and for us not to probe officially consistently and
directly what their intentions are, what they know, how they
will work with us I think is a grave mistake and a deeply
flawed policy.
Secretary Armitage in his quite excellent presentation did
discuss all the commonalities of U.S.-Iranian policies within
Iraq. One of the matters that I would like to go further on is
the question that was posed by Senator Feingold on the MEK-al-
Qaeda relationship.
We have heard that the U.S. proposed to Iran last March,
before the war, that there be a linkage of some sort between
our handling of MEK and the Iranian handling of al-Qaeda.
Whether that is true or not, that is at least what we hear from
the Iranians. The fact is there became a link and the Iranians
thought there was one. In the final official meetings that they
had that were held in Geneva in June before they were broken
off by the U.S., I understand that there was some specific
discussions of what the Iranians would do that would be more
forthcoming with regard to al-Qaeda.
Following that, the United States took actions against the
MEK, but up to very recently there are continuing reports in
Iraq that the Defense Department is continuing to associate
with the MEK. Whether this is Iranian misinformation or whether
it is an Iranian device to forego this presumed arrangement for
them to be better behaved on al-Qaeda, the Iranians believe
that there is continuing Defense Department interest in holding
the MEK in abeyance as a potential for undermining the Iranian
Government.
Now, I think the MEK issue has to be addressed in some
forum. We are also persuaded that the Iranians, if we have
direct discussions with them, would at least explain what they
have done with those over 2,000 al-Qaeda representatives whom
they have reported to the U.N. they have managed. We strongly
believe that discussions in some form would be possible in this
area.
Finally, on Hezbollah and al-Qaeda, the Hezbollah issue is
huge. It is the terrorist organization with probably the
largest reach of any in the world. It is not as active as al-
Qaeda, but it certainly is more broadly reaching. As one
develops a strategy toward Iran that makes some sense for us
and for U.S. interests, one has to relate that to how we
develop the strategy toward Hezbollah. A strategy toward
Hezbollah like the one we have toward al-Qaeda will not work.
There has to be an effort to try to recognize the fact that
Hezbollah does have a dimension to it that al-Qaeda does not
have, which is their political and social work in Lebanon.
I have already talked about al-Qaeda.
Finally, let me go to our several recommendations.
First, the United States must develop a strategy on how to
handle Iran that will allow the United States to associate the
multiple questions--the multiple problems we have with Iran in
a coherent strategy. Obviously, I am an engaging person and I
want to see us engage Iran. It seems to me that over time that
is the only strategy. The alternative strategy of taking it
piece by piece will result in us falling into a trap that will
define the rest of our strategy, which I think is a mistake.
Second, the confrontational approach, as Senator Biden
said, seems to be taking us nowhere right now. The likelihood
of us undertaking an ultimately military strategy begun by
sanctions perhaps is not high, given our involvement with Iraq.
We recommend now that there be strong support for the IAEA
and Western European involvement in discussing the nuclear
issues. When the discussions begin with the Western Europeans,
we should be involved in those discussions and we should try to
encourage, as much as possible, the Iranians to pursue a course
that will have their suspension of enrichment and processing be
a long-term suspension. It could go on indefinitely.
Third, we believe that we need to set up an environment in
which to discuss with Iran the issue of Iraq. We think that the
setting could be the five permanent members of the Security
Council plus the United States and Iran. The issue would come
up about the other neighboring states, but we think this is an
appropriate setting. And the U.N. Secretary General could
arrange for that.
In that discussion, we believe there should be a return to
the issue of al-Qaeda and some firm assurances given and
demonstrated that the MEK will be completely disassociated from
U.S. interests.
We believe that small steps should be begun in other
aspects of the U.S.-Iranian relationship, which have already
been mentioned by most of you.
Congressional exchanges should be pursued. We think there
is still that opportunity. We know some of you favor such
exchanges.
And I recommend that we begin planning for a U.S. interests
section in the Swiss Embassy in Tehran. I happen to have
negotiated the opening of the U.S. staffed U.S. interests
section in Havana when I was Acting Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs, I do not believe there was any
suggestion at the time that it reflected an approval of that
Cuban Government. We must have access to Iranian society. How
do you democratize? I have said here that democracy is most
infectious when it is related to human contact, and that is
what we must have with Iran. Information alone over the radio
is not enough.
Mr. Chairman, that is all I have to say right now.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Luers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. William H. Luers, President and CEO, United
Nations Association of the United States of America, New York, NY
Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, distinguished members of the
Committee on Foreign Relations, it is an honor to testify before you
today on the subject of Iran. I speak on behalf of a group of Americans
who have been involved in discussions with Iranians over the past year.
These informal talks have touched on many of the issues that this
committee is addressing in this important and long needed hearing. We
congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on your efforts to encourage a public
discussion on Iran and the U.S. interests engaged in our relationship
with that pivotal nation.
I am pleased to be back testifying before this Committee nearly two
decades since I left the Foreign Service. During my career with the
Department of State I was privileged to have had several opportunities
to testify on matters related to the Soviet Union, Cuba and Latin
American--regional issues in which I was professionally involved. I
come before you today, therefore, not as an Iranian expert--and there
are precious few of them given our twenty-year gap of official
relations with that country--or as an expert on the Middle East. My
credentials flow from: * Decades in helping to engage U.S. relations
with the former Soviet Union including arms control, negotiations, and
cultural exchanges. I served as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia.
Over a decade of engagement with Latin America including
issues of political and economic development and cultural
exchanges. I served as Ambassador to Venezuela.
Over 13 years as President of The Metropolitan Museum of
Art, during which time I became even more appreciative of the
essential role of cultural understanding in international
affairs.
Discussions with Iranians that a group of Americans have
been holding regularly over the past year.
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Association of the USA (UNA-USA) began to lead
these discussions with a group of Iranian policy experts following UNA-
USA's involvement in the United Nations effort to begin ``A Dialogue
among Civilizations,'' which was first proposed by Iran's President
Khatami. President Khatami and U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan
thought it worthwhile for an international effort to be undertaken to
discuss and explore the opportunities that might be available to avoid
the ``Clash of Civilizations'' predicted by Sam Huntington in his
prescient article and book of that title. The culminating report of the
``Dialogue Among Civilizations'' was presented to the U.N. General
Assembly in November 2001, only weeks after September 11th. President
Khatami, who spoke at the General Assembly on the topic, chose that
moment to denounce Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden directly, underscoring
that the terrorist attacks were in no way representative of Islam. Let
me remind you that the United Nations system is the only setting in
which Western nations deal regularly with Arab states and with the
numerous states where the one billion followers of Islam live. That is
one more reason why the United Nations is an important place--it offers
a place in which the United States can work to develop greater
understanding and reduce tensions with Islamic states over the years to
come.
The discussions that UNA-USA has been conducting began almost a
year ago. They have been held in a multilateral setting and have
involved a group of Iranian academics and policy advisers acting in
their individual capacities. During this period we have had access to
official Iranian thinking. These talks have been off-the-record and
included representatives of at least one other nation. We have met four
times over the past year. The Rockefeller Brothers Fund and several
other prominent American foundations have been the sponsors of these
talks. We have met in Europe and have not met either in the United
States or Iran for any of these conversations. We understand from the
Iranians and from our American colleagues that, although there had been
many informal efforts at policy dialogues with Iran in the decade
before the current administration, virtually all of those efforts have
dried up. Also, there are some continuing rich academic interactions
with Iran on the part of a number of individual American scholars and
there are journalists who still have unusual personal access to Iranian
society. We understand that this UNA-USA set of discussions is the only
one today that is seeking to carry out a broad policy discussion on
U.S.-Iranian relations.
The U.S. side has been composed of prominent former diplomats and
officials and representatives of the private sector. It is a non-
partisan group in its approach and composition. The President of the
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Stephen Heintz, one of the initiators of
this set of discussions, has essentially co-chaired this effort from
the American side and has participated in all of the meetings.
Our intentions are to continue these informal discussions over the
coming months and years with the following objectives:
(1) To expand the number and variety of Americans exposed to
these important issues;
(2) To extend our access to the Iranian policy community and
society;
(3) To continue to encourage the United States Government and
the Iranian Government to undertake direct official
conversations; and
(4) To offer suggestions on ways in which the United States
might better handle the potentially serious threats to U.S.
security interests in the Middle East that could result from
the current deeply flawed policy direction that the United
States Government is taking toward Iran and its engagement in
the region.
IRANIAN ATTITUDES
The Iranians have expressed very informally their concerns about
stagnation at home in Iran, the inability of the current Iranian
governing structure to carry out political and economic reforms, and
the potential instability in their neighborhood, including grave
concerns about Pakistan, which is one reason they have been seeking a
strategic alliance with India. At the same time, they make clear that,
whatever their concerns are about the current Iranian governing
structure, it is not about to collapse. The U.S. intelligence community
agrees with that assessment. No one we have talked to in the U.S.
intelligence community believes that the troubled and cleric dominated
Iranian system is on the verge of any sort of implosion, even though
one hears such claims on occasion from U.S. policy makers.
Most importantly, the Iranians have expressed concern about U.S.
policies toward Iran. They say that Iranian officials believe that
dealing with the United States is particularly difficult for Iran since
the U.S. does not seek ``policy change'' on the part of the Iranian
government but ``regime change'' and nothing short of ``regime change''
will satisfy the U.S. From public official U.S. statements and the
general impression they have had from the few direct talks with U.S.
officials, Iranians claim that they are discouraged from making any
steps toward ameliorating some U.S. objections to Iranian behavior
because the U.S. will always require more ``concessions'' until the
Iranian government is overthrown or removed. The Iranians say that the
U.S. does not seem prepared to make comparable steps to encourage
movement toward resolution of some of the core issues. They would be
far more ready to discuss the core issues between the two nations and
engage in negotiations with the United States if they believed that
U.S. policy was committed not to the overthrow of the current Iranian
system, but to working toward mutually beneficial steps.
At the same time, the Iranians say they are feeling more confident
today than perhaps during any time since the Iranian revolution due to
the U.S. elimination of Iran's two neighboring enemy regimes--the
Taliban and Saddam Hussein--and an Iranian perception that the U.S.
will be preoccupied with Iraq for some time. This sense of confidence
can obviously be a mixed blessing for American interests in the region.
We believe that the U.S. should try to play to this confidence rather
than fight it as a strategy moving forward. If Iran, for its own
economic and security reasons, wants to return gradually to playing a
more constructive role the international community, the U.S. should
take some steps to enable this to happen since that will offer the best
available opportunity to reduce Iran's support for terrorism and other
troubling activities in the region.
We recognize that it is difficult to know who speaks for Iran and
whether the U.S. government would be able to deal with an Iranian group
that has the authority to make the decisions the U.S. would seek.
Nevertheless, based on our discussions, we believe that this moment
offers an important opportunity to seek some movement from the Iranian
government on issues of great significance to U.S. interests in the
region. Most particularly, we think the Iranians are now intensely
focused on how best to preserve their own national security as the
environment in their neighborhood is changing dramatically. If both
governments do not undertake mutually reinforcing steps to ease the
differences, we believe that the uncertainty about each other's
intentions could heighten tensions and lead Iran away from potential
cooperation with the U.S. toward more confrontational policies and
perhaps toward taking further steps to acquire nuclear weapons. This is
an appropriate time to respond to Iranian overtures and to try to
dissuade Iran from pursuing such strategies.
TALKING ABOUT THE NUCLEAR ISSUES
On the nuclear issue, we have heard the official Iranian line that,
despite the IAEA's findings, Iran still has no intention to build
nuclear weapons, but needs a nuclear capacity for power (citing similar
nuclear power facilities in the U.S. and Russia which have substantial
fossil fuel energy resources) and for scientific work. The official
line also maintains that nuclear weapons would be unlikely to increase
Iran's security and that the Supreme Leader opposes the development of
nuclear weapons on moral and religious grounds. Yet in private
conversations, the Iranians have told us that there is a serious debate
in policy circles about nuclear weapons. They also say that there is
probably an intention on the part of some elements of the Iranian
governing structure to have at least the capacity to build such
weapons, but that Iran does not have the capability yet and has not
taken a firm decision on this matter. We have been told that the
Iranian government would reject any offer of a package of agreements
(such as is being discussed in connection with North Korea) that would
link proposals regarding Iran's security to discussions of
discontinuing the nuclear fuel cycle since such an approach would
implicitly suggest that Iran was seeking its nuclear capacity for
reasons of national security, i.e. nuclear weapons.
We welcome Tehran's announcement that it intends to sign and ratify
the additional protocol agreement under the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty and temporarily suspend uranium enrichment activities. We
believe that these hopeful steps are in the right direction and are in
line with the recommendations we have been making to both governments
over the past several months. We remain concerned that, should these
current promising indicators not result in a longer term shift in the
approach on both sides, Iran and the Western countries will remain on a
course that will result in the IAEA referring the Iranian violations to
the U.N. Security Council, with the possibility of sanctions being
brought against Iran. We do not believe that UNSC sanctions, even if
strongly supported initially by all of the European powers and China,
will help to change Iran's still ambiguous intentions with regard to
the capacity to build nuclear weapons. Indeed, prolonged sanctions
would more likely lead them toward an increased sense of isolation and
toward a decision to acquire nuclear weapons. From what we have heard
from the Iranians, the perception that the U.S. is mobilizing world
opinion against Iran makes it less likely that admonishments by the
U.S. will have positive results. Indeed, we have strongly recommended
that the United States Government remain in the background of
negotiations with Iran on nuclear issues and that these discussions
should be conducted primarily in the context of the IAEA and with key
European governments.
In this connection, it would be useful to consider a phased course
of action to address the nuclear issue. I understand that Robert
Einhorn, who has participated in UNA-USA's discussions with the
Iranians, will be providing further thoughts on this matter in his
testimony today before the Committee. In addition, we have been told
that Iranians might agree to permit Western technical personnel and
specialists to remain in Iran indefinitely to monitor the Iranian
nuclear facilities. In return for opening up their country to a
permanent monitoring presence from the West, the Iranians, we are told,
would want Western support in the development of Iran's peaceful uses
nuclear program. We have no assurance that these initiatives will be
successful, but we believe that the United States should continue to
support Western European expansion of such discussions with Iran at
this time.
If the British, French and Germans, together with the IAEA
(supported quietly by the U.S.), are able to work out an arrangement by
which Iran is encouraged to step back from a full fuel cycle in
connection with its peaceful nuclear program, then U.S. discussions
with Iran on Iraq in a multilateral context could be even more
productive.
TALKING ABOUT IRAQ
Throughout the course of our discussions over the past year, the
Iranians reiterated their interest in engaging in talks with the United
States at an official level on key issues of concern, especially with
regard to Iraq. In fact, the Iranians stated that Iraq has the
potential to become a constructive bridge-issue that could enable
discussions on matters of broader mutual interest to the U.S. and Iran.
They said that the more the U.S. begins to learn about the Shia through
dealing with Iraq, the more the U.S. will understand Iran and the Shia.
They also characterized this as a momentous time for security in the
region and suggested that the U.S. will come to understand that the
Shia and Iran itself are moving toward a more moderate stance on
regional and religious matters. We are well aware that over the past
decade Iranians have offered to have official discussions with the U.S.
Government on a variety of subjects, but when the time has come for
such talks, obstacles appear. We believe that it is in U.S. interests
to persist in testing these Iranian offers to have discussions since
the U.S. can only benefit from such discussions, particularly given the
new situation in Iraq.
We have been impressed by several aspects of Iran's policies toward
Iraq. The Iranians claim that Iran was the only country in the region
to strongly endorse the Governing Council in Iraq. They say that the
Governing Council in Iraq was well selected and will be able to form
the basis of an interim Iraqi government. While strongly critical of
the U.S. ``occupation'' of Iraq, our Iranian counterparts say they
realize that the U.S. will be in the neighborhood for a long time and
that Iranian and U.S. interests in Iraq generally coincide as they have
often coincided in Afghanistan. They claim that there is general
agreement among the various Iranian governing entities on a policy
toward Iraq that reflects a desire for cooperation with the U.S. in
Iraq. Yet, despite official U.S. government stated policies and
actions, the Iranians continue to be deeply concerned by the support
that the U.S. is giving in Iraq to the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization
(MeK).
We expressed much skepticism about this U.S. and Iranian
coincidence of interests in Iraq and the Iranians did not deny that
individual Iranian organizations, such as the Revolutionary Guard or
some conservative clerics, might well be carrying out activities that
are unhelpful to U.S. efforts. One Iranian participant said that Iran
was ``pre-positioning itself'' in Iraq just in case the U.S. were to
try to use Iraq as a platform for launching attacks against Iran or to
destabilize the Iranian regime. There have been occasional menacing
observations in the otherwise cautiously supportive attitude on the
part of these Iranians. For instance, they have warned that we should
know that Iran has the means to make it very difficult for the U.S. in
Iraq.
Yet despite their disappointment about the decision last May on the
part of the United States to cut off the Geneva discussions with Iran
on Iraq, it is our understanding that the government may be prepared to
respond favorably to a U.S. initiative to renew such talks in an
appropriate multilateral setting such as the 6+2 talks that were held
on Afghanistan.
On a related note, the Iranians continue to underscore with us
their willingness to consult on Afghanistan. If no other forum can be
found, they would welcome a reconvening of the ``6+2'' mechanism--
including Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Iran, Pakistan and
China, plus the U.S. and Russia. The aim of such a meeting would be a
reinforcing of President Karzai's ability to get the job done.
other issues: israeli-palestinian conflict, hezbollah, al qaeda
While our discussions in recent months have concentrated on the
nuclear and Iraqi issues in view of their immediacy, we have dealt
regularly with U.S. concerns over terrorism and the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. We believe that this set of issues is the most difficult and
it is unlikely that we can anticipate change in Iranian policy and
behavior in these areas until there is some positive movement on the
Middle East peace process. However, we see some possibility for Iranian
movement on the Al Qaeda issue.
Israel. Iran's official policy against Israel has not changed,
although its line on the peace process changed some time ago. It did
not oppose the road map per se, but expressed strong doubts about its
success. The official position remains that if Palestine should reach a
two-state agreement with Israel, Iran would be supportive. The Arab-
Israeli conflict is on the lower end of the list of priority issues for
Iran because the domestic political context is not ready for a retreat
on this issue and because Israel is not today seen as an existential
threat to Iran. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Iranians will become
helpful on this issue. The most the U.S. can hope for at the present
time is to reduce their motivation to be harmful. In sum, a substantial
change in the Iranian position on this issue is not likely.
Hezbollah. Iran's support of Hezbollah is a critical source of
U.S.-Iranian tension. Hezbollah is viewed, particularly within U.S.
intelligence circles, as an international terrorist organization whose
global reach equals or extends beyond that of Al-Qaeda. In addition, a
major U.S. concern continues to be Hezbollah's implacable opposition to
any two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. With Iraq
in a state of instability and the continuing bloodshed between the
Palestinians and Israelis, Hezbollah could well be tempted to expand
its terrorist activities in the region. We have no special knowledge
from the Iranians about Hezbollah and suspect that those we are talking
to do not have extensive information about the extent of Iranian
support for Hezbollah. Yet, from our discussions and general sense of
the region today, Hezbollah, while a large potential threat, has been
more restrained than might have been anticipated. But more importantly
we share the view of Daniel Byman in his article in the current issue
of Foreign Affairs that ``a campaign against it similar to the U.S.
effort against Al Qaeda will probably fail and might even backfire.''
The purely military option against Hezbollah will not work. As Byman
suggests, the role of Iran will be key to any more complex alternative
strategy toward reducing the threat of Hezbollah.
The Iranians say that Hezbollah, very much like Iran itself, has
been going through a significant transition over the past decade that
the U.S. has not understood. Moreover, the Iranians we have talked to
argue that with careful political management and with some future
improved prospects for a return to a Middle East peace process, the
Hezbollah threat in the region could decline if handled wisely. They
argue that there is a strategy that the U.S. could develop that would
both diminish external support for Hezbollah and move it more in the
direction of pursuing the social and political work that is
increasingly defining its primary role in Lebanon. Our Iranian
counterparts pointed out that during his visit to Lebanon earlier this
year, President Khatami made a conscious effort to address Hezbollah in
the context of Lebanese politics and stated that Hezbollah is becoming
a legitimate political organization.
Based on our discussions, we have become more convinced that
Hezbollah cannot be treated strictly as a military problem. Its reach
and potential for action is too great and buried in so many different
societies. The U.S. must begin to understand and manage relationships
with the various Shia groups in the region and worldwide and develop
multiple strategies to manage this large Hezbollah network. Iran, as a
major supporter of Hezbollah, would also be a key player in any broad
U.S. strategy to reduce the Hezbollah threat.
Al Qaeda. Iran's inability to control Al Qaeda operatives within
Iran and its failure to turn them over for prosecution is a source of
continuing concern to the U.S. Government. Indeed, discussions on Iraq
that had begun between some U.S. and Iranian officials in Geneva were
broken off by the U.S. over a belief that senior Al Qaeda operating
from Iran carried out the terrorist attacks against U.S. targets in
Saudi Arabia last May. The Iranian side considered that the U.S. was
seriously mistaken to have called off those potentially useful talks on
a matter of deep mutual interest. They also claimed that the U.S. had
faulty information on the role of Al Qaeda allegedly working from Iran
in Saudi Arabia.
In many conversations about Al Qaeda, we have found the Iranians
consistently surprised that the U.S. does not understand the degree to
which Iranians are opposed to Al Qaeda. They say: that they have
already returned many (over 500) Al Qaeda prisoners to their countries
of origin; that there are some Al Qaeda who are in Iran and cannot be
located such as in many other nations including throughout Europe; and
that of those who are still held in Iran, many more could be turned
over. We have reported to the U.S. Government on several occasions that
the Iranians have linked the U.S. continued practical support for the
MeK in Iraq to the U.S. effort to get more cooperation from Iran on Al
Qaeda. The Iranians say that, despite the fact that the MeK is declared
a terrorist organization by the U.S. and, despite repeated U.S.
statements of intentions to disarm and control the MeK in Iraq, there
is continuing evidence that the U.S. Defense Department seeks to keep
in reserve the possibility of deploying the MeK terrorists in Iraq
against Iran as part of a latent plan to destabilize Iran. The Iranians
we talked to say there is a deal possible with regard to Al Qaeda, but
they want something in return which will be responsive to Iran's own
fears about terrorism, i.e. solid action to eliminate the MeK as a
threat to Iran.
We cannot estimate the number of Al Qaeda in Iran or the degree to
which there are dark alliances between Al Qaeda and some components of
the complex Iranian governing structure, but we do believe that,
through direct discussions and mutually reinforcing actions between the
two governments, progress could be made on the Al Qaeda issue with
Iran. Just as the U.S. is reluctant to talk to Iran until the Al Qaeda
question is dealt with, the Iranians are not prepared to be more
forthcoming with Al Qaeda until there is a clear and consistent U.S.
policy toward MeK.
The MeK-Al Qaeda issue is a metaphor for the overall relationship
between Iran and the United States. One side places preconditions
before beginning discussions and before taking constructive actions,
and the other side holds back possible actions and concessions as
bargaining chips. It is time that this cycle that has blocked forward
movement be broken and that each side consider small steps that can be
undertaken to send signals, build confidence and engage officially in
order to determine whether, over time, significant steps would be
possible to reduce tensions.
RECOMMENDATIONS
We have several specific recommendations that flow from our
discussions:
The U.S. Government should support, as a critical first
step, the agreement reached by the three European governments
and Iran, under which Iran would adhere to the IAEA Additional
Protocol and temporarily suspend its uranium enrichment and
processing activities. In addition, Iran should cooperate fully
with the IAEA and provide to the Agency all the information
about its nuclear program requested by the IAEA Board in
September. In the longer term, Iran, the IAEA, the Europeans,
the United States, and other interested parties should seek to
put in place a more durable solution that would provide
confidence that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapons
capability.
Based on our discussions, we believe that an American
initiative to renew the diplomatic conversations on Iraq would
be well received by Tehran. We believe that a new group--like
the ``6+2'' group that met on Afghanistan--should be organized
by the U.N. Secretary-General. This new grouping might be
composed of Iraq's neighbors plus the permanent five members of
the U.N. Security Council. Whether this or another forum is
organized, we believe that an opportunity for renewed direct
conversations in some multilateral setting would be welcomed by
the Iranian government and lead to at least a better
understanding of each other's role and intentions in Iraq
In the context of renewed U.S. official discussions with
Iran on Iraq, we believe that a first priority should be direct
exchanges on Al Qaeda. These would lead toward a better
understanding of what steps the Iranians would expect the U.S.
to undertake with regard to the MeK or other potential threats
against Iran that might be causing concern to the Iranians and
that might lead to further Iranian and even joint U.S.-Iranian
action against Al Qaeda.
We also believe that there is a range of small steps that
each side could take over the coming months that could be seen
as confidence building measures for each side to move forward.
These steps would begin with the way each side speaks of the
other--language is one of the most important signals at the
early stage. For example, language in speeches and public
statements that suggest that the U.S. is expecting regime
change in Iran or is not prepared to deal in any way with the
current government of Iran undercut opportunities to have
serious discussions and reinforce the impression in Tehran that
the US is not serious about any negotiations with Iran.
We recommend that exchanges between Congressional
representatives and members of the Iranian Parliament should be
pursued as a way to build confidence and dialogue between our
two countries. We are aware that a number of members of
Congress have been seeking such exchanges and would be willing
to participate. It appears that the Iranians have delayed
moving forward, even though they have indicated that they are
favorably disposed.
We recommend that the U.S. begin planning for the
establishment of a U.S. presence in Tehran in the form of an
American-staffed ``U.S. Interests Section'' at the Swiss
Embassy--similar to what we have in Havana. This would mean a
comparable presence of an ``Iranian Interests Section'' in
Washington, D.C. Such planning should not be considered
unthinkable now, in view of our deep long term commitment to
the region and our need to know much more about the
neighborhood. In the Department of State in the mid-1970's I
oversaw two years of planning for such a step toward Cuba.
Then, as Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
I negotiated with the Cuban government the establishment of the
U.S. diplomatic presence in the ``U.S. Interests Section'' in
Havana in early 1976. Such an act does not imply approval, in
any way, of a regime, but allows the United States direct
access to the society and provides a vital means for our
understanding of a changing and distant culture, such as Iran.
CONCLUSION
We see Iran as very different from Saddam Hussein's Iraq and North
Korea--the other two members of the ``Axis of Evil.'' The option of
direct military action against Iran or even the option of prolonged
intensive covert efforts to bring about ``regime change'' should be
discarded. Such actions would threaten other U.S. interests in the area
and likely increase Iran's interest in seeking nuclear weapons and
openly opposing all U.S. activities in the region. Given the fact that
Iran borders on and is deeply engaged in two nations which represent
some of our most important interests in the region--bringing peace and
stability to Iraq and Afghanistan--we do not want Iran to be an
implacable, isolated, and even more determined enemy. Engagement with
Iran could serve to advance other U.S. interests, including: a better
understanding of the Shia Movement; stability in the Middle East;
stemming the proliferation of WMD; and addressing drug trafficking in
the region.
The negative effects to U.S. interests of a long-term strategy of
isolating Iran should be recognized. Such a strategy would deprive the
United States of the knowledge and ability to relate to one of the most
important nations--arguably the ``pivotal'' nation--in the region and
potentially one of the most troubling. We are placed at a disadvantage
by having no direct knowledge of them, often times having to depend on
flawed intelligence from ``technical means'' to evaluate what are
deeply human cultural, economic, and political issues in this young and
dynamic society.
Formal U.S. conversations with the government of Iran or the
establishment of some form of relations with that nation through a
diplomatic presence should not in any way reflect approval of Iran's
domestic or international behavior. The U.S. has close relations with
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, yet these are two nations, which at a
certain level arguably have done or could do great harm to U.S.
interests in the region. The U.S. certainly does not approve of all of
the internal actions of these two governments. Nor does it approve of
many of the domestic actions of the government of China or many other
governments whose political and economic systems are so vastly
different from ours. The U.S. does not bestow legitimacy on a
government by talking to it. On the contrary, such discussions would
provide the most powerful nation in the world the ability to increase
the varieties of influences it can bring to bear on a region of vastly
growing importance to U.S. interests. The U.S. can promote its
democratic values much more effectively by expanding contacts and
opening up societies through direct contact over a prolonged period of
time. If our objective is to ``infect'' nations with the ideas of
democracy, direct contact works best.
The U.S. is likely to be militarily, politically and economically
involved in the Middle East for decades to come. American involvement
there could conceivably reach the scale of its involvement in Europe
during the Cold War. Yet we knew Europe. We know little about the
Middle East. As the cultural, political, national and religious
elements of the Middle East evolve over the next generation, the U.S.
will have to develop direct expertise, knowledge and appreciation of
the trends in the area. The current course of U.S. policy makes it
virtually impossible for the most powerful and information-based
society in history to understand the basic elements of Iranian society.
The U.S. is without the personnel, the tools, the language and the
knowledge to make informed decisions or to conduct the appropriate
diplomatic efforts that can further U.S. interests. This should not be
the approach of this great nation.
Terrorism has become a fundamental threat to American society. Yet,
should the U.S. Government persist in dealing with all perceived
terrorist threats in purely military terms, it will surely fail and
indeed could polarize the nations of the world ever more frighteningly.
There is an opportunity today to begin to devise a strategy of
engagement with Iran that would be part of a new, more astute political
approach to the nuclear and the terrorist threats. This engagement
strategy is more likely over many years of determined effort to produce
a far more constructive outcome than the course of confrontation,
imposing isolation and military action that currently characterizes
U.S. policy. Even though the U.S. military has fought well and bravely,
Americans over the long run are better in engagement than in war.
Engagement certainly suits better the American traditions and
instincts. Engagement also contributes better toward providing the
world with a beacon of the United States as a strong nation determined
to spread its insights on democracy and liberty.
Mr. Chairman, it is now within the U.S. Government's capacity to
set a new course that will reduce Iran's threatening posture and
gradually encourage them to pursue a more cooperative role in the
region. This process could take years, and there will be setbacks, but
the time to begin is now lest our actions push them dramatically in the
opposite direction toward further endangering our interests and those
of the entire region.
I hope that these hearings give impetus to the efforts of so many
in this country who believe that the time has come for the United
States to directly engage Iran, one of the most important and
influential nations in the Middle East.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, sir.
Dr. Hadian.
STATEMENT OF DR. NASSER HADIAN, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
TEHRAN UNIVERSITY, AND VISITING PROFESSOR, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY,
NEW YORK, NY
Dr. Hadian. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I wish also
to express that this is a very good idea to have the hearing
about Iran, and again that is very timely.
Also, I wish to mention that I have been benefited by being
educated here tremendously in the U.S., and in fact, Senator
Alexander was the President of my university, the University of
Tennessee, at the time at which I was graduated, and that is an
honor and privilege, in fact, for me.
There are a number of points which I would like to discuss.
Of course, I have extensively elaborated on them in my paper,
but briefly I would love to mention the ones which I consider
are very timely and important.
First of all, unfortunately, I would like to characterize
the relationship between the U.S. and Iran predominantly as a
mutual failure since the revolution. I hope we change the
course, we change the paradigm, and try to go for a much better
relationship which is in the best interests of both countries
and very much a possibility.
To me the Iran-U.S. cold war is over. We are for all
practical purposes in fact neighbors. Iran is facing the U.S.
in Afghanistan. It is facing the U.S. west of Iran in Iraq and
also in the south in the Persian Gulf. For all practical
purposes we are neighbors, and I believe we just cannot
continue any further to have a sort of a cold war. Either we
have a choice of confrontation or reconciliation, which my
argument would be basically we are much better off to go for
reconciliation rather than confrontation which I am not sure
would serve any one of our countries' interests.
There are a number of important common interests which are
just mentioned, but I am not going to elaborate on them. We
have a huge interest in Afghanistan, narco-terrorism there,
terrorism, and the problem of refugees for Iran. Also, having a
stable and strong government in Kabul is in the interest of
both Iran and the United States.
In Pakistan, we have both, in fact, a very important
interest there to see a not-failed government there. Extremism
on the rise there, and Pakistan is a nuclear power. Pakistan is
our neighbor. Thus, to see a prosperous and stable Pakistan I
believe is in the interest of both countries again.
The same thing is Azerbaijan. In fact, the coming to power
of now President Aliev and the unresolved dispute with Armenia
there and the possibility of instability there and having a
large minority of Azeris in Iran, to see a stable Azerbaijan
again is in the interest of both of our countries.
In the Persian Gulf, the same thing. It is very important
to have a safe and stable Persian Gulf, particularly the safe
passage of oil.
The next issue is Iraq. On Iraq, I would like to elaborate
more. I would emphasize a little bit on the issue of the
nuclear programs in Iran, on Iraq, and the idea of regime
change. These are the three points which I would like to
elaborate a little bit more.
In regard to WMD or basically the nuclear weapons, I would
like to say that you have to be a little bit considerate of the
domestic situation in Iran. We have five major views in Iran
which are debating with one another.
The first view which would not be fundamentally different
from the American view is those who would argue that Iran in
fact even needs not to have nuclear energy and we do not need
to acquire extensive nuclear knowledge and technology. The
powerful Deputy Speaker of the Iranian parliament, Behzad
Nabavi, in fact has supported this view. He is a very important
reformist as well. But this is a very teeny minority view.
The second view is the view that Iran is entitled to have,
in fact, nuclear energy and also acquire nuclear technology and
nuclear knowledge. In fact, the very point that Iran signed the
NPT is because of access to this technology. Many people would
support this view. In fact, 500 students from Sharif University
which is the most important and prestigious engineering school
in Iran, incidentally the same type of students which have
protested against the Iranian Government and which have been
welcomed by many here, the same students have publicly stated--
they have published in a statement in support of having access
to nuclear knowledge and nuclear technology. In fact, they have
called those who--if the government officials want to prevent
Iran from such access, they have called it this is treason.
The third group is a group which would say that we have to
have access but different from the second one, but they argue
against, in fact, nuclear weapons. They would say that would
not increase and enhance Iran's national security environment,
that would lead to a sort of arms race in the region, and that
would not serve Iran's best interests. This is a third group.
And the fourth group is the one which would say that we
have to have nuclear weapons capability. The first three do not
link the nuclear technology to security, but the fourth group
would link it to the security issues. There are two major parts
in this fourth group.
One would argue for the fuel, even if the fuel is being
somehow provided for us. They would like some sort of
assurances that somehow those countries who are providing the
nuclear fuel for Iran is not going to be persuaded by one part
or another to stop providing Iran's nuclear fuel. Thus, they
are somewhat concerned about that. That is a security issue,
but a different kind of security issue.
But there is another major portion of them which would
think that because of Iran's national environment, because of
Iran's vulnerability, because chemical weapons have been used
against Iran, we need to have nuclear capability and that would
be very much a deterrent factor for Iran and that would provide
sort of a deterrence. Many people would support this view too.
And the fifth view is the one which is supportive of, in
fact, withdrawing from the NPT and going altogether for having
the weapons.
The first and the last view are among the minorities, but
there are a lot of supporters for the other three. I believe
the international community in general and the U.S. in
particular is much better off, rather than emphasizing the
first position, emphasizing the second position, recognizing
Iran's right to access knowledge and technology and nuclear
energy, but also addressing the legitimate concerns of the
fourth group which is the security and fuel through sort of
assurances for the fuel and a sort of exploring the idea of how
the insecurity, which is being perceived by the supporters of
that group, can be addressed and can be provided for. I believe
that is the only way you can convince a determined nation not
to follow the path for nuclear weapons. If Pakistan 30 years
ago with limited resources could develop nuclear weapons
because they were determined, for sure Iranians if they are
determined, if they are being confronted with possibly--there
are people who would argue that we have to follow the other
way.
Since my time is up, I wanted to discuss about Iraq and
about the regime change, but I probably have to stop here, and
in the question and answer I will try to do that.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hadian follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Nasser Hadian, Professor of Political
Science, Tehran University and Visiting Professor, Columbia University,
New York, NY
IRAN'S EMERGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED
STATES: DYNAMICS AND PROSPECTS
INTRODUCTION:
The objective of this paper is to provide an overview of Iran's
security environment, challenges and opportunities with specific
consideration to the critical nature of U.S.-Iran relations and its
current dynamics and future prospects. The paper initially will provide
a background on the evolving nature of Iran's security environment and
the historical factors affecting Iranian perceptions and policies. The
paper then will address factors shaping Iran's decision making process
and thinking on national security. The paper then will address the
U.S.-Iran relations in the context of common interests and areas of
contentions and concerns. The final section will be devoted to several
key observations on issues concerning Iran and the debate on Iran.
The Background:
Iran is a country that borders seven other nations, and it is
located in one of the most crucial and strategic locations of the
world. It connects the Middle East to Central Asia and Southwest Asia
and is located between the oil rich and strategically significant
Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea.
Iran maintained a border with the former Soviet Union, and it
played an important role for the West during much of the Cold War.
Because of its strategic location, its geopolitics and large oil
reserves, Iran drew the attention of both East and West during this
period. Its domestic stability along with its alliance with the West
was very crucial to the maintenance of Western interests. As an
extension of its strategic significance, it became one of the pillars
of the United States' twin pillar policy for the preservation of
stability in the Persian Gulf. The events of the 1979 Iranian
Revolution changed the geopolitics of Iran, an overnight transformation
from being one of the closest and most strategic allies of the U.S., to
being one of its most vehement opponents. Iran's threat perception and
foreign policy priorities changed with respect to its immediate
environment and the larger world at this pivotal juncture.
The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) left a deep imprint on the minds of
ordinary Iranians and policy makers alike. Iran felt alone in its war
with Iraq, going from a Western client to fighting an Iraq who had the
full support of important countries of the Arab and Western world. The
most relevant factor in this analysis for this discussion is the use of
WMD (chemical weapons) against the Iranians and Iraq's indigenous
Kurdish population. According to Robin Wright, Iran lost about 50,000
individuals during the course of the war as a result of the use of
chemical weapons. The West and Arab world supported Iraq in its
endeavors, providing military hardware, trainings, sometimes manpower,
credits, and satellite imagery to a hostile and WMD-toting Iraqi force.
The Iranians believed that the usage of WMD was a ``red line'' in
combat that would not be crossed. To their dismay, they found out that
international community in general and the West in particular either
supported or ignored the use of chemical weapons in Iran. Witnessing
such horrible facts Iranian elites reached a definite conclusion that
Iran had to rely on its own resources for providing security for its
citizen. They also concluded that the leaders of most powerful nations
could easily be persuaded to ignore the crossing of a ``red line'' for
shortsighted interests and the hatred of a regime in Tehran.
The next important event, which impacted Iran tremendously, was the
collapse of the former Soviet Union. A new geo-politics emerged which
changed the equation of threat and opportunity for Iran. Iran found
itself bordering three new land neighbors, and two new states vying
independently for the Caspian Sea access. A new geopolitics emerged:
the increased chance to use the opportunities to cooperate with these
countries was balanced by the immediate regional and the great power
decision to isolate Iran, especially in area of energy, and the new and
quickly erupted regional ethno- territorial conflict between new
neighbors, namely Azerbaijan and Armenia. In Afghanistan, due to the
withdrawal of Soviet forces, there was a period of internal war between
various Mujahideen factions which led to instability and a serious
refugee issue for Iran. Iran also became a significant transit route
for narcotics at this time.
These momentous events were synonymous with the coming to power of
President Rafsanjani. Iran tried to play a more constructive role in
the region and internationally as well. Iran's relations with its
Persian Gulf neighbors improved, and Iran's relations with the
Europeans and the East Asians also enhanced.
Relations with the U.S.:
The U.S. coup de tat of 1953 in Iran and its subsequent support of
the Shah during his quarter of a century dictatorial regime was an
important factor in shaping the perception of Iranians toward the U.S.
In post-revolutionary Iran, many were still suspicious of U.S.
intentions and some Iranian university students stormed the U.S.
Embassy, taking the Americans hostage for 444 days. The hostage crisis
left a negative image of Iranians in the minds of most Americans. Later
in mid 1980s during the Reagan administration some attempts were made
to improve relations with Iran; those attempts were buried with the
Iran--Contra affairs.
President George Bush also noted in his inaugural speech in January
1989, clearly having the American hostages in Lebanon and the possible
role that Iran might play in their release in mind, indicated that
``good will begets good will''. The message was received well in Iran;
Tehran facilitated the releasing of hostages in Lebanon. While
officially neutral in Second Persian Gulf War, Iran supported the
Operation Desert Storm. Rather than the reciprocal promise of good
will, Iran became a target of the U.S.'s ``dual containment'' policy.
Containment of Iran became an official doctrine during the Clinton
Administration and economic sanctions and toughening of visa
restriction and cultural exchanges followed. With the election of
President Khatami in 1997 in Iran, a new opportunity emerged for
improving relations between the U.S. and Iran. Positive exchanges
between the leaders of both countries was followed by the U.S. and Iran
open expression of regret for the events of 1953 and the 1979 hostage
crisis respectively. The positive atmosphere of the late 1990's,
however, did not lead to concert actions. The hopes were that the
United States and Iran would ultimately normalize relations within a
few years.
With the election of President Bush and the horrible events of
September 11th, a new security environment emerged which impacted both
the U.S. and the Muslim World, Iran in particular. Immediately Tehran
released an official condolence. Soon after the tragic event, Iranian
citizens poured out into the streets to show solidarity with Americans,
Iranian firefighters expressing regret for their counterparts in the
United States. Across the Iranian political spectrum, including from
the President Khatami himself, there was a strong condemnation of the
attacks and terrorism in general. Nonetheless, ``The War on Terrorism''
became the motto by which Bush approached his presidency, and it became
the primary objective of his administration. During the U.S. war
against Afghanistan, Iran was instrumental in supporting the Northern
Alliance and defeating the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Iran and America both
played an important role, cooperating in the constituting of a new
government in Kabul during the conference in Bonn. Expectations were
raised at this time that finally the end of the road of hostility was
reached. Light could be seen at the end of the tunnel for a workable
relationship once again between these two once allies.
Unexpectedly, Iran was accused of supporting Al-Qaeda, and Iran was
included in President Bush's State of the Union speech as a member of
the ``axis of evil''. In the minds of Iranians, this created an image
of the Bush administration as one driven by ideology and intent on
reshaping the entire region. Diverse forces with different political
persuasions in Iran opposed the inclusion of Iran in the ``axis of
evil''. They were convinced that U.S. intentions would be detrimental
to the national interest of Iran. The U.S. war in Iraq generated a
debate in Iran again. What should Iran's policy be toward the U.S. and
the war? There were calls for neutrality or implicit support from a
majority of the Iranian political spectrum. With the eventual
dismantling of the Ba'ath regime, a new security environment has
emerged which has created both opportunities and threats for Iran.
One of the most important impacts of U.S. policy toward Iran has
been the securitization of politics in Iran, and the external
negativity towards Iran. Everything in Iran became a matter of state
security. Newspapers were closed down, political activists, along with
academicians, were put in jail, and political parties were controlled
or banned many on charges of being agents of the U.S. Externally,
especially in the region, an informal U.S.-inspired international
``reward structure'' emerged that promoted hostility towards or
distance from Iran. Regional actors used this opportunity to receive
U.S. support in their presumably unified effort to contain the Iranian
fundamentalist threat. Nations are calling for U.S. concessions to
contain Iranian-style fundamentalism. A sense of mutual obsession which
cut on both sides domestically and internationally became the enduring
characteristics of the U.S.-Iran relations after the 1979 revolution.
Occasional attempts at realistic assessment of the relations and hopes
of possible rapprochement could not survive the intensity of the past
and recent legacy of hostility and mutual frustration. Will the
immediate or long-term future be the repetition of the past 25 years,
or one should expect and hope for a different and better alternative?
IRAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY: THE ENVIRONMENT, POLICY SOURCES AND THE
DECISION MAKING INSTITUTIONS
The Environment: The Center of Regional and Global Storms:
Three times in the last 25 years events of great historical
significance have transformed Iran's national, regional and global
setting. The 1979 revolution, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the
tragedy of 9/11 and the U.S. response to it. The revolution changed not
only the prism through which the external world was received and
interpreted, but also how Iran was perceived and treated; Saddam's
aggression and the disruption of relations with the U.S. were the most
consequential results. The collapse of the Soviet Union, changed Iran's
geopolitics, removed the limited umbrella of cold war, and added both
opportunities but mostly vulnerabilities by exposing Iran's northern
frontier, compiling the problems of an already border/neighbor-
saturated country. The 9/11 tragedy changed, one more time Iran's
regional if not very national security environment.
One doesn't have to be sympathetic to the Iranian regime to see the
incredible array of security challenges facing Iran. A simple look
might tell the basic sketches of Iran's regional complex. In the north
the stability of the Soviet time has been replaced by an intense new
``great games'' over the resources of the Caspian Sea, largely to the
territorial and, political, economic, and environmental detriments of
Iran. In the East first it was Soviet occupied Afghanistan, replaced by
a hostile Taliban-led, and now run by the United States. Another
neighbor in the East, Pakistan, while ``friendly'' on diplomatic face,
supported Taliban, harbored the anti Shi'/anti Iranian regional
extremist movement, and it is armed with nuclear weapons. The Eastern
front has also been the source of grave national security as the bulk
of socially devastating drug trafficking to Iran's young population is
generated from there. To the West is, Turkey, a NATO member, with
strong military ties to the U.S. and until recently a vocal champion of
the theme of ``the Iranian threat''. And, Saddam's Iraq with his
aggression and the use of WMD against Iran. Post Saddam Iraq is run by
the United States, a country that considers Iran a member of axis of
evil and openly talks about its regime change. In the South, where Iran
national and strategic resources are located, the country again faces
the United States.
Thus a true example of an international system that is based on
``self help'', Iran's ``anarchical'' regional environment has all the
ingredients of an strategic nightmare: Too many neighbors with hostile,
unfriendly or at best opportunistic attitudes, no great power alliance,
a 25 years face-off with greatest superpower in history, living in a
war infested region (5 major wars in less than 25 years), a region ripe
with ethno-territorial disputes on its borders (Iran has been a major
regional refugee hub), and with a dominant Wahabi trans-regional
movement which theologically and politically despises Iran, and finally
a region with nuclear powers; Pakistan, Israel, and India. Iran is
located at the center of the ``uncontrollable center'' of post-Cold war
and post-9/11 world politics.
Two points are worth emphasizing in understanding Iran's national
security environment. First, that assessing Iran's intentions and
policies, must out of rationality and not sympathy, take this taxing
environment into serious consideration. Second, that in spite of this
challenging security framework Iran has been able to maintain its
territorial and political integrity, stability and considerable
infrastructural development and an stable society, without external
support.
The Policy Sources and Decision Making Institutions:
A detailed discussion of Iran's decision-making process is beyond
the scope of this presentation, but two points are worth emphasizing.
First, the decision on major issues is not made by one person, or a
particular group; no body and no institution, in real world, has such
authority. Second, Iran's deacons on key issues are made through
consensus. Iran's defense and security policies and decision-making are
articulated by and developed in a composite of complex processes. A
number of formal institutions, informal networks, personal
relationships, and individual initiatives play a role in the formation
of Iranian policy. From the outside, it may seem very chaotic and it is
often difficult for outsiders to know who makes what decisions and how.
However, the output of the system is consensually based. While the
consensually driven process provides policy stability, it nevertheless
makes reaching decisions more difficult and arduous. On major national
security decision, while the elites have been too eager to factionalize
and politicize the issues including relations with the U.S., but at the
end great decisions are made through consensus. A consensus that is
borne out of a painstaking process of give-and-take, public and private
maneuvering, and at the end a ``democratic'' process in its own
context, within a maze of incredibly complex labyrinth of interest
groups and factions. The conservatives have significant power, but
their rhetoric is both checked by their own sense of reality and
serious challenge within their own ranks, and by the reformers. The
ironic and positive role of the conservatives in charge should not be
overlooked; they control the ``real believers'' and hot headed
radicals; something that the reforms are not capable of doing. The
difficult and so publicly made debate and struggle over the nuclear
issue last week was made in such a complex environment.
Policy Sources:
The Iranian national security policies are influenced by and are
made at the intersection of ideological factors which in addition to
revolutionary and reformist Islam, it includes Iranian nationalism.
Consideration over the economic prosperity of a very demanding
population, the multi ethnic character of Iran and finally the
geopolitical consideration play very significant role in informing and
framing Iranian national security decisions and policies. A critical
point that needs underscoring here is that all these factors in one way
or the other involves or affected by U.S.-Iran relations. Four
important facets are influential in the formulation of Iran's defense
and security policies:
1. Ideological Sources: Three important ideological orientations
are influential in shaping the security and defense policy in Iran:
Revolutionary Islam, Reformist Islam, and Iranian Nationalism.
Depending on the particular issue and the constellation of political
forces, along with the international community, any of these three
orientations can have a bearing on policy more or less. If there isn't
consensus among these three camps, as is often times the case, there
arises a serious problem in implementation.
2. Economic Prosperity: Iran's 70 million people have expectations
of a better standard of living. A quarter century has passed since the
time of the revolution, and the citizens of Iran are expecting better
economic performance and government policy. Thus, the Iranian
government is under serious pressure to perform. Iran has improved its
economic relations with the rest of the world and also created
infrastructure for foreign investment with the hopes of increasing
domestic prosperity. On the whole, economic issues are exercising more
and more influence on Iran's security and defense policies.
3. Multi-Ethnic Character: Iran is comprised of different ethnic
and religious minorities. Many of these minorities have an affinity to
their people on the other side of the geopolitical border. This has an
important impact on the defense and security policies of Iran. Whoever
presides in Tehran and wants to form a coherent policy must be wary of
the multi-faceted nature of society.
4. Geopolitical Considerations: More and more, Iran's security and
defense policies are being influenced by geopolitical issues.
Instability in Afghanistan and Iraq, uncertainties in Azerbaijan and
Pakistan, and Iran's maintenance of good relations with the Persian
Gulf countries all have a bearing on Iranian policy. A wide U.S.
presence in many of these areas poses a problem: there is no buffer, or
physical space between Iran and the U.S. anymore; they are literally
neighbors to the South, East, and West.
Decision Making Institutions:
A number of formal and informal institutions and organizations are
additionally important in shaping security policy in Iran. Highest
among the formal institutions include Iran's armed forces (both regular
and revolutionary), intelligence, interior, and foreign ministries,
Islamic propagation organizations, the expediency council, the office
of the President and the Supreme Leader, the Supreme National Security
Council (SNSC), and the Foreign Relations and Security Committee of the
parliament. A number of informal organizations and individuals also
have input in security policy issues. Depending on the nature of the
issue, the interplay between these different organizations and
institutions are different and their impact on policy differs as well.
The ultimate outcome is a product of debates and negotiations between
these groups.
The Supreme National Security Council of Iran plays a very
important role in initiating, debating, aggregating and helping reach a
consensus on security issues. All major players in the security
apparatus of Iranian government have a representative in the Supreme
National Security Council. Typically, decisions of the SNSC are abided.
To violate a decision of the SNSC is usually associated with paying a
heavy cost. This process was displayed last week, when the SNSC played
a pivotal role in making decisions with regard to Iran's nuclear
program. Though a number of hardliners and conservatives disagreed with
the decision, and expressed concern with the decision, they ultimately
abided by the decision. It is interesting to note that usually in the
United States, the Secretary of State is perceived to be a more
powerful individual than the National Security Advisor. However, in
Iran as we saw recently, the role of the General Secretary of the SNSC
was perceived as more central than that of the foreign minister. The
General Secretary sat among the three European Foreign Ministers during
the interview process, which indicates the power of the SNSC in making
ultimate security decisions.
U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS: ISSUES OF TENSIONS AND CONCERNS
There are several critical issues that have been at the center of
U.S.-Iran tensions especially since the early 1990's, namely Iran's
nuclear program, terrorism and radicalism, the Palestinian Israeli
conflict and the peace process, and finally the issue of human rights.
While the degree of significance and relevance of each might differ,
they have collectively become important issues of concerns in U.S.-Iran
relations.
1. Iran's Nuclear Program: Iran began its nuclear program in 1974
during the Shah's regime with the perception that oil is a finite
resource that would ultimately be exhausted. Ironically, the U.S.
supported that initiative. The statements that are being heard today--
that Iran doesn't need nuclear energy due to its vast oil and gas
reserves, were never made before 1979. This inconsistency is still a
confounding issue in the minds of many Iranians. They are surprised
that with a population twice the size of pre-revolutionary Iran, and
oil consumption exponentially higher, the U.S. would argue this point
of contention at this point in time. Simply put, this argument is
viewed as politically motivated argument particularly in the context of
today. Five domestic views can be identified with regard to Iran's
nuclear program.
a. Small numbers of people argue that due to environmental
and economic reasons, nuclear energy is not a necessity for
Iran. Arguments have been that the cost of investment for
generating a kilowatt of electricity is more expensive using
nuclear energy than it is with other means. Behzad Nabavi, the
powerful deputy speaker of parliament and one of the
influential leaders of the reformist movement, is a supporter
of this view (ISNA, 15, 08, 2003). This seems to be the
American position as well.
b. A much larger group argues that Iran needs nuclear energy
and should acquire nuclear knowledge and technology. They argue
that this is an economically wise decision (investing in
alternative forms of energy) and in terms of pride and
prestige, many would like to acquire that knowledge and
technology. It is seen as technology of the future, and no
country should be deprived of having access to such knowledge
and technology. They argue that the very point of Iran's
joining the NPT was to have this access and technology. Many
university students, hundreds of faculty members of
Universities, and officials and elites Iran wide are supporters
of this policy. The European, Japanese, and Russian governments
support this position.
c. Some hold the conviction that Iran should have access to
nuclear technology and be able to use nuclear energy for
civilian purposes but it should develop neither nuclear weapon
capability or nuclear weapons. Because they will not enhance
Iran's national security; violate Iran's international
commitments; contribute to regional proliferation and will be
detrimental to Iran's relations with the other states. They are
in favor of Iran's signing of Additional Protocol, are
supportive nuclear disarmament and are critical of the U.S.
overlooking Israel's nuclear weapons which works against
creating a nuclear free zone in the Middle East. The possession
of nuclear weapons by other states, including Pakistan and
Israel tend to weaken the proponents of this view in Iran.
d. Some would argue that we should not only have nuclear
technology for alternative sources of energy and a source of
knowledge, but would also argue that the capability for nuclear
weapons should also exist. For the supporters of this outlook,
the security environment of Iran considering the usage of
chemical weapons against it with no complaint from the
international community, and Iran's threat perception
necessitate that this capability exist. There is a nuance that
should be considered in this perspective. Some argue that the
capability to produce fuel for the reactors must exist. Their
main concerns are not typical security per say, but rather that
they may have to be dependent on others for fuel if they are
not self sufficient. This rises from the uncertainty of having
access to the necessary fuel for the reactors. The other
portion of the group would argue that it is in fact important
for Iran to have all the necessary elements and capabilities
for producing weapons. Of course, they only want the
capability, not the weapons. The capability alone is an
important strategic deterrence in their view, and can have a
positive contribution to Iran's defense and national security
policies. There are quite a few influential people who support
this perspective.
e. A small number of people argue that Iran should withdraw
from the NPT and move to develop weapons as soon as possible.
They believe that Iran should pay the price of international
sanctions if necessary. They cite the hostility toward Iran and
Iran's security environment, and say that the weapons would
make an ideal deterrence. It would preserves its territorial
integrity, provide reliable security and enhance Iran's status
in the region and the world.
The first and last groups have few supporters in Iran. They are
seen as extreme positions. A majority in Iran supports b, c or d views,
including the elites and governmental officials. It would be very
unwise of the U.S. to press for the first position, because that would
be perceived by a majority of ordinary Iranians and elites alike as
indicative of hostile intentions of the U.S. In other words, the U.S.
would want to deprive Iran of achieving knowledge and technology to
help better itself. An insistence on this position will serve to unify
diverse forces in Iran against the Americans.
The U.S. has already applied severe economic sanctions to Iran in
order to change the behavior and attitude of Iranian officials in
regards to terrorism, WMD and Arab-Israeli conflict, but as we are
witnessing, none of the objectives of these policies have been
achieved. According to the State Department, Iran is still at the top
of the list of terrorist supporters, Iran still opposes the peace
process as the U.S. sees it in the Middle East and according to the
IAEA, Iran has also had vast improvement in its nuclear infrastructure
and capability. Some would argue that much tougher sanctions by the
international community would force Iran and those who support
weaponization of Iran's nuclear program to quit, but if indeed Iran is
determined to achieve nuclear weapons (although this author does not
believe that Iran is), it has the capability to do so. Their resources,
for example, are significantly better than that of Pakistan to achieve
this objective. Thus, additional sanctions will more than likely be
unsuccessful in convincing those in Iran who would like to see a
weaponization of Iran's program.
It should also be pointed out that the surgical military attack on
different nuclear sites in Iran (either by Israel or the U.S.) would
only enhance and strengthen the will of the Iranians in going forth
with full nuclear weaponization.
Additionally, Iran has sufficient resources in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Azerbaijan, the Persian Gulf, Lebanon and other places to escalate the
tension. Iran's capabilities in these areas, policy makers in Iran
believe, should have enough deterrence for those contemplating a
surgical attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. Such a surgical attack,
also, would have to be unlimited and total for it to be successful,
which poses dangers that could be unimaginable. With the coming
presidential election in the United States, and the U.S. difficulties
in Iraq and Afghanistan, this seems an unlikely option. Iran's sense of
pride and independence and their capabilities and the lack of support
for such action by even the most hostile anti-Islamic Republic forces
would make this action further unrealistic.
A related issue is Iran's missile program. Asking Iran to stop or
dismantle its missile program would simply not work. Considering the
missile attacks by Iraq in the course of Iran-Iraq war, and missiles
importance and roles in defense policy, Iranian military planners were
convinced that it is imperative for Iran to invest in missile research
and development. Iran has successfully tested mid-range missiles-Shahab
3. As a part of comprehensive solutions to problems between the U.S.
and Iran, Iran may be persuaded to stop developing longer-range
missiles and also can be persuaded to deploy the already tested Shahab
3 from a particular point in its territory, which cannot reach
sensitive areas in Europe and Israel. A verifiable regime can be agreed
upon to check these deployments. These would be important confidence
building measures.
2. Terrorism: Two kinds of terrorism can be distinguished:
Politically oriented terrorism and ideologically oriented terrorism.
Politically oriented terrorism is an extension of politics. A cost
benefit analysis is present in a calculation of politically oriented
terrorism. Thus, if in someone's calculation the benefit of politically
oriented terrorism outweighs the costs, the possibility of action
increases. Suicide bombs in Israel can be included in this category.
Hence, it is very much possible that if a ``reasonable'' offer is
proposed to the Palestinians, suicide bombing can be stopped. It is
much easier to deal with this type of terrorism than the other kind.
Ideologically oriented terrorism is inherently and fundamentally a
different kind of action, though the consequence of action and the
outside appearance of such acts may seem the same. In this type of
terrorism, the actor performs a duty regardless of consequences.
Consequences are part of the calculation of those who partake in
politically oriented terrorism, while in ideological terrorism
consequences are secondary in importance. By performing these acts, the
actor has been promised true victory no matter what the specific
outcome of that event might be. Though it has been said that
politically oriented terrorism is easier to deal with, ideological
terrorism is more difficult particularly in fighting extremist Islamic
terrorist actions.
Islamically oriented radicalism is on the rise in Islamic
countries. It seems that the Muslim masses, elites, and intellegencia
have come to the conclusion that the Islamist alternative to secular
ideas is more promising. There is introspection in Islamic countries as
to why they are behind the West in a number of important areas of
social life, and they feel that their lifestyle and belief system is in
danger by the imposition of sets of alien values through globalization
or their Western supported governments. They believe a return to Islam,
to an idealized past or an Islamically constructed utopian in the
future is the solution. There is a belief that this idealism can be
brought to the here and now. They are willing to fight with whatever
force they deem is an impediment to the realization of their
objectives. If these forces were their governments, or supporters of
their governments, they would fight with them. Their commitment to this
cause is not a rational cost/benefit analysis. The only way you can
fight with them and deconstruct these ideological underpinnings is
through an alternative reading of Islam which seems both modern and
authentic. Tanks, missiles and other state of the art military hardware
are not appropriate weapons for fighting these kinds of wars. In other
words there is no military solution for this kind of terrorism. In
Iran, reformists' construction of Islam is the antidote to that radical
construction. In fact, a successful reformist government in Iran and a
reformist construction of Islam--which has already been articulated--is
the best prescription to fight with the radical ideological
construction of Islam. In the hearts and minds of many Muslim
intellectuals and intellegencia, it is the Reformist Islam--a reading
of Islam which is compatible with modernity--that appears very native,
authentic, and appealing. The West like the Muslim world has an
interest in seeing the victory of reformist Islam in its battle with
extremists Islam.
Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad: It is
wrong to lump different organizations of different stripes together,
and to try to prescribe the same course of action in dealing with them.
Iran's relation to each one of these four organizations is different.
Iran's relations with Hezbollah in Lebanon are much closer than to the
others. Across the political spectrum in Iran, there is support for
Hezbollah. To them, Hezbollah is not only a force which fought for an
end to Israeli occupation of Lebanon, but also a representation of
Shiite rights in Lebanese society. Iran is a predominantly Shiite
country, which feels a strong affinity with the Lebanese Shiite
community. In Hezbollah, we also find differences of opinions like we
do within Iran itself. There are hardliners, conservatives, and
reformers that preside within the party of Hezbollah. Thus Iranian
reformers feel closer to reformers in Hezbollah, and conservatives to
their counterparts in Hezbollah as well. In the eyes of the Iranian
reformists and popular supporters of the reformists, there is the view
that Hezbollah is not involved in acts of terrorism. If Hezbollah were
to engage in more radical acts that would be easier to distinguish as
acts of terrorism, the Iranian reformers would react accordingly.
There is generally support for the Palestinian cause among
Iranians, but approaches vary. With regard to Hamas, there is a
different type of relationship. Though conservatives and hardliners
support Hamas, this support manifests itself rhetorically and
psychologically. Certainly, the sympathy that exists between
conservative Iranians and Hamas is weaker than that between many Arab
countries and the latter group. With regard to Islamic Jihad, Iran has
a slightly closer relationship (hardliners in Iran). However, Iranian
reformers perceive both Islamic Jihad and Hamas as radical
organizations, which hurt the Palestinian cause. For the Iranian
reformers, the Palestinian Authority represents the Palestinian people.
In other words, they support the PA. Iran can play a very constructive
role should they be asked seriously to take a positive role in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They might be able to exercise some
influence on various groups, for example.
With regard to Al Qaeda it should be noted firstly that Iran has
never supported this group. In fact, for the past 5-6 years, they have
been engaged in a proxy war with Al Qaeda and the Taliban in
Afghanistan. Al Qaeda's actions are in fact considered extremism even
in view of the Iranian radicals. Even before September 11th, Iran
policy makers across the political spectrum condemned Al Qaeda's
actions and its naive construction of Islamic ideology. Post 9/11,
Iranians have continued to vehemently condemn Al Qaeda's actions. After
the U.S. overthrow of the Taliban and their fight with Al Qaeda, quite
a few Al Qaeda members escaped to Iran. Many of them have been
arrested, some of them being sent to their countries of citizenship.
Still, quite a number of them are in custody in Iran.
Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq and overthrow of Saddam however, a
peculiar relationship between the U.S. and the MKO (Mujahideen Khalq
Organization) has emerged. The MKO is an Iranian opposition group which
has fought violently with the Iranian government since the early days
of the revolution. They have killed many Iranian officials and non-
officials along the way. Throughout the Iran-Iraq war, the MKO
cooperated with Saddam in fighting with Iran, and also it is widely
believed it was used as a suppressive apparatus by Saddam against
Shiite and Kurdish forces. On the one hand, the Mujahideen has been
listed as a terrorist organization on the State Department's list.
However, some forces in Washington have argued that the MKO can be used
as an instrument to apply pressure on the Iranian government, be a
counterbalance to the Bath Brigade, collects intelligence for the U.S.,
and participates in possible acts of sabotage against Iranian interest.
Iran is receiving mixed signals from Washington with regard to the
status of the MKO. Sometimes, it is claimed that they have been
disarmed. At the same time, there are reports that they are in a
position to be rearmed if necessary. Thus, the issues of Al Qaeda and
the MKO are tied together in a sense. Iranians would not accept the
U.S. on the one side preaching moral clarity in the fight against
terrorism, while finding an interest in supporting an organization that
they themselves label terrorist on the other hand.
3. The Peace Process: Although Iran's official position is a one
state solution in Israel and Palestine, Iran has publicly announced
that it is ready to accept a two state solution if the Palestinians do.
Although Iranian leaders have publicly opposed the peace process and
verbally attacked Israel, they have repeatedly said they would not do
anything to sabotage the peace process in practice. For sure, there is
a dispute in Iran with regard to dealing with this issue. A majority of
Iranian reformers have already publicly announced that they support a
two state solution, and they oppose extremism of both Israelis and
Palestinians. These reformers have been accused by the conservatives
that by making such statements they are betraying the Palestinian
cause.
4. Human Rights: The issue of human rights is very much alive in
the Iranian domestic political scene, and Iranians are debating and
fighting among themselves on this issue. A number of debates have
emerged reconciling human rights and Islam, which has significant
impact on the Islamic World. Many individuals and institutions have
been engaged in supporting human rights issues. Thus, there is an
important constituency inside of Iran that demands its government
respect and promotes human rights and vehemently opposes the violation
of those rights by any institution. There are many different NGOs in
Iran, which directly or indirectly deal with this issue. The recent
reception of the Nobel Peace Prize by Iranian Shireen Ebadi, a human
rights activist, has strengthened the morale of human rights supporters
in Iran.
The U.S. has not been consistent in its demand for the observation
of human rights in Iran. At times, it has emphasized human rights, and
other times it has used it as a means for pressuring Iran. For sure, a
double standard of U.S. application of human rights issues to Iran and
not its allies with worse human rights records has served to politicize
the issue. Support for human rights, if not used as a means to pressure
Iran, can be a genuine objective of U.S. foreign policy toward Iran.
The U.S. should be sensitive of domestic issues, and pay attention to
debates within Iran instead of superimposing its own standards
inconsistently on Iran.
If U.S. policy makers are truly interested in non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons, a bold and new initiative should be adopted in dealing
with Iran. The U.S. should also be supportive of the second Iranian
position on nuclear issue like the Europeans, but should also address
the two most important considerations of the third position. Iran
should be assured of reliable source of fuel and legitimate national
security concerns of Iran should be addressed. A Middle East free of
nuclear weapons, and a collective security arrangement, which can
include the U.S. and others, and bilateral security assurances to Iran
all should be explored. In general the nuclear issue can be part of a
comprehensive approach to solving Iran-U.S. problems. None of the
Iranian requests are outside the bounds of the NPT. We have lost many
opportunities in the past, and we have both paid the cost of these
blunders. Both Iran and the U.S. have important common interests. The
issues of concern to both sides should be addressed in a bold and
comprehensive way.
Through engagement, and not containment or intensification of
hostility, the U.S. can address its legitimate concerns and interests.
This would be welcomed by Iran. In return, for cooperating with the
U.S. on these points, Iran has some concerns and demands as well. The
most important of these would be the recognition of its revolution and
perceiving Iran as a normal state and supporting Iran's legitimate and
constructive regional role. Again it should be repeated that this may
seem symbolic, but it indeed plays a very important role in the minds
of Iranian policy makers. As an indication of such a changed perception
by U.S. policy makers, a number of major measures should be adopted by
the U.S: For one, sanctions should be lifted. As it was stated before,
they do not have the intended outcome anyway, but they pose a
psychological barrier for Iranian policy makers. Second, U.S. should
not be an impediment toward Iran's ascension to the World Trade
Organization. Last week, the U.S. again prevented Iran from initiating
the process of joining the WTO. Third, the unfreezing of Iranian assets
is also very important. Fourth, changing rhetorical dynamics of
demonization will have a major impact. And finally, a preliminary move,
which will have a major positive impact in Iran especially among the
public is the easing of visa restriction for family visits, academic
purposes and cultural exchanges. This will not be a costly measure but
its impact will be very significant. After all no Iranians were
involved in 9/11 or any terrorist activity in the United States; the
pouring of sympathy for the U.S. on this tragedy in Iran was and
remains constant. A collective punishment that actually has been
unusually tough on Iranians who try to visit the U.S. has been very
damaging.
U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS: AREAS OF COMMON INTERESTS
While the relations between Iran and the United States have been
signified by hostility and lingering issues of concern, the two
countries, ironic as it may appear, have significant common interests
with considerable countervailing potential and the weight to overcome
the differences and the tensions. These common interests are most
significantly expressed in the desire of both countries for regional
stability in the Middle East, the Caspian Basin and in Southwest Asia.
A common desire which has given a new and urgent impetus in post-9/11
era and the subsequent U.S. military intervention in the region.
1. Afghanistan: Iran has a long and porous border with Afghanistan,
and the security and stability of Afghanistan are very important to
Iran and America alike. Having a large number of Afghan refugees in
Iran, having lost more than 3000 Iranians in fights with Narco-
Terrorists, and the presence of cheap narcotics in Iranian streets have
made Iranian policy makers determined in seeking a stronger and stable
central government in Afghanistan. The United States also has an
interest in a stable and secure Afghanistan because of its fight
against terrorism. Narcotics are also a problem for the U.S. and more
notably Europe. Rather than competing with one another, and perceiving
one another as a threat which can jeopardize the entire situation in
Afghanistan, it is imperative to cooperate for the sake of the
prosperity and improvement in Afghanistan. Depending on U.S. posture
toward Iran, Iran has the ability to either use its infrastructure to
play a constructive role in Afghanistan or do otherwise.
2. Azerbailan: With the coming to power of Ilham Aliev and his
deficit of legitimacy the possibility of subsequent instability in
Azerbaijan is high, yet unresolved disputes with Armenia, and a large
population of Azeris in Iran, Iran has an interest in seeing a stable
and prosperous Azerbaijan to its North. The U.S. also has similar
interests in Azerbaijan. Both nations therefore must help ease tension
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Rather than making it a point of
contention between two countries, and adopting exclusionary policies,
Iran and the U.S. should cooperate and would benefit greatly from
mutual respect. Any U.S. support for an Azerbaijani irredentist
movement in Iran, discretely or indiscreetly, will be perceived by an
overwhelming majority of Iranians as a hostile act.
3. Pakistan: Both Iran and the U.S. have interests in seeing a
nuclear Pakistan not turn out to be a failed state. The rise of
extremism in Pakistan and the multiethnic nature of Pakistani society,
the prevalence poverty, and its contention with India can lead to a
situation which will pose a danger to the region and to the world.
Stopping narcotic traffic through Iran, maintaining secure borders, the
Baluchistan minority problem, and the preservation of the rights of
Shiites in Pakistan are very important issues for Iran. Included among
these is the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. The U.S. has an
interest to see an extremist controlled and democratic Pakistan which
does not place nuclear weapons in the wrong hands as well. Both the
U.S. and Iran would like to see control of extremist elements within
Pakistan.
4. The Persian Gulf: Iran and the U.S. both have an interest in the
safe passage of oil in a stable and secure Persian Gulf. Stability of
world energy markets through cooperation and coordination between
producers and consumers is in vital interest of both countries and
world community as well.
5. Iraq: While all major U.S. regional concerns and preoccupations
somehow involve Iran, none has the immediacy, weight and far-reaching
regional, global and domestic implications of the future of Iraq. The
enormity of the U.S. stakes in Iraq needs no explanation; what is not
often acknowledged or appreciated is Iran's role in Iraq's future.
Beyond the U.S., Iran is and will be the most influential and relevant
state actor in Iraq. Not only Iran's proximity, but significant though
until now suppressed, historical, institutional, personal, and
religious ties, in addition to Iran's knowledge of Iraq and its
intricacies, underscore its significance and relevance. A hostile U.S.-
Iran relationship, especially one with built-in coercive military and
economic measures, will make a successful reconstruction in Iraq very
difficult if not impossible. One can easily assume the same in
Afghanistan.
Since Iraq is a pressing issue at this point in time, I would like
to expand on it in more detail. Overthrowing the Saddam regime was the
easier part of the Iraqi crisis. Establishing peace and security,
winning the terrorism war and convincing the Iraqi, Arab and Muslim
masses that America is not an occupying force and is not planning to
plunder Iraqi oil and wealth, and it does not have a grandiose plan for
reshaping the Middle East map are much harder tasks to achieve.
Radicalism in the form of terrorism and suicidal bombers will certainly
increase against Americans and would be considered as few remaining
options for Arab and Muslim who perceive the exercise of U.S. power
very unjust and detrimental. Over the course of the last few decades,
Saddam's Ba'ath party apparatus destroyed every feasible form of civil
society and prevented the emergence of any autonomous associations and
institutions. He ruled through terror and fear.
The resemblance with pre-revolutionary Iran is striking. The only
remaining autonomous institution in 1970s Iranian society was the
clerical network. Mosques were an important public space available to
masses and elites for debating and adopting goals and objectives for
their collective actions and designing strategies to achieve them. This
is the case in today's Iraq. The Shiite clerical network, in Iraq as
well as in Iran, is relatively hierarchical, with the Supreme
Jurisprudent at the top, learned Ayatollahs in the middle, and the
lower ranking clergy among the people in the rural areas and small
towns. The pinnacle of the hierarchy expands from Qum to Najaf (the two
main centers of learning in Iran and Iraq respectively) and consists of
deep relationships between the clerics of the two cities. The
structure, content and language of their training are almost identical.
Intermarriage between them further solidifies their relationship. This
establishment has influence both within Shiite villages and towns in
Iran and Iraq. Even withstanding the rivalry that exists between these
two centers of learning; substantial influence can be transmitted from
the Qum's clergy to Iraq, and from the Najaf's clergy to Iran.
Historically, this has indeed been the case. The return of a relatively
large number of senior clerics who have been residing in Qum as a
result of Saddam's repression, along with the Bath Brigade and other
Iraqi exiles, will seriously influence the course of events in Iraq. It
is reported that a number of Shiites who have returned from Iran are
already in positions of governance in Iraq.
This powerful clerical network presents an organized force with the
ability to set objectives, and ultimately set an agenda for society.
Given the current power vacuum in Iraq, the clerics are best positioned
to organize and mobilize the masses. This is the case, not only among
the Shiites but also among the more religious Sunnis. Mosques are
excellent resources at the disposal of the clerics' for facilitating
these processes. The potential exists for a very powerful socio-
political movement to be generated by this force under the slogan of:
``No to occupation, yes to democracy.'' A review of recent events in
post-war Iraq underscores the potential power of this idea.
Demonstrations under this slogan are indeed becoming the most visible
expressions of ``homegrown'' empowerment.
Iran is in the position to influence greatly the tide of events in
Iraq. It can, if it chooses, complicate the situation in Iraq by
fueling the anti-American mayhem, or it can play a constructive role in
containing extremism. The initiative of calling for Iranian cooperation
is now in the hands of the United States. Iran and the U.S. share a
number of crucial interests (territorial integrity, stability, fair
representation for Shiite majority and WMD disarmament) in Iraq. The
current climate of U.S.-Iranian relations does not lend itself to such
a bold initiative. However, with the future of Iraq and the final
verdict on the utility and legitimacy of U.S. intervention in the
balance, this opportunity should be taken not only to improve relations
with Tehran, but also to lay a more solid foundation to manage the
ever-complex socio-religious and political fabric of the Iraqi polity
and move towards a stable and prosperous Iraq.
The significance of Iran-U.S. relations in Iraq must also be
understood in the larger context of the perhaps unintended consequence
of the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of the ``Sunni minority''
rule and the eventual dominance of Iraq, in one form or other,
benevolent and democratic as it might and should be, of Shiites in
Iraq. The georeligious and geopolitical map of the Middle East will
never be the same. The two most powerful Muslim states of the Persian
Gulf/Middle East, Iran and Iraq, will be controlled by Shiites. While
some people in Washington may argue for an American policy based on the
emergence of an intra-Shi'i rivalry between Iran and Iraq, that
tempting paradigm, lacks, appreciation of the transnational and
translocal nature of relations between Qum and Najaf, the clergy in
Iran and Iraq, and the depth of historical, personal, and blood ties
between the two sides. One should not underestimate, in addition, the
centrality of Najaf and Karbala for the entire edifice of Iranian
worldview, emotion and identity. A closer or normalized Iran-U.S.
relationship means not only better bilateral ties, but rather a much-
improved situation in the larger social, ideological and political
milieu of the Muslim world that includes millions of Shi'is spread
throughout not only in Iran and Iraq, but also in Afghanistan, the
volatile Indian sub-continent, Africa, Lebanon, and the rest of the
Arab world including Saudi Arabia.
OBSERVATIONS: IRAN'S DOMESTIC AND REGIONAL CONDITIONS, AND RELATIONS
WITH THE UNITED STATES
Several key observations could result from an overview analysis of
Iran's strategic conditions, its domestic prospects and its relations
with the United States; issues that have been subject of discussions in
both countries and especially in the United States. Consideration of
these issues will be essential in the understanding of Iran, and the
contemplation over the future prospects of her relations with the
United States.
1. Iran's Centrality and the Myth of Isolation: Iran is the most
important linkage state in the Middle East. For the reasons of its
geography, its revolution and ambitions, and its peculiar and jealously
guarded sense of independence and thus centrality, all issues of
importance in the Middle East from the Palestinian-Israeli conflict,
proliferation, terrorism, future of Iraq, stability in Afghanistan,
future of relations between Islam and the West, regional political
change and reform, Persian Gulf security, to access to secure energy
both in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian, etc., either by default or
design, run in one way or the other, through Iran. Isolation of Iran is
not an option. What underscores this centrality is the significance of
U.S.-Iran relations in shaping Middle East dynamics; no other factor in
the last 25 years has had a more transformative impact on this region
than the Iranian revolution and the hostile nature of U.S.-Iranian
relations.
2. Iran's Loneliness and Independence: A key characteristic of
Iran's external condition is its essential strategic loneliness. Partly
the result of the revolution's character and nature, and partly self
inflicted, this loneliness, which was most dramatically displayed
during the 8 years war with Iraq where all major regional and global
powers including the United States supported the ``Butcher of Baghdad''
and his gas making and gas using machine, has resulted in a national
and elite-shared psychology that favors self sufficiency in defense,
lacks trust in the efficacy of international institutions and great
power alliances, and thus emphasizes reliance on its own resources,
both mental and physical for national protection and defense. While the
real and opportunity cost and damages of this imposed or selected self
reliance have been enormous, it has nevertheless also interjected and
infused a sense of confidence, pride, ability for crisis management,
and internal development of native recourses unparalleled in the
region. This combination of loneliness, independence, and self-
sufficiency underscores both Iran's cautious attitudes towards regional
conflicts on the one hand, and its bold, and even tough style on issues
of principle and national significance. You are dealing with a seasoned
elite that while displaying idiosyncrasies of its own in loosing
opportunities is quite capable of maneuvering in real crisis, not only
with regional states, but also with great powers like the United
States. Do not underestimate Iran's power; a power that is not
necessarily nor primarily physical. The subjective staying power is
considerable, especially in times of crisis. This is particularly all
the more true as Iran, thanks partially to the United States which
surgically removed Iran's enemies in Afghanistan and especially in
Iraq, is currently in its most favorable geopolitical position since
the revolution in 1979.
3. The Myth of the Regime Chance: There has been a lot of talk and
conversation about ``regime change'' in Iran especially after President
Bush's ``axis of evil'' speech, and more so after the victory in Iraq,
in Washington; a conversation that has been heavily influenced by
certain elements of Iranian expatriate community and some of the
influential think tanks. I think, such analysis is primarily driven by
politicized information, tainted and self serving opposition-supplied
knowledge. The regime in Iran has many difficulties for sure, and even
more serious shortcomings and flaws, many of which are in open display
in peoples' daily life, thought and conversations in the country, but
it is a regime firmly in control, and is not about to and will not be
overthrown by a few declarations in Washington. Discussion of the
domestic condition in Iran is too complex of a subject to be treated
here, but a few fundamental facts are worth mentioning.
First, although the conservatives in Iran are a minority, they are
in control of many resources. They have leadership and organization, an
ideology that binds them together and commits them to the cause,
control of coercive apparatus', economic and political resources, and
they have social and cultural propagation means. They are also well
linked with their constituency. All of these characteristics and
resources make them a very potent force. Reformers, many of them the
former radicals, who additionally control important resources, are also
not supportive of externally engineered change in Iran.
Second, the real, organized impetus and energy, both intellectually
and politically for reform and change is generated from within the
ruling elite itself, and not from outside of the regime;
notwithstanding the presence of others in the struggle for reform.
There is a real, and serious ideational struggle within the regime
itself over the very identity and substance of the Islamic Republic
which is not subject to simplistic wishes and dictates of outsiders.
The reformers are neither pro-U.S. nor anti-U.S.; they have a much
larger and historical agenda in mind which is the establishment of
democracy in Iran in harmony with its cultural and religious
traditions; an experiment with far reaching ramifications not only for
Iran but for the post-9/11 Muslim world in general.
Third, the elite, both conservatives and reformers, and the public
at large are quite intense if not ``paranoid'' about the sense of
independence and dignity of the country and thus very sensitive about
outside interference and meddling, especially in the case of the United
States, which has not had so bright a record with Iran in this regard.
U.S. meddling, especially attempts of few people in Washington at
manufacturing ``regime change'' through expatriate oppositions, covert
plans, etc., will weaken the reform efforts, will unify the elite and
will signal a beginning of real confrontation with the United States in
the region. Iranians want a peaceful change and through nonviolent
means. It should be a domestically driven change, and they would like
to bring change within the established framework of the Iranian polity.
Any foreign induced radical change will not be well received by the
population. Among a ten million-person population in Tehran, less than
10,000 people participated in last summer protests because they were
largely perceived as externally inspired or manipulated. The debate on
nuclear issue for example, among others, underscored also the important
caveat that Iran's domestic scene does not lend itself to simplistic
analysis; hundreds of the same students who protested in the summer,
and praised by the United States for their anti-regime demonstrations,
strongly and openly warned against Iran's acceptance of demands beyond
the IAEA additional protocols and inspection, while many of the
conservatives who forcefully had denounced the students' movement,
eventually lined up for the approval.
Fourth, while there is real frustration in Iran and outside about
the pace of reform in Iran, the reality is that there have been
significant and irreversible changes in Iran; frustration over unmet
and justifiably high expectations should not overshadow that fact.
Finally, the real subjective and objective check on Iran's elite,
both reformer and conservative, is the looming fear of lack of domestic
legitimacy. An imperfect Republic, the pride and the asset of the
regime for the last 25 years, in spite of external loneliness, however,
has been that it has sufficient popular support, that it is not lonely
at home. The public frustration over the unfulfilled promises of the
reform movement, not the fear of U.S. attack, is the number one worry
among the ruling elite. This concern for sure is not felt universally
and equally among all, but it has certainly become, in immediate years,
if not months ahead, will remain, the most important preoccupation of
the regime. This is not a regime, that though capable objectively, can
rule for long without a sufficient sense of public legitimacy.
4. Domestic Reward Structures and the Mutual Demonization: To a
large extent and in both countries, Iran-U.S. relations have become
domestic political issues and hostage to its intricacies and dynamics.
A reward structure has been established in the United States, which
supports anti-Iranianism, irrespective of merit. Anti-Iranianism is
cost free; yet calling for dialogue can be costly. A number of
congressional bills have been introduced in the U.S., which under
normal circumstances should have not been passed by Congress, but they
pass with overwhelming ease. Similarly, in Iran the same reward
structure exists for anti-Americanism. In Iran, those who have called
for rapprochement with the U.S. have paid a heavy price, being labeled
publicly and sometimes have lost their job. The mutual language of
denouncement and name-calling, while reflects the burden of historical
mutual mistreatment, it has acquired a life of its own; the changing
realities on the ground and real interests of both sides has little
bearing on the intensity and serious damage of public denouncement and
mutual demonization. Words have enormous consequences; they form
perception and cultural and mental straightjackets, which impedes
considerations of real and rational mutual interests. For the sake of
the interests of both countries, this reward structure should be
dismantled.
5. Iran and the U.S.: The Losers?: The biggest losers of the 25
year old U.S.-Iran hostility have been the Americans and the Iranians
themselves. While both have scored tactical gains against each other,
but one can make the argument that both have suffered strategic loses
in the process. Regionally, many countries, ranging from those with
secular claims of identity including Saddam Hussein's Iraq, to other
Arab dictatorships in orthodox clothing, to more recently emerged post
communist dictatorships in Central Asia tapped into the U.S.-made anti-
Iranian ``reward structure'', which in the pre-Alqaeda world also meant
anti-Islamism. Distance from or hostility towards Iran/radicalism, was
perceived to be the prerequisite for being in line with the U.S., and
became the justification for policies such as domestic repression and
development of alternative and harmless Sunni fanaticism; ironically
one of the hidden dynamics that gave rise to Saddam's. regional
ambitions as champion of secularism and later under-the radar
development of a region-wide Islamic extremism. In the realm of
geopolitical space of great power involvement, regionally Russia seemed
to be the winner, by simultaneously milking and using its relations
with Washington and Tehran cross-currently against the other, having
strategic partnership with both and limiting the maneuverability of the
United States and Iran. Also critical has been the emergence of Europe,
the EU, as perhaps the most important player in the global position of
Iran; a role which has only increased after the encounter with the
United States in Iraq, and underscored by the high drama display of
Europe's diplomacy last week on Iran's nuclear issue. European,
Russian, and even Chinese, economic and political gains have been and
would be significant, mostly at the expense of the United States and
not necessarily to the benefit of Iran.
CONCLUSION
This is the most critical time in U.S.-Iran relations. A quarter
century of U.S.-Iran cold war is almost over and the two countries,
having exhausted all the space for proxy war between them, have now
entered into a new cycle of direct proximity and relations that is
qualitatively different from the past 25 years; the prospects and
options are increasingly limited to either a direct confrontation, or a
major reconciliation. Iran and the United States, after the U.S. wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq, are not only virtual but real physical
neighbors. The direct and over-the horizon U.S. presence in the Persian
Gulf and Central Asia and the Caucasus, is being complemented by the
U.S. physical presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. For all practical
purposes the borders of Iran with those two states are the borders of
Iran with the United States.
The result of this real contiguity is that any qualitative
intensification of the conflict will lead to a physical clash, the
consequences of which are extremely serious for the national interest
and security of both countries. Iran is for sure very vulnerable to
U.S. military and coercive measures; a target reach country with a very
demanding population Iran will be significantly hurt. But so will,
though to a lesser degree, the United States. If people in Washington
are now worried that the U.S. is not doing well in Iraq against
Saddam's supporters or disgruntled Iraqis, and the future of the U.S.
global interest and even its very security is dependent on success in
Iraq and Afghanistan, one can imagine the level of difficulty the U.S.
will experience, especially in Iraq in case of an intense confrontation
with Iran. Iran is well pre-positioned, perhaps given the typical
trepidation on such a confrontation with the U.S., to make life for the
U.S. in Iraq very difficult; a democratic Iraq ala post-war Germany, as
a showcase of U.S. success will be out of the question; a Lebanon after
Israeli invasion will be a better metaphor.
While the prognostication for the disastrous impact of the
confrontation is obvious one can also assume the positive revolutionary
impact of U.S.-Iran reconciliation and rapprochement. A normalized
U.S.-Iran relationship is the missing link in the geopolitical,
geoideological, and geoeconomic structure of the Middle East and global
politics. The United States and Iran while ideologically constructed to
become enemies, in reality are unusual and in a sense unnatural and odd
enemies. This oddity is reflected in the fundamental reality that
neither has gained anything but insecurity and political headaches and
setbacks from this hostility, the enemies of one turn out to be the
enemies of the other (remember Iran went through an 8 year war and half
a million casualties trying to remove Saddam Hussein and almost went to
war with the Taliban--its sworn enemy--in 1998!). This oddity is also
reflected in the appreciation of the fact that resolution of most
issues of concern for the United States, as mentioned before,
significantly and directly involves a better relationship with Iran.
It is high and urgent time, that a new concerted effort be made on
both sides to move away from confrontation, and instead to engage in
real, open, equitable, and serious dialogue for reconciliation; the
national interests of both great nations and international security
demands it.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Hadian. Your
views, of course, are in the statement, and this will be
available to members and for the record, but perhaps we will be
able to get back to it in the questioning.
Dr. Hadian. Thank you.
The Chairman. Dr. Cordesman.
STATEMENT OF DR. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ARLEIGH A. BURKE CHAIR
IN STRATEGY, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Cordesman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
the opportunity of testifying here. Like the other witnesses, I
feel this is a very important subject to cover but I would like
to touch on only a few issues in my written testimony.
Let me begin by saying that I agree with the previous
witnesses that Iran is a country where we have some real
options and possibilities. However, I may be less optimistic
about internal developments in Iran. I have sat through quite a
number of informal discussions with Iranians and Iranian
officials. I am struck by the fact that over the years I do not
see that those who I would regard as moderates or the
supporters of President Khatami becoming more confident.
I think there is great concern about the tensions within
Iran on the part of many of those that I have dealt with. I am
very uncertain as to whether Iran is prepared to full, formal
dialog with the United States today. It may be. But time and
again, Iranians have privately said that--until the issues and
tensions between the various factions in Iran are resolved--
there are many things we might do to move toward an informal
dialog but they are not prepared to confront the issues of a
formal dialog.
I too, like Deputy Secretary Armitage, served in Iran in
the early 1970s. I too watched the Shah engage in a nuclear
program, and I watched the Shah lie about it. And I watched
reports emerge in the U.S. of imports of technology ranging
from laser isotope separation technology to other weapons
oriented technologies that bore no resemblance to a peaceful
nuclear program. As a result, I do not believe that getting
today's Iran to stop an overt program will really stop its
nuclear program, and I think we can count on Iran to try to
obfuscate and lie about that.
Now, Mr. Chairman, you talked about super inspections. I am
not sure what those really are. I am not sure that it is easy
to do more than UNSCOM and UNMOVIC did in Iraq, and they
obviously failed. They could not characterize that effort.
I think we are learning that there are deep problems in the
U.S. intelligence effort and in our coverage of proliferation.
Iraq is only a case example, and I would hope at some point
either the Senate Intelligence Committee or this committee
fully examines our capability to characterize proliferation.
I do not believe that we will ever have the capability to
be able to determine whether Iran pursues a research and
development strategy as distinguished from an overt production
of fissile material. Looking at the IAEA reports, I believe
Iran could conceal R&D efforts in the development of reactor
technology, that they could create a mature centrifuge
capability far more sophisticated than the one they have in
terms of centrifuge design, that they could proceed with many
aspects of nuclear weapons design, and that no amount of
inspection or intelligence coverage could, with confidence,
detect that effort if it was dispersed and concealed and did
not go into advanced development.
I would also note that this is a country that has stated it
has chemical weapons and which may well have biological
weapons. A focus on one form of proliferation may be dangerous,
particularly when it is far from clear to what threat Iran's
long-range missiles could pose with conventional warheads,
except as psychological weapons. The Shahab frankly has to have
a motive other than dropping 1,000 kilograms of high explosives
as an area weapon on an enemy. Having said that, I do agree
that we should move toward dialog and toward discussion.
I would also have to reinforce a point that has been made
in this hearing. I was in Iran when the MEK murdered American
officials. One of the people I was working with, Colonel Louis
Hawkins, was shot down in front of his family by the MEK. I
have followed their actions over the years. They are a
sophisticated lobbying body with many democratic fronts. They
also were a tool of Iraq, a cult of their leaders, and they
pursued a policy of murdering and assassination against Iranian
officials, which is well documented in the State Department
reports. I do not believe this is a movement we can tolerate or
encourage.
I would also have to say that whatever we do we should stay
as far away from the Shah's son as possible. I saw little
redeeming about his Imperial Majesty when I was in Iran. If the
Bunyaads are corrupt today, I can remember my wife going to an
orphanage supposedly supported by the Pahlavi Foundation and
finding out the Pahlavi Foundation took the money and kept it,
and it was the wives of American and British diplomats who kept
the orphanage going with their money. This is not in any sense
the successor regime that is needed in Iran.
Now, let me make a few final points about recommendations.
We must not forget that whatever we do, we have to maintain a
strong military position in the gulf to contain Iran. It is one
of the ironies of our action in Iraq that it has not altered
the need for containment and possibly not even altered the
level of containment that is required.
I would also say that labeling Iran as the leading nation
supporting terrorism, or part of an ``axis of evil,'' is the
worst possible way to influence the Iranian people. If we have
things to say about terrorism, identify specific actions,
identify specific groups, and seek specific goals. I think our
rhetoric on Iran illustrates a broad problem in American
policy. We speak in terms of domestic politics to American
audiences in ways which undermine our credibility in Iran, in
the Middle East, in Europe, and in the rest of the world.
As we deal with Iran, I also have to strongly endorse what
Senator Biden said about the need for as much informal dialog
as possible. I would also endorse the point that we had a semi-
official dialog with Iran and we broke it off in dealing with
Iraq. That was a mistake. It served no interest of our own, not
only in dealing with Iran, but with Afghanistan.
I would be cautious, however, about the nature of European
cooperation. I have had many discussions with Europeans and
many have criticized their own approach to the problem, as well
as ours. Perhaps one of the best statements about Europe's
approach to critical dialog was that, ``we have a tendency to
be all dialog and no critical.'' If we are going to rely on
Europe to deal with the problem of nuclear weapons in Iran, it
is going to require intense pressure.
Let me also say that this committee should, as it moves
forward, also reconsider the sanctions policy we have. I
thought the legislation that led to ILSA was stupid in terms of
the original proposal. I thought it was stupid when it was
passed, and I think it is stupid now. Its net effect is not to
alter proliferation or the military buildup. It is to ensure
that American business and American commerce cannot work with
Iranians to create barriers to contact with people who are
moderate Iranians. The end result is precisely what we do not
need, to reinforce the views of extremists and hard-liners. If
we need sanctions, they should lie in dual use technology and
limits on arms sales. The sanctions we have today are precisely
the sanctions we do not need.
Finally, in terms of the Arab-Israeli issue, if we are ever
to reach a modus vivendi with Iran, if we are to get them to
stop support of Hamas or the Hezbollah, we have to demonstrate
that we have an unremitting support for a peace process so
strong and convincing that every possible effort is being made
regardless of delays, problems, and reversals. If the United
States cannot demonstrate it is doing that, I frankly do not
know how we go to the Arab world and Iran and say, stop
supporting Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cordesman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke Chair
in Strategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, DC
Iran presents one of the most complex security problems the US
faces in dealing with the threat posed by proliferation, in securing
world energy supplies and the global economy, and in bringing stability
to the Middle East and the Gulf region. Iran is located in an area with
more than 60% of the world's proven conventional oil reserves and some
35% of its gas. It has borders on two nations where the US is still at
war: Iraq and Afghanistan.
Iran is a major proliferator. It plays an indirect role in the
Israel-Palestinian conflict. It has carried out direct terrorist
activities in the past, and it tolerates and supports terrorist
movements today. At the same time, Iran offers opportunities as well as
a threat. Political change is taking place, some forms of informal
dialogue have been possible, Iran has moderated some of its actions,
and the US has been more able to work out at least a partial modus
vivendi in dealing with some aspects of the problems posed by
Afghanistan and Iraq.
Moreover, the US cannot divorce its treatment of Iran from its
overall strategic posture in the region and the world. The US war in
Iraq is still underway, and it is not a popular conflict. The US lacks
the military resources for a major intervention in Iran, and limited
strikes might do as much to encourage Iranian proliferation and support
of terrorism as discourage it. While the EU has been more supportive
recently in pressuring Iran over proliferation, the US lacks allies in
its present approach to Iran at a time when it has more overall
tensions with its traditional allies than at any time since the war in
Vietnam.
THE RANGE OF POSSIBLE IRANIAN THREATS
The US faces a wide range of policy challenges in dealing with the
security threats posed by Iran. Nuclear proliferation is only one of
these challenges, and the US cannot afford to look at only one problem
and ignore the others. In brief, the challenges the US must deal with
may be summarized as follows:
The US faces a wide range of potential threats in terms of
proliferation. Iran has admitted it has chemical weapons and is
testing ballistic missiles. It may well be developing
biological weapons and cruise missiles. The unclassified
reporting by the US intelligence community on Iranian
developments is necessarily limited, and does not address many
of the most recent issues affecting Iran's nuclear program, but
a recent CIA report describes the range of Iranian activities
as follows:
Nuclear. Despite Iran's status in the Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United States
remains convinced Tehran is pursuing a nuclear weapons program.
To bolster its efforts to establish domestic nuclear fuel-cycle
capabilities, Iran has technology that also can support fissile
material production for Tehran's overall nuclear weapons
program.
Iran has continued to attempt using its civilian nuclear
energy program to justify its efforts to establish domestically
or otherwise acquire assorted nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities.
Such capabilities, however, are well suited to support fissile
material production for a weapons program, and we believe it is
this objective that drives Iran's efforts to acquire relevant
facilities. We suspect that Tehran is interested in acquiring
foreign fissile material and technology for weapons development
as part of its overall nuclear weapons program.
Despite Bushehr being put under IAEA safeguards, Russia's
provision of expertise and manufacturing assistance has helped
Iran to develop its own nuclear technology infrastructure. In
addition, facing economic pressures, some Russian entities have
shown a willingness to provide assistance to other nuclear
projects within Iran. For example, an institute subordinate to
the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) had agreed to
deliver in late 2000 equipment that was clearly intended for
atomic vapor laser isotope separation, a technology capable of
producing weapons-grade uranium. As a result of US protests,
the Russian Government has halted the delivery of some of this
equipment to Iran.
Chinese entities are continuing work on a zirconium
production facility at Esfahan that will enable Iran to produce
cladding for reactor fuel. As an adherent to the NPT, Iran is
required to accept IAEA safeguards on its nuclear material. The
IAEA's Additional Protocol requires states to declare
production of zirconium fuel cladding and gives the IAEA the
right of access to resolve questions or inconsistencies related
to the declarations, but Iran has made no moves to bring the
Additional Protocol into force. Moreover, Iran remains the only
NPT adherent with a full-scope safeguards agreement that has
not adopted a subsidiary agreement obligating early declaration
of nuclear facilities. Zirconium production, other than
production of fuel cladding, is not subject to declaration or
inspection.
Missiles. Ballistic missile-related cooperation from entities
in the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and China over the
years has helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-
sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles. Such
assistance during the reporting period continued to include
equipment, technology, and expertise. Iran, already producing
Scud short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), is in the late
stages of developing the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic
missile (MRBM). In addition, Iran publicly has acknowledged the
development of follow-on versions of the Shahab-3. It
originally said that another version, the Shahab-4, is a more
capable ballistic missile than its predecessor but later
characterized it as solely a space launch vehicle with no
military applications. Iran's Defense Minister has also
publicly mentioned a ``Shahab-5.'' Such statements strongly
suggest that Tehran intends to develop a longer-range ballistic
missile capability.
Chemical. Iran is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC). Nevertheless, during the reporting period it continued
to seek chemicals, production technology, training, and
expertise from Chinese entities that could further Tehran's
efforts at achieving an indigenous capability to produce nerve
agents. Iran already has stockpiled blister, blood, and choking
agents--and the bombs and artillery shells to deliver them--
which it previously has manufactured. It probably also has made
some nerve agents.
Biological. Even though Iran is part of the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC), Tehran probably maintains an
offensive BW program. Foreign dual-use biotechnical materials,
equipment, and expertise--primarily, but not exclusively, from
Eastern Europe--continued to feature prominently in Iran's
procurement efforts. While such materials do have legitimate
uses, Iran's biological warfare (BW) program also could benefit
from them. It is likely that Iran has capabilities to produce
small quantities of BW agents, but has a limited ability to
weaponize them.
Advanced Conventional Weapons. Iran continued to seek and
acquire conventional weapons and production technologies,
primarily from Russia, China, and North Korea. Since Russia
announced in November 2000 that it was abrogating the Gore-
Chernomyrdin Agreement, the Russian and Iranian Governments and
firms have engaged in high-level discussions on a wide variety
of military services and equipment--including air defense,
naval, air and ground weapons, and technologies. In October
2001, Tehran and Moscow signed a new military-technical
cooperation agreement, which laid the groundwork for
negotiations and created a commission for future arms sales,
but did not itself include sales contracts.
Contract negotiations, which may take years to complete,
continued in the following months and at least one sale--
apparently for helicopters--was concluded. Various Russian
officials and academicians have suggested that sales under this
new agreement could, in the next few years, make Iran Russia's
third-largest arms customer, after China and India. Until that
agreement is concluded, Russia will continue to deliver on
existing contracts. Estimates of conventional arms sales to
Iran of $300 million per year would put Iran's share of Russian
sales worldwide at roughly 10 percent, compared to more than 50
percent going to China and India.
To facilitate new arms agreements, Russian oil enterprises
entered an agreement with the Russian state arms trading firm
Rosoboronexport to promote arms exports. Russian and Iranian
arms dealers are to include such firms as Lukoil to coordinate
``commercial conditions'' and participate in projects proposed
by the customer.
Outside the Russian market, Iran's search for conventional
weapons is global. In particular, Iran capitalized on the
specialized weapons services and lower prices that China and
North Korea offered. Elsewhere, Iran sought out products,
particularly weapons components and dual-use items, that are
superior in quality to those available from Russia or that have
proven difficult to acquire through normal government channels.
The US cannot afford to focus on one form of proliferation.
Iran can pursue a wide range of proliferation strategies, and
this includes different approaches to nuclear weapons
development. Iran could, for example, give up any efforts to
produce fissile material using reactors and known centrifuge
facilities, while concentrating on covert research and
development of weapons, compact or ``folded'' high capacity
centrifuges, laser isotope separation, and warheads. It could
build more reactors as part of a ``peaceful power generating''
programs, appearing to conform to IAEA standards but preparing
for the day it was no longer dependent on imports and could use
its own fuel cycle. The recent IAEA reporting on Iran leaves
major questions unanswered regarding Iran's fuel cycle efforts,
but also regarding its research and development programs in
both laser isotope separation and centrifuge technology.
Iran can wage a number of forms of asymmetric warfare
against the US and its allies without ever being at war in any
overt sense. It can support hard-line and extremist elements in
Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank using
proxies to attack US interests without ever directly conducting
acts of terrorism. Here, Iran can also use organizations as
proxies that have a civil role or which cannot be identified
solely as terrorist groups. These include the Hezbollah,
Shi'ite movements in Afghanistan and Iraq, and Islamic
charities or political causes that fund or act as covers for
extremist groups. It can create ambiguous sanctuaries and
operating/training areas in Iran for organizations like Al
Qaida or simply turn a blind eye to low-level activities that
are difficult to detect or prove.
Iran can use more direct forms of terrorism, as it may well have
done in supporting the attack on the USAF barracks at Al
Khobar. The most recent State Department report on terrorism
describes Iran's role as follows, and this report was issued
before the full scale of Iran's relations to Al Qaida and
support of Hamas and the PIJ became a major issue:
Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in
2002. Its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Ministry of
Intelligence and Security were involved in the planning of and
support for terrorist acts and continued to exhort a variety of
groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals.
Iran's record against al-Qaida has been mixed. While it has
detained and turned over to foreign governments a number of al-
Qaida members, other al-Qaida members have found virtual
safehaven there and may even be receiving protection from
elements of the Iranian Government. Iran's long, rugged borders
are difficult to monitor, and the large number of Afghan
refugees in Iran complicates efforts to locate and apprehend
extremists. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that al-Qaida elements
could escape the attention of Iran's formidable security
services.
During 2002, Iran maintained a high-profile role in
encouraging anti-Israeli activity, both rhetorically and
operationally. Supreme Leader Khamenei referred to Israel as a
``cancerous tumor,'' a sentiment echoed by other Iranian
leaders in speeches and sermons. Matching this rhetoric with
action, Iran provided Lebanese Hizballah and Palestinian
rejectionist groups--notably HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic
Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-
General Command--with funding, safehaven, training, and
weapons. Tehran also encouraged Hizballah and the Palestinian
rejectionist groups to coordinate their planning and to
escalate their terrorist activities against Israel.
Iran also provided support to extremist groups in Central
Asia, Afghanistan, and Iraq with ties to al-Qaida, though less
than that provided to the groups opposed to Israel.
Iran can use the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a proxy war to
gain support from Arab nations, and put pressure upon the US
and Israel.
Iran lacks modern conventional forces, and is modernizing at
a slow rate compared to most Gulf and Middle Eastern countries,
but its conventional warfighting capabilities cannot be
dismissed. It did sign some $1.7 billion worth of new arms
agreements during 1995-1998, and $1,000 billion worth during
1999-2002--primarily with Russia, China, and Europe, and signed
$200 million worth of new agreements in 2002. It took delivery
on $2.1 billion worth of arms during 1995-1998, and $700
million worth during 1999-2002.
Iran has some 513,000 men in its armed forces, some 325,000 in
its army, 125,000 in its Revolutionary Guards Corps, 18,000 in
its navy, and 45,000 in its air force plus some 40,000
paramilitary forces and 300,000 in its Basij or Popular
Mobilization Army. These forces include some 1,600 tanks, 1,500
other armored vehicles, 3,400 artillery weapons, and 283 combat
aircraft--roughly 180-200 of which are operational. It has no
modern tanks, combat aircraft, or surface-to-air missiles, but
it can certainly pose a far better organized and more popular
resistance to any US or other outside military attack than
Iraq, and its conventional forces will improve with time.
Iran lacks any modern surface ships but geography gives Iran
a strategic position that commands the tanker routes through
the lower Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait is the
world's most important oil chokepoint. Some 13.6 million bbl/d
or so of oil transit the Strait of Hormuz each day and go east
to Asia (especially Japan, China, and India) and west via the
Suez Canal, the Sumed pipeline, or around the Cape of Good Hope
in South Africa to Western Europe and the United States.
Moreover, the EIA reference case indicates that exports through
the Strait must nearly double by 2020, reaching around 42 MMBD.
This implies that up to three times more tankers will transit
the Strait in 2020 than at present. Alternative routes cannot
move anything close to current export levels, much less the
much higher production levels forecast by DOE.
At its narrowest, the Strait consists of 2-mile wide channels for
inbound and outbound tanker within the Omani side of the
Strait, and a 2-mile wide buffer zone. The exits on both sides
of the Strait are close to Iranian waters and air space.
Iran and the UAE have also long quarreled over sovereignty over
three islands on the Western side of the Strait that are near
the main tanker channels. These islands include Abu Musa,
Greater Tunb Island, and Lesser Tunb Island, Reports that Iran
had fortified the islands seem to be untrue, but Iran has
steadily increased its numbers of smart mines. It has bought
three relatively modern Kilo-class conventional submarines with
long-range torpedoes and minelaying capability from Russia. It
has bought anti-ship missile equipped patrol boats from China,
has land based anti-ship missiles, and can deliver such
missiles from aircraft, including maritime patrol aircraft and
long range fighters. Over time, it can steadily improve its
capability to threaten Gulf oil traffic, and while the US can
certainly defeat Iran in any open attack on such traffic,
Iran's ability to intimidate its neighbors, disrupt such
traffic, or conduct low level raids give it the ability to
conduct asymmetric wars of intimidation as well as actual
military operations.
Iran has large asymmetric forces in its Revolutionary Guards
Corps, including some 20,000 men in the IRGC naval branch.
These can do more than attack Gulf shipping. South Gulf states
have vulnerable offshore oil and gas facilities, highly
vulnerable oil and gas loading facilities on their Gulf coasts,
and have become totally dependent on large-scale coastal
desalination plants for water. Once again, threats and ``wars
of intimidation'' can substitute for overt military action.
Finally, Iran can put pressure on the Southern Gulf and
other states by funding, training, and arming Shi'ite groups in
nations like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, by disrupting the
pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia, and by funding local liberation and
religious groups that are not Shi'ite but are hostile to such
states. These are not theoretical options. It has carried out
all of these activities at some point since the Iranian
revolution in 1979, and while it has chosen improved diplomatic
relations since the death of Khomeini, it can resume such
actions at short notice.
AN UNSTABLE AND CONFLICTED IRAN
The US cannot afford to ignore these potential threats. At the same
time, it also cannot afford to ignore the fact that Iran is a deeply
conflicted nation and one where no one can now predict whether it will
evolve towards moderation, move towards overt civil conflict, or come
under the control of its extremists and hardliners.
Iran is a partial democracy, but one where its religious leaders
and hard-liners control the choice of all candidates, can veto any
action by the President or Majlis, and have control over much of the
media, the justice system, the military and security forces, and
intelligence. The balance of power between reformer and hardliner is so
close that many Iranian officials that would like both to focus on
national development, and create a more moderate state that has
improved relations with the US, fear that clashes with the hard-liners
could lead to open conflict. Many have already been arrested and
imprisoned for such views, as have many Iranian religious leaders,
citizens, and students.
It is clear that the Iranian people want a more moderate
government, and many--probably most--are potentially friendly to the
US. At the same time, it is a proud and highly nationalistic nation and
one that has memories of a US role in the coup that destroyed a
previous secular Iranian democracy and brought back the Shah. If the US
has memories of a long hostage crises and Iranian terrorism, Iran has
memories of long periods of imperialism and US interference in Iranian
affairs.
This situation is complicated by the fact that the outside
opposition does have elements that support true democracy, but also
consists of a largely ludicrous effort to restore the monarchy and one
of the most vicious terrorists movements in the world: Mujahedin-e
Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO). This organization is designated as a
terrorist organization and is known under other several other names,
some of which lobby the US Congress: The National Liberation Army of
Iran (NLA, the militant wing of the MEK), the People's Mujahedin of
Iran (PMOI), National Council of Resistance (NCR), the National Council
of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), Muslim Iranian Student's Society (front
organization used to garner financial support).
The MEK claims to be democratic in the West, but its actual
structure mixes the cult of personality with political beliefs that
mixes Marxism and Islam. It was formed in the 1960s, opposed the Shah,
and murdered a number of Americans, including men like Colonel Louis
Hawkins. The organization was expelled from Iran, after which support
came from the Iraqi regime, and it was based primarily in Iraq, where
the remnants of its military forces remain.
The State Department describes the organization as follows:
The MEK's history is studded with anti-Western attacks as
well as terrorist attacks on the interests of the clerical
regime in Iran and abroad. . . . The worldwide campaign against
the Iranian Government stresses propaganda and occasionally
uses terrorist violence. During the 1970s, the MEK killed US
military personnel and US civilians working on defense projects
in Tehran and supported the takeover in 1979 of the US Embassy
in Tehran. In 1981, the MEK detonated bombs in the head office
of the Islamic Republic Party and the Premier's office, killing
some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including chief Justice
Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and
Premier Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. Near the end of the 1980-88 war
with Iran, Baghdad armed the MEK with military equipment and
sent it into action against Iranian forces. In 1991, it
assisted the Government of Iraq in suppressing the Shia and
Kurdish uprisings in southern Iraq and the Kurdish uprisings in
the north. Since then, the MEK has continued to perform
internal security services for the Government of Iraq. In April
1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian
Embassies and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating the
group's ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. In
recent years, the MEK has targeted key military officers and
assassinated the deputy chief of the Armed Forces General Staff
in April 1999. In April 2000, the MEK attempted to assassinate
the commander of the Nasr Headquarters--the interagency board
responsible for coordinating policies on Iraq. The normal pace
of anti-Iranian operations increased during the ``Operation
Great Bahman'' in February 2000, when the group launched a
dozen attacks against Iran. In 2000 and 2001, the MEK was
involved regularly in mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids on
Iranian military and law-enforcement units and government
buildings near the Iran-Iraq border, although MEK terrorism in
Iran declined throughout the remainder of 2001. Since the end
of the Iran-Iraq war, the attacks along the border have
garnered almost no military gains and have become commonplace.
MEK insurgent activities in Tehran constitute the biggest
security concern for the Iranian leadership. In February 2000,
for example, the MEK launched a mortar attack against the
leadership complex in Tehran that houses the offices of the
Supreme Leader and the President, and assassinated the Iranian
Chief of Staff.
THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HILL
The US cannot afford to ignore the fact that while Iran may be a
potential threat, it also feels threatened. Iraq--the main threat to
Iran is no longer under the control of Saddam Hussein--but Iran fought
one of the most bloody wars in recent history against Iraq and one that
involved the massive Iraqi use of poison gas. The US was seen to be
Iraq's ally in that war, and the US fought Iran in a low-level tanker
war between 1987 and 1998. The US now has forces on two of Iran's
borders, and if the US sees Iran as unwilling to engage in a meaningful
official dialog, Iran sees the US as unwilling to engage in a
meaningful unofficial dialog.
The US sees the Israel-Palestinian conflict largely as an Israeli
war on terrorism, but Iran's regime and people see it as an asymmetric
war between Palestinian and occupier. If Israel sees Iran as a major
potential threat because of its search for long-range missiles and
nuclear weapons, Iran sees Israel and the US as current threats with
both nuclear weapons and massive conventional capabilities. Iran has
little confidence--if any--in the future stability of Iraq and points
to proliferation in Pakistan and India. It also sees a Gulf in which
the Southern Gulf states have cumulatively imported $83.3 billion worth
of arms since 1995 versus $2.9 billion for Iran--a ratio of roughly
30:1
THE CONSTRAINTS ON US POLICY
The United States thus faces an extremely difficult situation. It
must contain any Iranian adventures, help to protect its allies, do as
much as possible to prevent Iranian proliferation and the support of
terrorism, and help ensure the security of Gulf energy exports. At the
same time, it must seek to find ways to support peaceful internal
change and the move towards a moderate democracy that the Iranian
people clearly want. It must seek to limit the actions of Iran's
extremists and hardliners, but it must avoid being seen as intervening
in Iranian affairs in ways that could provoke a nationalist reaction or
civil conflict, tie the US to terrorist groups like the MEK, and unify
Iran around a more aggressive and hostile posture towards the US.
The US must also act in ways that recognize that its approach to
Iran is virtually unique, and does not have the support of any European
ally of the US or any friendly Gulf state. Rightly or wrongly, all have
chosen dialogue and trade over the US effort to isolate and sanction
Iran. This is particularly important at a time when the US face growing
hostility to its operations in Iraq and has problems with many of its
traditional allies over both Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
More materially, the US cannot ignore the fact that the Department
of Energy and International Energy Agency project a steady increase in
global economic dependence on Iranian energy exports as part of a
projected increase in Gulf exports. It estimates that Iran's production
capacity must increase from 3.8 MMBD today to 4.9 MMBD by 2025, as part
of an increase in total production capacity that will allow the Gulf to
increase its total exports from 14.8 MMBD in 2001 to 35.8 MMBD in
2025--a more than 140% increase.
DEALING WITH THE IRANIAN THREAT
Given this background, there are several ways the US should
approach Iran, both in terms of threat and opportunity:
It should make it clear that the US will react to any
Iranian military threats and deter and contain them. It is as
dangerous to romanticize Iran, as it is to demonize it. Iran
may evolve towards a stable form of moderation. It has not done
so as yet. It must be made clear to Iran that any course of
action it pursues will be met with a reaction that does not
leave it any viable military options and that any major
military action would lead to the destruction of its present
regime.
The US should also be prepared to react decisively to any overt
Iranian deployment of nuclear weapons, biological weapons, and
long-range missiles. Deterrence and containment should not be
static. The US should be prepared to provide missile defenses,
and improved defenses against other forms of attack. The US
should also be prepared to extend a conventional deterrent
umbrella over its regional allies. It should never threaten
Iran with nuclear retaliation--which would only provoke more
problems in the region--but it should never renounce such an
option as long as there is any risk of Iranian proliferation,
leaving the issue in doubt.
It should be stressed that this does not mean adventures in areas
like preemption unless massive improvements can be made in US
intelligence and targeting capabilities, and unless it is
either clear that Iranian strikes are both imminent and far
more threatening than seems likely for some years to come.
Retaliation is the ultimate option, and the US cannot afford to
carry out strikes that miss their targets or which only succeed
in making an enemy out of the Iranian people while force Iran's
government to create more covert means of proliferation.
Demonstrate US will and capability responsibly: Deterrence
and containment are best done quietly and by deploying a ``big
stick.'' Harsh and over-simplistic rhetoric plays into the
hands of Iran's hard-liners and America's opponents. In
contrast, US military deployments and exercises, and military
cooperation with friendly Gulf states, provide a quiet and
tangible message. Similarly, US reporting and statements that
provide clear and validated public descriptions of threatening
Iranian actions persuade both regional and other allies, where
sweeping and vague charges simply undermine US credibility.
Pursue arms control without relying on it: It is highly
unlikely that Iran will abandon a major research and
development effort in every aspect of proliferation until major
changes occur in its regime and perception of the threat. The
US must assume this is the case until it has far better
intelligence collection and analysis regarding proliferation
than it now has on any country, and it must not forget that
nine years of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC inspection of Iran, and months
of postwar US efforts, have still failed to provide an
understanding of such efforts in Iraq. Even if Iran does fully
comply with its agreements with the British Foreign Minister
and gives the IAEA all of the access called for under the NNPT
protocol, major uncertainties will remain.
Iranian compliance in arms control may well, however, prevent any
overt acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons, and the
creation of major fissile material production facilities. Other
arms control efforts may limit the scale of Iran's chemical
weapons programs. The will still leave Iran with no meaningful
constraints on its missile and biological programs, but even
imperfect arms control can be far better than none provided
that the US is proactive in ensuring that every possible
violation is dealt with honestly and with suitable inspection,
and the US firmly seeks to enforce those treaty provisions that
could cut off the flow of nuclear, chemical, and possibly
biological technology.
Continue to put constant pressure on Iran's suppliers: The
US cannot cut off Iran from dual-use and direct technology for
proliferation, or block all purchases of advanced weapons, but
it should continue to make every effort to try. One possible
step would be to move beyond quiet dialogue with allied
governments over transactions and suppliers that appear to aid
Iran in proliferating and acquiring advanced arms and to
aggressively name and sanction such suppliers in the way that
has been done for some Russian and Chinese firms.
Pursue counterterrorism systematically and in a focused way:
The US should make it unambiguously clear to Iran that it will
do everything possible to check any Iranian support or
tolerance of terrorism against the US or any of its allies. Far
too much of the public US effort, however, again involves
sweeping and careless rhetoric, rather than carefully focused
efforts with detailed charges and credible demands for Iranian
action.
Make every effort to maintain an informal dialog with Iran,
and create formal official relations, without concession or
preconditions: Dealing with the Iranian threat requires more
than sticks. The US must demonstrate that it will do everything
possible to improve relations with Iran, that it is not hostile
to Iran's moderates or its people, and that the burden of the
failure to create formal relations lies solidly with Iran's
hard-liners and extremists. This does not mean concessions, but
neither does it mean demanding Iran change its behavior as the
price of the formal relations that are the key to allowing
meaningful security negotiations to begin.
The US dialog with Iran over Afghanistan is a model of how the US
should approach this issue; the sudden decision to break off a
dialog with Iraq over Iraq before the US and British invasion
of Iraq is a model of how not to deal with the problem. The US
negotiated and traded with far more threatening opponents
throughout the Cold War, and gained much of its eventual
victory by doing so.
Use the European and Gulf efforts at dialog and improved
cooperation constructively without compromising the US
position. The US has no chance of either persuading or
compelling its allies and other nations to join it in isolating
Iran unless a clear case can be made for doing so in ways that
actually change Iranian behavior. The reality is also that the
European dialog with Iran, and the efforts of the Gulf states
to normalize relations, have accomplish a great deal and offer
the only practical means at this point to change Iran's
behavior and directly influence its internal behavior. This
does not mean the US should not pressure Europe, the Gulf
states, and other nations to react to Iranian actions that
threaten the region or support terrorism. Europe, for example,
has sometimes only remembered the ``dialog'' part of ``critical
dialog.''
Do everything possible to support internal change in Iran,
but avoid adventures and efforts at regime change. The US
should use every diplomatic tool available to encourage
political moderation in Iran. The should include every effort
to help those Iranian's who call for real democracy, to improve
human rights, and encourage cultural exchanges and every other
way of both showing the Iranian people the US is on their side
and will act on their behalf. The problems and weaknesses in
the Iranian opposition outside Iran are so grave, however, that
they make the Iraqi opposition seem a tower of strength by
comparison. The MEK is beyond change and too contemptible to
deal with,
Consider major revisions to a largely failed sanctions
policy. It is one of the ironies of the post Cold War era that
the primary threat to the US no longer truly consists of
foreign power, but is rather the mistakes made by its Executive
and Legislative branches. The only nation that can defeat the
US is itself. The present US sanctions policy is a good example
of such self-defeating actions. It does not stop Iran from
proliferating. If anything, it makes proliferation and
asymmetric warfare Iran's only military options, and reinforces
Iran's hardliners in arguing that the US is hostile and a
threat. The US should consider lifting those Executive Orders
that cut US business off from their Iranian counterparts, which
block Iranian energy development without halting or limiting
Iranian proliferation, and which impede an unofficial cultural
and political dialog for no apparent reason. This does not mean
tolerating any transfer of critical technologies or offering
some kind of carte blanche in trade and investment that would
given the Iranian government large amounts of hard currency it
could use for weapons programs. This, however, is very
different from the present hollow sanctions policy that serves
no purpose other than posturing for domestic political
constituencies.
Pursue an Arab-Israeli Peace and the ``Road Map'' in the
face of all obstacles: The US cannot enforce a peace on Israel
and the Palestinians, and should not. Iran is, however, only
one example of the need to convince the people of the region
that the US is both serious in seeking an end to the Arab-
Israeli conflict, and that it will put pressure on Israel to
limit its settlements and restrict its military actions to
those action truly needed to protect its people and halt
attacks and terrorism. This in no way means relaxing US
pressure for Palestinian action and reform, for a halt to
Iranian support of extremist and terrorist organizations, and
for Arab and Iranian support of the peace process. A strong,
visible, and continuing US-led Arab-Israeli peace effort is
vital, however, to any effort to deal with Iran--as well as to
every other aspect of US security interests in the Middle East.
Finally, the US needs something it has badly lacked in recent
years: patience. There are no instant solutions or good options for
dramatic action. Poorly chosen rhetoric and political posturing aids
those forces in Iran that threaten the US and its allies, it does not
compel Iran or threaten it in productive ways. Most important, the US
needs to finish the job in Iraq and in dealing with Afghanistan and Al
Qaida before it even contemplates new confrontations that are not force
upon it be events, and the US needs to rebuild its relations with its
allies and adopt policies that can win international support.
Deterrence and containment have their risks and limits, and they only
succeed with time. Wandering off in search enemies, however, has never
made strategic sense and is only likely to further alienate Iran, other
regional allies, and the world.
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Cordesman. We appreciate, as
always, your testimony and your suggestions.
Dr. Einhorn.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. EINHORN, SENIOR ADVISER,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, thanks for the opportunity to
appear before the committee.
In your earlier remarks, you talked about the agreement
that was reached last week between Iran and the three foreign
ministers. I will not repeat the elements of that agreement. I
think the Europeans deserve a lot of credit for skillful
diplomacy, but this agreement last week would not have been
possible without a U.S.-led campaign of diplomatic pressure
that gave Iran a stark choice between cooperating or being
brought before the U.N. Security Council.
Last week's agreement was potentially a very useful step,
but its value is going to depend on how well it is implemented.
A key question will be how broadly the suspension of enrichment
and processing activities is defined. If, for example, it is
defined as covering only enrichment operations, it will not be
very meaningful. But if it also covers such enrichment-related
activities as the construction of enrichment plants, the
manufacture of centrifuge machines, the processing of
enrichment feedstock, then the suspension could put a very
significant break on Iran's fissile material production plans.
Importantly the declaration reached last week in Tehran
does not excuse Iran from meeting the requirements of the
resolution passed by the IAEA board last month. If Iran does
not meet those requirements, it will face very strong pressures
at the November board meeting for a finding of noncompliance
and for sending the matter to the U.N. Security Council.
There may be some interest in finding Iran in noncompliance
and sending the matter to New York even if Iran does show good
faith in meeting the IAEA's demands and the requirements of
last week's declaration. The rationale for doing that would be
that Iran has committed past safeguards violations and that the
IAEA statute requires that any such violations be sent to the
Security Council.
But if Iran actively cooperates, it would be a mistake in
my view to make a finding of noncompliance in November. Sending
the matter to New York would undermine support for further
cooperation in Tehran where the decision to suspend enrichment
and sign the additional protocol has come under very strong
criticism from hard-liners. If Iran genuinely cooperates with
the new agreement, its past violations can and should be
reported to the Security Council but at a later date. There is
precedent for that, and I could explain later.
Mr. Chairman, at best, last week's agreement in Tehran is
only a temporary arrangement. Before long, it would have to be
replaced by a more durable solution to the problem. Under such
a solution, Iran should be required permanently to foreswear
nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, especially enrichment and
reprocessing. Existing facilities and facilities under
construction would have to be dismantled. In exchange, Iran
would receive a multilateral guarantee that as long as it
complies with its various nonproliferation commitments, it
would be able to purchase fuel cycle services, including the
supply of fresh reactor fuel, and the take-back and storage of
spent fuel for any power reactors that it decided to build. The
U.S., Europeans, and Russians might join together in offering
such a guarantee. The combination of a ban on fuel cycle
activities and the additional protocol would provide confidence
that Iran was not engaged in clandestine fissile material
production.
While some would prefer that Iran not even be allowed to
possess nuclear power reactors, a ban on power reactors in my
view is neither achievable nor necessary. The risks associated
with large safeguarded nuclear power reactors are manageable.
This is a controversial point and we can explore this later.
The multilateral fuel services guarantee would address the
Iranian concern that they would be vulnerable to fuel supply
cutoffs, but it would not address their main reason for
pursuing nuclear weapons, and that is their national security.
The ouster of Saddam Hussein has eliminated one major threat to
Iran, but now Iran's principal security preoccupation is the
United States and the fear that the Bush administration may be
intending to undermine the regime. As long as this perception
exists, it will be very hard to get Iran to give up its nuclear
weapons capability altogether.
Ending the longstanding estrangement between the U.S. and
Iran may, therefore, be a necessary condition for getting Iran
to move beyond the interim arrangements that are now taking
shape and to accept a permanent solution to the nuclear
problem. For this and other reasons, the U.S. and Iran should
begin a step-by-step engagement process in which the two
countries can raise a range of issues of concern to them and
explore whether a modus vivendi between them is really
possible. Such an engagement process would provide the most
promising context for ending Iran's nuclear weapons program.
Mr. Chairman, we do not know whether last week's agreement
was an indication that Iran may now be prepared to abandon its
nuclear ambitions or whether it was simply a tactical maneuver
aimed at dividing us from the Europeans and dodging U.N.
sanctions, or perhaps a deeply divided Iran is simply keeping
its options open. It would be naive for us to act on the
assumption that Iran has already decided to throw in the towel
on its nuclear weapons program, but it would also be a mistake
to assume that an Iranian nuclear weapons capability is
inevitable.
In the period ahead, we must do everything possible,
working with the Europeans, the Russians, and the IAEA, to
bring Iranian leaders to the conclusion that continuing their
efforts to acquire nuclear weapons is too risky, too subject to
detection, too damaging to Iran's reputation and broader
national interests. Continued pressure will be essential, but
pressure is not going to be enough. A crucial incentive for
Iran is likely to be the prospect of a new and more promising
relationship with the United States. Indeed, U.S. willingness
to explore such a relationship with Iran may be the key to
resolving the nuclear issue.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Einhorn follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert J. Einhorn, Senior Adviser, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC
THE IRAN NUCLEAR ISSUE
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for giving me the
opportunity to speak with you this morning about the challenge of
heading off an Iranian nuclear weapons capability.
This hearing comes at a critical time in Iran's decades-old quest
to acquire nuclear weapons. Just last Tuesday, on October 21st, Iran
and the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the U.K. issued a
declaration in which Iran accepted some of the key demands of the
international community with respect to its nuclear program. That
declaration was, in the words of President Bush, a ``very positive
development.'' But it was only a first step and hardly an indication
that Iran has abandoned its hopes of having nuclear weapons. Achieving
a durable and verifiable termination of Tehran's nuclear weapons
program will require sustained, unified efforts by the United States,
the Europeans, the Russians, and many other interested parties in the
months and years to come.
Iran has pursued its nuclear weapons objective in the guise of an
ambitious civilian nuclear power program that, despite abundant Iranian
oil and natural gas reserves, Iran claims is necessary to augment and
diversify its sources of energy. Its nuclear plans call not just for
the construction of a significant number of power reactors (including
the Russian-supplied reactor at Bushehr), but also for the acquisition
of a full range of facilities capable of processing uranium and
producing fuel for those reactors. But it is precisely those sensitive,
dual-use ``fuel-cycle'' facilities--mainly enrichment and reprocessing
plants--that would enable Iran to obtain the fissile material needed to
build nuclear weapons. In the last few years, Iran has made substantial
progress on those fuel-cycle capabilities, especially in building a
large uranium enrichment plant at Natanz. Some experts believe Iran is
now only one to two years from having the capability to enrich uranium
to weapons-grade.
Iran's plans exposed
Iran had hoped to have its cake and eat it too--the reputation of a
law-abiding member of the international community and an active,
clandestine nuclear weapons program. But a little over a year ago its
plans began to unravel. An Iranian opposition group publicly disclosed
information about two fuel-cycle facilities that Iran had previously
tried to keep secret, including the Natanz enrichment plant. When the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) investigated these and other
leads, it discovered that ``Iran had failed to meet its obligations
under its Safeguards Agreement with respect to the reporting of nuclear
material imported into Iran and the subsequent processing and use of
the material.'' In the course of several site visits, it found a
considerable amount of incriminating evidence, including particles of
highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in environmental samples taken at Natanz
and elsewhere. The Iranians claimed that their enrichment equipment had
been contaminated with HEU before Iran imported it from foreign
brokers. But this explanation only generated more suspicion because it
contradicted an earlier claim by Iran that its enrichment program did
not rely on imports--one of several glaring inconsistencies in Tehran's
responses to IAEA inquiries. Throughout the IAEA's investigation, Iran
alternated between stonewalling and belated, grudging cooperation.
By the time of the IAEA Board meeting last month, Iran found itself
largely isolated. The Europeans, who had previously showed much less
concern than the U.S. about Iran's nuclear intentions, had become
alarmed and ready to take strong measures, including making a pending
European Union trade and cooperation agreement with Iran contingent on
resolving the nuclear issue. Even the Russians, who had gone ahead with
the Bushehr reactor project in the face of a decade of U.S. protests,
had grown wary about proceeding to complete and fuel the reactor while
serious questions remained about Tehran's nuclear plans. Prompted by a
vigorous U.S. diplomatic campaign, the September Board adopted a strong
resolution calling on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA in
resolving outstanding issues, to adhere unconditionally to the
Additional Protocol (requiring Iran to provide more extensive
information and to accept more intrusive inspections), and to suspend
all further uranium enrichment-related activities and any reprocessing
activities. Moreover, it set the end of October as a deadline for Iran
to meet these requirements.
The September IAEA resolution produced a strong public reaction in
Tehran, with leaders across the political spectrum denouncing foreign
attempts to pressure Iran. But the confrontation with the IAEA's
members also exposed sharp differences within Iran on the nuclear
issue, with moderate voices supporting cooperation with the
international community and conservatives advocating resistance, even
withdrawal from the NPT.
The European initiative
It was in these circumstances, and with less than two weeks
remaining before the deadline, that the French, U.K., and German
foreign ministers visited Iran and produced the October 21st
declaration. In that declaration, Iran pledges ``through full
transparency'' to meet all of the IAEA's demands and ``correct any
possible failures and deficiencies.'' It agrees to sign and ratify the
Additional Protocol and, significantly, to act in accordance with the
Protocol pending its ratification. And most positively (and
unexpectedly), Iran commits ``voluntarily to suspend all uranium
enrichment and processing activities as defined by the IAEA.'' For
their part, the European ministers express the view that, once
international concerns about the nuclear issue are fully resolved,
``Iran could expect easier access to modern technology and supplies in
a range of areas.''
The three European countries deserve a great deal of credit for
their timely and skillful diplomacy. But their initiative would not
have been possible without the strong pressures placed on Iran by the
United States, other members of the IAEA Board, and the IAEA itself.
Those pressures confronted Tehran with a stark choice--it could
cooperate and meet IAEA requirements or it could defy the IAEA
resolution, be found in non-compliance with its NPT obligations, see
the nuclear issue sent to the United Nations Security Council, and
eventually become the target of Security Council sanctions. Unlike
North Korea, Iran minds being branded an international outlaw. It
recognizes that its plans for a better future depend on re-integration
into the world community--and that becoming an international pariah
would not be consistent with those plans. The prospect of being hauled
before the U.N. Security Council, therefore, was presumably an
important factor motivating Iran to accept last week's declaration.
A first step, but not a solution
While the declaration has been acknowledged almost universally as a
valuable step, it clearly does not resolve the Iranian nuclear issue.
In the first place, the meaning of some of its crucial elements--
especially the suspension of ``all uranium enrichment and processing
activities as defined by the IAEA''--is not yet clear. If the IAEA were
to define the suspension as covering only enrichment experiments and
operations (permitting, for example, continued construction of the
Natanz plant), its value would be minimal. Instead, the IAEA should
look to the September Board resolution's appeal that Iran suspend all
``enrichment-related activities'' and ``any reprocessing activities,''
which presumably would cover not just the actual enrichment of uranium
but also further construction at Natanz or any other enrichment
facilities, manufacture of additional centrifuges and related
equipment, processing of uranium to make feedstock for enrichment, and
a range of other fuel-cycle activities.
The duration of the suspension is also unclear. Hassan Rohani,
secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, said that
``it could last for one day or one year; it depends on us.'' In light
of strong opposition to the suspension by some in Iran (presumably
because they recognize that once a moratorium begins, it may be
politically difficult to end), it is understandable why Rohani chose to
reassure Iranian audiences in this way. However, to have any value, the
suspension must be more durable, along the lines anticipated by the
September Board--at a minimum, it should last until the Protocol has
been fully implemented and concerns about Iran's program have been
resolved.
However the elements of the October 21st declaration are defined,
the value of the declaration will depend on how conscientiously it is
implemented. The text makes plain (and the European authors have
emphasized) that the declaration is no substitute for Iran meeting the
demands of the September Board resolution, including the requirement to
turn over to the IAEA all information needed to resolve outstanding
questions about its nuclear program. Apparently, Iran turned over
substantial documentation to the Agency late last week, but that
information will take some time to evaluate and will become the subject
of a report by the Director General to the Board before its November
meeting.
A finding of non-compliance at the November Board?
The Iranians may assume that last week's agreement means that there
will be no finding of non-compliance at the November Board and no
referral to the U.N. Security Council. But the European authors have
asserted clearly that the declaration does not excuse Iran from meeting
the requirements laid down by the September Board. So the decision the
Board takes at its November meeting will depend on Iran's behavior
between now and then.
If Tehran doesn't show the necessary cooperation and transparency
or drags its feet on the suspension or Protocol, it could well face
strong pressures for a tough finding and for sending the matter to New
York. However, if it clearly demonstrates good faith in meeting the
demands of the September resolution and the terms of the declaration,
the Board would probably decide to hold off on making a definitive
finding or referring the issue to the Security Council. It would
neither be found in non-compliance nor given a clean bill of health. It
would, in effect, be put on probation and would be called upon to take
a variety of concrete steps to resolve the issue fully. The IAEA would
remain actively engaged, including in monitoring the suspension and in
implementing the Protocol, which Iran has agreed to abide by
provisionally pending its ratification. At the following Board meeting,
progress would be evaluated and further decisions taken.
It might be argued that, regardless of Iran's behavior going
forward, its past violations warrant a November finding of non-
compliance and referral to the Council. According to this view,
reporting of violations is a statutory responsibility of the IAEA, and
failure to fulfill that responsibility would reduce Tehran's incentives
to end its nuclear program (because it would conclude that the threat
of punishment was hollow). But a stronger case can be made that, if
Iran begins fully and actively to cooperate, the better course would be
to hold off, for the time being, on a compliance finding.
There is little time between now and the November Board to
assess and further investigate the claims contained in the
documentation Iran has recently submitted. There is also not
enough time to evaluate properly Iran's readiness to follow
through on its commitments regarding suspension and the
Additional Protocol.
Given the emotionally charged atmosphere surrounding the
nuclear issue today in Tehran--where foreign pressures to stop
the nuclear weapons program are portrayed as attempts to
humiliate Iran, undermine its sovereignty, and deny it its
lawful right to acquire advanced technologies--there is a risk
that a finding of non-compliance and referral to the Security
Council, especially following concrete steps by Iran to meet
IAEA demands, could fatally undercut the case in Tehran for
cooperation with the IAEA. Supporters of Iran's weapons program
would argue that a decision to bring the matter to the Security
Council, especially after Iran had made significant concessions
on suspension and the Protocol, proved that the U.S. would not
stop at the nuclear issue, but would continue until it had
undermined the Iranian regime.
If the November Board decides to defer making a report to
the Security Council, it still can--indeed, under Article XII.C
of the IAEA Statute, must--report to the Council at a later
date on Iran's past safeguards violations and any additional
non-compliance. But the content of the eventual report would
depend on Iran's behavior in the period ahead. If Iran truly
``comes clean,'' suspends enrichment and other processing
activities, adheres faithfully to the Protocol, and otherwise
scrupulously abides by its nonproliferation obligations, the
report can follow ``the Romanian model,'' under which the IAEA
Board in 1992 reported to the U.N. Security Council and General
Assembly on certain past Romanian safeguards violations and
noted that corrective steps had been taken by Romania. Given
the absence of continuing concerns about Romania's activities,
no action was taken by the Council. If Iran decides to
cooperate and comply, such a precedent would be available.
But if Iran does not cooperate and comply--if it is
discovered in the future to be pursuing activities inconsistent
with its nonproliferation obligations--it can at any time be
found in non-compliance and brought before the Security
Council, whether or not the IAEA Board decides to hold off on
making a compliance finding at its meeting next month. To the
extent that Iran is motivated by a concern about the nuclear
issue going to the Security Council, this would remain a
continuing disincentive.
Has Iran abandoned it nuclear ambitions?
A key question is whether agreement between Iran and the Europeans
last week signifies that Iran has made a fundamental decision not to
have nuclear weapons--or whether it has simply made a tactical move,
hoping to divide the U.S. from the Europeans and dodge U.N. sanctions
while continuing, albeit more carefully and surreptitiously, to pursue
the goal of becoming a nuclear weapons power. Or perhaps there is a
third possibility: that an Iran deeply divided on nuclear and other
issues is keeping its options open and will proceed in the future on
the basis of an evolving calculation of benefits and risks, with its
domestic struggle playing a major role in the outcome.
We cannot at this stage know which of these explanations is most
accurate. It would be naive, given the tremendous commitment Tehran has
made to its nuclear program over the years, to act on the assumption
that last week's declaration marked the end of Iran's pursuit of
nuclear weapons. But it would also be a mistake to assume that an
Iranian nuclear weapons capability is inevitable and that there is
nothing we can do to influence Tehran's choices. Instead, we should do
everything we can to bring Iran's leaders, over time, to the conclusion
that continuing their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons will be too
risky, too subject to detection, and too damaging to Iran's reputation
and broader interests--in short, a losing proposition.
Bringing Iran to that realization may take considerable time. It
will certainly require the international community to speak with one
voice in sending the message to Tehran that it has much to lose by
continuing down the path toward nuclear weapons and much to gain by
reversing course. It will be essential for the Europeans not to declare
victory on the basis of the October 21st declaration and return to
business as usual. Their recent firmness was indispensable to achieving
last week's result and must be maintained. It will be crucial for the
U.S. and the Europeans to develop a common approach toward the November
IAEA Board meeting and beyond. The Russians too will be critical.
Rather than taking last week's agreement as a green light to accelerate
the completion of Bushehr and the delivery of fuel for the reactor,
they should maintain the deliberate approach they have adopted in
recent months and await an indication of whether Iran is proceeding
responsibly and expeditiously to meet the requirements of both the
declaration and the IAEA Board. The IAEA must continue its
investigations with the same thoroughness and professionalism it has
exhibited over the last year, while adding to its responsibilities the
tasks of defining and monitoring the suspension of enrichment and
processing activities and working with Iran to implement the Additional
Protocol.
A more durable solution to the nuclear issue
Together, the September IAEA Board resolution and the October 21st
Iranian-European declaration prescribe a useful intermediate step
toward resolving the Iran nuclear issue. But some of the elements of
this temporary solution will raise questions over time and cannot
provide confidence in the long run. For example, the U.S. and others
will not be comfortable with simply suspending Iranian fuel cycle
activities and will worry that Iran could re-activate its nuclear
weapons program by unfreezing those activities at some future date. For
its part, Iran will not be content for long with the vague promise in
the October 21st declaration that, if international concerns about the
nuclear issue are fully resolved, ``Iran could expect easier access to
modern technology and supplies in a range of areas.'' It will want
greater assurance that its plans for a nuclear power program are
sustainable.
Before long, therefore, it will be important to replace the interim
arrangement with a more permanent and stable solution. Such a solution
might include the following key elements:
In addition to faithfully implementing the Additional
Protocol and complying with its other nonproliferation
commitments, Iran would permanently forswear nuclear fuel cycle
capabilities, including enrichment, reprocessing, uranium
conversion, and fuel fabrication. It would agree to dismantle
existing fuel-cycle facilities as well as any under
construction.
The U.S., Europeans, Russians, and perhaps others would
provide a binding multilateral guarantee that, as long as Iran
met its nuclear nonproliferation commitments, it would be able
on a commercial basis to receive fuel-cycle services (including
fresh reactor fuel supply and spent fuel take-back and storage)
for any nuclear power reactors that it builds.
This approach would meet essential U.S. requirements. The
combination of the Additional Protocol and the prohibition of any fuel
cycle capabilities should provide sufficient confidence that Iran was
not pursuing a clandestine fissile material production program,
especially since any detected foreign procurement efforts associated
with fuel cycle capabilities would be a tip-off of noncompliance.
Moreover, while the U.S. would prefer that Iran not build any nuclear
power reactors, the risks associated with such reactors--especially in
the absence of fuel-cycle capabilities in Iran--are manageable. In this
connection, there is broad agreement that the likelihood of undetected,
clandestine diversion of plutonium from the spent fuel discharged by
such large, safeguarded power reactors would be minimal. Opinion is
somewhat more divided about the risk that Iran might in the future
withdraw from the NPT, kick out IAEA inspectors, and reprocess the
plutonium from the power reactor's spent fuel for weapons. While this
scenario is theoretically possible, it assumes: (a) that Iran will have
available a fairly large, illegal reprocessing plant that has escaped
detection by the Additional Protocol, (b) that Iran would be willing to
sacrifice its power reactors as generators of electricity (because once
Iran left the NPT and used its reactors to produce plutonium for
weapons, it would no longer receive foreign fuel), and (c) that Iran
would be prepared to accept the international opprobrium and the
resulting penalties that this brazen approach to achieving a nuclear
weapons capability would entail. Most experts believe the chances of
Iran pursuing this scenario are very limited.
The solution outlined above would enable the Iranian government to
claim that it had not given up its right to benefit from the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy, an issue that has taken on great symbolic and
political importance in the domestic debate. At the same time, Iranian
leaders could say that they had reached the conclusion (as many other
advanced nuclear energy countries had done) that the most cost-
effective way to enjoy the benefits of nuclear power is to rely on
foreign-supplied fuel-cycle services and that the main reason Iran had
been interested in producing its own fuel (i.e., concern about the
reliability of foreign supply) had been taken care of by the
multilateral assurance on fuel-cycle services.
Creating a more promising context for resolving the nuclear issue
While the solution described here may give the Iranians confidence
that their nuclear power program would not be vulnerable to capricious
supply cutoffs, it may not be sufficient to address the real reasons
they have been pursuing their own fissile material/nuclear weapons
production capability--primarily, concerns about their national
security. Until recently, the main security motivation for Iran's
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction programs was Saddam
Hussein's Iraq, the arch rival with which Iran fought a long, bloody
war in the 1980s, which was known to have pursued ambitious WMD
programs of its own, and which had used chemical weapons against
Iranians on a large scale. However, Saddam Hussein is no longer in
power and, at least for the foreseeable future, Iraqi WMD programs are
no longer a threat. Now Iran's principal security preoccupation is the
United States and the fear that the Bush Administration may be
intending to coerce and undermine the present Iranian regime. As long
as this perception exists, it will probably be difficult to get the
Iranians to move beyond the interim arrangements that are now taking
form and to accept a more durable and reliable solution to the nuclear
problem.
Ending the longstanding estrangement between the U.S. and Iran and
beginning to rebuild bilateral ties could therefore help create
conditions in which such a lasting solution could be found. But
movement toward an improved relationship will be difficult, especially
given the many grievances that have accumulated on both sides, the
continuing high levels of mutual suspicions and mistrust, and the
domestic political risks in each country associated with dealing with
the other.
In these circumstances, consideration might be given to a
relatively informal, step-by-step engagement process between the United
States and Iran in which the two countries would raise issues of
concern to them and explore whether a modus vivendi between them would
be possible. In addition to the nuclear issue and other WMD-related
concerns, the U.S. would presumably wish to raise such matters as the
disposition of al-Qaeda operatives under detention in Iran, the
question of Iranian activities and objectives in Iraq, and the support
by Iran for Middle East terrorist organizations. Iran would have its
own agenda, including alleged U.S. support for Iranian opposition
groups, Iran's legitimate interests in a post-Saddam Iraq, the
relaxation of U.S.-led economic restrictions against Iran, and concerns
about Bush Administration intentions toward the Iranian regime.
The objective of this engagement would not be a ``grand bargain,''
a written agreement covering a wide range of issues. Rather, it might
be a series of coordinated, parallel steps that would be discussed and
tacitly agreed by the two sides. An entire ``road map'' need not be
developed and agreed at one time. Instead, individual steps could be
agreed, carried out, and monitored before moving to additional steps.
Proceeding incrementally in this way would be designed to give each
side an opportunity to evaluate whether the other was both willing and
able to deliver on its commitments.
The goal of this step-by-step process would be the eventual
normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations. Neither side would be forced
to take normalization steps before it was ready. But the agreed premise
of the process would be that, if the key concerns of the two sides were
satisfactorily dealt with, the end point would be normalization.
At any point during this step-by-step process when the two sides
were ready, they could seek to convert an interim arrangement on the
nuclear issue (e.g., including the temporary suspension of uranium
enrichment and processing activities) to a permanent solution along the
lines outlined above. Because such a solution would be a multilateral
arrangement, they would bring in other parties, including the IAEA.
Conclusion
The October 21st declaration--the product of a skillful European
initiative and a U.S.-led multilateral diplomatic campaign--is
potentially a very important milestone in the effort to dissuade Iran
from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. Building on that
declaration and bringing Iran to the conclusion that its interests are
best served by giving up the nuclear weapons option will require
persistent, unified efforts by the international community, especially
the U.S., the Europeans, the Russians, and the IAEA. But while
disincentives will play a critical role--demonstrating that continuing
on the path toward nuclear weapons would be a risky and ultimately
losing proposition--Iran will also have to see positive reasons for
abandoning a course that it has pursued with so much determination over
so many years. A large part of that positive incentive will be the
opportunity to be re-integrated, economically and politically, with the
broader world community. But a crucial ingredient is likely to be the
prospect of a new and more promising relationship with the United
States. U.S. willingness to explore such relationship with Iran could
well be the key to arriving at a durable and reliable solution to the
nuclear issue.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Einhorn. Let
me suggest that we have questioning and maybe 5 minutes each
for each Senator. I will defer to other Senators if they appear
or reappear.
Let me just start the questioning by saying that I agree
with you, Dr. Cordesman, that the super inspector idea that I
suggested may or may not be possible. The basic question you
have asked with regard to our intelligence in terms of
nonproliferation questions is a very serious one here in the
Iranian case. We are having public discussion about
intelligence in Iraq and even in North Korea or elsewhere.
Ultimately this may be a question that can never be resolved.
On the other hand, I am curious as to whether there are any
parallels between the North Korean and the Iranian situation. I
do not want to stretch that possibility. The North Koreans
apparently have declared that not only are they working on
nuclear weapons, but that they may actually have already
produced one or two. The world questions whether they do or do
not have these. Once again, a very grave intelligence problem
has come on an issue that is that difficult. In Iran no one is
making a claim that they have produced anything to date. The
claims on our part are that they have an intent to do that, and
we have been tracing from the Shah onward some type of national
enterprise in that regard.
Should our objective as a nation now be to work with as
many other nations as we can? In the case of North Korea, five
others have been identified. Perhaps a good many could be
identified with regard to Iran so that we might have what might
be an nonaggression pact or a nonaggression piece of paper in
which we simply assure North Korea and assure Iran we do not
intend to overthrow their regimes, and we do not intend to
attack them if in fact they stop their nuclear programs. At
least that is apparently the intent in North Korea. They may or
may not be prepared to do that. To take Dr. Cordesman's point
with regard to Iran, it may be equally valid in North Korea.
How will we know in some cases? What are the inspector regimes
that finally ferret out whether somebody is keeping their word?
So maybe that policy works, maybe it doesn't. But for the
moment, we seem to be headed on that course in North Korea.
I am just curious with regard to Iran. Perhaps you would
employ softer language here rather than having a six-member
group sort of hovering around Iran. The suggestion is really
dialog of various sorts, informal, but constant on many levels.
A thought that somehow or other that relationship might work,
if not to a friendship, at least to a much greater mutual
respect and maybe mutual involvement.
Does anyone want to have a comment about overall policy?
Well, first of all, Mr. Luers, then Dr. Cordesman.
Mr. Luers. Two things on that, Mr. Chairman. First, in our
discussions with the Iranians on that subject, we hear from
some of them that a connection of a sort of nonaggression
agreement a la Korea with Iran would not be appropriate because
the Iranians maintain officially they have no intention of
getting nuclear weapons. Therefore, if we linked in any public
or direct way such a nonaggression pact, it would suggest that
the Iranian nuclear capacity is only for the purpose of
national security.
The second point I would make is that as a result of the
recent agreement that was reached with the West Europeans on
nuclear issues, there will not only be the IAEA process which
will be undertaken right away, but there will be meetings
between the three Western European Governments and Iran on an
overall look at this nuclear question. My understanding is the
Iranians would agree to have the United States participate in
those meetings.
In that context, there could be a discussion of a nuclear-
free zone in the Middle East, which has been discussed quite a
bit I am sure. Mr. Cordesman knows much more about that than I
do. Such discussions would provide the context in which non-
aggression or regional security might come up. But the Iranians
at this stage refuse, unlike the Koreans, to say they have any
intention of having nuclear weapons.
The Chairman. Dr. Cordesman.
Dr. Cordesman. I think that, Senator, you raise one of the
most critical issues in nonproliferation, that compellance by
itself will never succeed. You have to remove or ease the
motive to proliferate.
Bob Einhorn raised the critical issue, that if you can
control the fuel cycle, you greatly limit the ability of a
country to proliferate. Even today folded centrifuge systems
are going to be relatively large and visible. While laser
isotope separation presents a different problem, it is far from
clear that countries can actually develop that technology in
the near term.
I think that you can have success if you can couple changes
in their motive to proliferate with controls on the most overt
acts--the fuel cycle, the testing of a nuclear weapon, and the
deployment of vehicles designed to carry weapons of mass
destruction, like long-range missiles, particularly systems
which make no military sense unless they have weapons of mass
destruction, than you can address the most visible signs.
But we need to be honest, and perhaps this is an area where
the committee might wish to seek a classified response. With
today's technology, it is becoming easier and easier to develop
relatively sophisticated nuclear weapons designs without overt
testing. Basic research for laser isotope separation is in my
opinion undetectable, and moving it forward to the possibility
of industrial scale development would probably also be
undetectable. Advances in centrifuge design could be dispersed
and concealed and brought to the point of a breakout capability
in ways I do not believe we can detect. As long as these
realities exist, you cannot really talk about preventing
proliferation. What you can talk about is altering the path in
intensity of proliferation, and that is a different thing.
The Chairman. I thank you. I am going to defer.
Senator Biden. Take whatever time you want.
The Chairman. Let me just carry on.
The dilemma here in terms of our foreign policy is what the
President has often talked about, that is the intersection of
weapons of mass destruction with terrorism. On the one hand, we
have discussed with regard to Iran today that there has been
state-sponsored terrorism. Now, the suggestion is perhaps if
the conduct of Israel and the Palestinians and the Road Map and
what have you had worked out, this might now be less intensive
and less developed. On the other hand, maybe not. It appears
that the terrorism is a part of the current regimes, not the
same sort of thing that existed during the Shah's days. The
SAVAK and the Secret Service were there, but they were not
overt terrorism. So this poses quite a dilemma.
As you point out, Dr. Cordesman, if some program moving
almost to the point of breakout is undetectable ultimately--and
the terrorism is still there, we are on the horns of a dilemma
perpetually. The answer to that--I think you or someone
suggested--is that we better keep a lot of military forces in
the area because they might have to come into action. Now, that
then leaves the Iranians to feel that in fact we are after them
and we want to overturn their regime.
How can we finally sort out some sort of a situation here
in which there is even a minimum of mutual trust? Of course, as
Dr. Hadian has said, after all, the self-respect of Iranians is
that, by golly, if they want to have nuclear weapons, nuclear
power, all the rest of it, that is their given right. Well, at
least the power part of it is understandable, even if Iran has
all sorts of other resources. And who are we to determine you
should not be doing that sort of thing?
I am just trying to come to grips in my own mind's eye with
how we divine some degree of American security out of all of
this without at the same time having everybody out of sorts
perpetually, with no possibility of moving on except in these
informal contacts in which we sort of keep in touch sort of
looking for better days.
Dr. Cordesman. Senator, could I just make two quick points?
First, my own dialog or discussions with Iranians do not
indicate that the presence we have in the gulf, assuming we are
out of Iraq, is by itself something that they cannot live with.
I think it is something they would like to get rid of, but they
can accept it and they expect it to continue. The problem lies
in U.S. rhetoric which talks about regime change and
preemption, which is not backed by dialog, compromise, or
efforts to move forward. That we can change.
But the second thing that bothers me is that because a
nation supports groups we do not like, it somehow is going to
be a high risk in terms of the transfer of weapons of mass
destruction.
I think the problem is different and more serious in many
ways. Terrorist groups already know how to make crude chemical
weapons. Fourth generation technology will ease the burden with
time.
The proliferation of biotechnology, the components for
biological weapons, additional knowledge of genetic engineering
is not an urgent or immediate threat, but the anthrax problems
we saw in the U.S. show that the advanced technology for
building anthrax already exists and no terrorist movement is
not going to be able to build crude biological weapons.
It does not need Iran or anyone else. Radiological weapons
are probably not very effective, but all you need to do is buy
the agent. So the idea that weapons of mass destruction can be
kept out of terrorist hands or that it takes a state sponsor to
provide these weapons to terrorists is one for which I can see
no technological base.
The Chairman. Dr. Hadian.
Dr. Hadian. I wish to make a couple of points. First of
all, in regard to North Korea and Iran, there are a number of
important differences. First of all, as I said, in Iran there
are differences of opinion. There are different groups. There
is a public opinion which makes it much harder in fact what
should be done.
Also, from the outside the decisionmaking process, because
of many institutions, many informal networks, many individuals
are involved, may seem very chaotic, but in fact usually
important decisions are very much consensually made and you can
trust those decisions which have been basically made
consensually.
But in regard to terrorism and Iran's link with terrorism,
I very much agree with Dr. Cordesman also that we have to
distinguish between different kinds of terrorism. Just putting
Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and al-Qaeda as
one category, calling them terrorism and prescribing some
policies to containing them I believe is not going to work.
Iran's relationship with each one of these organizations is
very different. In fact, I can say Iran can play a very
important, constructive role in dealing with or in fighting
with terrorism.
I would make that terrorism, at least for the sake of our
discussion, in two main categories: ideologically oriented
terrorism and politically oriented terrorism. Ideologically
oriented terrorism, which is much harder fight with, is the al-
Qaeda type. They are performing a duty or a task. They are not
very much concerned about the consequences of their acts,
unlike the politically oriented terrorism, which is like an
extension of politics. There is a cost/benefit analysis of the
center of that activity. In other words, you can deal much
easier with the politically oriented terrorism than dealing
with ideologically oriented terrorism.
To me, Iran can be really helpful in dealing with this
second kind over the ideological one. In fact, dealing with it
or fighting with terrorism, you need an alternative ideology to
fight with that. For fighting with Islamic radicalism, you need
a reformist Islam to fight with it. You have to deconstruct the
main tenets of that ideology. And Iran is very much well
equipped because of the experience of radicalism. We are well
equipped to fight with that kind of terrorism. In fact, that is
an area which is in the common interest of both Iran and the
U.S. to explore, and Iran really can support the U.S. in its
fight with ideologically oriented terrorism. But, of course,
with the political as well, but I would describe it a little
bit later.
The Chairman. Let me just pass over Mr. Luers for a moment
because I want Senator Biden and Senator Nelson to come into
this, and then we may get back to Mr. Luers.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Well, gentlemen, first of all, thanks for
the testimony. There is a thread of agreement that runs through
what all of you have said, which is basically that, to use an
old term that no longer has much meaning, we have to engage
more here.
Let me be the devil's advocate for a minute here. First of
all, to the best of my knowledge, none of you have met with any
Iranians, nor have I. I have, but none of us has met with any
Iranians that make any decisions, that have the power to make
any decisions. Is that correct? Have any of you met with
anyone, in any of the meetings you have had, who you think has
the ability to affect events in Tehran? I am curious. I just
want to know whether you have.
Dr. Hadian. Oh, yes. I mean, for sure. I can say that a
number of my colleagues have for sure have been involved with a
number of the people who can make a decision.
Dr. Cordesman. I think, Senator, if I may say, one of the
problems here is that a number of times people are encouraged
to have informal dialog with Iranian officials, but they are
also encouraged not to discuss it in any way. So we have a----
Senator Biden. No, I understand that. But look, I have been
doing this for 31 years like you.
Dr. Cordesman. I think some senior Iranian officials have
talked to Americans outside the United States.
Senator Biden. Yes. I have talked with senior Iranian
officials outside the United States as well, but the bottom
line is those senior Iranian officials are people who can only
wield influence in the margins if events begin to move in a
direction that they can impact on. I do not want to pursue it.
I am not saying this to be critical. I just want to make sure
there is a sense of the type of person to whom we are speaking.
The second point I want to make is that, being the devil's
advocate again, I view this in terms of priorities with the
Iranians. Obviously, a long-term and important priority is our
hope, expectation, desire, and resolve not to have Iran as a
possessor of nuclear weapons, particularly with a long-range
delivery capacity. But no one that I have spoken to indicates
that that is a realistic possibility within the very near term,
meaning in the next year or several years. I have not found
anyone who has told me that. It does not mean that it is not an
incredibly important concern.
My concern, in the meantime, is if our relationship with
Iran continues to deteriorate, there are an awful lot of things
that can happen in the near term which are of incredible
consequence to us, starting with Iraq, moving to Afghanistan,
impacting upon our relationship indirectly our European allies,
with whom we have a very tenuous relationship now at best.
So I am wondering whether we shouldn't be encouraging the
Europeans to continue their dialog and agreements with the
Iranians relative to the IAEA and inspections, but move more
rapidly on trying to figure out whether or not there is a
common ground we can find with the Iranians, the U.S.-Iranian
dialog, on very specific, immediate, and serious concerns?
We have all been doing this a long time, some of you with
greater expertise than me and others on this committee. But the
idea that we can eliminate the capacity of Iran to acquire
nuclear weapons sometime in the future is extremely doubtful.
And when the tipping point comes, if they decide to move
from capacity to the reality of acquiring and producing a
nuclear weapon we will be left with a very, very stark decision
to make. But it seems to me that our ability to impact that
outcome, moving from capacity to reality, depends upon our
relationships with the rest of the world at the time. If we
have further fractured our relationships with our NATO allies
and with the European Community and with the Security Council
and with Russia and with China, et cetera, as we seem wont to
do, we will have much less leverage in impacting upon that
decision, if it is reached, of moving from capacity to
possession of nuclear weapons. So I put a high premium in the
coming weeks and months in trying to get on the same page with
regard to Iran as the Europeans are, as the Russians are, as
the Security Council may be.
If you look at the Iranian interests relative to their
neighbors, relative to their long-term future and security,
they are not at all inconsistent with U.S. interests.
Obviously, to have a non-threatening and stable regime in Iraq
and in Afghanistan is as much in our interest as it is in
Iran's interest. Obviously, having a stable and not teetering
and/or radicalized Pakistan is as much in the interest of Iran
as it is in the interest of the United States of America, and
so on.
So what do we do near term to get beyond the point where we
are literally unable or unwilling to discuss very specific
things where there is a common interest? Should we be sitting
down? Should we have, as I raised about a year ago in a hearing
when some of you were here, be talking and should we have
talked to in advance and should we be talking now very
specifically with the Iranians about our plans in Iraq?
Specifically, not generically. Should we be prepared to give
assurances relative to our presence in Iraq?
Similarly with regard to our plans and commitments in
Afghanistan, should that discussion be taking place? Or does
that pollute the possibility of getting other things going?
Is there any one thing that would make any of you suggest
that we should not be talking one on one with the Iranian
Government; i.e., if they fail to be more accountable on the
al-Qaeda or if they continue to support Hezbollah or Islamic
Jihad? Are these issues a reason in and of themselves that we
should not be talking to them about other things? Or does it
need to be this grand sort of negotiation to take place before
we discuss anything?
Dr. Einhorn. Senator, I think we should sit down and talk
to them. I do not think that we should focus on one particular
area of misbehavior that we are concerned with today and use it
as the reason why we should not sit down. If we have a kind of
dialog, it should not be designed to come up with some mega-
deal in the near term. That is going to be too complex----
Senator Biden. I agree.
Dr. Einhorn [continuing]. Too politically difficult for
either side to do. Imagine entering into negotiations whose
objective over the next 6 months was to resolve all of these
issues as a package. It just would not happen. But we should
begin bilaterally to sit down with the Iranians quite
informally and to deal, to talk about the range of common
interests. And we have identified a number of them.
Senator Biden. Bob, I know that this is not your, quote,
``brief,'' but you have been there. Would this administration
be able to politically, in terms of international as well as
domestic opinion, initiate a high-level contact with the
Iranians to discuss specifically the circumstances on the
ground and the future of Iraq? Politically would that be able
to be done?
Dr. Einhorn. I am sure politically that would be
sustainable. Earlier in the administration, there were
discussions. They were in a multilateral context in Bonn over
the future of Afghanistan. Cooperation between the U.S. and the
Iranian delegations was very good during that period. Now we
have a clear common interest in talking about the future of
Iraq and our respective interests in Iraq. I cannot imagine
that this would not be politically sustainable for this
administration.
Mr. Luers. Let me make a different point. When we have
suggested that to the government on that issue----
Senator Biden. I am sorry. When you?
Mr. Luers. When we have suggested to the U.S. Government
that we undertake discussions directly with the Iranians on
Iraq, the answer from U.S. officials was, ``no, because we
believe in democracy.''
Senator Biden. That is heartening.
Mr. Luers. The point being that by discussing directly with
the Iranians, the U.S. Government risks providing legitimacy to
a government that is illegitimate.
Senator Biden. I guess we are going to stop talking with
China then. Right?
Mr. Luers. Senator you asked the question, ``do I think it
is possible.'' I think the only discussion that is possible
during this administration is in some multilateral setting in
which we are part of a group in which the United States and
Iranian representatives go off to the water cooler and talk in
this international environment about problems we have in
common. That has worked. As Bob said, that has worked in the
past, but as far as I know, the discussions have only worked in
a multilateral environment. That is what Secretary Armitage
said, and it seems to me that is the limit to what this
government right now will be able to do.
Senator Biden. Able or willing?
Mr. Luers. Willing. I agree, as you know, with virtually
everything you have said on how important it is, to talk with
them. You too, Senator, in your outline, said we are going to
have a military presence in that part of the world for a long
time. I agree with Mr. Cordesman on that. There is no question
about it. It is going to look almost like our involvement with
NATO in Western Europe. We are going to be the only big force
in the region for a very long time. The fact that we do not
know anything about Iran, except through technical means and
occasional conversations, is unacceptable.
Mr. Cordesman and a few others of his generation are the
last remaining Iranian specialists we have. They were there
during the Shah. We need a whole new generation of people who
have lived in Iran, who have worked there, who understand the
country, and can reflect the reality. And we are not dealing
with realities today. We are dealing with reflections.
The Chairman. I am going to recognize Senator Nelson at
this point.
I have to offer parenthetically, as Senator Biden has
mentioned his history with Iran, mine is more limited. But I
went with Secretary Blumenthal on the last mission to see the
Shah, and we did see the Shah. It was a very unpleasant
meeting. We saw SAVAK. We saw lots of people in those days and
stayed in the embassy which was taken over fairly shortly
thereafter. But that is then. This is now. But the need for
engagement was true even then, and that was why that
extraordinary mission was undertaken.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I will be brief. Since I am
the cleanup hitter, let me just offer some----
Senator Biden. Florida cleanup hitters have done very well,
unfortunately, lately.
Senator Nelson. Yes, sir, we have.
I will just offer some observations here.
I have listened very closely to what you have said, and I
appreciate what you have imparted to us. I listened very
carefully to what the Secretary said. As you heard my comments,
I think he is one of the best in business.
But he also very carefully did not answer a number of my
questions, and I did not press him purposely because I think
there is a divergence of opinion from his office and the White
House. It sounds to me--my observations are from what I have
heard here today are that the U.S. Government has engaged in
exactly the wrong policy with regard to Iran. We call them the
axis of evil. We imply that we are going to invade them. We do
not engage them. And we do not have any plan for assisting the
Europeans, with our own economic assistance program. Now, that
is what I have concluded from this.
Does anybody want to--yes, Dr. Cordesman.
Dr. Cordesman. Senator, I do not have an idealized picture
of Iran. It is a nation where our relations do require pressure
and the presence of a big stick. I think that we have to be in
a position to keep that up. But I would have to agree with you.
I think we have provided recently the wrong kinds of pressure,
that we have tended to demonize Iran rather than to try to
influence it or to create a dialog. We have made it into a
political symbol which has weakened its moderates and
strengthened its hard-liners rather than influenced and changed
its behavior. A lot of that is a matter of posture and rhetoric
rather than things which we could not have avoided.
I do have to say, incidentally, if I may go back, that it
is my impression that we had not multilateral but de facto
unilateral dialog with Iran on the issue of Afghanistan, that
U.S. officials met with Iran on the issue of Iraq, and were
instructed to halt those negotiations before the war, and that
we have been able to talk about narcotics, and that we have not
been unable to discuss some of the issues that Bob raised on a
bilateral basis, but that we have reinforced just the problems
you mentioned at the cost of constructive dialog and with
almost universally negative results.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Are there other comments? Yes.
Dr. Hadian. There is also one important point which I would
like to mention, and that is in regard to the myth of regime
change because I believe probably that is the operating
assumption of a number of people in the administration that
somehow the Iranian regime is on the verge of collapse or we
are in a pre-revolutionary state.
To me, as a 25-year observer of the Iranian revolution, the
reality cannot be farther away from this myth. In fact,
conservatives are in full control. They have a lot of resources
at their disposal. They have an ideology which binds them
together and makes them committed to their cause. They have
leadership. They control all the coercive resources, and they
have a lot of political economic resources. In fact, if you
look at what happened a few months ago in the summer in the
student demonstration, considering the population of Tehran,
which is about 10 million, only probably 7,000 to 8,000 people
participated, not a large number, considering the level of
discontent which exists in Tehran and among the universities.
In fact, the regime did not use massive force to contain them.
That was relatively easy with the police. No tanks were there.
No Revolutionary Guard were in the streets. So they could
contain it easily. Thus, conservatives are in full control.
Second, the real organizing impetus, both intellectually
and politically, for reform and change is generated from within
the ruling elite itself and not from outside of the regime,
notwithstanding the presence of others in the struggle for
reform.
Third, in fact, the elite, both conservatives and
reformers, and the public at large are quite intense if not
paranoid about the sense of independence and dignity of the
country. So it is very important to take into consideration
this sense of independence. In fact, it has begun more than 100
years ago. It will be very crucial that once we are, as
Secretary Armitage said, presenting the fact or promoting and
provoking this sort of action, many of these TVs and radio
stations in Los Angeles are not just displaying information or
disseminating information. These are basically provocation for
a sort of action. And I doubt any country would allow another
country from the other places call the people come and take
hostile action against another government. So it is very
crucial once we consider how to deal with these TVs and ex-
patriots, Iranian, in Los Angeles.
Also, the fourth one, there is a real frustration in Iran
and outside Iran about the pace of reform in Iran. The reality
is that there have been significant and irreversible changes in
Iran. Frustration over unmet and justifiably high expectations
should not overshadow the fact. In fact, yes, it is true we
wanted much more. We expected much more, and we want much more.
There is no doubt about it. But how to get there is very
important issue. These facts should not overshadow what we have
already achieved in the reform movement. It is a painful, long-
term process, but that would serve, I believe, Iranian
interests best and possibly the others as well.
Senator Biden. Can I make one concluding point? I am sorry
to trespass on your time so much.
Iran is almost 70 million people. And 70 percent or more
are under the age of 30. None of you have, but there are those
who talk about a military option. It seems to me there is no
doubt that we could militarily, quote, defeat Iran. But what in
God's name do we do next in Iran? What is there that would lead
anyone to believe that there would be a coalescence of this
great democratic middle that would rise up in the military
defeat? The President is not suggesting a military defeat, but
there are some, if you read the op-ed pages and the like. Is
there's any reason to believe that if--it was not us, anyone--
somehow there was an overthrow from the outside of the Iranian
Government, that there would be a quickly emerging democracy in
Iran?
Dr. Cordesman. No, Senator. I do not know if all of us
would agree with that, but I think the problems we have in Iraq
would be an order of magnitude greater were we to attempt a
military adventure in Iran. Not only that, if we were to
actually do that in yet another country, in the face of no
support from within the region or from our allies, the
reputation and status of the United States as a world power
would be in jeopardy for reasons that go far beyond the
military problems in Iran.
Mr. Luers. Let me make one clarification on the subject of
how we have negotiated in the past with Iran. It is still my
understanding that even though we had off-line bilateral
discussions, it was always in the context of a U.N.-organized,
multilateral meeting. As far as I know, to your question,
Senator Biden, would this government be willing to state they
want direct discussions now with Iran to begin the process of
engaging that country, I do not think they would be willing to
do that. That is what you asked.
Senator Biden. No, I do not think they would be willing. I
was asking the question of whether or not it would be wise.
Mr. Luers. I think it would be wise, and I think it would
be wise to do it. I also agree with Mr. Cordesman and others
that this is not easy, that you cannot be romantic about Iran.
They are going to be a threat in that region for a long time
probably no matter what happens internally. But we know nothing
about the Iranians and have no contact with them, we have to
depend on the types of information that we have, which I think,
as Mr. Cordesman also said, is terribly flawed. I think all of
us would support a recommendation from you, Senator, Mr.
Chairman, that the administration begin the process, however
they have to do it, of engaging directly on some of these
really critical issues with the Iranian Government.
The Chairman. Well, we appreciate that counsel and we
appreciate the testimony from each one of you. You have been
generous with your time and your thoughts have stimulated our
thinking.
Having said that, why, the hearing is adjourned.
Senator Biden. Thank you, gentlemen.
[Whereupon, at 1:21 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
----------
Response to an Additional Question for the Record
Response of Hon. Richard L. Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, to an
Additional Question for the Record Submitted by Senator Jon S. Corzine
Question. What strategies is the U.S. using to curb Iran's
Jerusalem Force and other Iranian factions and units that support
terrorism? Does the list of al-Qaeda names that Iran recently gave the
U.N. Security Council include the al-Qaeda operatives whom the hard-
line factions are suspected of harboring?
Answer. To curb Iranian support for Hizballah, Hamas, Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, and other terrorist groups, we employ a number of
strategies, including implementing a variety of economic sanctions,
pressing other countries and regional blocs to recognize these groups
as terrorist entities and to work with us to block the flow of money to
them. The EU recently added Hamas to its terrorism list, but has not
yet included Hizballah. We continually press the EU, and other states
with which Iran seeks enhanced commercial ties, to leverage their
influence by conditioning any discussion of expanded trade on cessation
of Iranian support for terrorism. We also press countries to deny
overflight clearance for suspected resupply flights to these groups.
The FBI has issued a warrant for Imad Mugniyeh and other Hizballah
terrorists, wanted in connection with crimes committed against American
citizens. We are engaged in ongoing diplomatic efforts with Syria to
shut down completely the offices of Palestinian terrorist organizations
in Damascus, and with both Syria and Lebanon to rein in Hizballah.
Iran claims to have a number of high-level al-Qaeda operatives in
detention but has to date refused to turn them over to the U.S. or to
their countries of origin. It now says it may try them in Iran for
suspected crimes committed on its territory. We and other countries
have made clear to Iran that this is not acceptable. Other countries
need access to whatever intelligence these people may have. We do not
believe the list that Iran submitted to the U.N. Security Council
contains the names of those high-level al-Qaeda officials. In fact,
Iran has said publicly it would not release those names for reasons of
national security.