[Senate Hearing 108-708]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-708
VOICING THE NEED FOR REFORM:
THE FAMILIES OF 9/11
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
AUGUST 17, 2004
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
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95-509 PDF WASHINGTON: 2004
______________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Michael D. Bopp, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Jane Alonso, Professional Staff Member
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Kevin J. Landy, Minority Counsel
Amy B. Newhouse, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Collins.............................................. 1
Senator Lieberman............................................ 2
Senator Warner............................................... 17
Senator Levin................................................ 18
Senator Coleman.............................................. 24
Senator Durbin............................................... 27
Senator Specter.............................................. 29
Senator Carper............................................... 32
Senator Mikulski............................................. 35
Senator Clinton.............................................. 38
Senator Nelson (FL).......................................... 41
WITNESSES
Tuesday, August 17, 2004
Mary Fetchet, Founding Director and President, Voices of
September 11th, and Member, 9/11 Family Steering Committee..... 5
Stephen Push, Co-Founder and Board Member, Families of 9/11...... 9
Kristen Breitweiser, Founder and Co-Chairperson, September 11th
Advocates, and Member, 9/11 Family Steering Committee.......... 12
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Breitweiser, Kristen:
Testimony.................................................... 12
Prepared Statement........................................... 55
Fetchet, Mary:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared Statement........................................... 45
Push, Stephen:
Testimony.................................................... 9
Prepared Statement........................................... 52
APPENDIX
Copy of S. 1718 from the 104th Congress submitted by Senator
Specter........................................................ 66
Copy of S. 2811 submitted by Senator Specter..................... 143
VOICING THE NEED FOR REFORM:
THE FAMILIES OF 9/11
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TUESDAY, AUGUST 17, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:07 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M.
Collins, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Collins, Lieberman, Levin, Specter,
Coleman, Durbin, Carper, and Dayton.
Also present: Senators Warner, Mikulski, Clinton, and
Nelson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS
Chairman Collins. The Committee will come to order. Good
morning. I want to welcome our witnesses here today. Out of
their tragedies, they are doing so much to help our country,
and I hope that each of you who has suffered such a horrible
loss can take comfort in the fact that you have been able, out
of your loss, to do great good for our Nation. We thank you for
being here with us today.
This morning, the Committee on Governmental Affairs
continues its series of hearings on the recommendations of the
9/11 Commission for restructuring our intelligence
organizations.
Our witnesses today come from families who lost loved ones
in the attacks of September 11. They remind us of why we are
here. The victims were fathers and mothers, sons and daughters,
husbands and wives. Those of us who did not lose loved ones
that terrible day can never fully comprehend their loss, but
all Americans, indeed all civilized people throughout the
world, experienced an overwhelming mixture of grief, shock and
anger, feelings that persist to this day.
As this Committee wrestles with the issues, as we wade
through the alphabet soup of the 15 agencies that comprise our
intelligence community, and debate questions of budgets,
personnel, authority and accountability, we must never forget
that we are not doing this as an exercise in bureaucratic
reshuffling. We are undertaking this important task because
3,000 innocent people were murdered by terrorists on American
soil.
The September 11 attack was not just an attack against our
Nation, it was an attack against the entire world. The victims
came from 37 States and Puerto Rico, and from 17 other
countries.
Six Maine families suffered the most profound of losses
that day. Among the victims was a retired couple from Lubec,
the eastern-most town in the United States, who boarded Flight
11 to celebrate a son's wedding in California. Joining them on
that flight was a businesswoman whose parents lived in
Parsonsfield.
Two natives of Lewiston, Maine were on Flight 175. One, a
lawyer and former Army paratrooper, was on his way to Thailand.
The other, a former Marine, was on a business trip. A Navy
commander, born and raised in Gray, Maine, was at work in his
office at the Pentagon. And a young University of Maine
graduate was in just his third week on the job on the 101st
floor of the North Tower.
The senselessness, the cruelty, of the attacks that ended
these and so many other happy, productive and promising lives,
only magnifies the tragedy.
Since September 11 many family advocates have applied
themselves with great energy and devotion to discovering just
what went wrong. All who heard the testimony from family
representatives before the 9/11 Commission this spring had to
be impressed with the depth of their knowledge on terrorism
prevention and response.
Their knowledge is extensive, not because they are
government policymakers, but because they are driven to find
answers to their personal tragedies. This is a position that
none of them chose to be in, but where they are determined to
make a difference. And they have. You have made a difference.
Today we will hear from three individuals who have devoted
their time and their resources to making sure that we do all we
can to prevent another September 11. Mary Fetchet is the
Founding Director and President of Voices of September 11th.
Stephen Push is a leader of Families of 9/11. And Kristen
Breitweiser is the Founder and Co-Chairperson of the September
11th Advocates.
We very much appreciate your testifying today to help us,
as this committee undertakes the critically important task of
revitalizing our intelligence community. Thank you for all that
you have done since that terrible day.
Senator Lieberman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LIEBERMAN
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman, for
your introductory words, and thanks to our witnesses, and
welcome to Mary Fetchet, Stephen Push, and Kristen Breitweiser.
You and so many other families of the victims of September
11 have become familiar faces, friends, coworkers in the quest
to understand how September 11 could have happened and what
America must do to make sure, to the best of our ability, that
it never happens again.
We are, as we gather here today, moving toward our shared
goal of passing the needed reforms that might have prevented
September 11, and which we believe will help detect and prevent
future attacks.
I think the three of you have become skilled enough in the
legislative process to know that we are not there yet, and that
is where your continued advocacy, your presence this morning
and of the mornings and afternoons and evenings to come, is
going to be critical to achieve the goals that we have
together. The fact is that the bill that many of us introduced
to create the 9/11 Commission would never have passed if you
three, and those who are your colleagues and friends in
tragedy, had not come to Washington and spoke the truth of your
loss, and questioned those in power in this town who did not
want the 9/11 Commission to happen.
As a result directly of your advocacy, in my opinion, the
Commission was created, and that set the pattern that brings us
to where we are today, as you, the families of the victims of
September 11, continued to pressure and petition your
government to do what was right in ways that were much less
visible than your advocacy for the 9/11 Commission.
I can testify to this, that you were there when the
Commission had difficulty gaining access to the information it
needed; when the Commission needed its budget increased; when
some in Congress threatened to block the Commission's request
for a 2-month extension. On each of those occasions you were
there, and the result was a lot better than it otherwise would
have been. I would say to you, Madam Chairman, although I think
you know, that these citizens, these survivors, have become
skillful advocates for a critical national cause.
If a Congressman or Senator refused to meet with Kristen
Breitweiser and her compatriots, known collectively and
famously as ``the Jersey girls,'' three of them would wait
inside the office, while the fourth stakes out the side door.
They figured out those side doors of the Members of Congress.
Stephen Push opened lines of communications using his
experience in public relations with editors and reporters
around the country. When a Congressman or a Senator was
opposing the 9/11 Commission, Stephen made sure that the
member's hometown papers and voters knew about it.
Mary Fetchet opened her home in New Canaan, Connecticut to
family members of other September 11 victims who needed to
share their grief and seek assistance and strength, using her
training as a clinical social worker.
I guess I should have mentioned, Kristen, that you are a
lawyer, but maybe that would have been self-evident.
[Laughter.]
And then in Mary's spare time, she also lobbied for the 9/
11 Commission all the way up to the President of the United
States himself.
I want to say to the three of you that I continue to be
awed and inspired by the drive that you have shown to turn your
personal tragedies into public safety for our Nation.
Now the Commission has finished its work, the story of
September 11 has been laid at more comprehensively than before,
before the American people, along with bold recommendations for
reform. Congress is taking it seriously, and I am proud that
this Committee, under Chairman Collins, has set the pace in
holding these August hearings, and has set some tough goals for
action in September out of this Committee.
I must say that some people think we are moving too fast,
which is unusual for Congress. Somebody, I saw in a statement
the other day, said doing it right is more important than doing
it fast, but the important thing that you all have come to know
is that there is more than one alternative to doing it right
and wrong. The alternative is not to do it slow and wrong. The
alternative is to do it fast and right. With your help, that is
exactly what we are going to do.
Yesterday in our Committee, the Chairman and Vice Chair of
the Intelligence Committee, Senator Roberts and Senator
Rockefeller, came forward and suggested to us that they were
supportive of a strong National Intelligence Director. We are
going to hear the details of their proposal soon, but I thought
that was encouraging.
On the other hand, there are voices that were heard
yesterday, particularly in the Armed Services Committee that
held a hearing, that were resistant to change.
I want to say to the families generally, through the three
of you, that we need you now more than ever. We have come this
far together. We need to stay together to get the job of
genuine and comprehensive intelligence reform done. I think you
know, but if you do not, let me say it. You are a mighty force.
You are a citizen army. Ultimately, you are a great moral
force. And no mindless defense of the status quo can withstand
the pressure that you are capable of bringing.
This is going to be a battle. It is a battle for very
substantial change, and people will resist change, even if it
means protecting our country from another September 11. But
your presence here gives me confidence that when all is said
and done, we are going to have the real intelligence reform
that America needs to keep the American people safe, and we are
going to have it soon.
Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
I want to acknowledge that we have been joined by two
Senators who do not serve on this Committee, but who both lost
a number of constituents on September 11, and who have both
followed the Committee's work very closely. I know that both
Senator Mikulski and Senator Clinton made a great effort to
join us here today because they wanted to firsthand hear your
compelling statements. So we welcome them to our Committee
today, and we are very happy to have you join us.
I would now like to introduce the three witnesses. Mary
Fetchet lost her 24-year-old son, Brad, in the World Trade
Center. She is a Founding Director of Voices of September 11th,
which serves as a clearinghouse for information for the
September 11 families around the world. Her advocacy began
immediately after the attacks by calling for respectful
recovery efforts and family notification, and for the creation
of an appropriate memorial at the site. As a Founding Member of
the Family Steering Committee, she has not only advocated
strongly for the establishment of the 9/11 Commission, but has
also helped many other families. She is, as Senator Lieberman
mentioned, a clinical social worker, and her organization is in
the process of expanding its mission to providing counseling
and social services to victims' families. She lives with her
family in Connecticut.
Stephen Push's wife, Lisa Raines, was a passenger on Flight
77 which struck the Pentagon. He is a co-founder and board
director of Families of September 11th, an organization that
supports public policies that improve the prevention of and
response to terrorism. Families of September 11th also works
with private charities to reach out to family members of the
victims of September 11 that may need counseling or other help.
Mr. Push and his organization helped secure passage of the
legislation that created the Commission, and he has served as
the liaison between the families and the members and staff of
the Commission. Before September 11 he was head of corporate
communications at a biotech company in the DC area, and he now
lives in Northern Virginia with his wife Deborah, who is also
here today.
Kristen Breitweiser lost her husband, Ron, in the World
Trade Center. She is the founder and co-chair of the September
11th Advocates, a group that has vigorously lobbied Congress
and the White House for the independent Commission. Like Ms.
Fetchet, Ms. Breitweiser is also a Founding Member of the 9/11
Family Steering Committee. As Senator Lieberman noted, she is a
lawyer. We do not hold that against her. [Laughter.]
She used to practice at a firm specializing in family law,
and she and her 5-year-old daughter live in New Jersey.
Again, I want to thank each of you so much, not only for
being with us today and helping us sustain the momentum, which
as Senator Lieberman mentioned, is so critical. We are at an
impotant stage right now to complete the work that you started
when you pushed for the creation of the Commission. We look
forward to hearing your testimony.
Mary Fetchet, we will start with you.
TESTIMONY OF MARY FETCHET,\1\ FOUNDING DIRECTOR AND PRESIDENT,
VOICES OF SEPTEMBER 11TH, AND MEMBER, 9/11 FAMILY STEERING
COMMITTEE
Ms. Fetchet. Hon. Chairman Collins, Senator Lieberman, and
other distinguished Members of the Governmental Affairs
Committee, I am honored to be here today to testify on behalf
of the 9/11 families.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Fetchet appears in the Appendix
on page 45.
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My name is Mary Fetchet. I am a member of the 9/11 Family
Steering Committee, and Founding Director and President of
Voices of September 11th, a 9/11 family advocacy group. More
importantly, I am the mother of Brad Fetchet, who tragically
lost his life at the age of 24 in the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center on September 11.
We appreciate your urgency in holding these hearings to
address the critical task of implementing the recommendations
made by the 9/11 Commission. We are equally indebted to the 9/
11 Commissioners and their staff, who worked tirelessly in a
bipartisan manner over the last year to examine the events that
led to the attacks and to develop recommendations to prevent
future tragedies. The Commission may not have answered all our
questions, but its report does offer a much-needed overall
strategy to develop a comprehensive foundation for creating a
safer America.
The challenge now before all of us is whether we have the
national will to combat a political bureaucracy, general
inertia, and the influence of special interest groups in order
to enact a comprehensive set of recommendations to improve our
national security. The work will not be easy. It is, however,
essential if we are to protect our families and our country.
The last 3 years has been a painful education for me. It
began on September 11, 2001, when my husband contacted me at
work to let me know Brad had called him shortly after the first
plane hit Tower 1. Brad was on the 89th Floor of Tower 2, and
he wanted to reassure us that he was OK. He was shaken because
he had seen someone fall from the 91st floor, ``all the way
down.'' But Brad told my husband he expected to remain at work
for the remainder of the day. The Port Authority, after all,
had used the PA system to assure everyone in Tower 2 that they
were safe, and directed them to remain in the building. Brad
remained with his coworkers in their office as they were told.
Other individuals, who attempted to evacuate Tower 2 at that
time, were ordered back up to their offices. Shortly after my
husband's call, I witnessed the plane hit Tower 2 on
television. The image is forever etched in my mind, as it was
at that moment that I knew our country was under attack, and
that my son Brad was trapped in a high-rise building that he
would not be able to escape.
I never had the opportunity to speak with Brad. We later
learned from a message he left his girlfriend at 9:20 a.m. that
he was attempting to evacuate after his building was hit by the
second plane. Obviously, Brad and his coworkers never made it
out. He, and nearly 600 other individuals in Tower 2, who
should have survived if they had been directed to evacuate,
died senselessly because of unsound directions. As a mother, it
did not make sense to me that they were directed to remain in a
110-story building after the high-rise building next door had
been hit by a plane, had a gaping hole in its side and was
engulfed in flames.
Since that day I have come to recognize the inadequacies in
our overall preparedness, as well as the grave responsibilities
and the inexcusable inertia of our political system. As with
many who worked on the 9/11 Family Steering Committee, I came
to Washington as a political novice, unfamiliar with politics
or the political system, without a party affiliation.
Every election day I voted for individuals irrespective of
political party who I thought would best represent our country.
However, my political involvement ended as I cast my ballot,
assuming like most that my elected officials would act in my
best interest, ensure my family's safety and counter any
terrorist attacks. I believed that my government was a
comprehensive organization, whose officials and agencies, in
the best interest of national security, would share
intelligence, collaborate and coordinate their counterterrorism
efforts. Sadly, I was wrong.
I, like others, have also tried to make sense of my son's
death and those of the nearly 3,000 other innocent victims by
collecting and scrutinizing newspaper reports on 9/11 issues.
Two important themes quickly became apparent. One system did
not fail our country, virtually all systems failed. They failed
to follow existing procedures and failed to have protocols or
effective lines of communication in place, leading to
widespread breakdowns in our preparedness, defense and
emergency response. The other painful realization was that our
government is often paralyzed by partisanship and complacent to
a fault.
Our sad and frightening pre-September 11 history includes
pervasive failures and shortcomings within and amongst
government agencies due to breakdowns in communication on all
levels, lack of direction and overall strategic plan, and a
disconnect between policy, priorities and allocation of funds.
More specifically, failures occurred due to:
Intelligence agencies not sharing information within and
amongst their organizations despite their common responsibility
to protect our country;
Not leveraging or updating technology already in place,
which would have helped identify and stop these terrorists from
entering our country or passing through domestic airport
security point checks, ultimately preventing them from turning
passenger planes into weapons;
Inadequate or failed procedures and communication systems
that prevented emergency response teams from effectively
working with each other, connecting to workers in the World
Trade Center, and communicating with outside agencies, such as
airports and buildings that had already been identified as
targets;
Failure of the North American Air Defense Command and the
FAA to have a protocol in place to rapidly identify and respond
to hijacked planes;
Failure of the FBI to process and act on Colleen Rowley's
report and the Phoenix memo, which would have identified
terrorists and the potential for planes to be used as weapons;
Failure of the legislature to act on earlier
recommendations to address the threat of terrorism, such as
those proposed by the Hart-Rudman Commission, and those related
to airline security by the Gore Commission;
Allowing special interest groups to undermine and block
preventative safety measures that could have prevented the
September 11 attacks in an effort to save money, and
Failure of our government and its intelligence agencies to
have an overall strategy, to establish and coordinate policies,
priorities and procedures based on the escalating threat of
terrorism.
Colonel Randall Larsen and Ruth A. David of the Anser
Institute for Homeland Security, summed up the situation facing
pre-September 11 America in an article published in Strategic
Review in the spring of 2001, obviously, before September 11:
``What is needed now is leadership from the administration,''
they wrote. ``There is widespread concern that threats to our
homeland are both real and growing. . . . However, one of the
most troubling questions yet to be answered is whether
substantial changes such as those recommended by Hart-Rudman or
Collins-Harowitz, can be made unless America experiences a
tragic wake-up call.'' Ultimately, Larsen and David asked:
``Will the administration and Congress have the vision and
courage to act before we experience another Pearl Harbor or
something far worse that could change the course of history?''
We all recognize that we have experienced another Pearl
Harbor, now known as September 11. The administration and
Congress did not have the vision or the courage to act on
previous information. Now 3 years after this tragic event and
the death of nearly 3,000 innocent victims, it is apparent that
the status quo is unacceptable, and reform is necessary. The
questions we now face are twofold: Are we prepared? And if not,
are we ready to move decisively to embrace a comprehensive
overall such as the ones presented by the 9/11 Commission?
As a Nation, we remain amazingly ill prepared to prevent an
attack or at least minimize its impact. This is especially
frightening since we are under a greater threat than ever.
Consider for a moment that we live under a heightened
national terrorist alert, and yet 3 years later systems have
not been put in place to educate our families, our schools, our
communities, on how to prepare for another attack. Several
initiatives have been put in place since September 11, yet many
of the core problems within and amongst government agencies
have not been addressed.
Communications systems are still inadequate; community and
city-wide preparedness plans have not been effectively
established or communicated; government agencies and
legislative groups do not effectively share or leverage
intelligence and general information or even readily accept it
from the public as I know firsthand; an effective, government-
wide control center for all intelligence has yet to be
established; and crucial Congressional oversight and budgetary
control of this effort is not in place; no one is in charge.
Some in Washington have warned that it may take 3 to 5
years to enact all the measures needed. That is not acceptable
to the 9/11 families or the American people. Our enemies are
preparing to strike us now, and the longer we wait to move
decisively, the greater advantages and opportunities they have
to harm us.
Former Defense Secretary William Cohen put the impact of
unchecked aggression into perspective 6 years ago in speaking
to New York's Council on Foreign Relations: ``No government can
permit others to attack its citizens with impunity if it hopes
to retain the loyalty and confidence of those it is charged to
protect.'' Americans have lost faith in our government and its
ability to protect us. You have to act now to restore it.
I recognize the challenge with moving a Federal
bureaucracy, however well meaning, in a new direction. Like any
system, change and restructuring are difficult. Special
interest groups, turf battles and simple fear of the unknown
can all work against reform. Yet when American lives are at
stake, indifference or inertia is unacceptable. I am confident
you recognize what is at stake and are up to the challenge. We
must embrace a complete and interlinking set of recommendations
proposed by the 9/11 Commission. This plan should include the
creation of a National Counterterrorism Center, and the
appointment of a National Intelligence Director (NID) who
reports directly to the White House.
The NID should: Oversee all national intelligence and
counterterrorism activities; develop an overall strategy to
promote national and regional preparedness; coordinate
policies, priorities and protocols amongst the 15 intelligence
agencies; authorize and allocate the budget and resources to
execute this strategy; ensure qualified individuals are
appointed to key posts and have the ability to hire, fire, and
more importantly, promote, individuals who are proactive in the
fight against the war on terrorism.
The aim is simple: A coordinated and comprehensive approach
in gathering information and operating our intelligence
agencies. I recognize that this Committee is charged with
solely examining intelligence issues, but we must not allow
ourselves to become shortsighted or piecemeal in our approach
to America's safety. We must examine and embrace all of the
Commission's 41 recommendations, for they are interconnected.
As Governor Kean has mentioned, the success of the
reorganization is also dependent upon changes made in foreign
policy, public diplomacy, border and transportation security.
Effective implementation is reliant on legislation, executive
order, and a willingness to maintain a consistent strategy in
each of these areas. Is there risk in transition? Absolutely.
Governor Kean, Chairman of the 9/11 Commission, acknowledged as
much in his report. He warned, however, that there is even more
risk in doing nothing. We cannot afford to continue with the
status quo. We must act now.
Ultimately I want to do what I was not able to do on
September 11. I want to protect my children and keep them safe.
I cannot bring my son Brad back, but I can, in his memory, push
for a safer America. When critical reforms are implemented to
make our country safer, I will know that neither Brad's life,
nor the lives of nearly 3,000 others who perished on September
11, were lost in vain.
As a result of research into the horrific circumstances of
my son's death, I came to realize that our country was
unprepared for the threat of terrorism despite forewarning. I
now recognize that I cannot just be an observer, but have an
obligation and a responsibility as an American citizen to be
educated and aware of the larger issues that impact the safety
of my family and friends. I encourage all Americans to read the
9/11 Commission report, and to contact their elected officials
to urge them to act expeditiously in a nonpartisan fashion to
enact reform.
Again, I want to thank you for this opportunity to express
my views. My hope is that these hearings will lead to critical
reforms. We now look to you, our elected officials, for
leadership, courage and fortitude to embrace the
recommendations. The safety of our families, our communities,
and our country rest in your hands.
Thank you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you for such an eloquent statement.
Mr. Push.
TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN PUSH,\1\ CO-FOUNDER AND BOARD MEMBER,
FAMILIES OF 9/11
Mr. Push. Good morning, Senators Collins and Lieberman, and
Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting us,
representatives of the 9/11 families, to provide testimony on
this important issue.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Push appears in the Appendix on
page 52.
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With all due respect to the Members of this Committee, your
colleagues in Congress, and the Members of the Executive
Branch, I would like to state what I believe is at stake in
this debate. What is at stake is nothing less than the
legitimacy of the U.S. Government.
The primary function of government is to defend its people.
If the government cannot prevent terrorists from entering the
country and murdering innocent civilians by the thousands, its
other functions have little value.
The 9/11 Commission has confirmed what many of us who lost
loved ones in the attacks have long believed since shortly
after September 11: The U.S. intelligence community failed to
capitalize on numerous opportunities to discover and disrupt
the 9/11 plot. This failure disclosed long-standing systemic
problems that render the intelligence community ill-prepared to
deal with the threat of terrorist attacks by Islamist
extremists.
In fact, the term ``intelligence community'' is an
oxymoron. One of the so-called community's greatness weaknesses
has been its inability to coordinate its operations and share
its intelligence with those who could use the intelligence to
provide the Nation's leaders with useful, timely information.
I have no doubt that, in the wake of September 11, this
weakness has been ameliorated, in part by internal reforms, and
in part by heightened diligence on the part of intelligence
officers shocked by the devastation of the attacks. But I also
have no doubt that these reforms have not gone far enough. And
as the memory of September 11 fades in the minds of those not
directly affected, the systemic problems will reassert
themselves and our intelligence agencies will slip back into
the old habits that left the Nation so vulnerable 3 years ago.
I concur with the Commission's conclusion that fundamental
organizational reforms must be undertaken in the government to
create an intelligence community worthy of the name, worthy of
the trust and treasure that the American people have invested
in it, and worthy of the blood and sweat of the intelligence
officers who labor, and sometimes risk their lives, serving the
Nation.
In my testimony I would like to focus on three issues that
I believe you, as Senators and Members of this Committee, must
address as you consider the Commission's recommendations
regarding organizational reform of the intelligence community.
First, you must provide the new National Intelligence
Director with sufficient authority. We do not need a toothless
intelligence czar, who can only cajole the intelligence
agencies from the sidelines.
The NID must be able to marshal all of the intelligence
community's resources for collection and analysis. The NID must
also be able to ensure that intelligence and assessments are
shared with all of those who need them. To accomplish these
goals the NID must have control over budgets and personnel.
I recognize the concerns raised by the intelligence needs
of the military. We must provide our war-fighters with the
intelligence they need to accomplish their missions without
exposing them to avoidable risks. But this concern is not a
sufficient reason to maintain the status quo, in which the
Pentagon controls 80 percent of the estimated $40 billion
annual intelligence budget.
While I do not want you to fix what is not broken in
military intelligence, you must face the fact that the status
quo has failed us. The current allocation of authority over
intelligence budgets failed to prevent the murder of nearly
3,000 people in one day on American soil. If the status quo
continue, and if terrorists obtain weapons of mass destruction,
future attacks may take tens of thousands or even hundreds of
thousands of lives.
I urge you to draft legislation that recognizes the need to
coordinate intelligence for both military and homeland security
purposes. I believe this goal can be achieved with the
organizational structure recommended by the Commission, or
something very similar to it.
The position of the Deputy NID for Defense Intelligence can
ensure that the military continues to receive the tactical
intelligence it needs on demand, while enabling greater
integration with the CIA, the FBI and the Department of
Homeland Security. This integration will benefit both the
military and homeland security, and is essential for the
development of comprehensive intelligence assessments for the
President and others.
Some have complained that the Deputy NID for Defense
Intelligence would have two bosses. That complaint reveals
ignorance about the success of matrix management structures in
solving similar organizational problems. Such structures have
been used to great advantage for decades in corporations and
other organizations.
This model can be successfully applied to the intelligence
community as well. But the ultimate authority must rest with
the NID.
What clearly does not work in the intelligence community or
anywhere else is having 15 agencies ostensibly working towards
a common goal without someone in charge full time.
The second issue I would like to address today is the
vulnerability our Nation has during presidential transition
periods. While this may not be an issue that you will address
in legislation, it is an issue you face when you confirm
presidential nominees. I urge you to expedite the approval
process of all nominees to intelligence and homeland security
positions. When there is a change of administration, we do not
need acting or lame duck people in these positions. We need
these positions filled quickly with someone that the President
has selected and trusts.
I also believe that the President, through the selection of
nominees, and the Senate, through the confirmation process,
should avoid partisanship. When it comes to homeland security,
there should be no Democrats or Republicans, only Americans.
The third and final issue I would like to address is a need
for prompt action. Since the Commission released its report
last month, we have heard some officials urge us to take our
time in reforming the intelligence community. I realize that
fundamental reforms must be undertaken with deliberation, but
the problems of the intelligence community have been painfully
obvious to the public since September 11. In fact, previous
commissions and other knowledgeable commentators have tried to
alert Congress and the public to many of these problems for
more than a decade. And the 9/11 Commission, composed of 10
eminent individuals, backed by an outstanding staff of 80, has
spent 20 months studying these problems.
Meanwhile, al Qaeda and its offspring continue to hatch
plots against Americans. Time is not on our side.
Of course, please exercise due diligence in drafting the
legislation, but please do so quickly. Otherwise, we may have
yet another terrorism commission analyzing opportunities that
the government missed today to thwart another terrorist attack.
Thank you again for this opportunity to address you.
Chairman Collins. Thank you for an excellent statement.
I want to acknowledge that we have been joined by the
distinguished Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
Senator Warner, who also lost a number of constituents that
terrible day. I remember Senator Warner organizing a van to go
out to the Pentagon to assist the rescue workers, and he has
shown great commitment to this cause, so we are very pleased to
have him here today as well.
Ms. Breitweiser.
TESTIMONY OF KRISTEN BREITWEISER,\1\ FOUNDER AND CO-
CHAIRPERSON, SEPTEMBER 11TH ADVOCATES, AND MEMBER, 9/11 FAMILY
STEERING COMMITTEE
Ms. Breitweiser. Good morning, Senator Collins, Senator
Lieberman, and other Members of Congress. I want to thank you
for inviting me here today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Breitweiser appears in the
Appendix on page 55.
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Prior to September 11, we had no significant commitment or
political will to dedicate the necessary resources to counter
terrorism. Almost 3 years post September 11, perhaps that
environment has changed. Testifying before all of you here
today, I want to believe that it has changed, and that the time
has now come to reform our Intelligence Community.
We, as a Nation, should have made a historic reorganization
of our domestic security structure a priority on September 12,
2001, or at the very least, studied it more seriously. Yet
nothing has been done or even seriously considered in this
regard until now. Without doubt, the appointment of a NID in
the next few weeks or months will not thwart the next attack,
but perhaps if a NID was appointed 3 years ago, we might have
been in a safer position than we are today.
Realize that on the day of the next attack, Congress and
the Executive Branch agencies will no longer have to deal with
the 9/11 families, you will have to deal with the entire
American public who had read the 9/11 Commission's final
report. They will ask, ``How could this have happened?'' I only
hope that there will be real changes underway so that at the
very least your collective consciences will not haunt you.
It has been said by some that they would have moved heaven
and earth to prevent September 11. Respectfully, almost 3 years
after September 11, we do not need heaven and earth to move. We
just need our Executive and Legislative Branches to move so
that we are in the best possible position on the day of the
next attack.
September 11 has been called an intelligence failure. Prior
to September 11 we have legal impediments, intelligence
agencies that were not necessarily cooperative, integrated or
coordinated in their efforts, outdated computer systems, no
clear accountable and strategic management structures, and very
little strategic analysis performed on terrorist organizations
like al Qaeda. Part of the reason for these failure was due in
part because our intelligence community lacked a true captain
of its ship.
While DCI Tenet was, in theory, in charge of the entire
intelligence community, the record from Septemer 11 indicates
that he failed in that capacity. One reason he might have
failed was because he lacked budgetary authority to make all 15
intelligence agencies that he oversaw work efficiently,
cooperatively and successfully. Or, perhaps the real reason was
that the expectation that one man could effectively perform the
job responsibilities of a true DCI were far too high and
impossible to meet.
Yet, after reading the 9/11 Commission's Final Report, it
appears that our intelligence agencies did perform quite well
on some levels, because the record proves that our intelligence
agencies did have enough information to stop the attack. For
whatever reason, judgments were made at crucial times that
negated field agents and analysts from properly doing their
jobs. Sadly, the examples of these instances are far too many
to be fully enumerated in this limited testimony. Suffice it to
say that they are all clearly laid out in the Commission's
Final Report, its accompanying footnotes, and the Joint Inquiry
of Congress' Final Report.
Going forward, we must ensure that when intelligence
community judgments are made and people are killed, at a bare
minimum, someone in our intelligence community is held
accountable. The NID would be that person.
With a NID and a NCTC established, the next time we have a
terrorist organization planning against us, we will recognize
the existence of that threat sooner and develop a proactive
covert action program to counter that threat before it grows to
a reality. We will not suffer from instances of poor judgment
that hampered our agents' abilities to stop the September 11
hijackers. And if we find a series of poor judgments being
made, we will not only hold the deputy of that department
responsible, but we will hopefully have a NID to who has
ultimate responsibility for the actions and behavior of the
Intelligence Community.
Our intelligence community consumes $40 billion of taxpayer
dollars. The American public should expect some sort of
accounting from this organization. No one doubts the commitment
and work of the field agents and rank and file workers in our
intelligence agencies, but they need clear leadership. A NID
would provide this leadership. A NID would make a difference.
Prior to September 11, inadequacies in airline security
were recognized, yet there was no action taken by the FAA or
the airlines to remedy these system-wide shortcomings. Examples
of such inadequacies range from poorly trained and paid airport
security personnel, failure to maintain an effective/integrated
no-fly list, and a failure to establish effective airline
security protocols.
Three years post September 11, the need for a NID is more
urgent than ever. The impact of a NID on the airline security
apparatus is undeniable. Airline security is not fixed. Chain
of command and authority issues are not resolved. A NID would
be able to force all constants and variables involved in the
airline security equation to work together cooperatively. He
would be able to assign accountability and responsibility so
that problems are identified, addressed and remedied. He would
be able to effectively prioritize problems because he would
have the benefit of knowing our overall national intelligence
strategy. He could apply that overall strategy to affect the
day-to-day operations of the airlines industry.
In sum, a NID would be able to take the airlines, just one
component of the national security apparatus, and better equip
them to meet the demands of the ever-evolving national security
environment. He would not be influenced by financial interests
or persuaded by lobbyists. He would look at the airline
security system through a pure and singular focus to make the
airlines as safe as they can be. None of our public
transportation systems will ever be 100 percent safer, but they
can most definitely be made safer. A NID would set goals,
assign tasks to meet those goals, demand accountability, and
allocate funds accordingly. A NID would make a difference.
The largest problem presented to our military was in some
way, and continues to be, the failure of our intelligence
community to gather actionable intelligence for our military to
justifiably act upon. Prior the September 11, whether it was
missile strikes, deploying our special forces to infiltrate
organizations, or sending reconnaissance aerial vehicles to
gather information, all of these options ultimately failed
because they lacked the actionable intelligence to spark their
action.
Prior to September 11, much debate took place about whether
to fly the Predator over Afghanistan, who would pay for the
flights, who would be responsible if the aerial vehicle got
show down, who would be responsible if the vehicle marked and
killed people, etc. In short, no one, neither DCI Tenet or DOD,
wanted to take operational responsibility or fiscal
responsibility for flying this vital reconnaissance vehicle.
This was the topic of discussion during the first
principals meeting of the Bush Administration held at the end
of the summer of threat. September 11 was a mere 6 days away,
3,000 civilian people were rightfully carrying on with their
lives, completely unaware of their sealed fate. And our
leaders, those charged with protecting us, were fighting over
whether to fly the Predator halfway around the world to try and
gain surveillance video of al Qaeda. As their heated debate
continue, their argument over money and responsibilities, al
Qaeda was already here in the United States, lying in wait,
fully embedded and prepared to kill 3,000 innocent people. If
that does not illustrate how off the mark our military and
intelligence community was in the months leading up to
September 11, I do not know what does. A NID might have made a
difference.
Regarding the need to remove many of the 15 intelligence
agencies outside the Department of Defense, perhaps one thing
needs to be made clear. In the fight against terrorist
organizations, ``boots on the ground,'' engaging our military,
is Step Two in that process. We must not forget about Step One,
our intelligence community. In truth, if all players in Step
One, our intelligence community, do their job, we never have to
get to Step Two, our military. Our military should not be our
primary tool, it should be our secondary tool, our backup plan.
That is why we must strengthen our abilities and capabilities
in Step One.
Step One involves our intelligence community having the
most direct unfiltered information and effectively acting upon
that information. To get the best most direct information our
intelligence agencies need the authority and budgetary control
over the tools that provide them with such information. Leaving
management and budgetary authority over these tools in the
hands of DOD had proven ineffective. September 11 speaks to
that ineffectiveness.
In a perfect dynamic, if tools are used correctly,
intelligence information flows freely and directly, and our
intelligence community acts effectively, Step Two, boots on the
ground, might never be needed. The problem to this very day is
that nobody is coordinating our intelligence resources, being
held accountable for improving and reorganizing our overall
intelligence apparatus, and demanding responsibility from all
of those elements in our intelligence community, so that we do
not have to arrive at Step Two. Again, perhaps a NID could make
a difference.
Both prior to, and post September 11, the use of diplomacy
to deal with terrorist groups like al Qaeda was not a model of
success. The problem regarding counterterrorism and diplomacy
was a problem involving evidence and action.
Prior to September 11, we had a clear and present danger
presented by al Qaeda that was clearly not fully appreciated.
Our intelligence community failed to pick up and act upon the
real threat that was presented by al Qaeda. Politics and policy
might have played a role in this. Post September 11 we did not
have such a clear and present danger of WMD in Iraq and our
intelligence community apparently overstated that danger.
Politics and policy might have played a role in this result as
well. Nevertheless, in both scenarios, two constants remain:
One, people are being killed, and two, we have an intelligence
community failing to do its job. This has to change.
We, as a Nation, must find the middle ground. First, we
must have an intelligence community that we can rely upon. We
must equip them with the skills, tools and resources to do
their job, and we must set up a structure that will hold them
accountable when they fail to do that job. We must insulate
their work product from both politics and policy. Only then can
our leaders earnestly rely upon their work product and advice
in making their own policy level decisions. From that pure
unfiltered work product, our leaders can decide whether, when,
and how to take action. A NID could make a difference.
A NID would be able to integrate our border control into
our national security strategy and give our border control
agents commensurate resources. A NID would ensure that
terrorist travel intelligence became a valued part of our
counterterrorism strategy. A NID would recognize that
disrupting terrorist mobility globally is at least as important
as disrupting terrorist financing. He would demand that our
student tracking system be operable and effective. He would
oversee follow up and designate resources for the use of
biometrics in our border security system. He would make sure
that programs like TIPOFF are able to work effectively and
share their information collectively.
Three years since September 11 our border security still
suffers from inefficiencies, poor funding, inadequate
intelligence sharing, and the poor integration of an overall
strategy. A NID would make a difference.
While the two recommendations, the NID and the NCTC, that
are the focus of this hearing are important, we must not lose
focus on the equal importance of the remaining 39
recommendations. Quoting Commissioner John Lehman, ``the
Commission's report is not a Chinese menu.''
We must no longer take a single-track approach to our
Nation's security. It is not simply striking out and fighting
the terrorists overseas. We need to contemplate other
complimentary methods in this ongoing war. By holding public
hearings on these supplemental methods, the American public
will be able to consider these additional methods. methods that
include providing education and economic opportunities,
eviscerating terrorist funding, decreasing our dependence on
foreign oil, and reallocating funds to pay for vital programs.
Sitting here before you today, I want to divulge my self-
interest and the turf I want to protect. My self-interest is to
make sure that no other person has to walk in my shoes. I want
to do everything I can to ensure that no other family has to
feel the unparalleled pain that I felt on the morning of
September 11 as I watched my husband get murdered on live,
worldwide television. The turf I want to protect is the turf
that my 5-year-old daughter and I walk and drive across. It is
our great Nation. I answer only to the memory of my husband,
Ron, and my own good conscience.
The 9/11 Families are not concerned about reelection and
pleasing our constituents. We are not worried about losing
budgetary controls. We are not misguided by interagency turf
wars. We have one singular purpose, and that purpose is to make
our families, your families, and the Nation safer than it is
right now.
We ask the Congress, the White House, and all other
Congressional and Executive Branch agencies to be Americans
first, not partisan politicians with self-interests, not
appointed officials with turf to protect, not unimaginative
figures unwilling to embrace change out of fear of losing the
status quo, because it is no longer sufficient to support
national security on an ad hoc basis. Your support of national
security must be all inclusive and wholehearted, regardless of
how it may hurt you personally or politically. In short,
working cooperatively to make this Nation safe is like the 9/11
Commission's recommendations. Your commitment must be
wholesale, measured in thought, and endorsed by sound action.
You cannot pick and choose which initiatives should succeed on
the basis of your own self-interest. You must have the courage
to be an American first.
We stand before you as people who have lost our loved ones.
We felt our pain on September 11, and we are now adapting to
life without our loved ones. We have taken our unspeakable pain
and made some good out of it by fighting for the creation of
the 9/11 Commission. We are now urging you to act upon the
Commission's recommendations.
There are many other families whose loved ones are today
risking and giving their lives to defend this great Nation,
both at home and overseas. We are so grateful to them, and we
share their pain. We appreciate and are grateful to their self-
sacrifice in being Americans first, and making this Nation
safer.
In the ensuing months, hopefully not years, as this
language begins to be drafted, and thereafter battled out
behind the scenes, I simply, humbly, and with great respect,
ask all of you to remember during those negotiations and the
heated conversations, how many of us have already learned to be
Americans first. I truly hope that you can do the same.
Chairman Collins. Thank you for your moving testimony. In
my opening statement I said that you remind us of why we are
here, and why this task matters so much, and your eloquent
testimony helps us accomplish the goal that we have been
assigned, and that is to pass reforms that will help to make
our country safer, and I am very grateful for your role in
that.
I am going to go out of the usual order because two of our
members, Senator Warner and Senator Levin, are going to be
leading hearings in the Armed Services Committee in just 10
minutes or so, so I am going to recognize them first for any
comments that they might have or any questions.
Senator Warner.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF VIRGINIA
Senator Warner. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I commend
you and your Committee for the work that you have done.
I have been privileged to be here for a number of years,
and I have seen many groups formed to advocate their causes,
but none have ever equalled your groups collectively in terms
of your strong feelings, and yet your realistic appraisal of
the problem and how it can best be addressed. You have come
before the committees of the Congress, remarkably well
prepared, and you delivered your messages as well as any
witness that ever sat at that table. So I commend you.
I really believe that Congress can do some things, and will
do some things, important things. The President is considering
several options that can be implemented by executive order.
Much has been done since September 11, from the Patriot Act to
the Terrorist Threat Integration Center. So it is an ongoing
process, but each step must be done with great care, such that
we achieve a positive incremental improvement in deterring
terrorism and protecting ourselves against attack.
I pledge to you, as I have to my committee in the Senate, I
am not concerned about turf. I have been here many years. I
know exactly what our committees can do and should do, and I am
certain they will do the right thing, together with the Senate
as a whole, once we put together our report.
But bear in mind this Nation is at war. The intelligence
system that we have in place now must serve those brave young
men and women in the far-flung battlefields of the world, from
Iraq to Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and they must serve them
right at this very minute while we are here.
So, as we begin to discuss changes to our intelligence
structure and consider new authorities, we have to do it very
carefully so that we do not lose a single beat in the
efficiency of the system that is now serving this country. So
bear with us. I think our President has shown great leadership,
and Congress will likewise show leadership. And we can achieve
some things in this remaining Congress, but it is an ongoing
process, and I thank you once again.
I thank the Chairman
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
Senator Warner. I invite you to our committee hearings in
the Caucus Room, for those of you who wish to, when this
Committee concludes its work.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Madam Chairman, thanks to you and Senator
Lieberman for not just today's hearing, which is incredibly
powerful, but for the other important hearings that you have
had and that you will have. Your leadership is essential.
Our witnesses today have given us a powerful push towards
resolution of this matter, towards reforms. I think all of us
are guided by one goal, and that is to make our country safer
so that your loved ones will not have died in vain and that
some measure, positive measure of good, can come out of their
loss. That is not much solace, but I am afraid it is the best
that we can do and what we must do, but I only want to assure
you that every one of us, I believe, even though there will be
differences as to what the right way to go at these reforms is
and what the best reforms are will be moved by your standard.
We had better be or else we are letting you down, and letting
our families, and our children and our grandchildren down. That
standard is what will make our Nation stronger.
There will be differences, however, among people as to what
will make our Nation stronger. You will not probably find, at
least an easy consensus on that matter, but there is a
consensus on that goal, and you have reinforced that goal among
us. We thank you for that. I think you would want us to have an
honest debate and deliberation providing that polar star is
what will make our Nation stronger. Thank you for reinforcing
that.
One of the matters that is most troubling to me has been
the lack of accountability. We have to build in accountability
in a system, and I think the appointment of a NID, a National
Intelligence Director, can lead to that, but I must restate my
deeply held belief that there was a failure of accountability
in the existing system for people who failed to do their
assigned tasks, and that is an ongoing failure. We are still
waiting for word from the CIA, and the FBI as to what about the
failure to carry out assigned tasks. Where has been the
accountability there? So I am going to keep my focus on that,
among all the other needs here, but I want to again just add my
thanks to you and all of the other families for sharing with us
the pain that you have suffered so that hopefully we can be
stronger and avoid that pain for other families.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
Ms. Fetchet. Senator Levin, could I just comment on what
has been said so far? I am very concerned that it seems like
there is this mentality where there is more focus
internationally. I think that we have to rethink that. I think
we are at war in our own country today and that it needs to be
a priority. There has been report after report, commission
after commission, over the last decade, many with the same
recommendations. We cannot afford to continue to debate. We
have to move on this.
It does not mean that things have to be disassembled. I
think they have to be complemented and maybe readjusted--not to
move the boxes around, as some people have said, but to have
real structure and a real strategy in place so that
domestically we are protected. These people live in our
country. There is not monitoring in place, and I think there is
really an imbalance between the CIA and the FBI, which really,
in a sense, led to some of the challenges that they faced.
We have to be focused on domestic security, and we are at
war in our own country. Our families are not protected. Your
family is not protected today. So I welcome the debate, but I
think, at some point, we have to make some hard decisions, and
we have to move on them. We cannot continue to debate and do
nothing, and that is what has happened over the last decade.
I heard Ms. Harman mentioning that we have a plan in place
from 1947. We have other issues. It is a different world today
than it was in 1947, and we have to set those priorities. They
have to be constantly evaluated and re-evaluated. That system
is not in place. I mean, what are our priorities? They are
always changing. And so I think, because our priorities should
be changing, our approach should be changing. And maybe the
government that is in place worked in 1947, but we have
different issues today.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
Senator Levin. I agree with that, very much different.
Chairman Collins. I want to point out that we have been
joined by Senator Bill Nelson of Florida. He has attended I
think every one of our hearings. He has been extremely
interested. I know that he will be going to Armed Services, as
will Senator Clinton, and Senator Dayton, who was here earlier.
They will be coming back and forth, and I just wanted to
explain that to our witnesses today.
All of you have made the point that every one of the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission is important. One of you
quoted Secretary Lehman as saying, ``This isn't a Chinese menu.
They all work together.'' But based on all you have learned in
the past 2 years, which recommendations do you believe will
make the most difference? I am not saying that we should ignore
those that may be secondary, but which ones, based on all of
your study, all that you have learned, do you believe would
make the most difference?
We will start with you, Ms. Fetchet.
Ms. Fetchet. Well, I think the National Intelligence
Director and the Center really go hand-in-hand. There were
breakdowns. I mean, it is well-known that there were breakdowns
in communication between, really even within some of these
agencies. I think to have somebody in control, not just a
figurehead, but somebody that is working hand-in-hand with the
White House, so their policies, their procedures, and their
focus are in line because, again, I go back to talking about
priorities. The priorities change, and the priorities have to
be constantly reassessed, and so to do that that person has to
be able to evaluate, through these 15 agencies, what the real
priorities are of the day, and then they have to allocate funds
that are focused on that.
One thing that came up when we were researching this is
that some of the intelligence agencies had budgets and had
resources, but they were not in line with what the priorities
should have been. So the FBI may have been focused on drug
smuggling and prostitution rings, when the real focus should
have been the threat of terrorism. So I think having somebody
in control that can set the tone, identify the priorities
moving forward, would certainly be, I think, the most important
thing.
Chairman Collins. Mr. Push.
Mr. Push. Well, I would like to call attention,
particularly to the recommendations that the Commission made
concerning diplomacy and foreign policy. We need to change our
relationship with Saudi Arabia. It cannot just be about oil and
selling arms. We need better public diplomacy to win over the
vast majority of moderate Muslim people to our way of seeing
things or at least to create a dialogue with them to get us
communicating with them and to deprive al Qaeda of the recruits
that it currently has access to.
I hope you do appoint a strong NID, and I hope that
individual is able to make the country safer. But we can have
the best intelligence in the world. We can have heavy security
around every building in the country, but we are never going to
be able to stop people from coming here and killing Americans
if we do not win the war of ideas in the Muslim world. And so
those, very often in the press, those particular
recommendations get short shrift and are not concentrated on,
but I think they are very important.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Ms. Breitweiser.
Ms. Breitweiser. I concur with both Mary and Steve.
Candidly, I think the most important recommendation is the one
that is most likely to get done sooner rather than later. If I
had to pick one, I would say border security. My understanding
is that our border security apparatus is in shambles. It is in
very bad shape, and that is something that really could be
fixed with the proper allocation of funds. It is inexcusable
that we have a budget that we have, and yet border security has
finite solutions to problems that they are currently facing and
we are allocating the funds properly towards that direction.
Certainly, a NID would be able to make sure that those funds
were allocated to where they needed to go, but I would have to
say the border security recommendation by the Commission.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
Some groups have expressed concerns about the privacy and
civil liberties aspects of some of the recommendations of the
Commission. They point, for example, to the proposal to give
the NID authority over both domestic and foreign intelligence,
an area where we have always had a sharp divide, but a divide
that we now know has led to a lack of communication that should
have occurred prior to September 11.
They also point to the recommendations for biometric
screening and also the recommendations to have a standard
driver's license so that each State would not have a different
form of a driver's license. Some fear that is the equivalent of
a national identity card. Do you have any concerns about our
ability to strike the right balance between security and civil
liberties?
We will start with you, Ms. Breitweiser.
Ms. Breitweiser. You know, clearly, I think that there has
to be a balance. We have to strike that balance. I think we
particularly have had some problems striking that balance with
regard to the Patriot Act, and I think that we live in a
Democratic society, and I think that more than anything we need
to make sure that we do not lose the spirit of a democratic
society.
Nevertheless, I think what it comes down to is trust. If
the American people have confidence in our government and in
our leaders, particularly a NID, if we have the apparatus set
up in such a way that we have confidence that it will not be
abused, that it is necessary to have something like an
international identity card to carry out biometrics, then I
think that the American people will support that.
But I have to tell you they need to be educated on that,
and that is something that is a perfect topic for a public
hearing. Let the American people be educated and then let them
make an informed decision by calling all of their elected
officials up and giving their opinion. That is how democracy
works. And I think you can strike that balance. I just think
that you need to make an effort to do that, and one way you do
that is by holding hearings on that topic.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks very much, Madam Chairman. Let me
join you in welcoming Senator Mikulski and Senator Clinton, and
thanking them for taking the time to be here. They have been
very strong supporters of the 9/11 Commission in its initial
fight over whether it would exist and now in implementing its
reforms, and I thank them for taking the time to be here.
I would have to declare, by way of full disclosure, that
when it comes to the three of you, I am not unbiased, but I
thought your statements were very effective, very powerful. You
obviously bring your own experience of September 11 and the
loss you suffered, but you also made a study of this tragedy.
And with all respect to anybody else who would claim to be a
so-called expert, I would put you up against anyone. I think
you know this subject very well, and as a result there are two
critical roles, just to develop a little bit what I said in my
opening statement, that I think you can play in the weeks ahead
as we move to get this done.
The first is that you do bring your own human experience
here. Mary, you lost a son. Steve, you lost your wife. Kristen,
you lost your husband. And if this process, as it naturally
will at some point, does yield to turf protection or
partisanship, you have a unique, sadly, ability to focus us on
what all of you said in one way or another. We have to be
Americans here. We have to focus on protecting the safety of
the American people so that no one else is in your position
next time.
Second, you are experts, and you have studied this. You
have reached some conclusions. And from what I have heard from
the three of you, you feel very strongly about adopting the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, and you are as well-
prepared to stand toe-to-toe with people and argue for their
recommendations as anyone. So I think you have a critical role
to play, and I thank you for your extraordinary testimony this
morning.
I want to go back to when the report came out and you read
it. I am interested to know which of the factual findings
struck you as most significant or most surprising before you
got to the reform recommendations section.
Mary or Kristen, you want to start, please.
Ms. Breitweiser. We all have done so much research in the
past couple of years, so that really, after reading all of the
staff statements, there was very little in the final version of
the report that surprised us.
I would have to say, for me, personally, it would be in the
footnotes on page 502, particularly footnote 44, and I think
that is a prime example of why we need someone like a NID.
Because I think when you look at the record from September 11
and you read the Joint Inquiry of Congress's report, and you
read this report, clearly, we need to make sure that we have a
CIA that is answering to a boss because the record is just
replete with examples of the CIA making judgment calls.
Senator Lieberman. What does that footnote, just generally,
say?
Ms. Breitweiser. My favorite footnote.
Senator Lieberman. I do not need you to read it.
Ms. Breitweiser. It is page 502, footnote 44. It discusses
the watch listing issue, and it is a CIA desk officer. You have
to read the footnotes, too.
Chairman Collins. The print is too small. [Laughter.]
Senator Lieberman. Yes, that is what my law professors used
to tell me.
Ms. Breitweiser. All the good stuff is in the footnotes.
I think it does bring up the important point that our CIA
needs to be answering to someone, and I know there is talk
behind the scenes that we do not need a NID. We will leave a
DCI and just give them budgetary authority. I think the record
from September 11 clearly indicates that the CIA needs to
answer to someone, and that someone could be a NID.
Senator Lieberman. Amen. Incidently, I appreciate that you
mentioned the Predator story because part of the argument made
for not altering the Pentagon's control over its intel budget
is that nobody has said that the Pentagon fell short or
contributed to September 11, but the very fact that there was
that argument going on, right up to 6 days before September 11,
shows why there needs to be somebody at the top.
Ms. Breitweiser. I totally agree with you, and I think more
than the argument which, in my opinion, was a petty argument
that carried on for far too long, had we had a NID to say,
``Cut it out,'' like a mother saying, ``Cut it out''----
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Ms. Breitweiser. And to add to that the fact that we were
looking halfway around the world. These people were here.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Ms. Breitweiser. There were sleeper cells, and what is sad
is that you had DCI Tenet at that meeting. He knew about
Zacarias Moussaoui. He had that information in his head. It
should have been brought up at that meeting, and that is where
the attention should have been placed, not flying a very
important piece of machinery halfway around the world.
Senator Lieberman. Steve.
Mr. Push. Similarly to what Kristen said, very little in
the report surprised me because I had been following the issue
so closely, but I really appreciated that we finally had an
authoritative assessment of all of these facts.
The two things that I found most surprising was the role of
Iran in aiding the hijackers, which is, I think, a very
important point and speaks to the geopolitical issues that need
to be addressed in that part of the world. And the other is the
fact that the head of the CIA knew about Moussaoui, but the
head of the FBI did not, which I found rather shocking, that
not only do we have a lack of communication between agencies,
but also a lack of a communication within an agency.
Senator Lieberman. Absolutely.
Mr. Push. The so-called stovepiping, as opposed to--the one
advantage of the stovepiping is supposed to be providing
information up to the top, and it was not even doing that in
the FBI.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks. Ms. Fetchet.
Ms. Fetchet. Well, I would agree with both Kristen and
Steve. I was sort of reading between the lines because we do
have so much information after studying this for 3 years, but I
think the lack of communication. Maybe it is because my husband
works for IBM, but I just cannot understand, when there is
technology out there, how people are not put on watch lists. I
mean, if an airline can know what flight you are on, what seat
you are in, what time you are leaving, what time you are
landing, they should be able to simply put in names and to
identify not, as hijackers, but as the possibility of being a
terrorist.
And I think that just the systemic inadequacies, a lack of
communication, I mean, when you read the report that is
consolidated like it is, I think just the lack of
communication. And I think the thing that frustrates me is we
are all working towards one goal. I mean, if the goal is to
protect our country, to represent our citizens, and I see the
duplicity, the lack of having systems in place, that seems so
logical to me. I just cannot understand that. And I have seen
that actually in Congress, since I have been here, to just
mention the commission reports that have sat on shelves, but
also that one committee might come up with a finding, a
recommendation, and then the committee changes, and they start
the whole process over again.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Ms. Fetchet. That there is never any follow-through, and I
think that is pretty apparent overall, that the government, in
a sense, is antiquated, not having computer technology in the
FBI when you are supposed to be following people? That just
does not make sense to me.
Senator Lieberman. Your questions, your eyes are open so
clearly, and the questions you are raising, recommendations you
are making are so sensible. And in one sense, what is on the
line here in our response to this, is what one of you said,
which is the legitimacy of our government to carry out its
first responsibility, which is to protect the security of our
people or our citizens.
Ms. Fetchet. Senator Lieberman, could I just--Senator
Collins brought up the civil liberties issues. One thing I
would say, as we were working on this--and that came out with
the Patriot Act--I think it was very misleading to the general
public that that was going to fix what happened on September
11. And as you look at the report, you can see it was not that
they did not have information--they did not share information,
they did not compile information.
So I think that there was a sense, by the general public,
that this was going to address that issue, but that was not the
issue on September 11. And I think that we have to think in
terms of what is out there already--licensing, traffic
violations, visas, expired visas--all of these things that they
could compile in one database, and it would raise a red flag. I
mean, there is information out there that is not in a database
yet.
Senator Lieberman. You are absolutely right.
My time is up. I will just say this. The testimony you have
offered and the responses you just gave to the question I asked
remind me of something else. Our Committee has been focused on
what Chairman Kean and Vice Chairman Hamilton said were their
top two priorities: The National Intelligence Director and
National Counterterrorism Centers. But they made a lot of other
very important recommendations. And you have highlighted them
in different ways: The integrated screening system for people
coming in and out of the country, a possible need for a
standardized license, combining the watch lists the impact of
diplomacy, the whole border security system. I was struck that
you, Steve, pointed out in one of your top three issues the
need to accelerate the transition from administration to
administration.
They first hit the World Trade Center in 1993, the first
year of the Clinton Administration. They then hit the towers
again in 2001, the first year of the Bush Administration. Maybe
coincidental, maybe not. Thank you.
Thanks, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Senator Coleman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I again want to thank the witnesses for sharing their
personal stories. This is really extraordinary. Yesterday, we
had before this Committee three former heads of the CIA, and we
all said we learned a lot, and we did. But here we have average
citizens who have been deeply personally impacted who know this
stuff, who really know this stuff. I find it pretty
overwhelming. And in your tragedy, you have come to understand
a system that, in the end, we are going to make some changes.
We will make some changes.
Mr. Push, you indicated, and you talked about the primary
function of government is to defend its people, and I agree,
but you also then raised a cautionary note about the fading of
the memory of September 11, and I just want to make this
statement. I come from a Midwest State, impacted personally. I
have gotten to know one of the families, the Burnett family,
whose young son, Tom, was on Flight 93 and one of those folks
who charged the cockpit. And I come from Brooklyn, New York,
and had a grade school and high school friend on that same
flight.
But I have to say my family is still in New York, and they
are in New Jersey. They have a much different sense, a much
different present sense than I think many of my constituents do
because they live in Marlboro, Manalapan, and friends worked in
the World Trade Center, and so it is--so I just want to express
the importance of keeping the sense, and the memory, and the
impact alive. It then helps us kind of move through.
And we face the challenge that Senator Lieberman talked
about and that you talked about, to move quickly, but to do the
right thing. Because we have had ``reform'' in this country in
the past. We had the Church Commission and the Pike groups, and
they reformed us to a point, I think, and then they limited our
ability to do the right things, in the name of reform.
And so we do face a challenge here, but I guess my
reflection is to listen to citizens who--talking about foreign
policy, the Iran situation, this report says Congress needs to
follow up on that. I hope we do.
I want to get back to the issue that Chairman Collins
raised about civil liberties, and in particular I just want to
talk about the Patriot Act, not a long discussion. But here is
my question, and I am a former prosecutor. There are those
things out there that we just have not taken care of, I mean,
basic stuff out there. And that is part of your message. We
have all of this stuff. What are we doing with it?
But we are also, Ms. Fetchet, as you talked about, in a war
right here. We know there are cells right here. We know there
are folks who want to do bad things today. Part of that Patriot
Act gives us the ability to do things that I, as a former
prosecutor, used to be able to do with organized crime: The
nature of wiretaps, and cell-phone technology.
I just want to kind of get your sense, about the Patriot
Act. Because there is this balance that we always hear about. I
do not think pre-September 11 we could have done a Patriot Act.
Is there a sense that we need to do more, in terms of our
ability to figure out what is going on right here, right in
this country today, and to give folks more power to do that?
And, again, Ms. Breitweiser, your comment was if you let the
public know, they will kind of do the right thing. Just a
little further reflection on that issue.
Ms. Fetchet. Well, I think, as Kristen said, if they know
what the limitations are--I think we are living in another
world, and I think our country really has to have a better
sense of who is coming and going. I think INS was a big--well,
it was a failure. Visas were processed that were not completed.
I do not think that they had the resources that they needed. It
seems like the people that are really going through the process
in the right way are delayed. It is the ones that are coming in
illegally that have more rights almost than we do as an
American citizen.
So I think to educate the public, to know what the
limitations are with regard to the Patriot Act, but I do think
we should begin by having a database and not reinventing the
wheel. There is technology out there that can get you up to 80
percent, and then modify the other 20 percent, rather than
creating a whole new system. Three years later, I do not think
we have a system in place.
So I think that the real focus, my feeling is, should be on
getting the information that we have up and running, and
complement it by more information with some limitations.
Senator Coleman. I raise it because my concern is for folks
who are already here. They are here. Some may be coming, but
they are right here, and they have been here a while, and we
saw that on September 11. How we get to that and how we protect
that.
No one has mentioned the Department of Homeland Security.
Reflections on what they are doing? Obviously, by not
mentioning it, I sense the deep concern that what has gone on
has not been sufficient, but just reflections on Homeland
Security? Reflections on terror alerts? Can you respond to what
you see going on there?
Ms. Breitweiser. If I could just go back to what you were
talking about, the Patriot Act, and then I would love to answer
that question on DHS.
You also mentioned in the beginning that you are from the
middle of the country, and I think that even when people live
in the middle of the country, if they drink water, eat food, go
to malls or have planes flying over their home, they need to
care about these issues. It is not just the people that live in
the tristate areas or the big megalopolises, it is everyone,
because you either will do one of those things or you will have
a loved one that will do one of those things. I just wanted to
say that.
Senator Coleman. And I share that, absolutely.
Ms. Breitweiser. Listen, I try to make that point all the
time so people in the middle of the country who feel safely
ensconced realize if you are eating food, drinking water or
have planes flying over your head, you need to care about this.
Having said that, with regard to the Patriot Act, I think
that there needs to be an analysis. There needs to be proof
that the Patriot Act to date would have made a difference on
September 11, because our understanding from our research is
that we already had enough information on these individuals. I
think, like Mary said, I just want to reiterate, we have
enormous sources of information that we are not even using
right now. To set up the Patriot Act, which is giving access to
things that we do not even need, because right now with all the
information we have, we are not fully using it in an efficient
manner. It just seems like what are we going to do with all
this information? It is like a fire hose of information. As we
have been told, on September 11 they could not make sense of
any of it. Why are we enhancing the fire hose?
I think you need to keep that in mind. I would like to see
an analysis as to where exactly, specifically, with the
information regarding the 19 hijackers on September 11 that the
Patriot Act would have made a difference, because my
understanding is that really it would not have made much of a
difference.
Your comment about the Department of Homeland Security. I
think that certainly there is an awful lot of confusion with
regard to the threat levels. I think that particularly, I think
it was in June we had an incident, where DOJ, the Director of
the FBI and Mr. Ridge, were apparently not all on the same page
because someone thought we needed to go under alert, someone
thought we did not. That is a problem. There is really no point
in having a Department of Homeland Security if they are not
going to be talking to DOJ or the Director of the FBI. I think
that it is scary to hear the threat levels rise and fall, and I
think we need to know that those levels are rising or falling
for the right purposes and the right information, and again,
you have to strike a balance.
I think the Commission spells out that the Department of
Homeland Security is not necessarily working as well as it
could be working. It is a great idea, but especially Sally
Reagan Hart could sit and talk to you all about local
responders and how they need a lot more attention and a lot
more priorities need to be set, and I think Department of
Homeland Security could have played a big role in that in the
past couple of years.
Senator Coleman. Thank you.
Mr. Push. With respect to the Department of Homeland
Security, I support the Commission's recommendation that
another look be taken at how funding is allocated to local
areas, that is allocated based on threat rather than as some
kind of a grant program. It is true, what Kristen says, that we
are all at risk, but clearly, there are cities like New York
and Washington that are prime targets, and the fact that New
York could get lower per capita funding than more remote areas
that are under less a threat is, I think, a mistake.
Ms. Breitweiser. I just want to make it clear. I agree with
Steve. I was just drawing the point that everyone needs to be
interested in homeland security, but I think clearly we need
someone to prioritize the funding.
Senator Coleman. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Senator Durbin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Madam Chairman
Ms. Breitweiser, in your testimony you have a paragraph on
the first page which struck me. You say: ``We, as a Nation,
should have made a historic reorganization of our domestic
security structure a priority on September 12, 2001. Or, at the
very least studied it more seriously. Yet nothing has been done
or even seriously considered in this regard until now. Without
doubt, the appointment of a NID in the next few weeks will not
thwart the next attack. But, if a NID had been appointed 3
years ago, we might have been in a safer position than we are
today.''
We are here because of this 9/11 Commission Report, and I
am going to go out on a limb and tell you, we would not have
this 9/11 Commission Report had it not been for you. Had the
families of those who died on September 11 not been steadfast
and resolute and demanding, this would have fallen apart a long
time ago. There was resistance to creating this Commission.
There was resistance to funding this Commission. There was
resistance to extending the deadline for this Commission. Now
when you hear this chorus of praise for the 9/11 Commission,
you know better. There was a time when this was not a popular
idea at all. And the reason it happened was because you stuck
with it. Had you not done that, we would be off on our
vacations in August as usual, but we are at work, as we should
be, on a very important and critical national issue.
We like to stand in judgment of the Executive Branch. I
guess that is our role as an oversight committee. I would like
you to stand in judgment of us. You have been on Capitol Hill
now for a long time. You have been nudging and pushing and
making your presence known to create this force. There have
been press reports that some committee chairmen were hiding
behind doors so that they could avoid you. [Laughter.]
But you got the job done as American citizens, as you said,
who came here with not just grief but a determination to get
something done. What is your report card on Congress in terms
of what we have done? I mean let us put it all on the table
right here. What would you say needs to be done on Capitol Hill
for us to do the right thing, the American thing, and follow
through on these Commission reports? What is your greatest fear
in that regard, Ms. Breitweiser?
Ms. Breitweiser. I think your grade at this point is an
incomplete, and I think that you are serving the summer recess,
summer school. I really do, I think all of the families want to
thank everyone for attending the hearings this summer. We are
enormously grateful.
But undoubtedly, Congress has a lot of work to do, and I do
not think it just has to do with the Executive Branch agencies
reorganization. I think Congress needs a reorganization. I
think that the set-up of the Joint Inquiry, particularly when
they looked into the attacks on September 11, where you had
both houses, the Senate Intel and the House Intel together,
working cooperatively to produce one product, I think that was
a good setup. I know it is recommended in the Commission's
report, and I would urge you to seriously contemplate doing
something like that, because more than symbolically indicating
and illustrating that everyone is working together. I just
think on a realistic basis it is something that we could all
stand to benefit from, was to combine the Intel Committees that
they are working together.
We cannot urge you enough to act, and not necessarily act
in haste. Act with sound reform, because one of the things that
I just do not get is all this talk about reorganization. I
think that it is futile to reorganize the intel community if
you are going to leave people in positions that failed in the
years leading up to September 11 or the days before September
11 or on the day of September 11. If you are going to leave
those people in those positions and just reshuffle the boxes,
then you are setting this reorganization, if it does happen, up
to fail.
Senator Durbin. Which was a point I tried to make in
yesterday's hearing. Are we ready for reform? I mean can we
pass a law that is really going to achieve real reform?
In the New York Observer piece about your experience with
the Jersey Girls going around to the FBI and all the different
agencies, the fact that you are an attorney and you have some
training and skills, I could tell from the questions that you
asked and pressed on, that you were more successful than some,
but I could also note some real frustration here. You felt like
you were getting the runaround, that people there would not
accept responsibility for reality.
Ms. Breitweiser. I would say that I think I have acted like
a lady, in that I have not really been very transparent in some
of the behaviors and the tones and the attitudes of certain
individuals, who are elected officials, and going forward, I
will continue to act like a lady.
Nevertheless, we have an American public who is enraged,
outraged after reading this report. I know people that are just
commonplace people, moms, they do not work, they are stay-at-
home moms. They cannot get past page 50 because they are
shaking with anger that it was as bad as it was. I think that
is something, the jig is up. Everybody is going to know, and
there is going to be no more excuses. And I just urge you,
because I will be a lady, but there are going to be other
people that are going to want meetings, and they are going to
walk out of those meetings, and they are not going to act like
gentlemen and ladies. They are going to say exactly what went
on.
There are Websites currently being created by people like
that who are saying things, that you cannot carry out and
support national security on an ad hoc basis. You cannot call
for the declassification of over classified material and then
not support wholesome border security because it may affect
your constituency.
We need this to be a committed effort, and I want to
believe it can be done, and I promise I will continue to be a
lady.
Senator Durbin. I hope you all will continue in your
effort, and I thank you for it, and that noise, that pressure,
that heat, is democracy. That is what it is all about.
Ms. Breitweiser. I am not saying I will be a lady behind
the scenes. [Laughter.]
Senator Durbin. Thank you. I am sure you will. Thanks,
Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Specter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SPECTER
Senator Specter. Thank you very much for your very powerful
testimony, and thank you for pursuing your advocate's role. You
have a lot of people who are with you in this Committee and the
Senate, and in the House and Congress generally.
Madam Chairman, just for the record I want it noted that
the reason I was not here yesterday was that I had 85,000
notices for town meetings circulated in Pennsylvania on
meetings which could not be postponed. I just wanted that noted
in the record.
You have put the case very powerfully, Ms. Fetchet, when
you talk about inexcusable inertia, and, Mr. Push, when you
have excellent testimony. I think the highlight was your
sentence that ``What is at stake is nothing less than the
legitimacy of the U.S. Government.''
You are correct when you note that the U.S. intelligence
community failed to capitalize on numerous opportunities to
discover and disrupt the September 11 plot. As Ms. Breitweiser
said about the same thing, the intelligence agencies did have
enough information to stop the attack.
All of that was put on the record in October 2002 when we
noted the FBI Phoenix report about the suspicious man who
wanted to fly a plane, learn how to fly, but was not interested
in takeoffs or landings, and about the two al Qaeda people
known to the CIA in Kuala Lumpur not told to the INS, and about
Zacarias Moussaoui, where Colleen Rowley, the FBI agent, had a
13-page, single-spaced memorandum.
In this room, we had a hearing with FBI Director Mueller
and found that the FBI did not use the proper standard for
probable cause to get a warrant--just sort of incomprehensible.
But notwithstanding that, we were not able, when that bill was
passed restructuring homeland security, to put all of it under
one command. We could not get that job done because of the
entrenched opposition of the CIA and the FBI and the Department
of Defense and their cultures of concealment and their ability
to stop it.
Now, the point was made by Ms. Fetchet that the legislature
has failed to act on earlier recommendations to address the
threat of terrorism, such as those from the Hart-Rudman
Commission, the Gore Commission, and many others.
I chaired the Intelligence Committee back in 1995 and 1996,
and in a Senate bill, S. 1718, called for, ``enhancement of
authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to manage
budget, personnel and activities of the intelligence
community,'' going right to the core of what the 9/11
Commission has asked for. Then we had a cross-reference. It
went to the Armed Services Committee and they cut it to
ribbons.
I ask, Madam Chairman, that this bill be made a part of the
record.\1\
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\1\ A copy of S. 1718 from the 104th Congress submitted by Senator
Specter appears in the Appendix on page 66.
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Chairman Collins. Without objection.
Senator Specter. Two weeks ago, I circulated a bill to
establish a national director and to put under that director--
and I would ask that this be made part of the record, too,
Madam Chairman.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ A copy of S. 2811 submitted by Senator Specter appears in the
Appendix on page 143.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Collins. Without objection.
Senator Specter. To put the FBI counterintelligence out of
the FBI, put them under the national director; the same thing
for CIA foreign intelligence. We do have to look at the
tactical issue, but I think we can solve that as well.
Senator Roberts, the Chairman of the Intelligence
Committee, is about to file a bill, and a few of us are about
to introduce for the record the 9/11 Commission bill. So there
will be plenty of bills to start the markup and to make
decisions that we have been studying for a very long time.
The Scowcroft Commission has an excellent report. We are
not short of reports and we are not short of debate and we are
in a position to move. And it is my hope that we will start the
process and mark up in September and work on a bill before we
adjourn for the election. But that is going to be difficult
unless we get started very early because in late October people
are looking at the election. But your words today are very
forceful.
There are two questions I have for you where I am thinking
in a different direction from the 9/11 Commission and would
like to know your thinking, because you have demonstrated a lot
of insight and a lot of work here.
One question goes to the idea of a 10-year term. The bill
which I have drafted calls for a 10-year term for the director
so that we insulate as much as possible the director from
political influence. The precedent would be the FBI Director.
The second point where I diverge from the 9/11 Commission
is the idea of double-hatting. For example, they want to leave
counterintelligence in the FBI, to report to the Director of
the FBI, and also to report to the national intelligence
director. I have grave doubts that can be done, to have double
reporting. My thought is to take it out of the FBI and have
them report just to the National Intelligence Director.
I would be interested in all three of your comments on
those two points. Ms. Fetchet.
Ms. Fetchet. The first one--refresh my memory because I am
focusing on the second one.
Senator Specter. The 10-year term for the National
Intelligence Director.
Ms. Fetchet. The 10-year term. I think one thing, like
Steve brought up, was the issue about transition from one
administration to the other. So I think in terms of a longer
term, I think that would be very important, and to time it so
there is not a gap when there is a change or a possible change
in administration.
I think to keep it non-political is going to be very
important, and so to sort out how can you best address those
issues. I don't know, during a transition, if maybe Congress
gets sort of focused when there is a transition on
reorganizing, and maybe Congress should, in a sense, be really
focused on the transition and making sure that legislation is
passed, that deadlines haven't elapsed, and that there is some
follow-through from one administration to the other. So I think
the transition is a huge thing with regard to the term.
The principal meetings which they used during the Clinton
Administration, but there wasn't as much focus on during the
Bush Administration, I think, are an important aspect to pull
those people together so they are all on the same page. That is
how I would respond to your second question.
Senator Specter. Mr. Push.
Mr. Push. On the first issue on the 10-year term for the
director, I agree with your concern about keeping the
director's position non-political, and I think we should find
ways to do that. However, the National Intelligence Director is
going to have to have a very close relationship with the
President, a relationship based on trust, and it is hard for me
to see how that can happen unless that person serves at the
pleasure of the President.
On the other issue, the double-hatting issue, I have long
felt that the FBI is not really the right place for a domestic
intelligence agency. I know that the Commission decided to keep
it in the FBI, recommended keeping it in the FBI, and I know
there have been arguments that the FBI already has a well-
developed investigative function that could be capitalized on.
We certainly don't want to go and create something anew
that already exists, but I see no reason why whatever the FBI
has been able to build in that area, in the domestic
intelligence area, can't be transferred to another department.
For example, the Coast Guard was transferred to the Department
of Homeland Security and I haven't seen the Coast Guard miss a
beat on any of its responsibilities.
Senator Specter. Ms. Breitweiser.
Ms. Breitweiser. With regard to the 10-year term, I think
it is a no-brainer. I think that really you need to make sure
more than anything that a NID, if the position is created, is
insulated from politics and policy. More than that, we have to
be able to trust this individual. We need to have confidence in
them.
Rather than worrying about a 10-year term, I think you
should be more worried about who you are going to find. But I
think a 10-year term is very important. I think it works very
successfully with regard to the FBI, and I think there is a
very steep learning curve. There is a lot to learn in this
position. It is an incredible job description, and we don't
want a revolving door. We want some sort of continuity and we
want to give the person the time that they need to really
develop long-term strategies, because I think that is what we
have really failed to have.
We did not have long-term strategy. If you read the
Commission's report, there is much information about George
Tenet going from operation to operation. When it was over, that
was it; we moved on. We took care of the next threat. We need
to make sure that we have a long-term strategy, and the way
that you do that is by putting someone there who will have the
time to develop that long-term strategy, who will have an acute
memory, who will not forget things. I think it is a very wise
decision to have a term like that, in my humble opinion.
With regard to the FBI and double-hatting, I am no expert,
and I think really what you should probably do is have a
meeting with the actual agents, the analysts, personally and
see what they think. We could sit and listen to everyone at
headquarters and all of the head honchos, and you are not going
to get the story that the guys in the field and the women in
the field are going to give you.
They are the ones you should listen to because they are the
ones who will tell you the truth. They will tell you, look, I
am not going to do something like that because I won't raise
myself in the FBI; I am going to be set back by that; I have a
family and kids to support. You really should listen to the
rank-and-file. Their hearts are in this and they have an
enormous amount of information that is yet to be tapped. I
really would encourage you with regard to that question to ask
the people in the lower ranks. They will have a lot to share.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Ms. Fetchet, Mr.
Push, and Ms. Breitweiser. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
To each of you, thank you for being here with us today. I
can't imagine what you have suffered in the last 2 or 3 years.
Thank you for not just dwelling on that sorrow, but for using
it to transform it into something positive, I hope, for you,
and I am sure for our Nation.
Senator Durbin earlier held up a copy of the 9/11 report
and he said we wouldn't have this report were it not for your
efforts and the collective efforts of others, thousands of
families that you represent here today. He is absolutely right.
A friend of mine who is a pastor of a church in Wilmington,
Delaware--I am from Delaware--likes to say it is not how high
we jump up in church that counts; it is what we do when our
feet hit the ground.
We are having a lot of hearings; I think it is great that
we are. I want to commend our Chairman, and certainly Senator
Lieberman for pulling us all together not once, not twice, not
three times, but four times during an August recess, which is
rather extraordinary. I have only been here 3\1/2\ years, but
it is extraordinary certainly by my standards, and I think by
most people's standards.
I am encouraged that we are not just going to jump up in
this church today, but when our feet hit the ground and the
television cameras go away and we have the tough work of
figuring out how to craft legislation that we will actually do
it.
Having said that, Senator Lieberman worked real hard on
creating the Homeland Security Department. It took a lot of
time and a lot of effort, and I don't know that he ever got the
kind of commendation and thanks for all of his efforts, but he
certainly has mine.
Senator Collins and I have been working for about 3 years
on postal reform legislation, and we have a bill that has been
approved unanimously by this Committee, with bipartisan
support, to say what kind of postal system we are going to have
in this country in the 21st Century. Similar legislation in the
House passed unanimously out of committee, and it is not
altogether clear whether or not something that enjoys unanimous
support in the House and the Senate is actually going to be
signed into law. It is just tough to get anything done around
here.
I guess as I thank you, on the one hand, for the remarkable
tenacity and devotion you have brought to this important cause,
I would just ask you not to relent or not to let up. In
football jargon--and I know it is still baseball season and we
are getting some exhibition games going, but in football
jargon, we have the ball, we have possession of the ball, we
have gone across the 50-yard line and we may be inside the 20,
but we are not in the end zone. We need your help and your
effort and your energy to continue to push us to get there.
Mr. Push, I appreciate what everyone has said, but I want
to come back to something that you said. I don't think I heard
it from anyone else, and I am going to ask you just to revisit
it and then I am going to ask our other two witnesses to
comment on it.
Let me paraphrase what I understood you to say. It is
important that we adopt a number of the changes recommended by
the 9/11 Commission with respect to our intelligence
functions--the way we function, the way we organize, the way we
operate, how we hold people accountable. That is important. It
is important that we act militarily to go after and flush out
sources of danger, folks that pose threats to us.
But I think you also said that as important as the
intelligence work is and as important as the military work is,
if we forget about the minds of millions of people around the
world who have come to hate our country, we have not completed
the job. In a way, we will have dealt with the symptoms, but
maybe not the root cause.
Would you just revisit briefly what you said? And then I am
going to ask both Ms. Fetchet and Ms. Breitweiser. I am going
to ask each of you to comment on that aspect of his testimony.
Mr. Push. In response to your question, I said that I felt
that we should pay more attention to the specific
recommendations that were made with regard to public diplomacy
and, as you pointed out, developing allies around the world,
but also developing allies within the Muslim world to create
opportunities for better dialogue with the vast majority of
moderate Muslims, to improve our relationships with countries
like Saudi Arabia so that they are not based only on selling
arms and buying oil.
There is a reason why al Qaeda has fertile ground to
operate in, and unless we change those reasons, our children
and our grandchildren are going to be fighting this battle in
the future. I think while the NID and some of the other
recommendations that are made are the more urgent ones, the
ones that need to be acted on quickly, I think the more
fundamental ones, the ones that are going to really win the war
on terrorism are the ones that are going to change the hearts
and minds of people who create young men who want to come and
crash planes into buildings in our country.
Senator Carper. Mr. Fetchet.
Ms. Fetchet. I would agree with Steve. I think our foreign
policy is really the core of the threat of terrorism, and I
think that we have to reach out to other countries. We have to
develop an understanding of their culture, their religions, and
their beliefs. Many times, maybe we have to back off and we
can't dictate what women's rights should be or how they should
run their country.
I think that we had such an outpouring after September 11.
I have a husband that travels internationally and I am very
concerned about him traveling. He has developed individual
relationships with people in many of these countries, but for
the most part people don't respect Americans. They think that
we are arrogant. They think that we are trying to dictate the
world, and I have a concern about that.
I think that we have to develop some respect for people of
other cultures and we have to understand those cultures to know
really what our relationships should be. So I think we can
continue to build walls around our country, and certainly we
have to make our country secure. But to really address the core
of terrorism, we have to develop better relationships and
respect for people from other countries.
Senator Carper. Thank you. Ms. Breitweiser.
Ms. Breitweiser. I think Mary and Steve said everything. I
would just like to add that it is upsetting to hear from one of
the Senators from before that we can't do both; we can't
protect the boots on the ground and fix our intel community.
I think when you read the report, they say harden the
homeland, continue the situation we are in now with regard to
striking out. And, in addition, we need to get at the root of
the problem. Just on a basic level, I am a big believer in
education and I think that it has to be done wisely. You
cannot, as Mary said, go into a Nation and trample them and
drop propaganda everywhere and say this is what you should
believe.
We need to really work on our reputation, and the bottom
line is these people hate us and they want to kill us. We
cannot handle that situation in a one-track way. We need a
multi-track approach and I think the Commission does a good job
in setting that out.
Nevertheless, it is going to take a prioritization and we
are going to have to find funding for that. Rather than
discussing whether or not we should--I said to one of the
Senators last week that I know you all mean business when you
start setting out the funding. When you start discussing the
budget and where it is coming from and how it is going to be
paid, that is when, in my opinion, I realize that we are
getting down to business.
I think, though, that really we need to fight this new
enemy in a multi-pronged approach, and I think we should not
just be focusing on Muslim radicals. We have other groups that
are not metasticizing and sort of following along in other
areas of the world. I think we need to be patently aware of
those groups, too. It is not just about Muslim radicals. It is
about a whole host of people that we have offended through
years of behavior that we really need to take a multi-track
approach at, and one of those ways is by reestablishing our
respect in the world. To do that, you need to respect others.
It is a two-way street.
Senator Carper. Thank you very much.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Mikulski, welcome.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKULSKI, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF MARYLAND
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Chairman Collins. I
want to thank you and Senator Lieberman for inviting me today
to participate. We appreciate your collegiality and your
graciousness.
As a member of the Intelligence Committee, I want to pledge
to you as the team that will be putting together the bill our
utmost support and collegiality to make sure our war is against
terrorism and not about turf. So we want to thank you for that.
We want to thank the 9/11 families who are here today, and
all of those other families that you represent that would like
to be here today. We thank you for being their voice.
We remember and honor the memories of the loved ones of the
3,000 people who lost their lives on that horrific day. I am
here as a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee committed
to reform, but I am also here as the Senator from Maryland. We
lost 60 people that day.
I am honored to be here to interrupt my Senate recess. I am
happy to be here today to hear you. I am happy to be here
tomorrow when I listen to testimony at the Intelligence
Committee. I am ready to cancel the whole summer recess so that
we can move on reform. How about moving on the homeland
security appropriations bill that is just floating like a
feather in the Senate ethers right now? So we are ready to move
and I am ready to come back if we need to. That is the kind of
urgency we need to feel.
Why do I feel so strongly? We know about your loss and
about the loss in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, but we
in the capital region lost people that day, too. Sixty
Marylanders died mostly at the Pentagon. They came from all
over Maryland, but 24 of the 60 came from one county, Prince
George's County. Most of them were African American. Many of
them were women, like Odessa Morris, who had just celebrated
her 25th wedding anniversary. Max Bielke, working in financial
services, was the last soldier to leave Vietnam. Leslie
Wittington and Charles Falkenburg were academics who, with
their two children, were on their way to a sabbatical. Adam
White, a career worker at Cantor Fitzgerald. Darin Pontel, just
out of the Naval Academy, with his brand new bars, working at
the Pentagon. One of my own Senate staff lost someone who was a
police officer at the World Trade Center. So we feel very
strongly about that, we in the capital region.
So this is why we are committed to listening to you. We
want to thank you for what you have done because in your own
unflinching and unflagging way you helped create this 9/11
Commission. We thank you because the Commission could do in the
sunshine what we in the original intelligence inquiry had to do
in a classified way. So the Commission could build on our work
and be able to function. We think the Commission did a
fantastic job with integrity, independence, and intellectual
rigor.
So where are we now? I believe we need to focus on the
three Rs--reform, resources and being relentless to accomplish
both. Let's practice the three Rs.
They talked about the surprises. I will never forget being
in that committee, when I realized that of the 19 terrorists, 4
were stopped by local enforcement, 1 in my own State. When they
put the guy's name in the computer, there was nothing that came
out. We know more about deadbeat dads and their child support
than those who are trying to come into the country to kill us.
When they gave us the Phoenix memo, I put my head down on
the table and wept about a missed opportunity. But it is not
time for tears; it is time for action. This Commission calls
for 41 recommendations; 16 the President could do right now; 9
the President could do with funding, and we could pass our
appropriations by October 1. I am on the Appropriations
Committee. I know that where there is a will, there is a
wallet. Sixteen recommendations call for congressional action.
This is why I feel so strongly about this.
Now, after all of your days and months of speaking truth to
power, I want to talk about truth and about power. When all is
said and done, more often gets said than done. So my main
question to you is, would you support some type of mechanism to
stand sentry over the Executive and Legislative Branches,
scorecarding us through benchmarks on how we implement the
reforms of this Commission?
Have you considered this? What would be your thoughts? What
would be your recommendations, so that we speak not only truth
to power, but we have to understand the truth about power,
which is no one likes to give it up?
Ms. Breitweiser. I would say first I would encourage you to
visit our website and that report card is underway. I would
also note that a number of news programs, both cable and local,
do a little thing at some point in the show where they say
number of days 9/11 Commission report released, number of
things acted upon, zero.
It started out on just a couple of channels and now it is
making its way onto a number of channels. It is my favorite
part of the viewing process. Everyone shakes their heads. The
newscasters are hysterical. They say number of days the report
released, number of recommendations implemented.
Senator Mikulski. Kristen, that is voluntary, and three
cheers for that. But I am talking about this Congress passing a
legislative framework with appropriate funds that would extend
a form of the 9/11 Commission for monitoring the implementation
of the reforms. It would be organized, it would be systematic,
it would be mandatory, and it would be in the sunshine.
Ms. Breitweiser. I think it is an excellent idea. My only
concern is that it has to stand away from Congress. You cannot
have elected officials. You need to have independent people. It
has got to be bipartisan. I think undoubtedly that is an idea
that is an excellent idea.
Unfortunately, I have spoken to some of the commissioners,
because I know the topic was broached by someone recently. I
don't know if they are necessarily interested in doing
something like that. You would have to speak to them directly,
but I think we see the benefit of this Commission.
I think one of the commissioners testified last week or the
week before and said you should have seen these people when our
staff went in and started doing interviews; you should have
seen when we entered the room. I mean, they were worried.
Agencies that for years have intimidated or sort of let people
know, don't muck around with us, were scared.
There is a value in that because we know that we can stay
on top of things now. I think one of the greatest things this
Commission did is that it has shed sunlight onto intelligence
agencies that for years stayed in the dark, in a shroud of
secrecy. I think the 9/11 Commission speaks to the damage that
keeping these things in the dark results in. I think it is a
great idea. I would recommend looking into it.
Mr. Push. I would agree. Again, as Kristen stated, it needs
to be, like the independent Commission, independent,
bipartisan. The cost of doing something like that is so small
compared to the amount of money we are talking about investing
in intelligence and border security and homeland security, to
have someone independent looking at that and making sure that
the public knows how we are being served.
That was one of the lessons for me from September 11. The
fact is I didn't know a lot about this before September 11.
There were other commissions out there that had reported and it
had gotten very little press coverage, and I was quite ignorant
about things I should have known. I think that would be a great
public service to provide an independent commission like that.
Ms. Fetchet. I would agree with what Steve and Kristen
said, but I think I would defer to the commissioners if it
should be something that is legislated and funded by the
government. I know Governor Kean has talked about raising
public funds, and in that sense I think he would feel that the
Commission was more removed from the government.
Senator Mikulski. You mean private funds?
Ms. Fetchet. Private funds, yes. I am sorry. I know that he
was pursuing private funds to fund the oversight, but when I
think about the last 3 years, I think we, in a sense, have
become an oversight committee. I know I have received some
information that I have forwarded from an office in the House
to an office in the Senate, and vice versa.
So I think, as Steve said, we weren't aware of the previous
commissions. The public, like I was before September 11, is
typically not involved in the process, and I think that has
been something that has been a life lesson to me. But I hope
other Americans do as well, participate in the democratic
process. You can't assume anymore that things are being done in
your best interest.
I think to have a relationship with your Senator and
Congressman to talk to them about what your concerns are--that
educates them and their office on how they should pursue
things, what stand they should take, what your concerns are. I
think it is a two-way process, and that we can't assume that
you can make decisions without information from your
constituents.
So I would be in favor, to answer your question, of
oversight because I think that is where you fell short on these
other commissions, that they were just done and they sat on a
shelf. There was no oversight, and so other things came up that
became a priority that shouldn't have been. I think in this
case, this report is public and it is educating the American
public about changes that have to be made.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you. I know my time is up.
Chairman Collins. Thank you. Senator Clinton, welcome.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLINTON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF NEW YORK
Senator Clinton. Thank you so much. I particularly want to
thank the Chairman of the Committee, who has done extraordinary
work along with her Ranking Member. Both of you deserve a great
deal of gratitude not only from those of us in the Senate, but
everyone else who cares about these issues. Of course, I want
to thank our witnesses.
There are other family members and advocates in the
audience today, Madam Chairman, and perhaps if it would be
appropriate, could we have them just raise their hands or some
way of being acknowledged, because so many of them have gone
the extra mile time and time again on behalf of these issues
and I know we are all very grateful to them?
[Several members of the audience raised their hands.]
Senator Clinton. I think that the testimony illustrates
clearly the need for us to act in a comprehensive way on all of
the recommendations because they are interrelated. It is
difficult to imagine that we will have a successful reform
without looking at public diplomacy, border security, a
counterterrorism center, all of it together. So I appreciate
the comprehensive look that this Committee is providing.
But I think it is also fair to say that our biggest
obstacle will be the Defense Department. I, like some of my
colleagues, will be leaving shortly to go to an Armed Services
Committee that is currently hearing from Secretary Rumsfeld,
General Meyers, and John McLaughlin, the Acting Director of the
CIA.
As we heard from Senator Specter, as numerous commissions
and reports have pointed out, the effort to try to create some
overall intelligence apparatus runs afoul of both the
legitimate concerns of the Defense Department about tactical
battlefield intelligence and the desire to basically continue
to control 80 to 85 percent of the budget and call the shots as
they wish.
Yesterday, it was clear in the Armed Services Committee
hearing that was held with three former members of the Defense
Department, CIA and other distinguished positions that time and
time again, the CIA Director, whoever it was, has basically run
into a brick wall. You can declare war on al Qaeda, as George
Tenet did, and nobody can know about it, and you can have
previous efforts to try to consolidate the intelligence
functions and to create some accountability and it doesn't get
done.
Now, I will be leaving to go to this hearing and I want to
ask each of you if you have any questions for Secretary
Rumsfeld, General Meyers, or John McLaughlin, because I will
ask them when it is my turn. I think that really goes to the
heart of whether we are going to be successful or not because
any Secretary of Defense is extraordinarily powerful and is due
a lot of deference because of his position. But it has been
time and time again the place where good ideas about
consolidating the intelligence functions and creating a better
mechanism for sharing that information basically go to die.
So I would like to ask each of you if you have questions
you would like me to pose to any one of these three gentlemen.
Does anyone want to start? Kristen.
Ms. Breitweiser. It is my limited understanding that one of
the reasons why this idea of a NID has not happened in the last
15 or 20 years is because of DOD and various Secretaries of
Defense.
I think undoubtedly no one wants to harm or in any way put
in jeopardy the boots on the ground, but I think it is
unacceptable for us to not expect a department like the
Department of Defense to be able to adequately, and above
adequately take care of the boots on the ground while at the
same time reorganizing their department, their intelligence
agencies, and work with all of the other agencies involved to
get this structure set up and going.
To say that they can't do two things at once is
unacceptable because al Qaeda is doing about a hundred things
at once. And in addition to al Qaeda, there are other groups
doing things. We no longer can accept that excuse from DOD
because, going forward, we don't know if there will ever be a
time that we will not have boots on the ground. So if we are
not going to do it now, then when are we going to do it?
I would reiterate what I said. You need to fix the intel
community because if the intel community does its job right, we
don't necessarily need to get to the boots on the ground. I
don't understand the failure. We had the embassy bombings, the
Cole bombing. We had September 11. I don't understand how that
doesn't warrant someone saying, look, this is a broken system,
it is not working effectively, we need to do this and we need
to do it now.
I am very sympathetic to individuals that are going to have
to lose a lot of their budget. Nevertheless, someone has got to
take a good, hard look at how DOD is handling these budgets,
and it is going to have to change because there is always going
to be a war. We are always going to have people on the
battlefield. That is the nature of the world we live in today.
Like I said, al Qaeda is not taking a rest and we need to
accommodate that fact.
Senator Clinton. Thank you. Mr. Push.
Mr. Push. Senator Clinton, I would ask Secretary Rumsfeld
to imagine for the sake of argument that there is a national
intelligence director along the lines proposed by the 9/11
Commission. Under that assumption, what assurances would he
need to ensure that the military received the tactical
intelligence that they needed to continue to be effective and
protect the war-fighters?
Senator Clinton. Thank you.
Ms. Fetchet. I would agree with what Kristen and Steve
said. But, in addition, I would like to know--there really
wasn't a reaction on September 11 and I would like to know what
were the protocols on September 11 with regard to the military
and NORAD, and compare that to the changes that they have made
hopefully today, because it is our understanding that NORAD was
in a Cold War mentality and that despite knowing the threat of
terrorism, their main priority was illegal drugs.
So it is hard for me to understand how somebody that is
responsible to monitor our air space did not react on September
11, flew 40 miles away from NEADS itself, flew about 60 miles
away, some of these planes, from Camp David and weren't
intercepted. So I would like to know what the protocols are.
Without a shoot-down order, what are the protocols?
I am concerned after attending that hearing yesterday that
I do feel that people are digging in their heels and that they
aren't open, particularly DOD, to change or giving up either
funding or power. I think we need an accounting for where this
money is being directed, and I would like to understand what
their priorities are and have an understanding on what their
focuses are and where this funding is going because I don't
think that they have ever had to account for their funding.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
Senator Lieberman. Madam Chairman, may I just echo what you
said earlier? Senator Nelson has really been remarkable in this
series of hearings. As is well known, he doesn't live next
door, so he has come up here from Florida as a real expression
of his support for the Commission report and his interest in
learning from the witnesses, and I am very grateful to him for
that. He has done something else in the three previous hearings
that Senators don't normally do very well. He just sat and
listened, and I have sure learned.
Thank you, Senator Nelson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR NELSON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. And I will be returning this afternoon to
our most recent version of Ground Zero, which is Punta Gorda,
Florida, where I was over the weekend, where we have another
disaster, but nothing of the magnitude that you all had
suffered through. That is why I am here.
Like Senator Mikulski, there were Floridians that were
affected. I can name a few: Petty Officer First Class Johnny
Doctor, from Jacksonville, and he was in the Pentagon; Stephen
Philip Morris of Omond Beach, and he was in the World Trade
Center; Timothy Grazioso, from Gulf Stream, also in the World
Trade Center; and C.C. Lyles, from Fort Myers, not far from
where the hurricane entered the coast. She was a flight
attendant on Flight 93 that ended up in Pennsylvania.
I am going back to the same hearing where I have been
listening to the Secretary of Defense, and I will backstop
Senator Clinton on some of those questions. But one thing I
wanted to get some further commentary from you on as a result
of your comments with Senator Mikulski is yesterday in the
Commerce Committee when we had the Chairman and Vice Chairman
of the 9/11 Commission, they were remarking ruefully that in a
week the Commission evaporates because the funding runs out.
They were talking about how they are going out and doing
all this private financing, and several of us were lamenting
that fact. Thank goodness that you all pressed to get the 9/11
Commission, and then you have pressed to have them heard and
now they are going to disappear, except for private funding.
Madam Chairman, I went up to Chairman John McCain and
proffered the idea that since most of their staff is going to
disappear after next week, at least the essential staff want to
continue to assist the Chairman and Vice Chairman and other
members with the private financing.
One thing that we could do immediately is, through some
Federal rule, allow that staff to continue its Federal
benefits. Many of them are already Federal employees and have
been for the last year. Health insurance clearly is one
incentive, and maybe some of the best staff in order to protect
their families need that protection and might not continue on.
That is at least something that we could do. So Chairman McCain
seemed to be quite interested in that. We are working together.
I offer it to you for your and Senator Lieberman's
suggestions.
Chairman Collins. The Senator may be interested to know
that Senator Lieberman and I have hired four of the Commission
staffers to work with us until we complete the legislation. We
are also working very closely with the top two staffers, but we
have actually brought on to our staff in non-partisan positions
four of the very senior staffers. So we are doing our part and
they have been extremely helpful as we have been going forward.
Senator Nelson. Will that staff be working for you?
Chairman Collins. Working for the Committee.
Senator Nelson. Well, I think that is illustrative that
where there is a will, there is a way. Now, I am talking about
so that the important staff can continue with Governor Kean and
Congressman Hamilton to give them the support that they need,
as they are going to continue to press the case along with the
families. I would like you to put on your thinking cap and see
if we can't come up with a solution, and Senator McCain seems
to be very willing to do this.
Chairman Collins. Thank you for that suggestion.
Senator Nelson. I want to raise two other issues, and it is
more for us than for you all because, Madam Chairman, one of
the strongest suggestions to come out of the 9/11 Commission
report is that we have to get our house in order here with the
congressional oversight.
A good example occurred yesterday in the Commerce
Committee. The number two person at the Department of Homeland
Security was there and was defending the review that has taken
4 months of whether or not butane lighters ought to be allowed
on aircraft. They are now, and this was right after Governor
Kean had testified about the fellow Reid who got on the flight
that was coming across the ocean, and had he had a butane
lighter--the flip thing--instead of a series of matches, he
would have been able to successfully detonate that shoe bomb.
Yet, today we allow butane lighters.
We have been pressing the Deputy Secretary of Homeland
Security for 7 months, and so the question was raised and it
was raised in a bipartisan fashion. So when it was my turn, I
said, Mr. Secretary, you have heard Governor Kean say that one
of the biggest things we have to do is have vigorous
congressional oversight; you have heard the comments of this
committee in a bipartisan fashion. Now, listen to the
congressional oversight and start paying attention, and listen
to the congressional direction: Get rid of the butane lighters.
I said this in a friendly way, but I also said it in a
rather firm way, and I think it is beginning to get across. It
is like us sitting in the Armed Services Committee with
Secretary Rumsfeld and others--and I am not saying this in a
partisan way, but so often we get the feeling that they don't
care a wit about what our oversight is. You know the non-
answers that we get up there in S407, in the secure room.
So we have to start asserting our constitutional role as a
separate branch of government that is necessary for checks and
balances for this government to function like it should.
Otherwise, you run into the problems that we see.
The final thing that I would mention is something else that
came out of Armed Services yesterday. We paid a lot of
attention to structure and analysis and collection and
reorganization, and so forth. But somewhere along the line, we
have to start paying attention to how personalities affect the
analysis and the dissemination of intelligence information; in
other words, leadership.
I don't have any magic bullet for this, but I am surely
raising the issue. If we are going to get clear, unvarnished,
timely and accurate intelligence, which is the only way for us
to protect ourselves from the terrorists, then clearly that
issue of personalities has got to be discussed and handled.
So that is my comment to your hearings, and thank you for
letting me sit in on all these hearings over the course of the
last 2 or 3 weeks.
Chairman Collins. Thank you for your contributions.
Let me close this hearing today by thanking not only our
witnesses who were so eloquent and well-informed in their
presentations to this Committee and who gave such powerful
statements to us, but also all the family members who are here
today.
I was intending to at the end of the hearing do exactly
what Senator Clinton has already done by recognizing you and
thanking you for being here. You are the reason that we are
here today, and that is why Senator Lieberman and I felt so
strongly that, in addition to hearing from government officials
and the official experts, we wanted to hear from the family
members.
Your personal tragedies motivate us, your expertise and
your knowledge inform us, and your efforts give momentum to the
cause that we have all embraced. Please be assured that all of
the Members of this Committee are working hard in a bipartisan
way. Senator Coleman has been here at every one of our
hearings. We are all working together to produce a bill as
quickly as we can.
I know for many of you it feels like it should have been
done yesterday. Believe me, this is an extraordinarily rapid
path that we are on. We have held a number of hearings. We need
to hold more, but we are committed to reporting a bill, and I
hope that we can get unanimous support, or close to that, for a
bipartisan bill that we will report next month.
The Senate leaders have committed to us to expediting that,
and our goal is to get it signed into law as soon as possible
because as soon as we get started on these fundamentally
important reforms, the safer our Nation will be.
As we continue to make progress toward this goal, I want to
tell you that your testimony and your tragedies will always be
part of me; that what you have told us today will help us
accomplish the goal that we all embrace. So I thank you so much
for being here today. You really are making a difference. Out
of your unspeakable tragedies, I believe a great good will come
for our Nation, and I thank you for that.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for that
statement and for your leadership.
I want to say to the three of you how moved I was by your
testimony. I will say as your friend, and in one case as your
Senator, I am proud of you. It was very powerful. Too often,
progress is not easy here. You have all said that in different
ways. It is a lot harder than it should be, but at no point did
you or the others in the family member groups accept no for an
answer. That is why the Commission was adopted, that is why the
report is here, and that is why, with your help, we are going
to adopt the recommendations of the report.
There is going to be resistance. This Commission has
recommended bold change. It is critically necessary, but that
is no guarantee that it is going to get adopted because people
don't like change. People don't like to lose power, but it has
to happen for the greater good.
I can't thank you enough. Let's stick together, and we are
going to get this done. We are not only going to thereby make
the American people safer, but we are actually going to prove
that the American governmental system can still work, and that
is a big accomplishment.
God bless you. Thank you. See you soon.
Chairman Collins. Thank you.
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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