[House Report 109-434]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 109-434
_______________________________________________________________________
Union Calendar No. 241
2006 CONGRESSIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET AND POLICY ASSESSMENT: A REVIEW
OF THE 2007 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET AND 2006 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
STRATEGY
__________
SIXTH REPORT
by the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
April 25, 2006.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
26-504 WASHINGTON : 2006
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JON C. PORTER, Nevada C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina Columbia
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania ------
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio (Independent)
------ ------
David Marin, Staff Director
Keith Ausbrook, Chief Counsel
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman
PATRICK T. McHenry, North Carolina ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DAN BURTON, Indiana BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN L. MICA, Florida DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota DIANE E. WATSON, California
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
CHRIS CANNON, Utah C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio Columbia
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. Marc Wheat, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
James Kaiser, Counsel
Malia Holst, Clerk
Tony Haywood, Minority Professional Staff Member
?
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, April 25, 2006.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on
Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee's sixth
report to the 109th Congress. The committee's report is based
on a study conducted by its Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources.
Tom Davis,
Chairman.
(iii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
I. The National Drug Control Strategy: General Overview and Concerns1
1. Methamphetamine......................................... 7
2. Drug Interdiction Reclassified as Non-Homeland Security
Mission................................................ 12
3. Prevention.............................................. 13
4. State and Local Law Enforcement Drug Control Efforts.... 14
5. Interdiction............................................ 17
II. Strategic and Budgetary Analysis of Federal Drug Control Programs
and Agencies....................................................31
A. Department of Defense....................................... 31
1. Central Transfer Account [CTA].......................... 32
2. U.S. Military Support to Counterdrug Operations......... 33
3. Joint Interagency Task Force South [JIATF South]........ 33
4. Maritime Patrol Aircraft................................ 34
5. Maritime Refueling Vessel [Oiler]....................... 35
6. U.S. Navy--Aviation Use of Force [AUF].................. 36
7. Tethered Aerostat Radar System [TARS]................... 39
8. Afghanistan Operations.................................. 41
9. Colombian Operations.................................... 45
10. Department of Defense Performance Measures............. 48
B. Department of Education..................................... 49
1. Safe and Drug Free Schools.............................. 49
2. Student Drug Testing.................................... 53
3. Lack of Diligence in Reporting to Congress.............. 54
C. Department of Health and Human Services..................... 55
1. National Institute on Drug Abuse [NIDA]................. 57
2. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration [SAMHSA]................................ 59
D. Department of Homeland Security............................. 63
1. Reorganization.......................................... 63
2. Congressional Responsiveness............................ 64
3. Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement [CNE]............ 65
4. United States Coast Guard [USCG]........................ 66
5. Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ICE]............... 71
6. Customs and Border Protection [CBP]..................... 74
7. U.S. Border Patrol...................................... 77
E. Department of Justice....................................... 79
1. Assistance to State and Local Law Enforcement........... 79
2. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program.................... 80
3. Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant.......... 81
4. Regional Information Sharing System [RISS].............. 83
5. Weed and Seed Program................................... 83
6. Drug Court Program...................................... 84
7. Residential Substance Abuse Treatment Program [RSAT].... 86
8. Southwest Border Prosecutor Initiative.................. 87
9. Prisoner Re-entry Initiative............................ 88
10. Cannabis Eradication Program........................... 88
11. Bureau of Prisons...................................... 89
12. National Drug Intelligence Center [NDIC]............... 90
13. Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA].................. 91
14. Interagency Crime and Drug Enforcement/Organized Crime
Drug Enforcement Task Force [OCDETF]................... 94
15. Department of Justice Financial Management............. 98
F. Office of National Drug Control Policy [ONDCP].............. 100
1. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas [HIDTA]........... 103
2. National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign................. 111
3. Drug Free Communities Program [DFC]..................... 116
4. Counter Drug Technology Assessment Center [CTAC]........ 119
5. Counter Drug Intelligence Executive Secretariat [CDX]... 120
6. National Drug Court Institute [NDCI].................... 121
7. National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws............. 122
8. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency [USADA] and Membership Dues to
World Anti-Doping Agency [WADA]........................ 123
9. National Drug Control Program Performance Measures...... 124
G. Department of State......................................... 125
1. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs [INL].......................................... 125
2. Andean Counter Drug Initiative [ACI].................... 126
H. U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID]........... 133
1. Andean Counter Drug Initiative and Alternative
Development............................................ 134
2. Afghanistan and Alternative Development................. 134
3. Office of Management and Budget PART Performance
Evaluation............................................. 138
4. Harm Reduction.......................................... 140
I. Department of Treasury...................................... 142
1. Internal Revenue Service [IRS] Drug Control Funding..... 142
J. Department of Veteran Affairs [VA].......................... 144
1. General................................................. 144
2. Narrowing the Scope of the Provision of Treatment....... 144
3. Specialized Treatment................................... 145
4. Inter-Agency Cooperation................................ 146
VIEWS
Additional views of Hon. Henry A. Waxman and Hon. Elijah E.
Cummings....................................................... 147
Union Calendar No. 241
109th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 109-434
======================================================================
2006 CONGRESSIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET AND POLICY ASSESSMENT: A REVIEW
OF THE 2007 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL BUDGET AND 2006 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
STRATEGY
_______
April 25, 2006.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Tom Davis, from the Committee on Government Reform submitted the
following
SIXTH REPORT
On March 9, 2006, the Committee on Government Reform
approved and adopted a report entitled, ``2006 Congressional
Drug Control Budget and Policy Assessment: a Review of the 2007
National Drug Control Budget and 2006 National Drug Control
Strategy.'' The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the
Speaker of the House.
I. The National Drug Control Strategy: General Overview and Concerns
Significant progress has been made in protecting young
people from the devastating effects of drug abuse. Director
John Walters of the Office of National Drug Control Policy
recently testified before the committee that ``overall teen
drug use has declined significantly since the President took
office. Current use of illicit drugs by 8th, 10th, and 12th
graders combined has dropped 19 percent since 2001.'' \1\
Nonetheless, the committee is concerned about the potential
negative effects of the administration's proposed drug control
budget for FY 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See National Drug Control Budget for Fiscal Year 2007: Hearing
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 16,
2006) (testimony of John Walters, Director, Office of National Drug
Control Policy). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=39638.
The committee believes it is necessary to remind the
administration that when well-established drug programs were
significantly reduced in the early 1990's dramatic increases in
drug use among our youth followed.\2\ From 1992 until 1996, as
depicted above, drug use among 8th, 10th, and 12th grades
doubled from near 10 percent to over 20 percent.\3\ Having
learned this lesson in the past decade, the administration must
acknowledge that the substantial, proposed cuts to the drug
budget cannot be endured without an immediate and predictable
increase in drug usage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at
1. At http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs06/
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\3\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2006 National Drug Control Strategy presents the
administration's approach as based upon three pillars:
prevention, treatment, and interdiction.\4\ Each of these three
pillars supplement one another, creating a ``balanced,
integrated plan aimed at . . . reducing drug use.'' \5\ The
committee strongly agrees that this proposed, multi-faceted
approach is the most effective in dealing with the complex
social and political issues raised by illicit drug smuggling
and abuse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Id. at 2.
\5\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prevention, including primarily educational and drug-
testing initiatives, seeks to reduce or eliminate the demand
for illicit drugs on the domestic front. Prevention--``stopping
use before it starts,'' \6\ in the words of President Bush's
recent National Drug Strategy Report--is a vital component of
any effective drug control strategy. In many respects, it is
the most important component, since it is the demand for drugs
that attracts the supply. Prevention aimed at reducing drug use
by young people is, in turn, the most important kind of demand
reduction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Id. at 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Federal Government's major prevention programs include
the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities (SDFSC) program
at the Department of Education, which includes formula grants
to the states, and ``national programs'' that are competed for
at the national level: the National Youth Anti-Drug Media
Campaign (the ``Media Campaign'') at the Office of National
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), which helps fund a national
advertising campaign to educate young people and parents about
the dangers of drug abuse; the Drug-Free Communities (DFC)
program at ONDCP, which provides small grants to local
coalitions of organizations and individuals who come together
for drug use prevention efforts in their communities; and
prevention programs funded through grants provided by the
Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP), part of the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA) at the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).
The Federal Government supports significant research and
development of drug prevention methods through CSAP and the
Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC) at ONDCP. The
Federal Government also funds research into the health risks of
drug abuse at the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), a
division of the National Institutes of Health, the results of
which are then publicized by NIDA and other Federal agencies.
Drug treatment programs set out to provide ready and
effective means of rehabilitating those caught in the vicious
cycle of substance dependence. Since ``19.1 million Americans
have used at least one illicit substance in the past month,''
identifying those in need and providing accessible treatment
programs are essential components in any drug strategy.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Drug addiction is a complex disorder that can involve
virtually every aspect of an individual's functioning in the
family, at work, and in the community. Because of addiction's
complexity and pervasive consequences, drug addiction treatment
typically must involve many components. Some of those
components focus directly on the individual's drug use. Others
focus on restoring the addicted individual to productive
membership in the family and society.
A variety of scientifically based approaches to drug
addiction treatment exist. Drug addiction treatment can include
behavioral therapy (such as counseling, cognitive therapy, or
psychotherapy), medications, or their combination. Federal drug
treatment programs are found within the Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration, which oversees and
implements drug treatment programs; the National Institute on
Drug Abuse, which focuses on drug prevention research; and the
Department of Health and Human Services, which also provides
programs that address drug abuse treatment.
Finally, interdiction efforts, comprised of multiple agency
and interagency missions within the Department of Justice &
Department of Homeland Security, and supported by the
Department of Defense, have been developed over the past few
decades to efficiently and dramatically disrupt the flow of
illicit drugs from various source countries.
The Government Reform Committee, particularly via the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources, is responsible for oversight of all aspects of the
Federal Government's drug control policy and budget. Recent
hearings at the committee and subcommittee levels have focused
on drug use prevention, \8\ drug addiction treatment, \9\
Federal drug enforcement, \10\ and international supply
reduction.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See Drug Prevention Programs and the FY 2006 Drug Control
Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use
Prevention? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th
Cong. (Apr. 26, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=26210; Stopping the Methamphetamine Epidemic:
Lessons From the Pacific Northwest: Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Oct. 14, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=35704; Fiscal
Year 2006 Drug Budget: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 10, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=22068; ONDCP
Reauthorization: The National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign: Hearing
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 27,
2003); Drug Production on Public Lands--A Growing Problem: Hearing
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Oct. 10,
2003). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7225; To Do No Harm: Strategies For Preventing
Prescription Drug Abuse: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 9, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10001;
Marijuana and Medicine: The Need For a Science-Based Approach: Hearing
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 1,
2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=13362; ONDCP Reauthorization and the National
Drug Control Strategy for 2003: Hearing before the House Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 5, 2003); The Office of National
Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act 2003, H.R. 2086: Hearing before
the House Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (May 22, 2003).
9 See Harm Reduction or Harm Maintenance: Is There Such
a Thing as Safe Drug Abuse? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 16, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=22570;
Authorizing the President's Vision: Making Permanent the Faith-Based
and Community Initiative: H.R. 1054, The Tools for Community Initiative
Act: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th
Cong. (June 21, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29319; Recovery Now: The President's Drug
Treatment Initiative: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government
Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 27, 2003); Faith-Based Perspectives on the
Provision of Community Services--Field Hearing in Franklin, TN: Hearing
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (June 16,
2003); The Role of Faith-Based Organizations in Providing Effective
Social Services: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government
Reform, 108th Cong. (July 2, 2003); Faith-Based Perspectives on the
Provision of Community Services--Field Hearing in Chicago, IL: Hearing
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Aug. 25,
2003); Faith-Based Perspectives on the Provision of Community
Services--Field Hearing in Charlotte, NC: Hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Dec. 10, 2003); Faith-
Based Perspectives on the Provision of Community Services--Field
Hearing in Los Angeles California: Hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Jan. 12, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10078; Faith-
Based Perspectives on the Provision of Community Services--Field
Hearing in Colorado Springs, CO: Hearing before the House Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Jan. 23, 2004); Legal and Practical
Issues Related to the Faith Based Initiative: Hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 23, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=11573;
Measuring the Effectiveness of Drug Addiction Treatment Programs:
Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy,
and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar.
30, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=11695; Faith Based Perspectives on the
Provision of Community Services--Field Hearing in Seattle, WA: Hearing
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 26,
2004); Access to Recovery: Improving Participation and Access in Drug
Treatment: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th
Cong. (Sept. 22, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=19353.
\10\ See How Can the Federal Government Support Local and State
Initiatives to Protect Citizens and Communities Against Drug-Related
Violence and Witness Intimidation? Hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (May 2, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=26376; FY
2006 Drug Control Budget and Byrne Grant, HIDTA, and Other Law
Enforcement Programs: Are we Jeopardizing Federal, State and Local
Cooperation? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th
Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=23722; Fighting Meth in America's Heartland:
Assessing Federal, State, and Local Efforts: Hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 27, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29587;
Fighting Meth in America's Heartland: Assessing the Impact on Local Law
Enforcement and Child Welfare Agencies: Hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (July 26, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=31114; Law
Enforcement and the Fight Against Methamphetamine: Improving Federal,
State, and Local Efforts: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Aug. 23, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=33151; ONDCP
Reauthorization: The High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program and
CTAC: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th
Cong. (Apr. 8, 2003); Facing the Methamphetamine Problem in America:
Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy,
and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (July
18, 2003). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7300; Facing the Methamphetamine Problem in
America: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th
Cong. (July 18, 2003). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7300; How Can the Federal Government Assist
State and Local Programs to Protect Citizens & Communities Against
Drug-Related Violence? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (July 21, 2003). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7306;
Fighting Methamphetamine in the Heartland: Hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 6, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10066;
Terrorist Financing and Money Laundering Investigations: Who
Investigates and How Effective Are They? Hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (May 11, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=13993; Ice in
the Ozarks: The Methamphetamine Epidemic in Arkansas: Hearing before
the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (June 28, 2004).
At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=16356; Drugs and Security in a Post-9/11
World: Coordinating the Counternarcotics Mission at the Department of
Homeland Security: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government
Reform, 108th Cong. (July 22, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/
Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=16918; Law Enforcement and the Fight
Against Methamphetamine: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Nov. 18, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=20333; DOD
Counternarcotics: What Is Congress Getting for Its Money? Hearing
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 21,
2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=13557; The Poisoning of Paradise: Crystal
Methamphetamine in Hawaii: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Aug. 2, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=17259.
\11\ See Threat Convergence Along the Border: How Can We Improve
the Federal Effort To Dismantle Criminal Smuggling Organizations:
Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy,
and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (July
12, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=30454; 2006 DOD Counternarcotics Budget: Does
It Deliver the Necessary Support? Hearing before the House Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (May 10, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=27247; Threat
Convergence Along the Border: How Does Drug Trafficking Impact Our
Borders? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th
Cong. (June 14, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29024; Interrupting Narco-terrorist Threats on
the High Seas: Do We Have Enough Wind in Our Sails? Hearing before the
House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 29, 2005).
At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29727; The Impact of the Drug Trade on Border
Security and National Parks: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2003); The Impact of the Drug
Trade on Border Security: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 15, 2003); Disrupting the Market:
Strategy, Implementation, and Results in Narcotics Source Nations:
Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy,
and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (July
9, 2003). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7484; Implementation of a National Supply
Reduction Strategy: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government
Reform, 108th Cong. (Sept. 17, 2003). At http://reform.house.gov/
CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7291; Afghanistan: Law
Enforcement Interdiction Efforts in Transshipment Countries to Stem the
Flow of Heroin: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government
Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 26, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/
Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10843; Andean Counterdrug Initiative:
Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy,
and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar.
2, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=11000; Afghanistan: Are British
Counternarcotics Efforts Going Wobbly? Hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 1, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=13347;
Northern Ice: Stopping Methamphetamine Precursor Chemical Smuggling
Across the U.S.-Canada Border: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 20, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=13368; The
Impact of the Drug Trade on Border Security--Field Hearing in Las
Cruses, NM: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th
Cong. (June 29, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=16366; The War Against Drugs and Thugs: A
Status Report on Plan Columbia Successes and Remaining Challenges:
Hearing before the House Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong.
(June 17, 2004); Securing Our Borders: What We Have Learned From
Government Initiatives and Citizen Patrols: Hearing before the House
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (May 12, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, the committee and subcommittee are responsible
for the authorization of the White House Office of National
Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and related programs.\12\ In
fulfilling its oversight function the committee has identified
and highlighted several fundamental issues of utmost concern
that are significantly impacted by the 2007 National Drug
Control Strategy and Budget Summary.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ 21 U.S.C. 1703(c)(3).
\13\ ``It is a shameful thing to be weary of inquiry when what we
search for is excellent.'' Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC), Roman
Senator.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Methamphetamine
The committee is concerned about the administration's
complete unwillingness to provide any leadership or strategy to
address the growing methamphetamine epidemic throughout the
country. U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez stated that
``in terms of damage to children and to our society, meth is
now the most dangerous drug in America.'' \14\ According to
surveys conducted by the National Association of Counties, meth
is now the number one drug problem for the majority (58
percent) of county law enforcement agencies, and the drug is
having far-reaching impacts on child welfare services.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Jefferson, David J., The Meth Epidemic--Inside America's New
Drug Crisis, Newsweek, Aug. 8, 2005.
\15\ National Association of Counties, The Impact of Meth on
Children: Out of Home Placement and The Criminal Effect of Meth on
Communities, July 5, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Methamphetamine, because of its insidious, devastating
social and personal side effects, has presented a novel
opportunity to raise our country's cultural awareness of the
threat of illicit drug use in general. The committee remains
disappointed that ONDCP has not utilized the heightened media
attention that the methamphetamine issue receives to fully
develop public awareness and education.
Since the first mention of a meth strategy in the long-
overdue October 2004 ``National Synthetic Drug Action Plan,''
the Office of National Drug Control Policy has done nothing but
repeat its intention to provide a methamphetamine strategy, as
evidenced by the following statement in the Nation Drug Control
Strategy for FY 2006: ``The Administration is in the process of
developing and releasing a strategic document that details next
steps for addressing the problem of synthetic drugs like
methamphetamine.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy (Feb. 2006) at
15.
Methamphetamine has been steadily moving across the country
for years, starting on the West coast and moving eastward,
devastating countless communities in its wake.\17\ The
President of the International Narcotics Control Board recently
stated: ``The major problem that they have (in the United
States) is with methamphetamine . . . Methamphetamine is
pandemic now.'' \18\ In response, the administration has only
delayed, refusing to provide a necessary, comprehensive
strategy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Methamphetamine, 15 CQ Researcher Num. 25, 589, 592 (2006).
\18\ Francis Murphy, UN Narcotics Watchdog Sees New Pandamic,
Reuters Health, Mar. 1, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Absence of Administration Legislative Efforts on
Methamphetamine
The administration claims to have supported legislative
efforts by Congress to lead in addressing the methamphetamine
epidemic: ``The Bush Administration has urged Congress to enact
legislation that would limit the amount of pseudoephedrine for
retail sale to what could be used for individual, legitimate
medical purposes.'' \19\ Despite such rhetoric, however, the
administration provided no help to Congress when it was
considering the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act that is now
a part of the Patriot Act. In fact, a State Department
memorandum sharply critical of some provisions of the bill
circulated among congressional offices the night before a
committee mark-up, while the New York Times reported that the
FDA was working behind the scenes to block it.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy (Feb. 2006) at
15.
\20\ Gardiner Harris, Fighting Methamphetamine, Lawmakers Reach
Accord to Curb Sale of Cold Medicines, New York Times, Dec. 15, 2005,
at 33; at http://select.nytimes.com/gst/
abstract.html?res=F10810FA34550C768DDDAB0994DD404482 (last visited Feb.
24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, ONDCP also states: ``To ensure that the drug
[pseudoephedrine] is not rerouted away from legitimate
businesses and consumers, the Administration is working with
other countries to improve the flow of information to the US
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) about bulk shipments of
this chemical.'' \21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy (Feb. 2006) at
15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although a great deal of attention has been paid to the
local production of meth in small, clandestine (or ``clan'')
laboratories, the majority of the U.S. supply of illegal meth
is now believed to come from Mexico, or is controlled by
Mexican drug trafficking organizations. Moreover, virtually all
of the world's supply of the major meth precursor chemical--
pseudoephedrine--is manufactured overseas, in only relatively
few factories. As such, meth is as much an international as a
local problem. Of genuine concern is the report of the seizure
of a methamphetamine laboratory in Colombia in 2005, the first
of its kind in that country.\22\ On its own the seizure appears
to have little significance, however given the entrepreneurial
bent Colombia drug traffickers have displayed in the past,
neither the seizure, nor its potential, can be ignored.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ International Narcotics Control Board, 2005 Report, (Mar. 1,
2006) at 66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most of the methamphetamine problem can be attributed to
one simple fact: the U.S. and the international community have
failed to set up an effective control system for
pseudoephedrine and other precursor chemical products. Unlike
meth, pseudoephedrine cannot be made clandestinely--it can only
be manufactured in large facilities using very sophisticated
equipment. As a groundbreaking report by The Oregonian
newspaper recently showed, only a few companies worldwide make
the chemical, and virtually all of the world's supply comes
from three countries: Germany, India, and China.\23\ As such,
it would not be very difficult for the U.S. and its allies to
get better control of the chemical and prevent its large-scale
diversion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Suo, Steve, The Mexican Connection, Oregonian, June 5, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Instead, huge amounts of pseudoephedrine products are being
shipped all over the world, with little or no tracking or
control. Many nations are importing far more than they can
legitimately consume, meaning that the excess is probably being
diverted to meth production. Mexican imports of
pseudoephedrine, the primary meth precursor, have risen from
almost 100 tons in 2001 to nearly 224 tons in 2003. Mexican
authorities estimate their legitimate demand for
pseudoephedrine at only 70 tons per year.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
(INL) very recently released its annual report in which
international precursor chemical control is substantially
addressed. The INL report stated: ``The emergence of
methamphetamine as a major drug of abuse and a significant
domestic law enforcement problem in the United States was the
most important factor impacting U.S. chemical control in
2005.'' \25\ The report also indicates that ``Mexico is now
tightening its controls on methamphetamine precursors and the
concern is that they will be sold to countries with fewer
controls and smuggled into Mexico, or the U.S., for drug
production.'' \26\ ``Traffickers continue to evade the reach of
these initiatives by turning to nonparticipating countries to
obtain these . . . chemicals. Many of these countries lack the
legal, administrative, and law enforcement infrastructure to
control the chemicals.'' \27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Dept. of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,
vol. I, (Mar. 2006) at 73.
\26\ Id.
\27\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Where precursor control legislation is tightened,
traffickers have reverted to nations in Africa where controls
are weaker.\28\ Further, traffickers are using methods of
concealment for precursor chemicals that were previously
reserved for the drugs themselves.\29\ These occurrences are
causes for uneasiness for the international community. They add
weight to the call from International Narcotics Control Board
(INCB) for countries to provide pre-export notification of
precursor chemicals to importing nations.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ International Narcotics Control Board, 2005 Report, (Mar. 1,
2006) at 42.
\29\ Id, at 71.
\30\ Id, at 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee strongly encourages such international
efforts to address the control of international precursor
chemicals, but was very disappointed by the Department of
State's (DOS) direct opposition to the international provisions
addressing precursor chemical reporting within the Combat
Methamphetamine Epidemic Act. Moreover, no substantive support,
beyond technical comments, was received from the Department of
Justice (DOJ).
Cooperation with involved administration Departments and
agencies, such as DEA, State, & DOJ is the specific
responsibility of ONDCP. In sum, the committee must express its
deep dissatisfaction with ONDCP which offered no support
throughout the legislative process, despite being responsible
for leading drug policy efforts within the administration.
Beyond legislation, the committee seeks to highlight
particular Federal programs that have been established to
counteract the continuous and devastating spread of
methamphetamine abuse. These programs, critical to mitigating
the ongoing threat of methamphetamine, are in substantial
danger of being severely degraded by the proposed FY 2007 drug
control budget. Foremost among such programs are COPS Meth Hot
Spots and methamphetamine-oriented High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas.
Department of Justice: Methamphetamine-Related Assistance
(COPS Meth Hot Spots) \31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ For further information, see the COPS website, http://
www.cops.usdoj.gov/, or call the COPS office at (202) 616-1728.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee has ongoing concerns about the proposed
reduction in funds administered by the Department of Justice's
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) office dedicated to
law enforcement activities against methamphetamine trafficking.
To assist these overburdened agencies, Congress approved
$63,590,000 for fiscal year 2006 (up from $52,556,000 in fiscal
year 2005) for policing initiatives to combat methamphetamine
production and trafficking and to enhance policing initiatives
in ``drug hot spots.''
Disappointingly, the administration again proposes to
eliminate the remaining ``Meth Hot Spots'' funding for other
anti-meth enforcement activities--which Congress has always
appropriated in the form of specific earmarks for designated
projects.
The committee believes that Congress and the administration
need to work together to restore and reform the additional Hot
Spots funding. The proposed elimination of the rest of the
``Meth Hot Spots'' funding would greatly reduce the ability of
affected state and local law enforcement agencies to help their
Federal partners in reducing methamphetamine abuse,
particularly given the proposed overall reduction in other
state and local law enforcement assistance grants.
ONDCP: Methamphetamine oriented High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas (HIDTAs)
Each High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) that is
primarily focused on combating the spread of methamphetamine
was created after 1990. The Midwest HIDTA, which includes Iowa,
Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska and South Dakota, was created
specifically to fight the spread of meth in the Midwest. It
promotes a comprehensive, cooperative strategy by law
enforcement at the Federal, state and local levels to reduce
drug trafficking.
The collection of multi-agency leaders participating on
individual HIDTA boards, individual task force boards and/or
oversight committees allows for current information and trends
to be shared on the growing concerns and dangers of
methamphetamine production, distribution, and use. Nationally,
the latest survey indicates there are 211 HIDTA task forces
across the nation with 5,321 officers representing 34 states
and territories which, in addition to other duties, are
substantially involved in enforcement efforts regarding the
distribution and/or manufacturing of methamphetamine.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ See Law Enforcement and the Fight Against Methamphetamine:
Improving Federal, State, and Local Efforts: Hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Aug. 23, 2005) (testimony
of John Sommer, Director, Ohio High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The methamphetamine issue will continue to be a high
priority for the committee. Such commitment is necessary when
Congress is forced to embrace a leadership role where ONDCP has
left a void.
2. Drug Interdiction Reclassified as Non-Homeland Security Mission
within DHS
Another issue of serious concern to the committee is the
unannounced reclassification of the drug interdiction mission
within DHS. The congressional authorization that created DHS in
2002 specifically defined the drug interdiction mission as one
of the primary missions of the Department.\33\ This year,
without any formal explanation or announcement, the
administration's budget request for the Coast Guard
recategorized ``Illegal Drug Interdiction'' and ``Other Law
Enforcement'' missions as ``Non-Homeland Security''
missions.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. Sec. 888 (2002). Public Law 107-296.
\34\ U.S. Coast Guard, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, Feb. 2006,
Appendix B, at B-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The connection between terrorism and drug smuggling is
being increasingly established by incoming intelligence.
Antonio Maria Costa, the head of the United Nations Office on
Drugs and Crime, stated: ``The world is seeing the birth of a
new hybrid of organized-crime-terrorist organization.'' \35\
This new hybrid, according to many intelligence analysts, is
comprised of ``terrorist organizations stealing whole chapters
out of the criminal playbook--trafficking in narcotics, illegal
goods, counterfeit goods, illegal aliens--and in the process
converting their terrorist cells into criminal gangs.'' \36\ A
stark example, ``the terrorists behind the Madrid attacks were
major drug dealers, with a network stretching from Morocco
through Spain to Belgium and the Netherlands.'' \37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ David E. Kaplan, Paying for Terror, U.S. News & World Report,
(Dec. 5, 2005) at 41.
\36\ Id, at 42.
\37\ Id, at 44.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This proposed change clearly runs contrary to the organic
statute establishing DHS.\38\ When asked about the initiatives
being taken by ONDCP to counteract this fundamental, wide
reaching policy change, Director John Walters of ONCDP
indicated a complete lack of awareness of the issue or its
details.\39\ Moreover, the reclassification is not even
mentioned, much less properly highlighted and explained, in the
main body of the Coast Guard Budget in Brief.\40\ Inexplicably,
the only indication of this infrastructural policy realignment
must be found and interpreted from a program cost summary
table.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. Sec. 888 (2002). Public Law 107-296.
\39\ See National Drug Control Budget for Fiscal Year 2007: Hearing
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 16,
2006) (testimony of John Walters, Director, Office of National Drug
Control Policy).
\40\ U.S. Coast Guard, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, Feb. 2006.
\41\ Id, Appendix B, at B-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At a February 7, 2006, DHS budget briefing a DHS Budget
officer confirmed that the reclassification is not isolated to
the Coast Guard but is being implemented as a DHS policy
throughout each agency whose mission includes drug
interdiction.\42\ The reclassification explicitly excludes drug
interdiction from the general homeland security mission of DHS
and, over time, will gradually increase the ongoing diversion
of resources away from drug interdiction missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources staff briefing with DHS representatives on 2007 DHS drug
budget, Feb. 7, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee's skepticism concerning DHS's transparency
and willingness to communicate has been further strained by
this unauthorized recategorization which knowingly brushes
aside Congress's clear intent to classify drug interdiction as
a homeland security mission.\43\ In addition, ONDCP's utter
ignorance of this new DHS policy illustrates reason for the
committee's deep dissatisfaction with the leadership within the
administration that ONDCP is supposed to provide.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. Sec. 888 (2002). Public Law 107-296.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Prevention
The administration asserts that it seeks a ``balanced
strategy that focuses on three primary elements: stopping drug
use before it starts, healing drug users, and disrupting the
market for illicit drugs.'' \44\ As in years past, the
administration's 2006 National Drug Control Strategy identifies
drug use prevention--``stopping drug use before it starts''--as
one of the three key pillars of its drug strategy. However,
since prevention comprises only 11.7 percent of the entire FY
2007 drug control budget and represents a 19.3 percent decrease
in prevention funding from that enacted in FY 2006, the
committee questions the administration's claim that it has
``set a bold agenda'' in its prevention efforts.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006)
at 1. At http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/
ndcs06/.
\45\ Id, at 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Over the FY 2001--FY 2007 period, demand reduction
(prevention and treatment) has increased only $49 million or
1.1 percent whereas supply reduction (enforcement and
interdiction) increased by $3.2 billion, or 66.1 percent.''
\46\ In light of the profound emphasis the current
administration has placed on enforcement and interdiction, the
committee questions whether prevention, which has steadily
decreased in funding, authentically represents a ``pillar'' of
the administration's approach to the drug problem.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Carnevale Associates, Policy Brief, FY '07 Drug Budget: Demand
Reduction Being De-Emphasized, LLC, Feb. 2006. At http://
www.carnevaleassociates.com/
Federal--Drug--Budget--FY07.pdf (last
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to particular prevention programs, the
committee has concerns about the proposed elimination of the
State Grants program, representing the substantial portion of
the Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities (SDFSC) program
at the Department of Education. Congress emphatically rejected
a similar proposal in last year's budget.
The grants distributed under the State Grants program serve
as vital leverage that allows local communities to
significantly augment their capacity to provide drug prevention
programs.
Elimination of this funding will have a catastrophic
effect in the balance of drug usage among school-aged
children in America. Many school systems across America
have found unique ways to combine these SDFSCA funds
with very little local moneys in order to provide the
highest level of drug prevention. Removing the monetary
foundation of these programs could cause many if not
all of them to collapse. I know this because in our
system, one of the wealthiest in the nation,
elimination of these funds would severely impact or
cancel many well developed, well documented, and
successful drug prevention programs. I can't imagine
how drug prevention programs in other smaller systems
will survive.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ See Drug Prevention Programs and the Fiscal Year 2006 Drug
Control Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use
Prevention: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th
Cong, (Apr. 26, 2005) (testimony of Clarence Jones, coordinator, Safe
and Drug-Free Youth Section, Fairfax County Public Schools).
The State Grants programs serves as a vehicle for bringing
effective anti-drug education to millions of young people in
our schools. As we recommended last year, the committee
strongly suggests that the administration take substantial
steps to reform the well established State Grants program.
4. State and Local Law Enforcement Drug Control Efforts
The committee focuses much concern on the administration's
approach to programs directly impacting the cooperation between
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies and
initiatives. Since State and local agencies make over 95
percent of the arrests of drug violators, the vital role
carried out by non-Federal enforcement is unquestionable and
indispensable to furthering intelligence and operational
activities at the Federal level.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States,
Uniform Crime Report, U.S. Department of Justice (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration's recent budget proposal to realign
HIDTA under the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
(OCDETF) \49\ while decreasing its funding, to eliminate the
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program, and to
diminish the Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC)
would severely impede, if not permanently incapacitate, the
current system of broad-based interagency cooperation and
information sharing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Dept. of Justice, FY 2007 Budget and Performance Summary,
Annual Rep. at 107: ``The FY 2007 President's Budget proposes the
transfer of the HIDTA program from [ONDCP] to OCDETF.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA)
This year, the administration has requested $209 million
for the HIDTA program but has again asked that it be moved to
the Department of Justice despite the same proposal being
rejected last year. If enacted, these proposals would
effectively terminate the current HIDTA program. For this
reason, the committee again \50\ strongly opposes the budget
cut, any radical reallocation of funding (if unaccompanied by a
comprehensive, performance-based justification), and the move
of the program into the Justice Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ The National Drug Control Strategy for 2005 and the National
Drug Control Budget for Fiscal Year 2006, Committee on Government
Reform Report, H. Rept. 109-172, (2005) at 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moving HIDTA into the Justice Department is highly
problematic. Notably, the administration's representatives who
testified at the March 10, 2005, hearing declined to inform the
Congress how HIDTA would be managed under OCDETF and how
decisions would be made at the local HIDTA.\51\ Such a
significant change demands prior planning that can be clearly
and thoroughly communicated to Congress. Transferring the HIDTA
to OCDETF without any clear plan concerning the manner in which
the program would be administered is not an authentic proposal
that deserves consideration by Congress.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ See FY 2006 Drug Control Budget and Byrne Grant, HIDTA, and
Other Law enforcement programs: Are we jeopardizing Federal, state and
local cooperation? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government
Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005).
\52\ Dept. of Justice, 2007 Budget and Performance Summary, Annual
Rep. at 107: ``The FY 2007 President's Budget proposes the transfer of
the HIDTA program from [ONDCP] to OCDETF.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond the reasons just mentioned, the proposed transfer to
the Justice Department is contrary to existing law and to sound
drug enforcement policy. It would potentially be even more
disruptive to the HIDTA program than simple budget cuts.\53\
From a legal perspective, transferring this program across
departments is contrary to every authorization the Congress has
passed for HIDTA. Moreover, attempting to move the program
through an appropriations bill would almost certainly conflict
with any reauthorization legislation agreed to by the House and
Senate during the 109th Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ The committee's reasons for opposing the transfer of the HIDTA
program to the Justice Department are discussed in greater detail in
the committee's report on H.R. 2829 (H. Rept. 109-315, Part I, pps. 52-
53).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, eliminating or eviscerating particular HIDTAs
would be a far greater financial loss to Federal drug
enforcement efforts than simply the money spent by the Federal
Government directly on their budgets. State and local agencies
make significant contributions of their own agents, employees,
office space, and equipment to HIDTA task forces--much of which
is not reimbursed with Federal dollars and which frequently
dwarf, in their dollar value, the Federal budget components of
the individual HIDTAs. We risk losing those contributions
without the individual HIDTAs.
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant
The committee opposes the administration's renewed proposal
to terminate the state formula grants portion of the Edward
Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program. The
administration has asked Congress to eliminate it entirely and
restrict Federal assistance for state and local law enforcement
programs to a series of enumerated grants (most of which are
previously existing programs) under a ``Justice Assistance''
account. In practice, this will sharply limit the amount of
money available to help state and local agencies.\54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ The Byrne Formula Grant Program was created by the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-690). One-half of the appropriated
funds is to be awarded to the states based on their relative
populations, while the other half is to be awarded on the basis of the
violent crime rates in the states.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration's drastic proposed cuts would create
massive shortfalls in the budgets of state and local law
enforcement agencies across the country. Numerous state and
local officials have informed the committee members and staff
that many programs--particularly drug enforcement programs--
within their states would have to be shut down if all Byrne
Grant and similar funding were cut off.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\55\ See FY 2006 Drug Control Budget and Byrne Grant, HIDTA, and
other law enforcement programs: Are we jeopardizing Federal, state and
local cooperation? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government
Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005) (testimony of Tom Donahue,
Director, Chicago HIDTA, and Mark Henry, president, Illinois Drug
Enforcement Officer's Association).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that Federal
support for state and local efforts lacks national impact.
Particularly in the area of drug enforcement, state and local
participation is vital to our national success. As mentioned
above, state and local agencies make more than 95 percent of
arrests of drug violators.\56\ Collectively, they have far more
personnel and resources than the Federal Government does.
Federal support for these agencies can have a very positive
national impact by facilitating their involvement as partners
in the fight against drug trafficking and other criminal
activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States,
Uniform Crime Report, U.S. Department of Justice (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC)
The committee opposes the administration's current request
of only $9.6 million for the CTAC program, a drastic cut from
the $29.7 million appropriated for fiscal year 2006 (which was
itself a major cut from the $41.7 million appropriated for
fiscal year 2005). The CTAC research program provides support
to law enforcement supply reduction by developing advancement
in technology for drug detection, communications, surveillance
and methods to share drug crime investigative information.\57\
In addition, funding is available for research into drug abuse
and addiction. Further, CTAC supports the Technology Transfer
Program which supplies new counterdrug technologies to state
and local law enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at 89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed decreases would cut the research program from
$14 million to $9.6 million--while completely eliminating
Technology Transfer Program (appropriated at nearly $16 million
in fiscal year 2006). The committee strongly opposes the
termination of the Technology Transfer Program which provides
another means of building operational cooperation between
Federal, State, and local law enforcement.
The committee believes that reform is the appropriate
remedy for any CTAC difficulties. At a time when assistance to
state and local drug enforcement is under consistent attack
throughout the current drug control budget, it is unwise for
the Federal Government to cut off yet another source of badly
needed anti-drug trafficking technology.
HITDA, Byrne Grants, and the CTAC Technology Transfer
program represent networks of enforcement cooperation between
Federal, State, and local agencies in which information,
intelligence, and assets are shared and ultimately maximized.
The particular relationships and venues for dialog that
comprise this multi-level cooperation have been gradually
developed since the creation of the first HIDTAs in 1990.
If the proposed budget changes are implemented, it could
take another 16 years to recover and rebuild these programs to
their current level of operational sophistication.
Consequently, the committee, after much experience with the
profoundly improved and necessary impact made by collaboration
between Federal, State, and local law enforcement, believes
that maintaining these programs is of the highest priority.
5. Interdiction
It is crucial that the Federal Government pursue the most
effective interdiction strategy possible. In what appears to be
a rapidly developing partnership, illicit drug production and
smuggling is being directly linked to terrorist cells around
the world.\58\ Traffickers smuggle drugs, money, people,
information, weapons, and substances the same way terrorists
do. Sometimes, narco-traffickers are terrorists.\59\ When
speaking about the Colombian insurgency, Chairman Tom Davis of
the House Government Reform Committee stated, ``These are not
idealistic liberators; they're thugs and terrorists, funded by
the illicit drug trade.'' \60\ When drugs are interdicted, the
financing of terrorist operations becomes more difficult.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ Miles, Donna, Rumsfeld, Ecuadoran Leaders Vow Continued
Cooperation, American Forces Press Service, Nov. 16, 2004, at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2004/n11162004--2004111604.html
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006); Department of Defense Press Briefing by
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff General Richard Myers on Jan. 6, 2004, at http://
www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040106-secdef1104.html (last
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\59\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources drug control budget briefing with
Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Counternarcotics, Nov. 10, 2005; Dept. of State, Designated Foreign
Terrorist Organizations, 2004, at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/45323.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\60\ See The War Against Drugs and Thugs: A Status Report on Plan
Colombia Successes and Remaining Challenges: Hearing before the House
Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (2004) (statement of
Chairman Tom Davis).
\61\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006)
at 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For the third straight year, joint service, interagency,
and multinational forces in the transit zone have seized and
disrupted a record amount of cocaine.\62\ A critical element of
the strategy to disrupt the market focuses U.S. interdiction
efforts on seizing cocaine and other illicit drugs bound for
the U.S. from South America in the transit zone. The transit
zone is a six million square mile area that encompasses Central
America, Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the
eastern Pacific Ocean. Transit zone seizures and disruptions in
2005 amounted to 254 metric tons of cocaine, compared to 219
metric tons in 2004 and 176 metric tons in 2003.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ Id. Joint service, interagency, and multinational forces in
the transit zone seized 254 metric tons of cocaine in 2005.
\63\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transit zone interdiction is a team effort that relies on
the successful execution of several steps in an interdiction
continuum, including the collection and dissemination of
actionable intelligence, the detection and monitoring of
suspect vessels, and the physical interdiction of those
vessels.\64\ The primary operations center and coordinator for
detecting and monitoring suspected air and maritime drug
trafficking events in the transit zone is Joint Interagency
Task Force South (JIATF-South). Located in Key West, Florida,
JIATF-South includes representatives from Defense, Justice,
Homeland Security, and nations such as France, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ Id, at 35.
The chart depicted above reflects JIATF-South's estimates
of the intercontinental flow of cocaine out of the source
countries. However, estimates of the drug flow through the
transit zone are problematic. In its assessment for 2004, ONDCP
reported that between 325 metric tons and 675 metric tons of
cocaine may be moving toward the United States.\65\ Given the
lower and upper bound flow estimates, the committee has deep
reservations regarding the credibility of eradication,
production, interdiction, and usage estimates and performance
measures.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 6.
\66\ Id, at 25; The principal source of information about cocaine
flow in the transit zone is ONDCP's Interagency Assessment of Cocaine
Movement (IACM). The IACM is prepared annually for ONDCP by an
interagency group representing departments and agencies involved in
U.S. counternarcotics efforts. For 2003 and 2004, according to the
interagency group, the IACM's estimate of the amount of cocaine
available for export was too low in relation to estimated U.S. and non-
U.S. demand for cocaine after taking into account seizures and
disruptions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The majority of ``frontline'' interdiction personnel and
assets are contained within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). In addition, the Department of Defense (DOD) has been
designated as the single lead agency of the Federal Government
for the detection and monitoring of the aerial and maritime
transit of illegal drugs into the U.S.\67\ DOD carries out this
responsibility by providing aircraft and ships to patrol the
transit zones, utilizing radars and other technologies to
monitor drug smuggling routes, and employing tactical
intelligence units. With the ongoing DOD and DHS focus on the
global war on terrorism and illegal immigration, the committee
is deeply concerned that many of the resources within these
departments traditionally integral to drug interdiction will be
increasingly diverted for anti-terror and immigration missions,
and the administration is not adequately addressing the
interagency detection and monitoring capabilities that support
U.S. interdiction efforts in the transit zone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 124 (1989).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Increasing the challenge of interdicting drugs in the
transit zones is the mounting shortage of detecting, monitoring
and interdiction assets (ships, planes, and helicopters)
allocated to this critical mission. This is the result of the
administration's failure to plan to replace aging DHS and DOD
assets. The shortage of these assets is perhaps more pronounced
recently because of substantial gains that have been made in
developing ``known actionable'' maritime events.\68\ Moreover,
the Director of JIATF-South recently reconfirmed what Congress
was told last year: JIATF-South now has more actionable drug
intelligence than there are interdiction assets available to
respond to smuggling events.\69\ The impressive level of
intelligence is displayed by the accompanying graphic in which
known, specific, smuggling events are broken down to the means
of transportation used (``go-fast'' speed boat (57.2 percent),
fishing vessel (30.5 percent), motor vessel (9.6 percent),
other (2.7 percent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 17.
\69\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources visit to JIATF-South, Key West, Florida on
Jan. 12, 2006.
The committee is alarmed that the administration has not
directly addressed the issue of insufficient interdiction
assets. Equally troubling, ONDCP does not identify and discuss
this issue in its 2007 Strategy, other than to highlight the
improvements in intelligence. The committee is concerned that
until ONDCP clearly articulates the current shortages in drug
interdiction assets, the administration will not provide the
support necessary to respond.
Another crucial piece necessary to understanding the
challenge of the interdiction process addresses the vast
distances associated with the high seas maritime transit zones
that are manipulated by drug smugglers to their strategic
advantage. The Eastern Pacific maritime transit zone, as
depicted in the graphic nearby, places tremendous strains on
U.S. interdiction intelligence, personnel, and assets. Over
time the smugglers have measured the interdiction capabilities
of these assets and have continually utilized these known
limits to exploit weaknesses, irresolvable without an
additional commitment of assets, to continue the flow of
illegal drugs into the continental United States.
In addition to the vast distance being covered, the means
most frequently used by smugglers, even if detected, present a
substantial challenge to the interdiction mission. High-speed
``go-fast'' vessels are used in the majority of the smuggling
events in the transit zone. ``Go-fast'' vessels, which are very
hard to detect by ship and helicopter acting without maritime
patrol aircraft, are capable of speeds up to 40+ knots while
hauling as much as four metric tons of cocaine. In the Eastern
Pacific, these speed boats seek to avoid U.S. interdiction
forces by taking broad, round-about paths into the middle of
the Pacific Ocean before heading north to Mexico. In the
Caribbean, they leave Colombia's North Coast at night, rapidly
transit across the Caribbean basin, and then hug the Central
American coastline in the voyage north to Mexico.
The number of go-fast boats involved in smuggling has
increased substantially since 1995. Such craft are small, very
fast, nearly invisible to radar, and difficult to see in
daylight when painted in blue (seized go-fast (left) with four
200 horsepower outboard engines is pictured with a U.S. Coast
Guard over-the-horizon small boat).
Since calendar year 2000, JIATF-South officials report that
they had information about more maritime drug movements than
they could detect visually.\70\ The number of ``known
actionable'' maritime events in the western Caribbean Sea and
the eastern Pacific Ocean more than doubled from 154 in 2000 to
330 in 2004.\71\ According to JIATF-South officials, in many
cases the maritime event is too far away for available ships
and aircraft to go to the area and visually locate the
suspected drug movement. However, once JIATF-South locates a
suspect movement, the disruption rate has significantly
increased since 2000--from less than 60 percent in 2000 and
2001 to over 80 percent in 2003 to 2005.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\70\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 17.
\71\ Id.
\72\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The critical need for Maritime Patrol Aircraft
One of the most critical areas of concern to the committee
is the steady reduction of DOD and DHS maritime patrol aircraft
(MPA) patrol hours. MPA assets are the linchpin of maritime
interdiction operations and play a key role virtually every
significant maritime drug seizure. These aircraft provide the
necessary detection and monitoring capability in the transit
zones on which all other interdiction and law enforcement
efforts depend.
In his opening remarks to the House Committee on
International Relations Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
on November 9, 2005, Chairman Dan Burton said that many of the
air assets in the drug transit zone had been ``. . . taken out
of the interdiction business and committed to counter-terrorism
and homeland security. This often leaves us with more
actionable intelligence on drug shipments than assets to
intercept them.'' This lack of air assets often leaves law
enforcement with no way to counteract drug shipments, leaving
them to merely watch as drugs made their way into the
country.\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ See Illicit Drug Transit Zone in Central America: Hearing
before House Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Committee on
International Relations, 109th Cong. (Nov. 9, 2005) (statement of
Chairman Dan Burton).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the U.S. interdiction forces have seized record
amounts of cocaine over the past three years,\74\ the Coast
Guard, Customs and Border Protection and DOD face several
challenges in maintaining current level of assets to support
transit zone interdiction operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006)
at 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ON STATION FLIGHT HOURS FOR INTERDICTION IN THE TRANSIT ZONE, FISCAL
YEARS 2000-2005
According to JIATF-South and U.S. Interdiction Coordinator
officials, because of its longer range, the P-3 aircraft can
monitor a much larger surface area than other maritime patrol
aircraft and can provide covert surveillance until other
interdiction assets arrive.\75\ As displayed in the nearby
graph, the availability of the U.S. Navy P-3 maritime patrol
aircraft has steadily declined since 2002, and will degrade
JIATF-South's ability to detect and monitor maritime
movements.\76\ JIATF-South, Coast Guard, CBP, and U.S.
Interdiction Coordinator officials stated that while some
short-term fixes have been made, the longer-term implications
of the likely continued declines in the monitoring and
interdiction assets for the transit zone have not been
addressed.\77\ The committee is concerned that the reduced
availability of the U.S. Navy P-3 maritime patrol aircraft and
the apparent lack of a suitable replacement aircraft are the
most critical issues challenging the future of interdiction
efforts in the transit zone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 18.
\76\ See Interrupting Narco-terrorist Threats on the High Seas: Do
We Have Enough Wind in Our Sails? Hearing before the House Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 29, 2005) (testimony of Rear
Admiral Jeffrey Hathaway, Director of JIATF-South).
\77\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL P-3 ON-STATION FLIGHT HOURS IN THE TRANSIT ZONE, FISCAL YEARS
2000-2005
The availability of the P-3 aircraft has declined for
several reasons. In fiscal years 2000-2003, the U.S. Navy
provided the majority of P-3 maritime patrol flying hours in
support of interdiction efforts. However, in FY 2004, the Navy
began limiting the use of its P-3 maritime patrol aircraft for
transit zone interdiction missions because of structural
problems in the P-3's wings \78\ and other worldwide
commitments. Since FY 2000, the number of hours flown by U.S.
Navy P-3s has decreased nearly 60 percent to about 1,500 hours
in FY 2005.\79\ In addition, in December 2004, the Netherlands
removed the P-3 aircraft it used to fly interdiction missions
in the transit zone and sold its planes to Germany for use in
the Baltic. According to the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, the
P-3s flown by the Netherlands were vital to interdiction
efforts in the Caribbean Sea, averaging over 1,300 flight hours
during fiscal years 2000-2004. In April 2005, the Netherlands
began using the Fokker F-60, a shorter-range twin engine
aircraft, to fly interdiction missions, but, according to
Defense officials, these aircraft are less capable than the P-
3.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ The P-3 is a 40-year-old aircraft that has begun to develop
cracks in its wing structure. Presently, the Navy plans to retire the
P-3 and replace it with a different aircraft. However, the full fleet
of aircraft will not be available until 2013, leaving a potential gap
in Maritime Patrol hours.
\79\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 18.
\80\ Id, at 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Defense Department plans to support Maritime Patrol
Aircraft
The steady reduction of DOD maritime patrol aircraft
resource hours and the apparent gap in providing a replacement
aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicles in the transit zone
reflects woeful shortcomings in DOD's management of its
detection and monitoring responsibilities. The committee
believes that if DOD is unable to fully perform its statutory
responsibility as the lead Federal agency for the detection and
monitoring of illicit drug trafficking, other agencies, most
notably the enforcement agencies at the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), should be provided the resources necessary to
fill the void in illicit drug detection, monitoring and
interdiction missions.
Customs and Border Protection plans to support Maritime
Patrol Aircraft
To help compensate for the reduction in U.S. Navy P-3
availability, the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) has increased its P-3 maritime patrol
on-station flight hours in the transit zone from about 1,777
flight hours in 2000 \81\ to over 4,300 in 2005.\82\ The
committee strongly supports CBP's increasing role in transit
zone. However, CBP P-3 aircraft, which are formally owned and
operated by the U.S. Navy, are challenged with the same
maintenance issues of a Vietnam-era aircraft. The committee has
grave concerns about the apparent lack of replacement or
service life extension plans for CBP's aging air fleet. Also,
it is not clear what steps CBP or DHS, as a whole, are taking
to ensure continued P-3 aircraft support to counterdrug
missions in the transit zone, and are not diverted to other CBP
mission areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ Statistics provided in letter from Mary Beth Long, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics to Mark Souder,
chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources, Committee on Government Reform (July 13, 2005) (on file with
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
\82\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We recommend that the DHS closely evaluate current CBP
procurement and modernization proposals and submit
recommendations to Congress that will maintain these critical
MPA capabilities throughout the projected gap period before
U.S. Navy replacement aircraft come on-line. Without these
capabilities, DHS efforts to combat terrorism and illegal drug
movements in the source, transit, and arrival zones and to
provide interagency law enforcement support would be severely
hindered and may threaten national security. The committee
recommends CBP Air program continue to fully support all
international and MPA missions in the transit zones.
Coast Guard plans to support Maritime Patrol Aircraft
The Coast Guard, although hampered by its aging assets, has
also attempted to rise to the task. The Service is now
dedicating more maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) hours to drug
interdiction missions since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\83\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources Staff budget summary briefing with U.S.
Coast Guard officials on Nov. 17, 2005; Resource hours committed to the
drug interdiction mission include on-station hours spent on detection,
monitoring and interdiction operations, and also transit hours needed
for assets to get into position to begin operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the Coast Guard airframe which supports the MPA
mission, the HC-130, is less capable than the P-3 aircraft, and
the percentage of time the HC-130 maritime patrol surveillance
aircraft were available to perform MPA missions was below the
target level in fiscal year 2004. Additionally, the surface
radar system on the aircraft is subject to frequent
failures.\84\ In some instances, mission flight crews had to
look out the windows of the aircraft for targets because the
radar systems were inoperable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration has developed a strategic plan to
replace the Coast Guard's aging ships and aircraft. The
committee believes the Coast Guard's Deepwater fleet
modernization project is critical to U.S. transit zone drug
interdictions. However, the Coast Guard needs to develop
aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles that can effectively
perform the MPA mission, with the type of radars and sensors
capable of complementing the aging fleet of P-3 currently
performing the mission. Consequently, the administration and
DHS need to ensure they are putting the right tools and
equipment into the hands of Coast Guard men and women so that
they may continue to effectively interdict drugs on the high
seas, and deliver the maritime safety and security America
deserves.
II. Strategic and Budgetary Analysis of Federal Drug Control Programs
and Agencies
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD)
DOD Drug Control Funding (in millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
DOD Drug Control Requested \85\ Final \86\ Requested \87\ Enacted \88\ Request \89\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL........................... $852.7 $1,147.8* $895.7 $936.1 $926.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Includes supplemental appropriations.
Contact Information: Department of Defense Office of Public
Affairs: 703-428-0711, http://www.defenselink.mil/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\86\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\87\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\88\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\89\ Id.
The President's budget proposal includes approximately $927
million for Department of Defense (DOD) counterdrug funding.
However, this budget request does not reflect the total amount
of money given to the Department for Drug Control programs. DOD
has received counterdrug funds through the War Supplemental
Appropriations process to support programs in Afghanistan. The
committee is concerned that ONDCP does not account for this
supplemental counterdrug funding. It is very difficult for
ONDCP to provide effective oversight on the entire U.S.
National Drug Control Strategy if some DOD programs are funded
outside the established process for coordinating programs.
The committee understands and greatly appreciates the
efforts of U.S. Armed Forces in carrying out dangerous missions
around the world. It was on the heels of September 11th that a
changed world brought this marriage of drugs and terror into
stark focus. In a special briefing on Humanitarian Assistance
for Afghanistan, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense for
Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs, Joseph Collins, said
Osama bin Laden and the Taliban had been ``. . . closely
associated with major drug traffickers since 1996.'' He added,
``With overseas donations, kickbacks from Al Qaeda, and a huge
drug business, the Taliban has not lacked for financing.'' \90\
In November 2004, an unnamed senior defense official traveling
with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in Central America told a
reporter that drug trafficking (among other illegal activities)
in the region was helping fund Hamas and Hezbollah.\91\ In a
January 2004 press briefing, General Richard Myers, accompanied
by Secretary Rumsfeld, responded to a question concerning
recent ship seizures in the Persian Gulf that contained illegal
drugs. General Myers said it was clear there was a connection
between terrorism and the drug business, both in South America
and the Middle East.\92\ Mary Beth Long, Deputy Assistant
Defense Secretary for Counternarcotics testified in June 2005,
that Colombian narcoterrorists receive the majority of their
funds from protecting, ``taxing'' and engaging in this illegal
drug trade, and they seek to overthrow the freely elected
Colombian government, the oldest democracy in Latin
America.\93\ ``Financial, political and operational linkages
already exist among narcotics trafficking, smuggling at large,
and the regional and global expansion and movement of
terrorists.'' \94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\90\ Special Press Briefing on Humanitarian Assistance for
Afghanistan by Joseph Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Affairs, Nov. 15, 2001, at http://
www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2001/
t11152001--t1115aid.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\91\ Rumsfeld, Ecuadoran Leaders Vow Continued Cooperation,
American Forces Press Service, Nov. 16, 2004 at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/articles.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\92\ Dept. of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard
Myers on Jan. 6, 2004 at http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/ (last
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\93\ See 2006 DOD Counternarcotics Budget: Does It Deliver the
Necessary Support? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government
Reform, 109th Cong. (May 10, 2005) (Testimony of Mary Beth Long, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=26864.
\94\ Dept. of Defense, Office of Counternarcotics policy statement
describing the link between counternarcotics and terrorism, at http://
defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy--offices/solic/cn/
cn--terrorism.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The counternarcotics mission offers a solid opportunity for
DOD collaboration with other nations combating drug
trafficking. The development of ties and partnerships extends
beyond the drug issue and overlaps into other areas. For
example, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report stated, ``Where
possible, the United States will cooperate with Russia on
shared interests such as countering the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, combating terrorism, and counter
the trafficking of narcotics.'' \95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Department of Defense),
Feb. 2006, at 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOD has recently developed new counternarcotics policies
and programs that support the Global War on Terrorism, advance
security cooperation goals, and contribute to national
security. In order to accomplish these new policies, DOD has
defined ``narcoterrorists'' to include ``Terrorists who benefit
from narcotics production and trafficking.'' \96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources drug control budget brief with Department
of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Counternarcotics, Nov. 10, 2005 (on file with Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Central Transfer Account (CTA)
In an effort to align DOD's financial management accounts
to support this new definition of narcoterrorists, the
Department has proposed combining the one counternarcotics
central transfer account (CTA) with that of the much larger
counterterrorism account. No rationale has been offered by DOD
to support this change. In effect, DOD would fund all counter-
terrorism activities worldwide out of this one account. As a
practical consequence, it would merely augment the Department's
discretion over these funds and significantly frustrate
Congress' ability to hold DOD accountable for its mandated
counterdrug mission.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\97\ Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform to DOD Secretary Rumsfeld (Sept. 30, 2005) (on file
with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Currently, DOD's Assistant Secretary for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) is responsible for
supervising how DOD counternarcotics programs will be
prioritized and coordinated with approved national drug
strategies. Since the CTA funding mechanism is with the policy-
maker, timely disbursements can be, and have been made to take
advantage of immediate opportunities. The proposed takeover of
the CTA would make it virtually impossible for SOLIC to
continue to preserve the integrity of counterdrug
appropriations, allow for historical data collection, and
provide the basis for conducting cost-effectiveness and
comparative analyses.
The Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources raised similar concerns in
correspondence to the Department.\98\ The committee was
startled at the insolent response from DOD, which stated, ``If
we make changes to the Department's internal management of the
Counternarcotics program we will notify you immediately.'' \99\
The Department's lack of coordination and clarity on this issue
raises grave doubts and concerns about the priority and status
of all counternarcotics programs within DOD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\98\ Id; Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform to DOD Secretary Rumsfeld (Jan. 30, 2006), at http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=39045 (on
file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources); Roxana Tiron, Pentagon's possible move to eliminate special
ops oversight office could trigger Hill ire, The Hill, Feb. 1, 2006, at
http://www.thehill.com/thehill/export/TheHill/News/Frontpage/020106/
rumsfeld.html.
\99\ Letter from Thomas O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense,
to Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform (Oct. 11,
2005) (on file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee agrees with the Department's assertion that
terrorists may benefit from drug smuggling and that the
Department performs a critical role as the lead agency for the
detection and monitoring of drug trafficking into the United
States. Be that as it may, the committee opposes any attempt to
change the existing management, structure and procedures of the
Central Transfer Account. While a successful effort to combat
drug smuggling can deny funds to terrorists, it is less clear
that a successful effort against terrorists can impact the drug
trade. The committee strongly believes that DOD's current
authority is sufficient and preserves important safeguards
against the unnecessary diversion of counterdrug resources to
non-drug interdiction operations.
2. U.S. Military Support to Counterdrug Operations
The Department of Defense's role in support of stopping
illicit drug trafficking is clearly spelled out in statute; the
Department shall serve as the single lead agency of the Federal
Government for the detection and monitoring of aerial and
maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.\100\
The Department carries out this responsibility by providing
aircraft and ships to patrol the transit zones, utilizing radar
and other technologies to monitor drug smuggling routes, and
employing tactical intelligence units. The tactical
intelligence units utilize DOD's intelligence assets and
procedures to collect and analyze information about smuggling
events.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\100\ 10 U.S.C. Sec. 124 (1989).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South)
The committee fully supports the efforts of DOD's Joint
Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South), located in Key
West, Florida, which serves as the central operations center
for detection and monitoring activities covering the Caribbean
and Eastern Pacific transit zones. In recent years, JIATF South
has achieved remarkable results in coordinating the detection,
monitoring and eventual interdiction of record quantities of
cocaine in the transit zone. In FY 2005, the Coast Guard seized
over 300,000 pounds of cocaine.\101\ The committee recognizes
the Coast Guard's success is a direct result of the highly
successful efforts of JIATF South and its participating
agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\101\ U.S. Coast Guard, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, Feb. 2006,
Appendix B, at B-2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We commend the work of JIATF South and fully support the
international, interagency team effort that has led to record
drug seizures. The teamwork and unity of effort effectively
demonstrated at JIATF South should be fully supported and used
as an example of how U.S. departments and agencies can work
together to achieve a common goal.\102\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\102\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources visit to JIATF-South, Key West, Florida on
Jan. 12, 2006; The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb.
2006) at 34. At http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/
policy/ndcs06/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
JIATF South's continued success is based partly on their
efforts in fusing a wide range of information sources to
support patrolling ships and aircraft in the transit zones. The
committee fully supports JIATF South's focus on intelligence
and support of specific programs such as Operation Panama
Express. The committee recommends that DOD and JIATF South
continue to enhance these programs which have produced
outstanding results.
4. Maritime Patrol Aircraft
The committee supports the efforts of DOD to focus its
counternarcotics role in areas that uniquely call for military
support. However, we are concerned that DOD may not be
currently capable of fulfilling its assigned role in the source
and transit zones (i.e., Latin America, the Caribbean, and the
Eastern Pacific Ocean).
DOD Maritime Patrol Aircraft On-station Hours
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maritime
Fiscal Year Patrol
Aircraft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2001 \103\........................................... 7,229
FY 2002................................................. 6,425
FY 2003................................................. 6,000
FY 2004................................................. 4,426
FY 2005 \104\........................................... 2,940
------------------------------------------------------------------------
As shown above, the steady drop in DOD MPA hours has
steadily reduced a much needed detection and monitoring
capability in the transit zones and, subsequently, diminished
JIATF South's operational capabilities.\105\ JIATF South
officials attribute the recent declines primarily to the
reduced availability of U.S. Navy P-3 MPA because of structural
problems with the older aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ Statistics provided in letter from Mary Beth Long, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics to Mark Souder,
chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform (July 13, 2005) (on
file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources).
\104\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 15.
\105\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources visit to JIATF-South, Key West, Florida on
Jan. 12, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The lack of maritime patrol aircraft assets supporting
JIATF South is a crisis, as the U.S. has been unable to respond
to known shipments of drugs departing Colombia into the
Caribbean and Eastern Pacific transit zone. Credible
intelligence information far exceeds our ability to respond to
these shipments. The committee believes that if DOD is unable
to fully support the detection and monitoring mission, other
agencies, most notably the enforcement agencies at the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), should be provided the
resources necessary to fill the critical void in drug
detection, monitoring and interdiction missions.
5. Maritime Refueling Vessel for the Eastern Pacific
The committee is aware of and concerned about the flow of
drugs bound for the U.S. and recognizes the unique challenges
and vulnerabilities associated with U.S. interdiction efforts
in the transit zone. At the May 11, 2005 House International
Relations Committee hearing, Speaker Dennis Hastert testified
that Congress ``must continue to find ways to stop those
illicit drugs that are not eradicated from traveling through
the transit zone to our shores.'' \106\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\ See Plan Colombia: Major Successes and New Challenges:
Hearing before the House Committee on International Relations, 109th
Cong. (May 11, 2005) (testimony of Speaker Dennis Hastert).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the Eastern Pacific transit area, which is larger than
the continental U.S., there are, on average, four ships
dedicated to the drug interdiction mission. The example is
certainly sobering: four ships to patrol an area larger than
the continental U.S., trying to stop smugglers who will risk
everything to evade U.S. law enforcement efforts.\107\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\107\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources visit to Eleventh Coast Guard District,
Alameda, CA, on Nov. 29, 2005.
The Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland
Security report that narcotics smuggling organizations continue
to avoid U.S. drug interdiction efforts by transiting deep into
the Eastern Pacific ocean, often south and west of the
Galapagos Islands, which is well beyond the endurance of
employed U.S. ships.\108\ The graphic nearby details this
intentional, evasive strategy on the part of smugglers that
strikes at this persistent, yet unaddressed, vulnerability of
U.S. efforts. The traffickers have developed a sophisticated
refueling system using support ships, while the U.S. has
nothing similar.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources briefing at JIATF-South, Key West, Florida,
on Jan. 13, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Drug smugglers use the Eastern Pacific transit zone for
moving narcotics into Mexico and then the United States. On any
given day, U.S. and Allied forces seize an average of 100
kilograms of cocaine per ship when patrolling in the Eastern
Pacific maritime transit zone. Because of the lack of a
maritime oiler ship, the U.S. Coast Guard estimates it loses
100 ``ship-days'' each year due to lengthy refueling trips to
central and South American countries.\109\ U.S. Navy ships
conducting drug interdiction operations also face similar
refueling challenges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\109\ See Interrupting Narco-terrorist Threats on the High Seas: Do
We Have Enough Wind in Our Sails? Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 29, 2005) (testimony of Rear
Admiral Dennis Sirois, Assistant Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast
Guard). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29727.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As detailed above, interdiction efforts in the maritime
transit zones are hampered by the absence of a refueling ship.
The U.S. needs a maritime refueling vessel in the Eastern
Pacific transit zone for drug interdiction operations. U.S.
Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, and Allied warships performing drug
interdiction missions currently have no ``at-sea'' refueling
capability in that area and thus cannot operate for any
significant length of time before they must return to port to
refuel.
Acting U.S. Interdiction Coordinator (USIC) Ralph Utley
testified on June 29, 2005, that there would be substantial
benefits if a maritime oiler ship were employed to support
interdiction activities in the Eastern Pacific maritime transit
zone.\110\ At the same hearing, witnesses representing the
Department of Defense, the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border
Protection, and the Drug Enforcement Administration testified
that they believe the employment of a maritime oiler vessel
would be an immediate improvement to U.S. interdiction
operations in the transit zone.\111\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\110\ Id, (testimony of Ralph Utley, Acting U.S. Interdiction
Coordinator).
\111\ Id, (testimony of Rear Admiral Jeffrey Hathaway, Director of
JIATF-South) (testimony of Rear Admiral Dennis Sirois, Assistant
Commandant for Operations, U.S. Coast Guard) (testimony of Mr. Charles
E. Stallworth II, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air and
Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection) (testimony of
Mr. Thomas M. Harrigan, Chief of Enforcement Operations, Drug
Enforcement Administration).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Navy, which manages a fleet of refueling and
support ships, has been unable to commit refueling ships to
support the drug interdiction mission. On July 13, 2005, the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics
wrote to the Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources that ``the assets are
simply not available.'' \112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\112\ Letter from Mary Beth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Counternarcotics to Mark Souder, chairman of the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform (July 13, 2005) (on file with
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the post 9/11 world, where both securing and detecting
threats to our nation's borders have become critical national
security objectives, we cannot continue to neglect the fact
that narco-traffickers are breaching our borders on a daily
basis and transporting deadly narcotics onto our nation's
streets. Drug trafficking organizations have already adapted to
these long transit routes by employing support ships to refuel
drug laden boats on the high seas. The committee believes it is
time that U.S. interdiction agencies be provided the right
tools to respond to this unique opportunity to stop smugglers
in the Eastern Pacific.
Congress has recently attempted to address this
vulnerability. Amendment No. 10 to H.R. 889, The Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation Act of 2005, was agreed to by voice
vote on September 15, 2005, having received the support of
leadership and the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure. The Amendment authorized $50 million to enable
the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) to purchase or lease
a maritime refueling support vessel capable of refueling U.S.
and Allied vessels engaged in drug interdiction in the Eastern
Pacific transit zone.\113\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\113\ 109 Congressional Record H8047 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 2005)
(statement of Representative Souder), available at http://
thomas.loc.gov (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is the second time the House voted in favor of
procuring a drug interdiction refueling vessel. On July 19,
2005, a similar amendment was agreed to by voice vote and
included in H.R. 2601, The Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007.\114\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\114\ 109 Congressional Record H6049 (daily ed. July 19, 2005)
(statement of Representative Souder), available at http://
thomas.loc.gov (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee commends DOD for reaching out to our
international partners and requesting maritime refueling
assistance. In November 2005, DOD stated that the Chilean Navy
had an oiler available to support U.S. interdiction efforts in
the transit zones and that a trial period would begin in the
Spring of 2006.\115\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\115\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources drug control budget brief with Department
of Defense Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Counternarcotics, on Nov. 10, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. U.S. Navy--Aviation Use of Force (AUF)
The committee fully supports the U.S Navy's new armed
helicopter program for drug interdiction missions.\116\ We
believe that the Coast Guard's Helicopter Interdiction Squadron
(HITRON) has clearly demonstrated a safe and effective
capability to stop fleeing, drug-laden speedboats. Although the
process of developing the capability has been slow and was
originally scheduled to be fully capable in October 2005, the
committee commends the U.S. Navy for demonstrating flexibility
and initiative to incorporate the Coast Guard's
techniques.\117\ The committee has high expectations that the
new AUF capabilities will provide immediate results in
interdicting go-fast smuggling vessels in the transit zones.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\116\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources drug control budget brief with Department
of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Counternarcotics, on Nov. 10, 2005; The White House, National Drug
Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006) at 35.
\117\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources detection and monitoring brief with
Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Counternarcotics, on Aug. 31, 2005; Government Reform Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources visit to Coast Guard
HITRON, Jacksonville, Florida, on Jan. 9, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS)
The degrading of the Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS)
is an area of concern for the committee. As demonstrated in the
graphic nearby, the U.S. Air Force, which took over control of
TARS from the U.S. Customs Service, has reduced the number of
TARS radar sites from 14 to 8. This reduction in capability has
left the U.S. relatively blind to air and marine smuggling
activities along the entire Gulf Coast (stretching from the
east coast of Texas to the southern tip of Florida) and from
the eastern coast of Florida to Puerto Rico.
The Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources has raised concerns in
correspondence to the Department.\118\ In response, DOD has
stated they have developed an over-the-horizon radar system to
replace the old Caribbean radar network, \119\ but the
committee believes this new system has limited ability to
detect vector and speed and that TARS is superior. In addition,
DOD stated that drug smuggling through the U.S. gulf coast has
always been deemed to be negligible. The committee is very
concerned that a ``gap'' between detection systems may be
developing in the gulf coast region. As record seizures and
enforcement actions are increased in both the maritime transit
zones and along the Southwest Border with Mexico, the gulf
coast region will provide an easy entry way for traffickers
wanting to avoid detection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\118\ Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform to DOD Office of the Secretary of Defense, to U.S.
Southern Command and to U.S. Northern Command, (July 29, 2005) (on file
with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources); Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, to Director, Joint Interagency Task Force South,
(Jan. 31, 2005) (on file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources).
\119\ Letter from Mary Beth Long, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Counternarcotics, to Congressman Mark Souder, chairman of
the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform (July 13, 2005) (on file with
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If DOD is not committed to managing the TARS program as
designed, the committee recommends that the Customs and Border
Protection program in DHS, with appropriate funding for
maintenance and improvements, regain operational responsibility
for the TARS program. DOD, however, should retain the
responsibility for the program's logistics and procurement.
8. Afghanistan Operations
``We live in a world that is full of conflict,
contradictions, and accelerating change. Viewed from the
perspective of the Director of National Intelligence, the most
dramatic change of all is the exponential increase in the
number of targets we must identify, track, and analyze. Today,
in addition to hostile nation-states, we are focusing on
terrorist groups, proliferation networks, alienated
communities, charismatic individuals, narcotraffickers, and
microscopic influenza.'' \120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\120\ See Current and Projected National Security Threats to the
United States Hearing before Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
109th Cong. (Feb. 2, 2006) (testimony of John D. Negroponte, Director
of National Intelligence).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The connection between heroin production and terrorism in
Afghanistan cannot be overstated. ``The booming drug trade has
given a strong second wind to the stubborn insurgency being
waged by the Taliban and Islamists warlords--The ballooning
dope trade is rapidly creating narco-states in central Asia,
destroying what little border control exists and making it
easier for terrorist groups to operate.'' \121\ In an April
2004 hearing, Rear Admiral Bruce Clingan for U.S. Central
Command told the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee
on Emerging Threats and Capabilities that the counternarcotics
program in Afghanistan was a ``key element'' in the U.S.
campaign against terrorism.\122\ The cultivation of poppies,
which was regulated and taxed under Taliban rule, flourished
after the elimination of the Taliban regime.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\121\ David E. Kaplan, Paying for Terror, U.S. News & World Report,
(Dec. 5, 2005) at 50.
\122\ See U.S. Central Command's Counter Narcotics Program Hearing
before the Senate Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
Senate Armed Services Committee, 109th Cong. (Apr. 2, 2004) (testimony
of Rear Admiral Bruce Clingan, USN, Deputy J-3, U.S. Central Command).
At http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/
2004--hr/040402-clingan.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\123\ U.S. Set to Battle Afghan Drug Trade, New York Times on the
Web, Aug. 11, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In August 2005, the U.N. reported that opium production had
decreased by 21 percent from its 2004 level but, even with this
decrease, Afghanistan still ranks as the world's largest opium
supplier accounting for 87 percent of the world's supply,
according to the U.N.\124\ There is reportedly evidence that
the Taliban are ordering increased poppy production from Afghan
farmers in remote regions beyond the government's control as a
means to make money to finance their operations and also to
weaken the Afghan central government.\125\ In Helmand province,
the new governor recently stated that the Taliban have forged
an alliance with drug smugglers, providing protection for drug
convoys and mounting attacks to keep the government away and
the poppy flourishing.\126\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\124\ The Opium Situation in Afghanistan as of 29 Aug. 2005, the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (UN Report), Aug. 2005.
\125\ Philip Shishkin and David Crawford, In Afghanistan, Heroin
Trade Soars Despite U.S. Aid, Wall Street Journal, Jan. 18, 2006, and
Declan Walsh, In Afghanistan, Taliban Turning to the Drug Trade, Boston
Globe, Dec. 18, 2005.
\126\ Carlotta Gall, Another Year of Drug War, and the Poppy Crop
Flourishes, New York Times on the Web, Feb. 17, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee believes that U.S. counterdrug efforts in
Afghanistan have failed to prevent the explosion in heroin
production and trafficking. If all of Afghanistan's opium were
converted to heroin, the result would be 526 metric tons.\127\
Recent estimates from the United Nations office on Drugs and
Crime indicate that 87 percent of the world's illegal opiates
are produced in Afghanistan.\128\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\127\ Briefing by Drug Enforcement Administration to the Speaker's
Drug Policy Task Force, Washington, DC, (Jan. 26, 2006).
\128\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006)
at 38.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``For my money, the No. 1 problem in Afghanistan is
drugs,'' said U.S. Marine Corps General James L. Jones, the
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) and the Commander of
the United States European Command (COMUSEUCOM).\129\ Despite
recognition by some U.S. military leaders that drugs are
currently Afghanistan's primary security problem, DOD has
played only a supporting role in counternarcotics operations in
Afghanistan. The committee fully agrees with General Jones. The
illicit drug trade must be addressed through a coordinated
effort of involved U.S. agencies and coalition forces before
stability and democracy can take hold in Afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\129\ Associated Press, Drugs Main Threat in Afghanistan, General
Says, Los Angeles Times, Dec. 16, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2005, the Department of Defense increased its
counternarcotics role in Afghanistan but did not become
actively involved in counterdrug operations on the ground. The
U.S. military in Afghanistan supported efforts by Afghan and
U.S. agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
by providing helicopter and cargo aircraft transport and
planning and intelligence assets.\130\ To fund efforts to
combat the drug trade in Afghanistan, DOD requested $257
million, \131\ and Congress approved $242 million (Public Law
109-13, 119 Stat. 240) to fund facilities, equipment,
communications, and training, and to lease and refurbish
helicopters for the Afghan government. These funds are in
addition to the $15.4 million in DOD's FY 2005 Defense Budget
for counternarcotics assistance to the Afghan government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\ Thom Shanker, Pentagon Sees Antidrug Effort in Afghanistan,
New York Times, Mar. 25, 2005, and James Gordon Meek, DEA Team to Fight
Afghani Opium Trade, New York Daily News, Apr. 3, 2005.
\131\ Department of Defense FY 2005 Supplemental Request for
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and
Operation Unified Assistance, (DOD) Feb. 2005, at 81.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee supports the goals outlined in the
President's Drug Control Strategy Report.\132\ Many of these
efforts are pictured below, which call for helping the Afghans
build a judicial system, construct a narcotics prosecution task
force, establish border crossings and border strong points, and
train and equip a counternarcotics police force. However, while
the committee agrees that these are appropriate goals, they are
better suited to programs run by the State Department and not
efforts and missions to which DOD should be tasked.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\132\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006)
at 38.
Instead, the committee believes that the destruction of
heroin producing laboratories, stockpiles of precursor
chemicals, opium, and heroin should be DOD's primary mission
areas for counterdrug activity in Afghanistan. DOD should
target and destroy Afghan drug production infrastructures and
trafficking operations. The reluctance to target known
stockpiles of opium products will encourage even more heroin
production, threatening to increase heroin addiction in Europe
and the U.S. and providing increased funding for the terrorists
who are currently engaging our troops in Afghanistan. Until DOD
shows a willingness to take effective action against heroin
production and to closely coordinate its efforts with the State
Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), limited
progress will be made.
The committee is similarly concerned about the limited
support being provided by DOD to U.S. and Allied agencies
actually trying to conduct counterdrug operations in
Afghanistan. DOD has been reluctant to provide aviation assets
or other logistical support to DEA personnel.
Not only does the administration need to refine U.S.
mission areas in Afghanistan, but DOD needs to better align and
coordinate with U.S. agencies with similar mission sets. The
committee was pleased to learn of the Department's recent
decision to lease low-quality Soviet-era MI-17 helicopters to
support and transport DEA teams, and believes it is long
overdue. The committee recommends that the Department provide
better support to DEA's counterdrug efforts.
9. Colombian Operations
U.S. military involvement in Colombia began in 2000 under
``Plan Colombia'' and was limited to training Colombian
counternarcotics units, although U.S. forces now train the
Colombian military in counterinsurgency operations. This change
of emphasis is a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, whereby Colombia went from being a part of the ``War
on Drugs'' to the ``Global War on Terror'' (GWOT). The danger
to the Americas, even to those nations with long histories of
self-determination, and of the political instability generated
by drug trafficking was made clear by Chairman Tom Davis of the
House Government Reform Committee on October 7, 2005, when he
said of Colombia, ``(It) is not only one of the oldest
democracies in our hemisphere, but is also home to three
terrorist groups who fund their guerilla activities with drugs
smuggled into the U.S. for American consumption.'' \133\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\133\ Press Release, House Committee on Government Reform, (Oct. 7,
2005) at www.reform.house.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Colombia occupies a unique position in the administration's
global war on terror, in that its targeted terrorist groups are
Marxist, as opposed to Islamic-based, and have no reported
links to Al Qaeda or other Islamic groups. Colombia has been
involved for almost forty years in what some describe as a
civil war and others describe as a counterinsurgency campaign
against three major groups. The first two groups, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National
Liberation Army (ELN) started in the 1950s as Marxist
revolutionary groups but reportedly have lost most of their
ideological support and have transformed into violent criminal
organizations.\134\ The other group, the rightist United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) is a conglomerate of illegal
self-defense groups formed in rural areas where the Colombian
government did not exert a strong presence.\135\ All three
groups allegedly fund their activities through drug revenues
\136\ and are on the administration's official list of
terrorist organizations.\137\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\134\ Lieutenant Colonel Kevin W. Buckley, U.S. Support to Plan
Colombia: A Heading Check U.S. Army War College Strategy Research
Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. (2004) at 1 (on
file with U.S. Army War College).
\135\ Id.
\136\ Id.
\137\ Dept. of State, Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations,
(2004) at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45323.pdf (last
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In June 2004 congressional testimony before the House
Committee on Government Reform, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict told
House members that DOD and other U.S. agencies operating in
Columbia, ``. . . seek to systematically dismantle drug
trafficking networks, both to halt the flow of drugs into the
United States, and to bolster the broader war on terrorism
effort.'' \138\ Narcoterrorism was reported by Brigadier
General Benjamin Mixon, Director of Operations, Southern
Command in a hearing before Senate Armed Services Committee
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities in April
2004, as ``. . . erode(ing) the very fabric of democracy by
spawning terrorism, corrupting public institutions, promoting
criminal activity, undermining legitimate economies and
disrupting social order.'' \139\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\138\ See The War Against Drugs and Thugs: A Status Report on Plan
Colombia Successes and Remaining Challenges: Hearing before the
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (June 17, 2004) (testimony
of Thomas O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict).
\139\ See Testimony on the Department of Defense Counternarcotics
Program in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year
2005: Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities, Senate Armed Services Committee, 108th Cong. (Apr. 2,
2004) (testimony of Brigadier General Benjamin Mixon, U.S. Army,
Director of Operations, U.S. Southern Command).
About 200 special forces soldiers are currently serving as
trainers, where they are limited to training in garrison and
planning support at headquarters, and another 200 troops
provide ``information support'' including intelligence,
leadership, and planning support.\140\ Also contributing to
Colombia's success has been the Air Bridge Denial program.\141\
In 2005, this program resulted in seven interdictions, five
impounded aircraft, the destruction of two aircraft, and the
seizure of 1.5 metric tons of cocaine in Colombia.
Additionally, three aircraft and 2.1 metric tons of cocaine
were impounded in neighboring countries after coordination
between host nations and JIATF South.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\ Kathleen T. Rhem, U.S. Military Helping Colombian Military
Cope With Drug War's Legacy, American Forces Information Service, Nov.
29, 2005.
\141\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006)
at 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its Quadrennial Defense Review Report, released February
6, 2006, DOD justifiably recognized its part in the successes
achieved in helping stabilize large tracts of Colombia.
U.S. Southern Command's support for Plan Colombia is
yet another example of preventive action. The United
States has worked with the Government of Colombia to
combat the production and trafficking of illegal drugs.
In 2002, at the request of the Administration, Congress
granted expanded authorities to help the Colombian
Government wage a unified campaign against terrorism as
well as drugs, and thereby assert effective control
over its territory. This broader mission has helped the
Colombian Government seize the initiative against
illegal armed groups, demobilize thousands of illegal
paramilitaries, decrease violence and return to
government authority areas that had been under the
control narcoterrorists for decades.\142\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\142\ Dept. of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (Feb.
2006) at 14. At http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/
Report20060203.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
The committee strongly recommends that the Department
continue to fully support these important programs. These
efforts, combined with the Government of Colombia's efforts to
attack powerful drug traffickers and extradite them to the
United States has produced unparalleled results \143\ and need
to remain robust to be effective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\143\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006)
at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, the committee encourages CENTCOM to coordinate
the meeting of Colombian military and police personnel with
Iraqi counterparts to discuss Colombian approaches to oil
pipeline protection and counterdrug helicopter operations.
Colombian security services have had vast experience and
measured success guarding oil pipelines and carrying out
tactical helicopter missions that may prove beneficial to both
counterdrug operations and efforts to protect oil pipelines in
Iraq.
10. Department of Defense Performance Measures
Congress has had difficulty obtaining sufficient
information from DOD that would allow for an evaluation of the
effectiveness of counterdrug programs at the Department. For
example, the Department has not established a ship and aircraft
resource hour target to support transit zone detection and
monitoring programs.\144\ Additionally, DOD's counternarcotics
program has not yet been reviewed under the administration's
Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) process.\145\ GAO
reported in November 2005 that DOD ``is developing performance
measures that focus on the number of disruptions of cocaine
trafficking events, but it has not yet set any targets or goals
to assess its progress.\146\ The committee urges the Department
to make greater progress in performance accountability. In
particular, the committee believes that substantial increases
in resources committed to the Department's detection and
monitoring mission in the transit zone need to be made in order
to achieve greater supply reduction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\144\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at 15.
\145\ Id.
\146\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, Nov. 2005, at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities State Grants Program Funding
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
SDFSC State Grants Requested \147\ Final \148\ Requested \149\ Enacted \150\ Request \151\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*...................... $610.98 $437.38 $0 $346.50 $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: Office of SDFSC: 202-260-3954, http://
www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osdfs/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\147\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\148\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\149\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\150\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\151\ Id.
1. Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities
The committee has specific concerns about the
administration of the Safe and Drug Free Schools and
Communities (SDFSC) program at the Department of Education.
Despite the strong rejection by Congress of last year's budget
proposal to completely eliminate the State grants program and
ample evidence that the stated reasons behind such a step are
not properly grounded, the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) has once again made the same proposal with the support of
officials at the Department of Education.
Congressman Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, expressed
strong support for the State Grants Program: ``Safe and Drug-
Free Schools and similar programs have great potential as a
vehicle for bringing effective anti-drug education to millions
of young people in our schools.'' \152\ Moreover, Ranking
Member, Representative Elijah Cummings, reemphasized the same
message:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\152\ See Drug Prevention Programs and the Fiscal Year 2006 Drug
Control Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use
Prevention? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th
Cong. (Apr. 26, 2005) (statement of Congressman Mark Souder, chairman,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
The most severe program cut in the area of prevention
is the elimination of $441 million in funding for
grants to States under the Safe and Drug-Free Schools
program within the Department of Education. If we enact
the President's request, the consequences will be felt
in classrooms across the country, where States and
localities simply cannot afford to fund drug education
on their own.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\ Id, (statement of Congressman Elijah Cummings, ranking
member, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources).
The grants distributed under the State Grants program serve
as leverage that allows local communities to significantly
augment their capacity to provide drug prevention programs.
``Many school systems across America have found unique ways to
combine these SDFSC funds with very little local moneys in
order to provide the highest level of drug prevention. Removing
the monetary foundation of these programs could cause many if
not all of them to collapse.'' \154\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\ Id, (statement of Clarence Jones, coordinator, Safe and Drug-
Free Youth Section, Fairfax County Public Schools).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee is very concerned that the major reforms
required in Title IV, Part A of the ``No Child Left Behind
Act'' (NCLB) \155\ were never implemented by the Department of
Education. To date, the Department has failed to provide any
guidance to the states regarding implementation of the
requirements for a Uniform Management Information and Reporting
System (UMIRS).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\155\ No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 6301-6578
(2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This system was specifically included in the NCLB Act to
ensure that uniform information, data and outcome measures for
drug use were collected by every state in a uniform manner and
reported to the Secretary of Education, so that progress could
be measured within a state over time, as well as among and
between all of the states. Congress also specifically included
a minimum data set as part of the Safe Report required in
Section 4116 of the NCLB Act.\156\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\156\ Public Law 89-10 (1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This minimum data set requires that the following drug use
data be collected, tracked and reported to the Secretary by all
states: incidence and prevalence, age of onset, perception of
health risk and perception of social disapproval of drug use
and violence by youth in schools and communities. As outlined
in the law, the data set for the drug-related indicators are
identical to what is currently being collected successfully by
both the Office of National Drug Control Policy's Drug-Free
Communities Act grantees and the Center for Substance Abuse
Prevention's State Incentive Grant recipients.
The Department has failed to meet the requirements of Title
IV, Part A of the NCLB Act, intended to measure the
effectiveness and outcomes of the SDFSC program. Consequently,
Congress recently mandated that the following actions be taken
by the Department of Education to correct this failure of
implementation, in the Conference Report accompanying the FY
2006, Labor, Health and Human Services and Education
Appropriations Act: \157\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\157\ See http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109--cong--reports&docid=f:hr143
.109.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
The Conference Committee is concerned that the
Department of Education has neglected to report
specific data to Congress as required under Section
4122(c) of Title IV, Part A of the No Child Left Behind
Act. This data is required to be included in the State
Report under Section 4116 of the Safe and Drug-Free
Schools and Communities program. The report
specifically requires all states to collect and report
to the Secretary, in a form specified by the Secretary,
the following data: incidence and prevalence, age of
onset, perception of health risk and perception of
social disapproval of drug use and violence by youth in
schools and communities. The Conference Committee
expects the Department to develop a plan for how it
will collect the specified data from the states and
report it to Congress in a timely manner. The plan
should be submitted to the House and Senate authorizing
and oversight committees within 60 days of the passage
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
of this bill.
The committee focuses its critique on the administration of
the Safe and Drug-Free Schools program and the proposed
elimination of the State Grants program. A central reason
behind this proposal was the determination that this program
was ``ineffective'' under OMB's Program Assessment Rating Tool
(PART) review for the fiscal year 2004 Budget. However, in
qualifying this determination the PART assessment stated that
the ``existing program indicators use national surveys and
don't measure . . . drug abuse at State and local levels.''
\158\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\158\ Letter from Debra A. Price, Assistant Deputy Secretary,
Office of Safe and Drug Free Schools, Department of Education, to
Congressman Mark Souder, chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, (Dec. 8, 2005) (on file with
Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The subcommittee specifically inquired in a November 17,
2005, letter to the Department of Education concerning the
steps being taken to address this criticism. The Department
provided the following response: ``The President's Budget
request for FY 2006 recommended termination of the Safe and
Drug-Free Schools State Grants Program.'' \159\ Staff
interviews with representatives from Safe and Drug-Free Schools
and Communities also reconfirmed the administration's adherence
to the program's claimed ``ineffectiveness'' as justification
for not taking steps to reform the State Grants program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\159\Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the ``Summary: FY 2007 National Drug Control Budget,''
the administration once again, repeating the unfounded and
inadequate reasons given last year, states: ``The President's
Budget does not include funding for Safe and Drug-Free Schools
State Grant Program, as grant funds are spread too thinly to
support quality interventions and it was rated ``ineffective''
by PART because of its inability to demonstrate
effectiveness.'' \160\ However, the SDFSC representatives
interviewed by staff acknowledged that, utilizing proxy
measures, the Department of Education has been incapable of
getting results to show either the effectiveness or the
ineffectiveness of the State Grants Program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006)
at 1. At http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/
ndcs06/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, SDFSC State data collection project officials
developed a preliminary strategy designed to address the
problem of collecting data from the states, such as providing
exemptions from certain reporting requirements for some
states.\161\ ``However, this strategy has not been finalized,
and Education has not developed a specific plan of action for
how they might (1) help states that are deficient, (2) deal
with state expectations for phasing out the multiple data
collections, or (3) meet the expectations of their own program
offices.'' \162\ The committee is dissatisfied with the degree
of implementation on the part of the administrators of SDFDC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\161\ Education's Data Management Initiative: Significant Progress
Made, but Better Planning Needed to Accomplish Project Goals, GAO
Report No. 06-6 (Government Accounting Office), Oct. 28, 2005, at 2.
\162\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, Chairman Mark Souder made the following comments
directly addressing the lack of support the State Grants
program has received from the administration in general:
The administration has never attempted to reform this
program, however, which ought to be the first step, not
eliminating it entirely. And I want to say as a member
of the Education Committee, and as somebody who was on
it when we did this that we got no leadership at the
time we authorized the program either, other than
eliminating it.\163\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\163\ See Drug Prevention Programs and the Fiscal Year 2006 Drug
Control Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use
Prevention? Hearing Before House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th
Cong. (Apr. 26, 2005) (statement of Congressman Mark Souder, chairman,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
The committee agrees that ineffective programs should be
held accountable. However, proposing the elimination of a
program because it is supposedly ``ineffective,'' while also
admitting that its effectiveness is unknown, is of utmost
concern. The more serious concern arises from the Department's
contribution to the claimed inefficiency by having failed to
implement congressionally-mandated requirements and its failure
to give the States any specific guidance on how to report their
data and outcomes. These failures directly impact the
Department of Education's incapacity to actually determine the
effectiveness of the State Grants program.
In FY 2006 Congress emphatically rejected the same
administration proposal to eliminate the State Grants program.
Instead of eliminating the program, Congress appropriated
$346.5 million for the State Grants program. Similar to last
year, the committee strongly suggests that the administration
take substantial steps to reform the State Grants program
rather than eliminate it. More specifically, the committee
suggests that the administrators of the SDSFC program at the
Department of Education be held accountable for neglecting the
legal obligation to collect state data intended to measure the
effectiveness and outcomes of the SDFSC State Grant program.
2. Student Drug Testing \164\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\164\ For further information, see the Department's website at
http://web99.ed.gov/GTEP/Program2.nsf/b39cd123fd4a045b8525644400514f2b/
cea6c8f66422784785256d3c0074e597?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 26,
2006), or call the Department's Office of SDFS at (202) 260-3428.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For FY 2006, Congress appropriated $9.09 million for
school-based drug testing programs for students. The FY 2007
request of $15 million is a $4.6 million increase over last
year.\165\ The committee strongly supports this testing
initiative. However, in light of the administrations proposal
to eliminate the State Grants Program, a more significant
augmentation in the funding for student drug testing is
strongly recommended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\165\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at 17. At http://
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By addressing accountability, drug testing in schools has
proven the single most effective drug-prevention program in the
United States. In 2002 the Supreme Court declared: ``[W]e find
that testing students who participate in extracurricular
activities is a reasonably effective means of addressing the
School District's legitimate concerns in preventing, deterring,
and detecting drug use.'' \166\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\166\ Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration has taken a leadership role in promoting
drug testing in the schools. Drug testing shows great promise
in preventing young people from using narcotics. It is also a
tool for identifying which students will need treatment and
other special help to get them off drugs and achieve their true
potential. It is also an excellent tool for measuring the
success of other drug use prevention programs, as it shows
whether the true bottom line--reducing drug use--has been
achieved.'' \167\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\167\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at 17. At http://
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/07budget/ (last
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The purpose of drug testing is not to punish students who
use drugs but to help those in trouble by preventing drug use
and helping drug-using students become drug-free in a
confidential manner. The results of a positive drug test should
be used to intervene with not-yet-dependent students and get
drug-dependent students into effective treatment. After
assessing the extent of the problem, parents and administrators
can recommend further prevention activities such as education
on the negative effects of drugs, counseling, and if necessary,
drug treatment.
ONDCP and the U.S. Department of Education announced the
release of $7.2 million in Federal grants for schools to
implement student drug testing programs in October 2005. Fifty-
five grants were awarded to fund random student drug testing
programs in 352 schools.\168\ The competitive grant program
supports schools in the design and implementation of a
confidential and non-punitive program to randomly screen
selected students and to intervene with assessment, referral,
and intervention for students whose test results indicate they
have used illicit drugs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\168\ See ONDCP news release at http://
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/press05/122805.html (last visited
Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Results from a longitudinal study, the Student Athlete
Testing Using Random Notification Project (SATURN), reported
that of the 25 percent of students surveyed who used marijuana
and of the 60 percent who used alcohol, only 9 percent would
continue to use drugs and 12 percent would continue to use
alcohol if mandatory drug testing were present in their
schools.\169\ Moreover, a study at Hunterdon Central Regional
High School in New Jersey, highlighted in the chart below,
stated: ``of students who reported using marijuana in the last
year, 58 percent reported Random Drug testing (RDT) is a good
excuse not to use. 81.8 percent of those students who did not
use marijuana in the past year agreed that RDT is a good excuse
not to use.'' \170\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\169\ See http://www.studentdrugtesting.org/
SDT%20DUPONT%20STUDY.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\170\ See http://www.studentdrugtesting.org/Hunterdon%20study2.PDF
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
Student Past Month Drug Use: Hunterdon County vs. National Average \171\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10th US 10th 12th US 12th
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alcohol..................................................... 29.9% arrow>
Been Drunk.................................................. 9.7% arrow>
Marijuana................................................... 4.7% arrow>
Cocaine..................................................... 0 1% 1.4
Ecstasy..................................................... 0.1% NA 0.8% Na
Heroin...................................................... 0 <1% 0.6% <1%
Cigarettes.................................................. 11.5% arrow>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee supports the administration's request of $15
million for non-punitive random student drug testing as an
effective and economical method to deter drug use and identify
those in need of treatment. At the same time, if prevention
authentically represents one of the three pillars of the
administration's efforts to end illegal drug abuse, then the
committee strongly recommends a substantial increase to the
funding of student drug testing as an effective and accountable
form of drug prevention.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\171\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Lack of Diligence in Reporting to Congress
The committee is seriously concerned with the Department of
Education's lack of due diligence in preparing for a drug
prevention hearing held on April 26, 2005. Department of
Education representatives were formally notified to prepare to
testify at the April hearing in a December 16, 2004, briefing.
Despite being put on notice in December 2004 to prepare for the
hearing, ED officials claimed immediately prior to the hearing
in April that they had not had enough time to sufficiently
prepare to testify.
If not constituting intentional avoidance of testifying
before Congress, such unwillingness to be held accountable at
least is grossly negligent. ED representatives have an
obligation to promptly and reasonably respond to requests for
testimony from Congress. Otherwise, the oversight function of
congressional committees would be seriously impaired.
C. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
HHS Requested \172\ Final \173\ Requested \174\ Enacted \175\ Request \176\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Institute of Drug Abuse... $1,019.1 $1,006.4 $1,010.1 $1,000.0 $994.8
Substance Abuse and Mental Health $2,637.7 $2,490.5 $2,498.8 $2,442.5 $2,411.1
Services Administration...........
AGENCY TOTAL*...................... $3,656.8 $3,496.9 $3,508.9 $3,442.5 $3,405.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: HHS Office of Public Affairs: 202-690-
7850, http://www.hhs.gov/budget/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\172\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\173\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\174\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\175\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\176\ Id.
The President's drug control budget request for the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has historically
been the largest single-department request. This Department is
responsible for providing programs addressing drug abuse
treatment and prevention. The President has requested a total
of $70.64 billion for all of HHS's programs, of which $3.4
billion is part of the drug budget.
The two agencies within HHS that maintain drug control
programs tracked by the President's drug budget request are (1)
National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), and (2) Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA).
Conspicuously absent from the scrutiny of drug budget oversight
is the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which is responsible
for drug approval, labeling and manufacturing standards.
Perhaps due to the lack of oversight by the administration
of the FDA, prescription drug abuse today is a critical
national problem, second only to marijuana abuse.\177\ FDA's
stubbornly consistent position is that the problem of diverted
and abused drugs is solely one for the Drug Enforcement
Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\177\ The 2004 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) found
that 6.0 million Americans were current (past-month) non-medical users
of prescription drugs. Only marijuana was higher, with 14.6 million
users.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee notes with frustration the apparent
incongruity in FDA's sole authority to approve drugs--including
drugs likely to be abused--with their official non-involvement
in any sort of drug control program. Moreover, the FDA has
failed to act in any meaningful way in the face of twelve
states \178\ approving the use of botanical marijuana for
medical purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\178\ The 12 states and their relevant statutes are: Alaska [Alaska
Stat. Sec. 11.71.090 (2005)]; Arizona [Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 13-
3412.01(A) (2006)]; California [Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann.
Sec. 11362.5 (2006)]; Colorado [Colo. Const. Art. XVIII Sec. 4 (2005)];
Hawaii [Haw. Rev. Stat. Sec. Sec. 29-121 to 329-128 (2005)]; Maine [Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22 Sec. 1102 or 2382-B (5) (2005)]; Montana [Mont.
Code Ann. Sec. Sec. 50-46-101 to 50-46-210 (2005)]; Nevada [Nev. Rev.
Stat. Ann. Sec. Sec. 453A.010 to 453A.400 (2005)]; Oregon [Ore. Rev.
Stat. Sec. Sec. 475.300 to 475.346 (2003)]; Rhode Island [R.I. Gen.
Laws Sec. 21-28.6 (2006)]; Vermont [Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18,
Sec. Sec. 4472-4474d (2005)]; Washington [Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
Sec. Sec. 69.51A.005 to 69.51A.902 (2005)].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The seriousness of the prescription drug abuse problem
\179\ should compel, at the very least, FDA action with
education and approval programs that specifically address this
type of abuse. Likewise, state approval of drugs for medical
use should compel the FDA to assert its authority under the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act as the sole agency charged with
determining the safety and efficacy of a drug for therapeutic
treatment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\179\ See To Do No Harm: Strategies for Preventing Prescription
Drug Abuse: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th
Cong. (Feb. 9, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the FDA has never approved marijuana as a
treatment for any condition, \180\ its inaction when states
independently determine that marijuana can be used for
therapeutic purposes significantly undermines FDA's statutory
authority.\181\ It is possible that continued inaction on the
part of FDA in these critical abuse areas will prompt
congressional legislation to correct the problems and perhaps
formalize a stronger drug approval role for DEA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\180\ In 1978, as part of a lawsuit settlement by HHS, NIDA began
supplying cannabis to patients whose physicians applied for and
received, a ``compassionate use'' exemption from the FDA. The practice
was terminated in 1992, but NIDA was allowed to continue supplying
cannabis to those patients receiving it at the time, and is currently
supplying cannabis to seven patients. National Institute on Drug Abuse,
``Provision of Marijuana and Other Compounds for Scientific Research,''
Jan. 1998. At http://www.nida.nih.gov/about/organization/nacda/
marijuanastatement.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\181\ See Marijuana and Medicine: The Need for a Science-Based
Approach: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th
Cong. (Apr. 1, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/
Nora%20D.%20Volkow%20-%20NIDA.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the committee notes that it is unhelpful to
national anti-drug efforts for HHS to sponsor and participate
in so called ``harm reduction'' conferences promoting a pro-
drug legalization philosophy.\182\ A 2005 harm reduction
conference \183\ that consumed at least $20,000 of HHS funds
promoted pro-drug themes that are counter to the
administration's public approach in fighting illegal drug
use.\184\ One of the major sessions at this Harm Reduction
conference was entitled, ``We Don't Need a War on
Methamphetamine.'' Another conference topic was ``You Don't
Have to be Clean and Sober. Or Even Want to Be!''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\182\ See Harm Reduction or Harm Maintenance--Is There Such a Thing
as Safe Drug Abuse? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government
Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 16, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/
Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=22570.
\183\ Science & Response, Conference by Harm Reduction Coalition
and Harm Reduction Project, in Salt Lake City, Utah (Aug. 19-20, 2005).
HHS was listed on the conference program as a ``primary sponsor'' of
the event.
\184\ HHS's sponsorship of this meeting was the subject of a
critical letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, to HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt Aug. 12, 2005. At
http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/News/
DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentID=32260.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A Senate hearing \185\ revealed that HHS spent more than
$1.4 billion on conferences since the year 2000. At a time when
the nation's budget is constrained and our anti-drug efforts
are affected by certain budget restrictions, the committee
views as inexcusable for HHS to make lavish expenditures on
conferences where pro-drug legalization themes are dominant.
Such money would be better applied to real anti-drug efforts,
such as methamphetamine treatment programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\185\ Federal Agencies and Conference Spending: Hearing before the
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on
Federal Financial Management, Government Information and International
Security, 109th Cong. (Feb. 7, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. National Institute on Drug Abuse--[NIDA]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
NIDA Requested \186\ Final \187\ Requested \188\ Enacted \189\ Request \190\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*...................... $1,019.1 $1,006.4 $1,010.1 $1,000.0 $994.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: 301-443-1124, http://drugabuse.gov/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\186\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\187\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\188\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\189\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\190\ Id.
The President's drug budget request of $994.8 million for
the National Institute on Drug Abuse is a $5.2 million decrease
from the 2006 enacted amount for the Institute. This would mark
a two-year decline in the budget for NIDA.
NIDA is a component of the National Institutes of Health,
and supplies critical basic research that supports a broad
range of drug prevention and treatment programs, all designed
to reduce the adverse health, economic and social consequences
to individuals, families, and communities affected by drug
abuse.\191\ NIDA's activities are aimed at providing the
infrastructure, research and medical compounds for developing
new treatments for addiction, and its Clinical Trials Network
(CTN) is designed to bridge 15 to 20-year gap between treatment
research and practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\191\ See U.S. National Institute on Drug Abuse, Bringing the Power
of Science to Bear on Drug Abuse and Addiction: 5 Year Strategic Plan,
2000-2005. NIH Publication No. 00-4774, Sept. 2000. At http://
www.drugabuse.gov/StrategicPlan/index00-05.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NIDA's first priority area is prevention research in order
to better understand normal brain development, how that
development can be influenced by drugs, and how drug use harms
the developing brain. NIDA has increased its emphasis on
adolescent brain development, and the institute is currently
studying the ``social neuroscience'' of children and evaluating
the genetics, development, environment and co-morbidity to
determine which factors play a role in drug use and addiction.
The second priority area for NIDA is treatment
interventions. NIDA was instrumental in developing
buprenorphine, a treatment for opiate dependence, \192\ and has
placed an emphasis on developing new compounds to address
addiction to marijuana, America's most abused illegal
substance.\193\ In particular, NIDA's focus on how marijuana
abuse \194\ affects the adolescent brain is guiding the agency
in its development of new prevention and intervention programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\192\ See U.S. National Institute on Drug Abuse, Successful Trial
Caps 25-Year Buprenorphine Development Effort, at http://
www.drugabuse.gov/NIDA--notes/NNvol19N3/Successful.html
(last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
\193\ See Marijuana and Medicine: The Need for A Science-Based
Approach: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th
Cong. (Apr. 1, 2004) (statement of Nora Volkow, M.D., Director, NIDA).
At http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Nora%20D.%20Volkow%20-
%20NIDA.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
\194\ See NIDA's webpage devoted to information about Marijuana:
http://drugabuse.gov/DrugPages/Marijuana.html (last visited Feb. 21,
2006). See also A Collection of Articles that Address Research on
Marijuana at http://drugabuse.gov/NIDA--Notes/NN0058.html
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also a target for treatment intervention, and second only
to marijuana use, is the abuse of prescription drugs.\195\
Abuse of prescription drugs, which are cheaper than illegal
drugs and can be easier to obtain, is increasing at an alarming
rate. NIDA has developed science-based materials to educate the
public and health care community on abuse of prescription
drugs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\195\ According to the National Survey on Drug Use and Health
(available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nhsda.htm), 11.4% of youths
ages 12 to 17 in 2004 reported ever misusing prescription pain
relievers such as oxycodone and codeine, compared to 1.2% in 1989. See
Institute of Medicine, Committee on the Assessment of the U.S. Drug
Safety System, July 19, 2005, Statement of Marc J. Wheat, staff
director and chief counsel, House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform. At
http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/
Testimony%20for%20Meeting%20Two.pdf; See also To Do No Harm: Strategies
for Preventing Prescription Drug Abuse: Hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 9, 2004). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, NIDA recognizes the growing rate of
methamphetamine use and addiction as a special urgency for
treatment intervention because of its highly addictive and
toxic properties.\196\ In addition to the funds NIDA devotes to
general drug abuse research, NIDA has allocated an increasing
amount of funds specifically to methamphetamine targeted
research.\197\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\196\ See NIDA's webpage devoted to information about
Methamphetamine at http://drugabuse.gov/infofacts/methamphetamine.html
(last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
\197\ In FY 2001: $18.2M; FY 2002: $21.3M; FY 2003: $27.2M; FY
2004: $37.3M; FY 2005: $40.2M; FY 2006: $41.0M.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NIDA views methamphetamine addiction as chronic--the
addiction must be constantly treated but cannot be cured.
NIDA's focus, therefore, with methamphetamine is to minimize
the rate of relapse. NIDA has developed three promising
compounds to treat methamphetamine addiction, and its
Methamphetamine Clinical Trials Group is conducting several
clinical trials of medications for methamphetamine addiction.
NIDA expects data on these medications to be available within
two years.
NIDA has created the Clinical Trials Network as a way to
translate the research knowledge into successful treatment
programs. CTNs systematically test promising behavioral,
pharmacological, and integrated drug abuse treatments in
community settings. There are currently seventeen CTN nodes
comprised of approximately 120 providers.
In addition to a yearly review, the CTN nodes are
thoroughly evaluated every five years when each project must go
through a recompetition process in which applications for new
grants and continuation proposals can compete. The most recent
competition process led to the determination that two of them
would be discontinued.
The CTN program allows evaluation of treatments from small
research settings and has had measurable results in adapting
behavior treatment approaches: in 2005, the project trained 184
treatment providers \198\ in three treatment approaches adapted
for community-based settings; to date, the CTN has included
nearly 6,400 people participating in 21 different treatment
research protocols. The committee is disappointed that this
program is at zero growth.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\198\ This number of treatment providers is 94 more than the
projected target of training 90 treatment providers in 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee recognizes the importance of prevention
programs, and addressing drug abuse with a balanced strategy.
2. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration [SAMHSA]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
SAMHSA Requested \199\ Final \200\ Requested \201\ Enacted \202\ Request \203\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*...................... $2,637.7 $2,490.5 $2,498.8 $2,442.5 $2,411.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: SAMHSA Office of Policy, Planning and
Budget: 240-276-2200, http://www.samhsa.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\199\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\200\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\201\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\202\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\203\ Id.
SAMHSA was established by Congress in 1992 ``to fully
develop the Federal Government's ability to target effectively
substance abuse and mental health services to the people most
in need and to translate research in these areas more
effectively and more rapidly into the general health care
system.'' \204\ The President has requested $2.41 billion for
SAMHSA's prevention and treatment programs. This is an overall
decrease of $31.4 million from the FY 2006 enacted amount. The
President's request includes $551.6 million for prevention
programs and $1.86 billion for treatment programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\204\ Conference Report to Accompany S. 1306, H. Rept. No. 102-522,
at 125 (1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prevention
The President has requested a total of $551.6 million for
SAMHSA's prevention programs. Consistent with the President's
dramatic overall 19.3 percent reduction in prevention programs
in the drug control budget, the amount requested for SAMHSA's
prevention efforts is $11.41 million lower than the FY 2006
enacted amount. This continues the ongoing decline in funds for
SAMHSA's prevention programs, \205\ which are not justified by
SAMHSA in its budget requests.\206\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\205\ FY 2004 prevention programs through SAMHSA were funded at
$572.7M; FY 2005 prevention programs through SAMHSA were funded at
$572.6M; FY 2006 prevention programs through SAMHSA are funded at
$563.0M.
\206\ In a briefing with the House Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources staff, SAMHSA stated that the
2006 prevention reduction was realized through removing special
earmarks, though this was not discussed in SAMHSA's justification for
2006. Likewise, there is no discussion in the 2007 budget request
justifying the prevention reduction, and presumably would not be
explainable by the removal of earmarks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reduction in funding for our nation's prevention efforts in
the area of substance abuses is a matter of serious concern,
because it impacts our first line of defense. The President's
Drug Control Strategy emphasizes ``stopping use before it
starts'' as one of three national priorities for drug control.
Curtailing prevention efforts will only lead to an increased
need for treatment, and the committee is very concerned about
ensuring that prevention programs are adequately funded.
SAMHSA's prevention efforts are coordinated through the
Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP), which brings
prevention programs to all states nationwide. These programs
engage states, communities and organizations to reduce risk
factors for substance abuse through the Strategic Prevention
Framework (SPF).\207\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\207\ See Drug Prevention Programs and the Fiscal Year 2006 Drug
Control Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use
Prevention? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th
Cong. (Apr. 26, 2005). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=26210.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The SPF is a step-by-step process allowing communities to
implement the most effective prevention efforts for their
specific needs. Built on evidence-based practices, it is a
five-step model designed to (1) profile community needs and
readiness (2) mobilize and build needed capacity (3) develop a
prevention plan (4) implement programs, policies and strategies
based on what is known to be effective (5) evaluate program
effectiveness.
The SPF program is accomplished through State Incentive
Grants (SIGs) that require 85 percent of the funding must be
used locally within the state receiving the grant. In Fiscal
Year 2005, twenty-four states received SPF SIGs. The committee
applauds SAMHSA's efforts through the SPF program for its
evidence-based approach to prevention. Through the National
Registry of Effective Programs and Practices \208\ CSAP
identifies and works to increase model, evidence-based
prevention programs in communities throughout the country. This
demonstrable effort is faithful to the Drug Control Strategy's
goal of ``stopping use before it starts.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\208\ See SAMHSA's website for a description of the National
Registry at http://modelprograms.samhsa.gov/template.cfm?page=default
(last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Treatment
The President has requested $1.86 billion for SAMHSA's
treatment efforts, a decrease of $19.99 million from the
enacted amount for FY 2006. The committee is concerned about
the fact that this is an ongoing decline in SAMHSA's treatment
budget (FY 2006 enacted budget was $38.39 million below 2005).
SAMHSA's treatment efforts are coordinated through the
Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT). CSAT promotes the
availability and quality of community-based substance abuse
treatment programs.\209\ Working with other Federal agencies,
state and local governments, organizations, and faith-based and
community-based providers, CSAT's goals are to increase the
availability of treatment services, improve and strengthen
treatment support organizations, and promote and sustain
evidence-based practices.\210\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\209\ SAMHSA has a substance abuse treatment facility locator on
its website at http://findtreatment.samhsa.gov/ (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\210\ See Providing Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Services to Adolescents: Hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services, Committee on Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions, 108th Cong. (June 15, 2004). At http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=108--senate--hearings&docid=f:94
384.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within the President's budget request for SAMHSA's
treatment programs, $98.2 million is being requested for the
President's Access to Recovery program (ATR). This amount is
unchanged from the FY 2006 enacted amount. ATR is a state-run
voucher program allowing Americans with substance abuse
disorders to choose treatment and recovery support services
from a range of qualified community-based providers.
Within the ATR program, the President is requesting that
$24.8 million be dedicated to a stand-alone methamphetamine
voucher program, intended to fund approximately ten grants at
$2.5 million each for states where methamphetamine use and
treatment is high.
While the committee strongly supports a targeted approach
to the methamphetamine plague, it is unclear how the dedicated
program will materially supplement existing efforts, especially
when the $24.8 million is not additional funding to existing
efforts; rather, the request for ATR is level funded, and the
proposed stand-alone methamphetamine voucher program represents
a large portion of the existing ATR program.
The committee strongly supports the ATR initiative. The
voucher program achieves three key treatment objectives:
consumer choice, effective treatment outcomes, and increased
treatment capacity. Since the vouchers are intended to
supplement current programs, ATR enhances outcome-oriented
performance incentives in the substance abuse treatment
system.\211\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\211\ See Access to Recovery: Improving Participation and Access in
Drug Treatment: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government
Reform, 108th Cong. (Sept. 22, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/
CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=19353; Recovery Now
Initiative: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th
Cong. (Feb. 27, 2003). At http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=108--house--hearings&docid=f:868
28.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, individuals are able to access care that might
otherwise be out of reach for them, including care from faith-
based providers. (Among the providers participating in the ATR
program, 27 percent are faith-based.)
ATR requires reporting from the states to demonstrate that
they are increasing the array of providers and the number of
people treated. This accountability, and the array of
providers, including faith-based providers, are characteristics
applauded by the committee, which strongly supports the ATR
program.
The President's request also includes a voucher incentive
program that would provide up to 25 grant awards of $1 M to $5
M to States and Tribal organizations who voluntarily commit to
use a portion of their Block Grant funds to deliver prevention
and treatment services through vouchers. The committee commends
this initiative to increase voucher programs.
Block Grants
The Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment (SAPT) Block
Grants are administered through CSAP and CSAT. The SAPT Block
Grants represent forty percent of total State spending on
treatment and prevention. The Grants have been level-funded for
two years, and the President's request for 2007 at $1.76
billion continues this level-funding trend.
SAPT block grants are distributed at 20 percent to
prevention and 80 percent to treatment, in accordance with
statutory requirements in the Public Health Service Act.\212\
As a condition for receiving the funds, States are required to
spend at least 20 percent of their allotment on primary
prevention programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\212\ 42 U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1921-1955 (2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee is concerned about the fact that there is no
mandatorily-collected data from the states to determine
measurable outcomes for the SAPT block grants. Without such
data, there is poor accountability for the programs that are
continuously funded and no meaningful measure by which to judge
the effectiveness of SAPT-funded programs.
This lack of outcome measures led to a PART review rating
of ``ineffective'' for the SAPT prevention and treatment
programs in fiscal year 2005, since there was no quantifiable
data by which to demonstrate results. The importance of
performance measurement cannot be overstated, \213\ and the
committee continues to urge the swift adoption of consistently
measurable standards to assure accountability with publicly-
funded drug control programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\213\ See Measuring the Effectiveness of Drug Addiction Treatment:
Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy,
and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar.
30, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=11695; Performance and Outcome Measurement in
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Programs: Hearing before the Senate
Subcommittee on Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services, Committee
on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 108th Cong. (July 20, 2004).
At http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=108--senate--hearings&docid=f:95
101.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SAMHSA has identified ten domains as National Outcome
Measures (NOMs) to represent meaningful outcomes for those
striving to recover from substance abuse: (1) abstinence, (2)
employment/education, (3) crime/criminal justice, (4) stability
in housing, (5) access to services/increased service capacity,
(6) treatment retention, (7) social connectedness, (8)
perception of care, (9) cost effectiveness and (10) use of
evidence-based practices.\214\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\214\ Information on SAMHSA's state data and NOMs is available at
SAMHSA's website: http://nationaloutcomemeasures.samhsa.gov/./outcome/
index.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In an effort to improve data collection for its programs,
SAMHSA has made funds available for States to use in reporting
data that is associated with the SAMHSA-identified NOMs. SAMHSA
expects 32 states to take advantage of these funds for
enhancing data collection efforts, and the agency expects all
states to report on all NOMs elements by end of fiscal year
2007.
Currently, many states are reporting on various NOMs, but
no state is reporting on all NOMs. Not one state is reporting
on cost effectiveness or use of evidence-based practices, a
disappointing fact that the committee is watching closely.
D. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
DHS Drug Control Funding
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
DHS \215\ \216\ Final \217\ \218\ \219\
Requested Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*.................................. $2,519.4 $2,662.4 $2,936.9 $3,059.9 $3,304.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: DHS Office of Public Affairs: 202-282-
8000, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\215\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\216\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\217\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\218\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\219\ Id.
The committee supports the President's request for $3.3
billion for counterdrug activities at the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), which is a slight increase over the
$3.06 billion enacted in fiscal year 2006. That support,
however, is conditioned on the expectation that such funds will
actually be used for counterdrug purposes. As discussed
elsewhere, most of these funds are not actually designated for
counterdrug purposes; instead they are merely estimates of how
much time and how many resources the three main interdiction
agencies at DHS--Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--
will spend on counterdrug activities.
To ensure that those estimates turn into reality, DHS must
fulfill its responsibilities to the counterdrug mission. That
will require not only commitment by the leadership of DHS but
also diligent oversight by the Office of Counternarcotics
Enforcement (CNE) and ONDCP.
1. Reorganization
When Congress created DHS in 2002, it established an
Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security (BTS)
Directorate. The Directorate was assigned the legacy agencies
of the U.S. Customs Service (USCS), the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), the port of entry inspector of the
Department of Agriculture, the Federal Air Marshals Service
(FAMS), and the Federal Protective Service.
The newly created organization, once implemented, did not
bring forth the improvements intended. Far from providing
effective coordination and oversight, BTS served simply as a
policy office with little or no operational functions, adding
another layer of unnecessary bureaucracy.
Recognizing the mistake, DHS announced the results of a
``Second Stage Review'' (2SR) in July 2005 which realigned the
Department to increase its ability to prepare, prevent, and
respond to terrorist attacks and others emergencies.\220\ These
changes were intended to better integrate the Department and
its employees to improve the performance of their mission. The
2SR plan included the formation of a Directorate of Policy to
serve as the primary Department-wide coordinator for policy,
regulations and other initiatives. The new policy office
assumed the functions previously performed by BTS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\220\ Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Secretary
Chertoff's Second Stage Review (July 13, 2005) (on file with
subcommittee). Very few documents were provided to Congress on the
Second Stage Review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee believes that DHS' 2SR reorganization may not
have gone far enough, and may need to be revisited. The
Department must address the problems created by the arbitrary
and increasingly unworkable divisions which still exist within
DHS between the bureaus of Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). As former CBP
Commissioner Robert Bonner said, separating ICE and CBP was
like separating the cops ``on the beat'' from their
detectives.\221\ And even more importantly, the division means
that neither ICE nor CBP, nor any other Federal agency, has a
border security strategy for inside and beyond the border--not
just at the land border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\221\ Jerry Seper, Bonner Pitches Merging Agencies, Washington
Times, Dec. 7, 2005 at http://washingtontimes.com/national/20051206-
105109-9990r.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department's own Inspector General has issued a report
calling for ICE and CBP to be put back together.\222\ The
committee believes that until the current organizational
structure is remedied, DHS will continue to operate with great
inefficiencies. Such inefficiencies are exemplified by the
breakdowns in; 1) coordination between apprehension, detention
and removal efforts; 2) coordination between interdiction and
investigative efforts; and 3) coordination of intelligence
activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\222\ DHS Office of Inspector General Report, OIG-06-04, (Nov.
2005) at http://www.mipt.org/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Congressional Responsiveness
The committee is very concerned about the apparent lack of
responsiveness on the part of DHS in providing information to
Congress in a timely fashion. DHS has a legal responsibility to
use due diligence in promptly responding to the legitimate
information requests of Congress. Specifically, when DHS makes
``major'' media announcements such as the 2SR event or the
recent Secure Border Initiative (SBI), there is frequently no
plan behind the media event. These media events should be
clearly premised by distinctively articulated and communicated
plans, with specific details, so that Congress can fully
understand how and where the Department intends to achieve its
advertised goals. The committee believes that DHS needs to
provide more strategic, internal management documents instead
of just generalizations tailored for public relations events.
Additionally, the committee is disappointed to report that
certain elements of the newly created DHS bureaucracy have
already distinguished themselves as major obstacles to
congressional oversight. Leading this list is DHS' Customs and
Border Protection program. The frequent and consistent lack of
responsiveness to congressional correspondence by this program
is cause for great concern and heightened scrutiny.
The apparent lack of strategic planning, coordination and
communication demonstrated as CBP reorganized its Air program
has grave implications. CBP Air's P-3 airplanes provide
essential maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and are crucial to the
Department's and the nation's efforts against drug trafficking
in the ``transit zone.'' \223\ They also perform other vital
homeland security missions, such as providing airspace
security. For these reasons, the committee is concerned about
the nature of the Department's commitment to maintain the
current level of operation of each of the sixteen P-3s.\224\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\223\ As Acting Assistant Commissioner, Charles E. Stallworth
testified, ``The backbone of CBP's efforts in support of transit zone
interdiction operations is our fleet of aging P-3 aircraft.'' See
Interrupting Narco-terrorist Threats on the High Seas: Do We Have
Enough Wind in Our Sails? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 29, 2005) (Statement of Charles E.
Stallworth, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air and Marine
Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29727.
\224\ Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform to CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner (Nov. 4, 2005) (on
file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Equally disturbing is the disregard CBP has for briefing
relevant congressional committees. The Government Reform
Committee's Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources has submitted frequent requests for information
regarding CBP Air strategic and recapitalization plans, and
only after frequent reminders has the Department
responded.\225\ The committee strongly recommends that DHS
renew efforts to properly update congressional offices on
relevant issues and developments. In addition, specifically in
reference to CBP, DHS needs to reestablish control of an
apparently troubled operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\225\ Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, to DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff (Nov. 30, 2005);
Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government
Reform, to Acting CBP Commissioner Deborah Spero (Dec. 20, 2005);
Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government
Reform to Acting CBP Commissioner Deborah Spero (Jan. 23, 2006) (on
file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources); Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform to DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff (Jan. 23, 2006) (on
file with Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement (CNE)
When Congress created DHS in 2002, it combined some of the
most important anti-drug trafficking agencies in the Federal
Government. To assist DHS in meeting its vital counterdrug
responsibilities, Congress originally created the
Counternarcotics Officer (CNO) position. The original law did
not clearly define how the CNO was to fulfill those duties, nor
did it give the CNO adequate status or resources to carry out
what Congress had envisioned. In order to correct these
problems, Congress passed legislation in 2004 that replaced the
CNO with a new Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement, headed
by a Director nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. \226\ The law authorized up to $6 million of the
Department's management funds for a dedicated budget for the
new Office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\226\ Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law
108-458, (2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee fully supports the administration's proposed
appropriation of $2.8 million for the CNE program in fiscal
year 2007, but is disappointed that there was no specific line
item in the budget request.\227\ The additional funding is
viewed as a positive indication that drug control remains a
priority within DHS. However, the committee recommends that
Congress specifically designate a line item for the Office of
Counternarcotics Enforcement in DHS appropriations legislation.
Adequate and specific funding will allow DHS CNE to hire
sufficient staff for the Office and provide critical internal
oversight for the Department's counternarcotics efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\227\ Department of Homeland Security, Budget in Brief, FY 2007,
(Feb. 2006) at 102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. United States Coast Guard
U.S. Coast Guard Drug Control Funding
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
USCG Drug Control Funding \228\ \229\ Final \230\ \231\ \232\
Requested Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*.................................. $822.3 $871.9 $972.7 $1,032.4 $1,030.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: Coast Guard Office of Public Affairs: 202-
267-1587, http://www.uscg.mil/USCG.shtm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\228\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\229\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\230\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\231\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\232\ Id.
The President's budget proposal includes $8.4 billion for
the U.S. Coast Guard, of which $1.03 billion is estimated to be
used for drug control. Like other DHS agencies, the Coast Guard
does not have a specific appropriation for drug interdiction
activities. The committee conditionally supports this year's
proposal which is approximately the same amount as provided for
drug control in fiscal year 2006. The committee believes the
administration's proposal to ``flat line'' the Coast Guard
budget may have a leveling effect on the Coast Guard's drug
interdiction removal rate and prevent the service from
achieving the administration's established performance
standards in the upcoming year.\233\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\233\ U.S. Coast Guard, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, (Feb., 2006) at
Appendix B, B-13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As highlighted by its response to Hurricane Katrina in
August and September of 2005, the Coast Guard has continued to
struggle to balance new missions with traditional ones as a
component within DHS. Moreover, a rapidly deteriorating fleet
of ships and aircraft and limited resources made proper
prioritization of the manifold missions of the Coast Guard
increasingly difficult.
Regarding competing mission interests, the committee also
is gravely concerned with the administration's decision,
highlighted in the 2007 proposed budget, to tap the Coast Guard
to assume the airborne security mission within the National
Capitol Region (NCR) surrounding Washington, DC.\234\ The
administration's proposed budget includes $62.4 million for the
Coast Guard to establish a permanent National Capital Region
Air Defense program.\235\ Specifically, the committee is very
concerned about the impact of this new NCR mission on existing
Coast Guard missions, and specifically, counterdrug patrols
utilizing armed helicopters in the transit zone. It is not
clear how the NCR airspace security mission should fall to the
Coast Guard within any of the traditional or expanded DHS
missions of the Coast Guard. Furthermore, no specific plan has
been divulged to Congress explaining how the proposed funding
($62.4 million) would provide the additional helicopters,
personnel and equipment necessary to adequately support the new
mission without significantly degrading existing mission areas,
including its critical work in the maritime transit zones.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\234\ Department of Homeland Security, Budget in Brief, FY 2007,
(Feb. 2006) at 53.
\235\ U.S. Coast Guard, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, (Feb. 2006) at
19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As shown in the diagram below, Coast Guard ``total''
resource hours devoted to counterdrug patrols since the
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 have steadily
declined.\236\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\236\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources staff budget summary briefing with U.S.
Coast Guard officials on Nov. 17, 2005, (on file with Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
The downward trend of Coast Guard resource hours supporting
the counterdrug mission is due to new post-9/11 operational
requirements, ongoing traditional missions such as search and
rescue and maritime safety, and the Coast Guard's rapidly
deteriorating inventory of aging cutters and aircraft.
As an example, the administration's 2007 budget proposal
includes plans to decommission two veteran ships, the 61 year-
old cutter STORIS and the 64 year-old cutter GENTIAN.\237\ The
STORIS, based in Kodiak, Alaska, will be replaced by the 35
year-old cutter MUNRO. Saddled with many Vietnam-era deepwater
cutters, the Coast Guard is challenged to perform its important
missions with aged and nearly obsolete equipment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\237\ U.S. Coast Guard, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, (Feb. 2006) at
10.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During fiscal years 2000 through 2004, the readiness rates
of the Coast Guard's older ships and aircraft showed a general
decline, although the rates fluctuated from year to year.\238\
For example, ships used to monitor drug trafficking activities
and carry the helicopters that disable and stop go-fast boats
were below their target levels for time free of major
deficiencies or loss of at least one primary mission. These
declines are directly linked to the rapidly deteriorating
mechanical readiness of its aged assets.\239\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\238\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 21; The
Coast Guard uses these assets to perform a variety of missions, such as
interdicting illicit drug shipments and illegal migrants or rescuing
mariners at sea.
\239\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources staff visit to Cutter GALLATIN (WMEC 721),
in Key West, Florida on Jan. 14, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The diagram above also shows an increasing seizure rate
beginning in 2003, resulting from several record years of
cocaine seizures. In 2005, the Coast Guard prevented a record
338,000 pounds of cocaine and more than 10,000 pounds of
marijuana from reaching the U.S.\240\ These outstanding results
were due to a combination of the Coast Guard utilizing new
tools such as armed ``HITRON'' helicopters and specialized law
enforcement detachments. Equally important, the record-setting
year was a result of increasing and improved inter-department
and inter-agency cooperation, as well as significantly improved
intelligence developed through Operation Panama Express and
Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\240\ U.S. Coast Guard, Budget in Brief, FY 2007, Feb. 2006,
Appendix B, B-12.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Director of JIATF-South has recently stated that there
continues to be more known actionable intelligence available
than there are surface and air assets available to
respond.\241\ The national drug interdiction community and the
Coast Guard need more surface and air assets to respond to this
growing supply of invaluable intelligence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\241\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources visit to JIATF-South, Key West, Florida, on
Jan. 12, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Coast Guard, although hampered by its aging assets, has
attempted to rise to the task. As the following statistics
show, the service is now dedicating more maritime patrol
aircraft (MPA) hours to drug interdiction missions since the 9/
11 terrorist attacks.\242\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\242\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources staff budget summary briefing with U.S.
Coast Guard officials on Nov. 17, 2005; Resource hours committed to the
drug interdiction mission include on-station hours spent on detection,
monitoring and interdiction operations, and also transit hours needed
for assets to get into position to begin operations.
U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Patrol Aircraft On-station Hours
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maritime
Fiscal Year Patrol
Aircraft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2001 \243\........................................... 1,889
FY 2002................................................. 997
FY 2003................................................. 1,410
FY 2004................................................. 2,721
FY 2005 \244\........................................... 2,780
------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the percentage of time the HC-130 maritime patrol
surveillance aircraft were available to perform missions was
below the target level in fiscal year 2004, and the surface
radar system on the aircraft is subject to frequent
failures.\245\ In some instances, mission flight crews had to
look out the windows of the aircraft for targets because the
radar systems were inoperable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\243\ Statistics provided in letter from Mary Beth Long, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics to Congressman Mark
Souder, chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources (July 13, 2005) (on file with Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
\244\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 15.
\245\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 21.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration and the Coast Guard have developed a
strategic plan to replace its legacy ships and aircraft. The
committee believes the Coast Guard's Deepwater fleet
modernization project is critical to U.S. transit zone drug
interdictions. However, the Coast Guard needs to develop an
aircraft that can effectively perform the MPA mission.
Consequently, the administration and DHS need to ensure they
are putting the right tools and equipment into the hands of
Coast Guard men and women so that they may continue to
effectively interdict drugs on the high seas and deliver the
maritime safety and security America deserves.
Program Assessment Rating
The committee is pleased to see improvements in the Coast
Guard's measures of performance, specifically regarding the
drug interdiction program. As briefed by Coast Guard officials,
the service has recently updated and aligned its measures with
ONDCP's established goals and leveraged improvements in
intelligence.\246\ The Coast Guard now measures drug
interdiction performance using a Removal Rate figure, as
opposed to the previously established Seizure Rate. The new
Removal Rate includes drugs seized, and also includes drugs
jettisoned, destroyed, or otherwise lost at sea, and is vetted
through an interagency group led by the U.S. Interdiction
Coordinator's (USIC) Consolidated Counterdrug database (CCDB).
Although there is great concern and debate regarding the
overall quantity of drugs smuggled through the transit zones,
the committee is pleased to see the Coast Guard's efforts to
measure its drug control performance against national
standards.\247\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\246\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources staff budget summary briefing with U.S.
Coast Guard officials on Nov. 17, 2005.
\247\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
ICE Drug Control Funding
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
ICE Drug Control Funding \248\ \249\ Final \250\ \251\ \252\
Requested Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*.................................. $575.8 $361.5 $453.3 $436.5 $477.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: ICE Office of Public Affairs: 202-514-
2648, http://www.ice.gov/graphics/index/htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\248\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\249\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\250\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\251\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\252\ Id.
The committee supports the President's request for ICE,
which is estimated by ONDCP to include $477.9 million for drug
control operations. This would be an increase of approximately
$42 million over the $436.5 million enacted for fiscal year
2006. This increase, however, needs to be actually utilized by
ICE to fulfill drug control responsibilities and not diverted
to other missions.
The committee is concerned about ICE's annual budgetary
shortfalls. The ongoing funding shortage has led to serious and
continuous operational difficulties in pursuing drug
investigations and other critical mission areas for the agency.
It is unclear how the proposed 2007 budget will resolve these
financial management issues, and allow ICE agents to fully
focus on DHS investigations.
Mission Alignment
The committee is concerned about the evolving missions of
ICE within DHS. It is very important that the ``front line''
officers of CBP and the Border Patrol have a clear and
effective relationship with the investigators of ICE.
Currently, despite being the largest investigative arm within
the Department, it is not evident that ICE has a clearly
established role as the lead investigative arm within DHS.
Although ICE officials have testified that the agency is
responsible for identifying and eliminating vulnerabilities at
our Nation's border, there appear to be several bureaucratic
obstacles predating the creation of DHS that prevent ICE from
effectively and consistently supporting the Department.\253\
Specifically, the role of ICE appears to vary in different
regions of the country because of non-uniform, out-dated
memoranda which have carried over from legacy U.S. Customs
Service and U.S. Border Patrol.\254\ Currently, some U.S.
Border Patrol drug seizures are turned over to the DEA and
others are turned over to ICE, depending upon where the seizure
occurs along the border. The fact that ICE and CBP are now
within the same Department should be reflected in standard
management protocols that eliminate circumstantially outdated
management techniques. The committee recommends DHS, ICE, CBP
and DEA move quickly to establish new protocols and procedures
for investigating all seizures at the border, be it illegal
immigrants, drugs or other illicit contraband. DHS's campaign
to establish ``one face at the border'' should be broadened to
include ``one investigator at the border.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\253\ See Threat Convergence Along the Border: How Does Drug
Trafficking Impact Our Borders? Hearing before the House Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 14, 2005) (Statement by John P.
Torres, Assistant Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement). At
http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29024.
\254\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources staff visit to Messina, NY, on Aug. 15,
2005, Detroit, MI, on Aug. 16, 2005, and Bellingham, WA, on Aug. 18,
2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Financial Investigations
As stated in the 2006 National Drug Control Strategy, the
lure of making large sums of cash is the main motivation that
drives drug trafficking.\255\ It is critically important that
U.S. law enforcement strategically target and seize moneys and
revenue resulting from the illicit drug trade. This will cause
a significant disruption to the supply of illegal drugs
entering the U.S. and is a major focus both of DHS, through
ICE, and the Department of Justice, through the OCDETF program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\255\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006)
at 32. At http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/
ndcs06/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nationally, ICE financial investigations have resulted in
the seizure of more than $477 million over the past three
fiscal years, with $100 million of that in bulk currency. Since
ICE was created in 2003, ICE arrests in financial
investigations, including those involving drug smuggling,
increased from 1,224 that year to 1,567 in FY 2005. The number
of indictments increased from 865 to 932 and the number of
convictions increased from 703 to 823. From FY 2003 to FY 2005,
ICE agents arrested 260 individuals for bulk cash smuggling
alone. In FY 2004, ICE agents seized nearly $159 million in
currency and monetary instruments and executed approximately
1,400 arrests for financial crimes, many directly related to
drug smuggling and drug money laundering activities.\256\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\256\ For additional information regarding Immigration and Customs
Enforcement financial investigations see http://www.ice.gov/graphics/
cornerstone/index.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICE has introduced a number of new initiatives aimed at
analyzing and combating the movement of illicit funds by bulk
cash smuggling, trade-based money laundering, courier hubs,
money service businesses, charities, and alternative remittance
systems. Some of these initiatives, highlighted in the U.S.
Money Laundering Threat Assessment, include the creation of a
trade transparency unit, the creation of a foreign political
task force, and a multi-agency approach designed to target
unlicensed money service businesses that are involved in
utilizing money transmitters to wire illicit drug proceeds to
recipients in foreign countries.\257\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\257\ U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment, (Dec. 2005) at I. At
http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/4/480215.pdf (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee fully supports the efforts of ICE to
coordinate DHS financial investigations. For this reason, it is
important that ICE investigators be closely integrated into all
drug and money seizures along the border by the U.S. Border
Patrol and CBP officers. As Custom and Border Protection's
Director of Drug Interdiction, Greg Passic, testified before
the Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources, ``Nothing is more worthless . . .
than a load of dope that doesn't belong to anybody.'' \258\
Investigators are the critical link in establishing connections
between random drug seizures at the border and trafficking
networks. The committee believes it is vitally important that
all CBP seizures along the border be coordinated with ICE
investigators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\258\ See Threat Convergence Along the Border: How Does Drug
Trafficking Impact Our Borders? Hearing before the House Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 14, 2005) (Statement by Gregory
Passic, Director of Drug Interdiction, Custom and Border Protection).
At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICE coordination with OCDETF and DEA investigators is also
paramount to a unified, effective strategy to disrupt drug
supply revenues. Last year ICE's Deputy Assistant Director,
John Torres, testified that ICE does not currently participate
in the OCDETF Drug Fusion Center because of pre-existing legal
hurdles dealing with immigration and proprietary commercial
business relations.\259\ The committee fully supports ICE's
pending partnership in the OCDETF Drug Fusion Center.\260\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\259\ See Threat Convergence Along the Border: How Does Drug
Trafficking Impact Our Borders? Hearing before the House Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (June 14, 2005) (Statement by John P.
Torres, Assistant Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement). At
http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=29024.
\260\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources staff budget summary briefing with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials on Dec. 9, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Drug Investigations
Like the Coast Guard, ICE has struggled to re-balance its
counterdrug resources to sustainable levels since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. ICE agents are tasked with
conducting investigations of persons and events subject to the
administrative and criminal provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act. Although ICE continues to enforce U.S. drug
laws, primarily with a nexus to the border, investigative
resources are lacking due to the expanded responsibilities of
immigration enforcement.
The role of ICE as the primary criminal immigration
enforcement agency is critical to the nation's national
security. ICE has continued to increase its apprehensions of
criminal aliens while, at the same time, increasing its
seizures of narcotics. In 2003, DHS agents and officers
apprehended 1,046,422 aliens. DHS removed 186,151 aliens in FY
2003. This was an increase of approximately 36,067 from FY
2002.\261\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\261\ For additional Immigration and Customs Enforcement background
information and statistics see http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/
statistics/yearbook/2003/2003ENF.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2004, DHS agents and officers apprehended an estimated
1,241,098 foreign nationals and removed 88,897 criminal aliens
from the United States. Approximately 33,367 or 37.5 percent of
the criminal aliens removed in 2004 were for dangerous
drugs.\262\ In 2003, DHS agents and officers removed 79,395
criminal aliens, an 11 percent increase from FY 2002.
Approximately 31,352 or 39 percent of the criminal aliens
removed in 2003 were for dangerous drugs.\263\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\262\ Id.
\263\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In FY 2003, ICE completed 82,236 immigration-related
criminal investigations, an increase of 3,395 from the previous
year.\264\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\264\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee is very concerned about the apparent downward
trend in resources committed to drug investigations due to the
increased demand of immigration investigations. The committee
recommends that DHS and ICE take the necessary corrective
actions to ensure DHS' investigators at ICE have the proper
resources to keep drug investigations a top priority at the
border.
Program Assessment Rating
The ICE Office of Investigations received an ``adequate''
rating in the administration's Performance Assessment Rating
Tool (PART) process.\265\ The ICE Office of Investigations had
43.8 percent of their cases result in an enforcement
consequence (arrest, indictment, conviction, seizure, fine or
penalty). The committee hopes that ICE will continue to make
progress in its performance measurement system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\265\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
CBP Drug Control Funding
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
CBP Drug Control Funding \266\ \267\ Final \268\ \269\ \270\
Requested Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*.................................. $1,121.4 $1,429 $1,510.9 $1,591 $1,796.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: CBP Office of Public Affairs: 202-344-
1770, http://www.cbp.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\266\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\267\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\268\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\269\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\270\ Id.
The committee supports the President's request for $1.8
billion for counterdrug activities at Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), which is a sizeable increase over the $1.6
billion enacted in fiscal year 2006. That support, however, is
conditioned on the expectation that such funds will actually be
used for counterdrug purposes. As discussed previously, most of
these funds are not actually designated for counterdrug
purposes; instead they are merely estimates of how much time
and how many resources the three ``frontline forces'' at CBP--
U.S. Border Patrol, Air and Marine Program and Office of Field
Operations--will spend on counterdrug activities.
A significant portion of the increase to the drug budget
for CBP, $152 million, is to support the Secure Border
Initiative (SBI). The total increase for the SBI initiative,
which includes drug and non-drug funding, is $639 million. Most
of the SBI program comes in the form of new Border Patrol
agents, and technology and assets designed for border
operations. However, almost all of the Border Patrol's drug
seizures occur at checkpoints on the highways behind the ports
of entry. In other words, the new assets for Border Patrol
aren't primarily intended for the places where Border Patrol
agents actually seize drugs. The committee is concerned that
the only reason the administration's ``drug budget'' shows an
increase is because of these broad and often inaccurate
assumptions regarding drug budget assets and activities. The
committee strongly recommends the administration refine its
drug budget methodology so that drug control funds will
actually be used for drug control purposes.
The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) combines
the port of entry inspectors of the legacy Customs Service and
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as well as the
Department of Agriculture's port of entry inspectors, the U.S.
Border Patrol, and the Air and Marine Operations (AMO) division
of legacy Customs. The Customs inspectors, AMO aviators and
boat operators, and Border Patrol agents are crucial to our
drug interdiction and enforcement efforts. The committee is
very concerned that drugs remain a priority at CBP as the
agency vigorously attempts to ``take control of the border.''
CBP Air and Marine Operations
The President's budget includes $276 million for Operations
and Maintenance for CBP's Air and Marine Operations program
(CBP Air). It is not clear what percentage of the operations
and maintenance budget will be dedicated to support counterdrug
missions. The committee is concerned that the administration's
proposal will not be sufficient to cover CBP Air's current
commitments in the ``source'' zones of South America, in the
transit zones, and along the northern border.
The 2007 proposed budget also includes $61.3 million for
the procurement of 30 small helicopters to support the Secure
Border Initiative (SBI).\271\ The committee believes that the
SBI is a worthwhile effort to control the land borders, but it
should not come at the expense of CBP withdrawing from the
counterdrug mission. It is unclear how the administration's
budget will support the operations, maintenance and upgrades
for CBP Air's fleet of P-3 maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). The
CBP P-3 aircraft provide essential maritime patrol coverage and
as such are crucial to the administration's efforts against
drug trafficking in the transit zone. The committee strongly
recommends the administration and CBP remain committed to the
counterdrug mission and continue to provide and support CBP's
drug interdiction aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\271\ Customs and Border Protection, Budget in Brief, FY 2007,
(Feb. 2006) at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, CBP's Air and Marine Operations Center
(AMOC), the agency's primary tracking and monitoring facility
located in Riverside, California, remains undermanned and
underutilized.\272\ With the personnel shortfalls, AMOC
managers must selectively choose what radar feeds to monitor,
leaving the nation vulnerable in the sectors that AMOC cannot
watch. Additionally, with the development of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAV), AMOC can perform an important role in the
command, control and coordination for UAV operations within the
Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\272\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources visit to CBP's Air and Marine Operations
Center (AMOC), Riverside, CA, on Mar. 29, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In December 2005, CBP stated that all CBP air assets will
be tracked by AMOC in the very near future.\273\ The AMOC is a
unique tool which, if used properly, can provide crucial
operational and safety information to all CBP and Department
units, especially as DHS operations intensify along the
Southwest Border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\273\ Letter from Thaddeus Bingel, Assistant Commissioner, Customs
and Border Protection, to Mark Souder, chairman, the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, (Dec. 28, 2005) (on file with Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the statistics below demonstrate, and as discussed
previously, CBP Air plays a critical role in providing air
detection and interdiction support to drug control programs,
both domestically and internationally. The Director of the
Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South) recently
emphasized that there continues to be more actionable
intelligence available than there are surface and air assets
available to respond.\274\ As a result, the national drug
interdiction community needs more maritime patrol aircraft
(MPA) to respond to the growing supply of invaluable
intelligence. The committee recommends CBP Air continue to
fully support all international and MPA missions in the transit
zones to both support JIATF-South's actionable intelligence and
continue to directly promote record cocaine seizures on the
high seas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\274\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources visit to JIATF-South on Jan. 12, 2006.
Customs and Border Protection Maritime Patrol Aircraft On-station Hours
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maritime
Fiscal Year Patrol
Aircraft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2001 \275\........................................... 1,771
FY 2002................................................. 2,367
FY 2003................................................. 2,300
FY 2004................................................. 4,654
FY 2005 \276\........................................... 4,385
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee has grave concerns about the apparent lack of
replacement or modernization plans for the aging air fleet
found within the CBP. It is not clear what steps the program or
DHS are taking to ensure continued support to counterdrug
missions. We recommend that the Department closely evaluate
current agency modernization proposals and submit
recommendations to Congress that will maintain critical air
capabilities. Without these capabilities, U.S. efforts to
combat terrorism and illegal drug movement in the source,
transit, and arrival zones, provide law enforcement support,
and perform other air security missions would be severely
hindered and threaten national security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\275\ Statistics provided in letter from Mary Beth Long, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, to Congressman
Mark Souder, chairman, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy,
and Human Resources (July 13, 2005) (on file with Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
\276\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP Air and Marine Operations--Reorganization
Regardless of the status of the proposed ICE and CBP
merger, it is critically important to the National Drug Control
Strategy that the fixed wing aircraft of the CBP Air program
continue to support U.S. and Allied nation interdiction efforts
in the transit zones. Fiscal year 2005 was another record year
of cocaine seizures in the transit zones, and the CBP P-3
aircraft played a critical and necessary role in the detection
and monitoring of smuggling vessels and further directing Coast
Guard ships and helicopters towards their drug-laden targets.
Last year the committee applauded DHS' efforts to
consolidate aviation and marine assets by merging the Border
Patrol's air and marine program with the legacy U.S. Customs
Service Air and Marine Operations (AMO) program. The merger was
intended to help consolidate the operation, training,
maintenance, and procurement of these high-value/low density
law enforcement assets.
The committee's enthusiasm was misplaced. It appears that
the drug interdiction mission has suffered as a result of the
merger. The AMO program has historically been responsible for
interdicting drug-smuggling airplanes and ``go-fast'' speed
boats, supporting Customs drug investigations and raids (as
well as migrant interdictions), providing airspace security in
the nation's Capital (and at special events like the Olympics),
and for providing critical maritime patrol aircraft, most
notably the fleet of P-3 radar planes, for drug interdiction
operations in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific.
Today, however, CBP is attempting to transfer control of
most of AMO's operations to individual sector chiefs of the
Border Patrol. While the AMO program is responsible for
supporting Border Patrol missions, that is only one of its
traditional duties. However, despite the diversion of AMO
assets from drug interdiction activities, no proposal from CBP
has been forthcoming to address or replace the critical
aircraft. The committee feels it is unwise for CBP to take such
a vital national asset and ``regionalize'' it. That model did
not serve the old Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
well, and it will not serve DHS or the country well.
To solve this problem, the committee recommends that DHS
re-establish AMO with a clearly defined interdiction mission in
the transit zone requiring both air support for ICE and CBP,
and continuing to provide traditional MPA detection to the
international, interagency effort led by JIATF-South. AMO
should remain a truly national program, accountable both to the
Secretary and to Congress for its crucial missions.
7. U.S. Border Patrol
There are over 11,000 Border Patrol agents that are
assigned the mission of detecting and apprehending any illegal
entrants between the ports-of-entry along the United States
land borders. These illegal entries include alien and drug
smugglers, potential terrorists, wanted criminals, and persons
seeking to avoid inspection at the designated ports of entry.
The committee has deep concerns about the level of
commitment of all sectors of the Border Patrol to the drug
interdiction mission. In many sectors, the Border Patrol
appears to be far more focused on illegal migrant interdiction
than stopping drug traffickers. Moreover, the Border Patrol's
willingness to cooperate with other law enforcement agencies on
drug investigations and operations leaves room for improvement.
Stopping illegal immigration is certainly a vital mission of
the Border Patrol. If, however, the Border Patrol is going to
be the primary agency responsible for protecting our nation's
land borders, it must take a more active role not only in
conducting its own drug interdiction operations, but in
supporting the border-related drug investigations of other
agencies as well.
As noted above, former CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner
recently said that separating ICE and CBP was like separating
the cops ``on the beat'' from their detectives.\277\ Currently,
some Border Patrol drug seizures are turned over to the DEA,
and others are turned over to ICE. The fact that CBP and ICE
are now both within DHS should be reflected in updated
procedures and protocols. The current divisions between ICE and
the U.S. Border Patrol mean that neither CBP nor ICE, nor any
other Federal agency, has a border security strategy for inside
and beyond the border.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\277\ Jerry Seper, Bonner Pitches Merging Agencies, Washington
Times, Dec. 7, 2005, at http://washingtontimes.com/national/20051206-
105109-9990r.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shadow Wolves Customs Patrol Officers
The committee has grave concerns about the status of the
last remaining unit of Customs Patrol Officers patrolling the
border, the ``Shadow Wolves'' unit that works on the 76-mile
stretch of the Mexico-Arizona border contained in the Tohono
O'odham sovereign Indian Nation. The Shadow Wolves are all
Native Americans, who combine traditional tracking methods and
modern technology to find, follow, and arrest drug traffickers.
The Shadow Wolves have historically been one of our nation's
most effective drug enforcement units, seizing over 100,000
pounds of narcotics annually, with only 15 agents.
The Shadow Wolves were a part of the U.S. Customs Service
until March 2003, when DHS assigned them to CBP, which in turn
placed them under the control of the Border Patrol. Border
Patrol management has not been successful, as the missions,
priorities, and methods of the two groups are substantially
distinct. Only 15 of the 21 Shadow Wolves agents in uniform in
2003 are still active, and there is a serious risk that the
rest will retire or move to other employers if the problems are
not addressed. The Border Patrol itself has reportedly asked
that the unit be transferred to another agency.
The committee agrees that the Shadow Wolves should be moved
to another agency within DHS. Two possible new ``homes'' for
the unit are the Office of Air and Marine Operations (AMO) at
CBP, or the Office of Investigations at ICE. Both of these
units worked very successfully with the Shadow Wolves prior to
2003 (when they were all part of the Customs Service). The
committee may pursue legislation to address this problem if DHS
is unwilling or unable to take the initiative.
Program Assessment Rating
The overall CBP drug control program has not been reviewed
under the administration's Program Assessment Rating Tool
(PART) process. However, the Office of Border Patrol, found
within CBP, received a ``Results not Demonstrated'' rating from
the PART process due to a lack of suitable outcome measures for
the agency. A November 2005 GAO report noted that ``CBP is
developing performance measures related to operational
readiness rates (a measure of its ability to responds when
requested), but these rates are not specific to transit zones
or to counternarcotics activities and do not measure results.''
\278\ The committee recommends that CBP take prompt action to
develop an effective performance management tool for its
counterdrug programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\278\ Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines in
Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures for
Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005) at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
The Department of Justice is home to some of the most
important drug control agencies and programs in the Federal
Government. As our nation's primary law enforcement agency, its
efforts are crucial to the struggle to reduce drug trafficking
and abuse. Moreover, the grant programs it administers--which
assist state and local agencies with everything from
investigations to drug treatment for prisoners--are vital to
Federal, state, and local coordination and cooperation on drug
policy.
Contact Information: Department of Justice Office of Public
Affairs: 202-514-2007, http://www.usdoj.gov.
1. Assistance to State and Local Law Enforcement
Methamphetamine-Related Assistance (COPS Meth Hot Spots)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
COPS Meth Hot Spots \279\ \280\ Final \281\ \282\ \283\
Requested Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*.................................. $20 $52.6 $20 $63.59 $40.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: COPS Office: 202-616-1728, http://
www.cops.usdoj.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\279\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\280\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\281\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\282\ White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget
Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\283\ Id.
The committee has ongoing concerns about the proposed
reduction in funds (administered by the Department of Justice's
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) office) dedicated
to law enforcement activities against methamphetamine
trafficking. Methamphetamine abuse has ravaged communities
across the United States and put severe strains on state and
local enforcement agencies forced to find clandestine drug
labs, clean up the environmental damage they create, protect
the citizens who assist law enforcement, \284\ and arrest the
drug trafficking rings that operate them. To assist these
overburdened agencies, Congress approved $63,590,000 for fiscal
year 2006 (up from $52,556,000 in fiscal year 2005) for
policing initiatives to combat methamphetamine production and
trafficking and to enhance policing initiatives in ``drug hot
spots.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\284\ See How Can the Federal Government Support Local and State
Initiatives to Protect Citizens and Communities Against Drug-Related
Violence and Witness Intimidation? Hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (May 2, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=26376 .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration has increased its request for the
program from only $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2006 to
$40,084,000 for fiscal year 2007. As in previous years,
however, the administration is still only requesting funds for
the DEA-administered fund that reimburses state and local
agencies for the costs of cleaning up toxic meth lab sites.
Thus, the administration again proposes to eliminate the
remaining ``Meth Hot Spots'' funding for other anti-meth
enforcement activities--which Congress has always spent in the
form of specific earmarks for designated projects.
The committee fully supports the DEA reimbursement fund and
commends the administration for proposing to increase it. The
committee also believes, however, that Congress and the
administration need to work together to restore and reform the
additional Hot Spots funding. The proposed elimination of the
rest of the ``Meth Hot Spots'' funding would greatly reduce the
ability of affected state and local law enforcement agencies to
help their Federal partners in reducing methamphetamine abuse,
particularly given the proposed overall reduction in other
state and local law enforcement assistance grants.
It should be noted, however, that Congress itself needs to
take steps to ensure that Federal assistance is targeted to the
most affected areas of the country. Excessive ``earmarking'' of
these funds undermines their efficiency. Although many states
and communities suffer from methamphetamine trafficking and
abuse, Federal dollars are limited and must be directed to the
areas where they will make the most difference from a national
point of view. The committee urges Congress and the
administration to work together in finding ways to address this
issue.
2. Prescription Drug Monitoring Program
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program FY 2005 \285\ Final \286\ \287\ \288\
Requested Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*.................................. $0 $9.9 $5.0 $7.4 $9.919
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: Department of Bureau of Justice
Assistance: 202-616-6500, http://www.usdoj.gov/BJA/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\285\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\286\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\287\ White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007 Budget
Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\288\ Id.
The committee also has concerns about the continuing
reductions in funding for a prescription drug monitoring
program. For fiscal year 2006, Congress approved $7,500,000 for
this program--but that was itself a 25 percent cut from 2005
funding. This year, the administration has requested only
$9,919,000--about two-thirds of fiscal year 2005's appropriated
level.
Prescription drug abuse is a serious and growing problem
throughout the United States, as illustrated by the recent wave
of OxyContin and other oxycodone-related overdoses. In fact,
according to the Monitoring the Future survey of drug abuse
among high school students, prescription drugs were the only
drugs that showed an increase in student use in 2005.\289\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\289\ See Press Release, Meth And Steroid Use Decline Sharply Among
Youth; Overall Youth Drug Use Down Again, ONDCP (Dec. 19, 2005) at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/news/press05/121905.html. (last
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One major difficulty facing Federal, State and local law
enforcement agencies in dealing with this threat is the lack of
sufficient information about how these drugs are being diverted
from their proper medical uses to illegal trafficking and
abuse.\290\ The Federal Government needs to continue work on
the establishment of a monitoring system that would track
supplies of prescription drugs and give law enforcement
officials more information about illegal diversion.\291\ A
truly effective program will require more, not less, financial
assistance from the Federal Government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\290\ See To Do No Harm: Strategies for Preventing Prescription
Drug Abuse: Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th
Cong. (Feb. 9, 2004). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=10843.
\291\ See Hearing before the Institute of Medicine's Committee on
the Assessment of the U.S. Drug Safety System, 109th Cong. (2005)
(statement by J. Marc Wheat, staff director of the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources) at
www.reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
Byrne Memorial Grant FY 2005 FY 2005 \292\ \293\ \294\
Requested Final Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*.................................. $508 $634 $0 $416.5 $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
The committee opposes the administration's renewed proposal
to terminate the state formula grants portion of the Edward
Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant program. Congress
appropriated only $416,478,000 for the formula Byrne Grants for
fiscal year 2006, down from $634,000,000 for fiscal year
2005.\295\ The administration has again asked Congress to
eliminate it entirely and restrict Federal assistance for state
and local law enforcement programs to a series of enumerated
grants (most of which are previously existing programs) under a
``Justice Assistance'' account. In practice, this will sharply
limit the amount of money available to help state and local
agencies.\296\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\292\ 2005 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
2006, Appendix, 706.
\293\ 2006 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
2007, Appendix, 708.
\294\ Id.
\295\ Note that in addition to this funding for the Byrne state
formula grants, Congress also appropriated $191,704,000 for the so-
called Byrne ``discretionary grants''--the vast majority of which is
earmarked in the appropriations bill for specific projects.
\296\ The Byrne Formula Grant Program was created by the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988 (Public Law 100-690). One-half of the appropriated
funds are to be awarded to the states based on their relative
populations, while the other half is to be awarded on the basis of the
violent crime rates in the states.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration's proposed reduction appears to reflect,
in additional to fiscal constraints, a concern about excessive
Federal subsidization of law enforcement at the state and local
level. The Federal treasury is not infinite and simply cannot
pay for law enforcement at all levels and in every area.
Moreover, choices about how much to spend on law enforcement in
a state or community are, properly, choices that should be made
at the state or local level--and the responsibility of paying
for those choices should also remain at that level. Excessive
subsidization of state and local law enforcement by the Federal
Government may lead to inefficiency and imbalance in our
overall law enforcement strategy.
The committee shares those concerns, but the
administration's drastic proposed cuts would create massive
shortfalls in the budgets of state and local law enforcement
agencies across the country. Numerous state and local officials
have informed the committee members and staff that many
programs--particularly drug enforcement programs--within states
would have to be shut down if all Byrne Grant and similar
funding were cut off.\297\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\297\ See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne Grant,
HIDTA and Other Law Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing Federal,
State and Local Cooperation? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=23722.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that Federal
support for state and local efforts lacks national impact.
Particularly in the area of drug enforcement, state and local
participation is vital to our national success. State and local
agencies make more than 95 percent of arrests of drug
violators.\298\ Collectively, they have far more personnel and
resources than does the Federal Government. Federal support for
these agencies can have a very positive national impact if it
helps involve them as partners in the fight against drug
trafficking and other criminal activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\298\ Crime in the United States 2002, 2002 U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Report, sec. IV at http:/
/www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius--02/pdf/02crime.pdf. (last visited on
Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration should instead propose reforms, where
needed, to some of the Federal Government's assistance grants.
Specifically, legislation may be needed to help the Federal
Government collect more data about how these grants are being
used and to make them more accountable. Such reform proposals
should be accompanied by a comprehensive plan for how, and for
what specific purposes, future Federal assistance to state and
local law enforcement should be provided. Without such a plan,
the proposed massive reductions lack a complete and coherent
justification and leave the programs vulnerable to continued
earmarking and potential misallocation of funds.
4. Regional Information Sharing System \299\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\299\ For further information on the RISS program, see the program
website at http://www.rissinfo.com/, or call the Justice Department
RISS program manager at (202) 616-7829.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
RISS \300\ \301\ Final \302\ \303\ \304\
Requested Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*.................................. $45.0 $39.5 $45.0 $40.2 $39.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: Justice Department RISS Program Manager:
202-616-7829, http://www.rissinfo.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\300\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\301\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\302\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\303\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\304\ Id.
The committee supports the administration's request for
$39,676,000 for the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS),
only a 1 percent reduction from the $40,233,000 appropriated
for fiscal year 2006. The committee believes that RISS, which
facilitates electronic, computerized sharing of intelligence
and information among Federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies, is an important tool in the fight against drug
trafficking and other organized crime.
The committee does question, however, why the
administration has included the entire RISS budget request in
the Drug Budget Summary, though the system is not exclusively
intended or used for drug enforcement. It would be more
accurate to estimate the percentage used for drug enforcement
activities and include only that estimated portion in the drug
budget. If the entire RISS budget is included in the drug
budget, then it is unclear why none of the COPS grant funds are
included.
5. Weed and Seed Program
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
Weed & Seed Program \305\ \306\ Final \307\ \308\ \309\
Requested Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*.................................. $58.3 $61.2 $59.6 $48.6 $49.3
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
The committee supports the administration's request for
$49,348,000 for the Weed and Seed Program, only a 1 percent
reduction from the $50,000,000 appropriated by Congress for
fiscal year 2006. The Weed and Seed Program is an important
initiative designed to help state and local law enforcement
agencies work with members of the local community to
investigate and prosecute violent criminals and drug offenders,
helping to clean up our nation's streets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\305\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\306\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\307\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\308\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\309\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PART review rated this program as ``adequate,'' and the
committee is further encouraged by the fact that the
performance measures selected for the program included real
results--the percent reduction in homicides. The committee
believes, however, that the performance measures for the
program should also include the percent reduction in drug
crimes or drug availability in funded areas. The program was
not intended solely to reduce violent crimes but also drug
crimes, and it should be reviewed on both criteria.
The committee also believes that ONDCP should (as with some
other programs administered by the Department of Justice)
estimate the percentage of funds dedicated to illegal drug
control and include only that part in the drug budget.
Including the entire program in the drug budget is inaccurate
and undermines the ability of Congress to review how much of
the program's resources is being dedicated to drug control.
6. Drug Court Program
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
Drug Court Program \310\ \311\ Final \312\ \313\ \314\
Requested Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*.................................. $70.1 $39.5 $70.1 $10.0 $69.2
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
The committee supports the administration's request for
$69,186,000 for the drugs courts program, a significant
increase over the $10,000,000 actually appropriated by Congress
for fiscal year 2006. The drug courts program assists state and
local governments to establish alternatives to prosecution for
low-level drug offenders. Typically, a state or local agency
will offer a person facing drug charges the option of entering
a drug treatment program. If the defendant successfully
completes the program and avoids being rearrested for a period
thereafter, the drug charges will be dropped. The drug court
concept is praised by law enforcement officers, judges, and
addiction specialists throughout the country and shows a great
deal of promise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\310\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\311\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\312\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\313\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\314\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee is concerned that the ever-shrinking amounts
appropriated by Congress for this program jeopardize the
continued success of drug courts. The committee notes that
while drug court programs are likely to continue at the state
and local level, Federal assistance has two beneficial effects.
First, the financial assistance allows more drug offenders to
benefit from them. Second, and perhaps even more important, by
attaching conditions to the funding, Congress can help ensure
that they meet minimum quality standards. Without funding,
Congress has little leverage to ensure that these programs
achieve national goals.
In light of the most recent PART review (2002) of the
program, which found ``results not demonstrated,'' \315\ the
administration must take steps to improve the program's
accountability and performance management. The committee is
encouraged that, according to the latest PART review, the
Department has been able to improve grantees' reporting of
results. The committee also notes that, unlike many prevention
programs, the drug courts program is not simply defining
performance in terms of program expansion (i.e., the simple
number of drug courts in existence) but in terms of actual
results (i.e., the re-arrest rate of program participants).
This is a positive development that will hopefully be expanded,
not simply within this program but in other prevention and
treatment initiatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\315\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy (Feb. 2006)
at 86. At http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/
ndcs06/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee has previously stated its belief that the
drug courts program should monitor not simply the re-arrest
rate of program participants but their drug use as well.\316\
Ideally, convicts should be sentenced to drug abstinence, not
just drug treatment. A vigorous, mandatory system of drug
testing should be applied in every drug court case to ensure
that program participants are staying off of drugs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\316\ Committee on Government Reform Report, The National Drug
Control Strategy for 2005 and the National Drug Control Budget for
Fiscal Year 2006, H. Rept. 109-172, (2005) at 47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee acknowledges, however, that there are
practical and (potentially) legal limits on what drug court
programs can achieve in this regard. First, as a practical
matter, drug court programs have little ability to monitor a
participant's behavior after the participant has completed the
drug treatment program. Whether a participant has been re-
arrested is fairly easy to keep track of (provided the
participant does not move outside the drug court program's
jurisdiction). Drug use that does not result in re-arrest,
however, would require drug testing to monitor. Besides being
expensive, such after-completion drug testing likely would face
constitutional hurdles. Unlike parolees or probationers, who
(as convicts) may be required to submit to random drug tests,
those who complete drug court programs have not been convicted
of a crime. It is possible that the courts would hold that the
Fifth Amendment bars such post-program drug testing.
Given the difficulties associated with long-term, post-
completion drug testing of drug court participants, the
committee instead makes two recommendations. First, it is
imperative that the treatment required by a drug court program
be of sufficient duration to ensure its effectiveness. Second,
any treatment program should require multiple, random drug
tests, with serious and graduated consequences for participants
who fail them. The House recently passed legislation that would
mandate such testing for drug court programs receiving Federal
funding, and the committee urges the Senate to enact it into
law.\317\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\317\ See Conference Report to accompany H.R. 3199 (U.S.A. Patriot
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005), H. Rept. 109-333, Sec.
751 (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (RSAT) Program
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
RSAT \318\ \319\ Final \320\ \321\ \322\
Requested Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*.................................. $76.1 $24.7 $44.1 $10 $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
The committee opposes the administration's proposal to
terminate all funding for the RSAT program. The committee is
particularly disappointed with the administration's loss of
commitment to providing drug treatment for state and local
prisoners. Last year the administration requested $44,119,000
for the program, and only two years ago it requested
$76,054,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\318\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\319\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\320\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\321\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\322\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is regrettable that Congress continues to slash funds
for this program (appropriating only $10,000,000 for fiscal
year 2006), which is intended to support drug treatment for
prisoners in state and local prison systems.\323\ Most of our
nation's drug offenders are incarcerated in state or local
prisons. Moreover, most of these prisoners are the kind of low-
level offenders who would benefit most from drug treatment. (By
contrast, those in the Federal prisons are typically major drug
traffickers whose primary motive was most likely greed, rather
than the simple need to obtain more drugs to feed addiction.)
The committee is concerned that the administration's reduced
requests may accelerate Congress's shrinking commitment to drug
treatment in the prisons and jails.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\323\ Congressional cuts in this program need to be understood in
the context of the administration's overall drug budget proposal for
fiscal year 2006, which attempted to force through severe cuts in drug
control programs. Though Congress was able to restore some of that
funding, not all of it could be preserved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee believes that support for the program would
be increased if the administration took steps to improve
performance measurement for RSAT. The program's last PART
review found ``results not demonstrated,'' and it was clear
that the performance measures identified for the program--
namely the numbers of prisoners treated under the program, and
the cost per prisoner--address only the size and functioning of
the program, not its end result. Performance measures should be
developed to determine how effective the treatment provided
under the program is, not simply how much it costs or how much
is provided. Greater attention needs to be paid to monitoring
the actual positive results of RSAT grants.
8. Southwest Border Prosecutor Initiative
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
Southwest Border Prosecutor Initiative \324\ \325\ Final \326\ \327\ \328\
Requested Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*.................................. $48.4 $29.6 $48.4 $30.0 $29.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
The committee has concerns about the administration's
request for only $29,757,000 for the Southwest Border
Prosecutor Initiative, which is intended to reimburse state and
local prosecutors in border areas for the increase in local
crime from border activities (namely, drug and people smuggling
from Mexico). That would be a significant decrease from the
$48,418,000 requested for fiscal year 2006 and a slight
decrease from the $30,000,000 actually appropriated by
Congress. The committee hopes that the reduced request does not
reflect a reduced commitment on the part of the administration
to helping communities overburdened by cross-border drug
trafficking and other crime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\324\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\325\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\326\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\327\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\328\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee believes that (in accordance with
congressional intent) the program's funds should be directed
towards border-related crime--not simply general crimes
committed in the border area. Information provided by the
Department to the staff of the Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources indicates that only a
quarter (at most) of the program's funds is dedicated to drug
offenses, and none to immigration offenses.\329\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\329\ Dept. of Justice budget briefing for Staff of Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, (Dec. 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To be sure, the heavy drug and immigration caseload borne
by Federal prosecutors in border regions may indirectly
increase the ``general crime'' caseload of state agencies--
since Federal prosecutors may not be able to take on as many
non-drug or non-immigration cases in those areas. Nevertheless,
the committee believes that such a low percentage of drug cases
calls the program's justification into question. Moreover, it
calls into question the administration's decision to include
the entire program budget request in the Drug Budget Summaries
of recent years, distorting the true picture of Federal
counter-drug activities.
9. Prisoner Re-entry Initiative
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2006 FY 2007
Prisoner Re-entry Initiative FY 2005 FY 2005 \330\ FY 2006 \331\
Requested Final Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*.................................. $-- $-- $15 $3.0 $14.9
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
The committee supports the administration's request for
$14,879,000 for a prisoner re-entry initiative, designed to
assist faith and community-based organizations in their
services to prisoners preparing to reintegrate into society
after incarceration. The committee hopes that Congress will
improve on the only $3,000,000 approved for these kinds of
programs for fiscal year 2006 (as part of the appropriation for
the Federal prison system).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\330\ 2005 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
2006, Appendix, 704.
\331\ 2006 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
2007, Appendix, 706.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee held a hearing on this issue last year \332\
and was provided information about the significant
accomplishments of faith and community-based organizations in
the field of prisoner re-entry services.\333\ The committee
believes that this proposal would be further strengthened by
authorizing legislation from the Congress that protects the
rights of faith and community-based organizations. Legislation
of that kind would better define the program's goals and
methods of implementation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\332\ See Confronting Recidivism: Prisoner Re-entry Programs and a
Just Future for All Americans, Hearing before House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 2, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=21850.
\333\ Id, (testimony of Pat Nolan, president of Justice
Fellowship).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Cannabis Eradication Program
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
Cannabis Eradication Program FY 2005 FY 2005 \334\ \335\ \336\
Requested Final Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*.................................. $0 $0 $20.0 $5.0 $10.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
The committee has concerns about the administration's
request for only $10,713,000 for the Cannabis Eradication
Program. Only a year ago, the administration requested nearly
twice as much ($19,100,000)--although it should be noted that
even this year's request is twice as much as Congress actually
appropriated for fiscal year 2006 (only $5,000,000).\337\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\334\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\335\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\336\ Id.
\337\ Congressional cuts in this program need to be understood in
the context of the administration's overall drug budget proposal for
fiscal year 2006, which attempted to force through severe cuts in drug
control programs. Though Congress was able to restore some of that
funding, not all of it could be preserved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Led by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the
Cannabis Eradication Program organizes joint Federal, state,
and local enforcement actions to stop domestic marijuana
cultivation. Marijuana growing has become a major problem in
many parts of the U.S.--presenting a serious challenge to law
enforcement. For example, in California's national parks and
forests, marijuana growers (organized by Mexican drug
trafficking cartels) have caused major environmental damage and
have used violence against park rangers and tourists.\338\ The
committee believes that, far from cutting this vital program,
Congress and the administration should increase its scope to
tackle the growing problem of marijuana cultivation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\338\ See Drug Production on Public Lands--A Growing Problem: Joint
Hearing before House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, and the House
Subcommittee on Energy Policy, Natural Resources and Regulatory
Affairs, 108th Cong. (Oct. 10, 2003). At http://reform.house.gov/
CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=7225.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Bureau of Prisons
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
Bureau of Prisons \339\ \340\ Final \341\ \342\ \343\
Requested Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*.................................. $49.3 $48.6 $49.7 $49.0 $51.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: Bureau Of Prisons Public Affairs Division:
812-244-4400, http://www.bop.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\339\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\340\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\341\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\342\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\343\ Id.
The committee supports the administration's request for
$51,000,000 for the Bureau of Prisons' drug treatment programs.
This would be an increase of approximately $2 million over the
fiscal year 2006 enacted level.
The committee believes that the Bureau's efforts to reduce
drug use and addiction by prisoners are commendable and have
had very positive results. The Bureau should seek to actively
participate in programs that strive to replicate these results
in state and local prisons and jails, where the vast majority
of drug offenders are incarcerated. In addition, the Bureau
should foster the drug treatment services of faith-based
providers, who bring hope for a better future to the prisons.
The committee is disappointed that the administration did
not continue its practice, begun just last year, of requesting
a specific amount for ``inmate programs.'' That line item more
clearly separated the costs of actually confining prisoners
from the costs of assisting prisoners to reintegrate into
society after release. In addition to drug treatment, these
reintegration programs include education and vocational
training.
The committee is appreciative of the administration's
continued support, specifically mentioned in the Fiscal Year
2007 Budget, for faith-based programs such as the Life
Connections Program.\344\ The committee held a hearing last
year on the issue of prisoner re-entry programs and is seeking
ways to help promote them.\345\ The committee looks forward to
working with the administration to continue making progress and
to replicate these initiatives at the state and local level.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\344\ 2006 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
2007, Appendix, at 702.
\345\ See Confronting Recidivism: Prisoner Re-entry Programs and a
Just Future for All Americans, Hearing before House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 2, 2005). At http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=21850.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee has concerns, however, about the failure of
the administration in recent fiscal years to identify the other
drug control-related costs included in the Bureau's budget
request, including the cost of incarcerating drug offenders,
the cost of drug testing of prisoners and employees, and the
cost of screening visitors and packages for illegal drugs.
These are clearly expenditures directly associated with drug
control, meaning that it is simply incorrect for ONDCP to claim
that only 1.0 percent of the Bureau's budget is drug related.
12. National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2006 FY 2007
NDIC FY 2005 FY 2005 \346\ FY 2006 \347\
Requested Final Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*.................................. $34.9 $39.4 $17 $39 $15.85
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: National Drug Intelligence Center Public
Affairs: 814-532-4902, http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\346\ 2005 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
2006, Appendix, 1181.
\347\ 2006 Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
2007, Appendix, 673.
The committee supports the administration's request for
$15,852,000 to fund the shutdown of the National Drug
Intelligence Center (NDIC) and the transfer of its functions to
other agencies. Although the goals of NDIC are worthy--the
analysis of drug intelligence and the gathering of information
from local law enforcement--it is not clear that the separate
existence of the Center is necessary. Currently funded at $39
million for fiscal year 2006, NDIC is an expensive and
duplicative use of scarce Federal drug enforcement
resources.\348\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\348\ Though the administration has repeatedly proposed closing the
Center, Congress has continued to fund it through an earmark in the
Intelligence Community Management Account, part of the annual
Department of Defense appropriations bill. Although appropriated on
that bill, the funds have been directed to be transferred to the
Department of Justice, which Congress has made responsible for managing
the Center.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Center is located in Johnstown, Pennsylvania and has a
staff of nearly 400 employees. First created in 1993, it has
cost the American taxpayers nearly $400 million. From the
beginning, the agency was criticized as duplicative of already-
existing drug intelligence centers (such as the DEA's El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC) along the southwest border). Critics
also questioned why a Federal intelligence center would be
physically located so far from every other Federal drug
enforcement agency.\349\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\349\ Bret Schulte, A Drug War Boondoggle, U.S. News & World
Report, (May 9, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fact, NDIC was never able to fulfill its original
mission of centralizing and coordinating drug intelligence,
given its remote location and the unwillingness of the other
Federal agencies to contribute significant information.
Instead, over time the Center took on two different missions:
analysis of ``open source'' (i.e., publicly available)
information already published by other drug enforcement
agencies and the development of software capable of analyzing
documents seized by other agencies (particularly state and
local agencies).\350\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\350\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Though these missions are acknowledged as having some
marginal value by other Federal agencies, as well as drug
policy analysts, it is not clear whether they alone justify the
continued separate existence of NDIC or its location in
Johnstown. Moreover, the Center has been plagued by scandal.
Its director was fired in 2004 by the Justice Department for
inappropriately taking nearly $164,000 in official trips with
his secretary.\351\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\351\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee agrees that the Center's work has value, but
also agrees with the administration's assessment that the
current funding is excessive, and that the separate Johnstown
facility is unnecessary. In a time of shrinking budgets, it
makes a great deal of sense to consolidate the existing
resources and functions of NDIC within other agencies. For
example, the true intelligence-gathering personnel and
functions of the Center should be relocated to the southwest
border at EPIC or within the new drug fusion center established
by the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF).
13. Drug Enforcement Administration \352\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\352\ DEA budget figures discussed in this section include only
appropriations, and do not include funding through the Diversion
Control Fee Account (DFCA)--the fees paid by the pharmaceutical
industry to the DEA to finance its prescription drug diversion control
activities.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
DEA \353\ \354\ Final \355\ \356\ \357\
Requested Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*.................................. $1.66 $1.65 $1.69 $1.68 $1.74
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in billions.
Contact Information: Drug Enforcement Administration Public
Affairs: 202-307-7977, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\353\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\354\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\355\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\356\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\357\ Id.
The committee supports the administration's proposal for
$1,736,491,000 for the Drug Enforcement Administration, an
increase of approximately $50 million from the $1,686,457,000
received by DEA for fiscal year 2006. The committee also
supports the administration's proposal to increase the
Diversion Control Fee Account (DFCA)--the fees paid by the
pharmaceutical industry to DEA to finance its prescription drug
diversion control activities--to approximately $212 million, an
increase of over $10 million from the level approved by
Congress for fiscal year 2006 ($201,673,000).
DEA Demand Reduction
Given the tremendous cuts proposed by the administration
for demand reduction programs government-wide, the committee
can no longer support the administration's proposal to
eliminate the DEA's Demand Reduction program. Although the
committee recognizes that the DEA is a law enforcement
organization, it is imperative that what few demand reduction
programs remain within the Federal Government survive.
The committee is grateful that the final appropriations
conference report approving the DEA Demand Reduction program
directed it to be targeted against methamphetamine abuse.\358\
For such a relatively small program, a specific target like
methamphetamine will help to maximize its impact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\358\ Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2862 (Making
Appropriations for Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and
Commerce, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30,
2006, and for other purposes), H. Rept. 109-272, at 79 (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Methamphetamine Enforcement
The committee continues to be very concerned about the
growing danger from methamphetamine (meth) and recommends it be
a top priority at the DEA, and in the nation's overall drug
strategy. Meth is one of the most powerful and dangerous drugs
available. The last several years have seen an unprecedented
rise in its use, trafficking, and manufacturing.\359\ The
wholesale abuse of the drug itself is serious enough. But when
we factor in the toxic environmental effects from unregulated
chemicals used in clandestine laboratories, we see that
methamphetamine is taking a terrible toll. No community is
immune. Methamphetamine abuse has devastated communities across
the nation and put unsustainable strains on the responsible
State and local enforcement agencies. The committee is
therefore grateful that the final appropriations conference
report directed DEA to make methamphetamine enforcement a
priority.\360\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\359\ See Law Enforcement and the Fight Against Methamphetamine:
Hearing before House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Nov. 18,
2004). (Statement of Joseph T. Rannazzisi, Drug Enforcement
Administration). At http://reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/
EventSingle.aspx?EventID=20333.
\360\ Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2862 (Making
Appropriations for Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and
Commerce, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30,
2006, and for other purposes), H. Rept. 109-272, at 79-80 (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee is therefore opposed to the administration's
proposal to cut its Mobile Enforcement Teams (METs) by one-
half. The METs, small units of DEA officers who can be rapidly
deployed to assist local law enforcement, have been invaluable
tools in the fight against clandestine meth labs and simply
cannot be replaced. The committee applauds the appropriations
conference report's insistence that the METs be maintained at
their current level (rather than reduced as proposed by the
administration) and targeted at methamphetamine.\361\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\361\ Id, at 79.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee is also concerned about the impact of the
administration's proposal to eliminate the DEA's Regional
Enforcement Teams. These teams were intended to respond to
major drug trafficking activity in cities or communities that
did not have a permanent DEA presence. The elimination of the
Regional Enforcement Teams could have a detrimental impact on
rural communities that may lack a DEA office, but that have a
significant meth trafficking problem.
DEA Efforts in Afghanistan
The committee is concerned about the administration's
decision not to request a specific amount for its efforts
there. Last year, the administration requested $22 million to
enhance DEA's anti-heroin activities in Afghanistan. It is
critically important that DEA be fully supported in these
efforts to stop heroin production and trafficking by the
Department of Defense, the State Department's International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) program, and the U.S.
Agency for International Development. The committee remains
very concerned that an insufficient level of cooperation is
taking place in Afghanistan among State, U.S. AID, CENTCOM and
DEA programs. A specific line item in the budget would allow
Congress and the executive branch to account for and support
DEA's critical efforts in this troubled area of the world.
The committee is grateful that the final appropriations
conference report for fiscal year 2006 directed DEA to use at
least some of its funding increase for Afghanistan and Central
Asian activities.\362\ The committee urges the Appropriations
Committee, however, to strongly consider designating an actual
line item in the fiscal year 2007 budget for these activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\362\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee is pleased to learn of the Department of
Defense's recent decision to lease Soviet era MI-17 helicopters
to support and transport DEA teams and believes it is long
overdue. As mentioned previously, it is important that DEA
personnel be provided the tools and support necessary to safely
address and curtail heroin production and trafficking in
Afghanistan.
Diversion Control
As noted above, the committee supports the administration's
proposal to increase the Diversion Control Fee Account (DCFA)
by approximately $10 million. This program supports DEA's
efforts to stop the diversion of controlled substances and key
precursor chemicals (like pseudoephedrine by meth traffickers)
from being diverted to illegal uses. In an era of increased
prescription drug abuse and rampant methamphetamine
manufacturing, diversion control must be a top priority for
U.S. drug policy.
According to the budget, $3.4 million of the increase would
be financed through ``programmatic enhancements,'' and this
amount would be used to hire new intelligence analysts for the
program. The remaining increase is projected to come from
increased fee revenue due to increased industry profits.
In FY 2006, the DCFA received $47,457,000 in adjustments to
base and enhancements, which, in part, came from a transfer of
DCFA-related costs previously paid from DEA's direct budget. In
late 2005, DEA's proposal to increase the fee paid by the
registrant community, e.g., manufacturers, distributors,
pharmacists, and practitioners, was published in the Federal
Register. The revenue generated from the new fee will allow DEA
to cover the cost of 2006 enhancements and the DCFA program
costs in years 2007 and 2008.
Operation Panama Express
The committee is appreciative of the administration's
stated intent in the Budget to fund ``Operation Panama
Express,'' a joint drug intelligence operation with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), Department of Defense, Coast Guard and DEA
personnel. The committee remains concerned that the successful
intelligence driven programs of both Panama Express North and
Panama Express South continue to operate with insufficient
funding from the Departments of Defense, Justice and Homeland
Security. Therefore, the committee recommends that funding for
each Panama Express program (North and South) be clearly
identified with separate line items and fully supported in the
administration's budget.
Performance Measurement
The DEA has received an ``adequate'' \363\ rating through
the PART process and has developed new goals, objectives, and
strategies to support the Justice Department's goal of reducing
the availability of drugs in the U.S. by 5 percent each year.
The committee commends this effort to improve accountability
and performance measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\363\ See Program Assessment Rating Tool, 2007 Budget, at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/sheets/part.xls (last visited on
Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Interagency Crime and Drug Enforcement/Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
OCDETF Requested \364\ Final \365\ Requested \366\ Enacted \367\ Request \368\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*...................... $580.6 $554 $561 $489.44 $498.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: Executive Office for OCDETF: 202-514-2073,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/ocdetf.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\364\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\365\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\366\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\367\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\368\ Id.
The committee generally supports the administration's
request for $498,457,000 for ``Interagency Crime and Drug
Enforcement,'' the account under which the administration
places its request for funds for the Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF). That is an increase of over $9
million from the FY 2006 enacted funding of $489,440,000. The
committee does not, however, support the additional transfer of
$208 million for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas
(HIDTA) program from the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP) to OCDETF.\369\ As was the case last year, that
proposal has not been nearly adequately explained or justified
by the administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\369\ FY 2007 USDOJ Budget and Performance Summary 107, (2006)
(``The FY 2007 President's Budget proposes the transfer of the HIDTA
program from [ONDCP] to OCDETF.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Overview
The OCDETF program, established in 1982, was intended to
fund joint, case-specific drug enforcement ``task forces''
(both investigative and prosecutorial) between multiple
Federal, state, and local agencies. Headquartered at the
Executive Office of OCDETF within the Justice Department,
OCDETF operates through nine regional boards that oversee
funded task forces throughout the country.
Prior to fiscal year 1998, the Justice Department's OCDETF
office actually managed joint funding not simply for Justice
Department law enforcement agencies (such as DEA, FBI, and the
U.S. Marshal's Service), but also for non-Justice Department
agencies such as the Customs Service and the Internal Revenue
Service. Beginning in 1998, however, Congress ended this
practice--meaning that the OCDETF office no longer controls the
funding for any non-Justice Department Federal agency. Other
Federal agencies involved in OCDETF ``task forces'' (such as
ICE, CBP, and IRS), however, are still considered program
participants and have representatives on OCDETF regional
boards.
Today, OCDETF provides funding for investigations and
prosecutions of drug cases. The prosecutions are primarily
funded through direct disbursements to local U.S. Attorney's
offices, which pay for the salaries of full-time Federal
prosecutors. The investigations are funded both through direct
disbursements to Federal agencies to pay for full-time agent
salaries and through reimbursements of overtime pay for state
and local agents working on OCDETF task force cases.
In theory, to qualify for any funding under OCDETF, an
agency or U.S. Attorney's office must seek approval from the
regional board and the central OCDETF office. That approval, in
turn, depends on whether the funding is properly tied to a
specific OCDETF-qualifying case. To qualify, a case must target
a significant drug trafficking organization. New guidelines set
forth in 2002 eliminated eligibility for so-called ``local
impact'' cases not tied to national or at least regional
organizations.\370\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\370\ OCDETF budget briefing for Government Reform Committee,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources
staff on Dec. 7, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In practice, however, only the funding of state and local
overtime must be approved in advance. The funding of Federal
agent and prosecutor salaries is essentially pre-approved
through an annual allocation and must simply be justified post
hoc by demonstrating that the particular agency or U.S.
Attorney's office worked a sufficient number of hours on
OCDETF-approved cases. By contrast, state and local overtime
may only be paid after a case has been approved for OCDETF
status.\371\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\371\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Issues
The 2002 guidelines were designed to address concerns that
OCDETF had deviated from its original charter to target major
narcotic trafficking and money-laundering organizations by
accepting drug targets that did not meet the major threshold.
Despite this, the guidelines have apparently not had any
appreciable effect on the amount of OCDETF funds allocated to
Federal agencies or to individual U.S. Attorneys' offices. It
is possible, however, that the guidelines have spurred those
agencies and offices to target higher-level organizations.\372\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\372\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the weaknesses of the OCDETF program is that it is
not clear how valuable the assistance being provided by OCDETF
is to ongoing investigations of non-Justice Department
agencies. Non-Justice Department Federal agents involved in
drug investigations, interviewed by the committee staff,
asserted that OCDETF status merely gained them preferential
treatment for their cases by the local United States Attorney's
office. It should be noted, however, that Congress is most
likely to blame for this problem. When the OCDETF office's
authority over non-Justice Department agencies' funding was
eliminated after 1997, the OCDETF program no longer had much to
offer to those agencies. Moreover, even the funding of state
and local overtime is unlikely to be of much use to agencies
focused on drug trafficking at the borders and ports of entry--
notably ICE and the Coast Guard--because their cases rarely
rely on state and local assistance (unlike DEA, for example).
The committee is disappointed by the administration's
failure to re-submit its proposal of last year to use $58
million to fund additional narcotics agents at the FBI, as well
as prosecutors. Congress declined to support this proposal in
last year's appropriations bill, with the final conference
report expressing the concern that providing funding to the FBI
through OCDETF would ``unnecessarily limit the FBI's ability to
allocate resources to the highest priority threats such as
terrorism, counterintelligence, cyber crime and gang
enforcement.'' \373\ While these are all important priorities
for the FBI, the committee believes that drug trafficking is an
equally serious threat and one which FBI agents have special
abilities to deal with.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\373\ See Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2862 (Making
Appropriations for Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and
Commerce, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending Sept. 30,
2006, and for other purposes), H. Rept. 109-272, at 73 (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Keeping a certain number of FBI agents primarily focused on
narcotics enforcement is entirely in keeping with the agency's
history and practices. Certainly the FBI should be able, as it
was after September 11, 2001, to temporarily shift agents to
urgent needs (such as terrorist threats) in a crisis. But
Congress ought, through funding programs such as OCDETF, to
ensure that major enforcement agencies do not ``drop the ball''
when it comes to drug enforcement, simply because some threats
garner more media attention than others. The FBI, like other
agencies, should strive to maintain a constant level of effort
against key criminal threats (including drugs), regardless of
the ever-shifting currents of public or political opinion.
The committee does expect, however, that should Congress
ever approve this type of request, OCDETF would monitor these
new employees to make sure that their efforts remain focused on
drug enforcement. OCDETF should never become a funding source
for other agencies to conduct non-drug related activities.
Drug Intelligence Fusion Center
The committee is disappointed by the administration's
failure to specify in the Budget how much it proposes to spend
for the recently developed OCDETF Drug Fusion Center. The
committee has supported the continued development of the Fusion
Center computer system that finds criminal linkages by matching
criminal data inputs from a multitude of Federal drug
investigative cases. The committee has also supported the
integration of non-Justice Department agencies (such as U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)) into the Fusion
Center network and hopes that such integration will be
completed soon.
The committee is concerned, however, that the Fusion Center
not become a one-way street, in which participating agencies
provide information but receive nothing in return. Such an
approach may hamper the potential effectiveness of other
Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies that could
benefit from the linkage information.
The committee recommends that programs like OCDETF increase
their efforts to improve intelligence and information sharing
by drug enforcement agencies. The shortfalls in intelligence
and key information sharing described in the 9/11 Commission
Report are not confined to the FBI and CIA.\374\ Information
sharing failures extend to the agencies entrusted with
protecting our borders and interdicting illegal drugs--several
of which are now combined in the Department of Homeland
Security. In fact, the 9/11 terrorists each had to clear
Federal customs and immigration authorities and had brushes
with local law enforcement. If everyone had had all the
information on these killers, they might not have been able to
carry out their planned attacks. These problems can also
undermine our efforts to identify and stop drug traffickers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\374\ Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission, (2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Panama Express
The committee believes that OCDETF should seek to support
the efforts of Operation Panama Express, two interagency
intelligence-driven programs managed by the Departments of
Justice, Defense and Homeland Security. These programs should
be used as models for future information sharing efforts and
joint operations. Criminal Justice Subcommittee Chairman Mark
Souder and members of the subcommittee staff saw first-hand the
incredible effectiveness of Panama Express South during a
recent visit.\375\ The intelligence cueing from this operation
has allowed Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF-South) to
optimize its DHS and DOD interdiction forces, resulting in the
seizure of over 480 tons of cocaine and the arrest of over
1,000 individuals since its inception in February 2000.\376\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\375\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources visit to Operation Panama Express South,
Sarasota, FL, on Jan. 10, 2006.
\376\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy (Feb. 2006)
at 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee is concerned that these successful
intelligence-driven programs continue to operate with
insufficient funding from DOD, DHS, and the Department of
Justice. These programs should be fully supported and enhanced.
Therefore, the committee again recommends that funding for both
Panama Express North and South be clearly identified with
separate line items and fully supported within the
administration's budget. If Panama Express North can be given a
line item (in DEA's budget), then Panama Express South can,
too.
PART Review
The OCDETF program has not yet been reviewed by the
administration's Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART)
process. The committee has been informed, however, that a PART
review will take place soon. The committee believes that in
addition to other long-term outcome measures, the OCDETF should
be evaluated for its effectiveness in helping agencies focus on
high-level drug trafficking organization targets. In
particular, the PART review should determine whether the new
2002 guidelines actually caused OCDETF-participating agencies
to focus more time on such high-value targets.
15. Department of Justice Financial Management
The Department of Justice has come under heavy criticism in
recent years for its poor financial management. Beginning in
2004, the Government Accountability Office statement on Major
Management Challenges at the Department of Justice noted that
the results of the fiscal year 2004 financial statement audit
indicated ``serious financial issues,'' particularly at one of
Justice's significant components, the Office of Justice
Programs (OJP).\377\ OJP has assets of $8.4 billion (31 percent
of DOJ's total assets) and net costs of $4 billion (13 percent
of DOJ's total net costs). Because OJP is such a large
component, it is ``material'' to--meaning large enough to
affect--the financial statements for the entire Department.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\377\ Major Management Challenges at the Department of Justice,
Government Accountability Office, at http://www.gao.gov/pas/2005/
doj.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2004 financial audit revealed serious accounting
problems that have affected DOJ's ability to achieve its
mission. The most serious problems occurred in the area of
grants management, including the Community Oriented Policing
Services (COPS) Program. In the COPS Program alone, audits by
DOJ's Inspector General (OIG) alleged that $277 million was
misspent, and that the OIG has requested documentation from 82
police agencies that have not explained in detail how they
spent $111 million. It is clear that poor financial management
has undermined confidence in the COPS Program and other grants
programs.\378\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\378\ Peter Eisler, 10 years and $10B later, COPS drawing scrutiny,
USA Today, (Apr. 11, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proper accounting and management controls could prevent
these problems. Recognizing the importance of sound financial
management, Congress passed the Chief Financial Officers Act of
1990 to require Federal agencies to submit audited financial
statements. For fiscal year 2004, DOJ's auditors were unable to
express an opinion as to the reliability of the financial
statements, and they rescinded the unqualified opinion rendered
on the 2003 statements.\379\ The committee believes it is
important to recognize the seriousness of that audit result. In
the private sector, anything other than an unqualified or
``clean'' audit opinion would be unacceptable, and any
restatement of a prior year's audit would be front-page news.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\379\ Independent Accountants' Report on Financial Statements,
Fiscal Year 2004 Department of Justice Performance and Accountability
Report, at III-9. At http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2004/
TableofContents.htm (last visited on Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is not yet clear how much progress the Department has
made in correcting these problems. It is at least encouraging
that the fiscal year 2005 independent auditors were able to
express an opinion on OJP's--and hence the Department's--
financial statements, noting that OJP had at last set up an
adequate financial accounting system.\380\ Despite this, the
independent auditors identified two ``material weaknesses''
with the Department's financial management and with OJP's in
particular:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\380\ Independent Auditors' Report on Financial Statements, Fiscal
Year 2005 Department of Justice Performance and Accountability Report,
at III-7. At http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2005/
TableofContents.htm (last visited on Feb. 24, 2006).
Fundamental changes are needed in the
component's internal control to ensure that financial
information can be provided timely to manage the
Department's programs and to prepare its financial
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
statements within the reporting deadlines of the OMB.
Improvements are needed in the Department's
and components' financial systems general and
application controls.\381\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\381\ Independent Auditors' Report on Financial Statements, Fiscal
Year 2005 Department of Justice Performance and Accountability Report,
at III-14. At http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/pr2005/
TableofContents.htm (last visited on Feb. 24, 2006).
Moreover, the last ``scorecard'' in the GAO's Fiscal Year
2005 Financial Report of the United States Government does not
indicate substantial improvement. The Department received a
red, ``Agency has any number of serious flaws'' score for
financial performance (current status as of September 30, 2005)
and only a yellow, ``Slippage in implementation schedule,
quality of deliverables, or other issues requiring adjustments
by agency in order to achieve initiative on a timely basis,''
score for progress in financial performance.\382\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\382\ Fiscal Year 2005 Financial Report of the United States
Government, at http://www.gao.gov/financial/fy2005financialreport.html
(last visited on Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee urges the Department to make greater progress
in financial accountability. In particular, the committee
believes that substantial improvements in the Department's
financial management need to be made before Congress even
considers transferring programs like the High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program to the Department.
F. OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY (``ONDCP'')
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
ONDCP \383\ \384\ Final \385\ \386\ \387\
Requested Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*.................................. $27.60 $26.80 $24.22 $26.90 $23.31
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: ONDCP Public Affairs Division: 202-395-
6618, http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\383\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/budgetsum05.pdf (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\384\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/
office--national--drug--control--
policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\385\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/ondcp.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\386\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/
office--national--drug--control--
policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\387\ Id.
BUDGET REQUEST
The committee generally supports the administration's
request for $23.31 million for operations at ONDCP. That is,
however, below the appropriated level of $26.9 million for
fiscal year 2006, as well as below the administration's own
requests for $24.224 million for 2006 and $27.6 million for
fiscal year 2005. Director Walters, in response to written
questions from the Criminal Justice Subcommittee last year,
stated that the FY 2006 reduction reflected an attempt to shift
$2.6 million of ONDCP's rental and health care costs from ONDCP
to the Office of Administration at the Executive Office of the
President. Director Walters assured the subcommittee that no
reduction in ONDCP staffing or activity would occur.\388\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\388\ See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget: Hearing before the
House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 10, 2005)
(testimony of Director Walters). At http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109--house--hearings&docid=f:208
78.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee appreciates the fact that the administration
has committed to maintaining current staffing levels at ONDCP.
As noted above, however, even taking into consideration the
accounting shift of $2.6 million in costs from one office of
the Executive Office of the President to another, the
administration is still requesting nearly $1.7 million less for
ONDCP than it did two years ago. The committee would like to
know whether in spite of these steady reductions in ONDCP
funding requests, Director Walters' previous assurances to the
subcommittee that no reduction in staffing or operations remain
in effect. The committee also trusts that the declining funding
requests do not indicate a corresponding reduction in the
administration's commitment to the Office and its mission.
Similarly, the committee is very concerned about--and will
vigorously oppose--the administration's proposal to allow the
President to shift up to 10 percent of ONDCP's congressionally-
appropriated funds to any other department or program of his
choosing, without seeking the approval of Congress.\389\ The
committee is not, in principle, opposed to a temporary
reprogramming authority during a national emergency. The
administration's proposal, however, is not limited to national
emergencies--it would be unlimited in purpose and duration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\389\ See Office of Management and Budget: General Provisions--
Government-Wide, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
2007: Appendix, Proposed Sec. 835 at 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee is aware that in a time of shrinking budgets,
many agencies must share the burden of budget cuts. The
committee reminds the administration, however, that ONDCP is
not simply an administrative subdivision of the White House. It
is both the President's principal advisor with respect to drug
control policy development and program oversight, and it is
responsible to Congress to account for the nation's efforts to
reduce the use, manufacturing, and trafficking of illicit
drugs. Reductions in its budget and attacks on its independence
will hinder ONDCP's ability to provide effective policy
coordination and oversight--a result that this committee will
strenuously oppose.
OVERSIGHT AND COORDINATION BY ONDCP
The committee has ongoing concerns that ONDCP has not been
exercising the kind of active leadership, oversight, and
coordination of executive branch drug control efforts
envisioned by Congress when it was authorized in 1988. As the
committee noted in its report last year, ONDCP has not yet
provided effective responses to several major challenges to
Federal drug enforcement efforts.\390\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\390\ Committee on Government Reform, Report: The National Drug
Control Strategy for 2005 and the National Drug Control Budget for
Fiscal Year 2006, H. Rept. 109-172, (2005) at 27. At http://
reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/The%20 National%20 Drug%20 Control%20
Strategy%20 for%20 2005%20 and%20 the%20 National%20 Drug%20 Control%20
Budget%20 for%20 Fiscal%20 Year%20 2006%20-%20 Report.pdf (last visited
Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, ONDCP has not taken the initiative in formulating an
effective Federal anti-methamphetamine strategy. Although ONDCP
has been involved in the administration's very limited anti-
meth efforts to date (see Section I.1. above), there is little
indication that ONDCP has attempted to push other branches of
the Federal Government to take further, necessary action.
Indeed, public statements by a number of ONDCP officials
suggest that the Office does not regard the meth epidemic as a
priority--or even as an epidemic.\391\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\391\ See, e.g., David J. Jefferson, et al., America's Most
Dangerous Drug, Newsweek, Aug. 8, 2005 (quoting ONDCP spokesman Tom
Riley, ``I'm afraid there's also an element of people `crying meth'
because it's a hot new drug.''); Jim Barnett, Drug Czar Ignoring New
Peril, Some Say, Syracuse Post-Standard, Aug. 7, 2005 (``Two of [ONDCP
Director John] Walters' top deputies--Dave Murray and John Horton--
declared that meth still doesn't qualify as an epidemic.''); compare,
Prepared Remarks of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales at the National
District Attorneys Association Meeting, (July 18, 2005), at
www.usdoj.gov (referring to ``the epidemic of methamphetamine drug
use,'' and stating, ``In terms of damage to children and to our
society, meth is now the most dangerous drug in America.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nor is there any indication that ONDCP has effectively
responded to the increasing pressure on agencies such as the
FBI, the Coast Guard, the Border Patrol, and the legacy Customs
Service to abandon or reduce drug enforcement in favor of
homeland security and counterterrorism missions. This year,
Director Walters apparently certified a budget request for the
Department of Homeland Security that would eliminate any
funding to ensure that vital maritime patrol aircraft will
remain operational over the next 5-10 years.\392\ As described
in Section I.5. above, this would have a crippling effect on
our long-term drug interdiction capabilities. The fact that
Director Walters certified such a budget request as adequate
raises serious questions about ONDCP's fulfillment of its
statutory responsibilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\392\ Customs and Border Protection, Budget in Brief, FY 2007,
(Feb. 2006) at 25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, ONDCP must take more assertive action to respond
to the reduced commitment of the Department of Defense to
counterdrug efforts.\393\ The Defense Department has dedicated
fewer assets to interdiction in the ``transit zones'' of the
Caribbean and eastern Pacific Ocean, has scaled back National
Guard assistance to state and local law enforcement, and--most
significantly--has failed to take effective action against the
rapid growth of heroin production in Afghanistan. While the
committee recognizes that ONDCP must frequently defer to the
Defense Department on questions affecting the military, ONDCP
should also be assertive in ensuring that the national priority
of reducing drug trafficking is not forgotten, even by our
government's largest and most respected institutions. To date,
however, ONDCP has been publicly silent about the Defense
Department's reduced commitments--and has failed to present
Congress with any plans to ``backfill'' those reductions in
assets and personnel for counternarcotics missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\393\ See Drug Control: Agencies Need to Plan for Likely Declines
in Drug Interdiction Assets, and Develop Better Performance Measures
for Transit Zone Operations, GAO Report No. 06-2000, (Nov. 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was no accident that the original legislation creating
ONDCP was titled the ``National Narcotics Leadership Act of
1988'' (emphasis added). Congress expected leadership from
ONDCP on drug control issues--not simply passive support for
whatever actions the other branches of the administration take.
The committee hopes that the Office will increase its efforts
to forge a strong, unified approach to the drug problem within
the administration.
To help the Office achieve that result, the committee
included a number of provisions in H.R. 2829, the Office of
National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2005. These
provisions give ONDCP additional tools as it exercises its
leadership responsibilities, including:
A clear statement of congressional intent
that the Director of ONDCP has the same rank and status
as the heads of the executive Departments he is charged
with overseeing and coordinating;
Requirement for written strategies concerning
Southwest Border drug trafficking, Afghan heroin and
South American heroin and cocaine;
Requirement for revised, government-wide
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP) and
National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP);
and
Requirement that Federal agencies and
programs with drug control responsibilities submit all
of their drug control activity budget requests to ONDCP
for review and certification.
The Office administers several programs related to drug
enforcement and prevention. The committee's views on each are
set forth below:
1. High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006
HIDTA \394\ \395\ Final FY 2006 \396\ \398\ FY 2007 \399\
Requested Requested \397\ Enacted Request \400\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*................................... $208.4 $226.5 $100 $227 $208
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
The committee has deep concerns about the administration's
proposals for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA)
program. The administration has requested $208 million for the
program but has again (as it did last year) proposed moving it
(via the appropriations process) from ONDCP to the Department
of Justice's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
(OCDETF).\401\ The administration has also stated its
intention, should Congress approve that request, to create a
``better focused'' HIDTA program that will ``focus funds on
regions that are primary national drug distribution or transit
zones.'' \402\ The administration has not explained what it
means by that statement. The committee has received reports
from sources inside the program, however, indicating that ONDCP
and the Justice Department may intend to redirect most, if not
all of the requested funding to the five HIDTAs originally
designated in 1990--eliminating up to 23 of the current HIDTAs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\394\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/budgetsum05.pdf (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\395\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/
office--national--drug--control--
policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\396\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/ondcp.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\397\ The administration requested that funding for the HIDTA
program for fiscal year 2006 be shifted to the Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program at the Justice Department;
Congress rejected that request.
\398\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/
office--national--drug--control--
policy.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\399\ Id.
\400\ The administration is again requesting that the HIDTA program
funding be transferred from ONDCP to OCDETF at the Department of
Justice for fiscal year 2007.
\401\ The specific budget language proposed by the administration
is somewhat vague as to whether HIDTA would be officially controlled by
OCDETF. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007:
Appendix, at 1157 (stating only that HIDTA is ``to be carried out by
the Attorney General''). However, the appropriation requested by the
administration would be under the ``Interagency Crime and Drug
Enforcement'' heading, which is (in practice) the appropriation for
OCDETF. Id. Moreover, in its own budget submission, the Department
states, ``The FY 2007 President's Budget proposes the transfer of the
HIDTA program from [ONDCP] to OCDETF.'' 2006-2007 DOJ Budget and
Performance Summary, 107.
\402\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PROGRAM BACKGROUND
When it was created in 1990, the program was intended to
reduce the nation's overall supply of illegal drugs by bringing
together Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in
the most significant regions (each referred to as a ``HIDTA'')
where drugs were produced, smuggled, or distributed. As the
program's budget has grown--from only $25 million at its
inception to $228 million in fiscal year 2005--the number of
designated regions has grown as well. From the initial five
HIDTAs in 1990, the program has expanded to 28 HIDTAs, and
pressure is building in Congress to create even more of them.
The program's expansion has raised questions about what the
true purpose of the HIDTAs really is, and whether the current
program structure fulfills the mission Congress set out for it.
Those questions are not easy to answer. Some HIDTAs are located
in areas (such as the Southwest Border HIDTA) that clearly
serve as major smuggling corridors, while others are located in
areas more realistically characterized as high drug consumption
zones (rather than production or transshipment zones) or as
areas with highly localized drug production and trafficking.
Even within the HIDTAs, some funded initiatives are targeted at
major drug trafficking organizations, while others are aimed at
local manifestations of the drug trade (like open drug markets
in the streets).
The HIDTA program is, in practice, a blend of the
``national'' and ``regional/local'' purposes--both in terms of
which areas have been designated as HIDTAs and which
initiatives have been funded within each HIDTA. Even the most
nationally significant HIDTAs (like the Southwest Border HIDTA)
fund some local drug enforcement activities, while even those
with the least apparent national impact fund some initiatives
aimed at major drug trafficking organizations.
The fact that HIDTAs fund some initiatives of greater
significance to the local community and some more important to
Federal law enforcement is not in itself a problem. In fact,
the HIDTA program would not be able to carry out its primary
function--to bring Federal, state, and local drug enforcement
agencies together for cooperative efforts--if no allowance for
state and local priorities were permitted. Neither is the fact
that some HIDTAs have greater ``national'' significance than
others is itself a weakness. There will always be differences
in importance and focus from region to region.
What has been a problem, however, is the program's current
inability to base its allocation of funds to the individual
HIDTAs on any criteria at all--national, regional, or local.
Congress bears much of the blame for this. For many years,
appropriations bills have forbidden ONDCP from funding any
HIDTA at below its previous year's level--effectively locking
in over $200 million of its budget. ONDCP has had true
discretion over less than 10 percent of the program's funds.
The administration, for its part, has done nothing to solve
this problem. Each appropriations bill has given ONDCP the
option to request a reallocation of HIDTA funds by presenting a
plan to the Appropriations Committees in the House and Senate.
ONDCP has thus far declined to do so.
As a result, the HIDTA program currently guarantees funds
to the designated HIDTAs with little or no regard for
efficiency, impact, or national priorities. ONDCP cannot (and
until now has not even tried to) redirect the program's funds
in response to the ever-changing drug trafficking threat.
THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL
In response to these difficulties, the administration has
proposed drastic changes to the program in each of its last two
budget proposals. Last year, the administration asked Congress
to cut the program's budget from fiscal year 2005's enacted
level of $228,350,000 to $100,000,000 and to transfer the
administration of the remaining funds to the Organized Crime
Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF), a Department of Justice
program. Congress rejected both proposals, electing to keep
HIDTA at ONDCP and to fund the program at $227 million.
This year, the administration has requested $208 million
for the HIDTA program but has again asked that it be moved to
OCDETF. Moreover, as noted above, the administration has stated
its intention to redirect the program dollars to those HIDTAs
that are the most important national drug transit and
distribution regions.
If enacted, these proposals would effectively terminate the
current HIDTA program. The committee believes that this would
be a severe blow to Federal, state, and local cooperation and
to drug enforcement in general. For this reason, the committee
strongly opposes the budget cut, any radical reallocation of
funding (if unaccompanied by a comprehensive, performance-based
justification), and the move of the program into the Justice
Department.
Keeping HIDTA at its Current Funding Level
At first glance, the administration did avoid this year one
of the mistakes from its fiscal year 2006 budget proposal: the
56 percent cut in the HIDTA program budget. Instead, the
administration proposes a more modest cut--$19 million--from
the HIDTA budget approved by Congress for fiscal year 2006.
The committee is concerned, however, that the higher
request may not reflect any greater long-term commitment to the
HIDTA program. The administration did not provide any
explanation for the drastic cut in its budget proposal last
year; neither has it provided an explanation for restoring the
funding this year. This suggests that no serious study has gone
into what the proper level of funding ought to be. Rather, it
appears to reflect political and not practical considerations.
In any case, the committee believes that HIDTA funding
should continue at last year's level of $227 million. The $19
million cut proposed by the administration would eliminate the
only portion of the program budget that ONDCP has any real
discretion over. The regular budgets of the existing 28 HIDTAs,
together with ONDCP's administrative costs for the program,
would exhaust virtually all of the $208 million requested by
the administration. Since (as noted above) language requiring
``level funding'' of each individual HIDTA has been included in
Congress' appropriations bills for nearly a decade, ONDCP has
virtually no discretion over the allocation of those funds.
ONDCP has had discretion over the additional funds--
approximately $20 million per year--approved by Congress for
the HIDTA program. Such funds have, in the past, been used to
fund emergency counterdrug activity in specific HIDTAs (for
example, maintaining National Guard assistance at ports of
entry in the Southwest Border HIDTA), and to fund special,
high-priority investigations of major drug trafficking
organizations on the Justice Department's Consolidated Priority
Organization Target (CPOT) list.
The committee strongly supports these uses of the program
discretionary funds and urges Congress to continue providing
those funds. The committee also urges Congress, however, to
delete or amend language included in the fiscal year 2006
appropriations bill prohibiting the use of any HIDTA funds for
the CPOT program. While the committee agrees that HIDTA funds
should not be redirected to non-HIDTA programs, ONDCP should be
permitted to use the discretionary funds to reward those HIDTAs
that target CPOT organizations.
Keeping HIDTA in ONDCP
The proposed transfer to the Justice Department is contrary
to existing law and to sound drug enforcement policy.\403\ It
would potentially be even more disruptive to the HIDTA program
than simple budget cuts.\404\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\403\ See Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization
Act of 2005, H.R. 2829: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government
Reform, 109th Cong. (June 15, 2005). At http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/
257/2422/08dec20051200/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/
23688.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\404\ The committee's reasons for opposing the transfer of the
HIDTA program to the Department of Justice are discussed in greater
detail in the committee's report on H.R. 2829 (H. Rept. 109-315, Part
I, at 52-53).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
First, transferring this program across departments is
contrary to every authorization the Congress has passed for
HIDTA. The original legislation creating HIDTA, each of the two
reauthorization acts (in 1993 and 1998), and the most recent
reauthorization bill passed by the House (H.R. 2086, passed in
2003) specifically placed the program in ONDCP. At no time has
the House or the Senate passed legislation moving the program
into the Department of Justice. Congress emphatically rejected
moving HIDTA out of ONDCP in the final fiscal year 2006
budget.\405\ Letters signed by 90 Members of the House and 56
Senators expressed Congress' broad-based opposition to any
transfer or substantial reduction in HIDTAs.\406\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\405\ Public Law 109-115.
\406\ Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, et al., to House Appropriations Committee (Apr. 12,
2005) (on file with subcommittee); Letter from Senator Max Baucus,
Senator Chuck Grassley, et al., to Senate Appropriations Committee Apr.
20, 2005 (on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moreover, attempting to move the program through an
appropriations bill would almost certainly conflict with any
reauthorization legislation agreed to by the House and Senate
during this Congress. Notably, the current reauthorization
legislation approved by the committee, H.R. 2829, would keep
the HIDTA program within ONDCP.
Even apart from the legal question, moving HIDTA into the
Justice Department is highly problematic. At the Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources' March
10, 2005 hearing on this issue, not one of the state and local
officials who actively work with the HIDTA program supported
moving the program into the Justice Department. Also, in
written responses to questions submitted after the hearing, not
one of the HIDTA directors supported moving the program.\407\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\407\ See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne Grant,
HIDTA and Other Law Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing Federal,
State and Local Cooperation: Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005). At http://
a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01sep20051200/www.access.gpo.gov/
congress/house/pdf/109hrg/22201.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
HIDTA, unlike any program currently administered by the
Justice Department, seeks to bring together Federal, state, and
local law enforcement agencies in cooperative operations,
intelligence sharing, and investigations. Each HIDTA has an
executive board made up of equal representation of Federal
agencies on the one hand, and state and local agencies on the
other. The boards then decide how to allocate their budgets
among various task forces and other operations.
This equal voice for state and local agencies has generated
an unprecedented level of cooperation on the part of all
participants. It is unlikely that state and local agencies will
be willing to make significant contributions of their personnel
and resources to HIDTA task forces if they believe they will
not have an equal say in their deployment.
Notably, the administration's representatives who testified
at the March 10, 2005 hearing declined to inform the
subcommittee about how HIDTA would be managed under OCDETF and
how decisions would be made at the local HIDTA.\408\ The
Director of OCDETF, Catherine O'Neil, simply stated that her
program would ``study'' the HIDTA program if granted control by
Congress and make changes at a later date.\409\ The
administration has been no more forthcoming this year about how
the Justice Department would administer the HIDTA program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\408\ See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne Grant,
HIDTA and Other Law Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing Federal,
State and Local Cooperation? Hearing before the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005) (testimony of Catherine
M. O'Neil, and John Horton). At http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/
2422/01sep20051200/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/
22201.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\409\ Id, (testimony of Catherine M. O'Neil).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This approach gets things backwards by demanding the
authority to change the program before deciding what changes to
make or even whether change is necessary. The committee agrees
that some reforms of the HIDTA program may be needed. However,
the appropriate response is for the administration first to
study the program and then make recommendations to Congress for
changes in management and funding for individual HIDTAs. After
Congress has reviewed the administration's recommendations, it
can then decide whether to include them in reauthorizing
legislation. Once this occurs, an appropriations request for a
revised program would be in order.
Two additional arguments made by the administration to
justify moving the HIDTA program need to be addressed. First,
the administration relies on the HIDTA's Program Assessment
Rating Tool (PART) review--which claimed that HIDTA had failed
to demonstrate results--for its argument that the program must
be overhauled. However, ONDCP apparently failed to provide
sufficient information about the HIDTA program's results to the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and also failed to
establish specific performance measures in time for the review.
Had OMB been given the complete annual reports of the
individual HIDTAs, which detail the many investigations,
arrests, seizures, and other actions undertaken by the program,
and had OMB waited until the performance measures had been
fully implemented, it is difficult to see how the HIDTA program
could have been graded significantly worse than the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Coast Guard, or any other drug
enforcement agency. As noted above, the HIDTA directors have
developed a uniform performance measurement system, which now
awaits the approval of ONDCP. The committee urges ONDCP to
adopt that system expeditiously and to resubmit HIDTA for PART
review when sufficient data has been collected.
Finally, the administration argues that the program should
be transferred in order to consolidate drug enforcement
programs within the Department of Justice. There are two
problems with this argument. First, even within the Federal
Government, drug enforcement cannot be ``consolidated'' within
the Justice Department. Most Federal drug interdiction
personnel are employed by agencies at the Department of
Homeland Security, namely the Coast Guard, Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE), each of which participate in individual HIDTAs. ICE and
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), which also participates in
HIDTAs, also engage in significant drug enforcement and money-
laundering investigations.
Second, although the Justice Department certainly plays a
vital role in drug enforcement--both through the investigative
work done by DEA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and through prosecutions in Federal court by the U.S.
Attorneys' offices--that Department does not have an exclusive
focus on drug control. Instead, drug enforcement is but one of
many disparate missions that the Justice Department must
balance, and the committee is concerned that counterdrug money
would later be absorbed there by non-counterdrug programs. For
example, in its press release announcing the fiscal year 2007
Department of Justice budget proposal, the Department mentioned
``terrorism'' eleven times--and drugs only once.\410\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\410\ Press Release, Department of Justice FY 2007 Budget Request
(Feb. 6, 2006) at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/Feb./
06--ag--062.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ONDCP, by contrast, is exclusively dedicated to drug
control. It is not forced to divert resources or attention to
other matters. Thus, an anti-drug trafficking program like
HIDTA, which brings together both Justice Department and non-
Justice Department Federal drug control agencies, as well as
state and local drug control agencies, is much better located
within ONDCP.
Reallocation of HIDTA Funds
The budget cut proposed last year by the administration--56
percent of the previous year's enacted level--if enacted would
have shut down most of the task forces, intelligence centers,
and ``deconfliction'' activities funded by the program. This is
because either most of the 28 individual HIDTAs would have had
to be eliminated, or all of them would have had to accept very
deep cuts. The funding level requested for fiscal year 2007--
$208 million--in principle avoids this problem, since it would
permit each HIDTA to be funded at last year's base level.
The committee has questions, however, about how the
administration intends to implement its proposal to ``focus''
the HIDTA program's funding on only the most significant drug
distribution and transit areas. Presumably, this means that the
administration would reallocate funding among the various
HIDTAs--ending the current practice of ``level funding'' for
the HIDTAs. Indeed, if the administration has no plans to shift
the program's funds, then there seems to be little reason to
move it from ONDCP.
At present, however, it is unclear which HIDTAs meet the
administration's new standards--or even what the standards
actually are. The committee is aware of reports that the
administration is considering attempting to redirect all or
most of the program's funds into the original five HIDTAs. This
would (if fully implemented) eliminate 23 of the existing
HIDTAs, including:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chicago HIDTA Midwest HIDTA
Michigan HIDTA Washington/Baltimore HIDTA
Appalachia HIDTA Milwaukee HIDTA
Rocky Mountain HIDTA Central Florida HIDTA
Ohio HIDTA North Texas HIDTA
Gulf Coast HIDTA Atlanta HIDTA
Central Valley HIDTA Hawaii HIDTA
Lake County HIDTA Nevada HIDTA
New England HIDTA North Florida HIDTA
Northern California HIDTA Northwest HIDTA
Oregon HIDTA Philadelphia/Camden HIDTA
Puerto Rico/U.S.V.I. HIDTA
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee is not opposed to a reallocation of resources
among the various HIDTAs to meet the ever-changing drug
trafficking threat. Moreover, the committee strongly supports
the proposition that those HIDTAs which could have the greatest
potential impact on the national supply and distribution of
drugs should receive most of the program's funds. In fact, both
of the ONDCP reauthorization bills adopted by the committee in
recent years--H.R. 2086 in 2003, and H.R. 2829 in 2005--
envisioned the possibility of annual, evidence-based
reallocations among the HIDTAs.
The committee believes, however, that Congress must have a
great deal more information about the administration's long-
term plans for the HIDTA program before it grants such sweeping
authority. The termination of numerous HIDTAs will have a
severe impact on drug enforcement in the affected regions. The
23 HIDTAs designated after 1990 cover a broad section of the
country, including major urban centers, island ``transit
zones,'' and rural areas devastated by methamphetamine
production and trafficking. The total elimination of all or
most of them would have deep repercussions for drug enforcement
throughout the country.
Most importantly, the loss of these 23 HIDTAs would destroy
one of the most significant means for Federal, state, and local
cooperative efforts against drug trafficking. Federal drug
agencies cannot expect to have real success in controlling drug
trafficking without the assistance of state and local law
enforcement--the country is simply too large for DEA or any
other agency to police it. HIDTA is perhaps our most important
tool for enlisting the support of state and local agencies for
national anti-drug trafficking efforts.
Seven representatives of state and local law enforcement
agencies from around the country who work with the HIDTA
program testified about that impact at the Criminal Justice
Subcommittee's hearing on March 10, 2005. They told the
subcommittee that the vital task forces, intelligence and
investigation ``deconfliction'' centers, and other interagency
activities funded by HIDTA would be eliminated if the program
ceased operations in their areas.\411\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\411\ See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne Grant,
HIDTA and Other Law Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing Federal,
State and Local Cooperation? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005) (testimony of Ron
Brooks, president, National Narcotics Officer's Associations Coalition,
Tom Carr, Director, Washington-Baltimore HIDTA, Tom Donahue, Director,
Chicago HIDTA, Chief Jack Harris, Phoenix Police Dept. & Vice-Chair,
Southwest Border HIDTA, Leonard Hamm, acting Baltimore police
commissioner, Mark Henry, president, Illinois Drug Enforcement
Officer's Association, and Sheriff Jack L. Merritt, Greene County, MO).
At http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01sep20051200/
www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/22201.pdf (last visited
Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the loss of these HIDTAs would seriously
damage our national anti-methamphetamine efforts. All of the
HIDTAs with a primary or significant focus on meth were
designated after 1990. Some of these HIDTAs--such as the
Midwest HIDTA and the Rocky Mountain HIDTA--organize Federal,
state, and local efforts to stop the proliferation of meth
labs. Other HIDTAs--most notably the Central Valley HIDTA in
California--target the ``superlabs'' that have flooded the
entire country with meth. In both cases, the loss to our anti-
meth strategy would be irreparable. For example, Sheriff Jack
Merritt of Greene County, Missouri testified last March that
the anti-methamphetamine task force that brings together
Federal, state, and local law enforcement in his community
would be shut down without the HIDTA program.\412\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\412\ Id, (testimony of Sheriff Jack Merritt).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The impact would not be confined to anti-meth efforts,
however. Many of the threatened HIDTAs are designed to combat
the drug gangs that plague inner-city and other urban centers.
These HIDTAs--including the Philadelphia/Camden, Lake County
(Indiana), Washington/Baltimore, and Chicago HIDTAs--have been
the primary centers of joint Federal, state, and local anti-
drug gang activity. The elimination of these HIDTAs would
destroy one of our best weapons against the drug dealers who
terrorize city streets. Baltimore Police Commissioner Leonard
Hamm, for example, testified last March that his anti-heroin
and anti-drug gang task forces would also end without HIDTA
assistance.\413\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\413\ Id, (testimony of Commissioner Leonard Hamm).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Eliminating or eviscerating these individual HIDTAs would
be a far greater financial loss to Federal drug enforcement
efforts than simply the money spent by the Federal Government
directly on their budgets. State and local agencies make
significant contributions of their own agents, employees,
office space, and equipment to HIDTA task forces--much of which
is not reimbursed with Federal dollars and which frequently
dwarf, in their dollar value, the Federal budget components of
the individual HIDTAs. We risk losing those contributions
without the individual HIDTAs.\414\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\414\ Id, (written responses of each HIDTA director).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee proposes, instead, that the administration
present to Congress a comprehensive, evidence-based
reallocation plan for the HIDTA program--as permitted by recent
appropriations bills (and as would be required by H.R. 2829).
The plan would allow Congress to evaluate the current state of
the HIDTA program overall, the purpose and impact of the
individual HIDTAs, and recent trends that have altered the drug
trafficking landscape since present funding levels were set in
the late 1990's. That would allow Congress and the
administration to work together to ensure that HIDTA remains a
vital tool in our national anti-drug efforts.
2. National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
Media Campaign Requested \415\ Final \416\ Requested \417\ Enacted \418\ Request \419\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*............................. $145 $120 $120 $100 $120
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
The committee is deeply concerned about the future of the
National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign, and believes that the
administration is not working for adequate funding for it. The
Campaign, an integrated effort that combines paid and donated
advertising with public communications outreach to bring drug
abuse prevention messages to young people, has suffered
repeated, deep cuts in its budget since 2001. The cuts have
been so deep that the Campaign is now at a crossroads: if the
administration and Congress do not increase its budget, the
program will likely slip into irrelevance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\415\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\416\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\417\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\418\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\419\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Overview and History
The Media Campaign funds television, radio, print, and
Internet advertisements designed to communicate the dangers of
drug abuse to young people and parents. Most of the program's
dollars are spent on the purchase of advertising ``time and
space,'' namely the cost of actually airing or printing an
advertisement. The Campaign also funds the creation, testing,
and evaluation of advertisements, industry outreach, and
strategic partnerships with local communities. Each dollar
spent on time and space must be ``matched'' by the entity
accepting the dollar with one dollar of donated time and space,
doubling the impact of the Campaign's expenditures. No match is
required for other services purchased by the Campaign, however.
The Campaign was created by Congress in 1997 to expand and
enhance the efforts of the Partnership for a Drug-Free America
(PDFA), a not-for-profit organization created in 1987 to curb
illegal drug use among America's youth. In a collaborative
effort, the PDFA solicited anti-drug ads from various ad
agencies who donated their creative talent to design and
produce anti-drug television ads (pro bono). The PDFA also
solicited and obtained donated media airtime from the big three
television networks to run the anti-drug ads as public service
announcements (PSAs).
For over ten years, the PDFA coordinated these activities
with great success and at no expense to the American taxpayer.
According to the annual University of Michigan Monitoring the
Future survey, at the same time that the level of anti-drug
television ads was rising, attitudes about the social
disapproval and the perceived risks of illegal drug use were
also rising. Likewise, there was a corresponding decrease in
illegal drug use among young people during the same period. The
program seemed to be working.
Beginning in 1991, however, the donated airtime from the
big three media networks began to decline significantly.
Throughout the nineties, the PDFA worked diligently to rebuild
the donated air times to previous levels (in 1991 the estimated
value of donated media air time was $350 million)--but that
effort did not fully succeed.
In 1996, the PDFA commissioned an ad agency study which
determined that an effective media campaign would require an
exposure rate of 4 times per day and frequency rate of 90
percent of the target audiences. The minimum cost for such an
effort was determined to be $175 million (in 1996 dollars),
which represented one-half of the $350 million donated in 1991.
Realizing they needed help to reach their goals, the PDFA
approached Congress for assistance. In 1997, President Clinton
requested $175 million in Federal funds for the program, to be
named the ``National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign.'' Congress
appropriated $195 million (for fiscal year 1998) and ultimately
gave statutory authorization for the program in 1998.
Early Problems with the Campaign
The Campaign has not been problem-free, however. Almost
from its inception, some critics have attacked the program as
either ineffective, and/or an inappropriate use of Federal
funds.
Such criticism was amplified when, in 2000, it was reported
that Ogilvy & Mather, the advertising agency that ONDCP
(through its contracting agent, the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS)) had hired in 1998 to make media purchases
for the Campaign, had improperly charged the government for
services during 1999. A subsequent investigation by the GAO
determined that Ogilvy had indeed improperly billed the
government and that HHS had inadequately managed the contract,
in particular by awarding the contract before sufficiently
determining whether Ogilvy had an adequate accounting
system.\420\ A criminal investigation of Ogilvy by the Justice
Department resulted in a settlement in 2002, under which the
firm agreed to pay $1.8 million to the government. In 2005, two
former Ogilvy employees were convicted of conspiracy and making
false statements in connection with the investigation.\421\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\420\ Anti-Drug Media Campaign: Aspects of Advertising Contract
Mismanaged by the Government; Contractor Improperly Charged Some Costs,
GAO, Report No. GAO-01-623, (June 2001).
\421\ Joshua Chaffin, Former Ogilvy partner sentenced to prison,
Financial Times, July 13, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The negative publicity from the accounting scandal was
further exacerbated when, despite the accounting
irregularities, ONDCP's new contracting agent, the Department
of the Navy, exercised its option to renew the contract with
Ogilvy in 2001. Indeed, Ogilvy was retained to provide services
for the Campaign until the expiration of the contract in 2004.
ONDCP defended the government's decision to retain Ogilvy as
reasonable in light of all the circumstances, and that argument
was not without merit. Nevertheless, the continuing involvement
of Ogilvy almost certainly eroded congressional and public
support for the program.
Evaluating and Reforming the Campaign
When Congress first authorized the Campaign, it required
extensive evaluations to ensure the program's effectiveness at
reducing youth drug use. Beginning in 1998, ONDCP commissioned
the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) at HHS to conduct
regular evaluations of the Campaign through the program's
initial authorization period (i.e., until the end of fiscal
year 2003). NIDA then contracted with Westat, a private
research firm, to evaluate the effectiveness of the Campaign-
funded advertisements.
Westat's regular reports, the last of which was released in
December 2003 (covering the period ending in June 2003),
indicated that while the Campaign's advertisements had some
positive impact on the attitudes of parents, there was no
positive impact on the attitudes of young people.\422\ This led
many, including some in Congress, to question the utility of
the Campaign.\423\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\422\ Westat, Evaluation of the National Youth Anti-Drug Media
Campaign: 2003 Report of Findings, (Dec. 2003), executive summary
available at http://www.mediacampaign.org/publications/
performance.html).
\423\ See, e.g., Conference Report to Accompany H.J. Res. 2 (Making
Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 2003, and for Other
Purposes), H. Rept. 108-10, 1345-1346 (2003).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In response to Westat's reports, Director Walters
acknowledged the Campaign's shortcomings in 2002, \424\ and
ONDCP undertook a major strategic overhaul of the program.
Major changes included better targeting of advertisements at
key age groups, a renewed focus on testing of advertisements
before airing, and a primary focus on marijuana, the primary
illegal drug of abuse among teenagers.\425\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\424\ Christopher Newton, Survey: Anti-Drug Ads Have No Effect,
Associated Press, May 14, 2002.
\425\ See ONDCP Reauthorization & the National Youth Anti-Drug
Media Campaign: Hearing before House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th
Cong. (Mar. 27, 2003) (testimony of Christopher Marston). At http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=108--house--hearings&docid=f:874
50.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee believes that the preponderance of the
evidence indicates that the post-2002 changes have made the
Campaign significantly more effective. A survey by the
Partnership for a Drug-Free America (PDFA) in August 2003
demonstrated a significant positive connection between the
Campaign-funded advertisements and youth perceptions of
marijuana use risk.\426\ In June 2005, the Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), a division of
HHS, released a report showing that young people who reported
having seen or heard prevention messages in the media during
the past year were much less likely than their peers to report
illicit drug use.\427\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\426\ Partnership for a Drug-Free America, Partnership Attitude
Tracking Study-2003 Teens Study: Survey of Teens' Attitudes and
Behaviors Toward Marijuana, (Aug. 2003), at http://
www.mediacampaign.org/publications/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\427\ National Survey on Drug Use and Health, SAMHSA, (June 2005)
at http://oas.samhsa.gov/nsduh.htm#NSDUHinfo (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the ultimate evidence of the Campaign's success is
the continuing decline since 2002 in overall drug use, and
particularly marijuana use, among teens nationwide.\428\ The
bottom line is that when adequately funded and properly
managed, the Campaign works.\429\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\428\ See Monitoring the Future, 2005, at http://
monitoringthefuture.org/.
\429\ For these reasons, the committee believes that the most
recent OMB PART review findings for the Campaign--``results not
demonstrated''--are simply not based in fact. Although the direct
impact of advertising on its target audience is always difficult to
measure, the ultimate ``performance measure'' for an advertising
campaign is whether the target audience responded as hoped. In this
case, it is clear that it has: young people are reporting decreased use
of marijuana. While many factors may have contributed to this decline,
it is hard not to give at least some credit to the marijuana-focused
advertisements purchased by the Campaign. The committee believes that
this program is showing clear results, and should be fully funded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Funding
Despite that record of improvement and success, Congress
has not adequately funded the Campaign in recent years. When
the program was first created in 1997, it was funded at $195
million (for fiscal year 1998). From fiscal years 1999 through
2001, it was funded at approximately $185 million per year;
thereafter Congress cut the budget dramatically--to $180
million in fiscal year 2002, $150 million in 2003, $145 million
in 2004 and $120 million in 2005. Last year, Congress approved
only $100 million for fiscal year 2006. Following Congress'
lead, the administration began reducing its budget requests for
the Campaign, from $185 million for fiscal year 2002, to $180
million for 2003, $170 million for 2004, $145 million for 2005
and $120 million for 2006. Finally, for 2007, the
administration has broken this pattern by requesting $120
million--although this would simply restore the Campaign to
2005's already low level.
In fact, when inflation is taken into account, the budget
of the Media Campaign has declined from $195 million in 1998 to
only (approximately) $83 million (in constant 1998 dollars) for
2006--a drop of well over 50 percent in the Campaign's
resources. The damage to the Campaign is amplified by the fact
that advertising costs have far outpaced the overall rate of
inflation.\430\ Moreover, since the Campaign relies on the
``match'' requirement, a drop of one dollar in appropriated
funds is, in fact, a two dollar cut in actual advertising
exposure--since the Media Campaign cannot obtain a match for
that lost dollar.\431\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\430\ See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Control Budget and the Byrne Grant,
HIDTA and Other Law Enforcement Programs: Are We Jeopardizing Federal,
State and Local Cooperation? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2005) (testimony of Stephen
Pasierb, PDFA) (media advertising cost inflation has averaged between 8
and 12 percent over past 8 years). At http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/
257/2422/01sep20051200/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/
22201.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\431\ Id, at 123.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the face of these facts, Congress nevertheless began
slashing funding for the Campaign at the precise moment when
ONDCP corrected many of its early problems. There are probably
many reasons for this. First, the negative publicity
surrounding the Ogilvy scandal and the early Westat reports
garnered far more attention than subsequent improvements.
Second, ONDCP's refusal (until just last year) to target any
Campaign advertisements at the burgeoning epidemic of
methamphetamine abuse meant the Campaign lost an opportunity to
build support for the program in rural and other communities
hardest hit by that drug. Moreover, continuing disputes over
whether the Campaign has been effective, and even how to
evaluate it, have also taken their toll.\432\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\432\ The committee is aware, in particular, of a dispute between
ONDCP and Westat over how to evaluate the Campaign, which may result in
the replacement of Westat. That dispute is apparently being reviewed by
the GAO, with the GAO's findings to be released sometime this year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Whatever the reason, the Campaign is now at a crossroads.
The committee urges Congress and the administration to support
full funding for the program. If the current, greatly reduced
funding levels are continued or lowered even further, the
Campaign will no longer be able to function as originally
envisioned by Congress in 1998. A Campaign that cannot reach
its audience with sufficient frequency or quality of message is
probably not worth funding at all. The committee hopes that
such a result will be avoided.
The Future of the Campaign
In addition to the funding problems faced by the Campaign,
two major issues need to be addressed by Congress and the
administration. First, despite the fact that the Campaign's
original, primary purpose was to buy media time and space for
anti-drug advertisements (to ensure that they reach the
national youth audience with sufficient frequency), a growing
amount of program funds have been expended on other activities,
such as media consultants, and ``outreach'' to the media
industry. A recent report by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) revealed that the Campaign spent over 28 percent
of the program's funds from fiscal years 2002-2004 on such
activities.\433\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\433\ Anti-Drug Media Campaign: An Array of Services Was Provided,
but Most Funds Were Committed to Buying Media Time and Space, GAO
Report No. GAO-05-175, Mar. 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Concerns about this trend were raised by the Senate
Appropriations Committee and by this committee during the 108th
Congress.\434\ Although some such expenditures are undoubtedly
necessary to ensure program effectiveness and adequate
management of the Campaign by ONDCP, care must be taken to
prevent excessive diversion of program dollars away from their
primary purpose. This is particularly important now when the
Campaign's budget is shrinking. In a time of scarce resources,
the program must focus on its major purpose of getting
advertisements on the air.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\434\ See Senate Committee on Appropriations, Report to Accompany
S. 1589 (Transportation, Treasury and General Government Appropriations
Bill, 2004), S. Rept. No. 108-146, (2003) at 143; See ONDCP
Reauthorization: The National Youth Anti-Drug Media Campaign: Hearing
before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resource, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Mar. 27,
2003). At http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=108--house--hearings&docid=f:874
50.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To ensure that result, the committee has twice approved
legislation that would set a minimum percentage of program
funds for purchasing media time and space. H.R. 2829 (as did
H.R. 2086 during the 108th Congress) would require, under
normal circumstances, that at least 77 percent of Campaign
funds be spent on time and space. However, that percentage
would rise to 82 percent when the program's budget falls below
$125 million and would fall to 72 percent if the budget rose
above $195 million. By doing so, the legislation seeks to
minimize the loss of media time and space in a time of falling
budgets and to allow for greater diversification in a time of
rising budgets.
Second, although the Media Campaign has produced effective
advertisements targeted at marijuana abuse since 2002, only
last year (after a great deal of criticism from Congress and
the public) did the ONDCP agree to use Campaign funds to
produce similar advertisements targeted at the growing epidemic
of methamphetamine abuse. ONDCP has thus far committed to
spending $1 million to produce such advertisements (but has not
stated how much it will spend to ensure that they are actually
aired).
The committee believes that the Campaign needs to do more
to deal with methamphetamine and similar emerging drug threats.
Last year, a bipartisan amendment to add $25 million for anti-
meth advertisements to the Media Campaign's budget was passed
in the House. Regrettably, the Senate did not reciprocate that
move. The committee will explore amending H.R. 2829, however,
to set aside some percentage of Campaign funds for anti-meth
and similar targeted advertisements for emerging drugs.
3. Drug-Free Communities (DFC) Program
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
DFC Requested \435\ Final \436\ Requested \437\ Enacted \438\ Request \439\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*............................. $80 $80 $80 $80 $79.19
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
The committee generally supports the administration's
request for $79,190,000 for the Drug-Free Communities (DFC)
Program, which assists local community anti-drug coalitions to
prevent substance abuse among young people. This is slightly
below the same level of funding requested by the administration
and appropriated by Congress for fiscal years 2005 and 2006.
The reduction, however, is largely due to the fact that the
administration is only requesting the maximum amount ($750,000)
authorized by statute for the National Community Anti-Drug
Coalition Institute. Last year, Congress appropriated funds ($2
million) exceeding the maximum amount authorized (see
discussion below).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\435\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\436\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\437\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\438\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\439\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the committee agrees that the Institute should not be
funded above its authorized level (see below), the committee is
concerned about the administration's unwillingness to redirect
all of the excess funds into new coalition grants (keeping the
total program funds at $80 million). If the program's budget
does not expand, many new coalitions may not be able to start
their work--particularly in the poorest communities where the
need for drug use prevention is greatest.
One significant issue facing the program is performance
measurement. In its 2006 PART review, DFC received an
``adequate'' rating--higher than many similar prevention
programs.\440\ As is the case with other programs, however, the
targets established for DFC--``enhancing the capabilities of
community anti-drug coalitions,'' ``enhancing prevention
activities,'' and ``increase[ing] citizen participation''--have
more to do with the processes of the program than with its
intended result, namely reducing drug use. Although DFC should
not be singled out for criticism on this point, ONDCP and other
agencies involved in drug use prevention need to start defining
success less in terms of whether the program is simply
functioning as planned and more in terms of whether its
functions are achieving a quantifiable result.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\440\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary, 96 (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is some evidence that the program is achieving that
result. In testimony before the subcommittee on April 26, 2005,
General Arthur Dean, chairman and CEO of the Community Anti-
Drug Coalitions of America (CADCA), highlighted successes
achieved by the DFC Program. According to General Dean, in
communities where DFC grantees operate, drug use has sharply
decreased in comparison to communities in which there is not an
anti-drug presence. For example, in the period of 1993 to 2000,
Cincinnati, Ohio achieved a 41 percent decrease in marijuana
use among 7th to 12th graders, while communities in this region
without the presence of an anti-drug coalition experienced a 33
percent increase.\441\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\441\ See Drug Prevention Programs and the Fiscal Year 2006 Drug
Control Budget: Is the Federal Government Neglecting Illegal Drug Use
Prevention? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 109th
Cong. (Apr. 26, 2005) (statement of General Arthur T. Dean, U.S. Army,
retired, on behalf of CADCA). At http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/
2422/01sep20051200/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/pdf/109hrg/
22201.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee is pleased by this evidence and hopes that
coalitions receiving grants will continue to make efforts to
show their quantifiable successes. Such data will help Congress
evaluate competing programs for scarce counterdrug funding.
National Community Anti-Drug Coalition Institute
As noted above, the administration is only requesting
$750,000 for the Institute, which is the maximum amount
authorized by statute for fiscal year 2007.\442\ The Institute,
currently operated by CADCA, provides training and other
technical assistance to coalitions receiving funds under the
program.\443\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\442\ Public Law 107-82, Sec. 4(d) (2005).
\443\ Public Law 107-82, Sec. 4(c) (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress authorized $2 million for each of the first two
years of the Institute's existence, but thereafter funding was
to decrease to $1 million for two years and then $750,000 for
fiscal years 2006 and 2007.\444\ As this committee noted when
it approved the legislation authorizing the Institute, Federal
funding was only supposed to be temporary. The Institute was
expected to seek private funding and end all dependence on the
Federal budget within a few years.\445\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\444\ Public Law 107-82, Sec. 4(d) (2005).
\445\ Government Reform Committee Report, To Extend The
Authorization Of The Drug-Free Communities Support Program For An
Additional 5 Years, To Authorize A National Community Antidrug
Coalition Institute, And For Other Purposes (H.R. 2291), H. Rept. 107-
175, Pt. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Committee staff have subsequently been informed by
personnel at CADCA that the Institute has been unable to obtain
the expected private funding. While the committee is
sympathetic, that is a problem shared by many organizations and
institutions. While $1.25 million may not seem to be a large
amount of money in the context of the entire Federal budget, it
potentially represents grants to at least 12 new coalitions.
The committee believes that the Institute should be funded at
no more than its authorized level, with additional dollars to
go to new grants under the main program.
2005 Drug-Free Communities Grant Application Process
The committee is closely monitoring a significant dispute
that has arisen in the wake of the 2005 DFC grants application
process. Major changes implemented at the direction of ONDCP in
the review process for grant applications have resulted in the
de-funding of 63 community coalitions that had been receiving
grants and the placing on probation of 88 more coalitions. The
controversy threatens to undermine confidence in the program,
and the committee hopes that it can be resolved soon.
The changes implemented by ONDCP began with the replacement
in 2004 of the agency responsible for evaluating proposals and
awarding grants--the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention (OJJDP) at the Justice Department--with the
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA) at the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).
Though ONDCP indicated to program participants that the change
in administrator would not affect the actual administration of
the program, in fact a number of significant changes were made
in the evaluation procedures.
It is still not entirely clear how the decisions to fund,
de-fund, or place existing coalitions on probation were made by
ONDCP and SAMHSA. The co-chairs of the Senate Caucus on
International Narcotics Control have requested a full
investigation of the revised process by the GAO.\446\ From
evidence provided to the committee, however, several general
statements may be made about the revised grant review process:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\446\ Letter from Senators Grassley and Biden to GAO (Oct. 18,
2005) at http://cadca.org/CoalitionResources/pp-main.asp (last visited
Feb. 24, 2006).
Unlike in previous years, the professional
``peer reviews'' of coalition activity were given far
less importance in the final decision to continue
funding a coalition, as many of the defunded coalitions
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
received high peer review scores;
The policy staff of ONDCP played a far more
active role in deciding which coalitions would continue
to receive funding;
Although the grant eligibility criteria
applied to the coalitions supposedly did not change, it
is clear that ONDCP's interpretation of those criteria
did change, as coalitions were defunded on the grounds
that they no longer met the eligibility criteria--and
there is no evidence that the coalitions themselves
changed in any way;
ONDCP did a poor job of explaining to
defunded and probationed coalitions the precise grounds
for the adverse decision; \447\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\447\ For example, the letters sent to de-funded coalitions simply
listed all possible grounds why the coalition was found to be
ineligible--without specifying which specific grounds, or the facts
supporting the particular determination.
ONDCP placed 88 coalitions on probation
because they supposedly exceeded a 20 percent cap on
``direct services'' spending (namely, spending on
specific programs), even though the 20 percent cap is
not mentioned anywhere in statute.\448\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\448\ For more specific information about the controversy, see
Letters from Senators Grassley and Biden to Director Walters, (Oct. 18,
2005, and Dec. 2, 2005) at http://cadca.org/CoalitionResources/pp-
main.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
There are a number of other questions that remain to be
answered, including whether the 20 percent ``direct services''
cap was actually used as an eligibility criteria--a policy not
authorized by the statute. Moreover, the controversy as a whole
raises the question of whether ONDCP attempted to implement a
significant policy shift in the program--by essentially
redefining the purposes and goals of DFC--through what was
intended to be a merely administrative process. The committee
hopes that GAO will be able to report back to Congress soon on
this matter.
Until then, the committee urges ONDCP and SAMHSA to
reexamine some of the decisions made during the 2005 grants
review process. In particular, it may be appropriate for ONDCP
to implement an ``appeals'' process for defunded or probationed
coalitions, as has been urged by the bipartisan co-chairs of
the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control.\449\ The
committee also expects that the 2006 grants review process will
be conducted in a more transparent manner, ensuring that the
program's fairness is not left in doubt.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\449\ See letter from Senators Grassley and Biden to Director
Walters (Dec. 2, 2005) at http://cadca.org/CoalitionResources/pp-
main.asp (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Counterdrug Technology Assessment Center (CTAC)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
CTAC Requested \450\ Final \451\ Requested \452\ Enacted \453\ Request \454\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*............................. $40 $41.7 $30 $29.7 $9.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
The committee opposes the administration's current request
for only $9.6 million for the CTAC program, a drastic cut from
the $29.7 million appropriated for fiscal year 2006 (which was
itself a major cut from the $41.7 million appropriated for
fiscal year 2005). The CTAC research program provides support
to law enforcement supply reduction by developing advancement
in technology for drug detection, communications, surveillance
and methods to share drug crime investigative information.\455\
In addition, funding is available for research into drug abuse
and addiction. Further, CTAC supports the Technology Transfer
Program which supplies new counterdrug technologies to state
and local law enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\450\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\451\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\452\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\453\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\454\ Id.
\455\ Id. at 89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed decreases would cut the research program from
$14 million to $9.6 million, while completely eliminating
Technology Transfer Program (appropriated at nearly $16 million
in fiscal year 2006). The committee strongly opposes the
termination of the Technology Transfer Program.
The program is certainly in need of greater direction and
oversight. ONDCP has not taken sufficient steps to ensure that
the Technology Transfer Program supports national goals in
reducing overall drug trafficking and improving interagency
communication and cooperation. For example, ONDCP needs to make
sure that any communications or information sharing equipment
or systems funded by CTAC do not simply benefit the agency
receiving the transfer. Rather, such systems or equipment
should only be provided if they also link the recipient agency
with other Federal, state, and local agencies and result in
increased information sharing.
Legislation approved by the committee (H.R. 2829) would
help ONDCP to improve the program's accountability and
effectiveness. The bill would give priority, for example, to
technology transfers in border drug trafficking regions. It
would also require an annual report to Congress listing where
transfers were made and what the criteria were for awarding
them.
The committee believes that reform of this kind--not
termination--is the appropriate remedy for CTAC's difficulties.
At a time when assistance to state and local drug enforcement
is under consistent attack, it is unwise for the Federal
Government to cut off yet another source of badly needed anti-
drug trafficking technology.
5. Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
CDX Requested \456\ Final \457\ Requested \458\ Enacted \459\ Request \460\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*............................. $4.5 $1.98 $0 $0 $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
In its report last year, the committee expressed concerns
about the administration's proposal to eliminate all funding
for the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat (CDX).
Congress ultimately decided not to provide any funding for CDX
for fiscal year 2006, and it is the committee's understanding
that the last remaining member CDX staff has since been
transferred to the Drug Enforcement Administration's El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC). This year's budget again proposes
no funding for CDX.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\456\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\457\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\458\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\459\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\460\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This program, which was last appropriated at slightly less
than $2,000,000 for fiscal year 2005, certainly suffered from a
lack of direction. It was intended to help ONDCP coordinate the
drug intelligence policies and activities of multiple Federal
law enforcement agencies, most notably through the creation of
a General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan (GCIP). The need for
that coordination is as great today as it ever was, meaning
that the mission of CDX is far from fulfilled.
It may well be that the functions of CDX would be better
carried out by another agency, such as EPIC, or the new drug
intelligence fusion center created by the Justice Department's
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF). The
administration, however, should set forth its specific plans
for improving drug intelligence sharing, preferably through a
new GCIP (which is in great need of updating in the post-9/11
era).\461\ For that reason, the committee included a
requirement for a new GCIP in H.R. 2829.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\461\ The current General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan may be
found at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/gcip/
index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. National Drug Court Institute
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
National Drug Court Institute Requested \462\ Final \463\ Requested \464\ Enacted \465\ Request \466\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*............................. $1.0 $0.744 $1.0 $1.0 $0.99
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: 703-575-9400, http://www.NDCI.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\462\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\463\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\464\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\465\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\466\ Id.
The committee generally supports the administration's
request for $990,000 for the National Drug Court Institute,
which is slightly less than last year's request and the
appropriated level for fiscal year 2006 ($1 million). The cut
is small, but with the increasing popularity of drug court
programs around the country, it is more important than ever
that ONDCP review these programs and determine their rate of
success.
The committee believes that better guidance could help
improve and promote these programs nationwide. A vigorous,
mandatory system of drug testing should be applied in every
drug court case to ensure that program participants are staying
off of drugs. Convicts should be sentenced to drug abstinence,
not just drug treatment. Unless participants are given
incentives to overcome their drug abuse, it is unlikely that
they will avoid future crimes. It is not clear that ONDCP has
pursued this issue since the committee's last report. The
committee therefore intends to explore the matter further.
7. National Alliance for Model State Drug Laws \467\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\467\ For more information on the National Alliance for Model State
Drug Laws, see the Alliance's website at http://www.natlalliance.org/,
or contact the Alliance at (703) 836-6100.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
National Alliance for Model State FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
Drug Laws Requested \468\ Final \469\ Requested \470\ Enacted \471\ Request \472\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*............................. $0 $0.992 $0 $1.0 $0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: 703-836-6100, http://www.Natlalliance.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\468\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\469\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\470\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\471\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\472\ Id.
The committee opposes the administration's proposal to
eliminate all Federal funding for the National Alliance for
Model State Drug Laws, which was funded at $1,000,000 in fiscal
year 2006. The Alliance serves an important function by
reviewing the drug laws in the various states and by proposing
model state laws in response to new drug threats or challenges.
For example, the Alliance recently held a major conference on
methamphetamine legislation and policy, bringing together law
enforcement officials, addiction treatment professionals,
elected officials, and public health officials from 38 states,
4 countries, the District of Columbia and Guam to discuss new
solutions to the serious problems related to meth abuse,
production, and trafficking.
Most drug enforcement, treatment and prevention is provided
at the state and local level. The Federal Government has a
strong interest in effective state drug policies, and the
Alliance helps to promote such policies.
Although Director Walters has claimed that the work of the
Alliance could be performed by ONDCP staff, \473\ the committee
strongly disagrees. Since the administration has not proposed
to add any new staff positions to ONDCP, it is unclear which
current staff have the additional free time to take up the work
of the Alliance. The committee is not of the opinion that ONDCP
is completely fulfilling its current responsibilities. There is
thus little indication that the Office is prepared to provide
the extensive legal analysis, outreach to state and local
governments, and coordination of multi-state information
sharing that the Alliance does.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\473\ See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Budget: Hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 46 (Feb. 10, 2005). At
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109--house--hearings&docid=f:208
78.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. United States Anti-Doping Agency and Membership Dues to World Anti-
Doping Agency
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
U.S. Anti-Doping Agency Requested \474\ Final \475\ Requested \476\ Enacted \477\ Request \478\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*............................. $1.5 $7.44 $7.4 $8.5 $8.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
World Anti-Doping Agency Requested \479\ Final \480\ Requested \481\ Enacted \482\ Request \483\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*............................. $1.0 $1.438 $2.9 $2.9 $1.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
The committee supports the administration's request for
$8,500,000 for the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, an increase of
nearly $7 million over the administration's fiscal year 2005
request (and identical to the appropriated level for fiscal
year 2006). Similarly, the committee generally supports the
administration's request for $1,500,000 for our nation's
membership dues in the World Anti-Doping Agency. Through the
U.S. Anti-Doping Agency and its international counterpart, the
United States seeks to stop the use of illegal performance-
enhancing drugs by American and international athletes in
Olympic sports through education, drug testing programs, and
similar initiatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\474\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\475\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\476\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\477\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\478\ Id.
\479\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\480\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\481\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\482\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\483\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee remains committed to investigating steroid
abuse in professional sports. The committee held hearings on
March 17, 2005, April 27, 2005, May 19, 2005 and June 15, 2005
to examine steroid abuse in professional sports and steroid use
by young women and will continue to provide oversight regarding
this issue in order to establish and promote adequate drug
prevention and testing programs. The committee hopes that ONDCP
and other elements of the administration will increase their
efforts to stop steroids, doping, and other unhealthy and
illegal performance enhancement practices.
9. National Drug Control Program Performance Measures
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
NDCP Performance Measures Requested \484\ Final \485\ Requested \486\ Enacted \487\ Request \488\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL*............................. $2.0 $0.992 $2.0 $1.5 $1.98
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
The committee supports the administration's request for
$1,980,000 for the further development of performance measures
for Federal drug control programs, an increase of $480,000 from
the $1,500,000 actually appropriated for fiscal year 2006. The
committee notes, however, that the ``performance measures''
funds provided by Congress to ONDCP since fiscal year 2003 have
not been used (nor were they intended by Congress to be used)
to develop a truly comprehensive performance measurement system
for the national drug control programs. Instead, the funds have
been intended and used for research into discrete issues of
performance measurement. For example, the $1.5 million
appropriated for fiscal year 2006 will be spent to replace the
Justice Department's discontinued Arrestee Drug Abuse
Monitoring (ADAM) system.\489\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\484\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\485\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\486\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\487\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\488\ Id.
\489\ Office of National Drug Control Policy, FY 2007 Congressional
Budget Submission (Feb. 2006) at 129.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fact, there has been no attempt to generate a
comprehensive performance measurement system since 2002. ONDCP
was tasked in its 1998 reauthorization statute with developing
and submitting a report containing a comprehensive performance
measurement system in 1999.\490\ ONDCP submitted annual updates
to that report through 2002, but the program was discontinued
thereafter. Beginning in 2003, Congress began appropriating
limited funds to ONDCP for the more limited research programs
now in development.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\490\ 21 U.S.C. 1705(c) (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The problem of measuring effectiveness in drug control
programs--whether enforcement, treatment, or prevention--is a
difficult one. It has never been more necessary than now,
however, when tremendous pressure is being placed on every
aspect of the Federal budget, particularly drug control
programs. Without adequate performance measures, it will be
impossible to demonstrate the real, tangible results of the
billions of dollars being spent on enforcement, treatment, and
prevention.
The committee hopes that ONDCP will make solid progress in
developing and implementing such performance measures. To that
end, the new reauthorization legislation approved by the
committee (H.R. 2829) requires ONDCP to submit a comprehensive
performance measurement system as part of each annual National
Drug Control Strategy. While the research currently funded
should continue, ONDCP needs to ensure a more systematic and
inclusive measurement system that will allow Congress and the
public to evaluate the progress made by the Federal Government
against drug trafficking and abuse.
G. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
The Department of State receives significant Federal
funding in relation to its various drug interdiction, supply
reduction and alternative development programs.
1. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
\491\ \492\ Final \493\ \494\ \495\
Requested Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) Budget*.... $731 $725.2 $734.5 $727.2 $721.5
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement $190.6 $178 $341.2 $301 $445.2
(INCLE) Budget*...............................
Supplemental Account*.......................... - $260 - - -
Total INL Budget*.............................. $1,089.8 $2,833 $1,218.4 $1,199.6 $1,166.7
Drug Resources Percentage...................... 84.6% 41.1% 88.3% 85.7% 76.9%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: Andean Counterdrug Initiative: 202-647-
8464, Afghanistan: 202-647-6642 (Office of Civilian Police and
Asia, Africa and Europe Programs) or 202-647-5175 (Afghanistan
Country Desk) http://www.state.gov/p/inl/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\491\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/agency--budget.pdf (last
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\492\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/dept--state.pdf (last visited
Feb. 24, 2006).
\493\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/06budget.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\494\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/dept--state.pdf (last visited
Feb. 24, 2006).
\495\ Id.
The President's FY 2007 budget requests $721.5 million for
the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). This is a $5.7 million
decrease from the FY 2006 enacted amount of $727.2 million.
While the committee supports the FY 2007 budget request, we are
concerned with the decline in the proposed levels of financial
support for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative and the dire
situation in Afghanistan. It is encouraging to see that the
President's FY 2007 budget includes $297.4 million for
counterdrug support in Afghanistan.\496\ It is vital that the
U.S. work with its allies to continue to stamp out drug
production at the source and build and maintain momentum for
these critical programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\496\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During a committee-initiated briefing with INL held in
November 2005, it was suggested by INL staff that their
counter-narcotics mission may be better supported and achieved
if their budget resources were divided between counter-
narcotics missions and law enforcement support missions,
instead of by country program. The INL budget is currently
divided into an ACI account and an International Narcotics
Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account, which seems to
inhibit the discretion of INL to designate resources to purely
counterdrug missions. This type of division may provide INL
with more flexibility to move money to the programs or
countries that are in need of additional counterdrug resources
at a specific time. Although no proposals have been made to
affect this change, the committee supports research into this
possible new budget structure, on the condition that INL
provide strong justification for this change.
Programs operated by INL support two of the State
Department's strategic goals, which are ``to reduce the entry
of illegal drugs into the United States'' and ``to minimize the
impact of international crime on the United States and its
citizens.'' \497\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\497\ For more information, see the Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs home page at http://
www.state.gov/p/inl/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While counter-terrorism operations receive the highest
priority in many of the regions of the world in which INL
functions, according to documents received from INL, 85.75
percent of their FY 2006 budget has been designated for
counterdrug missions.\498\ Illegal drug production and trade
has long been believed to finance terrorist activities, so the
committee commends INL for prioritizing counterdrug missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\498\ Letter from William Todd, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Civilian Police and Asia, Africa and Europe Programs,
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, to Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform (Jan. 9, 2006) (on file with the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Andean Counterdrug Initiative
The State Department's INL Bureau and its Andean
Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) have both received ``adequate''
ratings in the administration's CY 2005 Performance Assessment
Rating Tool (PART) process.\499\ The committee supports the
programs' efforts to develop long-term performance and
efficiency measures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\499\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/06budget.pdf. At http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/59169.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee supports the administration's request for
$721.5 million for the ACI but is disappointed that it
represents a $5.7 million decrease from $727.2 million
appropriated for FY 2006. The ACI budget provides support to
Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela and
Panama.\500\ These funds are needed to continue programs in law
enforcement, border control, crop reduction, alternative
economic development, democratic institution building, and
administration of justice and human rights programs in the
region. It is critical to maintain the priority of funding drug
control programs in Colombia, since 90 percent of the cocaine
that enters the United States either originates in, or transits
through, Colombia.\501\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\500\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/dept--state.pdf (last visited
Feb. 24, 2006).
\501\ Connie Veillette, Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and
Related Funding Programs: FY2006 Assistance, CRS Report No. RL 33253
(Congressional Research Service) (Jan. 27, 2006) at http://
www.congress.gov/erp/rl/pdf/RL33253.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee is also concerned about funding for the Air
Bridge Denial program, which provides assets to conduct
surveillance and drug interdiction in Colombia. The Air Bridge
Denial program was once a separate line item with separate
funding and requests, in order to facilitate congressional
oversight, but is now funded through the ACI.\502\ The
administration has proposed $465 million for Colombia under
ACI, with approximately $13 million designated for the Air
Bridge Denial program. This is a slight decrease from the $14
million appropriated in FY 2006.\503\ Moreover, the request is
significantly lower than the State Department FY 2006 request
for $21 million.\504\ As stated in the National Drug Control
Strategy, the Air Bridge Denial program contributes to
Colombia's success.\505\ The committee agrees with this
assessment, and recommends the administration provide greater
support for the program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\502\ Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007:
Appendix, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/appendix.html
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\503\ See Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 3057 (Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act
of 2006) H.R. Conf. Rep. Public Law 109-102, at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109--cong--bills&docid=f:h3057eh
.txt.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\504\ Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, (Mar. 2005)
at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2005/vol1/html/42361.htm (last
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\505\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006)
at 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is crucial that the State Department be provided with
appropriate air assets and equipment, which are essential to
the counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism missions in the
Andean Region. In its FY 2007 budget, the administration has
requested $65.7 million for the Critical Flight Safety Program
(CFSP), which is intended to upgrade aged and ailing aircraft.
While this seems like a noble objective, the committee is
concerned that this sum of money has been designated solely for
upgrading 35 year-old helicopters, with over 10,100 airframe
hours, instead of purchasing new aircraft, which will serve
their mission for a longer period of time.\506\ For the amount
of money designated to refurbish 35 year-old helicopters--with
6,000 more airframe hours than DOD customarily allows its
helicopters to remain in service \507\--the administration may
be able to purchase nearly 20 new Huey II helicopters.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\506\ Dept. of State, Secretary of State, Summary and Highlights:
International Affairs, Function 150, Fiscal Year 2007, at http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/60297.pdf (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\507\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following seven years of counterdrug work, U.S. efforts in
Colombia are increasingly bearing concrete results directly
impacting the domestic supply in America. The price of cocaine
and heroin originating from the Andean region has risen and the
purity has decreased.\508\ These successes are due in large
part to interdiction missions carried out by the Marine Patrol
Aircraft (MPA) and other air-based interdiction efforts. In
order to capitalize on these gains, the committee agrees with
International Relations Committee chairman, Henry Hyde, in
urging the State Department to replenish and bolster MPA air
assets for the Colombian Navy.\509\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\508\ Id.
\509\ Letter from Henry Hyde, chairman of the International
Relations Committee, to Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State (Feb. 14,
2006) (on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy,
and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order to maintain the outstanding results to date under
plan Colombia, both with coca and opium eradication it is
essential that the 22 aircraft (fixed and rotor) lost by the
Colombian National Police (CNP) since 2000 be promptly
replaced. In addition, to ensure the safety and ongoing
training of the CNP pilots and to foster Colombianization of
the counternarcotics program, INL should upgrade the rotary
simulator and purchase a fixed wing simulator that will assist
the CNP in the performance of nighttime operations.\510\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\510\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, in order to produce successful efforts to stem
the flow of illicit narcotics from the Andean Region,
participating parties must be adequately supplied with
surveillance assets. The committee is pleased with the progress
being made to train more Bell 212 pilots and to equip these
aircrafts with Night Vision Goggle (NVG) capabilities as a part
of the plan to improve the technical capacity of the CNP. INL
held an NVG training session in early January 2006 for 5 Bell
212 pilots. In addition, INL has recently placed an order for
42 upgrade kits for ANVIS-6 NVGs, totaling $284,000, as well as
an order for 52 new ANVIS-9 goggles, totaling $454,000. These
new NVGs and the upgrade kits will be delivered in May
2006.\511\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\511\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee believes the administration should take a
more active role to ensure that the U.S. Government provides
financial and technical support for Colombia's demobilization
program. Under this program, former members of narco-terrorist
organizations (such as the FARC, ELN and AUC) agree to lay down
their weapons, stop drug trafficking, provide valuable
intelligence to Colombia's security agencies, and seek
employment in the civilian economy. Recently, a legal dispute
between the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of
Justice has delayed American support for Colombia's
demobilization program and has squandered important
opportunities. The administration should actively seek to
resolve those differences immediately to prevent any further
disruption in U.S. support for this vital program.
Finally, the committee commends the work of INL to stem the
international flow of illicit drugs across our American borders
and into our neighborhoods. However, the lack of significant
coordination between agencies to achieve this goal is a vital
concern. The committee is disappointed that the U.S. Department
of State and the U.S. Department of Defense cannot agree on
where to station crucial air assets, and that they cannot reach
an agreement on a counter-narcotics mission. The committee is
gravely concerned by the lack of coordination among USG
agencies to achieve a comprehensive, counter-narcotics strategy
and recommends that ONDCP take a prominent leadership role in
developing and coordinating a strategy.
Bolivia
ACI funding is given to seven countries located in the
Andean Region. While the focus of the initiative has
historically and logically been Colombia, Bolivia has lately
become a particularly volatile country.
On December 18, 2005, Evo Morales, former leader of the
Coca Grower's Union, was elected president by an overwhelming
majority. Morales, an indigenous cocalero, ran on a platform of
nationalism. He vowed to alleviate poverty and discrimination
towards indigenous persons. During his campaign, Morales
promised to re-examine the current coca eradication
programs.\512\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\512\ Dept. of State, Post Reports, (Jan. 25, 2006), at http://
foia.state.gov/phonebook/postrpt/
pr--view--all.asp?CntryID=18 (last visited Feb.
24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Morales claims that he wants to increase the
production of coca for use in medicines, toothpaste and soft
drinks. Eradication efforts are hampered to some extent because
the cultivation and sale of small amounts of coca is legal in
Bolivia. The United States contends that additional production
of the plant--the main ingredient used to make cocaine--
eventually ends up on illegal drug markets. To further
complicate matters, the coca plant is prized by Bolivian
indigenous farmers for traditional medicinal uses and herbal
teas.\513\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\513\ Coca grower in Bolivia drug post, BBC News, (Jan. 28, 2006)
at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/bizarre/3619594.html (last
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although he has been in office less than one month, Morales
has made numerous cabinet selections believed to be based more
on loyalty to his administration rather than qualifications or
credentials for the position. Most notable was his selection of
Felipe Caceres, a former coca grower, as Bolivia's new drug
czar. In an interview with BBC concerning his appointment, Mr.
Caceres said he was convinced he would help lead a successful
fight within President Morales' government to end drug-
trafficking in Bolivia, proclaimed, ``What we say is no to
drugs, but yes to the coca leaf,'' adding he would not stop
production on his own plantation.\514\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\514\ Coca grower in Bolivia drug post, BBC News, (Jan. 28, 2006)
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4658880.stm (last visited Feb.
24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior to taking office, Morales himself was a coca farmer
who often protested against U.S.-backed eradication efforts.
Since being elected President, Morales has repeatedly said he
is seeking a drug-fighting program whose emphasis would be,
``No to zero coca, but yes to zero cocaine.'' \515\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\515\ Coca grower appointed drug czar in Bolivia, Reuters News
Service, (Jan. 28, 2006) at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/
bizarre/3619594.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While it is too soon to predict Morales' stance on counter-
narcotics and drug eradication, he has agreed that it, along
with U.S. assistance, is important. During campaign speeches,
Morales indicated his loyalty to coca farmers by taking the
position of ``long live coca, death to gringos.'' However, he
has altered his slogan somewhat since his election to ``long
live coca, death to cocaine.'' \516\ Since taking office, no
eradication has occurred, although drug interdiction seems to
be improving.\517\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\516\ State Department Briefing to House Committee on International
Relations, (Feb. 10, 2006).
\517\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Afghanistan
The administration is requesting $297.4 million for the
State Department's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
(INL) programs in Afghanistan.\518\ According to the ONDCP
Budget Summary of the FY 2007 National Drug Control Budget,
``Funds will be used to expand the opium poppy elimination
program from 12 to 14 provinces, providing coverage for 90
percent of the territory where the poppy crop is grown.'' \519\
While this funding will be used to accelerate the development
of police programs and to reduce opium poppy cultivation by
providing a drug control capacity, the committee is concerned
that an insufficient level of cooperation is taking place in
Afghanistan among State, DEA, USAID and CENTCOM elements to
assure that the issue is properly addressed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\518\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/dept--state.pdf (last visited
Feb. 24, 2006).
\519\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee is pleased that the President's FY 2007
budget requests funding up front for State Department counter-
narcotics programs in Afghanistan, rather than seeking to fund
it through supplemental requests. Although, there is much more
work to be done. The U.S. agencies need to coordinate and
depend on many other countries' assistance for military support
and assistance, however, counterdrug operations are carried out
mostly by Afghan forces. The German mission statement, for
example, states, ``The responsibility for drug law enforcement
is with the Afghan government, it is not part of the mission of
the German forces in Afghanistan. It is a central task for the
German reconstruction teams to create an atmosphere of security
in which Afghan drug law enforcement forces can be trained and
in which these forces can be supported realizing their long
term drug fighting strategy by the International Community.''
\520\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\520\ Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 15/ 5996 Antrag der
Bundesregierung, Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher
reitkraefte an dem Einsatz einer Internationalen
Sicherheitsunterstuetzungstruppe in Afghanistan unter Fuehrung der NATO
auf Grundlage der Resolutionen 1386 (2001) vom 20. Dezember des
Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite multinational efforts to reduce poppy cultivation
and drug trafficking in Afghanistan, in 2005 it continued to
supply 87 percent of the world's illicit opium.\521\ In
addition, the export of Afghan opium in 2005, which totaled
$2.7 billion, was equivalent to 52 percent of the nation's GDP.
Of this sum, 80 percent ends up in the pockets of drug
trafficking networks, while the rest is distributed among the
nation's two million poppy farmers.\522\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\521\ Christopher Blanchard, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S.
Policy, CRS Report RL 32686 (Congressional Research Service) (Jan. 25,
2006), at http://www.congress.gov/erp/rl/pdf/RL32686.pdf (last visited
Feb. 24, 2006).
\522\ Press Release, Dept. of State, Office of the Spokesman, Fact
Sheet: Counter-Narcotics (Jan. 31, 2006) (on file with the Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the number of hectares of opium poppy decreased
slightly in FY 2005 to 104,000 hectares from 131,000 hectares
in FY 2004, the average opium yield increased from 32 kg/ha in
FY 2004 to 39 kg/ha in FY 2005, which represented a nearly 22
percent increase in yield.\523\ According to the UN report, the
Southern Region, including the Helmand province, displayed a
136.3 percent increase in opium poppy production from 27.8 kg/
ha in 2004 to 37.9 kg/ha 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\523\ Summary Findings of Opium Trends in Afghanistan, 2005 (United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), (Sept. 12, 2005) at http://
www.unodc.org/pdf/afghanistan--2005/annex--opium-
afghanistan-2005-09-09.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Afghan President Hamid Karzai has made a ``. . . clear
commitment to stemming drug production and trade in Afghanistan
and has set the goal of a 20 percent reduction in opium
cultivation in 2006.'' \524\ In order to assist Afghanistan in
its effort to eliminate its illicit drug economy, strong
narcotics laws and law enforcement must be present. The
committee is pleased that the President's FY 2007 budget
reflects and prioritizes the strategic role of the State
Department in assisting the Government of Afghanistan in the
development of its legal system and the rule of law. Both the
Afghan Counter-narcotics Tribunal (CNT) and the Counter-
narcotics Justice Center (CNJC), which have nationwide
jurisdiction over prosecution of mid-level and high-level drug
trafficking crimes, are now fully operational.\525\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\524\ Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report, (Mar. 2006) vol. I, at 208.
\525\ Press Release, Dept. of State, Office of the Spokesman, Fact
Sheet: Strengthening the Rule of Law (Jan. 31, 2006) (on file with the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While this progress is promising, much work still remains
to solidify the criminal justice system in Afghanistan and to
disarm drug trafficking organizations.\526\ A recent New York
Times article criticized the multinational poppy eradication,
alternative development and law enforcement efforts in
Afghanistan, noting that farmers have continued growing opium
poppy against the directive of the head of the Afghan anti-
narcotics department in the Helmand province, and in spite of
personal pleas from President Hamid Karzai.\527\ According to
Fazel Ahmad Sherzad, the head of the Afghan anti-narcotics
department in the Helmand province, ``Last year 40 percent of
land was used for poppy cultivation . . . This year it is up to
80 percent in places.'' According to Mr. Sherzad, many believe
that eradication efforts last year were ``a joke'' as
cultivation in Kandahar and Farah increased. Eradication
missions even led to conflict between farmers and Afghan
eradication teams trained by USAID alternative development
contractor, DynCorp.\528\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\526\ See Afghanistan--Law Enforcement Interdiction Efforts in
Transshipment Countries to Stem the Flow of Heroin: Hearing before the
House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (Feb. 26, 2004)
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=108--house--hearings&docid=f:965
24.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\527\ Carlotta Gall, Another Year of Drug War, and the Poppy Crop
Flourishes, The New York Times, (Feb. 17, 2006) at http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/02/17/international/asia/
17poppy.html?--r=1&oref=slogin (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\528\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a country that is so vital to the security of the United
States and its allies, opium growth and in turn narcotic
production and smuggling, which are widely known to support
terrorism, must be eliminated.\529\ The Taliban is currently
conducting a PR campaign to raise drug money to carry out their
terrorist activities by circulating flyers demanding farmers to
continue growing poppy. According to the new governor in
Helmand, the Taliban have forged an alliance with drug
smugglers, providing protection for drug convoys and mounting
attacks to keep the government away and the poppy
flourishing.\530\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\529\ See U.S. Counternarcotics Policy in Afghanistan: Time for
Leadership: Hearing before the House Committee on International
Relations, 109th Cong., (Mar. 17, 2005) at http://wwwc.house.gov/
international--relations/109/20058.pdf (last visited Feb.
24, 2006).
\530\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee strongly encourages the Department of State
and other Federal agencies to coordinate their efforts with
each other, as well as with their multinational partners and
the Afghan government. The committee advises the Department of
State to work closely with the Department of Defense in a joint
effort to root out the production and trade of illicit
narcotics, which finance the Taliban and potentially other
terrorist groups.\531\ Strong government and law enforcement
presence is needed in these poppy growing provinces to enforce
existing laws, and to protect those who are carrying out the
eradication and alternative development efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\531\ See Afghanistan: Are the British Counternarcotics Efforts
Going Wobbly? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government
Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 1, 2004) at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/
LPS57423 (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is crucial that every agency responsible for carrying
out the international counter-drug strategy remain open and
mindful to structural changes that may enhance their efficiency
in achieving this strategy. During a committee-initiated
briefing with INL held in November 2005, INL staff suggested
that counterdrug goals and priorities in Afghanistan may be
more effectively achieved if the USAID Alternative Livelihoods
alternative development program were to be moved under the
supervision of, and funded through, INL. This move would ensure
that the USAID Alternative Livelihoods program supports the
counter-narcotics strategy of INL. The committee supports this
effort.
Methamphetamine
According to the INL FY 2006 Budget Justification, in
addition to its traditional mission to stem the flow of cocaine
and heroin from Andean countries, ``INL is also targeting . . .
Mexico, which is . . . a source country for heroin, marijuana
as well as methamphetamines. Finally, INL is also giving
increased attention the entry of synthetic drugs via the
Western Hemisphere into the United States.'' \532\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\532\ Dept. of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2006 Budget, Congressional
Justification, at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/54134.pdf
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In FY 2007, Mexico will receive $39 million in INL funding,
which will be used for three major programs to combat narcotics
trafficking, including efforts to stem the flow of
methamphetamine to America. These programs include Homeland/
Border Security, Counternarcotics and Institutional
Development.\533\ According to a State Department publication,
``attacking methamphetamine production facilities will be a top
enforcement priority.'' \534\ The committee supports this
decision and is pleased that a substantial portion of the $39
million will be used to protect America against the threat of
methamphetamine production and trafficking.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\533\ Dept. of State, Summary and Highlights: International
Affairs, Function 150, Fiscal Year 2007.
\534\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to correspondence received from INL by the
committee, INL funds and supports a variety of precursor
chemical diversion programs in key nations. Recent multilateral
success in regulating the importation of precursors from Canada
has shifted the flow of precursors from the Northern Border to
the Southern Border. Mexico has become a major source of meth
and its precursors, which are frequently smuggled into America
across our common border.\535\ In order to address this new
challenge, INL is collaborating with the Mexican government to
establish training programs, prosecution teams, and specialized
teams to dismantle methamphetamine labs. INL also contributes
financial support to the International Narcotics Control
Board's Databank for Precursor Control, which assists
governments in their effort to prevent the diversion of
precursor chemicals.\536\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\535\ Letter from William Todd, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Civilian Police and Asia, Africa and Europe Programs,
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, to Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform (Jan. 9, 2006) (on file with the subcommittee).
\536\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee commends the efforts of INL to assist law
enforcement institutions in other countries in stemming the
international flow of illicit narcotics. However, we encourage
INL not to neglect the movement of precursor chemicals (those
chemicals needed in the production process) in the effort to
reduce meth, heroin and cocaine production. Meth use and demand
are increasing in the U.S. and elsewhere. Therefore, INL must
continue to fund meth precursor interdiction, as well as law
enforcement training programs, at appropriate levels.
We must address the meth epidemic using a comprehensive
approach of State laws restricting pseudoephedrine and
production controls on the few factories that produce
pseudoephedrine internationally.\537\ The committee encourages
the State Department to work toward a protocol for global
tracking of pseudoephedrine shipments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\537\ Meth still pouring through loopholes: Congress must adopt
global controls to put meth ingredients out of the long reach of the
Mexican drug cartels, The Oregonian, Jan. 24, 2006, at http://
www.oregonlive.com/search/index.ssf?/base/editorial/
1138065917166080.xml?oregonian?ede&coll=7#continue (last visited Feb.
24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the committee expects the State Department to be
aggressive in its implementation of the methamphetamine
certification statute in the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic
Act of 2005.\538\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\538\ The U.S.A. Patriot Act, Title II--The Combat Methamphetamine
Epidemic Act of 2005, S. 2118, 108th Cong., at http://
frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109--cong--bills&docid=f:s2118is
.txt.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
H. UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The President's FY 2007 budget requests $337.8 million for
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
to supplement counter-narcotics missions in Afghanistan and the
Andean Region. This represents a $31.6 million decrease from
the FY 2006 enacted amount of $369.4. While the committee
supports the FY 2007 budget request for USAID, we have numerous
areas of concern, particularly with respect to deficiencies in
the administration of taxpayer money.\539\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\539\ Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on
Government Reform, to Randall Tobias, U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator,
U.S. Department of State, (Feb. 6, 2006) at http://reform.house.gov/
UploadedFiles/
02.06.06%20State%20Tobias%20USAID%20prostitution%20lies.pdf.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
USAID Requested Final Requested \540\ Enacted \541\ Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACI--Alternative Development*............ $229.3 \542 $235.1 $216.3 $228.8 $228.8 \543
\ \
Afghanistan Alternative Livelihoods*..... $95.7 \544\ $175 $146 $140.6 $109
Total USAID counterdrug moneys*.......... $325 $362.3 $410.1 $369.4 $337.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: U.S. Agency for International Development:
202-712-4810, http://www.usaid.gov/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\540\ U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., Congressional Budget
Justification, FY 2006, at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/
summary.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\541\ Making Appropriations for Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2006, Public Law
109-102 to Accompany H.R. 3057, H.R. Conf. Rept. No. 109-265. At http:/
/frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109--cong--reports&docid=f:hr265
.109.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\542\ U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., Congressional Budget
Justification, FY 2005, at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/
summary.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\543\ Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2007:
Appendix, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2007/appendix.html
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\544\ U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., Afghanistan Budget Summary, at
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/ane/af.html.
1. Andean Counterdrug Initiative and Alternative Development
The committee supports the administration's FY 2007 request
for $721.5 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative but is
disappointed that it represents a $13 million decrease from
$734.5 million appropriated for FY 2006.\545\ Of this FY 2007
ACI request, nearly $207 million will be allocated to USAID in
order to carry out alternative development and institution-
building programs.\546\ This money will fund projects needed to
continue the enforcement, border control, crop reduction,
alternative economic development, democratic institution
building, and administration of justice and human rights
programs in the region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\545\ The Conference Report on H.R. 3057, Foreign Operations,
Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 2006
(Public Law 109-102), provides $734.5 million for the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative, of which $228.8 million was directed for
alternative development and institution building programs, to be
carried out by USAID. Of this amount, $131.2 million was allocated for
Colombia; $37 million for Bolivia; $11.54 million for Ecuador; and $49
million for Peru.
\546\ Press Release, U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., USAID Fiscal Year
2007 Budget Request (Feb. 8, 2006) at http://www.usaid.gov/press/
factsheets/2006/fs060208.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the committee applauds the work of USAID in the
Andean Region, it is concerned with the decrease in FY 2007
funding for its alternative development program within the
Andean Counterdrug Initiative.
USAID has the responsibility to take effective action to
eliminate illicit coca production and to establish licit,
sustainable farm-level production capacity and economic
stability in countries throughout the Andean Region. USAID uses
ACI funds for programs in four Andean countries--Colombia,
Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador.\547\ These programs include
expanding a licit agricultural economy, assisting displaced
groups, strengthening democratic institutions, promoting the
rule of law, human rights, and judicial reform. This work is
crucial to our nation's drug control strategy and must be
funded at appropriate levels.\548\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\547\ Dept. of State, Summary and Highlights: International
Affairs, Function 150, Fiscal Year 2007.
\548\ U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., Budget Justification to the
Congress FY 2006, at http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/
summary.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee believes that the USAID counter-narcotics
mission should coordinate more effectively with the State
Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs (INL), and because of their expertise, INL
must take a more active lead in the apportioning of designated
dollars. USAID acknowledges how important its efforts are in
the ACI supply reduction and alternative development efforts,
and therefore, moneys spent must be included in the national
drug budget.
The ACI budget provides support to Colombia, Peru, Bolivia,
Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela and Panama. The subcommittee is
concerned that the 13 percent reduction between 2003 and the
administration's 2005 request for the initiative (from $841
million to $731 million) stifles the hard-earned successes that
have recently become evident.
2. Afghanistan and Alternative Development
While the USAID alternative development programs in
Colombia can be called a qualified success, the committee is
cautious about making the same pronouncement of USAID's efforts
in Afghanistan. Although USAID's Alternative Livelihoods
Program (AL) is part of the strategy of ``The 1384 (2005)
Counter Narcotics Implementation Plan--to tackle the
cultivation, production and trafficking of drugs in
Afghanistan,'' this program has failed to curtail Afghan opium
poppy production, which has greatly increased since the
inception of AL in 2004.\549\ The AL Program was initially
funded at $5 million in FY 2004 but was financed at $175
million in FY 2005. In FY 2006, USAID will only receive $146
million for the AL Program, which is a $29 million decrease
from FY 2005. The committee is concerned with the declining
trend in the families of the AL program. USAID received $146
million for the AL Program in FY 2006 and has requested only
$109 million for FY 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\549\ The 1384 (2005) Counter Narcotics Implementation Plan of the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, at http://www.mcn.gov.af/
imp--plan.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee encourages USAID to be clear and consistent
in its presentation of the condition of poppy cultivation,
yield and opium production in Afghanistan. When the term
``cultivation'' is used, it refers to the number of hectares
that have been planted and the amount of land area used for
planting. The Federal agencies involved in opium poppy
eradication frequently use this measurement to determine the
number of hectares of poppy grown and the number of acres
devoted to poppy cultivation. The recent decrease in
cultivation is indeed a significant stride in the right
direction. However, it does not portray the complete picture.
One must also look at the poppy yield to determine the success
of eradication programs.
The term ``yield'' refers to the quality of the actual
harvest (or crop) of poppy in terms of its potential to produce
illicit opium. While it is important to determine whether poppy
cultivation is up or down, it is even more important to ensure
that the opium poppy yield decreases. A decrease or increase in
yield is often dependent on factors such as growing conditions
and weather, which are out of the control of those involved in
eradication. Yield may also be a result of better quality
fertilizer and other farming techniques. And finally,
``production'' refers to the actual production of illicit opium
from the good quality poppy crop.
Under the watch of USAID and other U.S. Government agents,
Afghan opium poppy cultivation dramatically increased, from
80,000 hectares in 2003, to 131,000 hectares in 2004.\550\
Similarly, the production of opium increased from 3,600 metric
tons (mt) in 2003 to 4,200 mt in 2004.\551\ On the other hand,
while opium cultivation and production increased, the average
opium yield decreased from 45 kg/ha in 2003 to 32 kg/ha in
2004.\552\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\550\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium
Survey, 2004, (Nov. 2004) at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/
afghanistan--opium--survey--2004.pdf
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\551\ Id.
\552\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As discussed previously, while cultivation of opium poppy
decreased slightly in FY 2005 to 104,000, the average opium
yield increased from 32 kg/ha in FY 2004 to 39 kg/ha in FY
2005.\553\ According to the UN report, the Southern Region,
including the Helmand province, displayed a 136.3 percent
increase in opium poppy production from 27.8 kg/ha in 2004 to
37.9 kg/ha 2005. USAID focuses much of its AL program in
Helmand.\554\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\553\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Summary Findings of
Opium Trends in Afghanistan, 2005 (Sept. 12, 2005) at http://
www.unodc.org/pdf/afghanistan--2005/annex--opium-
afghanistan-2005-09-09.pdf.
\554\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
State Department's anticipated cultivation trends for 2006
are alarming for Afghanistan. Only three of the thirty-four
provinces in the country are expected to see a decrease in
poppy cultivation.\555\ Another thirteen are expected to see
increases in production, with seven of those seeing growth of
greater than fifty percent over 2005.\556\ Helmand Province
alone is anticipated to produce 75,000 to 85,000 hectares of
opium poppy which represents 51 percent of the world's
anticipated opium poppy harvest.\557\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\555\ Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources staff briefing with INL Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
on INL Afghanistan Operations, Mar. 8, 2006.
\556\ Id.
\557\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the committee finds the initial efforts of AL
praiseworthy, the committee urges quick action to address
deficiencies. The committee is shocked and dismayed to learn
that the greatest increases in opium poppy production have
taken place in the areas where USAID administers its AL
programs.
FACT SHEET--AFGHANISTAN \558\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\558\ Id.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Variation on
2004 2004 2005
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Net opium poppy cultivation............................... 131,000 ha -21% 104,000 ha
in percent of actual agricultural land.................. 2.9% .............. 2.3%
number of provinces affected............................ 32 (all) .............. 25
Average opium yield....................................... 32 kg/ha 22% 39 kg/ha
Production of opium....................................... 4200 mt - 2.4% 4,100 mt
in percent of world illicit opium production............ 87% .............. 87%
Number of households involved in opium cultivation........ 356,000 -13% 309,000
Number of persons involved in opium cultivation........... 2.3 million .............. 2.0 million
in percent of total population (23 million)............. 10% .............. 8.7%
Average farm-gate price of fresh opium at harvest time.... US $92 +11% US $102/kg
Average farm-gate price of dry opium at harvest time...... US $142 -3% US $138/kg
Afghanistan GDP........................................... US $4.7 billion +10.4 US $5.2 billion
Total export value of opium to neighboring countries...... US $2.8 billion -3.6% US $2.7 billion
in percent of GDP....................................... 61% .............. 52%
gross trafficking profits of Afghan traffickers....... US $2.2 billion -2.7% US $2.14 billion
total farm-gate value of opium production:............ US $600 million 6.6% US $560-million
Household average yearly gross income from opium of opium US $1,700 +6% US $1,800
growing families.........................................
Per capita gross income from opium of opium growing US $260 .............. US $280
families.................................................
Afghanistan's GDP per capita.............................. US $206 .............. US $226
Indicative gross income from opium per ha................. US $4,600 +17% US $5,400
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In correspondence with the committee, USAID cited both U.S.
and United Nations estimates, which indicate a decrease in the
total area under cultivation for poppy in Afghanistan from 2004
to 2005.\559\ These estimates, which range from a decrease of
21 percent according to the UN, to 48 percent, according to the
United States, are misleading because they do not account for
the total increase in opium poppy yield. While the total area
dedicated to poppy cultivation decreased in 2005, improved
growing conditions resulted in a higher yield than in
2004.\560\ Consequently, the total production of opium
decreased by a much smaller margin than the decrease in the
total area under cultivation.\561\ A better representation of
the level of poppy production in Afghanistan would show only a
2.4 percent decrease from 2004 to 2005, and a 22 percent
increase in opium yield.\562\ The committee suggests that USAID
use the measurement of opium yield (in kilograms), rather than
total area under cultivation, in order to properly measure
progress in Afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\559\ Letter from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Administrator, Bureau
for Legislative and Public Affairs, to Mark Souder, chairman of the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 12, 2006) (on file with the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
\560\ See Afghanistan: Are the British Counternarcotics Efforts
Going Wobbly? Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government
Reform, 108th Cong. (Apr. 1, 2004) at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/
LPS57423, (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\561\ Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Office of the
Spokesman, Fact Sheet: Counter-Narcotics (Jan. 31, 2006) (on file with
the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources).
\562\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Summary Findings of
Opium Trends in Afghanistan, 2005, (Sept. 12, 2005) at http://
www.unodc.org/pdf/afghanistan--2005/annex--opium-
afghanistan-2005-09-09.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interviews of USAID officials by committee staff confirmed
numerous deficiencies in the management of the AL program.
Specifically, the committee is troubled by what it learned
about AL systems for delivering crop fertilizer and monitoring
its use. No standard or system had been established to certify
the use of fertilizer for its intended application to
alternative crops. The USAID officials interviewed on January
18, 2006, were unable to cite any steps taken in AL to ensure
that fertilizer is not being diverted to cultivate on the opium
poppy crops it was intended to help eradicate.\563\ However,
USAID representatives recently confirmed that for the most
recent Seed and Fertilizer distribution, USAID contractors and
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) officials met with
farmers and village elders in advance of the distribution to
ensure that recipients used the fertilizer for licit means.
From these meetings, a written agreement was signed with local
officials that committed the recipients to not grow poppy; and
the GAO is responsible for monitoring compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\563\ The staff of the Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, received a briefing from
USAID on Jan. 18, 2006, in which the lack of sufficient monitoring of
fertilizer distribution was discussed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Similarly, in order to properly monitor the AL Program, the
Committee urges USAID to perform vigilant oversight of both:
the Afghanistan AL contractors Development Alternatives Inc.,
Chemonics, and PADCO; as well as those used as a part of ACI.
USAID must be able to show that grants and contracts are
awarded through a competitive process. Appropriate requirements
for grantees or contractors must also be instituted in order to
work with USAID.
Finally, the committee believes that if a country is on the
``majors list'' (i.e. a major drug producer), then funding for
USAID programs should be co-managed with INL, thereby
facilitating more coordination to improve and accomplish the
counter-narcotics strategy.
In a Foreign Press Center Briefing in New York City on
September 15, 2005, Nancy J. Powell, Assistant Secretary of
State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
noted the 20 countries listed on the President's 2005 majors
list. These countries are: Afghanistan, the Bahamas, Bolivia,
Brazil, Burma, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Haiti, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela. In order for a
country to be among the world's largest drug producing/drug
transit countries, it must be one in which:
``(A) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy is
cultivated or harvested during a year; (B) 1,000
hectares or more of illicit coca is cultivated or
harvested during a year; or (C) 5,000 hectares or more
of illicit cannabis is cultivated or harvested during a
year, unless the President determines that such illicit
cannabis production does not significantly affect the
United States. FAA Sec. 481(e) (2).'' \564\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\564\ See http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/1999/916.htm (last
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Or
``(A) That is a significant direct source of illicit
narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled
substances significantly affecting the United States;
or (B) Through which are transported such drugs or
substances. FAA Sec. 481(e) (5).'' \565\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\565\ Id.
The USAID efforts in the Andean Region are currently funded
through INL, whereas the USAID Alternative Livelihoods Program
in Afghanistan is funded from a separate fund in the State
Department budget. Funding for the AL Program comes from a
combination of Economic Support Funds and Development
Assistance funds.\566\ The committee suggests that this funding
discrepancy be investigated and that appropriate changes be
made in the funding source of the USAID AL Program in
Afghanistan. More specifically, the committee strongly
recommends that the Afghan AL program be funded through INL as
in Colombia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\566\ Letter from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Administrator, Bureau
for Legislative and Public Affairs, to Mark Souder, chairman of the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 12, 2006) (on file with the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) PART Performance Evaluation of
ACI
A recent OMB Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART)
evaluation examined the USAID operations within the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative over a three month period from June 30,
2005 through September 30, 2005.\567\ While this was not a
comprehensive PART review, it did illuminate some apparent
flaws in the performance measures used to assess USAID
programs. The terms used in the performance measurements are
vague and must be defined so that performance measures
accurately reflect success or failure. The committee believes
that the performance measures used to assess USAID programs
must be unambiguous so that the Agency can be properly held
accountable for the taxpayer dollars they receive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\567\ Letter from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Administrator, Bureau
for Legislative and Public Affairs, to Mark Souder, chairman of the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 12, 2006) (on file with the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FY 2006 OMB PART Program Assessment scored the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative with an overall ``adequate''
rating.\568\ In the PART evaluation of ACI, it is clear that
USAID is a crucial actor not only in capacity-building programs
in the Andean Region but also in providing assistance directly
to those institutions and communities so as to prevent the
cultivation, processing and trafficking of illicit drugs. This
further supports the inclusion of USAID programs within the ACI
in the ONDCP National Drug Budget.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\568\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at 107. At http://
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/06budget/06budget.pdf
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While USAID received good marks for its yearly and long-
term output measures (i.e. measuring hectares of licit crops in
USAID assisted areas), the PART evaluation notes a deficiency
in USAID outcome measurements. It should be noted, therefore,
that although USAID has a long-term output measure for its
alternative development programs in the Andean region, the
agency ``has not yet developed long-term outcome measures for
the alternative development component of the program.'' \569\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\569\ Id, at 108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PART review also illustrated a lack of coordination and
consultation at the Washington headquarters level between USAID
and INL, specifically concerning whether the USAID alternative
development goals sufficiently complement INL's goals of
eradication. In addition, USAID and INL must effectively
collaborate with ONDCP when setting annual and long-term goals.
INL and USAID have, however, committed to closer coordination
in the planning of their complementary program goals.
The committee strongly urges USAID to work with OMB and
ONDCP to develop new and more detailed performance measurements
to be used in the PART Program Assessment, as well as in
ongoing outcome measurements. For example, in measuring the
success of USAID Alternative Development Programs, it would be
helpful to know how many villagers, either in the Andean Region
or Afghanistan, have formally agreed not to grow illicit crops
and not to divert seed and fertilizer for illicit purposes.
Similarly, it would be useful to measure success by the number
of acres that once grew illicit crops, but are now growing
legal crops or have been used to build a business and create
jobs.
The committee commends USAID for participating in so many
counterdrug strategy Working Groups with other Federal
agencies, as well as with host country governments. The Working
Groups include weekly counter-narcotics core group meetings at
the US Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, weekly Afghanistan
Working Group meetings, the Afghanistan Interagency Operations
Group (AIOG), in which ONDCP plays a leadership role, and the
Committee for International Drug Control, which is periodically
chaired by ONDCP.\570\ We urge ONDCP to ensure that these
Working Groups are truly collaborative in nature and that they
serve to provide cooperation, partnership and deconfliction
among the parties represented. If these Working Group meetings
are merely a formality, then they are not serving to achieve
goals to stem the flow of illicit narcotics into America.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\570\ Letter from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Administrator, Bureau
for Legislative and Public Affairs, to Mark Souder, chairman of the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 12, 2006) (on file with the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Harm Reduction
A recurring criticism is that the Washington, D.C. USAID
office exercises very little oversight over its field offices,
which are largely responsible to the embassies to which they
are attached, but less so to USAID headquarters.
USAID field offices are known to finance the production of
``Harm Reduction'' materials and brochures in Central Asia and
East Asia. However, these moneys are not accounted for by the
USAID Washington, D.C. office, or in the ONDCP national drug
budget. ``Harm Reduction'' is an ideological position
identified with the views of drug legalization financier George
Soros, which assumes certain individuals are incapable of
making healthy decisions. Advocates of this position hold that
dangerous behaviors, such as drug abuse, therefore simply must
be accepted by society and those who choose such lifestyles--or
become trapped in them--should be enabled to continue these
behaviors in a ``less harmful'' manner. Often, however, these
lifestyles are the result of addiction, mental illness or other
conditions that should and can be treated rather than accepted
as normative, healthy behaviors.
In its annual report released March 2, 2004, the
International Narcotics Control Board--the United Nations' drug
agency--sharply criticized ``harm reduction'' measures such as
needle exchange programs and so-called ``safe injecting
rooms,'' because such policies encourage drug use and violate
``article 4 of the 1961 Convention [which] obliges State
parties to ensure that the production, manufacture, import,
export, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of drugs
is to be limited exclusively to medical and scientific
purposes. Therefore, from a legal point of view, such
facilities violate the international drug control
conventions.'' \571\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\571\ Dept. of State, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement,
Drugs, The Law and Human Rights, Annual Report for 2003, at http://
www.release.org.uk/news/
International--Narcotics--Control--Boar
d--040316.pdf#search='International%20Narcotics%20Board%
202003%20annual%20report (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee is deeply concerned that while the
International Narcotics Control Board was warning parties to
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961), the Convention
on Psychotropic Substances (1971), and the United Nations
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances (1988) that government financing of
``harm reduction'' schemes may be in violation of those
accords, it appears that USAID was financing a ``harm
reduction'' agenda of its own.\572\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\572\ For more information on these treaties, see the International
Narcotics Control Board website at http://www.incb.org/incb/index.html
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On February 10 2005, the White House Office of National
Drug Control Policy Director John Walters testified before the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources.\573\ He was asked about USAID's involvement in two
questionable ``harm reduction'' projects. The first project was
the 14th International Conference on Reduction of Drug Related
Harm held in Chiang Mai, Thailand from April 6-10, 2003.\574\
The conference was sponsored by the International Harm
Reduction Association, the Asian Harm Reduction Network, and
cosponsored by the Centre for Harm Reduction and USAID.\575\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\573\ See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Budget: Hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (Feb. 10, 2005) (statement
of John Walters, Director of the White House Office of National Drug
Control Policy). At http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109--house--hearings&docid=f:208
78.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\574\ For more information on the 14th International Conference on
Reduction of Drug Related Harm held in Chiang Mai, Thailand from Apr.
6-10, 2003, see https://www.globalhealth.org/news/article/2194 (last
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\575\ For more information on the Asian Harm Reduction Network, see
http://ahrn.thaiis.us/
index.php?option=content&task=view&id=2117&Itemid=2 (last visited Feb.
24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second project was the Asian Harm Reduction Network's
350-page, second-edition Manual for Reducing Drug Related Harm
in Asia (which bears a USAID logo). USAID's role in the
production of the manual is acknowledged inside the cover:
``This publication was made possible through support provided
by the Office of Strategic Planning, Operations, and Technical
Support, Bureau for Asia and the Near East, U.S. Agency for
International Development. . .\576\ Included in the second
chapter of the manual, ``Rationale for Harm Reduction,'' are
sections on ``needle and syringe programs,'' ``sales and
purchasing of injecting equipment,'' and ``removing barriers.''
\577\ In the fifth chapter, ``Injecting Safely,'' are sections
devoted to ``sharing of injecting equipment,'' and ``safe
injecting.'' \578\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\576\ Manual for Reducing Drug Related Harm in Asia, Macfarlane
Burnet Centre for Medical Research and Asian Harm Reduction Network,
(the Centre for Harm Reduction), at http://www.chr.asn.au/freestyler/
gui/files/
Manual.pdf#search='manual%20for%20reducing%20drug%20related%20harm%20in%
20asia' (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\577\ Id.
\578\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ONDCP Director Walters responded that he was not aware of
the ``harm reduction'' publication financed by USAID nor did he
attend the USAID-cosponsored 14th International Conference on
Reduction of Drug Related Harm.\579\ He added, however, that he
has been aggressive in rebuking international organizations
which promote ``harm reduction.'' \580\ He pledged to look into
this regrettable matter and report back to the Committee.\581\
He has not yet done so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\579\ For more information on the 14th International Conference on
Reduction of Drug Related Harm held in Chiang Mai, Thailand from Apr.
6-10, 2003, see https://www.globalhealth.org/news/article/2194 (last
visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\580\ See Fiscal Year 2006 Drug Budget: Hearing before the House
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform, 109th Cong. (2005) (Statement of John
Walters, Director of the White House Office of National Drug Control
Policy), at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/
getdoc.cgi?dbname=109--house--hearings&docid=f:208
78.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\581\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While this matter is under investigation by the White
House, the committee recommends that any drug-related programs
of USAID be put under close oversight and management by the
State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement. Ultimately, taxpayer subsidies of ``Harm
Reduction'' efforts should be eliminated and all drug-related
activity by USAID must be accounted for in the national drug
budget, and, therefore, supervised by ONDCP.
In February 2005, the Government Reform Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources requested
that USAID provide comprehensive documentation of all financial
interactions with the Soros Foundation, the Open Society
Institute, and other organizations affiliated with George Soros
or the ``Harm Reduction'' movement. In a letter received on
January 12, 2006, from USAID, it is stated that, ``USAID has
not and does not support any `harm reductions' strategies
inconsistent with either U.S. law or policy.'' \582\ To date,
USAID has provided 11 CD-ROMs, with over 3000 documents
detailing financial interactions with these groups. The
committee is in the process of analyzing these documents and
thanks USAID for its cooperation and disclosure.\583\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\582\ Letter from J. Edward Fox, Assistant Administrator, Bureau
for Legislative and Public Affairs, to Mark Souder, chairman of the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources,
Committee on Government Reform (Jan. 12, 2006) (on file with the
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources).
\583\ USAID's cooperation and disclosure was markedly improved
after a Nov. 16, 2005 meeting with committee staff inquiring why USAID
should not receive a subpoena for document requests left unanswered for
an unreasonable amount of time. For more material on this meeting, see,
e.g., Letter from Mark Souder, chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, Committee on Government
Reform, to Randall Tobias, U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, U.S.
Department of State, (Feb. 6, 2006) at http://reform.house.gov/
UploadedFiles/
02.06.06%20State%20Tobias%20USAID%20prostitution%20lies.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Department of Treasury
1. Internal Revenue Service
IRS Drug Control Funding (in millions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
IRS Drug Control Funding \584\ FY 2005 \585\ \586\ \587\
Requested Final Requested Enacted Request
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL................................... $ $ $55.6 $55.0 $55.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Contact Information: Department of Treasury Office of Public
Affairs: 202-622-2960, http://www.irs.gov/compliance/
enforcement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\584\ FY 2006 was the first year that the IRS received a direct
appropriation to support drug control programs. In previous years, the
IRS would receive drug control funding through the Department of
Justice's OCDETF program.
\585\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\586\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006)
\587\ Id.
The committee supports the President's request for Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) drug control programs, which is estimated
to include $55.6 million for drug control investigations. This
would be an increase of less than $1 million over the $55
million enacted for fiscal year 2006. This funding would
provide 329 FTE to support the Department of Justice's
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) program.
As stated in the 2006 National Drug Control Strategy, it is
critically important that U.S. law enforcement focus its
resources to attack the financial infrastructure of drug
trafficking organizations.\588\ This will cause a significant
disruption to the supply of illegal drugs entering the U.S. and
is a major focus both of the Department of Homeland Security,
the Department of Justice (through the OCDETF program) and the
Internal Revenue Service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\588\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, (Feb. 2006)
at 32. At http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/
ndcs06/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Money laundering--the process of disguising or concealing
illicit funds to make them appear legitimate--is a serious
crime, with an estimated $500 billion to $1 trillion laundered
worldwide annually, according to the United Nations Office of
Drug Control and Prevention.\589\ Money laundering provides the
fuel for terrorists, drug dealers, arms traffickers, and other
criminals to operate and expand their activities, which can
have devastating social and economic consequences.\590\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\589\ See Threat Convergence at the Border: How Can We Improve the
Federal Effort To Dismantle Criminal Smuggling Organizations? Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources, Committee on Government Reform, 108th Cong. (July 12, 2005)
(testimony of Richard M. Stana, Director of Homeland Security and
Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office), at http://
reform.house.gov/CJDPHR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=30454.
\590\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee recognizes that the IRS plays a unique role
in illicit drug money investigations. The IRS has sole
jurisdiction for criminal violations of the Internal Revenue
Code (IRC), Title 26 of the United States Code.\591\ According
to the code, gross income is defined as ``. . . all income from
whatever source derived.'' This has been held by the courts to
include income earned from illegal activities such as drug
trafficking. The primary criminal statutes violated include
evasion of income tax, false income tax returns, and failure to
file tax returns, among others.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\591\ Additional IRS background information at http://www.irs.gov/
taxpros/article/0,,id=98137,00.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The IRS, as part of its core tax administration mission,
addresses both the criminal and civil aspects of money
laundering. The IRS Criminal Investigations Division (CID) is
involved in several initiatives which identify, target, disrupt
and dismantle drug traffickers. IRS-CI special agents ``follow
the money'' within various inter-agency task forces and
centers. Some of these initiatives include establishing 41
Suspicious Activity Review Teams (SAR-RT) to review and analyze
suspicious activity data, and participation in both High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) and the Department of
Justice's Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF)
initiatives.\592\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\592\ More information available at http://www.irs.gov/compliance/
enforcement/article/0,,id=107488,00.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee fully supports the efforts of the IRS to
support counterdrug financial investigations. Given the unique
statutory authorities of the IRS, it is important that its
investigators be closely integrated into all major drug and
money seizures pursued by the Federal law enforcement agencies.
The committee believes that investigators are the critical link
in establishing connections between random drug seizures and
trafficking networks.
J. Department of Veterans Affairs
1. General
VA Drug Control Funding
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2005 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2006 FY 2007
DVA Requested \593\ Final \594\ Requested \595\ Enacted \596\ Request \597\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AGENCY TOTAL*...................... $822.787 $396.13 $532.947 $412.648 $428.349
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* in millions.
Contact Information: Office of Public Affairs: 202-273-6000,
http://www.va.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\593\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2005
Budget Summary (Mar. 2004) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/budgetsum04/index.html (last visited Feb. 24,
2006).
\594\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\595\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2006
Budget Summary (Feb. 2005) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/06budget/index.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\596\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/
publications/policy/07budget/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
\597\ Id.
The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has served an
essential role in preventing and treating the abuse of drugs by
former military personnel. The committee generally supports the
administration's fiscal year 2007 budget request for VA drug
control. However, the committee has particular concerns,
detailed below, addressing the VA portion of the
administration's Drug Strategy and Budget.
2. Narrowing the Scope of the Provision of Treatment
The committee is deeply concerned with the administration's
strategy with respect to the availability of drug treatment for
military personnel now returning from active deployment. The
current VA policy allows for only a two-year window in which
all military personnel, including National Guard, returning
from duty abroad qualify for VA drug treatment.
VA officials made clear that current scientific evidence
indicates, based on studies dating back to Vietnam era
personnel, that 70-80 percent of those returning from active
duty will not begin to seek drug treatment until two years
after returning from active deployment.\598\ Consequently, the
committee expresses deep concern that the VA is not making drug
treatment sufficiently available to military personnel
returning from active duty. The committee strongly suggests
that the VA revise this policy to provide for a five-year
window for drug treatment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\598\ Paula P. Schnurr, Carole A. Lunney, Anjana Sengupta, & Lynn
C. Waelde, A Descriptive Analysis of PTSD Chronicity in Vietnam
Veterans, 16 J. of Traumatic Stress, (2003) at 545.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee also repeats last year's critique of the VA
policy of restricting access to drug treatment services by
excluding those veterans without dependents who have an income
of more than $29,903 or do not have a service-related
disability. Such an arbitrary delineation both restricts a
veteran's access to care and provides no assurance that
alternative care is available. This economic focus has been
described as being a ``Department wide'' policy in staff
interviews.\599\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\599\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources, drug control budget briefing with the
Department of Veterans Affairs on Dec. 16, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although the committee supports the position that those who
are most unable to provide treatment by private means should
receive treatment priority, the reality is that drug addiction
and dependence, commonly resulting from active duty, do not
respect the economic background of particular veterans.
3. Specialized Treatment
With an increase of drug abuse patients expected from
currently deployed troops, the committee supports the estimated
request of $428.3 million for VA drug treatment programs for
fiscal year 2007. This compares to the enacted fiscal year 2006
level of $412.6 million.\600\ In fiscal year 2004, the VA
reports having treated 89,000 veterans with substance abuse
disorders.\601\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\600\ The White House, National Drug Control Strategy, FY 2007
Budget Summary (Feb. 2006) at 6.
\601\ Dr. John D. McKellar & Meghan Saweikis, M.S., Health Services
for VA Substance Use Disorder Patients: Comparison of Utilization in
Fiscal Years 2004, 2003, and 1998, (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The committee supports the VA's prioritization on improving
specialized treatment. As indicated in our most recent Staff
interviews, the specific priorities are the replacement of
methadone treatment with buprenorphine treatment for opiate
addicts, the expansion of residential treatment capabilities,
and generally increasing overall treatment availability.\602\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\602\ Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources, drug control budget briefing with the
Department of Veterans Affairs on Dec. 16, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Patients who have acquired familiarity with methadone
treatment are extremely reluctant to adopt other forms of
treatment.\603\ In light of such difficulties involved with
replacing methadone treatment with buprenorphine treatment, the
committee supports the VA's initiative to utilize buprenorphine
with all new patient cases. VA representatives disclosed in
staff interviews that approximately 138 VA physicians have
received training and are currently prescribing
buprenorphine.\604\ VA is also planning four regional training
seminars for certification in prescribing buprenorphine.\605\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\603\ Id.
\604\ Id..
\605\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Continued training of VA physicians on buprenorphine
treatment is also strongly supported in order that VA
physicians will both understand its benefits over methadone
treatment and acquire a familiarity with its implementation
with new patients. The committee strongly suggests that
methadone treatments be entirely phased out and replaced by the
more effective buprenorphine treatment with new patients.
The committee also supports the VA's continued efforts to
expand its residential treatment capabilities. Specialized
treatment includes the cost generated by the treatment of
patients with a drug use disorder who are treated in a
substance abuse treatment program, including inpatient
programs, outpatient treatment, residential treatment, and
methadone and buprenorphine treatment. Staff interviews
revealed that approximately 125,000 veterans currently need
special treatment while only 89,000 receive it, many of whom
require residential treatment in order to receive optimal
care.\606\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\606\ Dr. John D. McKellar & Meghan Saweikis, M.S., Health Services
for VA Substance Use Disorder Patients: Comparison of Utilization in
Fiscal Years 2004, 2003, and 1998, (2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Inter-Departmental Cooperation
Staff interviews indicate the VA's strong collaboration,
specifically relating to research and development, with the
Center for Substance Abuse Treatment and the National Institute
for Drug Abuse.
DHHS--VA senior officials serve on the
National Advisory Councils of NIDA, the Center for
Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT), and the Center for
Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP). VA officials also
have a seat on a planning committee with SAMHSA on the
preparation of a conference in March 2006, on the
``Returning Veteran.'' The Program Evaluation and
Resource Center (PERC) shares data on VA programs with
SAMHSA, one of the major data sets being the triennial
Drug Abuse Program Survey (DAPS).
DOD--VA and DOD have jointly prepared a
detailed set of Treatment Guidelines for substance
abuse for use in both departments. Both departments
currently are actively involved in implementing the
``seamless transition'' initiative for returning
veterans.
NIDA--a number of VA investigators have
grants for their research from NIDA, and VA was a
primary site for research in NIDA's medication
development project.
ONDCP--VA works closely with ONDCP on
programming and budgetary issues relating to VA's
substance abuse treatment activities.\607\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\607\ E-mail from Dr. Richard T. Suchinsky, Associate Chief for
Addictive Disorders, Department of Veterans Affairs, to James Kaiser,
counsel, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human
Resources, Committee on Government Reform, (Feb. 9, 2006, 12:42 EST)
(on file with the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and
Human Resources).
Such dialog and information sharing is strongly encouraged
in order to most efficiently utilize resources allocated
towards research and development.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN AND HON. ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS
The report adopted by the committee was prepared by the
majority staff of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy, and Human Resources, without the consultation or
participation of the minority. Nevertheless, we concur, or do
not take issue, with many of the majority views expressed in
the report.
Fundamentally, we share a deep concern about the
substantial downward shift in the proportion of Federal drug
control funding devoted to demand reduction programs (i.e.,
drug prevention and drug treatment) versus supply reduction
programs (e.g., domestic enforcement, interdiction, and source-
country eradication) since President Bush issued his
administration's first National Drug Control Strategy in 2002.
If the President's fiscal year 2007 budget request is enacted,
prevention and treatment together will account for just 35.5
percent of the President's drug budget request, down from 47
percent in fiscal year 2001, while supply reduction will have
increased from 53 percent to 64.5 percent over the same period.
With more than 20,000 Americans dying from illegal drugs
annually, our Nation cannot afford to shrink from its
commitment to reducing demand for illegal drugs through
prevention and expanding access to drug treatment for those in
need. The administration has invested much effort in attempting
to alter the delivery mechanism for drug treatment services
with its Access to Recovery voucher initiative and this year's
proposal to ``voucher-ize'' treatment services delivered with
Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grant funding,
but it has failed to make significant progress in closing the
gap between the number of people needing treatment and the
woefully inadequate volume of accessible treatment services. It
is difficult to see how a budget that further reduces funding
for the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration's Center for Substance Abuse Treatment will turn
the tide.
We hope that, like last year, Congress will reject the bulk
of the administration's proposed cuts for key demand reduction
programs within the Department of Education and the Department
of Health and Human Services and for programs, including the
High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program, Byrne Justice
Assistance Grants, and Community Oriented Policing Services
program, that support and amplify State and local drug
enforcement efforts.
Harm Reduction and Needle Exchange Programs
As in years past, we strongly disagree with the majority's
perspective and representations concerning the purpose,
efficacy, and legality of ``harm reduction'' strategies,
particularly as they relate to needle- or syringe-exchange
programs [SEPs].
In arguing the need for increased oversight of USAID
activities, the majority offers the following
mischaracterization:
``Harm reduction'' is an ideological position . . .
which assumes certain individuals are incapable of
making healthy decisions. Advocates of this position
hold that dangerous behaviors, such as drug abuse,
therefore simply must be accepted by society and those
who choose such lifestyles--or become trapped in them--
should be enabled to continue these behaviors in a less
harmful manner. Often however, these lifestyles are the
result of addiction, mental illness o[r] other
conditions that should and can be treated rather than
accepted as normative, healthy behaviors.
Harm reduction is, in fact, a basic conceptual pillar of
mainstream public health policy in many contexts. With respect
to HIV prevention among drug abusers, harm reduction is
embodied in the National Institute on Drug Abuse's ``Principles
of HIV Prevention in Drug-Using Populations.'' This publication
describes a ``hierarchy of HIV/AIDS risk-reduction messages,
beginning with the most effective behavioral changes that drugs
users can make,'' as follows:
LStop using and injecting drugs
LEnter and complete drug abuse treatment,
including relapse prevention
LIf you continue to inject drugs, take the
following steps to reduce personal and public health
risks:
LNever re-use or ``share'' syringes,
water, or drug preparation equipment
LUse only sterile syringes obtained
from a reliable source (e.g., a pharmacy or a
syringe access program)
LAlways use a new, sterile syringe to
prepare and inject drugs
LIf possible, use sterile water to
prepare drugs; otherwise use clean water from
reliable source (e.g., fresh tap water)
LAlways use a new or disinfected
container (``cooker'') and a new filter
(``cotton'') to prepare drugs
LClean the injection site with a new
alcohol swab before injecting drugs
LSafely dispose of syringes after one
use \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ National Institute on Drug Abuse, Principles of HIV Prevention
in Drug-Using Populations (NIH Pub. No. 02-4733) 13 (Mar. 2002),
(online at http://www.nida.nih.gov/PDF/POHP.pdf).
Similarly, the Department of Health and Human Service has
published ``A Guide to Primary Care of People with HIV/AIDS''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
that advises:
The primary care provider should routinely screen for
drug abuse and treat or refer for treatment as quickly
as possible . . . [and] the provider should also
counsel patients who are actively using drugs not to
share needles with others and to take advantage of the
programs that distribute clean needles.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Health Resources and Services Administration, A Guide to
Primary Care of People with HIV/AIDS, 105, 111 (2004) (online at http:/
/hab.hrsa.gov/tools/primarycareguide/).
Neither NIDA nor HHS advocates the view that ``addiction,
mental illness o[r] other [unspecified treatable] conditions''
should be ``accepted as normative, healthy behaviors'' instead
of being treated. On the contrary, their advice to public
health professionals is consistent with ample research
demonstrating that the most effective approach to preventing
the spread of HIV among drug users is a comprehensive strategy
that includes community-based outreach, drug abuse treatment,
and access to sterile injection equipment.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Principles of HIV Prevention in Drug-Using Populations, supra
note 1, at 16-17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 1991, there have been at least 17 major reviews and
assessments of needle exchange programs by expert bodies such
as the National Commission on AIDS, the Institute of Medicine,
the National Institutes of Health, the Centers for Disease
Control, the American Medical Association, the American Society
of Addiction Medicine, and the World Health Organization. These
assessments have found that needle exchange programs help
reduce the spread of AIDS and other dangerous infectious
disease without encouraging or increasing drug use. In fact,
according to experts, needle exchange programs provide valuable
opportunities to reduce illegal drug use.
In part as a result of these conclusions, needle exchange
programs have been endorsed by a wide range of expert
scientific and medical organizations, including the American
Academy of Family Physicians,\4\ the American Academy of
Pediatrics,\5\ the American Academy of Physician Assistants,\6\
the American College of Preventive Medicine,\7\ the American
Medical Association,\8\ the American Nurses Association,\9\ the
American Psychological Association,\10\ the Association of
Nurses in AIDS Care,\11\ and the Infectious Diseases Society of
America.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ American Academy of Family Physicians, Substance and Alcohol
Abuse and Addiction (2003) (online at http://www.aafp.org/x7096.xml).
\5\ American Academy of Pediatrics, Provisional Committee on
Pediatric AIDS, Reducing the Risk of Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Infection Associated with Illicit Drug Use, Pediatrics, 945-7 (Dec.
1994) (online at http://aappolicy.aappublications.org/cgi/reprint/
pediatrics;94/6/945.pdf).
\6\ American Academy of Physician Assistants, Needle/Syringe Access
for the Prevention of HIV Transmission (policy paper adopted 2003)
(http://www.aapa.org/policy/needle--access.html).
\7\ American College of Preventive Medicine, Public Policy on
Needle-Exchange Programs to Reduce Drug-Associated Morbidity and
Mortality, American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 173-5 (2000)
(online at http://www.acpm.org/ajpm369.pdf).
\8\ American Medical Association, Syringe and Needle Exchange
Programs (Policy Statement H-95.958) (online at http://www.ama-
assn.org/apps/pf--new/
pf--online?f--n=resultLink&doc= policyfiles/HnE/
H-95.958.HTM&s--t=syringe+and+needle+exchange+programs&catg=A
MA/HnE&catg=AMA/BnGnC&catg=AMA/DIR&&nth=1&&st--p=0&nth=1&).
\9\ American Nurses Association, Position Statement: Needle
Exchange and HIV (effective Apr. 2, 1993) (online at http://
nursingworld.org/readroom/position/blood/blnedl.htm).
\10\ American Psychological Association, APA Council Endorses Fair-
Testing Code, Forms New Working Group, among Other Actions (Apr. 4,
2001) (online at http://www.apa.org/monitor/apr04/endorses.html).
\11\ Association of Nurses in AIDS Care, Position Statement: Needle
and Syringe Exchange (rev. Sept. 2002) (online at http://
www.anacnet.org/media/pdfs/
PS--Needle--Syringe--Exch--4
-2003.pdf).
\12\ Infectious Diseases Society of America, Supporting Document
for IDSA's Policy Statement on Syringe Exchange, Prescribing and
Paraphernalia Laws (Oct. 5, 2001) (online at http://www.idsociety.org/
Content/ContentGroups/
Public--Statements--and--Policies1/
Statements/
Supporting--Document--for--IDSA's--
Policy--Statement--on--Syringe--
Exchange,--Prescribing--and--
Paraphernalia--L.htm) (emphasis in original).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In chronological order, expert reviews and assessments of
needle exchange programs include the following:
LIn 1991, the National Commission on AIDS, whose
members included then-Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney,
convened a hearing on drug use and HIV. Based on the
testimonies of expert witnesses at the hearing and a review of
scientific evidence, the Commission issued a report that found:
Outreach programs which operate needle exchanges and
distribute bleach not only help to control the spread
of HIV, but also refer many individuals to treatment
programs . . .. Most significantly, these programs,
rather than encouraging substance use, lead a
substantial number of substance users to seek
treatment.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ National Commission on Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome,
The Twin Epidemics of Substance Use and HIV (July 1991) (online at
http://www.dogwoodcenter.org/references/
studies91F.html#RECOMMENDATION%202).
LIn 1995, a report prepared by a joint panel of the
National Research Council and the Institute of Medicine
reviewed the available evidence on needle exchange programs and
concluded: ``Needle exchange programs reduce the spread of
HIV--the virus that causes AIDS--without increasing either the
injection of illegal drugs among program participants or the
number of new initiates to injection drug use.'' \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ National Academies, Needle Exchange Programs Reduce HIV
Transmission among People Who Inject Illegal Drugs (Sept. 18, 1995)
(online at http://www4.nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/isbn/
0309052963?OpenDocument).
LIn 1997, a Consensus Panel convened by the National
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Institutes of Health concluded:
An impressive body of evidence suggests powerful
effects from needle exchange programs. The number of
studies showing beneficial effects on behaviors such as
needle sharing greatly outnumber those showing no
effects. There is no longer doubt that these programs
work. . . . Does needle exchange promote drug use? A
preponderance of evidence shows either no change or
decreased drug use.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ National Institutes of Health, Interventions to Prevent HIV
Risk Behaviors (Feb. 11-13, 1997) (Consensus Statement No. 104) (online
at http://consensus.nih.gov/cons/104/104--statement.htm).
LIn 1997, the Council on Scientific Affairs of the
American Medical Association issued a report on the medical and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
scientific literature on needle exchange programs that found:
There is substantial evidence of reduced needle-sharing
among regular participants in needle-exchange programs.
More importantly, HIV infection rates among drug users
have been consistently lower in cities with needle-
exchange programs. . . . For example, while the HIV
infection rate among injection drug users remained 1%
to 2% in the Scottish city of Glasgow, where a needle-
exchange program was quickly established, it reached
70% in nearby Edinburgh, where the response of
government officials was to implement even more
stringent controls over injection equipment.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ American Medical Association, Report 8 of the Council on
Scientific Affairs (A-97) (June 1997) (online at http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/13636.html).
LIn 1997, the American Public Health Association
stated that ``an enormous body of published research'' exists
``attesting to the efficacy of clean needle exchange for
reducing HIV transmission among drug users. Moreover, study
after study has shown that needle exchange does not lead to an
increase of illegal drug use.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ American Public Health Association, American Public Health
Association Supports Lifting Federal Ban on Funding for Needle Exchange
(Aug. 20, 1997) (online at http://www.apha.org/news/press/1997/
needle.htm).
LIn 2000, the U.S. Surgeon General and other senior
scientists at the Department of Health and Human Services
reviewed scientific research completed since April 1998 on
needle exchange programs. In a published summary of the review,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the Surgeon General announced:
After reviewing all of the research to date, the senior
scientists of the Department and I have unanimously
agreed that there is conclusive scientific evidence
that syringe exchange programs, as part of a
comprehensive HIV prevention strategy, are an effective
public health intervention that reduces the
transmission of HIV and does not encourage the use of
illegal drugs.\18\
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\18\ U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Evidence-Based
Findings on the Efficacy of Syringe Exchange Programs: An Analysis of
the Scientific Research Completed since April 1998 (Mar. 17, 2000).
LIn 2000, the Institute of Medicine released a report
on the findings of a committee it had convened at the request
of the Centers for Disease Control to conduct a comprehensive
review of current HIV prevention efforts in the United States.
The report described the evidence on needle exchange programs
as ``compelling'' and cited a study that suggested that
``expanded provision of needle exchange programs in the United
States could have averted between 10,000 and 20,000 new
infections over the past decade.'' \19\ According to the
report:
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\19\ Institute of Medicine, No Time to Lose: Getting More from HIV
Prevention, 114-5 (2000) (online at http://books.nap.edu/books/
0309071372/html/1.html#pagetop).
Although many communities and law enforcement officials
have expressed concern that increasing availability of
injection equipment will lead to increased drug use,
criminal activity, and discarded contaminated syringes,
studies have found no scientifically reliable evidence
of these negative effects.\20\
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\20\ Institute of Medicine, No Time to Lose: Getting More from HIV
Prevention, 114-5 (2000) (online at http://books.nap.edu/books/
0309071372/html/1.html#pagetop).
LIn 2000, the Academy for Educational Development, in
a policy report prepared in collaboration with the Centers for
Disease Control, observed that much research had been conducted
on needle exchange programs. Citing this research, the report
concludes that ``SEPs [syringe exchange programs] have
significant positive effects on preventing adverse health
consequences associated with injection drug use and . . . do
not increase drug use or promote the initiation of injection
drug use.'' \21\
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\21\ Academy for Educational Development, A Comprehensive Approach:
Preventing Blood-Borne Infections among Injection Drug Users, A7 (Dec.
2000) (online at http://www.thebody.com/cdc/pdfs/comprehensive-
approach.pdf).
LIn 2000, the American Society of Addition Medicine
reported that ``[n]eedle exchange programs have been shown to
be a crucial component of a spectrum of HIV prevention services
to injection drug users, resulting in an effective reduction in
the transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus.'' The
Society of Addiction Medicine also reported that ``[t]here has
not been an increase in drug use or an increase in injection as
a route of drug administration as a result of implementation of
needle exchange programs, nor has there been demonstration of
an increase in contaminated injection equipment in the
community.'' \22\
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\22\ American Society of Addiction Medicine, Public Policy of ASAM:
Access to Sterile Syringes and Needles (adopted Dec. 20, 2000) (online
at http://www.asam.org/ppol/Needle%20 Exchange.htm).
LIn 2002, the Centers for Disease Control summarized
scientific studies of needle exchange programs. CDC explained:
``SEPs have been shown to be an effective way to link some
hard-to-reach IDUs [intravenous drug users] with important
public health services, including TB and STD treatment. Through
their referrals to substance abuse treatment, SEPs can help
IDUs stop using drugs. Studies also show that SEPs do not
encourage drug use among SEP participants or the recruitment of
first-time drug users.'' \23\
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\23\ Centers for Disease Control, Syringe Exchange Programs (Jan.
2002) (online at http://www.cdc.gov/idu/facts/
aed--idu--syr.htm).
LIn 2002, the National Institute on Drug Abuse
published a research-based guide to preventing HIV in drug-
using populations. Concerning needle exchange programs, the
guide stated: ``Evaluations of these programs indicate that
they are an effective part of a comprehensive strategy to
reduce the injection drug use-related spread of HIV and other
blood-borne infections. In addition they do not encourage the
use of illicit drugs.'' \24\
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\24\ National Institutes of Health, National Institute on Drug
Abuse, Principles of HIV Prevention in Drug-Using Populations: A
Research-Based Guide (Mar. 2002).
LIn 2002, a Consensus Panel convened by the National
Institutes of Health on management of hepatitis C found that
``needle and syringe exchange programs . . . have been shown to
be effective in preventing HIV transmission and are likely to
be useful for decreasing HCV transmission.'' \25\ The panel
recommended: ``Institute measures to reduce transmission of HCV
among IDUs, including providing access to sterile syringes
through needle exchange, physician prescription, and pharmacy
sales.'' \26\
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\25\ National Institutes of Health, Management of Hepatitis C: 2002
(June 10-12, 2002) (http://consensus.nih.gov/cons/116/
091202116cdc--statement.htm#5).
\26\ Id.
LIn 2003, the head of the HIV/AIDS unit of the
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies, stated: ``There is clear scientific evidence that
needle exchange programmes work. They help contain the HIV/AIDS
pandemic, and in a very cost effective way. Evidence is also
clear that these programmes do not promote drug use.'' \27\
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\27\ International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies, Spreading the Light of Science: Guidelines on Harm Reduction
Related to Injecting Drug Use, 53 (2003) (online at http://
www.ifrc.org/cgi/pdf--pubs.pl?health/ hivaids/
harm--reduction.pdf).
LIn 2004, the Association of State and Territorial
Health Officials, together with the National Alliance of State
and Territorial AIDS Directors, the National Association of
County and City Health Officials, and the Council of State and
Territorial Epidemiologists, stated that ``[s]cientific
evidence demonstrates that needle exchange programs and
pharmacy sales of sterile syringes can be effective public
health strategies to reduce the transmission of injection-
related HIV infection without increasing drug use.'' \28\
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\28\ Association of State and Territorial Health Officials,
Position Statement: Guiding Principles for HIV Prevention (approved
June 18, 2004) (online at http://www.astho.org/
policy--statements/HIV% 20Position%20Statement.pdf).
LIn 2004, Dr. Elias A. Zerhouni, Director of the
National Institutes of Health, wrote a letter to Members of
Congress in response to an inquiry about the scientific
evidence on syringe exchange programs. The letter stated: ``A
number of studies conducted in the U.S. have shown that SEPs do
not increase drug use among participants or surrounding
community members and are associated with reductions in the
incidence of HIV, hepatitis B, and hepatitis C in the drug-
using population.'' \29\
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\29\ Letter from NIH Director Dr. Elias A. Zerhouni to
Representatives Henry A. Waxman and Elijah E. Cummings (Oct. 7, 2004).
LIn 2004, a policy brief from the World Heath
Organization discussed the evidence obtained from a review of
more than 200 studies on needle and syringe exchange programs.
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The policy brief reported:
There is compelling evidence that increasing the
availability and utilization of sterile injecting
equipment for both out-of-treatment and in-treatment
injecting drug users contributes substantially to
reductions in the rate of HIV transmission. . . . There
is no convincing evidence of major unintended negative
consequences of programmes providing sterile injecting
equipment to injecting drug users, such as initiation
of injecting among people who have not injected
previously, or an increase in the duration or frequency
of illicit drug use or drug injection.\30\
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\30\ World Health Organization, Policy Brief: Provision of Sterile
Injecting Equipment to Reduce HIV Transmission (2004) (online at http:/
/www.wpro.who.int/NR/rdonlyres/BA463DB4-2390-4964-9D86-11CBABCC9DA9/ 0/
provisionofsterileen.pdf).
LIn 2004, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/
AIDS noted that ``[a] review comparing HIV prevalence in cities
across the globe with and without needle and syringe programmes
found that cities which introduced such programmes showed a
mean annual 19 percent decrease in HIV prevalence. This
compares with an 8 percent increase in cities that failed to
implement prevention measures.'' \31\
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\31\ United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, 2004 Report on the
Global AIDS Epidemic, 85 (June 2004) (online at http://www.unaids.org/
bangkok2004/GAR2004--pdf/Chapter4--
prevention--en.pdf).
We strongly believe that U.S. policy on syringe-exchange
should be based upon scientific evidence as to its efficacy and
that the United States should not exercise is disproportionate
influence in international organizations and forums to
discourage the implementation of non-U.S.-funded syringe
exchange programs. The international community should not be
restricted from opting to implement the most effective programs
to prevent the transmission of HIV/AIDS among injection drug
users and the broader population.
In this regard, we reiterate our previous rejection of the
erroneous assertion by Chairman Davis and Subcommittee Chairman
Souder, repeated in this report, that SEPs violate the 1961
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. As we noted in letters to
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and U.S. Agency for
International Development Administrator Andrew S. Natsios, the
International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) has stated the
following concerning needle-exchange:
In a number of countries, Governments have introduced
since the end of the 1980s programmes for the exchange
or distribution of needles or syringes for drug
addicts, with the aim of limiting the spread of HIV/
AIDS. The Board maintains the position expressed by it
already in 1987 that Governments need to adopt measures
that may decrease the sharing of hypodermic needles
among injection drug abusers in order to limit the
spread of HIV/AIDS. At the same time, the Board has
been stressing that any prophylactic measures should
not promote and/or facilitate drug abuse.\32\
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\32\ International Narcotics Control Board, Report of the
International Narcotics Control Board for 2003, 36 (online at http://
www.incb.org/e/ind--ar.htm).
Nowhere has the INCB identified SEPs as violating any provision
of the Single Convention, despite the majority's interpretation
of the INCB's 2003 report.
In many developing and highly populous nations including
Russia, China, and Vietnam, injection drug use, not sexual
transmission, is the principal factor driving HIV transmission
rates.\33\ Indeed, one in three new infections outside Africa
is attributed to injection drug use. Even in many areas where
sexual transmission is the principal mode of HIV transmission,
injection drug use is a major contributing factor, because
high-risk drug use behaviors and high-risk sexual behaviors
often are linked.
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\33\ Taking Drugs Can Lead to HIV/AIDS, Fact Sheet, United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (2004); Spreading the Light of Science:
Guidelines on Harm Reduction Relating to Injecting Drug Use,
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(2003).
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Syringe exchange may hold the promise of saving millions of
lives in developing countries that are at high risk of
suffering an explosion in HIV/AIDs infections as a result of
IDU-driven transmission; moreover, as the scientific evidence
overwhelmingly indicates, it can do so without increasing drug
use among participants or surrounding community members.
Finally, we note that the committee's 2-year-long and
apparently ongoing inquiry into USAID activities relating to
harm reduction still has yielded no evidence that any USAID
funds have been expended in a manner inconsistent with U.S. law
Hon. Henry A. Waxman.
Hon. Elijah E. Cummings.