[House Report 109-435]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 109-435
_______________________________________________________________________
Union Calendar No. 242
UPDATING NUCLEAR SECURITY STANDARDS: HOW LONG CAN THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY AFFORD TO WAIT?
__________
SEVENTH REPORT
by the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
April 25, 2006.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JON C. PORTER, Nevada C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina Columbia
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania ------
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio (Independent)
------ ------
David Marin, Staff Director
Keith Ausbrook, Chief Counsel
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
J. Vincent Chase, Professional Staff Member
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
Andrew Su, Minority Professional Staff Member
?
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC, April 25, 2006.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: By direction of the Committee on
Government Reform, I submit herewith the committee's seventh
report to the 109th Congress. The committee's report is based
on a study conducted by its Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations.
Tom Davis,
Chairman.
(iii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
I. Summary..........................................................1
A. Findings................................................ 4
B. Recommendations......................................... 4
II. Background.......................................................4
A. The National Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA]..... 6
B. The Office of Energy, Science and Environment [ESE]..... 8
C. Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance
[SSA].................................................. 10
D. NNSA AND ESE Security Offices........................... 11
E. Design Basis Threat..................................... 12
III. Discussion......................................................15
A. Findings................................................ 15
B. Recommendations......................................... 22
Union Calendar No. 242
109th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 109-435
======================================================================
UPDATING NUCLEAR SECURITY STANDARDS: HOW LONG CAN THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY AFFORD TO WAIT?
_______
April 25, 2006.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Tom Davis, from the Committee on Government Reform submitted the
following
SEVENTH REPORT
On April 6, 2006, the Committee on Government Reform
approved and adopted a report entitled, ``Updating Nuclear
Security Standards: How Long Can the Department of Energy
Afford to Wait?'' The chairman was directed to transmit a copy
to the Speaker of the House.
I. Summary
The Government Reform Committee, National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations [NSETIR]
Subcommittee conducted an oversight investigation of Department
of Energy [DOE] efforts to improve nuclear facility security.
The subcommittee examined the DOE National Nuclear Security
Administration [NNSA] and the Office of Energy, Science and
Environment [ESE] to determine the reasons behind persistent
reports of facility security lapses.\1\ The Department of
Energy is the Nation's custodian for the protection of nuclear
weapons, components and special nuclear material.
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\1\ Pre 9/11 reports include: NUCLEAR SECURITY: Improvements Needed
in DOE's Safeguards and Security Oversight, GAO/RCED-00-62, Report to
the Chairman, Committee on Commerce, Feb. 24, 2000; Prepared testimony
of Gary L. Jones, Associate Director, Government Accountability Office,
NUCLEAR SECURITY: Security Issues at DOE and Its Newly Created National
Nuclear Security Administration, GAO/T-RCED-00-123, before the
Subcommittee on Energy and Power and the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, Committee on Commerce, Mar. 14, 2000; NUCLEAR SECURITY:
Lessons to Be Learned from Implementing NNSA's Security Enhancements,
GAO-02-358, Report to the Committee on Armed Services, Special
Oversight Panel on Department of Energy Reorganization, Mar. 29, 2002;
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security at Risk, Project on Government
Oversight, Washington, DC, 20001, September 2001.
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The oversight investigation conducted by the subcommittee
attempted to identify systemic problems within the structure
and management of DOE. The investigation sought to make sure
risk management policies are threat-based, not artificially
constrained by the question, ``How much security can we
afford?'' in the effort to formulate and implement a new, post-
9/11 security standard or Design Basis Threat [DBT].
Without question, DOE nuclear warhead production plants,
test facilities, research labs, storage locations and
decommissioned sites are attractive targets for terrorists
determined to turn modern technology against us, and willing to
die while doing so. The highly enriched uranium [HEU] and
plutonium [PU] held at various locations could be used as the
core of an improvised nuclear device or dispersed as a
radiological weapon.
At the subcommittee's request, the Government
Accountability Office [GAO] undertook a review of DOE nuclear
material security resulting in the release of a series of
reports entitled, ``Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better
Manage Its Safeguards and Security Program, (May 30, 2003, GAO-
03-471); Nuclear Security: DOE Needs To Resolve Significant
Issues Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat,
(April 27, 2004, GAO-04-623); and Nuclear Security: DOE's
Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and
Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the New Design
Basis Threat, (July 15, 2005, GAO-05-611).
GAO found that DOE was not aggressively confronting the
many challenges posed by the need to secure a sprawling, aging
infrastructure against post-9/11 threats. In general, the DOE
management structure may not reflect current security
imperatives. The oversight investigation found substantial
institutional, technical and fiscal challenges faced by efforts
to develop and implement a strengthened DBT within a reasonable
timeframe.
GAO examined the timeline for DBT implementation and found
it unrealistic. After September 11th, it took DOE too long to
formulate the May 2003 DBT and the resulting DBT failed to
capture some elements of the threat. In significant respects,
threats anticipated in the 2003 DBT did not parallel those
identified in the intelligence community's Postulated Threat.
Reduced threat levels, called ``dumming down the DBT'' by one
witness,\2\ were not adequately justified. As a result, the May
2003 DBT was reviewed again in response to GAO findings and
congressional criticism. DOE issued a revised DBT in October
2004. The 2004 DBT identified a larger terrorist threat for DOE
sites. However, DOE does not require full compliance until
October 2008.
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\2\ Testimony of Danielle Brian, executive director, Project on
Government Oversight, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons
Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, p. 151, June 24, 2003.
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During a subcommittee hearing in the summer of 2005,
internal Department divisions erupted publicly concerning the
2004 DBT levels. The subcommittee learned ESE officials
believed that the DBT was too demanding. Mr. Walsh, ESE
Director of Security stated, `` I am not totally convinced that
the current intelligence foundation that really does go into
developing a design basis threat supports where we are right
now.'' \3\ On June 22, 2005, ESE Environmental Management [EM]
directed sites not to comply with some aspects of the DBT.\4\
The following week, the Office of Security and Safety
Performance Assurance [SSA] informed ESE that any deviations
from the DBT would have to be approved by the Secretary of
Energy.\5\ In November 2005, DOE announced revisions \6\ to the
2004 DBT. According to GAO, the 2005 DBT revisions maintain the
threat level found in the 2004 DBT for NNSA sites protecting
nuclear weapons, test devices, and completed nuclear
assemblies. However, the 2005 DBT revisions did reduce the
threat level for ESE and NNSA sites protecting Category I
special nuclear material [SNM] such as nuclear weapon
components, metals, and oxides. The reduced threat level,
however, is within the lower range of adversaries contained in
the Postulated Threat.\7\
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\3\ Testimony of Robert Walsh, ESE Director of Security, Department
of Energy, DOE/ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force? before
the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial
No. 109-104, p. 104, July 26, 2005.
\4\ Memorandum from Maurice Daugherty, Director of Safeguards and
Security Emergency Management to Ronald Bartholomew, Director,
Safeguards and Security Savannah River Operations Office, June 22, 2005
(in subcommittee files).
\5\ Memorandum from Marshall O. Combs, Director, Office of
Security, SSA to Maurice Daugherty, Director, Safeguards and Security/
ESE Environmental Management, July 1, 2005 (in subcommittee files).
\6\ Nov. 29, 2005 memo concerning DBT revisions from Deputy DOE
Secretary Clay Sell to Linton F. Brooks, Under Secretary for Nuclear
Security/Administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration
[NNSA], David K. Garman, Under Secretary for Energy, Science and
Environment [ESE], and Glenn Podonsky, Director-Office of Security and
Safety Performance Assurance [SSA] (in subcommittee files).
\7\ Email correspondence from Jonathan Gill, Senior Analyst,
Government Accountability Office to subcommittee staff, Mar. 28, 2006
(in subcommittee files).
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Still, the stringent requirements of the 2004 DBT appear to
have transformed possession of special nuclear material from a
prestigious credential to a serious institutional liability.
Facilities now have a powerful incentive to blend down or
consolidate dangerous stocks.
In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, DOE
took immediate steps to improve physical security by increasing
the level of security readiness from Security Condition [SECON]
level 4 to SECON 2.\8\ The Secretary of Energy also established
a set of 14 security initiatives, and took additional steps, to
enhance short and long-term security. DOE has prepared
implementation plans for each of the ESE sites possessing
Category I special nuclear material. A multi-discipline team
has been created to review the DBT and reassess divergence
between DBT threat levels and the intelligence community
analysis. A Consolidation of Materials Task Force has been
formed and has compiled a list of excess material in the effort
to reduce the number of facilities housing special nuclear
materials but as of the task force had not yet released a
report identifying short-term and long-term options for
consolidation and relocation, something the task force had
promised to do in 2004.\9\ Finally, the Cyber Security
Oversight Office under DOE has been working toward assessing
and securing information assets and systems.
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\8\ DOE Notice 473.6 established Department security condition
[SECON] levels.
\9\ Testimony of Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of Independent
Oversight and Performance Assurance, Department of Energy, Nuclear
Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security Requirements? (II) before the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 108-237, p.
64, June 22, 2004.
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Charged by law to sustain the Nation's nuclear deterrent
capabilities, DOE and NNSA have the unenviable task of
balancing the demands of that mission against the risks and
costs of meeting security threats in a new and dangerous era.
That balance must be struck as openly and as effectively as
possible so that nuclear security, homeland security and
national security will be protected.
A. FINDINGS
1. The Department of Energy lacks an overarching,
coordinated security policy to ensure effective safeguards are
in place to protect nuclear weapons assemblies, components,
designs and special nuclear material.
2. Design Basis Threat [DBT] revisions are taking too long
to implement.
3. The Design Basis Threat has not been applied
consistently throughout Department of Energy facilities.
4. Maintaining the current far-flung Department of Energy
nuclear complex of facilities housing special nuclear materials
is not cost effective and increases security risks.
5. Protective forces are experiencing reduced readiness,
retention problems, and fewer force-on-force performance tests.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The Secretary of Energy should designate an office
responsible for Department-wide security policies and should
clarify the roles and responsibilities of site offices and
headquarters for conducting security oversight.
2. The Secretary of Energy should develop and implement a
coordinated department-wide, multiyear, fully funded
implementation plan for meeting new DBT requirements.
3. The Secretary of Energy should report regularly to
relevant congressional oversight committees on the status of
DBT implementation plans including which sites and facilities
are currently considered to be high risk and what steps are
being taken to mitigate those risks to acceptable levels.
4. The Secretary of Energy should develop a plan, timeline
and budget for the consolidation of special nuclear material.
5. The Secretary of Energy should develop and implement a
comprehensive management plan to improve training,
qualifications, and technology available to security protective
forces.
II. Background
The Department of Energy [DOE] was created in 1977 \10\ to
deal with the oil price shocks caused by the Organization of
Petroleum Export Countries [OPEC]. The department was formed
from the consolidation of a number of agencies with energy-
related missions. These agencies included the Energy Research
and Development Administration [ERDA], the former Atomic Energy
Commission [AEC], the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the
Federal Energy Administration, and several programs from the
Department of Interior.
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\10\ The Department of Energy Organization Act, Public Law 95-91.
The Department of Energy officially began operations on Oct. 1, 1977.
Pursuant to section 901 of the act, President Jimmy Carter issued
Executive Order 12009, prescribing Oct. 1, 1977 as the effective date
of the act.
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DOE manages the Nation's nuclear weapons production
complex, cleans up the environmental legacy from the production
of nuclear weapons, and conducts research and development on
both energy and basic science. The relative emphasis given to
these missions has changed over time. Early emphasis by the
department on research and initiatives to cope with the global
energy crisis quickly shifted to accelerated nuclear weapons
production. However, by the late 1980s, DOE funding priorities
again shifted to cleaning up the legacy of waste generated by
the weapons complex. Since then, DOE has placed increased
emphasis on basic scientific research. DOE also has a role in
helping to ensure the security of the Nation's energy
infrastructure. The result is a department with complex and
diverse missions. These diverse missions are largely
implemented by contractors to carry out the DOE program and
project activities at government-owned facilities and sites
across the country.\11\ The department contracts out more than
90 percent of its budget \12\ and has established an extensive
network of field offices to directly oversee the work of these
contractors and address other departmental responsibilities.
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\11\ DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY: Fundamental Reassessment Needed to
Address Major Mission, Structure, and Accountability Problems,
Government Accountability Office, GAO-02-51, December 2001.
\12\ Response to email inquiry from subcommittee staff to the
Department of Energy (in subcommittee files).
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The Department of Energy is responsible for developing the
national energy plan by coordinating and administering the
energy functions of the Federal Government. In addition, DOE is
responsible for long-term, high-risk research and development
of energy technology, Federal power marketing, energy
conservation, and the nuclear weapons program. In carrying out
this multifaceted mission, the department employs a workforce
of approximately 120,000 Federal and contractor employees and
manages assets valued at more than $128 billion, including a
complex of national laboratories, nuclear weapon production
facilities, and other research facilities.\13\
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\13\ Special Report: Management Challenges at the Department of
Energy, DOE Office of the Inspector General DOE/IG-0712, December 2005.
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The Department of Energy's overarching mission is to
advance the national, economic, and energy security of the
United States; to promote scientific and technological
innovation in support of that mission; and to ensure the
environmental cleanup of the national nuclear weapons complex.
The Department has four strategic goals toward achieving the
mission:
Defense Strategic Goal: To protect the
national security by applying advanced science and
nuclear technology to the Nation's defense.
Energy Strategic Goal: To protect national
and economic security by promoting a diverse supply and
delivery of reliable, affordable, and environmentally
sound energy.
Science Strategic Goal: To protect national
and economic security by providing world-class
scientific research capacity and advancing scientific
knowledge.
Environment Strategic Goal: To protect the
environment by providing a responsible resolution to
the environmental legacy of the Cold War and by
providing for the permanent disposal of the Nation's
high-level radioactive waste.\14\
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\14\ Department of Energy, About DOE, http://www.doe.gov/about/
index.htm (accessed Feb. 28, 2006).
The Department of Energy has two major program offices. The
National Nuclear Security Administration and the Office of
Energy, Science and Environment have the day-to-day
responsibility for all DOE programs under their jurisdiction.
NNSA is responsible for developing, producing, and maintaining
nuclear weapons, and insuring the security of those weapons,
components, and special nuclear material while ESE is
responsible for Federal energy-related programs and
environmental clean-up of former NNSA nuclear weapon sites.
The Department of Energy has requested a budget of $23.5
billion for fiscal year 2007.\15\ The budget request includes
$1.498 billion for NNSA, ESE, SSA and Information Management
Security, a decrease of approximately 1.3 percent over fiscal
year 2006, for security programs and implementation of
safeguard requirements identified in the Design Basis
Threat.\16\ The security funding will support DOE efforts to
protect nuclear material, conduct performance assurance
testing, and support programs to ensure security systems are
operational and functioning.
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\15\ Fiscal Year 2007, Budget of the Department of Energy, Office
of the Chief Financial Officer, Washington, DC.
\16\ Department of Energy, Fiscal Year 2007 Congressional Budget
Request, Budget Highlights, Office of Management, Budget and
Evaluation/CFO, February 2006.
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A. THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION [NNSA]
In 2000, the National Nuclear Security Administration \17\
was established within the Department of Energy as a semi-
autonomous agency with a mandate in a variety of security-
related domains. The NNSA is responsible for the research and
development, production, maintenance, storage, and
transportation of the Nation's nuclear weapons arsenal.
Congress established the NNSA to correct longstanding
management and security problems including ineffective controls
over foreign visitors, weaknesses in efforts to control and
protect classified and sensitive information, lax physical
security controls, ineffective management of personnel security
clearance programs, and weaknesses in tracking and controlling
nuclear materials.\18\ NNSA was established to be distinct from
DOE. To clearly show the separation of NNSA management from the
DOE organization, Congress laid out chains of command in both
DOE and NNSA that would insulate NNSA from DOE management and
decision-making, except at the level of the NNSA Administrator.
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\17\ National Security Administration Act, Public Law 106-65, Oct.
5, 1999.
\18\ Department of Energy, Views on DOE's Plan to Establish the
National Nuclear Security Administration, Testimony of Gary L. Jones,
Associate Director, Government Accountability Office, GAO/T-RCED-00-
113, Mar. 2, 2000.
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The nuclear weapons program is a multifaceted and hazardous
operation. The Department of Energy must maintain in readiness
a nuclear arsenal, maintain aging facilities, dismantle surplus
weapons, dispose of excess radioactive materials, clean up
surplus facilities, and construct new facilities.\19\
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\19\ Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Sixteenth Annual
Report to Congress, February 2006.
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The National Nuclear Security Administration maintains the
safety, security, and reliability of the Nation's nuclear
stockpile, manages nuclear non-proliferation efforts to reduce
the threats from weapons of mass destruction [WMD], and
provides the U.S. Navy with nuclear propulsion plants. The
United States last produced a new nuclear weapon in 1990 and
last conducted a nuclear test in 1992.
The mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration
is:
To enhance U.S. national security through the
military application of nuclear energy.
To maintain and enhance the safety,
reliability, and performance of the U.S. nuclear
weapons stockpile, including the ability to design,
produce, and test, in order to meet national security
requirements.
To provide the U.S. Navy with safe,
militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants and to
ensure the safe and reliable operation of those plants.
To promote international nuclear safety and
nonproliferation.
To reduce global danger from weapons of mass
destruction.
To support U.S. leadership in science and
technology.\20\
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\20\ Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security
Administration, About NNSA, Mission Statement, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/
aboutnnsa.htm (accessed (Feb. 27, 2006).
Nuclear weapons research, development, and production are
conducted at eight NNSA facilities,\21\ operated and maintained
by outside contractors. Because the facilities house special
nuclear materials used in the making of nuclear weapons and
nuclear weapons components, DOE and the NNSA administer
security programs to protect (1) against theft, sabotage,
espionage, terrorism, or other risks to national security and
(2) the safety and health of DOE employees and the public.
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\21\ DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration, Briefing Slide,
DOE/NNSA Nuclear Weapons Facilities (in subcommittee files).
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Currently, the nuclear weapons complex has four production
sites:
The Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas;
The Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee;
The Kansas City Plant, Kansas City,
Missouri;\22\ and
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\22\ The Department of Energy, NNSA, Kansas City, Missouri
facility, http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/siteoffices.htm (accessed Mar. 6,
2006).
The Savannah River Site, Aiken, South
Carolina.\23\
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\23\ DOE, National Nuclear Security Administration, Briefing Slide,
DOE/NNSA Nuclear Weapons Facilities (in subcommittee files).
In addition to the production sites, the complex includes
the Nevada Test Site and three national laboratories that
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design nuclear weapons:
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
Livermore California
Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos,
New Mexico, and
Sandia National Laboratory, Albuquerque, New
Mexico and Livermore, California.\24\
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\24\ Ibid.
NNSA relies on site contractors for implementation of
safeguards and security programs. The contractors are
responsible for conducting day-to-day security activities and
adhering to DOE policies for operation of production and
laboratory facilities.
Many of the sites contain substantial quantities of
Category I special nuclear material.\25\ Category I material
includes plutonium and uranium in the following forms:
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\25\ Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the
New Design Basis Threat, p. 2, Government Accountability Office, GAO-
05-611, July 15, 2005.
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Assembled nuclear weapons and test devices;
Products containing high concentrations of
plutonium or uranium, such as major nuclear components,
and recastable metal; and
High-grade materials, such as carbides,
oxides, solutions, and nitrates.\26\
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\26\ Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards
and Security Program, Government Accountability Office, GAO-03-471, p.
2, May 2003.
The risks this radioactive material poses vary, but include
the potential for sabotage, or theft for illegal use in a
nuclear device. Because these materials pose such risks, NNSA
management of the safeguards and security program, which
includes overseeing contractor activities, is essential to
prevent an unacceptable, adverse impact on national security.
B. THE OFFICE OF ENERGY, SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT [ESE]
The Office of Energy, Science and Environment is
responsible for the day-to-day management oversight of energy
programs, science and technology programs and environmental
programs. The program offices are:
Office of Science--Department of Energy science
programs provide through public-private partnerships,
the technology capable of developing abundant,
reliable, affordable and environmentally sound energy
supplies. This includes enhancing the Nation's energy
supply by conducting R&D in renewable energy, oil, gas,
coal, and nuclear energy. The mission of the Office of
Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy [EERE] is to
strengthen energy security, environmental quality, and
economic vitality in public-private partnerships that:
(1) enhance energy efficiency and productivity; (2)
bring clean, reliable and affordable energy
technologies to the marketplace; and (3) make a
difference in the everyday lives of Americans by
enhancing their energy choices and their quality of
life.\27\
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\27\ The Department of Energy, Energy Programs, http://
www.energy.gov/energysources/index.htm (accessed Feb. 28, 2006); http:/
/www.energy.gov/energyefficiency/index.htm (accessed Feb. 28, 2006).
Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology--The
Department of Energy is the single largest Federal
Government supporter of basic research in physical
sciences in the United States, providing more than 40
percent of total Federal funding for this area. DOE has
the oversight and is the principal Federal funding
agency for research programs in nuclear physics, and
fusion energy sciences.\28\
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\28\ The Department of Energy, Science and Technology Programs,
http://www.energy.gov/sciencetech/index.htm (accessed Feb. 28, 2006).
Environmental Management--The Department of Energy is
responsible for cleaning up contaminated sites and
disposing of radioactive waste left behind as a
byproduct of nuclear weapons production, nuclear
powered naval vessels and commercial nuclear energy
production. DOE must mitigate the risks and hazards
posed by the legacy of nuclear weapons production and
research.\29\
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\29\ The Department of Energy, Environmental Programs, http://
www.energy.gov/environment/index.htm (accessed Feb. 28, 2006).
ESE is responsible for the management of five sites that
possess special nuclear material [SNM]. The five sites: \30\
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\30\ Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the
New Design Basis Threat, p. 8, Government Accountability Office, GAO-
05-611, July 15, 2005.
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Responsible program office Site Location
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Office of Environmental Savannah River Aiken, South
Management. Site. Carolina
Office of Environmental Hanford Site...... Richland,
Management. Washington
Office of Nuclear Energy, Idaho National Idaho Falls, Idaho
Science, and Technology. Laboratory.
Office of Nuclear Energy, Argonne National Idaho Falls, Idaho
Science, and Technology. Laboratory-West.
Office of Science............... Oak Ridge National Oak Ridge,
Laboratory. Tennessee
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO.
NNSA and ESE offices are requesting nearly $1.194 billion
for security for fiscal year 2007.\31\ For the sake of
comparison, NNSA is requesting $746 million for security versus
$448 million for ESE security. Security funding requests by ESE
program office are $296 million for Environmental Management,
$77 million for Office of Science, and $76 million for the
Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology.\32\
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\31\ Department of Energy, Fiscal Year Congressional Budget
Request, Budget Highlights, Office of Management, Budget and
Evaluation/CFO, February 2006.
\32\ Ibid.
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ESE relies on site contractors for implementation of
safeguards and security programs. The contractors are
responsible for conducting day-to-day security activities and
adhering to DOE policies for operation of research and
laboratory facilities and former nuclear weapons sites. The
sites possess Category I special nuclear material. Category I
material includes plutonium and uranium in the following forms:
products containing high concentrations of
plutonium or uranium, such as major nuclear components,
and recastable metal, and
high-grade materials, such as carbides,
oxides, solutions, and nitrates.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards
and Security Program, Government Accountability Office, GAO-03-471, p.
2, May 2003.
The risks this radioactive material poses vary, but include
the potential for sabotage, or theft for illegal use. Because
these materials pose such risks, ESE management of the
safeguards and security program, which includes overseeing
contractor activities, is essential to prevent an unacceptable,
adverse impact on national security.
ESE facilities are operated and maintained by outside
contractors.\34\ Because these facilities house special nuclear
materials used for research, DOE administers security programs
to protect (1) against theft, sabotage, espionage, terrorism,
or other risks to national security and (2) the safety and
health of DOE employees and the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ Nuclear Security: Several Issues Could Impede the Ability of
DOE's Office of Energy, Science and Environment to Meet the May 2003
Design Basis Threat, Testimony of Robin M. Nazzaro, Director,
Government Accountability Office, GAO-04-894T, p. 1, June 22, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. OFFICE OF SECURITY AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE [SSA]
In December 2003, Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham
announced the establishment of the new Office of Security and
Safety Performance Assurance,\35\ combining the Office of
Security [SO] and the Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance [OA], to better coordinate the roles of
independent oversight and security policy organizations within
the Department.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ The Department of Energy, Press Release, Washington DC, Dec.
4, 2003, DOE Establishes Office of Security and Safety Performance
Assurance for Effective Implementation of Safeguards & Security
Policies.
\36\ The Department of Energy, Office of Security and Safety
Performance Assurance [SSA], http://www.ssa.doe.gov/mission--
functions.html (accessed Feb. 28, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to DOE, SSA is responsible for the development,
implementation and assessment of safeguards and security
policies and posture. The Director of SSA reports directly to
the Secretary of Energy.\37\ The creation of the SSA office
places added emphasis and focus on security with the ultimate
goal of providing the highest level of protection for the
security of nuclear assets held by DOE. According to the
Director of SSA, the merging of SO and OA will provide for
better integration and collaboration among the security and
oversight functions and will generate a synergy that will
facilitate communication and be more responsive to the security
needs of DOE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ The Department of Energy, Press Release, Washington DC, Dec.
4, 2003, DOE Establishes Office of Security and Safety Performance
Assurance for Effective Implementation of Safeguards & Security
Policies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SSA develops and promulgates DOE security policy. In
addition, the office is responsible for developing the Design
Basis Threat [DBT] to identify and characterize the range of
potential adversary threats to Department of Energy programs
and facilities. To carry out this mission, the SSA develops
strategies and policies governing the protection of critical
assets entrusted to the Department of Energy.
Specifically, the Office of Security and Safety Performance
Assurance is:
Responsible for managing the DOE Safeguards
and Security Technology Development Program;
Developing policies designed to protect
national security and other critical assets entrusted
to the Department of Energy;
Analyzing department-wide safeguards and
security policy and standards designed to protect
national security and other critical assets;
Provide an independent assessment of the
effectiveness of security policies and programs.
SSA employs an oversight process that emphasizes
performance and performance testing for evaluating the
effectiveness of contractor safeguards and security
performance. To carry out this function, SSA periodically
assesses both Federal and contractor operations for
improvement, including the use of force-on-force exercises. The
office also performs follow-up reviews to ensure corrective
actions are implemented and weaknesses in safeguards and
security are addressed appropriately. SSA also conducts ESE and
NNSA inspections to determine the effectiveness of safeguards
and security policies and programs; identifies and analyzes
safeguards and security policy issues, trends and directions;
and develops inspection and assessment methods and
technologies.
In addition to security oversight provided by SSA, NNSA and
ESE have the day-to-day oversight responsibility for
contractors' security programs. The program offices conduct
annual security surveys or surveillances at sites under their
jurisdiction.
The end of the Cold War changed the Department's focus from
building new weapons to extending the lives of existing
weapons, disposing of surplus nuclear material, and cleaning up
no longer needed weapons sites. NNSA is responsible for
extending the lives of existing weapons in the stockpile and
for ultimately disposing of surplus nuclear material, while
ESE, Office of Environmental Management [EM] is responsible for
cleaning up former nuclear weapons sites. Contractors, who are
responsible for protecting classified information, nuclear
materials, nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons components,
operate NNSA and EM sites.
D. NNSA AND ESE SECURITY OFFICES
The SSA guides NNSA and ESE safeguards and security
programs. NNSA and ESE are responsible for ensuring
contractors' security activities are effective and conform to
SSA orders and policy requirements. In conducting this
oversight, NNSA and ESE generally use certain key processes
intended to identify specific security weaknesses at
laboratory, production facility and environmental sites and
ensure weaknesses are corrected. These processes include annual
comprehensive surveys and ongoing reviews of contractor
security programs.
The Office of Defense Nuclear Security is responsible for
security activities at NNSA laboratories and production
facilities.\38\ The office develops agency security programs,
including protection, control, and accountability for nuclear
material and ensuring physical security for all facilities in
the complex. Through various contract mechanisms, NNSA provides
financial incentives for contractor performance. NNSA assesses
this performance based on the extent contractors meet
performance standards, which are established in annual
performance plans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ Department of Energy, NNSA Organization Chart, Feb. 6, 2005,
http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/orgcharts/NNSAOrgcharts.pdf (accessed Feb.
15, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unlike NNSA, ESE does not have a consolidated headquarters
security office with direct security budget oversight of
program offices. In April 2005, the ESE Undersecretary stated
ESE was composed of ``institutional stovepipes'' and that this
structure has hampered strategic security management within
ESE.\39\ As a result, the Undersecretary for ESE appointed a
director of ESE security in June 2005. Nevertheless, the ESE
Security Director does not have budget authority or policy
direction responsibilities nor does he have a dedicated staff
as found in NNSA. Because of this, each ESE program office is
organized and staffed differently. For example, the Office of
Environmental Management's headquarters security office has
more than 17 professional security personnel on staff. In
contrast, the headquarters offices of Science and of Nuclear
Energy, Science and Technology each have only one or two
security professionals on staff respectively. According to GAO,
this situation may be problematic because security
responsibilities are increasing with the consolidation of sites
and special nuclear materials.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the
New Design Basis Threat, p. 29, Government Accountability Office, GAO-
05-611, July 15, 2005.
\40\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOE's overall security policy is contained in DOE Order
470.1, Safeguards and Security Program, which was originally
approved in 1995. The key component of the DOE approach to
security is the Design Basis Threat [DBT], a classified
document that identifies the characteristics of the potential
threats to DOE assets.\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ Ibid. p. 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
E. DESIGN BASIS THREAT
The Design Basis Threat identifies and characterizes
potential attacks against DOE programs and facilities. The DBT
is based on the Postulated Threat, the official assessment by
the intelligence community of potential terrorist strategies
against DOE facilities. DOE, DOD, FBI, CIA and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission [NRC] participated in the development of
the postulated threat. The DBT is an integral part of DOE
efforts to secure and sustain domestic production and control
of nuclear materials. Detailed elements of the new DBT are
classified.
The DBT describes adversaries, such as terrorists,
criminals, and foreign intelligence agents, in terms of their
tactics, equipment, level of training, level of motivation, and
other characteristics. The DBT is used to assist DOE analysts
in evaluating specific vulnerabilities. The DOE DBT has been
coordinated historically with the Department of Defense [DOD]
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission [NRC] \42\ to ensure that
similar national security assets are provided equivalent
protection regardless of what agency has primary custody.\43\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ Nuclear Security: DOE Needs To Resolve Significant Issues
Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, Government
Accountability Office, GAO-04-623, p. 17, Apr. 27, 2004.
\43\ According to GAO, after 2003, there was a lack of coordination
between these agencies. As a result, the subcommittee asked GAO to
investigate the comparability of the DOE and the NRC DBTs for
protection of special nuclear material. The GAO report should be
completed by July 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The DBT is used to:
Develop overall safeguards and security
program requirements;
provide the basis for site specific
safeguards and security program planning,
implementation, and facility design; and,
provide the basis for evaluating the
effectiveness of systems that are implemented.
After the events of September 11, 2001, DOE began to
reassess and improve the physical security at NNSA and ESE
sites. In May 2003, the Department of Energy issued an updated
DBT. Reflecting the post-September 11, 2001 environment, the
2003 DBT \44\ is substantially different and a somewhat more
demanding document than the previous DBT which had last been
updated in 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ Design Basis Threat for the Department of Energy Programs and
Facilities, (UNCLASSIFIED), Short Title: Unclassified Design Basis
Threat, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Safeguards and Security,
May 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The 2003 DBT represents a departure from earlier DBTs in
its basic structure. Specifically, as discussed in the GAO
report, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs To Resolve Significant
Issues Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, key
differences from the 1999 DBT include the following:
Increased adversary threat levels. The 2003 DBT increases
the terrorist threat levels for the theft of the department's
highest value assets, special nuclear material, although not in
a uniform way. The 1999 DBT required ESE and NNSA sites to
protect against a single terrorist threat level. Under the 2003
DBT however, the theft of a nuclear weapon or test assembly is
judged to be more attractive to terrorists, and sites that have
these assets are required to defend against a substantially
higher number of adversaries than are other ESE and NNSA sites
that possess other forms of Category I special nuclear
material. For example, the Pantex Plant, which, among other
things, assembles and disassembles nuclear weapons, is required
to defend to a higher level than sites such Los Alamos or Y-12,
both of which fabricate nuclear weapons components. DOE calls
this a graded threat approach.
Specific protection strategies. In line with the graded
threat approach and depending on the type of materials
possessed and the likely objective of the terrorist group,
sites are now required to implement specific protection
strategies, such as denial of access, denial of task, or
containment with recapture for their most sensitive facilities
and assets.
Wider range of terrorist objectives. The 2003 DBT
recognizes a wider range of terrorist objectives, particularly
in the area of radiological, chemical, and biological sabotage.
The 2003 DBT requires the development of protection strategies
for a range of facilities, such as some radioactive waste
storage areas, that were not covered under the previous DBT.
Complexity. With a graded approach and broader coverage,
the new DBT is a more complex document than its predecessor.
The 1999 DBT was 9 pages long, while the 2003 DBT is a far more
detailed 48 pages.
Depending on the material, protective systems at DOE
Category I special nuclear material sites are designed to
accomplish the following objectives in response to the
terrorist threat:
Denial of access. For some potential terrorist objectives,
such as the creation of an improvised nuclear device, DOE may
employ a protection strategy that requires the engagement and
neutralization of adversaries before they can acquire hands-on
access to the assets.
Denial of task. For nuclear weapons or nuclear test devices
that terrorists might seek to steal, DOE requires the
prevention and/or neutralization of the adversaries before they
can complete a specific task, such as stealing devices.
Containment with recapture. Where the theft of nuclear
material is the likely terrorist objective, DOE requires that
adversaries not be allowed to escape the facility and that DOE
protective forces recapture the material as soon as possible.
This objective requires the use of specially trained and well-
equipped response teams.
GAO released the report, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs To
Resolve Significant Issues Before It Fully Meets the New Design
Basis Threat, (GAO-04-623) at the April 27, 2004 subcommittee
hearing and testified about how well DOE is positioned to
protect the nuclear weapons, material, and operations from
today's threat.\45\ In part, as a result of the subcommittee's
investigation of DOE facility security, DOE Secretary Spencer
Abraham announced on May 7, 2004 a series of new facility
security initiatives. These included enhancing protective
forces, consolidating nuclear material, protecting sensitive
information and a re-examination of the 2003 Design Basis
Threat.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Prepared testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government
Accountability Office, Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security
Requirements? before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on Government
Reform, Serial No. 108-237, pps. 10-12, Apr. 27, 2004.
\46\ Department of Energy Security Initiatives, May 7, 2004 (in
subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result of Secretary Abraham's May 7th Energy Security
Initiatives,\47\ DOE issued a revised DBT in October 2004. The
2004 DBT identified a larger terrorist threat for DOE sites
than had the previous DBT and merged and simplified threat
levels [TL] and sabotage threat levels [STL] into 4 threat
levels. In addition, the 2004 DBT required a reexamination of
the security posture at each facility, how the threat level
will be met and incorporating improvised nuclear device [IND],
radiological sabotage and measures to mitigate airborne threats
into the highest TL [TL1].\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Ibid. p. 3, Revising Threat Assessments.
\48\ Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance briefing
slides, Significant Events Leading to Current DBT Policy, pgs. 8-10,
March 2005 (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOE acknowledges that meeting the 2004 DBT requires an
integrated security approach for the Department of Energy that
will deploy security-based technical solutions to reduce the
need for an increased protective force, consolidate special
nuclear materials by reducing the quantities of materials and
the number of locations at which the materials are stored, and
deploy an elite protective force that is trained and equipped
to meet a more capable attacking force. Because the 2004 DBT
contains more challenging threat levels than the 2003 DBT,
achievement of DBT-compliance was changed from October 2007 to
August 2008.
In 2005, the DBT was again modified. The Deputy Secretary
directed the annual review of the DBT be completed on an
accelerated schedule \49\ and as a result, changes to the 2004
DBT were announced in November 2005.\50\ According to GAO, the
2005 DBT reduces the level of threat at most ESE and NNSA
sites.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Memorandum for Deputy Secretary Clay Sell, Nov. 28, 2005 from
Glenn S Podonsky, Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance
(in subcommittee files).
\50\ Memorandum for Linton Brooks, Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration, Davis Garman, Under Secretary, Energy, Science
and Environment and Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of Security and
Safety Performance Assurance, Nov. 29, 2005 from Deputy Secretary Clay
Sell (in subcommittee files).
\51\ Email correspondence from Jonathan Gill, Senior Analyst,
Government Accountability Office to subcommittee staff, Mar. 28, 2006
(in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. Discussion
A. FINDINGS
1.The Department of Energy lacks an overarching, coordinated security
policy to ensure effective safeguards are in place to protect
nuclear weapons assemblies, components, designs and special
nuclear material
The Department of Energy lacks a standardized, universally
applicable security policy, making it extremely difficult for
NNSA and ESE site offices to effectively oversee security
activities. GAO reported on security at NNSA sites in May 2003
and April 2004. GAO found that NNSA needed to improve
management of safeguards and security programs and that while
some action had been taken in response to the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, additional action was needed to ensure
that DOE sites were adequately prepared to defend themselves.
NNSA was criticized for not being effective. Ms.
Robin Nazzaro, Director of Natural Resources and
Environment of the Government Accountability Office explained
in her June 24, 2003 testimony that the NNSA had not yet fully
defined clear roles and responsibilities for headquarters and
site operations. The management structure is consistently in
flux, rendering NNSA site offices inconsistent in their
assessment of contractor safeguards and security activities.
When problems are identified, NNSA contractors do not
consistently conduct the analysis DOE policy requires in
preparing corrective action plans. Ms. Nazzaro also criticized
NNSA for being understaffed and having shortfalls in the
expertise needed to effectively oversee contractors.\52\
Furthermore, in their testimonies on June 22, 2004, both Ms.
Nazzaro and Ms. Danielle Brian, executive director of the
Project on Government Oversight, claimed the lack of
coordination between the labs and the leadership at
headquarters within DOE is a major cause for concern and
therefore, indicates the need for an overarching security
policy.\53\ Since that time, NNSA has strengthened its security
organization and clarified roles and responsibilities. However,
the effectiveness of these reforms has not been fully assessed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government
Accountability Office, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons
Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, pps. 6-7, June 24, 2003.
\53\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government
Accountability Office and Ms. Danielle Brian, executive director,
Project on Government Oversight, Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet
Facility Security Requirements? (II) before the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House
Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 108-237, p. 38, June 22,
2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to GAO, ESE headquarters is also not well suited
to meet the challenges associated with implementing the 2004
DBT.\54\ Specifically, there is no centralized ESE security
organization. The individual who serves as the ESE Security
Director has no programmatic authority. The lack of authority
limits the director's ability to facilitate ESE and DOE-wide
cooperation on such issues as facility security, nuclear
material down-blending and SNM consolidation at ESE sites.\55\
It was only in early July 2005 that DOE finally appointed a
permanent ESE Director of Security. The reaction of the ESE
Director of Security to GAO's concern about the lack of
programmatic authority was tepid at best. According to the ESE
Director of Security, formalizing the position of ESE Director
of Security in early July 2005 was responsive to GAO's
recommendation in this area.\56\ However, GAO believes the ESE
Director failed to address GAO's underlying concern that the
position of ESE Security Director does not have direct
programmatic authority for facility security, nuclear material
down-blending and SNM consolidation at ESE sites.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the
New Design Basis Threat, p. 5, Government Accountability Office, GAO-
05-611, July 15, 2005.
\55\ Ibid. p. 6.
\56\ Prepared testimony of Robert Walsh, ESE Director of Security,
Department of Energy, DOE/ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective
Force? before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform,
Serial No. 109-104, pps. 90-91, July 26, 2005.
\57\ Prepared testimony of Gene Aloise, Director, Government
Accountability Office, DOE/ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective
Force? before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform,
Serial No. 109-104, p. 25, July 26, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The Design Basis Threat [DBT] is taking too long to implement
The Design Basis Threat for the Department of Energy was
revised in 2003, 2004 and 2005. The latest DBT security
standards are to be implemented by 2008. Because of this
lengthy implementation period, there is a risk that terrorists
might seek to exploit lingering vulnerabilities in nuclear
facility defenses. There are a variety of factors contributing
to the lengthy implementation process. These include
development of the 2003 DBT which took almost 2 years because
of delays in developing the Postulated Threat, the lengthy
comment and review process at DOE for developing a protection
policy, the sharp debates within DOE and other government
organizations over the size and capabilities of terrorist
threats and the availability of resources to meet those
threats.\58\ As a result, GAO doubts DOE will be able to fully
implement the standards set in the DBT before 2008.\59\
According to GAO, serious improvements must be made at each
Category I nuclear site under DOE in order to meet the DBT
implementation deadline.\60\ Second, it is taking too long to
implement because there is a lack of coordination among DOE
offices, sites and contractors, and a lack of focused funding
needed to implement the DBT.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ Nuclear Security: DOE Needs To Resolve Significant Issues
Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, Government
Accountability Office, GAO-04-623, Highlights Page, Apr. 27, 2004.
\59\ Ibid. p. 6.
\60\ Ibid. p. 7.
\61\ Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the
New Design Basis Threat, pps. 29-30, Government Accountability Office,
GAO-05-611, July 15, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ronald E. Rimm, president of RETA Security Inc., in
testimony on June 24, 2003, explained that ``the necessary
implementation schedule for funding security improvements are
not required to be completed until 2009 with the actual
implementation to follow some time later.'' \62\ Ms. Nazzaro,
in April 27, 2004 testimony explained that a faster process to
reach consensus on policy within DOE is needed since
adversaries have the ability to move and adapt extremely
quickly.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ Prepared testimony of Ronald E. Rimm, president, RETA
Security, Inc., Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons Complex
Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, p. 169, June 24, 2003.
\63\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government
Accountability Office, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons
Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, p. 37, June 24, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GAO reported that DOE has been slow to resolve a number of
significant issues, such as issuing additional DBT
implementation guidance, developing DBT implementation plans,
and developing budgets to support these plans, that may affect
the ability of its sites to fully meet the threat contained in
the DBT in a timely fashion. Consequently, DOE's deadline to
meet DBT requirements is probably not realistic and will not be
met for some sites.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ Nuclear Security: DOE Needs To Resolve Significant Issues
Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, Government
Accountability Office, GAO-04-623, Highlights Page, Apr. 27, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As an example, in March 2006, subcommittee staff met with
GAO and learned the ESE Savannah River site [SRS] and Oak Ridge
site (Y-12) are at different stages in complying with the 2003
DBT. SRS expects to be fully compliant with all aspects of the
DBT by the end of the fiscal year 2006. Compliance relies on
the completion of a number of projects and efforts including
the installation of interlocking vehicle barriers, deployment
of armored vehicles, and installation of hardened fighting
positions, all of which appear to be funded and on schedule.
In contrast, Y-12 has been compliant with portions of the
2003 DBT since February 2004. This includes strict protection
requirements for some assets and facilities. However, the
universal application of stricter protection requirements will
not be completed until 2008. Both sites have developed broadly
similar visions for complying with the 2004 and 2005 DBT.
Implementation of those plans, however, will require adequate
funding and the completion of key and often interdependent
activities, especially at Y-12. Accordingly, Y-12 appears at
greater risk for not meeting its 2005 DBT requirements by the
end of fiscal year 2008.
3. The Design Basis Threat has not been applied consistently throughout
the Department of Energy
One of the reasons DOE officials have not applied the DBT
consistently throughout the Department of Energy is because of
cultural resistance and the belief by some that the Postulated
Threat applied only to sites containing nuclear weapons and or
weapon parts. As an example, ESE Hanford sites were required to
implement the original 2003 DBT denial strategy by fiscal year
2006 even though the 2004 DBT denial strategy changed the
implementation date to fiscal year 2008.\65\ However, a June
22, 2005 a memo from Maurice Daugherty, Director of Safeguards
and Security Emergency Management, delayed the Hanford denial
strategy until 2008 even though the sites had not yet begun
implementation of the 2003 DBT denial strategy.\66\ On July 1,
2005, in a memorandum to ESE EM, SSA objected to delaying the
implementation of the denial strategy and ESE rescinded the
delay.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ Memorandum from Maurice Daugherty, Director of Safeguards and
Security Emergency Management to Ronald Bartholomew, Director,
Safeguards and Security Savannah River Operations Office, June 22, 2005
(in subcommittee files).
\66\ Ibid.
\67\ Memorandum from Marshall O. Combs, Director, Office of
Security, SSA to Maurice Daugherty, Director, Safeguards and Security/
ESE Environmental Management, July 1, 2005 (in subcommittee files).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GAO disagreed with that assessment. According to Ms.
Nazzaro, ``we felt that the Department did not do an adequate
job of justifying why they were differentiating between sites
that had nuclear weapons and those that had nuclear
materials.'' \68\ Ms. Nazzaro went on to say, ``there was no
justification for these deviations other than we understand
there were serious concerns over budget, as to whether they
would have enough money to be able to implement the new design
basis threat.'' \69\ Ms. Brian testified that ``the threat of
an improvised nuclear device should really be the standard of
whether a site should be reaching the highest levels of
security, and not whether there is a full-up weapon there.''
\70\ The subcommittee notes that the 2004 and 2005 DBT, when
fully implemented, will have largely addressed this issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government
Accountability Office, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons
Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, p.43, June 24, 2003.
\69\ Ibid.
\70\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat
contained in the 2004 DBT, DOE and ESE officials recognized
they need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These
include transformation of the protective force into an elite
force, development and deployment of new security technologies
and the consolidation of special nuclear material.\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the
New Design Basis Threat, p. 4, Government Accountability Office, GAO-
05-611, July 15, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
GAO is concerned about the use of inconsistent assessments
of contractor security activities. According to GAO, this lack
of consistency occurs in part because site offices have assumed
new oversight responsibilities without clear guidance on how to
carry out those responsibilities.\72\ DOE policy requires
contractors to prepare corrective action plans for identified
problems and to ensure those actions are based on documented
root cause analysis,\73\ risk assessment, and cost-benefit
analysis.\74\ GAO found NNSA contractors have not consistently
prepared effective, formal root cause analyses when developing
corrective action plans for identified deficiencies. GAO found
that less than half of the contractors had performed the
required root cause analysis. In some cases, the root cause
analysis was poorly prepared.\75\ This resulted in confusion
and contradictions in correcting site security deficiencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government
Accountability Office, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons
Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, p. 7, June 24, 2003.
\73\ Failure analysis reports provide a clear picture of the root
cause, and include recommendations to avoid future failures from
security design through implementation.
\74\ Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards
and Security Program, GAO-03-471, pps. 2-3, May 30, 2003.
\75\ Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its Safeguards
and Security Program, GAO-03-471, p. 5, May 30, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Maintaining the current far-flung Department of Energy nuclear
complex of facilities housing special nuclear materials is not
cost effective and increases security risks
There are many reasons why maintaining Department of Energy
nuclear materials and components across the country is not cost
effective and poses higher security risks. Ms. Brian, in her
June 24, 2003 testimony, explained that ``DOE weapons-quantity
special nuclear materials are stored at 10 fixed sites even
though most have virtually no national security mission. DOE
cannot currently adequately protect this material, and security
at each site unnecessarily increases redundancies and costs.
Not only do the unnecessary sites cost the taxpayers billions
annually, but they also present a significant health and safety
risk to nearby communities.'' \76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ Prepared statement of Danielle Brian, executive director,
Project on Government Oversight, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear
Weapons Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House
Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, p. 103, June 24,
2003.
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Those 10 major sites have weapons-grade plutonium [PU] and/
or highly-enriched uranium [HEU] in sufficient quantities for a
nuclear device. Ms. Brian stated that these sites which house
nearly 1,000 tons of weapons-grade plutonium and highly
enriched uranium have at times failed to protect this material
during force-on-force exercises. Many of these sites are
located near metropolitan areas, including the San Francisco
Bay area, Albuquerque and Knoxville.\77\ Furthermore, the
Office of Secure Transportation [OST] under DOE moves weapons-
grade Special Nuclear Materials [SNM] across the country on
public, interstate highways, creating even more
vulnerabilities.\78\ Glenn Podonsky, Director of the Office of
Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance of the DOE,
explained that having so many sites makes DOE and the United
States more vulnerable because more targets are created.\79\
With fewer sites, DOE could better coordinate efforts, focus
and further enhance security measures. The number of DOE sites
containing nuclear material has remained a security concern. In
July 2005, Mr. Aloise stated, ``the consolidation of materials
in fewer places would increase security.'' \80\
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\77\ Ibid. p. 149.
\78\ Ibid. p. 107.
\79\ Testimony of Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of Independent
Oversight and Performance Assurance, Department of Energy, Nuclear
Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security Requirements? (II) before the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 108-237, p.
90, June 22, 2004.
\80\ Testimony of Gene Aloise, Director, Government Accountability
Office, before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, DOE/
ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force? Serial No. 109-104, p.
105, July 26, 2005.
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5. Protective forces are experiencing reduced readiness, retention
problems, and fewer force-on-force performance tests
The subcommittee found weapon specifications, protective
equipment and training were not consistent at DOE sites
containing special nuclear material. DOE Inspector General
Friedman stated, ``Between 2003 and 2005, we identified issues
regarding protective force overtime and training. In one
review, which included five Department sites, we found the
Department faced significant increases in unscheduled
protective force overtime. Further, we noted protective force
morale and retention problems due to mandatory overtime and
reduced training opportunities. In a review with the
Department's Oak Ridge Reservation, we found that contractor
protective force personnel spent, on average, about 40 percent
less time on combat readiness refresher training than that
specified in the training plan approved by Federal site
managers, and that the personnel worked in excess of the
Department's optimum 60-hour per week threshold. In a third
review we found that 10 of the 12 sites made significant
modifications to the Department's established protective force
core curriculum. This raised questions about the effectiveness
of the training received by the affected protective force
personnel, as well as the validity of the core curriculum.''
\81\
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\81\ Testimony of Gregory H. Friedman, DOE Inspector General, DOE/
ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force? before the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 109-104,
pps. 27, July 26, 2005.
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While GAO found that protective forces at ESE sites are
generally meeting current DOE requirements, some weaknesses
were identified in ESE protective force practices that could
adversely affect the current readiness to defend ESE sites.
These include protective force officers' lack of regular
participation in force-on-force exercises; the frequency and
quality of training opportunities; the lack of dependable
communications systems; and insufficient protective gear,
including protective body armor and chemical protective gear;
and the lack of armored vehicles.\82\
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\82\ Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the
New Design Basis Threat, p. 16, Government Accountability Office, GAO-
05-611, July 15, 2005.
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Mr. Aloise of GAO stated:
Regarding readiness, we found that protective forces at
the five ESE sites, with weapons-grade nuclear
material, generally meet readiness requirements.
Specifically, protective forces at the Savannah River
site, Hanford site, Idaho, and Argonne West, and Oak
Ridge National Lab generally comply with DOE standards
for firearms proficiency, physical fitness and
equipment, and had the required training programs and
facilities. However, we did find weaknesses that could
impact the protective forces' ability to defend their
sites. For example, most officers we spoke with were
concerned about the quality and realism of their
training. Further, because DOE neither sets standards
for, nor tracks individual participation in force-on-
force exercises, it was difficult to determine how many
officers had this important training.\83\
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\83\ Testimony of Gene Aloise, Director, Government Accountability
Office, DOE/ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force? before the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 109-104, p.
8, July 26, 2005.
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Mr. Aloise went on to say:
Another weakness identified by protective force
officers at all five sites concerned problems with
their radios. Some said that the radios could not be
relied on in the event of a terrorist attack. In
addition, although most protective forces are required
to have access to body armor, at one site we found that
body armor had not been issued for most officers.
Another site did not have its own special response
team. In the event of an attack, one of the jobs of a
special response team would be to recover stolen
nuclear material. In addition, the capability of some
of the protective forces to fight during a chemical or
biological attack varied. Specifically, two sites
expected and provided equipment for most of their
forces to fight in contaminated areas. Another site did
not provide any equipment. Indeed, it expected its
teams to evacuate the site with other workers. Yet
another site expected its forces to fight in a
chemically contaminated area, but did not provide
protective gear. Another weakness we observed was that
only one of the five sites had armored vehicles. In
contrast, all six NNSA sites with weapons-grade nuclear
material have armored vehicles.\84\
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\84\ Ibid.
Ms. Nazzaro and Mr. Podonsky also described problems
associated with the Department of Energy's protective force in
their June 24, 2003 testimonies. Ms. Nazzaro stated ``DOE and
NNSA took immediate steps to improve security in the aftermath
of the September 11 terrorist attacks. For example, DOE and
NNSA moved to a higher level of security that required, among
other things, more vehicle inspections and security patrols.
DOE and NNSA also conducted a number of security-related
reviews, studies and analysis and increased communication with
Federal, State and local officials. While these steps are
believed to have improved DOE's and NNSA's security posture,
they have been expensive. These steps have required extensive
overtime, which has had a considerable negative effect on DOE's
and NNSA's protective force through fatigue, reduced readiness,
retention, and reduced training.'' \85\
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\85\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government
Accountability Office, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons
Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, pps. 7-8, June 24, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Podonsky also explained that because of the heightened
security level, DOE must rely on the use of overtime until new
hires are cleared and trained to perform their duties. ``As a
result, protective force personnel testing and training have
been reduced or deferred because existing manpower is stretched
to the limit.'' \86\ Mr. Podonsky believes enhancing the
integration of manpower and technology, creating more effective
barriers, further consolidating security assets, and initiating
extensive performance testing to ensure system effectiveness
are necessary to mitigate the aforementioned problems with the
security forces.\87\
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\86\ Testimony of Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of Independent
Oversight and Performance Assurance, Department of Energy before the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Emerging Threats:
Assessing Nuclear Weapons Complex Facility Security Serial No. 108-62,
p. 32, June 24, 2003.
\87\ Prepared statement of Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of
Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, Department of Energy
before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Emerging
Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons Complex Facility Security Serial No.
108-62, pps. 34-38, June 24, 2003.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The Secretary of Energy should designate an office responsible for
Department-wide security policies and should clarify the roles
and responsibilities of site offices and headquarters for
conducting security oversight
Many of the problems found in security management,
consensus on security policy and implementation of the DBT
would be mitigated with the creation of an overarching security
office that would delegate the role and responsibilities of all
security divisions within DOE. This is especially important to
bridge the gulf between NNSA and ESE security. According to
GAO, there is no centralized security organization within the
Office of the Under Secretary, ESE.\88\ The ESE Security
Director does not have programmatic or budget control of
security at ESE sites. Mr. Aloise stated, ``DOE needs to
establish a centralized security office within ESE to help meet
the challenges of implementing the new design basis threat.''
\89\
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\88\ Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the
New Design Basis Threat, p. 31, Government Accountability Office, GAO-
05-611, July 15, 2005.
\89\ Testimony of Gene Aloise, Director, Government Accountability
Office, DOE/ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force? before the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 109-104, p.
8, July 26, 2005.
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Mr. Podonsky stated, ``we also endorse GAO's recommendation
to establish an ESE security organization. As it is up to the
Under Secretary to determine the best way to manage ESE, we
believe that an appropriate security organization at the
highest level within ESE and with appropriate authorities
delegated could facilitate effective and efficient management
of security resources and implementation of required upgrades.
Security upgrades will involve substantial effort over the next
two years, and if ESE is to achieve protection upgrade goals by
October 2008, this sizeable effort must be well coordinated and
well managed and fully endorsed by the Under Secretary for
ESE.'' \90\
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\90\ Prepared statement of Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of
Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, Department of Energy
before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Emerging
Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons Complex Facility Security Serial No.
108-62, p. 48, June 24, 2003.
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If not, some see the need to take the entire security
enterprise out of DOE hands. In her June 24, 2003 testimony,
Ms. Brian argued that it would be beneficial to take both
security management and the Independent Oversight Office out of
DOE and to set up an independent agency to provide security and
to oversee nuclear security from outside DOE.\91\
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\91\ Testimony of Danielle Brian, executive director, Project on
Government Oversight before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on
Government Reform, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons Complex
Facility Security Serial No. 108-62, p. 151, June 24, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The Secretary of Energy should develop and implement a coordinated
department-wide, multiyear, fully funded implementation plan
for meeting the new DBT requirements
In order to fully meet the new DBT requirements, a coherent
department-wide, multiyear and fully funded implementation plan
is needed. In the April 27, 2004 hearing, Ms. Nazzaro claimed
that DOE had not yet developed official estimates of the
overall costs of DBT implementation.\92\ Furthermore, current
DBT implementation cost estimates do not include items such as
closing unneeded facilities, transporting and consolidating
materials and completing line-item construction projects.\93\
Therefore, Ms. Nazzaro suggested creating a department-wide
implementation plan including the involvement of Environmental
Management and the Transportation Security Agency, and the
estimates for construction.\94\ Ms. Nazzaro explained that,
``because of the importance of successfully integrating
multiple program activities with security requirements, we
continue to believe, as we recommended in April 2004, that DOE
needs to develop and implement a Department-wide, multi-year,
fully resourced implementation plan for meeting the DBT
requirements that includes important programmatic activities
such as the closure of facilities and the transportation of
special nuclear materials.'' \95\
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\92\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government
Accountability Office and Ms. Danielle Brian, executive director,
Project on Government Oversight, Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet
Facility Security Requirements? before the Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House
Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 108-237, p. 6, Apr. 27,
2004.
\93\ Ibid.
\94\ Ibid. p. 45.
\95\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government
Accountability Office, Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security
Requirements? (II) before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-237, p. 15, June 22, 2004.
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In July 2005, Mr. Aloise stated, ``to protect these sites,
an effective security program is essential. DOE's security
program begins with a document known as the design basis
threat, which identifies the size and capabilities of potential
adversaries. The 2004 design basis threat identified a much
larger terrorist threat than before, and it could cost between
about $400 million and $600 million to develop the force
necessary to defeat this larger threat.'' \96\
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\96\ Testimony of Gene Aloise, Director Government Accountability
office, DOE/ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force? before the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 109-104, p.
7, July 26, 2005.
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3. The Secretary of Energy should report regularly to relevant
congressional oversight committees on the status of DBT
implementation plans including which sites and facilities are
currently considered to be high risk and what steps are being
taken to mitigate these risks to acceptable levels
Regular reports to relevant congressional oversight
committees will assure a more efficient and expedient DBT
implementation. It will also allow Congress to hold DOE
accountable for achieving specific goals and objectives for
security reform. Both Ms. Nazzaro and Ms. Brian strongly
supported this recommendation in their testimonies. Ms. Nazzaro
explained that DOE should regularly report to Congress in order
to assure that the implementation will be fully funded.\97\ Ms.
Brian further highlighted this recommendation since consistent
reporting will force DOE to maintain DBT implementation as a
top priority.\98\ In the June 24, 2003 testimony, Ms. Brian
explained that ``there are two things that move any
bureaucracy: one is sustained press attention to a problem and
second is congressional oversight . . . without sustained and
intensive scrutiny and oversight, DOE briefings and testimony
will not reveal the actual status of security.'' \99\
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\97\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government
Accountability Office, Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security
Requirements? before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on Government
Reform, Serial No. 108-237, p. 39, Apr. 27, 2004.
\98\ Testimony of Danielle Brian, executive director, Project on
Government Oversight, Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security
Requirements? (II) before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-237, pps. 45-46, June 22, 2004.
\99\ Testimony of Danielle Brian, executive director, Project on
Government Oversight, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear Weapons
Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, p. 152, June 24, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. The Secretary of Energy should develop a plan and timeline for the
consolidation of special nuclear material
During the course of the DOE nuclear facility security
investigation, the subcommittee heard from a number of
witnesses who support the consolidation of special nuclear
material. Ms. Nazzaro stated, ``as far as the category I
special nuclear materials, there is a lot of confusion. We have
sites where the site is managed by one entity within the
organization and yet there are materials that are owned by
another entity. One of the strategies that we have proposed in
the past is to consolidate materials, move materials to other
sites.'' \100\
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\100\ Testimony of Robin Nazzaro, Director, Government
Accountability Office, Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security
Requirements? (II) before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House Committee on
Government Reform, Serial No. 108-237, p. 46, June 22, 2004.
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In order to consolidate the special nuclear material, Ms.
Brian offered several recommendations in her June 24, 2003
testimony. She explained that unneeded facilities should be
closed, nuclear materials need to be consolidated and that
excess materials should be immobilized.\101\ In addition, Ms.
Brian explained that ``two of the most secure facilities in the
world would provide enough storage for the entire DOE weapons
complex--a secure underground weapons storage facility at
Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico and the Device Assembly
Facility at the Nevada Test Site.'' \102\ Developing a plan and
timeline for the consolidation of special nuclear material is
critical. If nuclear materials are consolidated to fewer, more
easily-protected sites, less money will be spent on unnecessary
sites and significant health and safety risk to nearby
communities will be mitigated.\103\ Mr. Podonsky assured that
DOE had already undertaken measures to address the
consolidation of special nuclear material. In his June 22, 2004
testimony, he stated, ``consolidation of special nuclear
material has perhaps the greatest potential impact on our
future protection requirements and programs.'' \104\ Mr.
Podonsky goes on to explain that ``protecting these materials
is among our most difficult security challenges. We can greatly
reduce the difficulty, risk, and costs associated with this
mission by disposing of material we no longer need and
consolidating the remainder in as few locations as
operationally feasible.'' \105\
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\101\ Prepared statement of Danielle Brian, executive director,
Project on Government Oversight, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear
Weapons Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House
Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, p. 103, June 24,
2003.
\102\ Ibid.
\103\ Ibid. p. 156.
\104\ Prepared statement of Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of
Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, Department of Energy,
Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security Requirements? (II)
before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial
No. 108-237, p. 74-75, June 22, 2004.
\105\ Ibid.
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In June 2004, Mr. Podonsky told the subcommittee, ``the
Department formed a Consolidation of Materials Task Force to
identify opportunities to relocate and consolidate special
nuclear materials. They have already compiled and consolidated
a list of excess material, a difficult and necessary step
toward a comprehensive consolidation plan. In August, they will
issue a report identifying short-term, which is 1 year, and
long-term, beyond 1 year, options for consolidation and
relocation. We are making progress in this area, but the
balancing of programmatic cost and risk against security-
related cost and risk is especially difficult. While everyone
wants to see this effort finalized and implemented, we must
allow adequate time to prepare a comprehensive plan that is
prudent and affordable.'' \106\ As of February 2006, the Task
Force had not yet released recommendations or options for
consolidating special nuclear material.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\106\ Testimony of Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of Independent
Oversight and Performance Assurance, Department of Energy, Nuclear
Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security Requirements? (II) before the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 108-237, p.
64, June 22, 2004.
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5. The Secretary of Energy should develop and implement a comprehensive
management plan to improve training, qualifications, and
increase force strength of the security protective force
According to GAO, DOE's response to the call to develop a
comprehensive plan to meet the new design basis threat does not
go far enough. Without such a plan, DOE may not be successful
in meeting the requirements of the design basis threat by
October 2008.\107\
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\107\ Testimony of Gene Aloise, Director Government Accountability
office, DOE/ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force? before the
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 109-104, p.
8, July 26, 2005.
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Measures must be taken in order to improve the training and
qualifications of an enlarged security protective force. In her
June 24, 2003 testimony, Ms. Brian explained that DOE must
increase the size of its protective force and improve weaponry,
tactics, and command, control and communication.\108\ In both
his June 24, 2003 and June 22, 2004 testimonies, Mr. Podonsky
explained that integrating manpower and technology will help
achieve more effective solutions within the security forces,
such as the issue of relying on overtime.\109\ He also
explained that with better training and a higher set of
standards for security forces and security managers, the
security protective force and will be stronger. ``We believe
rigorous force-on-force performance testing against tough,
skilled aggressor forces is one of the most important elements
in measuring the effectiveness of our protective forces and in
carrying us forward to an elite force. We are determined to do
our part in advancing the Department's ability to conduct
effective and informative force-on-force performance tests as
well as improving our ability to analyze the results of those
tests.'' \110\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\108\ Prepared statement of Danielle Brian, executive director,
Project on Government Oversight, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear
Weapons Complex Facility Security before the Subcommittee on National
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House
Committee on Government Reform, Serial No. 108-62, p. 103, June 24,
2003.
\109\ Testimony of Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of Independent
Oversight and Performance Assurance, before the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, House
Committee on Government Reform, Emerging Threats: Assessing Nuclear
Weapons Complex Facility Security Serial No. 108-62, p. 32, June 24,
2003.
\110\ Prepared statement of Glenn Podonsky, Director, Office of
Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance, Department of Energy,
Nuclear Security: Can DOE Meet Facility Security Requirements? (II)
before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, House Committee on Government Reform, Serial
No. 108-237, p. 81, June 22, 2004.
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There are many factors to consider in ameliorating the
status of the security protective force and all its components.
A comprehensive management plan is necessary to help achieve
this level of security. GAO assessed the current readiness of
protective forces at ESE sites and the steps still needed to
defend those facilities against the larger, more capable
attackers postulated in the DBT.\111\ Their findings point to a
generally proficient guard staff prepared to meet existing
standards. But the way forward to meet the higher DBT threat
level is far less clear. Efforts to deploy an elite protective
force, utilize new security technologies and effectively manage
ESE security initiatives require coordination and resource
commitments that GAO is not sure will materialize.\112\
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\111\ Nuclear Security: DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Action to Meet the
New Design Basis Threat, Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-611,
July 15, 2005.
\112\ Ibid. pps. 30-31.
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