[Senate Prints 109-43]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress S. Prt.
COMMITTEE PRINT
1st Session 109-43
_______________________________________________________________________
``PLAN COLOMBIA'':
ELEMENTS FOR SUCCESS
__________
STAFF TRIP REPORT
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Ninth Congress
First Session
December 2005
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
25-278 WASHINGTON : 2005
_____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Past and Present of ``Plan Colombia''............................ 1
Overview......................................................... 2
Additional Analysis.............................................. 6
Appendix I....................................................... 14
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
December 29, 2005.
Dear Colleagues:
The committee recently sent Mr. Carl Meacham of the
professional staff to Bogota, Colombia to assess specific
aspects of ``Plan Colombia.'' This six-year U.S. aid package,
which was intended to eliminate Colombia's production of
illicit crops and domestic terrorism, recently expired.
On September 23, 2005, the Government of Colombia (GOC)
provided a draft proposal to the U.S. Department of State for
an extension of Plan Colombia. The consultation process between
the Department of State and the GOC is ongoing. With this in
mind, I am pleased to share with you his trip report. I believe
it provides significant insight and a number of important
recommendations on drug eradication and interdiction, the
demobilization of rightist paramilitary fighters, and progress
regarding assistance to the GOC in advancing the defense and
expansion of government presence in Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC) and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
(AUC paramilitaries) controlled areas.
I hope you find this helpful as the Committee on Foreign
Relations considers its continued support for Plan Colombia. We
look forward to continuing to work with you on these issues and
welcome any comments you may have on this report.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman.
(v)
``PLAN COLOMBIA'':
ELEMENTS FOR SUCCESS
----------
From December 11-14, 2005, a member of the professional
staff from the United States Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations (SFRC) traveled to Bogota, Colombia. During this
trip, staff visited with Colombia's President, Alvaro Uribe,
and members of his Cabinet. Staff also met with representatives
of relevant multilateral organizations, foreign diplomats, an
influential Colombian Senator, Rafael Pardo, Ideas Para La Paz
President Sergio Jaramillo, and the Chief Editor of Semana
magazine, Rodrigo Pardo. (See Appendix I for complete list).
At the request of the Chairman, the purpose of the trip was
to examine three issues:
Drug Eradication and Interdiction;
Demobilization of rightist paramilitary fighters;
and
Progress regarding assistance to the Government of
Colombia (GOC) in advancing the defense and expansion
of ITS presence in Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) and United Self-Defense Forces of
Colombia (AUC paramilitaries) controlled areas.
Past and Present of ``Plan Colombia''
Plan Colombia (Public Law 106-246), which began in 2000,
was developed by former Colombian President Pastrana (1998-
2002) to end the GOC's long-standing armed conflict, eliminate
drug trafficking, and promote economic and social development.
The Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) is the primary U.S.
program that supports Plan Colombia. In addition, Colombia
receives assistance from the Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
program and the Department of Defense's central
counternarcotics account. ACI funding for Plan Colombia from FY
2000 through FY 2005 totals approximately $2.8 billion. When
FMF and DOD assistance is included, the total level of U.S.
support to GOC is $4.5 billion.\1\ The U.S. Congress will
continue support for Plan Colombia beyond FY 2005 through ACI
$469 million and FMF $90 million funding for FY 2006. Plan
Colombia is also receiving $1.7 million for International
Military Education and Training (IMET) and $4.1 million for
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining (NADR).
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\1\ ``Plan Colombia: A Progress Report,'' CRS Report for Congress,
Connie Viellette, May 9, 2005.
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From Plan Colombia's inception, the objectives of the GOC
and the USG have differed in some aspects, although there is a
significant overlap of goals. The primary U.S. objective is to
prevent the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, as
well as to help the GOC promote peace as it contributes to the
regional security of South America. The three topics examined
in this report are important to meeting USG objectives.
The GOC has not formally announced its plans for a follow-
up program. However, on September 23, 2005, the GOC provided
the U.S. Department of State with a draft document describing
its proposed Plan Colombia Consolidation Phase (PCCP), which
seeks continued U.S. assistance for 2006-2010.\2\ The PCCP
envisages four programmatic pillars that roughly correspond to
the areas the USG supported through Plan Colombia (Pillars I-
III), with the addition of the peace process (including
demobilization and reintegration) as pillar IV. These pillars
are:
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\2\ United States Embassy--Bogota, Colombia, Country Team Briefing,
December 12, 2005
Fight Against Terrorism, Narcotics Trafficking, and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Organized Crime
Strengthening Governmental Institutions and the
Justice System
Economics and Social Revitalization
Process for Peace and Re-Integration
The USG has informed the GOC that it supports the broad
priorities contained in the draft plan. The USG has not
submitted a formal draft for consultation to relevant
committees in the U.S. Congress.
Primary Recommendations:
1. In order to remain flexible, staff strongly
recommends that USG support for Plan Colombia be
extended on a year to year basis, working in the
context of continued cooperation with the GOC to ensure
rigorous implementation of relevant priorities,
especially related to drug eradication and interdiction
and the effective demobilization of the AUC, FARC, and
ELN. Policies toward the GOC must be continually
evaluated, given very fluid circumstances inside
Colombia and its neighboring countries.
2. Staff strongly encourages the U.S Department of
State to brief in a time sensitive manner and seek
input from the relevant committees in the U.S. Senate
and House on their consultations with the GOC regarding
the PCCP. Failure to address Congress' concerns could
weaken support for future extensions of Plan Colombia
in the U.S. Congress.
Overview
Since President Alvaro Uribe's election in 2002, he has
striven to build a close relationship with the USG. With the
expiration of Plan Colombia this relationship has been subject
to review in the following areas:
drug eradication and interdiction
The lack of reliable evidence of well-documented progress
in the war against drugs and neutralizing paramilitaries is
disappointing considering the billions of dollars the U.S.
Congress has appropriated to finance drug interdiction and
eradication since 2000.\3\
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\3\ More than $6 billion spent on Colombia and other countries
(during FY 2000-2005) in the region for counter narcotics, alternative
development, and judicial reform efforts. According to the report
entitled ``DRUG CONTROL, Agencies need to plan form likely declines in
drug interdiction assets, and develop better performance measures for
transit zone operations.'' Report to Congressional Committees by the
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), November 2005.
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In 2005 coca eradication broke the 136,000 hectare record
and destroyed the equivalent of 160 metric tons of cocaine; and
though cocaine seized in 2004 almost tripled to 325 metric tons
of cocaine, and is expected to be larger for 2005, \4\ Colombia
continues to provide about 90 percent of the cocaine available
in the U.S., in spite of the appropriated funds being earmarked
for Department of State programs in Colombia to fight drug
trafficking and terrorism through Plan Colombia.
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\4\ United States Embassy--Bogota, Colombia, Country Team Briefing,
December 12, 2005.
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The GOC claims to have made considerable progress
eradicating drugs and interdicting drug shipments, as well as
substantial progress in eliminating the internal terrorist
threat. Both the United Nations (UN) Office on Drugs and Crime
and the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP) lend credence to these claims in the form of glowing
statistics indicative of Colombia's good work.
The General Accounting Office (GAO), on the other hand, has
criticized all of these rosy reports. It says that ONDCP's
assessments of the amount of cocaine entering the United States
in 2004 are too broad in range to be ``useful for assessing
interdiction efforts.'' \5\ Even some Colombian officials have
cautioned that while the statistics presented by the UN and
White House are encouraging, more time is needed to determine
if current efforts will yield real progress. They refer, for
instance, to the impact of possible drug warehousing in
Venezuela and Mexico on price and supply. However, given the
absence of a consensus from respected organizations on the
success of Plan Colombia in stemming the flow of cocaine to the
United States, this does not bode well for efforts to push for
its extension, at least at its current funding levels, without
policy changes.
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\5\ ``DRUG CONTROL, Agencies need to plan form likely declines in
drug interdiction assets, and develop better performance measures for
transit zone operations.'' Report to Congressional Committees by the
U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), November 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration has incorporated existing programs in
supplementing Plan Colombia's drug interdiction efforts. These
efforts can be improved. Of particular importance to staff in
this regard is the opinion of Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
officials about the lack of Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) and
rapid intercept capability for interdiction (at this time, the
Colombians have no radar detection MPA or substantive
helicopter intercept capability.) Without adequate MPA
resources, it is impossible to detect and pinpoint drug-
smuggling vessels in the open waters of Colombia's coasts.
Although P-3 aircraft have been successfully utilized in the
Caribbean, along with MPA provided by the U.K. Government,
their use is being reduced and replacements are not available.
As a result the DEA and North Coast Colombian police and/or
military are unable to respond to intelligence on drug
trafficking because of the lack of maritime patrol aircraft.
Therefore, our ability to respond to real-time information
about smugglers and traffickers is seriously limited. This is a
major concern since Plan Colombia's main purpose is to stop
drug smuggling into the United States.
Recommendations:
1. It is strongly urged that additional Maritime
Patrol Aircraft (MPA) resources be acquired to support
the maritime interdiction efforts on Colombia's North
Coast and west into the Pacific Ocean.
2. It is strongly advised that the USG, particularly
the Department of Defense and the Department of
Homeland Security, develop and coordinate reliable
performance metrics to accurately measure the flow of
cocaine into the United States. Once this is done, all
parties will have accurate metrics on success or
failure.
demobilization of rightist paramilitary fighters
This demobilization is closely linked to realizing Plan
Colombia's goals on drug eradication and interdiction. The
Uribe administration's own study on demobilization, prepared
two years ago, concluded that paramilitaries are responsible
for at least 40 percent of the cocaine trafficking in
Colombia.\6\ An effective demobilization would represent a
victory in the war on drugs. The full demobilization process is
scheduled to begin during the first quarter of 2006 with
implementation of ``The Peace and Justice Law,'' signed by
President Uribe in July 2005, which attempts to establish a
legal framework to neutralize the AUC.
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\6\ Confidential assessment prepared for the president of Colombia
on whether peace talks should begin with the nation's main
paramilitary, as sited in Washington Post, June 23, 2003 news article
entitled ``Colombian Fighters' Drug Trade Is Detailed; Report
Complicates Efforts to End War.''
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Though the GOC reports that 13,592 paramilitaries have
handed their weapons over, fulfilling the introductory phase of
the full demobilization process, these efforts have been
problematic, and success is dependent largely on the co-
operation of terrorist groups, who must surrender their arms
and agree to allow drug traffickers to face U.S. justice
through extradition.\7\
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\7\ ``Colombia: Paramilitary Demobilization Update,'' Source:
Department of State, U.S. Embassy Bogota, Colombia, Dec. 2005.
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There has also been some criticism of the ``Peace and
Justice Law'' by Colombian government officials. The Peace
Commissioner, Luis Carlos Restrepo, has stated that he knows
full well that demobilization is a complicated ``monster of
four heads,'' specifically referring to problems with
government coordination of reintegration, legal processing and
monitoring of demobilized combatants, verification that ex-
combatants are no longer involved in illegal criminal
activities and victim reconciliation and reparations--the
demobilization's four key elements. Staff's opinion is that the
law will be ineffective because it relies on the AUC's
willingness to cooperate in the implementation of its own
demise. In addition the GOC has not built a strong framework
for the law's implementation.
Recommendations:
1. Staff strongly recommends that the USG condition
any funding support of the GOC's demobilization effort
on its ability to improve the demobilization law's
implementation, with special attention devoted to the
reintegration, legal processing and monitoring of
demobilized combatants, verification that ex-combatants
are no longer involved in illegal criminal activities
and victim's reconciliation and reparations. The USG
should strongly encourage the GOC to name a
``Demobilization Czar'' to help make the implementation
more effective.
2. Staff strongly recommends that the USG press the
GOC to start acting immediately and much more
aggressively in investigating and building up cases
against paramilitary commanders and locating and
confiscating their illegal assets. In this regard, the
U.S. State Department and U.S Embassy in Bogota should
examine how best the USG can provide technical
assistance to the GOC in its search for illegally
obtained assets and land.
3. Staff strongly recommends that the USG ask the GOC
to ensure that extradition arrangements with the USG
not be weakened by the ``Peace and Justice Law''.
progress regarding assistance to the government of colombia the (goc)
in advancing the defense and expansion of their presence in
revolutionary armed forces of colombia (farc) and united self-defense
forces of colombia (auc paramilitaries) controlled areas
At stake is the survival of a state that has been battered
and undermined by leftist rebels, who have long controlled the
countryside, rightist paramilitary armies, and an out-of-
control drug trade that funds both sides (right and left) and
fuels the cycle of chaos, violence and impunity. Experts say
the burden is simply too much for Colombia to shoulder alone,
but note that an important element of engagement with Colombia
is strengthening its security and other institutions. In this
regard, presently, Plan Colombia is the best structure in place
to provide the framework for the Colombian government, working
with the U.S. Military Group (MILGRP), to advance and
facilitate social services in areas that have traditionally
suffered from little state presence and pressure from illegal
armed groups and at the same time strengthening the state. Plan
Patriota, the GOC's military campaign to extend government
control and security presence throughout the national
territory, has made significant accomplishments, starting with
the clearing of the Bogota area in 2003. Today 17,000 Joint
Task Force troops in south-central Colombian jungles have
destroyed more than 380 FARC encampments, including many with
guest houses for visiting narco-traffickers.\8\
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\8\ United States Embassy--Bogota, Colombia, Country Team Briefing,
December 12, 2005.
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At the time of the writing of this report, the Colombian
Government had offered to demilitarize a small area of southern
Colombia to begin peace negotiations with the FARC and also has
recently begun peace negotiations in Cuba with the National
Liberation Army (ELN).
Recommendations:
1. Staff strongly recommends that efforts by the GOC
in advancing the defense and expansion of their
presence in Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC) and United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC
paramilitaries) controlled areas should continue to be
funded as necessary subject to review and with the
appropriate oversight.
2. Though, skepticism exists regarding the FARC's
response, these are positive developments and the Uribe
Government should be supported. Staff believes that the
GOC efforts demonstrate clear attempts to bring about
peace and should be facilitated and supported by the
U.S Embassy in Bogota appropriately.
Additional Analysis
DRUG ERADICATION AND INTERDICTION
As of November 2005, over 132,000 hectares of coca and 1500
hectares of opium poppy had been sprayed since the beginning of
2005. Ground fire against spray planes is well below 2003's
record levels but remains problematic.
Interdiction operations are on target to match or exceed
2004's record seizures. Through July 2005, the Colombian
National Police (CNP) had seized more than 65 metric tons of
cocaine and coca base, and the Colombian navy had seized more
than 75 metric tons of cocaine. In 2004 Government of Colombia
forces seized 178 metric tons of cocaine and coca base. Cocaine
seizures reportedly rose from 117 metric tons in 2001 to 196 in
2004. And just last month, White House Office of National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP) head John Walters announced the price of
cocaine rose 19 percent and purity declined 15 percent over a
seven-month period this year--evidence to him that cocaine is
getting scarcer.
Nevertheless, a recent General Accounting Office (GAO)
report on the reliability of key U.S. Government data on
cocaine trafficking, price, and purity questioned these numbers
and advised that the U.S. Government needs to do a better job
at obtaining more reliable data. The ONDCP estimated that
between 325 and 675 metric tons of cocaine entered the United
States in 2004, a range that is too broad to be useful, the
report added.
Although noticeable progress has been made regarding
interdiction, with the exception of Operation Firewall, a
cooperative U.S. and Colombian maritime interdiction initiative
on the North Coast of Colombia, there are no other organized
and capable partner nation maritime source or transit zone
programs. This is an extremely important activity in the war on
drugs, as it is estimated that approximately 70% of cocaine
trafficking to the United States occurs by water transport.
Source: Department of Defense, Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)
South
In any event, Operation Firewall has achieved significant
success with the direct and/or assisted seizures of
approximately 32 metric tons of cocaine in FY 2004 and 47 tons
in FY 2005. However, this program has been severely limited by
the lack of Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) and rapid intercept
capability mentioned above (at this time, the Colombians have
no radar detection MPA or substantive helicopter intercept
capability). Without adequate MPA resources, it is almost
impossible to detect and pinpoint those drug-laden smuggling
vessels in open waters. Although P-3 aircraft have been
successfully utilized in air, especially given the increase in
suspect air activity from Venezuela, their use is being reduced
and replacements are not available.
Source: Department of Defense, Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)
South
Recommendations:
1. Staff recommends additional dedicated assets to
support the Firewall program and to enhance coordinated
interdiction efforts with Joint Interagency Task Force
South (JIATF-South) that is envisioned to compliment
joint maritime activities. The importance of MPA to the
Maritime Interdiction program (JIATF-South and
Firewall) can not be understated.
2. Staff recommends a refueling platform to assist
Maritime Interdiction vessels coordinated through
JIATF-South operations to cover the eastern pacific
coast of Colombia (EASTPAC).
DEMOBILIZATION OF ``RIGHTIST'' PARAMILITARY FIGHTERS
Colombia's demobilization will be a challenge. The
``Justice and Peace Law'' to govern the process falls short
regarding the establishment of a strong framework for
dismantling the paramilitary groups. The law lacks the
effective enforcement structure necessary to ensure that
paramilitaries disclose information about their groups'
criminal operations or surrender their illegally acquired
wealth. Under the law there is a very real possibility that
Commanders convicted of atrocities will receive very short
sentences, even if it becomes clear that they have lied to
prosecutors, kept most of their illegal assets, drug labs and
wealth, or continued to engage in illegal paramilitary activity
after they have ``demobilized.'' When these leaders re-enter
society, their wealth, political power, and criminal networks
will have remained intact, allowing them to replace their
weapons and troops with ease if they choose, or form their own
laundered and ``legitimate'' narco-gangs.
Though President Uribe's record of extradition throughout
his term (08/07/02 to 12/15/05) is excellent (at 315), of
particular concern to the United States under the new ``Peace
and Justice Law'' is its ambiguity regarding the extradition of
paramilitary commanders who have been indicted in the United
States. It appears they can escape extradition by serving
reduced sentences for their crimes in Colombia and then claim
double jeopardy.
Extraditions from Colombia to the United States
------------------------------------------------------------------------
United
Colombia States Others Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Extraditions: From 1991
Through 8/6/1998
Total extraditions by 0 7 8 15
nationality, 7/4/91 through 8/6/
98..............................
------------------------------------
Total Extraditions: Pastrana and
Uribe
Individuals extradited by 51 4 9 64
nationality during the Pastrana
administration, 8/7/98 to 8/6/2.
Individuals extradited by 304 1 10 315
nationality during the Uribe
administration\1\ 8/7/02 to 12/
15/05...........................
------------------------------------
Total extraditions from 07/04/91 355 12 27 394
to 12/15/05.....................
====================================
Total Extraditions: From 1/1/05
Through 12/15/05
Total extraditions in 2005....... 131 0 3 134
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Note: The total of 315 includes ten (10) individuals that Pastrana
approved for extradition but were extradited after Uribe took office.
Source: Department of State, U.S. Embassy Bogota, Colombia, Dec. 2005.
Extradition provides President Uribe with an effective
weapon, a symbolic sword, to deter paramilitary commanders from
acting with impunity and encourages their adherence to
agreements. Up to now President Uribe has used extradition with
clear resolve. This sword must not be blunted by ambiguity.
State Department figures on the demobilization of the
paramilitaries show that approximately 13,592 (as of December
15, 2005) paramilitary troops have handed over their weapons.
That completes the introductory phase of the full
demobilization process, which is to begin its full
implementation through the ``Peace and Justice Law'' during the
first quarter of 2006. Approximately 10,000 paramilitaries
remain to demobilize.
------
COLOMBIA: PARAMILITARY DEMOBILIZATION UPDATE\1\
Demobilized Numbers: 22,218
13,592--paramilitaries have demobilized collectively, as of
12/15
8,626--illegal armed members have demobilized individually, as
of 12/15
FARC 4,292, AUC 3,040, ELN 1,176, Dissidents 229
Demobilized CRO Registered, DAS Certified, Jailed, Deaths, SENA and
Employed
CRO: 8,973, 7 CROs (Medellin, Turbo, Monteria, Sincelejo,
Cucuta, Antioquia, Cali) plus 2 mobile CROs
DAS certified: 4,658; Jailed: 126; Deaths: 135; SENA: 3,223
Employed: Of the 8,618 demobilized that have
registered at the CROs, 1,500 are working
14% fromal sector, 7% productive projects, 79% informal sector
Paramilitary Groups Left to Demobilize: 10,000
Approximately 10,000 paramilitaries remain to demobilize
3,000 from the North Bloc
3,000 from the BCB (over 25 fronts)
Independent groups:
Elmer Cardenas Bloc with 800 members
Mineros Bloc with 2,000 members
Self-Defense Mid-Magdalena Bloc
Two remaining fronts from the Centauros Bloc
Demobilization deadline: February 15 (According to Pretelt)
\1\ Source: Department of State, U.S. Embassy Bogota, Colombia, Dec.
2005
______
Recommendations:
1. Staff strongly recommends that the USG encourage
the GOC to create strong regulations for the law's
implementation (at the time this report was written
implementing language had not been signed by President
Uribe) and forcefully implement them.
2. Staff strongly recommends that the USG request
that the GOC ensure that regulations provide an
interpretation of the law's eligibility requirements
(including turnover of assets, cessation of illegal
activities, and release of hostages) that is as strict
as possible, establish rigorous procedures for
verifying that the requirements are met, and prescribe
effective sanctions for those who fail to meet them.
3. To preserve the possibility for extradition, staff
recommends that the USG request that the GOC ensure
that regulations should prohibit the GOC's Attorney
General's Office from bringing charges under the law
for crimes with which demobilized individuals have been
charged in other countries.
ASSISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA IN ADVANCING THE DEFENSE AND
EXPANSION OF THEIR PRESENCE IN FARC AND PARAMILITARY CONTROLLED AREAS
United States Government assistance to Colombia under Plan
Colombia is premised on combating the interrelated issues of
drug trafficking and terrorism and includes training, material
aid, and guidance to the security forces and other
institutions. Establishing a state presence throughout national
territory lies at the core of bringing peace to Colombia.
Increasing state activity in 2005 may have been responsible for
keeping FARC violence localized and below 2004 levels.
Nonetheless, the FARC attacked indigenous towns, electrical
towers, rural highways, military and police outposts. While the
attacks were partially directed at military targets, civilians
were also indiscriminately killed. Reductions in violence,
however, did occur and are due for the most part to the
effective implementation of military policy:
Plan Patriota: Plan Patriota, the GOC's military campaign
to extend government control and security presence throughout
the national territory, is composed of two major phases: Phase
1, the planning and preparation for the forceful removal of
armed groups; and Phase 2, which was divided into three
components: 2A, 2B, and 2C, to implement Phase 2. Phase 2A,
which took place from June to December 2003, resulted in the
removal of the FARC from Bogota and Cundinamarca Department.
Phase 2B, which began in February 2004 and continues, includes
Meta, Caqueta, and Guaviare Departments, involved the removal
of the FARC from those areas. This is a large part of the area
that comprised the ``despeje,'' or the area President Pastrana
had conceded to the FARC. Phase 2C, which is the forceful
removal of FARC from Antioquia Department, was scheduled to
begin late in 2005, but has been postponed.
Colombian Military Reports on Results for Joint Task Force Omega (in
Charge of Phase 2B), 2004-2005
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2004 2005 Total
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Battles 505 317 822
--------------------------------
COLMIL Troops Killed................. 67 25 92
COLMIL Troops Injured................ 328 78 406
FARC Members Killed.................. 264 204 468
FARC Members Captured................ 217 394 611
FARC Deserters....................... 97 76 173
================================
Materiel Captured
Guns, Rifles, Support Arms........... 265 431 1,451
Explosive Devices.................... 2,752 3,074 5,826
Explosives (KLS)..................... 16,335 28,339 44,674
Grenades............................. 4,440 5,962 10,402
Munitions............................ 630,428 826,022 1,456,450
Communication Equipment.............. 235 363 598
Mined Camps.......................... 206 88 294
FARC Camps........................... 421 619 1,040
Caches............................... 117 363 480
Cultivated Hectares.................. 1,277 1,167 2,444
Coca Paste and Base.................. 10,292 869 11,161
Laboratories......................... 32 196 228
Vehicles............................. 255 117 432
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Department of State, U.S. Embassy Bogota, Colombia
The Colombian military claims that Plan Patriota has
reduced the FARC ranks from 18,000 to 12,000 in the past year.
Information provided by the Office of the Colombian President
reports that 11 FARC-run villages were recaptured, more than
400 FARC camps were destroyed, 1,534 explosive devices and 323
gas-cylinder bombs were seized, 2,518 combatants were killed,
and a large amount of ammunition and weapons were taken. FARC
drug trafficking activities also were reduced. As of September
2004, the Government reported that the Colombian military had
located and destroyed more than 47 tons of solid chemical
supplies, 18,000 gallons of liquid precursors, half a ton of
cocaine base, and $34,000 in cash.
In addition, with support from the U.S. Military Group
(MILGRP), the Colombia Government formed an interagency center
to facilitate social services in seven areas that have
traditionally suffered from little state presence and pressure
from illegal armed groups. The ``Center for Coordinated
Integral Action'' focuses on providing immediate social
services, including documentation and medical clinics, and
establishing longer term projects, such as economic
reactivation. Approximately 40,000 individuals have been
enrolled in state health care, judges, investigators, and
public defenders have been placed in all 16 municipalities of
the Plan Patriota area, and a public library was recently
opened in the town of San Vicente del Caguan, which had long
been dominated by the FARC.
At the time this report was written, President Uribe and
the GOC had accepted an ``international commission''
(representatives from France, Switzerland, and Spain)
suggestion to establish a 65 square mile ``security zone'' in
the Valle del Cauca to conduct hostage exchange talks with the
FARC; and the GOC had begun conversations with the ELN in Cuba.
Regarding the FARC, the international commission handed the
proposal to the GOC and the FARC on December 13. The FARC has
not yet replied, and experts, including staff, viewed the
likely response from FARC with some skepticism. Some 30
families live in the proposed security zone, a rural area that
contains several small governmental facilities and a church.
Uribe said the proposal contemplates 40 international observers
in the security zone to verify that no armed actors are
present, either GOC forces or guerrillas. The security zone
would exist for seven days prior to any GOC-FARC meeting (to
allow the FARC to get to the zone) and for seven days following
the conclusion of the talks (to allow the FARC to leave). The
International Committee of the Red Cross would observe the
process, along with a committee representing the European
facilitators. Colombian sovereignty and law would remain in
effect in the security zone.
Regarding the ELN, the meeting between the GOC and the ELN
in Cuba (which began in mid-December 2005) is the first formal
encounter between them in almost four years. Few are optimistic
success will come easily. The talks will be exploratory with an
open agenda, assisted by Norway, Spain and Switzerland, the
group of civil society guarantors of the ``Casa de Paz''
initiative, and other members of Colombian civil society. The
first meeting will be in Cuba, primarily to schedule future
sessions. Subsequent meetings would likely take place in
Europe. The ELN leadership reportedly settled on Cuba rather
than risk legal jeopardy in Europe, given their designated
status as a terrorist organization. Cuba's role will be limited
to that of host.
Recommendation:
Staff strongly recommends that efforts by the GOC in
bringing about peace and in advancing the defense and
expansion of their presence in FARC and ELN areas
continue to be funded as necessary subject to review
and with appropriate oversight.
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Appendix I
STAFF HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS IN COLOMBIA:
Colombian Government Officials
President of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe
Minister of Defense, Camilo Ospina Bernal
Vice President of Colombia, Francisco Santos' Director for
Human Rights, Carlos Franco
Prosecutor General, Mario Iguaran
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alejandro Borda Rojas
Vice Minister of Defense, Jorge Eastman
Vice Minister of Defense, Hernando Sanin
Presidential Counselor, Juan Lozano
Presidential Advisor, Jaime Bermudez
Direccion de Policia Judicial--(Dijin), Director, Gen.
Oscar Naranjo
Attorney General of Colombia, Edgardo Maya
Colombian Government Legislative Branch
Senator Rafael Pardo
United States State Department, U.S. Embassy Bogota, Colombia
U.S. Ambassador to Colombia William Wood (POL. PAS, NAS,
AID, DATT, MILGRP, DEA, ORA Officers)
Diplomatic Community
Representatives from British, Canadian, Chilean, Swedish,
Swiss, and Dutch Embassies
Multilateral Organizations
Michael Fruhling, UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights in Colombia
Juan Pedro Schaerer, International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), Head of Delegation in Colombia
Sergio Caramagna, Head of the Organization of American
States (OAS) Mission in Support of the Peace Process
Think Tanks
Sergio Jaramillo, President, Ideas Para La Paz
Press
Rodrigo Pardo, Chief Editor, Semana Magazine