[Senate Prints 109-54]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress S. Prt.
2d Session COMMITTEE PRINT 109-54
_______________________________________________________________________
HAITIAN ELECTIONS: SETTING THE
FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY
__________
STAFF TRIP REPORT
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Ninth Congress
Second Session
February 2006
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
Primary Conclusion............................................... 1
Election Observations............................................ 1
Voting Conditions............................................ 2
Political Attitudes and Implications......................... 2
Recommendations.................................................. 2
Country Conditions........................................... 2
Security and Economic Growth................................. 3
Building Democracy........................................... 4
Haitian Election Preparations.................................... 5
Electoral Aid and Observation................................ 5
Voter Registration and National ID Card Distribution......... 6
Candidate and Party Registration............................. 6
Appendix I--Staff Discussions in Haiti........................... 7
Appendix II--List of Voting Centers Visited by Congressional
Delegation..................................................... 8
Appendix III--Scenes From Haiti's Election Day................... 9
Appendix IV--Haiti: Election Day Procedures...................... 14
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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February 10 2006.
Dear Colleagues:
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recently sent Mr.
Carl Meacham of the senior professional staff and Ms. Caroline
Tess, Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator Bill Nelson to Port-au-
Prince, Haiti to observe the first round of Haitian elections
on February 7, 2006. They were joined in Haiti by Mr. Ted
Brennan of the House Committee on International Relations,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere and Mr. Paul Oostburg-
Sanz, Democratic Chief Counsel, House Committee on
International Relations. This report reflects the views of the
Senate delegation.
The delegation's priority was to observe Haiti's electoral
process and to assess whether a free, fair, and inclusive
election took place. The presence of a bipartisan and bicameral
delegation from the U.S. Congress helped emphasize the
importance of transparent elections and demonstrate our
enduring commitment to the process, as well as provided the
U.S. Congress' moral support to the people of Haiti.
I hope you find this report helpful as the U.S. Congress
considers how to support the building of a strong and long-
lasting democracy in Haiti.
We look forward to continuing to work with you on these
issues and welcome any comments you may have on this report.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman.
Bill Nelson,
Senator.
(v)
HAITIAN ELECTIONS: SETTING THE FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRACY
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From February 5-8, 2006, a staff delegation from the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) traveled to Port au Prince,
Haiti to observe the first round of Haitian elections. Haitians
voted for a new President as well as Senators and Deputies who
will form Haiti's new Parliament. On February 7th, Election
Day, the delegation deployed to approximately 6 voting centers
in Port-au-Prince. The delegation also visited the Vote
Tabulation Center on February 6th and 8th. (See Appendix I for
detailed list of election centers visited.)
During this trip, the delegation visited with Haiti's
interim Prime Minister, Gerard LaTortue, and with the Special
Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, Juan
Gabriel Valdes. Staff also met with Organization of American
States (OAS) Secretary General, Jose Miguel Insulza. (See
Appendix II for complete list of meetings.)
Primary Conclusion
The delegation finds the voting process of the Haitian
elections observed on February 7, to be satisfactory as the
majority of registered Haitians were able to vote in a
relatively orderly and secure fashion. However, the election
was marked by serious challenges including: Haitians voting by
candlelight, spending hours in long lines at some polling
stations just to find that their names did not appear on the
electoral rolls, and many polling centers opening hours late
because they lacked the necessary workers, security, ballots,
and organization. As of this writing, the count is not yet
complete; this report in no way reflects on the Haitian
electoral process beyond Election Day. (See Appendix III for
scenes from Haiti's Election Day.)
Election Observations
The willingness, enthusiasm and overwhelming interest of
the Haitian electorate was evident during the elections. It is
estimated that over 60 per cent of the Haitian electorate came
out to vote.\1\ However, sufficient preparation and
organization at the polling centers was lacking.
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\1\ 2.2 million Registered voters.
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These elections will not be the solution to Haiti's
problems, but they are an obligatory passage to lay the
foundation for democracy.
Voting Conditions
In general, voting was characterized by delayed openings,
early and eager voters, shorter lines and waiting times in the
afternoon, the presence of many other national and
international election observers, and protracted closing
procedures and ballot counting. Haiti's Provisional Electoral
Council's (CEP) efforts to inform the public regarding changes
in the locations of voting centers seemed to have limited
impact: sizable numbers of voters were frustrated to learn the
locations indicated on the back of their ID cards were
incorrect. As a result, later in the day, the CEP opened voting
bureaus to all voters, regardless of where one's name appeared
on the official registration lists. The most prominent
irregularity was that poll workers selectively checked names
against the official registration lists after voters were
allowed to vote at any voting bureau.
Each voting bureau was run by four Haitian poll workers who
were then ``observed'' by multiple political party observers,
national observers, and international observers. Because of the
large number of parties (over 40), the presence of up to 10
political party observers at each individual voting bureau
slowed the process and also constrained the voter's ability to
cast their vote in secret. In other cases, the political party
monitors provided assistance to those in line, explaining the
voting procedure or helping voters to find the correct voting
bureau.
It was also evident that tabulating the results of the
election would take longer than the original 48 hours
anticipated by the CEP and the OAS. Tally sheets were hand
written--making them difficult to read, inconsistent, and in
some cases calling into question their validity. The need to
re-open ballot boxes or verify tallies could lead to even more
significant delays.
Political Attitudes and Their Implications
Unfortunately, supporters of the various political parties
made statements that sought to claim victory for their party
and candidate. There were also isolated acts of violence and
impatience which led to approximately four deaths, including
two by natural causes, and multiple injuries.
Inside polling centers, some voters engaged in campaign
activities directed at other individuals waiting to vote. Some
voters expressed an aggressive and discourteous public
discourse about the political parties.
In terms of the Haitian attitudes, political polarization
constituted a central element of the electoral contest. This
attitude may lead to violence, instability, and claims of fraud
from the election's losers once the official results are known.
Instability, in the long term could lead to disruptive
intrusions into Haitian politics by other countries in the
region, including Cuba and Venezuela. This could negatively
impact Haitians, the neighboring Dominican Republic, and United
States interests in the region.
Recommendations
Country Conditions
Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and
one of the poorest countries in the developing world. Its
annual per capita income--US$390--is considerably less the
Latin American average.\2\ Approximately 80 per cent of the
Haitian population lives in abject poverty.
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\2\ World Bank Operational Manual, July 2005.
In its fiscal year 2007 budget the administration
slashed Child Survival and Health Programs Funds for
Haiti by approximately 20 per cent, and Development
Assistance by approximately 22 per cent. We strongly
encourage increases in these accounts.\3\
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\3\ Child Survival and Health Programs Fund: actual fiscal year
2005 = $19,969; fiscal year 2006 estimate = $19,801; fiscal year 2007
administration request = $15,812. Development Assistance: actual fiscal
year 2005 = $24,281; fiscal year 2006 estimate = $29,700; fiscal year
2007 administration request = $23,143 (all amounts, thousands of
dollars).
We particularly support and encourage the
continuation of the Inter-American Development Bank's
(IDB) projects which focus on the improvement of access
to basic services, particularly regarding water and
sanitation, health and nutrition, and education, youth
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and sports, and local development.
Narco-trafficking is an ongoing problem in Haiti, primarily
in marijuana and cocaine but also some heroin, from Venezuela,
Colombia and to a lesser extent Jamaica. Drugs are brought by
fast boats or planes to the southern area of the island then
transported by truck and plane to the northern part (Port-de-
Paix), then through the Bahamas by sail freighter or straight
to Miami by fast boat. At varying times, anywhere from 5-10
percent to 15-20 percent of cocaine destined for the United
States passes through Haiti. \4\
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\4\ U.S. Embassy, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
The United States Government (USG) should expand
engagement with Haiti, in areas where feasible,
focusing on cooperation with U.S law enforcement
officials and the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA).
Security and Economic Growth
The success of Haitian democracy and government ultimately
lies with its government and the international community's
ability to work together to provide long term security and
development for the Haitian people. The long-term solution to
insecurity, particularly in Port-au-Prince, is by providing
Haitians with jobs--either in agriculture, tourism or light
manufacturing.
We urge the administration to support the passage of
the Haitian Economic Recovery Opportunity Act (HERO)
(S. 1937/H.R. 4211) to foster job creation.\5\
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\5\ HERO would:
Provide duty free entry to apparel articles assembled in Haiti
contingent upon Presidential certification that the new government is
making significant reforms; and
Cap the duty free treatment to ensure that Haiti's current apparel
exports, which amount to less than one half of one percent of total
U.S. apparel imports, cannot increase to a level that could cause
injury.
On February 29, 2004, shortly after former President
Aristide departed Haiti, the United Nations Security Council
adopted UNSCR 1529, authorizing the deployment of a
Multinational Interim Force (MIF) to restore order and to
prevent civil unrest. The Security Council established the
``Maintenance of the Expanded United Nations Stabilization
Mission in Haiti'' (MINUSTAH) by resolution 1542 on April 30,
2004, to replace the U.S.-led MIF. By resolution 1576 of
November 29, 2004, the Council extended MINUSTAH's Chapter VII
mandate for an additional period of six months until June 1,
2005, to maintain peace and security and to continue to ensure
a stable environment to facilitate the constitutional and
political process in Haiti. On June 22, 2005, the UN Security
Council adopted resolution 1609 extending MINUSTAH's mandate
and approving temporary force increases for approximately eight
months, through February 14, 2006.\6\
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\6\ At the time this report was written, the United Nations
Security Council had scheduled a vote to renew MINUSTAH's mandate and
extend increased personnel levels on the 14th of February 2006 (with a
ceiling of 9,397 for troops and police).
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The interim Haitian Government has come under increasing
pressure to improve security, protect human rights, and to
build the economy. The main security threat continues to come
from various criminal armed groups, some of which in recent
months have displayed an increasing willingness to defy
MINUSTAH. Despite some improvement, the security situation
remains a daunting challenge, particularly in the slum
districts of Port-au-Prince, as armed criminal elements torment
the population with violence and use the slums as a base for
kidnapping.
The interim Haitian Government's authority remains weak in
many parts of Haiti. Although the interim Haitian Government
has appointed all 140 municipal commissions and taken steps to
reorganize central structures, local state institutions remain
weak, in part due to lack of resources, particularly in rural
areas, and also because of a lack of communication in Port-au-
Prince. Poor command and control in the Haitian National Police
(HNP) and the lack of adequately trained and vetted HNP
officers have also contributed to the violence. \7\
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\7\ January 30, 2006 background paper from the U.S. Department of
State notifying the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations that
the United States intends to support a resolution in the United Nations
Security Council to extend for an additional six months previously
approved temporary increases in the authorized force strength of the
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MUNSTAH).
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Finally, the lack of economic opportunity, poor
infrastructure, and deficient education and health care systems
also contribute to the cycle of instability in Haiti.
We support the administration's vote in favor of a
resolution renewing the mandate of the ``Maintenance of
the Expanded United Nations Stabilization Mission in
Haiti'' (MINUSTAH), extending personnel levels for a
further six-month period covering the electoral period
and subsequent political transition.
We strongly support the continued participation of
troop contributing countries with particular
recognition of the Brazilians, Canadians, and Chileans.
And, we strongly encourage the USG to ensure they
remain in Haiti.
Building Democracy
Democratic political coexistence will be possible only
through explicit efforts by the winning candidates to reach
across party lines to accommodate concerns of losing parties
into the political agenda.
It would be highly beneficial for Haitian democracy if
government authorities, political parties, citizens and non-
governmental officials could, in the near future, reach a new
democratic consensus. The agenda for this dialogue could
include such items as: the development of a political party
system with transparent financing formulas, the maturing of the
parliamentary election system to ensure that the interests of
minorities are respected, and the strengthening of the
principle of separation, independence and balance of powers.
We strongly encourage the winners of these elections
to build respect and mutual recognition through a
frank, inclusive and good-faith dialogue, and the
empowerment of a political opposition in conjunction
with the new government. The role of the International
Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic
Institute (NDI) can facilitate this process. We
encourage both NDI and IRI to work with all political
parties in an open and transparent manner.
In the short term the USG should encourage the new
Haitian Government to work with other Caribbean
Community (Caricom) member nations to learn from their
experiences, with special attention to Jamaica. We also
encourage the OAS to foster excursions and exchanges
among Caribbean legislators and government officials to
facilitate the consolidation of democracy in Haiti.
Haitian Election Preparations
The Haitian presidential elections were delayed four times;
they finally occurred on February 7th, 2006 together with
parliamentary elections. If none of the candidates running for
president receives 50 per cent or more of the electorate; there
will be a second round for the two top vote getters. The second
round would take place on March 19, 2006.\8\ The presidential
inauguration is scheduled to take place on March 29, 2006.
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\8\ At the time this report was written ballot counting for the
presidential contest was not conclusive.
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Electoral Aid and Observation
United States Government electoral assistance was $30
million.\9\ In addition, IFES \10\ was awarded $2 million for
election observation with U.S. observers. IFES fielded 12 long-
term observers, 30 short-term observers (STOs) for the first
round and will field 30 STOs during the second round. The
National Democratic Institute (NDI) trained and supported
political party observers and domestic civil society observers.
The United States Embassy in Port-au-Prince separately fielded
30 observers including Creole-speaking staff.\11\
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\9\ The European Union provided approximately $22 million and the
Government of Canada provided approximately $22.75. Total electoral aid
was approximately $70 million.
\10\ ``IFES'' used to stand for the International Foundation for
Election Systems when it was dedicated exclusively to elections. In the
two decades since their founding, they have come to deliver
comprehensive solutions in democracy building and their name is simply
IFES.
\11\ The European Community (EC) and Election Canada (150) fielded
international observation missions. The Caribbean Community of Nations
(Caricom) also sent observers.
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Voter Registration and National ID Card Distribution
The OAS reports that over 3.5 million (3,535,025) potential
voters registered to receive new National Identity Cards. Wide
OAS distribution of the identity cards began on November 23,
2005. OAS reported that over 3.1 million cards (88 per cent)
were distributed by January 30, 2006. On Election Day, there
were 808 secure election polling centers; with approximately 50
per cent in communal sections and 50 per cent in urban centers.
Candidate and Party Registration
According to the U.S. Department of State, 35 Presidential
candidates were approved to contest the election; 45 political
parties were approved by the CEP. According to the CEP,
accommodations in the party registration process resulted in
all major parties participating. (See Appendix IV for Election
Day Procedures)
APPENDIX I
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Staff Discussions in Haiti
Staff held discussions with the following individuals in
Haiti:
Charge d'Affaires Timothy M. Carney (Amb. ret.)
Interim Prime Minister of Haiti, Gerard Latortue
Special Representative of the Secretary General of the
United Nations, Juan Gabriel Valdes
Organization of American States (OAS) Secretary General,
Jose Miguel Insulza
APPENDIX II
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List of Voting Centers in Port-au-Prince Visited by Congressional
Delegation, February 7-9, 2006
Tuesday, February 7, 2006 \1\
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\1\ Many of these centers were visited more that once during the
course of the day. Movement around Port-au-Prince was restricted due to
security concerns.
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1. Ecole Freres de l'Instruction Chretienne, Petion-Ville
2. Ecole Nationale Thomas Madio
3. Ecole Nationale de Guatamala, Lycee Petion-Ville
4. Delmas 75--Institut Mixte Evens Dorleans
5. Fermathe--College Mission Baptiste de Fermathe
6. Thomassin--Eglise Saint Vincent de Paul
Wednesday, February 8, 2006
The delegation visited the Vote Tabulation Center.
APPENDIX III
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Scenes From Haiti's Election Day, February 7, 2006
Haitians waiting to vote at Tomassin--Eglise Saint Vincent de Paul
Haitians waiting to vote at an unidentified voting center
Haitians waiting to vote at Ecole Nationale Thomas Madio
Haitians examining a voter list at Ecole Freres de l'Instruction
Chretienne, Petion-Ville
A Presidential ballot
Ballot boxes for Deputy, Senate, and Presidential elections
A Haitian woman has her thumb marked to indicate that she has voted
Vote Tabulation Center
Chinese MINUSTAH soldiers guarding the Vote Tabulation Center
A UN tank guards the Vote Tabulation Center
APPENDIX IV
Haiti: Election Day Procedures
Schedule for Voting Centers
5:00 a.m.: 38,000 voting center personnel arrive at
voting centers.
5:00 a.m.-6:00 a.m.: Personnel set up voting
6:00 a.m.: Voting opens
4:00 p.m.: Voting closes (any voters already in line
at 1600 will be allowed to vote)
Transportation
The Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) and IGOH plan to
allow public transportation on Election Day.
Steps to Casting a Vote
Voting site (BV) First Secretary checks voter IDs at
the door to the BV and directs them to the president of
the BV.
BV President examines both of the voter's hands to
make sure there is no mark indicating they have already
voted.
BV President finds voter's name, photo (identical to
the ID card photo) and ID number on j the partial
electoral list (LEP).
Voter signs next to their name on the LEP.
BV Vice President (VP) gives the voter a ballot for
presidential, senatorial and deputy races.
BV VP explains that the voter can choose one
president, three senators, and one deputy.
BV VP explains that voter should fold ballot as soon
as he votes to keep his decision private.
Voter casts vote at table divided in four by a
cardboard divider.
BV Second Secretary helps voter place ballots in
correct box, but does not touch ballots.
BV Second Secretary marks voter's thumb nail with
indelible marker.
Counting the Votes
Vote count begins at 4 p.m. or after all voters in
line at 4 p.m. have voted.
Candidate, party, national, and international
observers monitor counting. They will keep a separate
count to verify the official count before the BV
president records the official results.
Beginning with the presidential race, the BV
president will remove ballots from the ballot box one
by one, calling out who the vote is for, if the ballot
is blank, or if the ballot is undecipherable.
BV President will show the ballot to all observers so
they can confirm his assessment.
BV Secretaries will sort the ballots by candidate.
Once all the ballots are removed from the box and
sorted, the BV secretaries will count the votes for
each candidate.
The votes will be counted again if any of the
observers in the room disagree with the count.
Once, all the observers agree on the results, the BV
president will fill out the tally sheet and place clear
tape over the results on every carbon copy of the tally
sheet.
BV Secretaries will seal all of the ballots in one of
the ballot boxes.
BV President seals three tally sheets in envelopes,
one for the communal electoral bureau (BEC), one for
the departmental electoral bureau (BED), and one for
the CEP as required by the electoral law.
BV President seals the tally sheet for the CEP as
well as the time and attendance sheets for the poll
workers in a tamper-proof plastic bag for delivery to
Port-au-Prince,
A tally sheet is given to each of the two political
parties with the most votes, and one is displayed
publicly on the wall of the BV.
CEP staff accompanies the results throughout the
process; only Haitian elections workers are allowed to
handle the results.
UN vehicles and in some cases rented animals carry
the sealed results to UN departmental bases co-located
with or close to the BEDs.
The UN will provide space in all vehicles carrying
results (trucks and helicopters) for observers.
Ballots Stored, Tally Sheets Transferred
CEP staff unloads the ballots and tally sheets at
MINUSTAH departmental bases.
Ballots are locked in secure storage.
One copy of each tally sheet is sent to the relevant
BEC, the BED, and the tabulation center in Port-au-
Prince
Elections officials hope to transport tally sheets to
the tabulation center in Port-au-Prince quickly.
However, results transportation from some remote areas
may be slow--some roads are nearly impassable in foul
weather. It could take 3 - 5 days to finalize the count
from outlying areas.
Tabulating and Releasing the Results
CEP workers log in each tally sheet by their unique
identification number as they arrive at the tabulation
center.
Each tally sheet is randomly assigned to an OAS/CEP-
trained operator who enters the results into a
computer.
The sheet is then passed to another randomly selected
operator who enters the results a second time.
If the two entries do not match, the sheet is sent to
a committee that examines the entered results and the
tally sheet to verify the results.
The CEP will release results from the USAID-funded
media center, but has not yet decided when they will
begin to release results.
Members of the press, elections observers, and
members of the diplomatic community will have access to
the tabulation center throughout the counting process.
However, the tabulation center is divided into sections
to prevent results from leaking before they are
officially release by the CEP.
The technical process for voting and tabulation is
complete. This year's Election Day process will make
fraud significantly more difficult than in past
elections and should lead to a more credible result.
Source: U.S. Department of State.