[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FOSTERING DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: DEFEATING TERRORISM WITH
BALLOTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 17, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-48
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia Columbia
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ------
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina (Independent)
------ ------
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
R. Nicholas Palarino, Senior Policy Advisor
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
Andrew Su, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on May 17, 2005..................................... 1
Statement of:
Dugan, Elizabeth, vice president, International Republican
Institute; Leslie Campbell, director, Middle East Programs,
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs;
Febe Armanios, professor, middle eastern studies,
Middlebury College; Khaled Saffuri, chairman of the board,
Islamic Free Market Institute; and Mona Yacoubian, special
adviser Muslim World Initiative, U.S. Institute for Peace.. 47
Armanios, Febe........................................... 71
Campbell, Leslie......................................... 61
Dugan, Elizabeth......................................... 47
Saffuri, Khaled.......................................... 79
Yacoubian, Mona.......................................... 95
Sharansky, Natan, former Israeli Minister, author of ``The
Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome
Tyranny and Terror''; and Mithal Al-Alusi, Democratic Party
of the Iraqi Nation........................................ 14
Al-Alusi, Mithal......................................... 26
Sharansky, Natan......................................... 14
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Al-Alusi, Mithal, Democratic Party of the Iraqi Nation,
prepared statement of...................................... 28
Armanios, Febe, professor, middle eastern studies, Middlebury
College, prepared statement of............................. 73
Campbell, Leslie, director, Middle East Programs, National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs, prepared
statement of............................................... 64
Dugan, Elizabeth, vice president, International Republican
Institute, prepared statement of........................... 51
Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio, prepared statement of................... 8
Saffuri, Khaled, chairman of the board, Islamic Free Market
Institute, prepared statement of........................... 82
Sharansky, Natan, former Israeli Minister, author of ``The
Case for Democracy: The Power of Freedom to Overcome
Tyranny and Terror'', prepared statement of................ 18
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 4
Yacoubian, Mona. special adviser Muslim World Initiative,
U.S. Institute for Peace, prepared statement of............ 98
FOSTERING DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: DEFEATING TERRORISM WITH
BALLOTS
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 17, 2005
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Dent, Kucinich, Maloney,
Van Hollen, Ruppersberger, and Higgins.
Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and
counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, Ph.D., senior policy advisor;
Robert A. Briggs, clerk; Andrew Su, minority professional staff
member; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; and Jean Gosa,
minority assistant clerk.
Mr. Shays. We will call this hearing of the Government
Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations to order. And we welcome our witnesses,
our distinguished witnesses from both panels and those in
attendance.
Standing in a school courtyard in Irbil, Iraq last January,
some of us were fortunate enough to be able to witness that
nation's historic steps toward democracy in more than half a
century. The election was a decisive moment for the people of
Iraq, and its reverberations are still being felt throughout
the Middle East. In Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and
Iran, people saw that Iraqis asserted their inalienable right
to a freer, more secure future, and asked, why not here?
The question challenges us. What does prevent the
development of a democratic institution and free economies in
the region? Reasons often cited to explain the political and
economic stagnation in the Middle East include the corrupting
dominance of oil wealth, the distorting legacy of western
colonialism, the military exigencies of Arab-Israeli conflict,
and the alleged inherent incompatibility between Islam and
democracy. But the rise of Islamist terrorism as a global
strategic threat brought to our shores with galvanizing horror
on September 11, 2001 buried those excuses and breathed new
life into the call for democratic reforms in the Arab and
Muslim world.
The September 2002 National Security Strategy made the
promotion of democracy a primary tool in the war against
terrorism. In his second inaugural address, the President
succinctly set out this element of what is called the ``Bush
Doctrine'' when he declared ``it is the policy of the United
States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements
in institutions in every nation and culture with the ultimate
goal of ending tyranny in our world.''
It was not always so. For many, we come late to the dialog
advocating democracy in the Middle East. Having long subrogated
overt support for reformists to our Faustian cold war bargains
with repressive, oil-rich regimes, ours is not always a trusted
voice in the discussion. Others discount our good intentions in
the mistaken belief support for Israel and support for
Palestinian rights and aspirations are incompatible.
So we meet this morning to examine the scope and impact of
U.S. efforts to foster the rule of law, self-government, civil
society, and market economies in a part of the world thought by
some to be geographically or culturally immune to modern
forces. In advocating the universal values of human dignity,
political self-determination, and economic opportunity, we
advance our national interest in helping those who would drain
the repressive swamps where terrorism breeds.
It is not easy work. Exercise of the misnamed soft power of
ideas requires subtlety, humility, and perseverance, traits not
always synonymous with U.S. trade policy. As the birth of our
own democracy proved, emerging from oppression to self-
sufficiency is the work of decades, not days. But liberty must
be pursued with a determination and vision that allows
indigenous movements to grow naturally and enthusiastically at
a pace of their choosing.
The oppressor will always caution patience, endless
patience. We can no longer succumb to the despot's alluring
promise of near-term stability purchased at the expense of
attempting to delay the inevitable explosion of human freedom.
Nor can we indulge hubris. As then-Governor George W. Bush said
in 1999, ``America cherishes freedom, but we do not own it. We
value the elegant structures of our own democracy but realize
that, in other societies, the architecture will vary. We
propose our principles; we must not impose our culture. Yet the
basic principles of human freedom and dignity are universal.
People should be able to say what they think, and elect those
who govern them. These ideals have proven their power on every
continent.''
The witnesses on our first panel today understand the power
and the cost of the pursuit of liberty. Natan Sharansky is a
leading voice for democracy as a force for change in the Middle
East. A former Israeli government minister and influential
author, he offers the world a sobering look at the choice
between free societies and what he calls fear societies.
Mithal Al-Alusi is an Iraqi patriot whose dedication and
personal sacrifice to the cause of freedom give his views a
unique moral authority. And I might say parenthetically, when I
was growing up, I always thought, wouldn't it be wonderful to
have met the people who formed our country, the people who
risked their lives and the lives of their family. And I am in
the presence of such a man in Mr. Al-Alusi.
All our witnesses bring invaluable experience and
unquestioned expertise to this important discussion, and we
welcome their testimony. I want to say I am so excited about
this hearing today.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
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Mr. Shays. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on
National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations hearing entitled, ``Fostering Democracy in the Middle
East, Defeating Terrorism with Ballots,'' is called to order.
And I recognize the ranking member of this subcommittee, Mr.
Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want
to welcome our distinguished panelists, former Israeli Minister
Sharansky and Mr. Al-Alusi. Welcome. I want to thank the
chairman for his continued dedication to working to find out
what's going on in the Middle East and what the relationship is
with the policy of this administration and the outcome.
We have much to learn from the experts who are here with
us, and we must listen and use this knowledge to correct the
disastrous foreign policy road that America has embarked upon.
Congress can help save many lives by changing the direction of
policies, but to do that we need facts. As a journalist, Thomas
Friedman wrote recently: ``You can't build a decent society on
the graves of suicide bombers and their victims.''
Our policy has been greatly misguided. During the
President's 2005 State of the Union address, there were Iraqis
in the audience who held up their thumbs in a symbol intended
to convey that democracy had finally reached Iraq thanks to the
United States. Their hope was to send a message that, even
though WMDs were never found, the victory of bringing democracy
to Iraq was worth the cost in blood and treasure. I have to say
that we are in solidarity to all of those who inspire to
democracy all over the world.
We take the intention of the people of Iraq who strive for
freedom seriously. But before we congratulate ourselves, I
think that we have to--I have to admit at least, that I am
skeptical of the administration's policy of promoting
democracy. The United States does not have a history of
bringing democracy to nations out of pure altruism; rather,
there is usually something we have to gain by overthrowing a
Nation, and the promotion of democracy is the excuse we use to
use it. Or, in the case of Iraq, was our fallback excuse.
Perhaps the greatest argument against this vision of true
altruism is that, when it is in our interest to leave
undemocratic governments alone, we do. Examples of this
argument are in the central Asian states of Kazakhstan,
Kurjistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Those
countries have well-known human rights records and serious
impediments to democracy. According to the State Department's
2004 report on human rights practices, they catalog very
intensely the failings of these particular governments that we
have more or less found fit to work with.
The United States does not take firm steps to encourage
reforms. There have been provisions to condition aid based on
progress in democratization, respect for human rights. However,
the State Department decided to cut aid in this case to
Uzbekistan for failure to meet these conditions; but when the
State Department decided to do it, the Joints Chiefs of Staff
announced that Uzbekistan would receive more, $21 million, of
military aid. And the aid condition in Kazakhstan, where they
had human rights violations, was allowed a Presidential waiver.
So, soft line approach. And it's probably, in large part,
due to the strategic location of these states. The central
Asian states offered overflight and other support when the
United States went into Afghanistan. Kurjistan, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan have hosted coalition troops, provided access to air
bases.
Mr. Chairman, I could go on and on, but I want to include
the rest of this statement in the record.
Mr. Shays. Without objection.
Mr. Kucinich. But I hope as I conclude that this hearing
will go beyond self-congratulation and beyond merely
illuminating the desire for democracy by people in the Middle
East. Rather, I hope that this hearing will illuminate how our
missteps are hindering democracy so that we can correct a
failed policy. I want to welcome the witnesses, and I hope that
we can learn from their experiences and knowledge. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich
follows:]
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Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. His entire statement will
be in the record. And with this, we would first recognize our
two witnesses on our first panel, former Israeli minister Natan
Sharansky, author of ``The Case for Democracy: The Power of
Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror,'' and Mr. Mithal Al-
Alusi, Democratic Party of the Iraqi Nation.
As you know, we swear in all our witnesses, and I would at
this time ask you to stand. We are an investigative committee.
I would ask you to stand and be sworn in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Thank you. We will note for the record our
witnesses have responded in the affirmative.
Let me just also do unanimous consent. I ask unanimous
consent that all members of the subcommittee could place an
opening statement in the record, and the record will remain
open for 3 days for that purpose. And, without objection, so
ordered. I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be
permitted to include their written statements in the record.
And, without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Sharansky, we are going to have you open up. Your mic
needs to be on, and you should see a green light when you hit
that.
Mr. Sharansky. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. And what we do is we will have a 5-
minute count and then we roll over another 5 minutes. But we
would like your statement to be concluded within 10 minutes.
Mr. Sharansky. Within 5 minutes.
Mr. Shays. Well, we are going to let you roll over. You
have 5 minutes, and you can roll over into the next 5 minutes,
given that we have a smaller group here.
STATEMENTS OF NATAN SHARANSKY, FORMER ISRAELI MINISTER, AUTHOR
OF ``THE CASE FOR DEMOCRACY: THE POWER OF FREEDOM TO OVERCOME
TYRANNY AND TERROR''; AND MITHAL AL-ALUSI, DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF
THE IRAQI NATION
STATEMENT OF NATAN SHARANSKY
Mr. Sharansky. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Definitely, I didn't come here for self-congratulations,
but I think it is an extremely important issue, linkage
between--a connection between freedom and security in the
world, and I am very glad that today this linkage is recognized
much better than some years ago.
In the book which I recently wrote, ``The Case for
Democracy,'' and which is based also on my experience as a
dissident, human rights activist, humanitarian, and prisoner of
conscience for 9 years of the Soviet Union, and also my
experience of being 9 years in Israel development and being
involved in the policy discussions in the Middle East, and it
addresses the serious sources of skepticisms which people had
and still many of them have about this connection.
First, do all the people of the world really want to live
in freedom? Second, is freedom good for our security? Is
freedom a thousand miles from here good for our security here,
or it is only a creation of altruism? And does the free world
have a role to play in it? If so, what kind of role the free
world can play in all this?
The first question which, in fact, was the principle
question, which we as the human rights activists were facing
for many years in the Soviet Union. And sometimes we heard that
freedom is not for the people in the Soviet Union, freedom is
not for Russia, freedom is not for Eastern Europe. That type of
skepticism which we heard from our friends from the West is
once more and more often asked of the last years about Muslim
countries, about Arab countries, about countries of the Middle
East, about Palestinians, and more and more we heard about
there is not one Muslim country in the world which is
democratic; maybe it is simply not appropriate, it is simply a
different civilization.
I hear that today it is easier to answer to skeptics than 3
or 4 months ago with what happened in Iraq during elections,
what happened in Lebanon with 1 million people demonstrating,
what happened in these weeks in Cairo when so many dissidents
are ready to raise their voices shows that this questions is--I
hope, is at least partially answered.
But the second question is no less important. The current
debate today is one focused on whether there is a real critical
connection between democracy somewhere and security here. And
more and more, the question of elections is used as a source of
skepticism. Just now leaving Israel, a couple of articles that
you see that the elections are bringing the extremists to
power. This is the way how terrorist groups can come to power.
And maybe democracy can be even dangerous for security. And so
that is why in my book, I propose this town square test and why
I believe that American administrations use this test.
An election, not by itself, is democracy. Free elections
and free society, that's what has to be the aim. And free
society is a society which passes the town square test. That a
peasant can go to the center of the town square, express his or
her views, and not to be punished for this.
So if you look at every place where extremists are coming
into power as a result of elections, it is always that society
is still a fear society. There are still a lot of restrictions.
You have elections in a society where democratic institutions
are built of standards and developed around the process of
developing, it is mainly because a big influence of the
results; because when given the real choice, free choice to
choose between living in freedom or living in fear, people
choose to live in freedom. And that's why, if you have the
opportunity to choose between elections or building a free
society and elections in then the process, we always have to
understand that the most important thing is to build the free
society, to help to build the free institutions of the society.
And here is the question, the linkage. What is the role of
the free world? First of all, to bring moral clarity, to
understand that for the free world, the real partners are not
the dictators but the people, the dissidents who are speaking
the truth, who express the desire of their people to live in
freedom.
What has been done in the last few months by the President
of the United States of America cannot be underestimated. The
very fact that the leader of the free world speaks clearly
appeals to the dissidents, to the democrats of the world has
tremendous influence. I remember the days when I was in a
Soviet prison and when President Reagan was speaking about the
evil empire, how much hope it gave to all of us, how much
strength it gave to us. I remember the stories of my friends in
solidarity when John Paul II was speaking to them.
That is the power of the free world speaking with moral
clarity, supporting the dissidents. And, with all this, with
all this position taken by the United States of America, you
cannot understand the changes which are happening in the last
month as to whether in Ukraine, whether in Lebanon, whether in
Egypt, and then speaking about Iraq.
The second level of linkage are programs supporting
democracy. And here we see some progress and here we see a lot
of efforts and institutions which start dealing with education
for democracy, which start dealing with the support of
different efforts to build a civil society. Still, it's not
enough. When even today, today I hear from the dissidents in
Iran the complaint that they have problems in finding support
to find broadcasting, like we dissidents enjoyed in the Soviet
Union the broadcasting of the free world over the Radio
Freedom.
And if today the price of this support is less than the
price of one airplane, and to see the influence of this support
when Iran--letters are written--I heard from many people, Iran
more and more reminds me today of the Soviet Union in the last
months of its existence, when almost everybody was double
thinker, when almost everybody had balance about this imaging.
And there's the time to support--to encourage and support
building the civil society. And also the most important level
is direct linkage, direct linkage which then was a critical
issue of the relations between the East and West after the
Helsinki agreement when directly the question of human rights
was connected to all the projects of economical, culture,
political relations with these countries. Everybody who knows
the story of Saad Eddin Ibrahim, the dissident also from Egypt,
who was released after 3 years because of direct linkage of the
United States of America made between the relations between
Egypt and the fate of the dissident is a very important example
of this narrow but very powerful usage of this linkage.
The fact that where in the towns of the Soviet Union the
fate of the dissidents practically never come to a reasonable
conclusion in the Soviet Union was in the minds and the
decisions and the resolutions of this House and administration,
and today most of the dissidents of the Middle East, their
names are not even known, that shows that a lot can be done in
this direction.
And just now we are dealing with the very important issue
of [Unintelligible.]. As you probably know, he resigned from
the government, but it doesn't matter whether you are for the
way how it was implemented or not. I think we all agree that
the most important thing is that, one, that what will emerge
either will be a democratic society and not a terrorist
society. And the most important question for all of us must be
whether education of incitement in schools in Gaza will
continue after we leave it; whether Palestinians will continue
living in awful conditions in refugee camps, or whether this
will liberate them. But that free economy will be built there,
or, as in the times unfortunately of Yasser Arafat, there will
be a free hand to destroy, or we will be given a free
government civil society. And, of course, whether terrorist
organizations acting there today will be dismantled or they
will become even stronger.
These are the most important questions. And the course of
the free world of the United States of America, the course of
Europe, has to be whether you are helping the Palestinian
society--whether you are helping to defeat people in the
Palestinian Authority to live more free lives or less. And the
more free lives they have, the more security we will have in
Israel and you in the United States of America.
These are my initial remarks. And I will be glad to answer
your questions after this.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Sharansky. I would like to point
out that you were arrested and in Soviet prison, sentenced to
13 years in jail. You spent how many years, sir, in jail?
Mr. Sharansky. Only 9, because of the pressure of the
United States of America.
Mr. Shays. Well, you are a true hero, and it is a privilege
to have you here.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sharansky follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Mr. Al-Alusi.
STATEMENT OF MITHAL AL-ALUSI
Mr. Al-Alusi. OK.
Mr. Shays. Welcome, my friend.
Mr. Al-Alusi. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, this is really a
great honor for me to be a witness before this subcommittee.
Thank you so much for this opportunity. I do agree with many of
the things Mr. Sharansky has said. But as an Iraqi politician,
I have that reality. We do now have a free Iraq. We have
problems, this is true. We have a huge problem. You have to
understand, after Saddam Hussein, this kind of regime,
dictatorship, killer of the innocent, killer machines, we have
a problem. We have problems, but we also have the new Iraq. No
discussion about it. The election day was the Iraqi great day,
the Iraqi happy day.
But I agree with you, sir, when you say that the
extremists, that they are using the democracy. They are smart
and they are trying to use it as the tool to have a control of
our society. I agree with you because the terrorists, the old
way of the terrorism really has been changed. They are well
organized, they have government beside them, interior agencies,
and they are trying to use our democracy now to get control and
to come back again.
I have started in Iraq to work as the Director General by
the Iraq education. And from this experience, I know very well
how the Ba'athists, they are trying to get the power in Baghdad
again. Always we have heard many things about the
deratification, but always I can say from my experience, from
my knowledge, from the information that we got, from the facts,
the news is totally different and far away from the reality.
This is a fact.
I would like also to say it is impossible to split between
democratic peace and human rights. Some people, they believe
they are democrat but they don't need to look for peace or they
don't need to look for humanity rights. This is really a
problem in the Middle East. But we need time and we need the
real support, moral, political, and financial support for the
liberals in the Middle East. And this is something really
difficult now.
I mean, it is very painful when we see how the extremist
parties which power, which mechanisms they have. As an example,
they have TV channels, radio channels, many newspapers in
Baghdad today. They go and the Islamic extremist party and the
other extremist parties, the Ba'ath party. They have more than
100 newspapers. Maximum, the liberals newspaper in Baghdad,
five: 1 to 20. They have many TV channels, many radio stations.
No liberalist party in Iraq or in the Middle East have a TV
channel or free radio. This is the fact. And Iran is our
neighbor and Baghdad is the Iraqi neighbors.
But Iran is not a democratic country. Even if they have a
parliament there. The problem, I do believe that we need time
to feel this welcome, but also we need to work very hard to
make it work. There is a very important point. Again, we cannot
split between democratic, human rights, and peace. But somebody
must try to teach us that we don't need peace in the Middle
East or we cannot start to build the peace between Iraq and
Israel because of somebody. He has to start first; after that,
we can think about it.
This kind of message, the strategy, or Palestine
organization strategy, it is against the Iraqi strategy. We
were more than 50 or 60 years a hostage of every strategy in
the area. The area, we in Iraq and you see in Israel, all of us
we need a clear signal that we are for peace in the area, and
we can start between Iraq and Israel. And this will help the
Palestine people to be more realistic, to understand the real
politics of the problem, the pragmatic way in the politics.
I believe the era of terrorism and the reforms has just
started in the Middle East. The terrorists, they are an
alliance, Syria, Iran, Hezbollah, Jihad, Hamas, Ba'ath party,
al Qaeda, they are an alliance. They have the same political
goals, they have the same mechanism. It is now that our time to
stop to think about it. We need alliance between the democratic
countries where they have suffered very or they have paid a
huge price I believe is the right way to have the strategical
relationship between the United States of America and Iraq in
the alliance against the terrorism, the terror between Iraq,
Israel, United States, Turkey, maybe Kuwait, and the United
Arab Emirate.
Whatever the people can say, we know the news, always
pushing some kind of news coming from Baghdad. It might be
truth, it could be truth, but there is also another side. The
Iraqi people, they are free now. This is the main point. Let me
say it also here, Mr. Chairman, thank you, America. Thank you
so much for everything.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Al-Alusi.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Al-Alusi follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2706.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2706.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2706.019
Mr. Shays. We have behind you, Mr. Sharansky, Mr. Dermer.
And he is co-author of ``The Case for Democracy.'' And if he
would like, the subcommittee would welcome him to join this
panel. And we would swear you in, if you wanted to participate
in the questioning. Would you like to participate? If you don't
mind standing, welcome. Just raise your right hand, please.
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Welcome.
We are going to start out, I just would also recognize that
Mrs. Maloney has joined us as well. I recognize Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And again
I want to welcome the witnesses. And Minister Sharansky's
presence here is important because we recognize the
contributions that you have made as a dissident, someone who is
willing to put himself on the line to help achieve a statement
of moral clarity. And I think that everyone in this Congress,
whatever their particular view of the situation in Iraq,
respects that greatly, because it is individuals such as
yourself who have had a very powerful statement of moral
clarity which helps to bring about political change.
I think that when we are speaking about Iraq, though, and
the particular problems that we have here in the Congress is
with respect to the role of military intervention in bringing
about ``democracy.'' now, the United States did not intervene
militarily against Russia to help encourage the kind of changes
that was created or that were created. How do you see the
difference between what the U.S.' policy was with respect to
the Soviet Union and what the U.S. policy--where they'd they
did not use military intervention, and the U.S.' policies in
Iraq where we have used military intervention? Do you make any
distinction there at all?
Mr. Sharansky. Well, thank you for your question,
Congressman. Of course I make a distinction. As in our book,
anyway, we believe that all the totalitarian regimes are very
weak from inside because they have to spend all their power on
controlling their own people, the minds of their own people to
keep them on the course of control. But it is a lot of power
energy. In fact, and if they don't support it by the external
sources of power, they will become weaker and weaker. And that
is why it gives a great challenge to democracy simply by
putting in place effective forms of linkage between economical,
political, social, cultural, financial relations with these
countries and the question of human rights. And these countries
can become strong enough to stand in the free world only if
they have peace for a long period with the free world.
Yes, the regime of Saddam Hussein became very dangerous,
but we should not forget that in the 1980's, many countries in
the free world believed that it is in the interest of these
countries that these regimes exist, and you supported this
regime.
Mr. Kucinich. But may I ask, Mr. Sharansky, what about the
regime of, say, of Kruschev or Brezhnev? I mean, we did not
intervene militarily against Russia.
Mr. Sharansky. I have to say that this regime became so
strong because there was a policy of appeasement toward this
regime beginning from the 1930's and 1940's. And no doubt there
were periods of that regime, Soviet regime, when the world had
no other way but to cooperate. Like in 1943, Churchill and
Roosevelt could not stop cooperating with the regime, starting
at the times of war against Hitler. But in 1953 and 1963 and
1973, the free world continued cooperating and in fact helping
this regime to survive.
Now, the moment this regime was becoming so dangerous and
so aggressive that sometimes the free world had to respond. And
I don't have to remind you what happened in Cuba, the times
when they sold missiles over and then the Soviet Army sent the
troops--not their troops, Cuban troops to Africa. At the same
time, the very dangerous situation and they were sending troops
to Prague, Berlin, Hungary, and they take special recruit. And
of course it was dangerous moments, but there was no direct
threat to the United States. And they believe that as long as
there is no direct threat to the free world, the free world has
to use the policy of linkage and to undermine and to weaken
these regimes. And it can be very successful as it was in the
case of the Soviet Union.
What happened with Iraq--well, who I am to speak in the
presence of the hero of this nation here of Iraq, Mr. Al-Alusi.
But my personal opinion is that if the freedom of the United
States of America were challenged by the world terror and the
President of the United States accepted this challenge--he
didn't say that we are now fighting this one or another
terrorist group; he said we are fighting against the world
network of terror.
Sooner or later, America would have to deal with the regime
of Iraq because Saddam Hussein--and here I am speaking from my
own experience in the Middle East. The regime of Saddam Hussein
gave a lot of legitimacy, a lot of power to all the terrorists
in the Middle East. The very fact his regime was opening the
way to the free world, has been doing it for tens of years.
Here was a regime which was openly supporting every family of
suicide bombers. There was a big opportunity, President Saddam
Hussein is giving $10,000 to every family of a suicide bomber.
It's not the problem of the money; it's the problem of
encouraging them, of telling them that they knew that they have
their motherland, their country, their regime, which is behind
them. So if you are really having a--you are challenged with
this world war of terror and you want to respond, you have to
deal with this regime.
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Sharansky, first of all, you demonstrated
personally in Russia through the power of your courage that one
person could take a stand. And, again, I want to state that
every one of us appreciates the courage that you showed. And I
think that was one of the things that helped to lead to change
in the Soviet Union, that caused the Soviet Union to collapse:
Eventually, it could not keep people like yourself from stating
through their own sacrifice the truth of the conditions. And
what I'm simply stating here is that how much more does that
power of moral force of an individual trump the power of
military intervention? It's something that I think is worth--
from our standpoint, is worth looking at.
So thank you for your testimony. And, Mr. Chairman, I again
want to thank you for making possible for the witnesses to be
here.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman.
I see a significant difference between Iraq and almost any
other country, because basically having gone into Kuwait,
having an agreement but not a peace agreement with the forces
that got Saddam out of Kuwait, given his absolute insistence in
a sense that he wanted us to think that he had weapons of mass
destruction. But the challenge we have in this country,
obviously, is there were no weapons of mass destruction by that
period, and we have to accept the fact that the Duelfer Report
says that, means that you have a country that is--and some
debate in here with the fact that we then sent our troops to
Iraq.
I wish we had done it not under the strong belief that
Saddam had weapons of mass destruction, just that we needed to
close the chapter of 12 years of fly zones and the ambiguity of
not having a finality to our getting Saddam out of Kuwait. But,
the reality is we are there. And I would like to ask these
questions. And I would love--Mr. Dermer, I also would know that
you would be speaking as an individual, and we got you by
surprise and you didn't get to check with other higher
authorities about. So we know that you will choose your words
carefully. But it is an honor to have you here as well.
I would like each of you to tell me, how should the United
States promote democracy in the Middle East? What's
appropriate? What's not appropriate? How do we promote
democracy? What's required for us?
Mr. Al-Alusi. Well, this is really a good question. I mean,
in Iraq, we don't have Saddam and the Ba'ath regime. And we
have started the election. Can we change everything in 1 day,
in 1 year, in 2 years? Many people they have a huge critic in
Iraq politic, in your politic or in ours. I mean, the Iraqi
politician. But they forget how many years Germany and France--
they are now in the very, very good position as democratic
countries. They have forgotten, they took more than 40 years to
establish the first step what we have done it in 6 months. We
have done this very fast. But we need also to understand that
the terrorists in Iraq, they are a part of the terrorists in
the Middle East. They have their own agenda to stop any kind of
change in the area. I mean, positive change, reforms and
democracy.
Here's the difference: Cannot--if the liberals, they will
not have the help, the real help, moral, politic, and finance,
they will have the problem in the area. If we don't make it
really clear that we are not willing to deal with terrorists,
it is not enough just to change the system. The terrorists in
Iraq are really afraid, really afraid that 1 day we will see or
we will say the United States of America, they have made the
change; Saddam and the Ba'ath regime is not there. But the one
now is Iran, because Iran they have very well understood, they
can have this game, to win this game for a few million dollars,
and they are pushing interior agency and many millions to win
the game.
The most important point, it is not only your
responsibilities, it is our responsibility in Iraq, but it
always better to make it clear: Iraq is a free country. And the
Iraqi civility need to go through a dialog and agreement
between Iraq and the United States of America.
Mr. Shays. Do the Iraqis believe--and I will get to the
other two witnesses. Do the Iraqis believe that we are being
impatient with Iraq? Is there a feeling that we are asking too
much?
Mr. Al-Alusi. Not at all. No. We were glad to start. I
mean, the United States of America, the forces are there. Let
me ask us any Iraqi, what will happen if the American forces
are not more in Iraq? The answer would be very soon from any
Iraqi--any normal Iraqi: Iran will occupy it.
Mr. Shays. I'm going to have a lot of questions here
because I'm going to want to ask some other questions as well.
So I want to get to the other witnesses. But I am told by
observers, American observers, that Iraq has taken--the people
of Iraq have taken naturally to the dialog of interaction. They
like the political process, they like the debate, they like the
negotiations. That this is something that in a sense isn't
foreign to Iraqis. Is that something you would agree with or
disagree with?
Mr. Al-Alusi. No. I agree that we are very happy, more than
happy to have this situation.
Mr. Shays. I'm not even talking about happiness. I'm
talking about that there is just this natural inclination, that
this is not--even though democracy is something new and taking
initiative is not something you did in Saddam's world, unless
you wanted your head lopped off. But now, given this
opportunity, there is this genuine excitement, but, more than
that, a liking to the negotiations, the idea of trying to find
a solution. That Iraqis are taking to it. That it's not
something that is impossible for them to grasp. And I'm asking
if you agree with that.
Mr. Al-Alusi. Yes, I agree.
Mr. Shays. OK. Mr. Sharansky, Mr. Dermer, could you just
respond to what you would like to see the United States be
doing to promote democracy in the Middle East? Not just in
Iraq.
Mr. Sharansky. Well, there are so many aspects, let me
touch one of them. It will take. The big mistake of the Osla--
the Osla process was, the main effort was mainly how to have a
stable regime. And if it means that we must strengthen
dictatorship, we will strengthen dictatorship. And, in fact,
the efforts of Israel, of the United States of America, of
Europe, to for the very beginning of the process how to make,
to stop a dictatorship which will bring us stability. I hope
that this difficult lesson was learned, and now more and more
people understand that we have to go forward supporting free
society and then we get stability.
But if we go in the opposite order, we will get only more
terror. What it means today in----
Mr. Shays. Can I just--so I'm following you. What I'm
hearing you say is that we may have to tolerate instability
ultimately to get to stability through a democratic----
Mr. Sharansky. Yes. This fear that the democracy of one
freedom brings more than stability in the world, if you look a
little bit longer and you see how this so-called stability
brought by strong dictator is turned into more terrorist
attacks, more hatred and more world war. And it's clear, why?
Because dictators inevitably need external enemies for their
own stability.
And then we can extend something also process, which in
advance was planned in a way that we decided--the free world
decided that if Yassar Arafat needs to impose the restrictions
of freedom, let him do it. But I'm saying that definitely with
new leadership, we have better chance; but it will succeed with
better chance only if our enemy again will not support this
leadership by all means, and that is would not put
restrictions--will not demand on the democratic process.
Today, when the big efforts are taken, very positive
efforts to give economical assistance to something, it is very
important that the result of these efforts will be more free
economical life for something, and not more control over the
economy in terms of authority by their leaders. The same has to
be said, also, for terrorist organizations. This readiness to
tolerate the coexistence with terrorist organizations is a
very--we can see how the terrorist organization are making some
efforts to strengthen themselves again.
From the very beginning of the process, the demand must be
very clear, the linkage must be very clear, not cease-fire with
the terrorist organizations, but the struggle against terrorist
organizations.
Mr. Shays. My time has run out, but if Mrs. Maloney will
just allow me to ask Mr. Dermer to respond to this as well.
The first time we met, you were working with Mr. Netanyahu,
I believe. And I would say to you that he was the first one who
articulated in a way that I paid attention to the fact that you
have--you can't have peace without democracy, ultimately. So he
was kind of the individual that was saying this in a way that
at least caught my attention. I know others were saying it
before. But what would be your response about the role of the
United States in promoting democracy in the Middle East?
Mr. Dermer. Well, the first thing I would say--and I thank
you for allowing me to testify, even if it was very unexpected.
The first thing I would say is I understand exactly what
the problem is. And one of the disadvantages that I have had in
trying to understand what Natan Sharansky was saying to many
people for many years is that I was raised in a free society.
So to live under a regime where you are constantly afraid to
say what you want is something that was totally foreign to me.
And to understand the mechanics of how such a society works is
very hard for me to understand. So Natan was saying for years
and years and years, and it took me a long time to understand
the concept of what he was saying or thinking behind it. When
you see a suicide bombing attack and then you would see
thousands of people in the street celebrating it, you wonder if
we're talking about democracy; these people can be democratic?
And what I understood when I listened to him in trying to
understand the problem is that you have to understand what type
of society a fear society is. When you have a regime that
totally determines what people do, whether they have a real
component to go into Israel, whether they're going to receive
aid from international donors, whether or not they're going to
be able to participate in business in any way because there is
a monopoly over all basic industries, you see; but in order to
survive in that type of society you have to demonstrate loyalty
to their elite. It doesn't mean that the images that you're
seeing on television is what is really going on within those
societies.
So I think the most critical thing that I learned and that
I think would help, moving forward, is to focus as much as
possible on increasing the degree of freedom within that
society, to decreasing the dependence that people within the
society have on the regime. It doesn't matter if they're
dependent on a social network of a terrorism group or whether
they're dependent on a regime; the most important thing is to
make them independent and to build civil society.
I think if we recognize that's what the focus has to be, to
make the town square as free as possible, to build those
institutions as much as possible, constant focus on asking
ourselves a simple question: Is there more freedom within
Palestinian society today than there was yesterday, or is there
more freedom in Iraq than there was yesterday, or any country
that you look at? Just ask yourself that question. Not whether
we're closer to elections, not whether or not this particular
policy has been advanced or not. Is there more freedom for the
individual in this society than yesterday? If you do that, then
I think that you're going to be moving in the right direction.
As to specifically what the United States can do, I think
that Natan has been arguing that for many years, and he wrote
in the book, is to the greatest degree possible to link the
relations that you have to these countries to how they treat
their own people. This is really the revolution, if I recall
the Sharansky document. It is very different than the
conventional approach to foreign policy. The conventional
approach says we should treat country A based on how country A
is treating country B.
And here is what Natan has been saying for many years and
what the dissidents in the Soviet Union have been saying for
many years is that we need to treat a country based on how that
country is treating its own people. That is the lesson that I
think if we keep in mind all the time and pressure the regimes
to give more human rights and more freedom to their people and
use all the tools you have--political, moral, financial,
whatever you have in order to push in that direction--then I
think that things will be moving in the right direction in
terms of democracy.
Mr. Shays. I am loving this panel. Thank you very much.
Mrs. Maloney.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I'm delighted to
welcome the distinguished panelists.
Mr. Al-Alusi, you have lost two of your children and your
body guard, and there have been nine assassination attempts
against your life. We appreciate your great courage, and we
thank you for being here. I regret that the violence seems to
be increasing in Iraq, at least as it's reported in our papers.
And, Mr. Sharansky, it is rare to see or meet a living
legend. I recall when I was on the city council in New York, a
group of us named a street after you while you were still in
prison. And I remember how effective and forceful your wife was
as an advocate for democracy and for you. And it was thrilling
when you were released and came to city hall and to the mayor's
home. It was a great event.
And I followed the wonderful contributions you've made to
Israel. And I admire the way women are treated in Israel.
And my first question really to Mr. Al-Alusi--and welcome,
Mr. Dermer.
And I want to know how important do you think is the role
of women in the road toward democracy? I was very heartened to
read in the paper that Kuwait just passed a law to allow women
the right to stand for office and to become elected to office.
Qatar recently passed such a provision.
Many Iraqi women have come to this country, they are
remarkable. We have visited with them in your country. Some of
them I have corresponded with and some of them have been
murdered. I have stopped writing them because it breaks my
heart when one of them is murdered. And some of them have
expressed to me their tremendous deep concern that the Sharia
may be returned to the domestic law of Iraq. And I'd like your
comments--and all of the panelists'--on the role of women in
this fight for democracy. It is something I believe in very
deeply for American women, and really for all women in the
world. And I feel it is a very positive force, but I'd like to
your thoughts on it.
And it seems to me that women are targeted. There are so
many of them that are murdered of your leaders. And if you
could give us a review of where it stands. Is it a threat that
Sharia will be returned? What are your comments?
Mr. Al-Alusi. Thank you for your questions. Iraqi women,
like most of the women in the Middle East, they are killed more
than the men. In the Middle East, very high price because of
the economy, because of dictatorship, because of some of--they
call them new Islam, I would like to call them new Islam. That
means the people, the extremists, very strong--the terrorists.
But let me talk about Iraq.
I was on election day on the street. Many Iraqi politicians
also. The first hours, we didn't see that movement on the
street. But after that, we saw something which is only in
Europe. The Iraqi women started to move over the street. The
first really movement to go to the election or to enjoy the
election, that was the Iraqi woman. And the Iraqi woman made
the real change in the next hours. If there is any kind of
statistic, we would find the Iraqi women, they have enjoyed the
election the first 8, 9, 10 hours. At 10 o'clock, after dark,
they came. So they have played a very important role.
The problem is that more than 50 percent from our society,
of course, are women. And in Iraq they are about 55 percent.
Those people, those kind of parties, they are against any kind
of human rights in Iraq. And they are a part of a new strategy.
They well understand to keep from the Iraqi society, to make a
huge difference in this society in Iraq, that is the girl can
go for in Iraq. That is why, and they are paying a very high
price.
But now look in the government, they are very happy, very
happy and proud to have 50 percent. I am proud to have Iraqi
women. You have to like the Iraqi women, otherwise you will be
not in the party, otherwise they will punish you. This kind of
message is not officially, but anyway, the Iraqi woman are
willing to be free, and they have a very important role, and
you have seen it in the election. We just need to push more in
this direction.
And education is important. They are trying to keep the
Iraqi women far away from education and from the male role as
employed in the government; and we need also to help in this
direction. I mean, everything is new in Iraq. We just starting
today, and we just starting to feel democratic. This is the
fact.
Mr. Chairman was talking about weapons of mass destruction.
It is truth to know you didn't find it, or nobody has found it.
But also truth, we are not talking about an atom bomb, we are
talking about chemical weapons. To make chemical weapons, you
don't need huge industry, you need a small level, you need the
know-how and the willing to use it. Did Saddam have the know-
how? Yes. Did he get the power to use it? Yes. He has done it
more than 80 times. And many Iraqi women, because of this
chemical weapon, they have paid a very high price. More than 80
times he has used it.
Mr. Shays. Let me do this. I'm going to encourage the
panelists to give a little shorter answers because we want to
cover a lot of territory, and you will be here late at night,
and we do have a second panel. And you have so much to say, and
it is all so important, but we want to make sure we get these
questions in.
Do you have other questions?
Mrs. Maloney. I would just like to ask Mr. Sharansky, do
you believe that ultimately reform will come from the top from
the government, or from government reform initiatives, or by
popular demand by the grass-roots level? And I would ask Mr.
Dermer also to comment.
And what incentives, punishment, does the United States
have to influence other nations toward freedom and for
democracy for their people?
Mr. Sharansky. Well, thank you, Congresswoman, for your
remarks and for your question.
No. Change is always coming when there is words of
dissidents, those who are ready to speak open and loudly, where
there is determination of the free world to support these
dissidents, and where there is practical policy over linkage in
their relations with the free world with the leaders of the
country for which dissidents are speaking.
Now, no doubt for the main reason for changing that is the
desire for the overwhelming majority of people to live without
fear. To get rid of this awful double-think where you have to
say one thing and think another thing, and this desire to live
without fear, that is what brings the change.
But no doubt, it could be more painful or less painful, it
depends on the leadership; and it depends to what extent the
free world is ready to keep the leadership responsible.
So if today we are optimistic, we are cautiously optimistic
about possibilities in the Middle East in connection with
Palestine, it is because they have new leadership, but also
because the free world, and of course the United States of
America, demonstrates determination to connect their policy
with the creation of democratic reforms.
If I am very cautious of this optimism, still we can see
how this desire to connect the policy in relation with this
leadership with the creation of democratic reforms is not
otherwise long the voice among many others who want to go back
to the policy of appeasement.
Mr. Dermer. As to your first question about the rights of
women, I think that would be----
Mr. Shays. That says we have a vote in 15 minutes.
Mr. Dermer. I see. I haven't been cutoff, right? The
sandman isn't coming from somewhere around here.
Mr. Shays. It means we have one vote.
Mr. Dermer. As for the rights of women, I think that's an
excellent barometer for the degree of freedom in a society. And
we chose in the book ``The Town Square Test,'' could you walk
into the town square without fear of arrest, imprisonment or
physical harm? But I think probably something that would come
in a close second is how women are treated in society to really
let you know the precise degree of freedom; I mean, even in
societies that allow women to participate in elections, that's
going to be much freer than a society that doesn't, and the
individual rights that they have as well.
As to the second question, what needs to be done? I want to
get back to something I said earlier about what I call the
``Sharansky Doctrine,'' and that is, I know everyone is usually
focused on the question whether or not you engage or you
confront a given regime, and I think less focus is paid to what
you are engaging them on or about and what you're confronting
them about. And what Natan has been trying to argue for years
is that when you engage them on the issue of how they treat
their own people. And if that becomes all of a sudden the
policy of the United States and other democratic nations, that
whether we're going to engage or confront you is going to
depend on one answer, is how are you treating your own people.
And you will get more aid from us and you will get more
political support and diplomatic support, financial support,
whatever, if you give your people more rights, and you will get
less if you don't.
And so to get beyond the engage confrontation, I suppose,
dynamic and more focused on what exactly you're engaging them
about or confronting them about. And if we start to focus on
how they're treating their own people and use all the tools at
their disposal to encourage a democratic change, I think that
would be the most effective; and I think it will most likely
come from the ground up only because the top, at least the
current top in this region are not people who have a great
faith in democratic ideas or reforms. So I think it will
probably come from the bottom up.
Mr. Shays. Let me acknowledge that we have Mr. Higgins who
is here, as well as Mr. Van Hollen, and also Mr. Dent, and
they're free to jump in at any time. They told me they don't
have specific questions. And we may try to finish up so you
don't have to wait after voting and you can go on your way
here.
But I would like to have each of you respond to this
question. What would you say to the skeptics who basically say
that the Islamic faith and democracy are not compatible? That's
a key question that we need to resolve. Is the Islamic faith
and democracy compatible? Are the skeptics wrong? Do they have
some truth to what they say? Mr. Dermer or Mr. Sharansky or Mr.
Al-Alusi.
Mr. Al-Alusi. I believe that Islam is compatible with
democracy. But an understanding of the new Islam, radical Islam
is completely out of with the main message of all religion,
including variant Islam. In the Quran it states that if you
kill one being, it is as if you have killed the world. But now
we have people who act in the name of Islam throughout the
Middle East who are killing people in the name of Islam. That's
why I do believe we have to split between religion and state.
And those people that are not Islamic and the formation that
they got is the not the real Islam because there is no
difference. I mean, just read it. And as we say it in Iraq,
Solat, Ingil and Quran, it is very difficult to find the
difference between them. No one from these three religion will
have allowed anyone to kill somebody. How they can say in the
name of God----
Mr. Shays. Let's get beyond the killing issue, though.
There aren't a lot of Islamic regions that are democratic,
there hasn't been a real history of democracy in the Islamic
world. And is that an indication that they aren't compatible,
or is it just an indication that there hasn't been any movement
for democracy? And we're going to know this answer pretty soon,
but let me ask you, Mr. Sharansky.
Mr. Sharansky. Well, when I was recent to Russia, I
discovered that Russian people for several years lived in
tyranny, and that is part of their mentality, part of their
culture, they don't want to live in freedom. And you can read
the addresses to President Truman that Japan for 7 years never
had a democracy, and it is against their culture to live in
freedom.
And I heard the last year many times responding to my
arguments that Islam--people of Islam live in different
religion and different mentality, and it is against their
culture to be free. I think all these remarks are racist
remarks. I believe that all people who want to live in
accordance with their faith, in accordance with their
tradition, in accordance with their mentality and history and
so on, they all, when given the choice to live under constant
fear, to be punished by a totalitarian regime, or to live
without this fear, will choose to live without this fear.
That's why all these statements of some American
journalists who are saying that people in Iraq love Saddam
Hussein and this regime, when Saddam Hussein killed 1 million
of his own citizens and he was torturing people, remind me of
some of the statements of the so-called liberal guests who
would come to the Soviet Union at the top of the repressions as
are saying look how Soviet people love Stalin and his regime.
We have to believe, I think it is very important for humanity
to believe that all the people were born to be free and deserve
to live free.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Dermer. I'll tell you, one of the contributions of Mr.
Dermer is that he got me to recognize that how I was
pronouncing your first name was not correct, it is Natan, not
Natan.
Mr. Sharansky. It's OK.
Mr. Shays. It may be OK with you, but not me. Mr. Dermer.
Mr. Dermer. I would say that if we were having this
conversation 300 or 400 years ago, people would say that
Christianity is incompatible with democracy; and we know that's
not the case. I think what--not to mention about Japan is an
excellent example, because no one gave much of a chance for the
Japanese to have a democratic society. Their culture was much
more inimical to Western ideas than Arab culture, Islamic
culture that is. And there were many reasons I think that they
had to--when they first came up with the idea of democracy, it
took a letter of around four Japanese characters together to
make sense of it because they had no concept of what democracy
was.
But at the end of the day, what Sharansky is arguing is
that when people are faced with this choice between fear and
freedom, they're going to choose freedom. It's not because
they're Jeffersonian democrats, it's because they don't want to
live their lives in fear. And when we say is Islam compatible
with democracy, I think the majority of people everywhere don't
want to be afraid. Whether or not you force people to make a
choice--let's put it this way: If you force people to make a
choice, choose Islam or choose democracy--which I think is a
false choice--well, they will probably choose Islam. But in the
history, as I understand it, of Christianity's move toward
democracy, they actually found the seeds of democracy in their
own faith. John Locke did this, and many other great Christian
thinkers at the time of the development of democracy. They
weren't anticlerical, they actually found the seeds of
democracy in their own faith.
And I think that the process will probably start happening
within Islam. And the ascending force in Islam today, which is
this militant Islamic force that is very hostile to the
democratic way of life, can be replaced in a rather short
amount of time by a different force within Islam where Muslims
start seeing within their own faith the seeds of democratic
change. And I think that process is happening because of what's
going on in the region now.
Mr. Shays. We have about 4 minutes to vote.
Mr. Ruppersberger, do you intend to come back and ask
questions? Because I may keep this panel if you decide to come
back after the vote.
Mr. Ruppersberger. I think so. It depends.
Mr. Shays. Well, let me do this, if you don't mind. We are
just going to ask you to stay. And there just may be one or two
other questions. Is that a problem for any of you? We're going
to adjourn and we will be back. We are recessed, not adjourned.
Good grief.
[Recess.]
Mr. Shays. This hearing is called to order.
When power was transferred to the Iraqis in June of last
year, I went in August to visit, and then I came back to the
United States and met with Condoleeza Rice and about four other
Members of Congress. And she was talking about being patient
with Iraq, that this was a new democracy. And she reminded us
of our Declaration of Independence in 1776, our Articles of
Confederation in which we fought to sustain the 13 colonies in
a Federation, and then in the Constitution of the United States
we created a Nation. And I'm thinking, I get it Condi; 13
years, I understand. And then she looked at us and she paused
and then she said, in that Constitution I was three-fifths a
person and a slave. And I thought, wow, what an incredible
message to Americans not to be arrogant with the struggle that
exists for any new democracy.
It took us, as you know, a Civil War to sort out a failure
in our Constitution, and we're still resolving some of those
issues. So patience, obviously, is necessary.
But in the Arab Human Development Report of 2004, there is
on page 71--they talk about democracy and the Arab region. And
then they have the photograph of the one election, and it's the
concept of Hitler gaining power in a democracy and then taking
over the Nation and the concern that there could be one
election in which democracy would basically become the victim.
So what needs to happen, in your judgment, in Iraq? Does it
have to be a strong statement in the Constitution? What ensures
that there won't be a takeover by extremists that will
ultimately mean that democracy dies in Iraq? Everybody keeps
looking at you, Mr. Al-Alusi, and you can go first. But if you
want time to think about your answer, I can have Mr. Dermer go
first.
Mr. Dermer, you're going to go first.
Mr. Dermer. You put me on the spot twice in one session.
I think the German example is a very good example. In fact,
we addressed it in the book. And the question I think we have
to ask ourselves is what was the problem with that election in
Germany? Was the problem the very fact that the Nazis were
elected in a free election--that was actually was about as free
an election as you're going to have in one of these--and this
society was problematic at the time for other reasons, but it
was a free election. Was the problem that the Nazis were
elected, or was the problem that after they were elected and
then they decided to suspend and destroy democracy within
Germany, that the world did nothing about it?
I think most people would understand that it's the latter
and not the former. And I would say that is a model for how you
can avoid the problem of one man, one vote, one time, that
you're talking about; and that is, if the world takes a very
clear stand in the free world, led by the United States, that
you will not tolerate any type of society that is not willing
to tolerate dissent, and you make it clear in the quest for
international legitimacy that any new government will have--
will be dependent on that government giving their people basic
rights, well then you are unlikely to face this problem that
you faced in Nazi Germany.
And what Natan was arguing for many years is that the
chances of something like that happening, one man, one vote,
one time, will be minimal if the focus is on building a free
society and not on rushing to elections; that if you get
conditions of the town square in place, that the chances of a
regime that is hostile to democracy getting elected are very
small. And if it would happen on that--it does happen
occasionally, maybe once every 20 or 30 years--if the world
takes a very clear stand and says we're not going to allow you
to crush dissent within your country, you may rule it according
to how you see fit, but as long as you preserve a basic right
of dissent and to change government in the future, if the world
takes that stand, then I think that the threats that a regime
like Hitler's pose or other regimes in the region that would
seek power through democratic means in order to subvert
democracy I think would be taken off the agenda entirely.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Natan Sharansky.
Mr. Sharansky. Well, if the role of Mr. Dermer, when we
were writing this book, was to explain my thoughts, I think he
already explained it, with a little to add. He is doing, of
course, much better than I can do. But I will only add to this
in my country, when there is a big discussion of what will
happen after the elections in July, there is a lot of fear that
Hamas will become very strong. I have to say there is little
surprise why Hamas can become very strong when the whole
organization, which is really dealing with welfare for the
people, this terrorist organization Hamas, and when the
Palestinian Authority, its realizations with people, with
citizens, is characterized first of all by its corruption. So
there is little to expect from these elections.
But if democracy is to come, building democratic
institutions which guarantee freedoms of the individuals which
decrease their fear, which improve their standards and their
life, and at the same time is effective with fighting with
terrorist organizations, then I think the chances for
extremists to succeed in elections would become smaller and
smaller and smaller. That's why it is very important to see
elections as--free elections as the end of a process of a
building a free society.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Al-Alusi.
Mr. Al-Alusi. Yes. We are afraid from the Iranian influence
in Iraq, not because the Shi'ite or the Sunni, they are a part
of Iran, no, they are a part Iraqi. The problem is for more
than 55 years, we didn't have any kind of political activity in
Iraq. Most of the people there--all of them, they were outside
of Iraq, otherwise they would be killed.
So the Iraqi--very important part of the Iraqi opposition
grew up in Syria and in Iran. They are cleric, they are Iraqi
politician for sure; but at the same time, the Iranian and the
Syrian intelligence agency, they were always trying to buy and
to push them on people in our political parties.
I am very afraid, not because we have now a little of this
party, a part of the Iranian strategy, no; I'm afraid because
they are thinking totalitarian, and I'm afraid from the second
level in those parties. Nobody knows, even the leader of those
parties, nobody knows how many people we do have from the
Iranian intelligence agency in these parties. That's why I'm
afraid that we got people who are a part of Iranian strategy
playing game, using our mechanism in the democracy and take
over in the power.
Now we have the case in the security. Every Iraqi will
agree to clean the system from the Ba'athist. They are very
dangerous, they have done very, very bad things. But how to do
it very quickly and radically in 2 or 3 months? We will have a
vacuum. Who is coming to fill this vacuum? This is the main
question. That is why we agree that none Iraqi people in the
name of the Iraqi opposition, in the name of the Shi'ite or
Sunni trying to take over, are using the democratic as Hitler
has done it in Germany.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. What I would like is for each of you
to tell me what you would have liked to put--what question you
would have liked us to ask--let me put it this way: Answer the
question you would have liked us to ask, and put anything else
on the record that you think needs to be put on the record, and
then we're going to get to our second panel.
Mr. Dermer. I guess I'll start this one off.
I actually return to something you said earlier about the
link between democracy and peace. And you mentioned that--and
it's something that Netanyahu has also talked about for many
years, and the question that has been very interesting to me
over the last few years is what is the link between terrorism
and democracy, and is democracy the antidote to terrorism? And
we don't really focus directly on this in our book, but it is
something that Benjamin Netanyahu has talked about for quite
some time. And I think it is a very interesting question,
because if the root cause of terrorism is not--let's say the
root cause of terrorism--which many people believe is poverty
or the root cause is desperation or the root cause is some
deprivation of rights, political rights, national rights,
social rights, then going and embarking on a process where
you're trying to promote democracy in the region is not going
to win the war on terrorism.
But I don't think that the root cause of terrorism is
poverty. If it were, then Haiti would be the center of
international terrorism, and it's not. And I don't think the
root cause of terrorism is a deprivation of rights. If it were,
then Gandhi would have been a terrorist, and he wasn't; and
Martin Luther King would have been a terrorist, and he wasn't.
And there were many, many conflicts that you've had in history
where there has been deprivation of rights and people have
responded to them without resorting to terrorism. The French
Resistance didn't use terrorism and didn't kill the wives and
children of their German officers, and the Jewish underground
movement to win the State of Israel, Jews were not blowing up
buses in London to do so.
So if it's not the product of desperation or the
deprivation of rights, the question is what it is. And I think
the root cause of terrorism, as Netanyahu has said, is a
totalitarian mindset. And that mindset is brought under
conditions of tyranny, where you can take a closed society and
you can indoctrinate people and just pummel them constantly
through state-controlled media and to indoctrinate them into
some culture or some belief that puts some goal that is so all-
encompassing. That justifies anything, and there is no moral
constraints.
And once I think we understand--and I believe that this is
the case--that the root cause of terrorism is this totalitarian
mindset, the way that you actually defeat terrorism is by
promoting freedom; because in a free society you simply will
not have terrorism on a mass scale because people have a
pluralistic viewpoint, they can hear other ideas, and they're
not put in these pressure cookers. And that's why I think that
this is important not only on tyranny, but also to win the war
on terror, is the key critical thing here is I think to promote
freedom, and in the end I think that will drain the swamps of
terrorism in the whole region.
Mr. Sharansky. I will use this last-minute opportunity to
speak on behalf of Palestinian dissidents, because it so
happens so that they're not on our panel. But I had to say that
we're writing a little bit about it in the book, that while
meeting some of those Palestinians, who are very strong
fighters for civil society, who have very different visions
than I have maybe about what kind of a future we want to have,
but both of us agree that the main thing is to make sure that
all of us live in democratic societies, a Palestinian
democratic society and Israel.
And when I was talking to them in the times of Yassar
Arafat, I could always feel that they are the same dissidents
as I am, with one difference, that--I resided in the Soviet
Union, but with one difference: We in the Soviet Union knew
that we could go to prison but the free world would be on our
side. Here, we are facing a situation when these people can go
to prison, but the message of the free world is to them, the
only hope for peace is Yassar Arafat, and that's why I don't
try to weaken Yassar Arafat. And that's why many of the doors
of the free world were closed for them.
Today when we have new hopes and new chances, let's not
forget that it's not Palestinian leadership, it's democratic
dissidents, those Palestinians who really believe and want to
have civil society, they are our real allies. And that's why no
concern about stability of the regime shouldn't undermine your
readiness to support them and to stand for them. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
And Mr. Al-Alusi.
Mr. Al-Alusi. I think we have seen many changes in the area
that is the regime in the Middle East that is going to show us
some kind of reforms or the willing of reforms. I do believe it
can be only happen because there is a pressure from Washington
and the United States in this direction. There are bad regimes,
and they are just waiting with the hope that the policy in
Washington will be changed.
So please continue in this direction. The only way to have
human rights in Middle East, pushing in the right reforms
democratic. Without this we will never have peace there. And to
make a decree of those terrorists, all of them they are aliens.
And they are already aliens. Usually, just 50 years ago, we got
organization as a terrorist, we have organization and aliens
with regimes in the area. We are warned, we have to be very
sure that they don't get a chance to win again and to have
control of those areas. If America was in Iraq, we Iraqis would
not have only one Iraq, we would have maybe five, maybe, Iraqs.
And if Iran get control of Iraq, there is no peace in Middle
East. And Middle East is not that far away from Europe and the
rest of the world. Thank you so much.
Mr. Shays. Thank you so much. If you don't mind, Mr.
Ruppersberger would just like to ask a question of you all
before we get to----
Mr. Ruppersberger. I'm sorry I wasn't here, we have other
hearings that I had to attend.
First thing, we want to eventually try to direct families,
younger generations. And my question really to you, Mr. Al-
Alusi, with respect to Iraq and how we can influence people in
Iraq to look at democracy from a positive way.
My first question, based on your conversations, do you feel
that the average person in Iraq feels that we are trying to
force them into a situation instead of helping them get to
where they need to be?
Mr. Al-Alusi. No, not at all. We are thinking--many people
in Iraq, they cannot understand the message of what we have
seen sometimes in the newspaper, as an example of de-
Ba'athification. The main problem with the de-Ba'athification
are not the Ba'athists themselves, we can have control of them
through time, but the education in Iraq should be changed. The
way of thinking and the education should be changed. And to
hear this kind of signal that the Secretary, Condoleeza Rice,
she was asking to stop the de-Ba'athification, I cannot believe
it at all; that is the wrong signal. I mean, the media they're
playing now some kind of information which make the Iraqi not
that sure. To help them in the democratic process, we have to
find the change in the way of the Iraqi thinking to let them be
free. Let me tell you, there is people that are very afraid
from the Ba'ath and the terrorists.
Mr. Ruppersberger. And they still are, which means our
first priority, which is what we're doing, is to provide
security. My point is that for us to be able to influence the
Iraqi people to understand what a way of life would be like, we
have to improve their quality of life, we have to take care of
their infrastructure, make sure they have water that is not
contaminated, make sure that we can provide their education.
And then if they see that their life is better, it seems to me
that is where we're going. I know that is our goal.
My question to you, though, is where are we at this point?
I know where your philosophy is. It's not about philosophy,
it's about results. And what we need to do is to make sure we
are also in the phase--and I've been to Iraq on numerous
occasions and I understand--in fact, the last time I had a
conversation with Ambassador Negroponte--he is no longer the
Ambassador--about reaching the hearts and minds of the people,
and it seems to me that's what we have to do. Because you have
a different culture, you have different religions. I mean,
there are a lot of issues there. But if you deal with the
average person, it's like in politics, people vote based on how
they feel that their families will be protected, their
communities, their security, their education systems, that type
of thing.
Where do you think we are right now in Iraq as it relates
to what I just said as far as building infrastructure, winning
the hearts and minds of the people to understand that democracy
will work in the end? And then we will get to the elections,
which you already had, and we've done a good job. I think there
is a lot going on. And the insurgents are attempting to disrupt
all the more where national pride comes in to stand up and take
on the insurgents.
Mr. Al-Alusi. We are on the right track but we have to
continue. It is really a huge vacuum. We are talking about a
huge vacuum that you have in Iraq. We are in the right way, but
we have to continue and we are going very fast.
It is very important, as you say, sir, about the economy,
the infrastructure. We have to find quick as possible that our
people, the Iraqi people, they can see and they can feel the
change in their daily life. This is very important----
Mr. Ruppersberger. And my question to you is, do you think
at this point that the average Iraqi person feels that way? Are
we making headway, are we making progress as it relates to the
hearts and minds? We know what we're doing as far as taking on
the insurgents and trying to train Iraqis to take care of their
own security, but where are we at this point? And if we're not
where we need to be, what do we need to do?
Mr. Al-Alusi. If we have to deal with it, we have to work
it together; that means a clear strategical relationship. This
is the problem. Now the American side is working on one side
and the Iraqi is working on the other side. You have to find a
mechanism how to work it together. But we are on the right way,
and Iraq, they are accepting more from the United States of
America.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Does anybody else on the panel have a--
that's fine.
Mr. Dermer. We haven't been to Iraq, so----
Mr. Sharansky. Not yet.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Not yet? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Gentlemen, thank you very much. This has been
very helpful, very educational. And your contribution to peace
and democracy is extraordinary. Thank you.
We will now go to our second and final panel. And I
appreciate the patience of our second panel: Ms. Elizabeth
Dugan, vice president, International Republican Institute; Mr.
Leslie Campbell, director for Middle East Programs, National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs; Professor Febe
Armanios, professor for Middle Eastern Studies, Middlebury
College; Mr. Khaled Saffuri, chairman of the Board, Islamic
Free Market Institute; and, finally, Ms. Mona Yacoubian,
special adviser, Muslim World Initiative, U.S. Institute for
Peace.
You know what I'm going to do--I'm sorry, I had you sit
down, and I do need to swear you in, so if you would stand and
we will swear you in.
[Witnesses sworn]
Mr. Shays. Note for the record our five witnesses have
responded in the affirmative.
Given that we have five witnesses, I would prefer that you
stay close to the 5 minutes, but if you run over the 5 minutes,
that's OK.
We welcome all of you, and I want to just say how impressed
I was with the work of the International Republican Institute
and the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
in its work in Iraq in the last election.
I met some very impressive people who were helping the
Iraqis with this election, very impressed that 165,000 Iraqis
were involved in this election process. And they take great
pride, and deservedly so, in having an election that frankly
had more people participate than participate in the United
States. And the process was fair and almost flawless. It was
very impressive for me to watch.
We will start with you, Ms. Dugan, and then Mr. Campbell,
and go down the line.
STATEMENTS OF ELIZABETH DUGAN, VICE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL
REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE; LESLIE CAMPBELL, DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST
PROGRAMS, NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS; FEBE ARMANIOS, PROFESSOR, MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES,
MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE; KHALED SAFFURI, CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD,
ISLAMIC FREE MARKET INSTITUTE; AND MONA YACOUBIAN, SPECIAL
ADVISER MUSLIM WORLD INITIATIVE, U.S. INSTITUTE FOR PEACE
STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH DUGAN
Ms. Dugan. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ruppersberger, I want to thank
you for this opportunity to testify. And in the interest of
brevity, I will ask that my full testimony be----
Mr. Shays. All your testimonies will be in the record.
Ms. Dugan. I thank you, sir.
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has given the
topic of Middle Eastern democracy a new level of sustained
attention, and has buttressed that attention with additional
resources.
The questions you have posed to us as witnesses today allow
us to examine how effectively that attention and those
resources are being used. But before we look ahead, it may be
important to look back and to embrace at least two lessons
learned.
The first lesson is about democracy and security. President
Bush articulated a shift in the U.S. Government's thinking
about democracy and human rights in a very powerful speech at
the Commemoration of the 20th anniversary at the National
Endowment for Democracy when he said, ``60 years of Western
nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the
Middle East did nothing to make us safe, because in the long
run stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty.''
With these words he underscored that our commitment to
freedom and reform in the region was serious, and that
commitment is reinforced nearly daily, not only through his
vision but through the strategic programs that define the
policy, such as the U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative and
through organizations like IRI that mold the policy into
action.
The second lesson, which has been discussed at length here,
is about democracy in Islam. But I hope you will allow me to
give my perspective.
In the early 1980's, skeptics said democracy was not
possible in Latin America because of an ingrained sense of
servitude in the minds of Latins. In the late 1980's in east
Asia, similar expert theories were readily being tossed about
Washington. And even back in the 1920's when Catholic democracy
collapsed in southern Europe and Latin America, political
scientists began to theorize that only Protestant northern
European countries were capable of democracy. Now today, no one
would put forward such a notion, and yet skepticism about the
basic compatibility between democracy and Islam can still be
heard in the corridors of Washington.
For IRI, the question is settled. Islam, the faith of one-
fifth of the world's population, is consistent with democratic
rule. From our years of work in predominantly Muslim countries
like Indonesia and Bangladesh and Turkey, we have seen this;
and I fully expect that we will look back on the issue of
democracy in Islam in the years to come and see that many of
the questions being raised about the two are as wrong-minded as
those theories dating back to the European, Latin American, and
east Asian examples.
Our work in Iraq further confirms this belief. In Iraq, the
skeptics said Iraqis would never participate in an election
organized by the U.S. military. The skeptics said the security
situation was too dangerous for people to leave their homes.
And the skeptics said that insurgents would have a field day
attacking polling stations and voters. But the world watched in
January as some 8 million Iraqi voters turned out to
participate in the country's first democratic election in more
than 30 years. And while a great deal of hard work still
remains, Iraqis are firmly committed to the transition from an
authoritarian regime to a democratic government.
How do we know this? In a recent poll, a national poll
conducted by IRI, 90 percent of Iraqis said they believed that
it is very important, or important, that their new constitution
allow for the ability to select and change their government
through peaceable and fair elections. Ninety percent.
Similarly, 87.2 percent of those polled advocate keeping some
type of quota for women's representation in the new national
assembly as a means for securing roles for women in the new
government.
These numbers perhaps surprised some observers, but to
those on IRI's staff working daily in the region, they
demonstrate that not only is democracy compatible with Islam,
democracy is the aspiration of the people. It's not just what
we think, it's what they think and it's what they want. And it
is reverberating across the region and imbuing local reformers
with hope and courage in places like Lebanon, where the
opposition has been emboldened by recent events in both Iraq
and Ukraine; and in Egypt, where opposition has been more vocal
in its demands for reform than any point during the last
decade; in places like the West Bank in Gaza, where the Middle
East witnessed the most free and competitive leadership
election ever held in the region in January; and in places like
Qatar and Morocco and Jordan, and the list goes on.
It is not to say that significant challenges to advancing
democracy don't remain in the Middle East, but the prospect of
democratic governance in Islamic countries is really no longer
an abstract debate; democratic advances are occurring. Muslims
in the Middle East are participating in democratic processes.
President Bush has removed the taboo of talking about and
pressing for democratic reforms in the Middle East, and this
increased attention to democracy and human rights, in words and
in deeds, does help reformers in the Middle East committed to
democratic change, and it gives organizations like IRI more
muscle and more momentum to support them.
Political reform is going to be difficult, and when we're
talking about innovative initiatives like MEPI or the Broader
Middle East Initiative, and looking for success stories and
impact, we must be wary of demanding immediate results. We need
to remember Serbia, we need to remember Ukraine, countries
where IRI, among many others, engaged in democracy-
strengthening programs for a decade before the so-called
overnight victories of the people against corrupt government.
Democracy support is a long-term investment which, almost
without exception, requires a sustained diplomatic commitment.
But thanks to initiatives like MEPI, IRI is able to provide
that democratic support in a region in ways that simply were
unavailable to us in the 1990's.
At the most basic level, MEPI directly and positively
benefits IRI's democracy support mission by allowing us to
think much more strategically about where and how we want to
support democratic reform in the region.
I have some examples, they're part of my testimony. Let
me--I'll cut to my conclusion.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Ms. Dugan. I want to suggest the following: The President's
vision and commitment to democracy and human rights promotion
in the region is well conceived and forcefully articulated, but
there is a cautionary note. If democracy promotion is
undertaken without the support of our embassies, the tasks
before groups like IRI, especially in authoritarian countries,
are rendered infinitely more difficult.
All elements of our foreign policy apparatus, including our
embassies and USAID missions overseas, need to become
constructively and consistently engaged to ensure that
democracy promotion remains a priority and that both
governments and citizens in the Middle East receive a uniform
message about the need to implement reforms.
And from the standpoint of IRI's work in the region, I can
tell you it is crucial for democracy's expansion that Congress
continues to focus its attention on this issue, and it's one of
the reasons I'm so grateful for the hearing today.
U.S. policymakers, including Members of Congress, must take
the lead in giving praise where praise is due for those in the
Middle East moving forward on democracy, and they must continue
to condemn bad practices and to press for greater political
space in which IRI and other NGO's can operate with indigenous
reformers. And I thank you for your kind attention.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. What a thoughtful
statement; very helpful. How many years have you now worked for
the Institute?
Ms. Dugan. I started about 10 years ago, sir.
Mr. Shays. You have been there during a very momentous
time, haven't you?
Ms. Dugan. Indeed. We have seen quite a bit of remarkable
things happen in the world.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dugan follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Mr. Campbell.
STATEMENT OF LESLIE CAMPBELL
Mr. Campbell. Thank you, Chairman Shays, Mr. Ruppersberger.
I will echo my colleague, Liz, and thank you for the
opportunity to appear.
And just to refer to some of the nice words you said about
the work of NDI and IRI in Iraq, we very much appreciate that
and heard much about your visit. And I think it bears saying--
and we were very proud to work, of course, with the Iraqis,
thousands of them who really risked their lives. In fact 10,000
Iraqis acted as domestic election monitors, receiving nothing
in return, but just engaging in the process, going out to
actually watch people vote. It was an incredible day. I was
there. I was one of the few international observers out on the
streets. And I think, you know, without hesitation it was one
of the most emotional, but also fulfilling days of my life.
But coming back--and at the end of that day we did
celebrate, both the international staff, with our Iraqi
compatriots. We also realized that probably the harder work was
about to begin; in fact, we said about midnight that night that
the nice part about working on the Iraqi election was two
things: One is that Iraqis, we knew that the demand was there,
we knew that when given the chance they were going to show what
they wanted. The second part is that we all knew what an
election looked like. In a sense there was a linear path to an
election, we knew what had to happen.
Unfortunately, I don't think any of us quite know what
happens next. We don't know exactly what the institutions of
democracy in Iraq should or will look like. We don't know what
exactly the constitution-building process in Iraq should or
will be. And I think we knew then, and we found out in the week
since that time, as we have seen with the struggles in the
government, that the next steps are in some ways more important
and also in some ways more difficult.
So going back to the previous panel, I also would counsel a
lot of patience and have everyone understand, as you have said
several times in this hearing, that this is going to be a long
complicated process.
On the more general topic today of Middle East democracy
and the Bush doctrine, I tried to address some of the questions
that were posed for the panelists, and the first question was:
Is the Bush doctrine working? Well, my answer would be yes and
no. I have been involved in democracy promotion in the Middle
East for just under 12 years, I have been with NDI for 12
years, and much of that time has been a struggle.
I have to say that it was difficult to get the attention of
policymakers in Washington only a few years ago. And I often
joke that in 1999, if we were trying to get attention, for
example, out in the country of Yemen on the topic of democracy,
that was not a popular topic. It was difficult to get people to
listen. That has changed.
This paragraph in late 2000, in summing up NDI's work in
the region, said ``that the existence of courageous, democratic
activists points to the growing consciousness of the Middle
Eastern third way: The ground between the unresponsive
authoritarianism of existing regimes and the rhetoric of
religious extremism. The vanguard of this new third way are
cautiously chipping away at the ruling elite's assumption that
they can rule without the allegiance of the masses.''
So we found over the years that there was a courageous
third way, the type of people that are on this panel today. But
they didn't get a lot of support. In fact, much of the aid and
diplomatic efforts of the United States and others in the
international community in the nineties appeared to be designed
largely to show tangible results from the pursuit of regional
peace. And this type of democratic aid contained few programs
that challenged entrenched political authorities or that
encouraged a more vigorous legislative branch. Not only that,
the aid was channeled through official conduits, using formal
and informal bilateral agreements.
For example, U.S. aid to democracy in places like Egypt and
Jordan and Morocco was negotiated with the government. And this
is not a judgment on those governments, but their interest was
not always in changing the structures that they themselves
controlled. So that type of aid was not the most effective. And
there was clearly a reluctance on the United States and the
international community to push political reform in countries
like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.
So President Bush, though, has done something extremely
important. He has reinforced what is widely understood and
frequently demonstrated in the Middle East, and that is that
democracy is about universal values.
There was an article last year in Foreign Policy entitled,
``The True Clash of Civilization,'' where two professors
pointed out through surveys done in more than 70 countries,
that more than 80 percent of people in the Muslim and Islamic
world support democracy.
So what President Bush has done--and he has done it very,
very dramatically--is he has given voice to that huge majority
in the Arab and Islamic world, No. 1; and he has empowered and
emboldened these reformers who have existed, actually, for a
number of years.
The second thing that President Bush has done is through
his very frequent and powerful and forceful repetitions of this
doctrine, of this idea that all people, given the choice, will
choose freedom and want to control the decisions that affect
their lives, is that he has slowly but surely turned U.S.
policy around so that programs like the Middle East Partnership
Initiative, which Liz mentioned, USAID programs, the programs
of the National Endowment for Democracy, are now much more in
the mainstream, and organizations like NDI and IRI are much,
much more effectively able to push these democracy issues in
the countries that we work in.
To conclude, I would say that the challenge before us is to
ensure that this new focus on actually pushing democracy that
President Bush has articulated very well, that this new focus
has continued; that the resources continue to be made
available, and that U.S. policy doesn't do what would be the
easy thing, which is to sort of drift and to not continue to
push in these countries that resist this new democratic change.
Thank you.
Mr. Shays. I need to, for my own self sense of worth here,
acknowledge the fact that in my youth I had, if not led the
charge, been a vocal proponent of eliminating funding for the
National Endowment for Democracy. And that absurd position, in
light of what's happened in the last 15 years, humbles me. I am
so grateful that I wasn't as persuasive as I thought I was.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Campbell follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Professor.
STATEMENT OF FEBE ARMANIOS
Professor Armanios. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished
subcommittee members, I am honored to be here today and pleased
to share with you my views on this subject. My comments today
are also part of a summary of a longer submitted testimony.
Recent events in the Middle East, including the Lebanese
demonstrations for and subsequent withdrawal of Syrian troops,
the Iraqi elections in January, and the announcement of
forthcoming multiparty elections in Egypt, have been viewed as
a success for the Bush doctrine on democracy promotion in the
Middle East. But the ways in which the administration's
policies have been received by various groups in the region
might be indicative of the challenges facing U.S.-sponsored
programs. Some regional observers and politicians argue that
the Middle East had been moving toward democracy long before
the administration's calls for reform. Many also argue that
there is no causal link between U.S. policies and trends toward
reform.
While this is an inexact assessment, we cannot separate
recent developments from their local context. For example, the
Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon is also strongly linked to the
recent assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.
Moreover, we cannot neglect that there is growing suspicion in
the region toward the U.S.' motivation for reform, even from
local advocates who otherwise might be natural allies to U.S.
proposals.
Mr. Chairman, critics of the administration's policies and
some Arab leaders caution that promoting democracy in the
region is incompatible with U.S. national security objectives.
They argue that there is high level of support for Islamist
leaders among voting populations in the Middle East, and that
in most countries of the region, transparent democratic
elections held today would almost certainly produce radical
Islamic regimes that would then seek to undermine U.S.
interests.
In dealing with this assessment, we should first note that
genuine democratic change in the region would likely bring to
the foremultiple voices, including those of radicals and
militants. But it may also create an opening for moderate
Islamists. Moderate Islamists who reject violence and are
willing to participate in a democratic framework will be
crucial in sustaining stable democratic governments in the
coming years. The risks involved in a democratic process that
would allow these groups to become legitimate political actors
might be worth taking.
Second, there is a sense that open elections could bring
radical Islamist groups into power and they might then
transform the regimes that made elections possible into
theocracies. This might indeed be the case. But in Turkey, we
see that religiously motivated groups can participate under a
democratic structure where they bargain with other political
actors and become full-fledged members of a politically
pluralistic society. If moderate Islamists are invested in a
democratic system and realize that only within this system
could they express and achieve their goals, they could become
agents for, rather than obstacles to, positive change.
Third, a push for democracy in the Middle East might create
regimes that are partially or completely governed by Islamic
law. We should take into consideration that an Islamic
democracy might not completely conform to a Western-style
interpretation. And in helping establish democratic structures
in the region, U.S. policies must also strive for the inclusion
of women, nonMuslims, nonIslamists, and secularist groups.
Ultimately the United States can support democratic reform
by focusing on the following points: First, the United States
should encourage diversity in the political landscape of the
Middle East. While the United States may disagree with their
views, Islamists are part of the political reality of the
region. Here, the United States should learn more about
different Islamist groups, about their agendas, goals, and
popular appeal, and should determine their capacity for
participating in governance alongside secular or nonIslamist
groups. The exclusion of these groups as a totality without
making any distinctions among them might reinforce an existing
notion in the region that the United States rhetoric and
policies on democracy promotion are disingenuous.
Second, the United States should be cautious in the extent
in which it recognizes existing sectarian, religious, and
patriarchal divisions. In looking for natural allies in Iraq,
the United States has worked with religious and tribal leaders
to form a new government. This approach might substitute one
set of traditional power holders with another. The United
States should work with NGO's, grassroots organizations, and
civil society in soliciting ways to include women and
nontraditional power holders in governance.
Third, the U.S. Congress should work to strengthen existing
democracy promotion programs. Congressional oversight can
monitor programs such as MEPI by ensuring that they are
signaling the U.S.'s commitment to democratic reforms that are
sensitive to local political conditions and to indigenous
interpretations of democracy. Most importantly, perhaps,
provisions in these initiatives must take into account unique
conditions within each country in the region.
Finally, the State Department should intensify its public
diplomacy efforts and press for improvements in human rights,
political participation, strengthening the rule of law, and
promoting freedom of religion, speech, and press in the Middle
East. The United States will gain greater credibility in the
region if it prioritizes democratic reform alongside its short-
term economic and strategic interests. The United States should
maintain bilateral dialogs, bilateral dialogs with regional
governments, and should advocate reform especially from its
closest allies. This dialog should be bolstered by a
willingness to exert diplomatic and economic pressure to
express the seriousness of U.S. policies.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Professor Armanios follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Mr. Saffuri.
STATEMENT OF KHALED SAFFURI
Mr. Saffuri. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittee, I would like to thank you, especially Chairman
Shays, for inviting me to testify this morning. I have a
written statement which I ask to be included on the record.
Mr. Shays. It will be included.
Mr. Saffuri. Thank you. Thank you very much for holding
this hearing on such an important matter involving democracy,
civil rights, and foreign policy matters. The issue of
democracy in the Middle East has been of critical importance to
the Islamic Free Market Institute Foundation, which I am a
cochairman, a cofounder and chairman since its founding in
1998. We hosted the first conference of free market and
democracy in Doha, Qatar in the year 2000, and our fifth
conference was held just a few months ago.
Following the tragic attacks of September 11th, the larger
issue of democracy and freedom in the Muslim world has been
taking a profound importance. I welcome this opportunity to
provide this subcommittee and Members of Congress our opinion
on the impact of U.S. policy and U.S. statements on the Middle
East and in the Muslim world.
First, I would like to begin by talking about the problem
that is a credibility problem which hurts our effort in
spreading democracy in the Middle East. No matter how
passionately President Bush states or makes his notions of
spreading freedom, there is a growing perception that America
continues to deny justice to Islam and Muslims. Specifically,
the Muslim world is convinced that our government violates
civil rights and due process of Muslims right here in the
United States. This results in a perceived double standard
which runs the risk of preventing any meaningful dialog with
the Muslim street.
A few months ago Mr. Osama Siblani, the editor of the
largest Arab American paper in Detroit wrote: ``How can we
believe that America's engaged in spreading democracy in the
Arab and Muslim world while we as Arab Americans have less
democracy here in the U.S.?''
Many people are aware of the prosecution of Muslims in this
country, and Arabs. There is an article that I can make
available here, written in the American Conservative magazine
by James Bovard called ``Undue Process.'' These kinds of
incidents are translated in the Middle East into Arab and
Muslim press, and they cause this credibility problem to spread
more. This also runs the risk of rendering unmeaningful the
hundreds of millions of dollars we continue to spend in public
diplomacy, democracy initiatives, and the media. Anyone that
looks at the polling in the Middle East, you see that in
general America's stand in the Arab and Muslim street actually
is declining, not improving.
Islam provides not only religious guidance but represents
the philosophy, culture, and sociopolitical foundation of most
Muslim societies today. It is important that we recognize,
first and foremost, that allowing Islam or its belief to be
attacked hinders our effort at building bridges and
understanding with the Muslim world. So as we consider programs
and campaigns to foster freedom in the Muslim and Arab world,
we must realize that these societies will reject any approach
which marginalizes Islamic thought.
Yet there is much for us in the United States to teach in
emerging democracies. We can demonstrate the importance of
civic institutions which would be compatible to Islam to serve
as barriers to social injustice and authoritarian regimes.
In a nutshell, only--it is not only that Islamis compatible
with democracy, it is required as a foundation in any Muslim
country.
The issue of the state-run media--and this is something I
would like to address here regarding the programs of Radio Sawa
and Al Hurra--I would like to address the hurdles in presenting
U.S. viewpoints through media efforts such as Al Hurra
satellite channel and Radio Sawa. One thing that can be said of
Arabs is total distrust of state-run media. For generations,
governments in the Middle East were feeding information to
their public that people have total mistrust, it's a government
propaganda. The government point of view was always presented
without any challenge. Al Hurra is U.S. Government-funded and
perceived as strictly controlled by the U.S. Government. This
might not be true, but this is how the street looks at Al
Hurra. And this is the reason why Al Jazeera has been very
successful. And every time Al Jazeera is attacked in America,
the more popular it becomes in the Middle East.
Furthermore, the constant broadcasting on stations in the
Muslim world such as the Armed Forces Radio of perceived anti-
Islamic commentary by the likes of Rush Limbaugh. I have a
personal experience. I was in Bahrain 2 years ago, and a high-
ranking official of the Foreign Ministry said we are strong
allies of the United States but we are constantly embarrassed.
He said, we have the naval base in Bahrain, and we allow the
radio station, military radio station here, but we get
complaints and people are angry on the street because there is
this program of a guy--he couldn't spell his name, he said
Limbo. I said, Rush Limbaugh. He said, ``Yes. He is constantly
insulting Islam, and there's nothing we can do.'' So I said I
will go back to the States.
Mr. Shays. I have something in common with that as well. I
get the same insults.
Mr. Saffuri. We raised the issue with two Pentagon
officials and a letter was sent immediately. We didn't get an
answer. Then I raised an issue with Mr. Wilcox, assistant in
the Secretary of Defense, and he said this will be considered
censorship. He said Rush Limbaugh's program is the most popular
in the military radio, so they could not censor it, they could
not remove it.
But this really undermines the work, the great work that
has been done by IRI and NDI, and also the other stations that
we support, like Al Hurra and Radio Sawa.
I would like to conclude, I think I can talk more about
these issues later.
Mr. Shays. If you could bring your comments to a close.
Mr. Saffuri. OK. I will close here and I will leave it for
answering. Thank you again.
Mr. Shays. Thank you so much. I complimented our first
speaker on her thoughtful comments, but I congratulate all of
you and thank all of you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Saffuri follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Ms. Yacoubian.
STATEMENT OF MONA YACOUBIAN
Ms. Yacoubian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
subcommittee for inviting me to speak today. I am truly honored
to be among such distinguished company. The powerful title of
this morning's hearing, ``Fostering Democracy in the Middle
East: Defeating Terrorism with Ballots,'' underscores the
critical role that freedom and democracy can play in countering
extremism in this troubled region.
Indeed, in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist
attacks, the world turned its attention to the Middle East's
longstanding democracy deficit. With the Pentagon in flames and
the Twin Towers collapsing, the horror of that day initiated
deeper reflection both here and in the Arab world about the
roots of such a horrendous act.
Recently, global and regional interest has focused
intensely on the Middle East's need for reform. The region's
stagnation dates back decades. Yet until the 2001 attacks,
these ills received scant attention from governments in the
region or their global counterparts. The September 11th attacks
shattered the conventional wisdom that the region's stability,
anchored by its authoritarian governments, could endure
indefinitely and would come at little cost to U.S. interests.
Precisely the opposite conclusion has become apparent. Middle
East reform is critical for long-term regional stability and
broader international security. Absent change, the status quo
will only breed greater popular disaffection and provide
fertile ground for the continued growth of extremism.
In advance of today's hearings, you provided a number of
complex questions focused on two key issues: first, the
region's ripeness for reform; and, second, the Bush
administration's policies on Middle East reform. I will devote
the majority of my testimony to the first question. I want to
add that the views I express are my own and not necessarily
those of the U.S. Institute of Peace, which does not advocate
specific policy positions.
The absence of freedom in the Middle East is well
documented. Freedom House, in its most recent survey, notes
that the region is distinguished from the rest of the world by
its distinct lack of political rights and civil liberties. At
times, regimes in the region have resorted to wide-ranging
repressive practices in the name of fighting the global war on
terror. Such policies often result in an increase in human
rights violations and the overall suppression of dissent, even
when peaceful.
An Arab awakening to the need for reform has taken place as
well. In July 2002, less than a year after September 11th, a
U.N-commissioned panel of 30 Arab experts issued the first Arab
Human Development Report. In blunt language, the AHDR issues a
probing self-critical analysis of the region's shortfalls.
Specifically, the paper outlines three key deficits: freedom,
women's empowerment, and knowledge that impede the Arab world
from achieving its true potential.
The report concludes with a clarion call for reform. While
the Arab world's lack of political freedom is well documented,
the region's democracy deficit should not be misinterpreted as
a lack of desire or capacity for democratic reform on the part
of its citizens. Numerous polls and surveys verify the Arab
public's hunger for freedom and democracy. The most compelling
data originates from the 2001 World Value Survey which reveals
that Arab countries had the highest percentage of publics, 61
percent, who agreed strongly that, ``democracy may have many
problems, but it's better than any other form of government.''
Beyond the polling results, other data coupled with key
concepts in Islam suggests that there is not necessarily an
inherent contradiction between Islam and democracy. First,
there are many examples of countries with significant Muslim
populations that are considered electoral democracies. Second,
notable principals within Islam such as shura or consultative
decisionmaking and ijtihad, or interpretation, can propel a
democratic ethos.
The absence of freedom in the Middle East does not appear
to have precluded many of its people from embracing the hope
for democratic reforms. Indeed, intense international interest
directed at the need for Middle East reform has helped to
initiate an unprecedented dialog over reform in the region.
The boldest and most detailed proposals originating in the
Arab world have emerged from nongovernment organizations.
Beginning in January 2004, a diverse array of groups ranging
from the Arab Business Council to the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood have published a wide variety of reform
initiatives. Most significantly, many of these initiatives have
advocated forcefully for political reform. I would be happy to
discuss the specifics of these initiatives during the question
and answer.
In contrast, government proposals for reform may provide
entry points for pressing for more substantial democratic
change, but they fall short of meaningful, deeply rooted, and
sustained reform. Instead, government measures typically appear
designed to relieve popular pressure at home and assuage
critics abroad while leaving the power equation unaltered. To
be successful, any reform effort must be inclusive, reaching
out to all elements of society, including modern Islamists who
likely constitute the region's most potent opposition force.
Yet, with few exceptions, joint reform efforts that bring
together secular and Islamist reformers are rare. Calls for the
creation of national pacts could bridge secular and Islamist
demands for reform and possibly galvanize the reform movement.
In closing, it is useful to consider the implications for
U.S. policy. To date, the Bush administration's focus on Middle
East reform at a minimum has energized discussion of the issue
in the region. For all of its controversy, the U.S. invasion of
Iraq may have contributed indirectly to numerous positive
developments in the region. Still, several significant
challenges remain. First, bolstering U.S. credibility in the
region stands as a key priority for policymakers. Second, the
administration must determine how to reconcile the well-
documented need for change in the region with longstanding
desires for stability. Third, U.S. engagement with moderate
Islamist reformers is essential. Finally, U.S. policymakers
need to harmonize U.S. policies in support of the global war on
terror with the desire to promote reform.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing today on
such an important issue. The movement toward political reform
in this critical region of the world will not be easy, quick,
or without difficulties, but it is necessary and must be
sustained. The long-term stability of the region, which is in
everyone's interest, is at stake. Thank you very much for this
opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Yacoubian follows:]
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Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. It's been a wonderful panel
to hear from. And we will start with Mr. Ruppersberger for
questions.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I do think
it's an excellent panel.
I think we all agree that we would love to see the goal of
democracy in countries throughout the world. But then there's
the challenge of implementation, and that's a part of what we
are trying to talk about today. I think the areas that I would
like to focus on in my questions--and I will probably go to you
first Mr. Saffuri--are these.
First, how do we deal with radical Islam? Because I see
radical Islam, probably as one of our biggest problems as it
relates to world peace, as it relates to what's going on in
Iraq. And I'm concerned about the education of children with
respect to radical Islam. And how do we deal with that issue?
The second issue. I have been to numerous countries
throughout the Islamic world, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
Libya, over in Asia, different countries. And one of the things
that I think has to be done and has to be worked through is the
discrimination against women. If we are going to have a true
democracy, we have to deal with that issue. Saudi Arabia,
considered to be progressive, a woman cannot drive a car. They
have police running around trying to catch them showing a
little skin or whatever their issues are. And yet, you know, if
we don't have women involved--and I think there's a good role
model with Karzai in Afghanistan who worked hard to get women
involved. I think that's a very important and relevant issue.
The next issue is education. And that is so important. And
I talked in the previous panel, infrastructure and quality of
life. But that goes in together.
And the fourth is that how do we mitigate, how do we
mediate between the different religions? Iraq, as an example,
where you have Sunni, you have Shia, you have different
religions and have different points of view and they're
fighting with each other. How do we pull them together as it
relates to democracy? If you can address those four issues, I
would--and if we have time, I will go to the rest of the panel.
Mr. Saffuri. Thank you. I think this is a very difficult
subject to tackle.
Mr. Ruppersberger. That is why I asked the questions. And
one point I want to say about Rush Limbaugh. Rush Limbaugh has
personally said over and over he is an entertainer. So even
though a lot of people like to hear what he has to say in the
United States, if he says himself that he is an entertainer, I
would send that message out to the rest of the Islamic world
when he does--you feel like he is attacking you, that he says
he is an entertainer and not a part of the media. Maybe that
might help the situation.
Mr. Saffuri. Well, the problem, these statements come very
frequently. And the incident with the desecration of the Quran
in Guantanamo, even though Newsweek denied the story, but still
the result of that story, as you saw, caused the death of 17
people.
The issue of radical Islam, I really think one of the most
important issues is to engage Islamic parties and Islamic
activities in dialog. And if you look at the Islamic movement
in the Muslim world, it varies from one country to another. The
Islamic bloc in the Kuwait Parliament, they have been
participating in elections since 1963, they have 11 people out
of 15 in Parliament and they represent--even though they work
frequently as the Cabinet members. They are engaged in dialog
with the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait. They come frequently to
Washington. There was one of the leaders here just 2 weeks ago
speaking at the National Defense University. So it's from
country to another. The more pressure there is on people, the
more radical the reaction comes in the street.
This is my personal belief. You have countries that are
allies of the United States receive great aid from taxpayers'
money, and these countries imprison people for simply running
for Parliament. So when people have no hope in their societies,
they become radicalized gradually. So I think the most
important thing that the United States needs to do, we need to
start with our allies before--I think pressuring Syria is very
important, but before we pressure Syria we have to set an
example with our closest allies in the area. These countries
that get foreign aid, you can use for it as leverage with these
countries, whether you want to hold part of foreign aid,
whether you want to engage these countries, hold part of the
foreign aid until they start conducting political reforms in
these countries. And I think having these billions of dollars
pumped into these economies should be used to pressure these
countries to make change. That is extremely important.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Let me stop you there, because I want to
get an issue out. And I know I've had numerous conversations,
just this last Sunday night with Muslim Americans about what we
can do and what the Muslim community can do to help world
peace, to help democracy. And one of the issues that I think is
extremely important is controlling the message, something that
maybe Rush Limbaugh tries to do. And controlling the message
that we need the help of Islamic Americans and other Muslims
throughout the world to let the people in other countries know
that Islam is not about killing yourself because that's what
God wants you to do. And I think you have to start with the
younger generation and have to educate. But I am calling out
and challenge the American Muslim community, and then Muslims
throughout the world who are leaders, to help control that
message and to get the message out that Islam is a peaceful
religion. And to have people professing that they are killing
for God, that's not what it's about. And I would think that any
Muslim throughout the world would hold anybody and radical
Islam accountable for preaching and for promoting that.
And I think that we can't do it alone, the United States or
other countries. We can help you with security, we can help you
with infrastructure and money, but we need to have the Muslims
throughout the world, the leadership. And I know there's some
that are doing it, but it's not enough. And I'm encouraging you
to reconsider your goals throughout the world to help us
control that message about Islam.
Mr. Saffuri. Absolutely. I think the Muslim community have
a duty to help the United States, but also the U.S. Government
has a responsibility on asking the help of the Muslim
community. Frequently the State Department implores people that
all the relationship with Islam is a few classes at Georgetown
University, or being born and coming to the United States at
the age of 2 and having very little knowledge of the Islamic
world. That is a fact----
Mr. Ruppersberger. My time is almost up. Mr. Chairman, are
you going to let us go a little longer?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Ruppersberger. OK.
Mr. Saffuri. On the woman issue, the other----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Let's get to the women issue about
discrimination and how--you know, how can we have democracy and
freedom if we don't deal with the issue of women and
discrimination? And I know it's a different culture.
I will give you an example. I was at a function, an Islamic
function, and talking to the men and women that were mixed
together. And then it was time for me to have a speech, and in
the room the Muslim women were on one side and the men were on
the other. And during the speech I made a comment that I don't
really understand, but I understand it's your culture. Boy,
after I gave my speech I really got criticized by the women,
that this is what we want to do, that's our religion. And
that's where we have to understand and educate each other. So I
think this discrimination against women has to be dealt with.
Mr. Saffuri. Yes, I agree----
Mr. Ruppersberger. It doesn't mean that I am saying to
change your culture.
Mr. Saffuri. Frequently----
Mr. Ruppersberger. But educating women.
Mr. Saffuri. Frequently Islam is used to justify the
discrimination against women. In reality, it is absolutely not
true. I was in Kuwait during the debate over women being
allowed to vote in the year 2000. Kuwait issued a decree
allowing women to vote; Parliament overruled it. And we were
then with the congressional delegation meeting with some
members of the Islamic bloc, and they used Islam as a
justification. And I challenged them to prove it, and then they
backed down. They said actually Islam have nothing to do with
it; the whole issue is tribal and culture issue. And this is
why--the vote took place 2 weeks ago in Kuwait, and the Islamic
parties did not vote, actually did not vote against it because
they know that there is nothing in Islam against it.
Mr. Ruppersberger. It's a good step. But it's also--you
need to deal with the issue of education, too.
Mr. Saffuri. So going back to the issue. I think we need to
engage Islamic parties and Islamic activists in dialog whether
by inviting them here. The State Department have speakers
program where they bring people around the country. I think
they should include a large number of Islamic activities. I
know the work of NDI and IRI, they do lots of work in the Gulf
of Yemen and North Africa. They need to talk to those people.
Some countries they probably cannot meet with them probably
because, for example, in Tunis, Islamic activism is barred by
the government. They put all of them in prison a long time ago.
But you need to engage them, and I think through engagement
and dialog you can--I think they will eventually have to admit
that lots of stuff was influenced in the last 30 years by
Wahhabi ideas that have nothing to do with Islam; it's more of
the ideology, in my opinion. I can debate this----
Mr. Ruppersberger. But, you know, the influence of children
with Wahhabism and the schools that are developing, that's a
very serious issue, because the children are very
impressionable. And these are some of the people that are
recruited to put bombs on their bodies to kill themselves. So I
mean, I think--I would like to hear you suggest in dealing with
radical Wahhabism, how you as a Muslim and how leadership in
the Muslim community can deal with those messages.
Mr. Saffuri. I think Saudi Arabia is a very close ally of
the United States, and I think that's another leverage we
should use. We have a close relationship, and these issues
should be constantly with----
Mr. Ruppersberger. But how do we implement dealing with
that issue? How do we implement dealing with Saudi Arabia? I
was in Saudi Arabia and had conversations about this issue, and
they said, well, we have--how can you promote Wahhabism and
some of the radical teachings? And yet those are the same
people that are attempting to kill your leadership. How would
you recommend that we deal with that? If we don't deal with
radical Wahhabism and the training of young people, we are
going to have serious problems throughout this world for a long
time.
Mr. Saffuri. I do agree with that----
Mr. Ruppersberger. So how would you recommend that we deal
with it?
Mr. Saffuri. You know, I think the Saudis are trying to
make some changes. They have great resistance inside the
country. But I think that doesn't mean we should stop
pressuring them. I think the pressure should continue. I think
more visits from Members of Congress to engage the Saudi
leadership, this kind of dialog of making the changes. And also
with the leadership. I think the last elections of Riyadh, the
Islamic candidates won the entire, the elections for the city
of Riyadh. So I think those guys should either invite them to
the United States, engage them in dialog. You have to reach
some kind of agreement.
I also think another way of supporting more Muslim,
moderate Muslim leaders who do not subscribe to the Wahhabi
ideas, I think there is plenty of them. I think in the last 30,
40 years, the oil money caused explosion with this Wahhabi
ideas all over the world, especially in Muslim communities
within the Muslim world or in the West. Because of the access
to the large amount of money, these ideas were turned into
books and these books were made available where many Muslims
who tried to learn about Islam understood the Wahhabi ideas to
be the legitimate ideas for Muslim.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Do you think the leaders of the
different governments should attempt to have influence on the
Wahhabi teachings?
Mr. Saffuri. I think if they feel the pressure from the
outside, they will go hide in a corner and continue their
activities. I think it should be an open dialog. And they
should be challenged on facts from the history of Islam. Women
and Islam participated with men in the battlefield,
participated--the prophet's wife was a trader, she was a
businesswoman. So now to say women could not drive a car or
women could not mix with men, it is really in total
contradiction with Islamic teaching. So you have to challenge
it. You have to allow the more open-minded Muslim leaders to
challenge it under an open dialog.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Anyone else have comments on what we
discussed?
Mr. Campbell. If I could jump in.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Campbell. If I could jump in, maybe----
Mr. Ruppersberger. We learn more this way. Thank you.
Mr. Campbell. Maybe, with respect to my friend--and we have
talked a lot, I think, all of us, so you know we see ourselves
as colleagues basically. And I didn't hear anything I disagreed
with totally, but I think I would challenge the thesis a bit
about how to tackle Islam. And I would say that the challenge
before us--and I am thinking about NDI and IRI and others that
are on the ground doing these programs--it's not so much to
democratize Islam. I don't disagree with any of the concerns
that you brought up. I think these are real concerns. But I
think if we tackle this problem by thinking that we have to go
in, in a sense, as outsiders and try to democratize Islam, I
think we will get bogged down and not get very----
Mr. Ruppersberger. I agree. It has to come from within. And
success breeds upon success.
Mr. Campbell. Well----
Mr. Ruppersberger. That's very important.
Mr. Campbell. It does breed success. The other thing is
that if we champion freedom--and I don't always like to sound
like I'm parroting President Bush's words because I come from a
different political vantage point.
Mr. Ruppersberger. This shouldn't be----
Mr. Campbell. But--but if we champion----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Partisan anyway.
Mr. Campbell. Then what happens is you can build a middle.
I think the problem that we run into in Saudi Arabia, even in
Kuwait, certainly in Egypt, is that there are two extremes. You
are on the government's side where they say, oh, we can't open
up because we have the specter of the radicals on that side. If
you are on the radical side, they say there is no other choice;
the only way we can organize and speak is in the mosque. And I
think that the challenge that we have is, in thinking about
democracy promotion, is how do you open up that middle? So not
so much to democratize Islam, but to provide the political
space where other voices can be heard, including----
Mr. Ruppersberger. So be more specific. How would you
implement that?
Mr. Campbell. Well, one thing, pressure to have elections.
I agree that elections are not the only answer, but successive
iterations----
Mr. Ruppersberger. But before you can have elections, you
must have security. You must train countries to also provide
their own security, which is the only way in the end we are
going to get out of Iraq. And we have a long way to go there.
Mr. Campbell. That's true. Although--and, again, this is a
chicken and egg problem. If you have security but no freedom,
then we end up with this problem of developing a malignancy.
You know----
Mr. Ruppersberger. No question.
Mr. Campbell. People have said that we thought we were
getting stability in the Middle East; what we were getting was
malignancy, and eventually it erupts and it hurts us all. So
it's a very difficult balance. You can't have--I'm not
suggesting you forget about security and go into democracy in
elections, but you pursue these things simultaneously because
people are demanding a chance to have a voice. If they don't
have a voice, then the radicals dominate the agenda, and I
think that's what we have seen.
Mr. Ruppersberger. And if that is the case, then you must
win the hearts and minds of the people, because no government--
no one is going to be able to force somebody. They are going to
know what their quality of life is.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. If you want to jump in, Ms. Dugan, please feel
free.
Ms. Dugan. Not to put too fine a point on it, but just to
perhaps jump off from where Les left off here and talk a little
bit about the women's aspect of this. I think it would be a
different matter if NDI and IRI found themselves on the ground
in a place like Iraq or a place like Afghanistan, saying to
people women must be more involved here, so you'll have to go
out and try to find them and then we will do what we can to
find them.
In fact it's quite the opposite that has occurred. There
are women who have come to us from the very beginning and said
we need your help, we need an understanding, we need tools to
allow us to have our voices be more strongly heard. And as you
yourself have pointed out, the women's participation in the
political process in Afghanistan has been enshrined to some
degree in the constitution of Afghanistan. This is----
Mr. Ruppersberger. And that started with the leadership of
Karzai, too.
Ms. Dugan. Exactly correct. Exactly correct. So these are
the sort of signals that we can take to begin to expand our
programs.
Mr. Ruppersberger. In order to do that, do you feel that
education is one of the strongest elements to help this issue
of discrimination against women?
Ms. Dugan. It's a very important element. And the women
themselves, I think, are prepared to step up to that plate.
Mr. Shays. Did either one of you want to respond to Mr.
Ruppersberger's questions?
Ms. Yacoubian. Maybe just very, very briefly. One is to
actually build on the point that was made here. And that is the
whole issue of family code revisions, that--these are laws that
dictate women and their status that are often discriminatory.
And so certainly one way to begin to get at this problem is to
advocate for revision of these family code laws.
I would raise the example of Morocco in which its family
code law was revised, I believe it was last year, and it now
has one of the most liberal status codes with respect to women
in the Arab world. Of course, the trick is that once those
revisions are made, ensuring that in fact those statutes are
implemented and so forth. But I think that's a very important
means of getting at some of the discrimination issues. And the
only other point I'd like to make is that----
Mr. Ruppersberger. But where does that have to come from?
Does that have to come from the religious leaders? How can you
change a code?
Ms. Yacoubian. That has to come from government,
governments in power and parliaments. And obviously in the Arab
world, typically governments are the ones that control these
kinds of issues; parliaments often have their hands tied. And I
think in this regard the United States can play an important
role, quietly to push for and advocate for revisions of family
code.
I believe there are discussions now in Algeria--is that
correct, Les--about the family law. So this would be an
important place again to quietly perhaps lobby and push for
revision of a code in such a way that it's more liberal and
freer with regard to the way women are treated.
Professor Armanios. I would like to just add that we have
to be willing to be open to different voices within even the
women's movement itself. For the example of Iraq, we see that
there is a spectrum of women's groups, some of which are
actually advocating for a greater implementation of Islam. They
see that through Islam they would have greater rights. And this
is kind of building on your point. It takes a more moderate
interpretation in that sense of the religion. But they are
still working within those parameters rather than abandoning
cultural and traditional values, and that's something that I
think we need to be sensitive to on the ground.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. This is fascinating stuff. I was just thinking
as you were talking, I was an administrative aide to a mayor,
and I got a call from a constituent who was very unhappy that
the legislature was abolishing a law that said women couldn't
work past 12 at night. And she was a supervisor and didn't want
to work past 12 at night, and so she wanted that law. And I
think of that in light of the distortions sometimes that we get
in public policy. You know, if she didn't want to work past 12
at night, she needed to work that out with her boss, but she
didn't need a law that prevented every woman from working past
12 at night.
I want to just, I have been in awe, I was in awe of the
experience I had in Iraq during the election, and I interacted
in Irbio with both the International Republican Institute and
the National Democratic Institute. In Irbio, one was involved
with the monitoring and another was involved with getting out
the vote. Do you remember which organization, what your
organizations did in that area in Irbio? Do you remember?
Mr. Campbell. Well, the organization that NDI was
associated with was called the Election Information Network,
which was more a monitoring organization. And IRI was dealing
with an organization which was much more about actively
encouraging people to vote. I don't remember the name of the
organization.
Mr. Shays. And you had incredible systems set up around the
country. And they were Iraqis. But what was fascinating to me
was with the--I think it was the International Republican
Institute. There was a woman who was--appeared to be fairly
young. I thought she was still in her twenties. And I was
thinking she was devoting morning, noon, and night to this
effort. And she was from former Yugoslavia. And I said, why are
you here? And she said in so many words: Because your country
helped bring democracy. And I don't even know if she said
``your country.'' She said you helped bring democracy to my
country, and I wanted to share what I learned with someone
else.
I thought the power of that was just extraordinary. Do you
remember this young woman? I mean, is she--I mean, just, it was
just mind-boggling.
Ms. Dugan. Mr. Chairman, her name is Olga. She is star on
our team in Iraq, which is no small effort, as you know well.
And I too am grateful for your praise of our programs there.
You can know that it is a very challenging environment but one
that the entire staff of IRI is completely dedicated to.
Mr. Shays. Was she Muslim herself? I mean, was she a
Christian? Muslim? Do you know?
Ms. Dugan. No. But it's an interesting point that you bring
up because it's one of the things that we have tried to do, not
only in Iraq, but in many programs that we have around the
world. And that is to build off the experiences of those in
countries which are--which have come more recently to
democracy, who have a more recent experience with how these
systems are in fact not only built but rooted deeply. And so
here's a young woman who has sort of lived it in her lifetime,
who can bring her own sense of how you apply these things in a
different environment. And as I think you know well, this is
not a cookie-cutter approach that we can take. We understand
this from our work. You can't just pick it up, move it over,
and put it down. But you can begin to apply a lot of the same
concepts and modify them appropriately.
Mr. Shays. Well, it spoke to my Peace Corps heart, because
I was thinking this wasn't an American telling Iraqis or
helping, showing Iraqis. Not that there weren't Americans
there, but it was someone closer to their experience. It was
just downright extraordinary, it was impressive, and I think of
her and the organization and what you all accomplished in that
effort.
Last August, I led a CODEL, a number of Members of
Congress, not many, but a number, went to Iraq, spoke to the
leaders there, the leaders in Jordan, the leaders in Israel,
the leaders in the Palestinian community, the leaders in
Lebanon. That was really fascinating, how they have been able
to kind of cultivate a democracy. And then we went into Syria.
And that was extraordinary, too.
What I had learned of Lebanon made me feel that it was so
fragile. I mean, there are different leaders, different faiths,
allocations of who got to be in what position. And so when
there was this effort to get after--the assassination to get
Syria to leave, take its troops out of Lebanon, I thought this
isn't going to happen. And I was wrong. And it made me think of
how surprised I was that Syria did take its troops out. I was
surprised that there was a strong movement to make that demand.
But then there was the counterforce, Hezbollah and others, the
political wing of Hezbollah was out in force.
And so the question I want to ask each of you, because the
surprise to me was that Syria took its troops out. I want to
ask each of you, what is the biggest surprise that's happened
in the Middle East since the fall of Saddam? It can be a
positive surprise, it can be a negative. If you have more than
one but they are clustered together, you can do that. But tell
me the thing that honestly surprised you, your expectation was
different. And I'm not going to go in order because you may
want to think about this. But is anyone ready to say what
surprised them?
Mr. Campbell. I'll jump in.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Campbell. Sure. I think we don't know how it will turn
out yet, but what has surprised me are the potential changes in
Egypt and the fact that there are people on the street in Cairo
and in other places of Egypt. In the years that I've been doing
this, I think my greatest frustration has been the inability to
find partners in Egypt. NDI now has 10 offices across the
region, but one of those offices does not include Egypt. And we
have found demand for democracy in almost every other country.
If the Syrian government would allow, we could easily work with
Syrian reformists more. But Egypt has been difficult. And now
there are people on the street. These are not large numbers,
it's a couple hundred people in a country of 55 or more
million. But the fact that people have the nerve to go on the
street, the guts, the steel to go on the street and face arrest
and ask for change has really surprised me. I don't know how it
will turn out, but that I did not expect.
Mr. Shays. Tell me another surprise. Anyone? There has to
have been--everything has gone just the way you anticipated it?
I mean, there had to have been things that surprised you.
Mr. Saffuri. I think I have two surprises. One of them that
I am still astonished, that the Wahhabi establishment in Saudi
Arabia still have so much power and the government claim they
cannot do anything about it. That is a huge surprise, because I
think the government have lots of power and they can
marginalize them.
The other surprise is I think the Arab dictatorships are
the only ones in the world besides North Korea that these
revolutionary republics are giving the children the Presidency.
The President dies now, it's becoming monarchy republics. And
it happens in Syria and it looks like it might happen in other
places there, too.
Mr. Shays. And it's a surprise that could happen.
Mr. Saffuri. That could happen. Yes.
Mr. Shays. In this day and age.
Mr. Saffuri. Absolutely. Yes.
Ms. Yacoubian. I'm actually going to volunteer three
surprises. But I think if I sat here and thought more, I could
probably give you more. But the first that comes to mind is the
holding of municipal elections in Saudi Arabia, which, again,
to my mind, represents a very important forward step. While
they were limited in many ways, for a country that had not had
nationwide elections in decades, to me it showed the power of
over time the realization of what happened post-September 11th
and the need to change.
I have not had the privilege of going to Iraq, and I have
to say that I was very surprised at the way those elections
took place, and very, very wowed by the courage of the Iraqi
people to go to the polls.
And, finally, I too was surprised by the Syrian withdrawal
from Lebanon. And the power of the Lebanese people, again, to
go out into the street and demand some control over their
destiny, to me very, very powerful, and a reminder of the
forces at play at the region and how unpredictable they often
are.
Ms. Dugan. We are a little stymied by the question because
I think actually there have been a lot of things in the region
that have stunned us, because 5 years ago we couldn't have
really considered them.
Maybe the one thing that I will mention is this. For so
long the Middle East was the democratic exception, the only
place in the world where you just couldn't really have these
conversations. Clearly, that's not the case any longer. Now
what we find, though, is people in these countries as a result
of what happened in Iraq, presumably, saying, you know, if they
could have it there, why can't we have it, too? This has been--
I think this sort of vocalization of we want it, too, is
perhaps, you know, something that's clearly noteworthy.
Professor Armanios. Without being redundant, I would cite
both Egypt and the Lebanese case as the most surprising. But
overall--I guess I'm--having grown up in the region, I'm
surprised by a sense of optimism that exists there now that
perhaps had not existed earlier as a result of all of these
changes. I'm approaching it with cautiousness, but I'm sharing
the optimism as well, that reform will come soon.
Mr. Campbell. Can I cheat, because I have a surprise that
someone else told me the other day, which I thought was
interesting. And that is that the--his name is Mosin, and I'm
sorry I forget his second name. An Iranian student activist who
eventually became the architect of the repressive part of the
Iranian establishment that enforced certain types of behavior
on the street is now a fellow at the Washington Institute, as
everyone will know, what's regarded as a pro-Israel think-tank
here in Washington. And he is unapologetically there to talk
about the possibilities of democracy in Iran and the Middle
East. And an Iranian activist said yesterday: Why is this not
front-page news in the New York Times and Washington Post? This
is amazing.
So I will cheat and add someone else's surprise to that.
Mr. Shays. Any others? It's kind of fun to think about.
Isn't it?
This is not intended--this question is not intended to
justify our presence in Iraq or not. I mean, I voted to go
there and so on. But I have to believe that some of these
surprises are related to a presence in Iraq. Obviously, the
elections in Iraq itself. Obviously the--frankly, the timely
death of Arafat, frankly. And I want to know if you think these
things would have happened had there not been this stirring up.
I'm not saying--it happened now. Maybe they would have
happened, but it happened now.
Maybe I will put you on the spot a little, Mr. Saffuri. I
mean, not justifying our presence there. But has that been a
catalyst for some of these changes?
Mr. Saffuri. Probably in Egypt, yes. I'm not sure Lebanon.
I think the situation in Lebanon's been deteriorating for the
last few years. Lebanon also have a history of democracy. They
hold elections, they held elections during 29 years of Syrian
presence in Lebanon. I think the biggest factor in Lebanon was
really the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.
But I think Egypt probably is a factor. I think another is
Kuwait. That debate over women's right to vote and participate
in the democratic process in Kuwait, there has been lots of
resistance and the government was not willing to confront the
tribal section in Parliament or sector and Islamic parties. But
because of how they would be viewed by the United States, I
think that's how many of them backed down. And I believe in
that. I was in Kuwait 2 weeks ago during this debate.
Mr. Shays. I don't know what final status is though.
Mr. Saffuri. Yesterday the decision was made, there was
another vote taken that women will be allowed to participate in
elections.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Saffuri. So I think these are major changes, and I
think these are taking place because of the United States and
because of us being in Iraq.
Mr. Shays. I participated in the World Economic Forum, and
frankly, in Jordan, and it is one of the most engaging 3 days I
have had in the world community. And I see this unbelievable
desire on the part of individuals from so many different towns
in the Middle East, from wanting to interact and wanting to
reverse this report that basically points out that of the 21
Arab states, their gross domestic product is smaller than
Spain's, in spite of oil wealth. And it's a powerful feeling
that it is, you know, taking place in this forum, and yet there
is absolute--there is very strong anger with the arrogance of
the United States at the same time. And yet in a way I feel
like maybe it should have happened differently. And clearly we
shouldn't be so arrogant, but I feel it's happening in part
because of what we're seeing happen there.
What the thing that you would fear the most that the United
States could do to overplay its cards, to force a response that
would be contrary to what the United States would do? In other
words, if I asked someone in Iraq their biggest concern, they
would say that the United States will leave, after doing all
this, after getting us, you know, to a point where we're
willing to, you know, come out of the cave in a sense and step
forward and risk our lives. Now that's one fear that Iraqis
tell me. But what are other fears that you may have that the
United States could do that you think would be a mistake? If
you could tell the President of the United States or me or
someone else, what would you not want to see the United States
do?
Mr. Saffuri. My biggest fear is Iraq turning into a
theocratic democracy, and this is a truth here. And the end
part is run in the elections, run in the Kurdish umbrella or
the Shi'ite umbrella. And I think the majority of parliament
now is held by the Shi'ite groups, and my fear is that Iraq
will turn into Iran because you have religious and ethnic in
the civil war.
Mr. Shays. Why don't we take the question that you
answered, which isn't the question I asked; what is the biggest
fear that you have in the Middle East? Forget the United States
for a second. I should have asked it first. And you gave a very
important answer, what is the biggest fear that you have that
might occur in the Middle East that we need to be alert to? I'm
asking anyone.
Mr. Saffuri. I think a coup in Egypt or Saudi Arabia would
be my biggest fear. I think that would change the two countries
and would change the entire region.
Mr. Shays. Other comments?
Professor Armanios. I think my biggest fear that the change
that the United States is advocating from the ground will
appear to be coming only from the United States and not from
indigenous sources. It needs legitimacy. The kind of forces
we're advocating, it needs legitimacy, and my fear is not being
able to engage with wider groups in making significant change.
Mr. Campbell. I'm not sure if I fear that because in our
work in the Middle East, we have never seen or felt the demand
that we see now. In other words, there is no amount, it seems,
of time or staff or money that can satisfy the demand that
we're finding from indigenous reformers. I find that there
could be more, and they are committed and they are emboldened
and empowered by the rhetoric of President Bush and others.
Other countries are also stepping forward, Lebanon is becoming
very much a European project. Palestine is becoming more and
more a European project. So I feel optimistic about the region.
My fear here in the United States is that the constituency,
the policy constituency I think and the political constituency,
for the realist point of view, for the point of view that says
that we have to approach the rest of the world with our
interests in mind, and you know, Henry Kissinger had an op ed
piece in the newspaper yesterday articulating this very well.
The people that believe, that are still there, they're around,
they're still in the State Department, they're in academia.
Mr. Shays. They believe what, specifically?
Mr. Campbell. They believe that stability is--certainly
stability would be paramount and would take precedence over
democracy, because there is something inherently destabilizing
about democracy. They believe that the United States should
approach international relations with its own interests in
mind----
Mr. Shays. But the interesting thing is--excuse me for
interrupting, so keep your thought. If I attributed that policy
to any one government official, it would have been Henry
Kissinger. That's the irony.
Mr. Campbell. And he is articulating it again----
Mr. Shays. But promoting it?
Mr. Campbell. I think he is promoting the idea of stability
and----
Mr. Shays. Well, that would be consistent with his message.
Mr. Campbell. That is what he is promoting, but he is
simply voicing what others still feel--I can't put my fingers
on it, but in attending many, many meetings at the State
Department talking about Middle East democracy, there is still
a large reservoir of doubt and cynicism and skepticism. It is
out there. And a lot of people are laying in wait for this
whole experiment to fail, and it will become a self-fulfilling
prophesy.
And again, I have to preface these things because I don't
speak as a political supporter, in fact, I'm a stealth Canadian
from a left wing party in Canada. So if I had to express my
personal views, but in this business the United States has
unleashed, and I think tremendously positively unleashed,
something that existed below the surface. I don't think going
to war was the right idea, but there is no denying that it has
set in motion something unbelievably important. President
Bush's rhetoric gives voice to this, and it has energized the
demand. The fear is that there are many, many people laying in
wait. Europeans that are waiting for President Bush to fail,
there are some saying this is a cockamamie idea that is going
south, and it's going south in Iraq first.
So my fear is that people, through just kind of being half-
hearted, lay back and allow these things to fail. So I think my
final comment would be, that those of us who play a lesser role
need to redouble our efforts if we're serious about this, and
if we honestly believe that they deserve freedom as much as
anyone else, that has to be an absolute change in our thinking,
it cannot be reversed by the political ups and downs, or even
the ups and downs in Iraq. And I think a lot of people are
waiting for the political wings to change.
Mr. Shays. Any other comments? I'd just like to say I would
like to invite you all to my house for dinner, the only problem
is I wouldn't want to go to bed. You just make me want to ask
more questions. Your expertise is terrific, and you are giving
so much thought to these issues. It is really an enjoyable
opportunity to have with all of you. Thank you.
Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman.
I am relatively new here. And first of all, I'm very
impressed with your thoughtful analysis and presentation of a
very complex subject matter that is critically important to our
national security, but also to the security of our Nation and
all free nations throughout the world.
I'm a history teacher, and my focus of attention was Anglo
Irish history. But in the study of history and in the
presentation of it to students, you find that history lessons
inherent in history are timeless and universal, and they belong
to no one culture or no one people. And I was struck by not
only this panel, but the one that preceded it as well. And
we're talking about what is that tipping point, who are the
courageous leaders who sometimes are known, but today they may
be unknown. And I think of communist Poland in the earlier part
of the 20th century, and also the Islamic extremists within the
early part of the 21st century, when you look at both of those
tyrannical governments, what they seem to do is keep people
afraid, keep them isolated. They seek to own everything
physical and control everything intellectual.
And I am also struck, the recent passing of Pope John Paul
II, forget about religion for a moment, what he did for the
Polish people, he taught them to be unafraid, to challenge
their government. And when he went to Poland after becoming
Pope, he not only talked about God, he talked about history and
culture. And his warmth through millions of people into the
street, which he gave them, instilled in them the strength to
challenge the old way of government.
And I'm reminded of Machiavelli, who had said that the
reformer has enemies, and all those profit by the older order
and only lukewarm defenders who would profit by the new order.
And what he was saying was reform is very, very difficult. A
lot of people want it, but they don't quite know how to get
there. And the last panel, Mr. Al-Alusi, I think, demonstrated
the kind of emerging courageous leaders that will fundamentally
transform the direction of the Middle East to a more free and
democratic place. So thank you very much, it has been helpful
to me.
Mr. Shays. This is a comment only intended to say having
been to Iraq seven times, I would have been surprised if the
elections hadn't succeeded because I saw in Iraqis tremendous
pride, a lot of desire to succeed, and embarrassment in the way
that the United States had to come to rid them of Saddam, that
this is something they would have wanted to do on their own.
And absolute extraordinary astonishment and disappointment that
we basically wiped out their police, their army, their border
patrol, and started fresh because they had a lot of capable
people they felt, their brothers, their uncles and so on,
fathers who worked there.
So mistakes, I think, we made. But just an extraordinary--
when I meet with some of these Iraqi leaders, and I don't know
if you all have encountered this, but I feel like I'm meeting
with people who want to be the Jeffersons, the Madisons, the
Hamiltons. They feel like they have been given historic
opportunity. And obviously not every one, but there wasn't
everyone like that in our own beginnings. But they do realize
that they have this extraordinary opportunity. And Mr. Al-Alusi
is an example of one. I mean, I literally, when I met with him
in my office, said you can't go back to Iraq, you are not safe,
you are a target, your family is a target; I will do everything
I can to enable you to stay in the United States. And he looked
at me with some astonishment that I would say that and said,
no, I can't desert my party and desert my country, they need
me, or it needs me. It was just like this moment of saying
whoa, I'm seeing something extraordinary.
So I would like to just end by your all saying what you
think a question we should have asked that we didn't, something
you want on the record that you think needs to be on the
record, and just hear you close up this panel.
Maybe we could start with you, Ms. Dugan.
Ms. Dugan. Well, we had a bit of a curtain raiser within
the first panel, so I have been giving it some thought.
It really speaks to resources. And when I say resources, I
mean, quite distinctly, not just money. The fact of the matter
is that we are well funded. We will always be looking for more
money, but it really has to do with more, it has to do with all
the other tools that are available in our tool box, not only
from the perspective of an institute like IRI or NDI, but also
when it comes to kind of harnessing the energies of the U.S.
Government, of the U.S. Congress, of partners abroad, not only
at the government level, but also our counterparts at the NGO
level and identifying those voices on the ground and giving to
them as much oxygen as we possibly can provide.
And I just want to make sure that everyone has a chance to
reflect on that, because at the end of the day, that is what
will win the day. I thank you, sir.
Mr. Campbell. Again, referring to some of the questions
that were provided to us to help prepare our testimony, one of
the questions was how should the Bush doctrine be changed or
modified to encourage reform in countries. And what struck me
in thinking about that is it is very easy to think about the
experience in Iraq and some of the things that have happened
lately, Lebanon as we discussed and Saudi Arabia and so on, and
to assume that we should all be looking for dramatic changes.
It has struck me in my travels back and forth from Iraq and
watching Iraq that the experience of Iraq may, in the end, be
more instructive and more helpful in helping about the
countries that are called liberalized countries in the Middle
East, for example, Qatar and Yemen, countries that have gone a
certain distance, but who try to manage the process of
political change, who attempt to free up, to some extent, are
meant to control the rest. And my dealings in Iraq, as I
watched 300 parties emerge on the scene, hundreds of civil
society organizations and seen Iraqis celebrate the idea that
they could go out and cast a vote, it has struck me that Iraq
ultimately may cause the greatest change in those countries
that are trying to control this process of liberalization. And
it seems to me that the greatest challenge exists, and U.S.
policy changes challenges exist in pushing--continuing to push
in these liberalizing countries, in other words, not just
concentrating on the big breakthroughs, the Syrians and so on,
but to say you have gone this far, but you have to go further.
You are our friend, we respect you, we want to work with you,
but this is not yet democracy. So not stopping now and pushing
even with your friends. So I think that is a great challenge.
Professor Armanios. I think one of the challenges in front
of us today is the extent to which the United States is willing
to take risks in the region to promote democracy. Some of the
things that might happen are exactly what Mr. Saffuri was
implying, the rise of theocracies or the rise of governments
that do not necessarily adhere to our own interpretations of
democracy.
And I'm just curious to what extent the United States will
be willing to go that extra step to engage those groups that
frankly have been long disenfranchised and ignored by our
policies, but it might be time to really consider how they're
going to become included in the future.
Mr. Shays. I want to be clear, they being?
Professor Armanios. They being moderates on all sides,
those who call themselves moderate, Islamists, those who will
be willing to work in a pluralistic society without promoting
violence. Nonviolent groups----
Mr. Shays. You don't feel that they're being engaged by the
United States?
Professor Armanios. I don't feel that they're being engaged
enough. And ``engaged'' here is a problematic word. I don't
know how exactly we should go about engaging them, that is a
problematic question. I do feel that we should learn more about
them, we should find out more about them, who are they.
Mr. Shays. And this is more grassroots folks that you're
thinking of?
Professor Armanios. Yes, grassroots groups that have been
long repressed. I'm not suggesting that we talk to the Muslim
brotherhood in Egypt, but we should find out more about their
appeal, find out who their message appeals to and why, and talk
to those communities.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Saffuri. I think the U.S. Government is talking to the
brotherhood in many countries.
There is several points I would like to bring up. First,
the issue of Islam and democracy, they are compatible. I would
like to stress a point that Islam, the leader or the ruler does
not get his legitimacy without the sharia and the baya. When
the profit died, he did not appoint anyone, the elderlies, the
heads of the tribes had to meet, nominate during the sharia and
naya to get the baya. So to argue all the time that Islam is
not compatible with democracy is fault. As a matter of fact,
the leader is not legitimate as long as he does not go through
that process.
The other point is the media. The U.S. Government,
according to some reports, have spent over $1.7 billion to
spread democracy in the Middle East, and I think some of that
money has been well spent and there is lots of--has been put to
a great use, but one of the areas that has to be taken a look
at, and this is Congress, because Congress appropriated that
money, is the media project. I think the viewers show horrors
between 2 and 5 percent.
For the amount of money that is being spent, I think about
$170 billion a year, that is very little, they have to little
of another way of how to turn a horror into a real form that
people can watch something, not to compete with Jazeera, but
something similar to what Jazeera provides.
There is a real hunger in the Arab street for free dialog
and free debate. What Jazeera provided people in the Arab
street is something they never seen before, they saw it on CNN,
but they never saw it from their press. And for that reason
everyone watches Jazeera, regardless, they think some programs
are very civil programs, some programs are serious. And Jazeera
have been a cause of problem for the government of Qatar. And I
think several countries pulled their Ambassadors because of
Jazeera, many Arab countries. At one point four north African
countries pulled their Ambassadors.
The PLO closed their office one time also. And there was an
attack. So they must be doing something right, and I think we
teach the whole world, you know, with the influence of
Hollywood--Time magazine is everywhere you go. In the airport,
there is more Time magazine on the display than there is
economists.
So we have this tremendous influence that American media
plays on the whole world; on the other hand, we cannot pay any
influence as an American media in the Arab street. And this is
an area that really needs to be addressed.
Last point. I also have been thinking about this question,
and to my mind, the word that immediately came to mind was
courage. And I think first it was heartening to have such
courageous gentlemen to sit at the table, and it has been a
theme, the courage of those in the region pushing and voting
for reform.
I think that here in the United States we need to match
that courage with our own, both with respect to what my
colleagues suggest with regard to the need to engage Islamist--
moderate Islamists and others whom there is a bit of knee-jerk
response against. And also I think courage to push for
governments in the region who are our friends, who take some of
the difficult and necessary steps for opening that in the long
term will lead to a more stable free and prosperous Middle
East.
Mr. Shays. I want to thank each and every one of you. You
have been a wonderful panel. You have given us lots to think
about. And whether it was intended or not, you leave me with a
lot of hope, a lot of hope. And I appreciate the competence of
all five of you. It's nice to know that you're doing the work
you're doing. Thank you so much.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]