[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
MEDICAID PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: EXAMINING OPTIONS FOR PAYMENT REFORM
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON HEALTH
of the
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 22, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-25
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
__________
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------------------------------
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
JOE BARTON, Texas, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida Ranking Member
Vice Chairman HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
FRED UPTON, Michigan EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia BART GORDON, Tennessee
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois ANNA G. ESHOO, California
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico BART STUPAK, Michigan
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING, ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
Mississippi, Vice Chairman GENE GREEN, Texas
VITO FOSSELLA, New York TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
ROY BLUNT, Missouri DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
STEVE BUYER, Indiana LOIS CAPPS, California
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire TOM ALLEN, Maine
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania JIM DAVIS, Florida
MARY BONO, California JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
GREG WALDEN, Oregon HILDA L. SOLIS, California
LEE TERRY, Nebraska CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey JAY INSLEE, Washington
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho MIKE ROSS, Arkansas
SUE MYRICK, North Carolina
JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma
TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
Bud Albright, Staff Director
David Cavicke, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Health
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia, Chairman
RALPH M. HALL, Texas SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida Ranking Member
FRED UPTON, Michigan HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming BART GORDON, Tennessee
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona ANNA G. ESHOO, California
CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING, GENE GREEN, Texas
Mississippi TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
STEVE BUYER, Indiana DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania LOIS CAPPS, California
MARY BONO, California TOM ALLEN, Maine
MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey JIM DAVIS, Florida
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
SUE MYRICK, North Carolina JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas (Ex Officio)
JOE BARTON, Texas,
(Ex Officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Testimony of:
Calfee, John, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute 82
Fuller, Craig L., President and Chief Executive Officer,
National Association of Chain Drug Stores.................. 52
Gifford, Kathy D., Principal, Health Management Associates... 72
Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, Director, Congressional Budget Office.. 13
King, Kathy, Director, Health Care, U.S. Government
Accountability Office...................................... 63
Rodgers, Anthony D., Director, Arizona Health Care Cost
Containment System......................................... 47
Material submitted for the record by:
Association for Community Affiliated Plans, prepared
statement of............................................... 106
Fuller, Craig L., President and Chief Executive Officer,
National Association of Chain Drug Stores, response for the
record..................................................... 101
Holtz-Eakin, Douglas, Director, Congressional Budget Office,
response for the record.................................... 92
King, Kathy, Director, Health Care, U.S. Government
Accountability Office, response for the record............. 98
Pollack, Ronald F., Executive Director, Families USA,
prepared statement of...................................... 106
(iii)
MEDICAID PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: EXAMINING OPTIONS FOR PAYMENT REFORM
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, 2005
House of Representatives,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Health,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to other business, at 3:04
p.m., in room 2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon.
Nathan Deal (chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Deal, Bilirakis, Norwood,
Cubin, Shimkus, Shadegg, Buyer, Bono, Ferguson, Myrick,
Burgess, Brown, Waxman, Green, Capps, Allen, Baldwin, and
Dingell (ex officio).
Also present: Representative Wilson.
Staff present: Jeanne Haggerty, majority professional
staff; Chuck Clapton, chief health counsel; David Rosenfeld,
majority counsel; Brandon Clark, health policy coordinator;
Eugenia Edwards, legislative clerk; Bridgett Taylor, minority
professional staff; Amy Hall, minority professional staff; and
Jessica McNiece, minority research assistant.
Mr. Deal. This meeting will come to order. The Chair
recognizes himself for an opening statement.
I certainly want to welcome everyone to this hearing today
and our distinguished panel members. We have two panels that
you are going to hear from, and they will give various
perspectives on this issue of Medicaid prescription drugs and
various payment options--and certainly this is an issue that
everybody, I suppose, has their own point of view on--Medicaid:
a system that only a healthcare plan could love, one where
generic drugs definitely keep Medicaid costs artificially high.
Generic drugs--and lower costs, but under Medicaid's rules, the
system has been turned on its head.
According to a recent CBO report, the largest, single
factor contributing to the rapid increase in markups on
prescription drugs under Medicaid was the use of new or generic
drugs. What is truly outrageous is that these prices are rising
above--prices of prescription drugs based upon manufacturer
reporting average wholesale prices, or AWPs. As my former
colleague has noted several years ago, AWP, which also stands
for ``ain't what's paid.'' In many instances, AWP bears little
or no resemblance to what pharmacists really pay for drugs.
This is especially true for generic drugs.
In a recent report, CBO estimated the average markup
between what Medicaid pays the pharmacy for each prescription
and what the pharmacy or wholesaler actually pays for the drug
has dramatically increased. They estimated that between 1997
and 2002, an average markup on generic drugs increased by
nearly 79 percent per prescription. Generic drugs have a
critical role to play in containing soaring drug costs. My
concern, however, is that the cost of AWP, Medicaid is missing
out on a large portion of these cost savings. I want to
increase Medicaid's use of generic drugs but not at the expense
of rapidly increasing drug costs. Pharmacies gain substantial
Medicaid margins on many generic drugs, but the purpose of this
hearing is not to vilify pharmacists. Pharmacists believe that
the current overpayments for prescription drugs are necessary
to offset Medicaid dispensing fees, which they assert do not
cover the true cost of the services that they provide to
Medicaid beneficiaries.
I believe that any effort to reform Medicaid drug
reimbursement must reflect three basic principles:
transparency, accuracy, and fairness. Payments for drugs must
be transparent to the purchaser without hidden payments that
undermine competition. Payments must also accurately reflect
the costs pharmacists pay for the drugs. Finally, Medicaid
reimbursements for both drugs and dispensing fees should fairly
pay pharmacies for all of the costs of treating Medicaid
beneficiaries. Fairness is essential so that Medicaid
beneficiaries continue to get access to community pharmacy
services.
Both the Administration and the National Governors
Association have included changes to prescription drug pricing
in their Medicaid reform proposals. I hope that this is an
issue where we can find bipartisan consensus and work together
to solve the problem.
I want to thank all of the witnesses, both on this panel
and the one that will follow, for today's hearing for taking
time to attend the hearing. It is an important and worthy issue
of this committee's attention, and I hope the hearing will help
us in our efforts to reform the system that I believe is
obviously in need of change.
Mr. Brown, I recognize you for an opening statement.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Dr. Holtz-
Eakin, for joining us and other distinguished witnesses on the
other panel.
I appreciate your decision, Mr. Chairman, to focus on
pharmaceutical payment reform under Medicaid. I have actually
heard rumors that the intent is to focus solely on the
pharmacists--and from the chairman's opening statements on
generics--but I am sure that wouldn't be the case. CBO just
completed a study on drug rebates. I am sure neither side of
the aisle is going to ignore that analysis in a hearing
entitled ``Examining Options'', with an ``s'', ``for Payment
Reform.'' It would make no sense to focus on one small piece of
the cost puzzle and ignore the bigger ones.
And the Medicaid debates raise the most notorious cost
issue of all: drug prices. Prescription drug spending is the
fastest growing component of health care spending inside and
outside government programs. Tax dollars are a scarce
commodity. They should be used wisely. And drug companies
should be made to charge the government a fair price. That is
what the rebate program is all about; so while business dollars
also are a scarce commodity, they should be used wisely, too,
and drug companies should be made to charge businesses a fair
price. And American family dollars are scarce, too. Drug
companies should be made to charge every American a fair price.
While we do nothing, more and more Americans purchase their
medicines from Canada, because they can't afford medicines in
this country, and that is not good for our drug stores,
frankly.
The prescription drug industry issue isn't a Medicaid
issue. It is a health care issue affecting every individual and
business in our country. So the question is: Will taking action
to reduce drug prices in Medicaid stifle innovation? Will
taking steps to reduce drug prices outside Medicaid stifle
innovation?
There has been talk recently about weak profitability in
the drug industry, so we checked on that. According to the most
recent listing of 2005 profitability, drug makers earn nearly 4
times, 400 percent, the median for Fortune 500 industries, and
government analysts, including S&P industry watcher, Herman
Saphlis, think the outlook for the drug industry is bright. In
a recent interview, Mr. Saphlis highlighted the drug industry's
capacity for, get this, repatriating foreign earnings. How
could the drug industry have ample foreign earnings if the
price controls that they always talk about in foreign markets
are so draconian?
According to a recent study by Donald Light of Columbia
University in New York that is, in this country, price controls
in Canada, Britain, and other countries are not too low to
sustain a brisk pace of R&D. In fact, prices in these countries
are more than sufficient to cover operating and R&D costs and
to provide for healthy profits. That is why drug makers sell
their products in those countries. That is not to say price
controls can't have a dampening effect on R&D; it is to say
they don't need to have a dampening effect. With careful
effort, the U.S. can secure lower drug prices and spur
increased R&D. The drug companies can earn astronomical
profits, after all, on a single blockbuster product. Maybe they
will be prompted to reduce their emphasis on those blockbuster
drugs and further diversify R&D efforts.
Based on his testimony, Mr. Calfee, our witness from the
American Enterprise Institute, is not a big fan of price
controls. Clearly, he is an advocate of free market
competition. We all are. And he is right that price controls
distort free market competition. However, no one who
understands the concept would confuse the prescription drug
market for a competitive free market. In a free market, you
would have a large number of small producers, each of which
charges similar prices reflecting consumer demand. In a free
market, the government doesn't hinder competition by granting
patent extensions. Rather than a large number of small
producers, the drug market is characterized by a small number
of large producers, each of which has a patent monopoly
bestowed on them by the much-despised government over the
products that they make. As a result, drug makers have infinite
market power, not only to decide how much to charge for
medicine, but as a practical matter, frankly, in many cases,
who lives and who dies.
Indulging the fantasy that the drug market bears any
resemblance to the idealized college textbook free market is a
waste of time and money that the American people don't have. Of
course, we should require the drug industry to charge fair
prices. That can be our first step, but it shouldn't be our
only one. We ought to require the drug industry to charge fair
prices to every American. Medical innovation loses value with
every person who doesn't have access to it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentleman.
Ms. Wilson. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Deal. I recognize Ms. Wilson.
Ms. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would ask unanimous consent to participate and listen to
the witnesses and ask questions of witnesses.
Mr. Deal. Is there any objection? Hearing none, so ordered.
Mr. Bilirakis for an opening statement.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am pleased that you have called this hearing to examine
options for improving the way prescription drugs are paid for
in the Medicaid program. We are here today to examine possible
solutions to problems with Medicaid's system of reimbursement
for prescription drugs, which the Energy and Commerce
Committee's ONI Subcommittee reviewed extensively last
December.
For the past few years, this committee has been examining
the appropriateness of using the average wholesale price, or
AWP as we refer to it, payment methodology for reimbursement of
prescription drugs. We found it to be inaccurate and
inefficient to Medicare, which ultimately led to the inclusion
of provisions in the Medicare Prescription Drug Law, which are
expected to save $15 billion over the next 10 years. The ONI
Subcommittee's hearing last year was to determine whether the
Federal Government pays too much for prescription drugs under
the Medicaid program. The CBO subsequently reported that
Medicaid's reimbursement system has allowed a growing disparity
between what States pay for prescription drugs and what it
actually costs pharmacies to obtain them. These efforts have
shown definitively that Medicaid pays too much for prescription
drugs. These overpayments have resulted from a flawed payment
policy that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to determine
the actual cost that retailers pay to manufacturers to obtain
the drugs that they provide.
The current use of AWP, or the list price of a drug that
few purchasers actually pay to calculate these costs, falls far
short of the standard we should demand. It is clear to me that
the use of AWP-based reimbursement as a payment benchmark under
Medicaid is fatally flawed. The potential remedies for this
flawed payment policy are varied and certainly complex. What is
clear, however, is that States and the Federal Government
simply cannot continue to pay more than they should for
prescription drugs under Medicaid. Allowing this inefficient
practice to continue is costing Medicaid millions and millions
of dollars that otherwise could be used to help those who rely
on Medicaid to meet their basic health care needs.
So I am hopeful, Mr. Chairman, under your tutelage, that
this committee can craft a fair and efficient policy for the
reimbursement of prescription drugs under Medicaid, which must
be part of any comprehensive effort to modernize this valuable
program. I commend you for focusing our attention on this issue
and look forward to learning how today's witnesses believe we
can improve Medicaid's reimbursement of prescription drugs.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentleman.
Ranking Member Dingell, is recognized for an opening
statement.
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this
hearing. It is an important one. I believe that it is clear
that we can help both beneficiaries and taxpayers by making
sensible changes to the payment system for Medicaid
prescription drugs. Currently, drug companies are being
overpaid. Generic drugs are being underutilized. The taxpayers
and the beneficiaries of the program are being hurt. But as we
examine the various options for reforms, I caution my colleague
the changes that would have the effect of shifting more of the
cost burden to beneficiaries and providers could be dangerous
and counterproductive.
We will hear a good deal today about payments to
pharmacists. Improvements to their payments could down right
benefit both the pharmacies and save money for the government,
but the Medicaid policy is multifaceted, and there are many
other options for reforms to prescription drug policy that we
should not ignore. As we hear from the Congressional Budget
Office, the drug companies, too, have something to offer.
Medicaid has generally been doing a good job with getting
rebates from manufacturers. The Medicaid program accounts for
15 percent of U.S. spending on prescription drugs. With that
level of purchasing power, Medicaid shouldn't merely get a good
discount. They should get the best, and I will repeat that.
They should get the best.
As the Government Accountability Office will testify, there
is certainly also need for greater accountability, particularly
on the part of Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services, CMS,
and their administration of the rebate program. CMS has been
lax in issuing guidelines on how manufacturers should calculate
the rebates, so that the Inspector General, because of this
laxity, has been unable to conduct appropriate audits, and that
is a matter into which we should go today. This, too, could
save money for the States and the Federal Government, and it
would not harm the beneficiaries of the program.
We should also explore ways to increase the use of generic
medicines, an opportunity to save money for the program without
compromising beneficiary access to good care. Some States, such
as Arizona, have done an outstanding job of increasing the use
of generic drugs. This saves Medicaid and its programs
significant funds. Other States have not moved far along that
path. We must see to it that they begin that process.
But as we consider these changes, we must protect the
access to medicines for more than 50 million Americans who
depend on Medicaid for their care. Already one in four adult
Medicaid patients cannot afford to fill a needed prescription.
This burden falls disproportionately on the sick in Medicaid
where more than 40 percent of the patients with two or more
chronic conditions could not obtain needed medicines because of
the cost. In States that have implemented multiple cost
controls, such as prior authorization and preferred drug lists,
the danger of precluding access is even greater. Given that
Medicaid was designed to ensure access to medical care for the
poorest and sickest Americans, what we should be addressing now
is how to expand rather than to restrict access to needed
health care by those who are most vulnerable in our society.
Again I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing. I hope we will consider all of the options for
improving Medicaid prescription drug programs, not just the
narrow issue of payments to the pharmacists. At the same time,
we must keep in mind when a benefit is unaffordable for those
in need; it does nothing for us. Clearly, an unaffordable
benefit is no benefit at all. Payment reform should not mean
that those who need care under Medicaid cannot get it.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the recognition.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentleman.
Dr. Norwood is recognized for an opening statement.
Mr. Norwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You know, I would like to start out by saying and
recognizing the very good that has been done by prescription
medicines in this country in reducing health care costs,
prolonging life, and quality of life.
That said, the Medicaid program has experienced a rapid
increase in spending for prescription drugs. A combination of
factors is driving this growth, including increases in
beneficiaries' drug utilization and drug prices. Nearly half of
Medicaid drug costs are for low-income seniors who are dually
eligible for Medicare and Medicaid. That is important to note
as dual-eligibles are transferred to part D.
In recent years, most all States have worked to implement
pharmacy cost containment measures, but Congress has a
responsibility to make sure that every dollar under the program
goes to those citizens who deserve it and need it. We also have
an obligation to closely guard the taxpayers' dollar.
Unfortunately, the current reimbursement system doesn't
always match these goals. States are required and should
reasonably reimburse pharmacies, yet they lack access to actual
costs. Because of this, Medicaid reimbursement, based on
average wholesale price, does not match the price incurred by
retail pharmacies to purchase the very drugs.
So I think most can agree that AWP isn't where we need to
be. Although it was a government idea, it is still not where we
need to be. But where do we go? It is average sales price. Is
that it? Well, while ASP does not reflect the retail pharmacy's
acquisition cost, ASP is likely a better starting point for
estimating cost. But do we want to simply do better?
Ultimately, the benefit to States of ASP would depend on how
well CMS calculates and reports ASP prices. I don't feel that
should be overlooked. But ASP is an outdated price. It doesn't
take into account different classes of trade pricing and leaves
pharmacies at a loss when brand manufacturers raise their
prices. If ASP had been in effect this year for Medicaid when
many brand name increased its prices over 6 percent, pharmacies
would have been significantly affected. This is something to
note before we risk impacting pharmacies, especially in areas
where access is already an issue, especially since pharmacies
in rural areas often take a large amount of Medicaid
prescriptions.
I want to be clear that price competition is a very good
thing. Generic drugs have a critical role to play. My concern
is that under AWP or ASP retail pharmacies are not given
incentives to dispense generics. Pharmacies would still make
more money under an ASP-plus-six system for brands than they
would for generics. CMS should share with the States the price
data it collects to develop better estimates of acquisition
costs.
I am also interested to hear from our witnesses on how cost
savings can be found by addressing the disconnect between the
formula that is used to calculate the rebates and
reimbursements. I also think States can do a better job
managing rebate billings and collections. At the end of the
day, we simply can't go looking to the pharmacies to fix all of
our problems.
I will put the rest of it in the record, Mr. Chairman, but
say we should undertake this hearing with a goal of
comprehensive reform that works with Governors to reduce
Medicaid costs for prescription drugs through a multi-pronged
approach.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Waxman for an opening statement.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased the subcommittee is
holding this hearing today. Reform in the Medicaid payment
policies for prescription drugs is one of the legitimate areas
where we potentially can achieve program savings without
harming beneficiaries or undermining basic protections in this
program. In my view, however, the savings we achieve in this
area should be reinvested in Medicaid to help make necessary
changes in the program to better serve beneficiaries and to
help States meet the fiscal demands of the program.
Having said that, let me make just a few points that I hope
will guide us as we look into appropriate drug payment policy
reforms.
First, we need to be sensitive to the impact of the changes
we make of the access of beneficiaries to needed drugs. To the
extent we are overpaying for drugs, as in some cases we clearly
are, we need to fix that. But I am concerned that the proposal
included in the Administration budget does not accurately
reflect the acquisition costs for pharmacies, and could in some
cases result in a loss of access for recipients.
Second, we need to recognize that increased utilization of
generics is one of the most effective ways to reduce drug
expenditures. We must be sure that the reforms we undertake do
not have the unintended effect of undermining the use of
generics where they are available. Basing the payment to the
pharmacist on a percent of the cost of the drug raises some
serious concerns in this regard.
Third, we need to remember that most of our drug
expenditures are for brand name drugs that don't have generic
versions available. This is where the dollars are, and we
certainly should ask the brand name companies to contribute to
the savings we seek in this area. Increasing the rebate should
be the first option on the table, in my view.
Fourth, transparency in drug prices would provide
significant help to the States and hospitals and other members
of the so-called 340 B Coalition that use the Medicaid discount
system. If States had access to the best price information, for
example, I believe they would have in place systems that would
not result in the overpayments we see with systems based on the
average wholesale price, which we know is easily manipulated.
And finally, CMS needs to do a better job of administering
the best price and rebate system so that we are basing our
payments on accurate information. The study GAO did at my
request indicated lack of clarity on the policy and little real
monitoring by CMS, all of which resulted in inaccurate
information on which the payments were based. This situation
allows manipulation of prices by the companies. Further, it
fails to capture the effect of discounts that PBMs receive. We
need to change that. Whatever reforms we put into place will
only be as effective as the accuracy of the information on
which they are based.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentleman.
It appears we do have a series of at least two votes. If we
have other opening statements, though, we may try to get one or
two more in, if they are short. Anyone on the Majority side
wish to make an opening statement? Dr. Burgess, do you wish to
make an opening statement?
Mr. Burgess. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I----
Mr. Deal. You are recognized for that purpose.
Mr. Burgess. I was going to submit my opening statement for
the record, and I will still do that, but I just can't help
myself after listening to some of the comments that I have
heard here this morning.
In the year 2000, when I was away from thinking about
running for Congress, Congress passed a copyright extension for
Mickey Mouse for an additional 50 years. I presume that the
research and development costs on Mickey Mouse had been
recouped back in the 1930's, but for whatever reason, we have
extended it to well on into this century. Our patent protection
in this country for pharmaceuticals runs for 10 years. And we
can argue whether that is an appropriate time or not. Maybe it
needs to be a little bit longer, and maybe drug prices could
come down. But the fact remains that it is the regulation in
the pharmaceutical environment, in my opinion, that is the
cause for a great deal of the price inflation that we see in
our pharmaceuticals in this country. Remember Paul Irlich in
Germany at the turn of the century was trying to find the
silver bullet to cure syphilis. Alexander Fleming actually
found the silver bullet in what he thought was a spoiled Petri
dish. But it was the Pfizer Corporation that developed the
commercial production of penicillin that saved lives on the
battlefield in World War II with newborns in the nursery and
the Staphylococcus epidemics of the 1950's. And let us not
forget that those are uniquely American companies. Syntax
Corporation that discovered the precursor for estrogen in a
cactus out in west Texas made the commercial production of
estrogen in compounds available in this country.
Now Mr. Chairman, I have lived under a system of price
controls in my previous life, my whole professional career. It
is called medicine, and we lived under Medicaid and Medicare
price controls. I don't think Federal price controls are the
way for us to go, and I would urge this committee to not go
down that path. Differential pricing and lack of transparency
in pharmaceuticals have been a big problem in this country,
certainly in all of my professional career. That has been a
battle that I have fought. I was grateful 2 years ago or last
year, actually, when the Medicare Prescription Drug Act was
passed and we have the discount card that allowed for some
transparency in drug pricing in the Medicare system, which I
think allowed drug prices to come down. And I think we could
work a lot harder in that regard in bringing some transparency
and some common sense to the marketplace. But I don't think
Federal price controls, and I don't think punishing
pharmaceutical companies, are the correct ways to go about
that.
I will submit my formal statement for the record.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentleman.
I believe we will suspend on opening statements and come
back after the votes, but before we do so, Mr. Shadegg, who has
got a conflict and will not probably be here for the second
panel, I would recognize him at this time to introduce one of
our second panel members.
Mr. Shadegg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will include that
in my opening remarks.
I want to thank you for holding this hearing and continuing
the dialog on Medicaid reform. I also want to thank our witness
on this panel and our witnesses on the remaining panels. I
think this is an important discussion, and I applaud you for
proceeding in this direction.
I particularly want to thank Anthony Rodgers, who will
appear on the second panel. He is the Director of the Arizona
Health Care Cost Containment System, which is Arizona's
Medicaid program. As the ranking member of the full committee
already indicated, that program has been widely recognized
across the country as being a model for reform of the access
program. Mr. Rodgers is a veteran of the health care industry.
He has worked both for hospitals and health plans. He was the
general manager of State sponsored programs for Wellpoint
Health Networks and was also the CEO of one of California's
largest health plans, LA Healthcare Plan.
Today, he successfully directs Arizona's access program, as
I indicated, which provides coverage to more than 1 million
Arizonians and I think does it right. Indeed, it has had great
success in holding down the cost of prescription drugs within
the program, and it is some of the best. Arizona has been, I
believe, a pioneer in this area, for more than 20 years ago, we
embraced the waiver process to create a viable alternative to
traditional Medicaid. It is a managed care alternative. And
since that time, access has been nationally recognized for its
success in containing costs while providing beneficiaries
access to very high quality care.
I do want to thank the chairman for this opportunity and
mention that savings in the prescription drug program alone
have been outstanding. A 2003 study found that access had the
lowest pharmacy cost in the entire Medicaid program nationally.
Not only did the program as a whole cost less, but the per-
member-per-month cost was the lowest in the Nation.
Again, I welcome Mr. Rodgers to testify here and encourage
the committee to continue to look carefully at the access
model.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentleman.
The committee will stand in recess pending completion of
the votes on the floor.
[Brief recess.]
Mr. Deal. The committee will come back to order.
We will proceed with our opening statements as members
continue to come back in. And, well, Mr. Allen has come in. Mr.
Allen, I will recognize you for an opening statement.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this
hearing on examining options for controlling rising drug costs
in the Medicaid program. We need to examine a wide range of
options rather than place an undue burden on beneficiaries by
cutting benefits or raising cost sharing. There needs to be
sound evidence that any proposed solution will actually achieve
savings and will not further drive pharmacies from the Medicaid
program. It seems premature to recommend moving to average
sales price ``plus some factor.'' What would this factor be and
how would this be determined? States have been squeezing
pharmacy-dispensing fees in the last few years, so pharmacies
in some States, including Maine, are gravely concerned by the
impact this would have in their ability to serve their
customers. Fourteen pharmacies have closed in Maine since
September of 2003.
I believe that we must increase investment in evidence-
based research on prescription drugs. Last Congress, I
introduced a bipartisan bill, H.R. 2356, the Prescription Drug
Comparative Effectiveness Act. It authorized $50 million in
funding to NIH and $25 million in funding to the Agency for
Health Care Research and Quality. The bill directed these
agencies to examine existing research and, if necessary,
conduct new research, including head-to-head clinical trials in
order to develop balanced scientific evidence regarding the
comparative effectiveness, the cost effectiveness, and
comparative safety relative to other drugs and treatments for
the same disease or condition.
My bill would essentially provide a consumer reports for
prescription drugs, giving doctors and their patients valid,
evidence-based information on how drugs that treat a particular
condition compare to one another. Section 1013 of the Medicare
law makes initial investments in evidence-based research,
authorizing the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality to
conduct outcomes research on prescription drugs and other
treatments. This provision was not funded at the full $50
million level but rather at $15 million in fiscal year 2005 and
2006.
Facing rapidly rising drug expenditures in large budget
shortfalls, States have been examining various measures to
reign in drug spending, including utilizing evidence-based
reviews of the clinical effectiveness of drugs in the same
therapeutic class. In 2003, a group of States joined to form
the Drug Effectiveness Review Project, which funds systematic
reviews of drug classes. This information can be utilized to
help State pharmaceutical and therapeutics committees make
informed coverage decisions for their Medicaid preferred drug
list. The Drug Effectiveness Review Project, which now has 13
member States, has completed studies on 15 classes of drugs and
has 9 more currently scheduled for review. This approach would
yield, I believe, lower costs and higher quality for our
prescription drug services under Medicaid.
So I think we need to build on these State efforts in
determining comparative effectiveness research, and I certainly
look forward to hearing from our distinguished panels.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Ferguson is recognized for an opening statement.
Mr. Ferguson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing, which is one of a series of hearings the
committee has held on the problems associated with AWP. The
President's budget, and recently the National Governors
Association, stated what this committee has discussed in a
hearing last December, which studied a widely inappropriate
number to use as a reimbursement mechanism for Federal
programs. I think everyone here can agree on that.
I look forward to hearing from our panelists today to help
the committee craft a plan that will most accurately reflect
the costs involved in procuring and dispensing drugs to the
Medicaid population without overcharging the system, as AWP has
done. I want to stress, however, that it is imperative that we
choose real reforms that will slow the growth curve of this
program and not simply increase price controls or impose de
facto taxes on sectors of the Medicaid program that have become
the very small share of Medicaid spending in 2006.
I am encouraged that our committee will be looking into how
we can save taxpayers' money by updating how States pay for
prescription drugs. Currently, States are using AWP, which is
unfortunate, because that is costing our taxpayers a lot of
money in overpayments. We need to remember, however, that we
are not talking about how to increase existing burdens on
specific to Medicaid providers simply to raise money into a
broken program. As we found in every hearing that we have had
on this issue, Medicaid is broken, and we have to fix it. We
have to enact real reform. I am confident that what we will
ultimately develop is a fair mechanism to pay pharmacists
adequately so they can secure products to dispense to Medicaid
beneficiaries.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentleman.
Ms. Baldwin is recognized for an opening statement.
Ms. Baldwin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
witnesses who will be testifying before us shortly.
Almost everybody is feeling the effects of rising health
care costs, including the State Medicaid programs. Just
yesterday, the Center for Studying Health System Change
released a study that found that growth in medical costs far
outpace the gross of wages for the eighth straight year. In
fact, in 2004, the growth in medical costs was four times the
growth in wages. And the implications of these rising costs are
clear: more and more Americans will be unable to afford
insurance, more and more Americans will either join the ranks
of the 45 million who are uninsured, or join the ranks of those
50 million who rely on Medicaid, the safety net, for their
health care.
In 2003, gross Medicaid drug expenditures were close to $30
billion, and States received about $5.6 billion in rebates.
These are obviously significant amounts of money. If savings
can be gained through changes in the Medicaid Drug
Reimbursement System and we conclude that these changes do not
negatively affect beneficiaries, this is certainly an area that
we must explore. It seems abundantly clear to me that some of
the key ingredients prerequisite to reform include accurate
information and greatly increased transparency from all
transaction participants.
I look forward to today's discussion.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Buyer, do you have an opening statement?
Mr. Buyer. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for this
hearing.
This whole idea of how we calculate the average wholesale
price has always fascinated me and how that is really done and
how it also can easily be manipulated I think is of a strong
interest to me.
I also would like to say that I am very proud of the men
and women who work in the drug industry. I am proud of them,
because we have an enterprise whereby we recruit great talent
all over the world to come here to again press the bounds of
science, great discoveries that improve the quality of life are
people. The problem is that everybody then demands it, and the
social systems of the world think that they are ``entitled to
it.'' And they then really press us in what I would call real
trade issues and penalize our companies, parent companies of
America who also then become multi-national companies.
So I was a little concerned when I heard this slam when we,
in the last year, did this initiative to allow these companies
to repatriate those dollars back to America. I think that was a
pretty good thing. It was a great move. But now to somehow slam
that as if saying to these drug companies, ``Oh, I didn't think
you were making any profits overseas.'' That is one of the
shallowest things I have ever heard, because a multi-national
corporation, in order to do business in any country, they have
to create an entity to do business. So that is why they call it
multi-national.
So when you are a big company, if you want to do business
in another country, you create a what? Subsidiary. And then of
that subsidiary, whether you want to sell your product in that
country, you have got to create that entity. So you might be in
100 countries all over the world and you have got 100 entities
out there. And of those entities, whether it is by sale, you
might have warehousing. You might do manufacturing. You might
do some marketing. Everywhere you create an entity, you, then,
have a government. You have a taxing authority. And those
taxing authorities, they have an expectancy that they get an
allocation of a percentage of the profits based on the business
enterprise in the life cycle.
I am just dumbfounded that we have really smart people love
to just make some simple little attack. That is ridiculous.
So I am going to end where I finish. I am proud of the men
and women who work in the drug industry that benefit our
society and benefit the world, based on their discoveries. And
I am pleased that they were able to bring back a percentage of
those profits to America, so we can continue in our new
discoveries. Our challenge is as we look toward our own
``social systems'' that we have in our own quasi-free market
system of America and how we can make improvements.
I yield back.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentleman.
Ms. Myrick, do you have an opening statement?
Ms. Myrick. No, I will waive my statement, for questions.
Mr. Deal. Ms. Cubin, do you have an opening statement?
Ms. Cubin. I don't have an opening statement.
Mr. Deal. Mr. Bilirakis, I think we have already recognized
you for an opening statement. It was so long ago, I can't
remember.
Ms. Wilson, you are recognized for an opening statement.
Ms. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will waive and for
the questions.
Mr. Deal. All right. Dr. Holtz-Eakin, we appreciate your
patience. He told me, though, that if we were working on the
legislative branch appropriations bill, for us just to take
just as long as we needed on the floor, and he wasn't making
any complaints. So that is, in fact, what the rule was that we
just voted on.
We are, indeed, pleased to have you here. As most of the
members of this committee know, he is a frequent person to
testify, and we have always appreciated his candor. He is the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office, and I am pleased
to recognize you now for your testimony. Your written
testimony, of course, is a part of the record.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS HOLTZ-EAKIN, DIRECTOR, CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Brown, and
members of the committee.
The CBO is very pleased to be here today to testify on this
important topic. We have submitted for the record two reports
that we have done recently on payments for prescription drugs
in Federal programs in general, Medicaid in particular. And I
thought I would devote my time at the outset to an overview of
the payment system and the places where those reports address
payments and the findings of those reports. And to do so, I
thought I would walk through this diagram that we have got on
the screen and which I hope is in front of you for easy
viewing. And the basic notion is to review the kinds of payment
flows that are in the Medicaid system.
[Slide.]
So the blue arrows are the easy ones. They are the traffic
that takes prescription drugs from the drug manufacturer
through a wholesale and pharmacy chain and to a Medicare
beneficiary. That is the delivery of the healthcare itself. The
remainder of the discussion is about the smaller green arrows,
which is the set of transactions, financial transactions that
support the delivery of the pharmaceuticals. And there is one
small caveat that I will offer at the outset, which is that
this is a stylized depiction of many different State systems,
and it will fit no individual State exactly. For details on
individual States, we would be happy to work with you. This is
a broad overview.
In terms of the financial payments, a small footnote from
the point of view of where testimony today is the fact that
beneficiaries may be responsible for a minor co-payment and the
pharmacy might collect that from that. I will leave that to the
side and instead focus on the triangle of payments that
connects the program pharmacies and the drug manufacturer.
Now in the conduct of this business, pharmacies and
wholesalers negotiate with drug manufacturers for the price at
which they will acquire the drugs to deliver to beneficiaries.
And those market-based prices are the foundation of the
business transaction by which they acquire these drugs.
In turn, they get a tiny bit of money from the co-payment,
as I mentioned, and a reimbursement from the Medicaid program
itself to cover the cost of acquiring these drugs for
beneficiaries.
The formula differs by State, but really has two
components. One component is a dispensing fee, usually a fixed
amount of $3 to $5 meant to cover the cost of storage and
consultation and dispensing. And the remainder is an attempt to
compensate, through some proxy, for typical market price at
which the pharmacy might acquire those drugs. As has been
widely noted in the opening statements, the proxy is currently
the AWP, the average wholesale price, and that is a list price,
a sticker price that does not correspond to any particular
transaction. And in recognition of the fact that it is higher
than typical market transactions, a typical reimbursement will
be 15 or 20 percent, say, below the AWP. Those monies are sent
from the Medicaid program to the pharmacy in compensation for
acquisition of the drugs. That is one part of this chain.
The second part is the negotiation with the drug
manufacturer. And then the third part is the fact that everyone
in this system recognizes that on the whole, these transactions
are above yet what it really costs the entire system to deliver
these drugs. And so there is a requirement that manufacturers,
in order to have the drugs considered, provide rebates to the
Medicaid program as a whole. And that is the third part of the
triangle, payments from drug manufacturers back to the Medicaid
program.
Now as with all of the considerations today, there are
differences between those drugs which are brand name drugs and
those drugs which are generics. In the payment from Medicaid
programs to pharmacies, the list price for brand name drugs
tracks pretty well on a closed basis to the kinds of things
that might on in the market, whereas the list prices, the AWPs
for generics, does not. And in recognition of this, there have
been a series of payment limits put on, the FULs at the Federal
level, or a maximum price that will be compensated by the
States. Again, in the rebates from drug manufacturers back to
the program as a whole, there will be a distinction between
rebates on brand name drugs, which average about 30 percent,
and rebates on generics, which average about 11 percent.
That set of transactions is the heart of the CBO report,
and the second two slides summarize the two key findings that
we have. The first is to compare payments that go out from the
Medicaid program to the pharmacies with payments that actually
come into the drug manufacturer. The payment coming into the
drug manufacturer is what I will call the acquisition price.
The payment going out would be the total payment to pharmacies.
And everything in between is, by definition, called the markup.
This covers all parts of the distribution chain, including
wholesalers, where appropriate.
[Slide.]
So if we go to the second slide, you can see that in 2002,
an overall average for all drugs in the system, Medicaid paid
$60, almost $61, per prescription. That can be broken into
these two pieces. Money is actually flowing into the
manufacturer, $47, and monies which are to cover markups by
pharmacies, about $14.
Now there is a big difference that you can see between the
generic drugs and the brand name patented drugs. Brand name
drugs are much more expensive on the whole, $97 on average; new
generics, those which have just been introduced, $46; older
ones, about $14. And there is a big difference in the pieces of
those overall prices as well. For the brand name drugs, the
acquisition costs, payment to manufacturers, the bulk of the
cost, the markup, a much smaller percentage. In contrast, for
new generics, the acquisition cost is relatively low, and the
markup is $32, a much higher piece of the overall price.
Now one of the things to note in this in thinking about the
incentives involved is that because of this high markup, there
is a clear incentive to, where possible, steer beneficiaries to
a new generic drug. And from the point of view of the system as
a whole, this may be desirable because the total cost is much
lower. And those incentives should be an important part of the
thinking in any reforms that the committee might want to
consider.
[Slide.]
And then I will close with the final slide, which shows the
second piece of the CBO analysis, which is after consideration
of rebates, how much does the manufacturer actually reap from
delivering prescription drugs to different types of Federal
buyers. Here, you can see a diversity of bottom line results,
which are detailed in our report. I will highlight just one
item that is of interest when thinking about reforms and that
is, for example, the fact that while the Medicaid net
manufacturer price is a bit higher than the VA average price,
this is reflective of the ability of an entity like the VA to
control its formulary to deliver not just to beneficiaries but
also doctors in training and provide a variety of incentives
for manufacturers to give them a better deal. Thinking about
those private sector incentives in reforming the Medicaid
system as a whole is also an important part of the debate.
There is a lot of material in the reports. That was a
pretty high-speed overview. We are happy to be here today. I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin follows:]
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Mr. Deal. Thank you, Doctor, and I will begin the
questions.
As I understand it, according to your report and other
reports, Medicaid pays the pharmacies based on the average
wholesale price----
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Yes.
Mr. Deal. [continuing] but the rebates are calculated on
the average manufacturers price.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Yes.
Mr. Deal. Obviously when we use different scales to judge
things, it gets more complicated for everybody to understand.
Is there any advantage, if any, for going to using one price to
calculate both the rebates and the payment to pharmacists? And
what are the pros and cons of that?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. If one thinks about the AWP, the intent,
one can broadly say, would be to have some sort of price index,
AWP or AMP or some of the other of the alphabet soup that is
out there. And it is meant to indicate the typical price of a
market transaction that Medicaid can then use as a proxy for
reimbursement. In moving to some other index, instead of AWP,
which is convenient, because it is a list price and out there,
easily accessible, there are probably three different things to
consider.
The first is the degree to which it is readily available.
One of the advantages of AWP is it is always available. It is
updated by the manufacturers. It is available in a timely
fashion. So would the proxy be available in a regular fashion?
The second is the degree to which that would be the correct
comparison group for whomever you are trying to reimburse. Who
are the correct comparisons for pharmacies, for example? Is it
the VA? Is it hospitals? Or is it closer to the kinds of retail
pharmacy transactions that you see in the private market?
And then the third would be the impact that going to a new
index would have on private sector bargaining. If you went to a
different index and manufacturers new that that was going to
affect reimbursements, it might change the way they cut the
deal with their other customers.
So those three things will come up regardless of whether
you go to AMP or an average sales price or whatever it may be.
Mr. Deal. The testimony that we heard from the National
Governors Association last week reiterated something that I
think many committee members have said, both publicly and
privately, and that is that we do not want to make changes that
are going to adversely affect the pharmacists, because many of
those really are the point of contact for health consultations
within small rural communities, in particular.
The current structure, which as you outlined, I think, on
your second chart, indicates that the markup for newer brand
name generics is the highest category of markup, which, I
presume the pharmacist gets to keep that markup. Is that right?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. The pharmacist and whoever else might be
in that chain. The wholesalers get some.
Mr. Deal. Okay. But it would still be more profitable in
this scenario for a pharmacist to be able to fill a
prescription with a new generic. Is that right?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Yes.
Mr. Deal. Is that an appropriate incentive, in your
opinion?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. It is clear that if you look at the total
cost of the system, the new generic is a cheaper total cost to
the system than is a brand name drug. If they are
therapeutically equivalent, that would seem to be the kind of
incentives you want to embed in the system. Whether it has to
be that big, I think, is the question of the hour.
Mr. Deal. Right. Okay. In your December-of-last-year
report, you highlighted that some of the largest markups happen
in the new single source generics, and that is one of the areas
that you focused on. Could you go through how the average
markups on each of these various levels are arrived at? And how
does this discrepancy happen in those variations?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Well, the computations are the same in
each case. You will take the list price, the AWP, and take 15
or 20 percent of it, and that will be the appropriate
reimbursement. The real action is in the degree to which the
actual transaction between a pharmacist and a manufacturer
differs greatly below that list price. And there is a far
greater aggressive negotiation on the part of the new generic
entry, the single source generic drug, where their list price
might be up here, they are willing to discount to get it into
the market, and that provides a clear incentive for adoption by
the pharmacists. And as a result, you get this disparity
between those single source generics and then, say, older ones
that are in the table where you don't see a big discount from
the list.
Mr. Deal. But even in spite of that, as your chart
indicates, there is still significant savings to the system to
go that route?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Yes. Yes.
Mr. Deal. All right. Well, thank you.
Mr. Brown, you are recognized for questions.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is my understanding, Dr. Holtz-Eakin, that it is unclear
whether authorized generics are included with generic drugs or
brand name drugs in the data base you use for the markup study.
For those unfamiliar with the term, authorized generics refer
to brand name drugs repackaged by their manufacturer as a
generic and priced just below, in a shadow sort of way, the
brand price. It is a way for brand companies to undermine the
incentive for true generic competitors into the market. So if
you include them with the brand names, it skews it down, if you
will, the average price. If you put them with generics, it
skews up the average generic price so that, either way, the
drug industry wins. Am I correct about that?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I, to be honest, don't know how we class
that, but certainly to the extent this is an issue, and we will
get back to you with a clear answer about how the computations
were done for our study, one thing that we will do is check the
sensitivity of the results to classifying them one way or
another. It is a very straightforward thing to check. And the
second is to just provide the overall caveat that is true in
this area, which is our results are for particular years and
for the rules that were in place in those years. And results
are going to differ as new drugs----
Mr. Brown. But could one----
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. We can check on that in detail.
Mr. Brown. Okay. Because I mean it is hard for me to think
it doesn't skew the results depending on which one you
classified it with. It is just mathematics, and it would skew
the results.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Oh, it will matter, there is no question,
but the matter of magnitude, I don't know.
Mr. Brown. Okay. Let me shift to something else.
Many individuals don't realize there are two distinct areas
in Medicaid drug payments for Congress to achieve savings. The
first deals with the payments by States to pharmacists, which
we will discuss at some length. The second deals with the
rebates or mandatory discount given to States by drug
manufacturers, as we have discussed, because they are such
large purchasers of drugs. I would like you to tell me how much
money could be saved increasing the rebate paid from the
statutory 15.1 to say 20 percent. And I ask that, and before
you answer, and that will be my last question, it is pretty
clear from what we have seen with the profitability of the drug
industry, as I pointed out in my opening statement, the 400
percent profit is larger than other companies in other
industries, and the fact that, as Mr. Buyer so politely pointed
out, that drug companies are repatriating profits, profits that
they always seem to disclaim because they say that those price
controlled prices in Europe and around the world, they can't
make any money from that. So tell me, one, what you think of
moving it from 15.1 to 20 percent, if you are willing to do
that, but maybe more importantly, tell me what kind of money it
would save by increasing the rebate.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Well, the basic rebate being moved from 15
to 20 percent would save about $600 million in 2006 and a bit
over $3 billion over the 5-year budget window. So those are the
magnitudes of the monies involved. The rebate structure has two
pieces: the basic rebate and then an additional rebate for
those drug prices that rise more rapidly than inflation. And I
think it is best to think about the sort of desirability of
modifying the rebate structure and thinking about all of the
pieces and not just one in isolation. Those are the monies that
would be involved in any proposal that you might go in that
direction.
Mr. Brown. Can the drug industry continue its research and
development, and can you comment on that?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I----
Mr. Brown. Would this mean less research and development
for the drug industry?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. One of the central questions in this area
for the past several years has been the tradeoff between the
sort of any year reduction in prices, given the production
costs are actually a small fraction of things, and then the
incentives over time for the development of new chemical
entities, new drugs that will be beneficial. And this is
something about which we have been deeply interested in, and
which we are actually working on at this time. I won't prejudge
the outcome of our looking at that, but we are working on the
links between retail pricing and R&D, and it is something that
we will continue to work with years after.
Mr. Brown. Do they spend more on marketing or do they spend
more on research?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I don't know the exact numbers off the top
of my head, but it is, again, something that as we finish, I
would be happy to----
Mr. Brown. I am not looking for exact numbers. I just said
do they spend more on marketing or on research? It is hard to
think the CBO doesn't know the answer to that question.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Well, the question is which data source
you go to, sir. And----
Mr. Brown. Do you think accurate data, data not coming from
the drug industry, might be a start?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Why don't we get back to you?
Mr. Brown. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Deal. Mr. Bilirakis is recognized for questions.
Mr. Bilirakis. Doctor, again, our apologies for making you
wait so long, as we usually do at these hearings while you have
to listen to our rhetoric up here.
We have AWP. We have AMP. We have ASP. We have rebates. We
have markups. We have measuring of markups. I could just go on
and on and on here. All of these years, we have never been able
to simplify this process or get a handle on it. So I would have
maybe one question to you in three or four parts.
States, as I understand it, can currently negotiate
pharmacy reimbursement rates. So one question is why does
Medicaid continue, then, to overpay for drugs if the States
already have the ability to negotiate lower prices? Continuing
on, can't we make this process more simple? We are going to
hear from the next panel how Arizona relies on health plans to
negotiate drug prices for Medicaid beneficiaries, and they
reportedly get some of the lowest prices in the market. So I
guess could we have more States follow the Arizona model and
have health plans handle these negotiations? And I guess does
having the government handle these negotiations just
unnecessarily complicate the process?
So if you are able to kind of get a handle on all of those
questions, I am talking about simplicity here. We have got more
darn acronyms up here than you could shake a stick at and
complications in trying to solve AWP and all of that stuff. But
is it really truly necessary in order to be able to get the
best price for the drugs?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Well, first of all, I want to share my
sympathy with all of the acronyms. I am new to this area, and I
found it absolutely frightening.
I think that it is useful to think about it in really three
steps. Step No. 1 is do the private entities, and in my simple
diagram, pharmacies versus drug manufacturers, do the private
entities have sufficient incentives and abilities to negotiate
hard for low prices? And that is a question about whether you
are happy with the power of the pharmacies and the wholesalers
relative to the drug companies in cutting a good deal. And if
those incentives and tools are in place, that should be
sufficient in a market economy. If not, then you might want to
bring the government in with extra leverage.
Second, can you see those transactions? Are they
transparent, reported to CMS, or even reported publicly? And if
so, how will that influence the level of negotiation and the
satisfaction of the people of the price that is received? And
then given the ability to see them, it is very easy to
reimburse.
And so there are really three different steps there. No. 1
is power from the negotiation. Step two, who gets to see the
negotiation? And then step three, having been able to see it
directly or have to approximate it, the problem with the AWP is
it is a bad approximation to the market deal, how do you do the
reimbursement? With the wide diversity of experience in the
States, I think that is a great laboratory to really look and
see where it seems to be the most successful. And the Arizona
model is one that certainly stands out. It doesn't look like
most of the other Medicaid programs, and accounting for all of
the differences, the heavy reliance on managed care, for
example, is something that we would be interested in working
with you on.
Mr. Bilirakis. Well, why aren't the States taking a good
look at the Arizona model, or are they? And what do you think,
is coming down the pike? Florida, for instance, my Governor is
concerned about this problem. Is he familiar with it, do you
know? I suppose I should ask him.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I don't know.
Mr. Bilirakis. And is he trying to put that into effect in
Florida or take a look at it, or maybe some sort of a pilot
project? You don't know the answers, though?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I don't know the answer to that one.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay. Is it right, on newer generic drugs,
that there be approximately a 70 percent markup?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. It is a clear outcome of the reimbursement
formula and the incentives of the manufacturers and the
pharmacists. There is no way around it.
Mr. Bilirakis. And the States can't do a better job in
negotiating the----
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Change the reimbursement formula and, as a
result, alter the scale of that markup, but given the nature of
reimbursement based on AWP, incentives for entry into the
market by new generics----
Mr. Bilirakis. Well, why are we fooling around? I mean, my
time is up, but again, here we go. AWP and ASP. You know, we
have got a free market in this country. We take pride in it,
and yet we are not really letting it work, I don't think.
Okay. My time is up. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
Doctor.
Mr. Deal. Thank you.
Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. Thank you, Doctor, for being here.
I wanted to ask you a couple questions, but to start with
an issue related to the dual-eligibles, those people who
qualify for both Medicare and Medicaid. The Medicare
Modernization Act includes a provision by which the States must
pay back to the Federal Government a portion of the savings
that they receive from the transition of low-income Medicare
beneficiaries, who get their prescription drugs from Medicaid,
over to the Medicare drug benefit. Under that law, the base
year for determining the payments is 2003. And my State, among
others, has taken significant steps to save prescription drug
costs under Medicaid in the interim. In Maine, what we have
done is we have used prior authorization and we have used prior
authorization requirements, so essentially what would happen,
those States like Maine would not get credit for those savings,
and we would be overpaying the Federal Government for the so-
called savings that we would have. And I wonder if the CBO has
examined this issue and whether or not, if you have given any
thought to the cost implications if Congress were to move the
base year from 2003 to 2004?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. We have looked at this a little bit. The
key issue is the way it is calculated starts with a spending
per beneficiary, and then you find out how many beneficiaries
and what fraction the State pays, and then there is a
percentage of phaseout. So the starting point is the key,
spending per beneficiary. And if one were to move the base year
from 2003 to 2004 for that number, it would actually not make
it easier for the States. In fact, it would go the other
direction. But it will differ by State. And so I don't know the
particular experience with Maine, but for the system as a
whole, that wouldn't be the case.
Mr. Allen. Well, obviously my constituents care a lot about
what happens to Maine. I raise it as an issue, a real
challenge, I think.
And one other quick issue I just want to mention, and I
don't expect you to deal with this, but I am very concerned
about the transition under the new Medicare law of the dual-
eligibles. In 6 weeks, starting January 1, 2006, we are
expected to move 6 million Americans, who now get their
prescription drugs through Medicaid, to Medicare plans, which
they don't know about yet, we don't know about yet, we don't
know if their drugs are going to be covered. I would just
suggest that that is an area both Jay Rockefeller and I have
legislation to deal with it, but it is a very serious potential
problem.
But let me come back to one more point. The CBO report on
Medicaid reimbursements to pharmacies, as you have indicated,
indicates this dramatic difference, and maybe it would be
worthwhile putting up your second chart again, if we could have
that. The pharmacies' profit margin has been increasing
significantly, as you pointed out, on newer generic drugs. And
in response to Mr. Bilirakis' question, you referred to
incentives of the manufacturers. And I wanted to have you
elaborate, if you could, a little bit on the incentives of the
manufacturers. I mean, my information is that the inflation of
the list price to the pharmacies is driven, in part, by the
manufacturers' desire to expand their market share. And they
know the pharmacies will make more if they keep their list
prices higher. Could you confirm that, deny it, comment on it?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I think you have characterized the
calculation and the incentive very clearly. I mean, there is a
computation that delivers what we have labeled the markup to a
pharmacy. That computation is between what you actually sell it
and what the list price is. So the manufacturer who wishes to
have lots of beneficiaries use their drug has a clear incentive
to make that gap as large as possible to give the pharmacists
an incentive to use that generic drug. And that is an outcome
of basic economic incentives and the way the reimbursements are
structured.
Mr. Allen. I mention it because on this chart, which is on
the screen, it shows the markup for newer generic drugs to be
$32.10 and the markup for older generics to be $9.90. And you
know, when we think there is a markup, when we talk about a
markup, generally, we would think it is the pharmacists who are
doing the markup, but in this case, there is a profound and
strong incentive for the manufacturer to have a higher list
price for the reason you indicated.
I see my time has run out. I thank you and yield back.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentleman.
Ms. Cubin.
Ms. Cubin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The more I listen to this, the more ridiculous this system
sounds, and I think it probably is. If we can't do better than
this, then we all need to have our heads examined. This is just
one of the worst examples of government gone awry that I think
I have ever seen.
Now I want to ask you a question, Doctor. In theory, the
AWP is the price that the drug manufacturers suggest that the
wholesalers charge retail pharmacists, right?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Yes.
Ms. Cubin. But you testified that that varies greatly. Has
the CBO uncovered any information as to AWP variance related to
the socioeconomic makeup of a region? In other words, is there
any regional connection between what that price might be?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I am unaware of anything like that. We
haven't looked for that, specifically. These are national list
prices.
Ms. Cubin. Okay. I am interested in understanding further
the relationship between pharmacy reimbursement rates and
Medicaid beneficiaries' access to pharmacies, particularly in
rural areas, because rural areas have the least opportunity to
have a choice in where they go to get their drugs and so on.
Can you please discuss what the implications would be on
beneficiary access by moving to a pharmacy reimbursement
payment based on ASP?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I think it will depend exactly what is
meant by ASP. ASP, at the moment, exists only under Medicare
part B, and whether that particular calculation is the one that
you would want to use for reimbursement of pharmacies when it
is really not completely comparable to the kinds of
transactions that the pharmacies are going to make under
Medicaid. So you might want to have a different measure of
sales, a different set of retail sales put into that index. And
so that would be, probably, the first thing that would be
important. And the second of the issues that I mentioned
earlier----
Ms. Cubin. The three issues, yeah.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. [continuing] how quickly will this be
available? Can you do this? And how will the use of these
transaction prices change the kinds of transactions that are
actually done and reported?
Ms. Cubin. Yes. It just seems to me that doing something
simpler could outweigh those three things, because I just think
this is so unnecessarily complicated. And maybe when I
understand the issue better I won't feel that way about it.
You have discussed a number of potential methods for
cutting Medicaid prescription drug costs, each of which
essentially put the onus of cost savings on pharmacies or drug
manufacturers. I would like to hear your thoughts on the matter
of increased co-payment system. Has CBO studied the feasibility
of a sliding scale system based on somebody's means?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. We have looked, not just in this area, at
the issue of cost sharing with beneficiaries in the health
programs, and you run into the fact that additional cost
sharing provides incentives for not undertaking unnecessary
care, or in this case, purchases, looking for the lower cost
source of necessary care. And the flip side of that is the
concern that people will skip care which is desirable and
necessary, and as a result, has bad either financial or worse
health consequences. And we are trying to investigate, in all
areas of our work, what we can learn about those tradeoffs. And
I don't think there is anything definitive we have to offer at
this moment, but it is a very important issue.
Ms. Cubin. And I appreciate your observations. I just think
it has to be weighed with the fact that people have to be
responsible for their own health and that they have to play a
responsible part in what they do and how they spend their
money.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you so much.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentlelady.
Ms. Baldwin, questions.
Ms. Baldwin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Holtz-Eakin, I am looking at the table on page four and
five of your report, the June 2005 report, on the prices for
brand name drugs under selected Federal programs. This chart is
very informative, and one thing I would note is that we do not
yet have a box on that chart for the prices paid by Medicare.
As we all know, Medicare will begin its prescription drug
benefit in 6 months. And I am wondering whether the
Congressional Budget Office plans to update this chart to
reflect the discounts off average wholesale price received by
Medicare.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. We will certainly work with the Congress
and provide them anything that is requested. We don't have a
specific plan to do that at the moment, and we did feel it was
appropriate to leave that issue out of this report. Given the
transition at the moment, it would be impossible to do a fair
job on that. But that is something we would be happy to
continue to work with this committee on, if it becomes
important.
Ms. Baldwin. I think it is going to be vital for Congress
to understand where Medicare will fall in the spectrum of
Federal programs that purchase drugs. I am wondering what sort
of information the Congressional Budget Office will need in
order to provide such an analysis. And as a follow-up, you can
tackle both at the same time, whether you are sufficiently able
to get that information from CMS, or whether you require any
legislative change to derive the information that you will need
to inform us in this regard.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. We were able to do the report that we have
with the cooperation of CMS, and we thank them for that. And to
the best of my understanding, CMS will require drug plans under
the Medicare program to make public the prices they negotiate.
And that will be an important element in being able to analyze
it. There are some details about the delivery of that
information that may not make it possible to do it in a way
that is exactly comparable to this, but we will work with CMS
and see if we can't get the information necessary to do that.
But I think, from what we know right now, there is every
indication that the data will be public. It may not be
calculated in exactly the same, and we will work with them.
Ms. Baldwin. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentlelady.
Ms. Myrick.
Ms. Myrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am new to the committee, so I am digesting all of this,
and I actually agree with Barbara that it sure is convoluted
the way all of this is put together. So I hope this process
will help to simplify some of that.
But I do have a question I wanted to ask you, because I
keep hearing from people who come into my office and talk to me
about people who are involved in Medicaid one way or the other.
And they say that moving to an ASP system would really come at
the expense of the retail pharmacists. And I wanted to ask you,
and again it follows a little bit on what she was talking
about, but is ASP plus 6 percent really unfair to retail
pharmacists?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Let us talk about the ASP and the plus 6
separately.
Ms. Myrick. Okay.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. The ASP, as it is currently configured,
the concern is that those folks who are using the ASP in the
Medicare program, have a greater ability to negotiate with the
manufacturers and get lower prices than would retail pharmacies
who have to provide a wide array of drugs. They can't limit the
formulary. They have to provide the drugs that beneficiaries
are prescribed when they walk in.
Ms. Myrick. Okay.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. And so there may be a differential ability
to negotiate. So that is sort of piece one on whether the ASP
is a good comparison as it is currently configured. The plus 6
changes incentives, as well, because there 6 percent of a brand
name drug could be a potentially large number, if you look at
our charts, whereas 6 percent of a generic drug would be much
smaller. And incentives will come into play, and the question
would be is it desirable to shift incentives in that way and
move people toward brand name drugs, which might be more
expensive from the system, as a whole.
Ms. Myrick. Right. The other thing is, and again, I am just
trying to understand this, the difference between a pharmacy's
ability to negotiate prices for drugs from manufacturers
compared to physicians and hospitals, et cetera, can you just
briefly----
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. You can think of the mechanics of these
negotiations. You go to the manufacturer and say, ``Look, if
you give me a good deal, all of my guys are going to use your
drug and your drug only, and I have got lots.''
Ms. Myrick. Like 600 people or whatever.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. And so it is an ideal chance for a good
deal. Lots of quantity and ``exclusive'' use of that
manufacturer's drug. If you have got an obligation to provide
whatever drug is on the prescription when someone walks in the
door, you can't make that same promise. You may not be in the
same position when the bargaining takes place, and it will be a
different outcome as a result.
Ms. Myrick. Thank you.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentlelady.
Ms. Capps.
Ms. Capps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for your
testimony, Dr. Holtz-Eakin.
The topic I wish to discuss is one that is proposed by the
President, which is to move from a system where States pay
pharmacists based on average wholesale price, essentially the
manufacturer's list price for a drug, to a system where States
pay pharmacists based off the average sales price, an average
of prices paid by certain purchasers. I have heard concerns,
which I would like to hear you address, that average sales
price is not representative of the price that pharmacies
actually are able to purchase medicines for, because the ASP
includes prices from hospitals and other organizations that get
deeper discounts than pharmacies get. Could you address this
concern?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. This is the issue that Ms. Myrick just
raised. It isn't, obviously, a fair, at all, apples to apples
comparison, as the ASP is currently configured, that----
Ms. Capps. The pharmacist isn't at a disadvantage based on
the large quantities that hospitals----
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. May be at a disadvantage. It would not be
the same for the pharmacist in a large hospital. The hospital
would have a better negotiating position and would be able to
strike a better deal.
Ms. Capps. So why is this an advantage for pharmacies,
then, to be enthused about----
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. A disadvantage.
Ms. Capps. It is a----
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Yes.
Ms. Capps. It is a disadvantage? So the way that is
structured, that is----
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Other things equal, yeah.
Ms. Capps. The President is proposing something that might
not resonate too well with one segment of the drug dispensing
industry that is very central to Medicaid and Medicare, too.
Okay. I will move to another concern of the President's
average sale price based proposal, and that is that it would
pay asp plus 6 percent and that 6 percent would be intended to
fully or partially compensate pharmacies for dispensing,
stocking, counseling patients, and other activities. However, 6
percent of a $100 drug is much more than 6 percent of a $10
drug, and so on. And as best as I can tell, that flat 6 percent
has no relationship to what the pharmacist is actually doing or
what the pharmacy's actual overhead costs may be. And I am
concerned that such a concept would provide perverse
incentives, for example, for pharmacies to actually dispense
the more expensive prescriptions, medicines, not the least
expensive ones, because it would be in their interest to do so,
which would drive prices up all of the way around. Do you have
comments to say on this?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I think the first point I would like to
emphasize is that the question whether the 6 percent or a fixed
dispensing fee covers the pharmacists' costs. That is something
that we were unable to address in our report. I want to be
clear about that. We don't have a comprehensive measure of
their cost of dispensing a prescription. We tried to get some
proxies for growth in their costs by looking at the wages of
the kinds of people who would be in the pharmacies. But we
couldn't, in any scientific way, say that number is big enough
to cover their costs. The second piece of the----
Ms. Capps. Excuse me, but do you know what it was based on?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. The 6 percent?
Ms. Capps. Yes.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I do not. It is the President's proposal.
And then, I think you have summarized the incentives we have
heard discussed earlier, 6 percent of a more expensive drug is
more than 6 percent of a cheaper drug. And again, other things
being the same, the incentive to get a larger reimbursement
would push you toward the more expensive drug.
Ms. Capps. Yes. We have heard discussed today some of the
concerns about attempts now with the proposals, the roll-outs
of proposals, that there are efforts to restrict cost, and
that, as a couple of my colleagues have said on the other side,
certain populations, for example in rural areas, might be
really unduly restricted by, or at least have no choice, when
it comes down to the actual medications that they need, for
example, the national Medicaid buying pool, which attempts to
bring a large number of Medicaid populations in several States,
in order to negotiate deeper discounts, and some of this might
result in hampering beneficiaries from receiving the
medications that they need, and we are not talking about
frivolous medications. Many times, we are talking about life-
saving medications. This is a situation that I would like to
hear you comment on. I am really concerned that we now are
finding a situation, not just with Medicaid patients, but one
in two uninsured, for example, one in three publicly insured,
and one in six privately insured working age adults, with at
least one chronic condition, have reported not purchasing all
of their prescription drugs because of cost concerns. And this
reporting is increased from 16.1 percent in 2001 to 18.3
percent. So the number of people reporting these kinds of
concerns is not diminishing. Is there any way of seeing the end
result of what is being proposed as addressing this at all?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Not from what we have in front of us
today. The studies that we put together are national studies.
They used national prices. They are typical outcomes across
States, which do have differences, and they will differ both in
urban and regional dimensions. But they do reflect the basic
notion that the pharmaceutical market is a national market and
that the ability to manufacture and distribute it is not a
regional phenomenon, that that is a national phenomenon. So we
think these are sensible studies to do. If there are important
regional differences that you would like to pursue, we would be
happy to work with you on that.
Ms. Capps. Okay. Thank you very much.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentlelady.
Dr. Burgess is recognized for questions.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Doctor, for being here and staying with us so
long.
Just to go back for a minute to the average wholesale price
and then the average manufacturers' price: included in the
average manufacturer's price, do we include the cost for
research and development, or is that simply the cost for the
active ingredient and the vehicle and then the gelatin capsule?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. The average wholesale price is the list
price.
Mr. Burgess. Yes.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. The average manufacturing price is a
transaction price and reflects just the outcome of the
negotiation and the transaction of the pharmaceutical itself.
Mr. Burgess. So the nomenclature of the use of the word
``manufacture'' in there is, in fact, not erroneous, but it is
actually a negotiated price, so it wouldn't necessarily reflect
just the cost of manufacturing the pill?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Right. It is the manufacturer's sale
price, and presumably they are going to not sell in a way which
makes them unable to cover their full costs and recover those
costs.
Mr. Burgess. So research and development would be included
in that on something that was still covered under patent and
presumably not included on something that had left the coverage
from the patent protection?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. From the manufacturer's point of view, you
have a clear incentive to cover all of your costs, research and
development, manufacturing, distribution, marketing, whatever
they may be. The flip side of that is, of course, the other
side of the negotiation who wants the low prices. And this is
the outcome, but it is hard to imagine that there wouldn't be a
price that didn't recover costs, if at all possible.
Mr. Burgess. But is it your opinion that drugs that are now
off of the protection from the patent, are they always sold at
just about the cost of manufacture or are there healthy profit
margins built in?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. We haven't done a particular analysis of
profit margins. What one sees is the not terribly surprising
result that with the loss of patent protection, the entry of
generic competition, retail prices tend to come down from
single-source, patent protected drugs. But how that price is
relative to production costs and the margins as a result is
something that is not covered here.
Mr. Burgess. On the bar graph that you showed us, you ran
through very quickly the difference between the Federal supply
schedule price and the VA average price, and you referenced
that the VA has a tighter control of its formulary. Could you
just run through that again for us?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I was trying to spare the committee a bar-
by-bar description, and I will do that again. But you just saw
the Medicaid bars----
Mr. Burgess. Spare us nothing.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Be careful what you wish for.
If one just looks at the Medicaid bar and looks at the VA
bar and they are not the same, and you raise the question,
``Gee, why wouldn't they be? They are both government programs.
Why don't we get the same price?'' And the answer is the VA
carries with it into its negotiation some clout that the
Medicaid program cannot, because it has the ability to pick a
formulary and deliver that formulary to the veterans and, as a
result, negotiate strongly with the manufacturers to have their
drug included in the formulary. It is a training ground for
doctors, and so they can go to the manufacturer and say, ``We
can expose these young physicians to your products,'' and that
is an advantage to manufacturers. So those dimensions to the
negotiation matter, and that is one reason why you might see
those bars be different, because the programs, while they are
both Federal programs on the face, differ in their substance.
Mr. Burgess. I thank you for explaining that so clearly.
Do you have an opinion--as you have heard from several of
us up here today--that this is not the system that any one of
us would hope to construct if we were setting up today to build
the system? Do you have an opinion as to what type of system
that Congress ought to aspire to?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I think that the consensus of the
committee that I have heard today is that when the system was
designed to use a sticker price to proxy the actual market
transactions between pharmacies, wholesalers, and
manufacturers, it failed to do so, and that the rough justice
adjustments that came after the fact, discounts from AWP
rebates, fail to capture the actual cost of transactions. The
harder question, to which I think there is no single answer, is
how to better reimburse based on market transactions, get
closer to what it actually costs, and do that in a way that
does not destroy the incentives for the pharmaceutical market
as a whole to negotiate hard and have low prices. If you just
say, ``We are only going to reimburse for the lowest price ever
found in the United States,'' that is a clear incentive to not
drive down too hard in other transactions, and all prices will
drift up. That is the tradeoff you face.
Mr. Burgess. All right. I see my time is up. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentleman.
I recognize Mr. Waxman for questions.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Holtz-Eakin, the 2005 CBO budget options book says that
allowing States to increase cost sharing from $3 for adults and
$0 for children to $5 and $3 respectively will result in $1.9
billion savings over 5 years. The budget option book also
states that a potential drawback of this proposal is that a
``reduction in the use of appropriate healthcare services could
also result.'' For instance, previous research has shown that
poorer individuals facing higher co-payments displayed worse
health on some measures. Another example of the introduction of
a co-payment for prescription drugs in several State Medicaid
programs was found to lead to many beneficiaries going without
their medications. Is it the case that some portion of the $1.9
billion that is saved is a result of Medicaid beneficiaries
foregoing necessary and appropriate medical care and services,
including prescription drugs, due to the higher co-payment?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. It is certainly the concern. There is
evidence that it happens as part of the reaction to higher co-
pays. What fraction that would be passing up desirable medical
treatment, we don't know, but it is an element of the
behavioral response.
Mr. Waxman. And so therefore, a portion of that savings is
really people foregoing needed medical care?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Yes. This is the ultimate attention in
everything the CBO produces, which is the programs are there
for the benefits. We measure the costs and exclusive reliance
in the costs misses the flipside of the program's desirability.
Mr. Waxman. And you don't think CBO can factor in how much
is coming from that respect?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. It is not currently feasible for us to
draw a line between those parts of the cost reduction, which
are just better shopping and skipping luxuries from those parts
of the cost reduction which are skipping things you shouldn't.
Mr. Waxman. Well, we appreciate the work that you have done
on this issue and hope you will continue to look at it.
Dr. Holtz-Eakin, many of us are concerned about the
transition of the dual-eligibles, those individuals who are
enrolled in both Medicare and Medicaid, to the new Medicare
prescription drug benefit in 2006. In particular, many dual-
eligibles have chronic illnesses and take multiple prescription
drugs. Those living with mental illness, for example, are
already stabilized on a particular drug regime, and an abrupt
change in their medication could cause great harm. They could
no longer get their medicines through Medicaid. They will have
to go through Medicare's drug plan. Medicare's prescription
drug plan may not include all medicine that that individual
needs under formulary. There are some individuals who get
involved in these plans without any consideration to what the
medicine may be or the cost they will be paying out of pocket
may be may insurmountable to may of these individual. A number
of us are interested in exploring ways to use fluid continuity
of treatment for these elderly and disabled individuals. And
example of one option might be to require Medicaid drug plan to
cover all medicine an individual was taking prior to the
transition to Medicare for a certain period of time, so that
you can change to a more appropriate plan or find another way
to continue taking their medicines if unable to switch to
another product. Has the CBO examined this issue? Do you have
any sense of the magnitude of costs or even potential savings
associated with such a beneficiary protection?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. We have looked at this to the extent that
we have tried to understand the transition to the new drug
benefit in our baseline, and there are aspects of the
transition that have features like the ones you mentioned
where, for certain classes of drugs, the formulary requires
that all of the drugs be available, that the dual-eligibles can
switch plans as necessary, perhaps, because they don't have the
drug they have been stabilized on. There is an appeals process.
So there are aspects of this transition, which are in the
current CBO baseline, because that is the current CMS
procedure. We have not done anything beyond that to look at the
cost or the impact of more expansive guarantees during the
transition period.
Mr. Waxman. It doesn't sound like it would be all that much
different than what you have already looked at if you are
suggesting that they have some of these drugs available to
people.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. In some cases the anti-psychotics and
things, it doesn't sound like it would be very different at
all, but there may be examples where it is different and we
just haven't run across those yet. So if there are some
particulars that you want to bring to our attention, we would
be happy to take a look.
Mr. Waxman. Well, if, perhaps, you could look at this kind
of option if we spelled it out to see how much an additional
savings we might find.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Okay.
Mr. Waxman. But this might be a way to help those people
who would be affected by an abrupt cutoff in the drugs that
they are already conditioned to using and won't be able to
afford otherwise.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. There is also another feature of this.
There is a provision for advanced refills and extended supplies
to literally take the current Medicaid program and use it as
the bridge to the new drug plan, and to the extent that that
helps it, that is already built in. But that may not cover the
entire universe, and if there are more that you would like us
to look at, we would be happy to do it.
Mr. Waxman. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Deal. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Ferguson, you are recognized for questions.
Mr. Ferguson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Holtz-Eakin, we certainly appreciate you being here,
and thank you for your candid answers to so many of our
questions.
Just before my questions, some have suggested, and some on
this committee have suggested, that some of the drug
manufacturers actually spend more in advertising than they do
in research and development. That, of course, is absurd. The
drug companies spend enormous amounts of capital and make
enormous investments in research and development. Perhaps
sometimes the television advertisements that people see on TV
are a little bit more obvious than the countless people in labs
and scientists and researchers and clinicians and others who
make up the investments that go into finding the new cures and
the new treatments and the new drugs, but just to clear the air
and to clear the record, it is absurd to suggest that companies
spend more on advertising than they do for research and
development of these drugs.
My question--and some have suggested that raising the
rebate from 15.1 to 20 percent as a way to raise more money--is
there a policy rationale for that? In my estimation, that is
not reform; that is simply changing some of the numbers of the
system as it is currently in place, to try and raise additional
revenue. But if we are talking about reforming the system,
trying to fix some of the problems that we face, in your
estimation with CBO, is there any policy rationale, reform
rationale, for raising the rebate to 20 percent?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. We didn't originate the proposal. You
would have to talk to those who are interested in doing this
for their rationale. The economics, I think, set up an
incentive system where the rebate is a lower net received by
the manufacturer. That is what that does. It lowers the price
they get. But they still have the opportunity to access a large
client pool by entering the Medicaid program. And so it is the
tradeoff of being in versus being out versus getting a higher
or lower price once you are in. And that is the tradeoff
underneath all of these kinds of policies.
Mr. Ferguson. Doesn't it amount to a tax on the
manufacturer?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. You could label this anything. It is a
lower price to the manufacturer.
Mr. Ferguson. I could think of a lot of things to label it,
but I am just trying to be accurate.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I am a sufficiently good economist that I
could call it a negative subsidy. I could call it a tax. It is
a lower price to the manufacturer.
Mr. Ferguson. But there is no, as far as you can see,
reform-minded rationale, policy rationale for this; it is
simply looking for money in a system which isn't producing
enough money?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. The proposers would be best positioned to
answer that question.
Mr. Ferguson. Fair enough. The prescription drug component
of Medicaid amounts to about 15 percent of the program. Is that
correct?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. We will check the number and get the exact
number back to you.
Mr. Ferguson. More or less? I am not asking for a specific
decimal point. The estimates that I have seen have said that
after the drug benefit for Medicare goes into effect, because
of dual-eligibles, obviously, and other things, that the
prescription drug component for Medicaid will drop much lower
than that.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Yes.
Mr. Ferguson. Perhaps by two-thirds down to maybe 6
percent. Does this seem like, to you, from a budget standpoint,
talking about raising the rebate now to 20 percent, if we are
going to try and raise the rebate on a shrinking portion of the
Medicaid program, isn't it rational to think that that the
amount that that raises is going to continue to fall if more
dual-eligibles and others are going to be covered by the
Medicare program?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Well, the estimates that we provided for
this proposal would recognize the transition, and so it would
be built off a base that recognized the duals heading into the
Medicare program and out of Medicaid. So the numbers you have
got are consistent with that. The more general point is that
with the shifting, the population mix impacts in the Medicaid
program that spill over to private sector outcomes, prices
negotiated, and things like that, will be smaller in the future
than they have been in the past, and that will be something we
will have to think about in looking at the response of
manufacturers, pharmacies, beneficiaries to different
incentives that come up in the payment system.
Mr. Ferguson. But as you have acknowledged and as you have
said your study included, it is a much smaller portion, and it
is a shrinking portion----
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Going forward.
Mr. Ferguson. [continuing] of the Medicaid program going
forward.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Yes.
Mr. Ferguson. I think of that as squeezing water from a
rock, a shrinking rock, perhaps.
Mr. Deal. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Ferguson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Deal. Mr. Shimkus, you are recognized for questions.
Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will try to be really brief. I know you have been here
for a long time, and I appreciate the second panel we still
have to listen to.
Your report states that there is currently an incentive for
pharmacists to dispense generics because of the markup. Since
we already have this incentive to dispense generics, how do we
increase generic utilization by changing from average wholesale
price to another reimbursement model?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Ask the question again. I am not sure I
understood. How do you increase it?
Mr. Shimkus. Right. I mean, the intent has been to increase
generic utilization, but I mean, your report says the markup
does that.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. Yes. Other things equaled. There is a
clear incentive to supply the newer generic drugs.
Mr. Shimkus. But if we move to another model, will there
still be that incentive?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. That is far from obvious. I guess one of
the examples that came up was providing ASP plus 6 where you
would have to worry about undermining the incentive for
generics and moving the balance back toward incentives to
provide brand name drugs, so I think that that is an important
thing to keep your eye on if you go forward with changing the
payments mechanism.
Mr. Shimkus. Based on the current incentives, shouldn't we
already have high rates of utilization when generics are
available?
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. The ultimate utilization is going to
depend on, first and foremost, the medicine and whether it is
the right medicine and then second the relative prices and the
incentives to deliver it. And so without knowing what the
nature of the underlying prescription necessarily is, you can't
really answer that.
Mr. Shimkus. Okay. Great.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Deal. I thank the gentleman.
And Mr. Brown suggested we lock the doors before any other
members come in and want to ask any more questions. We are not
going to do that; but Dr. Holtz-Eakin, we do appreciate your
patience to bet with us today and for your testimony, as
always. And we will let you get back to doing some of the
scoring that some of us are interested in on some other issues
as well. But thank you. As always, a great witness.
Mr. Holtz-Eakin. I appreciate it. Thank you.
Mr. Deal. And we will ask the second panel if they will
come forward.
Once again, I thank this panel for your patience as well. A
very distinguished group, and I will make a very brief
introduction so we can hear your testimony as quickly as
possible.
Our first witness is Mr. Anthony Rodgers. We already heard
a rather in-depth introduction from Mr. Shadegg. He, of course,
is the Director of the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment
System. Mr. Craig Fuller is President and Chief Executive
Officer of the National Association of Chain Drug Stores. Ms.
Kathy King is the Director of Health Care at the U.S.
Government Accountability Office. And Ms. Kathy D. Gifford is
Principal of the Health Management Associates of Indianapolis,
Indiana. And Mr. Jack Calfee is the Resident Scholar of the
American Enterprise Institute. A very distinguished panel, and
we will start with you, Mr. Rodgers.
I would add that all of your written testimony is a part of
the record.
STATEMENTS OF ANTHONY D. RODGERS, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA HEALTH CARE
COST CONTAINMENT SYSTEM; CRAIG L. FULLER, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHAIN DRUG STORES;
KATHY KING, DIRECTOR, HEALTH CARE, U.S. GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; KATHY D. GIFFORD, PRINCIPAL, HEALTH
MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATES; AND JOHN CALFEE, RESIDENT SCHOLAR,
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Mr. Rodgers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will be talking about the Arizona model, especially the
results that we have been able to achieve related to our
pharmacy benefit.
[Slide.]
What you have on our slides, and go to the next slide,
shows a little bit about how we started. We started as a
Medicaid waiver back in 1982, 23 years ago. We still are a
waiver program. The waiver does allow us to operate a
Statewide, mandatory, Medicaid managed care program that
requires the members to enroll in a contracted health plan. The
members receive their Medicaid services, including pharmacy
benefits, through their health plan. Now access reviews the
actuarial models for each health plan, and we set our rates and
establish a PMPM capitation. And what is important about this
is that this is the nature of aligning the financial incentives
for the health plans, because they compete against each other
on quality and on service, but they also compete in a way that
relates to their capitation. If one health plan is out of
alignment in capitation, we can see this. And those health
plans are able to play off of that and keep our costs down. So
the managed competition model works very well for Arizona.
Go to the next slide.
[Slide.]
Our model is a full risk model. It creates a strong
motivator on the part of plans to operate cost-effectively to
come up with innovative ways to control costs and prescription
drug benefits. That is one area that our plan has been very
innovative. Our plans also are in competition for the members,
and they compete by their networks, the networks they offer the
members, and they compete by a reputation, whether they get a
reputation as a good plan. And oftentimes, that is dependent on
how the physicians as well as other members describe a plan. So
a lot of our plan growth is due to choice, and there is a lot
of loyalty to plans.
Next.
[Slide.]
We have no single State Medicaid formulary. The State
contracts with the plans. They establish a formulary. And this
allows the plans to negotiate very good prices. Each plan
develops a specific formulary, and there is always concern,
``Well, will the plans develop an appropriate formulary?''
Well, they are at risk for the whole medical cost. And so what
they are managing is not just a formulary, but what happens to
that member if they don't get access to their medication. And I
think that is going to be reflected in some of the later slides
in terms of the results that we have been able to achieve.
If you look at this concept, it is very similar to what you
are trying to do with part D Medicare, and that is you are
having Medicare plans as well as pharmacy plans compete for
members based on their formulary that they offer as well as to
maintain their costs. And so the Federal Government potentially
can get benefit from that kind of competition.
The keys to our success are simple. Our plans negotiate
with input from their providers on their formulary design. They
have contractual relationships between the providers and the
plans, and this is extremely important, because our plans are
responsible for assigning each member to a primary care
physician. It is the physician who is key to controlling your
prescription costs. Once they get on board, they control the
generic use. They can help you with controlling your costs. And
having a good primary care network is also key.
Non-formulary drugs are allowed and prescribed with prior
authorization. So if you look at our generic performance, you
will see that our generic performance is very high, over 70
percent, and that in most cases, when a generic is available,
the physician will prescribe the generic. So we have a very
high generic dispensing rate, when those are available.
Next slide, please. The slide after that. Next one.
[Slide.]
These are some of the tools that the plans use to control
prescription costs, including step therapy, which means try the
generic first. If that doesn't work, then go to a brand or a
different drug. And this is in consultation with the provider.
Because they are assigned to a primary care provider, that
relationship is key to controlling costs. Prior authorization
procedures are also another tool, establishing appropriate
quantity limits so that the plan can see if a member is
shopping, so to speak, for drugs. And those limits allow the
plan then to interface with the member. This is why our case
management system by our plans is so important. When they see a
member who is over-utilizing medications, they can then talk to
that member. But they are still at risk for any negative
consequences with that member not getting access to their
medications.
Each of our plans has a closed pharmacy network, which
means they contract with their pharmacy network. They are not
required to offer any willing pharmacy provider, but all of our
pharmacists and pharmacies are covered in our State.
And then finally, as a tool, we also have a mandatory
generic use as the first option for services.
Next slide, please.
[Slide.]
So a couple of things about our managed care program. There
are no limits on prescriptions, as some States have established
to control costs. We have no limits. There are very few quality
issues or complaints of the 1,200 quality issues we
investigated last year. Only 1 percent had to do with
medications. And quality issues are everything from a physician
prescribing the wrong dose for a child that has to be
addressed, and the plans pick these up. And so those are part
of the quality issues we oftentimes will evaluate. Exceptions
to the process are considered and physicians are able to
request non-formulary drugs as well.
And then we have a highly competitive environment, and this
has been due to the fact that, as access, the Arizona Health
Care Cost Containment System, we are a part of the competitive
environment in Arizona, and so it has established, not only
with providers but with pharmacies, a very good competitive
environment for our Medicaid, for Medicare, as well as for
commercial.
Next slide.
[Slide.]
This is basically the bottom line results that we see, and
this is why everybody is very interested in the Arizona model.
Now I have run health plans, started health plans. I have run
hospitals, county hospitals, clinics, and one of the things
about Arizona, it is known in the industry as uniquely managing
the population well. In fact, even the Arizona citizens voted
to expand access to more people in Arizona in 2002 because of
the results that they saw.
I would like to just bring your attention to a couple of
things. In our acute care program, our generic use is 93
percent for drugs that compare to other States. We took drugs
on our formularies as well as drugs on other State formularies
to compare, and so that is not all of the drugs, but that was
those drugs we could compare. The average prescription cost,
though, is significantly lower because of our generic use and
the ability to plan and negotiate good prices. Long-term care,
you see the same results: very high generic use and a very low
overall cost per prescriptions. And if you look at our taniff
population--and this was one population that is always
sensitive to us about drugs and drug use--our per-member-per-
month cost for drugs is lower than both other States' managed
care as well as fee for service, and that is due to the
maturing of our program. That doesn't happen right away. But as
your program matures, you can really get good results.
Next slide.
[Slide.]
What I asked my Director of Pharmacy to do was to look at
where we were today. We have a report that was done by the
Lewin Group that really established Arizona as a model in terms
of the data that they found with other programs, so I asked my
Chief Pharmacist to check again to see how we are doing, and
these are the results a month ago that he got: 70 percent
generic use as compared to the other States that he was able to
get information. Our dispensing fee is $2, which might be low
compared to other States, but again, we have a very competitive
environment in Arizona, and so when you have competition, you
have that benefit. That occurs from that. And we don't have co-
pays. And I think that that is a very important thing, because
our plans can manage and get us the results that we need
without establishing co-pays.
The next slide.
[Slide.]
Mr. Deal. Summarize, if you would, please.
Mr. Rodgers. Okay. Let me go to the last slide.
The last slide basically tells you what our strategic focus
is: controlling medical cost inflation, improving quality
health care and accessibility of primary care services,
reducing the number of uninsured in our State, reducing the
fragmentation of services, and assuring that there is adequate
infrastructure to oversee our programs. It is important to know
that the success of this program has been due to Arizona
learning how to manage managed care, and I think that is the
key to our success.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Anthony D. Rodgers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Anthony D. Rodgers, Director, Arizona Health Care
Cost Containment System
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to meet with you today on behalf of the Arizona Health Care
Cost Containment System (AHCCCS). I am appreciative for the opportunity
to share how Arizona's Medicaid program has been successful in keeping
the cost of prescription drugs significantly lower than other states'
Medicaid programs.
The AHCCCS Model
Arizona's Medicaid program operates under a Section 1115 Research
and Demonstration Waiver granted by CMS in 1982. This waiver allows
Arizona to operate a statewide managed care system and requires that
all Medicaid members enroll in a contracted health plan. AHCCCS pays
the health plans an actuarially determined per-member, per-month (PMPM)
capitation for each enrolled member. Under this model of contracting,
the health plans assume the financial risk of delivering the full range
of health care services for each member. The current Acute Care
Medicaid program and State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)
includes over 1 million low-income members.
In Arizona, the capitation paid to the health plans is for the
provision of all Medicaid services, including the prescription drug
benefit. The inclusion of the prescription drug benefit in the managed
care capitation rate disqualifies AHCCCS from participation in the
Medicaid Rebate Program. Nonetheless, this factor has not had a
negative impact on AHCCCS. This exclusion makes our health plans 100%
at risk for the cost of prescription drugs, creating a strong motivator
for them to deliver a cost effective prescription drug benefit focusing
on the use of generics.
Benefits to health plans for being at-risk for delivering prescription
drug services
Because AHCCCS' health plans assume full financial risk for
delivering the entire range of Medicaid health care services, including
prescription drugs, AHCCCS allows each health plan, or Managed Care
Organization (MCO), to develop its own plan-specific formulary and
prescription drug benefit management tools. In addition to this
inherent financial incentive, the health plans also have a constant
incentive to maintain quality services because they must compete for
membership enrollment. Thus, the health plans work to meet the needs of
the members and to provide a cost-effective benefit. With this in mind,
there is no single, statewide Medicaid formulary. The health plans
develop formularies based on input of their provider network, often
locally or regionally, that are reinforced with contractual
relationships with providers for compliance.
AHCCCS health plans utilize a variety of tools to maintain cost
efficiency. The most significant factor may be that AHCCCS health plans
mandate generic drug utilization. The overall AHCCCS dispensing rate
average for generics is 70+%. When generic drugs are available, our
health plans average 98 + % generic dispensing rate. Our experience has
been that using generic drugs is more cost effective for Arizona than
using brand drugs and receiving a rebate.
In addition, health plans have the ability to develop closed
pharmacy provider networks, which routinely provide aggressive Average
Wholesale Price (AWP) discounts and are negotiated in highly
competitive environments (15-17% for brand and 15-50% or greater for
generics). Maximum Allowable Cost (MAC) pricing for generics is also
used. The dispensing fees are very low compared to other states,
averaging less than $2 per RX.
In addition to the mandated generic utilization and the closed
pharmacy provider networks, health plans utilize other management tools
to keep their prescription drug costs low. These tools in and of
themselves are not exceptional and are widely used:
Step Therapy/Treatment Guidelines which look for evidence of failure
to achieve desired treatment outcomes with less costly, generic
or over the counter drugs and develop compliance with standards
of care or medical specialty developed treatment guidelines;
Prior Authorization Procedures;
Quantity Limits such as early refill edits and maximum monthly
quantities; and
Disease Management Program/Specialty Case Management for members with
Diabetes, Asthma, Heart Disease and others.
When used in conjunction with the emphasis on generic drug use, and
motivated health plans, these tools become a significant factor in
quality care and cost savings.
Benefits to AHCCCS Members When Pharmacy Services are Well Managed
AHCCCS is the largest single health insurer in the state with
membership at almost 20% of Arizona's population. Strong utilization
management by our health plans and monitoring of quality benchmarks
have kept costs under control so that the members enjoy no limits on
the number of prescriptions or, when necessary, brand name
prescriptions which they can receive per month. AHCCCS carefully
monitors our managed care plans to ensure that members receive the
services they need. Very few quality of care issues are related to drug
therapy. Out of an estimated 1,200 Quality of Care issues annually,
less than 1% is related to prescription drugs.
Arizona Model Produces Cost Savings
A recent study done by the Centers for Health Care Studies (CHCS)
and the Lewin Group compared prescription drug costs of the aged, blind
and disabled population enrolled in AHCCCS' Acute Care Program to
similar populations of other states. By definition, these populations
are heavy utilizers of prescription drugs. The CHCS/Lewin evaluation
found that AHCCCS' prescription drug costs provided through the managed
care model are more cost effective than other states' fee-for-service
models. AHCCCS' 2002 per member per month (PMPM) prescription drug
utilization cost was $112.21, which is 38% below the National Average
of $181.01 and is 11% below the next most cost-competitive state
(Michigan). This is even more impressive when one considers that these
savings were achieved without the benefit of rebates.
The following table illustrates the various elements of both
AHCCCS' prescription drug benefit in a managed care model and other
states' prescription drug benefit in a fee-for-service model. The data
was self-reported by the State Medicaid pharmacy program administrators
from each state in response to a national survey.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prior
State Generic Utilization Reimbursement Formula Dispensing Copayment Max Days Supply Monthly Auth
Fee Limit Program
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Az.................................. 70%.................... AWP-15-17% (negotiated $2 $0 Greater of 30 days or None Yes
by each health plan). 100 units.
Ak.................................. 42%.................... AWP-5%................. $$3-$11 $2 30 days............... None Yes
Ca.................................. 51%.................... AWP-17%................ $7.25-$8 $0 100 days.............. 6 Yes
Mi.................................. Not reported........... AWP-13.5% (independent $3.77 $1 Maintenance meds--3 None Yes
pharmacies) and AWP- months: all others 34
15% for chain days.
pharmacies.
NJ.................................. 48%.................... AWP-12%................ $3.69 $0 Greater of 34 days or None Yes
100 units.
Pa.................................. 51%.................... AWP-10%................ $4 $1 Greater of 34 days or None Yes
100 units.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Challenges to Lowering Prescription Drug Costs for Non-Managed Care
Population
While the Arizona model of Medicare managed care has been a success
story for our state, it must be acknowledged that it may be difficult
to convert from a fee-for-service program to a Medicaid Managed care
model. While commitment to the model has paid off relating to both
cost-efficiency and quality of care, the first 5 years of operating the
AHCCS program were difficult.
Conclusion
There are several points I would like to leave you with today to
assist you as you identify strategies to reduce Medicaid prescription
drug costs. The first is a paradox. By improving compliance and
utilization of prescription drug regimens, drug spending may actually
rise. However, this may lead to improvements in health status and
decreased overall health care spending. While this is the ultimate goal
we are still striving to meet, it sometimes makes it more difficult to
evaluate the ``success'' of ``cost-containment initiatives.
Secondly, the ability to have common data elements and the ability
to analyze data that cuts across health plans, and across state
Medicaid programs, is critical to ensuring that prescription drugs are
having the maximum effect of improving health status. Quality
performance indicators and benchmarks can be set for managed care
organizations and health plans without compromising their ability to
deliver health care services. Another challenge that will affect
states' ability to manage prescription drug costs is the implementation
of Medicare Part D under the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA)
on January 1, 2006. Due to the fact that the states will no longer be
providing coverage to the dual eligible population (members eligible
for both Medicaid and Medicare), states are losing critical purchasing
power. Arizona is concerned that the phased-down payments will not be
indicative of the savings that have been achieved in providing a
prescription drug benefit. This will be especially true if the trend to
provide brand name drugs over generics is realized. At the same time,
the MMA creates the opportunity for states to enhance the coordination
of care for the dual eligible population through collaboration with
Part D Plan Sponsors. By providing incentives for plans to become
Medicare Advantage-Prescription Drug Plans designated as Special Needs
Plans, members will be able to access both their Medicaid and Medicare
services through one health plan, allowing for greater coordination of
care and coordination of benefits. AHCCCS has collaborated with six of
its contracted health plans pursuing such designation. The provision of
all of the member's services by one health plan supports the notion of
person vs. program and allows the maximum opportunity for members to
receive quality, coordinated care without navigating two delivery
systems.
Another challenge Medicaid faces is the cost of providing long-term
care services. Arizona provides long-term care services through a
managed care model, the Arizona Long-Term Care System (ALTCS). ALTCS
controls the cost of providing long-term care services by utilizing a
Pre-Admission Screening document allowing only those members at risk of
institutionalization to enroll in ALTCS rather than Acute Care
Medicaid. The managed care model allows for imposition of network
standards and case management standards that enhance the quality of
services members receive. Members may choose to receive Home and
Community Based Services (HCBS) rather than enter an institution, which
is a savings for Medicaid as well as an effective way to allow members
to direct their own care.
I am available to take any questions you may have and want to thank
you again for the opportunity to highlight how our program is working
for the benefit of Arizonans.
Mr. Deal. Thank you.
Mr. Fuller.
STATEMENT OF CRAIG L. FULLER
Mr. Fuller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Brown. I represent
the National Association of Chain Drug Stores. We have over 200
retail members with over 35,000 stores and 120,000 pharmacists
across the country. This is a very, very important issue to us,
and we are grateful for the chance to testify.
My statement went on at some length about a variety of
issues. I would like to give you some highlights with some very
quick charts. If we could turn to the reform principles on the
next page.
[Slide.]
I think it is important, as you look at alternatives, to
think about three principles. One, the Medicaid payment system
reforms should reflect current market prices. They should be
prices, as I think you said, Mr. Chairman, that are
transparent, that are known, and verifiable. Second, the
savings that you seek in the program should somehow be
proportionate to the program's expenditures, and I will explain
that in a minute. And finally, behavior in Medicaid that
supports the policy objectives you are seeking should be
rewarded.
[Slide.]
The next slide just gives you a very quick picture of our
view of retail pharmacy today where a little over 15 percent of
what is happening in our stores is related to Medicaid, which
makes it a very important segment. I should add that in rural
communities, this number is larger, and in some urban
communities, this number is larger, which puts more pressure on
both rural pharmacies as well as urban pharmacies.
[Slide.]
The next slide is really a recap of, I think, some things
that have been said. Medicaid drug program spending is up
because there are more Medicaid recipients using prescription
drugs, there are more prescription drugs being used per
recipient, which, in my view, is a good thing, because the
value of medication today is very important in terms of the
overall healthcare costs. The cost of the prescriptions is up
partly because of the ingredient costs and we will show you, we
think, not so much because of the dispensing fees.
[Slide.]
In fact, the next slide shows you 22 years' experience of
what the average prescription cost where today, or in 2002, the
average prescription, both generic as well as brand, was about
$57. That has risen over time. The cost of dispensing has
stayed rather low.
[Slide.]
And the next slide actually demonstrates how over that 22-
year period the dispensing fee paid has actually gone down.
[Slide.]
This next slide is complicated, but it is terribly
important. The green bars are the product costs, the drug costs
associated with prescriptions dispensed under Medicaid as
projected by CMS as well as CBO from 2005 to 2010. That is the
product cost of the medication. The bar just to the left in
each case of that green bar is the gross margin that the
pharmacy receives. We take exception to CBO, we have sent them
a letter, and it is appended to your material, this notion that
there is a markup. There is a cost associated with dispensing,
and it is that gross margin that has to cover that cost, the
cost of stocking the medication, paying the pharmacists, doing
the transactions, and that sort of thing. That leaves that
small yellow bar, which is the net margin.
In the proposal that is before you, to use ASP as a reform
mechanism to save money, the red bar just to the left of the
yellow bar is, in each case from 2006 to 2010, slightly larger
than the yellow bar, and what this suggests to us, using the
government's numbers, is that the utilization of ASP pricing,
as it has been proposed to save money for retail pharmacy,
would actually seek to save more money than retail pharmacy
actually makes by dispensing a drug, or said another way, we
will lose money every time we dispense a Medicaid prescription.
And that, as some say, you can't make up for in volume. And
that is going to provide an access problem, because retail
pharmacies simply won't be able to provide the level of service
or won't, in fact, be able to participate in the program at
all.
[Slide.]
The next slide--and I am going to cover this quickly,
because ASP has been discussed. But the next slide just
mentions some of our concerns about ASP. First of all, it
doesn't really recognize classes of trade. This is very
important. We don't negotiate with brand manufacturers on
price. We buy the medication at the price it is sold to our
retailers at, usually through a wholesaler. In retail pharmacy,
we pay a higher price than other people buying exactly the same
drug--hospitals, PBMs, or others. So any average for us puts us
at a disadvantage, because we are paying a higher price, given
the ``class of trade'' that retail pharmacy is in. It is also
outdated. It is two or three quarters behind and does lack
transparency. It also discourages generic dispensing.
[Slide.]
The next slide talks about AWP. We are all interested in
moving off of that. It also references, and we represent to the
committee, that using wholesale acquisition cost, or WAC, is
actually a number that exists in nature. I know you have heard
a lot of acronyms, but this is actually a published price that
you can go to and look up, and it is updated frequently. And if
you are looking for a way to peg a number as to what retail
pharmacy is paying today, that, we believe, is a good way of
doing it.
[Slide.]
The next slide mentions ASP. I have referred to that. It
talks about the average manufacturers' price. Again, this is
not a price that exists in nature, so to speak. It is a
calculated price, and there are delays associated with it.
[Slide.]
The next slide, the goal is a pharmacy payment reform, and
I want to skip over it, because I made the point that we really
do recommend WAC pricing be used for brands.
[Slide.]
But we also, if you go to the next slide, want to emphasize
the importance of generics. I think that was just brought out
by Mr. Rodgers' statements, but this is what we are spending
today on the three types of drugs that are dispensed in
Medicaid, $122 for a patented brand drug, $65 for an off-patent
brand, and $20 for a generic. I think you can see why it is
desirable to increase generic utilization.
[Slide.]
If you go to the next slide, what that says today is that
we have, on the left, over 50 percent of the prescriptions
being filled with generic drugs. But there is a way to go,
because 83 percent of the money is actually spent on buying
drugs.
[Slide.]
The next slide simply shows how this works with one type of
disease state, gastrointestinal disease. I am not sure exactly
why we picked this, but the fact is there are three brands up
there. There is one of a generic Prilosec that is lower than
the three brands, but the generic brand is $0.56, giving you a
fairly dramatic savings.
[Slide.]
The next slide comes from data that we received for the
first quarter of this year. I better find out why Arizona isn't
better represented on this chart, but it looks at dispensing
rates by State. And we have provided in your packet a list of
all 50 States. The average in the first quarter from the NDC
Health numbers was 51 percent generic dispensing. What this
shows you is there is a wide range in the country, from the 40-
percent group to the 60-percent group. If you move generic
dispensing up to or closer to 60 percent, as several States
have achieved, or as Arizona has achieved at 70 percent,
literally, our calculations are there would be a $3.5 billion
savings per year.
[Slide.]
The next to the last slide talks just briefly about tiered
co-pays. I know that that is something that is of interest. We
need to make one important point. There are tiered co-pays
today, between 50 cents and $3. The problem is that we can't
collect those co-pays from many patients. Indeed, some States
actually promote the fact that the law doesn't allow
pharmacists to collect that money. There are two big problems.
To the pharmacy, that is simply a lost 50 cents or $1 or $3 per
prescription. That does add up, and it is significant to us. We
eat that cost. For you, the payer, it is a difference between
our prescribing a $20 drug or a $120 drug. So the payers' cost,
by losing this tool, could easily be $100 per prescription.
So if you are going to look at co-pays, tiered co-pays, and
we think that is a reasonable thing to do, it is very important
that that tool not be turned to but then negated by making it a
matter of law, something that we can't collect.
We do believe, in conclusion, that we are and want to be
part of the solution. We do believe the disproportionate
savings from pharmacy is going to reduce the access to
patients, because pharmacies just won't be able to participate
in this program, and we do strongly believe that part of the
solution has to be found in rewarding behavior on the part of
the pharmacy as well as the patient to pursue the kinds of
objectives you are seeking.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Craig L. Fuller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Craig Fuller, President and CEO, National
Association of Chain Drug Stores
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, My name is Craig
Fuller, I am President and CEO of the National Association of Chain
Drug Stores (NACDS), and I am very pleased to provide to you with our
organization's views regarding Medicaid payment reform options for
prescription drugs. NACDS represents more than 200 chain pharmacy
companies that operate more than 35,000 community-based retail
pharmacies, where the majority of all Medicaid prescriptions are
dispensed. Issues and policies that affect Medicaid reimbursement for
prescription drugs are of critical importance to our association and
our membership.
I. CRITERIA FOR MEDICAID PRESCRIPTION DRUG PAYMENT REFORM
We encourage the Subcommittee to keep the following three points in
mind as Medicaid prescription drug payment reform options are
considered:
Use Current, Market-Oriented, Retail-Based Prices: Any reforms made
to the current AWP-based payment system for Medicaid
prescription drugs must result in reimbursement that reflects
current, market-based prices at which pharmacies purchase both
brand and generic drugs. Reimbursement methods that use
retrospectively-determined prices, or are not reflective of the
prices paid by the retail class of trade, will underpay
pharmacies for Medicaid prescriptions and may create access
problems for Medicaid recipients. Moreover, pharmacies must be
paid adequately to dispense these prescriptions to Medicaid
recipients.
Encourage Generic Drug Dispensing: Payment policies should encourage
pharmacy providers to dispense lower-cost generic drugs when
possible and appropriate. Every time a pharmacist dispenses a
generically equivalent drug instead of the off patent brand
name counterpart, the Medicaid program saves an average of
about $45. Every time a pharmacist receives permission from the
physician to dispense a generic drug that is therapeutically
equivalent to a brand name single source drug, the Medicaid
program saves an average of about $100.
Require Proportional Cost Containment Contribution: For the purposes
of this year's budget reconciliation bill, each sector
contributing costs to the Medicaid prescription drug program
must make a proportional contribution to cost control. This
includes pharmaceutical manufacturers, pharmacists and Medicaid
recipients.
States have already taken hundreds of millions of dollars out of
Medicaid pharmacy reimbursement over the past several years. Yet
Medicaid prescription drug spending continues to escalate because
reducing pharmacy reimbursement does little to slow the growth of drug
spending. That is because drug spending is being driven by increasing
drug product costs and increasing drug use, not dispensing fee or
pharmacy payments. Medicaid pays pharmacies for both the drug product
dispensed, as well as the cost of dispensing. Pharmacies have no
control over 80 percent of the costs of brand name drug prescriptions,
which is the cost of the drug products we buy from manufacturers.
Reimbursement reductions reduce pharmacy payments only, not the
costs of goods. It is unfair to place 100 percent of the cost
containment burden on only 20 percent of the cost of the program; that
is, retail pharmacy gross margins.
II. CURRENT STATUS OF MEDICAID PRESCRIPTION DRUG PAYMENT POLICIES
Total Medicaid pharmacy payments are based on two components: drug
product reimbursement and dispensing fee. Consistent with the
flexibility given to states, some states have higher reimbursement
rates for pharmaceutical products and lower dispensing fees, while
others have lower reimbursement rates for products and higher
dispensing fees. The bottom line is that the total payment made has to
be adequate to pay pharmacies to cover their costs of buying the drug,
dispensing the drug, and earning a reasonable return on a Medicaid
prescription.
Moreover, when policymakers consider whether a particular level of
Medicaid reimbursement is ``adequate'' they often overlook other
important factors that have an impact on revenues that a provider
actually derives from Medicaid. For example, many states charge co-
payments for Medicaid prescriptions, ranging from 50 cents to $3 per
prescription. NACDS supports the use of reasonable Medicaid
prescription co-payments as a way of making individuals take more
responsibility for their health care. However, we also know that there
are many recipients that truly cannot pay, even these small amounts.
Pharmacies must provide Medicaid recipients with their prescriptions,
even if a recipient cannot or will not pay the co-payment. Moreover,
federal law prohibits Medicaid from reimbursing pharmacies for unpaid
co-payments, so unpaid co-payments reduce pharmacies' revenues.
Because many states have been imposing steeper co-payments on
recipients over the past few years, the rate of non-collection by
pharmacies has been increasing, affecting the overall revenues that
pharmacies derive from Medicaid prescriptions. Pharmacies should not
shoulder the burden of these uncollected co-payments.
The net profit margin of community retail pharmacies is only about
2 percent. Pharmacies are low-margin health care providers, and even
small changes in pharmacies' revenue streams can mean the difference
between whether the pharmacy's doors remain open or have to close.
Thus, it is vitally important that pharmacy payment rates be adequate
to maintain Medicaid recipients' access to pharmacy services.
A. Pharmacies Working With States to Achieve Medicaid Pharmacy Cost
Savings
Pharmacy providers are working successfully with many state
Medicaid programs to help implement cost savings and quality
improvement options that have helped save tens of millions of dollars
for states and the Federal government. These include programs to
increase use of lower-cost generic medications, disease management
programs, step therapy programs, prior authorization and preferred drug
list programs, and others.
We view ourselves as partners with the states in achieving savings,
although these programs come with significant administrative costs to
pharmacies and pharmacists, and little compensation.
Federal policymakers should encourage the appropriate use of lower-
cost generic drugs. There is significant room for growth for generics
in Medicaid. Generic drugs account for over half of all prescriptions
dispensed in Medicaid, but only about 17 percent of all Medicaid
prescription expenditures. This discrepancy is due to the significant
difference in average reimbursement paid by Medicaid for patented brand
name medications relative to generics. In 2004, the average
reimbursement for a patented brand name drug was $122, while the
average reimbursement for a generic was only about $20, less than one-
sixth the amount for patented brands. Even the generally larger rebates
on brand drugs cannot make up such a large difference.
Twenty-three (23) of the top 25 generic products dispensed by
Medicaid programs in 2004 had an average reimbursement of $20 or less
per prescription. Sixteen (16) of these medications were reimbursed at
an average of less than $15 per prescription and 12 were reimbursed at
under $10 per prescription. For these reasons, we encourage
policymakers to recognize the importance of maintaining incentives
within Medicaid to dispense generic-equivalents drugs.
Despite the tremendous cost savings possible from the use of
generic drugs, generic dispensing rates in states vary widely. Data
from the first quarter of 2005 found that the average state Medicaid
generic dispensing rate was about 51 percent. However, the top 5 states
were Washington (60.5%), Oregon (59.5%), Alabama (59%), New Mexico
(58.9%), and Hawaii (58.3%). On the opposite end of the spectrum,
however, the Medicaid generic dispensing rates were lowest in
Connecticut (47.1%), California (46.9%), Texas (46.4%), Louisiana
(44.5%) and New Jersey (42.4%). These stark differences in generic
dispensing rates--18 percent between the highest and lowest states--can
be explained by a number of factors. However, if all states were able
to increase their generic dispensing rates to 60.5% like Washington,
the Medicaid program would save an estimated $3.5 billion this year. A
complete analysis of state Medicaid generic dispensing rates is
appended to this statement.
Researchers consistently find that increased use of generic drugs
for off-patent brand name drugs could provide considerable savings to
consumers and plan sponsors, including states and the federal
government. In fact, as the budget reconciliation process moves
forward, policymakers should consider whether increased use of generic
drugs in Medicaid will generate most of the savings that might be
needed for the budget target. For example:
A study published in this month's Annals of Internal Medicine
examines generic substitution for a large, nationally
representative sample of adults. This study found that although
over half of this group's outpatient prescriptions from 1997-
2000 were for multiple source drugs, only 61 percent were
dispensed as generics. If generic equivalent drugs had been
dispensed in every instance where an off-patent brand name drug
was dispensed, national savings could have been around $8.8
billion per year.1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Haas, et al., Potential Savings from Substituting Generic Drugs
for Brand Name Drugs: MEPS, 1997-2000; Annals of Internal Medicine,
June 2005
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For dual eligibles at least age 65, the savings from substitution
of generic-equivalent drugs was $1.7 billion per year, while
for the under-65 Medicaid population, the savings was $388
million per year.
A study published in 2003 by the journal Health Services Research
estimated that Medicaid could have saved up to $229 million in
2000 if generic equivalent drugs had been broadly substituted
for off-patent brand name drugs.2
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Fisher, et al., Economic Consequences of Under Use of Generic
Drugs: Evidence from Medicaid and Implications for Prescription Drug
Benefit Plans, Health Services Research, 2003; 38: 1051-63.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These studies all focus on substitution of generic equivalent
products for off-patent brand name products. Even greater savings could
be achieved if patients were able to use a generic drug or lower cost
brand name drug that provided similar therapeutic benefit in place of a
higher-cost patented, sole source brand name drug.
B. Medicaid Benefits from Generic Price Competition Generated by Retail
Pharmacy
Medicaid benefits from the intense generic drug price competition
and price transparency generated by retail pharmacies. The purchasing
leverage of retail pharmacy forces competition among generic drug
makers to earn a pharmacy's business. This lowers generic prices to
pharmacies, and these lower generic prices are passed along to
consumers.
Medicaid also benefits from generic drug price competition between
retail pharmacies because Medicaid programs typically reimburse
pharmacies the ``lower of'' the program's payment formula for a generic
drug (i.e., FUL plus dispensing fee or MAC plus dispensing fee) or the
pharmacy's ``usual and customary'' charge to the cash paying public. In
many cases the Medicaid program pays a pharmacy's lower ``usual and
customary'' price rather than the amount determined by the generic
payment formula. As a result of competitive forces in the generic
marketplace, the average generic prescription reimbursement in Medicaid
has only increased by about $7 per prescription over the last 7 years,
from $13 in 1998 to $20 today, while the average brand name
prescription reimbursement has almost doubled from $63 in 1998 to $122
today. Clearly, Medicaid is benefiting from the price competition for
generic drugs generated by retail pharmacy at multiple levels in the
distribution chain.
Almost 60 percent of all Medicaid generic prescriptions have
Federal Upper Limits (FULs), meaning that the pharmacy is reimbursed
the same amount for a generic medication regardless of the price of the
product purchased by that pharmacy. The FUL is set at 150 percent of
the lowest price published in the national pharmaceutical pricing
compendia for a generic version of a drug product. A FUL is established
once there are three nationally-available sources of supply for the
generic. The current FUL system, while not perfect, works well in
balancing the needs of pharmacies to have sufficient economic
incentives to dispense generics to Medicaid recipients, coupled with
Medicaid's desire to not overpay for generics.
The FUL gives pharmacies the incentives to drive down the prices of
generics below the FUL so the pharmacies do not lose money. Medicaid
benefits from this price competition.
At the same time, the fact that the pharmacy can retain any small
margin between the FUL and its acquisition cost gives it an incentive
to drive a hard bargain with the generic companies, as well as
compensates for a dispensing fee component that may be inadequate. In
our view, the current incentives are aligned appropriately for both
pharmacies and Medicaid to dispense generics.
However, if pharmacy reimbursement were to be based on some markup
of actual ``acquisition costs,'' the incentives would change for
pharmacy providers in terms of generic dispensing. For example, if
Medicaid adopted Medicare Part B's policy to pay for covered drugs at
ASP (Average Sales Price) plus 6 percent, a pharmacy will derive more
revenue from dispensing a brand name drug with an ASP of $100 ($106)
than it would derive from dispensing a generic with an ASP of $20.00
($21.20). Thus, the economic incentives built into the ASP system would
actually raise Medicaid costs by encouraging the dispensing of more
expensive brand name drugs.
C. Competition Works for Drugs without Payment Limits
Even in cases where a FUL or MAC (Maximum Allowable Cost) is not
established for a generic drug, or is not established as soon as
multiple sources of supply become available, competitive forces at the
retail level help to lower overall Medicaid costs for generics. A good
case in point is what occurred when Prozac (known generically as
fluoxetine) became available in generic form in August 2001. Medicaid
was paying $2.86 per capsule total reimbursement for brand name Prozac
in August 2001, and the price of the first generic (which had an FDA-
granted six-month exclusivity period) was $2.46.
During the six-month period of exclusivity, when only one generic
version can be sold as a result of government policy, pharmacies are
essentially ``price takers''--we have little leverage over a single
source of supply of a generic drug. However, when there are multiple
sources of supply for a generic drug, pharmacies become ``price
makers.'' We can create competition between the multiple sellers of
these generic products.
After the exclusivity period for the first fluoxetine generic
expired in early 2002 and multiple generics came to the market,
Medicaid reimbursement for generic fluoxetine decreased rapidly.
According to data we have analyzed, the average generic reimbursement
for fluoxetine is now about $0.66 per capsule, or almost 75 percent
less than the reimbursement paid when the product first became
available generically. The rapid reduction in the reimbursement
Medicaid pays for this generic resulted from market forces and generic
competition that drove down the overall price of generic fluoxetine.
Medicaid benefits each and every day from this continued competition.
Medicaid's paying $0.66 per capsule total reimbursement for fluoxetine
is much less than the current reimbursement rate of $3.37 per capsule
for brand name Prozac.
D. Policymakers Should Consider Reimbursement for Total ``Market
Basket''
We think it is both fair and good public policy to consider the
adequacy of reimbursement paid to pharmacies by looking at their entire
Medicaid ``market basket'' of drugs provided by pharmacies, by not
singling out the reimbursement paid for certain medications.
With 56,000 community retail pharmacies and upwards of 60,000
individual drug products available in the marketplace, the pharmacy
reimbursement system is built on a series of averages and estimates.
These include the average discount paid by the average pharmacy on the
average wholesale price for prescription products and the average cost
of dispensing a prescription at the average pharmacy. Such a system
will have inherent highs and lows in the various components. But in the
end, Medicaid and pharmacy providers need to strike a fair balance that
would assure--in the aggregate--that Medicaid does not overpay or
underpay, and that providers are adequately compensated for the
``market basket'' of drugs they provide.
In this regard, we sometimes hear criticism that pharmacies are
making excessive markups on Medicaid generic drugs. Pharmacies do not
``mark up'' the prices on prescriptions dispensed to Medicaid
recipients. Payment amounts are based on formulas developed by the
state using Federal guidelines. Here are some of our perspectives on
this issue:
Considering Margins Based on Percentages is Misleading: First, the
perceptions about these so-called ``excessive markups'' are
fueled by the use of ``percentages'' to express the ``markup''
that the pharmacy retains on generic drugs, rather than
considering the absolute dollar margin involved. Using
percentages unfairly make the payments made by Medicaid look
excessive. For example, if a state paid a pharmacy $5 for a
generic that cost the pharmacy $1 to purchase, the markup would
be only $4, yet the percentage markup would be 500%. In
contrast, if the state paid the pharmacy $110 for a brand name
drug that cost the pharmacy $100, the markup would only be 10%,
but the absolute difference would be $10, greater than the 400%
markup on the lower-cost product.
Generic Dispensing Incentives are Necessary and Appropriate: Because
the drug product cost for a generic prescription is lower than
a brand, policy makers should be sure that the gross margin
made by the pharmacy on a generic prescription is equal to or
greater than that made on a brand. Otherwise, the pharmacy may
be economically indifferent as to whether a brand or generic is
dispensed because the pharmacy would make the same gross margin
revenue regardless of the product dispensed. It matters to
Medicaid because the state saves close to $45 each time a
generic equivalent is dispensed for an off-patent brand.
Many Generics are Dispensed at a Loss: In 2004, twelve of the top 25
generic prescription medications paid for by Medicaid were
reimbursed at an average of less than $8 per prescription. With
a pharmacy's average cost to dispense a prescription estimated
to be around $9.45 per prescription, pharmacies are losing
money each time they dispense one of these medications to a
Medicaid recipient. These prescription reimbursement losses are
offset by other prescriptions where the reimbursement may be
higher than the pharmacy's overall costs to dispense.
If this current system based on ``averages'' were to change,
fundamental changes in other parts of the system would also be
necessary--such as substantial increases in pharmacy dispensing fees--
to assure that pharmacies are adequately reimbursed and that they are
still able to provide pharmacy services to Medicaid recipients.
We are also appending to this statement a letter than NACDS sent to
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) last year that raised issues and
concerns with a paper that examined Medicaid reimbursement
policies.3 We believe that the paper overlooked many
important factors about the current Medicaid pharmacy reimbursement
system, and was overly critical of the payments made to pharmacies for
generic drugs. We urge that policymakers read the NACDS response to the
paper.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Medicaid Reimbursements to Pharmacies for Prescription Drugs:
CBO, December 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
III. MEDICAID PRESCRIPTION DRUG PAYMENT REFORM OPTIONS
With that background regarding the current Medicaid pharmacy
reimbursement system, it is now important to consider the implications
of various other alternatives to AWP (Average Wholesale Price) to
reimburse pharmacies under Medicaid. These alternatives include ASP
(Average Sales Price), AMP (Average Manufacturers Price), and WAC
(Wholesale Acquisition Cost).
A. Use of Average Sales Price (ASP) as Medicaid Prescription Drug
Payment Option
To achieve some of its Federal budget savings targets for the next
5 years, the Administration has proposed using ASP, rather than AWP to
reimburse pharmacies for Medicaid prescriptions. In fact, unlike most
states that reimburse pharmacies for both the cost of the prescription
drug and a reasonable dispensing fee, the administration proposes to
reimburse pharmacies ASP plus 6 percent for drug and dispensing costs.
This proposal would generate $5.2 billion in Federal savings over the
next 5 years, or a combined savings of $9.2 Federal and state savings.
This amount represents almost 23 percent of pharmacy's Medicaid gross
margins over this time period, a significant reduction by any measure.
Policymakers should understand that all of the savings under this
policy would be achieved at the expense of pharmacists. None of the
savings would come from reducing the pharmacy's costs of prescription
drugs, which account for 80 percent of the program's total costs,
because pharmacies have no upstream leverage with brand name
manufacturers. We cannot force brand name drug manufacturers to lower
their charges to us for the cost of goods.
Reducing pharmacy Medicaid gross margin prescription revenues by 23
percent could result in significant access problems for Medicaid
recipients, as pharmacies may have to reduce hours or close stores in
response to this significant loss of gross margin revenues. ASP has
other problems as well, which are described below.
ASP Does Not Represent Prices at Which Retail Pharmacies Purchase
Drugs: ASP is calculated as a ``weighted average sales price''
across all payors (except direct Federal sales) for a
particular pharmaceutical, net of various discounts and rebates
given by the manufacturer to the purchaser. However, retail
pharmacies are generally charged higher prices than other
pharmaceutical purchasers, and don't have access to the same
discounts, rebates, and price concessions of other purchasers.
This would mean that pharmacies would buy drugs at a higher
price than they would be reimbursed under ASP.
ASP does not Account for Other Costs to Pharmacies: There are other
costs involved in getting the drug to the pharmacy that ASP
does not account for, such as the pharmacy's costs to manage an
inventory, the costs of getting the drug to the local pharmacy
site, and the costs of complying with state and Federal
pharmaceutical regulations. Even adding a markup factor to the
ASP amount (e.g. ASP +6 percent) may not make a pharmacy whole
just for acquiring the drug, no less the costs of storing,
inventory, warehousing, and distribution of the drug. This
could force participating pharmacies to provide these products
at a loss, and create potential access problems for Medicaid
recipients.
ASP is Not Based on Current Market Prices: ASP is an outdated price,
since it is calculated on data that is two calendar quarters
old. Thus, it would not reflect the current prices at which
retail pharmacies are purchasing prescription drugs. If ASP had
been in effect on January 1, 2005 for Medicaid, community
retail pharmacies would have been significantly disadvantaged
in terms of Medicaid reimbursement for brand name drugs. That
is because many brand name manufacturers increased prices in
excess of 6 percent at the beginning of the year. Because the
first quarter 2005 ASP rates would have been based on third
quarter 2004 (July-September) sales data reported by the
manufacturers, retail pharmacies would have to absorb any price
increases after September 2004, the end of the third quarter
2004, all the way through March 2005.
ASP Proposal Does Not Envision Higher Medicaid Pharmacy Dispensing
Fees: The President's budget proposal does not include
additional funds for pharmacy dispensing fees that would
compensate for reductions in payment for drug products
resulting from the new ASP methodology. Medicare Part B moved
in January to an ASP plus 6 percent reimbursement for the few
oral drugs covered by Medicare Part B, but CMS is paying a
supplying fee of $24 per prescription. This was because CMS
recognized that the move to an ASP-based system requires a
significant increase in the pharmacy's dispensing fee, or
Medicare beneficiaries would have a hard time finding a retail
pharmacy that would fill their Part B prescriptions.
ASP Does Not Encourage Generic Dispensing: Retail pharmacies are not
given incentives to dispense lower-cost generics under an ASP-
based system. Because generics have a lower cost basis that
brand name drugs, an ASP-based system gives pharmacies
incentives to dispense brands because they would make more
money under an ASP plus 6% system for brands than generics
(i.e. 6% of a $100 brand is $6, but 6% of a $20.00 generic is
only $1.20).
We are encouraged that some members of Congress and other
policymakers are recognizing that the use of ASP as an alternative
reimbursement metric to the current formula may create more issues than
it solves.
B. Use of Average Manufacturers Price (AMP) as Medicaid Prescription
Drug Payment Option
The use of ``Average Manufacturers Price'' (AMP) as a potential
Medicaid payment or reimbursement option has similar problems to the
use of ASP. AMP is defined as the average price paid to manufacturers
by wholesalers for drugs distributed to the retail class of trade. AMP
was created in OBRA 90 for the purpose of calculating the Medicaid drug
rebates paid by manufacturers to states. However, there are several
problems that exist with the use of AMP as a reimbursement metric.
AMP Reflects Manufacturer's Sales, Not Pharmacy's Purchasing Costs:
Like ASP, AMP is a measure of a manufacturer's revenue for a
particular drug in a particular calendar quarter, and does not
represent the prices at which retail pharmacies purchase drugs
from wholesalers, or reflect the costs that pharmacies incur in
purchasing and maintaining a pharmaceutical inventory. Thus, to
approximate a pharmacy's acquisition costs for Medicaid drugs,
AMP would have to be increased by a significant percentage.
AMP Does Not Account for Manufacturers' Price Increases: If AMP had
been in effect on January 1, 2005 for Medicaid, community
retail pharmacies would have been significantly disadvantaged
regarding Medicaid reimbursement for brand name drugs because
many brand name manufacturers increased prices in excess of 6
percent at the beginning of the year. Because the first quarter
2005 AMP rates would have been based on third quarter 2004
(July-September) sales data reported by the manufacturers,
retail pharmacies would have to absorb any price increases
after September 2004, the end of the third quarter 2004, all
the way through March 2005.
AMP includes Mail Order Sales: Unlike ASP, AMP is calculated for the
retail class of trade only; however, like ASP, AMP is a
retrospectively determined price and can be up to six months
outdated. AMP includes both sales to retail pharmacies and mail
order pharmacies, and retail pharmacies do not have access to
the same discounts and rebates that mail order pharmacies do.
As a result, using AMP may mean that retail pharmacies will be
underpaid for Medicaid prescriptions because the reimbursement
will be calculated off a ``blended'' base, including mail order
sales. This would mean that the AMP basis used to reimburse
pharmacies would be lower than if just true retail community
pharmacy sales had been used to calculate AMP.
Significant Variation Exists in AMP Calculations: Many government
reports, including a recent report from the GAO, indicate that
there is wide variation among the manufacturing community in
calculating AMP. Final rules have never been published by CMS
regarding the exact methodology that manufacturers should use
in calculating the AMP values for their drug products.
Therefore, in some cases, manufacturers may be calculating an
AMP value that would underpay pharmacies for Medicaid
prescriptions. Guidelines should be published that help
manufacturers better understand how to calculate AMP so the
rebate payments they make to states are accurate.
AMP Discourages Generic Dispensing: Like ASP, using AMP would
discourage the use of generics. Because generics have a lower
cost basis than brand name drugs, an AMP-based system gives
pharmacies incentives to dispense brands because they would
make more money under an AMP plus 6 percent system for brands
than generics (i.e. 6 % of a $100 brand is $6, while 6% of a
$20.00 generic is $1.20). An AMP system does not encourage
pharmacies to dispense generic drugs. Moreover, in some
calendar quarters, the AMP for a particular generic might be a
negative number. That can happen if the manufacturer's
discounts and rebates for a given year were paid out
disproportionately in a particular calendar quarter. It would
be difficult to base a reimbursement amount to pharmacies on a
negative number.
C. Retail Pharmacy Encourages WAC-Based Reimbursement for Brand Drugs
NACDS has developed an alternative payment method for Medicaid
prescription drugs that is transparent and reliable, reflects current,
real-time prices that pharmacies pay for prescription medications, and
will be fair to pharmacy and Medicaid. This new model will meet or
exceed the Administration's cost-cutting goal by encouraging dispensing
of lower-cost generic drugs.
Brand Name Drugs: Unlike ASP or AMP, wholesale acquisition cost,
known as WAC, is a published, transparent, real-time price that
reflects the prices at which wholesalers buy from manufacturers the
brand name drugs that they sell to independent and chain operated
pharmacies.
The actual amount paid to pharmacies by Medicaid, however, should
be some percentage markup on WAC (i.e., WAC plus a percentage) because
WAC represents the wholesaler's costs to buy the drugs. Retail
pharmacies have additional costs of acquiring drugs from wholesalers or
manufacturers, such as overhead in maintaining a costly pharmaceutical
inventory, delivering the drugs to their stores or warehouses, and
complying with state and Federal regulations, such as board of pharmacy
and DEA requirements. We believe that ``WAC plus a percentage'' would
be an appropriate substitute for AWP, ASP, or AMP in determining
reimbursement for brand name drugs.
Generic Drugs: The CMS Federal Upper Limit (FUL) list has been an
effective tool in saving Medicaid money on generic drugs. Several
hundred generic products currently have a FUL. States can vary these
FUL rates consistent with local market conditions, but Medicaid will
pay states no more than the FUL amounts for this market basket of
generic drugs with FULs. NACDS has worked closely with CMS over the
past several years to make the FUL list more effective in terms of
assuring that Medicaid pays a fair price for generics, but also that
the generic reimbursements simultaneously encourage pharmacies to
dispense generic drugs.
In lieu of WAC, ASP or AMP for multiple source generics, we believe
that policymakers should retain the use of this type of list for
generic drug reimbursement under Medicaid. However, we encourage that
certain changes be made to the way that the list is developed. By using
a FUL list or a minimum ``federal generic reimbursement level'' (FGRL)
for all versions of a particular generic, Medicaid assures that
pharmacies have an incentive to buy the lowest cost generic available.
This FGRL would be set at a percentage of the median or other
market prices for the generic sufficient to encourage generic
dispensing. This approach would allow pharmacies to retain some of the
difference between the cost of that generic and the FGRL. This creates
incentives for pharmacies to dispense generics.
Payment of Adequate Dispensing Fees: NACDS believes that any
Medicaid payment reform system that seeks to pay pharmacies closer to
their acquisition costs for prescription drugs should pay a higher
dispensing fee than currently paid by states. In our view, payment for
the drug product plus the dispensing fee must be considered in tandem
in order to determine whether reimbursement is adequate. Moreover, we
strongly urge that a minimum state Medicaid pharmacy dispensing fee be
determined at the Federal level, with provisions made for annual
updates. We also urge that states be allowed to increase the fee to
account for local concerns, such as assuring adequate access to
pharmacy services in rural areas.
The Center for Pharmacoeconomic Studies at the University of Texas
at Austin recently conducted a survey of national and regional chain
pharmacies to estimate the current costs related to dispensing a
medication within those stores. Confidential operational and financial
data from the most recent corporate fiscal year was provided to the
Center by 40 separate pharmacies representing five geographically-
diverse chain pharmacy companies.
The data were collected using a modified survey instrument based
upon a financial reporting format that has been used within community
pharmacy for well over 20 years. The particular sample used for the
analysis was comprised of both high and low-volume Medicaid dispensing
pharmacies across the country, representing 13 different states. This
sampling method begins to provide us with a description of the broad
range of the costs involved in dispensing prescriptions within a chain
pharmacy.
Overall, the statistical range of costs of dispensing fell between
$8.50 and $10.41 per prescription, with the average within this
particular sample being $9.45 per prescription. Given that current
payments for dispensing fees fall well below this estimate, the results
from this preliminary analysis confirm that more widespread studies are
needed to estimate the actual costs of dispensing medications to
patients. However, policymakers should consider these findings as any
payment system reform proceeds forward, as well as provide for annual
updates to the dispensing fees to keep pace with increasing costs to
operate a pharmacy, especially pharmacy labor costs.
IV. CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, we look forward to working with you and the Members
of the Subcommittee to make sure that the Medicaid prescription drug
payment system is reliable, transparent, and reflects the current
market prices that retail pharmacies pay for prescription drugs. We
want to assure that the system encourages generic dispensing, as well
as continues to make pharmacy services available to Medicaid recipients
in their communities. This is especially important in urban and rural
areas where many Medicaid recipients live.
We also want to work with you to make the Medicaid program in
general, and the drug program in particular, financially sustainable in
the long run. Over 50 million Americans rely on Medicaid for health
care services. Drug coverage is an important part of these needed
health care services. Pharmacists can be partners with the Federal
Medicaid program and the states in trying to deliver the most cost-
effective drug benefit possible. We appreciate your considering these
views as you move forward with these efforts.
Mr. Deal. Thank you.
Ms. King.
STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN KING
Ms. King. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,
thank you for inviting me to be here today to discuss GAO's
report on the Medicaid Prescription Drug Rebate Program. The
hour is late, and I am going to try to be very brief.
There has been a lot of talk here today about how Medicaid
reimbursement is based on the AWP, but I want to talk for a
moment on how the rebate is calculated. It is calculated as the
difference between the best price, which is defined as the
lowest price to any manufacturer, and the AMP, the average
manufacturer price, which we have talked about today, which is
the lowest price--I am sorry, the average price paid to a
manufacturer by wholesalers for drugs distributed to the retail
pharmacy class of trade. So the rebate is calculated as the
difference between those two, or 15.1 percent, whichever is
greater.
The Drug Rebate Program is administered by CMS. And we were
asked to conduct a study on that, and we focused mostly on the
oversight of the program, and we had three basic findings. One,
we found that CMS's oversight does not ensure that the
manufacturer-reported prices of drugs or the price
determinations that are set are consistent with the rebate
wall, the agreement entered into with manufacturers, or the
guidance developed by CMS.
In administering the program, we found that CMS conducted
only limited checks for reporting errors in the prices that
manufacturers reported. And in addition, CMS only reviews the
manufacturers' price determination methods when they ask for
recalculations of prior rebates. The OIG, the Office of the
Inspector General, has also issued a number of reports on the
rebate program. They identified a number of factors that
limited their ability to verify the accuracy of drug prices,
including a lack of clear guidance by CMS on how the AMP should
be calculated. In some cases, the OIG also found problems with
manufacturers' price determination methods and reported prices.
We found that CMS had not followed up with manufacturers to
make sure that the problems identified by the OIG had been
resolved.
Our second finding is that we found considerable variation
in the methods that manufacturers use to determine the best
price and the AMP. And I should tell you that under the law,
manufacturers are allowed to make certain assumptions,
differing assumptions when determining the best price in the
AMP. We found that manufacturers made varying assumptions about
which sales and prices to include and exclude from their
calculations and that manufacturers differed in how they
accounted for certain price reductions, fees, and other
transactions in determining the best price in the AMP. In some
cases, the manufacturers' assumptions could have lowered
rebates and in some cases, they could have raised the rebates.
Our third finding is that the rebates that the
manufacturers paid to States may not reflect certain financial
concessions that operate in today's complex market. For
example, the role of pharmacy benefit managers, which was not
envisioned to the same extent in 1990 when the rebate law was
passed. The guidance that CMS has provided does not clearly
identify how the PBMs have to deal with price concessions.
As a result of our report, we made two recommendations.
The first is that we recommended that CMS issue clear
guidance on how manufacturers should determine their prices and
the definitions of the best price in the AMP. And we also have
recommended they update this guidance as additional issues
arise. This is important in a market that is changing quickly.
Our second recommendation is that CMS implement, in
consultation with the OIG, systematic oversight of the price
determination methods employed by pharmaceutical manufacturers
and a plan to ensure the accuracy of the prices that
manufacturers report. HHS agreed with us on the importance of
guidance to manufacturers but disagreed with our conclusion
that they had exercised inadequate oversight.
This concludes my prepared statement. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Kathleen King follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kathleen King, Director, Health Care, United
States Government Accountability Office
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to be
here today to discuss our report entitled Medicaid Drug Rebate Program:
Inadequate Oversight Raises Concerns about Rebates Paid to States,
which we issued in February 2005.1 Prescription drug
spending accounts for a substantial and growing share of state Medicaid
program outlays. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990
established the Medicaid drug rebate program 2 to help
control Medicaid drug spending. Under the rebate program,
pharmaceutical manufacturers pay rebates to states as a condition for
the federal contribution to Medicaid spending for the manufacturers'
outpatient prescription drugs. In recent years, the importance of
Medicaid rebates to states has grown as Medicaid spending on
prescription drugs has risen. From fiscal year 2000 to 2003, Medicaid
drug spending increased at an annual average rate of 18 percent, while
Medicaid spending as a whole grew 10 percent annually during that
period. In fiscal year 2003, Medicaid drug expenditures were $33.8
billion out of $273.6 billion in total Medicaid spending; under the
rebate program, manufacturers paid rebates to states of about $6.5
billion for covered outpatient
drugs.3,4
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\1\ See GAO, Medicaid Drug Rebate Program: Inadequate Oversight
Raises Concerns about Rebates Paid to States, GAO05102 (Washington,
D.C.: Feb. 4, 2005).
\2\ Pub. L. No. 101-508, 4401, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-143-161
(codified at 42 U.S.C. 1396r-8 (2000)). All states and the District
of Columbia participate in the Medicaid drug rebate program, except for
Arizona.
\3\ State Medicaid programs do not purchase drugs directly but
rather reimburse pharmacies when they dispense covered outpatient drugs
to Medicaid beneficiaries. These payments, which include an amount to
cover the cost of acquiring the drug as well as a dispensing fee, are
calculated using state-specific payment formulas.
\4\ This rebate amount includes the three types of rebates included
in the Medicaid drug rebate program: the ``basic'' rebate for brand
name drugs, the ``additional'' rebate for brand name drugs, and the
rebate for generic drugs.
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Medicaid rebates for brand name outpatient drugs are calculated
with two prices that participating manufacturers must report to the
federal government for each drug: the ``best price'' and the ``average
manufacturer price'' (AMP). Best price and AMP represent prices that
are available from manufacturers to entities that purchase their drugs.
Best price for a drug is the lowest price available from the
manufacturer to any purchaser, with some exceptions. AMP for a drug is
the average price paid to a manufacturer by wholesalers for drugs
distributed to the retail pharmacy class of trade. Both best price and
AMP must reflect certain financial concessions, such as discounts, that
are available to drug purchasers. The basic Medicaid rebate for a brand
name drug equals the number of units of the drug paid for by the state
Medicaid program multiplied by the basic ``unit rebate amount'' for the
drug, which is either the difference between best price and AMP, or
15.1 percent of AMP, whichever is greater.5 The closer best
price is to AMP, the more likely the rebate will be based on 15.1
percent of AMP--the minimum rebate amount.
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\5\ This testimony focuses on the basic rebate for brand name
drugs, not the additional rebate for brand name drugs--which occurs
when a brand name drug's AMP rises faster than inflation, as measured
by changes in the consumer price index--or the rebate for generics. The
total unit rebate amount for a brand name drug includes the basic
rebate and any additional rebate.
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The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) administers and
oversees the rebate program, entering into rebate agreements with
manufacturers,6 collecting and reviewing manufacturer-
reported best prices and AMPs, and providing ongoing guidance to
manufacturers and states on the program. The Secretary of Health and
Human Services, by law, may verify manufacturer-reported prices and has
delegated that authority to the Department of Health and Human
Services' (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG).
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\6\ The rebate agreement is a standard contract between CMS and
each manufacturer that governs manufacturers' participation in the
rebate program, providing, among other things, definitions of key
terms.
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In this testimony, I will discuss our February 2005 report, in
which we addressed (1) federal oversight of manufacturer-reported best
prices and AMPs and the methods manufacturers used to determine those
prices, (2) how manufacturers' methods of determining best price and
AMP could have affected the rebates they paid to state Medicaid
programs, and (3) how the rebate program reflects financial concessions
available in the private market.
In carrying out our work, we reviewed the rebate statute, the
standard rebate agreement between CMS and participating manufacturers,
CMS program memoranda, OIG reports on the rebate program, and market
literature; interviewed officials from CMS and OIG; and conducted an
analysis of rebates for brand name drugs, for which we reviewed the
pricing methodologies for the 13 manufacturers that accounted for the
highest Medicaid expenditures in the last two quarters of 2000. We
compared manufacturers' methods of determining best price and AMP to
the rebate statute, rebate agreement, and relevant CMS program
memoranda. In addition, we examined sales transaction data provided by
these manufacturers. We received data for the 10 brand name drugs that
produced the highest Medicaid expenditures for the last two quarters of
2000 for each manufacturer, as well as data for 5 additional frequently
prescribed brand name drugs--135 drugs in total. We examined the sales
transaction data to understand how manufacturers implemented their
price determination methods and to calculate the impact of manufacturer
practices on rebates. Because we purposely selected manufacturers and
drugs that accounted for a large share of Medicaid drug spending, the
results of our analysis cannot be generalized. We performed our work
from December 2003 through January 2005 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.
In brief, we reported in February 2005 that rebate program
oversight does not ensure that manufacturer-reported prices or price
determination methods are consistent with program criteria as specified
in the rebate statute, rebate agreement, and CMS program memoranda. We
found that CMS conducts only limited checks for reporting errors in
manufacturer-reported drug prices and only reviews price determination
methods when manufacturers request recalculations of prior rebates. In
addition, OIG reported that its review efforts were hampered by unclear
CMS guidance on how manufacturers are to determine AMP and by a lack of
manufacturer documentation. Although OIG in some cases identified
problems with manufacturers' price determination methods and reported
prices, CMS had not followed up with manufacturers to make sure that
those problems had been resolved. We also found considerable variation
in the methods that the manufacturers we reviewed used to determine
best price and AMP. In some cases, manufacturers' assumptions could
have lowered rebates; in other cases, their assumptions could have
raised rebates. Manufacturers are allowed to make reasonable
assumptions when determining best price and AMP, as long as those
assumptions are consistent with the law and the rebate agreement. We
found that manufacturers made varying assumptions about which sales and
prices to include and exclude from their determinations of best price
and AMP. We also found that manufacturers differed in how they
accounted for certain price reductions, fees, and other transactions
when determining best price and AMP. Finally, we found that the rebates
that manufacturers pay to states are based on prices and financial
concessions that manufacturers make available to entities that purchase
their drugs but may not reflect certain financial concessions they
offer to other entities in today's complex market. In particular, the
rebate program does not clearly address certain concessions that are
negotiated by pharmacy benefit managers (PBM) on behalf of third-party
payers--concessions that are a relatively new development in the
market.
We concluded that although the rebate program relies on
manufacturer-reported prices to determine the level of rebates that
manufacturers pay to states, CMS has not provided clear program
guidance for manufacturers to follow when determining those prices; in
addition, oversight by CMS and OIG has been inadequate to ensure that
manufacturer-reported prices and methods are consistent with the law,
rebate agreement, and CMS program memoranda. We recommended that CMS
take several steps to improve program guidance and oversight, namely,
to issue clear guidance on manufacturer price determination methods and
the definitions of best price and AMP; update such guidance as
additional issues arise; and implement, in consultation with OIG,
systematic oversight of the price determination methods employed by
pharmaceutical manufacturers and a plan to ensure the accuracy of
manufacturer-reported prices and rebates to states. HHS agreed with the
importance of guidance to manufacturers, but disagreed with our
conclusion that there has been inadequate program oversight. We
acknowledged HHS's oversight actions, but stated that HHS oversight
does not adequately ensure the accuracy of manufacturer-reported prices
and rebates paid to states. Some of the manufacturers that supplied
data for the report raised concerns about our discussion of certain
methods they used to determine rebates, and we clarified our discussion
of manufacturers' price determination methods.
BACKGROUND
The Medicaid drug rebate program provides savings to state Medicaid
programs through rebates for outpatient prescription drugs that are
based on two prices per drug that manufacturers report to CMS: best
price and AMP. These manufacturer-reported prices are based on the
prices that manufacturers receive for their drugs in the private market
and are required to reflect certain financial concessions such as
discounts.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers sell their products directly to a
variety of purchasers, including wholesalers, retailers such as chain
pharmacies, and health care providers such as hospitals that dispense
drugs directly to patients. The prices that manufacturers charge vary
across purchasers. The amount a manufacturer actually realizes for a
drug is not always the same as the price that is paid to the
manufacturer at the time of sale. Manufacturers may offer purchasers
rebates or discounts that may be realized after the initial sale, such
as those based on the volume of drugs the purchasers buy during a
specified period or the timeliness of their payment. The private market
also includes PBMs, which manage prescription drug benefits for third-
party payers and may also operate mail-order pharmacies.7
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\7\ See GAO, Federal Employees' Health Benefits: Effects of Using
Pharmacy Benefit Managers on Health Plans, Enrollees, and Pharmacies,
GAO03196 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10, 2003).
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The statute governing the Medicaid drug rebate program and the
standard rebate agreement that CMS signs with each manufacturer define
best price and AMP and specify how those prices are to be used to
determine the rebates due to states. In the absence of program
regulations,8 CMS has issued program memoranda 9
in order to provide further guidance to manufacturers regarding how to
determine best price and AMP.10 The rebate agreement states
that in the absence of specific guidance on the determination of best
price and AMP, manufacturers may make ``reasonable assumptions'' as
long as those assumptions are consistent with the ``intent'' of the
law, regulations, and the rebate agreement.11 As a result,
price determination methods may vary across manufacturers, particularly
with respect to which transactions they consider when determining best
price and AMP.
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\8\ In 1995, CMS issued a proposed rule for implementation of the
drug rebate program, which included provisions regarding best price,
AMP, and manufacturer reporting requirements. See 60 Fed. Reg. 48442
(1995). Only a portion of that rule--concerning the length of time
manufacturers are able to report price adjustments to CMS and how long
they must retain documentation of their reported prices--has been
issued in final form. See 69 Fed. Reg. 68815 (2004), 68 Fed. Reg. 51912
(2003).
\9\ As of October 2004, CMS had issued a total of 65 program
memoranda--also called ``program releases''--to manufacturers to
provide guidance on a range of issues relating to the rebate program.
\10\ CMS also responds to questions from individual manufacturers
on a case-by-case basis. In addition, the agency provides an
operational training guide and training for manufacturers and states on
resolving disputes over state-reported drug utilization information
used to calculate rebate amounts.
\11\ The rebate agreement also requires manufacturers to maintain
records of their assumptions.
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Under the rebate statute, best price is the lowest price available
from the manufacturer to any wholesaler, retailer, provider, health
maintenance organization (HMO), or nonprofit or government entity, with
some exceptions.12 Best price is required to be reduced to
account for cash discounts, free goods that are contingent on purchase
requirements, volume discounts and rebates (other than rebates under
this program), as well as--according to the rebate agreement and a CMS
program memorandum--cumulative discounts and any other arrangements
that subsequently adjust the price actually realized. Prices charged to
certain federal purchasers,13 eligible state pharmaceutical
assistance programs and state-run nursing homes for veterans, and
certain health care facilities--including those in underserved areas or
serving poorer populations--are not considered when determining best
price. Prices available under endorsed Medicare discount card programs,
as well as those negotiated by Medicare prescription drug plans or
certain retiree prescription drug plans, are similarly excluded from
best price. Nominal prices--prices that are less than 10 percent of
AMP--also are excluded from best price.
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\12\ See 42 U.S.C. 1396r-8(c)(1)(C). The rebate agreement further
defines best price as the lowest price at which the manufacturer sells
the drug to any purchaser in any pricing structure, including capitated
payments, with some exceptions.
\13\ Sales made through the Federal Supply Schedule are not
considered in determining best price, nor are single-award contract
prices of any federal agency, federal depot prices, and prices charged
to the Department of Defense, Department of Veterans Affairs, Indian
Health Service, and Public Health Service.
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AMP is defined by statute as the average price paid to a
manufacturer for the drug by wholesalers for drugs distributed to the
retail pharmacy class of trade.14 The transactions used to
calculate AMP are to reflect cash discounts and other reductions in the
actual price paid, as well as any other price adjustments that affect
the price actually realized, according to the rebate agreement and a
CMS program memorandum.15 Under the rebate agreement, AMP
does not include prices to government purchasers based on the Federal
Supply Schedule, prices from direct sales to hospitals or HMOs, or
prices to wholesalers when they relabel drugs they purchase under their
own label.
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\14\ See 42 U.S.C. 1396r-8(k)(1). The statute states that
customary prompt payment discounts are to be subtracted from prices
used to calculate AMP. There is no definition in the statute for
``retail pharmacy class of trade.''
\15\ Under the rebate agreement, AMP is calculated as net sales
divided by units sold, excluding free goods (i.e., drugs or any other
items given away, but not contingent on any purchase requirements).
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The relationship between best price and AMP determines the unit
rebate amount and thus the size of the rebate that states receive for a
brand name drug. The basic unit rebate amount is the larger of two
values: the difference between best price and AMP, or 15.1 percent of
AMP.16 The closer best price is to AMP, the more likely the
rebate for a drug will be based on the minimum amount--15.1 percent of
AMP--rather than the difference between the two values. A state's
rebate for a drug is the product of the unit rebate amount and the
number of units of the drug paid for by the state's Medicaid program.
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\16\ See 42 U.S.C. 1396r-8(c)(1).
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Manufacturers pay rebates to states on a quarterly basis. They are
required to report best price and AMP for each drug to CMS within 30
days of the end of each calendar quarter. Once CMS receives this
information, the agency uses the rebate formula to calculate the unit
rebate amount for the smallest unit of each drug, such as a tablet,
capsule, or ounce of liquid. CMS then provides the unit rebate amount
to the states. Each state determines its Medicaid utilization for each
covered drug--as measured by the total number of the smallest units of
each dosage form, strength, and package size the state paid for in the
quarter--and reports this information to the manufacturer within 60
days of the end of the quarter. The manufacturer then must compute and
pay the rebate amount to each state within 30 days of receiving the
utilization information.
Manufacturers are required to report price adjustments to CMS when
there is a change in the prices they reported for a prior quarter.
These adjustments may result from rebates, discounts, or other price
changes that occur after the manufacturers submit prices to CMS.
Manufacturers also may request that CMS recalculate the unit rebate
amounts using revised prices if they determine that their initially
reported prices were incorrect because of, for example, improper
inclusion or exclusion of certain transactions. In 2003, CMS issued a
final rule that, effective January 1, 2004, limits the time for
manufacturers to report any price adjustments to 3 years after the
quarter for which the original price was reported.17
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\17\ The 2003 final rule addressed the time frame for reporting
price adjustments to CMS and the time frame for retaining documentation
of reported prices. See 68 Fed. Reg. 51912, 55527 (2003).
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PROGRAM OVERSIGHT DOES NOT ENSURE THAT MANUFACTURER-REPORTED PRICES OR
PRICE DETERMINATION METHODS ARE CONSISTENT WITH PROGRAM CRITERIA
As we reported in February 2005, the minimal oversight by CMS and
OIG of manufacturer-reported prices and price determination methods
does not ensure that those prices or methods are consistent with
program criteria, as specified in the rebate statute, rebate agreement,
and CMS program memoranda. CMS conducts limited reviews of prices and
only reviews price determination methods when manufacturers request
recalculations of prior rebates. In addition, OIG reported that its
review efforts had been hampered by unclear CMS guidance on how to
determine AMP and by a lack of manufacturer documentation. Although OIG
in some cases identified problems with manufacturers' price
determination methods and reported prices, CMS had not followed up with
manufacturers to make sure that those problems were resolved.
CMS reviews drug prices submitted by approximately 550
manufacturers that participate in the program. Each quarter, CMS
conducts automated data edit checks on the best prices and AMPs for
about 25,000 drugs to identify reporting errors. These checks are
intended to allow CMS to ensure that, for example, prices are submitted
in the correct format and that the reported prices are for drugs
covered by Medicaid. When data checks indicate a potential reporting
error, CMS asks the manufacturer for corrected drug prices, but CMS
does not have a mechanism in place to track whether the manufacturer
submits corrected prices. CMS sometimes identifies other price
reporting errors when it calculates the unit rebate amount for a drug,
but the agency does not follow up with manufacturers to verify that
errors have been corrected. For example, CMS notifies a manufacturer if
the unit rebate amount for a drug deviates from that of the prior
quarter by more than 50 percent. It would be up to that manufacturer to
indicate whether the underlying reported prices were correct. If the
manufacturer determined that there were problems with the reported
price--for example, typographical errors such as misplaced decimals--it
would send corrected data to CMS.18 If the manufacturer did
not send revised pricing data to CMS, then the unit rebate amount would
remain the same.
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\18\ In this situation, the manufacturer also would recalculate the
unit rebate amount and, once invoiced by the states with total
utilization for the drug paid for by Medicaid, would send the rebate
payment to those states based on the recalculated unit rebate amount.
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CMS does not generally review the methods and underlying
assumptions that manufacturers use to determine best price and AMP,
even though these methods and assumptions can have a substantial effect
on rebates. Furthermore, CMS does not generally check to ensure that
manufacturers' methods are consistent with the rebate statute and
rebate agreement, but rather reviews the methods only when
manufacturers request recalculations of prior rebates. A manufacturer
may request a recalculation of a prior rebate any time it changes the
methods it uses to determine best price or AMP. CMS requires the
manufacturer to submit both its original and its revised methods when
requesting a recalculation of prior rebates so that the agency can
evaluate whether the revised methods are consistent with the rebate
statute, rebate agreement, and program memoranda. Recalculations can
involve substantial amounts of money; for example, six approved
recalculations we examined reduced prior rebates to states by a total
of more than $220 million.
In reports on its audits of manufacturer-reported prices, OIG
stated that its efforts were hampered by unclear CMS guidance on
determining AMP and by a lack of manufacturer documentation. In its
first review of manufacturer-reported prices in 1992, OIG found that it
could not verify the AMPs reported by the four manufacturers it
reviewed.19 OIG could not evaluate manufacturers' methods
for determining AMP because neither the rebate statute nor CMS had
provided sufficiently detailed instructions on methods for calculating
AMP. OIG therefore advised CMS that it planned no future AMP data
audits until CMS developed a specific written policy on how AMP was to
be calculated. CMS disagreed, saying that the rebate statute and rebate
agreement had already established a methodology for computing AMP and
stressed that this methodology was clarified, at manufacturer request,
on an as-needed basis through conversations with individual
manufacturers.20
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\19\ See HHS OIG, Medicaid Drug Rebates: The Health Care Financing
Administration Needs to Provide Additional Guidance to Drug
Manufacturers to Better Implement the Program, A-06-91-00092
(Washington, D.C.: November 1992).
\20\ Although CMS disagreed with OIG, it said it would further
clarify AMP calculation in a forthcoming drug rebate program
regulation. As of October 2004, the regulation had not been issued; as
we reported, CMS officials told us that the agency had no plans to
promulgate any such regulation in the near future. Instead, CMS has
issued several program memoranda intended to provide guidance on how
manufacturers should calculate AMP.
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In its second review of manufacturer-reported prices, in 1995 OIG
attempted to verify one manufacturer's recalculation request. While OIG
reported that it could not complete its analysis because of inadequate
manufacturer documentation,21 it was able to identify some
manufacturer errors in determining AMP. In its review, OIG found that
the manufacturer had miscalculated its revised AMP because it included
``free goods'' specifically excluded in the rebate agreement,
miscalculated cash discounts, and improperly included sales rebates
applicable to a period other than the quarter being audited. OIG
recommended that CMS have the manufacturer revise its AMP data.
Although CMS agreed with OIG's recommendations, as of October 2004, it
had not required any such revision of the audited manufacturer's AMP
determinations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ OIG reports on individual manufacturers are not publicly
available.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its third review, conducted in 1997, OIG attempted to review a
manufacturer's recalculation request but again reported that it was
unable to complete its evaluation because of a lack of specific
guidance on determining AMP and a lack of manufacturer documentation
supporting its revised AMP. In the absence of guidance from CMS, OIG
defined retail pharmacy class of trade for this audit to include only
independent and chain pharmacies that sold drugs directly to the
public. Therefore, OIG recommended that CMS ask the manufacturer to
exclude from the calculation of AMP transactions that OIG determined
were to nonretail entities such as mail-order pharmacies, nursing home
pharmacies, independent practice associations, and clinics. OIG also
found that the manufacturer used a flawed methodology to identify
certain sales that it had included in the retail class of trade and
thus AMP. As a result, OIG recommended that CMS ask the manufacturer to
exclude those sales from AMP unless the manufacturer could provide
additional documentation to support the inclusion of those sales in
AMP. Although CMS did not agree with OIG's definition of retail
pharmacy class of trade, CMS concurred with OIG's recommendation to ask
the manufacturer to recalculate AMP.22 As of October 2004,
CMS had not required any revision of this manufacturer's AMP
determinations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ In response to OIG recommendations, CMS said it would provide
the manufacturer with a copy of recent guidance on AMP: Medicaid Drug
Rebate Program Release No. 29, June 1997. This document, released to
all manufacturers at the time OIG was conducting the 1997 review, in
some cases differed from OIG's definition of retail pharmacy class of
trade. It stated, for example, that sales to nursing home and mail-
order pharmacies are to be included in AMP, while OIG's definition
excluded these entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its fourth review of manufacturer-reported prices, issued in
2001, OIG investigated how manufacturers were treating repackagers--
entities like HMOs that repackage or relabel drugs under their own
names--in their best price determinations. The work followed up on
previous work OIG conducted in response to a congressional inquiry in
1999. The rebate statute states that HMO sales are required to be
included in best price determinations. CMS's June 1997 program
memorandum stated that sales to other manufacturers that repackage the
drugs are to be excluded from best price determinations. However, the
rebate statute, rebate agreement, and CMS program memoranda did not
address how HMOs should be treated when they act as repackagers. In a
letter issued in response to the 1999 congressional request, OIG
reported that excluding drug sales to two HMOs that acted as
repackagers from best price determinations lowered state rebate amounts
by $27.8 million in fiscal year 1998.23 In July 2000, CMS
issued an additional program memorandum to manufacturers stating that
sales to an HMO should be considered in best price determinations
regardless of whether the HMO was a repackager.24 In 2001,
OIG reported that states lost $80.7 million in rebates in fiscal year
1999 because of improperly excluded drug sales to HMO
repackagers.25 In September 2004, a CMS official told us
that CMS planned to release a program memorandum instructing
manufacturers to revise prior rebates for which they had excluded sales
to HMOs from best price. However, CMS does not have a mechanism in
place to track that manufacturers have made these rebate adjustments
and therefore cannot verify that manufacturers have made or will make
these adjustments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Letter from HHS OIG to Ranking Minority Member, Committee on
Government Reform, House of Representatives, November 22, 1999.
\24\ Medicaid Drug Rebate Program Release No. 47, July 2000.
\25\ See HHS OIG, Medicaid Drug Rebates: Sales to Repackagers
Excluded from Best Price Determinations, A-06-00-00056 (Washington,
D.C.: March 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As we reported, OIG officials told us that, despite the program
releases issued by CMS, they remain unable to evaluate AMP because of
the lack of clear CMS guidance, particularly related to the retail
pharmacy class of trade and treatment of PBM transactions.
manufacturer price determination methods varied: some could have led to
LOWER REBATES
As we reported, we found considerable variation in the methods that
the manufacturers we reviewed used to determine best price and AMP.
Manufacturers are allowed to make reasonable assumptions when
determining best price and AMP, as long as those assumptions are
consistent with the law and the rebate agreement. The assumptions often
pertain to the transactions, including discounts or other price
reductions, that are considered in determining best price and AMP. We
found that in some cases manufacturers' assumptions could have led to
lower rebates and in other cases to higher rebates. Manufacturers can
later revise their assumptions and request recalculations of previously
paid rebates, which can result in states repaying any excess rebates.
We found that manufacturers made varying assumptions about which
sales and prices to include and exclude from their determinations of
best price and AMP. For example, some included sales to a broad range
of facilities in AMP, excluding only transactions involving facilities
explicitly excluded by the law, rebate agreement, or CMS program
memoranda. In contrast, others included sales to a narrower range of
purchasers--only those purchasers explicitly included in AMP by the
law, rebate agreement, or CMS program memoranda. Manufacturers also
differed in how they treated certain types of health care providers
that are not explicitly addressed by the law, rebate agreement, or CMS
program memoranda. For example, some manufacturers included sales to
physician groups in AMP, while others did not. These assumptions can
affect the reported prices and, in turn, the size of rebates paid to
states.
We also found that manufacturers also differed in how they
accounted for certain price reductions, fees, and other transactions
when determining best price and AMP. For example, manufacturers
differed in how they accounted for certain transactions involving
prompt payment discounts. In some cases, manufacturers' assumptions
could have reduced rebates below what they otherwise would have been.
In other cases, manufacturers' methods could have raised rebates. For
example, some manufacturers included in the determination of best price
the contract prices they had negotiated with purchasers, even if they
made no sales at those prices during the reporting quarter. This
practice could have increased rebates to states.26
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ One manufacturer, however, indicated that it later might
revise this practice and request recalculations to recoup any excess
rebates it had already paid. Manufacturers have up to 3 years to make
such revisions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
REBATE PROGRAM DOES NOT CLEARLY ADDRESS CERTAIN FINANCIAL CONCESSIONS
NEGOTIATED BY PBMS
As we reported, the rebates that manufacturers pay to states are
based on a range of prices and financial concessions that manufacturers
make available to entities that purchase their drugs, but they may not
reflect certain financial concessions manufacturers offer to other
entities in today's complex market. In particular, the rebate program
does not clearly address certain concessions that are negotiated by
PBMs on behalf of third-party payers, such as employer-sponsored health
plans and other health insurers. The rebate program did not initially
address these types of concessions, which are relatively new to the
market. CMS's subsequent guidance to manufacturers has not clearly
stated how manufacturers should treat these concessions in their
determinations of best price and AMP. Within the current structure of
the rebate formula, additional guidance on how to account for
manufacturer payments to PBMs could affect the rebates paid to states,
although whether rebates would increase or decrease as a result, and by
how much, is uncertain.
Certain manufacturer financial concessions that are negotiated by
PBMs on behalf of their third-party payer clients are not clearly
reflected in best price or AMP. PBMs, in one of the roles they play in
the market, may negotiate payments from manufacturers to help reduce
their third-party payer clients' costs for prescription
drugs.27 (In these circumstances, the third-party payer does
not purchase drugs directly from the manufacturer but instead covers a
portion of the cost when its enrollees purchase drugs from pharmacies.)
The basis of these PBM-negotiated manufacturer payments varies. For
example, manufacturers may make a payment for each unit of a drug that
is purchased by third-party payer enrollees or may vary payment
depending on a PBM's ability to increase the utilization, or expand the
market share, of a drug. The payment may be related to a specific drug
or a range of drugs offered by the manufacturer. The amount of
financial gain PBMs receive from these negotiated payments also varies.
A PBM may pass on part or all of a manufacturer's payment to a client,
depending on the terms of their contractual relationship. Manufacturers
may not be parties to the contracts that PBMs have with their clients
and so may not know the financial arrangements between the PBMs and
their clients.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ GAO03196.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These types of financial arrangements between manufacturers and
PBMs are a relatively new development in the market. When the program
began in 1991, PBMs played a smaller role in the market, managing fewer
covered lives and providing a more limited range of services--such as
claims processing--for their clients. Since then, PBMs' role has grown
substantially, contributing to a market that is much more complex,
particularly with respect to the types of financial arrangements
involving manufacturers. PBMs now commonly negotiate with manufacturers
for payments on behalf of their clients, in addition to providing other
services. Although complete data on the prevalence and magnitude of
PBM-negotiated manufacturer payments are not readily available, PBM
officials and industry experts have said that these and other
manufacturer payments to PBMs are a large portion of PBMs' earnings;
28 further, recent public financial information suggests
that manufacturer payments to PBMs as a whole are substantial and key
to PBMs' profitability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ GAO03196.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CMS has acknowledged the complexity that arrangements between
manufacturers and PBMs introduce into the rebate program but has not
clearly addressed how these arrangements should be reflected in
manufacturer-reported prices. In 1997, CMS issued program memoranda
that noted new types of arrangements involving manufacturer payments to
PBMs and attempted to clarify whether those arrangements should be
reflected in best price and AMP.29 However, in a program
memorandum issued shortly thereafter, CMS stated that there had been
confusion concerning the intent of the previous program memoranda and
that the agency had ``intended no change'' to program
requirements.30 At the time, CMS said that staff were
reexamining the issue and planned to shortly clarify the agency's
position. As of January 2005, CMS had not issued such clarifying
guidance on how PBM-negotiated manufacturer payments should be
reflected in best price and AMP when PBMs have negotiated on behalf of
third parties. CMS officials with responsibility for issuing program
memoranda advised us that they could comment only on specific
situations. They stated that financial arrangements among entities in
the market are complex and always changing; in their view, the market
is too complicated for them to issue general policy guidance that could
cover all possible cases. Rather, these officials told us that they
make determinations about PBM payments on a case-by-case basis, but
only when manufacturers contact them regarding this issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Medicaid Drug Rebate Program Release No. 28, April 1997, and
Medicaid Drug Rebate Program Release No. 29, June 1997.
\30\ Medicaid Drug Rebate Program Release No. 30, September 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within the current structure of the rebate formula, additional
guidance on how to account for manufacturer payments to PBMs could
affect the rebates paid to states, although whether rebates would
increase or decrease as a result, and by how much, is uncertain.
Because of the structure of the rebate formula, any change in the
determination of best price and AMP could raise or lower rebates for
any given drug, depending on how the change affects the relationship
between those prices. Incorporating PBM-negotiated manufacturer
payments into the rebate determination could decrease the unit rebate
amount for a drug if, for example, it reduced AMP but had no effect on
best price.31 Alternatively, if such a change increased the
difference between AMP and best price for a drug, the unit rebate
amount could increase.32
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ A change in guidance regarding how PBM payments should be
reflected in best price would not necessarily affect the best price for
every drug because best price can be determined by a transaction that
is not related to PBM payments.
\32\ A greater difference between best price and AMP would not
always yield a larger rebate. For example, if the difference between
the two prices increased but remained less than 15.1 percent of AMP,
the unit rebate amount would still be based on the 15.1 percent of AMP
minimum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
As we stated in our report, because the rebate program relies on
manufacturer-reported prices, adequate program oversight is important
to ensure that states receive the rebates to which they are entitled.
However, CMS has not provided clear program guidance for manufacturers
to follow when determining prices, and this has hampered OIG's efforts
to audit manufacturers' methods and reported prices. In addition,
oversight by CMS and OIG has been inadequate to ensure that
manufacturer-reported prices and methods are consistent with the law,
rebate agreement, and CMS program memoranda. As a result, we
recommended that CMS take several steps to improve program guidance and
oversight, namely, to issue clear guidance on manufacturer price
determination methods and the definitions of best price and AMP; update
such guidance as additional issues arise; and implement, in
consultation with OIG, systematic oversight of the price determination
methods employed by pharmaceutical manufacturers and a plan to ensure
the accuracy of manufacturer-reported prices and rebates to states. We
believe that these actions could help ensure that the Medicaid drug
rebate program achieves its objective of controlling states' Medicaid
drug spending. HHS agreed with the importance of guidance to
manufacturers, but disagreed with our conclusion that there has been
inadequate program oversight. We acknowledged HHS's oversight actions,
but stated that HHS oversight does not adequately ensure the accuracy
of manufacturer-reported prices and rebates paid to states. Some of the
manufacturers that supplied data for the report raised concerns about
our discussion of certain methods they used to determine rebates, and
we clarified our discussion of manufacturers' price determination
methods.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
happy to respond to any questions you or other Members of the
Subcommittee may have.
Mr. Deal. Thank you, Ms. King.
Ms. Gifford, I understand you are under some time
constraints. We will be pleased to hear from you.
STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN D. GIFFORD
Ms. Gifford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee.
My name is Kathy Gifford. I am a former State Medicaid
Director myself, and am now a Principal of Health Management
Associates. Along with my colleague, Sandy Kramer, I recently
prepared a report that discusses potential Federal options to
help contain Medicaid drug costs, and I would like to share
some of those options with you today.
I think maybe you can go right to slide four.
[Slide.]
As you know, drug spending is a significant cost driver in
the health system generally and a particular burden for
Medicaid programs. Virtually all States have implemented
pharmacy cost containment measures, and while the Federal
Government has been generally supportive, more could be done, I
believe, at the Federal level to assist States and promote
efficiencies across the country.
I want to touch very briefly on four general areas: first,
as has been discussed here a lot already, assisting States to
be more prudent purchasers at the retail level; second,
maximizing manufacturer rebates, reducing the ongoing cost
burden on States in the new Medicare drug benefit; and finally,
promoting the delivery of evidence-based cost effective
pharmaceutical care.
Now we have already talked a lot about the issues with AWP,
and those have been clearly stated for the committee already. I
think the Federal Government could be more proactive in
providing States with better data on actual drug acquisition
costs, and I sum it up in three categories. One, come up with a
new data source, and that is what we have been talking about,
ASP. Two, improve the accuracy and reliability of AWP data
potentially by linking it to the Medicaid drug rebate. Or
three, changing Federal law to allow a limited release to
States of confidential drug pricing data that is currently
available to CMS for purposes of the Medicaid Rebate Program.
Now please note that the first option, ASPs, implementing
that would, in my opinion, be no small undertaking. For all
States to benefit, the Federal Government would need to handle
the data collection and timely pricing for tens of thousands of
drug codes used by a typical Medicaid program compared to the
relatively small number of drug codes that are currently
subject to ASP pricing under Medicare part B. Ultimately, the
benefit to States will depend heavily upon the effectiveness of
the Federal Government in calculating and reporting the ASP
prices.
Next slide. And one more slide.
[Slide.]
The Federal Government could assist States to maximize
manufacturer rebates by increasing the federally required
minimum rebate, as was recently suggested by the NGA. Doing so
could help States compensate for the loss of market leverage
they will experience in their supplemental rebate programs when
the new Medicare drug benefit takes effect next year.
The last option on that slide I will touch on briefly
relates to the budget proposal to eliminate the best price
requirement from the Medicaid rebate formula. While no one
really knows what the fiscal impact of this would be, I am
concerned that in the short run, dropping the best price
requirement could undermine existing State preferred drug lists
to the detriment of States from both a fiscal and
administrative standpoint.
Next slide.
[Slide.]
I have included Federal policy options relating to the new
Medicare drug benefit, because States will be directly affected
by Clawback formula by growth in the part D spending. I have
therefore suggested removing the MMA non-interference provision
preventing HHS from negotiating better drug pricing. Even if
HHS chose not to negotiate for better prices, I think the
repeal of this provision may, nevertheless, promote better drug
pricing for Medicare, as drug manufacturers may be more likely
to exercise restraint in their pricing decisions to avoid
provoking a response from HHS.
Next slide, please.
[Slide.]
And finally, let me turn to what I suggest presents the
greatest hope for long-term drug cost containment, and that is
the ability to manage drug utilization using evidence-based
tools, basically making sure that the right drug is made
available to the right person at the right time and in the
right amount, all health payers, public and private, would
benefit from an expansion of the existing base of evidence-
based research. Few States, however, earn a position on their
own to undertake the needed research efforts to fill in the
gaps. We have already discussed, I believe, Section 1013 of the
MMA that recognized this need, and $50 million was authorized
for this purpose in 2004, but only $15 million was actually
budgeted in 2005, and a like amount was proposed in the budget
for 2006 by the President. I believe a greater investment in
comparative effectiveness research now would reap substantial
long-term savings.
And that concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Kathleen D. Gifford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kathleen D. Gifford, Sandy Kramer, Health
Management Associates
Spending on prescription drugs is a major cost driver in the health
care system generally and a particular burden for state Medicaid
programs that provide vital health care coverage for many of the
nation's most medically vulnerable individuals. Medicaid accounts for
nearly one in five dollars spent on prescription drugs in the United
States, and nearly half of those expenditures are for low-income
seniors who are dually eligible for Medicare and Medicaid (``dual
eligibles'').1 In recent years, almost all states have
worked to implement pharmacy cost containment measures that preserve
access to the vital drug therapies upon which Medicaid beneficiaries
rely. The federal government has been generally supportive of state
efforts, but has initiated few of its own. More could be done at the
federal level to assist states and promote efficiencies across the
country. This paper discusses federal options that would assist states
to (a) purchase prescription drugs more effectively at the retail
level, (b) maximize manufacturer rebates, (c) reduce the ongoing cost
burden on states of the new Medicare drug benefit, and (d) promote the
delivery of evidence-based, cost-effective pharmaceutical care.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Brian Bruen and Arunabh Ghosh, ``Medicaid Prescription Drug
Spending and Use,'' June 2004, Washington, D.C., Kaiser Commission on
Medicaid and the Uninsured, Pub. No. 7111.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
BACKGROUND
Since FY 2004, state revenue collections have been slowly
recovering from the most severe fiscal downturn in 60
years.2 Despite improving economic conditions, state revenue
remains below its 2000 peak (after adjusting for inflation and
population growth) 3 and budgets continue to be strained by
Medicaid spending growth that exceeds revenue growth in many states.
The long-term outlook offers little hope for a Medicaid spending
reprieve. Both the Congressional Budget Office and the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) project that over the next decade,
federal Medicaid spending will grow at an average annual rate of more
than eight percent.4
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\2\ National Governors Association, National Association of State
Budget Officers, ``The Fiscal Survey of States,'' December 2004.
\3\ D. Boyd et al, ``State and Local Governments Face Continued
Fiscal Pressure,'' The Rockefeller Institute of Government Fiscal
Studies Program, January 2005.
\4\ Congressional Budget Office, ``The Budget and Economic Outlook:
Fiscal Years 2006 to 2015,'' January 2005, and Stephen Heffler, et al.,
``U.S. Health Spending Projections for 2004--2014,'' Health Affairs Web
Exclusive, February 23, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over the past four years, state Medicaid officials have cited
prescription drugs as one of the top three Medicaid cost drivers along
with enrollment growth and rising medical care costs
generally.5 Indeed, prescription drugs are one of the
fastest growing Medicaid service categories; expenditures doubled
between 1998 and 2002, and have quadrupled since 1992. As a result,
prescription drugs grew from 8 percent of total Medicaid expenditures
in 1998 to over 11 percent in 2002.6 In CY 2003, Medicaid
spending for prescription drugs grew by 17.5 percent, similar to growth
in the previous two years.7 A combination of factors drove
this growth including increases in the number of beneficiaries, drug
utilization growth (i.e., more prescriptions per person), the
substitution of newer, more costly drugs for older, less expensive
drugs, and increases in drug prices. Medicaid drug spending growth is
projected to decelerate to 7.1 percent in CY 2004 due in large part to
state drug cost containment efforts.8 While this is below
the overall rate of drug cost growth (11.9 percent), it is still high
and more can and should be done.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ V. Smith et al, ``The Continuing Medicaid Budget Challenge:
State Medicaid Spending Growth and Cost Containment in Fiscal Years
2004 and 2005,'' October 2004, Washington, D.C., Kaiser Commission on
Medicaid and the Uninsured, Pub. No. 7190.
\6\ B. Bruen and A.Ghosh, June 2004.
\7\ C. Smith et al., ``Health Spending Growth Slows in 2003,''
Health Affairs, 24, no. 1 (2005): 185-194.
\8\ S. Heffler, et al., ``U.S. Health Spending Projections for
2004-2014,'' Health Affairs Web Exclusive, February 23, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Net Medicaid spending on drugs reflects payments made to pharmacies
at the retail level and rebates paid to states by manufacturers. States
have considerable discretion in setting retail pharmacy payments, which
must recognize both drug costs and a dispensing fee. For sole-source
brand name drugs, states must pay the lower of the pharmacy's ``usual
and customary charge'' to the public or the drug's ``estimated
acquisition cost'' (EAC) plus a dispensing fee. Each state determines
its own EAC formula (usually based on the ``average wholesale price''),
and sets its own dispensing fee. The EAC and the dispensing fee amount
vary significantly from state to state. Generic products are often
subject to different pricing rules. Some are subject to a ``federal
upper limit'' (FUL) set by CMS for drugs with generic equivalents that
meet certain criteria. Most states have also chosen to set their own
``maximum allowable cost'' prices for generics, which can be lower than
the FUL and sometimes apply to generics not covered by the FUL.
States struggling with the rapid growth of Medicaid drug spending
hoped that a new Medicare pharmacy benefit would provide significant
state fiscal relief. Instead, to help finance the new drug benefit that
begins in January 2006, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003 9 (the ``MMA'') requires CMS
to recoup from states much of the savings that states would otherwise
have realized from shifting prescription drug coverage for dual
eligibles to Medicare. This recoupment is commonly referred to as the
``Clawback.'' The MMA provides for a ten-year partial phase-down of the
Clawback amount starting at 90 percent in 2006 (in other words,
allowing the states to retain 10 percent of the calculated savings),
and decreasing to 75 percent in 2015 and thereafter. There is, however,
no end to the state Clawback obligation. In practice, many states
believe the Clawback formula is flawed and may result in a negative
state fiscal impact rather than a savings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Pub. L. 108-173
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
STATE ACTIONS TO CONTROL MEDICAID PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING GROWTH
In almost all states, prescription drugs have been the focus of
ongoing, sustained efforts to slow multi-year double-digit cost growth.
In 2004, 47 states and the District of Columbia reported implementing
prescription drug cost containment measures and 43 reported plans to
take additional steps in 2005.10 These measures include
imposing prior authorization requirements and step therapy protocols,
limiting the number of brand prescriptions per month, new or higher
copay requirements and reductions in retail pharmacy reimbursement
policies. States have also hoped to better control drug utilization by
implementing disease management and case management programs and
provider profiling and counter-detailing initiatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ V. Smith et al, October 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 1 below illustrates the results of a 2003 survey of state
Medicaid programs comparing drug cost containment measures reported in
2003 to those reported in 2000.11 Among other things, the
survey results demonstrate the widespread adoption of multiple policies
over a relatively short period of time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Jeffrey S. Crowley et al, ``Medicaid Outpatient Prescription
Drug Benefits: Findings from a National Survey, 2003,'' December 2003,
Washington, D.C., Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Pub.
No. 4164.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A rapidly growing number of states have also chosen to implement
preferred drug lists (PDLs) and negotiate for supplemental rebates from
pharmaceutical manufacturers: 37 states have implemented or plan to
implement a PDL and 33 states currently receive supplemental
rebates.12 More recently, a number of states have joined
multi-state pooling arrangements to increase their market leverage to
maximize supplemental rebates. In April 2004, Health and Human Services
(HHS) Secretary Tommy Thompson approved plans by five states (Michigan,
Vermont, New Hampshire, Alaska, and Nevada) to pool their collective
purchasing power and Minnesota, Hawaii, Montana, Kentucky and Tennessee
subsequently joined this pool. In May 2005, HHS Secretary Mike Leavitt
approved a new multi-state purchasing pool comprised of Louisiana,
Maryland and West Virginia. Over the next year, it is likely that more
states will join a multi-state purchasing pool motivated, in part, by
the January 2006 implementation of the new Medicare drug benefit that
will cut in half direct state Medicaid pharmacy expenditures. (States
will continue to indirectly pay for drug coverage for dual eligibles
through the Clawback.) Since greater volume translates to greater
leverage to negotiate supplemental rebates, states may be forced to
join multi-state pools just to retain their current level of
supplemental rebates after 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Data compiled by the National Conference of State Legislatures
and accessed at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/medicaidrx.htm;
Testimony of Dennis Smith, Director of the Center for Medicaid and
State Operations, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, presented
at a hearing on ``Medicaid Prescription Drug Reimbursement: Why the
Government Pays Too Much,'' before the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, Energy and Commerce Committee, U.S. House of
Representatives, December 7, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
States and the federal government jointly fund Medicaid, and
therefore rising Medicaid prescription drug costs also have adverse
fiscal consequences for the federal budget. In recent years, CMS has
taken some steps to assist and support states with their pharmacy cost
containment activities. In 2002, CMS issued guidance to states
supporting supplemental rebate programs.13 In 2004, CMS
approved requests from a number of states to form a multi-state
purchasing pool. Also, CMS identified selected best practices for
Medicaid pharmacy savings and offered assistance to those states that
have not implemented these effective mechanisms.14 While
these efforts are laudable, more could be done at the federal level to
assist states and promote efficiencies across the country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Dear State Medicaid Director letter dated September 18, 2002
accessed at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/states/letters/smd91802.pdf.
\14\ Included were (1) the long-standing practice of many states to
prior authorize brand name equivalents to generic drugs, (2)
negotiation of manufacturer supplemental rebates, (3) implementation of
disease management programs, and (4) efforts to promote e-prescribing.
Safe and Effective Approaches to Lowering State Prescription Drug
Costs: Best Practices Among State Medicaid Drug Programs (9/9/04),
www.cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/drugs/strategies.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRUDENT PURCHASING AT THE RETAIL LEVEL
States largely operate ``in the dark'' in setting drug cost
reimbursement without access to the actual drug acquisition costs paid
by pharmacies. States typically cover over 50,000 National Drug Codes--
each with its own price that can change unpredictably. It is therefore
a challenge to find adequate current information to set drug
reimbursement rates at levels that fairly compensate pharmacies without
overpaying.
While states often set their own maximum allowable cost prices for
generics and selected brand name drugs, they rely on national firms to
supply electronic drug pricing files for most drugs. States then
determine the pharmacy reimbursement rate by taking a discount from the
reported ``Average Wholesale Price'' (AWP), or by assigning a mark-up
to the reported ``Wholesale Acquisition Cost'' (WAC), and adding a
dispensing fee.15 Reimbursement formulas vary significantly
from state to state. Similar pricing policies are used by private
sector plans, but their rates are often lower than Medicaid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ For example, a state may reimburse a pharmacy at AWP minus 10
to 15 percent plus a fixed dispensing fee of $3 to $5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recent reports by the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) have
highlighted the millions of dollars lost to states and the federal
government each year due to Medicaid overpricing.16 One of
the main culprits for the overpricing is the AWP. The AWP is
essentially a nationally published list price (largely set by
manufacturers) that bears little resemblance to a pharmacy's actual
acquisition cost. Manufacturers may even raise an AWP to artificially
create a larger spread between AWP and actual acquisition cost to
increase retail pharmacy profits, thereby making the product more
attractive to pharmacies. Widely viewed as inflated and flawed, the AWP
was recently abandoned by Medicare Part B (in the MMA) in favor a new
``Average Sales Price'' (ASP) methodology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector
General, ``Variation in State Medicaid Drug Prices,'' September 2004,
OEI-05-02-00681; see also, testimony presented at hearing on ``Medicaid
Prescription Drug Reimbursement: Why the Government Pays Too Much''
before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Energy and
Commerce Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, December 7, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal policy could assist states in becoming more prudent
purchasers at the retail pharmacy level. Proposals 1 through 3 below
present alternatives that would each provide states with better
information to set retail pharmacy reimbursement policies by (1)
providing a new source of drug pricing data (ASPs), (2) improving the
accuracy and reliability of the drug pricing data most commonly used
today (AWPs), or (3) releasing (on a limited basis) drug pricing data
that is currently confidential (AMPs). The fourth proposal calls for
improvements in the current federal FUL program that establishes prices
for certain multi-source drugs.
1. Provide states with accurate and timely ASPs for Medicaid covered
drugs.
For drugs covered under Medicare Part B,17 the MMA
requires Medicare to use an ASP plus 6 percent payment methodology.
``AS'' is the weighted average of all non-federal sales from
manufacturers to wholesalers (net of chargebacks, discounts, rebates,
and other benefits tied to the purchase of the drug product), and is
based on quarterly pricing data supplied to CMS by drug manufacturers.
While some critics argue that the ASP does not accurately reflect a
retail pharmacy's actual acquisition cost, the ASP is likely a better
starting point for estimating that cost than the AWP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Part B drugs include drugs furnished incident to a physician's
service, durable medical equipment drugs, and other drugs covered by
statute, such as oral immunosuppressive, cancer, and antinausea drugs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moving to an ASP methodology in Medicaid, however, would be a
significant and costly undertaking that would be difficult for states
to accomplish on their own. To enable all states to benefit from this
methodology, the federal government (acting through CMS) would need to
handle the data collection and timely pricing of the over 50,000
National Drug Codes commonly covered by state Medicaid programs.
(Currently, CMS collects manufacturer data on only 5,700 National Drug
Codes to price 550 Part B drugs.) States would also need to rely upon
CMS for timely pricing information on new drugs entering the market and
for manufacturer price adjustments that occur from time to time.
(Currently, CMS provides only quarterly updates for Part B drugs
subject to ASP pricing.) Ultimately, the benefit to states of moving to
an ASP methodology would depend heavily upon the effectiveness of CMS
in calculating and reporting the ASP prices.
President Bush's 2006 federal budget proposal would require states
to adopt an ASP plus 6 percent payment methodology (consistent with
Medicare Part B) and estimates federal savings of $542 million in 2006
and $5.4 billion over five years. (The proposal, however, does not
address whether CMS would be responsible for the accurate and timely
calculation of the ASP prices.) While states would benefit from
accurate and reliable ASP pricing information to use in place of the
current inflated and artificial AWP prices, it would likely be
advantageous to allow states to retain some flexibility to revise
payment methodologies as the need for improvements becomes obvious or
necessary over time and to respond to local state conditions.
2. Incentivize manufacturers to set more realistic AWP prices by
linking them to the statutory Medicaid rebate formula.
Created by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, the
Medicaid Drug Rebate Program requires a drug manufacturer to enter into
a national rebate agreement with the secretary of HHS in order for that
manufacturer's drugs to be covered under Medicaid. CMS calculates
rebate amounts using a statutory formula based on the ``average
manufacturer price'' (AMP), defined as the average price paid by
wholesalers for drugs distributed to the retail class of trade. Using
the same benchmark (AWP) for both the rebate formula (instead of AMP)
and pharmacy reimbursement policy would provide an incentive for
manufacturers to establish lower, more realistic AWPs and reduce the
ability of manufacturers to ``game the spread'' between AWP and the
actual acquisition cost. Another way to achieve a similar result would
be to apply a rebate penalty if the difference between AWP and AMP
exceeded 20 percent. Medicare Part B uses a similar technique to
validate ASPs by comparing ASP to AMP. By law, AMPs are confidential
and therefore state Medicaid agencies are unable to implement this type
of reasonableness test for AWPs on their own.
3. Change federal law to allow the release of AMP information to the
states.
The AMP data provided to CMS by drug manufacturers to support the
Medicaid Drug Rebate Program is likely the most accurate drug pricing
data currently available to CMS for non-Medicare Part B drugs. A
limited disclosure of this data to states could be required by federal
law to help states set drug cost reimbursement at appropriate levels,
as has been recommended by the Department of Health and Human Services
Office of the Inspector General.18
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector
General, ``Variation in State Medicaid Drug Prices,'' September 2004,
OEI-05-02-00681.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Improve the process for placing multi-source drugs on the ``Federal
Upper Limit'' (FUL) list.
The FUL program, administered by CMS, limits Medicaid payments for
drugs with generic equivalents that meet certain criteria: there must
be three therapeutically equivalent drug products and CMS must verify
that there are at least three suppliers. If these criteria are met, the
FUL is set at 150 percent of the published AWP price for the least
costly therapeutically equivalent product. This formula implemented in
the late 1980s should be revised to reflect actual market pricing
trends and to use strategies based on AMP markups. Also, in a recent
OIG HHS report, CMS was criticized for failing to add many qualified
drugs to the list and adding others too slowly.19 As the OIG
recommended, CMS at a minimum could focus its resources on high-volume
brand name drugs that are coming off patent that could be placed on the
FUL list and result in significant Medicaid savings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Ibid. See also, testimony of George M. Reeb, Assistant
Inspector General, presented at hearing on ``Medicaid Prescription Drug
Reimbursement: Why the Government Pays Too Much'' before the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Energy and Commerce
Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, December 7, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
MAXIMIZING MANUFACTURER REBATES
The methodology for the required rebate that drug manufacturers
must pay to participate in Medicaid has not been modified for over 12
years, despite rapid growth in prices and costs (see Table 1 below.)
This has forced a growing number of states to seek supplemental
rebates, which can sometimes be difficult for a state to enact.
Proposals 1 through 3 below describe federal policy changes to the
current rebate formula that would increase rebate revenues to states.
The fourth proposal calls for improvements in the administration of the
rebate program and the fifth proposal raises a concern with the rebate
formula modification proposed in the Bush administration's 2006 budget
proposal.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2985.016
20 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicaid
Drug Rebate Program, Operational Training Guide, September 2001.
1. Increase the minimum federally required rebate.
When the new Medicare prescription drug benefit is implemented in
2006, direct state Medicaid drug expenditures will be cut in half. The
lost prescription volume will likely decrease the market leverage that
states have to negotiate supplemental rebates. An updated minimum
rebate would help states compensate for the loss of market leverage and
ensure that all states, as well as the federal government, pay a fair
price for prescription drugs covered by Medicaid. The National
Governors Association, on a bipartisan basis, supports increasing the
rebate.21
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ National Governors Association. 2004. EC-3. Medicaid Drug
Rebate Program. http://www.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/
1,1169,C_POLICY_POSITIOND_3716,00.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Implement an indexed best price calculation in the rebate formula.
To discourage manufacturers from raising AMP amounts, the rebate
formula contains a penalty for AMP price increases that exceed the
consumer price index for urban consumers (CPI-U). The penalty is equal
to the amount that AMP increased over and above the CPI-U. A similar
penalty, however, is not applied for increases in the ``best price''
component of the formula even though drug manufacturers have
consistently increased best price in excess of the CPI-U since the
inception of the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program.22 Indexing
the best price component of the rebate calculation would therefore
increase drug rebates for many brand name drugs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the
Inspector General, Cost-Saver Handbook, ``2004 Red Book.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Add an inflation-related adjustment to the federal rebate formula
for generic drugs.
Unlike the current rebate formula for brand name drugs, the current
formula for generic drugs contains no penalty adjustment for AMP price
increases that exceed the CPI-U. Adding such a penalty could increase
rebate revenues to states, but would also discourage generic
manufacturers from increasing prices in excess of the rate of
inflation.
4. Implement systematic oversight of self-reported manufacturer pricing
data to assure the accuracy of Medicaid drug rebates.
Currently, the calculation of Medicaid drug rebates relies upon
self-reported AMP and ``best price'' data supplied to CMS by drug
manufacturers. In recent years, a number of drug manufacturers have
agreed to pay millions of dollars in legal settlements to resolve
allegations involving the underpayment of Medicaid rebates arising from
the failure to properly report best price. A recent report from the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) also found that current rebate
program oversight by CMS does not assure that manufacturer-reported
drug prices are consistent with applicable laws and program
policies.23 Consistent with GAO recommendations, CMS should
implement a plan to systematically scrutinize AMP and best price data
reported by manufacturers to enforce the accurate payment of Medicaid
drug rebates to states.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ United States Government Accountability Office, ``Medicaid
Drug Rebate Program: Inadequate Oversight Raises Concerns about Rebates
Paid to States,'' February 2005, GAO-05-102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Maintain the ``best price'' calculation in the current rebate
formula.
The president's 2006 budget recommendations propose to eliminate
the best price requirement from the Medicaid drug rebate formula and
replace it with a budget neutral flat rebate to allow private
purchasers to negotiate lower prices from manufacturers. Flat rebates,
however, could dramatically affect the structure of state PDLs and the
savings they currently generate for states. PDL savings are based on
shifting utilization to those drugs with the lowest net cost after
federal and supplemental rebates. If federal rebates change, preferred
products may no longer be cost effective compared to non-preferred
drugs within a class and cost increases could result.
IMPACT OF THE MEDICARE DRUG BENEFIT
When the Medicare prescription drug benefit takes effect in January
2006, state Medicaid programs will no longer provide drug coverage for
dual eligibles but will continue to help finance a substantial portion
of the new Medicare drug coverage through the Clawback. States will
therefore lose the ability to manage the prescription drug benefit for
duals, even as they must continue to finance it. The Clawback formula
includes future annual adjustments based upon per capita spending
growth for the Medicare drug benefit. Thus, states have a direct
interest in how the Medicare drug program is managed: higher per capita
growth in Medicare drug spending means a larger Clawback obligation for
states.
The first two proposals below describe steps that the federal
government could take to constrain the growth in per capita Medicare
drug spending, and thereby directly benefit states by moderating future
growth in the Clawback. Proposals 3 and 4 suggest that the MMA should
be amended to eventually require the federal government to assume the
full financial cost of the Part D benefit for dual eligibles.
1. Eliminate the MMA prohibition preventing CMS from negotiating for
better pharmaceutical pricing.
Section 1860D-11(i) of the Social Security Act, as added by the
MMA, bars the secretary of HHS from interfering with the negotiations
between drug manufacturers and pharmacies and sponsors of prescription
drug plans, or from requiring a particular formulary or price structure
for covered Part D drugs. The CBO has estimated that there would be
negligible savings if this provision was struck,24 but
others disagree. They point to the substantial discounts obtained by
other countries who negotiate on behalf of their citizens and by the
U.S. Veteran's Administration as compelling evidence of the savings
potential for Medicare.25 Even if HHS chose not to exercise
its authority to negotiate for better prices (or exercised its
authority poorly), the repeal of Section 1860D-11(i) may, nevertheless,
promote better drug pricing for Medicare by changing the context in
which drug pricing decisions are made--pharmaceutical manufacturers may
be more likely to exercise restraint in their pricing decisions to
avoid provoking a response from HHS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ CBO Letter dated January 23, 2004 to the Honorable William H.
Frist, M.D. accessed at http://www.cbo.gov/
showdoc.cfm?index=4986&sequence=0.
\25\ See Families U.S.A., Another Hole in the Medicare Drug
Benefit, March 2004 accessed at http://www.familiesusa.org/site/
DocServer/Another_Hole.pdf?docID=2885.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Hold states harmless from the cost of future changes to the Medicare
drug benefit that have the effect of driving up the rate of
Medicare drug spending growth.
State officials are all too familiar with the phenomenon of special
interest groups advocating, often successfully, at the state level for
state insurance laws mandating specific benefits. The likelihood of
this happening at the federal level with regard to the new Medicare
drug benefit is surely high. Because the Clawback calculation is based
on a comprehensive Medicaid drug benefit that is likely to be more
generous than the basic Medicare benefit offered in 2006, states should
not be forced to pay twice if future federal actions are taken to
enhance the Medicare benefit in any way that would increase costs to
states under the Clawback formula. For example, many states exclude
certain classes of drugs (such as mental health drugs) from their PDLs
and prior authorization programs. The Clawback obligation for these
states will include the cost of this open access policy even though
dual eligibles may not have the same open access to these drugs under
the new Medicare benefit. If a mandate for open access to certain drugs
or drug--classes is added to the Medicare benefit in the future, the
cost of that mandate could increase the cost of the Clawback obligation
to states forcing some states to pay for open access a second time.
3. Eliminate the MMA exclusion of certain drug classes from the
Medicare Part D drug benefit.
The MMA excludes coverage for a number of drug classes that are
optional but commonly covered under Medicaid, including over-the-
counter drugs, barbiturates used for seizures and benzodiazepines for
anxiety. According to a recent study, more than half of dually eligible
nursing home residents will be affected by the excluded drugs provision
in the law because they are currently receiving at least one medication
that will be excluded from coverage under Medicare Part D.26
The exclusion of benzodiazepines and barbiturates has been identified
as a particular concern due to their widespread use in elderly
populations and the potential for therapeutic destabilization if
discontinued.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ R. Stefancacci, ``The Cost of Being Excluded: Impact of
Excluded Medications under Medicare Part D on Dually Eligible Nursing
Home Residents,'' Health Policy Institute at the University of the
Sciences in Philadelphia, February 16, 2005, citing an analysis
conducted by Omnicare, Inc., a national long-term care pharmacy
provider.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For dual eligibles who need one of these excluded medications after
January 1, 2006, they must either turn to Medicaid for coverage or
prescribers will be forced to use alternative medications that will be
less effective, more costly and, for some patients, even
toxic.27 Thus, states will either bear the cost of providing
the excluded drugs or incur greater nursing home or other costs due to
adverse health consequences. For these reasons, the MMA should be
amended to provide coverage for these excluded drug classes, at least
for dual eligibles and other persons receiving Part D low-income
subsidies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Amend the MMA to phase out the Clawback obligation completely.
The MMA currently provides for a ten-year partial phase-down of the
Clawback amount starting at 90 percent in 2006 and decreasing to 75
percent in 2015 and thereafter. The timing of the phase-down could be
accelerated or continued beyond 2015 with the goal of completely
eliminating this unprecedented Medicare financing mechanism and fiscal
obligation on states.
COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS
Advances in technology are transforming the delivery of health care
in the United States but are also the most important long-term driver
of health care costs. While the growth in prescription drug costs has
recently moderated, this could turn out to be a temporary ``lull''
rather than a long-term trend due to technology advances.28
Efforts to assist states to become more prudent Medicaid purchasers
must therefore go beyond improved pricing strategies (such as changing
from an AWP to an ASP-based pricing system), to also include the
creation of new evidence-based tools that will assist states in
appropriately controlling utilization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ According to a recent study from the Tufts Center for Study of
Drug Development, advances in biotechnology research and development
will result in nearly 50 new biotech medicines receiving market
approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. Tufts Center for
Study of Drug Development, March 7, 2005 press release, ``Biotechnology
Advance have Improved R&D Success Rates, According to Tufts CSDD.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After four years of widespread, continuous efforts to cut Medicaid
spending growth, an increasing number of states are turning to
evidence-based disease management and case management programs with the
hope that improving the quality of care will result in lower long-term
costs for care. In the pharmacy arena, a consortium of 15
organizations, including 13 states, has formed to create the Drug
Effectiveness Review Project (DERP) whose purpose is to carry out
systematic reviews of drug classes to inform state drug coverage
decisions, usually in connection with a state's Medicaid PDL. These
systematic reviews, conducted by Evidence-based Practice Centers
(mostly university-based), array, evaluate and summarize the aggregate
results of published and unpublished studies pertaining to the drug
class under review. The DERP reports its findings concerning safety and
effectiveness, but does not make policy or coverage recommendations. By
September 2004, the DERP had completed twelve reviews and a number of
review updates and had ten reviews in progress.
At the federal level, interest in evidence-based health care
management continues to grow as well. Most recently, Section 1013 of
the MMA requires the HHS secretary to set priorities and target areas
where evidence is needed to improve the quality, effectiveness and
efficiency of health care provided by Medicare, Medicaid, and the State
Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). The HHS secretary is
directed to:
``. . . conduct and support research to meet the priorities and
requests for scientific evidence and information identified by
such programs with respect to''
(i) the outcomes, comparative clinical effectiveness,
and appropriateness of health care items and services
(including prescription drugs); and
(ii) strategies for improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of such programs, including the ways in
which such items and services are organized, managed,
and delivered under such programs.''
The MMA language recognizes the need to synthesize existing
scientific research to inform policy and coverage decisions in public
programs, but also recognizes that there are gaps in the current
research base. In a recent article, the director of the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality summarized the challenge as follows:
``For many policy issues, there is too little evidence to be
of much help. The challenge now is to ensure that clinicians
and policymakers can easily find out what we do know, support
research to answer what we do not know, and promote change in
the health care system that will continue to narrow the gap
between what we know and what we do.'' 29
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Carolyn M. Clancy and Kelly Cronin, ``Evidence-Based Decision
Making: Global Evidence, Local Decisions,'' Health Affairs, 24, no. 1
(2005): 161.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
State Medicaid programs and beneficiaries would benefit greatly
from an expansion in the base of evidence-based research. In
particular, this information could be used to help further define
``smart'' PDLs rather than states relying too heavily on price
considerations when making PDL coverage policies. Few if any states,
however, are in a position, on their own, to undertake the needed
research efforts. Clearly, it is more appropriate for the federal
government to call upon its considerable technical, policy and fiscal
resources to tackle this challenge for the benefit of all federal,
state and private health care payers, purchasers and patients. While
the federal government has taken steps in this direction, it has not
gone far enough in light of the enormity of the health care fiscal
challenges that loom ahead, and therefore the proposal below calls upon
the federal government to commit greater resources to this effort.
Commit greater federal resources and leverage greater private resources
to carry out the purposes of Section 1013 of the MMA.
Federal, state and private efforts in recent years have expanded
the information base available to policymakers making health policy and
coverage decisions, but a greater investment is needed to keep up with
the pace of technological change. While the MMA authorized $50 million
in FY 2004 to carry out Section 1013, only $15 million was actually
budgeted for this effort in 2005 and the president's 2006 budget
maintains funding at the $15 million level. At a minimum, funding to
carry out Section 1013 should be increased to the amount authorized by
the MMA. Greater investments would likely lead to greater cost
containment benefits in the future.
CONCLUSION
Medicaid spending growth is straining both state and federal
budgets and growth in prescription drug spending continues to be a
major culprit in that overall growth. While states have made great
strides in reforming their prescription drug programs and have achieved
significant savings, more could be done at the federal level to assist
states. The federal government can help states obtain better drug
pricing information and can also assist states in maximizing
manufacturer rebates by adjusting the current rebate formula and better
enforcing rebate program requirements. By ensuring the cost-effective
management of the Medicare Part D drug benefit, the federal government
can also mitigate the future growth of the states' Clawback
obligations. Finally, like all payers, Medicaid's greatest hope for
long-term cost containment benefits lies in the ability to manage drug
utilization using evidenced-based tools. The federal government can
play an instrumental role in supporting research efforts that will fill
in the gaps in the existing research base and by supporting efforts to
synthesize and analyze currently available research to better inform
coverage decisions.
Mr. Deal. I thank you, Ms. Gifford.
Mr. Calfee.
STATEMENT OF JOHN ``JACK'' E. CALFEE
Mr. Calfee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me to
testify at today's hearing. I will briefly summarize the main
points in my written testimony, which I have submitted for the
record.
We all know that government reimbursement mechanisms often
create vested interests, inefficiencies, and unexpectedly high
costs. What seems reasonable when a program is created
eventually becomes unreasonable as conditions change and the
various parties take advantage of opportunities to reduce costs
or increase compensation. One of the most common problems is
the growth of cross-subsidies. These can be difficult to reduce
or eliminate, regardless of how adverse their consequences may
be. In the end, however, the only reasonable solution is to
rework the program or eliminate cross-subsidies and replace
them with a transparent system of direct, cost-based
reimbursement.
The Medicare part B reimbursement plan for oncology drugs
is an example of how systems can go astray and how difficult it
can be to fix things. In Medicare part B, overcompensation
occurred largely because reimbursement was based on AWP. As
drug sellers competed by lowering prices far below AWP, the
resulting distortions finally compelled Congress to legislate a
cost-based reimbursement system as part of the Medicare
Modernization Act of 2003.
More recently, Medicaid reimbursement for drugs obtained
through retail pharmacies had begun to move along a similar
path toward excessive reimbursement for filling prescriptions,
especially prescriptions, as we have heard, for newer and more
expensive generic drugs. We have heard about the recent CBO
report, which documented the average pharmacy markup today in
Medicaid is approximately $32 for newer generic drugs in the
year 2002 compared to $10 for older generic drugs and $14 for
old drugs. This pattern appears to reflect the oddities of an
AWP-based reimbursement system rather than differences in
actual cost.
I urge Congress and CMS to change the current Medicaid
pharmacy reimbursement plan to one that focuses more directly
on covering reasonable costs. One way to do this would be to
use the average sales price, or ASP, as defined in the Medicare
Modernization Act, assuming this is a reasonable measure of
drug acquisition costs by pharmacies. Another would be to use a
suitably defined AMP, or average manufacturer price. Either
approach would probably be superior to the highly artificial
AWP prices now used.
This change should be combined with reasonable compensation
to pharmacies for the services they perform in filling Medicaid
prescription. Although a fixed percentage market might be
appropriate in some cases, such a plan, as we have heard,
carries the danger of distorting incentives yet again, in
effect rewarding pharmacies for filling more expensive
prescriptions. Something closer to a fixed payment per
prescription may be a better solution.
I believe that new reductions of what Medicaid pays drug
manufacturers would be inadvisable. Even today, those amounts
are typically well below the lowest prices in the private
sector. We should beware, I would suggest, of yet more
reductions in the payoffs to research firms for developing the
kinds of drugs that are most useful to Medicaid beneficiaries.
As valuable as today's drugs are, it is perfectly clear that
Medicaid patients desperately need a new generation of such
crucial tools as anti-psychotics, anti-depressants, and
diabetes treatments.
Finally, I urge Congress and the States to make reasoned
use of co-payments in order to control drug costs. Of course,
such a tool should take account of the limited resources of
patients who, for the most part, are served by Medicaid
precisely because they lack substantial income and assets, but
a nuance co-payment program, drawing on the extensive
experience of the private sector, would control the overuse of
some drugs without impeding the use of essential drugs whose
value both to patients and the Medicaid system greatly exceeds
their costs.
That concludes my oral statement, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of John ``Jack'' E. Calfee
follows:]
Prepared Statement of John E. Calfee, American Enterprise Institute
I am honored to testify in these hearings on ``Medicaid
Prescription Drugs: Examining Options for Payment Reform,'' held by the
Committee on Energy and Commerce's Subcommittee on Health. I am a
Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy
Research, where I have conducted research on pharmaceutical markets and
other topics. The views I present are my own and do not necessarily
represent those of the American Enterprise Institute.
1. GOVERNMENT REIMBURSEMENT PROGRAMS OFTEN CREATE CROSSSUBSIDIES AND
OTHER DISTORTIONS
It is only natural that the details of federal reimbursement
programs will reflect the specific circumstances in which those
programs are created. Such details will inevitably create vested
interests among both payers (who may realize savings not offered by the
marketplace) and recipients (who may do better than they would in a
competitive market). As conditions change, the program's essential
features may persist because of these vested interests, even if a very
different arrangement would emerge if the program were to be re-created
under current conditions. As events proceed, very large inefficiencies
can become very difficult to dismantle.
A common feature of such hide-bound systems is crosssubsidies, in
which one set of parties receives compensation or reimbursement in
excess of reasonable levels at the expense of other parties, whose own
reimbursements may be enlarged to compensate for the cross-subsidies.
Another common feature is that suppliers and other parties act in
economically rational ways to take advantage of crosssubsidies, to
reduce the burden of funding crosssubsidies, and so on. Over time,
these reactions can substantially increase the scope and magnitude of
distortions including crosssubsidies.
2. CROSSSUBSIDIES AND SIMILAR MECHANISMS GREATLY COMPLICATE THE TASK OF
SETTING REASONABLE AND EFFICIENT REIMBURSEMENT LEVELS
In reasonably competitive private markets, affected parties tend to
eliminate or contain crosssubsidies and similar distortions, or reduce
their effects to manageable levels. Inefficient government
reimbursement methods, however, often persist despite growing
inefficiencies. As systems become more complex, essential elements
become difficult or impossible to measure. Administrative costs in
health care systems, for example, may change radically in the face of
new technology, altered patient or physician preferences, and
innovative organizational methods. The task of disentangling subsidies,
crosssubsidies, and straight-forward reimbursement may become nearly
impossible. Even the most competent analysts may find it impossible to
construct accurate measurements of the magnitude or even the direction
of crosssubsidies.
3. ELIMINATING OR MINIMIZING CROSSSUBSIDIES IS GENERALLY A GOOD IDEA
Because managing the inefficiencies arising from crosssubsidies and
related distortions in public reimbursement programs usually proves
impossible in the long run, the best strategy is to eliminate
crosssubsidies altogether. Assuming that private markets are not an
alternative, a suitable goal is to assure that each party is reimbursed
for acquisition and administrative costs in the most reasonable and
feasible manner.
4. FEDERAL MEDICARE AND MEDICAID DRUG REIMBURSEMENT PROGRAMS ILLUSTRATE
THESE PROBLEMS
It became apparent more than a decade ago that the Medicare Part B
program, which among other things reimburses physicians for infusion
drugs (mainly cancer treatments), systematically over-compensated
physicians and clinics.1 This engendered attempts by all
parties to take advantage of the system, and even discouraged superior
drug development because infusion products became favored over home-
injectibles or even simple pills. A striking feature of this system was
that sellers competed to provide products at less than the list prices
upon which reimbursement rates were based, and employed marketing tools
to make physicians aware of the benefits of prescribing brands with
large reimbursement margins. The list prices that underpinned
reimbursement rates were obtained from the ``Average Wholesale Price''
(or AWP) lists now published by Thomson Micromedex's Red Book and First
DataBank's Blue Book: Essential Directory of Pharmaceuticals. All this
was widely known at the time. A series of public hearings and reports
starting in 1989 (U.S. Senate 1989), along with TV and other news
stories (e.g., NBC News, Jan. 15, 1997), and a 1997 radio address by
President Clinton, repeatedly highlighted the basic dynamics of a
situation in which vested interests made it difficult to dismantle a
crosssubsidy system. Only in the past year has Congress provided means
for CMS to adopt a more direct cost-based reimbursement mechanism (CBO,
December 2004; Federal Register, Jan. 7, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Useful sources include: MEDPAC 2003 (especially chap. 9); USGAO
2001; and USGAO 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recent reports from the Congressional Budget Office (December 2004
and June 2005a), the Government Accountability Office (February 2005),
and the USDHHS Office of the Inspector General (September 2004) have
made clear that similar trends have come to characterize Medicaid
reimbursement for pharmaceuticals obtained by patients through retail
pharmacies. Among these trends are increasing pharmacy margins. This in
itself does not necessarily indicate a problem, but margins appear to
have become unreasonably large for generic drugs, especially newer
generics. This can be seen in Table 1, which is based on the December
2004 CBO report. Whereas average markups or margins increased from
$8.70 in 1997 to $13.80 in 2002, prescriptions for newer generics
involved average margins of $32.10 in 2002. Such large disparities
appear to make little sense because the actual costs of filling
prescriptions are relatively consistent across the bulk of generic and
branded drug.
Table 1
Medicaid's Prescription Drug Reimbursements, Wholesalers' and Pharmacies'' Acquisition Costs, and Margins, 1997
and 2002
(all amounts in dollars per prescription)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reimbursements to Acquisition costs Margins
Pharmacies -------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------
1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
All drugs................... 37.00 60.90 28.30 47.10 8.70 13.80
Generic drugs
Newer..................... N/A 45.70 N/A 13.60 N/A 32.10
Older..................... 11.90 14.20 4.30 4.40 7.60 9.90
Brand-name drugs............ 61.90 97.30 52.20 83.40 9.80 13.80
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: All data are taken from Congressional Budget Office, ``Medicaid's Reimbursements to Pharmacies for
Prescription Drugs,'' December 2004, Table 1.
N/A = not estimated because most ``newer'' generics were unavailable in 1997.
The June 2005 CBO report (CBO 2005a, p. 3) documents that the
source of the large and growing disparities in pharmacy margins is the
widespread practice among the states of basing reimbursement upon the
same AWP lists that used to be the basis for Medicare Part B
reimbursement. Although AWP price lists may once have been bona fide
attempts to describe common transaction prices from wholesalers, it is
well known that current list prices are often substantially above
acquisition costs. As long as pharmacy reimbursement is based upon AWP,
however, we can expect generic manufacturers whose drugs are available
at prices substantially below AWP to make pharmacies aware of this fact
and to encourage the filling of prescriptions with high-margin
generics. The December 2004 CBO report indicates that this tendency is
increasing, with substantial potential impact on overall Medicaid
costs.
5. ALTERNATIVES TO AWP FOR REIMBURSEMENT PURPOSES
I urge Congress and the states to reform the Medicaid drug
reimbursement process to more closely reflect costs. Adopting a more
accurate measure of drug acquisition costs is an essential part of
this. The government reports cited above describe alternative
acquisition cost indicators in some detail. The most promising appears
to be ``average sales price,'' or ASP. According to the June 2005 CBO
report (n. 6), ASP is defined in the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003
as the average price charged to nonfederal buyers, taking into account
volume discounts, prompt-pay discounts, cash discounts, free goods that
are contingent on any purchase requirement, chargebacks, and rebates
other than those paid under the Medicaid rebate program. Some of these
adjustments, however, such as rebates and chargebacks, may be
relatively unimportant for generics. Such adjustments are probably
largely confined to the on-patent branded drug market, where large gaps
between prices and manufacturing and marketing costs encourage private
bargaining that can yield a substantial variation in prices among
buyers of the same drug (cf. Frank 2001). In any case, however, the ASP
measure, unlike AWP, is clearly tethered to actual market transactions
and thus is not nearly as artificial as AWP prices. Basing
reimbursement for drug acquisition on ASP prices would probably be a
substantial improvement over the current system.
6. PHARMACY REIMBURSEMENT
The changes just outlined would require changes in how pharmacies
are reimbursed for filling Medicaid prescriptions. Again, I suggest
basing reimbursement largely on reasonable costs. In some situations, a
simple percentage add-on may be appropriate. But a percentage markup
can seriously distort incentives because the effect is to generate
larger pharmacy margins for more expensive drugs regardless of the
costs of filling prescriptions. This could distort Medicaid generic
drug usage toward higher cost drugs with little or no off-setting
benefit. It might make more sense to explore some mix of percentage and
fixed-amount reimbursement if that can be achieved without introducing
new and even larger distortions.
7. PHARMACEUTICAL ACQUISITION PRICES IN MEDICAID ARE ALREADY LOW ENOUGH
I also urge Congress and the states to avoid making further cuts in
the prices paid by Medicaid to drug manufacturers. A series of measures
in the past two decades has already pushed most of these prices below
even the lowest private sector prices. This is because manufacturers,
if they are to participate in Medicaid at all, must sell their drugs at
prices that are usually adjusted below the ``best price'' in private
sector sales--(cf. CBO June 2005a, p. 11, and CBO June 21, 2005 on the
increasing magnitude of ``additional rebates'' beyond meeting best-
price levels in the private sector). This arrangement causes the
Medicaid system to provide minimal payoffs for developing drugs to be
used by the Medicaid population. In the long run, this could prove
unfortunate. Certain conditions, notably schizophrenia,
disproportionately afflict the Medicaid population (indeed,
schizophrenia may be a prime reason why some people enter the Medicaid
system in the first place). New drug development for these conditions
is sorely needed. Even existing medicines can be costeffective in the
sense of moderating or even reducing overall Medicaid costs, and they
may improve beneficiaries' lives in ways that are otherwise difficult
to achieve with patients who often defy traditional treatment. Steady
reductions in the rewards for drug development for the Medicaid
population are therefore inimical to advances in public health.
8. COST-CONTROL:
The fact that Medicaid pays relatively little for pharmaceuticals
reduces the potential gains to be had from additional measures to
control drug costs. Nonetheless, co-payments offer an obvious tool for
cost control. Congress might consider granting the states expanded
authority to use this tool. It would make sense to borrow from what has
been learned by the private sector in its extensive experimentation
with drug co-pays. Given that lower than normal co-pays would be
appropriate for the typical Medicaid beneficiary, a nuanced approach
could be useful. For some drugs, a significant co-pay on the order of
three to ten dollars might cause patients to consider whether an
expensive anti-histamine, pain reliever, or anti-ulcer drug is worth
the extra cost. For other drugs (such as anti-psychotics, perhaps, in
addition to obvious candidates like vaccines), the Medicaid system
might be better off if patients are encouraged by zero co-pays to fill
their prescriptions and stick with their therapies.
References
Clinton, Pres. William J. (1997) Radio address of Dec. 13, 1997.
Congressional Budget Office (2004) ``Medicaid's Reimbursements to
Pharmacies for Prescription Drugs,'' December 2004.
Congressional Budget Office (2005a) ``Prices for Brand-Name Drugs
Under Selected Federal Programs,'' June 2005.
Congressional Budget Office (2005b) ``The Rebate Medicaid Receives
on Brand-Name Prescription Drugs,'' June 21, 2005 (letter to Sen.
Charles E. Grassley).
Federal Register, Jan. 7, 2004, p. 1084-1132, Department of Health
and Human Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 42 CFR
Parts 405 and 414, ``Medicare Program: Changes to Medicare Payment for
Drugs and Physician Fee Schedule Payments for Calendar Year 2004;
Interim Final Rule.''
Frank, Richard G. (2001) ``Prescription Drug Prices: Why Do Some
Pay More Than Others Do?'' Health Affairs, v. 20, n. 2 (March-April),
p. 115-128. Available (for subscribers) at content.healthaffairs.org/
cgi/reprint/20/2/115.pdf
MEDPAC (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission) Variation and
Innovation in Medicare, June 2003.
NBC News, Jan. 15, 1997, ``Fleecing of America.''
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the
Inspector General (2004) ``Variation in State Medicaid Drug Prices,''
September 2004.
U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO, 2000) ``Expanding Access to
Federal Prices Could Cause Other Price Changes,'' GAO/HEHS 00-118,
August.
U.S. Government Accounting Office (GAO) (2001) ``Medicare Physician
Fee Schedule: Practice Expense Payments to Oncologists Indicate Need
for Overall Refinements,'' GAO-02-53, October.
U.S. General Accounting Office (USGAO) (2002) ``VA and DOD Health
Care: Factors Contributing to Reduced Pharmacy Costs and Continuing
Challenges,'' testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security,
Veterans Affairs, and International Relations, Committee on Government
Reform, House of Representatives, July 22, 2002.
U.S. Government Accountability Office (2005), ``Medicaid Drug
Rebate Program:
Inadequate Oversight Raises Concerns about Rebates Paid to
States,'' February 2005.
United States Senate, Special Committee on Aging (1989), Senate
Majority Staff Report, ``Prescription Drug Prices: Are We Getting our
Money's Worth?''
Mr. Deal. Thank you very much.
Very impressive panel. Let me start off with the
questioning, and I will say, on Ms. Gifford's behalf, she had
to leave to catch an airplane, and I don't think anybody
anticipated that she would have to rush before the hearing was
over with to catch the airplane, but that is what has happened
today.
Mr. Rodgers, we have been hearing great things about
Arizona from Mr. Shadegg for a very long time, and I am
beginning to understand now why he has been saying that. Let me
just sort of review a few things. I mean, it seems like that
all we really need to do is sort of patent the Arizona model
and it would work for the rest of the country. Let me review
what you said. You have the highest generic usage in the
country, apparently, and that is one of the things we have been
trying to encourage is greater generic use. You have a very
high degree of patient satisfaction, less than 1 percent
attributable to the pharmaceutical part of the complaints. You
are doing it in an environment in which you have no co-pays,
which is certainly one of the concerns that the pharmacies have
as we talk about the idea of maybe raising co-pays, of the
collectability of that and whether or not that is going to just
have to be absorbed by the local pharmacist who never really
effectively can collect that. You don't have that problem,
because you don't have co-pays. And you don't have to deal with
this issue that we are talking about whether to raise the
rebates or not raise the rebates. You don't get any rebates. Am
I correct on all of those features?
Mr. Rodgers. Yes, you are.
Mr. Deal. Well, there has got to be something, other than
the good air, in Arizona that makes it all work. Let me ask a
few questions that come to my mind.
You are doing it through private plans. How many different
plans do you have in the State?
Mr. Rodgers. We have seven different acute care plans. We
have six long-term care plans. And these are both for-profit,
non-profit, as well as public plans. Some of our public
organizations, counties, have their own plan.
Mr. Deal. And I believe I understood you to say that all of
your pharmacies are included in some plan. Is that correct?
Mr. Rodgers. That is correct.
Mr. Deal. So there is nobody left out of this approach?
Mr. Rodgers. That is correct.
Mr. Deal. Okay. Mr. Fuller, I guess I will ask you the next
question, then. Are there any chain drug stores that don't go
into Arizona because they have this plan in place that you know
of?
Mr. Fuller. I am certain that no one is staying out of
Arizona because of this plan, and indeed, I think most of them,
if not all of them, are participating in the plan.
Mr. Deal. What is your reaction to the $2 payment to the
pharmacists for filling the prescription? I would assume that
in addition to that there is compensation through the plans
back to the pharmacists in addition to the filling of the
prescription. Is that right, Mr. Rodgers?
Mr. Rodgers. The dispensing fee is a flat fee that the
plans pay, but depending on what they have negotiated and
rates, there may be dollars in there with the pharmacy, retail
pharmacy. It is a negotiation, so different plans have
different negotiations.
Mr. Deal. And they may even include incentives if they use
a higher proportion of generics, I assume, is one of the,
maybe, incentives that are there?
Mr. Rodgers. Well, actually, it is the physicians that
determine the generic use.
Mr. Deal. Okay. All right.
Mr. Fuller, what is your reaction to that arrangement?
Mr. Fuller. Very good question, and we have recently seen
work completed out of the University of Texas that amalgamated
information from, I think, 40 different chains on what the cost
of prescribing was in these programs. Now it is important to
understand that there is a lot of flexibility that the States
have, as you heard about in Arizona. But the ranges of costs in
prescribing were from $8.50 to about $10.50. The average is
$9.45, so in another way, the pharmacy has to recover the cost
of what it paid for the drug, and it probably has to find a way
to recover about $9.45, or it is losing money. That doesn't
mean that the dispensing fee has to be $9.45, because there are
other ways of getting there. I think the one concern I would
have would be if it was interpreted to mean that simply a $2
dispensing fee covered the pharmacists' costs that would be an
error.
Mr. Deal. Right.
Mr. Fuller. There has got to be a mechanism in place for
the----
Mr. Deal. Which is part of that negotiation that Mr.
Rodgers----
Mr. Fuller. Exactly.
Mr. Deal. [continuing] referred to.
Mr. Fuller. Well, it is not to say that it is not fair, but
pharmacies can only participate, and I have already said they
do participate in this, if they can recover their costs, the
cost that they paid for the product, recover the cost of
dispensing the medication, and make some small margin, and the
profit margin is very, very small.
Mr. Deal. You are probably not prepared to do this today,
but would you give me a follow-up on what your pharmacists in
Arizona have to say about the plan that they participate in and
their degree of satisfaction? I think that would be a very
interesting item.
Mr. Fuller. Certainly, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Deal. And I might just close in my 10 seconds. Ms.
Baldwin asked the question of CBO about how do you make any
relationship to what we can predict in Medicare part D. I think
you have made the point in your presentation that if we want
some comparisons as to what to expect in Medicare part D--yours
is a very good example of that--and if that is an example, you
are currently 38 percent below the national average on
pharmaceutical cost, as understand it. And in fact, you are 11
percent below the next most cost-effective State, that being
Michigan. So I suppose we sort of produce an answer to say that
if we want some degree of speculation, maybe the Arizona plan
would be a good way to reach that conclusion. Would that be an
accurate statement?
Mr. Rodgers. I think Arizona is unique because of the fact
that we have managed care, and the MMA plan anticipates managed
care as well as managed pharmacy benefits. So our members are
already used to that. The key is that, again, the provider is
the one who gets the leverage to prescribe brand or prescribe
generic, and the key is will the providers' behavior change
because they are in MMA? We don't know yet, but that is our
concern.
Mr. Deal. Thank you. My time has expired.
Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Mr. Rodgers, thank you for explaining obviously
a very good system.
In spite of facts to the contrary, there is a pretty strong
ideological bias on this committee that the private sector
always does things better and can be counted on to deliver darn
near anything to the public, and serving the public interests.
I appreciate your comments about what you have done with
managed care in Arizona with for-profits and not-for-profits.
Do you just turn these programs over to the private sector for-
profits and not-for-profits and let them go to work? Or what
kind of oversight do you have to make sure that they are
serving the people of Arizona?
Mr. Rodgers. Thank you for that question. No, I think the
role that the State plays is to assure that the member first is
getting the services that they are supposed to get. We contract
with our health plans to assure that services are rendered, so
we have a significant oversight responsibility. What we gain
from the health plans is their negotiating power. They have
information, and they can position in a way that oftentimes is
difficult for a single State to position themselves. So we have
been able to take advantage of that, but the reality is that
the State has to be part of this as a public-private
partnership, and that is how we refer to ourselves, as a
public-private partnership, taking the best of what health
plans have to offer, public, non-profit, as well as for-profit,
as well as the best of what the State can offer in terms of
assuring that things are done according to our requirements.
Mr. Brown. Thank you. In the interest of Mr. Burgess and
Mr. Bilirakis, and I think the chairman wants to try to finish
before we go vote, because you would all have to wait for
another 45 minutes to an hour, and my guess is you probably
don't want to do that, let me just kind of go less than my 5
minutes. I appreciate what you said about Arizona not having
co-pays. I think that is very significant, especially in light
of the fact that the Governors came in here saying that we
needed co-pays and that we needed to up the co-pays. And there
is all kind of evidence that that drives people out of the
system and ends up often costing the system more, because they
don't get health care when they need it; they get it at more
expensive times. So I just wanted to thank you for your
comments about that, and I think you can be used as an example
for a whole lot of us in a whole lot of places.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Deal. Thank you, Mr. Brown. I appreciate your
cooperation on that.
Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Mr. Deal. We are going to try to finish, by the way----
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes.
Mr. Deal. [continuing] because we have about five votes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes, we will try to get this thing done.
Ms. King, does Medicaid overpay? Briefly.
Ms. King. I can't answer that question based on the study
that we conducted.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay.
Ms. King. It is not an issue we have looked at.
Mr. Bilirakis. What does GAO think of the Arizona plan? Is
it working? Is the quality there? Is there good customer
satisfaction, et cetera?
Ms. King. I hate to give you another ``I don't know'', but
we haven't evaluated it.
Mr. Bilirakis. Oh, you have not evaluated it? That is not
something you are charged to do, though, is it?
Ms. King. Typically, we do our work at request of Members
of Congress.
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes, and you have not been requested to do
it.
Mr. Fuller, how do your pharmacists like the Arizona plan,
the pharmacists in Arizona?
Mr. Fuller. Well, I think it is a plan they certainly
participate in, and it is certainly meeting the needs of many
people in Arizona. It is a managed care plan. Some are
speculating that the Medicare programs may, in fact, move to
managed care, because you are really working on all of the
healthcare costs associated with that patient. There do have to
be incentives, clearly, to drive generic utilization, and I
think understanding how those incentives work inside of managed
care is important, particularly if there is a desire to turn
away from the co-payments. The stand-alone plans that don't
have some of the incentives that managed care would provide,
would have a----
Mr. Bilirakis. You are giving me a lawyer's answer. Your
pharmacists, are they relatively happy with the plan or is it
just that that is the only thing that is available?
Mr. Fuller. It is hard to find pharmacists that are
relatively happy today. I would say they are participating in
the program, and the economic model is one that, clearly, most
can live with. I don't think there is a problem with
participation. I do promise to get back to the chairman and
through him to the committee on a little bit more analytical
document there.
Mr. Bilirakis. And I would like to ask--there will be a
number of inquiries coming at you all, which you would be
responding in writing. I would also like to get the chain drug
stores' comments on the rebate system. What do you think about
the rebate system, and do you like it, and that sort of thing?
In the interest of time, I will just go ahead and yield
back for Mr. Burgess, Dr. Burgess. Thank you.
Mr. Deal. Dr. Burgess.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rodgers, I must admit, when you started your testimony,
there were several things you said that sent cold chills down
my spine and the step therapy. Of course, my familiarity with
that is as a physician. When an insurance company did step
therapy, they were basically practicing medicine without a
license, but it sounds like, in your models, as that concept
was developed further, that you do have buy-in from your
providers. And I think that the chairman's enthusiasm for your
program is well founded, but the key there is apparently how
you treat your providers and how you use the word leverage.
Break that down for the committee, and tell us how you have
managed to do that.
Mr. Rodgers. Really quickly, managed care has gotten a bad
reputation because of how it has been managed, if you will. And
it has, oftentimes, inappropriately leveraged providers by
lowering rates and creating additional hassle. The key to
controlling Medicaid cost is really having your providers buy
into how your medical models work. And so we don't balance our
budget on the back of our provider rates. But because we save
in so many other areas, including in-patient utilization,
emergency room utilization, the pharmacy costs, we are able to
then allow our providers, especially our primary care
physicians, who are so important, to have appropriate rates.
And so that is the first premise of the program.
I think the other is the fact that we have multiple plans
allows the provider to choose between plans. If they don't like
a particular plan, if they feel that plan has too many hassle
factors, if you will, they can choose to contract with a
different plan. And many of them do. They have their plans they
like and two or three that they will contract with. Then the
member chooses the plan based on the provider networks. So it
is a balanced approach to the market. It allows the member to
make a choice based on provider network and to choose a
provider within the plan. It allows the provider to choose the
plan they want to contract with. And the plans themselves then
compete for both providers as well as members.
Mr. Burgess. And Mr. Chairman, I would just point out that
I think the State of Arizona is very fortunate to have Mr.
Rodgers in charge of that plan. I suspect it would not work as
well without his steady hand on the helm, and perhaps we ought
to see if we can steal him away. It is time for you to shine at
the national level.
As far as the issue of co-pays go----
Mr. Rodgers. My Governor is in town. I----
Mr. Burgess. I understand. As far as the issue of co-pays
goes, I, too, am grateful, and I understand the issue of co-
pays. I do think we have to be careful to completely abandon
the concept, though I feel that the community pharmacists'
pain, or the chain store pharmacists' pain that if the co-pay
is not paid, you are essentially the one who is paying that.
And of course, that would be true at the physician or hospital
level as well.
Mr. Calfee, just so that we are sure to include you in
this, your neighbor there, Ms. Gifford, who had to leave, made
the statement that one of the things that she thought would be
important would be for the Director of HHS to be able to
negotiate drug prices. Do you have an opinion about that?
Mr. Calfee. Yes. I think that would be a bad idea. I think
we are much better off if we have a situation more like the one
that was just described in Arizona where you have competing
buyers and competing sellers. If you have only one buyer, the
danger is that you are going to start forcing prices down
toward marginal costs, and what that does is it reduces the
payoff from research and development, and at some point, you
are going to start to dry up the supply of innovative drugs.
Mr. Burgess. Thank you. And then, Mr. Fuller, just one last
point, and you might get to the committee. We weren't supposed
to use any more three-letter acronyms, but you brought us a new
one with your wholesale acquisition cost. And that seems to be,
as you used the term, a real world representation of what
things actually cost. And you might just provide the committee
a little bit more information about that, and perhaps, Mr.
Chairman, that is something we should look into as well. So I
thank you for bringing that to our attention.
Mr. Fuller. We certainly will do so.
Mr. Deal. Well, thank you. I appreciate the members'
cooperation, and I certainly appreciate, once again, the
participation of this panel. It really is one of the better
hearings I think we have had on this issue. We are beginning to
broach the subject, as you can tell, and try to educate
ourselves, and you have been very helpful in that endeavor. And
we thank each of you.
We apologize again for the time delay. You may very well be
asked to respond to some written questions that the committee
members may have, and we would appreciate your doing that as
well.
Thank you again for your presence. This hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]
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Prepared Statement of The Association for Community Affiliated Plans
The Association for Community Affiliated Plans (ACAP) is pleased to
submit this statement for the record to the House Energy and Commerce
Committee on the topic of the hearing entitled Medicaid Prescription
Drugs: Examining Options for Payment Reform. ACAP represents 19
Medicaid-focused managed care plans that serve over two million
Medicaid beneficiaries in states across the country. The mission of our
organization is to improve the health of vulnerable populations through
the support of Medicaid-focused community-affiliated health plans
committed to these populations and the providers who serve them.
ACAP is supporting a policy change that will help Federal and State
governments save billions of dollars on prescription drugs provided to
Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in Medicaid health plans. This policy
change would give Medicaid health plans direct access to the Medicaid
drug rebate. The following statement outlines the history of the drug
rebate and the justification for the policy change.
Created by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990,
the Medicaid Drug Rebate Program requires a drug manufacturer to have a
rebate agreement with the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services for States to receive federal funding for outpatient
drugs dispensed to Medicaid patients. At the time the law was enacted,
managed care organizations were excluded from access to the drug rebate
program. In 1990, only 2.8 million people were enrolled in Medicaid
managed care and so the savings lost by the carve-out were relatively
small. Today, 12 million people are enrolled in capitated managed care
plans.
Under the drug rebate, States receive between 18 and 20% discount
on brand name drug prices and between 10 and 11% for generic drug
prices. At the time the rebate was enacted, many of the plans in
Medicaid were large commercial plans who believed that they could get
better discounts than the federal rebate. Today, Medicaid-focused plans
are the fastest growing sector in Medicaid managed care. According to a
study by the Lewin Group, Medicaid-focused MCOs typically only receive
about a 6% discount on brand name drugs and no discount on generics.
Because many MCOs (particularly smaller Medicaid-focused MCOs) do not
have the capacity to negotiate deeper discounts with drug companies,
Medicaid is overpaying for prescription drugs for enrollees in Medicaid
health plans.
The Lewin Group estimates that this proposal could save the federal
and state governments and plans up to $2 billion over 10 years. This
legislation has been endorsed by organizations representing both state
government and the managed care industry, including the National
Association of State Medicaid Directors, the Association for Community
Affiliated Plans, Medicaid Health Plans of America, the National
Association of Community Health Centers, and now, the National
Governors Association.
As Congress is forced to make tough choices to control the costs of
the Medicaid program, this proposal offers a ``no-harm'' option to
control costs and ensure that there is not a prima facie pharmacy cost
disadvantage to states using managed care as a cost effective
alternative to Medicaid fee-for-service. We urge Congress to implement
it as part of any Medicaid reform proposal that moves forward.
______
Prepared Statement of Ronald Pollack, Executive Director, Families USA
Thank you for allowing us to submit this statement for the record.
Families USA is a ational organization for health care consumers. Our
mission is ti ensure that all Americans have access to high-quality
affordable health care. Like everyone at the hearing, we aer deeply
concerned about the future of the Medicaid progran and look forward to
working with the Energy and Commerce Committee to strengthen and
impr4ovr Medicaid on behalf of the 53 million vulnerable children,
seniors and people with disabilitieswho rely on the program for their
health care needs.
As you know, the Budget Resolution requires the Senate Finance
Committee to identify $10 billion in budget cuts over the next 5 years.
Similarly, it requires the House Energy and Commerce Committee to
propose $14.7 billion in cuts over the same periob. Although the Budget
Resolution does not explicitly direct these cuts to come from any
specific programs, Medicaid has clearly been targeted and, in large
part, that is why we are all here today.
First, it is important to emphasize that there is no requirement to
cut as much as $10 billion from Medicaid. The cuts can occur through
savings in other programs and as much of these expected savings as
possible should come from programs not targeted toward low-income
Americans. What is more, the budget process is not an appropriate forum
for a conversation about ``reforming' or in any way restructuring
Medicaid. The program should be thoughtfully scrutinized to see if
there are ways to make it more cost-effective and efficient--and if so,
those changes should be enacted.
There is, however,, one area where most agree some savings can be
found without reducing services essential to those enrolled in the
program. That is the area of prescription drug spending. There is
widespread agreement that Medicaid pays too . . .
. . . in front of this Committee last week contains several very
helpful recommendations regarding prescription drugs. We look forward
to working with the Governors on their proposed improvements aimed at
decreasing the costs of prescription drugs that are purchased by
Medicaid.
There are lots of specific changes that could be instituted to help
the federal government and the states reduce the rapidly increasing
costs of prescription drugs. Such policies would need to be crafted
carefully with appropriate safeguards to ensure that people are able to
get the drugs they need and Medicaid gets the best price possible for
drugs, and to encourage responsible prescribing, dispensing, and
utilization of drugs. Strategies that may be worth considering include:
changing the formula for calculating Medicaid ``best price'' and
Medicaid rebates; changing the reimbursement rates to pharmacists for
dispensing drugs; and improving the management of the prescription drug
rebate program.
Families USA looks forward to working with this Committee to
achieve as many savings as possible from prescription drugs. However,
to the extent that Congress seeks budget savings from the other parts
of the Medicaid program, certain principles should guide its work.
Those principles include the following:
Health and long-term care coverage must continue to be guaranteed
for those who qualify for Medicaid. Like Medicare, Medicaid assures
that people who qualify must be enrolled and not be placed on waiting
lists. Any changes in this basic principle would leave vulnerable
people without access to health care, undermining the very purpose of
the Medicaid program.
Financing should continue to be fully shared between the federal
government and the states without caps. Today, the federal government
guarantees to states that it will pay at least half of Medicaid's
costs. Policies that shift costs and risks to the states or that impose
caps on federal payments to the states (such as block grants) will lead
to fiscal burdens on the states that they cannot afford and will result
in significant cutbacks of coverage and a weakening of the health care
system.
Benefits and cost-sharing should reflect the needs and economic
circumstances of the people served by Medicaid. The Medicaid benefit
package should be comprehensive and ensure that people are able to
access benefits they need. Needed medical services should be available
and affordable to the elderly, children, people with disabilities, and
other adults covered by the program whose low incomes make it
impossible for them to afford significant out-of-pocket costs. Changes
that would effectively deny access to needed care or saddle low-income
people and their families with costs they cannot afford to pay are
counterproductive and inconsistent with the program's mission.