[House Hearing, 109 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] ASSESSING ANTHRAX DETECTION METHODS ======================================================================= HEARING before the SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS of the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ APRIL 5, 2005 __________ Serial No. 109-57 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/ index.html http://www.house.gov/reform ______ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 23-142 PDF WASHINGTON : 2005 _________________________________________________________________ For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York KENNY MARCHANT, Texas ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia Columbia PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ------ CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina (Independent) ------ ------ Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director Rob Borden, Parliamentarian Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman KENNY MARCHANT, Texas DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont JOHN M. McHUGH, New York CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania Ex Officio TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel Kristine McElroy, Professional Staff Member Robert A. Briggs, Clerk Andrew Su, Minority Professional Staff Member C O N T E N T S ---------- Page Hearing held on April 5, 2005.................................... 1 Statement of: Burrus, William, president, American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO; Linda D. Stetzenbach, director, Microbiology Division, Harry Reid Center for Environmental Studies, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; James H. Schwartz, chief, Arlington County Fire Department; Michael P. Neuhard, chief, Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department; Philip Schaenman, president, Tridata Division of System Planning Corp.; and John Jester, Director, Pentagon Force Protection Agency, Department of Defense.............................. 109 Burrus, William.......................................... 109 Jester, John............................................. 164 Neuhard, Michael P....................................... 148 Schaenman, Philip........................................ 155 Schwartz, James H........................................ 140 Stetzenbach, Linda D..................................... 117 Rhodes, Keith, Chief Technologist, Government Accountability Office, accompanied by Sushil Sharma, Associate Director for Science, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Dr. Tanja Popovic, Associate Director for Science, Centers for Disease and Prevention, accompanied by Maxim Kiefer, Assistant Director for Emergency Preparedness and Response, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Dr. Klaus Schafer, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense, Department of Defense; Dana Tulis, Deputy Director for the Office of Emergency Management, Environmental Protection Agency, accompanied by Mark Durno, on-Scene Coordinator [OSC] EPA Region 5, Environmental Protection Agency; Thomas G. Day, vice president of engineering, U.S. Postal Service; and Dr. Katherine Kelley, director, Department of Public Health Laboratory................................................. 12 Day, Thomas G............................................ 73 Kelley, Dr. Katherine.................................... 80 Popovic, Dr. Tanja....................................... 36 Rhodes, Keith............................................ 12 Schafer, Dr. Klaus....................................... 55 Tulis, Dana.............................................. 62 Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by: Burrus, William, president, American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, prepared statement of............................. 112 Davis, Hon. Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia, prepared statement of......................... 8 Day, Thomas G., vice president of engineering, U.S. Postal Service, prepared statement of............................. 76 Jester, John, Director, Pentagon Force Protection Agency, Department of Defense, prepared statement of............... 167 Kelley, Dr. Katherine, director, Department of Public Health Laboratory, prepared statement of.......................... 82 Neuhard, Michael P., chief, Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department, prepared statement of.......................... 150 Popovic, Dr. Tanja, Associate Director for Science, Centers for Disease and Prevention, prepared statement of.......... 38 Porter, Hon. Jon C., a Representative in Congress from the State of Nevada, prepared statement of..................... 61 Rhodes, Keith, Chief Technologist, Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of.............................. 15 Schaenman, Philip, president, Tridata Division of System Planning Corp., prepared statement of...................... 157 Schafer, Dr. Klaus, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense, Department of Defense, prepared statement of............................. 57 Schwartz, James H., chief, Arlington County Fire Department, prepared statement of...................................... 143 Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State of Connecticut: Letter dated April 1, 2005............................... 187 Prepared statement of.................................... 3 Stetzenbach, Linda D., director, Microbiology Division, Harry Reid Center for Environmental Studies, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, prepared statement of................... 120 Tulis, Dana, Deputy Director for the Office of Emergency Management, Environmental Protection Agency, prepared statement of............................................... 65 ASSESSING ANTHRAX DETECTION METHODS ---------- TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 2005 House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:07 p.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Representatives Shays, Porter, Tom Davis (ex officio), and Kucinich. Also present: Representative Norton. Staff present: Lawrence Halloran, staff director and counsel; R. Nicholas Palarino, senior policy adviser; Kristine McElroy, professional staff member; Robert A. Briggs, clerk; Andrew Su and Denise Wilson, minority professional staff members; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk. Mr. Shays. The Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations hearing entitled, ``Assessing Anthrax Detection Methods,'' is called to order. Is this building contaminated? Almost 4 years after mail- borne anthrax attacks killed five Americans, infected 22 others and polluted postal facilities, the answer to that urgent ``yes or no'' question remains a protracted cacophony of ``maybes.'' Recent detections in local Department of Defense [DOD], mail facilities produced painful reminders of persistent gaps in both the science of biological detection and the art of communicating test results, and risks, to the public. Today, with those recent events as context and cautionary tale, we assess the extent of progress by Federal agencies toward standardizing and validating sampling, testing and analysis protocols for Bacillus anthracis. Each incident of suspected or actual biological contamination will be unique. Every situation presents a daunting array of variables and unknowns. But inherent complexity is no excuse to deter needed research or ignore lessons learned in favor of an ad hoc, uncoordinated and scientifically unsound response. All these events pose the same question: Is it anthrax? Is it still there? Only strong science and vigilant integration of that knowledge into a coordinated response will conquer the unknowns and limit the variables that still plague anthrax detections. Last year we asked the Government Accountability Office [GAO], to examine anthrax detection strategies used by the U.S. Postal Service [USPS], and other Federal agencies. In a report released today, GAO finds that despite some scattered efforts, the multi-step anthrax detection and confirmation process still has not been validated; that is, scientifically tested to measure its sensitivity, reliability and limitations. As a result, those responsible for assessing or mitigating anthrax contamination have scant information on which to base selection of sample techniques, specimen storage modes or testing methodologies appropriate to the incident at hand. Nor can first responders, potential victims, or the public have the degree of confidence they need in positive or negative results that only slowly emerge from this loosely forged chain of custody. Different anthrax detection technologies emitting different measures of ``positive'' and ``negative'' can trigger different responses by local, county, regional, State and Federal officials. The public often hears confusing and sometimes contradictory assessments of the anthrax threat. Law enforcement and public health officials on the scene don't get timely, actionable information on the level of risk. In effect, workers and the public are expected to serve as human detectors, as the absence of illness is used to prove the absence of contamination. But anthrax detection and remediation should be an environmental, not just an epidemiological exercise. Proven tenets of environmental science and industrial hygiene can be applied to determine with measurable accuracy when a building is clean. Without validated detection protocols, we risk terrorizing ourselves with preventable false positives that subject people to needless countermeasures and, perhaps more dangerously, we invite false negatives that breed an equally false sense of security. GAO recommends that Federal agencies refine their approach to anthrax detection, build on lessons learned and incorporate probability-based sampling techniques into a more coordinated response. Although these recommendations are directed primarily to the Department of Homeland Security [DHS], it is still not clear who is in charge of this process as evidenced by our crowded witness panels this afternoon. But the Department of Health and Human Services, specifically the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Environmental Protection Agency are designated as lead agencies for anthrax detection and remediation. Their testimony today and that of all our witnesses will help us understand how this vital public safety and public health process can be improved. DHS, fully engaged today in the TOPOFF III National Counterterrorism Exercise, will testify at a subsequent hearing. [The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]Mr. Shays. At this time, with the lady's permission, I will go to the chairman. Ms. Norton. Certainly, sir. Mr. Shays. Thank you. Chairman Tom Davis. Mr. Shays, thank you very much. I still remember the call I got from Fairfax Inova Hospital in November 2001 telling me that a postal worker from northern Virginia had the symptoms of anthrax. This individual, Leroy Richmond, would ultimately survive inhalation anthrax, but we all remember the five individuals who did not. Three and a half years have passed since the anthrax attacks on Capitol Hill and millions of dollars have been spent to improve our ability to detect and respond to future anthrax attacks. Yet as both the GAO report released today, and last month's anthrax incident demonstrate, we are still unable to perform those core responsibilities as we should. In fact, one of my greatest concerns since the United States refocused on homeland security in 2001 has been that we would throw money at innumerable problems to little or no benefit--much sound and fury, signifying nothing. Things are not quite that extreme, but we still struggle to accomplish fundamental tasks, and we must therefore continue to provide close oversight of Federal efforts to better protect our citizens. As we continue to see, there is little room for error in responding to a real or perceived biological attack. If the situation is not effectively managed, public confidence quickly erodes. In reviewing the testimony today, it is clear that our ability to detect the presence of anthrax leaves much to be desired. Our response capabilities hinge on our ability to determine whether or not anthrax is present. Proper scientific rigor must be applied to this issue so that all facets of anthrax sampling, strategy development, collection, transportation, extraction and analysis, ensure the highest probability of success. Last month's anthrax incidents at the Pentagon and Bailey's Crossroads provide an excellent opportunity to assess our ability to respond to a biological attack. While I am pleased the Federal, State and local entities involved conducted, or are conducting after-action reports, questions have also arisen. Specifically, I am curious why the Department of Defense has developed both detection and response protocols that differ from civilian agencies. I am also curious why DOD did not coordinate medical decisions with the appropriate State and local public health officials. At first glance it seems that a unified approach across all Federal agencies would be optimal. Is there an operational reason for DOD to be different? If so, what efforts have been made to facilitate interaction with civilian Federal agencies, States and localities? From my review of last month's events, it seems that even DOD's use of different terminology created much unnecessary confusion, especially when conference calls were the primary means of interagency communication. If our communication methods result in a telephonic Tower of Babel, we are not doing our jobs. I appreciate the work already commissioned by Virginia, Maryland and the District of Columbia to examine last month's events from the State and local perspective. I eagerly await the Federal component. This cannot be another scenario where lots of people agree that we need to sit down and talk about X and Y. I want to see actions and want to see results. In closing, I want to thank Chairman Shays for this timely hearing and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. [The prepared statement of Hon. Tom Davis follows:] Mr. Shays. I thank the chairman. At this time the Chair would also like to recognize another member from the area of D.C., obviously in D.C., who also has vital concerns about this issue. Ms. Norton. Ms. Norton. Well, first, Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for your permission to sit in on this hearing. I am on the full committee, not on your subcommittee, and I appreciate your understanding the special interest that I have in this issue in particular. I am not surprised, Mr. Chairman, for your foresight, because foresight is what it is, for calling these hearings, and members in this region will think that this hearing is in response to the frightening false alarms that recently occurred here, but this hearing and the GAO report where they were already when that took place makes the hearing especially timely. Mr. Chairman, I was so concerned, even before we knew that these were false alarms at the Pentagon facilities, that I immediately wrote to Chairman Davis to ask for a hearing, if only to settle the region down. About the last thing this region needs to go through is another sense that we have not gotten control of contamination of the mail, not after we have lost two good men, three others are seriously injured. False alarm or real alarm, the effect on particularly postal employees is virtually the same, and here of course including having to take Cipro. Mr. Chairman, when I looked at the GAO report, I was absolutely stunned. I could only think what year is this, are we back in 2001, because if you look at that report I think it is fair to say that nothing got fixed. It looks as if everything went wrong--detection, testing, coordination, communication. The only thing that ultimately went right is somebody understood that you ought to at some point tell employees and begin taking steps. Of course, those steps turned out to be unnecessary and we are 4 years after September 11th. Mr. Chairman, I was particularly concerned that the Pentagon had done its own testing in a non-CDC-certified lab. What in the world is the Pentagon doing farming out this important mission to a lab which hasn't gone through certification by the CDC when there are more than 100 such labs all around the country that have--I couldn't help but think who does the Pentagon think they are? Do they think they are not bound by the rules that came out after the anthrax scare here? That was extremely disconcerting to me. I cannot know whether or not another lab would have done better. I do know that workers and people who live in this region and in the United States have a right to expect after the anthrax attacks that occurred here and around the country, if I may remind you, have resulted in our taking care of the basics. The basics weren't attended to here and, Mr. Chairman, you were on the case as if clairvoyant with the GAO report and with this hearing, and I can't thank you enough for that. Mr. Shays. I thank the gentlelady and am very grateful that she is here to participate fully in this hearing. Let me say before recognizing our witnesses and swearing them in, that we have six witnesses in this panel and I think six in the next. So we are going to stick to the 5-minute rule. When the 5 minutes are up, I will ask you to wrap up if you haven't wrapped up, just so we can get to the questions, and we will have a number of questions to ask. So at this time the Chair would just note for the record that we have Keith Rhodes, Chief Technologist, Center for Technology and Engineering Department, Applied Research and Methods, U.S. Government Accountability Office, accompanied by Dr. Sushil Sharma, just behind him. So, Doctor, if you would stand when we swear and others as well; Dr. Tanja Popovic, Associate Director for Science, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Department of Health and Human Services, accompanied by Maxim Kiefer; Dr. Klaus Schafer, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense; Dana Tulis, Deputy Director for the Office of Emergency Management, Environmental Protection Agency, accompanied by Mark Durno; Thomas G. Day, vice president of engineering, U.S. Postal Service; as well as Dr. Katherine Kelley, director, Association of Public Health Laboratories. So if you would stand, if everyone else who I called will stand or anyone who might be providing some testimony would stand as well, if there is anyone accompanying you who may participate; if you would all stand and raise your right hands. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Shays. I would note for the record that all our witnesses and those who might testify have responded in the affirmative, and we will start with you, Mr. Rhodes. Thank you very much for being here. I thank all of you for being here and thank you all for your service to our country, whether it's directly in the government or in the case of the Associated Public Health Laboratories for your work as well. Thank you. STATEMENTS OF KEITH RHODES, CHIEF TECHNOLOGIST, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY SUSHIL SHARMA, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION; DR. TANJA POPOVIC, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE, CENTERS FOR DISEASE AND PREVENTION, ACCOMPANIED BY MAXIM KIEFER, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION; DR. KLAUS SCHAFER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; DANA TULIS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR THE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY MARK DURNO, ON- SCENE COORDINATOR [OSC] EPA REGION 5, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; THOMAS G. DAY, VICE PRESIDENT OF ENGINEERING, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE; AND DR. KATHERINE KELLEY, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH LABORATORY STATEMENT OF KEITH RHODES Mr. Rhodes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for asking us to participate in this hearing by presenting our assessment of the Federal activities conducted to detect anthrax in postal facilities in the fall of 2001. Mr. Chairman, the bottom line of our findings is the following: Since there were and largely still are no validated methods for sample collection and analysis, agencies cannot know with any level of statistical confidence whether or not a building is contaminated. In short, agencies cannot know when a negative result means negative and when a positive result means positive. I will now take a moment to discuss two of our major findings about Federal agencies' sampling strategies and lack of validation. Our first finding is that the agencies primarily used a targeted strategy; they collected samples from specific areas considered more likely to be contaminated based on their judgments. However, such judgments can only be effective when the source of contamination is definitive and the sample collection and analytical methods are validated. In addition, these judgments are based on certain assumptions. For example, contamination levels at the highest public health concern can usually be detected using a variety of available methods, despite their limitations. However, these assumptions may not always apply. For example, there may be limitations in the available information that restrict an agency's ability to reliably identify target locations. And when all results are negative, additional testing will need to be done, as was the case in Wallingford, CT. This in turn will result in the loss of critical time needed for public health intervention. A major weakness of targeted sampling approach is that in the case of a negative result, the basic question is this building contaminated will remain unanswered with a given level of confidence. Without probability sampling, inferences about a facility's status; that is, whether it was contaminated, could not be reliably made based on negative results. Probability sampling would address not only the immediate public health needs but also the wider environmental contamination and cleanup issues. In the future if the agencies decide to use a targeted sampling strategy, they must recognize that they could lose a number of days if test results are negative. Agencies would then have to collect and analyze additional samples, resulting in a loss of critical time for public health interventions. As you know, Mr. Chairman, this was the case at the Wallingford postal facility in the fall of 2001. About 3 weeks elapsed between the time the first sampling took place and the results of the fourth testing which revealed positive results. Furthermore, about 5 months elapsed between the time of the first sampling event and the time anthrax was found in the Wallingford facility's high bay area, the rafters above the machine that was contaminated. Our second finding finds that some collection and analytical methods used by Federal agencies were not validated for anthrax. This means that the agencies had no reliable basis on which to choose one method over another and there can be no statistical confidence in the negative results. Validation as it is generally understood is a formal empirical process involving two steps: One, development of standard protocols and, two, evaluation of those protocols in different labs and on several occasions. Reproducibility of the results by different labs and scientists is an essential component of this evaluation process. Validating a process is important because operational and health-related decisions are made on the basis of testing results generated by that process. In addition, validation would offer assurance that the results of using a particular method are robust enough to be reproduced regardless of which agency, contractor or laboratory is involved. Thus, agencies and the public could be reasonably confident that any test results generated by that method were reliable and, in particular, that any negative results would mean that a sample was free from contamination or within the method's limits of detection. Mr. Chairman, while agencies have taken some actions toward validation, these actions do not address the issue of validating all activities related to sampling. Since the fall of 2001, agencies have begun studies that may contribute to the validation process. Nonetheless, these studies appear to be limited in addressing only some aspect of an individual activity rather than the entire process. Finally, the agencies have not made appropriate and prioritized investments to develop and validate all activities related to sampling for anthrax and other biothreat agents. Accordingly, we made several recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Secretary should: One, ensure the appropriate validation studies of the overall process of sampling activities, including the methods, are conducted; two, ensure that a definition of validation is developed and agreed upon; three, see that appropriate investments are made in empirical studies to develop probability-based sampling strategies that take into account the complexities of indoor environments; and, four, ensure that appropriate prioritized investments are made for all biothreat agents. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have. [Note.--The GAO report entitled, ``Anthrax Detection, Agencies Need to Validate Sampling Activities in Order to Increase Confidence in Negative Results,'' may be found in subcommittee files.] [The prepared statement of Mr. Rhodes follows:] Mr. Shays. I didn't interrupt you because you left your most important part to the end and I couldn't interrupt you. Mr. Rhodes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Shays. You are welcome. Dr. Popovic. Dr. Popovic. Thank you very much. Dr. Shays. Is your mic on, Doctor? Dr. Popovic. It is now. Mr. Shays. Good. STATEMENT OF DR. TANJA POPOVIC Dr. Popovic. Good afternoon, Chairman Shays and members of the subcommittee. I am Dr. Tanja Popovic, Acting Associate Director for Science for Disease Control and Prevention, and I am accompanied today by Mr. Max Kiefer of CDC's National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. On behalf of CDC, I am pleased to describe CDC's views on detection of anthrax, the role of the laboratory response network and our ongoing activities to fully establish the scientific validity of environmental testing methods. During the 2001 anthrax attacks, CDC teams conducted a number of outbreak investigations in Florida, New York City, New Jersey, Washington, DC, and Connecticut. An environmental sampling was a very important component of these investigations. CDC used targeted or epidemiologically driven sampling strategies as the most straightforward approach to initial assessment that allowed for rapid determination of contamination and quick public health decisions. Targeted sampling proved to be rapid, efficient and successful and will continue to be our primary strategy in outbreak investigations. Environmental sampling approaches have substantially expanded since that time, and now they include early warning systems. BioWatch is an environmental air sampling surveillance initiated by the Department of Homeland Security with CDC, Department of Justice, EPA and National Laboratories as key partners. Over 500,000 analyses have already been conducted. Another system is biohazard detection system, the one used by the U.S. Postal Office, postal system. Both of them rely on a phased-in approach, and that is the initial signal for a particular biothreat agent is then followed by confirmatory identification. CDC has worked very closely with USPS and public health partners on steps needed for that confirmatory identification and on developing effective response protocols. CDC has also taken the lead in working with Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice and EPA in creating similar guidance for response to BioWatch signals. It is exactly the highly reliable methods of the Laboratory Response Network [LRN], that are used for this step of confirmatory identification. LRN is a national network of front line and advanced laboratory capacities capable of providing support in bio- threat, chemical or other public health emergencies. During 2001, LRN laboratories have conducted hundreds of confirmatory identifications for anthrax bacteria from all kinds of sources, environmental, human and others. They have also tested more than 120,000 environmental specimens for a total of about 1 million tests. At this time, it is very important for us to continue to grow and enhance this network's capacity to be parallel with its continuously growing responsibilities. With much of the progress, CDC does agree with the GAO that there is room for further research in the area of validation. The anthracis protocols that we used in 2001 have been validated for identification of the anthracis, and the members of the participating laboratories did take part in the proficiency testing programs. However, validation methods for collecting Bacillus anthracis from air and surface did not exist at that time and therefore CDC used caution when providing recommendations and guidance for use of these methods to others. We began addressing the issues of validation of these methods immediately after the response ended. And the example of that is a side-by-side study conducted at Brentwood in which we used different sampling materials, which was done almost in the middle of the national crisis. We do continue to make efforts to validate components of this biothreat agent detection process, but we do believe that the full validation of every possible scenario variation might not only be practical but could not entirely replace the scientific judgment and event-specific evaluations. In the meantime, CDC microbiologists have really worked hard on evaluating efficiency of different sampling materials and processing methods. We had an interagency agreement with the U.S. Army Dugway Proving Grounds that has led to the development of a chamber in which we can establish and generate known concentrations of anthrax spores, which is critical for any kind of reliable and repetitive validation procedures. Studies are under way that will look at the efficiency of sampling methods for both air and surfaces that will allow for the detection--for lower limits of detection and also, very importantly, talk about intra-laboratory validation. We also have extensive collaboration with the Sandia National Laboratory on a project funded by DHS, and these are the studies that will talk about the surface sampling and extraction methods as well. So, in summary, environmental microbiology and sampling issues are indeed important tools for public health decisions, for law enforcement investigations and for evaluation of remediation success. CDC is sponsoring research for a number of validation gaps for Bacillus anthracis, and there are many other agents, and we are looking forward to working with all the agencies, Department of Health and Human Services, Homeland Security and other agencies, so that we can move forward and improve all of our methods. [The prepared statement of Dr. Popovic follows:] Mr. Shays. Thank you, Doctor. Dr. Schafer. STATEMENT OF DR. KLAUS SCHAFER Dr. Schafer. Chairman Shays, distinguished members. Mr. Shays. I don't think your mic is on. I have never figured this out. Doctors know so much, but they never know to turn their mics on. There you go. Dr. Schafer. Chairman Shays, distinguished members, I am honored to appear before the subcommittee today. Mr. Shays. Thank you. It is an honor to have you, sir. Dr. Schafer. I am responsible for the oversight of the Chem-Bio Defense Program [CBDP] within the Department of Defense. The CBDP is responsible for all aspects of the Department of Defense's fielding of operational chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense capabilities, and the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear force installation program. The program has efforts across the acquisition life cycle from very early basic research and development activities, advanced development and the procurement of chemical and biological defense capabilities; finally, the entire life cycle management of these field of capabilities to ensure their quality and support while in the hands of the warfighter. I am accompanied this afternoon by Dr. David Cullen, who is immediately behind me, from the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense. The CBDP has been aggressively engaged in the research and development of biological warfare detection and identification technologies. Among these are technologies geared to rapidly and accurately detect anthrax in environmental and clinical samples. Prior to September 11, 2001, CBDP efforts had focused exclusively on developing capabilities that would eventually be fielded to their operational military forces. September 11th forced a broadening of the Chem-Bio Defense Program focus to provide capabilities in support of installation for its protection and the emerging homeland defense missions. Many of these technologies are the backbone of today's response system protecting the American public. In pursuit of these new missions, the CBDP has, and is currently fielding these systems and continuing the development of new capabilities which put a premium on sensitivity and precision in the integration of these technologies into the broader interagency response community. However, while the end mission has changed, the early research and development of these capabilities is still founded on the same basic tenets used to develop capabilities for the operational force, sound science and laboratory validation of technologies. This is always the first step in the eventual fielding of any capability. In support of the installation force protection and homeland defense missions, the Chem-Bio Defense Program has developed a total systems approach from directing the sample, the laboratory system for the routine analysis of aerosol samples as well as confirmatory analysis of suspect samples from other sources. The capability is founded on technologies largely developed and validated in DOD laboratories, such world class laboratories as USAMRIID and the Naval Medical Research Center, which are, by the way, also recognized as definitive Laboratory Response Network laboratories. Technologies, protocols and procedures developed in these labs, as well as others, are then transitioned into a network of laboratories providing capability to insulation force protection. This is what the Pentagon Force Protection Agency uses today. The CBDP has instituted an overarching Quality Assurance and Quality Control Program that assures these technologies, protocols and procedures developed and validated in the hands of scientists at DOD labs can and will perform with required precision and accuracy in the hands of field activities. The QA/QC Program involves not only the required documentation of all procedures and processes, but also continual proficiency testing to ensure that the laboratories are performing equally within the framework designed. The Chem- Bio Defense Program has also continually and aggressively engaged with operational units to assure that decisionmaking and risk assessment is coupled with the correct technical information so that timely and accurate operational decisions can be made. Finally, we have been and we will continue to coordinate the development of technologies with the requisite policymaking that must go hand in hand to create a proficient and capable system. Within the Department of Defense, we are collaborating with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Homeland Defense and Health Affairs so technologies we are developing and fielding can be integrated properly and seamlessly into the medical response community and within the interagency to provide these desperately needed capabilities. To that end we are collaborating with the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Health and Human Services in studies aimed at gaining VW collection, detection and identification systems, equivalencies between agencies, and we are developing interagency response frameworks that are so important to protecting the American public. Subject to your questions, that concludes my remarks. [The prepared statement of Dr. Schafer follows:] Mr. Shays. Thank you. Dr. Schafer, would you mind if we had someone reproduce your remarks? We don't have any written testimony from you. Dr. Schafer. I was told this was oral testimony, and I will be happy to provide written testimony at a later date, if that's OK with the chairman. Mr. Shays. Let me ask you this, just so it doesn't happen again in my subcommittee. My staff said you didn't need written testimony? It is usual practice we require it the day or night before you come to testify. Dr. Schafer. No, sir. I was a late add, so I did not prepare testimony. Through the processes, we couldn't get it cleared in time by OMB. Mr. Shays. Well, I understand that part. What you are saying for the record is that you---- Dr. Schafer. This is oral testimony. Mr. Shays. You were told just a while ago that you were testifying and didn't have anything written at the time, is that correct? Dr. Schafer. This is my oral testimony, sir. Mr. Shays. All right. Well, that's what we will have to deal with. I'm sorry, excuse me. Let me just recognize Jon Porter. Do you have a statement you would like to make or something you would like to say? Mr. Porter. Actually, I would like to enter it for the record, Mr. Chairman. I will submit it. But I would also like to welcome a good friend of mine, Linda Stetzenbach. She is here from environmental studies at the University of Nevada Las Vegas, Harry Reid Center. I will embarrass her for the moment. I think she is on the next panel. Welcome. But I will be submitting my statement. Thank you. Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Porter. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Hon. Jon C. Porter follows:] Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. Let me just, as you stated, ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the record and that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, so ordered. And I will ask for unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted to include their written statements in the record, and without objection so ordered. Dr. Schafer, we appreciate your being here. We understand you were told recently you would be testifying. So it is good to have you here. We will just have to proceed through questions to ask you. Dr. Schafer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Shays. Thank you. Ms. Tulis. STATEMENT OF DANA TULIS Ms. Tulis. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am Dana Tulis, Deputy Director of the EPA's Office of Emergency Management. My office is responsible for providing national leadership to prevent, prepare for and to respond to human health and environmental emergencies, including terrorist events. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss EPA's involvement in the multiagency efforts to detect anthrax during 2001 and GAO's findings in their recent report on anthrax detection. I would also like to share with you steps we have taken since that time to improve the Nation's ability to detect and respond to anthrax contamination. With me today is Mark Durno, Senior On-Scene Coordinator in EPA's Region 5 and one of EPA's foremost sampling experts. In responding to the anthrax attacks of 2001, EPA's role at a site generally began after CDC determined the presence of a biological contaminant, in this case anthrax. EPA collected targeted environmental samples at postal facilities in Florida, on Capitol Hill and other nonpostal facilities for the purpose of characterizing the extent of contamination and for subsequent decontamination. In taking these steps, we used either wet swabs, wet wipes, HEPA vacuum samples or combination of these depending on the site specific circumstances. We did not use dry swabs because we did not believe they were effective. The GAO report appears to recommend probability sampling over targeted sampling for detecting anthrax contanimation in a building. EPA believes that targeted sampling strategies are valid and necessary for rapidly accessing the likelihood of contamination to ensure that necessary actions can be taken quickly and to protect those potentially exposed. Especially where the source of contamination is known, targeted sampling of services most likely to be contaminated, as determined from incident-specific details such as traffic patterns and air flow within the facility, epidemiological data and forensic information should provide key information to determine whether contamination exists in a facility. Where contamination is known to exist, but the source is unknown, however, use of statistically based sampling, may improve the probability of detecting contamination. During the anthrax attacks of 2001, there were hundreds of postal facilities potentially contaminated and quick action was needed, therefore we used targeted sampling to minimize people being exposed. EPA agrees with GAO that there is a critical need for validated sampling and analytical methods, and we are taking a number of steps to address this gap. Although a lot remains to be done, sampling methodologies have improved and are more consistently applied. EPA is collaborating with other agencies to develop standardized methods and procedures, and anthrax, of course, is one of those contaminants. Techniques are being developed to concentrate samples of chemical and biological contaminants where necessary to facilitate detection at low levels. EPA is also evaluating the performance of emerging and commercially available technologies such as amino acid test kits and water and other methods. The GAO report notes that extensive sampling efforts constrain available laboratory capacity and it suggests that laboratory capacity can be increased. Unfortunately, it is not that easy to increase laboratory capacity, especially for environmental analyses associated with biological and chemical warfare agents, where capacity is very limited right now or may not exist. However, when possible, we do look at individual labs to assess whether research capacity is available during time of critical incidence. But there is no environmental laboratory response network analogous to the CDC's laboratory response network at this time. EPA and other agencies have initiated a number of steps to deal with this problem. Internally, EPA's own Homeland Security Lab Response Work Group was created in October 2002, and we are working closely with the White House's Homeland Security Council, DHS, USDA, DOD, FBI, CDC, FDA, State laboratory directors and a number of associations, including the Public Health Laboratories Association. We as a work group have developed an on-line Environmental Lab Compendium of State, EPA and some commercial environmental analysis capability for homeland security purposes. We are also working to incorporate the capabilities of other Federal agencies. We have analyzed and mapped current laboratory capacities to determine the national supply of laboratory analyses for chemical, biological and radiological warfare agents, and we are currently analyzing five of the White House Homeland Security Council's scenarios to look at what the need is and therefore we can determine the gap between supply and demand. We have also established a reserve corps of 79 EPA analysts who can be trained in chemical and biological analyses, and we will be able to assist in meeting surge demand. CDC and EPA have developed a MOA to work closely together and to leverage the work of the Laboratory Response Network and to define our respective roles in environmental analyses. We have worked closely with the White House's Homeland Security Council to expand the MOA to include all other Federal agencies with existing or developing networks. This MOA, known as the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks, is expected to be signed very soon. We have already started to meet and DHS has been posting these meetings. Consortium work groups will address consistency in sampling and analytical methods across the agencies. We do appreciate GAO's efforts to improve the Nation's ability to respond more effectively in the future, and we recognize there is a need to validate sampling and analytical methods to improve our tools and to increase national capacity for analyzing environmental samples. We believe we have taken significant steps in these areas and have greatly benefited by working closely with our colleagues on this panel, and we look forward to continued collaboration. Mr. Chairman, subcommittee members, this completes my oral statement. I, of course, am open to any questions you may have. [The prepared statement of Ms. Tulis follows:] Mr. Shays. Thank you, Ms. Tulis. Mr. Day. STATEMENT OF THOMAS G. DAY Mr. Day. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to meet with you today to discuss the recommendations of the Government Accountability Office regarding validation of anthrax detection methods. As the Federal agency most directly and tragically affected by the anthrax attacks of 2001, the Postal Service fully understands the value of public and employee confidence and test results for the presence of anthrax. This was an issue raised by the Government Accountability Office in connection with the 2003 hearing of this subcommittee. GAO recommended that the Postal Service work with other agencies and its unions to consider a number of issues related to the testing of 286 facilities in the fall of 2001, of which only 23 tested positive for anthrax. We were asked to: Reassess the risk level for our employees and customers of the facilities that tested negative; reconsider the advisability of retesting those facilities, employing the most effective sampling methods and procedures; and then finally communicate our conclusions along with our rationale to the Postal Service employees and general public. Following extensive review by a work group that included experts from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and our employee unions, it was concluded that no further sampling was warranted for those facilities that tested negative for anthrax spores. This decision was based on a number of factors. First, there was no new evidence of anthrax disease in postal employees or customers. Second, the Postal Service had instituted new maintenance procedures and modified work practices to reduce the potential for reaerosolization of anthrax spores. Third, that additional testing would not appreciably increase the safety of our facilities for employees or customers. The Postal Service is continuing to improve its process to protect our employees and our customers from biohazards in the mail. We have installed advanced Biohazard Detection Systems at 107 facilities. Eventually they will be installed at 282 of our key mail processing plants. To date, the Biohazard Detection System has performed over 550,000 tests involving over 12 billion pieces of mail. To date there have been no false positives. These automated systems, developed with the cooperation of experts from the Federal Government, the military and the private sector, provide rapid onsite PCR analysis of aerosol samples collected during the earliest stages of mail processing. They allow for quick response to a positive test result, triggering the local integrated emergency management plan, which includes the cessation of operations, facilities shutdown, notification to community first responders, including public health officials who would make any medical decisions regarding potentially exposed employees and customers. In addition to the Biohazard Detection System, we are also installing a ventilation filtration system designed to contain to release of biohazards as it moves through the mail. In developing and deploying the Biohazard Detection System, we recognized the need, very real need for standardization of processes to produce reliable, accurate test results in which our stakeholders can have a high level of confidence. Over the last several years, and as recently as last month, the Postal Service has been the focus of a number of events in which detection systems at other government facilities that receive mail have indicated possible presence of a biohazard. In each of these cases the Postal Service implemented a response plan that involved sampling and testing, operational adjustments and, where appropriate, preventive medical treatment for employees. Ultimately, investigation and further testing determined that mail was not involved in these incidents and, in fact, that no biohazards were present. The initial positive alerts, however, appear to reflect the varying capabilities of detection equipment as well as sampling and testing protocols relied upon by other agencies. Based on our experience, we agree with the Government Accountability Office recommendation that there be coordinated interagency efforts to develop standardized processes in connection with sample collection, transportation, extraction and analysis. However, based on our experience, we believe that targeted sampling, rather than the probability sampling recommended by the GAO, represents the most prudent and productive approach for the Postal Service. We believe probability sampling can be of value as a sampling protocol in response to a random event. However, once mail has been identified as a potential source of contamination, it is no longer random. At that point, logic and responsibility dictate that sampling follow the trail of the mail, permitting us to conduct sampling along the path taken by the suspect mail during processing. Probability sampling, by its very nature, might not include sampling from a specific location or piece of equipment through which a contaminated piece of mail has moved. This can create the potential for a false negative. Following last month's incident at the Defense Department's Remote Delivery Facility, we conducted targeted sampling at our Washington, DC, Government Mails Facility, where mail for delivery to the Department of Defense is prepared. Targeted environmental sampling allowed us to focus on the areas and the equipment through which this mail would have moved. While it was found that mail was not involved in the Defense Department, it provides a demonstration of the steps we take when this type of incident occurs. We quickly implemented a controlled shutdown of the Government Mails Facility. We promptly notified employees and their unions, both at a national and local level. We continued to provide employees and unions with regular information updates until the situation was resolved. We arranged for the distribution of antibiotics to all of the facility's employees on all work shifts, reflecting a decision that was made in conjunction with the Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and the District of Columbia Department of Public Health. We also promptly accounted for seven employees who were recorded on sick leave during the period of concern to verify that they were not exhibiting symptoms of anthrax. Considering that incident and others like it, we believe that the recommendations of the GAO, with the sole exception of probability based sampling, would go a long way in minimizing the possibility of similar future incidents. We look forward to working with the Department of Homeland Security and other agencies to implement these recommendations. Thank you, and I would be delighted to take your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Day follows:] Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Day. Dr. Kelley, we saved the best for the last. I say that because you are a true Yankee from Connecticut. Dr. Kelley. Yes. Mr. Shays. I don't know how long you have lived in Connecticut though. Dr. Kelley. About 6 years. Mr. Shays. About 6 years. Well, welcome to Connecticut. You have the floor. Is your mic on? Dr. Kelley. Yes, it is. Mr. Shays. I asked only because you are a doctor. Dr. Kelley. I know, we have problems with those things. STATEMENT OF DR. KATHERINE KELLEY Dr. Kelley. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on assessing anthrax detection methods. My name is Dr. Katherine Kelley, and I am here today representing the Association of Public Health Laboratories [APHL]. I am currently the director of the Connecticut Department of Public Health Laboratory. As its name implies, APHL is the association for State and local governmental laboratories that perform testing of public health significance. In the area of terrorism response that includes both human and environmental testing. This work is done through key partnership with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to provide rapid local response to a biological event, using consistent scientific methods and reagents and nationally accepted evidentiary practices. The structure for this partnership is the Laboratory Response Network [LRN]. The LRN was deployed in response to the mail contamination events post-September 11th. In some States the laboratory role was limited to testing mail distribution centers in support of the early survey to assess the extent of contamination. In other States, such as Connecticut, the laboratory participated in the diagnosis of infected people and clinical investigations to find the source of their infection and environmental investigations of the postal distribution system as a possible source of anthrax and in the environmental cleanup and clearance of contaminated sites. All this work was carried out under the direction of a joint command center made up of experts from CDC, the Environmental Protection Agency, National Institutes of Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Postal Service and APHL, and we drew on outside experts as needed. APHL agrees with the recommendations of the GAO report under consideration today. There continues to be a need for agreed upon, validated methods for clinical specimens and environmental samples that may be encountered in any kind of a threat event. However, 4 years after these events, it is easy to overlook the highly charged, complex situation of that moment in this Nation's history. I would like to use our experience in Connecticut as an example. The Connecticut Department of Public Health received CDC funding to build a response laboratory capacity for weapons of mass destruction bioagents. The working hypothesis at that time was that the LRN would be responding to human outbreaks caused by biothreat agents and that most, if not all, of the testing would be of human clinical specimens. As a followup to the anthrax letter sent to Congress, our laboratory assisted USPS in an assessment of three postal distribution centers in Connecticut. On November 11, 2001, our laboratory tested 53 samples from the Wallingford USPS distribution center as part of the assessment of the facilities that might have been contaminated by the Daschle or Leahy letters. All samples tested negative. But the machine that processed the mail at Oxford and Seymour wasn't sampled. On November 19th a local hospital contacted the Connecticut State Health State Department to report a suspected anthrax case in an elderly woman from Oxford, CT. Blood culture specimens were transported to our laboratory from the patient, and they tested positive for anthrax using LRN methods. CDC and the FBI were notified immediately. On November 20th, CDC retested the specimens and confirmed anthrax. Assuming that this was the index case of a potential anthrax outbreak, CDC was asked to provide assistance and a team of epidemiologists was dispatched to Connecticut. In the interim, the FBI and Connecticut State police secured the patient's home. Over the course of the next few weeks, CDC and State epidemiologists collected samples from all locations the patient had visited prior to her illness and also from every part of her home. The DPH Laboratory tested them all, and they were all negative for the anthrax Bacillus. One of the CDC epidemiologists was familiar with the USPS bar code system for tracking first class mail. This data were reviewed to see if any mail coming into close proximity to the Daschle or Leahy letters had gone to Oxford or Seymour. One such letter was identified and retrieved for testing. It was positive for anthrax spores even after repeated sampling. This link to the anthrax positive mail directed the investigation to the Wallingford postal distribution center and to a more targeted sampling of the machines that process mail to the Oxford-Seymour route. Mr. Shays. Your 5 minutes are up. Dr. Kelley. Yes, OK. To this day there hasn't been a direct link made to that case, but we do believe that the patient was very fragile and that cross-contaminated mail was probably the source of her infection. As I indicated at the start of my testimony, we agree with the recommendations of the GAO report. However, I would be remiss if I did not mention the challenges associated with the response to chemical terror events. Federal funding has improved the availability of public health labs to measure chemical substances in people exposed to a toxin. In fact, we drilled that yesterday. There is still, however, much work to be done to increase the capability of public health laboratories to be able to address local events in terms of environmental testing. [The prepared statement of Dr. Kelley follows:] Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. At this time the Chair will recognize Ms. Norton, give her the gavel for a few minutes, and I will be back in a second. Ms. Norton [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My first question has to go to the place where you would, I think if you asked the average person, I think if I asked any of you, if somebody was terrible and treacherous enough to want to do another anthrax attack, what facility of the U.S. Post Office would they go to, and I think you would say, well, they'd go to the facility that handled congressional mail or White House mail. You would say that based on past practice, where two Senators got terribly lethal letters. You would say that based on what we know about al Qaeda and terrorists. I have to say that I was stunned to learn, and if I am wrong I would like to know that right now, that of these facilities that have gotten the equipment, 107 facilities--and I understand you have to spread them, can't do it all at one time, but 107 facilities, eventually 282 plants, that V Street, where White House mail, congressional mail goes, is not one of the facilities that has these detection systems, is that true? Mr. Day. That's correct. As of now, that is a facility that will have it. That facility along with the Curseen-Morris facility, which already has one system, or a modification to the system that we are installing everywhere else. It's a free- standing system. So the V Street facility will have a free- standing system as well the Curseen-Morris facility. Ms. Norton. I asked this question not because I think Members of Congress or the White House are entitled to any preference over the average American, but looking at where the priorities for--that I think anybody, even your common sense, even the average layman would say, if you were going to pick, pick 50 places, pick 5 places to start and gave them a description, it does seem to me that at least in the top five, V Street would be there. The mail coming, for example, to the Congress was shut down 3 or 4 days after this until this got straightened out. So I want to know what are your priorities. How do you decide when this detection equipment will in fact be installed? Is there some method to your madness that escapes me when V Street doesn't have---- Mr. Day. V Street and the Curseen-Morris facility lack the piece of equipment that the biodetection system is installed on the Advanced Facer-Canceler. So there is a unique application, a free-standing---- Ms. Norton. So why do the others have it and they don't? First of all, I want to know what your priorities are. First of all, I want to know how you select the order in which facilities get this equipment. Second, I want to know when V Street, which serves the part of U.S. mail most likely to be attacked will, in fact, get such equipment? Those are my questions. Mr. Day. The priority has been along the East Coast in the areas that were directly affected. It went onto the Advanced Facer-Canceler System, which is not a system that either the Curseen-Morris or the V Street facility has or will ever have. They don't process that kind of mail. There is a free-standing system that is located at Curseen-Morris. The same system will go into the V Street facility as will additional free-standing systems. Ms. Norton. Thank God it is in Curseen-Morris, which everybody should understand is Brentwood, but haven't I gotten an answer from you about how you choose priorities based on the section of the country? OK, so we got the section nailed down pretty clear. Once you know the section of the country, and there are umpteen places to go, then how do you decide where in fact this equipment is going to go, and when will V Street get equipment? There are people in V Street who were at Brentwood and one of the reasons they wanted to get out of Brentwood is because they couldn't stand to go back in Curseen-Morris and now they learn that--or yet to hear that the equipment isn't in V Street, and I haven't yet heard from you when it will be in V Street. Mr. Day. We are working with a contractor to get it deployed in there. I will get back to you with the exact state it will be installed. Ms. Norton. I am speaking, I am sure, for the chairman. May I ask that in 30 days you get us a list of your priorities for installation for this equipment and specifically when the equipment will be installed in V Street. Again, this is why I say it is really 2001 all over again. Let me go to my next question. Mr. Rhodes. You know, you opened your testimony saying that there are no validated methods for sample collection and analysis, so that agencies, quote, cannot know. As you opened your testimony, I felt like I was hearing someone talk about how we don't have a cure for cancer yet so we cannot know certain things. I mean, is this really rocket science? I mean, what is it? I don't understand why we don't have any validated methods. Do you mean there doesn't exist any? Do you mean we just don't have any? Would you please clarify why there are no validated methods, 4 years after an anthrax attack. Or perhaps this is more complicated, would you break it down for us so that perhaps the Congress needs to do more to help whoever it is, CDC, EPA, somebody, learn how to validate methods so that they can then be assured that any samples will be as close to valid and what you tell us and what they tell us is possible. In trying to answer your question about why, I don't know exactly why, other than in the world of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear countermeasures, biological countermeasures are still considered less important. Ms. Norton. Do you think it is a matter that the priority has not been put on finding ways to validate these samples? Mr. Rhodes. Validation methods are well understood. I'm a scientist. Everyone here is a scientist. We know how to validate. It's a matter of is something going to be done. As you've heard from every person here, they've all concurred that validation of methods, they concur with that recommendation. Let's go back to the 1990's. In the 1990's there were several incidences, actually several hundred incidences of hoax letters being sent through the mail that claimed to have anthrax. As a matter of fact, in the year 2000 alone, the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigated approximately 200 false anthrax letters sent through the mail. At that point in time, methods still weren't validated and people didn't consider biological terror and biothreat to be a high threat. Since 2001, the fall of 2001, you would think that now that we have five people actually dead from that, 23 injured, seriously injured, that an emphasis on validation of both protocols as well as the techniques, the techniques, the tools, the procedures and the processes, would occur and would be a priority. It hasn't occurred. And I do not know why. It's not that it's something that isn't understood well by everyone sitting here at the table and other places. It's a matter of are we going to make it a priority; are we going to take the time? Because it's not just enough to say that a dry swab is inappropriate for testing in a particular area. It's taking the entire process of sample collection method--tool, transport, extraction, and analysis--so all of that has to be validated and the inherent errors in the various steps have to be understood so we can have confidence about the answer that comes out at the other end. Ms. Norton. Dr. Popovic, I do not understand how you can certify labs if in fact we don't have any understanding in these labs about validating their processes. On what basis are you able to certify the labs that have been certified? Dr. Popovic. I agree with everybody on the panel that validation of a lot of these steps is really important. I would add that there are a lot of steps within this process that have been validated. For example, the protocols for identification and molecular characterization of a number of biothreat agents have existed in 2001 and have been expanded up to this point. At this point, we have added to the laboratory response network 160 protocols to the existing spectrum of what we had since 2001. The problem here is twofold: One is scientific and one is physical. A lot of these validation studies require two things. One is space that has to be specifically designed. A lot of studies cannot be done with surrogates. They have to be done with the real thing, and so we do need more biosafety level 3 and biosafety level 4 space. Ms. Norton. Do you have to have anthrax in order to do it? Dr. Popovic. You can use surrogates for a large number of studies. But you cannot use it for all. So the other thing is you do need diverse scientific expertise. What we are saying here is individual agencies have done some steps of the validation, but as Dr. Tulis has pointed out, this integrated consortium of network laboratories is really a place where all of these individual efforts are now getting to be put together, and we see that as a big umbrella under which really major steps toward validating a lot of these methods are going to be able to take place. Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, I see you have returned. Mr. Shays. Keep going. The gentlewoman has more time. Let's turn off the clock. Ms. Norton. What you last said gave me some hope. Obviously this is something we have had to begun doing after the horrific, tragic anthrax attacks, and we understand that. And you say that this consortium of labs that Ms. Tulis talked about, too, are now apparently getting their act together and what is not an easy process will be taken care of. And I have every confidence that you are doing that. The problem we have is that in the meantime, these false positives, these false alarms--imagine yourself working in a postal facility today, hearing the testimony you have heard here. Nobody can tell you if it is or if it's not; so if they say it's not, they are not going to believe it's not. It must be terribly anxiety-producing. I must ask you, even given the complexity of the process you describe, when you think we will get validated testing somewhere, so that we don't have the GAO telling us that there's nowhere--because they say anywhere, there's nowhere anyway--there's no way anywhere, rather, in our country to know, when you get a sample, if it is negative or positive, regardless of what the lab tells you. That is extremely disconcerting for us to hear here, not to mention postal workers who every day have to deal with our mail here. So I have to ask you, when do you think we will in fact have this validation process underway so that at least the GAO will tell us there is somewhere in America where validated testing goes on? Dr. Popovic. I would like to emphasize once again that the steps for confirmatory identifications have been validated, and those are the steps that are necessary to be linked with the initial signals that come out of various early warning systems such as BioWatch, BioHazard detection systems. Efforts are really underway, and we have already talked with a number of our colleagues on trying to coordinate these initial signals with a proper public health response, which is what you are asking: When can we know that the initial signal is going to be confirmed? Confirmatory tests can be done within the LRN within the day, within several hours actually, so we are already working on that. Ms. Norton. We should remember that this has occurred after this mail has gone and been irradiated, or whatever we call it, and so obviously the chances are low. I do not want to scare everybody. But nevertheless, everybody knows that none of this is perfect. I am concerned that you have not given us a protocol for how you are going to get there and when you are going to get there. And knowing this chairman, I think he is going to want you to be more specific than that. I do not know if Miss Tulis is prepared to be more specific. But to say we are getting there really is not good enough, particularly since Mr. Rhodes has clarified that it really isn't rocket science. And he has been clear that in fact if the effort is put there, it can be done. And clearly the effort yet has not been focused here. And we are asking for it simply to be focused enough so that, for example, somebody from the government would be able to say in 6 months, by the end of the year, we ought to have a validated testing protocol so that we could then spread to the labs around the country. So is that too much to ask? Miss Tulis, you didn't have an opportunity to respond to the question. Ms. Tulis. On the environmental side, we have had a little bit of a problem, because we don't have the analogous laboratory response network, so we've been working the best we can to leverage the existing resources that are out there. In fact we've been having a number of conversations with CDC and worked on this initial memorandum of agreement which now has been expanded to all the Federal agencies. So what we're trying to do is leverage the resources as best we can. I don't know if I can give you a timeframe today, but I can tell you that on the analytical side, there is a basic compendium, standard and local methods, which we have put together with other agencies, which really is the first step. And the next step, as we are going through right now, is establishing a validation process for those methods. Again, I cannot give you an exact timeframe because we need to figure out which ones to validate first and how to go through this process. But it is something that is very much right now of being a high priority. Ms. Norton. Just bear in mind that our mail is irradiated before it comes here, for good reason, because this is the place of the tragedy; but the mail of most people in the United States is not irradiated so that the clear and present danger posed, as concerned as I am with the targeted facilities of the U.S. Government--let us be clear, the clear and present danger really is the people of the United States who don't have their mail irradiated. So if it goes to some big post office somewhere where there isn't a government facility, my friends, with what you have just testified here, there is a far greater danger to the average American and to the average American postal worker outside of this region than there is to anyone else. For that reason I believe that the subcommittee has simply got to look into giving you a deadline for focusing on the validation process so--that Mr. Rhodes of the GAO tells us can happen. And remember what his testimony is. Yes, it is not rocket science. No one has given it the focus that would produce validation. Yet that says it all to me. And without validation, I think you are endangering mail systems throughout the United States. And that is on you, and I think you have to do something about it right now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Shays [presiding]. I thank the gentlewoman. I was thinking as we were having this hearing, that we have had hearings that go well before September 11, 2001 in which we talked about, in theory, weaponized anthrax. And we said it had no antidote in a sense that where, if you were not protected before, it could kill you. Then we used Cipro, an antibiotic, to deal with it and it appeared to work better than I think we anticipated. So obviously we keep learning things. I am wrestling with a few things. I get the sense that CDC thinks from a target, and it starts narrowly and works out, and I get the sense that EPA starts broadly and works in. And then I am thinking to myself, well, is one better than the other? It seems to me they both have their role. But with the facility in Connecticut, we basically identified someone who was not well, an older person, and I am suspecting from that, the conclusion is that the more frail you are, the more vulnerable you become to the anthrax spores. I am told you can basically put about a million spores in your hand and have clearly weaponized a very fine structure. You could literally hold about a billion. I'm sorry, not a million, about a billion. And then what I have the sense was we did the CDC model, the person, and we targeted where the flow could go. And so there was part of this building that was not checked out. And in the rafters and in the machinery, we then did the EPA model. We then looked at every aspect and found some spores, anthrax spores. So far, does anyone want to correct me on what I am seeing has happened? Dr. Kelly, is that accurate or not? Dr. Kelley. That's pretty much the way it went, right. The Wallingford facility was sampled many, many, many times and from a different perspective, part being the investigation of the case, and then the extent of the problem; and then was it cleaned up sufficiently. So there were quite a few different ideas that were being called on. Mr. Shays. What's amazing to me is that I make the assumption that the elderly woman who was killed in Connecticut wasn't in the facility, yet she was killed by some contact with spores. I make an assumption--and I want to be corrected if I am wrong--that it's likely that some in the postal facility, they were also exposed, but they had the capability to have not been, to ultimately succumb to it. Were people in the facility given Cipro? Dr. Kelley. Yes. Mr. Shays. So the irony here is that if we are using the model that if you didn't die, it must not be there. Once we use Cipro, you might not even be sick; in a sense, we were using a prophylactic that protected some who were in the facility, so the model that you look at, you look at its impact on the folks there. So in one sense, one of our modeling systems couldn't work properly because we introduced Cipro to it. Dr. Kelley. The patient also received antibiotic therapy, but---- Mr. Shays. It was too late. Dr. Kelley. It was too late. Mr. Shays. And she was how old? Dr. Kelley. Ninety-four. Mr. Shays. So the bottom line is, though, it's very possible that we had postal workers who were exposed, who either didn't succumb because the exposure was so slight and they were so healthy, or that they were exposed more significantly but they had actually taken an antibiotic that got them through, and we then never knew they were exposed. Dr. Kelley. Correct. Mr. Shays. The chairman raised questions about why is DOD given different--and I'm going to raise it in two parts. Dr. Schafer, this is not in any way directed to you, but in the process of trying to find who would testify, it became very real to us that DOD didn't know; and the fact that DOD didn't know was an indication to us that you have a broad--there are a lot of folks involved, and there is no sense of one person being ultimately in charge. Dissuade of me of that view or help me sort out why it's true. Dr. Schafer. Sure, Mr. Chairman. DOD has had well- established processes in place for a long time. I believe after September 11th, many people tried to put things in place, so that may have been a factor. But there was an element of human error that happened in this particular case. But the processes we have in place for verification of results, we never rely on a single test alone, and there is this process that moves, basically moves through the various layers of the lab, with the final element of that being one of the lab response network labs actually doing confirmation. So I think that's why this particular incident looks somewhat different. But in general we have put processes in place that mirror the CDC processes, are exactly the same thing, and we are part of that network. So I don't view that---- Mr. Shays. You used the words ``exactly the same'' and ``part of the network.'' My view is that you used validated labs and some that were not. I do not know, what is the proper term? Certified and not certified? Dr. Schafer. Well, let me talk about something called the installation protection program. That was the Secretary's decision to bring 200 military installations, start doing environmental sampling in those. And those processes had to be established primarily because of funding constraints and so on. And the labs are different but the processes are exactly the same. So we are no different than the other agencies in that regard. But we do have different requirements, and so there may be differences in that regard. Mr. Shays. I honestly don't quite understand what you're saying. What I hear you saying is in a sense saying, yes, we used labs that weren't certified but were different. Dr. Schafer. In this particular instance, this was a contract let outside the system. Mr. Shays. Right. Dr. Schafer. And so there was an exception and there was human error as well. So it probably looked a lot worse than it really was. But on the other hand, it generated---- Mr. Shays. Describe human error to me. I am not asking for a name, but I am asking for human error in what way? Dr. Schafer. Well, we think there was an error introduced in the laboratory that did the procedure. What I would like to do is defer that to the second, the operational side of the questions that you have, because they have all those details. Mr. Shays. So we will leave on the table that there was human error, and you think the second panel will get the answer to that. Dr. Schafer. I believe there was error in the process which generated the false positive. Mr. Shays. Mr. Rhodes, when you hear the question I ask, what is your reaction? Don't tell me you are thinking about the fact that Illinois lost last night. What is your reaction to what we are wrestling with? Mr. Rhodes. Trying to find a single point of contact relative to this question? I think that is the problem everywhere. As you look at our recommendations relative to DHS--and I understand you want to have another hearing where DHS is actually present, but I have to be very clear. You have read DHS's comments. DHS's response to our report is a few pages of explaining why they can't do it, whether they have the charter or not. Not everybody in government is supposed to look like the Heisman Trophy, you know, pushing away the problem and carrying their own ball. Somebody has to be in charge. You have to be able to come back and say you are the one who is responsible. You now own the problem. That is how we organize validation and that is how we make it a priority. Mr. Shays. Who do you think owns the problem right now? Mr. Rhodes. Everybody. Mr. Shays. And who should own it? Mr. Rhodes. Well, the Department of Homeland Security is our recommendation, that they should be the one who owns it as a Department; but then within each department or agency, someone has to be designated as the owner and you should have the 1-800 number or something: Iamit.gov. That's the location. That's the person. Mr. Shays. One of the problems in this administration, I think, and in this Congress too, I guess, is that there is not the accountability that we need in a lot of things. I think that the failure to hold people accountable for a lot of bad things that are happening in government is seeping through. Nobody is making claim to it, no one wants ownership, and no one is taking responsibility once something goes wrong. Mr. Rhodes. I guess fallout is the wrong term--but the downstream effect is that you can't get good information. For example, you asked were the postal workers put on Cipro, and everyone jumped in and said yes, right away. Wrong. The moment it was found out that it was positive they were put on Cipro. There was a postal carrier who delivered a 94-year-old asthmatic shut-in's mail that killed her. His bag was contaminated. His vehicle was contaminated. No one knew it. So once everybody found out that it was positive, then, yes, they were put on Cipro. As somebody who was in the Hart Building the day that it was contaminated, yes, I was put on Cipro, but that was a very, very straightforward event: Open the letter. It falls on the floor. We all go get our Cipro. Mr. Shays. Let me just understand the concept of validation. We are not sure that we really have a good process in place, correct? Let me back up and say it's very difficult to detect anthrax, would everyone agree? I mean, it costs millions and millions of dollars, because we are in a huge building and we are looking for a few spores that you cannot even see. Mr. Rhodes. And let me extend this, when you say a few spores. If we are talking about your constituent who was a customer at Wallingford, as you've heard, no anthrax detected. There's anthrax in the neighbor's mail, there's anthrax in the postal carrier's vehicle, but no one found in all the sampling that was done in her home, no one found anything. So if I design a detection system for the lethal dose, 50 percent of 10,000 spores, what we have found in the fall of 2001 is the lethal dose, one, which is an immeasurable amount. She may have completely inhaled all of it, and now we're talking about less than 100 spores. You made the point, a billion spores in the palm of your hand. That's small potatoes. Multiple trillions of spores can be held in your hand if it is weaponized well enough. Mr. Shays. I am an impressionable person, and I may say that at some meeting. Your testimony is that where I said a billion, you're saying you could literally hold trillions of spores. Mr. Rhodes. Absolutely. You can hold trillions of spores in your hand if we're talking 1 to 5 micron with no electrostatic charge and all the rest of that. If we have milled it down to that level, of course, you can hold trillions of it. You can have trillions per gram, depending on the concentrate. So billion is a big number, but trillion is a bigger number. Mr. Shays. So my conclusion is that it's pretty difficult to locate this stuff in a building where you could have a handful, a trillion spores that go through the system, the air ducts and so on. At one point they were even talking about taking down the Hart Building, and I don't know if that was foolish talk, but they were basically saying that they may not be able to get all that is in this building, they would have to tear it down. Which was an extreme statement, but not so far- fetched given what you have just said. So having said that, we all acknowledge it's difficult to find these spores and determine it; and what you are saying to me is reminding me that what triggered the investigation the second time in Connecticut was someone died we believe because of anthrax, but we never nailed it, affirmed that she in her person and so on, but that it was in the neighborhood. It was with the carrier. It was with her neighbor and on and on. Mr. Rhodes. Just one clarification on that. That was actually the fourth time that facility was tested. Mr. Shays. Having said that, I came to this hearing thinking this is almost an exercise in futility. It's so difficult. How could you ever be certain? We could do the best test and never be certain, so how can we give something a clean bill of health even if we do what you recommend? So that is what I am still wrestling with a little bit. Maybe you can help me sort that out. What I am wrestling with is we can never know if the positive is real and if the negative is meaningful, because it may be we just didn't find it. Mr. Rhodes. What you can know through validation of both protocol as well as tools, techniques, etc., is you can understand your confidence interval, who comes back to you and says this building is clean, this building is safe. You can then ask them, how do you know, how well do you know, how much confidence do you have in that answer? Right now, as you've said and as Ms. Norton has said and as Chairman Davis said, we have a nice mosaic of maybes. And the idea is you're always going to get some confidence interval. But if somebody walks up to you and says I'm 90 percent confident or I'm 40 percent confident or I'm 60 percent confident, now you're able to make a public health decision based on how good the data are. Mr. Shays. OK. I'm going to put it in my words. First off, let me ask you, would anyone here like to make a comment to the dialog that is happened so far? Does anyone want to respond to any question I have asked or make a comment? Anybody disagree with anything I've said or anything anyone else has said? Mr. Day. Mr. Chairman, you've just used the case of Mrs. Lundgren. The fourth time through is when the positive was finally found, and it was through the ability to track through the trail of the mail to a specific bin on a specific machine. It was targeted sampling that found it ultimately. I agree with Mr. Rhodes, there's a level of probability sampling that can be done that will have confidence interval around it. But when you have a known event--and that becomes a critical issue for us, is it a known event, known source, versus a random event, unknown source--targeted sampling, as was the case with what happened with Mrs. Lundgren and when we finally were able to find it in the Wallingford facility, it was targeted sampling that found it. Mr. Shays. But what's interesting to me is had she not died, we never would have known that there was in fact anthrax at that facility. We never would have known it, ever. What I'm hearing you say about the validated approach is that we are going to know the strengths for the most part and weaknesses of the process. Mr. Rhodes. The limits, the limits of detection. Mr. Shays. Fair enough. And we are going to know some consistency from one place to another to another. Mr. Rhodes. Right, right. Mr. Shays. Let me, before going back to Ms. Norton, let me ask counsel to ask a few questions. Mr. Halloran. Dr. Popovic, you said twice that the CDC testing methodology in the lab has been validated. Is that validation, is it the same for clinical samples as well as environmental samples or is there some difference? Dr. Popovic. I was talking about the methods for identification, confirmatory identification. Those are the methods that are the same regardless of what the source of the organism is. Once you isolate the organism, be it from a clinical sample or from an environmental sample, the procedures and steps to identify what the organism is are the same. Mr. Halloran. So that's the gold standard? Dr. Popovic. Correct. Mr. Halloran. Now, work me back from there. Can you repeat what the gold standard is? Dr. Popovic. Once you have an organism regardless of the source, where it came from, it can come from air, from surfaces, from food, from clinical sample, the procedures to identify that organism and say this is Bacillus anthracis and the procedures that are molecular characterization are gold standard. They have been validated. And those are the methods that are used in the LRN. Mr. Halloran. And once that sample walks in your door, how long does it take to get that validation? Dr. Popovic. It can depend on a type of a sample. For example, if you have a clinical sample---- Mr. Halloran. Wait a minute. It didn't depend on the type of sample a second ago. Dr. Popovic. OK. Let me back up a little bit. If you have blood from a patient, you can usually grow the organism within 12 to 24 hours, and within another few hours you can perform all of the tests that are necessary for you to be able to say this is the Bacillus anthracis. Mr. Shays. Can you grow it faster than what would happen naturally within the body? I mean, do you speed up the process? Dr. Popovic. You cannot actually grow it faster than it would normally multiply in the best circumstances. Bacillus anthracis is one of the amazing bugs which actually multiplies fairly quickly. Mr. Shays. You're telling me more than I want to know right now. The point is, though, that is not really much of a help, because in the end, the person who has the blood who has been-- not infected, because--well, it's infected--who has been infected would be proceeding just along the same lines as when you discovered it. In other words, they would be getting sicker during that period of time. I'm sorry I went off the subject, but unfortunately I'm chairman so I get to interrupt. Remember your line of questioning. Let me understand this so I don't leave with a false impression. If you find it in the blood, you will find it fast enough to give them Cipro to help them. Dr. Popovic. It depends when the blood was collected. If the blood was at the beginning of the disease, yes. If the blood was collected when the patient was dying, then no. It really depends at what stage of the patient's disease. The sooner the better. Mr. Shays. Clear your mind of everything I asked you and go back to his questions. Why don't you start over again? Mr. Halloran. Work me back through the process now in terms of the differentiation between clinical and environmental samples and why there seems to be this either/or choice between targeted sampling and environmental sampling. Is it, let me spray the panel here, is that a mutually exclusive choice? Must we make that choice? Dr. Popovic. Do we have to make a choice with it to do targeted or probabilistic sampling? Mr. Halloran. Right. Dr. Popovic. We don't have to make that choice always. There are situations, such as in outbreak investigations, when you need to have rapid assessment, when you need to be able to make a decision, when you need to be able to within a very short period of time to make that decision, then targeted sampling is really efficient and effective. Mr. Halloran. Right. But wouldn't it make sense at the same time to begin to map out your grid and start sampling on that grid at the same time you are doing your targets, to know the zone of exposure you are going to have to go back to anyway, as they found out in Wallingford 5 months later? Why pick one? Dr. Popovic. There are a lot of issues. Sometimes there is a capacity issue. Can you actually handle thousands and hundreds of specimens when you actually have a fairly good scientific judgment based on epidemiology that this is where you need to look. Mr. Halloran. But you could store them, could you not? Do they keep? Dr. Popovic. You can store samples, that is correct. Samples can be stored. Ms. Tulis. If I may, grids could miss very small areas of contamination where, if you're targeted, you would know to go there, so you could do a larger sample area. Dr. Popovic. One example is if people are coming into a room and you can actually use the grid and sample all of the areas, but if you sample the doorway, many times your chances of getting something there are probably better than just going all over the room because the concentration of the entrance of--in this case let's talk about bacteria--would be a smaller area that you can focus on. Mr. Halloran. So you said, the chances are. It strikes me either way it is a crap shoot here. Where are the odds better? Dr. Popovic. I'm sorry; I did not hear you. Mr. Halloran. Where are the odds better that you will find what you need to find to be able to make a conclusion with some confidence of what you have found or not found? Dr. Popovic. If you have epidemiological information, if you have assessment of the individual event, then your chances and the odds are better that you will get the results quicker with the targeted sampling. Mr. Halloran. But in the nonspecific event that Mr. Day referred to, when you have a threat or someone says I sent anthrax through there but no one is sick yet, what's your plan? Dr. Popovic. Well, if you look at the nonspecific event and you look at the Wallingford postal facility, the first two samplings were really not targeted, they were sampled as part of the sampling of facilities. But as pointed out, when you actually knew where to look for it and when you focus there, we found it. So there are advantages in different situations. And like I said, for this initial assessment, for making a public health decision, it is really critically important to do this quickly. One of the main reasons is because the period of time within which antimicrobial prophylaxis is going to be effective is short. Mr. Halloran. I understand. Miss Tulis, in your testimony you said, ``but there is no environmental laboratory network analogous to the Laboratory Response Network at this time.'' Should there be? Ms. Tulis. That's a loaded question. We believe we need to have more capability than we have at this point and we do not have that capability. We're trying to do our best to leverage existing resources. We do need more capacity than we have at this point. Mr. Halloran. But separate environmental from clinical? Ms. Tulis. It is a separate type of analysis; yes, it is. Mr. Halloran. In what way? Ms. Tulis. It's different concentrations. Your whole focus is different when you're looking in air versus water versus looking at blood or serum. You're not looking at metabolites. It's a very different set of processes that you use. Mr. Halloran. But in that process you'd still need to get to that point where you could go to the gold standard before you really know; or do you have some confidence in the decision before that? Ms. Tulis. Generally we come in, once detection has been made, to do the actual decontamination, and that's generally when we're using our environmental sampling. Mr. Halloran. There was another statement to the effect that validation, the concern of validation at the time anyway, was the lack of facilities that could do validation studies. Is there still that capacity constraint or can these studies be done now? Dr. Popovic. I can address that. A lot of work is happening already. I did mention in a lot more detail in my written testimony, CDC has an interagency agreement with the Dugway Proving Grounds where such a chamber for establishing and generating known concentration of spores is available; and it has been available and studies are actually taking place there. One of the things that is important is, like I said, you really need to use the real thing for a lot of these studies. So there are efforts and there are places where these studies now can be conducted and some of these studies are conducted. Some of the preliminary results from the studies conducted at Dugway will be available in December of this year. Mr. Halloran. Thank you. Mr. Shays. Let me, before letting this panel go, just ask the question of DOD. According to Dr. Kelley's testimony, ``There is no comprehensive plan in place today for a response to a chemical terrorism event, and there are only three Department of Defense laboratories that could safely and effectively analyze these materials. Currently, public health laboratories are not privy to the analytical methods and check standards that have been developed by the Department of Defense, and thus have no ability to perform analysis in a validated and standardized method.'' She goes on to say, ``In the absence of these materials, public health laboratories will be limited to clinical testing in the response to a chemical event and will not be able to assist in determining the substance involved in the contamination or its source.'' Is that question pretty clear to you? Can you comment on that? Dr. Schafer. There are more than a couple of facilities capable of doing these procedures, but what I would like to do for the subcommittee is get back to you with the specific breakout of what those are, if that is OK. Mr. Shays. Tell me the impact of what she's saying, just so I make sure you understand and maybe help me understand what she's saying. What's the significance of her point? Dr. Schafer. I presume she's referring to perhaps a response time; that if we have to send all samples to a couple of laboratories, it would take a lot longer. That's probably the only reason. Mr. Shays. Aren't you saying something more than that, Dr. Kelley? Dr. Kelley. I am. The Laboratory Response Network that Dr. Popovic and others have talked about is primarily set out for biological agents. And we do have the capacity that recently has been put into the LRN to look for chemical WMD agents in clinical specimens, in human specimens. But one of the lessons we learned from anthrax is you don't have one without the other. If you have a human exposure, you want to know where that came from and is it cleaned up. So the environmental testing goes hand in hand with the clinical testing. And a lot of these things we've learned are local. They happen quickly and right within our jurisdictions. We currently do not have the ability to---- Mr. Shays. ``We'' being? Dr. Kelley. The State public health labs, the LRN labs at the State and local level, to do any kind of testing for a chemical agent to assist with the investigation, or to be the companion piece to a human exposure. Mr. Shays. Do you want to followup? Dr. Schafer. If I could respond to that. We actually do have the ability in 14 laboratories to do this kind of work. And then there is an interagency effort that's ongoing to try to put some processes in place for chemical laboratory network just like we're doing with the other laboratory network. Mr. Shays. But the point is, it's not very clear how that system is working right now? Dr. Schafer. No. Again, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to get back to you with the very specifics on that. Mr. Halloran. One final question. Mr. Day, the recent detections in this area were not at the USPS facilities; is that correct? Mr. Day. No, absolutely not. Since 2001, all of the false- positive events that have occurred in this area have been at other agencies, not with the postal service. Mr. Halloran. And in the 107 facilities where you have these detection devices operating, describe for us--assure us, if you would, of the response plan: when the red light goes on at one of those facilities, when there is an initial positive what happens? Who calls who, who talks to who; does it look like an ordinary process or does it look like the keystone cops? Mr. Day. Let me start at a high level. What we did before we ever deployed the equipment was to develop a template for response. We clearly did not want to deploy the equipment and not have a plan for how we would respond. We worked with other Federal agencies, DHS, CDC, OSHA, EPA, even the FBI to get the law enforcement piece into it. That template is then taken to a local level or local management team working with their supervisory work force as well as the local union and management associations and the local first responders--police, fire, rescue and public health--are all brought in so that everyone knows who is notified and what the response will be. Mr. Halloran. So, unlike in the DOD situation, when a local first responder comes to a postal facility, he or she knows what that equipment is, knows what its capabilities and limitations are, knows what's inside that building. Mr. Day. Absolutely. And we need to know it as well, because as you go out to 282 local and State government entities, the capabilities are quite different. So we need to understand from our standpoint what the local first responder is capable of doing. So there is a nationally developed template that every site utilizes, and then we implement that on a local level with agreement with local first responders, so that when the alarm goes off we know who is notified and what the appropriate actions will be. Mr. Halloran. Finally, just one last chance. As I recall, each of your testimonies agreed with the GAO recommendation to pursue validation of the whole process, including possibility sampling; is that correct? Dr. Popovic. No. Dr. Kelley. No. Mr. Day. No. Mr. Shays. Are you satisfied? They said no. Mr. Halloran. That is their answer. Mr. Shays. It begs the question why. Ms. Norton. Ms. Norton. Well, I must say, I had a different question for Mr. Day, but given Mr. Rhodes' testimony, I can understand about targeted sampling. Of course, I'm thinking also about places in the United States where it would be more difficult to know where the anthrax is, but I also recall from his testimony about the time it took, what has to be done, the followup, the days he talked about in Connecticut, weeks and finally months. And so to hear you all say, nevertheless targeted sampling is best, even given the false alarms and the time delay, probability testing has its drawbacks too. And I am aware that always we have to balance one against the other. I wonder. I know the targeted sampling is cheaper. I wonder if that has anything to do with it. I wonder if one has to be done to the exclusion of the other, and why we would only be validating for targeted sampling given the experience in Connecticut and elsewhere with delay and false alarms and the rest. And all of you going against the recommendation of the GAO just sort of leaves us in a real quandary as to--with the government all coming down on one side, and without your telling us why you would want to exclude probability sampling, which is the very recommendation of the GAO. Ms. Tulis. There's a lot of questions, so maybe we can tradeoff here as partners. I don't think we're saying we want to exclude probability sampling. Ms. Norton. I thought that was your response to the last question. Ms. Tulis. As a total, no. For example, when we went back to the Hart Building we did do statistical sampling before we had reoccupancy of letting people come back in. Ms. Norton. So you really had to do that, didn't you? You really had to do the probability sampling before you let people back into the Hart Building? Ms. Tulis. For reoccupancy, not for detection. Ms. Norton. We are all going to reoccupy these buildings, so why doesn't that tell you something? Why shouldn't both be done, Ms. Tulis? Ms. Tulis. Because the concern is that if you're not targeting where your areas of contamination are and you're using statistics, you can actually miss those areas. And we actually have some statistics, if you're interested, that we can give you on the effectiveness of targeting versus statistical. Ms. Norton. Somebody tell me why you cannot do both, as you did in Hart? Dr. Popovic. What I think we're saying is that both don't need to be done at the same time, that each one of them has a specific function in a different situation. And that is why we kind of all said no, because we feel that there is a need for these plans, which components need to be validated in which situations to really be made. And we're hopeful that this integrated consortium of networks of laboratories can actually provide guidance for that. We're thinking that the probability sampling can be a useful tool that can be added to targeted sampling, but we're not looking at it as a replacement for targeted sampling. Ms. Norton. I think we all need to give Mr. Rhodes the opportunity to respond to this, since it is all of you against one. Mr. Shays. Why the resistance? Ms. Norton. Mr. Rhodes, the chairman is asking why the resistance, do you think, to probability? Mr. Rhodes. I think that the point that keeps coming up relative to targeted is that there is an assumption that the people who walk into the facility actually know something. As a scientist, I know nothing until it's proven to me. The concern that I have about targeting--and I don't view them as being mutually exclusive. I would view targeting as being a weighted probability. And there was some discussion earlier about you can miss things with the grid. Yes, you can miss things if your grid is not fine enough. That's also a function of probabilistic analysis of space and air current and things like that. For example, you will note in a standard office, the computer screen is an attractive location. The neon lights are an attractive location. The ceiling tile is an attractive location. So is the carpet and things like that. So you may not want to stand exactly in the middle of the room and take a HEPA sample from the middle of the room. That can be a decision that's made. The point that we're making is that--and I think the reason that there is resistance is that probabilistic sampling is large sample set. There is no way for the current laboratory network to handle the load that would come off of that. It is not going to be as rapid as people would like. Now, my concern would be rapid is nice but getting the wrong answer faster and to a greater degree of precision is not useful to us. So I think that hearing a uniform statement of yes, we believe in validation; yes, we believe in this; yes, we believe in process; no, we don't believe in probabilistic; I think it's a function of dollars, network, capacity, it's all those things. And what you're probably--probably--hearing is that these are government professionals who are looking at it and saying, I can't get the money, I can't get the priority. I go back to my original statement about CBRN, the B is a little b, everything else is really important, even though we haven't encountered that. The thing we've encountered is a bio- attack. Nobody set off a nuclear weapon. Nobody has come in and dumped radiological material with dynamite around it, like the Chechens did over in Russia; but the thing that has happened, people have to complain because they can't get the support on it. If we were taking it seriously we wouldn't be having this argument, because B would be a capital B and it would be as important as anything else. Mr. Shays. There is a gentleman behind. Were you sworn in and did you want to make any comment? Did you want to respond to something here? Identify yourself. Mr. Kiefer. My name is Max Kiefer with the CDC, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Mr. Shays. Give your card to the transcriber when you leave, if you would, please. Mr. Kiefer. OK. I was very pleased to hear you mention that industrial hygiene as a basic tenet was very important. Targeted sampling, what is also known as worst-case sampling, is a fundamental basic industrial hygiene tenet that is used to help us target where we sample to try and rapidly get information for making public health assessments and decisions rapidly. That is what was done at Wallingford to get information on where the source of contamination was, as the doctor mentioned. It was targeted sampling that found the contamination in delivery bar code sorter No. 10, and not probabilistic sampling. Probabilistic sampling does have a role, and we certainly recognize that and want to work and we are doing work at CDC with Sandia National Laboratories to explore the use of probabilistic sampling for a characterization sampling, for remediation sampling, where it does have a very prominent role. But certainly, in the onset of an outbreak, it is very critical for us to really find out where the contamination is very quickly so we can target medical prophylaxis to people quickly, and we don't have the time to wait for 4 or 5 days to grid out a facility. And I'd like to correct something that was mentioned earlier. The high base sampling in Wallingford was not something that was uncovered due to probabilistic sampling or a different sampling strategy. That was found because--later in the course of routine maintenance on the part of the postal service. Because of the contamination found at DBCS No. 10, there was a concern that there might have been aerosolization, and there was examination of the upper structures above DBCS No. 10 because targeted sampling had been found there; and there was knowledge because of what had happened at Brentwood, that there may have been aerosolization there, and that's why the sampling was conducted there. Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, could I say what I think the problem is just as I derived it from your testimony? It sounds as if targeting sampling is fine if you--for example, if it's positive, you know something. I think what concerns us, as I understand, Mr. Rhodes' testimony, is that if it's negative, you're not sure if it is really negative. It sounds to me that if it's positive, before you let people back in there, it looks like you're going to do all the probability approaches anyway, so that you really do have a two-step process if in fact it is positive for anthrax. Where I think the problem comes is that if it is negative for anthrax, at least as I understand Mr. Rhodes, you do not know for sure it is negative because you have done no probability sampling. And some of our testimony, sir, about how things were found later, some of the testimony we've heard here about how they could be in the lights or other places, even though they are not where the target says you should go, would leave people who work there with the negative ``but perhaps there are spores in that facility'' because you have not done probability sampling. If I'm wrong on that I'd be pleased to hear it. Dr. Popovic. I would just like to comment that it is not just the sampling results that, in the initial phase of an investigation, are weighed in to make a decision whether to close the facility or whether to provide antimicrobial prophylaxis, and there's other factors that play into place and those decisions again have to be made. Ms. Norton. Like what? Dr. Popovic. There has to be epidemiological evidence. If you actually, for example, know that there were cases associated with postal facilities and you have had sick people in one facility and you have them at the other, you don't necessarily have to wait 2 or 3 days or how long it takes. You can make those decisions. The kinds of exposure that people had. There is a lot of these epidemiologic background information that really plays into place. You can put people on prophylaxis and then come back after a couple of days and decide whether to continue it or not. So those are the instances where time really is of essence. Ms. Norton. And you would have done probability sampling by that time. Again, you all have not convinced me at least that this is not a two-step process. And if you worked in that facility, I bet you would want it to be a two-step process. And all I can tell you is if it was a two-step process in the Senate of the United States, it better be a two-step process everywhere else. We're not going to have disparate treatment. That was one of the great, huge, terrible lessons that came out of the anthrax scare here. People believed, and believe to this day, that Congress was treated differently. If you're going to do that, you're going to have to develop somehow protocol to do it all. Mr. Chairman, I never did get to ask my question because your staff asked such a good question. Mr. Shays. You will get your chance. But before the transcriber leaves, I was just thinking that this is like my worst nightmare in college when I was taking statistics and probability, and I was watching the transcriber try to concentrate as we talked about this, and I was hoping that she would stay awake during the whole time here, just given my own record in college during that time. At any rate, we get to stay awake because we get to ask questions. That is one reason we get to ask questions. Ms. Norton. And you have to stay awake because you have to answer them. I have one last question for the panel today. In fairness, I think I should ask this question of you, because I read Mr. Burrus's testimony. He is on the next panel. You know how concerned I am that V Street, the No. 1 target for anybody wanting to use anthrax, does not have the basic bioterrorism equipment that 107 facilities somehow have. Mr. Chairman, while you were gone, I asked him to get us a priority schedule and get you a priority schedule in the next 30 days. Mr. Shays. Yes, we would like that, why would it take 30 days? Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Day. Mr. Chairman, I can get you the schedule tomorrow. Mr. Shays. If you would just give it to our committee so we can make sure that Ms. Norton gets it. Ms. Norton. Now, if you don't have the biodetection equipment in V Street, even though V Street serves the Congress, the White House--the one place that the terrorists-- the Federal agencies, the places where the terrorists want to get. OK. But I need to hear, because I am going to ask Mr. Burrus this, and I looked at his testimony, and he doesn't have an answer in his testimony, because I suppose it isn't in his control. But he says that he recently visited V Street. So not only don't we have equipment in V Street, but he says there's an oscillating fan in V Street, and that is precisely what the first thing that the Postal Service did when the Brentwood anthrax scare occurred was to say, shut down the fan. I want to know why--we already know you don't have--and you haven't given me any reason for why they don't have-- biodetection in V Street. But I want to know why there is a fan there, when our experience just a few blocks away in Brentwood says that fans will distribute the anthrax so you shouldn't have a fan going where there is no equipment, where you can't tell where there might be anthrax there at all? Mr. Day. The term V Street actually gets used in a generic way. There are two facilities over there. The facility that processes mail that has the automated equipment in it does not have any fans. That's concurrent and follows the national policy. We have a national policy, ever since the events of 2001, that our automated processing equipment--you are not allowed to have fans that direct air flow toward what we call the feed deck where the most likely release would take place, and that's true in V Street. It's not in place near any of that automated equipment. It's my understanding at the facility across the street, where the trays are simply prepared to go to the irradiation facility which has no air conditioning, has some fans in there. But, again, that is fully in keeping with the national policy. You will find that true throughout the Postal Service, that areas that do not have automated processing equipment have fans; it is true throughout the Postal Service. Initially in 2001, we shut down all the fans, and the request from many of our employees was to try to relax that policy. And the policy that's remained intact since then is we do not have fans that are directed at the automated equipment. That is the case at V Street as well. Ms. Norton. So the fans are directed at what at V Street? There are fans at V Street. Mr. Day. Across the street where the mail is prepared. Ms. Norton. There are two places at V Street. One has a fan, and one does not. And the one that does have the fan, what happens in the V Street facility that does have a fan? Mr. Day. That's what we call our preparation area. They simply are transferring trays of letters, tubs of flats to go into containers to be sent up to the irradiation facility in Bridgeport. You have no individual distribution of the mail; it's not opened up. It's just sent up prepared to go to the facility. So that's deemed a much lower risk, and we see that as reasonable that in those--those employees be allowed to have those fans. Again, consistent with national policy. Mr. Shays. Bridgeport? Mr. Day. New Jersey. Mr. Shays. Thank you, I live in Bridgeport, CT and I just wanted to make sure. All right. All right, is there any response to a question or a comment on the second tier behind the speakers that have been responding. Any of those of you who stood up that want to set the record straight or want to correct your boss and lose your job or want to amplify what your boss said. I am serious. Just identify yourself, make sure you leave a card with the transcriber. Dr. Sharma. Yes. My name is Sushil Sharma, and I work for Keith Rhodes. I want to clarify and set the record straight, with respect to how we articulate the role of the probability versus the targeted sampling. What we are saying is that, eventually, no matter what, whether you find a positive or a negative, you have to do probability sampling. What do I mean by that? If you have a positive, in order for EPA to do the cleanup, they have to do a probability sampling. If you don't have a positive, you have to offer some assurance to the public that, if anthrax is present, it is below certain detection limits that our meter could not find. Now, what we said in our report is that, at the outset, you decide how many samples and from where you need to collect in order to have that confidence level. Once you have done that, then we are not saying, don't use your head or judgment. Of course you should. You should first go to those places which you think would be most likely to, under the grand plan. If you don't find there, continue outwards. So we are not saying one versus the other; we think it is a good blending. There is a role for professional judgment, but there are also occasions when judgment does not work, as was the case in the Wallingford facilities. On the one hand, we hear that time is very critical for public health intervention. But in the case of Wallingford, it wasn't until 3, 4 weeks that anthrax was detected. So there is a chance, in the case of negative results when the source of contamination is not definitive, that you should have--you should work within the grand plan of probability sampling. Thank you. Mr. Shays. Thank you. I was looking at body language with you, Dr. Schafer and Ms. Tulis, as he was talking. Do you disagree with what he said? I mean, it's almost like I was reading. I will tell you what I was thinking: Easy for him to say, but he doesn't have to do it. OK. Was I reading something incorrect in that? Ms. Tulis. What I was doing is conferring with our sampling expert to verify the information. He can share some information with you if you would like to hear that further. Mr. Shays. Was he sworn in? Ms. Tulis. Yes, he was. Mr. Shays. Identify yourself and leave a card. Mr. Durno. Sir. My name is Mark Durno. I am a Federal on- scene coordinator with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Basically, with designing sampling approaches to attack any kind of contaminant, be it biological, chemical or whatever, we establish a hypothesis, or a set of objectives. And then our second step is to identify a sample space from which to collect these samples. And in the case of the Postal Service facilities, the sample space was the buildings where the letters originally passed through down to the buildings to which cross-contaminated mail may have passed. So the initial sample space, including the mail that had then passed down through the subsequent Postal Service facilities, contained a large number of samples. And if statistics were done on this process, I think you would see that the probability was very good that this sampling approach was adequate. In addition to that, utilizing targeted or judgmental techniques, we have a much, much greater confidence in the results that we see from that. So I will give you a case in point. At the Hart Building, for which we designed the sampling strategies for characterization, we established both a grid pattern over the entire Hart Building. We also instituted a judgmental or targeted sampling approach. Using those techniques, 23 locations were found to be contaminated or positive with Bacillus anthracis; 22 of those 23 locations were found through judgmental or targeted technique. One location was found by this grid sampling approach, and it just gives more credibility to the idea that this judgmental approach is one of the most important pieces of designing an appropriate data quality objective-based sampling plan. Mr. Shays. Sounds like nonhuman profiling. Any other comments? We are going to end this panel soon. We are going to begin the evening portion of our program. Dr. Popovic. May I make one comment? Mr. Shays. Yes. Dr. Popovic. I was thinking to put it in terms of human beings and live people. If you come to your physician, and you say I have certain symptoms and whatever, the physician can draw probably 1,000 different lab tests, and we will eventually, after 3 months, when those come from all of the laboratories pinpointed, but the physician also talks to you, and he targeted those after your symptoms. So if you have symptoms of knee ache, he is not necessarily going to do a brain biopsy. I am exaggerating of course of. But I think it's really important for us to emphasize that all kinds of information that you make when you make decisions about human beings, you actually make when you work in a setting where a bacteria like anthrax or other bacteria are spread all over the place. I just wanted to draw that comparison. I hope it's helpful. Dr. Schafer. Actually, if I could jump on that, I think this is actually the big issue. There are no silver bullets today. Mr. Shays. Right. Dr. Schafer. And I think that's the bottom line. We all know the various sampling techniques, we know how to use them and how to employ them. One is not necessarily better than the other. And at the end of the day, one has to make the decision as to what is the impact of whatever we find on a human being. So the goal here is, no matter what we do, human judgment has to come into the decision process. The end point is we are all here to try to protect our people. That's all I want to say. Mr. Shays. Thank you. Any other comments from anyone? Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman. Could I just put---- Mr. Shays. Sure. Ms. Norton. The chairman talked about our evening panel. You can see that this is a chairman that doesn't have show hearings. We really learn something, and the only way we can learn it is to have an exchange. Very few hearings I go to where the chairman says, ``and does anybody else in the room have anything he wants to say?'' But it does help Members of Congress to learn what we ought to do. Mr. Day, I just want to be clear what I heard, because it seems to me we have gone from bad to worse. We already have established that V Street, where all Federal mail and all White House mail comes, does not have the biodetection equipment. I asked you a question about fans. As I hear you, you said that in the particular facility we are talking about, there was a fan, but it was really not the facility we ought to be worried about, because this is a facility where workers are dealing with the mail before it has been irradiated and before it is sent to New Jersey for irradiation. What that means--again, I want to hear your explanation, because maybe I have it wrong again--is that these workers are working where there is no air conditioning. So in order for them to work, they have to say, will somebody turn on the fan? Well, if you turn on the fan and they are handling mail that has not been irradiated, as, for example, occurred when the mail came to the Senate, then, of course, you are really handling dangerous mail. Yes, it hasn't been opened, but as with the Senate mail, some anthrax could easily come through the openings in the envelope. And there you are with the fan on with unirradiated mail in a non-air-conditioned building, and I am supposed to feel that these V Street workers are really OK. I want you to explain why that is not a situation. If anything, that is even worse than the situation across the street where at least they are working with irradiated mail. Mr. Day. Again, that's consistent with our national policy. I would gladly go back. Ms. Norton. Excuse me, what is our national policy then? Mr. Day. Our national policy on fans that we implemented either late 2001 or early 2002 was to not direct fans at the automated equipment where the pinching occurs with the mail that causes it--if a biological threat were in there--to come out. Mail in trays, mail in tubs, is deemed a much, much lower risk. In just picking up a tray, there is nothing about the activity that is going to dislodge it. Ms. Norton. Well, of course, this is the same facility through which the anthrax mail came, through these three facilities. Mr. Day. Yes, ma'am. I will gladly go back. I will work with the local union. In a large extent, again, in 2001, we shut off all fans. That was our initial reaction. The feedback we got from employees was, is there a reasonable go-between where instead of all fans, what is reasonable in terms of risk? Ms. Norton. You are darn right. And the goal is, get some air conditioning in that building where government mail is handled and where anthrax is likely to occur, to be distributed. Mr. Day. I can find out about air conditioning, but that has an air flow associated with it as well. That does not mean, if there's a risk there, that it's eliminated. Ms. Norton. You have--across the street in V Street and quote, national policy, I take it does not pertain to air conditioning. Look, Mr. Day, you know, I am willing to go with the flow. I know we are trying to get this together, but I am really not willing to hear excuses about Government mail, White House mail, 4 years after September 11th--I'm sorry, after the anthrax scare--does seem to me that everything should be done in that facility to protect workers, because those are the facilities where people died, where workers are most fearful. And one of the things that I am asking you to do, whatever you do with the national policy everywhere else, is to remember that V Street and Brentwood are indeed where the deaths occurred and are indeed where the targeted mail for any, any terrorist should be if he is really seeking to do harm to us. And I am asking that the Post Office this summer take steps to air condition that facility. I am asking that V Street be put at the top of whatever lists you have for insulation of biodetection system. I am particularly concerned about these workers, because they are handling irradiated mail possibly with a fan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Shays. Thank you. Ms. Norton. Could I get your promise on that, Mr. Day? Excuse me. Mr. Day. The equipment for biodetection will be in there. I will find out the specifics about putting air conditioning in the other building. And, again, the policy is about fans that are directed at those pinch points. That is in effect in V Street. We will continue to do that. Ms. Norton. We just ask you to use your common sense when it comes to the kind of facility you are dealing with, and we are dealing with a facility that will most likely be the subject of an anthrax attack. If, quote, the national policy doesn't fit as well then please take steps to protect those who are in that facility. Mr. Shays. I think what Ms. Norton is basically saying is that most Members of Congress would believe that this facility more than any other facility is a targeted facility and should be highest on the list. And that's not a reflection of wanting to protect Members of Congress; it's talking about your postal employees. I think you know it. I am just going to say it that way. Mr. Day. We understand and concur. Mr. Shays. I think you do. I think all of you have been excellent witnesses, and we thank all of you, and we thank you for your patience. Is there anything that any of you wish we had asked that we didn't ask that you would like to put on the record? I honestly learned more from that last question. I mean, we had a hearing on terrorism. I asked at the end of a panel and a noted doctor of a major medical magazine before September 11th said, ``I want to share my greatest fear.'' He said his greatest fear is that a small group of dedicated scientists will create an altered biomedical agent that will wipe out humanity as we know it. This was by someone who was a mainstream doctor. That got our attention. That was before September 11th, and there were no cameras, and there were no print media. So I learned a lot from that last question, is there anything we need to put on record that wasn't? And it also enables me to say that if you leave here saying we should have asked a question we didn't, it's now on your shoulders because I am saying you can answer it. Any question we should have asked and any that you should have answered? OK. Thank you so much. You have been a wonderful panel. Very patient. We are very grateful to you. We appreciate your dedication to your work and to your country. We particularly thank the lady from Connecticut. And I am happy there's a Bridgeport, NJ. Our next panel is Mr. William Burrus, president, American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO; Dr. Linda D. Stetzenbach, director of Microbiology Division, Harry Reid Center for Environmental Studies, University of Nevada, Las Vegas; Chief James A. Schwartz, chief, Arlington County Fire Department; Chief Michael P. Neuhard, chief, Fairfax Fire and Rescue Department; Mr. Philip Schaenman, president, Tridata Division of System Planning Corp.; and Mr. John Jester, director, Pentagon Force Protection Agency, Department of Defense. We will ask you to stay standing, actually, and we are going to swear you all in. So when you get by your seat, we will swear you all in. Thank you all for your patience. [Witnesses sworn.] Mr. Shays. I would note for the record our witnesses have responded in the affirmative. Again, we will go with you, Mr. Burrus. We are really going to try to be as close to 5 minutes as you can. I do appreciate this panel's patience. Let me say the advantage of the second panel is you have heard the questions of the first panel, and there may be things you want to depart from your opening statement, if you feel it's been covered, and speak that way. But your full statement will be in the record. Mr. Burrus. STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM BURRUS, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN POSTAL WORKERS UNION, AFL-CIO; LINDA D. STETZENBACH, DIRECTOR, MICROBIOLOGY DIVISION, HARRY REID CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA, LAS VEGAS; JAMES H. SCHWARTZ, CHIEF, ARLINGTON COUNTY FIRE DEPARTMENT; MICHAEL P. NEUHARD, CHIEF, FAIRFAX COUNTY FIRE AND RESCUE DEPARTMENT; PHILIP SCHAENMAN, PRESIDENT, TRIDATA DIVISION OF SYSTEM PLANNING CORP.; AND JOHN JESTER, DIRECTOR, PENTAGON FORCE PROTECTION AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BURRUS Mr. Burrus. Good afternoon. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the subcommittee members for the opportunity to address the important issues of this hearing. As requested, my testimony will concentrate on the GAO draft report about the anthrax detection methods as well as the impact of the events surrounding the recent anthrax event at the Pentagon mail facilities. The terrible events of September and October 2001 have had a lasting effect on our country, taking the lives and shattering our citizens' security. Much as we evaluate what can be done to prevent such tragedies in the future, we must apply the lessons learned. The fears postal workers harbor about the accuracy of anthrax testing remain, and they will not be overcome until a comprehensive plan of protection and detection is put in place. I preface these remarks by stating my belief that in the immediate aftermath of the attack, the U.S. Postal Service acted appropriately based on the limited scientific knowledge available. Postal management relied upon the advice of public health officials, and the unions were informed that critical decisions were made. And when presented with the evidence that postal employees had been exposed, managers did not hesitate to close postal facilities. Mistakes were made, but they were honest mistakes. And hopefully, we have learned from them. However, in the weeks and months that followed, serious errors were made, errors that could have been avoided. Considerable resources had been expended to study anthrax detection methods since the October 21, 2001 incident. The GAO draft report presents a detailed analysis that reflects many of the concerns that we have raised since 2001. Following the 2001 attack, the Postal Service initiated testing protocol to evaluate all mail processing facilities. The facilities tested negative, but the experience in Wallingford called into question the accuracy of the sampling and the testing protocol. Subsequent tests using a different method, conducted after the death of an elderly woman, revealed the presence of anthrax. In response to GAO recommendations to reassess postal facilities that previously tested negative, the Postal Service asserted that, because there had been no accidental incidents-- additional incidents of anthrax-related illnesses or death, there was little or no risk to postal workers or the public. Despite our requests, the Postal Service declined to conduct future tests. We strongly disagree with the rationale and the decision not to conduct additional tests. No one can reasonably suggest that our members should serve as the ``canaries in the coal mines'' of the years past. The absence of illness or death cannot serve as proof that all is well. The buildings and their contents must be tested and declared free of agents of bioterrorism. APWU concurs with the GAO report that all testing should utilize the best-known practices, and the methods that will provide results that first and foremost is to protect the employees and the public. In those circumstances where nonvalidated processes have been used, we must ask: Are our postal facilities really safe, or could improper sampling and testing methods have missed anthrax? Could unsuspecting employees be exposed at some future date? While the GAO report does not answer these questions, it brings them to the forefront for a thorough examination. In 2001, the Postal Service was forced to make an emergency decision regarding the type of samplings to be used in postal facilities, whether to dry swab or wet swab. Despite the fact that the scientific community expressed concerns about the efficiency of the dry swab method, that was the method chosen. This choice was accepted by postal public health officials. However, it was known at the time--and GAO has now confirmed--that dry swab sampling is less efficient than the wet swab method. The USPS advanced a strategy of targeted sampling that proscribed testing the areas that were most likely to be contaminated. This approach, known as ``following the mail and monitoring employees,'' neglects the use of statistical probability. The APWU and GAO reject the premise that following the mail and monitoring employees can serve as a means of determining contamination. This is unacceptable and should not be permitted by the Congress of the United States. Recent anthrax-related events at the Pentagon mail rooms demonstrate a number of efficiencies in communication. They highlight the absence of standardized and validated testing protocols and expose the lack of coordination in public messages. These most recent events serve as the poster child for inefficiency. Many accounts of the Pentagon incident indicate that the initial sampling was done March 10th and that a positive result was announced March 14th. Reports also specify that the positive result was confirmed on March 15th. That means there was a lapse of 5 days between the initial sampling and the confirmation results. If it had been a true positive, postal workers would have been in grave danger. Had a biohazard been present, postal workers would have been exposed for 8 or 9 days before the results of the confirmation test were received. We know from our experience at Brentwood that waiting even a few days to act can result in death. Other major concerns arise from the most recent incident as well. First, timely notification was not provided by the Department of Defense to the Postal Service. Second, a certified laboratory was not selected. Third, reporting the results took too long, and as a result, postal workers were potentially at risk. It is fortunate that the positive results were false, but these failures cannot be overlooked. Mr. Shays. Mr. Burrus, you have gone now 6\1/2\ minutes, so I need you to wrap up. Mr. Burrus. I will. Of major concern is the situation at V Street that has been discussed at some length already. I will defer to questions in more depth about this issue, but the use of fans at V Street, sir, are not for the comfort of the employees. Those fans are used for the exhaust of the gases that are generated by the irradiation of the mail. So I would hope we would get into that subject in a little more depth as we go to the questions. Mr. Shays. Sure. Mr. Burrus. Let me conclude, I endorse in large part the inclusion of the GAO draft report and hope you will find them useful in initiating a comprehensive and effective program. Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have. [The prepared statement of Mr. Burrus follows:] Mr. Shays. Thank you for your very helpful statement. Dr. Stetzenbach. STATEMENT OF LINDA D. STETZENBACH Dr. Stetzenbach. Good afternoon. I am Linda Stetzenbach, the Director of the Microbiology Division for the Harry Reid Center for Environmental Studies, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, where I have been conducting bioaerosol research for the last 17 years. I would like to acknowledge Congressman Porter's attendance earlier today, and I know he is very concerned about these issues as well. Mr. Shays. That is Harry Reid of---- Dr. Stetzenbach. The Harry Reid, got us the Senate appropriation to build the building where our research center is located, yes, sir. The university names their buildings after the people that donate the money. In 1994, I presented results of our laboratory's work on the dispersal of microorganisms into the air at a scientific conference on chemical and biological defense at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Aberdeen, MD. During a break after my presentation, I was told by one of the attendees that while my data was interesting, anthrax spores would not redistribute into the air once they had settled, and therefore, my data had very little interest for biodefense. This is a---- Mr. Shays. How long ago was that? Dr. Stetzenbach. That was in 1994, sir. Mr. Shays. Interesting. Dr. Stetzenbach. Later, in June 2001, we published some data using an anthrax simulate in a room-sized environmental chamber that we have had at UNLV since about 1991. Unfortunately, the events in the fall of 2001 demonstrated that dispersal of infectious spores does occur and re-aerosolization does occur. But our earlier data basically was ignored. Since 2001, it's also acknowledged that monitoring of biothreat agents is problematic due to the lack of standardization and analysis protocols. You heard that with the earlier panel. For example, there are a variety of sampling methods that have been used by various Government agencies when monitoring for biothreat agents, but the likelihood of success using these methods has not been established. And there are currently no standardized environmental sampling methods for first responders, public health officials, law enforcement agencies and other agencies. I think it's acknowledged, and you heard earlier, that surface sampling is very useful for determining the presence and concentration of a contaminant, the location where it may have been released, the extent of contamination, forensics and the effect of remediation. But while swab sampling has a time-honored tradition in the hospital setting from everything from sore throats to wounds, the usefulness of the swab sampling method for sampling buildings is very limited. One disadvantage is that a large number of samples are generated. For example, tens of thousands of swab samples were collected as a result of the anthrax attacks. And the laboratory response network was simply overwhelmed. Handling of swabs by emergency personnel responding to an incident is also extremely difficult. Results in our laboratory that we published in 2004 evaluated a Government-developed large area surface sampling method, it's called the BiSKit. It demonstrated the ability to rapidly sample large areas, which translates into better detection and fewer samples. But the swab and the BiSKit are the only two surface sampling methods that have undergone validation testing. Validation testing and the establishment of all protocols used to determine if a biothreat exists in a building is critical. Therefore, research should be conducted to evaluate currently available and newly developing devices for biological sampling of surfaces. This would provide information on their efficiency of collection and the limits of their capability. You heard that earlier as well. This information can then be used to determine what device is optimal for what biothreat scenario. An integral part of this research is developing analytical capability through the application of molecular biology methods that enhance the enumeration and characterization of biothreat agents. And molecular biology methods are rapid, sensitive and specific. Unfortunately, there are interferences when you use these methods with environmental samples. They are not clinical samples. They are environmental samples. And simple background dust can give you a false negative. Therefore, research is needed to minimize the interferences and to optimize analysis of samples from surfaces from the earth and from the air. Also we need to develop standard operating procedures from optimal detection and measurement of biological contaminants. Comprehensive research on these topics would enhance sampling capabilities for the purpose of identification or attribution, while allowing inter-laboratory and interagency comparisons. There's also serious concerns with assessing the results of bio-aerosol monitoring. We have been focusing today on surfaces, but indoor and outdoor surfaces where air samples are taken is a very real issue. The purposeful dissemination of biothreat agents in enclosed public environments and outdoor facilities that attract the public would potentially result in the exposure of large numbers of individuals. Therefore, programs utilizing routine monitoring of aerosols has been initiated. Unfortunately, little information is available on the natural background populations of these organisms that are now called biothreat agents. This lack of data has resulted in false positive results with the biowatch system that's currently deployed in selected cities in the United States. A comprehensive survey to determine the levels of naturally occurring biothreat agents would assist decisionmakers when interpreting positive results. In addition, naturally occurring organisms in the air and on surfaces can affect the ability to discriminate background aerosols from biocontaminants. While some data has been published, the naturally occurring organisms in the types of facilities that may be sites of a purposeful biocontaminant release, such as sports arenas, convention facilities and mass transit, have not been adequately characterized. The research that I have outlined for you today is vital to provide rapid and accurate information to decisionmakers that are charged with protecting the public health and security of our citizens. But in closing, I wish to emphasize that universities are an underutilized research resource for much of this research. University scientists have a track record of high quality research on these topics, and they are cost-effective. In addition, they do not have a vested interest in any method, in any particular protocol, and they can develop and evaluate protocols with an unbiased perspective. In closing, I would like to thank you for allowing me to come today, and I would be happy to answer any questions. [The prepared statement of Dr. Stetzenbach follows:] Mr. Shays. It is pretty extraordinary that you would have been told in 1994 that once they settled, you didn't need to worry about the anthrax spores. Dr. Stetzenbach. Pardon me. I didn't hear you. Mr. Shays. It is pretty amazing to me that you were told, once anthrax spores had settled, they would not be a recurring problem. I mean, that's basically what you said, or did I---- Dr. Stetzenbach. That was the basic answer, yes, sir. And I said, ``did you see my data,'' and he said, basically, ``don't confuse me with the facts.'' It was unfortunate. Mr. Shays. That was 4 years before--I mean 10 years earlier from now. Dr. Stetzenbach. That was years earlier, yes, sir. Mr. Shays. OK. Chief Schwartz, welcome. STATEMENT OF JAMES H. SCHWARTZ Chief Schwartz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. In addition to my responsibilities as a fire chief in Arlington County, I am also a member of the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization where I co-chair the Detection and Decontamination Subgroup. And I am also a member of the International Association of Fire Chiefs Committee on Terrorism and Homeland Security. These issues have great relevance for both of those groups. I appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the issue of valid test methods for Bacillus anthracis today. This is a significant issue for Arlington County, which like most local governments, provide the public safety and public health response for our residents, visitors and businesses. In Arlington, our services also protect the Pentagon and dozens of Federal agencies that reside in the over 60 percent of the county's available commercial office space, office space that I would observe is greater than what you will find in Baltimore, Seattle or San Francisco. Arlington bears a significant responsibility for response to any incident that is perceived to have involved anthrax or other biological agents. I want to begin by complimenting the subcommittee on its charge to GAO regarding the assessment of postal facility testing and the validity of detection activities. This is a critical issue for local governments who, again, must manage the consequences of a local biological incident. But I would observe, it is not just postal facilities that we need to concentrate on. Given our experience to date, I would also observe that there is no crisis that requires more accurate and timely public information than a public health crisis. Assuring the public, especially those who have been potentially exposed to a biological agent, is of the highest importance and makes reliable test results from a certified laboratory essential. The decisions that result from testing, including the possible distribution of powerful antibiotics as prophylaxis, poses different but no less significant kinds of risk for the public. I want to say that I agree with the recommendations of the GAO draft report which was provided to us. While the report describes significant hurdles to effective testing, it is imperative that methods of detecting anthrax and other biological hazards be developed so that appropriate decisions that are in the best interests of public health can be made in a timely way. Special emphasis should also be put on environmental sampling methods. Detection methods have a considerable effect on the actions of local government. And as such, I want to take an opportunity to discuss briefly the incident at the Pentagon on March 14th, which I know you will be getting more testimony on in just a few moments. This incident was in many ways a model of inter-governmental cooperation. Arlington County was notified of a possible test result at the Pentagon's remote delivery facility. Upon arrival at the facility, responders from Arlington learned that a swab taken from a filter 3 days earlier had tested positive for BA at a contract laboratory. Arlington committed its fire, police, public health and emergency management departments to support the Pentagon. Because of our close working relationships with the Pentagon Force Protection Agency, we have a great deal of knowledge about their procedures. Numerous exercises over the last 7 years have helped to provide Arlington and the Pentagon Force Protection Agency with a better development system of planning and response. In general, the response was good. The Pentagon Force Protection Agency notified Arlington as soon as they recognized a problem. And our first responders notified our Office of Emergency Management as soon as they arrived on the scene and assessed the situation. Our Office of Emergency Management then made internal notifications and to other local governments in the region and the State. And I want to digress from my written testimony for just a moment here, because this morning, in hearing reports regarding the failure, the suggested failure of notification of the State in this particular incident, I believe that conclusion is largely flawed. Information went directly to the State from Arlington County's Office of Emergency Management as per protocols established by the Department of Homeland Security, soon after recognition that this was in fact an event, and our Office of Emergency Management took the next step by notifying the D.C. Emergency Management Agency to let them know what was going on as well. As always, there are lessons to be learned from incidents such as this. While there are parts of the March 14th Pentagon response that could be improved upon, we are far beyond where we were 5 years ago. And I am confident that the after-action reports will bear that out. However, one of the salient points with this incident that the subcommittee focuses on today is valid detection methods. Can we rely on the results we get from environmental sampling and subsequent laboratory analysis? Experts far smarter than I, I guess as you mentioned earlier, Mr. Chairman, smart science, will have to work out the answers to the challenges posed by the GAO report. But as a recipient of information derived from these practices, information on which critical public health and emergency management decisions can be made, I can say that the issue must be pursued. In addition to the importance of valid testing methods of the postal facilities, I want to draw the subcommittee's attention to the importance of providing reliable screening technology for first responders. The issue of testing for biological hazards has been a topic before the interagency board for over 3 years. First responders must have reliable biological detection capabilities. And I would ask that the subcommittee do everything it can to encourage the development of enhanced field-deployable technologies. There are those in the Federal Government who would dismiss the need for this kind of capability in the hands of first responders. They insist that local first responders cannot be properly trained to use handheld assays or PCR technology and that responders should rely solely on the LRN to provide definitive results regarding the identification of suspicious substances. As my friend A.D. Vickery from Seattle Fire Department is fond of saying, this is the same argument we heard years ago when we were told that doctors only should be doing CPR. The reality is that, on a frequent basis, first responders are called to investigate suspicious substances. This is especially true when the media is reporting a situation such as the one that occurred in Arlington and Fairfax several weeks ago. Simply relying on the LRN for test results is an ineffective way to provide timely advice and guidance to people who believe that they have been exposed to a biological agent. First responders understand that there are more sophisticated field testing methods, that sophisticated field testing methods only yield presumptive results. We are not making clinical decisions with these methodologies but tactical decisions to manage public anxiety. I will leave the remainder of my testimony in the written form and be happy to answer any questions that you may have. [The prepared statement of Chief Schwartz follows:] Mr. Shays. Thank you very, very much. Chief Neuhard. STATEMENT OF MICHAEL P. NEUHARD Chief Neuhard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will note that I have provided some lengthy testimony in writing, and I will summarize that very quickly here for you. Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. Chief Neuhard. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am Michael Neuhard, and I am the fire chief of the Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department, which is located in the northern Virginia area of the National Capital Region. We appreciate this opportunity to provide you with a local perspective on anthrax detection and the problems associated with first responder activities during potential anthrax incidents. During the last 4 years, Fairfax County and other regional agencies have had the unfortunate occasion to respond to over 1,000 potential anthrax incidents. As you are aware, we recently responded to a detection device activation at a Department of Defense facility located in Fairfax County, which occurred simultaneously with a potential anthrax incident at the Pentagon, Arlington County, VA. Our experience at these incidents shows that, at the most fundamental level, the question of determining if we are dealing with a biological agent in an accurate and timely manner remains elusive. We believe there are four areas relevant to this hearing in the anthrax detection chain which presents significant challenges during the first 72 hours of an incident. First is the current state of fixed detection systems being operated in local jurisdictions at government mail-handling facilities. Fixed mail-handling facilities are using different detection technologies with varying degrees of reliability. In many instances, the instance and type of device is not known to nor coordinated with local officials. Furthermore, these facilities may not even have technical support available for these detectors after normal business hours. On a positive note, a postal facility in Fairfax County has worked very diligently with officials to develop joint protocols for response to an activation of their biological detection system. Conversely, when the 911 call was received for the DOD facility on Leesburg Pike, first responders were not even aware that a detection device was located within the facility. The second issue is the lack of reliable field screening capabilities for first responders, as was noted by Chief Schwartz. None of the field test devices on the market today are endorsed by scientists or laboratories as being reliable, accurate and consistent. This prevents the first responders from having appropriate, technical information to support initial decisions in the field, and all of us know the consequences of that. The third issue is obtaining the laboratory results and ensuring that they are available for decisionmakers during an incident. Once field samples have been transported to a laboratory, local and State officials are not fully aware of nor included in the process. Many times and most of the time, our experience has been these have gone to Federal laboratories. During the recent simultaneous events, it was difficult to determine which location or sample, testing procedures or time lines the subject matter experts were referring to as they attempted to make decisions and articulate this to local and State representatives. This problem leads to local and State responders making decisions based on limited and sometimes unreliable information. Finally, the lack of confidence in the ability of the laboratories to produce timely, accurate and reliable analysis is troubling. Since emergency responders have limited ability to identify a potential biological agent in the field, they rely heavily on the testing laboratories for accurate and timely information. It is unconscionable that a laboratory can provide positive screening and culture test results for a biological agent that was not present. At a minimum, laboratories utilized for routine and incident specific samples should be certified in part of the laboratory response network. Additionally, initial test results should be available to decisionmakers within 4 to 6 hours as opposed to the 12 to 15 hours indicated during recent events. It is imperative that Federal, State and local authorities partner in efforts to improve detection, screening and analysis of potential anthrax contamination. The Federal Government can help by insuring, first, that all stakeholders are at the table as we further refine these capabilities, the local, State and Federal levels together. Second, provide ample funding to continue research that enables reliable, consistent and timely detection, field screening and lab analysis. Third, require Federal agencies operating fixed detection systems in localities to coordinate with local first responders and public health officials. And, finally, ensure that Federal agencies ensure similar protocols across Federal agency lines in the detection and response to potential anthrax incidents. While the Federal Government must continue to provide leadership in the anthrax response arena, it must remember that when an incident strikes, it is the localities that would be impacted and challenged with the appropriate response. We must recognize this and accept this, and we must do everything possible to provide appropriate technical capabilities so we can answer as quickly and confidently as possible the question, do we have anthrax? Thank you. [The prepared statement of Chief Neuhard follows:] Mr. Shays. Thank you, Chief Neuhard. Mr. Schaenman. Am I pronouncing your name correctly? STATEMENT OF PHILIP SCHAENMAN Mr. Schaenman. Schaenman, yes. Thank you again and the members of the subcommittee for inviting me to this important hearing. I will give you a quick verbal summary of the written testimony. I am Philip Schaenman, president of the Tridata Division of System Planning Corp. We have been providing analytical services dealing with public safety for about 35 years. We have done over 50 after- action reports for major public safety incidents. And we have evaluated public safety services at about 150 communities and 40 Navy installations. About 2 weeks ago, State and local officials in Virginia, Maryland and D.C. voiced concerns about the information flow, as well as the science--as you have been talking about--during the suspected anthrax incidents. They wanted a rapid after- action review of the State and local actions and information flow by an expert third party in parallel with the Federal studies that were being done of the time lines and what happened. And I got tagged with being the project manager. Here is a brief summary of the findings, focusing on the information flow rather than the science. Overall, the National Capital Region did much better than it would have been 5 years ago. Arlington and Fairfax County did extremely well in responding to the incidents, in communicating with each other and in sending information to the region, as Chief Schwartz said. The Commonwealth of Virginia was prepared to assist its counties. The State of Maryland was prepared and kept informed. D.C. government was prepared and played a direct role at the V Street facility. So the overall picture was good, but there were many communication problems identified. Most of them stemmed from the root cause of not having clear information about the status and findings of the anthrax tests. But in a sense, that's the homeland security version of the fog of war. You need to be able to deal with the uncertainty in these types of incidents. For one thing, there needs to be better protocols on who has responsibilities for keeping the region informed, beyond the jurisdictions directly involved. Should a county pass information to the National Capital Region or to the Department of Homeland Security for dissemination into the rest of the region. Mr. Shays. You have to move your mic back just a speck. Please just slide it back. Mr. Schaenman. Sorry. Mr. Shays. No need to apologize. You are doing great. Mr. Schaenman. So how should the information flow? Should it go from the State through the region, or should it go to DHS and then through the region? Should it go from office of emergency management to office of emergency management that are the hubs and in through the spokes, or should it be broadcast to all agencies simultaneously? Should it go public health to public health and fire to fire? Well the problem in these incidents, I went through all these channels. And it led to uncertainty as to what was the latest and most authoritative information at any given time, in part because the tests weren't clearly defined and time stamped as the information flowed across agencies. There were times when 80 people were on a conference call being updated without knowing what the source of the information was, whether that was the most recent information and whether they could ask questions or not, so they had little idea of the validity of the information at times. Another issue that needs guidance from the State and local chief executives is when they want to be informed about incidents that are not yet confirmed. There was hesitancy about passing information up the line, but generally good judgment. But people are concerned about the boy who cries wolf syndrome on the one hand and, on the other hand, keeping political leadership informed before they hear about it from CNN. A balance needs to be struck. There is also a need to more forthrightly inform the public on what is going on even in the face of uncertainty. It's probably better to say we have conflicting test information and trying to resolve it than delaying press releases all together, and that happened. There needs to be greater care in the use of English language and acronyms in emergency communications. We have been working the problem of interoperability of the hardware of communications, but there's an interoperability problem on the human side as well. For example, there was communication that it had set off an automatic alarm at Skyline Towers when it was in fact a person giving an alarm. And there's a big difference. There was a misunderstanding about whether a test was for the presence of anthrax spores or for the viability of anthrax spores, and that's a difference. DOD, several State and local agencies felt that DOD needed to better coordinate medical treatment decisions with their public health agencies, in this case Pentagon with Arlington County, but elsewhere in the Nation as well. And it affects people in the local jurisdiction. So those are just some of the key findings. We are going to have detailed time lines and findings from the point of view of all the major State and local government participants in a report that's forthcoming. I would be glad to answer questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Schaenman follows:] Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Jester. STATEMENT OF JOHN N. JESTER Mr. Jester. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you. My name is John Jester. I am the Director of the Pentagon Force Protection Agency. Thank you for inviting me to discuss the emergency response activities to the suspected anthrax contamination at the Pentagon's Defense Post Office and at a mail office in Skyline Tower 5. In addition to a brief summary of events, I also plan on sharing with the subcommittee lessons learned and actions taken since the event. Overall, I want to assure the subcommittee that the Pentagon is an equal partner with the Federal, State and local entities in protecting the health and safety of our employees and the surrounding communities. To briefly summarize the recent events, on Thursday, March 10th, Vistronix, a U.S. Army contractor, screened mail entering the Defense Post Office over down-draft tables. Swab samples taken from the filters under the tables were collected and sent to the Commonwealth Biotechnology Inc. Laboratory, hereafter referred to as CBI Lab. Standard procedures call for the contractor to hold the mail in quarantine mail for 3 days until the lab reports negative results. At 4 p.m. on Friday, March 11, representatives from the CBI Lab informed the Vistronix site supervisor that the initial test result of Thursday's mail sample would be delayed due to a preliminary positive test result. The Vistronix supervisor did not inform DOD of this preliminary test result. Over the weekend, CBI performed a confirmation test on the sample. On Monday morning, March 14, 6:15 a.m., Vistronix released Thursday's mail to the Defense Post Office for distribution. Three hours later, the CBI Lab informed the Vistronix supervisor that the test results from one of the samples from Friday's mail resulted in a positive response for anthrax. The Defense Post Office was notified of the positive test results, immediately shut down their facility and immediately notified the Pentagon Force Protection Agency. In the 2 hours that followed, we established a secure perimeter around the remote delivery facility, notified Arlington County and set up an instant command post integrating local and Federal emergency response efforts; 236 employees from the remote delivery facility were evacuated to a nearby vacant building until they could be briefed, tested and issued precautionary treatment, and offered counseling services. We coordinated with other Pentagon distribution offices to identify all possible recipients of the morning mail and deployed our HAZMAT teams to the sites for additional swab sample tests. Between 10 a.m. and 1 p.m., Pentagon Force Protection Agency notified State and local, Federal emergency response agencies of the potential biohazard incident through the Washington Area Warning System. By 1 p.m., the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Homeland Security Operation Center and the Office of the U.S. Postmaster General were all notified. The Arlington County Fire Department arrived at the Pentagon 11:04 a.m., and the FBI was on the scene by 1 p.m. Over the next 3 days, Pentagon officials coordinated with local, State and Federal officials, health and law enforcement officials. At approximately 2 p.m., we were notified that a bio alarm was set up in a mail distribution office in Skyline 5. It was later determined that the room in question did not have a biosensor or bioalarm. The device was a biological air filtration hood, and the alarm was simply a red light indicating air flow restriction. All subsequent tests returned negative, and the Skyline Complex and the Remote Delivery Facility reopened on Thursday, March 17th. By Thursday, March 17th, the DiLorenzo Clinic in the Pentagon tested more than 800 people through nasal swabs and provided 3 days of antibiotics. As in any emergency, there were actions that went very well and procedures that need to be improved. Our initial after- action assessments identified some positive aspects of the collective Pentagon response to this incident. The remote delivery facility as designed kept potentially harmful substances isolated from the large Pentagon population. We immediately identified and screened potentially contaminated employees. Within 3 hours, our organic HAZMAT team conducted 130 tests of the mail room and other suspected areas. Not everything transpired as it should have. It took too long for the original contractor lab mail results to be processed, and the contractor staff failed to follow mail release protocols. Additionally, there was no way to confirm that all State, local and Federal agencies heard the Washington Area Warning System message. The event illustrated that incidents at high-profile symbolic Federal facilities become breaking news stories and are quickly perceived as national events. We have already taken major steps to address these issues. Since the suspected anthrax incident, Pentagon Force Protection Agency has assumed responsibility for the oversight of the mail screening process and testing the samples from filters at our Pentagon laboratory. The onsite lab provides 24-hour response for positive initial screening of multiple threat agents. The Pentagon Force Protection Agency will ensure that mail is properly quarantined until the Pentagon lab returns negative sample test results. Revised notifications, both interagency and external, are in place for future chem-bioevents. Our procedures for using the Washington Area Warning System now include a preamble with an emergency message stating the who, what, where and when of the event. We will ensure that a response is received from an appropriate agency such as DHS, FBI and local counties. In 30 to 45 seconds, the emergency message will be repeated. A thorough review and the assessment of the ability to response to and management of the incidents is being conducted. DOD will receive a draft after-action report in 21 days and a final report within 45 days. The Pentagon is fortunate to have an excellent working relationship with Arlington and Fairfax Counties' police and fire departments. These working relationships were tested and proven on September 11th and continue to improve as we participate in annual exercises. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. Thank you for the opportunity to speak, and I will be happy to answer any questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Jester follows:] Mr. Shays. Thank you. We will start out with Ms. Norton. We are going to try to get at the bottom of what is still not clear to me as to where mistakes were made. You have you the floor for such time as you need it. Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Burrus, I am going to ask you to have somebody go with me to V Street. I am going to ask Mr. Day in the same way. You know, he laid it on the workers. We were able to--if you will forgive me, cross-examination that we are dealing with an unairconditioned facility. I think I just want to go there. It looks as though we did get a promise to deal with that situation. Very, very troubling. I would like to know from you whether this is the first time--were not V Street workers put on Cipro? Mr. Burrus. On which occasion? Ms. Norton. On this? Mr. Burrus. On the most recent one? Ms. Norton. Yes, on the most recent one. Mr. Burrus. Yes, they were offered Cipro. Ms. Norton. Was this the first time since the anthrax attack in 2001 that any postal workers in the United States have been on Cipro? Mr. Burrus. No, the employees at V Street. This is the second or third occasion since 2001. There have been other circumstances where those employees in that facility have been put on Cipro. Ms. Norton. Mr. Burrus, that is very troubling testimony to me. We know that at the time of the anthrax attack that Cipro was not a very nice medicine to have to take. We also know, if you keep taking something, it doesn't work, and yet, of course, we have heard from the last panel that there's no way to tell when there's a false positive, that is, simply saying something is negative doesn't make it negative. That's why you heard a lot of cross-examination by the chairman and me on that; your own testimony reinforces that. We are going to have to get to the bottom of that, particularly given your testimony that, in V Street, we have already had three times where people have had to take Cipro, and I understand that all of these are false positives. So, I mean, how many times are we going to expose workers to a very important, probably the only drug they could take, and when the real deal comes, and it's our job to see that it doesn't, then many of them would have been exposed over and over again to this antibiotic and perhaps it wouldn't work as well. That is very, very troubling. I want to move to Mr. Jester. Mr. Jester, is it your view that what we were dealing with here, we know we were dealing with a contractor. We know it was a noncertified contractor. So perhaps I ought to ask you why the Pentagon, of all places, was using a noncertified contractor. We had testimony in the prior panel--that this contractor was, ``outside of the Pentagon system.'' If you have a system, I assume that within your system they are certified. Is that true? Those who are within the Pentagon system are certified by CDC? Mr. Jester. We utilize the CDC protocols in our laboratories, but the laboratory, to answer your question--the laboratory, the CBI in Richmond, this contract was set up in November 2001, right after the incident on the Capitol, and the Pentagon quickly came to the conclusion they need to screen the mail, and they had a contract with Vistronix. Vistronix in turn subcontracted with CBI Laboratory. That process remained in place until this recent incident. We recognize there were some problems with that process. Ms. Norton. Well, subcontract--you didn't contract--there was a subcontract that resulted with this particular contractor being the laboratory? Mr. Jester. Yes. Ms. Norton. Not the contractor you in fact had employed? Mr. Jester. No, ma'am. The CBI laboratory was under contract to Vistronix who was under contract to the Army to screen the mail. And Vistronix screened the mail and sent their samples to the CBI Lab, so they were a subcontractor. Ms. Norton. I see. Mr. Jester. We recognize some problems with this. The Army had the American Academy of Sciences come in and take a look at the process and equipment. And they recognized there needed to be some changes. In fact, about 2 months before this event, the Army had asked my organization to take a look at the oversight of the screening process. And when we did that, we would then eliminate the CBI Lab and use our own laboratory. Ms. Norton. So are you any longer using this contractor or subcontractor to do lab work for the Pentagon? Mr. Jester. Pardon? Ms. Norton. Are you any longer using---- Mr. Jester. No, ma'am. Ms. Norton. So you are no longer using---- Mr. Jester. We stopped using it from the day of the incident. Ms. Norton. Are you using a CDC certified contractor? Mr. Jester. We are using a laboratory that we have with the Pentagon. The protocols that we use there are developed by the Army in consultation with CDC. The laboratory we have at the Pentagon is simply what I call a first alert laboratory. If we get a positive sample there, and we do have a PCR test there, we will immediately notify the FBI, and the FBI would take custody of that sample and then take it to the laboratory of their choice, which would be, I am sure, LRN laboratory. Ms. Norton. I guess that's all right, since you said, I understand, the Pentagon has perhaps the best experience with anthrax, because you have the military experience on which initially we relied. I will most certainly ask that--so when you said in consultation with CDC, I have to assume that CDC, that's the same thing as CDC certified. Because that consultation would not have their sign off, if it is not the functional equivalent of the certification? Mr. Jester. I would have to find out. I don't think there's a sample of approval per se. They did work with the CDC, the Army. Ms. Norton. They shouldn't be throwing their name around unless there is in fact something like that. Mr. Jester. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Norton. So I think you ought to get--if you would simply transmit to the chair by way of letter. Mr. Jester. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Norton. What the CDC consultation connotes so that we can translate it, do--does the lab use CDC reagents? Mr. Jester. Pardon? Ms. Norton. Does the lab use CDC certified reagents? Mr. Jester. No, ma'am. Ms. Norton. No? We use the Army agents, the Army's agents. Ms. Norton. Again, you know, that's going to be fine with me so long as two branches of government, the two agencies agree. Mr. Jester. Yes, ma'am. Ms. Norton. I have respect for the work that the Army and the military has done long before September 11th on anthrax, so just so we are talking about the same thing. But, again, I think that the chairman needs to have that understanding in writing. Let me tell you what really disturbs me and I guess the chairman when he opened this set of questions really got to the bottom of the core concern we have. We really are not interested, if you see how Mr. Shays goes at these hearings, which is not to ask a question, say got you and go on to the next one. We really are interested in finding out what happened particularly with respect to coordination so that this can kind of be a test that leads to remediation everywhere. We did not mean it as a test but it amounts to that. Now, in this region we have a National Capital Region Coordinator. I know it because it was my amendment to the bill that resulted in the National Capital Region Coordinator. When it got to the Senate it was even expanded. The feeling in both bodies was that this was the target region of the country, and while everybody else should have some kind of coordination in the States, since Federal facilities were located for the most part here, that the Department of Homeland Security should actually pay for the Coordinator. In all of this testimony, I have a hard time finding that Coordinator, and indeed, I can't figure out what the protocols are. So I'm going to try to break it down and not ask, you know, who struck John. Let me just ask a straight-forward question. Were there, let's leave aside what there are now because if there's something here now that was not there, you can tell me about that in answering this question. Were there, I will call them protocols, you can call them a list, for purposes of everybody understanding what I am talking about, that said once there is an incident, contact one, then contact two, then contact three, that kind of thing, the simple ABC's if you prefer of what to do in case there is an incident involving anthrax? Is there something that says immediately tell the National Capital Region Coordinator. Is there something that says go to the local police or fire, then go to X, Y? Remember we are dealing with somebody who may be anybody. There may be a worker who says there is some powder here, I don't know what to do. Well, is there a piece of paper that says every worker should go to his supervisor and the supervisor knows bingo, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5? All those people immediately know, then the information flows out and because the experts then know, the information then flows back as to what to do? If I could ask anybody who knows if there is anything written down that would tell a worker then or would tell a worker now what the steps are, let us say from 1 to 10 about who to notify or, if you like, what to do. Mr. Burrus. The Postal Service does have such information that is distributed to employees. The level of distribution is certainly dependent upon the managers in thousands of facilities across the country, but the real problem is we interact with all of the other agencies as well as private entities and everybody has a different protocol. There is no universal protocol. The Postal Service has its own. The Department of Defense or the Army, the Navy is not required to follow the Postal Service protocol. They have their own. So where the two intersect, as they differ, they differ. The Postmaster General, the U.S. Postal Service will follow his protocol, not that of the U.S. Army. Ms. Norton. But on an anthrax incident. Mr. Burrus. Yes, even with anthrax. Ms. Norton. Everybody has a postal facility. Mr. Burrus. Everybody suspects that if anthrax is identified that its origin--the initial suspicion is its origin is the U.S. Postal Service, particularly if it is discovered in a mailroom, and there are hundreds of thousands of mailrooms scattered in private entities. So if they discover anthrax in the mailroom, the immediate suspicion is that its origin was the U.S. Postal Service. That independent entity will follow their protocol and it will differ from what is followed by the U.S. Postal Service. So you have conflicting protocols. What happened in the Pentagon recently, the suspicion was it was a Postal Service initiated action. There were two different protocols that were in play and the media was in between. Ms. Norton. What protocols were in play? Mr. Burrus. The Postal Service. Ms. Norton. And who else? Mr. Burrus. The Department of Defense because the suspicion was the anthrax was identified as having not been initiated but identified in the Pentagon. Ms. Norton. Mr. Jester, was there anything in writing that indicated in this region what you should do in a Pentagon postal facility if there was a suspicion of anthrax in the facility? Was there anything in writing which I am calling a protocol, but it is anything in writing? You can call it what you want to. Mr. Jester. Yes, ma'am. We have what we call a concept of operations, CONOPS, and we have detailed concepts of operations both for chem, bio and radiological situations, and it details what you do in each of those events, what kinds of notification you make. Ms. Norton. Who is the first person you would notify in this region? Mr. Jester. Arlington County. They are our first responder. And then based on what we see we would be contacting the FBI. Ms. Norton. Who would be doing this contacting, the person in the facility? Mr. Jester. Our operations center. Let me back up a little bit. We train our employees in the building. We give them training. For example, we provide all of our employees with escape masks like they have here in the Capitol. To get that escape mask they must come to a training class where they are educated on the chemical, biological or radiological threat and what they should do. And they are also told on who they should contact. They contact our emergency number. We also train our employees on evacuation procedures. We also have an ability from our operations center to communicate to all 20,000 computers within a minute to say what is going on and what people should do. We exercise these procedures, these CONOPS that we have on the chemical, biological, radiological; we exercise these measures each year with Arlington County Fire Department. We have an exercise that's called ``Gallant Fox.'' So there are procedures set up for employees on who to contact and who we should contact. Ms. Norton. I'm with you so far as your emergency responders are concerned, but as I look at your testimony between 10 and 1 you say ``PFPA notified, local,'' the various parties. Then you say by 1 p.m. the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Homeland Security Operations, Postmaster General were all notified. That is between 10 and 1. By 1 that is 3 hours. I do not even see the National Capital Region Coordinator in here. Maybe somebody told him along the line. I do not see anybody who was responsible after the emergency responders were notified to then make sure that there was proper notification given all over, and in fact the Mayor of the District of Columbia and the county executives have all complained about confusion in response. And part of the problem I am having is I don't see that it has made any difference to have a Regional Coordinator paid by the Federal Government in this region, and I still don't know who is in charge of this operation once anthrax is suspected. There's no question if there's a fire, first call the fire department, and that is what you had here, but after that there may be something far larger going on and I am not clear from your testimony or the other testimony where it goes after the emergency responders are notified. Mr. Jester. Ma'am, what we do is we use what is called the Washington Area Warning System. It's an open telephone line. It's a system maintained by FEMA. When you pick up that telephone line and give a message, we gave it three times that day. Ms. Norton. That should mean everything in the whole region got it long before 1; that should mean instant notification if it's an open line. Mr. Jester. It was around 12, I don't know the exact time. Ms. Norton. Why did it take so long? If it was an open line why wasn't there an immediate response, Roger, or whatever you say. Mr. Jester. Our first issue is we're working with Arlington County. That's our first responder. Ms. Norton. I understand that. That's the first thing you have to do, and I will get to them in a minute. After that, since this may be an anthrax attack, there may be some reason to tell the Congress and the White House, there may be a reason to tell God knows who, I wouldn't know who, therefore I would want somebody in the Federal Government who knows who to know and all I'm trying to find out is after you call the emergency responders who should we look to for leadership on this issue so that everybody knows to relate to that person. Mr. Jester. We utilize the instant command system. We have a unified command. We follow the National Incident Management System on who is in charge of the event. The Washington warning system also goes to over 80 organizations. Ms. Norton. It was just pointed out, in your testimony, you say there is no way to confirm that all local, State and Federal agencies, this is what you've testified, heard the Washington Area Warning System message. So there's no way for them to say Roger, got you. Mr. Jester. There is no way of verifying. Ms. Norton. That isn't technology. That's what you could have done 100 years ago virtually. Mr. Jester, it is not you alone. We have a problem far larger than you. I'm just trying to figure out how it works. Chief Schwartz, did you want to clarify how this communicating worked? Chief Schwartz. A couple of points. One is that the National Capital Region Coordinator is not an operational position. While his role is to assist---- Ms. Norton. I'm fully aware of that but for him not to know, what's the point? Let's get rid of him them. Chief Schwartz. I'm getting to that. The way that the system is supposed to work is that initial notification and response is made, and then the jurisdiction in which the incident is occurring establishes their emergency management system. They may open their emergency operations center. Ms. Norton. Say that again. Who establishes? Chief Schwartz. The local jurisdiction. In this case, originally Arlington. When Fairfax had their incident they did the same thing. They are opening their local emergency operation center. That becomes the conduit from the incident scene, through the local jurisdiction, and possibly, and in this case this was done, to the State. The State is notified of the incident. It has an awareness for what's going on. The State, if they feel the need to notify the Federal Government, they can do that. Normally that occurs when we are requesting additional resources, when we are requesting something that is not available. Ms. Norton. Chief Schwartz, you are dealing with how a local official would normally through the chain of command up to his Governor handle this matter. But what we in Congress have to worry about is that anthrax is not a local or State concern. Once you are talking about anthrax you are immediately talking about a major Federal concern. You did the right thing. In fact, if anything the reports about Fairfax and Arlington or even D.C., which wasn't as closely involved, were that they responded appropriately. But anthrax is a national concern. It involves a Federal matter. And I cannot yet figure out after you did your job, which was making sure, one, that you got there, and, two, that you located everybody who should have been notified in your jurisdiction. Still the Federal Government is over here someplace where all the information and knowledge about how to deal with anthrax is supposed to reside and I can't find out who is in charge. I don't know if it's DHS. I don't know if it's the Pentagon. I don't know if it's the National Capital Region Coordinator. I don't know if it's the Department of Homeland Security, somewhere in the bowels of that organization. I don't know if it is the Postal Service, which is a Federal agency. I don't know who Mr. Jester is supposed to relate to. He's just in one agency. And at this point I can't figure that any of you know as well. Chief Schwartz. The answer is it's the local authority. The Federal Government does not take control even of anthrax. Ms. Norton. But we are not talking about control. You see, I've got to make sure we understand what we're talking about. Chief Schwartz. Because the issue you're talking about is notification. Ms. Norton. I'm not talking about notification in the local or county sense. Chief Schwartz. I know but here's the point that I was going to make, and this touches on something that Mr. Jester just mentioned. There is no reliable system in the National Capital Region where a jurisdiction can make a notification about an incident and be assured that everybody who has a need to know in fact gets that information. Ms. Norton. That really is all I need to know. The fact is that Mr. Jester has testified that this Washington Area Warning System message open line was used. And yet he did not know, or he is not able to say in his testimony that such primary actors as the actual operation center, you are talking operation, he cannot say for sure. He can only say for sure that their operations center at Homeland Security knew by 1 p.m. We are talking about 10 a.m. when all of this began, whatever the local officials were doing. And all reports are they were doing--they handled their own internal protocols appropriately. What we can't understand is how the Federal Government was not itself coordinating its appropriate response. Mr. Schaenman, you have looked at this matter in terms of the actors who were involved. As I have indicated, I'm not concerned about the emergency response because they have tested and rehearsed and they are just there when there is an event. But once they get there we are talking about anthrax. What in the world are they going to do? Anthrax has to go some place to be verified. Somebody has to say, I'm in charge here, everybody relate to me. And I would be very interested in what you found and where you think the flaws were, who you think might have been in charge or should have been in charge and what you'd recommend. Mr. Schaenman. Your question actually raises a whole bunch of issues. It's not a single simple thing. As the chief was saying, the actual incident was managed very well. There was unified command. In the face of uncertainty, the hard issue here was was it or wasn't it anthrax. So that drove a whole lot of things. Ms. Norton. Let me stop you there. So when the two chiefs go and the question is was there or was there not anthrax, what can they do? What can they do? Was it or was it not anthrax? What can two chiefs doing their jobs do? Mr. Schaenman. I think what happened early in the process, and, chiefs, tell me if this wasn't true, is the public health, the county level public health authorities get notified and start talking to each other and making medical decisions. Ms. Norton. Did your men and women go to the site? Chief Schwartz. Yes. To the Pentagon, yes. Ms. Norton. When you got there what could you do? Chief Schwartz. We immediately, recognizing the situation, notified our Office of Emergency Management. They operate our emergency management system. They have the connections throughout the local government. They immediately notified our local Public Health, who has a direct and statutory relationship to State Public Health because there is no Federal Public Health. Ms. Norton. What did they do about the substance or the part of the facility where it was thought that anthrax was suspected? What could they do about that? Here is where I'm trying to see the relationship between the Federal Government and the State authorities. Chief Schwartz. What they're doing is they're working with the folks on the ground, in this case at the Pentagon and I presume at the Fairfax facility also. They're working with Federal law enforcement personnel. Ms. Norton. Do either Fairfax or Arlington have facilities for testing? Chief Schwartz. No, we rely---- Ms. Norton. No matter what you can't test. Chief Schwartz. We have some minimal field testing capabilities to give us some indication as to what we may be dealing with. That was not necessary here although there were a number of those tests done. Ms. Norton. Let me go to Mr. Schaenman and then I will go to the chairman, who has been very gracious. The point I have been trying to establish is that making their very best, even heroic efforts, when it comes to anthrax, local emergency responders are at the mercy of somebody who can test to see if there is anthrax. I don't care how good they are, that is not their job. That is why I'm interested in the relationship between the local responders here, two counties that acted appropriately, and what looks to be the only entity that can get at whether or not we have a homeland security emergency. And Mr. Schaenman and I know Chief Neuhard also wanted to say something on that. So I would like your responses. Mr. Schaenman. The information flowed very fast, very early. NCR did know about it. NCR did participate in disseminating waves of information. It was not the only route. Ms. Norton. So who was in charge? Mr. Schaenman. So the people in charge of the incident, dealing with the incident were the local authorities. Ms. Norton. Here we go again. I know that. I've just established they can't do anything. They don't know what it is. They are doing their jobs. Who's in charge of everybody here? They're fine, so is everybody else fine. Mr. Jester has done what he's supposed to do. He said he's talked on his little phone and said hey out there, anthrax, anthrax, but nobody answers him back because that's not a part of the protocol. That's what I'm trying to find out. Who is in charge, who should be in protocol? Mr. Schaenman. There's one set of protocols that deal with disseminating the information about an emergency. There's a different set of protocols that deal with dealing with the action. It goes into the public health sector. The public health people who are alerted at the local, State and national level, it was going in waves. So lots of people are readied, resources were being readied to move drugs but until the incident gets beyond the local governments it doesn't---- Ms. Norton. Who's in charge, Mr. Schaenman, who's in charge? Mr. Schaenman. The local agencies are in charge. I mean, the incident commanders are in charge. There's a medical answer also. Ms. Norton. Well, that's certainly not acceptable. It's not that your answer isn't acceptable. It's truthful, but it's not unacceptable to us that local authorities are in charge of a major homeland security national event. Yes, sir. Chief Neuhard. There are through the incident management system very clear lines of authority and through State law and Federal law. The problem is as that escalates, as we asked for increased resources, which we do. And in this case we would need resources, there are Federal authorities that have very specific authorities on that scene and they would come integrate with us and we ask them for assistance in certain areas. We had two different incidents here with two different sets of problems. The problem became that while we knew at the incident scene who the Federal representatives were and what they were doing and how they integrated with the system, as you moved away from the incident site and the sample is taken to the lab, we knew where it was going, and the scientists within the Federal Government and the agencies within the Federal Government became to bear on the problem, it then was a question by the localities. We know who the responsible agencies are here, but we've got a lot of people talking and confused with no single clear point of contact about where this information should come back to the locality. And you're exactly right, we are slaves to that and that is a problem. The incident management system provides the answer to that, but that assumes that the plans that are in place identify who the lead authorities are in that case. At the local level and the State level it says for the type of emergency who is supposed to be there. And the national response plan, if operated, is supposed to define that as well. Ms. Norton. Who does it say is supposed to be there? Who does it say is supposed to be the lead authority in this region in the event of an anthrax incident of the kind we had at the Pentagon, for example? Chief Neuhard. I cannot answer that clearly for you, Ms. Norton. It will have to be asked to Federal authorities. Ms. Norton. The chairman says why not. If you don't know, Chief Neuhard, since you clearly understand what is supposed to be at your level it is because there is not clarity at the Federal level about who is in charge. I mean, if we have established nothing else here today, we have established that there is nobody in charge when there is an anthrax event, that there is plenty of information flowing, and that really scares me because information flowing from multiple sources is as confusing and perhaps more confusing than no information, and I think the way it began, Mr. Jester, was the right way to begin. But it seems to me that little fixes here could help. It began apparently with you using this Washington Area Warning System message. That message could have been received not only by everybody and may have been but by, quote, whoever is in charge. But the first thing to know is how do you report back that you have gotten it and how do you know that whoever is in charge, this mystery person, has gotten it, so that we know that all of the action that is then supposed to take place is then taking place. I'm assured that at some point it was, but everybody reported confusion, and that confusion begins and ends with no point of responsibility and accountability for an anthrax attack in this region, and that is something that we've simply got to straighten out. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Shays. Before I go to staff to ask some questions, Mr. Jester, are you involved with the anthrax vaccine program? Mr. Jester. No, sir. Mr. Shays. So would the Force Protection Agency--define to me what the Director of the Pentagon Force Protection Agency means. You are in charge of the building? Mr. Jester. I'm in charge of the security for the Pentagon reservation and other DOD office buildings in the National Capital Region that are not military reservations; for example, leased commercial buildings around the metropolitan Washington area. We perform a function that is very similar to the U.S. Capitol Police at this location. Mr. Shays. So in the end are you agreeing with Ms. Norton that we really don't know who is in charge of anthrax? Mr. Jester. No, sir. We are all guided by the National Incident Management System, which establishes a process on who is in charge---- Mr. Shays. If you don't agree then, don't tell me we all are. Tell me who is in charge. Mr. Jester. There is an incident commander. There is a process described in the National Incident Management System. It describes an incident. Mr. Shays. Is there a person with a name that is in charge overall? Who is that person? I see two heads shaking. Mr. Jester. It would depend on the nature of the incident. It is scenario driven, whether it is a law enforcement incident or whether it's a fire/rescue incident or whether it is a public health incident. Mr. Shays. Anthrax. We'll take anthrax. Who's in charge? Mr. Schaenman. The local public health director. Mr. Shays. I don't believe the local public health director can go into the Pentagon and take charge. I don't believe it. Chief Schwartz. And one of the things that the State and local after action report does point to is the fact that the public health dimensions; that is, the release of prophylaxis for those employees, was not well coordinated. Mr. Shays. You said ``and'' like you were going to give me some information. I said I don't believe that the public health director can in fact take charge, can take command in the Pentagon and you started to say ``and.'' What does ``and'' have to do with it? Are you agreeing or disagreeing that's true? Do you think the public health director can take charge? Can she tell Rumsfeld what to do? Chief Schwartz. No. But I'm saying by NIMS and by the National Response Plan she is supposed to be able to. Mr. Shays. OK. So in theory the national public health director has jurisdiction, except that we learn from Dr. Schafer that DOD has separate requirements and basically plays by separate rules. So what is the point of your telling me that the health director has jurisdiction and is in charge when in fact they haven't been in charge? They aren't in charge, and they probably never will be in charge. Chief Schwartz. Well, I think that things have changed a lot in the last couple of years, but I would also say with all due respect, sir, that's the purpose of these kinds of hearings is to get to the bottom of that and perhaps resolve some issues that we are unable to resolve. Mr. Shays. I basically view you as the good guy here in the sense that you are trying to help us sort that issue out, and I appreciate it. But it just seems to me we could just have someone without 30 minutes of questioning, if someone could say what it is and we don't have to do this kind of probing. I'm wondering why we have to do this kind of probing. The bottom line is nobody is in charge in essence or there is a real disagreement as to who's in charge or that everybody's in charge therefore nobody is in charge. I mean, that would start us in this process. Mr. Jester. From the standpoint of the Department of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, Dr. Winkenwerder, was our immediate public official, and he's the one that made the decision. He contacted CDC right away to talk about what he was facing. He was facing a situation where he had a positive test even though it was flawed but it was not known at the time. He had mail that was there for 5 days and he had 236 employees that were very concerned for their safety. So he made that decision, he made the public health decision. Mr. Shays. Let's just take what you said, Dr. Winkenwerder, he basically notified CDC. Did he notify the health director? Mr. Jester. The local health director? Arlington County Public Health Director? Mr. Shays. I'm not going to help you out as to who that would be. Did he? Mr. Jester. He did not notify directly the Arlington County Health Director. He talked to them later in the day. Mr. Shays. Let's stop right there. Chief Schwartz, you are telling me who's in charge? Chief Schwartz. I'm telling you by statute in Virginia the local public health director has that authority, including on the Pentagon reservation. Now that did not happen in this incident, but that doesn't diminish the fact that is the law in the State of Virginia. Chief Neuhard. Mr. Chairman, I would say that in our incident in Leesburg Pike that did occur. Mr. Shays. What is that? Chief Neuhard. That did occur, where our Public Health Director was the incident commander, decided when that building was going to be opened again based on the information provided to her, decided whether prophylaxis was going to be given to other building occupants. Now if the DOD went beyond that with their people that was their business, but very clearly in that case it was clearly our Public Health Director that was in charge after our initial response. I would also say that in past histories where we have had chemical releases in buildings that have been occupied by Federal agencies we have taken control and command of those buildings. The problem comes when you get to a facility that is federally owned and not leased, such--in our case such as the CIA. Then it is a Federal reservation and we do support their operations. Mr. Shays. So in my lingo support means don't take control, you just help them? Chief Neuhard. In most cases that is correct, sir. If it is on their land under their control then we support their operations. If they are in a position where they are in State or local lands, we very clearly take command and control and introduce our particular response plans to that. The incident commander will be the lead. It's defined. And if I were at the CIA ultimately there would be a Federal person that would be the lead on that incident, even though I would be in a unified command structure and providing my services at that incident under the National Incident Management System. Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, that is fine and that is appropriate because we are talking about the difference between a Federal property where you are preempted if the Federal Government so desires. And this facility was just an ordinary office building, isn't that true, and there were other people in there even besides--the Pentagon facility was not a Federal facility, isn't that right? It was an office building? Chief Neuhard. Skyline was not a Federal facility. Ms. Norton. It was not a Federal facility. So you understand we are not talking about preempting the State government. Indeed, I have to tell you that the D.C. government here pretty much had a very central role here even though we were talking about a Federal facility. So nobody would preempt you in an ordinary office building in the State of Virginia. What concerns us is that, for example, as with September 11th, you could have these incidents breaking out all over, No. 1. And that is their modus operandi by the way. That is exactly what they try to do, what you know they did do on September 11th, at least when they were using airplanes as weapons. That's the first thing. The second thing is that with a biological attack it is particularly important that at some level the Federal Government certify whether or not there has in fact--such an attack has occurred, every bit as much as if that attack had been on an office building owned by a developer in downtown Washington. At some point the Federal Government would have to assure us that a biological attack had or had not occurred. So really all that we are asking about when we say ``is not in charge,'' is not preempting the State officials who know better than the Federal officials could possibly know what to do in their own jurisdictions, but making sure that as with our questioning about certified laboratories, and so forth, with the prior panel that we are assured that we are not under attack, because if we are under attack Virginia may be the site but it is the United States of America that is under attack. Therefore, somebody in the Federal sector, particularly where all the information is--yes, there's a lot of information in public health departments, but that's why you pay taxes, for the Federal Government to come to grips with all of this. So I just wanted to make that distinction that I do not think the chairman or I are talking about preempting the State of Virginia and you acted absolutely appropriately, but we do think the Federal Government should have somehow understood its appropriate role. Mr. Shays. I am having trouble understanding who's on first and who's on second. I'm trying to sort out if there was a fire at the Pentagon, would the local fire department do that or would that be the Pentagon that would deal with the fire and then they would call in and who would have command. Chief Schwartz. Mr. Chairman, we can reply September 11th again and the attack on the Pentagon. It was the local authority that had all command and control for that incident. Mr. Shays. Do you agree with that? Mr. Jester. Yes, sir, he was the incident commander. Mr. Shays. See, I can almost understand it in reverse. I can almost understand that if the Pentagon had its own force they would be in charge because it is localized and they would ultimately, whatever consequence is localized. But I begin to be very uneasy if the Pentagon acts like China within the United States and there is a break out of SARS--I'm using that as somewhat an absurd example, but a biological problem that could go well beyond the confines of the Pentagon. Now I realize anthrax isn't contagious so it is not maybe the best analogy, but when it's a health issue I have a greater appreciation that it has to be more than the Pentagon that is involved, and what I am left with and I will leave this hearing with a weird feeling that we really don't know who's in charge and that's very unsettling to me. And no one here is basically telling me--in theory you are telling me, Chief, that it is the health director but in practice you said it isn't. So then I don't know who's in charge. Chief Schwartz. I have to say, Mr. Chairman, that I think that is only with regard to the Pentagon. This is the third incident of anthrax that we have experienced in the National Capital Region or the northern Virginia area since October 2001, November 2003, and a couple of weeks ago at the Pentagon, and we learn more each time we deal with these. I would submit that there is no kind of response that we deal with in this country with regard to terrorism where a systems approach to dealing with it is more required than a biological incident. There are not--because what I will tell you is when the incident is confined to a specific site it is very easy to determine what command and control system, what set of resources you're going to apply to that, how you reach out for that next set of resources. In a biological incident that spans--that knows no jurisdictional boundaries, and even in an anthrax incident the ones we went through before caused difficulties because the people that work at the Pentagon work in Maryland, they work in the District and they work in Virginia. Mr. Shays. So anthrax could still be on their clothes and they could carry it out? Chief Schwartz. Anthrax could be in all those jurisdictions and three different public health authorities might have to manage their components of that incident. Mr. Shays. So let me just be clear. In this incident, the Health Director in the Pentagon did not take command? Chief Schwartz. Correct. Mr. Shays. And was notified in the beginning, others were? Chief Schwartz. Our Public Health Director was notified very early because again the system works such that the first responders arrive on the scene, recognize the problem, reach back through our communications mechanisms to activate our emergency management system, our emergency managers say to Public Health this involves you, this is not the traditional public safety responders by themselves, you're involved here. Mr. Jester. In our operations center we have the Arlington County Deputy Police Chief, we have the Public Health Office, and we have the Office of Emergency Management, all within our office. Mr. Shays. And who is in charge? Mr. Jester. From the public health standpoint? It was just the Secretary for Health Affairs. He made the decision on the issue of antibiotics. The decision about isolating the areas was done initially by my personnel. When the incident first occurs, we secure the location. We are in charge. And again it is scenario driven. We have many exercises and, like Jim said on September 11th, many times the Arlington County Fire Department is the incident commander, in fact in many cases are the incident commander. But in the National Response Plan it talks about incidents of national significance. And from our operation of this event, it was looked at as a local event. There was no decoration that we know of, that I know of where it was declared an incident of national significance, which would then have made DHS come in. If that declaration had been made, DHS would have had a leading control. Mr. Shays. We are not talking about DHS. We're talking the director of health in the area. And even then we did not have-- that person was not in charge. That's all. Each of us are doing--I mean, if I got blamed for all the inefficiencies of Congress because I'm a Member of Congress I would be pretty unhappy, and I am not blaming any of you but where I have a little bit of lack of patience it just seems we could have described this scenario a lot sooner and not taken so long. In the end we know there is a lack of knowledge of who is in charge, not in terms of theory but in practice, and I would also say even in theory I don't believe the Secretary of Defense believes that the Health Director is in charge. I don't believe that for a minute. I do not think there is anything that would indicate that DOD in general thinks that the Health Director is in charge. At any rate I don't even know where this hearing is going to go because I don't know if anybody is going to pay any attention. I think DOD is going to keep doing what it does. I will just say, Mr. Jester, my sense of concern just goes back to hearings years and years ago when we were asking about the anthrax vaccine program. And we said the way we were doing it was an experimental drug and the courts said yes, it was an experimental drug and stopped doing it, but we basically court- martialed people. We saw people from the National Guard go out. And even though the court said this was illegal, the Pentagon basically said we do not care. We are going to keep going on. So there is a lack of credibility when I hear the word ``anthrax,'' whether it is vaccines or who's in charge here. I just think DOD is going to do whatever the hell it wants, and I don't think it's going to be in our Nation's best interest. Mr. Jester. Sir, I think except for the situation of public health, we've had September 11th, we've had other exercises there, we've had other incidents there, and we've always followed the National Incident Management System. We do not want to operate independently because we need our partners in the local communities. Mr. Shays. I think it would be good to sit down with the Health Director. Mr. Jester. And we will. Like I said, there are things we felt that, well, there are some things we need to work on, and that's one of the areas that we have to have some discussions. Mr. Halloran. Dr. Statzenbach, I just want to ask if you heard the CDC testimony in the first panel. Did they describe any of the research that you are advocating in your testimony? Did you hear that any of it was underway or planned? Dr. Stetzenbach. It is my understanding that CDC is working with Dugway in an experimental room to do the very research that we published on a couple years ago. Mr. Halloran. Twenty years ago? Dr. Stetzenbach. No, no. We published a couple papers in 2004 using an experimental room where we released an anthrax simulant and tested different sampling methods. They are now moving forward with that research in Dugway. Mr. Halloran. Replicating your research? Dr. Stetzenbach. I don't know if they're doing simulants or they're doing the actual anthrax. That's something we can't do in my laboratory. But our lab started off with some of that work. We're currently not doing it now. Mr. Halloran. Anything else that you heard that would meet--the research you're advocating, did you hear anything else that is planned or underway? Dr. Stetzenbach. There's a tremendous amount of research that needs to be done. As I was listening to the gentlemen here, it struck me that we can't lose sight of the fact that all of these different groups have a different focus. The first responders as they're called to a scene their question is, is there a threat. The public health officials want to know if there has been exposure and a resulting adverse human health effect. Law enforcement wants to know who did it and how can they gather their forensic evidence. And ultimately EPA wants to know what the scope of the contamination is so that they can get it cleaned up. Each of those different groups right now has a different sampling strategy and it is chaos when they all show up at the same place at the same time. Mr. Halloran. And I would suggest that each of them has different information needs in time. Whereas a fire is happening now, this thing moves across time and space as it were. You know things later that you would like to know now, which leads me to the next question to the chiefs. In terms of handheld assays or field tests for anthrax or biological agents, what do you know about their capabilities now? What do you feel now? What are their limitations and what realistically would you like them to be able to do? Chief Schwartz. A higher level of reliability is what we're looking for. But as I mentioned in my testimony that I want to be real clear with, we are not using a handheld assay or any kind of field testing. We are not using any handheld devices, any field testing to make clinical decisions. What we are looking to do is just manage the public anxiety when we're confronted with an incident like this, and when we're dealing with that we're dealing with it by doing a threat assessment and in consultation with our public health authorities. So we want higher levels of reliability but it is hard for me to imagine today a level of reliability or validity that would change that portion of the response. We're still going to be making tactical decisions as a part of our incident management structure and consulting with Public Health to make those clinical decisions. Chief Neuhard. As I mentioned in my testimony, we are very concerned about the reliability and the accuracy of what is available today on the market. We believe we need it and what we want from it is for us to say yes or no, it is present, and do that with probably 99 percent reliability. Dr. Stetzenbach. And those data are not out there. Chief Neuhard. And they're not there and that's the problem. But to say that they are not needed, we go through incidents, we maintain people onsites, we go through emergency actions over time because we don't have that answer and that prolongs the anxiety of the community. It prolongs the use of resources and we need a method that will allow us to do that. Now we keep getting closer. The PCR is the closest thing we've got today, but it's expensive. It requires a lot of training and a lot of use, and we're hoping that some day there is a better technology. Mr. Halloran. Just two more. Mr. Schaenman, who convened those conference calls with 80 people on them? Mr. Schaenman. Some of them were, they were convened by the Department of Homeland Security. NCR convened some of them. There were others that were convened by counties. Mr. Halloran. What was the point? What did they hope to achieve? Mr. Schaenman. I think they were trying to inform everybody where things stood. It wasn't just one call. It was a series of calls, and people were occupied with the call and it would be time for the next call. And they weren't using technology that allowed people to identify somebody who wanted to ask a question. It was a good hearted ``let's tell everybody what's going on.'' The pendulum has swung the other way, from everybody guarding information to too many people spreading information. And the kernel of the information not being clear as to what test are you talking about, what does it mean, what's the timestamp on it? Am I hearing the same thing three different ways? Is it a positive test? Is it a negative test? What's the interpretation? So there was almost overcommunication in these incidents. And people have called, all the State and local governments we interview have called, as Ms. Norton was suggesting, for a clearer protocol of who is responsible for sending the information beyond the county or jurisdiction of origin where it first starts. Mr. Halloran. Finally, Mr. Jester, it was described in an incident that local responders were coming up to a DOD facility and they did not know what technology was being used inside. They didn't even know that any technology was being used inside. Is that true elsewhere throughout this area? Can you tell us if it is getting better? Mr. Jester. You're talking about the Skyline 5 incident? Mr. Halloran. Yes. Mr. Jester. We didn't know there was technology that was being used. It was purchased by the tenants in that office. They used it, told no one except themselves, and so it confused Fairfax County. It confused us. Mr. Halloran. Was that the human error? Mr. Jester. I think what is happening is that offices are concerned for their safety and they see a lot of brochures and things around and salesmen go around and try to sell things to them, and they buy them probably carelessly. Hardware is no good without concept of operations. If there is a device in a building, you need to have someone who knows what they're doing, how to use it. There should be manuals there and they should be coordinated with their local responders. Mr. Halloran. Assuming for a moment that's the outlier, can you assure the committee that in DOD facilities not run by a contractor with technology that you don't know about, that you have made proper liaison with local officials so they know what's there when they get there? Mr. Jester. As far as we know, but what we're going to need to do is go out and survey. We have to go around to every office and ask the question, do you have a device here and if you do where is it, what is it, and in most cases tell them to shut it down until we can find out what they have and whether it is worthwhile. Mr. Halloran. Thank you. Mr. Shays. I would like to do a UC, and put into the record a letter and support materials from Assistant Chief Alan Vickery of Seattle, WA Fire Department. Without objection, so ordered. [The information referred to follows:] Mr. Shays. I would like to thank Bill Womack of Mr. Davis's legislative staff for very valuable help preparing for this hearing. I would like to thank the patient and wide awake court reporters. Thank you very much. I would also like to thank Kristine Kathleen McElroy of my staff, who has worked on this hearing, and to say that by the time the court reporter gives us the transcript her name will be Kristine Kathleen Fiorentino. McElroy is going to be history and it will be Fiorentino. Congratulations on your wedding next week. Without any more important business to do, let us adjourn. [Whereupon, at 6:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] [Additional information submitted for the hearing record follows:]