[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DOE/ESE SECURITY: HOW READY IS THE PROTECTIVE FORCE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 26, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-104
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee DIANE E. WATSON, California
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
DARRELL E. ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia Columbia
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ------
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina (Independent)
------ ------
Melissa Wojciak, Staff Director
David Marin, Deputy Staff Director/Communications Director
Rob Borden, Parliamentarian
Teresa Austin, Chief Clerk
Phil Barnett, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana TOM LANTOS, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JON C. PORTER, Nevada BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
Ex Officio
TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
J. Vincent Chase, Chief Investigator
Robert A. Briggs, Clerk
Andrew Su, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on July 26, 2005.................................... 1
Statement of:
Aloise, Gene, Director, Natural Resources and Environment,
Government Accountability Office, accompanied by James
Noel, Assistant Director of Natural Resources and
Environment, and Jonathan M. Gill, Senior Analyst, Natural
Resources and Environment; Gregory H. Friedman, Inspector
General, Department of Energy; Glenn S. Podonsky, Director,
Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance,
Department of Energy; Dr. Lawrence Brede, Wackenhut, DOE
Operations; Dr. Glenn Adler, Security Policy, Service
Employees International Union; and Robert Walsh, Security
Manager, Office of Energy, Science and Environment,
Department of Energy....................................... 7
Adler, Dr. Glenn......................................... 73
Aloise, Gene............................................. 7
Brede, Dr. Lawrence...................................... 62
Friedman, Gregory H...................................... 27
Podonsky, Glenn S........................................ 40
Walsh, Robert............................................ 86
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Adler, Dr. Glenn, Security Policy, Service Employees
International Union, prepared statement of................. 76
Aloise, Gene, Director, Natural Resources and Environment,
Government Accountability Office, prepared statement of.... 10
Brede, Dr. Lawrence, Wackenhut, DOE Operations, prepared
statement of............................................... 64
Friedman, Gregory H., Inspector General, Department of
Energy, prepared statement of.............................. 29
Grassley, Hon. Charles E., a Senator in Congress from the
State of Iowa, prepared statement of....................... 5
Podonsky, Glenn S., Director, Office of Security and Safety
Performance Assurance, Department of Energy................ 43
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3
Walsh, Robert, Security Manager, Office of Energy, Science
and Environment, Department of Energy:
Followup question and response........................... 110
Prepared statement of.................................... 89
DOE/ESE SECURITY: HOW READY IS THE PROTECTIVE FORCE
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TUESDAY, JULY 26, 2005
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Turner, Shays, Burton, Marchant, Dent, Maloney,
Kucinich, and Ruppersberger.
Staff present: Laurence Halloren, staff director and
counsel; J. Vincent Chase, chief investigator; Robert Briggs,
clerk; Sam Raymond and Eric Vaughn, interns; Andrew Su,
minority professional staff member; and Jean Gosa, minority
assistant clerk.
Mr. Turner. The hearing of the National Security, Emerging
Threats, and International Relations hearing entitled, ``DOE/
ESE Security: How Ready is the Protective Force?,'' is called
to order.
This hearing continues the subcommittee's examination of
security programs at Department of Energy nuclear sites.
Previous testimony described substantial institutional,
technical and fiscal challenges confronting efforts to develop
and implement a strengthened post-September 11th security
standard called the design basis threat [DBT].
Today we focus on the substance and pace of DBT
implementation at five sites outside the active weapons complex
managed by the Department's Office of Energy, Science and
Environment. Without question, ESE research labs and
decommissioned sites are attractive targets for terrorists
determined to turn our technology against us and willing to die
while doing so.
The materials at these facilities pose a threat and can be
used either as part of a weapon or a health threat directly. As
DOE succeeds in hardening weapons production facilities and
labs, ESE sites form the next tier of soft targets for nuclear
terrorists following the path of least resistance.
But as we have heard before, ESE facilities housing
substantial quantities of nuclear materials face unique
problems implementing and sustaining enhanced security
programs. The already vexing measure of how much security is
enough against an uncertain threat becomes only more difficult
when evaluating the costs and benefits of capital improvements
and protective force enhancements at decommissioned facilities
DOE hopes to close sooner rather than later.
At the request of our chairman, Christopher Shays, the
Government Accountability Office assessed the current readiness
of protective forces at ESE sites and the steps still needed to
defend those facilities against the larger, more capable
attackers postulated in the DBT. Their findings, released
today, point to a generally proficient guard staff prepared to
meet existing standards. But the way forward to meet the higher
DBT threat level is far less clear.
Efforts to deploy an elite protective force, utilize new
security technologies and effectively manage ESE security
initiatives require coordination and resource commitments that
GAO is not sure will materialize. Plans to blend down and
consolidate nuclear materials appear stymied by bureaucratic
stovepipes and uncertain cost projections. Even under the best
assumptions, security enhancements demanded by the 2004 DBT
will not be completed before 2008, if then. The new security
imperative demands implementation of a denial strategy to
thwart access to nuclear materials, not just contain or catch
intruders.
But in many ways, ESE seems stuck in denial about
organizational and fiscal demands of a DBT-compliant strategy.
Tactical training on assault scenarios lack vigor or realism.
Communications equipment may be unreliable. Exceptions to
training and equipment standards create inconsistencies and
gaps in ESE safeguard systems. A diffused ESE security
management structure frustrates efforts to implement and
coordinate DOE-wide security policy securities.
Almost 4 years later, the undeniable realities of the post-
September 11th world are not yet fully reflected in ESE
security policies or practices. Our witnesses this morning will
describe plans to implement the more stringent DBT and the
steps needed to sustain those efforts against an undeniable
dynamic threat. We appreciate their contribution to our ongoing
oversight of DOE nuclear security, and we look forward to their
testimony.
Gentlemen, as you are aware, it is the policy of this
subcommittee to swear in our witnesses. If you would please
stand and raise your right hands for the oath.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Turner. Please note for the record that the witnesses
have responded in the affirmative.
And I will acknowledge that Mr. Ruppersberger was in
attendance at the commencement of this hearing. And I ask
unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be
permitted to place any opening statement in the record and that
the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without
objection, so ordered.
I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be
permitted to include their written statements in the record.
Without objection, it is so ordered.
I ask further unanimous consent to place a statement from
Senator Grassley, a co-requester on the GAO study to be
discussed today, in the hearing record. Without objection, it
is so ordered.
[The prepared statements of Hon. Christopher Shays and Hon.
Charles E. Grassley follow:]
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Mr. Turner. Our witnesses today for this panel include Mr.
Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment,
Government Accountability Office, accompanied by Mr. James
Noel, Assistant Director of Natural Resources and Environment;
and Mr. Jonathan M. Gill, Senior Analyst, Natural Resources and
Environment.
We also have Mr. Gregory H. Friedman, Inspector General,
Department of Energy; Mr. Glenn S. Podonsky, Director, Office
of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, Department of
Energy; Dr. Lawrence Brede, Wackenhut, DOE Operations; Dr.
Glenn Adler, security policy, Service Employees International
Union [SEIU]; and Mr. Robert Walsh, Security Manager, Office of
Energy, Science and Environment, Department of Energy.
And if I have mispronounced any of your names, please
correct the record when you give your testimony.
We will begin our testimony with Mr. Aloise.
STATEMENTS OF GENE ALOISE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY
JAMES NOEL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENT, AND JONATHAN M. GILL, SENIOR ANALYST, NATURAL
RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT; GREGORY H. FRIEDMAN, INSPECTOR
GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; GLENN S. PODONSKY, DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF SECURITY AND SAFETY PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE, DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY; DR. LAWRENCE BREDE, WACKENHUT, DOE OPERATIONS; DR.
GLENN ADLER, SECURITY POLICY, SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL
UNION; AND ROBERT WALSH, SECURITY MANAGER, OFFICE OF ENERGY,
SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
STATEMENT OF GENE ALOISE
Mr. Aloise. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I
am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on nuclear
security at DOE's Energy, Science, and Environment sites. A
terrorist attack on one of these sites, containing weapons-
grade nuclear material could have devastating consequences for
the site and nearby communities.
Mr. Turner. Excuse me. These mics are relatively
directional. Could you pull the mic forward? And if you would
twist it just a bit so that it is pointed directly at you, that
would help us.
Mr. Aloise. These consequences could include theft of
nuclear material, explosion of an improved nuclear device, and
use of the material in a dirty bomb. To protect these sites, an
effective security program is essential.
DOE's security program begins with a document known as the
``design basis threat,'' which identifies the size and
capabilities of potential adversaries. The 2004 design basis
threat identified a much larger terrorist threat than before,
and it could cost between about $400 million and $600 million
to develop the force necessary to defeat this larger threat.
DOE is allowing its sites until October 2008 to fully meet
the new design basis threat. My remarks, which are based on the
report we are issuing for the subcommittee today, will focus on
whether ESE protective forces are meeting current readiness
requirements and what actions are needed to defend against a
larger October 2004 design basis threat.
Regarding readiness, we found that protective forces at the
five ESE sites, with weapons-grade nuclear material, generally
meet readiness requirements. Specifically, protective forces at
the Savannah River site, Hanford site, Idaho, and Argonne West,
and Oak Ridge National Lab generally comply with DOE standards
for firearms proficiency, physical fitness and equipment, and
had the required training programs and facilities.
However, we did find weaknesses that could impact the
protective forces' ability to defend their sites. For example,
most officers we spoke with were concerned about the quality
and realism of their training. Further, because DOE neither
sets standards for, nor tracks individual participation in
force-on-force exercises, it was difficult to determine how
many officers had this important training.
Another weakness identified by protective force officers at
all five sites concerned problems with their radios. Some said
that the radios could not be relied on in the event of a
terrorist attack.
In addition, although most protective forces are required
to have access to body armor, at one site we found that body
armor had not been issued for most officers. Another site did
not have its own special response team. In the event of an
attack, one of the jobs of a special response team would be to
recover stolen nuclear material.
In addition, the capability of some of the protective
forces to fight during a chemical or biological attack varied.
Specifically, two sites expected and provided equipment for
most of their forces to fight in contaminated areas. Another
site did not provide any equipment. Indeed, it expected its
teams to evacuate the site with other workers. Yet another site
expected its forces to fight in a chemically contaminated area,
but did not provide protective gear.
Another weakness we observed was that only one of the five
sites had armored vehicles. In contrast, all six NNSA sites
with weapons-grade nuclear material have armored vehicles.
Now regarding actions needed to meet the 2004 design basis
threat. In our view, DOE needs to develop and implement a
comprehensive Department-wide plan which addresses, among other
things, the transition to an elite fighting force, investments
in emerging security technologies, and the consolidation of
weapons-grade nuclear material. Further, DOE needs to establish
a centralized security office within ESE to help meet the
challenges of implementing the new design basis threat.
While I am pleased to note that DOE has accepted our report
recommendations, DOE's response to our recommendation to
develop a comprehensive plan to meet the new design basis
threat does not go far enough. DOE has cited only individual
efforts to address the new threat, and not the larger plan we
are calling for. Without such a plan, DOE may not be successful
in meeting the requirements of the 2004 design basis threat by
October 2008.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I would be happy
to respond to any questions you or members of the subcommittee
may have.
[Note.--The July 2005 GAO report entitled, ``Nuclear
Security, DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy,
Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated
Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-05-611,'' may
be found in subcommittee files.]
[The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Friedman.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY H. FRIEDMAN
Mr. Friedman. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,
I am pleased to be here, at your request, to testify on recent
reviews conducted by the Office of Inspector General regarding
security programs of the Department of Energy. This is the
latest in a series of testimonies that we have provided to the
Congress on this important subject. The issues addressed have
included training, physical security, and performance testing.
A number parallel those addressed in GAO's just issued report.
Between 2003 and 2005, we identified issues regarding
protective force overtime and training. In one review, which
included five Department sites, we found the Department faced
significant increases in unscheduled protective force overtime.
Further, we noted protective force morale and retention
problems due to mandatory overtime and reduced training
opportunities.
In a review with the Department's Oak Ridge Reservation, we
found that contractor protective force personnel spent, on
average, about 40 percent less time on combat readiness
refresher training than that specified in the training plan
approved by Federal site managers, and that the personnel
worked in excess of the Department's optimum 60-hour per week
threshold.
In a third review we found that 10 of the 12 sites made
significant modifications to the Department's established
protective force core curriculum. This raised questions about
the effectiveness of the training received by the affected
protective force personnel, as well as the validity of the core
curriculum.
In June 2005, we examined physical security at two DOE
facilities. In the first review we found that foreign
construction workers using false identification documents
gained access to the Oak Ridge Y-12 National Security Complex.
During our field work, management issued a revised access
policy. Nonetheless, we were concerned, and are concerned, that
similar conditions may exist at other sensitive Department
sites. Therefore, we recommended that management determine
whether agency-wide actions are warranted.
The second review concerns security at the Strategy
Petroleum Reserve. The Reserve, which the Department has
designated as part of its critical infrastructure, contains
about 695 million barrels of oil valued at about $36 billion.
We concluded that physical security at the Reserve could be
improved.
Specifically, we found that 87 percent of the non-
protective force contractor employees of the Reserve, some with
the ability to access sensitive areas unescorted, had never
been processed for any level of security clearance. Therefore,
in our judgment, the Reserve's level of protection against the
``insider threat'' may not be consistent with its critical
infrastructure designation. We also found the Reserve's deadly
force policy may also not be consistent with the Reserve's
critical infrastructure designation; and, finally, we
identified opportunities to make site protective force
performance tests more realistic.
Protective force performance testing was also the subject
of a January 2004 report, where we found that a performance
test at Y-12 was compromised as a result of certain protective
force personnel being allowed to view computer simulations of
the test scenarios prior to the test, and there was an apparent
pattern of actions by Oak Ridge Reservation security personnel
going back to the mid-1980's that may have negatively affected
the reliability of site performance tests.
In another 2004 report concerning Oak Ridge, we identified
that the two local Department management offices, the Oak Ridge
office and the Y-12 site office, were developing separate radio
communications projects. The two projects as designed would
have created gaps in radio coverage and would have prevented Y-
12 protective forces from maintaining communications with the
rest of the Oak Ridge Reservation and their own dispatcher.
These findings were similar to an earlier review at four
other Department sites, in which we found that three of the
four sites did not have direct radio communication with local
law enforcement agencies. These agencies would have been called
upon to assist in the pursuit of suspected felons or terrorists
fleeing Department sites.
We also have a number of ongoing and planned security
reviews relevant to the topics discussed during this hearing.
This includes an intensive effort to review the Department's
security program and its progress in meeting the threat posed
in the revised design basis threat document.
The Department is working to address many security concerns
and is doing so at a substantial cost. The Office of Inspector
General will continue to examine the Department's security
apparatus with the goal of providing recommendations to enhance
efficiency and effectiveness.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this
concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Friedman follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Podonsky.
STATEMENT OF GLENN S. PODONSKY
Mr. Podonsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to testify regarding
the readiness of protective force to defend Office of Energy,
Science and Environment facilities in light of the GAO's recent
report on their examination of protective force training and
equipment at five ESE sites.
I will highlight relevant aspects of the GAO report from
the perspective of the Office of Independent Oversight within
my Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance. These
issues are addressed in greater detail in my written statement.
The Department considers its responsibilities to protect
national security assets in our custody to be crucial.
Secretary Bodman and Deputy Secretary Sell have demonstrated an
intense interest and strong support for our security programs,
and have continued the significant initiatives begun by their
predecessors. This support includes the policy of holding line
managers responsible for security program implementation and
effectiveness, to include achieving established milestones for
meeting the requirements of the Department's design basis
threat.
While ESE site missions are generally associated with basic
and applied scientific research and environmental remediation,
rather than with national security matters, some ESE sites and,
in particular, the five sites addressed in the GAO report--
currently possess significant quantities of special nuclear
material.
We agree with the GAO's general conclusion that protective
forces at ESE facilities visited are adequately trained and
equipped to protect the facilities under the current
requirements. But there are some weaknesses that must be
addressed.
This conclusion is consistent with our own previous
independent oversight inspections of these facilities. We
believe that ESE line managers and security professionals at
all ESE organizational levels will move quickly and effectively
to address the protective force training and equipment
shortcomings outlined by the GAO, and will likely respond
positively to recommendations contained in the draft report.
We anticipate efforts to do so will be integrated with many
other actions necessary to meet the requirements of the design
basis threat. We are confident that the new Under Secretary,
Dave Garman, together with the newly appointed ESE Director of
Security, Bob Walsh, will provide the immediate and sustained
high level of attention necessary for these efforts to be
successful.
We are currently pursuing a number of Department-wide
initiatives designed to assist ESE in meeting its security
challenges and obligations. Two, in particular are aimed at
achieving affordable security upgrades to meet the design basis
threat requirements. One of these is the Elite Force
Initiative, by which we intend to enhance the tactical
capabilities of those protective elements responsible for
protecting our most critical national security assets.
We believe that to effectively defeat current and future
threats, we need protective force elements possessing the
advanced training, weapons, equipment, and tactics that will
enable them to conduct a coordinated and intense offensive and
defensive tactical operation at skill levels comparable to
those of elite military units.
While achieving this goal will require some modified
training and some upgraded equipment, together with policy
changes, it should not require significant changes in manpower
levels. Many of our current special response team personnel
already possess high levels of tactical skills and are well
armed and equipped. And this initiative is more about changing
how we use some protective force resources than it is about
adding more resources.
Further, this initiative will not directly involve
protective forces at all ESE sites, especially those that do
not possess critical national security assets, and may involve
only a portion of the forces at sites protecting such assets.
We have a number of activities under way to determine required
changes in policy, defensive strategy and tactics, training,
weapons, equipment, and supporting technologies that will
enable us to effectively implement the elite force concept as
envisioned on schedule.
Intertwined with the Elite Force Initiative is another
complementary initiative, involving the increased use of
security technologies to effectively and efficiently upgrade
our protection systems. Through the prudent application of
appropriate technologies, we expect increased use of those
security technologies to provide cost savings and improved
effectiveness over manpower intensive alternatives.
It is important to clarify that when we refer to security
technologies, we do not refer exclusively to expensive, high
technology and delicate electronic sensors. While such devices
are certainly included, security technologies also include many
other categories of items, such as improved barrier systems,
materials that provide ballistic protection, advanced
protective force weapons and equipment, and improved
construction techniques. We expect the security technologies
initiative to benefit all of our facilities.
The application of appropriate security technologies can
improve effectiveness and efficiency of any protection system.
Therefore, we believe all ESE sites are candidates for security
technology upgrades, although we would expect more intensive
investment in the benefits of such technologies at sites
protecting our more critical assets.
I wish to note that the Idaho site within ESE has actually
been extremely proactive with our security technology
deployment initiatives and has recently submitted an impressive
design basis threat implementation plan.
Through our technology deployment program, our site
assistance visit effort, and our development activities, we are
making progress in identifying and evaluating new technologies
for site-specific applications.
In summary, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we
agree with the general results, conclusions, and
recommendations of the GAO report, and believe that ESE line
managers under the new ESE leadership will address the issues
identified by the GAO and the IG as they address the challenges
associated with implementing the design basis threat.
We believe that our elite force, security technology, and
other security initiatives will assist ESE meeting those
challenges within the parameters established by Secretary
Bodman and Deputy Secretary Sell. But they are challenges, and
the ultimate success of the effort will in fact require the
attention and support of ESE line managers at every level.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Podonsky follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Dr. Brede.
Also, I want to acknowledge that Carolyn Maloney has joined
us.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Brede.
Dr. Brede, I don't think your mic is on.
STATEMENT OF DR. LAWRENCE BREDE
Dr. Brede. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
offer my views on the readiness of Department of Energy Office
of Energy, Science and Environment protective forces to meet
the terrorist threats identified by the intelligence community.
The perspective I bring to the table is that of a senior
contract manager for a protective force and a soldier. Until
recently, I served as General Manager of the Savannah River
site protective force contract, one of the five sites recently
reviewed by the GAO. I served in that capacity for more than 12
years. And prior to my DOE service, I spent 26 years as an Army
officer with three combat tours, including service with elite
units.
Let me say up front, for the record, that our protective
forces are well trained and, as a group, are as capable as any
of the military units with which I have served. In fact, the
majority of protective force officers with whom I am familiar
come from a military background and bring with them the skills
necessary for the protection of critical DOE assets.
Anecdotally, the winner of two annual recent National Level
Tactical Competitions comes from a DOE ESE site. In these
competitions, they scored consistently higher than military,
law enforcement, and Federalized forces in tests of shooting,
physical fitness, and tactical skills.
With reference to the GAO report, I believe it provides a
balanced assessment of ESE protective force readiness to defend
their respective sites. The report's conclusions, that
protective forces generally meet existing key DOE readiness
requirements and comply with DOE standards, firearms
proficiency, physical fitness levels, and equipment
standardization are accurate ones.
At the same time, the report's identification of possible
weaknesses and actions needed to correct these could serve to
enhance our abilities to defend against the 2004 design basis
threat. Because it matters not how capable we are today, we
ought to work at being better than we are. Our sites can and
are addressing the weaknesses in training and equipment
identified in the GAO draft report.
I would submit if the GAO would conduct a review today on
force readiness at ESE sites, the results would be
significantly different than the snapshot taken when the last
review began in March 2004. Today's picture would reflect more
tactically focused training, the employment of more advanced
weapons systems, communications, and armored vehicles, and a
host of other actions related to meeting the 2004 DBT.
Similarly, I believe that site contractors understand the
necessity to take our protective force readiness and
capabilities to the next level. That is, we need to transform
certain segments of our legacy force to an elite force. Based
on secretarial guidance and Office of Security and Safety
Performance Assurance initial efforts, some sites--and the
Savannah River site among them--have already taken actions to
transition to this elite force with challenging training,
increased performance standards, and tactical reorganization.
I also believe that the transformation to an elite force
can be facilitated by policy considerations in four areas: more
challenging physical fitness qualification standards;
introduction of height, weight, and body composition standards;
identifying appropriate safety performance expectations; and
considering a uniform retirement plan to allow for cycling of
human capital through elite force units.
In conclusion, I believe that ESE protective forces are
sufficiently trained and equipped to meet existing DOE
readiness requirements. Site implementation plans identifying
how sites will meet the increased challenges presented by the
October 2004 DBT have been provided to DOE ESE and are being
reviewed for approval. Meanwhile, my experience indicates we
are being provided the resources necessary to support the
phased implementation of measures to meet 2004 DBT protective
force requirements.
While addressing certain policy issues will certainly
enhance our force readiness, I have confidence in our
protective forces' ability to counter today's and future
threats. Simply stated, I am as proud to serve as these forces
as I was to serve with America's sons and daughters in my
military experience.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Brede follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Dr. Adler.
STATEMENT OF DR. GLENN ADLER
Dr. Adler. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I am Glenn
Adler, and I work for the Service Employees International
Union. I have submitted a statement for the record and will
summarize the main points.
We have three main concerns. The best standards in the
world will not improve security if contractors elude them if
DOE's oversight is weak, or if DOE lacks the will to weed out
poor performers or to avoid choosing them in the first place in
the procurement process.
SEIU is one of the largest trade unions in the United
States, with more than 1.8 million members. We are the largest
union of security officers in the country. I am responsible for
coordinating research and policy work in the Federal sector,
including in DOE nuclear facilities and NRC regulated
commercial nuclear power plants.
On September 11th, our security officers and janitors at
the World Trade Center, were among the first responders to that
terrible tragedy, working side by side with the NYPD and the
firefighters in a cause to which many of our members gave their
lives. But well before the horrible events of September 11th,
SEIU had been raising the issue of security standards, most
notably for airport security screeners. We have partnered with
responsible contractors, building owners, mayors, and
Governors, to raise standards and improve performance.
We know DOE's regulations for training and performance are,
as they should be, far beyond the standards in the commercial
office world. But the GAO report, on the table today, tells us
that contractors are in significant ways not living up to them.
Consider one failure identified in the report and then echoed
in the fine presentation by the Inspector General, undependable
radio communications. This may sound like a minor matter to
some people, but it may contribute to serious problems. In
fact, one may have already occurred.
According to the New York Times, in 2004, poor radio
communication played a role in the confusion of a near friendly
fire incident at the Y-12 plant in Tennessee. Officers are
courageous people, people doing difficult and important work.
They are heavily armed, and they go out into the night and we
learn that perhaps their radio communication doesn't allow them
to talk to each other. To what extent is DOE's multibillion
dollar security budget compromised by poor radios and dead
batteries? A chain is only as strong as its weakest link.
This problem is directly connected to issues that are not
directly addressed in the GAO's report, the oversight and
accountability of contractors' behavior. SEIU believes security
should be of the highest standard, whether performed by public
authorities or by private companies. We are not opposed to
privatization. But contractors' interest in the bottom line may
encourage cheating and cutting corners.
In response, we expect government to check and balance
their behavior, and to change the incentives that may lead to
cutting of corners. But the Department sometimes contributes to
these irresponsible outcomes. The GAO has consistently warned
DOE about problems, for example, with their award fees. Yet,
these problems persist today.
You are all familiar with last year's IG report on cheating
by the foreign-owned contractor Wackenhut during a security
drill at Y-12. The incident cost the contractor about $200,000
in fees. But the company still received a good performance
grade from DOE and a $2.3 million award fee. Rather than a
multimillion dollar award fee, such outrageous practices
demanded serious sanctions from the DOE, including the
consideration of canceling the contract, suspension, or
debarment. Remember, this is cheating at a facility that
contains special nuclear material.
We have heard from multiple security employees at other DOE
ESE sites that these practices are not confirmed to Y-12. And
some security officers told us the motto is ``if you ain't
cheating, you ain't competing.''
Oversight exercised by the Inspector General is critical to
corralling this sort of behavior, but their oversight has been
subject to continuous public criticism by contractors. After
the recent IG report on training problems at Oak Ridge, which
is referenced in the GAO report and which was mentioned by the
representative from the IG, a Wackenhut spokesman mocked the IG
as ``bean counters who didn't understand security practices.''
Such comments indicate contempt for the agencies, including
Congress, to whom the IG reports, who are charged with
oversight of these facilities. They create an impression, in
the minds of the public, at least--at odds with expectations of
oversight and accountability.
To us, the conditions described by the GAO report are
shocking but not entirely surprising, since we encounter very
similar problems in other contexts: NNSA sites, commercial
nuclear power plants, and U.S. military bases. However, today's
report and other GAO and IG investigations tend to mirror the
structure of DOE itself, taking a piece of the puzzle and
looking at it in depth.
We believe it is important to complement these perspectives
by assessing the contractors, and not just the agencies, and
looking at their entire record across different settings to
learn whether a problem reported at one facility is an isolated
event or part of a broader problem and pattern of poor
performance. This will help in oversight of current contractors
and, if applied during the procurement process, will help weed
out poor performances before they are even awarded a contract.
In conclusion, the best standards in the world will not
improve security if contractors elude them, if DOE's oversight
is weak and if DOE lacks the will to get rid of poor performers
or to avoid choosing them in the first place.
We make a few recommendations: One, that DOE urgency
implements an effective process to monitor performance and weed
out poor performers, rather than reward them; a review of award
fees and the robust use of penalties to enforce compliance; DOE
must have a dramatically lower tolerance for cheating and
cutting corners, making it too expensive for a contractor to
risk this kind of behavior; and, faintly, DOE acquisition
processes should be strengthened to ensure contracting officers
do the proper due diligence by assessing security contractors'
past performance and their record of business integrity and
ethics. This is already in the Federal acquisition regulars,
but is not always applied in practice.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Adler follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Mr. Walsh.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT J. WALSH
Mr. Walsh. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. On behalf of Under Secretary David Garman, I
would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you this morning to discuss the readiness of DOE protective
forces at facilities which are under the operational oversight
of the Energy, Science, and Environment programs.
My name is Robert Walsh. I am currently the Director of
Security for Energy, Science, and Environment programs for the
Department of Energy. This position was created last year by
former Deputy Secretary Kyle McSlarrow, pending the nomination
and confirmation of an Under Secretary. The purpose of creating
this position was to bring focus and management oversight to
security programs on the ESE side of the Department, similar to
what the Office of Nuclear Security provides for the National
Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA], and to ensure that ESE
interests are appropriately represented in the security
management decisions of the Department.
Subsequent to his confirmation on June 15th, and his
swearing in approximately 1 month ago, on June 23rd, Under
Secretary Garman directed that this position be formalized as a
permanent part of the staff of the Office of the Under
Secretary. The objective and intent of this position is to
provide executive management focus for DOE security initiatives
as they apply to ESE programs, and to ensure participation and
coordination, together with Mr. Podonsky's organization and
NNSA, in security decisions and management oversight of DOE
security programs.
Although ESE security directors have had two informal
meetings since last October, we have taken advantage of the
scheduling of this hearing to convene our first official
meeting of the ESE Security Management Team since Under
Secretary Garman's confirmation last month. In that regard, I
am pleased to have with me today security representatives from
each of the ESE programs--Environmental Management, Science and
Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology--and ESE sites,
including Idaho, Savannah River, Oak Ridge National Laboratory,
and Richland, which specifically were the subjects of the most
recent Government Accountability Office report regarding ESE
protective force readiness.
Mr. Chairman, we are here before you today to discuss the
readiness of protective forces at DOE's ESE sites. The
Government Accountability Office has indicated that they
believe that ESE security forces generally do meet readiness
requirements as defined by DOE policy directives, and we agree
with this assessment.
We are extremely proud of the men and women who comprise
the protective forces which are responsible for protecting DOE
facilities on a daily basis. These officers are our first line
of defense against any active aggression from any number of
malevolent sources, and we believe they do an excellent job.
One indication of the overall readiness of protective
forces at ESE sites is the fact that special police officer
teams from two ESE sites placed first and second at this year's
annual Security Protection Officer Training Competition
[SPOTC], which was held last month in Albuquerque, NM and was
previously referenced in Dr. Brede's testimony.
Our team from Savannah River finished first among 11 teams,
representing ESE and NNSA sites from across the country, with
the Hanford Patrol team taking second place in the overall
competition. In addition, this year's Police Officer of the
Year, Ryan Strader, hails from Savannah River, as does Ryan's
colleague, Allen Ford, the second place finisher in the overall
individual competition. We are very proud of Ryan and Allen,
and the teams from Savannah River and Hanford for their
outstanding showing in this year's competition, and I am
pleased to recognize them here this morning.
The GAO also identified a number of areas which they felt
needed to be addressed, and DOE has either corrected or is
working to correct the weaknesses that GAO has identified. I
would like to take a moment to briefly summarize our efforts
with regard to GAO's specific findings in this report.
First, GAO identified that current DOE policy does not
require all protective force officers to participate in every
force-on-force exercise, and that sites were not required to
formally track individual officer participation in those
exercises. GAO recommended that DOE develop policy requirements
to ensure officer participation and to require sites to track
individual officer involvement.
DOE agrees with these recommendations, and Mr. Podonsky's
office has committed to developing and issuing DOE-wide policy
to address both issues by the end of this calendar year. We
plan to work closely with Mr. Podonsky and his staff to ensure
that this is completed.
It should be noted that some ESE sites are already
requiring this participation in force-on-force exercises and
are keeping track of that participation.
Second, GAO found weaknesses or deficiencies at some ESE
sites with regard to equipment issuance or operability,
including radio communications, body armor, chemical protective
gear, and availability of armored vehicles. We have conducted a
comprehensive review of each identified category at each ESE
site. We have corrected, or are in the process of correcting
each weakness, and we believe that each ESE site is currently
in compliance with DOE policy requirements in each case.
Mr. Chairman, we can provide more specific information
regarding protective force equipment at your convenience.
GAO has also recommended that ESE develop Department-wide
multi-year fully resourced implementation plans to meet the
requirements of the new design basis threat. Three of the four
ESE sites have participated in the jointly conducted site
assistance visits to determine current and future resource
requirements of the current DBT. The fourth site, Hanford, is
scheduled to be completed in September.
In addition, together with staff from Mr. Podonsky's
office, we are currently reviewing the DBT implementation plans
from each ESE site. These plans include projected resource
requirements and specific timelines, and we believe we are
currently meeting all requirements as they have been defined.
We expect to complete our review and submit the plans to the
Deputy Secretary for his approval by the end of this week.
Last, GAO recommended that the Under Secretary for ESE
establish a security organization to provide management
oversight and coordination for security initiatives within ESE
programs. As stated earlier, Under Secretary Garman has
formalized the position of Director of Security for ESE as a
formal part of his management team. We believe that this
initiative is responsive to GAO's recommendation in this area.
Once again, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the
committee for the opportunity to appear before you this
morning, and I would be happy to answer any questions. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Walsh follows:]
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Mr. Turner. Thank you.
We will begin questions for the panel with our chairman,
Chairman Christopher Shays. We will begin with a 10 minute
round of questions.
Mr. Shays. I thank the chairman for giving me this
opportunity to ask questions and to say I was in Iraq 24 hours
ago, so I am trying to listen, but it is a little difficult.
We have had three hearings with the Under Secretary for the
National Nuclear Security Administration, and this is our
second hearing on the Under Secretary for Energy, Science, and
Environment. There are only two Members here. I don't know that
is an indication that people think we are doing well or whether
there are just so many things to focus on.
However, I happen to think this is a hugely important
hearing, and I thank you all for being here. I am not sure if
the chairman and I will direct questions to everyone, so I have
no problem with others jumping in if they want to respond to
questions.
Mr. Podonsky, you seem to come to either hearings we have,
given that you are involved in both areas, is that correct?
Mr. Podonsky. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. How would you evaluate ESE's efforts to
implement the design basis threat denial of access security
strategy?
Mr. Podonsky. Until Under Secretary Garman was confirmed
and until Director Walsh was put into his position, I would
characterize ESE as being somewhat slower in what we had
anticipated or hoped for implementation of the DBT. Part of
that we believe is because the ESE organization was made of
very strong, sincere individuals for their security programs
within ESE, science, nuclear energy, environmental management,
fossil energy.
The reality is they were all doing what they thought was
prudent for their particular sites. We did not see the rapidity
that we felt that was needed to implement the design basis
threat, but they all had their individual perspectives on what
their priorities were. I don't want to speak for what their
priorities----
Mr. Shays. Let me get to the next question.
Mr. Podonsky. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. How do you evaluate the ESE? Are you optimistic
that they are going to meet their 2008 deadline on the design
basis threat?
Mr. Podonsky. Yes, sir, we are guardedly optimistic that
they will because they have the new leadership that they have
not had in the history of the ESE before. And that guarded
optimism comes from the implementation plans that we have
recently read from Idaho and one of the other sites within ESE.
We hadn't seen that enthusiasm before.
Mr. Shays. What kind of program office resistance have you
encountered regarding the implementation of the design basis
threat?
Mr. Podonsky. If I said resistance, I misspoke. I think
what we have seen is extremely careful analysis of what the
design basis threat was and how it applied to their sites. The
other thing that I think, in all respect to the Department, the
design basis threat from May 2003 changed in October 2004. So
we would expect that ESE sites, like the NNSA sites, should be
moving toward completion of the 2003 DBT numbers in 2006 for
completion.
Mr. Shays. I have a sense that the Department is reluctant
to implement the design basis threat. You don't think there is
a reluctance?
Mr. Podonsky. We have seen a hesitancy in terms of the
Department----
Mr. Shays. That is called a reluctance.
Mr. Podonsky. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK. So you have seen that.
Mr. Podonsky. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK. Why did DOE change the design basis
implementation deadline from October 2007 to October 2008?
Mr. Podonsky. I am not familiar with the October 2007
deadline being changed to 2008. There was a review that former
Deputy Secretary McSlarrow asked for to be conducted at the end
of a series of this committee's hearing and the GAO report on
the NNSA facilities.
Mr. Shays. I will throw this out to you and then anyone
else who wants to answer. The design basis threat, if it isn't
met until 2008, we are basically stating that we are
vulnerable. That is what it says to me. In other words, we
can't meet what we believe is the threat. So I guess what I
have a hard time understanding is why does it have to take 3
years? It doesn't seem like it is rocket science to me. It
seems to me it is just a matter of doing it.
And I am going to throw this out to anyone else who wants
to answer.
Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Shays, if I could start off, if my
colleagues here at the table will permit me. From an NNSA
perspective, my organization, that has both policy and
oversight of the Department, safeguarding security and
cybersecurity, to name a few subjects, we don't disagree with
the perception and the reality that if you have a threat today,
how can you not meet it until 2008 and beyond.
What we believe has been a great distraction for this body,
as well as the executive branch, is the focus on the policy of
the design basis threat, when in reality it should be about
implementation: the application of new technologies, the elite
force that we have mentioned in our testimonies here today, how
we apply our security strategies at our sites, and, equally as
important, nuclear material consolidation.
It gets confused between both the legislative arm and the
executive branch on focusing on the policy and the threat, when
in fact we need to have our sites implement a more robust
security posture than we currently have if we are going to meet
today's challenges that we see throughout the world.
Mr. Shays. I don't really feel that you have given me an
answer to the question, though. Why does it have to take so
long?
Mr. Podonsky. I don't have an answer why it should take so
long.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Walsh.
Mr. Walsh. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I would add is, and
I spent some time in intelligence and working on postulated
threat and design basis threat. The design basis threat is, and
we have to be careful that we don't wind up getting into
anything classified, and make sure we don't. But the design
basis threat is a generic threat on which you design your
protective forces and your protection strategy over a very long
period of time, usually 15 or 20 years. For many years the
design basis threat was fairly stable. I think post-September
11th, realistically, we have to take a very close look at that.
Mr. Shays. Well, you had to take a close look. For
instance, if you believed that people who came in to get one of
the resources that we were protecting, if you believed that
they didn't want to lose their lives, were willing to risk
losing lives, but didn't want to lose their lives, you believed
that they also had to get out with the material. So you had a
design basis threat that said, well, maybe they can get in, but
they are not going to get out.
Mr. Walsh. Right.
Mr. Shays. But if you, all of a sudden, realize that they
don't care if they get out, if they are willing to blow
themselves up onsite, the design basis threat changes, correct?
Mr. Walsh. Parts of it change. The strategy may change.
Mr. Shays. Well, wouldn't it mean that you might have
accepted their getting in, but now you can't even let them get
in? And doesn't that mean, then, that your whole resources have
to change and your whole strategy has to change?
Mr. Walsh. Well, they do. But it is more than just the
strategy of your adversary; it is the numbers of adversaries
and numbers of other things, and their capabilities that go
into----
Mr. Shays. Right. But if you feel, for instance, that the
design basis threat was that they were only going to have one
insider who is helping, and you decide that there is going to
be two out of the logic that there could be two----
Mr. Walsh. That would change it.
Mr. Shays [continuing]. Then your design basis threat has
changed, correct?
Mr. Walsh. That would change it.
Mr. Shays. My question, though, is given that this is an
incredible resource that we are trying to protect, why would we
tolerate having to wait 2, 3, 4, or 5 years? That is what I
don't understand.
Mr. Walsh. I know I am not understanding your question,
but----
Mr. Shays. But you aren't answering the question. But why?
What is so difficult about a design basis threat that it has to
take 4 or 5 years?
I will leave that on the table and go to the chairman. I am
going to come back to that.
Mr. Walsh. OK.
Mr. Turner. Well, to pick up where the chairman has left
off, Mr. Podonsky, you made a statement that troubled me. You
said that this body has a design basis threat focus. And I was
just conferring with counsel here. My recollection is the
design basis threat process is not one that Congress has
imposed upon you. You have just acknowledged that is the case.
So we are left in doing an evaluation of whether or not you are
sufficiently protecting these very dangerous assets.
In reviewing your bureaucratic processes--and that is what
concerns me most, is that we are talking about a bureaucratic
process--you come up with a design basis threat and you
determine whether or not you are going to meet it. You go
through a process to assess what it is going to take to meet
it.
And I think that sometimes people don't get their heads up
from their desks enough to look out of the window and say if
you are actually sitting in front of this body and saying you
are not going to meet the design basis threat until 2008, and
it is a threat that we all acknowledge exists today, not in
2008--Mr. Walsh, I disagree with your statement of a 15 or 20-
year time period. You are not projecting what the threat is in
2008; you are projecting what the threat is today, and you are
trying to meet it by 2008. Is that correct?
Mr. Walsh. You are making an assessment of the most likely
or representative threat that you need to protect against and
you need to design your protection strategy against that.
Because of the nature of the design basis, it should stay
fairly stable over a long period of time.
Mr. Turner. Does the design basis threat that you are
currently trying to meet in 2008 represent a capacity for a
threat at these facilities today? That is a pretty easy
question.
Mr. Walsh. Well, not really.
Mr. Turner. I mean, either you believe that what is
currently in your design basis threat that you are projecting
to meet in 2008 is not a threat that is lurking out there today
or you think it is. And if you think it is, and you are saying
that you are going to meet it by 2008, then what you are saying
is that DOE is not currently meeting the threat that is out
there today.
Mr. Walsh. Well, first let me say that we on the ESE side,
as well as NNSA, are committed to meeting the design basis
threat, as it is presently laid out for us in the 2004 policy
that we have; and that is what we are moving toward meeting.
Now, the question of validity, what I can tell you is----
Mr. Turner. Well, perhaps let me ask it again. Are you
telling me, then, that you do not believe that the design basis
threat that you are attempting to meet by 2008 represents the
threat that exists at these facilities today?
Mr. Walsh. The most likely or most representative threat?
Mr. Turner. Does it meet a threat that you are facing
today? It is either yes or no.
Mr. Walsh. No, I am sorry, Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. If you don't believe it is out there, then that
is a whole other issue for us to pursue. Do you believe that
the design basis threat, that you are trying to meet by 2008,
represents a threat that exists to these facilities today?
Mr. Walsh. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry, it is more than a yes
or no answer. It has a lot to do with the numbers and the
capabilities and the strategies that you address with the
numbers of people that you assume are going to come at you. It
is not really a yes or no answer. And it is based on
intelligence assessments and postulated threats. So I
apologize, but it is more than a yes or no answer.
Mr. Turner. Well, I disagree. And I am very disappointed in
the position that you have for security in DOE, that you would
say that you can't answer yes or no. So we will just go down
the panel.
Mr. Aloise, do you believe that the design basis threat
that they are attempting to meet by 2008 represents a threat
that exists to these facilities today?
Mr. Aloise. In our view, that is DOE's criteria, and that
is what we measure them against.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Friedman.
Mr. Friedman. That is my understanding of the criteria for
the construction and development of the design basis threat
essentially, yes.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Podonsky.
Mr. Podonsky. It was written by my office, so my answer is
yes.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Brede.
Dr. Brede. That is a policy question from an implementation
standpoint. We are preparing to deal with that threat today.
Mr. Turner. That is not an answer.
Dr. Brede. We posit that threat exists today. That is my
opinion.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Dr. Adler.
Dr. Adler. I will pass and say the last time I looked the
DBT was classified information, and I lack a security
clearance, so I am not capable of answering it.
Mr. Turner. It is just an opinion as to whether or not you
think that the threat is out there today.
Dr. Adler. Again, the specifics of what the DBT consists of
are not something that is shared with ordinary citizenry. What
I would say is what is put out in the news about what this
could consist of isn't something that will happen in the
future, it has already happened. We have already been attacked
by such force.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Walsh.
Mr. Walsh. Yes, sir.
Mr. Turner. Do you want to change or supplement your
answer, or is your answer still so complex that I can't decide
if it is yes or no?
Mr. Walsh. Well, two of the previous answers said that it
is the criteria that they measure to.
Mr. Turner. That is why I found your answer confusing,
because my understanding of what the design basis threat was
based on today's threat, not a projection of the threat in
2008. And your answer was that it was the threat 10, 15 years
out in the future.
Mr. Walsh. It is a generic threat by which you design your
protective forces and your protective strategies that you hope
will be static for a number of years, 15 or 20 years. Now, you
have to adjust that, and we have a review process for that
every year. But the design basis threat is your most likely or
most representative threat over a long period of time. I agree
with two of the----
Mr. Turner. So does it represent a threat that these
facilities have today? Does that long period of time that you
are describing to us include today?
Mr. Walsh. If you are asking if the design basis threat is
the most representative or most likely threat against DOE
facilities today, I would have to say I am not sure. We are
going through a review right now.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Walsh, you are trying to answer honestly,
but I feel like you are Mr. Ford, telling us well before
Eastern Europe was free, that it is free. And I would like you
to kind of catch your breath a second.
Mr. Walsh. OK.
Mr. Shays. It is not a difficult question to answer. The
design basis threat is the threat we believe exists today and
will exist in the future. We constantly are changing the design
basis threat. The fact that we can't be ready until 2008 means
that we are not ready. And that gets to a question that I am
going to pursue again.
But, frankly, your answer is alarming. Or it just shows
that you don't believe in the design basis threat. In other
words, obviously, in the end, it is an opinion. It is an
opinion, with a lot of different people, that this is the
threat that we have to protect against. If you, in your mind,
think that it doesn't represent an accurate threat, that is an
answer that you can say, and you disagree with the design basis
threat. So let us go there.
Do you agree with the design basis threat or do you
disagree with the design basis threat, that is, we are not
going to talk about what it is, but do you agree with it?
Mr. Walsh. Once again, let me state for the record that we
are committed to the design basis threat as it is stated and we
are moving toward preparing for that through 2008.
Mr. Shays. I hear you.
Mr. Walsh. Because that is the Department policy. The
Deputy Secretary has asked us to review that right now, and we
are undergoing an internal review of the DBT. But to restate
it, if you are asking me if I think the design basis threat
right now, as it is stated, is the most likely or most
representative threat against a DOE facility----
Mr. Shays. I didn't really ask it that way, because the
design basis threat isn't necessarily the most likely.
Mr. Walsh. It is the most representative.
Mr. Shays. No. The most likely, it also has to be what we
believe we ultimately have to protect against.
Mr. Walsh. Right.
Mr. Shays. It may mean that the design basis threat
includes what we think is not as likely as something else, but
we at least have to get up to that level. We may think it is
more likely that--and since I haven't looked at the design
basis threat, the numbers I am throwing out right now these
numbers are made up.
But, for instance, if we thought the design basis threat
involved the fact that you could have two people on the inside
working with people on the outside, but we think it is more
likely it will be one, but we still have to prepare for two,
yes, it is more likely that it may be one, but we still believe
that we have to have our design basis threat to deal with two
because it is still a possibility that we know we have to
protect against.
So when you say what is most likely, that is not really
what I am asking. I am asking you a question: are you working
in this administration and are you on that side of the equation
that disagrees with the design basis threat, and is that
shaping your response? Because that is the only way I can
justify your answer.
Mr. Walsh. Well, the only thing I can say, sir, is that I
think that it is worth it to make sure that whatever the design
basis threat is, that it is right, that we get it right.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Walsh. And we are in the process of reviewing it now.
It might very well----
Mr. Shays. And the question I have is do you disagree with
the present design basis threat? That is not top secret, you
can say yes or no. I haven't asked you what it is.
Mr. Walsh. No, I understand that.
Mr. Shays. OK. So are you on that side of the equation that
disagrees with it?
Mr. Walsh. I am not totally convinced that the current
intelligence foundation that really does go into developing a
design basis threat supports where we are right now.
Mr. Shays. That is a fair question. Now, if that is shaping
your response to the first question----
Mr. Walsh. I believe it is.
Mr. Shays. OK, but it shouldn't, because the real question
is, in terms of policy, the design basis threat--the answer to
the question is the design basis threat is what we believe,
based on what we have agreed to, is a threat that we have to
protect ourselves against; not necessarily the most likely, it
is a threat we have to be able to protect ourselves against,
and we test ourselves against that.
Mr. Walsh. Right.
Mr. Shays. Then the answer to the question is a single yes,
it exists today. That is the simple answer to the question. The
design basis threat is the threat we believe exists today. Is
that not true?
Mr. Walsh. That is true.
Mr. Shays. Yes. And that is the better answer.
Mr. Walsh. That is true.
Mr. Shays. So we are going to sort out all your past
answers and that is an----
Mr. Walsh. OK. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Shays. And we are not badgering you into giving us that
answer; that is the answer.
Mr. Walsh. I appreciate that.
Mr. Shays. OK. And I appreciate your disagreement with the
design basis threat, and that is fair. You have a right to
disagree. And you have a responsibility to tell us if you
disagree. So that is an honest dialog.
But what I am having trouble with is given that we think
the design basis threat is the threat we believe exists today,
waiting until 2008 or 2007 to protect ourselves against it is a
little unsettling.
My question, and I will go with GAO and our Inspector
General to start us off in this--it seems to me that obviously,
if you change the design basis threat and you say that it is
two insiders instead of one, all of a sudden everything
changes. Isn't that correct? I mean, if you are protected
against one, and now you have changed it so you have two
insiders, then you have a different task? Can both of you
agree?
Mr. Aloise. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Friedman.
Mr. Friedman. Yes, I agree, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Shays. OK. Or you may decide that if you said it was
going to be 15 people, and now we think potentially 20 people
might attempt in some way to come in, that may change the
design basis threat. Is that correct?
Mr. Aloise. Yes.
Mr. Shays. A nodding of the head doesn't get recorded. Mr.
Friedman.
Mr. Friedman. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. If you believe that someone might use
aircraft in a way that we didn't anticipate, but now we say
they may use aircraft, that changes the design basis threat as
well, is that correct?
Mr. Aloise. That is correct.
Mr. Friedman. I think it does, yes.
Mr. Shays. OK, both responded in the affirmative.
Now, given whatever caused us to change it, tell me what I
need to know beyond this: you may need more people or you may
need those people trained differently; you may need some
technical capabilities that you didn't have in the past; or you
may have to do structural things just with the site.
In other words, candidly, when we were looking at Mr.
Brooks' operation and one of the sites there, we thought a lot
of old buildings, not a lot of clear sight lines. You need to
get rid of some of these buildings; there are a lot of places
to hide.
So is there anything other than structural, technical, or
people that go into responding to a design basis threat? And I
am not saying that there isn't; what other ones out there? I am
just trying to understand why it is difficult, why you have to
take 3 years. That is what I am trying to understand. So you
want to give me a----
Mr. Aloise. That about sums up a lot of what you would need
to do.
Mr. Shays. Is your mic on, sir?
Mr. Aloise. Excuse me?
Mr. Shays. Is your mic on?
Mr. Aloise. Yes. One thing would be also the consolidation
of materials in fewer places would increase security, and you
could develop your design basis threat around that as well.
Mr. Shays. And that could take time to consolidate.
Mr. Aloise. Sure. Yes.
Mr. Shays. But it is also true that in the short-run you
might over-utilize people to compensate for the fact that in
the future you can consolidate and even use less people than
you are using presently. In other words----
Mr. Aloise. You would use less people, of course, at the
places where you took the material from.
Mr. Shays. When you consolidate, that enables you to focus
your attention; collectively you are using less people. But in
the short-run, until you consolidate you may have to use more
people.
Mr. Aloise. Right.
Mr. Shays. Even more than exists right now. In other words,
you look at it and say we have this number of people and they
are trained, but the challenge is we think that we are
vulnerable with this new design basis threat. We can do it two
ways: one is we can add more people or we can take these three
sites, make them one site, or two sites and make them one, and
even use less people. But one takes longer, so you might have a
short-run solution until you get to the long-run solution.
Which gets me to this basic point: Why does it have to take 3
years to protect ourselves?
I will throw that open to anyone.
Mr. Friedman. Mr. Shays, can I? I come here as an IG, of
course, wearing several hats, but one of which is ensuring that
we spend our money prudently and in the right way. While I
agree the ideal is once you have an agreed upon, approved
design basis threat that is based on sound intelligence and all
the rest, the ideal is to have virtually an instantaneous
defense for the threat that has been postulated in the design
basis threat. That is, where we should be looking for. And I am
not sure that the time that we have currently have in mind is
an acceptable level, and I agree with your point on that.
But we want to make sure, as well, that we spend the money
wisely and get the money. We have to get the money, we have to
spend it wisely, and make sure it is spent in the right
locations and it is prioritized properly. And there are some
time constraints that are involved there.
I was going to mention the consolidation of material as
well. That is not an overnight process, and you have analyzed
that quite properly, I think.
So while I am not here defending the Department, I am here
trying to make sure, as well, that we spend the money
appropriately, we award contracts properly and do all the
things that have to be done in Government----
Mr. Shays. Mr. Friedman, let me just be very clear. As
Inspector General, I don't ever view that your job is always to
criticize the Department. Sometimes you criticize it and
sometimes you defend it. And you should never be embarrassed by
defending the Department, helping us understand.
Mr. Podonsky.
Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Shays, if I could offer an alternate
view, and it goes back to my earlier statement that Mr. Turner
responded to. If I might go there first, because of my bringing
in the legislative arm and the executive branch. I was not
criticizing either body; I was making an observation that we
are focused on a policy that is important, but I too don't have
the responsibility for programmatic implementation.
So it is easy for me to criticize, as an independent
overseer, and my criticism from my organization is the
following: It shouldn't take enormous sums of money to meet the
threat that we think we are dealing with if we start out with
changing our protective strategies, if we start applying new
technologies that are actually some off-the-shelf, if we begin
changing the way we train our elite force that we already have
in place--not our elite force, but we already have our special
operation forces that are trained to be responsive to different
events. We need to start training them differently, similar to
the way my oversight trains its composite adversary team.
The nuclear material consolidation piece is in fact
probably the more daunting challenge because of State
requirements and regulations, and where we are going to put all
the material. But I would offer to you we also, in SSA, share
the same concern about the length of time that it takes to
implement the new DBT, which is connected to budgetary cycles
because people think that they need an enormous amount of more
money.
My colleague in the Inspector General's office thinks it is
going to take an enormous amount of money; our colleague at GAO
thinks it is going to take a lot more money. And I would offer
to you that, yes, there will be more money, but not the amount
of money that everybody is talking about if we use the
resources we have at our sites today and use them in the 21st
century.
Mr. Shays. My time has run out for this line, but let me
just say the feeling that I get when I think that a design
basis threat can take 3 to 4 years to get up to, it really says
to me that it is almost the attitude that Mr. Walsh has, that,
you know, the design basis threat almost represents the extreme
and not the unlikely; and, therefore, we don't mind if it takes
3 years. That speaks volumes to me about the attitude. It is
really a statement that says that we can do that and take that
lump.
Mr. Turner. I recognize Mr. Dent from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Podonsky, my question is directed to you. GAO believes
that the ESE will not be able to field an elite force by the
October 2008 DBT implementation deadline. You disagree. Why is
that?
Mr. Podonsky. I disagree that the Department will not be
able to have the elite force requirements and policies in place
as scheduled. The elite force concept was a concept that was
born last year under previous Secretary Abraham's security
initiatives, and the concept originally started out as whether
we should Federalize the forces or have them as contract
guards.
And through an evolution of discussions with both ESE and
NNSA and field implementers, it was determined that what is
really needed at our sites is the capability to respond
differently to the different events at our sites. Specifically,
whether it be NNSA sites or ESE sites, the traditional response
by this Department has been more of a law enforcement ``respond
to the bank robbery'' response as opposed to more of a military
tactical response. We are moving toward that tactical
implementation now.
For the last year, since the anouncement of the initiative
of the elite force became a reality in terms of the initiative
taking hold, there have been multiple meetings and policy
implementation changes, and by the end of the year the part
that I own and am responsible for the Department, in terms of
issuing policy, putting out new standards, that will be done.
Now, whether or not ESE and NNSA step up to the requirement, I
can't speak for the implementers; that would be better answered
by Mr. Walsh or by Mr. Desmond from NNSA.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Podonsky.
Mr. Aloise, I have a question for you. How would you
evaluate ESE efforts to implement the DBT denial of access
security strategy, and do you think we can make the 2008
deadline for the DBT implementation?
Mr. Aloise. Not by business as usual. We are calling for a
comprehensive plan that outlines how they are going to develop
the elite force, how they are going to consolidate materials,
how and where they are going to develop and deploy
technologies. We believe that this is a big endeavor, and you
need a very smart plan to show Congress and others how you are
going to get there.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
No further questions.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. I thank the Chair. Sorry I wasn't in earlier;
there was a trade bill on the floor I was in debate on. So I
appreciate the chance to ask some questions.
I would like to begin with Mr. Podonsky. There have been
hundreds of news stories over the last year related to security
incidents at the Department of Energy facilities guarded by
Wackenhut, specifically the Nevada test site and Y-12. There
have been at least four Inspector General investigations in the
past year relating to Wackenhut's performance.
And I understand the Nevada test site security contract,
currently held by Wackenhut, is out to bid right now. I also
understand from recent news reports that the two security
contracts held by Wackenhut in Oak Ridge are to be put out to
bid together this summer.
In the face of questions over Wackenhut's performance, what
is the tolerance at DOE for a security contractor that creates
an image problem, if not a security risk?
Mr. Podonsky. I think that question would be more
appropriate for Mr. Walsh, but let me start out with giving you
the perspective from the SSA. We oversee the Department in
terms of its performance, and the performance tests that we
have run over the many years have demonstrated a mixed review
on the capabilities of the Wackenhut guard force. But when we
have done these inspections, like at Nevada test site, the
corrective actions we have seen taken by both the Federal and
the contractor, have been appropriate to resolve our concerns,
and then we go back and retest them.
Mr. Kucinich. So you are telling this subcommittee you
really don't have any concerns about Wackenhut right now?
Mr. Podonsky. We don't look at Wackenhut as a corporation
for concerns. We look at the performance at each site.
Mr. Kucinich. About their performance. Well, of course.
That is what I am talking about.
Mr. Podonsky. But as a corporation or as a contractor, that
would be better answered by Mr. Walsh.
Mr. Kucinich. OK, Mr. Walsh. Thank you, Mr. Podonsky.
Mr. Walsh.
Mr. Walsh. I am sorry, Mr. Kucinich, I wouldn't have any
information on that. We work on the ESE side, and you mentioned
the Nevada test site, which I don't really have any knowledge
of. I can only say that the few times that I have been involved
with direct oversight of Wackenhut contracts, for instance, at
headquarters, I felt that they performed in more than an
adequate way. So that would be the only information I have.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, let me ask you this, either you or Mr.
Podonsky, if you could answer this question. You had the recent
IG report on training and overtime problems at Oak Ridge.
Mr. Walsh. Right.
Mr. Kucinich. And it recommended that the managers of Oak
Ridge and Y-12 site officers, ``evaluate the impact of the
issues discussed in this report on Wackenhut's award fee.'' Can
you or Mr. Podonsky inform this subcommittee of the progress of
this recommendation since the report was issued?
Mr. Podonsky. I can tell you relative to answer your
question. Our inspection team went down to Y-12 recently, in
the last couple months, and we saw a vast improvement over the
last three inspections of the performance at Y-12. Specific to
the recommendation, I couldn't give you a current status, but I
can tell you that the performance of the protective force that
we saw at Y-12 far exceeded the last 6 years of our
inspections.
Mr. Kucinich. You say you can't give us an evaluation in
current performance?
Mr. Podonsky. No, I gave you the evaluation of the
performance of the protective force in performing their duties
through the force-on-force test that we conducted and the
training that we reviewed. But relative to award fee and any
other recommendations, I couldn't tell you where the program
office is on that.
Mr. Kucinich. Is there any way you can get that information
and get it to the committee? Is anyone here responsible for
that who could get that information to this committee?
Mr. Walsh. We can take it for the record, sir, absolutely.
Mr. Kucinich. Can you do that?
Mr. Walsh. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5259.080
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Chairman, I just want that acknowledged.
And, finally, Mr. Podonsky, many of the Department's
security upgrades could be limited by consolidating the nuclear
materials. Indeed, a few weeks ago a DOE task force proposed
just that for DOE nuclear weapons research sites, moving all
sensitive nuclear materials to a new manufacturing site. What
are your views on the report of the task force and have you
considered similar consolidation removal of Category I nuclear
materials at ESE sites?
Mr. Podonsky. Again, Mr. Kucinich, from our perspective,
from oversight, we think consolidation of nuclear materials is
a must for the Department if we are going to change our
safeguards posture and if we are going to continue to meet the
evolving and potential threat against the Department.
Mr. Kucinich. It is my understanding, though, if I may,
that according to a GAO report, neither ESE nor DOE has
developed a comprehensive or coordinated plan. Are we going to
see one forthcoming?
Mr. Podonsky. Again, I am not the program office, but I
will attempt to give you an answer from my perspective, and
that is that the Secretary of Energy, Secretary Bodman, has in
fact put together a nuclear material consolidation task group
to take a look at where the possibilities are for consolidation
across both ESE sites and NNSA sites. So I have every
expectation that, between the two Under Secretaries and the
Secretary's focus, that the Department will come up with a
plan.
Mr. Kucinich. I would like to ask the GAO, have you heard
any feedback from the Department that they are anticipating
bringing a plan to you?
Mr. Aloise. Not specifically, but we are aware of the task
force. We think the plan, again, is what is needed, because we
have looked at individual plans and, in some cases, they
conflict with each other, site-to-site.
Mr. Kucinich. OK.
Mr. Friedman, the reaction to your June 2005 report that
raised concerns about the excessive oversight of security
officers at Y-12, the Oak Ridge, TN facility, was strong. One
employee of a contractor, Wackenhut, called your inspectors a
bunch of bean counters who didn't understand security
practices. Would you care to comment on the reaction by the NRC
and Wackenhut officials to the June report? And, also, do you
believe security guards are as effective if they work more than
75 hours per week? And is hiring more guards the only solution?
Mr. Friedman. Mr. Kucinich, I knew three of my grandparents
who were immigrants and didn't have a great deal of formal
education. They all told me to be the best. Whatever I did,
they were satisfied to be the best that I could be. So if I am
a good bean counter, I accept that manifold from Wackenhut. And
I would rather not comment on it. I think our reports speak for
themselves, and I think that comment speaks for itself.
With regard to your second question as I understood it,
clearly the Department itself--and this is its criteria, not
mine--has said there are a maximum number of hours that a
protective force officer can work before they become
ineffective. They are just too tired physically. And we found,
in a disproportionate number of cases, that the guards were
working beyond the maximum threshold that the Department had
established, and the risks, I think, are fairly obvious.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, they are not obvious. What are the
risks?
Mr. Friedman. The risks are that physically and mentally
they are not capable of performing their duties.
Mr. Kucinich. And what does that mean? Please, help this
subcommittee understand what the implications are.
Mr. Friedman. Well, I think the implications are fairly
clear, and that is if the guard force, which is there to
protect the facility and protect the material, if the guards
are tired, if they are overextended, then I think there is a
potential degradation of the security of the facility and the
material.
Mr. Kucinich. So the greater the stress that is put on the
guards, the more there is a possibility of a breach of
security? Is it possible to say that?
Mr. Friedman. Well, I am not a physiologist, so I can't
speak with authority in that regard, but I think that is the
conclusion I would reach, yes.
Mr. Kucinich. OK.
I guess that is it for now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Walsh.
Mr. Walsh. Yes, sir.
Mr. Turner. In your discussion with Chairman Shays----
Mr. Walsh. Yes, sir.
Mr. Turner [continuing]. I understood your answer to be
that you have some disagreement with the current design basis
threat based upon available intelligence. And if my
understanding is incorrect, could you please tell me what a
correct understanding would be?
Mr. Walsh. What I hope to have said was that ESE programs
are committed to implementing the design basis threat as
provided to us, as it currently stands. We are committed to
moving out and doing the things necessary to make sure that we
protect against that design basis threat. I think whether or
not the----
Mr. Turner. Let me ask it again. I have to get back to this
because your answers concern me because I have a followup
question I want to ask you. What I was asking you is the design
basis threat a threat that the facilities are experiencing
today, is the threat that is out there. And you did not give a
yes or no answer, and Chairman Shays said to you, I believe,
that one reason why you could not believe that you could give a
yes or no answer is if you disagreed with the current design
basis threat, that you thought that the current design basis
threat was either insufficient or incorrect.
Mr. Walsh. Right.
Mr. Turner. And I thought I heard you say that you did have
some concerns about the current design basis threat.
Mr. Walsh. I said that I was not 100 percent certain, and I
believe that it is very important for us to make sure we get
that right, we get the DBT right, no matter what it is. But I
am not 100 percent certain at this time that the fundamental
intelligence that supports and that goes into the process of
deciding what the design basis threat is is sufficient, in my
mind, that I have seen so far. And there might be other things
out there that I haven't seen. But what I have seen, I am not
sure it supports the level that we currently have as what I
consider to be the most representative threat against DOE
facilities or nuclear facilities in general.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. Which gets me to my question.
Mr. Walsh. OK.
Mr. Turner. Do you believe that the current threat is
higher or lower than the current design basis threat?
Mr. Walsh. It is very difficult, until we do a more
complete review, including a review of all the intelligence
that is there. I would really be going out on a limb as to
whether I thought it was higher or lower. I would really like
to take part in the internal review that we are currently
conducting at the request of Deputy Secretary Sell and get that
done, and then I will come back and give you a good answer.
Mr. Turner. Fair answer.
Mr. Friedman, you referenced in your written testimony the
non-U.S. citizens that were improperly allowed access to leased
facilities at Y-12. Your testimony references it in the plural.
Could you tell us how many, if you know?
Mr. Friedman. Mr. Turner, I know the answer to the
question, and it doesn't come to me to recall. It was between
20 and 30.
Mr. Turner. Non-U.S. citizens----
Mr. Friedman. That is correct.
Mr. Turner [continuing]. That used false identification.
Mr. Friedman. That is right.
Mr. Turner. Can you say the number again?
Mr. Friedman. It was about 30.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Brede, one of the issues that has come up
in this hearing as a point to discuss is Wackenhut's foreign
ownership. Could you please go over the current foreign
ownership structure of Wackenhut and also, if you will, tell us
what businesses the parent corporation and affiliate
corporations to Wackenhut are engaged in internationally?
Dr. Brede. Yes, sir. The parent organization is currently
British owned. We formed essentially a separate government
services organization with a firewall between WSI, which is
Wackenhut Services Inc., the government arm of Wackenhut, and
the remainder of PWC, or the Wackenhut Corp. In doing so, we
went through the FOCI, or foreign owned and controlled process
implemented by the Department--not only the Department of
Energy, but the Department of Defense--to meet the specific
requirements for parent organizations like ours.
We are essentially in the security and emergency services
business. We provide firefighting and emergency medical and
security services throughout the world.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Podonsky, in the number of hearings that we
have had on these issues, of DOE security, I have always
appreciated your forthcoming positions on both concerns and
issues where you believe that DOE is performing. And in the
materials that we have concerning the GAO report there are a
number of references to surveys that have been taken of the
officers that are actually providing the security services.
I am just going to review a few of those and then I would
like your thoughts on this, because when the GAO sites the
issue of morale, and then when you look at these specific
survey statistics, they do not rate well. And I will give even
the positive ones and the negative ones.
Specifically, 102 of the 105 officers GAO interviewed say
that they believe that they understand what was expected of
them. Sixty-five of the 105 officers rated the readiness of
their site's protective forces high, while 20 officers rated
their protective forces somewhat or moderately ready to defend
the site. Only a minority of the officers, 16 of the 105, rated
the readiness of their force to defend their sites as low.
Then when you go to the other numbers, when you look at the
critique of the force-on-force analysis, 23 of 84 protective
force officers that had participated in these exercises
believed that they were realistic. While 23 said they were
somewhat realistic, in contrast, 38 officers believed they were
not realistic.
Then on the communication equipment, 66 of the 105
protective force officers reported that they did not always
have dependable radio communications, with 23 officers
identifying sporadic battery life, 29 officers reporting poor
reception at some locations on the site as the two most
important problems.
And when you go to the issue of protective force vehicles,
14 out of 30 of the protective force officers interviewed at
two sites reported patrol vehicles were old, in poor physical
condition, and not suitable for pursuit and recovery missions.
On the creation of an elite force, 74 out of 105 reported
that they are not at all confident in their current ability to
defeat the new threats contained in the design basis threat.
Could you comment on the officers' survey responses?
Mr. Podonsky. The responses from the individuals
interviewed by the GAO are often alarming to me in my role in
the Office of Oversight and Policy. First and foremost, the
elite force, we do believe that the training is important, that
we get that to those identified to play that role at their
particular sites. Our national training center in Albuquerque,
NM is setting up new curricula for that purpose so that we do
get the training out to the sites.
In terms of equipment, we have experienced ourselves,
during our inspections, that there have been equipment issues,
both in protective gear as well as radios, and we have seen
that the sites have acknowledged that and are in the process of
procuring equipment to fix those issues that were identified.
Relative to the lack of confidence that the force-on-force
exercises are realistic, having done force-on-force exercises
for my organization for 20 years, I would tell you that the
exercises that are our independent oversight runs have a
balance between safety and security. But they are as realistic
as humanly possible, considering the safety constraints. We
don't use real bullets; we use laser.
But we have employed in our organization former Navy Seal
Op 6, Delta Force, Army Rangers. We bring people in from real
world who--Mr. Shays just came back from the Middle East. We
employ people who have served time there so that we can put
into place a realistic testing of the forces.
Now, whether the sites, when they do their force-on-force
exercise, follow all that same realism, you are probably going
to get a mixed story there.
So we don't disagree with the findings or the interviews
that the GAO has. We take that on from my policy organization
and my oversight organization as the challenge to fix the
problems; get out there and find out why the implementation
isn't taking place in terms of robust force-on-force. Or, if it
is, then let us see how better we can fix it.
Further, make sure that the equipment is provided to the
security officers. Obviously, I sit in an interesting situation
because we don't implement the policy, we don't fund the
equipment; we just criticize what sometimes needs to be
criticized, very similar to the Inspector General's Office, but
from a different perspective.
But one thing I would also add, the commitment that we have
in SSA that I would like this subcommittee to know, we have put
in our budget the deployment of new technologies at four sites,
both two at NNSA and two at ESE. And the reason we have done
that, using money that the Congress has given me for technology
deployment and technology development, is to get it out there
now and to demonstrate to the program officers that it can be
done.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And, once
again, I want to thank the Chair for calling to the American
people's attention some of these very serious security issues.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Of course, we are here to talk about what the actions are
must be taken that are needed by the DOE to improve security of
weapons grade nuclear material at our Energy, Science, and
Environmental sites. And it is necessary to focus in on those
who are providing the security in order to come to some kind of
a conclusion about how secure these sites are. So in that
regard I would like to focus some questions on Dr. Brede from
Wackenhut, first of all, to kind of get an idea, for those
people who aren't as familiar with Wackenhut as certainly you
are.
What are Wackenhut's annual sales and their revenue? There
was a profit last year. Could you tell us a little bit about
the financial strength of the Wackenhut Corp.?
Dr. Brede. I cannot. I can certainly take that for the
record. Initially, in my opening statement, I indicated that I
had just come from, as the general manager of the Savannah
River site. And I can speak to those financials, but I am not
prepared, sir, to address those. However, I am willing to take
it for the record.
Mr. Kucinich. Because I think, as a matter of record, if we
have a corporation that is charged with providing security at
these sites, we certainly want to know what kind of financial
condition that corporation is in. We not only want to know
their ownership; we want to know if they are vulnerable to
takeover; we want to know if they are making a profit, if they
are experiencing a loss; we want to know what their
partnerships are. Because we are talking about security, and we
have to look at the architecture of security.
Can you tell the subcommittee, Dr. Brede, the security
guards who are the subject of some of the discussions here in
front of the committee, how much do they make an hour? What is
their hourly pay?
Dr. Brede. It varies. At the Savannah River site they earn
something like $19 an hour, with overtime differentials and
that sort of thing.
Mr. Kucinich. That is every security personnel who is
working there makes $19 an hour?
Dr. Brede. No, sir. It is based on--we have unarmed----
Mr. Kucinich. What is the lowest that a security guard
would make?
Dr. Brede. Somewhere in the range of $12 to $13 an hour.
Mr. Kucinich. Is the lowest. And do these individuals also
have full health benefits?
Dr. Brede. Yes, they do.
Mr. Kucinich. And are there any deductibles or co-pays? I
mean, is it fully paid health benefits, is that what you are
saying?
Dr. Brede. There are some minor co-pays.
Mr. Kucinich. And are these people who get paid time and a
half for overtime, double time for holidays, and things like
that?
Dr. Brede. Shift differentials, yes, sir.
Mr. Kucinich. They get that? Are these people who have
retirement benefits, do you know?
Dr. Brede. Essentially, their retirement plan at the
Savannah River site is a two-pronged plan. One is there is an
annual contribution made to a pension plan and, second, there
is a 401(k) matching plan.
One of the things that I pointed out in my opening
testimony is that as we build this elite force, one of the
things that needs to be looked at is a uniform benefit and
retirement plan across the complex, if we are going to
effectively recycle human capital through the elite force.
Mr. Kucinich. And how long have you been with Wackenhut?
Dr. Brede. I have been with Wackenhut for 12 years, sir.
Mr. Kucinich. And what about these security guards, do you
know generally how long these security guards have been with
the Wackenhut Corp.? How long the security guards who are the
subject of some of the discussions today, how long they have
been with Wackenhut?
Dr. Brede. I cannot speak to those at other sites. I can
say that those at the Savannah River site have been with us
anywhere from 21 years, as long as 21 years. More recently I
believe our last class was run less than 2 years ago.
Mr. Kucinich. Because I think it would be instructive for
the subcommittee to see what the length of service is of the
people that we are talking about so we could be able to make
some kind of a determination as to whether or not some of the
difficulties that may be experienced at some of these
facilities might happen to be with a work force that perhaps is
not as well trained.
Now, I would like to ask what is your doctorate in?
Dr. Brede. It is in criminal justice.
Mr. Kucinich. Criminal justice, OK. OK, that is important
for this next question. What about this issue of guards who are
routinely working in excess of 60 hours per week? And that is
in direct violation of DOE policy. Do you think that is
appropriate?
Dr. Brede. Actually, what the DOE manual really says is
that it imposes a limit of 60 hours, but goes on to say unless
there are alternate arrangements based on collective bargaining
agreements between management and the unions, which in the case
cited, Oak Ridge, there does happen to be an agreement between
the unions there and management.
Mr. Kucinich. So which unions are you talking about here?
Dr. Brede. The IGUA and the SFPFA, Security, Police, and
Fire Professionals of America.
Mr. Kucinich. OK. So you are saying you have an agreement
with this organization and they say 60 hours is OK. Well, as
someone who is a Ph.D. with a background in criminology, do you
think having guards working in excess of 60 hours per week is a
sound policy?
Dr. Brede. Our preference would be that they work less than
60 hours a week. However, beginning with the situation we found
ourselves in following September 11th, we actually, in some
cases, worked much more than that to meet what we perceived as
the increased threat. We are hiring additional officers at that
particular site, incidentally, to minimize the necessity for
overtime.
Mr. Kucinich. Do you think guards who are working that many
hours are as effective as guards who work, let us say, a 40
hour week? What is your experience in that as a criminologist?
Dr. Brede. Well, I think my more pertinent experience
perhaps is my military experience. Are they as effective? I
believe the answer is no. But are they sufficiently effective
to provide a defense against the threat? I believe they
certainly can be based on their training.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, this subcommittee, at least staff, has
provided information that says that these guards are working in
excess of 60 hours a week, week after week, month after month.
What can you tell this subcommittee about Wackenhut's
determination to make sure that these facilities are receiving
optimum protection from a work force that is not being ground
up?
Dr. Brede. I would submit to you, sir, that this is not
necessarily a Wackenhut issue, but, rather, a protect----
Mr. Kucinich. Well, let us talk about it in terms of
Wackenhut, though.
Dr. Brede [continuing]. A protective force issue. We are
saying we saw the same difficulty across the board at many of
our sites following September 11th. One of the problems that we
experienced, again, througout the complex, is that when an
officer goes through his or her basic training and are
employed, we must wait on security clearances.
So there is not an immediate resolution to the overtime
problem. We await security clearances and human reliability
program clearances before we can always put an officer to work.
That does operate to alleviate the problems that we are
experiencing with overtime.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, let me just say this becomes critical
to the concerns of this subcommittee about improving security
at these nuclear facilities, because if we have a work force
that is overextended, that is tired, that doesn't get relief,
is working long hours week after week, month after work, you
have a work force that is not going to be as alert.
Now, it occurs to me that, notwithstanding Wackenhut's
desire to be of service to the United States of America, that
it might be, Mr. Chairman, based on the record, that you have
an overextended work force here in a contractor who may
desperately want to be holding onto a contract, keep working
the workers, put in more hours and more hours, but not really
be able to meet the terms which we expect to protect. I mean,
either you need more people doing it or you need a whole
different arrangement that isn't reflected by what Wackenhut is
doing, with all due respect.
I have one more question before we move on, and that is for
Dr. Adler. Given the number of security problems and other
incidents that have been revealed in the last 15 months at DOE
facilities guarded by Wackenhut, do you believe that DOE could
be better served by hiring a different security contractor or
providing security through another kind of protective force or
protective force structure? Could you just give us an opinion?
Then I will yield to the chairman.
Dr. Adler. Thank you very much, Mr. Kucinich. Our comments
don't go to the security force structure per se; it goes to the
way things are organized at present. No contractor is a saint.
Everyone makes mistakes. And if they didn't make mistakes, you
wouldn't test. We test to find the mistakes and correct them.
The question that I have is what do you do when you find a
mistake. Do you admit it honestly? Do you try to discover the
roots? Do you attempt to redress the problems and resolve them
and move forward?
What we see, however, here is not just a mistake, one or
two, a snapshot, as my fellow panel member said. We see
something more like a full-length motion picture; and it is not
a comedy. What we see here are a series of problems, often on
the same themes, that are not being adequately addressed. They
are not being adequately addressed by the contractor, nor by
those directly responsible for----
Mr. Kucinich. Well, that is why we are having this hearing.
Dr. Adler. Yes. And I think the oversight that is being
provided by this hearing here is to air these problems.
Let us take, for example, the training issue. There is
nothing new in the fact that training is not realistic. The IG
made a comprehensive review of this over a year ago and
identified training cutbacks and deviations from policy at a
number of DOE facilities. We would think that would get people
alert, that the practice would be stopped and people would
conform with policy or indicate where they are not in
conformance.
Well, the IG now reports in June that, in fact, at Y-12 and
at Oak Ridge, both facilities, there are deviations from the
training. They said in excess of 40 percent of the planned
hours are not actually being used for training. Now, why is
that the case now? What we would expect is for those careful
reports to be acted on and for heads to roll, frankly. For a
regime to be set up where there is no tolerance for this sort
of behavior, and those who are responsible for it to be
appropriately punished so that it is too expensive for them to
do it.
Mr. Kucinich. I want to thank the gentleman.
I want to thank the Chair for his indulgence, and
appreciate the committee. Thank you very much.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. I understand that this hearing is not about the
question that I am going to ask, but maybe somebody can answer
it anyhow. And I apologize for my tardiness.
I understand we have 65 nuclear power plants, and I was
just told by our staff that there are 103 nuclear reactors. Can
anybody tell me what measures are being taken to protect those
facilities from either a ground attack or an air attack?
One of the reasons I ask that question is not too long ago,
well, twice in the last couple months, we have had scares here
in the Capitol, where they had to evacuate the Capitol and
other facilities around the Capitol because they thought there
might be a plane heading toward the Capitol.
And I would just like to know, with the nuclear exposure we
have at these facilities, what measures are being taken to
protect those facilities so that if a plane does try to go in
there, or they make an attack on one of these power plants,
that we don't have a nuclear disaster that spreads nuclear
material all over the place.
So anybody that can answer that for me, if you can, I would
really appreciate it.
Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Burton, I don't think any of us could
directly answer that question because the facilities you are
talking about are licensed under the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. And while we have some relationships with the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in terms of our exchange on
material control accountability, and we are looking at physical
security now, I shouldn't speak for everybody, but we could not
give you a direct answer.
Mr. Burton. Who would I address that question to? Does GAO
have any information on that? Has GAO looked into that?
Mr. Aloise. Currently, we do have some work going on now
looking at it. We have not finished our work, it is ongoing.
NRC has its own DBT, design basis threat, by which it guards
its facilities, similar to DOE's design basis threat, although
it is not exactly the same.
Mr. Burton. Maybe I could just ask the chairman, because
the chairman is up on all this.
Mr. Shays. I would say to the gentleman that what the GAO
is doing is a request of ours. Maybe others have requested it
as well. We will be having a hearing on the GAO report. We
encounter a lot of different issues when we are looking at our
nuclear electrical generations plants, whether the security
there--for instance, the very people who are defending it also
have contracts to try to infiltrate on both sides of the
equation, and that is of concern to us. We have a lot of
concerns, frankly.
Mr. Burton. Well, I would like to talk to you about that,
because that has been one of my concerns. That is one of the
reasons I came down today. Maybe we could do a hearing down the
road on that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Shays. We are almost done here.
We had a hearing one time about whether our troops were
exposed to chemical weapons, and we asked the question and DOD
said there has been no offensive use of chemicals in Iraq. This
was in the first Gulf war. We then learned and had films of how
our troops were exposed in Camassia.
And when we contacted DOD, they came back to us and said,
well, our troops hadn't been exposed to offensive use, they
were exposed to defensive use. And it made me realize sometimes
how you almost get in a word game. I mean, they knew the intent
of the subcommittee. And that is why we tend to focus a little
bit on how you are answering these questions to understand
really what are you saying.
Dr. Brede, when you said that your company is currently
owned, you weren't trying to imply that it won't be currently
owned in the future? It is in fact owned by----
Dr. Brede. Absolutely.
Mr. Shays. And it just raises the question your people are
aware--let me ask you this. Do some of your folks have security
clearances or do all of them have security clearances?
Dr. Brede. The majority of our people do have security
clearances.
Mr. Shays. And that is because they are in a facility
where, if they were on the wrong side of the equation, could do
tremendous harm, correct?
Dr. Brede. Yes.
Mr. Shays. So we care greatly about their capabilities. We
care about how much they are paid, because we want to make sure
you are able to attract good people; people that might want to
go somewhere else, but they are paid so well they stay there.
Do you have a significant turnover rate?
Dr. Brede. No. In fact, we do not. At the Savannah River
site, for example, the turnover rate there is somewhere in the
neighborhood of 2 percent. At the Oak Ridge site, if I may----
Mr. Shays. Two percent over what period of time?
Dr. Brede. Sorry?
Mr. Shays. Over what period of time? Is there a time
relating to the 2 percent? Two percent means what?
Dr. Brede. Two percent means we average about 2 percent
turnover per year.
Mr. Shays. Per year. OK.
Dr. Brede. And if I recall correctly, at the Oak Ridge
site, it is in the neighborhood of 3 to 5 percent. There was an
up-tick back in 2001, 2002, where the air marshals were hiring,
and some of our officers left to go there. But that has since
dissipated and the numbers are much lower now.
Mr. Shays. And there is obviously logic to wanting people
to have expertise. I mean, if we are training them, to have
them leave after they have been trained is not a great use of
our resources, or yours.
Dr. Brede. No, it is not.
Mr. Shays. Dr. Adler, your employees work both as
government employees and for private contractors, both?
Dr. Adler. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Shays. Do any of them work for Dr. Brede's company?
Dr. Adler. A small number.
Mr. Shays. Is there anything, before this hearing ends,
that you would like to add about the employees you represent
and the concerns they have?
Dr. Adler. I think the key point would be that our union
has been seeking partnerships with employers, with mayors,
Governors, and their clients on consistent ways to raise
standards in the security industry, and we have been doing it
for a long time. And we do this with the biggest security
companies in the country.
The kinds of problems we are talking here today, some of
them are large-scale, but the lion's share of them,
particularly, I think, around an elite training force, are
problems that can come right through consultation with the
people involved, if there is a willingness to admit the
difficulties and work hard to overcome them.
What I have heard today--and I should say I have heard it
from both sides, from the contractors and those responsible--
is, to some extent, denial; to another extent I think it is not
wishing the problem away, but pretending that the problems have
solved themselves. What we have been presented by the GAO and
the IG are serious problems. We have encountered these in the
private sector, and they are surmountable problems. But it is
not a resource problem; the officers aren't poorly paid, and
Mr. Podonsky has seconded this. The problem is a matter of
will.
Mr. Shays. Is what?
Dr. Adler. The problem is a matter of will, of a
willingness to confront these problems and overcome them in
consultation with those most directly involved, and in this
case I mean the guards. I don't see that emerging from this
discussion or from the practices of the Department over the
last number of years.
Mr. Shays. Is there a difference of approach when the
government hires the employees and when the contractor, or is
it pretty much similar?
Dr. Adler. Well, I think the pressure on the private
contractor to cut costs is greater than it is in government,
particularly if they have to report to a foreign owner who is
publicly traded. I think that pressure is there anyway, but I
think it is very sharp in the private world. We encounter it
all the time in the commercial office world. And those
pressures can only be lifted, I think, in an effective regime
of oversight that punishes those kinds of cost cuttings.
Mr. Shays. GAO has said in their statement, ``However, DOE
neither sets standards for individual protective force officers
participation in these exercises, nor requires sites to track
individual participation.'' This is under the heading
``Performance Testing and Training.'' In your statement it is
not that much different, you said ``Most officers we spoke with
were concerned about their quality and realism of their
training,'' which gets me to your point. ``Further, because DOE
neither sets standards for nor tracks individual participation
for its exercises, it was difficult to determine how many
officers had this important training.''
I am asking the question why not, and I think it goes to
you, Mr. Podonsky, and it goes to you, Mr. Walsh. Why does DOE
neither set standards for, nor track individual participation
for its exercises? So I will start with Mr. Walsh first.
Mr. Walsh. Mr. Shays, we do need to track that, and we
agree 100 percent with those recommendations. We are going to
work with Mr. Podonsky's office. We have already been in
contact with each other to commit to develop policy
requirements to do that by the end of this year on both of
those cases.
Mr. Shays. Good. Thank you.
Mr. Podonsky.
Mr. Podonsky. Mr. Shays, I would tell you candidly I am
embarrassed that 17 months ago I took over the policy group and
I did not know until the GAO report that the individual
tracking of participants in DOE was not taking place. I will
tell you that I was under the wrong assumption for 20 years,
when my oversight was conducting these tests, that all the
sites were tracking and following the performance of each
individual. We are changing that.
Mr. Shays. That is one reason we have the GAO and an
Inspector General, and my attitude is if they point out things
that need correction and there is a willingness to jump right
in and deal with it, that is when I think the system works the
best. We never can make an assumption that they are not going
to find things that need work.
So I am happy to end on that note as far as my questions.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. First of all, I don't want to belabor this
point and discuss something that is not on the agenda today,
but about 2\1/2\ years ago, I think, according to the staff,
you had a hearing on one of the nuclear plants and how they
protect them. And according to what your staff expert said was
that nuclear plant could withstand an air attack of some
magnitude without disbursing a lot of nuclear material into the
atmosphere.
I have a television show I do about every couple months,
and I had Curt Weldon on, Congressman Weldon, who is an expert
in a lot of areas on the National Security Committee. And he
brought on a briefcase that the Soviet Union--it was a replica
of a briefcase the Soviet Union had made. There were 65 or 70
of them manufactured, and there were nuclear weapons in a
briefcase; they weighed about 50 pounds. And I was told by him
and other experts that would destroy an area of about five city
blocks if it was ever detonated.
Now, several of those briefcase nuclear devices have never
been accounted for by the Russians, and there may be others
that have been manufactured. So what I would like for GAO to
find out is--and I understand from staff that the FAA has some
real problems with creating areas around these nuclear power
plants where planes can't fly, I guess because of the air lanes
that we have.
But it seems to me if a nuclear device can be put in a
briefcase, it can certainly be put on a small plane. And if it
would destroy five square blocks, it certainly could penetrate
and do a lot of damage to a nuclear power plant.
I would like to find out if there is anything we could do
to protect those nuclear power plants from that kind of air
attack. Because if there is an air attack and you do have
something like Chernobyl take place because of that air attack,
you are going to have tens of thousands of people dying of
radiation poisoning or ancillary diseases, cancer or whatever
it happens to be. So I don't know if you guys have ever looked
at that at GAO, but I would like--I understand you are doing a
research project right now.
Could you include that in your research project? Also, I
would like to, in that research project, if you could, there
may be some air restrictions by FAA that we could live with,
but when you are talking about low-flying aircraft that gets
down below, say, 1,000 or 2,000 feet, there might be some way
to protect that nuclear facility against that, if it gets
within a certain radius that might endanger that area.
There is no question in my mind that small nuclear devices
could be produced and put on a small aircraft that could
penetrate those, no matter how strong they are, if what I have
been told in the past is accurate. And I would just like to
find out if there is any way to protect those 60-some nuclear
power plants and those 100-some reactors we have from that kind
of an attack.
So, Mr. Chairman, I would really like to look into that.
And if we could have that study expanded to include that, I
would really appreciate it.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman. If the gentleman would
yield.
Mr. Burton. I will yield to my colleague.
Mr. Shays. My understanding is the NRC is looking at flight
zones right now and are looking at the vulnerability. But maybe
you could be responsive to the issue, without delving into too
much, to say whether, in this mix of looking at the postulated
threat and the design basis threat, whether we obviously take a
look at aircraft and the possibility of their being able to do
damage. Maybe you could respond, someone, to that question.
Mr. Podonsky. At 1:45 today we are meeting with Deputy
Secretary Sell to have the detailed discussion on the latest
review of the design basis threat, and part of that is looking
at not only the numbers that we have talked about, around, but
also in looking at all that encompasses and what kind of
threats are realistic today that we really need to protect
against.
Mr. Shays. Including----
Mr. Podonsky. Including aircraft and what can we do.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Friedman, you indicated you wanted to
respond?
Mr. Friedman. I appreciate the courtesy, Mr. Chairman. You
asked an important question before about the number of illegal
aliens and regarding Y-12, and I misspoke. I wasn't sure that I
recalled the answer, and I recalled it incorrectly. The correct
answer is 16, and I would like to correct that for the record,
if you don't mind. And I thank you and I apologize.
Mr. Turner. I thank you for that number, and I appreciate
your trying to accommodate us with an estimate. So thank you
for the correction.
Dr. Brede, Dr. Adler was raising the issue, when we have
security that is being provided by a private company, that,
unlike in the operations of government-provided security, you
have the issue of the bottom line that is more prevalent and,
therefore, pressures to cut costs. My thought is that you also
have the pressure to increase revenue.
And with the series of questions and concerns that have
been raised about the extensive time that some security
personnel are working it made me wonder about the current
construct of your contract. The contract under which you are
paid for the services, is it a cost-plus contract?
Dr. Brede. It varies with each site. At Oak Ridge I believe
it is a fixed price contract; at the Savannah River site it is
a cost plus award fee contract.
Mr. Turner. And the award fee, is that a percentage of your
expenses? Obviously, if you are encouraged to----
Dr. Brede. It is not a percentage, sir, it is an agreed-
upon figure agreed upon at the initiation of the contract, and
adjusted based on as missions are added or, in some cases, go
away.
Mr. Turner. OK. Well, for the record, if any of you, Mr.
Walsh, Mr. Podonsky, or Dr. Brede, want to supplement the
answer, what I am looking for is any financial incentive that
you might have as a private contractor to encourage overtime
such that the government's expenses go up and therefore your
profit goes up, I would be interested in knowing, because it
doesn't seem to me, in reading this information about the work
week of these security officers, that it makes a whole lot of
sense that, certainly, security is not served by officers
working in excessive hours.
So I would like to know what else might be at play here.
And if there is any increase in revenue to your company as a
result of excessive hours of security guards, I would like to
know it.
Dr. Brede. There is not in the two contracts with which I
am familiar.
Mr. Turner. In that, we are going to close, and I will just
give everyone an opportunity if there is anything that you want
to add to the record before we close.
Mr. Podonsky. I would, Mr. Chairman. We have talked about
the DBT extensively, and I just want to make it clear for the
record, from the SSA perspective, that the DBT is in fact the
current threat, and it should be met as soon as possible
utilizing all the areas that I have talked about previously, to
include elite force, training, technology application, nuclear
material consolidation, as well as strategies.
And we believe that while we need to meet that as soon as
possible, we also recognize hiring new guards, you have to hire
cleared guards, and cleared guards take some time. Putting in
technology costs some money. But there is no reason in the
world that we shouldn't be further along than we are right now.
Dr. Brede. Yes, I would also offer a statement in closing.
Throughout this hearing we have heard allegations of poor
performance, of cheating and so on by protective force
contractors. I would point out that these have been
investigated by the DOE, and refuted in writing and, indeed, in
previous testimony by both DOE and contractors. I would submit
to you our forces are not perfect. They do make mistakes. But
our training is designed so that these human errors are the
exception rather than the rule. And I believe their
demonstrated performance in competitions, in reviews by Mr.
Podonsky's organization prove that out.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Turner. I would just like to note, Dr. Brede, I don't
think that anyone questioned the individual security officers.
I think they questioned the management and the effective
management and the effective providing of resources, which
would be your company, and not the individuals who are
providing the services. I think the GAO report speaks for
itself as to the areas of criticism that it identifies.
Thank you. With that, we will be adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]