[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DETECTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AND RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS:
HOW EFFECTIVE IS AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY?
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
with the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, AND SCIENCE,
AND TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 21, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-23
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
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__________
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Peter T. King, New York Jane Harman, California
John Linder, Georgia Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Nita M. Lowey, New York
Tom Davis, Virginia Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Daniel E. Lungren, California Columbia
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Zoe Lofgren, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Katherine Harris, Florida Islands
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Dave G. Reichert, Washington James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Michael McCaul, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania
______
SUBCOMMITTEE ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACK
John Linder, Georgia, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska James R. Langevin, Rhode Island,
Christopher Shays, Connecticut EdwarD J. Markey, Massachusetts
Daniel E. Lungren, California Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Jane Harman, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Columbia
Michael McCaul, Texas Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Christopher Cox, California (Ex Islands
Officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(Ex Officio)
______
SUBCOMMITTE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY
Peter T. King, New York Chairman
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Mike Rogers, Alabama Jane Harman, California
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Nita M. Lowey, New York
Katherine Harris, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Columbia
Michael McCaul, Texas Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Islands
Christopher Cox, California (Ex Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(Ex Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Georgia, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Prevention of
Nuclear and Biological Attack:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack.... 6
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Science, and Technology.......................... 5
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology.............. 3
The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Prepared Opening Statement..................................... 7
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 65
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina.................................... 68
The Honorable Jim Gibbons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Nevada................................................ 70
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California................................... 73
The Honorable Edward J. Markey, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Massachusetts..................................... 71
The Honorable Michael McCaul, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 76
The Honorable Stevan Pearce, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New Mexico........................................ 67
The Honorable Dave G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 74
The Honorable Rob Simmons, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Connecticut........................................... 64
WITNESSES
PANEL I
Mr. Gene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment,
Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Sttement.............................................. 11
Ms. Bethann Rooney, Manager, Port Security, Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey:
Oral Statement................................................. 33
Prepared Sttement.............................................. 35
Dr. Benn Tannenbaum, American Association for the Advancement of
Science:
Oral Statement................................................. 40
Prepared Sttement.............................................. 42
Dr. Richard L. Wagner, Jr., Chair, Defense Science Board Task
Force on Prevention of,and Defense Against, Clandestine Nuclear
Attack and Senior Staff Member, Los Alamos National Laboratory:
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Prepared Sttement.............................................. 28
PANEL II
Mr. Michael K. Evenson, Acting Director, Combat Support
Directorate, DTRA, Department of Defense:
Oral Statement................................................. 89
Prepared Sttement.............................................. 90
Mr. David Huizenga, Assistant Deputy Administrator, International
Materials Protection and Cooperation, National Nuclear Security
Administration, Department of Energy:
Oral Statement................................................. 83
Prepared Sttement.............................................. 85
Mr. Vayl Oxford, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 78
Prepared Sttement.............................................. 80
FOR THE RECORD
Questions Submitted from the Honorable Norm Dicks, for Mr. Vayl
Oxford Responses............................................... 102
DETECTING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AND RADIOLOGICAL MATERIALS:
HOW EFFECTIVE IS AVAILABLE
TECHNOLOGY?
----------
Tuesday, June 21, 2005
House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack
with the
Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Science, and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:25 p.m., in
Room 210, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. John Linder
[chairman of the Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and
Biological Attacks] presiding.
Present: Representatives Linder, King, Lungren, Gibbons,
Simmons, Pearce, Jindal, Reichert, McCaul, Dent, Langevin,
Pascrell, Markey, Christensen, Etheridge, and Thompson.
Mr. Linder. The joint hearing of the Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological
Attack and the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science,
and Technology will please come to order. I see we do not have
enough seats for all of our guests, but those who can find a
seat, please do.
I would like to thank our witnesses today and thank the
distinguished gentleman from New York, Mr. King, who chairs the
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and
Technology, for jointly holding this hearing. I look forward to
your expert testimony regarding our efforts to deploy and
develop technology to detect attempts by terrorists to smuggle
a nuclear weapon or fissile material into the United States.
I am a strong believer in the power of technology, because
it will be an important key to success in the war against
terrorism. However, there is a dark side to the astounding
progress of S&T. The rapid pace of technological development is
the greatest single reason that terrorists must be taken more
seriously than ever before, because terrorists will eventually
have access to that technology. From the past seven hearings
and classified briefings that my subcommittee has held on
nuclear terrorism, it has been made obvious that terrorists
have access to science, technology and to scientists.
Let me begin with a few facts about our borders. The U.S.
shares a 2,000-mile border with Mexico and with Canada, 5,000
miles. We have 157 designated legal points of entry; 361
seaports, including 77 container seaports. We let 440 million
visitors arrive by land, sea and air each year; 118 million
vehicles, 11 million trucks, 2.5 million rail cars, 7 million
cargo containers enter our ports annually. The length of the
U.S. border, including coasts and lakes, is about 20,000 miles.
My greatest concern is that we are moving forward with
deploying technology that may catch the inept terrorists that
attempt to smuggle a nuclear device or fissile material through
our legal points of entry and miss the smart one that will slip
in illegally with a pickup truck or a small boat to then
construct and detonate a bomb in the United States.
However, I firmly believe that we must invest in technology
that would drastically limit avenues for smuggling a nuclear
device into this country. I do not hold the notion that a
terrorist that has gone to great lengths to acquire a nuclear
device or fissile material is going to simply pack it in a
random bale of marijuana and try to slip it into the country.
Terrorists attempting to smuggle a nuclear weapon into the
United States most likely only have one or a few weapons and
will go to great lengths to limit the risk of being discovered.
We must intelligently invest in detection technology and
its deployment. I hope that we will discuss here today what
kinds of detection technology we should invest in and how to
leverage our technology options to create an architecture that
maximizes the probability that we will deter smuggling and
intercept a nuclear device.
Our challenges are many. However, our investments in our
national and academic labs, our strong partnerships with the
private sector can and have provided us technological
solutions. We must take this opportunity to invest wisely and
not squander our scarce resources.
I look forward to the discussion with our experts and
government witnesses to help this committee understand the many
questions it has. Do we deploy plastics or the more expensive
sodium iodide gamma ray detectors? Should we use active or
passive interrogation? Should we invest in detectors for non-
nuclear physical attributes? How can we use an array of these
options to maximize detection?
It is not necessary to the terrorists' chance of success
that they be on the cutting edge of technology. They will not
need to have the world's most sophisticated technology in the
year it comes out. They just need to know enough and have the
sophistication to succeed in eluding us just once. However, to
win the war on terrorism, we must constantly exploit our
technological lead.
Prepared Opening Statement of the Honorable John Linder
I would like to thank our witnesses today and recognize the
distinguished Gentleman from New York, Mr. King, who chairs the
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology for
jointly holding this hearing.
I look forward to your expert testimony regarding our efforts to
deploy and develop technology to detect attempts by terrorist to
smuggle a nuclear weapon or fissile material into the United States.
I'm a strong believer in the power of technology, because it will
be an important key to success in the war against terrorism. However,
there is a dark side to the astounding progress of S&T. The rapid pace
of technological development is the greatest single reason that
terrorists must be taken more seriously than ever before. Because
terrorists will eventually have access to technology that is being
developed today.
From the past seven hearings and classified briefings that my
subcommittee has held on nuclear terrorism it has been made obvious
that terrorist have access to science, technology and scientists.
Let me begin with a few facts about our borders:
The U.S. shares a 2,000 mile border with Mexico and
the northern border with Canada stretches 5,000 miles.
We have 157 designated legal ports of entry.
361 seaports, including 77 container seaports.
About 440 million visitors arrive by land, sea, and
air each year--118 million vehicles, 11 million trucks, 2.5
million railcars, and 7 million cargo containers cross through
our ports annually.
Length of the U.S. border including coasts and Lakes--
about 20,000 miles
My greatest concerns is that we are moving forward with deploying
technology that may intercept an inept terrorist that attempts to
smuggle a nuclear device or fissile material through our legal ports of
entry and miss the smart one that will slip illegally with a pick up
truck or a small boat--to then construct and detonate a bomb within the
United States.
However, I firmly believe that we must invest in technology that
would drastically limit the avenues for smuggling a nuclear device into
this country. I do not cater to the notion that a terrorist that has
gone to great lengths to acquire a nuclear device or fissile material
is going to simply pack it in a random bale of marijuana and try to
slip it into the country. Terrorists attempting to smuggle a nuclear
weapon into the United States, most likely only have one or a few
weapons and would go to great lengths to limit the risk of being
discovered.
The value of a nuclear weapon to the terrorist provides us an
opportunity which can be exploited. This means we must intelligently
invest in detection technology and its deployment. I hope that we will
discuss here today what types of detection technology we should invest
in and how to leverage our technology options to create an architecture
that maximizes the probability that we will deter smuggling and
intercept a nuclear device.
Our challenges are many, however, our investments in our National
and Academic labs and our strong partnerships with the private sector
can and has provided us technology solutions. We must take this
opportunity to invest wisely and not squander our scarce resources.
I look forward to the discussion with our experts and government
witnesses to help this committee answer the many questions it has: Do
we deploy plastics or the more expensive sodium iodide gamma-ray
detectors? Should we use active or passive interrogation? Should we
invest in detectors for non-nuclear physical attributes? How can we use
an array of these options to maximize detection?
It is not necessary to the terrorist's chances of success that they
be on the cutting edge of technology. They will not need to have the
world's most sophisticated technology in the year it comes out. They
just need enough sophistication to succeed to elude us once. However,
we can win the war on terrorism if we constantly exploit our
technological lead.
The Chair now recognizes the ranking member of the S&T
subcommittee, Mr. Pascrell, for any comments he chooses to
make.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Chairman
King. On behalf of the minority, thank you for holding this
hearing today on this very important subject of technology and
equipment to monitor radiation at our Nation's ports.
Since 9/11, we have spent literally hundreds of millions of
dollars on radiation portal monitors, and this fact alone
demands rigorous oversight on the part of the Congress. I
applaud both subcommittees for taking action.
While DHS should be commended for confronting the
challenges of our changed world and taking immediate action to
get this technology to our Nation's ports, an abundance of
recent evidence suggests that the technology used may not
actually meet the needs at hand. It is the responsibility of
the Congress to ensure that we are getting our money's worth.
In fiscal year 2006, the administration requested $125
million to purchase an additional 279 radiation portal
monitors, which the House agreed to do within its Homeland
Security appropriations bill. DHS began deploying these
monitors in 2002 to mail facilities on the northern border. But
from the beginning, this equipment has been plagued by
problems, problems that are so severe that the government is
now testing technologies to upgrade or replace the equipment
recently installed.
For example, the equipment that is currently in place
cannot distinguish between a nuclear bomb and radiation that
occurs naturally in items such as ceramic tile and cat litter.
These nuisance alarms have caused some Border Patrol officials
to adjust the sensitivity of the monitors downward, thus
limiting their effectiveness.
In February of 2004, the Department of Homeland Security
adopted standards for radiological and nuclear detectors. At
the same time, Under Secretary for Customs and Border
Protection Asa Hutchinson said that ``These standards will
facilitate our ability to ensure that equipment meets rigorous
standards and supports the quick deployment of the best
equipment available.''
I always applaud the development of robust standards, but
should these standards not have been developed before the
equipment was deployed?
The committee will hear from representatives from three
different Federal agencies. I am very interested in hearing
from these witnesses about their roles and to what degree they
can coordinate their efforts.
One of these agencies is the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office. The mission of this office is to address many
radiological and nuclear protective measures, but it is
predominantly focused on nuclear detection. This includes
establishing strong relationships across multiple departments
and levels of government. I hope that this office, this
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, will ensure that conflicts
are minimized among the agencies involved in this issue.
I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses,
especially from Bethann Rooney from the New York-New Jersey
Port Authority.
While we consider the deployment of radiation detection
technology, it is imperative that we hear from the
practitioners who are actually using the equipment. I am very
interested in learning about the training that CBP inspectors
or Port Authority police receive on this equipment as well. I
am very interested in learning and hearing the Port Authority's
experiences with the equipment.
It is my understanding that seaports have been the most
difficult environment to deploy this equipment. How well did
DHS work with the Port Authority? Are they experiencing the
same problems of false, nuisance alarms? Do they have any
suggestions on how the deployment process could improve?
Again, thank you, Chairman King and Chairman Linder.
We have been joined by Ranking Member Jim Langevin.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Pascrell.
The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and Technology, the
gentleman from New York, Mr. King, for any comments he might
wish to make.
Mr. King. Thank you, Chairman Linder. Let me commend you
for your leadership on prevention issues, and Ranking Member
Langevin and the ranking member of my subcommittee, Bill
Pascrell, for their willingness to hold this joint hearing to
examine the Federal Government's efforts to protect us from
nuclear or radiological attacks.
I also want to welcome and thank our distinguished
witnesses for appearing here today to discuss this issue which
is of such vital importance to all of us.
Like Bill Pascrell, I want to acknowledge Bethann Rooney,
the Manager of Security for the Port Authority. As a New York
resident, I want to thank her for keeping us safe. I know that
Bill, who is from New Jersey, both of us have a particular
vested interest in you doing your job, and I want to thank you
for the job that you have done.
In the interest of time, I am going to keep my remarks
brief. But it goes without saying that the risk of a terrorist
acquiring and detonating a nuclear or radiological device is
one of the gravest threats to our Nation.
To prevent a catastrophic nuclear or radiological attack,
the U.S. has begun implementing a three-tiered strategy focused
on securing nuclear weapons and radiological materials at their
source, detecting the illicit movement of nuclear or
radiological materials overseas, and enhancing our domestic
detection and interdiction efforts. The installation and use of
radiation portal monitors, RPMs, and other radiation detection
technologies is a key component of each tier of the strategy,
and this fact is at the very heart of this afternoon's hearing.
Our Nation's reliance on RPMs and other detection devices,
though, raises numerous questions, one, how effective is
currently deployed technology at detecting certain radiological
materials? What is the time frame for developing technologies
that can detect illicitly trafficked nuclear material shielded
by lead and other metals? How are the Federal agencies
coordinating their RPM programs?
I am especially curious as to why the Departments of
Homeland Security, Energy and Defense each need multiple
separate test beds. Isn't such a duplication a waste of
precious resources? Will the Department of Homeland Security's
new Office of Domestic Nuclear Detention, DNDO, enhance
coordination among Federal agencies or just add one more layer
of bureaucracy?
Also--Congressman Pascrell commented on this--what kind of
training does the Federal Government provide to port employees,
border security personnel, first responders and others to
operate radiation detection equipment? It is a truism that
technology is only as effective as the people operating it.
Even if radiation detection technology could be 100 percent
effective, can RPMs guarantee our safety? Even with a domestic
system in place, terrorists could detonate a nuclear device in
a port before the cargo could be inspected. Wouldn't it be more
sensible to check for radiation when the cargo ships are still
out at sea?
Regardless of the technology's effectiveness, should the
Federal Government be spending up to $1 billion to deploy such
technology at every point of entry into the United States? Even
with the most robust system, couldn't a terrorist simply just
carry materials across an unprotected part of our land border
with Canada or Mexico?
These are the various questions out there. No one suggests
the answers are easy, but it is hearings such as this that get
to the root of the problems which do affect our Nation.
So I am eager to hear your answers to these and other
questions. I look forward to working with all of you on these
important issues.
Mr. Linder. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes my partner on this committee, the
ranking member, Mr. Langevin from Rhode Island.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Chairman Linder. Let me just thank
all of our witnesses for appearing today. I certainly look
forward to hearing your testimony.
I continue to believe that the threat of nuclear terrorism
is very real and that our government must move aggressively if
we are going to prevent a nuclear or radiological attack on our
shores.
This will be the subcommittee's fourth hearing on the
nuclear threat. After listening to many experts in both open
and closed sessions, who have testified before us, I believe
that the administration is not doing enough in terms of moving
with the sense of urgency required to stay ahead of the
terrorists. Not only is the administration not moving fast
enough, but in some ways it appears it is operating in a
vacuum.
Today's hearing will focus on the effectiveness of the
radiation equipment deployed at our ports of entry. I know a
great deal of attention will focus on the technical limitations
of the equipment, such as radiation portal monitors. I think in
fairness, though, we should state that these machines can
detect the materials used in a dirty bomb, including plutonium.
But what is more alarming to me than the device's
limitations is the speed at which they are deployed. Also the
lack of detection strategy and the lack of resources needed to
ensure that the best technology is being used in the field.
Just 3 weeks ago, Secretary Chertoff was at the Port of Los
Angeles-Long Beach, and he stated the port will have a full
complement of radiation portal monitors by December 2005. That
means that it would have taken the administration more than 4
years after 9/11 to ensure that two of the largest seaports in
the country have the ability to screen containers for nuclear
or radiological material. I also understand that the Port of
New York-New Jersey still does not have full coverage, and this
is simply unacceptable.
In addition, there is no overarching nuclear detection or
interdiction strategy that drives the deployment or detection
of equipment. Currently you have many government agencies
involved in nuclear detection without a framework that ensures
that all agencies are operating in an integrated fashion. We
need a big-picture strategy to ensure that each layer in our
defense is adequately covered.
The administration has created a Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, or DNDO, but it doesn't appear that this office is
responsible for developing and executing a national strategy.
Finally, our detection capability will only be as good as
the resources that are dedicated to it. Much more must be done
from an R&D standpoint.
The administration's request for the new DNDO is $227
million. That is $273 million less than what is spent in Iraq
in one day. If we are going to adequately deal with this
threat, we have to ensure that our government is investing in
the research required to develop and deploy the best technology
available to our borders and our ports. This cannot be a case
where our technology goes to the lowest bidder. The threat is
too serious, and we all know that the terrorists are not going
to wait for us to act. We must move with a sense of heightened
urgency to deal with this threat now.
I think today's hearing is a good start, and I look forward
to hearing from our witnesses.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Linder. I thank the gentleman. Did the gentleman from
Mississippi wish to make a statement?
Mr. Thompson. No, Mr. Chairman. I have a statement for the
record.
Mr. Linder. Okay. I would like to remind the rest of the
members, statements for the record on your behalf are welcome.
[The information follows:]
Prepared Opening Statement of the Honorable Christopher Cox, a
Representative in Congress From the State of California, and Chairman,
Committee on Homeland Security
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would also like to welcome and thank
our witnesses for appearing today before this joint Subcommittee
hearing to discuss this important issue and answer our questions.
The risk of a terrorist acquiring and using a nuclear or
radiological device is one of the greatest threats to our Nation. To
prevent such an attack, we have sought to develop a robust layered
defense--recognizing that there is no single, 100 percent solution.
Under President Bush's leadership, our Nation's efforts to date include
eliminating excess stocks of nuclear materials and weapons, protecting
existing stocks from theft or diversion, detecting the illicit movement
of nuclear or radiological materials overseas through both active and
passive efforts, enhancing our detection and interdiction efforts here
at home, and improving the security of our borders, ports, and cargo
transportation systems.
Today, we will focus on one part of this multi-pronged strategy--
the deployment of radiation and nuclear detection technologies at key
transit points at home and abroad. For the first time, representatives
from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of
Energy (DOE), and the Department of Defense will be at the same witness
table to talk about the various efforts the Federal government has
underway to detect nuclear or radiological materials and prevent them
from entering the United States. Each Department has its own program
and area of responsibility, but today we will explore the level of
coordination and harmonization among these programs.
In particular, each of the Departments represented here today has
its own initiative to install or deploy, whether at home or abroad,
Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) and other radiation detection
equipment at seaports, land border ports of entry and crossings,
international airports, international mail facilities, and other
critical facilities in an effort to detect smuggled nuclear or
radiological materials.
DHS, alone, plans to deploy a domestic, nationwide system of RPMs
in an attempt to screen 100 percent of all incoming goods and cargo for
such materials. While its initial plan called for a total cost of under
$500 million and had a 2005 completion date, the latest revisions
suggest a much costlier and lengthy project execution plan, with many
unanswered technology questions. We need to fully understand this
strategy and plan, and how it relates to DOE's efforts overseas, before
proceeding further.
Each of the Departments represented here today also has a slightly
different idea about which RPM technology is best and how it should be
deployed. We need to know why. Does this make sense? Are our various
Federal efforts sufficiently coordinated?
Currently, we have numerous National laboratories and research
facilities working on similar nuclear detection technology issues,
under the direction of several different Federal agencies. While
competition is useful to a point, we also need to ensure that we are
leveraging these R&D investments most effectively.
Similarly, there are questions regarding the efficacy of current
and next-generation RPMs, as well as other radiation detection
technologies such as Personal Radiation Dectectors (PRDs), and handheld
isotope identifiers. Various elements of DHS are deploying these
devices at significant cost, but are these investments worth it, and do
the CBP and Coast Guard officers using these devices fully understand
their limits?
Mr. Chairman, let me close by emphasizing that we must never forget
that the common denominator in all terrorist acts, of whatever kind or
consequence, are the terrorists. Since there is no technology plan or
strategy that will provide 100% protection against nuclear smuggling,
these passive detection efforts--while important--must continue to be
part of an integrated strategy that puts appropriate emphasis on
offensive and active tracking, detection, and interdiction of the
terrorists themselves. And it is within this broader context that
radiation detection technology deployment must be considered.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses and examining these important issues today, and as we
continue to explore them in the future.
Mr. Linder. We will now turn to our panel of expert
witnesses. Mr. Gene Aloise is the Director of Natural Resources
and Environment at the GAO. He is the GAO's recognized expert
on international nuclear nonproliferation and safety issues.
Dr. Richard Wagner is a Senior Staff Member with the Los
Alamos National Laboratory, based in D.C. He was a founding
member of the Threat Reduction Advisory Committee of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and Chair of the Defense Science
Board Task Force on the Prevention of, and Defense Against,
Clandestine Nuclear Attack.
Ms. Bethann Rooney is the Manager of Port Security for the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. She is responsible
for implementing and managing a comprehensive port security
program and setting the strategy for the future of port
security.
Dr. Ben Tannenbaum is a Senior Program Associate with the
Center For Science, Technology and Security at the American
Association for the Advancement of Science. He received his
Ph.D. in particle physics from the University of New Mexico.
We welcome you all. Thank you for being here. We are happy
to have you.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Aloise, if you would like to begin. We
would like to try and have you keep within the 5-minute rule.
We have your written statement for the record. You can start
out how you choose.
STATEMENT OF GENE ALOISE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Aloise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased
to be here today to discuss our work assessing U.S. efforts to
combat nuclear smuggling at home and in other countries through
the deployment of radiation detection equipment at border
crossings and other ports of entry.
The threat that nuclear or radiological material can be
smuggled across our borders is a real one and could happen in
several ways. Nuclear material could be hidden in a car, truck,
train or ship, carried in personal luggage through an airport,
or walked across an unprotected border.
My remarks today, which are based on our previous work in
this area, will focus on the activities of U.S. Federal
agencies deploying radiation detection equipment at home and in
other countries, problems with coordination and planning among
these agencies, and the effectiveness of radiation detection
equipment deployed in the United States and other countries.
Four U.S. agencies--DOE, DOD, State and DHS--are deploying
radiation equipment and training border security personnel.
Over the past 10 years, the Congress has appropriated about
$500 million for international efforts and about $300 million
for domestic efforts.
Initial concerns about the threat posed by nuclear
smuggling were focused on the former Soviet Union and Central
and Eastern Europe. As a result, in 1998, DOE created the
Second Line of Defense program which, through the end of 2004,
had installed equipment at 66 sites, mostly in Russia. In 2003,
DOE implemented its Megaports Initiative, which focuses on
major foreign seaports and, to date, has completed work at two
ports and is equipping five others.
Regarding the installation of this equipment at U.S. ports
of entry, the U.S. Customs Service began providing inspectors
with radiation detection pagers in 1998 and expanded its
efforts after 9/11. Just last month, DHS reported that it has
installed more than 470 portal monitors nationwide. Efforts to
deploy radiation detection equipment at home and abroad did not
start smoothly, and lacked effective coordination and planning.
On the international side, one of the most troubling
consequences of lack of coordination is that DOE and DOD were
installing better equipment in some countries than the State
Department installed in others. Specifically, DOE installed
equipment in one country and DOD installed similar equipment in
another country that is better able to detect weapons, usable
HEU and plutonium than the less-sophisticated radiation
detection equipment State has installed in more than 20 other
countries.
Since our report was issued, coordination has improved,
though it is still a concern; and while better planning has
occurred, in March of this year we reported that DOE's
Megaports Initiative did not include a comprehensive, long-term
plan to guide its efforts.
On the domestic front, we found that DHS had not
coordinated with other Federal agencies and DOE national
laboratories on long-term goals, including improving the
radiation technology and portal monitors.
This brings me to the subject of the effectiveness of the
current generation of radiation detection equipment. It is well
known that the equipment now being deployed in the United
States and abroad has limitations. Furthermore, the ways in
which the equipment is deployed, operated and maintained can
also limit its effectiveness.
Our work has identified problems not only with the
equipment, but the way the inspectors have used the equipment
as well, including allowing vehicles to pass through portals at
high speeds, excessively reducing the sensitivity of portal
monitors to limit the number of nuisance alarms, and using
radiological detection pagers for purposes they were not
designed for. In addition, environmental conditions, such as
cold climates, high winds and sea spray can affect the
equipment's performance.
It is important to note that radiation detection equipment
is only one of the tools that Customs inspectors and border
guards use to combat nuclear smuggling. Proper training and
intelligence are key and are vital.
Furthermore, our first line of defense are U.S. programs to
secure nuclear material at its source, both in the former
Soviet Union and the United States. Radiation detection
programs complement these other programs.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee.
That concludes my statement. I would be happy to respond to any
questions you may have.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Aloise.
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Mr. Linder. Dr. Wagner.
STATEMENT OF DR. RICHARD L. WAGNER, JR., CHAIR, DEFENSE SCIENCE
BOARD TASK FORCE ON PREVENTION OF, AND DEFENSE AGAINST,
CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR ATTACK
Dr. Wagner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am gratified that
your two subcommittees are addressing this problem. I have
worked on this problem now, the problem of defending the
country against--
Mr. Linder. Doctor, your mike is not on.
Dr. Wagner. I am sorry. I thought it was. Is it working
now?
Thank you very much.
I am gratified that these subcommittees are working on this
problem. I have, for 33 years now, I think it is, been involved
in activities to defeat this threat, until about--well,
unfortunately, it took the events of 9/11 before the government
and the country began to pay attention to it. So I am gratified
to see your committee and the executive branch are now finally
trying to pay attention to it.
You have my prepared statement. It is clear to me from your
statements that you are thinking ahead of this problem. So what
I would like to do in my few minutes allotted here is not
paraphrase my prepared statement, but try to address two or
three of the points you made. I may regret this, because I am
not sure I am going to be articulate enough to do it well, but
I will try.
Chairman Linder, you used the word ``deterrence,'' and I
think that since no defense, no matter how much money we spend
on the technology and the deployments, is going to be perfect,
it is important for us to build it and deploy it and operate it
in such a way that it enhances deterrence. That means creating
an uncertainty in the mind of the attacker as to what the best
way to penetrate the defense is. That uncertainty can be
created either by accident or by deliberate actions.
I think that those developing this system ought to put more
attention than I believe they are putting on methods to
deliberately deploy and operate the system in ways that create
uncertainty on the part of the detector. I think that is an
important subject for the Congress to look at. It would have to
be done in closed hearings.
Second, Chairman King, you asked how fast can we get to
improved detectors? In my prepared statement and the Defense
Science Board Task Force that I chaired, both assert that it is
possible to improve detection technology by a lot, think a
factor of 10 better, although the metric for exactly what you
mean by a factor of 10 is a little fuzzy.
But, Chairman King, you asked, how fast can we get to
better technology. And, Mr. Pascrell, you suggested that
developing better standards should be done before the equipment
is deployed.
To me, the administration in its management of this work
and the Congress are going to have to walk a fine line between
exercising too little and too much oversight. To develop
standards too soon means that they won't be right. The
standards will have to be developed in an iterative way, where
systems are put in the field, worked with, the flaws are seen
and then preliminary standards are developed; and then the next
generation of testing the equipment in the field to those
preliminary standards will lead to firmer standards. So that is
an iterative process.
I believe you and the executive branch are going to have to
recognize that there will be false starts and there will be
money wasted. If you and they try too hard to eliminate all
mistakes, we will not end up with a system that protects this
country, or we will end up with it in 500 years and we won't
have it when we need it.
So I believe you are going to have to find some way--and I
don't have a prescription for you--for finding just the right
degree of oversight, but not too much. The same for the
executive branch. The key to that is getting some good people
in place, leaving them in place and building trust between
yourselves and them; and that is a two-way street.
Let me comment on Mr. Langevin's comment on the amount of
money that is available. I am not carrying a brief for the
administration's programs here, I think they have been too
slow, not just for the last 4 years, but for the last 20-
something years, but I believe the administration's request for
R&D in this area for fiscal 2006 is about right. That will be
really kind of the first year, in which if the Appropriations
Committees fund at the appropriate level, at that level, it
will be really the first year for a serious program.
I think you could expect, however, that the administration
requests for R&D might go up in the years beyond that in order
to reach what I will call the ``technology limit,'' as opposed
to the funding limit approach to developing these technologies.
Chairman King, you mentioned also that you would prefer to
see checks for radiation while the cargo ships are at sea. I
think that is a crucially important theme to pursue. I think
that there have been two or three approaches brought to my
attention, one by a graduate student--no, he was an
undergraduate student at the time, at MIT--for doing that job
in a pretty clever way. I think that more attention should be
devoted to developing methods of detection at sea. And, in
general, the farther out we can beat this threat, the better. I
don't want them to get even as close as the ports, and I would
prefer they not get the threat objects onto the ship to begin
with.
To do that, to defend as far forward as possible, DOE has
programs for second lines of defense and their Material
Protection and Control programs, and the Nunn-Lugar activities
are crucially important and have to be woven into an overall
global architecture for dealing with this problem.
Then, finally, let me say with regard to beating the threat
far away from our shores, the Department of Defense is going to
have to play an important role in doing that. Many of the
scenarios, I think, that could lead to attacks like this will
involve failed regimes, let's say, in which DOD might want to
take action forward, should have the capability to take action
forward.
The DOD is beginning to step up to this problem in several
ways. I chaired the Defense Science Board Task Force, which
reports to the Secretary of Defense, so I am involved in this.
DOD has recently assigned the responsibility for their programs
for combating WMD to the United States Strategic Command at
Omaha. I am on their advisory committee as well, and I think it
is crucially important for DOD to continue to step forward on
this problem, and I would suggest that your committee might
want to help them do that.
Thank you.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Dr. Wagner.
[The statement of Mr. Wagner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Richard L. Wagner
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, members of the committees, I am honored
to be here to speak to you about the effectiveness of available
technology for detecting nuclear weapons and radiological materials,
and the potential for improving effectiveness in the future with new
technology resulting from research and development. I am encouraged
that the House Committee on Homeland Security and its subcommittees
have focused so strongly on the crucial task of protecting our nation
against clandestine nuclear attack.
I represent the 2002/2003 Defense Science Board Task Force on
Prevention of, and Defense Against, Clandestine Nuclear Attack. I am a
senior staff member with the Los Alamos National Laboratory, although I
do not represent the laboratory here today.
Nearly forty-five years ago, my Ph.D. thesis experiment in physics
involved radiation detection. Since then, on several occasions, I have
done additional scientific work, or managed programs, that involved
advanced radiation detection. Over thirty years ago, I helped form, at
the national laboratories, what later became the DOE's Nuclear
Emergency Search Team (NEST). In the winter of 1978, I was co-
scientific-leader of the NEST deployment to northern Canada to search
for radioactive debris from the Soviet Union's Cosmos 954 satellite. In
the 1980s, as Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy,
I brought NEST capabilities into the Department of Defense, and was
involved in various activities to detect nuclear weapons. In 1997, and
again in 2002/2003, I chaired Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Forces
related to defense against smuggled nuclear weapons.
I want to make the following six points to you today:
1. Radiation detection at portals is but one part of what must be a
multilayered, multi-component, civil/military, global architecture to
prevent smuggling of nuclear weapons into the US. Effective detection
at portals will require detection of other signatures than radiation,
but effective radiation detection is essential.
2. Currently installed radiation detection systems, or systems
which could be procured in quantity in the next year or two, are quite
limited in their capabilities and, in general, are insufficient to the
task. Substantial research and development (R&D) is needed to improve
detection capabilities. But deployment of even the limited near-term
capabilities should be significantly expanded to: (1) provide some
degree of added protection for the nation in the near term, (2) expand
the experience base in operations with radiation detection systems in
order to help guide research and development of greatly improved
capabilities for the future, and (3) build the necessary industrial
base.
When I speak of radiation detection capabilities, I
mean not only the detectors themselves, but networks of
detectors, communications and signal processing, protocols for
resolving alarms, and operational concepts for detection and
response-to-detection systems.
3. With an expanded, spiral, research and development (R&D)
program, carried out in the aggressive style that characterized certain
highly successful R&D programs in other areas over the past few
decades, capabilities to detect the presence or transit of nuclear
weapons can be improved greatly, within about five years, before
reaching the limits imposed by the physics involved.
Capabilities of specific detectors against specific
weapon designs are classified. Appendix #1 is an unclassified
excerpt from the report of the most recent DSB Task Force that
I chaired, which describes in general terms current and
potential future detection capabilities.
4. I cannot provide you with a detailed prescription for how to
apportion resources, over time, among near-term deployments with
limited capability, R&D, and later deployments of improved capability.
Such time-phasing must be worked out in some detail, and must be
allowed to change flexibly, even within budget cycles, as operational
experience is gained and as early results of R&D come in. But it might
be useful for you to think in terms of four generations of
capabilities, as follows:
Currently installed detection systems.
Modest but worthwhile improvements that might be
developed and deployed within a year or two.
A first generation of greatly improved detection
systems that would be quite expensive, but which should
nevertheless be deployed in limited quantities to protect some
crucial locations and to try them out in the field.
A generation that achieves greatly improved detection
at greatly reduced cost, which would be widely deployed in the
mature, objective architecture.
5. Even with the best detection systems, the overall future
protection architecture will not be perfect. No defense can be perfect.
But a less-than-perfect defense can be effective if it has enough
capability to:
Cause prospective attackers to have serious doubts as
to whether they will succeed.
Create synergies with other system elements, for
example by forcing the attacker to mount a larger operation
which is more likely to be discovered so that warning can allow
the defense to surge its capability.
I believe that, with an aggressive R&D program, we can achieve that
level of capability. The utility of a less than perfect defense is
discussed in Appendix #2, which is also excerpted from the DSB report.
6. The establishment, by the administration, of the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is a big step in the right direction.
It should be strongly supported by the Congress, along with especially
strong support for ``transformational R&D''. But work on
transformational capabilities is unlikely to be effective unless it is
carried out in the style that characterized certain highly successful
R&D programs in other areas over the past several decades. In Appendix
#3, which is derived from recent discussions on this subject among me
and a few broadly experienced colleagues, I mention these programs and
say some things about their style. Support of the Congress will be
essential in doing the program this way.
APPENDIX #1. EXCERPT FROM DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD REPORT:
4.0 ASSESSING DEFENSE PERFORMANCE AND THE UTILITY OF POTENTIAL SYSTEMS'
IMPROVEMENTS
. . .Defense performance is determined by many factors. The
performance of radiation detection systems is only one of them, but it
is an important one, and we will use such systems' performance to
illustrate broader issues. . . .
As with other elements of the protection/prevention architecture,
the performance of radiation-based detection systems can be thought of
on three levels. . . .
At the level of detailed technical metrics--detection range,
detection time, false alarm rates, etc.--much of what this report
recommends is based on our judgment that significant improvement is
possible in detection-systems' performance in threat scenarios.
Relative effectiveness is not too difficult to assess, but assessing
absolute effectiveness is difficult for several significant reasons.
One difficulty is that the utility of detectors in real operations
depends strongly on natural radiation backgrounds, which vary greatly
from place to place and often in time. Such backgrounds, and the nature
of radiation detection in general, introduce a probabilistic element in
assessment of performance, and the significance of detection and false-
alarm probabilities is very scenario-dependent. All of this fuzzes
concreteness, which creates difficulties in assessing system
performance and in planning defense (and is one basis for our belief
that performance can only be determined by field experience with real
systems). . .
4.1 Radiation detection performance
Despite these difficulties, rough estimates of radiation detection
performance can be made. The referenced IEEE paper lays out some
approaches to improving radiation detection and attempts to assess the
degree of improvement in terms of both technical metrics and scenario
assessment. Key points are excerpted below.
Today's capabilities. Only passive detection is available today.
Correlated operation of multiple detectors can be done today only for a
small number of sensors that can be integrated by human intelligence,
assisted by limited automatic processing. With these and other
capabilities:
Plutonium devices can be detected in vehicles at
portals, in cargo containers, and in vehicles at speed, if the
device is unshielded or lightly shielded.
Detection of devices containing highly enriched
uranium (HEU) is very difficult and varies widely and is
limited today to short range. In some cases lightly shielded
devices can be detected at portals. In other cases they can be
detected only if they are essentially unshielded.
Some high-value targets are defensible, thanks to geographic features
that channel traffic through defensible chokepoints, where capable
portal monitors can be stationed. Traffic that attempts to bypass these
chokepoints (e.g., on foot) is by definition suspect, and can be
detected by non-nuclear techniques.
These current capabilities may be impaired by high and/or variable
natural radiation backgrounds or innocent man-made radiation sources
that yield unmanageable false alarm rates.
In the future. This report recommends greatly expanded R&D on
radiation detection. The referenced IEEE paper illustrates some
improvements in capabilities that would result from R&D. The following
points summarize the potential benefits:
Detection range can be extended by an order of
magnitude, opening new defense operational modes such as rapid,
wide-area airborne and vehicle sweeps, and monitoring large
remote areas and/or extensive road networks. Shielding around
the weapon could reduce performance of the detection systems,
but the shielding mass can slow down the attacker and expose
him to discovery by other means--e.g., detection of the
shielding itself.
Increased range and improved false alarm rejection
will enable intelligent networking of detectors. This could
enable coverage of road and rail transport over significant
distances--e.g., along the U.S. East Coast, where long-distance
transport must pass through a relatively small number of choke
points.
Background and innocent alarm rejection will allow
detection of HEU in a wider range of circumstances, for example
(in certain cases) in cargo that is naturally radioactive
(e.g., bananas).
Increased sensitivity and background rejection could
virtually eliminate the effects of incidental shielding in
vehicles or cargo containers, except for HEU in certain cases.
More-portable and longer-lived sources for active
interrogation will enable widespread screening of containers
and vehicles. Advances in detectors and sources will allow
operational restrictions on active interrogation due to health
and safety concerns to be reduced.
Beyond such general and qualitative statements, what can be done
with radiation detection is complicated to describe. It is a multi-
dimensional parameter space, even for a single attack scenario against
a single defense layer. There are many possible scenarios, and we have
posited a multi-layer defense. The format of the chart below is one
greatly simplified way of summarizing some of this complexity. It
illustrates a fundamental offense/defense trade between the detection
range and time available for detection, and amount of shielding around
the device that can reduce the radiation output of the threat object.
The detection metric that the vertical axis represents is a function of
range and dwell-time, and it varies by approximately six orders of
magnitude along that axis. The diagonal lines on the chart reflect
current and future capabilities, some of which are summarized in the
paragraphs immediately preceding the chart. The uncertainties and
variations in the vertical location of the diagonal lines are about an
order of magnitude, as illustrated by the plutonium current technology
line. The relative locations of the lines are less uncertain. . . . .
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Appendix #2: Excerpt from Defense Science Board Report
4.3 Thinking about the utility of imperfect defenses
When and if the community involved in this work becomes able to
assess system performance against threats accurately and
comprehensively, it will be found that the defense is not leak-proof,
as no defense can be. Because of this, some might argue that devoting
the level of resources entailed in the Task Force recommendations would
be wasted. We believe this is profoundly wrong. No protection system
can be perfect, but over the course of history, defenses that are far
from perfect have played vital strategic roles. To deal analytically
with the issue of imperfect defense, the third level of performance
measures--including the overall goals of the defense--must be
addressed. . . .
With the best technology we can develop, how effective can
prevention/defense be?
Much better technology is essential, but not sufficient alone
Right--not perfection; rather: attenuate threat, dissuade
attempts, thwart some attacks, delay successful attack
--Historically, imperfect defenses often effective
Reference point: during late '70s, early '80s, the US. . .
Best technology can raise defenses above ``the threshold of
dauntingness'', dissuade attempts.
-- Deliberately create uncertainties for attacker
Synergies help. Examples:
-- Better defense larger threat operation
more signatures
possible warning surge
defenses
-- Concentrate nuc mat'ls control on hardest-to-detect mat'ls
Can't answer with paper studies; can find out only by trying
The stakes are worth the bet
The goal that should be set for a national/global system and its
DoD elements is not perfection. Rather, because clandestine nuclear
attack attempts will not be frequent, the goal should be to
substantially attenuate the frequency of successful attacks (including
significantly delaying the first one). Delay and attenuation could
provide time to mitigate the threat in other ways, including measures
to ameliorate the underlying political and cultural factors that
stimulate the terrorist threat, writ large.
Many of us believe that a strong case can be made that prevention/
protection can be developed that will substantially attenuate the
frequency of successful attacks, by being good enough to (1) dissuade
or deter many of those who might consider attempting attacks and (2)
thwart or defeat a good fraction of the (fewer) attacks that might be
attempted. The deterrent aspect of the protection equation involves the
often-great differences between how a defender and an attacker will
view the relative capabilities of the defense. The long history of
offense/ defense competitions is strongly characterized by both sides
taking own-side-conservative views. More particularly, the annals of
terrorism and counterterrorism are replete with instances in which a
prospective attacker was deterred by aspects of the defense that may
have seemed relatively weak and ineffectual to the defender. The
terrorist may not be afraid to die, but he (or his master) does not
want to fail.
Dissuasion/deterrence by the adversary's fear of failure might work
in a variety of ways. One aspect is that an attacker will want to know
enough about the defense to design a robust, successful attack. If the
capabilities of the defense can be improved enough that the attacker
must know the details of defensive measures in place to understand how
to best surmount them, then the attacker may expose himself to
discovery during the planning phases of the attack or be altogether
dissuaded from the attempt.
Creating uncertainty in the attacker's mind will be critical to
maximizing the success of defenses which, realistically, cannot aspire
to perfection. To exploit the effects of uncertainty, the defense
should be deliberately designed and deployed to create as much
ambiguity for the attacker as possible as to where the ``boundaries''
of defense performance lie. Deliberate deception should be used
(carefully) as part of an overall perception management effort.
Data that can be used to be more analytic about these and other
deterrence effects should be systematically assembled from the annals
of counterterrorism.
Many kinds of synergies contribute to defense effectiveness. An
obvious one is the effect of a layered defense, as we propose. With
multiple layers, each layer need not be highly effective in order for
the overall effectiveness to be high. If the layers require different
tactics or technologies to penetrate, the attacker's job is
considerably more difficult. This indicates a fundamental synergy
between a layered defense and the capability to detect the threat by
intelligence indicators, including from law-enforcement activities. A
more capable and varied defense means that the attacker must mount a
larger operation to penetrate it. A larger operation has more (and more
observable) signatures. More people with more skills must be recruited
and trained; more money must be obtained and laundered; the operation
takes longer; and the attacker must surveil the defense more
intensively. By increasing the signature of attack planning, the
likelihood of discovery increases commensurately. This, in turn, could
allow the defenses to be surged, further increasing effectiveness.
These preliminary thoughts about the effectiveness of a defense
have led the Task Force and its predecessors to become convinced that
reasonable success in mitigating the threat is sufficiently likely
that, in light of the seriousness of the threat and of the consequences
of successful attack, a serious development and deployment program is
warranted..
Appendix #3: Assuring program effectiveness
The establishment of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)
is an extremely positive step in improving and deploying detection
systems, and will provide a group which, adequately funded and properly
located organizationally, can do much to accomplish the objectives
cited above. But in light of the stakes involved, it is fair to ask
whether DNDO will be able to improve deployed detection technology as
much and as quickly as possible. DNDO's charter and authorities, as
they are expressed in its founding documents, are sound as far as they
go, but there are intangibles that are crucially important for success
and that are difficult to address in a charter or authority. These
intangibles are what I address here.
To deal with such a difficult scientific, technological, and
operational issue requires innovation, free thinking, continuity of
effort, creativity and simultaneous risk taking (technology investments
that may ultimately prove dead-ended). None of these qualities are
among those generally attributed to the government's conventional
research and development process--which often discourages even prudent
risk taking and is at best ponderously slow.
It has generally been found that truly creative research is best
pursued by maintaining close coupling between the researchers and those
dealing with day-to-day operational challenges. At the same time, it is
exactly these latter challenges which often usurp the attention,
priority, and budgetary resources which would otherwise be devoted to
longer-term research.
When facing such challenges in the past the government has
generally been most successful when it removed the attack on a specific
high priority problem from the every-day research and development
process and established a dedicated, high priority assault on the
specific issue at hand. DNDO is intended to catalyze such an assault,
but whether it will be successful will depend on its ability to emulate
key features of past successes. Examples include the Manhattan Project,
the Apollo Project, the development of the Polaris submarine system,
and the development of the U-2, SR-71 and F-117 at the ``skunk Works''.
What is needed is a mini-Manhattan Project which focuses specifically
on the detection of nuclear weapons and materials. The development of a
weapons detection capability is not an easy task, but neither was the
development of the nuclear weapon itself.
Key features of many of the past successes mentioned above include:
high-risk, high-payoff developments are pursued,
hedging against possible failure with alternative approaches
carried out in parallel;
R&D reaches from basic research through to fieldable
prototypes;
a streamlined management process with minimal
``outside'' influence;
a cooperative and open relationship between government
and industrial/academic participants;
the role of senior, centralized government leadership
is to set broad goals, secure funding, and provide freedom of
action for the R&D teams; and
the R&D is conducted mainly outside of government by
large, integrated, multi-disciplinary R&D teams with forceful
and experienced leaders, and with:
wide latitude to achieve broad, ambitious,
mission-level goals,
direct, frequent, working-level contact
between users and R&D people,
freedom to change R&D objectives and
approaches quickly and flexibly as the R&D proves what
is feasible, and
the expectation of continued involvement to
achieve both near-term milestones and long-term goals.
To accomplish such a feat would entail waiving many of the existing
procurement regulations which were designed to conduct the ordinary
course of research and development in the government.
The approach sketched here would be exceptional today--a
significant departure from the way most government R&D is currently
done. Because of this, it will be controversial and difficult to
implement and will need high level support, including from the
Congress.
Mr. Linder. Ms. Rooney.
STATEMENT OF BETHANN ROONEY, MANAGER, PORT SECURITY, PORT
AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY
Ms. Rooney. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to testify this afternoon on the
important issue of detecting radiation entering the Nation
through our U.S. ports.
In early 2003, Customs and Border Protection announced that
the radiation portal monitor program would be started in the
top 22 ports in the country, including New York and New Jersey.
We fully support the deployment of radiation detectors in our
port and believe they serve an important function as the
absolute last layer of defense in detection strategy. Our
experience with the RPM initiative, in particular, the
cooperation with the local Customs and Border Protection and
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory staff, has been certainly
exceptional.
To date, a total of 22 RPMs have been deployed in the port.
As has been indicated, we are not fully covered and there are
another 10 RPMs expected to be deployed later this year. We are
now averaging approximately 150 alarms a day from the radiation
portal monitors that are installed, which is about one in 40
containers that moves through our facilities. This high level
of innocent or nuisance alarms are from commodities such as
kitty litter, ceramics, medical isotopes and the like.
Customs personnel are stationed at the exit gates of the
container terminals. In each instance that a container sets off
an alarm, they are immediately directed to a secondary
inspection area where the containers are scanned with a
radiological isotope identifier and compared to the manifest.
CBP follows strict protocols to determine the source of the
alarm. In the vast majority of the cases, these alarms are
solved within 10 minutes or less causing no undue delays to the
flow of commerce. In the 16 months since these RPMs have been
operational in the ports, only twice have they detected what is
believed to be a neutron source which would be indicative of
either plutonium or uranium. In these instances, the container
was isolated and CBP worked with the Port Authority police and
other Federal, State and local agencies in order to render the
container safe, taking upwards of 24 hours to do so.
Approximately 15 percent of our containerized cargo volume
moves by rail or barge out of the port. None of that cargo, or
virtually none of that cargo, is currently being scanned by the
radiation portal monitor deployment. CBP recognizes this
shortcoming in the program and is working with Pacific
Northwest Lab and our terminal operators in order to devise
options to screen this internodal cargo.
In addition to screening the rail cargo, we also must find
a way to screen the cargo that transferred by barge, because in
many instances these barge movements are going through highly
congested urban areas and we don't want these containers to be
delivered to an inland area without being scanned.
Also given its heavy focus on containerized cargo since 9/
11, we remain concerned about the ability to use imported
vehicles, busses and subway cars to deliver weapons of mass
destruction to the United States. We import approximately
620,000 automobiles a year, and absent any other programs to
check the integrity of vehicular cargo and inspect it upon
arrival in the United States, we believe that steps must also
be taken with the auto terminal operators to devise a
methodology of screening this cargo with suitable technology.
Under an agreement with the Department of Homeland
Security, Science and Technology Directorate, the Port
Authority is involved in a very productive program of testing
radiation sensor technologies at various transportation
facilities, including our river crossings, airports and
seaports.
Since most of the commercial off-the-shelf radiation
detection devices use gross counters, a large number of alarms
from innocent sources are generated when the detection
threshold is set too low. Under the leadership of the
Department of Homeland Security's Environmental Measurement
Lab, we have first bench-tested devices with various radiation
sources and operating conditions at the Brookhaven National Lab
before deploying them at our facilities. Two devices are now
ready for commercialization and could be available for use as
early as fiscal year 2006. These devices will be better at
detecting things such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium.
The new Domestic Nuclear Detection Office at the Department
of Homeland Security provides an opportunity to recommend a
comprehensive research agenda that would focus on the marine
transportation system. We should take advantage of
opportunities to detect, deter and intercept a device well
before it passes through a terminal exit gate. Among the ways
to do this is to place radiation detection devices on the
container entry cranes or other container handling equipment.
The Federal Government should establish a research and
development program focusing on identifying a way to scan 100
percent of the containers as they are off-loaded from the ship
or when they are sitting idle in the terminal for upwards of 7
days.
We would also encourage the development of an integrated
scanning and detection device that would essentially allow for
the RPM and the VACIS exam to occur simultaneously. This
holistic approach could provide 100 percent screening of
international cargo for both radiation and density without
causing additional delays.
As screening technology is further developed and tested, we
must also take into consideration the potential impact that
this technology might have on other container security devices,
such as electronic seals and the advanced container security
device. We have experienced in Operation Safe Commerce trials
that the VACIS exam may have interfered with the radio signals
generated by electronic seals, thus rendering them unusable.
Therefore, the interference of VACIS and RPM inspection must be
considered as these technologies are further developed and
deployed.
Of course, detecting a weapon of mass destruction after it
arrives in our port or anywhere in the U.S. is too late. Since
9/11, the Federal policy has been to push our American borders
out, and DHS from those very first days has implemented that
policy through various programs.
In keeping with that policy and with a layered approach to
security, RPMs or other suitable radiation detection devices
should be installed at foreign ports of export. It would give
the U.S. greater confidence that cargo headed our way is not
likely to contain a weapon of mass destruction.
I hope my comments today have provided you with some
helpful insight on just one aspect of this complex matter of
radiation detection. We at the Port Authority of New York and
New Jersey are prepared to offer any additional assistance that
you may require.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Ms. Rooney.
[The statement of Ms. Rooney follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bethann Rooney
Mr. Chairmen, members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the important issue of radiation detection as
it relates to our nation's ports. I am Bethann Rooney and I am the
Manager of Port Security at the Port Authority of New York & New
Jersey.
I appreciate the invitation to speak on the steps that have been
taken since 9/11 to secure our ports and maritime industry from
terrorist acts, specifically our ability to detect nuclear weapons and
radiological materials that may attempt to enter the country through
our Port. The tragic events of September 11th have focused our
collective attention on the need to protect our borders at major
international gateways like the Port of New York and New Jersey and
small ports alike.
This morning I would like to briefly discuss the vital nature of
ports and the risk associated with them; the importance of supply chain
security, the status of Radiation Portal Monitor deployment in the
Port; our experience with the Department of Homeland Security
Countermeasure Test Bed and finally some recommended next steps.
THE VITAL ROLE OF PORTS
Ninety-five percent of the international goods that come into the
country come in through our nation's 361 ports; twelve percent of that
volume is handled in the Port of New York and New Jersey alone, the
third largest port in the country. The Port generates 229,000 jobs and
$10 billion in wages throughout the region. Additionally, the Port
contributes $2.1 billion to state and local tax revenues and $24.4
billion to the US Gross Domestic Product. Cargo that is handled in the
Port serves 80 million people or thirty-five percent of the entire US
population. In 2004 the port handled over 5,200 ship calls, 4.478
million twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), which is approximately
7,300 containers each day, 728,720 autos and 80.6 million tons of
general cargo. Today international trade accounts for 30 percent of the
US economy. Considering all this, it is easy to see how a terrorist
incident in our nation's ports and along the cargo supply chain would
have a devastating effect on our country and its economy.
THE TERRORIST RISK
When describing the potential impact of a terrorist event, the
words ``risk'', ``threat'' and ``vulnerability'' have generally been
used interchangeably. The fact, however, is that in the standard risk
equation, risk is a factor of threat, vulnerability and consequence.
Therefore, any discussion of the terrorist risk to ports and other
elements of the marine transportation system (MTS) must include each of
those three areas.
The most difficult area to understand is the threat, mostly because
it is a moving target and we must assume that terrorists are devising
new tactics everyday. There are a number of threat scenarios however
that are believed to be more likely and therefore are those that most
maritime security programs today are built around. These include the
use of vessels and ports as a means to smuggle weapons of mass
destruction or terrorist operatives into the United States, the use of
ships as a weapon, the scuttling of ships in major shipping channels,
and attacks on ships such as ferries or oil tankers. Since 9/11, we
have seen a number of these tactics used around the globe in events
such as suicide bombings using containers in the Port of Ashdod, small
boat attacks on an oil platform in Al Basra and the French oil tanker
Limberg, and the transportation of suspected terrorist operatives via
containers in Italy.
The maritime transportation system's vulnerability or the
likelihood that the safeguards will fail is complicated by the general
nature and openness of ports, with hundreds of miles of shorelines and
facilities that have historically been public access areas.
Additionally, the movement of cargo has been built on the tenets of
speed, reliability and cost, not security. Therefore, the sheer volume
of containers that move through US ports on a daily basis makes them
potentially attractive as a potential Trojan horse . . .62,000 of them.
The consequences of a terrorist attack by means of the maritime
industry could have an overwhelming and lasting effect. Not only would
there potentially be significant death and destruction but the national
and global economies could be devastated. It is estimated that for
every day that a port is shut down, it takes seven days for full
recovery. The West Coast labor strikes last year demonstrated that a
ten day shut down can cost an estimated one billion dollars a day.
While our ability to directly influence the threat is limited we
can use our understanding of the threat, to make infrastructure
improvements, and create policies, programs and procedures that can
help reduce our vulnerability and the consequences and thereby mitigate
our overall risk.
OUR PROGRESS SINCE 9/11
As a result of significant legislative action, capital investments
and operational improvements on the part of the public and private
sectors in the nearly three and a half years since 9/11, the Maritime
Transportation System (MTS) is more secure today than ever before.
While significant progress has been made and much has been
accomplished, work still remains to be done.
A Multifaceted Approach
Enhancing maritime security is a complex problem which requires a
multi-faceted and layered approach. Maritime security is so much more
than just the physical security of our ports and terminals and the
vessels that use them. We must also enhance security of the supply
chain and the cargo that moves through our ports.
Cargo and Supply Chain Security
America's consumer-driven market now depends upon a very efficient
logistics chain, of which the nation's ports are just a single link. US
ports provide the platform to transfer imported goods from ships to our
national transportation system--primarily trucks and trains--that
ultimately deliver those products to local retail outlets or material
to manufacturing plants. Historically, that goods movement system has
had one overall objective: to move cargo as quickly and cheaply as
possible from point to point. Today, a new imperative--national
security--has imposed itself onto that system. As such, we know that
ports themselves are not the lone point of vulnerability. Rather, the
potential for terrorist activity stretches from where cargo is stuffed
into a container overseas to any point along the cargo's route to its
ultimate destination.
We believe that through programs like Operation Safe Commerce, a
Federally supported study of international supply chain security, of
which the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey is a part, efforts
must be taken to verify the contents of containers before they are even
loaded on a ship destined for a US port. The process must include
certification that the container was packed in a secure environment,
sealed so that its contents cannot be tampered with, transported under
the control of responsible parties, and screened for dangerous
substances before it is loaded on a ship. This will be accomplished
through the identification and evaluation of new technology, business
processes, policies and procedures that could improve supply chain
security, and minimize disruption to commerce. The solutions must also
be economically and commercially viable.
The many programs that the Departments of Energy and Homeland
Security have implemented in the last three years--MegaPorts, the 24-
Hour Rule, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT),
the Container Security Initiative (CSI), the increase in VACIS exams,
and the deployment of Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) at terminals are
all valuable elements of a layered security system and have gone a long
way toward ensuring supply chain security.
RADIATION PORTAL MONITORS
One of the many layers of cargo security is Radiation Portal
Monitors (RPMs). In response to a Congressional mandate to preclude
nuclear weapons and radiological materials from entering the United
States, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) established a strategy in
early 2003 to deploy RPMs at twenty-two ports throughout the country,
including the Port of New York and New Jersey. RPMs are a passive, non-
intrusive means to screen containers for the presence of nuclear and
radiological materials, including special nuclear material (SNM),
naturally occurring radiation and common medical and industrial
isotopes.
We fully support the deployment of radiation detectors in our Port
and believe they serve an important function as the absolute last layer
of the defense in depth strategy. Of course, detecting a Weapon of Mass
Destruction after it arrives in our Port, or anywhere in the US, is too
late. The placement of RPMs in US ports must be coupled with the
installation of RPMs or other suitable radiation detection technology
in foreign ports through programs like MegaPorts and the Container
Security Initiative.
Our experience with the RPM initiative has been nothing but
positive and the level of coordination and cooperation with local CBP
officials and staff from the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory
staff exceptional. In July 2003, CBP brokered a meeting with all of our
port stakeholders to introduce them to the RPM program, describe the
technology and the environment in which it works, and address concerns
of different stakeholder groups and layout the timeline for deployment.
CBP later met with each of the individual terminal operators, their
executive management, traffic engineers and other employees to discuss
each terminal operator's specific issues, with the goal of integrating
the RPMs into each terminal's operation and not creating disruptions to
the normal flow of commerce.
To date, a total of 22 RPMs have been deployed in the Port of New
York and New Jersey (Global--5, PNCT-5, APM-12), with the first coming
on line in February 2004. Another 8 RPMs (Maher-7. NYCT--1) are
expected to be deployed by year-end. We are also expecting to receive 2
mobile RPMs that will be employed during the vessel discharge process
at one of our smaller terminals. At this time, we do not have a
confirmed schedule for when these mobile RPMs will be available.
CONCERNS WITH THE RPM PROGRAM
High Level of False Alarms
At the outset of this program, we were advised by Pacific Northwest
Labs that we could expect the alarm rate to be 1 in every 400
containers. In the Port of New York and New Jersey, we are now
averaging about 150 alarms a day from the RPMs, which is approximately
1 in 40 containers, ten times more than was expected. In order to
detect nuclear and radiological devices, the RPMs must be calibrated at
a low threshold. This results in a high level of innocent or nuisance
alarms from commodities with naturally occurring radiation such as
bananas, kitty litter, fire detectors and ceramics that move through
the port, even truck drivers who not long before had medical tests or
treatments with radioactive isotopes.
Customs personnel are stationed at the exit gates of each of the
container terminals. In each instance that a container sets off an
alarm, they are immediately directed to a secondary inspection point
when the container is scanned again, verified with a Radiological
Isotope Identifier Device (RIID) and compared to the manifest. CBP
follows strict protocols to determine whether the alarm is a potential
terrorist threat, a natural source or legitimate medical source of
radiation. In the vast majority of the cases, CBP is able to resolve
the alarm in approximately ten minutes or less and release the truck
without causing any undue delays to the flow of commerce.
In the sixteen months that the RPMs have been operational in New
York and New Jersey, there only twice have RPMs detected a neutron
source, which would be indicative of either Plutonium or Uranium. In
these instances, the container was isolated and CBP worked with the
Port Authority Police and various Federal and state agencies, under
established response protocols, to render the container safe, which
takes up to 24 hours.
Ability to Screen All Intermodal Cargo
In the Port of New York and New Jersey, 13 percent of our cargo
volume moves by rail and another 2 percent moves by barge. We expect
these percentages to significantly increase in the next 10-15 years.
While the current deployment schedule does not include RPMs at our on-
dock rail facility (670,000 TEUs), CBP recognizes that this area has
not yet been fully addressed and discussions are underway to develop a
way to effectively screen these containers. CBP, Pacific Northwest Labs
and the terminal operators are collaborating to devise options to
screen intermodal cargo in the least disruptive way. This could include
the installation of RPMs at choke points where containers enter the
rail facility from other container terminals or screening the entire
train as it exits the terminal. One concern would be delaying the
entire train schedule while an alarm from one or more of the containers
on that train is resolved. We expect to conduct a trial of scanning the
entire train later this year.
A process to screen containers that will be transferred by barge to
another US port must also be developed. In many instances, these barges
traverse congested waterways adjacent to densely populated urban areas.
We need the same level of assurance that these containers are free of
nuclear or radiological devices as we have about the containers that
are being delivered to inland destinations by truck.
Ability of CBP to Fully Staff RPM Operations
In some ports around the country, the RPMs are manned not by CBP
but by a local law enforcement agency. In theses cases, CBP has
committed to responding to an alarm within a specified period of time.
As ports and terminals across the country move toward expanding their
gate hours, we need to ensure that CBP will have the adequate resources
to staff and monitor all of these devices and analyze the high volume
of alarms that they will be receiving. Provision must also be made to
reimburse the local jurisdiction for assuming responsibilities under a
federally mandated program.
Ability to Scan Roll On Roll Off Cargo
Given the heavy focus on containerized cargo since 9/11, we remain
concerned about the ability to use Roll On / Roll Off (RoRo) cargo,
such as automobiles, buses and subway cars to deliver weapons of mass
destruction to the United States. Absent any other programs and
initiatives to ensure the integrity of RoRo cargo and inspect it upon
arrival in the United States, we believe that steps must be taken to
work with the auto terminal operators to devise a method of screening
all RoRo cargo with RPM's or other suitable technology upon discharge
from the vessel.
COUNTER MEASURE TEST BED
Under an agreement with the Department of Homeland Security,
Science and Technology Directorate, the Port Authority is involved with
a very productive program of testing radiation sensor technologies at
various transportation facilities including our river crossings,
airports and the seaport, including the New York Container Terminal on
Staten Island and the Customs and Border Protection VACIS facility in
Port Elizabeth.
Since most commercial off-the-shelf radiation detection devices use
gross counters, a large number of alarms for innocent sources are
generated when the detection threshold is set sufficiently low in order
to detect nuclear weapons or radiological materials. The
Countermeasures Test Bed (CMTB) explores operational methodologies and
tests advanced radiation sensor systems that have spectroscopic
identifiers that have been developed at various Department of Energy
laboratories in a real world environment at fully operational
transportation facilities.
Under the leadership of the Department of Homeland Security's
Environmental Measurements Laboratory in New York, potential devices
are first bench tested with a variety of radiation sources and under
various operating conditions at the Brookhaven National Laboratory
before being deployed at our facilities.
As a result of the test bed work in which we participated, the
Adaptable Radiation Area Monitor (ARAM) and Sensors for the Measurement
and Analysis of Radiation Transient (SMART) devices are now ready for
commercialization and could be available for use as early as FY06.
These devices will be better at detecting things such as highly
enriched uranium and plutonium.
Through our participation in this important initiative, we hope to
improve the Nation's ability to prevent the illicit entry and movement
of nuclear and radiological devices and materials, increase radiation
sensor coverage of the region's critical infrastructure and to advance
the capacity of technology to be reliable and of practical use in the
field. We remain committed to making our many facilities and operations
available to the Department of Homeland Security for this and other
important demonstrations and test bed projects.
In the coming year DHS S&T will conduct head-to-head operational
testing and evaluation of commercially available spectroscopic units at
New York Container Terminal (NYCT) to determine operational viability
and performance against real cargo in the port environment.
Additionally, DHS will evaluate how integrated radiation monitoring
systems at a complex intermodal facility such as NYCT (maritime and
rail) could improve operational performances of the facility while
meeting DHS goals.
RECOMMENDATIONS
With the advent of the new Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO)
at the Department of Homeland Security there is a unique opportunity to
recommend a comprehensive research agenda that would specifically
benefit the marine transportation system.
While the port itself is generally not thought of as a likely
terrorist target but rather a means of delivering a radiological device
to a higher priority target, we believe that we should take advantage
of opportunities to detect, deter and intercept a radiological or
nuclear device well before it passes through a terminal exit gate.
Among the ways to do this is to place radiation detection devices on
the container gantry cranes and other container handling equipment.
On average, an import container sits in a US port terminal for five
to seven days before it is picked up for delivery to the consignee.
Under the current design of the RPM program, the nuclear weapon or
radiological material could be sitting on the dock for an extended
period of time before it passes through a RPM at the exit gate on its
way to the highway system. The Federal government should establish a
research and development program focused on identifying a way to scan
100 percent of the containers as they are off loaded from the ship and/
or when they are sitting idle in the terminal.
Both we and the Virginia Port Authority have each conducted
``proof-of-concept'' projects over the last four years to design,
fabricate, install and test radiation detectors placed on the spreader
bars of gantry cranes. The device would need to be able to be rugged
enough to withstand the repeated shock and vibration from handling
containers, distinguish between the container that was being lifted and
other containers around it, and transmit data to a central monitoring
location. The state of the technology was inadequate for this
application however, we do believe that the problems can be overcome
and should be further evaluated by DNDO.
Another alternative would be to place radiation detection equipment
on straddle carriers or rubber tire gantry cranes, which are used to
move and stack containers at the marine terminal. That would allow for
containers that are stacked three high to be scanned simultaneously and
repeatedly during the normal course of business as they dwell on the
terminal.
We would also encourage the development of an integrated scanning
and detection device that would essentially allow for the RPM and the
VACIS exam to occur simultaneously. This approach is a much more
holistic solution to provide 100 percent screening of international
cargo for both radiation and density, without causing additional
delays.
As screening technology is further developed and tested, we must
also take into consideration the potential impact that this technology
might have on container security devices such as electronic seals and
the Advanced Container Security Device.
We experienced in Operation Safe Commerce that the VACIS exam may
have interfered with the radio signal generated by electronic seals
rendering them unusable. Therefore, the interference of VACIS and RPM
inspections must be considered as these technologies are further
developed and deployed.
Finally, I'd like to make one last point. Since 9/11 the Federal
policy has been to push our borders out and DHS from those very first
days has implemented that policy though their various programs such as
the 24 Hour Rule, CSI, and CTPAT. As part of both the layered approach
to security that I described earlier and the policy to push our borders
out, the deployment of RPM's at ports of export should be increased and
strengthened so that we can have even greater confidence that the cargo
destined for the US in not likely to contain weapons of mass
destruction.
CHALLENGES THAT REMAIN
Addressing the issue of port and maritime security is an enormous
challenge given the complexity of the international transportation
network. Devising a system that enhances our national security while
allowing the continued free flow of legitimate cargo through our ports
will not be solved with a single answer, a single piece of legislation,
or by a single nation. It will require a comprehensive approach with
coordination across state lines and among agencies of all levels of
government and the cooperation of the private and public sectors and
the international community. Importantly, it will require additional
resources for the agencies charged with this awesome responsibility and
for the public and private ports and terminals where the nation's
international commerce takes place.
I hope my comments today have provided with you some helpful
insight on just one aspect of the complex matter of radiation
detection. We at the Port Authority of New York & New Jersey are
prepared to offer any additional assistance that you may require. Thank
you.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Tannenbaum.
STATEMENT OF DR. BENN TANNENBAUM, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE
Mr. Tannenbaum. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, Congressman
Langevin, Congressman Pascrell, members of the subcommittees,
thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today on
the detection of nuclear weapons and radiological material.
I am Benn Tannenbaum, Senior Program Associate at the
Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy within the
American Association for the Advancement of Science. Founded in
1848, AAAS is the world's largest general scientific society,
with over 120,000 members and 262 affiliated societies.
The specific center for which I work seeks to connect
policy members, such as the members of these subcommittees,
with scientific and technical experts in a broad range of
science- and security-related topics. In general, we work to
identify the experts best suited to meet your needs by
providing clear, objective, unbiased research. We do not
perform original research ourselves, but instead act as a
conduit between the academic research community and the policy
arena.
We were approached this spring by Congressmen Markey and
Thompson, who sought to better understand the capabilities and
limitation of the radiation portal monitors being deployed to
detect smuggled radioactive and fissile materials arriving in
U.S. ports. We consulted two physicists with long experience in
this particular field, Professor Frank von Hippel of Princeton
University and Professor Steve Fetter of the University of
Maryland. Based on their expert input, we drafted a report that
is included within my written testimony and is the basis for my
testimony. In addition, I am a physicist with experience in the
design and construction of detector technology.
Having made those caveats, I would like to address five
main points in my remarks.
First, the isotopes best suited for use in dirty bombs can
be detected with passive radiation detectors similar to those
being deployed at ports both abroad and in the United States. A
passive radiation detector is simply one that monitors the rate
at which radioactive decays occur near the detector. The very
feature that makes for a good dirty bomb, namely a strong
source of radiation, also makes detection easier and shielding
more difficult.
In addition, the properties of plutonium, one of two
elements used to construct nuclear weapons, are such that it
can be detected with passive radiation detectors. An active
radiation detector, in contrast, uses some sort of a probe,
such as x-rays or neutrons, to determine the contents of a
container.
Second, the physical properties of uranium, including the
highly enriched uranium that would be used to construct a
nuclear weapon, are such that even lightly shielded uranium is
very likely to escape detection by passive radiation monitors.
While some ports of entry have both active and passive
detectors, some observers argue that they are not being used in
the most effective manner.
Third, there are several ways to improve the capabilities
of the passive detectors currently in use and to improve future
generations of detectors. The current detectors can be improved
by increasing the sampling time, decreasing the distance
between the container and the detector, decreasing the
background radiation through additional shielding around the
detector, and improving algorithms and adding column meters to
the detectors.
In addition, the passive detection of specific energies of
radiation, coupled with an active method that identifies the
location of very dense objects, greatly reduces false positives
by distinguishing harmless radioactive materials, such as kitty
litter, from dirty bombs and nuclear weapons.
Fourth, there are several interesting R&D programs
exploring new techniques to locate radiological and fissile
materials. At Los Alamos, researchers are using cosmic rays to
find very dense materials, such as plutonium and uranium, in
kilogram quantities within cargo containers. At Lawrence
Livermore, researchers use neutrons to ping a container. These
neutrons induce a very characteristic gamma ray response in
fissile materials.
Another proposal uses inexpensive detectors placed in cargo
containers during transoceanic shipment. These detectors take
advantage of the 10-day or longer transit time to locate HEU.
This has the additional feature of allowing the interception of
dangerous materials before they enter a U.S. port.
The Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration have recently
begun construction of a facility to test portal monitors and
expects to select the next deployment of technology this year
using a temporary test bed.
Fifth, the best way to protect the United States from
smuggled nuclear weapons is to use a layered defense. The
currently deployed portal monitors in some domestic and foreign
ports are an important first step. Adding in-transit detectors
and active scanners would increase our ability to locate
radiological and fissile material.
The intrinsic difficulties in detecting uranium make it
particularly important to secure, control and protect existing
supplies of HEU around the world. It will always be far easier
to monitor a lump of uranium at a known location than it will
be to detect uranium smuggling, and the infrastructure required
to make HEU is much more substantial than that required to
construct a gun-type nuclear weapon with existing HEU.
The comprehensive threat reduction threat program has
enabled the safeguarding of much of Russia's HEU, and some of
the HEU is being converted to fuel for use in nuclear power
reactors. This program should be expanded to cover more
countries and the rate of fuel conversion should be increased.
In addition, research reactors in many countries use HEU as
fuel. These reactors should all be converted to use low
enriched uranium fuel as soon as possible.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify here and look
forward to your questions.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Dr. Tannenbaum.
[The statement of Mr. Tannenbaum follows:]
Prepared Statement of Benn Tannenbaum
Mr. Chairman, Congressman Langevin, Congressman Pascrell, members
of the Subcommittees, thank you for this opportunity to testify before
you today on the detection of nuclear weapons and radiological
material. I am Benn Tannenbaum, Senior Program Associate at the Center
for Science, Technology and Security Policy within the American
Association for the Advancement of Science. Founded in 1848, AAAS is
the world's largest general scientific society with over 120,000
members and 262 affiliated societies. The specific Center for which I
work seeks to connect policy makers, such as the members of this
Committee, with scientific and technical experts in a broad range of
science and security-related topics. In general, we work to identify
the experts best suited to meet your needs by providing clear,
objective, unbiased research; we do not perform original research
ourselves but instead act as a conduit between the academic research
community and the policy arena.
In this case, we were approached by Congressmen Markey and
Thompson, who sought to better understand the capabilities and
limitations of the radiation portal monitors being deployed to detect
smuggled radioactive and fissile materials arriving in U.S. ports. We
consulted two physicists with long experience in this particular field,
Professor Frank von Hippel of Princeton University and Professor Steve
Fetter of the University of Maryland. Based on their expert input, we
drafted a report for Congressmen Markey and Thompson that is included
with my written testimony. The testimony I present today is based in
large part on their work. In addition, I am a physicist with some
experience in the design and construction of detector technology.
Having made those caveats, I would like to address five main points
in my remarks.
First, the isotopes best suited for use in dirty bombs, such as
cesium-137, cobalt-60, or americium-241, can be detected with passive
radiation detectors, similar to those deployed since 9/11 at ports both
in the United States and abroad. A passive radiation detector is one
that simply monitors the rate at which radioactive decays occur near
the detector. The very feature that makes for a good dirty bomb--
namely, a strong source of radiation--also makes detection easier and
shielding more difficult. In addition, the properties of plutonium, one
of two elements most useful in constructing nuclear weapons, are such
that it, too, can be detected with passive radiation detectors. An
active radiation detector, in contrast, uses some sort of a probe such
as x-rays or neutrons to determine the contents of a container.
Second, the physical properties of uranium, including the highly
enriched uranium (HEU) that would be used to construct a nuclear
weapon, are such that shielded uranium is very likely to escape
detection by passive radiation monitors. While some ports of entry have
both active and passive detectors, some observers argue that they are
not being used in the most effective manner. The passive detection of
specific energies of radiation coupled with an active method that
identifies the location of very dense objects is a good technique to
detect smuggled uranium.
Third, there are several ways to improve the capabilities of the
passive detectors currently in use and to improve future generations of
detectors. The current detectors can be improved by increasing the
sampling time, decreasing the distance between the container and the
detector, decreasing the background radiation through additional
shielding around the detector, and adding collimators to the detectors.
In addition, future detectors must have better energy resolution. This
allows one to distinguish harmless radioactive materials, such as kitty
litter, from dirty bombs and nuclear weapons. There are limits,
however, to the space available for these detectors and to the time
available for scanning.
Fourth, there are several interesting R&D programs exploring new
techniques to locate radiological and fissile materials. At Los Alamos
National Lab, researchers are using cosmic rays to find very dense
materials, such as plutonium and uranium, in very small quantities
within cargo containers. At Lawrence Livermore National Lab,
researchers use neutrons to ``ping'' a container. These neutrons induce
a very characteristic gamma ray response in fissile materials. An Ohio-
based company has proposed inexpensive detectors that would be placed
in cargo containers during transoceanic shipment. These detectors take
advantage of the 10-day or longer transit time to locate HEU. This has
the additional feature of allowing the interception of dangerous
materials before they enter a U.S. port. The Department of Homeland
Security and the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration have recently begun construction of a facility to test
portal monitors and expects to select the next generation of technology
next year using a temporary test bed.
Fifth, the best way to protect the United States from smuggled
nuclear weapons is to use a layered defense. The currently deployed
portal monitors in many domestic and foreign ports are an important
first step. Adding in-transit detectors and active scanners would
increase our ability to locate radiological and fissile material. The
intrinsic difficulties in detecting uranium make it particularly
important to secure, control, and protect existing supplies of HEU and
plutonium around the world. It will always be far easier to monitor a
lump of uranium at a known location than it will be to detect uranium
smuggling. The Comprehensive Threat Reduction program has enabled the
safeguarding much of Russia's HEU and plutonium, and some of the HEU
and plutonium is being converted to fuel for use in nuclear power
reactors. This program should be expanded to cover more countries and
the rate of fuel conversion should be increased. In addition, research
reactors in many countries use HEU as fuel; these reactors should all
be converted to use low enriched uranium fuel as soon as possible.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify, and look forward to
your questions.
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Mr. Linder. Mr. Aloise, you talked about the troubling
problem of lack of cooperation and coordination between the
various agencies. I presume you studied the proposed DNDO that
the department is attempting to stand up. Can this center help?
Mr. Aloise. Actually, Mr. Chairman, we have not yet studied
that proposal. We are doing that as we speak. We have ongoing
work doing that. But if the agency can get better coordination
and get the agencies talking to each other on a continuous
basis, that would help.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Wagner, if you were advising the terrorists
on how to get radioactive material into this country, would you
advise them to avoid the points of entry that are guarded?
Dr. Wagner. Mr. Chairman, that would depend on what we had
done elsewhere. Certainly today, I think, coming through the
guarded points of entry might be as good a way of getting in as
some other way. We can close off those relatively easily
because we control those. If we have done that and if we have
made it easy for them to get it to our shores, which we ought
to not let it be easy for them, then either you or Mr. King, I
believe, talked about bringing it in a pickup truck. That might
be a pretty easy way to do it.
I think, however, that with an aggressive R&D program it
would be possible to develop sensor technologies that might be
able to be deployed, even where pickup trucks could come
across, to close off that route too.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Aloise, you talked about two important
things that are going to have to be improved--training and
intelligence. I assume you are aware that the Department's
intelligence portion of the budget is about 1 percent, maybe as
much as 2, and we are sending billions of dollars to local
communities to buy things with no training and experience tied
to it.
Do you think it would be a good idea for us to find a way
to tie any of these grants to local States and localities for
training issues?
Mr. Aloise. Training is vitally important. It doesn't
matter how good the equipment is if they don't know how to use
it. It lessens the effectiveness of it greatly. I would say
that training would be a very good thing to invest in.
Mr. Linder. How about intelligence?
Mr. Aloise. As well as intelligence, of course, yes.
Mr. Linder. Should it be more than 1 or 2 percent of the
budget?
Mr. Aloise. I really couldn't comment on that at this
point.
Mr. Linder. Dr. Tannenbaum, how many locations do you think
there are in this country where you could find cesium-137?
Mr. Tannenbaum. Dozens.
Mr. Linder. Unprotected?
Mr. Tannenbaum. Yes.
Mr. Linder. Do you think it is fair to say that hospitals
spend more energy and money disposing of hypodermic needles
than they do taking care of their cesium?
Mr. Tannenbaum. I believe so.
Mr. Linder. How much would a terrorist have to have to make
a problem?
Mr. Tannenbaum. A dirty bomb is a weapon of mass terror; it
is a weapon of not mass destruction, but of mass disruption. So
as long as they were sufficient to trip radiation detectors,
that would be enough.
Mr. Linder. Thank you. I yield to my partner, Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Aloise, you have done a great deal of work on nuclear
detection, and one thing that stands out in your testimony is
that the Federal Government does not have a nuclear detection
and interdiction strategy. Such a strategy would define agency
responsibilities, ensure that all screening operations are
integrated and set the framework for our government's research
and development efforts.
In your work, have you come across such a nuclear detection
strategy, and if not, do you feel one is needed?
I would also, of course, be interested in hearing the
opinions of our other witnesses.
Mr. Aloise. When we started our work, none of the agencies
we looked at actually had plans or strategies, strategic plans.
Since the issuance of our report, some plans have been
developed, but we still are hearing of and are aware of
problems with coordination. That suggests there is still a need
for a broader strategy.
Mr. Langevin. Do any other witnesses care to comment?
Dr. Wagner. Well, since I already waded into this a minute
ago, I will wade a little farther, sir.
Somebody said that plans are nothing, but planning is
everything, and I think that is really important. I once read a
quotation from Winston Churchill where at the beginning of
World War II, one of his aides said, ``Prime Minister, are we
going to plan to win this war, or are we just going to muddle
through?'' And Churchill's answer was, ``We are going to plan
to muddle through.''
I think the flavor of the way the government approaches
this problem has to be to ``plan to muddle through.'' I think
it is possible to overplan, to spend so much effort on planning
and detail that the people doing the work in the field will
never get things to actually figure out how they work and feed
that back into the R&D process.
So, again, it is a question of balance between how much you
plan, how elaborately you lay out the architecture in advance
and actually get something in the field that helps a little bit
and gets some experience to plan the next cycle.
Ms. Rooney. As I mentioned in my statement, the
coordination at the local level is absolutely exceptional. As
we have said in other testimony on other subjects, there
appears to be a greater need for a strategy at the Department
or at the agency levels.
The delivery of the product on the local level is very
good, but we notice a number of gaps and overlaps in the
strategy, or lack thereof, from department to department.
Mr. Tannenbaum. There should also be better coordination
between domestic and foreign ports. I think the training levels
that the foreign operators receive are not always sufficient.
That would be a definite place to start.
Mr. Langevin. And in your testimony, Mr. Tannenbaum, you
had suggested that we need as quickly as possible to protect
research and medical reactors.
Mr. Tannenbaum. There are a set of research reactors used
at universities all over the world. There are also a set of
reactors used to produce medical isotopes. By and large, these
use highly enriched uranium as fuel, typically in several-
kilogram quantities. These are on university campuses, often
with low security, so these are prime targets.
Many of them, since they are being used for research
purposes, can be converted to low enriched uranium. Those that
are being used for medical purposes can also be converted to
low enriched uranium. There is no reason economically or by the
laws of physics not to convert those.
Mr. Langevin. Is that the standard right now, that those
research reactors use high enriched uranium, or is that the
exception?
Mr. Tannenbaum. When research reactors were first deployed
I believe they all used HEU, and as time has gone on, we have
converted more and more to low enriched uranium.
Mr. Langevin. Can you clarify that in terms of percentages?
Mr. Tannenbaum. I am afraid I cannot.
Mr. Langevin. I would be curious to know if you have the
committee follow up with getting an answer to that question. I
would like to know how much research reactors right now are
still using highly enriched uranium. I see my time is just
about to expire, so I just want to thank you very much. I have
other questions I will submit for the record.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. Chairman King.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Rooney, in your testimony, you said that New York has
approximately, has 22 of the 30 RPMs that are required. You
also said that the intermodal cargo is not screened. So
obviously, not all cargo is being screened. But even assuming
that you had 30 out of 30 and the intermodal cargo was
screened, it would seem to me that if the terrorists had
managed to get these type of devices into New York harbor, it
would be much more worthwhile for them to detonate it right in
the harbor rather than go to the trouble of offloading it. Do
you have any idea how many of the ships coming in have been
screened before they get into the harbor, into the port?
Ms. Rooney. If there is credible intelligence that CBP or
other agencies get of a particular device or substance that may
be on a ship, they do some screening and some preliminary
testing out at sea. We have a number of ships in the last four
years, the Mayview Maersk, the Palermo Senator, that have all
had suspect cargo on board that were screened out at sea. Other
than credible intelligence, all of the screening is done after
the cargo is discharged, after it has sat on the pier for 5 to
7 days, and only on its outbound entry, outbound exit of the
terminal into the hinterland.
We maintain that the screening should be done at the port
of export so that we have every reasonable assurance when the
cargo arrives in the United States, that it is in fact clean,
and that if we are doing screening here in the U.S., it is as
an absolute last resort, just to double-check, not as our
primary inspection point.
Mr. King. There is a practical matter, for instance, with
the megaport program and the container initiative, do you have
any way of knowing what percentage of ships that would affect
right now?
Ms. Rooney. I am not familiar with the container, as
familiar with the container security initiative in terms of
what equipment is deployed in which particular ports. I know
other container security issues that are not required to have
radiation portal monitors, as opposed to having an extra type
machine, which perform extremely different functions. So I
can't quantify that at this point.
Mr. King. Obviously, I am more familiar with New York and
New Jersey, but I would just think that Los Angeles, Baltimore,
Houston would all have the same dilemma that once it arrives,
the catastrophic damage that could be caused, you know would be
incalculable.
Okay. Let me go to another point. We are talking about
containers, but how about the thousands of boats and yachts and
other non cargo ships that travel in and out of our ports on a
daily basis? I can open it up to anyone on the panel. They are
not subject to RPM inspection. How significant a problem is
that? Let me just add that I agree with Dr. Wagner. We
shouldn't be afraid to fail in certain respects here. If we
have to overspend, if we have to make some mistakes, fine. It
is important to go ahead. So when I am asking these questions,
I am not trying to be overly negative. I really like your
opinions. What are we doing about non cargo ships that are
coming into our ports?
Ms. Rooney. In terms of passenger vessels or personal, you
know, vehicles, again, there is little that is being done
certainly by Customs on those vessels, unless they are arriving
from foreign, they are reported to Coast Guard. They do need to
indicate their arrival, their intended arrival to the Coast
Guard but there is very generally little focus on personal
vessels as compared to commercial vessels. And that remains an
area of concern, even so much as the physical security of
marinas, you know, remains a concern of ours.
Mr. King. Anybody else wish to comment?
Dr. Wagner.
Dr. Wagner. Yes, sir. You keep posing tough problems and
that is a really tough one. To beat that particular avenue of
attack, I think the main tool we have is intelligence and law
enforcement overseas. Now, portal monitors and other means that
we have at our disposal are not unconnected to intelligence.
They are connected to the question of discovering an attack on
us and interdicting it by intelligence and police work in the
following way. They are connected. If we can raise the bar by
deploying effective systems where we do control the
environment, that means the attacker has to mount a larger
operation, he has to recruit more people, he has to surveil the
routes that he will take in. Every one of those steps makes him
more subject to being discovered by police work and
intelligence.
Mr. King. Thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Linder. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My first question is
this to the panel, and I have asked you to be brief and I will
try to be brief with my question. There are very few containers
that are going through radiological inspection now before they
hit our ports. We have a relationship with about 35 countries
that are examining cargo before it goes on foreign ships when
they come here.
It would seem to me we want to cut down the amount--we are
never going to be able to examine every container, we know
that, for explosives, for nuclear weapons. But it would seem to
me, with such a small percentage of those ships, those
containers that will be inspected for radiological situations,
how can we increase appreciably the amount of inspections? Are
we trying to guess at this?
I know we don't have a seamless, and we will never have a
seamless process. I understand that. I heard the Secretary talk
about that as well. All right. We can accept that. We know this
is not a perfect world. We are finite beings. But it would seem
to me, that we--either we haven't--not only we haven't created
the technology, we don't have enough money to increase the
state of the art. What am I missing here? Suppose you start us
off, Dr. Wagner.
Dr. Wagner. Having, being a scientist and having been a
technologist my whole career, I believe that research can lead
to reductions in costs of even high tech stuff. It will take a
while. It will take years, although not decades to do that. The
Defense Science Board task force that I chaired posited
procurement and deployment of hundreds of thousands of
detectors. We said that such a defense might cost a few 10s of
billions of dollars. To me that is kind of the right--I mean,
we are spending many tens of billions of dollars on missile
defense, so I think the combination of thinking big in terms of
procuring large numbers of the detectors and driving the cost
for those detectors down through R&D is the path to success.
Mr. Pascrell. Ms. Rooney.
Ms. Rooney. I believe that the scientific community needs
to partner more with the private sector and with the maritime
industry in that, you know, making the technology work is only
one aspect of the problem. Fitting the technology into the
business process is a much more complex issue. And by
partnering with the private sector, the--we can inform the
scientists on how the technology needs to work within our
industry. Just by way of example, both the port of Virginia,
Norfolk and the port of Newark, New Jersey experimented with
radiation detector devices on our cranes.
The technology works, but the technology was beat up by
being, you know, the impact of hitting the container. The
technology needs to be ruggedized in order to withstand our
industry, and it is something as easy as understanding how we
operate that could help the science and their research and
development community to make better devices.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you. Anyone else wish to respond to
that?
Mr. Tannenbaum. I would focus on ports where security is
the least right now rather than those that have the highest
volume.
Mr. Pascrell. Well, we are doing an assessment of that. So
you are saying we should provide resources for those ports that
are most vulnerable, obviously.
Mr. Tannenbaum. Correct.
Mr. Pascrell. Okay.
Mr. Aloise. Well the DOE's megaports program is in two
ports. And one of the problems they are facing is convincing
other ports to cooperate. So it is not only technology, it is
getting the cooperation of other ports overseas to join in on
us in this effort.
Mr. Pascrell. Yeah. I am not too hopeful about the
situation from what I am hearing from you. I know that you are
telling me what you really think. But, I mean, you know, we are
going to hear from the panel, Department of Energy, Department
of Defense, Homeland Security, we hope that they are talking to
each other. We hope the intelligence community, all of these
agencies are talking with each other, since we do not have the
state of the art to find out where this radiation is. If it is
out there, hopefully these 15 agencies are talking with each
other, you know. I don't believe they are talking to each
other. But let me ask one more question.
Ms. Rooney, so far only the port of Oakland had fully
deployed radiation portal monitoring equipment. How far along
is the New York-New Jersey Port Authority in deploying this
equipment, and when do you expect to complete the work?
Ms. Rooney. Well, we have 22 out of the 30 devices that we
are going to get. They are not currently installed in our
largest volume terminal operator. So approximately 45 percent
of our cargo volume is currently being scanned. We expect that
they will be fully implemented by the end of the year, except
for the rail and barge cargo.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Simmons, do you wish
to inquire?
Mr. Simmons. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, I thank both of our
Chairs and both rankings for a very interesting subject. As I
reflect on Mr. Tannenbaum's testimony, point five had to do
with a layered defense, and I think there is a lot to be said
for a layered defense. I spent some time in Israel a few months
ago, and they have a very excellent system of layering their
defenses against terrorist activities, not so much nuclear but
terrorist. But it occurs to me that a layered system is
essentially passive in nature; that portals, especially fixed
portals, the portals that don't move around but are set in
certain locations are essentially passive; that even
inspections in ports, unless they are informed by intelligence
or tip offs are essentially passive.
And I recall a comment that was made some months ago that
if you want to find a needle in a haystack, it helps to have a
magnet. If you want to find a needle in a haystack, it helps to
find a magnet. Using a magnet to find a needle is more active,
less passive, in my opinion. And taking that analogy to the
next step, if indeed we are going to be successful and if
indeed we are going to be able to afford what we are doing, it
seems to me that we have to be more active. We have to rely
more on intelligence and law enforcement, both at home and
abroad, and that we may even have to rely on active measures to
draw the terrorists out, perhaps sting operations, things of
that nature, where you place a piece of bait out into the
domain and see who nibbles, and roll them up. Is there any
value in that? Has anybody in the panel given consideration to
those types of active measures?
Dr. Wagner. I think, sir, that you are just right. The
limit threat, in some sense, is highly enriched uranium that
has as much shielding around it as will fit in whatever the
container is that carries it, whether it is a pickup truck or a
cargo container. I don't think you are going to find that
without active interrogation.
Now, I was talking with Ms. Rooney before the hearings
began, and she tells me that the longshoremen in New York are
getting comfortable with x-ray radiation and the health and
safety concerns that might come along with that. I think that
is a fruitful avenue to pursue and it ought to be pursued
strongly.
Mr. Tannenbaum. If it reaches the United States it is too
late. If it leaves a foreign port it is too late. If it arrives
at a foreign port it is too late. I think that the best thing
to do is to maintain control of as much material as possible
where it is right now and rather than letting it be stolen and
converted into a weapon.
Mr. Simmons. So that would be essentially a ``nail it down
and keep an eye on it'' strategy, which works except in the
case of loss or theft.
Mr. Tannenbaum. Yes.
Mr. Simmons. Another alternative, and you made a very
interesting remark about whether a nuclear, a dirty bomb would
be designed to destroy or designed to disrupt. I believe cesium
is available in the United States in hospitals and universities
and other medical facilities. So in fact, it is resident here
in the United States. It could be stolen here and could be used
for a dirty bomb attack on an urban area. How would we address
that issue?
Mr. Tannenbaum. Even worse than being stolen or lost is on
a regular basis we have thousands of sources that are lost in
this country that are utterly unaccounted for. It depends on
how much money we want to spend. Do we want to put a radiation
detector on the underside of every bridge in New York City? Do
we want to put one on the corner of every building? I think
that is the extreme you have to go to if you are absolutely
sure that you want to get rid of absolutely every possible
dirty bomb.
Mr. Simmons. Anybody else?
Mr. Aloise. Yes. The question of dirty bomb material is a
significant question, and we have reported on this in the past.
DOE has developed a program to collect some of the worst types
of those materials. But again, it is a matter of resources. If
they had more money they could collect more. But it is an
important program that they have, and one that we support.
Ms. Rooney. Well, I can't comment on the amount of sources,
you know, that are available. We are heavily focused on supply
chain security and needing to know exactly what it is in a
container, what is going in a container from its point of
origin all the way through its final destination. And we
believe that development of supply chain security standards, so
that we know what is going in the container, we know the
individuals that are stuffing it.
We can ensure the integrity of the container. We can have
sensors in the container that will regularly scan for chemical,
biological, radiological devices and send an alert if something
happens all the way to the final point of delivery is what
needs to be developed as yet another layer in that overall
security system.
Mr. Linder. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr.
Thompson wish to inquire?
Mr. Thompson. Yes, Mr. Chairman. This is a good topic. One
of the questions, Ms. Rooney, that I hear quite often from the
business community is if we do the inspections, how will this
impact the movement of goods? Have you all done an analysis of
these technologies and whether or not they would impair the
movement of goods?
Ms. Rooney. Well, one of the reasons why it is important to
get the private sector involved in the development phase, is so
that we don't impact the movement of goods, we highly encourage
the R&D community to get the private sector involved at the
ground level. We have not done a study, per se, but I can tell
you that we have not had any complaints from the likes of the
trucking community or the shippers saying that their cargo has
been delayed because of the radiation portal monitors. Again
most of the alarms have been resolved within 10, 15 minutes and
the truck is sent on its way, so it is not a tangible delay
that the community is faced with right now.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. Dr. Wagner, in your view, has the
deployment of the portal monitors, resulted in improved
coordination between agencies, such as DHS or DOE? Is there
enough communication for us not to be repetitious, for us to
make sure that there is a standard that is employed across the
board so that we deploy the best possible technology?
Dr. Wagner. Mr. Thompson, I have not watched that
particular program closely enough to know whether the agencies
are coordinating well enough or not. My guess is probably not
because that is often the case. I am more concerned about close
coordination between Ms. Rooney's people and the scientists and
engineers in the private sector and at the laboratories than I
am about coordination between the government agencies. That is
the short circuit that I want to build in, between the people
really doing the work in the field to develop better
technologies and her people who are using the current ones so
that we can learn and they can learn.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Aloise, do you want to address that?
Mr. Aloise. Yes. Coordination was a problem in the
beginning. It got better, but it is still of concern. And it is
not just coordination for coordination's sake. As we reported
and it is in my statement, one agency, State Department was
deploying equipment that wasn't as good as other agencies were
deploying, so the countries that the State Department were in
deploying, their borders were more vulnerable because the
equipment they were deploying was not as good.
So, you know, coordination was a problem. It got better but
it is still a concern. We are still concerned that labs are not
talking to each other as they should. The agencies are not
talking to each other as they should. And we are looking at
that problem again right now.
Mr. Thompson. The other question I have speaks to whether
or not the communication between government and the private
sector is sufficient enough that we can get the latest
technology into the ports within a reasonable period of time,
or do you feel that DHS, for instance, does not move fast
enough in its implementation of this new technology? Have you
had an opportunity to look at any of that?
Mr. Aloise. Yes, we looked at deployment and it was slow in
the beginning. It is better now. The question is, a question
everyone faces, I guess at this point, do you wait until the
better technology comes along or do you deploy what you have
now? Originally this program was thought of as just another
tool for the Customs agent or border inspector. It wasn't an
end all or be all. So what we are facing now, what is the
incremental value we are going to get from this new technology
against what we have now, because the question is whether you
wait or not to deploy more equipment is a vital one.
Mr. Thompson. I guess the other issue is, protected
regardless of the technology, is there a uniform standard so
that we are not vulnerable at one point of entry, and not
vulnerable at another? Or is it that the technology is such a
state that it would render us more vulnerable? I guess that is
my point.
Mr. Aloise. The present set of equipment has limitations.
But the bottom line is that with the equipment you have some
chance of catching this material. Without it you probably have
very little chance of catching it.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. Mr. Pearce, do you
seek to be recognized?
Mr. Pearce. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Tannenbaum the
portal that you mentioned, is that the DTRA attempt to put
monitors in all of the Soviet Union sites?
Mr. Tannenbaum. That is part of it, yes.
Mr. Pearce. Are you familiar with the requirement to have
that completely done by 2007? In other words we have had about
15 years and it was supposed to be 100 percent finished by
2007.
Mr. Tannenbaum. That is correct.
Mr. Pearce. The reports I have are that it is about 30
percent done.
Mr. Tannenbaum. Again, correct.
Mr. Pearce. And the reports that I have is the 30 percent
that is done is very poorly done. In your report you are
pretty, you have--you have been very supportive of the portals,
and yet it sounds like the program is not functioning so well.
Mr. Tannenbaum. It has been, shall we say, a bad few years
for the installation of portal monitors where a lot of
negotiations on liability have been happening. And I am hopeful
that we will see things change now.
Mr. Pearce. Mr. Wagner, you indicate that we need not be
too concerned about waste. Does this waste that we see here
rise to the level that you get concerned, or is it part of what
you said, we just need to, if we try to eliminate all the
mistakes, we are not going end up with any progress. Are we
rising to the level where you are concerned?
Dr. Wagner. If you are asking, sir, about the DTRA CTR
program--
Mr. Pearce. Yes, that is what I am asking about.
Dr. Wagner. I think that no, sir, that particular one, I
don't think waste is the right way to characterize it. I agree
that the deployments have not been as effective. But I think
that the difficulties in doing contract work in Russia and
those places are so great that--
Mr. Pearce. Well, I mean we have spent the money.
Dr. Wagner. I am pleased that we have made the progress we
have. But I think it ought--I mean, I wish it were a lot faster
and a lot more--
Mr. Pearce. I understand. But if we have spent the money
and we didn't get--I just can't envision that it would be as
expensive to do that here as it is there. And if there are
problems getting it in, I can understand. But if we go ahead
and spend the money and we don't succeed, I don't understand
that.
Recently the vice president of Los Alamos labs was quoted
as saying that the future of Los Alamos labs is not nuclear
detection and security, but instead nanotechnology. Do you
agree or disagree with his statements?
Dr. Wagner. I am not sure I know--I wasn't aware of that
statement. But I would disagree. I think it is both radiation
detection, nanotechnology and a lot of other technologies that
are important for national security.
Mr. Pearce. Why do you think that he made those comments?
It makes it very difficult for us to--
Dr. Wagner. I know it does. The national labs, if I may
volunteer, the national labs, which are of crucial, although
not--they are not sufficient, but are a crucial part of working
this problem, have institutional issues that they need to deal
with. And what I mean by that is the following: That the labs
for decades have provided technology for problems like this
one, coming out of the technology base, the science
understanding that came with the nuclear weapons program, since
the Manhattan Project. The labs are concerned that programs
like the radiation detector program, will suck effort out, but
not renew that technology base. And I think that is an
important question for the labs.
Mr. Pearce. Okay. I have got one more question. Mr. Aloise,
also we have reports that the Department of Commerce is
permitting technology to be shipped out to accomplish these
oversight capabilities. But DOE is requiring certain permits
and slowing the process down by 6 months. Are you familiar with
that?
Mr. Aloise. I am not familiar with that, no, sir.
Mr. Pearce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is my last
question.
Mr. Linder. Thank you. Mr. Etheridge, do you wish to
inquire?
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do. Mr. Simmons
touched on the issue a while ago and several others have. I
tend to agree that if we could get our hands on this stuff,
especially through the Nunn-Lugar, we would be a lot better
off, and the dollars we spend there probably are the best
dollars we can spend.
But Mr. Aloise, let me ask you a question, if I may, sir.
Several have raised the issue of movement of goods, the
commerce that is so critical. People obviously want to get the
stuff here and we want to ship it out. And one of the issues
that has popped its head up as we move stuff in and out is this
whole issue of a false positive pops up with some of the
technology as important as technology is. As an example, if it
pops up in a port, you may just stop one truck. But it happened
to be at an airport, you know, you have got a much bigger
problem. Has the GAO done any kind of cost-benefit analysis on
these issues as the result of an unknown or even if it were an
unknown issue, or a medical piece, the cost of such issue?
Mr. Aloise. We have not done a cost benefit analysis, but
in our work every place we have gone we have asked that
question and we have observed operations overseas. The nuisance
alarms are a problem. And we have been at border sites at
Russia and around the world watching trucks pulled over and
gone through secondary inspections. No one has really told us
that it has impeded commerce to the point that they thought it
might at this point, even with the nuisance alarms they are
getting.
Mr. Etheridge. All right. Let me follow that up. Have you
done any examination of the cost-benefit or some of the higher
performing radiation technologies that may be out, or do you do
that?
Mr. Aloise. We have not.
Mr. Etheridge. Who does?
Mr. Aloise. We have not done that. And I am not aware of
any studies we have had along those lines. However, a lot of
the newer technologies are not to the point yet where, you
know, we would have even been there to do that yet. That is
what some of these new test beds that are developed around the
country are designed to do in Nevada starting in August.
Mr. Etheridge. Okay. Thank you. Ms. Rooney, let me ask you
a question along the same lines, if I may, because as someone
said, you are right where the rubber meets the road, where the
containers come in and out. As it relates to the containers
coming in, you mentioned earlier that you have had some, but it
was a matter of minutes, or certainly less than an hour they
would move. Do you consider such indirect cost when acquiring
the detection equipment that you buy?
You did allude to the fact that some of this was really not
designed for the heavy impacting it will take when you unload
containers, et cetera.
Ms. Rooney. We are not the purchaser or the users of
technology. It is the--
Mr. Linder. Is your mike on?
Mr. Etheridge. Turn your mike on, please.
Ms. Rooney. The Port Authority is not either the procurer
or the user of the technology. It is procured by CBP and it is
operated by CBP. So we have not done any cost-benefit analysis
as well. And as I mentioned before, we have had no complaints
of commerce being impeded as a result of these technologies.
There was grave concern when the program was first announced
that commerce would be impeded and would be slowed down, but
that has not come to be.
Mr. Etheridge. Let me just read a piece. A recent New York
Times article reported that at the port of Newark, the ports
follow system for radiation alarms are handling devices that
are supported to or supposed to determine what sets off an
alarm as a flawed device. The weakness of the devices were
apparent in Newark. One recent morning a truck whose records
indicated it was carrying brakes from Germany triggered the
portal alarm, but the back-up device could not identify the
radiation source. Without being inspected, the truck went on
its way to Ohio.
Ms. Rooney. I can't speak to the details of that particular
incident because I am not familiar with it. My understanding of
the way that CBP operates the program is if an alarm goes off
through the portal monitor, it then goes to a second inspection
where a handheld isotope identifier is used in order to
identify the actual isotope. That is then compared to the
manifest and a determination is made whether or not it could go
on. I would find it hard to believe that until the source was
identified and satisfactorily identified that that truck would
have been allowed to go on.
Mr. Etheridge. Mr. Chairman, I only read what I read in the
paper and I assume that is, but I--I know my time is expired.
Is there a record kept of those kind of things, someone keeping
the documented records, because I think that is important?
Ms. Rooney. CBP does keep the documented records of all of
the radiation alarms and their resolution.
Mr. Etheridge. And their disposition?
Ms. Rooney. Yes, sir.
Mr. Etheridge. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Gibbons.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. To our
witnesses, thank you today for being here and helping us
understand this issue greatly. I have just one question because
throughout the period of the Cold War, we have spent so much
time developing a strategy that was based on assured mass
destruction as a deterrent. What kind of deterrence do you
envision to be able to enact that would threaten somehow those
that are willing to perpetrate a disastrous event with one of
these radiological or nuclear devices in our community? How do
you create a deterrence image with--how would you do such a
thing? Dr. Wagner.
Dr. Wagner. Having lived through that Cold War, the
deterrence developed into almost a theology, as you know.
Deterrence meant in that context, deterrence by fear of
punishment. I don't think that is going to work very well
against these enemies. But there is another meaning, which is
deterrence by fear of failure.
Chairman Linder, I believe it was in his comment, said that
the terrorist would go to great lengths to be sure that he can
penetrate the defense. Deterrence by making him unsure that can
he penetrate the defense is the kind of deterrence that I think
is available and crucial for this job.
Mr. Gibbons. It seems a bit uncertain to me that those
people who are so committed to this type of a heinous act, who
have gone to such great lengths, would be so vulnerable or so
casual as to not select an avenue or a route that would allow
them to achieve their goal. They are not stupid people. They
are not people that would not, or would just take a rather
casual approach to this whole thing, but one which I believe
are very well studied. So I am not sure that that is any kind
of a deterrence at all.
Dr. Wagner. May I respond sir?
Dr. Gibbons. Yes, sir.
Dr. Wagner. I am not sure either. But no defense is going
to be absolutely sure. Do I think it is worth the money? If the
stakes weren't so high I would say it is not worth the money to
try. But the stakes are incredibly high, and so I think it is
worth the money.
Mr. Gibbons. One other issue that came to mind was the
issue about reporting for health issues. In other words,
whenever there is some kind of a radiation disease that is
noticed or recognized by a hospital or health care facility in
an individual, is there a mandatory report that has to be filed
with that so that we know somebody has been exposed? When you
are dealing with this type of material, it is a very expensive
process to avoid being exposed to this type of thing. I would
think that one of our first signs of intelligence would be some
type of a health report on somebody who is exposed, received
care for some type of radiation treatment. Is there a mandatory
report at all in any of the areas that you know about?
Dr. Wagner. I don't know whether there is or not sir, and
others may want to comment. But some of the, what are called
innocent alarms in portal monitors and other kind of radiation
monitors come from, you are quite right, people who have
received radiation treatment. It is possible to develop, in
fact, one can buy them today, isotope identification systems
that can distinguish the signature of that kind of radiation
from the signature of a bomb.
Mr. Gibbons. Well, that would be something like a
nanolever, wouldn't it, where it is coded to receive a certain
molecular or isotope?
Dr. Wagner. Some of the biological warfare programs are
intending to be molecular identifiers. In the case of
radiological treatment, health treatments, it is more detecting
the gamma rays, which is what we have been talking about here
this morning.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. Gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Markey.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Tannenbaum, first
of all, excellent study by you and Dr. Neureiter and Dr. Fetter
and Dr. Von Hippel. As you know, we sent our request to you
because there was a discrepancy between the views of many
experts who determined that the radiation portal monitors
deployed by the Department of Homeland Security were unable to
detect highly enriched uranium and assertions by Department
officials who repeatedly claimed that the portal monitor is
capable of detecting HEU. You, like so many others, came to the
conclusion that the laws of physics simply do not lend
themselves to detecting the very material that represents the
easiest pathway for a terrorist to build and detonate a
homemade nuclear weapon capable of killing tens of thousands
Americans.
Your analysis also discusses some cost effective
engineering fixes the Department could utilize in the short
term to approve the sensitivity of its equipment. Could you
please elaborate.
Mr. Tannenbaum. Certainly. We described several ways that
you could physically modify the terminals, the portal scanners.
I have since spoken with the current deployment of those
monitors and they question whether or not our recommendations
make sense. But we suggested that you decrease the distance
between the actual detector and the sample. That increases the
likelihood of measuring it. We suggest that you increase the
sampling time, meaning, you drive the truck through the portal
slower. This gives you more data to work with.
We suggest that you increase the amount of shielding around
the detector to decrease the amount of background so you can
find a real signal and get rid of all the background noise. And
finally, the algorithms that are being used right now are sort
of second generation algorithms, and I believe that there are
many ways that those can be improved.
Mr. Markey. How long do you think it would take for these
short-term fixes to be completed before entirely new detection
technology is ready?
Mr. Tannenbaum. I can't answer that question.
Mr. Markey. Let me ask this. ABC News smuggled kilogram
quantities of depleted uranium, not once but twice into the
United States. The Department of Homeland Security says the
detection problem is fixed. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Tannenbaum. I am not convinced that it is, no.
Mr. Markey. No. Dr. Wagner, you, like so many others, came
to the conclusion that detection of devices containing highly
enriched uranium is very difficult and varies widely and is
limited today to short range. Dr. Tannenbaum has said that
taking some simple short-term engineering measures such as
shielding the detector or decreasing the distance between the
container and the detector would help. Do you think the
Department of Homeland Security should take some of these or
all of these measures in the short-term while recognizing that
continued R&D might result in even better solutions long term?
Dr. Wagner. Yes, I do.
Mr. Markey. Could you elaborate.
Dr. Wagner. There is a continuum and the process is to
close off a larger and larger fraction of that continuum in the
threat space. My own view is that some of these near-term
measures of the sort that Dr. Tannenbaum mentioned ought to be
deployed, but in a relatively limited way at the highest
priority locations. And in parallel with that, R&D for even
better capability, ought to be done and deployed more widely
later.
Mr. Markey. All right. So let us just take that and parse
it a little bit. Where would those high--where would you deploy
these short-term fixes waiting for a longer term solution?
Dr. Wagner. The DOE has an analysis model that prioritizes
the risks at various locations. To first order, I think I would
follow the recommendations of that model. It is not a perfect
model. It will miss some things.
Mr. Markey. Okay. For the committees purposes could you
elaborate on where the specifics of those locations are.
Dr. Wagner. I don't know where those locations are. I like
New York City.
Mr. Markey. New York City would be on the list to have a
short-term solution.
Dr. Wagner. If I were calling the shots, yes.
Mr. Markey. Anything else that you would, off the top of
your head, put on that list?
Dr. Wagner. I would rather not give you specifics because I
haven't thought through those specifics.
Mr. Markey. Okay. Well, I thank both of you. It is very
helpful. And I think we do Mr. Chairman have to look from some
short-term solution especially for high priority targets, I
think.
Mr. Linder. I thank the gentleman. Does Mr. Lungren seek to
inquire?
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Tannenbaum you mentioned in your testimony about an Ohio-based
company that has proposed inexpensive detectors that would be
placed in cargo containers during transoceanic shipment.
Obviously, detectors would take advantage of the 10-day or
longer time to locate it. Can you tell us any more about that?
Mr. Tannenbaum. Certainly. The notion is that you have a
set of detectors that are placed in each container right before
it is shipped off across the ocean. They measure radiation.
They communicate with each other and before the ship arrives in
the port of the United States it communicates its data back to
some central location where it is interpreted and decided is
this a ship we need to intercept or is it one that can go ahead
and dock.
Mr. Lungren. Do you have any idea how far along this is in
terms of development?
Mr. Tannenbaum. This particular company claims to have a
prototype that is working and is ready to start doing some
serious scale testing.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you. Mr. Aloise, your earlier work--
Mr. Linder. Will the gentleman yield for 1 minute?
Mr. Lungren. Yes.
Mr. Linder. I would just like to ask, do you have any
estimate on cost on that?
Mr. Tannenbaum. No, I don't, sir.
Mr. Linder. Thank you. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Lungren. Anybody else on the panel aware of that? Okay.
Mr. Aloise your earlier work has identified certain weaknesses
in the effectiveness of the personal radiation detectors called
pagers.
Mr. Aloise. Right.
Mr. Lungren. It is my understanding, are Customs agents
still using these pagers in an attempt to search containers for
radiologic materials? Is this an effective use of these pagers?
Mr. Aloise. As search instruments, no. As we understand it
the Customs inspectors wear them on their belts as safety
devices. It is best used in a combination suite of equipment,
with the portals, with the grids, the isotope identifiers and
the pager. Used by itself it has limited effectiveness.
Mr. Lungren. Is it being used in concert with these others?
Mr. Aloise. Yes, as far as we know it is. But in some cases
we have seen them misused.
Mr. Lungren. What do you mean?
Mr. Aloise. Well, they were used as search instruments.
Instead of searching a truck with isotope identifier, we have
seen them search the truck with the pager, and it just does not
have the same effectiveness and is not designed to do that.
Mr. Lungren. So you are not suggesting that it is a
strategy that is proved by the Department, are you? You are
suggesting it may just be a lapse in good work product by the
people using them?
Mr. Aloise. It is a need for better training of the
equipment.
Mr. Lungren. Okay. The Department of Energy has the
Megaports Program. DHS has the Container Security Initiative.
Both place radiation monitors at foreign seaports. What is the
difference between these programs and why do we need both?
Mr. Aloise. Well, the Megaports Program is placing the
radiation detection equipment at the seaports and they have
done two so far. They have got five more underway. The CSI
program, which I am less familiar with, has got agreements with
many more ports and does a number of other things to target
containers for review.
Mr. Lungren. Dr. Wagner, you have been involved in
detection for many, many years. We have a limited budget. We
have admittedly incomplete technology right now. We have to
make some decisions. Where would you put the emphasis right
now?
Dr. Wagner. I would put it on developing detectors that can
both increase the sensitivity to the wanted--the signal
radiation from the weapon if it is there, by being larger so
that more radiation can intercept it, but can also sort out the
signal from the noise by doing very highly resolved
identification of the energies of the gamma rays. That is--
there are many, many instantiations of that general idea, and
exactly which one of those instantiations I would choose, I
can't say.
Mr. Lungren. Ms. Rooney, if you had one thing that you
needed from us, what would it be?
Ms. Rooney. Well, that is a loaded question. We do, as I
mentioned before, need to move to supply chain security
standards. And as an overall approach to cargo security, the
radiation portal monitors and the isotope identifiers and
Megaports and CSI are all parts of that.
Mr. Lungren. Well, let me ask you a question on that. And
that is with all due respect, you speak as if that is something
that can be done. Are you telling me we lose no containers at
sea, we don't lose track of them, that they are totally secure
once they are on an ocean-going vessel?
Ms. Rooney. We need to have greater assurances that we know
what is going into the container, that the container's
integrity is maintained, that we have indication of its
location of the radiation signal that is being emitted from the
container, all the way along in the supply chain, yes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Reichert.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Rooney, you
spoke of high level of false alarms, and if there is a hit, the
container is then scanned again and has a second inspection.
And I am just wondering if you are able to attach a cost for
that second inspection and who bears that cost?
Ms. Rooney. The entire program is funded and operated and
maintained by Customs and Border Protection. There is no cost
of the radiation inspection to the cargo owner or to the
trucking company, so we don't have any quantifiable numbers on
that.
Mr. Reichert. Additional personnel?
Ms. Rooney. It is all borne by Customs. We don't have any
visibility into that cost.
Mr. Reichert. So the cost is borne by Customs?
Ms. Rooney. Yes, sir.
Mr. Reichert. Can you describe to me what port security
looked like before September 11 in your world then?
Ms. Rooney. Port security prior to 9/11 was predominantly
based on theft and pilferage as opposed to national security.
We were more concerned about keeping cargo in a container and
on a facility until it was legally picked up than we were about
keeping bad stuff out of a container. So there has been a
complete change in our focus of container security.
Mr. Reichert. What kind of tools did you use then?
Ms. Rooney. There were little tools in terms of cargo
security or facility security. I mean, all of the port
facilities were secured. They had a perimeter fence. But the
threat was different. The threat profile, again, was completely
different pre-9/11 than it is today.
Mr. Reichert. Had you ever heard of RPMs?
Ms. Rooney. I personally had not, no.
Mr. Reichert. Before September 11?
Ms. Rooney. No, sir.
Mr. Reichert. I am just asking this question. The point is
that I am new to Congress and I am sitting in this hearing and
I am listening to this discussion and I think we would be
remiss to point out that this world has really changed. Your
world has really changed, and I appreciate the work that each
and every one of you are doing. We are in a transition period.
And I do agree with Dr. Wagner that there will be mistakes made
and we will spend some money that we wish we didn't have to
spend, but I think we are going to be in that process for a
while.
And with research and development that you have spoken
about, I now just want to ask this one last question, if you
can describe for me what port security will look like in 5
years or 10 years. Do you have a vision of what port security
might look like? We know where we came from and we know where
we are right now. We are trying to figure this out and here we
are talking about the things that we need to do. We might have
to place these monitors on corners of buildings as the doctor
had indicated earlier, if we really carried this thing out
further and further and further. What will port security look
like in this 5 to 10 years from now?
Ms. Rooney. Port security, from my perspective, has two
components, the physical security of the facility and the
vessels, and then the security of the cargo. The physical
security of the facilities and the vessel has been well
addressed by the Maritime Transportation Security Act. I
believe that there are more things that we can do in terms of
other threats, such as a small boat attack on a vessel, you
know, a USS Cole-type event. The Coast Guard has the--the Coast
Guard is trying to address that threat, but it is something
that is very difficult to get anyone's arms around, you know,
those types of threats.
In terms of cargo security, again, we talk about supply
chain security from origin to destination that we know a lot
more about the cargo. We don't know a lot more about the people
that are doing it. There is tremendous value in things like the
monitors and C-TPAT where there is voluntary compliance to new
standards. We believe that a container will have a lot more
security devices on board on the container, that it will have
electronic seals, that it will have tracking and trace devices,
that it will have sensors inside the container that will be
able to tell us whether there is a chemical, biological
radiological device, or whether or not a hole has been cut
inside the container.
We are fairly far along through a program, Operation Safe
Commerce, which is federally funded in developing those
technologies and coming up with the cost-benefit of those, with
the ultimate goal of not impacting the flow of commerce and
providing a cost-benefit to the shipper that there is
encouragement for the shipper to purchase this technology or
apply this technology on to their container, because there will
be some business benefit for doing that.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you very much. We now know you know
where you are going and we just have to figure out a way to
help you. And if anyone else has a comment, that would be
appreciated.
Dr. Wagner. I just want to comment. I think that was an
absolutely wonderful vision. I think radiation detection
technology can complement that vision, but it is only a
complementing function. All those things you mentioned are
really important to do. I see the radiation detection
technology part of this as doing triage while the container is
coming to the port, so that at the port the authorities at the
port can be fairly sure that certain ships and certain segments
on the ships don't have weapons. The radiation detection at the
port can then focus on those areas where there might still be a
problem, where identification, not just sensing, not just
getting a hit, as you say, but identifying what the hit is, is
highly sure and can be done very, very quickly. And I think the
radiation detection technology can be made available with R&D
to complement that vision.
Mr. Linder. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr.
McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A bit of a follow-up
on the technology. I am interested in the technology of today
and what we are capable of doing. And I see we have votes
coming up right now. Timing is everything in this game. But I
have one of the largest ports in the Nation in my district, in
Houston. Representative King led a delegation to the New York
Port Authority, you may recall that, very insightful. What I
have been told is that in 6 months, we will have radiological
sensors in place at the ports. Is that still an accurate
estimate of time? And this is probably to you, Ms. Rooney.
Ms. Rooney. My understanding in talking to my colleagues in
the port of Houston is that that is the current schedule yes,
but I am only getting that from my colleagues.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. How accurate is the technology of today
in detecting, and obviously we can't go through every cargo
container, which seems to me to be a very pragmatic way of
screening cargo. How effective is it in screening the
containers coming through?
Ms. Rooney. It does have the capability of screening 100
percent of the cargo when fully deployed. The capabilities of
the detection technology is something, you know, that Dr.
Tannenbaum and Dr. Wagner can speak of much better than I can.
Mr. McCaul. Do you care to comment, Dr. Wagner?
Dr. Wagner. I think the near-term technologies are going to
be pretty limited. But they are worth deploying for two
reasons. One is to give an attacker something more to worry
about and be some protection, but also to get experience with
actual use of even the limited technologies and actual
operations, which is really important for guiding the R&D that
will give you the better things later on.
Mr. McCaul. There is a concept, talking about R&D and the
energy windowing process. Are you familiar with that? Will that
enhance our ability to detect radiation?
Dr. Wagner. It won't help too much with the actual
detection of radiation, but it will help to you say, help a lot
with saying what is the radiation from. Is it a threat object,
an innocent alarm or natural background? That is really the key
to doing this.
Mr. McCaul. The University of Texas is in my district as
well. They are teaming with Lockheed Martin to bid on the Los
Alamos research project. What is your assessment in terms of
the sharing between the research laboratories out there and the
United States on this very issue? Is it working?
Dr. Wagner. I think sharing among the labs is not perfect,
but it is working pretty well. The government can help to
enhance the sharing by creating larger programs where the labs
aren't, in a sense, acting as contractors seeking small
contracts but are challenged with large problems. When they are
challenged with large problems they can work together.
Mr. McCaul. My final question, because I know we have to go
vote, and that is, I have the Mexican border in my home state.
What I have found in my experience at Justice was that you have
the major ports and we seem to be protecting those pretty well.
But the cartels can move contraband. They don't typically move
it through the ports. They move between the ports. And this is
really no exception. The movement of a nuclear device the size
of, say, a bale of marijuana, could be easily transported
across the border. And I know we can't be 100 percent safe in
everything. Where are we with the technology with these sensors
to detect between the ports of entry where we are most
vulnerable to a terrorist threat? Where is the technology today
with that?
Dr. Wagner. I think that within 5 or 6 years it might be
possible to build a sensor that could be put into a rather
large helicopter, like a Chinook, which I once flew around in
with radiation detectors in northern Canada trying to find
pieces of Cosmos 954, but much, much better, so that grid
patterns could be flown over low air grade at low altitude. But
certainly man-portable devices that would have to be made of
plutonium which would be light enough to smuggle in easily in
that way.
Mr. McCaul. We are moving towards that?
Dr. Wagner. Not as fast as we should.
Mr. McCaul. I thank you for your time here today. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. I want to thank the panel. Your testimony has
not only been interesting, but it has been helpful. We
appreciate it. You are excused. Thank you very much.
We have a 15-minute vote and four 5-minute votes. We will
ask the next panel to join us at about 4:45. Thank you all.
[Recess.]
Mr. Linder. We will reconvene this hearing. If you could
keep your statements to 5 minutes, thank you for being here.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Oxford, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, Department of Homeland Security.
STATEMENT OF VAYL OXFORD
Mr. Oxford. Good afternoon, Chairman Linder, Chairman King
and ranking members and members of the subcommittees. Thank you
for the opportunity to come before you today to show the
progress we have made in developing and deploying new
technology to protect the Nation from a terrorist nuclear or
radiological threat.
Today I will discuss several topics related to the use of
technology in the detection of nuclear and radiological
materials that could be used in a terrorist attack.
Specifically, I will discuss the Department's formation of the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, or DNDO, as you have heard
referred to it previously, and its near-term nuclear detection,
development and deployment strategy, as well as some of the
current DHS deployments. I will also address the various
detection technologies that we are currently developing and the
technology development and deployment model that we hope to use
in the future.
Before describing the Department's efforts, I would first
like to point out that protecting the United States from
nuclear threats is a job that extends beyond DHS. I would like
to thank my partners who are here today from the Department of
Defense and the Department of Energy for their contributions in
developing and deploying technologies to protect the Nation.
First, let me address the creation of DNDO. Combating the
threat of catastrophic destruction and loss of life posed by
terrorists possessing and using nuclear or radiological weapons
is one of the most critical priorities of the Nation. In order
to integrate the Department's efforts against this threat under
a singular direction, as well as to coordinate these efforts
with the partners with me today and others across the
government, the President established the DNDO.
This new office is chartered with developing a global
nuclear detection architecture and strategy and acquiring and
supporting the deployment of the domestic detection system to
detect or report attempts to import or transport a nuclear
device or fissile or radiological material intended for illicit
use.
Let me say a few words about the detection deployment
strategy that we have in mind. No single detection layer can
prevent a terrorist from importing nuclear or radiological
material with intent to harm the Nation. Therefore, partnering
with other government agencies and the private sector, we must
create coordinated, robust layers of defense.
While technology is a critical tool to combat nuclear
terrorism, we recognize that this threat is not one that can
effectively be done by technology alone. Accordingly, while the
DNDO is allocating considerable funding to research,
development and acquisition, we are also dedicating resources
to the people and infrastructure required to develop a fully
integrated operating environment.
We will ultimately have the ability to fuse detection data
and intelligence assessments in a near real-time environment to
maintain an overall system and situational awareness. This
integrated approach to detection and information analysis will
ultimately provide substantial improvement in alarm resolution,
threat assessments, data trend analysis, and, most importantly,
overall probability of mission success.
Regarding current DHS deployments, even as we develop next-
generation technologies, we are in the process of deploying
several commercially available technologies to the field. For
example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection has made rapid
progress with the radiation portal monitoring program, which
deploys commercially available radiation detectors to the
Nation's official ports-of-entry. The Coast-Guard also has
begun deployments of personal radiation detectors and more
advanced handheld detectors for use in detection and
characterization of radiological materials.
Technology itself is being pursued in several venues.
Recent reports have been published in the media questioning the
overall capability of currently deployed detection equipment.
Contrary to public perception that, that detection equipment is
not sensitive enough, the actual primary limitation of today's
systems is one of discrimination and shielding. Specifically,
today's equipment lacks a refined capability to rapidly
determine the type of radioactive material it detects.
Operationally, this leads to higher nuisance alarm rates, or
those alarms that must be resolved by further inspection.
Because false alarm rates are a direct function of probability
of detection, the operators must make operationally driven
decisions when deploying and operating currently available
systems.
To overcome these limitations, we are investing substantial
resources in the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal program that is
focused on developing detectors that will be able to
discriminate between naturally occurring radioactive materials
and threat materials. This level of discrimination will allow
systems to operate at a substantially lower detection
threshold, while simultaneously offsetting the subsequent
operational constraints associated with the current systems.
However, passive detection systems are ultimately limited
by physical properties of the radiation they are designed to
detect, specifically with regard to range of detection. The
problem is confounded by the sufficient amounts of high-density
shielding materials, such as lead or steel, that can act as
effective measures to prevent the emissions of detectable
amounts of radiation.
Radiography systems can, however, overcome this limitation
by providing images of the contents of the container to
identify areas of high density that are potentially indicative
of shielding materials. An integrated passive detection and
radiography system would, then, be capable of detecting either
the unshielded materials that are emitting radiation, or
detecting the materials that are used to shield the material
itself.
Active interrogation systems can further alleviate
detection limitations by probing or interrogating containers to
induce additional measurable detection signatures. A number of
methods are currently under investigation and are currently in
a prototype development and demonstration phase, including
systems which ``interrogate'' containers with either neutron or
gamma rays.
Let me talk next about the RDT&E process and model that we
hope to use. I would like to discuss a little bit more in that
context the ASP Program, the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal
program, that I mentioned previously.
The model that DNDO will use was, first of all, initiated
based on an operational requirement from Customs for a more
capable portable monitoring system to be deployed at the
borders. There are currently 10 R&D efforts under way that will
culminate late this summer with a high-fidelity test and
evaluation campaign to take place at our new Radiological and
Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex at the
Nevada Test Site where each of these developed systems will be
fully evaluated against one another as well as against
currently deployed systems. Based on the results of these
tests, a limited number of vendors will be selected to begin
initial low-rate production of detection systems to be deployed
at the border. Meanwhile, operational testing of these systems
will begin taking place at the Countermeasures Test Bed in New
York and New Jersey.
This comprehensive technology development program will
guarantee that capable radiological portal monitors, with known
performance characteristics, are being deployed to implement
the baseline domestic detection architecture. The bottom line
is, only after extensive testing is complete and performance is
characterized will acquisition and deployment decisions be
made.
In conclusion, the DNDO has taken a comprehensive approach
to addressing the threats posed by a nuclear attack. This
approach, which begins with focused research and development
and culminates in high-fidelity test and evaluation campaigns,
provides the basis for the Department to make informed,
justifiable acquisition decisions. Equally important, the DNDO
recognizes that the deployment of these technologies must be
done as part of an overall larger strategy, one that extends to
overseas deployments executed by the other agencies.
Ultimately, all of these systems must be connected and work
within an environment that is responsive to information gained
from the intelligence, counterterrorism and law enforcement
communities.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be glad
to answer any further questions.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Oxford.
[The statement of Mr. Oxford follows:]
Prepared Opening Statement of Vayl Oxford
Introduction
Good afternoon, Chairmen Linder and King, Ranking Members Langevin
and Pascrell, and distinguished members of the subcommittees. I thank
you for the opportunity to come before you today to share the progress
we have made in developing and deploying new technology to protect the
Nation from a terrorist nuclear or radiological attack.
My name is Vayl Oxford. I am the Acting Director of the Department
of Homeland Security's newly created Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
(DNDO). Additionally, I am currently serving as the Acting Director of
the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency within the DHS
Science and Technology Directorate. Prior to this, I have also held
positions at the National Security Council and with the DoD's Defense
Threat Reduction Agency.
Today, I will discuss several topics related to the use of
technology in the detection of nuclear and radiological materials that
could be used in a terrorist attack. Specifically, I will discuss the
Department's formation of the DNDO and its nuclear detection deployment
strategy, as well as current DHS deployments. I will also address the
various detection technologies that we are currently working to develop
and deploy and the program model that we are following, using the
Advanced Spectroscopic Portal monitor program as an example.
Before describing the Department's efforts, I would first like to
point out that protecting the United States from nuclear threats is a
job that extends beyond the work of DHS, and I would like to thank my
partners who are here today from the Departments of Defense and Energy
for the contributions that their organizations are also making to
develop and deploy technologies to protect the Nation.
Creating the DNDO
Combating the threat of catastrophic destruction and loss of life
posed by terrorists possessing nuclear or radiological weapons is one
of the most critical priorities of DHS. In order to integrate the
Department's efforts against this threat under a singular direction, as
well as coordinate these efforts with the partners with me here today
and others across the government, Secretary Chertoff provided
notification to the Committee on April 13 of this year, of his intent
to establish the DNDO.
On April 15, 2005, the President signed a joint presidential
directive establishing the office, NSPD-43/HSPD-14, ``Domestic Nuclear
Detection''. This new office is chartered with developing a global
nuclear detection architecture and acquiring and supporting a
deployment of the domestic detection system to detect and report
attempts to import or transport a nuclear device or fissile or
radiological material intended for illicit use.
DNDO Detection Deployment Strategy
No single detection layer alone can prevent a terrorist from
importing nuclear or radiological material with the intent to harm the
Nation. Therefore, partnering with other government agencies and the
private sector, we must create a well coordinated, robust layered
defense with built-in redundancies.
While technology is a critical tool to combat terrorism, we
recognize that this threat is not one that can be effectively overcome
by technology alone. That is why we must work hand-in-hand with well
trained Federal, State, Tribal, and local law enforcement agencies, as
well as the larger intelligence and counterterrorism communities.
Accordingly, while the DNDO is allocating considerable funding to
technology research, development, and acquisition, we are also
dedicating significant resources to the people and infrastructure
required to develop a fully integrated operating environment. We will
ultimately have the ability to fuse detection data and intelligence
assessments in a near real-time environment to maintain an overall
system and situational awareness. While this plan will require the DNDO
to interact closely with the Intelligence Community as a developer of
intelligence requirements and consumer of intelligence products, the
DNDO will not act as an intelligence collection agency. This integrated
approach to detection and information analysis will ultimately provide
substantial improvement in alarm resolution, threat assessments, data
trend analysis, and, most importantly, overall probability of mission
success.
Current DHS Deployments
As next-generation technologies are being developed, the Department
is already in the process of deploying several commercially available
technologies to the field For example, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection has made rapid progress with their Radiation Portal Monitor
Program, which deploys commercially-available radiation detectors to
the Nation's official Ports-of-Entry (POE). CBP has already deployed
detectors to international mail facilities and major POEs along the
Northern Border. Additionally, CBP officers are equipped with personal
radiation detectors, pager-like devices that indicate the presence of
radioactive materials. The U.S. Coast Guard has also begun deployments
of these same personal radiation detectors and more-advanced handheld
detectors for use in the detection and characterization of radiological
materials.
Technical Approaches to Detecting Nuclear Materials
Recent reports have been published in the media questioning the
overall capability of currently deployed detection equipment. Contrary
to public perception that detection equipment is not sensitive enough,
the actual primary limitation of today's systems is one of
discrimination. Specifically, today's equipment lacks a refined
capability to rapidly determine the type of radioactive materials it
detects. Operationally, this leads to higher ``nuisance alarm'' rates--
the number of alarms that must be resolved by further inspection.
Because false alarm rates are a direct function of the probability of
detection, the operators are being forced to make operationally-driven
decisions when deploying and operating the currently available
technologies.
To overcome these limitations, the DNDO is currently investing
substantial resources to the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP)
program, which is focused on developing detectors which will be able to
discriminate between naturally occurring radioactive materials and true
threat materials. So, rather than alarming when any radiation is
detected, whether it is emitting from granite tiles or a nuclear
weapon, these new systems will be able to determine, ``yes, there is
radiation present, but the radiation signature matches that of
naturally occurring radioactive materials and not special nuclear
materials or radiological threat materials, and, therefore, is not a
threat.'' This level of discrimination will allow the systems to
operate at a substantially lower detection threshold, while
simultaneously offsetting the subsequent operational constraints
associated with the current-generation systems.
However, ``passive'' detection systems are ultimately limited by
the physical properties of the radiation that they are designed to
detect, specifically with regard to range of detection. The problem is
exacerbated by the fact that sufficient amounts of high-density
``shielding'' materials, such as lead or steel, can act as an effective
measure to prevent the emission of detectable amounts of radiation.
Radiography systems, similar to x-ray machines, can, however,
overcome this limitation by providing density images of the contents of
a container to identify areas of high density that are potentially
indicative of shielding materials. An integrated passive detection and
radiography system would, then, be capable of either directly detecting
unshielded materials that are emitting radiation, or detecting the
materials used to shield materials and prevent radiation emission.
``Active interrogation systems'' can further alleviate detection
limitations by probing, or ``interrogating,'' containers to induce
additional measurable detection signatures. A number of methods are
currently under investigation, including systems which ``interrogate''
containers with either neutrons or gamma rays. However, current systems
are still in a prototype development and demonstration phase, and
design and performance obstacles must be overcome to substantially
reduce the size and cost of systems if they are to be widely deployed.
Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation to Advance the State-of-the
Art
I would like to discuss in a little more depth the Advanced
Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program, which I mentioned previously, in
order to explain the model that the DNDO will use for all technology
development and acquisition programs. The ASP program was initiated in
direct response to a CBP requirement for more capable radiation portal
monitors to be deployed at the borders. The Homeland Security Advanced
Research Projects Agency, or HSARPA, then issued two Broad Agency
Announcements and awarded contracts to ten private industry
participants for the development of these portals; these contracts have
subsequently been transferred to the DNDO. These efforts will culminate
late this summer with an extensive high-fidelity test and evaluation
campaign to take place at the Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures
Test and Evaluation Complex (Rad/NucCTEC) at the Nevada Test Site
(NTS), where the developed systems will be evaluated against one
another, as well as currently-deployed systems. Based on the results of
these tests, a limited number of vendors will be selected to begin
initial low-rate production of detection systems to be deployed at the
border. These first deployments will provide an opportunity for
operational test and evaluation of the systems, the results of which
will be provided to the design and production team for incorporation
into subsequent spiral developments. This comprehensive technology
development program will guarantee that capable radiation portal
monitors with known performance characteristics are being deployed to
implement the baseline domestic detection architecture.
This program highlights a unique DHS asset that I believe is
critical to the overall success of the DNDO research and development
efforts. The Rad/NucCTEC, currently under construction at NTS, has been
developed to ensure a high-fidelity test and evaluation cycle for all
technologies developed and transitioned to operational end-users. The
facility is being built in close proximity to the Department of
Energy's Device Assembly Facility, or DAF, to leverage its ability to
handle significant quantities of special nuclear materials (SNM). The
RadNucCTEC will be authorized to handle SNM for the purpose of testing
developed technologies against actual samples of these materials which
provide the greatest threat to the Nation for use in a nuclear attack.
Until the construction of this facility, no location existed which
allowed access to these quantities of materials while maintaining the
flexibility to place these materials into relevant threat scenarios and
cargo configurations. Once completed, the complex will provide the
Nation with a unique capability that will bridge the gap between
``bench-top testing'' preformed by developers and operational field
testing conducted during pilot deployments.
Conclusion
The DNDO has taken an end-to-end approach to systems development
and technology improvement. By integrating research and development
efforts with a comprehensive test and evaluation program that
ultimately leads to an informed systems acquisition and deployment
process, the DNDO is working to provide the Nation with a continuously
improving capability to protect against a terrorist nuclear attack.
The DNDO has taken a comprehensive approach to addressing the
threat posed by a terrorist nuclear attack. This approach, which begins
with focused research and development programs that culminate in high
fidelity test and evaluation campaigns, provide the basis for the
Department to make informed and justifiable acquisition decisions.
Equally important, the DNDO recognizes that the deployment of these
technologies must be done as part of a larger strategy, one that
extends to overseas deployments executed by other agencies. Ultimately,
all of these systems must be connected and work within an environment
that responds to information obtained from intelligence,
counterterrorism, and law enforcement communities.
I am proud to have shared with you today how the Department and its
interagency partners will work within the DNDO to continue to make
progress against this very real threat. I look forward to working with
you on these subcommittees in a continuing effort to confront this
threat to the Nation.
This concludes my prepared statement. With the committee's
permission, I request my formal statement be submitted for the record.
[Chairmen, Congressmen Langevin and Pascrell, and Members of the
Subcommittees, I thank you for your attention and will be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Huizenga.
STATEMENT OF DAVID HUIZENGA, ASSISTANT DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL PROTECTION AND COOPERATION, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Huizenga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and other members of
the committee, for inviting me to testify today.
I will be discussing the Department of Energy's role in the
interagency effort to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack
against this country. I will focus on the role of my office,
the Office of International Material Protection and
Cooperation, as part of this larger, coordinated effort.
Our mission is to enhance U.S. national security by
reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear
terrorism. We pursue this mission in two broad areas.
The first line of defense, our first goal is to secure
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material by upgrading
security at vulnerable sites at international locations. We
focus on the Russian Federation and other countries of greatest
concern to U.S. national security. By working to secure these
materials and weapons at the point of origin, we are making
significant progress toward denying terrorists the essential
element of a nuclear weapon, the fissile material. Securing the
material is a top priority of the Bush administration, and we
have now completed security upgrades at over 75 percent of the
sites in Russia and the former Soviet Union. We are building a
momentum from the recent Bush-Putin Summit and are poised to
accelerate these critical activities in the upcoming months.
The second line of defense, the second mission, basically,
is to prevent smuggling of nuclear and radiological material at
international seaports, airports and land border crossings. The
Second Line of Defense, or SLD, program, is dedicated to this
program. At the committee's request, the Second Line of Defense
program is the focus of my testimony today.
The SLD program has two parts. The Core Program focuses on
securing material primarily in Russia and other former Soviet
States, Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean region; and the
second part, the Megaports Initiative, which we had some
discussion of earlier today. It is a 2-year-old effort to equip
major international seaports with radiation detection equipment
to screen cargo containers bound for the U.S.
The implementation of the SLD program involves deploying a
suite of equipment, including fixed radiation portal monitors
and associated communications system, as well as handheld
equipment for secondary searches. This equipment is part of an
overall system that includes initial site surveys, installation
of the equipment followed by acceptance, testing and
calibration of these radiological detection monitors. We
provide extensive training on the use of the equipment to
assure the long-term reliability. This training is essential
since the very best equipment is ineffective if it is ignored,
incorrectly calibrated, improperly maintained or easily
bypassed by corrupt or incompetent operators.
The centerpiece and workhorse of the SLD effort is the
radiation portal monitor, RPM. Currently, we deploy monitors
that use plastic scintillators to detect gamma signatures and
helium 3 tubes to detect neutrons. The purpose of the
technology is to detect special nuclear material, in particular
plutonium and uranium. These monitors will also detect
radiological materials suitable for use in a radiological
dispersal device or a dirty bomb.
I am aware of and somewhat disappointed in the recent
criticism of the U.S. efforts to deploy radiation portal
monitors both here at home and abroad. I want to be clear at
the outset, over the last several years these portals have
proven their value on many locations, and I expect they will
continue to do so well into the future.
The gravity of the potential consequences of elicit
trafficking in nuclear material requires that we deploy and
employ all of the tools available to us now, while, of course,
seeking to update and improve our efforts as new technologies
emerge.
Certainly, as you have heard, there are issues, both
domestic and international. We face these challenges in
deploying this equipment. I have discussed these challenges in
some detail in my written statement, and I will briefly
summarize here.
First, certain configurations of shielded HEU are difficult
or impossible to detect. Intense R&D work is going on, as Vayl
Oxford has pointed out. Currently, the best solution is the
overlapping use of existing RPMs in conjunction with the
imaging technology to reveal anomalies within the container's
contents.
The second challenge is to quickly and effectively
distinguish the NORM alarms from special nuclear material.
Currently, the best solution is various types of energy
windowing used by both Customs and the Second Line of Defense
program to eliminate a significant number of NORM alarms and
then do secondary inspections to eliminate the rest.
Spectroscopic portal monitors may help with this problem.
However, the data on the portal monitors is being collected,
and we await the results.
The third challenge is transshipment, finding ways to scan
the container traffic at a port that moves from ship to ship or
ship to shore and then to ship and doesn't pass through a
checkpoint. As the program gains experience, we are finding
innovative ways to solve this problem.
In the port of Freeport, for example, we are using a
straddle carrier, which is a device that is pointed out on the
left-hand side of the picture over here that is used to carry
containers around in the port. We put monitors, both
spectroscopic and plastic monitors, on this straddle carrier;
and we are driving this around the port to make sure we are
screening the cargo that doesn't actually go through an entry
and exit gate.
SLD, the program is working closely with the Department of
Homeland Security to develop solutions to these issues. We are
engaged in cooperative efforts with several offices, including
the DNDO office and the Customs and Border Protection Office of
Field Operations and the Office of International Affairs. We
routinely exchange information, data and lessons learned with
our counterparts at CBP. We are also providing training courses
at the Pacific Northwest Laboratory facility, the HAMMER
facility, for CBP officers and foreign customs officers as
well. Finally, we work closely with the SNT office to share
implementation challenges and seek promising solutions.
I have addressed the effectiveness of the technology but
for context need to point out something that our trainers
always tell both the U.S. and foreign customs officers.
Equipment supplements the skill of the officers but does not
replace it. These officers must use all that they have learned
about human behavior, suspicious activities and smuggling
techniques in order to make the technology most effective.
Alert and effectively trained officials using the best
equipment available will always be our strongest protection
against illicit trafficking.
I would like to close by reiterating what I stated earlier.
While we are focused on technological challenges in our hearing
today, there are a lot these monitors can and are doing. They
can detect radiological materials. They can detect shielded
plutonium and certain configurations of shielded HEU. They have
proven to work reliably in a variety of extreme field
conditions.
An example pointed out recently by our Russian Customs
Ministry informed us that the second line of defense in Russian
monitors deployed along the Russian border recorded 14,000 hits
last year. Two hundred of these cases involved potential
attempts to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials. That is
200 cases that would not have been discovered and investigated
but for the presence of the radiation portal monitors.
Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions you
have.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Huizenga.
[The statement of Mr. Huizenga follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Huizenga
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for inviting
me to testify before you today. I would also like to express my
appreciation for the efforts of my colleagues from the Departments of
State, Defense and Homeland Security. I will be discussing the role of
the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) in the interagency effort to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack
against this country. More specifically, I will focus on the role of my
office, the Office of International Material Protection and
Cooperation, as a part of this larger, coordinated effort.
The mission of the NNSA's Office of International Material
Protection and Cooperation is to enhance U.S. national security by
reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. We
pursue this mission by improving the security measures protecting
weapons-usable material and by enhancing radiation detection and
proliferation interdiction capabilities at key transit points including
international border crossings and large ports of call. My group
implements these critical programs in Russia and other states of the
former Soviet Union (FSU) and in other countries around the world.
The first goal of my office is to secure nuclear weapons and
weapons-usable nuclear materials by upgrading security at vulnerable
nuclear sites. We focus on efforts in the Russian Federation and other
countries of greatest concern to U.S. national security. By working to
secure nuclear material and weapons at the point of origin, we continue
to make important strides toward denying terrorists and states of
concern the essential element of a nuclear weapon: the fissile
material. As you know, securing nuclear material is a top priority of
the Bush Administration, and we have now completed security upgrades at
over 75% of the sites containing nuclear materials and nuclear weapons
in Russia and the FSU.
The second goal of my office is to prevent smuggling of nuclear and
radiological material at international seaports, airports and land
border crossings. The Second Line of Defense program or SLD is
dedicated to this important effort. At the Committee's request, the SLD
program will be the focus of my testimony today.
The SLD program has two parts. The Core Program focuses on securing
border crossings in Russia and other former Soviet States, Eastern
Europe, the Mediterranean region and other key countries. The second
part of our SLD program, the Megaports Initiative, equips major
international seaports with radiation detection equipment to screen
cargo containers for dangerous materials.
Implementation of the SLD program involves deploying a suite of
equipment including fixed radiation portal monitors and an associated
communications system, as well as hand held equipment for secondary
searches of shipping containers.
I would like to emphasize that the nuclear detection technology
deployed by the SLD program is part of an overall system. This overall
system includes site surveys to determine the best placement of the
monitors at major transit points, and vulnerability assessments to
determine the potential efficiency of this technology at the particular
site. Once the technology has been installed, we perform extensive
acceptance testing and calibration of the radiation detection monitors.
We also work with the host country government to provide extensive
training on the most effective use of the installed equipment. This
training program includes specifics on incident response procedures,
requirements for maintenance and technical support, and long-term
sustainability planning. This systematic approach recognizes that the
effectiveness of the installed equipment is fundamentally determined by
how it is used on the ground by host country personnel. The very best
equipment available is ineffective if it is ignored, incorrectly
calibrated, improperly maintained or easily bypassed by corrupt or
incompetent operators. Therefore, the fundamental objectives of the SLD
program include ensuring that our equipment is operated properly and
effectively by the host country. We seek to ensure that the host
country understands how to maintain the equipment after U.S. assistance
has ended. We also work to ensure that the equipment, particularly the
communication system, is minimally susceptible to corruption at these
foreign locations.
The centerpiece of every Core and Megaport installation is the
radiation portal monitor or RPM. Currently, we deploy monitors that use
plastic scintillators to detect gamma signatures and Helium 3 tubes to
detect neutrons. The purpose of this technology is to detect special
nuclear material (SNM), in particular plutonium and uranium enriched to
levels of 20% or higher in the isotope U-235. Equipment targeting this
SNM will also detect other radioactive materials suitable for use in
radiological dispersal devices.
To understand how the RPMs work, it is important to understand the
interface between the detector and communication system. Our
communications systems will graph the gamma or neutron signal detected
by the RPM and help the operators identify what type of alarm has
occurred and where it seems to be located. If the RPM signals an alarm,
hand held equipment is then used to further localize the alarm and to
identify the specific radioisotopes that caused the alarm.
Determination of the specific isotopes involved and their specific
location is important because a number of common materials such as
ceramic tile and kitty litter, in large quantities, may signal an alarm
due to their relatively high concentration of radioisotopes. We call
these `NORM' alarms, for `naturally occurring radioactive material'
alarms. In addition, individuals who have recently had certain medical
treatments involving radiation may trigger an alarm. In these cases,
secondary inspections allow us to identify the actual nature of the
alarm.
Distinguishing ``NORM'' and medical alarms from actual instances of
illicit trafficking is one of a number of technological challenges
facing the operators of this equipment, in any location. For this
reason, there are a number of critics of U.S. efforts to deploy
radiation portal monitoring both here at home and abroad. I want to be
clear, however, at the outset that these portals have proven their
value on many occasions and I expect that they will continue to do so
well into the future. The gravity of the potential consequences of
illicit trafficking in nuclear material requires that we employ all of
the tools available to us now, updating and improving them as new
technologies emerge.
Now to the challenges we all face in deploying this equipment.
Serious concerns have been raised about the efficacy of RPMs in three
key areas.
First, certain configurations of shielded highly-enriched uranium
(HEU) can be very difficult to detect. This issue is of great concern.
Intense work is ongoing in laboratories and commercial arenas to
develop solutions to this challenge. The Bush Administration is making
substantial investments in an interagency research and development
(R&D) program in nuclear detection technology coordinated by the
recently created Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) at the
Department of Homeland Security. I am sure my colleague from DHS will
discuss these R&D efforts in greater detail.
Until these R&D efforts improve the detection of well-shielded HEU,
the best solution is overlapping the use of existing RPMs in
conjunction with imaging technology that reveal anomalies within a
container's contents. A trained operator can pinpoint areas of concern
within a suspicious shipping container or vehicle using imaging
technology and reveal a potential effort to shield HEU. Such imaging
equipment is present or will be soon in many U.S. and foreign ports.
Once imaging technology reveals a potential anomaly within a
container, the container can be searched, or an active interrogation
device can bombard the specific area of concern with a neutron signal
revealing more information as to the nature of the potential threat.
These active interrogation devices currently exist as prototypes, and
we believe they will become commercially available within the next few
years. I would like to note that the combination of imaging equipment
and RPMs is what DHS's Container Security Initiative (CSI) and SLD
provide cooperatively to foreign ports. Put another way, our joint
efforts maximize the possibility of the detection of trafficking in
nuclear materials.
The second technological challenge faced by users of portal
monitors is finding ways to quickly and correctly distinguish `NORM'
alarms from actual illicit trafficking in nuclear materials in order to
minimize the need for time and resource-consuming secondary
inspections. International port operators and foreign governments as
well as our own domestic ports are sensitive to the fact that these
nuisance alarms can and do slow down the flow of traffic and commerce.
We have developed number of ways to address this particular challenge.
Energy windowing (EW) is a method that U.S. Customs is using to reduce
the number of `NORM' alarms so as to allow more effective deployment of
RPMs. This approach entails specific algorithms that sort out alarms on
the basis of the fact that norm alarms generally have higher gamma
signals than special nuclear material. SLD currently uses a version of
EW that works well on our monitors by which the monitors are configured
for increased sensitivity to the low gamma energies of HEU. This
approach also reduces the number of NORM alarms. We are currently
working with Customs to compare these two approaches and to ensure the
highest possible standards for effectiveness.
Another promising approach for resolving `NORM' alarms is the
development and use of spectroscopic portals. These portals essentially
provide a means to identify the presence of nuclear material and to
identify the type of radioisotope present by means of a fixed monitor.
Although these portals will not, unfortunately, have increased
``intrinsic'' SNM sensitivity, they may be useful for quickly
distinguishing alarms caused when approved or naturally occurring
radioactive materials are found in cargo or vehicles. This potential
increased operational effectiveness may allow the monitors to be set at
a lower threshold, thus allowing for greater sensitivity. The potential
improvement in sensitivity may or may not be significant. Until these
monitors are completed and tested, it is impossible to know for sure.
We are currently studying their use for secondary inspections in cases
where a large spectroscopic portal will be more effective than the
currently available hand-held identifiers.
Such spectroscopic portals are currently under development and will
be tested by DHS later this summer. If these tests are successful, SLD
hopes to work through DHS to procure a number of these spectroscopic
portals and then put them in secondary inspection locations in selected
ports around the world. Operational testing under real deployment
conditions will help us determine the true effectiveness of the
monitors in the field. We hope that providing more extensive field-
testing for this DHS-led effort will be another exemplary example of US
interagency cooperation in the area of nuclear detection. It is
important to note that these spectroscopic portals are estimated to be
approximately eight times more expensive than the RPMs currently
deployed by SLD. Unfortunately, scintillation crystals with sufficient
sensitivity and sufficient resolution to be effective in these
spectroscopic portals are very costly and currently unavailable in
large quantities.
SLD is deploying a specialized version of the spectroscopic
detector as part of a pilot project in a selected port. In this effort,
a straddle carrier stripped of its lifting equipment has been outfitted
with plastic scintillators, neutron detectors, NaI detector systems
(spectroscopic detectors), and other equipment to allow the modified
straddle carrier to travel through rows of containers for successive
screenings. We expect to learn more about spectroscopic detector
capability from this specialized effort to solve the problem of
transshipment, which is containers that don't come into a port through
a gate, but rather are moved from ship to ship or ship to shore to
ship.
This issue of transshipment leads into the third challenge that
impacts the effectiveness of portal monitors--monitor placement. For
these monitors to work, they must be appropriately spaced, and vehicles
of all types must move through them within certain specified speeds.
This is not generally a problem for gate traffic, but large ports may
not be configured with choke points where portals can be effectively
deployed to screen the transshipped cargo, which is moving through the
port from one ship to another.
Such difficulties present serious deployment challenges. However,
as we gain valuable implementation experience in a variety of
environments and as new technology develops, we fully expect that our
ability to screen cargo effectively will improve. R&D efforts may
contribute to solving the current challenges we face. For example, in
addition to the straddle carrier which is being implemented, a crane-
mounted monitor may eventually be developed to facilitate the screening
of transshipped cargo. We are also taking new and creative approaches
to strategic deployment of RPMs and the technology that we do have at
our disposal right now. For example, in addition to the large
transshipment hubs, SLD is working to install equipment at feeder ports
in designated high threat locations, where most of the traffic comes
through the gate and can be screened entirely before it moves into the
maritime system.
In confronting these challenges and developing solutions to them,
SLD works closely with DHS. We are engaged in active cooperative
efforts with several offices including DNDO and various components of
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) including the Office of Field
Operations and the Container Security Initiative. We routinely exchange
information, data, and lessons learned with our counterparts in CBP.
Additionally, we provide joint training courses at the HAMMER training
facility at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory for CBP officers
and foreign customs officials. Commissioner Bonner and NNSA Deputy
Administrator Paul Longsworth signed a Memorandum of Understanding on
12 April to formalize this relationship.
Let me address a final concern that has been raised about the
portals--the variability in the detection capabilities of the portal
monitors that are being deployed in domestic and international
settings. Although DHS/CBP and SLD are deploying different portal
monitor models, they target essentially the same amounts of material.
Recent comparison tests conducted by DOE and DHS indicate that when SLD
and CBP radiation detection monitors are set to operate at thresholds
that would produce acceptable nuisance alarm rates in an operational
cargo setting, they demonstrate similar detection capabilities. In
other words, in operational settings, the two types of monitors are
operating at similar levels of effectiveness.
I have attempted to address the issue of efficiency of technology
while still keeping the place of the technology in perspective within
the larger system of inspection, detection and identification. On that
point, I would remind you of something that our trainers always remind
both the U.S. and foreign customs, border protection, and port
authority officers during training at DOE facilities. Equipment
supplements the skill of the officers but does not replace it. These
officers must use all that they have learned about human behavior,
suspicious activities and smuggling techniques and patterns in order to
make technology most effective. Alert and effectively-trained officials
in foreign and domestic facilities using the best equipment available
will always be our strongest protection against illicit trafficking in
nuclear materials.
I'd like to close by saying that, while we focused on technological
challenges today, there is a lot these monitors can do: they can detect
radiological materials, they can detect plutonium, and they can detect
HEU. They can also detect shielded plutonium and many configurations of
shielded HEU. They are proven to work in a variety of field conditions.
As an example, Nikolai Kravchenko, our counterpart in the Russian
Customs Ministry, recently informed us that these monitors deployed
along the Russian border recorded 14,000 ``hits'' last year. Some 200
of these cases involve potential attempts to smuggle nuclear or
radiological materials. That's 200 cases they would not have discovered
nor be investigating without these monitors that the Second Line of
Defense program has installed.
Finally, I would like to reiterate the strong and deepening
relationship with State, DHS, DoD and other agencies participating in
this effort to improve our nuclear and radiological detection
capabilities. We share the common objective of preventing terrorists
and states of concern from obtaining and smuggling nuclear materials
and work closely with other USG agencies in the implementation of the
program. The unique capabilities of each Department and agency are
being leveraged to accomplish this objective.
Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Evenson.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL K. EVENSON, ACTING DIRECTOR, COMBAT
SUPPORT DIRECTORATE, DTRA, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Evenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Linder, Congressman Langevin, distinguished
members, it is an honor for me to be here this afternoon to
discuss the effectiveness of radiation portal monitors and
other technologies to detect smuggled nuclear and radiological
materials. I will summarize my statement and ask that it be
included in its entirety in the record.
DTRA conducted the Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense
program, UNWD as we refer to it, as directed by Congress in the
2002 defense appropriations bill, and installed four test beds
to demonstrate nuclear protection systems at four different
U.S. military bases. We used existing technology, as directed.
For almost any ``bright'' materials, i.e., medical and
industrial, those probably used in a radiological dispersal
device, the existing portal monitors that were installed will
detect unshielded material, both at fixed and at highway
speeds. The detectors were somewhat effective against these
types of materials even if moderately shielded. However, for
special nuclear materials, the detectors are not as effective.
We have also conducted numerous tests at the Technical
Evaluation and Assessment Monitoring Site, the TEAMS facility,
at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico, and conducted red team
exercises against all four bases.
Our observations are that when the concept of operation, or
CONOPS, is followed rigorously by the personnel at the portals,
the protection scheme is 100 percent effective against all
unshielded materials.
We also developed detectors that detected at highway speeds
over 55 miles an hour. We developed detectors that detected
over water on small craft, 35- to 40-foot-size boats.
Our most successful installation is at Camp Lejeune, North
Carolina, where at the initiative of the base commander and the
local city and State governments the detectors are located off
base. The warning and notification network is integrated into
the base, city and county emergency operations centers, and the
local officials developed a plan to respond to detections and
prevent the device's approach to the base.
Our experience with this project and other detector work
DTRA performs leads us to the conclusion that the concept of
protection from nuclear devices must be thought about as
gaining warning time for a proper response and not solely that
of radiation detection. That is, we must have an integrated
systems approach and a well-developed concept of operations.
Currently, we must depend on an extensive number of sensors
to gain this warning time. For that reason, we encourage the
investigation and research into means to make the detectors
themselves cheaper.
We also encourage the committee to look into developing
alternative technologies, that is, other than radiation
detection, for technologies that detect other physical
phenomena, such as weight, density, heat and the presence of
high explosives. Despite the success of the UNWD program, our
conclusion is that much research needs to remains to be done.
Much of this work is detailed in the independent report on
UNWD, copies of which I provided the committee.
I would emphasize my earlier comments that the concept of
protection from nuclear devices must be thought about as
gaining warning time for a proper response and not solely that
of radiation protection, and we must look for alternative
technologies in the integrated system solution.
I thank the committee for their time and welcome your
questions.
Mr. Linder. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Evenson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mr. Michael K. Evenson
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittees, it is an honor for
me to be here today to discuss the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's
(DTRA's) radiation detection and portal monitoring programs. I will
summarize my statement and ask that it be included in its entirety in
the record.
The mission of DTRA is to reduce the threat of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD). Countering chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear weapons is the reason for the agency's existence. We focus
full-time on countering these threats. Our mission is guided by the
National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, and direction
provided by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. While our primary customers are the Combatant
Commanders, DTRA also makes unique contributions to homeland security
with its dual-use tools, knowledge, expertise, and services. We provide
these through the US Northern Command, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Homeland Defense, and others to address, counter, and
mitigate WMD threats.
DTRA programs and activities support the three components of the
national strategy: counterproliferation, consequence management, and
nonproliferation. These components are synergistic by nature. Our
counterproliferation programs provide offensive and defensive means for
combating WMD. DTRA nonproliferation programs support diplomatic and
cooperative international efforts to halt the spread of WMD. Our
consequence management efforts provide capabilities for responding to
actual use of WMD.
We also provide an interface between science and technology and the
warfighters by integrating current and emerging technologies from many
sources--US Government agencies, the DOE National Laboratories,
academia, the private sector, and from our friends and allies--into
products and tools that permit warfighters to counter and defend
against the threat of WMD, including the nuclear/radiological threat.
Within the realm of DTRA's detection technology program, our goals are
to provide and enhance current detection, identification, and
characterization capabilities for nuclear/radiological items, improve
equipment survivability during military operations, and improve ease of
use by the military forces. We also seek to standardize Concepts of
Operations, improve data dissemination and networks, and provide
reachback. These efforts yielded several tools that have been
operationally employed in several missions to include OPERATIONs
ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM.
One of our recent success stories is the Unconventional Nuclear
Warfare Defense (UNWD) Program wherein we collaborated with DOE, the
National Labs and the Services to establish four permanent test beds to
develop technologies and concepts of operation to counter the threat
from stolen nuclear weapons, improvised nuclear devices (INDs), or
radiological dispersal devices (RDD) delivered by unconventional means
other than missile or aircraft. Original funding for UNWD was provided
by Congress under Public Law Number 107-117. The four sites, one for
each branch of the armed forces, are located at: Kirtland Air Force
Base, NM; Submarine Base Kings Bay, GA; Camp Lejeune, NC; and Fort
Leonard Wood, MO. Successful demonstrations at these sites have also
provided a unique venue for critical infrastructure facility protection
systems, as well as integrating the system into state/local emergency
response assets that will augment the facility response and recovery
capabilities that could be used for homeland security.
As an off-shoot of this program, DTRA manages the Technical
Evaluation and Assessment Monitor Site (TEAMS) at Kirtland AFB. TEAMS
is a flexible, multi-use facility that serves as an important test-bed
to evaluate DTRA and inter-agency programs and emerging technologies to
detect, combat, and defeat the nuclear/radiological threat.
Under the Cooperative Threat Reduction or CTR program, DTRA is also
fielding nuclear/radiological portal monitors in Uzbekistan at 11 of
that nation's international ports of entry. We are also planning for a
second increment that will add six more ports of entry. Additionally,
the CTR program will help the Government of Uzbekistan develop and
implement a comprehensive ``Train the Trainer'' program to support the
CTR-provided equipment. Our goal is to provide Uzbekistan with self-
sustaining WMD detection and interdiction capabilities. The Department
of Defense coordinates CTR WMD border security activities closely with
the Departments of Energy (DOE) and State. In Uzbekistan, the CTR
program also will install nuclear/radiological portal monitors similar
to those that DOE is installing in Russia in its Second Line of Defense
(SLD) program. The Department of Energy will provide follow-on
maintenance and sustainment.
DTRA also executes the DoD International Counterproliferation
Program. Congress mandated that the Department of Defense work in
cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S.
Customs Service (now, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and Bureau of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement) to develop and deliver training programs to
counter the WMD proliferation threat. The resulting DoD International
Counterproliferation (ICP) Program provides training, equipment, and
technical assistance designed to enhance the detection, identification,
interdiction, and investigation capabilities of border, customs and law
enforcement officials in vulnerable regions. Using a country-specific
implementation approach, the ICP Program directly supports the National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction as the United States
continues ``to work with other states to improve their capability to
prevent unauthorized transfers of WMD.'' A significant component of the
DoD ICP Program is delivering equipment necessary to allow officials
tasked with interdicting WMD materials, or responding to crimes
involving WMD-related materials, to perform their duties. The equipment
includes radiation pagers, hand-held and bench-top isotope identifiers.
Two promising radiation detection research and development projects
are sensitive scintillating glass fibers technology and mechanically
cooled high-purity germanium spectrometry. These are particularly
applicable to our operational requirements in that the glass fiber
supports multi-mode application (land, sea, or air) and the
mechanically cooled spectrometer provides unequaled resolution and
identification capability in a hand-held device. In keeping with the
defense in depth concept, these technologies allow interrogation of
materials at any given point rather than in a single material handling
area, such as a port or staging area. Both technologies are at, or
slightly beyond, prototype stage and expect maturation with the year.
Our technology development process optimizes these and other
technologies by integrating their capabilities for a more robust effect
including integration with information connectivity, ruggedness, and
operator ease-of-use engineering.
Under the UNWD and other programs, DTRA has performed numerous
tests to evaluate the performance of current detection technologies.
For almost any ``bright'' materials, i.e., medical, and industrial,
those probably used in an RDD, the existing portal monitors will detect
unshielded material, whether fixed or at moderate highway speeds. The
detectors were somewhat effective against these types of materials even
if moderately shielded. However, for Special Nuclear Materials (SNM)
the detectors are not as effective. However, while shielding reduces
the potential for radiation detection, it opens other venues for
interdiction such as X-ray for dense materials (or alternative
signatures). Additionally, the evaluations demonstrated that if portal
monitors are placed in tandem, they are more effective and harder to
defeat; problems with false and nuisance alarms and system interface
need further development; and, that Concepts of Operations are key to
the system success.
DTRA's knowledge, experience, and expertise are available to
address the nuclear/radiological threat and we stand ready to assist
other US government agencies in addressing their mission requirements.
The most recent example of this long-standing commitment is our
assignment of two detailees in coordination with OSD to the newly-
formed Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), one of whom was a key
player in the Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense Program. DTRA
stands ready to assist DNDO as it performs its critical mission.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I would be pleased to
respond to your questions.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Oxford, Mr. Huizenga and Mr. Evenson, do
you all talk to each other regularly?
Mr. Oxford. Mr. Chairman, at least Mike and I have known
each other for at least 10 to 15 years, so we have known each
other well. Dave and I have gotten to know each as part of the
transition team to stand up DNDO. So we have worked very
closely in putting this together.
Mr. Linder. Do you think that the DNDO should have
statutory authority?
Mr. Oxford. Mr. Chairman, I guess it would depend on
statutory authority to do what? I think, right now, the way it
is established, with the agreements that we have across the
participating departments, that we are sufficiently authorized
to do what we need to do. We have agreed, as I testified
before, to jointly develop the strategy, because we do think
the strategy is critical, with each of us then understanding
our various implementation paths to make sure we are working
cooperatively across that and then sharing that information
with that deployed strategy.
Mr. Linder. You heard the previous panel, or one of the
members, talk about the lack of coordination in getting these
detectors out. Some countries have different types of detectors
than other countries. Some are better. Some are worse. Would
DNDO be the agency to try to pull those various disparate
groups together?
Mr. Oxford. Mr. Chairman, I believe it will. The goal,
again, was to do the joint planning. As the previous panel
said, planning together is very, very important. We do have
overseas hurdles, I think Congressman Markey was getting to the
point, we will have to deal with, and that is some of the
technology export control issues of advanced technology. There
are software and some other things we may have to deal with
from an export control perspective.
But understanding systems performance together so that as
we take these systems to our common test bed I think is our
goal, collectively, and the other members can respond to this.
I think you will ultimately see a narrowing down of the number
of test beds that are out there, so the one at the Nevada test
site will become a common test bed for all of us so we fully
understand systems performance. Therefore, we will be deploying
systems that we all understand how they work. The
implementation then becomes a lot more simple if we understand
that performance.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Huizenga, you note in your testimony that
14,000 hits--is that radiological hits in Russia?
Mr. Huizenga. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. What were most of them from? Is it Norm?
Mr. Huizenga. Some of it is Norm, some of it is
contamination, and some of it is the actual illicit movement of
material.
Mr. Linder. That was 200.
Mr. Huizenga. That is correct.
Mr. Linder. Did anyone ever determine, was it weapons grade
material?
Mr. Huizenga. Those are things probably that we would be
better off talking about in a separate session.
Mr. Linder. Did anybody track down where it came from?
Mr. Huizenga. We worked closely with the intelligence
community in that regard.
Mr. Linder. Okay. All of you have mentioned Megaports, I
think. Are we a little bit behind in getting those Megaports
stood up?
Mr. Huizenga. Well, it is a matter of perspective, I guess.
Gene Aloise and I talked at length about the report. It did
take us a while to get going. He is accurate. We have two done,
and we are working on--he said five--are actually working on
six, and we are negotiating with another 20 countries, and by
the end of 2006 we are projecting to have 10 done. So we are,
actually, I think ramping up and making steady progress right
now.
Mr. Linder. The radiography you talked about, it pictures
through the container, but it can't go through lead, is that
correct, to get a picture of what you are looking at?
Mr. Oxford. Mr. Chairman, that is exactly right. Although
we do expect with some of the advanced radiography systems to
have the possibility--again, we have to test this--to actually
be able to discriminate the HEU as well. We will definitely get
the high-density material so we know there is an anomaly in the
image. We are also hoping to be able to get some of the threat
materials. But that is what the advanced techniques will give
us over what is currently fielded.
Mr. Linder. How far away are we from that?
Mr. Oxford. Again, the design methodology and model that I
talked about in my opening statement, we are pushing hard for
that technology that is within hand to be able to fielded
within 3-1/2 years. So we are not proposing a protracted
development cycle. We are looking at doing an RFP, request for
proposal, for advanced radiography within the next 4 months.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Evenson, is anybody looking for cesium-137?
Mr. Evenson. Well, I think I understand your meaning, but
all our detectors will detect it. Do you mean are we actively
out searching for it?
Mr. Linder. We have got cesium-137 in virtually every
hospital in America, unprotected.
Mr. Evenson. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. Yes, sir.
Mr. Linder. Is that a problem for us?
Mr. Evenson. Yes, sir. Actually, I am part of a Defense
Science Board that is meeting now, and one of our conclusions
is that we in this country, at least if you share that board's
view, it is more likely a radiological dispersal device. The
materials will be gathered inside the United States and not
transhipped. We need to get control of the materials, yes, sir.
Mr. Linder. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentleman, thank you for being here today.
Mr. Oxford, I want to welcome you back and begin with you.
I would like to discuss a couple of things with you, the first
being the deployment plan for the current version of radiation
portal monitors.
You stated in your testimony in April that $71 million of
the fiscal year 2006 budget request will go to research and
evaluation of advanced portal monitors. Now, this will be $54
million for the deployment of current systems.
The concern that I have is that the deployment plan of the
current portal monitors is really funding dependent, and the
CBP has never received a full allocation to cover seaports,
landports and other ports of entry. So taking $71 million and
putting it towards research, while needed, clearly hurts
current detection operations.
So my question is, does the Department intend to reprogram
funds to cover the balance of the program costs, which are
about $163 million? And, if not, what is the target completion
date for the deployment of the current system if your funding
level remains unchanged?
Mr. Oxford. Out of the $125 million that was requested in
fiscal year 2006, what we agreed to do was not research with
the remaining amount. It really is all going towards deployment
activities. What we wanted to do was gradually phase in the
deployment of new systems, the advanced spectroscopic systems.
Based on a limited available amount of the sodium iodide
crystals and the actual source selection process, we felt it
was prudent to go ahead and continue with the deployment of
existing radiation portal monitors with Customs. The rationale
for that is our design methodology for the advanced systems is
what I will call a retrofit or plug-and-play. So for every
location that we have a current radiation portal monitor, we
will be able to go back in and replace directly those panels
with the new advanced spectroscopic systems.
About 80 to 90 percent of the cost of the existing
installation is in the physical installation, as opposed to the
current detector hardware. So we will be able to benefit by
their continuing deployment. But we will be following directly
behind them with deployment of the new systems. Roughly $131
million I think is our estimate in fiscal year 2006 of the new
advanced spectrographic systems. So we are not diverting R&D
money from that $125 million. It is all for deployments of
different kinds of systems.
Mr. Langevin. The cost that we are talking about here, does
that also include the training for those individuals that are
going to be operating? That is one of the Chairman's concerns,
we are spending money on equipment, that we may not be paying
as much attention to adequate training so that the people that
are operating this equipment are proficient.
Mr. Oxford. The total amount of money going into the
radiation portal monitoring in fiscal year 2006 is roughly $178
million, $53 million of which goes into training in the
operational support of fielded systems. So the $125 million you
saw as a direct acquisition request in the 2006 budget was for
deployment of either the current systems or the follow-on
systems. But there is a separate $53 million for training and
support in the field.
Mr. Langevin. Right now, it is my understanding that the
portal monitors, they can't distinguish between special nuclear
materials and naturally occurring radioactive material. This
has resulted in I guess numerous nuisance alarms at border
crossings and seaports, causing CBP inspectors to reduce the
sensitivity of the machines. Obviously, reducing the
sensitivity of this equipment diminishes the machine's
effectiveness. Can you comment on that?
Mr. Oxford. Again, the sensitivity is not the issue. It is
the discrimination, as I mentioned earlier. So one benefit of
the new systems is that we will be able to discriminate between
the normally occurring material and the threat material.
Again, without going into a lot of vulnerabilities, we
still have the issue of shielding that I mentioned in my
opening statement. The new systems--and, again, this is all
subject to the tests that we will do in August and September--
will give us the results. It will give us the discrimination
capabilities that replaces the currently fielded systems.
Mr. Langevin. On another topic, both the House and Senate
appropriations committees cut about $100 million out of the
President's request for the DNDO. The appropriators, along with
the members of the committee and Senator Lieberman, have also
voiced concerns with your office. Congress' primary concern
deals with role of DNDO as it relates to other Federal
agencies, especially the Departments of Energy and Defense. How
do you envision the role of the DNDO? Can you elaborate on
that? Can you tell us what steps you are taking to address
appropriators concerns?
If I could, I would also like to request Mr. Oxford brief
the members on DNDO as soon as possible.
Mr. Linder. We will be happy to invite him back.
Mr. Oxford. I would welcome that opportunity.
Let me address your first question. The extent of the $100
million cut causes great concern, obviously, and we have gone
through and briefed the Senate in an extensive fashion and will
do so with the House before the Conference Committee. I believe
in some cases it is a matter of a new office being stood up and
not having the ability to execute the resources in 2006. But I
will tell you that we have active programs in all the areas
that I mentioned before, the strategy development, the
architecture work, the active interrogation, the passive
detectors, as well as the radiography systems.
On top of that, we have an aggressive new start proposed in
the transformational research. It is in that category that you
will find us working things like this, what we call the long-
dwell transit problem, what the previous panel referred to as
the time between point-of-debarkation to point-of-entry, where
we have days to weeks to deal with the radiation detection
problem versus minutes at either the-point-of-departure or
point-of-entry.
We really want to be able to work that, and we think there
are technologies out there, even though some have mentioned
that there are industry representatives selling it as a near-
term solution. We have to drive the costs and the false alarm
rate significantly lower than what we currently expect. So,
from that vantage point, we would really like to start the
transformational program in 2006, and the $100 million cut
would seriously jeopardize that.
The coordination issue you raised, again, the first
priority we put within DNDO was to get a team together from
DOD, DOE, the FBI and DHS to work the strategy and the
architecture. That is our first priority. We have set a
baseline of March of 2006 to have that strategy in place so as
we go forward collectively we know what we want to implement.
So, again, we are very happy to work with the Congress on
resolving those issues as we go forward.
Mr. Linder. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from California.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Evenson, in response to the last question asked of you,
you suggested that a group that you are working with is either
coming to or has come to the conclusion that it is more likely
that we would see an attack based on material from within
rather than transported here.
Mr. Evenson. That is correct, Congressman.
Mr. Lungren. Can you tell me a little more about that?
Mr. Evenson. We actually think it is much easier to gather
the material inside this country and make a radiological
dispersal device than it is to go through DHS or anybody else's
detectors.
Mr. Lungren. Is that because of our lack of security with
hospitals and so forth?
Mr. Evenson. The conclusion of the group is we don't track
the materials well. It is not unguarded. Certainly you are more
aware of the problem possibly than I am. It is guarded, but it
is not tracked. It is not something you regard as a serious
weapon in this country, so our conclusion was it would be
fairly easy for a determined terrorist to gather that material.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Oxford, you mentioned in your testimony
that the U.S. Coast Guard has deployed some handheld radiation
detectors. Are these different than the ones we were talking
about with the first panel that are used by Customs and Border
Patrol now? And for what purpose are they used? The suggestion
was that they are actually used for the protection of the
agents, as opposed to actually being able to identify things in
a significant way.
Mr. Oxford. The current technology that they are using is
very similar to what Customs has used, at least in the handheld
and the pagers, but they are used in a much more strict
environment, they are doing it on a controlled boarding and an
interdiction where they actually know what they are going
after.
In the R&D program we have some handheld devices, some
advanced systems, that we are ruggedizing for maritime
application, specifically for the Coast Guard, to replace those
that should be available in the next couple of years. But they
are reliant on the currently existing systems as well.
Mr. Lungren. I like the word ``ruggedizing'' because
normally the word around here is robustness. So ruggedizing is
a nice word.
You were talking about the radiation portal monitor program
and about the $125 million for fiscal year 2006. As I
understand it, for you to continue onto that program in the
various modes you wish it to have, you are going to need
something like $880 million in fiscal year 2007.
Is it the thinking of your Department that, that is what
you are going to be asking for, and if you don't get it, can
you really suggest that you are going to complete the
installation of the portal monitors in 2009 as planned?
Mr. Oxford. I was actually scheduled to brief the Deputy
Secretary on our 2007 to 2011 program tomorrow, but it got
delayed for a week or so.
We will come in with a bigger request than that in 2007. I
can't tell you what that means. The $800 million that you heard
was a Customs number predicated on the existing plastic portal
systems versus some of the advanced systems. So we are going
back and looking at a combination of the retrofit and the
deployment of the new systems. We will be trying to seek an
2007 through 2008 completion at the legitimate ports-of-entry.
Mr. Lungren. Suffice to say, it is going to be a good chunk
of change?
Mr. Oxford. Absolutely.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Huizenga, you have testified about the
usefulness of the energy windowing to improve the performance
of the RPMs and lower the number of NORM alarms. At least I
have been informed there is some debate within the scientific
community regarding the effectiveness of energy windowing. Can
you comment on that debate and the reasoning behind DOE's
decision to go forward with the deployment?
Mr. Huizenga. Yes. It depends on the cargo, and what you
are hearing is the noise in the system. Some locations, the
energy windowing works better than others. So we have adjusted
our monitors in general to be focused more on the HEU, because
it is harder to detect, and we found this will allow a proper
balance between the NORM alarm rate and the actual target
quantities. So we have found it to be successful. It is kind of
a crude energy windowing we are actually using. It is a little
different than the one the CBP people are pursuing right now.
But if the cargo is right, it actually has a benefit.
Mr. Lungren. Do you have anything to say about that?
Mr. Oxford. We were asked by the Senate as well as the IG
to look at energy windowing. They wanted us to convene an
expert panel to look at the merits of that. What we finally
collectively agreed to do is we are bringing those systems to
the test bed in Nevada, so we will fully test those along with
a new developmental system. So instead of doing this based on
theory, we are going to actually test them against the various
threats and find out how well that works.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Oxford, are you familiar with the GAO
recent study that said that some of these other nations are
reluctant to use radioactive detectors in there simply because
it will slow down commerce?
Mr. Oxford. Yes, sir.
Mr. Linder. What is your response to that?
Mr. Oxford. I think that I would understand their concerns,
but, at the same time, I think we have an obligation to work
more collectively with them in a variety of ways. That is one
of the reasons why we brought the State Department into DNDO,
where they will be working with us, with our other partners, to
look at future agreements that we would seek.
In addition to that, for example, we are seeking to expand
our border protection by working more closely with the
governments of Mexico and Canada. It extended just beyond the
U.S. borders themselves, and the agreements look like they will
fall into place. So we will start to extend that to ports-of-
entry in North America, as opposed to just within the domestic
realm.
I understand their concerns, but, at the same time, I think
it is a matter of working with them collectively in the future.
Mr. Linder. At the previous panel we had testimony that
there are very small radiological detectors that can go inside
the container and can actually communicate with each other.
Would anybody care to tell us a little bit about that?
Mr. Oxford. I have looked at three or four different
concepts in that regard. We think there is a real opportunity
there.
Again, as I mentioned, I want to make sure that we
understand the cost and false alarm rate. The last thing we
want to do is start offloading ships based on false alarms. So
the same kind of problems we currently face at the borders. We
need to work within that transit system, and then to have the
real-time communications, that if we build up a threat basis of
radiation during the transit, that we have communications and
an interdiction, as Mr. Evenson said, a response model to get
to that ship, knowing that there is an actual threat there. We
think that is a great opportunity as part of layered defense
that is fertile ground.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Langevin?
Mr. Langevin. I would actually like to follow up and build
on the question the chairman just raised with respect to the
portal monitors.
The GAO report on the Megaports program reports that they
installed radiation portal monitors in two foreign ports. One
of the challenges that the Department of Energy faces is
getting a foreign government to agree to have the portal
monitors installed at their seaports, yet the Department of
Homeland Security has agreements with 35 countries to allow our
Customs inspectors to be deployed to foreign ports. Many of
these ports are the same ones that the Department of Energy
wants to install portal monitors. Why doesn't DOE leverage
existing DHS agreements to accelerate the installation of
portal monitors at foreign ports?
Mr. Huizenga. We actually are very closely partnering now
with the Department of Homeland Security CSI program. As a
matter of fact, we have gone to the last several countries with
the CSI as a package deal, making sure that when we are
pursuing the CSI initiatives we are pursuing Megaports at the
same time.
We started about 2 years after the CSI program ramped up,
and I think that we are now catching up with them. But we have
to install equipment. There was a concern that initially
countries had that if you were going to put these radiation
portal monitors in their ports that that was going to slow down
commerce. There really wasn't the same sense associated with
the CSI program.
Now that we have demonstrated in Rotterdam and Greece that
the program works and it really doesn't slow down commerce, we
are having a lot more acceptance of the program.
Mr. Langevin. With the use of Customs inspectors, wouldn't
that same argument apply? They could fear they were going to
slow down commerce when you have Customs inspectors on site?
Mr. Huizenga. If you think about it, the Customs inspectors
are selecting a certain percentage of containers for secondary
inspection. Our goal is to screen all the containers that go in
and out of these inbound and outbound gates. So the overall
sense was you are going to potentially impact our commerce in a
way that the CSI people may not. So we are overcoming this
operational concern at this point.
Mr. Langevin. I would like just to point out in that case
we have in these 35 countries--we already have an agreement
that is existing. So it would seem to make sense we would want
to leverage that and build off that.
Mr. Huizenga. We absolutely are. Like I say, we are going
with the CSI people to the new ports, and we are going back to
the ones they are already involved, and we are using that
leverage and their relationships they have already built in-
country in order to further the Megaports Initiative.
Mr. Langevin. I think that is important.
Just one other question for Mr. Oxford. When I asked about
training for and use of the equipment that will be installed,
just if you could describe for me where the $53 million for
training is coming from. Is that S&T or CBP or some other
source? That is the first time I have heard of that.
Mr. Oxford. It is in the CBP budget request, $53 million
for the training and the support of fielded systems. The
agreement of DNDO was we would do the development and
acquisition but not the deployment nor the support of the
deployment. So that is retained within the Customs' budget.
Mr. Langevin. The only last comment, Mr. Chairman, if we
could follow up with Mr. Huizenga, the number of elements of
potential nuclear material that had been--
Mr. Linder. We will follow up on that in closed session.
Mr. Langevin. That was a striking figure. I would like to
have more information.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Markey.
Mr. Markey. Yes. Mr. Oxford, you were named acting director
in February.
Mr. Oxford. Actually it was March 16.
Mr. Markey. March 16. When is that going to be a permanent
director?
Mr. Oxford. Actually, sir, that is in Presidential
personnel for final decision.
Mr. Markey. Is it going to be soon?
Mr. Oxford. I hope so.
Mr. Markey. For America's sake, I hope we have a permanent
nuclear detection head, and I hope you get it, if you want it.
But I just hope it is permanent. It gives you a lot more
authority.
As you know, ABC News smuggled depleted uranium into the
U.S. in September, 2003. I sent a letter to DHS to express my
concern about the potential for a terrorist to smuggle HEU into
the country. I also questioned the Department's technical
capabilities to detect the importation of these dangerous
weapons, usable materials.
The Department's response to my letter claimed it is likely
that the radiation portal monitors could locate and identify
highly enriched uranium in cargo.
On June 3, 2005, DHS issued a press release whose headline
read ``Nation's busiest seaports to have complete radiation
detection coverage by the end of 2005.''
Today, Mr. Thompson and I released an analysis conducted by
experts consulted by the American Association for the
Advancement of Science who confirm several other experts'
conclusions that this is not true. The technology used by DHS
is not capable of detecting kilogram quantities of HEU; and, in
fact, no usable technology really exists to do that job. Other
witnesses made similar references to this problem.
In your testimony today, you state that the problem with
the detectors is not that they are not sensitive enough to
detect HEU, but they are unable to discriminate between
naturally occurring radioactive materials and dangerous ones.
The Department appears not yet willing to concede the
limitations of the portal monitors currently being deployed
when it comes to detecting highly enriched uranium. Why are you
the only ones not willing to confront this reality? The science
seems to be uniformly on the other side.
Mr. Oxford. First of all, Congressman Markey, I would agree
with the technical merits of the argument. I think in some
cases, especially in open session, we don't want to talk about
vulnerabilities, and I think we are somewhat limited by that.
Again, if you go back to my testimony, the discrimination
and shielding does pose a problem, and we are working on active
systems and radiography systems to supplement existing passive
systems, as well as fielding advanced passive systems to get to
the discrimination of lightly shielded or unshielded materials.
So it is going to take a family of systems to do the job.
So I am not disagreeing with the technical basis of what AAAS
did.
Mr. Markey. In September, 2004, the DHS Inspector General
conducted a review of DHS's procedures to detect highly
enriched uranium in light of its failures to do so in the ABC
News case. The unclassified version of the report stated that
the IG made specific recommendations to DHS to enhance the
sensitivity of its detection capabilities. Has the Department
implemented all of these recommendations that were in the
unclassified version of the report?
Mr. Oxford. I don't think we have implemented those. What
we are doing is we are replacing the systems starting in fiscal
year 2006 with the advanced systems that give us more
discrimination capabilities and rapidly producing the advanced
systems for active interrogation radiography to give us the
ability to detect a shielded material.
Mr. Markey. But you are not adopting the recommendations?
Mr. Oxford. I would have to go back to Customs, because
they would be modifying operations in the field to do that. I
would have to ask CBP if they are acting upon that at this
point.
Mr. Markey. Please report to the committee.
The AAAS analysis released today indicates that by taking
some relatively straightforward and short-term engineering
measures, such as better shielding of the detector, it would
help improve the ability of the monitors to detect highly
enriched uranium. Do you plan to examine and implement those
recommendations?
Mr. Oxford. We will look at that, along with the
practicality of doing that versus deploying the new systems. We
may not want to pay for two different approaches. So as we come
out of the test bed this August and September we will make some
determinations as to whether that is more prudent or fielding
the new systems would be more practical.
Mr. Markey. In your testimony, you discuss the use of
radiography machines that would be able to show an X-ray image
of what was inside the containers at the same time as detecting
whether anything in the container was radioactive. In this way,
you could determine whether there was a shielded sample of
highly enriched uranium in the container by looking at the X-
ray image, and you could also use an X-ray image of what was
inside to eliminate concern associated with a shipment of
bananas that caused the radiation detectors to go off.
But this is nothing new. In fact, the company, AS&E, which
has headquarters in Billerica, Massachusetts, has installed
exactly this sort of system at the Port of Boston; and it is
being used to simultaneously X-ray and detect radiation in
every container leaving the port.
If you think that is the way to proceed, why haven't you
explored the commercially available options to do so?
Mr. Oxford. First of all, Congressman, that is the first I
have heard of that particular application. We went out with a
competitive solicitation on the advanced radiography program. I
am not sure if they proposed against that or not with our work.
I will have to go back and look at that.
Mr. Markey. It is already installed in the Port of Boston--
installed.
Finally, in your testimony you also discuss active
interrogation systems, which would certainly improve the
ability to detect radiological materials. But don't these
systems involve the use of neutrons that could harm the people
located near the sample?
Mr. Oxford. There are a variety of approaches being
investigated. One is a neutron source and the other is a photon
source. We are looking at that. There would have to be some
operational protocols put into place that would limit the
exposure of humans. But, again, we have to get through the
technology development. That is a consideration, obviously.
Mr. Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Linder. Thank you all. We are sorry you had to be
delayed, but from time to time we actually have to vote up
here. You are excused. Thank you.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:10 p.m., the joint meeting of the
subcommittees was adjourned.]
For the Record
Questions from the Honorable Norm Dicks, for Acting Director Vayl
Oxford Responses
You testified that ``the DNDO is currently investing substantial
resources to the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) program, which is
focused on developing detectors which will be able to discriminate
between naturally occurring radioactive materials and true threat
materials,'' and that the new systems can distinguish among different
radioactive materials. You also told the committee the ASP systems will
be tested in August and September of this year, and that based on the
results of these tests, a limited number of vendors will be selected to
begin initial low-rate production of detection systems.
What is DNDO's assessment of the near-term
availability of ASP systems and components (for example sodium
iodide crystals)?
Response: The relative simplicity of portal hardware design
requires the need for only a small number of (mostly) readily available
components. However, as your question highlights, there is a
potentially significant production capacity issue for the thallium
doped sodium iodide crystals proposed for use by seven of the ten
vendors. Initial market surveys indicate that the currently available
production capacity will support the production of 125-150 portals
annually. The low-rate initial production (LRIP) that will begin in
June 2006 will fall within the current capacity thresholds.
What are DNDO's plans for encouraging industry to
increase the availability of such systems and components?
Response: The DNDO has proposed investing $20M over two years (FY
2006 and FY 2007) to increase the industrial production capacity of
sodium iodide crystals. The DNDO released a Request for Information
(RFI) on May 12, 2005 ``to assess current manufacturing capacity and to
solicit industrial mobilization recommendations and options from
industry''. The DNDO intends to competitively award contracts in early
FY 2006 to address the known sodium iodide crystal deficiency.
What role will risk and cost play in DNDO decisions to
move to low-rate production of new detection technology?
Response: As with all large acquisition programs, risk and cost
will be large factors in any decision to proceed through the ASP
acquisition cycle, even prior to and beyond LRIP. The ASP program has
undergone Departmental review to ensure that the program addresses
Department requirements and to validate the projected investments. In
his Decision Memorandum approving ASP through LRIP, pending successful
testing, Deputy Secretary Jackson stressed the need for a concise plan
to mitigate cost, schedule, and performance risks. With regards to
performance risk, in particular, the DNDO is engaging in a robust test
and evaluation program, as was discussed in the testimony of June 21.
The thorough understanding of systems performance determined through
this testing will significantly decrease the performance risks
associated with the program. Additionally, the LRIP process will allow
for a comprehensive operational test and evaluation opportunity to
further characterize system performance prior to a full-rate production
award.