[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EVALUATING HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATIONS IN THE AMERICAN MINING
INDUSTRY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WORKFORCE PROTECTIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION
AND THE WORKFORCE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
March 1, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-31
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Education and the Workforce
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
or
Committee address: http://edworkforce.house.gov
______
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COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND THE WORKFORCE
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
Thomas E. Petri, Wisconsin, Vice George Miller, California,
Chairman Ranking Minority Member
Michael N. Castle, Delaware Dale E. Kildee, Michigan
Sam Johnson, Texas Major R. Owens, New York
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Donald M. Payne, New Jersey
Charlie Norwood, Georgia Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
Vernon J. Ehlers, Michigan Robert C. Scott, Virginia
Judy Biggert, Illinois Lynn C. Woolsey, California
Todd Russell Platts, Pennsylvania Ruben Hinojosa, Texas
Patrick J. Tiberi, Ohio Carolyn McCarthy, New York
Ric Keller, Florida John F. Tierney, Massachusetts
Tom Osborne, Nebraska Ron Kind, Wisconsin
Joe Wilson, South Carolina Dennis J. Kucinich, Ohio
Jon C. Porter, Nevada David Wu, Oregon
John Kline, Minnesota Rush D. Holt, New Jersey
Marilyn N. Musgrave, Colorado Susan A. Davis, California
Bob Inglis, South Carolina Betty McCollum, Minnesota
Cathy McMorris, Washington Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Kenny Marchant, Texas Raul M. Grijalva, Arizona
Tom Price, Georgia Chris Van Hollen, Maryland
Luis G. Fortuno, Puerto Rico Tim Ryan, Ohio
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Timothy H. Bishop, New York
Charles W. Boustany, Jr., Louisiana [Vacancy]
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina
Thelma D. Drake, Virginia
John R. ``Randy'' Kuhl, Jr., New
York
[Vacancy]
Vic Klatt, Staff Director
Mark Zuckerman, Minority Staff Director, General Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WORKFORCE PROTECTIONS
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia, Chairman
Judy Biggert, Illinois, Vice Major R. Owens, New York
Chairman Ranking Minority Member
Ric Keller, Florida Dennis J. Kucinich, Ohio
John Kline, Minnesota Lynn C. Woolsey, California
Kenny Marchant, Texas Timothy H. Bishop, New York
Tom Price, Georgia [Vacancy]
Thelma Drake, Virginia George Miller, California, ex
Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon, officio
California,
ex officio
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 1, 2006.................................... 1
Statement of Members:
Capito, Hon. Shelley Moore, a Representative in Congress from
the State of West Virginia, prepared statement of.......... 3
Miller, Hon. George, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on
Education and the Workforce, prepared statement of......... 35
Norwood, Hon. Charlie, Chairman, Subcommittee on Workforce
Protections, Committee on Education and the Workforce...... 1
Prepared statement of.................................... 4
Owens, Hon. Major R., Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee
on Workforce Protections, Committee on Education and the
Workforce.................................................. 4
Supplemental questions to witnesses...................... 45
Newspaper articles:
Associated Press: ``Additional Blasts Rock Alabama's
Biggest Mine, Now Closed''......................... 5
Birmingham News: ``Another Explosion Rocks Coal Mine;
Gas Eruptions Go On in Shoal Creek''............... 6
Rahall, Hon. Nick J. II, a Representative in Congress from
the State of West Virginia, prepared statement of.......... 9
Statement of Witnesses:
Friend, Hon. Robert, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Mine
Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. 12
Prepared statement of.................................... 14
Response to supplemental questions....................... 55
O'Dell, Dennis, Administrator for Department on Occupational
Health and Safety, United Mineworkers of America........... 19
Prepared statement of.................................... 21
Additional materials submitted........................... 64
Watzman, Bruce, Vice President, Safety and Health and Human
Resources, National Mining Association..................... 26
Prepared statement of.................................... 28
Response to supplemental questions....................... 62
Additional Materials Supplied:
Hawkins, Charles E. III, CAE, Executive Vice President and
COO, National Stone, Sand, & Gravel Association:
Prepared statement of.................................... 72
Supplemental materials................................... 74
Neason, Mike, Administrator, Mining Practice Specialty of the
American Society of Safety Engineers, prepared statement of 90
EVALUATING HEALTH AND SAFETY REGULATIONS IN THE U.S. MINING INDUSTRY
----------
Wednesday, March 1, 2006
U.S. House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Workforce Protections
Committee on Education and the Workforce
Washington, DC
----------
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 12:03 p.m., in
room 2175, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Charlie Norwood
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Norwood, Keller, Marchant, Price,
McKeon, Owens, Woolsey, Miller, and Holt.
Staff present: Byron Campbell, Legislative Assistant; Steve
Forde, Director of Media Relations; Kevin Frank, Coalitions
Director for Workforce Policy; Ed Gilroy, Director of Workforce
Policy; Rob Gregg, Legislative Assistant; Richard Hoar,
Professional Staff Member; Kimberly Ketchel, Communications
Staff Assistant; Jim Paretti, Workforce Policy Counsel; Molly
McLaughlin Salmi, Deputy Director of Workforce Policy; Deborah
L. Emerson Samantar, Committee Clerk/Intern Coordinator; Toyin
Alli, Staff Assistant; Jody Calemine, Labor Counsel; Michele
Evermore, Legislative Associate/Labor; Tylease Fitzgerald,
Legislative Assistant/Labor; Peter Galvin, Senior Legislative
Assistant/Labor; Tom Kiley, Communications Director; Rachel
Racusen, Press Assistant; Marsha Renwanz, Legislative
Associate/Labor; and Mark Zuckerman, Minority Staff Director/
General Counsel.
Chairman Norwood [presiding]. A quorum being present, the
Subcommittee on Workforce Protections will now come to order.
We are meeting today to hear testimony on evaluating health
and safety regulations in the American mining industry. Under
Committee Rule 12(b), opening statements are limited to the
chairman and the ranking minority member of the subcommittee.
Therefore, if any other members have statements, they may
be included in the hearing record.
Of course, we are delighted to have Mr. McKeon, our full
chairman, here. And if the chairman wishes to make a comment,
he certainly could.
With that said, I ask unanimous consent for the hearing
record to remain open for 14 days to allow member statements
and other extraneous material referenced during the hearing to
be submitted in the official hearing record. Without objection,
so ordered.
Today we have assembled an expert panel of witnesses to
help the subcommittee evaluate the safety of American mining
industry. This hearing will focus on the Mine Safety and Health
Administration's, MSHA's, role in enforcing the Mine Safety and
Health Act of 1977 and the responsibilities of mine operators
and workers to ensure a safe working environment.
I want this oversight hearing to help identify the safety
issues facing the mining industry today. This is a very
important goal that every member of our subcommittee shares.
However, I do not want it to focus on politics,
sloganeering, or partisan agenda. It is just simply too
important. That will not help Congress improve mine safety and
health. If you are here for the latter, I ask you please to
reconsider before we begin.
A few weeks ago, the House honored the miners lost in the
recent mine accidents in West Virginia and the mine rescue team
members who risked their lives to try to bring them back to
safety. I am moved by these families' losses and the bravery of
the mine rescue teams. They will not be forgotten.
As I stated earlier, I want to ensure that the focus of
this hearing is on preventing similar accidents from occurring
and how to best protect miners, mine rescue teams and
ultimately to prevent future tragedies.
With that said, we must keep in mind that the investigation
of the West Virginia accidents is ongoing, and I do not want to
prejudice that outcome.
Republicans and Democrats do not always agree on the major
issues facing Congress, but I will bet you we all can agree
that the United States must reduce its need for foreign oil.
In order to meet that goal, we are asking and turning to
the mining industry to produce more in order to meet our
domestic energy needs. This is especially true of the coal
industry, which is already supplying 50 percent of our nation's
electricity needs. But it does not stop simply at energy.
We also rely on domestic mining to support American
infrastructure and production. In my home state of Georgia, for
example, we mine a number of different minerals and ore that
contribute to our nation's construction and consumer needs.
In fact, Georgia-based kaolin and china clay producers have
an $830 million economic impact on my state every year. This is
serious business, and it is important to make sure the folks
that make this industry work are protected.
After all, we are asking men and women to go into mines
every day to work in challenging and sometimes very dangerous
conditions. Everyone in the industry recognizes the dangers,
and public policy must ensure that the law and regulations in
place are protecting these men and women.
We must also ensure that our laws take into account
available technology and that laws are fairly enforced. This
hearing is first in a series of hearings about mining and mine
safety.
Several of our colleagues who are not members of our
committee have requested time to address this subcommittee. I
want to assure my colleagues that there will be ample
opportunity to provide their thoughts to this subcommittee in
an appropriate forum.
Because of the recently concluded joint meeting of
Congress, our time today has been shortened. And at this time I
ask unanimous consent to enter into the record a statement from
Representative Capito. Hearing no one opposing, it is so
ordered.
[Prepared statement of Mrs. Capito follows:
Prepared Statement of Hon. Shelley Moore Capito, a Representative in
Congress From the State of West Virginia
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and the members of the Workforce
Protection Subcommittee for holding this important hearing on mining
health and safety regulations. West Virginia has experienced tragedy in
our mines this year; already 16 miners have been killed at the Sago,
Alma, and Boone County mines.
Coal mining is a vital part of West Virginia's economy and provides
a majority of the electricity used nationwide. We must strive to make
underground mining as safe as we possibly can.
Mining is a dangerous profession and unfortunately accidents will
happen. Our health and safety regulations must be enforced vigorously
to help prevent accidents and must include provisions for emergency
communication, tracking, and oxygen devices.
West Virginia's congressional delegation introduced legislation
that I hope will bring new safety regulations from MSHA. Communication
systems and tracking devices are used in mines around the world, and we
should make better use of these technologies in American mines.
The lives of dozens of Canadian miners were saved thanks to a
chamber equipped with oxygen, food and water, and a communications
device. At a minimum such chambers should be carefully examined to
determine whether they could be effective in US coal mines.
We should also examine the requirements for mine rescue teams. When
miners are trapped below the surface, rescue teams must be ready to
begin the search as soon as it is safe to enter the mine. Given that
underground mines vary drastically in design it is important that
members of a mine rescue team be familiar with the mine.
I am pleased that the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA)
has announced emergency regulations to increase the emergency oxygen
supplies below the surface in mines, require lifelines, and provide for
faster notification of accidents. The emergency action must not be a
final step, but a first step in evaluating the technologies, mine
practices, and response to accidents that can prevent serious injuries
or death in our nation's mines.
I encourage the subcommittee to continue to consider the opinions
of miners, operators, and other stakeholders as the oversight process
continues. These people work in the mines each day and know the details
of its work. It is important that their voices are heard as we go
forward.
Again, I commend the subcommittee for holding this important
hearing and look forward to working further on regulations and
legislation that will improve the safety of our mines.
______
Critics of MSHA have stated their belief that the agency is
not doing enough to enforce the law. Some also believe that
MSHA does not have enough money, enough manpower and resources
to enforce the law. MSHA will have an opportunity to respond to
those critics and to describe this year's budget proposal.
Today's panel will address many important policy issues as
we begin to consider what, if any, changes could or should be
made to improve the mine act. The policy debate has focused on
breathable air, improved communications and better miner
location technology. I urge our witnesses to broaden that
discussion to any item that will work to improve mine safety.
I would like to thank all of you, our witnesses, for taking
your time out from your busy schedule to testify before us
today. And I truly very much look forward to your testimony.
Now, with pleasure, I yield to Mr. Owens for whatever
opening statement he might wish to make.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Norwood follows:
Prepared Statement of Hon. Charlie Norwood, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Workforce Protections, Committee on Education and the Workforce
Today we have assembled an expert panel of witnesses to help the
Subcommittee evaluate the safety of the American mining industry. This
hearing will focus on the Mine Safety and Health Administration's
(MSHA) role in enforcing the Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, and
the responsibilities of mine operators and workers to ensure a safe
working environment.
I want this oversight hearing to help identify the safety issues
facing the mining industry today. This is an important goal that every
member of our subcommittee shares. However, I do not want it to focus
on politics, sloganeering or a partisan agenda. That will not help
Congress improve mine safety and health. If you're here for the latter,
I'd ask you to kindly reconsider before we begin.
A few weeks ago the House honored the miners lost in the recent
mine accidents in West Virginia and the mine rescue team members who
risked their lives to try to bring them back safely. I am moved by
these families' losses and the bravery of the mine rescue teams. They
will not be forgotten.
As I stated earlier, I want to ensure that the focus of this
hearing is on preventing similar accidents from occurring and how to
best protect miners, mine rescue teams, and ultimately, to prevent
future tragedies. With that said, we must keep in mind that the
investigation of the West Virginia accidents is ongoing, and I do not
want to prejudge that outcome.
Republicans and Democrats don't always agree on the major issues
facing Congress, but we all agree that the United States must reduce
its reliance on foreign oil. In order to meet this important goal, we
are asking the mining industry to produce more in order to meet our
domestic energy needs.
This is especially true of the coal industry, which is already
supplying fifty percent of our nation's electricity needs.
But it does not stop at energy. We also rely on domestic mining to
support American infrastructure and production. In my home state of
Georgia, we mine a number of different minerals and ore that contribute
to our nation's construction and consumer needs. In fact, Georgia-based
kaolin and china clay producers have an $830 million economic impact on
the state each year. This is serious business, and it's important to
make sure the folks that make this industry work are protected.
After all, we are asking men and women to go into mines everyday to
work in challenging and sometimes dangerous conditions. Everyone in the
industry recognizes the dangers, and public policy must ensure that the
law and regulations in place are protecting these miners. We must also
ensure that our laws take into account available technology and that
the laws are fairly enforced.
This hearing is the first in a series of hearings about mining and
mine safety. Several of our colleagues, who are not members of the
Committee, requested time to address the subcommittee. I want to assure
my colleagues that there will be ample opportunity to provide their
thoughts in the appropriate forum. Because of the recently concluded
joint meeting of Congress, our time today has been shortened. At this
time, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record a statement from
Representative Capito.
Critics of MSHA have stated their belief that the agency is not
doing enough to enforce the law. Some also believe that MSHA does not
have enough money, manpower, and resources to enforce the law. MSHA
will have an opportunity to respond to those critics and describe this
year's budget proposal.
Today's panel will address many important policy issues as we begin
to consider what, if any, changes could be made to improve the Mine
Act.
The policy debate has focused on breathable air, improved
communication, and better miner location technology. I urge our
witnesses to broaden the discussion to any item that will work to
improve mine safety.
I would like to thank our witnesses for taking time out from their
busy schedules to testify before us today. I very much look forward to
your testimony.
______
Mr. Owens. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to begin to acknowledging the front line mine
workers from the coal mining states of West Virginia,
Pennsylvania and Ohio who are seated in the audience today. You
all had to take a day off from work, and you traveled a far
distance to attend this hearing, so we are delighted to have
you.
Those of you who are coal miners, your families, your
communities and your states will be directly affected not only
by what we say here today, but also by what we do or fail to do
here in Washington.
I expect all hard-working Americans and families to hold
those of us who are elected officials fully accountable on this
issue.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased that this subcommittee has
agreed to hold an oversight hearing on mine safety, a hearing
that members on this side of the aisle requested in the
immediate aftermath of the Sago Mine disaster, in which 12
miners were killed on January 4, 2006.
We are only 3 months into 2006, and already 21 mine workers
have been killed on the job due to mine explosions, fires, roof
collapses and other hazards. We must take immediate steps to
stop this heavy death toll in our nation's mines, and the Mine
Workers Safety and Health Administration must be at the
forefront of these efforts.
I might add that recent press reports have indicated that
in the Shoal Creek Mine in Alabama there have been several days
now of mine explosions, and they have been forced to evacuate
140 workers to safety.
I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record two
articles about the blast at the Shoal Creek Mines----
Chairman Norwood. So ordered.
[The information follows:]
(From the Associated Press, February 28, 2006)
Additional Blasts Rock Alabama's Biggest Mine, Now Closed
by jay reeves
Birmingham--More underground explosions have rocked Alabama's
largest coal mine since a blast last week forced the evacuation of
scores of workers, and federal regulators said Tuesday it was unclear
when production could resume.
No one has been hurt in any of the blasts, and the government said
the severity of the explosions was unknown since the mine remains too
dangerous for anyone to enter.
The Shoal Creek Mine, which recently underwent a court-ordered
safety inspection, remained closed for a fifth day Tuesday following
what regulators said were three blasts. The first occurred early last
Friday, when about 140 workers were evacuated safely.
A spokeswoman with the Mine Safety and Health Administration, Amy
Louviere, said two more explosions occurred Sunday and Monday, but no
one was at risk because no one had been allowed to re-enter the mine
after the first explosion.
Inspectors are checking the mine's air quality through ventilation
shafts and bore holes, she said, and workers are pumping ``a lot'' of
water out of the mine. The mine, located about 45 miles west of
Birmingham, isn't safe enough for teams to enter and begin accessing
and fixing damage, she said.
The operator of the mine, Drummond Co., issued a brief statement
saying the initial explosion was not a ``major event.'' It has not
commented publicly on the subsequent explosions, and officials with the
privately owned company did not return telephone calls seeking comment.
Officials with the United Mine Workers of America also failed to
return calls.
Shoal Creek was among more than a dozen operations to undergo
court-ordered safety inspections by the state in late January and early
February after the union filed suit over lax oversight by the state.
The state said its inspection at Shoal Creek was incomplete because
of time constraints in meeting the court-ordered deadline, and The
Tuscaloosa News reported that records indicate state regulators did not
check the area where the initial explosion occurred.
Shoal Creek is described by Drummond as Alabama's biggest coal mine
and one of the largest in the nation. It averaged 820 employees last
year and produced 2.2 million tons of coal.
______
(From the Birmingham News, March 1, 2006)
Another Explosion Rocks Coal Mine;
Gas Eruptions Go On in Shoal Creek
by russell hubbard
Explosions continue to ignite fires at the Shoal Creek mine, with
the fiercest one yet happening Tuesday afternoon.
Monitoring equipment at the evacuated underground coal mine 45
miles west of Birmingham detected an explosion and fire about 2 p.m.,
said Thomas Wilson, health and safety representative of the United Mine
Workers of America.
That is the fourth such methane-fueled blast since Friday at the
Drummond Co. coal mine that reaches 1,200 feet underground.
Wilson said Tuesday's explosion caused carbon monoxide monitors to
register more than 6,000 parts per million, six times the levels
measured Friday when the mine was evacuated. That level is enough to
cause death within 15 minutes to exposed humans.
``There is nothing else down there to make those readings shoot up
like that but explosions and fire,'' Wilson said.
Attempts to reach Birminghambased Drummond for comment were
unsuccessful. The company, the union and the federal Mine Safety and
Health Administration are working at the mine near Adger to monitor
conditions and restore the site.
The mine was evacuated in the early hours Friday after the first
explosion and a roof fall. No one was injured. The mine employs 860
people and produced 3.1 million tons of coal last year. It was
Alabama's third largest by volume of production in 2005.
103(k) Rule
The mine has been vacant and idle since Friday. The federal mine
safety agency has invoked its 103(k) rule, which requires the mine
operator to get permission before re-opening the site, agency
spokeswoman Amy Louviere said.
``There has been some damage to the ventilation controls,''
Louviere said. ``They are drilling holes and boring down to collect air
samples.''
Drummond said Friday the explosion was caused by an ignition of
methane, a colorless and odorless combustible gas that often
accompanies coal deposits.
Union official Wilson said next efforts might include piping a
cement-like material into the mine to seal the area where the
explosions are happening. That might make things safe enough for
reclamation teams to descend and assess conditions directly.
Because the methane is hidden among tons of underground rock, it's
impossible for the miners to cut it off. The gas is erupting
unpredictably from the coal face, sparking the explosions and fires,
Wilson said.
Of the three aspects of the ``fire triangle''--fuel, oxygen and
heat--controlling the oxygen level might be the best bet in this case,
Wilson said.
``We have got to take the oxygen away,'' Wilson said. ``This one
keeps producing its own fuel, the methane.''
Controlled, targeted flooding is also a technique that might
interrupt the fire triangle, Wilson said.
Salvage Efforts
Some mines have burned for extended periods. In 1985, a Jim Walter
Resources mine in Tuscaloosa County went through a series of
explosions, said Wilson, who has been traveling the country working on
such cases for more than 20 years.
``We've seen it before, but not in recent years,'' he said.
There is no way to estimate how long it might take to salvage the
mine, he said. ``We just don't know how much damage is occurring down
there.''
The mine's water pumping equipment was shut off when electricity
was cut to reduce fire risk. That means the periodic natural flooding
the mine experiences has been unchecked for more than four days.
Louviere, of the mine safety agency, said burning mines sometimes
become too compromised to ever re-open.
``It doesn't happen often, but it has happened,'' she said. ``Some
mines have become so flooded and damaged that they are unrecoverable.''
______
Mr. Owens [continuing]. In Alabama.
Mr. Chairman, our government is a government for the
people, by the people, of the people. That means all the
people, not just the people who own property, not just the mine
owners, not just the millionaires.
The security and safety and protection of all the citizens
is the duty and the obligation of the government. Extreme
exploitation and exposure of the workers is as much our concern
as any other, so we are here today to talk about whether or
government is doing its duty and living up to its obligation to
protect all of our citizens.
This poses a significant challenge to MSHA, because the
Bush administration has severely undermined safety enforcement
over the past 5 years. Rather than selecting professionals with
expertise in mine worker safety and health issues for
leadership positions in MSHA, President Bush appointed a person
with mining industry management experience.
This action was akin to turning the clock back to the 1950s
and 1960s, when staffers from the Bureau of Mines and Interior,
people whose primary concern was the level of coal mine
production, were in charge of worker safety.
But Congress had clearly intended to change that mind set
by enacting the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969
and, subsequently, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of
1977. These acts established MSHA within the Department of
Labor. We need to return at once to strict adherence to both
the letter, the intent and the spirit of the 1969 and 1977 mine
safety laws.
On top of placing industry insiders in key MSHA posts, this
administration also started requesting officially with each
annual budget submission funding cuts and staff reductions for
MSHA. The MSHA staffers most heavily downsized between 2001 and
2005 have been those in coal enforcement.
We have a chart which depicts the coal enforcement staffing
cutbacks between 2001 and 2005. The graph on this chart
features a downward slope which is both steep in appearance and
depressing. It symbolizes a drop-off in coal enforcement.
The high point of the chart is 1,233 staffers in 2001. The
low point is a coal enforcement staffing for 2005 at 1,043
staffers. Overall, 190 positions have been cut in coal
enforcement at the very time that the division needs to
reinvigorate if it is to safeguard mine workers.
The Bush administration also requested steep cuts in
overall funding for MSHA between 2001 and 2006. This is
depicted on a second bar chart which tracks MSHA funding
requests in real dollar terms from 1998 to 2006. The bar chart
paints this picture for us by comparing the official budget
requests for each year with the previous year's enacted budget.
As you can see, annual increases in MSHA's budget were
requested from 1998 through 2001 during the Clinton years. In
contrast, annual reductions were requested from 2002 to 2006
during the Bush years.
Moreover, since 2001, the Bush administration has either
withdrawn or delayed some 18 safety regulations under MSHA--18.
Our third chart lists these rules, a number of which could have
afforded particularly important protections to mine workers in
some of the recent disasters.
For example, a pending rule to improve mine rescue teams,
which would have given mine operators assistance in having two
such teams on site, was withdrawn on September 4, 2002. When
the Sago Mine disaster struck, it took more than 5 hours to get
the rescue teams in place.
Another regulation to ensure the flame resistance of
conveyor belts was withdrawn on July 15, 2002. The Bush
administration adopted a dangerous rule in its place,
permitting conveyor belt air entries to be used as the sole
ventilation source for working places in the mine. In January
of this year, the Aracoma Alma Mine's conveyor belt caught fire
and killed two workers.
Mr. Chairman, as a result of these staff reductions in coal
enforcement, overall funding cutbacks in MSHA, and withdrawal
of important safety rules, a lot of work is now required to
strengthen protections for mine workers.
To ensure that that happens, Congressman Rahall has
introduced a bipartisan bill, H.R. 4695. On behalf of the
entire West Virginia delegation and others on this committee, I
ask you to schedule a markup on that bill as soon as possible
and also ask unanimous consent that a statement by Congressman
Rahall be included in this hearing record.
Chairman Norwood. So ordered.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rahall follows:]
Mr. Owens. In closing, I want to welcome Mr. O'Dell, who
directs Occupational Health and Safety at the United Mine
Workers of America. As we will hear from Mr. O'Dell, who spent
some 20 years as an hourly employee in coal mines, we know how
to prevent these tragic mine workers' deaths.
I look forward to hearing his testimony and the testimony
of the other witnesses. Thank you.
Chairman Norwood. Thank you very much, Mr. Owens. And you
know, just so we are fair and balanced, it should probably be
said that the MSHA budget has risen 40 percent over the past
decade, and mine safety funding has increased $30 million under
President Bush. I just think that probably ought to be in the
record, because it is true.
Subcommittee members, we have a very distinguished panel of
witnesses today, and I would like to introduce them to you.
First, we have Mr. Robert Friend, who is acting deputy
assistant secretary at the Mine Safety and Health
Administration.
Mr. Friend joined MSHA in 1978 as a metal/non-metal
inspector. He worked in several MSHA regions before joining
headquarters. He is a certified mine safety professional, as
recognized by the International Society of Mine Safety
Professionals.
Mr. Friend, you are most welcome.
Next, we have Mr. Ray McKinney. He is the administrator for
the Coal Mine Safety and Health at the Mine Safety and Health
Administration. Mr. McKinney joined MSHA in 1976 as a coal mine
inspector. He is a certified mine safety professional. And what
I like, he was a coal miner and a member of a mine rescue team
prior to joining MSHA.
In addition, he has received the Department of Labor's
Valor Award for the safe rescue of a miner trapped in Scotia
Coal Company's Upper Taggart Mine.
And we certainly congratulate you on that.
Next we have Mr. Dennis O'Dell. He is the administrator for
the Occupational Health and Safety for the United Mine Workers
of America. Mr. O'Dell worked in all aspects of coal mining
before becoming a member of the UMWA leadership.
Mr. O'Dell is an instructor at the National Mine Academy in
Beckley, West Virginia and was appointed to the Mine Safety and
Health Research Advisory Committee in 2006. He has been a full-
time representative of the UMWA for 11 years.
Lastly, we are happy to have Mr. Bruce Watzman--is vice
president of safety and health and human resources for the
National Mining Association. Mr. Watzman holds a master's
degree in environmental health management. He has worked for
the National Mining Association and its predecessor, the
National Coal Association, since 1980.
Mr. Watzman is a recognized expert in the field and was
also recently appointed as a member of the mine safety and
health research advisory committee.
A quick note: Although both Mr. Friend and Mr. McKinney are
appearing before us today, only Mr. Friend will present an
opening statement. Both gentlemen, however, will be available
for your questions.
And as you see, committee, we have a very distinguished
group.
And we are here to learn from you gentlemen today.
I want to remind the members, however, that we will be
asking questions of the witnesses after all four of you
testify. In addition, Committee Rule 2 imposes a 5-minute limit
on all questions.
Gentlemen, I think all of you are familiar with the timers.
I just do not like cutting people off at all. It makes me ill
at ease. If you can try to sort of see that caution light come
on, we really would appreciate it.
And with that, Mr. Friend, you are recognized now for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT FRIEND, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Mr. Friend. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McKinney and I are
pleased to appear before you today to discuss the work of the
Mine Safety and Health Administration. We appreciate your
interest in MSHA and the opportunity to share with you the
current activities in which the agency is engaged.
In recent years, the mining industry has experienced
historic lows in injury and fatality rates. In 1978, the first
year MSHA operated under the new mine act, 242 miners died in
mining accidents. Last year there were 57 fatalities, 22 at
coal mines and 35 at metal and non-metal mines.
From 2000 to 2005, the mining industry as a whole
experienced a 33 percent decrease in fatal accidents
nationwide, a 42 percent decline in coal mines. The coal mine
lost time injury rate has declined one-third over the past 5
years. These are important and compelling statistics that put
the current state of mine safety and health in this country in
its proper perspective.
MSHA inspectors vigorously enforce the law. With the
support of the entire agency, last year MSHA issued the highest
number of citations and orders since 1994.
In recent years, in order to gain compliance, MSHA has
increased its use of withdrawal orders, which is a powerful
tool that requires miners to be withdrawn from areas affected
by a violation. Many times this also results in lost
production.
During the last 5 years, the number of withdrawal orders
increased 20 percent over the previous 5 years. MSHA issued
more withdrawal orders in both 2004 and 2005 than in any year
since 1994.
It is important to note that any MSHA violation must be
abated within a specified time frame and before any penalty is
assessed. In the case of withdrawal orders, the hazard must be
abated before miners are allowed to return to work in the area
or activity affected by that order.
Recent statistics show our strong enforcement record very
strongly. From fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2005, total
citations and orders issued by MSHA at all mines increased five
percent. Total citations and orders issued at coal mines
increased by 19 percent. Total significant and substantial
citations and orders issued at coal mines increased by 13
percent.
However, I want to make something clear. And diligently and
vigorously as MSHA inspectors enforce the law, MSHA does not
have the authority to preemptively close entire mines because
of the number or the frequency of violations. We do not have
that authority under the mine act.
While we stand by our record, we know there is more to do.
We are now conducting thorough investigations of the recent
tragic accidents at Sago and Alma Mines. We are determined to
learn lessons from those accidents that can help us to continue
to improve mine safety and health.
We are happy to respond to your specific questions about
these two incidents, keeping in mind that this is an ongoing
investigation and it would be inappropriate at this stage to
speculate on the root causes of those accidents.
Although there have been great improvements in mine safety
and health, as long as there is one fatality or one ill or
injured miner, we know we have more work to do. We must
continually seek new and improved accident-prevention measures,
and we must give miners who are involved in accidents every
chance for survival.
Some of the areas we are working on to achieve that goal
include new rulemaking and mine technology evaluations.
I want to make sure that people know that MSHA will hold a
public meeting on Monday, March 13 at the National Press Club
in Washington, D.C. to get comments on two specific topics
covered in our request for information. Those are technology
used for underground communications and tracking of underground
miners.
We are also evaluating the efficacy and large-scale
permissibility of existing advanced underground mine
communications and tracking systems currently used in Australia
and in a small number of U.S. coal mines.
MSHA is reexamining mine rescue issues, and we are working
jointly with mine industry representatives to standardize mine
emergency procedures related to mine rescue organization, lines
of communication and lines of authority.
I would like to turn now to the question of MSHA resources.
I have seen recent reports that cite the decrease in the number
of mine enforcement personnel as evidence of an indifferent
attitude toward mine safety and health.
I want to assure you that MSHA currently has sufficient
resources to conduct the inspections mandated by the mine act.
The number of federal mine enforcement personnel has remained
relatively constant over the last 10 years, from a low of 902
in 1998 to a high of 986 in 2003.
We have shifted some resources into the metal and non-metal
area as the workload has changed between these two industry
sectors. While the number of coal enforcement personnel
declined 15 percent over the last 10 years, the number of coal
mines decreased 24 percent during that same time period.
The president has requested sufficient funding levels for
MSHA to conduct the required inspections of the mine,
requesting an increase in the agency funding every year.
I want to conclude with something that bears repeating time
and again, something that everyone should understand. Every
single employee at MSHA is dedicated heart and soul to the
agency's mission.
Every employee of the MSHA lives and breathes for the day
when there are no fatalities, no injuries and no occupational
illnesses among the country's miners. Every employee at MSHA
strives every day to reach that goal, sending every miner in
this country home to family and friends at the end of every
shift, every day.
We will not rest until that happens. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Friend follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert M. Friend, Acting Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Labor for Mine Safety and Health
Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss
the ongoing work of the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA).
MSHA works diligently to promote mine safety and health. We want
nothing more than to send every miner home safely at the end of every
shift, every day.
We have been moving closer to that goal every year. In recent
years, the mining industry has experienced historic lows in injury and
fatality rates. In 1978, the first year MSHA operated under the new
Mine Act, 242 miners died in mining accidents. Last year, there were 57
mining fatalities, 22 at coal mines and 35 at metal and nonmetal mines.
From 2000 to 2005, the mining industry experienced a 33% decrease in
fatal accidents nationwide--with coal mines seeing a 42% decline. The
coal mine lost-time injury rate declined one-third over the last five
years. These are important and compelling statistics one must consider
in placing current mine safety and health conditions in a proper
perspective.
MSHA inspectors vigorously enforce the law--with the support of the
entire agency, top to bottom. Last year, MSHA issued the highest number
of citations and orders since 1994. In recent years, MSHA increased its
use of ``withdrawal orders'' to gain compliance with the standards.
This is a powerful enforcement tool as withdrawal orders require miners
to be removed from the area affected by the violation, often resulting
in disruptions to production. The number of withdrawal orders increased
20% over the last five years when compared to the previous five years.
MSHA issued more ``withdrawal orders'' in both 2004 and 2005 than in
any year since 1994. It is important to note that any MSHA violation
must be abated within a specified time frame before the penalty is
assessed. In the case of withdrawal orders, the hazard must be abated
before miners are allowed to work in the area or activity affected by
the hazard.
The statistics show our strong enforcement record very clearly.
From FY2000 to FY2005:
Total Citations and Orders issued by MSHA at all mines
increased by 5% (119,183 to 125,161)
Total Citations and Orders issued at coal mines increased
by 19% (56,870 to 67,756)
Total ``Significant and Substantial'' Citations and Orders
issued at coal mines increased by 13% (23,586 to 26,717)
MSHA enforcement personnel have significantly increased
the issuance of withdrawal orders to coal mine operators who exhibit an
unwarrantable failure to comply with the regulations. Unwarrantable
failure orders are one of the most severe enforcement actions
inspectors can take and in each of the last two years MSHA inspectors
issued more such orders than in any year in the last ten years.
While enforcement activity and the number of miners went up from
2000 to 2005, the number of coal mines fell. There were 2,124 coal
mines in 2000 and 1,982 in 2005 (through the third quarter) and 108,098
coal miners in 2000 and 112,449 in 2005 (through the third quarter).
Clearly, MSHA inspectors continue to vigorously enforce the law--with
the support of the entire agency, top to bottom.
I want to make something clear. MSHA's inspectors diligently and
vigorously enforce the law. However, the Mine Act does not give MSHA
the authority to preemptively close entire mines because of the number
or frequency of violations. Nor does the Mine Act include the authority
to close or seize a mine because of unpaid fines or penalties.
While we are proud of our enforcement and compliance record, we
know there is more to do. We are currently engaged in a thorough
investigation of the recent tragic accidents at Sago and Alma Mines. We
are determined to learn from these accidents.
First, I want to publicly recognize the mine rescue teams who
responded to the accidents at Sago Mine and Alma #1 Mine. These teams
demonstrated exceptional bravery and professionalism, and they should
be commended for their efforts, as well as for their dedication to
their fellow miners.
I would like to give you an update on the Sago Mine and Alma Mine
#1 accident investigations. We have finished mapping the underground
areas of the Sago mine and have completed nearly all of the witness
interviews. Thus far, MSHA and representatives from the State of West
Virginia have interviewed forty-six individuals. We have completed an
evaluation of the geology of the roof in the abandoned area of the mine
where the explosion occurred. In conjunction with the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), we are developing
a protocol to test the materials used in the Sago mine to seal the area
where the explosion occurred. At this time we have no information that
would suggest that the explosion is related to any conditions that MSHA
enforcement personnel observed and cited at the mine before the
explosion.
We have completed the investigation of the underground areas of the
Alma #1 mine with the exception of the immediate vicinity where the
fire occurred. There are significant roof falls in this area that will
have to be removed before the underground portion of the investigation
can be completed. At this time we have interviewed 14 individuals and
the remaining interviews should be completed within the next several
weeks.
As standard operating procedure, MSHA conducts an internal review
after every major accident. We will look carefully to see if MSHA
followed its own policies and procedures with respect to Agency
activities prior to and during the accident. This report will be shared
with this committee and made public. MSHA has always viewed its
internal review process as an opportunity to take a hard and honest
look at how we do our job and to use that information to improve how we
do business. Past reviews have been comprehensive and objective
examinations that resulted in responsible recommendations for
improvement. The Government Accountability Office and the Department's
Office of the Inspector General are also conducting independent reviews
of various aspects of MSHA's programs.
Despite the progress the mining industry has achieved in the area
of health and safety, there is always room for improvement. The recent
fatalities in West Virginia, along with other recent fatalities, are
vivid reminders that we must continually seek new and improved accident
prevention measures. And when accidents occur, we need to give miners
the best possible chance to survive. I want to share some of the
actions MSHA is currently taking in the areas of rulemaking, mining
technology, mine rescue operations, and civil penalty assessments.
Emergency Temporary Standard
MSHA's safety and health standards are constantly being reviewed
and adjustments made to improve them or address newly recognized
hazards. As a direct result of the recent two West Virginia accidents,
we will soon be issuing an Emergency Temporary Standard to improve
safety in underground mines in the areas of: underground supplies of
oxygen generating breathing devices, training, lifelines, and accident
notification.
Technology
There has been much discussion surrounding the availability of
technology and equipment that, if available to miners during and after
fires and explosions, could increase their chances for survival. MSHA
constantly searches for and evaluates emerging technologies that can be
used to protect miners. On January 25, 2006, MSHA published in the
Federal Register a Request for Information (RFI) on Underground Mine
Rescue Equipment and Technology.
MSHA is currently in the process of evaluating advanced underground
mine communication and tracking systems. The Personal Emergency Device
(PED) system is a one way ``through the earth'' communication system
used in Australia, but only used in about a dozen underground mines in
the U.S. MSHA is evaluating the PED at four different U.S. underground
coal mines, and plans to evaluate the system at the only U.S. mine with
a surface-mounted antenna. Information on PED performance will also be
collected in Australian coal mines. Although the PED could send
evacuation instructions to miners in the early stages of a fire, system
limitations already noted in MSHA's field evaluations may seriously
compromise the reliability or true usefulness of the PED during a U.S.
mine emergency. These shortcomings include the vulnerability of
commonly-installed underground antennas in the event of a fire or
explosion, signal loss issues, range limitations, and potential
interference with other mine communication systems.
The Tracker Tagging System is an MSHA-approved tracking system for
use in underground mines. A remote unit, carried by a miner, transmits
its location to a ``beacon'' receiving unit as the miner passes the
beacon. Tracking of miners is limited to identifying their location in
the ``zone'' between two beacons where any given transmitter is
located, and beacons are commonly spaced at 3,000--4,000 ft. intervals.
While some have advocated mandating its use in underground mines in the
U.S., little is known about the system's performance. There are no
underground mines in the U.S. using the Tracker Tagging System. While
it is used in several mines in Australia, it is used in just one
underground coal mine in that country, and one coal mine in China.
Both the Tracker Tagging system and the PED system must be further
evaluated and their effectiveness tested before rushing into a decision
to mandate their use in underground mines. To that end, in a
cooperative effort with the manufacturer of both systems, MSHA and the
West Virginia Board of Coal Mine Health and Safety will visit four
mines in Australia this month to conduct further field evaluations of
the two systems. The issues reported in U.S. mines regarding signal
loss or ``shadow'' zones will be further investigated to accurately
determine the nature of these anomalies.
Other available communication technologies for consideration are
actively sought through the RFI. MSHA is soliciting technical
presentations or written comments on underground communications and
systems for tracking underground miners and will hold a public meeting
specifically for that purpose on March 13th at the National Press Club
in Washington, D.C. We are hopeful that the information gathered at
this meeting, together with the conclusions drawn following the field
evaluations of the PED and Tracker systems in both the United States
and Australia, will help direct MSHA and all other concerned parties in
our efforts to provide the best available communications technologies
to miners in the event of an emergency underground.
Furthermore, in response to the recent RFI noted above, MSHA has
received more than 70 proposals from manufacturers and distributors of
emergency communication and tracking systems. Additional proposals
continue to come in on a daily basis. MSHA's Technical Support
Directorate is currently reviewing these products and proposals and
will assist interested manufacturers in obtaining approval for the
equipments' use in underground mines. For our initial reviews we are
prioritizing the emergency communications or tracking systems that do
not rely on a wire back-bone and that have the greatest potential to
remain functional in the event of a roof-fall, inundation, fire, or
explosion. From the over 70 proposals received, MSHA has initially
selected several promising communication systems to evaluate based on
the following criteria: precise tracking and 2-way voice preferred
capability; survivability in a fire or explosion; current availability;
and capability of complying with MSHA requirements.
To help expedite and standardize the evaluation of these existing
and promising technologies, a mine communications partnership is being
formed with membership consisting of the National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), MSHA, the Bituminous Coal
Operators Association (BCOA), the United Mine Workers of America
(UMWA), the United Steelworkers, the National Mining Association (NMA),
and the State of West Virginia. The primary goals of this partnership
are to establish general performance expectations for mine emergency
communications systems, establish uniform and fair criteria for testing
and evaluating systems, and to conduct in-mine tests on systems. A
secondary goal is to identify gap areas that should be addressed
through research.
The State of West Virginia, MSHA, and NIOSH are co-sponsoring the
International Mining and Health Safety Symposium on April 20-21, 2006.
The symposium will bring together technology developers, equipment
manufacturers, the Federal Government, the State of West Virginia,
organizations representing the mining community, and other countries to
discuss the development, approval, and adoption of state-of-the-art
technologies and mining methods. Wheeling Jesuit University will host
the symposium at the Robert C. Byrd National Technology Transfer Center
and the Civic Center in Wheeling, WV.
MSHA is working with the BCOA and the NMA to jointly develop a
template on mine rescue preparedness. This document will describe
standardized mine emergency procedures related to mine rescue
organization, lines of communication, and establishing lines of
authority.
In addition, MSHA has sought information from the entire mining
community, including labor, industry, academia, and local first-
responders on improvements to mine rescue preparedness.
Civil Penalty Assessments
Assessments are civil penalties (fines) levied on mine operators,
independent contractors working on mine property, agents of operators
or contractors, or, in some cases, individual miners, for violating
safety or health standards or sections of the Mine Act. The process of
determining penalty amounts is governed by the criteria included in the
Mine Act and federal regulations. The penalty assessment process is
administered by an MSHA office separate from the enforcement arms of
the agency to ensure the objectivity of the fines proposed for
violations. The Office of Assessments implemented the most recent
guidelines for proposing civil penalties in 2003.
These penalties range from $60 to a statutory maximum of $60,000.
The $60 fine is generally imposed for less serious, timely abated
violations that occur in mines with low violation histories. More
serious violations may receive a computer-generated regular formula
assessment that assigns points based on criteria specified in the Mine
Act. The most egregious violations may receive higher assessments with
proposed penalty amounts determined by assigned specialists. The
statutory maximum of $60,000 can be imposed for regular formula or
special assessments.
Proposed civil penalty amounts are determined using five statutory
criteria in the Mine Act:
the size of the operation,
the operation's history of violations,
the negligence of the operator,
the gravity of the violation, and
the degree of good faith the operator exhibits in
correcting the violation.
A sixth statutory criterion, the ability of the operator to
continue in business, is taken into account only after the amount of
the fine is proposed and presented to the operator. The operator must
provide convincing evidence of financial hardship and inability to
continue in business. In these cases, MSHA may adjust the fine.
If the mine operator thinks the proposed penalty is too high, the
operator can contest the penalty. The contested penalty first goes to
an administrative law judge of the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Commission who can uphold the original penalty, vacate the
penalty, reduce the penalty, or (in rare instances) increase the
penalty. If the operator is dissatisfied with that result, the operator
can ask the full Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission to
hear the case. If the Commission takes the case and the operator is
dissatisfied with that result, the operator can appeal to the Court of
Appeals. Sometimes this process takes several years. A case may
ultimately go to the Supreme Court.
Operators have 30 days to pay or contest their fines once they are
assessed. If the fine is not contested, it is considered a final order
of the Commission after the 30 days. If these fines are not paid within
30 days, MSHA begins contacting the operator and 8% interest begins to
accrue. If the debt remains unpaid for 90 days, an additional non-
payment penalty of 6% begins to accrue, retroactive to the date the
fine became final.
Penalties are considered debts under the provisions of the Debt
Collection Improvement Act of 1996. When a debt is delinquent more than
180 days, MSHA refers the debt to the Department of the Treasury for
collection. Treasury may attempt to collect the debt directly, refer
the debt to a private collection agency, collect the debt by offsetting
Federal payments made to the debtor, or, ultimately, refer the debt to
the Department of Justice for collection. If this process is
unsuccessful, MSHA may terminate collection of the debt and report it
to the Internal Revenue Service to be included in the company's income
tax liability as taxable income.
MSHA cannot close a mine if it has too many fines or does not pay
the fines assessed. The Mine Act does not give MSHA that authority.
MSHA is neither soft on enforcement nor soft on assessments. This
Administration stands by its assessment record. Over the last five
years, MSHA proposed 21 percent more penalties at the $10,000 or higher
level than during the previous five years. The total dollar value was
up by 16 percent during this same period of time.
Approximately 6% of citations and orders are contested. Litigation
at the Commission or in federal court impacts a large percentage of
contested proposed assessments. For assessments contested between 1995
and 2005, 46 percent of the penalties were reduced and the average
reduction in the penalty was 47 percent. The Administration has already
proposed legislation to increase the maximum civil penalty for flagrant
violations from $60,000 to $220,000. Additionally, I been directed to
re-examine the penalty amounts and MSHA will soon propose rule making
revisions to the penalty schedule (subject to the statutory $60,000
penalty cap).
MSHA has also filed two lawsuits in February in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky seeking injunctions against
two separate mine operators who have chronically failed to pay assessed
civil penalties for violations of the Mine Act. The complaints ask that
both operators be enjoined from failing to pay penalties for future
violations of the Mine Act and that both be required to post a bond
with the court to guarantee future compliance with the law. MSHA is
also evaluating other cases involving operators who have refused to pay
civil penalties and will seek injunctions against them where
appropriate.
Finally, it is important to note that any MSHA violation must be
abated within a specified time frame even before the penalty is finally
assessed. In the case of withdrawal orders, the hazard must be abated
before miners are allowed to work in the area or activity affected by
the hazard.
Every employee at MSHA is dedicated heart and soul to the agency's
mission. Every employee at MSHA lives and breathes for the day when
there are no fatalities, no injuries, and no occupational illness among
all of this country's miners. Every employee at MSHA strives every
second of every day to reach our goal: sending every miner in this
country home to family and friends, safe and healthy, at the end of
every shift, every day. We will not rest until that happens.
Thank you.
______
Chairman Norwood. Thank you very much, Mr. Friend.
Mr. O'Dell, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DENNIS O'DELL, ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEPARTMENT ON
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY, UNITED MINEWORKERS OF AMERICA
Mr. O'Dell. Mr. Chairman, members, I want to thank you for
allowing me this opportunity to appear before your committee. I
am testifying on behalf of the United Mine Workers of America.
I come out of the coal fields having been an underground
coal miner for 19 years as well as both a local union
international safety representative and a local union safety
committee man.
I participated in many recent and most tragic mining
disasters of the last decade, including the Jim Walter's No. 5
mine explosion in September of 2001 and the Sago Mine disaster
earlier this year.
We are here today to review the performance of the Mine
Safety and Health Administration, known as MSHA. The UMWA
recognizes that MSHA includes many hard-working civil servants
whose efforts coal miners deeply appreciate. However, we
believe MSHA's top policy makers have fallen short.
In the hearing room this afternoon are a number of active
miners from coal mining states that sit behind us. They are
here because they care deeply about miners' health and safety.
They join me in urging Congress to ensure that MSHA
aggressively protects miners' health and safety so that they
can perform their job safely and return home to their families
each and every day.
MSHA's not developing enough new mandatory standards to
protect miners' health and safety, and through policy it is
allowing operators to pursue practices that compromise rather
than enhance miners' health and safety.
We hope that this committee can help redirect MSHA so that
it will engage in the principal activities Congress mandated
when it crafted the mine act shortly after 78 miners died at
Farmington, West Virginia in 1968.
These laws were written to protect the health and safety of
miners after this major disaster occurred, yet mining still
remains the second most dangerous industry in this country.
Every year, thousands of miners remain disabled and dying from
black lung disease, while many other miners die in mining
accidents every year.
Most often, mining accidents claim the lives of one or two
miners at a time, from roof falls, equipment failures,
electrical problems and other accidents. In just the first 6
weeks of 2006, in addition to the 12 miner who perished at the
Sago Mine and the two who died in the January 19 mine fire at
Massey's Aracoma on the No. 1 mine, seven other coal miners
also have died one at a time.
It is also interesting to note that there are countless
near-misses that occur on a regular basis. Since August of
2000, MSHA records show there are well over 400 mine fires,
ignitions, explosions and inundations that too far easily could
have developed into significant disasters and fatalities, some
of which has just recently occurred last week at the VP 8 mine
in Virginia and Shoal Creek Mine in Alabama.
Many other incidents like these likely went unreported. As
a result, tragedies at the Sago and the Alma No. 1 coal mine
demonstrate, there is a serious void in the regulatory
framework for underground miners confronting a mine emergency.
While there is a lot yet to be determined about these
incidents, the note that Sago miner George Junior Hamner wrote
to his wife and daughter reveals that most miners survived the
initial explosion at the Sago Mine. This demonstrates that
those miners had no information about where to find fresh air
or about how they might have been able to exit the mine.
Though Congress specifically suggests in 1969 that the
secretary consider promulgating a rule requiring rescue
chambers for miners to find shelter in an emergency, we are
unaware of any substantial efforts that have been made to
pursue this option since the act was written.
At the Alma Mine, miners were killed after a mine fire
erupted on a belt that was used to ventilate the mine. If belt
air had not been permitted, and if belts were not flammable, or
if the miners had more oxygen, perhaps the outcome of these
miners' fate would have been different.
These deficiencies in miners' health and safety are all
ones MSHA has known about for many, many years. Most of them
have been known since the coal act was passed in 1968, over 37
years ago.
Problems of no communication, the inability to locate
underground miners, insufficient self-rescuers were all noted
as problems that confronted miners as far back as Farmington
No. 9, the Jim Walter's No. 5 mine, Sago Mine and the Alma No.
1 mine. Experience demonstrates that most miners will not have
them available when the next emergency strikes.
Unfortunately, under former assistant secretary MSHA, David
Lauriski, 17 proposed rules were scrapped. I attached a list of
those withdrawn rules with my testimony.
Along with some of those protections that would have--along
with some of those protections, it would have helped miners who
perished at Sago and Alma be able to avoid their disastrous
fates.
Examples: As a rule that would have imposed new procedures
and requirements for flame-resistant conveyor belts, to
reinstate the non-use of belt air to ventilate working areas, a
rule concerning improvements for self-rescuers, which we only
got in 1982. And it took us 12 years to 20 years to be able to
have Congress enact that under a court order.
Even with the recent spate of coal mining fatalities, I
consider the industry lucky to not have suffered more injuries
and deaths. This is because for too many years, the agency has
not been writing new rules to protect miners and has not been
doing a good job enforcing the rules it already has.
Mining is dangerous work. When you at the agency take that
serious, when Congress first said in the mine act that they
declare the first priority of all in the coal and other mining
industry must be the health and safety of its most precious
resource, the miner, we take that serious.
Everyone else associated with the mining industry must
reestablish miners' health and safety as their top priority.
Also, senseless deaths and injuries must stop. I urge you to
require MSHA to do in 2006 all that Congress demanded in 1969
and again in 1977.
Regulations that were in the pipeline in 2001 and 2002
should be reactivated and finalized in a timely fashion. New
regulations to protect miners both while on the job and on
emergency strike must be promulgated. All such regulations must
then be enforced regularly and aggressively.
I thank you for your interest in miner safety and will be
happy to answer any questions you have later.
[The statement of Mr. O'Dell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dennis O'Dell, Administrator, Department of
Occupational Health & Safety, United Mine Workers of America
Thank you for allowing me this opportunity to appear before your
Committee. I am testifying on behalf of the United Mine Workers of
America (``UMWA''), the union that has been an unwavering advocate for
miners' health and safety for 116 years. I come out of the coal fields,
having been an underground coal miner for 19 years, as well as both a
Local Union and International safety representative. I have
participated in many of the recent and most tragic mining disasters of
the last decade, including the Jim Walters No. 5 mine explosion in
September 2001, and the Sago Mine disaster earlier this year.
Miners' health and safety has been in the headlines for much of
2006 because so many coal miners have perished. In fact, nearly as many
miners died in just the first six weeks of 2006 as in all of 2005.
We are here today to review the performance of the Mine Safety and
Health Administration (``MSHA''). The UMWA recognizes that MSHA
includes many hard-working civil servants whose efforts coal miners
appreciate. However, MSHA's top policy-makers have fallen short. They
have not been doing their job protecting and enhancing miners' health
and safety.
In the hearing room this afternoon are a number of active miners
from coal mining states. They are here because they care deeply about
miners' health and safety. They join me in urging Congress to ensure
that MSHA aggressively protects miners' health and safety, so that they
can perform their jobs safely and return home to their families each
and every day.
Focusing on MSHA's rulemaking responsibilities, it is apparent that
the Agency has failed to promulgate rules that will better protect
miners. MSHA has enacted rules that help operators' productivity while
it withdraws potential rules that it should promulgate to advance
miners' health and safety.
Coal is being produced at record high levels. At the same time, far
fewer miners are needed to extract the mineral. However, MSHA has not
promulgated rules to keep pace with record productivity and the new
mining techniques, which sometimes introduce new hazards.
I will first review how current mine safety laws came into being;
and then describe a number of ways in which MSHA has failed to protect
miners' health and safety: it is not developing enough new mandatory
standards to protect miners' health and safety, and through ``policy''
it is allowing operators to pursue practices that compromise--rather
than enhance--miners' health and safety. We hope that in exercising
your oversight responsibilities, this Committee can help redirect MSHA
so it will engage in the principal activities Congress mandated when it
crafted the Mine Act.
Shortly after 78 miners died at Farmington, West Virginia in 1968
Congress enacted the Coal Act in 1969; the legislation was then
expanded to other mining industries and renamed the Mine Act in 1977.
Since the Coal Act was passed, fatalities in coal mining have decreased
dramatically: while over 300 miners died in 1968, the year before the
Coal Act was enacted, fewer than 100 miners have perished in any single
year over the last 20 years. Yet, mining still remains the second-most
dangerous industry in this country.
Every year thousands of miners remain disabled and dying from black
lung disease, while many other miners die in mining accidents every
year. Most often, mining accidents claim the lives of one or two miners
at a time, from roof falls, equipment failures, electrical problems,
and other accidents. In just the first six weeks of 2006, in addition
to the 12 miners who perished at the Sago mine and the two who died in
the January 19 mine fire at Massey's Aracoma Alma #1 mine, seven other
coal miners also died, one at a time.
There are also countless near-misses that occur on a regular basis.
Since August 2000, MSHA records show there were well over 400 mine
fires, ignitions, explosions and inundations that far too-easily could
have developed into significant disasters and fatalities. Many other
incidents likely went unreported.
In passing the Coal and Mine Acts, Congress made it clear that a
primary purpose of the legislation was to require the Secretary to
promulgate mandatory health and safety standards, and to ensure that
operators would follow all health and safety standards, including the
long list of ``interim mandatory standards'' that Congress wrote into
law.
However, MSHA has done neither: it has not promulgated sufficient
protective health and safety standards, and it has failed to
aggressively enforce the regulations it has on the books.
As the recent tragedies at the Sago and Alma No. 1 coal mines
demonstrate, there is a serious void in the regulatory framework for
underground miners confronting a mine emergency. While there is a lot
yet to be determined about these accidents, the note that Sago miner
George Junior Hamner wrote to his wife and daughter (copy attached)
reveals that most miners survived the initial explosion at the Sago
Mine. It also demonstrates that those miners had no information about
where to find fresh air or about how they might have been able to exit
the mine. In fact, miners survived for many hours, but in the end they
had inadequate access to oxygen to survive the toxic mine atmosphere.
Though Congress specifically suggested in 1969 that the Secretary
consider promulgating a rule requiring rescue chambers for miners to
find shelter in an emergency, we are unaware of any substantial efforts
MSHA has made to pursue this option since the Act was written.
Nevertheless, earlier this year just such a chamber was successfully
used by, and saved the lives of, miners at a potash mine in Western
Canada when they confronted a mine emergency. If they could rely on a
rescue chamber to survive, why weren't the miners at Sago and Alma
afforded that same opportunity?
At the Alma mine, miners were killed after a mine fire erupted on
the belt that was used to ventilate the mine. If belt air had not been
permitted, and if the belts were not flammable, or if the miners had
more oxygen, or if they had lifelines to guide them out of the smoke-
filled mine, perhaps we would have had a different outcome.
These deficiencies in miners' health and safety are all ones MSHA
has known about for many, many years. Most of them have been known
since the Coal Act was passed in 1968, over 37 years ago. In fact, in
1968 rescuers could not locate all the miners killed in the Farmington
disaster and 19 remain entombed in that mine. The problems of no
communications, the inability to locate underground miners, and
insufficient self-rescuers were all noted as problems that confronted
miners, including the 13 who were killed at the Jim Walters No. 5 mine
on September 23, 2001. The need for these improvements has been talked
about after too many tragedies. Long ago, it was time to stop talking
and time to take action to implement changes that would help miners
survive emergencies.
We do not have to wait for 100% guarantees; we need to enhance a
miner's chance of escaping an emergency, or surviving if trapped. Much
technology is already available that would help miners survive a
disaster like what confronted the miners at Sago and Alma. More oxygen,
better communications, and the ability to locate the trapped miners--
these improvements may well have made a critical difference in those
emergency situations.
It is interesting that those advocating the status quo will say
that some of the protections we seek, like supplemental oxygen, and
better communications, are not worth pursuing because they may be
damaged in the event of an explosion or other emergency. However, if
the miners survive that initial event, they may well be able to escape
or survive if they are provided additional resources. At the Sago Mine,
miners survived for many hours and may well have been able to escape if
they had been directed out; or they might have survived if they had
supplemental oxygen stored nearby. At the Jim Walters mine, those
killed had inadequate information largely because the primary method of
communication was interrupted; if secondary communications (i.e.,
supplemental wireless devices) had been available, it is possible more
would have survived. Shouldn't they be given their best chance of
surviving?
Experience demonstrates that unless MSHA requires operators to
provide these protections, most miners will not have them available
when the next emergency will strike. Since the devastating coal mining
tragedies of 2006 captured the nation's attention, a number of
manufacturers of various technologies and others from various
backgrounds have submitted information about various devices, and
suggestions about techniques that might be able to help miners survive
an emergency. I know I have received a number of interesting proposals,
and that MSHA has received many more in response to its request for
such information. While the UMWA supports MSHA's action to undertake a
review of such information and technologies, why didn't the Agency do
this decades ago? Why do we have to have a discussion about such simple
solutions as more oxygen and the ability to locate miners underground
in the 21st Century?
Active miners and family members of those killed at the Jim
Walters' mine testified about the need for better communications, the
need to be able to locate miners underground, and the need for more
oxygen supplies stored underground, during a series of hearings that
MSHA conducted in February, 2003. Transcripts from those hearings are
available through MSHA's web page. What came from all those good
suggestions? Nothing. Sadly, it came as no surprise to me when these
very same problems and deficiencies confronted miners trapped in the
Sago and Alma No. 1 mines; MSHA had not advanced any such protections
in the intervening years.
In fact, MSHA has been going backwards in providing some of these
protections. Assistant Secretary for MSHA David Lauriski scrapped 17
proposed rules on topics MSHA had identified as needing attention. I
attach a list of those withdrawn rules. Among them were some of the
protections that might have helped the miners who perished at Sago and
Alma. Offering no explanation for its decision, on September 24, 2001
MSHA withdrew a rule that would have imposed new procedures and
requirements for flame-resistant conveyor belts, even though the rule
was then close to completion. On that same day, citing ``resource
constraints and changing safety and health regulatory priorities,''
MSHA withdrew its ``pre-rule'' concerning self-rescuers that had been
among the Agency's rulemaking agenda since 1999.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Throughout the industry there have been problems with miners
not being able to properly don the self-rescuer units in emergency
situations. Moreover, without a rule addressing self-rescuers,
technological advances of these breathing devices has been stymied. In
the legislative history of the Mine Act, Congress indicated that mining
regulations should be technology-driving, to maximize miners'
protections. We had hoped that with the promulgation of a new rule
addressing self-rescuers, the existing problems would be addressed, and
technological advances encouraged. The UMWA is convinced that such a
rule would have been the catalyst for a new generation of self-rescuer
devices. While operators are willing to invest in new technology when
it increases production, it appears that they are not so willing to
invest when in miners' health and safety.
We note that reports of the recent coal mine disaster in Mexico
indicated that miners had access to at least six hours of oxygen, and
there were additional units available underground. If so, their oxygen
resources far exceeded what must be provided to miners in this country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One year later, MSHA withdrew a pre-rule that would have addressed
problems related to diminishing mine rescue capabilities.\2\ The mine
rescue system needs MSHA's attention. It is time for MSHA to promulgate
rules that would compel the expansion of mine rescue capabilities, and
require mine rescue teams at each and every mine, regardless of the
mine size or location.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ It took from three to five hours for the first rescue teams to
arrive at Sago. That mine does not have its own rescue teams, even
though MSHA regulations require mines to ``establish at least two mine
rescue teams which are available at all times when miners are
underground, or * * * [make an arrangement] for mine rescue services
which assures that at least two mine rescue teams are available at all
times when miners are underground.'' 30 CFR Sec. 49.2. (The regulation
includes an exception for small and remote mines, but does not apply to
the Sago mine.) That same regulation specifies that teams ``shall be
considered available where teams are capable presenting themselves at
the mine site(s) within a reasonable time after notification. * * *''
Id. Given that it took three to five hours for the first mine rescue
teams to arrive at Sago, it is apparent that the current system is not
acceptable.
The UMWA submits that every underground coal mine should have mine
rescue capabilities on site. These team members should be employees at
the facility who would be acutely familiar with the mine. These
individuals would not only be best able to carry out many of the duties
required in these situations, but would also be uniquely qualified to
brief additional offsite teams that may be necessary to complete the
rescue. For even small and remote mines, MSHA should require mine
rescue teams to be ready when disasters strike. No trapped miners
should ever again have to wait three to five hours for rescue efforts
to begin.
Instead of promulgating a rule that would improve rescue teams'
availability and capabilities, MSHA eliminated further work on rescue
teams regulations. Meanwhile, it permits operators to expand on the
ill-advised practice of contracting out such work. Withdrawing the
proposed rule effectively eliminated any meaningful improvement in
comprehensive mine rescue activity, but it also afforded some mine
operators the opportunity to disband teams so they could increase their
profits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This current administration also withdrew a number of other rules
that were at various stages of the rulemaking process. Some of the most
compelling ones concern air quality, miners' exposure to airborne
contaminants, and coal dust. The existing regulations utilize the same
permissible exposure limits (``PELs'') that were in place when the Mine
Act was promulgated in 1977; even MSHA recognizes them to be outdated
and inadequate to protect miners' health. MSHA had planned to update
them; instead the Agency withdrew its proposed rule in September 2002.
Another proposed rule would have enacted recommendations emanating
from the Secretary's 1996 Advisory Committee on the Elimination of
Pneumoconiosis Among Coal Workers. This rule would have decreased the
amount of respirable coal dust to which coal miners may be exposed.
Reducing the allowable respirable dust exposures would both diminish
miners' likelihood of contracting black lung disease and it would also
reduce the amount of explosive coal dust in the mine environment. This
was in the pre-rule stage when MSHA withdrew it in September 2004.
Unfortunately, the only efforts regarding coal dust that MSHA made
under former Assistant-Secretary Lauriski was a proposal that would
have allowed respirable dust levels to increase by four fold. After a
public outcry, including from a number of Congressmen, Mr. Lauriski
withdrew his ill-advised proposal.
In September 2001, MSHA also withdrew a proposed rule that would
have required the monitoring of respirable dust at all times. And MSHA
stopped its plans to increase the required training and retraining of
miners, even though the Agency identified this need back in 1998, and
the UMWA has consistently asked for such increases because current
requirements are inadequate.
MSHA dropped rulemaking efforts the Agency began in January 2001 to
establish uniform procedures for its accident investigations. Not
having such procedures has frustrated the designated miners'
representatives in their efforts to participate in the investigatory
interviews that took place in connection with the Sago investigation.
The UMWA has been excluded from all these interviews, even though a
number of active miners as well as several family members of those
killed have asked the UMWA to serve as their representative.
MSHA knows how to do better. The Agency itself has performed
countless internal reviews and self-analyses; the federal government's
watchdog agency, the GAO, has given it direction, and the UMWA has
communicated both formally and informally about how MSHA can and must
do better.
Only on the heels of so many coal mining disasters commanding
national attention, has MSHA recently begun to initiate some
potentially useful rulemaking that could improve a trapped miner's
ability to survive a mine accident. MSHA has announced plans to
implement an emergency rule that would require more oxygen, lifelines,
and the requirement that an operator provide MSHA with notice of a mine
emergency within 15 minutes of the event. These efforts are important
and we support MSHA in pursuing them to a quick resolution. The Agency
has also solicited information about wireless technology for
communicating with and locating underground miners. These are all very
worthwhile.
But we must ask, why did MSHA wait this long to pursue these
issues? Why wasn't it looking for these solutions ten and twenty (or
more) years ago? For an agency with such a clear mandate as that which
Congress wrote into the Mine Act--to protect and improve miners' health
and safety, we ask you to consider how MSHA could have gotten so
terribly misdirected.
MSHA has been neither aggressive nor consistent in enforcing the
regulations that already exist. It spends too much effort at
``compliance assistance,'' and too little on enforcement.
After MSHA completed its investigation into the Jim Walters
disaster, the Agency also performed an Internal Review of MSHA's
actions before the explosions to ``improve our inspection process to
better protect our nation's miners.'' The review compared what MSHA
actually did with what the Mine Act requires it to do. A number of
problems were identified as deficiencies ``at both the district and
headquarters level'', deficiencies ``relevant to inspection procedures,
level of enforcement, plan reviews, the [Alternative Case Resolution
Initiative] and accountability programs, supervision and management,
and headquarters oversight.'' The GAO also noted in a report issued in
September 2003, when it investigated MSHA after the Jim Walters
accident, that MSHA headquarters was not performing adequately in
several key areas. Specifically, the GAO found MSHA failed to ensure
violations cited to mine operators were corrected in a timely fashion.
In fact, GAO found that of all the citations issued by the Agency,
including those written as ``significant and substantial,'' despite
inspector-imposed deadlines by which problems were to be abated, 48% of
the time the Agency failed to follow-up in a timely fashion to see if
the operator fixed the hazards.
Unfortunately the Agency's top managers have done little to move
any of the necessary improvements from recommendation to reality. We
hope that by having Congress add its voice now, along with the public's
demand for its better performance on the heels of Sago, Alma, and the
other tragic accidents, MSHA will finally refocus its attention.
In addition to the subjects that are already underway for emergency
rulemaking (more self-rescuers and training on transferring units,
lifelines to help miners evacuate the mine, and the need to notify MSHA
of an emergency within 15 minutes), and subjects that MSHA is also
actively studying (emergency communications and tracking systems)--all
of which are long over-due for regulation--we urge MSHA to promulgate
and implement rules that would materially contribute to miners' health
and safety. Without intending to be comprehensive, the issues that we
identify as constituting the top priorities for MSHA rulemaking
include: reducing miners' exposure to respirable (coal) dust, updating
permissible exposure limits for contaminants in the mine environment;
undoing the unwise belt air rule, and requiring non-flammable belts,
improved atmospheric monitoring systems, expanding the mine rescue team
requirements and support, improving requirements for firefighting and
evacuation plans, developing a nationwide emergency communications'
system for mines, increasing training and retraining for miners,
revising MSHA's approval and certification system for mining equipment,
requiring secondary telephone lines in a separate entry, providing
miners with a safer means of escape in the event of a mine fire,
explosion, or inundation, updating and increasing fines for Mine Act
violations, and developing uniform accident investigation procedures.
MSHA should also determine whether the seals it approves are adequate
(note that MSHA-approved seals failed at Alma although 30 USC Section
303(z) of the Mine Act requires explosion-proof seals, and 30 CFR
Section 75.334 and .335 provides that seals must withstand 20 psi); the
Agency also should study emergency safety chambers, as suggested in the
Mine Act, at 30 USC Section 315.
MSHA needs a larger budget for coal enforcement. Aside from its
budget not keeping apace with inflation, instead of focusing on
enforcement, in recent years MSHA has redirected some of its
inspectors' time towards ``compliance assistance.'' MSHA also needs to
bolster its expertise, and prepare for the transition as many of its
inspectors approach retirement.
MSHA also has been remiss in enforcing the penalties it imposes for
Mine Act violations. A fundamental problem is that MSHA compromises
penalties far too often; whether at conferences held with the operator
at MSHA's district offices or through negotiated settlements, MSHA
collects very little in the way of the fines it assesses. This means
that operators have little incentive to pay. There has developed a
culture whereby operators view MSHA fines as little more than a
nuisance, a minor cost of doing business. MSHA can and must do better
to ensure that its fines coerce compliance with the Mine Act--that is
what is most needed.
Just last month, in February 2006, MSHA initiated two injunctive
actions against operators with large unpaid fines. This was the first
time the Agency attempted such remedies. While we support these
efforts, we also must ask, why has it taken this long for MSHA to put
teeth into the enforcement side?
Coal remains a vital part of our nation's economy and a primary
component of our energy needs. The industry is growing, and for the
first time in decades, there are now many young coal miners. This is
means there are many miners working with relatively little experience
under their belts.
Even with the recent spate of coal mining fatalities, I consider
the industry lucky to not have suffered more injuries and deaths. This
is because for too many years, the Agency has not been taking care of
business. It has not been writing new rules to protect miners, and it
has not been doing a good job enforcing the rules it already has.
Mining is dangerous work. We need an Agency that takes seriously
the first words Congress placed in the Mine Act: ``Congress declares
that (a) the first priority of all in the coal or other mining industry
must be the health and safety of its most precious resource--the
miner.'' (30 U.S.C. Section 801.) We take that admonition seriously;
everyone else associated with the mining industry must reestablish
miners' health and safety as their top priority, too. Senseless deaths
and injuries must stop.
I urge you to require MSHA to do in 2006 all that Congress demanded
in 1969 and again in 1977. Regulations that were in the pipeline in
2001 and 2002 should be reactivated and finalized in a timely fashion.
New regulations to protect miners--both while on the job and when
emergencies strike--must be promulgated. All such regulations must be
enforced regularly and aggressively.
I thank you for your interest in miners' safety and would be happy
to answer your questions.
______
Chairman Norwood. Thank you, Mr. O'Dell.
Mr. Watzman, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF BRUCE WATZMAN, VICE PRESIDENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH
AND HUMAN RESOURCES, NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION
Mr. Watzman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity
to be here today. At the very outset, allow me to restate our
shared support for the fundamental tenet of mine safety and
health legislation. That is, our first priority and concern
must be the safety and health of the miner.
We appear before you today to pledge to work with you and
others in the Congress to ensure that out of the recent
tragedies will emerge greater cooperation in pursuit of safer
mines.
The mining industry has undergone significant
transformation that continues at an astounding pace. Safety and
health programs have advanced and have become embedded in the
mining culture. And we continue to adopt new technologies that
advance the complimentary goals of safety and productivity.
Since the first oil embargo in the early 1970s, the coal
industry has answered the call to provide more coal to meet the
nation's energy needs while providing a safer work environment
for our employees. Since 1970, coal production has increased 82
percent and coal mine fatalities have decreased 93 percent.
And today's reportable injury incident rate gives coal
mining a lower rate than many other industries. No longer can
coal mining be stereotyped as the most hazardous job in
America. We take pride in these accomplishments, yet more can,
must and will be done.
Today I would like to discuss with you a threefold
challenge. First, the principles we believe should guide our
actions and policy makers based on our analysis of the partial
information coming out of this year's tragic events.
Second, the need to focus on accident prevention in a
changed and changing mining industry. And third, modernizing
MSHA's enforcement procedures to more accurately mirror actual
conditions in the mines rather than inflexible adherence to
somewhat outdated procedures.
We have reviewed the publicly available information that
has emerged from the events in West Virginia. In addition to
the establishment of an independent commission, we have
developed and offer for the subcommittee's consideration as it
looks at ways to advance mine safety and health through
legislation the following principles.
First, ensuring development and introduction of ground-
penetrating communication and tracking technology. Improving
emergency notification. Enhancing safety training and rescue
capabilities. Providing a liability shield and indemnification
for mine rescue activities. Ensuring that new requirements are
accompanied by workable transitional time frames. Providing
authority for mine operators to conduct mandatory substance
abuse testing of all personnel at the mine. And providing
incentives to help companies invest in equipment and training
needed for enhanced mine safety and rescue capabilities.
Beyond the specific guiding principles, we direct your
attention to two overriding challenges. Today many coal mines
present challenging geologic conditions.
As mines access deeper reserves, the technologic
limitations of historic control methodologies are readily
apparent, presenting miners, mine operators and agency
personnel with new and more difficult engineering challenges.
To address these, we have initiated several partnerships
with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
to examine new technologies to better protect miners' health.
These partnerships have brought together experts to work on
practical solutions to mine safety and health problems
confronting the industry.
I am pleased to report that the industry recently joined
with NIOSH and others to form a partnership on mine emergency
communications.
The members of this subcommittee and the colleagues in the
respective appropriations subcommittees are very aware of the
need to maintain a vibrant and well funded mining research
program with the NIOSH. Recent events underscore this need.
The federal government has an important role to play in
technology development in order to bring safer, newer
technologies to a relatively small market for safety equipment.
We urge your support to strengthen this vital government
function.
In addition, certain structural changes in our regulatory
approach to mine safety are necessary. Key among them is the
need for MSHA to conduct more focused inspections and enhance
the quality of inspections. Many of our members who operate
some of the safest mines in the country continue to have
inspectors on site each and every day.
The misperception exists that the mine act mandate for four
inspections annually of an underground mine and two annually of
a surface mine only translate to four and two visits annually.
Nothing can be further from the truth.
MSHA statistics show that a large underground mine can have
more than 4,000 onsite inspection hours per year. This means
the presence of two or three inspectors each and every day the
mine operates.
Flexibility in inspection procedures is central in
achieving the resource allocation determinations that are vital
for improving the agency's safety and health programs and the
industry's performance.
Mr. Chairman, as we look to the future, we recognize that
our ability to further advance coal mine safety and health will
require an examination of the structural and technologic
hurdles that must be overcome.
Further improvement will require us to identify potentially
dangerous conditions before they put miners' safety and health
in jeopardy, as well as the appropriate means to minimize those
hazards. We look forward to working with you and the colleagues
in the Congress as you consider legislation to address this.
Working together, we will develop programs to train and
educate a new generation of employees so that they can have a
safe and productive career in an industry vital to the
country's energy markets and national interest. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Watzman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bruce Watzman, Vice President of Safety and
Health, the National Mining Association
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you again to review the activities of the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), the federal role
in mine safety, and training and current regulatory activity. At the
very outset, allow me to restate our shared support for the fundamental
tenet of federal mine safety and health legislation, that is--our first
priority and concern must be the safety and health of the miner.
We appear before you today to pledge to work with you and others in
Congress to ensure that out of the recent tragedies will emerge a
stronger resolve and greater cooperation in pursuit of safer mines. Our
expectation is that from this and similar hearings and from the
exhaustive official investigations now underway * * * we can do better
what we've tried hard to do well.
Industry Safety Performance
In order to consider what improvements are necessary to further
advance miner safety and health, one must first review what has been
achieved. Due to the tremendous commitment of all who work to provide a
safe and healthy work environment for the men and women who work in our
nation's mines, mining is a much safer occupation.
The mining industry has undergone a significant transformation that
continues at an astounding pace. Safety and health programs have
advanced and have become embedded in the mining culture. New
technologies and mining methods have reduced miners' exposure to
harmful conditions, and the industry continues to adopt new
technologies that advance the complimentary goals of safety and
productivity.
The coal mining industry takes seriously its commitment to protect
its workforce. Since the first oil embargo in the early 1970s, the coal
industry has been called upon to provide more coal to meet our nation's
energy requirements. The industry has answered that call while
providing a safer working environment for its workforce. Since 1970,
coal production has increased by 83 percent, and coal mine fatalities
have decreased by 92 percent.
One need only look at 2004's safety record to recognize that the
industry is moving in the right direction. Today's reportable injury
incident rate of 5.6 per 100 workers gives coal mining a lower rate of
occupational injuries than hospitals, manufacturing, nursing and
residential care facilities among others. No longer can coal mining be
stereotyped as the most hazardous job in America--a characterization
often used by those unfamiliar with today's mining industry.
Similar dramatic reductions have been accomplished across the
entire mining industry both in terms of reductions in fatal injuries as
well as the industry's lost-time injury rate. During the period 1990--
2004 fatalities declined 53 percent and injuries declined 52 percent.
Again, progress with more work to be done.
We take pride in all of these accomplishments. Yet, the events in
West Virginia again illustrate the fragile nature of these
accomplishments and the need for constant vigilance to sustain them.
More can, must and will be done.
Today, I'd like to discuss with you a three-fold challenge:
First, the principles we believe should guide our actions and
policy makers based on our analysis of the partial information coming
out of this year's tragic events;
Two, the need to focus on accident prevention in a changed and
changing mining industry; and
Three, a call to modernize MSHA's enforcement procedures to more
accurately mirror actual conditions in the mines, rather than an
inflexible adherence to outdated procedures.
Guiding Principles
NMA has reviewed the publicly available information that has
emerged from the events in West Virginia. In addition to the
establishment of an independent commission of safety experts who will
examine how technology and training procedures can be more readily
adapted for use in our mines, our review has led to the development of
a set of guiding principles that we offer for the Subcommittee's
consideration as it looks for ways to advance mine safety and health.
Those principles include:
Expediting development and introduction of ground
penetrating communication and tracking technology;
Improving emergency notification;
Enhancing safety training and rescue capabilities;
Providing liability shield and indemnification for mine
rescue activities;
Ensuring new requirements are accompanied by workable
transitional timeframes;
Providing authority for mine operators to conduct
mandatory substance abuse testing of all personnel at the mine; and
Providing tax incentives to help companies invest in
equipment and training needed for enhanced mine safety and rescue
capabilities.
Mine Safety Commission Formed
In pursuit of these principles and to ensure a focused and
transparent effort, NMA shortly after the first mine accident announced
the formation of a Mine Safety Technology and Training Commission. The
commission is drawn from safety experts in academia, labor and industry
for the purpose of examining safety technologies, emergency response
and rescues procedures and training regimes that could significantly
enhance safety and rescue conditions in our nation's underground coal
mines. The commission is being chaired by a recognized expert in mine
safety, Dr. R. Larry Grayson, chairman and professor of mining and
nuclear engineering at the University of Missouri-Rolla. The
Commission's first meeting will be held next Friday, March 10, and it
will report its preliminary findings to the public and mine safety
authorities by July 1, with a final report by the end of this year. We
anticipate the commission will examine, among other items, the current
and new promising technologies for mine communication, tracking miners'
locations, rescue technology and methods to more readily and reliably
detect potential safety hazards.
Beyond the specific guiding principles discussed above, we direct
your attention to two over-riding challenges.
Focus on Accident Prevention
Today, many coal mines present challenging geologic conditions. As
mines access deeper reserves, the technological limitations of historic
control methodologies are readily apparent, presenting miners, mine
operators and agency personnel with new and more difficult engineering
challenges. To address these challenges miners and mine operators,
alike, have initiated several partnerships with the MSHA and the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to
examine new technologies to better protect miners' health. These
partnerships have brought together experts to work on practical
solutions to safety and health problems confronting the industry. I'm
pleased to report that the industry has joined with the NIOSH, MSHA,
the United Mine Workers of America, and the State of West Virginia to
form a partnership on Mine Emergency Communications.
The work of these partnerships is still on-going, and our members
continue to dedicate time and resources to this vital work. Our hope is
lingering problems can be overcome through the development of new,
mine-worthy engineering solutions. When based on sound science, this
work can and will provide the basis for future rulemaking, if
warranted. More importantly, however, the partnerships also reflect a
new working dynamic that has evolved in the mining industry to advance
miner safety and health.
The members of this subcommittee and your colleagues on the
respective appropriations subcommittee are very aware of the need to
maintain a vibrant and well funded mining research program within the
NIOSH. The tragic events in West Virginia underscore this need. The
federal government has an important role in technology development--in
order to bring safer, new devices to a relatively small market for
safety equipment. We urge your support to strengthen this vital
government function.
Modernize Our Regulatory Approach
In addition, certain structural changes in our regulatory approach
to mine safety are necessary.
Key among them is the need for MSHA to overcome institutional
barriers to change, including changes that prevent the agency's
management from implementing new programs. No less than a paradigm
shift is required for the manner in which the agency implements its
legal requirements. The agency must conduct more focused inspections
and enhance the quality of inspections through continued inspector
training and education.
In order to allocate its resources more effectively, we believe the
agency must foster a more flexible inspection protocol while
maintaining compliance with the inspection mandates of the Mine Act.
Many of our members that operate some of the safest mines in the
country continue to have inspectors on-site during each and every
operating shift. In regions where mines have closed, inspector presence
has, without cause, increased at operating mines. The misperception
persists that the Mine Act's mandate of four inspections annually for
every underground mine and two inspections annually for every surface
coal mine translates to only four and two visits annually. Nothing can
be further from the truth. MSHA statistics show that a large
underground mine can have more than 4,000 on-site inspection hours per
year. This means the presence of 2-3 inspectors each and every day the
mine operates. With infinite resources, this wouldn't be a concern. But
none of us have that luxury.
As a result, flexibility in inspection procedures is central to
achieving the resource allocation determinations that are vital for
improving the agency's safety and health programs and the industry's
safety and health performance. The Voluntary Protection Program (VPP),
instituted by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, has
been a remarkable success in the non-mining sector. Introduction of a
VPP for the mining industry is long overdue. We must overcome
traditional barriers to reach new safety and health plateaus--and VPP
is an important tool to achieve this goal. Mines with safety
performance that exceeds stringent, verifiable safety goals should not
be inspected with the same vigor as those that fail to meet such
criteria. Continuing to mandate a minimum of rigid inspections, with no
correlation to performance, will not help us further reduce the
incident rate.
Even with the changes that have been adopted, and the improvements
that have been documented, more must be done. MSHA must redirect
personnel and budgetary resources to ensuring safety improvements from
mines with poor or unsatisfactory compliance records. We remain
concerned that failure to implement, or delays in implementing required
changes, may thwart the positive safety and health advances that are
attained when the agency can allocate resources based upon need, rather
than on historic geographic or political considerations.
The West Virginia Experience
Mr. Chairman much attention has been focused on the response the
expediency with which the West Virginia legislature passed legislation
to address the actual and perceived shortcomings of safety practices.
Following passage of that legislation emergency rules were promulgated
that became the subject of discussion and debate. This week revised
emergency rules are being issued that are significantly different than
those initially published. Why is that? We would submit that once the
expertise of industry, labor and all relevant government officials were
utilized, a better solution was achieved without losing site of the
general precepts of the initial legislation. Mr. Chairman, we would
hope that the Congress will learn from that experience. We believe that
the best way to improve mine safety is to pool the collective efforts
of industry, labor and government to solve problems, without agendas.
Summary
Today the mining industry and its dedicated mine safety and health
professionals face challenges far different from those anticipated when
the Mine Act was adopted. Difficult geological conditions, faster
mining cycles and changes in the way work is conducted introduce
potential complications that require the introduction of new and
innovative responses.
As we look to the future, we recognize that our ability to further
advance coal mine safety and health will require an examination of the
structural and technologic hurdles that must be overcome. It will
require a commitment to identify and foster the development of 21st
century technology that will perform effectively and reliably in the
mining environment. Technologies such as the introduction of remote
control miners, integrated methane monitors on mining equipment,
atmospheric monitoring systems, and longwall mining systems are a few
of the advances that have contributed to the industry's improved safety
record. Advances in technology have been integral to our safety
improvements thus far and will, we believe, contribute to further
improvements in mine safety.
Further improvement will require us to identify potentially
dangerous conditions before they put miners' safety or health in
jeopardy as well as the appropriate methods to minimize, to the degree
possible, the onset of dangerous conditions and practices.
Simply put, improved safety performance demands that both
government and industry redirect resources toward the prevention of
accidents, injuries and illnesses and away from business-as-usual
policies that inevitably lead to unnecessary and unproductive
confrontation.
Mr. Chairman we look forward to working with you and your
colleagues as the Congress considers legislation. Working together, we
will develop programs to train and educate a new generation of
employees so that they can have a safe and productive career in an
industry vital to this country's energy markets and national interests.
Thank you.
______
Chairman Norwood. Thank you, Mr. Watzman.
I will have to tell you that I do not think any of us up
here are miners, but we are people who are desperately
interested in the right policy for health and safety for
miners, and so you will forgive us if we ask some questions,
gentlemen, that may seem elementary to you, but we are in the
process of very much trying to learn.
And I would like to follow up--I recognize myself for 5
minutes for questions. I would like to follow up just exactly
on what you were saying, communications. I know a little bit
about that. I know that I am told that presently a land line is
what we use in mines to communicate with today, and that is not
necessarily reliable, as recently we found out.
A land line is used in many situations--in war--and often
they get cut. So what we want to do is say okay, you must use
proper communications so these men can talk to the surface. Is
it out there?
Yes, sir?
Mr. Watzman. Yes and no, Congressman. There are systems out
there, but the systems that exist today have limitations. What
we ultimately, as an industry, would like to see----
Chairman Norwood. Let me rephrase. Is it out there that
will work----
Mr. Watzman. No.
Chairman Norwood [continuing]. Get the job done?
Mr. Watzman. No. It is not today. What we want to see----
Chairman Norwood. Under any feasible circumstance, we can
rely on these folks to be able to talk to the surface and the
surface back to them?
Mr. Watzman. The systems that are in place today in use in
the U.S. rely, for the most part, on some installations of
underground hardware to support that technology. That
underground hardware can get damaged in an explosion or fire.
We do not have today true uninterruptible, ground-penetrating,
two-way communication systems.
Chairman Norwood. Mr. Friend, we sat right down there in
Houston, and we talked of astronauts on the moon. Now, why in
the dickens can't we talk to the men underground and them talk
to us?
You are having a session coming up, I understand, to--let's
review all of the technology, is that what is going on?
Mr. Friend. Currently, as I mentioned in my statement, the
meeting on the 13th--that is the subject. However, we do have
someone in Australia this week examining some of the technology
that already exists.
Chairman Norwood. That is a one-way technology?
Mr. Friend. That is a one-way. We need a two-way
communication system.
Chairman Norwood. That is right. Now, what do we need to do
to get to that?
Mr. Friend. I think we need to create the market. I mean, I
think if the market is there, probably the manufacturers will
step up. We are investigating all of that right now. We are
looking at what is available, what can be done.
We are talking to the Department of Defense and everybody
we can consult with to see if the technology exists and what it
would take to drive it. We are----
Chairman Norwood. We should talk to NASA and get them to
figure this out for us. There is no reason we cannot get that
done, I do not believe.
Mr. Friend. Well, there is a lot of ground over some of our
mines. Some of them are extra deep, and without hardware in the
mine itself, it is difficult to go through that much ground,
that much cover.
Chairman Norwood. Mr. McKinney, help me understand a little
bit about belt air systems. I mean, I understand--I mean, the
way I would envision it, there is a conveyor belt that goes to
the bottom of the mine, and we are hooking a tube onto that,
where we can put air into the face of the mine for the purpose
of helping have a cooler environment plus remove methane gas.
Is that what a belt air system is?
Mr. McKinney. Not exactly. We have dedicated entries that
actually channel fresh air to the faces.
Chairman Norwood. You have to do that--no matter what else,
you still have to do dedicated entries, right?
Mr. McKinney. Yes, sir. And as a normal rule, those are
separated from the belt entry because of some issues associated
with belt drives and things like that.
Over the last 20 years we have petitions and modification
which are the mechanism we have to look at alternate ways of
complying with requirements in the regulations. And those
petitions allowed people to actually take the air that
ventilates the belt line, the conveyor belt line, into the face
area.
It is done for a couple of different reasons. In some
mines, you have a lot of ground control problems. You have
3,000 feet, 4,000 feet of cover. They cannot drive multiple
entries in order to have the intake air courses, so they
utilize the belt entry to take air into the face area.
When that happens, we have----
Chairman Norwood. Well, may I? Excuse me. I cannot figure
out why employers want to do that and the miners do not want to
do that. That is confusing to me.
Mr. McKinney. Well, I think sometimes----
Chairman Norwood. I mean, doesn't it help?
Mr. McKinney. I will try to--I think sometimes it does get
confusing for folks. With belt air, there are some things that
you have to have safeguards in place, and we do that. We have
atmospheric monitoring systems that we place along the belt
line to give early warnings to miners on the section and on the
surface.
There is someone that stays on the surface at all times
that looks at that. There is an alert level, like it could be
set at five parts per million of carbon monoxide. At that alert
level, you notify people that there is an occurrence ongoing.
There is an alarm level where we bring people out of the
coal mine. So there is built-in safeguards when we use belt air
in the face.
I think we have to be cautious--I heard a statement a
moment ago about what occurred at Alma. I think we have to be
cautious about prematurely jumping to conclusions on this until
we find out exactly what occurred there.
I was at Alma during the recovery operation, and from what
I have seen on the front end, belt air was not allowed to be
used on the two section legally. So I think we need to find out
exactly what the situation was there before we jump to
conclusions.
Chairman Norwood. Well, the 1977 law says you cannot use
belt air, am I right about that?
Mr. McKinney. That is exactly correct. And there is a
petition and modification process that allows you to offset a
regulation if you put safeguards in place. As that happened
through the course of industry and we looked at those
petitions, more and more mines, almost 100 petitions, are out
there where people were using belt air in the face through the
petition process.
We did not see occurrences that caused us to believe that
that was an unsafe practice, so that is why the rule was put in
place.
Chairman Norwood. Probably need to ask the boys and girls
down at the bottom of the mine how they feel about it.
My time, I see, has gone.
Mr. Owens. Mr. Chairman, we have the ranking member.
Chairman Norwood. The ranking member here?
Mr. Owens. I would like to yield to him for----
Chairman Norwood. Mr. Miller, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding this hearing.
And Major Owens, thank you for yielding to me.
First, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous consent
to insert my opening statement in the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. George Miller, Ranking Minority Member,
Committee on Education and the Workforce
Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that you are holding this hearing
today. I hope it will be the beginning of our efforts to address this
mine safety crisis, and not the end. And let's be clear--this is a
crisis. Twenty-one coal miners have died in the first two months of
2006, only one fewer than the total number of coal miners who died in
all of 2005.
Our goal should be to reduce the number of mining deaths to zero.
We will not make progress toward that goal if we continue down the path
the Bush Administration is on. This Administration has not only failed
to make the safety and health of mine workers a priority, it has also
undermined the mine safety program through regulatory roll backs,
budget cuts, and unqualified leadership.
The President has filled the top political positions at the Mine
Safety and Health Administration with former mining executives. Those
executives have begun to act, predictably, in the interests of their
friends in the industry, not of the mineworkers. I recently issued a
report that showed that the Bush MSHA has delayed, weakened, or
scrapped 18 regulations intended to protect mine workers, while
adopting one rule that clearly would make them less safe.
This Administration has ignored the requirement of the law that no
new standard be less protective than an existing standard. Instead of
implementing a critical rule that would have gone into effect this
January to help reduce the risk to underground metal and nonmetal
miners of lung cancer, this Administration instead proposed to delay
implementation for five years. Indeed, it claims this approach is
equally as protective in putting the rule into effect promptly!
The Bush MSHA has also shifted from a focus on enforcing the law to
a focus on so-called ``compliance assistance.'' Compliance assistance
is a fine approach to take with responsible mine operators, of which
there are many. But the Sago Mine's owners failed to rectify serious
repeated violations of the law in 2005. Its owners were interested in
maximizing their profits, not complying with safety laws. Scofflaws
like that only understand one thing: money. They will only comply with
the laws when failing to do so means losing a lot of money.
The Bush Administration has also cut MSHA's funding every year
since 2001. As a result, there is funding for 190 fewer coal
enforcement personnel now than there was when the Bush Administration
took office. This year, even after the horrors at Sago and Aracoma
Alma, the Administration refused to request funding to pay for more
enforcement personnel.
As with FEMA, when it comes to mine safety, the Bush Administration
has failed in its most basic responsibility. And this Congress has
failed to hold the Administration accountable. This is the first
oversight hearing on worker safety in five years--five years. That is
an inexcusable record of neglect.
There are a number of steps the Bush Administration must take to
improve mine safety, and it is Congress' responsibility to make sure it
takes them.
For starters, the Bush Administration has an obligation to stop
shutting the public out of decision making processes and actions that
affect mine safety. For this reason, Democrats have asked the
Administration to open up all of its records, including inspectors'
notes, to public scrutiny. It has begun to do so. We have also asked
MSHA to hold a public hearing on the Sago accident, and it should do so
immediately.
Next, the Bush Administration must immediately use the authority it
already has to enforce the law to make mines safer. This means
immediately implementing commonsense rules that we know would protect
the lives of mine workers and could have affected the outcomes of the
tragedies we have seen this year. It also means punishing scofflaw mine
operators with meaningful fines that will force them to change their
bad behavior, not letting them off easy with paltry fines--lower than
the cost of a speeding ticket--that can simply be written off as just
another cost of doing business. MSHA has said it will look at the fine
structure, and that is a positive step. But it has not provided any
timetable for doing so, and it should.
Finally--and this is an issue we have heard repeatedly from miners
and their family members--MSHA must move more quickly to adopt new
technologies to improve the safety and communications capabilities of
mine workers. Communications and tracking devices are a prime example
of technological advancements that could have saved the lives of many
of the miners who have died last month at the Sago Mine. In an age
where communications technology is rapidly advancing, it is beyond
shocking that basic communications and tracking devices are not
required safety protocol in mines.
Last month, Democrats convened a forum on mine safety to give
miners' and miners' families a chance to make their voices heard on
Capitol Hill. We heard from seven people--sons, daughters, and wives--
who had lost loved ones in mining accidents in Alabama and West
Virginia.
One of those witnesses was Amber Helms. She was only 23 years old,
but she made a smart and eloquent statement that would make any father
proud. Her father, Terry Helms, died in the explosion at the Sago Mine.
Amber talked about how generous and caring her father was, and how he
was her best friend. She asked why more wasn't being done to keep
miners safe, and she questioned the lack of proper equipment for miners
when she said:
``Yet these men work as we speak--right now today there are men
underground working in conditions and with equipment that are so
outdated--I mean, it's ridiculous that I can get a computer and I can
make a full Web site in an hour and have it up and running so the whole
world can see it, but no one can find my dad or no one can track these
men. In Australia, they have tracking devices that cost as little as
$20. What's $20 to a company?''
Industry executives will argue that this technology is not yet
perfected, and therefore is too risky to equip mine workers with. But
even if these tools had worked properly only half of the time, lives
would have been saved, and serious, life-threatening injuries would
have been prevented. There is too much hanging in the ballots here to
hold out for perfection. As Amber said, ``The technology is out
there.''
This Congress has been blind to the need to maintain even the
protections that already exist under the law. It wasn't long ago that
some members of our committee, including its former chairman, were
actively seeking legislation to abolish MSHA and NIOSH and to cut back
critical enforcement provisions.
Under that legislation, three out of the four mandatory annual
inspections at every underground mine would have been eliminated.
Inspectors would have needed a warrant before entering mine property.
Only miners in unionized mines would have had the right to accompany
inspectors as they examined the mine. The circumstances in which an
inspector could shut down an unsafe section of a mine would have been
restricted. Mine operators would not have had to pay fines for typical
citations as long as the hazards were abated. And on and on.
That legislation was defeated. But that apparently hasn't deterred
Administration officials from trying to gut MSHA anyway. Now they're
just dismantling it and taking it out the back door, where they think
no one is watching. Well, we are watching. Legislation must be enacted
to ensure that changes are made, changes that make the safety and
health of these mine workers a priority, and that prevent the industry
from being allowed to get away with further abuses.
I want to commend Congressman Nick Rahall and his West Virginia
colleagues for their prompt hearings and action on these issues. On
February 1, they introduced H.R. 4695, the ``Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act of 2006,'' which enhances and reinforces the original
purpose of the landmark Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, as amended by the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977.
This legislation is a vital step in this process, and an effort that I
am hoping will be a catalyst for change.
Amber's testimony, and the powerful and courageous testimony
provided by all the witnesses at the forum, is documented for all to
see. I strongly urge all members of this subcommittee to watch the
footage of the forum, and the incredibly important questions posed by
these witnesses, questions that have not been answered--not by the
Administration, and not by MSHA.
As Amber said: ``I understand that nothing that I say today or
nothing that happens in the future is going to bring my dad back. But
my uncle Johnny, my uncle Mike, my cousin Rocky, as well as every other
miner that is underground and every other son who's getting ready to go
into the coal mines--because that's where the jobs are in West Virginia
and maybe some of these other states--we can prevent their families
from going through this.''
We owe it to Amber and every other American who has lost a loved
one in a mining accident to learn what more we can do to make mines
safer. And then, just as Amber says, we must take action to prevent
more families from going through the hell that she has had to go
through.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
______
And I would also, Mr. Chairman, like to ask unanimous
consent that the transcript of the forum that we held with
miners' families, the victims of the Sago and Aracoma mine
disaster--that the transcript of that hearing be made part of
this record.
Chairman Norwood [continuing]. To have an opportunity to
look at that.
Mr. Miller. I would be more than happy if you would read
this record of what these families had to say to us. That would
make my day, and I would hope that it would be made part of
this record. So I renew my request.
If I might, Mr. Friend, what were we doing about
communications before this mining disaster?
Mr. Friend. Underground communications? We had a hardwired
system in the underground mines.
Mr. Miller. No, but what are the agencies doing about
looking at this in terms of modernization, new technologies? As
the chairman has pointed out, people see us talking light years
into space, and they do not see us talking into a mine.
Mr. Friend. Two communications systems that have received a
lot of attention of late are the TRACKER, so-called TRACKER,
and the PED System. Our technical support group has evaluated
those in the past, as they are mandated to do because of
permissibility.
So those two systems are approved, and that is when it came
to our attention, and we started looking at it.
Mr. Miller. That was when?
Mr. Friend. I do not know when they received their
approval. I can get you----
Mr. Miller. Does anybody at the table know when their
approval was handed out?
Mr. Friend. We can get you that information.
Mr. Miller. But I mean, nothing was done to provide for any
requirement of this kind of communication system in the mine or
tracking system.
Mr. Friend. That is correct.
Mr. Miller. So up until this disaster, then, on the 25th
you put out a request for some information, according to your
testimony, is that correct?
Mr. Friend. In January, I believe.
Mr. Miller. Mr. O'Dell?
Mr. O'Dell. Yes, I would like to speak specifically to the
tracking equipment.
Mr. Miller. Quickly, if you can.
Mr. O'Dell. In 1968, when the Farmington No. 9 mine blew up
and killed 78 miners, the then Bureau of Mines was directed to
come up with tracking devices to locate miners.
In 1970, the Bureau of Mines developed a system, an
electromagnetic tracking system, that was proved to work as
deep as 4,000 feet coverage. And it was approved and tested,
and it passed all those things that needed to be passed to
locate miners.
To this day, that system has sat on a shelf somewhere
collecting dust. And following up on that, in 1975----
Mr. Miller. Mr. Friend, is that accurate?
Mr. Friend. I have no knowledge of it.
Mr. Miller. Well, I mean, I find it kind of stunning in the
testimony. Apparently, nobody had any knowledge of this until
we had this disaster. Now everybody says it is available, says
it is in use in some cases in the United States and apparently
in Australia, and now we are asking for a request for
information on this.
And yet you put this coalition together in West Virginia
and they pass the law, and I think it is going to be done in 90
days. Is that accurate? Is that correct?
Mr. McKinney. I did not hear what you said. My
understanding is that part of that regulation's been delayed
until they could see if the technology is there.
You are right about the regulation being passed, but I
think I read where the governor has delayed the implementation
of the communications----
Mr. Miller. Is that correct?
Mr. Watzman, is that correct?
Mr. Watzman. That is correct. In fact, we are told that
today revised emergency rules are being announced by the
governor to reflect what Mr. McKinney just said.
Mr. Miller. And that would do what?
Mr. Watzman. It will delay the implementation of those to
allow time for an examination to make sure the technology meets
the objectives that have been outlined in the legislation.
Mr. Miller. Has the agency ever conducted any experiments
on any of these systems? I mean, you know, I assume that there
is journals of mining, there is journals of mining safety.
People keep up to speed in the health sciences and education.
Do you keep up to speed? Do you try these things in the
mines? Has the association tried----
Mr. Watzman. Mr. Miller, one of the problems we have, as I
alluded to in my testimony, is that there are 634 underground
coal mines in this country. We are not a big market----
Mr. Miller. I am asking you have you tried any of these.
Have you gone to a manufacturer and said we would like to see
if this works in a 4,000-foot-deep mine?
Mr. Watzman. Many technologies have been tried. Others have
not, because there are not manufacturers who have developed
these. What Mr. O'Dell referred to was research done by a
government agency. I am not aware of any manufacturer that then
took that information and brought a product to market.
Mr. Miller. Mr. Friend, in your testimony, you praised, and
properly so, the rescue teams that were engaged in the rescues
after the events at these two mines.
And yet we have seen a number of those teams go down and a
number of people being trained for those teams continue to go
down, and regulations were withdrawn that would have required
to have a couple of teams at each mine.
So nothing was done since those regulations have been
withdrawn? I mean, it took 5 hours for people to get the rescue
teams to be put in place at Sago.
Mr. McKinney. I think if you look closely at those
regulations that were withdrawn----
Mr. Miller. Are you answering for Mr. Friend?
Mr. Friend. Oh, was the question directed to me, sir?
Mr. Miller. Yes. Hello, Mr. Friend. You are in this room.
Do you want to listen for a minute?
Mr. Friend. Sure.
Chairman Norwood. Be nice.
Mr. Miller. Be nice? This is the third time he says I--you
know, he is in some other place.
Mr. Friend. Well, you know, I spent a few years in the
mining industry, and my hearing is not quite what it should be.
Mr. Miller. Well, then say so, and we will----
Mr. Friend. I apologize for that.
Mr. Miller [continuing]. Be happy to work with that. So
what is the answer? The question is what has been done since
the regulation was withdrawn that would have required a couple
of trained teams at each mine. What has been done since then?
As I look at the figures, both the number of teams and the
training provided has continued to go down.
Mr. Friend. The regulations allow mining companies to
contract their mine rescue services. That is in the regs. Most
of the large mines have their own teams. And in that respect,
we have not done anything to change the numbers because they
are all in compliance with the regulations.
Mr. Miller. So you are not suggesting to me that there is a
qualified rescue team readily available at each and every mine.
Mr. Friend. Yes, within a 2-hour travel time, which is what
the regulation requires.
Mr. Miller. How come it took 5 hours?
Mr. Friend. Two hours travel time.
Mr. Miller. Well, why was it 5 hours in this case?
Mr. Friend. Well, I was not there that day, but we did not
receive notice until 2 hours after the incident. We were on the
property 4 hours after that. I do not know when the first team
got there.
Mr. Miller. Are you addressing the rescue team issue, or
you do not think it needs to be addressed? It is nowhere in
your testimony.
Mr. Friend. That is part of the request for information.
Also, with the state of West Virginia we are having a co-
meeting along with NIOSH to discuss technologies,
communications, rescue, all of it.
Mr. Miller. This is a real busy agency since this disaster.
Mr. Friend. Well, we have had a remarkable record up until
this January, and I do not think anyone can dispute that, in
accordance with the numbers.
Mr. Miller. But you do not engage--I mean, you do not
engage in some kind of constant, continuous improvement around
these critical issues of in-mine safety, of rescue safety, of
communications? This isn't an ongoing effort?
Mr. Friend. Absolutely. But I do not think anyone in this
room knows the root causes of Alma or the Sago Mine accident.
Mr. Miller. This is about just dealing with the event. You
know, listen, we are very happy with the record, but it is not
to suggest that we have erased the events. Mine rescue deals
with an event taking place. Communications deals with an event
taking place.
I assume that there is some effort to constantly update our
ability to respond to events, but apparently there is not. It
has all sort of happened since January 9th.
Mr. Friend. We are taking a look at that.
Chairman Norwood. Thank you, Mr. Miller. You are into Mr.
Owens' time.
Would you restate you request, please?
Mr. Miller. I asked unanimous consent that the transcript
of the February 13th hearing that we had with the families of
the miners who lost their lives in the mine could be made part
of the transcript of this record.
Chairman Norwood. That is so ordered.
Mr. McKeon. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Miller. Thank you.
Mr. McKeon. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Owens. Yes, sir.
Chairman Norwood. Mr. Chairman, yes.
Mr. McKeon. Good to see you.
Chairman Norwood. Good to see you.
Mr. McKeon. It was not a hearing. It was a forum held by
the minority.
Mr. Miller. Correct.
Mr. McKeon. And that will be so stated in the record.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Submitted and placed in permanent archive file, Democratic Members
of the House Education and the Workforce Committee, Forum on Mine
Safety (Political Transcripts, CQ Transcriptions, Inc.) (February 13,
2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Miller. Yes.
Mr. McKeon. Just for that clarification.
Mr. Miller. We get carried away and think it is a hearing
every now and then, Mr. Chairman. You know how it is. But we
were listening, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Norwood. We are going to make sure it is not.
Dr. Price, you are now recognized for questioning for 5
minutes.
Mr. Price. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
holding this meeting and appreciate the information that has
been delivered. I would also request and just reiterate what
you said early on that sober, deliberate, calm discussion of
this is the way that we get to solutions, I believe, and would
encourage that from all.
I want to thank the miners who are here, and please convey
to your brothers and sisters in your work that I believe and we
believe you are on the front lines of our energy independence,
and thank you for the work that you do.
I want to also thank MSHA and those folks who have
demonstrated clearly a decrease in mine incidents and
fatalities. As I understand it, 2005 had the lowest number of
fatalities in the history of the mining industry, and so
somebody's doing something right.
And I just want to point out for the record that both Mr.
Friend and Mr. McKinney are from MSHA, and Mr. Friend mentioned
at the beginning that Mr. McKinney may answer certain questions
if somebody has greater information, and so I respect that you
two are tag-teaming it, and would ask whoever has the greatest
amount of information to supply that for us.
I would ask either of you whether you believe that Congress
needs to do anything to improve MSHA or mine safety at this
point, given the recent history?
Mr. Friend. Well, certainly there are several areas that
maybe could use improvement. Our penalty process is antiquated.
It is quite old. And the acting assistant secretary of labor,
David Dye, has asked me to start the process to revise part
100, which is in the 30 CFR, which will increase the penalties.
The secretary has proposed, and the president, I think, has
recommended that the maximum fine, which now is set at $60,000
in the statute, that that be increased to $220,000 for the
flagrant violations. Those are some of the things, I think,
that Congress can do.
Mr. Price. Anything besides penalties?
Mr. Friend. Sir?
Mr. Price. Anything besides penalties?
Mr. Friend. We are doing pretty well with what we are--I
mean, with the regulations that we are proposing. As far as
congressionally, I do not know.
I know there are some things in there that we are currently
already doing that has been put forth--for example, the 24-
hour, 7-day hotline to report accidents, which the management
at the Sago did not utilize. That is answered every day by a
person.
Mr. Price. Let me move on to a couple other items,
because----
Mr. Friend. Sure.
Mr. Price [continuing]. We are limited on time, and I
appreciate that.
Mr. O'Dell made some pretty scathing statements, and as far
as I can tell, many of them are accurate. And I would ask you
to comment on--this belt air issue has me perplexed. As the
chairman said, it appears that the company wants it, the miners
do not, and that has not been worked out. I would ask you to
comment on that.
And then as a lay person not knowing anything about mines,
how can belts be flammable? I mean, I understand how they can,
but why do we allow flammable belts in an environment where
explosions are possible?
Mr. Friend. For your first question on the use of belt air,
we have been approving on a case-by-case basis the use of belt
air to ventilate working faces for 26 years. In fact, during
the previous administration, those were approved on a case-by-
case basis 67 times. So it is not anything new.
So the belt air rule, when it came out in 2004, codified
all the stipulations and requirements that were in those case-
by-case petition for modifications. That included, as Ray
mentioned, the atmospheric monitoring systems and the state-of-
the-art fire suppression systems.
Air is needed at the working face to dilute methane.
Mr. Price. And flammable belts?
Mr. Friend. And the flammable belts--we determined that
with the atmospheric monitoring system and the fire suppression
system, there wasn't a need for a rule.
Mr. Price. And I find that hard to believe, but I will take
you at your word. Again, as a lay person, it is just
inconceivable to me that we cannot tell where miners are at all
times by some tracking device, and I just cannot believe that
that technology is not out there.
Mr. Friend. It is only in two coal mines in the world, the
TRACKER system. One is in Australia, which we are evaluating
this week, and the other is in China.
Mr. Price. We just ought to be able to tell where they are.
Mr. Friend. Sir?
Mr. Price. We just ought to be able to tell where they are.
It does not make any sense.
Second, and I will close with this, it would make sense to
me from a structural standpoint of mine that there ought to be
safety rooms as the mine is built, as you go further in, that
have some kind of communication device.
So when we are sitting at home watching the television and
crying and grieving for the families that are waiting for their
loved ones to come up, it just seems like there ought to be a
room where they ought to be able to go and be safe until we get
there.
Mr. Friend. Well, the metal and non-metal mines have
required refuge chambers for many years in this country. If a
miner cannot get to the surface within 1 hour, they have to
have a refuge chamber. And the 1 hour is because the
limitations on the self-rescuer they are wearing on their belt.
However, that ore does not burn. It is totally unlike coal.
I mean, coal in itself is a fuel. And does it work? It has in
some countries, I understand, and certainly we want to look at
those. I met with a manufacturer recently from Australia who is
willing to make one that is telescopic, and that is due to the
low heights of coal seams in this country, and they go down to
28 inches, 29 inches, if you can believe that.
So it is difficult because coal advances at such a rapid
rate in development. Coal is a fuel. And we do not want people
going into a refuge chamber if they can evacuate the mine. And
if we failed anywhere over the years, it is to get that
message: You evacuate the mine. You do not barricade.
And we have distributed stickers--I have one on my hard hat
that is years and years old. First item on it: If escape is
blocked--and it is in red--then, in black letters--then you
barricade. And perhaps we have not continued to hammer on that
message, but we had that opportunity in January during the
stand down for safety.
All across this nation, we made that point, and we will
continue to make it. You do not stay. You do not barricade. You
get out of the mine. And that is the reason for the SCSR in the
early 1980s. It gave them 1 hour of oxygen to get out of the
mine, not to barricade with.
Mr. Price. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
Chairman Norwood. Good question, Dr. Price.
Mr. Owens, you are now recognized for questioning.
Mr. Owens. Mr. Chairman.
I would like to direct my first question to Mr. Friend and
Mr. Watzman about these devices. Our information is that
devices, tracking devices, are available not just in China and
Australia but South Africa, Argentina, Canada and a couple
other places.
Now, in your department, is there any person assigned to
keep up with what is happening in the world? We try to stay
ahead of the world in every other respect.
And, Mr. Watzman, you gave very fuzzy answers about such
equipment, as if it may exist but it is not perfected. We can
communicate with people on the moon. We can communicate with
people on the Titanic at the bottom of the ocean. We have all
kinds of ways to communicate, you know, on reasonable mediums.
So why does it have to be absolutely perfect before it is
useful? This device here has been in use for 15 years to 16
years. It is a tracking device. It costs $20. Why doesn't every
miner have one now?
Are the costs so great that a coal industry that is making
tremendous amount of money on energy--produce energy now--I am
sure you are making huge profits. What is the impediment to
introducing these devices?
There is another device here which has been in existence
for quite a while which will give you a--send to the miners a
message. It cannot communicate two-way, but it can send them a
message. It could have gotten a message which says--those
miners in Sago--that if you walk a certain distance in a
certain direction, you will be out of the smoke.
You know, this is the kind of thing--these things exist
now. Why is not America, always wanting to be ahead in
technology--why are we dragging our feet, and why do you give
such fuzzy answers about the possibilities?
Mr. Watzman. Congressman, let me begin with the tracking
device and set the record straight on a couple facts. Number
one, the device you have shown is not $20. It is $200. But
price is not the issue.
Mr. Owens. You mean the market has not brought it down yet.
Mr. Watzman. This industry has shown time and time again
that it will spend what it takes to provide a safe environment.
But that----
Mr. Owens. $200 is an impediment?
Mr. Watzman. But that device in and of itself does not
provide the tracking. There are underground beacons that have
to be placed every 150 feet for those to operate. The miners
must pass by those beacons. And if one of those is damaged when
underground, you have lost tracking capability.
It is not that we will not do it. It is not that we are
unwilling to do it. It is that we are not aware of technology
that has been perfected to provide----
Mr. Owens. Are you going to wait until it is fully
perfected?
Mr. Watzman [continuing]. What we ultimately would like to
see----
Mr. Owens. It has to be 100 percent perfect before you will
install it?
Mr. Watzman. No, it does not have to be 100 percent, but we
also do not want to provide a false sense of security. These
systems are not perfect today. They require----
Mr. Owens. Thank you, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Watzman [continuing]. Underground----
Mr. Owens. Mr. Friend, Mr. Friend----
Mr. Friend. Yes.
Mr. Owens [continuing]. Have you ever considered mandating
that they use these devices? Anybody looked at the situation?
Has your department concluded that it is too costly, it is not
quite perfect? Has there been any real discussion of these
existing devices employed in mines throughout the world?
Mr. Friend. Yes. As I said, we are evaluating one in
Australia now. There is none in this country, the TRACKER.
Mr. Owens. You are evaluating one in Australia.
Mr. Friend. Yes, the TRACKER system--also, the PED System.
We have gone to four mines in the last 2 weeks to evaluate the
effectiveness of the PED.
Mr. Owens. One has been around for 15 years.
Mr. Friend. I spoke to president of the company that
manufactures those, and they are not $20. They are $200. But as
he said, the price is irrelevant. But there is a lot of
misinformation----
Mr. Owens. Price is irrelevant, okay?
Mr. Friend. That is what I said, yes.
Mr. Owens. Let me talk about price in these--I have about
18 significant safety rules, health and safety rules, that you
have either withdrawn--17 you have withdrawn and one you have
delayed.
What was the problem? I will just read a few: Enhanced
requirements for self-rescuers. Require conveyor belts to be
flame resistant. Establish accident investigation hearing
procedures. Lower miner exposure to coal mine dust.
Why were they withdrawn, all of these? Was it too costly,
too complicated? I mean, what is----
Mr. Friend. Well, first----
Mr. Owens. I am going to----
Mr. Friend. First of all, those are----
Mr. Owens [continuing]. Ask unanimous consent to submit
questions----
Mr. Friend. First of all, and I may not be able----
Mr. Owens [continuing]. In writing--I am going to give you
the whole list of 18, but----
Mr. Friend. Sure.
[The submitted questions follow:]
Supplementary Questions for Witnesseses Submitted by Representatives
Owens and Miller
Questions for Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) Witnesses
1. News reports have indicated that MSHA investigators have
declined to interview the mine rescue teams which participated in the
rescue attempts at the Sago and Aracoma Alma mines. This has caused
much concern among the rescue team members, the families of the
victims, and the mining communities. Do MSHA accident investigation
procedures require such interviews? How can we ensure future rescue
teams are prepared for their tasks without interviewing those who have
recently had to perform rescue duties?
2. The regulations currently provide that with the exception of
small and remote mines and those operating under special mining
conditions, every operator of an underground mine is to establish or
enter into an arrangement for two mine rescue teams to be available at
all times when miners are underground.
a. How does MSHA ensure compliance with this requirement? Is
this something checked during mandatory and spot-inspections?
How many operators have been cited by MSHA over the last year
for failure to comply with the requirements of 30 CFR 49.2 and
what penalties have been assessed?
b. Has MSHA delegated any responsibility to ensure compliance
with this requirement to any of the States? Do any of those
states have requirements concerning rescue teams that differ
from those under 30 CFR 49.2?
c. How many underground coal mines and how many underground
metal and nonmetal mines currently meet this requirement by
establishment of their own rescue teams?
d. How many underground coal mines and how many underground
metal and nonmetal mines currently meet this requirement by
entering into an arrangement for mine rescue services rather
than establishing their own rescue teams? Of these, how many
contract with a state to provide rescue services? How many
contract with the operators of other mines? Do any contract
with local rescue services or fire departments? How does MSHA
ensure that these non-resident teams are trained and equipped
in accordance with the requirements of 30 CFR Part 49?
e. How many underground coal mines and how many underground
metal and nonmetal mines are currently considered ``small'' or
``remote'' for the purposes of this requirement? How frequently
does MSHA review their mine rescue plans?
f. How many underground coal mines and how many underground
metal and nonmetal mines currently operate ``under special
mining conditions'' for the purposes of this requirement? How
frequently does MSHA review their mine rescue plans?
3. What procedures does MSHA have in place to coordinate its
activities during an emergency with local first responders such as
police, rescue and fire departments? Does MSHA have funds dedicated to
training first responders about special needs in mine emergencies? Are
mine rescue teams required to invite local first responders to
participate in required training sessions?
4. Why did this Administration withdraw from its rulemaking agenda
initiatives that would have addressed some of the safety hazards that
have led to the recent loss of lives underground? Why haven't you
restarted each one of these initiatives?
5. You have announced you will be using the agency's authority to
issue emergency temporary standards to deal with a few of the safety
hazards that have received public attention since the Sago accident. On
the other hand, you seem to be moving at a much slower pace in adopting
rules requiring new communications technologies which could have saved
lives in that tragedy. Is this because the industry has threatened you
with a lawsuit? What can this Congress do to ensure these life-saving
devices get into our mines before more lives are lost?
6. For many years, permitting air used to ventilate the mine to run
over conveyer belts, which generate friction and sparks, was prohibited
by the law. Exceptions were only permitted after a public hearing and a
determination by MSHA that the mine operator would observe a set of
conditions specifically designed to limit the risk of fire in that
mine. This Administration ``green lighted'' the use of ``belt air''
with a new regulation. In light of the Aracoma-Alma fire, why isn't
MSHA seeking to put a hold on its ``belt entry rule''?
7. We have seen a news release announcing a new review of the
penalty assessment process at MSHA, but nothing more than a news
release. What is the scope of this effort and when can we expect some
answers?
8. You appear to have succeeded in greatly angering the families of
the victims of these tragedies by, to date, keeping them from hearing
witnesses who may be revealing information about the last hours of
their loved ones. Why did MSHA withdraw proposed rules that would have,
after public notice and comment, established procedures for public
hearings and accident investigations?
9. After tragedies like this, how should MSHA's own conduct be
assessed? Don't we need some independent jury or body performing this
critical function to ensure a full and honest review?
10. Are decisions about mine safety and health being made by MSHA's
technical experts, or are non-expert appointees in other parts of the
Department of Labor calling the shots?
11. Self rescuers only provide about one hour's worth of oxygen,
and MSHA only requires operators to provide one for each underground
miner. Why hasn't MSHA required more?
a. Isn't it true that it could often take more than an hour
to evacuate a mine?
12. It was recently reported (Charleston Gazette) that the number
of mine rescue teams declined by 10 percent between 2000 and 2002
alone, and the number of people participating in the annual rescue team
competition has declined by 70 percent in the last 30 years. Do you
know how many mines currently meet the requirements for having at least
two mine rescue teams within two hours of the mine?
a. When the Bush Administration withdrew a Clinton-era
proposal that sought to increase the number and availability of
mine rescue teams, the Administration stated that it planned to
evaluate non-regulatory alternatives to that proposal. What
have you done to evaluate those non-regulatory alternatives?
What would those non-regulatory alternatives be? What have been
the results of your evaluation thus far?
13. What is the state of your inspector workforce? In a September
2003 report, the GAO warned that 44 percent of MSHA's inspectors would
be eligible to retire within 5 years. Are we facing a shortage of
qualified mine inspectors?
14. What impact has the loss since 2001 of 190 authorized coal
enforcement personnel had on MSHA?
15. When the Administration withdrew the Clinton-era proposal to
improve the use of self-contained self-rescue devices, the
Administration said it was withdrawing the item ``in light of resource
constraints and changing safety and health regulatory priorities.''
What were those resource constraints? What were those changing safety
and health regulatory priorities?
a. When the Administration withdrew the Clinton-era proposal
to improve accident investigation hearing procedures, the
Administration said it was withdrawing the item ``in light of
resource constraints and changing safety and health regulatory
priorities.'' With respect to this proposal, what were those
resource constraints? What were those changing safety and
health regulatory priorities?
b. When the Administration withdrew the Clinton-era proposal
that included requirements for technology to strengthen
protections against two-story high trucks that haul coal, the
Administration said it was withdrawing the item ``in light of
resource constraints and changing safety and health regulatory
priorities.'' With respect to this proposal, what were those
resource constraints? What were those changing safety and
health regulatory priorities?
c. When the Administration withdrew the Clinton-era proposal
to lower exposure to silica to prevent silicosis in
mineworkers, the Administration said it was withdrawing the
item ``in light of resource constraints and changing safety and
health regulatory priorities.'' With respect to this proposal,
what were those resource constraints? What were those changing
safety and health regulatory priorities?
d. When the Administration withdrew the Clinton-era proposal
to provide new safety standards for specific conditions in
anthracite mines, the Administration said it was withdrawing
the item ``in light of resource constraints and changing safety
and health regulatory priorities.'' With respect to this
proposal, what were those resource constraints? What were those
changing safety and health regulatory priorities?
e. When the Administration withdrew the Clinton-era proposal
to increase the number of hours of annual refresher training
for mine supervisors, the Administration said it was
withdrawing the item ``in light of resource constraints and
changing safety and health regulatory priorities.'' With
respect to this proposal, what were those resource constraints?
What were those changing safety and health regulatory
priorities?
f. When the Administration withdrew the Clinton-era proposal
to address the safe design and construction of impoundments at
metal and nonmetal mines, the Administration said it was
withdrawing the item ``in light of resource constraints and
changing safety and health regulatory priorities.'' With
respect to this proposal, what were those resource constraints?
What were those changing safety and health regulatory
priorities?
g. When the Administration withdrew the Clinton-era proposal
to revise and clarify a standard to require underground metal
and underground non-metal mines to have at least two separate
exits to the surface, the Administration said it was
withdrawing the item ``in light of resource constraints and
changing safety and health regulatory priorities.'' With
respect to this proposal, what were those resource constraints?
What were those changing safety and health regulatory
priorities?
h. When the Administration withdrew the Clinton-era proposal
to address a gap in the regulation that prohibits people from
walking on or around surge or storage piles but allows vehicles
and equipment to be operated on the piles ``in light of
resource constraints and changing safety and health regulatory
priorities.'' With respect to this proposal, what were those
resource constraints? What were those changing safety and
health regulatory priorities?
i. When the Administration withdrew the Clinton-era proposal
to explore both regulatory and non-regulatory ways to eliminate
or reduce hazards associated with confined spaces in mines,
including entrapment by shifting piles, falling into materials,
and being struck by overhanging materials ``in light of
resource constraints and changing safety and health regulatory
priorities.'' With respect to this proposal, what were those
resource constraints? What were those changing safety and
health regulatory priorities?
j. When the Administration withdrew the Clinton-era proposal
to specify the proper equipment electrical grounding, in light
of accidents occurring from inadequate and improper grounding
of power mining equipment ``in light of resource constraints
and changing safety and health regulatory priorities.'' With
respect to this proposal, what were those resource constraints?
What were those changing safety and health regulatory
priorities?
16. A February 27th, 2006 article in USA Today stated that
``federal inspectors routinely concluded that safety violations at the
Sago Mine endangered only one person, findings that helped keep fines
to a minimum before the disaster killed 12 miners in January.'' We
understand that, if a violation is deemed to endanger more than one
person, the fine may go up dramatically.
a. Sago had six citations for blocking escapeways that miners
use to flee a fire or explosion. Each citation said only one
miner was endangered by the blocked escapeway. The mine paid
$60 fines for each of two such violations. Why would only one
miner be endangered by a blocked escapeway?
b. On August 16, 2005, an inspector found ``chemical smoke''
being blown toward areas where two mining teams were working. A
team typically has eight to ten miners. The citation said one
miner was endangered. Why would only one miner out of a total
of two mining teams be endangered by chemical smoke?
c. Sago was cited for 22 violations from July 2004 to
December 2005 for ``accumulation of combustible materials''--
coal dust and coal chunks that can spread fires and explosions.
All 22 violations said one miner was endangered. Why would only
one miner out of an entire underground workforce be endangered
by the accumulation of combustible materials each time?
i. Across the board, is this a common practice? What
does it accomplish other than deflating the fines that
may be assessed for a safety or health violation?
Questions for National Mining Association (NMA) Witness
1. Is the NMA prepared to support any of the legislation that has
been introduced to-date in the U.S. House or Representatives or the
U.S. Senate?
2. You remember the efforts of this House about a decade ago to
eliminate the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), to cut the
number of mandatory inspections, and to otherwise weaken protections in
this Nation's mines. Did your organization support those efforts? Does
your organization believe any strengthening of the law is required, for
example to deal with scoff-laws who refuse to pay penalties after all
the adjudication is completed?
3. It is widely accepted in Australia and other nations that a safe
and healthful mine is a productive mine. Given this country's increased
demand for coal, isn't it the obligation of this Congress to give MSHA
more vigorous enforcement authority so it can ensure that each mine
operator understands this simple but fundamental, guiding principle?
4. What does your organization think about a user fee which would
fund MSHA compliance assistance activities, so that it would be able to
provide you with such services while using the taxpayers' money to fund
enforcement?
Questions for the United Mineworkers of America (UMWA) Witness
1. Why do you think MSHA has yet to require mine operators to use a
continuous dust monitor to help bring new cases of black lung disease
to an end?
2. The mining industry has recently renewed its efforts to bring in
foreign workers to operate the nation's mines. Aren't there plenty of
our own young people who have gone through the basic training required
for these jobs? Does this body need to do something more to help ensure
the new generation of miners is trained in avoiding safety and health
hazards?
3. The UMWA serves as a miners' representative in the Sago
investigation. Could you describe the role of a miners' representative
in an investigation? Has the miners' representative been permitted to
attend all the witness interviews at Sago?
______
Mr. Owens [continuing]. For those few, can you give me one
or two examples of why you withdrew the mine safety health?
Mr. Friend. First of all, most of those, or a lot of them,
were advance notices of proposed rules. They were not proposed
rules, which makes a difference. A lot of administrations puts
things on the regulatory agenda to seek information from the
public, and that is what a request or advanced notice of
proposed rulemaking is, such as the mine rescue teams was.
The SCSR proposed rule, or ANPR, whichever one it was, and
I am not really sure--the rationale for the core issue was to
reduce the shelf life from 10 years to 5 years.
Actually, NIOSH is drafting a rule now on SCSRs along with
us. We do the approval for the explosiveness, and so it would
be a joint effort.
Mr. Owens. Would you agree with me that the coal mine
industry is not in any fiscal difficulties that would prevent
them from going forward to implement these procedures? It is
quite well off in terms of its profits at present.
Mr. Friend. Well, I cannot speak for the coal industry, but
the profits probably are pretty good, considering the price of
coal.
Mr. Owens. Maybe Mr. Watzman will tell us.
Is there any problem with not being able to finance these
safety measures?
Mr. Watzman. Congressman, as I said before, this industry
has shown repeatedly that it will spend the money to provide a
safe and healthy environment when the technology is available.
Mr. Owens. Mr. O'Dell, will you comment on that, please?
Mr. O'Dell. Yes, sir. I would like to make a couple of
comments, if I may, on some of the things that you have said
and some of the other members have said, if I may, just to
clear up.
There has been some information that was given today that
may not be accurate. Self-rescuers, self-contained self-
rescuers--the same units that I wore when I worked underground
in 1977. There has been no improvements. That is sad.
The miners that provide energy to this country today have
to rely on a 1-hour unit to get them out. I would suggest to
anybody in this room, if they knew they only had 1 hour of
oxygen to get out of this room, if they would stand still for
that. It is time to move on and develop something better than
what we have today.
To suggest that the mining industry is safer now than it
was before--if you look at it, we have had 21 fatalities this
year. If you go back to February of last year, in a 12-month
period up to now, we have had 43 total mine fatalities in that
12-month period. That is unacceptable. It should never be
acceptable.
To clear up what is going on in West Virginia with the
commission on the 90 days, I helped set that up. We have three
members who sit on that commission. Three members represent
industry. Three members represent labor.
What they are to do is look at what is available today,
because we believe there are systems out there available today
with better communications, better self-rescuers, better forms
of oxygen, and that panel is instructed to deliver all those
available technologies to Governor Manchin.
I personally talked with Governor Manchin. And if they
cannot come to a conclusion after 90 days, Governor Manchin
will push his bill as it is written, and it will move forward.
Belt air--the only reason we have belt air ventilating coal
mines today is because of poor planning. Operators got behind
on their long wall developments.
And if you ask any of these miners behind me, they will
tell you they sat in meetings with mine management, and they
have come to them to ask them to help get belt air to ventilate
their mines because they got behind on their long wall
developments.
We had to reduce down to three entries, so now you only
have three entries to ventilate the coal mines. that is
unacceptable, and that is the only reason.
Congress prohibited the use of belt air ventilation, and
they need to go back and reinforce that rule that they have on
the books.
Chairman Norwood. Thank you, Mr. Owens.
Mr. Owens. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Norwood. Senator Kline, you are recognized now for
5 minutes for questioning.
And I remind us all we have a vote at 1:30. Oh, okay, good,
we are good to go. Three o'clock.
Go ahead.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I want to identify
myself with the remarks of the chairman early on that I am not
a miner and I do not think any of us are miners.
I have been in a mine one time, and that was scary enough
for me, so my hats off to the miners who do this every day--
fairly amazing career choice.
Let's see whose testimony--it looks like this is Mr.
Friend's testimony. On page eight there is a fairly interesting
chart on coal mining fatalities going back to 1978 and up to
2005. That is a trend line that we would like to see, I think,
in the long range. It is going down, the number of fatalities,
on an angle about like that.
Then on page 10, there is another chart that is much
shorter. This is incident rates going from 2000-2005. I am
curious as to what that would look like if it went back to
1978.
In other words, are the rates going down on the same sort
of trend line that the total fatalities are? Do you happen to
know off the top of your head?
Mr. Friend. Well, just off the top of my head, from 1996,
for example, to 2000, the incidence rate was above five, to
give you a little bit of comparison. And in 2001 it dropped to
4.75, 4.60, 4.23, 4.05, and currently, for 2005, and with
preliminary data, it is down to 3.89 total incidence rate.
Mr. Kline. Okay.
Mr. Friend. So it was in the fives.
Mr. Kline. Again, it is important to look at it over along
term, because you can have spikes in any given time. And I
bring this up because I sort of had a flashback when I looked
at this in my earlier life when I was a naval aviator, a Marine
pilot.
If you look at the number of accidents and accident rates
in naval aviation over that similar period of time, the line
looks pretty much the same; that is, when I was a young man
back in the 1960s, the naval aviation accident rate was
horrific. And today, it is much better. And we have had this
sort of trend line.
And there are some key events that took place, and I am
working up to a point here, but--some key events that took
place over time. One of them was the development of standard
operating procedures. You know, in naval aviation, that is
pretty easy to dictate.
And you talked about--I am going to kind of scan the panel
here. You have over 600 mines operating in the United States.
You have your agency overseeing it. You have interaction with
labor, with the unions. Is there such a thing?
You talked about, you know, get out, I think, Mr. Friend,
you said on your hat. Is there such a thing as a standard
operating procedure across the industry that would tell
everybody, in red--is it on everybody's hard hat, get out?
I am looking for where would that come from. Is that your
job to come up with such a thing? Is it industry's job? Is it a
collaborative effort that has to be done with the union?
And I will start with you, Mr----
Mr. Friend. We have been teaching and training that for
many years, even prior to the MSHA days. That was standard
operating procedure. Where I said we probably failed is we did
not reiterate it as much as we should.
Now, in my opening statement, I mentioned that we are
working with industry and others to put together a procedure
that should be followed in such an event. One of those things
will be stressing evacuation.
Mr. Kline. Well, I really did not mean to address that
specific--I am just using that example, that little get out in
an hour red and black sign. The point is is there standard
operating procedures that is available across the industry that
would include things like that.
Mr. Friend. I do not know of a template, what each company
is using.
Mr. McKinney. We have training plans--excuse me. If I may
respond.
Mr. Friend. Yes.
Mr. McKinney. We have training plans that we require at
every coal mine, and when you hire in at a coal mine, you
employ experienced miner trainer or inexperienced miner
training--it is required that you are covered with those folks
escape and evacuation procedures.
So anybody coming to work at a coal mine--they go through
those procedures with them. Then there is annual refresher
training once a year.
Mr. Kline. Okay.
Mr. Friend. But in a broader term, I think you are talking
about the procedures in case of an emergency, getting the teams
there, getting the people who needs to be there----
Mr. Kline. Right.
Mr. Friend [continuing]. The whole thing.
Mr. Kline. Right.
Mr. Friend. And I do not know that--I do not think each
mine has a standardized plan, but perhaps Mr. Watzman can----
Mr. Kline. Well, I would just--I see my time is rapidly
expiring. I would just suggest--and that is a fairly useful
thing to think about whether it is the industry or the
regulators or the miners themselves, to think about how that
might come to use.
And then one more comment about that. We found in that same
naval aviation analogy that there came to be points where no
matter what your SOP said, you needed a change in material. And
part of getting that accident rate down was making the flying
machines better.
And that gets to the technology point, which I hope that
all of us collectively are going to continue to work for. I see
my time has expired.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Norwood. Thank you, Mr. Kline.
Ms. Woolsey, you are recognized now for 5 minutes.
Ms. Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is an
improvement over our last hearing on the same subject, because
at that hearing I remember several people, including a
representative from the Heritage Foundation, who had never even
been in a mine, who thought he could sit there and tell us how
much we did not need the standards and the safety rules that we
were working on at that time.
Who can tell me--Mr. Secretary, can you tell me or tell us
how many on-site inspections Sago has had over the last 2 years
and how many withdrawal and returns at the Sago Mine?
Mr. Friend. Well, I can tell you what they had in 2005, and
I do not know if----
Ms. Woolsey. Well, that is a beginning.
Mr. Friend [continuing]. Goes back to 2004 or not, but----
Ms. Woolsey. Well, let's have 2005.
Mr. Friend. They had their mandated inspections and 208
citations and orders were issued at the Sago Mine in 2005.
Eighteen of those were withdrawal orders, where the miner was
actually withdrawn and the piece of equipment or the area of
mine as shut down, so they lost production.
We increased enforcement that year because of the spike in
their incidence rate. Management with MSHA met over 20 times
with the management of the Sago Mine.
Ms. Woolsey. Well, do you think it is because $60 was a
fine instead of a hefty fine?
[Applause.]
Would that have made a different to the----
Mr. Friend. And as noted, we are revising part 100.
Ms. Woolsey. Well, cause and effect. The Mosaic Company
mine in Saskatchewan, Canada had a disaster. All 72 miners
escaped. Now, it was not a coal mine. It was a potash mine. It
was a fire. But they escaped because they had rescue chambers.
They had a place to go while they were waiting to be rescued.
Mr. Watzman, is that one of your recommendations from your
organization? I mean, you are the National Mining Association.
Would that be a recommendation to MSHA that that be something
that we need to----
Mr. Watzman. Rescue chambers are being examined currently
by our member companies to determine their application in the
underground mines. You have touched upon the most important
distinction. That was not coal.
The ore body there, in and of itself, did not burn, and
they used different mining practices that made that mine
accommodating to a rescue chamber. But coal companies are
examining the application of those, how to install them, where
they might be installed in underground coal mines today.
Ms. Woolsey. Well, don't you think that if you were in a
coal mine fire, don't you think you would be safer if you were
in one of these rescue chambers? Wouldn't you rather a rescue
chamber than hanging out there with a red something on your
safety helmet that says evacuate, when you do not know where to
go?
Mr. O'Dell. Ms. Woolsey?
Ms. Woolsey. Yes.
Mr. O'Dell. May I speak to that, please?
Ms. Woolsey. Yes.
Mr. O'Dell. First and foremost, we want to be able to get
out of the coal mines.
Ms. Woolsey. Absolutely.
Mr. O'Dell. And so what we push for as miners is better
protected intake escape ways, which has not been done in the
past years.
But such as the case that happened at Sago, had they have
had mine chambers, those miners would have been alive today. I
believe that the best plans go wrong, and we have been in
contact with manufacturers out there who build these mine
chambers, and we believe they can be used throughout the mining
industry.
We have seen them where they can be built for low coal, for
high coal. We have seen them to where they can be rubber-tired,
to where they can move in and out, rail mounted, as well as
able to put them in crosscuts.
So we think that they should be mandated as a backup
resort. If we cannot escape, it would be nice to know that
there would be some place to go in the event that all else
would fail.
Ms. Woolsey. Well, thank you. While I have got your
attention, would you tell me if there are any other proposed
rules that have been withdrawn from MSHA, Mr. O'Dell, that you
think make it even more dangerous for miners? Which are the
most--the rules that have been withdrawn that make it most
dangerous?
Mr. O'Dell. I guess I should also back up and say that in
the 1969 and 1977 mine act that the secretary actually mandated
that--it was mandated by the mine act that the secretary may
require the use of such chambers.
And because the language ``may'' was there, I guess they
never moved on it. But there is language in the mine act that
allows that to happen.
Self-contained self-rescuers--we believe we need to improve
upon those and move forward with those. We believe those
technologies have not moved quickly enough, as we had stated
before. Better protected intake escape ways.
We believe that the investigative process being used during
mine fatality investigations needs to be improved upon. The
problem is that there is a whole world of technology out there,
and nobody is talking.
We have actually sat down and talked with folks from NASA.
We have talked with folks from the Navy. We have talked with
folks from throughout the country who says hey, this technology
is here. It is there, but nobody is talking with each other,
and nobody makes it apply to the mining industry.
I mean, I would love for everybody at this table or
everybody in this room to be able to have the opportunity to
sit down and see what is actually available. You would be
shocked to find out what there is.
Ms. Woolsey. And is not available.
Chairman Norwood. Thank you----
Ms. Woolsey. Or what is available in the marketplace, you
mean, already.
Mr. O'Dell. Well, for instance, communications wise----
Ms. Woolsey. All right.
Mr. O'Dell [continuing]. We have been told by the Navy--and
there is a group from the aviation department, actually from
the Pentagon, who is working on a wireless system right now out
of the University of Texas that believes that there is a system
that can be applied to the mining industry that can be used to
utilize communications not only in the event of emergencies,
but we have communication problems on a day-to-day basis, so
that could be applied on a day-to-day basis as well.
So the communications systems, we believe, are there. The
oxygen systems, whether it be the mine chambers or whether it
be new, improved self-contained self-rescuers--it is a shame we
have not moved on that.
Chairman Norwood. Thank you, Mr. O'Dell. That sounds like a
very good hearing for us to bring in some of these experts and
see really what is available to us.
I would love to do that, Mr. Owens, if you would work with
me on that.
Just quickly, mine arts, you are familiar with those, Mr.
McKinney, from Australia?
Mr. McKinney. Yes.
Chairman Norwood. Yes. They look pretty neat to me. Maybe
we ought to look at one some time.
I want to thank all of you----
Mr. Miller. May I respond to one question, please? Do we
get a second round of questions?
Chairman Norwood. No, sir. We are going to have a lot of
hearings, though.
Mr. Miller. Well, this is bullshit. I mean, you have people
here.
Chairman Norwood. When you get in charge, you get to run
the damn thing. Right now, you are not.
Mr. Miller. No, it is not about being in charge. It is
about you have people here----
Chairman Norwood. I want to thank each of----
Mr. Miller [continuing]. To answer questions about the
safety--and we do not get to ask the questions.
Chairman Norwood. I know I appreciate your time and
expertise.
Mr. Miller. It is incredible.
Chairman Norwood. And I expect my colleagues do as well.
Mr. Miller. First hearing in 5 years, and you cannot have
questions at the hearing.
Chairman Norwood. As I indicated at the start of this
hearing, today is the first of a series of hearings I expect--
--
Mr. Miller. No wonder nothing gets----
Chairman Norwood [continuing]. Our subcommittee----
Mr. Miller [continuing]. Done downtown.
Chairman Norwood [continuing]. Will conduct in this
Congress relating to mining, mine safety and the need for
changes, if any.
I expect we will hear more about various legislative
proposals from our colleagues in the House and from this
subcommittee.
Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, I move that members of the
committee have an additional round of questioning, which is the
ordinary course of business in every other committee hearing I
have been in.
Chairman Norwood. That is just not the truth. It has not--
--
Mr. Miller. Maybe not where you run them. This is the first
time I have sat----
Chairman Norwood. There has not been a second round of
committee----
Mr. Miller. We are not having a vote until 3 o'clock.
Chairman Norwood. I have another committee hearing going on
right now.
Mr. Miller. No, we have these people here to ask questions
about today, about what is going on, when miners and their
families want to know what the hell is going on, and the only
thing we see is once we had a disaster, they started moving.
Chairman Norwood. I apologize, folks. This committee is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]
Response From Robert M. Friend, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Labor for Mine Safety and Health, to Supplemental Questions
1. News reports have indicated that MSHA investigators have
declined to interview the mine rescue teams which participated in the
rescue attempts at the Sago and Aracoma Alma mines. This has caused
much concern among the rescue team members, the families of the
victims, and the mining communities. Do MSHA accident investigation
procedures require such interviews? How can we ensure future rescue
teams are prepared for their tasks without interviewing those who have
recently had to perform rescue duties?
The MSHA investigations into the Sago and Aracoma Alma accidents
are ongoing. I can assure you the necessary mine rescue personnel have
been interviewed. With regard to required accident investigation
procedures, the investigation team, in consultation with senior MSHA
management, has discretion to interview those witnesses deemed
necessary to the investigation.
2. The regulations currently provide that with the exception of
small and remote mines and those operating under special mining
conditions, every operator of an underground mine is to establish or
enter into an arrangement for two mine rescue teams to be available at
all times when miners are underground. How does MSHA ensure compliance
with this requirement? Is this something checked during mandatory and
spot-inspections? How many operators have been cited by MSHA over the
last year for failure to comply with the requirements of 30 CFR 49.2
and what penalties have been assessed?
Both Metal and Nonmetal (MNM) and Coal Mine Safety Inspectors
ensure that the requirements of Part 49--Mine Rescue Teams are being
complied with by mine operators during each mandatory regular
inspection of underground mines. Four MNM mine operators have been
cited during 2005 for violations of 30 CFR 49.2, which are primarily
paperwork violations. The assessed penalty for each violation was $60.
Five coal mine operators were cited during 2005 for violations of 30
CFR 49.2 and they received similar proposed civil penalties.
3. Has MSHA delegated any responsibility to ensure compliance with
this requirement to any of the States? Do any of those states have
requirements concerning rescue teams that differ from those under 30
CFR 49.2?
MSHA has not delegated responsibility to ensure compliance with 30
CFR 49.2 to any of the States, and does not have the authority to do
so.
4. How many underground coal mines and how many underground MNM
mines currently meet this requirement by establishment of their own
rescue teams?
Sixty-one MNM mines and 80 coal mines maintain their own mine
rescue teams.
5. How many underground coal mines and how many underground MNM
mines currently meet this requirement by entering into an arrangement
for mine-rescue services rather than establishing their own rescue
team? Of these, how many contract with a state to provide rescue
services? How many contract with the operators of other mines? Do any
contract with local rescue services or fire departments? How does MSHA
ensure that these non-resident teams are trained and equipped in
accordance with the requirements of 30 CFR Part 49?
163 MNM mines and 689 coal mines have entered into
arrangements for mine-rescue services.
39 MNM mines and 383 coal mines have arranged through the
state to provide mine-rescue service.
50 MNM mines and 200 coal mines have arranged for mine-
rescue coverage with other mines.
74 MNM mines and 106 coal mines have arranged for mine
rescue coverage with local rescue services or fire departments.
Physical inspections of independent and contract rescue
stations are conducted quarterly by MSHA to verify compliance with the
regulations. State mine rescue stations are inspected when such
stations are utilized for compliance with Part 49.
6. How many underground coal mines and how many underground MNM
mines are currently considered ``small'' or ``remote'' for the purpose
of this requirement? How frequently does MSHA review their mine-rescue
plans?
Forty MNM mines have approved rescue plans under the ``small and
remote'' criteria. Coal has 30 ``small'' or ``remote mines.'' Annual
reviews are conducted to ensure these alternative mine-rescue
capability plans are appropriate.
7. How many underground coal mines and how many underground MNM
mines currently operate ``under special mining conditions'' for the
purposes of this requirement? How frequently does MSHA review their
mine rescue plans?
Eighty-three MNM mines, operating under special mining conditions
as set out in Part 49, have approved alternative plans assuring that
suitable mine-rescue capability is provided. Annual reviews are
conducted to ensure alternative mine-rescue capability plans are
appropriate. All underground coal mines are in compliance with rescue
team requirements without resorting to the special circumstances test
of Part 49. All underground mines have mine-rescue team coverage. MSHA
reviews mine-rescue team arrangements during regular inspection
activities.
8. What procedures does MSHA have in place to coordinate its
activities during an emergency with local first responders such as
police, rescue and fire departments? Does MSHA have funds dedicated to
training first responders about special needs in mine emergencies? Are
mine-rescue teams required to invite local first responders to
participate in required training sessions?
The MSHA Metal/Non-Metal directorate maintains a Mine Emergency
Plan for each district. This plan includes the contact information for
local first responders such as police, rescue and fire departments.
Coal Emergency Plans maintained by the MSHA Coal directorate list all
applicable emergency numbers including ambulance and first responder
contacts. There is no requirement in mine safety standards that mine
rescue teams invite local first responders to training sessions;
however, it is acceptable to do so. MSHA does not fund training of
first responders although MSHA does discuss these issues and works with
first responders whenever possible. MSHA has participated in a limited
number of drills or training exercises with first responders. MSHA
makes every effort to work cooperatively with all State and local
authorities during emergencies although the precise protocol is not
established by procedures. MSHA is implementing the requirement in the
MINER Act that each underground coal mine operator have an approved
emergency response plan.
9. Why did this Administration withdraw from its rulemaking agenda
initiatives that would have addressed some of the safety hazards that
have led to the recent loss of lives underground? Why haven't you
restarted each one of these initiatives?
It would be premature to address perceived causes of the two fatal
West Virginia mining accidents at the Sago and the Aracoma Alma No.1
Mine and provide presumed solutions before the actual causes have been
identified by professional staff trained to render such judgment. MSHA
and other authorities are still conducting their investigation to
determine the causes of these accidents.
MSHA is unaware of any withdrawn rulemaking initiative that would
have prevented the recent loss of lives underground.
In December 2001, MSHA withdrew a rulemaking from our regulatory
agenda that would have primarily addressed the service life of Self-
Contained Self-Rescuers (SCSRs), and the appropriate inspection of
SCSRs, as well as some issues regarding training. In July 1999, MSHA
had published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking soliciting
information on a variety of issues related to SCSRs but did not propose
a rule. A primary objective of this rulemaking initiative was to
address the reliability of SCSRs, primarily by shortening the accepted
service life of the SCSRs. We determined that this objective could be
and was in fact being appropriately addressed by working with NIOSH to
increase reliability of SCSRs through improvements in technology. NIOSH
and MSHA are currently active in monitoring SCSR performance and NIOSH
is testing additional features designed to monitor the reliability of
approved SCSR devices.
MSHA and NIOSH have confirmed that the SCSRs used at Sago Mine were
all functional and had all been partially used. MSHA has required
additional training in the use of SCSRs and we encourage miners to
quickly don SCSRs immediately in the event of explosion or fire. MSHA's
emergency temporary standard (ETS), published on March 9, 2006, assures
that miners receive the necessary evacuation training and additional
SCSR training under realistic conditions, and that miners have
additional equipment available (SCSRs and lifelines) to successfully
evacuate the mine during an emergency. We are exploring the efficacy of
newer tracking, communication, and other mine rescue technologies to
determine if they are safe and effective for use in an underground coal
mine environment after a mine fire, explosion, or inundation.
The MINER Act requires operators of underground coal mines to
improve accident preparedness and emergency response. They must develop
and adopt an emergency response plan specific to each mine they
operate. Emergency response plans must address post-accident
communication and tracking systems, post-accident breathable air,
schedule for maintenance and checking the reliability of self-contained
self-rescuers (SCSRs), training for SCSRs and lifelines.
In December 2002, we withdrew an advance notice of proposed
rulemaking (ANPRM), which had been on the Regulatory Agenda since 1999.
This ANPRM solicited ideas from the mining community about where we
might increase flexibility and provide increased safety for miners in
our current regulations on mine rescue teams. However, this ANPRM did
not produce promising suggestions. The mining community insisted that
monetary incentives would be required for mine operators to increase
the number of mine-rescue teams. Each of the incentives suggested would
have either reduced safety (e.g., decrease the amount of training;
reduce the assessed penalties if the mine operator had a mine-rescue
team); or exceeded the scope of MSHA's authority (e.g., provision of
tax incentives). We continue to promote mine rescue teams and work
through non-regulatory means to increase the number of teams. MSHA is
implementing requirements in the MINER Act related to mine rescue
teams.
10. You have announced you will be using the agency's authority to
issue emergency temporary standards to deal with a few of the safety
hazards that have received public attention since the Sago accident. On
the other hand, you seem to be moving at a much slower pace in adopting
rules requiring new communications technologies which could have saved
lives in that tragedy? Is this because the industry has threatened you
with a lawsuit? What can this Congress do to ensure these life-saving
devices get into our mines before more lives are lost?
MSHA is moving expeditiously to implement the MINER Act and other
regulations that it believes will further protect miner health and
safety.
MSHA's pace in adopting rule changes regarding communications
technologies is dependent on the limitations of the currently available
technologies and the current state of development of other
technologies.
The majority of currently available, MSHA-approved communication
systems are dependent on a wire-backbone, or installed wires or cables
that provide power and a communication signal. Systems dependent on a
wire-backbone would likely be compromised in a fire or explosion which
could sever the wire connection rendering the system inoperable. The
only MSHA approved system that does not necessarily require a wire-
backbone is the Mine Site Technologies Personal Emergency Device (PED)
system. MSHA has investigated the PED and determined that it has
serious limitations during emergencies, such that making the use of
this specific device mandatory would be problematic at this time.
First, the system's performance is predicated on the installation of a
large loop antenna, which must be installed on the surface for the
system to operate during an emergency. Some mines may have too much
overburden or do not own the property rights, making surface
installation impractical. Second, evaluation of the PED has revealed
performance concerns regarding ``shadow zones''--certain places in
underground mines where there is no signal received by the PED. Third,
PED is a one-way paging system, meaning that the message sender cannot
receive confirmation that the message has been received.
MSHA is also currently investigating other wireless communication
technology. We have received more than eighty (80) proposals in
response to our request for communication and tracking system
suggestions. None of the proposals received are currently approved as
safe for use by MSHA. In reviewing the proposals, there are a number
that have great potential. We have selected several of the most
promising proposals that offer two-way wireless communications and are
conducting field tests of these systems. We plan to evaluate
performance and capabilities of these systems and share the findings
with all concerned parties. Our expectation is that more state-of-the-
art systems will soon be available for America's mines, offering a
wider choice of communication and tracking systems with improvements in
coverage, reliability and range.
11. For many years, permitting air used to ventilate the mine to
run over conveyor belts, which generate friction and sparks, was
prohibited by law. Exceptions were only permitted after a public
hearing and a determination by MSHA that the mine operator would
observe a set of conditions specifically designed to limit the risk of
fire in that mine. This Administration ``green lighted'' the use of
``belt air'' with a new regulation. In light of the Aracoma-Alma fire,
why isn't MSHA seeking to put a hold on its ``belt entry rule?''
The investigation at the Alma No. 1 mine is ongoing, and we cannot
yet be certain of its ultimate findings. As the US. Attorney has
stated, we have made a criminal referral of the preliminary findings at
the Aracoma Alma No. I Mine.
We believe from our preliminary investigation that the use of belt
air did not contribute to the severity of the accident. The Aracoma
Alma No. 1 belt air petition was approved by the Agency in 2000 and
contained routine requirements. The final belt air rule actually
increased miner protection at Alma No. 1 by including various
requirements that were not included in the granted petition.
MSHA has determined that the recent ``belt air'' rule increases
protection for miners by adding various requirements that were included
only in some granted petitions, and by making all mine operators comply
with the same strict safety conditions when choosing to use belt air.
For example, all sensors must be listed by a Nationally Recognized
Testing Laboratory, such as Underwriter's Lab; the trunk lines for the
communication system and the Atmospheric Monitoring System (AMS) must
be installed in separate entries; carbon monoxide sensors must be
installed in the intake escapeways; point-feeds must be monitored;
sensor spacing must be reduced to 1,000 feet; alert and alarm levels
must be reduced to 5 and 10 ppm; all outby sensors must automatically
notify sections of alarms; and lifelines are required when returns are
used as alternate escapeways.
The recent ``belt air'' rule also provides additional protections
for use of belt air to ventilate areas where mechanized mining
equipment is being set up and removed. Before the ``belt air'' rule,
this practice would have been permitted without additional protections.
Some advantages of using belt air to help ventilate working places
include: reducing dangerous methane concentrations; promoting the use
of technologically advanced early-warning fire-detection systems; and
reducing the number of additional entries required. There are also
certain ground control advantages realized by being able to limit the
number of development entries, such as reducing the probability of roof
falls and rib outbursts. A recent analysis of accident and injury data
reveals that there has never been a fatality attributed to fire or air
contaminants being carried by belt air to the face of a coal mine.
Since 1978, MSHA has evaluated about 90 petitions for modification
to allow the use of belt air to ventilate working places in an
underground coal mine. MSHA's experience over more than 25 years has
established that the use of belt air is safe, provided that specified
conditions, designed to maintain the level of safety and health, are
met. The rulemaking itself, which began in 1983, was completed in 2004.
There was appropriate notice and comment throughout the history of this
rulemaking.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in International
Union, United Mine Workers of America v. Mine Safety and Health
Administration, 407 F.3d 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2005), affirmed that the belt
air rule did not violate section 101(a)(9) of the Mine Act, which
states--
No mandatory health or safety standard promulgated under this title
[Title 30] shall reduce the protection afforded miners by an existing
mandatory health or safety standard.
MSHA is implementing the provision in the MINER Act related to the
use of belt air in underground coal mines.
12. We have seen a news release announcing a new review of the
penalty assessment process at MSHA, but nothing more than a news
release. What is the scope of this effort and when can we expect some
answers?
MSHA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on September
8, 2006. The rulemaking will implement penalty provisions in the MINER
Act, and will also revise the existing penalty structure and the
process for issuing proposed penalties. This rulemaking is a high
priority and will be completed within the required timeframe. Public
hearings began in September and will continue in October, 2006.
13. You appear to have succeeded in greatly angering the families
of the victims of these tragedies by, to date, keeping them from
hearing witnesses who may be revealing information about the last hours
of their loved ones. Why did MSHA withdraw proposed rules that would
have, after public notice and comment, established procedures for
public hearings and accident investigations?
On the contrary, MSHA has taken a number of steps to fully inform
the families of the miners who were killed in the Saga Mine explosion,
the Aracoma Alma Mine fire and Darby Co. mine explosion about critical
information and the status of the agency's investigations. Ten MSHA
officials and technical experts, including the chief accident
investigator, met with the Sago families for four and a half hours on
March 9, 2006 in Buckhannon, WV. Another meeting of similar length with
the Sago families was held on April 13, 2006. At that time, the
families were given an advance set of the transcripts of the private
interviews conducted during the accident investigation and we again
answered questions and discussed the status of the ongoing
investigation. On May 2-4, 2006 the Sago families had another
opportunity to participate in the investigation by submitting questions
to witnesses during the joint MSHA/ WV public hearing into the
accident. In addition, MSHA's chief accident investigator has been in
regular contact with the two families that were most directly affected
by the Aracoma Alma Mine fire and they both have expressed appreciation
for the regular updates. MSHA used a similar approach with one of the
victim's families from Darby who desired regular updates on the
Agency's progress in that investigation. MSHA is implementing the
requirement in the MINER Act to establish a family liaison policy.
MSHA's draft procedures for conducting public hearings were never
published as proposed rules. The regulatory agenda item relating to
public hearing procedures was withdrawn in favor of focusing resources
on other priorities.
14. After tragedies like this, how should MSHA's own conduct be
assessed? Don't we need some independent jury or body performing this
critical function to ensure a full and honest review?
MSHA's long-standing policy to conduct an internal review following
each accident that results in three or more fatalities provides a full
and honest assessment of MSHA's performance as it relates to an
accident--and, in many cases, has led to corrective actions to address
issues identified by internal review teams.
MSHA believes in the importance of conducting a thorough review of
its own overall performance. MSHA's internal review teams consist of
highly qualified, professional MSHA personnel who are outside the
district where the accident occurred and independent of the accident
investigation team. Team members report directly to the Assistant
Secretary for Mine Safety and Health.
An internal review is a thorough examination and objective
evaluation of MSHA's enforcement practices at a mine that has
experienced a major accident. It is one element of a management system
designed to improve the Agency's enforcement performance with the
overall goal of preventing future accidents.
The internal review team reviews existing MSHA policies and
procedures, inspection records, and data in MSHA's computer systems.
The team also interviews Agency employees who perform inspection,
investigation, and management functions.
The review team prepares a detailed report documenting its findings
and recommendations. MSHA makes internal review reports available to
the public and posts the reports on its web site. MSHA believes that
interested members of the public should have an opportunity to review
the findings and recommendations in an internal review report and to
hold the Agency accountable for correcting the deficiencies found.
Numerous positive changes have resulted from internal reviews. Some
examples include: better follow up on rock dust surveys; improved
documentation of inspections; more appropriate decisions in Safety and
Health Conferences following inspections; funding to update the 30-year
old Impoundment Design Manual; increased management oversight at the
district and national levels; and improved use of enforcement tools
provided by the Mine Act.
MSHA policy requires an internal review after each mining accident
that results in three or more fatalities. For example, an internal
review is underway into the Darby mine accident where five miners lost
their lives. There may be other circumstances when the Assistant
Secretary will direct that an internal review be conducted. An example
of one of those internal reviews is the internal review conducted after
the Martin County impoundment failure which did not cause a loss of
life but did cause substantial environmental damage. The mine fire at
the Aracoma Mine, in which two miners were killed, is also the subject
of an internal review by the Agency.
15. Are decisions about mine safety and health being made by MSHA's
technical experts, or are non-expert appointees in other parts of the
Department of Labor calling the shots?
MSHA conducts its business by and through its core component of
dedicated mine safety and health professionals who inspect mines and
enforce the law on a daily basis. In addition, they handle everything
from day-to-day matters to emergency situations. In every instance,
issues are addressed and decisions are made with the health and safety
of our Nation's miners as the primary concern of these safety and
health professionals. These individuals provide the key experience and
decision making capability necessary to address mine safety and health
matters.
16. Self rescuers only provide about one hour's worth of oxygen,
and MSHA only requires operators to provide one for each underground
miner. Why hasn't MSHA required more? Isn't it true that it could often
take more than an hour to evacuate a mine?
MSHA has issued an Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) which has
increased the stocks of SCSRs available and established safe cache
locations which are well within reach of a single SCSR to address
longer distances in the larger and deeper mines and mines that have
obstacles which prevent direct egress.
On March 9, 2006, MSHA's ETS went into effect, requiring at least
one additional SCSR per miner. MSHA inspectors are currently reviewing
mine operator storage plans for caches of extra SCSRs including
determining that the first SCSR will last to the cache point. We are
doing this to ensure the appropriateness of the SCSR cache location but
in addition we have an additional opportunity to monitor SCSR use.
MSHA's ETS takes into consideration that in some mines and in some
circumstances, it may take more than one hour to exit the mine or to
reach a safe breathing area, and thus requires caches of additional
SCSRs in both required escapeways if it takes more than one hour to
evacuate a mine. The preamble contains an extensive discussion of these
issues. The full text is available at http:/ /www.msha.gov/KEGS/FEDREG/
FINAL/ 2006finl/ 06-2255.pdf.
MSHA is also implementing MINER Act requirements. For example, MSHA
has issued a Program Policy Letter which provides guidance to mine
operators to facilitate the development of their Emergency Response
Plans. On August 30, 2006, MSHA published a Request for Information in
the Federal Register in order to solicit information and develop
further guidance for mine operators in assuring that the plans provide
safe and reliable post-accident breathable air supplies for trapped
miners. MSHA has also participated with stakeholders in information
meetings about the new MINER Act held across the country.
17. Do you know how many mines currently meet the requirements for
having at least two mine rescue teams within two hours of the mine?
All Coal Mines are in compliance. One hundred thirteen Metal
Nonmetal mines have at least two mine rescue teams within two hours of
their mine.
18. When the Bush Administration withdrew a Clinton-era proposal
that sought to increase the number and availability of mine rescue
teams, the Administration stated that it planned to evaluate non-
regulatory alternatives to that proposal. at have you done to evaluate
those non-regulatory alternatives? What have been the results of your
evaluation thus far?
The number of mine rescue teams has declined over the years, as has
the number of mines. MSHA looked at regulations that would increase the
number of these teams and held a public meeting in March 2002 in
Barbourville, Kentucky to gather current ideas and suggestions
concerning mine rescue capabilities and preparedness. Both labor and
industry stated that cost is the major factor considered in
establishing a mine rescue team. Recommendations to MSHA focused on
incentives, particularly reducing penalties for violations if a mine
had a mine rescue team. Legally, MSHA could not adopt that approach.
Therefore, MSHA withdrew the mine-rescue agenda item (no proposal was
ever published) and issued two Program Information Bulletins that
addressed mine rescue cost concerns related to training and technical
assistance. The Administration continues to offer assistance for mine
rescue team training and drilling. In addition, the Administration has
revitalized the Mine Rescue Team Contests; the National Contest last
fall drew the largest number of teams in recent years. MSHA is
implementing requirements in the MINER Act related to mine rescue
teams.
19. What is the state of your inspector workforce? In a September
2003 report, the GAO warned that 44 percent of MSHA's inspectors would
be eligible to retire within 5 years. Are we facing a shortage of
qualified mine inspectors?
STATUS OF COAL ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL AS OF 6/30/06
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Underground Inspectors.................................... 274
Surface Inspectors........................................ 53
Specialists............................................... 168
Trainees.................................................. 92
-------------
Total............................................... 587
------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. MSHA is not not facing a shortage of qualified mine inspectors.
It is certainly true that a significant number of federal mine
inspectors are eligible to retire within less than five years, but our
experience has been that MSHA's employees do not exercise their
retirement option as soon as they are eligible. However, MSHA has taken
steps to anticipate coming retirements, by recruiting qualified
candidates through aggressive on-going job fairs in each district and
reducing the time required to hire inspector trainees. Still, while we
have reduced the hiring time for inspectors to approximately 45 days,
it takes 18 months to fully train an inspector. The rate of attrition
and training time, along with an increase in the mining industry's
activity and the competition with the private sector for promising
candidates remain challenges for MSHA. MSHA is currently moving
promptly to recruit and train coal enforcement personnel, as called for
in the FY 2006 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense,
Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery.
20. What impact has the loss since 2001 of 190 authorized coal
enforcement personnel had on MSHA?
These changes have not had an adverse impact on enforcement. To the
contrary, in both metal/nonmetal and coal, MSHA is conducting more
inspections than five years ago, and has increased its mandated
inspection completion rate since 2000. On the coal side, MSHA has
improved its required regulatory inspection completion rate from 98.3%
in 2000 to 99.6% in 2005.
Since 2001, the coal mining sector has seen a 6% reduction in the
number of mines. During this period, MSHA adjusted its internal
structure to correspond to the workload decrease by consolidating
administrative support operations, allowing resources to be dedicated
to its core functions. The vast majority of the decrease in staffing
levels since 2001 have occurred in the administrative and support
components of the Agency. Increased automation and use of technology
enabled MSHA to reduce the number of staff needed to effectively
perform the functions. In 2005, we saw a moderate increase in the
number of mines and miners as the industry stepped up production to
meet the demand for this increasingly vital resource. MSHA once again
looked at its structure and processes and identified areas for
improvement that enabled it to attain the safest year in history.
21. When the Administration withdrew the Clinton-era proposal to
improve the use of self-contained self-rescue devices, the
Administration said it was withdrawing the item ``in light of resource
constraints and changing safety and health regulatory priorities.''
What were those resource constraints? What were those changing safety
and health regulatory priorities?
The issue noted in your question had been on the Agency's
regulatory agenda as an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM)]
for four years before this Administration took office without a rule
being proposed. This Administration revised the regulatory agenda upon
taking office to provide a roadmap for regulatory actions that would be
realistically addressed and completed and that were in active status.
Self-contained self-rescuers (SCSRs) are closed circuit breathing
apparatuses that provide a source of oxygen and greatly increase a
miner's chance of surviving a mine emergency involving an irrespirable
atmosphere. This agenda item would have addressed the inspection and
service life of these breathing devices, as well as training
requirements for their use and storage. We determined that additional
testing and monitoring was a necessary predicate for rulemaking.
Currently, NIOSH is working on a proposed rule to address reliability.
MSHA is assisting NIOSH in the development of that rule. MSHA and NIOSH
have a long-term protocol to take SCSRs out of service from mines (and
replace them) in order to test the functionality of SCSRs at all stages
of their shelf life. In addition, any report either agency receives of
a defective or less than fully functional SCSR is fully investigated.
MSHA's other priorities over the succeeding years have included
lowering the permissible exposure limit for asbestos exposure;
developing a final rule for diesel particulate exposure; finalizing a
rule for hazard communication; proposing rules on respirable coal mine
dust and a continuing collaboration with NIOSH to develop a personal
continuous dust monitoring system; publication of a final rule on
independent laboratories to allow alternative testing and evaluation
requirements to bring technological innovations to the U.S. mining
market more quickly; a final rule on methane monitors and roof bolting
equipment; a final rule on belt entry ventilation; a final rule on
approval fees for testing; an ANPRM on substance abuse; and a final
rule on training for shaft and slope construction workers as well as a
final rule on the use of low and medium power electric generators at
underground coal mines. MSHA is moving very expeditiously to finalize
the Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) issued in the aftermath of the
Sago and Aracoma Alma mine accidents. Provisions in the ETS will
greatly improve mine operator emergency preparedness and a miner's
chances of safely evacuating an underground coal mine when a mine
emergency occurs. In addition, MSHA is implementing MINER Act
requirements designed to improve mine safety rescue and emergency
response technology. The MINER Act requires that MSHA issue regulations
addressing: (1) mine rescue teams at underground mines; (2) civil
penalties at all mines and (3) seals at underground coal mines. MSHA
expects to be able to fully meet this ambitious rulemaking agenda in FY
2007.
22. A February 27, 2006 article in USA Today stated that ``federal
inspectors routinely concluded that safety violations at the Sago Mine
endangered only one person, findings that helped keep fines to a
minimum before the disaster killed 12 miners in January.'' We
understand that, if a violation is deemed to endanger more than one
person, the fine may go up dramatically.
a. Sago had six citations for blocking escapeways that miners use
to flee a fire or explosion. Each citation said only one miner was
endangered by the blocked escapeway. The mine paid $60 fines for each
of two such violations. Why would only one miner be endangered by a
blocked escapeway?
b. On August 16, 2005, an inspector found ``chemical smoke'' being
blown toward areas where two mining teams were working. A team
typically has eight to ten miners. The citation said one miner was
endangered. Why would only one miner out of a total of two mining teams
be endangered by chemical smoke?
c. Sago was cited for 22 violations from July 2004 to December 2005
for ``accumulation of combustible materials''--coal dust and coal
chunks that can spread fires and explosions. All 22 violations said one
miner was endangered. Why would only one miner out of an entire
underground workforce be endangered by the accumulation of combustible
materials each time? Across the board, is this a common practice? What
does it accomplish other than deflating the fines that may be assessed
for a safety or health violation?
MSHA is currently conducting an Internal Review of all inspection
and associated activities at Sago mine. The severity of the risk posed
by the violation (number of persons affected) and negligence will be
addressed by the review. To preserve the objectivity and independence
of the Internal Review team, it would be inappropriate for MSHA to
prematurely draw conclusions.
______
Response From Bruce Watzman, Vice President Safety, Health, and Human
Resources, National Mining Association, to Supplemental Questions
National Mining Association,
Connecticut Ave., NW,
Washington, DC, March 29, 2006.
Hon. Charlie Norwood,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Workforce Protections, Committee on Education
and the Workforce, 2181 Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for providing us the opportunity to
appear before the Subcommittee earlier this month to share the views of
the members of the National Mining Association on ``Evaluating Health
and Safety Regulations in the American Mining Industry.''
Attached are responses to the questions I received following my
appearance.
We look forward to working with you and the members of the
Subcommittee as you consider legislation to advance mine safety.
Sincerely,
Bruce Watzman,
Vice President Safety, Health, and Human Resources,
National Mining Association.
1. Is the NMA prepared to support any of the legislation that has
been introduced to-date in the U.S. House of Representatives of the
U.S. Senate?
Response: We support several of the concepts contained in
legislation that has been introduced but have concerns with other
components of the pending measures. As stated during my appearance
before the Subcommittee on March 1, 2006, we have developed the
following set of guiding principles that we believe should be reflected
in legislation:
Expediting development and introduction of ground
penetrating communication and tracking technology;
Improving emergency notification;
Enhancing safety training and rescue capabilities;
Providing a liability shield and indemnification for mine
rescue activities;
Ensuring that new requirements are accompanies by workable
transitional timeframes;
Providing authority for mine operators to conduct
mandatory substance abuse testing of all personnel at the mine; and
Providing tax incentives to help companies invest in
equipment and training needed for enhanced mine safety and rescue
capabilities.
2. You remember the efforts of this House about a decade ago to
eliminate the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), to cut the
number of mandatory inspections, and to otherwise weaken protections to
this Nation's mines. Did you organization support these efforts? Does
your organization believe any strengthening of the law is required, for
example to deal with scoff-laws who refuse to pay penalties after all
adjudication is completed?
Response: We do not support efforts to eliminate the Mine Safety
and Health Administration, nor do we support a cut in the statutory
requirements that each underground mine be inspected four times per
year and each surface mine twice per year. We do believe however that
the manner in which inspections are conducted needs to be revised to
reflect industry operational changes that have taken place since the
law was passed. We submit that providing the agency with the ability to
focus its resources on those who persistently ignore citations and
penalties would supply a more effective deterrent to those who chose to
ignore the law.
3. It is widely accepted in Australia and other nations that a safe
and healthful mine is a productive mine. Given this country's increased
demand for coal, isn't it the obligation of this Congress to give MSHA
more vigorous enforcement authority so it can ensure that each mine
operator understands this simple but fundamental guiding principle?
Response: The guiding principle that a productive mine is a safe
and healthful mine is well-understood and followed in the United
States. As the information we have furnished the Subcommittee
demonstrates, as coal mine productivity improved accidents and injuries
have declined. The Mine Act vests MSHA with significant enforcement
powers, including the authority to close a portion of a mine or have
removed from service equipment that presents an imminent danger hazard
to miner's safety and health. This authority, when correctly applied,
has proven sufficient to improve safety performance at our nation's
mines.
4. What does your organization think about a user fee which would
fund MSHA compliance assistance activities so that it would be able to
provide you with such services while using the taxpayers' money to fund
enforcement?
Response: We do not believe that a ``user fee'' is necessary or
appropriate. Compliance assistance activities are, in truth, an
integral part of an inspector's work protocol. As such, it would
extremely difficult and burdensome to require inspectors to allocate
their time spent at the mines to differentiate between what one would
deem to be ``compliance assistance'' activities as opposed to
enforcement activities. Other agencies, such as the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration and Environmental Protection Agency, which
have established and administer compliance assistance programs do not,
to our knowledge, charge user fees for those activities
______
Additional Materials Submitted by Dennis O'Dell, Administrator for
Department on Occupational Health and Safety, UMW
Text of the note that Mr. Hamner left in his lunch bucket for his wife
and daughter. Mr. Hamner died in the Sago mine disaster.
______
Prepared Statement of Charles E. Hawkins III, CAE, Executive Vice
President and COO, National Stone, Sand, & Gravel Association
Mr. Chairman, the National Stone Sand & Gravel Association (NSSGA)
appreciates the opportunity to submit a statement for the record of
this mine safety hearing.
Based near the nation's capital, NSSGA is the world's largest
mining association by product volume. Its member companies represent
more than 90 percent of the crushed stone and 70 percent of the sand
and gravel produced annually in the U.S. and approximately 115,000
working men and women in the aggregates industry. Sale of natural
aggregates (crushed stone, sand and gravel) generates nearly $38
billion annually for the U.S. economy. The estimated output of
aggregates produced in the first half of 2005 was 1.3 billion metric
tons, a four percent increase over the same period in 2004 (2.85 b MT).
According to the U. S. Geological Survey, the significant increases in
aggregates production were due to the increase in construction
activity, which has risen every year for the past decade. Construction
spending amounted to $617.9 billion during the first half of 2005, a
nine percent increase over the same period in 2004.
Aggregates are used in nearly all residential, commercial and
industrial building construction and in most public works projects,
such as roads, highways, bridges, railroad beds, dams, airports, water
and sewage treatment plants and tunnels. While the American public pays
little attention to these natural raw materials, they go into the
manufacture of asphalt, concrete, glass, paper, paint, pharmaceuticals,
cosmetics, chewing gum, household cleansers and many other consumer
goods.
The disasters in the Sago Mine and Aracoma Coal Alma No. 1 Mine are
tragic and the loss of even one life, let alone 14 lives, is
devastating. Nevertheless, the safety record of the mining industry,
and the aggregates industry in particular, has improved due to a
heightened level of effort invested by the industry to sustain an
improved performance. The improvement in the aggregates industry safety
record is attributable to a combination of more effective safety and
health programs developed and implemented by the industry over the past
decade.
The first priority for the aggregates industry is and will continue
to be the safety and health of its miners. The industry recognizes that
its employees are its most valuable asset, an asset that must be
protected for the well being of the industry now and in the future. As
the workforce ages, it has become increasingly difficult to recruit new
miners to the industry. Maintaining an excellent safety record through
the implementation of effective safety and health programs is
considered a critical element for attracting and keeping a highly
skilled workforce.
Members of the National Stone, Sand & Gravel Association have
developed and agreed to a set of guiding principles to assist member
companies in their efforts to understand the importance of safety to
their individual organizations as well as to the industry as a whole.
In addition, a safety pledge was developed in 2002 incorporating the
safety guiding principles. More than 90 percent of the operations of
NSSGA member companies are now covered by this pledge, signifying the
importance of safety and a commitment toward ensuring the safety and
health of all their employees.
It is important to recognize that underground aggregates operations
present a much lower risk than other underground mining sectors because
of the nature of the mined product and the mining methods used to
extract the material. Specifically, aggregates products are non-
combustible, non-flammable minerals. As a result, the probability for
fire is very low. Since there are no flammable gases present and the
material does not act as a fuel, specialized equipment is not needed in
aggregates underground mines. The mining methods used, called ``room
and pillar,'' create large open spaces adequately supported by the
material left in place. This technique minimizes the need for extra
support for the mine roofing. These mines are generally only a few
hundred feet deep and have entrances suitable for large material
handling equipment like front end loaders and haul trucks. These large
entrances also provide access for emergency equipment minimizing the
need for specialized mine rescue teams and equipment. Natural
ventilation is often adequate for providing adequate air to miners
underground.
Recent news articles have ascribed some of the responsibility for
the Sago incident to the cooperative alliances MSHA has signed with the
industries it regulates, implying an inappropriately close
relationship. We would argue the opposite. The NSSGA and MSHA
formalized the first such alliance in 2002, setting forth a cooperative
agreement to develop programs and tools for the improvement of safety
and health in the aggregates industry. The resulting reduced incidence
rates speak for themselves.
It should also be noted that MSHA has similar alliances with labor
organizations, including the International Association of Bridge,
Structural, Ornamental and Reinforcing Iron Workers and the
International Union of Operating Engineers. Important alliances also
exist with the National Safety Council and the American Society of
Safety Engineers. Through these alliances, MSHA has been able to
enhance its mission of protecting worker safety and health
Another collaborative effort resulted in the MSHA Part 46
``Training and Retraining of Miners'' regulation in 2000. This
excellent regulation ensures every miner knows and understands how to
perform their job (all miners know and understand how to perform their
jobs OR every miner knows and understands how to perform his or her
job) safely by covering the important safety and health information
prior to starting work and annually thereafter. This regulation was
developed collaboratively, with input from both labor and industry
groups, guaranteeing support of the rule by all involved stakeholders
and assuring their commitment to the ultimate goal of injury reduction.
The Coalition for Effective Miner Training included many industry
groups working in a joint industry/labor arrangement in conjunction
with MSHA to develop an effective standard for the aggregates industry.
The Part 46 regulation resulted from this effort.
In another example, the NSSGA and MSHA developed a cooperative
workplace-based sampling training program of noise and dust monitoring
workshops. A partnership agreement was signed and the training workshop
program launched on December 1, 1997. These workshops have been given
to industry representatives using training specialists from the Mine
Safety Academy every year since 1997. These workshops have won two
awards from Innovations in American Government for this joint venture
aimed ay reducing hearing loss and silicosis through a program of
recognition, evaluation and control of workplace hazards.
The NSSGA/MSHA alliance was further enhanced by an ad hoc coalition
consisting of the U.S. aggregates industry (NSSGA and MSHA) and the
quarrying industry (Health & Safety Executive and the Quarry Products
Association) in the England. This informal alliance was developed to
share best practices between the countries in a similar industry.
Based on the sharing of information about successful programs in
the England, the NSSGA/MSHA Alliance has moved forward with joint
efforts to implement programs that will further improve the safety and
health of U.S. aggregates miners. The alliance first assembled a Data
Mining Task Force to review the incident data (not fatalities) with the
hope of elucidating specific areas where efforts could be targeted to
reduce injuries. It is this focus on incidents, rather than the focus
on fatalities, that offers the best chance of improving the safety
performance and at the same time reducing fatalities.
Simultaneously, the alliance began working on a model safety and
health program to take the best of industry and develop a model that
could be used by both small and large aggregate producers to develop a
safety management system. This resulted in the publication in December
2005 of the ``Core Principles of a Safety Program'' by the Alliance. It
is available free on the MSHA and NSSGA websites.
At present, the Alliance is working on promoting safety and health
through the publication of ``rip & share'' safety tools in the
bimonthly association magazine and articles on timely safety topics for
the industry to use in improving their safety programs. MSHA and NSSGA
member company representatives jointly develop these tools. The
cooperative relationship has made great strides toward improving the
safety of the aggregates industry.
You can see this clearly using the data required to be submitted by
mine operators on injuries/illnesses and manhours. The attached chart
``Comparison of Aggregate Industry Workhours vs. Incident Rates'' shows
that even with an increasing number of hours worked at aggregates
producers' sites there has been a significant reduction in the total
incidence rate in the industry. The second chart ``Aggregate Industry
Incident Rates 1989--2004'' shows this data broken down by aggregates
industry sector. More progress has been made since 2002 through the
cooperative efforts of the NSSGA/MSHA Alliance.
In no way does the NSSGA/MSHA Alliance interfere with the
compliance program of the agency. MSHA has an important role in
ensuring that safety at aggregates mines and quarries maintain
standards that protect employees. The MSHA enforcement program operates
independently of any of the cooperative industry alliances. The Mine
Safety Act, unlike any other safety agency, requires complete
inspections of every mine property 2 or 4 times per year depending on
whether it is surface or underground, respectively.
The mining industry is more heavily regulated and inspected than
general industry covered under the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration regulations. It is important that caution be exercised
before rushing to impose more regulations on the mining sector. Careful
study of the programs in place must be made and effective enforcement
ensured.
NSSGA believes that the cooperative relationship the aggregates
industry has developed with MSHA has led to increased safety for
aggregate industry employees. We believe that these relationships
rather than being discouraged should be encouraged. They are especially
helpful to the small- and medium-sized companies that are unable to
afford a staff safety professional by providing the mechanisms
necessary for continuous improvement to the safety and health of
aggregate workers.
NSSGA appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on this very
important issue.
______
Prepared Statement of Mike Neason, Administrator, Mining Practice
Specialty of the American Society of Safety Engineers
My name is Mike Neason, and I am a fifth generation miner and a
Certified Mine Safety Professional. I manage safety and health for the
mining operations of Hanson Aggregates in Kentucky and surrounding
states--both surface and underground mining. I come before you today in
my role as Administrator of the Mining Practice Specialty of the
American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE). ASSE represents more than
30,000 safety, health and environmental (SH+E) professionals dedicated
to seeing that every worker has the best possible opportunity to go
home healthy and safe from their jobs each day. The Society is the
largest professional safety organization and, founded in 1911, has been
in existence the longest.
ASSE's Mining Practice Specialty--one of thirteen ASSE practice
specialties covering the spectrum of safety and health professional
interests--currently has more than 350 members. My colleague members
are men and women on the front lines of managing mine safety and health
in coal and metal/nonmetal mines, surface and underground, or providing
training, auditing and consultation services to the mining industry.
We commend the Committee for looking critically at mine safety and
health issues today, both in terms of what can be done to prevent
another disaster such as the Sago mine catastrophe two months ago and
also to discern what can be done to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). ASSE
shares your concern. We have established a task force to review mining
emergency preparedness and communications in response to the recent
tragedies. Through ASSE's alliance with MSHA as well as our partnership
with the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH),
we intend to help encourage an effective, proactive federal response to
the concern many share over this nation's commitment to mine safety and
health.
For today's purposes, ASSE reviewed the two pending Mine Act reform
measures, S. 2231, introduced by Senator Robert Byrd on February 1,
2006, and S. 2308, introduced by Senator Arlen Specter on February 16,
2006. Our comments here are initial reactions largely to the ideas
contained in these bills. Following the work of ASSE's task force
examining these same issues, ASSE will be able to provide the Committee
with a more elaborate response, which we look forward to doing.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to recognize that, while
the loss of life in the Sago disaster was unacceptable to mine safety
and health professionals dedicated to doing everything we can to make
mines safe and healthy places to work, it is far from indicative of the
overall state of mine safety and health in the United States. To the
contrary, mine safety has drastically improved over recent decades, and
last year marked the lowest number of fatalities in U.S. history,
capping a general trend of declining fatalities, injuries and
illnesses. The successes should not be overlooked based on this
failure.
These strides were achieved, first, through tough and effective
enforcement of this nation's mining laws. It should not be overlooked,
however, that efforts of government, state and private sector
initiatives, often working in cooperation, also played a necessary
role. Because of the commitment from each of these sectors, technology
is getting better and better at engineering hazards out of mining and
removing miners from exposure to hazards. We are now seeing greater
computerization of mining methods having a substantial impact on our
ability to manage the safety and health risks within mines, with a
substantial promise that even better protections can be achieved.
Duplicating Responsibility for Technology Advancement
Many of the technological advances we already have in place were
developed through the efforts of dedicated researchers at the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), which houses the
former Bureau of Mines. As we indicated in a recent letter to you and
Senator Kennedy, ASSE was extremely disappointed that a NIOSH
representative was not permitted by his agency--the Department of
Health and Human Services--to participate in last month's roundtable on
mine safety technology. NIOSH's Mine Program is already positioned to
conduct effective intramural research, and, by expanding its already
proactive outreach to academia and private sector resources, to support
extramural research and develop pilot programs that can test the
viability of new mine safety technology in real-world situations.
With all due respect to Senator Byrd and his fully understandable
effort to examine new approaches for protecting miners--especially
since the unacceptable price of Sago tragedy is being paid by citizens
of his own state--ASSE cannot support legislative proposals, as
included in S. 2231, that would create an Office of Technology within
MSHA or in any other way diffuse this nation's already limited mining
safety and health research. Any duplication of NIOSH's technology
transfer and research infrastructure would only spread resources thin
and most likely add a needless layer of bureaucracy that would delay
the development and implementation of new measures to protect miners.
Significantly, Congress originally tasked NIOSH with performing the
research to inform MSHA regulatory decisions in the 1977 Mine Act, in
which Section 501 directs NIOSH to ``conduct such studies, research,
experiments, and demonstrations'' necessary, among other things
(T)o improve working conditions and practices in coal or other
mines * * * to prevent accidents and occupational diseases originating
in the coal or other mining industry * * * to develop new or improved
methods of recovering persons in coal or other mines after an accident
* * * and to develop new or improved means and methods of communication
from the surface to the underground area of a coal or other mine.
The same legislation created MSHA, and the rationale for assigning
these responsibilities to NIOSH rather than MSHA was to keep research
independent and distinct from regulatory and enforcement influences.
The reason to for keeping these functions separate still exists. ASSE
could not support creation of a duplicative effort within MSHA. MSHA
should have every resource necessary to focus on enforcement and
reaching out, not only to NIOSH, but the private sector as well to help
ensure that its methods and the expertise of its staff keeps current
with technological advances and incorporates ongoing change into its
culture. A new commitment to outreach, not a new department, is not
needed for that to occur.
If any change is needed, it is the current Administration's
commitment to NIOSH. For Fiscal Year 2007, $5 million has been proposed
to be taken from NIOSH, this after many of its essential capabilities
were taken away in the name of Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention reorganization. We urge the Senate to reject this reduction
in commitment and increase NIOSH's resources so that NIOSH can better
fulfill its mandate to conduct mine safety and health research, develop
technology and provide training support materials.
Mine Safety Technology
With respect to mine safety technology, the Sago disaster has
pointed out that gaps exist in protections for underground miners--both
coal and metal/nonmetal. Although many mines, such as the ones that I
oversee, go beyond compliance with MSHA's mandatory standards, others
unfortunately adhere to the bare minimum standards, with the result
that lives may be lost due to inadequate respiratory protection and
technologically obsolete communication systems.
As indicated at the February 15 Subcommittee on Employment and
Workplace Safety hearing, the market makes readily available products
that function in the same manner as the one-hour Self-Contained Self-
Rescuers (SCSRs) but provide expanded protection from toxic gases that
can be created in mine fires or present in gassy mines even without an
accident. Promising technologies also exist for locating or
communicating with miners underground, such as the text messaging
technology currently being tested in approximately 140 mines throughout
the world. We agree that redundant communications systems that can
demonstrate effectiveness make a great deal of sense.
However, when considering what is and may not be feasible, focus
must be placed on post-incident functionality when electrical systems
may not be working. We urge both NIOSH and MSHA to investigate this
issue thoroughly and to explore the utility of technologies developed
by the U.S. Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space
Agency, and the fire service industries post-911 for communication with
firefighters in emergencies. Although we understand that there may be
real promise in current communication advances, the transfer of such
technology to the underground mining industry is very much in question.
Neither Congress nor MSHA should rush to force solutions by assuming
the viability of these products before in-mine tests and research can
be conducted and such products become commercially available. At this
point in time, there simply is no one-size-fits-all solution to
underground mine communication, respiratory protection, or mine rescue,
as much as we all would wish it.
Although, as Senator Specter suggests, some mines might easily
adopt oxygen stations that provide a four-day supply of clean air for
all mines in each working area of a mine, this might not be readily
accomplished in some smaller mines such as those in the anthracite
sector, or those with low passageways. There may, in the alternative,
be other ways of achieving the goal more feasibly in such mines. Until
the information is available, such regulations should not be
congressionally mandated. While the Mine Act has historically been
considered a ``technology forcing'' statute, there are realistic limits
as to what can be achieved. To be truly effective, any action meant to
improve safety--whether mines or any workplace--through technology must
fully consider whether appropriate ``off the shelf'' technology is
readily available before mandates are put in place.
Incentives for Technology
Congress must also be aware that, in the metal/nonmetal sector,
approximately 98 percent of underground mines are classified as ``small
business entities'' under U.S. Small Business Administration criteria.
Many coal mines especially are small business enterprises with as few
as five employees.
ASSE hopes the Committee will consider this reality and look for
creative solutions, such as establishing new tax incentives, giving
operators some credit against citation penalties to encourage them to
adopt new technology quickly, or making establishing small business
loans for the purchase of mine rescue, communications and personal
protective equipment. Such measures should help expedite the necessary
protection of miners without unnecessarily diminishing the economic
viability of these mining businesses, many of which are located in
economically deprived areas of our nation.
Effective Penalties
Both legislative proposals offered by Senators Specter and Byrd
would increase significantly penalties for violations of MSHA
standards. ASSE fully supports strong enforcement and the role
meaningful penalties can play in focusing an employer's attention
toward safety and health of its workers.
From the popular reaction to the Sago tragedy, it is apparent that
many outside the mining industry may not be aware that MSHA already has
more enforcement power than any other federal agency, including:
mandatory quarterly inspections of all underground mines; warrantless
search authority and automatic right of entry under Section 103(a) of
the Mine Act; strict liability enforcement powers; mandatory civil
penalties for all citations; and civil penalties that have been
increased from $10,000 to $60,000 in the past decade. Under Section
110(c) of the Mine Act, individual agents of management can be
personally fined up to $60,000 for actions or omissions that constitute
aggravated conduct--a power lacking in the Occupational Safety and
Health Act covering every other industry. Moreover, the current Mine
Act has felony criminal enforcement provisions of up to five years of
incarceration, and, unlike OSHA, no injuries need occur for MSHA to
recommend criminal prosecution by the U.S. Department of Justice.
However much we would like to think that increases in maximum
penalties may be appropriate, in the day-to-day reality of the mining
industry that I work in, the heightened penalty levels of $500,000 for
high negligence violations (compared with OSHA's $70,000 maximum), the
$10,000 minimum penalty for ``serious'' violations--especially when
compared with OSHA's maximum of $7,000 for similar violations--and the
other enhanced penalties and ``user fees'' suggested in S. 2308 and S.
2231 could very well put the average, well-meaning mine out of business
with a single penalty.
Moreover, as drafted, the legislation offering these increases is
often ambiguous. For example, ``habitual violators'' would be subject
to a minimum penalty of $20,000 for ``significant and substantial''
citations. However, the legislation does not define ``habitual'' and
includes no statute of limitations after which a repeated violation
would no longer trigger this mandatory minimum. Because MSHA does not
``group'' violations into a single citation as OSHA commonly does, it
is not unusual for a mine to have multiple guarding or equipment
violations in a single inspection. If each individual citation were
assessed at $20,000 because these triggered the ``habitual'' provision,
most mines could not withstand the penalty burden and continue to
operate. This area must be more critically explored before any new
categories of penalties are created.
Unintended Consequences
We also want to caution the Committee that some provisions of the
proposed bills, though well intended, should be reconsidered following
this hearing to ensure that unintended consequences do not result in
everyone's understandable eagerness to prevent another Sago from
occurring.
For example, provisions that would deny the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission (FMSHRC) authority to modify penalties, or
requiring abatement action on all citations within 24 hours--have
critical due process implications that cannot be overlooked by this
Committee if it is to move forward an effective program of reform.
It also appears that, while the technology provisions of the
proposed legislation largely concentrate on underground coal mines, the
penalty provisions would cover all categories of mines, including
surface aggregate operations that do not involve the same level of
hazards as do underground operations. Such action appears unwarranted
at this time. In particular, Section 7 of Sen. Byrd's bill incorporates
the definition of ``coal mine'' from the 1977 Act, which expands
coverage to surface and underground metal/nonmetal mines and to all
independent contractors performing any work at any mine, surface or
underground Congress' intent with respect to the proposed Senate
legislation must be more clearly articulated to prevent inadvertent
expansion of the provisions to those outside the underground coal
mining sector.
Other suggested provisions, such as a $100,000 minimum fine for
failure to notify MSHA of an accident within fifteen minutes, are
simply unachievable and may result in unintended consequences in
individual situations. In many cases, especially in small mines with
few workers, those who would make the call to MSHA must also be
involved in immediate rescue activities longer than this time period
would allow. Current provisions state ``immediately,'' which the FMSHRC
has interpreted this to mean ``two hours or less.'' Moreover, there are
eleven categories of accidents where this fifteen-minute notification
requirement would apply, as set forth in 30 CFR 50.2(h), so it could
very well not be apparent within fifteen minutes that an incident such
as a mine fire or a non-fatal injury falls into the immediately-
reportable category. Clearly, we all like the response to mine
tragedies to be immediate, but fifteen minutes is probably less than
can be mandated effectively, especially given the enormity of fine for
failure without regard to the impact of the accident. We urge the
Committee to work with MSHA, NIOSH and stakeholders to reexamine this
provision in order to determine a more meaningful way to ensure
emergency response.
With regard to mine rescue teams, Sen. Byrd's legislation would
direct all coal mines to have rescue teams consisting of their own
employees. If this is to be achieved, the consequences of either closed
mines or a market for coal that bears this cost must be understood.
Many small mines have too few workers to field a team. This is why MSHA
has for many years permitted mines to join together to form area rescue
teams of highly trained personnel. This practice has been demonstrated
to work effectively over many years and can remain as an effective
option.
Conclusion
ASSE commends the Committee for its consideration of these various
issues as well as Senators Specter and Byrd for their efforts in
defining specific solutions to issues with which we all struggle. This
leadership is needed if we are to move forward and help prevent another
Sago tragedy. However, we urge the Committee not simply to assume a
lack of MSHA enforcement powers or too weak penalties are the root
cause of the failures we have seen. Along with an examination of
penalties and more stringent requirements, the Committee must consider
other factors that may not be readily apparent.
It could be that the most effective solution is that MSHA make
better, smarter use of its current powers and target enforcement
resources more directly at the proven ``bad actors'' rather than being
required to inspect all mines in exactly the same way, regardless of
their compliance history or safety and health performance. It may be
appropriate, if the Mine Act is reopened, to provide the agency with
more flexibility in terms of these mandatory inspections so it can
deploy its inspectors where they are most needed. More effective and
not merely more severe enforcement may very well be the answer we all
seek. Again, we urge the Committee to work with MSHA, NIOSH and
stakeholders, both within industry and organizations like ASSE to help
make these determinations. .
ASSE thanks the Committee for including us in your deliberations.
We stand prepared to provide further technical assistance through our
Mining Practice Specialty as the Committee continues to explore these
critical mine safety and health issues. We also pledge our support in
working with MSHA and NIOSH as they look for new methodologies to
protect miners and to improve existing standards, programs and outreach
efforts.