[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
DEATH PENALTY REFORM ACT OF 2006
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM,
AND HOMELAND SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
H.R. 5040
__________
MARCH 30, 2006
__________
Serial No. 109-93
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov
______
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr., Wisconsin, Chairman
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
LAMAR SMITH, Texas RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
ELTON GALLEGLY, California JERROLD NADLER, New York
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California ZOE LOFGREN, California
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
CHRIS CANNON, Utah MAXINE WATERS, California
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
BOB INGLIS, South Carolina WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
RIC KELLER, Florida ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DARRELL ISSA, California LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
MIKE PENCE, Indiana DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
STEVE KING, Iowa
TOM FEENEY, Florida
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
Philip G. Kiko, General Counsel-Chief of Staff
Perry H. Apelbaum, Minority Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina, Chairman
DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California ROBERT C. SCOTT, Virginia
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas
TOM FEENEY, Florida MAXINE WATERS, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
RIC KELLER, Florida WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
Michael Volkov, Chief Counsel
David Brink, Counsel
Caroline Lynch, Counsel
Jason Cervenak, Full Committee Counsel
Bobby Vassar, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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MARCH 30, 2006
OPENING STATEMENT
Page
The Honorable Howard Coble, a Representative in Congress from the
State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security............................... 1
The Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security........................ 2
WITNESSES
Ms. Margaret P. Griffey, Chief of the Capital Case Unit, Criminal
Division, United States Department of Justice
Oral Testimony................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Robert Steinbuch, Professor of Law, University of Arkansas
Oral Testimony................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Mr. Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director and General Counsel,
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation
Oral Testimony................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 26
Mr. David Bruck, Director of the Virginia Capital Case
Clearinghouse and Clinical Professor of Law, Washington & Lee
School of Law
Oral Testimony................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 29
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Robert C. Scott, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Virginia, and
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security....................................................... 61
Letter from Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director and General Counsel,
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation to the Subcommittee.......... 63
``Smoke and Mirrors on Race and the Death Penalty,'' submitted by
Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director and General Counsel, Criminal
Justice Legal Foundation....................................... 67
DEATH PENALTY REFORM ACT OF 2006
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THURSDAY, MARCH 30, 2006
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:47 a.m., in
Room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hoonorable Howard
Coble (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Coble. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
This is a departure from our normal regular order. There's
a vote on the floor, and I am told there will be a subsequent
vote imminently. And the Ranking Member, the distinguished
gentleman from Virginia, I think Mr. Scott is on the floor now.
If that bell does ring, I'm going to have to go.
But in the interest of time, since we have to clear this
building at 1:30 for another hearing, I want to go ahead and
give my opening statement now. And then, when Mr. Scott comes,
we will hear from him, and then we will hear from our panel.
And I apologize to you all for that. But the best-laid
plans of mice and men, you know, sometimes go awry. And today's
no exception.
I welcome you all to this important hearing before the
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security to
examine H.R. 5040, the ``Death Penalty Reform Act of 2006,''
introduced by the distinguished gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Gohmert.
As I have said on previous occasions, the death penalty is
the severest form of punishment in our country, and we must be
vigilant in ensuring that it's meted out against only the truly
guilty. It is imperative that we implement common sense
procedures to ensure proper and fair application of the death
penalty.
The Death Penalty Reform Act proposes a variety of
procedural reforms to improve the Federal capital system. In
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia,
which prohibited the execution of a mentally retarded offender
as unconstitutional, the bill implements procedures for the
determination of whether a defendant is, in fact, mentally
retarded.
Although the Federal system prohibited such executions
prior to Atkins, the Federal capital statutes did not have any
specific statutes addressing how such a determination should be
made or procedural rules for the handling of these issues. The
bill prohibits capital punishment for mentally retarded
defendants and contains specific notice of evidentiary
procedures for handling such claims.
The bill furthermore enhances the efficiency and fairness
of capital sentencing proceedings by providing additional
notice and preparation time and improving jury selection and
retention procedures.
I believe all these procedural reforms will improve the
Federal death penalty system and provide adequate safeguards to
ensure accurate and uniform application of our laws. I commend
and thank Mr. Gohmert for his dedication and hard work on this
critically important issue, and I look forward to hearing from
today's witnesses.
And I think, for the moment, we will just suspend. You all
rest easy, if you will. And I, again, apologize to you for
this. It's really no one's fault. It's just the way the system
sometimes works, and we can't control when these votes are
called upon.
So you all rest easy for the moment, and we will proceed,
hopefully, imminently. Thank you.
[Pause.]
Mr. Coble. Ladies and gentlemen, in the interest of time,
if you would, the Subcommittee swears in all of our witnesses
appearing before it. So, to save even more time, if you all
would please rise and raise your respective right hands?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Coble. Let the record--you may be seated, and let the
record show that the witnesses all answered in the affirmative.
And I thank you for that. So that's a little bit more time
saved.
And I will return imminently.
[Recess.]
Mr. Scott. Mr. Coble is on the way back and asked me to
give my statement. He indicated that he's sworn in the
witnesses.
So I'd like to thank Mr. Chairman, and I'd like to thank
you for holding the hearing on H.R. 5040, the ``Death Penalty
Reform Act of 2006.'' I'm disappointed, however, that we're
considering yet another bill, this Congress, that expands the
opportunities to seek the Federal death penalty.
We recently expanded the death penalty applications in the
USA PATRIOT Act renewal and the gangbusters bill and the court
security bill, the sex offenders bill, and others. And here we
go again, in a bill touted as a death penalty procedures bill,
but it further expands the instances in which the death penalty
can be sought.
There's still no credible evidence that the death penalty,
particularly the Federal death penalty, deters murders or other
crimes or otherwise promotes the general interests of the
United States. Indeed, every time we expand the situations in
which the death penalty can be applied, we restrict further our
ability to extradite from other countries to this country
terrorists and other killers of Americans.
Moreover, there's clear evidence that the Federal death
penalty is disproportionately applied to African Americans and
other minorities. And despite former Attorney General Reno's
departing decision to have the Department of Justice examine
the disturbing prevalence of minorities among those selected
for the death penalty prosecutions and sentenced to death, no
comprehensive and scientific examination has been made.
And although we passed last Congress the Innocence
Protection Act, which enacted a set of standards to protect and
support innocents in death penalty cases, we still have not
provided the funding necessary to fully implement the law.
While the impact of the law on the Federal death penalty is
limited, the death penalty--Federal death penalty practice does
and should serve as a model for the States. Thus, we should not
be expanding the application of any death penalty provisions
before we provide the funding necessary to fully protect and
support innocents.
This bill is problematic, and it's proposed procedural
reforms as well. One cynical evaluation of the bill suggested
that it represents DOJ's attempt to legislate victory on every
point on which it has lost in court in recent years.
By adding more aggravating factors to a long list already
in the statute and removing one of the few existing mitigating
factors, DOJ further stacks the deck in favor of finding
something which will hand down an argument for the death
penalty.
Adding obstruction of justice aggravating factor in the way
it is now worded would allow particularly broad application of
an easily charged factor. We see from the current Moussaoui
death penalty case over in Alexandria that the Department of
Justice is willing to go to great lengths to argue for a death
penalty where it wishes to do so.
One reason for expanding opportunities to pursue the death
penalty is simply to ensure the impaneling of more death
eligible juries. Death eligible juries necessarily are more
focused on and inclined toward more severe penalties and more
likely to convict than other juries.
So I'm concerned that the bill's proposed structure--excuse
me. I'm concerned with the bill's proposal to structure
procedures for the determination of whether a defendant is
mentally retarded and, therefore, not subject to the death
penalty, pursuant to the Atkins case.
First, the bill narrowly structures the definition of
``mental retardation,'' requiring that all of several factors
must be shown, or you can be put to death. And rather than have
a pre-trial determination of whether a defendant is mentally
retarded, the bill requires that a defendant be first tried by
a death eligible jury and then found to be guilty and otherwise
eligible for death. Then they would determine whether or not
the defendant was mentally retarded. This virtually assures
that a defendant's mental illness is not a factor until the
jury has made up its mind that the defendant should die.
Further, I cannot believe--and I can't believe that on the
basis of fairness to the prosecution, we would consider a
provision that turns the traditional burden of proof on its
head. That's what we would do if we would require a defendant
to admit up front that he committed a crime under duress or
extreme emotional distress in order to submit this as a
mitigating factor during sentencing.
Yet another difficulty with the bill is its proposal to
impanel less than 12 jurors to re-sentence an offender where
the first jury deadlocks.
There can be no purpose for such drastic change in the
time-honored criminal procedures other than to ensure that it
would be easier to obtain the verdict of death. Opponents of
this approach would certainly not be promoting it if they
thought that death would be less likely.
While I understand Department of Justice's desire to win
and its efforts to acquire more death penalties, I don't
understand why Congress should want to further stack the deck
in favor of prosecution in this manner.
Mr. Chairman, I can go on with other problems with the
bill, but we'll leave some--we'll leave that to the witnesses
to point out some of the pros and cons. And I appreciate you,
again, holding this hearing.
Mr. Coble. I thank you, Mr. Scott.
And again, the panelists and Members in the audience, I
apologize for the delay. I want you all to hold Mr. Scott and
me harmless for this.
When the trains run on time, we take credit for that. When
the trains are belated, we discharge that elsewhere. But this
was--we did not--we can't control when the time is called for
votes.
I want to reiterate what I said to you earlier. We must
clear this room at 1:30 because of a subsequent hearing that is
scheduled herewith.
Let me introduce the witnesses. Our first witness is Ms.
Margaret Griffey, chief of the Capital Case Unit, in the
Criminal Division of DOJ. Prior to assuming this role, Ms.
Griffey served for 5 years as chief of the Capital Litigation
Division at the Texas attorney general and as assistant
attorney general in that division. She's also argued two cases
before the Supreme Court.
Ms. Griffey received her J.D. from the University of Texas
and a master's degree from Stanford University.
Our second witness is Mr. Robert Steinbuch, professor of
law at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock. Professor
Steinbuch has held numerous positions in Government, including
counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee, trial attorney for
the Justice Department, and deputy senior counsel to the
commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service.
He earned his undergraduate and master's degrees from the
University of Pennsylvania and his J.D. from Columbia
University.
Professor, is the School of Law not at Fayetteville?
Mr. Steinbuch. There are two schools of law. One in Little
Rock and then one in northwestern----
Mr. Coble. Okay. I wasn't sure about that. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Steinbuch. Sure.
Mr. Coble. Our third witness is Mr. Kent Scheidegger, legal
director for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation. Mr.
Scheidegger has written over 100 briefs in cases in the United
States Supreme Court. His articles on criminal and
constitutional law have been published in law reviews, national
legal publications, and congressional reports.
Previously, Mr. Scheidegger served for 6 years in the
United States Air Force as a nuclear research officer. He was
awarded his undergraduate degree from New Mexico State
University and a law degree from the University of the Pacific.
Our final witness today is Mr. David Bruck, clinical
professor of law at the Washington & Lee School of Law and
director of the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse. Now,
Professor, I know of at least two Members of our body up here
who are W&L law grads, and perhaps more than those two.
Currently, Professor Bruck serves as one of four part-time
Federal death penalty resource counsel to the Federal defender
system Nation wide. Previously, he served as a county and State
public defender in South Carolina and was awarded his
undergraduate degree from Harvard and his J.D. from the
University of South Carolina at Columbia.
Good to have you all with us, folks. We adhere to the 5-
minute rule here. We are not totally inflexible about that, but
when you see the amber light appear on the panel before you,
that is your warning that you have 1 minute.
And when the red light illuminates, the ice on which you
are skating becomes ever so thin. So if you will try to wrap up
within that 5 minutes, we would be appreciative.
And Ms. Griffey, we'll start with you.
TESTIMONY OF MARGARET P. GRIFFEY, CHIEF OF THE CAPITAL CASE
UNIT, CRIMINAL DIVISION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Ms. Griffey. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Scott, and
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today and for inviting the Department of
Justice to testify about this issue of great importance.
The department applauds Congress for passing the recent
improvements to death penalty procedures as part of the PATRIOT
Act reauthorization, and particularly the provisions combining
the title 21 procedures with those in title 18. But I think we
can all agree that there is more to be done in this area.
It is our shared goal to ensure that the death penalty is
administered in a fair and consistent manner across the
country. In the department's view, the Death Penalty Reform Act
of 2006 addresses several outstanding issues that have arisen
due to recent court decisions and the continuing evolution of
the death penalty practice across the country.
As we are all aware, certain court decisions have created
the potential for either uncertainty about or the uneven
application of death penalty procedures, and the department
supports this effort to provide clarity and consistency in this
critical area.
There are few greater responsibilities of Congress or of
the Department of Justice than ensuring that there is a Federal
death penalty procedure in place that comports with all
constitutional requirements, and we should act now to fulfill
that responsibility.
At the outset, however, I would like to respond to Mr.
Bruck's criticism of the length of time between the indictment
of a capital case and a decision by the attorney general
whether to seek the death penalty. I must say that I'm
surprised that Mr. Bruck would rush that decision or have it
made on less than full information.
An indictment represents a grand jury's determination that
there exists probable cause to believe that the defendant
committed the charged offense, hardly an adequate basis upon
which to decide whether to seek the death penalty. The period
between indictment and trial allows additional time for trial
preparation, particularly for defense counsel who normally are
the only--are only appointed following indictment.
Following indictment, if the U.S. attorney is considering
whether to seek the death penalty, he or she affords the
defendant's counsel the opportunity to present the case against
seeking to the U.S. attorney. When the case is forwarded to the
Department of Justice, if the Committee is considering
recommending that the death penalty be sought or simply needs
more factual development, the defendant will again be afforded
the opportunity to present the case against seeking.
Defense counsel routinely ask for extended periods to
prepare their case, ranging from several months to a year.
Again, I want to emphasize that the department considers the
death penalty decisions to be among the most important, if not
the most important decisions it undertakes. Nothing less than
the full and careful review should precede a decision to seek
the death penalty, and I am surprised that Mr. Bruck would have
it otherwise.
In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the
execution of the mentally retarded offenders violates the
eighth amendment. Although the Federal capital sentencing
scheme already prohibited the execution of mentally retarded
offenders, it did not provide a procedure for determining
whether a defendant's mental disability is sufficiently severe
to foreclose execution.
The Death Penalty Reform Act of 2006 responds to the
Supreme Court's decision in Atkins by providing a procedure for
a capital sentencing jury to determine whether a defendant's
mental retardation forecloses a death sentence.
The legislation is consistent with all prevailing
definitions of mental retardation. A determination of mental
retardation would require the jury to find that, since some
point in time prior to the age of 18, the defendant has had
both an IQ of 70 or less and deficits in adaptive reasoning.
The statute incorporates the limitations in adaptive
functioning identified by the Supreme Court in Atkins.
Mr. Bruck, however, would have us substitute the
limitations in adaptive functioning, including in clinical
definitions. Those definitions reflect a behavioral focus of
diagnosticians, which is to identify an individual's need for
services and support.
In contrast, the focus of a mental retardation inquiry in
the capital sentencing context is on the defendant's
culpability. The diminished capacities identified by the
Supreme Court reflect characteristics that, in the court's
view, render a defendant less culpable.
It must be recognized that a criminal defendant may have
poor home living skills, engage little in community activities,
and exhibit poor self-care skills for reasons independent of
his mental capacity. There is no reason to exclude from a
certain level of criminal responsibility someone who exhibits
poor socialization skills if he or she is capable of running a
complex criminal enterprise.
The Death Penalty Reform Act would also establish a
punishment phase procedure for determining mental retardation.
Mr. Bruck also takes issue with this provision, claiming that
it's fair to the defendant and less wasteful of resources for
the determination to be made pre-trial.
What he fails to recognize in his written testimony, but
what I'm sure he would assert were he representing a defendant
for whom there had been a pre-trial determination that the
defendant was not mentally retarded, is that the Constitution
likely requires that such a defendant be afforded an
opportunity for the jury to determine his mental retardation.
In other words, Mr. Bruck seeks to have two bites of the
apple or wants to have each defendant afforded two
opportunities to establish his mental retardation. Either that,
or what he proposes is most assuredly a constitutionally infirm
procedure by resolving the issue pre-trial.
I look forward to questions later. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Griffey follows:]
Prepared Statement of Margaret P. Griffey
Mr. Coble. I thank you, Ms. Griffey.
And the Chair will note that Professor Bruck smiled very
warmly. [Laughter.]
So, if facial responses are any indication, Ms. Griffey, I
think the Professor will at least disagree agreeably.
Thank you, Ms. Griffey.
I don't mean to put words in your mouth, Professor. We'll
hear from you subsequently.
Mr. Steinbuch, good to have you with us.
And thank you, Ms. Griffey.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT STEINBUCH, PROFESSOR OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF
ARKANSAS
Mr. Steinbuch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member.
It's an honor and a pleasure to be here.
I just want to touch on three parts of this bill. First,
dealing with the interference with the sound administration of
justice. It's imperative that we have statutory aggravators
that deal with this issue. We certainly need an aggravator for
witness tampering. We certainly need an aggravator for jury
tampering. And we need to adjust the aggravator regarding
pecuniary gain so that killing a witness to hide the pecuniary
gain satisfies that aggravator's standards.
The most important part of our justice system is to have
legitimacy and continuity. These are interfered when criminals
know that they can kill witnesses and get away with it. This is
the highest order of statutory--should be the highest order of
statutory aggravator, and its absence speaks loudly and its
correction is needed.
Secondly, in the existing statutory scheme, the firearm
aggravator needs to be adjusted. Currently, it is applied
inconsistently. There is an anomaly in the legislation that
allows it to be applied in certain death penalty cases, yet not
in others. There doesn't seem to be any rational--rationale,
excuse me, for this. And that needs to be made--that needs to
be corrected.
Finally, I would like to talk about qualifying death
penalty juries. Some case law has developed where it has been
suggested that death qualifying juries can take place after the
liability phase of the trial. Supreme Court precedent has long
well defined the boundaries of jury qualification in death
penalty cases. Jurors may not be hanging juries, and jurors
must be willing to impose the legally mandated sentence if
appropriate.
Failing to qualify a jury beforehand makes the system
inefficient. Why would we not want to qualify a jury in the
beginning of a trial regarding death penalty? Well, some have
suggested that jurors who would never vote for the ultimate
sentence are also less likely to convict defendants. We can
draw two possible conclusions from this.
One, perhaps anti-death penalty advocates might be trying
to circumvent the death penalty through increased acquittals.
This, clearly, is inappropriate. So this does not serve as an
adequate justification for not death qualifying juries at the
beginning of a trial.
Some suggest that the greater statistical likelihood of
conviction by a death qualified jury demonstrates an anti-
defendant bias. I suggest otherwise. I believe that this is an
improper conclusion.
This statistical difference, if it exists--and it may,
indeed, exist--is not surprising. Jurors unwilling to apply the
law to sentencing should equally be expected not to apply the
law properly during the liability phase of a trial.
Accordingly, this bill corrects the three infirmities that
I've discussed, and I support it.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Steinbuch follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Steinbuch
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify before the
United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary on
these important issues of criminal law. I would like to discuss a few
critical substantive issues that are of concern.
I. INTERFERING WITH THE SOUND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
In order for our justice system to work effectively and with
legitimacy, deliberate wrongdoing to procure the unavailability of a
witness or other participant in the judicial and law-enforcement system
must not be tolerated. Such behavior, as the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit has said, ``strikes at the heart of the
system of justice itself.'' United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269,
273 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984). As such,
tampering with, or retaliating against, a witness, victim, or an
informant, resulting in death should be the archetypal statutory
aggravating factor. The murder of a law enforcement informant, or a
witness or cooperator in a federal or state prosecution because of his/
her status as such is not only abhorrent in and of itself, but sends
the message to criminals that sufficient wrongdoing could allow them to
escape punishment. Similarly, the murder of a jury member or a jury
member's family creates an incredible chilling effect on the
willingness of honest citizens to perform their civic duty in the most
important cases before our courts.
The potential beneficial outcome in the eyes of criminals of
avoiding criminal liability by killing witnesses and other relevant
actors in the legal system creates a positive incentive for criminals
to pursue this risky and socially devastating behavior. In order to
create a balancing disincentive for such behavior, the costs to
criminals must be significant. Because of the flagrant nature of these
offenses, and the heightened interest of the government in deterring
such action, adding such behavior to the category of the statutory
aggravating factors is indeed appropriate and modest. The very same
rationale led to the recent change in the Federal Rules of Evidence to
permit the admission of hearsay statements because the witness was made
unavailable as a result of this type of criminal wrongdoing. FRE
804(b)(6); see also United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271 (1st Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1118 (1997). Criminals must be sent the
message that interfering with the judicial system with violence will
result in greater punishment, not less. The proposed statutory
amendments addressing this concern are well needed and appropriate.
Moreover, for the very same reasons, the proposed statutory
amendment regarding the pecuniary gain aggravator is well needed.
Currently, section 3592(c)(8) provides that the pecuniary gain
aggravator exists when ``[t]he defendant committed the offense as
consideration for the receipt, or in the expectation of receipt, of
anything of pecuniary value.'' 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3592(c)(8). Courts have
interpreted this in a manner that precludes the government from proving
this factor in cases where the murder is committed after the pecuniary
value has been received.
In United States v. Bernard, 299 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002),
defendant gang members drove around in search of potential carjacking
victims, planning to, among other things, acquire the victims Personal
Identification Number (``PIN'') for Automatic Teller Machine (``ATM'')
transactions. The gang members eventually ended up at a local
convenience store where they encountered two youth ministers from Iowa.
After successfully soliciting a ride, the gang members forced the
couple at gunpoint to drive to an isolated location, where they robbed
the couple of wallets and jewelry, acquired the couple's ATM PIN, and
then forced the couple into the trunk of the car. The gang members then
attempted to withdraw money from the ATM, drove the couple to an
isolated spot, shot them in the head and burned the car. The court held
that evidence in the case was insufficient to support the pecuniary
gain aggravator because ``the application of the pecuniary gain
aggravating factor is limited to situations where pecuniary gain is
expected to follow as a direct result of the [murder].'' Id. at 483
(quoting United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1263 (10th Cir.
2000). The court reasoned that the motivation for the robbery was
pecuniary gain while the motivation for the murder, in contrast, was to
prevent the robbery from being reported. Id. While this seems accurate,
the latter motivation is by far the more insidious. It demonstrates not
only nefarious criminal behavior but because it is a manifestation of
an attempt to manipulate our system of justice to conceal the former to
avoid criminal liability. The latter behavior is manifestly more
egregious, not less. As such, it must have greater, or at the minimum,
equivalent, negative consequences relative to the former. The
interpretation of the pecuniary gain aggravator demonstrated in
Bernard, unfortunately, draws completely the opposite conclusion.
To illustrate the perverse outcome under existing caselaw, we need
only compare Bernard with United States v. Barnette, 390 F.3d 775 (4th
Cir. 2004). In Barnette, the defendant sought to commit a carjacking in
order to secure transportation from Charlotte, N.C. to Roanoke, VA for
the purposes of killing his estranged ex-girlfriend. The defendant hid
in the bushes at a road intersection, waited for a car to stop, walked
up to the window with a sawed-off shot gun, forced the driver from the
vehicle, shot and killed the driver on the side of the road, and left
with the vehicle. Id. at 781. The Fourth Circuit held that the
pecuniary gain aggravator was applicable because the defendant
committed the murder in order to gain the transportation. Id. at 785.
In comparing the criminal conduct in Barnette with that in Bernard, the
greater culpability, in fact, rests with the Defendant in Bernard. Yet,
the aggravator was applied only in Barnette. In Bernard, the attack is
equally upon society and the victim. In Barnette, Society is
undoubtedly greatly impacted, but derivatively from the victim. The
courts' approach needs to be corrected.
II. FIREARM AGGRAVATOR
Current law provides another anomaly by barring the government from
proving the firearm aggravating factor in cases where the death
sentence is sought based on the commission of a crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime while carrying or possessing a firearm that
causes death. In seeking the death sentence for such a crime, the
government is barred from proving as an aggravating factor that ``the
defendant has previously been convicted of a Federal or State offense
punishable by a term or imprisonment of more than 1 year, involving the
use or attempted or threatened use of a firearm against another
person.'' 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3592(c)(2). However, if a defendant commits an
offense punishable by death under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848(e), for example,
murder while working in furtherance of a continuing criminal
enterprise, the firearm aggravator is available.
Thus, under current law, if a defendant previously committed a
violent crime using a firearm and served a two-year term in state
prison and after release commits an offense punishable by death under
section 924(c) or (j), he will not be subject to the firearm
aggravator. But, if a defendant previously committed a violent crime
using a firearm and served a two-year term in state prison and after
release commits an offense punishable by death under 21 U.S.C.
Sec. 848(e), the firearm aggravator is applicable. If both defendants
have satisfied the capital eligibility factors of age and intent, it is
unclear why the previous state firearm conviction, under 3592(c)(2),
can be used to prove a statutory aggravating factor in one case but not
the other. Both have committed a capital eligible crime, and both have
a similar previous criminal conviction. The purpose of this restriction
is unclear and its application is uneven. It also seems to cut against
the policy of deterring the use of firearms in conjunction with violent
criminal behavior. This anomaly needs to be rationalized.
III. JURY QUALIFICATION
In United States v. Green, 407 F.3d 434, 444 (1st Cir. 2005), the
First Circuit refused to issue an opinion regarding the district
court's practice of delaying death qualification of the jury until
after the jury had found the defendant guilty of a capital crime. In
its opinion, the district court reasoned that ``[i]f death-qualified
jurors can be found among the jurors from the guilt phase, the terms of
the statute [under Sec. 3593(b)(1)] will be followed. If none can be
found, the jurors will be discharged for ``good cause'' shown, and the
statute will still be followed [under Sec. 3593(b)(2)(C)].'' United
States v. Green, 324 F.Supp.2d 311, 331 (D.Mass. 2004). This
interpretation of Sec. 3593 is contrary to the intent of the statute
and misapplies the ``good cause'' provision.
Section 3593(b) provides that, in general, the sentencing hearing
should be conducted before the jury that determined the defendant's
guilt, unless one of four exceptions exist that justify impaneling a
new jury. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3593(b)(1)-(2). One of the four exceptions
relates to situations where the guilt-phase jury has been discharged
for ``good cause.'' 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3593(b)(2)(C). The intent behind the
``good cause'' provision centers on addressing situations where an
event or circumstance, which occurs after the defendant's guilt has
been determined, renders the guilt-phase jury unable to serve during
the penalty phase. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 418
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (opining that ``[d]ischarge for `good cause'
under Sec. 3593(b)(2)(C) . . . is most reasonably read to cover guilt-
phase . . . juror disqualification due to, e.g., exposure to
prejudicial extrinsic information or illness''); see also Green, 407
F.3d at 441. When combined with the structure of the statute, this
supports a conclusion that Congress intended, in Sec. 3593(b), a
default rule--that the jury that determined the defendant's guilt also
determines the sentence, barring some unavoidable circumstance making
it impracticable or unfair. See Green, 407 F.3d at 441-442. Thus, the
trial jury should be treated as the sentencing jury, and, as such, the
trial jury must be qualified at the outset of the trial to be able to
fulfill its obligations in the sentencing phase. In addition to
constituting a strained reading of Sec. 3593, a contrary an approach,
as suggested by the trial court in Green, is illogical and wastes time
and resources.
Indeed, pre-qualifying juries is consistent with well-established
Supreme Court precedent. In Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510
(1968), the Court set forth the important boundaries for juries in
death-penalty cases. As such, the Court properly held that the 6th
Amendment protects a defendant from a predetermined ``hanging jury.''
Equally, the Court in Witherspoon held that prospective jurors are
excludable if they would vote against the death penalty irrespective of
guilt and culpability, or their personal views on the death penalty
prevented them from making an unbiased decision regarding guilt. Thus,
prospective jurors in death-penalty cases, said the Court, should fit
within the extremes and be appropriately open to fairly evaluating the
facts and sentencing the defendant pursuant to the controlling law, if
found guilty. Witherspoon remains good law and has been reaffirmed in
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980). In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412
(1985) and Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986), then Chief Justice
Rehnquist further refined the previous caselaw on qualifying juries for
death-penalty trials. And, in Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992),
the Supreme Court provided the same protection on the opposite end of
the spectrum, by reaffirming the notion that jurors who would
automatically vote for the death penalty irrespective of the facts are
equally as objectionable. These cases clearly demonstrate the
appropriateness and Constitutional validity of qualifying juries prior
to trial. The qualification of the jury on the death penalty should
occur at the outset of the capital trial and the aberrant caselaw needs
correcting.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for considering my remarks and I remain
available to respond to any questions.
Mr. Coble. Professor, you may have established a world
record. You beat the red light by about a minute. I don't think
that's ever happened.
Mr. Steinbuch. I figure we could average it out.
Mr. Coble. We will award you the gold medal.
Mr. Steinbuch. Thank you.
Mr. Coble. Mr. Scheidegger, good to have you with us, sir.
TESTIMONY OF KENT SCHEIDEGGER, LEGAL DIRECTOR AND GENERAL
COUNSEL, CRIMINAL JUSTICE LEGAL FOUNDATION
Mr. Scheidegger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr.
Ranking Member.
I'm here today on behalf of the Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation, which supports the rights of victims of crime and
the law-abiding public to a fair and effective system of
criminal justice.
The Death Penalty Reform Act presently before the Committee
would make a number of worthwhile changes in the Federal death
penalty law. And in particular, the bill would make the pre-
trial notice requirements fair. The bill would require the
defendant to give notice in mitigating circumstances, just as
the Government is required to give notice of aggravating
circumstances.
However, the bill as presently drafted fails to correct and
arguably codifies what I consider to be the most glaring defect
in existing Federal death penalty law, which I call the
``embassy bomber loophole.''
In July 2001, followers of Osama bin Laden were tried and
convicted for their role in the conspiracy to bomb America's
embassies in Africa. On the question of penalty, most of the
jurors believed that death was the appropriate punishment. Yet
three jurors held out for a life sentence, and the result was
that the decision of the three trumped the decision of the
nine.
Now how can this be when the law clearly states the jury's
choice of sentence must be unanimous? Three to nine is not
unanimous. In the guilt phase of the trial, everyone
understands unanimous means unanimous one way or the other. If
a jury deadlocks at 11 for guilt and 1 for acquittal, the judge
does not enter a verdict of acquittal. That would be
preposterous.
The jury must deliberate until it is unanimous, and if the
jury is truly deadlocked, the judge declares a mistrial and
impanels a new jury. That is how the penalty phase also works
in California and, in my opinion, what the Federal statute
provides if correctly interpreted.
Unfortunately, the Federal death penalty law was poorly
drafted in this regard and does not expressly state what
happens when the jury cannot agree. In the case of Jones v.
United States, the Supreme Court decided that this silence,
combined with ambiguous language about lesser sentences, meant
that the failure of the jury to agree results in a lesser
sentence.
This effective abrogation of the unanimity requirement
makes the death penalty less fair and more arbitrary, and it
prevents the jury from serving its function as representing the
conscience of the community.
In 1972, the Supreme Court declared the system of unbridled
discretion in choosing between life in prison and death to be
unconstitutional because it was arbitrary and capricious. The
system of guided discretion that replaced it was not for the
purpose of reducing the number of death sentence rendered. The
purpose was to make capital sentencing more consistent and less
arbitrary.
It is important that the death penalty not be arbitrarily
imposed, and it is just as important that it not be arbitrarily
withheld. If one murderer gets the death penalty and another
equally or greater culpable murderer gets a life sentence on
the random chance that his jury includes a single juror who
refuses to impose the punishment where it is warranted, that is
arbitrary.
A discretionary system can never be completely uniform, but
we should strive to make it as evenhanded as possible.
Requiring the jury to come to unanimous agreement one way or
the other reduces the chance of arbitrariness in either
direction.
The jury is supposed to express the conscience of the
community. To perform that function, the jury must be required
to come to agreement. If a single juror knows that he can
impose his will over the objection of the rest of the jury
simply by holding out, then the jury fails to perform its
representative function.
So I ask the Congress to restore the requirement of a truly
unanimous jury to the Federal capital punishment law. Doing so
will make the death penalty more fair and evenhanded, and it
will reduce the change of miscarriages of justice such as we
saw in the embassy bomber case.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Scheidegger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kent Scheidegger
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to address the
committee today on this important legislation. I am here today on
behalf of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation, which has for the last
twenty-four years fought for the right of victims of crime and the law-
abiding public to a fair and effective system of criminal justice. In
no other area of the law is this right more routinely violated than in
capital punishment.
The Death Penalty Reform Act of 2006 presently before the committee
would make a number of worthwhile changes in the federal death penalty
law. In particular, the bill will make the pretrial notice requirements
fair. This bill will require the defendant to give notice of mitigating
circumstances, just as the government is required to give notice of
aggravating circumstances. However, the bill as presently drafted fails
to correct and arguably codifies the most glaring defect in existing
federal death penalty law, which I call the Embassy Bomber Loophole.
In July 2001, followers of Osama bin Laden were tried and convicted
for their role in the conspiracy to bomb America's embassies in Africa.
On the question of penalty, most of the jurors believed that death was
the appropriate punishment. Yet three jurors held out for a life
sentence, and the result was that the decision of the three trumped the
decision of the nine, and the terrorists received a life sentence.
How can this be, when the law clearly states that the jury's choice
of sentence must be unanimous? Three-to-nine is not unanimous. In the
guilt phase of the trial, everyone understands that ``unanimous'' means
unanimous one way or the other. If a jury deadlocks at eleven for guilt
and one for acquittal, the judge does not enter a verdict of acquittal.
That would be preposterous. The jury must deliberate until it is
unanimous, and if the jury is truly deadlocked, the judge declares a
mistrial and empanels a new jury. That is also how the penalty phase
works in California, and, in my opinion, what the federal statute
provides if correctly interpreted.
Unfortunately, the federal death penalty law was poorly drafted in
this regard and does not expressly state what happens when the jury
cannot agree. In the case of Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373
(1999), the Supreme Court decided that this silence, combined with
ambiguous language about lesser sentences, meant that the failure of
the jury to agree results in a lesser sentence. This effective
abrogation of the unanimity requirement makes the death penalty less
fair and more arbitrary, and it prevents the jury from serving its
function as representing the conscience of the community.
In 1972, the Supreme Court declared the system of unbridled
discretion in choosing between death and life in prison to be
unconstitutional because it was arbitrary and capricious. The system of
guided discretion that replaced it was not for the purpose of reducing
the number of death sentences rendered. The purpose was to make capital
sentencing more consistent and less arbitrary. It is important that the
death penalty not be arbitrarily imposed, and it is just as important
that it not be arbitrarily withheld. If one murderer gets the death
penalty, and another, equally culpable murderer gets a life sentence on
the random chance that his jury includes a single juror who refuses to
impose the punishment where it was warranted, that is arbitrary. A
discretionary system can never be completely uniform, but we should
strive to make it as even-handed as possible. Requiring the jury to
come to a unanimous agreeement one way or the other reduces the chance
of arbitrariness in either direction.
The jury is supposed to express the conscience of the community. To
perform that function, the jury must be required to come to agreement.
If a single juror knows that he can impose his will over the objection
of the rest of the jury simply by holding out, then the jury fails to
perform its representative function.
I ask the Congress to restore the requirement of a truly unanimous
jury to the federal capital punishment law. Doing so will make the
death penalty more fair and evenhanded, and it will reduce the chance
of miscarriages of justice such as we saw in the Embassy Bomber case.
Thank you.
SUGGESTED AMENDMENT TO FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY STATUTES
(a) Amend 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3593(b)(2) to redesignate present
paragraph (D) as paragraph (E) and insert a new paragraph (D):
``(D) the jury that determined defendant's guilt was unable to
reach unanimous agreement on the sentence;''
(b) Amend 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3593(e) to add at the end:
``If the jury is unable to agree unanimously on a sentence, the
court shall impanel a new jury for retrial of the penalty hearing;
provided, that if the government withdraws its notice under subsection
(a), the court shall sentence the defendant is if the notice had not
been given.''
Mr. Coble. Professor, the pressure is on you. These two
guys both beat the red light. Now, Professor, Mr. Scott is my
neighbor to the north in Virginia. Were you reared in South
Carolina?
Mr. Bruck. No, I was there for 30 years, and I've now moved
to Virginia.
Mr. Coble. Well, you're my neighbor to the south. I must
say this. I think Mr. Scott's heard me say this before. It has
been said that North Carolina is a valley of humility between
two peaks of pride. I think that would be the exception over
you and Mr. Scott. I don't think you all are that proud.
Good to have you with us, Mr. Bruck.
TESTIMONY OF DAVID BRUCK, DIRECTOR OF THE VIRGINIA CAPITAL CASE
CLEARINGHOUSE AND CLINICAL PROFESSOR OF LAW, WASHINGTON & LEE
SCHOOL OF LAW
Mr. Bruck. Appreciate the invitation, Mr. Chairman. And I
can certainly be agreeable to my friend Ms. Griffey, for whom I
have great regard. However, I can't promise that I will break
any speed records since I seem to be the only witness who has
noticed the many problems in this legislation today, and I'd
like to try to touch a few of them in the time I have
available.
George Will memorably remarked not long ago that
conservatives should always recall that the death penalty is a
Government program, so skepticism is in order. The Federal
death penalty is a large, bureaucratic, expensive, and
exceptionally inefficient Government program, and a lot of
skepticism is in order.
I was a little surprised that Ms. Griffey was so concerned
about my having observed that the average time under Attorney
General Gonzalez between an indictment and a decision to seek
the death penalty is now 23 months.
I'm not at all suggesting that these decisions should be
made fast, but we clearly have a problem. It has its roots in a
decision that Attorney General Reno made that every single
death eligible case should be reviewed by the attorney general
him or herself, even when the U.S. attorney that actually has
to try the case doesn't want to seek the death penalty.
This has produced tremendous backlog, tremendous delay. It
has not produced any particular consistency. We have just as
lopsided a racial picture on death row now as we did when this
decision was made back in 1994.
But I mention it because one of the provisions in this bill
is a very strange response to a decade of complaints by Federal
judges that DOJ takes too long to make these decisions, and it
is too expensive. The cases are being held up at great cost to
the taxpayers.
And DOJ's response, or at least the response of this
legislation, has been to say, well, we can save money by
eliminating the entitlement to two lawyers, one of whom is
qualified to handle death penalty cases, until the attorney
general months and months and even years after indictment
finally makes a decision.
Mr. Chairman, that entitlement was passed and signed into
law by President George Washington on April 30, 1790. It was
enacted by the first Congress that drafted the Bill of Rights.
We are tinkering with things now that are fairly sacred to our
system of Government and our sense of due process in this
country.
I cite that not because it is the most serious problem with
this bill, although it is a problem, but as a reminder that the
devil is in the details in these matters, and we need to
proceed with extreme caution.
Some more details. The mental retardation procedures. There
are none in Federal law right now. There may be a need for
them, but the procedures and the definition that is proposed in
this bill is so far from being constitutional that it will move
the Federal Government from having been a leader in the
development of protections for people with mental retardation
to a retrograde outlier whose statute would be struck down by
the Supreme Court.
The definition of mental retardation is not a definition at
all, but actually, a series of some of the reasons why the
Supreme Court said that people with mental retardation can't
get the death penalty. And this statute, if it were enacted,
would require the jury, basically, to reconsider what the
Supreme Court did on a case-by-case basis and to do it in the
most unfair possible way after all the reasons to impose the
death penalty have been set before the jury and before any of
the reasons not to impose it have been heard by the jury.
I'd be more than happy to work with staff and to provide
any help that the--that we can, based on all the years of
observation in the trenches in these cases about how this
system ought to work. I'm not at all just saying let's do away
with this proposal and be done with it. But clearly, there are
some very serious problems. There are devils in these details
that really need--need to be looked at.
The--there is reform that could well be undertaken with
regard to the Federal death penalty. I've mentioned one, which
is to restore that things ought to be done again the way they
were done in the first Bush administration, which is when a
Federal prosecutor that's there with the evidence doesn't want
to seek the death penalty, that's the end of it. They don't
need permission from Washington.
When that change was made, Attorney General Ashcroft 43
times told local prosecutors who didn't want to seek the death
penalty that they had to seek the death penalty. His success
rate in those cases was 8 percent. In other words, the system
spun its wheels at a cost of millions of dollars and produced
almost no additional death sentences and did not improve the
fairness of the system.
I could go on if I had more time, which I don't. But I hope
I've made the point that this is something that needs a very,
very careful look.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bruck follows:]
Prepared Statement of David I. Bruck
Mr. Coble. Well, in the spirit of equity, if you wanted--in
view of the generosity of your two predecessors, if you want
another minute, Mr. Bruck, you may have it.
Mr. Bruck. I'd much rather answer questions that the
Committee has. I think that might be more helpful, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Coble. Yes. I was hoping that the gentleman from Texas
would be here, the primary sponsor, and I'm told he's on his
way. So we'll get a chance to hear from him as well.
Now, ladies and gentlemen, we impose the 5-minute rule
against ourselves as well. So I will begin the questioning, Ms.
Griffey, with you.
Why, Ms. Griffey, are procedural guidelines for determining
mental retardation needed in the light of Atkins and the
existing prohibition on executing mentally retarded defendants?
Ms. Griffey. They're needed because although the Federal
statute precluded the execution of the mentally retarded, there
were no procedures in place. And while the mental retardation
issue had been addressed on an ad hoc basis, but through a
variety of mechanisms--most typically a pre-trial determination
by district courts when they hit the issue--it is our best
understanding of the constitutional requirements that the
determination, as I indicated in my earlier testimony, must be
made or at least the defendant has the right to have the
determination be made by the jury.
So that is why we--with the constitutionalization of the
mental retardation issue, we really do need procedures that
conform with the Constitution.
Mr. Coble. Mr. Steinbuch, you touched on this, but I want
to give you a chance to expand on it. Why is the 924(c)
exception from the firearms aggravator unfair?
Mr. Steinbuch. It just doesn't make any sense, Mr.
Chairman. There is a firearms aggravator for other death
penalty qualifying crimes. But for some reason, 924(c) has an
exception where the firearm aggravator may not be applied.
Now if we don't want firearms to be an aggravator for the
death penalty, then we should eliminate it. But if we want
firearms, as I think, indeed, most on both sides of the aisle
want, then we should have it for all death qualifying crimes.
Mr. Coble. Mr. Scheidegger, in your testimony, you
mentioned that provisions of the bill ``will make pre-trial
notice requirements fair.'' Explain in a little more detail, if
you will, how this will achieve fairness, and how might these
provisions impact the treatment of crime victims?
Mr. Scheidegger. Well, I think that a fact-finding
procedure operates better when both sides have notice of what
the procedure is going to be about and have a chance to prepare
a rebuttal to the other side's case.
And I think that a requirement that each side share with
the other what factors it's going to put forward as aggravating
or mitigating will produce a more reliable and a better truth-
seeking function in the penalty phase of the trial.
Mr. Coble. Professor Bruck, now here's the chance for you
to agree/disagree, I believe, because I know you and Ms.
Griffey are not in agreement on this. Tell me again--and again,
you touched on this, Professor--how does the provision
requiring pre-trial notice by the defendant of mitigation
circumstances or mental retardation violate the fifth
amendment?
Mr. Bruck. Mental retardation, it would not. And in fact,
existing law, Congress and the Supreme Court just remanded rule
12.2 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure just in December of
2002 to require notice of expert testimony on any mental health
issue, including mental retardation. So, in a way, there's
really no need for a new notice provision on that.
And clearly, there's no reason--notice for MR. When mental
retardation is advanced as a bar, there is nothing wrong with
requiring notice. But the idea that every mitigating factor
should be only admissible if there has been notice, there are
38 States with the--38 jurisdictions with the death penalty in
this country, and not one has a rule like that. And the reason
is that many mitigating factors, not mental retardation, but
many of the others, would require--in effect require the
defendant to admit that he committed the crime.
Mitigating factors, such as he acted--the defendant acted
under duress in the commission of the murder, or he committed
the murder while under the influence of mental or emotional
disturbance. You can't file notice of that as your mitigating
factor, and this actually requires it be signed by the
defendant, unless you admit you did the killing.
And that's why none of the 38 States have that requirement
because that violates the fifth amendment. You haven't been
tried yet. It's much too early. This is simply not a
requirement.
Mr. Coble. Ms. Griffey, I'll give you a chance to respond
subsequently. But for the moment, I'm going to take a page from
Mr. Steinbuch and Mr. Scheidegger's book and recognize the
gentleman from Virginia before my red light illuminates.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There's a prohibition against using sentiment as a
consideration in applying the death penalty. Mr. Bruck, can you
indicate what--how you can do that if you're allowing victim
impact statements?
Mr. Bruck. Yes. There is a provision in this legislation to
tell the jury to allow no influence of sympathy or sentiment or
passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. There's
nothing wrong with an instruction that says not to be carried
away by emotion, but this instruction is very different.
It--and in particular, as I pointed out in my prepared
remarks, it pushes the constitutional envelope. The whole point
of mitigation is to try to show that even though a man
committed murder, there are still reasons that he deserves some
small amount of sympathy, enough to let him have life in prison
rather than death.
To tell the jury not to be influenced by any influence of
sympathy violates that constitutional provision. Now this isn't
something that we can--we can follow or not if we choose. This
is a constitutional requirement imposed in case after case by
the United States Supreme Court, beginning with Woodson v.
North Carolina in 1976 and going straight on until today.
So, again, the devil is in the details. There could be an
argument, and perhaps the Department of Justice will win a 5-4
decision saying this pushes the envelope, but not too far. But
why risk it? These are the kinds of things that really
shouldn't be--shouldn't be trifled with.
Mr. Scott. What about sympathy on behalf of the victim? If
you have the witness--the victims parading before the jury,
presumably eliciting emotional--an emotional response, how does
that play?
Mr. Bruck. Well, there is something a little inconsistent
about now that we have victims able to testify so broadly, the
survivors, which is not something--I mean, I understand why
it's being done, why the Supreme Court allowed it. But then to
turn around and say, ``Oh, and don't be influenced by
sympathy.'' It's a little illogical. The why did we hear all
that testimony if we're not supposed to have any sympathy?
The real point of an instruction not to be influenced at
all by sympathy is to try to convey to the jury what
prosecutors try to do naturally in their closing argument,
which is to say to the jury, ``Don't use your heart. Don't be a
human being. Don't look at all aspects of this. Just be sort of
a calculator, a machine.'' And you know, total up the
aggravators and mitigators and don't use really human common
sense in deciding what is, after all, a moral judgment, the
Supreme Court has told us, these sorts of add-ons to this.
You know, it's true that the Justice Department has had
relatively little luck in getting anybody sentenced to death.
There are 42 people on death row right now, and there have been
3 executions. But these little bells and whistles to try to
grease the skids are not going to make any appreciable
difference. All it's going to do is put these statutes at some
constitutional risk.
Mr. Scott. Should lack of moral certainty of guilt be a
mitigating factor?
Mr. Bruck. Yes, I think it should. And it probably already
is, informally. It's probably the oldest reason why juries have
declined to seek the death penalty since there was--has been
jury sentencing more than 100 years ago.
If we're going to--if we're going to make some fixes in
this bill, making that explicit, whether it's constitutionally
required or not--good grief, we've seen enough innocent people
being found on our Nation's death row. President Clinton had to
commute a sentence at the request of the attorney general's
office, someone who had exhausted all of his appeals because of
doubt about his innocence, about his guilt.
And of course, the jury ought to be able to consider
whether it's certain enough to convict, but not certain enough
to execute.
Mr. Scott. The obstruction of justice factor, do I
understand the--I think what they're trying to get at is that
you're killing the witness in that case. The way it's worded--
--
Mr. Bruck. Yes.
Mr. Scott. What's the problem with the wording of the
case--of that----
Mr. Bruck. Well, I should say that I understand from
majority staff that this is something that they already intend
to correct. As it's written now, this would--if somebody had
threatened to hurt a witness 20 years ago, that would be an
aggravating factor. And I think that's not what they actually
intended.
This should be--if we're going to add yet another
aggravating factor, this should be very narrowly drawn. It
should be made clear that it not only doesn't apply to a threat
20 years ago, that it has to relate to the murder that they're
sentencing for. But it should also make clear that it doesn't
apply to everyone who might become a witness. It should only
apply to someone whose motivation is to obstruct an ongoing
prosecution.
Otherwise, this will be the universal aggravator. Someone
goes into a store with no premeditation, no advance planning,
no prior record, and on and on and on, and shoots the clerk.
And the Government could say, well, they probably shot the
clerk because they were afraid the person would be a witness.
Therefore, this aggravator applies. That is much too broad.
Mr. Scott. Can I ask one additional question?
Mr. Coble. Without objection.
Mr. Scott. Just a kind of a general statement is do we have
evidence that a death eligible jury is more likely to convict?
Mr. Bruck. Yes. Absolutely. The Supreme Court has, by a
vote of 6-3, said that it's close enough for Government work
and has allowed it.
But there's no doubt that juries that are picked, where the
willingness to impose the death penalty is a requirement for
serving on the jury, and that's the way we do it now, is a jury
that is more likely than a normal jury, a regular American
jury, to find the defendant guilty in the first place. And that
increases the risk of executing--of convicting and executing
the innocent.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman from Virginia.
Now, as a general rule, ladies and gentlemen, we usually
restrict opening statements to the Chairman and the Ranking
Member. But the introducer of the bill is a Member of the
Subcommittee. So, without objection, I'll recognize the
distinguished gentleman from Texas for an opening statement,
symbol for dash, examination of the witnesses.
The gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
I really appreciate this opportunity, and I thank you for
holding this hearing today on a bill that I think will clarify
some of the areas of death penalty law that are currently in
flux due to the things such as the Supreme Court decision in
Atkins v. Virginia.
Now, it falls on Congress to promulgate statutory
provisions that are both fair to the accused and fair to the
victim's family, and this bill clarifies certain aggravating
factors in death penalty cases, and it firms up notice
requirements for both sides, the prosecution and the defense.
Having presided over three death penalty cases during my
tenure on the bench and having been court appointed as counsel
for a convicted capital murderer it turns out should not have
been convicted, and the job I did was able to reverse that
case. That's not a case of the system not working. It's a case
of a good lawyer helping the system to work, all humility
aside.
But it appears that in the areas of a sentencing, the
various districts across the country have interpreted different
provisions in different ways. And this bill seeks to bring
consistency to the process and especially when the life of an
individual is in the hands of our justice system.
And I'd like to address a few things that Mr. Bruck had
indicated with regard to a death eligible jury convicting in a
higher percentage of cases. There are a number of factors at
work there, I would point out.
First of all, if you've been involved in death penalty
prosecutions or death penalty cases, you know that prosecutors
do not do that lightly. And because of the tremendous amount of
expense incurred simply as a result of pursuing the death
penalty, DAs, prosecutors don't want to do it unless they have
a very solid case. Otherwise, it wastes hundreds and hundreds
of thousands of dollars.
So I would indicate and I would submit humbly that, you
know, there aren't many of those capital murder cases that go
to trial where they don't feel good about the evidence as far
as producing a conviction. Otherwise, they don't go there.
With regard to the sympathy factor, you know, in the case
of Saffle v. Parks, the Supreme Court of this glorious United
States had dealt with that issue, and they dealt with an
instruction there that said you must avoid any influence of
sympathy, sentiment, passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary
factor when imposing sentence.
And Mr. Bruck, you had referred to the fact that we should
use human common sense, and as a former judge and chief justice
and prosecutor and defense attorney, all, my experience is if
you let sympathy either for the victim, which is often a
problem, or sympathy for a defendant rule, then common sense
often has to take a back seat, and that's what we're trying to
avoid.
And you've mentioned that we've found enough innocent
people on death row, well, I had a client that was on death
row. But the system worked, and he came off death row.
So I think we have a good system. But because capital
murder is such a serious matter, it does require continually
tweaking. Unfortunately, we have a Supreme Court that not only
can't observe precedent, they can't even observe their own
precedent and often subject their opinions to the fleeting
whims that appear more like something a child's daydream would
happen.
And that makes it tough for those of us trying to follow
the law when we were judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys,
when you haven't got any consistency on the Supreme Court. And
you did rightfully mention about the threat provision. And you
had said you understood that may be corrected in the future. I
did want to let you know the original draft did not have that
in there, and that I'd worked on and that the wonderful
Judiciary staff had worked on.
And apparently, DOJ made that submission without my
approval. And as soon as I caught it, that was yanked out of
there. So that has already been changed and corrected. Whereas,
I don't want something in the bill that I felt like going in is
just not going to work. So you obviously noticed the same
thing.
But anyway, fortunately, with the scrutiny of staff and
Committee and colleagues, I think we have come to a fairly good
bill that will assist in this death penalty tweaking to satisfy
the ongoing, evolving will of our wonderful, illustrious
Supreme Court.
So with that, I yield back--well, actually, my time is up.
But Mr. Chairman, thank you for the hearing. Thank you for this
opportunity.
Mr. Coble. You're indeed welcome. And I say to you, Mr.
Gohmert, we'll be glad for you to hang around. We're going to
have a--we seem to have a pretty good handle on time. So I'm
going to commence a second round. And Mr. Gohmert, I'll be glad
for you to remain for that if your time permits.
Mr. Scott and I--I only have one more question, and I'm
going to give Ms. Griffey a chance to respond and also the
other two witnesses, if you feel so obliged, to Mr. Bruck's--
Professor Bruck's comment regarding the fifth amendment.
Ms. Griffey. Yes. Thank you for that opportunity.
The fifth amendment would not, under any circumstances, be
violated by the requirement that they identified, the
mitigating factors that the defendant will rely on. The fifth
amendment is not violated unless a compelled incriminating
statement is used against a defendant in a criminal case.
It's not violated. You--that's--if you would like, I saw a
frown up there. The Supreme Court case is Chavez v. Martinez.
It's a 2003 case. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760.
And of course, it's been well established the requirement
that you give a variety--notice of a variety of defenses
doesn't violate the fifth amendment. So just the fact that you
have to provide notice does not violate the fifth amendment.
Mr. Coble. Gentlemen, either of you wanted to weigh in on
this?
Mr. Steinbuch. Mr. Chairman, uncharacteristically, I have
no comment on this issue. [Laughter.]
Mr. Coble. Mr. Scheidegger?
Mr. Scheidegger. No, I think Ms. Griffey covered it. Thank
you.
Mr. Coble. And Ms. Griffey, the Professor continues to
smile. So I'll--do you want to have a rebuttal on this,
Professor?
Mr. Bruck. Well, I would note that--I mean, I've expressed
my view generally. I would note that the statute as drafted
actually requires that the defendant sign--sign his name to the
mitigating factors which, on their face, admit to having
committed the crime.
I don't--there are many ways to violate the fifth
amendment, including allowing the Government to make derivative
use, and then there would be all sorts of hearings about
whether the Government benefitted unfairly pre-trial by having
a written, signed notice from the defendant detailing the
circumstances of the offense.
There is a reason why none of the other 38 States have
anything like this, and I would suggest that----
Mr. Coble. Well, and I'll give the distinguished gentlemen
from Virginia and Texas, respectfully, a chance to respond as
we go along. Mr. Scott?
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just to follow up on that, Ms. Griffey, would sometimes to
get the mitigating circumstances, factors, you have to
essentially admit to the crime. Can that admission be used
against the defendant in the prima facie case?
Ms. Griffey. No.
Mr. Scott. No?
Ms. Griffey. No.
Mr. Scott. Can the information--investigatory information
that you glean from the fact that he's admitted to it be used
to help the investigation?
Ms. Griffey. The situation is no different than if the
defendant filed a notice of an insanity defense. It, you know,
nobody is going to stand--no prosecutor is going to stand up in
the courtroom and say that defendant admitted that he was
insane at the time, so he must be admitting that he did it.
That's just not something that's going to happen.
It would be a fifth amendment violation for sure to do
that. But it is the fifth amendment that protects against such
actions. It's not--just merely requiring notice is not a fifth
amendment violation.
Mr. Scott. So the prosecution doesn't get undue advantage
by extorting an admission of guilt from the defendant?
Ms. Griffey. They're not extorting an admission of guilt.
They are requiring notice that they intend--that the defendant
intends to rely on a factor such as duress or other factor.
This is no different from insanity or any other sort of defense
that the defendant raises.
And what it does is it creates a level playing field. These
cases are too important to be--to have the outcome be
determined by surprise or hiding the ball. What we need to do
is to have each side know what is going to be at issue and for
each side to be able to test the evidence that is being put
into--into the case.
Mr. Scott. Well, a level playing field is inconsistent with
the presumption of innocence. Is it not?
Ms. Griffey. Well, I don't see that as being inconsistent
at all. I don't understand your question, I guess.
Mr. Scott. Well, you go in a civil trial with a level
playing field. All you've got to prove is preponderance of
evidence. There's no presumption one way or the other.
In a criminal trial, you're supposed to go in with an
unlevel playing field. The prosecution has to prove the case.
Not only prove it, but prove it beyond reasonable doubt. That's
not a level playing field.
Ms. Griffey. I think we're talking apples and oranges here.
There's the--the burden of proof is one thing, and the due
process and ability to establish the facts are another.
Mr. Scott. Let me ask you a couple of background questions,
if I can, Ms. Griffey? What is the present law, and what would
the bill do for co-defendant--the penalty given to a co-
defendant?
What is the present law on the admissibility of that
information, and what would this bill do to that present law?
Ms. Griffey. It would change it so that the only way in
which you could have--the only way in which you could claim
entitlement to the statutory mitigating factor would be if
there was a defendant against whom the Government could have
sought the death penalty, but declined to do it.
You would not be entitled to a--the benefit of the
statutory mitigating factor if, for example, a co-defendant was
ineligible for the death penalty either because they had to be
extradited from a foreign country or because he was underage
and such.
And I did see Mr. Bruck claimed that that would create a
disparate situation in terms of the outcome. But, of course,
the focus of the sentencing phase is on a defendant's
culpability.
Mr. Scott. Well, just simply the present law and how this
would change the present law?
Ms. Griffey. It would restrict the defendant's ability to
claim the benefit of statutory mitigation. I don't think it
would foreclose him claiming mitigation based on an ineligible
co-defendant is nonstatutory mitigation. And there's very
little difference between the two.
Mr. Scott. Another kind of background question. What is the
law now, and what would the law be, if this bill were to pass,
on people--on the felony murder, where the person--where the
defendant is not the triggerman? Can a person who is not the
triggerman be given the death penalty under Federal law, and
would that change that?
Ms. Griffey. Yes, they can be given the death penalty under
Federal law. The Federal law provides for at least four
different threshold intent factors. And for example, in
carrying out a robbery in which everybody goes in carrying a
gun, only one person is the trigger person. Nonetheless, that
person engaged in a dangerous act, knowing that it could create
a risk of death to the victim.
So, yes, a non-triggerman can--or you know, somebody can
commission a murder and order it and not be the triggerman.
Mr. Scott. What about the driver in the case? You drive the
four or five people. One's a driver. Four go in with guns. Can
the driver get the death penalty along with the rest of them?
Ms. Griffey. That depends on what the driver knew.
Mr. Scott. Mr. Bruck, do you have any other comments on
that, on either question?
Mr. Bruck. On the last, second to last issue you put to Ms.
Griffey about the equally culpable co-defendant. I was very
struck that Ms. Griffey just now said it really doesn't change
anything that much because the jury can still consider other
kinds of unfairness between co-defendants other than
prosecutorial decision-making.
And I was very surprised to hear her say that because it's
obvious that if this passes, Federal prosecutors will be
arguing to judges not only that juries cannot consider anything
that is not here because Congress ruled that out as a
mitigating--as a mitigating factor, but also that the
Government is entitled to a jury instruction.
And that saying you may not consider the fact that there
are three people equally guilty of this, but only this man is
on trial for his life, and the others are going to get a lesser
sentence. And moreover, I bet they're going to move, and judges
will say that lawyers for the defense can't even argue that to
the jury.
Because when Congress speaks, judges listen. This is a very
mischievous provision, and----
Mr. Scott. I don't know if that's good or bad. But go
ahead. [Laughter.]
Mr. Bruck. I'm not going to respond to that, Mr. Scott. I
just think that I was very surprised to hear the Justice
Department say that it really won't change the way these cases
are tried, when I think we all know perfectly well that it
will.
Mr. Coble. Professor, I'm not thoroughly convinced that
they always listen to us, but that's for another day.
We've been joined by the distinguished gentleman from Ohio,
Mr. Chabot.
And the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a couple of other things. Mr. Bruck raised a good
issue about mitigation being signed by the defendant because if
that were to go before the jury that, gee, he signed in advance
basically tantamount to an admission, that would be a problem.
And the fifth amendment protects that.
To me, it's a bit like in non-capital cases in Texas, a
defendant has to make an election in writing before the case
ever starts as to who will do the sentencing, either the judge
or the jury. Well, that is not an admission of guilt. It's
just--and it's never to be taken that way or anything of that
nature. The fifth amendment protects that.
But it's just the procedure. You've got to sign that in
advance, and if you don't make a choice, then your choice is
made for you. But that has to be done in advance, and the fifth
amendment protects that being taken or used as somehow an
admission against interest.
So I see that in the same way, and I would certainly want
to protect the fifth amendment rights. They work pretty well
for us so far, and I want to see that continue. So I would
expect that not to ever be an issue.
As far as good questions, my friend Mr. Scott regarding
whether someone not the triggerman might ever get the death
penalty, and it's a good issue, good question about whether a
driver might ever get that.
Of course, Ms. Griffey pointed out appropriately, it
depends on what he knew. And if the evidence isn't there to
establish basically that he reasonably knew somebody was
probably going to get killed, then the death penalty will not
be appropriate there.
You can't just hail somebody off the street, and they don't
know you're going to go in and probably kill somebody in
robbing a place. There has to be much more evidence than that.
And again, sympathy for the victims in the case is just not
enough to ever give somebody the death penalty. So either
sympathy for victims or the defendant or the defendant's family
is just not to be the issue, but whether there is evidence to
support those things.
I really do wish that when Congress spoke that all the
judges listened because that's--I think we need some people
with hearing aides maybe on the court so that they do hear
better.
But I do appreciate the testimony of the witnesses. I
appreciate your input. I appreciate what each of you do in
order to protect the integrity of our system. That's the only
way we plod on forward.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman from Texas.
And we need to vacate this room before too long, but I want
to recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I apologize for being somewhat late for this hearing,
having had some conflicts. And I'll be brief in my questions
since we do have to vacate the room.
It's my understanding, if I could start with you, Mr.
Bruck, that in your testimony you said that--I believe I'm
correct in this--that there is no place in a trial for victims'
impact statements or victims' testifying relative to the--to
the situation, and you shouldn't risk tainting the jury. Was
that your testimony in general?
Mr. Bruck. No. No, it was a question of what should happen
in what order. There's no doubt that victims have--surviving
members of victims' families have a statutory right to testify
and have the jury hear the grief that they have suffered and
the impact of the crime on their lives.
The question is whether the jury's decision about mental
retardation as a bar should happen before or after the jury has
been subjected to what is undeniably, whichever side of the
aisle you sit on, very, very emotionally wrenching and powerful
testimony that hasn't a thing in the world to do with whether
the defendant is eligible for the death penalty by reason of
mental retardation.
It's a question--there are many things that we do in a
certain order in a criminal trial in order to protect the
rights of the accused. And this is an example of something
where the order, I think, is backwards in this legislation.
And it's the reason why most States implement Atkins v.
Virginia by having the judge decide before trial and before
millions of dollars or thousands and thousands of dollars are
spent on a capital trial whether there's any point going
through all this or whether this man is ineligible because of
mental retardation. That's the proper order.
And if you're going to have the jury make the decision,
which is not the better way to do it, at least have the jury do
it when they can focus on that issue and not after they've
heard all of the reasons why this guy ought to get the death
penalty, mental retardation or no mental retardation, which is
a very human reaction.
Mr. Chabot. Because I--it's my belief that the role of the
victim or the victim's family is really critical and one of the
things that too often does get short shrift. And it's one of
the reasons that I proposed a victims' rights constitutional
amendment. Our Chairman, former Chairman Henry Hyde had
originally proposed it, and we took up the mantle when Henry
left the Committee.
And it's always been my view that when you consider that
the defendant's rights are protected in our Constitution, and
the victim's rights, on the other hand, are sometimes
statutorily protected, sometimes not. But if the two come into
conflict, the Constitution's going to trump the statute every
time. And there are a number of instances where this has
happened.
We haven't had the votes, quite frankly, to pass that
constitutional amendment. We've only amended the Constitution
27 times in our Nation's history, and the first 10 times, of
course, were the Bill of Rights. So that leaves 17.
And of those 17, 2 of those were--canceled each other out,
Prohibition and then doing away with that. So it's only 15
times. So we really don't do that very often.
That being the case, in order to protect victims, we did
pass some, I think, helpful legislation which did emphasize
more victims' rights about a year or two ago. It didn't go
quite as far as a lot of us would have liked it to, but I think
it's a step in the right direction.
So anything that we can do to elevate the rights of
victims, whether it's a death penalty case or not, I would
certainly like to take the opportunity to do that.
Would any of the other members of the panel like to comment
relative to victims' rights and the issue that Mr. Bruck just
discussed? Have any input they'd like to give us on that?
Mr. Scheidegger?
Mr. Scheidegger. Yes, I'd like to address that, as far as
the sympathy instruction goes. Because of the decision of
Lockett v. Ohio, where the Supreme Court read into the
Constitution a requirement to introduce practically anything
the defendant wants, death penalty proceedings have become more
emotional than necessary, and the victim impact statements are
brought in, in part, to rebalance the scale.
I would like to see less emotional testimony on both sides,
but we're kind of stuck with what we have. But I do think it is
appropriate to instruct the jurors to make their decisions
based on objective circumstances and not on sympathy, even
though they are inclined to be sympathetic.
The victim impact testimony is about the impact of the
crime on not only the direct victim of the homicide, but on
other people, and that is a circumstance for them to consider
rationally. And I think an instruction to consider that not
based on sympathy is an appropriate one for both sides of the
aisle.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I see that
my time has expired here.
Mr. Coble. I thank the gentleman from Ohio.
And folks, as I did not exhaust my full time, I want to put
two brief questions. We're going to have a vote here before
long.
Ms. Griffey, you mentioned in your testimony that the bill
places the burden of proof--strike that. That the bill places
the burden of proof for mental retardation determination upon
the defendant. Is this type of burden shifting present in other
areas of prosecution?
Your mike's not on.
Ms. Griffey. Yes, it is. In terms of a variety of defenses.
We took a very, very careful look at all of the remotely
applicable Supreme Court precedent, and we concluded that it
was best to put the burden on the defendant by a preponderance
of the evidence.
Mr. Coble. What would be some other instances where that
occurs, the shifting?
Ms. Griffey. Well, the burden is on the defendant to prove
insanity. The burden is on the defendant to prove a variety of
defenses such as that. The burden--what is a constitutionally
permissible burden depends on a variety of factors in terms of
the analysis.
Mr. Coble. Right. I got you.
Mr. Steinbuch, very briefly. In your testimony, you
stressed the importance of pre-qualifying jurors for both the
trial and sentencing phase. Why is this important, A? And B, do
these types of questions on prospective jurors have the
potential to create a bias toward guilt?
Mr. Steinbuch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is important for our system to work efficiently,
simply. We need to have juries that are willing to impose the
law. If the law is the possibility of a death sentence, it
makes no sense to have a jury that says ahead of time, we won't
follow the law.
And as for the bias issue, as my co-panelist has said,
there has been demonstrated some statistical difference between
juries that are death qualified and juries that are not death
qualified, although I would not characterize the latter as
``normal juries.''
And as I said previously, I suspect that the bias or,
indeed, the statistical aberration is not a bias, but a
reflection of the fact that the jurors are willing to follow
the law, both in the sentencing phase and in the guilt phase.
Mr. Coble. Well, Professor, is pre-qualification used in
other States? And if so, how many? Or do you know?
Mr. Steinbuch. You know, I'm probably not the best--the
practitioners are probably the best to answer that question.
I'm confident it is done, but I don't know----
Mr. Coble. You can get that to us. We're going to leave the
record open for 7 days anyway.
Mr. Scott, any more questions?
Mr. Scott. Yes. Mr. Steinbuch, as you death qualify the
jury, just demographically, isn't that also a nice way to
reduce the number of African Americans on the jury?
Mr. Steinbuch. I have seen no statistics that demonstrate
that one way or the other. So I can't comment on that.
Mr. Scott. Statistics show that death penalty is about 50
percent in the African-American community and about 80 percent
everywhere else. Doesn't that give you a better shot at back-
door striking African Americans from the jury?
Mr. Steinbuch. Well, I mean, I think it gives you a better
shot at back-door subverting the sentencing procedures enacted
by Congress. So if those two factors coincide statistically,
that may be the case, yes.
Mr. Scott. Just another point, Mr. Chairman.
When you do insanity and some of these other things that
you have to kind of give notice on, you get in your case-in-
chief with the burden beyond a reasonable doubt on the
prosecution before you have to kind of help them out. This is a
mitigating factor, which you ought to be able to wait until the
end of the case after the conviction--after the conviction.
Then you come up with the sentencing as a mitigating factor for
the death penalty. There's really no reason to require the
defendant to put this in prior to the guilty verdict.
And so, I think it is slightly different from some of the
others because you actually get to argue about whether they're
insane or not. You don't--and it's part of the case-in-chief,
which I think is different than what we're talking about here.
Mr. Coble. Well, folks, we thank you all for your testimony
today, and the Subcommittee appreciates your contribution.
In order to ensure a full record and adequate consideration
of this important issue--and it is, indeed, an important
issue--the record will remain open for 7 days for additional
submissions. Also, any written questions that a Member of the
Subcommittee wants to submit should be submitted to you all
within that 7-day timeframe.
This concludes the legislative hearing on H.R. 5040, the
``Death Penalty Reform Act of 2006.'' Thank you all for your
cooperation, and the Subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:12 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Robert C. Scott, a Representative
in Congress from the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank you for holding this
hearing on H.R. 5040, ``The Death Penalty Reform Act of 2006.'' I am
disappointed, however, that we are considering yet another bill this
Congress that expands opportunities to seek the federal death penalty.
We recently expanded federal death penalty applications in the USA
PATRIOT Act renewal, in the ``Gangbusters'' bill, the Court Security
bill, the sex offender bill, and others. And here we go again, in a
bill touted as a death penalty procedures bill, expanding further
instances in which the death penalty can be sought.
There is still no credible evidence that the death penalty,
particularly the federal death penalty, deters murder or other crimes,
or otherwise promotes the general interest of the U.S. Indeed, every
time we expand the situations in which the federal death penalty can be
applied, we restrict further our ability to extradite from other
countries to this country terrorists and other killers of Americans.
Moreover, there is clear evidence that the federal death penalty is
disproportionately applied to African Americans and other minorities.
And despite former Attorney General Reno's departing decision to have
the Department of Justice (DOJ) examine the ``disturbing'' prevalence
of minorities among those selected for death penalty prosecutions and
sentenced to death, no comprehensive and scientific examination has
been made.
And although we passed last Congress the Innocence Protection Act,
which enacted a set of standards to protect and support innocence in
death penalty cases, we still have not provided the funding necessary
to fully implement the law. While the impact of the law on the federal
death penalty is limited, federal death penalty practice does and
should serve as a model for the states. Thus, we should not be
expanding application of any death penalty provisions before we provide
the funding necessary to fully protect and support innocence.
This bill is problematic in its proposed procedural reforms as
well. One cynical evaluation of the bill suggested that it represents
DOJ's attempt to legislate victory on every point on which it has lost
in court in recent years. By adding more aggravating factors to the
long list already in the statute, and removing one of the few existing
mitigating factors, DOJ further stacks the deck in favor of finding
something on which to hinge an argument for the death penalty. Adding
the obstruction of justice aggravating factor in the way it is now
worded would allow particularly broad application of an easily charged
factor. We see from the current Moussaoui death penalty case over in
Alexandria that DOJ is willing to go to great lengths to argue for a
death penalty where it wishes to. One reason for expanding
opportunities to pursue the death penalty is simply to ensure the
impaneling of more death-eligible juries. A death-eligible jury is
necessarily more focused on, and inclined toward, more severe penalties
than would a regular jury.
I am also concerned with the bill's proposal to structure
procedures for determination of whether a defendant is mentally
retarded and, therefore, not subject to the death penalty pursuant to
the Atkins case. First, the bill narrowly structures the definition of
mental retardation, requiring that all of several factors must be
shown, or you can be put to death. And rather than have a pre-trial
determination of whether the defendant is mentally retarded, the bill
requires that the defendant be first tried by a death-eligible jury and
when found guilty and otherwise eligible for death, then they could
determine whether he is mentally retarded. This virtually assures that
a defendant's mental illness is not a factor until the jury has made up
its mind that the defendant should die!
Further, I cannot believe that ,on the basis of fairness to the
prosecution, we would consider a provision that turns the traditional
burden of proof on its head. That's what we would do if we require a
defendant to admit upfront that he committed the crime under duress or
extreme emotional distress in order to submit this as mitigation during
sentencing.
Yet another difficulty with the bill is its proposal to impanel
less than 12 jurors to re-sentence an offender where the first jury
deadlocks. There can be no purpose for such a drastic change in time-
honored criminal procedures other than to ensure that it is easier to
obtain a verdict of death. Proponents of this approach would certainly
not be promoting it if they thought it would make death a less likely
verdict. While I can understand DOJ's desire to win in its efforts to
acquire more death penalties, I don't understand why the Congress
should want to further stack the deck in favor of the prosecution in
this manner..
There are other significant problems with this bill, Mr. Chairman,
but I will leave discussions of those problems to our witnesses and our
questioning. Thank you.
Letter from Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director and General Counsel,
Criminal Justice Legal Foundation to the Subcommittee
``Smoke and Mirrors on Race and the Death Penalty,'' submitted by Kent
Scheidegger, Legal Director and General Counsel, Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation