[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE LONDON BOMBINGS:
PROTECTING CIVILIAN TARGETS
FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS
PART I AND II
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC
SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION, AND CYBERSECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 7, 2005 and OCTOBER 20, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-39
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Peter T. King, New York Jane Harman, California
John Linder, Georgia Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Nita M. Lowey, New York
Tom Davis, Virginia Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Daniel E. Lungren, California Columbia
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Zoe Lofgren, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Katherine Harris, Florida Islands
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Dave G. Reichert, Washington James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Michael McCaul, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania
Ginny Brown-Waite, Florida
______
Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
Cybersecurity
Daniel E. Lungren, California, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
John Linder, Georgia Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
Cybersecurity:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Opening Statement, September 7, 2007.................. 3
Prepared Statement, October 20, 2007........................... 55
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 4
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 39
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island................................. 40
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas........................................ 44
The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Georgia............................................... 38
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of New Jersey................................... 35
The Honorable Stevan Pearce, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New Mexico........................................ 74
The Honorable Mark E. Souder, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Indiana........................................... 45
WITNESSES
Wednesday, September 7, 2005
Mr. Peter Lowy, CEO, Westfield America, Inc:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Joe Madsen, Director, Safety and Risk Management, Spokane
Public Schools, Spokane, Washington:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Mr. Bill Millar, President, American Public Transportation
Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Mr. Michael Norton, Managing Director of Global Property
Management, Tishman Speyer Properties:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Thursday, October 20, 2005
Mr. Robert Jamison, Deputy Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 64
Prepared Statement............................................. 66
Mr. Robert Stephan, Assistant Secretary, Infrastructure
Protection Division, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 57
Prepared statement............................................. 58
For the Record
The International Council of Shopping Centers:
Prepared Statement, September 7, 2005.......................... 43
The Honorable Kip Hawley, Assistant Secretary, Transportation
Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement, September 7, 2005.......................... 87
Letter From Mr. Robert B. Stephan................................ 93
THE LONDON BOMBINGS:
PROTECTING CIVILIAN TARGETS
FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS
----------
Wednesday, September 7, 2005
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:09 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Daniel Lungren
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Lungren, Linder, Souder, Thompson,
Dicks, DeFazio, Lofgren, Jackson-Lee, Pascrell, and Langevin.
Mr. Lungren. [Presiding.] Good morning. I would like to
welcome everyone to this hearing of the Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure
Protection, and Cybersecurity.
We are meeting today for the first time in the committee's
permanent hearing room, so maybe we will also get an office
next to it at some time in the future, but we will work on
that.
This morning, the subcommittee will focus on the protection
of civilian or soft targets against terrorist attacks. A soft
target can be any place or thing whose destruction or
impairment will cause a loss of life, economic damage or
psychological trauma, which is difficult to protect or harden
because it is a location that is accessible to the public.
Soft targets would include schools, buses, trains, hotels,
office buildings, restaurants, night clubs, apartment
buildings, churches, mosques, synagogues or any place where
many people can be found in close proximity.
It is true that in a free and open society such as ours,
there are an infinite number of such potential targets which a
terrorist could choose to attack. Compounding our difficulties,
terrorists have many advantages. They have the ability to
choose what, where, when and how to execute an attack. As the
President has said, we have to be right 100 percent of the
time, while they only have to get lucky once.
The latest tragedies in London and Egypt have highlighted
the ease in which terrorists can perpetrate heinous crimes
against the civilian population, even where reasonable security
measures had already been instituted. Public transportation,
particularly trains and buses, this has been the favored target
of many high-profile attacks, but terrorists have also
repeatedly targeted night clubs, restaurants and hotels.
The inability to effectively restrict access and the
potential for numerous casualties, combined with the
psychological impact on the public and its resulting affect on
our national economy makes these soft targets highly attractive
to terrorists.
According to the RAND Memorial Institute for Prevention of
Terrorism database of terrorist events, there have been almost
10,000 terrorist incidents worldwide since 9/11, of which more
than 5,500 could be considered to have taken place against soft
targets.
Increasing physical security of such sites is, of course,
part of the solution to the challenge, but let's face it:
screening every person accessing every possible soft target is
both a physical and economic impossibility. Even if it were
possible, there is simply no way to be 100 percent effective
against a determined terrorist that is willing to take his or
her own life in pursuit of the mission.
So accordingly, we must prioritize our efforts based on
known risks and consequences, and avoid the temptation to focus
on one soft target sector to the detriment of others. As
Secretary Chertoff has said, terrorists are quite adaptable, so
as we harden some types of facilities they would naturally
switch to others that are seemingly less protected.
We must also figure out how to remain one step ahead of the
terrorists and stop them before they execute their plans. We
can accomplish this in large part by continuing to aggressively
pursue intelligence regarding terrorists and their intentions.
And we can expand our intelligence-gathering capabilities
further by training employees and civilians around or within
soft targets to be watchful of suspicious behavior and attempt
to intercept terrorists in the planning or reconnaissance or
even implementation stages of an attack. Mass transit
facilities and other security forces have begun doing this type
of training already.
So I would like to welcome our witnesses today and thank
them for participating in this timely discussion.
We had planned to have an initial panel with two witnesses
representing the views of the Department of Homeland Security,
the Honorable Kip Hawley, the Administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration, and Robert Stephan, the
Acting Under Secretary for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection. But given the need of these
witnesses to be focused on the continuing response to Hurricane
Katrina, we have decided to postpone that panel to another date
later this month.
So our planned second panel now will be our only panel
today. The witnesses represent a wide array of soft-target
sectors, including mass transit, shopping malls, office
buildings, and public schools. Let me restate that. Our
witnesses represent a wide array of our economy, which, because
of the nature of terrorism, makes them soft-target
opportunities. As I say, they include mass transit, shopping
malls, office buildings, and public schools.
The witnesses will provide us with important insights on
the steps they have taken thus far to address the challenges
posed by terrorists, the assistance they receive from DHS and
other federal agencies, and what they believe the proper role
of the federal government should be with respect to security
within their sectors.
As I have said many times, we do not have all the wisdom in
government and we can be well educated as to what is being done
in the private sector. We would particularly like to
concentrate on the cooperative nature of efforts between the
private and public sector.
So I would like to thank the witnesses for appearing before
us today and tell you that I look forward to your testimony.
I would recognize the Ranking Member of the full Committee,
Mr. Thompson, who has been busy in the last week or so with
some concerns in his own district as a result of the hurricane.
As you know, you have our best wishes and our prayers for
the people in your district and the evacuees who have come to
your district.
Prepared Opening Statement of Hon. Daniel Lungren
Wednesday, September 7, 2005
I would like to welcome everyone to this hearing of the Committee
on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure
Protection, and Cybersecurity.
This morning, the Subcommittee will focus on the protection of
civilian or ``soft'' targets against terrorist attacks.
A soft target can be any place or thing whose destruction or
impairment will cause loss of life, economic damage, or psychological
trauma, and which is difficult to protect or ``harden'' because it is a
location that is accessible to the public.
Soft targets include schools, buses, trains, hotels, office
buildings, restaurants, nightclubs, apartment buildings, churches,
mosques, synagogues, or any place where many people can be found in
close proximity.
In a free and open society such as ours, there are an infinite
number of such potential targets from which a terrorist could chose to
attack.
Compounding our difficulties, terrorists have many advantages--
having the ability to chose what, where, when, and how to execute an
attack. As the President has said, we have to be right 100 percent of
the time, while the terrorists only have to get lucky once.
The latest tragedies in London and Egypt have highlighted the ease
in which terrorists can perpetrate heinous crimes against the civilian
population, even where reasonable security measures had already been
instituted.
Public transportation--particularly trains and buses--has been the
favored target in many high-profile attacks. But terrorists also have
repeatedly targeted night clubs, restaurants, and hotels. The inability
to effectively restrict access and the potential for numerous
casualties--combined with the psychological impact on the public and
its resulting effect on the national economy--makes these soft targets
highly attractive to terrorists.
According to the RAND-Memorial Institute for Prevention of
Terrorism database of terrorist events, there have been almost 10,000
terrorist incidents worldwide since September 11, 2001, of which more
than 5,500 could be considered to have taken place against soft
targets.
Increasing physical security at such sites is, of course, part of
the solution to this challenge, but screening every person accessing
every possible soft target is both a physical and economic
impossibility. Even if it were possible, there is simply no way to be
100% effective against a determined terrorist that is willing to take
his or her own life in pursuit of the mission.
Accordingly, we must prioritize our efforts based on known risks
and consequences, and avoid the temptation to focus on one soft target
sector to the detriment of others. As Secretary Chertoff has said,
terrorists are quite adaptable, so as we harden some types of
facilities, they will switch to others that are less protected.
We also must figure out how to remain one step ahead of the
terrorists and stop them before they execute their plans. We can
accomplish a large part of this by continuing to aggressively pursue
intelligence regarding terrorists and their intentions.
And we can expand our intelligence gathering capabilities further,
by training employees and civilians around or within soft targets to be
watchful of suspicious behavior--in an attempt to intercept terrorists
in the planning, reconnaissance, or even implementation stages of an
attack. Mass transit facilities and other security forces have begun
doing this type of training already.
I'd like to welcome our witnesses today and thank them again for
participating in this timely discussion.
We had planned to have an initial panel with two witnesses
representing the views of the Department of Homeland Security: the
Honorable Kip Hawley, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, and Robert Stephan, Acting Under Secretary for
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection. But given the need
for these witnesses to be focused on the continuing response to
Hurricane Katrina, we have decided to postpone this panel to another
date later this month.
So our planned second panel will now be our only panel today. The
witnesses represent a wide array of soft target sectors, including mass
transit, shopping malls, office buildings, and public schools. These
witnesses will provide us with important insights on the steps they
have taken thus far to address the challenges posed by terrorists, the
assistance they have received from DHS and other Federal agencies, and
what they believe the proper role of the Federal government should be
with respect to security within their sectors.
I would like to thank the witnesses for appearing before us today
and I look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me acknowledge Mr. Pascrell and a number of other
members of the committee who also called during what has been
and continues to be a very trying time for this entire country,
and more specifically for the people of Louisiana, Alabama and
Mississippi.
But as you know, the matter we have before us today is a
very important issue for this country. Like all Americans, I
was shocked and repulsed by the terrorist attacks in London.
This latest attack should serve as a reminder that America and
its close allies continue to face a determined enemy that
thinks nothing of slaughtering innocent people.
Now, after seeing the numerous failures to adequately
prepare and respond to the Hurricane Katrina situation, I have
my doubts about our nation's plans for dealing with
emergencies. If we cannot handle a hurricane that we know is
coming 4 days before, how can we trust that we are prepared for
a catastrophic terrorist attack that we do not know about?
Because we live in an open and democratic society, we are
particularly vulnerable to terrorists who live among us. This
is especially true when it comes to our mass transit systems.
Our mass transit and rail systems are large, open systems
carrying billions of passengers a year, making it a prime
target for terrorists.
Almost 4 years after the September 11 terrorist attack,
passenger, rail and transit security remains a Department of
Homeland Security afterthought. While the United States spent
$11 billion on aviation security since 9/11, we managed to
offer up $450 million for transit security. That is simply too
little and too short, especially when one considers that
Americans take mass transit 16 times more often than they
travel by air.
This disparity, frankly, sends chills down my spine when I
consider the pattern of train bombings overseas, first in
Madrid, then in Moscow, and most recently in London. If the
recent past is any guide, what is to prevent New York,
Washington or Chicago from being next?
With the establishment of the Department of Homeland
Security, the American people expected the department to help
prevent such attacks. I would have to like to hear from the
department who is doing this, but in the instance of this
catastrophe we are dealing with, we will deal with it later.
What I would like for them to do when they do come, Mr.
Chairman, is provide us with the transit security plan that was
due April 1 of this year. I have sent two letters to the
administration indicating that you are overdue with this
transit security plan, but I have yet to receive a response to
those letters. It is sort of indicative of why we are behind
right now.
Trains are not the only targets of al-Qa'ida and like-
minded groups, as terrorists have attacked hotels in Saudi
Arabia, a night club in Indonesia, and worst of all, a school
full of children in Russia.
I would like to hear from the witnesses today what measures
are in place to protect these soft targets and what has DHS
done to address it. We will look at it when they come.
Mr. Chairman, I really would like to know whether or not in
emergencies like we had with Katrina how our mass transit
systems could potentially have helped with the evacuation of
people, especially in the New Orleans area.
And after that, how soon could we get our system up and
running? In London, they did it in a day after the bombings. I
wonder what it would take us, with any kind of event, to get
our systems up and running again? Since we are supposed to have
a plan, I would like to hear it.
I look forward to the witnesses' testimony, and I yield
back.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson.
Other members of the Committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have one distinguished panel of witnesses
before us today on this important topic. As I mentioned,
Assistant Secretary Stephan has been and continues to be
working more than 18 hours a day at the command center dealing
with the Katrina devastation. Assistant Secretary Hawley is
also working on the Katrina response. The Subcommittee plans on
having both of them in later this month to answer questions on
this critical issue.
Let me remind the witnesses that your entire written
statement will appear in the record. Because of the number that
we have and the number of members we expect to be asking
questions, we would ask that in accordance with committee rules
you would limit your oral testimony to approximately 5 minutes,
and then we would allow each panel member to testify before
questioning any one of the witnesses.
The chair would first recognize Mr. Bill Millar, President
of the American Public Transportation Association.
Mr. Millar, thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF BILL MILLAR
Mr. Millar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee. On behalf of the 1,500 members of the American
Public Transportation Association, we are certainly glad to be
here.
It is very clear from your opening statement and Mr.
Thompson's opening statement that the committee already has a
very good understanding of some of the potential that public
transit has to be a target and some of the funding disparities,
in our opinion, that have occurred over the years.
Quite simply put, we need to invest more money. We need to
have better intelligence, and we need to do a better job of
planning both for prevention and recovery. Those would be the
three fundamental points of my testimony.
In light also that we find ourselves the week after
Katrina, it is also important to realize that much of the
investment in making our transit systems more secure can also
assist in meeting national and natural disasters such as
Katrina represents. I will be pleased to make further comments
upon that point during the question period.
Public transit in America is a major form of public
transportation. Every year, over 9.6 billion customers use
public transit. Every weekday, 32 million times every weekday,
Americans use public transit. And as has been pointed out, this
is 16 times the number of people who use our nation's airline
system, and yet the expenditure by the federal government to
make public transit more secure is minuscule compared to the
federal investment in the air system. We all understood and
understand why the air system needs to be made secure, but now
it is time to look at other parts of our transportation system.
As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, over the last 25 years
public transit around the world has too often been a target of
terrorist attack. While we are focused on the most recent
events such as London or Madrid or Moscow, the list goes on and
on and on. Thus, prior to 9/11/2001, our industry knew that we
could be a target. Our industry had already in place many plans
and had taken many steps to try to improve its dealing with
security issues. However, much more needs to be done.
Since 9/11, the industry has invested out of its own
resources more than $2 billion in improving our security and
preparing for terrorist attacks and in developing plans for
recovery in the even that, God forbid, such an attack would
occur in the United States. We do not need more wake-up calls.
We need help. We need plans for action. We need investment.
We did a survey of our members which we released about 1 1/
2 years ago asking that, at that point, we were 2 years into
the post-9/11 environment. We knew that more needed to be done.
What did our members tell us out of that survey?
They told us several things. First, I have already referred
to the $2 billion that at that point they had invested
themselves. Second, they felt that a major capital investment
approaching $5.2 billion was necessary to take common sense
solutions.
You are quite right, Mr. Chairman. None of us believe that
you could totally insulate public transit systems from the
potential of terrorist attack, but we do believe that there are
many common sense steps that could be taken, such things as
improving preparedness planning, training, drilling; such
things as improving the communications systems of our transit
systems; improving the access points to our access systems; and
many, many common sense steps that could be taken.
Regrettably, sufficient funds have not been provided to
undertake these steps. This current fiscal year, the Congress
appropriated $150 million to cover all of public transit,
passenger, freight and rail security. That simply is not a
large enough investment. More needs to be done.
According to our survey, what did we find? Well, we find
that over 2,000 rail stations in America do not have any
security cameras. Some additional work we did subsequent to
that revealed that 53,000 buses do not have cameras on those
buses. Over 5,000 commuter rail cars do not have security
cameras. Over half of all buses do not have automatic vehicle
locator systems. And the list goes on and on and on.
Certainly, we saw something in New Orleans that ought to
make us all think about this next statistic. More than 75
percent of the demand-response vehicles, the small vehicles
that are used primarily to transport persons with disabilities
or senior citizens or others in that type of need, over 75
percent of those vehicles lack automatic vehicle locator
systems.
There is no permanent biological detection system in any
rail transit system in America.
And the list goes on and on and on.
The second area I mentioned relates to the need for
intelligence. After 9/11, in cooperation with the Federal
Transit Administration, a federal public transportation-funded
ISAC program, Information Security Analysis Center, was set up
throughout the country. Regrettably, the funding for that ISAC
center and the great intelligence that it provided to transit
systems across the country has expired.
The Department of Homeland Security has offered a
substitute, allowing us to tap into what they call their
Homeland Security Information Network, the HSIN Network.
However, in our judgment, this is no substitute for the ISAC
that has already proven its worth and is already in place. So
we certainly need to work on how we can get more information
access to intelligence.
We need to make sure that when the terror alert level is
raised that everyone understands that has major costs to that.
For example, a survey we did this last summer showed that when
the alert level was raised to orange, simply going up one step,
even though nothing happened, we found that that added $900,000
a day to our costs. In the time between July 7 when the London
bombings occurred and the threat level was raised, until August
12 when it was lowered, transit systems incurred over $33
million in costs.
So the list goes on and on. I am sure my time is about
done. I will be happy to expand on these or any other points as
may be appropriate.
Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, for your concern and allowing me to be with you.
[The statement of Mr. Millar follows:]
Prepared Statement of William W. Millar
Wednesday, September 7, 2005
Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to testify on the
security and safety of public transportation systems. We appreciate
your interest in transportation security, and we look forward to
working with you on these issues.
ABOUT APTA
The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is a
nonprofit international association of more than 1,500 public and
private member organizations including transit systems and commuter
rail operators; planning, design, construction, and finance firms;
product and service providers; academic institutions; transit
associations and state departments of transportation. APTA members
serve the public interest by providing safe, efficient, and economical
transit services and products. More than ninety percent of the people
using public transportation in the United States and Canada are served
by APTA member systems.
OVERVIEW
Mr. Chairman, public transportation is one of our nation's critical
infrastructures. We cannot over-emphasize the critical importance of
our industry to the economic quality of life of this country. Over 9.6
billion transit trips are taken annually on all modes of transit
service. People use public transportation vehicles over 32 million
times each weekday. This is more than sixteen times the number of daily
travelers on the nation's airlines.
Safety and security are the top priority of the public
transportation industry. Transit systems took many steps to improve
security prior to 9/11 and have significantly increased efforts since
then. Since September 11, 2001, public transit agencies in the United
States have spent over $2 billion on security and emergency
preparedness programs and technology from their own budgets with only
minimal federal funding. This year's events in London and last year's
events in Madrid further highlight the need to strengthen security on
public transit systems and to do so without delay. We do not need
another wakeup call like London and Madrid.
In 2004 APTA surveyed its U.S. transit system members to determine
what actions they needed to take to improve security for their
customers, employees and facilities. In response to the survey, transit
agencies around the country have identified in excess of $6 billion in
transit security investment needs. State and local governments and
transit agencies are doing what they can to improve security, but it is
important that the federal government be a full partner in the effort
to ensure the security of the nation's transit users.
In FY 2003, transit security was allocated $65 million in federal
funds for 20 transit systems from DHS. In FY 2004, $50 million was
allocated for 30 transit systems from DHS. For the first time in FY
2005, Congress specifically appropriated $150 million for transit,
passenger and freight rail security. Out of the $150 million, transit
is to receive approximately $130 million--almost $108 million for rail
transit and more than $22 million for bus. Also, passenger ferries are
slated to receive an additional $5 million for security from a separate
account. We are very appreciative of this effort. However, in the face
of significant needs, more needs to be done.
We urge Congress to act decisively on this issue. In light of the
documented needs, we have respectfully urged Congress to provide $2
billion in the FY 2006 Homeland Security Appropriations bill for
transit security. Of that amount, we recommended that $1.2 billion be
provided for capital needs, and $800 million for additional transit
security costs. Federal funding for additional security needs should
provide for, among other things, planning, public awareness, training
and additional transit police.
Transit authorities have significant and specific transit security
needs. Based on APTA's 2003 Infrastructure Database survey, over 2,000
rail stations do not have security cameras. According to our 2005
Transit Vehicle Database 53,000 buses, over 5,000 commuter rail cars,
and over 10,000 heavy rail cars do not have security cameras. Less than
one-half of all buses have automatic vehicle locator systems (AVL's)
that allow dispatchers to know the location of the bus when an
emergency occurs. Nearly 75% of demand response vehicles lack these
AVL's. Furthermore, no transit system has a permanent biological
detection system. In addition, only two transit authorities have a
permanent chemical detection system. A partnership with the federal
government could help to better address many of these specific needs.
We were disappointed that the Administration recommended only $600
million for a Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program in the FY 2006
DHS budget proposal, which would fund infrastructure security grants
for transit, seaports, railways and energy facilities. We were also
disappointed that the Administration did not include a specific line
item funding amount for transit security. We look forward to working
with the Administration and Congress in securing adequate transit
security funding that begins to address unmet transit security needs
throughout the country.
We further request that the existing process for distributing DHS
federal grant funding be modified so that funds are distributed
directly to transit authorities, rather than to State Administrating
Agencies (SAA). While we understand the need to coordinate with the
states and urban areas that we serve, we believe direct funding to the
transit authorities would be more efficient and productive. For the
FY2003 grant funding that was allocated by DHS, it took more than a
year to be awarded to some transit systems. In addition, the FY2005
grant funding has not been awarded to the transit systems to date.
We are pleased to note that APTA has become a ``Standards
Development Organization'' (SDO) for the public transportation
industry. Our efforts in standards development for commuter rail, rail
transit and bus transit operations over recent years have been
significant and our status as a SDO has been acknowledged by both the
Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA). The FTA and the Transportation Research Board
have also supported our standards initiatives through the provision of
grants. We would like to apply our growing expertise in standards
development to transit industry safety and security, best practices,
guidelines and standards. We look forward to working with the
Administration and Congress in support of this initiative and trust
that federal financial assistance would be made available to develop
such standards and practices.
We also would like to work with Congress and the Department of
Homeland Security's Directorate of Science and Technology to take a
leadership role in advancing research and technology development to
enhance security and emergency preparedness for public transportation.
INFORMATION SHARING
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, public transit
systems across the country have worked very hard to strengthen their
security plans and procedures and have been very active in training
personnel and conducting drills to test their capacity to respond to
emergencies. As well, to the extent possible within their respective
budgets, transit systems have been incrementally hardening their
services through the introduction of additional technologies such as
surveillance equipment, access control and intrusion detection systems.
While the transit systems have been diligent, they have been unable to
fully implement programs without more assistance from the federal
government.
A vital component of ensuring public transit's ability to prepare
and respond to critical events is the timely receipt of security
intelligence in the form of threats, warnings, advisories and access to
informational resources. Accordingly, in 2003, the American Public
Transportation Association, supported by Presidential Decision
Directive #63, established an ``Information Sharing Analysis Center
(ISAC)'' for public transit systems throughout the United States. A
funding grant in the amount of $1.2 million was provided to APTA by the
Federal Transit Administration to establish a very successful Public
Transit ISAC that operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and gathered
information from various sources, including DHS, and then passed
information on to transit systems following a careful analysis of that
information. However, given that the Federal Transit Administration was
subsequently unable to access security funds, and given the decision of
DHS to not fund ISAC operations, APTA then had to look for an alternate
method of providing security intelligence through DHS's newly created
``Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN).'' APTA is now in the
process of transitioning from the successful Public Transit ISAC to the
new HSIN network. However, we believe that consistent, on-going and
reliable funds from Congress should be provided for the Public Transit
ISAC that has been proven an effective delivery mechanism for security
intelligence.
In addition, APTA's membership includes many major international
public transportation systems, including the London Underground, Madrid
Metro, and the Moscow Metro. APTA also has a strong partnership with
the European-based transportation association, the International Union
of Public Transport. Through these relationships, APTA has participated
in a number of special forums in Europe and Asia to give US transit
agencies the benefit of their experiences and to help address transit
security both here and abroad.
COST OF HEIGHTENED SECURITY
Following the attacks on London, APTA was asked to assist the TSA
in conducting a teleconference between the TSA and transit officials to
discuss transit impacts pertaining to both increasing and decreasing
the DHS threat levels. There is no question that increased threat
levels have a dramatic impact on budget expenditures of transit systems
and extended periods pose significant impacts on personnel costs. These
costs totaled $900,000 per day for US public transit systems or an
estimated $33.3 million from July 7 to August 12, 2005 during the
heightened state of ``orange'' for public transportation. This amount
does not include costs associated with additional efforts by New York,
New Jersey and other systems to conduct random searches.
Many transit systems are also implementing other major programs to
upgrade security. For example, New York's Metropolitan Transportation
Authority is taking broad and sweeping steps to help ensure the safety
and security of its transportation systems in what are among the most
extensive security measures taken by a public transportation system to
date. NY-MTA will add 1,000 surveillance cameras and 3,000 motion
sensors to its network of subways and commuter rail facilities as part
of a $212 million security upgrade announced late last month with the
Lockheed Martin Corporation.
SECURITY INVESTMENT NEEDS
Mr. Chairman, since the awful events of 9/11, the transit industry
has invested some $2 billion of its own funds for enhanced security
measures, building on the industry's already considerable efforts. At
the same time, our industry undertook a comprehensive review to
determine how we could build upon our existing industry security
practices. This included a range of activities, which include research,
best practices, education, information sharing in the industry, and
surveys. As a result of these efforts we have a better understanding of
how to create a more secure environment for our riders, and the most
critical security investment needs.
Our latest survey of public transportation security identified
enhancements of at least $5.2 billion in additional capital funding to
maintain, modernize, and expand transit system security functions to
meet increased security demands. Over $800 million in increased costs
for security personnel, training, technical support, and research and
development have been identified, bringing total additional transit
security funding needs to more than $6 billion.
Responding transit agencies were asked to prioritize the uses for
which they required additional federal investment for security
improvements. Priority examples of operational improvements include:
Funding current and additional transit agency and local law
enforcement personnel.
Funding for over-time costs and extra security personnel during
heightened alert levels.
Training for security personnel.
Joint transit/law enforcement training.
Security planning activities.
Security training for other transit personnel.
Priority examples of security capital investment improvements
include:
Radio communications systems.
Security cameras on-board transit vehicles and in transit
stations.
Controlling access to transit facilities and secure areas.
Automated vehicle locator systems.
Security fencing around facilities.
Transit agencies with large rail operations also reported a
priority need for federal capital funding for intrusion detection
devices.
Mr. Chairman, the Department of Homeland Security issued directives
for the transit industry in May 2004, which would require that transit
authorities beef up security and to take a series of precautions which
would set the stage for more extensive measures without any federal
funding assistance. Transit systems have already carried out many of
the measures that Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is
calling for, such as drafting security plans, removing trash bins and
setting up procedures to deal with suspicious packages. The cost of
these measures and further diligence taken during times of heightened
alert is of particular concern to us. We look forward to working with
you in addressing these issues.
As you know, in the FY 2005 Homeland Security Appropriations bill
(PL 108-334), TSA can hire up to 100 rail inspectors using a $10
million appropriation. We have concerns about this provision. We
believe that funding for the inspectors would be better spent on things
that would support the industry such as surveillance cameras, and
emergency communication and other systems rather than highlighting
security issues without providing the necessary resources to address
them. We look forward to working with you in addressing our concerns.
ONGOING TRANSIT SECURITY PROGRAMS
Mr. Chairman, while transit agencies have moved to a heightened
level of security alertness, the leadership of APTA has been actively
working with its strategic partners to develop a practical plan to
address our industry's security and emergency preparedness needs.
Shortly after the September 11 events, the APTA Executive Committee
established a Security Task Force. The APTA Security Task Force has
established a security strategic plan that prioritizes direction for
our initiatives. Among those initiatives, the Task Force serves as the
steering group for determining security projects with more than $2
million in Transit Cooperative Research funding through the
Transportation Research Board.
Through this funding, APTA has conducted four transit security
workshop forums around the nation for the larger transit systems with
potentially greater risk exposure. These workshops provided
confidential settings to enable sharing of security practices and
applying methodologies to various scenarios. The outcomes from these
workshops were made available in a controlled and confidential format
to other transit agencies unable to attend the workshops. The workshops
were held in New York, San Francisco, Atlanta, and Chicago.
In partnerships with the Transportation Research Board, the APTA
Security Task Force has also established two TCRP Panels that
identified and initiated specific projects developed to address
Preparedness/Detection/Response to Incidents and Prevention and
Mitigation. The Security Task Force emphasized the importance for the
research projects to be operationally practical.
In addition to the TCRP funded efforts, a generic Checklist For
Transit Agency Review Of Emergency Response Planning And System Review
has been developed by APTA as a resource tool and is available on the
APTA web site. Also through the direction of the Security Task Force,
APTA has reached out to other organizations and international
transportation associations to formally engage in sharing information
on our respective security programs and to continue efforts that raise
the bar for safety and security effectiveness.
APTA has long-established Safety Audit Programs for Commuter Rail,
Bus, and Rail Transit Operations. Within the scope of these programs
are specific elements pertaining to Emergency Response Planning and
Training as well as Security Planning. In keeping with our industry's
increased emphasis on these areas, the APTA Safety Audit Programs have
been modified to place added attention to these critical elements.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, in light of our nation's heightened security needs
post 9/11, we believe that increased federal investment in public
transportation security by Congress and DHS is critical. The public
transportation industry has made great strides in transit security
improvements since 9/11 but much more needs to be done. We look forward
to building on our cooperative working relationship with the Department
of Homeland Security and Congress to begin to address these needs. We
again thank you and the Committee for allowing us to testify on these
critical issues, and look forward to working with you on safety and
security issues.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Millar, for your
testimony.
The chair would now recognize Mr. Peter Lowy, the CEO of
Westfield America, Inc., to testify.
Thank you for coming, sir.
STATEMENT OF PETER LOWY
Mr. Lowy. Thank you and good morning, Mr. Chairman. My name
is Peter Lowy. I am the chief executive of the Westfield Group.
Westfield is, in terms of equity market capitalization, the
world's largest publicly traded real estate company, with an
equity market capitalization of over $23 billion. We own and
operate 129 regional shopping malls in four countries:
Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and here in the
United States, where we own 68 regional shopping centers and
manage the retail concessions at nine major airports, including
terminals at JFK, Logan, Miami, Dulles and Reagan National.
I am testifying today on behalf of the Real Estate
Roundtable.
In my written testimony, there are a number of broad
suggestions with regard to business and homeland security
relations that while I believe would be helpful, seem almost
trivial in light of Hurricane Katrina. I would be happy to
discuss those suggestions with the staff or the committee at a
later date.
It is clear from the country's response to the devastation
in Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama that we are not
adequately prepared for the aftermath of a terrorist attack.
Democracy and the political process that we are governed by, is
by definition reactive.
The issues that business and government need to deal with
fall into three interrelated categories. They are
communication, coordination and preparedness.
From a communication point of view, things as simple as an
organizational chart should be distributed so that we in
business, and presumably the government, know who is
responsible for what; whom to deal with for what issue; and
most importantly, who is actually in charge.
At Westfield, our security plans assume the new normal is a
yellow alert level. However, we do not know if our normal
operating systems are consistent with what the government might
consider appropriate for a yellow alert level.
Business often receives no indication of what threats we
should be protecting against. And if they are identified, there
is no standard for us to look at that tells us how to protect
against that particular type of threat. A published list by
Homeland Security of best practices, tied to specific types of
threats, for example, would be extremely useful and helpful.
As you may know, Westfield owned the leasehold on the
retail mall at the World Trade Center prior to 9/11. Because of
our involvement in the World Trade Center, we unfortunately
have direct knowledge of the issues that a terrorist attack can
cause, whether they are personal, corporate, legal, economic,
or insurance-related. From a coordination and preparedness
point of view, prior to 9/11 Westfield implemented a nationwide
program to improve coordination between ourselves and first
responders. We also photographed all of our centers and fully
digitized those photographs and the building plans, including
those of the World Trade Center. The idea is to create a
database that can effectively and efficiently be shared with
first responders.
As you know, the Port Authority offices were destroyed on
9/11, and all of the paper building plans were destroyed with
it. So the emergency personnel did not have the use of the
blueprints for search and rescue operations. We realized
immediately after the attack that we actually had the plans
digitized. However, we literally could not find anyone to give
them to. Finally, 10 days after 9/11, with the help of the
mayor's office, we were able to get those plans to FEMA and the
Office of Emergency Management to assist rescue and recovery
workers in their efforts.
This experience resulted in our placing renewed emphasis on
building solid lines of communication between ourselves, the
local police, and fire and emergency departments at each of our
locations. There is no doubt that 9/11 accelerated our security
program and our investment in technology, people, systems, and
increasing working relationships with our first responders. We
sometimes even need to provide the technology that the local
authorities need in order to access our information.
We have now built strong relationships between the local
authorities and ourselves. We have held tabletop exercises in
our Los Angeles headquarters with the LAPD, L.A. Fire
Department, FBI, DHS, U.S Secret Service, Los Angeles Sheriff's
Department and other local emergency responders. We also staged
joint drills and training exercises with those authorities in
the many local jurisdictions where we have shopping centers
across the country.
In summary, I think that the events of the past week have
clearly demonstrated that Congress must aggressively pursue its
oversight of the government's planning and execution for all
activities related to homeland security.
Congress must work with DHS and all relevant state and
local entities so that clear lines of communication exist for
coordinated action to be carried out. The explosion of a
biological or nuclear bomb or multiple conventional terrorist
attacks in a major city can cause similar problems as those we
have witnessed in New Orleans.
Congress must make the effort to see around the corner and
designate with strict precision who is responsible for all
major facets of the government's response to a terrorist
attack, in order to best mitigate the potential damage and loss
of life.
The private sector can work to take as many proactive
measures as possible. As a mall owner, we can practice getting
our customers and tenants safely out of the door. However, an
effective evacuation will demand that the police can secure the
routes, the city can provide potential medical relief if
needed, and the state can provide transportation.
Congress must do all possible to achieve a comfort level
that Homeland Security and all relevant government entities
will work and communicate in the execution of these crucial
plans.
I thank you for your time and would be happy to answer any
questions after.
[The statement of Mr. Lowy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter Lowy
Wednesday, September 7, 2005
Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. Thank you
for this opportunity to address you this morning.
My name is Peter Lowy and I am the Chief Executive of The Westfield
Group. By way of reference, Westfield is in terms of equity market
capitalization the world's largest publicly-traded real estate company
with an equity market capitalization of over $23 billion dollars. We
own and operate 129 regional shopping malls in four countries--
Australia, New Zealand, the UK and here in the US where we own 68
regional shopping centers and manage the retail concessions at 9 major
airports including terminals at: JFK, Logan, Miami, Dulles and Reagan
National.
I am testifying today on behalf of the Real Estate Roundtable.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Real Estate Roundtable is the organization that brings
together leaders of the nation's top public and privately-held real
estate ownership, development, lending and management firms with the
leaders of major national real estate trade associations to jointly
address key national policy issues relating to real estate and the
overall economy. The Roundtable provides day-to-day operational
staffing of the Real Estate Information Sharing and Analysis Center.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I think I am in a somewhat unique position to discuss this issue.
As you may know, Westfield owned the leasehold on the retail mall at
the World Trade Center prior to 9/11. Because of our involvement in the
World Trade Center we unfortunately have direct knowledge of the issues
that a terrorist attack can cause--whether they are personal,
corporate, legal, economic or insurance related, as well as firsthand
experience in trying to cope with the new reality that malls as public
gathering places are considered to be targets for potential terrorist
activity.
Because we view our malls as ``town centers,'' even prior to the
recent events in London and before 9/11, Westfield was looking for more
effective ways to keep our centers--and thus our customers and
employees--safe. For instance, we had begun a nationwide program to (1)
improve communication and coordination between ourselves and first
responders and (2) photograph our centers and fully digitize them and
the building plans--including those of the World Trade Center. The idea
is to create a database that can be efficiently shared with responding
governmental entities so that first responders can know very quickly
where all the points of entrance and egress are--how to access the
roof, the HVAC and other sensitive areas. We did this because we took
on the view that while we may not necessarily be able to stop a
terrorist event--we have an obligation to try to mitigate the damage
one might cause in terms of death, injury and property damage.
As you know, the Port Authority offices were destroyed on 9/11 and
all of the paper building plans were destroyed with it--so that the
City and first responders were lacking the blueprints of the
structures. We realized immediately after the attack that we had the
plans digitized--however, we literally couldn't find anyone to give
them to. Finally, 10 days after 9/11 and with the help of the Mayor's
office we were able to get the plans to FEMA and OEM to assist rescue
and recovery workers in their efforts. This experience caused us to
place renewed emphasis on building solid lines of communication between
ourselves and local police, fire, and emergency departments.
There is no doubt that 9/11 accelerated our security program and we
invest in technology, in people, in systems, in creating active working
relationships with first responders--we sometimes even need to provide
the technology that local authorities need in order to access and
understand our information. In the US alone (since 9/11), 20% of our
operating costs are now devoted to security, that's approximately $40
million per year, and 20-25% of our operating capital expenditures have
been diverted to security infrastructure. But, as I have alluded to,
arguably the most important--and most challenging--piece of this is the
most low-tech of all. . .basic communication between the private sector
and the local and federal authorities.
Firstly, I recognize as a business person that building strong
relationships between local authorities and other key agencies is a
priority. That is why we have held table top exercises in our Los
Angeles headquarters with the LAPD, LA Fire Department, FBI, DHS, US
Secret Service, Los Angles Sheriffs Department and other local
emergency responders. We have also staged joint drills and training
exercises with those authorities in the many local jurisdictions where
we have shopping centers across the country. As an observer and a
participant in this process, it has been my observation that one of the
most difficult issues to solve is the lack of communication and
coordination between ourselves, the local authorities and the FBI and
the Department of Homeland Security. However, I understand that DHS has
launched a new initiative in the form of placing in the field
``Protective Security Advisors'' to provide better coordination between
Washington and the rest of the country. And there have been other
outreach efforts including local Homeland Security Advisory Councils--
which I have recently become involved in the greater-LA and Orange
County region. These and other initiatives are important as the
communication gap must be closed in order for prevention and response
to be effective.
No where is this more telling than in the threat-level system.
While again progress has been made, we all know of instances where the
level has been elevated without business leaders then hearing from the
government what measures we ought to take in order to meet that higher
level of threat.
Our security plans assume that the new, ``normal'' is a yellow
alert level. However, we don't know if our normal operating systems are
consistent with what the government might consider appropriate for a
yellow threat level. So that if there is an incident at one of our
centers, I can almost guarantee that someone will sue us and make the
argument that we didn't operate up to par with what a company should be
doing under a yellow alert. However, business often receives no
indication of what threats we should be protecting against. And if they
are identified, there is no standard for us to look to that tells us
how to protect against that particular type of threat. While I am not
looking to codify some new set of lengthy government regulations, it
would be helpful to create for business some ``safe harbor'' in the
event of litigation after a terrorist incident. One way DHS might
assist business would be to publish a list of ``best practices'' tied
to specific types of threats and then encourage insurers to incentivize
them.
I have here an internal document that shows how a mall such as ours
might deal with the various threat levels. This is obviously a
sensitive document that I would be hesitant to put into the official
public record but I would be very happy to review it and share it with
the Members of the Committee and the staff if that is helpful to them.
Currently, insurers have incentives in place for certain building
improvements to better protect the property in case of earthquake,
flooding and other natural disasters. In theory, if insurers are
provided guidance from federal or local authorities as to best
practices in security--they can then in turn incentivize their policy
holders. I am working with other CEOs around the country as a Member of
the Advisory Board of Rand's Center for Terrorism Risk Management
Policy where we are focusing on this issue of how insurance should
function in the post 9/11 economy. Rand currently has a study that is
underway which will look at the factors that affect the security
decision-making of commercial real estate owners and will include
insurance company incentives--or the lack thereof. I would be pleased
to share the results of this research with the committee when they are
available.
However, a recent Rand's study, ``Trends in Terrorism'' did touch
on this subject. That report stated: ``a long-run solution to terrorism
should be designed to incorporate specific mechanisms, such as
security-based premiums discounts, so that appropriate security
investments can be encouraged through private insurance.'' Needless to
say, in order for insurance to create incentives coverage needs to be
available in the marketplace; so while I know its not the focus of this
hearing I feel bound to remind you how important it is for Congress to
extend the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act.
As part of their outreach to the private sector, I know that DHS
has been working with industry groups and the Chamber to address the
need for more specific guidelines to the color code system. Clearly,
this is positive. I would simply urge that more communication with the
business community--and especially businesses like ours which thrive on
drawing large numbers of people to our properties--is necessary if we
are to be truly prepared for an emergency situation.
The Rand ``Trends in Terrorism'' study has made it clear that the
US Government's War on Terrorism has changed the operational
environment of al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups to softer targets
that are easier to attack and more likely to be in the private sector.
This trend has been exacerbated by target hardening around prominent
sites--which has triggered a process of threat displacement to the
easier to attack, civilian-frequented locations.
In summary, it is my opinion that at the heart of any cooperative
efforts between the government and the private sector lays clear and
reliable lines of communication. With more direction from DHS as to
``best practices'' and with insurers showing a willingness to reward
policy holders for instituting them, I believe business would spend
their limited resources more wisely and with greater benefit to the
public. If we accept that soft targets have in fact become more
attractive to terrorist cells, then it is especially important that a
vibrant private-public partnership continue to develop and from that
provide the business community with the best tools possible to secure
our properties and most especially our employees and customers.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Lowy, for your
testimony.
The chair would now recognize Mr. Michael Norton, Managing
Director of Global Property Management for the Tishman Speyer
Properties, to testify.
Thank you, sir, for coming.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL NORTON
Mr. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee.
My name is Michael Norton. I am responsible for directing
all property management activities at Tishman Speyer both in
the U.S. and globally.
Our company is one of the leading owners, developers, fund
managers and operators of first-class real estate in the world,
with a property portfolio totaling more than 42 million square
feet in major metropolitan areas across the United States,
Europe and Latin America. Notably, our portfolio includes
Rockefeller Center, the MetLife Building and the Chrysler
Building in New York City.
I am testifying today on behalf of the Real Estate
Roundtable, the Real Estate Board of New York, and BOMA
International.
Thank you for holding what I believe is the first
congressional hearing since the events of 9/11 at which major
real estate companies and their associations have been invited
to share their experience and expertise in security-related
matters.
As a company and as an industry, we are committed to
managing the risk of future acts of terrorism. That commitment
is, of course, influenced by the expectations and demands of
our various constituents including our tenant customers, our
lenders, investors, insurers, legal advisers and local, state
and federal government. In the end, any approach to security in
buildings will need to be supported by all those constituents
in order to be successful over the long term.
As an industry, we are spending over 20 percent more on
security than we were pre-9/11. And yet, in the end, managing
the risk of terrorism is not principally about spending more
money. It is about strategically using existing resources to
cost-effectively mitigate risks. Access to information,
experience and best practices are assets that are hard to put a
hard-dollar number on and yet they may be the most critical
resources we have.
In my statement, I have detailed specifically some of the
risk mitigation measures we have implemented at our company for
the buildings I mentioned above and for other high-profile
properties. These best practices fall into six basic
categories: communications; emergency response, including
emergency area access; training programs; hardening techniques;
information sharing; and coordination initiatives.
In reviewing the specific security measures, it is
important to recognize that we do not institute these measures
without first undertaking building specific risk assessments.
We are fully accountable for how we use our limited resources.
Our tenants and other key partners are looking for us to be as
efficient as possible by allocating limited resources where
there is the greatest combination of threat and vulnerability.
We certainly encourage Congress to take a similar risk-
based approach to funding homeland security. Scarce federal
resources should only be allocated to places and initiatives
that are addressing the greatest risk of death or injury to
civilian populations.
As for lessons learned, first let me say the need for
robust local communications channels with emergency response
officials is perhaps the single greatest lesson learned since
9/11.
One excellent system that I believe has become a model for
other cities is the New York Police Department's communication
channel to the private business sector known as the Area
Police-Private Leadership Security Liaison, also referred to as
APPL. Information about events taking place throughout the city
is now continuously provided via APPL e-mails. The recipients
of these e-mails are notified, normally in real time, of events
such as a manhole explosion on Fifth Avenue or a suspicious
package in a Times Square train station.
This information flow allows real estate operators to
ratchet up or down elements of their emergency response plans,
if necessary. Equally important is the fact that we can forward
this kind of information to our tenants and thus relieve
frazzled nerves by reassuring them that we are in the know.
Nationally, our focus on the need for improved
communications led to the development by 13 major trade
associations, representing office, hotel, shopping center and
multi-housing owners, for our own Information Sharing and
Analysis Center, also referred to as ISAC. Our ISAC is a 24/7,
two-way information channel between the real estate industry
and DHS that facilitates information sharing on terrorist
threats, warnings, incidents, vulnerabilities and response
planning to a network of over 120,000 real estate owners and
operators.
Our best local government partners know we are looking for
information, including actionable intelligence that bears
directly on the operation of our buildings, and they provide it
quickly. I am not sure there is any organization in the country
that does a better job of this than the NYPD. By working
closely over time, we have begun to have a mutual understanding
of our respective roles. We know our buildings' individual
vulnerabilities. Government has more of a beat on the changing
threat environment. We both need each other to succeed. This is
the proper model for our partnership at the federal level as
well.
Another lesson learned has been the need to ensure
government officials know who is actually responsible for the
security of high-profile buildings in this country.
Notably at the time of the orange alert for the New York
financial sector last year, the first DHS officials to
communicate with the private sector about the potential risks
to the Citicorp Center, including the then-Secretary of DHS,
were initially unaware that Citicorp neither owned nor managed
the physical security of the facility that bore its name.
To assist DHS and others to avoid that mistake in the
future, the Real Estate Board of New York has made available
its database of New York City commercial building owners and
managers as a reference to local, state and federal officials.
We strongly recommend other cities implement similar programs,
perhaps working with local building owners and managers
associations.
In conclusion, we are truly blessed that there have been no
major attacks on our country since 9/11. However, without
further incidents, it is sometimes difficult, particularly in
cities that have not experienced terror attacks in the past, to
ensure the proper level of realistic vigilance.
Through our ISAC, the real estate industry has recently
completed a 6-month public service advertising campaign
reaching well over 100,000 members of our industry. To that
same end, in April, the Real Estate ISAC facilitated the
participation of over 60 real estate firms in the national
terrorism simulation known as TOPOFF-3.
DHS should continue to reach out to the public at large
with similar awareness campaigns and to provide our industry
with opportunities to participate in exercises. We will get
more support for what we are doing from our key constituents if
there is consensus among the general public and our industry on
the need for appropriate measures.
These priorities must continue to be addressed aggressively
by DHS and other government authorities. Only then can we feel
confident that if there are other major acts of terrorism, we
can return to your committee and say we did everything
reasonably within our power to save human lives. That, in the
end, is what this is all about.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Norton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael L. Norton
Wednesday, September 7, 2005
Introduction
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Sanchez, and Members of the
Committee, my name is Michael Norton. I am responsible for managing and
directing all global property management activities at Tishman Speyer.
Tishman Speyer (www.tishmanspeyer.com) is one of the leading owners,
developers, fund managers and operators of first class real estate in
the world, with a property portfolio totaling more than 74 million
square feet in major metropolitan areas across the United States,
Europe and Latin America. Let me note at the outset that I am not aware
of any Congressional hearing where owners of landmark buildings have
been given the opportunity to share their homeland security experience
in the post 9/11 era. Thank you then for providing this unique forum.
I am testifying today on behalf of the Real Estate Roundtable \1\
(www.rer.org) where our company's Chief Executive Officer, Jerry
Speyer, is a member of the Board of Directors. I am also testifying on
behalf of the Real Estate Board of New York \2\ (www.rebny.org) and the
Building Owners Managers Association (BOMA) International \3\
(www.boma.org) two organizations where I personally sit on senior
governing boards and councils. In addition to my work with these
organizations, I am active on a number of other civic and charitable
organizations and was recently promoted to the rank of Lieutenant
Colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserves.
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\1\ The Real Estate Roundtable is the organization that brings
together leaders of the nation's top public and privately-held real
estate ownership, development, lending and management firms with the
leaders of major national real estate trade associations to jointly
address key national policy issues relating to real estate and the
overall economy. The Roundtable provides day-to-day operational
staffing of the Real Estate Information Sharing and Analysis Center.
\2\ As the oldest and most influential real estate trade
association in New York City, The Real Estate Board of New York
represents major commercial and residential property owners and
builders, brokers and managers, banks, financial service companies,
utilities, attorneys, architects, contractors and other individuals and
institutions professionally interested in the city's real estate.
\3\ Founded in 1907, the Building Owners and Managers Association
(BOMA) International is a dynamic international federation of over 100
local associations. The 19,000-plus members of BOMA International own
or manage over 9 billion square feet of downtown and suburban
commercial properties and facilities in North America and abroad.
BOMA's mission is to enhance the human, intellectual and physical
assets of the commercial real estate industry through advocacy,
education, research, standards and information.
I. Managing the Risk of Further Terrorist Attacks on Commercial Office
Buildings
A. Our Company's Stake and Commitment
The unique nature of our portfolio of assets--both existing
buildings and projects under development--ensures that sophisticated
risk management, including managing the risk of further terrorist
attacks, is a core business priority. We own and manage some of the
highest profile office buildings in the world, including Rockefeller
Center, the MetLife Building and the Chrysler Center in New York City.
Rockefeller Center, for example, is the number one tourist destination
in New York City with all the pedestrian traffic that comes with that
status. The Chrysler Center is a worldwide icon that, together with the
Empire State Building, defines the New York skyline. All these
buildings--and many others in our portfolio--sit atop mass transit and,
in the case of the MetLife Building, Grand Central Station itself.
Current projects now under development by Tishman Speyer include the
new baseball stadium for the New York Yankees, a major new building for
Citigroup in Long Island City, and the new headquarters buildings for
Goldman Sachs and the Hearst Corporation in New York City.
In the end, our guiding principle as a company in managing the risk
of terrorism is to meet or exceed the expectations of our customers--
our tenants. Many of these tenants are Fortune 500 companies or other
high-visibility institutions with strong commitments to managing
terrorism-related risks. We are also deeply influenced by the
expectations or demands of our lenders, investors, insurers, legal
advisors and local, state and federal government.
B. Our Industry's Commitment
Managing the risk of terrorism in the post 9/11 environment, and I
am speaking for the industry as a whole at this point, has galvanized
our individual and common resources to an unprecedented degree. By our
industry's standard benchmarking reference--BOMA's 2005 Experience
Exchange Report \4\--we are spending, as an industry, over 20% more on
security than we were pre 9/11. And yet, I hesitate to mention that
statistic because in the end managing risk is not principally about
allocating additional resources, it is about strategically using
existing resources to cost-effectively mitigate risks. Information and
experience are two assets that are hard to put a dollar value on and
yet they may be the most critical resources we have. Post 9/11, there
has been an unprecedented degree of information sharing within our
industry and with local, state and federal counter-terrorism and
emergency response authorities. This sharing of information--including
best practices--is being advanced in New York City through the
sophisticated local networks facilitated by the Real Estate Board of
New York as well as national networks supported by the Real Estate
Information Sharing and Analysis Center or ISAC (www.reisac.org), and
the various committees and task forces of BOMA and the Real Estate
Roundtable. We are also allocating substantial resources as an industry
to support the work of Rand Corporation's new Center for Terrorism Risk
Management Policy. (http://www.rand.org/multi/ctrmp)
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\4\ The Experience Exchange Report is an annual income and expense
benchmarking report for the commercial real estate industry performed
by the Building Owners and Managers Association International for more
information see www.boma.org. The report is based on the weighted
average responses of 3,210 buildings, representing approximately 700
million square feet of space.
C. The Nature, Including the Limits, of Our Industry's Role
Upon reflection, it is evident that the terrorist attacks in New
York City on 9/11 were, among other things, attacks on major US
commercial buildings and their tenants/occupants. In the aftermath of
these events, no one has implied that the collapse of the two towers
was as a direct result of the failure of the commercial real estate
industry. In fact, just five years after the 1993 Trade Center bombing,
the twin towers became internationally renowned for having the best
security measures of any commercial real estate property in the world.
After 1993, the World Trade Center had to provide the utmost security,
without making that office, retail and hotel complex the equivalent of
a closed military compound. In fact, as we all know, even a closed
military complex--the Pentagon itself--was also unable to deter
airborne attacks on 9/11.
As a result of the attacks of 9/11, the subsequent anthrax scares
(including one at NBC studios, located in Rockefeller Center), last
year's Citigroup Building incident, and the recent London bombings, the
commercial high-rise building industry, through no failure of its own,
has been severely affected, challenged, and thrust into the heart of
the terror threat issue. We always look for ways to better manage the
risk of further threats and attacks. But, at the same time, we remain
very dependent on the ability of government (including mass transit
authorities) to help limit the ability of terrorists to reach our
facilities in the first place.
D. The Reality of Target-Substitution
As Frank Cilluffo, the former special Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security and the current Director of the Homeland Security
Policy Institute at The George Washington University, testified before
this subcommittee on June 15, 2005,
We do not face an adversary that we can defeat in a
conventional war on a traditional battlefield by going plane
for plane or tank for tank, but one that will take the path of
least resistance by constantly searching for our greatest
vulnerabilities.
Mr. Cilluffo's assessment, as well as that of many experts with
Rand's Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy, confirm the harsh
reality of ``target substitution.'' Specifically, as traditional
critical infrastructure, including government facilities, are further
hardened, the attractiveness and vulnerability of our nation's so
called civilian ``soft targets'' is increasing. To mitigate this
disturbing reality, it is crucial that we move to simultaneously
address the threats against both hard and softer targets.
E. Pre-condition for all Security Measures: Sound Risk Assessment
Before detailing specific risk mitigation measures, it is important
to stress the central role that building-specific risk assessments play
in any rational allocation of resources. We are fully accountable for
how we use our limited ``resources''. Our customers, lenders and
investors are looking for us be as efficient as possible. Spending more
of their money, while sometimes appropriate, is not the way that we or
our constituencies measure progress. Limited resources need to be
applied first to those measures that have the greatest potential for
limiting loss of human life and property damage.
Risk is assessed both from the standpoints of threats and
vulnerabilities. In addressing the vulnerability-part of the equation,
we have benefited (as I know other major real estate companies have
been) by visits from DHS officials that have reviewed with us our own
assessments of our properties' vulnerabilities. These teams toured a
number of our buildings and spent a day at each property, speaking with
the staff and assessing what security measures were in place and what
additional measures we might consider now or in the event of specific
threats. We understood the overall aim of this exercise for DHS was to
assess privately owned commercial office buildings across the country
in an effort to establish the current state of security at these high
profile locations and to identify what ``best practices'' can be
established and shared among our business community. The DHS visits
were informative exchanges of private and public sector perspectives
and helped establish improved working relationships between our
organizations. In New York, the NYPD provides a similar service.
II. Commercial Real Estate Industry Lessons Learned and Best Practices
for Managing Terrorism Risk for Higher-Risk Buildings
The specific ``lessons learned'' and examples of best practices I
would like to share now with the subcommittee fall into six basic
categories: communication, emergency response (including emergency area
access), training programs, ``hardening'' techniques, information
sharing, and coordination initiatives.
A. Communication & Information Sharing
One of the greatest lessons that the real estate community learned
from 9/11 was the need for more robust communication channels between
the private and public sectors. These channels--both formal and
informal--should enable real estate operators to instantaneously
receive information and act more effectively based on that that
information. The channels should convey valid information, as well as
dispel rumors.
Locally: The need for robust local communications is perhaps the
single greatest lesson learned since 9/11. One excellent system--that I
believe has become a model for other cities--is the New York Police
Department's communications channel to the private business sector
known as the Area Police-Private Leadership Security Liaison or
``APPL.'' \5\ Information about events taking place throughout the city
is now continuously provided via APPL emails. The recipients of these
emails are notified normally in real time of events such as a manhole
explosion on Fifth Avenue, a suspicious package in a Times Square train
station, or an unauthorized helicopter flight over the Empire State
Building. This information flow allows real estate operators to ratchet
up or down elements of their emergency response plans, if necessary.
Equally important is the fact that we can forward this kind of
information to our tenants, and thus relieve frazzled nerves by
reassuring them that we are ``in the loop.''
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\5\ A number of other cities have strong systems in place or under
development. In Chicago's Central Business District the Chicago Police
Department has established the Security Broadcast Email System to
communicate with private sector security directors. Within the same
district they have established the Early Alert Radio Network (EARN)
program. EARN is a system by which high-rise buildings that purchase a
radio receiver can obtain information from the Chicago Police
Department. In the District of Columbia, ``D.C. Alert'' uses the Roam
Security Alert Network (https://textalert.ema.dc.gov/
index.php_CCheck=1) to provide immediate text notification and update
information during a major crisis or emergency. This system delivers
important emergency alerts, notifications and updates to a number of
devices, including cellular telephones, e-mail accounts, Blackberry
devices, and pagers.
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After this communication channel was established with the NYPD,
Tishman Speyer subscribed to an international communication service
that enables us to send messages to employees and tenant contacts
worldwide via email, text messages, and voice messages. Here is a real-
world example of how this information flow helps our company operate
more effectively:
Last month a suspicious package was discovered against a
building located on 54th Street and Madison Avenue, which is
directly across from one of our properties. The police had
arrived and closed off all pedestrian and vehicular traffic.
APPL sent out a message that informed us what was occurring and
later notified us that the package was found to be a regular
briefcase with no explosive devices. We were then able to use
our own in house multi-medium communication channels to
simultaneously inform every one of our tenants.
Nationally: The real estate industry--including major office,
hotel, shopping center and multi-housing owners and operators--has
requested and received permission from federal counter-terrorism
officials to create our own Real Estate Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (ISAC). The ISAC is a 24/7, two-way information channel
between the real estate industry and DHS that facilitates information
sharing on terrorist threats, warnings, incidents, vulnerabilities and
response planning to a network of over 120,000 real estate owners and
operators. For many years prior to 9/11, traditional critical
infrastructure industries (e.g., the financial services, electric
power, oil and gas, water, telecommunications, information technology,
chemical and food industries) all operated similar ISACs. We are
grateful to the White House and DHS officials that were willing to
think ``outside the box'' by supporting the creation of an ISAC for our
industry.
B. Emergency Area Access Procedures
Another lesson learned was the need for essential authorized
building personnel to have access to their properties as soon as
possible following an event. Immediately following the September 11
attacks on the World Trade Center the police cordoned off a very large
area in downtown Manhattan. However, in the future, property managers
and building engineers, who can identify themselves as such, will be
granted access to these types of restricted areas in order to address
vital building issues (e.g., shutting down running machinery and
turning off water lines). This will allow us to prevent any additional
damage and further economic loss. The cities of Boston, New York, and
Chicago have all instituted programs that allow private property owners
to register critical personnel with the city for that purpose.
C. Training Programs
Another lesson learned is the importance of expanding training
programs that incorporate the lessons learned from 9/11 so that they
can better prepare security officers and building management officials
that work in high-rise office buildings. Training should address not
only evacuation procedures, but also consider the difficult issue of
how and when to ``shelter-in-place'' if an actual or suspected bio-
chemical event occurs.
The American Society of Industrial Security, International (ASIS,
International) has established the Private Security Officer Selection
and Training Guideline. This guideline sets forth minimum criteria for
the selection and training of private security officers, which may also
be used to provide regulating bodies with consistent minimum
qualifications. In addition, ASIS's Physical Security Measures
Guideline is currently under development. This guideline will assist in
the selection of appropriate physical security measures, including
defining risk levels, implementing an integrated set of physical
security measures, and devising policies and procedures related to
security incidents, access control, monitoring systems, lighting,
security personnel, and audits and inspections. When completed, this
will be an extremely helpful tool to ensure that we members of the
private sector are providing improved training to our security officers
and other relevant officials.
Training should be provided not only to security officers but also
to other building personnel, including property managers, engineers,
fire safety directors and cleaners. It is important to remember that,
for all these groups, emergency action plans should be considered
crucial elements of their respective training programs. Exercises that
test these action plans are fundamental to the learning process. The
training, should, of course, include how to address biological and
chemical attacks, explosive devices, suicide bombers, and other
recognized terror techniques.
D. Target Hardening Techniques
As discussed above, it has become common practice, as part of sound
risk assessments, to perform vulnerability risk assessments on all
major properties. Buildings that receive high threat vulnerability
ratings may be appropriate for target hardening especially against
explosive devices (vehicular or pedestrian borne). Target hardening
focuses particularly on building lobbies, and since 9/11 many large
commercial office buildings in New York have installed turnstiles and
card access readers. In addition to the lobbies, the facades, loading
docks, and underground parking lots of many commercial office buildings
have been target hardened. After 9/11, Tishman Speyer target hardened
various elements of all of its then existing properties We are also
developers and as such we now incorporate target hardening from the
very beginning of the design and construction process.
E. Research
As stated above, post 9/11, the commercial real estate industry has
supported sophisticated research on how best to protect our homeland.
Most notably, we have helped launch the new RAND Center for Terrorism
Risk Management Policy (CTRMP) and provided high-level technical
consulting to that organization. While the Center has several missions,
one of its principal goals is to help security decision-making in an
age of catastrophic terrorism. Its mission is to help not only the
private sector but also the public sector assess the consequences of
individual and collective decisions about allocating terrorism security
resources and help these institutions make decisions about the risks
they face and the security portfolios appropriate to mitigating those
risks.
In addition to analytic research, the CTRMP has provided invaluable
learning tools for interactive strategic exercises. Most recently,
CTRMP further developed a RAND simulation involving the mock detonation
of a nuclear device smuggled into the United States aboard a container
ship in a major California port city. The exercise, which was developed
for various business sector audiences and senior Congressional
staffers, showed just what the human and financial losses would be if
this were actually to occur and what impact it would have on other
parts of the United States and the rest of the world.
F. Coordination with Government Authorities on Building
Ownership and Management Data
The commercial real estate industry stepped up to face another
challenge last summer when the national threat advisory system was
elevated for the financial sector. As you know, intelligence was
uncovered showing al-Qa'ida was doing extensive pre-attack surveillance
on prominent properties housing several major financial institutions.
The Citicorp Building in New York City was one of those properties.
Notably, the first DHS officials ``on the ground'' in New York--
including the then Secretary of DHS--were initially unaware that
Citicorp neither owned nor managed the physical security of that
facility. Indeed, across the country, it is not uncommon for counter-
terrorism officials to assume that the companies whose names are
associated with landmark buildings actually own or manage those
buildings.
To assist DHS and others identify quickly those actually
responsible for the management of a given building's physical security,
the Real Estate Board of New York has made available its database of
New York City commercial building owners and managers as a reference.
This database is regularly updated as purchases and sales take place
within the New York City office market. It includes landline telephone,
cellular telephone, beeper, and email contact information sorted by
building name and address. This could prove to be a valuable resource
for DHS, especially when notifications are required in an
``actionable'' timeframe. REBNY has also provided this database to the
New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM) and to the New York
City Department of Buildings (DOB). We encourage other cities to make
use of similar data bases of office buildings by working with local
BOMA organizations.
G. Building Industry Awareness Through Media Campaigns and
Exercises
Post 9/11 it has become increasingly clear that without continuous
citizen awareness campaigns, public interest and concern about
terrorism can drop dramatically. This is particularly true in cities
that have never had a major terrorist incident. Therefore, the Real
Estate ISAC in January of 2005 commenced a six-month public service
advertising campaign to encourage building owners and managers to
address homeland security issues. Through their ``Fighting Terrorism''
advertising campaign in Real Estate Forum and 10 trade journals, the
ISAC, its trade member groups and its media partner, Real Estate Media
Inc., have reached over 120,000 real estate professionals with their
important message about the need for a well-prepared real estate
industry sector.
To the same end, in April, 2005, the Real Estate ISAC further
advanced its mission of encouraging greater industry awareness and
readiness by facilitating the participation of over 60 real estate
firms in the national terrorism simulation exercise known as ``TOPOFF
3''. This biennial exercise, involving some 10,000 federal and state
officials and representatives of Great Britain and Canada, sought to
strengthen the nation's capacity to prevent, prepare for, respond to,
and recover from large-scale terrorist attacks involving weapons of
mass destruction. It was the first of these exercises in which the
private sector, including the commercial real estate sector, was
allowed to participate on an equal footing with our public sector
partners. Those who participated from our industry leveraged this
multi-million dollar federal exercise to assess their own current
emergency plans. Following the exercise, industry participants reported
making changes to those aspects of their plans that were found to be
insufficient. Going forward, I cannot stress enough the importance to
our industry of opportunities to participate in joint exercises with
local, state and federal officials.
H. Specific Security Measures and Best Practices for Major
Buildings
In our company's experience, effective building security is a
combination of design features (e.g., physical barriers and electronic
systems), personnel and staffing strategies (personnel and procedural)
that are integrated into a well-defined program. As indicated above,
determining the degree to which each of these components should be
utilized depends on several risk factors. These factors include whether
the building is a symbol or has some other national status, the
specific environment at or around the building (e.g., is it a tourist
attraction? Are their high-risk tenants or other specific risk
factors?), and the structural design of the building (e.g., is there
interior parking). I would like to take a few moments to tell you about
some of the security measures that have been implemented in our
industry. I will use some examples of security measures that Tishman
Speyer has employed at its properties, but most of these are recognized
as best practices by other major owners in our industry.
Satellite Telephones: Many real estate owners and
operators have satellite telephones in each region where they
have properties. In the event of an emergency, when all
landline and cellular connections are busy, these portable
satellite telephones will continue to operate. As events unfold
in a region, security directors and senior managers can remain
in contact with personnel on location in order to assess the
situation and issue instructions. The satellite telephones also
ensure that the building staff will be able to communicate with
the emergency services at all times during an incident.
Furthermore, key personnel, including senior management, should
carry emergency contact information with them at all times.
Emergency Procedure Guidebooks: Buildings are often
equipped with Emergency Procedure Guidebooks These standardized
manuals provide staff members with check lists of their
respective responsibilities in the case of a property
emergency. This ensures that, even under difficult
circumstances, building personnel will know the procedures
necessary to facilitate the safe evacuation of their
properties.
Company or Building Specific-Color Coded Alert
Systems: Many real estate companies have instigated their own
internal color code or security level alert systems. For
example, under our procedures, the color green represents the
current ``Standard Operating Procedures'', the color yellow
indicates ``Heightened Alert Operations'' and the color red
signifies ``Emergency Event Operations.'' This system requires
us to constantly and consistently assess the security risk in
any region at any time.
Emergency Response Training Videos: Tishman Speyer has
developed a two hour training video for property staff to learn
about biological and chemical agents, including their effects
on the human body, how they can be transmitted, and what
initial actions should be taken while waiting for emergency
services to arrive. The objective of this training program is
to help ensure that the property staff can better identify the
potential release, dissemination, or detonation of these deadly
agents in the event of an attack. This training segment also
addresses what actions may be appropriate to take once an
attack has occurred, including evacuations or sheltering in
place, shutting off of fresh air intakes, and receiving of
updates from the local authorities.
Terrorism Awareness Training: Security officers also
receive training in terrorism awareness and response. The
elements of common terror attack modes are discussed with a
focus on the opportunities a security professional may have to
intervene. The officer is encouraged to concentrate on a
person's behavior, as opposed to a person's physical
characteristics. For the purpose of this training, the ``Stages
of a Terrorist Event'' are defined as ``Target Selection;
Surveillance of the Target; Planning of the Operation;
Rehearsals and Dry-runs; Escaping from the Target; and the
Exploitation of the Act.'' Finally, substantial time is
committed to discussing conventional explosive devices and
improvised explosive devices, as well as the correct way to
handle a report of a ``suspicious package'' or telephone or
written bomb threat. This kind of in-house training may be
supplemented by DHS's own `'soft target'' terrorism awareness
training programs.
Rapid Shut Down of Air-Intakes: Some high profile
buildings have implemented controls that enable building
personnel to quickly and easily shut off the fresh air intakes
in the case of an emergency. Automatic shut-off switches have
been installed at appropriate locations and can easily be
activated if we receive timely information from the relevant
authorities. A critical aspect to successfully addressing a
potential biological or chemical agent attack/event at or in
the vicinity of a building is having adequate early warning/
communication channels with the appropriate local government.
In-Depth Property-Specific Threat Vulnerability
Assessment: In our high profile properties property specific
threat vulnerability assessments were performed by nationally
recognized security consultants, and these consultants provided
recommendations on how to improve security in certain areas.
Action plans to implement these recommendations, together with
the corresponding budgets, are formulated by each individual
building's property manager in light of property specific
factors including tenant demand.
``Closed Buildings'': Many properties that are viewed
as potential targets have been transformed from open access
buildings into ``closed'' buildings. Building lobbies were
historically vulnerable areas for unauthorized access into a
facility. Without lobby access control, anyone can enter an
elevator and reach any floor desired. Prior to September 11,
2001, most properties only enacted access control systems after
normal business hours (6PM--7AM, Monday--Friday and weekends).
Since 9/11, turnstiles and visitor pre-registration systems
have been installed in certain buildings to provide management
with detailed knowledge of when people are entering the
property. In order to pass through the turnstiles, tenants must
have valid building-issued identification cards including
personal photographic images.
Visitor Processing Centers and Courier Centers: Post
9/11, some buildings have set up visitor processing centers and
courier centers. The visitor centers authorize access to the
elevators only after they have received approval from relevant
tenant hosts. The security officers then scan the visitors'
proof of identification and issue temporary access badges, in
some cases with photographs of the visitors on them. At the
courier centers, security officers use X-ray machines to scan
all packages. In some cases, couriers are not granted access to
the buildings and instead building employees deliver packages
to the appropriate offices.
H. Response to the London Mass Transit Bombings
The London bombings occurred exactly two months ago to the day, on
July 7, 2005. As such, it is still too early to identify exactly what
new lessons we learned and what new security measures will be
instituted as a result of this tragedy.
We have long had an excellent working relationship with the
Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) and are working with the REBNY and
the Real Estate Roundtable to build a stronger industry-wide
partnership with mass transit authorities throughout the nation. We
are, of course, also watching closely as the MTA looks at the benefits
of increased use of CCTV. This is one example of how this nation
appears to be embracing technological advances to increase the safety
of our civilian infrastructure. This is particularly relevant to us as
we need to provide tenants with secure buildings but also we are
directly affected by our tenants' confidence in the public
transportation that delivers them to our properties on a daily basis.
Furthermore, as I mentioned at the outset, many of our properties are
built directly above subway networks and we are only as secure as our
weakest link. Again our dependence on sound government security
initiatives is extraordinary.
III. Continuing Challenges & Policy Recommendations
My testimony has stressed specific ``on the ground'' lessons
learned and best practices with the hopes that this may spur dialogue
within our industry and elsewhere on how best to encourage improved
homeland security. I recognize the extraordinary challenges that local,
state and federal government authorities face in helping to advance the
state of the art in terms of homeland security. At the same time, as an
industry, we do have some policy suggestions for you to consider as you
oversee the work of DHS.
A. Priorities
Emergency Response: In terms of allocating scarce federal
resources, when it comes to improving public-private homeland security
partnerships, we agree with the emphasis the 9/11 Commission has placed
on the need for emergency response and business continuity planning. In
that regard, we believe that partnerships at the local level with
emergency response agencies should be a top priority. DHS can and
should continue to support--financially where appropriate--outreach
efforts at the local level to bring the business community more fully
into partnerships with local emergency response officials. The decision
to spend very limited federal funds should be made with a very
realistic understanding of the different level of threat and
vulnerability presented by different geographic locations.
Also with respect to emergency response planning, we are well aware
of the spotlight the 9/11 Commission, and later federal legislation,
placed on the general goals and principles set out in the National Fire
Protection Association Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and
Business Continuity Programs (NFPA 1600). As an industry we have a
range of sound references to help us begin to apply those very general
goals and principles to specific buildings and situations. As you may
know, that Standard was not developed with individual building issues
in mind.
It will be important to retain the flexibility to make asset
specific decisions, based on asset specific risk assessments. At the
same time, we recognize the need to encourage greater consistency of
performance across all business sectors and within our sector. The
government does have a role in helping to create a shared language and
set of performance oriented metrics in this area. We look forward to
working with DHS and others to help improve the private sector's
emergency readiness. A solid simulation and exercise program at the
local level--supported where necessary by federal resources--is an
important step in this direction. We also suggest that DHS continue to
work closely with the insurance industry to ensure their policies offer
proper incentives for positive performance in the area of emergency
response planning.
B. Actionable Intelligence
With respect to the issue of intelligence sharing with the private
sector, I want to stress that we are not asking for uncensored access
to all intelligence reports. What we are looking for is access to any
information made available to local counter-terrorism officials that
bears directly on the operation of our buildings. Where the threat is
so vague and general that no ``actions'' are being recommended, that
fact also needs to be made clear. As indicated above, we have a growing
number of strong partnerships at the local level where intelligence is
shared effectively with our industry. I am not sure there is any
organization in the country that does a better job of that than the
NYPD. By working closely over time, we have begun to have a mutual
understanding of our respective roles. We know our buildings'
individual vulnerabilities; government has more of a beat on the
changing threat environment. We both need each other to succeed. This
is the proper model for our partnership at the federal level as well.
C. Public Awareness
Often, conflicting tenant expectations and awareness are challenges
that we face as an industry. The tenants want to be comfortable that we
are doing everything possible to ensure their safety but at the same
time they do not want to work in a military fortress. We note that
striking the right balance in this regard is also an issue that the
public transportation authorities are forced to deal with today. The
DHS needs to support the efforts at the local level to build public and
business awareness of the importance of proper planning and training in
this area. Only when our tenants have fully ``bought-in'' to the
importance of this issue do they support our efforts to take rational
security measures. In many parts of the country, tenants do not believe
this issue is a major risk factor and are therefore unwilling to pay
for some or all of the specific measures, I've detailed above. In my
view, government has an obligation to help educate the public in a
reasonable and realistic way about the threats we face in the post 9/11
environment. Frankly, unless or until there are more attacks, that
educational process will be very challenging. Hearings like this and
recent public comments by Secretary Chertoff suggest top government
officials are committed to this goal.
Conclusion
These priorities must continue to be addressed aggressively by DHS
and other government authorities. Only then can we feel confident that,
if other major acts of terrorism were to occur, we could return to your
committee and say we did everything reasonably within our power to save
human lives. That, in the end, is what this is all about.
Thank you and I am happy to take questions.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Norton, for your
testimony.
The chair would now recognize Mr. Joe Madsen, director,
safety and risk management for the Spokane Public Schools, to
testify.
Thank you for coming, sir.
STATEMENT OF JOE MADSEN
Mr. Madsen. Chairman Lungren, members of the Committee, I
am Joe Madsen. I am a risk manager in a school district of
31,000.
There are 47 million students every day attending schools
in our nation. Of those, 25 million ride 444,000 school buses.
They do over 8.8 billion trips and are exposed that many times
per year in regards to them being a soft target.
I have provided you written testimony indicating what we in
Spokane have done with the school district, the fire department
and the police department.
I certainly could come before you to indicate our wants,
needs and desires in terms of funding for facilities, for
training, target-hardening, or specific allocations for school
resource officers. I, however, think it is more important to
concentrate on the big picture, those things that actually
matter at the ground level; those things that have affected us
in Spokane.
The all-hazards approach that we have conducted affects not
only terrorism, not only disasters, or natural disasters, but
any type of incident and the planning and preparation for those
in advance has been what made the difference for us. Potential
issues such as critical incidents, natural disasters and of
course terrorism are those issues that we need to concentrate
on.
We are a nation of special interests, but one that cannot
be seen through only one set of lenses. We need to be
constantly looking at the big picture and looking at systems
approaches, systems which combine resources, shared data,
relationships built on trust, joint training exercises, not
just large-scale required drills, but small-scale trust-
building exercises. It is less about me and mine, but more
about us.
Systems revolving around communications, relationships,
pre-planning, data-sharing and the use of technology, I am here
to tell you that it can be done with successful results.
In a microcosm, I manage five departments: safety,
transportation, security, worker comp, and insurance. Those
five departments 10 years ago did not work together. They
reported to different people and they did not help each other.
But over the last 10 years, we have been able to cause the
effect that we need to successfully work together.
By ensuring that safety officers work with security
officers, that security officers work with transportation
staff, we ensure a system that responds to an incident no
matter large or small, no matter whether it is a security issue
or a safety-related issue, as a unit.
In the city of Spokane, we also have made that opportunity.
For over 10 years, we have had police liaison meetings between
the school district and the police department. Those types of
relationships and trust-building are critical to having
resolved our incident at Lewis and Clark High School.
Just 2 weeks ago, the police department conducted SWAT
exercises within our high schools. They did not do it by
themselves. They did not do it at the police academy, but they
came into our schools. They have been doing this for years. At
those exercises, we had our principals and our district
resource officers.
It is the relationships that we have built over the past
several years that allow us to respond to an incident, to plan
for it, and to communicate effectively when an incident occurs.
At the state level in Washington, we have the Department of
Emergency Management, the Office of Superintendent for Public
Instruction, the Washington State Patrol, all working together
with a data management system that allows us to map schools, to
provide photographs, to provide the information related to the
critical structures and information related to the
organizational charts in every one of our facilities.
Right here today in my computer, I have all 12 of our high
schools and middle schools and all the data I need to make a
decision from across the nation to be able to respond to an
emergency or to communicate effectively with the fire
department and police department.
It is communication, relationships, data-sharing,
preparation and working together as a system that causes the
effect that we need. The question is, is on the federal level,
are we sharing data, are we communicating, and do we have the
relationships between the multitude of different agencies?
I work currently with the Department of Homeland Security,
the Department of Education, Occupational Safety and Helath
Administration (OSHA), but I receive different direction from
each of them. If we can have the relationships and the
information and the communication that I think that we have
shown in Spokane in the state of Washington with our police and
fire, I think that we would go a long ways to solving our
issues such as Katrina.
Thank you for the ability to present. You have my written
testimony. I would be happy to answer any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Madsen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph C. Madsen
Wednesday, September 7, 2005
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sanchez, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for having me here to discuss this important
subject. My name is Joe Madsen and I am the Director of Safety and Risk
Management for Spokane Public Schools in Spokane, Washington.
I am before you today to discuss school safety and how the federal
government can be more proactive in protecting our school children,
teachers, and staff from a wide variety of threats and emergencies.
Following 9/11, the federal government focused its efforts on improving
security around airports, transit systems, and public facilities, the
so called ``hard targets.'' Today I'd like to talk about one of our
nation's most valuable assets, our children, and a successful program
begun in Washington State that combines old fashion relationship-
building, interagency cooperation, and state-of-the art technology to
protect our schools against terrorist attacks and other emergencies.
We have more than 47 million children enrolled in educational
facilities across the U.S. Because schools typically contain large
numbers of students in a single location, they represent an appealing
target for terrorists seeking the maximum emotional impact for their
cowardly acts. Domestically we've already experienced a form of
terrorism, and schools like West Paducah in Kentucky; Springfield in
Oregon; Columbine in Colorado; and Red Lake in Minnesota stir emotion
in the hearts of parents and dispel the feeling ``that it couldn't
happen here.'' On the international side, it's even more disturbing. In
Beslan, Russia last year, terrorists took more than 1,100 hostages at a
local school. More than 330 students and staff were killed and another
700 people were seriously injured. A similar incident occurred this
June when terrorists attacked an international school in Cambodia and
took over 70 children and staff hostage.
I know first hand the damage a terrorist attack can do at a school.
At 11:30 a.m. on September 22, 2003 a student with a 9mm handgun
entered one of my schools, Lewis and Clark High School, in Spokane. It
was the lunch hour and the school was packed with more than 2,000
students eating lunch in the hallways, a tradition at this school.
Normally, chaos would break out at this point. But in Spokane, the
police, fire, school staff, and students are well trained on how to
respond to emergencies. Just prior to the incident, Washington State
had begun deployment of a statewide crisis management system (CMS) for
protection of critical public infrastructure. Using this new system,
the Spokane Police Department, the Spokane Fire Department, the
Washington State Patrol, and school district officials implemented pre-
determined tactical response plans and quickly responded to the school.
Detailed information about the school building in the CMS system
allowed police to isolate the gunman in just 12 minutes, evacuate more
than 2,000 students to a pre-established family re-unification center,
and immobilize the gunman. The students were spared the trauma of
having to witness the incident and were able to return to their school
the very next day.
This situation, and it would be no different if it had been an
organized terrorist incident, a fire, a hazmat spill, or a hurricane,
was successfully mitigated because the first responders in Spokane have
developed an excellent system for emergency response, involving
training, relationship building, implementation of FEMA's National
Incident Management System (NIMS) protocols, and use of state-of-the
art CMS technology that makes critical facility information accessible
to all responding agencies. How this incident was handled, and the
systems put in place to mitigate such events, could well serve as a
model for other school districts across the nation.
I'd like to take a few minutes to talk about this incident in
greater detail, because the story exemplifies many of the issues facing
police and fire today in responding to a wide variety of emergencies.
To provide you with some background: In 2003 the State of
Washington funded development of a statewide crisis management system
for critical infrastructure. The computer-based system provides first
responders with instant access to critical information, including fire
and police tactical preplans and more than 300 data points including
facility emergency plans, satellite images, interior and exterior
photos, floor plans, evacuation routes, utility shut-offs, hazardous
materials locations and more. The simple, easy-to-use software is
designed to allow emergency response personnel to act quickly,
decisively, and safely during any facility-related emergency incident.
The system combines data that used to be kept in three-ring binders at
a variety of locations into a single, master database. It also provides
all responding agencies with equal access to critical infrastructure
data. Equally important, facility owners can quickly update information
about changes at their facilities via the Web, ensuring that first
responders are basing their decisions on the most current data
available.
This system was implemented at Lewis and Clark High School in
August 2003, just two weeks before the actual shooting incident. An
integral part of the implementation is a series of planning sessions
where school officials meet with their local police and fire
representatives to pre-plan how each agency will respond to various
emergency scenarios. This process establishes working relationships
between first responders from various agencies and is the basis for
development of trust and cooperation. The system is also compliant with
FEMA's National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Incident
Command System (ICS). ICS, a subset of NIMS, is a standardized on-scene
incident management protocol designed to allow responders to adopt an
integrated organizational structure equal to the complexity and demands
of any single incident or multiple incidents without being hindered by
jurisdictional boundaries.
The crisis management system adopted by Washington State melds well
with the approach advocated by many of our nation's police and fire
departments emphasizing the primary role local public safety agencies
play in emergency response:
1. Local responders need to have venue specific information
available to them in order to plan, prepare, and mitigate acts
of terrorism and other emergencies (both man-made and natural).
2. While not frequently addressed in national anti-terrorism
policy, schools represent perhaps our community's most
sensitive venues.
3. Local, tribal, state, and federal public safety providers
need to have affordable, reliable, scalable, and extensible
data system(s) to manage this information.
4. Development of ``information silos'' creates
interoperability issues at local, regional, and federal levels.
The goal would be development of a standardized national
interface.
5. First responders need to have simple and reliable access to
information in order to act swiftly and decisively.
6. Disaster mitigation requires interagency cooperation and
common access to information in a standardized form.
The Lewis and Clark High School Shooting Incident
Now, let's go back and look at how this combination of interagency
cooperation, preplanning, use of the Incident Command System protocols,
and implementation of a crisis management system helped us successfully
mitigate a potentially dangerous shooting incident at Lewis and Clark
High School. It is important to remember that during this type of
incident, many things are happening concurrently and involving a wide
number of public safety agencies and other stakeholders.
As gunfire rang out in the school, the principal and the school
resource officer (SRO) immediately responded to the 3rd floor to
evaluate the situation and determine the exact location of the gunman.
In a shooting incident, the standard operating procedure calls for a
school lockdown, but in this situation there were thousands of students
out in the hallways eating lunch. After a short discussion, they
realized the quickest way to evacuate the students was to pull the fire
alarm. Lewis and Clark students go through numerous fire drills during
the school year and were quick to respond.
At the same time, a SRO at another school had pulled up the crisis
management system on his laptop and was relaying information about the
gunman's location and the school layout directly to police dispatch,
which in turn passed the information on to responding officers.
Local patrol officers arrived at the school within four minutes and
initiated what is known as an ``active shooter response'' to contain
the suspect. This means that they immediately entered the school and
moved directly towards the gunman, not waiting for a SWAT team to
arrive and deploy.
During the Columbine incident, it took more than five hours before
officers responding from multiple police agencies coordinated their
efforts and entered the building.
Fire, police, and school security quickly set up a command post in
a pre-determined location and accessed the crisis management program on
a nearby computer. The program can be accessed via laptop computers,
Internet connected computers, or by thumbnail-sized USB devices carried
by SROs and first responders. A SRO initially assumed the role of
Incident Commander per the ICS protocol. Police, fire, and emergency
services in the Spokane area all adhere to ICS, whereby responders play
pre-determined roles during an emergency, independent of their rank or
agency. This high level of coordination made a world of difference in
their ability to quickly respond and mitigate the critical situation at
the high school.
The SWAT team, taking over from the active shooter team, positioned
themselves in a nearby stairwell outside of Room 307 where the gunman
was barricaded. They were puzzled when he popped his head out of three
different doorways along the 3rd floor hallway. Officials at the
command post accessed the floor plan via the CMS system and told them
that Room 307 and Room 305 were connected by an internal doorway.
As a hostage negotiator began talking with the gunman, officials in
the command post noticed that the corner room he occupied had
unobstructed views of the grassy field where the students had been
evacuated, and to eight lanes of traffic on the adjacent Interstate 90
freeway. Officials viewed aerial photos of the site and decided to move
the students under the overhead freeway where they would be out of the
line of fire. Using phone contacts listed in CMS, I called our
transportation contractor, Laidlaw Educational Services, and asked them
to immediately send 20 buses to relocate the students to an alternative
site. Since the school district transportation department had
participated in the preplanning sessions, they immediately understood
what was needed. At the same time, a list of pre-determined roadblocks
from the CMS was sent to the Spokane City Streets Department to block
access to the school. Another list was sent to the Washington State
Patrol to block access to the eight lanes of Interstate 90, which were
exposed to the gunman's line of fire from the corner classroom. In both
instances, valuable time was saved because all the roadblocks were
determined during the pre-planning sessions with school officials,
police, fire, and State Patrol that are part of the CMS implementation.
As news of the incident spread to parents via cell phone calls from
their kids, it became important to discourage parents from driving
towards the school and blocking local access routes for emergency
vehicles. PIOs from both the school district and the police departments
worked together to provide ongoing information to parents and the
general public regarding the evolving situation.
Another problem developed when the gunman asked the police
negotiator for matches. Fire officials knew from the CMS that Room 307
was a science lab, and as such, had a number of natural gas outlets.
The concern was the gunman may be suicidal. In addition, there was
always the potential for an explosion caused by any errant gunfire.
Officials in the command post called the local gas company, which
dispatched the nearest crew to help shut off the gas. Unfortunately,
the crew was used to working on residential facilities and wasn't
familiar with commercial installations.
Using the CMS, officials printed out photos of the utility shut-off
valves and their location. A police officer escorted the utility crew
and the gas was quickly shut-off. Fire officials also used the CMS to
print out a list of all chemicals stored in Room 307. The printout
listed the type of chemicals, their location, quantity, and Material
Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) that profiled the chemical's characteristics
and safety precautions.
With all the students safely evacuated, the roads blocked off, and
the gunman isolated to a single location, it became a waiting game
between the police and the gunman. Unfortunately, the gunman chose to
provoke the SWAT team who were forced to fire in self-defense. The
wounded student was quickly evacuated by waiting paramedics to a nearby
hospital where he eventually survived his wounds.
What was learned as a result of this incident that is pertinent to
terrorism incidents and other emergencies? First, schools are highly
vulnerable to a terrorist type attack. They need to be considered by
DHS for both increased funding and protection. Secondly, in any such
incident, local responders always will be the first on the scene. In
even a minor emergency, these responders will represent multiple
agencies with overlapping and sometimes divergent priorities. It is
absolutely critical that these agencies establish trusted, working
relationships with each other prior to a major event. Facility owners
(schools, court houses, businesses, etc.) also need to sit down with
public safety officials to talk about how they will respond to a wide
variety of emergencies, and how they will work with other agencies to
mitigate the situation. Third, agencies need access to common, pre-
established communications channels during emergencies. Last week's
rescue operations following Hurricane Katrina emphasize the problems
when public safety and other responders cannot communicate with each
other during rescue and recovery operations. And lastly, all first
responders need access to detailed, up-to-date building and site
information, such as that provided by a crisis management system.
The Problem of Protecting Students on School Buses
I've talked about the procedures for protecting students in school
buildings, but we also need to consider the problem of protecting
students on school buses, an often neglected area in emergency plans.
Spokane Public Schools serve 31,000 students in 55 different
facilities, including six high schools, six middle schools, 35
elementary schools and a variety of special schools located in jails,
hospitals and contracted agencies. Seven thousand of these students
ride school buses to get to and from their local school. These 167
buses, carrying between 44 and 72 students each, travel 9,000 miles
each day, the equivalent of going from Spokane to New York City and
back 180 times a year. Along the way, they stop at thousands of bus
stops to pick up children.
To give you an idea of the scope of the problem, there are more
than 47 million students in any given day attending our nation's
schools. Of these, 25 million ride in 440,000 yellow school buses that
travel 8.8 billion trips each year. This is in comparison to public
transit systems that serve 5.2 billion unlinked passenger trips each
year in the U.S.
It is now easy to understand why protecting students on all these
buses is a gargantuan task. Imagine this frightening scenario: One of
the Spokane School District buses does not show up at its school of
destination after picking up its 58 students. It takes 12 minutes until
a phone call is made from the school to the transportation department.
They in turn call the bus contractor who attempts, without success, to
contact the bus by radio. After another 15 minutes, the school
district's security department and the Spokane Police Department are
notified. In a city of more than 150 big, yellow school buses, it is
next to impossible to check each one to see if they are the missing
school bus.
Meanwhile in Miami, Florida; San Francisco, California; Dallas,
Texas; Tupelo, Mississippi; and Mt. Lebanon, Pennsylvania the same
scenario is unfolding. Each local jurisdiction is dealing with a crisis
of a missing bus full of children. It isn't until an hour later that a
connection is made by a national AP reporter who ties together news
reports of three of the instances. Thirty minutes later, now two hours
into the incident, it is confirmed by an anonymous phone call to the
FBI that what was a series of localized emergencies is now a national
terrorist crisis.
While it would be impractical to provide armed escorts for the
thousands of school buses on our nation's roads each day, we can use
technology, training, and communications tools to better protect these
children. One solution, being implemented in Spokane Public Schools, is
to do ``security mapping'' of school buses and incorporate this
information, along with tactical response plans, into a CMS system. A
similar approach could be taken with our metropolitan transit
authorities nationwide, many of whom provide transportation services
for school children.
Constant Shifting of Priorities Jeopardizes National Security--A
Study of HVAs
Another issue effecting national security is how Hazard
Vulnerability Analysis (HVA) information is ``siloed'' and not shared
with other agencies. HVAs have been and continue to be a vital means of
studying and prioritizing local community, state, and national areas of
concern regarding natural disasters, emergencies, and security crises.
There is no question that HVAs should be conducted at the local, state,
and national levels. That said, local agencies, including emergency
responders such as police, fire, medical, and EMS, as well as the
institutions they serve (school districts, businesses, hospitals, etc.)
should be held responsible for response planning, training, facilities
security improvements, etc.
Equally important is that the HVAs utilize an ``all hazards''
approach. I feel HVAs should not focus solely on security issues at the
expense of fire prevention, medical services, or hazardous chemical
exposures. As Hurricane Katrina has shown us in the past week, whether
it is a terrorist incident, a hurricane, a flood or any other type of
disaster, the emergency response is similar in all cases. Emergency
agencies, as well as businesses and institutions, should support the
cooperative sharing of HVAs through communication and joint planning.
The root of this problem is that agencies often operate within a
vacuum of their own priorities, frequently at the detriment of other
agencies or service providers. Nationally, we seem to be bouncing from
one priority to another (air transportation to subways to trains, etc.)
with little coordination between agencies, first responders or those
affected. HVAs certainly help to set department goals, budgets,
training, etc., but if done without consultation with other responder
agencies, it creates a system of individual priorities, and often,
conflicting priorities. As a result, decisions about finance, training,
personnel, equipment, policies, and response procedures are made
without dovetailing into a national priority. It is easy to get caught
up in MY needs and priorities when in an emergency; WE will need to
work and act together as a system.
The Importance of Sustainability of Programs
Often the sustainability of a program is only thought of in regard
to the funding of the program. Sustainability should be tied to local
community priorities, or decisions regarding the determination of HVAs
made by all stakeholder organizations. It is only through this joint
decision-making that long term support of a program can be ensured.
Most federal grants now require the signatures of many different
service agencies or end users. These signatures by themselves, however,
do not ensure long term cooperation.
Another aspect of sustainability is the continued ``silo effect''
that permeates many agencies based on their specific goals or mission.
While these missions are important to those they serve, they do not
necessarily meet the needs of a common good. Take for example the
Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and the
Department of Education. Each of these agencies offers grants designed
to serve the needs of states and local agencies. It is rare, however,
that these agencies coordinate their efforts and require these funds to
be used jointly or leveraged to serve a common good.
One of the final indignities regarding sustainability of programs
is that if a program is effective, the funds are cut! Why would you not
reward and promote programs that have been successful, thereby enabling
the programs (with a requirement in future funding) to help other
agencies or service providers, both public and private. Agencies invest
time, energy, and limited funding into these programs. To not support
the outcomes and take advantage of their successes is poor fiscal
planning in my opinion.
Lastly, the sun-setting of grant funding creates an unmet need for
newly created programs. In many programs, services are established or
programs developed that then create service expectations in the local
community. When the local entity cannot fiscally support these services
due to grant money drying up, the program goes away leaving recipients
empty handed and not served. Having the money to start up well meaning
programs is great and serves to fill a short-term need. A more
effective approach would be to tie grant funding to longer timelines
for providing services and ensure that the written assurances of
agencies supporting the grant application are, in fact, not just
signatures but collaborative commitments. And by working with grant
recipients in their local communities, rather than having them attend
planning and training sessions in Washington, DC, you would go a long
way to ensure the long term success of the programs.
Federal Direction and Support for Communications Systems
Currently, the various response agencies and those they support in
Spokane have the following means of communications available for use in
emergencies: ``push to talk'' radios, such as Nextel®, UHF radios,
VHF radios, 900 MHz radios, cellular phones, PDA's, Smart Phones, cell
phones, laptop computers with a variety of communications software
platforms, personal recreation radios, and PC-based Internet e-mail. As
you can see, we are not lacking in the means of communicating; we are
in fact buried in it.
Due to the number of divergent systems in place, we are less able
today to communicate with other agencies and even within our own
organizations. As an example, even the local branch of the U.S. Postal
Service has its own internal PDA communications system. They have a
wonderful means of communicating with their fellow members of the U.S.
Postal Service, but it does not allow for communications with other
agencies or those emergency responders who might be providing services
to them.
The ability to communicate is essential in an emergency. From the
advent of the NIMS system in the 1970s, the result of disastrous
wildfires that occurred due in part to a lack of common communications
systems, to the recent 9/11 tragedy in New York City where fire and
police could not communicate, communication continues to be a critical
issue. Common radio frequencies or communications methods are an
important part of an essential communications system. Again, the
breakdown of communication between first responders during Hurricane
Katrina exemplifies this point.
Functional radio communication is one part of the solution, and
human communication is another. Having agencies and end users meeting,
planning, and training prior to an incident is critical to reducing
response time and saving lives. Sitting down together and conducting
pre-plan tactical exercises allows: 1) relationship building, 2)
establishment of trust; 3) an understanding of the other agency's or
business' needs during an emergency; and 4) the development of a common
plan of action.
In Spokane, we use a crisis management program that facilitates
collaborative pre-planning sessions and collection of critical data
about key facilities. In addition to providing a common platform for
data collection (including photos, organizational charts, floor plans,
site plans, hazard chemical listings, etc.), it provides the necessary
forum for the pre-incident planning. In my experience, this approach is
critical in breaking down communication barriers and building trust
between first responder agencies and the organizations they serve.
One of the benefits of the crisis management system developed by
the State of Washington is that it is a statewide program. In
Washington, all first responders, including police, fire, State Patrol,
and others all have access to the same master database of information.
The Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs is responsible
for the crisis management system, assuring that there is a common
platform for data collection, training, procedures, response policies,
and data security between local, county, and state first responders and
their recipients.
If each local fire, police, and emergency management agency chose
to use a different system, a coordinated response would be difficult.
Establishing a standardized statewide system is certainly not
without its difficulties, especially those issues concerning ``turf,''
budgets, and political concerns. But once agencies begin to use the
system in actual emergencies, most of these issues resolve themselves
and the agencies begin to see the inherent value of such a system. In
our case, the CMS approach has truly served as a catalyst for
collaboration and problem resolution. This type of program fosters
communication, collaboration, and helps to build trusted relationships,
all of which are critical factors during an actual emergency situation
when lives and property are on the line.
Suggestions and Recommendations
1. Facilitate relationship-building between agencies at the
local, state and national level, both within individual
disciplines and between different types of agencies and
organizations. Providing for training, in-services, and product
conferences where planning, response, resolution and recovery
conversations could be facilitated to establish common ground
and exchange key information.
2. Provide for sustainable funding of model programs based on
the requirement that agencies share their expertise and
experience with others in their industry. The funding would be
broad-based in that it would come from various agencies and
serve to establish and maintain collaboration between local
agencies and those they serve. It would encourage local
investment of time, talent, and funding to create joint
planning and response.
3. Develop and adopt communication models that can be
implemented on a local or statewide basis. Support programs
that facilitate pre-incident data collection and pre-plan
tactical exercises, and encourage relationship-building between
emergency responders and those they serve.
4. Support the development of an ``all hazards'' approach to
emergencies, disasters and crises by providing all first
responders with the basics in response protocols,
communication, and incident response. Encourage adoption of
NIMS / ICS protocols. Provide ICS training not only for police
and fire services, but also for other emergency responders,
including those in the public and private sector who will be
responsible for ensuring their own employees' safety during the
early stages of a crisis.
5. Establish model plans for response to various emergencies,
disasters and crises. Select a lead federal agency in each area
that would become the ``go-to'' agency. This would reduce
competition between agencies, create efficiencies at the
Federal level, and reduce confusion on the part of local
agencies regarding direction.
Once again, I appreciate the opportunity to come before this
subcommittee to share my views on these subjects.
I will be available for any questions.
Thank you.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8921.001
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much for your testimony.
I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony. More
than that, I would like to thank you for the work that you have
already done in terms of responding to the various hazards,
specifically terrorism, but all of the hazards that may affect
your facilities wherever they might be.
I would like to ask one question to all four of you on the
panel.
It seems to me that all four of you have talked about
communications being extremely important, communications at the
time of an incident, but even before that, communications in
preparation for any type of problem, with local authorities, in
some cases federal authorities.
My question is this: While the detail of information that
you have, the digitalized documents that actually give people a
blueprint and a visual of where they go and where
vulnerabilities are, I presume you would be very concerned
about that falling into the wrong hands. Has there been any
concern expressed by any of you about this information getting
public?
For instance, we do have the Freedom of Information Act.
There are certain exceptions that we have built into the
legislation that prohibit that from being turned over to the
public.
But have any of you had that concern raised, and if you
have raised it, have you had responses that are satisfactory to
you by the authorities, either local, state or federal?
Mr. Millar?
Mr. Millar. Yes, we have had that concern. However, we do
believe that the steps taken by the Congress a couple of years
ago to change, give those exceptions, as you have said, have
taken care of it. That has greatly enlarged our ability to
share among transit properties. So I do not believe that is a
significant problem to us right now.
Mr. Lowy. We are nervous about the issues there. Not only
do we have the plans digitized and we give an update disk to
local authorities each month, we also have then on the
Internet. We have a Web site that is available where the local
police, fire, ambulance, et cetera, have access to the mall
that they may be dealing with.
The issue for us, though, is that since we deal with them
on such a local level, I would be surprised if even as you get
higher up in the LAPD or certain of the police departments that
we deal with that even know that that actually happens. When we
deal with them, we deal with the local watch commander or the
person in the local patrol cars. We go as far as having to buy
them actually laptop computers because they do not have them to
access the information.
So while it is a risk, it is one that we deem appropriate
because there is no other way to inform them and give them all
the information they need.
Mr. Lungren. So you are not sure exactly who all has it
within the departments that you are dealing with?
Mr. Lowy. We know who we are dealing with who has it. We do
not know how far up the chain they actually send them and deal
with the authorities. It also depends on how large a city you
are dealing with or how small a city.
Mr. Lungren. Sure.
Mr. Lowy. In Los Angeles, such a large city, if it is not
the West L.A. guys who know what we are dealing with, I would
be surprised if they know what is going on downtown. That is no
opinion about the city and how it is run. It is just such a
large city.
Mr. Lungren. Just an observation?
Mr. Lowy. Yes, just an observation.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Norton?
Mr. Norton. We have taken steps post-9/11 with regards to
this, especially in New York City, where a lot of our building
documents were a matter of public record. Anybody could go down
to city hall and pull these documents and do studies on them.
There was, working in conjunction with the Real Estate
Board of New York, a law passed that there is a signature now
required by the owner of that building if somebody goes down
and is trying to get reference to that particular site. So that
was a good thing that was implemented.
Additionally, in other markets where we used to have
readily available, and I am speaking on behalf of commercial
office buildings, plans for potential leasing and potential
bringing in tenants, that kind of data is now secured both
internally within the company and outside as well as off-site
locations. So in the event of an emergency, we have access to
that and we can get that to federal and local officials.
Again, I think it is important to emphasize we need to
build the trust, and I think you have to earn that trust over
time in working in conjunction with the federal, state and
local.
We have done that in New York City and we feel that working
with them and having them look at our high-profile assets, they
have a very comfortable level of if there was an issue that
came up, they understand what we are up against and they
understand how to attack it, unlike the World Trade Center when
they went down. There were no plans. They did now know where
people were down in the retail. So there were a lot of lessons
learned there.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Madsen?
Mr. Madsen. Three points.
The data-set that we have in Spokane and Washington state
is controlled by the Washington Association of Sheriffs and
Police Chiefs. They own that data as such, so it is
confidential in that nature.
Secondarily, there are different levels of access in terms
of us being able to authorize different agencies, whether it is
police, fire, or the Department of Emergency Management.
And then the last point is really about the control of the
data, while still allowing it to be used. We had a flood in one
of our high schools. That data was very important to the
maintenance department to save a $100,000 gym floor. If we
regulate it down to a point where it can only be used for one
purpose, I think that that is wasted financial dollars. Again,
that all-hazards approach is very important. That data can be
used for a multitude of different things and it would be a
shame to waste it. It is secure. We can limit it, but it has a
multitude of purposes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Mr. Pascrell is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Madsen, I am very interested in what we tell kids about
impending threats. I want to ask you a couple of questions, if
you will respond, since you are there day to day.
How do you prepare children to respond to an attack without
inducing fear in those kids? How do you do that?
Mr. Madsen. We have, for the last 10 years, done training
with our staff and our students. We have a four-step process.
That process starts with the general orientation of the
principal of the building to let them know about the district-
wide plan, our three levels of crisis codes. From there, we
then move on to the building staff itself.
The reason for that first and second step is to make sure
that the building staff, the school staff, have an
understanding that their principal, their person in charge of
the building, has a level of understanding and they then in
turn have a confidence with them.
We then move on to the third level, which is actually
conducting tabletop exercises or small drills.
Mr. Pascrell. What do you tell the kids before you are
conducting the drills? Why are we conducting the drills? What
are you telling these kids?
Mr. Madsen. That is the fourth step, and that is
publicizing to both parents in newsletters as well as students
in orientation that we are going to be doing these drills,
again from an all-hazards approach. It does not matter whether
it is a terrorist activity, a school shooter, or a railroad
tanker overturned by a school. We want to be prepared.
They do nine fire drills every year. We are very well
supported by the superintendent. In addition to that, we do two
crisis drills. Those are active drills that are done, both
walk-down as well as all-hazard.
It is to the point where they are not fearful. It is
commonplace, much like throughout this nation for 100 years we
have done fire drills. It is the same level of preparedness,
and just as they are not anxious because of the ongoing nine
fire drills, their doing the two crisis drills every year
allows them to not be anxious.
Mr. Pascrell. So what you are telling us is that what you
are telling children, communicating to children, is that we are
stepping up the process, the mechanism, but really this is a
fire drill we are doing which will encompass the entire school
that you are in. Is that what you are telling kids?
Mr. Madsen. It is moving beyond just a hazard of fire
itself in a building, but all other hazards that could occur.
Unfortunately in our nation, with what is occurring, we need to
be prepared. We want to keep you safe. We tell parents we want
to keep their children safe.
We have had very, very little push-back from parents in
regard to that these live drills. We are doing them throughout
the school district at all levels, elementary, middle and high
school in 55 facilities.
Mr. Pascrell. Spokane schools, I imagine, have quite a few
police officers in them with regard to the COPS program, which
was a very successful program. What experience have you had
with the very police that are already in your schools?
Mr. Madsen. There are two levels of police. We have our own
Spokane public school district resource officers. There are 11
of them located throughout the elementary, middle and six
particularly in the high schools. We did have six SROs as part
of that COPS in-schools program.
Those funds have gone away, and so unfortunately we do not
have the Spokane Police Department SRO program currently. We
still have retained the 11 officers and I know that the chief
has prioritized the SROs to come back first on his budget.
Mr. Pascrell. Mr. Millar, if I may?
Mr. Millar. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pascrell. In your testimony, you talked about not only
the lack of response from Washington and this huge $6 billion
inventory of needs that you laid out for us. And you are
disappointed, correct me if I am wrong, at the $600 million
response in the 2006 budget. Is that correct so far?
Mr. Millar. That is correct so far.
Mr. Pascrell. Let me ask you this question. It seems that
you spent some emphasis on how the money gets to the transit
systems. You are recommending and suggesting, I think, a change
in how this money is distributed, since a lot of it has never
gotten to the point of implementation.
What you are suggesting is, are you not, the money go
directly to the transit system, rather than go through the
state administrative system. Would you explain that and why you
believe that the system should change?
Mr. Millar. Yes, sir. Transit systems are responsible for
the safety and security of their customers. We understand that.
We have long-time direct relationships with the federal
government, primarily through the Department of Transportation.
We are used to applying for federal money. We are used to
receiving it. We are used to all the requirements for audit and
other things that necessarily come with the federal government.
We do not believe that there is any value-added by sending it
through the states. It is simply another step.
Now, we certainly agree that the states have statewide
planning responsibilities, and we certainly agree that the
money that we would receive ought to be consistent with the
statewide plans, much the way transportation money is now
distributed. It has to be consistent with area-wide and
statewide plans. But we see no value in sending it through the
states.
In addition, the Congress at least 2 years ago authorized
as much as 20 percent of the money intended for transit to be
skimmed off by the state. Now, last year the Appropriations
Committee put a 3 percent limit on it, but still we do not see
why 3 percent of the money that should be going to improve
security for our customers, your constituents, ought to go off
to some administrative red tape. It makes no sense, never mind
the time delays and all the other aspects of it.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you for the response.
Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Linder for 5 minutes.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Millar, if $600 million is not enough, how
much is enough?
Mr. Millar. Let's be clear about the $600 million. The
president's proposal was to take several infrastructure groups,
public transit, railroads, ports, a number of other group, and
lump them all together to $600 million. So even on my happiest
day, I could not imagine, even if the Congress appropriated
$600 million, that public transit would get anything other than
a small portion of that because the needs in the other areas
are great as well.
What we have suggested is that we work with the Congress
and the administration on about a $6 billion program. We could
not spend all that money in a single year. We have suggested
that it be spread over 3 years. We do believe that once this
initial investment is made in capital infrastructure
improvement, in training, in research, in planning, there will
be an ongoing need, but it will be a much smaller need. It will
be perhaps $800 million a year, something like that.
But we simply need to bring our systems up to standard; do
common sense improvements. As the chairman has said and we
completely agree, we are not talking about an airport-style
screen every passenger, but we do believe the kinds of
improvements that I have spoken about in my testimony, which
everyone agrees need to be done, ought to be done. It is a
partnership between the federal government, state government,
local government, and we are prepared to be part of that
partnership.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Lowy, how many owners of real estate,
organizations are doing this, digitizing their plans?
Mr. Lowy. As far as I understand, we are the only one that
I know of. It is something we actually developed ourselves. As
we were involved, we were in the retail facility at the World
Trade Center prior to 9/11. It was something that we started
doing even before that. Mainly the issue there is to be able in
an emergency to know where all the entries and exists are; how
to get people in and out; and how to get the first responders
into the facilities.
Mr. Linder. And that is in your interest?
Mr. Lowy. That is definitely in our interest, and in the
interest of our customers.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Norton, why aren't other organizations
doing that?
Mr. Norton. I cannot speak for what other organizations are
doing with regard to digitizing. But as I stated earlier, we
have taken precautions post-9/11 with regard to building plans,
securing them, making sure in the event, especially on a high-
profile asset like the ones that I had mentioned earlier, that
we are prepared. If an event does take place, we are prepared
to go in with both federal and local governments and assess
that situation with the proper plans.
Again, I cannot speak for what the rest of the industry and
what they are doing and why they are not doing it.
Mr. Linder. Do you have a rough idea, Mr. Lowy, of how much
you have spent doing this?
Mr. Lowy. Just on the digitization? What we have actually
done is we have probably spent on the investment in security
somewhere around $25 million a year on capital items, and about
$40 million a year on operations. But the digitization of the
plans and what we have done, we have actually created our own
internal systems that integrate the digitization of the plans,
the CCTV cameras that we use and all of the information on the
malls that we can use remotely are on-site, really in response
to what happened to us at the World Trade Center.
Because we have been involved in it and have dealt with it,
we have unfortunately a knowledge and an expertise that we
would rather not have. But once we saw all the issues that we
faced, we have just been developing these systems for the last
4 or 5 years in-house. The problem at the end of the day,
though, is while we can do this for our facilities, integrated
with all these other office buildings and all the other cities
and everything, and we need to be part of the wider community
as well.
Mr. Linder. Mr. Norton, why isn't it in the interests of
BOMA to spread this information and do it on your own?
Mr. Norton. Again, I cannot speak for BOMA, but again for
Tishman Speyer's properties, we, and I think there are
organizations on the vendor side that have new programs out
there that you can actually buy into, are looking at this.
Again, are you going to do a suburban building in Phoenix
versus a high-profile asset that sits over a transit station in
midtown Manhattan? I think post-9/11 we have put a lot of
emphasis on just gathering that data and making sure it is
secure and safeguarded.
Again, I think it is something of the future, especially
with the computer age, that we will continue to look at this
and eventually get all of our buildings as an industry on this
kind of a program. That will then be shared. Again, I think it
will take getting more association with DHS and the other state
and local government and federal agencies more time in getting
comfortable with these organizations, to start sharing this
kind of information. Because I think it would be overwhelming
to try to get all this information and give it to these people.
In the commercial real estate sector, it changes. You will
move tenants in; you will move them out. You will reconstruct
space. You will add floors and take floors down. So it is a
continually changing process.
So to update and keep plans accurate on such a mass volume
of real estate throughout the portfolio of the United States
that we are focusing on, I think would be a big undertaking. I
think in time you will have to address it. It will have to be
addressed.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. The gentleman, Mr. Dicks, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you very much.
I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony,
particularly Mr. Madsen. I want to welcome you here to the
committee. I appreciate your work on the school mapping
program.
The incident that occurred at Lewis and Clark High School,
which you referred to in your testimony, was terrifying, but
lives were very likely saved because of your mapping program
that had just been implemented a couple of months before, which
enabled first responders to see detailed maps and information
about the high school while they were traveling to the scene.
Instead of taking many precious minutes to formulate a
response, once they got the high school police were able to hit
the ground running.
That is the key to this mapping program, that you have all
the information gathered and in a PC you can go through it as
you proceed out to the incident, wherever it is.
Mr. Madsen. You can access it in a variety of fashions. You
can have it on the hard disk as I do on my laptop here. You can
do it with a thumb-drive or you can do it via the Web. The
benefit of the program is two-fold. One is the data-set itself.
The other is the creation of trust and relationships. The pre-
planning tactical sessions that were done prior to the incident
between police, fire, transportation and the school district is
one of the critical pieces.
Mr. Dicks. I would say to my colleagues on the committee, I
am very proud of what Washington state has done on this.
Washington has completed the emergency planning, mapping and
inventorying all of the public high schools in the state, over
400. The state legislature has initiated funding for mapping of
all public elementary and secondary schools. The year-long
project to map the more than 1,275 elementary and middle
schools began this July.
Also, we have done a program on critical infrastructure in
the state of Washington so that key buildings, Washington has
entered over 1,200 sites and 6,500 individual buildings into
the critical infrastructure planning and incident management
system, which I think will give first responders in our state a
much better opportunity in a crisis to be able to deal with
that particular facility. I think this technology, which has
been developed by a company not in my district, but in Seattle,
Prepared Response, Inc., they build and deploy this school
mapping and solutions used by the state of Washington.
So I want to commend you for your work on this and your
involvement and leadership in the Spokane area. You need a
little leadership over there these days. But honestly, you guys
have done a great job and we are proud of you.
Also on the question of transportation, I agree. I think we
need to have a more even-handed approach to this thing. My view
of it is a lot of the money has been spent on air
transportation, and these other modes have not been given the
consideration that they need to.
I also want to thank the witnesses from the private sector.
I would recommend that you take a look at what we are doing out
in the state of Washington. I think in major cities to have
this kind of a mapping program where they really can look and
have the analysis of these buildings ahead of time would help
in any situation.
I thank you for my time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I thank you all for your testimony this morning.
It has been very enlightening and the committee appreciates it.
Mr. Madsen, let me begin with you, if I could. In your
testimony, you describe a sophisticated technological system to
provide building plans and predetermined emergency response
scenarios for first responders. I am actually familiar with the
technology. It is actually very impressive. As my colleague Mr.
Dicks just mentioned, the Lewis and Clark shooting incident
proved that the system can mobilize police, fire and school
security to quickly respond to an emergency.
My question, if I could just delve in a little bit and talk
about again the costs: I think you have mentioned that already,
but the costs associated with implementing the system, and if I
could ask how did your school district pay for the system? Did
you receive any federal assistance in helping to pay for those
costs?
And if you could just elaborate a little bit for the
committee on what other soft targets could potentially benefit
from a similar implementation.
Mr. Madsen. Our funding in Spokane public schools has come
from a variety of sources. The initial funding, by us being
proactive and actually wanting to be part of a pilot, we do
that quite a bit, allowed us to be part of the state pilot
project, which allowed us to be mapping Lewis and Clark High
School when that incident happened.
The rest of the high schools came from the state, funding
through the state legislature. Our middle schools were a
separate grant, privately funded. Our elementary schools, I
attached that to our Safe Schools/Healthy Students Grant that
we applied for last year and received this year.
Our school district, along with five others, share a $8.3
million, of which a portion of that, about $250,000, was
assigned to our 35 elementary schools and the other 27
elementary and middle schools in the other school districts.
So it is creative financing. It runs anywhere from $5,000
to $12,000 per building. Then it is just time from there on
maintaining that data.
Mr. Langevin. And can you elaborate for the committee on
other soft targets, buildings, assets, that could benefit from
the technology?
Mr. Madsen. Currently, we are working on our school buses.
I feel--and I am in a very unique position with both safety,
transportation and security departments, to see kind of a
bigger picture.
I think that the issue with school buses in our nation, but
specifically in Spokane, is critical. We will have all of our
school buses, the six different types that we operate, with our
contractor, Laidlaw as a partner, actually mapped. So all of
the exits, all of the electrical shutoffs, the fuel tanks, all
of those types of systems or components in regard to the
physical school bus.
So whether it is a rollover or whether it is a terrorist or
hostage situation or a fire on board a bus, fire and police,
school security and transportation all have access to that
critical data. That is my next step in our school district, is
to map the actual school buses. It is not a building, but it is
a rolling facility for us, and it has up to 72 students.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Dicks. Would my colleague yield just for a quick point?
Mr. Langevin. Of course.
Mr. Dicks. RPI, the company, has mapped all types of
venues, including schools, hospitals, port facilities,
commercial office buildings, water treatment facilities, and
Navy ships. So this has been used broadly in many different
contexts.
I appreciate your yielding.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I appreciate your making that
point.
Quickly before my time runs out, to Mr. Lowy. Your
testimony indicates that your company spends about 20 percent
of your operating costs on security.
Can you just tell us, is this amount standard across the
commercial real estate industry? At what point, I should say is
there a point, where the economic costs of security have a
greater affect on your bottom line where the cost-benefit
analysis shifts?
Mr. Lowy. I think the issue is not how much money we spend,
but how effective is the money that we spend. Security is now
the single largest line item in the mall industry itself, the
single largest cost line item that we face, which is even more
than our cleaning costs, which cleaning used to be major item.
Where it is really affecting it is in the mall industry you
tend to be able to collect the cost of managing and operating a
mall back from the merchants. So what happens is at the end of
the day the cost of security ends up in the price of goods that
are sold to the consumer. It is in essence added to the rent
that a retailer pays.
The issue with those costs, though, is a retailer can only
pay a certain percentage of the cost of these total sales at
the end of the day. The cost of security, that is increasing
substantially after 9/11, while it is not eating into the
bottom line just now, it all depends on how much you can pass
on to the consumer or not, what happens with general prices,
and then what happens with the total cost of operations for a
retailer.
I would like to add to the last testimony, just for one
second.
We actually do something similar to what they are doing in
Washington in our malls across the country. We are actually
have integrated that into our CCTV cameras, which is also on
the Internet. We run a 24-hour-a-day central facility which we
can access and also local authorities can access, which has all
the plans, all the maps, all the fire hydrants, everything
available to them, as well as real-time online cameras that we
use for management as well.
So we have actually implemented that in the mall business
here in the U.S. and we are actually exporting that to the U.K.
within our own portfolio.
Mr. Langevin. I see my time has expired. Thank you all for
your testimony and for being here. It has been very helpful.
Thank you.
Mr. Lungren. The chair would state that we have received a
statement of testimony from the International Council of
Shopping Centers, who have requested that it be entered into
the record. If there is no objection, I will do so.
So ordered.
For the Record
Statement Prepared on Behalf of the International Council of Shopping
Centers
September 7, 2005
Founded in 1957, the International Council of Shopping Centers
(ICSC) is the premier global trade and professional association of the
retail real estate industry. Its more than 50,000 members in 96
countries include shopping center owners, developers, managers,
marketing specialists, investors, retailers and brokers, as well as
academics and public officials. As a global trade association, ICSC has
relationships with 25 national and regional shopping center councils
throughout the world.
The shopping center industry takes its role of providing a safe and
comfortable environment in which to shop very seriously. Security has
always been a priority of the industry. Simply put, consumers will not
shop at a shopping center that they do not feel is safe.
Shopping centers employ well-trained professional security officers
and enjoy excellent working relationships with their local municipal
police departments. In fact, many shopping centers actually have a
police sub-station located within the center. Those that do not have a
police sub-station are frequently visited by local police patrols.
While the shopping center industry has a long history of providing a
safe environment in which to shop, we recognized that the terrorist
attacks on our nation forever altered the way we police and secure our
shopping centers.
In October 2001, ICSC and the shopping center industry convened a
conference call with the newly formed Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
The conference call was initiated by ICSC to establish a working
relationship with DHS and to allow shopping center security
professionals and law enforcement officials the opportunity to share
security practices and procedures. In all, over 1,000 shopping center
industry professionals participated in the call. Since that initial
call, ICSC has been in constant contact with DHS and the FBI to provide
a communication channel for our members.
Communication is paramount. ICSC joined with other real estate
associations in creating an Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(ISAC) to expedite two-way security intelligence between retail
properties and DHS. ICSC will continue to monitor the threat level and
communicate to our members any and all information from government
authorities as soon as it becomes available.
ICSC members have actively participated in the DHS Basic Terrorism
Awareness Training program. In the first year, ICSC had 609
participants representing 20 programs. In 2005, 18 programs were
involved with over 500 participants. In addition, ICSC is developing a
comprehensive training program that addresses the potential for
chemical, biological or radiological terrorism. Designed to meet the
DHS Office of Domestic Preparedness requirements for the first-
responder community, ICSC's program is utilizing a ``train-the-
trainer'' approach. Each participant will be expected to share the
program's training insights with other security personnel thereby
enabling the industry to maximize the effectiveness of the program.
Since September 11, 2001, the shopping center industry has been on
a heightened state of alert. Many of the security procedures the
industry implemented will be obvious to consumers. These include but
are not limited to:
Increased patrols by uniformed security personnel in
and outside of the shopping center.
Increased patrols by uniformed local police officers
in and outside of the shopping center.
No overnight parking in parking lots.
No curbside parking.
The use of barriers and or blockades in front of
entrances.
The use of security surveillance camera systems.
In addition to these security procedures, the shopping center
industry has implemented many programs and policies that go on ``behind
the scenes'' and will not be obvious to consumers. These include but
are not limited to:
The lockdown of heating and ventilation systems with
access limited to center personnel.
The lockdown of loading docks.
The lockdown of supply corridors.
Searches of incoming deliveries.
Background investigations of center personnel.
All workmen entering a center must be prescreened,
have identification, and report to security before starting
work.
Increased patrols by non-uniformed security personnel.
Increased patrols by non-uniformed local police
officers.
Shopping center security is very site-specific. What is needed and
used at one center may not be appropriate at another center. There are
many factors that are used by shopping center security professionals in
concert with their local police departments to determine the level of
security required. These factors include but are not limited to the
size of the center, location of the center, history of criminal
activity in the surrounding community, and size of the local police
department.
While we are under a heightened state of alert, some centers may
choose to change or increase their level of security. Others may not
because they are confident the level of security in place is
sufficient. Again, security is a site-specific science and it is
important for consumers to have a sense of normalcy in their lives, and
that includes the ability to travel freely about our shopping centers
without being unduly inconvenienced.
As Peter Lowy of The Westfield Group demonstrated in his testimony
before this subcommittee, the retail real estate community is actively
engaged in responding to the lessons of September 11 as well as the
attacks in London. ICSC appreciates this opportunity to provide the
subcommittee with an additional perspective of the overall shopping
center industry. Please do not hesitate to call upon ICSC or its
individual members during your future deliberations.
Mr. Lungren. The Gentlelady from Texas?
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The issue before us is an extremely important issue and I
will pose a question based upon your expertise. I would like to
acknowledge the committee for its wisdom in delaying the other
witnesses who are presently dealing with a horrific horror in
our own nation that is occurring.
In light of that and in light of my representation of the
impact area in Houston, I just want to make these remarks for
the committee's consideration, and as well for the record. It
is very important that the work of rescue and recovery dealing
with Hurricane Katrina continues, so I am the least willing to
distract individuals from the work at hand. But I do believe
that there should be important interaction.
I note that a number of impacted members are on the
Homeland Security Committee and are probably functioning from
one place to another trying to assist their constituents and
others. But I do believe, Mr. Chairman, and to the prospective
full committee chairman and ranking member, that we should be
having daily briefings either by conference call or otherwise
of the progress that is being made in the region.
I think there are some serious policy issues that should be
addressed as well, particularly on the question of the human
devastation. The individuals, in essence, in Houston for
example, probably the largest repository at this time,
placement of evacuee survivors, has an array of disparate
policies that are enormously confusing, particularly with the
presence or the work of the Red Cross and FEMA and the need for
there to be some alignment and cooperation. The establishment
of Red Cross sites is not really organized. The presence of
FEMA personnel is not there yet, not enough. The need for
increased technology, a system-wide technology that would be
able to reunite families.
And then one of such magnitude that I think that we need an
immediate cease-secession order, cease and desist. And that is
the random evacuation of persons who desire not to be evacuated
to places unknown. There are policies of putting people on
airplanes, and when the door is open in the jurisdiction they
say, ``They put me on the plane, they closed the door, and I
didn't even know where I was going.'' And this is in America.
So I hope that, although Mr. Chertoff is certainly consumed
with the responsibilities, I think part of the problem was that
he was consumed and not in communication. Many members cited
that on the floor of the House and I think that is unpardonable
without excuse, inexcusable, if you will, and unacceptable. It
certainly is unacceptable for those of us who have a large
share of the responsibility, willingly so.
I cannot announce for you, if you will, or articulate for
you the wide depth of charitable expression in Houston; $10
million that the city voted on in an emergency session just on
Monday; feeding, if you will, food service bills for a day-and-
a-half of $225,000 at one site; individuals who have opened
homes and gyms and otherwise taken money out of their own
pocket; others who are in hotels; 15,000 Vietnamese are in our
community that we have to address through their language; a
number of people from Central America.
And there are no enunciated policy positions dealing with
this vast number of people except waving them out across
America against their will. It is well known that the leaders,
the elected persons of Louisiana want their constituents to
return home.
So we have a crisis that we need to deal with here. I
expect and would hope that this committee would have immediate
hearings or briefings. If they can be abbreviated, so be it,
but we cannot operate in the dark again.
I thank the committee for its indulgence.
Gentlemen, your issue is very important, but I am facing
day-to-day life and death situations, as my colleagues in
Louisiana and Mississippi are. I have the aftermath. They have
the real impact. I believe this is something egregious
occurring and I believe we should act immediately.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the Gentlelady for her comments.
Mr. Souder is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
I apologize that I missed the first panel and the
testimony. I have been trying to go through the testimony here.
I had actually a hearing that I had to start in my own
subcommittee, as well as another meeting.
I have become particularly interested in this, having gone
over with Curt Weldon over to London. We met with Prime
Minister Blair shortly thereafter and gave him our
congressional condolences, and was there particularly on the
day where they had just had the shooting of the suspect who
defied the authorities, and they thought potentially had a
bomb.
I wondered, Mr. Millar, do security guards have the ability
to detain people, and if they restrain, can they shoot at them?
Do you have the legal authority if they make a judgment on the
ground that many people may die if they do not act, can they
act?
Mr. Millar. The individual police powers that individual
transit police forces have is generally speaking governed by
the state law of that particular state.
So, for example, I used to run a transit system in
Pennsylvania. Our police officers had full police powers and
were trained and licensed to carry guns. Obviously, that was
the absolute last resort, but in that case they were trained to
use their judgment and were permitted to use guns if
appropriate.
So it depends on the state and depends on the jurisdiction
as to what the law allows and what the orders are that guide
what the officers do.
Mr. Souder. In going through your testimony and looking at
this problem in general, we spent so much time on airports and
the numbers that use mass transit every day are much harder to
screen and go through.
Mr. Millar. Yes, sir.
Mr. Souder. Yet much of what we seem to be oriented toward
video surveillance and so on, seem to be more how to find the
perpetrator after they have blown us up.
Do you believe that it is possible to do more if we get a
network, a security pass system that works for airports, that
that can also be used long-term for mass transit, particularly
for subways, but also for buses and other things?
Or is this just not going to be possible because of the
scale? When you think of the Staten Island Ferry and the
numbers there, and people coming in at the last minute and
holding the doors open, I mean, is this even conceivable?
Mr. Millar. We do not believe that with current technology
it is practical to screen every person who would choose to use
the public transit systems. There are thousands and thousands
of railroad stations. There are tens of thousands of bus stops.
You are talking about more than 100,000 vehicles that provide
service across the country, from the very largest cities to the
very small.
We believe that there are other steps that must be taken.
We believe you need to start with good intelligence. In my
testimony, I emphasize the fact that I think we need to
continue the ISAC, the Information Sharing Analysis Center for
Public Transportation, for example.
We believe that you need to secure the facilities the best
you can. Some of that is very low-tech and some is very high-
tech. It is low-tech in the sense of having better fending
around garages where trains and buses are stored. It is high-
tech in the sense of in-stations have biological sensors,
chemical sensors, radiological sensors.
We believe that surveillance cameras have a very important
role to play. We believe that the experience in London showed
that. For example, while the terrible tragedy that occurred in
London, we know over the last several years the camera system
there has prevented at least 20 major attacks on the system. We
know that in the aftermath of the attack, the camera system in
London has been instrumental in obtaining evidence and
ultimately obtaining the arrest of the perpetrators.
So there are several different steps that must be taken, in
our view. We believe these steps are common sense steps. We are
not asking for pie-in-the-sky things that do not make sense,
but it does require an additional investment, as my testimony
lays out.
Mr. Souder. With the chairman's indulgence, I would like to
ask a question of Mr. Madsen that also may apply to those who
work with the malls.
At Columbine High School and the aftermath, over in the
Education Committee one thing we learned, part of the reason
for the delay is the police went in and the cafeteria had been
remodeled. The map that they had did not work, and they had to
come out, and a student and a teacher had to draw how the doors
were shaped.
A similar thing in 9/11, apparently going into the World
Trade Center, some of the stairways were in different places
because often when a school is redone, when a mall is redone,
the plans that they find do not have the updates on them for
the emergency personnel.
Is this something that your school system has addressed? Is
this something malls are addressing?
I know that it is happening across the country. It can be
fairly expensive, but it is unbelievable that when we go into
the buildings we do not know where the doors or the stairwells
and so on are. It is kind of a basic thing we ought to be
focusing on.
Mr. Madsen. The system that we have allows us to update and
uplink information, and then that is automatically downlinked
to all of the other computers that store that data that police,
fire, school district security access.
I have charged each of my district resource officers that
responsibility to at least annually ensure that if there are
any changes from a capital project standpoint that they
communicate with our facilities department, get updated CAD
drawings, and those are then entered into the system, much the
same as organizational charts, photos from our photo ID system.
Individual district resource officers have buildings
assigned to them, and that is one of their charges to ensure
that that data is correct and updated on an annual basis.
Mr. Souder. Are the malls doing that as well? Obviously, if
there are hostages; if there is a bomb in a location and our
maps do not work, we are helpless.
Mr. Lowy. It is a little easier for us because we get to
control the resources, rather than a city itself. With
merchants coming in a changing in the mall all the time, we
actually update them every month, and then we uplink them onto
our Web site and then we send a new disk to the local police
and fire every month. They are on mall properties all the time
anyway so we have terrific relationships with them.
But you are right, if you do not update it every month or
every year, the plans that you pull down can be old and things
change.
The one issue about digitizing all of the plans and having
first responders come and go is the initial costs may be high,
but you have to also keep the ongoing expenditure because you
must update them all the time, otherwise it is a waste of time.
Mr. Souder. Thank you.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Lowy, you mentioned in your written
testimony that--and I know it is not the total focus of this
hearing, but it seems to me it is an important component in
this whole process, and that is the extension of Terrorism Risk
Insurance Act (TRIA). Why do you find that important enough to
have mentioned it?
Mr. Lowy. It is a very important issue for us.
One of the issues we talked about a little bit is the
amount of money we spend on security and why have we put all
these systems in place. One of the issues that we face even
with TRIA or without TRIA is it is very difficult for us to get
terrorism insurance. So that the risk of insurance or the risk
of a terrorism attack prior to 9/11 was actually taken by the
insurance industry itself.
Without TRIA, we could not get enough insurance or in some
cases any insurance for a terrorist attack, so the economic
risk of that attack was moved over to the shareholders or the
business owners or whoever else was earning the asset itself.
So one of the reasons we spend so much money and time on
the security is that we are actually at risk, whether TRIA is
in place or not right now. We cannot get enough coverage. We
have $14 billion worth of assets in the U.S. We can get $800
million of coverage today. We believe that without TRIA being
renewed, that coverage will fall to somewhere close to zero,
and that we just will not have any ability to get insurance.
The issue with that, then, is if you get another attack
similar to what went on with 9/11, we believe at the end of the
day that the federal government will have to decide whether it
will come back in and make all the losses, make everybody good
and settle up all the losses for the people and/or the
property. Or it will stay out and the economics effects on the
economy will be much greater than happened in 9/11.
Just one last thing. The key in 9/11 to the economy being
stable straight after the attack was that the federal
government stepped up and put almost $30 billion into the
economy to make good the losses and the victim's compensation
fund.
Mr. Lungren. Even though TRIA is not under the jurisdiction
of this committee, I happen to think it is important for us to
look at because it is part of the total picture as we deal with
the soft targets that are out there in private industry.
That leads me to another question. I would like to direct
it to Mr. Lowy and Mr. Norton.
That is this. Mr. Lowy, you have talked about the specific
way you have developed you own program digitalizing plans and
so forth, making them available, updating them every 30 days.
It is obviously not the standard in the industry right now.
Some may say you are the leaders in the industry.
One of the concerns I have is this. How do we work from a
governmental standpoint, working with those of you in the
private sector, to emphasize best business practices that are
actually best business practices?
That is, if some take certain steps that they can afford to
take to protect them against or their assets against possible
terrorist attack, does that leave others open to lawsuits
thereafter such that you are fearful of exchanging information,
or such that the business community is worried about
establishing what the business practices are?
The reason why I say this is when we originally--I was
outside the Congress at the time, but working on it--when TRIA
was originally passed by the House, it contained in it some
liability limitations with respect to terrorist attacks. When
it went over to the Senate side, that was taken out.
The Administration, having looked at TRIA, is not quite as
negative about it as I feared the Treasury Department would be,
but they indicated that Congress needs to look at some changes
in the program.
From your standpoint, both of you, is there a concern about
liability after the fact that in some ways impedes the ability
of your industry to get together and say, these are best
business practices, or publish what the best business practices
are, for fear that later on you will be subject to suits
because you did not expend 20 percent of your capital as others
have done?
Mr. Lowy. I think the way we look at it is if there is a
terrorist incident, we are convinced we will be sued no matter
what we do. Part of the issue in the testimony is that one of
the things we are looking for from Homeland Security is that we
might have best practices or the money we spend may be wasted.
I doubt it is wasted, but we think we have best practices. But
depending on the alert level that Homeland Security puts out
depends on how we operate our malls.
I actually brought with me, which we would not put into the
public record because it is a security document, what happens
when the threat levels actually increase; what we actually do
in the mall; how much more manpower; where do we put them; what
do we do.
So we respond to Homeland Security, but we do not know if
we respond in a manner that is in line with what the government
thinks or not.
So at the end of the day, while it was not in my testimony,
we would be looking for some form of safe harbor; that if there
were best practices that came out from Homeland Security after
a survey of what everybody does, that if we follow those
practices we do get some safe harbor provision.
Mr. Lungren. My concern is at some point in time you could
make us so hardened to attack that you cannot do your job. We
could make every mall in America and every hotel in America and
every business in America and every school in America basically
impenetrable, but people would not want to go. People do not
want to go to a moat. You do not want to go to a prison to
enjoy your honeymoon. You know what I am saying.
Mr. Lowy. I agree.
Mr. Lungren. So how do we strike that balance and how do we
in the Congress encourage such activity? TRIA is part of it,
but best business practices are others. Maybe tax incentives
are others. But how do we do it in a mix of incentives and
disincentives such that we do respond to the terrorist attack,
but we do not change essentially who and what we are?
Mr. Lowy. We agree with that. The biggest issue that we
face is, while we all talk about security here, that is not my
main focus in life, but we do have to make sure that our
customers and our consumers are protected to the best of our
ability, while keeping the malls open and while having freedom
of movement, freedom of goods. At the end of the day, people
have to come and shop and work within the society.
The way we look at it is in conjunction with TRIA. At the
moment, we get no benefit on our insurance premiums for any of
the security work that we do, any of these systems that we have
designed or any of the capital that we put in. Our insurance
premiums are exactly the same as the person next door or the
guy down the street.
We would hope that Congress could work with the insurance
industry and ourselves; that if a certain set of practices were
used, that we could then get some break on the insurance
premiums that we are paying for terrorism insurance, because we
are making our responses better, our targets better. At the end
of the day, we are not looking to make our malls impenetrable
because we actually need to operate in a capitalist society,
which we honestly prefer to do.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Lungren. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. Just for a second.
I think it is especially relevant on transportation what
you just said. I mean, you are talking about malls, but you
have to have transportation systems that the people can use in
a timely way.
We have, for example, ferry systems in Washington state. If
we had an inspection of every car or every truck, that would
stop it. You would not be able to use the ferry system or the
subway system. I think it is very relevant to the other
witnesses here as well.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
I understand the Gentlelady has a statement to make?
Ms. Jackson-Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, the hearing is very important. I am going to ask
unanimous consent to have my statement placed in the record,
and subsequently pose questions dealing with best practices.
But as you realize, there are conflicting and competing
concerns, and I want to thank you for this hearing and look
forward to a further hearing.
Mr. Lungren. Without objection, so ordered.
The Gentleman from Indiana?
Mr. Souder. I wanted to make an additional comment. As a
member of Congress, we all have different things in our
district that shed light upon the different things. By the time
we retire, we are almost up to where we understand.
This insurance question is huge, because it is not the
insurance companies, it is the reinsurance companies. Lincoln
Financial in Fort Wayne sold their big division to Swiss Re,
and Swiss Re took a hit on 9/11 that was unbelievable because
they had like 50 percent or 60 percent of all the reinsurance
for the insurance companies.
The insurance companies do not hold the bag; they just hold
a percent. They pass it off. American Specialty in my district
handles a high percentage of stadiums, NASCAR places, amusement
parks and so on, and they put together the packages. Right
after 9/11, we sat down with the risk assessment people.
I mean, it is a tough decision right now whether to insure
all you guys with their private capital, because unless we have
these government programs to back it up, there is no way to
factor in the risk of a failure without just assuming you are
going to go bankrupt, then you do not have insurance anyway.
Because if your reinsurance and your insurance preparers go
bankrupt, the government is doing to wind up, either the people
are out or the government is there.
We have to have some form of backup supplemental. It is
more of a question of what it is going to be and how much is
going to be absorbed directly through the consumers; how much
is going to be absorbed through taxes; and how much is going to
be theoretically, businesses are just pass-through
institutions.
It is a huge challenge because from the insurer's
perspective, they do not know how to factor this risk either.
Mr. Lowy. As an industry, what we are really asking for is
that the federal government give the reinsurance industry
capacity so we can actually buy insurance at a reasonable cost.
We are not looking for any handouts. We do not want this to be
a big handout to the insurance industry. What we really need
them to do is insure our risk at a reasonable cost for us to be
able to deal with it.
Mr. Souder. What the chairman was saying in sharing best
practices and risk pooling, while it may be counter to some
things that we have looked at in the past, the fact is it is
one of the only ways to keep the insurance rates in a
reasonable way either to the taxpayers or to the consumers who
are going to pay it in raised prices, because businesses, like
you say, are going to pass it on. You are just a pass-through
institution. You either have to reduce the quality of your
products or the labor costs or something, or raise the prices.
This is a crux of how we are going to protect people,
because if they cannot get insurance, we are in real trouble.
Mr. Lowy. The biggest fear we have without TRIA is there
will not be terrorism insurance and the economy will actually
be taking the risk, not the insurance industry.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the Gentleman from Indiana. Having
been at Heinz Field in Pittsburgh this weekend to watch Notre
Dame beat Pittsburgh, I compliment you on your dress today.
[Laughter.]
I will not say anything about the Washington Huskies.
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the
members for their questions.
The members of the committee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to
these in writing please. The hearing record will be held open
for 10 days.
Let me once again thank you. Your very, very helpful
testimony will assist us as we move forward.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:43 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
THE LONDON BOMBINGS:
PROTECTING CIVILIAN TARGETS
FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS
PART II
----------
Thursday, October 20, 2005
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:06 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Dan Lungren
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Lungren, Pearce and Thompson (ex
officio).
Mr. Lungren. The hearing of the Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure
Protection and Cybersecurity will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony from
the Department of Homeland Security on protecting soft targets
from terrorist attacks.
I want to thank our panel of witnesses for joining us
today. What we are doing today is convening as a continuation
of a hearing that was held in the beginning of September on
efforts to better secure our Nation's numerous soft targets. At
that time we heard from representatives of shopping malls,
office buildings and schools on their efforts to prepare for,
protect against and mitigate a terrorist attack.
We originally planned on having a government panel before
the private panel, but due to Hurricane Katrina and the
workload that ensued afterwards, our DHS witnesses had to
postpone until today. This was fortuitous in some respects as
we were able to learn a lot from that first panel of witnesses,
and we can now get some answers and clarification from the
Department with respect to some of the issues that were raised
at that time.
What became apparent during our first panel discussion on
the soft target issue, and really an issue that we have
grappled with time and time again on this committee, is how do
we take our limited resources and expect to protect against an
almost infinite number of civilian targets and terrorist
scenarios. The response that we have collectively heard again
and again to this problem is that our Nation must be risk-based
in our approach to security.
I think it is important that we take time to realize what
this would actually look like in practice and begin to think
about how the Department can move forward towards utilizing
this methodology across the board. In practice, a risk-based
methodology means not focusing on each sector from top to
bottom--it means not focusing on one sector at the expense of
others. I don't expect the Department to secure, or for that
matter, even to analyze, the risk of every single chemical
facility in this country and then move on to do the same for
dams and office buildings, and then off to malls and so forth.
There are not enough resources to do this, and certainly not
enough time. We must be acting as if the next terrorist attack
is just around the corner. And, the job at the Department of
Homeland Security, I believe, is to focus on securing the
highest-risk sites first.
Each sector is filled with a mix of low, medium, and high-
risk sites, the majority falling into the first two categories
of medium to low risk. For every low risk site the Department
spends time analyzing or securing in one sector, there is the
potential for a high-risk site in another sector to go
unaddressed--at least for a time. What we need is cross-sector
risk analysis to identify the highest-priority sites across the
country and across all sectors, and simultaneously be working
to identify protective measures that can be taken to mitigate
those risks. At the same time, we should be working with our
partners in the private sector to develop guidance for the low
and medium risk sites so they can improve the security
practices there as well.
As Secretary Chertoff has said repeatedly since taking
office earlier this year, Homeland Security must be more than
simply reacting to the latest action of our adversary. We
should avoid being dictated to by the ``target du jour''. We
should be securing our homeland in a systematic and prioritized
manner based on our best understanding of the risk.
When we originally scheduled this hearing, I was expecting
that Members would focus on transit security in the wake of the
London subway attacks. We now know from the President himself
that we have foiled al-Qa'ida attacks aimed at apartment
buildings, other urban targets, tourist sites and ships. And,
of course, post-Katrina there is a renewed focus on the
vulnerabilities of dams and levees. Yet we recently learned
that the New Orleans levee system, which for years has been
identified as being vulnerable to hurricanes with catastrophic
consequences by DHS itself, was something that received little
attention by either DHS or state officials prior to Katrina,
even though a terrorist attack on the levee system could have
been even more catastrophic than a hurricane. In fact, it is my
information that this levee system was not even included on the
Department's list of top priority assets, even though other
less consequential sites did make that list because they fell
within a particular sector. I would hope that we would be
better--we have to be better about developing a truly
prioritized national list and doing so quickly.
What I hope to hear from our witnesses today is how you are
prioritizing across sectors, and what you are doing in real
time to secure our most critical and most at risk
infrastructure, whether they be dams, levees, chemical plants,
subways, apartment buildings, malls, you name it.
I thank the witnesses for their appearances today, and I
recognize the Chairman of--excuse me, the Ranking Member--I
keep calling him Chairman, I keep trying to get him to become a
Republican.
Prepared Statement of the Hon. Dan Lungren
October 20, 2005
Good Afternoon everyone and I want to thank our panel of witnesses
for joining us today. The Subcommittee is convening today as a
continuation of a hearing that was held in the beginning of September
on efforts to better secure our Nation's numerous soft targets. At that
time, we heard from representatives of shopping malls, office
buildings, and schools on their efforts to prepare for, protect
against, and mitigate a terrorist attack.
We had originally planned on having the Government panel before the
private panel, but due to Hurricane Katrina and the workload that
ensued afterwards our DHS witnesses had to postpone until today. This
was fortuitous in some respect, as we were able to learn a lot from
that first panel of witnesses and we can now get some answers and
clarification from the Department with respect to some of the issues
that were raised then.
What became apparent during our first panel discussion of the soft
target issue--and really, an issue that we have grappled with time and
again on this Committee--is how do we take our limited resources and
expect to protect against an almost infinite number of civilian targets
and terrorist scenarios?
The response that we have collectively heard again and again to
this problem is that the Nation must be ``risk-based'' in our approach
to security. I think it?s important that we take time to realize what
this would actually look like in practice and begin to think about how
the Department can move towards utilizing this methodology across the
board.
In practice, a risk-based methodology means not focusing on each
sector from top to bottom--it means not focusing on one sector at the
expense of others. I don't expect the Department to secure--or, for
that matter, even to analyze the risk of--every single chemical
facility in this country, and then move on to doing the same for dams,
and then to office buildings, or to malls.
There are not enough resources to do this--and certainly not enough
time. We must be acting as if the next terrorist attack is just around
the corner. And your job, as the Department of Homeland Security, is to
focus on securing +the highest risk sites first.
Each sector is filled with a mix of low, medium and high-risk
sites--the majority falling within the first two categories of medium
to low risk. And for every low-risk site that the Department spends
time analyzing or securing in one sector, there is the potential for a
high-risk site in another sector to go unaddressed.
What we need is cross-sector risk analysis to identify the highest
priority sites across the country--across all sectors--and
simultaneously be working to identify protective measures that can be
taken to mitigate those risks. At the same time, we should be working
with our partners in the private sector to develop guidance for the low
and medium-risk sites so they can improve their security practices as
well.
As Secretary Chertoff has said repeatedly since taking office
earlier this year, homeland security must be more than simply reacting
to the latest action of our adversary. We should be securing our
homeland in a systematic and prioritized manner, based on our best
understanding of the risk.
When we originally scheduled this hearing, I expected that Members
would focus on transit security in the wake of the London subway
attacks. We now know, from the President himself, that we have foiled
al-Qa'ida attacks aimed at apartment buildings, other urban targets,
tourist sites, and ships. And, of course, post-Katrina, there is a
renewed focus on the vulnerabilities of dams and levees.
Yet we recently learned that the New Orleans levee system--which
for years had been identified as being vulnerable to hurricanes with
catastrophic consequences by DHS itself--was something that received
little attention by either DHS or State officials prior to Katrina,
even though a terrorist attack on the levee system could have been even
more catastrophic than a hurricane. In fact, this levee system was not
even included on the Department's list of top priority assets, even
though other less consequential sites did make that list simply because
they fell within a particular sector. We have to be better about
developing a truly prioritized, national list, and doing so quickly.
What I hope to hear from our witnesses today is how you are
prioritizing across sectors, and what you are doing, in real time, to
secure our most critical and most at-risk infrastructure--whether they
are dams, levees, chemical plants, subways, or apartment buildings.
I thank the witnesses for their appearance today, and I will now
recognize the Ranking Member, Ms. Sanchez, for any opening statement
she may wish to make.
Mr. Thompson. You are already looking into the future.
Mr. Lungren. Well, maybe I am looking into the future. We
would always welcome you in the Republican Party. The Chair now
recognizes the Ranking Member of the full Committee, the
gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for any statement he
might have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The good
thing about this committee is, as you know, whether you are
Democrat or Republican, our real goal is to make sure that we
are safe, and I can say that all our members see that as number
one priority.
Let me welcome the panelists for today. Generally speaking,
this would be a full panel, but when the Congressional schedule
changes, people go to their districts real quick, and we
understand that. I think their absence is no indication of them
not being interested in this issue.
Like all Americans, I was shocked and repulsed by the
terrorist attacks in London. This attack has served as a
reminder that America and its close allies continue to face a
determined enemy that thinks nothing of slaughtering innocent
people.
I was troubled, I have to say, by Mr. Chertoff's comments
yesterday before the Katrina Committee that he had to get his
house in order. How many disasters, attacks, and close calls is
it going to take before the Department of Homeland Security
wakes up? First, we saw the Government's response to the
hurricanes. Then we saw the disconnect between the Federal
Government and the New York officials about threats to the
city's subway systems. Two days ago the Baltimore tunnel was
closed. I heard, as the tunnel closed, conflicting reports
about whether it was a real or fake threat.
Mr. Chertoff, in your absence, while you have been putting
your house in order, it has crumbled to the ground from neglect
to its foundation and walls. Trust is important. I, along with
every other American person, must be able to trust the
Department of Homeland Security to perform at 100 percent, if
not more. I am close to losing all trust.
With regard to our mass transit and passenger rail systems,
I am especially worried. Almost 4 years after the September
11th terrorist attacks, passenger rail and transit security
remains a Department of Homeland Security afterthought. While
the United States has spent over 18 billion on aviation
security since 9/11, we managed only to offer up 717 million
for transit security. That simply falls too short, especially
when one considers that every American takes mass transit 16
times more often than they travel by air.
The National Strategy for Transportation Security that the
Department recently submitted that was supposed to lay the
groundwork for securing our mass transit systems was lacking.
Indeed, it did not meet Congressionally mandated requirements.
Speaking of which, I want to know when DHS will start using
the National Response Plan. Secretary Chertoff told Members of
Congress yesterday that the Department did not have an
integrated plan in place when Katrina struck. What about the
National Response Plan? Did he forget about it? Is it another
document that contractors put together that wastes taxpayers'
dollars because the Department doesn't think it is good? I
would like to know.
One thing I would also like to hear from today's witnesses
is when will the Department finish the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan? Our Chairman alluded to this plan. The levee
systems are not included in that plan. We had some, as you
know, miniature golf courses that were on the plan, and I can't
see how we can put a miniature golf course on this
infrastructure protection plan but we can't put a levee system
on the plan. Andy Purdy from the Department testified 2 days
ago that he couldn't tell us definitively when it was going to
be completed. I hope you can do better than that.
GAO and IG both have looked at the National Infrastructure
Plan, and they said it is inadequate. It is back in the
Department for further review. We were told initially we might
get it by November; now we hear February, but I would like to
know for sure when that time is.
I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Lungren. We are pleased to have two members for a
distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this
important topic, and the Chair recognizes Mr. Robert Stephan,
the Acting Under Secretary for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection of the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security to testify.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT STEPHAN
Mr. Stephan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good afternoon. And
good afternoon to you, Representative Thompson. I appreciate
the opportunity to speak with you and your distinguished
committee today.
The Department of Homeland Security, I assure you, is
committed to working with our partners in State and local and
tribal governments, as well as across broad elements of the
private sector to reduce the overall level of risk of terrorist
attacks against our national critical infrastructure and key
resource base.
In analyzing terrorist risk, it becomes clear that certain
means of attack against certain types of targets are easier for
terrorists to accomplish and execute, and more difficult for us
to protect against. The July 7th and 21st horrific attacks on
the London mass transit system in 2005, as well as the March
2004 attacks in Madrid, underscore the inherent vulnerability
of so-called open-access systems.
Recognizing that despite our best efforts we cannot always
protect everyone and everything against all dangers, Secretary
Chertoff's risk-based approach allows us to make better
judgments about where we target resources, and prioritize our
protection efforts to reduce this overall risk, and protect our
critical infrastructures and key resources from terrorist
attacks.
In doing so, DHS has several principle objectives in mind:
providing resources and training to State and local governments
and law enforcement for security enhancements across the board;
providing information to both public and private sectors on the
threat environment, the tactics, techniques and procedures of
terrorist organizations and terrorist individuals, our common
vulnerability and risks, suggested protective measures; as well
as creating information-sharing networks and mechanisms that
efficiently and effectively enable DHS to share best practices,
as well as our Federal Government partners in the unique
aspects of their assets, to improve situational awareness
during a crisis or when faced with a general or a specific
threat situation.
These objectives are being realized through the
implementation of a Unified National Plan--and I will answer
Representative Thompson's concerns regarding the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan in follow-along questions, sir--
for the consolidation of critical infrastructure protection
activities into your basket that we are responsible for. The
cornerstone of this National Infrastructure Protection Plan is
a risk management framework that combines threat, vulnerability
and consequence information and approaches to produce a
comprehensive, systematic and informed assessment of national
and sector-specific risks that drive our risk reduction efforts
in the critical infrastructure and key resource sectors.
The principal steps in this risk management framework are
to set sector security goals, identify assets, assess risks,
and prioritize our efforts and resources accordingly based on
the severity and mass effect of potential consequences
principally, although, importantly, also taking into account
vulnerabilities and specific threat information.
DHS has developed two important tools to assist in this
process. The first of these is the National Asset Database, the
central Federal repository for national infrastructure-related
information that we get from a host of stakeholders across
State, local and private sector arenas, and serves also as an
inventory of the Nation's assets and infrastructures.
Secondly, we have a risk management tool called RAMCAP,
which is an acronym for risk assessment and management for
critical asset protection, which is collaboratively being
developed across sectors that will guide and provide a
spearhead for this national risk assessment, Mr. Chairman, that
you are looking so desperately for, to enable an assessment and
comparison of risk of critical infrastructure assets both
across and within our most important sectors of responsibility,
thereby enabling the prioritization of protective efforts and
resources, and a more efficient conduct of our responsibility.
DHS leads the Federal Government's critical infrastructure
protection efforts and works in collaboration with State and
local governments, the private sector, and, of course, numerous
other Federal departments and agencies. We are not lone wolves
in this mission.
Examples of protected programs DHS has implemented
successfully and will continue to execute upon include the DHS
Vulnerability Identification Self-Assessment Tool, which has a
very broad application across these open-access targets that
you are very concerned about with this hearing. The goal of
this program is to raise the level of security awareness in
public assembly facilities across the Nation, as well as
establish a common baseline of security from which these
facilities can build their protection plans and their
appropriate response mechanisms with Federal, State and local
partners.
We also have a Target Awareness Training Program that
provides baseline prevention and awareness training to first-
level supervisors and security personnel across these so-called
soft target categories in order to increase their ability to
deter and detect potential attacks, as well as increase the
reporting of suspicious activity and suspect items.
One of the principal goals of our Federal, State, local and
private sector partnership is providing the necessary framework
and support to really enable coordination and information
sharing within critical infrastructure sectors across these
sectors, and between all levels of government and the private
sector in order to achieve and execute our responsibilities.
Examples of various information-sharing mechanisms. Later
on in the question-and-answer session, I would love to get in
more deeply with you some of the more specific incidents
surrounding the London bombings, the recent terrorist threat
information relative to New York and Baltimore, if you would
like.
Examples of things that we use as information-sharing
mechanisms includes sector coordinating councils, government
coordinating councils, our Homeland Security Information
Network--which our director Matt Broderick will be briefing you
on tomorrow--the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center,
and various private sector information-sharing and analysis
centers.
DHS also has and will continue to work closely with allied
nations and international partners with respect to garnering
information relative to open-access target sets as well as
tactics, techniques and procedures that are employed by
terrorist adversaries that more routinely perhaps than in the
United States perpetrate devastating attacks abroad against
their facilities, assets and open-access systems.
We also are members of the Department of Defense's effort
in the Joint Improvised Explosive Device-Defeat Task Force,
which is an important interagency, international effort with
Israeli, Australian, Canadian and British participation to get
at very significant problems.
In terms of reacting to crisis situations in the immediate
aftermath of the London attacks on July 7th, DHS activated our
Interagency Incident Management Group to serve as the national
headquarters-level multiagency coordination hub for incident
management and response. Upon the decision to elevate the
Homeland Security advisory system from yellow to orange for the
mass transit sectors specifically targeted, the Office of
Infrastructure Protection, in partnership with the
Transportation Security Administration, coordinated outreach
with the private sector and public sector partners broadly in
the mass transit sector to provide them with an overview of the
latest threat intelligence, to explain the implications
nationwide of the move to orange, and to provide them an
opportunity to discuss those implications.
We have worked with our Federal partners to enhance
security in our Nation's largest mass transit system and
transit systems across the board, and have made Urban Area
Security Initiative funding available for overtime to State and
local law enforcement for activities related to increased mass
transit security.
Throughout this process DHS effectively executed a mission
during the July 7th and 20th attacks as coordinator of National
Critical Infrastructure Protection efforts as well as the
national--level focal point for information sharing both within
the Federal Government and between the public and private
sectors.
In conclusion, I would like to reinforce--and I want to
answer many of the important questions you raised in your
introductions, gentlemen--that we are dedicated to working with
infrastructure stakeholders across the country to increase the
security of our Nation's critical infrastructure sectors using
Secretary Chertoff's risk-based approach. The places and events
where our fellow citizens are most vulnerable are a key
priority. With your continued support, spirit of cooperation,
as well as that of the American people, we will succeed in this
very important issue, and these people are not going to beat
us. Thank you.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Stephan.
[The statement of Mr. Stephan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert B. Stephan
October 20, 2005
Introduction
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sanchez and
distinguished Members of this Subcommittee. I appreciate the
opportunity to speak with you.
The Department of Homeland Security is committed to working with
our partners in State, local and tribal governments and the private
sector in reducing the overall level of risk of terrorist attacks
against our national critical infrastructure. By reducing risk, we mean
examining the consequences of a potential attack; examining the
vulnerability of critical sites and facilities to various modes of
attack; and examining the potential threat--that is, the intent of
terrorists to attack in a given place and their likelihood of success.
In analyzing risk, it becomes clear that certain means of attack
against certain types of targets are easier for terrorists to
accomplish and difficult for us to protect against. The July 7 and 21
attacks on the London mass transit system in 2005, as well as the March
2004 attack in Madrid, underscore the inherent vulnerability of open-
access systems.
Recognizing that despite our best efforts, we cannot always protect
everyone against all dangers, this risk-based approach allows us to
make better judgments about where we target resources and prioritize
our protection efforts.
In working to reduce risk and protect critical infrastructure, DHS
has three principal objectives:
Provide resources and training to State and local
governments and law enforcement for security enhancements;
Provide information to both public and private sectors
on the threat environment, tactics and techniques of
terrorists, common vulnerabilities and suggested protective
measures; and
Create information-sharing mechanisms that enable DHS
stakeholders to share best practices and the unique aspects of
their assets to improve situational awareness during a crisis
or when faced with a specific threat.
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan
These objectives are being realized through the implementation of
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). Directed by
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), the NIPP is a
unified national plan for the consolidation of critical infrastructure
protection (CIP) activities. The NIPP is a collaborative effort between
the private sector, State, local, territorial and tribal entities and
all relevant departments and agencies of the Federal government.
The cornerstone of the NIPP is a risk management framework that
combines threat, vulnerability, and consequence information to produce
a comprehensive, systematic, and informed assessment of national or
sector risk that drives our risk reduction efforts in the critical
infrastructure/key resources (CI/KR) sectors. This framework applies to
the general threat environment as well as specific threats or incident
situations.
NIPP Risk Management Framework
Set Security Goals. Achieving a secure, protected, and resilient
infrastructure requires a common set of national and sector-specific
security goals that address those aspects of risk that can be affected
and collectively represent an acceptable security posture. Therefore,
sector security goals will be determined through a collaborative effort
of government agencies and the private sector. Establishing sector
security goals is the nexus of the NIPP planning process that will
drive the public/private partnership. Nationally, the overarching
security goal of reducing risk begins with an enhanced state of CI/KR
security, a state which is best achieved through the implementation of
focused risk reduction and protective strategies across the critical
sectors.
Identify Assets. Once security goals are set, the next step in the
framework is to develop and maintain an inventory of the Nation's
assets. First, asset information is collected and catalogued in the
National Asset Database (NADB), which is the central Federal repository
for national infrastructure-related information. Second, after an asset
is identified and basic information on it is collected, DHS employs an
initial screening methodology to determine whether or not it is of
national consequence. Finally, priority is given to applying federal
resources to those assets that, if attacked, could have a nationally
significant effect.
Assess Risk. If an asset is determined to be of national
consequence, it is then subjected to a risk analysis. As mentioned
before, risk is determined through a combined assessment of:
Consequence--estimates of the damage a successful
attack would cause;
Threat--estimates of the likelihood that a particular
target or type of target will be selected for attack; and
Vulnerability--assess which elements of infrastructure
are most susceptible to attack and how attacks against these
elements would be most likely carried out.
One of the Department's principal risk-assessment tools is RAMCAP
(Risk Assessment Methodology for Critical Asset Protection). RAMCAP is
being developed by DHS in collaboration with other federal agencies and
the private sector as a sector-specific consequence, vulnerability, and
risk methodology. RAMCAP enables an assessment and comparison of risk
of critical infrastructure assets both across and within CI/KR sectors,
thereby enabling the prioritization of protective efforts and effective
use of available resources.
Prioritize. It is impossible, nor do we attempt, to protect all CI/
KR equally across the entire United States. We assess the potential
consequences of an attack, threats, and vulnerabilities for CI/KR
sectors, as well as individual assets within those sectors and
prioritize our efforts based upon the severity and mass effect of
potential consequence. Conducting risk analysis provides us with the
information needed to make such determinations, as well as provides the
department a basis upon which to make longer-term resource decisions
including strategic protective programs and planning for response and
other contingency situations.
Implement Protective Programs. The widely dispersed nature of
critical infrastructure demands equally dispersed ownership and
execution of protection programs. It requires centralized leadership
which in turn drives consistent implementation and ensures the greatest
cost-benefit through addressing the greatest risks. DHS leads the
Federal government's critical infrastructure protection effort, and
works in collaboration with State and local governments, the private
sector, and our international partners to protect against potential
terrorist attacks through reducing our vulnerabilities and enhancing
our response capabilities to potential terrorist attacks. Some of the
key DHS programs include:
Vulnerability Identification Self-Assessment Tool--An
important initiative designed to increase the capabilities of
private sector owners and operators to enhance their own
security is the DHS Vulnerability Identification Self-
Assessment Tool (DHS-VISAT). This is a voluntary, on-line
assessment tool that was originally developed to help
transportation asset owner/operators enhance security. The goal
of this program is to raise the level of security awareness in
public assembly facilities across the nation and establish a
common ``baseline'' of security awareness from which these
facilities can build their protection plans. To date, it has
been adapted for use by stadium and arena managers and access
has been provided to over 300 stadiums and 400 arenas.
Currently this tool is being modified for use by other
commercial venues including convention and performing arts
centers. In addition, we have engaged in piloting efforts with
the States of Texas, Virginia, and California to adapt the tool
to support security awareness in K-12 schools.
Target Awareness Training--The Target Awareness
Training (TAT) program provides baseline prevention and
awareness training to first level supervisors and security
personnel and is supported by VISAT. The primary objectives of
TAT are to increase the ability to deter and detect potential
attacks and to increase the reporting of suspicious activity
and suspect items. The courses focus on law enforcement and
security staff working in shopping malls and centers, places of
worship, educational institutions, hotels, and sports
complexes. Over 2,500 law enforcement and private sector
personnel have participated in 128 TAT Courses since September
2003. We also provide a Surveillance Detection Course, Surface
Transportation Antiterrorism Program, and an Improvised
Explosive Devices/Weapons of Mass Destruction (IED/WMD)
Electronics course.
Bomb Prevention--Bombing is a preferred tactic for
terrorists seeking relatively uncomplicated, inexpensive means
for harming large numbers of people and inflicting maximum
damage on critical infrastructure. The threat that IEDs and
other types of explosive weapons pose are of great concern
given the relative technological ease with which such an attack
could be planned and executed. Central to preventing bombing
attacks are:
the need for new critical thinking and analysis
regarding the nature and scope of preventing an attack;
innovation in detection, deterrence, and improving
system robustness in the face of an adaptable enemy;
the importance of increased stakeholder participation
and cooperation;
the need for more robust information sharing and
collaboration measures; and
meaningful dialogue between State and local
jurisdictions and the Federal government to identify and fill
operational capability gaps related to training, equipment,
technology and resources
We will continue to assist state and local entities in identifying
gaps in protective capacity and obtaining required resources. Under
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 and the National
Preparedness Goal, the Department is identifying bomb prevention
capabilities at every level of the government and identifying gaps in
this capability. We are taking steps to address any gaps that exist by
developing a focused and unified national bombing prevention effort
through such groups as the Interagency Governance Board and the IED
Task Force. DHS is also developing enhanced knowledge management
systems that foster information sharing and collaboration between
Federal, State, and local entities involved in bombing prevention, and
among various and disparate law enforcement jurisdictions.
Information Sharing
One of the principal goals of the Federal-State-local-private
sector partnership is to provide the necessary framework and support to
enable coordination and information sharing within each CI sector,
across all CI sectors, and between all levels of the government and
private sector in order to achieve the execution of a full spectrum of
prudent and responsible protective actions.
Sector Partnership Model--Under the NIPP framework,
DHS is helping to create private sector-led Sector Coordinating
Councils (SCCs) for each of the 17 critical infrastructure
sectors. These councils will serve as a mechanism for
identifying risk and protection issues within their specific
sector and addressing the range of infrastructure protection
activities. For example, the ``Commercial Facilities'' sector
coordinating council encompasses open-access facilities that,
if attacked, could cause significant casualties and economic
damage. Accordingly, membership in the Commercial Facilities
SCC includes all major sports leagues, International Council of
Shopping Centers, Marriott, Warner Brothers, Disney, the Real
Estate Roundtable, the Self Storage Association, the
International Association of Assembly Managers, and others.
Both the SCCs, and their government counterparts, Government
Coordinating Councils (GCCs) will increase inter-agency coordination
and information sharing on critical infrastructure protection
activities. The GCC coordinates strategies, activities, policy, and
communication across organizations within each sector. Unlike the SCC,
it does so through the Federal government. The SCC and GCC work
together to create a coordinated national mechanism for infrastructure
protection in their sector. Members of the Commercial Facilities GCC
include the US Secret Service, the Federal Protective Service, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the General Services Administration,
and the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Interior, and Education.
Homeland Security Information Network--DHS is developing a
networked approach to information-sharing that enables rapid
information dissemination to decentralized decision makers across the
nation. The key objectives of this approach are to enable multi-
directional information sharing between and across government and
industry; provide all CI/KR sector owners and operators with a robust
communications framework, tailored to the specific information sharing
requirements of each sector; and provide a comprehensive threat
landscape to all security partners, including general and specific
threats, incidents and events, impact assessments, and best practices.
At the core of this networked approach is a series of
sophisticated, secure tools and support mechanisms, collectively
referred to as the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), which
provides a national communications platform that enables the flow of
near real-time information among governmental entities at all levels
(i.e., Federal, state, territorial, local, and tribal), private sector
organizations, and international security partners.
National Infrastructure Coordinating Center--The National
Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC) is a 24x7 watch operation
center that maintains operational and situational awareness of the
Nation's CI/KR sectors. The fully operational NICC provides a
centralized mechanism for gathering information and a process for
sharing and coordinating information between and among government,
SCCs, GCCs, and other industry partners. The NICC receives incident
reports from specific sectors in accordance with pre-established
information-sharing standard operating procedures. When required, the
NICC also disseminates a wide range of products containing warning,
threat, and critical infrastructure protection (CIP) information to the
private sector and government entities. The NICC is also responsible
for receiving situational and operational information from the private
sector and disseminating that information throughout the Homeland
Security Operations Center (HSOC), other government operation centers,
and industry partners as applicable.
Information Sharing and Analysis Center--The private
sector has established a number of information-sharing mechanisms that
contribute to the protection of their assets. One such mechanism is the
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC). While the SCCs
ultimately define the unique information-sharing requirements for each
sector, ISACs and other existing mechanisms provide an array of options
and capabilities for some infrastructure owners and operators.
ISACs, while varying greatly in composition, scope, and
capabilities, offer a viable information-sharing mechanism. Some ISACs,
for example, maintain 24x7 watch centers and provide various levels of
sector-specific alerting and analysis. In this regard, the Surface
Transportation and Public Transportation ISAC collects, analyzes, and
distributes critical cyber and physical security and threat information
from government and numerous other sources on a 24/7 basis. Other ISACs
maintain a watch center that is staffed during traditional business
hours, with the ability to contact analysts via telephone or pager
during periods of increased activity. Still others operate primarily
through Websites, allowing members to access sector-related alerts,
warnings, and incident information. Regardless of the variance in
breadth and depth, however, ISACs are capable of disseminating DHS-
issued threat information.
International Information Sharing--We have made
significant progress in cooperation with our international partners in
the war on terror to share best practices and intelligence. This is
especially true in the area of bombing prevention. The United Kingdom
and Israel have years of experience in bombing prevention. DHS has and
will continue to work closely with Scotland Yard and the Israeli
Defense Force and police in order to learn better methods of bombing
detection and prevention.
Additionally, we are part of the Department of Defense's effort in
the Joint Improvised Explosive Device-Defeat Task Force, an
interagency, international effort with Israeli, Australian, Canadian,
and British participation. The task force will establish an open-door
program of international partners who will work to develop and exchange
detection and prevention technologies.
Reacting to Crisis
In the immediate aftermath of the July 7, 2005, attacks in London,
DHS stood up the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) to serve
as the national headquarters-level multi-agency coordination entity for
incident management. Secretary Chertoff then recommended to the
President that the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) move from
YELLOW to ORANGE for the Mass Transit Sector. In response, the Office
of Infrastructure Protection, in partnership with TSA, coordinated
outreach with public and private sector owners and operators in the
Mass Transit Sector to provide them with an overview of the latest
threat intelligence, to explain the implications of a move to ORANGE,
and to provide them an opportunity discuss those implications.
We worked with our Federal partners to enhance security at our
Nation's largest mass transit systems and made Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) funding available for overtime to State and local law
enforcement for activities related to increased mass transit security.
Our intelligence and analytical units produced Joint Advisories and
Information Bulletins with the FBI that detailed what we knew about the
terrorists target selection, attack methodology, implications, and
suggested protective measures that mass transit operators could
implement. Following the attacks, personnel from the Office of
Infrastructure Protection and TSA conducted analysis of mass transit
systems, starting in large cities such as the New York and New Jersey
systems. Inspectors from the Federal Railroad Administration conducted
inspections of passenger rail operations in the days immediately
following the July 7 attacks. Throughout this process, DHS effectively
executed its mission as a coordinator of national critical
infrastructure protection efforts, and served as the focal point for
information sharing both within the Federal government and between the
public and private sectors.
Conclusion
DHS is dedicated to working with infrastructure stakeholders across
the country to increase the security of our Nation's critical
infrastructure sectors using a risk-based approach. The places and
events where our fellow citizens are most vulnerable are a key
priority. With your support and that of the American people, we will
succeed. Thank you.
Mr. Lungren. The Chair would now recognize Mr. Robert
Jamison, the Deputy Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, to
testify.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT JAMISON
Mr. Jamison. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Thompson.
I am pleased to appear before you in my new capacity as the
Deputy Administrator for TSA to testify on the critical subject
of protecting civilian targets from terrorist attack. My
testimony this morning will focus on our approach to
accomplishing this mission, focusing particularly on public
transportation.
At the outset, I want to acknowledge the team nature of
security in today's world and express appreciation for the work
of the Department of Transportation and our partners in State
and local government and throughout the transportation
industry.
Public transportation in America is a dynamic,
interconnected network. It consists of overlapping subnetworks
and multiple organizations with a variety of government
structures and a mix of public and private ownership. In terms
of security, decentralized systems such as this are more
difficult to control, but they also have advantages. They
present more operational uncertainty to those who seek to harm
them, and they are more robust in the face of catastrophic
failure of any single component of their network.
Despite the good work that has already been done in
improving security in transit, the London bombings and other
events throughout the world have demonstrated the need for a
new strategic approach to transportation security.
Fundamentally our challenge is to protect our transportation
network in a constantly changing threat environment. We
understand better that terrorists will not only look for
weaknesses in our transportation system and in security
measures, but they will also adapt to perceived security
measures. As a result, it is not possible to precisely predict
with any degree of certainty the next attack based on previous
terrorist activity.
In the face of this unpredictability and rapid change with
respect to threats, our approach to security in every
transportation sector must be based on flexibility and
adaptability. While it is necessary, it is no longer sufficient
to protect ourselves against known or suspected terrorists; we
must protect ourselves against people with no known affiliation
to terrorism. While it is necessary to, it is no longer
sufficient to focus on finding threat devices like guns and
explosives; we must enhance our ability to find terrorists
before an attack is underway. And while it is necessary, it is
no longer sufficient to subject every passenger to basic
security procedures; we must create uncertainty, an element of
unpredictabilty in our security operations, in order to disrupt
terrorist planning and attempts.
To accomplish these objectives, TSA is pursuing a security
strategy based on Secretary Chertoff's Second Stage Review.
There are four cooperating principles applicable to TSA. First,
we will use analysis based on risk vulnerability and
consequence to make investment and operational decisions.
Second, we will avoid giving terrorists an advantage based on
our predictability. TSA will deploy resources, such as K-9s and
air marshals and inspectors, for example, and establish
protocols, standards and best practices flexibly based on risk.
Terrorists will not be able to use the predictability of our
security measures to their advantage in carrying out an attack.
Third, we will continue to intervene early based on
intelligence, law enforcement information and suspicious
incident reporting that focus our security measures on the
terrorist as well as the means for carrying out the threat.
Effective analysis and dissemination of timely information to
those in need is a vital component of this effort.
Finally, we will build and take advantage of security
networks. We are pursuing a restructuring of TSA that will put
renewed emphasis on building on information-sharing networks in
every transportation sector. Through these efforts, we will
work more closely with stakeholders and put a renewed emphasis
on sharing intelligence, capacity and technology with other law
enforcement, intelligence-gathering and security agencies at
every level of government. We will build a more robust,
distributed network of security systems to protect America.
As we move forward, we are fortunate to be able to build on
solid foundation not only at the local level, but nationally as
well. This foundation includes products and resources developed
by our Federal partners, especially at the Department of
Transportation, with the Federal Transit Administration and the
Federal Railroad Administration, and partners in the industry
at the American Public Transportation Association, the
Association of American Railroads and its members, labor
unions, and individual public transportation systems. This
collective expertise fortifies their knowledge, expertise and
overall strategic approach. We value the critical role of
Congress and especially this subcommittee, that this
subcommittee plays in this effort, and we look forward to
working with you on a full range of these issues.
I am happy to appear, and I would be pleased to answer any
questions you might have.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Jamison follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Jamison
October 20, 2005
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez, and Members of
the Subcommittee. I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on
the subject of ``The London Bombings: Protecting Civilian Targets from
Terrorist Attack.'' As requested, my testimony today will focus largely
on public transit and intercity freight and passenger rail
transportation.
As you know, the September 11 attacks focused Congress, the
Administration, and the public on improving the security of our
aviation system. It is an honor today to assist Assistant Secretary
Hawley in leading TSA as we refocus and realign it to reflect the
changing reality of terrorist threats to the transportation sector. Of
necessity, much of our early work at TSA focused on the very real and
present threats and vulnerabilities in aviation. We were fortunate to
have partners at DOT and in industries and communities around the
Nation who immediately stepped forward at that time to initiate
security improvements in the transit and rail sectors. Today, we
continue to work with these partners and build upon their record of
success to address the changing transportation threat environment.
Overview of Surface Transportation
America's passenger and freight transportation system is a dynamic,
interconnected network. It consists of overlapping sub-networks and
multiple organizations, with a variety of governance structures and a
mix of public and private ownership. In terms of security,
decentralized systems such as this are more difficult to ``control,''
but they also have advantages. They present more operational
uncertainty to those who seek to do them harm, and they are more robust
in the face of catastrophic failure of any single component of their
networks.
Public Transportation. America's public transportation system is
actually composed of over 6,000 separate local transit systems. These
local systems range from very small bus-only systems in rural
communities, to very large multi-modal systems in urban areas that may
combine bus, light rail, subway, commuter rail and ferry operations.
Transit systems are not only locally operated, but they are also
protected largely by State and local law enforcement.
Americans took 9.4 billion trips using public transportation in
2003. The 30 largest transit systems in the U.S. carry most (almost 80
percent) of the Nation's transit passenger trips. There is now some
form of rail transit (light rail, subway, or commuter rail) operated by
53 different transit agencies located in 33 cities and 23 States. These
rail systems provide a combined 11.3 million passenger trips each
weekday, compared to 1.8 million domestic emplanements per day
nationwide.
Approximately 28 percent of all transit trips and 77 percent of all
rail transit trips are on heavy rail. There are 14 heavy rail transit
systems (also known as subways) in the U.S., consisting of more than
2,000 route miles, with over 1,000 stations and approximately 10,500
subway cars. The New York City subway system is the largest in the
U.S., carrying about 75 percent of the nation's heavy rail passengers,
with half of the stations and more than 6,000 scheduled trains per day
carrying over 3 million riders. In New York's Penn Station alone, more
than 1,600 people per minute pass through dozens of access points
during a typical rush hour.
Intercity Bus Transportation. Though not owned by public entities,
intercity bus service is an important component of America's
transportation network. Intercity bus service is provided by over 4,000
private operators across the country, 90 percent of which operate 25 or
fewer buses. Greyhound is the largest intercity bus operator, with a
fleet of more than 2,400 buses. Public transit buses annually carry
about 8 times the number of riders as intercity buses; heavy rail
(subway) operators carry over 3 times as many riders as intercity
buses.
Intercity Passenger Rail. Intercity passenger rail service is
provided by two entities: Amtrak and the Alaska Railroad Corporation
(ARRC), which is a public corporation of the State of Alaska. The ARRC
provides freight and passenger service from Whittier, Seward and
Anchorage to Fairbanks, Denali National Park, and military
installations.
Amtrak carries approximately 25 million passengers per year or an
estimated 68,000 passengers per day, operating as many as 300 trains
per day and serving over 500 stations in 46 States. In many large
cities, Amtrak stations are co-located with stations serving rail
transit, intercity bus, and other modes of transportation. Amtrak
operates over more than 22,000 route miles. It owns 650 route miles,
primarily between Boston and Washington, DC, and in Michigan. In other
parts of the country, Amtrak trains use tracks owned by freight
railroads.
Freight Rail. U.S. freight railroads operate over a network
spanning more than 140,000 route miles. This system is vital to the
economy, linking businesses and ensuring products reach consumers in an
efficient, safe, and cost-effective manner. Still, recent events, such
as the accidental derailment in Graniteville, SC, that resulted in the
release of chlorine gas, have highlighted the need to focus additional
attention on the potential security risks associated with freight rail.
Over 64 percent of toxic inhalation hazard chemicals are currently
transported by rail. In 2003, over 60,000 tank cars of chlorine or
anhydrous ammonia chemicals were shipped, each carrying an average of
90 tons of chlorine or 30,000 gallons of anhydrous ammonia.
London Lessons Learned
Al-Qa'ida and its affiliated extremist groups and sympathizers
demonstrated their ability to strike mass transit targets with suicide
bombings on buses in Israel, Turkey and China, and bombings of subways,
rail systems, and ferries in India, Pakistan, Thailand, Chechnya,
Russia and the Philippines. The Madrid train attacks in 2004 and the
London subway and bus attacks on July 7 and 21 of this year have
further reminded us that our trains, subways and buses may be terrorist
targets.
Heavy rail transit systems in the U.S., like the London
Underground, are particularly high consequence targets in terms of
potential loss of life and economic disruption. These systems carry
large numbers of people in a confined environment, offer the potential
of targeting specific populations at particular destination stations,
and often have stations located below or adjacent to high profile
government buildings, major office complexes, or public icons. Threats
to particular economic sectors, like government or financial
institutions, may also be carried out through attacks on public
transit.
The London attacks were particularly noteworthy from a security
perspective.
In a relatively short period of time, unknown and
apparently unaffiliated individuals/groups were able to plan
and execute the attacks with little or no surveillance or
rehearsal activity.
The perpetrators came through fare-gates directly onto
the train; they did not access storage yards, tunnels or
bridges. As a result, London's extensive intrusion detection
devices and security cameras did not prevent the attacks.
Recording capability was helpful, but only after-the-fact in
helping to identify suspects.
The improvised explosive devices used by the attackers
were assembled with materials readily available in local shops.
The devices fit easily into backpacks of the type and design
commonly carried by students, commuters, and tourists.
Even with markedly increased public awareness,
countermeasures, and law enforcement presence after the first
London bombings, the same methods were able to be used in the
second attack without suspicion or detection.
Immediately following the first London attacks, transit agencies
and local officials took action. Responding to a joint inquiry by TSA
and DOT's Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the 30 largest transit
agencies reported that they:
Extended patrol hours through law enforcement overtime
and the deployment of administrative and operational personnel;
Expanded the use of canine explosive detection
patrols; and
Issued more frequent and more detailed public
awareness announcements regarding how to report unattended bags
and suspicious behavior and how to evacuate from particular
transit environments (i.e., train cars, tunnels, and bridges).
These actions built upon the important security foundation that was
established over the last several years. In contrast to their pre-9/11
security posture, all of the largest transit agencies have now:
developed and implemented action plans that are specific to each
Homeland Security Alert System threat level; sent front-line employees
to Federally-funded security and emergency response training courses;
instituted public awareness campaigns, many utilizing Federally-
developed materials; developed and tested emergency response plans; and
hardened numerous assets to protect against security threats.
Adapting to a Changing Threat Environment
Despite the work that has already been done, Mr. Chairman, the
London bombings and other events throughout the world have demonstrated
the need for a new strategic approach to transportation security.
Fundamentally, our challenge is to protect passengers, freight, and our
transportation network in a constantly changing threat environment. We
understand better that terrorists will not only look for weaknesses in
our transportation system and its security measures, but they will also
adapt to perceived security measures. As a result, it is not possible
to ``predict'' the next attack based on previous terrorist activity or
put into place specific security measures to protect against it. In
this dynamic environment, history is an unreliable guide.
In the face of unpredictability and rapid change in terms of
threats, our approach to security in every transportation sector must
be based on flexibility and adaptability.
While it is necessary, it is no longer sufficient to
protect ourselves against known or suspected terrorists; we must
protect ourselves against people with no known affiliation to
terrorism.
While it is necessary, it is no longer sufficient to focus
on finding weapons and common explosives; we must enhance our ability
to recognize suspicious behavioral patterns and demeanors to identify
people who may have devised a new means to attack our transportation
systems or passengers.
While it is necessary, it is no longer sufficient to
subject every passenger to the same basic security procedures; we must
create uncertainty and an element of randomness in security operations
in order to disrupt terrorist planning and attempts.
While it is necessary, it is no longer sufficient to focus
solely on identifying the actors, like suicide bombers; we must
integrate our security measures with local law enforcement to identify
those who make the bombs and provide support.
Therefore, TSA is pursuing a security strategy based on Secretary
Chertoff's Second Stage Review, the National Strategy for
Transportation Security, and the following four operating principles:
First, we will use risk/value analysis to make investment and
operational decisions. That means that we will assess risks based not
only on threat and vulnerability, but on the potential consequences of
a particular threat to people, transportation assets, and the economy.
Further, we will assess and undertake risk management and risk
mitigation measures based on their effect on total transportation
network risk. This holistic approach to risk assessment and risk
mitigation may lead us, for example, to redirect the actions of our
airport screeners to focus less on identifying and removing less
threatening items from carry-on luggage, so that their time and
attention can be spent on identifying potential components of an
improvised explosive device.
Second, we will avoid giving terrorists or potential terrorists an
advantage based on our predictability. TSA will deploy resources--
whether they are canine teams, screeners, air marshals, or inspectors--
and establish protocols flexibly based on risk, so that terrorists
cannot use the predictability of security measures to their advantage
in planning or carrying out a threat. This may mean changing or adding
to inspection routines on a daily or hourly basis to introduce
uncertainty into terrorist planning efforts.
Third, we will continue to intervene early based on intelligence,
and focus our security measures on the terrorist, as well as the means
for carrying out the threat. Enhancing and expanding the techniques to
identify suspicious persons at the transit, train, or bus station, or
to detect explosive devices is necessary. However, the strongest
defense posture detects the terrorist well before the attempt to launch
an attack has begun. A coordinated interagency intelligence collection
and analysis effort must stand as the first line of defense. Effective
dissemination of timely intelligence products to those who need them is
a vital component of this effort.
And, finally, we will build and take advantage of security
networks. As you may know, I am pursuing a restructuring of TSA that
will put a renewed emphasis on building information sharing networks in
every transportation sector--rail, transit, maritime, and trucking, as
well as aviation. Not only will we work more closely with stakeholders
in these industries, we will put a renewed emphasis on sharing
intelligence, capacity and technology with other law enforcement,
intelligence gathering and security agencies at every level of
government. We will build a more robust, distributed network of
security systems to protect America.
As we apply these operational principles, I have also directed my
staff to rededicate themselves to important customer service
principles, as well. As we move forward,
TSA will identify opportunities and engage the private
sector in its work to develop and implement security systems
and products.
We will protect the privacy of Americans by minimizing
the amount of personal data we acquire, store and share, and we
will vigorously protect any data that is collected, stored or
transmitted.
And TSA will remember, in all that we do, our goal in
stopping terrorism is to protect the freedoms of the American
people. Therefore, we will work to make travel easier for the
law-abiding public, while protecting the security of the
transportation network and the people who depend upon it.
A Solid Foundation
As we move forward strategically to enhance our security efforts in
the public transportation and rail sectors, we are fortunate to be able
to build upon a solid foundation of work, not only at the local level,
but nationally, as well.
Grants. Substantial Federal assistance has been and will continue
to be provided to support improved transit and rail security. TSA has
assisted the DHS Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparation (SLGCP) in the development of its Transit Security Grant
Program (TSGP). To date, SLGCP has provided more than $255 million to
State and local transit agencies through this program to increase
protection through hardening of assets, greater police presence during
high alerts, additional detection and surveillance equipment, increased
inspections, and expanded use of explosives detection canine teams. In
April 2005, DHS announced $141 million in TSGP funding, of which more
than $107 million has been dedicated to owners and operators of rail
systems. An additional $6 million was awarded to Amtrak through the
Inter-city and Passenger Rail Security Program (IPRSGP) for security
enhancements to passenger rail operations in the Northeast Corridor and
at Amtrak's hub in Chicago. Additionally, through SLGCP's State
Homeland Security Grant Program and Urban Area Security Initiative, the
Department has allocated more than $8.3 billion for general
counterterrorism preparedness.
The FY 2006 appropriations bill includes an additional $2.5 billion
for this purpose. The bill also includes a total of $390 million in
discretionary grants specifically for surface transportation security
programs, including $150 million for rail and transit security, $175
million for port security, $10 million for intercity bus security, and
$5 million for the Highway Watch program. TSA will continue to work
closely with SLGCP on these programs, as well.
Security Exercises and Training. TSA has held numerous security
exercises that bring together stakeholders, Federal, State, and local
first responders, and security experts to test preparedness and
response and identify best practices and lessons learned. We are also
seeking new and improved ways to exercise and train for prevention
methods, which will help strengthen a national prevention capability.
These efforts will develop and support effective relationships among
Federal, State and local entities and the private sector, and they
significantly enhance our ability to anticipate and respond quickly and
appropriately to security issues.
Additionally, through an interagency agreement with the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), TSA has trained over 400 law
enforcement officers, transit police, and first responders through the
Land Transportation Anti-Terrorism Training Program. TSA has also
contracted with FTA's National Transit Institute to develop a CD-ROM-
based interactive training program for passenger and freight rail
employees. This product is expected to be completed before the end of
the current fiscal year. These training programs emphasize
antiterrorism planning and prevention for land transportation systems.
Areas of focus include security planning, transit system
vulnerabilities, contingency planning, recognition and response for
threats involving explosives and weapons of mass destruction, and
crisis and consequence management. Guest instructors with specialized
expertise supplement the FLETC staff, providing the benefit of actual
experience through case studies.
Self-Assessment Tool. TSA has developed the Vulnerability
Identification Self-Assessment Tool (VISAT), a multi-modal tool that
public transportation agencies may voluntarily use to self-assess
vulnerabilities within their systems. Specific modules focus on mass
transit (heavy rail/subways), rail passenger stations, highway bridges,
maritime, and operations centers. Additional modules under development
will ensure this tool covers the spectrum of modes for which TSA holds
lead responsibility for security. In general, the tool focuses on the
prevention and the mitigation of an array of threat scenarios developed
for each mode within the sector. Users rate their entity in terms of
target attractiveness (from a terrorist's perspective) and several
consequence categories that broadly describe health and well-being,
economic consequence, and symbolic value of the entity. The tool
enables a user to capture a snapshot of its security system baseline
assessing vulnerabilities in the system and assisting in the
development of a comprehensive security plan.
Surface Transportation Security Inspector Program. The Department
of Homeland Security Appropriations Act for FY 2005 provided $12
million to TSA for rail security, including $10 million to deploy 100
Federal security compliance inspectors and Congress has continued this
funding in FY 2006. TSA has made substantial progress in developing a
robust and comprehensive surface transportation security compliance
inspector program with emphasis on hiring, training, and logistical and
procedural planning. A total of 99 inspectors are now on board. Among
other tasks, the security compliance inspectors will identify gaps in
security and validate compliance with TSA's security directives.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I want to assure you
that TSA is pursuing a robust strategy to support rail and transit
security that builds upon the work of other Department of Homeland
Security agencies, the Department of Transportation, and our public and
private sector partners at the State and local level. We look forward
to working with Congress and this Committee as we continue to protect
America's transportation infrastructure, its passengers, and the
commerce that depends upon it.
Thank you. I would be pleased to respond to questions.
Mr. Lungren. We only have the two of us here, but I will
sort of go by my 5-minute rule so we can go back and forth on
this and spend as much time as we need.
Mr. Stephan, do you prefer being referred to as Colonel
Stephan?
Mr. Stephan. Either one.
Mr. Lungren. Well, I think someone who has earned that
title ought to be able to keep it; so if you don't mind, I will
call you Colonel.
Mr. Stephan. All right, sir.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much for your testimony.
We have had this question about the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan and sector-specific plans due by the end of the
year. When are we actually going to see them? And plans are all
well and good, but what do you do with them? I mean, what is
the added value to those plans over and above what your
Department is doing or what sectors are doing themselves
individually?
Mr. Stephan. Yes, sir. This subject is very near and dear
to me, and I want to be very up front and candid with both of
you gentlemen.
I took this job--the most significant responsibility I
think I have had in my life--the end of April of this year. The
strategic backbone document for everything I am supposed to be
doing is something called the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan. I grabbed ahold of that document in the early
May time frame in its interim form that the Department issued
in February, and as I read the document, a sinking feeling
rapidly came over me. I took the document and I compared it to
what the requirements that President Bush set forth clearly,
very clearly articulated in HSPD-7, and the document was simply
missing in action 50 percent of what I believe the President
clearly articulated needed to be in that document, in HSPD-7.
And the document appeared to me to be yet another one of these
never-ending series of documents that tell us what has to be
done. After multiple years have passed since September 11th
attacks, everyone in this room knows what has to be done. The
question that document has to get to is: How are we going to do
the whats that are listed in the document?
So doing this the only way I know how to do it--and I have
developed or led the development of three other national plans
or strategies at this level--I took the document, I got a new
team. It is not a team of contractors, it is a team of
government employees that have helped me with previous plans. I
have got them firmly under my direction, and we have worked
that document over the last several months to include some very
important missing-in-action items.
We very clearly articulate now in this document what the
roles and responsibilities of various State and local players
in all of this and private sector players are; the
international dimension; the cyber dimension; how the Federal
budget infrastructure protection should come together in some
kind of logical, meaningful way, a series of metrics, a series
of things that will hold people accountable, deliverables,
timelines. All of this, I am happy to report, I completed with
my team last week, and I have turned it in to Department
Secretary Jackson and Deputy Secretary Chertoff for their
review.
Prior to this, I conducted a broad review across our
Federal Interagency Senior Leadership Council and have gotten
back from them on a one-for-one Q&A session with no significant
pushback on anything in the plan.
What I need to do now is, upon release authority from the
Secretary and the Deputy Secretary, is allow this plan in final
draft form to go out for about a 30-day comment period to a
broad gathering of State, local, tribal government partners and
the private sector folks so I get their opinions, because the
previous version of this document was not very broadly
coordinated as it should have been across the very wide
stakeholder community. I owe that to those people, so I am
going to do that when I get the send button pushed from the
Secretary. I hope to get that very, very soon.
I will take the comments that come back from that process,
and if there are significant comments, I will propose a second
round of coordination across that stakeholder community. And I
want to put the final pieces of this together as quickly as I
can towards the end of the year or the first of the year, to be
as frank and honest as I can with you. That will be depend on
the level of comment that I get across the private sector and
across our State and local government partners.
I firmly believe in this document. If we don't have this
document, we have no strategic backbone. We don't have the
``hows'' answered. We need to figure out how we are going to
operationalize this risk assessment piece that is now in this
plan. We have to figure clearly and clearly state who is
responsible for what, that is in this plan; how our resources
come together; and how they are wisely targeted against the
broad array of critical infrastructure and key resources.
Mr. Lungren. You appreciate the frustration of Members of
the Committee when they hear that this is the strategic
backbone, and here we are 4 years after 9/11 and we don't have
it yet?
Mr. Stephan. Yes, sir. And I can say to you personally that
no one in this room is more frustrated than I am personally by
this, sir. And it is my job to fix it. I own this operation
now, and it is going to be fixed. And it is on my boss's desk.
Mr. Lungren. I looked at your bio, and I noticed that you
had been involved with contingency operation planning in
Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Croatia, Liberia, Colombia, Kosovo. You
have been the one that has been involved in that kind of
planning in the past as part of your military experience.
Mr. Stephan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lungren. And I take it from what you are saying you
have tried to apply that same sort of military rigor to this
planning even though you arrived late at the process?
Mr. Stephan. Sir, it has to be a very rigorous process. And
I led the development of the President's Strategy for Critical
Infrastructure Protection in the year 2001 and 2002. I know how
to do this. I spent a lifetime trying to attack other people's
target sets. I have to reverse-engineer that across the United
States. And the defensive team is challenging, a lot more
challenging than the offensive has it.
Mr. Lungren. You see what happens here in the Committee, we
look at DHS as sort of an amorphous operation, and when we have
heard this plan is going to be coming out, it is going to be
coming out, it is going to be coming out, we tend to look with
a little skepticism about another repeat that ``it is going to
come out''. But what I am taking from what you are saying is
you arrived late to the game, you found somethi ng that looked
like a fumbled football, and you picked it up, and you are
trying to bring it forward; would that be correct?
Mr. Stephan. Sir, I realize the importance of this document
and how important it is to the country, and I realize I am not
going to get another chance to get it right. And I am going to
get it right with my team.
Mr. Lungren. It was not right when you picked it up.
Mr. Stephan. I don't believe it was accurate; it did not
meet President Bush's thoroughly articulated criteria that
appeared in HSPD-7.
Mr. Lungren. Well, this is the President's clearly
articulated criteria. What about your sense of what you needed
to do to have a mission understood and carried out?
Mr. Stephan. No, sir, it was not an operational document.
This document was more akin to a strategy, broad-level strategy
document that we have multiple copies of those kinds of things
floating around the Federal Government. This needs to be an
operational plan that everybody understands, knows what their
part is, knows how resources come together, how they are
applied, how we are going to focus, what risk assessment
criteria we are going to use as a standard across the Nation.
That is what this has to be. And I believe Bob Stephan has
produced what it needs to be, and it is sitting on my boss's
desk right now.
Mr. Lungren. The Ranking Member is recognized for 5-plus
minutes.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Colonel, I appreciate your truthfulness. And I think this
committee supports the effort to come up with a document that
we all can feel proud of. Anything less is not acceptable. I
don't think you will have any problem from this committee
pursuing exactly what you see as that mission and the
production of the plan.
I had a couple of questions I wanted to ask. Mr. Jamison, I
actually had a hazmat question to ask you, and I was told I
can't ask you this question as you have a conflict. Any idea on
when you are going to get the conflict resolved so I can get my
question answered?
Mr. Jamison. I would be happy to provide an answer to you
for the record. Unfortunately, this is my first day on the job
at the Transportation Security Administration, so I am still
going through the ethics process, and as soon as I am through
with that process, I will be able to answer your question. But
I will be happy to provide an answer to you for the record.
Mr. Thompson. Can you give me some kind of time frame on
when you will have it resolved?
Mr. Jamison. I am hoping to have it resolved in the next
several weeks.
Mr. Thompson. And that conflict doesn't prevent you from
doing your job?
Mr. Jamison. It does not prevent me from doing my job. I am
recused from certain matters until that conflict is resolved,
but I am able to execute the duties of the job.
Mr. Thompson. All right. Thank you very much.
In the 9/11 Commission report and the legislation that came
from that, we require a plan to be developed for transportation
security, a strategy. When will Congress see that strategy?
Mr. Jamison. They received the strategy in September, which
is the National Strategy for Transportation Security, which was
submitted. After Mr. Stephan submits his National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, I believe it is 180 days after
that it will be updated, but the strategy was received.
Mr. Thompson. So it is your testimony that we now have that
strategy?
Mr. Jamison. You have the National Transportation Security
Strategy.
Mr. Thompson. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have a list of
questions I would like to submit for Mr. Jamison to answer
because what we have is not a strategy. We have some elements,
but we don't have a strategy. But I will accept your word on it
and just pursue it at a later date.
Mr. Thompson. In addition to that, this committee heard
testimony earlier in the week relating to some intelligence
questions around collection and analysis as it relates to
transit security with both New York City and Baltimore. We were
a little troubled that there appeared to be a disconnect
between the transit security system and the Department of
Homeland Security intelligence-gathering system and the city of
New York. Have you had--and I know this is your first day on
the job, but have you had an opportunity to look at that
disconnect? If so, can you tell us how we can fix it?
Mr. Jamison. Well, while I was involved in my role in DOT
in that event--and I think the lesson learned from London is
even one of the most prepared systems in the world at a
heightened state of alert, it is very difficult to prevent
attacks on mass transit. So it is very important that the
shared responsibility of security between Federal, State and
local, that we share information as quickly as we can and get
as much information to the State and locals and have them make
a decision they need to make.
In this instance that was done quickly, the information was
shared. In addition to the information, an analysis portion,
which the Federal Government plays a key role in, was shared
with the New York officials. And it is their role--and I
respect that role--to take that information and weigh the risk
in their local areas versus the information and make decisions
to take action.
Mr. Thompson. So do you agree with what they did?
Mr. Jamison. I respect the decision. I mean, the analysis
that we gave them was given in an effort to enable them to make
decisions.
Mr. Thompson. I will ask you one more time, did you agree
with the decision they reached, yes or no?
Mr. Jamison. I agree that they have the right to make that
decision. The issue on whether or not they have the right to
deploy the resources, absolutely, I agree that they should have
deployed resources if they felt like that was their
responsibility.
Mr. Thompson. Well, one of the things we keep hearing is we
don't have enough connectivity between all these agencies; even
though we passed legislation that mandated it, we still don't
see it. At their press conference that Mayor Bloomberg had, the
FBI was standing next to him, but not DHS. I am trying to
figure out whether you agreed with it or you didn't. Does your
absence at this press conference signify that you didn't agree
with it?
Mr. Jamison. Well, again, Congressman, I think this is a
positive story that the system worked, that the information got
down to the local levels, it got to the local levels quickly,
they were able to assess it and make decisions. You know, I was
not in Mayor Bloomberg's shoes--
Mr. Thompson. Were you invited to the press conference?
Mr. Jamison. Was DHS invited to the press conference? I
don't know that. I don't know the answer to that.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, can we, for the record, find
out from DHS if they were invited to this process conference
that Mayor Bloomberg had? I think it would be important.
Mr. Lungren. I am sure you can let us know whether you were
invited or not.
Mr. Jamison. Absolutely.
Mr. Thompson. Your absence at the press conference would
indicate a lot, given the information you provided New York
City.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Pearce, are you ready to inquire?
Mr. Pearce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman--
Mr. Lungren. We have a loose 5-minute rule, more than 5.
Mr. Pearce. Thank you very much. That differs from some
committees, and I appreciate the Chairman's--
Mr. Harley, the Transportation Security Administration just
recently did a field test of the--we don't have Mr. Harley. Mr.
Jamison. The TSA ran the puffer machines. I have seen one of
those. They had, I think, one at Mount Vernon--not Mount
Vernon, the Statute of Liberty--and I wonder how those machines
are working and the effectiveness and what the cost on those
is.
Mr. Jamison. We did run what we deem as a successful test
called Trip on the puffer machines, and actually a three-phase
test. The first part was in New Carrollton, Maryland. And the
major success part of the test is that we were able to take
that technology, the puffer machine that is usually used in
aviation, and adapt it to the transportation environment. It
did work in that arena; however, there still remain a lot of
problems with deploying that technology in the security or in
the transit environment.
One, the throughput, it takes 15 seconds or more for each
passenger to go through that system, and it was tested in very
low-volume conditions. So in an environment such as New York
City, Penn Station, where you have 1,500 people a minute coming
into a system through various entrances, it is just not
practical to deploy that type of technology.
We are continuing to research the technology, continuing to
try to find ways that we get better throughput and develop the
alternatives, but at this point there is no current plans to
deploy that technology in the transit environment.
Mr. Pearce. What is the basic cost on those units? And then
if we could work out some of the problems, what cost are we
looking at broad scale?
Mr. Jamison. I don't know what the individual cost of the
units are. I would be happy to provide that for you for the
record. They are expensive.
Mr. Pearce. Multiples of where we are right now?
Mr. Jamison. Excuse me. I just got the answer to your
earlier question. It is $125,000 per unit.
Mr. Pearce. And how does that compare to some of the
screening mechanisms we are currently using? Is that a multiple
of two or three or the same?
Mr. Jamison. Do you mean in the aviation environment?
Mr. Pearce. Mm-hmm.
Mr. Jamison. Actually, it is a multiple of two on some of
the technology screening.
Mr. Pearce. About $65,000 versus $125,000.
If you we look at some of the screening devices that we are
using at the airports, we look at the time that it takes there
plus the labor intensity, do you see any emerging technologies
that can detect the same thing the puffers do, the explosives
or weapons? Are we seeing any technologies coming out of that?
Mr. Jamison. We are carefully evaluating all the
technologies that have been used in the aviation arena to see
whether or not they are applicable in the transit environment,
like backscanner and other types of technologies, to see if we
can get high volumes of throughput. But based off of the
evaluation currently, we don't see any near-term technology
that is going to come up that is going to give us an
opportunity to apply it in the transit environment.
Mr. Pearce. What are the European nations doing with regard
to transit safety? Are they doing anything at all?
Mr. Jamison. There are some contemplating some technology
deployments, as pilots only, and we are working closely with
them. I was just on a trip overseas to London, and lessons
learned, and we were discussing with them what some of the
options are, but they currently don't have that technology
deployed in London.
Mr. Pearce. If there is none of the technology deployed,
what is the basic philosophical outlook on safety in the mass
transit system?
Mr. Jamison. Well, first of all, I mean, I think the mass
transit systems are more secure than they have ever been. What
London did was validate that the approach to try to get the
terrorists before they get to the system is the most effective
strategy, and we need to continue to receive good intelligence
and so forth. They also validated that the focus that we have
had on training, awareness training, and making sure that your
operators know how to spot suspicious behavior and know how to
report it and know how to react, in addition to public
awareness campaigns, and in addition to emergency preparedness
so that you know how to respond and mitigate the impact of an
event are still the most effective strategies.
Mr. Pearce. And are we prepared in your agency to come to
the conclusion that you might not--it might not be able to
provide 100 percent fail-safe screening mechanisms; that the
cost would be too prohibitive, and there are too many other
access points? Are we prepared in this Nation and in your
agency to have an open discussion about whether or not we can
and should? Because it sounds like that is where Europe already
is; that they may employ some things, but they are definitely
not sitting here at the cutting edge of technology and
approaching it the way we are.
Mr. Jamison. That is correct. And as I mentioned before, I
think we must continue to look--to put research money into
technology and to try to determine what the opportunities are
to continue to improve the security. But currently more boots
on the ground, awareness training, other types of methods are
most effective, and screening is not the solution in the near
term.
Mr. Pearce. I see my red light blinking, Mr. Chairman. How
loose is your parameter here?
Mr. Lungren. I just understand that Mr. Thompson has to
leave, so I was going to let him inquire, and then--
Mr. Pearce. Let me yield, and then if we have a second
round, I will take another turn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate you allowing me to do this.
A couple more questions, Mr. Jamison. Can you tell me if
TSA mandates transit systems to provide security training for
its employees?
Mr. Jamison. There is a security directive that instructs
transit agencies to provide training to their front-line
employees, yes.
Mr. Thompson. Do you interpret ``instruct'' to mean
``require''?
Mr. Jamison. It is a security--it is a legal, binding
security directive, yes.
Mr. Thompson. Can you provide this committee with that
document that requires transit systems to provide training to
its employees?
Mr. Jamison. Sure.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Thompson. Another question. Colonel, at a hearing
earlier this summer, we talked about chemical plant security,
and I think basically you promised, in response to a question
from me, that we would have a plan for chemical security within
a few weeks. Can you tell me where we are with that now?
Mr. Stephan. What I have done at my level in coordination
with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary and the Homeland
Security counsel, we have worked out, I believe, internal to
DHS what we believe the major pillars of a regulatory framework
for the chemical industry would look like in terms of a risk-
based approach by facility, by facility category, by facility
type, performance measures. I am ready to discuss with Members
of Congress the parameters associated with this.
I don't believe we promised a plan, sir; I believe we
promised we would be ready to have discussions with our friends
on the Hill regarding a framework that would end up in a piece
of legislation eventually.
Mr. Thompson. Well, given the fact that our chemical
plants, as you know, are vulnerable, we do need to come up, I
think, in a short period of time with some kind of strategy for
the security of those plants, and I look forward to working
with you on it.
Mr. Stephan. May I add, whether or not we get authority or
not, as part of our sector-specific plan for the chemical
industry we will have an option A and a B; an option A if we
get regulatory authority through legislation, and an option B
if we do not have a set authority. We will work through what
our other options are and put that as far as the NIPP.
Mr. Thompson. Could you, if it is available, provide us
with any of that information? Or maybe, Mr. Chairman, we might
need to set up a briefing because a number of our Members have
concern about chemical plant security.
Mr. Stephan. I would like to give you a briefing, if I
could do that.
Mr. Lungren. We can set that up.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Jamison, earlier, in response to a question dealing
with the transportation security strategy, I am aware that a
plan was sent to us, it was a classified document, and for some
reason we are not able to really address it as we should. I
understand it is under review to be declassified, but according
to Section 4001 of the 9/11 Act, there were some things that
that strategy had to include, and I will read them: Set
realistic deadlines to address transportation security needs
across all modes, establish clear responsibilities between all
levels of government and the private sector, delineate roles
and responsibility for response and recovery, and prioritize
research and development to ensure that effective technologies
are deployed as soon as possible.
Now, our reading of the plan indicates that these
requirements are not there, so now can you tell me--if my
interpretation is wrong. Can you just tell me if those things
are there?
Mr. Jamison. I don't know that the specific plan gets into
that much detail. What I can tell you is it is currently
security-sensitive information which should give you access to
it for one issue. But also the issues that you just laid out
there, the majority of those issues have been addressed in a
memorandum of understanding between the Department of
Transportation and the Department of Homeland Security, such as
roles and responsibilities, research, and so forth and so on.
Part of that memorandum of understanding requires that DHS and
DOT do an annual plan to prioritize research funding, other
resources to make sure that they are coordinated, and focused
on risk, and prioritized based off of the resources of both
agencies.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, I would basically submit my
question to Mr. Jamison in writing so he can give it back to me
in writing. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, Mr. Thompson. And I am sure, Mr.
Jamison, you will respond in writing to the question by the
Ranking Member.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Jamison, following the Madrid bombing last
year, it is my information that TSA issued 20 security
directives to public transit agencies to increase transit
security. There has been a suggestion by some observers as to
whether or not these directives would be effective in
preventing a terrorist attack.
Has TSA had a chance to go back and look at those security
directives to see if, in fact, they are sufficient for the
purpose that they were issued?
Mr. Jamison. Well, we continue to look at the security
directives. And the security directives were meant to establish
a baseline of protective measures, and they are also intended
to give agencies some flexibility within those baselines so
that they could adapt those directives to their individual
operating conditions. But the fundamentals of some of the
discussion that we were just talking about, about having aware
employees, reporting suspicious activity, utilization of K9
teams and other types of measures, is a good indication of the
security directives. We need to continue to look at those,
continue to work with the industry and continue to determine
what are the most effective security measures.
Mr. Lungren. So does that mean you are?
Mr. Jamison. Yes.
Mr. Lungren. I mean, you said you should, but I guess that
means you are doing that.
Mr. Jamison. Yes.
Mr. Lungren. Congress appropriated millions of dollars to
hire 100 rail security inspectors to enforce these security
directives. What is the status of that, and how will they be
utilized to improve security of mass transit?
Mr. Jamison. Currently, 99 of the 100 on board are being
processed through the HR process. That is an opportunity to
look at the security directives and to continue to analyze the
gaps in rail transit. It is also a huge opportunity to improve
coordination with our stakeholders and make sure we will get
real-time, ground-truth information from the field to determine
whether or not the appropriate security measures are in place.
Mr. Lungren. What kind of feedback are you getting?
Mr. Jamison. Generally, the majority of the transit
agencies--the overwhelming majority of the transit agencies are
doing those measures, all of those awareness measures; and as
the program ramps up and we get the opportunity to do more
security gap analysis, we hope to get more information that
helps us develop a more robust strategy.
Mr. Lungren. Colonel Stephan, you stated the Department is
focused on a risk-based approach to critical infrastructure
protection. You heard my comments at the beginning that I was
concerned that IP might have developed a risk-based methodology
that focuses on each sector from top to bottom and one sector
at the expense of others. What are you doing to make sure we
are doing it across the board?
I mean, risk number 10 in one sector may be less severe
than risk number 75 in another; and if we are doing sector by
sector my concern is, with the limited amount of resources we
have, that we might divert them to a less risk-appropriate
target scenario than otherwise.
Mr. Stephan. We do not intend to methodically go through
one sector at a time sequentially and somewhere, years and
years and years from now, get to the bottom of this problem.
What we are doing is attacking this at cross sectors now in
terms of our data calls and data acquisition efforts with State
and local governments and the private sector. We are doing this
across all 17 critical infrastructure and key resource sectors
that are defined in HSPD-7.
The problem that we face, of course, is getting the data.
That is one piece. The second piece is doing something
meaningful with that data that would then inform a risk-based
approach to planning and resource investments.
What we are working on feverishly is making sure that we
can compare these apples and oranges within sectors and across
sectors. In order to do that, we have worked with the private
sector: first with nuclear energy; the chemical industry, next;
liquefied or natural gas; the various modes of transportation;
the energy sector, to develop this RAMCAP piece.
This is a risk-assessment technology, a technological tool
that, when we get this deployed across all the sectors, we will
have a standardized criteria by which these data calls will be
supported with consequence information, vulnerability
information and threat information that is logical across the
sectors. That is my big stumbling block now. We are working
diligently. We piloted these first two efforts. It took us
about a year to get it right with the energy sector and the
chemical piece.
The next versions of these are going to go much quicker;
and, again, I want to close this whole piece out within the
next year or so in terms of having a risk-assessment module,
that we have the same thing in each of the sectors in terms of
the standardized criteria that allows me to take the data that
people are providing me, put it into a computer, and have the
apples and oranges all become apples so I can do this cross-
sector comparison.
But we are also not waiting for that. We are also taking by
whatever criteria I have now and we recently put out about 3
months ago a data call across all the 17 sectors asking us for
based-upon criteria that we put out to them. I will be happy to
share this document with the committee.
Agriculture and food, banking and finance, chemical,
energy, information technology, emergency services, postal and
shipping, the list goes on. What are your top assets systems or
networks based upon criteria that is specifically defined for
each of these sectors? Give us this information so that we can
use it to better inform our buffer zone protection plan grant
activities, to inform our operational planning, to inform our
information-sharing activities.
So that stuff is all under way now.
Mr. Lungren. Let me pick up on the buffer zone protection
plan grants. It is my information that the way it is to operate
is that every State will be given 70 BZP slots. That is, the
State of California will be given 70, the State of Wyoming will
be given 70. Then, within that, each State is supposed to make
a determination on their own.
My question is: Is that your understanding of the way it is
going to be? And, if so, does that make sense that each State
gets 70 slots? That is, that you would presume--and I don't
want to pick on Wyoming, but in the previous grants program
everybody has analyzed it to show that Wyoming has 7 times or
10 times per capita the amount of grants in the previous
homeland security grant funding than New York does. So that is
why I will pick on Wyoming.
Mr. Stephan. That must have been an earlier version of the
BZPP for '06 process. I saw what I think is probably a similar
version about 2 or 3 weeks ago; and I told my people that is
not the way, in fact, we are going to do this. The BZPP thing,
we have to take a look at using a risk-based approach. We are
going to have to marry it up with the UASI program, marry it up
with the transit grant programs. We are going to focus it where
we have clusters of targets so we can get more bang for the
buck.
Because the intent of this program is to drive operational
planning between State and local governments and the private
sector and help those people develop operational prevention and
response capabilities clustered around key areas where nuclear
plants, chemical plants, transportation systems--where if we
are going to provide grants to law enforcement capability, it
can surge multiple ways.
That is one piece of this, but there are still important
facilities across the country that may not be clustered with
others, that are standalone, very consequential; and the BZPP
program has to take those into account. I think one of the
Secretary's visions in creating this new preparedness
directorate, of which IP would be a part as well as the new
Assistant Secretary for Grants in Training, is to make sure we
are logically looking at what the requirements are across the
board, figuring out what the criteria are for the different
individual grant programs and making sure we are putting the
most bang for the buck where it makes sense based on risk.
Mr. Lungren. I am going to recognize the gentleman from New
Mexico but first mention, at least from what I hear at the
local level in my State, what you have just said has not been
conveyed to them. Somehow it was conveyed to them every State
was going to get a predetermined number of slots, irrespective
of risk; and the States would decide what they do. The number
we heard was 70 to each State, and that didn't seem to me to
make a whole lot of sense.
Mr. Pearce is recognized for at least about 5 minutes.
Mr. Pearce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If we explore this risk-based prioritization again as
Secretary Chertoff has placed emphasis on, can you--what is the
ultimate determinative risk?
Mr. Stephan. There are three pieces to the risk puzzle.
The first piece is threat information, which, sadly, is not
always as granular as we would like it to be with respect to
these critical infrastructure, key resource sectors, although
we are following it with very smart people every single day.
Just never seems to get us the granularity expect for some
specific instances you all know about, mainly in the mass
transit world over the last several months.
The other piece of the equation is consequences,
consequences in terms of public health and safety, human lives,
human impacts, economic consequences, national security
consequences. Those go into the mix.
And, finally, vulnerabilities, just how vulnerable is a
consequential facility with respect to various potential modes
of terrorist attack.
All of these pieces involve a formula that is basically
consequences times vulnerabilities times threat equals risk.
Mr. Pearce. So if we were going to say look at the nuclear
power plant that is just west of our State in eastern Arizona
and we are going to assess the risk of that versus a
conventional power plant located in New York State with a dense
population, which of those is going to percolate higher in the
risk stream?
Mr. Stephan. If you go strictly by consequences in terms of
population impact, naturally the piece in New York is going to
receive more attention. But I also have to say this is not--
this is an art, this is not a science; and I would say a
successful attack on any nuclear plant anywhere in the United
States of America is going to have a very important
psychological dimension that no mathematical formula can bring
to the table.
So in addition to those pieces of the risk calculus, we
have to have good old-fashioned common sense and roll in some
Kentucky windage reference psychological impacts to all of
these target sets out there.
Mr. Pearce. I understand that, but as a Department agency
and looking at Secretary Chertoff's emphasis on risk-based
prioritization, I am just asking which is going to percolate
higher in the stream.
Mr. Stephan. I think all nuclear power plants are going to
receive a high priority focus across the country.
Mr. Pearce. If we then downgrade the risk to the next level
and we look at water systems and you get, say, a water system
pretty well protected and not very vulnerable, no threat info,
and you have the open lake in New Mexico that feeds all down
through Mexico and Texas, through the rest of New Mexico, and a
biological hazard placed in that, no threat info on that, so
which of those are going to percolate to the higher end of the
risk-based assessment?
Mr. Stephan. Again, then we get a little bit more into the
mathematical calculus piece. But this is not a winner-take-all
or a winner-loser zero sum game. No matter what your level of
risk happens to be, there are certain kinds of things that the
Department of Homeland Security is going to reach out and touch
you on. Everyone is going to be part of some kind of organized
leadership structure that allows us to interact and
interoperate and figure out what each other's needs and
requirements are.
Everybody that wants to be is going to be tied into an
Information Sharing Mechanism, no matter what your level of
risk, because I hope to God in all this risk-management piece
that al-Qa'ida kind of follows our own risk-management
methodology or we could be in trouble. Therefore, everybody--if
you are on a target set today that meets our risk criteria, but
al-Qa'ida goes another way, everybody has to be connected from
an information perspective so we can rapidly adjust from where
we think they hit us to where they might hit us based upon
their own calculations.
So when we say risk-based focus, I am really talking about
an allocation of DHS dollars and specifically IP dollars in
terms of the monies we have at our disposal for specifically
targeted initiatives like BZPPs, or buffer zone protection
plans. Everybody is going to get a leadership structure put on
top of them that they participate in. Everybody is going to get
an information-sharing mechanism. Everybody is going to get
access to a widely accepted vulnerability assessment
methodology set of criteria and tools to help them out. And
everyone is going to get information bulletins that specify
specific threats when they do arise.
So I don't want to leave you all with the impression this
is a zero sum game in terms of risk. There are certain baseline
things everyone will be plugged into or be a part of.
Mr. Pearce. Being from one of the rural areas, I will tell
you that the great concern is that, through whatever mechanism
that bureaucracies work and agencies work, is that risk-based
is going to end up percolating down to population; and I will
tell you that the Nation will be worse off than better off if
population becomes a single criteria. I know you are telling me
that is not the case, but I will tell you that human nature is
that we try to find the easiest solution when the solutions are
not very easy.
I will tell you that the nuclear components in New Mexico,
with al-Qa'ida sitting there, coming across a border, that has
nobody posted on it now. Last night, we got word that the
border patrol has completely evacuated, and we are the last to
learn that al-Qa'ida has come across our border. We get that in
the newspapers when everybody else reads it. Somewhere we have
to do a little bit more thorough job of understanding that
risk-based is a little bit broader than just population. That I
think is a task for us to remember through the long, dark
nights of trying to assess our risk, but I appreciate your work
on the effort.
I yield back.
Mr. Stephan. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Lungren. Colonel, if I could just ask you something
with respect to an issue we dealt with on the committee
yesterday that has to do with the Bureau of Reclamation.
They run over 400 dams and levee assets in the western half
of the country in the 17 western States. They have what they
would describe as a rather robust effort to provide security
for their assets. Is your operation informed of their efforts?
Are you integrated in any form, shape or fashion? What added
value do you provide to them, if any, over and above what they
are doing? And how does that contrast with what your other
elements of DHS are doing with the other dams?
Because we are talking about 400 dams, levee assets under
Bureau of Reclamation. That doesn't talk about State dams and
certainly doesn't talk about privately owned dams.
Mr. Stephan. Yes, sir. Our problem is we have about 80,000
or so dam structures and levee structures across the United
States of America. I think about 5 percent may be owned by the
Federal government across multiple agencies. The rest are State
and local owned and operated facilities.
Our value in this has given this incredible patchwork of
ownership authorities, regulations, resource dollars that go
into this, is to provide an organizing leadership to all of
that patchwork of different people out there searching for
leadership. Through the NIPP structure, the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan organizing umbrella, we at DHS
IP lead the dams sector in terms of the government coordinating
council represented by DOI, the Bureau of Reclamation, the Army
Corps of Engineers, Agriculture, Energy, the Department of
Defense, other folks that own dams wearing Federal hats. We
also, through that coordinating council, bring together the
major State players that own dams within their jurisdictions;
and we have a private sector and some State membership on
another council that we also bring to the table so that all of
those equities are there. Our goal is to bring this amazing
patchwork of different dam owners and operators together, make
very sure that all those people are connected to some kind of
information-sharing network.
The Federal pieces of the puzzle are fairly well connected
together at this point in time. The State pieces of the puzzle
are connected very well through the homeland security advisor
network at this point. We have more work to do in terms of
connecting individual State-level and private-sector dam owners
and operators together from an information-sharing piece. Right
now, we reach out and touch them through local law enforcement
networks in partnership with the FBI, but I also need to be
able to reach out and touch the owners and operators of those
various facilities together.
We work together, realizing that some people like Bureau of
Reclamation has some important resources they can bring to the
fight. In other cases, where there is nobody covering down on a
particular set of assets, we may make a buffer zone protection
grant available based on consequences to a State government
that has an important dam within its jurisdiction and try to
make all of that work in some meaningful way.
Again, just a lot of different actors out there, a lot of
players, a lot of information needs to be shared. We have to
work together to make sure we clearly have identified what is
more important than other things based mainly on consequences
in the dams world and that we are all putting some kind of
resource patchwork together to get at the really significant
problems.
Mr. Lungren. I hope you don't mind if I harp a little bit
on dams, but as I have explained before, I live downstream of a
major dam that has been identified by the Bureau of Reclamation
as one of concern.
Let me ask you about this. DHS and with dams, other than
this information sharing and trying to get people together and
so forth, do you have any operational responsibility in a
terrorist attack scenario? What I mean by that is this--We know
now, because we have had a couple of breaches of the no-fly
zone around the D.C. area, that there is a decisionmaker that
makes the decision as to whether or not to shoot down a plane.
What about in terms of critical assets like a Federal dam?
I am not going to talk about any specific dam, but dams
have different structures. You may have a reservoir that has
several dams on it, maybe earthen, maybe the concrete
structure, maybe dikes. A determination could be made at a
particular time that, because of a threat to it, they have to
relieve some stress on certain areas; and that decision could
put some population centers at risk more than other population
centers, actually, life-and-death situations.
Do those decisions that would be made operationally by
Bureau of Reclamation in that context, would they in any way
interface with the Department of Homeland Security before that
decision is made or is that decision made within the Bureau
itself?
Mr. Stephan. Sir, again, the decisionmaking power, as you
correctly stated, resides with those organizations. But I think
if we are talking about a terrorist incident here in terms of
prevention, protection, response and recovery phases, DHS owns
the overall operational coordination piece across the Federal
Government for each particular phase of a response to a
potential terrorist threat or national incident. There is an
important role that headquarters would play in terms of that
operational information-sharing reference the threat, reference
protective measures that are in place and that need to be
bolstered through the State homeland security advisor network
principally as well as our Federal Department and agencies if
it is a Federal asset.
The FEMA component of DHS has a very significant role to
play in terms of consultation and the emergency preparedness
posture of the downstream communities. There is a big program
in FEMA, the Dams Safety and Security Program, that was created
back, I think, in 2002 by an act of Congress that give those
guys some very specific roles and responsibilities and some
grants to facilitate preparedness planning on a steady state
basis every day of the year, as well as technical assistance,
as well as some other security-related activities.
Mr. Lungren. Maybe I will have to follow up with you at
some other time, and maybe I need to look at some of the
tabletop exercises that have gone on. It just strikes me after
seeing Katrina and some suggestion that we didn't have--we had
failure of decision making in some areas and not others. And
posse comitatus, that goes in there. But if you have got a
Federal facility and a terrorist attack, I don't think you have
to worry about posse comitatus, but I think it would be good
for us to insure we know what the chain of command is and the
decisionmaking, where it may be considered operational of a dam
or other asset. But the decision could very well determine who
is in harm's way by the election of the decisionmaker, and I
just would hope that we think about that ahead of time.
Mr. Pearce, if you have some further questions.
Mr. Pearce. I do, Mr. Chairman, one more series of
questions.
Mr. Stephan, the idea that we have got 80,000 dams out
there that need some sort of protection plan, is homeland
security going to provide the protection plan for each one of
those?
Mr. Stephan. No, sir, we are not. The protection plan is
the responsibility of the owners and operators.
Mr. Pearce. How can we tell when they have done their
homework?
Mr. Stephan. That is the challenge. There is no way that we
can insure that 80,000 facilities--and they go from things like
the Grand Cooley dam all the way to a simple earthen levee that
is part of some neighborhood complex.
Mr. Pearce. Early on, our office engaged in the difficulty
of not only dams--I mean, 80,000 dams tends to put it in
perspective, but if we look at the number of communities with
the number of risks in communities, there is no way the Federal
Government can identify and understand each risk, that it
becomes a local and a State responsibility but mostly it is a
local responsibility.
In trying to put some sense into that process, our office
early on established--we went to one of the institutions that
is syndicated with several other higher education institutions
to provide security for the Nation and security training; and
they helped us develop a thing called Certified Communities,
with 35, 34 different components that are measurable--many are
already measured, just not tabulated--and we created a concept
called Certified Communities.
The idea is that the certified communities would get some
sort of rating from insurance agencies. The insurance agencies
do that right now, the ISO ratings for fire. What happens if
your community loses its capability or drops its training for
fire protection, homeowners get increases in their insurance
policies. So what you have is you have all the residents of a
community become kind of overseers. They are the first to
realize that their insurance rates are going up because our
community has not prepared itself. And if our community hasn't
prepared itself then they call and they begin to raise
pressure, you guys have let your ISO rating drop and we now are
paying more insurance.
So it is not just that you need a program but you need a
program that reinforces itself, that self-enforces it; and
tying it to insurance rates is a way to get the public vision
on it.
The second aspect of tying it to that is communities will
know, if they have a better ISO rating, then their personal
insurance costs go down. So, many times, they can pay for the
protection that they are getting through the lower insurance
premiums for the community.
Now we submitted this thing, and it has been locked down in
ODP for about 6 months, and they refuse to bring it to the
light of day. We think it could be done regulatorily, and it
just does not make sense that Homeland Security has got this
thing deep-sixed. It is just a gift that these education
institutions have given to the Homeland Security Department. It
would be very easy to implement, and it doesn't have any
requirement that you do it. It just gives us a measuring stick,
gives the tie-together that if you do--we visited with the
insurance industry. Would you be willing to give better rates
if communities are prepared against either terrorist threats or
natural disasters, and they said of course we would.
So the enforcement mechanism is right there. That is the
people and their insurance accounts. I just--someday maybe
Homeland Security is going to think it important enough to get
those 80,000 dams certified and all the communities across the
Nation, some sort of process to where people will know if they
are actually doing their work to prepare or not. It is very
frustrating from our point of view to have asked agencies or
institutions to do this of work and then have it locked down
over in ODP. So if you want to make a comment, fine.
Mr. Stephan. The only comment, I am not aware of the status
of this paperwork, but I will go back and press on that.
Mr. Pearce. I would appreciate it. It just makes sense for
the Nation and appears like it would give us a measurement
mechanism. The thought process that went into it came far
broader than just into New Mexico. It was institutions across
the country that are in this group that just worked to prepare.
Mr. Stephan. May I ask for the title of the program?
Mr. Pearce. Certified Communities Program.
Mr. Stephan. Certified Communities Program.
Mr. Pearce. It is very straightforward.
I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for your indulgence.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentleman from New Mexico for his
questions, his inspiration and his persistence. I thank the
witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for
their questions. I just want to let you know the absence of
more members is not an indication of an absence in the interest
of the work that you are doing, but it is the fact that at
12:30 we stopped having votes.
Mr. Pearce. The other people got their airplanes out, and
we did not.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Pearce and I decided we would rather stay
here with you.
The members of the Committee, as you know, may have some
additional questions for you, and some will be submitted to you
in writing. We would ask for you to respond to these in writing
in a timely fashion. The hearing record will be held open for
10 days.
The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
For the Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Kip Hawley
Spetember 7, 2005
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez, and Members of
the Subcommittee. I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on
the subject of protecting civilian targets from terrorist attack. My
focus today will be on the programs and initiatives of the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in rail and mass transit
security--where we are investing our resources and why--as well as our
immediate response to the London bombings and our vision for the road
ahead.
TSA is an agency created on the heels of the atrocious 9/11 attacks
on our Nation. We are charged with protecting all modes of
transportation--a mandate we have taken seriously since our inception,
notwithstanding the more visible comprehensive federalization of our
Nation's aviation security system directed by the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA). The tragic bombings in Moscow on
February 6, 2004, in Madrid on March 11, 2004, and in London on July 7,
2005, and the attempted attacks there two weeks later, are grim
reminders of the heinous tactics of our enemies and of the need to
remain vigilant and prepared.
Our Current Program
Efforts to ensure transportation security vary with the nature of
the system being protected. The Nation's rail and mass transit systems
are fundamentally different from our aviation system. Transportation
systems differ in size, in openness, and in control. Most importantly,
our passenger rail and mass transit systems are, by design, far more
accessible than the commercial passenger aviation system, with multiple
entry points, few barriers to access, and hubs that serve and allow
transfers among multiple modes--subway, intercity rail, commuter rail,
and bus--and multiple carriers. While commercial passenger aviation is
a closed system that can be closely monitored at controlled
checkpoints, passenger rail and mass transit are open systems without
controlled checkpoints--hence, monitoring cannot be accomplished by a
single staff person or closed circuit television. Many passenger rail
and mass transit systems are vast in terms of infrastructure and
ridership. As just one example, each weekday an average of 4.5 million
passengers ride the New York City subway, compared to approximately 1.8
million domestic aviation enplanements per day, nationwide. In
addition, passenger rail and mass transportation assets are owned or
controlled by State or local governmental entities or private industry,
each of which is responsible for its own security. The Federal
government has only very recently issued security regulations in mass
transit and passenger rail. In contrast, although commercial passenger
aviation also has a wide variety of owners and operators, its security
has historically been heavily regulated by the Federal government.
And so, we cannot simply graft our commercial passenger aviation
security systems onto the passenger rail and mass transit modes. To do
so would be unrealistic, expensive, disruptive, and ultimately
ineffective. Instead, we have, since our inception, been carefully
weaving a web of security measures that depend upon three key
components: stakeholder partnership and cooperation; risk assessment;
and technology evaluation. These components have provided a strong
security base and promise to strengthen mass transit and passenger rail
security as we move forward.
Stakeholder Partnership and Cooperation. One hallmark of our rail
and mass transit security program is the close working relationships we
have fostered with other DHS components, with the Department of
Transportation (DOT) and its modal administrations, and perhaps most
importantly, with the stakeholders--the public and private providers of
rail and mass transit transportation who are also responsible for the
systems' security. Our efforts have focused on greater information
sharing between the industry and all levels of government; addressing
vulnerabilities in the rail and mass transit sector to develop new
security measures and plans; increasing training and public awareness
campaigns; and providing greater assistance and funding for rail and
mass transit activities.
Risk Assessment. Security measures are a filter, not a guarantee,
but effectiveness can be maximized, without unduly sacrificing freedom
of movement, through risk assessment. A primary goal of our approach to
security is to assess the risks and evaluate vulnerabilities associated
with different components of the rail and mass transit systems to
determine how to optimize resources. TSA's initiatives are intended to
focus the collective limited resources available on the protection and
prevention of terrorist incidents with the greatest potential
consequences.
Technology Evaluation. The challenge of harnessing security
technology for rail and mass transit is two-fold: How can we best adapt
the security technology developed for aviation to the unique
circumstances of rail and mass transit systems? What new technologies
are uniquely suited to rail and mass transit systems? Pilot programs,
exercises, and research and development aim to leverage current and
emerging technologies to deter attacks against rail and mass transit
systems, especially those intended to cause catastrophic damage through
use of chemical, biological, radiological, or high explosives weapons.
Together, these three components support our current security
program and future planning.
Grants. Although primary responsibility for funding mass transit
security rests with State and local governments, substantial Federal
assistance has been and will continue to be provided through a variety
of grants. TSA has worked closely with DHS' Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness (OSLGCP) in the review of
grant applications, the determination of eligibility, and final award
determinations. Since its creation, through the State Homeland Security
Grant Program and the Urban Area Security Initiative, DHS has allocated
$8.6 billion for counterterrorism preparedness. The President's FY 2006
homeland security budget proposes an additional $2.4 billion for this
purpose as well. These funds can also be allocated by State and local
governments for rail and mass transit security efforts. The FY2006
budget also requests $600 million--a more than 60 percent increase--for
the Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program, which covers security
for mass transit, rail, ports, inter-city buses, and programs such as
highway watch and buffer zone protection. These areas and programs
combined received $365 million in FY 2005. Additionally, to date DHS'
Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) has provided more than $255
million to State and local transit authorities to increase protection
through hardening of assets, greater police presence during high
alerts, additional detection and surveillance equipment, increased
inspections, and expanded use of explosives detection canine teams. In
April 2005, DHS announced $141 million in TSGP funding, of which more
than $107 million has been dedicated to owners and operators of rail
systems. An additional $6 million was awarded to Amtrak through the
Intercity Passenger Rail Security Program for security enhancements to
rail operations on the Northeast Corridor and at the railroad's hub in
Chicago.
TSA has also coordinated closely with DOT's Federal Transit
Administration (FTA), which launched a comprehensive public
transportation security initiatives program funded primarily through a
$23.5 million supplemental security allocation in an FY 2003 emergency
wartime appropriation. The program included threat and vulnerability
assessments at 37 of the largest transit agencies, most involving
multiple modes; the deployment of on-site security technical assistance
teams to the 50 largest transit agencies; the award of security drill
and exercise grants to over 80 transit agencies; the launching, with
industry partners, of a Transit Watch security public awareness
campaign; and the development and holding of community forums to
enhance coordination and integration of transit agencies with emergency
responders, fire and police departments, and other key stakeholders.
Security Exercises and Training. TSA has held numerous security
exercises that bring together rail carriers, Federal, State, and local
first responders, and security experts to test preparedness and
response and identify best practices and lessons learned. These efforts
support effective relationships among Federal entities and with State
and local governments and the private sector and greatly enhance our
overall security posture. These exercises assist TSA and stakeholders
in addressing gaps in antiterrorism and response training among rail
personnel.
Through an interagency agreement with the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center, TSA has trained over 400 law enforcement, transit
police, and first responders through the Land Transportation Anti-
Terrorism Training Program. Additionally, TSA has contracted with the
National Transit Institute to develop a CD-ROM based interactive
training program for passenger and freight rail employees. This product
is expected to be completed before the end of the current fiscal year.
Stakeholder Engagement. TSA has reached out and engaged with
industry stakeholders, including the American Public Transportation
Association and Amtrak, to identify common security practices and
obtain feedback on security programs and initiatives. This input is
crucial to TSA's efforts to identify best practices, which will enhance
security in the rail and mass transit modes. We are committed to
maintaining these engagements and using the information and experience
gained in security measures and programs.
Corporate Security Reviews (CSR). Since FY 2003, TSA has conducted
27 on-site corporate security reviews with rail and mass transit
stakeholders, including six of the Nation's seven Class I railroads, to
gain an understanding of each surface transportation owner/operator's
ability to protect its critical assets. The program's goals are to
supply baseline data that can be used to develop security standards,
provide domain awareness of security measures throughout the
transportation sector, and promote outreach to transportation
stakeholders as a means to ensure constant communication and foster
stakeholder relationships.
The CSR Program has several recognized benefits. The data collected
during these visits, such as security plans and critical infrastructure
lists, supplies TSA with information to assist with other programs and
exercises, baseline the state of security in the Nation, and establish
performance-based security standards. This data also assists TSA in
identifying areas where additional resources need to be dedicated to
address security shortfalls. Additionally, the field presence fosters a
higher degree of confidence in TSA with the stakeholder community,
builds trusted partnerships faster, and validates stakeholder policies
and procedures already in place.
Security Directives. To secure the U.S. passenger rail and mass
transit sectors after the Madrid attacks, TSA issued Security
Directives (SDs) that mandate specific security measures. The SDs set a
standardized security baseline. They were developed in conjunction with
stakeholders and DOT. The measures required by the SDs support DHS's
overarching goals of prevent, protect, respond, and restore. A key
measure mandated by the SDs is frequent inspections of key facilities,
including stations, terminals, and passenger rail cars, for suspicious
or unattended items.
Surface Transportation Inspection Program. In addition to the grant
programs I have discussed, the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act for FY 2005 committed $12 million to TSA for rail
security, including $10 million to deploy 100 Federal security
compliance inspectors. TSA has made substantial progress in developing
a robust and comprehensive surface transportation security compliance
inspector program with emphasis on hiring, training, and logistical and
procedural planning. More than 60 have been deployed to date. TSA
expects to have hired and deployed all 100 inspectors to field
locations in the next 60 days. The inspectors will identify gaps in
security and inspect for compliance with the SDs.
Pilot Programs. TSA has successfully conducted the Transit and Rail
Inspection Pilot (TRIP) program, which was designed to test the
feasibility of screening passengers, their luggage, and cargo for
explosives in the rail environment. The pilot occurred in three phases
and tested advanced automated x-ray explosives detection equipment and
canine patrols. TRIP provided valuable lessons on how to successfully
deploy, maintain, and use screening technology outside the airport
environment. Results indicated that such technology might be useful if
threats were made against a specific rail or mass transit system or in
support of a National Special Security Event (NSSE). This aspect was
successfully demonstrated at the Republican National Convention in the
summer of 2004 and at the Presidential Inauguration in January 2005.
Explosives Detection Canine Teams. The FY 2005 DHS Appropriations
Act also includes $2 million to deploy explosives detection canine
teams. The National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program consists
of two components. First, a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) has been
developed to deploy DHS explosives detection canine team resources in
support of local law enforcement agencies on an as needed basis in the
event of heightened levels of security. TSA's participation in the RDF
has included augmentation of local law enforcement and local
authorities during NSSEs, such as the Presidential Inauguration and the
Democratic and Republican National Conventions, as well as conducting
joint training and assistance to existing mass transit canine teams.
The second component of the explosives detection canine team program is
devoted to rail and mass transit and should be completed by the end of
calendar year 2005. This segment is being accomplished by partnering
with local mass transit and rail authorities. It includes the training
and deployment of additional TSA-certified explosives detection canine
team assets to support mass transit systems and the development of
national standard operating procedures for rail and mass transit
systems. As one example, TSA partnered with the Metropolitan Atlanta
Rapid Transit Authority, deploying six TSA-certified explosives
detection canine teams throughout their system.
This program is effective and expanding. On August 10, 2005, TSA
offered a cadre of three dogs each to ten of the largest mass transit
systems in the Nation. Law enforcement officers from the ten systems
that choose to participate will attend the TSA Explosives Detection
Canine Handler Course beginning this month. During that ten-week
course, handlers will be matched with a TSA canine and trained in
proper dog handling and search techniques. Upon graduation, the teams
will return to their systems for local training, familiarization, and
certification.
Hazardous Materials. The security of hazardous materials (HAZMAT)
shipments, including radioactive materials and defense related items,
is an area that has received special emphasis since September 11, 2001.
DHS and DOT have been working on several initiatives that support the
development of a national risk-based plan to address the shipment of
HAZMAT by rail and truck. For rail, a major effort is the assessment of
the vulnerabilities of urban areas through which toxic inhalation
hazard (TIH) materials are transported. TSA and DHS' Directorate for
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) have worked
together to enhance security in the Nation's capital with the National
Capital Region (NCR) Rail Security Corridor Pilot Project. The $9.6
million pilot initiative established a seven-mile long Rail Protective
Measures Study Zone to protect HAZMAT traveling through the city.
Measures undergoing testing and development include screening and
monitoring of trains, monitoring of personnel, chemical monitoring,
radiation and contamination monitoring, and physical security measures
to prevent intruders from tampering with the rail lines or trains. The
task force for this effort includes private stakeholders and other
Federal and local government agencies that conducted risk vulnerability
assessments and identified critical areas and mitigation strategies to
enhance HAZMAT security along the D.C. Rail Corridor.
TSA continues to improve HAZMAT security through the High Threat
Urban Areas (HTUAs) Corridor Assessments. The DHS/DOT team is
conducting vulnerability assessments of HTUAs where TIH HAZMAT is
transported by rail in significant quantities. TSA, IAIP and federal
partners from DOT (Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)) have completed
four corridors. The goal of DHS is to complete nine corridor
assessments of selected high-threat urban areas by the end of this
calendar year. These assessments comprise one portion of a DHS and DOT
plan to enhance the security of TIH rail shipments. Other goals of the
plan are to enhance the ability of railcars to withstand attack,
improve compliance with security plan regulations, develop protocols
for protective measures, establish communication standards on rail car
tracking systems, and improve rail car security during storage in
transit.
TSA contracted with the Texas Transportation Institute (TTI) to
conduct an independent rail HAZMAT placarding study to assess the
feasibility of technological alternatives to the current placard system
that would enhance security while maintaining the same level of safety
for the first responder community. TTI identified alternatives in three
categories: cloaking devices; decentralized systems; and centralized
systems. The study was completed on December 17, 2004, but the
technologies examined did not demonstrate capabilities that would
justify replacing the current system. Therefore, the Secretary of
Homeland Security has decided that the current placarding system will
remain in effect.
In addition, FRA has administered and enforced the hazardous
material shipment regulations promulgated by PHMSA or its predecessor,
DOT's Research and Special Programs Administration since the 1970s.
These safety regulations cover multiple subjects implicated by the
shipment of HAZMAT by rail, including loading, unloading, transloading,
placarding, rail car placement in trains, and documentation of the
movement. There are nearly 100 FRA and State inspectors involved in
aggressively inspecting and enforcing the HAZMAT regulations with
respect to railroads, shippers by rail, tank car manufacturers, and
tank car repair facilities. The FY 2005 FRA budget provides funding
specifically for additional HAZMAT inspectors for tank car design,
construction, quality, and maintenance.
Freight Rail Security Demonstration Projects. TSA has worked with
IAIP and DOT's FRA and PHMSA to develop projects to be funded with $5
million allotted from the appropriation in the FY 2005 DHS
Appropriations Act to OSLGCP for intercity passenger rail
transportation, freight rail, and transit security grants. These
projects will be carried out in accordance with the September 2004
Memorandum of Understanding between DHS and DOT on agreed upon roles
and responsibilities. Through this team approach, OSLGCP, TSA, IAIP,
FRA, and PHMSA will engage stakeholders at the ground level in
designing a comprehensive and meaningful strategy for successful
implementation of the proposed demonstration projects.
Self-Assessment Tool. TSA has developed a Vulnerability
Identification Self-Assessment Tool (VISAT), a multi-modal tool that a
rail or mass transit system may voluntarily use to detect and weigh the
vulnerabilities within their systems. In general, the tool focuses on
the prevention and the mitigation of an array of threat scenarios
developed for each mode within the sector. Users rate their entity in
terms of target attractiveness (from a terrorist's perspective) and
several consequence categories that broadly describe health and well-
being, economic consequence, and symbolic value of the entity. The tool
enables a user to capture a snapshot of its security system baseline by
assessing vulnerabilities in the system and assisting in the
development of a comprehensive security plan.
Of note, VISAT has been adapted for use by stadium and arena
managers to enhance security as well. To date, access to VISAT has been
provided to over 300 stadiums and 400 arenas. IAIP is spearheading
efforts to adapt the program for use by other commercial sector venues,
to include convention and performing arts centers. An IAIP pilot
program with the States of Texas, Virginia, and California, aims to
adapt the tool to support security awareness in K-12 schools.
Infrastructure Protection. TSA has been integral in assessing the
vulnerability of rail and mass transit infrastructure. To date, TSA has
reviewed over 2,600 facilities, structures, and systems in a
comprehensive effort to determine critical infrastructure. DHS has
conducted 52 Site Assistant Visits (SAVs) in the transportation sector
including mass transit systems, tunnels, bus terminals/systems, rail
lines, and bridges as of August 26, 2005. DHS and TSA personnel
continue to review the security plans, countermeasures, mitigation
strategies, and technologies used by industry, and will identify best
practices in the future.
FRA is assisting Amtrak in enhancing the security and safety of New
York City tunnels under the East and Hudson Rivers. TSA and FTA are
assessing the security of high-risk transit assets, including
vulnerabilities in subway tunnels and at stations where large numbers
of people converge and where an attack would cause the greatest loss of
life and disruption to transportation services. FTA is working with
local systems to develop best practices to improve communication
systems and develop emergency response plans.
By a final rule issued on May 31, 2005, FTA met Congressional
direction to establish a program providing for State-conducted
oversight of the safety and security of rail systems not regulated by
FRA. To be codified at 49 C.F.R. Part 659, the rule imposes specific
requirements for the development, implementation, monitoring, and
assessment of security plans in addition to expanding safety oversight
requirements.
Response to the London Attacks
The recent London subway and bus attacks reaffirmed our need for
vigilance in securing our rail and mass transit systems. The nationwide
response to those attacks, however, also affirms the capability of
TSA's approach to mass transit security to date. TSA and FTA jointly
surveyed the top 30 transit agencies to determine changes in their
security posture. Even before DHS officially raised the threat level
for this sector, many transit agencies had voluntarily enhanced their
security with additional patrols, explosives detection canine support,
and enhanced public awareness campaigns. These efforts built upon
improvements in the security posture brought on by adherence to the
security directives TSA issued in the aftermath of the Moscow and
Madrid bombings in 2004. Most transit agencies also increased the
frequency of security inspections, including track inspections. Many
indicated that they would continue increased use of these resources
even after the downgrading of the threat level from Orange to Yellow.
In the immediate aftermath of the bombings, TSA personnel were
given access to transit agencies' operations centers nationwide to
observe and evaluate and assist in responsive measures. TSA's surface
transportation inspectors deployed to the operations centers of the
major railroads and transit systems across the Nation to assess
security posture and facilitate protective actions. FRA safety
inspectors provided exceptional support and assistance in this effort
with the railroads. This collective effort leveraged the assets,
expertise, and carefully fostered partnerships of government and
industry stakeholders to increase our situational awareness. Lessons
learned by all parties will enhance overall security posture and
awareness and foster effective cooperation and partnering among
Federal, State, local, and private sector entities in the prevention
of, and response to, acts of terrorism.
Internationally, TSA officials have engaged with their foreign
counterparts on rail and mass transit security issues, with the aim of
sharing and gleaning best practices from countries with a history of
terrorism against their surface transportation systems, an effort we
will continue and expand upon. TSA has met with the responsible
officials from the United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, Israel, France,
Japan, Greece (particularly in preparation for the 2004 Olympic Games),
the Netherlands, Canada, and other countries. TSA has developed forums
for sharing security information and practices on behalf of DHS across
all modes of transportation. TSA also benefits from the efforts of DHS
representatives based overseas in U.S. Embassies, who have expanded
their traditional aviation security roles to include security issues
relating to all modes of transportation.
The Road Ahead
We go forward with a disciplined measured program for protecting
our rail and mass transit systems. Our efforts will continue to
emphasize the shared responsibility of the Federal government, State
and local governments, industry, and academia. TSA will continually set
the standard for excellence in transportation security through people,
processes, and technology.
Crucial to our success as we move forward will be our ability to
determine how to best invest our resources. As we continue with our
risk assessments and pilot programs, we must optimize our resources to
assure that they are invested where they will give the most information
or protection. We cannot and will not arbitrarily push money into
security programs without an intelligent assessment of their utility.
Securing rail and mass transit systems must be a shared effort
among Federal, State, and local governments and private stakeholders.
Owners and operators are properly responsible for their own security.
In mass transit, well-trained local law enforcement personnel
understand the unique design characteristics and security challenges of
their home town systems far better than anyone else. Success depends
upon an effective partnership that builds on the strengths and
resources that each level--Federal, State, and local--can offer and
reflects the unique attributes and architecture of each system. To
foster this effort, TSA has initiated a pilot program aimed at
leveraging and networking information resources to ensure decision-
makers at all levels have the tools they need to implement measures and
take actions to deter and prevent terrorist actions.
Our challenge is great--to assure security and protect lives and
property while maintaining the access and efficient movement that is
essential to rail and mass transit systems. Stakeholder partnerships,
information networks, development and leveraging of technology, using a
risk-based approach to deployment of Federal resources, grants to
foster innovation at the State and local level and in the private
sector--through these means, we will continue to strengthen our base of
security programs in a manner that ensures freedom of movement for
people and commerce.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear this morning. TSA looks
forward to a continuing dialogue with Congress on the issues of rail
and mass transit security. I will be pleased to answer any questions
you may have.
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