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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD
MARCH 14, 2006

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CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2006

	Page
HEARING:	
Tuesday, March 14, 2006, Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review	1
APPENDIX:	
Tuesday, March 14, 2006	57

TUESDAY, MARCH 14, 2006

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services	1
Ortiz, Hon. Solomon P., a Representative from Texas	3

WITNESSES

Donnelly, Thomas, Resident Fellow in Defense and National Security Studies, American Enterprise Institute	46
England, Hon. Gordon, Deputy Secretary of Defense	3
Giambastiani, Adm. Edmund F., Jr., Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	5
Korb, Dr. Lawrence J., Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress, Senior Advisor, Center for Defense Information	41
Krepinevich, Dr. Andrew F., Executive Director, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments	43

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:	
Donnelly, Thomas	96
England, Hon. Gordon	66
Korb, Dr. Lawrence J.	71
Krepinevich, Dr. Andrew F.	83
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services	61
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:	
[There were no Documents submitted.]	
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:	
Mr. Abercrombie	103
Mr. Marshall	103
Mr. Ortiz	105
Mr. Taylor	104

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 14, 2006.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 2:03 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the committee) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this afternoon to review the Defense Department's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). We will hear first from the department and then from a panel of outside experts.

Our department witnesses are the Honorable Gordon England, Deputy Secretary, Department of Defense; Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and with him also is Ryan Henry, Principal Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

So, gentlemen, thank you for being with us today. And we look forward to your remarks.

Congress created the Quadrennial Defense Review after the Berlin Wall fell to connect threats, strategy, force structure, and budgets. Over the years, it has helped us to do so to one degree or another. And while we haven't always been satisfied with the product, the effort forces the department and Congress to pause and ask fundamental questions, which is valuable in and of itself.

In fact, we believe the process is so important that the committee decided to conduct its own review this year. Many members have contributed to the committee defense review over the last six months, and we are closing in on completing the project. Throughout that process, the department was very helpful.

And I want to thank you, Mr. Secretary, especially for being so cooperative, making sure that the briefings, the information, the analysis that the Pentagon had that was relevant to our process was made available to us. And we appreciate that.

That, of course, leads us to some aspects of the Quadrennial Defense Review with which we have a few concerns.

First, the QDR is resource constrained. In other words, the final product has to assume that a certain amount of funding will be available to meet our defense needs. Now, for some time, members of the committee have been concerned that the resource con-

strained model affects how QDR planners review threats and the capabilities required to meet them.

A resourced constrained approach can lead planners to consider only those threats and capabilities for which they have adequate resources. Defense planning should be undertaken the other way around.

We need to first identify what we need and then decide how and whether we can afford it. At least that way we can be clear about the risks of not adequately funding our defense.

Second, the QDR reaches some contradictory conclusions about force structure. It calls for making our armed forces more expeditionary than they are now. Yet it concludes generally that we possess enough strategic lift today to achieve that mission, even though our current lift assets were not designed for an expeditionary Army.

It proposes handing some special operations missions to regular Army units, increasing the demands on the force at the same time that it shrinks the number of brigade combat teams. In other words, the QDR promises to do more with less. The armed forces have been doing a lot more with a lot less for a decade. It is fair to question the wisdom of a strategy that proposes to accelerate that trend.

Third, the QDR makes some programmatic decisions that seem to contradict its strategic findings. For example, it stresses the value of and increased demands on deep strike platforms at the same time it recommends cutting the operational bomber force and making up the difference with aircraft that do not yet exist and certainly will not exist for another decade. And, of course, we are talking about the proposed cuts in the F–117, but more importantly, the B–52H models.

I am not making these points to be critical. But I think that they highlight a larger point. The QDR is very optimistic that new technologies and operational concepts will address these problems. Yet it is somewhat vague on these technologies and concepts. Meanwhile we continue to increase the demands on our current force structure, which the QDR will reduce in order to free up resources for modernization. Ultimately these two trends conflict with one another, a point that the QDR does not seem to acknowledge.

In suggesting that we can move forward without confronting that fundamental contradiction, the QDR may lead us to miss the forest for the trees. So I think we need to view the QDR and the committee's defense review as inputs into the process of building our nation's defenses not as a last word.

Now, let me turn to the gentleman from Texas. And, you know, the gentleman from Missouri would be with us today, but he has had natural disasters in his district. Some of his constituents, in fact, have been killed. And he has been rather consumed with that problem. And so, the great gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz, is sitting in as the ranking member.

And the gentleman from Texas is recognized.

STATEMENT OF HON. SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to request unanimous consent to submit the statement of my good friend, Mr. Skelton into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 61.]

Mr. ORTIZ. And I would like to take this opportunity to welcome the witnesses here with us today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank you, Mr. Ortiz.

And, Mr. Secretary and Admiral Giambastiani and Under Secretary Henry, thanks for your continuing contributions.

And, Mr. Secretary, you have been at the point of the spear on lots of tough challenges for our nation. And we walk through them sometimes with bumps and bruises but always your ability to bring people together and to work with Congress, I think, has been a strength for the Department of Defense. And so, I know this is a big deal, this QDR. And I know you have got Admiral Giambastiani, who is well known for his ability to innovate and to think and to analyze. And you have had a lot of talented people working this program. So we appreciate the work product.

And, Mr. Secretary, what do you think? The floor is yours, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON ENGLAND, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Chairman, thanks. You are right. This is indeed a big deal.

And, Mr. Ortiz, thank you, sir, and all the members of the committee. It is always a delight to be here.

And it is always a delight and a pleasure to be with Admiral Ed Giambastiani and also Mr. Ryan Henry. The three of us were very instrumental in this report and activity. And I appreciate their terrific contribution.

Also I will thank you for the great support for our men and women in uniform, who are absolutely magnificent in doing the work of our nation. And God bless them for what they do every day for our freedom and liberty.

It was a pleasure, Mr. Chairman, for us to support you. And I do thank you for your committee defense review efforts. It is very important that we approach this as a team if we are to go implement change and bring about change in the Department of Defense. So I thank you for your initiative and all the hard work of this committee and the opportunity for us to work with you. And we do look forward to the outcome of your studies and to work with you at that time.

I would like to make just a couple comments about the Quadrennial Defense Review. The QDR is a strategic document. And it looks out 20 years. Obviously, the further you get in time, the less precise it is. So it is probably more precise 7 and 10 years from now. But we try to go out 20 years in terms of looking ahead. So it is strategic. It is not a budget document.

The 2007 budget, Presidential budget submittal—that is obviously budget and program oriented. And the QDR is really not program oriented. Your comment about being resource constrained—I would say it is resource informed. Since it is strategic, we did not look at a specific constraint, a budget constraint. But obviously we realize that there is just not unlimited funds. So we wanted to get a degree of realism obviously in our thinking.

The 2007 budget contains some, what we call, leading edge implementations of the QDR. I know there are people saying, "Gosh, why didn't—you know, everything isn't implemented in 2007." Actually, nothing was intended to be in the 2008 budget because the 2007 budget was being prepared in parallel with the Quadrennial Defense Review.

We took it upon ourselves to incorporate as much as we could in the 2007 budget. But the QDR will be implemented going forward in 2008, 2009. And by the way, it will take a considerable time to implement the QDR. I mean, time is sort of the tyranny of this process. Here we are working on the 2008 budget already. So we are already two years from things that are going to be in the 2008 budget, which is why we tried to back up in the 2007 budget.

I also want to comment that this was a very inclusive process, the QDR. This is not just the Department of Defense. This was the Department of Defense. It was all the agencies of the Federal Government. I mean, specifically, state, intel communities, Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security. But outside the Federal Government, we had at least three defense science board studies. We had think-tanks from throughout the area and throughout the private sector.

We had an independent array team within the Department of Defense. And so, while there are a lot of personal views, we, I believe, integrated lots of views. Our responsibility was to get views and balance them across a spectrum of input and being concerned for the total security of the Nation over a long-term period, not just for today and not just a specific area, but across a total spectrum of threats to America.

That said, I also wanted to say I believe and we concluded in the studies for the Quadrennial Defense Review there is likely a great diversity of challenges and more uncertainty today than there has been, I would say, at least in my whole lifetime. We now have this disbursed networks of terrorists. We have states and non-states that can acquire—some have acquired—and could use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to a devastating effect.

We have major and emerging powers that could choose a hostile course in the future. And, of course, we have a homeland that is vulnerable to all of these threats. And therefore, we provide capability to the Nation in terms of homeland and particularly, support to the Department of Homeland Security. So this is a very challenging time for the department.

Also the QDR is not a static document. I think it was—I am not sure how this came about in the Congress, frankly. It was an excellent initiative to do this every four years. But the fact of the matter is the world is changing very rapidly. And every four years is likely probably not the right scenario. So our intent is to revisit this and

revisit it as we need to and as events and circumstances change. So this will be dynamic. And it won't be static.

And I also want to assure the committee that we have already started taking action to implement the Quadrennial Defense Review. We have 141 actions to be implemented. And we have nine major roadmaps, that is, very comprehensive issues that will require pretty lengthy schedules and activities. All that is being scheduled with milestones and people being assigned. So there will be a very comprehensive approach in implementing the Quadrennial Defense Review.

So I appreciate—I do on behalf of the secretary and also my associates here today—we appreciate the opportunity to be here because we can only make progress in the QDR with your support. Otherwise, I mean, if we do not make any changes to our budget, that is if we maintain the status quo, then we will be stuck, frankly, with the status quo for a long time.

So this will take the department working with the Congress to build a consensus to actually move the vector in terms of a different direction and to move in a different direction will mean that we will need to stop doing things that are not completely necessary as we go forward in the future.

So we look forward to the discussion. And we look forward and appreciate the support of Congress as we go forward in the QDR. And so, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you very much.

And I would like my friend and compatriot here, Admiral Giambastiani, to make a few comments. And then we will be ready for your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary England can be found in the Appendix on page 66.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Admiral.

STATEMENT OF ADM. EDMUND F. GIAMBASTIANI, JR., VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Thank you, Chairman Hunter, Mr. Ortiz, and members of the committee, for this opportunity to testify before you today. And also thank you for your strong and dedicated support of our armed forces on a continuing basis and also that very important group that is behind them, their families.

I strongly second Secretary England's comments to you on the challenges we face and the QDR's attempt to attack these challenges and make the hard choices that are required along the way. And I look forward to engaging with you on what we would like to call this vector for the future of the joint force recommended by the QDR that we have just submitted.

Let me take a moment and give you some context I think might help from my perspective. In our QDR discussions, we had a very clear idea of our customers as we debated and discussed the way ahead. First, of course, the commander in chief, the President and through him, the secretary of defense to give them options and choices for what we refer to continuously throughout the document as an uncertain world and second, of course, the combatant commanders who execute any assigned missions to give them the right

capabilities to be successful in any plausible scenarios that we could think of.

I come to this task working with Secretary England and the rest of our department here after almost three years as a combatant commander. I found this experience valuable, and it gave me what I consider to be invaluable perspectives in supporting our other combatant commanders around the world.

I returned just last month from another troop visit to our folks in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait. I know many of you have completed or will be going on similar visits once again here shortly. This visit once again reconfirmed my faith that by and large the vector for the future we set in the QDR, I believe, is broadly correct. I bring back from the troops their thanks for your support in the past and their determination to complete the mission at hand.

Our work in the QDR did not start from scratch or proceed in a vacuum. It builds on the 2001 QDR submitted back in September of 2001. It seeks to provide the capabilities required to successfully execute the 2005 national defense strategy. It is informed by extensive lessons learned in more than four years of war against a determined, ruthless and adaptable enemy. And it guided part, as Secretary England mentioned, our 2007 President's budget.

I would like to reinforce two points, if I may, before we take your questions. First, in this QDR, we refined our force planning construct to help us understand, given the mix of capabilities we desire, how much of these capabilities we need and how to apportion these capabilities in the total force. This refined force planning construct retains major elements of QDR 2001, and it is based equally on three major capabilities: homeland defense, the war on terror, irregular warfare, and not surprisingly and finally, conventional warfare.

But during all of these, it accounts for both steady state and surge operations. But for the first time, steady state operations are identified as key capacity drivers across the entire force.

The second point I would like to make is that these desired capabilities and capacities will receive a considerable down payment in the President's budget submitted this first time alongside the QDR. While there is a whole list of initiatives I could talk about and I could describe and they aim to provide this shift of weight, this vector that I talked about earlier and that the secretary has mentioned to make us responsible and flexible, I would like to defer those for your questions.

Again, I thank the committee for this opportunity to speak with you today and for your continued strong support. We look forward to your questions, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Admiral, thank you. And thank you for your career and service to this country.

And, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being with us today.

Let me go to just one point. And I will reserve other questions until the end of the event here today. Deep strike—the QDR evidences interest and focuses on the importance of the Nation maintaining deep strike capability. That is the ability in shorthand to reach long distances around the world with explosive on target.

Platforms that manifest that capability today are aging, mainly comprised of bomber capability, a small fleet of B–2s, a reduced

fleet now of B–1s following Air Force early retirements of a good piece of the B–1 force. And, of course, at the remaining core of that force is an ancient B–52Hs. I think the last one rolled off the assembly line in 1962.

If you look at that force, it is smaller than it has ever been. And yet the recommendations in the budget you have got before us is to cut that force down by another fairly substantial percentage. And as I recall, the QDR posits that we should be developing around 2018 a new deep strike capability. What do you think?

Don't you think we are counting on a fairly long period of having a benign environment that doesn't require that forceful dimension of America's war fighting capability for a fairly substantial period of time? And don't you think there is a fairly substantial risk in pulling that bomber force down with the outlook for a future capability so far out? What do you think, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary ENGLAND. If I can just make a comment, Mr. Chairman, and then I will turn it over to the admiral. I think in terms of the capability because of a lot of advances in technology, today one of those pretty aged but very, very capable B–52s can now take out basically 90 targets, every airplane on every sortie because of precision weaponry and the targeting and the capability we have. So if you look at the number of targets served, it is, I expect, vastly higher now than it was in past years just because of the benefit of technology.

So we are recommending that we come down in some of the airplanes that are basically pretty expensive and high maintenance and limited utility to us. And then we will be investing. And we do have money in the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) for the beginning of a new deep strike capability. So this is a transition. But, in my judgment, it does not leave us with a void or high risk because of the vastly improved capability of the platforms that we have today.

And I will ask the admiral to make a comment.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Chairman, first of all, you have a lot of deep strike advocates across the department. And you have a very strong group of leaders who support this capability. I will talk about myself individually for just a second. Having probably five years ago—I think I am the only Navy admiral who has flown in B–2 sortie, for example, for two-and-a-half hours. And what I would say to you is that first of all, we looked very carefully in this area. The continued upgrades of our B–2 fleet are exceptionally important.

Number two, the upgrades of our B–52 fleet are exceptionally important to keep each one of those that we keep online up to date, fully modernized and fully capable. Now, there is a series of proposals that will probably come forward in 2008, which will make this long-range strike situation, I think, a little more clear with regard to missions and the rest. I would prefer not to get into those right now because we haven't finalized them. But we are looking very carefully at them.

But let me say the following. In the B–52 fleet, getting in the specifics, there is a group of attritioned aircraft, for example. There is a sizeable number. We have got one B–52 that has been turned

over to National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). We have got 18 in the attrition reserve.

So when you look at those, we feel that those always have been aircraft that we did not need to keep fully up to speed and online, even though we have done that. And what we would like to do is invest the money—the Air Force would like to invest the money that they can get from some of those aircraft into upgrading and accelerating this new long range strike aircraft, manned or unmanned, here in the future.

In addition, the precision weaponry that is carried onboard these is exceptionally important. And with a whole package of long range strike, including, for example, conventional Trident and the rest, we feel that we are actually going to increase our capability in the short-term and over the long-term. So that is the reason why we are very supportive of this movement.

Because, you know, the Air Force—I think they advertised that they wanted to come out with a new long range strike aircraft in 2037. It is hard for me to envision that date way out there now. So 2018 may look like a long time away.

But I have to tell you I did a study once when I was a Navy captain. And it was to take a look at the national security environment out to 2010. And that was in 1990. And I thought that date would never arrive. And the last time I looked in the mirror, it was close at hand.

That is all I have, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Thank you, Admiral.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My question is going to be—and maybe you can try to respond, all three of you. But how do you respond to QDR critics who have argued that the QDR gets the rhetoric of irregular warfare correct but then fails to cancel any of the major acquisition programs that began during the Cold War? Is that something that you were able to work through, these old programs that began during the Cold War? And how do we either bring them in to this new study or take them out?

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Ortiz, if I could make a few comments or perhaps Mr. Henry could comment. First of all, the QDR was not to try to cancel programs. It was a strategic document going forward.

And then based on that strategic document, we started making changes that we felt we could in the 2007 budget. So first of all, you have not seen the implications of the QDR yet in the budget because the QDR, again, is a strategic document. We did some things in 2007, but it will unfold. And we may end up needing to do that, although we are not looking just to cancel programs.

That said, we have made some recommendations in the budget. And for example, tomorrow we will have a hearing on the joint strike fighter because we have recommended only one engine developer and not two. Because of the strategic lift, we have said that we should, you know, stop the C–17 program at the end of its current production, et cetera.

So there are a number of changes in the document. There is also, I would tell you, a lot of money sort of below the water line, money

that has moved around in terms of emphasis to meet the intent of the QDR. So the measure should not be killing programs. The measure should be how are we positioning our military forces recognizing there is still conventional—none of this is 20 years.

So we are shifting a lot of money to the irregular warfare. But we also deter threats. And so, we do need other capabilities. This is a broad spectrum capability and not focused on one particular threat. This is a hedge against surprise and uncertainty in a world we are in. And so, it is balanced. And that is what we tried to do across the QDR in terms of understanding threats and putting a strategic framework going forward.

And, Ryan, comment?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Deputy, if I could, let me add a couple of comments to the secretary's.

Secretary ENGLAND. Okay.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. First of all, one of the main assumptions of the Quadrennial Defense Review, as the secretary pointed out, was uncertainty. And there is considerable uncertainty more in the future than we think we have seen at least in the last 15 years. And it continues to be a more and more uncertain world.

As we look at what movement we have to make within the programs, it depends on what one's view of major is. I suspect to a taxpayer, $2 billion—you know better than I do—is a significant amount of money. For example, the deputy mentioned this alternative engine for the joint strike fighter.

But let me just tell you that there is a substantial amount in tens of billions of dollars in the President's budget that moved around inside it to plus up certain capabilities. In addition, what you have seen is is that we have terminated the aerial common sensor, for example, to give you a few examples. I am going to give you a couple more here. And we have said if we go forward, we need to make it a joint program.

We have restructured the joint tactical radio system. We have restructured the advanced seal delivery submarine program. It was supposed to be three. We have said we only want to go to one because we have to look at whether we need to restructure this in a very different way.

We have canceled the B–52 jammer program. We have canceled the Air Force portion for the joint unmanned airborne surveillance system. The E–10 and the airborne laser will only be research and development (R&D) platforms, for example. We are going to accelerate and conduct early retirement of the U–2 and F–117s. So I could go on and on. There is a number of other ones here. But I think it is a misnomer. And personally I think it is the wrong metric if people think that every four years we are going to come up with massive new programs and massive cuts at a Quadrennial Defense Review time.

Our view is is that if you are changing and modernizing on a day to day basis and you have this culture of change and learning embedded in an organization that you will be doing this on every budget every day that you work. So that is why we don't expect to see these major changes.

Ryan.

Mr. HENRY. Well, other than, as the vice chairman mentioned, there are a number of other programs that were restructured, caps, production terminated. Beyond that, I think it gets to the point the chairman raised at the very beginning. If you approach this from a strictly resource constrained approach, then you are going to be looking to cancel programs. But if you do it from what are the capabilities you need and a capabilities based approach and then you are able to shift below the level of the major programs, you are going to be able to get the freedom of action that we have had to make this major shift in investment toward irregular warfare.

I would say the other reason that we were successful in being able to do this is rather than pushing the services in a direction they didn't want to go, it was an issue of the services understanding that we needed to make this shift toward irregular warfare and then reaching deep down in their programs and them having a much clearer understanding of where the savings could be had below the major program level to be able to come up with the funding to be able to fund the irregular capabilities.

Mr. ORTIZ. Just one last question now. What kind of reception have the other services and agencies given to the DOD recommendations? Are they all for it? Did they accept them? I know you get a lot of input and a lot of recommendations. How do they accept the recommendations by DOD?

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Ortiz, this was an, I will say, extraordinarily open and collaborative process. So throughout the QDR we had all of the commanders. We had all the services. We had all the under secretaries. We periodically reviewed this with the secretary of defense and with all the combatant commanders. So this was very open, very inclusive.

Risk was weighed in every decision that we made. And my judgment is that we have consensus effectively across the board on the QDR. I mean, maybe there is somebody that objects to one or two things. But I would tell you certainly the main—there is unanimity of agreement across the Department of Defense, military and civilian, service chiefs, combatant commanders, certainly the secretary and myself.

So this was, again, a very open and collaborative process. And I believe we did reach a conclusion that that is the right direction for the Navy and for the nation. And we do have concurrence on this direction.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I might add, Mr. Ortiz, that the combatant commanders, in particular, as one of those primary customers of executing missions with the forces assigned to them are strongly onboard with this vector and strongly supportive of this Quadrennial Defense Review because of the capabilities that they think they need to conduct the types of war plans, contingency plans and day to day operations that they get assigned.

Mr. HENRY. I would just add to that, sir, that it goes beyond that within the services, within the U.S. Government, as the secretary and the vice chairman mentioned, but also the international community, our alliance partners and our coalition partners. We had them as part of the process taking input.

Some of our closest partners were actually members of the QDR process with it every step of the way. And now that it has been

published and we have been out there for a month, we are out doing consultations. And each of our partners welcomes this, thinks it is a shift in the right direction and are interested in how they can collaborate with us to further develop these capabilities.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HEFLEY [presiding]. Thank you very much.

In the QDR, did you deal with the issue of the use of the National Guard? We have taken this up over and over and over in this committee. And it is the feeling of some on this committee at least that we are not going to be able to sustain the way we use the guard now. Traditionally people go into the National Guard with the idea that when there is an emergency, emergency in your state—in my state, you have wild fires or things like that. Why, they are pressed into service—or floods—or in the Nation.

And I know in the second World War we called up guard units, and they were there for the rest of the duration. And we called up guard units in the Korean War, and they were there for the duration and perhaps Vietnam as well. But I don't think traditionally we have had the guard rotated to active duty on a regular rotational schedule, no matter how long that schedule is before they are rotated.

And there is a feeling of some of us that you simply are not going to be able to sustain the National Guard if you do that. You are not going to be able to because most of our National Guard members today are married. They have families. The families don't want them gone every 6 or 12 or 18 months.

And the employers are not going to go along with the idea that their guard people are going to be gone every couple of years or so. So did you deal with that issue as to whether or not we can sustain using the guard the way we are using them now?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Sir, we looked at this extensively. I can tell you just a significant number of discussions on this. We do, as I mentioned in my opening statement, look at both surge and a steady state operations. And we do this in some pretty extensive analysis to see how we can deal with the active component and the reserve component, of which I will include not only the National Guard but the reserves.

And as a result of this very extensive look over a long period of time of this analysis we have doing here for about three years, that is part of the reason why the Army came forward and looked at increasing the number of active component brigade combat teams and adjusting the way the National Guard and the reserves were structured for both combat brigade teams on the National Guard side and then brigades total, combat service and combat service support, on both National Guard and the reserve side.

And the thought process was as follows. Now, the problem is we were out fighting a war. And so, as you know better than anyone here in Congress, we had up to 40 percent of, for example, the forces deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom were National Guard at one time, about a year ago. Today it is about 19.5 percent, somewhere in there. It has dropped considerably.

We have had to restructure the guard and reserve to make it not only a strategic reserve, but an operational, but not to expect, if

you will, that we were going to have rotations every year or two years. That is not the long-term intent here for the guard and reserve.

The intent was to produce more active component brigades and brigade combat teams so that we can rotate them frequently in what we call a one in three optimal rotation. And our target for the National Guard and the reserve is about one in six for those entire units. So this would allow us, in fact, to not have more than a maximum of one in six when we federalize National Guard and actually send them out to work these types of missions.

So we have kept the number of brigades within the National Guard to about 106. We have adjusted, as you know, the number of brigade combat teams and support teams and combat service support so that that mix will be useable for contingencies, natural disasters and others here in the United States, but at the same time be able to assist in being an operational and strategic reserve overseas. I hope that answers your question.

Mr. HEFLEY. Well, do you still plan to rotate them on some kind of a schedule into active duty?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. From the brigade combat side, if we have a need for sustained operations overseas, the answer is yes, we should have that capability. Do we expect to do it on a routine basis? The answer is no, unless we are in the middle of a war. And what we want to do is have 42 active combat brigades. If you do a 1 in 3 rotation, that allows us to sustain 14 brigades deployed out of the active force.

From the 28 brigade combat teams, if we rotate them 1 in 6, this allows us to have about 4.5 of them rotated once every 6, if you will, 1 out of 6 years. So this essentially allows us to have 18 or 19 total brigades if we need a sustained force. But I don't think anyone—we know we are in a long war. But keeping this level of troops deployed constantly out into the future, we don't see that day in and day out. Can we do it? Yes. But do we want to? The answer is no.

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much.

Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank our panelists for being with us.

Admiral, going back to what you just said, we see this as a long war. I think regardless of how the people in this room feel about it, it is fair to say that there are some hidden costs to the war in Iraq. I think the equipment that has been left behind by the different guard and reserve units is a hidden cost.

I know in the days immediately after the hurricane as I am making frantic phone calls asking for tents, generators, and meals ready to eat (MRE) it certainly strained a system that was already strained because of the war in Iraq. The use of the guard and reserve—again, at about a year ago right now, I think 40 percent of the troops were guardsmen.

It is probably safe to say that if this continues for a while, we will see another ramp up to have a substantial portion of the troops being guardsmen, if not next year, then the year after that. So to give me an idea of how this whole puzzle comes together, in your QDR, when did you predict an end to sizeable American in-

volvement in Iraq? Because I think if you are going to be looking out into the future, that certainly has got to be the biggest tent in the pole.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Mr. Taylor, we did not look at when Iraq or Afghanistan would end. What we did look at is how to deal with sustained operations over a long period of time and also how to deal with surge operations. And what I was just describing a moment ago was the level of sustained operations from an Army perspective—didn't include Marine Corps, for example—that we could handle once we finished modularizing the Army, finishing the brigade combat team builds and fill-outs and the manning.

So we didn't go in and say, "Now, in our QDR deliberations, Operation Iraqi Freedom support at this level must end at this date." But we did look at generic situations like it and looked at how we could sustain and surge as required if we have another contingency, a natural disaster and the rest.

So that is why once we have completed, if you will, the build of these brigades, the rest of this transformation package that we have put together with modularizing it that we can sustain levels of 18 and 19 Army brigades. Those are the kind of things we looked at.

Mr. TAYLOR. Admiral, with all due respect, proponents say this is costing us $4 billion. Some of the skeptics think it is anywhere from $6 billion to $7 billion a month. So either way, you are talking about the difference between $48 billion a year to $72 billion a year out of a $400 billion budget. How can you just ignore that?

The second question will be does your QDR envision or set a timeline for another round of base realignment and closure (BRAC)?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I am sorry, the second piece?

Mr. TAYLOR. The second piece would be, since I know my time is running out, does your QDR envision or set a timeline for another round of base closures?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Let me answer the first part of that. I know the deputy will want to answer the second part.

Mr. TAYLOR. Sure.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. In our force planning construct, that is the part of how we plan for all types of contingencies. Now, we have what some people have referred to as the 1421 strategy in this force planning construct. Without going through a lengthy explanation of that, when we look at two major operations going on, could one of them be a long-term situation like we currently see in Afghanistan in Iraq. The answer is that would be part of one of those two.

But my comment to you is now let us get beyond the QDR. If you want to talk about the Iraqi situation, we would look at it and say our job is to build Iraqi security forces so we can draw down U.S. forces. That is the long-term answer here. That is the short-term answer, which is why we are working so hard to build the Iraqi Army and then the Iraqi Police force because we want to transition this over to them so we don't have to be into this for years and years. That is really the answer.

But the QDR did not look at Iraq and say we are going to be in this for five years. We looked at generic situations.

Mr. TAYLOR. You know, that $48 billion to $84 billion, now that I think of it, did you just kind of ignore it?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Sir, we don't expect—I don't think anyone expects that we are going to be in a war and getting the very large supplementals that we are getting forever. There is nobody who expects in a planning scenario for that to happen.

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Taylor, again, if I could just comment. First, I don't know of any hidden costs. I mean, the comment about there must be a lot of hidden costs—I just——

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Secretary, if I may. With all due respect to you—and I do respect you—there is no one that I have spoken with in the past two to three years who doesn't off the record tell me that there are hidden costs, whether it is in delayed maintenance, delayed acquisition, equipment left behind and not replaced. My guard unit left every stick of every engineering equipment in Iraq, came home, had to deal with the hurricane with only 60 percent of it replaced.

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Taylor, let me just say this, I mean, so you know. We go out to the department, every service, and we ask them for every single cost associated with the war. And that includes maintenance of equipment that is being worn because it is in the war. It is replacement of damaged equipment. It is replacing of equipment that is literally left by the roadside, maybe worn out. I mean, every cost we know of we have in the supplemental.

I mean, I can tell you—and I would testify under oath—that I know of no cost that is not included in our supplemental, recognizing that there will be costs in the future we don't know about today because the operation is still ongoing and recognizing that at the end, there will likely be some costs just because maybe there is some equipment we leave behind that is not scheduled today. But I can tell you today every cost we know of is accounted for in the supplemental.

The other question you asked, I believe, did we anticipate another BRAC during the period of the QDR. And we did not anticipate another BRAC. We did not include in there some wedge of savings example for BRAC. So the answer is no, sir, we did not anticipate another BRAC.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, gentlemen.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary, it is really good to see you again. Welcome.

Secretary ENGLAND. Thank you.

Mr. BARTLETT. I have in front of me two documents. One is clearly historic. The second one, I think, may be about as historic.

The truly historic one is a copy of a speech given by M. King Hubbert 50 years ago, March 8th in San Antonio, Texas, at the American Petroleum Institute Plaza Hotel. And in that speech, he said that the United States—this was 1956. He said the United States would peak in oil production in 1970. We did.

A little later, he predicted that the world would be peaking in oil production about now. He was right about the United States. It looks like he may have been right about the world.

The second document I have is an Army document. It is dated September 2005, but I think that it is just now become public. It is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Construction Engineering Research Laboratory. And I want to read just a few sentences from this and then ask you a question. The question is this so that you can be considering it. To what extent does the QDR reflect the concerns of this document? Let me read.

Energy implications for Army installations—and that could have read Air Force, Navy, Marines if it had been done for them. "The days of inexpensive, convenient, abundant energy sources are quickly drawing to a close. Domestic natural gas production peaked in 1973. The proved domestic reserve lifetime for natural gas at current consumption rates is about 8.4 years.

"The proved world reserve lifetime for natural gas is about 40 years, but will follow a traditional rise to a peak and then a rapid decline. Domestic oil production peaked in 1970 and continues to decline. Proved domestic reserve lifetime for oil is about 3.4 years."

I am not reading from some environmental quack literature here. I am reading from the Army.

"World oil production is at or near its peak. And current world demand exceeds the supply. Saudi Arabia is considered the bellweather nation for oil production and has not increased production since April 2003. After peak production supply no longer meets demand, prices and competition increase. World crude reserves like tranquil oil is about 41 years, most of this at a declining availability."

"Our current throw-away nuclear cycle will consume the world reserve of low-cost uranium in about 20 years. Unless we dramatically change our consumption practices, the Earth's finite resources of petroleum and natural gas will become depleted in this century. We must act now to develop the technology and infrastructure necessary to transition to other energy sources. Policy changes, leap ahead technology breakthroughs, cultural changes, and significant investment is required for this new energy future. Time is essential to enact these changes."

Again, my question, sir, to what extent did the QDR—because if you are looking ahead 20 years, sir, this is going to impact what we do. To what extent does the QDR reflect these concerns?

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Bartlett, I would say I don't believe it does directly address those concerns. I will tell you, however, that toward the end of the QDR this did become an issue for all of us in the department, including the secretary. And we put out guidance to the department each year in terms of specific guidance. And that guidance, which will come out now in about a week, one aspect of that guidance does deal with the energy situation and what steps can we take both now and in the future regarding energy.

Now, obviously in some cases wise decisions in the past for our nuclear carriers and submarines obviously have mitigated that somewhat. But it is an issue to be addressed. But I will tell you we are just now really starting to address that issue. And it is indeed a very good point.

It is a subject that we have had considerable discussion in the department. But I will tell you we do not have a comprehensive answer to that problem long-term.

Mr. BARTLETT. Sir, I think that business as usual will not address this concern. I believe this will be the challenge of the future, relatively short-term future. I believe that unless we have a program that is pretty much like a combination of putting a man on the moon and the Manhattan Project that we face a very bumpy road ahead. Thank you for your concern for this issue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary ENGLAND. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. Abercrombie.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it is a little disconcerting to listen to the answer that was given to Mr. Taylor in the context of what is going on today because it says Quadrennial Review. Presumably you are going over what has been with an idea of where you are going in the future. And if you have ongoing operations that are continually funded out of supplemental budgets, at least to this point, it is a fair point in turn to ask you how does that relate to what you want to do and what you are projecting as to what needs are and how you are going to fund those needs in the future.

I don't think you can ask us in this committee to pay attention to the review in that light if we can't take into account the funding, both now and what might be anticipated if we follow through on some of the recommendations here. To wit, if you go to page 67—and with your permission, I would like to pass out to you the reference I am making.

I realize you are just on the job, but you were familiar from your previous work with my requests and discussions over the years about capital budgeting. You may recall that in last year's authorization, we put in section 1004, reports and feasibility and desirability of capital budgeting for major defense acquisition programs. And that is the section I am passing out to you folks now.

The report that required this is not later than July 1, 2006, this upcoming July. If you go to page 67 of the report under your building capabilities for strategic choices, I am quoting now, "To manage the budget allocation process with accountability and acquisition reform study initiated by the deputy secretary of defense," which is what you are now—I am quite content to have the Quadrennial Defense Review say it was initiated by the deputy secretary rather than from the Congress.

I am pleased that the deputy secretary at the time thought it was worth doing—"recommend the department work with Congress to establish a capital accounts for major acquisition program." Can you tell me today two things? Will the report be ready by July 1st? And is this what the page 67 commentary is referring to?

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Abercrombie, the effort of the capital accounts that is in that document was started by me last July. We have turned on a special study we call the Defense Acquisition and Program Authorization (DAPA) study dealing with acquisition reform.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes.

Secretary ENGLAND. Plus we had one in-house. Plus there was another study accomplished by one of the firms here, think-tanks here in town.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And you and I have had this in-depth discussion on this.

Secretary ENGLAND. In the past, yes, sir. And so, it turns out a number of these have all come together in terms of having a capital account. So in the QDR, in response to past issues that you are familiar with, particularly in the acquisition arena, we concluded that we should indeed try to implement a capital account within the Department of Defense as a way of better managing these large acquisition programs.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, if you look at—excuse me. It is just our time is so short. I don't mean to cut you off.

So the answer is that you are intending to follow through on the four-point report request, you know, potential long-term effect on defense industrial base? You know, I wrote these four things—I shouldn't say I did it. The chairman and I worked on this together. It was a bipartisan effort, I can assure you. We worked on those four points very, very assiduously with the Quadrennial Review in mind.

Secretary ENGLAND. Look, I can just tell you we are in concurrence. I mean, I violently agree with you on this subject.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. So we can be ready July 1st?

Secretary ENGLAND. Let me say by definition we will. I didn't know until today, frankly, you had this requirement. I was really concentrating more on the QDR. I am pleased that you also have a requirement. I will go back and check the schedule. But if this is the law, we will comply with the law obviously and have a response to you.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. I appreciate that.

Secretary ENGLAND. So we will definitely—and just one other comment. If it looks like it is going to take us longer, obviously——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. No, I realize you probably won't have anything definitive on July 1st. But if you set back with section 1004, I think you will find a very, very succinct yet comprehensive outline, which probably covers virtually all of the initiatives that you just spoke of. And if we can synthesize this and put it together—I don't know if we can do it for the 2007 budget, but I think we can take giant strides toward dealing with some of the funding issues that were inherent in Mr. Taylor's question.

Secretary ENGLAND. Looked terrific. And I appreciate your cooperation. We will definitely work with you on this. This is high on our agenda of things we want to accomplish this year. So we will definitely get back with you, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 103.]

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Texas, who has had now some three million acres consumed by a forest fire in his district. We appreciate the gentleman being here with us to work these issues today. Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't think it is a forest fire in my part of Texas, but it is certainly grass fires that are of a scale that is incomprehensible nearly.

Gentlemen, I appreciate you being here. I think the most important sentence in the QDR is on page one where it says the department must adopt a model of continuous change and reassessment if it is to defeat highly-adapted adversaries.

Now, Admiral Giambastiani has already said today there is more uncertainty than any time in the last 15 years. And you can read that one of two ways. One way is that this is already out of date because the world changes so fast. The other way you can look at it is you know it is going to be out of date, so what you have got to do is make sure that the organization is flexible, adaptable and can meet whatever is around the corner, which you can't possibly predict.

But I am not sure I see that emphasis in this QDR. I mean, I read the pages starting about page 60 that talk about how we are going to have a culture of innovation, how you are going to use metrics to make sure you are going to get there and so forth. But what concerns me is a couple of years ago we had the department come before this committee, make a major emphasis that a new personnel system, both for the civilian and the military, was going to be essential to being more flexible and adaptable, partly because we watered it down, partly because the courts have slowed it down, but partly because the department hadn't been pushing it. That stuff is not moving as fast as it seemed to be in the testimony two and three years ago.

So I guess what I would like for you to address is the sense of urgency you feel in creating a culture of change that is embedded in the organization, which is roughly a quote for what you said today.

Mr. Thornberry, if I could answer that because a lot of that initiative, frankly, was mine in terms of what I call the other side of the coin. That is one side of the coin is the strategic direction for the U.S. military. But the other side of the coin are the underlying processes and structures and methodology and management structures that allow you to be flexible, adaptable and agile on the military side. And you can't do one without the other, frankly.

And recognizing that, there is a major emphasis as part of the QDR to look at the structures, processes within the Department of Defense. And so, we have laid out road maps. And we will have milestones and metrics and measures as we move along that.

I need to tell you, however, this is an extraordinarily complex organization. I mean, we are $.5 trillion a year enterprise that conducts warfare. And so, it is extraordinarily complex. The personnel system, the National Security Personnel System (NSPS), has now been slowed by the courts. Although within the next month or two, we will implement it for our first tranche of non-union employees. But that is for 800,000 employees. I mean, this is probably the largest redesign of the civilian personnel system anywhere in the world at any time, frankly.

And so, it is important that we do it right and we do it thoughtfully and we do experimentation, et cetera. But I can tell you there is a genuine sense of urgency. And our objective is to have in place

within two years all the initiatives, or at least everything reasonable in that QDR that we can get in place, so that during our tenure we can actually incorporate this and have a period of operation, you know, before this Administration and all of us come to an end, frankly.

So we do have our own built-in schedule. Also keep in mind, this is "a regulated enterprise" we have. And so, we don't have total freedom of action in this regard. But I will tell you at our end, there is a great sense of urgency. And we are anxious to work with the Congress. We are recommending about 20 legislative changes. We will, to the Congress, this year as a consequence of the QDR in areas that provide flexibility and adaptability, you know, to do things better in terms of modern business practices, et cetera. So you will find us extraordinarily cooperative and responsive in this regard. And I just give you my assurance that this is a major effort of the QDR.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. If I might just follow, Congressman Thornberry. I think from the perspective of how to embed this culture on a day to day basis into organizations, one of the ways is to self-critique your organization. And we have emphasized to a very great degree, I think as you know, in our previous discussions, lessons learned and our analytic ability to take a look at ourselves, analyze, sit down and look at where we are wrong and where we need to adapt and change. And we have embedded this in, this self-critiquing in, extensively.

We have also, in addition to some of these operational lessons learned organizations we have created, a joint forces command and others, we have now created a permanent lessons learned effort inside the Pentagon to make sure we are looking at ourselves inside the building, for example, just as we look at outside the building. And I think that is a key component and an important piece.

Last, I would say this support for experimentation and an ability to test and not be afraid of failure—that is something that has to be pervasive across the department and understood at all levels. Those are all important components of this learning and adaptive culture.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

The gentlelady from San Diego, Ms. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you very much.

Well, Mr. Secretary, Admiral, it is good to have you with us. Thank you very much for your exceptional service.

Secretary ENGLAND. Thank you.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I wanted to turn up to a particular issue that the committee defense review dealt with. And that is the one of interagency coordination. And I know in the QDR you certainly do address that. I think you also recommend that there may be a national security planning guidance to direct the development of military and non-military plans and capabilities.

And some have even suggested having a national security budget. And I wonder if you could comment on that because one of the difficulties that we see with that, of course, is you might be talking about culture and the development of capabilities, capacities within DOD. But in order for you to be successful, other agencies also have to be working with you.

And we know in Iraq that that is not what happens. And so, how can you help us to understand who should lead that effort, what role should DOD play, what role should other agencies play? And I think more particularly we know that we also have to look at ourselves and understand the extent to which our own budgeting sometimes gets in the way of that kind of coordination. So could you please address that?

Mr. HENRY. Yes, ma'am. I will go ahead and take that, if I might. As you are probably aware, we use a strategic planning guidance. And we recommended in the QDR that the national security community within the interagency might also investigate having a national security planning guidance to guide them. And we use that to couple in our strategy and with our plans and programs and to be able to bring those together. We think that that would be a good activity to go across the U.S. Government.

The role we would play would be as a contributing agency, as would other parts of the national security community. And we would envision that that was probably something that would be coordinated in the interagency process, which is normally led by the National Security Council. That is at the implementation phase.

But we have also made some recommendations on how at the foundation phase that we might do things. So there is a recommendation in there to look at our national defense university and what can we do to broaden that to a national security university. So as we catch people in the formative stages of their career that we can get to this interagency mindset.

There is also a recommendation to follow-up on the benefit that we have gotten out of Goldwater-Nichols in pushing us toward jointness. And a key attribute of that is what is known as the joint duty officer where a military officer in order to reach flag rank has to have a substantive tour in a joint billet. And we think that something similar within the national security community for someone to move to the senior executive service that we might consider that they would have a tour outside of their parent agency or some sort of formative experience like that.

So there is a number of elements in the QDR that we think that would be helpful. We are having discussions with other agencies at the State Department right now who see likewise that we do and trying to come forward with collaborative initiatives in the interagency.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. What do you think will be the biggest obstacle to trying to move forward?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. If I could address this for just a moment. Congress 20 years ago this year passed Goldwater-Nichols. We have come a huge way, tremendous resistance inside the Department of Defense at both the civilian and military levels, resistance to change for jointness. And Congress forced this on it. I like to say it is one of the two most significant events in my career, was the advent of Goldwater-Nichols.

If you look at this and look, for example—and I am no expert on Congress. But I look at your committee structures. You don't have any committees that generally look across the interagency. You are stovepiped like we were as services. And one might ask what a

Goldwater-Nichols type of look across the entire government would do to help this out.

There is a lot of bureaucratic resistance to doing certain things. There is tremendous number of people across the government who want to do this. But clearly, there is a lot of people who have been brought up, just like our services were over many, many years, who are entrenched in those services and those stovepipes in a way that it takes a long time to break down that resistance.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And I guess I am just wondering if the resources are there to enable you to try and bring that vision forward. Does it take resources, or does it just really take the will to do it?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I think General Pace brought this up in some of his testimony before both this committee and also the Senate Armed Services Committee. Our lessons learned show that what I would suggest this type of high-level debate and discussion within the legislative and executive branch. As a humble personal opinion here from this military officer looking at it, I would tell you that it certainly seems to be necessary to me. To directly answer your question, I think this is a fairly high-level debate.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary.

Secretary ENGLAND. Well, Ms. Davis, I would just say one thing. This is not a resource issue. This is a leadership issue. Again, today this is about collaboration at the very senior levels. And I think this is all about leadership. And I believe that the leadership we have today in the various agencies are determined to make this work.

Just last weekend, all the deputies were together. So there is an effort to work across the interagencies. And I think that is starting to strengthen, frankly. I believe we are doing better in that regard. And the QDR is an effort within the Department of Defense literally to send a message through the Department of Defense as to this is an interagency because the Department of Defense cannot win this war ourselves. I mean, this is a national—and then as the QDR points out, it is an international effort. It is going to require every resource of the U.S. Government and every international friend and ally to win in this war.

So you will find this department very active in terms of outreach to our friends and allies around the world and across the interagency.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you, gentlemen, for not only being here today, but for your many years of dedicated service and sacrifice.

Mr. Secretary, we watch with interest as you maneuvered from one key post to another. We are very glad to have you in your position here with us today.

I want to pick up, if I could, on the line of questioning and discussion that Mr. Hefley was on earlier about how the QDR approached the use of the reserve component.

And, Admiral, in listening to your answer, you concluded that we are looking at for the active component about once every three years a deployment and a sustained commitment such as the one we are in now and for the reserve component, once every six years or so. And I am trying to understand how the QDR got to that. I know that that is the policy that we have been talking about in the department for the last year or two. And, frankly, I think I am being entirely consistent in saying that I believe that we have been over-using the reserve component all along.

And so, the question I would ask is why didn't the QDR say what is the capability that we want and why shouldn't we get that in the active component until we got pushed over the edge and needed to go to the reserve component.

How did you arrive at this sort of notion that it is okay every six years to call up members of the reserve component for essentially two years at a time in light of the concerns, which I know you are aware of, with employers' patience starting to wear thin? I am sure that the members of the guard and reserve are serving cheerfully, but it is putting a lot of strain on them and their families and their employers in a way that wasn't envisioned when that was set up.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Sir, what I would tell you is first of all, we don't expect all reserve component, whether the National Guard or reserve, to be in a one in six rotation. And we also don't expect ourselves to be in a continuous one in six rotation for all. But let me explain in a little more detail.

First of all, if you take the National Guard brigade combat teams or if you take the other brigades in the reserve and National Guard, we don't expect to be able to—I mean, to have to deploy them in a one in six rotation. What we looked at was what is the capacity, what is the capability that we desire in the long-term that we need. The question you asked?

And what we said to ourselves was from the perspective of those reserves who are in units, we want to be able to send them out as full units as opposed to the way we are doing it today where we have huge cross-leveling. Sometimes up to 40 or more percent of the unit is from various states as opposed to the integral unit. So cross-level equipment, all kinds of things.

We don't want to do that. We want to send them out as a unit. But we don't want to over-use them. We talked to the National Guard leadership. We discussed it and debated it inside the Army in particular to ask ourselves what would be the optimum if we had to remain in a sustained war fighting or a sustained post-major combat operation situation. One in six would be about as much as we could handle.

If I could just add one final point. That is many reserves do not rotate in units, as you well know. Many of them are in the Air Guard. Many of them come on and off of active duty constantly and serve all the time. So we are only talking about those units, if you will, as opposed to what we use for the individual reservists.

Mr. KLINE. Okay, I thank you for that. And I do know certainly individuals come on and off active duty. And you see that an awful lot in the Air Guard with the C–130's, for example. And we have our share of those in Minnesota. I am very proud of them.

I am just still having difficulty on why we think it is the optimum to be requiring the reserve component to be called up on anything like that frequency. It just seems to me—and I feel very confident that in the minds of many people when they join the National Guard, some of them prior service where they had already served and deployed—they weren't envisioning being called out of their new careers with that kind of frequency. So I just was trying to understand why in the QDR you moved to that supposition that we were going to put those kinds of demands on the reserve component rather than creating an active component that wouldn't require that.

Mr. Secretary.

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Kline, I think the key words are is that you would not be called up more than one every six years. It is not the expectation that every six years you are called up. But you would not be called up more than once every six years.

Mr. KLINE. Excuse me. I understand that.

Secretary ENGLAND. Pardon me. But it may be in your whole career you are only called up one time.

Mr. KLINE. Right.

Secretary ENGLAND. Which would be closer to none at all.

Mr. KLINE. The optimum, not the expectation. I just was trying to understand the thinking that went into that. I see my time is expired. I am going to continue to pursue this, and we will have other opportunities to discuss it.

Secretary ENGLAND. Sure, we will.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HENRY. If I could add one point to that, sir.

Mr. KLINE. Yes.

Mr. HENRY. And the vice chairman mentioned it in his opening remarks when he talked about the concept of a force planning construct and the issue of steady state versus surge. And we can do all the steady state tasks with the active component. But when we go in to do surge tasks, whether it be in homeland defense, something like Katrina, conventional operations, which would be major combat operations or a prolonged irregular conflict like we find in Iraq and Afghanistan, then that is the point where we would use the reserve component on this one in six rotation.

Mr. KLINE. Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Tauscher.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, Admiral, Mr. Henry, thank you for being here. It is fascinating to me. I think words really mean things. It is fascinating to me for the last three years, as we understood the post-September 11th attacks and Afghanistan and Iraq, words about the future are things like unpredictable, unconventional, asymmetrical, uncertain, unknowable, indirect, irregular, complex, adaptable for our enemies. And I think we all understand that we are in a very unconventional time, although we have to hedge our bets and make sure that we don't have a conventional enemy that becomes hostile.

I am interested in what possessed anybody to pick the term long, for the long war, why we have a term now that has emerged in everybody's documents, the long war. If it is unconventional, unpre-

dictable, and asymmetrical, how do you know it is long? And is long just basically the rubric that is being used to justify things like forever and ever, amen, supplementals to fund Iraq and Afghanistan when we certainly have known for well over two-and-a-half years that it is costing us anywhere between $4 billion and $6 billion a month?

Mr. Secretary.

Secretary ENGLAND. The term is not derived from Iraq and Afghanistan. It is really looking at the nature of warfare in the future. I mean, the Nation has been in long wars. I mean, the Cold War was a long war. It was 40 years. And I think everybody recognized that there was a threat to America over a long period of time from before Korea until the wall came down in 1989. And there are other examples of long wars.

So this was a recognition of the kinds of threats facing our Nation, a different kind of threat facing our Nation, a threat brought about by technology where terrorists can now be organized terrorist groups that they couldn't do before, at least on an international basis, where they have access to advanced technology, even commercial advance technology, much less military technology.

The possibility that they may indeed acquire weapons of mass destruction, which, of course, would be hugely damaging to the United States, our friends and allies. And we have had weapons of mass destruction around for a long time before World War II. Right? I mean, used by countries.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Developed in my district, the Livermore Lab.

Secretary ENGLAND. Pardon?

Ms. TAUSCHER. We have two national labs in my congressional district, so I know all about——

Secretary ENGLAND. Okay. So, I mean, our assessment is that this is when you look out into the future, I mean, this threat is not going to go away. It appears to be deep rooted in some sections and people in the world. And they are apparently determined to disrupt our way of life and to do us great damage. And so, our assessment is that this is a long war.

And, frankly, I will give you my personal view of this. My personal view, the way I think about this is that Afghanistan and Iraq are more in my lifetime of experience more like Korea. That is this is beginning.

Korea was basically the first bloody battle, not the war, but a bloody battle of a long war that lasted until the wall came down almost 40 years later. And in my personal construct of life, you know, having been through that in my lifetime, I mean, I see Iraq and Afghanistan as sort of equivalent to that. This is a bloody battle of a long war, most of which is still in front of us. And I think the QDR tries to encapsulate that in terms of looking at the future.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, assuming that I buy into this premise that this is a long war—I am not sure I do, by the way—what are the metrics we use to evaluate our failures and successes in a long war?

Secretary ENGLAND. I think one thing you do is you measure your preparedness to deal with uncertainty in a long war because that is part of not knowing what this future is going to be. And

that is part of what we are trying to do. So this is how do you measure your preparedness to deal with a wide range of threats.

In the QDR, we really pointed out a number of threats, which I commented in my opening statement. So there is a wide range of threats to America. And in my judgment, the measure is how you prepare, the probability that you will have to deal with these and your level of preparedness to deal with them. Because, you know, I am not sure you can have detailed metrics, except in the preparedness area.

Ms. TAUSCHER. Well, let me just comment on something that Ms. Davis was talking about in the congressional defense review. We had significant testimony from many members of the military, some of it in classified settings.

Over and over and over again what we heard from our military commanders was where were the civilians. And I think that what we have to understand is whether this war is long or short, whether it is unconventional, asymmetrical or has a conventional component to it, whatever the scenario we see coming forward, what we have to do are two things. First and foremost, we can't have the situation we had in Afghanistan where we don't have follow-on civilians, for example, from the Department of Agriculture saying to the Afghanis, "Winter wheat, not poppies," because part of the fight that we have now is we have a narco state called Afghanistan. And I don't think that is good for anybody.

And we can't have a situation where we don't know that our foreign policy is engaging enough and enticing enough and is culturally sensitive enough to move people toward us so that we don't ever have to use our military. And I find that we need more congruency in the QDR, much more of a connection. I thought that Admiral Giambastiani's comment about Goldwater-Nichols applying to Congress—I am for it because we do not have an arc of control in the Congress over things where things actually meld together now because of the asymmetry of the kind of fights we have and the enemies we have out there.

So I appreciate your comments. I think that this is an interesting rhetorical debate. But I think it really hits policy. And I would be interested. And my time is up.

Secretary ENGLAND. Okay, but listen. We do not disagree here. I mean, again, this is all elements of the Federal Government, international friends and allies. And this is political. And it is economical. And I know there are a lot of dimensions to this war, one of which is the Department of Defense.

Earlier I commented to Mr. Thornberry about two sides of the same coin. It applies in this regime also. That is in most parts of the world you need security for economic development. But long-term, you need economic development for security. So, again, it is two sides of the same coin.

We work on the first side of this coin to allow the second to occur, hopefully. And, I mean, that is, I believe, part of this dimension going forward. So we do not disagree here.

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. I want to see if I can make my question coherent. And, as you probably would expect, it is going to be talking about carriers and submarines.

Back in the QDR 4 years ago, it was required to have 12 carriers. Ever since I have sat on this committee, I have repeatedly asked the question any time there was a panel here how many carriers were needed. Everyone says 12.

This QDR, I believe, says 11. The last time I looked, the waters aren't getting any smaller. We are still in this war. We wouldn't have made it in Afghanistan without seven of the carriers. But what really concerns me is we are retiring the USS John F. Kennedy (JFK), which, if I understand correctly, we will be dropping down to 10 carriers for about an 18-month or 2-year period.

Did anyone take into account that conceivably 2-year period where we will be down to 10 carriers? And also I am not real clear on how the department plans to get to the 60/40 in submarines and the six to five in the carriers in the Pacific. I think that is what it said in the QDR. And I guess I have just got a real concern because we don't know—and you said it today—we don't know where this war is going to take us. And we don't know when our allies are going to close down our land ports, if you will and we are going to need sea basing. And I guess I am still not satisfied.

What I am told in my office is it is a risk we can take. I guess that doesn't make me real comfortable, that it is a risk we can take. So——

Secretary ENGLAND. Ms. Davis, you know, about 2 years ago the Navy concluded that they could go down to 11 carriers on the basis of, again, capability rather than numbers because a carrier today is vastly superior to a carrier in the past. A new carrier will be able to service, like, 1,000 sorties. And in the past, it was, you know, in the tens of numbers. And eventually and I think today it is like 330 or somewhere like that. But it is going up rapidly to 600 and to 1,000.

And we are investing in new airplanes and smart munitions and all those things that make our carriers much more capable. In addition, the Kennedy, frankly, is not in very good shape. I mean, every inspection is worst than the last one. And I understand the bill is now well over $2 billion of maintenance on the Kennedy that would literally take years. So, I mean, it is not going to be in service for an extraordinarily long period of time, even if you wanted to put it back in service, frankly.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I don't mean to interrupt, but I don't disagree with you on that because I also am well aware that $2 billion would come out of building the next CVN 21, which I don't want to do. But I also am very concerned about that 2-year period we are down to 10.

Secretary ENGLAND. Well, but, you know, there are options of the Navy. I mean, we can extend things dependent what the fuel capacity is of our nuclear carriers. We do want to get to an all—and I can speak for the Navy now. But having been secretary of the Navy, we do want to get to an all-nuclear force. And that is beneficial.

We also, you know, want to disburse the force. I mean, there are a whole lot of demands. But we were asked, by the way, in the

QDR to specifically look at this issue. So we were asked by the Congress to look at this in the QDR and to make a concluding recommendation. So we did.

We went back and examined this process one more time in the QDR, came to the conclusion that this was the right course, to retire the Kennedy. So that is the path that we recommended in the QDR. And my judgment is it is still the right path for America, particularly when you consider the very, very high expense to get the Kennedy—and even at the end of the day, it still will be a conventional carrier with limited capability for America.

So, I mean, frankly, its time has come. And the QDR just reaffirms that earlier decision by the Department of the Navy.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Ms. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I don't disagree with that. But you are not answering the question. What did you do about that 2-year period we are going down to 10?

Sorry, Admiral.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. If I could just add one thing. Part of the analysis that we did is that we can surge aircraft carriers and carrier air wings to a much higher degree today than we could in the past. Remember I said we looked at steady state, and we also looked at surge. And our ability with maintenance patterns and the rest to be able to surge these and to respond to crises is a very significant component of the overall strategy, which I think helped reinforce this when we went through the analysis.

Secretary ENGLAND. Thank you.

And, Ms. Davis, regarding the gap in there, again, my judgment is there will be opportunities. In the past, we have been able to extend particularly some of our nuclear carriers just because dependent on the usage and the speed and all that, we have energy left in the core. And so, in the past, we have been able to do that. I don't know if we can do that. But typically we have been able to do that in the past. And so, I would not just rule that out.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Mr. Chairman, I could ask a million more questions about this, but my time is up. So maybe next time.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Secretary ENGLAND. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Mr. Chairman, if there are other questioners, could I pass and come back to me? I was going to ask some questions for Mr. Krepinevich's written statement, but he just stepped out. And maybe he will come back in the next few minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Dr. SNYDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We won't forget about you.

Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I think you met this past week with a young man who was trying to get in the Naval Academy in a year or two. And you made a very good impression on him. So he is still sold on the Naval Academy.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Thank you, sir.

Mr. CONAWAY. In the 2007 budget, it seems we have got $80 billion for procurement and $72 billion for research, which is just, you

know, rough numbers. You know, we are trying to figure out new stuff, and we are spending about as much money on new stuff as we are actually buying things. There is a part of the QDR giving its 20-year look. And you have got this incredible matrix of moving parts in terms of new platforms, new capabilities, new gear, new whatever that is in there and also that money is tight.

And I know, you know, over the last several years it doesn't look like that. But we will eventually have to make some choices. And it would seem to me that a choice that we could look at is this ratio between research and procurement with the idea that can you articulate any realistic risks that some other bad guy nation or some other bad guy person could invent a weapon or a capability that we can't currently defend ourselves or that, you know, puts our protectors, the young men and women that wear our uniform at a disadvantage that is unacceptable to us. Is that capability out there to justify the research dollars?

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Conaway, of course, we have a very robust Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) capability. We have very robust labs within the services. We have our national labs. We literally have American industry that invests in their R&D budgets, some of which are billed back as part of their contracts to us.

So I guess my judgment is we have a robust R&D program in the United States across a very broad spectrum, everything from deep water to space to biological to, you know, just about everything. I guess you can always do more R&D obviously.

But, frankly, I feel comfortable where we are. Typically the Congress actually adds funds to the R&D account every year. And they are robust. And so, I am not quite sure what the——

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, I guess the idea is that maybe the R&D budget shouldn't be so robust, given the overall circumstances. And if you looked at the risks that—obviously the platforms that we are developing, all the research that is going on is intended to counter something that may already be out there or is countering something we expect. And when you step back and look at that array of stuff that we are doing, are there opportunities or choices to say, "All right, that capability we really don't need for ten years and may not need at all," and thereby, lowering the R&D budget?

Secretary ENGLAND. I, frankly, recommend not, Mr. Conaway. The thing we don't want to be is surprised. And so, in my judgment, you do need, particularly as the United States of America, need to look across this broad spectrum of technology because if anything, this is such a rapid change and it will likely be that way.

The science and technology—I have heard people predict it is going to be four times the rate we have had in the past in rate of change and things. And that being the case, actually my concern is probably the other way. That is there is so much research now going on in other countries that used to not have that kind of research. And a lot of companies have moved to other countries.

And so, there is now research internationally that is extensive. And, again, I believe we have a balanced approach here between our research and our procurement. But obviously that is a matter of judgment.

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, I guess one way to look at——

Secretary ENGLAND. I mean, I would be happy to hear your views on this subject.

Mr. CONAWAY. Sure. Well, I am careful about rookies coming by with drive-by shootings and telling professionals—but if you looked inside this budget in terms of just absolute dollars spent versus our budget, in terms of bad guys out there who are looking to build things either for their own account or to sell to other folks to hurt us with, I guess are we taking the right amount of risks? In other words, it is going to be okay to take some risks, in my mind. And it seems as if we are developing a nation that is just totally risk averse.

We get up every morning, and we politicians try to figure out how we are going to scare ourselves into being reelected or scare the general public into reelecting us. And it is a race to who can frighten the public the most. We are getting to be a nation that is afraid of our own shadow. And it seems to translate into our military budget as well.

Secretary ENGLAND. Well, I will tell you. We try to take a risk-based approach in the QDR. And there are programs—and I guess we just had the discussion about the carriers. I mean, that is a risk-based approach. Certainly, you know, you can have any number. But you do balance this, and you balance it across the broad spectrum of capability. So we do try to balance the risk across a broad spectrum of capability rather than in one sector.

So it is about risk. And we do, frankly, need the help of the Congress in this because it is a risk-based situation. And we need to be able to move away from some areas where we believe we can have higher risks to invest in other areas where we believe the risk is too excessive. So, again, this dialogue is important for us because we do need to come out with a balanced quote, what we call a balanced portfolio of capability.

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, I appreciate the secretary's comments because that is more articulate than my lame attempts of trying to get to that.

Secretary ENGLAND. We would be happy to—look, nobody has a corner on this. And so, we are pleased to engage in dialogue to whatever extent, you are available. We would be pleased to have further discussions with you, Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is expired.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, Mr. Krepinevich is sitting to your right there. He is going to be on the second panel. I thought I would read a couple statements from his written testimony and let you all respond to it. I am also showing off that I can pronounce his name properly.

I want to read this statement. This is actually a paragraph.

"Is the defense program adequately funded? It is not. The QDR calls for a large scale modernization effort in the coming years, the first in over two decades. Yet it also proposes to reduce defense spending toward the end of this decade in part by holding down spending on personnel, even though recent increases in benefits have failed to stem the decline in the quality of recruits entering the Army.

"To be sure, some personnel cuts are planned. And a few small programs will be canceled. But the tough choices were deferred raising doubts whether the existing defense program could be executed, let alone one including initiatives to address the new and emerging challenges to U.S. security. Independent estimates conclude that over the long-term the defense program may be short some $50 billion a year, a shortfall that will prove difficult to erase, given the Administration's plans to cut the deficit in half by 2009."

Would you all, Mr. Secretary, comment on that? Does this QDR over-promise without confronting the American people with hard choices we need to make about defense policy?

Secretary ENGLAND. Well, again, the QDR is not a program document. So I guess I have a disagreement here. And I don't think that is an appropriate assessment. It is a strategic document. It is not a program document. The program is the President's fiscal year 2007 budget. No one ever expected the QDR to be implemented in the 2007 budget. The original plan was none of it would be implemented in the 2007 budget. And we took it upon ourselves to do as much as we could, Mr. Snyder, in the 2007 budget.

So I don't think that is a correct representation to say that no choices, no hard choice has been made. Some were made to the extent that that was doable in the 2007 budget. The QDR will "play out" over a period of years. It isn't going to happen at one time. There are broad considerations. I mean, there are, frankly, industrial considerations. There are congressional considerations. There are department considerations. There are international considerations.

I have learned that this is a question of finding the right confluence of situations that are important that you can get concurrence on. So this will play out over a long period of time. It is certainly not going to be something you can judge today in terms of what programs have either been canceled or implemented because it is a strategic direction. And we will continue to learn and adapt and make decisions as we need to going forward.

Dr. SNYDER. Let me read a couple of quotes that relate to the Navy, again, from Mr. Krepinevich's written statement. I don't know if you all have seen it or not. This one sentence here, "The Navy's DD(X) destroyer at roughly $4 billion a copy is a fire power platform. Yet the naval challenge from China, if it comes, will be centered on its submarine force, a threat against which the DDX is irrelevant." Do you all have any comments about that statement?

Secretary ENGLAND. Well, first of all, we have concluded in QDR there is a minimum number of submarines. And we have said that we need to increase the rate of submarines in 2011 to go to two a year so we maintain the right number of submarines because we understand that. I think DD(X) is debatable as to different views on that subject.

On the other hand, to be frank, we are building DD(G)s today. We are not about to shut down the shipbuilding industry in the United States. We do not need any more DD(G)s. And DD(X), to the best of everybody's judgment, is a very useful platform, both for defense in the fleet and for offensive purposes. So I think that is a judgment call. But nonetheless, our judgment is and is the consensus of the entire U.S. military and civilian leadership that at

this time, that is the right ship to build. How many we build is a different issue. But I believe it is appropriate to build it.

And we have also emphasized it is not going to be $4 billion. I don't know where that number came from, but I can tell you that won't be the case. We have emphasized, frankly, fitting this into a reasonable number in terms of affordability for the Navy because at the end of the day, they do have to afford this within their budget. And they are taking steps to take money out.

And that was one issue that was addressed in the QDR. So affordability was indeed considered. But I believe—and the QDR team concurs—that that is the right approach to proceed with DD(X). And, again, the total number, I think, is still open at this point.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Mr. Secretary and Admiral Giambastiani. I figured if Mr. Snyder got to show off, I would, too.

Admiral G., thank you.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SAXTON. I have a question that won't surprise any of you because we have had similar discussions before. The C–17 line was designed, I am told, to fly 30,000 hours. And that would be over a 30-year period. And obviously the simple math tells you that the airplanes were expected—the assumption was that they would fly 1,000 hours a year.

I recently learned that they are flying 1,000 a year plus. In fact, they are flying 160 percent of what was anticipated, which with more simple math shows us that for the last 5 years at least we have been flying them 1,600 hours a year on average. The first squadron of C–17s were stood up, I believe, at Charleston in January of 1995, making those airplanes 11 years old.

We build about 15 a year so that those that came online in 1996 are now 20 years old. Those that came online in 1997 are now 21 years old. Those that came online in 1998 are now 22 years—I am sorry, I am saying this wrong—are now 8 years old. And those that came online in 1999 have now been in service for 9 years, leaving the oldest with 19 years of life expectancy, according to the original plan. And the newest that came online in 1999—and that is where I have stopped with my little analysis here—have 23 years of life expectancy remaining.

Notwithstanding the fact that we have flown them more than 1,000 hours. When you factor in that over the last 5 years we have flown them at actually 159 percent—I did round up to 160 percent—that means that we have flown them 8,000 hours each over the last 5 years or 3,000 hours more than we thought we would.

What that means to me is that those that we originally thought at this point would have 19 years of expectancy left have 3 years less, as do all of the others. Meaning that 75 percent of our airplanes, C–17s—75 of our airplanes or 50 percent of the fleet have less than—20 years or less life expectancy. I guess my question is this. In the QDR, which is supposed to look out 20 years, what plans have we made to replace or modernize the fleet.

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Saxton, if I could answer. I guess we have done a few things. First of all, the over-usage of the C–17s because of the war—we have actually used the equivalent of about, I believe, seven, nine. It is still being analyzed, but in that area.

We have actually used that equivalent number of airplanes consistent with the ground rules that we have for our supplemental, we do plan to include in the supplemental funds for those equivalent number of airplanes to be replaced as a consequence of usage during the war. So we will be replacing. So the amount that we have used in the above expectations—our plan is to basically add that life through the equivalent number of airplanes being bought.

We also are planning to move to a new tanker program, which will also have cargo capability. Today we use C–17s for all of our cargo capability. If we have a tanker/cargo combination, it allows us to use those tankers for commodity type cargo, which today we are using C–17s, which would lessen the number of hours on the C–17.

So the approach today is to upgrade the C–5A, upgrade the C–5B, finish the C–17 billet, except for international and the ones that we talk about for overage and then also move into the tanker program, which also has a cargo capability. So that is the approach going forward, which takes us out well into that 20-year period in terms of lift capability for the United States government.

Mr. SAXTON. Now, if we buy, you say, seven additional aircraft, then that would round out the buy in 2008. Correct?

Secretary ENGLAND. Well, I am not sure that is the exact, but it is somewhere, seven, nine, thereabouts for the usage rate, over-usage rate. And in addition, there are international sales that are pending on C–17. But at that point, that would——

Mr. SAXTON. But let us honestly not be too optimistic. We know that the Aussies are probably going to buy four. And the E.U. may buy four. That is nice, but that is not a significant buy in terms of going forward far.

Secretary ENGLAND. No, but again, my point is that still—you asked what is the plan. I mean, that is the plan between C–5, C–17s and the new tanker, combination tanker/cargo, that would provide the lift capability for the country.

Mr. SAXTON. I am sorry, but that really wasn't my question. My question was, given the fact that this is a long war and the last 5 years we have flown 159 percent of what we thought we would, which means we are over-flying the fleet, you are proposing to fix this whole deal by buying the equivalent to what we have over-used them currently and hope that we can do intra-theater as well as inter-theater requirements with tankers and C–17s.

My point, I guess, to you would be to respectfully suggest that when supplementals go away we won't have the luxury of saying we have over-flown the fleet and we are going to buy more through a supplemental, which does not then exist and if the line happens to be still open.

Secretary ENGLAND. But we also will have a tanker/cargo airplane in production. That money is in the budget. And we are getting close to requests for procurement (RFPs) and proceeding with that program. So that is additional lift that we will bring online.

Mr. SAXTON. I would just respectfully suggest—and my time has expired, so this will be my conclusion—is that I hope that this all works out fine. I suggest that there is a better than equal chance that we will be nearing the end of the lifetime usefulness of the C–17. And there will be those asking the question who made this decision.

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Saxton, I expect C–17s like our other airplanes will be upgraded, modified, re-engined, just like we do in those C–5s today. So the life of those airplanes—I mean, typically we extend the life through extensive modifications. And I would expect it would be no different for the C–17.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, sir.

Secretary ENGLAND. You are welcome. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady from Guam.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And, Mr. Secretary, it is good to see you again. And I thank you again, you and Mrs. England, for visiting Guam.

Also to you, Admiral, welcome.

Secretary ENGLAND. You are welcome.

Ms. BORDALLO. I have a question on intelligence collection. I am concerned that the United States does not have sufficient information on the capabilities, planning and intentions of hard target countries, some of whom pose significant threats to the U.S. Since the release of the 9/11 Commission report and since the invasion of Iraq, the quality of U.S. intelligence collection capability, in my opinion, has been in question.

Clearly, some countries are not easy for intelligence collectors to operate in. And as a result, the information on which our policy makers and commanders base their decisions is sometimes limited. I believe we should improve our intelligence collection capability so that our policy makers can benefit from higher quality information.

I know that on Guam we are all excited. We will be hosting U.S. Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles. But, Mr. Secretary, do you think the QDR creates an appropriate road map for innovative thinking on U.S. military intelligence capabilities on acquiring information on hard target countries such as North Korea? In your opinion, does the QDR provide the Congress sufficient guidance on how to best provide for U.S. military intelligence as it seeks information on these difficult countries?

Secretary ENGLAND. Ms. Bordallo, I am going to turn that over to my military expert, if I can.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Ma'am, thank you. I would make a few comments.

First of all, we spend a significant amount of time, as you know, in the verbiage of the report talking about intelligence collection. Now, clearly, this is a bigger issue than just the Department of Defense. However, the department has a sizeable amount of intelligence assets within the intelligence community.

What I would suggest to you is is that the first part in support of general intelligence collection, we spend a significant amount of resources within the Defense Department to upgrade, as you have mentioned, the Global Hawk, but not only that, a significant amount of our unmanned aerial vehicle capacity to be able to collect on intelligence. There are also numerous classified programs in

the satellite world, for example, and others where we have spent quite a bit of time adding additional resources.

I can't get into the specifics here in this hearing, but going back to the unmanned side, for example, we essentially will double our capacity, is what we are looking for in unmanned aerial vehicle capability. That is a sizeable and very substantial commitment.

In addition, organizationally we have some very big changes coming up. Some are to transition our fusion centers to make it both an operational and an intelligence fusion center to support our commanders out on the field. Now, with regard to looking for hard and deeply buried targets, clearly, that is a way because of our precision weaponry more and more adversaries in certain areas are burying, if you will, to protect their infrastructure. And this is an important area that we have to focus on. We understand that. And, again, without going into a classified discussion, we would do that.

But this general area of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance has really brought a lot of attention and focus. I can't tell you how many hours we have spent. I have only given you a couple of snippets here.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much.

I have one quick question also, Mr. Chairman.

This is following up on Ms. Davis's questions on the carriers. I think maybe, Mr. Secretary, you may be able to answer this. The QDR was highly anticipated by so many in our country and especially the community on Guam. We were truly looking forward to that report.

Most important to the Pacific was the decision to move to a 60/40 split on submarines favoring the Pacific over the Atlantic as well as increasing the carrier presence in the Pacific by one. And as you know, for the past two years, I have long advocated for changes such as these. And I am especially well attuned to the growing threat of China and North Korea because of our location and further advocated that increased resources be moved to the island of Guam because of our bases and immensely valuable strategic location.

I am aware that the decision as to home porting of carriers still remains. Although this decision has long been discussed, it appears we are no closer to making a final decision. Hawaii must make infrastructure decisions if it knows a carrier is coming. And Guam must prepare in an even more robust way.

And I believe that it is time to set a timeline and make clear what process will be followed to make this decision. And I realize, Mr. Secretary, this is not some arbitrary decision that happens in a vacuum. But can you please discuss how and when decisions will be made to implement this strategy? When will firm decisions be made?

Secretary ENGLAND. Ms. Bordallo, we will have to get back with you on that subject. I mean, again, the QDR emphasizes the strategic importance of the Pacific. The details of when those decisions will be made I don't believe any of the three of us have that detail. But I will personally get back with you on that subject. So if you will allow me, I will get back with you on this subject——

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary ENGLAND [continuing]. And make sure we address that issue with you.

Ms. BORDALLO. We are still optimistic. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Marshall.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to associate myself with the current chairman's comments about the C–17 program. I don't know that that is really to be discussed today. But the case that has been made so far seems to me to be rather weak to end the line in 2008. And I hope we will be dealing with this over the future weeks.

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Marshall, can I make one comment, though? And I think across the board here—I mean, this is a question of balance for us. And at the end of the day, there is only so much money in the defense budget. It is important. I mean, the QDR—we have funded a number of new initiatives: special operation forces, bio-defense, efforts in homeland security. I mean, there are questions about lots of other projects.

I mean, at some point, we do need to balance the force. Otherwise, we will be in the status quo, you know, we will be in this identical position for the next 20 years. I mean——

Mr. MARSHALL. I understand. And the question is going to be where to strike that balance. And somehow we will muddle through this.

Secretary ENGLAND. And understand it is debatable, and we appreciate the debate. I just emphasize we do need to be open on this matter. Otherwise, we will be in the same situation 20 years from now we are today.

Mr. MARSHALL. We could have thousands of C–17s. I know it is not going to happen.

I got in a little bit of trouble, I guess, raising the question in the projection forces committee meeting, the last one we had, which dealt with the tanker program. And what I did was I said, "Gosh, I would like to hear what the witnesses have to say in response to what I consider to be my subcommittee chairman Mr. Bartlett's reluctances concerning the tanker program." And so, I described, I thought, what his position was and then said, "What do you all have to say about this?"

And then an article came out saying that was my position. I thought I had been quite clear that I was trying to describe a position that I heard and not adopted as my own but just say I have heard this position, I would like to hear what your response is. And I am going to do the same thing now at the risk of having the same thing happen to me.

While you all have been talking, I read the written testimony of the panel to follow you. There are three individuals. Mr. Donnelly goes so far as to say in his final page, thus it has become his view. This says "my view." I want to be careful about using that word. This is a quote from his testimony: "Thus it has become his view that the QDR process has outlived its usefulness. The many defense reviews of the past decades have failed utterly to do what they were meant to do, provide a link between strategy, force planning and defense budgeting. Indeed with every QDR, the situation

has gotten worse. The basic ends means dichotomy has grown wider."

He says that, Mr. Secretary, in response to Mr. Snyder's question, which was just quoting verbatim Mr. Krepinevich's written testimony. Did I say it correctly?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Krepinevich.

Mr. MARSHALL. Your response was, if I understood correctly, that there would be programmatic decisions that we would make with regard to particular platforms, et cetera, as time progressed, that the QDR really wasn't a place to do that. And yet it sounds like Mr. Donnelly is saying and that is the problem with the QDR. It was intended to do exactly that, make these tough calls. And it hasn't done that.

What I would ask is this. And I don't expect that you would respond now or that anybody would respond now. I don't know that we have got the time. But if you look at Mr. Krepinevich's statement, he makes some very specific comments about specific platforms and the wisdom, given the threats and our likely future strategic needs of spending money on those initiatives.

And what I would ask maybe is that you look through that testimony and maybe give a written comment in response to each one of the observations that are made. They are fairly succinct. They start on page nine. And he just runs through a list of about five specific examples of where he thinks we are misplacing our priorities.

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Marshall, first of all, Mr. Krepinevich is on our read team, so, I mean, he has direct input into the system. And I respect his views. I have to say, however, that there are a lot of personal views. I mean, everybody has a personal view. And I respect all these views. But, frankly, in the QDR we heard lots of personal views, I, mean, from lots of people, a lot of them divergent. And since then, of course, lots of people in the press. And I respect all those views.

But we tried to strike a balance across a lot of inputs and a lot of threat data. And so, the realism of the world we deal with is this is a strategic document. It is not a program document. So, I mean, I hope there is no misunderstanding. I think everybody agrees with that.

Mr. MARSHALL. Mr. Secretary, are you suggesting that it is inappropriate for you to reply to a particular view since——

Secretary ENGLAND. Pardon?

Mr. MARSHALL. It is inappropriate for you to reply to particular individual views.

Secretary ENGLAND. Is it appropriate for me——

Mr. MARSHALL. Are you suggesting that it is inappropriate, since the document itself represents the combined thinking of an awful lot of people and a lot of views put together over a long period of time, it is at this point inappropriate to comment or reply to——

Secretary ENGLAND. No, no, no. No, look, I mean, we are very open. Again, you know, this whole process, you know, we were international. We had people from different countries. We have had people from different militaries. We have had think tanks. I mean, we outreached everyone we could. I mean, we have literally had thousands of inputs into this system. But there are also people out-

side this system that didn't get an input in. They have their views, and I respect them.

I am just saying that while everybody has personal views, I believe that we have considered as much thoughtful input as we could in terms of arriving at the conclusions of the QDR. It is not an individual person's input in the QDR. It is based on a lot of thoughtful work by a lot of people who worked very hard.

And look, it is certainly not a perfect document. It will be revised as we go forward. And I appreciate all these comments and inputs. But again, there are lots of personal views. I respect them, but I also understand they are personal comments and opinions of people. I am just trying to put it all in perspective. That is all, sir.

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, I have got that. I just have a specific request. And that is there are about 4 specific points that are made beginning on page 9 lapping over to page 10. And it would be helpful to me if, despite the fact that they are personal views, some comment.

Secretary ENGLAND. No, I would be happy to respond. No, I would be happy, Mr. Marshall. And we will get back with you and meet with you personally or whatever. No, we are pleased to respond to you on this subject. Absolutely. And we will do so, sir. We will set up a time and come see you, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 103.]

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you.

Secretary ENGLAND. No, absolutely. Happy to do so.

Mr. MARSHALL. Thanks.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from South Carolina, my friend, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you very much for being here today.

And Secretary England has received a number of accolades. But I have to tell you that in my home community, last year we were very pleased that he was the grand marshal of the Beaufort Water Festival parade. And so, many rose petals were thrown in his direction. This was right after BRAC with Parris Island and the Marine air station and naval hospital. So he knows where retirement beckons in the future. There is still one condo at Hilton Head available.

Secretary ENGLAND. It is very appealing, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. And many years from now. But again, as was earlier indicated, appreciation for our guard and reserve and what they are doing. As an indication, I think, of success, I have noted today that we have a 13-year high in recruiting for the Army National Guard, 26,000 new troops in the last 5 months. And I think it is a recognition that your leadership, both of you, indeed the Pentagon in full is appreciative of the guard providing equipment.

In my 31-year service with the guard I have never seen better troops serving. I have two sons who are in the guard now. I have another son very likely to join the guard later this year. So I want to thank you for what you have done.

Now, the issue that always stirs passion—our appreciation of C–17s. I want to join with the chairman and the Member of Congress from Georgia. But the QDR properly recognizes that we have an

asymmetric enemy long-term and there needs to be changes for that. But yet—and I know this is a virtually impossible question. But are there any major acquisition programs of the Cold War, after the victory of the Cold War, that could be canceled or, as was indicated earlier, our support of one aircraft? Can we look to any substantial changes or cancellations?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Mr. Wilson, thank you. And it is good to see you again, sir.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. What I would say to you is—I don't think you were present earlier, but there is a series of systems that we have, frankly, that currently have either been terminated or we have recommended termination for or restructuring. Let me quickly go through and give you a list of these. The joint tactical radio system, restructuring airborne common sensor. We have terminated that. The existing contract was terminated. Then we are looking for a better approach to make it more joint.

The B–52 standoff jammer, we have terminated that. The joint unmanned aerial combat system, restructured. Joint strike fighter alternate engine, terminated. E–10 and airborne laser, program reduced to development demonstration phase only. U–2 and F–117, accelerated and early retirements. I could go on.

There is a whole series of these that we have looked at. There are, frankly, billions of dollars, tens of billions of dollars inside the budget and we will see in the future that will be in this area. But those are some of our recommendations to date.

Mr. WILSON. And I appreciate you reciting that and bringing that to the public's attention. Because the perception is that government programs have virtually eternal life. Also I want to commend you in that six years ago, I went on a rotation with my National Guard brigade to the national training center at Fort Irwin. The equipment that we used was the best equipment of the period, of the time.

Now all of it could be in a museum because of the upgrades of the body armor, the vehicles themselves with up-armor, the gas masks that can be outfitted from outside, I mean, just on and on, the upgraded night vision capability, the unmanned aerial vehicel (UAV) use that you cited a few minutes ago. As a parent, as a veteran, I want to thank you. And I just look forward to working with you in the future and with great leadership like Chairman Saxton, you have strong supporters here.

Thank both of you.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.

I might mention that I was just out at the National Training Center myself three weeks ago. And I was out for a rotation of soldiers in a Stryker Brigade Combat Team from up at Fort Lewis. I can assure you that the equipment they were using was front line. It was, frankly, across the board almost brand new.

And we were training them to a much different level of sophistication in training than we have seen in the past. It is not that what we were doing before was wrong. But it is tailored to today's situations for today's deployments and readiness. I would encourage you to come out. It was really quite impressive. As a Navy officer, this is either my fifth or sixth visit out there. I have been out

there a lot of times. And Brigadier General Bob Cone in the Army, I know, would love to host you, sir.

Mr. WILSON. Well, I would love to visit and visit my son, who is in the Navy at Balboa Naval Hospital. Thank you very much.

Mr. SAXTON [presiding]. We are now going to turn to the gentleman from North Carolina, whose district almost includes Camp Lejeune and whom I had the privilege and honor of accompanying him to watch the new Marine Special Operations Command standup, MARSOC. And, Mr. Butterfield.

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for those comments. It was a great day in North Carolina and for our Nation. And thank you very much for those comments.

I realize the hour is late, and I am not going to belabor this process any longer than I can. I realize that we have another panel waiting to come up on deck, and I am not going to interfere with them. So I am not going to have any questions, Mr. Chairman, except to thank all of you for your service to our country.

I apologize for being late today. I have been down on the floor of the House reminding the Nation that the Solomon Amendment has been unanimously upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. And our universities must make their campuses available.

Thank you very much for your service.

I yield back.

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Butterfield, thank you, sir.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you for your brevity, Mr. Butterfield.

Mr. BUTTERFIELD. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SAXTON. The gentleman from Hawaii has a very short and concise question that he wants to ask for the record.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Secretary, I don't know how I will make the question short because I am not sure you can answer it all here today. But perhaps we can get together on this. It has to do with the Northern Command. As you know, I am no fan of the Northern Command. It appears here on page 25, 36, 37, the background material we have, especially with this homeland security side of it, is that it is not clear in here at all in this Quadrennial Review as to what the role of the Northern Command is, what it has been doing for four years, why it exists.

Everything here is couched in future terms about coordination of something or other, what they are going to do. Can you prepare for me and for the committee just exactly what is this Northern Command for, other than setting up another line of promotion, I suppose, and buildings and yanking people out of other commands to staff them in there? As far as I can tell, it is utterly, totally, completely useless and has not protocols, no programs, no anything at all, other than what you propose to do for it in the vaguest terms here in the QDR.

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Abercrombie, I will get back with you. But I do have to take issue about the Northern Command. It is an integral part, frankly, of the homeland security, homeland defense of the United States. And they are, in my judgment, immensely valuable to the Nation. But we will indeed get back with you. It is more than just, I think, a couple minutes sitting here. I mean, it does require——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. No, I understand. Just so it is clear, you share training and exercises, standardizing operational concepts, compatible technology solutions and coordinated planning. You have had four years to do that. It is not here. Improved interagency planning—I would hope so—and enhance interoperability. Enhancing it means that you have interoperability right now. And I don't see it. I can't find it.

So I would appreciate it if you could put together something that justifies why we should spend a penny more on this Northern Command and explain exactly how it is supposed to be able to do preevent spending and to insert itself into operations that belong to the guard bureau. Okay?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary ENGLAND. We will get back with you, Mr. Abercrombie. But again, I mean, I just for the record have to tell you that this is an integral part of the homeland security of the United States. And that is the office in the United States, the military office in the United States that commands all the forces in times of emergency or call-up in the country. So if we are faced with a catastrophe in the United States of America, we rely on Northern Command to take charge of U.S. forces during a time of crisis in America.

But we will come back to you in detail and discuss this, sir. I mean, it does require more than just a couple of minutes of discussion.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Sure. Of course, it does.

Secretary ENGLAND. And, again, we will make arrangements with your office, Mr. Abercrombie.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I will provide you with a more detailed explication of what I am inquiring about.

Secretary ENGLAND. We will definitely close the loop with you, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. We will get back with you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SAXTON. I thank the gentleman from Hawaii.

I have a question for the record also. And I intended and I probably will write a letter to you on this subject.

Mr. Secretary and Admiral Giambastiani, you both had a short conversation a few minutes ago about the balance that we need between the continued evolution of DD(G) and standing up a capable DD(X). And I couldn't agree more.

But one of the questions that I have and that I can't for the life of me understand is why in the world we are not competing the electronics component of DD(X). And I am going to write you a letter and ask you that question. I am sure you have an answer. But it seems to me that given the escalated cost that has driven some members of this committee to oppose DD(G), that we ought to be looking for ways to save. And it seems to me, I respectfully submit, that that is one of the ways. I will get you a letter this week, and we can talk about it further.

Secretary ENGLAND. Will do. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SAXTON. Okay, we are going to move to our——

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, for the record, Mr. Abercrombie's question really did perk some interest that is of particular importance to me.

Secretary ENGLAND. Pardon me, Mr. Taylor, I can't hear you.

Mr. TAYLOR. Sure. Mr. Abercrombie's question on Northern Command really did get me to thinking. I would like to request for the record a list of what elements, be it people, be it materiel, whatever, that Northern Command supplied to South Mississippi in the days prior to and, let us say, for the 30 days after the hurricane. I think that is a fair question.

Secretary ENGLAND. No, I mean, that is available.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 104.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much.

Secretary ENGLAND. We will respond to you, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you. And we appreciate that very much.

Thank you for being here today. We really appreciate the job and the high degree of dedication that all three of you gentlemen are giving to your service to our country. And we look forward to working with you as we move forward.

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Saxton, same here. I thank the committee. This is a valuable interchange. And as I said at our very beginning, this needs to be a very cooperative effort. And we sincerely appreciate the cooperation of the committee. And we thank them very much, sir. And thank you to the membership.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SAXTON. We are going to move now to our next panel as we bring them up to the table as this panel leaves.

The first witness on panel two is Mr. Thomas Donnelly, who is a Resident Fellow of the American Enterprise Institute; Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Executive Director of the Center on Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, who has recently written a good document, which I have had the opportunity to read, on the subject that we are here to discuss today, the QDR; and Mr. Lawrence J. Korb, Senior Fellow from the Center for American Progress.

STATEMENT OF DR. LAWRENCE J. KORB, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, SENIOR ADVISOR, CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION

Dr. KORB. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be back here again before the committee.

I have a statement for the record, which I would like to enter, and I will spend a few seconds summarizing.

Mr. SAXTON. Certainly, without objection. Thank you.

Dr. KORB. I think the Congress is quite correct in asking for a QDR. And I must say, sitting here for the last couple of hours, I am somewhat disappointed in what it did not do. And I think to say that this edition compared to the previous ones in 2001 and 1997 is a disappointment would be an understatement.

Remember this is the first QDR that was written really since 9/11 and since the Bush Administration came out with its national security strategy. I also feel it does not deal with the real problems confronting the armed forces. And it has been mentioned here today several times it shows no sense of urgency.

I don't have to tell you the problems facing our armed forces. Our ground forces are over-stretched and reaching the breaking point. Our weapons systems are not tailored to existing threats. And despite again what has been said here today, there are far more weapons on the drawing board than we can afford, given our record-setting deficits. Our nuclear posture is outdated, and we still don't have an appropriate role for the military in homeland defense. And I think that was brought up by the last couple of questions.

But rather than recommending increasing the size of the Army to decrease the strain on our soldiers and allow us to get the National Guard back home so it can properly defend the homeland, they are talking about reducing the Army back to its pre–9/11 levels. It doesn't recommend canceling a single major weapons system. We heard today about some of the minor cuts, but it doesn't cancel a single one and has been quoted in Andy's testimony—and if you look at the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), we would need about $75 billion more in 2011 to pay for the weapons on the drawing board. It does nothing about the 7,000 nuclear weapons we have as well as the cost of maintaining that large arsenal.

Now, we at the Center for American Progress decided that since they didn't do the job, we would. And we put out our own Quadrennial Defense Review, which I would also like to ask the chairman's permission to enter into the record.

Mr. SAXTON. Without objection.

[The information referred to is retained in the committee files and can be viewed upon request.]

Dr. KORB. And basically what I will do is just say that our strategy is based on two principles, which we have heard discussed here today. One is realism. That is we want to respond to the real threats facing the United States to allocate the financial resources available for defense in a cost-effective manner and to redefine the military's capabilities and responsibilities after the fighting ends.

What we do is we put people first. My old mentor told me people, not hardware, have got to be our highest priority. And we also recommend reopening the B–2 production line. We have heard here today about they have reduced it from getting a new bomber from 2037 to 2018. In our view, that is way too long. And we also want to integrate not just the armed forces, but the non-military government agencies and with our alliances.

And let me conclude with this. We have heard talk today about spending our scarce resources. It seems to me that when you spend more on one program in the Department of Defense, national missile defense, than you do on the entire Coast Guard, you are not spending the resources of this country in the most effective manner to deal with the threats we face.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Korb can be found in the Appendix on page 71.]

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you.

Dr. Krepinevich.

STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of time, I will offer a brief summary of my testimony.

In examining the Quadrennial Defense Review, I looked at three questions: does the QDR correctly identify the major challenges confronting the United States, is the program it proposes in balance with the projected resources that will be available to the Defense Department and third, does this QDR offer us the best defense program, the best mix of forces and capabilities to meet the challenges that it identifies.

I think this QDR is particularly strong in identifying the major challenges to our security. There are, in the QDR's estimation and in mine as well, three enduring challenges that we will confront, not only in 2006, but over the coming decades. And those are obviously the trans-national network of radical Islamist organizations and movements, second, what I would call the nuclearization of Asia, the atomic arc of instability that potentially will stretch from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Japan by the end of this decade and third, the question of the rise of China, what the QDR calls a country at a strategic crossroads.

As Congressman Snyder mentioned in terms of the issue of whether the program is in balance with projected resources, it is difficult to see how it is. And quite frankly, in defending the Defense Department on this issue, as far back as you can go there has rarely been a program that has been in balance with the resources projected. There is always a program funding mismatch.

And typically that is solved over time by either adding money, which doesn't look like it is going to occur in the foreseeable future, or by cutting back on the modernization program of reducing force structure. I think the concern this time around, though, is particularly acute when you realize we are coming, according to the Administration's projections, to the end of the build-up. So it is going to be very difficult to buy our way out of this particular program funding mismatch. And so, I think, again, that makes this particular problem particularly acute in this defense review.

But the major question is is this the best program. Is this the program that really offers us the best prospects for minimizing the overall risks to our national security? There has been a lot of talk about risk today. And ideally that is what your defense program does. It reduces to an absolute minimum the major risks to the security of the country.

And despite the disclaimers that the QDR is not a programmatic document, there are a lot of program decisions that are made in the QDR. And a lot of them, quite frankly, are quite good: increasing, for example, the special forces; developing technologies to detect radiological weapons; render safe teams that can disable loose nuclear weapons; more money for biological defense; language training; improving Army deployability through the Army modularity program; the commitment, as Dr. Korb said, to increasing our long range strike capability by 2018 and enhancing submarine production in the not-too-distant future.

The problem is that because of the program funding mismatch, the lack of tough decisions over existing programs means that in a sense you have a lot of legacy oak programs, to use a kind of a forest analogy. And you have these transformation seedlings. Well, as the money begins to dry up, it is these oaks that generate program momentum over time that I think stand the best opportunity of being sustained.

And these seedlings, these new, very beneficial initiatives that are worked into the QDR that will be of the greatest risk in terms of being marginalized or crowded out. And, again, I think that is one of the pernicious effects of not looking more closely at not only what we add to the defense program, but given resource constraints, what we cut.

I think another issue that is missing in this document is the linkage between the new challenges that are identified and the programs and capabilities that the Defense Department talks about providing for our armed forces. The link between the two is if you have these new set of problems, how does this capability set, how does this defense program enable you to meet those problems. And so, for example, if you look at the issue of a failed nuclear state—and I can say this because I am not in the government. But what happens if Pakistan becomes a failed state? It is certainly not beyond the realm of possibility.

Well, there are some bits and pieces in the QDR that says, "Well, we are going to improve our ability to detect radiological weapons. We are going to have render safe teams. We are going to have some special forces." But that doesn't really tell you how, if Musharraf doesn't avoid the next assassin's bullet, how we are going to deal with that country.

And we can talk about the ability to sustain 18 Army brigades in the field, the combination of the active and the guard force. But at the end of the day, 18 brigades are going to get lost in the middle of Pakistan. Pakistan has about seven times the population of Iraq. So how are we going to stabilize that situation? How are we going to be confident that we will detect those loose nuclear weapons? What does defense of the homeland in-depth mean under these circumstances?

The QDR, for example, talks about building partner capacity. Well, what are the means by which we are going to do that? In the past, we have had in the Vietnam era, for example, military assistance advisory groups, or MAGs. And these were training organizations that went to foreign countries and helped them prepare their own forces to deal with threats to their internal security. There is nothing like that in the QDR.

So, again, how do we propose—you know, what is it about this set of capabilities that enables us to deal with these new problems that I think the Defense Department has done a very good job in identifying? I will also point out, I guess, a couple of other things very quickly and then wrap up. There are some issues, I think, that are important, especially if this is a strategic document that the QDR remains silent on. We are going to need allies and partners a lot more.

Again, the QDR talks about building partner capacity. Well, who are they, and how are we going to enable them to assist us? What

countries do we want as partners and allies? What kind of capabilities would we like them to have?

You know, this was a steady discussion during the Cold War when we were in great need of allies. Well, now once again we find ourselves increasingly in need of allies. We need to get back to that discussion because if they can't pick up the slack, then that falls back on our own armed forces.

Second, the industrial base—you know, we have been through a difficult period where we have found that an Army that was built for short wars found itself in a long war and has had to go through a kind of organizational institutional hell to try and adapt to deal with that very different circumstance. And you can see the results in the churn that is going on in the recruiting problems.

Well, there is also a situation in which for the last 30 years we have not suffered any significant attrition of our military equipment in war. We have not lost a significant number of combat vehicles, aircraft and so since the Vietnam War. Well, again, there are, I think, plausible contingencies where you can see that that attrition, not only in terms of the wear and tear on the human resources, but the materiel resources. And we have all but ignored our defense industrial base on that issue.

We also talk about the need for innovation. Well, what are we doing to promote innovation among the defense industrial base? It is not clear that we are really following any particular strategy in that area. And yet we do want the best equipment for our forces in the field.

And finally, a point that has been brought up here, which has to do with if you characterize the new set of challenges, which I think the QDR does a very good job of, you are starting to look at challenges that are inherently inter-departmental or interagency in their character, whether it is homeland defense, stability operations, counterterror operations, defensive of global commerce. These are inherently interagency kinds of operations.

And just as in the 1970's and 1980's we fought the battle over the need to somehow bring the services together to operate jointly, now we need to fight the battle to bring the various departments and agencies of the executive branch and in some cases, state and local government together, to operate in a coherent and effective way. And I think that is the big challenge before us when you look at these challenges that the QDR sets forth.

And quite frankly, if you read the QDR, in a couple of occasions it says exactly that. And if you go back to the origins of the QDR, which is in 1995, the Commission on Roles and Missions, John White, who was that commission's chairman, his argument was what we need is a national security review (NSR), not a Quadrennial Defense Review. Well, nobody was willing to sign up to that in 1995. And so, what you got when John White went to be deputy secretary of defense was a QDR, not an NSR. Well, quite frankly, that is what is needed.

So in conclusion, I would say the QDR represents a good diagnosis of the challenges before us. It has some promising initiatives. It is a programmatic document as well as a strategic document. But there are some critical unanswered questions regarding resources and regarding whether we are really going to put the prior-

ity in the proper set of capabilities, given the very different circumstances in which we find ourselves.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Krepinevich can be found in the Appendix on page 83.]

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, Dr. Krepinevich.

Mr. Donnelly, please.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS DONNELLY, RESIDENT FELLOW IN DEFENSE AND NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Mr. DONNELLY. Thank you very much. As an alumni of the committee staff, it is genuinely an honor to be asked to come back. I guess there is the old adage that amateurs do strategy and professionals do logistics, along the committee context. Certainly, professionals do afternoon hearings.

So I appreciate the patience of the members. And since Mr. Marshall has sort of given away the punch line of my remarks, which are themselves a summary version of the brief monograph that I did a couple months ago, which I believe has been given, I will be really brief. And I want to concentrate in particular on one aspect of the QDR.

I think there is a lot of congruence between what Andy had to say and what I would say. I would give the QDR pretty high marks for dealing with the question of China's rise, also pretty high marks for beginning to wrestle with the question of what to do about weak nuclear states. But the one failure that really strikes me as a fatal one almost is the review's dealing with the long war, so-called, in the Middle East. And in a brief time, I would like to give a fairly close analysis of what the report has to say and why I think that is some misguided.

My overall critique would be that the Administration and the department continue to take a counterterrorism approach to what is, in my judgment, a counter-insurgency war. And if you read the review—and indeed, to hear the testimony of the preceding panel—this came through quite clearly.

The report talks about creating forces that are more expeditionary and agile rather than durable and sustainable that are sort of technologically more advanced, particularly in terms of precision weaponry and information management, not by increased manpower. The report wants to move away against nations against war or deal with other kinds of wars. When, in fact, what we have really done since 9/11 is to invade two very weak, but very clear and very obvious states. So what we have done in the war on terror has been really a fairly conventional set of operations.

And the QDR sort of describes victory as essentially a tactical victory. The idea is that we are supposed to find, fix and finish combat operations against these new and elusive foes. And it doesn't tell us very much about the post-combat, I would say, more strategic counter-insurgency operations that are ongoing.

It talks about the need for better intelligence fusion and to produce action plans that could be executed in real time. All good stuff, but it doesn't tell you what to do in an inherently complex environment where the fog of war remains still quite present.

And everything is supposed to be done through the lens of joint warfighting when, in fact, I think the wars that we are involved with and even the wars that are on the horizon are less likely to be conducive to joint operations than more. And, again, overall the theme that comes through to me is the emphasis on improving the tactical performance of a force that, in my judgment, is already tactically superbly competent. And this is true even in counter-insurgency operations.

The experience of the last couple of years has been a really harsh schoolhouse. And to visit units on the ground today in Iraq is to visit units that are approaching their operations quite differently than they did in the immediate aftermath of the invasion. And likewise the training of Iraqi and Afghan security forces has been thus stepped up.

But the essential problem, that of force size, still remains unaddressed. The problem in Iraq and Afghanistan still very much is what happens when we are not there, when there is not an American or friendly force on the street corner, in the neighborhoods. That is where our enemies retain and regain the initiative.

And if you read the QDR description both of Afghanistan and Iraq, what you get, I would say I think, is a very distorted telling of the tale. Again, we see pictures of special operations forces on horseback in Afghanistan. And so, after the invasion, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) showed up. And there is no mention of the U.S. force, which is double the size essentially of the NATO force and more than twice as effective. And one only has to talk to Afghan people, both on the streets and in the ministries, to understand that that is true.

The same is true in Iraq. Again, the story essentially is we had a blitzkrieg-like invasion, and then we started training the Iraqi forces. And we are doing better at that. Again, very little mention of the counter-insurgency operations, which, again, are not only by sort of weight and volume the largest effort that we are making, but obviously the most important.

And, again, listening to the previous panel, the constant message of Iraq was a really bad idea, let us never do this again, and let us get out of there as fast as possible comes through distressingly strongly to me. To me, they measure victory in Iraq as not so much how fast we get out, but how long we stay and how peaceful and how safe it is for Americans both in uniform and non in uniform to be able to be in Iraq.

I want to conclude by saying that to me this long war in the Middle East is not only just one of the three sets of challenges we face, but is really the decisive factor, I think, going forward into the 21st century. I see the region is inherently unstable, that it will continue to be strategically important and it will be kind of a magnet for potential great power confrontation, including confrontation with China going forward. So to me, even looking out over the 20-year horizon imagined in the QDR, I can't see any set of circumstances under which the United States is likely to withdraw certainly not completely or even substantially from the region.

If you look back 25 years to the days when the rapid deployment joint task force, the precursor of Central Command (CENTCOM),

was dreamed up during the Carter Administration and you plot out the number of man days in the region over that course of time, that curve has been steadily rising to the point in the 1990s where it was an average of more than 25,000 every day, 365 days a year in the region. And I can only imagine what the number is going to be 10 years from now.

But it is not going to go back to that level. It is just in the nature of the conflict in the region. And this is where we have to succeed. And in my judgment, this is where the QDR signally fails to give us the direction we need.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Donnelly can be found in the Appendix on page 96.]

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Donnelly.

We have been instructed or asked by staff in light of the fact that we have a markup that begins at 5:30 to vacate the room by 5 or just a few minutes thereafter. So I am going to pass.

And maybe, Solomon, if you just ask a short question.

And if you gentlemen would be willing to give us short answers, we would appreciate it. So I will let you know when about three minutes go by.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you.

Thank you so much for joining us this afternoon. And this committee has been doing their own defense review, you know, getting ready for this QDR report. Is there any areas that you think that this committee needs to focus on? I know that they are thinking about cutting the F–22 lane and talking about maybe strengthening the National Guard, you know, in the states when they are being used in Iraq and Afghanistan. What other areas do you think that this committee needs to focus on?

Dr. KORB. I think the first thing is that you need a bigger active Army because, as my colleagues have talked about here, it is hard to see us not needing a lot of boots on the ground. And if you can have a bigger active Army, that means you don't have to call up the guard and the reserve, particularly the guard, as often as you can.

The second thing is that the question that has come up is the resetting the force. Now, through the supplementals, you are doing that. But, you know, if we withdraw, as happened after Vietnam, the supplementals go away, the money for resetting the force. And the third is you simply have too many weapon systems on the drawing board within existing budgetary guidelines. If money was no object, sure, you would buy all of them. But money is an object. And I think you are going to have to make some hard choices. And you have to look at those weapons that are most effective in dealing with the threat from these radical jihadists.

You have heard today about the DD(X). Well, I think your money would be much better putting it into a larger Army. And if you are concerned, a littoral combat ship, I think, can provide the support for the forces ashore.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Two quick responses. One is I would focus more on linking the defense program with the challenges that confront us. In other words, how do the forces and capabilities that this program provides enable us to deal with these challenges? A

real disconnect—we go from the threat to the program, and there is no linkage there. And that is a critical problem.

I will give you another example in addition to the Pakistan contingency, which would be if you look at the set of capabilities the Chinese are developing, it would be a great set of capabilities for a blockade of Taiwan. And how would we respond to that blockade? So that is one point.

The second is I mentioned two programs, two major programs that I thought were beneficial in terms of the QDR. One was increasing submarine production in 2012. The other was long range strike capability by 2018. My concern is that in the process of working through those issues, think about the bomber for a minute. One thing that happened was the F–22 production line was extended from 2008 to 2010. Okay. That means that it is some future Administration that is going to have to tell the Air Force to stop buying F–22s. And it is some future Administration that is going to have to clear away a wedge to allow that bomber to happen.

Think of DD(X) and SSNs. Again, by giving the go-ahead for DD(X), what you are doing is you are creating a funding wedge that is just going to explode over the next four or five years. And somebody is going to come to the Navy if anybody remembers in 2012 and say you are supposed to go up to two boats. And the Navy will say, "Well, look, I am spending all this money on DD(X). You are going to have to give me more money if you want me to buy two boats."

So in a sense, the services pocketed, I think, some concessions about programs that I think are questionable in terms of their merit, given what the diagnosis of the challenge is while they made promises that some other Administration is going to have to hold them to.

Mr. DONNELLY. I would agree with both what Larry and Andy said. I would hope that you guys would also take on the question of resources. The nation is getting what it pays for from people in uniform. It is getting more than what it pays for. And I don't think that rearranging the programmatics is going to solve the strategic conundrum that we find ourselves in.

The previous panel used the term resource informed as a substitute for not enough money. I think that there is only one way out of the dead end we are in. And that is to spend some more money.

Mr. MCKEON [presiding]. Okay. Well, I thank the gentleman.

And I thank you, Mr. Saxton, for doing such a great job of running the panels. I apologize for having to go in and out because this is really, really important to us.

Fast question: you all think that the submarines will continue to provide us strong leverage in the world you see ahead?

Mr. DONNELLY. I think they are essential, and particularly in the case of hedging against China's rise. I worry about the size of our sub fleet, particularly in five or ten years.

Mr. MCKEON. Mr. Krepinevich.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. My personal belief is, you know, China is the principle maritime challenge we may have to confront. And what you would like to do is convince them that they don't want to try

and compete with us in submarines. And you can do that one or two ways. You can try and build excess capability now. Personally I would be more comfortable with beginning to ramp up toward the end of the next decade when the L.A.-class begins to block obsolesce and begin the design of a new submarine in the fairly short-term.

What that does is it keeps your design teams fresh, but it also makes the Chinese wonder what the hell are those Americans up to now. Because they may gain some intelligence on the Virginia class, but then they have got to worry about a whole new class of submarines. And the assumption will be they are even better, which I think, again, the whole idea is to avoid a naval arms race with the Chinese. And that might be the best way to do it, given resource constraints.

Dr. KORB. I would re-core the Los Angeles class to extend their life. I don't know why we don't do that.

The other thing—if you are worried about China, I would stop borrowing money from them.

Mr. MCKEON. Now, did you say you would re-core?

Dr. KORB. Re-core the Los Angeles class. The other thing—if you are really worried about China, we better stop borrowing money from them.

Mr. MCKEON. Okay. Bombers—what do you think?

Mr. DONNELLY. Go ahead, Andy.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Well, a couple of things. One is if you look at the contingency since the end of the Cold War, bombers—a small percentage of the sorties, enormous percentage of the tonnage drop. Second, the way we have gone after critical mobile targets is loitering. And bombers give you not only the range, but the capacity to loiter.

Third, if you are worried about China down the road and you don't want to, again, get into a competition with China, right now we have really very little way to penetrate deep into China. And you don't want to allow the Chinese to think that they can create a sanctuary for missile forces, Air Force forces, command and control centers, leadership targets deep inside China where we can't reach.

Dr. KORB. I think one of the reasons I urge you to think about reopening the B–2 production line, not only for what Andy said, but the fact of the matter is then you wouldn't have to depend on what I would call ugly allies where you have to make these compromises in order to get your short range planes in there.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. One final point that I forgot to mention about the bombers is it represents a kind of cost imposing strategy against the Chinese in the sense that right now if all you have are relatively short range systems, they can layer their air defenses on the coast. If you can come at them from multiple directions and not only along the periphery, but deep into the interior, if they want to defend things, that really drives up the money they have to spend on air defenses. And I would rather have them spending money on air defenses than some of the other things like submarines.

Mr. DONNELLY. All I can add is that in addition to increasing not only bombers per se, but the long range, long-loitering firepower

force, I think it is necessary to take a more aggressive approach to reposturing, rebasing, particularly around the Pacific rim. It is not just the strike platforms per se, but even the B–2s need a lot of tanking and a lot of help to get over deep targets and to distribute a large bomb load over a lot of targets.

Mr. MCKEON. Okay. Mr. Chairman, you know, I really apologize for this shortness of time that we have got. And maybe we can go a little longer than we—if our next hearing fires up at 5:30, maybe we can go a little longer than had been recommended.

But I would ask, gentlemen, if you couldn't be our guests at one of our breakfast symposiums. It is an informal thing. We sit around at breakfast and kick these things around with members able to ask any question they want. And I think we have got a lot more questions for this panel.

So, gentlemen, could you do that for us?

Mr. DONNELLY. Happily.

Dr. KORB. I would be delighted.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Happily.

Mr. MCKEON. Okay, we will fire that up in the next couple of weeks and look forward to seeing you. I have got a ton more questions. And you guys have got great insights. I mean, I think this has been a great tee-up. We just need three more hours here. Thank you.

Mr. SAXTON [presiding]. Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. I am curious if any of you gentlemen found it strange that the national defense plan for the next four years doesn't take the war in Iraq into account at all apparently. And, you know, that $40 billion to $80 billion is kind of just off here to the side and doesn't affect what we are doing in any way apparently from what the first panel said.

Dr. KORB. I agree, particularly if you talk about reducing the size of the Army to its pre–9/11 levels. It is like we haven't been through this, you know, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. And the other is in terms of the money, I think we are far enough along in these wars that the money should be in the regular budget so that you can look at them all together because while the supplementals are considered separately, they do impact the national debt.

They do impact our position in the world. And so, I think it would be important to look at them. And there are some things if you look closely enough in the supplemental that one could argue should be in the regular budget, like moving the Army toward modularized brigades.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. I think you have an excellent point, Congressman. The way this war ends or evolves over the next three or four years will have an enormous effect, I think, on what our military looks like. If we lose this war or if we pull out before we achieve some level of stability, there is a great opportunity that we will see a regional war going on there.

And, again, the consequences for us in terms of the risk to energy resources, the potential problems associated with Israel, even state-on-state warfare could be substantial. Not only that, but the boost it would give to radical Islamists, not only in Iraq, but other parts of the world.

If we are successful, I think part of success is going to be a significant, not 136,000, but a significant long-term U.S. presence in Iraq. The old saying about NATO was you needed NATO to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. We will need 30,000 or 40,000 troops in Iraq to keep the predators out, the Irans, the Turkeys, the Jordans, the Syrias, the Saudi money, the Americans in, and the internal factions down until you can build some kind of a strong central government that is legitimate and democratic.

And that is going to take a long time. And the fact that we aren't really addressing the implications of what this means for us is a big omission.

Mr. DONNELLY. Again, I would just associate myself violently with both Larry and Andy's remarks. The puzzle to me is that if this isn't a planning factor for the department, what is. I mean, and it makes you wonder whether the White House and the President talk to the Pentagon and the secretary of defense. They seem on such different sheets of music that it is just a puzzle. I cannot explain it.

But I do think that Andy is quite right, that these are the first and second campaigns in a really long war. And if things go badly, we will be there. If things go well, we will be there. And the measure of simply conducting the war or engaging in the attempt to try to stabilize and democratize the Middle East is an American presence in the region. And it goes beyond Iraq. It goes beyond Afghanistan. I don't know where the next conflict is likely to be, but I would be willing to bet my mortgage there will be one.

Mr. TAYLOR. For the record, Mr. Chairman, very quickly, I would like the gentlemen to, when you are comfortable, supply me with what you think the hidden costs of this war are, as the previous panel said there were none.

Mr. SAXTON. As you heard the chairman say, we are going to have a breakfast in the next couple of weeks, and we can discuss that issue.

Mr. Abercrombie. Neil, this is a challenge now. You have got three minutes.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, it is too much.

Mr. SAXTON. He laughs.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Krepinevich, thank you for putting forward something I want to draw to your attention and to the others. And we will have to take it up. You all have read this thing, this Quadrennial Defense Review. Page 11 is the strangest column I have ever seen in my 16 years of trying to understand the strategic thinking and doing my best to figure it out. To fight beyond Afghanistan and Iraq—it is just strange. U.S. forces have been engaged in many countries fighting terrorists, helping partners to police and govern their nations.

Then they talk about two elements, the line of least resistance and the line of least expectation. And then they go on to cite T.E. Lawrence. And I think this column is associating us with what Lawrence was doing at Aqaba.

Now, I fancy myself somewhat of a Lawrence aficionado. And I for the life of me can't figure out how in the hell this QDR remotely

reflects a Lawrencian approach for even the special forces or the special operations. I don't have a clue.

And in that context then, I am trying to figure out is there an unspoken Pentagon resistance to this QDR, especially in the context of what you just said, Mr. Donnelly, about, you know, if you can't deal with Iraq and Afghanistan in terms of expenses and so on, then what can you do. Surely, they don't say that we have to develop an armed forces to continue to occupy and run entire countries. And if they don't, then what do they mean by citing T.E. Lawrence and apparently saying here on page 11 that we should develop an armed forces capable of dealing with the line of least resistance and the line of least expectation?

Mr. DONNELLY. Mr. Abercrombie, I would almost turn your question on its head. I don't think that there is a way to be successful in Iraq without a long-term, large scale presence, particularly at this very crucial moment. These are communities in Iraq who have no trust in one another and for whom as much as they, you know, resent Western invading and occupying forces also understand that the only way for them to have a future is to work with the United States.

You know, we are the least bad alternative for all the factions in Iraq. And I don't see that dynamic changing any time soon.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, I don't know if I agree with that. But my point here is it seems to me it is almost schizophrenic. On the one hand, they seem to be saying we should be prepared to be able to engage in lightening thrusts and spectacular moves with small numbers of highly mobile people. And at the same time, we apparently need to be able to occupy entire countries and run them apparently for decades.

Mr. DONNELLY. Well, anybody who compares *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* to the subsequent political history of the Arab world should understand the limitations of the T.E. Lawrence approach. That would be my response.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, Lawrence would be the first to agree.

Mr. DONNELLY. His experience was not entirely a happy one.

Mr. SAXTON. I thank the gentleman from Hawaii.

We are going to have this breakfast coming up. We will start at 7:30.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Can we have a breakfast on Lawrence? I would like to have that.

Mr. SAXTON. And we will go for as long as you want to stay, Neil.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We will go to his letters to the Times in the post-war conference.

Mr. SAXTON. The good doctor from Arkansas.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In my brief time here, Dr. Krepinevich, I was going to read another little section from your written statement. You say—it is on page three—"As with most insurgencies, victory rests less in military action than in the successful treatment of political, economic and social ills and of winning the war of ideas against those advancing a perverse and dangerous distortion of the Islamic faith. But victory will take years and perhaps decades to achieve. In the interim, the military's job is to buy the time needed for these other

elements of counter-insurgency to succeed." And that is the end of the quote there.

My question gets back to what Ms. Davis was talking about earlier. That draws an awfully bright line between the military function and the rest of everything else. Did you mean to draw that bright a line by overstating that?

It seems like if you have a military who is in a country like this—maybe this relates to what Neil was just asking about our only job is to buy time for other things to occur, that that may be too bright a bright line in terms of getting the workload done. Would you amplify on that, please?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Well, a quick way of giving an answer would be in Iraq, the center of gravity is not the enemy force. It is the people of Iraq. If the people of Iraq are on our side, we win the war. It is not like the Cold War where we worried, you know, do we have enough firepower to stop the Soviet Armies from crashing into Western Europe. We have more than enough military capability. We need to know who the enemy is and where they are. And the Iraqi people can give us that information.

Dr. SNYDER. Well, in the interest of time, Dr. Krepinevich, let me just interrupt. Our experience in Iraq, particularly my first visit there was it was the military that was pleading for authority to build sewer plants and lay sewer lines and hire civilians. I mean, they were the ones that were, I think, wanting to do this, the economic job. And they are the ones that meet with mayors. I mean, it seems like the line was not drawn very brightly.

Dr. KREPINEVICH. Well, that is certainly true. And, you know, work tends to gravitate toward those that have a capability and a willingness to do it. And that is certainly not the way I think you would draw it up if you were starting from scratch. The problem is after the Vietnam War we got out of that business. And we stayed out of that business for about 30 years. And now we are finding we have to get back into it. But if you look at the conflicts, especially where this insurgency is, this insurgency right now is a police war.

You know, the police are really the organization that needs to be supported because they are the enduring face of security in their communities. And we need to get to that point. And then we have got to integrate that with the intelligence and reconstruction efforts because those are the things that will bring the population over to our side and begin to eliminate the insurgent threat. But there are no insurgency battalions or brigades.

It is nothing like Vietnam in that regard. And so, really the military, our military, which is used to in Desert Storm and allied force and so on being the supported element, supported by diplomacy and other forms of national power. Here the roles are reversed. As Tom said, another case of where something is stood on its head. The military is really ideally in a position of supporting these other institutions as they go about their work.

Mr. DONNELLY. Just really briefly, the military is the tool that we have in these cases at the moment. And as important as it is to sort of stand up the expeditionary State Department or, you know, agency for international development or Agricultural Department, what we have now is the military. And we need to make the

military capable and to be able to be successful in the here and now so that when, you know, in the long-term when we can create the governmental structures across multiple agencies that are capable of dealing with this kind of war, you know, that we can safely get from where we are now to where we need to go.

Dr. KORB. Four years ago, Admiral Cebrowski, the late Admiral Cebrowski, who was in charge of transformation for Secretary Rumsfeld, pointed out that we know how to win wars, but we don't know how to secure the peace. And what he recommended was in the military you create two peacekeeping and stabilization divisions so that you could make the transition and then bring in the other workers. And that was our problem in Iraq.

We thought we would be greeted as liberators. We not only didn't have the capacity, we didn't provide the guidance for the troops as to what to do. And they really did not have the skills. And they sort of made them up as they went along. Some commanders did better than others, and that is why we are paying, paying the price. And when we sent General Garner over there and Ambassador Bremer, they did not have the people that they needed to do the things that you are talking about.

Mr. SAXTON. Dr. Snyder, thank you.

I want to thank the panel for being here. We are going to look forward to seeing you again shortly.

And thank the members for their participation.

And we are going to break now, and we will be back here at 5:30.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

March 14, 2006

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 14, 2006

Opening Statement for The Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services
US House of Representatives

Hearing on the Quadrennial Defense Review
March 14, 2006

Thank you, Mr. Chairman

Welcome, Secretary England and Admiral Giambastiani. Thank you for appearing before us today. We've been anticipating the Department's release of the Quadrennial Defense Review for quite a while and we're looking forward to your insights.

Congress has mandated that the Secretary of Defense conduct a comprehensive examination of the national defense strategy and all of its component parts and today we take a look at the fruits of that effort. Taken as a stand-alone

document, the QDR does a reasonable job at painting the complex security environment we face today. Title X requires the QDR to look 20 years into the future. It does a little less well at identifying those future challenges, but I will grant that it is a difficult task. Nobody at the eve of World War II, for instance, could have accurately predicted what the nuclear era and Cold-war style containment would yield twenty years later.

Still, I believe the QDR has done a good job at identifying the DOD's most pressing priorities: Defeating Terrorist Networks, Defending the Homeland, Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and Preventing hostile states and non-state actors from acquiring or using WMD are where we need to concentrate our efforts.

But once I read past the opening pages, I am struck by an enormous disconnect between what we seek to do and the

means we plan to use to accomplish it. After the QDR lays out the challenges for which we must prepare, it details the types of missions and activities our military must be ready to execute. In describing what it calls "steady-state" or routine missions, the QDR lays out a requirement that significantly exceeds what our armed forces were doing prior to 9/11. And that's ok and responsible. But it then says that the pre-9/11 force sizing construct is generally okay. And if that weren't enough, it calls for a 75,000 man reduction across the force. I can't imagine how we'll do more, with less. Or why we should. Our experience of the last five years has demonstrated how capable our force is – certainly – but also how demanding sustained operations are on the total force.

On top of that, the QDR force planning construct calls for a "surge" capacity to deal with a "long-duration irregular warfare campaign," such as the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. "Surge" to me implies an extraordinary

level of effort that can be sustained only for a limited time. Long-duration "surges" are an oxymoron! That's what's called "steady-state." If we anticipate long-duration campaigns on the level of Iraq and Afghanistan, then one could argue that those capabilities should be included in "steady-state" planning and resourcing.

Furthermore, the QDR assumes a greater level of contribution from coalition countries and other agencies to conduct and win conventional campaigns. This assumption is based upon a second assumption that a planned increase in "the level of security cooperation and other activities to enable partners" is successful. We have done so much to damage our credibility and standing in the world over the last several years that I think it will take a long time before we can count on coalition assistance that takes the form of significant military capability.

Lastly, let me point out an explicit theme that runs throughout the entire QDR. In its treatment of what it calls the "Long War" the QDR states that "this struggle cannot be won by military force alone, or even principally." That's a true statement but it is remarkable for its inclusion in this document. It is followed by many references to the contribution other government agencies make to our national security. This is, I may point out, a featured finding in our own Committee Defense Review, as well. It's time, perhaps well past time, that we begin thinking about how to coordinate our inter-agency effort along the same sort of lines we once worked to inculcate jointness throughout the military, in what became known as the Goldwater Nichols act.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman

Statement of Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England
2006 QDR
Before the House Armed Services Committee
March 14, 2006

Chairman Hunter, Representative Skelton, Members of the Committee,

Thank you for the invitation to engage in a dialogue with you today. It is a special privilege to appear together with my close friend and colleague, Admiral Ed Giambastiani, who has been my constant counterpart in co-leading the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review process, and with Ryan Henry, who has spearheaded the effort all the way through. We do appreciate the opportunity to meet with this Committee. Today, we are prepared to discuss our efforts on the QDR to date, and our plans for the implementation of the QDR's strategic direction.

Let me start out by saying how much we appreciate this Committee's support for our men and women in uniform, and the great things they are doing around the world and at home, to defend freedom and liberty. You have also expended a great deal of effort and energy in your Committee Defense Review, trying to make sure that we have it right. The Department has made every effort to cooperate fully with the CDR. My understanding is that we have provided some 53 presentations and over 100 hours of briefings, from OSD Components, the Joint Staff, Services, and our Combatant Commands. We have made available 14 three-stars and 6 Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and our QDR team under Ryan Henry has worked closely with you. The Department appreciates the efforts you are making and looks forward to your conclusions.

Continued close cooperation between Congress and the Department of Defense is critical to our national security mission. The Department needs your continuing support in making hard choices as we prepare the military and the Nation to meet future security challenges. Without the full support of Congress, in making the hard choices still before us, there will be no way that the Department can implement this QDR and the strategic direction it lays out.

The QDR is a strategic document. It is based on the recognition that the Department of Defense, and our nation as a whole, face a global security climate of dynamic, complex threats, and that these threats will continue into the foreseeable future. The Nation has accomplished a great deal over the four years since our last Review. Much more remains to be done.

As you know, this is a critical time for America. We are a nation at war.

America is fighting against dispersed networks of terrorist extremists. This enemy is adaptable, relentless, and will continue the attack whenever and wherever he finds the opportunity. We did not choose this fight, but we don't have the option of walking away. Victory requires that our military continue to adopt unconventional, irregular and indirect approaches to eliminate the enemy's ability to strike.

But the Long War is only part of the nation's security challenge.

Hostile states or non-state actors could acquire and use weapons of mass destruction, and could strike a shattering blow to the US or our allies. This is a real danger as corrupt regimes are actively developing WMD, while terrorists seek access to WMD. Guarding against this threat – and preparing for possible attacks - requires that we pursue new technologies, build new sets of skills, and redouble our counter-proliferation efforts with international partners.

The nation also faces the possibility that a major or emerging power could choose to pursue a hostile course. The most effective approach will be to foster cooperation with emerging powers, while taking prudent steps to hedge against surprise. Traditional, state-based threats are still a concern. They have been kept at bay precisely because our nation has been so well prepared.

Of course, all of these challenges have a bearing on the security of our US homeland. Detecting, deterring, and defeating the threats far from our shores is the best way to keep America safe. But the Department of Defense is also prepared to defend America closer to home, and the Department continues to provide support to other agencies of the US Government for homeland security missions.

Importantly, over the next quarter century, scientific change will proceed significantly more rapidly than ever before. These advances will help us improve and expand our economy, but they will also help our adversaries who would do us harm. In a global marketplace, small competitors will increasingly have access to the latest commercial technologies and, in some cases, to advanced military technologies as well.

The 2006 QDR lays out the strategic approach of the Department of Defense for meeting these challenges. It captures the Department's best thinking, planning, and decisions as of early 2006. It is therefore an "interim" document, intended to launch a continuous wave of future improvements.

Highlighted below are the key findings of the 2006 QDR, for consideration as this Committee and the full Congress decide how best to act on the QDR's recommendations. Some of these steps apply to the Department of Defense alone, but many require the cooperation of other agencies.

- Defeat terrorist extremists in the Long War.
- Defend the homeland in depth.
- Help shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads.
- Prevent the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction by hostile state or non-state actors.
- Ensure that the United States maintains its scientific and technological leadership.
- Integrate all the elements of U.S. national power for both homeland and national security.

- Develop a management structure for the Department of Defense that is as agile as our forces, moving to an Information Age enterprise rather than the Industrial Age enterprise we have today.

- Meet the security challenges of a new century with the broad support of all political parties and administrations.

- Focus on building capabilities, rather than numbers.

When you look at all of these initiatives together, as Newt Gingrich wrote in the *Washington Post* several days ago, "This is an extraordinary level of change." He added, correctly, that "the QDR is best seen as one more building block in the new architecture of 21st century American security". The QDR is indeed part of a longer-term continuum of change.

Now, to be clear, the QDR is not the same as the 2007 budget request. Change doesn't happen that way in this town – you don't reorient strategic direction in just one budget cycle. The QDR is the Department's long-term strategic vision. Putting all of it into practice – institutionalizing real change – will take time. That said, the Department has inserted a few "leading edge" measures from the QDR into the 2007 budget request.

To realize the QDR's strategic vision, and to meet the challenges of the 21st century, America will require constancy of leadership, and unity of purpose within the US Government and with our friends and allies.

It was a steady commitment of national and international will, sustained for over 40 years, that succeeded in defeating the Communist threat. In the difficult days of the Cold War, America was blessed to have a succession of leaders with vision and courage, who faced down Communist expansion and intimidation, and stood up for freedom, liberty, and prosperity.

This commitment of national will transcended multiple Presidencies and Congresses. It included Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, all of whom put America's security first.

At the beginning of the Cold War, Harry Truman, a Democrat, was fiercely opposed on many issues by the Republican Congress. Nevertheless, to make sure we succeeded in the epic struggle between freedom and totalitarianism, the two parties found common cause, forged a consensus, and established capable, long-lasting new institutions of national security, including our own Department of Defense.

At the beginning of this new Long War, our nation needs to build on its past successes. More than in any past conflict, America needs a strong, bipartisan consensus on national security. Success will also require coordination between the Executive and Legislative Branches. This Committee has a critical role to play in facilitating these relationships. The Nation will also need an integrated effort among all agencies and at all levels of the US Government, as well as with our international partners.

The security challenges before us are difficult and complex, and how well we handle them will profoundly shape the prospects for future generations. This is a war of commitment, will, and resolve, over a sustained period of time. America remains the strongest nation on earth. With the united will of Congress and the American people, and the hard work and sacrifices of our men and women in uniform, the Department of Defense will continue to provide the security that supports the freedom we all enjoy.

Thank you for your commitment to this most profound endeavor.

The Quadrennial Defense Review

United States House of Representatives
Committee on Armed Services

Testimony of

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February 16, 2006

Chairman Hunter and members of the House Armed Services Committee, it is my pleasure to appear before you this morning to discuss the Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review.

Since 1996, the U.S. Congress has required quite appropriately that every four years the Department of Defense conduct a major defense policy review, called the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), to examine U.S. defense strategy and submit a report on its findings. The Pentagon released their QDR on February 3, 2006.

To say that their 2006 edition of the QDR is a disappointment would be an understatement. Given the fact that this is the first QDR produced since 9-11, and the first produced since the release of the Bush Administration's National Security strategy, and that Donald Rumsfeld is the first secretary of defense to get a chance to produce a second QDR, the men and women of the armed forces and the American people had a right to expect more.

While the QDR is full of nice sounding rhetoric, it does not deal with the real problems confronting the armed forces. Four years after 9-11 and five years into the Bush Administration, our overstretched ground forces are reaching the breaking point, the Pentagon's weapons systems are not tailored to existing threats, the armed forces have more weapons on the drawing board then they can afford given the administration record setting deficits, our nuclear posture is outdated, and the Administration has not yet defined an appropriate role for the military in homeland defense.

But rather than increasing the size of the Army to relieve the strain on the soldiers, the Administration actually proposes reducing the end strength of the active Army by 20,000, returning these troops to their pre 9-11 force levels. Given the fact that what the Bush administration calls the long war on terrorism is being waged primarily by the ground forces, this is a step in the wrong direction and will only increase the changes that the all volunteer Army will break.

The QDR does not recommend canceling a single major weapons program despite the fact that some programs like the $300 million F/A-22 deal with threats from a bygone era and others like the $100 million V-22 Osprey has severe technical problems and others like the $7 billion DD(X) destroyer are experiencing tremendous cost growth. Nor does it halt deployment of the national missile defense system even though it has not been successfully tested in three years. If the Pentagon gets all the money it requests, an unlikely prospect given the burgeoning federal deficit and the escalating costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it simply cannot afford all the weapons systems on the drawing board. It will be impossible to pay for them even if there is no further cost growth in the weapon systems, which is unlikely given the fact that in the past four years the top five weapons systems under development have increased in cost by 85 percent.

The QDR calls for making only token reductions in the 7,000 strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in the American arsenal, including several hundred in Europe. Given the fact this is far more weapons than the United States needs for the deterrence or war

fighting and that the cost of maintaining such a large arsenal is nearly $20 billion, this is not money well spent.

Finally the QDR provides only small increases in funding for homeland defense and does not increase the size of the Army National Guard, the service which has primary responsibility for providing that defense. Since defending the homeland is the military's primary responsibility, this is an unforgivable oversight.

A meaningful and realistic QDR would have added 86,000 troops to the Army, and double spending on homeland defense from $10 to $20 billion. It would have paid for these additions by canceling production of outdated and poorly performing weapons programs, slashing nuclear weapons to 1000, keeping national missile defense in a research mode, and stopping the weaponization of space.

Secretary Rumsfeld and the Bush Administration have squandered the opportunity to fix the Pentagon's problems. If the Congress does not set things straight these problems will only get worse and our security will be jeopardized. We cannot afford to wait until the next QDR in 2010.

To help the Congress in this process, my colleagues and I at the Center for American Progress have put together what we believe is an appropriate QDR for meeting the unprecedented challenges faced by the nation. In order to meet these challenges, the Department of Defense (DoD) must begin a fundamental shift in military doctrine and priorities over the next four years so that this country is better positioned to respond to the threats of a post-Cold War and post-9/11 world and to project power whenever and wherever necessary.

Our Quadrennial Defense Review outlines a strategy that gives top priority to protecting the homeland, investing in military personnel, and preventing conflicts. It gives the military the manpower and technology it needs to best combat asymmetric threats from non-state actors such as terrorist groups, to deter and contain traditional enemies, and to fulfill its responsibilities in post-conflict situations. It aims to produce a more powerful, flexible, and agile military force that can best protect the American people and advance U.S. national interests. Implemented over time, it will rebalance forces and weaponry in order to allow the United States to protect the homeland, fight one major regional conflict, engage simultaneously in two substantial post-conflict missions, and contain conflict in three regions.

Our strategy is based on the twin principles of realism and integration:

- *Realism* to best respond to the threats the United States faces; to allocate limited financial resources available for defense in a cost-effective manner; and to redefine the military's capabilities and responsibilities after the fighting ends; and
- *Integration* to best unite the efforts of the U.S. armed services and non-military government agencies; to get the most from alliances around the globe; and to rebalance spending to allow the United States to go beyond the military and exercise all the instruments of power.

Threats

The U.S. military must have the capacity to confront a diverse array of threats. In the short term, these include dealing with violent extremists and terrorists with a global reach, weak and failing states, and extreme regimes. In the long term, the United States will have to deal with the rise of China, new challenges from Russia and across the so-called "arc of crisis" in Central Asia, combustible regions around the globe, competition for scarce resources, the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, and the declining reputation of the United States in the world.

As threats evolve, U.S. forces must be able to adapt in order to confront conventional and non-conventional threats alike. The United States' unmatched military technological superiority is no longer enough to guarantee that Americans will be safe and that U.S. forces will prevail in battle and in securing the peace. Nation-states no longer possess a monopoly on the ability to develop and deploy nuclear and biological weapons. In Iraq, suicide bombings and crude explosive devices are claiming more lives of U.S. troops than tanks or enemy troops. New capabilities are required.

In addition, the years since the Cold War and 9/11 have shown the need to better define, and develop capacity to support, the military's role in counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, disaster relief, humanitarian interventions, and stabilization operations. Budgetary and personnel constraints demand that the United States support the growth of regional forces and help allies' militaries share in the burdens of international security. The U.S. military must always retain the capacity to address threats alone, but the recent historical record demonstrates the need to cooperate with others, particularly in addressing transnational threats such as terrorism, organized crime, proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons, and infectious diseases.

Goals

The strategy presented in our QDR recognizes that the Department of Defense must consistently pursue core missions, despite a fluid security environment. Acting in concert with other agencies and military forces, the Pentagon's primary goals include the responsibilities to:

- Protect the American people from harm by safeguarding the homeland and projecting power around the globe.
- Deter and defeat aggression against the United States, its people, and its interests.
- Prevent conflict around the world, especially in weak and failing states, which have the potential to become terrorist havens and sources of regional insecurity.
- Forge strategic and tactical alliances with other U.S. agencies, foreign states, and international organizations to build capacity in these other entities to leverage their strengths and enable them to shoulder greater responsibilities.
- Assure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security.
- Shape the strategic goals and calculations of current and potential adversaries.

- Project power to ensure access to energy supplies and protect the flow of trade and communications.

Strategy

There are nine core elements to the strategy presented in our QDR.

First, this strategy will counter the threats of the 21st century by promoting a process of developing forces and equipment that will enable the military to defend the homeland; fight one major regional conflict; engage concurrently in two substantial post-conflict peacekeeping and stabilization missions, including counterinsurgency campaigns; and deter or contain conflicts in three countries or regions. This doctrine is referred to as "1-1-2-3."

Second, the United States must commit the necessary personnel, both military and civilian, to ensure quick and decisive military victories and a stable peace that enables U.S. military forces to be redeployed to other key areas. The United States should remain committed to the Powell Doctrine, making sure that – regardless of whether it acts unilaterally or with its allies – it employs overwhelming force to win on the battlefield. The United States must also clearly define its military and political objectives and have a concrete post-conflict strategy so that Congress and the American people are aware of the potential costs before risking lives and treasure. Our country's experiences in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan dictate that we should hope for the best but plan for the worst and take steps to maintain domestic support from the moment American troops are dispatched to the day they come home.

Third, this strategy recognizes that unilateral military action is sometimes necessary to deal with imminent threats. Protecting the American people requires that the United States strike to stop imminent threats. Any country that has credible intelligence that it is about to be attacked has the right under the international legal doctrine of anticipatory self-defense to strike first.

Fourth, the recruitment, training, development, and retention of quality military personnel must be the Pentagon's top priority. The war in Iraq has placed excessive burdens on U.S. forces, and the all-volunteer military is seriously strained. In particular, ground forces must be increased by at least 86,000 active-duty troops and receive greater attention in the allocation of limited defense funds. The military must also devote more resources to, and redefine the role of, the National Guard and Reserve, increasing their responsibilities in homeland defense and avoiding situations like Iraq that have kept them on active duty far longer than the norm.

Fifth, the Department of Defense must direct its resources to areas likely to reap the largest security gains. The administration's current so-called "capabilities approach," which "focuses more on how an adversary might fight than who the adversary might be and where a war might occur," fails to assign levels of risk and importance to the various threats this nation faces. The Pentagon must reintroduce elements of a "threat-based"

model that guided its thinking in the immediate post-Cold War period. Weapons procurement policies must also change dramatically so that they are attuned to actual needs rather than political interests. The administration and Congress should eliminate outdated weapons, cut systems that do not work but are kept alive because of political interests, and increase funding for systems that reflect changing threats to U.S. national security. Only through the assignment of risks and priorities can the Pentagon produce programs and budgets that are affordable and cost-effective.

Sixth, the administration must structure U.S. nuclear forces to deter and defeat catastrophic attacks on the United States and its allies, assure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security, and actively shape the strategic goals and calculations of current and potential adversaries. Our nuclear strategy is based on two fundamental principles: only military targets are legitimate targets, and the collateral damage associated with a nuclear strike must not exceed the military value of a nuclear strike. Applying these principles to the current and foreseeable security environment, a nuclear force posture of 600 deployed warheads and 400 warheads in "reserve" offers a more than credible deterrent against catastrophic threats. Our strategy advocates the development of technology capable of generating new strategic capabilities in response to new threats. It places a greater reliance on conventional weapons and places a much stronger emphasis on nonproliferation.

Seventh, the Department of Defense must balance the necessity of maintaining the readiness and capabilities of the existing force with the need to modernize and transform, as it did during the 1990s. The administration's excessive focus on the so-called "revolution in military affairs" to transform the armed forces rapidly has threatened the readiness and capabilities of U.S. ground forces. Funds for equipping ground troops have instead been diverted to bring these new transforming technologies into the force much more rapidly than prudent or necessary.

Eighth, while the military's most important mission is to protect the homeland, this administration has never given homeland defense the priority it deserves in doctrine or resources. As the Gulf Coast hurricanes demonstrated, national emergencies at times demand significant involvement by the U.S. military. The administration must establish clear guidelines for the U.S. military in homeland security, including chains of command, roles and responsibilities and timelines for engagement, and ensure that the Department of Defense gives adequate attention and resources to this area.

Finally, the military must work to maintain stability and prevent serious international crises before they erupt into armed conflict. This requires renewed and stronger ties with U.S. allies, including increased funding to help train and equip allied armed forces, as well as with international and civilian agencies, including the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). On the regional level, the United States must increasingly rely on and support peacekeeping units like those of the African Union in resolving regional conflicts, thus reducing the need to deploy U.S. forces.

Increased Integration

Our QDR requires the Department of Defense to adopt new commitments to responsible, realistic policies and pursue greater integration both within the Pentagon and with other government agencies. The strategy will require the Pentagon and Congress to adopt institutional changes that will allow the government to achieve its missions in a more cost-effective manner.

First, our strategy promotes a unified national security budget, in which the budgets of DoD, State, USAID, and other agencies with responsibility for national security and international policy are consolidated and rebalanced. The current budgeting system gives overwhelming power to the Pentagon in determining both the direction and tactics of U.S. foreign policy.

Second, the DoD must increasingly coordinate the activities of its component intelligence agencies with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The DNI should have actual authority to determine the allocation of the Pentagon's intelligence budget, which accounts for approximately 80 percent of the country's overall intelligence spending.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Military Personnel and Readiness

In order to support, strengthen, and protect U.S. armed forces, the following steps must be undertaken:

- *Increase the size of the total Army by at least 86,000 active-duty troops.* The Pentagon should add two division-sized peacekeeping or stabilization units, double the size of the active-duty Special Forces, and add 10,000 military police, civil affairs experts, engineers, and medical personnel to the active-duty force.

- *Maintain the end strength of the Marine Corps at 185,000 active troops and 40,000 selected reserve troops.*

- *Reduce the number of carrier battle groups in the U.S. Navy from 11 to 10 and the number of Air Force tactical fighter wings from 19 to 18.*

- *Amend the "back door draft" policies.* The DoD should reduce the duration of the military service obligation, change stop-loss policy implementation, and issue a new executive order on selected reserve recall.

- *Improve quality of life for military personnel.* The DoD should maintain troop pay and benefits, compensate federal civilian employees in the National Guard and Reserve for lost pay when their units are summoned to active duty, and

enable selected reservists and their families to enroll in TRICARE, the military's healthcare system. This will improve personnel readiness and have a positive impact on retention and reenlistment rates.

- *Repeal the "don't ask, don't tell" policy.* This will widen the pool from which the military can recruit and retain people with critical skills that are already in short supply.

- *Drop the ban on women in combat.* The armed services should establish standards for every military occupational specialty and allow those who meet the standards to serve, regardless of gender.

- *Continue to invest substantial resources to reset, recapitalize, and modernize the force.* Congress and the DoD must ensure that sufficient funds are allocated to reset the force even after U.S. forces are withdrawn from Iraq and Afghanistan. They must increase the Army's share of the baseline budget from 24 to 28 percent in order to pay for the additional troops, as well as resetting the force.

Conventional Weapons Systems

The Department of Defense should seek funding for flexible, efficient weapons systems that help combat 21st century threats, while stopping development and production of weapons systems that unwisely use scarce resources and/or do not meet performance standards. The DoD should:

- *Maintain funding for the following weapons systems:*

  F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to provide cost-effective next-generation air technology to the three branches of the armed services and to U.S. allies.

  Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to carry out strike missions and provide real-time battlefield imagery and other functions without risking personnel or incurring the costs of manned aircraft.

  B-2 heavy bomber to increase the military's ability to deliver large payloads over long distances with minimal risk and decrease reliance on other countries to provide the United States with airbases.

  Future Combat Systems (FCS) to enhance the Army's ability to deploy units and increase their firepower and effectiveness.

  Stryker Interim Armored Vehicle to provide a relatively light and easily deployable combat vehicle to bridge the gap between today's heavy forces and FCS.

CVN-21 aircraft carrier to provide increased power protection while lowering operational costs.

Littoral Combat Ship to support a cost-effective, multi-use system that can protect forces on shore and launch unmanned aircraft and watercraft.

- *Stop development, and production of the following weapons systems:*

F/A-22 Raptor stealth fighter jet, which is an unnecessary and costly supplement to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

SSN-774 Virginia class submarine, which offers few technological advantages yet substantially higher costs compared to existing submarines.

DD(X) destroyer, which suffers from innumerable technological difficulties and ballooning costs without offering any true advantage compared to the Littoral Combat Ship.

V-22 Osprey, which has caused numerous training deaths and excessive cost overruns and which suffers from unresolved development issues while offering only marginal advantages compared to existing helicopters.

C-130J transport aircraft, which provides no additional capabilities compared to existing transport aircraft and suffers from severe technological flaws.

Offensive space-based weapons, which are of no use in low-tech asymmetric conflict and are far more expensive than existing technologies without offering many additional strike capabilities.

Further deployment of the National Missile Defense System, which offers unproven technology at exceptionally high costs to defend against a highly unlikely nuclear missile strike against the United States.

Nuclear Forces

In order to structure U.S. nuclear forces more effectively to deter and defeat attacks on the United States and assure allies of the U.S. commitment to their security, the United States must:

- *Field a deployed arsenal of 600 warheads on Minuteman III ICBMs, Trident SSBNs, and B-2 and B-52H strategic bombers, with 400 weapons held in reserve.* A generous estimate of the number of military targets in China and Russia that

would be essential to either country's war fighting abilities (and that only nuclear weapons could effectively hold at risk) is several hundred each. A "600 + 400" arsenal would enable the United States to hold these targets, as well as the very limited number of such targets in extreme regimes, vulnerable with a high degree of certainty.

- *Maintain nuclear forces and prepare "surge capacity."* The DoD and the Energy Department should retain the ability to sustain the technological readiness of the current force and supplement it with additional forces should there be a dramatic shift in the international security environment.

- *Pursue the utility and cost-effectiveness of a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program.* Any RRW should lead to ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by guaranteeing the end of U.S. nuclear testing; result in significant long-term cost savings; enable the permanent, irreversible dismantlement of several existing warheads for every new RRW; and should not create new missions for nuclear weapons.

- *Revitalize arms control with Russia.* The United States should negotiate a follow-on agreement to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with Russia that codifies further reductions, mandates the permanent dismantlement of excess warheads and creates new verification mechanisms, extends existing transparency and verification measures (which are based on START I, a 1991 U.S.-Soviet/Russian arms control agreement) beyond their 2009 expiration, and includes tactical nuclear weapons in arms reduction.

- *Cease research and development of an advanced, earth-penetrating nuclear weapon (the "Bunker Buster").* This gratuitous, destabilizing, and expensive weapons system not only lacks any practical use, but also sends precisely the wrong message about the U.S. commitment to nuclear non-proliferation.

Homeland Defense

In order to enhance the Department of Defense's role in homeland defense, the following steps must be taken:

- *Integrate the DoD budget with those of other agencies involved in homeland security and defense.* This will allow the president and Congress to make cost-effective trade-offs across agency lines.

- *Increase coordination among the DoD, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other agencies in order to better complement each other's work.* The military can help instill a joint culture within the intelligence community, drawing from its own experience under Goldwater-Nichols during the past 20 years.

- *Double the funding that the Pentagon allocates to homeland defense from $10 to $20 billion.* This would allow the DoD to increase its capabilities to support civil authorities in minimizing the damage and helping in the recovery from chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive attacks on the United States.

- *Reorient the Army National Guard toward protecting the homeland against large-scale disaster.* This restructuring will require the Guard to emphasize light infantry, military police, and combat support functions in Guard units as opposed to such major combat functions as armor and artillery.

- *Strengthen the command structure of the National Guard to reflect its expanding real-time responsibilities.* At least two regional commands should be established between existing state headquarters and the National Guard Bureau to enhance homeland defense/disaster response planning and improve coordination with the U.S. Northern Command.

- *Improve the active-duty response times of U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to catastrophic disasters.* Although the U.S. military should not routinely be given lead responsibility for disaster-response planning and execution, it should be prepared to support or relieve the Army National Guard in a national emergency.

- *Prepare at least two active-duty Army divisions and a headquarters unit to bolster the Army National Guard in responding to a catastrophic disaster.* These forces would assist the Guard only if the president declares a national emergency.

- *Add civilian first responders, such as police and firefighters, to the list of critical jobs that are prohibited from joining or remaining in the selected reserve.* The Pentagon cannot continue to allow individuals with civilian jobs that are important to homeland security to join the National Guard and Reserve.

- *Establish in each state a non-deployable homeland security corps of volunteer citizens with skills that are central to responding to catastrophic disasters.* These units would serve as a back up for National Guard units, which will continue to be deployed away from their home states.

Intelligence

In order to develop more robust intelligence capabilities, the following steps must be taken:

- *Improve coordination between the Department of Defense's intelligence agencies and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).* Better coordination

will assist in integrating the DOD's intelligence activities with those of other agencies and eliminate duplication.

- *Ensure that the DNI has final budget sign-off on national DoD intelligence programs, as provided under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004.* Under this Act, it is the DNI's responsibility to determine the annual budgets for all national intelligence agencies and offices (including DoD) and to direct how these funds are spent.

- *Implement a human capital plan for DoD intelligence personnel as recommended by the DNI's National Intelligence Strategy.* The DoD must ensure that the right people are recruited and trained for their jobs.

- *Coordinate DoD human intelligence (HUMINT) operations with other Intelligence Community HUMINT operations.* DoD's intelligence operations should form a complementary rather than a competitive or duplicative structure.

- *Ensure that DoD clandestine operations (both domestic and international) comply with U.S. law and regulations.* All databases and intelligence collection activities must be conducted in accordance with U.S. law.

The Quadrennial Defense Review

TESTIMONY

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

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Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

March 14, 2006

Introduction

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before you today, and to share my views on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). My testimony is intended to provide a context within which one might evaluate the results of this defense review.

The QDR is charged with looking out twenty years into the future. Twenty years from now, we should be able to look back and find that the recent QDR represented the most important and far-reaching review of our military posture since the early days of the Cold War. The reasons for this are clear. Consider that since the last QDR in 2001, the United States has:

- Seen New York and Washington attacked by radical Islamists;
- Invaded and occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, and waged an ongoing counterinsurgency in both of those counties;
- Initiated what stands to be a protracted "Global War on Terrorism" with radical Islamists;
- Witnessed the continued drift toward a "Nuclear Asia," with the prospect that, by decade's end, America will confront a 5,000-mile "Atomic Arc of Instability" stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Japan; and
- Observed the continued growth of Chinese military capabilities along disturbing lines.

To meet the demands of its charter, the QDR must address four main issues:

- Does it clearly present the major challenges that may plausibly confront the United States over the next 20 years?
- Does it present a strategy for meeting these challenges?
- Given the resources requested by the administration, is the strategy adequately funded?
- Are the force structure and defense program proposed by the Defense Department consistent with the diagnosis of the threat and the strategy proposed for addressing it?

Four Issues

The balance of my testimony focuses on these four issues.

I. Did the QDR identify the major existing and emerging challenges to America's security?

Overview

The report gets high marks here. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld has concluded that no current or prospective enemy is foolhardy enough to take on the US military directly—tank against tank,

fighter jet against fighter jet. Rather, he argues, the threat is assuming different forms. Radical Islamist movements employ terror and subversion, and seek weapons of mass destruction to cause widespread damage. Hostile and potentially unstable countries like North Korea and Iran seek nuclear arsenals to intimidate American allies and threaten our military's ability to protect vital national interests. While China is not an enemy, it is developing a set of military capabilities it calls the "assassin's mace"—emphasizing ballistic missiles, information warfare, anti-satellite weaponry, submarines and high-speed cruise missiles—capabilities clearly designed to threaten US access to the "global commons" of space, the infosphere and the oceans, and intimidate America's allies and friends in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

Radical Islamists

The first, and most obvious long-term challenge, is that posed by radical Islamists. Today the United States does not confront a war against terrorism. Terrorism is a form of war, not an enemy. Rather, the United States is at war with radical Islam, and the Defense Department's adoption of the term "Long War" represents an improvement over "Global War on Terrorism." Radical Islamists are employing terrorism as it is the only form of warfare available to them at the moment, just as an insurgent movement employs terrorism as its principal means of war while it seeks to gain strength for more ambitious forms of military operations. Radical Islamists constitute a transnational, theologically based insurgent movement seeking to overthrow regimes in the Islamic world that are friendly toward the United States, and to evict US presence from parts of the world viewed as vital to America's interests.

Aside from its transnational character and theological roots, this insurgency differs from most in that its leaders seek to employ advanced technology—in the form of telecommunications for coordination, and weapons of mass destruction—to cause maximum destruction. The radical Islamists' global network, their lack of respect for the laws of war and the lives of innocents, combined with their apparent willingness to employ weapons of mass destruction and disruption, should they acquire them, makes this insurgency especially threatening. Radical Islamists have exploited elements of globalization, to include financial networks, the internet and increasingly porous borders, to form a network whose reach is global. Moreover, insurgencies and wars of religion tend to be protracted affairs and, particularly in the case of religious wars, often bloody as well. The roots of this insurgency run deep. No one should be under the illusion that this war will be won quickly, or that the price of victory will be cheap. As with most insurgencies, victory rests less in military action than in the successful treatment of political, economic and social ills, and in winning the "war of ideas" against those advancing a perverse and dangerous distortion of the Islamic faith. But victory will take years and perhaps decades to achieve. In the interim, the military's job is to buy the time needed for these other elements of counterinsurgency to succeed.

Nuclear Proliferation

The second major, enduring challenge to US security is the spread of nuclear weapons to unstable and/or hostile states in Asia. Since 1998, India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons and created nuclear arsenals. North Korea apparently has nuclear weapons and is

producing the fissile material necessary to fabricate more of these devices.[1] Iran, no doubt aware of the very different treatment accorded North Korea by the United States relative to a non-nuclear Iraq, is pressing forward vigorously with its nuclear weapons program. It is conceivable that before the decade is out, a solid front of nuclear armed states will stretch from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Japan, running through Iran, Pakistan, India, China and North Korea, with Russia looming from above—a five-thousand mile "atomic arc of instability" in a part of the world which has become increasingly important to US security and economic well-being.

These states may not view nuclear weapons in the same way that the United States' political leadership has come to view them over the years; i.e., as weapons of last resort, to be used only under the most extreme circumstances. In particular, it is far from certain that Iran, North Korea and Pakistan, whose cultures are quite distinct from that of the United States, and whose regimes are either unstable or unremittingly hostile (or both), view the role of nuclear weapons in this way.

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by hostile rogue regimes also threatens to disrupt the military balance. All things being equal, the United States' willingness to project power against nuclear-armed adversaries would likely be much more constrained then against those who do not possess them. Washington may be compelled to alter its war aims when confronted by rogue states armed with nuclear weapons (e.g., abandoning the objective of regime change).[2] This seems to be a principal motive for North Korea and Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. If they succeed, it will reduce substantially, and perhaps precipitously, US freedom of action in two regions of vital interest. It may also make it far more difficult to deal effectively with ambiguous forms of aggression, such as Iran's support for terrorism and for the insurgency in Iraq, or potential North Korean trafficking in fissile materials.[3]

The proliferation of nuclear-armed states also increases the likelihood that these weapons will be used. Again, it is not clear that they will be viewed as weapons of last resort, or that the regimes possessing them will take the kinds of precautions to secure them against unauthorized use that the mature nuclear powers put into place over the years. Owing to the relative instability of states like Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan when compared to the mature nuclear powers, it is conceivable that these weapons could fall into the hands of nonstate entities, either as a consequence of corruption (e.g., the unauthorized sale of a nuclear weapon to a nonstate entity), or state failure (e.g., possession by a faction in a civil war; seizure by radical Islamists). Nor can

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[1] David E. Sanger, "North Korea Says it Now Possesses Nuclear Arsenal," *New York Times*, April 24, 2003.

[2] It is fair to ask whether the United States would strike a nuclear-armed state under *any* circumstances. However, during the Cold War the US military had plans to attack its nuclear superpower rival, the Soviet Union, with nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. It is possible to envision plausible scenarios, to include those involving regime change, when a nuclear-armed adversary would be subjected to the full range of US military capabilities. For instance, were North Korea to employ nuclear weapons, or execute attacks that resulted in mass casualties (e.g., a chemical or biological attack on Seoul), the United States might consider regime change operations to be necessary.

[3] In the case of Iran and North Korea, there also exists the possibility that the regimes in power will, at some point, either collapse or be overthrown. Should this occur, a period of chaos may ensue. If so, the security of those countries' nuclear arsenals could be at risk.

one discount the possibility that a state like North Korea, which proliferates ballistic missile technology, or Pakistan, whose prime nuclear scientist was running a nuclear weapons production materials bazaar, would consciously provide, for a price, nuclear weapons or fissile material to other states, or even nonstate groups.

To put it bluntly, the United States is now in an era that might be characterized as a "Second Nuclear Regime," with the First Regime, which began in 1945 with the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, having passed into history. That earlier regime was defined by two principal elements: first, a few, "mature" great powers possessing nuclear weapons, with all but China having a common European cultural orientation. Second, during that period, which lasted until the early 1990s, there developed a strong tradition of non-use of these weapons. Now the former characteristic no longer holds, while the latter is open to debate.

We might expand the Second Nuclear regime's definition to include state and nonstate actors possessing biological weapons. By all accounts, biological weapons are becoming progressively easier to fabricate—certainly far easier than nuclear weapons—and, under the right conditions, can produce the mass casualties, economic disruption and terror associated with a nuclear strike. Yet little has been done to restrict the knowledge associated with developing biological weapons, and the infrastructure costs for producing them are quite modest when compared to those associated with nuclear weapons.[4] For nonstate entities, this combination of comparatively low cost and high destructive potential may make the pursuit of biological weapons irresistible.

China

The third enduring challenge the United States confronts is the rise of China to great regional power status and, perhaps, over time to global power status. To date, discussions about the disposition of China often describe it as either a threat that must be addressed along the lines of the Soviet Union, or as a state that simply needs to be engaged and brought more fully into the global economy to ensure it will remain a member in good standing of the international community.[5]

The truth probably lies somewhere in between these gloomy and rosy poles. China does not represent the type of threat posed by the Soviet Union. For example, unlike Soviet Russia, China is not wedded to an aggressive, expansionist ideology. However, this does not mean that China will not pose challenges to the United States. Rather, if it does, they are likely to be advanced in different forms, employing different means. For example, whereas the United States had no significant commercial relationship with the Soviet Union, it has an enormous economic relationship (and trade deficit) with China. Moreover, both the United States and China may

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[4] Steven M. Kosiak, *Homeland Security, Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Diagnostic Assessment* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2003), pp. 47-56.

[5] See, for example, Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," *International Security*, Winter 1993/1994, pp. 5-33; David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," *International Security*, Spring 2003, pp. 57-85; and Amitav Acharya, "Will Asia's Past be its Future?" *International Security*, Winter 2004, pp. 149-164.

have important common security interests in the area of limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and combating radical Islamists. Should this prove to be the case, a more appropriate analogy might be the alliance formed by Great Britain and the Soviet Union in the wake of Germany's invasion of the USSR in June 1941. Britain, which had been at war with Germany for two years prior, quickly embraced Stalinist Russia as an ally, despite their many mutual antagonisms.[6]

On the other hand, China could emerge as a major threat to US security in the manner of Germany against Britain a century ago. Like Germany in the late 19th and early 20th century, China is a rapidly rising power. China is also beset by questions of political legitimacy; growing ecological problems; an economy that has enjoyed remarkable growth, but which may be entering a more mature period characterized by slower growth; potentially serious demographic problems that could induce societal instability; a rapidly growing dependence on foreign energy supplies; and outstanding security issues in the form of Taiwan, the Spratley Islands, Tibet, and perhaps portions of the Russian Far East. This could lead to friction between Washington and Beijing, especially if the other two major threats to international peace and stability cited above are slow to mature.

China presents problems for US forces quite different in some respects from those posed by US adversaries in other post-Cold War conflicts. For instance, the scale of military effort that China can generate far exceeds that of any rogue state. China's anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities are far more mature than any potential US rival.[7] China's enormous size (it is the world's fourth largest country) also provides it with great strategic depth, a problem US defense planners have not had to address since the Cold War.

There is also some evidence that China seeks to displace the United States as the principal military power in East Asia, and to establish itself as the region's hegemonic power.[8] If this were to occur naturally, stemming from the evolution of Chinese economic power and a corresponding increase in influence, the United States would probably accept such an outcome. However, if Chinese preeminence were achieved through coercion or aggression, this would serve neither US interests in the region, nor the stability of the international system and rule of law.

The challenge, then, for the United States is to encourage China to cooperate in areas where the two states have common security interests, and to convince Beijing that the resolution of its

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[6] Conversely, radical Islamists or nuclear-armed rogue states might preoccupy the United States far more than China. If so, the latter might be tempted to exploit this preoccupation by engaging in military operations that would jeopardize US security interests (e.g., coercion of Taiwan). An example here is the Soviet Union's use of the 1956 Suez Crisis to reassert, by force, its control over Hungary.

[7] A combination of asymmetric capabilities sometimes referred to as "Assassin's Mace," comprise the core of China's A2/AD threat. Among these capabilities are advanced air defenses, information operations, ballistic and cruise missiles, and underwater systems (e.g., submarines) and munitions (e.g., anti-ship mines). See Michael Pillsbury, "China's Military Strategy Toward the U.S.: A View From Open Sources," *U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,* Commission Contracted Research Paper, November 2, 2001, available at http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2000_2003/pdfs/strat.pdf.

[8] Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Struggle for Mastery in Asia," *Commentary*, November 2000, pp. 17-26.

outstanding geopolitical issues should be accomplished within accepted international legal norms. This means creating and maintaining a military balance in East Asia that is favorable to the United States and its allies against those kinds of contingencies that might tempt Chinese efforts at coercion or aggression. Since, for a variety of reasons, China is unlikely to challenge the US military symmetrically, the US defense planner's challenge will be to adapt its forces to confront more novel forms of Chinese military power.

II. Did the QDR present a strategy for meeting these challenges?

Here the QDR's record is mixed.

The QDR offers a reasonably clear picture of how the Department of Defense intends to prosecute the war in which it is now engaged—the war against radical Islamists.

The approach is generally proactive and aggressive, reflecting a belief that the defense in depth of the US homeland is best assured by engaging the enemy as far from US shores as possible, and keeping up the pressure on such groups so they have little time to organize and plan future attacks, let alone carry them out.

The military strategy envisions US forces, in combination with those of friends and allies, working to break down radical Islamist terrorist cells within friendly states. The US military will also endeavor to maintain surveillance over failed and ungovernable areas, along with the capability to act quickly in the event that terrorist cells are identified. Hence the QDR places emphasis on highly distributed special operations forces, either working in tandem with similar indigenous or allied forces to defeat terrorist groups, or prepared to act quickly on their own if such help is not available. It also emphasizes building and leveraging partner capacity as a way of expanding the capability needed to defeat radical Islamists, especially those waging insurgencies, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The QDR is somewhat less clear how it plans to deal with China, which is euphemistically described as a country at a "strategic crossroads." The report notes that China is developing a worrisome set of military capabilities.

> China is likely to continue making large investments in high-end, asymmetric military capabilities, emphasizing electronic and cyber-warfare; counter-space operations; ballistic and cruise missiles; advanced integrated air defense systems; next generation torpedoes; advanced submarines; strategic nuclear strike from modern, sophisticated land- and sea-based systems; and theater unmanned aerial vehicles for employment by the Chinese military and for global export.[9]

The QDR asserts that the Defense Department will pursue investments that "preserve US freedom of action" and "provide future Presidents with an expanded set of options" for

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[9] Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 6, 2006, pp. 29-30. Hereafter cited as "QDR."

addressing the potential Chinese threat.[10] But how might China use these capabilities to threaten US security interests and freedom of action? And how will US investments enable the military to dissuade, deter or defend against such efforts? For example, it seems likely that the Defense Department's decision to accelerate the development of a new long-range strike aircraft is intended to convince the Chinese that they cannot use their country's strategic depth to create a sanctuary of sorts for key military capabilities (e.g., ballistic missiles, land-based anti-satellite systems, command and control centers, etc.). But this is speculation. It would be useful to have the Pentagon's perspective as to how the interaction of the Chinese and US capabilities discussed will preserve stability in the Far East. This would be extremely useful in enabling Congress to make informed judgments regarding the Defense Department's force posture and investment priorities.

The QDR is even less clear as to how the United States will address the problem associated with nuclear rogue states, or the failure of nuclear-armed states. For example, the QDR states that

> [T]he United States must be prepared to deter attacks; located, tag and track WMD materials; act in cases where a state that possesses WMD loses control of its weapons, especially nuclear devices; detect WMD across all domains . . . and eliminate WMD materials in peacetime, during combat, and after conflicts.[11]

> [T]he United States must be prepared to respond . . . [and] employ force if necessary, ... [to include] WMD elimination operations that locate, characterize, secure, disable and/or destroy a state or non-state actor's WMD capabilities and programs in a hostile or uncertain environment.[12]

It is unclear as to *how* the US military will accomplish these missions, which are not hypothetical problems that may arise at some point in the distant future. They are *today's* challenges. Consider, for example, that the QDR candidly concedes that detecting fissile materials and rendering safe WMD devices (e.g., a nuclear weapon) are "particularly difficult operational and technical challenges."[13] Even collecting reliable intelligence on WMD programs and activities is judged "extremely difficult."[14] But it offers little insight as to how the US will address the WMD problem if these challenges cannot (as it seems likely) be overcome in the foreseeable future. Nor does the QDR invest much in the way of resources to address this problem.

Indeed, at present there appears to be little confidence that the United States can conduct preventive attacks to disarm North Korea or Iran of their nuclear materials production facilities,

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[10] QDR, p. 31.

[11] QDR, pp. 33-34.

[12] QDR, p. 34.

[13] QDR, p. 34.

[14] QDR, p. 33.

or that it can quickly identify and secure the weapons in the event of a nuclear state failure (e.g., Pakistan). Given the difficulties associated with taking preventive action against a country developing nuclear weapons, or of detecting, tracking and intercepting those weapons in transit, the US military may have to default to the unsatisfactory option of attempting to deter enemies from using WMD. However, this may be risky, as the United States has little understanding of the cost-benefit calculus of states like Iran and North Korea, let alone nonstate entities like al Qaeda, which seeks to acquire such weapons.

In the end, the QDR fails to provide a sense of how the Defense Department will address this admittedly difficult challenge.

III. Is the defense program adequately funded?

It is not. The QDR calls for a large-scale modernization effort in the coming years, the first in over two decades. Yet it also proposes to reduce defense spending toward the end of this decade, in part by holding down spending on personnel, even though recent increases in benefits have failed to stem the decline in the quality of recruits entering the Army. To be sure, some personnel cuts are planned, and a few small programs will be cancelled, but the tough choices were deferred, raising doubts whether the existing defense program could be executed, let alone one including initiatives to address the new and emerging challenges to US security. Independent estimates conclude that over the long term the defense program may be short some $50 billion a year, a shortfall that will prove difficult to erase given the administration's plans to cut the deficit in half by 2009.

IV. How well does the proposed defense program address the existing and emerging threats to national security?

Not nearly as well as it could, or should. The saying "Show me your budget priorities and I'll show you your strategy" may be somewhat hyperbolic, but it contains a strong element of truth. Given the magnitude of the changes witnessed over the last four years, and with the prospect of more to come, one would expect major changes in our military forces and equipment. Yet despite Secretary Rumsfeld's guidance, the QDR leaves US forces equipped primarily for traditional warfare. Among its top priorities:

- The Army's Future Combat System, projected to cost nearly $150 billion, was conceived to exploit information technologies to defeat enemy tank forces at a distance—but none of our existing or prospective enemies are building a new version of Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard armored force.

- The Navy's DD(X) destroyer, at roughly $4 billion a copy, is a firepower platform. Yet the naval challenge from China, if it comes, will be centered on its submarine force, a threat against which the DD(X) is irrelevant.

- The Pentagon's F-35 fighter program is by far the most expensive program in the defense budget, at over $250 billion. The fighters are designed to sweep enemy aircraft from the skies and strike targets on the ground. But al Qaeda has no air force, and the most

worrisome strike systems being fielded by China, North Korea and Iran are ballistic missiles, not fighter aircraft.

- The Marine Corps' V-22 aircraft, designed to hover like a helicopter and fly like a plane, has become so expensive that it cannot be built in large numbers. Meanwhile, the Corps' aging helicopter fleet the V-22 is designed to replace is wearing out at an alarming rate, owing to the high pace of operations in Iraq.

The Pentagon's unwillingness to scale back these programs, or in some cases terminate them, will allow them to generate "program momentum." As they consume ever more funding, their constituencies in the military, Congress and the defense industry will grow. Consequently, other QDR initiatives that might enable our military to meet new threats risk being starved of funding in their infancy. Among the most promising:

- A one-third increase in the number of Special Forces battalions, our most heavily deployed units in the war against radical Islamists.

- A new long-range strike aircraft designed to loiter for protracted periods over the battlefield, whether searching for terrorists targets in remote areas or missile launchers deep inside Iran or China.

- Programs and forces to cope with the problem of detecting, tracking and disabling weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons that enemies might attempt to smuggle into the United States.

- Medical countermeasures against bio-terror threats. Here the Pentagon is adding $1.5 billion over five years to the effort—less than half the cost of a single DD(X) destroyer.

- Modernizing our air tanker refueling fleet to replace aging aircraft that date back to the 1950s. These aircraft have been in great demand since the Cold War's end. Their ability to refuel our reconnaissance and strike aircraft in flight helps in the effort to maintain something approximating an "unblinking" eye over the battlefield to search and engage high-value targets like terrorist leaders, "loose nukes" or mobile missile launchers armed with weapons of mass destruction.

- Increasing our submarine production to send a clear signal to China, and our allies, that Beijing cannot expect to threaten US freedom of action in an area of vital interest, or coerce America's friends and allies in East Asia.

Which set of capabilities best reflects the QDR's assessment of the principal challenges before us? Which would be most useful in tracking terrorists in remote areas of Africa and Central Asia? Dealing with a destabilized Pakistan or Saudi Arabia—al Qaeda's two principal targets? Thwarting radical Islamist attempts to smuggle a nuclear weapon into the United States? Conducting persistent extended searches for North Korean nuclear-tipped missiles emerging from their caves to launch an attack? Deflecting the efforts of China's submarines, ten years hence, to threaten our Navy's ability to defend Taiwan from coercion or aggression? Clearly it is

the infant initiatives spawned by the QDR, which cost but a fraction of the legacy programs whose principal focus is on traditional forms of warfare that the QDR rightly notes are of progressively less relevance.

Yet most of these worthy initiatives are under-funded, or not yet funded at all. Other promising programs, such as creating an "advisory corps" to train other militaries in the war against radical Islamists, have been sacrificed altogether. In a case of "robbing Peter to pay Paul," the Army has had to scale back its force modularity plans in order to divert soldiers into the Special Forces. While the effort to increase our SOF capability is laudable, scaling back Army force structure given its current deployment rates seems unwise.

Conclusion

The QDR performs a great service in identifying security challenges that in some cases are very different from the planning metrics that shaped much of the defense program since the Cold War's end. In so doing, the QDR enables some first-order decisions or adjustments to some main elements of the defense posture:

- The Army and Marine Corps need to reorient themselves on *irregular challenges* to our security, with principal emphasis on capabilities associated with foreign military assistance, special operations, counterinsurgency, counter-terror "manhunting," and human intelligence.

- The Air Force and Navy need to reorient themselves on existing and prospective *disruptive challenges*, (i.e., China) placing primary emphasis on countering emerging anti-access/area-denial capabilities, and threats to the global commons (e.g., space, the infosphere; offshore undersea economic assets such as the global fiber optic grid and energy fields; and maritime commerce).

- It seems likely that the four Services have important roles to play in addressing direct, *catastrophic threats* to the American homeland. These include defense against ballistic and cruise missile attack; border control; defense against delivery of WMD through nontraditional means (e.g., capabilities for identifying, tagging and tracking these weapons); and consequence management.

- Military operations over the past 15 years have demonstrated that when our enemies challenge us in *traditional warfare*, as in the two Gulf Wars and in the Balkans, air power can play an increasingly important, if not dominant role. While all four Services should maintain a significant residual capability for traditional warfare, the Army and Marine Corps should be able to migrate more of their capabilities into other challenge areas than either the Air Force or the Navy.

In addition to rebalancing Service forces and capabilities to address irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges to U.S. security, the military needs to undertake key institutional changes. Among them are:

- Refocusing the professional military education (PME) system to emphasize the study of Asia in general, and radical Islam and China in particular. Irregular warfare is also in need of increased emphasis. The foreign area officer (FAO) program needs to be expanded and enhanced. Intelligence operations need to accord much greater emphasis on HUMINT than in the recent past. Finally, as officers needed to become "physics literate" after the advent of nuclear weapons, today they need to become "biosciences" literate owing to the prospect of biological weapons becoming available to hostile nonstate entities that may prove difficult, if not impossible, to deter.

- Transforming the training infrastructure to better account for irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges to US security.

- Restructuring the force to sustain sufficient forces engaged in a protracted conflict. The Navy and Marine Corps long ago established a rotation base for their forces. More recently, significant progress is being made in this area, with the Air Expeditionary Forces and the Army's modularity initiative. However, these forces are primarily oriented on traditional challenges. More effort will be needed in areas where the QDR has made a down payment, such as increasing the Special Operations Forces, expanding the Army's psychological warfare and civil affairs capabilities, and creating a robust Advisory Corps to build partner capacity in the Long War on radical Islamism.

- Developing a strategy for the defense industrial base that fosters innovation while addressing the possibility that, in future conflicts, US forces may suffer significant attrition of equipment, something that has not occurred since the Vietnam War.

- Reviewing the nation's alliance portfolio. With the rise of threats to the national security that are greater in scale and broader in scope than those confronted in the first decade after the Cold War, the United States needs capable allies and partners far more than at any time since the Cold War—but for different types of missions, and in different parts of the world.

- Engaging relevant departments and agencies of the Executive Branch with the goal of developing more effective interagency relationships and relevant capabilities for dealing effectively with irregular and catastrophic challenges to US security.

I applaud the Committee's determination to tackle this important issue. It is critically important that we seize this opportunity to position ourselves by crafting a strategy and force posture that can sustain us for what is likely to be a long struggle. Failure to accomplish this runs the risk that defense planners will invest increasingly scarce resources in capabilities optimized for the "wrong" future. Tragically, the Defense Department's unwillingness to reduce or clear away the big-ticket programs that represent strategic "dead wood" will see them consume ever greater levels of funding in the coming years. The result will be that many of the QDR's worthy infant initiatives will be stillborn, starved of funding by far less relevant programs kept on life support at a cost of hundreds of billions of dollars.

Having provided an accurate diagnosis of the new challenges confronting the nation, and made a modest down payment on addressing them, the Pentagon's leadership has passed on making the tough decisions needed to reorient the military. But tough choices must be made, for as Sir Francis Bacon noted: "He who will not apply new remedies must expect new evils."

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS DONNELLY

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To the House Committee on Armed Services
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Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skelton, members of the Committee, it is a distinct pleasure to appear before you today. A priest once told me that, no matter how I strayed in life, the doors of the Church would always be open to me; a former staffer invited to give testimony in this sacred spot has the same premonition.

I am particularly pleased to testify on the subject of the Quadrennial Defense Review. A good deal of my work here involved the legislation enabling the QDR and the oversight of the process. Indeed, many of the issues associated with this year's review give me a strong sense of déjà vu.

This is at least the fifth formal attempt to align the U.S. military with the demands of the post-Cold-War world – from the "Base Force" plan of the first Bush Administration through the 1993 Bottom-Up Review and three QDRs, the essential questions have remained identical: how to preserve the great-power peace won through the Cold War, and how to protect the flowering of freedom and the growing prosperity that the peace occasioned. In sum, the defense of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness on a global scale. And the key to this has been – as it remains now – the international leadership of the United States.

The desire to maintain global leadership is a very tall order for the U.S. military, for a variety of reasons. One, it's been an expanding task for a force substantially smaller than it was; members will remember the committee's complaints during the 1990s about "doing more with less." We are now doing much, much more with less and less.

Two, there aren't many allies to be found, either internationally and militarily or among the other agencies of the U.S. government. The "burdensharing" debates of the 1990s seem quaint by comparison to what we face today. The Bush Administration deserves great credit for transforming the alliance with Japan and trying to build a partnership in India, but help is not on the way any time soon.

And three, there are a lot of enemies and potential enemies. As President Clinton's former Director of Central Intelligence James Woolsey put it long ago, we slew

the Soviet dragon only to find the garden infested with snakes. Smaller, but still poisonous.

Until recently, a fourth problem has been our difficulty in admitting our own ambitions. The Pentagon has long pretended that it is plagued by "strategic uncertainty." But in fact, the National Security Strategy, the so-called "Bush Doctrine," gives quite clear guidance; although the White House is working on an updated strategy, the basic principles will remain the same, just as there is great continuity between Bush strategy and Clinton strategy. Last year, in anticipation of the QDR, I wrote a report on *The Military We Need: The Defense Requirements of the Bush Doctrine*. This testimony is based upon that work. I believe that copies have been made available to the committee.

Three Missions, Three Measures

Beyond the defense of the American homeland, preserving the world we've got imposes three security demands. The first is to preserve the great-power peace; that means integrating China, the only possible great-power competitor, into the existing order. That isn't a prediction of a war with Beijing, just a recognition of its rapidly growing military power.

The second demand is that we win what the QDR calls "The Long War" in the greater Middle East. More about this later, but the real innovation of the Bush Doctrine is the recognition of the underlying and fundamental political problem in the Islamic world, particularly in Arabia. The failures of governance in the region have created a very violent and dangerous set of problems, not only for the peoples of the region, but for us. Returning to the pre-9/11 status quo, of relying on the region's own autocrats, to maintain "stability" – and stable energy prices – is not a viable option.

The third demand is to figure out a better way to deal with weak states with nuclear weapons. As North Korea and Iran remind us almost daily, nuclear-armed rogues confound the usual calculus of the balance of power; Iran's coming mixture of recycled nuclear fuel with recycled revolutionary fervor makes the North Koreans look staid. Even a nominally friendly regime like Pakistan demonstrates the strategic conundrum that flows from the toxic combination of weak government and nuclear know-how.

The QDR does address these three demands – and the missions of homeland "defense in depth." The China question, which has been a growing concern in the department for a decade an already a shaping factor in the 2001 QDR, gets the most thorough treatment. While trying to encourage Beijing to act like a "stakeholder" in the *Pax Americana* and encouraging "China to choose a path of peaceful economic growth and political liberalization rather than military threat and intimidation," the report acknowledges that "the pace and scope of China's military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk." This is the thinking that is reflected, for example, in the reposturing of U.S. forces in the Pacific.

The QDR also discusses the potential for Chinese provocations by unconventional means; these are the asymmetric capabilities that can accelerate the ways by which China can become, in the Pentagon's terminology, a "disruptive" power. The report forecasts that Beijing "is likely to continue making large investments in high-end…capabilities, emphasizing electronic and cyber-warfare; counter-space operations; ballistic and cruise missiles; advanced integrated air defense systems; next-generation torpedoes; advanced submarines; strategic nuclear strike from modern, sophisticated land- and sea-bases systems; and theater unmanned aerial vehicles for employment by the Chinese military and for global export." A great-power competitor if ever there were one; this section of the QDR gets high marks.

It also gets good marks for the section on nuclear proliferation; excuse me, "weapons of mass destruction." In addition to observing these growing dangers, complete with the latest "Israel must be wiped off the map" rhetoric from Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the QDR delicately discusses the dangers of nuclear states that suffer from "internal instability" and potential "loss of control over their weapons." This means Pakistan-type problems as well as Iranian-type problems. "The prospect that a nuclear-capable state may lose control of some of its weapons to terrorists is one of the greatest dangers the United States and its allies face."

The QDR also begins what will be a long and difficult process of developing military options for such situations. The report moves beyond the idea of an Osirak-style strike operation, calling for improved surveillance and interdiction capabilities and, importantly, the ability "to deploy, sustain, protect, support and re-deploy special operations forces in hostile environments" and anti-WMD missions.

Yet because the report is mum on the most pressing reason for solving this very challenging puzzle – the deterrent effect the nuclear rogues, particularly those in the Middle East, have on U.S. grand strategy – it leaves the reader with the impression than old-style containment remains a realistic long-term solution. In short, the problem is not simply an operational one, although the operational challenges are severe.

Two Out of Three Ain't Enough

To the singer-strategist Meatloaf, "two out of three ain't bad." But for a singer-superpower, it ain't enough. Especially when the failing third comes in the understanding of The Long War in the Middle East.

The defense review opens with the statement, "The United States is a nation engaged in what will be a long war." It continues, "The terrorist attacks on September 11 imposed a powerful sense of urgency to transforming the Department." It is as though we responded to Pearl Harbor with an accelerated program of bureaucratic reform.

That's meant not simply as a cheap shot; to read the QDR report is to begin to take the measure of the rejectionism of the key tenet of the Bush Doctrine in the Defense Department. The Pentagon insists upon understanding The Long War as a massive

counterterrorism campaign rather than a counterinsurgency war, as requiring forces that are "more agile and expeditionary," not more durable and sustainable; marked by "technological advances, including dramatic improvements in information management and precision weaponry," not by increased manpower; moving away from "war against nations," even though the two main military acts since 9/11 have been invasions of nations and replacing their regimes.

The QDR's keys to victory in this war are all tactical. The report "reflects the thinking of the senior civilian and military leaders of the Department of Defense" that the primary need is to "find, fix and finish combat operations against new and elusive foes," not complete the more strategic post-combat operations. The second need is for better "intelligence fusion" to "produce action plans that can be executed in real time;" not boldness in the face of an irreducible fog of war. And thirdly, "everything done in this Department must contribute to joint warfighting capability," whether or not a joint solution is the right one.

The fact is that today's force is superbly competent in the tactical sense. Yes, until lately it has generally been focused on large-scale conventional operations. But the failures of Iraq and Afghanistan have been more strategic than tactical. Counterinsurgency tactics have been dramatically improved, and proven in the harshest environment imaginable, over the last several years. Likewise, the training of Iraqi and Afghan security forces has accelerated. But the essential problem – that is, where friendly forces are not present, unfriendly forces are free to operate, to terrorize and intimidate – remains unsolved. The Pentagon's sense of urgency evaporates when it comes to increasing the size of the force. The force must be perfected before it can be made larger.

The Defense Department's model and preferred scenario for The Long War is a potted recent history of Afghanistan – the QDR again treats us to pictures of special operations forces on horseback. First, there was the invasion, which "reinforced the principles of adaptability, speed of action, integrated joint operations, economy of force, and the value of working with and through indigenous forces." Since then, as the report would have it, the reconstruction and counterinsurgency campaigns have been the mission of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force of 9,000. No mention of the long-term U.S. force presence that has averaged about 18,000 and surged, at election and other crucial times, above 20,000.

The telling of the Iraq story is likewise distorted. "The weight of effort in Iraq has shifted over time, from defeating the Iraqi military and liberating the Iraqi people, to building up Iraqi security forces and local institutions, and to transitioning responsibility for security to the Iraqis." What about the counterinsurgency part?

Indeed, the main lesson the Pentagon seems to have to have learned from Iraq is, "Let's *never* do this again." I sympathize, but would hesitate to make that the basis of defense planning. Not many imagined that post-war Iraq would turn out as it has, but it should now be obvious that "regime change" in the Middle East will be a messy business.

Are we sure there will never be circumstances – think of the array of illegitimate and unstable governments throughout the region – that might force us into the same or a similar situation?

Is it reasonable to presume that our current level of effort in the region – a rotational force of about 20 brigade-sized units, counting Iraq, Afghanistan, the horn of Africa and elsewhere – is the limit to what we can anticipate in the future? Even if so, is a fully "modularized" regular Army of 42 brigades, plus a two-division-plus Marine Corps, sufficient to sustain the long-term strain? Do we expect the Army National Guard to continue to deploy at recent rates?

Again, to confuse tactical competency with strategic adequacy has been the folly of recent years. To commit this mistake once was, perhaps, understandable. To commit it again is less forgivable.

Thus, it has become my view that the QDR process has outlived its usefulness. The many defense reviews of the past decades have failed utterly to do what they were meant to do: provide a link between strategy, force planning and defense budgeting. Indeed, with every QDR, the situation has gotten worse. The basic ends-means dichotomy has grown wider.

In sum it's time to stop thinking and start spending. The premises of the "cheap hawks" and the "transformationists" have, I think very clearly, been proven false. In the defense department more than in any other agency of government, you get what you pay for. We have reached the limits of our ability to think our way out of our strategic dilemma. Only a larger and more capable force – a more expensive force – can give us the strategic options that we need.

Indeed, and in retrospect, the notion that the United States could retain its position of international leadership while spending just 3 percent of gross domestic product on its military was optimistic, to put it kindly. The real measure of our interest in preserving the Pax Americana is what we're willing to pay for it; people in uniform are making the ultimate sacrifice abroad, but people at home seem less willing to make a more modest financial sacrifice.

These complaints are not new to the members of this committee: the theme of every authorization bill that I worked on was one of defense "shortfalls." Shortfalls in modernization, in readiness, in personnel – in resources of all kinds. This administration has squandered two golden opportunities to address these shortfalls, one in the earliest days of 2001 and then again in the aftermath of 9/11.

I do not think we can afford to wait another four years, for the next QDR, to address these problems.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Skelton, and the members of the Committee.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 14, 2006

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. No, I realize you probably won't have anything definitive on July 1st. But if you set back with section 1004, I think you will find a very, very succinct yet comprehensive outline, which probably covers virtually all of the initiatives that you just spoke of. And if we can synthesize this and put it together—I don't know if we can do it for the 2007 budget, but I think we can take giant strides toward dealing with some of the funding issues that were inherent in Mr. Taylor's question.

Secretary ENGLAND. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller (OUSD(C)) are coordinating the development of a report in response to Section 1004. Preliminary meetings have been held with representatives of various offices within OSD and with representatives of the Service Financial Management (FM) organizations to discuss the requirements and a way-ahead for meeting the reporting requirement. A tentative schedule has been established and the Services have been requested to appoint action officers to participate in the development of a response to the congressional language. The Department anticipates submitting the report, as required, by 1 July 2006.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MARSHALL

Mr. MARSHALL. How well does the proposed defense program address the existing and emerging threats to national security?

- The Navy's DD(X) destroyer, at roughly $4 billion a copy, is a firepower platform. Yet the naval challenge from China, if it comes, will be centered on its submarine force, a threat against which the DD(X) is irrelevant.

Secretary ENGLAND. The Navy Staff recently completed a comprehensive review of expected Joint warfighting demands through the 2020 time frame and their associated capability and capacity requirements. The Navy conducted extensive campaign analysis, against a wide spectrum of potential scenarios including some with stressing submarine threats, to determine the sufficient mix of capabilities required for success. As with previous analysis, a mix of platforms (ships and aircraft), sensors and networks was required for success against a robust submarine threat. DD(X)'s transformational capabilities, particularly in terms stealth and its advanced sensors, made significant contributions to the overall success of the Joint force.

Successfully defending the Joint Maritime force from submarines requires a myriad of systems including the P–8A (MMA), MH–60R, attack submarines, and ships including DD(X). These platforms, augmented with a number of off-board distributed sensors and integrated through a sophisticated system of networks, will provide the defense in-depth required to protect the Sea Base in any operation. Although primarily tasked with providing Naval Surface Fire Support to the Joint force in the littoral battlespace, the multi-mission DD(X)'s inherent stealth and advanced sensors will make it significantly less vulnerable to enemy submarines while enabling it to locate and attack threat submarines. DD(X) is a critical component of the Navy's transformational roadmap and it will deliver advanced capabilities across all warfare areas and serve as a technology feeder for other future platforms like CG(X) and CVN–21.

Mr. MARSHALL. How does the proposed defense program address the existing and emerging threats to national security?

- The V–22 Osprey, which has caused numerous deaths and excessive cost overruns and which suffers from unresolved development issues while offering only marginal advantages compared to existing helicopters.

Secretary ENGLAND. The V–22 Osprey was granted full rate production in September 2005. The aircraft can fly twice the speed, cover six times the range, and lift three times the payload of the legacy aircraft it is replacing. The V–22 is on track to achieve Initial Operational Capability in 2007 and is scheduled to deploy in support of combat operations during the same year.

Even as we expedite the fleet introduction of the Osprey, we continue to pursue programs which further reduce the cost of the aircraft. The V–22 Program has a

robust cost reduction program to include a planned 5 year multi-year procurement program commencing in FY08 (with FY07 Economic Order Quantity/Cost Reduction Initiatives (CRI) investment). The last four lots procured have met or exceeded our affordability targets. Through cost reduction initiatives, lean manufacturing, and a multi-year procurement strategy, the program is well-leveraged to meet its procurement objectives.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Abercrombie's question on Northern Command really did get me to thinking. I'd like to request for the record a list of what elements, be it people, be it material, whatever, the Northern Command supplied to south Mississippi in the days prior to and let's say 30 days after the hurricane. I think that's a fair question.

Secretary ENGLAND. Two days prior to Katrina landfall (27 August 2006), U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) designated Naval Air Station Meridian, MS as a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) operational staging area and deployed a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO), Colonel Damon Penn, to Jackson, MS to co-locate at the State Emergency Operations Center with the Federal Coordinating Officer, Mr. Bill Carwile.

One day prior to landfall, the Air Force Emergency Communications team (Hammer Ace) arrived at Keesler AFB, MS to provide communication support for the base which was in Hurricane Katrina's path.

On 30 August, USNORTHCOM deployed search and rescue helicopters, established Joint Task Force Katrina at Camp Shelby, MS and had the DCO staff located in Jackson, MS. USNORTHCOM provided helicopter transport to the FEMA preliminary damage assessment teams.

By 31 August, over 36 helicopters and the USNS COMFORT were en route to Mississippi to provide transportation and medical support. A 125-person Navy Construction Battalion (SEABEE) unit was in place at Gulfport-Biloxi, MS. On 1 September, a helicopter delivered relief supplies to the Special Boat Team—22 (SBT–22) at Stennis, MS and another helicopter moved to Keesler AFB to provide transportation support. Additionally, there were airdrops of Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) and potable water along the Gulf Coast.

On 2 September, Keesler AFB was designated as an operational staging base for FEMA and the Gulfport SEABEES cleared debris. USNORTHCOM began purchasing pharmaceuticals and medical supplies for the Mississippi Department of Health and contracted a passenger ship to provide lodging for disaster victims and responders.

On 3 September, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit was designated Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force and sent to the Gulf Coast. They moved to Stennis Space Center on 4 September and received support from the USS IWO JIMA. The Army Reserve Center in Greenwood, MS was authorized as a shelter on 4 September and four water purification units were sent to the Hancock Medical Center and the Jackson County Singing River Hospital.

By 5 September, one week after landfall, five C–5s flew to Gulfport with 320 short-tons of MREs. The USS WHIDBEY ISLAND and the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit arrived at Gulfport, MS. The USS HARRY S. TRUMAN provided helicopter staging support off the coast of Biloxi, MS. The U.S. Army Reserve Center in Laurel, MS was used as a shelter for relief workers. By the first week after Katrina landfall, the Department of Defense (DOD) had delivered 700,000 liters of water, 2.6 million pounds of ice and 900,000 MREs in Mississippi.

During the following week, 6–12 September, the 1st & 8th Marines were at Stennis Space Center and a mobile micro-bacteria lab relocated to at Camp Shelby. The Navy Mobile Construction Battalions 7 & 133 removed debris, reopened piers, worked in the Emergency Operations Center and established staging areas in Gulfport and Biloxi. In Pascagoula, the USS GRAPPLE began clearing the channel, the USNS COMFORT moored and provided medical support and the USS BATTAN crew supplied food and medical relief. Vicksburg U.S. Army Reserve Center had provided overflow classroom support for the Mississippi school system. By the end of the second week, DOD had delivered over 10.8 million liters of water, 60.2 million pounds of ice and 8.5 million MREs to the citizens of Mississippi.

From 13–19 September, DOD delivered an additional 320 short-tons of MREs to Gulfport and the 54th Quartermaster Company (Mortuary Affairs) had personnel at Camp Shelby. Two Armed Forces Institute of Pathology DNA teams flew in to assist the coroners in Gulfport, MS. The USS HARRY S. TRUMAN and the USS

WHIDBEY ISLAND were released and departed for home station. Aerial bug spraying for medical abatement began in Gulfport.

From 20–26 September, in response to the Mississippi Governor's request for firefighting support, DOD flew C–130s with the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting Systems from Idaho to provide aerial firefighting support. Two berthing barges were provided to support up to 600 people with food, water, shelter, medical assistance and counselors. DOD sent communication packages to the emergency departments of the cities of Pearlington, Bay St. Louis, Gulfport, Biloxi, Ocean Springs and Pascagoula.

USNORTHCOM also coordinated humanitarian assistance from Canada, Mexico, the Netherlands and France. The USS BATAAN directed support operations of Canadian, Dutch and Mexican ships; Canadian and French divers; as well as Mexican Marines in Pascagoula and other areas impacted in Mississippi.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ

Mr. ORTIZ. Preventing the acquisition or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction is a key goal of our Nation's defense. However, on page 33 of the report, you cite the following: "Based on the demonstrated ease with which uncooperative states and non-state actors can conceal WMD programs and related activities, the United States, its allies and partners must expect further intelligence gaps." Shouldn't one of the goals of the Department [be] to close those intelligence gaps? Why didn't the QDR address this?

Secretary ENGLAND. The 2006 QDR placed emphasis on closing Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) gaps, particularly relating to WMD. Specifically, the report emphasized the need for improved capabilities in the following areas: locate, tag, and track WMD; detecting fissile material; persistent surveillance over wide areas; and human intelligence. However, despite anticipated improvements in these areas, intelligence gaps will likely persist: if there is any area in which we expect high levels of secrecy and deception on the part of potential adversaries, it is with regard to their WMD development and capabilities.

Mr. ORTIZ. The QDR discusses changes in DOD to improve its capabilities to provide foreign assistance and conduct homeland security missions. Yet, the Department is not the lead agency for either activity. What changes are the Departments of State and Homeland Security making to improve their capabilities in this area? If these Departments improve their abilities, will the Department of Defense then forego some of the changes it proposes in the QDR?

Secretary ENGLAND. The QDR emphasized the importance of unity of effort with interagency and international partners. We are working collaboratively with the Departments of State and Homeland Security to improve unity of effort across the U.S. Government. U.S. national security interests are well-served by having more capable civilian agencies to address challenges at home and abroad, whether those challenges take the form of natural disasters or complex stabilization missions. For this reason, the Department urges Congress to increase funding for State Department efforts, including State's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability. Improvements that the Department of Defense and our interagency partners make are complementary and strengthen our collective ability to face 21st century challenges. The QDR Report emphasized "[s]upporting and enabling other agencies, working toward common objectives, and building the capacity of partners" as indispensable elements of the Department's mission. As partners become more capable, roles and responsibilities may be reassessed.

Mr. ORTIZ. The QDR envisions a Navy with new missions and some expansion of current missions. It also anticipates an expansion of Special Operations Forces and Marine missions. How do you reconcile that with the recent closure decisions to ensure that we don't close new bases such as Naval Station Ingleside and then spend millions more recreating a facilities capability that the Department of Defense already has available?

Secretary ENGLAND. The BRAC's recommendations became part of the foundation of the QDR, just as the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy did. As with the BRAC, the QDR aimed to achieve economies of scale by promoting joint and multi-Service solutions, without sacrificing needed capability. BRAC outcomes and operational demands of the 21st century are consistent with the ongoing reorientation of Navy, Marine Corps, and Special Operations communities, as reflected in the QDR.

Addendum: In the case of Naval Station Ingleside, this installation was closed to reduce excess infrastructure and to create a center of excellence for undersea warfare at a fleet concentration area. This reorganization removes the mine warfare

community from a location that is remote from the Fleet, thereby better supporting the shift to organic mine warfare.

Mr. ORTIZ. The QDR recommends changes to stop terrorist attacks on the U.S. and outlines initiatives to address irregular warfare. How do we ensure that the rhetoric matches the reality? For instance, maritime security has obviously been front and center in the public eye lately, clearly indicating the concern about port security against attack. We also know that SOUTHCOM tracks significant traffic (arms, drugs, people) moving north out of their AOR, but we lose sight of that traffic once we get into Mexico and under the auspices of NORTHCOM. Yet once we implement the latest round of BRAC, we will have zero active duty surface naval bases located in the Gulf of Mexico. How do you envision working with the Department of Homeland Security to clearly define your roles and missions and ensure that the Gulf of Mexico region is not left without sufficient surface maritime presence to deter attacks potentially emanating from that area? How does this relate to the plan to expand the WMD capabilities for a domestic mission?

Secretary ENGLAND. Recognizing the complexity of operating in the approaches to, as well as within, the US, the QDR called for expanding dialogue and collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security. In the maritime approaches, the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard work closely together, both in practice and in training and exercises. In December 2004, DOD and DHS signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) that incorporated the U.S. Coast Guard in support of DOD maritime homeland defense operations. This MoA established a joint command, control, and coordination structure using existing DOD and U.S. Coast Guard operations centers. The Secretary of Defense approved a new USNORTHCOM Maritime Homeland Defense Execute Order in June 2005, which allocated forces, established procedures and coordination requirements, and articulated rules of engagement to counter threats to the U.S. homeland, including WMD proliferation. Finally, DOD and DHS signed an additional MoA that emphasized DOD support to U.S. Coast Guard maritime homeland security operations in April 2006. Close coordination is essential to our ability to interdict terrorists and others, possibly with WMD materiel and components, attempting to enter the United States via maritime approaches such as the Gulf of Mexico.

Mr. ORTIZ. What do you think of the proposed changes to the way in which the DOD should interact with foreign governments and military forces? What force does that leave for the Department of State? In particular, what does this mean in terms of shifting cost balances as described on page 18 of the QDR?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. The discussion on page 18 of the QDR refers to the ability of radical Islamists to impose disproportionate costs on the United States. It provides an example of the 9/11 attacks, which cost about a million dollars to mount, but caused over $40 billion in annual spending by the U.S. government to prevent a repetition. This represents a 40,000:1 cost ratio imbalance.

In response, the QDR advocates seeking opportunities to impose disproportionate costs on the enemy. Unfortunately, while this concept makes sense, the QDR offers no insight as to what kinds of costs they might be (e.g., time, resources, casualties, etc.), or how they could be imposed. Nor does the QDR mention whether planning is underway to identify U.S. cost-imposing strategies. One would expect that such planning would include options involving all the instruments of national power, to include diplomacy, strategic communications (e.g., propaganda), military and economic instruments.

Mr. ORTIZ. What do you think of the proposed changes to the way in which the DOD should interact with foreign governments and military forces? What force does that leave for the Department of State? In particular, what does this mean in terms of working with international allies and partners, as discussed on page 87 of the QDR?

Dr. KREPINEVICH. This section addresses DOD's intention to increase its ability to build "partner capacity," a term that connotes training and equipping foreign forces, be they allies or friendly states threatened by aggression (especially from radical Islamists). The DOD does not elaborate on how much funding will be required, nor does it establish the force within the U.S. military structure necessary to train large numbers of foreign troops to build partner capacity.

The role left for the Department of State is unclear. During the Cold War, U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) were deployed to many foreign countries to build partner capacity. They reported to the ambassador, as well as to the Defense Department. The Department of State may be involved in a similar manner if and when the DOD establishes similar programs.

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