[Senate Hearing 109-93]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-93
U.S. TSUNAMI WARNING SYSTEM AND S. 50, ``THE TSUNAMI PREPAREDNESS ACT
OF 2005''
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 2, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
22-845 WASHINGTON : 2005
_________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free
(866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail:
Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Co-
CONRAD BURNS, Montana Chairman
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas Virginia
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BARBARA BOXER, California
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
JIM DeMint, South Carolina FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Lisa J. Sutherland, Republican Staff Director
Christine Drager Kurth, Republican Deputy Staff Director
David Russell, Republican Chief Counsel
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Samuel E. Whitehorn, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and General
Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Policy Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on February 2, 2005................................. 1
Statement of Senator Cantwell.................................... 53
Prepared statement........................................... 56
Statement of Senator DeMint...................................... 51
Statement of Senator Inouye...................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Statement of Senator E. Benjamin Nelson.......................... 46
Statement of Senator Smith....................................... 49
Prepared statement........................................... 51
Statement of Senator Stevens..................................... 1
Letter, dated February 1, 2005 to Hon. Ted Stevens from Jane
T. Dana, Acting General Counsel, Department of Commerce.... 13
Witnesses
Bement, Jr., Dr. Arden L., Director, National Science Foundation. 21
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Cox, Dr. Daniel, Director, O.H. Hinsdale Wave Research
Laboratory, Oregon State University............................ 58
Prepared statement........................................... 59
Frist, Hon. Bill, Senate Majority Leader, U.S. Senate............ 2
Groat, Charles G., Director, U.S. Geological Survey.............. 31
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Hansen, Roger A., Professor, University of Alaska Fairbanks;
Director, Alaska Earthquake Information Center................. 69
Prepared statement........................................... 71
Kelly, Brigadier General John J., U.S. Air Force (Retired),
Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)......... 14
Prepared statement of Vice Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher, Jr... 16
Landrieu, Hon. Mary L., U.S. Senator from Louisiana.............. 5
Marburger, III, Dr. John H., Director, Office of Science and
Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President........... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Shea, Eileen L., Project Coordinator, East-West Center, Honolulu,
Hawaii......................................................... 63
Prepared statement........................................... 65
Letter with Attachments, dated February 9, 2005 to Senators
Stevens and Inouye......................................... 77
Appendix
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California, prepared
statement...................................................... 83
Carlson, Doug, Honolulu, Hawaii, prepared statement.............. 83
Response to letter dated February 7, 2005 from Chairman Stevens
and Co-Chairman Inouye to:
Dr. Arden L. Bement, Jr...................................... 107
U.S. Geological Survey....................................... 111
Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr...................... 94
Response to written questions submitted to Dr. Arden L. Bement,
Jr., by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 109
Hon. Mark Pryor.............................................. 110
Response to written question submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Roger A. Hansen................................................ 118
Response to written questions submitted to Charles G. Groat by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 121
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye........................................ 127
Hon. Mark Pryor.............................................. 128
Response to written questions submitted to Brigadier General John
J. Kelly by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 88
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye........................................ 85
Hon. Mark Pryor.............................................. 91
Response to written questions submitted to Dr. John H. Marburger,
III by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 101
Hon. John McCain............................................. 99
Hon. Mark Pryor.............................................. 103
U.S. TSUNAMI WARNING SYSTEM AND S. 50, ``THE TSUNAMI PREPAREDNESS ACT
OF 2005''
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
The Chairman. Welcome to our first hearing. We're honored
to have Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist and, soon, Senator
Mary Landrieu here to testify on their recent trip to the
countries impacted by the Indian Ocean tsunami. We do thank
them for their willingness to come.
In 1994, Senator Inouye and I, along with Senator Hatfield
of Oregon, directed NOAA to develop the National Tsunami Hazard
Mitigation Program. We had had a tsunami in 1968, after the
earthquake. But this was in response to a small tsunami that
impacted the West Coast. It reflected the concern we all shared
about the frequency of tsunamis in the Pacific. This bill is
intended to build on the current tsunami warning network that
we have in the Pacific.
I thank the witnesses for being here today.
Let me yield to Senator Inouye, our Co-Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
Senator Inouye. I'd like to join our Chairman in welcoming
our distinguished panel of witnesses, especially the Leader, as
they testify on a catastrophe that has left the world in shock,
and governments scrambling to react.
We all saw the devastation, the incredible human suffering,
and the obliteration of entire communities. The destruction hit
everyone and everything in its path, without regard to national
or ethnic identity, level of economic development, or
technological sophistication.
Our response, as a global community, must, similarly, cut
across superficial distinctions among nations and people. Our
response, however, must not be a disorderly surge of activity
and investment dictated by emotions.
Mr. Chairman, may I request that the rest of my statement
be made part of the record?
[The prepared statement of Senator Inouye follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, U.S. Senator from Hawaii
I would like to join our Chairman in welcoming our distinguished
panel of witnesses today. As they testify on a catastrophe that has
left the world in shock, and governments scrambling to react. The
tsunami that struck the coasts of the Indian Ocean struck without
regard to national or ethnic identity, level of economic development,
or technological sophistication. I believe that our response as a
global community must similarly cut across superficial distinctions
among nations and peoples.
That response, however, must not be a disorderly surge of activity
and investment dictated by emotions. Rather, we must study carefully
the nature of the threat of tsunami, assess our capacity for detecting
and forecasting these natural disasters, and make a plan that both
makes sense, and is sustainable over time.
Protecting human life and property from natural disaster requires
the ability to reliably detect and forecast, the capacity to broadcast
warnings in a timely and informative manner, and the knowledge in
communities of how to respond and evacuate to safety. Above all,
however, it requires the willingness to invest resources to prepare for
a threat that is largely unseen and unpredictable--until the last
moment, when a monstrous wave actually strikes.
As we came to understand the broader threat that tsunami posed, Ted
Stevens and I worked together in 1994 to direct the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to develop a Tsunami Hazard
Mitigation Program. We are pleased to report that this program has laid
the foundation for tsunami preparedness in the Pacific. The National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has taken the lead in this
effort with support from other federal partners, such as the U.S.
Geological Survey, and the National Science Foundation. We look forward
to hearing reports and testimony from these agencies as they describe
where their work has brought us today.
The appalling scope of the Indian Ocean tragedy illustrates the
importance and necessity of our work of the past 10 years, and with
stark clarity, we can see that despite our best efforts, much remains
to be done. Now, as before, Senator Stevens and I have come together to
lead the charge toward national and international tsunami preparedness
by introducing our bill, S. 50, the Tsunami Preparedness Act, which
many of our colleagues here in this room have chosen to cosponsor.
I hope that today's testimony will shed additional light on how we
may further improve our bill and come to grips with national and global
tsunami preparedness. In particular, I look forward to the testimony of
Ms. Eileen Shea, an authority on risk management in the Pacific. Her
report on how the Pacific community has come together to form a
family--or ``ohana''--in order to pool resources for disaster
preparedness will be most informative. I welcome her perspectives on
how our risk management ohana can integrate tsunami preparedness into
an overall portfolio of planning and preparation.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Unless there's objection, we'll have Senators make their
statements after the Leader and Senator Landrieu make their
statements.
Welcome. Dr. Frist, we welcome your statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL FRIST, SENATE MAJORITY LEADER, U.S.
SENATE
Senator Frist. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman and Senator Inouye, Members of the Committee,
it is a real honor for the two of us to present to you, and to
share some of our findings on a trip that we made, very early,
to the tsunami region. We had a wonderful opportunity to see
the very best of compassion and caring expressed and, at the
same time, witness the devastation, destruction, sorrow, and
the pain that we all know characterized this tsunami. Thanks
for holding this hearing as we look at ways to prevent, as well
as to respond to, disasters such as the tsunami. This is a very
important hearing.
Senator Landrieu and I, on the spur of the moment, did
leave the United States to witness this destruction,
predominantly in Sri Lanka. As mentioned, 150,000 people, at
least, have died, over five million homes destroyed, thousands
remain missing. A real focus on children, will be reflected in
both of our comments.
Many of the nations' first responders came to help. But I
have to say, right up front, it gives us a great deal of pride
to watch our Marines, very early on, as part of the 12,000 to
15,000 military personnel who responded quickly with usable
forces. It was very impressive to see them coming, moving
debris, working with USAID, working in a very cohesive fashion.
The destruction is exactly as described. I have a slide up.
It's a little bit shaded, because it's taken through the window
of an airplane, but the coast is there. You can see, for those
several hundred meters, there's total destruction. What was
amazing is, when you flew in a helicopter, there's no end to
it. It goes for miles--10 miles, 20 miles, 50 miles, 100 miles,
1,000 miles.
Much remains to be done. Much has been done already. We
have psychological trauma that is going to take years to deal
with. We have shelter needs that will take years to deal with.
The immediate recovery and response, indeed, was quite
impressive.
Amidst all the tragedy, what was clear to me is that, in
terms of the response, it was not the absence of food, because
food was provided fairly quickly, and not the absence of
hospitals, although they were overcrowded, but it was the
access to something as basic as water, that we all take for
granted. What happened with the tsunami, the wells that people
had were filled with saltwater, which is not potable water. You
had water buckets that were washed away totally; therefore,
people, however they got their water initially, were not able
to do that.
We had a focus on water. I have a slide up right now that
shows the aid that's delivered really typifies everybody coming
together, with USAID written on the side of that package. You
see Sri Lankan physicians from the Sri Lankan Red Cross there,
aid delivered from around the country in the background there,
the types of quarters in refugee camps, schools that were taken
over to house many people.
Quick action was taken; and, therefore, we didn't see
epidemics of malaria or pooling of water that might have
resulted. Dredging took place. So as water came in and washed
in, early dredging prevented those pools of water from which
malaria could have arisen, from which typhoid fever could have
arisen, a breeding ground for mosquitoes.
Now we need to look at long-term solutions, which is part
of what this hearing is today.
One area that I want to focus on is this area of public
health, particularly as it does relate to water. The conditions
that we witnessed in the tsunami's aftermath are common
conditions around the world. There's about 1.2 billion people
who don't have access to potable water today. That will result,
probably, in about 135 million deaths over the next 15 to 20
years, all because of this lack of access to clean water.
Three proposals that I'd like to mention:
First, clean water should be, ought to be, a major priority
in our development programs, the U.S. development programs. And
they're not. Today, we spend about 3 percent of our
international development and humanitarian assistance budget on
water. That's only about $600 million of $20 billion. We must
work to improve the water quality, not only in the areas that
were tsunami-damaged, but, indeed, throughout the world. I
mentioned 1.2 billion people, today, don't have access to clean
water; 2.4 billion people don't have access to basic
sanitation. It applies to children, specifically, because there
are 4 billion cases, diarrheal cases a year, and that results
in 1.8 million deaths of children under the age of 5 each and
every year, something that absolutely can be prevented.
I show this slide because what is in my hand are these
little packets that we had the opportunity to deliver. This
little packet, which costs about 7 cents to make, if we had put
in any kind of water, addresses both bacteria and parasites.
And this little packet costs 7 cents to make, and will give
about 45 days of clean water, which is pretty amazing. This
shows that there are inexpensive solutions that we need to be
both mobilized up to develop, which we have--this is just 1 of
about 4 types of packets like this--but also to be able to
distribute very, very quickly, and that was one of the things
that Senator Landrieu and I had the opportunity to do.
No. 2, we, I believe, need to use medical assistance and
public health as a currency for peace as we engage others
around the world. We've missed it in the past, but I believe
medicine and public health can be used as a vital tool for
international diplomacy as we look ahead and decide how to
spend our resources.
The assistance that we give other nations has its greatest
impact when it is on the ground, when it touches individuals in
very intimate and in very personal ways, at the community
level.
I throw this slide in here, because this is a hospital that
we visited, and this is one of the victims from the tsunami who
had come in. You see the Sri Lankan physicians, in the past we
met Scandinavian physicians, they all make a difference,
directly impacting people's lives, with their expertise, but
also by reaching out and touching people in a very intimate
way. And we have missed it. We don't have any national or
international programs now that focus on what I will come back
to, and that is a global health corps.
I do intend to promote a new version of the type of Peace
Corps that we reach out very directly as a global health corps.
It would bring together medical professionals, it would bring
together people in this country who want to donate a period of
time. It might be a month, it might be 6 months, it might be a
year, in terms of technology and expertise in public health and
medicine, and it also would allow them to come back to this
country and help educate us and the American people. When you
look at the big, big killers that are out there today, it is
still infectious disease. It is HIV/AIDS. It is malaria. It is
tuberculosis. So it is a win-win for everyone. This global
health corps, I'll be talking more about in the future, but at
least wanted to introduce the concept.
So, No. 1, water should be injected into our development
policy in foreign aid. And, No. 2, let's begin to think of
using medicine and public health as a currency for peace, part
of our diplomacy. And a good way to start that is a global
health corps.
Third, and last, we should leverage private dollars to
develop water infrastructure around the world. We've done it
pretty well in the United States of America, but we have not
done it elsewhere around the world. We are the Nation who can
do that. Private companies, not state entities, will ultimately
do the hard work of providing clean, potable water.
In the tsunami-ravaged areas, we saw private businesses,
big and small, respond and assist in everything from water
purification, through packets like this, to logistics. And what
we can do, and should do, is leverage those private dollars
into the field, looking for ways to develop, and ways we can do
it, and certain models to develop, private/public partnership
to inject this capital and help people with their water
projects.
In closing, I'll just show this one slide. Again, this was
from our trip, because it was one of the clinics that we
visited. And there are two children there, because, as Senator
Landrieu will say, this tsunami had a huge impact on children.
It reminds me of the medical response. These two kids were
sleeping in the same bed, because the infrastructure is not
fully developed. And as we reinvest in these parts of the
world, I hope that we can inject both water infrastructure, as
well as public-health infrastructure.
We have much to do. We've got to be bold. I think this
hearing is a great start to look both at prevention and
appropriate response. The first steps, indeed, can be quite
modest. I do hope that my colleagues will support these
proposals in responding with water as a major priority in
development assistance; No. 2, a global health corps; and, No.
3, policy which will leverage private and public dollars to the
benefit of kids like this that are sitting with me in the
hospital.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Landrieu?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARY L. LANDRIEU,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure
for me to join Senator Frist today and give very brief
comments, because he's covered so much of what we realized on
the trip.
Let me begin just by thanking you, acknowledging a new
Member of this Committee, Senator David Vitter, who I'm sure
will be joining us shortly. His willingness to tackle complex
problems will, no doubt, continue the impressive work of
Senator John Breaux, who served for many years, and most
admirably, on this Committee.
I want to just ditto, if I could, the points made by
Senator Frist, but add a few new points, if I could.
Jokingly, I told him I'd be happy to accompany him on this
trip, if he did not require me to go in any operating room,
which, I'm pleased to report, he lived up to his end of the
bargain.
Senator Frist. But we got close.
Senator Landrieu. Well, we got close, but he--I was
successful in staying out of the operating rooms.
But I want to thank you for your introduction of the
Tsunami Warning System bill, which we're here to testify on
today, our need to invest in coastal communities, and the
immediate and long-term impact of this tragedy on children and
families.
First, I would like to say that it's hard to describe the
destruction in words. Truly. Not just the intensity of it, but
the expanse of the coastline affected. In an instant, Mr.
Chairman, thousands of people and structures on miles of
coastline were simply eliminated, swallowed up, washed away by
a massive surge of water. The only warning that millions of
people had was the ominous and awe-inspiring retreat of the
ocean's waters, revealing hundreds of feet of sand and beach.
Then, in a rush of water, the magnitude of this force wiped out
3,000 miles of shoreline, and carried with it the homes and
lives of hundreds of thousands of people.
To give those in our country a better understanding of the
magnitude, this chart would be helpful. I've tried to explain
this. It would be as if you took an eraser, started at
Galveston, Texas, and just erased the coastline all the way up
to Bar Harbor, Maine, back as long as a football field, in some
instances, or a fourth of a mile to a mile in other instances,
eliminated.
The most amazing thing that we saw was actually the fact
that the palm trees survived. I've been through many hurricanes
in my life, as many of you all have--and, Mr. Chairman,
yourself, you've witnessed a lot of the weather's ferociousness
in Alaska--but Senator Frist and I commented, as we flew over
this coastline, mile and mile, that the palm trees managed to
just bend with the wave, and after the wave receded, came back
up. But there were no homes or people or structures underneath
the palm trees, themselves.
It reminds me to testify, this morning, that we should
think of our coastal communities like palm trees, and build
them in a way that they can weather these inevitable natural
disasters, whether they be tsunamis or hurricanes or the surge
of saltwater intrusion. With adequate and improved warning,
better planning, and more robust investments in the right kind
of infrastructure, our coastal communities here in America and
around the world will continue to grow and thrive decade after
decade.
Above all, these astonishing images. While the death toll
was staggering--it could be over 150,000, 226,000, it's going
to be hard to actually get an accurate estimate, of course; in
many of these countries the census is not as sophisticated as
ours--and over 500,000 were injured. But while the death toll
is staggering, it is also extremely disturbing to realize that
many of these people could have been saved, even with minimal
time involved. People could have simply walked to safety.
Experts say that oceans may give people as much as 5-minute
warnings to escape to higher ground. Five minutes could have
saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Mr. Chairman, even the
smallest of toddlers and the most frail of seniors can walk the
length of a football field, out of the reach of this wave.
So I'm pleased to lend my support and eye-witness accounts
to the Tsunami Preparedness Act. This legislation will improve
methods of detecting and warning coastal residents about
tsunamis, establish important mitigation programs, enhance our
research, and assist our friends abroad, as Senator Frist said,
and build peace.
But warning, Mr. Chairman, is not enough. We must also
invest and reinvest in our natural barriers, and constantly
review our evacuation routes. This giant wave, not only killed
a quarter of a million people, it also, as I said, obliterated
the natural coastal barriers in the region. The United Nations
Environmental Program estimates the damage to the environment
could topple 675 million in loss of natural habitat, an
important ecosystem function. This number could not only--
should not only concern environmentalists that seek the worthy
goal of preserving nature's wonders, it should also concern
those whose safety and economic livelihood depend on these
barriers being intact. We know something about that in
Louisiana, and so do you in Alaska. Restoring the reefs and
barrier islands and shorelines of these areas will help long-
term disaster risk reduction. Without the barriers that act as
nature's own line of defense against flooding, storm surges,
waves, hurricanes, and even tsunamis, human lives are at risk.
Mr. Chairman, as I told you, from Louisiana, I know how
vulnerable coastal communities are. 122 million people in
America, 53 percent, live in coastal counties or parishes. The
most common threat to these communities is the rapid rise of
the water tables, hurricanes, saltwater intrusion.
I'd like to show the next chart, briefly, and then end with
just one or two comments.
In the same area that I showed, the areas in red are
basically areas in our southern part of the country that are
below sea level. And I'm sorry I did not have the charts for
the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts. But just the Gulf Coast
region will show you, in red, it is 1.5 meters below sea level.
I ask this Committee, as we pass this legislation, what
have we done if we warn people of danger, but don't help them
escape it? In the hurricanes that ravaged Florida and the Gulf
Coast region last year, people left their homes, only to get
stuck in gridlock on highways trying to escape the 150-200
mile-and-hour winds that were projected along the Gulf Coast.
So I ask, as you all look forward, not only to this piece
of legislation, but in the Oceans Act or oceans legislation
that is emerging from the recent study, to think carefully
about that. While our work here today will focus on warning, we
must also focus on what this disaster means, or disasters like
this could mean, to our own communities in Louisiana.
And, finally, one sentence, Mr. Chairman, about the
families. Nations are, in fact, built on roads and
infrastructure and railroads. But nations are primarily built
on families, strong families, united, protective of one
another, and focused on building and protecting their
communities. Everything we do, in this Committee or the Foreign
Ops Committee or in any other Committee in this Congress,
should be focused on rebuilding these 11 nations, family by
family, picking the one child that was left, uniting them with
the one aunt that was left, finding the one grandfather that
may still have a fishing boat intact, and trying to put them
together to help rebuild these nations, and, in doing so,
remind ourselves that building families in America is the best
way we can assure our future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you both very much.
Leader, last year in the Foreign Operations appropriations
bill, we put $100 million in there as an add-on to start a
program for clean water throughout the world, fashioned after
the system that we started in Alaska to deal with the 240-odd
villages in Alaska that, until recently, did not have clean
water and sewer. We figure that the cost is about $2,000 a
well. As we go into places like African villages, it's much
less than what's in our state. But I do believe we should
followup on your idea with regard to try and find a way to deal
with this access-to-clean-water problem. And it's--I don't know
how much of it's within the jurisdiction of this Committee, but
we're going to take a look and try to work with you on that
aspect.
Does anyone have any comment or a statement to make to the
Senators?
[No response.]
The Chairman. We thank you both very much.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We look forward to working with you----
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman.--on this legislation.
Senator Frist. I do appreciate that focus in
appropriations, just real quickly, because I think every
Committee needs to go back and look, because we've had this
lack of coordination, and we absolutely know that that well,
for $2,000, going back to what Senator Landrieu closed on, has
an economic impact, has an impact on family. It is a huge
women's issue throughout Africa. We traveled throughout
Mozambique, had a large bipartisan group, last year, and,
indeed, when you talk to women who are walking 3 to 4 hours a
day, each day, for water, and you look at their children, you
see the huge economic, social, and family impact that a simple
well, $2,000, can have on a community.
So thank you for your leadership there.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Appreciate you both
being here.
Our second panel of witnesses are Jack Marburger, the
Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy; John
Kelly, the Deputy Under Secretary for Commerce for Oceans and
Atmospheres; Dr. Arden Bement, Director of the National Science
Foundation; and Dr. Charles Groat, the Director of the U.S.
Geological Survey.
We do thank you for being here today, and would urge you to
take your positions.
I must state to Members and to the audience that Admiral
Lautenbacher, sadly, is seriously ill and cannot be with us. We
will schedule another time for him to appear. But we do send
our best wishes to him.
May we proceed in the way that I presented your names,
gentlemen? Your statements will be printed, in full, in the
record, and we ask you to summarize them as concisely as you
are able to do so. It's a highly technical subject, so we do
not want to shut you off or limit you unnecessarily.
Mr. Marburger?
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN H. MARBURGER, III, DIRECTOR,
OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT
Dr. Marburger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee. Thank you for inviting me today to discuss the
Administration's plans for the U.S. Tsunami Warning System.
I'll keep my oral remarks short. Thank you for including my
written testimony in the record.
I, too, have just returned from the tsunami-devastated
area. And I, too, was sobered by the extent by the extensive
damage I saw there.
I attended a ministerial meeting on regional cooperation on
tsunami early warning arrangements in Phuket, Thailand. Science
ministers from approximately 46 countries were invited,
including all the countries affected by the December 26th
earthquake and tsunami.
The greatest tragedy of this colossal natural disaster is
that many of the deaths, as Senator Frist indicated, could have
been prevented, if only a warning system had been in place to
alert people in harm's way. Preventing deaths in future similar
catastrophes will require a high degree of international
cooperation, and I will mention, later, steps the
Administration has taken, and plans to take in the future, for
securing international cooperation and developing a global
tsunami warning system as part of the Global Earth Observation
System of Systems, or GEOSS.
Mr. Chairman, about 85 percent of tsunamis worldwide occur
in the Pacific Ocean, where life-threatening ones appear about
once per decade. Because of this risk, the U.S. has led in the
development of tsunami detection and monitoring technologies,
and has cooperated since 1968 in the International Coordination
Group for the Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific, which
currently has 26 member countries. This system operates under
the auspices of UNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission, or the IOC.
The world's most advanced tsunami-detection systems, NOAA's
Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami buoys--they're
called ``DART buoys''--are deployed as part of the U.S. Pacific
Tsunami Warning System. The Administration's plan includes
enhancing the existing Pacific Warning System to provide more
comprehensive coverage and faster alerts to broader
populations.
Tsunamis occur less frequently in the Atlantic Ocean, the
Caribbean, and the Indian Ocean, but, obviously, they are still
a threat. Their potential impact is increasing because of the
global migration of populations to coastal areas. By 2025, for
example, approximately 75 percent of the U.S. population will
live in coastal communities.
The current risk, measured by the frequency of occurrence
times the consequences, justifies the investment in expanded
detection warning and disaster-reduction systems. The
Administration's plan, which you will hear more about in other
testimony, will expand our detection and warning capabilities
to the Atlantic and Caribbean, permitting very effective
detection capability in the event of a U.S. coastal tsunami.
Of course, some of the components of a tsunami detection
warning and disaster reduction system are unique to the tsunami
hazard, such as the sensors for deep-ocean detection of tsunami
waves, but much of such a system has value for other hazards,
as well. The communications infrastructure, the emergency
evacuation and response plans, damage-assessment tools, public
education programs, and many other components are relevant, in
general, for disaster preparedness, mitigation, and response.
Many federal agencies cooperate to provide technical
support for tsunami readiness. Those represented here today:
NOAA, USGS, and the National Science Foundation lead the
effort, but agencies like the Department of Homeland Security,
with the Disaster Warning System, and NASA's Satellite Remote
Sensing, also contribute to tsunami detection and warning, as
well as to post-incident damage assessment and response. Such
interagency science and technology activities are coordinated
through the National Science and Technology Council, managed by
my office, to ensure optimal use of public funds.
The U.S. and the international community are well prepared
to create a global tsunami warning system. Catalyzed by the
U.S., the Intergovernmental Group on Earth Observations----
The Chairman. I'm constrained to tell you, we would
appreciate it if you would summarize, that we have another
panel.
Dr. Marburger. this is actually an abbreviated version of
the whole statement.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to thank you for this opportunity.
I'd just indicate that we are cooperating with other nations in
an effective organization. We're ready to carry out the intent
of a bill that is introduced, and Administration plans which
are consistent with that bill.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Marburger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of
Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
The recent tragic earthquake and resulting tsunami in the Indian
Ocean was a natural disaster of almost unimaginable proportion. The
U.S. and the world have responded generously with aid to those who have
been hurt and with resources to assist in assessing and responding to
the damage. What made this event even more tragic is that many of the
deaths were preventable--if only an effective warning system had been
in place to alert the communities that were in harm's way. The
Administration is committed to helping ensure that warning and response
systems are put in place--domestically and internationally--that will
substantially reduce loss of life and property in the future.
The Tsunami Threat
A tsunami is a series of very long, fast-moving waves that can
travel long distances across the open ocean at speeds up to 500 mph. As
the tsunami approaches shore, the successive waves may slow to speeds
of 20-30 mph and grow substantially in height, with the first wave
commonly not the largest or most destructive. Tsunamis are generated by
any rapid, large scale sea disturbance. Approximately 90 percent are
generated by undersea earthquakes, but not all undersea earthquakes
generate tsunamis. They may also be caused by events such as volcanic
eruptions or major landslides.
Approximately 85 percent of tsunamis occur in the Pacific Ocean
because of this ocean's encircling major seismic zones that are
associated with the volcanoes of the ``Pacific Ring of Fire.'' Since
1946, five Pacific Ocean tsunamis have cost the U.S. more than 300
lives and hundreds of millions of dollars in property damage. Because
of the much greater frequency of Pacific Ocean tsunamis, prior U.S. and
global efforts to develop tsunami warning systems have focused on this
region. Since 1968, the U.S. and other Pacific region nations have
cooperated in the International Coordination Group for the Tsunami
Warning System in the Pacific (ICG/ITSU), which currently has 26 member
states. This system operates under the auspices of UNESCO's
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC). Currently, the
world's most advanced tsunami detection systems, NOAA's Deep Ocean
Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami (DART) systems, are deployed in the
U.S. Pacific Tsunami Warning System.
Although less likely, tsunamis have some potential of occurring in
the rest of the world's oceans, including the Indian Ocean, Caribbean,
and Atlantic Ocean. Even though the probability is small, the potential
for tsunami-related loss of life and property is increasing because of
population migrations to coastal areas. The United Nations reports that
already two-thirds of the world's population crowd near the coastline,
and within three decades, if trends continue, 75 percent of humanity
will reside in coastal areas. By 2025 nearly 75 percent of all
Americans are expected to live in coastal counties, many of whom will
be in tsunami risk areas. Given a tsunami's great destructive power,
expanding tsunami protection for U.S. coastal communities and
developing global early detection and warning systems are justified.
While plans to expand the world's tsunami detection and warning
capabilities for global coverage were already in development when the
December 26 tsunami struck, this event has focused international
attention on the need for tsunami detection and warning and has created
opportunities for enhanced international cooperation in developing and
deploying such systems.
Disaster Warning and Reduction Systems
Some of the components of a tsunami detection, warning and disaster
reduction system are unique to the tsunami hazard, such as the sensors
for deep ocean detection of tsunami waves. But, I would like to
emphasize that a great deal of the investment is not confined to
tsunamis alone. The communications infrastructure, emergency evacuation
and response plans, damage assessment tools, public education programs,
and other components are relevant to many types of disasters.
I would like to outline the generic components for a successful
disaster detection, warning, and reduction system, including how these
components relate specifically to the tsunami hazard. A complete system
includes:
Risk assessment, which is enabled by the detailed modeling
of coastline communities and by increased scientific
understanding of the formation and propagation of tsunamis;
Detection, to reliably indicate whether a tsunami has
occurred, avoiding costly false alarms and the associated
erosion of public confidence;
Warning, including the initial issuance; transmission to
affected countries, regions, and communities; and communication
to the affected population;
Activation of a response plan, already in place in the local
communities;
A ``ready public,'' able to respond in an efficient and
timely manner through preparedness education;
Situational awareness, with monitoring of the incident until
an ``all clear'' has been sounded;
Resilient infrastructure, protective shelters, reliable
supply routes, food and water, medical supplies and medical
evacuation procedures; and ultimately
Lessons learned; a post-incident evaluation with feedback to
enable future improvements.
Science and Technology for Tsunami Readiness
Mobilizing federal science and technology to support tsunami
readiness requires the contributions from a number of federal agencies,
and also requires a coordinated approach. The agencies represented here
today, NOAA, USGS, and NSF, lead our tsunami readiness effort, but the
contributions of other agencies, such as the Department of Homeland
Security in disaster warning systems and NASA in satellite remote
sensing, contribute in a variety of ways to tsunami detection and
warning, as well as to post-incident damage assessment and response.
Federal science and technology challenges that draw on the strengths of
more than one agency are coordinated through the National Science and
Technology Council (NSTC). In particular, coordination through the
Subcommittee on Disaster Reduction and the Interagency Working Group on
Earth Observations has been critical in assuring the best use of our
collective capabilities.
Although we are focused here today on what it will take to deploy a
system that will allow faster and more accurate tsunami detection and
warning, I would like to point out some of our other significant
contributions to tsunami warning and disaster reduction:
Our ability to do accurate risk assessment and prediction is
supported by basic research on seismic and tsunami processes as
well as by advances in numerical modeling and simulations of
these processes and of their impact on coastal communities.
Enhanced community warning systems and improved disaster
response capabilities are being developed by FEMA and other
agencies, capitalizing on an ``all hazards'' approach to
disaster-resilience.
Research findings from the social and behavioral sciences
are being employed to improve emergency response planning.
Advanced satellite communications technologies and data
relay allow real-time monitoring of the situation, and
satellite remote sensing images and products are being used by
relief agencies to assess the extent of the damage and
determine where relief efforts are most critical and how best
to carry them out. Satellite images from the December 26
tsunami also provided the first large-scale, open ocean data of
a major tsunami event.
And, tsunami education programs are being developed and used
with at-risk populations, such as NOAA's National Weather
Service TsunamiReady Program that provides public education and
preparedness measures for vulnerable U.S. coastal communities.
Tsunami detection begins with seismic monitoring. The Global
Seismographic Network, which is managed jointly by the USGS and NSF
with international partners, currently has a network of 137 seismic
stations that have been installed around the world in a variety of
configurations. The seismographs detect earthquakes and, judging from
the location, type and magnitude of the earthquake, can indicate the
possible generation of a tsunami. In many areas of the globe, the
presence of a tsunami can only be confirmed as the tsunami nears shore
and is detected by tidal gauges. However, in the Pacific Ocean NOAA has
deployed six Deep Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami (DART)
systems consisting of a seafloor pressure sensor that can detect a
tsunami as it passes and relay the information to a moored surface buoy
for communication via satellite to Tsunami Warning Centers. DART
systems provide earlier and more accurate tsunami detection and
significantly reduce costly false alarms.
U.S. plans for improved initial tsunami detection and warning hinge
on deploying more DART systems to cover at-risk areas of the world's
oceans, and on improving the Global Seismographic Network to provide
enhanced coverage as well as improved analysis and communications of
earthquake activity. Additional research into seismic and tsunami
processes, and public education and preparedness programs, are also
essential. The Administration has outlined detailed plans for an
enhanced U.S. system that will provide nearly 100 percent detection
capability for the U.S. coasts, and we have proposed to commit $37.5
million over the next two years to build and deploy this system. You
will hear the details of this proposal from the other members of this
panel.
International Coordination for Tsunami Readiness
Tsunamis and many other naturally occurring phenomena are global in
scale and require international cooperation in response. The
Administration is committed to working with our international partners
on the process of developing a global tsunami detection, warning and
response capability.
In the aftermath of December 26, a number of countries have called
for expanded tsunami warning systems both in the Indian Ocean and
globally. Australia, Germany, Japan, India, China and other countries
quickly announced proposals for establishing early warning systems for
tsunamis or, in the case of China, for all natural disasters. A number
of countries and organizations have also proposed special international
meetings on these topics. We are endorsing and promoting coordination
of efforts among likely key contributors as well as incorporation of
these efforts into existing mechanisms for global cooperation on
disaster warning and reduction.
We propose that coordination be carried out through the
Intergovernmental Group on Earth Observations (GEO). Enhanced Earth
observation was a core element of the 2003 G-8 Evian Action Plan on
Science and Technology for Sustainable Development. The World Summit on
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 also called for greater
integration of Earth observation systems. Responding to this priority,
the U.S. hosted the first Earth Observation Summit in Washington, DC in
July 2003. As a result of this meeting, the GEO was established to
organize the development of a comprehensive, coordinated, and sustained
Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). 56 countries are
currently GEOSS partners, including India, Indonesia and Thailand. All
nations are invited and encouraged to join. GEO has developed a ten-
year plan that is focused on nine societal benefits, including ``reduce
loss of life and property from disasters'' and ``protect and monitor
our ocean resources.'' Once implemented, this plan could not only
revolutionize our understanding of the Earth and how it works, but how
countries cooperate.
It is important to note that UNESCO's Intergovernmental Ocean
Commission (IOC) is a GEO member and the coordinating body of the
existing Tsunami Early Warning System in the Pacific. Efforts to
establish a tsunami early warning system in the Indian Ocean can
benefit from the experience and expertise of the IOC, not only in
coordinating the Pacific Early Warning System, but also in addressing
the full range of ocean and coastal problems through the sharing of
knowledge, information and technology among countries.
At the World Conference on Disaster Reduction, January 18-22, in
Kobe Japan, the U.S. delegation affirmed U.S. commitment to working
with our international partners on a global tsunami warning system. I
have just returned from the Ministerial Meeting on Regional Cooperation
on Tsunami Early Warning Arrangements in Phuket, Thailand, at which we
considered a Thai proposal for developing a regional tsunami early
warning system for the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. The U.S. has
proposed that the development of any regional or global tsunami warning
system--particularly in the Indian Ocean--be coordinated through GEO
and be a top, near-term priority for GEOSS. This discussion will
continue when the Group meets in Brussels, February 14-16 and formally
adopts the GEOSS 10-year implementation plan. After the implementation
plan is ratified by the GEOSS partners in February, specific country
commitments and steps forward will be important topics for the G-8
summit in July 2005.
As part of the strategic planning for this international ``system
of systems,'' the U.S. has developed its own Strategic Plan for the
U.S. Integrated Earth Observation System which, like the international
plan, focuses on the nine societal benefit areas. This strategic plan
was developed by the NSTC Interagency Working Group on Earth
Observations, and provides the essential framework for the U.S.
contribution to the GEOSS implementation plan. The expansion of the
U.S. tsunami warning system will be implemented in the context of this
U.S. Integrated Earth Observation System and as a U.S. contribution to
GEOSS.
I should also mention that Admiral Lautenbacher is the U.S. Co-
Chair of GEO, along with Japan, the European Commission, and South
Africa, and that Dr. Groat is the U.S. representative to GEO. They will
also speak in more detail about the development of GEOSS and the U.S.
contributions to this important international project.
Conclusion
In closing, I would like to quote David Broder of the Washington
Post on this topic: ``Just as the world has managed to put aside
political, religious, and ethnic rivalries to help the victims of this
disaster, so the scientists and environmentalists meeting in Brussels
will have an opportunity to show their foresight in making such
calamities less likely. The United States leadership in this
international effort is a source of pride for the nation.''
The Chairman. We thank you very much. I apologize for the
interruption.
General Kelly, we're pleased to have your statement.
Before your statement, I would place in the record the
letter we received from the General Counsel of your Department
which advises us that the Administration does support this
bill.
[The information referred to follows:]
February 1, 2005
Hon. Ted Stevens,
Chairman,
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This letter provides you with the Department of Commerce's views on
S. 50, the ``Tsunami Preparedness Act''. The recent catastrophic event
in the Indian Ocean highlights the threat tsunamis pose to many coastal
communities, and the need to defend American communities against future
tsunamis. The Department supports the Committee's efforts to strengthen
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) tsunami
detection, forecast, warning, mitigation and education and outreach
programs. In light of this event, as well as this past hurricane
season, the Department believes that we should take this opportunity to
strengthen and clarify NOAA's responsibilities for protecting lives and
property from the broad spectrum of natural hazards the nation faces.
We would like to work with the Committee this year to pass the
Administration's NOAA Organic Act, which provides the necessary
authorities and flexibility for NOAA to effectively and efficiently
carry out its mission, including tsunami warnings.
While the Department supports the Committee's legislative intent to
address tsunamis through the authorization process, we are concerned
that the specificity in the proposed bill could unintentionally limit
NOAA's ability to effectively manage these programs. Our major concerns
are with sections 3(b), which could restrict NOAA's ability to apply
new technologies and techniques, and 3(d)(4), 3(e), 4(c)(6), 6(a)(1),
6(b) and 7(c), which seek to restrict the authority of NOAA and the
Administrator, and which would impair NOAA's ability to manage its own
resources and priorities. Further, we are concerned that S. 50 does not
vest authorities in the Secretary of Commerce, who is responsible for
all Department of Commerce programs.
Finally, the Department requests that all funding authorized for
this purpose be consistent with the amounts contained in the
Administration's proposal for strengthening the U.S. Tsunami Warning
System, which was released on January 14, 2005. The Department of
Commerce appreciates the opportunity to present views on S. 50 and
looks forward to working with you to ensure NOAA has the necessary
authorities to respond effectively to all natural hazards, including
tsunamis.
The Office of Management and Budget has advised that there is no
objection to the transmittal of these views from the standpoint of the
Administration's program.
Sincerely,
Jane T. Dana,
Acting General Counsel
STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN J. KELLY, U.S. AIR FORCE
(RETIRED), DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE FOR OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (NOAA)
General Kelly. Mr. Chairman, thank you for those kind
remarks about my boss. I'll pass them to him, and hopefully
that will help speed his recovery. I know he really wanted to
be here today to talk about this subject, because he keenly
cares about it.
The Chairman. Well, he is a great friend, and we visited
with him when he visited the Hawaii Tsunami Center, just
recently. So we do send our best wishes.
General Kelly. Chairman Stevens, Senator Inouye, Members of
the Committee, I thank you for the opportunity to testify about
NOAA's activities with tsunamis, and I appreciate you
submitting my written remarks and including them in the record.
What I'll briefly focus on this morning is the U.S. Tsunami
Warning Program, how the U.S. can help the world better prepare
for tsunamis, and NOAA's role in the Tsunami Warning Program.
NOAA and its predecessor agencies have provided tsunami
warning services to this nation since 1949. In 1996, as you
mentioned, the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program was
established, and it is a NOAA-led effort, to forge partnerships
with federal and state entities to detect and, most
importantly, prepare for, and respond to, tsunamis.
Your continued support for that program has helped prepare
this nation for the next tsunami in three ways. One, creation
of tsunami flooding and inundation maps; the use of these maps
to establish TsunamiReady committees; and improvements in
tsunami warning services through research, better use of
seismic and deep-ocean tsunami data, and the development of
forecast models. NOAA is proud of the collective
accomplishments that both we, on the federal side, and with our
partners in the states have accomplished, and believe your
investments and NOAA's efforts have already paid big dividends.
Yet the tragedy in the Indian Ocean shows that we need to do
more to accelerate and expand our tsunami preparedness in this
country.
The current Tsunami Warning System consists of two warning
centers, the Richard H. Hagemayer Center, in Hawaii, and the
West Coast Alaska Tsunami Warning Center, in Palmer, Alaska.
These centers are responsible for issuing all tsunami warning/
watch advisory and information messages.
As Dr. Marburger mentioned, NOAA research activities
developed the Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis,
or DART, buoys to measure tsunamis in the deep ocean, and to
transmit this information back to the warning centers. These
instruments accurately characterize the size of a tsunami by
measuring the pressure wave from the deep-ocean floor as it
passes. Tsunamis as small as half a centimeter have been
measured.
In November of 2003, the DART buoys demonstrated their
effectiveness. A large earthquake occurred in the Aleutian
Islands and generated a tsunami. The two warning centers
evaluated the tsunami, based on data from the DART buoy, and
confirmed only a small wave. This accurate prediction of the
non-destructive tsunami is estimated to save the government of
Hawaii about $68 million in preparation costs. We also have
about 100 water gauges used by the Tsunami Warning Center to
provide information on the magnitude of the tsunami.
The NOAA Hagemayer Warning Center also serves as the
operational center for the International Tsunami Warning Center
of the Pacific, which is comprised of 26 nations. The center's
primary responsibility is to issue tsunami warnings in the
Pacific Basin for tsunamis that may cause damage far away from
their source; however, it is the responsibility of the member
nation to issue local warnings.
On Sunday the 26th of December, within 7 minutes of
notification, and within 15 minutes of the Indonesian
earthquake, both centers issued tsunami information bulletins.
However, an effective tsunami warning system requires many
components: one, an assessment of the hazard; two, near-
realtime data; three, highspeed data-analysis capabilities;
four, a highspeed tsunami warning communications system; and,
last, but probably most important, an effective local
communications infrastructure for the timely and effective
dissemination of warning and evacuation requirements.
Unfortunately, such a system does not exist in the Indian
Ocean.
With global attention on this important matter, we have a
great opportunity to better prepare the world for tsunamis
through the development of a Global Earth Observation System of
Systems. The United States has been leading this effort for the
past 2 years. Next month, in Brussels, 54 nations of the world,
and the European Union, will gather together to reach an
agreement that will begin the development of GEOSS.
Vice Admiral Lautenbacher is the co-chair of that effort,
and we are going to work to ensure that the GEOSS's first order
of priority is to develop a global tsunami warning system. It
is my hope that positive changes in technology, education, and
cooperation will emerge from what happened in the Indian Ocean.
The Bush Administration recently announced that we are
committed to completing the current U.S. Tsunami Warning System
by mid-2007. NOAA's contribution to that system includes
modernizing and expanding the existing DART buoy network. We
plan on installing 32 new operational DART buoys--25 in the
Pacific, 7 in the Atlantic and the Caribbean. And, as you well
know, Mr. Chairman, the weather in the Aleutians is a real
challenge, and it complicates our ability to repair the DART
buoys when they malfunction; and so, we are going to place, in
the Aleutian area, in the water, three backup buoys, so if a
primary one goes down, we'll automatically have an ability to
continue to get that data.
We will also procure and install 38 new sea-level
monitoring and tide gauge stations, and expand the operation of
the Alaska and Hawaii Tsunami Warning Centers to 24 hours a
day, 7 days a week. NOAA forecasters will then be better able
to protect the United States, and will be able to alert
communities within minutes of a tsunami-producing effect.
As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the Department of Commerce
does support Senate Bill 50, the Tsunami Preparedness Act, and
you do have the letter of support from the Department.
In closing, I appreciate your efforts to help better
prepare this country for the next tsunami, because it's not a
question of if there will be one, it is when it will be and
where it will be.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Lautenbacher
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher, Jr., U.S. Navy
(Retired), Undersecretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere;
Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for the
opportunity to testify before you regarding the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administrations (NOAA) activities with tsunamis. I am Vice
Admiral (retired) Conrad Lautenbacher, Jr., Undersecretary of Commerce
for Oceans and Atmosphere and NOAA Administrator.
As the world and our Nation mourn the loss of life from the Indian
Ocean tsunami tragedy, we recognize the very real threat of tsunamis
and ask, ``Could it happen here? '' We need to be able to answer that
question with a high degree of confidence.
We know a tsunami can affect any community along the coast of the
United States. This is particularly true for the Pacific coast, where
tsunamis have been more frequent. The recent event in Southeast Asia
and Africa highlights the need to identify steps we can take to
mitigate the potential impact of such an event here at home.
NOAA and its predecessor agencies have provided tsunami warning
services for our Nation since 1949. Following the 1992 Northern
California earthquake/tsunami, Congress asked NOAA to examine tsunami
preparedness of the U.S. West Coast and the National Tsunami Hazard
Mitigation Program (NTHMP) was born. The NTHMP is a NOAA led effort to
forge federal/state partnerships to detect, prepare and respond to
tsunamis. Your continued support for this program has prepared our
country for the next U.S. tsunami in three main ways: (1) Creation of
tsunami flooding/inundation maps using advanced numerical models; (2)
Use of these maps to develop evacuation procedures, road signs to guide
evacuation, educational programs to raise tsunami awareness, and the
establishment of TsunamiReady communities; and (3) Improvements in
tsunami warning services through the use of better seismic and deep
ocean tsunami data and the development of tsunami forecast models. NOAA
is proud of the collective accomplishments of federal partners (USGS,
NSF, and FEMA) along with our state partners (Alaska, California,
Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington). Over the past 8 years we have
identified what needs to be done, but so far there are inundation maps
for only 30 percent of the Pacific states coastline, local communities
are in need of warning dissemination systems, and the NOAA tsunami
warning system needs more deep ocean tsunami detectors to improve
warning services. Your investments and NOAA's efforts to date have paid
large dividends, yet, in the face of the Sumatra tsunami, we believe
our Nation should accelerate and expand our tsunami preparedness
efforts.
In this testimony, I will describe our existing tsunami warning
program, including a brief overview of our work with the International
community; specific actions NOAA took during the recent tsunami; and
then briefly outline the Administration's plan for developing a global
tsunami warning system.
Tsunamis are natural disasters that can form in all of the world's
oceans and inland seas, and in any large body of water near seismic
activity. Each region of the world appears to have its own cycle of
frequency and pattern for generating tsunamis that range in size from
small events (no hazards) to the large and highly destructive events.
Eighty-five percent of tsunamis occur in the Pacific Ocean and its
marginal seas. This is not surprising as the Pacific Basin covers more
than one-third of the earth's surface and is surrounded by a series of
mountain chains, deep-ocean trenches and island arcs called the ``ring
of fire.''
Most seismic activity occurs in this ring of fire where the main
tectonic plates forming the floor of the Pacific collide against one
another or against the continental plates that surround the ocean
basin, forming subduction zones. While tsunamis can be generated by any
sudden pressure source in the water, such as a meteor, landslide, etc.,
most are generated from earthquakes. Large earthquakes can create
tsunamis that may be locally devastating, their energy decays rapidly
with distance. Usually they are not destructive more than a few hundred
kilometers away from their sources. That is not the case with tsunamis
generated by great earthquakes in the North Pacific or along the
Pacific coast of South America. On the average of six times per
century, a tsunami caused by an earthquake in one of these regions
sweeps across the entire Pacific Ocean, is reflected from distant
shores, and sets the entire ocean in motion for days. Although not as
frequent, destructive tsunamis have also been generated in the Atlantic
and the Indian Oceans, the Mediterranean Sea and even within smaller
bodies of water, such as the Sea of Marmara, in Turkey. There have also
been tsunamis in the Caribbean, but the lack of any recent tsunami in
that area has lowered the level of interest and hindered establishing a
warning program in that area.
According to NOAA's National historical tsunami databases, during
the 105-year period from 1900 to 2004:
923 tsunamis were observed or recorded in the Pacific Ocean.
120 tsunamis caused casualties and damage, most near the
source. Of these, at least 10 caused widespread destruction
throughout the Pacific.
The greatest number of tsunamis during any one year was 23
in 1938. While most were minor, one event did result in 17
deaths.
There was no single year during this period that was free of
tsunamis.
19 percent of all tsunamis were generated in or near Japan;
9 percent were generated off Alaska and the west coasts of
Canada and the United States; and 3 percent were generated near
Hawaii.
The U.S. Tsunami Warning System consists of two warning centers:
the Richard H. Hagemeyer Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) in Ewa
Beach, Hawaii; and the West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WC/
ATWC) in Palmer, Alaska. NOAA conducts research on tsunamis, operates
essential ocean buoys and tide gauges to detect tsunamis, and works
with other federal, state, local government agencies and universities
as our partners in the tsunami warning mission.
The Richard H. Hagemeyer Pacific Tsunami Warning Center in Hawaii
was established in 1949 in response to the unpredicted 1946 Aleutian
tsunami, which killed 165 people on the Hawaiian Islands. In 1967, the
West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center in Palmer, Alaska, was created
as a result of the 1964 Great Alaska earthquake and tsunami. These
centers are responsible for issuing all tsunami warning, watch,
advisory, and information messages to emergency management officials
and the public throughout their respective areas of responsibility. The
Pacific Center covers United States interests and territories
throughout the Pacific, including Hawaii, while the West Coast/Alaska
Center covers Alaska, and the west coast of North America from British
Columbia, Canada through California.
About 100 water level gauges are used by the Tsunami Warning
Centers and are operated by the United States and our international
partners. These gauges are along the coasts of islands or continents
around the Pacific Rim. NOAA operates many of these stations, including
33 from NOAA's National Water Level Observation Network in the Pacific
Ocean basin, which are equipped with software to support the Tsunami
Warning System. Water levels from these gauges can be sent directly to
NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers and others who want the information. NOAA
is working to upgrade the nationwide network with a real-time
capability to provide a continuous (minute-by-minute) stream of water
level data for integration with tsunami warning systems and research
applications. NOAA also helps support many coastal gauges located in
other countries around the Pacific.
NOAA operates six Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis
(DART) buoys. NOAA research activities developed these buoys to measure
tsunamis in the deep ocean and to transmit the information back to the
Warning Centers in near real time. These instruments accurately
calculate the size of the tsunami by measuring the pressure it exerts
on the deep ocean floor as the wave passes over. Tsunamis as small as
0.5 cm have been measured. NOAA began placing DART buoys in the Pacific
Ocean in 2002 and plans to have a complete coverage of potential
Pacific tsunami source zones over the next few years.
In November 2003, the buoys demonstrated their effectiveness. A
large earthquake occurred in the Aleutian Islands and generated a
tsunami. The two Tsunami Warning Centers evaluated the tsunami using
coastal gauge data but did not ``stand down'' until a reading arrived
from the nearest DART buoy confirming only a small tsunami. During post
analysis of the event, DART data were used for a model simulation and
the output from the simulation accurately predicted the 2 cm tsunami
recorded at Hilo, Hawaii. This NOAA model is still being developed, but
an initial version will be transferred to the warning centers for test
operations this year. DART data and the forecast model show much
promise to help accurately predict tsunami impacts. In the history of
the Pacific Warning Center, 75 percent of its warnings to Hawaii have
been for non-destructive tsunamis. The DART data combined with forecast
models promise to significantly reduce false alarm rates as well as
provide a better measure of the severity of destructive tsunamis for
Hawaii and all other parts of the Pacific. The accurate forecasting of
a non-destructive tsunami in November 2003 saved Hawaii an estimated
$68M in projected evacuation costs.
The Pacific Center also serves as the operational center for the
International Tsunami Warning System of the Pacific, which is comprised
of 26 member nations of the Pacific Rim. These members share seismic
and water level information with the Pacific Center so the Center can
determine whether a tsunami was generated in the Pacific Basin and
assess its strength. The Pacific Center's primary responsibility is to
issue tsunami warnings for Pacific Basin teletsunamis--tsunamis that
can cause damage far away from their source. It is not the Center's
responsibility to issue local tsunami warnings from seismic events
outside of the United States. For example, if an earthquake occurs off
the coast of Japan and a local tsunami is generated, it is Japan's
responsibility to issue a local tsunami warning. However, it is the
Pacific Center's responsibility to warn all participating Nations in
the Pacific Basin if the Japanese tsunami will cause damage far from
its source.
Only Australia and Indonesia have coastlines bordering both the
Pacific and Indian Ocean coasts. None of the other countries impacted
by the Indian Ocean tsunami have coasts bordering the Pacific Ocean and
therefore they do not receive tsunami bulletins via the automated
dissemination network.
Thailand and Indonesia are member states within the International
Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific (ITSU), but their participation
has been limited. Thailand has no coast along the Pacific, and
Indonesia's tsunami threat is primarily outside the Pacific Basin. As a
member of the International Coordination Group (ICG) for ITSU, the U.S.
has actively encouraged non-member States to become ICG/ITSU members.
Under the IGC/ITSU, the U.S. has actively supported the need for global
tsunami mitigation actions and will continue to provide support through
the development of a Global Earth Observation System of Systems
(GEOSS), an effort in which the UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission, the UN International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
(ISDR), and a number of other UN agencies and programs participate.
NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers have no authority or responsibility to
issue tsunami warnings for the Indian Ocean basin. However, knowing the
concern Pacific countries might have about the potential devastating
impact a large earthquake and resulting tsunami can inflict, on Sunday,
December 26, 2004, at 8:14 p.m. EST, within 15 minutes of the
Indonesian earthquake, both centers issued Tsunami Information
Bulletins. These bulletins included location and initial magnitude
(8.0) information and an assessment that there was no tsunami threat in
the Pacific. As the Indian Ocean is outside the NOAA tsunami area of
responsibility, NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers have no procedures in
place to issue a warning for this region. An hour and 5 minutes after
the earthquake, as additional information came in from seismic
monitoring stations around the world, another bulletin was issued by
both Centers revising the magnitude of the earthquake to 8.5. This time
the bulletin contained a statement that the potential existed for a
tsunami near the epicenter. Unfortunately, there was no sea-level data
or other information available to substantiate or evaluate a tsunami
until 3\1/2\ hours after the earthquake when news reports began coming
indicating casualties in Sri Lanka and Thailand. At about the same
time, data from the one sea-level gauge in the Indian Ocean (Cocos I;
west of Australia) was received indicating a 45cm peak-to-trough non-
destructive tsunami.
Sea-level gauges are essential elements of the current Tsunami
Warning System in the Pacific. When strategically located, they are
used to quickly confirm the existence or non-existence of tsunami waves
following an earthquake, to monitor the tsunami's progress, and to help
estimate the severity of the hazard. There was no data available from
the Indian Ocean to help the warning centers know what was occurring.
An effective tsunami warning system requires (1) an assessment of
the tsunami hazard, (2) near real-time seismic and oceanographic (sea-
level change) data; (3) high-speed data analysis capabilities; (4) a
high-speed tsunami warning communication system; and (5) an established
local communications infrastructure for timely and effective
dissemination of the warning and evacuation requirements. It is also
critical that coastal populations are educated and prepared to respond
appropriately to tsunami warnings and calls for evacuations. For the
Pacific Basin, these tsunami warning requirements are well known.
Unfortunately, for the Indian Ocean basin, they were basically non-
existent.
There are currently 6 DART buoys in the Pacific operated by NOAA--3
off the coast of Alaska, 2 off the coast of the western U.S., and one
in the eastern Pacific. These first buoys of the currently envisioned
29 buoy array are an example of a successful transition of buoys from
research and development into an operational system. Presently, three
of the deployed DART buoys are non-operational due to failure of the
sea floor pressure unit (buoys 46401 and 46402; Aleutian Islands) and
communication module inside the surface buoy (buoy 46404; Pacific
Northwest/Washington). The Washington buoy has been out of service for
15 months for various reasons. Initially there was a power failure, but
when the buoy was retrieved an explosion occurred. Service to all buoys
was stopped while a safety stand-down was held to determine the cause
of the explosion and while a redesigned buoy compartment was
implemented in all buoys. Upon service, the Washington buoy's sea floor
unit failed, indicating a problem with undersea cabling. A technical
stand-down led to further refinement of the cables. Weather conditions
further delayed our attempts to bring this buoy back online; the sea
floor unit was repaired during a service visit in January.
Unfortunately, subsequent to that visit the buoy experienced failure of
the communications module. A service visit to repair the Washington
buoy is expected in mid-February. Of the two buoys in the Aleutian
Islands, one has been out of service for 6 months and the other for 1
month. As many of you are aware, particularly you Mr. Chairman, the
seas are particularly rough in this region during the winter months. We
are currently waiting for a safe weather window, and will service the
buoys as soon as that window of opportunity presents itself.
The government of Chile purchased one DART buoy from NOAA, and that
buoy is now operating off the northwest coast of Chile; another buoy is
in the process of being purchased by Chile at this time. Japan also
operates a few cabled deep ocean sensors off its Pacific coasts. The
NOAA buoys represent the only current deep ocean capability available
to the Tsunami Warning Centers to detect tsunamis. In July of last
year, staff from the Pacific Center had discussions with Japanese
representatives about the possibility of allowing PTWC access to data
from the Japanese cabled buoys.
While technical equipment is required for detection and
communication, equally important are continued research and
development, and education and outreach to mitigate potential impacts
from tsunamis. People must have the knowledge and information to act
during potentially life threatening events. Outreach and education
efforts, such as NOAA's own StormReady and TsunamiReady programs, are
key components of the U.S. National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program
(NTHMP). These programs foster interaction between emergency managers
and their citizens, provide robust communications systems, and
establish planning efforts before certification. NOAA also developed
multi-hazard risk and vulnerability assessment training and decision
support tools using GIS mapping technology to highlight populations,
infrastructure and critical facilities at risk for coastal hazards.
These tools and other support are critical to land use planning, pre-
disaster planning, mitigation efforts, and targeted dissemination of
outreach, education and information about high-risk areas.
The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) was
launched by the General Assembly of the United Nations to provide a
global framework for action to reduce human, social, economic, and
environmental losses due to natural and man-made hazards. The ISDR aims
at building disaster-resilient communities, highlighting the importance
of disaster reduction as an integral component of sustainable
development. ISDR is the focal point within the United Nations system
for coordination of strategies and programs for disaster reduction and
to ensure synergy between disaster reduction activities and those in
the socioeconomic and humanitarian fields. One particularly important
role of ISDR is to encourage both policy and awareness activities by
promoting national committees dedicated to disaster reduction and by
working in close association with regional initiatives. As part of this
effort, tsunami hazard maps have been produced for over 300 coastal
communities in over 11 countries, including 130 communities throughout
the United States.
The United Nation's Education, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization's (UNESCO) Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
(IOC) has developed products to help countries implement tsunami
response plans. Road signs and other mitigation products are available
through the NTHMP (http://www.pmel.noaa.gov/tsunami-hazard). In
summary, Tsunami Response Plans are probably the most cost-effective
way to create a tsunami resilient community. To be successful,
communities must remain committed to a continuous, long-term education
program. Tsunamis are infrequent events and it is important to ensure
future generations understand tsunami safety.
Protecting near-shore ecosystems, like coral reefs, is equally
important for maintaining disaster-resilient communities. The
international media and South Asian officials reported less destruction
in locations protected by wave-absorbing healthy coral reefs. NOAA and
our federal, state, territorial, and international partners work to
protect and preserve coral reef ecosystems.
The United States will continue working closely with the
international community to help implement recommended tsunami detection
and warning measures for the Indian Ocean Basin and other regions of
the world currently without adequate tsunami warning capability. A
comprehensive global tsunami warning program requires deploying DART
buoys along each of the world's major subduction zones; adding real-
time sea-level monitoring/tide gauge stations; establishing Regional
Centers for Disaster Reduction, assessing hazards, promoting education
and outreach efforts; and conducting research and development.
As recently announced, the Bush Administration has a plan to
upgrade the current U.S. Tsunami Warning System. NOAA's contribution to
this plan includes procuring and installing 32 new DART buoys,
including 25 new buoys in the Pacific and 7 new buoys for the Atlantic
and Caribbean. We expect to have the complete network of DART buoys
installed and operational by mid-2007; 20 buoys should be operational
in FY06, with the final 12 in place in FY07. In addition to the DART
buoys, NOAA will procure and install 38 new sea level monitoring/tide
gauge stations. The Administration has allocated $24M, over the next
two years, to NOAA for this effort, including $18.1M for the Pacific
Basin and $5.9M for Atlantic/Caribbean/Gulf.
There were many lessons learned from the Indian Ocean tsunami. A
key point to make is that, for all coastal communities, the question is
not ``if '' a tsunami will occur, but ``when.'' We know what causes a
tsunami to develop, and we know a great deal about how to track them
and forecast their path. With expansion of the U.S. Tsunami Warning
System, NOAA forecasters will be able to detect nearly 100 percent of
tsunamis affecting the United States and will be able to respond and
alert communities within minutes of a tsunami-producing event. With
expanded education and outreach via NOAA's TsunamiReady program and
other efforts, we can rest assured that our coastal communities have
the opportunity to learn how to respond to a tsunami event and that we
have minimized the threat to American lives.
With global attention on this important matter, we have a great
opportunity to help the world better prepare for tsunamis through the
development of a Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS).
This system would include a real-time global seismic monitoring
network, a real-time DART network, and a near real-time sea level
monitoring network. I will be a member of the U.S. delegation at the
Third Earth Observation Summit (February 16, 2005; Brussels, Belgium)
and will work to ensure that the development of a global tsunami
warning system is a high priority for the larger Global Earth
Observation System of Systems and the Integrated Ocean Observing
System.
In closing, I would like to thank Members of this Committee for
their work in developing S. 50, the Tsunami Preparedness Act. The
catastrophic event in the Indian Ocean highlights the threat tsunamis
pose to all coastal communities, and the need to defend American
communities against future tsunamis. The Department of Commerce
supports the purposes of this legislation to authorize and strengthen
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's tsunami
detection, forecast, warning, mitigation and education and outreach
programs. As you know, the Department believes that in addition to
improving the ability to detect and forecast tsunamis, it is equally
important to educate citizens on what actions to take when they receive
a tsunami alert. The Department supports and appreciates the language
that calls for strengthening the TsunamiReady program, an
administrative initiative to educate and prepare communities for
survival before and during a tsunami.
We look forward to working with Congress and other Nations around
the world to help take the pulse of the planet and make our world a
safer place. Attached to this written testimony submitted for the
record is an article published in the International Tsunami Information
Center Tsunami Newsletter, which provides detailed information about
NOAA's Pacific Tsunami Warning Center. Much more information about
tsunamis can be found at http://wcatwc.arh.noaa.gov, http://
www.pmel.noaa.gov/tsunami/, http://www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc/, and http://
www.ngdc.noaa.gov/spotlight/tsunami/tsunami.html.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Bement, the National Science Foundation Director,
please?
STATEMENT OF DR. ARDEN L. BEMENT, JR., DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
SCIENCE FOUNDATION
Dr. Bement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Inouye,
and Members of the Committee. Thank you very much for the
opportunity to present testimony on the National Science
Foundation's role in providing greater----
The Chairman. Could you pull that microphone up closer,
please?
Dr. Bement. Is this better?
So, again, I thank you for the opportunity to present
testimony on the National Science Foundation's role in
providing greater understanding and education of tsunami events
through science and engineering research.
Because the National Science Foundation has the mission to
build the nation's scientific and engineering knowledge
capacity and capability, NSF and the communities we support
have a responsibility to undertake relevant research in the
context of these events.
Through rapid-response reconnaissance teams supported by
the National Science Foundation, we have moved quickly to focus
the U.S. research community's efforts to understand the nature
of this event, identify relevant lessons for future disasters,
and build on the research that we have funded in the past.
Our rapid-response research teams include problem-focused
interdisciplinary collaborations. In these collaborations, NSF
is working with international partners and countries directly
affected, or neighboring the disaster, to improve
communications, collaboration, and priority-setting as the
immediate and longer-term research efforts get underway.
This disaster has raised awareness of, and attention to,
earthquakes and tsunamis and their predictability. NSF has long
funded the research and instrumentation aimed at detecting and
understanding the impacts of these phenomena.
Prominent examples include the realtime Global
Seismographic Network, or GSN, the data from which forged the
critical core of the early warning of this event.
From the figures accompanying my written testimony, we see
the power of this warning system. Figure 1, on the easel, with
the globe in the center, depicts the location of the GSN
stations in relation to the epicenter of the quake, which is in
the center of the diagram. Figure 2 illustrates the collected
seismic measurements from these stations made as the wave front
traveled around the world. These charts illustrate the power of
this network, which is operated by the Incorporated Research
Institutions for Seismology.
The GSN is funded, in partnership, by NSF and the United
States Geologic Survey, and it is a primary international
source of data for earthquake location and also tsunami
warning.
NSF also funds research designated to support damage and
loss prediction and avoidance. These efforts include the
effects of earthquakes and tsunamis on buildings, bridges, and
critical infrastructure systems. Additionally, research efforts
center on estimating economic consequences, human and societal
impacts, and emergency response and warning capabilities. For
example, engineers and scientists at the Earthquake Engineering
Research Centers and the Southern California Earthquake Center
are working to establish the nature, attenuation, and impacts
of subduction-type earthquake ground-shaking. These centers are
developing hazard assessments that can be applied to critical
infrastructure design in areas threatened by earthquake and
tsunami hazards.
Mr. Chairman, more than 75 million Americans in 39 states
live in areas at risk for earthquakes. The NSF has recently
established the George E. Brown, Jr., Network for Earthquake
Engineering Simulation, or NEES, as we refer to it. This is a
major national infrastructure project that is revolutionizing
earthquake engineering research. It allows NSF-funded
researchers to create physical and computational simulations in
order to study how earthquakes and tsunamis affect our critical
infrastructure. The NEES Tsunami Wave Basin at Oregon State
University is the world's most comprehensive facility for
studying tsunamis and storm waves.
Mr. Chairman, thank you, again, for the opportunity to
testify on a topic of great importance to the science and
engineering communities. I hope that I have conveyed to you the
NSF's serious approach to generate new knowledge about the
natural phenomena that lead to tsunami events, also the design
of safer coastal structures, the development of early warning
and response systems, and effective steps for disaster
recovery.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Bement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Arden L. Bement, Jr., Director, National
Science Foundation
Good morning. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Inouye, and Members of
the Committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to present
testimony on the National Science Foundation's role in providing
greater science and research to understanding tsunami events.
The events surrounding the December 26, 2004, Sumatra-Andaman
Island earthquake and Indian Ocean tsunami constitute disasters for the
natural, social, and constructed environments in the region. Because
the National Science Foundation (NSF) has the mission to build the
nation's scientific and engineering knowledge capacity and capability,
NSF and the communities we support have a responsibility to undertake
relevant research in the context of the events.
NSF has moved quickly to focus the U.S. research community to
address the disaster, response, and relevant lessons for future
disasters, building on the research related to these topics that we
have funded in the past. Later in my testimony, I will detail the ways
our previous research has contributed to the ability of the United
States and others to understand and respond to the disaster, and
information on the NSF's role in supporting the U.S. research
community's immediate response to the tragedy.
This disaster has revealed several areas in which understanding--as
well as infrastructure--were insufficient to deal with the crisis, and
where NSF's research communities can bring basic knowledge and relevant
infrastructure to bear. The U.S. communities include problem-focused,
interdisciplinary research teams, often with international partners in
mutually beneficial and sustainable collaborations. NSF is working with
counterpart organizations in countries directly affected by the
disaster, as well as other countries in the region, to improve
communications, collaboration, and priority setting as the immediate
and longer-term research efforts get underway.
This disaster has raised awareness of and attention to the
phenomena of earthquakes and tsunamis, and their predictability. NSF
has long funded scientific and engineering research infrastructure
aimed at detecting and understanding the impacts of these phenomena.
Prominent examples include the real-time Global Seismographic Network
(GSN), the data from which forged the critical core of the early
warning of the December 26, 2004, earthquake. This Network, operated by
the Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology, is funded in
partnership by NSF and the United States Geological Survey, and is the
primary international source of data for earthquake location and
tsunami warning.
We also fund research designed to support damage and loss
prediction and avoidance for the United States and elsewhere, including
earthquake and tsunami effects on buildings, bridges, and critical
infrastructure systems, and estimates of economic consequences, human
and societal impacts, and emergency response. For example, engineers
and scientists at the Earthquake Engineering Research Centers and the
Southern California Earthquake Center are working to establish the
nature and attenuation of subduction-type earthquake ground shaking,
and to develop probabilistic hazard assessments that can be applied to
critical infrastructure design in areas threatened by earthquake and
tsunami hazards. NSF has recently established the George E. Brown, Jr.
Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation (NEES), a major national
infrastructure project to create a complete system of test facilities.
The project is revolutionizing earthquake-engineering research. NSF-
funded researchers create physical and computational simulations in
order to study how earthquakes and tsunamis affect buildings, bridges,
ports, and other critical infrastructure. The NEES Tsunami Wave Basin
at Oregon State University is the world's most comprehensive facility
for studying tsunamis and storm waves.
These globally historic earthquake and tsunami events have
heightened awareness in the engineering and science research
communities of the huge responsibilities to create new knowledge about
our human and organizational environments, natural biologic systems,
constructed environments, and about our vulnerabilities in the face of
damaging forces. It is important that the work includes all aspects of
environmental damage, mitigation, response, and recovery.
The National Science Foundation Research Portfolio
The tremendous loss of lives and destruction of the natural and
built environments resulting from the December 26 events brought to the
forefront questions about disaster preparation, mitigation, response,
and recovery. NSF's research investments have developed a knowledge and
human resource base over broad areas relevant to these questions.
Current and past pertinent research activities include:
Earthquakes: The Sumatra earthquake occurred along a subduction
zone where tectonic plates collide. These subduction quakes are the
largest and most destructive type of earthquake, and cause most of the
world's tsunamis. NSF researchers have been making exciting
advancements in subduction zone research including new techniques and
facilities that define the structure, chemistry and dynamics of active
subduction zones. A prime example is the findings about the Cascadia
subduction zone in the U.S. Pacific Northwest. This fault structure
generated a 9.0Mw earthquake on January 26, 1700, with a tsunami that
destroyed whole forests on the largely uninhabited Oregon coast,
toppled buildings on Vancouver Island, and killed coastal dwellers in
Japan.
Tsunami Generation: NSF research includes field studies using
research vessels and other platforms and facilities, including the
Integrated Ocean Drilling Program's (IODP) drill ship the Joides
Resolution. NSF research aims to understand the processes by which
earthquakes, large slumps, and other landslips generate tsunami waves,
and to model how tsunamis interact with the shore zone, including the
nature of present and past sediment deposits left by tsunamis.
Rapid Response Reconnaissance: NSF supports the Earthquake
Engineering Research Institute (EERI) and its Learning from Earthquakes
(LFE) project that trains and deploys rapid-response teams of civil
engineers, geoengineers, and social scientists to earthquakes that
occur around the world. These teams identify information resources,
research needs, and provide ground truthing for remotely sensed
observations. NSF also funds the Natural Hazards Research and
Applications Information Center at the University of Colorado at
Boulder, which supports rapid-response research by social science
researchers, and leads the world as a clearinghouse for
multidisciplinary and social science studies of hazards and disasters.
Remote Sensing: Remote-sensing technologies quantify damage over
large geographic areas and provide reconnaissance information where
access to impacted areas is difficult. For the first time, high-
resolutions sensors (Quickbird and Ikonos), moderate-resolution sensors
(SPOT, LandSat, and IRS), and low-resolution sensors (MODIS, Aster) are
recording the Indian Ocean events in near real-time. With this
information it will be possible to identify and quantify damage and
impacts to critical infrastructure systems (including electric power
systems, water supply, sewage, transportation, safe shelter buildings,
ports, and harbors). Such assessments can then be verified by on-the-
ground inspections.
Physical and Computational Simulation: Tsunami disasters are
dominated by coastal damage and loss of life. Scientists and engineers
need to predict site-specific wave run-up patterns and determine
tsunami-induced forces and scour effects to enable better design of
waterfront structures and help guide decision-making processes
including vulnerability assessment. NSF research has developed scenario
simulations for tsunami hazard mitigation, including tsunami
generation, hydrodynamics, warning transmission, evacuation, human
behavior, and social and environmental impacts. The NEES Tsunami Wave
Basin is being used to construct and test large-scale, realistic models
of infrastructure--such as shorelines, underwater pipelines, port
facilities, and coastal communities.
Sensor Networks: NSF research investigates new uses for and new
kinds of sensors and networks for health monitoring and damage
assessment of the civil infrastructure, both physical and cyber.
Flexible and scalable software architectures and frameworks are being
developed to integrate real-time heterogeneous sensor data, database
and archiving systems, computer vision, data analysis and
interpretation, numerical simulation of complex structural systems,
visualization, probabilistic risk analysis, and rational statistical
decision making procedures. NSF has also funded research on socio-
technical arrangements for bringing information to policymakers.
Risk Assessment: Risk assessment and decisions about preparing for
risks are immediately relevant topics that NSF-funded scientists have
researched in depth. Basic science and engineering research provides
the in-depth understanding needed to design effective detection,
warning, mitigation, response, and recovery programs. Research on risk
communication and decision-making regarding low-probability, high-
consequence events is being applied to many types of disasters. Key for
application of engineering knowledge is to establish the basis for
performance-based design to be applied to all critical infrastructure
systems and facilities of the constructed environment.
Warning Systems and Evacuation: NSF has supported extensive and
long-term research on warning systems and evacuation, with clear
implications for managing tsunami events. NSF research includes basic
work on integrated warning systems for rapid-onset extreme events,
including detection, modeling, and communications technologies, and
also the social and organizational components needed for effective
warnings: societal and community public education and preparedness,
appropriate authorities and resources for organizational and
governmental entities responsible for warning and evacuation processes,
appropriate messages and means of dissemination to at-risk populations,
and the management and maintenance of warning systems over time. One
specific focus for research has been sensor networks that must
``funnel'' a sudden impulse of data that is generated due to an
anomalous event such as an earthquake, terrorist attack, flood, or
fire. The objective is to understand how to design sensor networks to
adequately handle these impulses of data and to feed the information
into public warning systems.
Behavioral Responses: Emotional and cognitive responses to stress
as well as vulnerability and resiliency in the face of threat and
terror are the focus on current research in social psychology. Research
in geography and regional science examines patterns of settlement that
lead to social vulnerability and the differential impact of hazards,
including earthquake hazards, on different groups. An earlier study
exploring the restoration of assumptions of safety and control
following the 2001 terror attacks has direct implications for
understanding the restoration of human wellbeing following these
devastating events.
Human and Socio-technological Response: Behavioral and social
science research funded by NSF provides insights about how people
respond to disasters and identifies the short- and long-term effects.
Scientists have documented and analyzed social phenomena in the
immediate wake of disasters, such as altruism, volunteerism,
convergence, and improvisation. These phenomena vary by country and
culture. NSF researchers are developing distributed, reliable, and
secure information systems that can evolve and adapt to radical changes
in their environment. Such systems would deliver critically important
services for emergency communication and management through networked
information services and up-to-date sensor data over ad-hoc flexible,
fault-tolerant networks that adapt to the people and organizations that
need them. Such technology facilitates access to the right information,
for the right individuals and organizations, at the right time. This is
necessary to provide security, to serve our dynamic virtual response
organizations, and to support the changing social and cultural aspects
of information-sharing among organizations and individuals.
Emergency Response Research: The complex problems associated with
earthquake and tsunami hazard mitigation and response strategies
necessitate interdisciplinary and international research efforts,
including modeling and computational simulation, large-scale laboratory
modeling, geographical information and communication systems, and
social sciences and planning. NSF supports research on social,
political, and managerial aspects of emergency response activities and
aid provision, including need-based distribution of assistance within
diverse societies.
Ecology: Research on the ecology of infectious disease contributes
to understanding the dynamics of epidemics and change, particularly in
the context of ecological changes such as those following natural
disasters. Disturbance ecology examines how biological populations,
communities and ecosystems respond to extreme natural and human events,
including hurricanes and tsunamis. Long-term ecological research is
critical to understanding the base line conditions, without which the
changes resulting from catastrophic events such as earthquakes and
tsunamis cannot be understood.
Microbial Genome Sequencing: NSF funded research on microbial
genome sequencing provides key information that enables identification
and understanding of the life functions and ecology of microbes that
play critical roles in the environment, agriculture, food and water
safety, and may cause disease in humans, animals, and plants. Genome
sequence information can be utilized to develop tools to detect
disease-causing organisms and develop countermeasures such as
antimicrobial chemicals and vaccines.
Education and Human Resources: NSF has dozens of active projects
funded that target or include Earth science education and understanding
of natural hazards. For example, the NSF National Science, Mathematics,
Engineering, and Technology Education (SMETE) Digital Library program
is supporting a multi-year project to develop a data-oriented digital
library collection on education in plate tectonics, the central Earth
science paradigm governing earthquakes and resultant tsunamis. Such a
collection works to ``bridge the gap'' between science data archives
and libraries, and improves access to the historic and modern marine
geological and geophysical data. Further, the project is enhancing the
professional development of teachers through interactions with a local
school district and with teachers nationwide. Also, NSF has supported
the incorporation of advanced technologies in K-12 learning materials
in Earth science, including visualizations and working with images from
space, real-time data, and experimentation with models and simulations
(techniques used in earthquake events to generate model predictions of
tsunamis). This work was utilized to update and improve one of the most
widely used high-school Earth science textbooks.
NSF Investments in Research Infrastructure
The natural disaster raised awareness of and attention to the
phenomena of earthquakes and tsunamis, and their predictability. NSF
has long funded scientific and engineering research infrastructure
aimed at detecting and understanding the impacts of these phenomena.
Prominent examples include:
IRIS, GSN--Real-time Global Seismographic Network (GSN) data
forged the critical core of the early warning of the December
26, 2004, Sumatran Earthquake. The GSN, operated by IRIS
(Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology) and funded
in partnership by NSF and the United States Geological Survey,
is the primary international source of data for earthquake
location and tsunami warning.
Engineers and scientists at the Earthquake Engineering
Research Centers \1\ (EERCs) and the Southern California
Earthquake Center (SCEC at the University of Southern
California) are working to establish the nature and attenuation
of subduction-type earthquake ground shaking, and to develop
probabilistic hazard maps and shaking levels due to subduction
earthquakes in all oceans. This information will support damage
prediction for the U.S. and elsewhere, including earthquake and
tsunami effects on buildings, bridges and other lifelines, and
estimates of economic, safety, and emergency response
consequences.
\1\ MAE (Mid America Earthquake Center at the University of
Illinois, Urbana-Champaign), MCEER (Multidisciplinary Center for
Earthquake Engineering Research at the University of Buffalo) and PEER
(Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center at the University of
California, Berkeley).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NSF has completed construction of the George E. Brown, Jr.
Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation (NEES), a major
national infrastructure project to create a complete system of
test facilities that is revolutionizing earthquake engineering
research. NSF-funded researchers create physical and numerical
simulations in order to study how earthquakes and tsunamis
affect buildings, bridges, ports, and other critical
infrastructure. The NEES Tsunami Wave Basin at Oregon State
University is the world's most comprehensive facility for
studying tsunamis and storm waves.
The National Science Foundation's Immediate Response
For more than three decades, NSF has supported quick-response
disaster studies that dispatch scientists and engineers to the
aftermath of crises ranging from hurricanes and earthquakes to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Researchers were in the field
within days after the South Asian tsunami to gather critical data
before it was lost to nature and reconstruction. The ephemeral
information, including assessments of physical damage to both the built
and natural environments, as well as social science research that will
help emergency teams and local leaders better direct future rescue
efforts, is vital for scientists and engineers to understand and
prepare for future disasters.
A variety of mechanisms are available to support quick-response
research, including the following: (1) Small Grants for Exploratory
Research (SGER), which may be awarded in order to gather data that is
likely to disappear over time after the impact of disasters; (2)
supplements to existing awards to fund data collection; (3) specific
continuing grants that support quick-response field reconnaissance and
research across a variety of disciplines; and (4) flexibility inherent
in existing awards that allows for the support of post-disaster
investigations. NSF has already utilized all of these types of support
in responding to the December 26, 2004, earthquake and tsunami in the
Indian Ocean.
Several programs and projects have established funding to send
rapid response teams to disaster sites:
NSF Earthquake Engineering Research Centers are undertaking work on
damage assessment. The Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake
Engineering Research (MCEER) sent a team of researchers to Thailand in
partnership with the Asian Institute of Technology and the Earthquake
Disaster Mitigation Research Center from Japan. Shubharoop Ghosh from
ImageCat will join a team led by Prof. Yamazaki of Chiba University.
The team is examining impacts of the earthquake and tsunami upon
buildings and critical infrastructure. Research is also being supported
by the earthquake centers on validating the potential of remote sensing
data to accurately assess damage and impacts.
Multidisciplinary research has been undertaken through the NSF-
funded Learning From Earthquakes (LFE) Program that is managed by the
Earthquake Engineering Research Institute (EERI), a non-profit
institution in Oakland, California. LFE is sending two teams to Sri
Lanka, Thailand, the Maldive Islands, and India. The teams will gather
data on estimated wave heights, extent of inundation, geological
scouring, and other perishable information related to the physical
aspects of tsunamis. They will coordinate their work with teams from
Japan and Australia.
In addition, other EERI activities will collect data. Jose Borrero,
University of Southern California, was one of the first U.S.
researchers to gain access to one of the hardest-hit area of Sumatra. A
13-member team of engineers led by EERI member Sudhir Jain, Indian
Institute of Technology, Kanpur, is investigating the structural damage
and impacts on port facilities along the eastern coast of India, as
well as on the Adaman and Nicobar Islands.
These initial EERI teams include geotechnical, structural, and
coastal engineers; geologists; geophysicists; and experts in fluid
mechanics. In subsequent efforts, a joint EERI/ASCE team of engineers
will travel to the area along with social scientists from the Disaster
Research Center at the University of Delaware. They will focus on
damage to lifelines, including highways, bridges, ports and harbors,
water delivery systems, sewage facilities, and other utilities. They
will also begin to document the resulting impacts on communities and
the entire region. These impacts include search and rescue operations,
medical response, multinational relief, organizational response,
effects on children and families, shelter and housing, and social and
economic impacts. Members of EERI and other earthquake engineering
experts who reside in the affected countries will also contribute the
results of their independent investigations. These reports will be
compiled on the EERI website, published by EERI as part of the LFE
program, and made available internationally.
NSF's Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation (NEES) is a
major source of information about tsunamis. The O.H. Hinsdale Wave
Research Laboratory at Oregon State University, home to the largest
tsunami research facility in the world, was sought out as a source of
answers to the pressing questions in the wake of the disaster. The lab
hosted local news teams as well as CNN, NBC's `` Today Show,'' the
Discovery Channel, and Spiegel TV from Germany.
The Directorate for Geosciences is offering SGERs and award
supplements to study physical processes in the earthquake-tsunami zone.
For example, NSF-funded investigators from the California Institute of
Technology who were already studying uplift or subsidence of atolls in
the earthquake zone returned to Sumatra immediately after the event to
measure earthquake-related vertical displacements. Additionally,
scientists from the University of California-San Diego plan to resurvey
a network of approximately fifty geodetic monuments in North Sumatra,
the Mentawai Islands, and Banda Aceh to determine coseismic and
postseismic deformation caused by the Sumatra earthquake. These new
data will provide critical geodetic constraints for the seismographic
inversion of the earthquake source to constrain models of the
subsequent devastating tsunamis and to contribute to the study of the
great earthquake cycle in that region. The NSF-funded geodetic
consortium UNAVCO Inc. is coordinating efforts by the scientific
community to measure the post-earthquake distortion in the region of
the earthquake. The NSF-funded seismology consortium IRIS (Incorporated
Research Institutions for Seismology) is leading efforts to develop
real-time, finite-fault modeling techniques so that information on the
actual characterization of the earthquake source can be updated
continuously as real-time seismic data are received.
The oceanographic communities are actively mapping the earthquake
rupture zone, studying aftershock events, and venting of natural fluids
using ocean bottom seismometers, ships, remotely operated vehicles, and
potentially autonomous undersea vehicles. In addition, the NSF's
Division of Ocean Sciences will sponsor a series of free, on-line
workshops for K-12 teachers that will provide them with lesson plans,
teaching materials, and access to scientists so that they can present
the latest scientific tsunami information to their students. These
workshops will reach several thousand teachers this month alone, with
additional workshops possible dependent upon demand. A major challenge
for these oceanographic studies is gaining permission from the
Indonesian government to conduct research in its territorial waters.
The Directorate for Computer and Information Science and
Engineering will be offering SGERs and award supplements to extend
projects on sensor networks for damage identification, information
about the location of survivors, emergency response infrastructure
technology, and the ability of organizations to respond to man-made and
natural disasters. The San Diego Supercomputer Center at the University
of California, San Diego has offered computational and data integration
and data backup resources to local universities, facilities, or
government agencies that might need them.
The Human and Social Dynamics (HSD) priority area has allocated $1
million to support SGERs for multidisciplinary research, including such
issues as warning systems, disaster epidemiology, crisis decision-
making, emergency response, and short-term and long-term recovery and
mitigation. These awards will be established by the end of February
2005. Additional funding will be available from the NEES program to
archive data collected under these SGERs in the central data repository
operated by NEES Consortium, Inc. The Directorate for Social,
Behavioral, and Economic Sciences has also made special funds available
for SGERs pertinent to learning from this event.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, as you well know NSF has as its mission the promotion
of the progress of science, the advancement of the national health,
prosperity and welfare, and the securing of the national defense. Since
science is truly global in nature, NSF engages in these activities in
collaboration with international partners. As such, NSF will continue
to respond to disasters such as the earthquake and tsunami events in
partnership with others in the global science and engineering
communities.
The South Asian tsunami disaster is representative of an entire
class of catastrophic disasters: events that are low probability yet
have high consequences. With the right information, communities and
nations can characterize such risks and determine how to allocate
resources for detection, warning, and preparedness.
Research into decision-making provides insights and tools for
characterizing such risks and for addressing future questions about
allocating resources to detection and warning. NSF, in cooperation with
the world research community, including the scientists, engineers, and
students from the affected countries, will continue to generate new
knowledge about the natural phenomena of these events, the design of
better coastal structures, the development of early warning and
response systems that can mitigate loss of life, and recovery from such
disasters. These new bodies of knowledge need to be transferable to all
regions of the world that can benefit from these efforts. With NSF
support, scientists will continue to study societal vulnerability to
natural hazards with a view to building resilience through increased
knowledge and preparedness, improved natural resource management, and
other policy strategies so that we may help stem the loss of life and
property in future events.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to testify on a
topic of great importance to the world community. I hope that I have
conveyed the serious approach that NSF has taken to help generate new
knowledge about the natural phenomena that lead to tsunami events, the
design of safer coastal structures, the development of early warning
and response systems, and effective steps for disaster recovery.
I would be pleased to answer any questions you might have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Groat, from the U.S. Geological Survey?
STATEMENT OF CHARLES G. GROAT, DIRECTOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
Dr. Groat. Thank you, Senator Stevens.
Senators Frist and Landrieu gave you a good sense of the
dramatic impact that this dramatic event had. Let me give you a
sense, in beginning, of the forces of the earth that caused it.
The December 26, 2004, a magnitude-nine earthquake was
initiated 20 miles below the sea floor off the western coast of
Sumatra. It was the fourth-largest earthquake to strike the
planet since 1900, and the largest since a magnitude-9.2 struck
your state, Alaska, Senator Stevens, in 1964. As with other
giant earthquakes, this one took place along the subduction
zone, where the tectonic plates that make up the earth's rigid
outer layer are thrust beneath one another. This thrusting
resulted in a rupture that propagated northward along the plate
boundary fault for over 750 miles. Along the length of that
fault, the sea floor was jolted upward as much as 15 feet,
lifting trillions of gallons of water into the air, and
resulting in the forces that provided the tsunami.
While not all tsunamis are caused by earthquakes, most of
them are. So, therefore, the earthquake monitoring system that
Director Bement referred to is critical in providing
information about where tsunamis are likely to occur. And so,
the network is extremely important, and it has to be up to the
task of providing information about the earthquakes in a very
sophisticated and very timely manner. The GSN that he referred
to is the key part, on a global scale, of doing that. And with
128 globally distributed seismic sensors that are all very
modern, we have the infrastructure in place to provide the core
part of the knowledge that is necessary to interpret whether
earthquakes will generate tsunamis or not, if they occur in
ocean basins.
A little closer to home, in the United States, the USGS
operates an advanced national seismic system which provides
seismic data to NOAA's Tsunami Warning Centers. That system
includes a 63-station backbone network that is, itself, very
modern, and provides information supported by 17 regional
seismic networks that ensure that the United States has
adequate and detailed coverage for providing this kind of
information.
As a result of the Indian Ocean tsunami, the President
announced and asked the Departments of Commerce and Interior to
determine whether our systems were adequate. As a result of
that, the United States Geological Survey has put together a
plan to upgrade our seismic system capabilities and our
interpretive capabilities, both to provide NOAA with the
information it needs as to whether these earthquakes that occur
on plate boundaries will generate tsunamis, and also to provide
information locally to the United States coastal communities,
as they need it.
So let me close by just indicating what it is we're doing.
We're implementing 24-by-7 operations at our National
Earthquake Information Center, where the information is
gathered and sent out.
We're upgrading the hardware and software there to make
sure that we have the sophisticated processing that's necessary
to give the interpretive information, both on the global sense
and in the U.S. sense.
We're also improving the detection response time of the
Global Seismographic Network by making data from all stations
realtime. In other words, we get the information when it's
received by the stations, not with any delays. Only 80 percent
of that network is realtime right now.
We're also increasing the maintenance schedules for all of
the stations so that we have data available as continuously as
possible.
We're also providing some new software that was generated
by the California Integrated Seismic Network, which is a USGS
university and state partnership, to speed USGS-generated
earthquake information directly to local emergency managers.
And this is extremely important in coastal communities, because
earthquakes that generate tsunamis close to shore have to be
responded to very quickly. There isn't the time, nor the
instrumentation, between those and the shore to provide the
warnings. So the earthquake is a key part of what coastal
communities need to have in which to base their warning
systems. So we're upgrading our ability to do that.
And, finally, we're also increasing the geologic studies
that occur around the margins of the United States and in the
Caribbean to understand the past frequency of tsunamis, which
gives us some sense of when and where they occur, and the
magnitude of those.
The Sumatra Earthquake, which contributed significantly to
the loss of lives and property, also continues us to forward
our comprehensive concern about earthquakes, themselves,
because they do occur more frequently, and they do destroy
lives and property on a more regular basis, and in a very
destructive basis. And through the National Earthquake Hazards
Reduction Program, in which we partner with the National
Science Foundation with NIST and with FEMA, we will also work
with other agencies and universities to improve tsunami hazard
assessments and warnings, and to expand our knowledge of
tsunami generation and the impacts, and to evaluate the
research and operational requirements for effective hazards
planning, warning, and response systems.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Groat follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Charles G. Groat, Director, U.S. Geological
Survey
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for this
opportunity to discuss the recent tragedy in South Asia and what can be
done to reduce the threat that tsunamis and earthquakes pose to coastal
communities in the United States and around the globe. Events such as
this serve as a tragic reminder of our vulnerability to natural
hazards. While the United States is not as vulnerable to tsunamis as
other regions of the world, we do face significant risk.
On December 29, the President asked the Departments of the Interior
and Commerce to determine whether our systems are adequately prepared
for a tsunami on our coasts. As a result, the Administration announced
its commitment to implement an improved domestic tsunami detection and
warning system. As part of the President's plan, the U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS) will strengthen its ability to detect global earthquakes
both through improvements in the Global Seismographic Network (GSN),
which we support jointly with the National Science Foundation (NSF),
and through around-the-clock analysis of earthquake events. The changes
that are proposed for USGS clearly have a dual purpose, improving our
capacity to respond to earthquakes as well as supporting the tsunami
warning program of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA).
In addition to earthquake monitoring and reporting, the USGS
conducts a number of activities aimed at improving tsunami hazard
assessments, education, and warnings, including geologic investigations
into the history of and potential for tsunami occurrence, coastal and
marine mapping, and modeling tsunami generation. Although most tsunamis
are caused by earthquakes, they can also be caused by volcanic
eruptions, submarine landslides, and onshore landslides that cause
large volumes of rock to fall into the water. All of these tsunami-
generating hazards can impact the United States. Consequently, a broad
range of USGS work in earthquake, volcano and landslide hazards, and
coastal and marine geology, contribute to better understanding of
tsunami impacts and occurrences.
Additionally, USGS is playing a role in relief efforts for nations
impacted by the December 26 disaster by providing relief organizations
worldwide with pre- and post-tsunami satellite images and image-derived
products that incorporate information on population density, elevation,
and other relevant topics. These images and products are being used by
relief organizations to determine where relief efforts are most
critical and how best to carry out those relief operations. In our
efforts to assist and improve relief efforts, we work closely with
partners at NOAA, the U.S. Agency for International Development, other
federal agencies, and in academia. For example, USGS scientists are
part of international teams conducting post-tsunami investigations in
Sri Lanka and Indonesia with the goal of applying the knowledge
developed to other vulnerable areas in the United States and around the
globe.
USGS is also working with NOAA and other domestic and global
partners through the Global Earth Observing System of Systems (GEOSS)
and other mechanisms. Through GEOSS, improved monitoring capabilities
must be firmly linked into all-hazards warning systems and, the most
important link in the chain, public education and mitigation programs.
As we move forward, we must bear in mind that this was an earthquake
disaster as well as a tsunami disaster, and we must learn from both.
This is not just a scientific endeavor; it is a matter of public
safety.
Earthquake and Tsunami of December 26, 2004
This was the second year in a row in which a deadly earthquake
occurred near the end of the year. In 2003, a magnitude 6.6 quake
struck Iran's ancient city of Bam, killing over 30,000 people. In 2004,
the deadly quake was a magnitude 9 earthquake that initiated 20 miles
below the seafloor off the western coast of Sumatra, the fourth largest
earthquake to strike the planet since 1900 and the largest since a
magnitude 9.2 earthquake struck Alaska in 1964. The earthquake and
resulting tsunami killed more than 150,000 people around the Indian
Ocean, two-thirds of them in northern Sumatra, whose inhabitants
experienced not only the severe shaking from the earthquake but also
the tsunami's full force.
As with other giant earthquakes, this one took place along a
subduction zone, where one of the tectonic plates that make up the
Earth's rigid outer layer is being thrust beneath another (see Figure
1). The Sunda trench is the seafloor expression of such a plate
boundary where the Indian plate is thrusting under the overriding Burma
plate. The size of an earthquake is directly related to the area of the
fault that is ruptured. This rupture propagated northward along the
plate boundary fault for over 750 miles beneath the Nicobar and Andaman
Islands almost to Burma with a width of over 100 miles and slip along
the fault averaging several tens of feet.
It is difficult to comprehend the scope of a magnitude 9
earthquake. When we hear the term earthquake magnitude, we think of the
Richter scale, which was the first of several scales developed to
measure the earthquake size from the seismic waves they generate. These
scales are logarithmic such that each whole number represents an order
of magnitude larger in the seismic waves generated. So a magnitude 7
earthquake is 10 times larger than a magnitude 6 and 100 times larger
than a magnitude 5. However, the amount of energy released goes up much
faster. This magnitude 9 earthquake released 32 times more energy than
a magnitude 8 earthquake and 1000 times more energy than a magnitude 7
earthquake such as the one that struck the San Francisco Bay area in
1989. The energy released by the Sumatra earthquake is roughly equal to
that released by all the earthquakes, of every size, everywhere in the
world since the mid-1990s. It's important to remember that our own
coasts, Alaska in 1964 and the Pacific Northwest in 1700, were the site
of earthquakes as large as the Sumatra earthquake.
A great deal of that energy was transferred to the Indian Ocean's
waters and ultimately to its surrounding shores. Along the length of
the fault rupture, the seafloor was jolted upward by as much as 15
feet, lifting trillions of gallons of sea water--a volume more than 30
times that of the Great Salt Lake--and generating the tsunami that
swept both east, inundating the coast of Sumatra, Thailand and Burma,
and west, crossing the open ocean at hundreds of miles per hour on its
way to the coasts of India, Sri Lanka, and eventually eastern Africa.
Tsunamis strike the Indian Ocean less frequently than the Pacific
Ocean, which is ringed by subduction zones, but there have been at
least a half dozen Indian Ocean tsunamis caused by earthquakes in the
past 200 years. What had been the deadliest tsunami in the region was
not caused by an earthquake but by the explosion of Krakatau volcano in
1883. The tsunami generated by the collapse of that volcano killed
36,000 people on Java, Sumatra and neighboring islands.
It is important to emphasize that not all large subsea earthquakes
generate tsunamis. For example, four days before the Sumatra
earthquake, a magnitude 8.1 earthquake struck the seafloor south of New
Zealand near the Macquarie Islands. Instead of generating a thrusting
motion as in a subduction zone, this earthquake occurred on a strike-
slip fault, moving side to side like the San Andreas Fault, a motion
much less efficient at creating a tsunami. No tsunami was generated.
Even earthquakes generated in subduction zones may not produce tsunami,
depending on whether the fault rupture reaches the seafloor, the amount
of displacement on the fault and other factors. One of the key roles of
a tsunami detection system is to avoid false warnings that cause costly
and unnecessary evacuations that can undermine people's willingness to
heed warnings in the future. In addition to buoys and tide gauges,
seismic data may be able to provide an additional check, and research
in this area could improve our ability to recognize tsunami-causing
events in minutes.
U.S. Earthquake Monitoring Networks and Their Role in Tsunami Warning
Center Operations
To monitor earthquakes in the United States, the USGS has begun to
install and operate the Advanced National Seismic System (ANSS), which
was established by the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program
(NEHRP) in 2000 (Pub. L. 106-503). The system includes a 63-station
ANSS Backbone Network, which is capable of locating most felt
earthquakes nationwide and provides data in near-real-time to USGS.
Extending our capability in high-hazard areas of the country are 17
regional seismic networks that provide detailed coverage and rapid
response, local expertise in event analysis and interpretation, and
data. Our ANSS partnerships--which include universities, state
government agencies and NSF--greatly leverage USGS seismic monitoring
capabilities. The key products of the system are rapid and accurate
earthquake locations and magnitudes, delivered directly to users for
emergency response.
In several of the highest-risk urban areas in the United States,
dense arrays of seismic sensors designed to record strong ground motion
have been deployed under ANSS. These areas include the Los Angeles, San
Francisco, Seattle, Anchorage and Salt Lake City metropolitan regions.
When triggered by an earthquake, data from these sensors are
automatically processed into detailed maps of ground shaking
(``ShakeMaps''), which in turn feed loss estimation and emergency
response. Also, because earthquake losses are closely tied to the
vulnerability of buildings and other structures, USGS monitors
earthquake shaking in structures in support of engineering research,
performance-based design, and rapid post-earthquake damage evaluations.
If placed in certain critical facilities, these sensors can contribute
to critical post-earthquake response decisions.
USGS has set a minimum performance goal of determining automated
locations and seismic magnitudes within 4 minutes or less in the U.S.
This is exceeded in many ANSS regions; for example, the magnitude 6.5
San Simeon, California, earthquake of December, 2003, was automatically
located within 30 seconds. Earthquake data, including locations,
magnitudes, other characterizations and, where requested, the actual
seismograms, are automatically transmitted from USGS and regional
centers to federal response departments and agencies such as the NOAA
tsunami warning centers, the Department of Homeland Security, including
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), state governments,
local emergency managers, utility operators, several private sector
entities, and the public and media. USGS does not currently have 24
7 earthquake analysis, but analysts are on-call in the event
of a large earthquake worldwide. The Administration has recently
proposed 24 7 operations as a key needed improvement in
response to the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster.
To monitor seismic events worldwide, the Global Seismographic
Network (GSN) maintains a constellation of 128 globally distributed,
modern seismic sensors. USGS operates about two-thirds of this network,
and the University of California, San Diego, operates the other third
with NSF support. NSF also funds the IRIS (Incorporated Research
Institutions for Seismology) Consortium to handle data management and
long-term archiving. Two GSN stations were the first to detect the
December 26, 2004, Sumatra earthquake, and automated analysis of these
data generated the ``alerts'' of strong recorded amplitudes sent to
NOAA and USGS. At the present time, about 80 percent of GSN stations
transmit real-time data that can be used for rapid earthquake analysis
and tsunami warning. The Administration is requesting funding to extend
the GSN's real-time data communications, as well as to improve station
uptime through more frequent maintenance. These changes will result in
improved tsunami warning in the United States and globally.
Through the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, the USGS,
NOAA, FEMA, and five western States (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon
and Washington) have worked to enhance the quality and quantity of
seismic data provided to the NOAA tsunami warning centers and how this
data is used at the state and local level. This program has funded USGS
to upgrade seismic equipment for regional seismic networks in Northern
California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska and Hawaii. The seismic data
recorded by the USGS nationally and globally are relayed to the NOAA
tsunami warning centers. USGS and NOAA also exchange earthquake
locations and magnitude estimates, with USGS providing the final
authoritative magnitudes of events. USGS is also working with emergency
managers in the Pacific Northwest to support public warning systems in
coastal communities there.
Improving earthquake monitoring in the United States--with
consequent improvements to public safety and the reduction of
earthquake losses--can be achieved through the modernization and
expansion of the ANSS, including expansion of seismic sensor networks
nationwide, the upgrading of the associated data processing and
analysis facilities, and the development of new earthquake products.
Funding over the past three years has focused on installation of over
500 new seismic sensors in high-risk urban areas. The FY05
appropriation for ANSS is $5.12 million. The President's proposed
increase in funding to USGS in response to the tsunami disaster would
allow USGS to make critically needed improvements to performance in one
key element of ANSS, providing 24 7 operations capacity and
completing software and hardware upgrades to speed processing times.
These improvements will enhance USGS support of NOAA's tsunami warning
responsibility.
The Threat From Tsunamis and Great Earthquakes in the Pacific
The concentration of U.S. tsunami warning efforts in the Pacific
reflects the greater frequency of destructive tsunami in that ocean.
Approximately 85 percent of the world's tsunamis occur in the Pacific.
This is due to many subduction zones ringing the Pacific basin--the
source of submarine earthquakes of large enough magnitude (greater than
cents7) to produce tsunami. While Hawaii's position in the middle of
the Pacific makes it uniquely vulnerable to ocean-wide tsunami, this
chain of volcanic islands also faces a hazard from locally generated
tsunami due to local earthquakes or submarine landslides. In 1975, a
magnitude 7.2 earthquake just offshore the island of Hawaii caused a
tsunami that killed 2 with maximum runup height (elevation reached by
tsunami as they move inland from the shoreline) of 47 feet.
U.S. Insular Areas in the Pacific also face a threat both from
ocean-wide tsunami as well as ones generated locally. The volcano
Anatahan in the Northern Marianas, which began actively erupting on
January 5, 2005, serves as a reminder that inhabitants and U.S.
military interests in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
and the Territory of Guam are threatened by nine islands with active
volcanoes that have the potential to generate hazardous ash plumes as
well as tsunamis through eruption-induced collapse. The risks from
tsunamis to the inhabited islands are poorly understood, and tsunami
inundation modeling is needed to assess the threat represented by such
an event.
Our knowledge of what may be the greatest risk to the United States
does not come from our tsunami experiences of the last half century,
but rather to the detective work of USGS and other scientists in the
Pacific Northwest. In contrast to the San Andreas Fault, where the
Pacific and North American plates are sliding past one another, a
subduction zone known as Cascadia lies offshore further north, its size
nearly identical to that of the rupture zone of the Sumatra earthquake
(see Figure 2). On January 26, 1700, the Cascadia subduction zone broke
in a great earthquake, probably from northernmost California to the
middle of Vancouver Island. Along the Pacific coast in Oregon,
Washington, California, and British Columbia, this huge event of the
same general size of the Sumatra earthquake, caused coastal marshes to
suddenly drop down several feet. This change in land elevation was
recorded by the vegetation living in and around the coastal marshes.
For example, along the Copalis River in Washington State, Western Red
Cedar trees that have lifespans of over 1000 years were suddenly
submerged in salt water. Over the next few months, those trees died. By
comparing tree rings of the still standing dead trees with nearby trees
that were not submerged, paleoseismologists established that the trees
were killed during the winter of 1699-1700.
Digging through river bank deposits along the Copalis and other
rivers in Cascadia, paleoseismologists found a pervasive, black sand
sheet left by the tsunami. Because the sands deposited by the tsunami
are transported by the tsunami waves, paleoseismologists can combine
the location of tsunami sands with the change in marsh elevation to get
an approximate idea of the length of the rupture for the 1700
earthquake. Tsunami sands have been found from Vancouver Island to
Humboldt Bay in California.
Once paleoseismologists found evidence of the 1700 event, they
combed written records in Japan to see if evidence existed of an
unknown tsunami wave. Several villages recorded damage in Japan on
January 27, 1700, from a wave that people living along the coast could
not associate with strong ground shaking. The coast of Japan had been
hit, not unlike Sri Lanka and Somalia, by a distant tsunami, but this
tsunami came from the west coast of North America. By modeling the
travel time across the Pacific, paleoseismologists were able to
establish the exact date of the last Cascadia subduction zone event.
Based on estimates of the return interval, USGS scientists and
others have estimated that there is a 10-14 percent chance of a repeat
of the Cascadia magnitude 9 earthquake and tsunami event in the next 50
years. Since that initial discovery in the early 1980s, many of the
elements of the seismic systems for the Pacific Northwest described
above have been put in place along with improved building codes to
address the higher expected ground shaking and increased public
education through the efforts of state and local emergency managers.
The December 26, 2004, earthquake and tsunami together cause us to
focus on the similar threat from the Cascadia subduction zone that
faces the Pacific Northwest as well as our long Alaskan coastline. Here
I cannot emphasize enough the critical role played by our partners in
state and local government, especially the state emergency managers.
Largely through the efforts of the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation
Program partnership, much has been accomplished. Seismic systems have
been improved, allowing NOAA's West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning
Center to issue warnings within minutes of a significant offshore
earthquake. Inundation maps, graphic representations of estimates of
how far inland future tsunami waves are likely to reach, are available
for most major communities in northern California, Oregon, and
Washington. Working with FEMA, public education has been stressed, and
emergency managers have begun installing all-hazard warning systems.
USGS is co-funding a $540,000 pilot project in Seaside, Oregon with
FEMA and NOAA to develop risk identification products that will help
communities understand their actual level of risk from tsunami in a way
that could be conveyed on existing flood maps. The goal of the project
is to develop techniques that can be used to determine the probability
and magnitude of tsunami in other communities along the west coast of
the United States.
Tsunami Threats in the Atlantic
With respect to tsunami hazard risk to the U.S. East coast, it
should be noted that subduction zones are scarce in the Atlantic Ocean.
But the Atlantic Ocean is not immune to tsunami. A tsunami following
the great 1755 Lisbon earthquake, generated by collision of the African
and Eurasian tectonic plates, devastated coasts of Portugal and
Morocco, reached the British Isles, and crested as much as 20 feet high
in the Caribbean.
In 1929, the magnitude 7.2 Grand Banks earthquake triggered a
submarine landslide and tsunami that struck Newfoundland's sparsely
settled coast, where it killed 27 people with waves as high as 20 feet.
An event like this, involving a submarine landslide, may be the most
likely scenario for the Atlantic coast. Scars of past large submarine
landslides abound on the continental slope off the U.S. Atlantic coast.
As in the 1929 Grand Banks event, some of the slides probably resulted
from large earthquakes. If earthquakes are the primary initiator of the
observed landslide features, the hazard to the Atlantic coast is
limited as large earthquakes rarely occur in the vicinity of the U.S.
and Canada Atlantic coast--perhaps once a century, on average (Boston
area, 1755; Charleston, 1866; Newfoundland, 1929). Additionally, this
type of tsunami would affect a much smaller geographical area than one
generated by a subduction zone, and its flooding effect and inundation
distance would be limited. Much work is needed, however, to more fully
understand the triggering of submarine landslides and the extent of
that threat in the Atlantic.
Another tsunami scenario for the Atlantic coast that has been
widely publicized is a landslide involving collapse of part of the
Cumbre Vieja volcano in the Canary Islands into the sea. While this
collapse would be dramatic and might indeed induce a transatlantic
tsunami, such a collapse may occur only once every hundred thousand
years. Furthermore, unlike the West Coast with the abundant record of
past ocean-wide tsunami deposits, no such regionally extensive deposits
have been found to date along the Atlantic coast.
Tsunami Threats in the Caribbean
The Caribbean is subject to a broad range of geologic processes
that have the potential to generate tsunami. Indeed, the Caribbean
tectonic plate has almost all of the tsunami-generating sources within
a small geographical area. Subduction zone earthquakes of the type that
generated the Indian Ocean tsunami are found along the Lesser Antilles
and the Hispaniola and Puerto Rico trenches. Other moderately large
earthquakes due to more local tectonic activity take place probably
once a century, such as in Mona Passage (1918 tsunami) and in the
Virgin Islands basin (1867 tsunami). Moderate earthquakes occur that
may trigger undersea landslides and thus generate tsunami. An active
underwater volcano (Kick'em Jenny near Grenada) where sea floor maps
show previous episodes of flank collapse also poses a tsunami hazard.
Above-water volcanic activity occurs, wherein the Lesser Antilles
periodically generate landslides that enter the sea to cause tsunami.
And finally, the possibility exists of tele-tsunami from the African-
Eurasian plate boundary, such as the great Lisbon earthquake of 1755
described above.
In 1867, an 18-foot high tsunami wave entered St. Thomas' Charlotte
Amalie at the same time that a 27-foot wave entered St. Croix's
Christiansted Harbor. Were that to occur again today, the 10-fold
increase in population density, the cruise ships, petroleum carriers,
harbor infrastructure, hotels and beach goers, nearby power plants,
petrochemical complexes, marinas, condominiums, and schools, would all
be at risk.
On October 11, 1918, the island of Puerto Rico was struck by a
magnitude 7.5 earthquake, centered approximately 15 kilometers off the
island's northwestern coast, in the Mona Passage. In addition to
causing widespread destruction across Puerto Rico, the quake generated
a medium sized tsunami that produced runup as high as 18 feet along the
western coast of the island and killed 40 people, in addition to the 76
people killed by the earthquake. More than 1,600 people were reportedly
killed along the northern coast of the Dominican Republic in 1946 by a
tsunami triggered by a magnitude 8.1 earthquake.
In contrast to the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico has low tsunami
risk. The region is seismically quiet and protected from tsunami
generated in either the Atlantic or the Caribbean by Florida, Cuba, and
broad continental shelves. Although there have been hurricane-generated
subsea landslides as recently as this fall, there is no evidence that
they have generated significant tsunami.
Lessons Learned: What the United States Can Do to Better Prepare Itself
and the World
Natural hazard events such as the one that struck Sumatra and the
countries around the Indian Ocean on December 26, 2004, are
geologically inevitable, but their consequences are not. The tsunami is
a potent reminder that while the nations surrounding the Pacific Ocean
face the highest tsunami hazard, countries around other ocean basins
lacking basic tsunami warning systems and mitigation strategies face
considerable risk. Reducing that risk requires a broad, comprehensive
system including rapid global earthquake and tsunami detection systems,
transmission of warnings in standardized formats to emergency officials
who already know which coastal areas are vulnerable through inundation
mapping and tsunami hazard assessment, and broadcast capabilities to
reach a public already educated in the dangers and how to respond. For
tsunami crossing an ocean basin, an adequate system of earthquake
sensors, Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) buoys,
and tide gauges should allow for timely warnings if the rest of the
system is in place. For tsunami generated near the coastline, time is
considerably more critical. For tsunami warnings to be effective, they
must be generated and transmitted to the affected coastline within a
few minutes of detection, local emergency responders must be prepared,
the population must be informed, and the entire system must be executed
without delay.
The Sumatra earthquake and its devastating effects will encourage
us to continue forward on the comprehensive NEHRP approach to
earthquake loss reduction. USGS is committed to do so in partnership
with FEMA, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and NSF
to translate research into results through such initiatives as ANSS,
the George E. Brown, Jr. Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation,
the plan to accelerate the use of new earthquake risk mitigation
technologies, and development of improved seismic provisions in
building codes.
As part of the President's plan to improve tsunami detection and
warning systems, the USGS will:
Implement 24 7 operations at the National
Earthquake Information Center and upgrade hardware and software
systems in order to improve the timeliness of alerts for global
earthquakes. As part of the upgrade, USGS will fully develop
what is now a prototype system to estimate the number of people
affected by strong ground shaking after an earthquake using our
ShakeMap model and databases of global population. Known as
Prompt Assessment of Global Earthquakes for Response (PAGER),
this system can provide aid agencies and others with a quick
estimate of how significant the casualties might be well in
advance of reports from affected areas where communications may
be down.
Support research to develop more rapid methods for
characterizing earthquakes and discriminating likely
tsunamigenic sources.
Improve the detection response time of the Global
Seismographic Network by making data from all stations
available in real time via satellite telemetry and improving
station up-time through increased maintenance schedules.
Improved coverage in the Caribbean region will be achieved
through the addition of stations and upgrades of existing
stations through international partnerships and cooperation.
Further the use of software developed by the California
Integrated Seismic Network (a USGS, university and state
partnership) to speed USGS-generated earthquake information
directly to local emergency managers with a dual use capability
to also provide NOAA tsunami warnings.
Enhance existing USGS geologic and elevation mapping for
coastal areas in the Caribbean. Such mapping is critical to
development of improved tsunami hazards assessments for Puerto
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
The USGS will also continue its ongoing efforts to improve tsunami
hazard assessment and warnings through geologic investigations into the
history of and potential for tsunami occurrence; coastal and marine
mapping; modeling tsunami generation, source characterization, and
propagation; and development of assessment methods and products such as
inundation maps with NOAA, FEMA, and other partners. USGS will also
continue strong partnerships with state tsunami and earthquake hazard
mitigation groups and contribute to public awareness efforts. An
example of the latter is the 2001 publication, USGS Circular 1187,
Surviving a Tsunami: Lessons Learned from Chile, Hawaii and Japan,
which was prepared in cooperation with the Universidad Austral de
Chile, University of Tokyo, University of Washington, Geological Survey
of Japan, and the Pacific Tsunami Museum. Continuing investigations of
the Indian Ocean tsunami provide a critical opportunity to expand our
knowledge of tsunami generation and impacts and to evaluate the
research and operational requirements for effective hazard planning,
warning, and response systems.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to appear before the
Committee and would be happy to answer any questions now or for the
record.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
We have just created a new Subcommittee on Disaster
Prevention and Prediction. We hope that that Subcommittee will
keep your two agencies pretty busy, because we think we have to
find some way to make this a more robust system.
Let me ask you, Dr. Marburger, what's the timeline for the
Administration's improved Tsunami Detection and Warning System?
Can you tell us the timeline, how soon are you going to move
into it? As I understand it, we're going to finish the one
we've already got going, but there's a tremendous expansion of
it. How long is it going to take us to do that?
Dr. Marburger. That's correct. The agencies indicate to us
that they ought to be able to have substantial improvement of
the existing system within 2 years, at the end of 2 years, if
I'm not mistaken. Fortunately, all the technology is available.
The systems are up and running, and it's improvements and--
improved maintenance and additional deployment of things like
these new buoys that's required. So it should be doable in a
relatively short period of time. Mid-2007 are the dates that
I've heard. They can be confirmed by others.
The Chairman. As I understand it, General Kelly, several of
these buoys are not working right now. The DART is on the
surface of the ocean. They're connected to a detector at the
bottom. Tell us what is leading to the malfunction of these
warning devices now?
General Kelly. Many things.
The Chairman. I can't hear you, I'm sorry.
General Kelly. Many things. And you are correct, there are
six DART buoys sited in the water today. Three of the six are
not operational. One has not been operational since October of
2003. There are two complicating factors. One is the weather,
the weather in the Aleutians, there's a narrow window when we
can get boats in there, or ships in there, to repair them, and
then, two, a number of components have failed, different
components have failed at different times. And so, part of our
plan is, in fact, to put a better buoy in place of the existing
ones, and then expand the network.
The Chairman. Could you put that chart up again, showing
where these new buoys are going to be----
General Kelly. Yes, sir.
The Chairman.--and where the existing ones are? As I
understand it, half of the buoys we've detected--we've deployed
right now are not functioning?
General Kelly. That is correct.
The Chairman. Which ones?
General Kelly. (Indicating.) The red ones.
The Chairman. Tell us, for the record.
General Kelly. Three along the Aleutians.
The Chairman. Three along the Aleutian chain.
General Kelly. Yes. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And what's the plan for replacing those?
General Kelly. Within the last--within the last several
weeks, we--or last month--we attempted to repair one, got it in
the water, and then a component malfunctioned. And we are ready
now, as soon as we get a break in the weather--we have forward-
deployed the parts into Alaska--as soon as we get a break in
the weather--and we need about 7 days of good weather--we'll
get a ship out there and replace the buoys.
The Chairman. Whose job is it to maintain and assure that
they are functioning?
General Kelly. NOAA's.
The Chairman. Which part of NOAA?
General Kelly. The National Weather Service.
The Chairman. Do they have the equipment to do that?
General Kelly. Well, they certainly don't own the ships to
do it, and they use the NOAA Corps to do that, or we contract
out. But they have--we have a National Data Buoy Center in Bay
St. Louis, which has the capability----
The Chairman. Where do you have it?
General Kelly. Bay St. Louis, Mississippi. And----
The Chairman. The center's in Mississippi, and all the
buoys are in the Pacific?
General Kelly. Well, no, sir, we have other kinds of buoys
along the Gulf Coast and along the United--and along the----
The Chairman. We're talking about tsunami warning now.
General Kelly. Well, yes, sir, but we're also talking about
buoy technology. And they have engineers and they have
scientists, and they work closely with the Pacific Marine
Environmental Lab. So our operational and maintenance repair
facility is in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi.
The Chairman. How long have they been down, those three?
General Kelly. One has been down since October 2003, one
was down in--one went down in December 2004, and another went
down in August 2004.
The Chairman. Is there a specific program looking at the
reliability of these buoys we're going to deploy?
General Kelly. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Who's in charge of that?
General Kelly. We're working jointly with the Pacific
Marine Environmental Lab and our experts at the National Data
Buoy Center.
The Chairman. All right. That worries me a great deal. If
we're going to spend money expanding the system we're going to
put out there--the buoys have been failing at this rate, it,
sort of, looks to me like the taxpayer may be just financing a
facade.
General Kelly. It is not our intent to put a one-for-one
replacement of the buoys that are out there as we expand this
network. We need to put out buoys that are more robust and
survive longer. And, in fact, given the challenges that we've
had in--as I mentioned earlier, including--included in the plan
will be three buoys that I will call ``in-water backups,'' so,
in case one does malfunction, we will still have something
providing us data.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Groat, the problem of these earthquakes and prediction
and tying them into this system, can you tell us, we have these
buoys deployed, but you're not relying on those buoys for your
predictions and detection of earthquakes, are you?
Dr. Groat. No, sir. We rely on the Global Seismic Network,
local networks that are subsidiary to it, to understand the
earthquakes and the potential for generating a tsunami. Many
earthquakes are very large, but don't generate tsunamis, even
those that occur in the ocean. The key is getting that
earthquake interpretation to NOAA in a timely fashion so that
if it's likely to have generated a tsunami, then they can be
prepared to use that information.
The Chairman. Is there a way to tie together what you've
got and the other systems here to make a prediction telling us
if an earthquake occurs at any particular place, there will or
not be a tsunami? We seem to only get tsunamis as a reaction to
the earthquakes, mainly in the Pacific, right?
Dr. Groat. Correct.
The Chairman. So are we tied together--can we say, if
there's an earthquake at such-and-such a place on the Aleutian
chain, there probably would be a tsunami that would go any
particular direction?
Dr. Groat. With the upgrades that we've talked about in our
seismic monitoring system and the data processing, we will do a
better job of predicting whether the earthquake was of a type
that would generate a tsunami. There are many large
displacements that go this way, and they don't generate
anything.
The Chairman. OK. But if you can predict there's going to
be a tsunami, can you predict where it's going to go?
Dr. Groat. Well, they go--it's, sort of, like dropping a
rock in a pond, the waves go in all directions. So once we know
where it is, then we can watch where the waves will go. And we
can predict that pretty well.
The Chairman. Thank you. That's what I was looking for. I
watched the Discovery channel the other night. You all did a
very good job on that, and I did not know that until then, that
it is like dropping a stone in a pond. There will be tsunamis
everywhere if it's located, say, around Senator Inouye's
country, it's possible it could affect the whole Pacific,
right?
Dr. Groat. Very much so.
The Chairman. Senator Inouye?
Senator Inouye. Like most of my colleagues, I'm concerned
about the six DART buoys. Three have been out of commission for
about 15 months. And if it weren't for the tragedy of biblical
proportions, the likelihood is that this Congress would not
have been notified. Am I correct?
General Kelly. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. We would not have known that three were out
of commission.
General Kelly. You're correct. But I would point out that
the DART buoys, while important, are not the only components in
the network.
Senator Inouye. I realize that there are many circumstances
that would cause problems, such as weather and the budget. Why
was it impossible for NOAA to notify the Congress that three of
the six were out of business?
General Kelly. Senator, within NOAA, there are a number of
observing systems out there. And, as a matter of practice, we
routinely don't notify the Congress when a given sensor, or a
series of sensors, goes out.
Senator Inouye. You don't know whether the system is
working or not?
General Kelly. Well, no. We know, but we don't routinely
notify the Congress. We sometimes have problems with
satellites, with a given sensor on a satellite, and, at least
in my experience, we have not routinely provided an update to
the Congress of a problem with a satellite sensor. We try to
work through it, and, in most cases, get it resolved.
The Chairman. Would the Senator yield just there?
Senator Inouye. Sure.
The Chairman. Who do you notify when a buoy goes down?
General Kelly. When a buoy goes down, the head of the
National Weather Service gets notified, the two Tsunami Warning
Center directors get notified, and it is the responsibility of
the head of the National Weather Service to get those buoys
repaired.
The Chairman. So they don't tell your Governor, or mine.
Senator Inouye. These buoys are obviously very important.
They not only prevent the loss of lives, they prevent the
unnecessary expenditure of funds. I'm just thinking to myself,
if that disaster that we experienced in Indonesia and Sri Lanka
had occurred in Washington or Oregon or Alaska, and we weren't
warned because the three buoys were not operational, the
atmosphere in this room would be, I think, much more heated.
General Kelly. I agree with you, Senator Inouye, but I
believe that, while the three buoys are important, we still
have the capability to warn. And even if that earthquake had
occurred somewhere in the Pacific, warnings would have gone
out. Because even with the three buoys being down, the Pacific
Tsunami Warning Center did issue a--what we call an information
advisory that a tsunami had, in fact, been generated. So, while
the three are down, and that's regrettable, and we're working
to get them repaired, we are not totally defenseless because
those three are down. And I am not trying to condone the fact
that they are down, or they've been down as long as they have,
but I think it is important that we don't leave here thinking
that we are totally defenseless in providing information and
warnings. And you are correct that one of the great benefits of
those DART buoys are, it gives confirmation as to the
characterization and the magnitude of the tsunami, and, in
fact, helps reduce the number of what we call false alarms, and
then saves the local governments money, in terms of responding.
And, frankly, most importantly, a whole string of false-alarm
tsunami warnings will cause the citizens not to pay attention
to it, and that is a critical thing we need to work against.
Senator Inouye. By indicating your position, you're not
suggesting we don't need any more DART buoys.
General Kelly. No, sir, I am not indicating we don't need
any more DART buoys. They will improve the system. I am trying
to get the message across that we are not totally defenseless
with the existing systems, and the citizens of Hawaii and the
citizens of Alaska and the West Coast of the United States
ought not to get unduly alarmed.
Senator Inouye. I have just one more question, to any one
of you. Within 24 hours after the disaster in Southeast Asia,
major stations, such as CNN and all of the networks began
criticizing, and suggesting that they should have been notified
so that they could have used their offices and facilities to
warn the people. Is that a valid criticism? Could that have
been done?
Dr. Marburger. Well, it certainly could have been done. I
do not know what the protocol is for notifications, but the
National Weather Service is notified instantly, and usually
their information is shared immediately with the media.
General Kelly. Senator Inouye, it is my belief that many of
those news organizations did, in fact, get the tsunami bulletin
that was sent out from the Hagemayer Warning Center in Hawaii.
I think what they were asking for was some type of protocol
being established wherein the watch officer might make a
telephone call to them or somehow take an explicit step to get
the information to them.
Senator Inouye. Is that a valid request?
General Kelly. I think we have to do some analysis of it
and what we are talking about. Now, let's take the National
Hurricane Center. When hurricanes are coming, there is a large
press presence in the Hurricane Center. Fortunately, with
hurricanes, we have a bit more time to start alerting the
public. With tsunamis--and while this earthquake, as Dr. Groat
said, was one of the more massive in the century, I mean, we
had time to watch the tsunami perpetuate across the Pacific.
Frequently, in Alaska and Hawaii you only have minutes, and I'm
just not sure, given one watch officer trying to issue
bulletins, clarify the bulletins, that there's sufficient time
for him to be talking to the press. There may be other
arrangements that can be made with the press for them to get
the information differently.
The Chairman. There was another criticism, in that we did
notify the countries involved, but the receiving facility was
not operational. Is that a valid one?
General Kelly. When you're talking about the ``receiving,''
you're talking about the receiving system in the in-country?
Senator Inouye. Yes.
General Kelly. As I said in my testimony, we have an
agreement with 26 countries in the Pacific Rim to provide
information to them, and then they have the responsibility of
developing their local warnings and distributing them to their
country. No such system exists in the Pacific Ocean, so I--I'm
sorry, in the Indian Ocean--and so, that is--there's some truth
in that, that countries were not prepared to deal with it.
As I said in my testimony, tsunami preparedness has a
number of variables in it. To my mind, the most important one
is, when you get the warning, have you got a way, internally,
to get it out to your citizens, and have you educated them and
worked with them so that they know what to do? Thanks to both
of your help with the Tsunami Mitigation Program legislation in
1996, we've been able to do a fair amount of that work on the
West Coast and in Hawaii.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, if necessary, Senator Inouye and I
will send you a letter, to each of your agencies, for this
request. We would ask that you report back to us, in 2 weeks,
what it would take to establish a system to notify the entities
who have been mentioned--specifically, 911, the Weather
Channel, the emergency disaster systems that exist in the 50
states.
The Chairman. We're concerned primarily with this country
because of our Committee's jurisdiction. I'm sure others will
be asking the question about the international aspects of the
system to come. But, right now, we thought we had a system, and
we found, when this occurred, that it was--half of it was
dormant, was not working. And we think we ought to have a
system that not only--we're notified if something's gone wrong,
but we also have adequate apparatus to detect the problem and
get at it now.
And, beyond that, though, I think that the news media have
a legitimate cause to object. There's no reason why we can't
have an interconnection with 911 or with the Weather Channel or
with the disaster system or with FEMA. That can--we also handle
communications, gentlemen, and that can be done automatically.
Once you press the button, it can be very ubiquitous and go
throughout the country, if it's set up right.
So we'd like to know, What will it take to do that? And if
you need money, the appropriations bills are coming up, we'll
see to it you'll get it.
General Kelly. Mr. Chairman, I may have misunderstood your
question. I thought, when you were talking about the press, you
were talking about internationally. We work--we, in NOAA, work
very, very closely with the Weather Channel. We work very, very
closely with FEMA. We will provide the information you
requested. I will be surprised, in fact, if those organizations
you talked about did not have information about this tsunami.
The fact was, though, that the tsunami was not going to impact
the United States, and, therefore, some of their interest may
not have been as great on it. But internationally--dealing with
the international press, I'm not sure what the arrangements
are.
The Chairman. Well, of course, we're talking here about
when it might be coming our way, and those buoys are supposed
to tell us that.
General Kelly. Well, that's what I'm telling you. I believe
the system is in place if this one would have affected the
United States.
The Chairman. Yeah. I'm sorry to take your time.
Senator Nelson?
STATEMENT OF HON. E. BENJAMIN NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
gentlemen, for helping us understand what is involved in
detecting and--tsunamis and communicating the information.
As it relates to a globalization for a warning system so
that it's not only--we're not only capable of communicating the
information to affected locations, what would be involved in
making sure that the receiving end of the information is
capable of, not only receiving, but acting on this information?
If the information goes out, and there's no reaction to it,
obviously, then, it's not terribly helpful. We will have
committed our--we will have fulfilled our responsibility, but
we're certainly not going to get the result we're looking for.
And if $350 million of aid is going from the United States,
given the fact that there's also private aid that will go, what
would be involved in making sure that we have receivers at the
other end so that there could be action taken on it? And, also,
what barriers might we encounter? And some idea of the cost. I
suspect that if we're looking at this in terms of dollars and
cents, there may be a way to quantify it. There is no way to
quantify or qualify the untold misery and loss of life and the
disruption to entire areas around the world.
Dr. Marburger?
Dr. Marburger. Yes, let me take a crack at that.
First, the most important part of the receiving nation's
capability must be communications and education systems,
country by country, in the affected countries. And it is
necessary for some of those countries in the Indian Ocean
periphery to build from scratch. There's a great deal of
unevenness in the state of development in those countries, as
you well know. The most capable countries are already on their
way toward building systems like ours in their countries.
Senator Ben Nelson. Were they in the process of doing that
before this, or is this subsequent to the event?
Dr. Marburger. I believe that some of those countries were,
countries like India and Australia and Indonesia, Thailand all
have important capabilities. And as a result of the meeting
that I attended last weekend in Thailand, it became clear to me
that those countries are likely to be the centers. Just as the
U.S. and Japan and some other countries around the Pacific have
strong systems, I believe those systems will begin to emerge in
the Asian nations around the Indian Ocean.
The U.S. will participate in advising and helping those
nations to develop strong programs, which include more than
just the sensing systems. We have a great deal of experience.
We work closely with the UNESCO IOC, and they are on the scene
and helping to advise those countries, as well. I believe that
aid will be required, and that aid will be delivered through
the normal channels, but, at this time, I can't make an
estimate of how much might be necessary.
Senator Ben Nelson. Could somebody else help us? Yes?
Dr. Bement. I think education and preparation is vitally
important, especially in being able to do risk and
vulnerability assessment. It's critically important that there
be lifelines that are robust and can function under this type
of a disaster. And I think our field surveys will inform that
process.
We're discovering that there are many bridges that were not
pinned to their support structures, that were washed away. That
affected, not only food and water supply, but also medical
evacuation. There are many structures on the coastal regions
that were not built to earthquake codes. We're still sorting
out what was earthquake-related and what was tsunami-related.
Unfortunately, they both reinforced one another.
But detection is one thing. Casting that detection into a
suitable warning system based on risk and vulnerability
assessment that's done before-the-fact, so you can at least
have an understanding of how much damage can be done and what
prior preparation would help mitigate the event, I think, is
critical----
Senator Ben Nelson. So----
Dr. Bement.--in this particular instance.
Senator Ben Nelson.--our ability to detect, without the
capability to followup, is inadequate in order for these
countries to be able to respond, even though we may. And I
suspect that those three buoys will be corrected rather quickly
in the Alaskan area. I sense the Chairman's----
Dr. Bement. I think Dr. Marburger, in his----
Senator Ben Nelson.--interest in doing that, yes.
Dr. Bement.--Dr. Marburger, in his written testimony, I
think spelled out all the elements that are needed for a robust
system, and it involves, not only detection and warning, it
requires a good response plan, a good recovery plan, and it
also requires an infrastructure that has lifelines that will
survive the event.
Senator Ben Nelson. Now----
Dr. Groat. Senator, could I--oh, excuse me.
Senator Ben Nelson. Sure. Yes, Dr. Groat?
Dr. Groat. Just one particularly challenging aspect of
this, not only internationally, but domestically, that we all
have to worry about is the fact that if the rock drops in the
pond, and the waves come from some great distance, we have
plenty of time--literally hours, in some cases. And if there is
a structure in place to get warnings to citizens--news media,
weather--whatever it happens to be--were in decent shape,
particularly in the United States. The challenge comes if this
subduction-zone-caused earthquake-generated tsunami is just a
few miles off the coast, as it was in the case of Sumatra,
where we have very little time, then the challenge of getting
that information, that it is likely to have generated a
tsunami, into the hands of the response agencies, even when
they're sophisticated, as they generally are in the United
States, and then eliciting the proper response from the
citizens, is a super challenge for all of us. And that's where
these communication links and education links and programs,
such as the program that NOAA supports, are so important, and
the engagement of local governments and regional governments
and all of the preparedness agencies is so critical.
So literally you have little time, other than to say
there's a likely tsunami, the tide gauges and others indicate
that it may be coming is to--the run-for-your-life business has
to be communicated very quickly and very effectively. And
that's a challenge even in our country, where we could probably
do it pretty well, but in the countries that we were just
talking about, it's a whole other order of magnitude to do
that.
Senator Ben Nelson. Is it possible for us to improve from
``pretty well'' to ``very well''?
Dr. Groat. I think we can. I think the Subcommittee you
described as having created is going to create a much broader
awareness of the array of natural hazards that we have.
Tsunamis are certainly one, but earthquakes, landslides,
hurricanes, all of those things that affect populations very
quickly, need to be paid attention to, not only from how-they-
occur, when-they-occur warnings systems, but creating that
education process that puts our populations-at-risk at less
risk. And I think this Subcommittee can go a long way in
helping that happen.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you for your comments.
If the information we're getting from some people about
global climate change is correct, we may be in for a lot more
of these than we anticipate right now, so I think it's
essential that we take this action. That's why we created that
Subcommittee.
Senator Smith?
STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON H. SMITH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wonder if I can
ask that my longer opening statement be included in the record.
The Chairman. Sure. It will be.
Senator Smith. Gentlemen, thank you for being here and for
considering our implications of S. 50, which is the subject of
this hearing.
As a Senator from a coastal state, I'm very mindful that 85
percent of tsunamis occur in the Pacific. I'm also mindful that
Oregon is right in the middle of a Cascadia Subduction Zone.
Apparently, according to your written testimony, Dr. Groat,
about every few hundred years there's a major shift in this
zone. And the last time it shifted was in 1700, and that that
produced a tsunami on the Oregon coast the equivalent of what
occurred in Southeast Asia. And I understand you're saying that
there is a 10 to 15 percent chance that that will occur in the
next 50 years.
Dr. Groat. That's correct.
Senator Smith. I guess, on the basis of that, that we're at
the end of that likely millennial period where we could suffer
another. I'm wondering if S. 50, and the changes that are
proposed in that bill, are sufficient to give Oregonians,
Washingtonians, Californians, and Alaskans the warning time
that they would need to avoid the kind of devastation we saw in
Southeast Asia.
I say that, because I understand that this plate is close
enough to the coast of Oregon that it would only give coastal
residents somewhere between 10 to 30 minutes to retreat. Are
the systems in place to save their lives?
Dr. Groat. Let me first comment, Senator, from the role
that the USGS plays in this--and that is that if the upgrades
that we're talking about in the seismic systems, and the
ability to interpret the information that would occur from an
earthquake in the zone you just described, were processed and
communicated in the way--I think, in a technical sense, the
bill does recognize the role that we would play in providing
that information to the appropriate places and to the
appropriate agencies. I would have to rely on others to comment
as to whether--once that got communicated, whether there was a
system in place that would, in fact, warn Oregonians quickly
enough to respond in the way that I just described.
Senator Smith. I'm mindful, having come from my state
legislature, that we have done a great deal of work on this
issue, but I wonder if you're aware, Are other states on the
Pacific Coast--are they making sufficient preparations for
warning systems? I mean----
General Kelly. Senator, let me address it from the National
Weather Service point of view. Within the National Weather
Service, we have a program called TsunamiReady. It is not a
very complicated program. It is--you ask the coastal community
to have some point where the warning information could come.
You ask that that be manned 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. You
ask that they have developed a communications system to get
that warning out to the citizens in that community, and that
they have thought through where we would evacuate the citizens
to in the event that warning came, and they have some scheme or
practice schedule to practice evacuations.
And if they have that, we, in the Weather Service,
designate them as TsunamiReady. They get a number of big
placards that go on the state highways and the roadways coming
in. There's little notes at the bottom of them which says
things like, ``If you feel the ground shake, get away from the
waterfront.'' That's applicable in your State of Oregon. We
work in the state of Washington. It's in the State of Hawaii.
It's in the state of Alaska. The local forecast offices up and
down the West Coast work with the local emergency managers.
I would love to tell you that 99 percent of the local
communities are enrolled in that TsunamiReady program, but I
would be misleading you. I think up and down the West Coast
there may be a combination of 15 cities, slash, counties that
are in the program.
So what we need to do is redouble our efforts to start
working with the local areas, because, in the final analysis,
the local communities have to be where the action will take to
get the citizens ready to move out of the way of this event.
Senator Smith. Are you gentlemen, in your positions, are
you familiar with the Hinsdale Wave Research Center at Oregon
State University?
Dr. Bement. Well, the National Science Foundation supports
that center, so we're very familiar with it.
Senator Smith. I had the privilege of touring that with Dr.
Cox, who will be on the next panel. I hope you make good use of
it. It is a spectacular facility that certainly taught me a lot
about tsunamis, long before this one occurred in Southeast
Asia. And it's a remarkable asset that we have to spread
information about what we're facing if you live on the coast.
And I'm wondering about inundation mapping. Can that help
ensure that coastal residents immediately know when to go and
what to do? How----
Dr. Bement. I think that's part of the prevention and
education. Some of our reconnaissance teams now are trying to
infer wave heights based on water lines and inundation surveys
that they're currently doing, because one of the weak points in
our predictive models are the runup part of the event, where it
hits the shore. And enclosed bays, estuaries, and the beach
gradient can have a big effect on how large that wave will be
when it hits. And those are areas where we need to refine our
current models.
Senator Smith. Not only refining the models, but my
question is, because of what happened in Asia, Do you have
sufficient funding to complete these inundation mappings?
Because I think that that--if not, we need to get you the
money, because people need to know where they can go, in their
geography, to avoid the wave.
Dr. Bement. Well, we do need to respond to that in our
future-year budgets. Currently, we're planning workshops this
spring and summer to assimilate and understand the data coming
back from the survey teams. And based on those reports, we will
be developing longer-range research activities, and we'll
probably have to incorporate that in our budget for next year.
Senator Smith. I would strongly urge you to do that.
Senator Stevens has a lot of sway on the Appropriations
Committee. And I just think if you need funding for inundation
mapping----
Dr. Bement. Well, I did shift some funding for next fiscal-
year request to help address some of that, but it may not be
adequate.
Senator Smith. Anything that it needs--you need to make it
adequate, on behalf of the people of Oregon, please do it.
Dr. Bement. Thank you.
Senator Smith. Thanks.
[The prepared statement of Senator Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Gordon H. Smith, U.S. Senator from Oregon
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing and for
including on today's witness list Dr. Daniel Cox from the O.H. Hinsdale
Wave Research Center at Oregon State University (OSU). I had the
opportunity to tour OSU's research facilities with Dr. Cox last year. I
look forward to hearing from him as well as the other panelists. I want
to thank each of today's witnesses for being here.
As a Senator from a coastal state, I have a very obvious interest
in today's proceedings. Eighty-five percent of tsunamis occur in the
Pacific Ocean. While in the United States we have been fortunate not to
have experienced destruction on the scale currently seen in southeast
Asia, the recent tragedy reminds how important it is that our
communities are prepared in the event that a major tsunami strikes our
coast.
Running along the Pacific Northwest--stretching from northern
California to British Columbia--lies the Cascadia Subduction Zone.
Research has shown that the Cascadia Subduction Zone has unleashed
massive earthquakes off the coast of the Pacific Northwest every few
hundred years. The last such quake occurred in January 1700. This event
was similar in magnitude to the Sumatra earthquake and sent huge tidal
waves barreling into the shores of the Pacific Northwest.
In testimony prepared for today, Dr. Groat writes that ``there is a
10-14 percent chance of a repeat of the Cascadia magnitude 9 earthquake
and tsunami event in the next 50 years.'' Scientists estimate that
given the proximity of the subduction zone to the coast--approximately
70 miles off shore--it would take a tsunami roughly 10 to 30 minutes
from the time the fault line ruptured to strike the Oregon coast.
Warning and detection systems are important, but alone they are not
enough to protect our coastal communities. Our coastal residents must
know where to go and what to do when the ground begins to shake. To
protect the safety of our coastal residents, we must continue to work
with our state and local partners to accelerate tsunami inundation zone
mapping and ensure contingency plans are in place for rapid evacuation
of vulnerable low-lying communities.
I was pleased to join Senator Inouye, Senator Stevens, and a number
of my other Senate colleagues last week in introducing the Tsunami
Preparedness Act of 2005. By improving tsunami detection and warning
systems, as well as inundation mapping and community outreach and
education, I am hopeful that this legislation will go along way toward
helping our coast be better prepared should a tsunami strike.
Thankfully, these events are rare and the cost of preparing for them is
miniscule compared to the loss of life and property that could result
if we are caught ill-equipped.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for holding this hearing and for
the opportunity to speak. I look forward to learning more from today's
panelists. I also ask unanimous consent that the testimony of the
Oregon Coastal Zone Management Association be entered into the
Committee record.
The Chairman. Senator DeMint?
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM DeMint,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA
Senator DeMint. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm from South Carolina, so I'm on the Atlantic side, and I
think what you're suggesting, we're not at nearly as much risk,
is that what I understand from the panel? Although there may be
some applications that we need on the East Coast.
Just a quick question, I guess, to anyone on the panel, in
the--is, I appreciate the information that you've shared. I
certainly don't pretend to be anywhere near an expert on what
you're talking about after a few minutes, but, based on what
you've told me, I have a--somewhat of a concern that we might
be quickly expanding antiquated technology in order to cover
our bases as quickly as we can. The failure rate of these buoys
is apparently a concern to everyone who's heard that, and it
doesn't sound like a quick fix or a few new parts is going to
solve the service problem of these. And my question is simply,
Has there been a coordinated attempt to look at all the
technology that's available to see if water-based is really the
way to go? Are there land-based water-level measurements that
could go out several hundred miles that could give,
particularly states like Oregon that expect a very short
notice, a quicker way to respond than something that's floating
around in the ocean that may not be working? That would be my
only question. I think everyone is going to be interested in
funding whatever works. But from what I've heard today, I'm a
little concerned that what we may be funding might not be the
most reliable way to go.
General?
General Kelly. Senator, on the observation side, there are
two components to it. One, there is--there are the DART buoys.
Larger in number are the tide gauges I mentioned. We're going
to put some 38 new ones in. There are a number of tide gauges
up and down the United States coasts today. They serve multiple
purposes, not just for tsunamis.
The utility of the DART buoy is, with it being out in the
deep water, you get an earlier confirmation as to whether a
tsunami has or has not occurred. On the side that it has not
occurred, that prevents the number of false alarms from being
too high. On the fact that it did occur, then you can give more
positive statements to the citizens that something not very
nice is coming their way.
Yes, we have challenges with the DART buoys. We've had
trouble maintaining them. I would point out that we know of no
other country in the world that has developed a technology like
this. The Germans contend they have a system. But the best I
can determine, no one has ever gotten any data from the system
and been able ever to see--to operate.
So I don't want to minimize the technical accomplishments
that the researchers that have developed these DART buoys have
made in doing it. And, yes, indeed, we do have some reliability
problems with them, but when you're dealing with high-tech
equipment--and I'm not trying to minimize that--that's not an
unusual thing. It is not our intention to, with all the new
DART buoys that are going out there, to replicate old
technology that has given us maintenance problems. We are going
to try to make it more robust.
But we believe the data from the DART buoys is an essential
element of the observing network. It is not the only element,
as I tried to say earlier. It's regrettable that three of the
six are down. We still have some capability. We would like to
have more capability. But we do believe that the DARTs are an
important part, and we are going to try to make them more
reliable.
Senator DeMint. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Cantwell?
STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask that my
statement be inserted in the record.
The Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
for holding this hearing on the Tsunami Preparedness Act of
2005. I had an opportunity, in the last 10 days, to visit the
Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory in Seattle that is part
of the NOAA operations. And, first and foremost, I want to
thank the Chairman and the Ranking Member for their diligence
on this issue.
When a crisis happens, you go back and look and see how
prepared we are to date, and one thing that is very clear to me
is that Senator Stevens and Senator Inouye, because of
incidents that have happened in their states, have put a lot of
energy into focusing on this issue and getting us where we are
to date.
I had the chance to see the current DART buoy, and to
understand the information system that connects to it and how
it relays information. And I also got a chance to see the next-
generation buoys, which will be much easier to deploy. So I
have a good sense of where we're heading with the technology,
which, for taxpayers and security reasons, will be much more
cost-efficient and reliable. Instead of spending hundreds of
thousands of dollars on a research vessel trying to go out
hundreds of thousands of miles to deploy this, we might even be
able to push them out of an airplane or off of any kind of
vessel. So we're making good progress.
That doesn't mean that we, in the Northwest, don't want to
know when the current buoys are going to be fixed. And I know
my colleagues have raised these questions already, so I won't
say anything other than we're very concerned, and we'd like
them to be, obviously, operational as quickly as possible.
The one thing that is clear when you see the technology at
the Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory is that this act is
really about the preparedness element. It is about mapping. It
is, in the sense of what happened in Indonesia, understanding
that the effects of such devastation basically wipe out roads
and bridges and they hinder not just evacuation, but also
support in the future.
So my question to General Kelly or to Dr. Groat is just,
How far can--how fast can we get this mapping done? As you
know, the last time we had a major earthquake was in the year
1700. A 30-foot-high tsunami smashed into our coastline, and
the USGS estimates that there is a 10 to 14 percent chance that
another major Cascadia quake could happen in the next 50 years.
We're very interested in how soon the mapping could happen. And
exactly, then, what does the mapping provide us, in the sense
of local law enforcement and others, regarding the certainty of
our preparedness efforts?
Dr. Bement. Senator Cantwell, the field data that's coming
back will help inform the mapping process. But we currently
have remote sensors--high resolution, medium resolution, low
resolution sensors that are actually gathering data in real
time of the affected regions in this latest disaster. Once we
assimilate that data, we will be able to accelerate, I think,
the mapping effort. And by learning through our predictive
models we can infer what the damage zones would be if such an
earthquake were to happen, for example, at the Cascadia fault
line, which is about as large as the fault line in the Indian
Ocean. The extent. It's almost a similar event.
As far as timelines are concerned, I'm not at the position
to really lay that out in any great detail, but I think we're
going to be much better informed about how to go about doing
that.
Dr. Groat. If I could comment, Senator Cantwell, you've hit
upon a very sensitive point, I think, with both U.S. Geological
Survey and NOAA. There are several kinds of maps that are
useful in this process. Inundation maps clearly are important.
Accurate maps upon which models can be built are important. But
they depend on, in our case, the topographic maps that show the
details of the topography on the onshore areas, and, in the
case of NOAA's responsibilities, the bathymetric maps that are
offshore. Having the most modern, current information about
what the land looks like and what the sea bottom looks like is
really critical to providing the information for inundation
maps and for providing information to response agencies about
surges in areas that might be affected.
I know in our case--and I can't speak for General Kelly--
getting that information as current as it needs to be--many of
our maps are 27 years old--so that it reflects the coast as it
is today, and the infrastructure as it is today, is a real
challenge for us. And if we're talking about funding challenges
to provide information needed for those efforts, this is one,
in our case, where the topography--the mapping of the
topography needs to be modern, needs to be current, needs to be
digital, so that it can go into the models and into the
inundation mapping. And I know General Kelly has similar
concerns.
General Kelly. I'll just second what Dr. Groat said. It is
a challenge to get current surveys of the undersea and what the
shoreline and the surface--sea surface is.
Senator Cantwell. So are we talking years?
Dr. Groat. I think the capabilities are there now, with
LIDAR and some of the technologies that provide information
about the landscape in digital form, to turn those into digital
map products, that we don't have to be talking about very many
years in critical coastal areas. In other words, we're not
talking about decade-long programs. I think in a matter of a
few years, with the funding, we could have current, update
digital information about the areas of the coast that are
likely to be impacted by this sort of event.
Dr. Bement. I can say that, if you look at just the area--
the terrain that's above the water level, the inland terrain,
there are geodetic surveys that are currently underway, some
involving Caltech, other universities that are involved. And
that's part of the survey work that's currently going on at the
present time. Now, how all that geodetic information will be
factored back into topological maps and update the maps, that's
outside the science area. That's more than the----
Dr. Groat. We do have a framework for that, called the
National Map, and it's an attempt to bring information from the
sources that Dr. Bement described, and others who are gathering
relevant digital information about the landscape, into one
framework so that it is the same around the coast, so we have a
product that has set standards, set approaches to providing
this information that everyone can use in a standardized
fashion.
So we do have the framework, we do have a lot of
organizations gathering it. What we don't have is sufficient
support to gather that information as quickly as we would like
to have it.
Senator Cantwell. Well, I think that was the point I was
trying to draw out. It's not a next-week project, but it isn't,
also, a 10-year time-frame before we'll have the results we
need.
Dr. Groat. Exactly.
Senator Cantwell. And the sooner that we can get to the
mapping, the better preparedness plans we'll be able to
develop.
I see my time is almost up, Mr. Chairman, but if I could
just ask another question about inland waterways.
I think a lot of people think of this tsunami threat as
unique to coastal regions, but Puget Sound, with its population
base, cities of Seattle and Tacoma and up the coastline of
Puget Sound, Bellingham and others, may be as susceptible to a
tsunami threat as the outer coasts. How do you see the
inundation mapping efforts helping to prepare large communities
with, in terms of not just evacuating communities but also
protecting infrastructure?
Dr. Groat. I think the mapping is, as you're pointing out
very accurately, needs to extend into those inland bodies,
those sounds, those estuaries, those bays, that are accessible
to the sea, where waves can come in--as they have in all cases
with these tsunamis, if there is an inlet, they'll come through
them--and that the infrastructure, as well as the people in
there, needs to be accurately represented so--on these maps.
And that's part of the National Map, is to include not just the
terrain, but the infrastructure that's there--houses,
buildings, bridges, so forth. And that needs to be as much in
place for areas facing--you know, areas on these inland bodies
connected to the sea as it is on the raw coast. And that is
part of the structure that we're talking about.
Senator Cantwell. I see. And if I could just throw this
in--if we had this mapping done prior to December 26, 2004, and
we knew what was going to happen in Indonesia--which, in fact,
I know the minute the earthquake happened, people ran to the
lab at the Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory in Seattle
and started trying to model scenarios, but by the time they got
information, the tsunami was actually hitting--but say we had
gotten all this mapping done 3 or 5 years ago. What would we
have done differently in preparing that community?
Dr. Marburger. Let me say, the main problem in the Indian
Ocean countries was not the technical warning. The main problem
was the absence of local public education and local
communications systems. That was the biggest thing that was
there. There were warnings available, based on seismic data
alone, that were transmitted to some spots in the Indian Ocean
that could receive them and knew what to do, but the biggest
challenge that we have is to provide infrastructure in those
nations so that they can educate their people and communicate
with them when they get the information.
So while simulations and additional instrumentation in the
Indian Ocean are important, nevertheless, the most important
thing is the public education and the identification of the
critical infrastructure long before the tsunami hits.
Dr. Bement. One thing that's going to be a major unknown is
what really changed as a result of the tsunami and the
earthquakes with regard to the relationship between groundwater
and surface water and what damage was done to the aquifers that
may not be reversible. Had that information been baselined, we
might be able to detect or determine what changes took place.
Now, that's one thing we can yet do in our own coastal regions,
is to develop that baseline data, so that we would be better
informed what possible damage might be done to aquifers and
other sources of fresh water.
General Kelly. Senator Cantwell, you put your finger on the
real challenge. And while the death--the number of deaths pale
in comparison to what happened in the Indian Ocean, it was a
very active hurricane season last year. They were, overall,
very well forecast. The Government of Haiti was provided good
forecasts and good information on what was likely to happen
with the hurricane, and they still lost 3,000 of their citizens
due to flooding. And it's my belief, in large measure, that
that's tied to the infrastructure challenge that that
particular government faced. And so, it cuts across all natural
disasters, and it is a big challenge.
Senator Cantwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Thank you very much, gentlemen.
I'll just drop a little pebble in this small bowl up here.
Do you ever think what would happen if the Madrid fault slipped
again? I mean, I heard that bells rang in the churches in
Boston and the Mississippi changed its course. So, I mean, we
still have problems all over this country. It's not necessarily
coastline.
And, second, back years ago, the Navy was building up Adak,
and we finally ended up with about five different naval bases
on that little island. We built a tsunami-proof shelter. We
didn't build any more, because of the cost of that one. But
there are things we must think about, and that is, can we get a
tsunami-proof shelter in the areas where they might be needed?
I would--I hope that our Subcommittee that we're going to
create will go into things like that.
And we look forward to working with you, but we're very
serious about this coordination thing, now, and I hope you will
help us by giving us your ideas of, what could we do to assure
that there would be proper notification to all the public
sources that would help disseminate news.
[The prepared statement of Senator Cantwell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Maria Cantwell, U.S. Senator from Washington
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for holding this hearing and for championing this
critical bill. Your leadership and foresight--along with that of
Senator Inouye--created the existing tsunami warning system, and I look
forward to working with you to further upgrade and modernize this
essential service.
Mr. Chairman, the loss of life and infrastructure incurred as a
result of the recent tsunami in the Indian Ocean provides a jarring
reminder of the need to evaluate the risk of tsunamis to our own
coastal populations.
That's why this well thought out bill, developed in cooperation
with the Administration, is so important. I am pleased to be a
cosponsor of it.
I recently visited the Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory in
Seattle, which provides research support for all aspects of the U.S.
tsunami program. While I was greatly impressed with their work, I also
learned that we can and must do more.
Whether it is developing more reliable monitoring buoys, or
improving our nation's vulnerability assessments, more resources are
needed.
I also learned more about the massive Cascadia fault that lies off
the coasts of Washington, Oregon, and Northern California and the fact
that it is similar in size and geologic character to the fault that
produced the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami.
A major Cascadia earthquake--the last which occurred in the year
1700 and led to a 30-foot high tsunami smashing into Washington's
coastline--could happen at any time. The U.S. Geological Survey
estimates there is a 10 to 14 percent chance of another major Cascadia
quake within the next 50 years.
Since a Cascadia-generated tsunami would allow for only 10 to 20
minutes of warning, I am pleased that this legislation includes
community-based tsunami hazard mitigation program and an acceleration
of critical vulnerability assessments and inundation maps. This
information is critical for coastal communities to plan for future
tsunami events.
I'd also like to thank Senator Inouye and Stevens for accomodating
my request and including language in this bill that requires an
assessment of tsunami risks in vulnerable inland bodies of water.
Earthquakes within the Puget Sound have historically produced
significant tsunamis, which today would cause significant flooding
along the waterfront of Seattle and other inner coastal communities.
So again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I fully
support the Tsunami Preparedness Act and believe it is essential if we
are to prevent the devastation caused by the Indian Ocean tsunami from
one day becoming realty on our coasts as well.
Senator Inouye?
Senator Inouye. I just wanted to clarify the record. In
November of 2003, one of the DART buoys issued data and
suggested that a massive tsunami was on its way to Hawaii. But
thanks to the efficiency of NOAA, they immediately clarified
the data and suggested it was not hitting us. And we've
calculated that it saved the State of Hawaii about $70 million;
otherwise, we would have spent all that money. So I want to
thank you very much.
And, Mr. Chairman, may I submit written questions?
The Chairman. Yes. *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Written questions and responses are printed in the Appendix.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Chairman. I'd appreciate it if you would respond to
questions that will be submitted by the individual Senators.
And, again, we thank you, gentlemen, for joining us. We
consider this to be a very important first hearing.
We'll now turn to the second panel--or maybe the third
panel, Dr. Roger Hansen, Professor of the University of Alaska
in Fairbanks, the Director of the Tsunami Warning and
Environmental System for Alaska; second, Ms. Eileen Shea,
Project Coordinator of the East West Center, of Honolulu,
Hawaii; and, third, Dr. Daniel Cox, the Director of the
Hinsdale Wave Research Laboratory at Oregon State University.
Senator Smith has a conflict, so, as a matter of courtesy,
Dr. Cox, we're going to call on you first.
We do hope that you all will give us a summary of your
statements, or at least shorten them somewhat, but all of your
statements will be printed in the record as though read.
Senator Smith. Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Senator Smith?
Senator Smith. May I thank you for that courtesy and also
welcome Dr. Cox. He has taken the redeye to be here. Senator
Cantwell and I know that flight very well. Welcome.
The Chairman. Dr. Cox, I welcome you. I left Oregon State
College to go to war, some 50-odd years ago. Nice to see you
here.
STATEMENT OF DR. DANIEL COX, DIRECTOR, O.H. HINSDALE WAVE
RESEARCH LABORATORY, OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY
Dr. Cox. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Members of
the Committee, for this opportunity to discuss the research
that we're doing at Oregon State in the Hinsdale Wave Research
Laboratory. I'm the director of that laboratory, and also
associate professor in civil engineering.
We are home to the world's largest facility specifically
constructed for tsunami research, and I'd like to give you,
just, sort of briefly, the history of it, just to show you that
this has been many, many years in the making, planning long
before I got there. I've only been there for about 2\1/2\
years.
And I'd also like to tell you just, sort of, how the
tsunami community has come together, a little bit about what
we're learning about today's--the recent events, and then how
we're trying to improve the nation's ability to respond to
tsunami disasters, emergency planning, and so on.
In the 1990s, there was a series of NSF workshops to decide
what are the nation's needs for tsunami research. And, as a
result of these workshops, there was a proposal to come up with
a very large wave basin. This is a large rectangular concrete
basin that can very accurately repeat a tsunami-like wave. It's
called a soliton. And the main purpose of this facility is to
provide proof that the numerical models are working well. We've
heard a lot of testimony today talking about inundation mapping
and the reliance on these maps for telling people where to go,
directing them, deciding what kind of infrastructure will be in
place after the tsunami event happens, and so on. But all of
these computer models have to be tested very carefully before
we rely on them.
And we use, to some degree, the fieldwork that's been done,
trying to piece together the clues from the site reconnaissance
surveys. But they don't have enough information. They don't
give you the wave height, the wave direction in all locations.
And so, we can very accurately make physical models with very
carefully controlled conditions, and then compare the results
of the physical models with what the numerical models predict.
And that's how we use our facility.
We also use it as a sort of a center for the research
community. It's a great place where people gather and share
ideas, exchange information. We had two of our professors going
to Madras, to India, to look at the survey, the damage, and
then they'll come back, share their results, hold a series of
seminars, and so on. So it's also provided a great focal point
for the research community.
There was also a report published by the National Research
Council for the NEES program. And, in that report, it outlines
very specifically what are the challenges for the research in
our areas--and that includes better understanding of the
tsunami inundation that we heard about earlier today--and also
the tsunami impact, what happens when that wave hits buildings
and bridges and other critical lifelines that would be
necessary in an evacuation.
The long-term goal is really to develop a comprehensive
numerical model that includes not only the hydrodynamics of the
wave and the wave impact and the debris flow, but also includes
human factors--how people will respond in a crisis--and this
will greatly improve our ability to plan for tsunami attacks--
tsunami disasters.
So I just--I'd like to finish here and just say that I
think we have an extremely unique tool here for the Nation to
use. It's a shared-use facility. It's hosted at Oregon State,
but it's really designed with a number of researchers in mind.
We bring them here, we do the--the research--the tsunami
research is supported by the National Science Foundation. So if
their proposals are accepted, then their work is supported in
our lab for free, or by the National Science Foundation.
And, yeah, with that, I'd be happy to answer any questions
that you might have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cox follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Daniel Cox, Director, O.H. Hinsdale Wave
Research Laboratory, Oregon State University
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee for the
opportunity to discuss how research will continue to improve our
nation's ability to deal with tsunami risks. I am Daniel Cox, Director
of the O.H. Hinsdale Wave Research Laboratory at the Oregon State
University College of Engineering, home to the world's largest and
most-wired facility specifically designed for tsunami research.
Today, I would like to provide some information on how this new
Tsunami Wave Basin facility is helping this country better prepare for
the next tsunami scenario, including development of more effective
tsunami warning systems, safer evacuation routes and procedures, and
better building and bridge design.
As mentioned in previous testimony and elsewhere, advanced
numerical models are essential for tsunami mitigation and evacuation
procedures. These simulation tools have been developed at research
universities like Oregon State over the past several decades. The
guidance and validation of these models, especially the inundation
process of the tsunami wave impacting the coast and flowing over the
land, has been achieved through careful comparison with laboratory
studies. It is important that we continue to use the latest numerical
techniques to improve their predictive capability and systematically
test their accuracy with benchmark data before we rely on them for
emergency planning, zoning, and construction guidelines.
Background on the Development of the Next-Generation, Shared-Use
Facility for Remote Tsunami Research
In the 1990s a series of NSF-supported workshops were convened by
the tsunami research community to determine the needs for supporting
the further development of tsunami research and numerical models. These
workshops led to a document that outlined the requirements of a large
wave basin, capable of generating solitons (or solitary waves which
have tsunami-like behavior). In addition to the physical requirements
and instrumentation of the new facility, the workshops stressed
collaboration and a close integration of physical experiments and
computer simulations through data sharing and research guidance based
on field work and practical applications. Many of the researchers who
participated in these early workshops were also actively involved in
post-tsunami surveys, for example in Nicaragua, Indonesia, and Papua
New Guinea. Their graduate students have gone on to successful careers
at places like the NOAA's Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory to
work on tsunami inundation mapping.
In the late 1990s, the need for a tsunami wave basin was recognized
at the NSF, and funding for up to two facilities was included in the
initial call for proposals in the first solicitation of the George E.
Brown Jr. Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation (or NEES)
program. Through a competitive proposal process, Oregon State
University was awarded a $4.8M grant, which was augmented by
approximately $1.2M from the Oregon State University College of
Engineering. One of the first steps was to establish an advisory board
of tsunami experts, coastal engineers, and computer scientists from
universities such as Cal Tech, Cornell, USC, and Delaware, as well as
government agencies including NOAA. A second step was to actively
engage the tsunami and coastal research community for input on the
design of the new facility, instrumentation, and data sharing
requirements. In parallel with this, the Principle Investigators of the
tsunami project at Oregon State continued to work with the entire NEES
consortium. The NSF funding also helped the OSU College of Engineering
attract a world-class team of tsunami experts, computer scientists, and
ocean engineers who appeared in many national media reports following
the Asian tsunami last December. Construction of the new facility was
completed ahead of schedule and commissioned during a ceremony on
September 13, 2003. The Tsunami Wave Basin at Oregon State University
was selected as one of four out of 15 NEES sites showcased in the NSF's
live demonstration of the NEES program in November, 2004.
The Tsunami Wave Basin facility itself (Figure 1) is a large,
rectangular basin, measuring 160 ft. long by 87 ft. wide by 7 ft. deep
(48.8 m x 26.5 m x 2.1 m) with a wavemaker consisting of a series of
programmable wave boards at one end. These paddle-like wave boards can
be programmed to move in a carefully prescribed motion that generates a
soliton (or solitary wave), which is a simplified form of a tsunami. At
the end of the basin opposite of the wavemaker, researchers install
contoured terrain characteristic of coastal features, such as bays or
points of land. On this terrain, researchers can place models of
coastal infrastructure such as bridges and buildings, for example,
instrumented with sensors to measure the impact of the wave or debris.
It is important to note that although the soliton is a simplified
representation of the tsunami, it is complex enough to provide a strict
test for numerical models. In other words, if a numerical simulation
can not reproduce the simplified conditions of the laboratory, it will
have little use as a decision-making tool. In addition to the
construction of the physical basin, the NSF grant provided for the
development of cutting-edge information technology (IT) infrastructure.
This IT infrastructure assists in experimental planning, archiving, and
sharing of data. It also enables researchers anywhere in the nation to
remotely participate in experiments in real-time, saving travel costs
and speeding research.
Grand Challenges for the Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation
(NEES) and Tsunamis
A National Research Council report published in 2003 outlines the
challenges in earthquake engineering as well as a research agenda for
the NEES program, including tsunamis. The report provides the
historical perspective of tsunami research, critical knowledge gaps,
and outlines short-term and long-term research goals.
The report recommends that:
``A complete numerical simulation of tsunami generation,
propagation, and coastal effects should be developed to provide
a real-time description of tsunamis at the coastline for use
with warning, evacuation, engineering, and mitigation
strategies.''
The short-term goals outlined in this report include:
1. Better understanding of tsunami inundation--how the wave
travels over dry land.
2. Better understanding of sediment transport under tsunamis.
3. Quantify the impact forces of the tsunami wave and debris on
structures.
4. Determine the effects on buildings and groups of buildings.
5. Work with the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program
(NTHMP) to refine research needs to best support NOAA's
mission.
Medium-term goals include:
1. Verify and validate numerical models for defining runup
limits.
2. Work with the geotechnical community to study the mechanics
of landslide generated tsunamis.
The long-term goal is summarized as:
Develop comprehensive, interactive scenario simulations that
integrate the physical aspects (generation, propagation,
inundation) with societal issues such as transmission of
warnings to the public, evacuation, environmental impacts,
rescue tactics, and short-term and long-term recovery
strategies.
What is the Role of the Tsunami Wave Basin for Future Tsunami
Disasters?
The intended purpose of the Tsunami Wave Basin at Oregon State
University is to provide the research community with a controlled
environment for the systematic study of primarily tsunami inundation
and tsunami generation from landslides.
Post-tsunami (reconnaissance) surveys provide new insights and
valuable lessons learned about the real effects of the actual events.
However, it is impossible to collect sufficient and accurate data from
surveys to improve numerical models because the data/information are
ephemeral and difficult to obtain. There is no way to make advance
preparations to obtain data since it would be a formidable task to
install a sufficient number of sensors in the field prior to a very
unpredictable and rare tsunami event. For example, the speed of the
wave is an important variable when considering evacuation or the safe
design of buildings or bridges, but this data are rarely available.
Wave height and direction are also extremely important but elusive
quantities.
All numerical models require known boundary conditions and initial
(or starting) conditions. Because we have almost no quantitative
information about the real tsunami as it approaches the shore, we can
not properly prescribe the initial condition, and therefore we can not
easily compare the damage at the site to the damage predicted in the
model. The laboratory, however, provides us with a tool that can
provide boundary and initial conditions as well as the resultant force
of the tsunami as it impacts the coast. We can prescribe the same
initial condition to the numerical simulation and then through
comparisons with laboratory data, we can verify (or refute) the
accuracy of the simulations. The increasing computational speed of
numerical simulations has shown that we can simulate large geographical
regions with complex shapes. The remaining questions are the accuracy
of these simulations and inclusion of realistic features such as wave-
impacts and debris flows.
Development of Collaborative Tools for Natural Hazards Mitigation
We have been developing three separate but closely related research
programs on integration of hazard mitigation tools and information: (1)
tsunami scenario simulations, (2) computational portal, and (3) tsunami
digital library. These activities heavily rely on the advanced
information technologies, and have direct impacts on hazard mitigation
practice.
Scenario simulations:
An alternative to a full-scale field investigation is to perform
repeatable and precisely controlled ``scenario'' simulations. A
scenario simulation means a case study, either in a real or
hypothetical background setup. Tsunami phenomena and effects are
simulated for given geographical, seismological, geological, and
societal conditions. Simulations must be comprehensive and integrated
not only in tsunami generation, propagation, runup motion (flow
velocities and inundation) and flow-structure interactions, but also
other types of simulations such as warning transmission to the public,
evacuation, environmental impacts, rescue tactics, and short-term and
long-term recovery strategies. The simulation exercises should include
physical models, numerical models, informatics, human behavior,
communication simulations, and other exercises that will integrate the
tsunami source with its eventual effects on communities and the
environment. This activity is by nature a multi-university, multi-
community, and multi-disciplinary effort. The goal is to provide damage
estimates based on best available information, ultimately leading to
earthquake related risk analysis/assignment for an urban region and to
provide a rich problem-solving environment for the education of
students. A tsunami simulation scenario must actually expand this
concept to include the modeling of human behavior, since a primary
emphasis of tsunami hazard mitigation is not only minimization of
structural damage but also the saving of lives through evacuation. It
is emphasized that this type of work must be collaborative. The
collaboration with only a few researchers is insufficient; the entire
community involvement is essential for the success.
Tsunami digital library:
In recent years, the Internet has become the primary source of
information and data. Before the Internet, the challenge was limited
access to information and data. Now the problem is locating information
relevant to their discipline and validating the quality of such
information. Existing web search technologies are insufficient to
retrieve information that is relevant to a particular scientist's
context and guaranteed to have some level of quality assurance. New
technology for information search that addresses both quality and
context will substantially increase the effectiveness of scientists
studying natural hazards and their mitigation, enabling greater
understanding of hazards and more effective preparedness and response.
Such information and data are highly diverse, and serve a very
diverse community. The unique information challenges presented by
tsunamis, the history of research collaboration among the tsunami
scientific community, and increasing public awareness of the danger to
life posed by natural hazards combine to make tsunamis an obvious focus
for the first digital library of natural hazard information. The
software components to be developed as part of this project will be
used to develop digital libraries for other natural hazard domains.
Computational portal:
Numerical modeling is an essential tool for advancing our
understanding of natural hazards, allowing us to study hazard
characteristics, impacts, and prediction. At the same time, highly
sophisticated models impose complex requirements for data,
computational resources, and knowledgeable interpretation. Typically,
it is individual researchers and mitigation personnel who must grapple
with these problems. We are developing a coordinated, Web-based
environment for sharing knowledge about tsunami prediction and
mitigation. It will provide points-of-entry through which users can
access computational models without the difficulties usually involved
in managing data, computing resources, and other operational
requirements.
Summary
The Tsunami Wave Basin at Oregon State University provides tsunami
researchers with a unique tool to develop and test the next-generation
of numerical models for tsunami simulations. The basin is designed as a
shared-use laboratory, meaning that is researchers from around the
country can access it through the Network for Earthquake Engineering
Simulation program supported by the National Science Foundation through
2014.
I would be happy to answer any questions you might have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator do you have any questions? I'd be pleased to yield
to you.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Senator.
Dr. Cox, thank you for being here. I very much enjoyed the
tour that you gave me. Having listened to today's testimony--
and yours, as well--I'm curious as to your thoughts, if you've
had a chance to review S. 50 and the Administration's proposal
from an academic perspective. Do you see these proposals as
adequate, in terms of research, mapping, and education? Do you
think--is this a sufficient step forward?
Dr. Cox. I think it's a step in the right direction, and I
think the points that are outlined today, the importance of
education--once you have a warning system, and you tell
people--you've got to tell them what to do, and they have to
know how to respond. There's no time to educate them during the
time of crisis. So I think these are all steps in the right
direction.
We've talked about inundation mapping. The future of
inundation mapping is really trying to start to measure the--or
map the intensity of the event, not just where the last water
line is. And the intensity is really related to whether or not
a building is going to withstand the attack or not. So there's,
I think, a lot more work that we need to do to better prepare
ourselves for the inevitable tsunami.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Dr. Cox, for being here, and, Mr.
Chairman, for your courtesy. I appreciate that.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
May we proceed, then? Ms. Shea?
STATEMENT OF EILEEN L. SHEA, PROJECT COORDINATOR, EAST-WEST
CENTER, HONOLULU, HAWAII
Ms. Shea. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye, Members
of the Committee. It's my honor to be here today, and thank you
for the invitation to talk about S. 50, the U.S. Tsunami
Preparedness Act, as well as your general interest in building
disaster-resilient coastal communities.
I first sat in this hearing room over 30 years ago, as a
NOAA employee, in Congressional Affairs, and I believe that S.
50 represents just another step in your long legacy in this
Committee of commitment to the coastal communities, the coastal
resources, and the coastal businesses of this nation. And,
therefore, it is an honor to be here.
I'd actually like to just touch on three things, in
particular, and they have all come up, in one form or another,
today.
The first is, I want to commend the Committee for taking a
multi-hazard perspective on this bill and on building our
resilience to tsunamis and other natural hazards. The same
coastal communities in Southeast Asia and along the United
States that are subject to tsunamis are also subject to other
natural disasters--coastal flooding, typhoons, hurricanes, high
wind and wave events. All of those events have the potential to
threaten life and property, and all of those events are things
that we need to address if we're going to build what I like to
call an effective risk-management information system.
I believe that S. 50 and much of the discussion in the
testimony today is headed in the direction of building that
kind of risk-management information system, but I'd like to
pick up on something that, Senator Inouye, you mentioned in
your opening remarks, Senator Cantwell has, Senator Nelson has,
others have mentioned, the idea of focusing on the receivers of
these informations. It really doesn't matter how accurate and
how efficient the arm of a quarterback is. If there isn't a
person at the other end waiting to receive it, and a team of
people--NGOs, the media, the civil-society community leaders,
the governments, at a local level--a team of people who can
help get that individual down the field and in the end zone.
It is essential, if we are to pursue building disaster-
resilient coastal communities, that we do focus on those
receivers of this information. An effective warning system,
like we've heard discussed by many of the panelists today, is a
part of that information system, but we really must invest in
that education program.
And TsunamiReady communities is a good example of helping
to reach out to communities and prepare them, but it's only
part of the picture. And we've heard several witnesses today,
as well as several of the Members, talk about the broader
education effort, formal and informal education, technical
training, and also leadership training, building the next
generation of leaders of these institutions that will be
responsible for warning and response.
The second element of a--for me--of an effective risk-
management system is this concept of a better understanding of
vulnerability and our choices for adaptation, our choices for
building resilience. We've heard much talk today about these
inundation maps. These are parts of tools for understanding how
exposed we are to a risk. How sensitive are we to a risk? The
other part of the equation is, how prepared are we to deal with
that? How resilient are we? How much like those palm trees that
Senator Landrieu mentioned are we, are our businesses, our
infrastructure, our key economic sectors, and the people in our
communities who call the coastal zone ``home''? Building that
partnership, building those--that understanding of
vulnerability, and our ability to adapt is an essential part of
what we're about.
I think that it's important to remember that building this
understanding of vulnerability is not just a matter of funding
a few socioeconomic studies. It's about establishing a new way
to doing science. It's about participatory research in which
the decisionmakers and the community leaders and the scientists
and the technical experts work together in a process of shared
learning and joint problem-solving.
It's also important to remember that this is probably best
done at a regional level. One size does not fit all when it
comes to education programs, warning systems, or adaptation.
It's really important, I think, as we consider the next steps,
that we consider the regional effect.
And, finally, it's important to build critical
partnerships. I don't have to add much to the discussion today
about the international partnerships involved in the tsunami,
but I will mention that--and thinking about those receivers
again--that one institution that wasn't mentioned in the
tsunami arena is the International Tsunami Information Center
in Honolulu, which is the focus of the receiving-education--
reaching out, education and training both in the U.S. and
abroad.
Finally, I would like to touch on a regional activity.
There is, in the Pacific now, something called the Pacific Risk
Management Ohana. ``Ohana'' means family. ``Ohana'' means
working together. Three years ago, under the leadership of the
NOAA Pacific Services Center, all of the federal agencies in
the Pacific Islands region who work in disaster management sat
around a table together to talk about better coordinating the
work that they do. As a result of that initial meeting, the
scientific institutions active in risk management in the
Pacific, the Federal agencies active in risk management in the
Pacific, and state and local entities and organizations are all
now acting together in the context of PRiMO, a coordinated
effort on the part of all of those interested institutions to
work together.
In one way, it's an example of the kind of coordination
that you're calling for in S. 50. In other, it's a reflection
of how important it is to do this at the regional level,
because it is at the regional level where we can work together,
touch each other in ways that the Majority Leader mentioned
today. It's about understanding the people, the resources, and
the businesses in these communities. And I think we're on our
way.
Thank you for the opportunity. I'll be happy to answer any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Shea follows:]
Prepared Statement of Eileen L. Shea, Project Coordinator, East-West
Center, Honolulu, Hawaii
Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye, Honorable Members, ladies and
gentlemen, ALOHA and thank you for the opportunity to share some
thoughts on the U.S. tsunami warning system and enhancing our efforts
to build disaster-resilient coastal communities in the wake of the
December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Your initiative and leadership in
this endeavor is crucial and is an important next step in this
Committee's longstanding legacy of commitment to the communities,
businesses and natural resources that call the coastal zones of the
world home. According to the Global Forum on Oceans, Coasts and
Islands, coastal areas (within 60 km of the shoreline) are home to 50
percent of the world's populations and two-thirds of the world's
largest cities are located on coasts. The final report of the U.S.
Commission on Ocean Policy notes that approximately 52 percent of the
U.S. population resides in coastal counties which constitute 25 percent
of the U.S. land area and include economic activities that contribute
approximately $4.5 trillion (roughly half) of the Nation's annual GDP.
I am honored by your invitation to contribute to your deliberations. My
thoughts today are based largely on my work in climate vulnerability
assessment and risk management in the Pacific, including the use of
climate forecast information to support decision-making.
The tragic loss of life and property associated with the December
2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami highlights the complex and
close relationship between achieving national development goals and the
ability to anticipate, prepare for, respond to and recover from natural
disasters. Increasingly, international and regional development bodies
like the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank and the
Asian Development Bank are recognizing that effectively managing the
risks associated with natural disasters such as tropical cyclones,
coastal inundation from storm surge, droughts, floods and geologic
hazards such as earthquakes and tsunamis, is an essential component of
an effective, long-term development strategy.
It is important to remember that the same nations that suffered the
greatest impacts from the December 2004 tsunami are also highly
vulnerable to other natural disasters. Typhoons, floods, and high wind
and wave events are frequent visitors to the same coastal communities
affected by the recent tsunami. As we take steps to reduce the
vulnerability of coastal communities to high-impact, low-frequency
events such as future tsunamis, we should also be strengthening their
resilience in the face of other, more frequent and often devastating
natural disasters including weather and climate-related extreme events
such as hurricanes and typhoons, floods, landslides, drought and high
wind and wave events. In other words, a comprehensive, multi-hazard
approach is needed that establishes the social (human, institutional
and political) as well as scientific and technical infrastructure
necessary to anticipate and manage risks. If we focus only on the
tsunami hazard itself, I fear that we will be like the proverbial
general planning for the past war.
In the 2004 World Disasters Report: Focus on Community Resilience,
the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
advocates a stronger emphasis on proactive, people-centered approaches
to building resilience--rather than simply understanding and describing
a community's vulnerability to natural and man-made disasters. In this
context, the 2004 report highlights the importance of ``understanding
the ability of individuals, communities or businesses not only to cope
with but also to adapt to adverse conditions and to focus interventions
at building on those strengths'' with an emphasis on risk reduction and
development work. I commend your Committee for emphasizing a
comprehensive, longer-term approach in your initial planning for an
effective U.S. response to the December 2004 tsunami. In this context
and in light of other testimony, let me highlight the particularly
important elements of such a program. These elements include:
First, building information systems that support pro-active,
comprehensive risk management;
Second, improving understanding of vulnerability and effective
adaptation strategies; and
Third, establishing and sustaining the critical partnerships
required to develop disaster-resilient coastal communities.
Comprehensive Risk Management Information Systems
Following the December 2004 disaster, we all focused on what could
have been done to prevent such an awful loss of lives. Immediate
attention was, appropriately, given to the technical systems that can
provide the basis for more effective advance warning of future
tsunamis. The expansion of seismic and ocean monitoring programs, the
establishment of warning centers and the improvement of communications
infrastructure to disseminate warnings and alerts are all critical and
should be pursued aggressively. In this context, I would like to
reinforce the importance of providing warnings and forecasts in
language and formats that are accessible, understandable, useful and
usable. In many parts of the U.S. and the world, this will involve
translation into local languages and the use of relatively simple forms
of communication such as radio, phone, facsimile and visual and
auditory cues (such as warning flags and sirens) as well as the
involvement of trusted, local knowledge brokers such as NGOs,
religious, civic and, in the case of indigenous populations,
traditional leaders and teachers. As we saw with the Indian Ocean
tsunami, many of the most vulnerable populations lived in remote
communities without access to the communications infrastructure of
large urban centers. Reaching these communities remains perhaps the
biggest challenge for disaster warning systems. Meeting that challenge
should be of the highest priority as we move toward a pro-active risk
management information system since the system will only be effective
if it reaches those in danger.
Decades of natural hazards research, responding to weather extremes
as well as my own experience in exploring adaptation to climate-related
extreme events in the Pacific suggests, however, that good
international and local warning systems are only one part of an
effective risk management information system. As a colleague of mine
pointed out recently, a successful pass in the NFL requires not only a
skilled quarterback but a skilled receiver who not only knows where on
the field to be to catch the ball but also what he's expected to do
once he has the ball. In addition to knowing that more effective
warnings are produced and disseminated, we should also be concerned
with enhancing the knowledge, skills and capabilities of the receivers
of those warnings including disaster management agencies and other
national and local government officials, community and business
leaders, NGOs and other key elements of civil society such as women's
and youth groups and, ultimately, the public.
The concept of enhancing public awareness is, of course, not new in
the disaster management world. There is a strong foundation of ongoing
disaster preparedness education programs underway funded by a number of
U.S. Government agencies (e.g., NOAA, FEMA, USGS), other national and
local governments; scientific and educational institutions as well as
regional and international organizations and technical institutions.
NOAA's Tsunami Ready Communities program is a good example of this
existing foundation. I hope that our response to the Indian Ocean
tsunami will provide us with an opportunity to strengthen those
programs and expand their focus beyond warning and immediate response
to include a broader public awareness of the social, institutional and
political challenges associated with building more disaster-resilient
coastal communities.
In this context, warning and communications system improvements
should be accompanied by a broad education program designed to enhance
the cadre of individuals and institutions in the region capable of
assessing vulnerability, communicating warnings and managing risks
associated with natural disasters. Such a program should include:
Targeted technical training to increase awareness of recent
scientific developments in key hazard areas (e.g., tsunamis,
weather extremes, climate variability and change) and make new
tools and technologies in vulnerability assessment risk
management decision support available to a wider Asia-Pacific
community;
Leadership training programs in risk assessment and
management for representatives of government agencies,
businesses, universities, NGO's, and coastal communities; and
Formal and informal education programs and materials to
broaden public awareness and understanding of disaster risk
reduction challenges and opportunities by introducing them to
the multi-disciplinary suite of issues involved in development
and implementation of risk reduction strategies. Such a program
would recognize the importance of knowledge of local
communities and cultures as well as the technical aspects of
risk assessment and management including: environmental science
and technology, land use planning, health, civil society, and
cultural aspects of leadership, problem solving and decision-
making.
As we move forward, we also need to more effectively engage the
media as a critical component of an effective, comprehensive risk
management information system.
Understanding Vulnerability and Promoting Enhanced Resilience
An effective risk management information system also requires a
better understanding of the multi-hazard vulnerability of coastal
communities with an emphasis on strengthening the resilience of
critical infrastructure, key economic sectors, valuable natural
resources and, most importantly, the people who call those communities
home. As some of today's witnesses have suggested, the provision of
high-resolution imagery, geospatial (GIS) technology, risk and
vulnerability maps and model-based decision support tools are important
elements of work in this arena. I encourage the Committee to complement
these traditional vulnerability assessment tools with an integrated
program of research and dialogue focused on building disaster-resilient
coastal communities that would draw on the broad multi-disciplinary
expertise of and technical capabilities of partners in government,
academia, business and civil society. Such a program would recognize
the connections among social, economic and environmental goals to
reduce significant risks and build sustainable communities. In our
internal deliberations following the tsunami, my own organization, the
East-West Center, has decided that the multi-hazard approach to
building resilience in coastal communities is the framework in which we
will organize our post-tsunami program.
Emphasizing a multi-hazard approach to comprehensive risk
management such a program might include:
Targeted research to improve our understanding of the links
between disaster risk reduction and sustainable development;
assess vulnerabilities for key sectors, resources and
populations; identify and explore opportunities to minimize the
economic and social impacts of disasters; support the
integration of traditional and local knowledge and practices
with new scientific insights and technology to enhance risk
management and adaptation; and explore local, national and
regional governance options for effective risk management;
Enhanced risk reduction information services including the
provision of high-resolution imagery, geospatial (GIS)
technology and model-based decision support tools as well as
support for local, regional and international discussions to
support the emergence of an effective, multi-hazard warning and
disaster risk management systems at local, national, regional
and international levels; and
Dialogue on local, national, regional and international
governance options for effective risk management--exploring how
to better coordinate the roles of government, civil society and
local communities in disaster warning, response and risk
reduction.
This last item reflects the importance of using a collaborative,
participatory approach that effectively engages the scientific
community and decision-makers in a process of shared learning to
understand vulnerability and enhance resilience. Returning to my
earlier football analogy--as we all know, that successful long pass
requires more than just the quarterback and his receiver; it requires a
team of individual players and coaches each contributing their special
talents and unique expertise as part of a coordinated team effort
informed by history, a shared understanding of individual roles and
expectations and months or years of practice in working together toward
a common goal. In thinking about building and sustaining disaster-
resilient coastal communities, we'll want to build a powerhouse team of
international, regional and international institutions, government
officials, businesses, resource managers, scientists, engineers,
educators, NGOs, the media and community leaders--each bringing their
own insights and expertise to the table in a combined effort focused on
the future.
Building and Sustaining Critical Partnerships
Building these partnerships will be a critical factor in our
success. As the overwhelming response to the December 2004 Indian Ocean
tsunami demonstrates, there are a large and diverse number of players
on a risk management team ranging from individual community volunteers
to international organizations like the United Nations. Many of the
witnesses today have emphasized the importance of setting the
international elements of a U.S. tsunami response program in the
context of existing multi-national programs and institutions such as
the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
(ISDR); the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO); the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP);
the World Bank and regional development banks; and the planned Global
Earth Observing System of Systems (GEOSS) among others. Earlier I
referred to the importance of integrating local and cultural knowledge
to enhance the effectiveness of technology and, in this context, we
will also want to capitalize on the expertise and networks of a number
of regional organizations and institutions. In the Pacific, for
example, development of an effective multi-hazard, risk management
system will likely involve technical, government leaders; disaster
management and development agencies from all Pacific Rim nations,
including the United States; the UNESCO International Tsunami
Information Center; the South Pacific Applied Geosciences Commission
(SOPAC), the Secretariat for the Pacific Regional Environment Programme
(SPREP), scientific, technical and educational institutions throughout
the region. Hawaii alone, for example, is home to a number of technical
and educational institutions that stand ready to contribute to the
emergence of an effective, multi-hazard risk management system in the
Asia-Pacific region including the East-West Center, the Pacific
Disaster Center, the University of Hawaii, and the Center of Excellence
for Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance as well as the regional
programs of a number of U.S. Government agencies such as NOAA, USGS,
FEMA and others. As we consider the more local components of a
comprehensive risk management system, of course, the team will expand
to include state and local agencies, communities and NGOs. Coordinating
the work of these diverse partners is a challenge but meeting that
challenge is essential to fulfilling our shared obligation to this and
future generations.
I'd like to take a moment to highlight an ongoing partnership in
the Pacific that is already beginning to demonstrate the value of
innovative collaboration and cooperation in the area of risk
management. About three years ago, the NOAA Pacific Services Center
convened a roundtable discussion among the various federal, state and
local agencies, scientific and educational institutions and regional
organizations active in disaster management in the American Flag and
U.S. Affiliated Pacific Islands. Those individual players are now
working together as part of a Pacific Risk Management Ohana (PRiMO).
The Hawaiian word Ohana means family and, as the name suggests, the
various agencies and organizations active in PRiMO are identifying
opportunities to work together in creative new ways to advance critical
elements of an effective local and regional multi-hazard risk
management system including: coastal and ocean observing systems; data
management; decision support tools; communications infrastructure and
information dissemination; post-disaster evaluation and performance
indicators; education, outreach and training; and traditional knowledge
and practices. The enhanced level of collaboration represented by PRiMO
helps put the Pacific in a strong position to take advantage of new
technological capabilities and support the emergence of a comprehensive
risk management information system in the region. An enhanced program
of risk assessment and adaptation in the Pacific could contribute
significantly to enhancing the resilience of the communities,
businesses and natural resources of the region and, I believe, provide
a demonstration of the value of not only new technologies but also of
innovative institutional partnerships focused on comprehensive risk
management.
Concluding Remarks
The overwhelming magnitude of the disaster generated by the
December 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami will, I suspect, keep
the images of suffering and devastation in our minds for some time.
With those vivid images has come a remarkable level of energy,
generosity and commitment to assist those in need. I fear, however,
that if history is precedent, that commitment--like the images from the
newspapers and television--will begin to fade in the collective memory
of those not immediately affected by the tragedy. The testimony of
today's witnesses and this Committee's leadership in developing an
effective, long-term response, however, suggests that this tragedy can
lead to a new level of collaboration and commitment that will last far
into the future. From the devastation of a single event in the Indian
Ocean, I believe that we can work together to build disaster-resilient
coastal communities in the United States and around the world. Perhaps
the ultimate legacy of this recent disaster will be the emergence of a
comprehensive risk management program that will protect the people,
communities, economies and natural resources who call this planet home.
Mahalo nui loa--thank you very much--for the opportunity to share
these thoughts with you and Godspeed in your deliberations. I would be
happy to answer any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Hansen?
STATEMENT OF ROGER A. HANSEN, PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA
FAIRBANKS; DIRECTOR, ALASKA EARTHQUAKE INFORMATION CENTER
Dr. Hansen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Committee, for inviting me today.
I am the----
The Chairman. Pull that mike toward you.
Dr. Hansen. I'm the state seismologist for Alaska, and a
research professor at the Geophysical Institute at the
University of Alaska Fairbanks. I've been invited today to give
testimony on the tsunami warning system in Alaska.
Today, tsunami safety in Alaska comes from a strong
partnership between several state and federal agencies as a
result of the participation in the National Tsunami Hazard
Mitigation Program, which has been----
The Chairman. I'm sorry to tell you again. I can see people
back there straining to hear you, Doctor. Pull that mike right
up to you, please.
Dr. Hansen. Is this better? OK.
Today, tsunami safety in Alaska comes from a strong
partnership between several state and federal agencies as a
result of the participation in the National Tsunami Hazard
Mitigation Program, which has been aided in Alaska by expanded
roles for the University of Alaska, the State Geological
Survey, the State Emergency Management Agency, and the West
Coast and Alaska's Tsunami Warning Center, run by NOAA. This
program consists of hazard assessment of our coastal
communities through tsunami forecasting, monitoring and warning
guidance, and education and mitigation at the local levels. I
will speak briefly on each of these topics.
On March 27th, 1964, a magnitude 9.2 earthquake ripped
through the Prince William Sound in Southern Alaska, generating
a devastating tsunami. Though the death toll in 1964 is
minuscule compared to the Indian Ocean disaster, Alaska today
still faces difficult challenges for warning its at-risk
communities of the occurrence of tsunamis.
These challenges come, in part, from the nature of our
remote location, our irregular coastlines with complex
bathymetry and topography, the vast size of our state, where
our coastlines extend from equivalent distance of California to
the tips of Florida, that we live in one of the most
seismically active regions of the world, and the lack of
infrastructure throughout the area for both operations and
maintenance of monitoring systems, and for consistent and
timely communication of warning messages.
Warning guidance. First and foremost, we must be able to
detect events that can trigger tsunamis. And this is done with
the use of seismology and seismic networks as the primary
method to detect earthquakes that may cause tsunamis. Sea-level
data, both tide gauges and deep-ocean buoys, are also monitored
to verify the existence of, and the danger posed by, tsunamis.
But our primary hazard comes from the local tsunami generated
by nearby large earthquakes in or near the coast of Alaska.
The deep-ocean buoys, while a part of the larger warning
system designed for the Pacific-wide tsunamis, are secondary
indicators for local Alaska warnings. This is because a locally
generated tsunami wave will likely hit most of Alaska's coast
long before it reaches the deep-ocean buoys. Therefore, we must
rely on the rapid warnings that can be issued from the
detection of large earthquakes by a seismic network.
Modern seismic recordings can provide rapid information on
earthquake location, size, and the distribution of sea-floor
deformation that generates tsunamis. However, since much of the
seismic network in Alaska has been in operation since the
1960's, many stations are in need of modernizations to achieve
this goal.
Over the past few years, the Alaska Earthquake Information
Center, the state's seismic network operator, was tasked,
through the National Hazard Program, to develop 18 of these
modern stations for Alaska and ensure the timely delivery of
this data to the warning centers. The university program has
now increased the number of modern stations that we can provide
to augment this sparse improvement, and, through applied
research efforts, provides some enhanced information on the
local earthquakes. However, even with the funding of both the
national program and the university program, nearly 75 percent
of Alaska's seismic network still relies on outdated equipment.
This leaves vast areas of Alaska, and, in particular, the very
seismically active Aleutian Islands, still underpopulated with
modern seismic stations.
Mitigation. It is important to recognize that a tsunami
warning system must go beyond just the ability to detect a
tsunami and send a warning message. The most important aspect
of tsunami warning systems is the existence of a mechanism for
disseminating warning information to the people on the
shorelines and for the recipient of the warning messages to
understand how to react.
Tsunami hazard mitigation requires a long-term sustained
effort of continuing public education and responsible planning
decisions in coastal communities. The power of education is
clear.
The state of Alaska partners are well aware of our
difficulties in reaching our more than 80 communities at risk
to tsunamis. Improving the warning communication and outreach
infrastructure at the state and local level for both emergency
managers and the public represents the most important
improvement to be made in Alaska for saving lives.
Hazard assessment. Tsunami warning and safety procedures
require an understanding of hazards and risks associated with
tsunamis. In Alaska, led by researchers at the University of
Alaska Fairbanks, we are evaluating the risk by constructing
inundation maps for all the at-risk communities through our
super-computer modeling of tsunami water waves from scenario
earthquakes and landslides.
Reliable modeling results, however, require that we have
accurate bathymetry. And, in fact, we need this bathymetry to a
resolution that is not available in Alaska today.
Much of the sea floor along the shallow waters off the
coast of Alaska have not been mapped in many years. Some areas
not since before the 1964 Prince William Sound magnitude 9.2
earthquake. And note that large earthquakes can change
bathymetry in local areas of the sea floor by tens of meters.
Collection of improved bathymetry along Alaska's coastal
communities should be a top priority for enhanced funding of
any tsunami program. In addition, it is important to stabilize
the funding necessary to create the numerical models and
inundation maps.
In summary, Alaska has in place a partnership to address
the threat from tsunamis, yet we still have continuing needs
for improved monitoring with seismic and tide-gauge networks,
scientific infrastructure for numerical forecasting of
tsunamis, and the civil infrastructure to educate and warn
people.
Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman and the Members of the
Committee. I'm happy to answer any questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hansen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roger A. Hansen, Professor, University of Alaska
Fairbanks; Director, Alaska Earthquake Information Center
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you very much for
inviting me to testify. My joint appointment as the State Seismologist
for Alaska and as a Research Professor at the Geophysical Institute of
the University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF) places me in a unique and
advantageous position to partner in a tsunami hazard mitigation program
for Alaska bringing together operational monitoring, education, and
research activities. I have been involved in the National Tsunami
Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) since its inception as a co-author of
the Implementation Plan nearly 10 years ago, and continuing to this day
as a strong facilitator and member of the NTHMP Steering committee
representing Alaska. My unique position also serves to manage the
Alaska Earthquake Information Center which operates and maintains the
over 400 station Alaska Seismic Network for regional monitoring of
earthquakes and volcanos in Alaska. Our decades long collaboration and
partnership with the Alaska Tsunami Warning Center for seismic data
exchange has been recently strengthened by our involvement in the NTHMP
and the related Tsunami Warning and Environmental Observatory for
Alaska (TWEAK) programs. TWEAK has funded the creation of a virtual
center at UAF, called the Alaska Tsunami Center and Observatory, that
combines the strengths of the Geophysical Institute, the Institute of
Marine Sciences, and the Alaska Regional Supercomputer Center into one
organization in partnership with our federal and state agencies.
Tsunami Safety in Alaska comes from a strong partnership between
several state and federal agencies. The NTHMP was created with the
understanding that the best way to address the hazards posed by
tsunamis was through a state/federal partnership that leveraged an
improved ``coordination and exchange of information to better utilize
existing resources.'' Through participation in the NOAA National
Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP), this partnership provides
improved levels of warning guidance, hazard assessment, and mitigation;
allowing an integrated response in Alaska to a potentially tsunamigenic
earthquake.
It is important to recognize that tsunami warning systems require a
sophisticated infrastructure that goes well beyond just the ability to
detect a tsunami and send a warning message. This infrastructure must
include a continuing partnership between the state and federal agencies
and the local communities at risk to assess the hazard and provide
levels of mitigation to minimize the risk to life and property. Nowhere
in the U.S. is such a partnership more important than in Alaska. Much
of Alaska is remote, with little built infrastructure for
communications, harsh winters, and communities that are located in one
of the most seismically active regions of the world. Our primary hazard
comes from the ``local'' tsunami generated by nearby large earthquakes
in or near the coast of Alaska, rather than from the ``distant''
tsunami that travels across the open ocean. In this case, the deep
ocean buoys, or ``tsunameters'', while a part of the larger warning
system designed for U.S. Pacific-wide tsunamis, are secondary
indicators for Alaska warnings, because a locally generated tsunami
wave will hit the Alaska coast long before it reaches the deep ocean
buoys. We must rely on the rapid warnings issued from the detection of
the earthquake; and even more so on education, hazard assessment, and
mitigation as to how to respond to the potential of a tsunami.
The U.S. Tsunami Warning System consists of two warning centers:
the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) in Ewa Beach, Hawaii and
(important to Alaska) the West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WC/
ATWC) in Palmer, Alaska. These centers work in cooperation with other
NOAA units to perform their mission. In Alaska, state agencies such as
the Alaska Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
(ADHS&EM) and the Alaska Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys
(ADGGS), and the Alaska Tsunami Center and Observatory at the
University of Alaska Fairbanks (UAF), are strong partners in the
tsunami warning mission.
Warning Guidance
First and foremost, we must be able to detect events that can
trigger tsunamis. The current tsunami warning systems are triggered by
information from earthquake seismic networks. Typically, earthquake
magnitudes above certain levels cause tsunami warnings to be issued. In
Alaska the WC/ATWC has the responsibility for issuing all tsunami
warning, watch, advisory, and information messages to emergency
management officials. As earthquakes trigger most tsunamis, the WC/ATWC
monitors data from seismic networks throughout Alaska and worldwide.
While the WC/ATWC maintains a backbone network of 11 seismic stations
in Alaska, in order to monitor for large coastal earthquakes they
receive a subset of about 40 stations from the 400-station combined
seismic network of the Alaska Earthquake Information Center (AEIC) and
Alaska Volcano Observatory (AVO). The data are processed in near-real-
time and initial warnings for tsunamis from large earthquakes are based
solely on seismic data. This is the reason that it is so critical to
have modern instrumentation for application to modern techniques for
rapid determination of earthquake magnitude. Sea level data (both tide
gauges and deep ocean buoys) are also monitored to verify the existence
of and danger posed by tsunamis. Bulletins are issued through standard
NWS channels, such as the NOAA Weather Radio and the NOAA Weather Wire
as well as the FAA NADIN2 system, FEMA's National Warning System, State
Emergency channels, and other means. (All Alaska earthquakes are then
re-processed by AEIC utilizing the entire combined Alaska Seismic
Network and included in the authoritative catalog at AEIC). The NTHMP
funded upgrades to cents55 seismic stations in regional networks
throughout the western U.S. This leveraged NTHMP resources with the
already substantial investments in seismic networks in order to provide
high quality data to the tsunami warning centers. AEIC was tasked
through NTHMP to develop 18 of these stations for Alaska for delivery
to the warning centers. At the request of ATWC, the TWEAK program has
now substantially increased the number of modern stations AEIC can
provide to augment this sparse improvement. Yet many vast areas of
Alaska (and in particular the Aleutian Islands) still remain
underpopulated with modern seismic stations.
Hazard Assessment
Well recognized in the NTHMP, a second part of the tsunami warning
and safety procedure requires an understanding of hazards and risks
associated with tsunamis in Alaska. Without a clear understanding of
what areas are at risk and which areas are unlikely to be flooded, it
is impossible to develop effective emergency response plans and
education programs. To ensure reliable tsunami early detection and
hazard assessment capabilities, it is essential to create a numerical
model to forecast future tsunami impact and flooding limits in specific
coastal areas. The NTHMP made it a priority to develop the expertise
within each state for providing tsunami flood maps for the states
communities at risk. In Alaska we are evaluating the risk by
constructing inundation maps for at-risk communities through modelling
of the tsunami water waves from scenario earthquakes and landslides.
This effort for Alaska is being led by the UAF Alaska Tsunami Center
and Observatory in close collaboration with ADHS&EM, ADGGS, the UAF
SuperComputer Center, and other state and federal partners. As
inundation maps for communities are completed, they are presented to
both state and local emergency managers who then use the information
for planning and exercising evacuation routes and safe zones for the
communities visitors, tourists, and local residents. Maps for several
communities on Kodiak Island, Homer, Seldovia, and Seward have been or
are nearly completed, and we now wait for needed information on
bathymetry for the many other at-risk communities for which maps will
be made. The earlier example of the remoteness of Alaska again affects
our productivity in map generation. Many regions along the shallow
waters off the coast of Alaska have not been mapped in many years. Some
areas not since before the 1964 Prince William Sound M9.2 earthquake.
Reliable modelling results require that we have accurate bathymetry to
a resolution that is not generally available except in the lower 48
states, and at a very few communities in Alaska. Collection of improved
bathymetry should be a top priority for enhanced funding of any tsunami
program. In addition, it is important to stabilize the infrastructure
necessary to create the numerical models within Alaska.
Mitigation and Response
Arguably the most important aspect of tsunami warning systems is
the existence of a mechanism for disseminating warning information to
the people and businesses on the shorelines. It has been recognized
that tsunami hazard mitigation requires a long-term sustained effort.
Tsunami mitigation needs to be an institutionalized part of continuing
public education, emergency management and responsible planning
decisions in Alaska's coastal communities. Tsunami education materials,
inundation maps, community evacuation maps and signs, warning sirens,
and numerous other mitigation-related products are being developed as
part of the NTHMP program. These materials are brought to communities
by a team of scientists and statewide emergency planners on a routine
schedule to establish the infrastructure for education and outreach
with respect to tsunami hazards and warnings. This infrastructure of
communication between UAF, WC/ATWC, emergency management officials,
ADGGS, and local communities is what allows warnings to be disseminated
and acted upon in an efficient manner throughout the Alaska
Communities. The TWEAK program is assisting this through an active
education and outreach program, as well as partnering with ATWC and
ADHS&EM to purchase and install tsunami warning sirens in at risk
communities. Discussions with the emergency management community and
the Director of the Alaska Tsunami Warning Center both concluded that
the most useful improvement to be made to the warning system in Alaska
is to improve the warning and communication infrastructure at the local
level for both emergency managers and the public. Again, increased
funding for tsunami programs for Alaska should also include as a top
priority resources for expanding the warning dissemination
infrastructure and mitigation activities.
What is Needed for the Future
While Alaska has created an infrastructure for efficient tsunami
warning and safety procedures, our efforts are only beginning. As
mentioned earlier, the weak link of information and communication must
include not only improvements to infrastructure and data collection and
processing, but also include a continuing state/federal partnership for
education and outreach.
Important to tsunami safety for Alaska, the TWEAK program between
UAF and the Alaska regional level of the NOAA Weather Service, is a
program in support of the NTHMP that provides direct assistance to the
issues most critical to tsunami safety in Alaska. The TWEAK program has
brought the federal, state, and university partners within Alaska into
a mature organization of tsunami activities described above. A virtual
center, called the Alaska Tsunami Center and Observatory, has combined
the strengths of the Geophysical Institute, the Institute of Marine
Sciences, and the Alaska Regional SuperComputer Center in one
organization in partnership with our federal and state agencies. This
Center will continue to support the goals of the National Tsunami
Hazard Mitigation Program that are unique to the difficult setting of
Alaska through improvements and enhancements in monitoring, modeling,
and education and outreach.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Hansen. Sorry to be
reading a memo that just came in from my office. I'm told that
you just made a little history, Doctor, you just lectured your
graduate students at the University of Alaska who are tuned in
and watching this on a live broadcast through our Webcast. So
thank you for coming here. And your students, I'm sure, will
appreciate the fact that you're here and they're there.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Hansen. They got a free breakfast.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. I think we ought to thank them. You realize
what time they had to get up to watch you?
Dr. Hansen. Yes.
The Chairman. It's 4 hours earlier than we are.
But, anyway, I want to ask you, first, Dr. Cox, Am I
correct, in reading your testimony, that you think you could
test things like buildings?
Dr. Cox. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Could you test a model of a tsunami survival
hut, if we could devise one?
Dr. Cox. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Could you devise one?
Dr. Cox. We're working on it. And I think, also----
The Chairman. Are you thinking something that's big enough
for a lot of people, or just a little one for individual
islands?
Dr. Cox. It--I'm at a loss for words. But the--what we're
looking at is really, Can the computer--let's say, Could a
numerical simulation correctly predict the impact force on the
building, however that building is constructed. And so, what we
measure in our laboratory is the actual force of that wave on a
building.
But we're--and then, let's say, for example, how--let's
say, if you were to design breakaway walls, for example, if--
let's say, in a hotel, a modern hotel, if you had two strong
walls and two weak walls, at what point would the weak walls
break away, for example?
The Chairman. But I'm going at it a different way. When we
did the----
Dr. Cox. Sure.
The Chairman.--the building in Adak, we looked at what
could survive a wave going over it and coming back over it. OK?
Dr. Cox. Yes.
The Chairman. In terms of a lot of people. Can you look at
that for the purpose of determining, could we start a program
of some sort of fairly inexpensive shelters designed in a
fashion that could resist a wave, force it to go over it and
come back over it?
Dr. Cox. Yes, sir. And in addition to the design of one
particular building, what we're finding out from the field
surveys is that it's often the arrangement of the buildings
that can either increase or decrease the forces. So that's
something else we'll be testing in the laboratory, is, how does
the arrangement of particular buildings improve our ability to
withstand the tsunami.
The Chairman. Well, we devised wings that were capable of
standing up at greater than the speed of sound, so I think you
ought to be able to find a way. But the question is, can you do
it so we can produce them and really help the world to provide
some shelters for these people, like in areas just--what we
just witnessed out there.
Dr. Cox. Yes, sir, that's one of the goals at the
laboratory. Sure.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Shea, you--how do you interface with the concept of,
you know, warning to people in the outer islands?
Ms. Shea. It's a very big challenge. Part of it is a
communications challenge, actually, not just the physical
technological systems, but also language, and communicating in
language that is understandable. But the other is actually
building local networks of people who are skilled in
understanding what's coming through as a warning and then can
communicate locally, in local languages and in local context.
So----
The Chairman. Do you use commercial media?
Ms. Shea. Absolutely. And, in fact, the role of the media
is important, but it's also important to remember that many of
the communities, those remote fishing communities, for example,
that were--whose structures were completely wiped away, didn't
have access to some of the media. In the United States, we can
rely on the media the way the Weather Service has done for
years. And I think it's really important that we consider the
role of the media in warnings in the United States, as well as
internationally. But I also think we have to build that local
community network, those community leaders entrusted--those
trusted information brokers in a community who can help.
The Chairman. A lot of them didn't have a public media----
Ms. Shea. That's right.
The Chairman.--wireless media.
Ms. Shea. That's right. And----
The Chairman. My feeling is, maybe we should assist them to
get wireless media so it will be there. It would be maintained
by the local people. You put up some warning system, someone's
going to forget to turn it on.
Ms. Shea. Yeah.
The Chairman. It's really providing a continuous service,
in terms of some sort of weather service or whatever it might
be. I should think, on a wireless basis, they would have gotten
the information much better out there.
Ms. Shea. I think that's true. And I think there are also
some fairly low-tech solutions that include Hi-Fi radio, HF
radio, and satellite downlinks in a wireless way from warning
centers that then can be rebroadcast by HF radio. That's
relatively inexpensive. The other is, then, combining that
wireless link, the information that comes from the wireless
link, with low-tech capabilities like warning flags or siren
systems. Those two can be used without having to rely on that
infrastructure that you so rightly point out is not available
in many of these communities.
The Chairman. Dr. Hansen, how about using those graduate
students out there--I assume they're still watching--why don't
you review our proposal to have this new Subcommittee of
Disaster Prediction and Prevention, and ask them what they
think we ought to go into. What should we ask the Subcommittee
to start out on? What's the most important areas that we could
look at to see where there are deficiencies in prediction and
prevention? Could you do that for us?
Dr. Hansen. Yes.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Hansen. I will.
The Chairman. Senator Inouye?
Senator Inouye. As we have demonstrated, it usually
requires a disaster of biblical proportions to get all of us
acting. For example, it took the tsunami disaster in Southeast
Asia to bring about the creation of the Disaster Prevention and
Prediction Subcommittee.
I don't know if you have the expertise to respond, but do
you believe that the bill that we are proposing, S. 50, would
do what you believe is necessary?
Ms. Shea. Yes. I think it's a really good start. I think
that if I were looking at S. 50, I might suggest broadening the
education components of S. 50, and I also might suggest that we
look at ways of broadening that vulnerability and adaptation
research component. And, in particular, leveraging ongoing
activities. These same communities that are subject to tsunamis
are also, as several people have mentioned today, subject to
other coastal threats. There are other coastal warning systems
out there. There are climate forecast systems out there, in the
United States and around the world. And if we can leverage
those, find those partnerships, we can make a significant
advance in the receiver end of this problem without an
investment of a significant amount of new resources. It's
really about bringing those partnerships.
Senator Inouye. Would you favor this Committee with the
memos carrying out those proposals?
Ms. Shea. Absolutely. Be happy to, Senator. Happy to.
Senator Inouye. It would be very helpful.
Ms. Shea. Great.
[The information follows:]
East-West Center
Honolulu, HI, February 9, 2005
Hon. Ted Stevens,
Chairman,
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
Washington, DC
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye,
Ranking Minority Member,
Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
Washington, DC
Dear Sirs:
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify last week on S. 50
and the evolution of an effective U.S. tsunami warning and preparedness
program. As I mentioned at the hearing, I am honored to be able to
contribute in some small way to your efforts to build more disaster-
resilient coastal communities in the U.S. and around the world. During
the hearing, you asked me to provide you with some written suggestions
to strengthen S. 50, including an outline of the elements of regional
pilot projects focused on building the resilience of coastal
communities. By way of this letter, I am pleased to respond to that
request for additional information.
First, I would like to reinforce the importance of setting tsunami
warning and preparedness programs in a multi-hazard, risk management
context as mentioned in Section 2(a)(10) of S. 50. As we discussed
during the hearing, many of the elements of a program designed to
improve warnings and enhance resilience in the face of low-frequency,
high impact events such as tsunamis will also make important
contributions to enhancing the resilience of coastal communities in the
face of other natural hazards such as extreme weather events (floods,
hurricanes, high wind and wave events) as well as the consequences of
climate variability and change. I would encourage the Committee to
respond to Section 2(a)(10) with a new title/section authorizing NOAA
to work with other federal partners, state governments, academia, the
extramural research community, and the private sector to implement a
Disaster-Resilient Coastal Communities Vulnerability and Adaptation
Program. Such a program would complement and build on the tsunami-
specific hazard mitigation program called for in Section 4 of S. 50 but
would provide a broader context in which to support various activities
that can help coastal communities respond to a variety of hazards/
threats. Pursuant to your request, I have included a description of the
key components of such an integrated program as Appendix A to this
letter.
As we discussed briefly last week, this kind of integrated
vulnerability assessment and adaptation program is perhaps best
implemented on a regional scale since one size does not fit all when it
comes to understanding vulnerability, providing useful and usable risk
assessment information or developing effective risk management
strategies. I would like to strongly endorse the idea of initiating
this program through one or more regional pilot projects that would
both demonstrate the value of the integrated programmatic approach
described above and move quickly to reduce the vulnerability--enhance
the resilience--of coastal communities particularly at risk to tsunamis
and other natural hazards such as weather and climate-related extreme
events.
As I mentioned last week, I believe that the Pacific might be one
such region based on its vulnerability to tsunamis, a dependence on
climate-sensitive resources and sectors such as fisheries, tourism and
agriculture; ongoing work in tsunami, weather and climate forecasting
and assessment; and the institutional partnerships reflected in the
Pacific Risk Management Ohana (PRiMO). Based on the testimony of my
colleague from the University of Alaska, I believe that Alaska would be
another high-priority candidate for a regional pilot program for many
of the same reasons. I might suggest that a third regional program
might be considered for the Atlantic seaboard with its vulnerability to
coastal flooding and hurricanes. I would encourage consideration of at
least three years for a regional pilot project along the lines
described above with an eye toward sustaining the partnerships
established during the pilot phase.
My review of S. 50 identified a few additional specific suggestions
for strengthening the bill. I have included those suggestions in
Appendix B to this letter.
Mahalo nui loa for the opportunity to provide this additional
information as you continue your deliberations on S. 50.
Aloha pumehana,
Eileen L. Shea,
East-West Center
Appendix A
Key Components of a Disaster-Resilient Coastal Communities
Vulnerability and Adaptation Program
Such a program would complement and build on the tsunami-specific
hazard mitigation program called for in Section 4 of S. 50 but would
provide a broader context in which to support various activities that
can help coastal communities respond to a variety of hazards/threats.
Such an integrated program might include:
The development of multi-hazard vulnerability maps that help
governments, businesses and communities characterize and assess
their current risks in the face of a variety of natural hazards
and provide a baseline for assessing future risks;
Multi-disciplinary vulnerability assessment research and
dialogue to improve understanding of a coastal community's
exposure and sensitivity to hazards as well as providing
insights into adaptation options (policies, engineering,
resource management) that would either reduce exposure and
sensitivity or enhance resilience. The ultimate focus of this
component of the program would be the integration of risk
management considerations in the context of economic
development and community development planning and policies. As
I mentioned last week, this will involve more than a few,
isolated studies of the socioeconomic impacts of hazards/
natural disasters. Such a program will be most effective when
it incorporates a collaborative, participatory approach that
effectively engages scientific and technical experts as well as
policy officials and decision-makers in government, businesses,
academia, NGOs and community leaders in a process of shared
learning and joint problem solving.
Risk management education programs, including: (a) technical
training on recent scientific developments in key hazard areas
(e.g., tsunamis, weather extremes, climate variability and
change) and new technologies; (b) leadership training to
enhance the cadre of individuals and institutions responsible
for risk assessment and risk management programs; and (c)
formal and informal education programs and materials including
public awareness brochures and campaigns as well as curriculum
development;
Risk assessment technology development including (but not
limited to) developing practical applications of the insights
gained from risk perception and risk communication research as
well as the provision and application of new tools and
technologies such as high resolution imagery and modeling,
remote sensing and in situ observations and imagery, geospatial
(GIS) technology, innovative uses of current and planned
observing systems and model-based decision support tools;
Risk management data and information services including: (a)
access to observational data and derived products from relevant
observing systems including, but not limited to the tsunami
observing system of buoys and tide gauges authorized in S. 50
as well as the weather, climate and hazard/risk management
components of regional and global observing systems (e.g., the
Integrated Ocean Observing System, the Global Climate Observing
System and the Global Environmental Observations System of
Systems); (b) developing and maintaining multi-disciplinary
data sets on the nature and consequences of key hazards; and
(c) development and provision of new, integrated data products
that support risk assessment and risk management programs; and
Risk communication systems that build on existing warning
and forecast systems such as the expanded tsunami warning
system called for in S. 50 as well as ongoing weather, climate
and ocean monitoring and forecasting systems. This component of
the program would also provide a focus for exploring the
applicability of a variety of communications tools and
technologies as well as the development of the social network
of individuals and institutions involved in risk/hazard
warning, response and recovery.
This kind of integrated vulnerability assessment and adaptation
program is perhaps best implemented on a regional scale since one size
does not fit all when it comes to understanding vulnerability,
providing useful and usable risk assessment information or developing
effective risk management strategies. Criteria for identifying
appropriate regional pilot projects in the context of S. 50 might
include:
Vulnerability to tsunamis as well as weather, climate and
other coastal hazards;
Dependence on economic sectors and natural resources that
are particularly sensitive to coastal hazards such as coastal
inundation as well as weather and climate-related extreme
events such as hurricanes, floods, and high wave events;
Opportunities to link to and leverage related ongoing
regional risk observation, research, forecasting, assessment,
education and risk management programs such as: the Pacific
Risk Management Ohana (PRiMO) and/or the Alaska Tsunami
Preparedness Program discussed during the February 2 hearing;
NOAA's Regional Integrated Science and Assessment (RISA)
program which focuses on climate-related risk management;
regional coastal ocean observing system programs in support of
the U.S. Integrated Ocean Observing System (IOOS); and state
coastal zone management programs with strong hazards/risk
reduction components;
Evidence of strong, interagency collaboration in the area of
risk management; and
Access to NOAA and other federal agency programs, facilities
and infrastructure in tsunami and other coastal hazards
monitoring, warning, forecasting, research, assessment and data
management.
I would encourage the Committee to consider funding such regional
pilot programs for a three-to-five year period with annual funding
levels reaching approximately $1M.
Appendix B
Additional Specific Suggestions to Strengthen S. 50
The following specific suggestions to further strengthen S. 50 are
also offered for your consideration:
Add to the end of Section 2(a)(l0) ``and a sustained program
of education and risk assessment to support the development of
effective response strategies;
In Section 7, Global Tsunami Warning and Mitigation Network,
explicitly identify and authorize expanded support for the
International Tsunami Information Center which NOAA hosts as
part of the UNESCO/IOC tsunami program;
Also in Section 7, I would encourage you to authorize NOAA
to contribute to international tsunami education and
vulnerability and adaptation programs as well as the detection
equipment and technical advice already included in S. 50;
Consider combining the discussion of ``Transfer of
Technology, Maintenance and Upgrades'' that currently comprises
Section 3(d) with the ``Tsunami System Upgrade and
Modernization'' provisions of Section 6 under Section 3;
More explicitly call out the importance of engaging state
coastal zone management programs in the implementation of S.
50; and
Include a section on data management to authorize expanded
support for efforts by NOAA to support the data management
requirements associated with the expanded observing system
called for in S. 50.
In the context of this latter item, I might suggest inclusion of a
new subsection--possibly under Section 3, Tsunami Detection and Warning
Systems--that would authorize and direct NOAA to support the data
management requirements associated with the Tsunami Detection and
Warning System called for in S. 50. From my perspective, these
requirements would include:
Quality control and quality assurance for the ocean
observation and geophysical data from the tsunami detection and
monitoring system;
Archiving and maintaining ocean observation data from the
tsunami detection and monitoring system;
Supporting the integration of ocean observations from the
tsunami detection and monitoring system with other national and
international water level measurements such as the Global Sea
Level Monitoring System (GLOSS);
Supporting the integration of ocean observations from the
tsunami detection and monitoring system with other elements of
the global and coastal components of the Integrated Ocean
Observing System (IOOS) and the Global Environmental Observing
System of Systems (GEOSS); and
Supporting the development of and access to data sets and
integrated data products designed to support multi-hazard
regional vulnerability assessment and adaptation programs such
as those called for in Title__.
In addition to national data centers such as NODC, NGDC and NCDC,
NOAA should look to regional data centers like the NOAA Integrated
Environmental Applications and Information Center (NIEAIC) in Honolulu,
HI to fulfill the requirements described in this section.
Senator Inouye. Dr. Cox, this Committee has heard that
Japan has already developed buildings, in place and
operational, for tsunami purposes. Have you heard about them?
Dr. Cox. Yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. Are they working?
Dr. Cox. To my knowledge, they're working. But I think
that--if I could just continue that--I think the--how many
people you could put into the building versus, you know,
getting people to higher ground, I--I mean, I can't speak for
the United States, but I think we have to consider whether or
not we have a--sort of, a high concentration of people in a
particular area, let's say at a resort community or something
like that, then I think such a building might make sense. I
think other times we have to consider just evacuating everybody
to higher ground. I think we heard earlier that we can't have,
sort of, a one-size-fits-all policy, but I think sometimes it
may make sense to build tsunami-resistant structures in high-
density places like a resort community.
Senator Inouye. Dr. Hansen, I think statistics indicate
that the State of Alaska is more prone than any other state to
earthquakes and tsunamis. Are you satisfied that the warning
system we have today is sufficient?
Dr. Hansen. No, I'm not. I believe that it's insufficient
in ways of getting the information out to the local
communities. We're----
Senator Inouye. How would you----
Dr. Hansen.--in need of improving that.
Senator Inouye.--improve that?
Dr. Hansen. Right now, we're trying to establish--we're
trying to exercise our established partnership to get out
education and outreach programs. We visit communities. We've
put together videos to help educate the populations of Alaska
about the tsunami in our state. In addition, we're trying to
work with leveraged moneys from the National Hazard Program and
the university program to get sirens put out that have been
developed under this--the National Program. Sirens then need to
be triggered somehow, and so, we're working with the NOAA
Tsunami Warning Center to put together the infrastructure we'll
need to get out to communities where, say, NOAA Weather Wire
doesn't work, or it doesn't work very well, and improve that
infrastructure to get information out beyond just the local
manager, but to the people that are in danger.
Senator Inouye. Ever since the end of World War II, the
State of Hawaii has maintained an air-raid siren system, and it
blows off once a month, and some of the tourists go berserk,
not knowing whether it's a bombing attack or tsunami, but it
serves a little purpose.
Ms. Shea, do you think it works?
Ms. Shea. Oh, absolutely. I think that for low-frequency
events, like tsunamis, I think we tend to forget--the
population tends to forget, in the long period of time. But I
think it's useful in the sense that when we hear it, in Hawaii,
and we know that what it means is, if it's the first Monday of
the month, we know it's a test. And if it's not the first
Monday of the month, then we know there's something to be
concerned about, and then we do turn to the television, the
radio, call the local agencies, call the State Civil Defense.
So it absolutely does work. Those low-technology but high-
impact systems are really quite effective.
Senator Inouye. Oftentimes, when we venture into something
that's complex and new, we set up pilot programs. Do you think
a pilot program would work in this situation?
Ms. Shea. I think it would. I think pilot programs would
be, in fact, very useful. And I think--again, look for those
opportunities where you have areas at high risk--Alaska, the
Pacific comes to mind in the case of tsunami--and also those
areas where you're built--where these partnerships of other--of
agencies working together already exist. And I think--so I
think that--I think we've heard enough testimony today to
suggest that there are probably a couple of places, at least,
where a pilot project could demonstrate that partnership,
demonstrate the different kinds of technology, and demonstrate
the value of building this comprehensive risk-management
information system.
Senator Inouye. See, we have no idea what the costs will
be, and a pilot program might be helpful.
Ms. Shea. Yes.
Senator Inouye. Can members of the panel provide us with
your ideas of what, if any, the pilot program should look like?
Ms. Shea. Absolutely.
Senator Inouye. I would appreciate that.
Dr. Cox. Yes, thank you.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And, Dr. Hansen, I think I'm indebted to you for this, a
copy of ``Ocean Fury: Tsunamis in Alaska.'' Let me read to the
Senator, what this says. It says, ``Future tsunamis will hit
Alaska. Taking its cue from the survivors of 1964, this program
explains how scientists, local officials, and emergency
responders are working together to reduce the loss of life and
property when tsunamis assault Alaska's coast again. With the
aid of 3D computer graphics, scientists describe how different
kinds of tsunamis form, how they can travel at jetliner speeds,
sometimes striking shorelines with little or no time to escape.
More important, this program describes what you should do to
improve your chances of surviving the next tsunami.''
I hope, Dr. Hansen, you've provided a copy of this to every
school in the state.
Dr. Hansen. The emergency management group is doing that
kind of thing, that's exactly right.
The Chairman. That should be a program that all young
people should look at so they can understand there's something
out there to prepare for.
We thank you very much. You demonstrate that this a issue
of substantial concern to where we come from, the two of us,
and we appreciate you--have you got another copy? I'll give
that to Senator Inouye.
Dr. Hansen. I don't with me, but I can get you one.
The Chairman. One of those graduate students will mail me
one.
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. We do thank you very much for taking the time
to come here. It's very important. This is our first hearing.
The two of us, as Co-Chairmen of this Commerce Committee, we
wanted everyone to understand this is going to be one of our
number-one targets, to really deal with prevention and
detection of disasters.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator from California
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. The
December 26th Indian Ocean Tsunami was a terrible tragedy.
The sheer devastation inflicted by the tsunami reminds us all how
vulnerable our coastlines are to widespread damage. In California, this
is a serious threat because we are home to miles of beautiful coastal
communities, well within reach of potential damage caused by tsunamis.
Californians have confronted tsunamis in the past. On March 28,
1964, a tsunami originating from an earthquake near Alaska hit the
Northern California community of Crescent City, killing 10 people, and
damaging 91 homes and 197 businesses. The power of this tsunami was so
intense, large buildings in Crescent City were uplifted by the force of
the waves.
The Cape Mendocino earthquake in 1992 created a tsunami that
wreaked havoc along California's northern coastline. Thankfully, there
were no deaths, but the 1992 tsunami highlights the need for
notification of a tsunami as well as public outreach efforts.
One of the many lessons learned from the 1964 and 1992 tsunamis was
that proper warning and evacuation truly saves lives. First, we need to
ensure there are enough buoys to protect the California coast from
tsunamis. Currently, only three out of the six buoys deployed in the
Pacific Ocean are functional.
Second, coastal communities need adequate funding so that they can
become tsunami ready. Since the time of the 1964 tsunami, Crescent City
has made tremendous strides to protect its residents by implementing
tsunami emergency plans, installing warning sirens, and creating a
tsunami education program. As a result, Crescent City has been honored
by NOAA as a TsunamiReady community.
However, much more is needed to make sure all of our coastal
communities are as well prepared as Crescent City is today.
After consulting with the California Office of Emergency Services
(OES), my staff has been informed that California is in dire need of
more funding that will help map potential inundation zones, and that
will help educate the public.
According to OES, only $88,000 in federal funding is given annually
for tsunami evaluation and preparation in California's 15 coastal
communities, and only two are TsunamiReady by NOAA standards. Tsunami
taskforces in California have said they need more money to erect
warning signs on county beaches, plan evacuation routes, and conduct
public outreach efforts.
Mr. Chairman, we must do more to ensure that our citizens living
near the coast are well-educated and better prepared to deal with a
tsunami, and our emergency officials have the necessary funding to
achieve this goal.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
______
Prepared Statement of Doug Carlson, Honolulu, Hawaii
Mr. Chairman, it is highly probable that tens of thousands of
people died around the Indian Ocean rim on December 26, 2004 because an
agency of the United States Government was unprepared to issue an
effective tsunami warning to the region's population. This inference
can be made with great certainty based on the public record and the
statements of numerous Federal Government employees.
The warning failure occurred even though Pacific Tsunami Warning
Center (PTWC) scientists first suspected the existence of the tsunami
as much as two-thirds of an hour before the first waves struck Sri
Lanka, India and Thailand. That is clearly established in the tsunami
timeline by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (Ref:
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2004/s2358.htm)
It's true that scientists did not initially know that a 9.0
magnitude earthquake had struck near Indonesia. They first calculated
the magnitude at 8.0, which they felt would have triggered only a
localized tsunami or no tsunami at all.
Others may wish to investigate the too-low estimate of the
earthquake's strength with a goal of improving early forecasting
techniques. The intent of my testimony, however, is to demonstrate that
the communications protocols that existed on December 26 were
inadequate to issue an effective warning and that U.S. officials may
not have been sufficiently trained or sensitized to the importance of
calling on the news media for assistance.
We know from numerous media interviews with the scientists that
about an hour after the earthquake they felt a need to alert people in
the Indian Ocean region about a possible tsunami. We also know that
they felt handicapped by the absence of a high-tech tsunami detection
and alert-dissemination system in the region. Nothing around the Indian
Ocean approximates the sophistication of the Pacific Rim tsunami
warning network.
To their credit, the Center's personnel wanted to take some kind of
action to alert the region. According to the Center's director, as
quoted in The International Herald Tribune: ``We wanted to try to do
something, but without a plan in place then, it was not an effective
way to issue a warning, or to have it acted upon.'' (Ref: http://
www.iht.com/articles/2004/12/28/news/warning.html)
Without a notification plan, the scientists resorted to telephoning
their colleagues in south Asia, with virtually no success. What they
did not do was telephone the major international news media, such as
the Associated Press, CNN, the BBC, Reuters or any other news
organization with world-wide communications capabilities.
In other words, in the 41 minutes between issuing a bulletin that
mentioned a possible tsunami and when the first waves are now thought
to have reached Sri Lanka, the scientists used the telephone to call
one person at a time rather than call the mass media to help issue a
warning through their broadcast and cable networks.
A NOAA spokesperson later gave what may be the most telling comment
about the PTWC's crisis communications preparedness: ``Not only was the
center focused on warning agencies, it does not have an official list
of media contacts.'' (Ref:
http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20050107-050909-7208r.htm)
Would alerting the news media in those first critical minutes have
made a difference in how many people died in south Asia? With proper
planning and coordination of media protocols, I'm certain lives could
have been saved.
And I'm not alone. Many others around the world have questioned the
lack of an effective warning. A woman in Sri Lanka who lost her father,
sister and niece was interviewed by National Public Radio: ``Why didn't
we receive warning? We had two hours after Indonesian quake, and at
least five minutes warning would have helped. Five minutes would have
saved my father's life.'' (Ref: http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=4277/95)
On January 11, the day NOAA's administrator visited the PTWC and
met with the Honolulu news media, I posted questions on my web log site
that I felt might well be directed to him. They are still relevant
today:
Will NOAA release the PTWC's crisis communications plan? (If
not, why not?)
What liaison did NOAA accomplish with the major media
(Associated Press, CNN, BBC, etc.) before 12/26 to ensure
emergency phone calls to these media would produce timely
warnings to their audiences?
Are PTWC scientists trained to telephone the media to issue
life-saving warnings?
Is the PTWC too high-tech oriented? Do you think low-tech
telephone calls have a place in your pre-crisis planning and
emergency warning protocols?
Have you ordered changes in the PTWC warning protocols since
the tsunami?
Does NOAA accept responsibility for an internal procedural
failure that might have cost the lives of tens of thousands of
people in South Asia?
What is NOAA telling south Asia nations about its
performance on 12/26?
What are your personal feelings about NOAA's performance on
12/26?
The administrator did answer many media questions that day,
including a variation of the last one. According to the Honolulu Star-
Bulletin, he called the PTWC staff's actions ``excellent'' and faithful
to the warning procedures in place. ``This is a group that believes in
saving lives and protecting property at all costs,'' he said. (Ref:
http://starbulletin.com/2005/01/12/news/index1.html)
The sad fact is the ``warning procedures in place'' on December 26
saved no lives and protected no property. Nothing PTWC scientists knew
or did that day helped people in the tsunami danger zone.
I respectfully submit to this Committee that the PTWC's apparent
inability to issue effective warnings is unacceptable. I have proposed
a five-point program that would help NOAA shift its thinking and its
culture to include meaningful media notification after future tsunami-
generating earthquakes:
NOAA should accept constructive criticism--rather than
deny--that actions it could have undertaken likely would have
saved lives in south Asia.
NOAA should resolve to change its communications culture to
include reevaluating the scope of its information-disseminating
mission--i.e., whether its mission extends beyond the Pacific
Rim.
NOAA should rewrite its communications protocols to include
early telephone calls to news organizations that have the
capability of sending worldwide tsunami warnings.
NOAA should accomplish high-level coordination with the
management of these news agencies to ensure proper execution of
the alerts when received by the media.
NOAA should train its personnel to respond to suspected
tsunamis by making direct person-to-person contact with major
news outlets based on prior planning.
The media can be an efficient way to send warnings to threatened
populations when time is of the essence, and NOAA would do well to
integrate them into its crisis communications planning. Thank you for
the opportunity to contribute to your deliberations on this important
matter.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Brigadier General John J. Kelly
Failure of DART Buoys and Long Term Tsunami Funding Needs
General Kelly, in your testimony, you noted the failure of three of
the six Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami (DART) buoys
used to detect tsunami in the event of an earthquake. As you know,
these buoys are extremely important to our coastal communities, both in
detecting tsunami that pose a threat to these communities, and in
preventing expensive evacuations by detecting false alarms. I am
concerned that these problems have existed for over 15 months and
Congress is just now learning of this situation.
Had there been a devastating tsunami in the Pacific this December,
instead of in the Indian Ocean, and we found out 3 of the DART buoys
were down, this hearing would have a very different tone. We would like
to avoid ever having such a situation arise.
Question 1. What are NOAA's plans for instituting better oversight
procedures to ensure that contractors are meeting the specifications of
the system?
Answer. NOAA has existing procedures in place to ensure contractor
performance meets the specifications of the DART station. The quality
of work by the contractors is not a reason for buoy failure. Buoys can
fail for a variety of reasons related to technology, mechanical or
mooring systems.
Question 1a. When can we expect all six DART buoys to be
operational again?
Answer. One of the three buoys is now operational, and once the
weather permits, NOAA is ready to repair the other two. We expect all 6
DART stations to be operational by summer 2005, and we will follow our
maintenance schedule to ensure they remain functional. While it is not
possible to guarantee that these prototype stations will be operational
100 percent of the time, NOAA is focused on making the DART network
more robust.
Question 1b. Will you notify Congress in a timely fashion if other
failures occur?
Answer. For any outages of longer than 60 days, NOAA will notify
the Committee of the status of the network. Additionally, the Committee
can visit the National Data Buoy Center website for up-to-date
information on the status of the DART buoys (http://www.ndbc.noaa.gov/
dart.shtml).
Question 1c. How will you ensure these buoys--and the new buoys--
are serviced regularly and stay in operational condition?
Answer. NOAA will ensure all DART stations are serviced regularly
to ensure operational condition to the greatest extent possible. NOAA
plans for the network to meet operational requirements, even with
occasional DART station outages. NOAA will develop capabilities to
address network coverage and redundancy to ensure, as best we can, that
single DART station failures will not impact the integrity of the
entire network. Planned redundancy and hardening of the infrastructure,
combined with the addition of a two-way communication capability, will
mitigate risk from system-wide failures. In addition to these measures,
NOAA is also procuring three redundant DART buoys for the Alaska DART
buoy array and will acquire 10 spare DART buoys as part of expansion of
the tsunami warning system in FY 2005 and FY 2006. These spare buoys
will ensure that NOAA can rapidly respond to buoy failure. As the
expanded network is transitioned from a prototype to a fully
operational network, NOAA will inform Congress of any outages impacting
the integrity of the network as a whole.
Question 2. Funding. The President has committed $37.5 million over
the next two years (through the end of Fiscal Year 2006) to expand the
tsunami warning system. Of that funding, how much will go towards (1)
inundation mapping for all coastal communities; (2) continued
technology research and development for next generation equipment and
forecasting; and (3) public education to ensure our communities are
prepared?
Answer. Of the $24M scheduled for NOAA use, approximately $4.75M
will be spent on inundation mapping and modeling, as well as education
and outreach (e.g., community preparedness activities including
TsunamiReady). Of this $4.75M, approximately $2.25M will be spent on
inundation mapping and modeling and $2.5M will go towards public
education activities. Following the current plan, inundation mapping
for the major population centers will be complete in 2015. Of the $24M
scheduled for NOAA use, approximately $1.0M will be directed to support
Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) buoy research
and development activities.
Question 2a. What are the out-year costs (beyond Fiscal Year 2006)
of maintaining in working order the entire expanded detection system,
and the associated tsunami programs?
Answer. By the middle of calendar year 2007, NOAA expects to fully
deploy the new suite of DART stations, to continue accelerated
inundation mapping and modeling activities, and to continue accelerated
community preparedness activities. NOAA anticipates additional
operation and maintenance (O&M) costs to maintain the expanded
detection network in working order, as well as continued costs for
efforts in tsunami inundation mapping and education/outreach programs.
The level of funding required beyond FY 2006 will be determined through
the budget process.
Agency Participation in the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program
Question 3. Both you and Ms. Shea have provided testimony about the
importance of interagency cooperation in the National Tsunami Hazard
Mitigation Program, specifically cooperation among the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the United States Geological
Survey (USGS), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). I have some questions about FEMA's
role in the program.
In 1996, the Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Federal/State Working Group
presented its Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Implementation Plan to the
Senate Appropriations Committee. In this plan, FEMA was given
responsibilities to produce inundation and evacuation maps, and to
implement state and local tsunami mitigation programs. The
Implementation Plan called for over $2.2 million in funding from FEMA
to carry out these responsibilities--including mapping and mitigation.
How much funding or in-kind work has FEMA contributed to this
interagency program since 1996? How does this compare with the other
federal and state agency contributions?
Answer. Under the original National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation
Program (NTHMP), FEMA responsibilities were limited to the mitigation
and implementation of the mapping. While the original plan may have
called for FEMA funding, under the NTHMP there was no funding made
available for FEMA.
Up until last year, FEMA contribution to the NTHMP has primarily
been in-kind support. This includes the support of two FEMA Regional
staff members who have been members of the NTHMP Mitigation committee
since its inception. At least one regional staff person has spent 25
percent of her time on the tsunami hazard over a 10-year period. A
rough estimate of staff time and travel over this time is approximately
$200,000. In addition, one FEMA Headquarters scientist has also been
involved in this committee as a technical liaison for several years.
As described in further detail in question 3b, for the first three
years of the NTHMP, FEMA was the distribution agency for the NOAA state
grant funding. This was done since NOAA did not have a mechanism to
transfer funds to the states, while FEMA did. While the actual funds
came from NOAA, this activity did require significant staff resources
on the part of FEMA.
Also described in further detail in question 3a, FEMA jointly co-
funded a $400,000 project with NOAA to study and develop tsunami
shelter design guidance. This project builds on a first phase, which
involved a five-state engineer concept feasibility workshop funded by
NOAA and led by the State of Washington and the identification of
existing guidance material. The project will work with the engineering
community and the states to research and produce the construction
design guidance for a tsunami shelter structure capable of withstanding
both the severe ground shaking expected during a design earthquake and
specific velocities and water pressure that a tsunami will bring to
bear on structures. The product will be especially useful to low-lying
communities that lack evacuation access to high ground following a
local great earthquake and that may have to rely on vertical evacuation
in existing buildings.
FEMA has also jointly funded 66 percent of a $412,000 pilot project
through its National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) with NOAA and the
USGS to develop risk identification products that will help communities
understand their actual level of risk from tsunami in a way that could
be conveyed on FEMA's existing flood hazard maps. The goal of the
project is to develop techniques that can be used to determine the
probability and magnitude of tsunami in other communities along the
west coast of the United States. The location of the pilot project is
Seaside, Oregon. FEMA's NFIP is involved because FEMA is responsible
for mapping areas subject to flooding in order to properly rate flood
insurance policies and provide risk assessment information to states
and local communities.
In addition, it should be noted that FEMA's NFIP has considered
tsunami wave heights during the development of its Flood Insurance Rate
Maps since the late 1970's for areas of Hawaii and the West Coast where
tsunami was considered a significantly probable flood threat. The NFIP
flood maps still reflect tsunami wave heights for areas such as Hawaii
where inundation heights from that hazard are considered that most
probable form of flooding.
Other federal agencies that participate in the National Tsunami
Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) include NOAA, which has contributed
approximately $27M, and USGS. The five states participating in the
NTHMP (Alaska, Hawaii, Washington, Oregon, and California) have
contributed a total of $5.0M in in-kind contributions since FY 1997.
Question 3a. Has NOAA transferred funds to FEMA in order for the
agency to perform any work for the program? Please explain.
Answer. There are two instances of NOAA transferring funds to FEMA
to perform work under the program. First, as mentioned above, was that
for the first three years NOAA transferred the state grant funds to
FEMA, who then distributed those funds through our existing State
Emergency Management Preparedness Grant program. FEMA did not receive
any compensation for managing this activity. NOAA subsequently took
over this function and has been distributing the state grants directly.
Second, also mentioned above, FEMA and NOAA jointly funded a
project to determine if it is possible to design and build a structure
to withstand specific tsunami loads and, if so, to develop technical
design and construction guidance for special shelter facilities that
would allow for vertical evacuation. Funding for this two-year $400,000
effort is equally divided between FEMA, through the National Earthquake
Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP), and NOAA, through the NTHMP. The
project will produce construction design guidance for a tsunami shelter
structure capable of withstanding both the severe ground shaking
expected during a design earthquake and specific velocities and water
pressure from a tsunami that would impact structures. This is a
significant challenge since current design practice takes into account
earthquake or coastal storm surge but does not address stronger forces
that a tsunami would generate. The project, which is being done under
contract, was initiated last fall and is just getting underway.
A potential future phase of this project may include developing
information for states and local communities on how this tsunami
shelter design guidance can be utilized. This information would
especially be critical for low-lying communities that lack evacuation
access to high ground following a local earthquake and that may have to
rely on vertical evacuation. Future funding would be equally divided
between NOAA and FEMA.
Question 3b. Given that FEMA's priorities have shifted from natural
disaster mitigation to preparing and responding to terror attacks, how
much funding and effort can FEMA reasonably be expected to contribute
in the post-9/11 environment?
Answer. Although the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is
focused on terrorism and protecting the homeland, it is also committed
to an all-hazards approach of preparedness for, response to, recovery
from, and mitigation against all events, including natural disasters.
Recent efforts to improve response to and recovery from a terrorism
event does not diminish FEMA's commitment to dealing with the
destruction of a natural disaster--just the opposite. FEMA has enjoyed
a long history of focusing on an all-hazards approach, and being part
of DHS has strengthened that approach. FEMA has successfully continued
to respond to and recover from a multitude of natural disasters in the
past year. At the same time, these efforts provide FEMA with
opportunities not only to better prepare for terrorism events, but also
for catastrophic events, whether they are natural or caused by
terrorism.
Question 3c. What financial burden does this place on NOAA, as the
primary federal partner, as well as on the states?
Answer. FEMA's participation has not placed any financial burdens
on NOAA. NOAA is not in a position to comment on financial burden
placed on the states.
Tsunami and Earthquake Program Compatability
Question 4. As you may know, Congress recently enacted this
Committee's reauthorization of the multi-agency National Earthquake
Hazards Reduction Program (NEHRP), which is aimed at both improving
earthquake detection and community resilience to earthquakes--including
building construction and planning guidelines. Similarly, S. 50, would
authorize NOAA's National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP),
another multi-agency program involving many of the witnesses here
today.
Looking at these two programs together, are the activities of the
Earthquake program consistent with the goals of the Tsunami program?
For instance, is a building designed to be earthquake resilient also
designed to be resilient against tsunami?
Answer. The National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP)
activities, under the leadership of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), are consistent with those of the National
Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program. NEHRP operates the Global
Seismographic Network and the National Earthquake Information Center,
which provide data essential to the tsunami warning system. Currently,
buildings designed to be earthquake resilient are not also designed to
be resilient against tsunamis. NEHRP has a nascent effort to develop
tsunami hazard maps and design criteria for shelters and critical
facilities in cooperation with the Tsunami program. While it would not
be economically feasible to build a typical structure to withstand a
tsunami, NEHRP believes that structures could be designed to withstand
at least some specific level of tsunami without collapse. This is
especially important for buildings such as community shelters or
critical facilities (e.g., hospitals).
Question 4a. Does the Earthquake Program have any programs or
approaches that should be adopted by the Tsunami program? For example,
should we expand programs regarding construction and planning?
Answer. The Administration has recently proposed significant
expansion of the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program. The
primary goal of this proposed expansion is to develop and maintain a
fully operational tsunami warning system. While construction practices
may be of interest, our efforts are currently focused on improving our
Nation's tsunami warning capabilities.
Question 4b. Has the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
participated meaningfully or financially in either program? Are there
limitations that we should know about?
Answer. FEMA has the opportunity to play an important role as a
participant in the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP).
The NTHMP receives strong regional level support from FEMA Region X,
whose staff attends all NTHMP meetings. FEMA Region X also supports
including tsunamis as part of the FEMA National Flood Insurance
Program, and has funded a pilot project being conducted by NOAA to
evaluate this inclusion. NOAA does not participate in the National
Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP), and therefore cannot speak
to FEMA's contributions to that program. Our federal partners, such as
NSF, NIST, and USGS, are better suited to address FEMA's participation
in the NEHRP.
Question 4c. How can we improve coordination and better define
agency roles in our legislation?
Answer. An effective National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program
requires active participation of key federal and state partners. NOAA
believes this can be accomplished within the existing NTHMP.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Brigadier General John J. Kelly
Question 1. I recently visited the Pacific Marine Environmental
Laboratory (PMEL) in Seattle, which, as you know, provides research
support for all aspects of the U.S. tsunami program. I was extremely
impressed by their work and dedication and I thank you for your support
of this critical facility. As I'm sure you know, PMEL developed the
DART buoys, which are, and will be, a critical component of our
Nation's tsunami warning system. These technologies have greatly
reduced the number of false tsunami alerts, which helps people take
real alarms seriously. However, I was troubled to learn that three out
of the six buoys in the Pacific Ocean, including the one off
Washington's coastline, are currently not functioning properly. An
emergency repair last month only lasted four days, and then a few days
ago the buoy started working again. What this situation illustrates, I
believe, is the need for more reliable buoys and a more redundant
system. When I visited PMEL, I learned they were working on developing
a new generation of buoys that would be more reliable, have a longer
working life, have improved two-way communications, and hopefully be
less expensive to produce than the older models. Can you please explain
how you feel passage of this legislation will accelerate the timeline
for completion of these buoys? Will the buoys deployed under the
Administration's plan be more reliable?
Answer. NOAA agrees that we need a reliable and redundant tsunami-
warning system, and we have accounted for some redundancy in our plan.
It is important to note that the current DART network (DART I) is a
research system that was only recently (October 2003) transitioned into
operations. As you mentioned, the DART stations are being redesigned to
include redundant features so that they will better withstand the harsh
conditions in the northern Pacific. The redundant capabilities built
into the stations will increase the life span of the DART systems, as
will routine maintenance of the stations. NOAA will also maintain three
redundant in-water backup stations in the Gulf of Alaska, where sea
conditions are particularly harsh and servicing buoys can be difficult.
The Administration's plan was developed in response to the Indian
Ocean Tsunami, and is designed to improve and expand coverage for the
United States. This plan represents an accelerated version of NOAA's
current efforts through the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program
(NTHMP), and has accelerated the timeline for completion of the full
network of DART stations. The U.S. Tsunami Warning System, as described
in the Administration's plan, will use the funds over the next two
years to expand U.S. tsunami detection and monitoring capabilities. The
complete network of 39 DART stations is planned to be fully operational
by mid-2007. These measures will provide the United States with nearly
100 percent detection capability for a U.S. coastal tsunami, allowing
response within minutes.
The buoys that will be deployed in the Administration's plan are
those you describe--capable of two way communications and we expect
this next generation DART system, DART II, to be more reliable. As
there is always room for improvement, the Administration's 2-year plan
also provides $1M for research and development for future innovation of
the DART network.
Question 2. I understand the next major tsunami to hit the
Washington coast could originate from an earthquake along the Cascadia
plate rather than a deep ocean earthquake. However, the buoy-based
warning system would be largely useless detecting a near-shore tsunami.
Are there ways to make our current tsunami warning system more
effective for mitigating near-shore hazards? For example, the NSF's
NEPTUNE program to wire the Juan de Fuca plate with fiber optic lines
seems to be supportive of these efforts. Do you feel that there are
other technologies or approaches Congress should consider funding that
might produce more timely warning for near-shore generated tsunamis?
Answer. Near-shore generated tsunamis present a difficult
challenge. NOAA and federal, state and local emergency managers have
ensured warning dissemination capabilities are in place for people to
receive tsunami warnings. With response time for these events measured
in ``minutes'' rather than ``hours,'' education and outreach are
critical, as with tornadoes, to enable people to understand their
vulnerabilities and take appropriate action immediately. The
Administration's plan includes $2.5M for education and outreach
efforts, including NOAA's TsunamiReady program.
Question 3. On my recent visit to PMEL, I learned that Washington
State is vulnerable not only to tsunamis generated by distant
earthquakes in the North Pacific Ocean or the closer Cascadia
subduction zone, but also from faults within the Puget Sound. In fact,
there is a fault line that goes right across Puget Sound and downtown
Seattle. While the last major earthquake event happened in the year
1100, scientists believe another event could happen at any time.
Although a Puget Sound generated tsunami would provide almost no time
to effectively evacuate citizens to higher ground, the vulnerability
assessments and inundation mapping authorized by this bill is critical
to inform city planners on future siting and permitting considerations.
Can you tell me the current plans to analyze the tsunami risk for
inland bodies of water like the Puget Sound?
Answer. The impact of tsunamis on inland bodies of water, such as
the Puget Sound, is being researched by NOAA through inundation mapping
and computer modeling efforts. The analysis of risks to areas such as
these is included in NOAA's inundation mapping efforts.
Question 4. Considering the short warning time for earthquake-
derived tsunamis within the Puget Sound, are there other technologies
that you think could provide more timely warning to these inland areas?
Answer. Issuing improved local tsunami warnings due to near-shore
earthquakes requires enhanced earthquake detection capabilities. The
U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), which operates the Advanced National
Seismic System to detect domestic earthquakes and jointly operates the
Global Seismographic Network (GSN) with the National Science
Foundation, is best suited to answer this question. However, the
Administration's plan includes funding for upgraded seismometers used
to improve tsunami detection and includes funding for improvements to
the GSN. Most tsunamis are triggered by seismic events, and
improvements to the GSN are critical to (1) quickly determine the
precise location of the seismic event (2) its precise magnitude and (3)
quickly disseminate this information to the USGS National Earthquake
Information Center and the NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers. Prior planning
and rapid response are the most effective means of minimizing
casualties in any local tsunami event. People must be educated to move
to higher ground if they are in tsunami threatened area and can feel a
strong ground shaking. Until we are able to forecast earthquakes, we
are limited in how well we can forecast local tsunami events.
Question 5. I am grateful for NOAA's work through the TsunamiReady
program preparing coastal communities for tsunami hazards. However, you
yourself noted in your testimony that very few coastal communities
currently meet NOAA's standards of tsunami preparedness. In fact, only
three Washington State communities qualify as ``tsunami ready'' under
NOAA's program. How do you plan to work with communities and local
emergency response agencies to improve and develop emergency response
strategies?
Answer. NOAA is committed to accelerating and expanding its
TsunamiReady community program to all at-risk communities. The
Administration's plan provides $2.5M to NOAA over two years to support
public education activities, including community preparedness
activities such as the TsunamiReady Program. While NOAA recognizes
achieving TsunamiReady status requires significant state and local
support, NOAA will continue working with local communities to leverage
existing assets and community warning preparedness programs, which
provide the foundation for allowing a community to become
``TsunamiReady.'' NOAA will also continue to work with communities and
local emergency response agencies interested in developing or improving
emergency response strategies, through our participation in the
National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP).
Question 6. Although I am very concerned about the threat of a
tsunami to a coastal or Puget Sound community, I would also like to
state for the record that I remain concerned about all hazards.
Therefore, it is important to me that related threats be considered
when investing resources in tsunami preparedness. Do you see ways in
which earthquake preparedness can be combined with tsunami preparedness
with the passage of this bill? Please explain if you see opportunities
to maximize hazard preparedness by preparing for both earthquake and
tsunami threats.
Answer. The National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP)
activities, under the leadership of the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) and other experts, are consistent with those of
the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program.
Question 7. Like Senator Stevens, I am concerned about coordination
of agency efforts to ensure effective use of resources and efficient
warning systems. I understand that the National Earthquake Information
Center of the USGS is the recognized worldwide authority for rapid
earthquake detection and location and already has most of the
technological resources to provide earthquake information rapidly to
anyone globally. I would like to know specifically how the NOAA tsunami
warning centers and the USGS NEIC can coordinate to make sure that we
create the best warning system possible without duplication of effort.
Answer. NOAA and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) National
Earthquake Information Center (NEIC) currently coordinate to make sure
that we have the best, and most efficient, tsunami warning system
possible. The USGS operates the Advanced National Seismic System
domestically and jointly operates the Global Seismographic Network
(GSN) with the National Science Foundation. These networks provide data
in real time to NOAA's tsunami warning centers through the USGS NEIC.
The NEIC has a direct link into the NOAA dissemination network, which
immediately transmits earthquake information to the NOAA tsunami
warning centers. NOAA, USGS, and FEMA are members of the NTHMP and as
such, have worked together to ensure coordination. Installation of the
Consolidated Reporting of Earthquakes and Tsunamis (CREST) system is an
example of coordination between NOAA and USGS to strengthen the ability
to rapidly detect tsunamigenic earthquakes.
Question 8. I understand that the conditions in which the DART
buoys operate can be dangerous and that a certain rate of equipment
failure may be unavoidable. However, I'm concerned that 3 of 6 DART
buoys are currently unreliable, including the buoy off the Washington
coast. In your estimation, what is the failure rate of these buoys and
the new buoys that might succeed the current generation of DART buoys?
Given that failure rate, what is your estimation of the average
effectiveness of this system?
Answer. While it is true that, at the time of the hearing, 2 of the
6 DART stations were offline, this does not indicate that these buoys
are unreliable in general. The reliability of the DART stations, since
October 2003, the time when they were transitioned from a research
program of NOAA Research to an operational program of NOAA's National
Weather Service, has been 72 percent. This percentage represents the
combined number of hours the stations have been operational, and
indicates that the DART station array is a highly effective system
overall. Our goal is to have a fully capable network of 29 DART
stations in the Pacific, with 3 additional in-water backups on the Gulf
of Alaska. While it is not possible to guarantee that these prototype
stations will be operational 100 percent of the time, NOAA is focused
making the DART I network more robust and deploying a DART II network
with reliability built into the design. NOAA plans for the network to
meet operational requirements, even with occasional DART station
outages. NOAA will develop capabilities to address network coverage and
redundancy to ensure, as best we can, that single DART station failures
will not impact the integrity of the entire network. Planned redundancy
and hardening of the infrastructure, combined with the addition of a
two-way communication capability, will mitigate risk from system-wide
failures.
Question 9. Confronted with a fresh reminder of the potential
devastation of an off-shore, tsunami-causing earthquake, I share
Senator Stevens' concern about ensuring sufficient warning systems are
in place so that loss of human life can be minimized. Senator Stevens
requested an estimation of what it would take to establish a
comprehensive tsunami notification system. I am very interested in your
response and ask that you please forward me a copy of your answer to
Senator Stevens' question.
Answer. A copy of the NOAA response to Senators Stevens and Inouye
(as well as the incoming letter from the Senators) was faxed to your
staff (Amit Ronen) on Thursday, March 3, 2005.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
Brigadier General John J. Kelly
Voice Sirens for Effective, Reliable Tsunami Warning
Question 1. Effective tsunami warning should rely on a variety of
redundant modes of communication. While there are several technologies
for communicating tsunami warnings highlighted in the Tsunami
Preparedness Act of 2005 (S. 50), it is a concern that voice capable
sirens are not among the technologies mentioned. Emergency managers
have long depended on sirens to warn the public of emergency and civil
defense situations including tsunamis, tornados, floods, hurricanes,
hazardous material accidents, and of a potential nuclear attack.
Sirens have a number of significant advantages: they insure that
all residents and visitors to a particular area can be informed without
regard to the cell phone or pager technology platform or provider they
may have, when equipped with backup power supplies they will work even
when the electricity or phone lines are out; when equipped with live
public address or pre-recorded messages they can be used BEFORE and
AFTER the incident to communicate important public safety information.
Without the use of/installation of voice sirens as part of a
preparedness plan, how do you warn people on the ground? Are there
other effective warning systems available for this purpose? What
criteria are used to determine which warning system is reliable in case
of tsunami?
Answer. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
works with the emergency management community to ensure warnings are
received by the public in as many ways as possible--including cell
phones, pagers, Internet, NOAA Weather Radio All-Hazards, television,
radio, and sirens. All of these methods are effective, and emergency
managers must decide how to best warn the public. NOAA's dissemination
systems are available for the emergency management community to use in
broadcasting emergency messages. NOAA will continue working with
federal, state and local emergency managers to ensure warnings are as
widely distributed as possible. Some National Weather Service Offices
also issue tsunami warnings via High Frequency (HF) and Very High
Frequency (VHF) marine radio as well, as do other federal agencies.
There are no unique criteria for determining which warning systems are
reliable for tsunamis.
Question 1a. Should a preparedness plan include a warning mechanism
for small fishing boats trawling near the coastline? National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather radios can be used to
inform these fishing boats at minimal cost (approximately $20).
Answer. A comprehensive preparedness plan must address how to get
messages to people, whenever they need it, wherever they are. NOAA
Weather Radio All-Hazards is an effective way to reach fishing boats
near the coast. There are other alternatives available as well,
including satellite based communications links (Internet and cell
phone). We employ all possible methods of delivering warnings to those
at risk.
Improving Tsunami Prediction and Preparedness
Question 2. NOAA's National Weather Service has been able to mark
its progress in severe weather prediction and forecasting with a number
of useful metrics. For example, they have substantially increased
warning times for hurricanes and tornadoes, while at the same time
increasing accuracy of forecasts. Unlike these events, tsunamis are
caused by largely unpredictable tectonic events that can strike without
warning, which makes improving prediction a bit harder. However, it is
important that we use the same approach to improving out tsunami
prediction and warnings. One way we have started to characterize our
success is a 75 percent reduction in false alarms since 1996. This is
indeed an accomplishment. But we also want to make sure that when a
deadly tsunami is headed for our coasts, we have the best information
possible for our communities on time, place and severity.
What kind of progress have we made in accuracy of forecasting and
prediction since 1996? What is a good measure of such progress?
Answer. Tsunamis often result from unpredictable seismic events
that strike without warning. It is a challenge to improving the
prediction of tsunami-genesis. With each tornado or hurricane, NOAA
collects a tremendous amount of data. We are able to learn new things
about these natural disasters with every event; this information aids
us in our efforts to improve prediction. Fortunately, tsunamis are
relatively infrequent. That means we record fewer events and have much
we can learn when it comes to tsunami generation and propagation.
Understanding how these natural disasters develop is key to determining
how we can predict these destructive events.
The Administration's plan calls for NOAA to have a network of 39
advanced-technology Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis
(DART) buoys for a fully operational enhanced tsunami warning system by
mid-2007. With a complete network of DART stations, we will have the
opportunity to detect more tsunami events, and we have the opportunity
to learn from each one. In November 2003, a large earthquake occurred
in the Aleutian Islands and generated a tsunami. The DART stations
recorded this event, confirming only a small tsunami. During post
analysis of the event, DART data were used for a model simulation and
the output from the simulation accurately predicted the 2 cm tsunami
recorded at Hilo, Hawaii. With each tsunami-event recorded by the DART
stations, we have the opportunity to fine-tune our models used to
predict tsunami impacts. The DART data combined with forecast models
promise to significantly reduce false alarm rates as well as provide a
better measure of the severity of destructive tsunamis for Hawaii and
all other parts of the Pacific. The accurate forecasting of a non-
destructive tsunami in November 2003 saved Hawaii an estimated $68M in
projected evacuation costs. With the additional DART stations, we
expect to substantially reduce false alarm rate for distant tsunamis
from 75 percent to less than 25 percent over the next 4 years. Little
change is expected in reducing false alarms for local tsunamis (those
generated from near-shore causes). A reduction in the rate of false
alarms, and the associated cost-savings for our states and territories,
is an appropriate measure of our progress in tsunami detection.
Question 2a. What other metrics will be important to pay attention
to? For example, only 30 percent of our communities at risk have
inundation maps--shouldn't this percentage improve? How much will this
metric improve with the funds proposed under the President's plan?
Answer. NOAA agrees that the percentage of at-risk communities with
complete inundation maps is an important metric, and we are working to
increase the number of areas covered by inundation maps. Another
important metric is the number of at-risk communities that are
``TsunamiReady.'' NOAA's TsunamiReady program promotes tsunami hazard
preparedness as an active collaboration among federal, state and local
emergency management agencies, the public, and the National Weather
Service tsunami warning system. The Administration's plan provides
funding to allow NOAA to increase the number of mapped and TsunamiReady
communities. Of the $24M scheduled for NOAA use, approximately $4.75M
will be spent on inundation mapping and modeling, as well as education
and outreach (e.g., community preparedness activities, including
TsunamiReady). Of this $4.75M, approximately $2.25M will be spent on
inundation mapping and modeling and $2.5M will go towards public
education activities. Following the current plan, inundation mapping
for the major population centers will be complete in 2015.
Question 2b. Since we have experienced a 50 percent decline in buoy
service in the past 2 years, wouldn't this be another metric to focus
on? What will be your goal?
Answer. It is not accurate to say that we have experienced a 50
percent decline in buoy service in the past 2 years. We believe you are
referring to technical malfunctions of 3 of the 6 DART buoys in the
weeks preceding the hearing. While it is true that at the time of the
hearing, 2 of the 6 DART stations were offline, this does not indicate
a 50 percent decline in performance over the last 2 years. The
reliability of the DART stations since October 2003, the time when they
were transitioned from a research program of the Office of Oceanic and
Atmospheric Research to an operational program of the National Weather
Service, has been 72 percent. This percentage represents the combined
number of hours the stations have been operational, and is an
appropriate metric to use in evaluating the reliability of the DART
system. Further, this percentage indicates that the DART station array
is a highly effective system overall.
Our goal is to have a fully capable network of 29 DART stations in
the Pacific, with 3 additional in-water backups in the Gulf of Alaska,
where sea conditions are particularly harsh. While it is not possible
to guarantee that these stations will be operational 100 percent of the
time given the demanding environmental conditions in which these
stations operate, NOAA is focused on making the current DART network
(DART I) more robust and deploying a next generation DART network (DART
II) with reliability built into the design. NOAA plans for the network
to meet operational requirements, even with occasional DART station
outages. NOAA will develop capabilities to address network coverage and
redundancy to ensure, as best we can, that single DART station failures
will not impact the integrity of the entire network. Planned redundancy
and hardening of the infrastructure, combined with the addition of a
two-way communication capability, will mitigate risk from system-wide
failures.
Funding for Tsunami Mitigation and Response
Question 3. The Administration recently released its plan to expand
and modernize its tsunami detection and warning system. This plan
includes the expansion of the system into areas such as the Atlantic
Ocean, Caribbean, and Gulf of Mexico. I applaud the Administration's
timely response, however, I am concerned that while the plan addresses
the issue of tsunami detection, it does not completely address the
issue of response to tsunami, as well as community preparation.
Which agency will be taking the lead for mitigation, mapping, and
response?
Answer. NOAA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and
the United States Geologic Survey (USGS), through the National Tsunami
Hazard Mitigation Program, coordinate inundation mapping efforts with
state and local emergency management officials. FEMA is the lead agency
for mitigation and response, with NOAA assisting any way possible.
NOAA's role is to assist in identifying the tsunami hazard (required
inundation mapping), providing tsunami warning guidance (including
site-specific tsunami forecast models) and providing tsunami mitigation
program support through community-based preparedness programs and
education outreach--including the TsunamiReady Program.
Question 3a. Does the funding proposed by the Administration
include funding for tsunami response? How much?
Answer. The two-year plan proposed by the Administration includes
funding for NOAA and USGS for an improved tsunami detection and warning
system. FEMA is the lead federal agency in the response area and is
best suited to answer questions regarding response funding.
Question 3b. Will these amounts be adequate given the plans for
expanded areas of coverage for the tsunami program?
Answer. The new NOAA funding for mitigation includes $2.5M for
education and outreach and $2.25M for inundation mapping. This is a
significant increase from the base funding levels managed through the
National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program. FEMA is the lead federal
agency in the response area and is best suited to answer questions
regarding response funding.
______
Response to Letter Dated February 7, 2005 from Chairman Stevens and
Co-Chairman Inouye to Vice Admiral Conrad C. Lautenbacher, Jr.
In response to a letter, dated February 7, 2005 from Chairman Ted
Stevens and Co-Chairman Daniel K. Inouye, asking to:
Please explain what information or resources your agency requires
before it can issue a public warning notification of a natural hazard
or disaster. In addition, we would like to know which entities or
organizations receive warnings from, or through, your agency, such as
the appropriate federal and local disaster response entities, first
responders/911, and local and national media outlets. To the extent
possible, your report should also demonstrate which communications
technologies are currently used to deliver these public warnings, such
as automatic alert televisions and radios, telephones, wireless and
satellite technology, including cellular telephones, pagers, personal
digital assistants (PDAs), and the internet. If such communications
technologies are not being used, we would like to know what the
impediments are, and the status of any discussions to expand the
warning system's capability to do so.
Your report should also specify a process by which your agency,
either on its own, or in conjunction with other relevant agencies, can
maximize effective dissemination of public warning notifications.
Lastly, we would be interested to know how your agency interacts with
the Department of Homeland Security (including the Federal Emergency
Management Agency), the Federal Communications Commission, the
Department of Commerce, or other relevant agencies with respect to
warning systems.
Response
Thank you for your letter regarding General John J. Kelly's
testimony at the February 2, 2005, hearing of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation on the U.S. tsunami warning system
and the Tsunami Preparedness Act of 2005. At the hearing, you asked us
to tell the Committee how the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) could improve public notification of impending
natural hazards and disasters.
NOAA's National Weather Service (NWS) is acknowledged as the
premier agency in government for disseminating warning information. We
are efficient at disseminating weather and natural hazard information
through our vast communication network. We currently provide public
notification of weather warnings as well as other natural hazards and
disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and civil emergency messages,
e.g., hazardous materials spills. These warnings can be received and
transmitted by a myriad of other users providing access to virtually
all of the people across the Nation. We can provide access, but we
cannot ensure the message is received.
While our system is effective, we can still make improvements. We
can make our systems more reliable and improve public education. We can
work with the private sector to utilize new technology to make warnings
available, and develop other methods to increase accessibility of
warnings.
NOAA Weather, Alert, and Readiness Network (NOAA WARN), includes
all NOAA's National Weather Service warning dissemination systems (see
attachment). This includes the NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards (NWR)
program, which consists of over 900 radio transmitters covering nearly
97 percent of the nation's population. The President's FY06 Budget
request includes funds to modernize 64 of 400 remaining vintage 1970's
NWR transmitters. These improvements will make them more robust by
including backup power supply, and make them easier to maintain. Backup
power is critical during major weather events, such as hurricanes, when
commercial power is out.
Our assessment and decision-making equipment, the Advanced Weather
Interactive Processing System (AWIPS), is the initial generation point
for all NWS disseminated warnings. We are working to ensure AWIPS has
appropriate software capabilities, capable of disseminating new
information technology standard formats, to effectively support the new
technologies such as Geophysical Information Systems (GIS) and Personal
Digital Assistants (PDAs).
Issuing weather and water related warnings (including tsunamis) are
the culmination of a complex process, beginning with observations,
analysis, and interpretation, and culminating with disseminating the
warning. NOAA's NWS maintains a complex infrastructure of people and
technology to create, and then issue those warnings. It is our mission.
It is what we do.
Issuing civil emergency warnings or earthquake warnings has a
different process. NWS serves as a dissemination service for these
warnings. We rely on communication processing, which is automated for
earthquake warnings, and is being automated for federal, state and
local civil emergency messages. For these civil emergency messages to
be disseminated, we need to ensure agreements are in place to allow
access to NOAA dissemination systems. In June 2004, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and NOAA signed a Memorandum of Agreement
allowing DHS to use the NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards network to
disseminate civil emergency messages.
Once warnings are in NOAA WARN, they are automatically transmitted
to the Emergency Alert System (EAS; for wide distribution in real and
near-real time), the NWS dissemination network, and through other
private and public dissemination systems. NOAA WARN systems include
NWR, NOAA Weather Wire, NOAAPort, Emergency Managers Weather
Information Network (EMWIN), and the Internet. Most local and all
national media outlets have links to NOAA's NWS dissemination network
to receive warning information.
Warning messages from NOAA's NWS activate the EAS and also reach
the private sector, which rebroadcast the emergency information via
television, radio, internet (e.g., e-mail warnings), pagers, and in
some cases PDAs and cell phones. Through this warning system, all
appropriate federal and local emergency officials have access to the
warning information and can receive warnings.
Newer technology (e.g., cell phones, reverse 911, PDA's, pagers)
can receive warning information, but most are set up to do so only when
requested by the user or as a subscription service. There is no
federal, state or local policy in place to mandate redistribution of
warning information. While there are some technical challenges to
alert, for example, every cell phone within a certain area, it is
possible. The difficulty with broadcast cell phone warnings is there
are no national standards. NOAA will continue to work with appropriate
public and private entities to ensure warning information is available
in industry standard formats for ease of interoperability.
NOAA and DHS have ongoing discussions with satellite communications
operators, such as XM Satellite Radio, who already have a channel
devoted to emergency messages. This method to deliver warnings shows
promise, with the only reservation at this point the limited number of
users.
Effective dissemination of public warning notification requires
using existing systems and infrastructure where possible and public
education and outreach to recommend what actions to take once the
warnings are issued. For example, USGS uses the NWS infrastructure to
disseminate earthquake messages and, as stated above, DHS also has
access to NWR to disseminate warnings. This is an efficient use of
government infrastructure. All federal agencies involved in warning the
public need to continue to work together to leverage available assets.
NOAA has been working with DHS, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), and other agencies within the Department of Commerce to help
coordinate the federal effort on a consolidated warning system to
ensure the public is able to receive emergency messages. This dialogue
will continue.
For example, NWS is working with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) on a system to streamline the ability of pre-approved and
authenticated officials at federal, state, and local levels to submit
messages for broadcast over NWS systems. The NWS received funds in the
FY 2004 Omnibus Appropriations Act to streamline and automate the
current manual creation, authentication, and collection of all types of
non-weather emergency messages in a quick and secure fashion for
subsequent alert, warning, and notification purposes. HazCollect, as
the new system is known, will function through FEMA's Disaster
Management Interoperability Service (DMIS). All weather and non-weather
emergency messages will be available on the DMIS backbone network for
national, state and local dissemination through myriad public and
private sector systems.
Essential to any effective warning system is education and
outreach. NOAA's NWS has two programs to help ensure local communities
can receive warning information they need--StormReady and TsunamiReady.
These programs focus on preparedness and education activities to make
sure local communities can take appropriate steps once the warning
information is received. One of the criteria for a community to be
certified as StormReady is to have in place alternate and redundant
ways to receive warnings. For example, an emergency operations center
may have Internet notification as well as NWR as their methods to
receive warnings. Receiving warnings through multiple systems reduces
the possibility of missing critical information.
NOAA is working with DHS and other federal, state and local
agencies to increase usage of NWR and expand the use of new and
emerging technology to deliver warnings. Timeliness is always a factor,
but existing NWS dissemination systems transmit warnings usually within
seconds. Redistribution through EAS is also quick. However, the Nation
needs a federal lead agency for a nationwide warning system, using a
common message standard. We believe DHS/FEMA is the appropriate agency
to lead such an effort, and must build on existing warning systems,
such as NOAA WARN, to create a warning ``system of systems.''
American territories, such as American Samoa, do not have an
extensive communications infrastructure. NOAA is working with these
communities and our international partners to ensure warning
information is communicated to government officials. Much communication
is done through the Emergency Managers Weather Information Network
(EMWIN) and Radio and Internet (RANET) systems.
Enclosed is a brief summary of existing NOAA/NWS and related
federal dissemination systems. We would be pleased to meet with you and
your staff to provide more detailed information about NOAA warning
dissemination methods and processes.
An Integrated Public Alert and Warning System is an important
element to help keep the people of this Nation safe. Public safety is a
fundamental responsibility of federal, state and local governments.
Public alert and warning systems save lives by informing, reducing
fear, and assisting emergency managers. NOAA will continue to work with
DHS, FCC and other government agencies to continue to integrate these
systems.
Enclosure
NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards
NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards (NWR) is a nationwide network of
transmitters broadcasting continuous weather information directly from
a National Weather Service office. NWR broadcasts National Weather
Service warnings, watches, forecasts, and other hazard information 24-
hours per day. Known as the ``voice of NOAA's National Weather
Service,'' NWR is provided as a public service by the Department of
Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). NWR
includes more than 925 transmitters, covering more than 97 percent of
the United States, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the U.S.
Pacific Territories. NWR requires a special radio receiver or scanner
capable of picking up the signal. Broadcasts are found in the public
service band on seven frequencies.
Currently, about 17 percent of the U.S. population owns a NOAA
Weather Radio, though the actual percentage of the population reached
may be greater due to the promulgation of receivers in public places
such as schools, hospitals, fire stations, and malls. NOAA Weather
Radio receivers can be purchased at many retail stores selling
electronic merchandise. Some televisions are now equipped with
AlertGuardTM, which is essentially an embedded NWR receiver
with alert capability. NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards receivers are
often sold in boat and marine accessory businesses, as they are popular
in the marine community. These are just some of the places NOAA Weather
Radio receivers can be purchased.
A survey on Weather Radio Interests and Awareness conducted in
August 2002 by eBrain Market Research (a service of the Consumer
Electronics Association) identified the following key points:
The most common type of the NOAA Weather Radio owned is a
hand-held model (50 percent). Additionally, 32 percent of
owners possess a desktop weather radio, 19 percent own a marine
weather radio that picks up NOAA Weather Radio, 11 percent have
a clock-radio equipped to receive NOAA alerts, and 10 percent
can pick up NOAA announcements on their CB.
Given the right product offerings and marketing campaigns to
promote awareness of weather radios, it is possible
manufacturers can sell 7.4 million weather radios over the next
year.
Emergency Alert System
The Emergency Alert System serves two functions:
It provides a last resort method for the President to
address the Nation in times of national attack or major crisis
(National Alert).
When not in use by the President, it can be used to issue
warning messages of imminent or ongoing hazards at the state
and local levels by radio, television, and cable systems in
selected regions. (NOAA Weather Alert, State and Local Alerts).
\1\
\1\ Plan for the Operation of the Emergency Alert System (EAS)
during a National Emergency (FEMA EAS OPLAN), dated September 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During a national alert, all radio and television stations and
cable television systems must either broadcast Presidential alerts
immediately or cease transmission during the message. Broadcasting of
state and local alerts is not mandatory, and stations/systems can
postpone broadcasting a given warning or alert still in force until
there is a programming pause. National alerts are issued through the
Primary Entry Point (PEP) system via dialup telephone lines (with High
Frequency (HF) radio backups) to 34 continental U.S. and territorial
radio stations. For national alert and warning, the 34 PEP stations
would then serve as relay points for the Presidential message to
automatically seize the broadcasts of all U.S. radio and TV and cable
stations monitoring the PEP stations. The direct PEP radio station
broadcasts cover approximately 95 percent of the continental U.S. and
Hawaii and the seized broadcast would cover well over 95 percent of the
American public.
State and local alerts generally originate in the State Emergency
Operations Center or other similar official location. Because there is
no standard in the country for EAS plans, some states have more robust
systems than others. For example, Florida and Pennsylvania use
satellite technology to get out emergency messages from the Governor
reaching the entire state. Most other states rely on the cascade system
used for typical EAS messages where stations monitor ``up stream''
stations for a signal until the entire state is covered. ``Amber
Alerts'' are also sent out over the system; these may originate from a
law enforcement agency within the state. The only thing states using
the system have in common is that they all must enter the system at
some point from an authorized official.
All non-PEP broadcast stations and cable systems are required to
follow their state EAS plans. \2\ Integral to all state plans is they
must specify monitoring assignments for all broadcast stations and
cable systems in the state. All broadcast stations and cable systems
are required to monitor at least two EAS sources according to their
state EAS plan. At least one PEP station should be monitored by a
state's EAS network so national level EAS messages can be distributed
in the state. In an effort to bring order to the system, all broadcast
stations and cable systems have EAS designations. PEP stations have an
EAS designation of National Primary (NP), since they are the source of
national level messages. State level sources have designations of State
Primary (SP) and State Relay (SR) and local sources are designated
Local Primary (LP).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ There is no requirement from the FCC for states to have an EAS
plan, but regulations require states choosing to develop an EAS plan to
have it reviewed by the FCC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is also one national network, National Public Radio (NPR),
which has voluntarily agreed to distribute national level messages to
its affiliates via satellite. The NPR directly monitors a PEP/NP
station and will relay a national level EAS message as soon as it is
received.
The National Weather Service (NWS) originates about 90 percent of
all EAS alerts. Many participating EAS entities voluntarily monitor the
National Weather Service's NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) transmitting
alerts. NWR supplies local EAS encoded alerts to broadcast and cable
entry points as described in each approved state and local EAS plan. In
many localities, emergency managers can originate EAS alerts through
NWS, through a broadcaster or cable operator, or through their own
equipment if they have made prior arrangements documented in EAS plans.
Proper operation of the EAS depends on those state and local plans
specifying how stations are linked together in monitoring webs; how
State Primary (SP), State Relay (SR) and Local Primary (LP) EAS sources
get EAS warnings; how EAS testing is accomplished; and which EAS
messages may be relayed.
National Warning System
FEMA maintains and operates the National Warning System (NAWAS),
which was developed and installed during the 1950s, as the primary
national emergency communication system among federal, state, and local
emergency operations centers. NAWAS is a dedicated, 24-hour,
specialized party telephone line with 1,850 terminals at state and
local emergency operations centers, 911 centers, and police and fire
stations to all be activated at the same time. The system is used to
relay national and local information within states. It also has direct
links to the command center at the North American Aerospace Defense
Command. Every NWS forecast office has connectivity to NAWAS.
NOAA Weather Wire System
The NOAA Weather Wire Service (NWWS) also plays a role in getting
weather warnings to the public. NWWS is a satellite data collection and
dissemination system. NWWS broadcasts can be received anywhere in the
United States and Puerto Rico. NWWS disseminates warnings in less than
10 seconds. The warnings have embedded digital information identifying
specific threats and specific geographic areas at risk. Satellite
receivers are commercially available. At least one emergency management
or law enforcement agency in each state has NWWS. These agencies
rebroadcast the information to other state and local emergency managers
and also provide local hazard information to the NWS for broadcast,
when appropriate.
Negotiations are underway to add the National Law Enforcement
Telecommunications System to NWWS. This would permit several thousand
law enforcement agencies around the country to exchange all-hazard
warnings.
Emergency Managers Weather Information Network
The Emergency Managers Weather Information Network (EMWIN)
transmits real time weather and emergency information. The EMWIN signal
is available anywhere within the NOAA's Geostationary Operational
Environmental Satellites (GOES) footprint, which covers most of the
western hemisphere as well as the central and eastern Pacific Ocean.
The National Weather Service gathers real time weather and emergency
information from sources across the globe and broadcasts the
information via EMWIN. Emergency management groups and municipal
agencies receive EMWIN data from the satellite and retransmit it on
local radio frequencies. State and local agencies select the
information to fit their specific area. The EMWIN datastream is
rebroadcast by the University of Hawaii over the PEACESAT satellite
covering much of the Pacific Ocean including remote Pacific islands. In
some small island countries, it is the most reliable way to get
forecasts and warnings and information. Commercial software is
available to allow local computers to be configured to trigger alarms
for specific hazards.
RANET
Advancement of communication and dissemination capacities in
developing countries for purposes of tsunami and other hazards warning
is being addressed in part through the NOAA and USAID Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance supported Radio and Internet (RANET) program. RANET
works to develop dissemination capacities for distribution of critical
weather and climate information to rural and remote populations in
developing countries. This program is active throughout Africa and the
Pacific, and activities are expected to begin in late spring and early
summer in Asia. The RANET program utilizes WorldSpace digital satellite
broadcast capacity, provided through the not-for-profit First Voice
International, to deliver a variety of graphic and text based
information to national weather services and remote field offices
anywhere in Africa, Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the
Pacific. The broadcast on the AsiaStar and AfriStar WorldSpace
satellites is a comprehensive suite of weather forecasts, observations,
bulletins, and related information. RANET ties this broadcast capacity
to traditional FM and HF radio broadcasts, as well as other networks.
In response to the December 26, 2004, tsunami disaster, RANET is
working with the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center to develop a `global'
cell phone based SMS/text messaging service. Technical development of
the system was completed on February 14, 2005, and it is now undergoing
a series of tests before being formally announced. The service will
provide notification to foreign government officials and those
appointed by a country point-of-contact when bulletins from the Pacific
Tsunami Warning Center and other centers are released. Similarly, RANET
is developing a web-based alert notification system. While receiving
activity support and coordination, RANET is not currently provided
operational resources.
Dissemination of Tsunami Warning Information to the Public
The NOAA National Weather Service (NWS) Richard H. Hagemeyer
Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) disseminates bulletins by a
variety of methods to (1) eliminate single points of failure, and (2)
to reach all of its clients. PTWC relies heavily on the established
communications infrastructure used by the weather side of the NWS.
Bulletins are sent via a dedicated circuit to the NWS
Telecommunications Gateway (NWSTG) in Silver Springs, Maryland, and
from there they are forwarded into the Advanced Weather Information
Processing System and delivered to NWS Forecast Offices. From NWS
Forecast Offices tsunami information is relayed into the NOAA Weather
Radio (NWR) and Emergency Alert System (EAS) when necessary. Bulletins
are also forwarded from the National Weather Service Telecommunications
Gateway (NWSTG) into the World Meteorological Organization's Global
Telecommunications System for delivery to weather offices worldwide.
Bulletins are also forwarded from the NWSTG into the Emergency Managers
Weather Information Network (EMWIN) for delivery over the GOES and
PEACESAT satellites to many places including remote Pacific islands.
PTWC bulletins are also sent to the NWSTG over the NOAA Weather Wire
System (NWWS), a satellite based system with a 2-way dish at PTWC. In
addition to providing a redundant path from PTWC to the NWSTG, the NWWS
provides NWS products including tsunami bulletins to a variety of
customers, including the media, via an NWS program called the Family of
Services (FOS). Television stations in Hawaii, for example, subscribe
to an Associated Press (AP) feed over which they receive PTWC
bulletins. The AP receives its weather information from multiple NWS
forecast and warning dissemination systems to help ensure high
reliability. PTWC sends tsunami information to the U.S. Armed Forces
via a legacy dial-out GateGuard terminal delivering the bulletins via
the AUTODIN system to approximately 200 commands. PTWC also informs the
Pacific Command of U.S. Forces and the Navy Command Center for the
Hawaii Region by telephone. PTWC also sends its bulletins to
approximately 30 airfields and other locations in the Pacific over the
Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunications Network. In addition, bulletins
are sent via e-mail to about 100 addresses and via fax to about 20
offices.
The procedure PTWC has always operated under is it only provides
tsunami warning guidance to national and local authorities. This is no
different than for other natural disasters, such as hurricanes, floods,
etc. NWS provides the information to decision-makers. Those authorities
are then responsible for making decisions about whether or not to issue
an evacuation order, and for disseminating such orders to the public.
In some cases, such as an urgent local tsunami warning in Hawaii, the
issuance of evacuation orders with sirens sounding and an activation of
the EAS and NWR (by the NWS Honolulu Forecast Office in response to a
PTWC bulletin) is pre-approved by State Civil Defense (SCD) in the
interest of time when minutes and seconds count. But in other cases
such as a distant tsunami approaching Hawaii, SCD may consult with its
own tsunami advisors and control the issuance and timing of any
evacuation. Local authority for evacuations is critical since PTWC
warnings to various parts of the Pacific, being based initially on only
the seismic data, have a high false alarm rate. It could be very
confusing to the public if PTWC issued evacuation guidance to a region,
but local authorities in that region had decided not to evacuate.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
Dr. John H. Marburger, III
Question. What actions are being taken by the U.S. in response to
the health threats that continue to exist in the affected countries?
Answer. My office, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, is
not coordinating the U.S. response to health threats in the affected
countries. However, I have asked the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to provide detailed
information on their response to health threats, which are described
below. In addition, I have asked NASA to summarize its less direct, but
nevertheless important, contributions through satellite imaging.
USAID
USAID/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has
provided over $30 million to non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
international organizations to provide assistance in health, water/
sanitation, and psychological and social activities. OFDA has provided
$8 million to NGOs and international organizations for health sector
programs (excluding psychological and social activities, and water/
sanitation). OFDA funded partners have provided mobile health clinics
and field hospitals, rehabilitated primary health care clinics and
hospitals, and provided medicines and emergency health care supplies.
In addition, OFDA-funded international organizations are tracking
patterns of life-threatening diseases, and assisting in the control of
communicable diseases through surveillance and early warning systems,
immunization, distribution of hygiene kits, and health/hygiene
education.
USAID/OFDA has provided $17 million to organizations for water and
sanitation activities to ensure sanitary conditions and access to
potable drinking water for affected populations. Partner activities
include construction of latrines, provision of containers for
transportation of water and water storage bladders, disinfection of
water sources, water purification and treatment, hygiene education, and
distribution of hygiene kits.
In addition to the traditional emergency health activities, OFDA is
supporting organizations that are carrying out interventions to
mitigate the psychological trauma of the tsunami. OFDA is providing
funding in India, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia for programs that provide
psychological and social support for survivors of the tsunami. Total
support for these activities totals approximately $5.2 million. We have
given particular attention to the needs of children and are supporting
several organizations that are facilitating structured activities for
children and adolescents, often through child-centered spaces. These
activities are being implemented in internally displaced persons (IDP)
program settlements and tsunami-affected communities alike.
OFDA is currently funding the following organizations to implement
Health, Psychological and Social, and Water/Sanitation programs
benefiting tsunami-affected populations:
Action Contre la Faim
American Center for International Labor
The Asia Foundation
CARE
Catholic Relief Services
Christian Children's Fund
Church World Services
Cooperative Housing Foundation International
GOAL
International Medical Corps
International Organization for Migration
International Rescue Committee
International Relief and Development
Johns Hopkins Program for International Education in Gynecology
and Obstetrics
Project Concern International
Sarvodaya
Save the Children/US
Save the Children/UK
Shelter for Life
Sri Lanka Red Cross
United Nations Children's Fund
World Health Organization
USAID is also considering proposals from NGOs and others and
working to respond to the needs assessments being developed for the
region. For additional details, see the INDIAN OCEAN--Earthquake and
Tsunamis Fact Sheet, available on the USAID website (http://
www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/tsunami).
DoD
The Defense Department has dispatched the medical ship USNS Mercy
off the coast of Banda Aceh Indonesia. This medical ship is staffed by
a unique combination of military personnel and American volunteers from
the medical community coordinated by the NGO Project HOPE. In
coordination with the Government of Indonesia, the military staff and
volunteers are providing state of the art medical services to those
patients that cannot be treated by the hospitals on shore. They are
also providing consultation services, limited training, and
bioengineering repair services in hospitals on shore.
HHS
HHS has deployed 54 employees to the region, including four people
assigned to the U.S. Disaster Assistance Response Teams, as well as
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) epidemiologists and
field staff in Indonesia, Thailand, and Sri Lanka. They are assisting
with activities related to vaccine-preventable diseases, childhood
injuries and trauma, malaria control, health and nutrition, mental
health, rapid needs assessment, and response coordination. Among the
diseases that are being monitored are cholera, dysentery, malaria and
typhoid fever. In addition, HHS staff are assisting the Department of
Defense aboard the USNS Mercy.
Since late December, CDC staff in Thailand and India, where HHS has
ongoing programs, have been assisting local health and other officials,
under the direction of the respective U.S. embassies. Their activities
include assessing health needs, monitoring for diseases, and
documenting the dead and missing. HHS scientists are assisting teams
led by Department of Defense, the State Department and international
organizations. HHS officials in the United States are in daily contact
with American, international and local officials involved in the
tsunami response.
HHS is working with other agencies of the U.S. government planning
for the recovery and reconstruction phase of the tsunami response.
NASA
NASA satellite observations and predictions of Earth processes are
being used to support human health aid programs in the tsunami affected
regions and elsewhere in the world. Health factors that are measurable
from NASA research instruments include, air and water contaminants,
ambient temperature extremes, ultra-violet radiation and a myriad of
other factors that contribute to our knowledge of public health
challenges. NASA collaborates to expand the use of Earth observing
instruments, advanced communication technology, high speed computing
capabilities, data products, and predictive models associated with the
occurrence of disease to assist partners in enhancing their
surveillance systems.
For example, NASA's Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center
(SEDAC) is working with the Geographic Information Support Team (GIST),
which includes representatives from the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA), the World Bank, the World Food Programme (WFP), the UK
Department for International Development (DFID), the World Health
Organization (WHO), and others. This group is providing access to key
geospatial data needed by working teams in the field.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Dr. John H. Marburger, III
Question. Dr. Marburger, confronted with a fresh reminder of the
potential devastation of an off-shore, tsunami-causing earthquake, I
share Senator Stevens' concern about ensuring sufficient warning
systems are in place so that loss of human life can be minimized. Thank
you for the outline you provided in your written testimony of the
generic components for a successful disaster detection, warning, and
reduction system. Senator Stevens requested an estimation of what it
would take to establish a comprehensive tsunami notification system,
such as the one you outlined in your testimony. I am very interested in
your response and ask that you please forward me a copy of your answer
to Senator Stevens' question.
Answer. I share your concern that the citizens of the U.S. have
sufficient warning of any tsunami event on our shores. In fact, tsunami
warnings are a part of a larger effort to provide warnings for all
natural and human-caused disasters within the U.S.
The responses to Senator Stevens' question come mostly from the
agencies charged with the development of a comprehensive tsunami
notification system. The U.S. already has significant warning
capabilities for a variety of severe weather events and other
emergencies. For example, I have attached an extended excerpt from a
letter submitted by NOAA Administrator Lautenbacher in response to
questions by Senators Stevens and Inouye in which the current warning
capabilities of the U.S. are summarized nicely. We believe that the
efforts of the Department of Commerce (NOAA), the U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS), the National Science Foundation (NSF), and the
Department of Homeland Security (FEMA) are effective and should
continue their development. The next steps in this process are outlined
in the fact sheet that the Office of Science and Technology Policy
released (copy attached) describing the Administration's immediate
steps to strengthen the U.S. tsunami detection and warning capabilities
in the Pacific Ocean, Atlantic Ocean, and Caribbean Sea. Furthermore we
have assembled an interagency working group under the National Science
and Technology Council to provide the detailed planning and
identification of responsibilities to implement these improvements.
This group will issue a detailed plan by mid-summer.
In addition, the evolving emergency notification situations
following the events of September 11, 2001 have motivated us to create
an interagency effort to coordinate the activities with the Federal
Government that deal with emergency warnings. This new group is now
being formed under the National Science and Technology Council and will
be called the Task Force on Effective Warnings. This Task Force will be
charged with examining both natural disaster warnings and homeland
security warnings, and to will examine and make recommendations about
disaster warning/communication systems, networks or facilities to
provide effective disaster warning systems for the Nation. We believe
that the integration of warning systems for natural hazards should be
combined with warning associated with homeland security into a single
``all hazards'' warning system for the people of the U.S.
Excerpt from letter to Senators Stevens and Inouye from Vice Admiral
Conrad C. Lautenbacher on February 22, 2005:
NOAA's National Weather Service (NWS) is acknowledged as the
premier agency in government for disseminating warning information. We
are efficient at disseminating weather and natural hazard information
through our vast communication network. We currently provide public
notification of weather warnings as well as other natural hazards and
disasters, such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and civil emergency messages,
e.g., hazardous materials spills. These warnings can be received and
transmitted by a myriad of other users providing access to virtually
all of the people across the Nation. We can provide access, but we
cannot ensure the message is received.
While our system is effective, we can still make improvements. We
can make our systems more reliable and improve public education. We can
work with the private sector to utilize new technology to make warnings
available, and develop other methods to increase accessibility of
warnings.
NOAA Weather, Alert, and Readiness Network (NOAA WARN), includes
all NOAA's National Weather Service warning dissemination systems (see
attachment). This includes the NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards (NWR)
program, which consists of over 900 radio transmitters covering nearly
97 percent of the nation's population. The President's FY06 Budget
request includes funds to modernize 64 of 400 remaining vintage 1970's
NWR transmitters. These improvements will make them more robust by
including backup power supply, and make them easier to maintain. Backup
power is critical during major weather events, such as hurricanes, when
commercial power is out.
Our assessment and decision-making equipment, the Advanced Weather
Interactive Processing System (AWIPS), is the initial generation point
for all NWS disseminated warnings. We are working to ensure AWIPS has
appropriate software capabilities, capable of disseminating new
information technology standard formats, to effectively support the new
technologies such as Geophysical Information Systems (GIS) and Personal
Digital Assistants (PDAs).
Issuing weather and water related warnings (including tsunamis) are
the culmination of a complex process, beginning with observations,
analysis, and interpretation, and culminating with disseminating the
warning. NOAA's NWS maintains a complex infrastructure of people and
technology to create, and then issue those warnings. It is our mission.
It is what we do.
Issuing civil emergency warnings or earthquake warnings has a
different process. NWS serves as a dissemination service for these
warnings. We rely on communication processing, which is automated for
earthquake warnings, and is being automated for federal, state and
local civil emergency messages. For these civil emergency messages to
be disseminated, we need to ensure agreements are in place to allow
access to NOAA dissemination systems. In June 2004, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and NOAA signed a Memorandum of Agreement
allowing DHS to use the NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards network to
disseminate civil emergency messages.
Once warnings are in NOAA WARN, they are automatically transmitted
to the Emergency Alert System (EAS; for wide distribution in real and
near-real time), the NWS dissemination network, and through other
private and public dissemination systems. NOAA WARN systems include
NWR, NOAA Weather Wire, NOAAPort, Emergency Managers Weather
Information Network (EMWIN), and the Internet. Most local and all
national media outlets have links to NOAA's NWS dissemination network
to receive warning information.
Warning messages from NOAA's NWS activate the EAS and also reach
the private sector, which rebroadcast the emergency information via
television, radio, internet (e.g., email warnings), pagers, and in some
cases PDAs and cell phones. Through this warning system, all
appropriate federal and local emergency officials have access to the
warning information and can receive warnings.
Newer technology (e.g., cell phones, reverse 911, PDA's, pagers)
can receive warning information, but most are set up to do so only when
requested by the user or as a subscription service. There is no
federal, state or local policy in place to mandate redistribution of
warning information. While there are some technical challenges to
alert, for example, every cell phone within a certain area, it is
possible. The difficulty with broadcast cell phone warnings is there
are no national standards. NOAA will continue to work with appropriate
public and private entities to ensure warning information is available
in industry standard formats for ease of interoperability.
NOAA and DHS have ongoing discussions with satellite communications
operators, such as XM Satellite Radio, who already have a channel
devoted to emergency messages. This method to deliver warnings shows
promise, with the only reservation at this point the limited number of
users.
Effective dissemination of public warning notification requires
using existing systems and infrastructure where possible and public
education and outreach to recommend what actions to take once the
warnings are issued. For example, USGS uses the NWS infrastructure to
disseminate earthquake messages and, as stated above, DHS also has
access to NWR to disseminate warnings. This is an efficient use of
government infrastructure. All federal agencies involved in warning the
public need to continue to work together to leverage available assets.
NOAA has been working with DHS, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC), and other agencies within the Department of Commerce to help
coordinate the federal effort on a consolidated warning system to
ensure the public is able to receive emergency messages. This dialogue
will continue.
For example, NWS is working with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) on a system to streamline the ability of pre-approved and
authenticated officials at federal, state, and local levels to submit
messages for broadcast over NWS systems. The NWS received funds in the
FY 2004 Omnibus Appropriations Act to streamline and automate the
current manual creation, authentication, and collection of all types of
non-weather emergency messages in a quick and secure fashion for
subsequent alert, warning, and notification purposes. HazCollect, as
the new system is known, will function through FEMA's Disaster
Management Interoperability Service (DMIS). All weather and non-weather
emergency messages will be available on the DMIS backbone network for
national, state and local dissemination through myriad public and
private sector systems.
Essential to any effective warning system is education and
outreach. NOAA's NWS has two programs to help ensure local communities
can receive warning information they need--StormReady and TsunamiReady.
These programs focus on preparedness and education activities to make
sure local communities can take appropriate steps once the warning
information is received. One of the criteria for a community to be
certified as Storm Ready is to have in place alternate and redundant
ways to receive warnings. For example, an emergency operations center
may have Internet notification as well as NWR as their methods to
receive warnings. Receiving warnings through multiple systems reduces
the possibility of missing critical information.
NOAA is working with DHS and other federal, state and local
agencies to increase usage of NWR and expand the use of new and
emerging technology to deliver warnings. Timeliness is always a factor,
but existing NWS dissemination systems transmit warnings usually within
seconds. Redistribution through EAS is also quick. However, the Nation
needs a federal lead agency for a nationwide warning system, using a
common message standard. We believe DHS/FEMA is the appropriate agency
to lead such an effort, and must build on existing warning systems,
such as NOAA WARN, to create a warning ``system of systems.''
American territories, such as American Samoa, do not have an
extensive communications infrastructure. NOAA is working with these
communities and our international partners to ensure warning
information is communicated to government officials. Much communication
is done through the Emergency Managers Weather Information Network
(EMWIN) and Radio and Internet (RANET) systems.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
Dr. John H. Marburger, III
The questions voiced by Senator Pryor reflect concern and interest
in the success and effectiveness of existing warning mechanisms and the
likelihood that these systems will get better in the future. I share
those concerns and have assembled an interagency working group under
the National Science and Technology Council to gather together the
agencies working on tsunami warning systems to provide the detailed
planning and identification of responsibilities to implement these
improvements. This group will issue a detailed plan by mid-summer and
we will follow up with the agencies to ensure effective implementation.
The specific questions submitted by Senator Pryor are identical to
the questions submitted to NOAA. Since NOAA is the agency responsible
for managing the TsunamiReady Program and is primarily responsible for
instituting any needed changes in the U.S. tsunami warning system, I
will defer to NOAA's detailed responses to these questions, listed
here.
Voice Sirens for Effective, Reliable Tsunami Warning
Question 1. Effective tsunami warning should rely on a variety of
redundant modes of communication. While there are several technologies
for communicating tsunami warnings highlighted in the Tsunami
Preparedness Act of 2005 (S. 50), it is a concern that voice capable
sirens are not among the technologies mentioned. Emergency managers
have long depended on sirens to warn the public of emergency and civil
defense situations including tsunamis, tornados, floods, hurricanes,
hazardous material accidents, and of a potential nuclear attack.
Sirens have a number of significant advantages: they insure that
all residents and visitors to a particular area can be informed without
regard to the cell phone or pager technology platform or provider they
may have, when equipped with backup power supplies they will work even
when the electricity or phone lines are out; when equipped with live
public address or pre-recorded messages they can be used BEFORE and
AFTER the incident to communicate important public safety information.
Without the use of/installation of voice sirens as part of a
preparedness plan, how do you warn people on the ground? Are there
other effective warning systems available for this purpose? What
criteria are used to determine which warning system is reliable in case
of tsunami?
Answer. NOAA works with the emergency management community to
ensure warnings are received by the public in as many ways as
possible--including cell phones, pagers, Internet, NOAA Weather Radio
All-Hazards, television, radio, and sirens. All of these methods are
effective, and emergency managers must decide how to best warn the
public. NOAA's dissemination systems are available for the emergency
management community to use in broadcasting emergency messages. NOAA
will continue working with federal, state and local emergency managers
to ensure warnings are as widely distributed as possible. Some National
Weather Service Offices also issue tsunami warnings via High Frequency
(HF) and Very High Frequency (VHF) marine radio as well, as do other
federal agencies. There are no unique criteria for determining which
warning systems are reliable for tsunamis.
Question 1a. Should a preparedness plan include a warning mechanism
for small fishing boats trawling near the coastline? National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather radios can be used to
inform these fishing boats at minimal cost (approximately $20).
Answer. A comprehensive preparedness plan must address how to get
messages to people, whenever they need it, wherever they are. NOAA
Weather Radio All-Hazards is an effective way to reach fishing boats
near the coast. There are other alternatives available as well,
including satellite based communications links (Internet and cell
phone). We employ all possible methods of delivering warnings to those
at risk.
Improving Tsunami Prediction and Preparedness
Question 2. NOAA's National Weather Service has been able to mark
its progress in severe weather prediction and forecasting with a number
of useful metrics. For example, they have substantially increased
warning times for hurricanes and tornadoes, while at the same time
increasing accuracy of forecasts. Unlike these events, tsunamis are
caused by largely unpredictable tectonic events that can strike without
warning, which makes improving prediction a bit harder. However, it is
important that we use the same approach to improving out tsunami
prediction and warnings. One way we have started to characterize our
success is a 75 percent reduction in false alarms since 1996. This is
indeed an accomplishment. But we also want to make sure that when a
deadly tsunami is headed for our coasts, we have the best information
possible for our communities on time, place and severity.
What kind of progress have we made in accuracy of forecasting and
prediction since 1996? What is a good measure of such progress?
Answer. Tsunamis often result from unpredictable seismic events
that strike without warning. It is a challenge to improving the
prediction of tsunami-genesis. With each tornado or hurricane, the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) collects a
tremendous amount of data. We are able to learn new things about these
natural disasters with every event; this information aids us in our
efforts to improve prediction. Fortunately, tsunamis are relatively
infrequent. That means we record fewer events and have much we can
learn when it comes to tsunami generation and propagation.
Understanding how these natural disasters develop is key to determining
how we can predict these destructive events.
The Administration's plan calls for NOAA to have a network of 39
advanced-technology Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis
(DART) buoys for a fully operational enhanced tsunami warning system by
mid-2007. With a complete network of DART stations, we will have the
opportunity to detect more tsunami events, and we have the opportunity
to learn from each one. In November 2003, a large earthquake occurred
in the Aleutian Islands and generated a tsunami. The DART stations
recorded this event, confirming only a small tsunami. During post
analysis of the event, DART data were used for a model simulation and
the output from the simulation accurately predicted the 2 cm tsunami
recorded at Hilo, Hawaii. With each tsunami-event recorded by the DART
stations, we have the opportunity to fine-tune our models used to
predict tsunami impacts. The DART data combined with forecast models
promise to significantly reduce false alarm rates as well as provide a
better measure of the severity of destructive tsunamis for Hawaii and
all other parts of the Pacific. The accurate forecasting of a non-
destructive tsunami in November 2003 saved Hawaii an estimated $68M in
projected evacuation costs. With the additional DART stations, we
expect to substantially reduce false alarm rate for distant tsunamis
from 75 percent to less than 25 percent over the next 4 years. Little
change is expected in reducing false alarms for local tsunamis (those
generated from near-shore causes). A reduction in the rate of false
alarms, and the associated cost-savings for our states and territories,
is an appropriate measure of our progress in tsunami detection.
Question 2a. What other metrics will be important to pay attention
to? For example, only 30 percent of our communities at risk have
inundation maps--shouldn't this percentage improve? How much will this
metric improve with the funds proposed under the President's plan?
Answer. NOAA agrees that the percentage of at-risk communities with
complete inundation maps is an important metric, and we are working to
increase the number of areas covered by inundation maps. Another
important metric is the number of at-risk communities that are
``TsunamiReady.'' NOAA's TsunamiReady program promotes tsunami hazard
preparedness as an active collaboration among federal, state and local
emergency management agencies, the public, and NOAA's National Weather
Service tsunami warning system. The Administration's plan provides
funding to allow NOAA to increase the number of mapped and TsunamiReady
communities. Of the $24M scheduled for NOAA use, approximately $4.75M
will be spent on inundation mapping and modeling, as well as education
and outreach (e.g., community preparedness activities, including
TsunamiReady). Of this $4.75M, approximately $2.25M will be spent on
inundation mapping and modeling and $2.5M will go towards public
education activities. Following the current plan, inundation mapping
for the major population centers will be complete in 2015.
Question 2b. Since we have experienced a 50 percent decline in buoy
service in the past 2 years, wouldn't this be another metric to focus
on? What will be your goal?
Answer. It is not accurate to say that we have experienced a 50
percent decline in buoy service in the past 2 years. We believe you are
referring to technical malfunctions of 3 of the 6 DART buoys in the
weeks preceding the hearing. While it is true that at the time of the
hearing, 2 of the 6 DART stations were offline, this does not indicate
a 50 percent decline in performance over the last 2 years. The
reliability of the DART stations, since October 2003, the time when
they were transitioned from being operated by NOAA Research to NOAA's
National Weather Service, has been 72 percent. This percentage
represents the combined number of hours the stations have been
operational, and is an appropriate metric to use in evaluating the
reliability of the DART system. Further, this percentage indicates that
the DART station array is a highly effective system overall.
Our goal is to have a fully capable network of 29 DART stations in
the Pacific, with 3 additional in-water backups in the Gulf of Alaska,
where sea conditions are particularly harsh. While it is not possible
to guarantee that these prototype stations will be operational 100
percent of the time given the demanding environmental conditions in
which these stations operate, NOAA is focused making the DART I network
more robust and deploying a DART II network with reliability built into
the design. NOAA plans for the network to meet operational
requirements, even with occasional DART station outages. NOAA will
develop capabilities to address network coverage and redundancy to
ensure, as best we can, that single DART station failures will not
impact the integrity of the entire network. Planned redundancy and
hardening of the infrastructure, combined with the addition of a two-
way communication capability, will mitigate risk from system-wide
failures.
Funding for Tsunami Mitigation and Response
Question 3. The Administration recently released its plan to expand
and modernize its tsunami detection and warning system. This plan
includes the expansion of the system into areas such as the Atlantic
Ocean, Caribbean, and Gulf of Mexico. I applaud the Administration's
timely response, however, I am concerned that while the plan addresses
the issue of tsunami detection, it does not completely address the
issue of response to tsunami, as well as community preparation.
Which agency will be taking the lead for mitigation, mapping, and
response?
Answer. NOAA, FEMA and USGS, through the National Tsunami Hazard
Mitigation Program, coordinate inundation mapping efforts with state
and local emergency management officials. FEMA is the lead agency for
mitigation and response, with NOAA assisting any way possible. NOAA's
role is to assist in identifying the tsunami hazard (required
inundation mapping), providing tsunami warning guidance (including
site-specific tsunami forecast models) and providing tsunami mitigation
program support though community-based preparedness programs and
education outreach--including the TsunamiReady Program.
Question 3a. Does the funding proposed by the Administration
include funding for tsunami response? How much?
Answer. FEMA is the lead federal agency in the response area and is
best suited to answer this question.
Question 3b. Will these amounts be adequate given the plans for
expanded areas of coverage for the tsunami program?
Answer. NOAA funding for mitigation includes $2.5 million for
education and outreach and $2.25M for inundation mapping. This is a
significant increase from prior year funding levels managed through the
National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program. FEMA is the primary federal
agency in the response area and is best suited to answer that portion
of this question.
______
Response to Letter Dated February 7, 2005 from Chairman Stevens and
Co-Chairman Inouye to Dr. Arden L. Bement, Jr.
In response to a letter, dated February 7, 2005 from Chairman Ted
Stevens and Co-Chairman Daniel K. Inouye, asking to:
Please explain what information or resources your agency requires
before it can issue a public warning notification of a natural hazard
or disaster. In addition, we would like to know which entities or
organizations receive warnings from, or through, your agency, such as
the appropriate federal and local disaster response entities, first
responders/911, and local and national media outlets. To the extent
possible, your report should also demonstrate which communications
technologies are currently used to deliver these public warnings, such
as automatic alert televisions and radios, telephones, wireless and
satellite technology, including cellular telephones, pagers, personal
digital assistants (PDAs), and the internet. If such communications
technologies are not being used, we would like to know what the
impediments are, and the status of any discussions to expand the
warning system's capability to do so.
Your report should also specify a process by which your agency,
either on its own, or in conjunction with other relevant agencies, can
maximize effective dissemination of public warning notifications.
Lastly, we would be interested to know how your agency interacts with
the Department of Homeland Security (including the Federal Emergency
Management Agency), the Federal Communications Commission, the
Department of Commerce, or other relevant agencies with respect to
warning systems.
Potential Enhancements to the Global Seismographic Network (GSN)
Background
Over the past 20 years, the National Science Foundation (NSF),
through funding to the Incorporated Research Institutions for
Seismology (IRIS) Consortium, has established the 137-station Global
Seismographic Network (GSN). This network serves as the primary
international source of data for earthquake location and tsunami
warning. Although the establishment of the GSN is an NSF-supported
function and the acquisition of GSN equipment is solely supported
through the NSF, the GSN-station operation is shared with the U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS), which supports the maintenance of
approximately 2/3 of the network. The GSN infrastructure includes not
only the in situ observing stations, but also global telemetry, and
data collection and distribution through the IRIS Data Management
System. The Data Management System, in addition to being the primary
world repository for seismic data, analysis tools, and visualization
software, provides an essential quality-control function for the GSN
hardware and communication links that are so vital to real-time hazard
warning functions related to earthquakes.
Real-time GSN data formed the critical core of the early warning of
the December 26, 2004 Sumatran Earthquake. Within 8 minutes of the
initial rupture of the M=9.0 earthquake, GSN data flashed
electronically via satellite and the Internet to the GSN Data
Collection Center and then to the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC/
NOAA) and the National Earthquake Information Center (NEIC/USGS). GSN
seismometers recorded with full-fidelity the ultra-long period energy
radiated by the earthquake's 1000 km long rupture. The unique long-
period response of the GSN is the key factor in providing an accurate
measure of the size, character, and tsunami-potential of such mega-
events.
Potential Enhancements
Although the GSN system is working very well, there is much that
can be improved. Some of the enhancements that might be possible with
the appropriate resources, over the next five years are:
(1) Telemetry and Information Technology--Expansion and Reliability
The rapid collection of GSN data and distribution of earthquake
information is at the heart of an earthquake/tsunami warning system.
Over 80 percent of the GSN now has real-time telemetry links. However,
the means of telemetry are very heterogeneous. These include local
Internet and telemetry links supported by local host organizations;
Internet infrastructure supported by IRIS and USGS; satellite telemetry
links supported by IRIS, USGS, National Weather Service, and NSF; and
global satellite infrastructure shared by the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). To complete GSN telemetry to 100
percent coverage and to enhance low-bandwidth links, 40 telemetry links
need to be established and maintained.
(2) Expanding Coverage--International and National Cooperation
Under NSF supervision, the GSN and the IRIS Data Management System
are prepared to work with the international community (in particular
Australia, Japan, France, India, and China) and U.S. agencies, such as
NOAA and USGS, to enhance the GSN capabilities. This includes the
installation of much-needed stations on the ocean floor to augment and
complement the land-based GSN. As new seismic stations are proposed and
installed in the Indian Ocean region and elsewhere, arrangements need
to be made to ensure that these stations will contribute to the GSN
system. IRIS successfully worked with international organizations and
governments to establish similar networks in Kyrghizstan and Africa.
The GSN's success is predicated on its close relationship with the many
local organizations that host the seismic stations. The international
Federation of Digital Seismograph Networks (FDSN) and the Global Earth
Observing System of Systems (GEOSS) provide appropriate pathways for
international collaboration. Needs include data and information
exchange, shared telemetry, joint stations, coordination of
infrastructure and the development of local capacity for seismological
observations and research. Portable seismic systems provided through
IRIS offer a basis for collaborative research projects between U.S.
Earth scientists and specialists in South Asia on the structure,
dynamics, and seismic hazard of the region.
(3) Long-term Viability of the GSN--Operation and Maintenance
The Sumatran earthquake once again points to the importance of
diligence in maintaining a highly reliable and fully operational system
at all times. Relationships must be nurtured to improve local help for
GSN maintenance and interagency support by the NSF and the USGS must be
provided on an ongoing basis.
With the resources at its disposal, the GSN currently operates at
about 90 percent data availability. About 10 percent of the network
( 14 stations) is down at any given time, awaiting repair. Increasing
station uptime requires more field engineer FTE's and travel support.
The GSN equipment is currently spared and refreshed at a yearly rate
equal to 5 percent of the total installed equipment base. Increasing
station uptime will deplete spares more rapidly, requiring an increased
rate of equipment sparing.
(4) Sensor Development--Next Generation Ultra-long Period Seismometers
The Streckeisen STS-1, the premier seismometer used by the GSN for
recording ultra-long period Earth motions, is no longer manufactured or
available. The information provided by this unique sensor is the single
key component in determining the size, and tsunami potential, of great
earthquakes. As these sensors age and fail, the prospect of a decline
in network quality looms very real. That there is no comparable
replacement for the STS-1 is an internationally recognized problem.
Given the small market (<1000) for such exquisite seismic sensors,
there is no financial motivation for the private sector to undertake
such a development. This a potential area for collaboration among
groups at NSF involved in sensor design. The United States has an
opportunity to take the lead in developing the next generation ultra-
long period sensor, which serves both tsunami warning and scientific
purposes.
The NSF Division of Earth Sciences has an ongoing Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with the USGS regarding joint operation and
maintenance of the Global Seismographic Network, joint support of the
Southern California Earthquake Center (SCEC), and participation of the
USGS in the EarthScope project. The NSF also participates in the
National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) with the USGS,
FEMA, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
NEHRP fosters cooperative activities with respect to the nation's
vulnerability to earthquake hazards, and fosters knowledge transfer
efforts related to earthquake hazards. It should be noted that in
addition to earthquake/tsunami research, the NSF also maintains a broad
research portfolio relevant to potential hazards from volcanic
eruptions, landslides, and hydrological hazards such as floods,
droughts, and ground-water contamination. We look forward to continuing
these interagency activities. It is certainly in the public interest
that efforts in ameliorating the effects of natural hazards are
improved by our activities in fundamental research.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Dr. Arden L. Bement, Jr.
Question 1. Please describe how you expect the Ocean Observatories
Initiative to cooperate with other seismic research projects within the
Foundation and other agencies.
Answer. The National Science Foundation (NSF) supports basic subsea
research to understand fundamental earth processes, including those
that generate earthquakes with tsunami potential. The Ocean Observatory
Initiative (OOI) will add to understanding and monitoring of large
submarine fault zones. Sites constructed through the OOI will
contribute to the seismometer arrays of the Ocean Seismic Network
(OSN), as well as provide other research tools such as undersea
pressure sensors. Both these efforts will enable the research and
technological advancements that will enhance the warning system for
earthquakes and tsunamis.
NSF is committed to cooperation and coordination between all
environmental observing networks, including those that are part of the
tsunami warning system. Program managers from each of the NSF observing
systems and geophysical facilities (e.g., EarthScope, OOI, Incorporated
Research Institutions for Seismology--IRIS, Network for Earthquake
Engineering Simulation Research (NEES), and UNAVCO) promote
interactions and synergies between the observing systems and work
together to respond to common needs for measurement tools, data
management and cyberinfrastructure, as well as to develop novel
approaches to interactions across disciplines. For example, studies by
the Integrated Ocean Drilling Program (IODP) drill ship Joides
Resolution include instrumented subsea boreholes linked to seafloor
observatory networks. These are similar to those proposed for the OOI
and provide excellent prototype information for the future OOI system.
Further coordination and cooperation between the OOI and other
seismic research projects within the Foundation and other agencies also
occurs through shared facility support as well as use of common data
management systems such as that funded by NSF through the IRIS
consortium. Program officers for the NSF, USGS, NASA, and NOAA work
together to coordinate scientific projects and share support for
geophysical facilities. This ensures the full capacity and cost
effective use of these facilities.
Question 2. Could you please detail how you anticipate OOI, and
particularly the NEPTUNE project, could contribute to the science that
will lead to a better understanding of tsunami?
Answer. The Regional Cabled Observatory (NEPTUNE) that is part of
NSF's Ocean Observatories Initiative will be constructed off the
Washington and Oregon coasts. This ocean observing network will be
equipped with an array of seismic and acoustic sensors that will
provide data that will complement the Deep-ocean Assessment and
Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) buoy array for effective warning of
tsunami generation and will also enable researchers to investigate
processes leading to creation of large tsunamis. Information collected
by NEPTUNE will flow instantly to shore where it will be relayed via
the Internet to the Tsunami Warning Center, researchers, educational
institutions, science centers and the public.
The oceanic region off the coasts of Washington and Oregon is an
ideal location to create an undersea laboratory to investigate the
processes leading to tsunami generation. This area is home to a variety
of active environments each of which will be instrumented with seismic
and pressure sensors. This will enable researchers to better understand
how differences in tectonic regimes can lead to variations in the
amplitude and direction of tsunamis. In addition, this region has areas
of gas hydrate generation that will be instrumented and their evolution
studied as part of the NEPTUNE array. Therefore, the effects of gas
hydrate release on submarine slides and their influence on tsunami
generation can be studied in detail. Another significant benefit will
be the ability to investigate all of the processes leading to tsunami
generation in one location at the scales at which these processes occur
so that the outcomes of these combined influences can be quantified.
Question 3. Senator Stevens requested an estimation of what it
would take to establish a comprehensive tsunami notification system. I
am very interested in your response and ask that you please forward a
copy of your answer to Senator Stevens' question.
Answer. We have attached a discussion of ``Potential Enhancements
to the Global Seismic Network'' (GSN). This paper describes NSF's role
in the GSN, a system that provides real-time information on location
and tsunami potential of great earthquakes, and also suggests some
improvements to the system that could be made over the next few years.
NSF has supported acquisition of equipment for the GSN, and shares
operation of the GSN with the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Immediate
notification of significant earthquake events is made to the National
Earthquake Information Center (NEIC), operated by the USGS.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
Dr. Arden L. Bement, Jr.
Question 1. Without the use of/installation of voice sirens as part
of a preparedness plan, how do you warn people on the ground? Are there
other effective warning systems available for this purpose? What
criteria are used to determine which warning system is reliable in case
of tsunami?
Question 1a. Should a preparedness plan include a warning mechanism
for small fishing boats trawling near the coastline? National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather radios can be used to
inform these fishing boats at minimal cost (approximately $20).
Answer. We have attached a discussion of ``Potential Enhancements
to the Global Seismic Network''(GSN). This paper describes NSF's role
in the GSN, a system that provides real-time information on location
and tsunami potential of great earthquakes. NSF has supported
acquisition of equipment for the GSN, and shares operation of the GSN
with the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Immediate notification of
significant earthquake events is made to the National Earthquake
Information Center (NEIC), operated by the USGS. Although NSF
participates in the interagency National Earthquake Hazard Reduction
Program (NEHRP), agencies other than NSF have primary responsibility
for issuing public disaster warnings and NSF defers to them to provide
detailed responses concerning warning mechanisms.
______
Response to Letter Dated February 7, 2005 from Chairman Stevens and
Co-Chairman Inouye to U.S. Geological Survey
In response to a letter, dated February 7, 2005 from Chairman Ted
Stevens and Co-Chairman Daniel K. Inouye:
Explain what information or resources your agency requires before it
can issue a public warning notification of a natural hazard or
disaster.
The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) has responsibility under the
Stafford Act to issue forecasts and warnings for earthquakes,
volcanoes, and landslides. For tsunamis, wildfire, flood and hurricane
hazards, USGS provides critical support to the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and other agencies tasked with
warning responsibility. In order to carry out these mandates, USGS
requires a monitoring infrastructure that includes local, national and
global networks; reliable and redundant telecommunications; modem
computing centers for data analysis and dissemination; and a skilled
staff of analysts, technicians, scientists, and network support people.
To ensure that publicly funded monitoring networks and education
programs are targeted to regions at highest risk, USGS performs
assessments of the distribution and extent of each natural hazard
listed above at various scales--from national to, in high-hazard urban
areas, local. To improve the accuracy and timeliness of warnings and to
minimize false alarms, we perform (and fund university and State
partners to perform) targeted research to understand the underlying
processes and their predictability. To maximize the extent to which
hazard information is received and acted upon by appropriate
individuals when disasters strike, we actively pursue and foster links
with local governments, emergency management agencies and the media.
The USGS targets these capabilities to areas with the highest hazard
and the greatest risk.
Volcanoes
Impending volcanic eruptions can be forecast and warnings issued in
time for communities to take preparatory actions. Eruption forecasts
and warnings depend on telemetered, real-time data streams from diverse
suites of monitoring instruments on volcanoes, including reliable data
streams transmitted by other agencies (e.g., GOES satellite data from
NOAA, seismic data from key university cooperators). Observatory-based
scientists are necessary to interpret monitoring data, as eruptions are
too complex for the fully automatic generation of alerts directly from
machine signals. Automatic warnings of large volcanic debris flows
(lahars) based on signals from acoustic-flow-monitor arrays may be the
exception. These capabilities are currently deployed at the highest-
priority volcanoes. The USGS has closely monitored the eruption of
Mount St. Helens since September 2004, correctly forecasting the style
of eruption, and remaining in daily communication with the Washington
State Emergency Management Division and the U.S. Forest Service (USFS)
who rely on USGS information to restrict public access to potentially
threatened areas surrounding the volcano.
Landslides
Landslides, whether induced by rainfall or earthquakes, involve
complicated physical processes that are not sufficiently well
understood to permit reliable predictions, but the capability to
provide advanced warning of increased landslide danger now exists.
Doing so requires accurate landslide thresholds to monitor the hazard
and travel distances to gauge possible impact. The first step is a
detailed study of susceptible geographic regions having the requisite
geology and topography. Probable landslide paths and travel distances
are analyzed to identify possible landslide hazards, for example, by
specifying areas where landslides have a high probability of impacting
roads and buildings. Within different regions, the timing of landslides
needs to be observed during storms and correlated with the rainfall
intensity and duration in order to develop the criteria of rainfall
thresholds for triggering landslides. Advanced weather forecasts can be
combined with the threshold models to evaluate whether landslides are
likely to occur within regions susceptible to landsliding. Real-time
monitoring of rainfall and site measurements of rising groundwater and
initial slope movements near landslide sources can provide critical
information for issuing immediate public warning of landslide hazards.
Numerous rainstorms in southern California this winter have resulted in
serious landslides and debris flows. USGS scientists have issued
advisories of potential landslides to the National Weather Service,
California Office of Emergency Services (OES), other state and federal
agencies, and the public--as recently as February 15, 2005. The San
Bernardino County Sun and other local newspapers have used these
advisories in crafting news articles alerting their readers to the
possibility of landslide occurrence and instructing their readers on
ways to protect themselves.
The USGS and NOAA recently signed an MOA to develop a joint watch/
warning system for rainfall-generated landslides (debris flows). The
MOA calls for NOAA-generated precipitation observations and forecasts
to be forwarded to the USGS, where they will be compared with the
threshold models. When a watch/warning is warranted, the USGS will
forward the pertinent information to NOAA for NOAA to disseminate a
joint message using its standard watch/warning communication
procedures. The prototype of this system will be fielded by September
2005 in the area of operation of NOAA's Weather Forecasting Offices of
Oxnard (CA) and San Diego (CA), and will cover a number of counties,
including San Bernardino and Ventura counties.
Earthquakes
For earthquakes, it is not yet possible to predict the time and
location of damaging events, but it is possible to predict their
impacts and deliver rapid post-event information to emergency
responders. First, USGS delivers long-term forecasts of earthquake
shaking in the form of hazard maps that underlie most building codes
used in the United States. Second, within minutes after a domestic
earthquake, USGS and its regional network partners issue an alert with
location and magnitude. In five urban areas where dense arrays of
strong-motion instruments have been deployed through the Advanced
National Seismic System (ANSS), Internet-distributed ShakeMaps showing
the intensity of ground shaking are available to prioritize response
efforts. Following the December 22, 2003, magnitude 6.5 San Simeon
earthquake, the California OES was automatically notified within five
minutes, and the first ShakeMap was pushed to OES and other users in
less than nine minutes. Third, in the time scale of hours to days
following large earthquakes, USGS provides short-term predictions for
the likelihood of aftershocks in California.
Which entities or organizations receive warnings from, or through, your
agency (such as federal and local disaster response entities,
first
responders/911, and local and national media outlets).
Earthquakes
The USGS provides hazard alerts to a broad suite of federal, state
and local government agencies, and private-sector entities, including
the media. The scope of the USGS notification process depends on the
severity, extent, location, and possible impact of the hazard at hand.
For damaging domestic earthquakes, USGS notifies by telephone, fax, e-
mail and/or pager:
White House, The Situation Room
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Department of the Interior (DOI) Watch office
Dam and power plant operators (including U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE, Bureau of Reclamation, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and some public and private utilities)
Pipeline operators
Railroads
Insurance companies
Department of Defense (DoD) offices with domestic civil defense
responsibilities
State and local offices of emergency services
State geological surveys
Veterans Administration
Department of Agriculture
Department of Transportation including the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA)
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Transportation Security
Administration
NOAA
The Weather Channel
National Science Foundation (NSF)
National Institute of Standards and Technology
For both domestic and international damaging earthquakes, USGS also
e-mails earthquake notifications to over 40,000 subscribers including
many print and broadcast media companies. For public and news media,
notices are automatically posted to the Web. In the first few days
after the Sumatra disaster, USGS earthquake Web sites received over 120
million hits. The ANSS regional networks also have e-mail/pager
notification lists that reach further into affected States and
communities. Depending on the location and severity of the earthquake,
targeted distribution also proceeds to key users that can include the
Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, NOAA Pacific and Alaska/West Coast Tsunami Warning Centers,
state and local emergency managers, and 200 foreign agencies.
For damaging international earthquakes, USGS notifies by telephone,
fax, e-mail and/or pager:
White House, The Situation Room
Department of State
U.S. Embassies and consulates in affected countries
U.S. Agency for International Development
United Nations Office of Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs
Department of Defense
Federal Aviation Administration
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Earthquake Engineering Research Institute
Humanitarian groups (Red Cross, Red Crescent)
International Atomic Energy Commission
Private sector and government search-and-rescue groups
Volcanoes
For volcanic alerts, each of the five U.S. volcano observatories
has developed communication protocols tailored to the appropriate
hazard and region. For notifications of explosive eruptions that can
send volcanic particles (``ash'') into the atmosphere, USGS eruption
alerts are sent to
FAA air traffic control centers
NOAA meteorological watch offices and Volcanic Ash Advisory
Centers Air Force Weather Agency
U.S. Coast Guard
Military bases
Airports
For volcanic ground hazards (such as lava flows and debris flows),
USGS relies on the interagency incident command system (ICS), operated
either by state emergency or federal land managers (like the one
established by the U.S. Forest Service in 2004 for the eruption of Mt.
St. Helens). In the absence of an operating ICS, the protocol for
ground hazards is to alert State emergency and land managers (e.g.,
National Park Service, U.S. Forest Service, and Washington Emergency
Management Department), who in turn alert county emergency managers and
other federal agencies. When an eruption is expected or underway, USGS
also makes ash fall forecast graphics and sends them to appropriate
FEMA regional offices and may have a FEMA representative on-site at an
observatory. To communicate with the local and national media--before,
during, and after an eruption or episode of unrest--each observatory
commits experienced staff to talk directly with media representatives.
Landslides
Landslide advisories and warnings are sent to the appropriate State
Offices of Emergency Management and the National Weather Service.
Notice is also provided (through the DOI Watch Office) to the White
House, DOI land management agencies, DHS (including FEMA), and Military
Commands. To communicate with local and national media prior to,
during, and after landslide events, Landslide Hazard Program scientists
are available to respond to media inquiries. The Landslide Hazard
Program also posts detailed information and maps on its Web site, which
is available to the media, public officials, and the public.
Demonstrate which communications technologies are currently used to
deliver these public warnings, such as automatic alert TVs and
radios, telephones, digital assistants (PDAs), and the
Internet. If such
communications technologies are not being used, we would like
to know what the impediments are, and the status of any
discussions to expand the warning system's capability to do so.
The USGS uses a broad range of technologies to distribute alerts
and notifications, including the public Internet, private/government
Internet, text messaging, pager, phone, fax, NOAA Weather Wire, and
briefings to local and national media. Currently, over 40,000 e-mails
will be sent following a large earthquake. Users have the choice of a
full message by e-mail or a shorter message suitable for a cell phone
or PDA. Several improved distribution programs are in development under
the ANSS, including a replacement for the current e-mail notification
system that will allow users to customize which earthquake sizes and
locations will generate alerts. In the Pacific Northwest, the National
Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program--a partnership that includes NOAA,
FEMA, NSF, USGS and five Pacific States--is deploying all-hazards
warning system technology to coastal communities in that region,
providing tsunami, earthquake and mudflow warnings. The pole-mounted
All Hazard Alert Broadcast system has a blue warning light to cut
through fog, a siren warning, and a voice warning that is keyed by NOAA
Weather Radio or local emergency managers. Washington Emergency
Management is developing this warning system as part of the National
Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program. This Program is a model for how
federal agencies and their State partners can work together to reduce
risk.
The USGS relies on FAA and NOAA communications systems to relay
notifications of volcanic activity to enroute aircraft and airline
dispatchers. For other groups, USGS primarily uses brief phone calls,
followed by fax and e-mail, to provide more detailed information.
During both the premonitory and eruptive phases of a volcanic crisis,
PDAs and text messaging are used to notify off-duty scientists
automatically of changes in monitoring parameters.
Specify a process by which your agency, either on its own, or in
conjunction with other relevant agencies, can maximize
effective dissemination of public warning notifications.
The USGS hazard/disaster notification process relies on a
``notification tree'' or infrastructure, in which federal and state
agencies alerted by USGS take responsibility for disseminating USGS
information to emergency responders and other critical users. This
system contributes to an all-hazards approach to public warning. This
process is supplemented regionally and locally by direct (and in many
cases automated) alerting to critical users (e.g., earthquake ShakeMap
delivery to utilities, state transportation departments, homeland
security command centers, and regional pager/text-messaging to
emergency managers). We believe this is an effective strategy for USGS,
and it is appropriate to our mission. The USGS is continually honing
its disaster response strategy.
As part of the President's plan for an improved tsunami warning
system, USGS proposes to deploy software developed by the California
Integrated Seismic Network (a USGS, university and State partnership)
to speed USGS-generated earthquake information directly to local
emergency managers with a dual use capability to also provide NOAA
tsunami warnings.
Tsunamis are not solely produced by earthquakes. Approximately five
percent of tsunamis in the past 250 years were produced by volcanoes,
and some of these are among the most destructive tsunami events known.
Volcano induced tsunamis are generated in various ways; the largest,
most destructive tsunamis have been caused by large explosive eruptions
and flank collapse events on island and coastal volcanoes. There is a
demonstrated volcanic tsunami hazard in Alaska and Hawaii and a likely
one in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Improved
volcano monitoring systems and response planning at volcanoes that have
a potential tsunami hazard would help provide better mitigation
concerning an important natural hazard.
The USGS will continue its broad-based public awareness activities,
which are integral to effective use of warnings and other hazards
information by the public and civil defense authorities. For example,
USGS is working with the FAA, NOAA and others, to formulate a National
Interagency Operational Plan for Volcanic Ash Episodes, and we continue
to develop other inter-agency response plans for ground hazards. Such a
plan is necessary for USGS to meet the aviation sector's stated need
for notification of explosive ash-producing eruptions by a volcano
observatory to the appropriate FAA air-traffic control center within 5
minutes of the event. The USGS offices in California and Washington
provide training programs for local emergency managers and media on how
to use ShakeMap and other earthquake notification and assessment
products generated by the regional and national networks. The USGS is
working with the American Planning Association to develop a best-
practices manual on landslides that will become available to thousands
of planners this spring.
The USGS is working with the National Weather Service to develop a
protocol for issuing landslide warnings over NOAA Weather Radio All
Hazards network. State and county emergency managers--the agencies most
responsible for issuing instructions to citizens--rely on this
communication network for timely warnings. Part of the protocol will
allow real-time transmittal of current weather conditions to USGS
landslide experts to better pinpoint the areas of greatest danger.
For improved delivery of flood warnings, USGS currently partners
with other federal agencies, including the National Weather Service,
Army Corps of Engineers, and Bureau of Reclamation. This includes
efforts to raise public awareness about appropriate responses to flood
watches and warnings. In addition, there are a number of proof-of-
concept experiments underway to improve the timeliness and quality of
USGS information used by public and private entities to reduce flood
damages and loss of life.
To aid wildland fire suppression, USGS manages and hosts the
Geospatial Multi-Agency Coordination Group or GeoMAC, an Internet-based
tool that permits fire managers to access online maps of current fire
locations and perimeters in the conterminous 48 States and Alaska using
a standard Web browser. GeoMAC is a multi-agency group with technical
and subject matter experts from the Department of the Interior's fire
management agencies--the Bureau of Land Management, National Park
Service, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, and the United States Forest Service of the Department of
Agriculture, as well as numerous other agencies and firms.
The USGS is working with the National Interagency Fire Center and
the University of Alaska Fairbanks, specifically the Geographic
Information Network of Alaska (GINA) to develop a process for analyzing
satellite information to obtain daily updates of vegetation condition
for Alaska to improve the sensitivity to fire weather conditions. A
cooperative project called LANDFIRE is conducted by USGS and the Forest
Service to provide regional and local scale geospatial data of
vegetation, fuel, and fire regime. The project will enhance prediction
of fire danger and understanding of fire behavior for incident
commanders and a broad range of other users.
Specify how your agency interacts with the Department of Homeland
Security (including FEMA), the Federal Communications
Commission, the Department of Commerce, or other relevant
agencies with respect to warning systems.
The USGS interacts with DHS, Department of Commerce, DoD and many
other Federal agencies on matters related to hazard mitigation,
preparedness and disaster alerting. Key among these are FEMA, National
Weather Service and, for volcanic hazards, FAA. Notifications are
either direct to the responding agency or coordinated through the
Department of the Interior Watch Office, which operates around the
clock to compile and disseminate information relevant to law
enforcement, homeland security, and natural disasters impacting the
Department's responsibilities across the United States. For
earthquakes, USGS National Earthquake Information Center has a direct
phone line to the DHS/FEMA operations center in Washington. The USGS
and FEMA are partners in the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction
Program and have developed and tested a coordinated earthquake response
plan. For tsunami coordination, USGS exchanges telephone, e-mail, data,
and Web products with the NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers (and with
tsunami warning centers in Japan, Chile and Russia). The USGS also
provides earthquake alerting through the NOAA Weather Wire, as
previously noted.
For volcanic hazards, USGS works with FAA, NOAA, and DoD to
disseminate notifications of explosive eruptions and associated ash
clouds to the aviation sector (both military and commercial). For
ground volcanic hazards, USGS relies on the interagency Incident
Command System (ICS), operated either by state emergency or federal
land managers (like the one established by USFS in 2004 for the
eruption of Mt. St. Helens). In the absence of an operating ICS, the
protocol for ground hazards is to alert state emergency and land
managers (e.g., NPS, USFS), who in turn alert county emergency managers
and other federal agencies. The USGS sends ash fall forecast graphics
to appropriate FEMA regional offices.
To improve the effectiveness of flood warnings, USGS collaborates
with many federal, state and local government agencies and the private
sector. The FEMA, and state and local officials monitor flood watches
and warnings and use USGS Internet sites to ascertain flood conditions
for those rivers not serviced by the National Weather Service river
forecast system.
Explain how your agency could improve public notification of impending
natural hazards and disasters.
The USGS could improve public hazard notification and warning of
natural hazards in three basic areas: (1) Modernization and expansion
of monitoring networks; (2) increased robustness and redundancy of
communication links; and, (3) accelerated development and deployment of
capabilities to take full advantage of new data streams, research
findings and communication technologies to improve the accuracy and
timeliness of information we provide for emergency management.
(1) Modernization and expansion of monitoring networks
The President's proposal for improving tsunami warning systems
would replace legacy hardware and software systems at the USGS National
Earthquake Information Center (NEIC) and establish 247
operations, actions that will improve response time, benefiting both
earthquake notification and tsunami warning. The proposal also includes
support to improve station up-time in the Global Seismographic Network
(GSN)--a partnership of USGS, the National Science Foundation, the
Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology, and the University
of California--and to install additional stations in the Caribbean
region. The NEIC modernization is a key component of the Advanced
National Seismic System (ANSS). As described in USGS Circular 1188, the
ANSS plan includes both notification and early warning of earthquakes
as fundamental goals.
Impending volcanic eruptions can be forecast and warnings issued in
time for communities to take preparatory actions. To improve this
warning capability, USGS is developing a plan for a National Volcano
Early Warning System (NVEWS). This plan will outline priorities for
monitoring instrumentation at our most threatening volcanoes, along
with development of a new generation of information technology tools
for sharing of data.
Fire danger information and specific information on fire fuels
assessment depend on reliable timely satellite observations. It is
important that USGS continue to provide remote sensing technology to
the fire management agencies. It is, therefore, important to support
the ongoing development of the Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM)
and the companion National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental
Satellite System (NPOESS), a satellite system used to monitor global
environmental conditions, and collect and disseminate data related to:
weather, atmosphere, oceans, land and near-space environment.
(2) Robust telemetry and communication links
For rapid-onset events like earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic
eruptions and landslides, only realtime systems can provide data in
sufficient time to issue actionable notifications and warnings. The
funding in the Emergency Supplemental for improved tsunami detection
and warning system for the United States, along with the funding in the
2006 budget for the same purpose, will expand and improve telemetry
connections to monitoring stations, so that the seismic stations in the
Global Seismographic Network provide real-time data. This will
contribute to decreasing the reporting time for global earthquakes from
over one hour to about twenty minutes.
USGS data and products often travel across a web of communications
links from the monitoring network to the public, typically involving
satellite uplinks and downlinks, the Internet, and radio or television
bands. Although some USGS systems employ redundant links (e.g.,
satellite, phone lines, and/or Internet communications), in many cases
the communications channels are vulnerable to a single point of
failure. Hardening of these telecommunication links is essential to
ensure a reliable warning system is available with the appropriate
level of redundancy.
As part of the NEIC upgrade, the President's proposal calls for
247 network operations and robust Internet serving of seismic
data. It would also increase the number of USGS-operated GSN stations
that provide real-time data to NEIC and the NOAA tsunami warning
centers. Currently, only 80 percent of GSN stations have digital
telemetry links that allow for real-time communication. Both for the
GSN and the ANSS, a fully telemetered system with redundant
communications links will improve response time for damaging
earthquakes. For volcano hazards, establishing a local Internet portal
in Alaska would strengthen the robustness and reliability of warnings.
(3) New capabilities
The USGS is testing dedicated ground-based Doppler radar at
volcanoes in order to improve its ability to provide notification of
explosive ash-producing eruption to the appropriate FAA air traffic
control center within 5 minutes of the event, a need identified by the
aviation sector. By adding such radar units to the suite of monitoring
instruments in place at restless or erupting volcanoes, rapid detection
and confirmation of eruptive ash plumes at night and in bad weather is
greatly improved.
Increased use of new remote-sensing technologies such as airborne
LiDAR and satellite-based InSAR would allow USGS to provide more
accurate information for a number of hazards. In the case of
landslides, LiDAR delivers highly detailed topography, which is
critical for landslide susceptibility characterization and
identification of past landslide scars. InSAR allows monitoring of
large slow-moving landslides. These technologies have proven valuable
for early detection of volcano re-activation as well as providing
important insights on earthquake fault rupture characteristics.
Forecasting coastal hazards associated with hurricanes and other
major storms is critically-dependent on the availability of accurate
and up-to-date information on nearshore and coastal elevations. In
cooperation with NASA, NOAA, and the USACE, USGS is developing a
comprehensive national assessment of coastal hazards based on high-
resolution LiDAR surveys of coastal and nearshore elevation. Data
developed within this program have supported the development of models
relating coastal response to storm surge and wave run-up and nearshore,
beach, and dune elevations. Forecasts of coastal vulnerability to
impending storm landfall are developed prior to landfall and made
available to state and federal agencies to guide pre-storm evacuation
and post-storm recovery planning. At present, forecasts rely on
historic or ``model'' storm characteristics and USGS and NOAA are
working collaboratively to develop vulnerability products that
incorporate hurricane forecasts issued by the National Hurricane
Center.
The USGS routinely acquires and distributes global satellite image
data from its Landsat satellite system; receives and distributes data
from several NASA earth-observing satellites; and obtains and
redistributes data from U.S. commercial and international satellite
systems. In support of tsunami disaster-response, USGS is distributing
many types of tsunami-related satellite imagery, maps, and other
geospatial data and working with commercial satellite data providers to
support the needs of Federal Government agencies. For disaster
situations such as these, where hundreds of thousands of digital files
have already been distributed, USGS posts digital data on a server and
users electronically ``pull'' what they need over the Internet. The
President's budget request for USGS includes funds to ensure the
continued operation of Landsat 7, along with NASA and NOAA, and to
begin work on an upgraded ground-processing system to acquire, process,
archive and distribute data from a new generation of satellite-based
land image sensors. This Landsat Data Continuity Mission is expected to
begin operations in 2009.
The President's proposal for upgrading NEIC will accelerate
development of several rapid-response products, including the Prompt
Assessment of Global Earthquakes for Response (PAGER) system, which
uses information about an earthquake's source, combined with
information regarding population and infrastructure in the affected
region to estimate potential damage and loss of life in a major
earthquake. The PAGER system is ideal for both domestic and
international areas where a dense seismic network is not available, but
where a rapid assessment is critical for estimating impact.
In several metropolitan areas, the ANSS ShakeMap System supports
direct links to critical users. In California for example, ShakeMap is
automatically sent by Internet to:
California Department of Transportation (DOT)
California Office of Emergency Services (OES)
Utilities (Southern California Edison, Pacific Gas & Electric,
Southern California Gas, the Los Angeles Department of Water
and Power, East Bay Municipal Utility District)
Bay Area Rapid Transit system
National media outlets
Communications companies
California Earthquake Authority
Los Angeles County Office of Emergency Services
Local media outlets
FEMA regional offices
Outside of California, ShakeMap is in various stages of development
and integration. ShakeMap requires dense instrumentation. ShakeMap has
been deployed in Salt Lake City, Utah, Anchorage, Alaska, and Seattle,
Washington. In those cities, ShakeMap has been integrated into their
emergency management and response procedures. The ShakeCast software,
now under development at a pilot level, is designed to help users
overcome Internet security barriers and effectively integrate USGS
earthquake notifications into emergency procedures.
The USGS is exploring the feasibility of earthquake early warning,
in which rapid computer analysis and communication links are used to
provide seconds of warning before earthquake waves arrive. Such warning
systems are in place in Japan, Mexico and Taiwan. The 2000 re-
authorization of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program
(NEHRP) called for development of a U.S. early warning system for
earthquakes. The USGS currently sponsors modest research and
development in this area, including research on earthquake early
warning feasibility and efforts to improve the numbers of seismic
stations reporting in real time and the speed and reliability of
earthquake reporting.
Building on current capabilities for issuing aftershock
probabilities, USGS and its partners in the California Integrated
Seismic Network will be releasing a public Web site this spring with
the probability of strong earthquake shaking in the next 24 hours,
based upon a background probability from our understanding of geology,
modified by the probability that earthquakes that have just occurred
will trigger other activity. In southern California, USGS is
investigating what information from structural instrumentation can be
used to provide rapid estimates of structural damage following
earthquakes or explosions. An experimental instrumentation package is
being installed in two buildings in the Los Angeles area and we are
developing tools to analyze the structural health of the buildings from
those data streams.
______
Response to Written Question Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Roger A. Hansen
Question. Dr. Hansen, thank you for your work to improve local
communication systems for tsunami warnings in Alaska. Because of his
strong interest in protecting coastal communities, Senator Stevens
requested a written suggestion of what a pilot project for improving
and expanding local tsunami warning systems would look like in your
estimation. Because of Washington State's high risk for a tsunami
disaster in the next 50 years, I'm very interested in your vision of a
possible pilot project and request that you please also send me your
suggestions.
Answer.
Pilot Project for Improving Tsunami Safety in Alaska
The Problem
The December 26, 2004 Sumatra Earthquake and Tsunami illustrated a
fundamental failure: The inability to communicate a warning message to
remote areas. This failure existed (both nationally and
internationally) at all levels of observation, information
dissemination, and local education and outreach.
Lack of warning system contributed to deaths of 10s or 100s
of thousands of people.
All links in chain missing.
Scientists--National Authorities--Local Authorities--Populace
A Secondary failure (scientific) comes from the inability to obtain
a rapid and robust estimate of an earthquake magnitude using current
instrumentation.
The Magnitude of the earthquake was dramatically
underestimated in real time.
But we can do something about it. The combination of strong
motion seismic stations and GPS data in the near regional area
of a large earthquake can be shown to estimate magnitude
rapidly within 0.1-0.2 magnitude units of the final estimate.
Forty years earlier on March 27, 1964 a magnitude 9.2 earthquake
ripped through the Prince William Sound in southern Alaska, generating
a devastating tsunami. Though the death toll in the 1964 Good Friday
quake is miniscule compared to the Indian Ocean disaster, Alaska today
is vastly different but still faces difficult challenges with warning
its at-risk communities of the occurrence of tsunamis. These challenges
come in part from the nature of our remote location, irregular
coastlines with complex bathymetry and topography; the vast size of the
state that we live in, one of the most seismically active regions of
the world; the lack of infrastructure throughout the area for both
operations and maintenance of monitoring systems; and consistent and
timely communication of warning messages.
The Solution
As presented in my testimony to the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, I will concentrate on addressing some of
the needs for improving tsunami safety in Alaska by focusing this pilot
project on combining warning guidance, hazard assessment, and
mitigation in the very seismically active Alaska Peninsula and Aleutian
Islands region.
The pilot project area has been recognized as the most seismically
active area in the United States. The area generates large tsunamis
that can affect not only the coastlines of Alaska, but also the rest of
the Pacific Ocean. The goals of this project will be accomplished by
engaging the partnerships that already exist in Alaska for addressing
tsunami safety. This team of professionals from the University of
Alaska, and state and federal agencies are already operating as a
partnership within the Tsunami Warning and Environmental Observatory
for Alaska (TWEAK) program coordinated out of the University of Alaska.
Warning Guidance
The region of Southern Alaska extending into the Aleutian Islands
is severely lacking in modern earthquake instrumentation even though
there have been more large earthquakes in the past 50 years than
anywhere else in the United States.
First and foremost, we must be able to detect events that can
trigger tsunamis. The primary method of event detection is accomplished
using seismology and seismic networks. Sea level data (both tide gauges
and deep ocean buoys) are also monitored to verify the existence of and
danger posed by tsunamis. Our primary hazard (like that in Sumatra)
comes from a ``local'' tsunami generated by nearby large earthquakes in
or near the coast of Alaska. Therefore, we must rely on the rapid
warnings that can be issued from the detection of large earthquakes by
the seismic network.
Modern seismic recordings combined with GPS data can provide rapid
information on earthquake location, size, and distribution of sea floor
deformation that generates tsunamis. However, since much of the seismic
network in Alaska has been in operation since the late 1960s, many
stations are in need of modernization.
Over the past few years, AEIC was tasked through the National
Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) to develop 18 of these modern
stations for Alaska and to ensure timely delivery of this data to the
warning centers. The University program has now increased the number of
modern stations AEIC can provide to augment this sparse improvement,
and provides enhanced information on local earthquakes through applied
research efforts. However, even with the funding of both the NTHMP and
the University TWEAK program, nearly 75 percent of the Alaska seismic
network still relies on outdated equipment, leaving vast areas of
Alaska (and in particular the very seismically active Aleutian Islands)
still under-populated with modern seismic stations.
To improve this situation we propose to augment the network with:
20 Modern broad band seismic stations with high dynamic
range and frequency bandwidth.
20 Modern strong motion seismic sensors that will stay on
scale for even the large magnitude 9+ earthquakes that can
occur in the region.
20 continuously reporting GPS sensors that can directly
measure permanent deformation and robust earthquake size.
Modern tide gauges.
Modern satellite telemetry to record seismic and deformation
signals in real time at the Alaska Earthquake Information
Center and the Alaska Tsunami Warning Center.
Near real time processing of the combined signals to rapidly
estimate the earthquake size, and distribution of deformation.
This gives direct and rapid estimates of tsunami potential.
A prototype multi-observing deep ocean buoy system
consisting of at least an ocean bottom pressure sensor and an
ocean bottom seismometer giving lateral constraint to the land
based seismic network.
Unique to this effort is the co-location of modern seismic and GPS
instrumentation. The combined observations give rich information for
the rapid determination of earthquake location, size, and distribution
of sea floor deformation that generates tsunamis.
Hazard Assessment
Tsunami warning and safety procedures require an understanding of
hazards and risks associated with tsunamis. Alaska researchers at UAF
are evaluating the risk by constructing inundation maps for at-risk
communities through super computer modeling of the tsunami water waves
from scenario earthquakes and landslides. Reliable modeling results,
however, require that we have accurate bathymetry to a resolution that
is not generally available in Alaska. Much of the sea floor along the
shallow waters off the coast of Alaska have not been mapped in many
years. Some areas have not been mapped since before the 1964 Prince
William Sound M9.2 earthquake (Note that large earthquakes can change
bathymetry in local regions of the sea floor by tens of meters.).
Collection of improved bathymetry is necessary along Alaska's coastal
communities and should be a top priority for our pilot project area.
High resolution modeling and mapping is needed to identify
potential areas for evacuation and lifeline infrastructure at risk. As
a part of the pilot project at least one community at risk should be
selected for acquisition of very high resolution bathymetry. This data
will enable the construction of very detailed flooding maps for the
community. Benefits of this process include the enhanced understanding
of the local risk, construction of evacuation routes for the community,
and an evaluation of the capabilities (and potential errors) of
numerical modeling and forecasting of tsunamis with the highest quality
data available. The models would then be hosted for evaluation by the
research community as part of the Alaska Region Super Computer Center
tsunami portal system developed as part of the TWEAK program. A
candidate community for this evaluation is Akutan. Akutan has one of
the largest communities in the Aleutian Islands, which supports the
largest fishing industry in the United States. Other candidate
communities could include Sand Point, Adak, Dutch Harbor, and a host of
others among Alaska's 76 coastal communities.
Mitigation
Last, but not least, to tie together all the components of tsunami
identification and warning with the hazard assessment, the pilot
community needs a comprehensive public education program. It is
important to recognize that tsunami warning systems must go beyond just
the ability to detect a tsunami and send a warning message. The most
important aspect of tsunami warning systems is the existence of a
mechanism for disseminating warning information to the people on the
shorelines, and for the recipient of the warning message to understand
how to react. Tsunami hazard mitigation requires a long-term sustained
effort of continuing public education, and responsible planning
decisions in coastal communities.
The power of education is clear.
The State of Alaska partners' are well aware of our difficulties in
reaching our 76 communities at risk to tsunamis. Enhancing the warning
communication and outreach infrastructure at the state and local level
for both emergency managers and the public represents the most
important improvement to be made in Alaska for saving lives.
Among the pilot project community enhancements to be made include:
Tsunami training for schools at all grade levels--Adult
public education through media, community workshops, and other
means.
Exercises and drills for elected officials, schools, and the
general public.
Focus groups for mitigation, contingency and continuity
planning workshops for essential services and tsunami-at-risk
businesses.
(Note that Public education could have saved thousands of
lives around the Indian Ocean.)
Tied to this effort will be an enhanced technical communication
infrastructure package that can ensure tsunami warnings are broadcast
to people along the coastlines or in their homes, businesses, and
boats. Within the pilot community, we will explore all possible
communication possibilities, including but not limited to:
Local alert and notification communication equipment such as
the Emergency Management Weather Information Network, NOAA
Weather Radios for indoor use, and All Hazard Alert
Broadcasting (AHAB) Siren and Radio for outdoor use.
Support from Alaska Division of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management professionals for disseminating existing
alert notification, and other enhanced communication protocols,
to ensure tsunami warning and evacuation messages can be
received by the public rapidly and effectively.
The key to success is developing a strong communications link from
the Tsunami Warning Center to a hazard control center or emergency
contact point that can be assured of receiving and relaying the
warnings to the local people through the above considerations.
Summary
In summary, Alaska has partnerships in place to address the threat
from tsunamis. Yet we still have continuing needs for improved
monitoring with seismic and tide gauge networks, scientific
infrastructure for numerical forecasting of tsunamis, and the civil
infrastructure to educate and warn people.
This pilot will demonstrate the techniques and procedures necessary
to enhance the delivery of hazard warnings to very remote areas of the
world. It will focus on an integrated approach of improved monitoring,
coupled with extensive hazard and risk assessment and quantification,
tied together with a strong approach for education and outreach, and
reliable information delivery. In addition, the enhanced monitoring
with world class multi-use sensing stations will allow for rapid
evaluation of earthquake size and characteristics, estimates of the
deformation of the sea floor, and more accurate forecasting of tele-
tsunamis that would potentially impact Hawaii, the west coast of the
United States, and other coastlines of the Pacific Ocean.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Charles G. Groat
Question 1. Dr. Groat, I understand that the Cascadia Subduction
zone off the coast of Washington state is similar to the fault that
produced the Indian Ocean tsunami. The last major Cascadia quake on
January 26, 1700 caused 30-foot high tsunamis that inundated the
Washington coastline. In your testimony, you stated that USGS
scientists and others have estimated that there is a 10-14 percent
chance of a repeat of the Cascadia magnitude 9 earthquake and tsunami
event in the next 50 years. What is the basis for this estimate?
Answer. The 10-14 percent probability of having a magnitude-9
earthquake on the Cascadia subduction zone in the next 50 years was
derived from the average recurrence time of these great earthquakes
observed in studies of coastal subsidence. For example, at Willapa Bay,
WA there are wetland soils that were buried during coastal subsidence
that occurred during great Cascadia earthquakes. These buried soils are
evidence that seven great earthquakes occurred along the Cascadia
subduction zone during the past 3500 years. The dates of when these
soils were buried are consistent with the dates of subsidence events
found at other locations along the Pacific Northwest coast, further
supporting the concept that these buried soils record the occurrence of
great earthquakes along the coast. The ages of these buried soils
indicate an average recurrence time of about 500 years for great
Cascadia earthquakes. The USGS used this average recurrence time to get
two probability estimates for the next 50 years: the 10 percent
estimate is derived from a model that does not consider the time from
the last earthquake and the 14 percent estimate is derived from a model
that considers the time since the last great Cascadia earthquake (in
1700 A.D.) and the variability in the recurrence time of past great
earthquakes as seen in the record of buried soils.
Question 1a. Please explain what makes this fault especially prone
to generating a tsunami-causing earthquake.
Answer. Nearly all of the world's major tsunamis occur in
subduction zones. The geometry between two adjacent tectonic plates in
subduction zones gives rise to the possibility of tsunami generation in
areas like Cascadia, where the offshore Juan de Fuca plate is moving
landward about 1.5 inches per year. Because the rocks in the Juan de
Fuca plate are more dense than the rocks in the North American plate,
the Juan de Fuca plate begins to dip slightly into the earth just off
the Pacific Coast. The contact between the two plates is the Cascadia
fault. Unlike the San Andreas fault, which is nearly vertical, the
Cascadia fault is nearly horizontal. This shallow, dipping, geometry
establishes a very wide contact area--perhaps as much as 60-80 miles--
between the two plates. The wide contact area combines with the 600-
mile length of Cascadia to give a huge earthquake fault area. When an
earthquake occurs on the Cascadia fault, there is as much as 30-60 feet
of displacement of one plate against the other, and that motion can
cause rapid changes in the level of the sea floor, resulting in
tsunamis.
Not all subduction-zone earthquakes generate damaging tsunamis. If
the fault displacement does not cause significant movement on the ocean
floor, then only small waves are generated. In some cases, the initial
earthquake ground shaking may generate huge underwater landslides that
can either produce their own tsunamis or complicate a tsunami generated
by displacement of the ocean floor. Although most tsunamis are
generated in the world's active subduction zones such as Cascadia,
occasionally large gravity-driven slumps have occurred elsewhere that
produced significant waves.
One issue that needs more study in Cascadia is the effectiveness of
existing warning systems in the event that only a portion of the
subduction zone ruptures. In the case where the entire subduction zone
from Vancouver Island to northern California ruptures, the immediate
response of coastal residents must be keyed on the strong ground
shaking. However, the geologic record shows that earthquakes are more
frequent in the northern California-southern Oregon portion of Cascadia
than off the Washington coast. If only a portion of the subduction zone
breaks during an earthquake, then warning systems could be used to help
guide initial response on the portion of the coast adjacent to the
immediate earthquake area. The June 14, 2005, magnitude-7.1 earthquake
off northern California highlighted the need for strengthening seismic
warning systems to provide better guidance to state officials in the
event of the next Cascadia earthquake rupturing along only a portion of
the coast.
Question 2. Dr. Groat, I understand that a tsunami generated by an
earthquake along the Cascadia fault could reach the coast of Washington
state within 10-20 minutes. I'm concerned because only three Washington
towns are considered prepared under the TsunamiReady program, meaning
that many, many coastal residents would not have adequate time to
escape a tsunami. Would the USGS earthquake notification system be able
to notify coastal communities in time to allow for an orderly
evacuation?
Answer. It is important to distinguish the roles of the USGS and
NOAA with regard to notifying the public about tsunamis. The USGS
supplies earthquake data to the NOAA West Coast/Alaska Tsunami Warning
Center (WC/ATWC) in Palmer, AK, which is responsible for issuing
warnings to coastal Washington. While the WC/ATWC receives USGS
earthquake data within seconds, it takes their seismologists a few
minutes to process the data and obtain a reliable earthquake location
and magnitude and for the duty seismologist to execute the response
procedures. Under optimal conditions the WC/ATWC can issue warnings as
rapidly as two minutes after the earthquake.
The USGS is also supporting the development of software like
California Integrated Seismic Network (CISN) Display that enable
emergency managers to receive notification about earthquakes and
tsunami warnings quickly as they are distributed by USGS and NOAA. This
technology eliminates any delays in information distribution and
portrays the earthquake data on maps that can be customized with local
highways, hospital locations, and other geographic features. The
President's tsunami warning initiative provides funding to enhance CISN
Display and provide it to coastal emergency managers.
Even though the goal of the USGS is to put automated earthquake
information into the hands of the emergency management community and
the public within seconds, and likewise the WC/ATWC strives to issue
tsunami warnings within a few minutes, it will be difficult, if not
impossible, for many communities to successfully evacuate all citizens
in inundation zones within 20 minutes. For that reason, education about
tsunami hazards and proper evacuation procedures, land-use planning,
and construction of structures that enable vertical evacuation will all
be necessary to reduce the loss of life from a tsunami generated by a
repeat of the 1700 Cascadia earthquake.
In an effort to further coordinate U.S. national response to the
threat from tsunamis, USGS and NOAA co-led two separate task groups
organized by the National Science and Technology Council Subcommittee
on Disaster Reduction and U.S. Group on Earth Observations: ``Tsunami
Lessons Learned Interim Report'' provides a first look at what lessons
can be taken from the December 26, 2004 earthquake and tsunami, and
``Tsunami Risk Reduction for the United States: A Framework for
Action'' provides a national plan to reduce future losses. These
reports are expected to be released shortly.
Question 3. Dr. Groat, I understand that the goal of USGS's
National Earthquake Information Center (NEIC) is to rapidly determine
location and size of all destructive earthquakes and immediately
disseminate that information to the public. I understand this to be
critical because a person on the ground can't tell if the earthquake
they just felt was a little one under their feet, or a huge one off the
coast that may be followed by a tsunami. However, I understand that in
previous instances, such as the Nisqually Earthquake that gave Seattle
quite a shake in 2001, NEIC notification came in too late to inform and
improve emergency response efforts. For this reason, I'm pleased to see
that under the Administration's proposal, the NEIC would upgrade their
operations and be able to provide 24 hour, 7 day a week notification.
It is my understanding that a Cascadia fault generated earthquake would
give Washington state coastal communities only 10 to 20 minutes of time
to evacuate. Is it possible to reach a two minute performance standard
for issuing tsunami warnings?
Answer. The speed at which seismic networks can report about an
earthquake is governed by the number of seismic stations in the
vicinity of the earthquake and the speed at which seismic monitoring
systems can calculate earthquake location and magnitudes. For example,
the coastal region of Washington is monitored by seismic stations of
the Pacific Northwest Seismic Network (PNSN), operated by the
University of Washington with funding from USGS. Data from the PNSN is
continually transmitted to the WC/ATWC within seconds as a result of
system upgrades funded by the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation
Program. As a result of this cooperative effort and because NOAA staff
were on duty at the time of the earthquake, the WC/ATWC released the
Nisqually earthquake location and magnitude within 2 minutes. It should
be noted that the PNSN, like other U.S. seismic networks participating
in the ANSS, typically releases automated earthquake information within
3-5 minutes.
Despite improvements in the speed in which USGS or NOAA systems can
compute location and magnitude and rapid human response, the goal of
reaching a two minute performance standard for issuing tsunami warnings
is only possible if there are sufficient seismic stations in the
epicentral area. For quakes that occur in remote areas of the planet
where the nearest seismic stations are many hundreds of miles away, it
can take 10 minutes for sufficient data to be available for a seismic
network to release a reliable location and magnitude. Although 10
minutes may seem like a long time to locate a distant earthquake, the
transit times for distant tsunamis to reach U.S. shores are on the
order of hours.
Just as the PNSN provides seismic data to the ATWC , the NEIC also
provides continuous transmission of data from seismic stations around
the globe to the WC/ATWC in order for them to be able to issue tsunami
warnings as fast as possible. With the planned upgrades for the NEIC
with funding from the President's tsunami warning initiative, the NEIC
is standing up 247 operations and upgrading their software and
hardware systems. Like the WC/ATWC, it will then be possible for the
ANSS to release authoritative and reviewed earthquake information at
the same speed at which the WC/ATWC releases earthquake information.
We again want to emphasize that it is unlikely that a 2-minute
performance standard would be sufficient to guarantee successful
evacuation of all citizens in inundation zones. However, quick,
reliable earthquake locations can be used to ``turn off'' initial
activities that began with felt ground shaking. As noted above, the
USGS is working to distribute these locations through such systems as
CISN Display. The USGS is also working to provide a more complete
description of the earthquake within minutes by automatically
delivering ShakeMaps to emergency responders so that they can see the
extent of strong shaking in their region. ShakeMaps also serve as input
to the HAZUS program for rapidly calculating the expected losses from
an earthquake.
Question 4. Dr. Groat, I've heard that coordination and cooperation
between NOAA, NSF, and USGS is very poor leading to lots of
inefficiencies. Given the possibility of only 10 to 20 minutes warning,
it is very important to me that both USGS and NOAA work together to
disseminate information as fast as possible. Please explain how current
procedures could be improved to ensure communication and dissemination
of critical information.
Answer. Since 1997, the USGS and NOAA have successfully partnered
on tsunami warning efforts under the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation
Program (NTHMP) in cooperation with FEMA and the five Pacific states.
The USGS installed dedicated data circuits connecting the two NOAA
Tsunami Warning Centers to the ANSS to ensure reliable data exchange.
USGS installed 53 new seismic stations in Alaska, California, Hawaii,
Oregon and Washington to support improved earthquake detection for
tsunami warnings and collaborated with NOAA staff in the installation
of USGS seismological software in the Tsunami Warning Centers. As
described above, the WC/ATWC also submits their calculations of
earthquake location and magnitude into the ANSS earthquake information
distribution system. The USGS and NOAA meet regularly under the
auspices of the NTHMP to discuss how we could improve cooperation and
coordination, and the level of cooperation between the ANSS operations
and Tsunami Warning Center operations is excellent.
In addition, USGS scientists often are active collaborators with
NOAA scientists in performing tsunami inundation modeling. USGS
scientists are tasked with specifying the ``source characteristics''
(e.g., the dimensions, orientation, and the amount of fault movement)
of anticipated earthquakes for the models. The USGS has an active
research program to investigate the geologic evidence from historic
tsunamis to gain a better understanding of the amount of wave run-up
and frequency of occurrence. These studies guide the inundation
modeling of NOAA scientists and form the basis for mitigation planning.
The USGS, NOAA, and FEMA all belong to the State-Local Tsunami
Working group convened quarterly by Washington Emergency Management.
The working group seeks to implement directions and programs developed
by the NTHMP and provide guidance back to the national program. These
meetings involve local emergency managers from all Washington coastal
counties and outside experts as required by the items being discussed
(e.g., a structural engineer, business continuity planner, etc.).
The key to coordination among agencies in the NTHMP is the twice-
yearly meeting of the Steering Committee, made up of representatives
from the three federal agencies and the five Pacific States. The NTHMP
has used the steering committee structure to develop the priorities for
the entire program, ensure a uniform message in tsunami-prone areas,
and initiate new efforts such as the guidelines for construction in
inundation zones. Washington State has been particularly aggressive in
taking full advantage of this coordination by calling routinely on the
federal partners to help improve public safety efforts in the state.
As a research granting agency, the National Science Foundation is
not directly involved with NTHMP or tsunami response. However, USGS and
NSF collaborate extensively on research activities that contribute to
an improved understanding of Earth processes that lead to earthquake
generation. An important aspect of that collaboration is NSF's
EarthScope initiative, which is establishing a dense array of geodetic
stations along the western boundary of the North American tectonic
plate to better understand plate interactions. EarthScope also includes
a drilling project into the San Andreas fault, and a moving array of
seismic stations to image the crust and deep structure of the
continent. In all three projects, USGS scientists are closely
collaborating with their NSF and university counterparts. NSF and USGS
are partners in the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (along
with FEMA and the National Institute of Standards and Technology).
NEHRP is focused on translating research into on-the-ground earthquake
loss reduction.
Question 5. Dr. Groat, on my recent visit to PMEL, I learned that
Washington State is vulnerable not only to tsunamis generated by
distant earthquakes in the North Pacific Ocean or the closer Cascadia
subduction zone, but also from faults within the Puget Sound. In fact,
there is a fault line that goes right across Puget Sound and downtown
Seattle. Can you tell me the current plans to analyze the earthquake
risk for this fault? Are there other technologies that could provide
more timely warning to these inland areas?
Answer. Pacific Northwest earthquakes occur in three source zones:
along the Cascadia subduction zone boundary, within the subducting Juan
de Fuca plate and within the crust of the overlying North American
plate. Earthquakes from all three zones threaten the Puget Sound and
western Washington, but a large crustal earthquake would have very
severe consequences in Seattle and other cities.
Crustal zone earthquakes, typically of small magnitudes and usually
not felt, are the most common earthquakes in western Washington.
Crustal earthquakes have been as large as magnitude 5.5 in the last 40
years but have produced little damage. The initiation points
(hypocenters) of earthquakes located beneath Puget Sound form a dense
cloud of locations in the crust and do not define linear fault zones as
seen in California. For many years, the lack of clear trends in the
located earthquakes, coupled with a lack of known surface evidence in
the form of fault scarps, contributed to the uncertainty as to how best
to account for the possibility of crustal earthquakes in hazard
assessments.
There are three major fault zones--the Seattle, the Tacoma, and the
Southern Whidbey Island--that cut through the heavily urbanized regions
of central Puget Sound. Of these, the Seattle fault is the best studied
and because of its proximity to so many people and infrastructure, is
the most critical feature of regional hazard assessments. Although
known for many years based on regional geology and geophysics, until
1992 there was no evidence that the Seattle fault was active. In that
year, paleoseismologists showed that large changes in the elevation of
prehistoric beaches, in some cases as much as 22 feet, occurred during
a very large earthquake on the Seattle fault about a thousand years
ago. This large displacement is consistent with an earthquake of about
magnitude 7. However, even with these large vertical motions, the exact
location of the Seattle fault was still poorly known. The portion of
the fault thought to be responsible for the elevation changes has yet
to be found.
Nevertheless, the discovery of the vertical land elevation changes
sparked considerable research on the fault. In 1994 a basic model was
developed linking the Seattle fault to the Seattle basin; the Seattle
basin is a deep (5 miles in places) structural feature roughly centered
beneath downtown Seattle and Bellevue. A regional aeromagnetic
experiment suggested the location of three strands of the Seattle
fault. These strands curve from southern Bainbridge Island through
south Seattle before bending more northeastward and crossing Lake
Washington to the greater Bellevue area.
The introduction of LIDAR flights--Lidar stands for light detecting
and ranging similar to radar, which stands for radio detecting and
ranging-- over the Seattle fault on Bainbridge Island in 1998 allowed
geologists to find the fault in the field for the first time. With a
precision of about 20 centimeters, LIDAR can map very subtle changes in
the surface topography, and allows scientists to organize features of
the landscape. In particular, short linear features that might be
missed with conventional topography are easily highlighted with LIDAR
data. Field trenching very rapidly discovered several earthquakes on
the Seattle fault on and near Bainbridge Island. USGS Geologists also
found evidence for an active scarp near Vasa Park in southeastern
Bellevue.
USGS has used LIDAR since 1998 to document at least eight faults
from the southeastern Olympic Peninsula to Whidbey Island that have had
large earthquakes of magnitude 6.5 or greater during the last few
thousand years, and there are many additional faults that have now been
identified that need thorough study. Ground motions from crustal
earthquakes of moderate size, magnitude 6-6.7, produce strong shaking
on hard rock that can have major effects on buildings and lifelines.
Fieldwork on various strands of the Seattle fault documents three
or more large earthquakes in the last few thousand years. By modeling
the expected ground motions from these earthquakes, seismologists can
show that the ground and buildings will shake very hard when they next
strike. The scientific and engineering understanding of the large
crustal earthquakes on the Seattle fault is now well accepted and the
USGS joined seven other agencies and organizations to develop a
detailed scenario of the consequences of a major earthquake on the
Seattle fault. The scenario, published in June 2005 by the Earthquake
Engineering Research Institute and Washington Emergency Management, is
being used to help the region develop a more aggressive strategy to
lower losses from future events.
Unfortunately, for crustal earthquakes in urban areas, there is
little prospect of providing warning of possible tsunamis, because the
travel time of the first arriving wave will be a few minutes at most.
Thus, as with the offshore Cascadia events, sustained public education
is the best way to lower losses and save lives in the event of strong
shaking in Puget Sound. It is also why the region puts such a high
premium on completing a full inventory of possible active faults using
LIDAR data. Without LIDAR, possible crustal faults that could be
tsunami sources in northern Puget Sound will be almost impossible to
evaluate.
Investigating the possibility of tsunamis in Puget Sound is a good
example of USGS-NOAA cooperation. Under the NTHMP, Washington State
asked USGS and NOAA to consider this issue. The USGS and NOAA jointly
convened a panel of experts to discuss shallow earthquake faults in the
inland waters and consider their potential to generate tsunamis.
Washington State's request was built on the Seattle fault geologic
history, which generated a tsunami about 1100 years ago. That tsunami
overtopped the site of the current West Point Wastewater Treatment
plant in Seattle and has been traced as far north as Whidbey Island.
The expert panel developed reasonable fault parameters for several
major crustal faults that cross the inland waters. NOAA has completed
modeling a worst-case scenario for the Seattle fault and is now
beginning modeling on the Tacoma fault. Future modeling will likely
include the Southern Whidbey Island fault and the Devils Mountain-
Darrington fault. Modeling of the last fault is hindered by a lack of
high-resolution topographic data from LIDAR along much of the fault
trace.
Much of Seattle and the surrounding area is underlain by poorly
consolidated glacial materials that may be prone to landslides during
earthquakes in areas of steep slopes. In addition, the inland waters of
Washington are subject to landslides that sometimes cause local
tsunamis. Although not nearly as widespread as other types of tsunamis,
landslide driven tsunamis may have very high local run-up. Again, at
the request of Washington State, USGS and NOAA held a meeting to assess
possible landslide tsunami sources in the inland waters. Using a series
of maps showing steep, geologically unstable slopes and deep waters,
the panel designated sections of the inland waters as more likely than
others to generate tsunamis. NOAA is now studying the best way to use
the source areas in developing models of possible tsunami inundation
areas from landslides.
Question 6. Dr. Groat, I understand that it is most likely that a
tsunami hitting the Washington coast would originate from an earthquake
along the Cascadia plate rather than a deep ocean earthquake. I also
understand that there may be several ways to make our current tsunami
warning system more effective for mitigating hazards. For example, the
NSF's NEPTUNE program to wire the Juan de Fuca plate with fiber optic
lines seems to be supportive of these efforts. Do you feel that there
are other technologies or approaches Congress should consider funding
that might produce more timely warning for near shore generated
tsunamis?
Answer. There are certainly many reasons to take advantage of
collaborative opportunities in the region. Already, USGS and the
University of Washington are collaborating with the NSF-sponsored
Earthscope initiative that will improve deformation monitoring and
seismic capabilities in the region. With respect to NEPTUNE, there have
been discussions between the university departments responsible for
NEPTUNE and the Pacific Northwest Seismic Network about studying
possible deployment of offshore seismometers.
The greatest benefit of offshore seismometers would be more
reliable earthquake locations for events occurring there. Some offshore
seismometers might help resolve the forces producing the occasional
offshore earthquake west of Oregon and Washington, and that would give
seismologists a better understanding of these events. However, improved
locations would still be within the time constraints discussed in the
above questions, meaning that ongoing, consistent education would
remain their best hope for people on the beach of surviving a
devastating Cascadia earthquake and tsunami.
Question 7. Dr. Groat, confronted with a fresh reminder of the
potential devastation of an off-shore, tsunami-causing earthquake, I
share Senator Stevens' concern about ensuring sufficient warning
systems are in place so that loss of human life can be minimized.
Senator Stevens requested an estimation of what it would take to
establish a comprehensive tsunami notification system. I am very
interested in your response and ask that you please forward me a copy
of your answer to Senator Stevens' question.
Answer. Sen. Stevens and Sen. Inouye jointly asked USGS to explain
how we could improve public notification of impending natural hazards
and disasters. The components of the USGS answer related to earthquakes
and tsunamis follow:
The USGS could improve public hazard notification and warning of
natural hazards in three basic areas: (1) modernization and expansion
of seismic monitoring networks; (2) increased robustness and redundancy
of electronic communication links; and, (3) accelerated development and
deployment of capabilities to take full advantage of new data streams,
research findings and communication technologies to improve the
accuracy and timeliness of information we provide for emergency
response and management.
(1) Modernization and expansion of monitoring networks
The President's proposal for improving tsunami warning systems
would replace legacy hardware and software systems at the USGS National
Earthquake Information Center (NEIC) and establish 247
operations, actions that will improve response time, benefiting both
earthquake notification and tsunami warning. The proposal also includes
support to improve station up-time in the Global Seismographic Network
(GSN)--a partnership of USGS, the National Science Foundation, the
Incorporated Research Institutions for Seismology, and the University
of California--and to install additional stations in the Caribbean
region. The NEIC modernization is a key component of the Advanced
National Seismic System (ANSS). As described in USGS Circular 1188, the
ANSS plan includes both notification and early warning of earthquakes
as fundamental goals.
(2) Robust telemetry and communication links
For rapid-onset events like earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic
eruptions and landslides, only real-time systems can provide data in
sufficient time to issue actionable notifications and warnings. The
funding in the FY 2005 Emergency Supplemental for improved tsunami
detection and warning system for the United States, along with the
funding in the 2006 budget for the same purpose, will expand and
improve telemetry connections to monitoring stations, so that the
seismic stations in the Global Seismographic Network provide real-time
data. This will contribute to decreasing the reporting time for global
earthquakes from over one hour to about twenty minutes.
USGS data and products often travel across a web of communications
links from the monitoring network to the public, typically involving
satellite uplinks and downlinks, the Internet, and radio or television
bands. Although some USGS systems employ redundant links (e.g.,
satellite, phone lines, and/or Internet communications), in many cases
the communications channels are vulnerable to a single point of
failure. Hardening of these telecommunication links is essential to
ensure a reliable warning system is available with the appropriate
level of redundancy.
As part of the NEIC upgrade, the President's proposal calls for
247 network operations and robust Internet serving of seismic
data. It would also increase the number of USGS-operated GSN stations
that provide real-time data to NEIC and the NOAA tsunami warning
centers. Currently, only 80% of GSN stations have digital telemetry
links that allow for real-time communication. Both for the GSN and the
ANSS, a fully telemetered system with redundant communications links
will improve response time for damaging earthquakes.
(3) New capabilities
The President's proposal for upgrading NEIC will accelerate
development of several rapid-response products, including the Prompt
Assessment of Global Earthquakes for Response (PAGER) system, which
uses information about an earthquake's source, combined with
information regarding population and infrastructure in the affected
region to estimate potential damage and loss of life in a major
earthquake. The PAGER system is ideal for both domestic and
international areas where a dense seismic network is not available, but
where a rapid assessment is critical for estimating impact.
The USGS is exploring the feasibility of earthquake detection and
early warning, in which rapid computer analysis and communication links
are used to provide seconds of warning before earthquake waves arrive.
Such warning systems are in place in Japan, Mexico and Taiwan. The 2000
reauthorization of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program
(NEHRP) called for development of a U.S. early warning system for
earthquakes. The USGS currently sponsors modest research and
development in this area, including research on earthquake early
warning feasibility and efforts to improve the numbers of seismic
stations reporting in real time and the speed and reliability of
earthquake reporting.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Charles G. Groat
Tsunami and Earthquake Program Compatibility. As you may know,
Congress recently enacted this Committee's reauthorization of the
multi-agency National Earthquake Hazard Mitigation Program (NEHRP),
which is aimed at both improving earthquake detection and community
resilience to earthquakes--including building construction and planning
guidelines. Similarly, S. 50, would authorize NOAA's National Tsunami
Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP), another multi-agency program
involving many of the witnesses here today.
Question 1. Looking at these two programs together, are the
activities of the Earthquake Program consistent with the goals of the
Tsunami program? For instance, is a building designed to be earthquake
resilient also designed to be resilient against tsunami?
Answer. Because earthquakes are the triggering mechanism for most
tsunamis, NEHRP activities aimed at improving seismic monitoring
capabilities are directly relevant to improved tsunami warnings. The
2000 reauthorization of NEHRP authorized the development of the
Advanced National Seismic System (ANSS). The data from ANSS stations is
provided to the NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers. In addition, NSF's George
E. Brown Jr. Network for Earthquake Engineering Simulation (NEES)
facility, authorized as part of NEHRP legislation, includes a tsunami-
wave tank at Oregon State University that is making significant
contribution to our understanding of tsunami phenomena.
With respect to the second part of this question, the forces
generated by a tsunami wave are different from those generated by
strong seismic shaking, and the building design for the earthquakes
does not necessarily address the hydrodynamic forces generated by
tsunamis. USGS is not directly involved in the issuance of model
building codes, although USGS data provides a critical input to the
process. This question would be best directed to our NEHRP partner
agencies, NIST and FEMA. FEMA is in the process of developing model
tsunami inundation zone vertical evacuation shelter construction
guidance for coastal areas, a project that was initiated before the
Sumatra earthquake and tsunami brought this issue to the forefront.
Question 2. Does the Earthquake Program have any programs or
approaches that should be adopted by the Tsunami program? For example,
should we expand programs regarding construction and planning?
Answer. The USGS operates seismic networks in order to record data
from large earthquakes. We conduct extensive research on this data to
document the amount of shaking that earthquakes can generate and to
predict the probability of strong shaking for the entire nation. This
information is utilized by engineers to make improvements to the
International Building Code so that structures can withstand the
shaking from strong earthquakes.
This collaboration between engineering seismologists in the USGS
Earthquake Hazards Program and the engineers who are responsible for
modifications of the building code serves as a model for developing
structures that could withstand the forces of a tsunami.
Hydrodynamicists can study and model these forces for input to
engineers developing building codes for inundation areas.
Question 3. Has the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
participated meaningfully or financially in either program? Are there
limitations that we should know about?
Answer. FEMA plays a crucial role in both programs, ensuring that
fundamental and applied research activities are implemented into loss-
reduction practice. FEMA's role in the NTHMP flexes according to the
needs of the five Pacific states. During the first formative years of
the program, the mitigation budget was divided between the five states
and FEMA, with FEMA running a multi-state project. However, rather than
transfer funds to FEMA for a multi-state project, a few years ago the
Steering Committee decided to support these projects through a grant
directly to one of the states. Currently, the NTHMP is funding the
Guidelines for Construction in Tsunami Inundation Zones, a multi-state
program effort, through Washington State. FEMA Headquarters has
contributed about $250K to match the funding from NTHMP for this
effort.
Question 4. How can we improve coordination and better define
agency roles in our legislation?
Answer. The NTHMP program has provided the impetus for interagency
coordination and cooperation. Under guidance of a federal-state
steering committee, the need for reducing the hazard of future tsunamis
has been foremost in guiding cooperative efforts by NOAA, FEMA, and
USGS. Continued support for this program, with a strong interagency
steering committee and active interaction at the working level, is in
the best interest of furthering this work. No single federal agency has
the resources or mission to address this complex hazard.
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Mark Pryor to
Charles G. Groat
Voice Sirens for Effective, Reliable Tsunami Warning
Effective tsunami warning should rely on a variety of redundant
modes of communication. While there are several technologies for
communicating tsunami warnings highlighted in the Tsunami Preparedness
Act of 2005 (S. 50), it is a concern that voice capable sirens are not
among the technologies mentioned. Emergency managers have long depended
on sirens to warn the public of emergency and civil defense situations
including tsunamis, tornados, floods, hurricanes, hazardous material
accidents, and of a potential nuclear attack.
Sirens have a number of significant advantages: they insure that
all residents and visitors to a particular area can be informed without
regard to the cell phone or pager technology platform or provider they
may have, when equipped with backup power supplies they will work even
when the electricity or phone lines are out; when equipped with live
public address or pre-recorded messages they can be used BEFORE and
AFTER the incident to communicate important public safety information.
Question 1. Without the use of/installation of voice sirens as part
of a preparedness plan, how do you warn people on the ground? Are there
other effective warning systems available for this purpose? What
criteria are used to determine which warning system is reliable in case
of tsunami?
Question 2. Should a preparedness plan include a warning mechanism
for small fishing boats trawling near the coastline? National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather radios can be used to
inform these fishing boats at minimal cost (approximately $20).
Answer. USGS will defer to NOAA's responses to these questions.