[Senate Hearing 109-151]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-151
THE NOMINATION OF DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JANUARY 18 AND 19, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
22-847 WASHINGTON : 2005
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Day One--January 18, 2005
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana
Opening statement............................................ 1
Round One Questions.......................................... 22
Round Two Questions.......................................... 99
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., U.S. Senator from Delaware
Opening statement............................................ 4
Round One Questions.......................................... 26
Round Two Questions.......................................... 102
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, U.S. Senator from California,
introduction of the nominee.................................... 9
Rice, Dr. Condoleezza, nominee to be Secretary of State, opening
statement...................................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska
Prepared statement........................................... 30
Round One Questions.......................................... 31
Round Two Questions.......................................... 106
Sarbanes, Hon. Paul S., U.S. Senator from Maryland
Round One Questions.......................................... 35
Round Two Questions.......................................... 109
Chafee, Hon. Lincoln , U.S. Senator from Rhode Island
Round One Questions.......................................... 38
Round Two Questions.......................................... 114
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut
Round One Questions.......................................... 41
Round Two Questions.......................................... 116
Round Three Questions........................................ 145
Allen, George, U.S. Senator from Virginia
Round One Questions.......................................... 47
Round Two Questions.......................................... 121
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachussetts
Round One Questions.......................................... 50
Round Two Questions.......................................... 125
Round Three Questions........................................ 149
Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator from Minnesota
Round One Questions.......................................... 55
Round Two Questions.......................................... 128
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin
Round One Questions.......................................... 59
Round Two Questions.......................................... 131
Voinovich, Hon. George E., U.S. Senator from Ohio
Round One Questions.......................................... 63
Round Two Questions.......................................... 134
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California
Round One Questions.......................................... 67
Round Two Questions.......................................... 136
(III)
Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator from Alaska
Round One Questions.......................................... 74
Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from Florida
Round One Questions.......................................... 77
Alexander, Hon. Lamar, U.S. Senator from Tennessee
Prepared statement........................................... 84
Obama, Hon. Barack, U.S. Senator from Illinois
Round One Questions.......................................... 86
Round Two Questions.......................................... 141
Sununu, Hon. John E., U.S. Senator from New Hampshire
Round One Questions.......................................... 90
Martinez, Hon. Mel, U.S. Senator from Florida
Round One Questions.......................................... 93
Day Two--January 19, 2005
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana
Opening statement............................................ 165
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut
Round One Questions.......................................... 166
Chafee, Hon. Lincoln , U.S. Senator from Rhode Island
Round One Questions.......................................... 168
Round Two Questions.......................................... 192
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., U.S. Senator from Delaware
Opening statement............................................ 170
Round One Questions.......................................... 173
Round Two Questions.......................................... 192
Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator from Minnesota
Round One Questions.......................................... 175
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin
Round One Questions.......................................... 176
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California
Round One Questions.......................................... 179
Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from Florida
Round One Questions.......................................... 187
Obama, Hon. Barack, U.S. Senator from Illinois
Round One Questions.......................................... 189
Business Meeting--January 19, 2005
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California, closing
statement...................................................... 197
Allen, George, U.S. Senator from Virginia, closing statement..... 199
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachussetts, closing
statement...................................................... 200
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, closing
statement...................................................... 201
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut, closing
statement...................................................... 203
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., U.S. Senator from Delaware, closing
statement Biden................................................ 204
The Roll Call Vote............................................... 208
Appendixes
appendix i--responses to questions submitted for the record by members
of the committee to dr. condoleezza rice
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator
Richard Lugar.................................................. 211
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Joseph
R. Biden, Jr................................................... 246
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator
Russell Feingold............................................... 262
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Bill
Nelson......................................................... 265
appendix ii--additional material included in the record at the request
of members of the committee
Prepared Statement Submitted by Senator Russell Feingold
(Submitted as part of the 1/19/2005 Business Meeting Prior to
the Vote)...................................................... 273
Letter to the Chairman from the Department of State in reference
to DOS support for S. 2127..................................... 274
Charts Detailing U.S. Trade Deficits Submitted by Senator
Sarbanes....................................................... 275
``The Right Call,'' by L. Paul Bremer III, The Wall Street
Journal, January 12, 2005...................................... 278
Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's
WMD, 30 September 2004......................................... 280
Excerpts from The White House Regular Briefing, April 10, 2003,
Thursday....................................................... 281
Correspondence from the White House Regarding H.R. 10/S. 2845
(Intelligence Reform Legislation).............................. 283
THE NOMINATION OF DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE
----------
Day One
----------
Tuesday, January 18, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m. in Room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Allen, Coleman, Voinovich,
Alexander, Sununu, Murkowski, Martinez, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd,
Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
The Chairman. The committee is called to order.
Let me begin by welcoming distinguished new Members to the
committee who have joined us. I want to introduce Senator Lisa
Murkowski of Alaska, Senator Mel Martinez of Florida, Senator
Barack Obama of Illinois. We're delighted that you have chosen
to be on this committee, and we assure you that we will have
activity and, we hope, progress. We appreciate your coming with
us, and appreciate all Members' attendance this morning.
We will proceed with an opening statement, that I will
give. In the event that the distinguished Ranking Member,
Senator Biden, arrives during that time, he will then deliver
his statement. If he does not, he'll deliver the statement
following Dr. Rice's statement and before our questioning. And
I will ask, after the two opening statements, our distinguished
colleague from California, Senator Feinstein, to introduce Dr.
Rice.
The Committee on Foreign Relations meets today to consider
the nomination of Dr. Condoleezza Rice to be Secretary of
State. We are especially pleased to welcome Dr. Rice to the
committee. As a result of her distinguished service as National
Security Advisor to President Bush in her earlier assignments
on the NSC, she is well known to many Members of this
committee, and we admire her accomplishments. We're
particularly thankful for the cooperation that she has provided
to this committee in its work.
The enormously complex job before Dr. Rice will require all
of her talents and experience. American credibility in the
world, progress in the war on terrorism, and our relationships
with our allies will be greatly affected by the Secretary of
State's actions and the effectiveness of the State Department
in the coming years. Dr. Rice is highly qualified to meet those
challenges. We recognize the deep personal commitment necessary
to undertake this difficult assignment, and we are grateful
that a leader of her stature is willing to step forward.
The Secretary of State serves as the President's top
foreign-policy advisor, as our nation's most visible emissary
to the rest of the world, as a manager of one of the most
important departments of our government. Any one of those jobs
would be a challenge for even the most talented of public
servants, but the Secretary of State, at this critical time in
our history, must excel in all three roles.
Since 2001, we have witnessed terrorists killing thousands
of people in this country and destroying the World Trade Center
and a part of the Pentagon. We have seen United States military
personnel engaged in two difficult and costly wars. We have
seen the expansion of a nihilistic form of terrorism that is
only loosely attached to political objectives and is,
therefore, very difficult to deter. We have seen frequent
expressions of virulent anti-Americanism in many parts of the
Islamic world. We have seen our alliances, our international
standing, and our budget strained by the hard choices that we
have had to make in response to terrorism.
In this context, many diplomatic tasks must be approached
with urgency. In particular, our success in Iraq is critical.
The elections scheduled for January 30 must go forward, and the
United States must work closely with Iraqi authorities to
achieve the fairest and most complete outcome possible. At the
same time, we must understand that those forces that want to
keep Iraq in chaos will commit violence and intimidation. Both
Iraqis and the coalition will have to be resilient and flexible
in the elections' aftermath.
The Bush administration and the State Department also must
devote themselves to achieving a settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict; to coming to grips with the nuclear proliferation
problems in Iran and North Korea; to continuing urgent
humanitarian efforts in Sudan, the Indian Ocean region and
elsewhere; to maintaining our commitment to the global fight
against HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases; to advancing
democracy in Afghanistan, Ukraine, and elsewhere; to repairing
alliances with longstanding friends in Europe; to
reinvigorating our economic and security relationships in our
own hemisphere; and to engaging with rapidly changing national
powers, especially China, India, and Russia.
Even though this list of diplomatic priorities is daunting,
it is not exhaustive and does not anticipate unforeseeable
events. Just weeks ago, none of us could have predicted that an
earthquake and a tsunami would change the face of the Indian
Ocean region. Our efforts must include the expansion of our
foreign-policy capabilities so that we will be better prepared
for crises that cannot be averted, and better able to prevent
those that can be.
I would like to outline a handful of initiatives brought
forward by this committee on which I would ask for your
assistance.
First, the committee intends to report out a Foreign
Affairs Authorization Bill no later than March. With the
support of the Senate leadership, I am confident that the
obstacles to Senate passage that we have encountered in the
past will be overcome. It is crucial that the executive branch,
especially the State Department, works together with our
committee on this legislation. Not only does the authorization
fund the Department and foreign affairs programs, it also
contains personnel and other authorities important for the
Department to carry on its work effectively and efficiently. We
will be calling upon you for you advice and to exercise your
considerable persuasive power at key moments as the legislation
works its way through Congress.
Second, the Bush administration must continue its efforts
to safeguard and destroy vulnerable stockpiles of weapons of
mass destruction. To this end, I plan to reintroduce
legislation designed to eliminate impediments to the Nunn-Lugar
program. My bill would drop conditions on weapons dismantlement
work that in the past have slowed or threatened to slow the
urgent task of eliminating nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons. Furthermore, the legislation removes the $50 million
cap on the President's ability to utilize Nunn-Lugar funds
outside the former Soviet Union.
I will also reintroduce the Conventional Arms Threat
Reduction Act, designed to improve the State Department's
efforts to combat the proliferation of advanced conventional
weapons, including MANPADS. The bill would unify program
planning, coordination, and implementation of a global strategy
into one office at the State Department.
Third, we must ensure the State Department has adequate
resources to do the difficult job it faces. Under the
leadership of President Bush, the administration has requested
major funding increases for the State Department and U.S.
foreign policy objectives. You have argued successfully for the
creation of new foreign policy tools, including the Millennium
Challenge account, the Global AIDS Initiative, and the new
Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization.
The State Department's Diplomatic Readiness Initiative,
launched by Secretary Powell, has made great progress in
addressing personnel shortfalls in the Foreign Service. In
addition, the State Department has continued an efficient
program to upgrade security at U.S. missions around the world.
Even though Congress has failed to provide all the funds
requested by the President to strengthen the State Department
and U.S. foreign policy capabilities, this committee is
enthusiastic about the progress that you have made so far. We
want to work with you to achieve the President's vision of
reinvigorated diplomatic capabilities.
Finally, I would like to highlight a crucial need that has
been identified by Members of this committee. Our country must
improve its capacity to stabilize failing or war-torn nations,
and to assist in their reconstruction. If we are to deny
sanctuaries to terrorists, a goal identified by the 9/11
Commission as a top priority, we must improve planning and
organization for post-conflict reconstruction operations.
Last year, the Foreign Relations Committee unanimously
passed the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management
Act of 2004. I appreciate the State Department's letter
endorsing the purposes of S. 2127, and I ask that the letter be
submitted in the record.
[The letter referred to by Chairman Lugar appears in
Appendix II of this hearing transcript.]
The Chairman. In addition, a study done by the Defense
Science Board endorses the legislation. The State Department
has now established an Office for Reconstruction and
Stabilization, as called for in the legislation.
The new office, headed by Carlos Pasqual, is doing a
government-wide inventory of the civilian assets that might be
available for stabilization and reconstruction tasks. It is
also pursuing the idea proposed in S. 2127 of a Readiness
Reserve to enable rapid mobilization of post-conflict
stabilization personnel.
In addition, I hope that the office will develop the
concept of a 250-person active-duty Response Readiness Corps.
In Army terms, this is less than a small battalion of well-
trained people--a modest but vigorous force-multiplier that
would greatly improve our nation's stabilization capacity. This
Corps would be composed of State Department and USAID employees
who have the experience and the technical skills to manage
stabilization and reconstruction tasks in a hostile
environment. I consider this new office to be one of the most
important long-term defenses that the State Department can
mount against future acts of terrorism. I would urge the State
Department to embrace the concept of a well-funded civilian
stabilization and reconstruction capability.
Dr. Rice, we welcome you to the committee on this historic
occasion. We look forward to a dialogue that will illuminate
the direction of United States foreign policy for Members of
this committee and for the American people, who are observing
this hearing.
Now, at this point, I would normally call upon Senator
Biden, but I would say, on his behalf, his train was canceled.
He took the next one possible, and he will be here momentarily.
We appreciate that very special effort.
I'm going to call now upon Senator Feinstein, our
distinguished colleague from California, for her introduction
of Secretary----
Ah, in the nick of time. Indeed, the distinguished Ranking
Member has arrived. And I'll talk for a few minutes to give you
a chance to catch your breath. And then if you will proceed
with your opening statement.
Senator Biden. I'm ready, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Biden. My purpose in being here today is to get
more money for Amtrak. I want to know your position on that,
Madam Secretary.
Dr. Rice, welcome. If I'm somewhat out of breath, it's
because I am. There's very few people I'd run from the station
for. And I welcome you, as you already have been welcomed.
And I'd also like to welcome the new Members of the
committee--Senator Obama, Murkowski, and also a man who sat in
your chair in a different committee, the distinguished Senator
from Florida. And I want to welcome back, although I don't see
him here right now, our good friend, John Kerry, a long-time
member.
Dr. Rice, I congratulate you and President Bush on your
nomination. We've enjoyed frequent discussions, maybe more than
you would have liked, over the past four years in your office
and in the Oval Office. And I've enjoyed our meetings. And I
hope this will be the first of many visits before this
committee.
As you know as well as anyone, America faces two overriding
national security challenges in this century. We must first win
the struggle between freedom and radical Islamic
fundamentalism, and, in my view, with the leadership of the
Chairman of this committee, Senator Lugar, keep the world's
most dangerous weapons away from its most dangerous people. To
prevail, we obviously have to be strong, but we also have to be
smart, wielding the force of our ideas and our ideals, as well
as the force of our arms.
Today, after a necessary war in Afghanistan and a optional
war in Iraq, we're rightly confident in the example of our
power. But we have sometimes forgotten the power of our
example. Foreign policy is not a popularity contest, as you
well know. We have to confront hard issues, and sometimes it
simply requires us to make hard choices that other countries
don't like. But, above all, these hard decisions require
American leadership--the kind that persuades others to follow.
We've been having a tough time doing that the past few years;
that is, persuading others to follow.
Clearly, we pay a price, in my view, for being the world's
sole superpower--we inspire as much envy and resentment as we
do admiration and gratitude, even if we do everything
correctly, in my view. But the fact is, relations with many of
our oldest friends are, quite frankly, scraping the bottom
right now, and we need to heed the advice of the President of
the United States, just before his first inaugural, when he
talked about acting with humility as well as force.
In the Muslim world--despite the hundreds of thousands of
Muslims that we have helped save in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and, yes, in my view, in Iraq, as well, our
motives are still suspect, our actions are resented, and, as
bizarre as it sounds to most Americans, the polls show that
Osama bin Laden has a higher approval rating than, not only
President Bush, but than America, as a whole, in most of those
areas. And the result is that, despite our great military
might, we are, in my view, more alone in the world than we've
been in any time in recent memory. And the time for diplomacy,
in my view, is long overdue.
As a result, we're in--in my view, a less secure position
than we should be in the world. That's because virtually all
the threats we face--from terrorism to the spread of weapons of
mass destruction to rogue states flouting the rules to the
pandemic diseases that we face now, and will face--can be
solved solely by American soldiers, by themselves. America is
much more secure working with, and reaching out to, others than
it is walking alone.
And I believe the heart of your mission must be to help
rebuild America's power to persuade and to restore our nation
to the respect it once enjoyed; quite frankly, for our own
safety's sake. And it's going to be very difficult to achieve
any of this until we find a way forward in Iraq.
This committee has worked hard across party lines to
support the President's decision to hold Saddam Hussein to
account. In return, prior to going in, we asked the
administration to do two things: one was to build a broad and
deep international coalition, and, two, develop a detailed plan
to win the peace. We held extensive hearings, as you know, and
we had many discussions in this committee--back in the bad old
days, when I was chairman, and then immediately after that,
when the Chairman took over, not about the day after--we held
detailed hearings about the decade after. And the
administration, in my view, neither generated a deep
international coalition nor had a plan to win the peace. And I
think we're paying a very heavy price for it now.
We also asked the administration, most importantly, to
level with the American people about how hard and dangerous
Iraq was going to be, and how long it was going to take, and,
to our best judgment, how much it was going to cost.
You may remember, just prior to going in, we had a meeting
with congressional leaders--you were present, Secretary of
State, Secretary of Defense--in the Cabinet room. And the
President, as he often does--he's engaging--leaned over to me
and publicly said, in front of all our colleagues, ``Joe, why
aren't you with me?'' He called me ``Mr. Chairman,'' which I'm
not. I'm flattered he did that, but he really understands who
the chairman is. He said, ``Mr. Chairman, why aren't you with
me?'' You may remember, I said then, and publicly many times,
``Mr. President, I'll be with you when two things occur. One,
when you, in fact, indicate what you're going to do after we
win, because winning's not going to be the hard part; and, two,
level with the American people about the cost, the price
they're going to have to pay.''
I think one thing we all learned--whether we were for or
against the war in Vietnam, whether we went or didn't go--of
the Vietnam generation is that no foreign policy can be
sustained without the informed consent of the American people.
The informed consent.
And I think the only people who leveled with us before the
war--like General Shinseki, who said it would take several
hundred-thousand troops to secure Iraq, and the Economic
Advisor, Larry Lindsay, who said it would cost upward of $200
billion--were shown the door. And, since the war, Ambassador
Bremer has indicated that he said he needed more force, and
didn't get it. Field generals, with whom I have spoken on my
three trips since 2003 to Iraq, have indicated that they need
more force. And we keep hearing from the Defense Department and
the President, ``No, we're winning, and we don't need any
additional force, and we haven't needed any additional force
for the past two years.''
Just last week, very quietly, the administration ended its
search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Not much
fanfare. The administration concluded that the reason for going
to war--weapons of mass destruction--did not exist, they found
nothing, and said so. Quietly.
And the National Intelligence Council, the CIA's think
tank, concluded that Iraq has replaced Afghanistan as the
training ground for the next generation of terrorists,
something it was not before the war.
Despite all that, we now learn from the President that
there's no reason to hold any administration officials
accountable for mistakes or misjudgments in Iraq. According to
the President, ``We had an accountability moment, and that's
called the 2004 elections.''
Dr. Rice, I hope that you, as Secretary of State--and I'm
confident you will be confirmed Secretary of State, and I plan
on voting for you as Secretary of State--I hope you will demand
accountability from the people who serve you if, heaven forbid,
they mis-serve you to the extent that our country has been, in
my view, mis-served in Iraq. This is not about punishing people
or embarrassing the President; it's about learning from our
mistakes so we don't repeat them. And a second term is also a
second chance, and I hope the President will seize it. I hope
he will seize it, quite frankly, by rejecting the neo-
conservative notion about how we are going to, in fact, secure
Iraq and the Middle East.
So I hope we can start leveling today. We'd like to hear
how you see the road ahead in Iraq. What should the American
people expect about what we can achieve, and when we can hope
to achieve it, and how we are going to succeed? I, for one,
want to work with you toward success, but I hope you'll not
give Wolfowitz answers by saying, ``It is unknowable.'' There's
a whole heck of a lot that is knowable.
Iraq is an overwhelming issue. And this administration,
like its predecessors and the seven Presidents with whom I've
served, is only human. Every major problem winds up on the desk
of the same senior people. The same senior people. Every
problem. This is not a criticism; it's an observation. It's not
possible--in my experience of observing seven Presidents up
close and personal--to give every challenge the attention it
deserves.
Consequently, it's understandable that, while we're focused
on Iraq, other problems remained, if not on the back burner,
not getting full attention. But now, some of those pots are
boiling over, starting with the nuclear program in North Korea
and Iran, the dangerous backsliding of democracy in Russia, the
genocide in Sudan, and the lack of focus on public diplomacy,
which I hope, and I expect, you'll talk about.
Over the past few years, North Korea has increased its
nuclear capacity by as much as 400 percent, and now may have as
many as eight nuclear weapons which it could test, hide, or
sell to the highest bidder. You have said, ``It is
unacceptable,'' for North Korea to have nuclear weapons. What
does that mean? And what do you propose to do to stop this
growing threat?
Over the past few years, the reform movement in Iran has
been literally crushed in front of the whole world. Surrounded
by about 200,000 forces, it very openly just reached out and
crushed the democracy movement. So much for the notion of
leveraging power.
Over the past four years, things have gotten considerably
worse in Iran, and it's accelerated its own nuclear program.
There may be nothing we can do to persuade Iran not to develop
weapons, mass destruction. But our European allies are trying,
through a combination of carrots and sticks. They believe they
cannot succeed unless the United States engages in this effort.
And, in my view--and it may not be true; I'm anxious to hear
what you have to say--we seem to be sitting on the sidelines.
What do you propose we do to diffuse--or, if necessary,
defeat--this emerging danger?
Over the past few years, President Putin has reversed the
course of democratic development, human rights and the rule of
law in Russia. The administration has been largely silent. How
can we be so concerned about the advancement of democracy in
the Middle East and so unconcerned about the regression in
Russia? At the same time, we've gotten little return for
turning the blind eye to Russia's regression. Just the last
week, the press reported--hopefully it's not true, but I worry
it may be that Russia is about to sell new missiles to Syria,
which would threaten stability and progress toward peace in the
Middle East.
One of the most important programs to protect America's
security--the effort to help Russia account for, secure, and
destroy weapons of mass destruction and related materials--has
become mired in red tape that the two presidents need to cut
through. How are we going to approach this problem? How are you
going to approach it as Secretary of State?
And, finally, the administration has done, in my view, an
admirable job of promoting peace between North and South in
Sudan. But in Darfur, we have watched a terrible tragedy
unfold, as militia supported by the Sudanese government have
killed as many as 100,000 civilians and chased as many as two
million from their homes.
I literally, as I was getting off the train, spoke to Jack
Danforth, who called me. He said he hoped I would keep an open
mind about the notion of carrots and sticks to deal with this
problem. I'd like to know how--it seemed as though that process
worked in Libya. I can't believe, had we not made the
concessions or agreements we made relative to oil and their
ability to produce more in cooperation from the West, and us in
particular, I doubt very much, in my meeting, that--I will be
precise--when I went to meet with Qaddafi, I believe, at the
President's request; I know it was at yours--I am confident
that--and I think you did an incredible job--I'm confident that
it wouldn't have happened unless there were carrots, as well.
The last four years, we've not seen many carrots except there,
and that process started earlier.
Four months ago, before this committee, Secretary Powell
rightly called what was going on in Sudan ``genocide.'' Since
then, the situation has gotten worse. What do you believe the
administration and Congress can do, now, to stop this slaughter
and to help African allies develop their own peacekeeping
capacity?
There's much, much more to talk about that we'll not be
able to talk about here at this hearing. Relations with
emerging powers like China, fault-line friends like India and
Pakistan, long-time allies in Europe and Asia, and, closer to
home, the troubled--but ignored in many respects--Latin
America.
I've spent a little bit of time in Europe recently, and I
have one simple message: ``Get over it. Get over it. President
Bush is our President for the next four years, so get over it
and start to act in your interest, Europe.'' But that requires
us to engage the hoped-for diplomacy from the gentlelady from
Stanford.
We want to hear your thoughts about bolstering our capacity
to handle post-conflict reconstruction. I listened on the
radio, and I know you spoke about that. Chairman Lugar has
drafted important legislation to do just that, which I was
pleased to cosponsor. And I hope you'll support it.
And I intend to ask you about a source of urgent
opportunity: the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Abu Mazen's
election may provide a rare second chance to forge a lasting,
secure peace in Israel and to give the Palestinians a state of
their own. I'd like to know what you believe we should do to
seize this opportunity, and how urgent you think it is.
But let me end with something you've talked about and that
I hope you will elaborate on today: putting diplomacy back at
the center of America's foreign policy. I strongly agree that
this is a time for a new diplomatic offensive with old friends,
rising powers and even hostile regimes, but it has to be
sustained, it has to be persistent, and it has to do as much
listening as it does talking. And it has to use all the tools
at our disposal--our military might, but also our intelligence,
our public diplomacy, our alliances, international
organizations, treaties and agreements, development assistance,
trade and investment--even if it is frustrating, even if the
payoff takes years, even if it takes a generation.
You often point out to me privately, and to others, with
some degree of accuracy, in my view, that the corresponding
difficulty after World War II and the corresponding
difficulty--corresponding to the situation in Iraq--I'm not
sure how applicable it is, but one way it clearly was a major,
major, major, major piece of our post-reconstruction effort in
Germany and after World War II was diplomacy, public diplomacy.
We convinced many parts of the world that our ideas were
ascendant, that we provided what was needed, and would provide
what was needed, to bring security to the region, and freedom.
I remember when Lech Walesa first walked into my office,
like he did to many of us here, he walked up, and I said,
``Congratulations''--I said, ``Solidarity.'' He said, ``No, no,
no, Radio Free Europe. Radio Free Europe.''
Now we're faced with a new but no less dangerous set of
challenges, and it seems to me we have to recapture the
totality of America's strength. Above all, we must understand
that those who spread radical Islamic fundamentalism and
weapons of mass destruction although they may be beyond our
reach--we have to defeat them, but there are hundreds of
millions of hearts and minds around the world that are open to
American ideas and ideals. There are 1.2 billion Muslims in the
world, and we have to reach out to them.
So I'm looking forward to working with you to do just that;
I'm anxious to hear what you have to say, and I'll have some
questions.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to make my
statement. And, again, welcome.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden. I
call now on Senator Feinstein for her introduction.
STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Feinstein: Thank you very much.
Chairman Lugar, Ranking Member Biden, distinguished Members
of the Foreign Relations Committee, it gives me great pleasure
to introduce a friend and fellow Californian, Dr. Condoleezza
Rice, as the President's nominee to be the next Secretary of
State.
Dr. Rice's story began 50 years ago with her birth in
Birmingham, Alabama. A precocious child, she began piano
lessons at age three, could read by five, and skipped the first
and seventh grades. She attended public schools before
enrolling at Birmingham Southern Conservatory of Music in 1964.
Her mother and father are here in spirit today. Her father, an
educator and pastor, aptly nicknamed his only child Little
Star. Today, she is, indeed, a big star.
Dr. Rice's family moved to Denver, Colorado, in 1969, where
she entered an integrated school for the first time as a tenth
grader. Staying close to home, she opted for the University of
Denver, and was awarded her B.A. degree, with honors, at the
age of 19.
By this time, Dr. Rice was engrossed with Soviet military
issues and the related problems of arms control. She began her
graduate studies on the topic at Notre Dame, and was awarded an
M.A. degree in 1975. Thereafter, she returned to the University
of Denver to finish her dissertation on the Czech military's
effect on society.
Dr. Rice's career as an academician then brought her to my
alma mater, Stanford University, in 1981, where she became an
assistant professor of political science. During this time, she
authored ``Uncertain Allegiance, The Soviet Union and
Czechoslovak Army, 1948 to 1963,'' and continued to follow her
great interests in football and piano.
From 1989 to 1991, in the first Bush administration, she
proved her mettle in government for the first time as a senior
director for Soviet Affairs and East European Affairs at the
National Security Council. President George Bush had this to
say about her abilities, quote, ``Condi was brilliant. She
disarms the biggest of big-shots. Why? Because they know she
knows what she is talking about,'' end quote.
It was then back to Stanford in the early 1990s, where she
was named provost of the university. She was the first woman,
first African American, and the youngest person, at age 38, to
hold the position, in the school's history. For six years, she
managed a one-and-a-half-billion-dollar school budget, 1400
faculty members, and 14,000 students.
She returned to the White House, as the first African
American woman to serve as National Security Advisor, in
January 2001.
As a young girl, Condi stood at the gates of 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue with her father, telling him that, quote,
``Daddy, I'm barred out of there now because of the color of my
skin, but one day I'll be in that house,'' end quote. She's
delivered on that promise. Now she is the President's choice to
be our country's next Secretary of State.
As both the Chairman and the Ranking Member have so well
stated, American foreign policy today is at a crossroads--in
Iraq, across the Middle East, in North Korea, in our relations
with China, and in so many other places we face major
challenges. I would submit that Dr. Rice has the skill, the
judgment, and the poise and the leadership to lead in these
difficult times. If confirmed, she will have the deep, personal
trust and confidence of the President, a real asset. She has
been by his side for every crucial national security decision
in the last four years. My sense is that the President trusts
her implicitly. When Dr. Rice meets with Hu Jintao or Arial
Sharon or Vladimir Putin, there will be no doubt that she
speaks for, and on behalf of, the President of the United
States.
The problems we face abroad are complex and sizeable. If
Dr. Rice's past performance is any indication, though, we can
rest easy. It's difficult to know ahead of time how anyone will
perform as Secretary of State. Time and events test vision,
facile thinking, and resolute problem-solving. But, indeed,
this is a remarkable woman that I introduce to you today, and
it is with great pride that I do so.
The Chairman. Well, Senator Feinstein, we thank you for a
truly remarkable introduction of our candidate.
And, Dr. Rice, before I call upon you for the opening
statement, I'm going to ask you to rise and to raise your right
hand so that I might administer the oath.
Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Dr. Rice. I do.
The Chairman. I thank you. Please proceed with your
statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, NOMINEE TO BE
SECRETARY OF STATE
Dr. Rice. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, and Members of
the committee. I'd also like to thank Senator Dianne Feinstein,
who, as a fellow Californian, I have admired as a leader on
behalf of our state and our nation, and on whose wise counsel I
have relied, and will continue to rely.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, it is an honor to
be nominated to lead the State Department at this critical
time, a time of challenge and hope and opportunity for America.
September 11th, 2001, was a defining moment for our nation
and for the world. Under the vision and leadership of President
Bush, our nation has risen to meet the challenges of our time,
fighting tyranny and terror, and securing the blessings of
freedom and prosperity for a new generation. The work that
America and our allies have undertaken, and the sacrifices we
have made, have been difficult and necessary and right.
Now is the time to build on these achievements to make the
world safer and to make the world more free. We must use
American diplomacy to help create a balance of power in the
world that favors freedom. The time for diplomacy is now.
I am humbled by President Bush's confidence in me to
undertake the great work of leading American diplomacy at such
a moment in history. If confirmed, I will work with the Members
of this Congress, from both sides of the aisle, to build a
strong bipartisan consensus behind American foreign policy. I
will seek to strengthen our alliances, to support our friends,
and to make the world safer and better. It is a time to reflect
on this challenge, and I do so humbly.
I will enlist the great talents of the men and women of the
State Department, the Foreign and Civil Services, and our
Foreign Service nationals. And if I am confirmed, I will be
especially honored to succeed a man--a man that I so admire, my
friend and my mentor, Colin Powell.
Four years ago, Secretary Powell addressed this committee
for the same purpose that I do now. Then, as now, it was the
same week that America celebrates the life and legacy of Dr.
Martin Luther King. It is a time to reflect on the legacy of
that great man, on the sacrifices he made, on the courage of
the people he led, and on the progress our nation has made in
the decades since. I, personally, am indebted to those who
fought and sacrificed in the civil-rights movement so that I
could be here today.
For me, this is a time to remember other heroes, as well. I
grew up in Birmingham, Alabama--the old Birmingham, of ``Bull''
Connor and church bombings and voter intimidation, the
Birmingham where Dr. King was thrown in jail for demonstrating
without a permit. Yet there was another Birmingham, the city
where my parents, John and Angelina Rice, and their friends
built a thriving community in the midst of terrible
segregation. It would have been so easy for them to give in to
despair and to send that message of hopelessness to their
children, but they refused to allow the limits and injustices
of their time to limit our horizons. My friends and I were
raised to believe that we could do or become anything, that the
only limits to our aspirations came from within. We were taught
not to listen to those who said, ``No, you can't.''
The story of Birmingham's parents and teachers and children
is a story of the triumph of universal values over adversity,
and those values, a belief in democracy and liberty, and the
dignity of every life and the rights of every individual, unite
Americans of all backgrounds, all faiths, and all colors. They
provide us a common cause and a rallying point in difficult
times, and they are a source of hope to men and women across
the globe who cherish freedom and work to advance freedom's
cause. And in these extraordinary times, it is the duty of all
of us--legislators and diplomats and civil servants and
citizens--to uphold and advance the values that are core to our
identity and that have lifted millions around the world.
One of history's clearest lessons is that America is safer,
and the world more secure, whenever and wherever freedom
prevails. It is neither an accident, nor a coincidence, that
the greatest threats of the last century emerged from
totalitarian movements. Fascism and communism differed in many
ways, but they shared an implacable hatred of freedom, a
fanatical assurance that their way was the only way, and a
supreme confidence that history was on their side.
At certain moments, it seemed that history might have been
on their side. During the first half of the 20th century, much
of the democratic and economic progress of earlier decades
looked to be swept away by the march of ruthless ideologies
armed with terrible military and technological power. Even
after the allied victory in World War II, many feared that
Europe, and perhaps the world, would be forced to permanently
endure half-enslaved and half-free.
The cause of freedom suffered a series of major setbacks--
communism imposed in Eastern Europe, Soviet power dominant in
East Germany, the coup in Czechoslovakia, the victory of
Chinese communists, the Soviet nuclear test five years ahead of
schedule, to name just a few. In those early years, the
prospect of a united democratic Germany and a democratic Japan
seemed farfetched.
Yet America and our allies were blessed with visionary
leaders who did not lose their way. They created the great NATO
Alliance to contain, and eventually erode, Soviet power, they
helped to establish the United Nations, and created an
international legal framework for this and other institutions
that have served the world well for more than 50 years. They
provided billions in aid to rebuild Europe and much of Asia.
They built on an international--they built an international
economic system, based on free trade and free markets, to
spread prosperity to every corner of the globe. And they
confronted the ideology and propaganda of our enemies with a
message of hope and with truth. And, in the end, though the end
was long in coming, their vision prevailed.
The challenges we face today are no less daunting. America
and the free world are, once again, engaged in a long-term
struggle against an ideology of hatred and tyranny and terror
and hopelessness, and we must confront these challenges with
the same vision and the same courage and the same boldness that
dominated our post-world-war period.
In these momentous times, America has great tasks, and
American diplomacy has great tasks. First, we will unite the
community of democracies in building an international system
that is based on shared values and the rule of law. Second, we
will strengthen the community of democracies to fight the
threats to our common security, and alleviate the hopelessness
that feeds terror. And, third, we will spread freedom and
democracy throughout the globe. That is the mission that
President Bush has set for America in the world, and it is the
great mission of American diplomacy today.
Let me address each of these three tasks.
Every nation that benefits from living on the right side of
freedom has an obligation to share freedom's blessings. Our
first challenge is to inspire the American people, and the
people of all free nations, to unite in common to commonly
solve problems that confront us. NATO and the European Union
and our democratic allies in East Asia and around the world
will be our strongest partners in this vital work.
The United States will also continue to work to support and
uphold the system of international rules and treaties that
allow us to take advantage of our freedom, to build our
economies, and to keep us safe and secure. We must remain
united in insisting that Iran and North Korea abandon their
nuclear-weapons ambitions and choose, instead, the path of
peace. New forums that emerge from the broader Middle East and
North Atlantic Initiative offer the ideal venues to encourage
economic, social, and democratic reform in the world.
Implementing the Doha development agenda and reducing trade
barriers will create jobs and reduce poverty in dozens of
nations. And by standing with the freed peoples of Iraq and
Afghanistan, we will continue to bring hope to millions, and
democracy to a part of the world where it is sorely lacking.
As President Bush said in our national security strategy,
America is guided by the conviction that no nation can build a
safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral
institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving
nations. If I am confirmed, that core conviction will guide my
actions. Yet when judging a course of action, I will never
forget that the true measure of its worth is its effectiveness.
Our second great task is to strengthen the community of
democracy so that all free nations are equal to the work before
us. Free peoples everywhere are heartened by the success of
democracy around the globe. Together, we must build on that
success.
We face many challenges. In some parts of the world, an
extremist view threaten the very existence of political
liberty. Disease and poverty have the potential to destabilize
whole nations and whole regions. Corruption can sap the
foundations of democracy. And some elected leaders have taken
illiberal steps that, if not corrected, could undermine hard-
won progress for democracy.
We must do all that we can to ensure that nations which
make the hard choices and do the hard work to join the free
world deliver on the high hopes of those citizens for better
lives. From the Philippines to Colombia to the nations of
Africa, we are strengthening counterterrorism cooperation with
nations that have a will to fight terror, but need help with
the means. We're spending billions to fight AIDS and
tuberculosis and malaria and other diseases, to alleviate
suffering for millions, and help end public-health crises.
America has always been generous in helping countries
recover from natural disasters, and today we are providing
money and personnel to ease the suffering of the millions
afflicted by the tsunami and to help rebuild those nations'
infrastructure.
We are joining with developing nations to fight corruption,
instill the rule of law, and create a culture of transparency.
In much of Africa and Latin America, we face the twin
challenges of helping to bolster democratic change while
alleviating poverty and hopelessness. We will work with
reformers in those regions who are committed to increasing
opportunity for their peoples, and we will insist that leaders
who are elected democratically have an obligation to govern
democratically.
Our third great task is to spread democracy and freedom
throughout the world. I spoke earlier of the grave setbacks to
democracy in the first half of the 20th century. The second
half of the century saw an advance of democracy that was far
more dramatic. In the last quarter of that century, the number
of democracies in the world tripled. And in the last six months
of this new century alone, we have witnessed the peaceful
democratic transfer of power in Malaysia, a majority Muslim
nation, and Indonesia, the country with the world's largest
Muslim population. We've seen men and women wait in line for
hours to vote in Afghanistan's first-ever free and fair
presidential election. We--and, I know, you, Mr. Chairman, and
I want to thank you for your role in this--were heartened by
the refusal of the people of Ukraine to accept a flawed
election, and heartened by their insistence that their
democratic demands would be met. We have watched as the people
of the Palestinian territories turned out to vote in an orderly
and free election. And soon the people of Iraq will exercise
their right to choose their leaders and set the course of their
nation.
No less than were the last decades of the 20th century, the
first decades of this new century can be an era of liberty. And
we, in America, must do everything we can to make it so.
To be sure, in our world there remain outposts of tyranny.
And America stands with oppressed people on every continent--in
Cuba and Burma and North Korea and Iran and Belarus and
Zimbabwe. The world should really apply what Nathan Sharanski
called the ``town-square test.'' If a person cannot walk into
the middle of the town square and express his or her views
without fear of arrest, imprisonment, and physical harm, then
that person is living in a fear society. And we cannot rest
until every person living in a fear society has finally won
their freedom.
In the Middle East, President Bush has broken with six
decades of excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom, in
hoping to purchase stability at the price of liberty. The
stakes could not be higher. As long as the broader Middle East
remains a region of tyranny and despair and anger, it will
produce extremists and movements that threaten the safety of
America and our friends.
But there are hopeful signs that freedom is on the march.
Afghanistan and Iraq are struggling to put dark and terrible
pasts behind them, and to choose a path of progress.
Afghanistan held a free and fair election, and chose a
president who is committed to the success of democracy and the
fight against terror. In Iraq, the people will soon take the
next step in their journey toward full, genuine democracy. All
Iraqis, whatever their faith or ethnicity, from Shias to Sunnis
to Kurds to others, must build a common future together. The
election later this month will be an important first step as
the people of Iraq prepare to draft a constitution and hold the
next round of elections, elections that will then create a
permanent government.
The success of freedom in Afghanistan and Iraq will give
strength and hope to reformists throughout the region, and
accelerate the reforms already underway. From Morocco to Jordan
to Bahrain, we are seeing elections and new protections for
women and minorities, and the beginnings of political
pluralism. Political, civil, and business leaders have--during
calls for political, economic, and social change. Increasingly,
the people are speaking, and their message is clear: the future
of this region is to live in liberty.
And the establishment of a Palestinian democracy will help
to bring an end to the conflict in the Holy Land.
Much has changed since June 24th, 2002, when President Bush
outlined a new approach for America in the quest for peace in
the Middle East and spoke the truth about what would be
required to end this conflict. Now we have reached a moment of
opportunity, and we must seize it. We take great encouragement
from the elections just held in the Palestinian territories.
And, Senators Biden and Sununu, I want to thank you for
representing the United States at those historic elections.
America seeks justice and dignity and a viable, independent,
and democratic state for the Palestinian people. We seek
security and peace for the state of Israel. Israel must do its
part to improve the conditions under which Palestinians live,
and to build a better future. Arab states must join to help,
and deny any help or solace to those who take the path of
violence.
I look forward to personally working with Palestinian and
Israeli leaders and bringing American diplomacy to bear on this
difficult, but crucial, issue. Peace can only come if all
parties choose to do the difficult work. And the time to choose
peace is now. But there can be no permanent peace without an
end to terror. Building a world of hope and prosperity and
peace is difficult. As we move forward, America's relations
with world global powers will be critical.
In Russia, we see that the path to democracy is uneven and
that it's success is not yet assured, yet recent history shows
that we can work closely with Russia on common problems. And,
as we do so, you can be assured that we will continue to press
the case for democracy, and we will continue to make clear that
protection of democracy in Russia is vital to the future of
U.S./Russian relations.
In Asia, we have moved beyond the false assumption that it
is impossible to have good relations with all of Asia's powers.
Our Asian alliances have never been stronger, and we will use
that strength to help secure peace and prosperity.
Japan, South Korea, and Australia are key partners in our
efforts to deter common threats and spur economic growth. We
are building a candid, cooperative, and constructive
relationship with China that embraces our common interests, but
recognizes our considerable differences about values.
The United States is cooperating with India, the world's
largest democracy, across a range of economic and security
issues. This, even as we embrace Pakistan as a vital war on--
vital ally in the war on terror and a state in transition
toward a more moderate future.
In our own neighborhood, we are cooperating closely with
Canada and Mexico and with our close neighbors in Latin
America. We are working to realize the vision of a fully
democratic hemisphere bound by common values and free trade.
But, perhaps most importantly, we must realize that America
and all free nations are facing a generational struggle against
a new and deadly ideology of hatred that we cannot ignore. We
need to do much more to confront hateful propaganda, dispel
dangerous myths, and get out the truth. We will increase our
exchanges with the rest of the world. America should make a
serious effort to understand other cultures and learn foreign
languages. Our interaction with the rest of the world must be a
conversation, not a monologue. And America must remain open to
visitors and workers and students from around the world. We do
not, and will not, compromise our security standards; yet if
our public-diplomacy efforts are to succeed, we cannot close
ourselves off from the rest of the world.
If I am confirmed, public diplomacy will be a top priority
for me and for the professionals I lead. In all that lies
ahead, the primary instrument of American diplomacy will be the
Department of State and the men and women of its Foreign and
Civil Services and Foreign Service Nationals. The time for
diplomacy is now, and the President and I will expect great
things from America's diplomatic corps. We know from experience
how hard they work, the risks that they and their families
take, the hardships they endure. We will be asking even more of
them in their service of the country and of a great cause. They
will need to develop new skills and rise to new challenges.
This is a time that calls for transformational diplomacy.
More than ever, America's diplomats will need to be active
in spreading democracy and fighting terror and reducing poverty
and doing our part to protect America's homeland. I will
personally work to ensure that America's diplomats have all the
tools they need to do their jobs, from training to budgets to
mentoring to embassy security. I also intend to strengthen the
recruitment of new personnel, because American diplomacy needs
to constantly hire and develop top talent. And I will seek to
further diversify the State Department's work force. This is
not just a good cause, it's a necessity. A great strength of
our country is its diversity, and the signal sent to the rest
of the world when America is represented abroad by people of
all cultures and races and religions is an unsurpassed
statement about who we are and what our values mean in
practice.
Let me close with a personal reflection. I was in
government in Washington from 1989 to 1991. I was lucky enough
to be the Soviet specialist in the White House at the end of
the Cold War. I got to participate in the liberation of Eastern
Europe and the unification of Germany, the beginnings of the
peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union. It was a heady time for
all of us. But when I look back, I know that we were just
merely harvesting the good decisions that had been made in 1947
and 1948 and in 1949, when Truman and Acheson and Vandenberg
and Kennan and so many wise and farsighted statesmen in the
executive and legislative branches recognized that we were not
in a limited engagement with communism, we were in the defining
struggle of our time. Democrats and Republicans united around a
vision and policies that won the Cold War. The road was not
always smooth, but the basic unity of purpose and values was
there. And that unity was essential to our eventual success.
No President and no Secretary of State could have
effectively protected American interests in such momentous
times without the strong support of the Congress and from this
committee. And the same is true today. Our task and our duty is
to unite around a vision and policies that will spread freedom
and prosperity around the globe.
I have worked directly with many of you. And in this time
of great challenge and opportunity, America's coequal branches
of government must work together to advance freedom and
prosperity.
In the preface to his memoirs published in 1969, Dean
Acheson wrote of the postwar period that, ``Those who had acted
in this drama did not know, nor do any of us yet know, the
end,'' close quote.
Senators, now we know. And many of us here were witness to
that end. The end was a victory for freedom, the liberation of
half a continent, the passing of a despotic empire, and
vindication for the wise and brave decisions made at the
creation.
It is my greatest hope and my deepest conviction that the
struggle we face today will someday end in a similar triumph of
the human spirit. Working together, we can make it so.
Thank you very much.
[Dr. Rice's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Condoleezza Rice
Thank you Chairman Lugar, Senator Biden, and Members of the
Committee. And let me also thank Senator Dianne Feinstein who, as a
fellow Californian, I have long admired as a leader on behalf of our
state and our nation.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, it is an honor to be
nominated to lead the State Department at this critical time--a time of
challenge and hope and opportunity for America, and for the entire
world.
September 11th, 2001 was a defining moment for our nation and the
world. Under the vision and leadership of President Bush, our nation
has risen to meet the challenges of our time: fighting tyranny and
terror, and securing the blessings of freedom and prosperity for a new
generation. The work that America and our allies have undertaken, and
the sacrifices we have made, have been difficult--and necessary--and
right. Now is the time to build on these achievements--to make the
world safer, and to make the world more free. We must use American
diplomacy to help create a balance of power in the world that favors
freedom. And the time for diplomacy is now.
I am humbled by President Bush's confidence in me to undertake the
great work of leading American diplomacy at such a moment in history.
If confirmed, I will work with members of Congress, from both sides of
the aisle, to build a strong bipartisan consensus behind America's
foreign policy. I will seek to strengthen our alliances, to support our
friends, and to make the world safer, and better. I will enlist the
great talents of the men and women of the State Department, the Foreign
and Civil Services and our Foreign Service Nationals. And if I am
confirmed, I will be especially honored to succeed a man I so admire--
my friend and mentor, Cohn Powell.
Four years ago, Secretary Powell addressed this committee for the
same purpose I do now. Then as now, it was the same week that America
celebrates the life and legacy of Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. It is
a time to reflect on the legacy of that great man, on the sacrifices he
made, on the courage of the people he led, and on the progress our
nation has made in the decades since. I am especially indebted to those
who fought and sacrificed in the Civil Rights movement so that I could
be here today.
For me, this is a time to remember other heroes as well. I grew up
in Birmingham, Alabama--the old Birmingham of Bull Connor, church
bombings, and voter intimidation--the Birmingham where Dr. King was
thrown in jail for demonstrating without a permit. Yet there was
another Birmingham, the city where my parents--John and Angelena Rice--
and their friends built a thriving community in the midst of the most
terrible segregation in the country. It would have been so easy for
them to give in to despair, and to send that message of hopelessness to
their children. But they refused to allow the limits and injustices of
their time to limit our horizons. My friends and I were raised to
believe that we could do or become anything--that the only limits to
our aspirations came from within. We were taught not to listen to those
who said to us, ``No, you can't.''
The story of Birmingham's parents and teachers and children is a
story of the triumph of universal values over adversity. And those
values--a belief in democracy, and liberty, and the dignity of every
life, and the rights of every individual--unite Americans of all
backgrounds, all faiths, and all colors. They provide us a common cause
in all times, a rallying point in difficult times, and a source of hope
to men and women across the globe who cherish freedom and work to
advance freedom's cause. And in these extraordinary times, it is the
duty of all of us--legislators, diplomats, civil servants, and
citizens--to uphold and advance the values that are the core of the
American identity, and that have lifted the lives of millions around
the world.
One of history's clearest lessons is that America is safer, and the
world is more secure, whenever and wherever freedom prevails. It is
neither an accident nor a coincidence that the greatest threats of the
last century emerged from totalitarian movements. Fascism and Communism
differed in many ways, but they shared an implacable hatred of freedom,
a fanatical assurance that their way was the only way, and a supreme
confidence that history was on their side.
At certain moments, it almost seemed to be so. During the first
half of the 20th century much of the democratic and economic progress
of earlier decades hooked to be swept away by the march of ruthless
ideologies armed with terrible military and technological power. Even
after the allied victory in World War Two, many feared that Europe, and
perhaps the world, would be forced to permanently endure half enslaved
and half free. The cause of freedom suffered a series of major
strategic setbacks: Communism imposed in Eastern Europe--Soviet power
dominant in East Germany--the coup in Czechoslovakia--the victory of
the Chinese Communists--the Soviet nuclear test five years before we
predicted--to name just a few. In those early years, the prospect of a
united democratic Germany and a democratic Japan seemed far-fetched.
Yet America and our allies were blessed with visionary leaders who
did not lose their way. They created the great NATO alliance to contain
and eventually erode Soviet power. They helped to establish the United
Nations and created the international legal framework for this and
other institutions that have served the world well for more than 50
years. They provided billions in aid to rebuild Europe and much of
Asia. They built an international economic system based on free trade
and free markets to spread prosperity to every corner of the globe. And
they confronted the ideology and propaganda of our enemies with a
message of hope, and with the truth. And in the end--though the end was
long in coming--their vision prevailed.
The challenges we face today are no less daunting. America and the
free world are once again engaged in a long-term struggle against an
ideology of tyranny and terror, and against hatred and hopelessness.
And we must confront these challenges with the same vision, courage and
boldness of thought demonstrated by our post-World War Two leaders.
In these momentous times, American diplomacy has three great tasks.
First, we will unite the community of democracies in building an
international system that is based on our shared values and the rule of
law. Second, we will strengthen the community of democracies to fight
the threats to our common security and alleviate the hopelessness that
feeds terror. And third, we will spread freedom and democracy
throughout the globe. That is the mission that President Bush has set
for America in the world--and the great mission of American diplomacy
today.
Let me address each of the three tasks I just mentioned. Every
nation that benefits from living on the right side of the freedom
divide has an obligation to share freedom's blessings. Our first
challenge, then, is to inspire the American people, and the people of
all free nations, to unite in common cause to solve common problems.
NATO--and the European Union--and our democratic allies in East Asia
and around the world will be our strongest partners in this vital work.
The United States will also continue to work to support and uphold the
system of international rules and treaties that allow us to take
advantage of our freedom, to build our economies, and to keep us safe
and secure.
We must remain united in insisting that Iran and North Korea
abandon their nuclear weapons ambitions, and choose instead the path of
peace. New forums that emerge from the Broader Middle East and North
Africa Initiative offer the ideal venues to encourage economic, social
and democratic reform in the Islamic world. Implementing the Doha
Development Agenda and reducing trade barriers will create jobs and
reduce poverty in dozens of nations. And by standing with the free
peoples of Iraq and Afghanistan, we will continue to bring hope to
millions, and democracy to a part of the world where it is sorely
lacking.
As President Bush said in our National Security Strategy, America
``is guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better
world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the
strength of freedom-loving nations.'' If I am confirmed, that core
conviction will guide my actions. Yet when judging a course of action,
I will never forget that the true measure of its worth is whether it is
effective.
Our second great task is to strengthen the community of
democracies, so that all free nations are equal to the work before us.
Free peoples everywhere are heartened by the success of democracy
around the globe. Together, we must build on that success.
We face many challenges. In some parts of the world, an extremist
few threaten the very existence of political liberty. Disease and
poverty have the potential to destabilize whole nations and regions.
Corruption can sap the foundations of democracy. And some elected
leaders have taken illiberal steps that, if not corrected, could
undermine hard-won democratic progress.
We must do all we can to ensure that nations which make the hard
choices and do the hard work to join the free world deliver on the high
hopes of their citizens for a better life. From the Philippines to
Colombia to the nations of Africa, we are strengthening
counterterrorism cooperation with nations that have the will to fight
terror, but need help with the means. We are spending billions to fight
AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other diseases, to alleviate suffering
for millions and help end public health crises. America has always been
generous in helping countries recover from natural disasters--and today
we are providing money and personnel to ease the suffering of millions
afflicted by the tsunami, and to help nations rebuild their
infrastructure. We are joining with developing nations to fight
corruption, instill the rule of law, and create a culture of
transparency. In much of Africa and Latin America, we face the twin
challenges of helping to bolster democratic ideals and institutions,
and alleviating poverty. We will work with reformers in those regions
who are committed to increasing opportunity for their peoples. And we
will insist that leaders who are elected democratically have an
obligation to govern democratically.
Our third great task is to spread democracy and freedom throughout
the world. I spoke earlier of the grave setbacks to democracy in the
first half of the 20th century. The second half of the century saw an
advance of democracy that was far more dramatic. In the last quarter of
that century, the number of democracies in the world tripled. And in
the last six months of this new century alone, we have witnessed the
peaceful, democratic transfer of power in Malaysia--a majority Muslim
nation--and in Indonesia--the country with the world's largest Muslim
population. We have seen men and women wait in line for hours to vote
in Afghanistan's first ever free and fair presidential election. We--
and I know you Mr. Chairman--were heartened by the refusal of the
people of Ukraine to accept a flawed election, and their insistence
that their democratic will be honored. We have watched as the people of
the Palestinian Territories turned out to vote in an orderly and fair
election. And soon the people of Iraq will exercise their right to
choose their leaders, and set the course of their nation's future. No
less than were the last decades of the 20th century, the first decades
of this new century can be an era of liberty. And we in America must do
everything we can to make it so.
To be sure, in our world there remain outposts of tyranny--and
America stands with oppressed people on every continent--in Cuba, and
Burma, and North Korea, and Iran, and Belarus, and Zimbabwe. The world
should apply what Natan Sharansky calls the ``town square test'': if a
person cannot walk into the middle of the town square and express his
or her views without fear of arrest, imprisonment, or physical harm,
then that person is living in a fear society, not a free society. We
cannot rest until every person living in a ``fear society'' has finally
won their freedom.
In the Middle East, President Bush has broken with six decades of
excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the hope of
purchasing stability at the price of liberty. The stakes could not be
higher. As long as the broader Middle East remains a region of tyranny
and despair and anger, it will produce extremists and movements that
threaten the safety of Americans and our friends.
But there are hopeful signs that freedom is on the march.
Afghanistan and Iraq are struggling to put dark and terrible pasts
behind them and are choosing the path of progress. Just months ago,
Afghanistan held a free and fair election, and chose a president who is
committed to the success of democracy and to the fight against terror.
In Iraq, the people will soon take the next step in their journey
toward full, genuine democracy. All Iraqis, whatever their faith or
ethnicity--from Shias to Sunnis to Kurds--must build a common future
together. The election later this month will be an important first step
as the people of Iraq prepare to draft a constitution and hold the next
round of elections--elections that will create a permanent government.
The success of freedom in Afghanistan and Iraq will give strength
and hope to reformers throughout the region, and accelerate the pace of
reforms already underway. From Morocco to Jordan to Bahrain, we are
seeing elections and new protections for women and minorities, and the
beginnings of political pluralism. Political, civil, and business
leaders have issued stirring calls for political, economic and social
change: Increasingly, the people are speaking, and their message is
clear: the future of the region is to live in liberty.
And the establishment of a Palestinian democracy will help to bring
an end to the conflict in the Holy Land. Much has changed since June
24th, 2002, when President Bush outlined a new approach for America in
the quest for peace in the Middle East, and spoke the truth about what
will be required to end this conflict. Now we have reached a moment of
opportunity--and we must seize it. We take great encouragement from the
elections just held for a new Palestinian leader. And Senators Biden
and Sununu, I want to thank you for representing the United States at
these historic elections. America seeks justice and dignity and a
viable, independent, and democratic state for the Palestinian people.
We seek security and peace for the State of Israel. Israel must do its
part to improve the conditions under which Palestinians live and seek
to build a better future. Arab states must join to help--and deny any
help or solace to those who take the path of violence. I look forward
to personally working with the Palestinian and Israeli leaders, and
bringing American diplomacy to bear on this difficult but crucial
issue. Peace can only come if all parties choose to do the difficult
work, and choose to meet their responsibilities. And the time to choose
peace is now.
Building a world of hope, prosperity and peace is difficult. As we
move forward, America's relations with the world's global powers will
be critical. In Russia, we see that the path to democracy is uneven and
that its success is not yet assured. Yet recent history shows that we
can work closely with Russia on common problems. And as we do so, we
will continue to press the case for democracy, and we will continue to
make clear that the protection of democracy in Russia is vital to the
future of US-Russia relations. In Asia, we have moved beyond the false
assumption that it is impossible to have good relations with all of
Asia's powers. Our Asian alliances have never been stronger--and we
will use that strength to help secure the peace and prosperity of the
region. Japan, South Korea, and Australia are key partners in our
efforts to deter common threats and spur economic growth. We are
building a candid, cooperative and constructive relationship with China
that embraces our common interests but still recognizes our
considerable differences about values. The United States is cooperating
with India, the world's largest democracy, across a range of economic
and security issues. This, even as we embrace Pakistan as a vital ally
in the war on terror, and a state in transition towards a more moderate
and democratic future. In our own neighborhood, we are cooperating
closely with Canada and Mexico, and working to realize the vision of a
fully democratic hemisphere, bound by common values and free trade.
We also must realize that America and all free nations are facing a
generational struggle against a new and deadly ideology of hatred that
we cannot ignore. We need to do much more to confront hateful
propaganda, dispel dangerous myths, and get out the truth. We will
increase our exchanges with the rest of the world. And Americans should
make a serious effort to understand other cultures and learn foreign
languages. Our interaction with the rest of the world must be a
conversation, not a monologue. And America must remain open to visitors
and workers and students from around the world, without compromising
our security standards. If our public diplomacy efforts are to succeed,
we cannot close ourselves off from the world. And if I am confirmed,
public diplomacy will be a top priority for me and for the
professionals I lead.
In all that lies ahead, the primary instrument of American
diplomacy will be the Department of State, and the men and women of its
Foreign and Civil Services and Foreign Service Nationals. The time for
diplomacy is now--and the President and I will expect great things from
America's diplomatic corps. We know from experience how hard they work,
the risks they and their families take, and the hardships they endure.
We will be asking even more of them, in the service of their country,
and of a great cause. They will need to develop new skills, and rise to
new challenges. This time of global transformation calls for
transformational diplomacy. More than ever, America's diplomats will
need to be active in spreading democracy, fighting terror, reducing
poverty, and doing our part to protect the American homeland. I will
personally work to ensure that America's diplomats have all the tools
they need to do their jobs--from training to budgets to mentoring to
embassy security. I also intend to strengthen the recruitment of new
personnel, because American diplomacy needs to constantly hire and
develop top talent. And I will seek to further diversify the State
Department's workforce. This is not just a good cause; it is a
necessity. A great strength of our country is our diversity. And the
signal sent to the rest of the world when America is represented abroad
by people of all cultures, races, and religions is an unsurpassed
statement about who we are and what our values mean in practice.
Let me close with a personal recollection. I was in government in
Washington in 1989 to 1991. I was the Soviet specialist in the White
House at the end of the Cold War. I was lucky to be there, and I knew
it. I got to participate in the liberation of Eastern Europe. I got to
participate in the unification of Germany and to see the Soviet Union
collapse. It was a heady time for us all. But, when I look back, I know
that we were merely harvesting the good decisions that had been made in
1947, in 1948, and in 1949, when Truman and Acheson and Vandenberg and
Kennan and so many wise and farsighted statesmen--in the Executive and
Legislative branches--recognized that we were not in a limited
engagement with communism, we were in the defining struggle of our
times.
Democrats and Republicans united around a vision and policies that
won the Cold War. The road was not always smooth, but the basic unity
of purpose and values was there--and that unity was essential to our
eventual success. No President, and no Secretary of State, could have
effectively protected American interests in such momentous times
without strong support from the Congress, and from this Committee. And
the same is true today. Our task, and our duty is to unite around a
vision and policies that will spread freedom and prosperity around the
globe. I have worked directly with many of you. And in this time of
great challenge and opportunity, America's co-equal branches of
government must work together to advance freedom and prosperity.
In the preface to his memoirs, published in 1969, Dean Acheson
wrote of the post-war period that ``those who acted in this drama did
not know, nor do any of us yet know, the end.'' Senators, now we know--
and many of us here bore witness to that end. The end was a victory for
freedom, the liberation of half a continent, the passing of a despotic
empire--and vindication for the wise and brave decisions made at the
beginning. It is my greatest hope--and my deepest conviction--that the
struggle we face today will some day end in a similar triumph of the
human spirit. And working together, we can make it so.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Dr. Rice, thank you. The committee asked you
to make a comprehensive and thoughtful statement, and you
certainly have fulfilled our request. We appreciate the time
and effort that you have given to that statement, and,
likewise, to the responses that you've given to all of our
questions. Just for the benefit of Senators and those following
the hearing, I would add that during the past few weeks,
Senators have submitted to Dr. Rice folios of questions. The
questions have been answered, and they will all be made a part
of the record. For the record, some Senators may wish to
reiterate some of those questions today, but we know you will
be well prepared, because you have already written some
remarkable answers that give us a great deal of assurance.
I've consulted with the distinguished Ranking Member,
Senator Biden, about the format, and we will now have a round
of questions. Each Member will have ten minutes, and I'll ask
Members to be respectful of that time so that they will not
infringe upon the opportunities of others. And then, following
that, if Members wish to ask additional questions, we will have
a second round of ten minutes per Member; and, if required, a
third and even a fourth round. I have consulted with Dr. Rice.
She is prepared for a number of hours of questions, and I
appreciate that.
We'll proceed at least until noon, and maybe a little
beyond that, commence again at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon.
If it appears that the hearing might be concluded at some time
in the early evening, it would be my privilege to continue on
and to preside and to be with any Member who wishes to keep
asking questions throughout that period of time.
My hope is that Members on both sides of the aisle will be
prepared, at the conclusion of all of the questioning, whether
it should occur today or tomorrow, to have a business meeting
of the committee so that we might take a vote upon this
nomination, and that it might be available, therefore, for
action on the floor of the Senate on Thursday, January the
20th. Dr. Frist has indicated that, after 3:00 o'clock, roll-
call votes will be in order. My prayer is that one of the roll-
call votes will be on this nomination.
This is a potential roadmap for us to proceed through the
hearing in an orderly way that is fair to all Members, and I
want to make that point clear. We have offered two full days so
that, in the event Members have a lot of questions, they will
have an opportunity to raise them for a complete record of the
hearing.
Now, Dr. Rice, I'll begin, and I'll ask the timekeeper to
be as rigorous on my questions as on anyone else's for the next
ten minutes.
Let me say that, last year, I introduced legislation
intended to relieve the burdens placed on the Nunn-Lugar
program by the Congress in the form of conditions,
certifications, reporting requirements. These have occurred
over many years, and many were points well taken at the time,
as there was gross distrust of the Russians, and, likewise, a
hope for progress through these restrictions. Nevertheless,
they have inhibited, substantially in some years, the amount of
work that could be done to actually work with the Russians in
cooperative threat reductions, to take warheads off of
missiles, to destroy the missiles, to destroy the aircraft that
might fly over our country, and even in the Shchuch'ye Project,
to move toward a neutralization of the chemical weapons.
The goal of my legislation is to provide President Bush
with more flexibility in the utilization of this program in
achieving nonproliferation and dismantlement goals. Does the
administration support this legislation?
Dr. Rice. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
Yes, we do. And I want to start by saying thank you very
much for the tremendous leadership that you have given and
that, earlier, Senator Sam Nunn gave to this. And I know that a
number of Senators on this committee and on other committees
have been stalwarts in this extremely important initiative. I'm
an old student of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet military,
and I really can think of nothing more important than being
able to proceed with the dismantlement, the safe dismantlement,
of the Soviet arsenal, with nuclear safeguards to make certain
that nuclear weapons facilities and the like are well secured,
and then the blending down, as we are doing, of the number of
hazardous, potentially lethal materials that could be used to
make nuclear weapons, as well as, of course, you mentioned,
Shchuch'ye and the chemical weapons.
So this is an extremely important program. I want to be
clear that we do pay attention, in our relationship, to the
progress, or lack thereof, of democracy. We pay attention and
push the Russians on questions of accounting fully for their
chemical-weapons stockpiles, for permitting an understanding of
their biological-weapons programs. But flexibility in being
able to administer the program would be most welcome, and it is
just an extremely important program that--I think you know--
that we continue to push.
The Chairman. I appreciate that statement very much. We
will be working with you and the Department. Likewise, we will
continue our efforts with the Department of Defense and DTRA
and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Group, which has been so
helpful.
Now, the future of U.S./Russian cooperation on
nonproliferation and the dismantlement of weapons of mass
destruction is contingent also upon the continuation of the
Nunn-Lugar Umbrella Agreement that undergirds all of our
efforts in this area. To date, the Kremlin has not submitted
the agreement reached in 1999 to the Duma for approval. What
are your views on the prospects of the United States and Russia
reaching agreement on such things as liability, tax-free
status, and the other issues that are covered by the umbrella
agreement?
Dr. Rice. Senator Lugar, the President has raised with
President Putin the issue of ratification in the Duma of the
CTR over--umbrella over a number--on a number of occasions,
including, most recently, when they were at Sea Island. I'm
sure that he will raise it when he sees President Putin in the
next several weeks. And we are, ourselves, reviewing what we
may want to do about the liability procedures here. It is
extremely important that this work go forward. And to the
degree that there are bureaucratic logjams that need to be
broken, we've simply got to break them.
The other possibility, which is that you leave materials
unsecured and you don't take as full initiative as you can
under these very important programs, is simply not acceptable.
And so, we are working to see how we can move this forward with
the Russians.
We had discussions, just recently, with the Russian Defense
Minister, when he was here, about moving forward, so you can be
assured that we're looking to break whatever bureaucratic
logjams have emerged over this period of time.
The Chairman. I appreciate that response, and I'm hopeful
that you will work with the President so that that will be on
the agenda of his meeting with President Putin. Clearly,
President Putin is cognizant of all of these programs, but
bureaucracy in Russia sometimes moves slowly----
Dr. Rice. Right.
The Chairman [continuing]. ----as it does in our country.
To the extent that we can expedite this, that would be helpful.
As the President pointed out, weapons of mass destruction or
materials of mass destruction, improperly secured, are the
basis for many of the terrorist threats, whether it be al Qaeda
or the Russians' fear of the Chechnyans, or whoever. The
materials are there to be picked up and to be utilized without
research and difficulty. These are critical items, and I know
that you agree.
Let me also mention that the G8 meeting, the so-called ``10
plus 10 over 10'' program, attempted to enlist our allies in
matching the effort, of about a billion dollars a year, that we
are putting into these programs--Defense, State, and Energy
Departments. It's been difficult for them to do that, because
they do not have satisfactory umbrella agreements, in most
cases, either.
So, while the President is visiting with President Putin
bilaterally, perhaps he could also mention our seven allies
within the G8 that we urgently need to enlist in this type of
work.
Dr. Rice. I agree completely, Senator. In fact, the
President has talked to President Putin about the difficulties
that others are having extending money.
I think one of the really great breakthroughs was when we
came up with this global partnership initiative, because it
permitted us to multiply the resources that the United States
was putting in by resources from Japan and Italy and Great
Britain and other places. And it's important that those
resources get spent.
This is one part, an extremely important part, of a broad
nuclear nonproliferation initiative agenda that we are pursuing
to--with our allies--to try and deal with this very nettlesome,
difficult problem.
The Chairman. And, of course, also, as the President visits
with the German leadership, and perhaps the French leadership
and what have you, they are parties to this and are----
Dr. Rice. They are.
The Chairman [continuing]. ----hopefully, eager to be a
part of it.
Dr. Rice. In fact, I think that the nonproliferation story
is a quite remarkable story of cooperation among the major
allies. We have outstanding cooperation with France and Germany
and our other allies. We have been working, for instance, in
something called the Proliferation Security Initiative, which
60 countries are now party to--and a number of others have
expressed interest--to try to interdict with--consistent with
international law--to try and interdict suspicious shipments.
This has given us new means of intelligence cooperation, law-
enforcement cooperation, naval cooperation. And it--these are
very important.
We work best when we're putting the alliance to use and to
work----
The Chairman. Yes.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----on difficult problems together.
The Chairman. And this is a great way to do so. I would add
an agreement that's also important, the AMEC agreement. We have
enlisted the support of Norway and friends who want to work in
that area, particularly on the submarine issues and the
pollution of nuclear material that may have been dumped, or
could be dumped, without activity on our part.
Let me turn to another issue. In your answers to questions
for the record--and I cite that, because I've asked this
question for the record and you have responded--I particularly
appreciated your response on the Law of the Sea Convention. You
urged the committee to favorably report it out, and you said
that you will work with the Senate leadership to bring the
convention and implementing agreement to the floor for a vote
during the 109th Congress. You also said the following,
``Joining the convention will advance the interests of the
United States military. The United States, as the country with
the largest coastline and the largest exclusive economic zone,
will gain economic and resource benefits from the convention.
The convention will not inhibit the United States, nor its
partners, from successfully pursuing the Proliferation Security
Initiative. And the United Nations has no decision-making role
under the convention in regulating uses of the oceans by any
state party to the convention.'' That language clears up an
issue sometimes raised by opponents to the convention. And,
finally, you said, ``The convention does not provide for, or
authorize, taxation of individuals or corporations.''
I cannot think of a stronger administration statement in
support of the Law of the Sea Convention. Should I assume that
the President would like to see this convention passed as soon
as possible?
Dr. Rice. Would certainly like to see it passed as soon as
possible. And, Senator, I think--you know the history of this
better than I, as well as Senators like Senator Warner and
others, who worked very hard to make sure that some of the
early concerns about the convention were addressed and that the
convention, as it now stands, serves our national security
interest, serves our economic interest, and we very much want
to see it go into force.
The Chairman. I thank you for that response.
In your responses to questions for the record, you embraced
the Department's role as the lead on an interagency team
working for a more coordinated approach to stabilization and
reconstruction efforts, a role that I've been pushing, as have
Senator Biden and many others on our committee, as a new core
mission for the Department of State. Your support for the
Department's Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization in the
Department will be crucial as it seeks the personnel,
resources, and budget to succeed. Can you outline your own
vision for the Department of State in this area? And how would
you integrate USAID with this effort?
Dr. Rice. We have learned a lot of lessons over the last
several years, and one of them, I think, is that we need to be
better able to marry civilian expertise in reconstruction and
stabilization with whatever we need to do militarily to
stabilize the situation. These post-conflict situations require
a wide range of skills and talents that we've had to assemble,
in a rather ad-hoc fashion, from within the United States
Government when we faced Afghanistan or faced Iraq. And,
frankly, we will face these again. We face it in Liberia, we
face it in Sudan--we will face it in Sudan if those situations
can be stabilized. And so, we have been--and I've been--very
heartened by the work that has been done on this new Office
of--for Reconstruction and Stabilization. I know, Senator, that
you and your staff have had a lot of conversations, first with
people who were on my staff in the NSC who were interested in
this. And now that the office has been created in the State
Department, I've had briefings on what Carlos Pasqual and his
people are already doing. We are going to try to make sure that
they have the resources for this first-phase effort that they
are in.
I think we need to look at what further functions and what
further requirements there are for this especially important
task. But the State Department does need to lead this effort.
There is great enthusiasm in the State Department for being
able to do this, as I've talked to people in briefings and the
like. And so, the office will not only have my support, but I'm
counting on it to be able to help us make better efforts as we
face these stabilization problems around the world.
The Chairman. Great. And we will count upon you for
leadership of our legislative efforts. We will work together on
this.
Dr. Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Biden?
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Dr. Rice, you're, I'm told, a great football fan. I notice,
when I go in your office, you are. I'm not going to ask you
this under oath, but are you aware of who the national
champions that won double-A football were last year?
Dr. Rice. Did they come from Delaware, sir?
Senator Biden. Yes, they did.
Dr. Rice. Yes, sir.
Senator Biden. University of Delaware. Thank you very
much. I knew you'd know that. I knew you'd know that.
Dr. Rice. Right.
Senator Biden. Very important point.
Dr. Rice, I'd like to talk to you about Iraq, if I may
start there. You quote eloquently, and you write eloquently, in
your opening statement, ``But when I look back, I know that we
were merely harvesting the good decisions that had been made in
'47, '48, and '49, when Truman, Acheson, and Vandenberg and
Kennan, and so many other wise and foresighted statesmen in the
executive and legislative branch, recognized that we are not in
a limited engagement with communism, we are in the defining
struggle of our times.''
Based on our discussions over the years, I think we agree
that the defining struggle of our times right now is this
struggle between freedom and radical Islamic fundamentalism.
That's not the only problem in the world, but it's the one
that, I think, takes a long time. And Truman and Acheson and
others came up with--and leveled with the American people about
how long and hard and expensive it was going to be--the Truman
Doctrine, the establishment of NATO, the Bretton Woods
agreement, the Marshall Plan, well over 300,000 troops in
Europe. We still have a considerable number of troops in
Europe. And we flat-out told the American people. And yet I'm a
little concerned that the American people don't have a clear
sense of what is expected of them in this defining struggle
that we always talk about. And the focus right now is primarily
in Iraq. And we have an exit strategy, which I happen to agree
with. The ultimate exit strategy is a stable, secure Iraqi
government brought about as a consequence of a series of
elections, this one just being the first of a series, and
providing Iraq the capacity to maintain order and peace, not
only in the streets, but along their borders.
And, toward that end, we had significant discussions in
this committee prior to going in, and a number of experts, from
RAND to others, indicated that we were going to need somewhere
in the order of 5,000 European paramilitary police troops, in
addition to the military. I think the number was 5,600. And my
first question is, Did your outfit write a report suggesting
how many military forces your team thought would be needed in
Iraq?
Dr. Rice. No, Senator, we did not write a report of that
kind. We, obviously, were aware of all the literature out there
about how one stabilizes, and we looked at that literature, we
considered it. But as a part of a team that is the National
Security Council, and that is where the President's primary
national security advisors sit, I sat through briefing after
briefing that assessed the plan for both the war and for the
immediate postwar period and, as a part of that plan, the troop
levels that were recommended by General Franks and by his
commanders. The President had good military advice from General
Franks, good military advice from Chairman Myers, who
represents, of course, not just himself, but the corporate body
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. And they were very clear that
they believed that the plan that they were going to execute,
including phase four--that is, the stabilization phase--was
adequately resourced, in terms of troop strength.
Senator Biden. In retrospect, do you think it was
adequately resourced? What do you think now? Everybody gets a
chance to determine whether or not what they signed on to or
thought, recommended by professionals, was workable or not. Do
you think it was adequate, now, looking back?
Dr. Rice. Senator Biden, I would not presume to try to
give the President military advice, but I do believe that he
got good military advice, and I do believe that the plan and
the forces that we went in with were appropriate to the task.
We did meet with some unforeseen circumstances; most
importantly, as we swept through the country really rather
rapidly, this--the core of this insurgency--that is, the
Ba'athists and many of Saddam's loyal forces melted into the
population. They didn't stand and fight. When they reemerged,
they reemerged as an insurgency, I think, that, frankly, cannot
be dealt with by military power alone, and certainly not by
overwhelming military power, but must now be dealt with through
the political mobilization of the Iraqi people, which is why
these elections are so important, through economic
reconstruction--and I would be the first to say that we want
very much to accelerate that reconstruction--and then, most
importantly----
Senator Biden. So bottom line----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----through the Iraqi forces.
Senator Biden [continuing]. ----getting the chance to look
back, you think there were an adequate number of forces--
beginning, middle, and now. You wouldn't, if you got to go
back, change the force structure.
Dr. Rice. I don't think I would, Senator.
Senator Biden. Okay. You're aware that Mr. Bremer suggests
that we needed more force--he is the former, as we all know,
ambassador who was in charge up until we handed over
sovereignty. And I've made three trips since 2003, and every
trip I make I meet with the flag officers, and they're all
telling me they need more force, and they needed more force.
The reason I asked the question is not to assess blame, because
who the heck knows--as I said to Bremer--and I think the three
of us were together the first time--I said, ``Mr.
Ambassador''--in the first meeting after Saddam was dethroned
and we were in Baghdad--I said, ``If the Lord Almighty came
down and sat on this table and gave you the right answer to 60
percent of all the difficult questions you'll have to answer,
you still only have an even chance of succeeding. No one's ever
done what we're trying to do.'' And I supported the effort. But
it concerns me that, in retrospect, you still think the force
structure was appropriate.
Which leads me to this issue of one element of our exit
strategy, and that is the training of Iraqi security forces. On
October 21st of last year, you said, ``The Iraqi security force
will number 125,000 by the end of the year, there will be
145,000 security forces by February, and 200,000 by the time of
the permanent election.'' And then March of last year,
Secretary Rumsfeld, ``We now''--he said, ``We now have 200,000
Iraqi security forces that are out there providing security in
the country.'' And a month later, he said, ``210,000 in
uniform,'' and called it, quote, ``an amazing accomplishment.''
And now, what I'd like to know is what you all mean by
``trained Iraqi security force.'' Do you mean someone who we
give a uniform to, someone who had been in the Iraqi military
before, or the police? Or does ``trained'' mean someone capable
absent a physical presence of the United States or a coalition
force with them to, in fact, do their job, whatever it's
assigned, in whatever region they're in? What do you mean by
``trained?''
Dr. Rice. By ``trained,'' Senator, what we've been trying
to do is to take Iraqis--some of whom have served before, some
of whom have not--and to give them, depending on whether it's
police training or army training or commando training, the
skills that they need to be able to secure the country. Now, we
have had to, in many cases, understand that this is--that the
initial training is--just that, it's initial training, and that
you face a number of other issues. You face the issues of
leadership. One of the problems that we've had with the
desertion rates that we faced in the Iraqi security forces and
with some of the problems of--I'll call it, ``discipline,''
broadly--is that we think there has been leadership gap. We
learned, early on, that Iraqis were not going to train and then
serve coalition leaders. And so----
Senator Biden. What have we done about that leadership
gap?
Dr. Rice [continuing].----we have a very active program now
that Prime Minister Allawi is very involved in, himself, of
vetting proven leaders in the former Iraqi security forces to
bring top-down leadership to those people. NATO, of course, has
put in a training mission that is devoted to training
leadership, and a----
Senator Biden. That's not even set up yet, is it?
Dr. Rice. Well, it's--we have, on the ground----
Senator Biden. I'm not criticizing. Look, here's the
reason I asked this question. I talked about, earlier--and my
time is about up--I talked, earlier, about the need to level
with the American people. When you say we have 200,000 trained
security forces, and the Secretary of Defense says you have
210,000, the impression of the average American is that, we've
actually trained up people who can do the job.
Now, I've made four trips there, three since Saddam came
down. I've gone to the training facility for police in Jordan.
With the American head trainer, I said, without anybody there,
and I believe my friend--and a person who has an ideological
bent considerably different than mine--my friend from South
Carolina was there. I said, ``There's no one in the room.
Please cut all the malarkey. Is this training program worth a
darn?'' And the answer was, ``No,'' from our own trainer. I
asked the head of the Jordanian police force who was there, and
the Canadian Royal Mounted Policeman who was there as the
triumvirate running the operation. I've been back and spoke
with General Petraeus on two occasions. He is a first-rate
soldier. He has indicated that he is just basically beginning.
How many--and this is my last question, Mr. Chairman--how
many security forces do you think are trained that can shoot
straight, kill, and stand their ground? I don't mean in a
uniform. I spent four hours in Fallujah. Our marines are not
real anxious to stand next to, and count on, a lot of Iraqi
forces, except the few that were trained as special forces.
Now, how many do you really think are trained that Allawi can
look to and say, ``I can rely on those forces?'' What do you
think that number is?
Dr. Rice. Senator, I have to rely on the what I get from
the field. And, by the way, I think that the trips that you've
made, and the trips that the others have made, have given us
information that we can go back with, and I appreciate your
doing that
We think the number right now is somewhere over 120,000. We
think that, among those people, there are clearly--continue to
be questions about on-duty time; that is, people who don't
report for duty. And so, this is being looked at. We are trying
to provide, for some of these units, mentors who can help,
trying to provide leadership from the Iraqis, themselves, that
can help these people.
But this is the reason that Gary Luck has gone out, at
Secretary Rumsfeld's direction, to take a hard look at the
training program to see what General Petraeus--who, as you say,
is a terrific soldier and has a lot of experience in Iraq--what
he's been able to achieve, to work with the Iraqis to address
some of these problems of leadership and morale and desertion
in the armed forces and in the police forces, and to look at
some of the equipping of the police forces.
But I do want to note, Senator, that the Iraqis are making
a lot of sacrifices here----
Senator Biden. No question.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----their soldiers, their police. In
places like Fallujah and places like Samara, and places like
Najaf, they have played an active role in their security. But
it is a process that takes some time. We believe that we've
made some progress. We have more progress to make.
Senator Biden. Well, I thank you for your answer. I think
you'll find, if you speak to the folks on the ground, that they
don't think there's more than 4,000 actually trained Iraqi
forces. I strongly urge you to pick up the phone or go see
these folks. And the reason I press it is not that the Iraqis
aren't sacrificing; they are--but that's almost irrelevant in
one regard: the exit strategy for America is a trained force of
several hundred-thousand people. We're talking about a year or
more to get anywhere close to that. We should level with the
American people about it. But after you take a hard look, as
Secretary of State, I'd like to talk more with you about that.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Hagel?
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Welcome, Dr. Rice.
Dr. Rice. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement that I
would ask to be included in the record.
The Chairman. It will be included in full.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
[Senator Hagel's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Chuck Hagel
Mr. Chairman, I congratulate Dr. Rice on her nomination and look
forward to working with her in her new position as Secretary of State.
She has served with distinction as Assistant to the President for
National Security, as well as in other National Security Council
positions. Dr. Rice comes to this job well-qualified and prepared to
take on her new responsibilities.
The challenges for U.S. foreign policy over the next four years
will be formidable. U.S. foreign policy cannot be separated from our
energy, economic, defense and domestic policies. It all falls within
the arch of national interest. There will be windows of opportunity,
but they will open and close quickly. Foreign policy will require a
strategic agility that, whenever possible, gets ahead of problems,
strengthens U.S. security and alliances, and promotes American
interests and credibility.
Our public diplomacy requires convincing the next generation of the
world that America's purpose is not defined solely by our power. It is
to work with our friends and allies to help build a better world for
all people. A safer, more stable and prosperous world is in America's
interest. That message has been lost. I am not sure how it happened,
nor do I believe that it was solely our fault. I do know that public
diplomacy is not about packaging, marketing, or spin. It is about our
policies and, most importantly, our actions. It is a long-term process
of engagement, dialogue and enhancing present relationships and
building new ones.
American policies in the war on terrorism must address the
political and economic conditions that breed radicalism and violence,
especially in the Muslim world. Poverty and underdevelopment do not
necessarily lead to terrorism. But a lack of political freedom and
economic opportunity undermine the prospects for stability and
democracy in developing regions, and present easy targets for
extremists.
We must think creatively about how best to reorganize our foreign
policy structure for stabilization and reconstruction missions, whether
in post-conflict situations like Iraq and Afghanistan, or following
natural disasters like the tsunami in Asia.
America's inter-agency process and our military have done a
tremendous job helping those people affected by the tsunami. We learn
from experiences that test and exercise relationships within our own
government.
The U.S.-Europe-Japan alliance has been the foundation of our post-
World War II global strategy and should remain so. America is both an
Atlantic and Pacific power. Our alliance with Europe and Japan
functions as a bridge between East and West, Atlantic and Pacific, and
is based on a shared commitment to democracy, free trade, and global
leadership. In addition to strengthening our Trans-Atlantic bonds as
Europe undergoes its own historic changes, America's Asian alliances
will also require attention and focus. The Asia-Pacific region will
greatly define America's interests in the 21st century.
America's relationships with Russia, China and India will shape
international politics, commerce, and security in the coming decades.
These are powerful states undergoing dramatic and historic changes. Our
bilateral relations with Russia, China and India will require a
delicate diplomatic balance of security and commercial interests, as
well as support for reform and human rights.
The Western Hemisphere must be a high priority for U.S. foreign
policy. The U.S. relationship with Mexico is as important as any
relationship we have. The United States' cultural integration with the
Western hemisphere is a fact of life--more than 50% of U.S. immigrants
are from Latin America. The United States and Mexico must work together
on immigration polices that further our shared interests in a more
stable and prosperous Western hemisphere.
There are few more urgent challenges facing this country today than
immigration reform. A new 21st century U.S. immigration policy must be
developed and implemented. I look forward to working with the Bush
Administration on immigration policy and plan to re-introduce my
immigration reform bill in the next few weeks.
America must recognize the opportunities, however imperfect,
presented by the election of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu
Mazen) earlier this month, and the election of the Iraqi National
Assembly, which will take place on January 30.
The Israeli-Palestinian issue lies at the core of our strategic
engagement with the Middle East and the Muslim world. The United
States, its Quartet partners--the European Union, the United Nations,
and Russia--and the Arab world must now actively engage in helping
Israelis and Palestinians re-start the Peace Process. It will not be
easy. Israeli Prime Minister Sharon faces a political challenge from
Israeli settler groups and from those within his own Likud Party
opposed to Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. Terrorists and extremists will
continue to be a security threat to Israel and will seek to undermine
Abu Mazen's government. That is happening now. We must not allow
terrorists to hold hostage Middle East peace and the future of a two-
state solution.
The National Assembly elections on January 30th represent a
critical benchmark for Iraqi sovereignty and self-governance, as well
as for an American exit strategy from Iraq. Developments in Iraq will
influence and constrain America's foreign policy initiatives as long as
U.S. combat troops remain there. We need a military exit strategy for
Iraq. The questions are when and how. An exit strategy requires a
sovereign Iraqi government and a strategy for diplomatic partnerships
and regional security with Iraq and its neighbors.
This hearing is an opportunity to discuss with Dr. Rice the war in
Iraq, other foreign policy challenges facing the United States, and the
Bush administration's plans and initiatives to deal with them.
Thank you.
Senator Hagel. As has been noted here and, I think,
eloquently stated by Senator Feinstein, you come before this
committee impressively qualified, well prepared, and it is a
nomination all of America can be proud of. And I mean that
sincerely. So thank you for offering yourself for another four
years of very engaging, responsible leadership. We appreciate
that.
I also want to note, Mr. Chairman, for the record, the good
work of Secretary Powell, Deputy Secretary Armitage--I noted,
Dr. Rice, that you mention him in your statement--the work that
the Powell-Armitage team has done for this country over the
last four years has been significant. All those who were part
of that team need to be acknowledged, as well. So thank you,
Dr. Rice, for noting Secretary Powell's leadership.
I want to pursue, to some extent, some of the same line of
questioning on the same subject, as well as other subjects in
my ten minutes, that Senator Biden was talking about: Iraq. He
left off with exit strategy. Would you explain to this
committee what you and the President see as an exit strategy
for America from Iraq, which would be, I suspect, connected to
a post-January 30th election, which will provide an Iraqi--an
elected Iraqi national assembly? What are our plans after that?
Dr. Rice. Well, we do have some things that we have to
accomplish after the elections. Senator Biden has talked a lot
about the training of Iraqi security forces. I think that's
probably, in many ways, our most important task. Iraq's most
important--the task of the Iraqis is to find a way forward from
their elections for political reconciliation. And we can, of
course, try to help in that, and do what we can to support that
effort, but that's largely an Iraqi task. I think for us to try
and improve Iraq's capability to defend itself.
And I will just say, I have talked with people from the
field, and I recently talked with General Casey, who was back
here, and others. I think they think that they are doing
relatively well on starting to get the numbers up for Iraqi
security forces, but that they do need to address these
questions of leadership, which then lead to problems with
desertion and the like, and that they need to do something that
is actually quite promising, which is to work with the Iraqis
who have some ideas, themselves, about how some of these
security forces might be restructured. So we will focus very
heavily, I think, on trying to give the Iraqis, or help them
get, more capacity on the security side.
It is also the case that, of course, we will continue to
seek the terrorists, and to help them fight the war on
terrorism that they are now fully engaged in, and to try and
continue to help in building capacity in the Iraqi ministries.
Because, ultimately, the coalition is there because the Iraqis
lack certain capacities. And if we focus, in this next period
after the election, on helping them to build those capacities
beyond where they are now, I think we will have done a major
part toward the day when less coalition help is needed, across
the board. The----
Senator Hagel. May I----
Dr. Rice. Of course.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. ----may I just ask----
Dr. Rice. Certainly.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. ----a followup to that? How
will that change from what we have been doing? Can you give
this committee some specifics of what you've stated? You've
framed clearly--I think we understand what you said. I support
what you--what you're talking about, your objective. But how
will that change from what we have been doing? Fewer troops?
Less troops? More NATO troops? Or what will envision the change
in what you're anticipating our role to be? And connect that to
an exit strategy.
Dr. Rice. Well, our role is directly proportional, I
think, Senator, to how capable the Iraqis are. And so, as the
Iraqis become more capable, then I would assume, certainly, our
help will be needed less. I am really reluctant to try to put a
timetable on that, because I think the goal is to get the
mission accomplished, and that means that the Iraqis have to be
capable of some things before we lessen our own responsibility.
But we will be working with a newly elected government, and I'm
quite sure that they're going to have their own ideas about how
this--how we move forward to improve security. The Iraqis will
take more and more responsibility for fighting the terrorists,
for rooting out the Ba'athists. And we have to help them get
there.
If I could just add, Senator, on--we also, of course, have
a major task of continuing, on the reconstruction front, to
employ the resources that were given to the executive branch by
the Congress so that we can help the Iraqis with their
reconstruction tasks. But I see it as a diminution of our
responsibility, over time, as the Iraqis become more capable.
So we need to focus on building their capability.
Senator Hagel. Will that require a change of policy?
Dr. Rice. I don't think it requires a change of policy. We
have all had, over time, an evolution of attitude, which just
comes from the fact that, as you work with increasingly more
representative and legitimate Iraqi government, they have more
say in how this is all done. And I think that that's only
appropriate and right. We are no longer in occupation of the
country, as we were under the Coalition Provisional Authority.
And so, this has become a very intensive partnership with the
Iraqis to get these tasks done, and I think that will probably
continue to----
Senator Hagel. Well, let me----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----to accelerate.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. ----let me ask you, on the
basis of troops, if I have read accurately--and you've noted
this, General Casey's statements regularly; when some of us
were over there last month, we met with General Casey, as well
as other general officers--will that mean that the 150,000 or
so American troops we have there today will now be refocused on
acceleration of training or--what does this mean in the way of
actually accomplishing what you are talking about?
Dr. Rice. Well, we're certainly, right now, very focused
on security for the election. And while that will pass on
September--on January 30th, there will continue to be important
security tasks to make sure that the initial stages for this
new government are secure. But one of the things that the Luck
mission is to try and determine is what the path forward is
with the Iraqis, in terms of security. Are we training the
right--continuing to train the right security forces? What
ought to be the roles and responsibilities of coalition forces
in training, versus active security? How much can the Iraqis
take on some of these active security roles themselves? So we
thought that the time just before the election and leading to
after the election was an ideal time to have this mission. And
I think we will get some answers from that mission.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Let me move to the Israel-Palestinian issue. What do you
and the President envision as a new role, or a different role,
for the United States now as a result of the Palestinian
elections? For example, are you contemplating a special envoy?
How are we going to engage more deeply and widely than we have
in the past? Or are we going to? Give this committee some sense
of where we're going in the next year.
Dr. Rice. We all believe--and most especially, the
President--that we have a really good opportunity here, given
the election of a new Palestinian leader, and given the Israeli
Gaza withdrawal plan, which is linked to the West Bank through
the forced settlements that would be dismantled in the West
Bank, as well. We think this is a moment of opportunity. That
means that there is going to have to be engagement at all
levels. I expect, myself, to spend an enormous amount of effort
on this activity.
I can't substitute for the parties and their willingness to
take on their responsibilities, and that's the message that we
have to keep sending. We've had to note that--how hard this
road is going to be was in evidence during this last few days,
and we've pressed very hard for the Palestinians to take on
terrorism, because we're not going to get very far if there is
terrorism from the Palestinian militants. But you can be sure
that we will have very active engagement, because we think this
is a time of responsibility.
I think I need to, for the time being, demur on the
question of a special envoy. No one has objections, in
principle, to the idea of an envoy, but it is a question of
whether that is appropriate to a particular point in time in
the process that we're involved in.
Senator Hagel. But, as Secretary of State, you intend to
be very involved, engaged, with considerable activity as we go
forward.
Dr. Rice. Absolutely. Because, Senator, I don't think we
can afford to miss this opportunity if the parties, themselves,
are willing to really take advantage of the opportunity.
Senator Hagel. I probably have time for one question
that's going to be on more--one more question--immigration. You
noted, in your prepared delivery--and I thought it was
excellent; you covered a number of the areas that we all have
interest in, and we'll want to go deeper into them--but you
talked about exchange programs. You hit on that, I thought,
very--a very important point. Immigration reform. Is the
President going to push for immigration reform?
Dr. Rice. As you know, the President has been concerned
about, and a proponent of, immigration reform going back to the
time that he was Governor of Texas, when he faced these issues
as Governor. He has a proposal on the table for a temporary-
worker program that would serve the purpose of--purposes, in a
humanitarian sense, in that it would help to alleviate what is
really a humanitarian crisis for us. It would help us
economically, because matching willing workers and willing
employers is an extremely important thing for our economy, when
Americans--when there are jobs that Americans will not take.
It's not an amnesty, and the President's been very clear about
that, but it also has, for our security, real implications,
because if we are not asking our border guards and our border
personnel to deal simultaneously with immigration that comes
out of economic circumstances, and dangerous border
infringement that comes out of terrorism, and they have a more
regularized way to deal with the former, we think that that
will make it easier to deal with some of the terrorism and
concerns about bad people coming to do bad things.
Senator Hagel. I'm going to reintroduce my comprehensive--
I think the only bipartisan immigration reform legislation of
last year--I'm going to reintroduce it. I look forward to
working with you on this. I don't think there is a more urgent
problem America has to deal with today--far more urgent than
Social Security, in my opinion--than this immigration reform
issue. So thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Senator Sarbanes?
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
First of all, I want to welcome our new colleagues to this
committee--Senator Murkowski and Senator Martinez, on your side
of the aisle; and Senator Obama, on our side of the aisle.
We're very pleased to have them join the committee.
And, Dr. Rice, I want to join all of my colleagues in
welcoming you----
Dr. Rice. Thank you.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. ----here before the
committee today.
The post for which you've been nominated is obviously an
extremely important one, perhaps the premier post in the
Cabinet. And in an independent and interconnected world, where
events that happen thousands of miles away can affect our own
economy, our health, or our national security, literally within
minutes, the Secretary of State can make a critical difference
in our everyday lives.
In my view, a Secretary who forges meaningful partnerships
to foster peace or reduce global poverty and hunger, promote
democratic values, and address emerging threats can set our
country on a course to greater security and prosperity. By the
same token, I think a Secretary who adopts a unilateralist
approach in the international environment may miss important
opportunities to prevent conflicts and to build alliances. And,
in that regard, I'd just note that it's not enough to have the
ear of the President; I think the Secretary of State must also
win the ear of the world.
Before I turn to my first question, I want to note that I
have watched Senator Lugar work assiduously on this cooperative
threat reduction issue. I think he and Senator Nunn provided
exemplary leadership. And Senator Lugar, assisted by Senator
Biden and others on this committee, has continued to pursue
that issue. And the only counsel I would give you is, listen to
Senator Lugar on the cooperative threat reduction question. He
knows the issue, he's lived with it, he's invested an
incredible amount of his own time and effort to try to make it
work. So I would hope the administration would, in effect,
follow his counsel and guidance on this issue. I know of no one
who knows the issue better, or whose advice is more measured
and more reasoned than that of the Chairman.
I'd extend the same advice, if I may be so bold as to do
so, in terms of hoping you would listen to Senator Biden and
Senator Hagel in their interchange with you about Iraq. They've
both been there now a number of times, at some risk to
themselves, obviously, as anyone who goes out there well knows.
And it seems to me, the counsel and advice they have given is
perceptive, it's measured, it's tough-minded, and I would very
much hope the administration would listen to that.
Now, my first question is based on a new book by T. R.
Reid, a very distinguished journalist. His book, which has just
only recently come out, is entitled, ``The United States of
Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy.''
And I want to talk some economics with you here this morning. I
looked through your statement quickly, and, other than a couple
of references to ``prosperity'' and to ``free trade,'' there's
not much in it on economics. And I think that's a very
important dimension of what we need to discuss here.
A review of this book, which recently appeared in the New
York Times, said that small things happen, of which we may not
be aware, but over time they gather, and then they become
instrumental. They really end up having a very significant
impact. Let me just quote here, ``Sometimes major events take
place quietly, their import obscured by the hubbub of more
arresting happenings. Only with time is the shift
perceptible.''
And in that regard, I'd like to show you just three charts
that set the context. First is a chart that shows the U.S.
Trade deficit.
[The charts to which Senator Sarbanes referred appear in
Appendix II to this hearing transcript.]
Since Senator Dodd is an important part of our efforts to
get a trade surplus, I don't want to close him out of this
discussion.
Senator Dodd. I've been in your shadow for years.
Senator Sarbanes. As this chart shows, it's pretty
apparent what's happened here. There has been an incredible
deterioration in recent years in the U.S. trade deficit. And
it's estimated that we're now running a trade deficit of well
over $600 billion a year, by far the largest trade deficit in
our history. Now, of course, when you look at the current
accounts--which is a somewhat broader measure--we have the same
situation. Again, we see an incredible deterioration in the
current-account situation, and much of it highly accelerated in
the last four or five years. And the end consequence of running
these large trade deficits and these large current-account
deficits--astronomical for us, in historical terms--is to give
us this marked deterioration of our net investment position.
Our net investment position is now going well over the three-
trillion mark.
Now, it seems to me, this ought to be a matter of very,
very real concern. Chairman Greenspan, testifying before the
Congress, said that ``the rate at which the U.S. is running
current-account deficits and accumulating external debt is
unsustainable.'' He said, ``countries that have gone down this
path invariably have run into trouble, and so would we.'' And
just a few days ago, the president of the New York Federal
Reserve Bank, Timothy Geithner, said in a speech, ``The size
and concentration of external imbalances in the system are at
an unprecedented scale, between 5 to 6 percent of GDP, in the
case of the U.S. current account deficit.'' He concluded,
``what's new is that we are significantly more dependent today
on the confidence of the rest of the world in U.S. economic
policy and the safety and stability of our financial markets.''
Now, the Economist recently said, talking about the dollar
as the reserve currency and the challenge now to the dollar
that's coming from the euro, ``Never before has the guardian of
the world's main reserve currency been its biggest net
debtor.'' ``Never before has the guardian of the world's main
reserve currency been its biggest net debtor.'' And the
Financial Times, earlier this year, in an editorial entitled
``Borrowing From the Rest of the World,'' warned, ``Like
Tennessee Williams' ill-fated character Blanche Dubois, the
U.S. has long been dependent on the kindness of strangers.
Foreigners' hitherto insatiable appetite for dollar assets is
what has enabled the U.S. to keep running on credit for so
long. Like Miss Dubois' dysfunctional relationships, this one
is symbiotic but potentially hazardous.''
How serious do you regard this situation as being?
Dr. Rice. Well, I know, Senator, that the President and
his economic team regard it as a serious set of issues that
they will be dealing with. The President has talked about the
importance of the fundamentals of the American economy,
strengthening the American economy, the importance of a strong
dollar, which continues to be our policy. He's talked about the
need for budget discipline. And I think he is working toward a
budget that will express that.
Senator Sarbanes. Do you consider this a matter for your
agenda? After all, it affects American power and the ability to
project power, and there's a lot of suggestion now that the
economic basis on which we can project power is being
substantially eroded.
Dr. Rice. Yes, Senator, of course it is an important--the
strength of the American economy is an important issue for
American power, and, therefore, an important issue for the
Secretary of State. I do think that the help that our diplomacy
and our foreign policy can give to a strong American economy
comes, for instance, through trade and through the efforts that
we make to promote free trade, and to promote it on a basis in
which the playing field is level. The United States is engaged
in, through the person who will become my deputy, I hope, if
you confirm him, Bob Zoellick, a very active trade agenda
through the Doha development agenda, which will improve growth
worldwide, but also will improve the American economy, because
we're believers in free trade. I think----
Senator Sarbanes. But the trade balance----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----I think that is one way that we
can help.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. ----has worsened markedly. I
mean, something's wrong with the set of policies we're
pursuing, it seems to me, if we're going to have the kind of
erosion in the trade balance that we have seen, particularly in
recent years. It's a very negative figure. And, of course,
every year the figure is negative, the amount of debt that we
owe overseas and our dependence upon others increases.
Dr. Rice. Senator, there are a number of factors that have
contributed to that, and the--I do think that the economic team
is aware and trying to deal with those factors in the American
economy. Where the State Department and our diplomacy can be
supportive is really in two ways--first, to promote a trade
agenda that is--that levels the playing field, that makes
certain that the rules of the trading system are followed. For
instance, many of the changes, economically, are coming as the
result of a strong and growing China, and China's role in the
world economy. The need to make certain that China is, in its
growing strength in the economy, playing by the rules of the
international economy, is enhanced by the work that we did to
have China accede to the WTO. We now, of course, have to make
certain that China is living up to its obligations on the WTO.
So we spend a good deal of time, for instance, trying to get
the Chinese to react to intellectual-property-rights issues.
Another way that the State Department can help with this
very important agenda is to make certain that the markets of
others are as open to us as our markets are to them. And that's
an activity that I would expect to be involved in as a part of
my diplomacy, I've been involved in as National Security
Advisor. If we're not to have deformations in the way that the
international economy works, then people cannot be
protectionist.
Those are some of the ways in which I think the diplomacy
can support a strong economic policy. And I agree with you
completely that a strong economy is very important to our
national--to our international standing.
I would note that we are still the fastest-growing of the
major developed countries of the world, so we have considerable
economic strength.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, we're growing in a way, though,
that causes us to become increasingly mortgaged to others.
China and Japan now are holding tremendous dollar reserves,
which then, of course, play into the trade relationship much to
their advantage, so that we become more dependent. They're able
to skew the trade arrangement to their advantage, which makes
us more dependent, and the vicious circle continues in a
downward spiral.
But I see my time is expired. I may revisit this in another
round. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Chafee?
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And congratulations and welcome, Dr. Rice.
Dr. Rice. Thank you.
Senator Chafee. Senator Feinstein mentioned how proud your
parents John and Angelina must be, and, here in spirit, would
be, rather. And out of curiosity, did your father know Martin
Luther King at all?
Dr. Rice. He did. And--he was a minister in Birmingham,
and they all did, and everyone admired him. We also had a
number of friends who worked with him, like Reverend Fred
Shuttlesworth and--who was a giant in our community.
Senator Chafee. Well, Dr. King's one of my heroes.
Dr. Rice. Yes. Mine, too.
Senator Chafee. Senator Hagel mentioned the distinguished
career of your predecessor, Secretary Powell, and I'm curious
as to how you might look at the improvements as we go forward,
or how you--what would you see, as you come in now, as the new
Secretary of State--what improvements might be occurring----
Dr. Rice. Okay.
Senator Chafee [continuing]. ----in the State Department?
Dr. Rice. Thank you, Senator.
The goal here is to build on the considerable achievements
of Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage. I think that
it is well recognized that they did a great deal to improve the
fundamentals in the State Department, and I would hope to
follow on that. For instance, the Diplomatic Readiness
Initiative, which brought whole classes of new people into the
diplomatic corps. We can't afford, again, to get to the place
where we skipped several years in hiring of Foreign Service
officers. That--you pay the price for that later down the road.
You pay for the price for it early, too, because you don't
bring in that new, young energy. And so, I would hope to
continue to press the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative.
I know that the Secretary was, kind of, appalled when he
saw the state of technology in the State Department. And
Senator Allen has had a particular interest in this. I gather--
I don't know if it's apocryphal or not--that people were still
using WANGs in certain parts of the State Department--not that
there was anything wrong with WANGs; it's just a few
generations back. And they have done a lot on the IT side. And
I would expect to continue to try to help people have those
tools.
I will say, I've had briefings about this, and they've made
wonderful investments in the infrastructure, the hardware. I,
myself, chaired Stanford's executive committee on the changing
out of Stanford's information technology systems. And Stanford,
even though it was in the heart of the Silicon Valley, had a
terrible set of legacy systems. The hard part now is to give
people the training and the software and the ability to use
that technology in their jobs, and I would hope we could do
that.
They've made tremendous progress, I think, on the training
of people. Colin's emphasis on leadership training and skills,
management skills, for the State Department personnel is
extremely important. We have to make sure that people are well
paid and that they are valued.
But the most important thing--and here they've made
tremendous progress--is on the security of our personnel
abroad. We operate in a very dangerous environment in which
everybody--many, many bad people would like nothing better than
to wreak havoc against American interests abroad. And so, the
efforts that have been made to build new security into the
facilities and to revamp our most vulnerable posts will be a
very high priority for me. The first meetings that I had were
with the Under Secretary for Management, and I would expect to
make that a large part of the agenda.
Senator Chafee. Do you see any significant changes ahead?
Dr. Rice. Well, there are--there's always need for change,
because, of course, conditions are different. And I think we
have to continually review and update the skills of our
diplomatic corps. We're asking our diplomatic corps to do more,
actively, in, for instance, helping transform whole societies,
getting in and helping the Iraqis with their currency exchange,
or getting in and helping the Nigerians root out corruption.
These are skills that are of a more active transformational
diplomacy, and one that probably wasn't really foreseen in the
earlier stages of building Foreign Service skills. So I look
forward to working with those people, but also with Members of
this committee, who I know have some interest in skills
development, to see if we can push that envelope.
Senator Chafee. Well, thank you.
As Chairman of the Middle East Subcommittee of the Foreign
Relations Committee, I'm interested in your comments on the
Israeli-Palestinian issue. And in your opening statement, you
talked about, ``America seeks justice and dignity and a viable
independent, democratic state for the Palestinian people.'' Can
you expound--expand at all on ``viable?'' What do you see as a
viable Palestinian state?
Dr. Rice. Well, there are several ways to think about
viability. One is that it has to have territory that makes it
viable. It cannot be territory that is so broken up that it
can't function as a state. And I think that's now well
understood. It has to have economic viability. And, there, it
probably needs to have economic viability in relationship to
other states around it--to Jordan, to Israel, and to others.
And viability also comes from democratic institutions. One of
the things that I think we didn't pay enough attention to in
the past is the development of democratic institutions in the
Palestinian territories. In a time when we are promoting the
progress of democracy in the Middle East, the Palestinians are
a people who should be able to adopt those habits and take them
up. They are a talented, in many ways educated population, a
population that has tried, even under very limited
circumstances, to have some, at least, pluralism in their
politics. And so, viability, I think, also has a political or a
democracy dimension that we need to pay attention to.
Senator Chafee. I'm sure that many Palestinian moderates
would like to hear more specifics on what might constitute a
viable Palestinian state. Are we looking at something perhaps
along the Geneva Accord lines?
Dr. Rice. Well, I--as the President said when he met with
Prime Minister Sharon back in--I think it was May--we have to
recognize that the parties are going to determine their
borders, that it is not for us to prejudge what those borders
might be. There has been a lot of negotiation. I think we
will--they will need to look at what has been looked at before.
But the June 24th, 2002, speech really focused on some
fundamentals to get us to the place that discussions of final
status would be successful. And those fundamentals now seem to
be starting to come into place. The new Palestinian
leadership--I think, a Palestinian leadership, at least in
word--is devoted to fighting terror. It needs to be, indeed, as
devoted to fighting terror. An international community that,
whenever I talk to people, is quite devoted to, and taken with,
the idea of helping the Palestinians to build those democratic
institutions, to reconstruct, economically, in areas which
Israel leaves. We have, in Israel, a new coalition that was
built around the idea that Israel will disengage from the Gaza
and from the four settlements in the West Bank.
And we now really--I'd just like to mention the neighbors.
The Arab states have responsibilities here, too. And they can't
incite violence against Israel, on the one hand, and call for
peace and a two-state solution, on the other. And so, we've got
work to do with them.
But, as the fundamentals are beginning to come into place,
everyone can be certain that it is a very high priority to
seize this moment to try and push toward the day when we have
interlocutors who can work on the final status issues.
Senator Chafee. In the news today, some were calling upon
the new Palestinian leadership to be more proactive against
some of the violence which is occurring within their own ranks.
The previous Palestinian leadership did not intend to go--to do
that, under Yasser Arafat, the danger being that once
Palestinians take up arms amongst themselves, you could have
Palestinian civil war. How do you--how do we go forward with
that dilemma?
Dr. Rice. Yes. Well, I do believe that Abu Mazen made a
good start in what he said, which is that there really is no
route to a Palestinian state through violence. And that means
that he is appealing, in my--to my mind, correctly--to those
Palestinians who realize that the use of terror techniques, the
use of violence is not going to result in the fulfillment of
their national aspirations.
Having said that, the people who insist on violence, and
insist on terrorism, have got to be isolated and, ultimately,
disarmed. The Palestinians are fond of saying, ``There has to
be one authority, one gun.'' We can help with that, because the
restructuring of the Palestinian security forces is something
that we have helped with in the past, and should now, with
other neighbors like Egypt or Jordan, be helping with in the
future. The construction of unified Palestinian security forces
that are accountable to the Palestinian leadership and are not,
in effect, armed gangs is probably one of our most important
tasks.
So I don't see it as a matter of civil war; but, rather, as
a matter of the isolation of those who are unwilling to pursue
the aspirations of the Palestinian people through peaceful
means.
Senator Chafee. Well, thank you very much, Dr. Rice. I see
my time is up. I just returned from a trip with Senator Dodd
and Senator Nelson----
Dr. Rice. Yes.
Senator Chafee [continuing]. ----to Latin America, and I
have to say, Senator Dodd was a good leader of this trip--he
has perfect Spanish--and a good ambassador for the United
States as we travel in the region.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator Chafee. And what a
wonderful introduction of our questioner.
Senator Dodd?
Senator Dodd. Bienvenido a nuestra commite.
Dr. Rice. You'll stimulate me to answer in Russian. I'm
sorry, Senator.
Senator Dodd. I'm not going to try and ask you questions
in Spanish. Welcome to the committee. And, Mr. Chairman, thank
you very much.
Let me also join my colleagues in welcoming our new Members
to the committee--Mel Martinez, who I got to know when he was
Secretary of HUD and appeared before my other committee, the
Banking Committee, on numerous occasions; and Senator
Murkowski, of course, a colleague from Alaska; and Barack
Obama, new Member from Illinois. We're delighted to have all
three Members here.
Senator Sarbanes. Senator Martinez has gone on the Banking
Committee. He wants to work over his successors.
Senator Dodd. I know. I'll expect you to ask tough
questions in those hearings and through the confirmation
process.
Let me also, Mr. Chairman, commend you for your opening
statement, and some very wonderful ideas that you've raised
here. I particularly want to commend you for working hard, I
think all of us will join you on this side, to get an
authorization bill out of this committee as early as we can, by
March. And that's a--we've done it once before in my tenure on
this committee, when you chaired the committee a number of
years ago. It was a very exciting time for the committee, and I
look forward to working with you to achieve that reality.
Let me also join with Senator Sarbanes and Senator Biden in
commending you and our former colleague, Senator Nunn, for the
efforts in the Nunn-Lugar approach. You and I have talked about
this on several occasions over the last year or so, and I'm
heartened to hear you raise it again as such a priority. I
think it's critically important. There's still time for us to
make a difference in this area. And, Dr. Rice, I appreciate
your response to Senator Lugar's question in expressing a
strong interest to see the ideas that Senator Lugar has offered
are ones that you could endorse and support and urge the
President to do, as well.
Let me also join Senator Hagel in--this is a
transformational time, as you talked about, for American
foreign policy. We'd be remiss in this committee if we did not
express our deep sense of gratitude to Colin Powell and Richard
Armitage and the staff they put together. He's been a
tremendous public servant, and whatever else life holds for
him, he deserves our commendation for the job he's done for our
nation. So we thank him for that, as well.
And I want to thank my colleagues for raising some of the
issues they have. Obviously, Iraq is a major current foreign
policy question and, rightfully, would dominate a lot of our
conversation here today.
As Senator Chafee mentioned, Senator Chafee and Senator
Nelson and I just completed an eight-day trip to Latin
America--Venezuela, Paraguay, Argentina, Peru, and Ecuador,
coming back. And I want to focus some attention on that in this
first round. There are other questions I have.
There are roughly 600 million people in this hemisphere,
excluding ourselves, who look to the United States for
leadership. Two of our most important trading partners--Mexico
and Canada--are, of course, in this hemisphere. The issues that
Senator Sarbanes has raised about economic policy are
absolutely on target and one that we should be paying much more
attention to, in my view. Because, as we have found over the
last eight days traveling in South America, these issues are
the ones they care the most about, in many ways, and they're
the ones the absence of our attention to these questions over
the last number of years, for reasons they understand--
certainly, 9/11 diverted our attention elsewhere, the events in
the Middle East have certainly dominated our attention. But I
want you to know, at least my observations over the last week
or so, is, we're in trouble in this hemisphere, Dr. Rice. We're
in deep trouble in this hemisphere. And I--others may know
other parts of the world well, and certainly there have been
great changes in China and India, Russia, the Middle East,
certainly in Africa, but we need to get back on track in this
hemisphere. And I'm going to ask you a broader question about
what direction we're going to take here.
Let me tell you, just briefly, some of the things that we
found over the last seven or eight days. And my colleagues,
Senator Nelson, Senator Chafee, can add or detract from these
conclusions.
We found facing--these governments facing major demands
from their citizens, with inadequate resources to meet those
demands. In fact, the budget indications coming out of the
administration are significantly--going to provide
significantly less resources, in terms of aid to this part of
the world, than has been the case in previous years. You
mentioned the important years of 1947, '48, '49, and
thereafter, in terms of our efforts to grapple with the great
challenge of the second half of the 20th century. Certainly,
one of the great speeches given, that set the tone for that,
was Harry Truman's only inaugural address, in which point 4
would set up the U.S. aid missions. It made a huge difference
in the 1950s and '60s, the Alliance for Progress that Senator
Kennedy initiated. These ideas had strong economic components
to them as we grappled with the great challenges facing choices
in those days between what the Soviet Union offered and what we
offered. So we found great demands on the part of the citizens
of these countries.
We found government institutions that have been weakened
and co-opted by unsolved internal political disputes. We found
government officials interested in concluding bilateral free-
trade agreements, not only because it would improve access to
our markets, but because they know it can be a means of
institutionalizing reforms, that it will mean more jobs and
incomes for their citizens.
We found government leaders concerned about the declinein
U.S. resources available to assist them fight against narco-
terrorists, terrorists ready to take advantage of the
lawlessness created by the systemic corruption that exists
generally throughout the region, and especially in the tri-
border area of Paraguay and Brazil and Argentina, where Muslim
organizations are reportedly raising and laundering money to
support their international ambitions.
We found government leaders frustrated by the suspension of
U.S. military assistance and training to their military
services because of our fixation with the international
criminal court, as codified by the American Servicemen's
Protection Act, which links continued assistance to these areas
to the signing of the so-called Article 98 Agreements of the
United States. And I heard this from American military
personnel, Dr. Rice--not from foreigners, but our own personnel
worried about placing so much emphasis on that point we're
stopping the training so necessary to build those relationships
in this century with people in that part of the world.
We found government leaders desirous of positive
relationships with the United States, and disappointed that our
government hasn't made relations with them a higher national
priority. Even President Chavez expressed an interest in
improved relations with the United States. Putting aside the
obvious issue that's going on in the last several days, it's
going to be critically important that we try and do something
new with Venezuela than the continued policies of isolation, in
my view.
So I'd like to get from you, if I could, after these
opening comments, Are we going to have a new direction here in
this critical part of the world? Senator Hagel mentioned
immigration. No other issue. Vicente Fox, the one issue that he
was hoping he'd get some resolution from over the last four
years was on immigration, and nothing was done. One speech that
I'm aware of, no legislation introduced, no effort up here to
make a difference. It's a crippling economic problem here at
home and a sword of continuing contention between one of our
very, very important allies around the globe and the closest
neighbor to us with some of the important issues. What are we
going to do about that? And are we going to change some
direction here? Or are we going to stick with the policies of
the past that are creating some serious, serious problems in
this part of the world for us?
Dr. Rice. Well, thank you, Senator Dodd. And thank you,
also, for the time that you did spend. And I look forward to
talking to you more about the future of Latin America, Western
Hemisphere. It's obviously extremely critical to our agenda.
Let me start with Mexico and Canada, because the
relationship with our closest neighbors--a good policy begins
with the relationship with your closest neighbors. I do think
we've made a lot of progress with Mexico and Canada on a number
of issues. For instance, on the Smart Border Initiative, which
has helped us to solidify and codify our homeland-security
concerns, it was something that we needed to do in the face of
9/11 and the terrorist threats and the relationships that our
Homeland Security Secretaries have been able to forge so that
we get to a position where the borders are allowing in
commerce, but not allowing in those who might harm us. And that
was very important, because I remember, in the very first days
after September 11th, that some of our efforts to secure the
border were actually very quickly going to prevent commerce.
And so, we needed to find the right balance. And we've made a
lot of progress, in terms of the use of technology. And those
Smart Border initiatives will continue.
We also, with our Mexican and Canadian counterparts, are
talking a lot about what the next steps are in our NAFTA
relationships, because, as--Senator Sarbanes talked about some
of the economic difficulties the United States may face, or
some of the difficulties we may face if we're--if we should
have problems in our economy--we also face a lot of competition
around the world. And as we have watched Europe and the
European Union integrate its economic policies, I think it has
raised questions about what the future can look like for NAFTA
and for the NAFTA states to extend those relationships. And
we've had discussions about what the next phases are. And I
think that is a way forward, and I would look forward to having
extensive discussions about how we improve the competitiveness
of Northern America as we face competition from the rest of the
world.
We also have been very active in Central America. And I
would agree with you, there are very grave challenges now to
some of these regimes. And we don't want to repeat what has
tended to be a cycle in Latin America of democratic
developments followed by authoritarian ones. And I don't think
that we have to.
In Central America, and in Latin America, we have to
recognize that, while there are, in many of these places,
growth rates that are very, very high for these regions, that
the ability for these countries to actually deal with the
problems and demands of their people are--that's really the
next step. And we had, at Monterey, a number of discussions
about developing the human potential of these countries,
worrying about education and worrying about literacy and
worrying about economic opportunity for people. These are, in
many ways, very highly stratified societies, and we need, in
the United States, to associate ourselves, I think, with the
struggle of those who are trying to overcome that
stratification. We can't just associate ourselves with an old
order. We have to be concerned about the indigenous peoples
that are trying to find their rightful place in a political and
economic system. Our own history should tell us that that's an
extremely important task ahead.
So it is a very big agenda to do what the President has
been trying to do, which is to promote democratic development
and democratic institutions, to begin to marry those democratic
institutions with economic progress for the peoples of the
region.
Certainly, one of the ways that we can contribute to the
twin progress of democracy and economic development is through
trade, and we have had a number of successful free-trade
agreements. We had the free-trade agreement with Chile. We
are--you, in the Senate, will be contemplating, at some point,
a free-trade agreement, the CAFTA agreement. We continue to
work, with Brazil as our co-chair, to try and push forward on
the Free Trade of the Americas Agreement. So trade is a big
part of this agenda.
If I might just take one other moment to say that we also
are trying to work relationships, key relationships in this
region, in a very aggressive way. And I would focus for just a
moment on the relationship with Brazil, which I think is
extremely critical to the region.
There are others, as well, but the President and President
Lula have met on a couple of occasions. We had, in the earliest
stage, a meeting of both cabinets to try and have an agenda
going forward. Because if we think about the real challenges,
those are economic, social mobility, education and literacy for
people, and how that can be done within democratic institutions
so that the challenges don't have to come from outside of
democratic institutions, we need partners in that. Brazil is
such a partner, but so are others. And I would hope to really
spend some time with the Organization of American States making
certain that the agenda of promoting democratic development,
holding accountable leaders who do not govern democratically,
even if they are democratically elected, that that would be an
agenda that we could mobilize around.
Senator Dodd. Well, I thank you for your broad answer. My
time is up here. Let me--just a couple of points.
One, this underscores the point Senator Sarbanes was
making, in my view, that--I, too, was a bit disappointed,
reading your opening statements, about the parsity of--paucity,
rather, of comments about economics and the importance of the
issue. You've highlighted this exactly, and you're correct,
this is part of the issue. But I think it's critically
important that we pursue these issues without expressing yet,
until we see them, these final agreements on these trade
agreements.
But I would hope--and if you want to quickly answer--Are we
going to have these trade agreements up here in short order?
You and I both know that if you wait--even good trade
agreements, if coming up at the wrong time up here, the
circumstances, can fail. And if they fail, I think the
implications could be serious for the region.
So, quickly, are we going to see CAFTA and the DR Trade
Agreement coming up, the Andean Agreement, which they're
working on right now? Are we going to see those sooner rather
than later, an administration priority?
Dr. Rice. Well, we will certainly work with the Congress
on this. But we, obviously, would like to see these agreements
sooner rather than later.
Senator Dodd. And let me just comment, please, I think
Senators Chafee and Nelson and I would tell you, as well, we
were very impressed, Mr. Chairman, with the competency and
quality of the State Department personnel we ran into in these
countries.
I would hope, as you're making choices about the senior
positions, there's some wonderfully talented, knowledgeable
people about this part of the world, and my hope would be that
you'd put a team together that would reflect the very things
you're suggesting in response to my questions. Because I think
you will agree with me: for reasons we may understand, we've
really got to pay more attention to this part of the world.
Dr. Rice. Thank you. Senator, may I just have one moment?
You asked--you mentioned Venezuela, and I'd like to just
address that quickly, if I may.
We have a long and good history with Venezuela, and long
ties. I think it's extremely unfortunate that the Chavez
government has not been constructive. And we do have to be
vigilant, and to demonstrate that we know the difficulties that
that government is causing for its neighbors, its close
association with Fidel Castro, in Cuba--still the only empty
chair at the OAS is that of Cuba, because it's not a
democratically-elected government. And those relationships are
deeply concerning to us, and to me. And we are very concerned
about a democratically-elected leader who governs in an
illiberal way. And some of the steps that have been taken
against the media, against opposition, I think, are really very
deeply troubling. And we're going to have to, as a hemisphere
that signed a democracy charter, be devoted to making sure that
those who signed that charter live up to it.
Senator Dodd. Well, I appreciate your saying that. But
it's a two-way street, Dr. Rice. It requires we work on it, as
well. It's not the 1960s or '70s, and there are people down
there--you mentioned President Lula. I can go back and show you
statements that President Lula made that would compete with
anything President Chavez has said, yet we've found a way to
work with this new president. My strong suggestion is, find
ways to do this. Going back and repeating these statements over
and over again only digs the hole deeper and deeper. And that's
an important relationship, it's important in the hemisphere. We
need to work at it. My hope is, you will.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd. I
congratulate you and Senator Chafee and Senator Nelson on the
trip. I know Senator Coleman has been very active in the area,
too. And I would underline the request that we really have
people in the Department who are on top of the situation. I
think that Senator Dodd makes a good point, a group of people
really interested in the area, forwarding these difficult
situations.
Let me call now on Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I guess
this is on. And I'd thank all the Members preceding me for
their questions.
And, Dr. Rice, I've thoroughly enjoyed listening to your
statement and your very positive life story. Four years ago, as
a rookie Senator, I was introducing Secretary Powell, or
General Powell, to this committee, a genuine American hero.
Your personal life story, and his, although in different
backgrounds, certainly are an inspiration and, I think, very
helpful for us as we, as a country, try to advance freedom for
people all over the world.
And I do think that when you talk about your life story,
and bringing up Birmingham, I would encourage some of my
colleagues, there's a civil-rights pilgrimage every year. Last
year, I went on it. Senator Coleman was there--Senator DeWine,
a few others. This year, Senator Corzine, on the Democrat side,
me on the Republican side, will be heading a delegation there
for the 40th anniversary of the Voting Rights Act. And it
goes--you go to Birmingham, that church that was bombed that I
know that you are a member of, as well as Montgomery and Selma.
And I found it a very moving, profoundly impacting, and very
meaningful event for me. And a lot of those who--now, Dr. King,
obviously, is gone, but many of those who were involved in the
civil-rights movement are actually still alive, and you can
talk and question them on what they were trying to do.
Now, Dr. Rice, you mentioned the future, which is
important. And some people call the 20th century ``America's
Century.'' I believe, as you do, that the 21st century needs to
be ``Freedom's Century.'' Individual freedom, regardless of
race or gender or ethnicity or religion, are key. I look at
those as some of--the four pillars of freedom or individual
liberty are: freedom of religion, freedom of speech--you used
the town-hall test--three is private ownership of property,
and, fourth, the rule of law to protect those rights, and
constitutional rule. And we do learn from history. That's why I
like reading and listening to your statement.
You referenced Truman--President Truman and Acheson and so
forth, and--1947 to 1949, and that is fine, that was the
beginning of the Cold War. I will say, though, that President
Ronald Reagan, George Schultz, Cap Weinberger and that
administration were the ones who changed that dynamic of the
Cold War from one of containment and coexistence to the
advancement of freedom. Some criticized President Reagan for
calling the Soviet Union--in my view, rightfully--``The Evil
Empire.'' They criticized him for going to the Brandenburg Gate
and telling Mr. Gorbachev to ``Tear down that wall,'' but
that's actually what did happen. Because of that, there are now
hundreds of millions of people tasting that sweet nectar of
liberty in Central Europe, Friends and allies, not just in the
war on terror, but also economically, thanks to that
leadership.
One of the things that was key in those years was Voice of
America and Radio Free Europe. Presently, there's still Radio
and TV Marti, insofar as Cuba is concerned.
One of the concerns that I have presently, insofar as the
Arab world and, more particularly, Iraq, is--we may grouse
about what TV stations people may watch or what radio they may
listen to. There are so many satellite dishes that you see in
Iraq. I would like to get your views--and Senator Biden brought
this up in his opening statement, just a glancing blow of it.
What is your view of what we can do with the Board of
Broadcasting Governors to find a way of--not propaganda, not
music, but just facts----
Dr. Rice. Yes.
Senator Allen [continuing]. ----about the United States,
our motivation, or just the concepts of freedom, so that the
people of Iraq and others in the Arab world have a fair and
balanced view of the United States and our purposes and the
concepts of individual liberty?
Dr. Rice. Yes. Well, we really do have to enhance our
efforts, I think, in getting our word out, and getting ``the
word'' out. And I used ``the word'' advisedly, because Radio
Free Europe and Voice of America and Radio Marti are about
telling the truth, not about propagandizing, and we have to
make certain that people that otherwise don't have access to
the truth receive it. We also have to make certain that people
who are hearing what are sometimes just incredibly amazing
propaganda and lies about our policy have alternative sources
of information.
And so, I would expect that, as the part of a broad public-
diplomacy effort, which I really want to emphasize, I think
this is something that we really have to pay attention to.
We've done some good things, we've done some good things with
al Hurra, which is the Arab-language television satellite
station. We have done some good things with Radio Farda and
Radio Sawa. Obviously, we've done some good things with Radio
Marti. But--and TV Marti--but there is, perhaps, in this war of
ideas, nothing more important than getting out the truth.
And so, I look forward to working with the Broadcasting
Board of Governors, respecting the line that is there, that has
been observed between the State Department and the Board, but
recognizing that if we're going to win the war of ideas, then
we're going to have to really compete on the playing field a
lot better than we're competing right now.
I think it's broadcasting, but I also look forward to
broadening our exchanges and our efforts to get people here so
that they know what America is about. Some of our student
exchanges have been probably our most valuable policies. I
remember sitting in many places where the prime minister or the
economics minister or the foreign minister were people who
studied in the United States, and they obviously have a
different view of us.
So I can't think of a more important task.
Senator Allen. Well, count me as one who's going to want
to work with you to make sure that we're getting news and
information out to people in those areas. We actually don't
have the same problems we have with jamming, say, to----
Dr. Rice. Right.
Senator Allen [continuing]. ----Cuba or with the former
Soviet Union in that regard.
Now, when you talk about students, let me go to the second
issue, and that has to do with visas. You mentioned in your
remarks, ``America must remain open to visitors, workers, and
students from around the world.'' I hear from business leaders,
from those in research and also in the scholarly or the
collegial--in the literal sense--community how difficult it is
for people to get visas. Clearly, after 9/11, we do need to
have better information. The consulates all have to have the
information that Defense Intelligence has, and the CIA, so that
visas are not granted to people who should never be allowed
into this country. However, in between there, of completely
shutting it down, and with these long delays, versus no
scrutiny whatsoever, in my view, are ways that we can be
utilizing technology. Your predecessor, Secretary Powell, has
done a great job in upgrading the technology, so at least they
can e-mail back here in--within some of the embassies.
The technologies on visas, whether it's a variety of
biometrics, need to be implemented. We need to show the lead,
here in this country, clearly harmonizing, particularly with
Europe and certain Asian countries where we do have a lot of
visitors, whether they are for tourism, whether it's for
business, whether it's research, or for our universities. Can
you share with me and our committee what you envision of
utilizing better biometrics and ensuring security while also
stopping this--or reducing the lengthy, inhibiting time
involved in acquiring a visa for somebody who is a safe
traveler to come to this country?
Dr. Rice. Well, obviously, after September 11th we had to
worry about who was inside the borders, and I think we took a
number of steps that were very important and long overdue. But
it is also important to remain open.
Now, I--the State Department, should I be confirmed, under
my leadership would be resolute and attentive to the security
issues and the kind of policies about biometric passports and
biometric identification. I want to look at where we are on
that issue and--to make sure that we can get the standard in
place so that when we require others to have it in place, that
we have been in the lead. It's obviously the case that you
can't ask others to do what you won't do. And so, I will pay a
lot of attention to that, and spend some time understanding
whatever impediments there are to getting that done.
As to the visa policies, themselves, and the slowness, I
would very much like to have the time--and also the counsel of
this committee, because I think it's the one issue that came up
when I talked to almost every Member of this committee--to see
what we can do to improve this situation. It's partly--a lot
has been done. Secretary Powell and Secretary Ridge worked very
hard on it. They made available some information-sharing
between various agencies that has made it quicker. We put a lot
of stress and pressure on our consular people in this process,
and I appreciate their good works.
But there is clearly and certainly more that we can do. And
I look forward to working with Judge Chernoff, if he is
confirmed, to see what we can do to give a sense of greater
openness to people who want to come here, not to harm us, but
to be a part of this great experience that is America.
I am a big proponent of, particularly, student exchanges,
having been, myself, in a place that had a lot of foreign
students. It's the best policy that we can have. Universities
will have to play their part in helping us to make sure that
the policies that they are carrying out help with the security.
But this is something that I'm going to pay a lot of
attention to, Senator.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Dr. Rice. I look forward to
working with you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.
Senator Kerry, as you--before you came in this morning,
Senator Biden paid tribute to your service on the committee,
and let me join him. We're proud that a Member of our committee
was a candidate for President of the United States, and we're
delighted that you are here today.
We recognize you for your questions.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt, I
indicated to Senator Kerry. I am very disappointed that he's
back. But I am happy to see him.
Senator Kerry. Well, Mr. Chairman, I wish we could have
translated your pride into some votes, but thank you, anyway.
But I respect the pride, and I love your friendship, and I
thank you for it very, very much. And to my friend Joe, the
Ranking Member, I want to thank him also for his comments. I
actually heard them back in the office, and I wanted to thank
you personally, both of you.
I guess it's, sort of, good to be back.
Dr. Rice, welcome. Welcome to the world of oaths and
testimony and congressional accountability, which I tried so
hard to distance myself from for awhile.
I admire, enormously, your personal story. I admire the
road you've traveled. I admire your relationship with the
President, which is obviously special. And he certainly has the
right and prerogative, as we all know, as President, to make
choices. You are going to be confirmed, and everybody knows
that. But without anything personal at all, whether or not it
is with my vote is yet to be determined.
I have reservations. And they are not personal in any way
whatsoever. But they do go to the story and trail of the last
four years. And I even listened closely to your answer to
Senator Biden a few moments ago about troops, and the numbers.
And, frankly, your answer disturbed me.
Despite Paul Bremer saying he thought they needed more
troops, despite General Shinseki talking about more troops,
despite the acknowledged mistake by so many people, certainly
all the leaders I met with in the region in recent days, about
the disbanding of the military, the de-Ba'athification that
went as deep as it did, despite the failure to guard ammo
dumps, the weapons of which are now being turned on our troops,
despite the failure to guard nuclear facilities, when, after
all, the purpose of the invasion was to deal with weapons of
mass destruction, despite the inability to deliver services
immediately, despite the security level that we have today, you
sat there this morning and suggested it was the right number of
troops, contrary to the advice of most thoughtful people who
have been analyzing this.
The Chairman of this committee, at one point, said that he
thought the administration's efforts with respect to the
delivery of aid, et cetera, was embarrassing. The Ranking
Member on their side, Senator Hagel, thought it was both
pitiful and even reached a zone of dangerous. So there's, sort
of, this hanging-in-there to the status quo, which is
worrisome. And then, afterwards, you said, ``Well, there were
unforeseen consequences, unforeseen events, because the army
melted into the countryside.'' Well, that wasn't unforeseen.
That's exactly what they did in '91. And we, in fact,
encouraged them to do it, because we leafletted and broadcast
and told them that if they disbanded, we would pay them, and
they would not suffer any consequences for putting down their
arms and going home and getting out of uniform. So we told them
to do that. But we didn't pay them. We went back on that
promise. And they got angry and organized.
Now, having just come back from there--I haven't been as
many times as Joe, but--in Fallujah and Kirkuk and Mosul, I
talked with Iraqis, who are trying to make this work, who are
desperate about the lack of support from Baghdad, the lack of
resources coming. And they almost feel forgotten by Baghdad.
And it seems to me that if the administration is going to--
you know, we went in to rescue Iraq from Saddam Hussein. Now I
think we have to rescue our policy from ourselves. And what I
learned from every single leader over there--and, you know, I
don't come back with any joy in this, but it's, sort of, the
reality we've got to deal with. We've got kids who are dying
over there. They're going on missions that, in my judgment, are
questionable in what they're going to achieve, in terms of the
population and the overall goal. I hope General Luck comes back
with some judgments about that.
Our troops are stunning. Superb. You know that, I know
that, the President knows that, every American knows that. But
they deserve and want a policy. They ask questions, you know,
``How are we going to do this? How are we going to get out of
here? How are we going to take care of this business?'' And
what I came away from was an unbelievable sense of willingness
of the community-at-large--European leaders, Arab leaders--to
do more, to be able to be more a part of this.
My question to you is several-fold, and there are a lot of
questions I want to ask, in a number of areas, obviously--North
Korea proliferation, the Middle East, a whole host of things.
But all we've have time for in these rounds is probably this
first initial effort.
Every Arab leader I asked, ``Do you want Iraq to fail?''
says no. ``Do you think you will be served if there's a civil
war?'' They say no. ``Do you believe that failure is a threat
to the region and to the stability of the world?'' Yes. Same of
European leaders. But each of them feel that they have offered
more assistance, more effort to be involved, want to be part of
a playing field that's more cooperative, and yet they feel
rebuffed.
I'll give you an example. President Mubarak said to me,
``We're only training 146 officers.'' He doesn't understand
why; offered to do more, hasn't been taken up on it, by Iraqis
or by us. Similarly, European leaders are prepared to do more,
in terms of training. I know they don't want to put boots on
the ground; well, I understand that. But we're not training
people with the sense of urgency that recognizes that there's
only one way out of this successfully, and that is to provide
the capacity ofIraq to have stability and then, with the
stability, to affect a political reconciliation that they all
talk about, critical to making up for what will be the
deficiencies of this election.
So the event we have to look at is not the election,
itself, but what you do--you and the President and this
administration--in the immediate minutes and hours after that
election, to change this dynamic.
Now, can you share with us what you believe the reality is
on the ground and what steps you intend to take to change this
dynamic that is spiraling downwards and not resolving, you
know, centuries-old conflicts in the way that we ought to be?
Dr. Rice. Thank you, Senator. I know that you've been
there recently, and I look forward to hearing from you on what
you found. I do think that we have to look at the overall
difficulty and complexity of trying to help a society recover
from the kind of tyranny that Saddam Hussein imposed upon it.
This was never going to be easy. It was always going to
have ups and downs. I'm sure that we have made multiple--many
decisions, some of which were good, some of which might not
have been good. But the strategic decision to overthrow Saddam
Hussein was the right one, and we're all going to be very glad
that we no longer have to deal with a bloody dictator, in the
middle of the world's most dangerous region, who was an avowed
enemy of the United States. I would rather trade the
considerable difficulty of helping the Iraqi people get to a
democratic future, and a future in which they will be allies in
the war on terror, for what was, yet again, a chance or a
policy that thought that we could buy stability even if there
was a regime of the tremendous brutality of Saddam Hussein's in
place in the Middle East. And so, I think we made the right
decision to overthrow him.
Having made that strategic decisions, you're right, we do
have some big tactical challenges to get the strategic--to the
get to the strategic goal that we have.
After the election--and I do think the election is an
important event, it's a next step on the Iraqi people's road to
a better future. It is not the final step. It's a step that
will allow them to elect leaders who will then begin the
political process of trying to deal with the many divisions and
historic and other divisions that the Iraqi people, themselves,
have. And they're going to have to make political compromises
to do it. They're going go have to find their own way
politically, and we will be there to support them. That is
perhaps the most important set of steps that have to take place
after this election.
Our role, as you rightly say, is to focus on what we can do
to help them build capacity in their security forces and in
their economy. And in their security forces, again, I--we can
talk about what was foreseeable or what was not--the people who
are fighting now, yes, some of them are frustrated young
people, and we need to do--and Allawi is doing--Prime Minister
Allawi is doing what he can to siphon those people off and to
give them a stake in the future of Iraq, and he's doing it--we
will help him with jobs programs. I think we do, as one
adjustment, need to pay more attention to what jobs we are
creating for Iraqis out of the reconstruction dollars that we
are spending. And that's one issue that I've asked to have
looked at a little bit more closely. If the metric is, ``How
many jobs are we creating,'' how are we really creating jobs
for the Iraqis?
But many of the people who are blowing up their fellow
citizens, are blowing up Iraqis, are not actually people who
were angry because they weren't paid. They are people who were
part of Saddam Hussein's regime. They were Ba'athists, at the
high level of Ba'athism--not people who joined the party
because they had to, to get a job, but people who enjoyed the
benefits and the fruits of Saddam Hussein's regime, and people
who spent their lives oppressing their fellow citizens. They've
lost power, and they want it back. And so, we have to be clear
who the enemy is here.
Others are foreign terrorists, like Zarqawi, the face of
terrorism, who, frankly, do see Iraq as the central front in
the war on terror. And they were committing terrorist acts
someplace. They weren't sitting and drinking tea someplace.
They were fighters, hardcore fighters, in the war on terrorism;
now they've decided to fight in Iraq.
Senator Kerry. Can I just interrupt you for a minute?
Dr. Rice. Yes.
Senator Kerry. I understand that. I mean, you're
describing for me the different groups of terrorists. I know
who they are. Some of them are criminals, some of them are
jihadists, some of them are the former Ba'athists, some of them
are Zarqawi. We understand that.
The question I asked you is, what are you going to do? Why
have we rebuffed the efforts of others to be involved--
Russians, Indians offered peacekeepers, others involved, the
U.N. offered at a point in time. There have been a series of
offers here, and we keep, sort of, making this decision to go
it alone. And there's a frustration out there in the global
leadership that's wondering, you know, whether we're going to
change that dynamic and bring them to the table in a legitimate
way.
Dr. Rice. Well, Senator, the only reason that I rehearsed
who we're fighting is that there was the notion somehow that
these were people who were made angry by----
Senator Kerry. Well, somewhere----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----our policies. I think most of
them were made angry by the fact that Saddam Hussein was
overthrown. But, you're right, there are people who we need to
respond to who need jobs and the like.
As to international help, I would note we do have an
international coalition. We have 27 countries on the ground
with us, soon to be 28. Yes, some of the contributions are
small, but, for small countries, they are significant
contributions. We have contributions from places like Japan and
South Korea that one would not expect, Asian allies who are
serving in Iraq, and we need to honor those contributions.
Senator, I'll check, but, frankly, I'm not aware of Russian
effort--or Russian offers of peacekeepers----
Senator Kerry. Indian----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----or Indian peacekeepers----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. ----peacekeepers?
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----in Iraq. As a matter of fact,
quite the opposite, that there don't seem to be people who are
willing to put forces on the ground. There are people----
Senator Kerry. They offered training, and----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----there are people who, in
differing ways, are offering training. For instance, we've
taken up, and have been using for some time, the German efforts
at training in the UAE, for police forces. The Egyptians have
trained some people. We'll look at what more they can do.
Senator Kerry. Germans say they could do more.
Dr. Rice. And we will--if they want to do more, they only
have to say they can do more. And I can guarantee you we will
want them to do more.
One of the things that I will do, going forward, is, after
this election is over, we have a chance now to, as an
international community, support a new elected Iraqi
government. And it may be a time that we can enhance the
contributions of some members of the international community.
But it is not for lack of trying that we have not been able to
get forces on the ground from some of these countries.
Senator Kerry. Well, are--my time is up, and I want to--
we're not really finished with it, in a sense, but let me just
say to you, very quickly, that, as you make a judgment about
this, I think all of my colleagues would report to you--and I
think you'll hear it from generals and others--that current
policy is growing the insurgency, not diminishing it. And you
need to think, as--I mean, I'm still, sort of--you know, try to
see if we can be more precise about what you intend to do to
change this dynamic and affect the political reconciliation
necessary. There are many people who believe that Kirkuk, for
instance, may explode because of the Kurd issue, after the
election, because of what happened in their efforts to move
people in, and they were denied the effort. And so, the
dynamics of the election could actually, without the proper
actions, provide a greater capacity for civil war than there is
today, absent the right steps.
Dr. Rice. Senator, I think that the elections--the Iraqis
understand the opportunity that the elections will give them to
address some of the divisions that you are talking about. There
is no doubt that Iraq is a country that has deep divisions, and
it is a country where Saddam Hussein exploited those
divisions--for instance, with the policy of Arabization in
Kirkuk. And so, they have a long and hard road ahead to effect
national reconciliation.
But I've been, frankly, quite heartened by the fact that
the Shia, whenever there is an attack against them by Zarqawi
and his people or by the insurgents, don't take to the
barricades. What they say is, ``This is going to be a unified
Iraq, and we're not going to fall to sectarian violence.''
So I think we need to give them a chance here. You know,
the political process, as you well know, and you all know
better than I, is one of coming to terms with divisions--coming
to terms with institutions that mitigate against people's sense
of alienation. It takes time, it takes effort. Sometimes the
compromises are a bit imperfect, at first. But, over time, it
gets better.
You know, we've had our own history with this. I often say,
and I don't mean it jokingly, that, so far, I have not seen the
Iraqis, or, for that matter, the Afghans, make a compromise as
bad as the one in 1789 that declared my ancestors to be three-
fifths of a man.
So we need to be patient with people as they make these
moves to democracy, understand that it will be in small steps,
that they will have ups and downs, that the whole process will
have ups and downs. But as long as they're on a strategic road
that is getting them to a government that can actually
represent the aspirations of the Iraqi people, as a whole, I
think they've got a chance.
The insurgency wants, very much, to halt that process and
throw Iraq back. We have to provide the Iraqis with the tools--
through training, through capacity-building--to defeat that
insurgency, with our help. And that's what we're trying to do.
Senator Kerry. I couldn't agree with you more. The only
question is why it's not happening at a pace that maximizes the
capacity for success and minimizes the potential of disaster.
The Sunnis are viewing this election, as you know, with the
highest level of anxiety and suspicion. They view it as, sort
of, a quasi-American joining with the Shia to provide Ayatollah
Sistani and the Shia with a power-hold that they never could
achieve in several hundred years otherwise. And unless there's
some kind of reconciliation process, that every European leader
and every Arab leader talked to me about, which currently isn't
on the table, we're going to have an exceedingly hard time,
sort of, patching that together.
I want to have happen what you just described. My fear is,
there is nothing that shows me a sufficient level of
sophistication and openness to bringing people to the table to
make it happen. I think you have a unique opportunity now. But
I'd like to hear the administration articulate a little more
how it intends to proceed to grab that opportunity.
And I've abused my time. I apologize, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Kerry. The
Chair has allowed the exchange to proceed because it was an
important one, and perhaps there will be a further opportunity
to continue that dialogue.
I'm going to suggest, respectfully, to Members that there
will be four more Senators recognized before we have our break
today, and that will get us farther and farther down the
batting order, so that we can commence this afternoon with
recognition of everybody else, and then maybe a second round.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to join those in applauding Secretary Powell and
Deputy Secretary Armitage for the work they did.
And I also do want to note that some of us are overjoyed to
have Senator Kerry back here with us today.
Senator Kerry. There's going to be a certain unanimity
over there.
Just pass a quick resolution and move on.
Senator Coleman. I also want to make note of the
incredible work that the Foreign Service staff does. I just
came back from a bipartisan trip, with Majority Leader Frist
and Whip McConnell, Senator Landrieu, from Louisiana, and
Senator DeWine, from Ohio. And we had a chance to be in Iraq
with Ambassador Negroponte and his staff, many of whom are
former ambassadors who have come back into service, and not the
ambassadorial level. That level of commitment is just
extraordinary. I saw that in Afghanistan and Pakistan and India
and other places that we were--in Brussels--as part of our
journey. So I just--I don't think we give enough credit to
folks who are doing such great work for this country.
Just an observation from my trip, and perhaps a little
different perspective from Senator Kerry's. One, what I saw was
an incredible moment of opportunity, right now. I met with
Prime Minister Singh of India, and he said that relations
between America and India have never been better. Have never
been better.
And I didn't sense, by the way, that sense of being
rebuffed in Iraq. In fact, the sense I got--and we raised the
issue of Iraq with all the leaders in Pakistan and in India and
with the European Union--I think there's a tentativeness,
certainly about the security situation in four of the 18
provinces. There is a concern--not a concern, but there is a
hope--that the election, the election that's going to take
place, that has to take place--has to take place--on January
30th, provides a moment of opportunity, with two more elections
to come. But one of the great success stories, which we don't
talk about enough, is Afghanistan. The election there was a
paradigm-shifting event. Paradigm-shifting event. President
Karzai ran on a platform of developing a stronger strategic
relationship with the United States--and was elected. Eighty-
two percent, by the way, of the voters were women. And in
Minnesota, where we pride ourselves in having the highest
turnout in the nation, I don't think we get 82 percent. Pretty
stunning.
And so, the sense I got is, Afghanistan is this great
miracle. Iraq, in four of the 18 provinces, deep concerns. But
we met with Carlos Valenzuela, the U.N. Advisor to the
Election; he said the election would pass, today, international
tests of credibility and independence. It would be a solid
election.
In Pakistan, we met with Musharraf, who was not
democratically elected, but talked about a commitment to
democracy within two years, talked about a vision of
enlightened moderation within the Islamic world. And that was
heartening. He's got to follow through now. We have to hold him
to those commitments. But we saw that.
And then, in Brussels, with the EU, with Secretary General
de Hoop Scheffer and European Union President Barraso, they
talked a new wind blowing, a new moment of opportunity.
So I hope that, Dr. Rice--and I'm sure you recognize--there
is this moment of opportunity, for whatever reason. The
President's going to be there four more years. What happened in
Afghanistan with the election, I think, is very important. I
don't think we reflect on it enough. And the sense I got from
our allies is not that they're being rebuffed, but a little
hesitancy. But now they're ready to come forward, and we have
to then seize the moment.
The challenge, in two areas that I think are critical.
One--and Senator Dodd raised--in Latin America. I'm deeply
concerned that--we've had 20 years of democracy that, I think,
threatens to be undermined by economic promises that aren't
fulfilled. And I think we need to be focused on that region.
And then, in the second round of questions, I think I'll
specifically ask about Colombia and talk about that. So I think
there is a great challenge. And the other is Russia. I think in
your comments you talked about an uneven path ``the path to
democracy is uneven.'' I would agree with Senator Biden that
what we're seeing is a slippage, we're seeing a reversal of
course, we're seeing a regression on the part of the Russians.
And as the President prepares to meet with Putin, I just hope
we continue to press this issue.
In fact, I'll raise a micro-issue, and the micro-issue has
to do with some religious documents important to the Jewish
community, the Schneerson documents important to the Chabad-
Lubavitch community. I marched for Soviet Jewry--for the issue
of freedom for Soviet Jewry--in the 1980s here in Washington.
And we still face those issues.
So my concern is, as we look to develop our relationship
with the Russians, that we continue to press them on the
religious freedom issues, these documents in particular. I
continue to have deep concerns--deep concerns--as to what I see
as a regression.
So I just want to make that statement, and I hope that you
would, kind of, push on those. The little things sometimes
become big things.
Dr. Rice. Thank you. And we will very much push on those
issues and the issues of the Schneerson documents, but also
religious freedom. I think you're very right, we need pay
attention, in Russia, to what is happening to individual rights
and--as well as religious freedom.
Senator Coleman. Let me raise, then, in this round, just
one other issue. Obviously, my Subcommittee is involved in the
investigation of Oil for Food. We just had a release of
documents. By the way, I want to thank the State Department. I
know, within the budget committees of the U.N., they pushed to
have member states have access to these reports. And, as a
result, we got them a lot quicker, because of that kind of
support, that kind of focus.
These most recent documents highlight a lot of
mismanagement, serious mismanagement. We fund 22 percent of the
U.N.'s operating budget. We've had, as you know, a terrible
environmental crisis, which, by the way, we responded to very,
very well. The Indians also responded well. I worry about the
ability of the U.N. to be able to respond credibly when we've
got this stain of mismanagement. Again, I think we're just
seeing the tip of it right now. Our investigation will go on,
but these audits demonstrate severe mismanagement of resources.
That is simply not tolerable with concerns and the needs that
we have.
Can you reflect a little bit on the Oil for Food impact on
U.N. credibility and how do we move forward?
Dr. Rice. Yes, absolutely. I would agree with you that it
is a--I'll use the world ``scandal.'' I think it is a scandal
that--what happened with Oil for Food. And it is extremely
unfortunate, because it--not only did it allow Saddam Hussein
to continue to get resources, it really did--it was very hard
on the Iraqi people. So we had the worst of both circumstances.
It was also the process that we were relying on, of course, to
keep Saddam Hussein contained and checked. And clearly we
weren't doing that. The sanctions were breaking down. He was
playing the international community like a violin. And we can't
let that happen again, should we ever get into a position where
we have to do something in terms of sanctions. It's just
outrageous.
Now, I hope that the Voelcker commission will get all of
the cooperation that they need from the U.N. to continue their
process. And we have worked--and I appreciate hearing that
things have gotten better for the congressional committees
here, because we really do expect openness and transparency and
information flow from the United Nations. I know we've made
State Department people, who would have knowledge, available to
talk with people here. We've opened up the Iraq--the Iraq
Survey Group's files, in effect, to people. We've got to get to
the bottom of what happened here, and those who were
responsible, I think, should be held accountable.
I will note that some changes are being made at the U.N.,
in terms of the structure of the staffing there, that more
changes have been recommended as a part of the high-level
panel, and the United States has to stay active in the U.N.
reform process, because we want the U.N. to be effective. We
don't want it to be an ineffective organization. We have too
much work to do together, and it has to be in--it has to be
effective, and it has to be admired and--for its integrity and
its programs. And so, this will be an important agenda for us.
And if I could just go back to the point that you made
earlier, Senator Coleman, which is about the moment of
opportunity. It's very easy, in the day-to-day, to lose sight
of some of the things that you mentioned. I do think that if
you had sat here two-and-a-half years ago trying to talk about
the situation in Afghanistan, you might have wondered at the
sanity of someone who said that there was going to be an
election, with a president elected who was running on a
platform that he is pro-American, who would have dealt pretty
effectively now with the warlords around him, who is moving
toward women's rights and the likes. I think we would have
thought that farfetched.
Similarly, if you had sat here three-and-a-half years ago
and said that Pakistan was going to turn its guns on extremism,
rather than supporting the extremists in places like al Qaeda
and the Taliban, you would have, again, said that this is
farfetched.
So we have to remember that these are historical processes.
And I want to just go back to Iraq for a moment. This is a
huge historical change that is going on in the center of the
Arab world, and it has great promise, and it has great peril.
And we are aware of both. But we shouldn't lose sight of the
promise of Prime Minister Allawi and the leaders, including the
Shia leaders, reaching out to Sunnis and saying, ``You are
going to have a place in this government. Yes, you are only 20
percent of the population, and, yes, the Shia, who are now 60
percent of the population, have been repressed, as have the
Kurds, but that doesn't matter. We're going to have a common
Iraqi future.'' And my read is that the reason that Sunnis are
nervous about this election is not that they want to boycott
the elections because they think they're somehow just a shield
for Sunni--for Shia dominance, but, rather, because there is
widespread intimidation by these thugs against the Sunni
people. We have to recognize what the motivation is here. The
Sunnis want to participate in these elections, but there are
people who are engaging in the most brutal intimidation.
And so, the Iraqis, I think, will find a way to, after the
elections, unify their country again, and we have to be there
to help them. But from the historical perspective of 30,000
feet, it's sometimes important to see the long sweep, not the
short--short term.
Senator Coleman. And we heard that from our bipartisan
visit just last week.
If I can, Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the
record a commentary by Paul Bremer that was in the Wall Street
Journal of January 12th.
Dr. Rice has answered the concern raised by Senator Kerry,
but Bremer did note in this article, he said, ``Moreover, in
July 2003, we began paying a monthly stipend to all but the
most senior former officers. These payments continue to this
day. So if any former army officers is involved in the
insurgency, it is not for money; their objective is simply to
retake power and to return Iraq to its horrible past.'' So I
would like that to be part of the record.
The Chairman. It will be made a part of the record.
[The article to which Senator Coleman referred appears in
Appendix II of this hearing transcript.]
Dr. Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Coleman.
Senator Feingold?
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me join the other Members of this committee in
congratulating you, Dr. Rice, on your nomination. I've always
enjoyed our conversations and work together. It's long been
apparent that the President has tremendous confidence in you,
and his choice to nominate you to be the Secretary of State at
a time when the United States faces so many profound challenges
and so much global distrust, is still more evidence of his deep
and abiding trust in you.
Dr. Rice, obviously you and I disagree on many issues. I
actually think that the Bush administration's foreign policy
over the last four years has been, on many fronts, misguided
and self-defeating, and I will continue to oppose these
policies.
Nothing is more important to this country than prevailing
in the fight against terrorism. In that effort, and the related
effort to repair our country's image and create a more stable
and just and prosperous world for our children to inherit, we
have to make sure our policies are effective and well thought
out.
I just returned, two days ago, from a trip to Algeria,
Chad, and Mali. And, after that, I'm even more convinced than
before that we need to make a much more substantial commitment
to ensuring that the vast youthful populations of the Middle
East and Asia and Africa do not mistakenly believe that our
goal is to humiliate them, and, therefore, believe that their
best hope might be a movement, that may seem to promise pride
and belonging, but actually delivers hatred and repression and
brutality and terror.
So, Dr. Rice, where we do agree, I hope to be a strong and
active ally of yours. We have to make the right policies work.
Just as an aside, I note that, in response to Senator
Coleman's questions, you talked about the need for
accountability of the U.N. for the Oil for Food Program. And I
agree with that. But I just have to note, shouldn't the demand
for accountability also apply to this administration for the
long litany of mistakes and misstatements about Iraq? There
hasn't been serious accountability for that. So I'm not going
to hesitate to point out mistakes or raise questions. The
stakes are to too high.
And I'd like to begin by continuing an exchange you had
with Senator Kerry. You indicated that if there are countries
willing to do more to help us stabilize Iraq, quote, ``All they
have to do is say they want to do more.'' I think this comment
troubles me.
Americans are dying, and our approach to burden-sharing is
to wait for others to come to us?
I would like to hear a little bit about what your strategy
will be to proactively reach out, to squeeze every drop of
assistance from others that is available. That will be your
job. We just can't sit and wait for others to raise their hands
and volunteer.
I wonder if you could comment on that?
Dr. Rice. Of course. And, Senator, let me be very, very
clear about this. We have been reaching out to others and
asking them what they can do to stabilize Iraq. It is a
constant preoccupation of Senator--or of Secretary Powell, who
has talked to every counterpart that he has about what might be
possible. It is something that the President has raised in his
many meetings with people. It's something that we took to NATO,
and that's how we got the NATO training mission, talking to
people about what NATO can do. We mobilized the world to--the
G7 to give debt forgiveness to Iraq, which will save that
country a lot of resources and make it possible for it to
recover.
I know, in my personal conversations around the world, I
always ask the question. I start with the premise that we all
want to see a stable and democratizing Iraq. I then go on to
say that I understand that we've had differences in the past,
but that now we all have a common future in looking to a stable
and democratizing Iraq. And then the very next question is,
``So what can you do to help?'' And this has been a
preoccupation of reaching out.
My only point was that we will have another opportunity
when the elections are held, elections that will come out of a
process that the U.N. blessed in a U.N. Security Council
Resolution, and that countries that may have had hesitancy, for
whatever reason, I hope that they will really step up. We had a
very successful donor conference, for instance, in which
countries made very large financial pledges to this effort.
So we are getting help. I think we can get more. Perhaps
more countries will be active after the elections.
I would just note, on the matter of the region, there have
been a couple of very important meetings of regional leaders--
one that took place with the G8 and--with the EU the G8 and
regional leaders there--to pledge support to Iraqi democracy.
There was a recent meeting that King Abdullah of Jordan held,
which was a meeting that was to actively ask people to
participate in the elections.
I think the world is coming together behind the idea that
we have to succeed in Iraq, and we have to succeed by building
a more democratic Iraq. And we'll welcome all the help. But I
didn't mean to leave the impression that we're not reaching
out. We're consistently and constantly reaching out.
Senator Feingold. Well, I thank you for that. My sense is
that we've not reached out as often and as well as we could,
but I wish you well in an aggressive approach to this. I don't
think anything would mean more to the American people, and
particularly the families of our soldiers, to know that we're
doing everything that we can possibly do to get the help from
other countries that we can.
Dr. Rice, I've reflected, a lot of times, on the memo that
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld issued in October 2003, which
indicated that despite over two years having passed since
September 11th, quote, ``relatively little effort had gone into
developing a long-range plan to win the fight against
terrorism.'' He pointed out that there is no consensus within
the national security community of the United States about how
to even measure success in the fight.
Now, I think the Secretary of Defense was quite right, and
I don't see any particular evidence that this problem has been
remedied. In fact, we just listened to discussion here at this
three-hour-some hearing today--there's been, actually, not a
whole lot of discussion about the fight against terror, unless
you believe that the Iraq War is the heart and soul of that,
which I don't. And that troubles me. I think we risk losing
focus, something I believe happened when we turned the lion's
share of our attention to Iraq, devoting many years and
billions of dollars, and possibly many American lives, to
ineffective or self-defeating strategies.
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, how have
you and the Department been assessing the success and efficacy
of policies designed to actually fight terrorist networks, to
strengthen the multilateral coalition cooperating to combat
these networks, and to prevent these networks from gaining new
support and new recruits? And how do you, sort of, measure that
success? Do you think the metrics and assessments that we're
now using in the fight against terror are sufficient?
I want to reiterate, I'm talking here about, not the
broader strategy that the President has articulated, but the
specific issue of terrorist networks and where they actually
exist.
Dr. Rice. Well, Senator, there are a number of important
elements in the fight on terror, and I'll come back to--because
I do think there is a broader context here that has to be
understood. But, first of all, when you look at the
organization that did 9/11, al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden's
organization, I think that you would see that we have had
considerable success in bringing down the ``field generals'' of
that organization, people like Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Abu
Zubaydah and others. It is true, I'm certain, that they worked
to replace those people, but they lose a lot of skill and
experience in these field generals in--who had trained in
Afghanistan together and had worked to produce September 11th.
There's a lot of evidence that we've really hurt the
organization in that way.
Secondly, in terms of their financing, I think we've made a
great deal of progress, not just in the United States in
tracking and dealing with terrorist financing, but around the
world. You know, we didn't understand, really, the structure of
terrorist financing very well. We didn't understand the role of
non-governmental organizations that sounded like they were for
good purposes but were, in fact, carrying out or funding
terrorist activities. Others didn't understand that, in the
Muslim world, like the Saudis. And we have made, I think, great
strides in doing that.
We've made strides in denying them territory. You know, one
of the ways that you fight a war is, you deny the other side
territory. And when you look at what has happened to them,
their world has gotten smaller. Afghanistan is not a hospitable
environment now for terrorists. It used to be the home base for
al Qaeda, with its training camps and its access to
Afghanistan's benefits of being a state. They can no longer
count on Pakistan, which had such strong ties to the Taliban
that it was not really an aggressive actor against al Qaeda.
They can no longer count on not being pursued up in the
northwest frontier. The federally administered tribal areas
that hadn't been governed by Pakistan for--hadn't been ever
governed by Pakistan--they can't count on that territory. So we
are denying them territory.
Senator Feingold. Dr. Rice, I don't share the view that
they've lost territory, actually. I happen to have supported
the invasion of Afghanistan, and understand absolutely why we
had to do that. But I've done a fair amount of work in East
Africa and Northern Africa. We aren't denying terrorist
elements those territories. When it comes to Somalia or Algeria
or the activities that have occurred in Kenya--our focus on
Iraq has been so single-minded--and, in fact, I was told by
some of our own officials in that region, this past week, that
a lot of things have gone waiting because of the demands of the
Iraq invasion, in terms of dealing with this issue in North
Africa and in East Africa. I know there are efforts going on,
and I encourage those efforts, and I support them. But in terms
of the balance? I think the balance has not been correct.
Dr. Rice. Well, Senator, in East Africa, we have a very
effective set of partnership in counterterrorism strategy with,
for instance, Kenya. Somalia is a particular problem, a unique
problem, given that it's ungoverned, in effect, and the problem
there is to try and bring about some kind of stable government,
in the long run. But, in the meantime, we have worked with
Somalia's neighbors to try and increase their capacity to deal
with counterterrorism----
Senator Feingold. Dr. Rice, I see my time's up, but we
have no policy in Somalia. Our government has no policy in
Somalia, and we simply must reverse that if we're going to get
serious about terrorism.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----But, Senator, our intention in
Somalia is to try to work with the EGAD process there to bring
about a government. It has been extremely difficult. In the
meantime, we've tried to contain the terrorist threat in
Somalia by working with Kenya and with others in East Africa.
But I will tell you, Senator--I'd just like to make one
final point--I do sit every day and look at the terrorist-
threat reporting that's coming in. I look, every day, at the
efforts that disrupt terrorism around the world. And I can tell
you that the reports come from every--practically every service
in the world, because our liaison relationships are so much
more developed now, that when you have a situation like we
faced back in December of last year, where we thought there
might be an imminent threat to the United States, that we are
able to mobilize law enforcement around the world, that you do
get major take-downs of terrorists in places like Pakistan,
which had been a central place for them to operate. We are
making a lot of progress in this, but I--I know that there are
differences on the question of what the ultimate antidote to
terror is, and it is our view, and the President's view, that
the ultimate antidote is to deal with the source of that
terror, and that really is, ultimately, the freedom deficit,
and that in order to do that, you've got to have a different
kind of Middle East. And that's why we do see Iraq as being a
part of that war on terrorism.
Senator Feingold. Just one last comment. I certainly--the
freedom deficit is a legitimate way to look at this, but I
think the reality of failed states and lawless areas is just as
important, in terms of the terrorist threat, and needs to be
considered in that regard.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Senator Voinovich?
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I'd like to publicly thank Secretary Powell
and Secretary Armitage--and their team--for the outstanding job
that they've done for this country during the last four years.
I'd like to thank you, also, for being willing to come
before us and to seek confirmation as Secretary of State of the
United States of America.
I couldn't help but think, as I have heard my colleagues
ask questions here today, about the enormous responsibilities
that you're taking on, in terms of the world. There's no
country in the world where a foreign minister is being asked
questions about the whole world. And, today, you're being asked
questions about the whole world and, what you are going to do.
And I'd like to share with my colleagues that one of the
things that we all ought to be concerned about is whether or
not the new Secretary of State is going to have the budget and
the human capital that she is going to need to get the job
done. Are we going to prioritize, in terms of this nation, the
money necessary, so that many of the questions that have been
asked here at this table about what you are going to do in
parts of the world can actually be done? And, at the same time,
maybe we need to look at our own tax policy and give
consideration to what Senator Sarbanes has been talking about,
the trade deficit that's looming, and the account deficit.
And I am very happy to hear that Bob Zoellick is interested
in coming over to the State Department because Bob's got
tremendous background in the area of trade, which I think is
essential to almost everything that you'll be doing.
I was glad, also, in your testimony you said that, ``More
than ever, America's diplomats will need to be active in
spreading democracy, fighting terror, reducing poverty, and
doing our part to protect the American homeland. I will
personally work to ensure that America's diplomats have the
tools they need to do their jobs, from training to budgets to
monitoring embassy security.
We expect you to come here before this committee and tell
us what you think you need to get the job done. And I think
it's your job to advocate to the administration about what it
is that you need to get the job done. We've got to be real.
I have dealt with a lot of the major issues that are on
everyone's mind, but I think you know I have a particular
interest in Southeast Europe, where I've spent probably more
time than any Member of the Foreign Relations Committee. And
we've made some progress there. We've gotten rid of Milosevic,
we've gotten rid of Tudjman. Stipe Mesic just got reelected to
serve as President of Croatia. Slovenia has joined NATO and the
EU. There's some real progress being made.
But I am very concerned about what's going on in Serbia and
Montenegro today. I'm also very concerned about what's
happening in Kosovo, because I really believe that unless
things are stabilized in Serbia and Montenegro, and unless we
stabilize things in Kosovo, we could very well have another
crisis on our hands this year, particularly because we're
discussing the final status of Kosovo and what's going to be
happening there.
I'd like to say that Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman
has done a good job, but I'd like to know, where is this on
your priority list? Are you familiar with problems in Southeast
Europe? We've got our NATO forces in Kosovo, and they haven't
got the job done. You'll recall, on the 17th of March last
year, ethnic violence resulted in 4,000 refugees, 900 homes
burned, and 30 churches destroyed. There are some real problems
in that part of the world. We've invested a lot of money. I'd
like to know, what do you think you're going to do about that?
Dr. Rice. Yes. I think it is a high priority, Senator,
because it would help complete the European construction, if
you think of it that way, that, in effect, until the Balkans
have settled, it's going to be hard to think of Europe as truly
whole and free. And so, we need to resolve the remaining
Balkans issues.
And on Bosnia and Herzegovina, we've made a lot of
progress. We've been able to end the S4 mission there and to
have the EU take that mission over. But, you're right, in
Kosovo, in Serbia Montenegro, we have a thorny set of problems.
One of the issues in Kosovo has been to try to get some
energy into UNMIK. And I think we've got now, in the leadership
there, strong people who are looking to try to improve the
coordination on economic and political affairs there. We
definitely need the Serbs to continue their democratic process.
I think we were all somewhat heartened about the election
there, of Mr. Tadic. And I hope that they will take the
opportunity that that provides to make progress on the further
democratization of Serbia. And, of course, we do need their
cooperation in the international tribunal for Yugoslavia, and
we continue to press that case.
Ultimately, on Kosovo, as we've had this standards-before-
status approach, we recognize that the standards are going to
be important to the future of that region. Meeting those
standards is going to be important to the future of that
region. And I notice that Mr. Jessen Peterson has put a lot of
emphasis on those standards that are about minority rights and
the need to deal with the Serbian minority there so that we can
move on, then, to discussions in the review conference that's
coming up----
Senator Voinovich. I'd just like to say that I hope that
we really give it the priority it needs.
Dr. Rice. Yes.
Senator Voinovich. Because last year, when Secretary Powell
was here, I said to him, ``I don't think we're doing the job
we're supposed to be doing.'' He said, ``No, I think things are
fine.'' And then we had the blowup there.
Dr. Rice. Oh.
Senator Voinovich. But I'm just telling you, we have a
situation, and now you've got the new prime minister of Kosovo,
who may go to The Hague. Solana and our people have encouraged
the Kosovars not to put that person in, and he's still there.
So you've got a real problem there that needs to be taken care
of, in addition to getting the other countries to give up their
national caveats, in terms of what they can do. Because we had
the burnings of homes there, and some NATO forces just watched
the homes and monasteries burn down and said, ``We can't do
anything about it, because our orders are--we only protect
people, not property.''
Dr. Rice. I take the point, Senator.
Senator Voinovich. The other issue that I'm very
interested in, and where we've made some great progress, is the
issue of global anti-Semitism. And, as you know, we passed
legislation, which the President signed into law. I think the
report on global anti-Semitism that came out of the State
Department did an outstanding job of portraying the situation,
which is a crisis all over the world, particularly in the OSCE
area.
And I would encourage you to give the same kind of
commitment to this issue that Secretary Powell has made. He was
in Berlin. And one of the concerns I have--and I'd be
interested if you're familiar with it--is the budget of the
OSCE, and whether or not the OSCE is going to provide the money
necessary to ODIHR, which is the Office of Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights, to really monitor this anti-
Semitism issue. They've agreed to do it. But, as you know, so
often people agree to do things, and then the money is not
there to get the job done.
And I am not sure whether anybody has talked to you about
the fact that they're going to have another conference in
Cordoba, Spain, in June. I would recommend that you be there,
because I think that, without the presence of the Secretary of
State of the United States, it doesn't get the kind of clout
that we need for that issue to be dealt with.
Dr. Rice. I appreciate it, Senator. I am aware of the
conference. It'll be a very important conference.
I will look into the budget issue. I was not aware of the
budget issue, but I will look into that----
Senator Voinovich. Well, it's my understanding that the
Soviet Union--or Russia----
Dr. Rice. Russia.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. ----is dragging its feet
and slowing things down right now.
Dr. Rice. Right. And I think, at some point, have said
they might not contribute. I understand that.
But this is an issue that I think gets everybody's
attention when you have something pending, like the conference.
We'll put a focus on it, we'll put an emphasis on it the way
that we did in the past. I think it was a great thing.
Actually, everyone who was there, including the countries of
the OSCE, thought it was a great thing, and I'm glad we're
having a second one.
Senator Voinovich. Well, as I say, it's a high priority,
the money.
As you know, I also, feel that our best offense against
terrorism is intelligence, diplomacy, and something that Robert
Burns once spoke to, and that is, ``Oh, that some great power
would give me the wisdom to see myself as other people see
me.''
I was recently in England and parts of Southeast Europe
prior to attending the NATO Parliamentary Assembly meeting in
Venice. And I was just shocked at what I got back from our
friends about how badly we're thought of today in that part of
the world. And I just wonder, what are you going to do to try
and change that? I think what we're doing to help following the
tsunami right now is wonderful. But we have got to show people
that we love them, that we are for democracy, that we want them
to enjoy the same thing, that we haven't any hidden motives.
What are you planning on doing in that area?
Dr. Rice. Senator, first of all, I do agree that the
tsunami was a wonderful opportunity to show, not just the U.S.
Government, but the heart of the American people. And I think
it has paid great dividends for us.
Sometimes what happens is that we've had to ask people to
do very difficult things, and we've had policies that people
don't like. I think, in some corners, there are people who have
been unhappy with the way that we've dealt with the Middle
East, with the strong support for Israel, with our strong
belief that terrorism has got to stop there. But we somehow
have to get the message out that this is also the first
President to call, as a matter of policy, for a Palestinian
state. And somehow we're not getting that message out, as well.
What I plan to do is that, I'm going to put a major
emphasis on public diplomacy, in all of its forms. That means,
in getting our message out. And public diplomacy really is the
State Department's core--a State Department responsibility. The
State Department has to take on this challenge. Because public
diplomacy isn't done here in Washington; public diplomacy is
done in London, or done in Oman, or done in Riyadh. And so, the
arms and legs of the public-diplomacy effort are our embassies
out there and our ambassadors and what they do on a daily
basis. And so, I think we have to have a new renewed effort on
that piece of it, getting our message out.
We also have to have a new renewed effort on getting our
people back and forth, because people, when they come to the
United States and see who we are and can get past some of the
filter of, perhaps, some of the sides of America that are not
well liked or respected, I think, do come away with a different
view of us. And so, I will have a strong emphasis on getting
our message out, on getting the truth to people, on diminishing
the--on doing something to mitigate against the propaganda
that's out there against us, but also on going to our long-time
partners and friends and saying, ``We have a common purpose
here, a great cause ahead of us.'' And the Transatlantic
Alliances--you know, sometimes it's a little bit like whatever
it was that Mark Twain said about Wagner's music; I think he
said, ``It's better than it sounds.'' Well, in fact, our
Transatlantic Alliances are really getter than people give us
credit for. We're cooperating in a lot of places, we're working
hard together in a lot of places, we've had a lot of successes.
But we can do more, in this period of tremendous opportunity,
to unify the great democracies, the great alliances for a push
to spread freedom and liberty. I think it's an agenda thatis
inspiring, and I think we've done a lot already, but there is
much more that we can do.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.
Senator Boxer?
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you, Dr. Rice, for agreeing to stay as long as it takes,
because some of us do have a lot of questions.
And, Senator Lugar, you are a very fair Chairman. And I
wanted to say to the new Members, also, welcome, and you'll
enjoy this committee because we have such a great Chairman and
such a terrific Ranking Member, and we really do a lot of
things in a bipartisan way, unlike other committees. And I
think you're going to enjoy your time here.
Dr. Rice, before I get to my formal remarks, you, no doubt,
will be confirmed. That's, at least, what we think. And if
you're going to become the voice of diplomacy, this is just a
helpful point. When Senator Voinovich mentioned the issue of
tsunami relief, you said--your first words were, ``The tsunami
was a wonderful opportunity for us.'' Now, the tsunami was one
of the worst tragedies of our lifetime. One of the worst. And
it's going to have a ten-year impact on rebuilding that area. I
was very disappointed in your statement. I think you blew the
opportunity. You mention it. It's part of one sentence. And I
would hope to work with you on this, because children are
suffering, we're worried they're going to get in the sex trade.
This thing is a disaster, a true natural disaster and a human
disaster of great proportions, and I hope that the State
Department will take a huge lead, under your leadership, in
helping those folks in the long range.
Mr. Chairman, again I thank you.
Dr. Rice, I was glad you mentioned Martin Luther King. It
was very appropriate, given everything. And he also said,
Martin Luther King, quote, ``Our lives begin to end the day we
become silent about the things that matter.''
And one of the things that matters most to my people in
California and the people of America is this war in Iraq. Now,
it took you to page three of your testimony to mention the word
``Iraq.'' You said very little, really, about it, and, only in
this questioning, have we been able to get into some areas.
Perhaps you agree with President Bush, who said, ``All
that's been resolved.'' I'm quoting today's Post, ``Bush said,
in an interview last week with the Washington Post, that the
'04 election was a moment of accountability for the decisions
he made in Iraq. But today's Washington Post/ABC poll found
that 58 percent disapprove of his handling of the situation, to
40 percent who approve, and only 44 percent said the war was
worth fighting.''
So, in your statement, it takes you to page three to
mention the word ``Iraq.'' Then you mention it in the context
of elections, which is fine, but you never even mention,
indirectly, the 1366 American troops that have died or the
10,372 who have been wounded, many mentally. There's a report
that I read over the weekend that maybe a third will come home
and need help because of what they saw, it's been so traumatic
to them. And 25 percent of those dead are from my home state.
And this from a war that was based on what everyone now says,
including your own administration, were falsehoods about WMDs,
weapons of mass destruction. And I've had tens of thousands of
people from all over the country say that they disagree--
although they respect the President, they disagree that this
administration and the people in it shouldn't be held
accountable.
I don't know if you saw the movie ``The Fog of War.'' War
is a nightmare. You know that. Colin Powell, I think, was the
most eloquent I've heard on it, because he's seen it, himself.
He's been there and done it. And I don't want to have you in a
circumstance where you're writing something, years later, about
the fog of war. And I'm fearful, if we don't see some changes
here, we're going to have trouble. And I think the way we
should start is by trying to set the record straight on some of
the things you said going into this war.
Now, since 9/11, we've been engaged in a just fight against
terror. And I, like Senator Feingold and everyone here who was
in the Senate at the time, voted to go after Osama bin Laden,
and to go after the Taliban, and to defeat al Qaeda. And you
say they have less territory? That's not true. Your own
documents show that al Qaeda has expanded from 45 countries in
'01 to more than 60 countries today.
Well, with you in the lead role, Dr. Rice, we went into
Iraq. I want to read you a paragraph that best expresses my
views--and ask my staff if they would hold this up--and, I
believe, the views of millions of Californians and Americans.
It was written by one of the world's experts on terrorism,
Peter Bergen, five months ago. He wrote, ``What we've done in
Iraq is what bin Laden could not have hoped for in his wildest
dreams. We invaded an oil-rich Muslim nation in the heart of
the Middle East, the very type of imperial adventure bin Laden
has long predicted was the U.S.'s long-term goal in the region,
we deposed the secular socialist, Saddam, whom bin Laden has
long despised, ignited Sunni and Shia fundamentalist fervor in
Iraq, and have now provoked a defensive jihad that has
galvanized jihad-minded Muslims around the world. It's hard to
imagine a set of policies better designed to sabotage the war
on terror.''
This conclusion was reiterated last Thursday by the
National Intelligence Council, the CIA Director's think-tank,
which released a report saying that, ``Iraq has replaced
Afghanistan as the training ground for the next generation of
professionalized terrorists.'' That's your own administration's
CIA.
NIC Chairman Robert Hutchings said Iraq is, quote, ``a
magnet for international terrorist activity.'' And this was not
the case in '01. And I have great proof of it, including a
State Department document that lists every country--could you
hold that up?--in which al Qaeda operated prior to 9/11. And
you can see the countries. No mention of Iraq. And this booklet
was signed off on by the President of the United States, George
W. Bush--was put out by George Bush's State Department, and he
signed it. There was no al Qaeda activity there. No cells.
Now, the war was sold to the American people, as Chief of
Staff to President Bush, Andy Card, said, ``like a new
product.'' Those are his words. ``Remember,'' he said, ``you
don't roll out a new product in the summer.'' Now, you rolled
out the idea, and then you had to convince the people as you
made your case with the President. And I, personally, believe--
this is my personal view--that your loyalty to the mission you
were given, to sell this war, overwhelmed your respect for the
truth. And I don't say it lightly. And I'm going to go into the
documents that show your statements and the facts at the time.
Now, I don't want the families of those 1366 troops that
were killed, or the 10,372 that were wounded, to believe for a
minute that their lives and their bodies were given in vain,
because when your Commander in Chief asks you to sacrifice
yourself for your country, it is the most noble thing you can
do to answer that call. I am giving their families, as we all
are here, all the support they want and need, but I also will
not shrink from questioning a war that was not built on the
truth.
Now, perhaps the most well-known statement you've made was
the one about Saddam Hussein launching a nuclear weapon on
America, with the image of, quote--quoting you--``a mushroom
cloud.'' That image had to frighten every American into
believing that Saddam Hussein was on the verge of annihilating
them if he was not stopped. And I will be placing into the
record a number of such statements you made which have not been
consistent with the facts.
As the nominee for Secretary of State, you must answer to
the American people, and you are doing that now through this
confirmation process. And I continue to stand in awe of our
Founders, who understood that, ultimately, those of us in the
highest positions of our government must be held accountable to
the people we serve.
So I want to show you some statements that you made
regarding the nuclear threat and the ability of Saddam to
attack us. Now, on July 30th, 2003, you were asked by PBS News
Hour's Gwen Ifill if you continued to stand by the claims you
made about Saddam's nuclear program in the days and months
leading up the war. In what appears to be an effort to downplay
the nuclear-weapons scare tactics you used before the war, your
answer was, and I quote, ``It was a case that said he was
trying to reconstitute. He's trying to acquire nuclear weapons.
Nobody ever said that it was going to be the next year.'' So
that's what you said to the American people on television.
``Nobody ever said it was going to be the next year.''
Well, that wasn't true, because nine months before you said
this to the American people, what had George Bush said?
President Bush, at his speech at the Cincinnati Museum Center,
``If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an
amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single
softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year.''
So the President tells the people there could be a weapon.
Nine months later, you said, no one ever said he could have a
weapon in a year, when, in fact, the President said it.
And here's the real kicker. On October 10th, '04, on FOX
News Sunday with Chris Wallace, three months ago, you were
asked about CIA Director Tenet's remark that, prior to the war,
he had, quote, ``made it clear to the White House that he
thought the nuclear-weapons program was much weaker than the
program to develop other WMDs.''
Your response was this, ``The intelligence assessment was
that he was reconstituting his nuclear program, that, left
unchecked, he would have a nuclear weapon by the end of the
year.''
So here you are contradicting--first contradicting the
President, and then contradicting yourself. So it's hard to
even ask you a question about this, because you are on the
record, basically, saying--taking two sides of an issue. And
this does not serve the American people. If it served your
purpose to downplay the threat of nuclear weapons, you said,
``No one said he's going to have it in a year.'' But then
later, when you thought perhaps you were on more solid ground
with the American people, because, at the time, the war was
probably popular, or more popular, you say, ``We thought he was
going to have a weapon within a year.'' And this is--the
question is--this is a pattern here of what I see from you--on
this issue, on the issue of the aluminum tubes, on the issue of
whether al Qaeda was actually involved in Iraq, which you have
said many times. And in my rounds--I don't have any questions
on this round, because I'm just laying this out--I do have
questions on further rounds about similar contradictions. It's
very troubling.
You know, if you were rolling out a new product, like a can
opener, who would care about what we said? But this product is
a war, and people are dead and dying, and people are now saying
they're not going to go back because of what they experienced
there. And it's very serious. And as much as I want to look
ahead--and we will work together on a myriad of issues--it's
hard for me to let go of this war, because people are still
dying. And you have not laid out an exit strategy, you have not
set up a timetable, and you don't seem to be willing to, (a)
admit a mistake, or give any indication of what you're going to
do to forcefully involve others. As a matter of fact, you've
said more misstatements, that the territory of the terrorists
has been shrinking, when your own administration says it's now
expanded to 60 countries.
So I am deeply troubled.
Thank you.
Dr. Rice. Senator, may I respond?
The Chairman. Yes. Let me just say that I appreciate the
importance of Senator Boxer's statement. That's why we allowed
the statement to continue for several more minutes----
Senator Boxer. I'm sorry.
The Chairman [continuing]. ----beyond time.
Senator Boxer. I'm sorry. I lost track of the time.
The Chairman. Clearly, you ought to have the right to
respond. And then, at that point, we're going to have a recess.
But will you please give your response?
Dr. Rice. Yes.
Senator, I am more than aware of the stakes that we face in
Iraq. And I was more than aware of the stakes of going to war
in Iraq. I mourn and honor--I mourn the dead and honor their
service, because we have asked American men and women in
uniform to do the hardest thing, which is to go and defend
freedom and to give others an opportunity to build a free
society which will make us safer.
Senator, I have to say that I have never, ever lost respect
for the truth in the service of anything. It is not my nature.
It is not my character. And I would hope that we can have this
conversation and discuss what happened before, and what went on
before, and what I said, without impugning my credibility or my
integrity.
The fact is that we did face a very difficult intelligence
challenge in trying to understand what Saddam Hussein had, in
terms of weapons of mass destruction. We knew something about
him. We knew that he had--we had gone to war with him twice in
the past, in 1991 and in 1998. We knew that he continued to
shoot at American aircraft in the no-fly zone as we tried to
enforce the resolutions of U.N. Security Council--that the U.N.
Security Council had passed. We knew that he continued to
threaten his neighbors. We knew that he was an implacable enemy
of the United States who did cavort with terrorists. We knew
that he was the world's most dangerous man in the world's most
dangerous region. And we knew that, in terms of weapons of mass
destruction, he had sought them before, tried to build them
before, that he had an undetected biological weapons program
that we didn't learn of until 1995, that he was closer to a
nuclear weapon in 1991 than anybody thought. And we knew, most
importantly, that he had used weapons of mass destruction.
That was the context that, frankly, made us awfully
suspicious when he refused to account for his weapons-of-mass-
destruction programs, despite repeated Security Council
resolutions and despite the fact that he was given one last
chance to comply with Resolution 1441.
Now, there were lots of data points about his weapons-of-
mass-destruction programs. Some were right, and some were not.
But what was right was that there was an unbreakable link
between Saddam Hussein and weapons of mass destruction. That is
something that Charlie Duelfer, in his report of the Iraq
Survey Group, has made very clear, that Saddam Hussein intended
to continue his weapons-of-mass-destruction activities, that he
had laboratories that were run by his security services--I
could go on and on.
But, Senator Boxer, we went to war, not because of aluminum
tubes, we went to war because this was the threat of weapons of
mass destruction in the hands of a man against whom we had gone
to war before, who threatened his neighbors, who threatened our
interests, who was the world's--one of the world's most brutal
dictators, and it was high time to get rid of him. And I'm glad
that we're rid of him.
Now, as to the statement about territory and the terrorist
groups, I was referring to the fact that the al Qaeda
organization of Osama bin Laden, which once trained openly in
Afghanistan, which once ran with impunity in places like
Pakistan, can no longer count on hospitable territory from
which to carry out their activities. In the places where they
are, they are being sought and run down and arrested and
pursued in ways that they never were before. So we can have a
semantic discussion about what it means to take or lose
territory, but I don't think it's a matter of misstatement to
say that the loss of Afghanistan, the loss of the northwest
frontier of Pakistan, the loss of running with impunity in
places like Saudi Arabia, the fact that now intelligence
networks and law enforcement networks pursue them worldwide,
means that they have lost territory where they can operate with
impunity.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, I'm going to take 30 seconds,
with your permission.
First of all, Charles Duelfer said, and I quote--here it
is--I ask unanimous consent to place in the record Charlie
Duelfer's report----
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record.
[The information to which Senator Boxer referred appears in
Appendix II to this hearing transcript.]
Senator Boxer [continuing]. ----in which he says,
``Although Saddam clearly assigned a high value to the nuclear
progress and talent that had been developed up to '91, the
program ended, and the intellectual capital decayed in the
succeeding years.''
Here's the point. You and I could sit here and go back and
forth and be--present our arguments. And maybe somebody
watching a debate would pick one or the other, depending on
their own views. But I'm not interested in that. I'm interested
in the facts. So when I ask you these questions, I'm going to
show you your words, not my words. And, if I might say, again
you said, you're aware of the stakes in Iraq. We sent our
beautiful people--and thank you, thank you so much for your
comments about them--to defend freedom.
You sent them in there because of weapons of mass
destruction. Later, the mission changed, when there were none.
I have your quotes on it. I have the President's quotes on it.
And everybody admits it but you, that that was the reason for
the war. And then, once we're in there, now it moves to a
different mission--which is great. We all want to give
democracy and freedom everywhere we can possibly do it. But
let's not rewrite history. It's too soon to do that.
Dr. Rice. Senator Boxer, I would refer you to the
President's speech before the American Enterprise Institute, in
February, prior to the war, in which he talked about the fact
that, yes, there was the threat of weapons of mass destruction,
but he also talked to the strategic threat that Saddam Hussein
was to the region.
Saddam Hussein was a threat, yes, because he was trying to
acquire weapons of mass destruction. And, yes, we thought that
he was--that he had stockpiles, which he did not have. We had
problems with the intelligence. We were all, as a collective
polity of the United States, trying to deal with ways to get
better intelligence.
But it wasn't just weapons of mass destruction. He was also
a place--his territory was a place where terrorists were
welcomed, where he paid suicide bombers to bomb Israel, where
he had used SCUDs against Israel in the past, and so we knew
what his intentions were in the region, where he had attacked
his neighbors before, and, in fact, tried to annex Kuwait,
where we had gone to war against him twice in the past. It was
the total picture, Senator, not just weapons of mass
destruction, that caused us to decide that, post-September
11th, it was finally time to deal with----
Senator Boxer. Well, you should----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----Saddam Hussein.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. ----read what we voted on when
we voted to support the war, which I did not, but most of my
colleagues did. It was WMD, period. That was the reason and the
causation for that, you know, particular vote.
But, again, I just feel you quote President Bush when it
suits you, but you contradicted him when he said, yes, Saddam
could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year. You go on
television nine months later and said, ``Nobody ever said it
was going to be''----
Dr. Rice. Senator, that was just a question of pointing
out to people that there was an uncertainty, that no one was
saying that he would have to have a weapon within a year for it
to be worth it to go to war.
Senator Boxer. Well, if you can't admit to this mistake, I
hope----
Dr. Rice. Senator, we can----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. ----that you'll----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----we can have this discussion in
any way that you would like, but I really hope that you will
refrain from impugning my integrity.
Thank you very much.
Senator Boxer. I'm not. I'm just quoting what you said.
You contradicted the President, and you contradicted yourself.
Dr. Rice. Senator, I'm happy to continue the discussion,
but I really hope that you will not imply that I take the truth
lightly.
The Chairman. Let me intervene at this point now. We've had
four hours of good hearing. And we thank all Members for their
constancy.
We're going to recess, and I'm going to suggest we come
back at 2:30. Is that convenient for----
Dr. Rice. Perfect.
The Chairman [continuing]. ----you, Dr. Rice?
Very well. We recess until 2:30.
[recess]
[The committee remained in recess until 2:35 p.m.]
The Chairman. The hearing is called to order again.
The Chair recognizes Senator Murkowski for a ten-minute
round of questioning.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It's a privilege and honor to be part of the committee, and
I appreciate the warm welcome from you and the other committee
Members.
Welcome to you, Dr. Rice. The opportunity to sit down and
speak with you a couple of weeks ago was greatly welcomed, and
it was a chance for me to speak to some of the issues that, as
a new Member to this committee, were important to just, kind
of, have that discussion and get on the table.
One of the issues that is really quite paramount in
Alaskans' mind is the situation over in North Korea. Our
proximity in that region is one that causes us to look very
carefully at what is happening in North Korea, and what is
happening particularly with the nuclear-weapons program over
there.
I'm heartened to hear, from the media reports, that North
Korea appears willing to restart the six-party talks. And,
again, I think Alaskans are anxious to know that there will be
success there.
Looking beyond the talks and further down the road, I'm
curious to know your views on a future North Korea. We
recognize that, for these past many years--about 60 years or
so--under the reign of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jung Il, an entire
generation of North Koreans, including their military leaders,
have basically been brainwashed into believing that their
military can defeat the armed forces of any country in this
world. And this raises considerable concern, in the event of a
regime change, about who has control over the North Korean
military, and what actions that military, or an individual
commander, might take.
So as the administration moves forward in these six-party
talks, what steps will you take to develop the relationship
with North Korea's future leadership?
Dr. Rice. Well, thank you very much, Senator Murkowski.
I--we did have an opportunity to talk about a number of issues,
and I recognize the importance of this issue to everyone,
because, obviously, North Korea is a very dangerous power, and
one that has been intent on seeking weapons of mass
destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.
Let me start by just saying that it is important to repeat
that North Korea should understand fully that we have a
deterrent against any North Korean action, or attempts at
action, because we have a very strong alliance with South
Korea, a very technologically sophisticated alliance, that is
getting more so with the changes that we are discussing with
the South Koreans about how to realign military forces on the
peninsula. And we do have, as you mentioned, a very active
diplomacy now through the six-party talks, which brings all of
the neighborhood together to say to the North Koreans, ``You do
not have a choice. If you intend to be a part of the
international system, you have got to give up your nuclear-
weapons programs.'' And that's an important innovation, because
it speaks, in a part, to the broader question of how we manage
a problem like North Korea in the neighborhood. It is not
something that the United States wants to have to do
unilaterally. It's something that we're much better off doing
with South Korea, with Japan, with Russia, and, most
especially, with China, which is playing an important role in
the six-party talks, and needs to play--it needs to continue to
play an active role.
This is a very closed and opaque society that we're dealing
with when we're dealing with North Korea. It is a sad thing
that there probably is no more desperate population than the
population of North Korea, in terms of starvation, in terms of
repression. The United States has no problem with the people of
North Korea. And, in fact, we have consistently been a large
food-aid donor to North Korea because we do not want the people
of North Korea to suffer.
It doesn't have to be this way. There is another path. And
we've made clear to the North Korean regime that the President
of the United States has said, and that the United States has
no intention to attack North Korea, to invade North Korea, that
multilateral security assurances would be available to North
Korea, to which the United States would be party, if North
Korea is prepared to give up its nuclear-weapons program
verifiably and irreversibly. So we will continue to work on
that issue.
It is very hard, actually, to make contact with the
Korean--North Korean people at all, but, to the degree that we
can, through South Korean contacts, try to encourage the North
Korean people that there might be a better future for them, I
think that's an important thing to do. But our goal now has to
be to make the six-party mechanism work for dealing with the
North Korean nuclear program, and then hopefully for dealing
with the broader problem of managing this dangerous regime.
I hope that they will follow through, and that, indeed,
they do intend to restart the six-party talks. We have an offer
on the table that we put there at the last round of the six-
party talks. It was an offer that I think all other parties
thought moved the ball forward. We've heard nothing, really,
from North Korea, and I hope that they will actually act,
because we've found that their words are not always completely
reliable.
Senator Murkowski. We also had a chance to talk a little
bit about the Arctic Council. This is probably not a question
that you're going to get from anybody else on this panel, so I
will take the time to ask it. I know that my colleague here
from Florida is not going to ask it, so I will.
But one of the things that I hoped to achieve, or to work
on, during my time here on the Foreign Relations Committee is
to raise my colleagues', and the rest of the United States',
awareness of--and just really the knowledge of the Arctic
regions. And there's a lot of focus right now on what's going
on up north because of the climate change. We're wondering
whether or not this is a permanent event or whether it's just
part of a natural cycle. But we do know that it's a reality. We
do know that it's--it will have an impact on our lands,
particularly up north. And what we're seeing is, there's a
potential for increased circumpolar maritime commercial
activity, which is going to impact our northernmost boundaries,
as well as substantial new scientific exploration in the Arctic
region.
Now, along with the Arctic nations, the U.S. is a member of
the Arctic Council, which was formed to address the common
problems of the many Arctic nations. And so far as I can tell,
our role, the U.S. role, within this Council, has been
underutilized in furthering our relationship with our Arctic
neighbors.
So my question to you at this time is, what role do you see
for international institutions, like the Arctic Council, in
U.S. foreign policy? And how can we use our Arctic location to
further this country's interests?
Dr. Rice. There's a very important point that I'd like to
make about the broader question that you ask. And I do think
that, on issues of this kind, we can work both internationally
and regionally--in a sense, the most interested and affected
countries.
I would like to spend some time talking with you about what
more we might do in the Arctic Council. I know we've been
supportive of the Arctic Council and members, but perhaps there
is more that we can do.
It speaks--for instance, you mentioned the environmental--
global environmental issues, like climate change. We have a lot
to offer, in terms of the science and the technology, and we
ought to be, and are trying to, develop relations with others
who are interested in harnessing that science and that
technology to deal with some of the environmental challenges
that we have.
And so, I very much look forward to talking with you about
what role we can play. There are some important countries that
would probably share interests. For instance, the Russians
would probably share interests, and this is another area for
potential cooperation. And so, I look forward to having a
chance to look at what more we can do.
Senator Murkowski. I think it is an opportunity for us,
and it's something that needs to be cultivated in order to work
to our advantage. So I do look forward to that opportunity,
with you.
Very general. This might be a softball to you, but how is
the administration working to improve the role of women in the
Middle East and elsewhere in the world?
Dr. Rice. Well, in fact, it may be one of the most
important things that we do over the next few years. We've
already tried to do a lot. I think there's no doubt that the
Afghanistan situation, which was really one of the true horror
houses for women--and I know that Senator Boxer and others were
very involved in trying to promote the cause of women in
Afghanistan. Well, we promoted the cause by the overthrow of
the Taliban. It's a remarkable thing that the first person to
vote in Afghanistan was a young woman. It's a remarkable thing
that women can now see a doctor without a male relative's
permission, that they can no longer be punished for letting one
little hair show out from under the veil, that women are taking
their rightful place in Afghan society. And I think it is in
their documents, like their new constitution, that women are
considered equal citizens.
That may seem like a small thing, but in a region of the
world where women have been anything but equal citizens, to
have that enshrined in the Afghan constitution--and it will
be--it's in the TAL, or the Transitional Administrative Law,
for Iraq. These are important steps forward.
We've also been very outspoken about the need of every
society to make sure that women's rights are protected. It is a
part of the agenda in the broader Middle East initiative, where
clearly countries are going to move at different speeds on this
issue, but where you have to put on the agenda that you cannot
function as a modern society if half your population is
essentially kept out of the political process. And we are
particularly interested in women's education, the education of
girls, which, in some of these societies, stops when girls are
10 or 11 years old. Pressing the case for the education of
girls is an important part of what we're doing. Helping to
empower women politically through political activity and civil-
society activity.
And we've done more than just in the Middle East, which is
to be very active on, for instance, the Trafficking in Persons
Initiative, which benefits women, because, very often, the
people who are trafficked, particularly for sex crimes, are
women. And the President went to the United Nations, put this
on the agenda. We've gotten a resolution about it, and we are
prosecuting people here and pressing countries to prosecute
people on this very terrible crime.
Finally, I would just mention the HIV/AIDS initiative, with
has a mother-to-child transmission element, as well as helping
caregivers, who, many times, are women, to deal with the
travails of caring for relatives with AIDS, preventing further
infections, many of whom would be women. This is a broad agenda
of helping women, and it is in our moral interest, of course,
to do so, but it's also in the interest of these societies,
economically and in terms of modernity, that women take a
rightful place and are fully contributing to the prosperity of
these societies.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you. Appreciate that.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Murkowski.
Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Dr. Rice.
Senators Dodd and Chafee and I just returned from visiting
with four Latin American presidents in their respective
countries, and we are certainly of one mind that we need to be
more engaged in the region. When a leader, such as Chavez in
Venezuela, starts lurching to the left, and yet we have a
dependency there of some 13 to 15 percent of our daily
consumption of oil coming from Venezuela, clearly one part of
our foreign policy ought to be that we ought to start planning
on weaning ourselves from that dependence, not even to speak of
the global dependence that we now have on foreign oil. But
here's one right in our neighborhood.
And Chavez has threatened, from time to time, that he was
going to cut it off. Now, that's a hollow threat, because there
are no refineries that--outside of the Gulf Coast, that can do
it, although it would take them a year, maybe two, to build
those kind of refineries, if, for example, they struck a deal
in China, to take his oil. We, clearly, urge you that we need a
Latin American policy that will get us engaged a lot more.
And then in the places where we see the presidents of those
countries really trying to do something--and, in fact, having
an effect--such as Toledo in Peru, such as Paraguay, such as
Argentina's beginning to have some economic uplift that--if
America is more engaged, it's just going to--it's going to be
some wind under their wings, and it's going to help stem that.
If Chavez continues to go leftward, we should enable those
other countries, who are more centrist, to corral him, or at
least have a chance of doing that. So that's a little message
that I bring you from the activities of the last week.
Now, elsewhere in the hemisphere--and you can appreciate
this since I represent the state of Florida. Haiti is a
disaster. And it's going to continue to be a disaster until we
get engaged and do something seriously, along with particularly
the other nations of the Western Hemisphere, financially and
politically, to help them.
I've had a difference of opinion with the administration,
and I think you did have a policy of regime change. And
although Aristide was a bad guy, you know, it's kind of hard to
say we support democracy in elections and then we go and push
him out. But that's done.
Looking forward, we're getting close to the authorized
support, now, under the U.N. peacekeeping force, of 6700
military and 1600 civilian police. Do you think that's an
adequate number?
Dr. Rice. Well, I believe the number that has been
determined, 6700 or so led by Brazil as a stabilization force
now, after the initial stabilization was done by the United
States and the French and the others, is judged to be adequate
to the task. The question has really been about--more of, what
can that force do? And I think the expansion of it, of a more
aggressive stance by that force in going into areas that are
particularly violent, and dealing with the violence and the
militias in those areas, is probably really the question that
we have to deal with.
I'm glad, Senator, you mentioned the police forces,
because, in the long run, what really will help Haiti is that
it needs a professional civilian police force that can be
counted on to enforce law, not to break law. And we have, as
you well know, dispatched civilian police trainers from the
United States, and from other places, to try and engage in that
activity. But I agree completely.
Unfortunately, Haiti seems to be a place where natural and
manmade disasters have come together in a really terrible way
for the Haitian people. They do have a new chance now. They
have a transitional government that is trying to arrange
elections in the fall. We need to support that process. And we
have had a successful donor conference recently, with a
billion-dollar commitment. The United States is about 230
million of that. And so----
Senator Nelson. The problem is, they never follow through.
Dr. Rice. Senator, I agree, we have to press very hard on
people to follow through on the pledges that they make. That's
a problem worldwide.
Senator Nelson. And this has been going on for 200 years
of Haiti's history. Now, when the U.N. peacekeeping force comes
up for reauthorizing, in the Security Council, what's going to
be your posture about considering an expansion of that
peacekeeping force? This is a country of seven-and-a-half
million, and a lot of them are outside, in those areas that are
now defoliated; thus, the mud, the slides after the storms, and
so forth.
Dr. Rice. Senator, we've been focused, to now, on trying
to stabilize the situation with the stabilization force that is
there. The Brazilians have done a fine job of leading that. And
I just might mention that this is the first time that a lot of
those countries, most of whom are from the hemisphere--many of
whom are from the hemisphere--have actually done peacekeeping
in the Western Hemisphere. And so, this is a step forward, for
the neighbors to embrace Haiti in the way that they have.
What more will be needed, I have to demur. I think we need
to look at the situation. But, for now, I think we are in the
right place, in terms of the peacekeeping forces. We have been
concerned about what missions they were prepared to take on,
and that is being resolved, and there is a more aggressive
posture. And we really have to put a major effort into the
civilian police development.
We also, as you--you are absolutely right, people pledge;
they don't follow through. And we have money to put Haitians to
work. We have money to help restart the Haitian economy. But
we've got to----
Senator Nelson. Well, then I want to----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----follow through.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. ----I want to suggest
something to you. And it's a bill that is sponsored by one of
our Republican colleagues, Mike DeWine of Ohio, and it's called
the HERO Act, which is an acronym, but what it does is, it
allows textiles to come in, like we already have in the
Caribbean Basin Initiative in other areas in the Caribbean, but
it allows it for Haiti. And then they can come, duty free, into
the U.S. It would foster an economic uplift by creating jobs.
But we can't get the administration to support it. It's a
Republican Senator's bill.
Dr. Rice. Senator, I think we believe, at this point, that
the best course with Haiti is to work with them to take full
advantage of the Caribbean Basin Initiative, to work with them
on job creation through some of the programs that we have out
of our economic support fund for Haiti. They will benefit, in a
secondary way, from what happens in Central America with trade
if CAFTA can be taken--can be passed. And so, at this point we
think we have the right tools, we just have to make it work.
I understand fully the concerns about Haiti, both from a
humanitarian point of view and also from a stability point of
view. And we probably dodged a bullet, in the earlier days,
with the ability to get Aristide out peacefully, because he had
lost the ability to control that country, to govern
authoritatively in that country.
But we have a lot of work ahead of us in Haiti. I'd be the
first to admit it.
Senator Nelson. Madam Secretary-designate, you can make a
difference. If you'll jump on that horse and ride it, and keep
on it over the next four years of your tenure, it'll start to
pay huge dividends. And nobody's done that. We go in, and we
fix a problem, and then we turn around and we leave it, and so
do the other nations. And then Haiti just goes back into chaos.
Let me shift to the other side of the globe, to Iran. What
specific steps will you advocate to stop Iran's nuclear
program? And I'm talking about beyond the noise that we hear
from Europe. This Senator doesn't think that's gonna cut it.
Dr. Rice. Well, Senator, we--this is a problem that we're
trying to approach both multilaterally and through some
bilateral pressure. And we were the first to really put the
Iranian nuclear program on the table when the President did his
speech, his State of the Union speech, and identified the
Iranian nuclear program. I can remember, back in the early
days, Senator, people didn't take nearly as seriously that Iran
was actually trying to, under cover of its nonproliferation
treaty access to civilian nuclear energy, to build a nuclear
weapons program. I think people now, because of Iranian
behavior, are very skeptical and suspicious of what the
Iranians are doing.
Senator Nelson. Are you ready for sanctions?
Dr. Rice. Well, we already have an awful lot of sanctions
on Iran unilaterally. There is really not terribly much more we
can do. But I do----
Senator Nelson. How about getting Europe to go along?
Dr. Rice. Well, Senator, I would take it the first step,
that if the Iranians do not show that they're going to live up
to their international obligations, that we refer them to the
Security Council. That has been our policy. That--when you're
in violation of your obligations under the NPT, that you get
referred to the Security Council. And the IAEA has been, I
think, documenting that the Iranians have not been serious
about their obligations. So, at some point, that may be exactly
where we need to go.
We are making some progress in unifying people's view of
what the Iranians are doing, and putting pressure on the
Iranians. We do work with the EU 3 to try and help them
formulate a strategy that would really hold Iran accountable,
not just take Iran's word for it. And we've made some progress
in getting people who engage in bilateral assistance with Iran
to be more cognizant of some of the proliferation risk. For
instance, the Russians, who have a civilian nuclear power
program with Iran in their reactor at Bushehr, now say to the
Iranians that, ``You will have to return the fuel.'' In other
words, ``Close the fuel cycle and sign the additional
protocol.'' Those are all positive steps. We need to continue
to take those.
But, Senator, the spirit of your question is that, at some
point, Iran has to be held accountable for it's unwillingness
to live up to its international obligations, and I could not
agree more.
Senator Nelson. Hopefully, sooner, than later.
Dr. Rice. I could not agree more.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Alexander?
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Rice, welcome, congratulations, and thank you for being
here today.
I apologize to you, I missed part of the hearing because I
was at another hearing for Mike Leavitt, who's been nominated
to Department of HHS. But it wasn't a total loss, because we
were talking about early-childhood education, and I was able to
remind your new colleague in the Cabinet that you began piano
lessons at age three, and that that is a good sign for early-
childhood education, to have that kind of example here.
I have three questions to ask. They're all subjects that
have come up before in one way or the other. And I thought I'd
ask 'em all at once and then give you a chance to comment on
them, because they're interrelated. One is about Iraq, one is
looking beyond Iraq, and one is to return to the subject that
you said almost every Senator had mentioned to you, Senator
Coleman has done some work on, especially on this committee,
and that has to do with visas of foreign students and the
effect on our higher-education system. I want to think about
that in a little different way.
Question number one, about Iraq. Some colleagues have
suggested and asked you about an exit strategy. I don't think
we need an exit strategy. I think we need a success strategy.
But I would suggest--and my question is this--that is--after
the election, that we might take a more realistic, and perhaps
a different, view of how we define success. And so, my question
is, how many American lives? How long are we willing to take?
How much money are we going to spend? What is the definition of
``success'' in Iraq? It's one thing to give people their
freedom, it's quite another to help build a stable pluralistic
democratic society. What are the limits of that? That's the
first question.
The second question. This is beyond Iraq. I know your
conversations with the President are between the two of you,
but perhaps you can talk about this in a general way. You're
the Secretary of State, President Bush is President, you're
sitting around in a National Security Council meeting in a year
or so, and someone suggests that we have a circumstance in a
Middle-Eastern country or some other country where we need
change a regime, we need to engage in nation-building again.
What are--what kind of advice would you give the President
about what lessons we've learned from Iraq and the other
examples of nation-building that he ought to consider before he
commits us again to one more nation-building?
I've heard strong words today about Iraq. I wasn't here,
but I would have voted to give the President authority to go to
Iraq. I think he made a reasonable decision to go. The war was
a stunning success. And, in my view, they've done a series of
miscalculations since then. You, yourself, have used words like
``adjustments.'' I think it's no--it's a sign of strength for
us when we--when we look back, we see something that we could
do better, that we recognize that, learn from that, and go
ahead.
So I'm asking, if we were to consider nation-building
again--and we've done it many times since World War II--what
are the lessons for the President? And my own view of that is
that there is more than one way to implement the City on the
Hill moral mission that we have in this country to spread
freedom around the world. One way is to change a regime and try
to make a country more like ours. Another way might be to
celebrate our own values and strengthen ourselves, and be a
good example, and, by doing that, to spread freedom.
You, yourself, mentioned--and this leads me to my third
point--the example of foreign students here. All of us, when we
travel, we see ministers, we see citizens, business people, who
have been in this country, and who have carried our message,
our values, our principles back more effectively than almost
anything we can think of. In fact, I think perhaps our most
effective method of foreign policy has been our programs that
have admitted so many students from around the world to the
United States.
But there is another aspect of that, as well. The number of
foreign students attending our major universities, especially
the graduate programs in our major research universities, such
as the one where you were provost, Stanford, has dropped
dramatically. Applications to American graduate schools
declined 28 percent last year. Those from China fell 45
percent. From India, 28 percent.
There are several reasons for that. One is that India,
China, Germany, Great Britain all are seeing a brain-drain to
the United States. We talk a lot about outsourcing of jobs; we
have an insourcing of brains that that drop of foreign
students, of brain power, hurts our ability to keep our
technological edge. And it is of great concern to me over the
next ten years.
So I'm not just looking at spreading our values around the
world; I'm looking very much at our own self interest in
another way, which is, what can we do to make certain that we
pay more attention, for example, to making sure that students
who are here, or researchers, who already cleared the visa
process don't have to go home for a month to reapply for the
same kind of visa.
So my questions, related, are, one, what is our success
strategy for Iraq? Number two, based on the lessons for Iraq,
what advice would you give our President about some things he
might want to consider, in terms of the amount of money, the
amount of time, the amount of troops we might have to expend or
sacrifice in any future nation-building exercise? What have we
learned in Iraq? And, number three, what can we do to help you,
in your new role, to make it easier for foreign students to
come here, both so we can spread our values around the world
and so we can take advantage of their brain power to create
jobs for us in the United States?
Dr. Rice. Thank you, Senator.
Let me take the first of this, and I'll try to segue, as
you did so well, into the second.
I do think that, in Iraq, you were right, what we need is a
success strategy, not an exit strategy. And I--that's a very
good way to talk about it. The success here is going to be that
Iraqis are in charge of their own future, and recognize that it
is really up to them to make that future one that is inclusive
of all of the divisions that have bedeviled Iraq, that we have
given them the capability to defend themselves--principally
from internal insurgency, but also to give them the ability
that their neighbors will understand that Iraq is a stable
place that is a unified Iraq--one of the obligations, by the
way, that we undertook when we decided to change the regime in
Iraq was that we would be concerned about the territorial
integrity of Iraq, and we have to keep that obligation--and,
finally, that they are beginning the process toward the
stabilization of their economy so that the economy can support
those first two, a political process and a military--a security
process.
I can't give you a timeline, but I think we will know when
the Iraqis are able to have in place institutions, no matter
how fragile and no matter how young, where they're actually
beginning to try and solve their own problems within those
institutions. Now, they're not going to solve them perfectly,
they're not, probably, going to solve them the way that we
might, necessarily, but you see, step by step, over the last
year or so, the Iraqis taking more and more responsibility for
solving their own political problems. And I would take, for
example, what has been going on with the Kurds about provincial
elections in Kirkuk. They have been resolving that among
themselves. That's an important political process.
On the security side, I think it's going to be somewhat
clearer. They may need the help of multinational forces for a
while, but, ultimately, Iraqis have to be willing to defend,
and fight for, their own freedom. And they are showing a desire
to fight and defend their own freedom. We have to get them the
capacity to do it. And I took note of what Senator Biden and
Senator Hagel and others said this morning--Senator Kerry--
about the need to make sure we're training forces in the right
way, that we accelerate that training. I do look forward to
General Luck's coming back and letting us know what the next
phase ought to be. We've faced changing circumstances here, but
I've put a lot of emphasis and a lot of--a lot of emphasis on
getting those security forces trained, and then, finally,
helping them economically.
So it isn't that we have to see an Iraq that is a fully
democratized, mature economy, fully able to deal with all of
its divisions. That's going to take a very, very, very long
time. What we have to see is that they've been launched on a
path to be able to achieve that, that that path is one that is
clear ahead for everybody, and where they are taking advantage
of that path. And I think we will start to see that after these
elections. And I think they are thinking in those ways.
Senator, I've thought, a thousand times, about how one
thinks about nation-building, something that I famously said we
probably wouldn't be involved in. We have been. And it's turned
out that we've had to be, because our security depends on
states that can function, on not having failed states in the
midst. We learned the dangers of an Afghanistan that people
left alone after the Soviets left, and we left it as a place
that became a terrorist haven. We can't make that mistake
again.
One of the important lessons that we've learned is that the
skills needed to help reconstruct and stabilize the country and
put it on a path to stable nationhood are skills that we
haven't really had to use in a very long time, maybe since
World War II. And one of the reasons that I'm so supportive of
this new Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization is, I think
it starts to give the State Department a focus for those
skills. We find ourselves trying to help people create police
forces. We find ourselves trying to help people create
independent judiciaries that are not going to be wracked by
corruption. We find ourselves giving technical assistance on
currency. We find ourselves giving people advice about how to
start up a ministry, in many of these places. We can learn,
from the experiences that we've had in Afghanistan and in Iraq,
how to put those skills together in a more permanent way, and
how to be more predictive of what might be needed in places
that we know we're going to have to engage in this kind of
activity.
The office that is there now, I think, needs to look at
what is going to be needed in Liberia, what is going to be
needed in Sudan, and start to put together those skills now, so
that you have a civilian counterpart to what our military often
does in providing immediate stabilization. Otherwise, we have
to depend on the military to do it, and that's not always the
best answer.
I can tell you how incredibly supportive the uniformed
military and the Defense Department are of this idea of an
Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, because they want
and understand that the State Department needs to have the kind
of expertise that we need to do this.
Finally, just on the visa issue, I will be coming back to
you on exactly this. I'm, of course, an academic. I was provost
of Stanford University. We had a large foreign student
population. It was one of the best things for the foreign
students, and it was one of the best things for our students,
too, because they engaged people from other places as
students--not as Chinese or not as Russians, but as students.
They were all in a common enterprise. It changes the way we
think about people, it changes the way they think about us.
I've gone abroad so many times and sat and heard the prime
minister describe how many universities his--American
universities his people have come from. And you know what's
really remarkable about it? It's not just from Stanford or
Harvard or Yale, but it's also from universities like I went
to, the University of Denver or Texas A&M or Nebraska or, I'm
sure, Tennessee. And that's invaluable.
And so, I will be coming back to you, because these numbers
are disturbing, and we need to do something to reverse the
trend.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to
ask to put my entire statement in the record.
The Chairman. It will be.
[The prepared statement of Senator Alexander follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Lamar Alexander
President Bush has made an excellent choice in nominating Dr.
Condoleezza Rice to be America's next Secretary of State. her
experience as national Security Adviser will make her uniquely
effective. When foreign leaders talk with Dr. Rice, they will know she
is speaking with the President's voice.
I will have a question for Dr. Rice about Iraq and one beyond Iraq.
The major issue confronting Dr. Rice and our Nation is the war in
Iraq. Some of my colleagues have said we need an exit strategy in Iraq.
I disagree. We don't need an exit strategy in Iraq, we need a success
strategy--but such a strategy may mean taking a more realistic view of
what we mean by ``success.'' It is one thing to help people to win
their freedom. It is another to help a country become a stable,
pluralistic, democratic, flourishing society. How many American lives
are we willing to sacrifice to do this? How long are we willing for it
to take? What is our standard for ``success?''
That leads me to the question beyond Iraq, and it is this: the next
time the opportunity occurs for the United States to undertake regime
change or nation building, what advice will Dr. Rice give President
Bush about the lessons we have learned in Iraq? During his campaign for
the Presidency in 2000, President Bush was critical of nation building.
That was before September 11, 2001.
Our initial war in Iraq was a stunning success. What came
afterwards has been a series of miscalculations. But the United States
has engaged in nation building more than a dozen times since World War
II. Based upon those experiences, should we not have anticipated that
nation building in Iraq should have required more troops, more money
and taken longer than we expected? And what do these lessons say about
our future policy toward nation building?
American history is the story of setting noble goals and struggling
to reach them and often falling short. We sincerely say that ``
anything is possible'' and that ``all men are created equal'' and ``no
child will be left behind'' even though we know down deep we will fall
short and we will have to keep trying. We also have said we want to
make the world safe for democracy and we remember and inaugural speech
44 years ago in which a new President said we would ``pay any price,
bear any burden'' for freedom. Yet there obviously is a limit to what
we can do, and what we are willing to do and the number of lives we
will sacrifice to secure the blessing of freedom and democracy for
others.
At President Reagan's funeral last June, former Senator Jack
Danforth said the text for his homily was ``the obvious,'' Matthew
5:14-16. ``You are the light of the world. A city built on a hill
cannot be hid. No one after lighting a lamp puts it in a bushel basket,
but on a lamp stand, and it gives light to all in the house. In the
same way, let your light shine before others, so that they may see your
good works, and give glory to your Father in heaven.''
From our beginning, that vision of the city on a hill has helped to
define what it means to be an American and provided America with a
moral mission. It helps explain why we invaded Iraq, why we fought wars
``to make the world safe for democracy,'' and why we are forever
involving ourselves in other nations' business. It is why when I was in
Mozambique last summer I found 800 Americans, 400 of them missionaries
and most of the rest diplomats or aid workers.
But is it possible that too much nation building runs the risk of
extending too far the vision of the city on a hill? Letting a light
shine so that others may see our good works does not necessarily mean
that we must invade a country and change its regime and remain there
until it begins to look like us. It may mean instead that we strive
harder to understand and celebrate our own values of democracy, equal
opportunity, individualism, tolerance, the rule of law, and the other
principles that we hope will be exported to other parts of the world.
How we ourselves live would then become our most persuasive claim to
real leadership in a world filled with people hungry to know how to
live their lives. For example, in my own experience, and I am sure in
Dr. Rice's, we have found that sometimes the most effective way to
export our values is to train foreign students at our universities who
then return home to become leaders in their own countries.
Of course we will never say that only some men are created equal,
that only some children will not be left behind or that we will pay
only some price to defend freedom. But perhaps we should think more
about strategies for extending freedom and democracy in the world other
than nation building and determine what those strategies are and when
they most appropriately might be used.
Senator Alexander. And if I may just underscore, I just
want to emphasize the point that, with all the discussion about
visas, that we're not just talking about some goodwill gesture
to the world; we're basically talking about recruiting the most
talented people in the world, who have helped us create our
very high standard of living so that 5 or 6 percent of the
people in the world have 25 to 30 percent of all the money.
That's what we're--that's one of the things we're talking about
here. We're going to lose our capacity to do that, to some
degree, if we don't solve this problem.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Alexander.
As you can tell, Dr. Rice, the committee is fortunate to
have people who have served as governors of states, members of
the Cabinet. But the visa issue was a part of our hearings last
year. Senator Alexander played a leading role in the followup
with a roundtable group. It's a very serious issue because of
homeland security and other purposes. We are losing ground, and
the committee takes it very seriously. I'm sure you do too from
your background in Stanford and elsewhere. I appreciate his
bringing this up, and, likewise, your reiterating the
reconstruction idea, which could also be called nation-
building, which is so important. And the progress you're making
there, I think is critical.
Well, let me now call upon Senator Obama for his initial
ten minutes of questioning.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Members
of the committee, Dr. Rice.
First of all, let me say how grateful I am to have the
opportunity to serve on this committee. I know that it has a
wonderful reputation for bipartisanship, and that, I think, is
partly due to the excellence of the Chairman and the Ranking
Member, and the degree to which you both work together
extremely closely. So I'm looking forward to my service here.
Dr. Rice, it's wonderful to see you here, and I've been
very impressed, obviously, with your mastery of the issues.
Since it's the day after King's birthday, obviously 20 to 30
years ago it's unlikely that I'd be sitting here asking you
questions. And so, I think that's a testimony to how far we've
come, despite how far we still have to go. And I think
everybody, rightly, is extraordinarily impressed with your
credentials and your experience in this field.
I've got three areas that I'd like to explore that have
already been touched on to some degree. I want to try to see if
I can knock out all three of them with the time that I have
remaining.
The first has to do with the issue of nuclear
proliferation, which has already been discussed. But, you know,
I think it's important to note that, in the midst of what was
sometimes a very divisive campaign, there was strong agreement
between President Bush and Senator Kerry that our number-one
priority, that our single greatest challenge, is keeping
nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists. And there has
been enormous leadership on the part of this committee--and
Senator Lugar, in particular, working with former Senator
Nunn--to move the process forward of securing nuclear material
in the former Soviet Union.
I am still concerned that less nuclear material, as I
understand it, has been secured from the former Soviet Union in
the two years after September 11th than the two years prior to
September 11th. Now, it may just be that there was low-hanging
fruit initially, and it starts getting harder as time goes by.
But I'm also concerned by the fact that we've never fully
funded, it appears to me, the Nunn-Lugar program. And so, I
know that Senator Lugar is going to be presenting an amendment
that gives your office more flexibility in this area. I'm
hopeful that I'm going to have the opportunity to work with him
and my colleagues on this piece of legislation.
I guess my question is, how are you going to use this
flexibility? Number one, are you going to be seeking full
funding? Number two, beyond the existing mechanisms to lock
down existing nuclear material, what else are we doing, for
example, to make sure that Pakistan has a mechanism in place to
assure that those nuclear weapons, or that technology, is no
longer drifting off into the hands of hostile forces?
Dr. Rice. Thank you. First of all, on nuclear
proliferation, let me just say that, broadly, our strategy has
been really threefold. First of all, to be very concerned about
the loopholes in the Nonproliferation treaty. The
Nonproliferation Treaty is in trouble, because there are
countries that have signed on to it, and then are using the
access to civilian nuclear power to really pursue nuclear-
weapons programs. Iran is a prime example of that. The
President has made a number of proposals--Senator Lugar has--
we've talked about this--to close the fuel cycle, to make it
not possible for countries to enrich uranium or other fuels to
the point that they are left with the fuel, but, rather, to get
a fuel supply from the fuel suppliers that are out there. And
it's a proposal that has met with some resistance, but it's
something that we're continuing to work on.
Clearly, we have to make the proliferation problem somewhat
easier by not having countries, that are suspect, with access
to the fuel supply.
Senator Obama. Can I interrupt, just real quickly?
Dr. Rice. Yes.
Senator Obama. Is the resistance on those reforms coming
simply from countries that are in the midst of development, or
are we also seeing resistance from allies, like France and
Germany and others, that already have----
Dr. Rice. Yes.
Senator Obama [continuing]. ----existing nuclear capacity?
Dr. Rice. Well, the resistance really is coming from
countries that we think have no intention of trying to build a
nuclear weapon, but who want to maintain the access to their
entire civilian nuclear cycle. So we've had to talk with some
countries about the fact that, yes, under the Nonproliferation
Treaty, countries have a--have access to this, but, when you
get a country that is cheating under that access, that maybe
for those countries you shouldn't have the access. So this is a
discussion--we got a one-year moratorium on enriching and
reprocessing, and we'll try to keep pressing forward.
Secondly, we've been very aggressive on what is a really
bad problem, which is nuclear entrepreneurship, the kind of AQ
Khan factor, these black-market entrepreneurs who are selling
nuclear secrets, selling, in fact, the whole little ``kit,'' if
you will. And the takedown of the AQ Khan network is really one
of the most important things that we've done. It will give us
information on how this works. We have to put this one out of
business, and we have to work to see if there are others.
This has all been helped by what happened Libya, where a
country voluntarily gave up its weapons of mass destruction, in
hopes of a better relationship with the international
community. And we have to try and incent that kind of behavior
on countries that have pursued weapons of mass destruction.
And then, finally, you mentioned--oh, I should also mention
the Proliferation Security Initiative, which, of course, helps
us to interdict dangerous cargo. So it's a broad program. But
the Nunn-Lugar piece of this is very important. As I've said,
as an old Soviet specialist, I know a good bit about the
dangers there.
We have tended--we have tried to fund it at levels that are
adequate to do the work at hand. And you mentioned the securing
before 2001, and the securing afterwards. Some of that is
exactly as you mentioned, low-hanging fruit. Some of it is that
there's a, kind of, schedule for which sites get secured when.
What we have done is to go to the Energy Department and ask
them to prioritize, to try to get the most important sites
secured in the earliest time. And the timetable has been
collapsed to one where, if we keep to schedule, we should be
able to secure all materials within the next four years. So
we're making some progress.
We need to work harder on the bureaucratic impediments to
this. There are impediments on both sides.
Senator Obama. Okay, but my understanding, though, is also
that, at the current schedule, we'd be stretching this process
out for potentially 13 years, as opposed to four. Collapsing it
will require a little more aggressive movement on the part of
the State Department. And I recognize this is difficult. Russia
may not always be entirely----
Dr. Rice. Right.
Senator Obama [continuing]. ----interested in moving this
along as quickly as possible. But it strikes me that, with the
expertise we have on this committee, this is something we'd
like to work on----
Dr. Rice. And we should certainly work on it.
Senator Obama [continuing]. ----aggressively.
Dr. Rice. We do, by the way, have a collapsed schedule,
for four years. We will see what it takes to get that done. But
I appreciate the interest in this. This is something we should
work very carefully on.
Senator Obama. The second question I have--and this is
something that I think repeatedly comes up as I travel through
Illinois; I suspect this is true everywhere--and that is the
enormous strain that is being felt by our national guardsmen
and reservists in Iraq. And, you know, I did a calculation, or
my staff did, that I think if Illinois was a country, we'd be
fourth or fifth in size of--as a coalition partner. I think
that may be true, in fact, for just the National Guard, alone.
Now, I recognize that you're not up for confirmation as
Secretary of Defense. Presumably, at some point I'll have the
opportunity to ask Secretary Rumsfeld about some of these
questions. But I am concerned about this notion, that was
pursued by Senator Biden and others, that we've made
significant progress in training troops. Because it seems to me
that--in your response to Senator Alexander--that we will not
be able to get our troops out, absent the Iraqi forces being
able to secure their own country, or at least this
administration would not be willing to define success in the
absence of such occurring.
I never got quite a clear answer to Senator Biden's
question as to how many troops, Iraqi troops--don't just have a
uniform and aren't just drawing a paycheck, but are effective
enough and committee enough that we would willingly have our
own troops fighting side by side with them. The number, of
120,000 that you gave, I suspect does not meet those fairly
stringent criteria that Senator Biden was alluding to. And I
just want to make sure, on the record, that you can give me
some sense of where we're at now. You may not have all the
answers, but I'd like to at least get a better sense of that.
Dr. Rice. The number that we consider trained is 120,000.
It's a little hard to give a number in--for exactly the
criteria that you are talking about, because a lot of this is a
matter of what you experience when these forces actually go
into difficulty.
We have had--and everybody understands that we have had
problems with people leaving, people deserting. We've had
problems with people--well, not coming back. And we've had
problems with, particularly, some of the police forces, who
are, frankly, undermanned. And one of the things--or under-
supplied--we are dealing with the structure of the police
forces by trying to go to more commando units that are more
heavily armed for what is now contact with insurgencies, not
just what your average beat-cop can do.
The Iraqi forces have fought pretty well in a number of
places. The forces that have fought best are the ones that have
clear leadership by Iraqis. And this has caused us to focus
more on the need for leadership, for coherent leadership for
these forces. And I mean leadership of units, not leadership in
the broad sense. And so, the Iraqis, themselves, are spending
more time vetting people who--experienced leaders--who can be
brought back these--to give structure and moral to these
people. They're considering the policy of putting some of our
people in as, really, almost mentors with these forces, really
paying more attention to their capability to fight as integral
units, not just the numbers of people that we're training. And
I think that's going to be responsive to some of the concerns.
And one of the points that General Luck will look at is how
well that process is going and what more we need to do.
But the numbers are 120,000. When they are tested, some
perform well, and some don't. We have to recognize that this is
a very tough environment, even for the best-trained forces.
Senator Obama. Ours.
Dr. Rice. Even for our--even for our forces. And while we
want to accelerate the training of the forces, we don't want to
do what we did in an earlier cycle, I think, which was to
accelerate it to the point that we put unprepared forces on the
field. So it's a complicated issue, but I think we're trying to
work our way through it. We've tried to adapt to what are
really changing circumstances and changing demands for the
Iraqi security force personnel.
Senator Obama. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. I would
just make this note, that if our measure is to bring our troops
home, and success is measured by whether Iraqis can secure
their own circumstances, and if our best troops in the world
are having trouble controlling the situation with 150,000 or
so, it sounds like we've got a long way to go. And I think part
of what the American people are going to need is some
certainty--not an absolute timetable, but a little more
certainty than is being provided. Because, right now, it
appears to be an entirely open-ended commitment.
Dr. Rice. Senator, if I may just--to that point, I want to
be understood that we are always looking to complete the job,
but, of course, to get our forces home as soon as possible. And
it will be a function of our--their capability and our ability
to help them. But there is at least some hope that Iraqis may,
themselves, fight this fight somewhat differently and somewhat
better, because it is their fight.
I was asked once, why are Iraqis better in certain
situations than even the best-trained coalition forces? And, of
course, an Iraqi knows whether that is a Syrian or a Saudi or
an Iraqi. They are ``of'' the country, ``of'' the culture, and
they're fighting for their own freedom.
And so, one of the standards of success is really that the
Iraqis are fighting for their freedom; even if they're not
fully able yet to secure themselves, that they are fighting for
their freedom. And I think we are seeing very strong signs of
that in the country.
Senator Obama. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Obama.
I just want to underline the Senator's point. And you have
addressed that, in your own way, Dr. Rice. But I know that when
Prime Minister Allawi was here, he told some of us who are
around this table that, by the time of the election--about a
year from now, there would be at least 200,000 people, who are
both police force and National Guard, who would be capable, who
could, in fact, patrol the streets, control the country. And
then, he assured us, there will be a good election, unlike what
we are likely to see on January the 30th.
I'm wondering if it's not possible for us to devise,
between you and us, some metrics that are more satisfying than
the large spread that we have between Senator Biden's questions
and Senator Obama's followup, 4,000 and 120,000. As you point
out, of the 120,000, it is very difficult to determine how
well-trained they are, how many weeks they will need, what kind
of staying power they might have, whether they're overwhelmed.
We appreciate that. As Allawi said, the negotiation with us as
to how rapidly we withdraw in a seemly and secure way must
occur. This is going to be up front with the American people
for quite some time. And I think we can probably do better with
the question. It's very difficult to do so in this dialogue
because all the criteria of training and capability are not
really clear. But I'd just ask you to think through this a
little bit, and we will, too, creatively, maybe through
hearings or through studies of some sort. I think some
measurement is essential, perhaps like the way we were gauging
the electrical power output for a while, or determining how
much oil was in the planning to be produced. There have to be
some indicators that give some sense of progress and hope and
what have you.
Dr. Rice. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Senator Sununu? And I congratulate you on
your co-chairmanship with Senator Biden of a very successful
observation effort.
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I suppose
it's largely due to the fact that you chose me, so I'm very
grateful for that.
Dr. Rice, in your remarks, you mentioned that the United
States has a role to play in providing assistance to the new
Palestinian leadership. And in our meetings last week with both
Abu Mazen and Abu Ala, it was emphasized that, in structuring
the Palestinian security forces, one of the biggest needs was
money to deal with the pension issues and payment issues.
Do you intend to recommend a financial-assistance package
for the new Palestinian leadership to restructure their
security forces? And is it likely that that request would be
part of a supplemental budget early in the year?
Dr. Rice. Thank you, Senator. I will look with others,
when I get to State, at precisely how we might fund the
obligations that I'm sure we're going to have to undertake to
help the Palestinians in this important period of time.
Clearly, the training of the security forces is going to be
critical. They've got to fight terrorism. They've got to have
trained security forces to do it. It will be a good investment,
to train those forces.
I would just note that we have, through indirect
assistance, through the United Nations, through non-
governmental organizations, provided a good deal of funding to
Palestinian reconstruction, Palestinian humanitarian needs. We
also have--the President approved the funding of $20 million in
direct support to the Palestinians just recently to help with
their elections. So there is a fund flow, and we will look at
what more we need.
I would hope that some of this would be funded by their
Arab neighbors. I have to say that, you know, if people really
want a peace--if the countries in the neighborhood, as they
come and they tell me, and they come and they tell the
President, they come and they tell the Secretary Powell all the
time, ``We have got to have peace, you've got to work on behalf
of the Palestinians''--then there are a number of their
neighbors who could really afford to help fund some of these
efforts. And I'm sure that I will be actively seeking their
support, because that is one thing that the neighbors could do
for the Palestinian people.
Senator Sununu. Well, that was my second question: What
can the Arab states do to help? Obviously, with 45- or 50-
dollar-a-barrel oil, the economy is there, and the revenue base
there is much stronger than it has been in past years. Is there
any specific role that you see for the Arab states, in addition
to financial resources? One of the issues that was raised in
some our meetings were, perhaps, the opportunity to assist in
the training of the security forces. And, let me be clear,
there are two different steps to this. One is restructuring the
security forces, which will take resources and funding, in and
of itself, and a lot of political will. And then the second
step would be the training of security forces. Is there a
particular partner in the region that you think might be best
suited to that training role?
Dr. Rice. Yes, I--it appears to me that both the Egyptians
and the Jordanians will probably have a role to play. They've
played that role before, in various ways, and we have had
extensive conversations with them at other times about playing
that role--at the time, for instance, of Akaba. And we would
want to get them involved. The Egyptians, of course, also have
a role to play in helping stabilize the Gaza as the Israeli
forces withdraw, and we have talked with them about that.
There are other roles that we need the Arab states to play,
and I think the most important is--I mentioned earlier, you
can't incite hatred against Israel and then say you want a two-
state solution. It's just got to stop. They've got to stop it
in their media, they've got to stop it in their mosques,
because it is a message that is inciting the people who want to
destroy the chances for peace between Israel and Palestine--the
Palestinian territories. So we have--we've sent that message.
And it was probably little noticed, but when we went to
Sharm El Sheik, the Arabs actually issued a very good
statement, and it was on behalf of Arab states, the Arab
League, and it was a very good statement. We will be going back
to them to remind them of that statement and to ask them to
live up to it.
Senator Sununu. In addition to the value of that
statement, I would mention that one of the things that came up
time and again was the impact that your visit had on the area,
and the importance of that kind of high-level engagement. I
know you answered some questions with regard to a special
envoy. It's something that you have supported, in concept. But
I would just underscore the value of that, a high-level
engagement, whether it's through our special envoy or your
personal commitment.
You mentioned Egypt and Jordan. So a third question has to
do with public diplomacy. You mentioned it in your remarks.
It's obviously a goal that's shared by most everyone on this
committee, to focus on public diplomacy and even to reform some
of our efforts in that area. I believe one of the areas of
public diplomacy that has been a success story is that of the
American university in Beirut, the American University in
Cairo, what they have done for both students in the region and
American students seeking to broaden their educational base.
I have had suggested to me the initiative of developing an
American university in Amman, and I was curious what you
thought of that objective, and what kind of support you might
lend to such an effort.
Dr. Rice. Well, thank you. I will certainly look at it. I
haven't taken a look at that, and I'd like to have a chance to
do that. But I have to say that the two universities that you
mentioned have been, really, extremely important in helping to
create a link between the United States and these important
countries and in providing a place for moderation in these
societies. And so, it's certainly the kind of thing that we
should look at.
We have to look, overall, at what I like to call a
conversation, not a monologue. It's one thing to get your
message out, which is how we often think about it, but it's
also important to engage other cultures. And I would hope that
that includes, on the part of the United States, a commitment--
a renewed commitment to the training of people--Americans in
critical languages, like Arabic and Farsi and other languages,
and in the study of those cultures.
I was a Soviet specialist and learned Russian at a time
when a lot of us were told that was a good thing to do for the
well-being of the country. And we linked our cultural awareness
and linguistic awareness to the broader question of how we
secured ourselves and how we won the war of ideas. And we have
to do that again. There are too few of us who are able to
engage those societies on their own terms.
Senator Sununu. Finally, I'd like you to talk a little bit
about the Middle East Partnership. This is a new way of looking
at financial assistance. It's obviously consistent with the
goals that you spoke about in your remarks today--economic
liberalization, political reform. Do you believe that MEPI, as
implemented to date, has been successful? Is it a model that we
ought to seek to reproduce elsewhere? And how do we ensure that
an approach like MEPI and the funding commitment made through
the Middle East Partnership isn't duplicative of efforts within
USAID or other State Department programs?
Dr. Rice. On the broader question, there needs to be very
close coordination between USAID and the State Department. And
I think that that has gotten better. Just watching it from the
outside--I will obviously know more as I get to the inside, but
I really do think that Andrew Natsios and Rich Armitage and
Colin Powell have worked very closely together to make sure
that all our resources are going in a way that is not
duplicative to further our goals.
I am a supporter of MEPI. I think that it is a part of the
concrete things that we can do to change the environment in the
Middle East. And its focus on good governance, as well as
liberalization of economies at the same time that assistance is
flowing, is a very important innovation. It is also behind the
Millennium Challenge account approach, where I think we now
have a consensus about foreign assistance, that foreign
assistance has to be a two-way street--that it's not just money
going into a country, but it is--a country has to be devoted to
fighting corruption, to liberalizing the economy, to good
governance, to spending money on healthcare and education for
the people--or it's not going to succeed. And that kind of
compact between donor and donee is the wave of--the future
wave, I believe, for foreign assistance.
And so, we do have other initiatives that push in the same
direction. I might just mention, also, Senator, that we hope,
in the Middle East, to be able to take advantage of free trade
as a tool, both to encourage peaceful liberalization between
the countries of the region, but also with us. And so, Bob
Zoellick has been putting free-trade agreements in place in a
lot of places in the Middle East, and looking to the day that
we might have a Middle East free-trade area.
Senator Sununu. I want to note, for the record, that was
question number five, Jordanian free trade and, obviously, the
initiatives in Morocco that have been undertaken. And I
certainly encourage you to continue along that line. I think,
in the long term, the issues that have been stressed within
part of the Middle East Partnership--that is, economic
liberalization and the trade liberalization that comes along
with that--will do far more for economic growth and development
as any short-term assistance that we might provide. That short-
term assistance is important, and especially in areas like
restructuring the Palestinian security forces. I don't think
that can happen in the short term without some outside
assistance, but, in the long term, economic growth, development
opportunity--it's really going to be determined by the
macroeconomic policy and trade policy that are chosen by our
partners.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Sununu.
Senator Martinez?
Senator Martinez. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. It's a
great honor to be a part of your committee. I want to thank you
and Ranking Member Biden for the warm welcome, and I look
forward to working with you and the other Members.
I'm particularly honored today to have the opportunity to
participate in the confirmation of Dr. Rice, someone I came to
know as a colleague and friend in our work together in the
administration. And I can certainly recall many moments in
which her steady leadership and her steady hand were felt, from
those early days of our administration, when an American
airplane was down in the--off the coast of China, to tumultuous
days after 9/11. When good, steady leadership was needed, Dr.
Rice was there, providing it to the President each and every
day. And I know that, in all my interactions with her, I've
always found her to be, not only extremely competent, but a
person of great personal integrity, and I'm extremely proud to
be in support of her confirmation.
We've talked a little bit about Latin America, Dr. Rice, an
area that's of great interest. I share, with Senator Dodd and
Senator Nelson, the anxiety that we have about the need for us
to be more engaged in the region. You hear it from all their
leaders when you travel there. You also just know that it is an
area that begs for our participation and engagement in a more
direct way than we've had in the last several years.
There are some signs that are troubling to me. And I know
we've talked about Venezuela. I want to go back into Venezuela
for a moment, because it seems to me that over the last--well,
first of all, Venezuela is a government that, purportedly, was
elected through a democratic process. However, anything but a
democratic governance is what takes place there today. I'm
troubled by the recent events, where property has been
expropriated, inflammatory statements, as Mr. Chavez travels
the world, that he continues to make against the United States,
which has been a pattern of his throughout the time of his
governance, his close relationship with another negative force
in the region, with the Government of Cuba and Fidel Castro,
himself. It really does raise, in my mind, some serious
skepticism of our ability to work with him, or his commitment
to true democracy and pluralism within his own country.
In addition to that, we now know, recently, that Mr. Chavez
has initiated conversations with Russia about the major
purchase of arms. It sounds to be something in the order of $5
billion. It would be a terribly destabilizing effect on the
region. He's talking about purchasing MiG-29s, advanced jet
fighters, as well as a large, large number of AK rifles and
other military equipment. He's already purchased helicopters.
This would create, I think, a tremendous imbalance in the
region, in terms of the potential to trigger an arms race in a
region that, frankly, does not need one.
And, also, I greatly concern myself with the continuing
friction that appears to exist--or, actually, doesn't appear;
it, in fact, exists--between Venezuela and its neighboring
country, Colombia. I know, in Colombia, we have tried to
support President Uribe in his fight against the narco-
trafficker terrorists, or narco-terrorists.
And so, my question to you would be, how do you view the
government of President Chavez, the kind of threat that it
represents to stability in the region, as well as to his
neighboring Colombia, and his continuing pattern of association
and relationship with some of the worst characters in the
world, including Fidel Castro?
Dr. Rice. Thank you, Senator. I think that we have to
view, at this point, the Government of Venezuela as a negative
force in the region, negative in terms of its effect on its
neighbors, as you have outlined, and negative in embracing the
only undemocratic government in the region--as I said, the only
place there's an empty chair in the OAS is for Cuba--negative
in the sense of what he is doing inside of his own country to
suppress opposition. And it's a very, very serious matter. And
the--we can, I think, work with others to expose that and to
say to President Chavez that this kind of behavior is really
not acceptable in this hemisphere that is trying to make its
way toward a stable, democratic future.
Democracy has a lot of challenges in Latin America. It has
challenges of new, fragile institutions that have come into
being over the last less-than-two decades. It has the
challenges of trying to bring economic prosperity to very poor
populations. It has the challenge of trying to integrate into
the political system people who have long been shut out of that
political system, like indigenous peoples. It has a lot of
challenges. In some places, it has the challenge of terrorism
and narco-trafficking, like Colombia.
But I do want to say that President Uribe has been very
tough on narco-trafficking and terrorism, and we've supported
him, and I think he's making some progress. It has places like
the Andean region, which we've supported through extension of
Andean trade preferences and through working on the Andean
Initiative.
We are engaging, and need to engage more, this very vital
region. It has a lot of challenges. It has a lot of promise.
But I would have to say that, at this point, one would have to
judge the influence of Venezuela--Venezuela's government as
negative. And it's too bad, because it has been a longstanding
good relationship with the United States, and we have great
affection for the Venezuelan people. I just think that right
now it's a pretty negative influence.
Senator Martinez. As it relates to Cuba, I know that the
President put forth a very broad policy towards Cuba in May of
this year, which included, among other things, a really strong
outreach to the dissident community with Cuba, and providing
encouragement and assistance so that this budding group of
people could continue to thrive. Understanding that they
operate under tremendous difficult circumstances, as we know,
from the continuing human-rights suppression in Cuba and
political prisoners, like Dr. Oscar Elias Biscet and others,
who continue to unjustly be imprisoned.
I wondered if you could speak to the implementation of the
recommendations of the Commission on a Free Cuba, which,
obviously, some of them have been already taken place, but I'm
particularly concerned about whether there will be, within the
State Department, someone that you will task to be a point-
person in the continuity of this and in the ensuring of the
implementation of all of its different points, including, in
this, the obvious need for there to be a continuing flow of
information to the Cuban people.
I was delighted when Ranking Member Biden mentioned that,
when he saw Lech Walesa, the first thing he said was not
``solidarity,'' but was ``Radio Free Europe.'' I think that
Radio and TV Marti can have that same freeing potential for the
people of Cuba if we can break through the jamming that
continues to be there because of Castro's fear of his own
people hearing just free news and information.
So can you help me giving me some assurance that there will
be someone to ensure the carrying out of this by having a
point-person so assigned, and a continued commitment to Radio
and TV Marti, and the platform that we're talking about, having
a dedicated opportunity to pierce the jamming, by ways in
which--we've done it recently, in ways that I think would help
the people of Cuba to get free information.
Dr. Rice. Well, the information flow to Cuba is a very
important tool for us, because Castro would like nothing better
than to have his people shut off from information. And Radio
Marti and TV Marti, of course, we've been very supportive.
We've been flying commando solo. We're looking at how best to
extend that and make certain that we can continue to do that.
I don't know about the structure just yet, but I can assure
you that there will be very close attention to the
implementation of the Commission's recommendations. We've
already made a lot of progress with our--with immigration, with
homeland security. Castro, I think, is feeling some of that,
where we are beginning to make it not possible for him to skim
money off of monies that people send for humanitarian or family
reasons or travel to fuel his dictatorial regime.
The day that the people of Cuba are finally free is going
to be a great one for the Western Hemisphere, and the
Commission recommendations were intended to try and hasten that
day and also to try and prepare the ground for a peaceful
transition. And it's a very important goal, and you can be
certain that we'll pay extremely close attention to it.
Senator Martinez. You have in the past, and I know you will
in the future.
Dr. Rice. Thank you.
Senator Martinez. Shifting to the Middle East, I had the
opportunity to travel there recently and also saw the
Palestinian election take place. One of the great concerns that
seems to be there as we look to a peace process is the
continued stability in Southern Lebanon--the fact that the
United Nations resolutions have never been implemented, Syria
has never really left the region, the Lebanese Government has
never really taken over the southern part of Lebanon--and it
just continues to exacerbate the inability of Israel to not
suffer the terrorist attacks, which then creates more
instability in the region.
Do you think that there will be an opportunity for us to
more forcefully assert the need for that resolution to be
observed by Syria and Lebanon?
Dr. Rice. Absolutely, Senator. The Resolution 1546, which
we and the French cosponsored to put the Syrians on notice that
the world expected them to observe the legitimate sovereignty
of Lebanon, to begin to remove their forces, to stop terrorism
from there, I think, was a very important achievement.
Secretary General Annan has appointed someone to keep on top of
the implementation of that resolution. And that's also very
important.
Lebanon can be one of the democratic strongholds in the
Middle East. And so, we need to pay attention to what is going
on in Lebanon.
And if I just may say one line about Syria, as well, I
think that it's fair to say that the Syrian Government is
behaving in a way that could, unfortunately, lead to long-term
bad relations with the United States. It is incumbent on Syria
to respond, finally, to the entreaties of the United States and
others about their ties to terrorism, about the harmful
activities that are taking place from Syrian territory into
Iraq, and to act on a number of the steps that were first
outlined to them by Secretary Powell almost three years ago,
and then by Deputy Secretary Armitage just very recently. And
so, this is an important issue with Syria, and I just want to
thank the Congress. We do have, thanks to the Syrian
Accountability Act, some tools, but we will have to mobilize
them, because Syria should not be, but is, thus far, not a
constructive force.
Senator Martinez. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Martinez.
At this point, I want to have a little discussion. I will
not let this become a full-scale debate. But I want to survey
what is possible with the committee this afternoon in the
hearing. And so, I'm going to ask each Member who is assembled
for some estimate of how many minutes the Member would require
in raising additional questions. And we'll try to total that up
and come to some idea, then, of whether we might complete our
work this afternoon and, in fact, have a vote on confirmation.
Or, if that is not in the cards, we will proceed in regular
order so that Members will have the opportunity to ask the
questions that we promised everyone they could ask.
Dr. Rice. And, Senator, I'm willing to stay here longer
than the afternoon, if you need me to be.
The Chairman. Well, you may be more prepared than all of
our Members. But, nevertheless, we'll not debate that, either,
in terms of eagerness.
But let me just ask. Senator Hagel, do you need more time?
Senator Hagel. Ten minutes.
The Chairman. About ten minutes.
Senator Chafee?
Senator Chafee. Probably five.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Coleman?
Senator Coleman. Maybe five, but I'd forego my five if we
came to some consensus that we could vote this afternoon.
The Chairman. I see. Flexible, okay.
Senator Voinovich?
Senator Voinovich. Ten.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Martinez?
Senator Martinez. Sir, I'm awfully new, I need to be very
flexible.
The Chairman. All right. Well, I read that somewhere
between 30 and 40 minutes--plus or minus a few.
Senator Biden?
Senator Biden. I have at least ten minutes.
The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes?
Senator Sarbanes. Another round.
The Chairman. All right.
Senator Dodd?
Senator Dodd. The same, 10 or 15 minutes.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Feingold?
Senator Feingold. Ten minutes.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer?
Senator Boxer. About two rounds.
The Chairman. About two hours?
Senator Boxer. Two rounds.
The Chairman. Two rounds, all right.
Senator Boxer. I don't want two hours.
The Chairman. All right. Very good.
Senator Obama?
Senator Obama. That sounds better than 20 minutes.
The Chairman. All right. Well, that would be at least 70
minutes or so, it looks like.
And, Senator Murkowski, how many more minutes would you
like to question the witness?
Senator Murkowski. I think it can be done in ten.
The Chairman. Another ten, all right.
Well, it appears probably we have at least two hours of
work ahead of us, maybe more. And let me just mention, the
distinguished Ranking Member, because of an important
commitment, will need to leave at about 6:00 o'clock or
thereabouts.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I do have a longstanding
commitment at 6:00. I assumed we'd go two days. But I want to
make it clear, if, in fact, the committee has exhausted its
questions in the time frame of 6:00 or 7:00 o'clock, I would
leave my proxy with my colleague, if you would be still here,
or with you, to vote my proxy. I have no objection to
proceeding, assuming every Member is satisfied they've had
their questions answered. And I'm sure the witness would be
delighted to not have to be back tomorrow, although we enjoy
her company greatly and expect her back many times.
Dr. Rice. Many times.
Senator Biden. So I have no objection, as long as the
Chairman understands, my constraint is at about ten minutes of
6:00. I'm going to have to leave for a longstanding commitment.
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, if I might just--I think what
you're doing to do is a wise thing, to proceed in this way, but
let's--I would hope, because, in terms of the nominee's
responses and so forth, you may find Members needing more time
than they've indicated to you here----
The Chairman. Could be.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----in good faith. It would be
improper for us to assume that you might be able to say there
are two hours left, and we'd be, sort of, failing in our
commitments to you if we discovered that we needed more time to
pursue some issues maybe a little more aggressively.
The Chairman. I understand that. And the Chair will not be
unreasonable in keeping the hearing going forever. We'll try to
gauge what is doable. Now, if, at some point it appears that
we're still raising good questions, but we're not going to
conclude, then I would ask for Members' cooperation to come
back tomorrow morning at 9:00 o'clock again. And, hopefully,
under those circumstances, perhaps to have a vote on the
nomination before noon so that we would then compact our
efforts, perhaps, and thus leave afternoons available for the
nominee and for ourselves.
But if that doesn't work, why, we've reserved the
afternoon, also. One option or another probably will work out,
and that's why I just took the time to gauge your preferences
at this juncture. We've had wonderful attendance. As you've
noticed, Dr. Rice, all 18 Members have been present and have
all taken at least ten minutes, some a few more--as the case
may be.
There is deep interest in this, as is evidenced by the
attendees at the hearing who have come to hear you. And we've
had standing-room only throughout the hearings. You cannot see
this from where you are sitting, but I can testify to this.
Well, we'll proceed now. We'll set a ten-minute round.
Members need not use all ten minutes if they are disposed to
stop short of that.
Let me begin by saying, Dr. Rice, that I submitted a
question to you, and I appreciated your response, endorsing my
initiative for an institute on the free press at the National
Endowment for Democracy. Given both public and private sectors
working together, the National Endowment seemed to me to be a
good framework for this. We can make some headway on the public
diplomacy initiatives that you have expressed today, and enlist
both parties, Republicans and Democrats, through the
International Republican Institute and the National Democratic
Institute, and others who are affiliated. I'll not take time to
question you, but I just wanted to note that I appreciated,
very much, that endorsement. I mention it because of your
strong advocacy, today, of public diplomacy, the need for us to
get our message out.
Dr. Rice. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Let me ask about Ukraine. We have had a
dramatic chain of events, and they are, by no means, at
conclusion. The story evolves there. But it is clear that
President Yushchenko will have numerous hurdles in front of
him. It would be helpful, in my judgment, if we could have the
administration's support of legislation repealing Jackson-Vanik
restrictions for Ukraine. Do you have an opinion on----
Dr. Rice. We would----
The Chairman [continuing]. ----that initiative?
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----we support the repeal of those--
--
The Chairman. For Ukraine.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----For Ukraine, at the time that
it's appropriate, yes.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate that. And you may be able
to help us determine, in the timetable, when it is appropriate,
and to work with us on that legislation so that there will not
be hitches or misunderstandings with the government that we are
trying to assist there.
Senator Biden has indicated an appropriate and timely call
from our former colleague Senator Danforth, our ambassador to
the United Nations, with regard to Sudan. And I had the
privilege of visiting with him in the last few days, over the
telephone, on specific issues that are now before us. Despite
peace between the north and the south, there is, in fact, the
need, still, for peacekeepers--African troops, essentially.
About $250 million, he estimated, would be required to pay for
that peacekeeping effort by these troops, in addition to a
commitment he feels that we have made as part of the carrots of
the carrots-and-stick business, of about $500 million in
development aid to the Government of Sudan. Now, Senator
Danforth was concerned about both sums, the 250 million and the
500 million, and the incorporation by the Department of this in
our foreign assistance budget--or wherever it may be
appropriate, perhaps in the Defense budget. Have you given
thought to how we are going to meet the Sudan commitments?
Dr. Rice. Senator, I need to look at precisely how we will
meet the commitments. We have been aware of the commitments
that we have, and we will do it through some combination of
funding accounts.
As to the peacekeepers, I think our goal, right now, is to
convince the Sudan Government that the AU needs to have the
full 3,300 complement, not just 1,100. And we're working very
hard on that. But we recognize the commitments that we've made
on----
The Chairman. So they still need to be convinced that they
need 3300 peacekeepers.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----Right. That's right.
The Chairman. Oh, well, that's a very----
Dr. Rice. That's a problem.
The Chairman [continuing]. ----important factor. But it's
still important that we succeed, I think, in having an
appropriate amount, not only to gel together the success thus
far, but, obviously, because Darfur is still in some jeopardy,
as Senator Danforth has told this committee, with a lot of
guilt on all sides, in that situation.
Of course, sadly enough, he also, I'm sure, informed
Senator Biden, as he did me, that he will be leaving his post
today.
Dr. Rice. Yes.
The Chairman. And so, once again we have a very important
diplomatic assignment that requires a nominee. I would just
request that you work closely with colleagues in the White
House and with the President to forward a nominee quickly,
because, as we went through this progression with Ambassador
Negroponte's nomination, the committee moved very rapidly to
hold a hearing almost before the Ambassador might have been
prepared for it, as well as the Department, considering all of
the paperwork that needs to be done. At this particular crucial
time, an ambassador to the U.N. from the United States is so
important. So I know that that's on your mind, but I----
Dr. Rice. Yes, it is.
The Chairman [continuing]. ----just wanted to take the
occasion of the hearing to underline it.
Dr. Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. I wanted to mention, in Venezuela, as others
have already, that we do have a very, very heavy oil traffic
with Venezuela that's mutually beneficial. However, given all
the difficulties and vagaries of the situation, I just simply
want to ask, Is there a contingency plan, in the event of
another suspension of oil exports from Venezuela? Because even
the hint of this, or of labor difficulties in Venezuela, causes
spikes in the oil futures markets. These bring speculation and
higher gas prices for Americans, all over. They see us, as
constituents, and ask, ``What are you going to do about it?''
Nigeria sometimes is responsible, quite apart from the
Middle East and the normal suspects. But, with Venezuela, do we
have, really, some contingency plan of what to do with this 13
percent of the oil that we require?
Dr. Rice. Well, we're certainly hoping that the Government
of Venezuela realizes, as you said, the mutual beneficial
nature of this. I think that it was Senator Nelson who
mentioned the fact that some 80 percent of Venezuelan exports
are actually--in oil--are actually to us. So it is mutually
beneficial. Obviously, we have to prepare for disruption.
That's why we have a strategic petroleum reserve. And the long-
term goal, of course, is to have an energy policy that lessens
our----
The Chairman. Yes.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----dependence on foreign supplies.
But it would be--I would hope that the Venezuelan government,
whatever our differences and difficulties with, understand that
this is, economically, a mutually beneficial relationship.
The Chairman. Well, as you take hold, would you just take
under advisement the need for a more explicit plan, and
perhaps, through the appropriate departments in the Department
of State, work with the subordinates that you will have?
Because it just seems to me that something here is going to be
required, beyond the hope, eventually, for an energy plan or
the various contingencies that we have thus far.
I just wanted to touch on Iran briefly to indicate that
there has been enormous commentary, not only from the press,
but among academics, about the extent of our participation with
the Europeans in negotiations with Iran or with the IAEA. And
from time to time, it appears that the Europeans, or Ambassador
Baradei, negotiate various things, and then we make an
editorial comment about it, but are not exactly around the
table are not lifting in the same way.
Are you examining what our role ought to be in these
ongoing negotiations so that, in fact, they will be more
successful, so that they will have greater staying power, and
the Europeans, as well as the U.N., will have greater
confidence that our heft is behind this situation?
Dr. Rice. Well, we're certainly working very closely with
the Europeans. And, with the IAEA, we're full participants, as
members of the board, in the processes that the IAEA is going
through.
Obviously, we need to keep reviewing this situation, but I
think that we believe, at this point, that there is a path
ahead. If the Europeans are unable to get satisfactory
understanding with the Iranians about their international
obligations, I think we have to go back and look at the process
that was prescribed, which is that this would go to the
Security Council, and we would go from there.
Nobody is saying that there have to be sanctions right
away, or anything of the sort, but we are saying that Iran has
to be held to account for its international obligations.
The Chairman. Well, indeed, that has been our policy. I,
once again, am hopeful--and I see an opportunity with the
Europeans here, as we begin to meld together strategies for the
future in the Middle East--some possibilities for more
cooperation, for more mutual assistance in this process, in
addition to, as you say, our thought that responsibility means
that they've got to do this or that, or face the U.N.
Ultimately, they might face the Security Council, and not much
might come of it. I think you understand better than any of us
the importance of the negotiations. I've just seized, once
again, on some possibilities of working with Great Britain,
with France, with others who have been doing more heavy-lifting
here.
Dr. Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Now, finally, in May, the Nonproliferation
Treaty Review Conference is going to take place in New York.
May is at least four months away, but what sort of preparations
is the administration making for that conference? What sort of
objectives will we have at that point?
Dr. Rice. Well, we will try, at that conference, to work
with others to try and address some of the loopholes that are
there in the NPT. And I think the big one, of course, is this
issue of civilian nuclear-use being used to cover----
The Chairman. The loop that----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----nuclear programs----
The Chairman [continuing]. ----you mentioned earlier.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----this fuel cycle----
The Chairman. Yes.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----loop. And we have some
proposals. We're working--there's a proposal for a special
committee on compliance, which I think is a good proposal, and
we probably can work that out. But the NPT needs some repair.
And we will try and press this agenda at the conference.
I have to say that the leadership of the IAEA has also been
interested, when I've talked to Mr. El Baradei about this, in
trying to pursue some of these problems, too, because they know
that, without a sound NPT, there's--we really are--we have one
hand tied behind our backs.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Biden?
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Dr. Rice, I'm going to ask several questions, and we can
both get right to it. It'll keep me from a second round, maybe
an incentive.
First of all, I'd like to ask you briefly about Iraq. In my
last trip to Iraq, I was surprised at how frequently--and I'm
not exaggerating, my colleagues may have found the same thing,
I think they did--how many people asked us, including our own
military, ``Are we staying''--how many times I heard the
question, from Iraqis as well as our own military, ``Are we
staying, or is the administration's exit strategy an election?
At the end of January, Allawi, whomever is elected, turns and
says, `We want you out,' and we leave; we declare that Saddam
has been defeated, we have eliminated weapons of mass
destruction, or there are none there to begin with, and we've
done our job, and we leave.''
Can you tell this committee whether or not it's the
administration's position to see through the process until the
election that's due at the end of 2005?
Dr. Rice. Well, it is certainly this administration's
intention to see that process through. I think what that means
for our force levels, we will have to see, as we've been
talking about, Iraqi forces. There's no doubt that we believe
strongly that they're on a path here, and we have to help them
through that path.
Senator Biden. Do you see any possibility--now, everything
is possible--do you see any reasonable possibility that the
United States would withdraw the bulk of its forces before the
end of 2005?
Dr. Rice. I can't judge that, Senator Biden, but I will
say that we're going to try to help the Iraqis get this done.
And what force levels we need to get it done, we'll just have
to keep to get it done.
Senator Biden. Well, I think it would be a useful thing,
upon consideration, once you're sworn in, for somebody to tell
the American people what to expect, so they have some sense of
an honest assessment of what is likely. Every single military
person I have spoken with in my trips to Iraq says we need a
minimum of 150,000 troops, at least for the next year and
possibly beyond that, that there's no reasonable possibility,
no matter how well we train Iraqis, that we would be able to
draw down in any significant way. Some are talking about
drawing down the 12,000 we put in for the election.
And so, I hope that there will be an attempt on the part of
the President to try to just give his best judgment to the
American people of what is expected of them, because I think
they're prepared to do anything that's asked of them, but I
don't think they're prepared to continue not to know, not to
have some honest sense of what may be expected of them. Because
I expect you're going to have to come back for tens of billions
of dollars this year, and I know we'll go through the game of
not--I know Iraq's not part of our budget; it's that magic
thing that we never know--having any idea what we're going to
spend, even though we know exactly how much it costs to
maintain X number of troops in Iraq. It's just fascinating.
It's like Democrats talking about revenue enhancements.
Republicans talking about Iraq is up there in the sky somewhere
and we don't have to include it in the budget, like the Lord
Almighty may come down and pluck it from the Earth and drop it
on Mars. But I just think we need a little more candor. I hope
you'll focus on that a little bit.
Iran. Seymour Hersch wrote, in The New Yorker, that the,
quote, ``Hawks in the Pentagon, in private discussions, have
been urging a limited attack on Iran because they believe it
could lead to a toppling of the religious leadership,'' end of
quote.
I'm not asking you about whether there's any discussion
about an attack, but do you believe that it is possible to
``topple,'' quote, the religious leadership in Iran? And--by
any short-term military action--is that a goal--not
militarily--is it a goal of the United States to change the
regime in Iran?
Dr. Rice. The goal of the administration is to have a
regime in Iran that is responsive to concerns that we have
about Iran's policies, which are 180 degrees antithetical to
our own interests at this point. That means that the--a regime,
``the'' regime, would have to deal with its nuclear-weapons
obligations, deal with the fact that there are al Qaeda leaders
who have been there, deal with the fact that they're supporting
Hezbollah and terrorism against--and Palestinian rejectionists
against the Middle East peace process. That's what we're
seeking.
I do want to say that the Iranian people, who are among
some of the most worldly, in a good sense, that we know, do
suffer under a regime that has been completely unwilling to
deal with their aspirations, and that has an appalling human-
rights record----
Senator Biden. One of the things that--if I can stick on
the nuclear side of this equation for a minute, one of the
things that I've found--I may be mistaken, but I think Senator
Hagel also might have found, there were a lot of feelers coming
out, we talked to you about it in detail, from the Modulists
and members who were viewed as at least modern and not
clerical, not necessarily pro-Western--was, I didn't find a lot
of distinction between quote, ``Iranian democrats,'' with a
small ``d,'' and the Ayatollas on the issue of whether Iran,
quote, ``was entitled to be a nuclear power.''
The arguments I would get would be--even from people we
would not consider hardliners--was that, ``We're in a dangerous
neighborhood. We believe Israel has nuclear weapons, Russia has
nuclear weapons, Pakistan has nuclear weapons, India has
nuclear weapons, others are seeking nuclear weapons. Why are we
not entitled to nuclear weapons? And there's no umbrella or
guarantee coming from any nuclear power for us.''
Do you think, if there was a regime change--that is, assume
that the reform movement had been successful, assume that
instead of toppling those elected officials in genuinely held
democratic elections, assume that instead of them being thrown
out, assume that they had prevailed and the religious
leadership had been defeated, politically, in Iran. Do you
think Iran would forego its nuclear aspirations?
Dr. Rice. Well, it's hard to--I really don't want to
speculate. I think it's the kind of thing that we've--we don't
know. I do think that we're sending a message--the world is
sending a message to Iran that Iran cannot be a legitimate
participant in international--the international system,
international politics, and pursue a nuclear weapon. And I
would hope that that would have an effect on----
Senator Biden. Well, we did----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----whatever regime there is in----
Senator Biden [continuing]. ----that, and----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----Iran.
Senator Biden [continuing]. ----and you did it very
successfully, along with our European friends, who had
initiated it, with regard to Qaddafi. But, as I said earlier,
there were significant carrots in the Qaddafi, quote, ``deal.''
And I fully supported what you did, and I think it was a great
success.
Now, the EU 3, the European community, has approached this
in a slightly different way than we have, with a slightly
different emphasis. And I asked you about that in my questions
to you, written ahead of time, and you said, in answer to the
question about our participation with the EU 3, you said, among
other things, ``The United States Government is not a party to
the EU 3's ongoing dialogue with Iran. We believe that
additional bilateral and multilateral pressure, including
reporting Iran's noncompliance to the U.N. Security Council,
will be required to persuade Iran's leadership to end its
sensitive nuclear fuel cycle pursuits. We will continue to
consult with our friends and allies toward this end.''
Now, my question is, why do you think it is not--or is it
that we are not welcome, or is it not profitable to be actually
engaged with the EU 3 as they proceed now? Because the
likelihood of the U.N. Security Council--maybe you have more
faith in the U.N. Security Council than I do--but the
likelihood of them concluding that Iran is in noncompliance and
imposing broad sanctions--we're already sanctioning the heck
out of them--I wouldn't want to bet anything on that.
So I'm confused. Why are we not prepared to engage in the
process and talk about what carrots we may be willing to offer
in return for a cessation of their nuclear program and their
missile program? Is there some philosophic reason for that, or
is it a practical reason or what's the reason?
Dr. Rice. Well, we do have a number of other problems with
Iran, not just the nuclear problem. And I think that the future
of Iranian relations--U.S./Iranian relations--rests, not only
on the nuclear issue, but at other--a number of other issues,
too--terrorism, our past--their human-rights record.
The way that we've chosen to do this is that Europeans work
very closely with us, and they--we are trying to see if,
indeed, the process that they're engaged in is going to bear
any fruit.
Senator Biden. I understand that. And I think you've given
me a straightforward answer, and I want to make sure I don't
misunderstand you. When I talk to our European friends, who are
the three, their foreign ministers and/or their
parliamentarians who are engaged in this, what they say to me
is essentially what you just said. I think the Europeans would
be willing to cut a deal with the Iranians now, relating to
economic help, if there was a verifiable foreswearing of
production of nuclear weapons and a missile program. But the
truth is--and I'm not being critical, I just want to make sure
I understand it--even if they did that, as long as they were
continuing to support Hezbollah, as long as they were exporting
the efforts to destabilize Israel, and as long as they were
engaged in human-rights abuses, then the administration's
position would be--even if the Lord Almighty came down and
said, ``We guarantee you we can verify this, guarantee we can
verify a compliance with no nuclear weapons and no missile
technology,''--we still wouldn't go for that deal, would we?
Dr. Rice. Well, I think we would have to say that the
relationship with Iran has more components than the nuclear
side, but let's see how far the Europeans get, and----
Senator Biden. Well----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----take a look at----
Senator Biden [continuing]. ----I appreciate----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----where we are.
Senator Biden [continuing]. ----that. I would just suggest
that we have a real relationship with China, and their human-
rights abuses are terrible. The watch group looking at Russia
has now put Russia in the category--I can't find the exact
quote, my staff has it--of being non-democratic. We continue to
have a relationship with them. And my worry is--I'll be very
blunt with you, with regard to both Iran and Korea--is that I'm
not sure we're ready to take yes for an answer. I don't know
whether they would go forward. But I do believe one thing
firmly, that there is no possibility of any fundamental change
in the nuclear program in Korea or Iran, absent the United
States actively, deeply engaged in the negotiation. We're the
800-pound gorilla. We're the outfit, they want to know where
they are, where we are. And it concerns me that we say the
single most dangerous thing--as my friend from Illinois said--
and that both candidates agree, the most single-most dangerous
thing in the world is the spread of nuclear weapons and their
possible access by the bad guys beyond the nation-states.
We seem to be able to delineate when we deal with Russia.
We seem to be able to delineate when we deal with China. I
would argue the human-rights abuses in China are not
fundamentally different than human-rights abuses in Iran. By
the way, it was Freedom House who categorized--I know you guys
know this, I couldn't remember the outfit--that now labels
Russia as, quote, ``not free.''
As my grandpop used to say, the horse may not be able to
carry the sleigh that you all are insisting on, but at any
rate, thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Hagel?
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Dr. Rice, can you share with us what diplomatic initiatives
President Bush will be carrying to Europe next month?
Dr. Rice. Well, we are working, currently--and, indeed,
discussing--with our European allies how we might structure
this very important trip. I think what we want to do, and what
the President wants to do, is to unite this important alliance
behind the kind of great goals that we all have. And there is a
calendar that permits some potential movement on the Middle
East. We can hope for that. For instance, there's a conference
in London on March 1st that Prime Minister Blair is hosting.
And that should, therefore, provide an area where, in the runup
to that, which the President's trip will be, we can have a
discussion about how we move forward on Middle East peace. I
think we will want to have a discussion about how we move
forward on Iraq in the wake of elections. Elections will have
just been held. What are the tasks? Who's going to play what
role? What, with a new government in place, we can do to
support that government. I would hope we would also look for
concrete movement on the broader Middle East agenda.
The Forum for the Future was a great success, but we need
to keep moving that forum forward so that it doesn't just
become a place where we get together, kind of, every six months
and talk.
I would characterize it this way, Senator Hagel, that what
we'll try to do is to focus--and when I talk to my friends in
the Transatlantic Alliance, they agree with this--focus the
Transatlantic Alliance on what we're going to do together.
We've spent a lot of time talking about ``the'' Transatlantic
Alliance. We've actually spent a good deal of time transforming
some of its elements, like the changes that we've made to an
expanded NATO, over time, giving it a rapid-reaction force, and
so forth. But it's now time to put this great alliance to work
in the service of the great causes that we have ahead of us.
And I think that's really the agenda, is to enlist, unite,
discuss how we move ahead together on what is really, kind of,
the agenda of our time.
Senator Hagel. Might that agenda include climate change?
Dr. Rice. We will certainly be in discussions with the--
with our allies on this issue, because Prime Minister Blair has
made it a discussion issue for Gleneagles in the G8. And so, we
will want to work with them. I don't know how much will be done
on this trip, but this is in--a set of discussions we've
already begun to have. I know of your interest in this,
Senator, and perhaps we can talk more about it.
There are technological initiatives that we have with a
number of countries in the world. There is a Methane Emissions
Initiative that we have with a number of countries in the
world. What we, in the developing--developed world need to
realize is that we need to have an approach to this that is
growth, energy, and environment, because we're going to have to
bring onboard the large developing states, like China and
India, if we're going to be able to approach the issues of
climate change.
So it will certainly be an--a subject for discussion, and
eventually an initiative. Whether, on this trip or later, as we
prepare for Gleneagles, I think we'll have to see.
Senator Hagel. Well, I--as you know, and you mentioned
when you and I had an opportunity to visit a little bit, I told
you that I was going to introduce comprehensive climate-change
legislation. I've been working with Chairman Lugar and others
over the last few months on this. And I also, as you know, met
with Prime Minister Blair last month, in London, on this. So I
would hope, especially in light of what Senator Murkowski
noted, and others, this morning, that this would get some
attention, because I do think climate change is one of those
areas where it's value-added for relationships, especially
diplomacy. And so diplomacy, and some efforts--and I hear that,
incidentally, from many from of our friends around the world.
So thank you.
Dr. Rice. Thank you, Senator. And I will work you. I know
we're spending $5 billion on this issue. And so, I think----
Senator Hagel. I know it.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----we have something to bring to
the table.
Senator Hagel. No--well, the record is actually very, very
positive. It's just that we have not explained it very well.
Dr. Rice. I agree with you there.
Senator Hagel. And I think we have an opportunity to do
that.
Speaking of explaining records, we spent some time this
morning on public diplomacy. You thoroughly noted how important
it is to you and your efforts, in your statement this morning,
as well as in our private conversations. Can you share with
this committee any new initiatives that you are thinking about
in the area of public diplomacy at the State Department?
Dr. Rice. Well, I would like to do a couple of things.
First of all, I have to get there and look at the structure.
There have been a number of studies of what to do about the
structure. I've had the chance to talk to Ed Djerejian, I've
had a chance to talk to Davie Abshire, I'm going to talk to
others who have been a part of these studies, because we need
to look at how the--Washington works with the field. As I said,
public diplomacy's done in Amman, not in Washington. And so,
we're going to look at that set of issues.
I think we will need to--we have some very effective
cultural and educational exchange programs. I think we need to
look at how we leverage those, move those forward. Are we doing
enough, particularly in the Muslim world and in places like
Indonesia and countries that we have, unfortunately, been not
very active in recent years? What more can we do? And so, I
would hope to have some initiatives on that score, too.
So both structure and through initiatives, I would hope to
make a very early push to demonstrate that--we have fine
professionals in this field. I'm quite certain of it. But this
is something that we once really knew how to do, during the
Cold War. We somehow lost our ability to do it as effectively
as we once did. And we broke up a lot of the apparatus when we
thought we--the end of history had come. And now we are going
to have to look at what we need to reestablish in order to be
able to do the job. And, again, I think this is an area where I
would hope to have considerable input from Members of the
committee.
Senator Hagel. Well, I think you will not have to ask
twice on that. You've received some indication of this
committee's interest. And I think, under Chairman Lugar and
Senator Biden's leadership, it has been a high priority over
the last few years, and it needs to be revisited. And I think
the entire committee is very pleased that you have put this on
your list, on your agenda, as a high priority.
United Nations. It was mentioned here earlier during our
hearing, but, in particular, what types of reform, at the
United Nations, would you be looking for and will you help
lead?
Dr. Rice. Well, we are digesting the High-level Panel
Report, at this point. And we're going to put a lot of
attention on consultations with countries around the world
about that report. It's something that I've discussed with Kofi
Annan, and that he's asked of us to make an effort.
Obviously, there are two kinds of reforms, simply those
that will make the U.N. work better, in terms of management--
and we've long had an interest in those. I think we need to
pursue them. We also, obviously, want the U.N. to have the
kinds of structure and tools that it needs to face the threats
and the opportunities of the 21st century.
And I know there's a lot of discussion of Security Council
reform. I don't think we have any particular perceived wisdom
right now on how to do that, except to say that there needs to
be a look at where we are, in terms of the representation in
the U.N. bodies of countries that are contributing a lot.
Even outside of the United Nations, there are a number of
rising influential democracies, like India and Brazil and South
Africa, that we just need to be working more with on all kinds
of issues. And I hope that we can pursue that at the same time
that we look at what the structure of the U.N. may look like.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
There has been considerable discussion today about
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; in particular,
nuclear proliferation. Little conversation, so far, about
bioterrorism. Do you think it would be in our interest to
initiate an effort to develop some kind of an international
model--using CDC, Centers for Disease Control, as an example--
where all nations could, in some way, work together through
that international body, which--not unlike some of the
nonproliferation treaty efforts, although we're seeing, I
think, necessary refinements, and probably reforms, in that, if
that can happen. But if you would speak to that kind of an
idea, about maybe a CDC international model for bioterrorism.
Dr. Rice. It's a very interesting idea, Senator. We should
definitely explore it. Homeland Security people have had some
discussions with their counterparts around the world about the
bioterrorism threats, because it's obviously one of those
threats that could be quite borderless and quite stateless. And
so, we have had some discussions of that. But a more
concentrated international effort that deals with all of the
elements of bioterrorism detection, prophylactic efforts that
might be undertaken, and then, heaven forbid, consequence
management, I think this is something that should be put on the
international agenda, and we'll look at various ways to do
that.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Sarbanes?
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Rice, I'm going to run through a series of questions,
and maybe we can move very quickly, and then I want to come
back to the economic questions, as well.
First of all, if you were Secretary of State, how much
discretion or authority would you have in filling positions
within the State Department?
Dr. Rice. I work very closely with presidential personnel,
but I have to say that the folks have been very understanding
of the fact that I have to have a team that is a team that I
can work with and that's my team.
Senator Sarbanes. But your selections have to clear
Presidential Personnel?
Dr. Rice. Well, these are presidential appointments, at
least the ones that are presidential appointments.
Senator Sarbanes. I know it's been written so often about
how close you are to the President, but you don't have, as it
were, the kind of a vote of confidence or commitment to you
from the President that you can go ahead and fill these
positions yourself.
Dr. Rice. Senator, it's been just very easy to work
through Presidential Personnel. It's just not been an issue.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, if there were an issue, though,
you don't have that kind of commitment, is that correct?
Dr. Rice. These are appointments by the President. And so,
I think it's a perfectly appropriate role.
Senator Sarbanes. I understand the answer.
My next question is, I've always been curious to know the
rationale why a National Security Advisor will not appear
before the Congress to testify and answer questions, but goes
on the news programs or appears at the Press Club and, at the
end of it, says, ``Now I'm open to take your questions,'' and
then proceeds to answer questions on the public record in front
of the public. Now, what is the rationale for that? Why doesn't
the National Security Advisor respond to the Congress?
Dr. Rice. Well, the rationale, Senator, has been a couple
of things--first of all, that there is a separation of powers,
and the President's staff is, to him, in the executive branch,
private counsel. When you go on----
Senator Sarbanes. Well, it's not very private counsel when
you go on the national media shows, appear publicly, and answer
questions in that forum. I'd have a little more understanding
of the rationale if you didn't do that, if you limited yourself
to giving private advice to the President, and turned down the
interviews. But you depart from that, and you go outside in
very public fora and make these appearances and answer
questions, and won't come to the Congress.
Dr. Rice. Senator, it's a longstanding practice of every
National Security Advisor. I have actually been here to answer
questions of the whole committee at one point, but also
Senators and groupings of Senators, but not in testimony. It's
a line that National Security Advisors have kept as private
advice to the President, as presidential staff. And I--National
Security Advisors have also, of course, gone on television and
made public appearances.
But in terms of the line between the executive and the
legislature, the President's staff has simply not been subject
to congressional testimony.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, what's your position on appearing
before the Congress if you were the Secretary of State? How can
we be confident that you would engage in frequent, thorough,
and meaningful consultations with this committee?
Dr. Rice. Well, Senator, I would no longer be staff to the
President if I'm confirmed. I'll be the Secretary of State if
I'm confirmed, and that is a Cabinet officer with--who's been
confirmed by this body. And, it seems to me, at that point, it
is not only perfectly appropriate, but only right, that the
Secretary of State and other members of the Cabinet, as well as
other members of the State Department, respond positively to
requests to testify whenever possible.
Senator Sarbanes. Is it your view, then, that Secretary of
State would not invoke executive privilege in testimony before
the Congress?
Dr. Rice. Well, I believe that the Secretary of State
would come and testify before the Congress, and testify fully.
Whether a Secretary of State might choose to keep private some
conversation that that person has had with the President or
not, I think that's another matter. But certainly the Secretary
of State would appear before this body and others on a regular
basis, and it has been----
Senator Sarbanes. What's your sense of your
responsibility, if you were the Secretary of State, to deal
with the Congress in a nonpartisan or bipartisan manner,
however one wants to describe it? I'm prompted to ask that
question by the fact that you did, at one point, make a rare
trip to Capitol Hill for separate closed-door briefings with
Republicans and Democratic lawmakers, if you recall that. You
met with Republican representatives for well over an hour, did
not meet with the House Democrats--met only with the Republican
members of the House. You came to the Senate side, had a
lengthy meeting with Senate Republicans, and then a very brief
meeting with Senate Democrats, caught short by a vote that was
scheduled by the leadership, I guess. But, in any event, there
was a marked difference in the extent of the meeting and the
consultation between Republicans and Democrats.
Presumably, as Secretary of State, you wouldn't intend for
anything of that sort to happen, I would take it.
Dr. Rice. Senator, I will conduct this in a completely
bipartisan way. Let me just say that--I will check, but I
believe that we've generally offered to both sides in both--
both sides of the aisle and both houses, and I was prepared to
stay in that Senate meeting as long as desired. But, as you
said, it was cut short by a vote.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, what about the House side?
Dr. Rice. I believe we offered, but I will check to see.
Because it was my view that the National Security Advisor also
needed to deal in a bipartisan way, and I believe I've dealt
with Members of the committee, Democrat and Republican.
Senator Sarbanes. Ordinarily, at the start of each new
Congress, the administration conducts a review of signed
treaties to determine which ones to send as priorities for
Senate advice and consent to ratification. The administration
did not submit a treaty priority list to this committee in the
108th Congress. Are there plans or intentions to send up a list
of treaty priorities to this new Congress?
Dr. Rice. There are plans to do so, Senator. We will.
Senator Sarbanes. You plan to do that.
Dr. Rice. We plan to do that, yes.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, let me ask you to come back to the
economic questions. Do you think it's to America's advantage
for the dollar to be the world's main reserve currency?
Dr. Rice. Senator, I'm going to demur here. I will think
these questions better asked of the Treasury. I have a strong
interest in our economic well-being. I have a strong interest
in what I can do, as Secretary of State, to promote our
economic well-being, particularly through free trade and
through the establishment of good partners in trade and a level
playing field in trade, but I really don't feel that I should
comment on currency matters.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, it goes back to our discussion
this morning. I, frankly, concluded that round with some
concern, because you kept talking about the President's
economic team, as though that's something separate and apart
from the concerns or the responsibilities of the Secretary of
State, even though at one point you stipulated that the
strength of America's economy is fundamental to its ability to
assert strength in the world. And these all play together.
And I mentioned a book, this morning, ``The United States
of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American
Supremacy,'' and one of the points made in that book is that
the euro was specifically designed to challenge the global
hegemony of the dollar.
And, of course, we've seen the value of the euro rise very
substantially in recent times. In fact, we now know, in 2001,
Middle Eastern oil-producing countries kept 75 percent of their
currency reserves in dollars. Now, that figure is now 60
percent--it's dropped substantially--with much of the rest of
it in euros. And Chinese and Russian central bankers are also
shifting their reserves.
Does this cause you some concern?
Dr. Rice. Senator, there are many reasons for what has
happened to the relationship between the euro and the dollar,
but, again, I really think it best that I not comment on
currency matters. I will do what I can, as Secretary of State,
to try and enhance the prospects for a strong American economy.
I think I can do that principally through the promotion of free
trade, through the promotion of a level playing field, in using
the diplomacy to carry economic messages, when we need to do,
as we've done, for instance, with the Chinese on intellectual
property rights. I'll be an active and interested participant,
but there are some matters that I really feel are best left to
the Treasury, and that's the commentary on----
Senator Sarbanes. Last month, China's president, Hu
Jintao, embarked on a 12-day tour of Latin America. He wound up
making commitments to invest $30 billion in the region. China
is now Brazil's second largest trading partner, and Chile's
largest export market. In trade, technology, investment,
education, and culture, China has been displacing the United
States all across Asia, and it's now starting to do the same in
America's backyard. Are you concerned about this expansive
China?
Dr. Rice. Well, this is an area that I think bears some
watching and some activity, and I would work very carefully and
very closely with those in trade and economics to try and deal
with this. We do face a rising China. There is no doubt about
that. And the way that we've tried to deal with the fact that
China's economic strength is growing, and that China's
influence is growing along with its economic strength, and its
penetration of markets and its own market are growing
exponentially, is to embed China in the World Trade
Organization, and to make certain that it lives up to the rules
of a rule-based international economic system. And we have a
lot of work to do, because China is not always completely
attentive to some of its obligations under the World Trade
Organization.
The other thing that we can do, Senator, is that we can
assert our still-considerable global reach and our still-
considerable regional influence through organizations like
APEC, which we attend, and which we are nurturing, and which we
are pushing forward with a very active agenda. We have had
problems with ASEAN because of the presence of Burma, but we
have had meetings and discussions with the countries of ASEAN.
I was in China, Japan, and South Korea in June of this past
year, and I will say that I think most of the countries of Asia
look to us to continue to be a major influence and an active
player in Asia, because they don't want to see China
``supplant,'' quote/unquote, the United States. We also have to
remember that the Chinese economy, for all of its vigor and all
of its robustness, is still a developing economy whose size is
not going to approach the size of the American economy for
quite a long time. It is a China that is dealing with
tremendous difficulties with inequities between its interior
regions and its coastal regions. It is still a developing
economy. And while it is a huge market, and is doing very well
in our own markets, I think it's important to recognize that it
is a--at a different stage of its economic development than the
United States.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, it's interesting, because they
seem to be doing pretty well, if that's the case. I mean, our
accumulated debt to foreign investors is now 28 percent of our
gross domestic product. That's nearly double the share of four
years ago. And most of it is being funded by borrowing from
foreign central banks, primarily those of Japan and China. In
fact, it's staggering, the increase of foreign official assets
in the United States.
Mr. Chairman, in closing, I would just note that, in the
1990s, the U.S. admonished Mexico and Argentina to get their
economic houses in order. This month, the Chinese premier gave
Washington a similar lecture. And by not taking the important
corrective measures we need to take with respect to our
economy, we're running up these large trade imbalances and
becoming increasing dependent on the kindness of strangers.
We're in their hands. And I can't help but believe that this
will be brought to bear in other areas of the U.S.-China
relationship, if and when it becomes relevant.
Dr. Rice. Well, Senator, I agree with you, and I think the
President would agree, that the issue is for the U.S. economy
to be as strong as it possibly can, and as competitive as it
possibly can. And there are a lot of measures being undertaken
to do that. My role, I think, will be to try and enhance our
economic growth and our economic strengths through our openness
in trade, but also by making certain that those with whom we
trade are dealing with us on a level playing field. And I'll be
completely dedicated to that.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.
Let me just indicate, Dr. Rice, that I appreciate the point
you're making as to what the scope of the State Department may
be, and your role. But I would have to agree with Senator
Sarbanes. The issue that he's touching upon--and this would be
the subject for a couple of days of good hearings--is
profoundly important. It finally comes down to how we're going
to pay for our foreign policy. We have reached a critical
juncture, given the circumstances of the foreign exchange
situation, our own exchange rates, and so forth.
I suppose that we are taking advantage of the fact that you
are perceived as a super-competent person and are perhaps
prepared to take all of this on, on behalf of the President.
But I would encourage you to visit with the President about
this--you probably have--because I'm sure we'll all be getting
back to it again and again. We'll not be able to solve it
today, but I would just underline that there are some dynamics
here that all of us find difficult to comprehend--the growth of
China, the growth of India as economies, a third of the
population of the world going out now to try to find energy
resources everywhere, maybe sucking up the resources of the
world. This is good for the soybean farmers of Indiana, and
we're grateful for everything that comes along that way. But
it's nevertheless going to be tough, with regard to energy and
other things.
I don't want to take more time, but I was moved by what
Senator Sarbanes is saying, because he works over in the
Banking Committee. Other Members of this committee are active
in that area. And we have interchanged disciplines in our own
way, as you do. But please, if you can, take under advisement
our conversation today.
Dr. Rice. Absolutely. Thank you, Senator. I will.
The Chairman. Senator Chafee?
Senator Chafee. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I agree
with your comments and Senator Sarbanes' comments also,
concerning on the financial issues, particularly the rise of
the euro and the potential for OPEC to move in that direction.
It could be alarming.
Thank you for your time. Your stamina and your breadth of
knowledge are both remarkable. In fact, at the lunch we were
joking that we're going to find an obscure country to ask you
about.
But we agreed it would be futile, you'd know all about it.
And I'd like to follow up on some of Senator Biden's
comments about what seems to be a hypocritical approach to our
foreign policy, in some ways; in particular, how we deal with
some of those democracies, such as Russia, Senator Biden said,
uneven or undemocratic or some of the Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan, even Musharraf--President Musharraf, and then, on
the other hand, have a completely different view of, say, Iran,
as Senator Biden was saying. It seems as though we magnify our
differences, on the one hand, and then, on the other hand, we
magnify our similarities.
In particular, after having just come back from South
American and meeting with President Chavez--here he has been--
gone before his people--high, high turnout, just had a
referendum. And, as one of the people from our embassy said,
``He cleaned their clocks and kicked their butts.'' And it
seems to me to say derogatory things about him may be
disrespectful to him, but also to the Venezuelan people. How do
you react to that?
Dr. Rice. Well, I have nothing but good things to say
about the Venezuelan people. They are a remarkable people. And
if you notice, Senator Chafee, I was not making derogatory
comments, I was simply recognizing that there are unhelpful and
unconstructive trends going on in Venezuelan policies. This is
not personal.
Senator Chafee. And there aren't in Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan----
Dr. Rice. And we----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. ----and Russia and----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----and we speak out about those----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. ----Pakistan?
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----we speak out about those, as
well. But some of this is a matter of trend lines and where
countries have been and where they are now going.
Senator Chafee. Are their government's unconstructive?
Dr. Rice. Well, the Russian government is not
unconstructive in a lot of areas. It's quite constructive in
many areas. It's been more constructive on Iran in recent
years. It is constructive on--to a certain extent, in trying to
deal with the kind of Nunn-Lugar issues that we've talked
about. It's been constructive in Afghanistan. It's constructive
on a number of areas. But that doesn't excuse what is happening
inside Russia, where the concentration of power in the Kremlin,
to the detriment of other institutions, is a real problem. And
we will continue to speak to the Russians.
I think we do have to remember, that is also not the Soviet
Union. The Russians have come quite a long way from where the
Soviet Union was, and we need to always keep that in mind when
we judge current policies. But where they're going is simply
not very good. It is something to be deeply concerned about,
and we will speak out.
And countries are going to need--going to move at different
speeds on this democracy test. I don't think there is any doubt
about that. But what we have to do is, we have to keep the
agenda--keep this item on the agenda. We have to continue to
press countries about it. We have to support democratic forces
and civil-society forces wherever we can.
I would just note that Ukraine, I visited in 2001, not long
after I had become National Security Advisor. And I, frankly,
when this happened, in Ukraine, was pretty stunned by how
effective civil society was and how effective the Ukrainian
people were in making their voices known. Some of that is
because we and the EU and others have spent time developing
civil society, developing political opposition, working with
people, not to have a specific candidate in any of these
countries, but to have a political process that's open. And we
have to do more of that.
We're going to spend some $43 million this year--I believe
that's the number--on Russian institutions, trying to help, for
the development of civil society there. We need to do more of
that kind of thing, because, while we put it on an agenda,
while we confront the governments that are engaged in
nondemocratic activities, we also have to help the development
of civil society and opposition.
Senator Chafee. You and Senator Boxer were having a little
bit of a debate over credibility. And, to me, it seems as
though trust is built with consistency. Is it possible for you
to say something positive about the Chavez administration?
Dr. Rice. It's pretty hard, Senator, to find something
positive.
Senator Chafee. I don't understand----
Dr. Rice. Let me say----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. ----that.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----this.
Senator Chafee [continuing]. ----After----
Dr. Rice. Let me say this----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. ----after----
Dr. Rice. Let me say this----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. ----Tajikistan, Pakistan,
Russia----
Dr. Rice. No, what----
Senator Chafee. It seems as though, as I say, magnifying
our differences to some countries, and magnifying our
similarities with others. And, as I said, I think trust is
built with consistency. I don't see consistency----
Dr. Rice. Well, the----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. ----in some of your comments.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----the state of behavior in the
Western Hemisphere, or the state of affairs in the Western
Hemisphere, is such that we've had democratic revolutions in
all of these places, and we don't want to see them go back. We
have some places where the democratic revolution is still to
place. And we just have to understand that there are
differences in that regard.
But I have said, we hope that the Government of Venezuela
will continue to recognize what has been a mutually beneficial
relationship on energy, and that we can continue to pursue
that. We certainly hope that we can continue to pursue counter-
drug activities in the Andean region, and Venezuela
participates in that.
But I have to say that, for the most part, the activities
of the Venezuelan government, in the last couple of years, have
been pretty unconstructive.
Senator Chafee. Well, thank you very much. I'll go back to
what I said earlier. It seems disrespectful to the Venezuelan
people. They have spoken.
Dr. Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator Chafee.
Senator Dodd?
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'll try
and move along in this, as well.
Let me just pick up on the--one of the points that Senator
Sarbanes was raising earlier with you, and that is, of course,
the apparent contradiction, obviously, of having an NSC advisor
not be able to appear with any regularity before the committee,
and then appearing with rather significant regularity on
national television. I'll also note--and I'm sure you're not
the first NSC advisor to do this--but, just in the fall of this
year, according to some staff work here, that you made some ten
speeches in the fall of this year in battleground states, I
guess, except one, involved in the politics. And I always--I
know that the Secretary of State, historically, is not
Secretary of Defense, and I commend Senator Powell and Senator
Rumsfeld for not having been involved in the campaign. Would
you make a similar commitment? Obviously, there--the President
doesn't run again, but, obviously, there are midterm elections.
And would you share with us your opinion on whether or not it's
wise, given the historic efforts to try and create
bipartisanship when it comes to foreign policy, to have an NSC
advisor out on the campaign trail, and certainly as Secretary
of State. Can you quickly give us some sense of where you think
that ought to----
Dr. Rice. Certainly. As National Security Advisor, I spoke
a lot, actually, and I tried to get outside of Washington to
speak. I went----
Senator Dodd. Were these campaign stops?
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----I went to places that were
nonpartisan. I went to places like world-affairs councils and
universities. Anybody could come. I was thoroughly questioned
about American foreign policy, and I thought it only
appropriate, at a time in which we were at war. They were not a
part of the campaign, and I think the fora that we chose would
demonstrate that.
But you can be certain that I will respect the tradition of
this office, of Secretary of State, should I be confirmed. I
think it has to be bipartisan. I think it cannot be political
in any way. And I, in my comments, mentioned how important I
thought bipartisan foreign policy is, and I'll do everything
that I can to make----
Senator Dodd. I don't want to dwell on it, but it's an
important point. And, again, I'm not sure what the precedents
are of those who have preceded you in the office as NSC
advisor. But I think it is bad business, in those periods, to
get involved in this stuff. It does create problems, and I
think it's a wiser course to follow.
Let me quickly jump to the issue of the Justice
Department's opinion memos regarding torture in interrogation.
In a response to a question for the record, you indicated that
the Justice Department opinion memos on torture in
interrogation were provided to the National Security Council
for review by staff, in draft form. And you indicated that the
response--that you were not involved in reviewing the draft
opinion. Just a series of three or four questions, if I may.
Did you ever read the opinion?
Dr. Rice. I did not read the opinion.
Senator Dodd. And did you have a view at the time about
them at all?
Dr. Rice. Senator, I did not think it my role to try and
give legal advice to the President, but that legal advice was
then discussed in a policy context. And, at that point, the
policy of how we would treat detainees in this new kind of
war--and we did face a very difficult and different
circumstance. I mean, you were dealing with al Qaeda on the
battlefield, people----
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----who were not living up to the
laws of war. This is a different kind of combatant. People like
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and people who were--who plotted 9/11
and clearly were not part of any organized army. We did have a
series of difficult choices to make, but----
Senator Dodd. You were aware, I presume, of the State
Department concerns at that time about these memos?
Dr. Rice. I was aware. And, in fact, we made certain that,
before the President made a final decision on this matter of
how Geneva would be applied, that he had the advantage of
hearing from all of his advisors.
Senator Dodd. Do you want to share with us what your
opinions were?
Dr. Rice. Senator, I gave my advice to this--to the
President on this matter, and I really would prefer not to talk
about what advice I gave him. He came out in a place that I
think was consistent with both living up to our international
obligations and allowed us to recognize that the Geneva
Conventions should not apply to a particular category of
people. Now, when we got to Iraq, there was no question that
the conflict itself was covered under Geneva. Iraq was a
signatory to the Geneva Conventions, and we believed that the
conflict was, therefore, covered.
Senator Dodd. Let me just ask you very briefly about--what
are your views? Let's get to the bottom of this--we can fool
around with the language here, but what are your views on
things like waterboarding and nudity? What are your views on
that? Is that torture, in your view, or not? And should it be--
should the United States stay away from that activity, or is
that--do you have a--sort of, a mixed view on that? I'd just
like to get some sense----
Dr. Rice. Senator, under no circumstances should we, or
have we, condoned torture. And the President has been very
clear that he expects everyone to live up to our international
obligations and to American law. And the Justice Department
makes a determination on any interrogation techniques that are
used, that they have to be consistent with our international
obligations and with American law. I----
Senator Dodd. You're familiar now, aren't you, with----
Dr. Rice. No.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----the draft opinion that was
submitted? Just tell me what--now that you know what the draft
opinion was, not according to what you thought at the time,
would have raised objections to it, had you been aware of what
was included in that?
Dr. Rice. I didn't say I wasn't aware of what was in the
opinion; I didn't read the full opinion, Senator. But I believe
that the President, as a policy matter, decided that, in order
to protect American interests, but also in order to live up to
our obligations, internationally, even though this was a very
different kind of war, a different kind of set of
circumstances, that the right policy call was to treat the
detainees, even al Qaeda detainees, consistent with our
obligations--or consistent with the principles of Geneva,
consistent with military and security necessity. And I think
that was the right call. And it--I just can't emphasize enough
how difficult it is when you're dealing with a totally new set
of circumstances.
Now, we have talked about what we might to do engage the--
--
Senator Dodd. Let me just come back to the--just want to
make--this is a simple question.
Dr. Rice. Yes.
Senator Dodd. Is it your view, as a human matter, is
waterboarding and the--uses we saw in the prisons in Iraq, of
nudity, is that torture, in your personal view, as a nominee
here for the----
Dr. Rice. Senator, I'm not going to speak to any specific
interrogation techniques, but let me talk about Abu Ghraib,
because that was not acceptable----
Senator Dodd. I'd like to just get your views on this
simple matter. It's a simple question I'm asking.
Dr. Rice. Well, you asked me about the incidents in Iraq,
and----
Senator Dodd. I asked you about some very specific
techniques that we used, whether or not you consider them to be
torture, or not.
Dr. Rice. Senator, the determination of whether
interrogation techniques are consistent with our international
obligations and American law are made by the Justice
Department. I don't want to comment on any specific
interrogation techniques. I don't think that would be
appropriate, and I think it would not be very good for American
security.
Senator Dodd. Well, let's leave it. That's your answer,
there. It's a disappointing answer, I must say. And this is a
very--the face of U.S. foreign policy is in the person of the
Secretary of State, and it's important, in moments like this,
to be able to express yourself, aside from the legalities of
things, how you, as a human being, react to these kinds of
activities. And with the world watching when a simple question
is raised about techniques that I think most people would
conclude, in this country, are torture. It's important, in a
moment like that, that you can speak clearly and directly,
without getting involved in the legalisms questions. I
understand these involve some legal determinations. But, as a
human being, how you feel about this, about to assume the
position to be responsible for pursuing the human-rights issues
that this nation has been deeply committed to for decades, it
is a very important moment.
Dr. Rice. Senator, I maintain the commitment, and will
maintain the commitment, of the United States to norms of
international behavior and to the legal norms that we have
helped to----
Senator Dodd. Let me ask you this, then. What would happen
if someone did this to an American? What would happen if we saw
it on television, that a captured American was being subjected
to these kind of activities? How would you react to it?
Dr. Rice. Senator, the United States of America--American
personnel are not engaged in terrorism against innocents----
Senator Dodd. I wasn't asking what they have been charged
with; I'm asking whether or not, if you saw an American being
treated like this, how would you react?
Dr. Rice. We expect Americans to be--because we are
parties to the Geneva Conventions, we expect Americans to be
treated in accordance with the Geneva----
Senator Dodd. Of course we do.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----Conventions.
Senator Dodd. And so you consider these kinds of
activities to violate the Geneva Conventions?
Dr. Rice. We believe that there are certain categories of
people--the al Qaeda, for instance--who were not covered by
Geneva, that, in fact, it would have been a stretch to cover
them under Geneva, would have weakened Geneva to cover them.
But the President said that they had to be treated, as military
necessity allowed, consistent with the application of Geneva--
--
Senator Dodd. Do me a favor, at the end of all these
hearings, I'd like you to spend about 15 minutes with John
McCain and talk to him about this stuff. I think you'll get
some good advice, when it comes to this subject matter, someone
who's been through this, about what the dangers are when we
have, sort of, waffling answers about these questions, and then
Americans can be apprehended, and what happens to them?
Let me move on, because I don't want to take up the
committee's time on this particular point, but I'm troubled by
your answer.
Now, let me ask you about, if I can, the HIV/AIDS issue.
Let me move to the Caribbean again, come back to the--this
region of the world. During the consideration of the
legislation on 2003, I attempted to add countries to the HIV/
AIDS legislation--Caribbean countries. And let me tell you why
I did. We have a staggering percentage, high percentage, of
people in the Caribbean who are HIV-positive. I know we do a
lot already as part of this program in Guyana and Haiti, but--
and I won't list all of the island nations in the Caribbean--
involving some 600,000 people who have almost as high a rate of
AIDS contamination as some of the most seriously affected
countries in Africa. And yet we've left these countries out
because we never passed the legislation. It's an important
issue. I won't go through all the details with you here, but
there are ten million Americans who visit these island nations,
not to mention the tremendous number of people who come to our
own country, far more so than have contact with some of the
nations that are very adversely affected in Africa. And I would
hope that you might, as we look at these programs here, expand
the coverage to these countries.
The average--today, the average Haitian man can expect to
live only 47 years; the average woman, 51 years. It's the
single highest cause of death in the Caribbean nations for men
under the age of 45. It really deserves far more attention than
it's getting. Do you want to--have a quick answer, a quick
response?
Dr. Rice. Yes, just that the President's emergency plan
was intended to deal with the 14 and then 15 most affected
countries. I think it's an excellent plan. And if we meet our
goals, we will be providing treatment to two million people,
and preventing seven million infections, and getting ten
million people into contact with educational and other
programs. And it's a very fine program. It's not all that we
do. We do a lot of other assistance, bilateral assistance. Some
85 or so countries are affected by the assistance that we give.
And, of course, the global fund, to which we are, by far, the
largest single contributor, is also very active in that.
I think we've made a very big step forward. I know Senator
Kerry and others have been long proponents of an international
effort on AIDS. We have made a major breakthrough in the
President's emergency plan. We wanted to have a number of
countries where we could worry, not just about the disbursement
of money, but about helping to build delivery systems that
would actually get the job done. But I would just emphasize
that it's not the only assistance that we give.
Senator Dodd. Take a good look at this, please. The
Dominican Republic is on the same island--shares the island of
Hispaniola with Haiti. Haiti is covered; the Dominican Republic
is not. That's ridiculous, on its face, given that cross-
contamination that occurs, with just populations that move from
Haiti to the Dominican Republic, as we speak, here, because of
the cane-cutting seasons and the--and, obviously, the potential
there.
I see my time is expired. Let me just--just quickly, and
I'll come back--I said one round, Mr. Chairman. I apologize, I
may have to come back for a few more questions.
But I want to emphasize, again--I know you'll come back to
this Venezuela issue, and Latin America. We've got to be
thinking a bit differently. No one's going to argue about some
of the decisions that have been made in many of these
countries, things that they do that we find very different from
how we would approach issues. But what Senator Chafee has said,
I think is an accurate description, we've got to be more
balanced about this view. It strikes many of us as being, sort
of, domestic politics rather than foreign policy, when it comes
to these issues.
I mentioned earlier, statements that have been made--it's
good politics in Latin America, too often, to attack the United
States. Here was our good friend, Chile, for instance, when the
issue came up in the vote in the United Nations on Iraq, where
we threatened them not to complete the Chilean-U.S. Trade
Agreement. It was only as a result of the intervention of Spain
which put it back on track again. That word is widely known--
that conclusion widely known in the region. That's not helpful
as we're trying to build these relationships. And I'd urge you
not to get caught in this mindset, sort of, to use your own
experience, the Pavlovian sort of reaction to some of these
people, and to try and engage in a positive and constructive
way.
I'll guarantee you that, certainly in Venezuela today,
they're watching very carefully what's been said. That's not to
say we agree or applaud decisions being made that we would
disagree with, but we need to try something differently here if
we're going to succeed in building different relationships. And
I'll want to come back to that.
But I've been disappointed in the way that--I don't expect
you, sort of, agree with Democrats up here, but we've got to be
thinking in a way that shows we're going to move where the
world is headed, in many ways, looking for different ways to
establish better relationships. And I want to come back to that
when we finish our round.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Dodd.
Senator Allen?
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have some questions I want to get to on competition and
corruption, but let me follow up on some of the cross-
examination of Senator Dodd.
On the question of what--I understand you don't want to use
the word ``torture,'' but maybe the word ``abuse'' is
appropriate, insofar as the conduct of our military, some of
our military people in Abu Ghraib prison. Now, we all can agree
that this conduct, whatever you want to call it--whether it's
``abuse,'' whether it's ``torture''--the bottom line is, as far
as Americans are concerned, this is a violation of our
standards, standards of conduct and the expectations that we
have of our government, and, therefore, the Bush
administration. And not just the administration, the United
States, indeed, is going after those who are culpable and are,
in fact, being prosecuted and punished. Charles Grainer just
received a ten-year sentence for his actions and activity, and
responsibilities for it.
So I would say, Dr. Rice, that this administration and the
United States Government is on record finding that deplorable,
regardless of what phraseology one wants to use to describe
this conduct.
Dr. Rice. Yes. Senator, let me just be very clear. I
didn't have a chance to say, Abu Ghraib was unacceptable, it
was abuse, and people are being punished for that. The question
came about broader detainee policies, but what happened at Abu
Ghraib made everyone sick to their stomachs. And the good thing
about the United States is that we actually prosecuted the
people who did it, and will continue to as the investigations
unfold.
Senator Allen. Thank you. I wanted to adduce that
response, which I figured was actually was your sentiments on
it. You're getting kind of tied in all the legalistics there.
On the issue of competition that Senator Sarbanes brought
up, you mentioned a fair or level playing field, I very much
agree with some--many of the things Senator Sarbanes is saying,
as well as what you brushed on, generally. And the Chairman
mentioned India and China being concerns, long term.
I look at India differently. India is the largest democracy
in the world. We have great and strong bilateral ties with
India and also, more recently, with Pakistan. Somehow we ought
to be able to help continue the rapprochement with India and
Pakistan.
Insofar as China, though, China is not a democracy, and
China--there are concerns that you're going to be facing, as
far as China, with the Europeans potentially selling arms to
China. But on the area of what you mentioned, corruption--this
is on page 3 of your statement--``corruption can sap the
foundation of democracy.'' And, indeed, if you look at the
trade practices of China, they cheat on a variety of fronts--
textiles, furniture--they have in semiconductor chips, as well.
Mr. Zoellick, who's going to be with you, has helped prosecute
some of those, to various degrees, but finally got 'em on their
cheating-on-the-semiconductor-chip matter, as well as South
Korea doing that, as well.
But the one area that they wholly fail, as well, in is
intellectual property, and they--there's no adequate protection
of intellectual property, which is stealing from Americans,
their creativity, our ingenuity. I'd like your view on what we
can do--and you said ``corruption can sap the foundations of
democracy''--and part of that corruption, in my view, would be
China's unfair trade practices.
I have worked with this committee to increase funding, to
train law enforcement and judicial-system systems around the
world on the protection of intellectual property. We've
funded--it's $5 million to help enforce IP laws, intellectual
property laws, and make these countries, many of whom are
unaware, apparently, of violations, and they needed to be
educated on it. I do think, though, China is educated on it.
This is not a question of unknowing violations.
I would like to hear from you what steps that you can
foresee the United States taking to help combat corruption in
other nations; in particular, the violations and the theft of
our intellectual property, which is so key to the
competitiveness of our country in the future.
Dr. Rice. It absolutely is. And we have been very active--
in fact, aggressive--with China about the IPR problem, trying
to get them to have more stringent laws and, more importantly,
enforcement when they finding pirating. We make the point to
them that, as they begin to invent, themselves, they are not
going to want a world in which intellectual property rights are
stolen, but, rather, in which intellectual property rights are
protected.
I think we've gotten a little movement forward, but not
enough, and we keep pressing this agenda. We are pressing the
agenda, by the way, also with Russia, where pirating is a very
big problem and where, actually, there have been fewer
prosecutions than in China. So I think we need to press those
issues.
As to the broader concerns about corruption, there is no
doubt that corruption, which leads to legal systems that allow
the--allow pirating of technology, allow terrorists to
flourish, allow drug-runners and arms dealers to flourish, it's
all a part of the same problem. And so, having police forces
that are properly paid, trained, and loyal, having judges that
are properly paid, trained, and loyal, is a very important part
of a wide--worldwide effort that we have to help with
corruption, especially in some countries, like Nigeria--we've
offered assistance in these ways.
We also, Senator, have tried to get the international
development banks to be more concerned about corruption in the
granting of aid, that when aid goes in, that it's clear that
the tax isn't going to be a corruption tax on top of the aid
that goes in. And we've made some progress.
Finally, in something like the Millennium Challenge
account, the President's made very clear that corruption, which
is one of the indices that leads to a country being eligible or
not, that corruption is an index that we ought to look at very,
very carefully, because if you have a corrupt government, that
aid is just going to be wasted.
Senator Allen. Well, thank you very much. I look forward
to working with you, and I know this whole committee will, on
this issue of protecting intellectual property rights and the
issue of corruption, as well, because it does undermine freedom
and democracy and the respect for the rule of law.
Finally, let me just bring up this area of question, and
this is South Caucasus, or the Black Sea, area. I've been one
who believes that we ought to be looking at maybe basing more
of our NATO forces in the Black Sea area, closer to the Middle
East, the areas that are of greatest concern because of the
proximity, obviously. It seems clear that--I think--the United
States ought to be working to shore up--it's not even ``shore
up,'' it's actually ``enhance'' our alliances with the new
countries in Central Europe that have joined the European
Union, joined NATO.
How do you envision the administration working with
countries in the Caucasus, Southeast Europe, as they--to
promote their democratic reforms, but also your views on
integrating them into the European Union, and into our NATO
operations?
Dr. Rice. Well, certainly some of the countries of that
region have already begun to integrate in very fruitful ways. A
number of them have already acceded to the EU, as well as to
NATO.
One of the ways that we can encourage that integration is
what used to be Partnership for Peace is now, in many ways--in
many cases, NATO membership, and, as NATO refines its
capabilities to be responsive to the threats of the 21st
century, rather than sitting and waiting for the Soviet Union
to come across the German plains, as much of the forces looked
like--the ability of those countries to place specialized
missions within NATO's overall portfolio is very important, and
it gives opportunities for training, for civil-military
interaction, for the kinds of things that strengthen democracy.
And I happen to think that what we did with Partnership for
Peace, and what we continue to do in some countries that are
not yet capable of accession to NATO, like, for instance,
Georgia, that those programs which ensure contact between
democratically-governed militaries and militaries in those
societies, the kinds of seminars that we are able to conduct
under Partnership for Peace, those all have very positive
effects, and I would hope that those would continue. But the
future for most of these countries is a further integration
into Europe's great pillars, and we need to work toward that.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Dr. Rice.
Mr. Chairman, I just want to say, in conclusion here, Dr.
Rice, thank you for your wonderful leadership that you have
provided. I look forward to working with you in the years to
come. I know we're going to have some debate here, and some
votes, but I feel very comfortable that with you as our
Secretary of State in this administration, and I think,
reflecting all the highest and best aspirations of America, you
will help us advance freedom, our security, but also for
freedom for people all over the world. Thank you, and good luck
to you, and thank you for putting up with a lot of cross-
examination today. But it'll be nothing compared to the
achievements that you will see in the next four years.
Dr. Rice. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.
Let me just broach, with the committee, two scenarios, one
of which is that we would have a business meeting at some time
this evening, and a vote on the nominee; or alternatively that
we will continue, in either case, to have questioning so that
Members will have an opportunity to ask their questions, but
also to continue again tomorrow. Might I suggest, perhaps, a
vote so that Members can be alerted in midmorning tomorrow
morning. I have asked this in terms of the preferences of the
committee, in terms of other schedules. Senator Boxer, you
have----
Senator Boxer. Yes, I just would like to say, myself, that
what's happening here is, the questioning is so good from both
sides of the aisle that it raises other issues. And I don't
agree it's ``cross-examination.'' I think it's our job. And so,
I think we ought to do this tomorrow. I think we ought to maybe
hear from Senator Kerry, as the closer--it's a thought--and
come back in the morning and continue.
The Chairman. Well, we'll come back in the morning, in that
event, anyway. But we'll also continue this evening so that
every Senator who is here has an opportunity to ask questions.
Senator Boxer. Okay.
The Chairman. I'm not prepared to end the hearing. My
thought was simply that we might have a vote at the end of the
questioning this evening, thus obviating the need for a meeting
tomorrow. In the event that Senators are not prepared to vote
this evening, then we'll continue the hearing tonight and
reconvene tomorrow and proceed.
Senator Boxer. Are you saying we would continue
questioning tomorrow, as well, and then have the vote?
The Chairman. In the event that we are still meeting
tomorrow, then it would be open for questions tomorrow morning.
Senator Allen. Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Yes. Senator Allen?
Senator Allen. Just for the Senator from California, the
term--I used the term ``cross-examination,'' not in a
derogatory sense. It's normal. Just questioning people and
adducing answers from people. So don't take any offense from
that.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Very well.
Senator Kerry?
Senator Kerry. I don't know if I want to get in the middle
of this.
I wonder, Mr. Chairman--I know I heard Dr. Rice say,
earlier, she's willing to stay and stay and stay, but I wonder
if, you know, there's sort of a limit of decency of how long we
want to----
Dr. Rice. No, I'm perfectly happy to stay, Senator. I look
forward to further exchange.
Senator Kerry. Fair enough.
I'm reading from an article, on December 15th, which says,
by David Ruppe, ``Invoking comments by then-presidential
candidate Senator John Kerry, a senior Energy Department
official said yesterday that the Bush administration would defy
critics and finish securing 600 tons of Russian nuclear weapons
materials by 2008.'' It goes on to explain the distinction
between sites and tons and how they're going to try to do it.
So I'm glad that some people heard what we were talking
about. But in a debate with the President, we were both asked--
I think it might have been by Bob Schaffer--what we thought the
most important issue was, and I answered, nuclear
proliferation, globally, and the President agreed.
Now, this is in 2004 that the President agreed that this is
the most pressing issue, globally and nationally, to our
security. And yet the fact is that, by the end of this year, we
will have secured maybe 46 percent of the material that's out
there, and 70 percent of the sites. The fact is, also, that
this administration has requested less money than the Clinton
administration did in its last year. And each year, this
administration has either cut or flat-lined the money for this
enterprise.
In 2002, the administration unveiled its G8 Global
Partnership Against Weapons of Mass Destruction, pledging to
spend $10 billion. But if you look at what was then being
spent, it was about a billion dollars a year; in effect, that
was ten billion over the next ten years--same amount of money,
no additional commitment of funds to the most significant
threat the country faces.
Now, a number of years ago, I remember a suitcase was
captured--I think it was in Amman, at the airport--with
something like 250 grams of radioactive material, and the sale
was several hundreds of millions of dollars on the black
market. That's the suitcase we caught. As a former prosecutor,
you always wonder about the suitcases you don't catch and the
people you don't catch.
No threat has been greater to us, according to, I think,
everybody, than the potential of a ``dirty bomb'' and the
threat of terrorists securing these materials. And you
explained earlier about the sort of marketing of this process.
You know, I don't say this as a matter of politics at all,
but just as a matter of common sense. I don't understand how
the administration can choose to spend--now we're going to be
close to $300 billion in Iraq to disarm weapons that weren't
there, and yet $1 billion a year to secure weapons that we know
are there, potentially, because every fissionable site is a
potential weapon. Real. Ascertainable. Tangible.
So my question to you is, there are a series of steps that
could be taken, very simply, as a matter of common sense, for
the United States of America to lead the world, as we ought to,
with respect to proliferation. One is accelerating, even
further, this securing of sites. That material is subject to
theft, some of it poorly guarded by people who are poorly paid.
It is insecure. Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn and others put
enormous energy into this effort. And the administration even
allowed money to be cut at one point with respect to this
effort. That hardly defines a serious commitment.
So, one, will the administration--will you press for a
global effort that meets the seriousness of the threat and that
puts the United States back into the position of leadership
with respect to securing fissionable material that we know is
there?
Dr. Rice. Senator, I think that we are working to do
exactly that. There are a lot of reasons that the schedule is
what it is. We've talked about some of the bureaucratics of
this; not just here, but principally in Russia. We're on a
schedule to do this in four years. I think we will get it done
in four years. We're also on a very active program of securing
nuclear sites with the Russians, through Nunn-Lugar.
I'm completely and totally dedicated to this program. I
think Senator Lugar would tell you that I've been one of its
biggest advocates inside the administration, and I will
continue to be one of its----
Senator Kerry. Well----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----biggest advocates.
Senator Kerry. But, you see, that--what you just said
doesn't ring with what has happened. I mean, we secured more
nuclear fissionable material in the two years prior to 9/11
than we did in the two years after 9/11, when we supposedly had
an even better relationship with Mr. Putin. Now, the fact is
that you've allowed summit after summit with Russian President
Putin to go by without any action that has been taken to
overcome--in fact, at the last--the most recent summit, in
September of 2003, the United States and Russia laid out an
agenda for that effort, and it didn't even include the subject
of securing nuclear stocks. It wasn't even on the agenda.
Dr. Rice. It is part, Senator, of what we call the
``checklist,'' which is a vehicle that we have for working with
the Russians on very concrete projects that we have going
forward. And we just had discussions, in the strategic dialogue
with the Russians, about what more we can do to push this
agenda forward. And I think it will be a major issue when
President Putin and President Bush meet----
Senator Kerry. Yes----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----in a couple of weeks.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. ----I know, but global
diplomacy, as you know well, is defined by the issues that a
President of the United States chooses to publicly put on the
table and to publicly announce accomplishments on. And, you
know, whether it's a checklist that's private versus a major--
--
Dr. Rice. The checklist----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. ----agenda issue----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----the checklist is public,
Senator.
Senator Kerry. But the--it wasn't on the agenda.
Dr. Rice. Senator, the President has, not only put this
nonproliferation on the agenda, but he's made proposals for how
we might deal with the multiple aspects of nonproliferation
that we have to deal with at this point. I mentioned the
proposals that he made at National Defense University, which
we've taken up in the G8 and we've tried to press, the Global
Partnership, to which you referred, which multiplies American
assistance to this area----
Senator Kerry. With the same amount of money. It didn't
add a cent.
Dr. Rice. Senator, there--this is a program that we've
worked out jointly with the Russians on what can be done when.
The amount of money that is dedicated to that particular part
of the program is the amount of money that we believe we can
spend on the programs that are in the queue. We are going to
accelerate the securing of these materials to the point that it
can be done in a period of four years, not 13 years. This is a
very high priority, and we have funded the program, we have put
emphasis on it. We have run into some bureaucratic obstacles,
and I've just represented to Senator Lugar that I intend to try
and break through those bureaucratic obstacles.
Senator Kerry. Well, I appreciate that, and I certainly,
obviously, hope you will.
A second initiative that could be taken with respect to
this is to actually push for a global clean-out of potential
bomb-making materials, and that could be done in four years.
We've got highly enriched uranium that can be used to create a
bomb. I gather it's being used to fuel over 130 research
reactors in more than 40 countries right now. I've set out a
plan that would allow us to be able to secure that completely.
I think your current plan, the Bush administration took three
years to even get to the point of saying that it would take
another ten years to achieve. I believe that could be done in
three or four years. Is there any reason that the
administration couldn't similarly accelerate that?
Dr. Rice. Well, Senator, I'd love to sit down and talk
with you about your plan and what it entails, and to see what
could be done. I do think that we spend an awful lot of time
trying to work with the Russians to make full use of Nunn-Lugar
and other aspects. Now, in terms of a global way to deal with
this material that is around, we have a G8 partnership that
might allow us to do that, but I'd be very pleased to talk with
you about your plan.
Senator Kerry. What do you think about pursuing an effort
which many nations support--there's a lot of international
support for this--to embrace a ban on all production of highly
enriched uranium and plutonium for use in nuclear weapons, and
that would, in effect, permanently freeze current stockpiles?
Dr. Rice. In the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, that is
being--we have said that we favor the negotiation of a Fissile
Material Cutoff Treaty. We've been prepared, for some time, to
live up to its terms. The problem has been that we did an
extensive review, and we do not believe that we can get
adequate verification of such a treaty. But we are still
prepared to pursue a fissile-material cutoff, and we've made
very clear to our partners that we're prepared to do that.
Senator Kerry. And what about any initiatives or
discussions with President Musharraf and the Indians with
respect to failsafe procedures in the event--I mean, there have
been two attempts on President Musharraf's life----
Dr. Rice. Yes.
Senator Kerry. If you were to have a successful coup in
Pakistan, you could have, conceivably, nuclear weapons in the
hand of a radical Islamic state automatically, overnight. And,
to the best of my knowledge, in all of the inquiries that I've
made in the course of the last years, there is now no failsafe
procedure in place to guarantee against that weaponry falling
into the wrong hands.
Senator Kerry. Senator, we have noted this problem, and we
are prepared to try to deal with it. I would prefer not, in
open session, to talk about this particular issue.
Senator Kerry. Okay. Well, I raise it, again. I must say
that, in my private briefings, as a nominee, I found the
answers highly unsatisfactory. And so, I press on you the
notion that--without saying more, that we need to pay attention
to that.
Dr. Rice. We are very aware of the problem, Senator, and
we have had some discussions, but I really would prefer not
to----
Senator Kerry. Okay.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----discuss that.
Senator Kerry. Let me get to the question of North Korea.
North Korea has quadrupled its weaponry capacity----
The Chairman. Senator, your----
Senator Kerry. I'm sorry. I apologize.
The Chairman. That's all right. Proceed, but then make that
the final----
Senator Kerry. No, that's fine.
The Chairman. Well, the Chair is going to declare a recess
of ten minutes. We've been at it for over three hours, and you
have been responsive for that period of time. Then we will come
back. We have five Senators who remain to be heard; and so, we
will hear those five and then conclude for the evening at that
point, and then we will start at 9:00 tomorrow, with the
thought that the Senators, hopefully, will be prepared for a
midmorning business meeting and a vote.
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, you said 9:00 o'clock? Is that
what you said?
The Chairman. Yes.
We'll have a recess for ten minutes, in the event that you
would like to recess at this point.
[Recess at 5:30 p.m.]
The Chairman. The hearing is called to order again.
The chair now calls on Senator Coleman for his questions.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Dr. Rice, I do want to thank you for your strong
remarks about the international student exchanges. I think you
said that we need to do something to reverse the trend, and we
do. My colleague from Tennessee talked about it as an economic
competitive issue in the United States. I also think it is a
national security issue, that we are losing the ability to have
relationships with folks who are going to be the prime
ministers and the generals and others.
So I have actually introduced legislation which contains a
number of provisions to reverse the decline in international
students studying in America. One, the computer system, the
SEVIS system that tracks students, needs to be improved. It
tends to get bogged down.
And another little piece of it is we have got a 50-year-old
requirement under law that requires students who are applying
for student visas to demonstrate strong ties with the country
they come from. But it is hard if you are a 19-year-old kid.
You do not have a mortgage. You may not have a spouse. So we
put some requirements on folks that, I think, if we took a more
common sense approach, we would be able to increase the flow,
and in the end I think there are both economic competitive
issues and national security issues.
I also want to echo the comments of some of my colleagues
about Latin America. And we have talked about that and we had a
chance to visit. We need to increase American involvement.
I do want to make one comment about Venezuela. It is clear
that Chavez won an election. There are a number of us who want
to engage. We want to engage more. But I also think it is fair
to say that in our business, actions matter and words matter.
And the rhetoric from Chavez has to change. You cannot be
proclaiming sympathy with folks who are killing Americans in
Iraq. My colleague and friend from Connecticut noted that
President Lula had said some things, but he said them 20 years
ago. Chavez said them last week, in the last month.
Senator Dodd. It was not 20 years ago. I hear you but----
Senator Coleman. But in any case--I think it is fair.
There are a number of us who believe we need to figure out a
way to engage, but there has got to be a two-way street here.
And words matter; actions matter.
My question for you is about Colombia. After decades of
terror, we are seeing killings down. President Uribe is, I
think, providing outstanding leadership. Folks are actually
able to travel on the roads, which they were not able to do
before. The economy is responding positively to some of the
increased security. Clearly Plan Colombia is working, but Plan
Colombia expires at the end of this fiscal year. Our
President--I am pleased that one of his first trips right after
reelection was to Latin America--visited Colombia.
I have two questions for you. One, if you can reflect on
the situation in Colombia and discuss the future of Plan
Colombia. Where are we going?
And then the second issue is that one of the things Uribe
is doing is that they are having one of the largest
demilitarizations of a paramilitary group probably in history.
Because of limitations put on us in the Foreign Operations
Bill, this is going on without the participation of the U.S.
Government. I would appreciate your reflections on what you
believe to be the proper role of the United States in this
effort to demilitarize a paramilitary group.
Dr. Rice. Well, thank you very much, Senator.
First of all, on Colombia, I think that Colombia has
outstanding leadership in President Uribe. What he has done is
to mobilize Colombian society, the Colombian people to take on
the terrorism, the narcoterrorism in a new and renewed fashion.
He went to the people in a democratic way, and he said here is
what we have to do and here are the resources that we have to
put behind it. He is starting to have a lot of success. It is a
very tough environment, but he is also taking very tough
policies toward the FARC. We have very good cooperation on that
piece of it.
I think that many of the aspects of Plan Colombia that
dealt with alternative livelihoods, that dealt with dealing
with the crop, all of those have worked to improve the
circumstances in Colombia to the point that now it is possible
for President Uribe to have this very tough policy. It is
always a struggle, but it is beginning to work and we just need
to support this democratically elected president who went to
his people and said we have got to defeat the narcoterrorists,
and he is doing it.
The dismantlement or the disarming of militias, including
the AUC, is an important part of this revitalization of
Colombia and dealing with its past problems. Obviously, there
are some things that we cannot do. We have gotten a little bit
of flexibility to help some in some of the efforts that he
needed toward the FARC, and that was much appreciated.
We would like to be in a position to do whatever we need to
do to help him and to have him tell us what that is. I am sure
that in the demilitarization, we could do more. But the one
thing that we have made clear is that while the AUC needs to be
demobilized, demilitarized and while he has talked about
reconciliation with certain aspects, not with blood on their
hands, and that has been a very important admonition to this
government. But Colombia is becoming--I will not declare yet--a
success story because you have had very determined leadership,
and I think we have been a good partner for President Uribe.
Senator Coleman. I think the challenge is you cannot give
a free pass to folks with blood on their hands, but we need to
somehow have an ability to continue forward with getting guns
out of the hands of narcoterrorists.
Dr. Rice. The most important thing that they must do next.
Senator Coleman. I would hope that we would be able to
have a more assertive role in that and perhaps some guidance
from State down the road.
Just to follow up in terms of what we can do to support
President Uribe, what do you see as the next phase with the
expiration then of Plan Colombia but with, obviously, still
great needs, still security concerns? What is our role in the
next 2, 3, 5 years for Colombia?
Dr. Rice. I think there is no doubt that we are going to
have to explore with Colombia its economic development. It is a
country that has potential but a lot of that potential has been
held back by the terrible security situation produced by
narcotrafficking. As the narcotrafficking situation is brought
under control, we obviously will want to be a partner with
Colombia in how they build a vibrant democracy.
Part of that is that they have asked us to discuss with
them what we might be doing in the area of free trade. I think
that is something that we will want to explore with them.
Obviously, it has to be seen in the context of what we are
trying to do with the free trade area of the Americas, but we
have not been shy to go ahead and look at what we might be able
to do bilaterally in trade. I know that trade is an area that
Colombia is extremely interested in.
Senator Coleman. One of the areas where we have been
successful is cutting down on the hectares of cocaine, coca
that is being grown there. Spraying has worked in Colombia.
Dr. Rice. Yes.
Senator Coleman. When we met with Karzai in Afghanistan, I
know that in Afghanistan there are concerns about the spraying.
The good news there is that we are hearing that their folks
were actually voluntarily stopping poppy growing. We are still
waiting to get confirmation of that, but we have got a number
of those reports. I think the climate may be more fertile for
other things to grow there.
But I would hope that we would at least give evidence to
the Afghans about spraying, that it can be done with
environmental concerns being met, and that it can be effective
if some of the other things that they are doing do not work to
the degree that we think they should.
Dr. Rice. I agree, Senator. In fact, we asked the
Colombians, and they agreed, to talk to the Afghans about their
experience.
But we are exploring or pursuing with Afghanistan a kind of
five-pillar approach to the counternarcotics problem, which
really is now, I think, in many ways the most urgent in
Afghanistan, first of all, to look at eradication, to look at
eradication both aerial and manual. At this point, manual is
all that we can do, but we will see whether aerial is needed
and what we can do in that regard.
We are working on alternative livelihoods. We are working
on legal reform and police training so that we can help with
that. Prosecutions of people need to take place.
And then there is a very big public affairs campaign.
Karzai made the point to us that he needed, after many years of
no democratic contact with the society, to delegitimize in the
eyes of the people the growing of poppy. He has been very
aggressive on that. He has appointed a minister for
counternarcotics. He went to the people and said this is a
stain on Afghanistan that we have this. So there is a lot of
work to do, but I think we have a government that is dedicated
to the counternarcotics fight. And we will see what role aerial
spraying has to play.
Senator Coleman. We saw last week great success in
Afghanistan. Some people talk about the hustle factor. The
people there are proud of what they have accomplished, proud of
what they have done with their election, proud of where their
country is going. The opium trade threatens to undercut all of
that. We spoke to our European allies, NATO, about that. But
that is the one issue that could derail the incredible success
we are having.
So I appreciate your perspectives and I look forward to
supporting your nomination. I know that you will serve this
country with great distinction and great skill as you have done
already, and I know you will continue to do so.
Dr. Rice. Thank you, Senator.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Coleman.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Rice, thanks for all your time today.
I do want to commend you for your strong statements on the
need to focus in a much more serious way on public diplomacy
and particularly to ensure that our efforts involve a real
dialogue and exchange, not just broadcasting our opinions or
handing out cassettes or pamphlets. We have to show people the
basic respect of listening to them, even when we disagree. It
is so important particularly in political cultures in which
ideas about humiliation are so prominent. I hope to work
closely with you on these issues.
Every time I travel, I become more and more convinced of
the importance and the value of involving more and more
Americans, our farmers, our artists, our teachers, in this kind
of an issue. I think Americans want to contribute in this way,
and I very much hope that you will consider me a true ally in
your efforts in this regard.
On the other hand, I am deeply troubled by your response
or, rather, your failure to respond clearly and directly to
Senator Dodd about torture and interrogation techniques. We
went through the same kind of process with the nominee for
Attorney General in our Judiciary Committee, but frankly this
was even more troubling. It is simply not okay to equivocate on
torture. It is not okay from the point of view of the safety of
our own troops. It is no okay in terms of global perceptions of
this country, and it is not okay because it is not who we are
as a country. America is better than that. We stand for
something and we do have standards. I just felt I wanted to say
that before I proceed to one other area.
Less than 10 days ago, a comprehensive peace agreement was
signed that we all hope will mean a lasting end to the
tremendously costly north/south civil war in Sudan, which the
Chairman mentioned. I congratulate the administration, which
worked tirelessly on this issue, on this accomplishment, but as
we all know, the crisis in Darfur continues to fester. And
despite the fact that Secretary Powell acknowledged that we
were dealing with genocide, the United States and the
international community have basically taken no effective
action to stop the violence.
Last week I met with refugees who had fled to desolate
camps in eastern Chad, and I heard the fear in their voices as
they told me that they cannot return home until there is some
kind of meaningful security on the ground. To date the
administration simply has proven unable or perhaps unwilling to
exert enough pressure on the Government of Sudan to convince it
to change its behavior.
Of course, one of the many difficult issues in addressing
Sudan, something that has come up in other contexts today, is
the tension between the desire to have a solid counterterrorism
relationship with Sudan and, on the other hand, our reaction to
the kind of unacceptable atrocities we see in Darfur right now.
We see this tension in other places as well, such as
Uzbekistan.
How can this kind of tension be managed?
Dr. Rice. Thank you, Senator.
First, let me try to be clear. The United States does not
and cannot condone torture. I want to make very clear that that
is the view and the policy of the administration, the policy of
the President, and that he has made very clear to American
personnel that we will not condone torture.
As to Sudan, it is a very difficult problem. And I thank
you very much for the recognition for what we have been able to
do on the north/south issue, and I want to just say that
Senator Danforth did a fantastic job on that. The President,
when he first came into office, said that he wanted to try to
do something about Sudan. He enlisted Jack Danforth and we did
get something done on the comprehensive peace between north and
south.
We have hoped that that would give us some leverage to deal
with the Darfur issue because Khartoum now has more at stake.
If, in fact, we are going to move forward on a relationship,
having resolved the north/south issue, Darfur has to be
resolved too. So there is more at stake for Khartoum in
resolving the Darfur issue.
We were early and we have been consistent in trying to deal
with the humanitarian crisis, getting access for the
nongovernmental organizations, having opened up an additional
access route with Libya, spending money. I met with NGO's that
were operating there. I think they believe that the American
effort on the humanitarian side was really quite active.
The problem, as you note, is that Khartoum has been
difficult to deal with, particularly on the security issue,
where we have been saying to them you have got to disarm the
Janjaweeds. You have got to stop the atrocities against people.
We do believe it rises to the level of genocide and we are
pressing Khartoum very, very hard on those matters.
There also has to be a political process ultimately, and we
have tried to help sponsor one.
Frankly, this is a place where I am really disappointed in
the response of some others in the international community. The
reason that we could not get a tougher Security Council
resolution is not because the United States did not want one.
It was because certain members of the Security Council refused
to have one. One of the problems in working in a multilateral
environment is that sometimes you are blocked by others.
Now, we are impressing and I think we need to. One reason
that we thought it important to call genocide genocide was to
put pressure on members of the Security Council who have been
reluctant to even talk about the future, a future that might
include sanctions, that it was important to put pressure on
those other Security Council members. So we will continue to
press this case.
We also need--I think I mentioned earlier, and this is
actually a broader issue within Africa. Our policy has been to
try to improve the capability of African institutions to
involve themselves in civil conflict of this kind. We did it
with ECOWAS in Liberia. We are working with the AU in Sudan.
But again, right now, we believe 3,300 peacekeepers ought to be
there. Khartoum has allowed 1,100.
So we are really going to have to have an international
effort in order to bring greater pressure on the Sudanese
Government, but we are trying to raise the spotlight on it. We
are trying to pressure others to raise the spotlight on it, and
we are doing what we can, in the meantime, to deal with the
humanitarian circumstances.
Senator Feingold. Well, I think your comments are fair
with regard to the lack of cooperation from other countries in
past months with regard to Sudan. But based on the extensive
conversations I had last week in that region, my guess is that
the combination of our counterterrorism interests and the
commitment to the north/south agreement in Sudan will provide
too much momentum in the other direction and that the Darfur
situation will not be resolved unless we do something fairly
dramatic.
Let me reiterate my call and the call of others that a
special envoy be appointed to deal with this issue. You
mentioned Senator Danforth. He did a tremendous job as a
special envoy on the north/south problem. This situation, this
genocide, as your predecessor called it, will not be resolved
unless we do something dramatic, and it makes perfect sense to
take that step. So let me urge that on you.
Finally, just to go back to the torture issue for a minute,
I appreciate your general statement that you abhor and reject
torture. Senator Dodd got it down to specific types of
activities that are reprehensible. You were unable to say that
those particular kinds of conduct were unacceptable forms of
torture. And I am afraid that that is absolutely the wrong
message we want to send today, with all respect.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to talk to you a little bit about budget and
management. The 150 account, function 150, is what funds your
agency. It is about 1 percent of the total Federal budget
outlays, that is as compared to the defense budget which
represents about 17 percent of budget outlays.
The President--and I pat him on the back for this--
requested a 7 percent increase for the Department in his 2005
budget. We unanimously agreed to that and, unfortunately, my
colleagues in Budget and Appropriations came up $1.8 billion
short.
There is some talk today around town that the President is
going to be asking all agencies, other than Defense and
Homeland Security, to prepare options for cutting current
spending by 5 percent with the intention of holding non-defense
resources to 1 percent of growth in the 2006 budget.
What impact would this have on your 150 account, number
one? And do you believe the State Department should be included
in such national security exemptions in a way similar to the
Defense Department, Intelligence, and Homeland Security?
Dr. Rice. First of all, I do understand the budget
concerns that the country is operating under at this point and
the need to have budget discipline. I fully understand that.
And obviously, the budget numbers are not yet available, not
yet final.
I do believe that we will be able to execute the American
foreign policy. We will be able to keep momentum in the very
considerable improvements that have been made in management in
people, in the diplomatic readiness initiative in technology--
--
Senator Voinovich. Do you believe that the State
Department should be part of the national security exemptions
just as the Department of Defense, Intelligence, and Homeland
Security? I would like to know whether you think it should be
an exemption or not.
Dr. Rice. I think the important thing, Senator, is that we
are able to perform the functions that we need to perform. That
is what I am going to be watching. If at any time I do not
think we will be able to perform those functions, I will make
that known not only to OMB but to the President.
Senator Voinovich. Well, it is pretty important because we
have heard a lot today. There are a lot of areas where people
want money, but there is just only so much that is there. I do
believe that your Department is as important to our national
security as the Defense Department, and we are going to have to
start to reevaluate the way we spend our money around here if
we are going to deal with this new challenge that we have of
global terrorism.
The next question I have is the issue of management. Do you
know when the last time was when the Department of State had a
management audit to find out whether or not it was organized
the way it ought to be organized?
And second of all, when was the last time that somebody
looked at how the Department sets its priorities?
Dr. Rice. Senator, I do not know when the last management
audit was, and I have to assume that they looked at priorities
on a yearly basis. I know that this has been a very fine
management team that Secretary Powell has set in place and they
have made a lot of progress.
But I want to assure you that I feel very strongly about
the need to manage a Department very well. Without the
management of your resources--and that means budget, people,
technology, buildings, all of those things--it is very hard to
actually conduct policy. You have my word that the management
agenda will be a very important part of my agenda, and if there
has not been a management audit or a review for some time, then
there will be because it is an important thing to do.
Senator Voinovich. I am going to be paying a lot of
attention to that part of it not only as a member of this
committee, but also because of my chairmanship of the Oversight
of Government Management in Governmental Affairs. I am really
interested in that information because if you do not have the
people to get the job done, then we have got some real
problems.
Dr. Rice. I agree, Senator. Let me just say, on the budget
matter again, we can meet our obligations. If there is a
supplemental, we will look forward to, obviously, being a part
of it for a number of our requirements for a number of things
that have to get done. But I just want to emphasize we will
look at the resources that we have and can we do the job, and I
will not hesitate, if I think that we have problems in that
regard, to make certain that the President knows.
Senator Voinovich. I would really like to know who is
going to be looking management issues? Bob Zoellick? You are
going to be so busy with all kinds of things. We are talking
about special envoys to other places, among other things, and
you are saying, well, maybe we will not do it. If you get
involved in the Middle East and start shuttle negotiations or
something, somebody has got to pay attention to who is running
the shop, and I am real concerned about it.
One other thing I would like to bring up is the Global
Anti-Semitism Review Act. Part of that act requires the State
Department to create a new office to monitor and combat anti-
Semitism. I would like to know when is that office going to be
created.
Dr. Rice. Senator, I will have to look into that. I know
that we need to create the office. I know that they have looked
at creating it. There is some question about where it will be
located. I will look into that as soon as I am, hopefully,
confirmed and get back to you with an answer.
As to who will manage, clearly the deputy has an important
role to play in the management. So does the Under Secretary for
Management.
But I just want to emphasize I know that I will be doing a
lot of things, but I was chief operating officer of Stanford
University's Provost. I cared a lot about the management
issues. I understand management of big organizations, and I
know that if you are not watching, all kinds of things can
happen that are to the detriment of your objectives. So you can
be certain that it is something I will be paying attention to.
Senator Voinovich. That is great because your people will
want to know you care.
Dr. Rice. The first briefing that I actually had was with
the Under Secretary for Management because I wanted to
understand what the management challenges were, what the future
looked like. Secretary Powell and Deputy Secretary Armitage
have done a fine job of managing. We have to continue that
tradition and push further.
Senator Voinovich. One other issue again deals with
management. Our European Subcommittee conducted a hearing on
crime and corruption in Southeast Europe and that area. You
have got the FBI, you have got the State Department and other
agencies involved in it. I would suggest that someone look at
the way that effort is organized because the conclusion I drew
was that everybody is involved, but there does not seem to be
an orchestra leader or somebody who is coordinating it. I do
not know whether it is the State Department or the Justice
Department. I think you understand it. You mentioned in your
remarks that crime and corruption in some of those parts of the
world are a much greater threat than terrorism, and if we do
not really have our act together in that regard, many of these
new democracies are going to be undermined.
Dr. Rice. Understood. Thank you, Senator. I will look into
that.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thanks so much, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to make a couple of comments and then I am going
to continue the questioning on the torture issue.
I hope that you will consider what colleagues have said on
both sides of the aisle about a lack of consistency in our
foreign policy. For example, Senator Dodd at one point said we
are in trouble in Latin America, and I would say, having come
back from a 6-day conference with Senator Lugar, bipartisan on
Central and South America, it is true because they do not sense
a consistency. As Senator Chafee points out, you praise Uribe
for democracy even though we were told at this conference that
he is trying to pass a law which would forbid sitting governors
and sitting senators from running against him. And you condemn
the head of Venezuela, Chavez, after having the administration,
not you personally, briefly praise a coup. And it was not until
the OAS spoke up and said, well, wait a minute, that is wrong,
that we backed off. So we really do need more consistency here.
For example, in Mexico where the PRI is coming back. We
have got to pay attention to Mexico. I hope that will be a
priority because I know they are very distressed and
disappointed that they do not feel they were a priority. We
have got immigration issues in my State that I know you are
very aware of being a resident there, and we have got to deal
with these issues. We have a situation where the PRI now is
trying to disqualify someone who wants to run. So we have got a
lot of democracy issues there, and I think we need to be even-
handed.
Also, I think Senator Biden's point--and I think Senator
Lugar might have picked up on it. I am not sure--that for the
Axis of Evil countries, we have a certain set of criteria, but
yet it does not extend to other countries like China and Russia
and other places that I think Senator Chafee mentioned.
I put this out there because I know it is all tough and we
play the game and we need all of our friends to be with us and
we overlook certain things. But we will lose credibility. So I
hope you can think about that as you, I believe, will try to
restore credibility for this country.
Now, we sparred over the weapons of mass destruction, and I
just want to place something in the record because I do not
want to go on and on because we just will not agree. We might
as well say you see it one way, I see it another. But I thought
what I put in the record is a statement by the President's
spokesman, Ari Fleischer, right after the war started. I ask
unanimous consent to place this statement in the record.
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record.
Senator Boxer. At a press conference he said: ``The fact
of the matter is we're still in a war and not everything about
the war is known, but make no mistake, as I said earlier, we
have high confidence that they have weapons of mass
destruction. That is what this war was about and it is about.''
That's Ari Fleischer.
I would like to place that in the record because we are not
going to agree at the end of the day. That is why I am trying
to put in statements that say that my view is not coming from
me. It is coming from people who are all around you.
[The material to which Senator Boxer referred appears in
Appendix II of this hearing transcript.]
Senator Boxer. Now, Senator Dodd gave you a great moment in
history to show your humanity on the issue of torture. He said,
I am not talking to you as a nominee. I am talking to you as
one human being to another. And you answered in legalisms. Then
Senator Feingold gave you another chance and you did not take
the opportunity. Now, I respect that, but I am distressed about
it. And I agree with Senator Dodd. It is very, very
disappointing. So I am going to press you a little further not
only on what you have said on it, but what you have actually
done on the issue.
What you said today what happened in Abu Ghraib was
unacceptable, was abuse. It made us all sick to our stomachs,
and I think we could all agree. Did you see all of the photos
that were available from that prison?
Dr. Rice. I do not know if I saw all of them, but I saw
enough of them to know that it was a stain on our country.
Senator Boxer. Well, I appreciate that. I went up to see
the photos. And at my age we take stress tests. Also because of
the work we are in, we take stress tests. And they tell you,
when you get up on that machine, just keep on going until you
cannot take it anymore. That is how I felt when I was watching
those photographs. I saw things there that will be burned in my
memory forever.
And that is why I am so supportive of making sure that
America stands tall, tall, the leader in the world against
torture. I am very upset at certain things that occurred, and I
want to tell you what they are.
You said, on July 1, 2004, when you commented on the abuses
that took place in Abu Ghraib--we are going to put this up
here. You said: ``What took place at the Abu Ghraib prison does
not represent America. Our Nation is a compassionate country
that believes in freedom. The U.S. Government is deeply sorry
for what happened,'' and so on. You said that about Abu Ghraib.
I thought your remarks were very appropriate.
Now, last Thursday we find out that after the Senate
unanimously approved an amendment to restrict the use of
extreme interrogation measures by American intelligence
officers, you wrote a letter, along with Mr. Bolton, to the
members of the conference committee asking them to strike that
language from the final bill. Unfortunately, that is what they
did at your request.
Now, I want to read you the operative language that you
asked to be struck from the bill and was struck from the bill.
And by the way, this is written by Joe Lieberman and John
McCain--John McCain, a man who knows what torture is. So he
wrote this with Joe Lieberman. ``In general, no prisoner shall
be subject to torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading
treatment or punishment that is prohibited by the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.'' Pretty
straightforward, pretty elegant, bipartisan. That amendment
passed the Senate unanimously, every single member.
A letter comes and the newspaper writes that at your
request, at the urging of the White House, congressional
leaders scrapped a legislative measure last month that would
have imposed new restrictions on the use of extreme
interrogation measures by American intelligence officers. In a
letter to Members of Congress sent in October and made
available by the White House on Wednesday--this is last week--
Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor, expressed
opposition to the measure on the ground that it ``provides
legal protections to foreign prisoners to which they are not
now entitled under applicable law and policy.''
Now, my understanding of this is that is a restatement of
what the law is.
So again, I am so distressed that we hear from you, even
though you had a chance today to put your personal touch on
it--we hear good words about how it was terrible, what happened
at Abu Ghraib. Again, I know you are aware that the
overwhelming number of those people were set free from Abu
Ghraib. So those people in that pyramid who were being sexually
abused were set free, the vast majority of them. Yet, when we
had a chance, the bipartisan Senators voted to say this has to
end, this has to stop, who writes a letter--you do--telling
them to drop this?
Why on earth did you do that after we passed this
unanimously? And you say that what happened in Abu Ghraib was
unacceptable and it was abuse. It is to me rather stunning. So
can you explain to me why you wrote that letter?
Dr. Rice. Senator, it was our view in the administration
that, first of all, this was covered in the defense
authorization bill, which the President did sign.
Senator Boxer. But this has to do with the intelligence
community, not the military.
Dr. Rice. And secondly----
Senator Boxer. So it is not covered.
Dr. Rice. But all Government agencies were covered in the
defense authorization.
Senator Boxer. This was just the intelligence officers.
Go ahead.
Dr. Rice. All Government agencies were covered in the
defense authorization. So intelligence was covered.
Senator Boxer. No, it was not.
Dr. Rice. It was our view.
Secondly, we did not want to afford to people who should
not enjoy certain protections those protections. The Geneva
Conventions should not apply to terrorists like al Qaeda. They
cannot or you will stretch the meaning of the Geneva
Convention.
But, Senator, I have to go back to the broader point here.
Senator Boxer. One second. Excuse me. I just want a
clarification.
Dr. Rice. Yes.
[Pause.]
Senator Boxer. Got it. Thanks. Go ahead.
Dr. Rice. Nobody condones torture. Nobody condones what
was done at Abu Ghraib. In fact, you had everyone from the
President of the United States on down, in effect, offer an
apology to those who had endured that treatment. The people who
perpetrated it have been punished and are being punished. It is
being investigated. It is looked into as to whether there was a
broader problem. The United States reacted the way that
democracies react when something goes wrong. And something
definitely went wrong at Abu Ghraib and nobody condones or
excuses what happened at Abu Ghraib.
The problem of how to deal with unlawful combatants,
though, in a different kind of war is, frankly, a very
difficult problem. You have people who kill innocents with
impunity. You have people who burrow into our country and try
to harm us. You have people who have engaged in large-scale
acts against children in Russia and against commuters in
Madrid. This is a different kind of war and these are
combatants with which we are not accustomed.
Senator Boxer. So do you then oppose that language in the
defense bill? You seem to oppose it in the intelligence bill.
Dr. Rice. Did we oppose the language in the defense bill?
Senator Boxer. I am asking you now. You said that you
should----
Dr. Rice. The President signed it.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. ----No, no, no. I am asking
about you. You said----
Dr. Rice. The President signed it.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. ----No, no. You are not
listening to the question.
You said you do not want to extend these international laws
to all prisoners. However, it is extended in the defense bill,
and this was just extending it to the intelligence officers. So
that is why I am asking you. Since you said you cannot extend
it, do you support it in the defense bill? Whether the
President signed it, I am asking your opinion.
Dr. Rice. Of course, I support it in the defense bill,
Senator.
Senator Boxer. But you do not in the intelligence bill. Is
that correct?
Dr. Rice. No. Senator, we think the intelligence agencies
are covered in the defense bill. It was unnecessary to have it
in----
Senator Boxer. But then you go on to say that these
agreements should not cover it.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----I was making a broader point,
Senator, which is that the Geneva Conventions should not be
extended to those who do not live up to the obligations of the
Geneva Conventions.
Senator Boxer. Well, let me just say this, Mr. Chairman.
The person who wrote this, Dick Durbin, Senator Durbin, the
senior Senator from Illinois, offered the language to the
Defense Department bill. He then said the Senate intelligence
reform bill would have simply extended these requirements to
the intelligence community.
Now, I am getting two messages from you. One is we did not
need this because the intelligence community is already
covered. If that was the case, why not leave it in so the world
can see that we are not only willing to put it in the defense
bill, but in the intelligence bill? Because, obviously,
colleagues here--John McCain kind of knows what he is doing in
legislation and so does Senator Lieberman. They are the ones
who did this. 100 to nothing it was passed through the United
States Senate. I think people felt it was important, in light
of Abu Ghraib, to stand up and be elegant on the point.
And I am going to read it one more time, because what they
said was quite elegant. And it does not have any extra words at
all. ``In general, no prisoner shall be subject to torture or
cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment that is
prohibited by the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.''
And for everyone in the Senate, Republican and Democratic,
it was a shining moment. And then in a letter--and it just
comes to light last week that you write--you asked that this be
stricken. I have to say that is the problem I have. There are
beautiful words and then there is the action or there are
contradictions.
Dr. Rice. Senator, it is the law of the land.
Senator Boxer. I do not think that you have explained it
because by saying we did not need it, it was in the defense
bill, A, people do not agree with that in the Senate; and B, so
what if it was duplicative, that we said it twice that torture
is wrong and we will obey international laws?
I think it just shows that this is not an issue that you
feel very comfortable with. You had an opportunity when Senator
Dodd asked you. You had an opportunity to say how you felt
personally about it. You had a chance to embrace this language,
which was embraced by Senator McCain and Lieberman and every
Member of the Senate, and yet you write a letter and as a
result, it is dropped. I just think it is a sad day for us.
That is how I feel.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
I call now on Senator Obama.
Let me just announce, while there are still Senators here,
that after consultation with many parties and if not quite
unanimous consent, certainly majority consent, it is the
chair's view that we will commence our hearing tomorrow morning
at 9 o'clock. We will have a round of questions for cleanup
purposes, limited to 5 minutes a Senator. At 10 o'clock, we
will have a business meeting of the committee at that point,
and at that point we will have debate and hopefully a vote on
the nominee.
I appreciate that this inconveniences some Senators and the
witness. On the other hand, Senator Biden had obligations this
evening and so have two Senators, who will remain nameless, who
had television appearances and other things that needed to
happen. So we are attempting to do the best we can to try to be
fair to everybody involved.
We will continue this evening and Senator Obama will ask
questions and take a regular round. We will then go back to
other Senators who wish to continue the questioning at that
point. Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Rice, I appreciate your stamina.
I have got one very specific question that I would like
maybe a brief answer to even though it is a large question, and
then maybe I want to engage with you a little bit on this
public diplomacy issue.
I think that you have done a commendable job in helping the
United States rethink its international aid and development
programs. So I know the Millennium Challenge Account you were
very active in. I understand the President pledged $10 billion
by fiscal year '06. To date, $2.5 billion has been
appropriated. My understanding is very little has been spent.
The President also pledged in 2003 $15 billion for HIV/
AIDS, something that all of us care deeply about, but to date
only around $2 billion has been appropriated for HIV/AIDS,
leaving $13 billion to be appropriated and spent over the next
3 years.
So my very specific question is, are you planning and would
you pledge here to make full funding of these commitments a
central priority of the administration in its budget requests
for Congress?
Dr. Rice. The MCA is a very important initiative for us,
and we have been trying to get it right. So it takes some time
to negotiate compacts with these countries and to make sure
that they are prepared to take on the obligations of receiving
MCA funding. We were also about a year late--not a year late, a
year in getting in the Millennium Challenge Corporation up and
running. So what we will do is we will make sure that the
funding is there for the program that is before us, and we
will, over time, certainly fulfill the President's obligation
to, by 50 percent, increase American spending on development
assistance.
Senator Obama. Okay. The reason I make this point I think
is not that I want us to spend money willy-nilly. And in the
same way on social programs, if programs are not well thought
through and you throw money at them, it may be a waste of
money--and we do not have money to waste--the same is certainly
true on the international stage.
On the other hand, when we publicly announce that we are
making these commitments and if it appears that we are not
following through, then that undermines our credibility and
makes your job more difficult. So I would urge that there is a
clear signal by the administration in its budgeting process
this time out that we are moving forward on this. And if in
fact it turns out that the spending on this money was overly
ambitious because we do not quite know how to spend all of it
wisely, then that should be stated publicly and clearly and the
time line should be extended, but there should be a clear
signal sent by the administration on that. So that is the
relatively narrow point.
The broader point I think draws on a number of themes that
have been discussed earlier. The issue of public diplomacy--
some of it is technique. It is technical. Do we have the
equivalent of a Radio Free Europe in the Middle East that is
effective? What are we doing with respect to exchange students
and visas? I think there are a whole host of technical
questions that we can deal with.
But effective public diplomacy, at least from my
perspective, is not just spin. It is substantive. Part of the
problem we have overseas is not just a matter of presentation.
It is profound disagreements with our approach to certain
policies. And I think that one area that this comes up--and I
think Iraq highlighted, and I see in your statement I think it
may highlight it as well. When I read in the third paragraph of
your testimony or opening statement today, it says, ``under the
vision and leadership of President Bush our nation has risen to
meet the challenges of our times, fighting tyranny and terror
and securing the blessings of freedom and prosperity for a new
generation. Part of, I think, the concern of that I have here--
and this has been a concern for critics of the administration
for some time--is the conflation of tyranny and terror. That
may be where the mixed signals or the lack of consistency that
Senator Chafee and Senator Boxer and others were alluding to
arises.
We are unanimous in wanting to root out terror. It appears
that even within the administration, there is ambiguity with
respect to our views on tyranny. Tyranny is problematic but if
engaged in by an ally of ours or a country that is sufficiently
powerful that we do not think we can do anything about it does
not prompt military action. In other cases it does.
Part of the, I think, debate and divisiveness of Iraq had
to do with the fact that it appeared that the administration
sold military action in Iraq on the basis of concern about
terror, and then the rationale shifted, or at least got
muddied, into an acknowledged desire to get rid of a tyrant.
And I guess what I am trying to figure out here--and this
is particular to military action and military incursions--do we
have a well-thought-through doctrine that we can present to the
world that explains when we feel that military action is
justified and when it is not?
Apparently it is not justified in Sudan where there is a
genocide taking place. It was not justified in Rwanda, despite
I think unanimity that that was one of the greatest tragedies
that occurred in my lifetime. There are a number of
circumstances in which we have felt that such incursions or
nation-building are not appropriate despite the evidence of
great tyranny, and yet in Iraq and perhaps in Iran and perhaps
in other circumstances, we think it is.
So what I am looking for is some clearly articulated
statement as to when you think, as Secretary of State, military
action is appropriate. Or do you think alternatively that the
administration should be able to engage in sort of ad hoc
judgments as it goes along as to whether, well, let us take
these folks out and let us not take these folks out?
Dr. Rice. Well, it is a very interesting question,
Senator. It is one that actually is debated in the academy
around the world. How can you think about a standard for the
use of military force?
Senator Obama. Not to interrupt, but of course this is not
academic because----
Dr. Rice. No, of course.
Senator Obama [continuing]. ----we have 150,000 troops over
there right now.
Dr. Rice. Of course. That is exactly my point, that when
you are not debating it in the academy, it is a bit more
difficult to have a hard and true definition of when one would
use military force and when one would not because circumstances
differ and one has to, when choosing a policy course, look at
the mix of tools available to you. Military force should really
be a last resort, certainly not a resort that is early on in
the process because so much is at stake and lives are at stake
and war is an unpredictable, blunt instrument. So it is,
indeed, outside the confines of the academy, very difficult to
have a specific definition of when you use force and when you
do not.
I think that when one looks at Iraq, you look at a
circumstance in which an awful lot of factors came together to
make the case of Saddam Hussein approachable really ultimately
only through the use of military force, that it was in that
sense a last resort because you had had 12 years of failed
diplomacy after a war, in which he had fought a war of
aggression, and which he had then signed on to certain
obligations, not kept those obligations. He signed on to the
obligations, by the way, in order to end the 1991 conflict. He
then did not live up to those obligations, flaunted them before
the international community, continued to threaten his
neighbors, continued to threaten our pilots trying to enforce
the no-fly zones. We did have someone with a history and a
present and a shadow of the future concerning the world's most
dangerous weapons, and we had someone who was an ally of terror
and was in the world's most dangerous region. I think he had
the whole package.
Senator Obama. Dr. Rice, I do not mean to interrupt you,
but I know that I am going to be running out of time. I see
that yellow light going off.
I guess my point is not to relitigate the Iraq issue. I
think it is to move forward. The concern that many of my
constituents in Illinois express is that we went into Iraq, at
least in their minds, because of a very specific threat of
terror, not tyranny but terror. Had the administration sold the
plan to go into Iraq based on this complex mix, then it is not
clear it would have generated public support. That is past.
As we move forward and we look at Iran or we look at North
Korea or these other circumstances, I think it is important for
us to be clear that the American people have to have an honest
accounting of why we are going in because once we are in, we
are stuck.
Dr. Rice. Yes.
Senator Obama. And we are now going to be spending at
least $200 billion in Iraq, and we have lost over 1,300 lives
and it is counting.
So part of the public diplomacy, both internationally as
well as domestically, requires this administration to at least
be able to articulate these reasons in a way that are coherent
and somewhat consistent. I understand that the world is
complicated and it is not always going to be fitting into the
neat boxes of the academy, but right now at least, it seems
like it is a moving target, both for the American people and
for the international community.
Dr. Rice. Well, Senator, I appreciate that, but if I could
just speak to the moving target notion because I do not think
it has been a moving target.
The fact is tyranny and terror are linked. They are linked.
We know that if we deal with Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda and
the organization that did 9/11, we are still going to be
dealing with its spawn and we are still going to be dealing
with the ideology of hatred that it has been perpetrating. And
we know that the ground in which that ideology of hatred has
grown and matured and prospered is the ground of places in the
world where there is a freedom deficit and where the anger and
hopelessness has been channeled into these very malignant
forces.
Senator Obama. Absolutely, but again--I know I am out of
time here, but that is true in Sudan. There is a lot of anger
in Sudan. There is a lot of anger all through sub-Saharan
Africa, and yet we do not make these decisions. So I am not
disputing that if you have a vibrant democracy and a healthy,
functioning free-market system there is less likelihood of
terrorism. I think all of us recognize that connection, but we
are making very specific calculations on the basis of flawed
information or flawed intelligence and finite resources. And so
we have got to make the best judgments we can in these
circumstances. So the fact that there is a link somewhere
between terror and tyranny is not sufficient for us to be
making decisions about spending $200 billion to $300 billion or
sacrificing the lives of American servicemen and women.
Dr. Rice. Senator, I appreciate that, but I have to say I
do not think it is a vague link. When you talk about the Middle
East, it is a pretty clear link. You are talking about the rise
of Islamic extremism. You are talking about jihadism. You are
talking about the ground in which it grew up, and you are
talking about a very narrow definition of terrorism if you only
talk about trying to take down the al Qaeda organization.
Senator Obama. I think that is fair, and if that is the
case--again, I do not belabor this, but I am just trying to
give you a sense of where I think our public diplomacy fails.
There is certainly a link between tyranny in Saudi Arabia and
terrorism, and yet we make a whole series of strategic
decisions about accommodating the Saudi regime. I am not saying
that is a bad decision.
But what I am saying is the degree to which you as the
spokesperson for U.S. foreign policy are able to articulate
greater consistency in our foreign policy and where those links
exist between tyranny and terror, you are able to apply those
not just in one or two areas but more broadly, then I think
your public diplomacy is going to be more successful.
Dr. Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Obama.
I will pass on this round and recognize Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a
number of areas to cover.
Let me mention, first, on a positive note because Senator
Voinovich and others, I think maybe the chairman raised
earlier--in fact, I want to thank you. You came by and we had a
pleasant conversation I think in December or early January. I
have forgotten which now.
Dr. Rice. December I think.
Senator Dodd. I appreciate the time and the willingness to
do that.
One of the things you and I talked about in that meeting
was this issue of the--at least statistically we are told in
the press about a declining number of graduate students coming
to the United States. I think you were talking about this
earlier, the visa issue and this problem we are having with, I
think, a 45 percent decline in graduate schools, about 8
percent in undergraduate degrees. We ran into it in this trip
that Senator Nelson and Senator Chafee and I took in our
embassies and talking to other people. There is a declining
number of applicants coming through our office because of the
bureaucracy, just waiting for a decision whether or not they
can come. Given the opportunities to choose other universities
around the world who are competitive with our own, they are
making choices to go elsewhere.
I think one of the great strengths in this post-World War
II era was the opening of America's doors, our universities and
the tremendous benefit to us, to them as well going back. How
many of us have run into students, leaders today that went to
American universities, came here as students and had a
wonderful effect on their decision-making process as young
adults? I am hopeful that we can get back to that issue again.
I realize there are modern considerations in the wake of 9/
11 that we have to weigh in all of this, but I think we do so
at our own peril if we do not get this right soon in my view.
I will not go back because time is limited here, but in
your opening statement, you made a couple of wonderful
statements here that I certainly agree with. You speak
eloquently about the visionary leaders we had at the end of
World War II. I think too often we forget about how visionary
they really were in many ways and things they did.
I say that because in talking about the subject matter
earlier when I raised the issue of torture and these questions,
and I say this because I remember growing up and getting a
constant diet of this. My father was about a 35- or 36-year-old
lawyer when he went to Nuremberg. And Winston Churchill and
others at that time talked about the defendants in the first
round of prosecutions were some of the most vicious people that
mankind had ever seen. Whether they wore uniforms or not, they
brutally murdered 6 million Jews and 5 million others,
civilians not to mention the millions who lost their lives as
combatants.
Winston Churchill and others argued at the time that we
just ought to summarily execute these people, but the American
team argued, without any basis--there was no Geneva Convention
that I am aware of in those days that sat--that they believed
very deeply that the place at Nuremberg was so appropriate
because that was the site of the Nuremberg laws that gave the
Nazis the legal justification for the final solutions. And the
Nuremberg trials occurred in that city. We insisted that every
defendant there get a lawyer. They could present evidence
before that court, that tribunal made of the allies.
They did so not because there was some body of law
someplace that said they had to, but because we wanted to tell
the world who we were. We were very, very different not just in
terms of our economic plans and political plans, but how we
viewed mankind.
What I think we are getting at here in these questions to
you is not about the legalisms of this, but in these troubled
times--and we are dealing with great threats of fundamentalism
that threatens our way of life--that we are different out
there. We stand for things that are different based not so much
on laws or statutes that get passed, but go right back to our
Constitution in this country. When our Founders wrote, they did
not talk about people who were blessed enough to either be born
here or live here when they talked about mankind. And that is
what we are getting at with these questions.
I know you have got a job to follow the law and read the
statutes and so forth, but I wanted to give you as an
opportunity to talk as that very visionary generation did in
the wake of World War II with all of the anger, all of the
feelings they had. They insisted that we send a different
message to the world, that even these brutal, cruel human
beings who did what they did to innocent civilians, we treated
them differently than they ever would have treated their own
victims. That is the issue really, not what the law says, not
dotting the I's and crossing the T's, but speaking more
fundamentally as to who we are as a people. That is really what
is at the core of this issue. I want to give you a chance to
talk about that because that is important to people around the
globe. So that is the reason I raised it.
It goes to a third issue which I want to get to in a
minute, but if you want to respond to this again, I would like
to give you another chance to do so because your answer was
very troubling to me.
Dr. Rice. Well, we are and have been different. We have
now friends who have similar views of international law. The
United States has been a leader. Senator, I understand what
something like Abu Ghraib does to our image and not just our
image but to people's desire to really hold onto America as
something different. I understand that. I understand it fully.
It is one reason that it was so hard to watch and so hard to
respond to and so hard to know exactly what to say. It is a
rare thing that the President of the United States apologizes
for something like that, but he did, and I thought it was the
right thing to do.
I know too that we are struggling with the fact that we are
in a different kind of war even than World War II when there
were certainly terrible atrocities, but now a war in which we
are trying to prevent the next attack through information by
the people who are captured on these battlefields and the like
and people who blow up innocent civilians and who drive
airplanes into buildings and who behead people and who slit the
throat of Daniel Pearl. It is a different kind of war. I think
you would agree with me that these are enemy noncombatants that
we----
Senator Dodd. Do not become like them.
Dr. Rice. No.
Senator Dodd. Do not become like them.
Dr. Rice. I agree. And Senator, if we were like them, we
would not have punished the people for Abu Ghraib. If we were
like them, the President of the United States would not have
apologized. If we were like them, we would not have so much
concern about how not to have that happen again.
Senator Dodd. All right.
Dr. Rice. But may I just say one final thing about this?
Because probably the answer to the tensions between trying to
live with the laws and the norms that we have become accustomed
to and the new kind of war that we are in is to really have a
kind of international conversation about this problem. I have
been talking to other national security advisors when they face
terrorism. I have talked to attorneys general and interior
ministers around the world. They feel the tension too, and we
would like to look--I know Judge Gonzales mentioned this. We
would like to look at what other kinds of international
standards might be needed to deal with this very special war
because we are a country of laws. We are going to maintain
them.
Senator Dodd. Well, make sure you come up here and talk
with us on these treaties because they are important. I am sure
the chairman would underscore that point as well----
Dr. Rice. Absolutely.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----that we would like to be
involved.
Let me jump quickly because the time is going to move here.
Senator Martinez and others have raised the issue of Cuba.
Again, no one is here apologizing or defending Fidel Castro at
all. But one of the things that struck me--again, your opening
statement talked to this, and I think you rightly point out in
1989-1991, I remember being in the Senate and watching those
miraculous events occurring. You are so right to point out this
just was not a victory of that year. This was a victory that
took years to achieve.
And one of the things that I think contributed to it--and I
presume you would agree with this--in addition to our military
prowess, which was very important, was the amount of access we
had, the amount of information we punched into those eastern
bloc countries that gave hope to people like Lech Walesa and
Vaclav Havel and others who, because there was that
communication and contact back and forth and I think
contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union--you might
argue it was not an overwhelming reason, but it certainly was a
major factor.
What troubles me here is that we are going the opposite
direction in a sense in dealing with Cuba in many ways. I hear
no idea to change anything at all. Tonight, if I walked out
here, I could go to any country in the world if they would
accept me. I can fly to Iran. I can go to Iraq. I can go to
North Korea. They may not let me in. But my own Government will
let me go there. The only place in the world that I cannot go
to, nor can a Cuban American to see their family, is the island
nation of Cuba.
Why do we make such a difference or distinction on that
country if we are trying to break down those barriers and to
demonstrate to the Cuban people that we are different? Why is
it we deny Cuban Americans, second and third generations, the
opportunity to go and visit their families, put limitations on
the remittances that go back? Is there not a greater
possibility, given our earlier experience in the latter part of
the 20th century, that we might have a greater chance of
effectuating change there than keeping it isolated and closed
off?
Dr. Rice. Well, Senator, there are those who believe that
that is the case.
Senator Dodd. Well, did it not work in part in eastern
Europe?
Dr. Rice. Well, it worked in part in eastern Europe but it
worked in part in eastern Europe after a long time in which
those countries were actually quite isolated. It did not happen
overnight in eastern Europe.
Senator Dodd. We had Radio Free Europe. We had all those
activities.
Dr. Rice. These were countries that it was possible to
actually access a civil society. It was possible to actually
access university students and the like. Castro keeps such a
tight lid and such a tight handle on that regime----
Senator Dodd. That is another point. Let him turn me down
if show up to go in. Why are you telling me I cannot go? I can
go to North Korea. Right? I can fly to North Korea. You would
let me go there, would you not?
Dr. Rice. Yes, if you would like to go.
Senator Dodd. Yes, but there is nothing that prohibits me
from going. I can go to Iran. I can go to Iraq tonight if I
wanted to. The only country you will not let me go to is the
island nation of Cuba. Why does the----
Dr. Rice. Because the Cuban regime would use your travel
and the skimming off the top of that travel----
Senator Dodd. And North Korea would not do that?
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----to continue to strengthen the
hold of that brutal regime. And that is what Castro does. He
uses humanitarian efforts by people with their families. He
uses travel. He uses every possible way to skim the money to--
--
Senator Dodd. But, Doctor, you are not going to tell me
you are going to make that distinction there and tell me that
all these other places I mentioned are not equally as brutal
and can be more brutal. In fact, some of them are directly
involved in exporting terrorism, shipping weapons around the
world. You cannot say that about the Cuban Government at this
point. They may have earlier but not today.
Dr. Rice. Senator, not that many people are going to go to
North Korea.
Castro has made a living of siphoning money off of travel,
off of mules that he sends, off of humanitarian packages. The
Cuban regime needs to be isolated in this hemisphere.
Senator Dodd. All right. The point is--enough said.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Dodd.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. I pass.
The Chairman. Senator Chafee passes.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
you, Dr. Rice, for your patience and hanging in here.
I have got a few areas of inquiry that I would like to
pursue if I can.
Number one, have you read this article in the New Yorker by
Sy Hersh? Are you familiar with it?
Dr. Rice. I am familiar with it, but I have not read it,
Senator.
Senator Kerry. Coming wars. Just to quote from it for a
minute, he talks about the administration conducting secret
reconnaissance missions inside Iran at least since last summer.
He talks about the administration looking at the region as a
huge war zone, and next we are going to have the Iranian
campaign. This is a quote from the Bush administration former
high level intelligence official. ``Next we're going to have
the Iranian campaign. We've declared war on the bad guys
wherever they are, the enemy. This is the last hurrah. We've
got four years and want to come out of this saying we won war
on terrorism.''
I am not going to ask you to comment on anything
classified, but I am going to ask you to comment on this. A
former high level intelligence official told me: ``They don't
want to make any WMD intelligence mistakes as in Iraq. The
Republicans can't have two of those. There's no education in
the second kick of a mule. The official added that the
government of Pervaiz Musharraf, the Pakistani President, has
won a high price for its cooperation: American assurance that
Pakistan will not have to hand over A.Q. Khan, known as the
father of Pakistan's nuclear bombs, to the IAEA or to any other
international authorities for questioning.'' Do you know
whether or not that is accurate?
Dr. Rice. I will just reiterate what was said about that
article by the Defense Department. It is filled with
inaccuracies and its credibility is sorely lacking. The----
Senator Kerry. Well, on that specific point----
Dr. Rice. Let me just speak to the handling of A.Q. Khan.
What we have been concerned about is that we are able to get
the information that we need to break up the network. We have
not made any deals about what happens with him.
Senator Kerry. I am sorry.
Dr. Rice. We have not made any deals about what happens
with him, but we have been concerned with the Pakistani
Government to get access to as much information as we possibly
can. This is a matter that is being handled by the Pakistanis.
It is not our place to talk about what should or should not
happen with the IAEA, and we have not.
Senator Kerry. So what about our own interests and our own
efforts with respect to A.Q. Khan?
Dr. Rice. Our own interests are being very well served by
the fact that A.Q. Khan is now off the market, that we are
working with the Pakistanis to get information about what he
knows, very well served by cooperation with several other
governments about members of his network. Several of them are
in custody. Some will be prosecuted. So our interests are very
well being served in this regard.
Senator Kerry. Are they being served if we do not have
direct access to him?
Dr. Rice. We believe that we have a working relationship
with Pakistan on dealing with the A.Q. Khan matter. At this
point we are getting cooperation from Pakistan on what we need
with A.Q. Khan.
Senator Kerry. But are they being served if we do not have
direct access to him?
Dr. Rice. They are being served at this point.
Senator Kerry. Adequately?
Dr. Rice. We are getting the information that we need to
deal with the A.Q. Khan network. Senator, I do not know what we
will need to ask in the future, but at this point we have a
good working relationship with Pakistan on this matter.
Senator Kerry. And with respect to Iran, are you also
denying or discounting any of the allegations in this article?
Dr. Rice. The article is inaccurate.
Senator Kerry. With respect to Iran.
Dr. Rice. The article is, as Defense said, inaccurate.
Senator Kerry. With respect to Iran.
Dr. Rice. Senator, the article does not represent our
policies toward Iran or our expectations of policies toward
Iran.
Senator Kerry. Coming back, if I may, for a minute to
Iraq, what steps are you going to take in the immediacy of your
confirmation in the next days, if you have thought about this,
or if any, prior to the election, to put in place the kind of
political reconciliation that I talked about at the very
beginning in the morning? Have you thought that through?
Dr. Rice. Well, the Iraqis are trying to put in place a
means for political reconciliation to the degree of what is
needed for political reconciliation after the elections.
Senator Kerry. You do not think we have a specific role to
play with the Europeans and Arab community?
Dr. Rice. We certainly have a role to play and we have
played that role in doing what we can to encourage contacts
between the Sunnis and certainly the members of the Iraqi
interim government. We have tried to help with that. We have
tried to facilitate it.
You know, they have their own contacts that are, frankly,
much better even than our own. They are reaching out to the
tribal leaders. Sheikh Gazi al-Yawar, the President of Iraq, is
himself an influential leader in Mosul, an influential Sunni,
and as he says, many members of his tribe are also Shia. He is
actively engaged. We help them, we talk to them, but really but
this has to be an Iraqi process. I do not think we want this to
be an American process.
Senator Kerry. Oh, I agree with that completely, which is
really what I am getting at, because it has been, it is, and is
still perceived as such. This was what was raised with me with
almost all of the leaders that I met in the region. It is the
urgency of the sense of reconciliation of coming together. I do
not think they believe it is going on, and I am just reporting
to you what I gleaned in the last few days, real serious
concerns that it is not going on. And within the country
itself, deep concerns.
I cannot remember if it was in Mosul or Kirkuk the
governor--incidentally, just a tribute to a lot of the Iraqis--
and I agree with you. So many of them want to vote. So many of
them want the freedom. We understand all that and I am very
sympathetic towards it.
But this fellow was the governor. His brother had been
killed. His son had been killed. His cousin had been killed and
he still assumed the role of governor, which says something.
But he and others were all complaining about just sort of the
lack of communication, lack of contact, sense of divorce and
alienation from Baghdad and so forth.
So the urgency seemed to leap out everywhere, whether it
was Sunni, Shia, secular, religious, whoever I met with. And
especially leaders in the surrounding countries who feel that a
major effort is going to be necessary, almost a convening--I am
sure you are familiar with it, but whether it is right in the
focus right now--but in the 8 June resolution in the United
Nations, section 5 specifically invites the Government of Iraq
to consider how the convening of an international meeting could
support the above process, the above process being the forming
of the transitional government and this kind of reconciliation
I am talking about.
So you really have this already solidly laid out within the
resolution itself, but there does not seem to be the kind of
organizational effort or initiative or leadership on the table
to say this is what we are going to do and there is a post-
election process so you avoid any kind of post-election chaos.
Dr. Rice. Well, I think that they are very focused. I
really do think that they are very active in reaching out. All
that we hear from the embassy and from others about the
contacts is that they are almost constant at this point.
It is an Iraqi process. Some of it is transparent to us.
Some of it is not, but that they are actively engaged in trying
to reach out to all aspects, I have no doubt about that.
As to the international piece, we have had one
international conference and the King of Jordan just recently
on January 6th brought people together. The Sunni leaders from
around the world or around the region, like the King of Jordan
and like the Saudis and others, are speaking out. When the
meeting took place, the Egyptians spoke out. When we recently
had a meeting in Egypt, the grand religious leader of Egypt
spoke out to encourage Sunnis to participate in the vote. I
think there is a lot of activity.
Now, as to the post-election period, how to bring about a
process of reconciliation after what will be a difficult and
probably imperfect election, but nonetheless a tremendous step
forward for the Iraqi people that they will hold this election,
that is a process that I think the Iraqis themselves are
discussing and trying to come to terms with how they are going
to use the process of putting together the transitional
assembly and then the process of writing the constitution to
begin to overcome their divisions.
But I have to say, Senator, I have been impressed with the
degree to which they recognize the importance to use this next
step as a step in the process of national reconciliation. They
are not saying we are going to have elections and that is it.
Senator Kerry. Well, I know they are not saying that, but
with all due respect, I was in Jordan the night before that
meeting. I met with several of the foreign ministers who were
at that meeting, including the Syrian, may I add. You have been
pretty tough on Syria here today, but Syria tried to cooperate
and send its foreign minister and specifically stood up and
said, yes, the elections ought to take place. Each of the
foreign ministers that I met with there, as well as King
Abdullah, as well as President Assad and others, talked about
this Sunni alienation, as well as intimidation, but alienation
beyond the intimidation.
There is a lot of curiosity because there is such a history
here. I do not know if you have had a chance to ever read a
book I happen to read going over there. It was Desert Queen by
Gertrude Bell. You read about her meetings in Cairo in 1919 and
she is sitting there talking about Mesopotamia--Iraq did not
exist--and how they were going to divide up completely separate
interests between Shia, Sunni, Kurds, Jews, Christians, et
cetera, none of whose interests mixed. We are doing the same
thing.
Dr. Rice. Well, Senator, I think it is better than that.
This would not be the first time in history that countries
through a process of democratization, through a process of
building institutions start to overcome differences that seemed
irreconcilable in the past. This would not be the first time
that that has happened. We are watching a process in
Afghanistan where precisely that is happening, and I do not
think you would have bet on Afghanistan to be able to carry
that forward either.
Senator Kerry. Actually I did.
Dr. Rice. Good.
Senator Kerry. And I supported that, if you will recall.
Dr. Rice. I know you supported it, but there were many
people who did not think that they would ever reconcile Pashtun
and the various ethnic groups of Afghanistan.
Senator Kerry. But they are very different in a lot of
ways, and that is what concerns a lot of people who are
struggling with this now.
Look, I do not pretend to be an expert, but I know how to
listen to people who have lived there all their lives and who
talk through the history. I think they all have an interest in
seeing things stabilized and work. I come at this from the
position of I want it to work. We all want it to work.
But I am just relaying to you that there is a deep-rooted
skepticism in the region among people who are potential players
and existing players, some more visible than others in some
countries and some very much on the line like Jordan or Egypt
who are deeply concerned about the lack of a sense of how this
reconciliation itself is going to take place.
Dr. Rice. Well, what we have been saying to them is that
they can translate that concern into action because this is an
Iraqi process, but it is also a process that can include the
neighbors. In recent weeks, I do think that the King of Jordan
and others have made more efforts to reach out to Sunnis
themselves and to be part of the reconciliation effort.
It is one thing for them to express concern. It is another
thing for them to realize that they actually have a role to
play in the reconciliation and stabilization of Iraq. And I
think we are beginning to see that.
Senator Kerry. But it is another thing also for them to
put their political necks on the line when they have seen a
series of, frankly, unilateral and, to them, insensitive steps
taken that have worsened the situation and not made it better.
For a population in Jordan that is majority Sunni and for a
population in Egypt, majority Sunni, likewise in Saudi Arabia,
this is complicated. So it does not come easily to step in if
they do not see how it is going to play out, which is why I am
saying this international effort. And I heard it in Europe from
the European leaders likewise. I think there is a readiness for
it, and if I were you, I would embrace it and want to get in
there. And I think you will be surprised pleasantly at the
possibilities. But if we stand back and we are not willing to
share both decision-making and listening, I think we are going
to invite more problems.
Dr. Rice. I appreciate that, Senator. I just want to
assure you that we are reaching out and we are encouraging
international partners to be as active in Iraq as they possibly
can be. There has been some hesitancy. I think the security
situation has made some people uncomfortable about certain
kinds of activity. But we are all hands on deck. We believe
very strongly that a free and democratic Iraq, a stable Iraq is
going to be in everybody's interest, and the opposite is true.
If Iraq does not find stability, then that is going to be to
everybody's detriment. And that is the message that we have
been carrying, and I think that after these elections, we will
try to carry it even more strongly.
Senator Kerry. I do have some more questions, but I see my
colleague is waiting also. So I will pass to him and then I
will come back.
The Chairman. Senator Voinovich.
Senator Voinovich. I am just staying here to keep the
Chairman company.
I pass on my questions.
The Chairman. All right. Senator Voinovich passes, and we
revert back to Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you.
North Korea. There are a lot of observers, and I heard this
throughout the campaign and we obviously went back and forth on
the subject of Six Party versus alternatives. Your predecessor,
Secretary Powell, at one point announced that the
administration was going to proceed forward with bilateral
talks following up on the Clinton administration, and even
while Kim Dae-jung was here, the President announced otherwise
from the Oval Office. Since then, we went through a period
where there was no discussion at all, no dialogue at all, and
then finally under pressure, the Six Party Talks came together.
But generally speaking, observers have indicated to me that
those Six Party Talks are really waiting for U.S. leadership
and for a change in U.S. position that moves it forward.
Do you have any feeling at this point that you might be
prepared to recommend to the President or that the President
will and you will engage in bilateral discussions that might
try to resolve this question of nonaggression versus progress
on the nuclear program?
Dr. Rice. I think, Senator, that the North Koreans should
be well aware that the United States has no intention to invade
them or attack them--we have said that--and that there are
multilateral security assurances that are available to them if
they choose to take them. Now, obviously, if there are
multilateral security assurances, the United States would be
one of the parties to those security assurances.
We did put a new proposal on the table at the last round of
the Six Party Talks. The North Koreans were unresponsive. Some
say that they wanted to bide their time a bit and that they
will get back to us now that they are trying to position
themselves for the President's second term.
But I really do think that we have to step back and
recognize that what happened in the '94 agreement--and by the
way, at the time it was probably the right thing to do, but we
know now that the North Koreans, within just a couple of years
perhaps, were violating that agreement by pursuing a separate
route to a nuclear weapon, a highly enriched uranium route.
Jim Kelly, the Assistant Secretary for Asia, was all set to
go to North Korea and say here is a bold approach on how we can
change the nature of North Korean/U.S. relations. And it had
all the things that you might imagine in it about what role we
might play in economic assistance, what we could do in
humanitarian assistance, so forth and so on.
On the way to that, we learned in a definitive way that was
not available to the Clinton administration about this HEU
program. So when Jim got there, he told them we also know you
have an HEU program. First they admitted it. Then they shut
down. And the bilateral route at that point was really closed
to us, and it had not been effective.
Our strong view is that the Six Party Talks has the
advantage of not letting the North Koreans play us off against
the others. It has the advantage of having China at the table,
and China has much greater leverage with North Korea than we
will ever have. And it has the advantage of having the parties
in the region work together on a serious security problem.
Now, I am hopeful that the North Koreans, seeing no other
option but to recognize that they are going to have to give up
their nuclear weapons program in a verifiable way, that they
are going to be persuaded to come back to the talks.
But as to the question of what they have to fear from the
United States, the President has been very clear that we do not
have any intention to invade them, any intention to attack
them, and that there is another path that could be there for
them, but the roadblock on that path is the North Korean
program. So sometimes there is a tendency to think that the
problem is U.S. policy. The problem is North Korean regime that
has not yet made a fundamental choice, and we just have to
press them to make a fundamental choice.
Senator Kerry. That is different from what one hears from
some of the other parties to the talks themselves who believe
that we have not put something sufficient on the table. Now, we
are not going to iron this out here and now, but I would love
to pursue that with you at some point in time.
I mean, if that is true and they are now, let us say, up to
the published publicly number of eight weapons and it is again,
as we have said about Iran, unacceptable that they do this,
what do you view as the options that are on the table?
Dr. Rice. Well, we still believe that this is something
that we can resolve diplomatically. We are committed to that
course. Of course, the President never takes any option off the
table, but I think we all know that this is something that
needs to be resolved diplomatically.
Senator Kerry. Given the intransigence and the cheating,
why does this lend itself more to being resolved diplomatically
than Iraq?
Dr. Rice. Because, Senator, despite the problems with
North Korea, it is actually not sitting in the middle of the
Middle East. We have not gone to war with them twice in recent
years.
Senator Kerry. Well, I am taking about before we went
twice and we were working on once.
Dr. Rice. Well, they invaded Kuwait. That was the reason--
--
Senator Kerry. No, no, no. I am working after that. During
the WMD inspection process.
Dr. Rice. Well, the WMD inspection process was simply not
getting anywhere. I think the inspectors will tell you that
while they were in the country, they were able to make some
headway, but of course, Saddam Hussein----
Senator Kerry. I think the inspectors said--I do not want
to go back and redebate it, but they said they were partially
in compliance and partially out. That was the last report of
Hans Blix.
Dr. Rice. Well, partially was not good enough----
Senator Kerry. Well, I understand that.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----when you are talking about
somebody who had used weapons of mass destruction. And so we
could not accept partial compliance.
But you asked me, Senator, what is the difference, and my--
--
Senator Kerry. Well, the difference is why could you not
have gotten full compliance. You do not know the answer to that
because you made a different decision.
Dr. Rice. Well, I do not think you were going to get full
compliance from Saddam Hussein.
Senator Kerry. We know you do not think that.
Dr. Rice. Well, with American and coalition forces
building up on his shores, he still decided not to comply with
his international obligations. So that is pretty good evidence
that he was not going to be convinced to comply.
Senator Kerry. But again, this goes into process, which I
do not want to really go to for a number of different reasons.
I am just trying to find the root of your confidence about this
resolution with North Korea.
Dr. Rice. Oh, I did not say that I was confident that it
would be resolved. I said that I thought we still had room for
a diplomatic solution. We also, of course, have a vibrant
deterrent on the Korean peninsula in the person of our alliance
with South Korea.
But if anyone is going to do anything about the North
Korean nuclear program, it is going to be the combined pressure
of its neighbors, not the United States alone. When we put the
proposal on the table, one that, by the way, was discussed and
vetted and talked about with our closest allies, Japan and
South Korea, before we put it on the table, people did think
that it was a step forward. The North Koreans have not
responded. We will see if we can get them to respond.
What I had really hoped that they would see is that there
is another path. They do not have to be on this path, but they
are going to have to recognize that there is no good path in
the international system as long as they try to hold onto their
nuclear weapons program.
Senator Kerry. And how do you distinguish that from Iran?
Dr. Rice. From Iran?
Senator Kerry. Yes, and the possibilities there.
Dr. Rice. Well, for one thing, I think with Iran we are
dealing with a country that is not nearly as isolated as North
Korea. The Iranian people are not going to eat bark as the
North Koreans do, and so I think that we have some other
instruments of pressure, if we are willing and able to mobilize
them, on Iran.
We are also in a somewhat earlier stage with Iran, and the
IAEA, I think, is starting to try to function there in an
effective way.
We have some bilateral ways to try and deal with the
Iranian nuclear program. I mentioned earlier that the Russians
and their requirement with the Iranians that they sign the
additional protocol and bring back the spent fuel.
We simply have different tools with Iran than we had with
North Korea and different tools with North Korea than we had
with Iraq. That is the nature of dealing with these very
different regimes.
Senator Kerry. Do you believe that we would be better
advantaged with respect to Iran if we were to be either leading
or at least joined into more directly and openly with the
British, French, and Germans in their initiative?
Dr. Rice. I think the British, French, and Germans know
that we are coordinating with them, that we are skeptical that
this is going to work, but we certainly hope that it is going
to work. We will see how far the Europeans get. Someone needs
to test the Iranian willingness to live up to their
international obligations, and that is what the EU-3 are doing.
Senator Kerry. Why not be part of it?
Dr. Rice. I think it is always very important, Senator,
that the Iranians know that the United States is not prepared
at this point to take away the possibility that the real course
ought to be here to declare them not in compliance and take
them to the Security Council.
Senator Kerry. Do you not always have that option anyway?
Is the option of sanctions and greater action not always on the
table?
Dr. Rice. I think we think the best course right now,
Senator, is to EU-3 see if they can get this agreement. We are
skeptical about it.
Senator Kerry. Is this a good cop/bad cop routine, or is
it something more thoughtful than that?
Dr. Rice. I think it is probably not a good thing for us
to be involved in negotiations about which we are skeptical.
Let us let them explore with the Iranians, and we will see what
steps are needed by the United States.
Senator Kerry. Is it possible that your own skepticism
breeds a failure?
Dr. Rice. I do not think so. I think if the Iranians are
going to live up to their international obligations, the EU-3
have given them plenty of reason to do it.
Senator Kerry. The Iraqi Stabilization Group that you were
put in charge of October 2003 by almost everybody's judgments
has disintegrated. People have left it. It has not been
successful. I wonder if you would speak to that. There were a
half dozen agencies or so that were supposed to identify and
resolve problems. How would you characterize the work and
effect of that group?
Dr. Rice. The Iraq Stabilization Group, Senator, was
actually an internal NSC group. It was not an interagency
group.
Senator Kerry. Well, you had a half dozen agencies that
were part of it that were reporting to you as part of it, were
they not?
Dr. Rice. No. The role of the Iraq Stabilization Group was
to improve the information flow during the period of time when
we had the CPA in place. It was to try and de-bottleneck back
here when there were problems for the CPA. We were very active
and I think played a very important and useful role in the
governance issues so that Bob Blackwell, who at the time was
heading the Iraq Stabilization Group on governance and had an
under secretary's group on governance, was very active in
working with Lakhdar Brahimi in bringing about the Iraq interim
government. So that was a very successful outcome of having the
Iraq Stabilization Group.
But it was a group that was really there for the period in
which the Coalition Provisional Authority was moving from one
that had been almost exclusively in the chain of command for
the Defense Department to one that needed more interagency
back-stopping back here. Many of those functions have really
now been taken over by the United States embassy and by the
State Department.
Senator Kerry. Well, in the Washington Post--maybe they
got it wrong, but they characterized it as the new group to be
led by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and drawn
from more than a half dozen cabinet agencies----
Dr. Rice. Let me just make the distinction that the Iraq
Stabilization Group was an intra-NSC group.
Senator Kerry. No, I understand that.
Dr. Rice. It reached out to and tried to help the CPA by
bringing together interagency teams when it was necessary to
try and get something done. We tried to improve the information
flow. We tried to improve the coordination back here. We tried
to de-bottleneck for the CPA. When the CPA needed some help,
for instance, on the currency reforms, we worked with the
Treasury to get the right people out there from Treasury to do
the currency reform, which was actually very successful.
Senator Kerry. Was this an effort to try to straighten out
what the military itself was not able to do or not doing?
Dr. Rice. It was an effort to move from a stage at which
it had been almost exclusively Defense Department and military
to a period in which you needed better interagency support for
what the CPA was doing.
Senator Kerry. How successful would you say it was?
Dr. Rice. I think it was successful in a number of ways.
If you look at several projects, the currency reform I think
was very successful. I think that we were very successful on
the governance issues. Again, Bob Blackwell, who was the chair
of the governance Iraq Stabilization Group, was very active
with Lakhdar Brahimi in bringing about the Iraqi interim
government. I do not think it would have happened without the
activities of that group. So it had its successes. Bottlenecks
also remained and we continued to work on them.
I think it is a much smoother system, frankly, with an
embassy and an ambassador who can oversee those things with the
back-stopping of the State Department and the interagency
process of which the State Department is in the lead.
Senator Kerry. Has been?
Dr. Rice. I think it has been smoother----
Senator Kerry. Smoother.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----with an embassy in place that
can be the coordination in the field. We have always had the
view that most of the interagency coordination ought to
actually be done in the field.
Senator Kerry. How does that reconcile with the pretty
strong opinion you had that you wrote in Foreign Affairs when
you said the President must remember that the military is a
special instrument? It is lethal and it is meant to be. It is
not a civilian police force. It is not a political referee. It
is most certainly not designed to build a civilian society.
What happened?
Dr. Rice. Well, we found ourselves building a civilian
society, and we frankly as a country do not really have the
tools outside of the military to do it, which is why the work
that Senator Lugar has done in sponsoring this office of
reconstruction and stabilization is such important work. We
need a civilian corps that can do the kinds of things that we
had to put together in a really rather ad hoc fashion in
Afghanistan, in Iraq, even frankly in Bosnia-Herzegovina going
all the way back. This has been a need, a set of skills that I
think we will want to have in a more coherent and directed way.
That is why I think we have to give very great support to this
office of stabilization and reconstruction. It would have been
very helpful to have it in the past couple of years.
Senator Kerry. Do you think that that misjudgment about
what it can or cannot do--and I say misjudgment in broad
terms--has complicated choices that you may face and the
President may face today as a result of the stretching pretty
thin of our military forces, numbers of divisions, active duty,
equipment? The commanders over there tell me that in a matter
of months, you put on several years of wear and tear on
equipment. There is going to be a huge equipment deficit at the
back end of this that America has yet to really see the bill
for. I gather 1 year there is worth 7 years on an aircraft.
Dr. Rice. Well, we have been at war and we have had to use
our forces and use them hard. I think that Secretary Rumsfeld
is giving a lot of attention to how to deal with the
obligations that we have and the structure of our forces. We
believe we can continue to meet obligations that we have
globally with the forces that we have, but there is no doubt as
to the matter of how one transitions from war to peace and that
intermediate stage that we need new skills and new
organizations in order to be able to do that. The military
fights and wins the war. There is a period of time, I think
appropriately, where the military is really the dominant force
on the ground. But as you move to civilian reconstruction, you
need people who understand legal reform and understand how to
build a civil justice system and a police system, how to change
a currency, and that is what we are going to try to build.
Senator Kerry. I know that Senator Lugar has long been
concerned about this. A lot of us on the committee have. But I
must say to you that I am deeply concerned. I recommended that
we add another 40,000 troops. I gather there is going to be an
addition of some 30,000 without formally creating new
divisions. But I think we are way behind the curve in terms of
this civilian side combined public diplomacy component, and I
do not think the budget begins to match what it needs to. And
when you look at the other side of the costs I just described,
the back-end military equipment, et cetera, the American
taxpayer, to pursue this properly, has a--it goesback to what
Senator Biden was saying earlier about kind of telling the
American people what is expected of them. I do not personally
think it is all on the table sufficiently when you combine the
needs of the counterproliferation efforts with various
challenges of the human condition with various challenges of
the narcotics and other environmental and other kinds of
efforts that are all sort of growing rather than receding.
And then you add it to what Senator Sarbanes has been
saying about our overall fiscal challenge here. We have some
very, very tough choices ahead of us and I hope the
administration and you will really put them to the Congress and
to the American people because the outcome is obviously
gigantic, but we have got to be on the right track.
With that in mind, I would just like to ask you a couple
more quick things, and I appreciate your patience.
You wrote or said--I cannot remember whether it was in a
speech--that the terrorist ideology is the direct heir to
communism and naziism and fascism. That struggle against terror
is fundamentally a struggle of vision and values. Do you really
see terrorism as an ideology? Is it not really anarchy?
Dr. Rice. Senator, I think it is really--terrorism is the
tool of Islamic extremism. That is really what I was referring
to in that article.
Senator Kerry. You would not really think of it as an
ideology.
Dr. Rice. I think of Islamic extremism as an ideology.
Senator Kerry. So do I. Terror is the----
Dr. Rice. Right. We have talked a lot about this. The fact
is that early on what we have had to do is to talk about
terrorism in order to delegitimize it, and I think we are doing
a good job internationally of delegitimizing it. Saying that no
cause can be served by the use of terrorism is an extremely
important message. But there is no doubt that when you talk
about al Qaeda or you talk about the threats to the Middle East
or the threats to the Pakistan or what operated out of
Afghanistan, you are talking about a virulent form of extremism
coming, in large part, out of the Middle East, which is a
perversion of Islam.
Senator Kerry. Do you believe that we can do a better job
than we have been of bridging that gap, of reaching out to
moderate Islam, bringing mullahs, clerics, imams, et cetera
together, along with leaders of other religions and having a
much more concerted global dialogue on this?
Dr. Rice. I do think that interface efforts are very
important and should be done. I think a lot of it is going on
in the private sector, and I actually am not sure that this is
something that the U.S. Government would do better than letting
the private sector----
Senator Kerry. Well, is it not really a part of public
diplomacy? There is no way to----
Dr. Rice. It is certainly a part of public diplomacy,
Senator, but I often think that we are too narrow in our
definition public diplomacy if we only think it is something
the U.S. Government is going to do.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. ----Well, this will be the
first time this administration left a faith-based analysis
lying by the wayside.
Dr. Rice. Well, the faith-based analysis here I would
agree with, and I think the need for interfaith dialogue is
important. I would hope it would happen in the society more
broadly.
But on the debate that is going on within Islam itself,
that is also an extremely important debate. We cannot be the
ones who carry that debate. Moderate imams, moderate mosques,
moderate universities have got to do that.
Senator Kerry. Of course, but they're anxious. I met with
one of the principal leaders of Islam in Cairo, and they are
fighting their own struggle. I think they are interested in
seeing us and others reach out in a way that tries to help
bridge the gap because it has serious implications in their
countries.
Dr. Rice. I could not agree more, and we should be doing
that. We are trying in some ways. The broader Middle East
Forum, the forum for the future, allows for moderate voices,
civil society, business groups, other groups, to come together
in kind of space that they can engage each other, and I think
that is very important.
You take a country like Pakistan, it has come a long way.
It was, 3 and a half years ago, on the brink of really going
completely to extremism, with its ties to the Taliban, with
thorough penetration of al Qaeda. If you look now at the way
that they fight instead al Qaeda and if you look at one of my
top 10 speeches that any leader has given in recent years, it
was a speech that Musharraf gave on December 12th after the
attack on the Indian parliament in which he said that extremism
and modernism cannot exist side by side in Pakistan. That has
given rise to very promising developments, if you think about
it, in South Asia. As India and Pakistan start feeling a better
future, I think in part that has been fueled by Pakistan's
unwillingness to be associated with extremism and India's
democracy and a very healthy set of developments there. They
are small steps still and it is still fragile.
Senator Kerry. Yes, they are and I agree with you. I hope
you will really take a look at this. I think it is an important
mark of the current leadership because there are such political
and obviously security overtones attached to this so that it
cannot be left exclusively to the realm of whatever religious
initiatives are going to take place.
And secondly, it is paramount because we have an urgent
need to isolate the terrorists rather than having them isolate
us or having extremists isolate us. In many parts of the world,
we have been the ones. I think you know that.
A couple of last questions. You also wrote at one point
that you moved our Nation beyond antiquated theories like
mutual assured destruction and moved forward with the
deployment of ballistic missile defense. To the best of my
knowledge, obviously, not to be cute, but we do not have a
ballistic missile defense yet. And the outlook as to when we
might have the kind of defense that really obviates mutual
assured destruction is anybody's guess.
Do you really believe it is ``antiquated'' after your
experience as a student of the Soviet Union and what we
succeeded in doing and what Ronald Reagan succeeded in doing in
all of this?
Dr. Rice. Senator, it was meant really to reflect a change
in the relationship between the United States and Russia. I do
think mutually assured destruction was antiquated in regards to
the United States and Russia. With the United States and the
Soviet Union, there was nothing----
Senator Kerry. But you are not referring generically----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----coming between us but mutually
assured destruction. The change here was to say to the Russians
that when we are no longer enemies, mutually assured
destruction does not make any sense. We need to have a
different kind of relationship.
And by the way, on ballistic missile defense, we will, I
think, have initial operating capability fairly soon, but the
important thing is that we are exploring the technologies now,
working toward the development of the systems. We are getting a
lot of interest in these systems from some corners that one
might not expect. We have even had discussions with the
Russians about what we might do to deal with the threat of
ballistic missiles.
Senator Kerry. Well, I support the research and the
development. I am skeptical of a rapid deployment prior to its
being adequately tested and proven, particularly given the
financial concerns that we face as a country. But obviously, we
ought to pursue it, and if it is feasible, I think there are
ways to make it safer.
Dr. Rice. Well, we will deploy. We actually have begun
deployment and will continue deployment because we believe that
sometimes it is important to start getting the initial
capability in place.
Senator Kerry. If I can just say, summarizing, a couple of
things. Number one, you said earlier that you support the State
Department's new office of reconstruction and stabilization so
that our skills in nation-building can be honed and we can do
the job. And we need to do that, and all of us agree. But
regrettably, the State Department itself issued a report saying
that its own plan for that kind of stabilization and effort in
Iraq was ignored.
So we have had a process here, and I am not going to go
through it all. But I think a lot of us are hoping--let me just
take this instance to say something about your predecessor.
I think Colin Powell pushed as hard as he could. I think he
wanted to do those things. I think he is obviously an
exceptional public servant. We owe him a great deal, a great
debt of gratitude for that service. And I have great respect
for him. I know that he fought for things and was skeptical
about things that others were more certain of and went forward
notwithstanding his advice and counsel. And I know that the
State Department had very significant plans and concerns that,
had they been adequately embraced and adequately implemented,
might have really saved us not just lives, but money and
prestige and relationships in the world.
You do not have to comment on this, but you pick up the
newspapers almost anywhere and you read about how the President
is going to be going to Europe shortly in order to repair
relationships. Now, you might not use that language, but the
language is used universally around the world.
So my hope is--and I say this with the deepest commitment
to working in a bipartisan way when we can. When we cannot,
when criticism is appropriate, I intend to level it. But after
20-plus years on this committee and working with people like
Senator Lugar and others and watching the balance shift here so
many times, we all know that we are strongest when we are
together. We are strongest when we are bipartisan. Historically
in the old days with Senator Vandenberg and others, foreign
policy picked up in a bipartisan fashion almost always and
politics ended at the water's edge.
I think that is how it ought to be if it is properly done,
but that requires a level of consultation, a level of respect,
a level of listening and of dialogue that just has been absent,
unlike any period of time since I have served here in the
Senate. I think there was greater dialogue and greater
discussion and greater trust and less ideology with President
Reagan, with George Herbert Walker Bush, and going back in
history.
So my hope is that you are going to herald a new period.
Everybody knows the trust that the President has in you.
Everybody knows the closeness of your relationship. You have
the President's ear. You would not be here. So we are all
really asking for an opportunity to try to bind the wounds up,
bring the country together, find the common ground.
I think the world is waiting for a different approach, and
I am confident that if the President offers the genuine
opportunities for this kind of mutuality, not just here but
abroad, you will be able to advance the interests of our
country and of the planet. I think that history can be written
in a different way than it has been in the last 4 years.
So I hope you will seize that opportunity and I hope that
we have the opportunity to work together. I pledge to you that
if you reach out and if there are ways to find that common
ground in the interests of our country, I am prepared to meet
you halfway, which I think we need to do.
Dr. Rice. Thank you, Senator, and I fully accept and look
forward to working with you.
Senator Kerry. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Kerry, and
that is a good note on which to conclude today, that there is a
reaching out to work together. I thank you, Dr. Rice, and
members of the committee for over 9 and a half hours of
testimony today. We look forward to seeing you again tomorrow
morning at 9 o'clock. Providence willing, we will have a
business meeting at 10:00.
Dr. Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 7:45 p.m., the committee was recessed, to
reconvene at 9:00 a.m., Wednesday, January 19, 2005.]
THE NOMINATION OF DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE
----------
Day Two
----------
Wednesday, January 19, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:02 a.m. in Room
SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman,
Voinovich, Alexander, Sununu, Murkowski, Martinez, Biden, Dodd,
Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson, and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
We appreciate the attendance of Senators. We appreciate,
especially, the attendance of our witness, the nominee for
Secretary of State, Dr. Condoleezza Rice. I want to thank Dr.
Rice, her staff, and all Members for their diligence throughout
yesterday. As has been mentioned, we had over nine hours of
testimony, including, I think, very good questions and very
good answers. I was just visiting with my colleague Senator
Boxer. Almost every point of view of the American public was
heard.
We want to continue this morning with another round of
questioning from committee Members who have remaining questions
to ask. Some do have questions, some do not; and, therefore, a
number of Members will pass. We will have a five-minute round.
This will conclude at 10:00 o'clock. We've announced to Members
that they should anticipate a business meeting and a roll-call
vote on nomination, with that activity commencing at 10:00.
But, prior to that time, we look forward to questioning.
Now, let me say, from the beginning, at least on my part, I
will pass on this round, and I will call now upon Senator Dodd
for any remaining questions that he might have.
Senator Dodd. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
let me join you in commending our colleagues in the committee
yesterday, and our nominee, as well. It was a long day. If
nothing else, I was very impressed with your tenaciousness to
sit at that table and have 18 of us up here raising questions
that covered the entire globe, and matters of deep concern to
all of us. And we appreciate your willingness to go through
that. It was a long day, but, I think, a worthwhile one, Mr.
Chairman, as you point out. And I'm sure our colleague, Senator
Biden--I don't know if he's going to be along or not this
morning.
I just have a couple of matters I'd like to raise----
The Chairman. Very well.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----if I may, with you, as this
time moves on, of--a little more than ten days ago, Dr. Rice, a
disturbing report surfaced that the United States--
specifically, the CIA--was making a practice of handing over
detainees from U.S. control to a third country for the purposes
of interrogation. This process is referred to as ``rendition,''
I think, is what it's called. And the Intelligence Agency
admits to practicing it since the early 1990s. In this report,
there are several accounts of prisoners being transferred by
the U.S. to certain countries, and then allegedly being
tortured during those interrogations.
Last year, I introduced an amendment to the defense
authorization bill, part of which would have prevented the
Department of Defense from transferring prisoners to third
countries without keeping a record of the transfer, and the
reasons for it. I wonder if you might comment on this, if
you're familiar enough with the practice, and whether or not we
might be willing at least to--one, at least, either preventing
these renditions from occurring, or, if not, at least keeping
some record so we have some way of determining how these people
are being treated. Are you familiar----
Dr. Rice. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----with the subject matter?
Dr. Rice. Thank you, Senator. May I just take one moment,
before answering the question, just to also thank the Members
of the committee for yesterday? I think it was an extensive,
some would say even exhaustive, look at the questions that we
face in American foreign policy, but I think it was an
important day. I appreciate, very much, the spirit in which the
questions were asked. And I look forward--and I really meant
what I said, and I want to underscore--I look forward to
working with each and every Member of the committee in a
bipartisan fashion so that we can fashion an American foreign
policy for the 21st century that takes advantage of the
substantial opportunities before us, recognizing that these are
also difficult times for the country.
And I want to thank you, especially, Mr. Chairman, for your
leadership of yesterday, and to tell you that I look forward to
many other sessions of that kind.
The Chairman. Great.
Dr. Rice. Senator--now let me turn to Senator Dodd's
question--the United States is not permitted to transfer anyone
if we think that they are going to be tortured. And, in fact,
we make efforts to ascertain, from any party, that this will
not happen. And you can be certain that we will continue to do
so.
I want to be careful on commenting on intelligence matters,
particularly in open session, but to say that we do--anything
that is done, is done within the limits of the law. It is done
with a recognition that the United States is special, and has
special responsibilities, and that we will continue to do that.
As to keeping a record, I would have to demur for now. I
don't have enough information----
Senator Dodd. If you'd look at that for me, and get back--
--
Dr. Rice. I will, and I'd be happy to talk with you about
it at some point, when we're not in open session.
Senator Dodd. Appreciate it. Another one--and I'll--this
may be the last, Mr. Chairman, to make sure we have enough time
for others as well--mentioned earlier, Senator Nelson, Senator
Chafee, and I made this trip in--to South America. And one of
the issues, obviously--it came up everywhere--is the contraband
issues and the narco-trafficking issues. It's very, very common
thing. The economic issue is important, as well. I'm not asking
you to comment on this. I'd ask you to pay particular attention
to that tri-border area----
Dr. Rice. Yes.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. ----that Senator Chafee, Senator
Nelson, and I spent some time in, that Brazilian, Argentinian,
Paraguayan corner where there--it is the--the term ``The Wild
West,'' in terms of contraband issues, and money flowing back
and forth, and some very, very important questions. And there
needs to be some specific attention, I think, paid to that,
more attention than we are right now.
The narco-trafficking issue, there's a great concern about
the ballooning effect we've seen over the years, and that is
where we've put a lot of attention, as we have, over $3 billion
dollars in Columbia over the last few years. And there's
concerns now of this problem reemerging again in Peru and
Bolivia, where it was in the past, even parts of Brazil. The
issues of Venezuela obviously get effected by these decisions,
as well. And there is--really is a need, I think, for a more
comprehensive approach to this.
When we had the certification process here, which the
Chairman and others will remember, it was a rather difficult
process we went through, year end and year out, declaring which
countries were complying, or not complying, with our anti-
narcotic efforts. It caused a lot of acrimony between countries
that would be labeled not being supportive and the like. So we
changed that, we dropped that. But we promised, when we did it,
that we were going to replace it with something. Just doing
nothing about it was not the answer.
And part of what we talked about was developing a more
comprehensive approach; whereas, the consuming country, we'd
work more closely with the producing, transferring, money-
laundering nations, as well.
I would urge you to see if we can't revitalize that. There
is a growing concern with the great disparity of resources
we're applying to these countries as they battle with these
issues, and it's something that really deserves more attention
or we're going to find this problem just moving from nation to
nation in these countries without really addressing it more
thoroughly.
I don't know if you want to comment on that at all, or not,
but I'd ask you to really pay attention to that, if you could.
Dr. Rice. Thank you Senator. I will take a hard look at
it. We had, in concept, when we had the Andean Initiative,
exactly this in mind, of course, which was that if you stop the
spread narco-trafficking in one place, it would find a home in
another. And it was intended to be comprehensive, in terms of
alternative livelihoods and in terms of economic development to
forestall that. But it's a very good point and I'll take a hard
look at it.
Senator Dodd. Thank you.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.
Many Senators have come in since the beginning of the
hearing. Let me repeat, we're going to have a five-minute
round. Senators are not obligated to use their five minutes.
Some will want to pass. In any event, at 10:00 o'clock,
Senators, we'll gather for a business meeting on the
nomination.
Senator Chafee?
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning,
Dr. Rice.
I see you're fourth in line for succession to the
presidency. And so, this is an important hearing we're having.
And also, in that line of succession, the only one that hasn't
appeared before the public in any kind of capacity in electoral
process, so this is an important process.
Dr. Rice. Thank you.
Senator Chafee. Going back to our questions of finding--my
questions from yesterday--finding common ground. And as I look
back in history--and you're a historian--and the success we had
with the thaw with the People's Republic of China, had a lot to
do with the exchange of pingpong teams of all things. And I
always admired the architects of that doctrine, in that we knew
the Chinese pingpong players were probably going to beat us 21
to 2, or something, but that wasn't what was important; it was
the start of finding common ground. And I was wondering--in
some of my questions you seem to reject that doctrine of
finding common ground.
Dr. Rice. Thank you Senator, for giving me an opportunity
to answer that. Because, obviously, we need to look for common
ground. There is no reason that the United States has to have
permanent enemies. We have had circumstances in which there
have been major changes in the world. And the Libyan experience
shows that--if there are countries that are prepared to
foreswear behavior that is dangerous to the international
system, that we can start down a different path. And I'm glad
that you mentioned the pingpong diplomacy, because, obviously,
in almost every circumstance, the exchange of people of civil
society, of non-governmental actors is often an important tool
in thawing difficult relations. And so, I don't want to leave
the impression that I would be, by any means, opposed to
looking for those opportunities, and I will look for them.
Senator Chafee. Can we specifically go back to Venezuela,
again? Where can we find common ground?
Dr. Rice. Well, we have, obviously--we talked about the
economic relationship yesterday, and there's common ground
there. We sit together in the OAS, we sit together in the
Summit of the Americas. The point is that the--we don't have a
problem with finding common ground. We have, right now, a
government in Venezuela that has been unconstructive, in
important ways. And I would just urge that the entire
neighborhood, as well as the Venezuelan Government, look at
what's happening, in terms of democracy in Venezuela, in terms
of Venezuela's relations with its neighbors. But this is a
matter of sadness, not of anger.
Senator Chafee. And with Iran, can you--is there any
potential for finding common ground with Iran?
Dr. Rice. Well, I think the problems with Iran are well
known. And we've tried to make them known to the Iranian
government--often through third parties, sometimes when we've
been in four together.
This is just a regime that has a really very different view
of the Middle East and where the world is going than we do.
It's really hard to find common ground with a government that
thinks Israel should be extinguished. It's difficult to find
common ground with a government that is supporting Hezbollah
and terrorist organizations that are determined to undermine
the Middle East peace that we seek.
So I would hope that the nuclear issues will be resolved.
It's extremely important to the world that Iran not acquire a
nuclear weapon. And we are working closely with the European
Union on that. I would hope that Iranian Government does
something to make clear to the world that they're not going to
support terrorists who are determined to undermine the two-
state solution in the Palestinian--in the Holy Land. And those
are barriers to relations, and we just have to be honest about
it. It's a very different view. Not to mention, by the way,
that a theocratic government that has a view that the mullahs
ought to rule, that has no rights--or it has a human-rights
record that is really appalling, and that treats its citizens,
its women, in that way is not a regime with which I think we
have very much common ground, particularly given the way that
we would like to see the Middle East develop.
Senator Chafee. It seems to me, going back into history,
the same occurrences were--with the People's Republic of China,
at the time--they were arming the--in the middle of the Vietnam
War, arming our opponents in that war. I mean, there was every
opportunity to accentuate our differences and everything wrong
with them, but, nonetheless, through this thawing, this process
of exchange and ping-pong diplomacy, now the two countries are
not killing each other.
And, interestingly, on Iran, I went to a conference in
Bahrain, earlier in December, and the Iranians were there, and
I looked up, out of curiosity, ``Who are these delegates from
Iran?'' And each of the three delegates from Iran had been
educated in the United States--one at the University of
Houston, one at the University of Cincinnati, and one at
Michigan State. And I wasn't surprised. There is common ground.
But, given every opportunity to express even the slightest
finding of that common ground, I find that you, instead, fall
into accentuating and magnifying our differences.
Dr. Rice. Well, Senator, let me just make the following
point. You know, when the Forum for the Future was held, the
very important meeting that was held to talk about reform in
the Middle East, the Iranians were actually invited. The
Moroccans wanted to invite them. We said we had no objection.
And they didn't come. And I think there's a reason they didn't
come, which was that that was a gathering of civil society and
business leaders and people--people in the country who wanted
to talk about reform. That's an opportunity for Iran to
interact with the world.
We showed, I think, our respect for, and our humanitarian
impulse to, the Iranian people with our response to the Bam
earthquake, and it was a very great moment in American--in the
history of American compassion and generosity. And I hope we'll
have other opportunities, that are not linked to disaster, to
let the Iranian people know that we have no desire to isolate
them from the international system, or from others.
And so, I understand your question. It's a complex problem,
when you're dealing with a regime that really has views that we
consider illegitimate. But from the point of view of the
Iranian people, this is a people who should be in contact with
the rest of the world.
Senator Chafee. Well thank you very much. I know my time
is up. I'll just say thank you for your time. And yesterday we
talked about Martin Luther King day and I recommend you read
his great treatise, ``Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or
Community.''
Dr. Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Chafee.
Senator Biden?
Senator Biden. Madame Secretary, you had a long day
yesterday, and you've got many long days ahead of you as
Secretary of State. But I'd like to cut right to it.
I want to make it clear, I intend to vote for you, because
I believe, strongly, the President is entitled to his Cabinet,
unless the person he taps is far out of the mainstream, and
you're clearly not, or is not intellectually capable to handle
the job. You're clearly capable. And he obviously values you
very, very much as his counsel. So I'm going to vote for you.
But I must tell you it's with a little bit of frustration and
some reservation.
The questions we asked you in writing, and then yesterday
at the hearing, I thought gave you an opportunity to
acknowledge some of the mistakes and misjudgements of the past
four years. And I want to make it clear--and I've made it clear
time and again--no matter who is President--it could have been
the Lord Almighty, it could have been Al Gore, it could have
been John Kerry, it could have been anyone, it could have been
John Kennedy, Franklin Roosevelt, Ronald Reagan--after 9/11,
they would have made mistakes. There's no way in which we could
have undertaken this effort without some mistakes being made.
So the point we are--at least I, and I don't think anyone else
here is different--trying to get to you yesterday, is not to
play ``I got you,'' or embarrass the President, but about what
we've learned, what we'd do differently, how we would proceed
differently, given the opportunity again or given a similar
circumstance, which we may face. We may face a God-awful choice
in North Korea. We may face a God-awful choice in Iran. We may
face an awful choice with regard to Syria.
And so, we're trying to get some insight into how a second
term, a second chance, a second round might be different, not
because--not even because anyone else would have done it
better--that Al Gore, had he been President, would have done it
better.
But instead of seizing the opportunity, it seems to me, Dr.
Rice, you danced around it. You sort of stuck to the party
line, which seems pretty consistent. You're always right, you
all never made any mistakes, you're never wrong. And it's
almost like, ``If I acknowledge any weakness, if I acknowledge
any misjudgments on the part of me, or the President, or
anybody on the team, it's a sign of weakness.'' But I,
personally, don't think it is. I think it's a sign of some
degree of maturation, a strength.
Yesterday, you claimed my colleague Barbara Boxer was
impugning your integrity when she asked you about the changing
rationale for the war in Iraq. I wish, instead, you had
acknowledged the facts, that the administration secured the
support of the American people, and of the Congress, for going
to war based overwhelmingly on the notion that they believed--
and it was portrayed, in my view, by the administration,
understandably, from your perspective--that Iraq was an
imminent threat because it possessed, or was about to possess,
weapons of mass destruction. Now, when it turns out there were
no such weapons, you claim the war was based on removing a
dictator.
Now, my recollection--I've asked my staff to go back and
check this, and, before the hearing's over this morning,
they'll have statements--my recollection is that it was
explicitly stated it was not about regime change. That's not
why we were going to war. That would be effect, but that wasn't
the rationale for going to war when we went to war.
Now, I'm glad Saddam's gone. He deserves a special place in
hell. A special place in hell. Chuck Hagel and I, we went up
into Irbil, got smuggled in before the war in Northern Iraq, we
rode in a seven-hour ride through the mountains--I understand
why the Kurds now say, ``The mountains are our only friends''--
and three hours, four hours before that in Turkey, and we met
with the widows of those people who were gassed. We saw the
pictures of little kids' eyes bulging out. And, you know, we
saw what Chemical Ali actually did to those people. So he
deserves a special place in hell.
But if you read the resolution Congress passed giving the
President authority to use force if necessary, it was about
disarming Saddam. It was about disarming him. And reread the
words of the President and other senior officials. In speech
after speech, TV appearance after TV appearance you left the
American people the impression that Iraq was on the verge of
reconstituting nuclear weapons. I don't doubt you believed
that. But to pretend we didn't leave them that impression, and
leave the Congress the impression. In fact, I'm not positive of
this, but I think I was on Face the Nation the day that the
Vice President was on Meet the Press, and he got asked about
nuclear weapons. The Vice President said, ``They have
reconstituted their nuclear weapons.'' And I got on, and I was
asked, on either Late Edition or one of the other Sunday
shows--they said, ``Is that true?'' And I looked at the camera
and said, ``Absolutely not. One of two things, either the Vice
President is deliberately misleading the American people and
the Congress, or you all are not telling the Congress the
truth''--and at that time I was the Ranking Member and, just
prior to that, the Chairman--``telling us the truth about what
we had, in terms of intelligence, because,'' I said, ``I've
seen nothing--nothing, nothing, nothing, up to that date, to
indicate they had reconstituted their nuclear capability.''
Back then, as I said, we were all left with the impression, as
Senator Boxer suggested, that this was about weapons of mass
destruction and an imminent threat.
Now, when I said, about, I don't know, six, eight months--
maybe longer--ago, I said the administration claimed that there
was an imminent threat. It was pointed out to me that the
phrase ``imminent threat'' was not used by the President. But
here's what other senior officials said: ``immediate threat,''
quote, ``moral threat,'' quote, ``urgent threat,'' quote,
``grave threat,'' quote, ``serious and mounting threat,''
quote, ``unique threat''.
Now, it would almost be funny, if wasn't so, so serious,
that we are sort of dancing on the head of a pin here, whether
``imminent'' was stated. Now, you didn't say that--I was
corrected by other administration officials for saying the
President said ``imminent.''
But here's my point. Especially on matters of war and
peace, we've got to level with the American people. And if we
want, not only their support, if we want to sustain that
support--my greatest worry, and it genuinely is a worry, is
that if we're going to get the job done in Iraq, you're going
to have to come back here for another at least $100 billion
dollars before it's over, probably close to $200 billion before
it's all over. And I'm worried your friends on that side of the
aisle are going to say, ``Whoa, whoa, whoa, wait a minute,
Jack. You all didn't tell me that.'' Now, maybe I'm wrong.
Maybe they'll all pledge today, publically, that if you ask for
$200 billion dollars, they'll belly up to the bar and do it. I
can tell you, I will. I can tell you, I will. But you're going
to have a little problem here--``you, the administration''--
with this outfit, Democrats and Republicans, because I don't
think they know what's in store here. We've all got to be
honest, also, with the world. Otherwise, we'll do terrible
damage, beyond what we've already done, to our credibility,
which is, in my travels around the world, at least in question,
in many places.
You've heard, a thousand times, the analogy about, you
know, when Acheson went to de Gaulle and said, ``You know, Mr.
President, here, I want to show you the pictures of the Cubans,
the fact that the Cubans have put in Russian missile sites,''
et cetera, et cetera, and de Gaulle raised his hand and said,
``No, no, I don't need to see that.'' I'm paraphrasing. He
said, ``I know President Kennedy would never mislead me in a
matter of war and peace.'' Well, we both know, because the
world has changed, that even if Kerry had been elected, nobody
out there is likely to believe a President of the United States
on matters of intelligence just by saying, ``I know he'd never
mislead me, you don't have to show me anything.'' Those days
are gone, unfortunately, for a while.
After Iraq, it's much harder for the world to rally to our
side if we have to face a truly imminent threat in Korea or
Iran. The same goes for the way you answered my questions, in
my view, about training Iraqi security forces. It is true,
there's probably about 120,000 people in a uniform. But the
question really is--and I'll end Mr. Chairman, I know I'm going
over my time--the question really is, how many of those forces
could supplant an American force, how many of them we could
trade off for an American soldier? Because that's ultimately,
again, the exit strategy--get enough Iraqis there so we don't
need American troops there.
Time and again, this administration has tried to leave the
American people with the impression that Iraq has well over
100,000 fully trained, fully competent military police and
personnel. And that is simply not true. You and I know that.
We're months, probably years, away from reaching our target
goal.
When the Chairman and I were in Iraq with Senator Hagel,
right after Saddam's statue went down, we asked the military,
as well as the police trainers, ``How long would it take you to
train the military forces necessary?'' They talked about
40,000. And they said, ``At least two, maybe three years.''
``How long would it take you to train a police force capable of
policing the country, to replace the 79,000 thugs that were
called police before?'' They said, ``Three to five years.''
That was our people. Our people told us that.
And, all of a sudden, Rumsfeld announces, ``Hey, we got
this done.'' ``Don't worry, be happy,'' that calypso song,
should be the theme song of the civilian leadership of the
Defense Department.
So yesterday I think you had a chance to help wipe the
slate clean for the American people and our allies, tell them,
flat out, how hard it was going to be, how much more time it
was going to take, and why we needed to do it. It's not about
revisiting the past, Dr. Rice, it's about how you're going to
meet the challenge in the future. And I must tell you, for the
first time in the last four years, I have doubts about it.
Either because you're not telling us, the President doesn't
know, or you all don't have a plan, because I'm telling you
honestly, that's what I walk away from this hearing worried
about.
I'm going to vote for you because of the standard I have
about the President having intelligent, bright people, if
they're honorable--and you're all of those things--he gets to
choose who he wants. But I left the hearing yesterday, and got
on the train somewhat perplexed. I mean--and I'll end with
this--it was like the issue I asked you about Iran--if, in
fact, the Lord Almighty came down and said, ``Look, we
guarantee we can monitor whether they're keeping the
commitment--no nukes, no missiles''--would we make a deal with
them? Doesn't mean we don't still fight about their support of
Hezbollah, terror, human rights.
And my impression from you--and maybe you can clarify it
now--is that you said, ``no, we wouldn't make a deal if it was
just those two things. No nukes, no missiles. Period.'' Would
we make a deal with them? That's my question. Would we? Or do
we have to have it all settled, all at once, with them?
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Rice. Senator, I'll be--I'll be brief. The question
about Iran, I think, is a question of looking at the totality
of the relationship. Obviously, the pressing issue, right now,
is to deal with Iran's nuclear program. And I think that we
will see what becomes of the EU-3 efforts. We'll work with
them. We will see what we can do in the IAEA. If the Iranians--
--
Senator Biden. If they got that deal, would we sign it?
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----if the Iranians are prepared to
verifiably and irreversibly get rid of their nuclear program,
then that will be a very good day, and I think it would
certainly change the circumstances that we are looking at.
Senator Biden. I wish we had a court reporter----
Dr. Rice. But I----
Senator Biden [continuing]. ----to play back----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----I really----
Senator Biden [continuing]. ----what you just said. What's
the answer? Would you----
Dr. Rice. The answer----
Senator Biden [continuing]. ----make the deal----
Dr. Rice. The answer----
Senator Biden [continuing]. ----or not?
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----Senator, is, I'm not going to
get into hypotheticals til I know what I'm looking at. That's
the answer.
Senator Biden. Well, you're in a hypothetical with China.
You make a lot of deals with China. Their human-rights record
is horrible.
Dr. Rice. I understand those----
Senator Biden. Their problems with us are serious. I don't
get it. Why can't you just say, ``If that worked''--wouldn't
that be a nice message to send to the Iranians? Hey, guarantee
us no missiles, guarantee us no nukes, we can make a deal.
Dr. Rice. Senator, what we have----
Senator Biden. Is that a good idea?
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----what we have said to the
Iranians is, ''Look at the Libyan example.'' The United States
doesn't have permanent enemies.
Senator Biden. And look at the Libyan example, and look at
Qaddafi's role in human rights now, in his country.
Dr. Rice. But what we've done with the Libyan example, is
that the Libyans made an irreversible, we believe, decision
about their weapons of mass destruction. They made it, by the
way, without a promise of specific deals. They--we told them
that there could be a path to better relations, and they're now
on a path to better relations. That's----
Senator Biden. That's not what Qaddafi told me. I asked
him why he made the deal. Straight up. The State Department was
in there. He said, ``It was simple.'' He said, ``I knew if I
had used nuclear``--first of all, he said, ``Nuclear weapons
didn't help you much``--through a translator--``Nuclear weapons
didn't help you much in Vietnam and in Iraq.'' That was his
comment. Secondly, he said, ``I know, if I use them``--and I
forget exactly the phrase--``you'd blow me away.'' And thirdly,
he said, ``They weren't much value to me.'' And then he went on
to say, ``And now I can have American oil companies in here
pumping the oil out of the ground.'' I asked why he wanted
American oil companies, and he made an analogy of the French.
He said, ``You make a deal with the French, they say 90-10 and
they take 95.'' He said, ``The Americans, you say 50-50, they
only take 50.'' He was the most candid guy I ever spoke with.
Dr. Rice. Well, the Libyan example is a good example.
Let me turn to the--very briefly, to the question of
lessons learned. I said, yesterday, Senator, we've made a lot
of decisions in this period of time. Some of them have been
good, some of them have not been good. Some of them have been
bad decisions, I'm sure. I know enough about history to stand
back and to recognize that you judge decisions, not at the
moment, but in how it all adds up. And I've--that's just
strongly the way that I feel about big, historical changes. I'm
being as straightforward with you as I possibly can.
Senator Biden. I appreciate----
Dr. Rice. And that's----
Senator Biden [continuing]. ----that.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----that's how I see it.
Senator Biden. It's a little----
Dr. Rice. Now----
Senator Biden [continuing]. ----bit like I told my
daughter, when I have no doubt--16--I have no doubt, by the
time she was 30 years old, she would be a beautiful,
intelligent, well-educated, happy lady. I just wondered how
much pain there was going to be between then and----
Dr. Rice. I understand that. And I'm----
Senator Biden [continuing]. ----I'm talking about pain,
here.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----Well I'm afraid, in difficult
hysterical circumstances, there's going to be a lot of it, and
a lot of sacrifice.
I don't have a 16-year-old daughter to refer to, but I will
tell you that I think the analogy is apt, because it's how Iraq
turns out that really ultimately matters.
If I could just say one thing, though, about lessons
learned--and that is--I spoke, yesterday, about the important
work that we've been doing on the Office of Reconstruction and
Stabilization. I think that's a lesson learned. We didn't have
the right skills, the right capacity to deal with a
reconstruction effort of this kind. And we are going to face
these again, even if it's not after war. And I certainly hope
that it will not be. We're going to face it in places like
Liberia, places like Sudan. And so----
Senator Biden. All we want to know is, how are you going
to face it with the $15 billion bucks that's sitting out there
now, that you haven't spent, and, you know, you don't know what
to do with?
Dr. Rice. We do know what to do with it, Senator. And----
Senator Biden. If you want to tell us----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----That----
Senator Biden [continuing]. ----it would be good. Tell us.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----that spending is accelerating,
and I'll be glad to give you a full accounting of it next time
I see you.
Senator Biden. God bless you. And, by the way, my daughter
is 23. She thinks I'm handsome and smart again, and all is
well.
Dr. Rice. All is well.
The Chairman. And she's right.
Senator Boxer. We'd better straighten her out.
Senator Biden. Thanks, pal.
The Chairman. Senator Coleman?
Senator Coleman. Thank you. I just----
Senator Nelson. I've got one that's 27, and I'm still
going through a lot of pain.
Senator Coleman. Two comments, Dr. Rice. One, with all the
talk about foreign-policy goals, there are things that impact
my constituents most directly. I was surprised, my first year
as a Senator, I probably spent more time on immigration issues
and child adoption than any other issue in my state office. So
I just want to raise that. And probably, by the way, the most
satisfying portion of what I do, to unite families.
You have a program called Adjudicate Orphan Status First.
It's a pilot project. I would just urge you to take a look at
expanding it. We do wonderful things to bring families
together, and it's really important stuff that we don't talk
about much.
And I am just going to have to join in the conversation
here. I am sympathetic to some of my colleagues' concerns about
finding common ground. I join with some of my colleagues,
believing that we need to find more common ground with
Venezuela. I think we have to figure out a way to do that.
But I have to agree with you, and appreciate your response,
in separating Venezuela from Iran, a country that's calling for
the destruction of Israel, that's supporting terrorism, that
has no freedom of religion, an abysmal human-rights record.
Pursuit of nuclear weapons--just in Iraq, talking to Allawi
with concerns about Iran interfering with what's going on in
Iraq. And I will say, Dr. Rice, for this Senator, the idea of
finding common ground with Iran, and the mullahs makes me sick.
So I guess there is a separation there, and I believe it's
important for some of us to keep our eye on that difference
between Iran and Venezuela.
Dr. Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, very much Senator Coleman.
Senator Feingold?
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Rice, thanks for this further opportunity to speak with
you.
I'm struck by the conversation you just had with Senator
Biden with regard to Iraq; in part, because I think if people
are watching this hearing, they would think that we've been in
great disagreement about foreign policy ever since 9/11. That's
not what really happened. We were all quite unified with regard
to the fight against terrorism, trying to figure out this
challenge, up until the time that serious disagreements
occurred with regard to whether Iraq really was part of that
effort, or to what extent it was.
So I want to return, in that spirit, to the item that I
started with yesterday, Secretary Rumsfeld's interesting
comments, in his memo, that there was no consensus within the
national-security community of the United States about how to
even measure success in the fight against terrorism. And you
and I had an exchange about this yesterday, where you talked
about some of the places, geographically, where it's much
harder for the terrorists' network to operate. I talked about
my concern that I think they actually are able to operate in
other places--North Africa--and we went back and forth on that.
But, fundamentally, I'd like to have you say a little bit
about, how do we measure success--not a list of things we've
done, but how do we measure how well the terrorists are doing?
How do we know whether they're picking up steam, in terms of
picking up recruits and gathering more help around the world,
or not? How do we measure this thing? I think that's one of the
most important things that perhaps we could come together on,
and start discussing again, once we get through this serious
disagreement on Iraq.
Dr. Rice. It's a very interesting question Senator. And
it's a hard question. As you know, when you're measuring any
social phenomenon, you are usually without hard tools to do it.
That's one of the lessons of social science. If you're
measuring scientific phenomena, you have hard tools to do it.
If you're measuring human phenomena, how do you measure how
well a young person is developing? These are human phenomena.
They are hard to measure.
One of the hardest things about this is, it's a very
shadowy network whose numbers are hard to count. It's important
and difficult to know what is a hardcore terrorist who is
committed to the jihad and would never be reformable in any way
versus somebody who might just be attracted to the philosophy
because they're jobless or hopeless, or whatever, and might be
brought back into the fold. That's the kind of important
question for which we, frankly, don't have a measurement. And I
don't think we're going to. I think we're going to see this in
broader strokes.
We can measure, with good intelligence, issues like how
well we think they're doing on funding. We can measure
something like that. Imperfectly, because we're dependant on
what intelligence we can learn about that. We can measure,
imperfectly, when we take down some of their leadership,
whether they seem to be able to replace that leadership. We can
measure, imperfectly, whether we think they are able to carry
through on threats that we believe they have issued. But,
again, imperfectly.
What we're not going to be able to measure, and I would
resist trying to measure, is how we're doing in empowering
moderate Islam against radical Islam, because that is an
historical process that is going to have its ups and downs,
but, in time, when you have a Pakistan coming back from the
brink of extremism, or you have an Indonesia carrying out a
democratic election in which the role of terrorism in Islam was
actually a fairly minor issue, you have to say, we are making
some progress. How much? I can't tell you, but we're making
some progress.
What I keep my eye on is, how is moderate Islam doing? When
I'm asked what future am I looking for, I'm looking for a
future in which the regions of the world that we're concerned
about, whether it is North Africa, or East Africa, or the
Middle East, or Southeast Asia, that moderate Islam is winning.
It's winning in government, it's winning in rhetoric, it's
winning in educational programs, but the impact of that is
going to be a while before we see it.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate that answer. Let me--I
recognize how imperfect it is. And I do think a lot of it has
to do with how moderate Islam is doing. But let me just give
you an example from Algeria, where, of course, they've gone
through this horrendous period of terrorism, and they're coming
out of it. And we had a dinner with civil society people last
week, in Algiers, and I said, ``Now, what about the young
people here? Are they likely to return, to be attracted to a
radical, violent Islam, or not?'' And the sense was that they
probably wouldn't, because it was horrible; but perhaps if
economic opportunity didn't improve, that it could happen. I'm
not so sure that can't be measured more than we're doing. I'm
not so sure that we can't identify these trends in a more
serious way than we are, and I think it would be very valuable
information.
Let me turn to another question. I'd like you to explain
how the President's emergency plan for AIDS relief will help
build infrastructural capacity in Africa, particularly in the
area of training healthcare practitioners, especially community
health workers and discouraging the medical brain-drain. In the
course of the work I've done on this committee, I've had a lot
of wonderful conversations with people in countries seriously
affected by the pandemic, especially in Africa. And I found one
of the most heartbreaking to be my conversation in Botswana
with the president of that country, President Mogae, who was
acknowledging that they had a 40 percent AIDS rate, and that
they were trying to deal with it, but, whenever they'd get some
local healthcare workers trained, they were poached by American
healthcare entities or European healthcare entities, and they
couldn't keep the very people that were trying to deal with
this situation.
So will implementing partners all adhere to a set of
principles regarding hiring local staff to ensure that we don't
siphon resources away from the domestic healthcare
infrastructure, making our efforts, in the end, unsustainable?
Dr. Rice. That's, again, a very important point. And the
whole concept, especially of the part of the emergency plan
that is for the 15 most affected--once 14, now 15 most
affected--is to focus, not just on the delivery of services,
which is important in itself--the cure--the treatments to
millions; preventing seven million, giving access to
information and care for ten million--those are all very
important goals. But the design of the program has also been to
worry about the delivery mechanism for that care, to use a
tiered approach so that you have clinics in the cities that can
do that, or hospitals in the cities, but that you also build
capacity in the village--in some of these places, even using
motorcycle-riders to get the care out that people who've been
trained to administer, or help administer, the drugs--so that
you're improving the delivery, the healthcare delivery system,
as well. And that really was the innovation that came about
through studying and working with, for instance, the Ugandans,
who have a very effective system of delivery.
It is also the case, of course, that if you improve the
delivery system for AIDS you improve the healthcare delivery
system for other things, as well--malaria, tuberculosis are
part of the program, but other--others as well. If you improve
mother-to-child transmission delivery, you improve OB/GYN care,
you improve neonatal care, and so forth.
And so, I think it's a really--probably one of the most
important aspects of the emergency plan would be not to just
focus on the treatment itself, although that's extremely
important, but what are we doing for the healthcare delivery
system.
I hadn't thought much of the--about the problem of well-
trained healthcare workers being siphoned off, but we'll go
back and give that some thought.
Senator Feingold. I would appreciate that.
Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much Senator Feingold.
Senator Hagel?
Senator Hagel. No questions.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel passes.
Senator Boxer?
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
being so fair.
Thank you, Dr. Rice, for answering our questions.
Mr. Chairman and my Ranking Member, I'm going to use my
time this morning to lay out the rest of my concerns, and then,
when we get a chance to vote, I'm going to put all my concerns
back into context again.
Dr. Rice, clearing the air and, as Senator Biden said,
starting from a fresh page here would have been wonderful. We
haven't had that. And the reason I think it is so important to
place into the record some of your past statements is because
your administration has named several countries in the ``axis
of evil.'' We don't know what your plans are. We haven't been
able to flush them out. I think Senator Biden has been trying
to push you on the Iran situation. We don't have an exit
strategy for Iraq, that we can tell, because you insist there's
120,000 in the Iraqi forces, but yet, being pressed by several
Senators here yesterday, you still won't say how many of them
really are trained. So we've got problems here; at least, I
have problems here. So forgive me if I continue along the lines
of yesterday.
Now, Dr. Rice and colleagues, our country is united in
waging war on those responsible for 9-11, and eliminating the
al Qaeda network. That is why I find it so troubling that the
Bush administration used the fear of terror to make the war
against Iraq appear to be part of the response to 9/11. And,
Dr. Rice, as I said, you were involved in that effort. You were
the face on television, as was pointed out yesterday. You tell
us that you were giving the President confidential advice, but
you didn't shrink from talking straight to the American people.
Now, I don't know one American who wants Saddam Hussein to
see the light of day. I don't. So that's not the point. I don't
know of one American who wanted Slobodan Milosevic to see the
light of day. And guess what? And you know this--1,300 plus
American soldiers didn't have to die to get rid of Slobodan
Milosevic, and 10,000 didn't have to get wounded. So there are
issues surrounding this.
Now, on September 25th, '02, you said, in an interview with
Margaret Warner, on PBS, ``We clearly know that there were in
the past, and have been, contacts between senior Iraqi
officials and members of al Qaeda going back for actually quite
a long time.'' And you went onto say, ``And there are some al
Qaeda personnel who found refuge in Baghdad.''
Now, that statement and others by administration officials
assert there was a longstanding operational alliance between
Iraq and al Qaeda.
We know the truth is otherwise. We know it. And I'll show
you, again, the State Department document, signed off by
President Bush in October 2001, one month after 9/11, showing
absolutely no operational cells in Saddam-Hussein-controlled
Iraq.
And, second, most experts agree that Saddam Hussein and
Osama bin Laden were far from being allies. In an interview on
CNBC with Maria Bartiromo, on March 24th, '03, Peter Bergen was
asked if he saw any direct connection between Saddam and Osama.
Mr. Bergen said, ``Well, you know, I met bin Laden in '97, and
I asked him, at the end of the interview, his opinion of
Saddam. And he said, `Well, Saddam is a bad Muslim, and he took
Kuwait for his own self aggrandizement.' ''
In November '01, the former head of the Saudi intelligence
said, quote, ``Iraq doesn't come very high, in the estimation
of Osama bin Laden. He thinks of Hussein as an apostate, an
infidel, or someone who is not worthy of being a fellow
Muslim.''
Third, you were contradicted by the bipartisan 9/11
Commission, which stated in its report, last summer, that there
was, quote, ``no collaborative relationship between Iraq and al
Qaeda.'' In fact, the 9/11 Commission report states that you
received a memo on September 18th, '01, detailing what was
known about the links between al Qaeda and Iraq. Let me read
the 9/11 Commission's description of the memo you received.
They write, ``The memo pointed out that bin Laden resented the
secularism of Saddam Hussein's regime. Finally, the memo said,
there was no confirmed reporting on Saddam cooperating with bin
Laden.''
So you received a memo, on September '01, clearly stating
there was no link. The President, himself, was part of a State
Department publication which said there were no al Qaeda in
Iraq prior to 9/11, there's documented history of bin Laden's
loathing of Saddam, and, in spite of this, you went on TV and
told the American people there was a clear connection between
Saddam and al Qaeda. Even the State Department was very clear
that there was no such contacts.
So it is very disturbing to think that, in spite of
everything and all the information that you had, you continued
to go out there and claim this contact and make the people feel
that, somehow, going to war against Iraq was our response to 9/
11.
Now, on the aluminum tubes, I'm not going to get into the
back and forth with you on the aluminum tubes, but I'm going to
lay this into the record, because I think it's essential. On
September 8th--first, I believe you tried to convince the
American people that Iraq's purchase of aluminum tubes proved
positively that they were going to build a nuclear weapon.
Thus, your statement about the mushroom cloud, which scared the
heck out of every American. On September 8th, '02, you were on
CNN's Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, and you made this
statement, ``We do know there have been shipments going into
Iraq, for instance, of aluminum tubes that are really only
suited to high-quality aluminum tubes that are only``--I'm
reiterating what you said--``really suited for nuclear weapons
programs, centrifuge programs.''
That unequivocal statement was wrong. You never mentioned
to the American people that there was a major dispute about the
tubes, even though our nation's leading nuclear experts in
Department of Energy, in 2001, said, ``The tubes were for small
artillery rockets, not for nuclear weapons.''
It is reported that one Energy--a Department analyst summed
up this issue for the Senate Intelligence committee saying,
quote, ``The tubes were so poorly suited for centrifuges that
if Iraq truly wanted to use them this way, we should just give
them the tubes,'' unquote.
This dispute among the CIA, the DIA, the Department of
Energy, Department of State over the likely use of tubes was
played out in front of this committee. And, Mr. Chairman, I
remember it. I was there in that meeting. It was very
contentious, and we saw all sides of the issue.
This dispute was so well known that the Australian
Intelligence Service reportedly wrote, in a July 2002
assessment, that the tubes evidence was, quote ``patchy and
inconclusive.''
Third, the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency,
reported, on January 8th, '03, that the tubes were, quote,
``not directly suitable for uranium enrichment, and were
consistent with making ordinary artillery rockets.''
So, given the concerns raised by Department of Energy,
Department of State, the Australians, the IAEA, you still
failed to level with the American people on the subject of the
aluminum tubes. Even as recently as a few months ago, October
3rd, 2004, you had the opportunity to finally set the record
straight. And, as Senator Biden says, it's good to set the
record straight, we've got to move on. But when you were asked
by This Week's George Stephanopoulos about the tube
controversy, you said, ``There was dispute only by one agency.
That's the State Department.''
Now, that is not the truth. It's not the facts. And it is
very, very troubling to me. As Senator Biden said, we all make
mistakes. God knows, I've made mine, and I will make more. I
apologize in advance to my constituents for the mistakes I'll
make. But once all the facts are out there, can't we just make
sure that the truth is finally embedded into history, without
being--without turning our backs on what the truth is. So
that's another area.
Now, I know my time is up. I can either wait til one more
round, or just finish up my last area of concern. Can I just
finish it up?
Mr. Chairman: Proceed.
Senator Boxer. Okay.
When you were making the case for the war in Iraq, one of
the things you said that, frankly, stunned me was that a reason
to go was, the Iranians were gassed by the Iraqis. Now, this is
truly a horrific fact, that is right. But, Dr. Rice, we all
know the Iran-Iraq war took place between 1980 and 1988. And
the United States knew--they knew--that Saddam Hussein was
using chemical weapons against the Iranians. And it was
appalling. Despite this fact--despite this fact--I'm sure
you're aware who traveled to Iraq to meet with Saddam Hussein
one month after we became aware of this. It was Donald
Rumsfeld. And Donald Rumsfeld tried to increase diplomatic
relations with Saddam Hussein. Iraq was a charter member of the
terrorism list in 1979, put on there by Jimmy Carter. Do you
know--and I'm sure you knew at the time you said this--that it
was the United States who removed Iraq from our list of state
sponsors of terrorism? And they didn't get put back on til
1990.
So, let's review. While Saddam was gassing the Iranians--a
despicable act--Donald Rumsfeld and the Reagan administration
reestablished U.S. relations with the Iraq and refused to put
Iran back on the terrorism list.
So, in '03, when you told the American people that Saddam
Hussein's use of chemical weapons against Iran was a
justification for war--one of them that you gave--why didn't
you tell them the full story? Why didn't you mention that it
was Rumsfeld who favored the normalization of relations with
Iraq during a time when Saddam was using chemical weapons
against Iran?
So a reason you gave the American people for the war in
Iraq, and a reason you believe it was worth American lives, was
the heinous gassing of the Iranians by Saddam in the '80s. This
gassing was known to the American Government at the time. The
gassing did nothing to dissuade the American Government from
launching full diplomatic relations with Saddam. America gave
its seal of approval to Saddam Hussein by sending special envoy
Donald Rumsfeld to Iraq when we had zero relations with Iran at
that time.
So, to me, it's telling a half truth to the American
people. It's ``gaming'' the American people. And, as someone
who believes that we, again, owe the full story, it was very
upsetting to me that you didn't put it into context.
Now, had you said, ``You know, we were wrong, we were
fooled,'' maybe it would have been better. But there's no
mention, anywhere.
So I guess what I'm saying, Mr. Chairman, these are my
areas of deep concern. I've gone back through the record,
exhaustively, because I knew Dr. Rice--and you saw it
yesterday--you know, we can get into a give-and-take, and she's
a very good debater, and I'm a pretty good debater, and that's
interesting, but I think we need to see what the facts are and
why I'm disturbed about this particular nomination. It isn't
based on qualifications or intelligence or all the rest,
because that's obvious--wonderful break in the glass ceiling
and all those beautiful things, which I'm proud of. It's not
about that. It's about candor. It's about telling the full
story. It's about, seemingly, not being willing to go with us,
in both sides of the aisle, because it was the same answer to
Senator Chafee when he pressed you. It seems to me a rigidness
here, a lack of flexibility, which is so troubling to me; and,
most of all, going back into recent history, an unwillingness
to give the American people the full story. Because the
mission, the zeal of selling the war, was so important to Dr.
Rice, that was her job. And yet I feel--and, again, I know not
everyone agrees with me at all in the country, but many do--
that this war, and all of these horrific deaths and the wounded
and all of that, is a direct result of not leveling with the
American people.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
Dr. Rice. Thank you. I'll just--I'll be brief.
Senator Boxer, let me respond to a couple of specific
points, very briefly, and then to an overall point. But I,
first, need to go back to yesterday.
Senator Boxer, you mentioned the letter that we wrote
concerning----
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----I just want to note--and I will
want to note for the record, that you put up one provision,
not----
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----all of the provisions.
Senator Boxer. That's right.
Dr. Rice. And it was a provision, of course, with which we
would have no difficulty, which was one that is enshrined in
law, which is that we should not torture, and so forth and so
on. But there were other provisions that you did not put up
that was not fully in context, what you presented yesterday.
And----
Senator Boxer. Dr. Rice, I agree with you completely.
Dr. Rice. Yes, and----
Senator Boxer. But your letter didn't say----
Dr. Rice. No, I understand that.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. ----that one----
Dr. Rice. But----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. ----provision.
Dr. Rice. But----
Senator Boxer. Because the conferees could have kept that
one provision.
Dr. Rice. Yes, we decided--you're right--not to try and
parse. But I just want to make clear that you did not put up
the entire set of provisions.
Senator Boxer. Of course I didn't.
Dr. Rice. Yes.
Senator Boxer. Because the conferees could have kept that.
You didn't tell them to keep it.
Dr. Rice. Yes, but the impression was left that what we
objected to was that one provision, when it----
Senator Boxer. Well, you did.
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----when, in fact, there were
several.
Senator Boxer. Well, you did, yesterday, object to it. You
said it was duplicative, didn't you?
Dr. Rice. No, I said it was in the Defense authorization
bill. But I just want, for the record, it to be noted that the
Bush administration was objecting, not to something to do with
the law of the land, but to other provisions, and I'll provide
that to you.
[The information to which Dr. Rice referred appears in
Appendix II of this hearing transcript.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Rice. So the context here was extremely important.
Secondly, let me just respond, very briefly, Senator Boxer,
to a few points.
First of all, I really just can't agree that Milosevic and
Saddam Hussein were the same problem. And we do have to
recognize that different tools have to be taken against
different dictators. It was a remarkable set of events with
Milosevic, but he was in the center of Europe. We had all kinds
of pressure on Milosevic that we had failed to be able to bring
about with Saddam Hussein. And so, I just reject the analogy
between the two.
Secondly, as to the question of al Qaeda and its presence
in Iraq, I think we did say that there was never an issue of
operational control, that al Qaeda--that Saddam Hussein had
nothing to do with 9/11, as far as we know or could tell. It
wasn't a question of operational alliance, it was the question
of an attitude about terrorism that allowed Zarqawi to be in
Baghdad and to operate out of Baghdad. There were contacts
going back to the early 90s, and those are, indeed, detailed in
the 9/11 report.
Third, on the question of aluminum tubes, we didn't go to
war because of aluminum tubes. This was a debate about whether
this issue, this particular piece of evidence, was evidence was
reconstitution of the nuclear program. And the--there was one
agency that disagreed that he was reconstituting his nuclear
program, and that was the State Department. The INR. Other----
Senator Biden. Didn't the Department of Energy also----
Dr. Rice. No, the Department of Energy said that they did
not believe that the tubes were evidence of reconstitution, but
that he was, indeed, they believed, reconstituting his program.
And that's--that's an important distinction, though. But I said
``reconstituting his program.'' I was not talking about the
tubes.
The Department of Energy, in fact, I learned, when the
process unfolded, did have reservations, or did believe that
the tubes were not for nuclear weapons. The majority of
agencies in the intelligence community did.
I was representing, Senator--and I've made this available
for the record--the views of that majority, and the view on
reconstitution was one that all but the State Department held.
Now, I just have to put this into context. When you're
dealing with intelligence matters, you are not dealing with
perfect information, and you do have to put that information
into a context of someone's history--this was someone who was
very close to a nuclear weapon in 1991, much closer than we
thought; of his present--the intelligence community's belief
was that he was reconstituting his program, that there was
evidence of this in his procurement activities and keeping the
nuclear scientists together; and he--and that the shadow of the
future, according to that National Intelligence Estimate was
that, left unchecked, he would have a nuclear device by the end
of the decade. I just don't think that the President of the
United States and I were going to give him the benefit of the
doubt.
And as to the ``mushroom cloud'' statement, one that I've
heard repeated many, many times, it was simply a statement
about uncertainty, that you didn't want the first evidence that
he had nuclear weapons to be the kind of evidence that we
learned when we found out that the Soviet Union had a nuclear
weapon five years ahead of schedule.
On the Iranians and Iraq, I'll say it right now, the United
States Government has often, as the President's said, supported
regimes in the hope that they would bring stability. And we've
been, in the Middle East, sometimes blind to the freedom
deficit. We're not going to do that anymore. And what happened
with Saddam Hussein was probably evidence that that policy was
not a very wise policy.
In general, Senator, let me just say, again, we did go to
the American people with a case for war. It was a case that,
yes, said that the threat that this horrible dictator--sitting
in the Middle East in the worlds most dangerous region, with
whom we had gone to war twice before, who had used weapons of
mass destruction, who was shooting at our aircraft--that it was
not acceptable to have him with weapons of mass destruction.
And we believed, like most of the intelligence agencies in
the world, like the United Nations--and much of the information
was from the United Nations--that he had weapons of mass
destruction. He refused to account for them. Even with
coalition forces sitting on his doorstep, he refused to account
for them. We weren't prepared to give Saddam Hussein the
benefit of the doubt, given his history and given the shadow of
the future.
We also had a situation, now rectified, of a Middle East
out of which the terror threat, the jihad's threat, comes, with
a factor, in Saddam Hussein, who was going to make it
impossible to change the nature of the Middle East. I don't
think anybody can see a different kind of Middle East with
Saddam Hussein in the middle of it.
So we can disagree about the course that we took. We can
certainly have, I think, a healthy debate about the course that
we should take, going forward. I would be the first, again, to
say, we've had to make a lot of decisions, some of them good,
some of them bad. But I would hope that what we will do now is
to focus on where we go from here.
I can assure you, I will be candid. My assessments may not
always be ones that you want to hear, they may not always be
ones with which you agree, but I will tell you what I think.
And that's a promise that I make to you today.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Boxer. Thank you. If I could--and I know I'm
taking a lot of time--I just don't want to have to speak again,
but I would like to finish my comments here.
The fact is that the reconstituting were based on the
yellow cake and the aluminum tubes, both of which proved to be
false. And when I asked you about aluminum tubes----
Dr. Rice. And balancing equipment and the accounts out of
which these came and his keeping nuclear scientists together.
Let's have the entire picture.
Senator Boxer. Okay. Yes, exactly my point. Let's have the
entire picture. And when I asked you about aluminum tubes, you
talked about the larger picture. The fact is, when you go on
television, and you say the aluminum tubes can only be used for
nuclear weapons--you want to turn it to a different subject,
that's okay, but that's what you said, and the facts proved
otherwise, and we knew that at the time--four or five agencies
were having a giant battle over that. No one could have
possibly said that they could only be used--because the
Intelligence Community was split.
My last point has to do with Milosevic. You said you can't
compare the two dictators. You know, you're right, no two
tyrants are alike. But the fact is, Milosevic started wars that
killed 200,000 in Bosnia, 10,000 in Kosovo, and thousands in
Croatia. And he was nabbed, and he's out, without an American
dying for it. That's the fact.
Now, I suppose we could have gone in there, and people
could have killed to get him. The fact is, not one person wants
either of those two to see the light of day again. And in one
case we did it without Americans dying, and in the other case
we did it with Americans dying. And I think if you ask the
average American, you know, ``Was Saddam worth one life, one
American life,'' they'd say no. He's the bottom of the barrel.
And the fact is, we've lost so many lives over it. So if we do
get a little testy on the point, and I admit to be so, it's
because it can continues, day in and day out, and 25 percent of
the dead are from California. We cannot forget--we cannot
forget that.
Dr. Rice. May I just close by saying, Senator Boxer, I,
probably more than most, because I did have a role in the
President's decision to go to war, mourn every day the people
that are lost. I look at their pictures, I think about their
families, I've been to Walter Reed, I see the pain and
suffering. I believe that their service and their sacrifice was
needed for our security.
I don't think there is anyone who believes that you could
have gone into Iraq and nabbed Saddam Hussein. It wasn't that
kind of regime.
The Chairman. Members of the committee, let me just say, we
tried, in fairness, to leave the debate open last evening. Dr.
Rice, Senator Kerry, Senator Voinovich and I were here for 50
minutes of questioning. The table was available for any Senator
who wanted to stay and ask questions at that point.
Now, Senator Boxer obviously has strong points of view.
And, in a spirit of fairness, the Chair has let the hearing
verge out of control.
But we're going to come back into control at this stage.
Senator Boxer. I'm finished, you'll be happy.
The Chairman. Yes, I understand, and I appreciate that.
We have called for a business meeting at 10:00 o'clock.
Now, I don't want to be arbitrary, because I appreciate that
there may be impelling questions for the completion of the
record, questions that people hadn't thought of last night, but
rather this morning.
We rapidly want to come to conclusion here. I just simply
want to ask, Are there Senators who have impelling questions,
or can we proceed to have a business meeting of the committee?
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Chairman: Yes.
Senator Biden. In response, Senator Levin importuned me in
the hall on the way up here, and he had said that he had sent a
letter, which I asked for a copy of--that there are questions,
some of which have been touched on here, that he'd like Dr.
Rice to answer in writing before we vote in the Senate. And
I'll read the letter.
``Dear Dick and Joe, Enclosed are some questions for the
record which I request that you ask Dr. Rice on my behalf. I'd
appreciate a response in writing before the time set for the
Senate vote on her nomination. Thank you for your assistance.''
They're pretty straightforward. I'd be guided by your
judgement. I could ask them, on behalf of the Senator, right
now, or we could do them in writing, and I think there's plenty
of time.
I think you could answer all of these, Dr. Rice. They
relate to, for the record, uranium from Africa, and the
second--and there are a total of six questions relating to
that--aluminum tubes, one question; and no distinction between
Iraq and al Qaeda, one question. So I guess, for the record----
The Chairman. Well, let me suggest that, first of all, as
Senators know, Dr. Rice has been answering questions for a
month. We've all had ample opportunity to ask everything we
wanted.
Secondly, however, I'll ask Dr. Rice to respond to the
questions of Senator Levin, our colleague, as a courtesy. Our
hearing, here, is with the Foreign Relations Committee. Yet we
are prepared to help any Senator find answers. I'm sure Dr.
Rice will be cooperative; at least I presume so. And so, within
the next few hours, presumably those questions will be
answered.
Senator Biden. They're very straightforward.
The Chairman. My guess is, they probably have been answered
in the folios of questions that are a part of the record, so it
will not be difficult, I suspect, to reiterate.
Dr. Rice. I'm happy to do it, Senator.
The Chairman. I appreciate that.
Dr. Rice. We'll get them back to you shortly.
The Chairman. All right.
Now, impelling questions. I see Senator Nelson raising his
hand. Are there any, on this side, that feel they need to ask
questions? All right, one short question by Senator Chafee, and
Senator Obama has----
Senator Biden. And there may be closing statements, not
questions, before the actual vote, which would be appropriate.
Senator Dodd has a closing statement, and maybe someone else
does.
The Chairman. Well, that could perhaps be a part of our
business meeting.
Senator Biden. Yes. That's exactly right.
The Chairman. We'll have discussion at that point.
All right. Senator Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just picking up on a theme that was hit here, there was a
discrepancy, Dr. Rice, between the intelligence in the State
Department and other intelligence. In this particular case that
was discussed, about the aluminum tubes, there was also a
difference of opinion within the intelligence community with
regard to unmanned aerial vehicles possessed by Saddam Hussein.
Indeed, I and other Senators were told, that not only did he
have those UAVs for offensive reasons, but there was a plot. He
was going to put them on ships off the eastern seaboard of the
United States and launch them over eastern cities of the United
States, dropping chemical or biological weapons. We were told
that. But what we were not told is that there was a vigorous
disagreement within the intelligence community--specifically,
that Air Force intelligence, which knows the most about UAVs--
but we were not told that they had disagreed. Now, it was
written in the report, but I'm talking about those verbal
briefings that we received in the secure room in the Capitol.
Tell us what you know about that kind of dispute of
intelligence. Because we don't ever want to get into a
situation where we are operating on information that is
incomplete, as we were in this particular case.
Dr. Rice. Senator, I'm sorry, I don't remember the
briefing--what was said at the briefing. I don't even know if I
was there at the briefing to which you're referring. There was
a dispute about the UAVs, and I think it was fully outlined in
the National Intelligence Estimate, which should have been the
basis for the briefings.
Let me just--if you don't mind, I'll just make a broader
point, which is, obviously we need the very best intelligence,
and obviously there were problems with the intelligence
concerning Iraq weapons of mass destruction. I don't think
members of the intelligence community were trying to deceive or
to do a bad job or any of those things. It's an incredibly
difficult intelligence challenge when you're dealing with a
closed society that is deliberately deceiving, and where
they're using dual-use equipment. And the question very often
is, Do you give Saddam Hussein the benefit of the doubt that
these are really for weather monitoring, or not? And so, I
think it's just a very difficult--I'm sorry, I just don't
remember----
Senator Nelson. Well, I guess----
Dr. Rice [continuing]. ----the circumstance.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. ----the question would be--
since we're looking forward, which has been the theme of my
statements. If your intelligence in the Department of State has
a difference of opinion from the rest of the intelligence
community, what is the way that you will receive and handle
that intelligence?
Dr. Rice. Well, I will certainly encourage INR, which is
headed by an assistant secretary who I've known for 20-plus
years, somebody that I have known at Stanford--I will certainly
make certain that they are making their views known in the
intelligence community. I don't think I have to do that. I
think they have been making them known. And I think INR has
demonstrated that it has a different take on things and that
that is worth looking at. Why have they had a different take?
They have very often been right about some of the dissents that
they've taken. And so, I look forward to working with them to
understand that somewhat better. But as we're restructuring the
intelligence community, understanding how different
intelligence agencies do their work is going to be important to
the National Intelligence Director--the Director of National
Intelligence--in making sure that he's getting competitive
views on the intelligence front.
Senator Biden. Would the Senator yield for ten seconds?
Senator Nelson. Of course.
Senator Biden. Will you tell us if there's a difference,
if we ask you?
Dr. Rice. Well, of course. And you'll know, because the
intelligence community always fights any dissents.
Senator Biden. No, but you, as Secretary of State, will
you tell us, if we don't ask you, if we don't know to ask you?
Will you level with us? Will you tell us, ``By the way, there's
a different take on . . .''----
Dr. Rice. From the INR----
Senator Biden. Yes.
Dr. Rice. Of course, yes.
Senator Nelson. See, that's the point. We felt like we
didn't know what to ask, because we were told about these UAVs.
Yes, it was buried in the National Intelligence Estimate, but
we were getting these verbal communications in a very secure
room. And that's the whole point, so that we can make
judgements based on the full information.
Mr. Chairman, let me just wrap up with a couple of other
subjects here. It's already been discussed, we've got a problem
in Latin America in the tri-border region, and that needs your
attention. It is, as Senator Dodd said, ``The Wild West.'' And
there's a lot of financing of some bad actors that comes out of
that area. We've got to keep our eyes on President Chavez. He
told us one thing, a week ago Monday, and then, lo and behold,
a whole different thing suddenly emerges after we left Caracas.
And thanks to the Chairman, he noted this, way back in
November, which I fully support. What are the implications to
the United States if Chavez cuts off the oil?
And the Chairman has called for a GAO investigation. I hope
the Chairman will call for hearings on this, and I fully
support him.
And then, you know, there seems to be some flap over this
very courageous Cuban resident name Oswaldo Paya, who went out
and got 11,000 signatures on a petition and then the government
of Cuba stiffed him, when, in fact, that was a part of what
their constitution said. Will you support the Varela Project,
and other grassroots movements inside Cuba?
Dr. Rice. Absolutely. And we'll look for even better ways
to support them.
Senator Nelson. Okay. And my final statement, it's just a
little thing that nobody ever recognizes, but, because in my
former life I had been, handling issues for people that were
victims of the Holocaust, and their families. There's a little
office in the United States State Department that is a pittance
on what its budget is. I asked this four years ago of Secretary
Powell, when he was here for his confirmation. He said he would
continue it. It still is there. And what it's trying to do is
to see that people in the particular life, that I had lived
before, were seeing how all of these people had been run over
by insurance companies. They had collected the policies for
years and years, and then, after the war, they said, ``We don't
know you.'' And that's just one of the things that the
Holocaust victims and their families, now, and the Holocaust
survivors, have suffered. And so, I would ask you to maintain
the Office of the Special Envoy for Holocaust Issues.
Dr. Rice. Thank you Senator. I will.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
I will call upon Senator Obama, because Senator Chafee has
already had one opportunity, and then I will call upon Senator
Chafee.
Senator Obama?
Senator Obama. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. And I'll
try to be brief.
The first question I guess I have is more of a request, Dr.
Rice, and that is, assuming your successful confirmation here
today that we schedule some mechanism for your Department to
follow up on the question that had been raised yesterday, both
by Senator Biden as well as myself and others, about figuring
out a concrete measurement of our progress in training,
because--training of Iraqi troops--because one of the questions
that will continue to come up, every time I have a town hall
meeting in Illinois, is, what's the status of our troops, and
what's our exit strategy?
And I recognize that you are hesitant, in your current
position, to provide a timetable. I thought Senator Alexander
said something, yesterday, about wanting a success strategy, as
opposed to merely an exit strategy, and I recognize that
approach. On the other hand, constituents and families in small
towns all across Illinois need some more satisfactory answer to
them. And it strikes me that this whole issue of training
troops, turning over security functions to the Iraqi Government
is critical to that.
So my first question, I guess, is, Are you committed to
setting up some mechanism whereby we can get some specific
answers on that?
Dr. Rice. I am. I will note that the police training is
actually under the Defense Department, and not under the
military.
Senator Obama. I understand. This may require----
Dr. Rice. But I will make certain that----
Senator Obama [continuing]. ----an additional commitment
from----
Dr. Rice. I'll----
Senator Obama [continuing]. ----Secretary Rumsfeld. But----
Dr. Rice. I will talk to Secretary Rumsfeld about it. And
I'm certain that we can be responsive to the concern.
Senator Obama. Okay. The second--I guess this is more of a
point, rather than a question, but I'm happy to solicit a
response. You know, all of us, I think, are rooting for your
success. And I recognize--not just yours, personally, but this
administration's success. I think the notion that we have a
very real and present danger in the nihilistic ideologies of
radical Islam, I think most Americans share.
I think to the extent that we can encourage a more moderate
brand of Islam, it already exists, it has to be nurtured.
Although I have to dispute, a little bit, your notion that,
sort of, we're always making progress. Indonesia, for example--
I actually lived in Indonesia for five years--perceptions of
America and the West were much better then than they are
currently, subsequent to 9/11. So I'm not always certain we're
going in a straight line in that route, but I recognize that
it's a complicated issue, and we wish you well.
And I'm--I don't think there's anybody on this committee
who would not prefer to see this administration succeed, even
though there have been strong disagreements about the decisions
that have been made in the past.
I guess the comment that I'd like to make is that--in the
activist, proactive strategies that you've pursued. It seems to
me that this administration often asks that we simply go along
and have faith that you're making the right decisions. And
that's true--I think part of the reason you were hesitant to
talk about the torture issue yesterday had to do with the fact
that you don't want to define ``torture'' too much, because you
want a little bit of wiggle room. You want us to assume that
you will make sound decisions based on immediate circumstances.
And I think that the reason it's hard to pin you down on an
exit strategy, or Iran, or these other circumstances, is, you
don't want to bind this administration. ``Trust us,'' I think
is the message, ``and we'll make the best decisions.''
But I think that, from the perspective of my constituents
in Illinois, at least, a number of people did vote for George
Bush, and do trust him. But my job, as a Senator, is to make
sure that we're basing these decisions on facts and that I
probe and not simply take it on faith that good decisions are
being made.
And so, my final comment, I guess, is simply this. Your
predecessor had a reputation of being willing to maybe tell the
President some things that he didn't always want to hear. I
think he displayed a certain independence that was encouraging,
and I think the people felt that he was speaking on behalf of
the American people and not simply being a mouthpiece for the
administration. If there's criticism of this administration, I
think, on foreign policy it's--I think the most profound one
is--is that maybe dissenting views have a difficult time
getting a hearing.
And so, I just would urge you, in your role as Secretary of
State, to display some independence and make certain that, as
you're making these difficult calculations, that you are not
engaging in simply agreement with the conventional wisdom
inside the White House, but that the hard questions are being
asked in all these decisions, because, ultimately, you've got
young men and women who are making sacrifices as a consequence
to these decisions, and the entire country is spending huge
sums of money that could be spent on other things on the basis
of these decisions.
So I think my comment is just, I hope that you show the
kind of independence that will make the country proud, and not
just please the administration.
Dr. Rice. Thank you. Let me just, perhaps--Senator Chafee
will have comment--but let me just--I have no difficulty
telling the President exactly what I think. I've done that for
four years. Sometimes he agrees, and sometimes he doesn't. The
fact is, that I felt, very strongly, that no one else should
ever know the times that when he disagreed and the times that
when he didn't.
Senator Obama. Which I respect.
Dr. Rice. When we agree----
Senator Obama. I have no problem with that, in your role
as National Security----
Dr. Rice. Yes. Well, but in my role as Secretary, I want
it to be clearly understood that I still believe that we are
one administration, with the President in the lead.
The President is the only elected official in the war
council. Of course, the--was the only elected official in the
war council, other than the Vice President, of course.
The President will, as we move from war to peace, still be
the elected official as we decide how to try to use this time
of diplomacy to build new structures and to bring old
relationships to use to pursue this new agenda.
But I know what he expects from me. And he expects my most
candid advice. He expects me to argue vociferously for that
which I believe. He expects the State Department to play a
strong and active role, not just in the execution of American
foreign policy, but in its generation, in its formulation. And
that, he'll get.
I know the men and women of the State Department--not every
single one of them, but I've worked with them--many of them
over the last four years and in years past. And what I'll ask
from them is their best in pursuing a course, and in
recommending a course, and then moving forward on a course. So
you don't have to worry, Senator, that I will be a strong voice
for what I believe and for what the State Department believes
is the best course, going forward.
Senator Obama. I wish you the best of luck.
Dr. Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Chafee?
Senator Chafee. Thank you, once again, Mr. Chairman.
I'd just like to respond to some of the comments from
Senator Coleman. And I deplore any rhetoric of hate, and
particularly against the state of Israel. I do believe the
challenge with the Iranians is to empower those many, many
Iranians who believe that we've got to find a way to resolve
our differences without bloodshed, and that's our challenge.
The Chairman. Thank you Senator Chafee.
Now, I've been requested by the distinguished Ranking
Member to welcome one final comment or statement that he will
make. Following that, we will proceed to the business meeting,
and we will excuse you from further activity, Dr. Rice.
Senator Biden?
Senator Biden. Dr. Rice, I suspect your press office has
been asked by the press as often as I have in the last 24 hours
how there could be such a discrepancy in our individual
assessment of the trained troops in Iraq. And I want to just
set the record straight. It implies that I know I'm right. So
I'm not setting the record straight--I'll give you how I
arrived at my numbers and why I think it's important.
It's not about criticizing the administration. It's about,
I believe, a recognition on the part of our trainers, our folks
in the field, that we made, understandably, the wrong
judgement, early on, as to how to train. I will not mention the
general's name--but last trip, I think my friend said this; I
don't want him in trouble, because maybe he didn't--he said,
``We went for quantity, not quality, at the front end, and it
hasn't worked,'' end of quote.
Now, here's what I know to be the facts, as told to me by
your administration personnel in charge of training, not by
anybody from the outside. First of all, the claim there is
53,520 trained police. That's what the administration says in
the last report. These consist of police who receive a three-
week refresher course and new recruits who get an eight-week
course.
Parenthetically, I'll point out that we talked about lack
of automobiles and lack of equipment for the police. At the
training center, when I asked whether they received the
automobiles, the person in charge of training said, ``We have
them, but they're not much use. I found out they don't know how
to drive.'' Literally. My word. They don't know how to drive.
``So we're teaching them how to start automobiles, mainly''--
paraphrasing; I don't know the exact quote--``to get out of the
way of an explosion.''
So that's the quality of the people we're sending.
There's a 24-week field-training course by U.S. trainers in
the manual. It has never begun. Not a single one of these
claimed 53,000 cops have gone through that. They don't even
know, when they send the police back to--you should know this,
if you don't--back to Iraq, they have no notion where they go,
they have no notion who they've been assigned to, they don't
have any idea where they are, and no one way to follow up.
Instead of the 5,700 international trainers recommended by
your administration, your assessment team, in June of '03, it
took until this fall, '04, to get 500. U.S. only. Nobody else.
U.S.-only trainers.
You stated, yesterday, Doctor, this is not an environment
for, quote, ``beat cops.'' It's an insurgency--witness Mosul in
November, where the police force nearly deserted after
insurgent attacks.
On September 15th, 2004, the administration claimed it had
32,000 trained police. You all are now claiming--you've gone
from 32,000 to 53,000--up 20,000 just since September 15th.
In that hearing, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Joe Bowab, who I think will still be there when you get there,
who was in charge of overseeing the training program from
State's end, I asked him the following question, quote, ``Do we
have 32,000 trained Iraqi cops on the street?'' Trained. Not
cops on the street, but trained Iraqi cops. Bowab said, ``No,
sir.'' Quote, ``No sir.''
I won't bother you with the rest of it. I went onto say,
``My impression is, you don't have one trained Iraqi cop--
having gone through all the training.'' His answer to that was,
``Yes, we don't.''
National Guard, 40,063 in the latest report. Training
consists of three weeks by the individual and three to four
weeks collective training. Training is not standardized. There
have not been good results. They report high absenteeism. Large
casualties from insurgents has led to a climate of
intimidation. Reports of infiltration by insurgents--they think
infiltration of the U.S. base in the Mosul attack.
Allawi himself dismissed the national guard before the
interim assembly, saying it was a concept not understood by
Arab societies.
So, who's equipped, trained, led and experienced to fight
the insurgency? As General Petraeus said--and he's a first-rate
guy, please listen to him--we have to change the--quote, ``the
operational concept. This is an insurgency, not regular police
work.'' That's Petraeus. Police commandos, led by General
Adnam--I think, A-d-n-a-m, a former Iraqi general with whom I
met last time around--Petraeus introduced us to him in
December. He will eventually have about 1,000--he probably has
about 600 now; that's an educated guess--able to operate
independently in collecting their own intelligence. But
Petraeus has figured out: don't send the cops back to their
home town. Send the cops you finally do train to another town.
Focus on--what we've been arguing you should do for two years--
focus on training, essentially, SWAT teams, people to rely on,
heavy training, heavily armed, to send them in. So we're
finally doing that, Petraeus is doing that. But, just to put it
in perspective, there's about 600 of those folks now. And this
General Adnam is a pretty tough guy. I'm convinced he knows
what he's doing, and Petraeus does, too.
Intervention force--latest reports, 9,159--all of them
don't have the experience to stand up to the insurgency.
Special operation forces--latest report, 674--some element
to the army--the latest report puts the number at 4,159--are
trained. That's where I got the number, roughly 4,000. That's
what we're saying.
The latest report puts the number at 4,159, though the
mission is supposed to be national defense, not fighting
internal battles against fellow Iraqis. These same outfits
refused to fight in Fallujah in April.
This is my staff's assessment, and I agree with it.
At the high end, assuming every one of these forces is
battle-ready, that would give you about 14,000 forces. But, in
reality, it's probably no more than a third who are actually
battle-ready. Most are rookies and will not have time to gain
the experience, the skills that are needed, unless they're
embedded, like our reporters are, in U.S. forces.
And the delays in the NATO staff colleagues helping? That
hasn't helped at all, either.
Now, Peter Khalil, the former Director of National Security
in the CPA--this is the guy who was in charge of training--in
the New York Times, December 20, said, ``The answer lies with
specially trained Iraqi internal security forces, separate from
the standard military, including mobile counterterrorism units,
light infantry police battalions and SWAT teams. There are now
only a handful of battalions with such training.'' Continue to
quote, ``Unfortunately, the coalition was late off the mark in
building up these units, and the training is long--a minimum of
16 weeks for each man, as compared to the two weeks of boot
camp given to a typical guardsman.'' Quote--continued quote,
``Training these specialized troops will take time; the United
States should be prepared to shoulder the main burden of Iraq
security for the next six to 12 months.''
Now, Khalil also did a piece in the New York Times. He's
now a visiting fellow of the Saban Center for Middle East
Policy. And he says, and I'll end this, ``150,000 Iraqis who
have so far joined the state security services can do little to
stand in their way; in fact, even if their ranks increased to
500,000 through rushed training, they would still be largely
ineffective. However a force of 25,000 or so highly trained
Iraqi internal security troops, operating at the sharp end of
the spear, with the remaining bulk Iraqi forces in a supporting
role, might be able to do the job. That's because
counterinsurgency is not about numbers; the quality of the
security forces, not their quality is the key.''
Every single person I have spoken to--on the ground in
Iraq, in my four trips, three since Saddam is down, every tough
marine, every single military guy I've spoken to, says that.
Been saying it for two years. And yet you guys--I'm not asking
people to say, ``Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa, we
made a mistake.'' Forget that. You all don't do anything except
parrot, ``We've trained 120,000 forces.''
So I go home, and people ask me the same thing they ask the
Senator from Illinois, ``Why are we still there--120,000
trained Iraqis--why are we still there?''
So do me a favor--as my mother would say, ``God love you,
please do me favor``--start to tell the whole deal. Let me cite
a new definition of ``trained.'' If you're able to take the
place of U.S. Forces. Let's call it that.
And I'd like you to think about and, in private, tell us
later--after you're Secretary, and I'm about to vote for you in
about five minutes--tell us how many of those folks you think--
and, for God's sake, don't listen to Rumsfeld; he doesn't know
what in the hell he's talking about with this.
Thank you very much. You want to comment? I welcome it.
Dr. Rice. I only want to say, Senator, that we talked,
yesterday, about the fact that the 120 is ``those trained.'' I
said, there are problems with leadership, there are problems
with desertion, there are problems with some absenteeism, as
well. And I also said, in response to Senator Obama, that the
real test is, do they fight when they're put in the field? In
some places they've fought well, in other places they've not
fought well.
Senator Biden. What's your overall assessment?
Dr. Rice. I think that we have had problems with the
training. I'd be the first to say that. That's why General
Petraeus says what he says. And we're working to address those
problems. And that's one reason that General Luck is out there,
is to get an assessment of what we need to do.
Part of it is that the circumstances do keep changing. We
thought we were training ``beat cops.'' We were training cops
who were going to have to face insurgents.
Senator Biden. In truth, they haven't changed, in 19
months.
Dr. Rice. Well, that piece of it has changed. Because the
cops were taking a real beating. But, at any case, we are
absolutely clear that that key for the administration, the key
for America, is to get Iraqi forces trained. We understand
that. We are working on it.
Senator Biden. That translates, then, that we have to keep
American forces in large numbers there for at least six months
to a year, right?
Dr. Rice. Well Senator, we can--let's have this discussion
later. I will say that I don't know if the standard is----
Senator Biden. Believe me, I'd rather have it after I was
confirmed.
Dr. Rice. I don't--no, no. I don't know if the standard is
that they have to be able to, one for one, replace American
soldiers. There are some things that they will do better than
American soldiers because they know the neighborhood. There are
many things that they will not do as well. And so I think I
would not accept as a standard a one-for-one exchange of an
Iraqi for an American soldier. That's my only point.
Senator Biden. What is your standard? You tell me your
standard.
Dr. Rice. My standard is that they are able and capable of
carrying out the tasks that are required to deal with the
insurgency, and to begin to root out the insurgency, and to
work in a counterinsurgency way. Frankly, they may not do it
the way an American soldier would do it.
Senator Biden. As long as they do it, so we can come home.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Dr. Rice, as you can tell, we are, as a committee,
concerned about the training; likewise, we are concerned about
the economic issues that were raised yesterday as a part of
foreign policy; we are concerned about the budget; we are
concerned about support for your Department. We want to ensure
that you have the resources that are required.
We appreciate, very much, the quality of your answers. We
appreciate the quality of the questions that were raised. This
has been a comprehensive view of American foreign policy at
times of stress. We congratulate you on the hearing.
I look forward to supporting you. For the moment, I will
recess the hearing, and then, in a few moments, we will
commence a business meeting of the committee.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Dr. Rice.
Dr. Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Senator
Biden. Thank you, Members of the committee.
[Whereupon, at 10:44 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
THE NOMINATION OF DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE
----------
Business Meeting
----------
Wednesday, January 19, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:46 a.m. in
Room 423 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar
[chairman] presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Coleman, Biden,
Sarbanes, Feingold, Kerry, Boxer, Nelson, Obama, Dodd,
Alexander, Sununu, Murkowski, and Allen.
The Chairman. Members of the committee, I call the business
meeting to order. The question before the committee is on the
nomination of Condoleezza Rice to be Secretary of State of the
United States of America. Is there a debate, or discussion, at
this point?
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, first let me thank you from
the bottom of my heart for your fairness in these hearings. I
know it's difficult, and these are difficult times, difficult
matters. I think you show patience and you show a spirit of
bipartisanship that I think is a model for the rest of us
tonight.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Boxer. I just want you to know I feel that way. In
my mind there is no doubt that Dr. Rice has the resume and the
intelligence, and the experience to be Secretary of State. And
after nine hours of grueling questions and answers she
certainly proves she has endurance for the job.
But I'm very troubled because, although this committee on
both sides gave Dr. Rice the opportunity to speak candidly and
set the record straight, there were a number of areas where she
just didn't do that. She was given a chance to set the record
straight on the nuclear threat which was hyped to the American
people and got this country into a war. She failed to admit
that she had made any mistake in over stating Saddam's nuclear
capabilities even though as I put into the record at least four
agencies had told her otherwise.
She was given the chance to set the record straight on
terrorism and the effect of the Iraqi war on terror. She
actually stated that al-Qaeda had lost territory, when in fact
the record shows that al-Qaeda has expanded from operating in
45 countries in 2001 to 60 countries today. And I think Senator
Feingold pressed her on that in terms of al-Qaeda's president--
presence in Africa.
I pointed out to her a State Department document showing no
al-Qaeda in Iraq before 9-11. She didn't even address that. And
that was a report that was signed by the President of the
United States. She was on another subject given a chance to set
the record straight on our inconsistent policy towards Central
America. Senator Chafee pressed her on that, I pressed her on
that, Senator Dodd pressed her on that. And she showed a
rigidity in her answer which I found troubling. She was given
the chance to set the record straight on what Iran can do--this
was an answer to Senator Biden--to avoid a dangerous clash with
the United States of America. And she demurred when given this
amazing opportunity she had to speak directly to the Iranian
leadership.
She was given the opportunity to set the record straight on
the number of really trained Iraqi security forces and our exit
strategy in Iraq. Every American wants us, yes, Senator
Alexander, to succeed and leave. And yet she would not really
even say that this was a troubling issue, when pressed by
Senator's Biden, Kerry, and Obama. She was given the chance to
address the issue of America's past relationship in supporting
Saddam Hussein when he was gassing the Iranians. She didn't
even pick up that challenge, or discuss that in anyway to set
the record straight.
And I have to say most troubling to me, she was given the
opportunity to set the record straight on her feelings about
torture and the United State's policy on torture. And here I
have to say I have grave concerns. Because she said to us today
that she never objected to the language in the intelligence
bill written by Senators Lieberman and McCain when I have right
here her very words that the administration opposes that
section which provides legal protections of foreign prisoners.
And I ask unanimous consent to place this into the record.
The Chairman. It will be placed in the record.
Senator Boxer. So a lack of candor in the past is bad
enough. And here we have a continuing assault on reality. This
is not right. The fact is she said, well, we objected to other
sections, not the section that guaranteed that no prisoner
shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhumane, or degrading
treatment or punishment that's prohibited by the Constitution,
and yet that's the very section she cites in her letter, Mr.
Chairman. So her lack of candor on that issue alone is very
troubling to me.
Now I know there are areas of common ground. I think that
Senator Murkowski raised some of those because--I'm so happy
she's on this committee because we can really work together on
issues affecting women and children and families, and I'm
thrilled that she's here. And Dr. Rice is very accepting of the
fact that this will be important to her. I'm very glad about
that. And I'm glad she mentioned the Syria Accountability Act
which I authored along with Rick Santorum, which is now the law
of the land. But that aside, these other areas are terribly
troubling.
And I'll conclude in this way. This is a terrific
committee. I'm so proud to be on it. I think members on both
sides are very candid and forthcoming. And I didn't see that
replicated by Dr. Rice and we gave her every opportunity on
both sides to do that. I look at her opening statement, as I
said yesterday, and wait to page three, the bottom of page
three, a thousand words into it to mention Iraq and a passing
reference to the Tsunami.
I just if--I think if someone was kind of beamed down and
knew about what was troubling Americans and they read that, I
agree with Senator Biden, it was sort of ``don't worry, be
happy'' until this committee got into the hard issues of the
day. So I continue to stand in awe of our founding fathers. I
wish there were founding mothers at that time. Give credit
where credit is due. That anyone at a high level like this is
in fact responsible to the American people.
And I hope if nothing else Dr. Rice now gets the difference
between her role as the National Security Advisor where she
wasn't in any way responsible to come before Congress, but went
to the American people and sold a war, and continued to repeat
things that were not so. And her role now where she is
responsible to the American people as well as to the President,
and to the American people through us. And so I just hope we
have better times ahead and I will not be able to support this
nomination even though I know I'm in a--a quite a minority.
Thank you.
Senator Allen. Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. If I may Mr. Chairman. Thank you and Senator
Biden for your outstanding leadership of this committee. I've
listened to the Senator from California's comments and
questions. In fact when talking about Dr. Rice's opening
statement, I thought it was a very powerful opening statement.
And while we can quibble as to which page and when into the
speech one gets into talking about Iraq, I think this is how we
need to look at Dr. Rice and the totality of her character, her
experience, her knowledge, and capabilities to be our next
Secretary of State. One, in reading her statement, she first
talked about her own background. All of us are a composition of
our life experiences. The fact that she grew up in the
segregated south, persevered, is part of what I think will help
her be an effective Secretary of State as we're trying to
advance freedom around the world.
She then got into the details, but the key point in her
testimony and all the questions was, we want to advance
freedom. And I think that should be a bipartisan goal and
aspiration. And throughout it all, Dr. Rice showed a basic,
fundamental belief in trusting free people, trying to advance
freedom, put in the institutions of freedom so that there is
not corruption in government, how there's religious freedom,
how there's freedom of expression, many times talking about the
rule of law. She faced some tough questions on some tough
challenges facing our country presently and in the future. And
there was some bump and run defenses and tactics used against
her but she never really got off stride. She kept her poise
through these many, many hours of questioning and I think when
you look at the totality of her--of her record, her experience,
her principles I respectfully ask my colleagues to confirm
President Bush's choice to be his Secretary of State.
I think she will do our country proud. She has shown a
great deal of poise, a great deal of intellect, and I believe
that this committee has asked, and every Senator's had more
than adequate chance to ask questions.
But through it all Dr. Rice has never gone off stride.
She's the embodiment of the modern day American dream for all
people who have an equal opportunity to compete and succeed
regardless of their gender, their race, or their religion. That
is the meritocracy we have in this country. And she understands
that as does this President. As other countries, the people in
other countries of the world have such opportunities not only
will they have greater opportunity and hope, but we also will
be more secure. And I think Dr. Rice will be an outstanding
Secretary of State for advancing those principles. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Allen.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes, Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you very
much for your stewardship of these hearings. They have been
what my colleagues have--have called them. I think you've been
fair and patient and generous and I appreciate it and I think
everybody on the committee appreciates it. And I want to thank
you for staying extra time last night and I thank Dr. Rice for
hanging in there. The Senator from Virginia talks about sort of
the standard here by which we should make this judgment.
There isn't anybody in the United States of America who
doesn't admire Dr. Rice for the journey she's made, for what
she represents. And is she qualified for the job? Absolutely.
Of course she is, absolutely qualified. The President has a
right to make a choice. But our votes also have to count for
something, and it seems to me if you think about this hearing
and what we've heard over the course of the last hours, a
majority of this committee, bipartisanly, has expressed
unbelievably serious reservations about policies in one part of
the world or another. Serious reservations about North Korea,
about Iraq, about Iran, about proliferation, about Haiti, about
Latin America. And particularly the absence even of policy in
some of those places.
So in my judgment it's not a question of ratifying a life
story as much as it is a judgment that we make about the
direction of our nation, the security of our country, and the
choices that have been made. The judgments that have been made
over the last years. I choose to vote my concerns, not to
overlook them. I choose to vote my gut, not custom. I know what
custom says. But the fact is that Dr. Rice is one of the
principle architects, implementors, and defenders of a series
of administration policies and choices that in my judgment have
not made our country as secure as we ought to be in the
aftermath of 9-11. And that have alienated much of the world
and certainly much needed allies in our effort to reduce the
cost in lives and dollars to the American people.
I also believe there's been a collateral cost of other
initiatives that we might have been able to undertake that
would also have advanced the cause of freedom as well as the
security of our nation. I came to this hearing genuinely open
minded to see what I would hear. And I regret to say that while
we heard words sort of offering--so the convention of this city
and of current politics. I didn't see in the testimony an
acknowledgment of the need for a fundamental bipartisan change.
For a policy that shows a direction that can build the kind of
consensus that our nation needs and that the world needs.
Nor even a new vision for America's foreign policy that can
make us stronger and help us win the war on terror. On Iraq, on
North Korea, and on Iran to name just a few what I heard was
really a policy that predicts more of the same. Senator Biden
is right about those numbers and the refusal to even
acknowledge that to the American people is quite stunning at
this point in time. You can't deal with that kind of reality,
you can't really tell the American people what the choices and
options really are.
I hope I'm proven wrong. And I hope the course will change.
And I hope the administration will recognize the strength of a
foreign policy that has bipartisan support. And I'm prepared as
I said last night to work with Dr. Rice and all the colleagues
on this committee to find the kind of bipartisanship that has
always made America stronger. Historically politics stopped at
the water's edge, it ought to. We haven't seen that kind of
strength in these last years.
So I will work, I'll work with the administration, I'll
reach out and I'm confident that colleagues on both sides of
the aisle will do the same. But while I recognized at the
beginning of this hearing that Condoleeza Rice will be
confirmed overwhelmingly by the United States Senate it will
have to be without my vote for the reasons that I've stated.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Kerry. Let me just make a
personal comment. Part of Dr. Rice's responsibilities, as we
all recognize, is to be a strong administrator of the
Department of State. She has spent quality time to try to make
certain that confidence could be built in the Department.
Secretary Powell was certainly remarkable in the leadership
that he gave in that respect. I mention that part of the issue
because it's one that we all have to be cognizant of on this
committee.
We talked about the support that she will need, the
budgetary support, the things that need to happen in our
embassies abroad, in our consulates, the security of our
people. We touched upon these issues which are not really
differences of policy but really ones of emphasis. This
committee should be an advocate for a strong budget. We have
talked about the need for a strong authorization, the
refashioning of various institutions that sometimes don't get
looked at.
I see in Dr. Rice someone who is fully capable of making
changes as required, of working and listening carefully to
those who are part of that Department and in our embassies. I
admire that. I appreciate the points made by members on both
sides of the aisle with regard to the debate that we have had
for many years on American foreign policy. Certainly that has
been found in this committee in abundance. We have a
responsibility to try to bring forward a bipartisan support so
there is one face for America. I think that the committee has
discharged that very well through the chairmanship of my friend
Joe Biden and hopefully during the past two years.
I think that this hearing was designed for not only a
ventilation of all of our views but also a public opportunity
for Dr. Rice and for the American people to understand the
gravity of our concerns. We have underlined many concerns.
There were, in fact, instances during our hearing in which
Dr. Rice recognized that we have work to do. There will be more
conversations, more hearings. There will need to be. At the end
of the day, she does have very strong confidence in the
President of the United States, and it's a unique relationship.
I'm not certain that I saw the very beginning of it, but I
think I saw a part of that in visits to Stanford University to
see my friend and our former Secretary of State George Schultz
at a time when Dr. Rice was serving as provost of the
university. For a variety of reasons, George Schultz came to
the conclusion that, at least on the Republican party side,
that George Bush was the best bet. As a result he gave very
strong support to the candidacy of the Governor of Texas.
Perhaps through his intercession, Dr. Rice became an
advisor, and was even sometimes suggested as a tutor, as a
mentor to Governor Bush during the primary campaigns and the
election. That trust has been built over many years. She does
have the ear of the President.
Many of you have raised questions as to how candid she will
be with the President. She affirmed today that she tells the
President what's on her mind. Sometimes he agrees and sometimes
he disagrees. Each one of us, less frequently, has had that
opportunity. Most of us have availed ourselves of that
opportunity in very candid ways, advising to the best of our
ability our President about what we believe is the thing to do.
I see in Dr. Rice, in the conversations that I've enjoyed
with her, sometimes with Senator Biden, sometimes with other
members of the committee, a degree of openness to listen. She
possess a loyalty to the President, so there is not immediate
acquiescence or commitment. But at least there is an
opportunity to move the policy along. I saw in her discussion
today of the nation building issue, now called reconstruction
or whatever, a very large change. President Bush in his first
few speeches on foreign policy five years ago indicated that we
were not involved in nation building, and that was the
generally held view of many people, on both sides of the aisle.
When Chairman Biden held hearings before the war on Iraq, we
heard from many witnesses. We asked how long will we be there.
The witnesses said, some in the Bush administration, some in
previous administrations, that the mission would not be very
long because it would be embraced by the Iraqi people. They'll
proceed on to democracy and we'll be out of there.
Our role is not one of building, and hand holding and so
forth. We've had a 180 change in this world. We all understand,
having seen Afghanistan and elsewhere, how profound that change
has been. Dr. Rice did acknowledge that we are enthusiastically
trying to build something. We're going to have to make sure it
has the right personnel cadre for whatever the contingency may
be.
I look forward to supporting her nomination both today and
when we will have a vote of the full Senate. Even more
importantly I look forward to working with her, and to
expressing to her as candidly as we did today things that we
think are important, and try to make available for members of
the committee those opportunities, so that we will have a
sharing as constantly and as consistently as possible. Let us
just conclude by saying that I'm hopeful that members will give
her strong support with their votes today, but, even if not,
then at least with their support and their good advice in
months to come.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me--
because I presume others may want to if not make public
statements here today want to have some remarks included in the
record. So I'd ask unanimous consent that any and all members
be allowed to express their views. I'd ask unanimous consent
that some comments I have be included in the record. I'll leave
it there.
Let me--first of all let me begin by saying if I had my
druthers this morning the chair to my right would be vacant and
that I would have listened to someone appear before this
committee at some date seeking the job of Secretary of State.
Is that mic--is that mic on? And possibly even the chair to my
left might have been vacant as well under some circumstances. I
began my membership on this committee 24 years ago. I'm
watching this new freshman from Illinois, and by the way you
handled yourself brilliantly, I thought, during the last day
and a half, and I'm very proud to have you as a member of the
committee along with Senator Martinez and Senator Murkowski.
When I sat in that chair, Al Haig was the nominee under the
Reagan administration. Senator Sarbanes, Senator Biden,
Senator--the chairman of the committee were present at that
time. And so I've been through a number of these hearings over
the last 24 years. I think I've counted I think seven
Secretaries of State over that period of 24 years that have
been before this committee.
I always begin with the presumption that elected Presidents
ought to have their official families, their cabinets. To begin
with that presumption--I don't do the same with judicial
nominations, but I certainly do when it comes to having the
people around you who are going to express and carry out the
policies as you've described them and as they've articulated
them. And I do that here in this case as well.
And I intend, on that basis, to vote for this nominee.
Having said that, I want to thank Senator Boxer and Senator
Kerry. Others may take the same view they have of this
nomination, but I think the Chairman has said it well and the
ranking member has said it well. This is a very important
service we provide to the American public through a
confirmation hearing. However the votes are cast those who have
watched the hearings and as they've been reported it's one of
the unique opportunities we get to really examine as we
thoroughly would like a broad array of issues that affect the
interests of this nation. And whatever you may feel about the
votes we cast here I think the Senators who have raised the
criticisms and the expressions made by my colleagues from
California and Massachusetts have provided an invaluable
service. Because they've raised serious questions about past
policies of this administration and where they will take this
nation over the next four years.
I was deeply troubled by the unwillingness of Dr. Rice,
just very candidly and simply to answer the question about
torture. It's troubling to me because as others have said, it's
not just the President of the United States, it's the face of
American foreign policy, but the Secretary of State as well. In
simple statements that they make they can say so much about who
we are as a people. What direction we want to go in as a nation
as we begin this 21st century.
Troubled as well about a lack of interest that I suspect
that exists when it comes to Latin America. And again I thank
my colleague from Florida, my Senate colleague from Rhode
Island, for spending the last week, more than a week traveling
in the region to try and understand better the needs of this
part of the world and how we can, in a cooperative way, look
for new ways to establish new relationships that will advance
the interests of our own Nation.
So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your patience as Senator
Kerry and Senator Boxer have pointed out. You've conducted a
wonderful hearing. It's been a pleasure to serve with you over
these last 24 years in this committee. And I hope that Dr.
Rice, that she listened carefully to what Senator Boxer was
saying and Senator Kerry and Senator Biden, Senator Obama,
members on this side. We need to get back to building this
bipartisanship in foreign policy. It is critical. The problems
we face are international in scope; they require cooperation.
We've done it in the 20th century, we need to do it in the 21st
century. And so I'm going to take the side of supporting this
nominee with all the reservations that have been expressed.
Because I want to begin with a sense of optimism that maybe we
can go in a bit of a different direction on these pressing
issues before us. And I look forward to working with her. I
hope she does reach out to the minority, work with the majority
and this committee to try to help forge a more constructive and
thoughtful foreign policy for the 21st century.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator. All right, Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, thank
you, and I thank Dr. Rice in abstenia for being willing to be
here as long as it would take. I don't second guess the motives
of any Senator and how they vote. I respect the Senators from
California and Massachusetts and I could easily see how I could
go that way.
But I want to make one clerical point. We did have
extensive hearings prior to going to war in that brief period
when I was chairman, then you followed through with even better
hearings on whether or not to go to war. And it is true that
former administration witnesses came forward, from Weinberger
on, saying that this would be a slam dunk--didn't use the words
slam dunk but that we'd be greeted with open arms, that if
would be fairly quick. We didn't have to worry about nation
building. Then you raised, extensively, questions about
duration. But the vast majority of the witnesses we had said
this was going to take years upon years. That's why the title
of the article that was issued after our series of hearings
when I was Chairman was not ``The Day After'' but ``The Decade
After.''
``The Decade After.'' You and I and Senator Hagel and
others on this side talked about how this was going to be a
gigantic commitment, and that we should get ready for it. Which
leads me to this point. I think we're going to rue the day when
the administration acknowledges that they failed to level with
the American people about what was required of the American
people in order to make this policy work. I know I've said it a
thousand times, and I'm going to say it a thousand more times,
no foreign policy can be sustained without the informed consent
of the American people. And that means the whole deal.
I thought Senator Boxer was really articulate in making the
point about half truths. I am a practicing Catholic which I
guess as a Democrat is getting harder to be. But I'm a
practicing Catholic. I went through Catholic grade school and I
remember when we were learning to receive the sacrament of
penance where we Catholics go in confession, as some of my non-
Catholic friends know, and confess our sins. Which I still do
because I still have many to confess.
And I'll never forget the pastor in Saint Helen's where I
was a student taught by the Sisters of Saint Joseph. He tried
to explain to a grade school kid that when you go to confession
you have got to tell the whole truth. And he gave the following
example: Johnny went to confession and said, ``Bless me,
Father, for I have sinned, this is my first confession. And I
want to tell you the sins I've committed''. Johnny proceeded to
say, ``I did something very bad, I stole something.'' And
Father said, ``what did you steal, Johnny?'' Johnny said, ``I
stole a gold chain.'' Father said, ``Well, Johnny, are you
sorry for that?'' And Johnny said, ``I am heartily sorry
Father. I'm heartily sorry for it, but I lost the chain and I
can't give it back.'' So the priest admonished him and then
said, ``Say three Our Father's and three Hail Mary's and be a
good boy.'' And Johnny left.
And then father learned that there was a gold watch
attached to that chain. Johnny told the truth, he stole a
chain. But there was a gold watch on the end of the chain.
Johnny didn't tell Father that part. And he still had the
watch. So Father went on to say, ``When you go to confession
tell the whole deal. I not only stole a chain. There was a gold
watch hooked to the chain.''
This administration, first of all, doesn't go to
confession, nor should it have to. But it hasn't told the whole
story about what we face. And I hope I'm wrong. I've been here
32 years. I go back a long way with Secretaries of State.
Kissinger was National Security Advisor when I got here. Wasn't
even Secretary of State yet.
And I am very concerned that the American people--when the
going gets even rougher, which it well--may say, ``Hey guys you
don't know what you're talking about. We want to get out of
there.'' And I'll make you all a bet, I doubt whether anybody
would disagree with me.
We leave before the job is done and we will have a
generational problem. A generational problem in the Middle
East. It will be chaos. The likelihood of the Saudi Kingdom
remaining is, I think, is problematic. The Jordanians would be
under incredible stress, the Turks and the Kurds may very well
go to war over time. It will be a disaster. I hope I'm wrong.
Hope everybody gets to say, Biden, you said if we lose this for
the American people, leave prematurely, that these awful things
are going to happen and they didn't happen. I hope I'm wrong.
You're all politicians, you all know what your folks are
saying at home. How many of your folks are saying at home what
you know is the truth? We've got to send more forces. How many
folks at home say, ``Let's really stay the course here?''
Some are, but they are doing it, I think, because they
believe the President's told them the whole deal: ``We got
120,000 trained troops, we don't really need to have any more
significant expenditure there. We, in fact, don't even have to
include Iraq in the budget--it's going to take care of itself.
And by the way, things are getting better from June through
December. Everything is fine in Iraq, it's getting better.''
The American people, because they like him, as I like him,
believe the President levels with us. ``Man, what's the matter
with you, Joe? You go over there to Iraq and you come back and
say, `Geez it's not that good.' President says it's fine.''
And with regard to advancing freedom, if my colleagues can
forgive me, although the future Secretary of State likes
football so she won't mind the analogy. Senator Allen's father
is one of the greatest pro football coaches in my lifetime, so
I suspect he knows a lot more about it than I do. If I can
continue the football analogy, he said, ``We want to advance
freedom.'' Well, we want to score when we're on the team.
But if the offense you're running isn't working, you've
only gained a total of 74 yards in the first three quarters,
and there's been four interceptions. And the defense is riddled
with holes because you're running nickel defense, and it's not
working against this quarterback. What you want to ask at
halftime is, ``Hey, it ain't working, we're losing. What's the
plan Stan, what's the game plan? Are you going out of that
nickel defense, are you going to stop trying to run the ball up
the middle? Are you going to move on the outside and run
counter plays? What's the deal, what are you going to do? How
are you going to score?''
So everybody here wants to advance freedom. But a lot of us
think of advancing freedom by wishing that if we just make it
available to you and you see it you will rise up and embrace
it. I don't think it works that way.
So what we need is a coach George Allen. We need a game
plan. And all we're looking for here, to continue this silly
analogy, is for a game plan on training. Just tell me the plan,
what is the game plan? What you have now, everybody
acknowledges, is not working. What's the game plan on Iraq?
You want us to support you, Mr. President, and I want to
support you. We want to have a bipartisan foreign policy. As my
friends can tell you, I often get beat up on in our caucus
because I'm not more critical of the President. I want to help.
But we also need a game plan for Iran and Russia. And how are
we going to do it? Everyone, including Dr. Rice, says it needs
to be done.
What Dr. Rice is saying, by implication and directly, is
that we have to repair our relations around the world.
Diplomacy will be the watch word. Did any of you hear a plan on
diplomacy? I've submitted to the President and other have, I
think, about a 15-16 page game plan on public diplomacy that he
seemed to like a lot. Other people submitted other plans. The
President says, ``No, what's the plan? What are we going to
do?'' I didn't hear a thing other than the ortatory assertions
that we want to do this. But I don't want to dwell on my
disappointments as a result of Dr. Rice's testimony.
I must tell you, though, that the thing that stunned me
most is either her lack of willingness to talk about it or her
lack of understanding of the impact of the economy on foreign
policy. I was literally stunned, when asked the question, ``Do
you want the dollar to be the reserve currency for the rest of
the world or the Euro?'' And then she said she didn't have an
opinion on that. I'm paraphrasing. Whoa, that's the Secretary
of Treasury's job.
I'll conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying optimism is an
occupational requirement in this business. And my job is the
same as every other Senator here, no more, but its slightly
different. My job as the Democratic Ranking Member on this
committee is to, hopefully, continue to have a relationship
with whoever the Secretary of State is. And it gets harder when
you vote no. I like her, I've been disappointed, but I think of
the obligation I have. And every other Senator can judge it for
themselves. For me, my particular role is to be able to work
with her where we can. Because I do think she has the
President's ear.
And I hope she's willing to take on some of the
neoconservative notions in this administration. And maybe this
is the wish is the father of the thought, maybe she is a
neoconservative and I don't know. But if she's not, I hope she
confronts some of the premises upon which this is based. And
that's the reason I asked her yesterday, Mr. Chairman about the
stories in the New Yorker by Seymour Hersh, who is a pretty
solid guy. Saying that we already have teams in there trying to
figure out how to take down the nuclear act. Coincidentally, I
had George Tenet in Delaware for four hours, rode up in the
train with him. He made the obvious point without declaring
anything that I didn't already know or you don't already know.
The Iranians have gotten smart. It's diverse, it's all over the
country. There ain't no one rocket shot that we can take out
like the Israelis did before. That does not exist as a
possibility. The reason I asked her the question was not about
her confirming whether they're in there or not. I wanted to ask
her the underlying point.
The premise the neocons have, if this is being done, some
of our neoconservative friends, is not that you'll destroy all
the nuclear capacity but that that will cause the freedom
loving people of Iran to rise up and throw out the clerical
oppression. That's the basic fundamental premise. And I hope to
God she doesn't believe that. And I hope to God that if she
doesn't believe it, that she'll be the one, if anyone presents
such a plan to the President, who says, ``Whoa, whoa, wait a
minute. Let's get real here.'' That's the reason I asked the
question.
You know, Mr. Chairman, we who do foreign policy everyday,
we have a whole different vocabulary, we talk in terms and
phrases that make what we do sound really important. We talked
about the first tranche agreement and the second tranche and we
talk about having bilat with so and so. We better start to
speak simple English. All foreign policy is a logical extension
of human relationships with a whole hell of a lot less
information to go on. So we've got to start talking to the
American people that way. And the President is extremely good
at that if he chooses to do it.
Now I'll end, Mr. Chairman, with this point. I thought that
Senator Kerry was eloquent when he said how he chooses to view
this question. And it reminded me--I hope I'm quoting it
correctly because I try to quote everybody correctly--of a
quote from Samuel Johnson, who was talking about second
marriages. And Samuel Johnson said, ``Anyone who marries a
second time is choosing the triumph of hope over experience.''
That's Samuel Johnson's comment. Well this is a second
administration and I acknowledge I am choosing the triumph of
hope over experience.
Because my experience with the first four years of this
administration has not been real good in terms of what I think
their policies are. And my experience with Dr. Rice in this
hearing has been a disappointment. But I choose hope over
experience. Because at the end of the day the constitution
says, as my friend from Connecticut says, the President gets to
propose and we dispose. We all are required, as responsible
Senators on both sides of the aisle, to choose the standard by
which we'll make that judgment. And my standard has always
been, with regard to a cabinet, the President is entitled to
his family even if they're substantially wrong.
The only time we'll vote against cabinet appointees is when
they're appointed to dismantle that cabinet that they're being
appointed to. That's why I voted against Reagan nominees for
the Department of Education because Reagan said, as the former
Secretary would say, he chose to eliminate the Department of
Education. So I wasn't going to be complicitous in voting for
someone who's job it was to dismantle the Department of
Education. And I also voted against people who I thought were
incompetent in their mastery of the subject or people who's
reputation and character was not worthy of a vote. On all that
score, in no sense does Dr. Rice fit any of those probations in
my view.
So I'm going to vote for Dr. Rice. But I pray to the Lord
that she's at least telling the President, ``Hey boss, it's not
going that well. Hey boss, we don't have that many people
trained. Hey boss, the Iranians aren't going to rise up if some
of our special forces guys take out a nuclear facility. Hey
boss, we ought to read a little bit of history.'' It's really
that basic. I'm not trying to be a wise guy. It's that basic.
So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your patience as you would
acknowledge this is, other than voting for the Supreme Court or
the third branch of the government, I think this and the
Secretary of Defense jobs are the two most important jobs we
vote on. And I look forward to working with you and Dr. Rice.
She's always been available when I've asked her for her view.
But I was disappointed in this hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you Senator Biden. This is an important
vote, and I hope we're prepared for the vote. And if so, I'll
ask the clerk to call the roll.
Ms. Oursler. Mr. Hagel?
Senator Hagel. Aye.
Ms. Oursler. Mr. Chafee?
Senator Chafee. Aye.
Ms. Oursler. Mr. Allen?
Senator Allen. Aye.
Ms. Oursler. Mr. Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Aye.
Ms. Oursler. Mr. Voinovich?
The Chairman. Votes aye by proxy.
Ms. Oursler. Mr. Alexander?
Senator Alexander. Aye.
Ms. Oursler. Mr. Sununu?
Senator Sununu. Aye.
Ms. Oursler. Ms. Murkowski?
Senator Murkowski. Aye.
Ms. Oursler. Mr. Martinez?
Senator Martinez. Aye.
Ms. Oursler. Mr. Biden?
Senator Biden. Aye.
Ms. Oursler. Mr. Sarbanes?
The Chairman. Aye by proxy.
Ms. Oursler. Mr. Dodd?
Senator Dodd. Aye.
Ms. Oursler. Mr. Kerry?
Senator Kerry. No.
Ms. Oursler. Mr. Feingold?
Senator Feingold. Aye.
Ms. Oursler. Mrs. Boxer?
Senator Boxer. No.
Ms. Oursler. Mr. Nelson?
Senator Nelson. Aye.
Ms. Oursler. Mr. Obama?
Senator Obama. Aye.
Ms. Oursler. Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. Aye.
Will the clerk please tally the count?
Ms. Oursler. Sixteen yeas two nays.
The Chairman. Sixteen yeas; two nays. The committee votes
to report the nomination to the Senate floor. I thank all
Senators.
[Whereupon at 11:31 a.m. the committee was adjourned]
A P P E N D I X E S
----------
APPENDIX I--RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD BY MEMBERS
OF THE COMMITTEE TO DR. CONDOLEEZZA RICE
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted by
Senator Richard G. Lugar
AIDS Vaccine
Question. A group of independent organizations under the urging of
the Gates Foundation has formed an alliance called the Global HIV
Vaccine Enterprise. The Enterprise is preparing a blueprint for action
by researchers and others to improve international collaboration. Do
you believe that development of an AIDS vaccine is a national security
issue for the United States? What plans does the administration have to
support an international development program for an HIV vaccine?
Answer. This administration is dedicated to providing unprecedented
global leadership and commitment in funding the global AIDS emergency.
The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief is the largest
international public health initiative ever launched by a single nation
against a single disease. Beyond being a vital matter of public health,
the global HIV/AIDS pandemic carries strategic implications, posing a
direct challenge to our country's political, economic, and even
security interests.
Prevention of HIV infection remains a primary strategy in the fight
against the worldwide HIV pandemic, and a safe and effective HIV
vaccine would provide an extremely important tool for this purpose. At
the Sea Island Summit, the G-8 countries, under the President's
leadership, endorsed the establishment of a Global HIV Vaccine
Enterprise. The President announced that he would establish an
additional Vaccine Research and Development Center here in the United
States and urged other nations to do the same.
The Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator works with several
agencies in implementation of the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief. Research for the development of an AIDS vaccine is primarily
conducted under the auspices of the National Institutes for Health
(NIH). The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
(NIAID), who oversee this initiative, recently released a Request for
Applications (RFA) to establish a Center for HIV/AIDS Vaccine
Immunology (CHAVI). The Center will support intensive, coordinated, and
multi-pronged approaches to address key immunological roadblocks to the
discovery and development of a safe and effective HIV vaccine as
identified by the Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise at the G8 Summit. The
award is expected to be awarded in late in FY06.
ITAR Waivers for the United Kingdom and Australia
Former Secretary of State Powell wrote to me shortly after I
introduced legislation in 2003 regarding agreements the administration
negotiated with Australia and the United Kingdom to gain exemptions
from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR, 22 CFR 120-
130). Former Secretary Powell called my language ``a prudent measure of
legislative relief that will allow these agreements to come into
force.''
On October 28, 2004, President Bush signed H.R. 4200, the Ronald W.
Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public
Law 108-375). I am very concerned with language appearing in section
1225, ``Bilateral Exchanges and Trade in Defense Articles and Defense
Services Between the United States and the United Kingdom of
Australia.'' The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2005 did not provide the exceptions I sought, and, in fact, enactment
of its provisions made many question the need for future efforts to
obtain statutory exceptions for the exemption agreements with the
United Kingdom and Australia. The language of section 1225(b) of Public
Law 108-375 states: ``the Secretary of State shall ensure that any
license application submitted for the export of defense articles or
defense services to Australia or the United Kingdom is expeditiously
processed by the Department of State, in consultation with the
Department of Defense, without referral to any other Federal department
or agency, except where the item is classified or exceptional
circumstances apply.''
Question. Does the administration, and do you, support the
agreements with the governments of Australia and the United Kingdom, as
negotiated?
Answer. I welcome the Senate's support for these agreements, which
would allow most categories of unclassified defense items to be
exported to two of our closest allies without a license, advancing
interoperability and defense cooperation with the UK and Australia.
Only the British and Australian governments, and a limited number
of companies that the United States selects, would be authorized to
receive U.S.-origin defense items under the waivers.
I am aware our efforts to work with Congress on this issue are
unresolved. If confirmed, I will review the situation promptly, and I
look forward to working with the committee on this important issue.
Question. Do you envision any effort on the part of the
administration or yourself to renegotiate either of these agreements,
in whole or in part?
Answer. I know that our efforts to implement these agreements have
been stalled, and, if confirmed, will review the situation promptly.
These agreements are the product of years of serious negotiation
with the British and Australian governments and require them to enact
new export control laws, regulations, and practices to better protect
U.S. defense technology. Those improved measures are very much in our
interest.
The British and Australian companies that would be authorized to
receive certain categories of U.S. defense items without a license
would also have to make new commitments, including to their own
governments, to protect U.S. defense items.
Question. With regard to section 1225, do you agree with me that
this language could harm our government's ability to provide necessary
and complete interagency review of munitions license applications
because of the inclusion of the phrase ``without referral to any other
Federal department or agency?''
Answer. The State Department agrees with the general point that
defense export licenses for our British and Australian allies should be
processed as quickly as possible. However, it is not clear how the goal
of responsible defense export controls was advanced by a law
restricting the ability of licensing officers to seek input from
agencies other than DOD. For example, most licenses related to the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) have been referred to an
interagency committee (Missile Technology Export Control committee,
MTEC), which includes Commerce, and NASA as well as DoD. In other cases
we have seen fit to consult law enforcement or intelligence agencies.
We think a better approach would be to approve the ITAR waiver
agreements with these governments, which would allow certain
unclassified exports to proceed without any license under controlled
conditions, and to permit licensing officers to determine when and to
which agencies cases need to be referred for input. Now, with more
sensitive defense exports meriting case-by-case approval, our licensing
officers will only refer an application to an agency other than DoD if
they believe it has an interest or expertise that should be taken into
as an ``exception'' to normal practice.
Nunn-Lugar Liability Issues
From 1992 until 1999, the Nunn-Lugar program operated under the
terms of the Umbrella Agreement negotiated in 1991-92. In 1999, the
1992 agreement expired. A re-negotiated Extension Protocol was signed
by the United States and Russia in 1999, and has never been sent by
Presidents Yeltsin or Putin to the Duma. President Putin and other
Russian officials have at various times promised to send the Umbrella
Agreement Extension Protocol to the Duma, but this has not happened.
Question. Will you make ratification by the Duma of the Nunn-Lugar
Umbrella Agreement with the Russian Federation a priority matter, and
ensure that the United States engages at the highest levels necessary
to break this logjam?
Absent Duma approval, and should the Extension Protocol expire
under provisional application, do you see any other means with which to
remedy the liability problem with our Russian non-proliferation
assistance programs?
Are the problems of liability peculiar only to nuclear non-
proliferation assistance programs in Russia, or are they emerging in
other nonproliferation programs such as chemical weapons destruction or
biological weapons redirection efforts?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to make Duma approval and
Russian ratification of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) umbrella
agreement (as extended in 1999) a key priority and will seek to ensure
the United States engages with Russia at the highest levels necessary
to achieve this. Ratification would put ongoing CTR programs on a solid
footing. It is our understanding, however, that CTR ratification will
not resolve liability for any expanded or new nonproliferation
assistance programs with Russia. We will want to resolve both
ratification and these other matters in 2005, well before CTR comes up
for extension again in 2006. The administration is actively reviewing
ways of breaking the liability logjam with Russia--while protecting CTR
programs--to remove this impediment to plutonium disposition and other
cooperation. If confirmed, I will make every effort to resolve these
issues as soon as possible. On the other hand, ongoing CTR programs can
continue absent Russian ratification of the CTR agreement, as they have
since 1992 with no Duma approval or ratification. Those programs could
also continue without Duma approval or ratification after the 2006
expiration date of the CTR agreement, if both sides agree again to
extend that agreement provisionally in 2006.
Ongoing efforts under the CTR umbrella agreement or the
International Science and Technology Centers Agreement (such as
chemical weapons destruction and biological weapons redirection) have
not been blocked by differences over the liability issue. But the
liability issue has hindered progress on important projects outside
CTR, most notably U.S. and G-8 efforts to convert excess Russian
weapon-grade plutonium into forms not useable for weapons under the
plutonium disposition program.
Congressional Conditions on Nunn-Lugar Assistance
Question. What is the national security benefit of maintaining the
CTR certification and waiver process in light of the fact that for
every time Russia (or in some cases other states) have not met the
conditions, the administration has waived the conditions in the
interests of US national security?
Answer. I share concerns about the certification requirements for
assistance to Russia (or other states) under Cooperative Threat
Reduction programs of the USG.
The fact that each year since 2002, Russia has benefited from
waiver authority when certification could not be made demonstrates the
over-riding importance to U.S. national security interests worldwide of
the aid provided under CTR.
Since there is every reason to believe that CTR assistance will
continue to be of vital importance to the U.S. national interest as
long as it is needed, if confirmed, I look forward to working with
Congress on this issue.
Congressional Conditions on Nunn-Lugar Assistance: Chemical Weapons
Destruction Facility at Shchuchye, Russia
Question. Section 1308 of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 107-107) created six requirements for
certification before construction of the Chemical Weapons Destruction
Facility (CWDF) at Shchuchye, Russia, could continue. Four of the six
requirements have now been met, but Russia still has not provided
information ``regarding the size of the chemical weapons stockpile of
Russia.'' More than three years after their enactment, do you believe
the requirements of section 1308 of Public Law 107-107 have furthered
US objectives with respect to securing and destroying chemical weapons
at Shchuchye or with regard to Russian transparency under the Chemical
Weapons Convention?
Answer. The destruction of Russia's chemical weapons at Shchuchye,
in accordance with the verification provisions of the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), furthers the key U.S. national security objective of
keeping weapons of mass destruction and related technologies out of the
hands of terrorists or rogue states.
However, the United States maintains longstanding concerns
regarding the completeness and accuracy of Russia's chemical weapons
stockpile declaration. Despite Russia's insistence that they do not
possess any undeclared chemical weapons stocks, the United States
continues to pressure Russia for clarification of our concerns, and an
acceptable approach that will increase our confidence in this area as
part of our regular expert level consultations. Experts and Senior
administration officials have pressed Russian officials for
documentation into past activities, as well as short-notice visits to
undeclared suspect Russian chemical weapons sites. Russian officials
have told us that past documentation in this area no longer exists and
that visits to undeclared suspect CW sites are not acceptable. However,
the United States remains ready to review Russian proposals in attempt
to resolve our concerns.
The existence of the conditions in Section 1308 provides some
additional leverage on our continuing efforts to address our compliance
concerns with Russia. The construction and use of a CWDF at Shchuchye
is essential for the timely and irreversible destruction of Russia's
nerve agent
Despite slow progress and longstanding concerns regarding the
completeness and accuracy of Russia's chemical weapons stockpile
declaration, the United States will continue to pursue resolution of
these concerns with Russia.
Senior administration officials meet regularly with Russian
counterparts and stress the importance of resolving these concerns in a
timely manner, as well as remind counterparts that funding hinges on
tangible progress.
The United States intends to continue to address this matter
through a combination of gathering corroborating information,
identifying an acceptable approach, encouraging Russian cooperation and
transparency, and continuing bilateral expert consultations.
Budget: Strengthen Capacity
Question. One of your most important tasks as Secretary of State
will be to design and fight for a budget that reflects the challenges
and difficulties that our foreign policy faces as we fight the war
against terror. What are your plans to strengthen our civilian capacity
in the same way we are strengthening our military capacity?
Answer. Winning the war on terror remains our top foreign policy
priority. With support from Congress, the Department has established a
new Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction to provide a civilian
capacity to respond to post-conflict situations and thwart the growth
of terrorism and spread freedom and prosperity. State Department
budgets have also included resources to:
increase diplomatic staffing on the front lines of the
global fight, including additional security professionals;
extend an on-going program of security upgrades to protect
diplomatic facilities and personnel in the face of terrorism;
and
accelerate a capital construction program to replace
facilities at high risk with secure new embassy compounds.
Budget: Cut Current Spending
Question. There are reports that the White House is asking all
agencies, other than Defense and Homeland Security, to prepare options
for cutting current spending by 5%, with the intention of holding non-
defense resources to 1% growth in FY 2006. Do you believe that the
State Department should be included in such national security
exemptions in a way similar to the Defense Department, Intelligence,
and Homeland Security?
Answer. The President, OMB, and Congress recognize the vital role
that the State Department and International Affairs funding play in
national security.
Discretionary belt-tightening has constrained State operations and
Foreign Operations funding levels.
With supplemental funding, the Department has been able to meet
U.S. foreign policy priorities.
Budget: Budget Pressures
Question. The combination of previously announced spending
commitments for international HIV/AIDS, the Millennium Challenge
Corporation and the Middle East Peace Initiative is going to put
tremendous pressure on the foreign affairs budget for '06. Are you
working now to make certain that these program increases can be
accommodated without cutting into other important areas of a very tight
budget? To what extent is the administration going to request funding
for 150 account activities in the supplemental?
Answer. The President's Fiscal Year '06 budget is still under
review. If confirmed, I look forward to briefing the committee and
ensuring our important needs in the 150 account activities are met.
We do have significant foreign and State operations funding
shortfalls in FY 2005 that can only be met through supplemental
appropriations. Once the administration has finalized the supplemental
requirements, and if confirmed, I would be pleased to brief the
committee on those needs.
Defense Science Board Study on Transition to and From Hostilities
Question. In August 2004 the DSB concluded a study on ``Transition
to and from Hostilities.'' The study included an analysis of the very
substantial costs and manpower requirements for both the Department of
State and Defense that are needed to achieve our objectives in
stabilization and reconstruction operations, like our current
activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. The intent was to provide
guidelines for matching our national foreign policy objectives with the
resources that need to be devoted to accomplishing those objectives.
What is your assessment of the gap between the Department of State's
current and near-term projected manpower and resources and the
requirements revealed by the DSB study, and if you are confirmed what
will you do to bridge that gap?
Answer. The DSB study has provided a valuable analysis of the costs
we already spend on reconstruction and stabilization and the level of
resources required not only to provide assistance, but to manage that
response, to prepare for it, to staff it, and to maintain it. It
highlighted the need for additional resources for civilian agencies in
both people and money.
We agree with the basic thrust of the resource recommendations in
the DSB study: resources are needed both to lead, manage and implement
stabilization and reconstruction operations, and to support
programmatic activities that promote security and rule of law and
create the conditions for democracy and market economics to take root.
Some important resource requirements are not highlighted in the DSB
study, particularly the cost of deploying civilian teams, when needed
together with the military, to multiple locations in a country. We will
review all these resource needs in State and other agencies in order to
institutionalize a strong stabilization and reconstruction capability
within the U.S. Government.
Question. That same DSB study proposed a management regime aimed at
even better planning, including preparation far in advance, for
stabilization and reconstruction operations. The approach would
orchestrate, not just coordinate, activities in the Department of
State, the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and
other organs of government, taking into account not only legislated
authorities but also realistic organizational capabilities. Do you
agree with the proposed regime; if not, can you describe the specifics
of a better alternative to accomplish comparable goals; and if you are
confirmed what particular steps will you take to ensure even better
planning for stabilization and reconstruction?
Answer. We appreciate the DSB report's analysis and agree with the
need for a more coordinated approach between all agencies. The
administration has taken the decision to vest the responsibility for
this coordination in the Department of State, which has the lead in
foreign policy and which must manage our long-term interests overseas.
Within the State Department, we have built an interagency team with
USAID, CIA, and the Departments of Defense, Treasury, Justice and
others to coordinate stabilization and reconstruction activities for
countries in transition from conflict and civil strife, to plan for
potential conflicts, and to avert or mitigate conflict when we can.
This interagency team for planning and for response management led by
the Department of State will achieve the objectives of the study,
provided that sufficient resources are made available to State and
other agencies implementing programs overseas.
Office of the Coordinator For Reconstruction and Stabilization
Question. How do you expect the Office of Reconstruction and
Stabilization to develop in the future? Can you describe a hypothetical
situation where you and the President might turn to it and what you
would expect from it, both in terms of planning and operations?
Answer. Creating a strong USG stabilization and reconstruction
capacity is an administration national security priority. We appreciate
the leadership Senators Lugar, Biden and Hagel and others in the
Congress have shown on this issue.
S/CRS will not take over activities of partner organizations within
the government, but will be value-added by: preparing contingency
plans; building USG capabilities for stabilization and reconstruction;
developing systems to pre-position people and money; conducting
outreach to international partners and NGO's aimed at strengthening
global capacity; applying lessons learned and managing and integrating
the USG response.
If it is determined that the technical capacities of S/CRS would be
a value added in a certain situation, S/CRS will be asked to organize
and manage, in conjunction with the relevant regional bureau at the
State Department, a multi-agency response to a failing, failed or post-
conflict state.
S/CRS would manage a response effort by--establishing an
interagency task force proposing strategies to senior leadership
working with international community to coordinate efforts mobilizing
required personnel deploying personnel, equipment and other resources
designing programs to respond to identified needs managing response
efforts to meet identified goals.
Our efforts will be focused on early response when assistance can
have the most impact on the long-term prospects. Longer term management
of these responses will be devolved to normal structures when long-term
plans and budgets are in place.
Office of the Coordinator For Reconstruction and Stabilization: Budget
Question. The Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization is small
and has a very modest budget. Will the administration be requesting
substantial funding for the Office in the upcoming supplemental or in
the '06 budget?
Answer. The office currently has 35 staff from: State, USAID,
Defense, Treasury and CIA. The administration will recommend the
resources necessary for the office to start meeting its mission.
We will need resources for management--from CJS appropriations--and
for foreign assistance programs from Foreign Operations appropriations.
Experience has shown that we must have the capacity to manage 2-3
stabilization and reconstruction operations concurrently. That means
staff in Washington and the field to manage and deliver quality
programs.
In advance of a specific crisis, the Department will need to have
certain programs and funds already in place and have money available to
deploy teams quickly and pay for security and logistics, while
additional longer term funds are identified and sought.
Obviously we are in a difficult budget climate, but the
administration is committed to working with Congress to support this
stabilization and reconstruction initiative as a national security
priority.
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction And Stabilization:
Legislation
Question. The committee's bill, S.2127, called for a new 250-person
nation-building corps of civilians who can move quickly into a still
hostile environment to provide public information, deliver emergency
medical care, train police, rebuild schools, roads and airports, and
reconstitute political processes. Do you share our view of the
necessity for such an active duty civilian corps?
Answer. We need the ability to send the right people into the field
as well as to manage programs in Washington. To deploy people quickly
and lead the coordination process in Washington, we need to have in
place core staff who can plan, exercise, and train together. This will
require additional staff and resources because the gaps we must fill
cannot be met by rearranging existing personnel.
The model we have developed incorporates the core concepts you laid
out in your bill for a civilian response corps. And, if confirmed, I
want to examine the concept further. And, if confirmed, I look forward
to discussing it with you. We need additional diplomatic personnel to
underpin operations overseas and we need a corps of technical experts
to design, deliver, and manage programs.
The complete solution requires a mixture of on-call rosters,
permanent staff and pre-positioned contracts in order to assemble the
teams needed in varying situations.
As we analyze the capacity we have and the gaps, we will work with
the Congress to put in place the necessary authorities, mechanisms, and
resources.
Law of the Sea: Ratification Efforts
Question. The most recent Treaty Priority List submitted by the
administration to the committee listed the Law of the Sea Convention as
a treaty ``for which there is an urgent need for Senate approval.'' How
can we work together to make certain that the treaty is ratified on an
urgent basis?
Answer. The administration supports early Senate action on the
Convention.
The administration urges the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to
again favorably report out the Convention and Implementing Agreement,
with the Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification as reported
by the committee last March.
The administration will work with the Senate leadership to bring
the Convention and Implementing Agreement to a floor vote in the 109th
Congress.
Law of the Sea: Benefits for National Security
Question. I was pleased to see in the U.S. Ocean Action Plan that
he submitted to the Congress on December 17, the President states that
``as a matter of national security, economic self-interest, and
international leadership, the administration is strongly committed to
U.S. accession to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.'' Can you
cite specific benefits that accession will have for U.S. national
security?
Answer. Joining the Convention will advance the interests of the
U.S. military.
As the world's leading maritime power, the United States benefits
more than any other nation from the navigation provisions of the
Convention.
Those provisions, which establish international consensus on the
extent of jurisdiction that States may exercise off their coasts,
preserve and elaborate the rights of the U.S. military to use the
world's oceans to meet national security requirements.
They achieve this, among other things:
by stabilizing the outer limit of the territorial sea at 12
nautical miles;
by setting forth the navigation regime of innocent passage
for all ships in the territorial sea, through an exhaustive and
objective list of activities that are inconsistent with
innocent passage--an improvement over the subjective language
in the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous
Zone;
by protecting the right of passage for all ships and
aircraft, through, under, and over straits used for
international navigation, as well as archipelagoes;
by reaffirming the traditional freedoms of navigation and
overflight in the exclusive economic zone and the high seas
beyond; and
by providing for the laying and maintenance of submarine
cables and pipelines.
U.S. Armed Forces rely on these navigation and overflight rights
daily, and their protection is of paramount importance to U.S. national
security.
Becoming a party to the Convention would strengthen our ability to
deflect potential proposals that would be inconsistent with U.S.
national security interests, including those affecting freedom of
navigation.
Law of the Sea: Economic Benefits
Question. Support for U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea
Convention has been expressed by U.S. companies and industry groups
whose businesses depend on the oceans. These include the American
Petroleum Institute, the U.S. Oil and Gas Association, the Chamber of
Shipping of America, the U.S. Tuna Foundation, the American Chemistry
Council, the National Oceans Industries Association, and the U.S.
Council for International Business. Do you agree with these U.S.
companies that acceding to the Law of the Sea Convention will advance
U.S. economic interests and benefit American businesses?
Answer. Yes. The United States, as the country with the longest
coastline and the largest exclusive economic zone, will gain economic
and resource benefits from the Convention:
The Convention accords the coastal State sovereign rights
over non-living resources, including oil and gas, found in the
seabed and subsoil of its continental shelf.
The Convention improves on the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention,
to which the United States is a party, in several ways:
by replacing the ``exploitability'' standard with an
automatic continental shelf out to 200 nautical miles,
regardless of geology;
by allowing for extension of the shelf beyond 200 miles if
it meets certain geological criteria; and
by establishing an institution that can promote the legal
certainty sought by U.S. companies concerning the outer limits
of the continental shelf.
Concerning mineral resources beyond national jurisdiction, i.e.,
not subject to the sovereignty of the United States or any other
country, the 1994 Agreement meets our goal of guaranteed access by U.S.
industry on the basis of reasonable terms and conditions.
Joining the Convention would facilitate deep seabed mining
activities of U.S. companies, which require legal certainty to carry
out such activities in areas beyond U.S. jurisdiction.
The Convention also accords the coastal State sovereign rights over
living marine resources, including fisheries, in its exclusive economic
zone, i.e., out to 200 nautical miles from shore.
The Convention protects the freedom to lay submarine cables and
pipelines, whether military, commercial, or research.
In addition, the Convention establishes a legal framework for the
protection and preservation of the marine environment from a variety of
sources, including pollution from vessels, seabed activities, and ocean
dumping.
The provisions effectively balance the interests of States in
protecting the environment and natural resources with their interests
in freedom of navigation and communication.
With the majority of American living in coastal areas, and U.S.
coastal areas and EEZ generating vital economic activities, the United
States has a strong interest in these aspects of the Convention.
Law of the Sea: Military Operations
Question. It is my understanding that it has been U.S. policy since
President Reagan's 1983 Statement of Ocean Policy that the United
States, including the U.S. military, will act in accordance with the
Law of the Sea Convention's provisions relating to the traditional uses
of the oceans. Would acceding to the Law of the Sea Convention require
the United States military to make any changes in its existing policies
or procedures with respect to the use of the oceans to conduct military
operations?
Answer. No.
As the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, testified
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 8, 2004, ``I am
convinced that joining the Law of the Sea Convention will have no
adverse effect on our operations . . . but rather, will support and
enhance ongoing U.S. military operations, including continued
prosecution of the global war on terrorism.''
The Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mike Mullen, testified
before the House International Relations Committee on May 12, 2004,
that the Navy ``currently operate[s]--willingly because it is our
national security interests--within the provisions of the Law of the
Sea Convention in every area related to navigation. We would never
recommend an international commitment that would require us to get a
permission slip--from anyone--to conduct our operations.''
Admiral Mullen concluded his oral statement by emphasizing,
``Simply, the Convention does not require a permission slip or prohibit
these activities; we would continue operating our military forces as we
do today.''
Law of the Sea: Weapons Of Mass Destruction
Question. Some commentators have asserted that acceding to the Law
of the Sea Convention would prevent the United States from taking
action necessary to stop the transportation of weapons of mass
destruction across the oceans. I note, however, that State Department
Legal Adviser William Taft testified before the House International
Relations Committee that ``the Convention will not affect applicable
maritime law or policy regarding interdiction of weapons of mass
destruction, their means of delivery and related materials.'' Do you
believe that acceding to the Law of the Sea Convention will in any way
diminish the ability of the United States to take necessary action to
prevent the transport of weapons of mass destruction?
Answer. No.
The Convention's navigation provisions derive from the 1958 law of
the sea conventions, to which the United States is a party, and also
reflect customary international law accepted by the United States.
As such, the Convention will not affect applicable maritime law or
policy regarding interdiction of weapons of mass destruction.
Like the 1958 conventions, the LOS Convention recognizes numerous
legal bases for taking enforcement action against vessels and aircraft
suspected of engaging in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction:
exclusive port and coastal State jurisdiction in internal
waters and national airspace;
coastal State jurisdiction in the territorial sea and
contiguous zone;
exclusive flag State jurisdiction over vessels on the high
seas (which the flag State may, either by general agreement in
advance or approval in response to a specific request, waive in
favor of other States); and
universal jurisdiction over stateless vessels.
Nothing in the Convention impairs the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense (a point which is reaffirmed in the
Resolution of Advice and Consent proposed in the last Congress).
Law of the Sea: Proliferation Security Initiative
Question. Some commentators have asserted that acceding to the Law
of the Sea Convention would prevent or inhibit the United States from
implementing the Proliferation Security Initiative. I note, however,
that State Department Legal Adviser William Taft testified before our
committee that the PSI is consistent with the Law of the Sea
Convention, and that the obligations under the Convention do not
present any difficulties for successfully carrying out this important
initiative. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark gave similar
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee. I also note that
all of the other countries that are partners with the United States in
PSI are themselves parties to the Law of the Sea Convention. In your
view, will acceding to the Convention inhibit the United States and its
partners from successfully pursuing the PSI?
Answer. No.
PSI requires participating countries to act consistent with
national legal authorities and ``relevant international law and
frameworks,'' which includes the law reflected in the Law of the Sea
Convention.
The Convention's navigation provisions derive from the 1958 law of
the sea conventions, to which the United States is a party, and also
reflect customary international law accepted by the United States.
As such, the Convention will not affect applicable maritime law or
policy regarding interdiction of weapons of mass destruction, their
means of delivery, and related materials.
Like the 1958 conventions, the LOS Convention recognizes numerous
legal bases for taking enforcement action against vessels and aircraft
suspected of engaging in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction:
exclusive port and coastal State jurisdiction in internal
waters and national airspace;
coastal State jurisdiction in the territorial sea and
contiguous zone;
exclusive flag State jurisdiction over vessels on the high
seas (which the flag State may, either by general agreement in
advance or approval in response to a specific request, waive in
favor of other States); and
universal jurisdiction over stateless vessels.
Nothing in the Convention impairs the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defense (a point which is reaffirmed in the
Resolution of Advice and Consent proposed in the last Congress).
Law of the Sea: Role of the UN
Question. Some commentators have asserted that the Law of the Sea
Convention gives the United Nations the power to regulate the use of
the oceans and that U.S. accession to the Convention would allow the
United Nations to veto uses of the ocean by the United States,
including by the U.S. military. It is my understanding that, under the
Convention, the United Nations has no decision-making role with respect
to any uses of the oceans. Please explain what role, if any, the United
Nations would have in regulating uses of the oceans by the United
States if the United States were to accede to the Law of the Sea
Convention.
Answer. The United Nations has no decision-making role under the
Convention in regulating uses of the oceans by any State Party to the
Convention.
Commentators who have made this assertion have argued that the
International Seabed Authority (ISA) somehow has regulatory power over
all activities in the oceans.
The authority of the ISA is limited to administering the
exploration and exploitation of minerals in areas of deep seabed beyond
national jurisdiction, generally more than 200 miles from shore. The
ISA has no other role and has no general regulatory authority over the
uses of the oceans, including freedom of navigation and oversight.
Law of the Sea: Taxation by International Seabed Authority
Question. Some commentators have asserted that acceding to the Law
of the Sea Convention would involve giving the International Seabed
Authority the power to impose taxes on U.S. citizens. State Department
Legal Adviser William Taft has testified before Congress that the
International Seabed Authority has no ability or authority to levy
taxes. In your view, is there any basis for concern that U.S. accession
to the Law of the Sea Convention will result in U.S. citizens being
subject to taxation by the International Seabed Authority?
Answer. No. The Convention does not provide for or authorize
taxation of individuals or corporations.
Law of the Sea: Technology Transfer
Question. Some commentators have asserted that the United States
would be required to transfer sensitive technology, including
technology with military applications, to developing countries if it
acceded to the Law of the Sea Convention. It is my understanding,
however, that provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention containing
mandatory technology transfer requirements were eliminated by the 1994
Agreement addressing the Convention's deep seabed mining regime. Do you
believe there is any reason for concern that acceding to the Convention
would require the United States to transfer any technology to
developing countries?
Answer. No, technology transfers are not required by the
Convention.
Law of the Sea: U.S. Sovereignty over Ocean Resources
Question. Some commentators have asserted that acceding to the Law
of the Sea Convention will involve ceding to the International Seabed
Authority sovereignty currently enjoyed by the United States over ocean
resources. It is my understanding, however, that the jurisdiction of
the International Seabed Authority addresses only mining of minerals in
areas of the deep seabed beyond the jurisdiction of any country, and
that the United States has never asserted sovereignty over such areas.
Do you believe that acceding to the Convention would involve any
surrender of existing United States claims to sovereignty over ocean
resources?
Answer. No, the United States has never claimed sovereignty over
areas or resources of the deep seabed.
The Convention's provisions on the exclusive economic zone and
continental shelf preserve and expand U.S. sovereign rights over the
living and non-living ocean resources located within, and with regard
to the continental shelf beyond, 200 miles of our coastline.
Law of the Sea: Effect of 1994 Implementing Agreement
Question. Some commentators have asserted that there is uncertainty
as to the legal status of the 1994 Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention, which
addresses the Convention's deep seabed mining regime. I have received a
letter from eight former Legal Advisers to the Department of State from
both Republican and Democratic administrations stating that the 1994
Agreement ``has binding legal effect in its modification of the LOS
Convention.'' Do you believe there is any basis for questioning the
legal effect of the 1994 Agreement?
Answer. No. My understanding is that the notion that the 1994
Agreement has no legal effect is incorrect.
Defense Science Board Recommendations
Question. The Pentagon's Defense Science Board (DSB) recently
proposed establishing at the NSC a new deputy post to coordinate
strategic communications and public diplomacy throughout the
government. Is this a good idea?
Answer. The DSB and other studies of public diplomacy and strategic
communications over the past several years offer many good ideas for
strengthening public diplomacy and strategic communication. If
confirmed, strengthening public diplomacy will be one of my priorities
as Secretary of State. I do not want to comment at this time on what
structures would best serve that objective but will consider a full
range of options, and will be delighted to do so in cooperation with
members of this committee. The State Department must lead the Public
Diplomacy effort, particularly in the field through our embassies and
missions abroad.
Public Diplomacy: Budget Increases
Question. ECA has finally seen its budget increase after suffering
significant cuts in the 1990s. There has been a major shift in funding
to programs aimed at the Middle East and Muslim world, at the expense
of programs in Europe, the former Soviet Union, and other parts of the
world. Do you believe that enough is being done to focus attention on
the growing degree and shrillness of anti-Americanism in Europe, Latin
America, and Asia?
Answer. Combating terrorism and the apparent deterioration of the
U.S. image abroad are global challenges that require a strategic
approach to the use of exchange programs in every region of the world.
Our political and economic adversaries use misperceptions about our
goals, disagreements about our policies and a general sense of anti-
Americanism to move their specific agendas forward around the world.
The Department is committed to balancing the needs of all our regions
to address U.S. foreign policy goals.
We know that exchanges present the best face of America, they work
to convey to publics that we care about the future of their young
people and education, they convey that we have common cause in basic
shared vales, and they are ``moving the needle'' with individuals.
Results consolidated from a number of program evaluations in 2003 show
that 88% of exchange participants gained new knowledge/skills on key
issues, and 89% of exchange participants gained a better understanding
or more positive view of the United States.
Twenty-five percent of ECA's budget currently goes to exchanges in
the countries covered by the Bureaus of Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs; new programs and increases in traditional exchanges are
effectively addressing these critical areas. We have moved some
resources from Eurasia to do so, but have maintained robust programs in
Eurasia aimed at youth, from high school through undergraduate and
graduate level students. In all other regions, we have been able to
keep exchange programs at roughly the FY 03 level. In all regions, we
are focusing on our most important audiences.
Resources for exchanges, coupled with the effective programming
provided by ECA, offer a strong antidote to anti-Americanism. The
Department looks forward to working further with Congress to identify
the appropriate level of resources for exchanges to meet the challenges
we face in every part of the world.
Public Diplomacy: Guidance to U.S. Broadcasting
Question. How do you view the State Department's role in providing
strategic guidance and greater coherence to U.S. broadcasting efforts?
Should the Department play a stronger role? Does the current
bureaucratic structure serve us well or could it be improved? For
example, should the VOA be integrated into State?
Answer. The State Department and BBG must effectively coordinate
U.S. international broadcasting efforts. As you know, the Secretary of
State is a member of the Board of Governors, and his/her designee
actively participates in Board meetings and deliberations.
The BBG also coordinates regularly with the regional bureaus and
with the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. As
part of its annual language service review process, the BBG regularly
receives briefings from the Department of State on matters of strategic
guidance as a way to ensure that high priority languages are
identified. The Department provides guidance and clears on VOA
editorials on a daily basis, and when issues of difference arise, the
BBG and Department work together to resolve them.
I believe that these arrangements serve the State Department and
the BBG very effectively.
NED
Question. In the 9/11 Commission legislation that Congress recently
passed, my initiative to establish a free press institute at the NED
was included. NED officials and other stakeholders in the media field
have moved quickly to begin to make it a reality. They will be making a
proposal to the State Department for $1 million for institute staff,
the development of a strategic plan, and organizational meetings. Would
you support this grant and expedite its approval?
Answer. The State Department supports the work of the NED and will
support the initiative to develop a free press institute. We would also
support including the $1 million for free press staff as part of the
grant for NED core funding that passes through the Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights and Labor. We look forward to consultations on the
development of a strategic plan and discussion of organizational
efforts.
Embassy Security
Question. Some agencies who will be required to contribute under
the Capital Security-Cost Sharing Program have maintained that their
financial participation is unwarranted or excessive. The Department of
Defense has been particularly reluctant to participate. Are all the
agencies now on board with this plan, including Defense?
Answer. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L. 108-447)
makes clear that all Departments and agencies are to contribute their
shares under the Capital Security Cost-Sharing Program
``notwithstanding any other provision of law,'' ``without offsets,''
and ``in advance.'' The Department is directed not to build space for
employees of any agency that fails to pay its full amount of funding
required by cost-sharing.
OMB had already directed each agency to include its FY05 cost-
sharing contribution in its FY05 budget. All agencies have been
cooperating with the Department in determining their respective
overseas staffing levels, and we anticipate that they will transfer the
funds upon request. So far we have no indication that any agency will
refuse to comply.
Danger Pay
Question. The committee has voted twice in favor of increasing
danger pay for State Department employees who serve in hostile
environments. Why has the administration not requested this benefit as
part of its overall submission to the Congress?
Answer. I appreciate your support for creating further incentives
for employees to serve in hostile environments. The administration did
not request the danger pay increase as part of its overall submission
for FY 2004 or FY 2005 for budgetary reasons.
Any future administration initiative to increase danger pay would
need to consider the additional funding required to finance the
increase within overall budget constraints.
Submission of Treaties
Question. The administration did not submit to the committee a
Treaty Priority List during the 108th Congress. Does the administration
intend to submit a Treaty Priority List during the 109th Congress? If
so, when does the administration expect to submit the list?
Answer. The administration intends to submit to the committee a
Treaty Priority List during the 109th Congress. The administration
recognizes that having such a list can assist the committee in
organizing its work. We will endeavor to submit a list as soon as
possible after receiving the customary request from the committee.
NED and Free Press
Question. The President last year called for a doubling of the NED
budget. We were successful in increasing the budget significantly in
the omnibus legislation. I was able to have included in the
intelligence reform bill language that embraced the concept of S. 2096.
Do you agree that a free press institute funded through NED would be
one good way of consolidating U.S. expertise, allowing for private
contributions, and building a coordinated capacity to support free
press in countries building democratic institutions?
Answer. The Department of State recognizes and supports the
importance of and the role of independent media in the development of
open democracies. The establishment of a free press institute funded
through NED would be one way to promote this objective and would add a
fifth ``core'' partner institute to complement NED's work in other
areas to promote democracy. We support the initiative to coordinate USG
and private efforts to develop and encourage free press and believe
that a free press institute could help mobilize private sector
resources to build free press activities and support democratic
institution building. We believe that USG efforts to promote free and
independent media should also be coordinated with the important similar
work being done by Internews, IREX and other nongovernmental
organizations that support and share these universal human rights
values. We would urge the funding of the free press institute to be
treated as separate from existing media training and independent media
support activities, and kept clearly distinct from public diplomacy
initiatives.
Iraq Issues
Question. Reports indicate General Casey and Ambassador Negroponte
have established a close working relationship. There is a gap, however,
between the military and civilian efforts in Iraq. The Department of
State, which is responsible for executing U.S. assistance to Iraq, is
dependent on the Department of Defense, which owns and controls
transportation assets, controls the airspace and roads and is helping
the Iraqis establish security. The U.S. military, for its part, does
not have the statutory responsibility, mechanisms or resources to
operate jointly with the State Department to provide reconstruction
assistance. How can you ensure that there is an integrated, joint
civilian-military operational capability for stabilization and
reconstruction in Iraq?
Answer. All agencies of the United States government recognize the
importance and urgency of reconstructing and stabilizing Iraq. It is a
prime mission for both our DoD and Department of State components in
Iraq, and they are working together closely. We have developed a strong
interagency process--at all levels--both in Washington and Iraq to
ensure civilian-military coordination and cooperation.
The overall policy and operating relationship between the State and
Defense Departments is set out in a series of documents, including NSPD
36, ``Operation Plan (OPLAN) Sovereign Iraq,'' and three Memoranda of
Understanding on support and security. These documents are the product
of the joint State-DOD Interagency Transition Planning Team that closed
down CPA and stood up Mission Baghdad. In practice, they are working
well.
Embassy Baghdad (and DOD) participates through video teleconference
in regular and frequent interagency meetings on Iraq--meetings of the
National Security Council, Principals and Deputies Committees, and the
Iraq Policy Operations Group. General Casey participates in meetings of
the National Security Council.
On the ground in Iraq our reconstruction efforts are coordinated by
a civilian-military interagency organization, the Iraq Reconstruction
Management Office (IRMO), headed by Ambassador William Taylor. IRMO
coordinates closely with the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), a
Pentagon-based organization responsible for implementing projects from
the $18.4 billion Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund that Congress
approved in 2003.
The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), led
by LTG David Petraeus, is responsible for the development of the Iraqi
Armed Forces and Iraqi Security Forces. MNSTC-I works closely with MNF-
I, and Embassy, and IRMO.
Rather than seeing a ``gap'' between civilian and military efforts,
I see that at every level they are intertwined and integrated:
State Department, USAID and PCO representatives at the
Regional Embassy Offices in Mosul, Kirkuk, Hilla and Basra work
closely with the military commands in those regions. Our State
Embedded Teams are located within military commands in Tikrit,
Ba'quba, Ramadi/Falluja, Najaf and Karbala, providing close
State-military coordination.
MNF-I officers are embedded in the offices of IRMO's senior
ministry consultants. MNF-I officers participate in the
Mission's Elections Security Cell.
The military has changed its security mission in Iraq to
ensure the protection of infrastructure under insurgent attack,
and to provide security for the assistance materials IRMO
imports for the reconstruction of the country.
Military commanders have used their Commander's Emergency
Response Program (CERP) funds to fund reconstruction projects.
800 Civil Affairs personnel work on the ground, in every
major American maneuver command, in coordination with civilian
reconstruction officials. MNF-I's Civil Affairs troops are
supporting IRMO in Falluja resettlement and reconstruction.
USAID and 1st Cavalry Division have partnered to provide
services and employ youth in Baghdad; expanded to include PCO,
this has been a model for reconstruction assistance in
strategic cities such as Najaf, Samarra, Tal Afar and Falluja.
Carrying out reconstruction and securing the country are two parts
of a single effort, and that is the way our people on the ground in
Iraq see it--civilian and military alike. They understand that
cooperating in such a difficult and dangerous environment is essential.
They are doing a superb job.
Question. When USAID advertised openings for 20 personnel in their
Baghdad office, there were no applicants. They have managed through
aggressive recruitment by Mr. Natsios to fill these openings, but mid-
level experienced FSO's are still needed. How will you address the
personnel shortfalls created by the demands of Iraq and Afghanistan? Do
we need to offer tax-free war zone incentives for State Department
personnel like we have done for the military? The committee has
supported increasing danger pay and would like to see an administration
request to that effect. What other incentives are needed?
Answer. USAID has done a tremendous job recruiting for Baghdad and
Kabul, already filling all positions through October 2005. State, of
course, has many more positions than USAID to fill at both posts.
Despite the difficulties and dangers of service, Department of State
employees have also been responsive for service at these sites, as well
as in the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and the
remotely located positions throughout Iraq. This includes Civil Service
as well as Foreign Service volunteers.
USAID has noted that issues like security and family concerns are
more important determinative factors for recruitment than financial
compensation, and the Department of State will continue to address
these issues for all agencies under Chief of Mission authority.
We are exploring whether any additional financial incentives are
needed, and would expect to return to Congress if we determine such
incentives are necessary.
Question. This committee has given great attention to the pace of
reconstruction assistance, which has accelerated somewhat, but still
remains slow. Effective reconstruction projects can make a great deal
of difference in Iraq, yet U.S. assistance continues to be plagued by
lack of coordination and duplication of efforts between the military
and civilian organizations, bureaucratic processes, and above all, by a
lack of security in Iraq. You have seen this from the NSC vantage
point. Do you consider the pace of reconstruction too slow? Are we
making progress? Do you plan another review and overhaul? What will you
do differently?
Answer. The pace of reconstruction is not moving as smoothly as we
may have hoped; however, we are making progress, even in the face of an
ongoing insurgency. Clearly, security remains the most serious issue
affecting the pace of our reconstruction efforts. Despite the
challenging environment, the U.S. continues to increase our
reconstruction spending, and we have obligated nearly $13 billion of
the over $20.9 billion that Congress has appropriated for Iraq
reconstruction. Of this total, we have disbursed over $4.3 billion-$1.9
billion from the FY03 Supplemental (IRRF I) and $2.4 billion from the
FY04 Supplemental (IRRF II) as of January 5th.
All agencies of the United States government recognize the
importance and urgency of reconstruction and stabilizing Iraq. It is a
primary goal of each civilian and military organization working in
Iraq, and they are working together closely.
We continue to develop a strong interagency process--at all
levels--both in Washington and Iraq to ensure civilian-military
coordination and cooperation and to review and fine-tune our effort.
The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) located within our
Embassy in Baghdad is working hard to coordinate reconstruction efforts
among the implementing agencies ``on the ground'' in Iraq.
Rather than seeing a ``gap'' between civilian and military efforts,
I see that at every level they are becoming more intertwined and
integrated. For example: since early 2004, USAID and the 1st Cavalry
Division have engaged in a partnership to provide essential services in
Baghdad while generating employment for Iraqi youth. This partnership
was expanded to include the PCO, and ultimately became the model for
rapid reconstruction assistance in strategic cities such as Najaf,
Samara, Tel Afar and Falluja.
Our reconstruction efforts have made significant progress in
supporting our objectives in Iraq and in improving the lives of the
Iraqi people.
Currently, over 133,000 Iraqis are employed in USG administered
programs.
Despite recent and serious insurgent attacks on the oil
infrastructure, the weekly average output during Dec. 27-Jan. 2 stood
at 2.1 million barrels per day with exports earning Iraq more than $1.4
billion in hard currency each month.
We have added over 1800 MW generating capacity to the Iraqi power
grid since the transition to Iraqi sovereignty and we will add more.
Power is also more equitably distributed throughout the country than
under Saddam, when electric power was diverted to Baghdad.
Iraq is experiencing power shortages now due to sabotage, fuel
distribution problems, unscheduled outages and seasonal spike in
demand. We are working with the Ministry of Electricity to increase
available hours of power in the shortest possible time.
We continue to seek the most effective means of delivering
assistance to Iraq. Last fall, Ambassador Negroponte, in close
coordination with the Iraqi Interim Government, General Casey of MNF-I
and LTG Petraeus of MNSTC-I, undertook a strategic review of the
spending plan and suggested the reallocation of $3.46 billion in
reconstruction assistance.
In an effort to disburse funds more quickly, PCO is proceeding with
a pilot program to contract directly with the IIG Ministries, allowing
them to implement and manage infrastructure projects which meet their
most pressing priorities.
We are also using Iraqi firms to the greatest extent possible to
put an ``Iraqi face'' on our reconstruction efforts.
As part of the ongoing assessment of spending priorities, our
Embassy has recently identified an additional $457 million to
reallocate to high-impact, rapid-action projects designed to stabilize
and address the near-term needs of the electrical sector as well as to
deliver quick-delivery essential services programs to the populations
of 4 cities (Fallujah, Najaf, Samarra and Sadr City) living in post-
battle environments.
Question. The elections scheduled for January 30, 2005 are the
first in a multi-year process. Will the Iraqi Election Commission (MCI)
[presumably referring to the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq
(IECI)] have the credibility to monitor elections? Will the elections
be judged fair if the Sunnis boycott or if we have to bypass three
governorates? How are plans for the next two elections coming? Should
we expect the security situation to improve after Iraqis vote?
Answer. The elections that will take place on January 30 are an
important next step for Iraqis seeking to put their dark past behind
them. Over the past several months, the IECI has repeatedly
demonstrated its independence and its dedication to ensuring that
Iraq's elections are substantially free and fair. The IECI is enlisting
thousands of Iraqi election workers. Thousands more will serve as
domestic election monitors and are being trained by the National
Democratic Institute (NDI). A conference in Ottawa in December
organized the International Mission for Iraq Elections (IMIE), an
international effort that we support.
PM Allawi, President al Yawar, the IECI, and the Iraqi Interim
Government (IIG) have all called for full participation--by all Iraqi
political, ethnic, and religious groups--in the January 30 elections.
We support the Iraqi call for full participation and believe all Iraqis
have a role to play in the future of Iraq, including Iraqi Sunnis.
The IECI, Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, and the Multinational
Force-Iraq are working closely together to ensure security for the
elections in all 18 governates. The IECI is also considering ways to
ensure that voters in areas still plagued by security issues are able
to participate in the election, even if they have not yet registered to
vote.
The IECI is responsible for carrying out not only the January
elections, but also the constitutional referendum scheduled for October
and the elections for a constitutionally based government in December.
We welcome Secretary General Annan's statement that the UN stands
ready, if asked, to help Iraqis as they draw up a new constitution and
conduct a national referendum and further elections. The U.S.
Government will provide support as requested by the Transitional
Government of Iraq.
The January elections will mark a watershed moment in Iraq's
history, which should help the Iraqi Transitional Government battle
those who seek to derail Iraq's progress to full democracy. But we
should not underestimate the commitment of these forces to deny Iraqis
a stable, democratic, and prosperous future. As election day
approaches, these elements will probably step up their attacks out of
desperation that Iraq's political transition is succeeding.
Afghanistan
Question. A Congressional Notification arrived in December
outlining a new Afghanistan counter-narcotics program costing $776.5
million in 2005. Given the exponential growth of poppy cultivation and
drug production in Afghanistan in the past two years this amount may be
justified, however, the entire Afghan appropriation for 2005 is only
$980 million. Does this put other reconstruction in Afghanistan in
jeopardy? How much funding for Afghanistan will be requested in the
upcoming supplemental? What is the expected budget request for FY 2006?
Answer. The new Afghanistan counter-narcotics program does not put
in jeopardy other reconstruction in Afghanistan, provided that
supplemental funding is received to replenish the reprogrammed accounts
in full prior to beginning of the third quarter. In preparing the
reprogramming request every effort was made to minimize any delay or
disruption in existing programs.
The President has not yet decided on the timing or content for a
Supplemental.
Funds will be requested to continue the Afghanistan counter-
narcotics program in FY 2006. However, the levels have not yet been
finalized.
Question. The Congressional Notification indicates that $312.5
million is to be immediately reprogrammed from other critical accounts
identified for Afghanistan. What programs will be affected by the
reprogramming? Will these be replenished in the supplemental?
Answer. In preparing the reprogramming request every effort was
made to avoid any delay or disruption to existing programs.
All reprogrammed funds would to be replenished with the exception
of the INCLE ``Prior year De-obligated Funds'' of $3,000,000.
Question. Why is 40 percent of the counter-narcotics budget being
slated for eradication of only 10 percent of the crop, while only 15
percent is being budgeted for alternative livelihoods? Should more
resources be spent to put courts, prisons, laws and greater
opportunities for alternative livelihoods in place to prepare for a
sustainable Afghan-driven eradication program?
Answer. Eradication is one of the most crucial elements of a
counter-narcotics program, and the objectives of the other elements
will be undermined without an effective eradication program.
Considerable up-front capital investment in equipment and
infrastructure to support eradication is needed. This constitutes a
large share of the initial counter-narcotics spending. Farmers must
also be given alternative livelihoods opportunities if they are to stop
planting poppies. We are already at work providing farmers with real
options and have reprogrammed $11 million from FY2004 funds to provide
economic incentives for farmers to plant licit crops.
Most countries--the United Kingdom and the U.S. being the
exceptions--decline to contribute to eradication programs for a variety
of reasons. The eradication program is therefore a key U.S. value-added
contribution to the overall effort.
The proposed Afghanistan counter-narcotics initiative takes into
account the willingness of other donors to contribute to law
enforcement and criminal justice system development, alternative
development, public information, and demand reduction programs. The
counter-narcotics initiative will be coordinated with existing USG
programs that provide support for the justice sector in Afghanistan,
with the objective of a stable, peaceful Afghanistan with a legitimate
central government respecting the rule of law.
Question. There are consistent concerns that the funds identified
for Afghanistan are not reaching the ground. What proportion of each
dollar is going toward overhead? How can we improve the impact of every
dollar and the timeliness of assistance? Is the head of the Afghan
Inter-Agency Operations Group sufficiently authorized to ensure
coordinated and efficient obligation of funds?
Answer. From FY 2001-2004, the U.S. provided over $4.5 billion for
Afghanistan's reconstruction. The size and diversity of our ambitious
program precludes a simple answer to the proportional amount allocated
towards overhead. Overhead costs vary by sector and project, and would
have to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.
We believe the current inter-agency organizational model is
sufficient to adequately monitor and track the impact of our spending
and the timeliness of our assistance program to Afghanistan. Through
the near-daily meetings of the Afghanistan Inter-agency Operation Group
(AIOG), there continues to be close inter-agency collaboration on all
funding issues and the Coordinator and other policy makers are
periodically provided charts that track all U.S. obligations and
available resources. These charts are designed to highlight
efficiencies and expose bureaucratic bottlenecks. Progress toward
specific sectoral objectives is also carefully tracked on a month-to-
month basis through our Afghanistan ``metrics'' document.
We believe the Coordinator for Afghanistan possesses sufficient
authority to carry out the administration's priorities in Afghanistan.
Iran Issues
Question. What should the U.S. do to encourage Iran to close its
shared borders with Iraq? Who is coming across the border now? Are
fighters sanctioned or supported by the Iranian government?
Answer. We have made clear to Iran that we will oppose actions that
undermine Iraq's stability. Senior officials of the Iraqi Interim
Government have publicly voiced their concerns about Iranian
interference in Iraq.
We urge the Iranian government to live up to its publicly stated
policy of supporting the sovereignty, independence, territorial
integrity, and national unity of Iraq, and its commitment to combat the
flow of terrorists across the Iraqi-Iranian border as stated in the
November 23, 2004 regional conference on Iraq held at Sharm el-Sheikh.
Iran should also heed the requirements of UN Security Council
Resolution 1373 to deny safe haven to those who plan, support, or
commit terrorist acts and to affirmatively take steps to prevent the
commission of terrorist acts by providing early warning to other states
by exchange of information.
Saudi Arabia Issues
Question. How can U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia counter the
growing anti-Americanism in some segments of the Saudi population and
facilitate the Kingdom's progress toward political, economic, and
educational reforms, without undermining our close security and
economic cooperation with the government?
Answer. Our support for reform in Saudi Arabia is not incompatible
with our close security and economic agenda with the Kingdom. In fact,
we believe strongly that the Saudis must pursue reform as the best way
to ensure that the shared security and economic interests of the US and
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia grow stronger.
We are addressing anti-Americanism in Saudi Arabia through two
principal means. The first is our traditional public diplomacy effort,
which includes Fulbright and carefully targeted International Visitors
programs, other educational exchanges, and dissemination of U.S. views
via placements in the local media and through USG-sponsored Arabic
language media.
The Saudis themselves have a reform agenda that includes holding
first-ever municipal elections in the spring of 2005; developing a new
school curriculum aimed at promoting greater tolerance; and continuing
Crown Prince Abdullah's ground-breaking series of national dialogues
with religious leaders, intellectuals, young people and women on
Saudi's most sensitive issues. The Saudis are also taking significant
steps to advance economic reform, and are currently in the process of
negotiating their accession to WTO.
We support these initial efforts and are encouraging the Saudis to
take additional steps, via our bilateral Middle East Partnership
Initiative (MEPI) and the G-8 sponsored Broader Middle East and North
Africa Initiative (BMENA), to provide a better future for their
citizens, and to give all those citizens a greater voice in the
decisions affecting their lives.
We share the view that meaningful reform must reflect the desires
of the people of the region--it will only succeed if it is internally
driven, not externally imposed, but we and others can and must help.
Greater Middle East 21st Century Trust Issues
Question. What is your view of the Greater Middle East Trust idea
contained in S. Res. 375?
Answer. President Bush has established the promotion of freedom,
democracy, and political, economic, and educational reform in the
countries of the broader Middle East as a major long-term priority for
the United States. Increasing freedom and opportunity will generate new
hope, and diminish the appeal of extremism for people throughout this
region.
We are moving forward with implementing the Broader Middle East and
North Africa Initiative, agreed by G-8 leaders at the Sea Island
Summit, and continue to make progress through the dozens of impact-
oriented reform programs launched under the U.S. Middle East
Partnership Initiative.
We welcome the leadership shown by Members of Congress in proposing
increased assistance and new programs and coordination mechanisms to
support reform. I share the goal of structuring U.S. efforts
effectively to coordinate and implement democracy and reform assistance
programs to support the President's vision.
A ``Greater ME 21st Century Trust'' is a worthy idea which we
should explore further. Creating such a trust fund, however, could
require an increase in available appropriations for promoting reform
and democracy in the region. The steady reduction in funding for MEPI
over the past three fiscal years has strained our ability to advance
U.S. reform efforts. It would be difficult to persuade other
governments to contribute into a ``Trust'' unless we demonstrate U.S.
resolve in this area.
Cuba
Question. I have received reports that officials of the U.S.
Department of State, Treasury, and possibly the National Security
Council are recommending administrative or regulatory clarification
related to implementation of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export
Enhancement Act, which would likely impact U.S. agricultural exports to
Cuba. The reported revision of requirements applied to U.S.
agricultural sales will be injurious to American farmers, and emphasize
that the U.S. is not a reliable exporter. If accurate as reported, the
proposed change would overturn Congressional intent to allow normal
cash sales to Cuba as they are currently transacted. Dr. Rice, please
provide background information on the genesis and status of this
proposed change and how you expect it to affect agriculture sales to
Cuba.
Answer. U.S. agencies, including the Department of State, have met
with concerned parties, including U.S. exporters and shipping
companies, to hear directly their views about any potential change and
its impact on their business.
There is an inter-agency process considering whether the
regulations implementing the law should be clarified. However, no
decision has been made, and thus no change has been made in U.S. policy
concerning agricultural shipments to Cuba.
Russia
Question. How would you describe U.S.-Russia relations today? What
are the main challenges to the relationship that you will need to
address in the near future?
Answer. In many areas, the relationship is more or less on the
right track, but we have a ways to go to realize the full potential
that both countries had hoped for. We have worked well together in some
areas, notably on counter-terrorism and non-proliferation. However, we
have growing concerns about Russia's reversal of many democratic
reforms implemented in the 1990's. We continue to raise our concerns as
a partner that wants Russia to succeed as a strong, vibrant, democratic
country.
The cold-war rhetoric and threat of global nuclear annihilation has
been replaced by unprecedented U.S.-Russia counter-terrorism and
nonproliferation cooperation. We now share actionable counterterrorism
intelligence and are close to concluding a bilateral agreement on
MANPADS.
Presidents Bush and Putin have a good, strong relationship that
sets the right tone for moving forward on a broad range of initiatives.
Recent joint successes include Iraqi debt forgiveness, space
cooperation, and Afghanistan elections. The relationship's resilience
was shown on ABM withdrawal and NATO expansion to the Baltics, which
many said would provoke a crisis in our relations and did not.
At the same time, significant challenges remain. We have some work
to do to convince the Russians that geo-political and economic success
is not a zero-sum game. Free, peaceful and prosperous Ukraine, Georgia,
Moldova and other neighbors are in Russia's interest.
Ten years on, Chechen war needs a political solution and an end to
human rights abuses. We must also make clear that there is no excuse or
justification for terrorism.
Russia needs to integrate more firmly into global institutions as
appropriate. Russia can play a constructive role in Six-Party talks, on
Iran, BMENA initiatives and as part of the Middle East Quartet. Recent
backsliding on democracy and other human rights may begin to raise
questions about the suitability of Russian participation in other
international institutions.
To further this integration, Russia must show that it shares
Western and international values, including a free judiciary and press,
strong civil and governmental institutions, the rule of law, freedom of
speech, assembly and religion.
Russia will likely continue to project ``soft'' power using its oil
and gas resources and nuclear know-how. Unfortunately, the handling of
the Yukos case poses serious questions about Russia's respect for the
rule of law, property rights, and openness to investment.
Question. How is Russia cooperating with the United States in the
Global War on Terror? What assistance is Russia providing to
Afghanistan? Does the United States envisage a role for Russia in
reconstruction activities in Iraq?
Answer. President Putin was the first world leader to call the
President to offer assistance in the wake of September 11.
Our two governments have a Counterterrorism Working Group, chaired
by the Deputy Secretary of State and his Russian counterpart, that
facilitates operational cooperation and exchanges of information on a
wide range of terrorism concerns. Among the priority issues addressed
by this Working Group are intelligence and law enforcement, aviation
security, WMD, MANPADS, and terrorist financing.
Russia is assisting the Afghan National Army with equipment. We
expect Russian aid to Afghanistan may increase if continued progress is
made on resolving the issue of Russian debt contracted by previous
Afghan governments.
To contain the outflow of Afghan narcotics, we are encouraging
Russia to work with us, the EU, the United Nations Office on Drugs and
Crime, and the Tajiks to strengthen border security and interdiction,
as well as to train and equip the Tajik Border Guard as Russian-led
forces leave the Tajik-Afghan border by 2006.
Russia has considerable potential to assist in Iraq's
reconstruction, particularly in infrastructure development and the
energy sector.
President Putin recently committed to reducing Iraq's debt to
Russia by about 93 percent, in accordance with its Paris Club
obligations and additional commitments made by Paris Club members in
November.
Question. How could possible setbacks in democratization and
respect for human rights in Russia affect U.S.-Russian relations? How
might the United States respond to such developments?
Answer. A stable, healthy, democratic Russia serves both U.S. and
Russian interests, and will make Russia a more effective international
partner.
Today's Russia bears little resemblance to the country that emerged
from the ashes of the USSR. Despite fits and starts, Russia has overall
made progress toward a more open society and economy. Recent
backsliding--particularly the dilution of judicial independence, state
control over nationwide television and end of the direct regional
elections--raises concerns for us. Actions surrounding the Yukos case
undermine Russia's commitment to the rule of law, transparency, respect
for property rights and willingness to uphold the norms and values of a
democratic market economy.
Based on these trends, during the certification process for the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative, we decided this fall for the
first time to not certify Russia on human rights grounds. We informed
our Russian colleagues about this decision as well as Members of
Congress (the President signed the waiver to ensure continued flow of
CTR funds).
We must maintain good channels of communication at all levels of
the Russian Government in order to effectively share our concerns about
how negative trends in these areas could hurt our relationship. We
speak to our Russian interlocutors as frank partners who want to see
Russia become a strong, vibrant, democratic country.
We also need to maintain good ties with those individuals and
groups in Russia that are advocating for democratic values and
institutions. Therefore, the U.S. must continue to provide robust
support for programs that strengthen the rule of law, help fight
corruption, and defend democratic values, including respect for human
rights, in Russia. Building a larger constituency base between our two
countries and our two societies will redound to the benefit of our
overall relationship.
In FY 2005, we plan to spend over $43 million for democracy
programs in Russia--about a third more than we did in FY 2004. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress to ensure continued
strong support for democratization and human rights in Russia.
Ukraine
Question. What is your sense of the impact the Ukrainian elections
will have on the future of democracy in the region?
Answer. The fact that a democratic process prevailed and delivered
a result that reflects the will of the people represents a stunning
success for Ukraine.
It could have a major impact on the development of democracy in the
region. It will signal to millions of people that democratic freedom is
within reach and on the ascendance, and that citizens standing up
peacefully for their political rights can make a difference. This will
help bolster supporters of democracy, even as authoritarian governments
in Belarus, Central Asia, and elsewhere in Eurasia crack down on pro-
democracy civil society groups.
We will intensify our efforts to ensure that respect for democracy
and human rights remains an integral component of our relationships. We
will continue to emphasize that long-term stability, security, and
prosperity arise when people enjoy freedom to participate in the civic
life of their countries and fundamental human rights. We should bear in
mind, however, that the conditions that made people's revolutions in
Ukraine and Georgia a success--especially a well-developed civil
society--do not exist everywhere in the former Soviet Union. Moreover,
rulers in some of these countries are already drawing the wrong
conclusion from the Orange Revolution and are bringing strong pressure
to bear on pro-democracy NGOs.
Question. The U.S. imposed sanctions on several top Ukrainian
leaders. What is the current status of those actions?
Answer. For months, we repeatedly and consistently warned Ukrainian
officials of the high importance we place on the conduct of their
presidential election process and voting day itself.
Most recently, in his November 18 letter to President Kuchma,
President Bush wrote that a tarnished election would lead us to review
our relations with Ukraine, and consider further steps against
individuals engaging in fraud.
As we said during the campaign, any individual who has engaged in
or benefited from corruption or interference in judicial or electoral
processes should expect his visa application to be reviewed in light of
Presidential Proclamation 7750 and all U.S. laws relating to visa
eligibility. Pursuant to the Proclamation, we have denied the U.S. visa
application of one prominent Ukrainian under Section 212(f) of the U.S.
Immigration and Nationality Act for engaging in serious corrupt
activity, including in the Ukrainian electoral campaign.
We continue to review the behavior of senior officials of the
Kuchma/Yanukovych government and to consider whether further action may
be in order in some cases.
Question. What is the new president's position on Ukraine's troops
in Iraq? What impact, if any, will Ukraine's troop presence in Iraq
have on your deliberations?
Answer. The U.S. and our Multinational Force (MNF) partners are
very grateful for Ukraine's substantial troop contribution in Iraq.
Ukraine has a 1,580-man troop contingent in Iraq--one of the largest in
the MNF. Ukraine also has contributed peacekeepers in the Balkans,
Africa, and Lebanon, and has provided support for Coalition operations
in Afghanistan. These troops are making valuable contributions, and we
have encouraged Ukraine to continue to support these operations.
During the presidential election campaign in Ukraine, both leading
candidates said they would consider the possible withdrawal of
Ukrainian troops from Iraq. Since the circumstances of any withdrawal
are hypothetical at this point, I cannot comment further on their
implications.
Europe
Question. How can we improve U.S.-European relations? In your view,
can gaps between U.S. and European views regarding the role of
multilateral institutions and the use of force be bridged?
Answer. The continued strength of U.S.-European relations is shown
in the common values we share, and our common efforts to address the
challenges to the transatlantic community. Although we have had
sometimes very public disagreements with some European countries over
Iraq and other issues, we are working together effectively in counter-
terrorism, non-proliferation, Afghanistan, promoting democracy and
reform in the Broader Middle East, Haiti, Darfur, the Balkans, and many
other areas.
In Iraq, even leaving aside our largest coalition partner, the
United Kingdom, we are working closely with many European nations to
strengthen security and democratic institutions and to rebuild the
economy. NATO is training senior military officers, and the European
Union is playing an increasing role in providing technical assistance
and police training.
The President's upcoming trip to Europe will take us still further
in working together with our Europeans allies and friends, including
through NATO and the European Union, to address the common challenges
we face.
The U.S. consults with Europeans constantly through a variety of
fora, bilaterally with virtually all European countries and
multilaterally through such institutions as the UN, NATO and the EU. We
often consult with our European friends and allies before taking
positions in international meetings. We regularly discuss with European
governments the need to ensure that multilateral institutions are
effective in carrying out their work. These consultations cover the
widest spectrum imaginable, ranging from democracy promotion in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the Middle East to combating HIV/AIDS, fighting
terrorism, and promoting economic growth through free markets and
competition.
We also engage a broad spectrum of European audiences in public
fora in order to ensure that our policies are understood. There is no
substitute for personal contact as we advocate our policies. It is
important also to consider how to increase educational exchange with
Europe.
Despite popular perceptions, the U.S. and Europe are working
together more often than not in both multilateral institutions and in
the use of force. Although Europe is proud of its ``soft power,'' its
hard power is also essential: German soldiers are playing a major role
in promoting security in Afghanistan. France has taken a leading
military role in peacekeeping in Africa, a French general is commanding
the ISAF mission, and France has special forces deployed with us in
Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Troops from the United
Kingdom, Poland, Italy, and many other European nations are playing a
vital role in strengthening security and building democracy in Iraq.
And while popular attention focuses on U.S. military deployments, the
United States regularly uses civilian experts, technical assistance,
public diplomacy, economic contacts, and a range of other diplomatic
means to advance our objectives. America and Europe work together best
when we both deploy all the variety of resources at our disposal in
addressing common challenges as we are doing in so many areas today.
Question. What will be the administration's priorities in NATO and
for U.S.-EU relations over the next four years? How can Washington best
encourage its NATO allies to strengthen enhanced military capabilities
and develop mobile forces able to project power beyond Europe?
Answer. The U.S. seeks in the EU a healthy, reliable partner that
can help us address the challenges of the 21st Century: building stable
and secure democracies in Iraq and Afghanistan; preventing Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons; fighting terrorism and WMD proliferation;
promoting freedom, markets, social integration in the Broader Middle
East; finding a lasting solution to the Israel/Palestine situation; and
addressing lingering challenges in Eurasia and in Europe's immediate
neighborhood: Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Caucasus, the Balkans
(especially Kosovo).
On the economic side, we will seek to boost growth on both sides of
the Atlantic, by promoting economic reform and innovation, enhancing
our trade and investment relationship, and working jointly to speed
global trade liberalization through the WTO. We will also seek to
resolve all outstanding trade disputes.
We welcome EU efforts to enhance its military capabilities and to
create rapid response forces, as long as these efforts are consistent
with Berlin Plus arrangements.
NATO remains the essential forum for transatlantic security, and we
will continue to implement the historic decisions made by NATO leaders
at Istanbul last year: promote peace and stability in Afghanistan;
train and equip Iraqi security forces; maintain security in Kosovo; and
reach out to partners in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle
East.
But NATO is only as strong as its capabilities. At Prague in 2002,
NATO agreed on the need to improve Alliance capabilities to meet
current and future threats and committed to acquiring the most needed
capabilities, such as airlift, sealift, air refueling, and precision
munitions. Progress has been made, but more work is needed. We will
continue to urge Allies to meet these capability commitments.
NATO is strengthening its ability to respond to contingencies
quickly through the creation of the NATO Response Force, which is
expected to reach full operational capability by 2006. We have been
pleased to see Allies making substantial NRF troop contributions.
The Balkans
Question. How does the administration plan to carry out its
``Standards Before Status'' Review policy on Kosovo by mid-2005? What
process can be established to begin to address Kosovo's status? Should
status be considered if Kosovo has not achieved progress on certain
standards, such as security for the Serbian minority in Kosovo? What
will be the U.S. role in this process?
Answer. We remain committed to a secure, stable and multiethnic
Kosovo that is fully integrated into Europe. Resolving the issue of
Kosovo's status will be a major step in achieving the President's
vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace.
The eight international standards for Kosovo cover everything from
security to rule of law to the economy. Their achievement will benefit
the people of Kosovo no matter what its future status. Kosovo has made
some progress on the standards, but much work remains.
The head of the UN Mission in Kosovo, Soren Jessen-Petersen,
recently identified a number of key indicators that Kosovo should focus
on in the lead up to the mid-2005 review. These are standards primarily
designed to ensure the protection and rights of Kosovo's minority
communities, notably the Serbs. Achievement of these key standards,
while ensuring there is no major outbreak of violence, would help pave
the way for a positive review.
At the same time, we are encouraging work to decentralize the
administration of Kosovo, which would give Serb communities a greater
voice in education, health care and possibly even justice issues, in
municipalities where they have a large presence.
We are actively engaged with the Contact Group--where we join the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and the EU--as well as
with the UN, in assessing Kosovo's progress on the standards and in
considering the possibility of launching status discussions. We are
also actively engaging Belgrade to ensure that Serbia has a voice, but
not a veto, in this process.
The United States will be an active player in the mid-2005 review
and in any status discussions that may be launched. However, Kosovo's
future, and that of its neighbors, is as a part of Europe. We will
expect our Allies and friends in the European Union to take a leading
role in this process.
Question. Following examples in Macedonia and Bosnia, should
peacekeeping duties in Kosovo be turned over from NATO to the European
Union? Should the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) be reformed or
restructured?
Answer. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 has governed the
administration of Kosovo since the end of NATO air campaign against the
Milosevic regime in 1999. Under 1244, UNMIK was established as the
civil administration for Kosovo and a NATO-led KFOR provides security.
We are committed to both institutions.
The administration remains committed to the President's ``in
together, out together'' pledge but we seek to ``hasten the day'' when
Kosovo will be stable enough to stand without a NATO mission. While it
is possible that either or both missions could change as part of
discussions on Kosovo's status, it is premature to speculate on what
direction those discussions might take.
At their December meeting, NATO Foreign Ministers agreed to
maintain a ``robust KFOR'' and to consider changes to its composition
only as a result of an improved security situation on the ground. Soren
Jessen-Petersen, appointed by Kofi Annan to lead UNMIK last August, and
his American deputy, Larry Rossin, have brought a new dynamism to the
mission that has greatly improved its effectiveness.
We will continue to work with UNMIK, the UN Secretariat in New
York, and other partners, such as the EU, to ensure that the mission is
structured effectively and operating smoothly, particularly in the run-
up to the mid-2005 review and possible launch of discussions on
Kosovo's future status.
Question. Despite episodes of cooperation, Belgrade's lack of
compliance with its commitments regarding the ICTY has held up Serbia
and Montenegro's efforts to become more closely integrated into the EU
and NATO. U.S. bilateral assistance has also been curtailed. What is
the way forward on this issue?
Answer. The United States remains strongly committed to supporting
the work of the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and its efforts to bring to justice those most responsible
for serious violations of international humanitarian law. The United
States and our allies have made clear that upholding international
obligations to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia remains the most serious obstacle to Serbia and Montenegro's
further integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions, including
membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace.
We have called on all authorities in Serbia, especially Prime
Minister Kostunica as head of the government, to issue clear and
unambiguous orders for cooperation with the Tribunal, including the
immediate apprehension and transfer to The Hague of Ratko Mladic, the
three indicted generals living openly in Belgrade and all other
fugitives hiding in the country.
We want to see Serbia succeed. We want to help Serbia and
Montenegro integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures to create a Europe
whole, free and at peace. We look forward to working with leaders in
the state union and the Serbian Republic on a variety of issues in the
coming months. The U.S. is ready and eager to broaden and deepen our
relationship with Serbia and Montenegro and the Republic of Serbia. But
the way forward will depend on Belgrade's actions to meet its
international obligations. Serbia and Montenegro already faces
consequences from its record of non-cooperation, including the
suspension of some U.S. assistance.
President Bush's NDU Speech: IAEA Proposals
Last February, President Bush made several important proposals
concerning the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
IAEA Proposals. The President made three proposals with regard to
strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). First, he
proposed that all states should sign the IAEA Additional Protocol, and
that signing of the Additional Protocol should be a condition for
countries seeking equipment for their civilian nuclear programs by next
year. Second, he proposed that the IAEA Board of Governors create a
special committee on safeguards and verification. And, third, he
proposed that no state under investigation for proliferation violations
should be allowed to serve or continue serving on the IAEA Board of
Governors or on the new special committee.
Question. What is the status of each of these proposals?
Answer. Additional Protocol (AP)
We are actively engaged in a number of efforts to promote universal
acceptance of the safeguards agreements mandated under the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as well as the related Additional Protocols.
For the past several months we have been engaged with other G-8
partners in diplomatic approaches to a variety of states that have not
yet concluded one or both of these agreements.
We are also actively engaged in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
in advocating signature of the AP as a condition of supply for
transfers of nuclear trigger list items and technology. A subsequent
British/Austrian proposal would require AP implementation rather than
only signature as a condition of nuclear supply by the end of 2005.
This is attracting broad support in the NSG, although a few states are
reluctant to move ahead. We will continue to press for approval of the
British/Austrian version of the President's proposal.
There is substantial support for the President's proposal to
establish a special committee of the IAEA Board of Governors to focus
intensively on safeguards. At last year's summits, G-8 and EU leaders
agreed to work together to establish such a special committee, which
would be responsible for preparing a comprehensive plan for
strengthened safeguards and verification. These leaders also agreed
that the special committee should be made up of member states that are
in compliance with their NPT and IAEA commitments.
We have circulated a proposal for the mandate of this special
committee to members of the IAEA Board of Governors, and expect the
Board of Governors to take this up in the coming year.
The President's proposal that states under investigation for
proliferation violations should not be allowed to serve on the IAEA
Board of Governors or the proposed special committee was based on the
principle that those actively breaking the rules should not be
entrusted with enforcing the rules. We have achieved broad support for
this principle.
G-8 and EU leaders agreed that countries under investigation for
non-technical violations of their nuclear non-proliferation and
safeguards obligations should elect not to participate in decisions by
the IAEA Board of Governors or the special committee regarding their
own cases.
We are working to have this principle accepted by the Board of
Governors. We will also work to persuade each of the regional groups
not to put forward as candidates for Board of Governors membership
states that are under investigation.
Question. What is the current status of all U.S. diplomatic efforts
to achieve universal adoption of the Additional Protocol?
Answer. We have long pressed for universal adherence to the
Additional Protocol, and are working actively with G-8 and EU leaders
to achieve that goal. We are also urging those states that have not yet
done so to conclude promptly the safeguards agreement required under
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In particular, G-8 Foreign
Ministers, led by Secretary Powell, agreed to write to their
counterparts worldwide and urge them to take the necessary steps.
We have also supported the IAEA's global outreach efforts. We will
continue this work and use our actions on the U.S. Additional Protocol
to demonstrate our commitment to strong IAEA safeguards.
I would like to thank the Senate and the members of this committee
for your prompt action in consenting to ratification of the U.S.
Protocol. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on the
passage of implementing legislation.
IAEA Referral of Cases of Noncompliance
Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA states that the Board of
Governors, in cases of non-compliance, ``shall call upon the recipient
State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds
to have occurred'' and ``[t]he Board shall report the non-compliance to
all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the
United Nations.''
This language, however, appears to have been ignored given that no
action was taken by the United Nations on the IAEA's report North
Korean noncompliance in 2002 and we remained stalled in Vienna on Iran.
Some experts believe that reporting to the UNSC is a formula for
inaction and, therefore, risks undermining the NPT.
Question. What do you think we should do to correct the impression
that referral to the UNSC might result in inaction at the UN thereby
undermining the NPT, starting with the case of North Korea?
Answer. Reporting of noncompliance with International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
is an important tool in enforcement of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We should not shrink from its
use. In the case of North Korea, reporting to the Security Council has
placed pressure on the North Korean regime to address the international
community's concerns regarding its violations of the NPT.
While a report of noncompliance does not mandate any particular
UNSC response, the action alone makes an important statement. Reporting
noncompliance to the UNSC places the issue on the agenda of the
international body with the legal authority to address threats to
international peace and security. A demonstrated willingness by the
IAEA Board of Governors to report noncompliance to the UNSC can itself
lead to positive movement on remedying noncompliance even before the
IAEA Board of Governors votes on a decision to report noncompliance.
Moreover, the Board of Governors has a responsibility to all NPT
parties to safeguard their security and to place these matters before
the UNSC. The Board of Governors cannot shy from its duty under the
IAEA Statute simply because it fears ``inaction'' by the UNSC.
While the UNSC may not always pursue the action we would want in
response to a report of safeguards noncompliance from the IAEA Board of
Governors, having the weight of the UNSC behind the IAEA Board of
Governors could be useful. This is the case even when immediate action
by the UNSC is not feasible (or perhaps even desirable) under the
circumstances of a particular case.
Question. Do you believe that any nation should be allowed to
withdraw from the NPT after violating it and not be held responsible
for its violations?
Answer. No. Article X of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) should not be treated as an escape clause for
Parties that violate the NPT.
Arms control and nonproliferation treaties typically have
withdrawal clauses stating that a Party, in exercising ``its national
sovereignty,'' shall have the right to withdraw from the treaty if it
believes that circumstances ``jeopardizing its supreme interests''
justifying that action. Article X of the NPT contains such a provision.
However, if an NPT party exercises its right to withdraw when it is in
violation of the NPT, withdrawal does not excuse those violations. In
some cases, a party may be held responsible for violations that
preceded its withdrawal from the NPT. Moreover, the United Nations
Security Council and/or Parties to the NPT, may find it necessary to
take action against the withdrawing party based on legal authorities
separate from the NPT, even though the state is no longer Party to the
NPT.
Question. As Secretary of State, how will you work to make sure
that IAEA referral of noncompliance to the UNSC will no longer result
in inaction at the United Nations?
Answer. If confirmed as Secretary of State, I will work to ensure
that any future International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of
Governors' report of noncompliance with IAEA safeguards agreements to
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is handled in the most
effective way possible.
Every case of noncompliance is unique, and there is no one remedy.
In some cases, such as the one involving Romania in 1992, it may not be
necessary for the UNSC to take action other than noting that the
noncompliance occurred and has been remedied. Even in cases not already
resolved, there also may be no immediate need for punitive action. For
example, it may be enough initially for the UNSC to provide support to
actions being taken by the IAEA to resolve the noncompliance. In the
toughest cases, those in which the violating state refuses to meet its
obligations, sanctions may indeed be required to help compel the
necessary compliance.
The gravity of noncompliance with the NPT must be addressed and in
a manner that ensures that noncompliance does not weaken the NPT or
cause Parties to reassess their security calculations.
NPT 2005 Review Conference
Many experts have called for re-examination of the ``atoms for
peace'' philosophy that appears to sit at the heart of the NPT.
Sometimes called ``the nuclear bargain,'' this thinking states that
guarantees to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy ought to be provided
to any state forswearing nuclear weapons under the NPT. Thus, states
such as Iran argue that they have a ``right'' to fuel-cycle activity
under the NPT that could lead to a nuclear weapon. The plain terms of
the NPT, though, seem to suggest that a NNWS can only obtain the
benefits of the nuclear bargain under Article IV so long as they are in
conformity with their obligations under Article II.
Question. Do you believe that the NPT contains a right to fuel-
cycle activities, notably reprocessing of spent fuel and enrichment of
fresh fuel?
Answer. No, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) does not create a right to engage in fuel-cycle activities.
States have a right to develop nuclear energy as a matter of national
sovereignty. However, non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) parties to the
NPT--such as Iran--have undertaken a legal obligation to pursue only a
peaceful nuclear program, in conformity with the nonproliferation
obligations in NPT Article II and, by extension, the safeguards
obligations in NPT Article III.
Iran's claims that its extensive, covert fuel-cycle activities,
including enrichment and reprocessing, are for peaceful, non-weapons
purposes are belied by the fact that they were not pursued in
conformity with Iran's Article III commitment, nor, we believe, were
they in conformity with Article II. The only credible explanation for
Iran's enrichment and reprocessing programs is that Iran is vigorously
pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. For nearly two decades, Iran
procured technology for and developed these programs in secret and in
violation of the NPT. It deceived the IAEA. Iran's small and nascent
nuclear research and power programs cannot justify its expensive and
troublesome nuclear program. In short, Iran cannot credibly argue that
the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes extends to
its program of developing enrichment and reprocessing for clear weapons
purposes.
There is no need to reconsider the atoms for peace ``bargain'' of
the NPT. There is an adequate nuclear fuel supply and compliant NPT
parties are receiving ample external assistance for their peaceful
programs. Currently there is no need for new states to establish
reprocessing or enrichment capacity.
Parties do need to address the challenge posed by noncompliance
with NPT nonproliferation obligations and ensure that parties pursue
peaceful programs in ways fully consistent with the NPT's core
nonproliferation obligations. Given the nature of the technology, the
recent record of parties pursuing this technology, and the adequacy of
the nuclear fuel supply, NPT parties that currently do not have fully
functioning reprocessing and enrichment plants should not pursue these
technologies. In keeping with the President's February 2004 initiative,
we are seeking to persuade other supplier states not to supply such
technologies to those parties that do not possess fully functioning
plants, but rather to ensure fuel supply at a reasonable price. In the
meantime, we should deal promptly with NPT violators that seek these
technologies, particularly in the pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Question. Are the challenges posed by the fuel cycle the only
challenges for the NPT, or are there other areas in which the United
States might focus attention during the 2005 Review Conference?
Answer. The fuel cycle is only one part of a broader challenge
faced by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
and its parties: non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) noncompliance with NPT
nonproliferation obligations. Our principal focus at the Review
Conference (RevCon) will be on this challenge, and we will cite Iran
and the DPRK as the most pressing examples. We will urge others to
recognize the gravity of noncompliance, press all parties to insist on
full compliance by all parties, and more to strengthen collective tools
against proliferation.
In the last two decades four states--the DPRK, Iran, Iraq, and
Libya--have violated their NPT nonproliferation obligations in an
effort to produce nuclear weapons. These violations threaten the
security of all NPT parties. Two of these cases remain unresolved: the
DPRK and Iran. The RevCon can provide vital political support to
efforts such as the Six-Party Talks to resolve these cases. The RevCon
can reaffirm the NPT's contribution to international security, the need
for strict compliance with all of its provisions, the need for parties
to address promptly and firmly cases of noncompliance, and the need to
strengthen the NPT to avert future cases of noncompliance.
In addition to noncompliance, the RevCon should also consider the
threat to international security posed by non-state actor interest in
acquiring nuclear weapons and non-state actor involvement in
trafficking in nuclear materials, technology, and equipment. We will
pursue support for the President's February 11, 2004 NDU proposals to
address these challenges from noncompliance and non-state actors. In
addition to restraint on enrichment and reprocessing, other key tools
are the NPT Additional Protocol, the Proliferation Security Initiative,
implementation of UNSCR 1540, and expansion of the G-8 Global
Partnership. We will of course be prepared to address the full range of
issues we anticipate will be discussed at the RevCon.
Question. Do you believe that the NPT continues to serve the
interests of the international community, or has it been permanently
weakened given the events in Iran, North Korea or even South Korea to
the point of making it irrelevant?
Answer. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) continues to be of fundamental importance to the interests of the
international community. The NPT is the cornerstone of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime and is vital to the national security of its
parties. It sets the standards by which we define nuclear proliferation
as a common security threat and provides essential mechanisms to
respond to that threat.
The challenge posed by non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS)
noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations is unquestionably
serious, particularly those posed by the unresolved cases of the DPRK
and Iran. However, the proper response to these challenges is to
strengthen international resolve to compel compliance, not to devalue
the Treaty itself.
The vast majority of NPT parties comply with their obligations.
Four states relinquished nuclear weapons and adhered to the Treaty as
NNWS; others relinquished serious nuclear weapons ambitions to do the
same. As many as 35 to 40 NPT NNWS have the technological capability to
pursue nuclear weapons but do not because they perceive their security
interests better protected by a strong NPT. The key challenge for the
United States and all responsible NPT parties is to ensure that this
equation does not change. Parties must address current cases of
noncompliance and work to prevent future cases. Parties must ensure
that noncompliance does not weaken the NPT or cause parties to reassess
their security calculations. As part of this effort, the United States
will urge others to recognize the gravity of noncompliance, press all
parties to insist on full compliance by all other parties, and move to
strengthen collective tools against nonproliferation.
Nuclear Suppliers Group Proposals
The President also proposed that members of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG) should refuse to sell uranium enrichment or reprocessing
equipment or technology to any state that does not already possess
full-scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing plants.
Question. Neither the thirteenth nor fourteenth NSG Plenary
meetings (at Pusan, South Korea and Goteborg, Sweden) adopted the
President's proposals. Does the administration intend to continue
advocating for these ideas in the NSG?
Answer. We introduced the President's February 2004 proposal for
blocking the further spread of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing
technology (ENR) into the NSG's Consultative Group (CG) meeting in
March and pursued it in the May Goteborg Plenary and in the October
2004 Consultative Group Meeting. (FYI--The 13th NSG Plenary in Pusan
referred to in the question took place in May 2003, nine months before
the President's speech.) The proposal has also been discussed in G-8
meetings. The G-8 Leaders at Sea Island in June 2004 agreed to put in
place long-term controls on ENR equipment and technology by their July
2005 Summit, and in the interim to refrain for the next year from
transfers involving such equipment and technology to additional states.
We are continuing to press for the President's original proposal at the
NSG and in the G-8. Other members have suggested instead establishing
criteria by which to judge potential ENR transfers. We are discussing
with partners the possibility of an alternative, criteria-based
approach which would deny ENR technology or equipment to actual or
potential proliferators. Thus far, however, we have not identified
criteria--other than those which the President proposed in February
2004--which would provide sufficiently strong protections against ENR
proliferation.
NSG Proposals
Question. As I noted in correspondence with the administration last
April, China's entry into the NSG was preceded by its sale to Pakistan
of two reactors. How do you assess China's record with regard to
nuclear non-proliferation? Are you in any way concerned with China's
ability to both control nuclear technology exported to it from the
United States or other countries as well as enforce necessary export
controls over dual-use nuclear commerce?
Answer. President Clinton's 1997 certification to the Congress that
China ``is not assisting and will not assist any non-nuclear weapon
state, either directly or indirectly, in acquiring nuclear explosive
devices or the material and components for such devices'' remains
valid. China has shown that it is serious in wanting to improve and
strengthen implementation of its nuclear export control laws and
regulations, including strengthening its ability to enforce nuclear
export controls.
For example, in September 2003, China intercepted a shipment of
chemicals that could have been used in North Korea's nuclear program.
Chinese officials repeatedly have emphasized China's opposition to
nuclear weapons proliferation and support for international nuclear
nonproliferation efforts, including enhancing the effectiveness of the
NPT, strengthening IAEA safeguards, and encouraging wider acceptance of
the Additional Protocol. In fact, China was the first nuclear weapon
state to bring an Additional Protocol into force. China has supported
efforts to enhance physical protection of nuclear material and
strengthen international and national export controls. China has cited
its establishment of a comprehensive legal system for nuclear,
chemical, biological and missile export controls in accordance with
international treaties and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Australia
Group, and Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines. At the May
2004 NSG Plenary, China announced it was adopting dual-use catchall
provisions and full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply.
However, vigilance is clearly required in the area of dual-use
nuclear commerce where Chinese enforcement against illicit transfers to
countries of concern remains inadequate. To that end, we have
repeatedly raised with China the need for rigorous enforcement of its
export controls to prevent such transfers, and interdict transhipments.
Problems persist in Chinese export control implementation, enforcement
and transparency. Exports by Chinese entities to sensitive countries
continue to be of concern and U.S. statutory sanctions continue to be
applied against Chinese companies, including sanctions for exports to
Iran, pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. To encourage
China's movement in the right direction on export controls, we held two
export control talks with China in 2004, with specific emphasis on
implementation of nuclear export controls. These talks open
possibilities for additional U.S.-China technical cooperation on
enhancing nuclear export controls.
NSPD-19 and Regulatory Issues
On November 21, 2002, the White House announced details of a
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD-19) examining many
aspects of U.S. defense trade controls law and policy.
Question. What is your understanding of the status of the
administration's promulgation of policies I understood to be contained
in NSPD-19 or when President Bush might sign it?
Answer. State, Defense, and Commerce concluded their review of
defense trade issues and held consultations with Congressional staff
several months ago.
I believe the measures developed by the agencies are prudent and
useful, but whether the President will choose to have the measures
implemented is a matter for his decision.
Question. What do you understand to be the specific regulatory
changes associated with the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(the ITAR, 22 CFR 120-130) on which some of NSPD-19 bears, and what
specific changes to the ITAR would you envision being necessary as a
result of President Bush's potential signature of NSPD-19? Would any
part of NSPD-19 require amendments to the Arms Export Control Act?
Answer. Some of the measures recommended by the interagency review
would require changes to the ITAR, and one would require a change to
the AECA , but as noted previously, all the agency recommendations are
a matter for Presidential decision.
Question. What are the specific problems created by the current
regulatory environment under the ITAR for allied interoperability,
controls on U.S. defense articles, services and technical data once
they are exported, and the 21st century defense industrial global
marketplace?
Answer. The ITAR has served its primary objective, which is to
ensure that exports of U.S defense articles and services support U.S.
national security and foreign policy interests, and to keep such
articles and services out of the hands of potential adversaries. The
licensing process can be cumbersome; many improvements have now been
made. But we need to pay attention to how we manage 60,000 license
applications valued at nearly $100 billion in proposed exports each
year. Overregulation can harm our ability to control sensitive goods
and support legitimate coalition and alliance efforts.
Coalition operations in the Global War on Terrorism have reinforced
the importance of ensuring that our friends and allies have timely
access to U.S. defense technology in order to fight effectively
alongside our forces against our common enemies. In addition, rapid
advances in defense technologies and changes in the U.S. and foreign
defense industries require us to look for ways to make our laws,
regulations, and procedures as timely and effective as possible in
advancing our objectives.
Question. Will you continue to respect the long-standing practice
of pre-notification of commercial arms sales to Congress under section
36 (c) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC 2276(c))?
Answer. The Executive Branch has a strong interest in ensuring U.S.
arms transfers enjoy the benefit of congressional oversight. We will
continue to comply with the Congressional notification requirements of
Sec. 36 of the AECA.
If confirmed, I intend to work with the Congress to ensure that the
oversight process promotes effective consultation so that we may better
understand the Members' perspectives in our management of this
important defense export function.
Question. There were multiple changes to the United States
Munitions List (the USML, 22 CFR Part 121) in both 2003 and 2004. Do
you envision any additional changes in 2005, either as a part of the
NSPD-19 process or other administration reviews of the USML? If so,
which USML categories might be amended?
Answer. Considerable effort has gone into reviewing the USML since
2001. Of the 21 categories in the Munitions List, 10 have been revised
and published in the Federal Register. Eight additional categories are
completed, near completion or being reviewed by State, Commerce, and
DOD, so I expect there will be additional changes in the near future. I
expect this process to continue, as the USML continues to be out of
date.
As required by law, removals from the USML will be notified to the
Congress.
Pakistan: Arms Sales and Policy Linkages
In November 2004, the State Department notified Congress of three
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) sales to Pakistan under 36(b) of the Arms
Export Control Act, ``the Act'', (22 USC 2776(b)). The three sales had
not received, by long-standing and well-established practice, the pre-
clearance of the majority and minority sides of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. These sales to Pakistan were notified without
resolution of many issues and questions surrounding arms sales to
Pakistan during pre-consultations on these cases.
Question. If you are confirmed to the position of Secretary, your
Department will coordinate FMS with the Defense Department. Will you
respect the long-standing practice of pre-notification of FMS to this
committee?
Answer. We will continue to comply with the Congressional
notification requirements contained in the Arms Export Control Act and
the Foreign Assistance Act.The Executive Branch has a strong interest
in ensuring that U.S. arms transfers enjoy Congressional support. If
confirmed as Secretary of State, I intend to work with Congress to
ensure that these objectives are met.
Question. What is the administration's overall policy with respect
to arms sales, government or commercial, to South Asia?
Answer. The U.S. Government's overall policy for the conduct of
arms sales, government or commercial, is governed by the Arms Export
Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act. These legislative
parameters are codified by the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy
with the Department of State having been given statutory oversight for
arms transfers and military export programs. Conventional arms sales
are a legitimate instrument of U.S. foreign policy, designed and
implemented to serve U.S. foreign policy and national security
requirements. To this end, defense trade with the countries of South
Asia is consistent with existing conventional arms transfer policy.
With the lifting of sanctions against India and Pakistan in 2002,
the Department has applied the CAT policy with rigor and deliberation
to all countries of South Asia. Arms sales, particularly commercial
licenses, have increased significantly over the past three years. The
Department applies the rigor required of the CAT policy to all arms
sales in order to ensure U.S. national security interests are being
served and that regional stability factors are duly weighed.
Utilization of Foreign Military Sales (government-to-government arms
sales) has not yet reached its potential. Increased Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) to Pakistan, and continuity of message to the
Government of India will help achieve greater reliance on government-
to-government arms sales in the coming years.
We are mindful of the importance of not fueling a potentially
destabilizing arms race between India and Pakistan. That said, both
countries have legitimate defense needs. U.S. defense sales are a means
of helping them address those needs in a way that is consistent with
our foreign policy objectives.
Question. I have read many reports with respect to the potential
sale to Pakistan of FMS under F-16's. Should the sale, particularly if
it is financed by the U.S. taxpayer, be conditioned on greater access
by U.S. officials to A.Q. Khan and increased efforts by the Pakistan
Government to counter all forms of terrorism emanating from its
territory, especially given the potential regional repercussions of
such a sale?
Answer. Pakistan sent the U.S. government a Letter of Request for
18 Block 50 F-16 aircraft in July 2004. The administration has not made
a final decision on Pakistan's request. We will continue to consult
closely with Congress on this matter.
Since July, Pakistan has made substantial progress in the war on
terror, has acted decisively to shut down A.Q. Khan's proliferation
activities, and has pursued peace with India. The GoP has raised the
issue of F-16s with us on a number of occasions. It is a conversation
we will continue to have. If confirmed, I will of course be available
to address questions of this kind with the committee, perhaps in a
closed session.
Question. Public press reports indicate that Pakistan and Iran have
completed a formal defense cooperation agreement. Does such cooperation
increase any concerns you may have with respect to Pakistan's ability
to keep sensitive U.S. arms and technology out of the hands of state
sponsors of terror, namely Iran?
Answer. Pakistan and Iran share a common border and maintain
correct relations. The administration is aware of discussions and
agreements between Pakistan and Iran on defense-related matters.
In August 2004, Jane's Defense Weekly reported that Iran's DefMin
Ali Shamkhani and GoP acting DefMin Haid Nawaz Khan signed an MOU
expanding defense ties and setting up a joint commission for defense
cooperation. It remains unclear whether the August visit and subsequent
MOU will lead to a significant increase in Pakistani-Iranian defense
trade.
We have expressed our concerns about this issue to the Government
of Pakistan on multiple occasions. On August 19, 2004, the South Asia
Bureau stressed to officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
Ministry of Defense the comprehensiveness of USG law and policy on
diversions of U.S.-licensed equipment and technology to third parties
and access by third parties to the equipment and technology. The
Assistant Secretary of the Political-Military Bureau reinforced these
points with MFA officials in Islamabad at the end of August.
In our discussions, we have made clear the potential implications
for U.S.-Pakistan relations of defense-related cooperation between
Pakistan and Iran. Subsequently, those discussions were relayed to your
staffs. It is also worth noting that Iran has also pursued closer
defense ties with India simultaneously, even engaging in joint naval
maneuvers. Iran is looking for allies to break out of its strategic
isolation and Pakistan is one of several countries with which Iran is
engaged. We will continue to monitor this issue. If confirmed, I will
of course be available to address questions of this kind with the
committee, perhaps in a closed session.
Question. Do you know of any past cases of transfers from Pakistan
to other countries of U.S. defense items which could result in
sanctions for illegal transfers of lethal military equipment (LME)?
Answer. Any discussion on this topic will have to be classified. If
confirmed, I will of course be available to address questions of this
kind with the committee, perhaps in a closed session.
RD-180: Goals and Policy
Commercial space launch vehicle cooperation with Russian entities
has been seen as a means of preventing the diversion of ballistic
missile technical knowledge and equipment to rogue states such as Iran
or North Korea and achieving a domestic production capability for
advanced and unique Russian systems.
Until 2004, the State Department had continued licensed cooperation
with NPO-Energomash for co-production of the RD-180 engine under a
contract with United Technologies Corporation. Pratt and Whitney and
Lockheed Martin on a limited basis. In 2004, the Department submitted
four licenses to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, three of
which, (DTC 018-04, 019-04 and 020-04) were authorizations that
extended the validity of these licenses beyond the annual duration
under which they had been previously notified. A subsequent
authorization DTC 086-04, was received by the committee in the later
part of 2004. All of these licenses were approved on the understanding
that the goal of these arrangements was to achieve a U.S. production
capability for the RD-180 and prevent proliferation of this technology.
Yet, Russian ballistic missile proliferation appears to have continued,
as the Central Intelligence Agency's most recent Unclassified Report to
Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31
December 2003, notes.
Question. What is your understanding of U.S. goals and policy with
respect to licenses for the RD-180, both with regard to a timeframe for
domestic U.S. production and whether this licensing arrangement has, in
fact, served U.S. non-proliferation concerns in Russia?
Answer. Industry-to-industry contact can be an effective
nonproliferation tool. We have repeatedly made the point to Russia that
it is important that the Russian aerospace industry not assist missile
programs in problem countries if it wants to enjoy the benefits of
space cooperation with the United States. Export arrangements for the
RD-180 program have been scrutinized at the highest levels of the
Department to ensure that the progress of the program has been in line
with our nonproliferation objectives.
According to United Technologies, the current contract phase will
allow for the building of critical engine components and establishment
of a capability to produce such systems in the United States. It is
currently estimated that a co-production facility in the United States
will be completed in 2007.
Question. How do you assess Russia's ballistic missile
proliferation, both with regard to steps the Russian Government has
undertaken to prevent such proliferation and its failures to prevent it
(as can be inferred from the latest CIA report to Congress)?
Answer. We continue to have concerns about the Iranian missile
program and its efforts to acquire missile technology from Russian
sources.
We use every opportunity to make our concerns known to the Russian
Government, to urge Russia to cut-off the flow of sensitive items to
Iran, and continue to use the leverage afforded by U.S. space launch
cooperation to seek better Russian controls.
As a result, Russia has taken some steps to address the problem of
Russian supply to Iran's missile program, including implementation of
strengthened export control laws and enforcement.
But we remain concerned that Russia has not done enough to thwart
Iranian missile-related procurement. Russia's enforcement efforts
remain inadequate, and the Iranian missile program continues to have
access to missile-related technologies from Russian entities.
Museum Project
Question. The Department has set aside a space and promised to
provide staff and security if private funds are raised for exhibits for
the planned national museum of American diplomacy. What is the status
of this project? Will it be completed during your tenure?
Answer. The Department shares with the Congress, the White House
and other Federal institutions a commitment to make the work of our
government more accessible to the American people. As with the Capitol
Visitor Center, the Department's Visitor Center and Museum of American
Diplomacy will provide an engaging place where citizens can come to
learn how diplomacy was crucial in shaping our nation and how the work
of the Department affects the lives of all Americans every day. Only an
informed public will lend us their full support.
Working closely with our non-profit partner, the Foreign Affairs
Museum Council, the Department has laid the groundwork for this project
by creating a design concept that will draw visitors to the Department;
finalizing a fundraising strategy that will ensure adequate private
sector support; and creating an office, the United States Diplomacy
Center, to oversee and manage the project. The Foreign Affairs Museum
Council will assist in raising $25 million in private funds for design
and fabrication of the exhibitions and has already raised over $1.2
million to support the design effort
This project began as a Department exhibit, expanding to its future
18,000-square-foot location within the Harry S Truman Building as its
potential as a public resource was realized. The three immediate
preceding Secretaries of State have supported the project and all
living former Secretaries of State are Honorary Directors of the
Foreign Affairs Museum Council. The Chairman of the Board of Directors
is Senator Charles McC. Mathias and Ambassador Stephen Low serves as
President. Senator Sarbanes is also on the Board of Directors.
The Visitor Center and Museum of American Diplomacy will operate in
conjunction with an adjacent, publicly accessible conference center and
auditorium at the Department's 21st Street entrance. Together, the two
will provide programs and events that enhance the Department's public
outreach efforts.
The United States Diplomacy Center is working closely with the
Bureaus of administration and Diplomatic Security to address safety and
security concerns. Visitors to the centers will pass through an
exterior security pavilion with x-ray and magnetometer screening
devices. Both centers will be outside the security hard line.
Global Environment Facility
Question. Since 1994, the United States has been part of the Global
Environmental Facility (GEF). The GEF has committed $4.2 billion in
grants, and leveraged $11 billion in additional financing for more than
1,000 sustainable development projects in 160 countries. The U.S. is
behind in its dues by $139.8 million. Our dues for FY05 are $177
million.
Is the administration committed to supporting the GEF, correcting
our arrears, and paying our dues this year on time?
Answer. The United States remains committed to supporting the GEF.
The U.S. is the largest contributor to this important fund, whose
projects have resulted in significant environmental and development
benefits in over 160 countries.
The United States pledged $107.5 million per year for each of the
four years of the 2003-2006 GEF replenishment period, in exchange for
the GEF adopting specific reforms, including the adoption of a
performance allocation system, by the end of the replenishment period.
We volunteered to seek an additional $70 million if the reforms were in
place by November 2004, which unfortunately did not occur. In addition,
we committed to seek additional contributions to pay off earlier U.S.
arrears during this same period.
We will continue to work with the Congress to ensure that the GEF
successfully meets its objectives under the 3rd replenishment
agreement, particularly those concerning performance and transparency.
Although the administration sought a total of $153 million in arrears
in fiscal years 2003 to 2005, Congress only provided $65 million over
these three years. So it is clear that it will take longer to pay off
arrears than originally anticipated.
Over the past three years, the United States has actively pressed
for significant improvements in the GEF's operations. As part of the
2003-2006 replenishment deal, the GEF agreed to establish a transparent
performance-based allocation system to ensure effective use of
assistance funds.
While some very real improvements have been made in the GEF as a
result of U.S. initiatives, we are concerned that this performance-
based allocation program has not yet been put in place. The progress
made in implementing this program could be a factor in decisions on
future U.S. contributions.
India-Pakistan Dialogue
Question. The U.S. has played an important role over the last two
years in getting India and Pakistan back to the negotiating table. How
can the U.S. most effectively use the strong ties we have developed
with both sides to encourage further progress on the India-Pakistan
dialogue?
Answer. We welcome the positive developments in relations between
India and Pakistan. The agreement last January to resume a wide ranging
dialogue, with the objective of reaching a peaceful settlement on all
bilateral issues including Kashmir, was a real breakthrough. The
efforts that have been made by both governments since then to move the
Composite Dialogue forward are encouraging.
The conflict between India and Pakistan has deep roots. Ultimately,
it will be up to both countries to resolve their differences. They must
make the determination to accept the dictates of geography and
recognize that there is no alternative to getting along with their
neighbor. The decision to enter into a dialogue and their success in
sustaining it throughout 2004 is testament to the fact that a desire
for peace is growing in both nations. Our aim is to develop strong,
separate relationships with India and Pakistan. I think we are
succeeding, and we were able to put those good relationships to use
during our efforts to reduce tensions in the region when they have
flared during the last few years.
U.S. efforts to encourage the Indo-Pak peace process--some public,
some private--are centered on nudging both countries to sustain
dialogue and positive engagement. While we strongly support the
dialogue process, we do not see ourselves as mediators or taking a
direct role. We stand ready to provide any assistance requested by both
sides.
Pakistan: Cutting Off Support for Kashmiri Militancy
Question. U.S. officials in the past have said that we cannot push
the Musharraf government too hard on the issue of cutting support to
Kashmiri militants because of the myriad other issues on our agenda
with Pakistan and out of concern that we might contribute to
destabilizing his regime by asking him take on too many vested interest
at once. However, many of the Pakistan-based militants training to
fight in Kashmir have links to international terrorists, including
those that target U.S. personnel in Afghanistan. How do we plan to work
with the Musharraf government to ensure all official support
(financing, training, and other) to Pakistan-based militancy is halted?
Answer. The U.S. Government is concerned about the activities of
Kashmiri militant groups. We have repeatedly made clear to the
Pakistani Government that it must continue its efforts to close all
Kashmiri militant training camps and halt all militant infiltration
across Kashmir's Line of Control (LOC). The Pakistani Government has
formally banned several major extremist organizations, including
Kashmiri militant groups, and has prohibited donations to these groups.
We look forward to working with Pakistan and the international
community at large to intensify the effort to cut off money flows to
these groups.
Pakistan: Support for President Musharraf
Question. The U.S. has taken a fairly neutral position on the issue
of Musharraf maintaining his dual role as President and Chief of Army
Staff, leading many U.S. observers, as well as Pakistanis, to criticize
U.S. policy as being too ``Musharraf-centric.'' How do you react to
this criticism? How can we continue to encourage real progress on
democracy in Pakistan over the next few years?
Answer. The U.S. Government is committed to a long-term
relationship with Pakistan that goes beyond individuals. Pakistan's
transition to a sustainable democracy with strong democratic
institutions is among our top policy goals in Pakistan. We regularly
impress upon our interlocutors in the Pakistani Government the need to
continue to make progress on democratization, including holding free
and fair multi-party elections in 2007, as scheduled.
The U.S. Government is assisting Pakistan's own democratization
efforts through USG-funded programs aimed at making Pakistani democracy
more participatory, representative, and accountable. This includes
strengthening national and provincial legislatures, political parties,
NGO's, and independent media.
North Korea
Question. North Korea continues to insist on a ``security
guarantee'' from the United States. Under what conditions is such a
guarantee possible, and how would it be structured?
Answer. The proposal that we tabled at the last round of Six-Party
Talks, in June 2004, included the provision of a multilateral security
assurance if the North were to commit to dismantle its nuclear programs
in a permanent, transparent and thorough manner, subject to effective
verification, and begin taking the steps we outlined in our proposal to
commence the dismantlement process.
As we told the North in our proposal, upon acceptance of the DPRK's
initial declaration of its nuclear programs, and while it verifiably
undertakes the initial dismantlement steps outlined in our proposal,
the parties would provide provisional multilateral security assurances,
which would become more enduring as the process proceeded. These would
include assurances that no party had any intention to invade or attack
another, as well as a commitment on the part of all parties to respect
the territorial integrity of others.
We have made clear to North Korea and all of the members of the
Six-Party process that the U.S. will not provide a bilateral security
assurance to the North. As North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons is
a multilateral concern, the U.S. will participate in only a
multilateral security assurance. President Bush has, however, made
clear that the United States has no intention of invading or attacking
North Korea.
U.S.-China Relations
Question. Several East Asian leaders have expressed frustration to
committee Members over what they view as mixed messages from the
Executive branch on the cross-Strait issue involving China and Taiwan.
Could you explain our nation's ``One-China'' policy? Is it your
understanding President Bush intends to continue this approach? Under
what circumstances would the U.S. come to the assistance of Taiwan in
case of attack?
Answer. President Bush remains committed to our One-China Policy
based on the three Joint Communiques and on the Taiwan Relations Act.
Our establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's
Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan
will be determined by peaceful means. We oppose unilateral moves by
either side to change the status quo.
To this end, we make available to Taiwan arms of a defensive
character, and we maintain the capacity of the United States to resist
any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize
the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on
Taiwan.
We consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other
than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, to be a threat
to the peace and of grave concern to the United States.
The President will promptly inform the Congress of any threat to
the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan.
The President and the Congress would then decide on appropriate action
by the United States in response to any such danger.
Question. During your visit to Beijing in July 2004, what areas of
agreement and disagreement did you find concerning U.S. and PRC
information on North Korean nuclear weapon programs? Has China shared
any information on Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan's nuclear sales? How
might China be more helpful in using its ``considerable influence with
North Korea?''
Answer. We have briefed our Six-Party partners on our assessment of
North Korea's nuclear programs, including its uranium enrichment
program. The evidence we have supports that assessment.
We continue to have close consultations with all of our Six-Party
partners, including China, on the nuclear issue. Our allies and other
partners in the Six-Party talks share our concerns about North Korea's
possession of nuclear weapons.
As coordinator and host of the Six-Party talks, China has been
active in all aspects of the Talks, including working groups and formal
plenary discussions, as well as during the intervals between plenary
sessions. We have encouraged China to be an active participant, and not
just a mediator in the Six-Party talks.
We also told China that they must work harder at convincing North
Korea's Kim Chong-il that North Korea must return to the Six-Party
talks and must commit to the dismantlement of their entire nuclear
program, to include their uranium enrichment program--which North Korea
continues to deny having
There is a concerted, worldwide investigation into the A.Q. Khan
proliferation network. China supports the international community's
efforts to shut down the network.
Question. China is rapidly accelerating its diplomatic and business
ties to Southeast Asia. Whether to locate necessary resources to meet
growing energy demands or to increase cooperation in agricultural trade
and economic development, China is aggressively reaching out to ASEAN.
Recently agreement was reached to pursue the China-ASEAN Free Trade
Zone. How will such economic ties impact U.S. security and trade
interests in the region?
Answer. China's outreach to ASEAN has indeed accelerated in recent
years. The outreach takes the primary form of economic engagement, a
fact that has political and strategic implications for the United
States. Nevertheless, the United States continues to be a major player
in the economy of the Asia-Pacific region, and U.S. ties with ASEAN are
strong and growing stronger.
China's recent outreach has included the November 2004 ``early
tariff reduction agreement'' between China and ASEAN countries, which
will begin reducing duties in mid-2005, prior to the projected 2010
conclusion of the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area.
Countries in Asia increasingly view Beijing as a positive economic
force in the region. For example, Beijing pledged more than $20 million
to support work in agriculture, information technology, education and
Mekong River Basin Development under the China-ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement. Because final processing of goods has generally migrated to
China in recent years, ASEAN enjoys a significant trade surplus with
China.
Nonetheless, the strength of the U.S. economy means we will remain
a top trading partner for most Asian nations. China's free trade
agreements with other Asian economies are unlikely to dramatically
reduce that dominance. The United States has over $120 billion in trade
annually with ASEAN countries. Over time, development in China and
other Asian countries might enable them to compete more aggressively
with us in high-tech and service sectors. We will work hard to ensure
that competition with China and other rising economies takes place
within the context of a rules-based system. We are working to
strengthen U.S.-ASEAN relations through the President's Enterprise for
ASEAN Initiative, which focuses on improving trade ties, and the ASEAN
Cooperation Plan, which supports cooperative programs, including in the
economic area.
More broadly, we will continue strong economic engagement in Asia,
working with our long-term partners, South Korea and Japan, and
strengthening regional fora such as the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) forum.
Broader Latin America
Question. How would you define success with Latin America at the
end of your tenure?
Answer. Thirty-three of our thirty-four neighbors in the Western
Hemisphere enjoy the benefits of democratic government. Most share a
commitment to free market principles.
One of the key goals of the Bush administration is consolidation of
democratic rule in our hemisphere. Hopefully, that will include a
peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba in the near future.
The administration's strategy for the Western Hemisphere is built
on secure borders and commitments to democracy, free markets and
economic integration. True success will be the extension of economic
opportunity to all citizens of the Western Hemisphere, working to
liberate millions more from the tyranny of poverty, inadequate
education and crime.
Question. How can we best reverse negative public opinion in the
region toward the United States? Do we need a change in our policies
toward the region or is it a problem of communication?
Answer. Press reports to the contrary, mid-2004 polls show the U.S.
is well respected in most countries in the region. Majorities in 12 of
17 countries polled hold a good image of the United States. Majorities
of two-thirds or more in 13 countries see good ties between their
country and the United States. Citizens of Central America, Panama,
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru hold the most positive opinions of the U.S.
Six in ten Mexicans have a positive image of the U.S., and two-thirds
assess bilateral relations as good.
We will build on these good relations by expanding our outreach
efforts, including educational, press, and economic exchanges,
throughout the hemisphere. We will continue to counter negative claims
by the Cuban and Venezuelan governments and highlight the USG's
sustained efforts to improve the lives of millions in the hemisphere.
Question. Could you list in order of importance challenges facing
U.S. interests in the region?
Answer. Our challenges in the Western Hemisphere include:
Securing our borders by developing capacity for governments
to exercise effective sovereignty and provide basic security
over their territories.
Strengthening democratic institutions by promoting
representative, constitutional government as the only
legitimate form of political organization in our hemisphere.
Ensuring economic opportunity by bringing economic benefits
to all, not just the rich or powerful.
Investing in people by fomenting policies and programs to
allow all citizens a ``share'' of prosperity and quality of
life.
President Bush's strategy and vision for the hemisphere provides
the roadmap for responding to these challenges and achieving full
implementation of the economic and social reforms needed to deliver the
benefits of democracy to all citizens of this hemisphere.
North American Border Security
Question. What progress has been made in implementing ``Smart
Border Declaration'' agreements with Canada and with Mexico? What other
policies are being implemented to improve hemispheric border security?
What will you do during your tenure to gain improved cooperation with
Mexico and Canada on border security?
Answer. The Smart Border Partnership Action Plans continue to be
the framework for United States border security cooperation with Canada
and Mexico.
The United States is pleased with Mexican and Canadian cooperation
under these Plans. Through Congressional authorization, we have
provided assistance to Mexico to strengthen border controls, such as:
13 state-of-the-art inspection (VACIS) systems in Mexican
customs facilities, and mobile X-Ray inspection units in some
Mexican cities.
Expansion of a secure electronic network for Travelers'
Rapid Inspection lanes.
Training for over 350 Mexican officials on border safety
issues.
If I am confirmed, I will continue our collaborative efforts under
existing plans while seeking opportunities for new initiatives to
further border security in hemisphere.
Unilateral United States programs, such as US-VISIT and passport
requirements for American citizens, further improve hemispheric
security.
Beyond our collaboration with Mexico and Canada on contiguous
border security, we work in multilateral fora, including the
Organization of American States Inter-American Committee Against
Terrorism (CICTE), and with regional partners. Examples of such
cooperation include:
President Bush's Third Border Initiative to focus attention,
including security upgrades, on our border with the nations of
the Caribbean Basin.
In Central America, the United States supports a variety of
anti-smuggling initiatives, including the Container Freight
Tracking System.
Our on-going ``3+1'' Counterterrorism Dialogue with
Paraguay, Brazil and Argentina has made significant steps to
enhance border security and build counterterrorism finance
capacity in that region.
Question. Though the ``Smart Border'' declarations with Mexico and
Canada further enhance the security of the borders and the flow of
commerce, these agreements are largely dependent on current government-
to-government relations. There is no legal framework within which to
implement these agreements. Under your leadership, what will the
Department do to create an institutional framework to deal with
hemispheric border security? Given that Guatemala is the southern
border to the NAFTA space, should Guatemala be included?
Answer. Agreements, letters of intent, statements of mutual
understanding, and other arrangements that have been developed in the
past several years shape our security cooperation with Mexico and
Canada.
With Canada, the Smart Border Accord is the framework. The Canadian
Preclearance Act provides authority for U.S. border inspectors working
in Canada. In Mexico, the 22-Point Border Partnership Action Plan,
signed in 2002, provides a framework. Letters of agreement with Mexico
have been negotiated for the use of Congressionally-authorized funds to
improve border security.
The U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission, which has met annually for
23 years, includes cabinet-level bi-national discussion of border
security and cooperation.
The U.S.-Canada Cross-Border Crime Forum provides similar
opportunity for senior officials of our countries to review security
efforts.
The United States has a multifaceted law enforcement program with
Guatemala, including enhancement of border ports of entry. The work is
part of a larger Central American regional program to improve border
controls. The Government of Mexico actively cooperates with the
Government of Guatemala to combat smuggling and other threats along the
Mexico/Guatemala border.
Venezuela
Question. Has the administration drawn up contingency plans in the
event of another suspension of oil exports from Venezuela? Should
arrangements be made with other regional oil producers to replace a
Venezuelan shortfall? What other contingency plans should be made?
Answer. The United States and Venezuela have traditionally enjoyed
a strong, mutually beneficial energy relationship. Venezuela is among
the largest suppliers of petroleum to the United States. The United
States is the single largest destination for Venezuelan oil.
We strongly believe this energy relationship remains in the
national interests of both countries.
As outlined in our National Energy Policy, we are constantly
working to enhance our energy security through promoting increasing
diversity of global energy suppliers.
Question. How can the United States press for Venezuelan adherence
to democratic standards without appearing to interfere in Venezuelan
affairs?
Answer. Pressing for adherence to democratic standards is not
interference in the internal affairs of another country. It is the
right thing to do. As a signatory to the Inter-American Democratic
Charter and other instruments, Venezuela must honor its commitments to
uphold democracy, human rights and the rule of law. We are increasingly
concerned about the continued deterioration of democratic
institutions--unchecked concentration of power in the executive,
politicization of the judiciary and increased threats to basic
democratic and civil rights.
We are working with our hemispheric and international partners and
the Organization of American States to help strengthen democracy in
Venezuela. We continue to press the Venezuelan government to honor its
constitutional and international commitments to democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law. Additionally, we continue to engage civil
society and democratic nations that share our values and concerns.
In August 2002, the United States Agency for International
Development established the ``Venezuela Confidence Building
Initiative'' to strengthen the country's fragile democratic
institutions by working with independent organizations to facilitate
and enhance dialogue and support constitutional processes. We will
continue to look for ways to enhance our support to democratic
institutions in Venezuela and elsewhere. Support for democracy is a
cornerstone of President Bush's foreign policy.
Question. Currently the level of our direct engagement with the
Venezuelan government is through our ambassador in Caracas. Do you
intend to elevate this level of contact?
Answer. Our two countries traditionally have enjoyed close,
friendly relations based on shared democratic values. We lament this
historic relationship has deteriorated due to the actions and rhetoric
of the Government of Venezuela (GOV).
Our relations are conducted in Caracas through our Ambassador and
in Washington between the Department of State and the Venezuelan
ambassador to the United States. In June, we accepted a GOV proposal
for a bilateral working group. Although the GOV informed us of the
intention to send two special representatives to Washington to explore
the idea, the Venezuelan government never followed through.
Our Ambassador has been in Caracas for nearly five months and has
only been granted a handful of meetings with Venezuelan officials in
Caracas. Regrettably, the actions of the Government of Venezuela do not
appear to indicate a desire to improve bilateral relations.
__________
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted by
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Tenure as National Security Adviser
Question. Section 108 of the National Security Act requires
submission to Congress of a ``national security strategy report'' on an
annual basis. Such a strategy report is also required within 150 days
after a new President takes office. During this administration, this
report has been submitted to the Congress only once, in September 2002.
As Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, is it not
your responsibility to assure the preparation and submission of this
report? Why has the administration failed to comply with this legal
requirement?
Answer. Unlike previous national security strategies, President
Bush's National Security Strategy of September 2002 was meant to be an
enduring document, one that would last for more than a year.
Significant time and resources were dedicated to producing a
comprehensive strategic document that would reflect the President's
vision and his specific priorities and initiatives to protect our
national security over the next several years and beyond. It was a top
down document that required Principals' time and that of the President.
We have reviewed the September 2002 strategy during each of the last
two years and believe that it remains valid today. I regret, however,
that we did not communicate this conclusion to Congress. The
administration plans to update the strategy to take account of
significant developments since its publication, including the war in
Iraq, and to submit an update to Congress this year.
In the last six months of 2004, you gave 11 public speeches, nine
of which were delivered in states that were considered important
``battlegrounds'' in the 2004 presidential election, including Oregon,
Washington, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Florida.
Question. (a). Please comment on why you believe it was appropriate
to deliver these speeches in such ``battleground'' states during the
presidential campaign period. Why did you not have a concern that these
appearances--inasmuch as all of them (but one) occurred after the
Democratic and Republican national conventions and prior to Election
Day--might be construed as partisan political activity?
(b). Do you agree that, as Secretary of State, you should abstain
from activities that might be construed as partisan political activity?
Answer. By tradition and custom, the National Security Advisor does
not actively participate in public campaign or political events, and I
have continued that tradition. However, I do not believe that this
means being non-accessible. At a period in U.S. history when national
security has been very much on the minds of the American people, I have
found it important, throughout my tenure as National Security Advisor,
to discuss the President's national security policies in public
speeches . It is also important to me to make myself accessible not
just in Washington but to citizens in their communities and to local
reporters. Because of concerns expressed by some members of Congress, I
understand that all of my speeches in 2004 were reviewed by the Office
of Special Counsel, which concluded that they were standard policy
speeches that did not involve partisan political activity or
campaigning. If confirmed as Secretary of State, I intend to continue
the tradition in that position of not actively participating in public
campaign or political events.
9/11 Attacks
Question. Looking back at the period between January 20, 2001 and
September 11, 2001, do you believe there is anything you should or
could have done differently to assist the President to try to prevent
the 9/11 attacks?
Answer. I believe that we did everything that was appropriate and
possible at the time to protect the American people and our interests
from terrorist attacks. I do not believe there was a single ``silver
bullet'' that could have prevented the 9/11 attacks. As I said during
my testimony before the 9/11 Commission, ``In hindsight, if anything
might have helped stop 9/11, it would have been better information
about threats inside the United States, something made difficult by
structural and legal impediments that prevented the collection and
sharing of information by our law enforcement and intelligence
agencies.'' This view is shared by the 9/11 Commission, which found
that government institutions failed to adapt to the threat of
terrorism, enabling the terrorists to exploit ``deep institutional
failings within our government'' caused by a variety of factors
spanning many years, many departments, and multiple administrations.
On July 13, 2001, you gave a speech at the National Press Club. You
indicated that mid-July was ``as good a time as any to start making
some observations on how [the administration was] doing.'' The speech
started by listing the President's priorities, and then reviewed some
of these priorities, such as relations with Europe and Africa, and
missile defense. A noticeable omission was the subject of terrorism,
which was mentioned only as a challenge that faced Africa. The report
of the 9/11 Commission indicates there was a significant level of
threat reporting in the immediate period before your speech (see, e.g.,
p. 257--``Threat reports surged in June and July, reaching an even
higher peak of urgency'').
Question. Given the ongoing level of threat reporting, why was the
threat of terrorism against the United States and U.S. interests not
considered a priority meriting substantive discussion in this address?
Answer. Counterterrorism was--and continues to be--a high priority
for President Bush. After he took office, President Bush retained
George Tenet as Director of Central Intelligence and Louis Freeh as
Director of the FBI; I retained Dick Clarke and the entire Clinton
administration's counterterrorism staff at the NSC. We quickly moved to
develop a new and comprehensive strategy to eliminate the al-Qaeda
terrorist network, which was approved on September 4, 2001, and was the
first major national security policy directive of the Bush
administration. While we were developing this new strategy to deal with
al-Qaeda, we also took action on a number of specific anti-al-Qaeda
initiatives that had been proposed by Dick Clarke, and worked hard on
multiple fronts to detect, prevent, and protect against terrorist
activities. I did not address the subject in this speech because we had
not yet concluded the policy review.
Question. The 9/11 Commission reported that ``no Principals
committee meetings on al Qaeda was held until September 4, 2001,''
although there were 32 such meetings on other subjects prior September
11, 2001. At the September 4 meeting, the Principals Committee approved
a draft presidential directive on al Qaeda. Why did it take over 7
months to convene a Principals Committee meeting on this subject, and
to approve a strategy on al Qaeda?
Answer. The Deputies and department/agency staffs worked intensely
on developing this new National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)
beginning in March 2001. The development of a new, comprehensive, and
aggressive al-Qaeda strategy was exceptionally fast, especially given
the time required for the Senate to confirm key principals and
deputies, the complexities involved in orchestrating all aspects of our
national power, other pressing issues, and the activities attendant to
the start of a new administration. While the NSPD was approved by the
Principals Committee on September 4, it is important to note the
strategy development process was completely different from the on-going
process of identifying and responding to specific threats, which
occurred throughout 2001 and was not contingent upon the Principals'
approval of the NSPD.
Iraq and Pre-War Intelligence
On January 28, 2004, David Kay stated to the Senate Committee on
Armed Services that ``we were almost all wrong'' about the judgment
that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction before March 2002.
Question. (a). Do you agree with Dr. Kay's statement? Please
elaborate.
(b). Do you believe the President was well-served by the
Intelligence Community and by the NSC staff in the preparation and
presentation of pre-war intelligence on Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction programs? Please elaborate.
Answer. I believe that the matter is more complicated than Dr.
Kay's five word characterization. I agree with Charles Duelfer's
conclusion that:
Saddam continued to see the utility of WMD. He explained that
he purposely gave an ambiguous impression about possession as a
deterrent to Iran. He gave explicit direction to maintain the
intellectual capabilities. As UN sanctions eroded there was a
concomitant expansion of activities that could support full WMD
reactivation. He directed that ballistic missile work continue
that would support long-range missile development. Virtually no
senior Iraqi believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever.
Evidence suggests that, as resources became available and the
constraints of sanctions decayed, there was a direct expansion
of activity that would have had the effect of supporting future
WMD reconstitution. Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor
to the DCI on Iraq's WMD, September 30, 2004, Vol. I, p. 9.
In ordering the creation of the Commission on the Intelligence
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass
Destruction, the President has shown his determination to ensure that
we have the very best intelligence possible on this critical issue.
Aluminum Tubes
In an interview with CNN on September 8, 2002, you stated that Iraq
was importing aluminum tubes that ``are only really suited for nuclear
weapons programs, centrifuge programs.'' The report of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence (``Report on the U.S. Intelligence
Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq,'' July 7, 2004)
indicates that there was considerable debate in the intelligence
community for nearly a year and a half before September 2002 about the
utility of the aluminum tubes. On September 12, 2002, in his address to
the United Nations General Assembly, the President stated that ``Iraq
has made several attempts to buy high-strength aluminum tubes used to
enrich uranium for a nuclear weapon.''
Question. Were you aware of this debate when you made this
assertion about the aluminum tubes? Were you aware of it during the
preparation of the President's speech to the UN? If so, do you regret
your categorical statement about the purpose of the tubes? If not, why
do you think you were not informed that there was such a debate?
Answer. My statement in September 2002 was consistent with the
majority view of the Intelligence Community at the time. Subsequently,
in October 2002, the National Intelligence Council produced the
National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, which stated that: ``Most
agencies believe that Saddam's personal interest in and Iraq's
aggressive attempts to obtain high-strength aluminum tubes for
centrifuge rotors--as well as Iraq's attempts to acquire magnets, high-
speed balancing machines, and machine tools--provide compelling
evidence that Saddam is reconstituting a uranium enrichment effort for
Baghdad's nuclear weapons program. (DOE agrees that reconstitution of
the nuclear program is underway but assesses that the tubes probably
are not part of the program.).''
Iraq
On July 21, 2003, USA Today reported that, prior to the war, the
NSC staff prepared a memorandum that examined previous peace and
stability operations and came up with specific estimates for a force
size to stabilize a post-Saddam Iraq. According to the article, the
memo suggested that using Bosnia as a guide, 500,000 forces would have
been required.
Question (a). What were your views on the requirements of the size
of the stabilization force?
(b). Prior to the war, there was an open disagreement between
General Eric Shinseki (then Army Chief of Staff), and the civilian
leadership of the Pentagon over the size of the force required in post-
conflict Iraq. Did you take steps to ensure that the views of General
Shinseki and others in the uniformed military reached the President?
Why were those views dismissed? What is your understanding of the
assumptions that led the Pentagon to ultimately deploy the level of
troops it did for stability operations? In retrospect, do you believe
that we deployed sufficient forces for stability operations?
Answer. The NSC staff did perform a ``quick look'' prior to the
war, which examined the ratio of stabilization forces to the overall
population of countries where such forces had been stationed. A number
of examples were examined, and the ratios varied widely. None was seen
as a yardstick for Iraq. The NSC staff does not determine military
requirements. The President was briefed on a continuing basis prior to,
during, and after the Operation Iraqi Freedom by the Secretary of
Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (who is the
principal military adviser to the President and also represents the
Joint Chiefs), and the Commander, U.S. Central Command.
On October 25, 2004, the Wall Street Journal reported that the
Department of Defense prepared detailed plans in June 2002 for options
to strike a military camp in northeastern Iraq where Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi allegedly was based, but the White House never approved such a
strike. NBC News reported on March 2, 2004 that such a strike was
rejected three times by the White House between June 2002 and January
2003. Press reports also indicate that the vast majority of
terrorists--many of whom were al-Qaeda from Afghanistan--fled the camp
before we and the PUK finally attacked it during Operation Iraqi
Freedom. Zarqawi is now one of the most lethal terrorists in Iraq,
having recently been named head of al-Qaeda in Iraq by Osama bin Laden.
Ansar al-Sunna, which has taken responsibility for the recent bombing
of a U.S. military base in Mosul and a series of other vicious attacks
in Iraq, is thought to be an off-shoot of Ansar al-Islam, which was
operating in the same camp.
Question (a). On how many occasions did the administration refuse
to approve strike plans? Please explain why.
(b). Do you regret that such a strike was not undertaken?
Answer. If we had been able to determine Zarqawi's location prior
to the war, we would have taken action to capture or kill him. While we
knew that he and his associates were transiting the border between Iraq
and Iran prior to the war, we did not have actionable intelligence that
would have given his location at a given point in time.
Iraq Stabilization Group
In October 2003, the President directed that you head the Iraq
Stabilization Group. As of this month, only $2.4 billion of the funds
appropriated the following month have been expended, (just 13%),
despite the fact that the administration requested them on an urgent
basis that autumn.
Question (a). What specific steps have you taken to accelerate the
disbursement of the $18.4 billion package for Iraqi reconstruction
signed into law by the President in November 2003?
(b). Are you satisfied with the current rate of expenditure? Do you
believe that enough Iraqis are involved in the process? Are local and
provincial governments in Iraq being used enough to help get funds
expended so that Iraqis realize tangible benefits?
Answer. My staff has been interacting with relevant agencies and
Embassy Baghdad (and the CPA prior to the transfer of sovereignty) on
an almost daily basis with respect to how the United States might best
use the $18.4 billion IRRF monies. We have worked to improve the flow
of information and to coordinate the U.S. response in an effort to
create innovative ways to spend taxpayer money most effectively while
at the same time maximizing benefits to Iraqi citizens.
Iraq needs the resources to overcome the formidable obstacles its
faces. Our goal is to give the people of Iraq the resources they need
to cultivate a new Iraq. Through our strategy, we have sought to
identify and target key high-impact areas for immediate focus--and
funding--to create the momentum and legacy of visible success, which
can, in turn, support longer-term reconstruction efforts.
Offices in the government that became involved in post-conflict
Iraq have told the committee that they were not involved in planning
before the war.
Question (a). Why was the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance established only on January 20, 2003, less than two months
prior to the conflict?
(b). What steps did you take to ensure that State Department's
Future of Iraq project were incorporated into the overall
administration efforts to plan for post-Saddam Iraq?
(c). What role did the NSC play to promote interagency coordination
in pre-war planning, and what notable successes and failures resulted?
Answer. Contingency planning in case of war in Iraq began in the
early Fall of 2002. It was done by an interagency team coordinated by
NSC staff, and included every relevant agency. The team met multiple
times per week for months, and covered both pre-war planning to support
the war-fighter and to avert humanitarian disasters if war occurred as
well as every aspect of post-war civilian matters--water, sewage,
medical care, food, ports, electricity, courts, and governance.
Later, in January 2003, it was decided that a special office should
be established to take all the work that had been done and put it to
use if we went into Iraq. ORHA was created with that purpose. The
interagency team was indeed familiar with the work the Future of Iraq
project had done, and of course the State Department was represented on
the team. That work did become part of the overall preparations the
team was undertaking. Some aspects were immediately useful; other
parts, such as the redesign of the judicial system, are still very
valuable and will, we hope, help Iraq's new government with that
important task. The team worked well and put together a good plan for
the civil and humanitarian work in case of war.
Our planning efforts have paid off in many vital areas, although
the environment in Iraq has proved to be very challenging and we have
had to adapt to some unforeseen circumstances. At the same time, I
strongly support the creation of the Office of Reconstruction and
Stabilization inside the State Department to create the permanent
capacity to work with the Department of Defense to do reconstruction
and stabilization planning in post-conflict and other crisis
situations. I very much appreciate the committee's leadership on this
effort.
Before the war, a specific recommendation was made to this
committee that, based on past experience in post-conflict situations,
it was necessary to recruit an international police force of roughly
5,000 before hostilities to move in quickly to train Iraqi police
afterwards. A similar recommendation on the size of an international
police training force was made by our own experts in the Iraq Police
Assessment Team in June 2003.
Question (a). What steps were taken to act on their
recommendations? Please describe any attempts that the administration
made to recruit international police forces before the war. If none
were made, please explain why.
(b). In June 2004, more than 14 months after the fall of Baghdad,
General Petraeus was appointed to revamp and consolidate the training
program for Iraqi security forces. Why did the administration not move
more quickly to overhaul this program?
Answer. Recommendations made early on to field an international
police force of approximately 5,000 men in Iraq failed to recognize the
significant differences between the situation in Iraq and past
experience with UN peacekeeping missions.
Importantly, in contrast to Kosovo and other UN peacekeeping
missions, the security situation in Iraq, where heavily-armed soldiers
are being killed every day, has never been stable enough to allow for
widespread deployments of lightly-armed civilian policemen. There has
never been a UN Civilian Police force deployed in a non-permissive
security environment, and governments have shown their reluctance to
send national contingents into the volatile environment of Iraq.
Because there is a limited pool of trained civilian policemen in
the United States available for international missions, the United
States alone could not have supplied a 5,000 man force. Few local or
state police departments will release officers badly needed at home,
and American civilian policemen going to missions are retirees or leave
poorly paying jobs. To field 500+ U.S. civilian policemen in Kosovo
posed significant difficulties, and INL had similar difficulties to get
to 500 by November 2004, the target number set for March 2004.
As such, assembling a force of 5,000 men would require large
contributions both in funding and personnel from a number of countries,
since national contingents are often less than 200 and are often
dependent on the UN to pay for the bulk of their expenses. However, no
UN peacekeeping account was available for Iraq and many European
countries have exhausted their supplies of police available for other
peacekeeping missions.
The military has been very involved in Iraqi police programs since
the outset and has had considerable influence over the way it has
progressed. State/INL initially led the interagency management effort
because of its control of funding and its traditional role in running
civilian police programs in UN missions. The deteriorating security
situation together with the recognition that a different approach was
required made it prudent to shift lead responsibility for the entire
program to the military. MNSTC-I was then set up and General Petraeus
was put in charge.
China
In your Foreign Affairs article you wrote: ``The longstanding U.S.
commitment to a `one-China' policy that leaves to a future date the
resolution of the relationship between Taipei and Beijing is wise.''
And you strongly criticized the Clinton administration for articulating
a policy of ``three no's'' during the President's trip to China.
Specifically, President Clinton said, ``I had a chance to reiterate our
Taiwan policy which is that we don't support independence for Taiwan,
or `two China's,' or `one Taiwan, one China,' and we don't believe that
Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a
requirement.''
The Bush administration has not only adopted the ``three no's''
position you criticized, but gone a major step further, arguing that
Taiwan does not currently enjoy sovereignty and rejecting a final
outcome that might lead to Taiwan independence, both steps that no U.S.
administration had ever taken before. On October 25, 2004, Secretary
Powell said in Hong Kong: ``Both sides should show restraint, not taken
any unilateral actions, look for ways of improving dialogue across the
Straits and move forward toward that day when we will see a peaceful
unification,'' adding, ``There is only one China. Taiwan is not
independent . . . It does not enjoy sovereignty as a nation, and that
remains our policy, our firm policy.''
Question (a). Does the United States have a position on whether
Taiwan enjoys sovereignty? If so, what is that position? Is Taiwan part
of China?
(b). Was Secretary Powell wrong to rule out Taiwan independence as
a possible future for Taiwan?
(c). Will you continue to argue that Taiwan and China should be
reunified and that Taiwan does not enjoy sovereignty?
Answer. Our policy of long standing has not changed. We do not
support Taiwan independence, and we oppose attempts by either side to
unilaterally alter the status quo. American policy toward Taiwan is
governed by our One-China Policy, the three Joint Communiques, and the
Taiwan Relations Act.
Additionally, we have reaffirmed our commitment to uphold the Six
Assurances to Taiwan originally conveyed by President Reagan, including
the assurance that the United States will not alter its position on the
sovereignty of Taiwan, which is that it is a matter to be decided
peacefully by the Chinese themselves.
We have long maintained that differences between the People's
Republic of China and Taiwan are matters to be resolved peacefully by
the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, absent the threat or use
of force, and in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the
Taiwan Strait.
Indonesia: Timika Murders
Question.No suspect has yet been brought to justice for murder of
two U.S. citizens in Timika in August 2002. Initial reports, by both
Indonesian police and the State Department, implicated the Indonesian
military in the attack. In June, however, Attorney General Ashcroft
shifted the blame to an alternate suspect, and downplayed a possible
connection to the Indonesian military (TNI). In the meantime, the
suspect remains at large, well documented ties between him and the TNI
remain unexplored in official accounts of the case, and there appears
to be no effort under way to advance the investigation.
Do you believe the FBI's investigation exonerates the TNI, or do
you believe more investigation needs to be done? If more needs to be
done, what do you intend to do to persuade the Indonesians to
cooperate?
Answer. The arrest and prosecution of Anthonius Wamang, who was
indicted by the FBI for the murder of two American citizens, is one of
our top priorities. Although the investigation is not complete, the FBI
has uncovered no evidence indicating TNI involvement in the Timika
murders.
We know President Yudhoyono understands the importance of this
matter to the United States and trust that the Government of Indonesia
will take the appropriate actions to achieve justice in this case.
Question. If the case remains stalled--with no suspect in jail, no
investigation actively probing alleged ties to TNI, no plans for any
movement in the future--would you support a resumption of IMET training
to the Indonesian military?
Answer. IMET for Indonesia is in the US interest. In FY 05, we have
allocated $600,000 in IMET funds (includes E-IMET) for Indonesia. The
aim of IMET is to strengthen the professionalism of military officers,
especially with respect to the norms of democratic civil-military
relations such as transparency, civilian supremacy, public
accountability, and respect for human rights. The GOI has demonstrated
cooperation as required. We are currently evaluating whether to issue
the required determination.
Nonproliferation
Question. The United States has several very useful programs to
help former Soviet weapons of mass destruction scientists find new
careers in more socially useful areas. These programs include the
International Science and Technology Centers, Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention, Chem/Bio Redirect, Nuclear Cities Initiative,
and the Cooperative Research and Development Foundation (which is
independent of the U.S. Government, but receives State Department
funds). These programs have been so successful that some of them are
being used as models for similar efforts to redirect Iraqi and Libyan
scientists. But the programs have rarely received budget increases from
this administration, although Congress has sometimes increased their
funding. Will you seek greater funds for these programs?
Answer. We have developed a strategic framework for
Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Expertise (NWMDE) that
is relevant to both mature programs in Russia and Eurasia and nascent
programs in Iraq and Libya. The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
(NDF) will allow us to exploit unanticipated opportunities in Iraq and
Libya in FY 2005. In FY 2006, we plan to sustain our engagement of
former Soviet, Iraqi and Libyan WMD scientists within the
Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise budget line.
IAEA Director General
The United States took a ``principled stand'' last year that nobody
should be elected to a third term as IAEA Director General. No other
country seems to have agreed with that stand, however, perhaps because
previous IAEA Directors General have routinely served more than two
terms. Nobody has filed to even challenge Dr. ElBaradei for that post,
so it would appear that he will be re-elected.
Question.What does the United States gain by persisting in its
opposition to Dr. ElBaradei's re-election, which is probably seen by
other countries as based more on personal pique than on principle? Will
you continue that approach in our non-proliferation policy, or will you
inject more practicality into our policy?
Answer. For many years the United States and other major donors to
the UN system have expressed the view that the heads of UN
organizations serve only two terms. This is not a new approach and we
reminded Dr. ElBaradei of this view at the beginning of his second term
as IAEA Director General. From the U.S. perspective, Dr. ElBaradei has
served with distinction. However we do see merit in predictable
turnover at senior levels in international organizations that a two-
term policy provides. If I am confirmed, I will look carefully at the
views of other governments and take them into consideration as well as
discuss this with other members of the IAEA Board as we move ahead.
Non-Proliferation Assistance Programs
Although the administration has voiced support for threat reduction
and non-proliferation assistance programs in the States of the Former
Soviet Union, these programs have suffered from recurrent crises and
have too often failed to achieve the speed or universality of coverage
that was envisioned for them.
Question (a). The issues of access to Russian sites and contractor
liability protections have stalled new efforts in the MPC&A and
plutonium disposition programs. Why have the U.S. and Russian
bureaucracies been unable to make progress on these issues?
(b). Will you urge President Bush to engage directly, intensively,
and in a sustained manner with President Putin to agree on solutions
and give clear direction to the bureaucrats? Alternatively, would you
recommend a new mechanism to develop U.S. Russian inter-agency
decisions on these programs?
Answer. The administration strongly supports cooperative threat
reduction efforts with Russia and will continue to work hard to resolve
the challenges of liability and access to sensitive nuclear facilities.
On liability, if confirmed, I will continue to make Russian
approval and ratification of the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
umbrella agreement (as extended in 1999) a key priority and will seek
to ensure the United States engages with Russia at the highest levels
necessary to achieve this. Ratification would put ongoing CTR programs
on a more solid footing.
It is our understanding, however, that CTR ratification will not
resolve liability for any expanded or new nonproliferation assistance
programs with Russia. This includes U.S. and G-8 efforts to convert
excess Russian weapon-grade plutonium into forms not useable for
weapons under the plutonium disposition program. The liability issue
has hindered progress on this important project. The administration is
actively reviewing ways of breaking the liability logjam with Russia--
while protecting CTR programs--to remove this impediment to plutonium
disposition and other cooperation. If confirmed, I will make every
effort to resolve these issues as soon as possible.
On the issue of access to sensitive Russian nuclear facilities, we
are continuing our efforts to address this effort with Moscow. We and
the Russians have developed special procedures to provide access to
these sensitive facilities and protect their nuclear secrets but have
not been able to agree to implement them at some key remaining
facilities. We have also recently provided unprecedented access to
Russian officials to U.S. nuclear facilities to demonstrate openness
and show them how we too are grappling with how to improve nuclear
security. We will continue to press senior Russian officials on these
issues to ensure that the security at all such nuclear facilities is
increased to prevent terrorist access to these weapons.
We will want to resolve both CTR umbrella agreement ratification
and these other matters in 2005, well before CTR comes up for extension
again in 2006.
Nonproliferation (Global Pathogen Surveillance Act)
Since 2001, I have introduced legislation to authorize the State
Department to lead an interagency effort to help other countries
improve their pathogen surveillance capabilities--with particular
emphasis on giving them the ability to spot an outbreak that might be
man-made and to call in international resources to promptly investigate
and respond to such an outbreak. The Senate passed that bill in 2002,
and it was a title in the State Department authorization bills reported
out by this committee in 2003 and 2004. In a world where natural
diseases like SARS and avian flu threaten to cause world-wide
epidemics, and where biotechnology gives our enemies increased ability
to create ``designer'' diseases for use against us, don't we need a
major program to build up the world's defenses against biological
terrorism?
Question (a). Will you work with us to see that the Global Pathogen
Surveillance Act is enacted?
(b). Do you agree that the State Department should take the lead in
this area, or do you favor leaving that to the Departments of HHS or
Defense?
Answer. We believe that the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act will
indeed help strengthen developing countries' abilities to identify and
track pathogens that could be indicators of dangerous disease
outbreaks--either naturally-occurring or deliberately-released.
Improved disease surveillance and communication among nations are
critical defenses against both bioterrorism and natural outbreaks. We
look forward to working with you in support of the Global Pathogen
Surveillance Act.
We believe that improving monitoring and reporting on infectious
disease outbreaks globally sits at the very intersection of foreign
policy, health, and national security concerns. As such, we agree that
the Department of State should lead the activities articulated in the
Global Pathogen Surveillance Act. The Department is already working to
better coordinate and integrate the multiple U.S. initiatives on
disease surveillance internationally, collaborating with the
Departments of Health and Human Services, Defense, Homeland Security,
Agriculture, and other federal agencies.
One of the true ``nightmare'' scenarios--of a bioterrorist attack
or a naturally-occurring disease--involves a contagious biological
agent moving swiftly through a crowded urban area of a densely
populated developing nation. Thus, we believe that it is critical to
increase efforts to strengthen the public health and scientific
infrastructure necessary to identify and quickly respond to infectious
disease outbreaks--and that the Global Pathogen Surveillance Act will
provide valuable support in these efforts.
Proliferation Security Initiative
Several countries have joined the Proliferation Security
Initiative, there have been many meetings and exercises, and the United
States has signed boarding agreements with some major seafaring
nations. But thus far there has been no interdiction that we know of
that was clearly a PSI operation.
Question (a). What real-world interdiction capability does PSI give
us, what are its operational objectives, and how will we know if it has
been successful and worth the effort?
(b). What do you plan to do, if confirmed, to further the PSI?
Answer (a). An important measure of PSI's success is the foundation
it provides for states to work together. Over sixty countries support
the PSI and dozens have participated in or observed PSI exercises. PSI
is succeeding because of the international consensus that WMD
proliferation is a threat to global peace and security. PSI is also
succeeding because it is based on practical actions that make maximum
use of each country's strength in countering proliferation. The real-
world capability consists of partnerships being forged, contacts being
made, and operational readiness established, all of which helps create
a lasting basis for cooperative action against proliferation.
The PSI Operational Experts have overseen fourteen interdiction
training exercises and currently have 15 sea, air, and land exercises
scheduled for 2005/6 with additional regional exercises in the planning
stages. These have significantly improved the interoperability of PSI
participants and contribute directly to our ability to work
cooperatively to interdict shipments of WMD, their delivery systems and
related materials at sea. PSI exercises also send a strong deterrent
signal to those who would engage in proliferation trafficking because
they could be stopped, caught and held responsible for their
activities. These operational gains and deterrent benefits are already
worth the effort.
(b). In 2005, we will work to build on our successes. We will seek
to put smooth, effective communication and operational procedures in
place to interdict shipments and we will seek to use them; we will
learn more about how proliferators behave; we will devise new
strategies to shut down this deadly trade; and we will reach out to
industry to intensify cooperation. In all, we will make it far more
difficult and costly for those who engage in WMD trafficking to
continue their dangerous work.
Public Diplomacy: Decline in Support for U.S. Foreign Policy
Public opinion polls abroad reflect a significant decline in
support for the United States and U.S. foreign policy. For example, the
``Global Attitudes Survey'' in March 2004 by the Pew organization found
that the percentage of people that had favorable views of the United
States were just 37% in France and 38% in Germany, and much lower
percentages in key countries with Islamic majorities, such as Jordan
(5%), Pakistan (21%) and Turkey (30%). In the same survey, Osama bin
Laden had higher favorability ratings in Pakistan (65%) and Jordan
(55%).
Question. To what do you attribute this decline in support for the
United States in foreign countries and the significant support for bin
Laden in some key Muslim countries?
Answer. Although polling can be useful in providing insights into
some aspects of public opinion, it is easy to put too much stock in
polls. Even polls which gain the most attention as apparently revealing
a very negative picture of America's standing abroad show a much more
complex picture with many positive aspects when we dig more deeply into
the details.
America's standing in the eyes of the world is, of course,
important. We must do all we can through active public diplomacy to
ensure that our policies and actions are understood and that we build
sustainable relationships of mutual understanding with people and
institutions in other countries.
Our goal is not popularity per se but increased understanding of
American values, policies and initiatives to help create an
international environment receptive to U.S. interests.
Public diplomacy is not the answer to all negative views others may
hold of America. Our military, cultural and economic power, our pre-
eminent position in the world can create negative reactions. In some
cases, policies which we pursue as necessary for our national interest,
are unpopular. We cannot forego necessary policies for the sake of
international public opinion, but we can extend every effort to create
understanding and acceptance if not active support.
Any support for Osama bin Ladin is disturbing in that it indicates
a great lack of understanding of the threat he poses to international
stability and security. One of the primary challenges for public
diplomacy is to break the myth of Osama bin Ladin where it exists and
support the voices of tolerance opposed to the regressive fanaticism
Osama bin Ladin represents.
Public Diplomacy: Measuring Public Diplomacy Efforts
Question. What measures do you think are necessary to improve U.S.
public diplomacy efforts?
Answer. The improvement of our Public Diplomacy efforts will be a
very high priority for me. We must improve coordination of public
diplomacy strategy and activities within the Department and
interagency. Within State, the Under Secretary must serve as a full
advisor to the Secretary on all aspects of foreign policy, ensuring
that all policy initiatives have a strategic communications component
and that public diplomacy resources are deployed in support of those
policy objectives. This is done now; we can do better.
We must strengthen the position of the Under Secretary. In
particular, we must strengthen the effective relationship between the
Under Secretary and our embassies and consulates, which shape and carry
out public diplomacy for maximum impact in the field.
We have interagency mechanisms which can be used to strengthen
public diplomacy. In particular the Policy Coordinating Committee
process can be developed more fully in the public diplomacy context.
We must transform the conduct of diplomacy by demonstrating through
action and awareness that every major strategy, policy or diplomatic
initiative must have public support in order to succeed. This requires
better institutional understanding of the promise of public diplomacy
within the Department and foreign affairs community, promoted through
vigorous outreach on the part of public diplomacy practitioners, from
the Under Secretary on down.
To communicate with a skeptical world, the United States must
exploit its technological edge and vastly expand its international
media presence. It must build on successful exchange programs and
expand face-to-face contact. Certainly greater cooperation and
coordination with private sector outreach efforts will extend the reach
of the American people, but we cannot rely on the private sector to
carry the government's policy messages.
Additionally, public diplomacy must continue to develop meaningful
methods of evaluating its performance. This will require the
development of honest performance indicators, the proliferation of a
culture of measurement among public diplomacy practitioners, and the
professional staff to analyze results.
Public Diplomacy: Role of DoD
There have been press reports that the Department of Defense is
seeking to take a leading role within the government on public
diplomacy, and undertaking disinformation campaigns abroad (e.g.,
``Pentagon Weighs Use of Deception in Broad Arena,'' The New York
Times, Dec. 13, 2004).
Question (a). Do you believe that the State Department should have
the lead role in this area? Should the Defense Department have a
significant role in this area?
(b). Should the Department of Defense--outside the context of the
battlefield--engage in disinformation campaigns?
Answer (a). The State Department is charged with conducting the
foreign relations of the United States, and public diplomacy falls
squarely within this responsibility. With a continued, consistent
presence worldwide and an already established infrastructure through
our missions abroad, the Department of State is best equipped to advise
on how to engage, inform, and influence foreign publics most
effectively. We have a broad range of tested programs to do so, as well
as a corps of creative public diplomacy professionals who are not
afraid to innovate. State has strengthened its capacity to lead by
establishing an office of policy, planning, and resources under the
Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.
Other departments and agencies, including DOD, also make valuable
contributions to public diplomacy. An example is the high-visibility
role played by the U.S. military in delivering relief to the victims of
the Indian Ocean tsunami. State and the NSC co-chair a policy
coordinating committee on Muslim World Outreach that includes Defense
and several other agencies in an effective process of collaboration, an
interagency model that can be applied to other tasks. Since shortly
after 9/11, State has maintained a working-level fusion team, with DOD
participation that manages State-DOD collaboration on strategic
communication on a daily basis.
If confirmed, I will be open to good ideas and the improvement of
our Public Diplomacy efforts will be a very high priority for me.
(b). Truth is our greatest public affairs weapon and the Department
of State will not ever seek to influence the media or others with lies
or half-truths. I would argue strenuously against others in the U.S.
Government using disinformation tactics. Deliberate deceptions and
falsehoods can seriously undermine the credibility of the U.S.
Government and irreparably harm our foreign policy and our national
security. The credibility of the United States is too valuable an asset
to risk for a momentary advantage.
Memos on Geneva Conventions and Torture Convention: Torture Convention/
Interrogation Memo
A Justice Department opinion memorandum on the Torture Convention
and interrogation, issued August 1, 2002 (and then superseded last
month) was reportedly vetted by lawyers from the National Security
Council before being finalized [Washington Post, June 27, 2004].
Question (a). Were NSC lawyers involved in reviewing the document?
Did you have a role in reviewing the document, or in supervising the
NSC legal staff? Please elaborate.
(b). The Department of State was not involved in the preparation of
this memorandum, and in fact were unaware of it until it was reported
in the press. As Secretary, will you work to ensure that State
Department lawyers are involved in any legal review of issues relating
to treaty obligations?
Answer. The President has repeatedly made clear that the United
States stands against and will not tolerate torture. The President has
also made clear that American personnel are required to comply with all
U.S. laws, including the United States Constitution, Federal statutes,
including statutes prohibiting torture, and our treaty obligations with
respect to the treatment of all detainees. Interrogation policies of
U.S. government departments and agencies have been carefully vetted by
the Department of Justice to ensure that they comply with this mandate.
I have been advised that a copy of the draft opinion on the Torture
Convention and torture statute was made available to the Legal Adviser
to the National Security Council before it was finalized. I was not
involved in reviewing the draft opinion, although our Legal Adviser
advised me that the Office of Legal Counsel was preparing analyses of
laws applicable to interrogation of detainees to ensure that we comply
with those laws.
Yes, if confirmed, intend to work to ensure that State Department
lawyers are involved in any legal review of issues relating to treaty
obligations.
Memos on Geneva Conventions and Torture Convention: Geneva Conventions
According to President Bush's directive of February 7, 2002,
Taliban prisoners taken in Afghanistan are denied the protections of
the Geneva Conventions.
Question. Were you involved in the consideration of this directive?
Please elaborate.
Answer. I was involved in the process by which the President made
the decisions reflected in his February 7, 2002 directive concerning
humane treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees. Although the
Attorney General and other senior lawyers within the administration
took the lead on the legal question concerning application of the
Geneva Conventions, I was involved in meetings where both the legal and
policy issues were discussed.
In his directive, the President decided that, as a policy matter,
the Department of Defense will treat all Taliban and Al-Qaida detainees
humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military
necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva
Convention.
Role as Secretary of State
Question. What are your top five foreign policy priorities?
Answer. The United States is a global power which does not have the
luxury of maintaining a single focus on just a few foreign policy
issues. We have several opportunities and imperatives which we must
address simultaneously.
A guiding principle of our foreign policy is the promotion of
democracy. The spread of freedom is the single greatest factor behind
the spread of peace and prosperity in the world, and thus also the
greatest long-term guarantee of the safety and well-being of the United
States.
We must remain focused on winning the war on terrorism. This means
continuing and winning the fight against al-Qaida and other jihadist
groups.
But it also means supporting the development of a different kind of
Broader Middle East--one that is built on the foundations of freedom
and democracy, and opportunity for all people in the region. A
democratic and secure Iraq, as well as a democratic and secure
Afghanistan, will contribute to the transformation of this wider
region. We are committed to continuing to work with the Afghan and
Iraqi governments to this end. And we are committed to supporting
freedom and reform throughout the Broader Middle East, a process
launched by President Bush and G8 leaders at the Sea Island Summit,
strengthening through the Forum for the Future meeting held in December
2004 in Morocco, and continuing, with the next meeting set for 2005 in
Bahrain. And we are determined to working as hard as we can to achieve
the President's vision of Israel and a democratic Palestinian state
living side-by-side in peace and security.
We are also focused on the need to prevent and, where necessary,
counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction, in Iran, in the
Broader Middle East, in North Korea and elsewhere.
Our efforts to promote freedom and democracy are not limited to the
Broader Middle East. We are pleased to see the will of the Ukrainian
people reflected democratically in the election of a new President; the
strengthening of democracy in Russia will be critical to the pace and
extent of our ability to develop a strategic partnership with that
country.
We continue our efforts to promote and strengthen democracy,
opportunity, prosperity, trade and hope in Latin America. And, of
course, the relationships with our neighbors, Canada, Mexico and the
states of the Caribbean, are critical for freedom, prosperity, and
security for ourselves and our hemisphere.
In Asia, we will strengthen our sound alliances with Japan, South
Korea, and Australia, as well as those in Southeast Asia, while working
to promote a positive and constructive role for a transforming and
increasingly powerful China.
We have strengthened our ties with India and that will continue
because the world's two largest democracies should have strong
relations. Similarly, other increasingly influential democracies, such
as South Africa and Brazil, must be a part of our vision for the
future.
Under President Bush's leadership, we have strengthened our support
for democracy, development, good governance, and peace on the African
continent. We will continue to lead the fight against poverty and
disease, and to strengthen institutions that will guarantee freedom,
opportunity, human rights, and justice for a new generation of
Africans.
In all of these areas, we will work together with our allies and
friends in Europe, especially through NATO and the European Union. The
United States and Europe share common values, common history, and
common goals. We must therefore meet together the common challenges we
face at the dawn of the 21st century. As President Bush has said, ``the
world is better off, America is better off, Europe is better off when
we work together.''
In Europe, in Asia, in Africa, the Americas, and the Broader Middle
East, we seek to mobilize and lead the efforts of all free nations,
while maintaining strategic relationships with other global powers, all
in the interest of strengthening a balance of power that favors
freedom.
Middle East Peace Process
Question. I understand that when the Jordanian government first
proposed the idea of the Road Map, you stated that the administration
could not support it. The President later agreed with the concept.
Please explain the rationale behind your initial position.
Answer. When the concept of the roadmap was first raised, we
reacted positively, not negatively. But we could not support a plan
that lacked phasing, had a strict calendar, or was not performance
based, and it was clear that stopping terrorism had to be an immediate
goal in any such document. That is what we sought, and we engaged in,
intensive negotiations in the Quarter to produce a document that met
these goals.
The President's Personal Representative
In June 2003, the President designated you as his personal
representative to the peace process.
Question (a). What specific actions did you take in your capacity
as the President's personal representative?
(b). During Abu Mazen's tenure as Prime Minister, did the United
States, the international community, and the Israelis do enough to
support him? What steps did you take to bolster him? After Abu Mazen's
departure, what steps did you take to try to revive peace efforts?
Answer. The President designated Secretary Powell and me to work
together. And we did. Both of us made trips to the region, both of us
met--often together, in my office--with literally dozens of European,
Arab, Israeli, and Palestinian officials. We continued the hard work of
diplomacy as we moved first into a hopeful period after Aqaba, then
quickly into a longer period where Arafat blocked progress. Many of the
meetings I held were efforts to get things moving again despite the
roadblocks. We also helped to mobilize international assistance to
support Palestinian reform. As part of this effort, we provided $20
million in direct budget assistance to the Palestinian Authority, whose
Finance Ministry under Salam Fayyad managed, despite Arafat, to attain
a level of fiscal transparency and accountability that was heralded and
recognized internationally. As part of this effort, we appointed
Ambassador John Wolf to serve as the head of a United States monitoring
mission to monitor the parties' compliance with the Roadmap. Our
efforts helped produce an agreement between the two sides by which
Israel withdrew its military forces from roads and population centers
in Gaza and Bethlehem. Indeed, the Israelis were about to withdraw from
more population in the West Bank when significant Palestinian
terrorists actions were perpetrated, undermining their efforts.
It was the pressure from the United States, and our Quartet
partners, that led to the creation of the position of Prime Minister to
begin with. When Abu Mazen was appointed, we put together the Sharm el
Sheik and Aqaba summits in June 2003 to bolster him and add to the
forward momentum. We then hosted him at the White House in August. As
you know, he was soon thereafter in essence fired by Arafat After his
departure, Secretary Powell and I pressed very hard to work around
Arafat, but it became evident to everyone in the Quartet that unless
and until the PA firmly broke with terrorism, and had new leadership,
forward movement was unlikely.
Iran
The United Kingdom, France and Germany--known as the EU-3--have
been engaged in negotiations with Iran to explore the chances of
getting Iran to extend indefinitely its suspension of uranium
enrichment and reprocessing activities and to drop its program to
construct a heavy water-moderated research reactor that could be used
for plutonium production. Many believe that such an agreement cannot be
achieved unless the United States becomes part of the solution, so that
Iran could receive security and other benefits that only the United
States can provide in return for giving up its nuclear weapons
ambitions.
Question (a). Do you believe the EU-3 effort can succeed, and if
so, what role should the United States play? What specific benefits
might the United States put on the table? If you believe the EU-3
effort is likely to fail, what alternatives do you suggest for U.S.
policy?
(b). The administration has called on the IAEA Board of Governors
to refer Iran to the UN Security Council for its nuclear activities.
What specific action do you believe the Security Council should take?
Have you developed any plans for a phased initiation of sanctions? Can
anything short of sanctions on Iran's sale of oil get Tehran's
attention?
(c). Russia plays a critical role as chief supplier of nuclear
technology and fuel to Iran and has also been one of Iran's advocates
at the IAEA. How will you convince Russia to join the U.S. and EU
effort to terminate Iran's fuel cycle program?
Answer (a). Whether or not the EU-3 initiative can succeed depends
on whether or not Iran is willing to step away from its nuclear weapons
ambitions. So far, we have seen no indication that Tehran is willing to
do so. The United States shares with the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany (the EU-3), with the rest of the EU, and with many others on
the IAEA Board of Governors and in the international community, strong
concerns about Iran's long record of clandestine nuclear activities and
Iran's systematic violation for almost two decades of its NPT-required
IAEA Safeguards Agreement. We share with the EU3 and others the view
that Iran must permanently and verifiably end all of its efforts to
develop fissile material production if it hopes to build international
confidence that it has abandoned the pursuit of a nuclear weapons
capability. It is our understanding that the EU3's goal in its ongoing
dialogue with Iran is to secure Iranian agreement to such full
cessation of its sensitive nuclear fuel cycle pursuits.
However, we have seen no evidence suggesting Iran's leadership has
made a strategic decision to abandon its nuclear weapons program, and
we remain skeptical of Iran's intentions to implement fully the terms
of its November 14, 2004 suspension agreement with the EU3. Indeed,
Iran's leaders have publicly admitted that they have no intention of
ending their enrichment program, and Iran most recently followed-
through on its stated intention by rushing to convert 37 tons of
natural uranium yellowcake at the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility.
The United States government is not a party to the EU3's ongoing
dialogue with Iran. We believe that additional bilateral and
multilateral pressure, including reporting Iran's noncompliance to the
UN Security Council, will be required to persuade Iran's leadership to
end its sensitive nuclear fuel cycle pursuits. We will continue to
consult with our friends and allies toward this end.
(b). Once the IAEA Board of Governors reports Iran's safeguards
noncompliance to the UN Security Council (UNSC), as is required under
the IAEA Statute, we believe there will be a range of options available
to the Council. The UNSC has the legal authority to require Iran, for
example, to stop its dangerous, unnecessary pursuit of the capability
to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. We continue to consult
other Council members regarding how the UNSC might address Iran's
nuclear activities, which we consider to be a growing threat to
international peace and security. We believe that UNSC involvement on
this issue would help change the Iranian leadership's calculations
regarding the costs to Iran of continuing to pursue its nuclear weapons
program.
(c). The United States has for several years raised the Iran
nuclear issue actively and at high levels with Russia, and we will
continue to do so. We have engaged Russia both bilaterally and
multilaterally, including at the IAEA Board and within the G-8. Russia
has already joined us in calling on Iran to accept and implement a full
moratorium on all sensitive nuclear fuel cycle efforts. We believe
Russia shares our profound concerns at the prospect of a nuclear
weapons-capable Iran, and Russia agrees with us that the international
community must do all it can to prevent Iran from acquiring that
capability.
Arms Control Reorganization
We understand that Secretary Powell intends to propose the merger
of the Bureau for Arms Control (AC) with the Bureau for
Nonproliferation (NP), and to notify Congress of this action just
before your nomination hearing. Such a reorganization would clearly
constitute a reprogramming request under current law, and you would be
responsible, if confirmed promptly after the hearings, both for
obtaining the assent of congressional committees and for implementing
the reorganization.
Question (a). Do you support the merger of the AC and NP bureaus?
If so, why?
(b). How would the AC and NP bureaus be merged without sending the
world a message (whether intentionally or not) that the administration
is renouncing Arms Control as a tool of U.S. foreign policy?
(c). How would the AC and NP bureaus be merged without diverting
the attention of the Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation from the
difficult, day-to-day world-wide diplomacy involved in stemming sales
of suspect materials and technology around the world to the more
glamorous world of international treaty negotiations?
(d). Will you commit to close consultation with this committee as
you move forward with any reorganization?
Answer (a). I support the merger of the Arms Control and
Nonproliferation Bureaus as part of the Bush administration's strategy
to fine tune the State Department's international security units to
better address the challenges of the post-9/11 world. This merger
recommendation by the Department of State Inspector General was
endorsed by Secretary Powell, Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage, and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security John Bolton.
If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring the AC/NP merger best
utilizes these bureaus' talented officers while improving efficiency. A
State Department task force headed by Human Resources experts has been
working on the reorganization since last September. I have been briefed
on their work and I believe that new bureau will be an asset to U.S.
foreign policy.
(b). Per the recommendations of the State IG Inspection Reports of
the AC and NP bureaus, this is a merger of equals. The Bush
administration will remain committed to pressing all states to honor
their arms control treaty obligations through the new bureau,
especially the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons
Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
(c).The State Department panel overseeing the AC-NP merger has
worked to devise a structure for the new bureau that provides adequate
coverage for all of its responsibilities. Like the current AC and NP
bureaus, the merged bureau will retain special representatives and
ambassadors who are responsible for treaty negotiations.
(d). If confirmed, I will stay in close contact with Congress about
this reorganization and welcome this committee's questions and comments
on it.
China and Nonproliferation
You wrote in the Wall Street Journal in October 2003 that China has
shown a ``pattern of cooperation'' in combating proliferation, yet the
Bush administration sanctioned Chinese firms 37 times from June 21,
2001 through September 2003. The Assistant Secretary of State for
Verification and Compliance said on July 24, 2003 that Chinese
``entities are involved in too many sensitive transfers for the problem
merely to be one of imperfect enforcement.'' The State Department has
repeatedly sanctioned Chinese firms since the Fall of 2003, most
recently imposing sanctions on four more Chinese firms in November
2004.
Question (a). Why did you praise China for a ``pattern of
cooperation'' weeks after the State Department announced new sanctions
on Chinese firms and complained about a pattern of violations? Has
China's proliferation conduct improved since October 2003?
(b). What will you do as Secretary of State to end China's
continuing pattern of proliferation of WMD technologies to countries
such as Iran and North Korea?
Answer. Cooperating with the Chinese government on non-
proliferation issues while sanctioning Chinese companies for actions
taken which are in violation of our nonproliferation laws, including
the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, are not mutually exclusive
actions. They are part of our overall effort to get China to play a
more responsible role on non-proliferation. In the past 15 years, China
has taken substantial steps to strengthen its nonproliferation
policies, joining the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, adhering to
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, joining the Biological Weapons
Convention, signing and ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention,
signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and agreeing to work with
the international community to ban production of fissile nuclear
weapons material.
In 2002 the PRC promulgated a series of regulations restricting the
export of missiles and missile-related technology; subsequently, the
PRC promulgated regulations on dual-use chemical and biological items
and technologies and joined with us in the Container Security
Initiative. In December 2003, China incorporated these existing
measures into a new comprehensive system of export control regulations
that include counterterrorism and regional stability considerations in
licensing decisions. I might note that these measures were implemented
as we have been increasing the use of sanctions against Chinese
entities. The point is that one shouldn't assume that sanctions and
cooperative measures are inconsistent. In fact, they are two sides of
the same coin, and Chinese nonproliferation cooperation improved after
we imposed sanctions on Chinese entities that had apparently not gotten
the message. More recently, China has been working closely with the
U.S. and other nations in the Six-Party Talks to persuade North Korea
to dismantle its nuclear program.
We will continue our extensive efforts to persuade China to
effectively control exports, including the imposition of sanctions when
warranted or when required by U.S. law. Through continuing dialogue and
steps to impose costs upon proliferant entities where problems arise,
we look forward to seeing China's pattern of cooperation improve even
more in the future. In particular, we hope that China will improve
implementation of export controls to the point that Chinese companies
no longer engage in transfers that lead to the imposition of U.S.
sanctions.
FMCT
In March 1995, the Conference on Disarmament agreed to negotiate,
in the words of the Shannon mandate, ``a non-discriminatory,
multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty
banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices.'' In September 2004, after a lengthy review,
the United States declared in Geneva its view that effective
verification of an FMCT is not achievable.
Question (a). If confirmed, will you push for negotiation of an
FMCT without any verification provisions whatsoever, or might it be
possible to agree on some measures that would be imperfect, but would
not harm our national security?
(b). Will you call for revising the Shannon mandate (which could
well be difficult to achieve because the Conference on Disarmament
operates on the basis of consensus), or will the administration be
willing to begin negotiations under the Shannon mandate, while adhering
to its stand that verification measures might do more harm than good?
Answer. The United States announced the results of its review of
FMCT in July, reaffirming our commitment to negotiation in the CD of a
treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosives. Noting that the United States has not
produced fissile material for such purposes for over 15 years, our
announcement also reaffirmed the U.S. moratorium on such production. At
the same time, we noted our serious concerns that effective
verification of an FMCT is not realistically achievable.
Because of these concerns, which we described in more detail at the
end of August, we have told other interested states that including in
the negotiators' mandate an a priori requirement that an FMCT be
effectively verifiable would only set an unrealistic standard, making
success impossible and blocking prospects for an agreement.
Constructing an ineffective set of ``verification'' provisions could
give false confidence about states' compliance with their obligations,
while the difficulty of negotiating them would slow agreement on the
basic FMCT prohibition. That legal prohibition on producing fissile
material for weapons, the central element of any FMCT, would add an
important further barrier to nuclear proliferation, one applying to
both current and potential nuclear powers. To delay this achievement
while arguing at length over provisions that would at best still not
provide effective verification and at worst possibly damage other U.S.
interests (e.g., risking disclosure of proliferation sensitive or
national security information) is, in our view, counterproductive.
We have not made agreement on this view a condition for moving
forward, but do not wish to reaffirm a position on verification we
believe incorrect. We hope to achieve consensus in Geneva that
negotiations on an FMCT should begin without any imposed prejudgment.
NPT Review Conference
In May 2005, the States Party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation
of Nuclear Weapons will gather in New York for a five-year review of
the Treaty. The 2000 Review Conference seemed poised for failure, with
many countries focused on proliferation on the subcontinent, the
seemingly slow progress on reductions by the five nuclear weapon
states, and the typical effort by Middle East nations to draw attention
to Israel's nuclear program. After lengthy negotiations, however, a
consensus resolution was agreed. If the results of the 2004 Preparatory
Committee meeting are any indication, this year's Review Conference
promises to be equally, if not more, contentious and will require high-
level, careful and focused U.S. leadership to prevent further erosion
to the nonproliferation regime. Secretaries Christopher and Albright
led the U.S. delegations to the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences,
respectively.
Question (a). Will you lead the U.S. delegation at the May review
conference?
(b). What are we doing now to ensure that the NPT Review Conference
is successful?
Answer (a). The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) remains the foundation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and
is vital to U.S. and international security interests. Review
conferences are important benchmarks in the life of the NPT. The 2005
Review Conference (RevCon) promises to be particularly important, given
the many challenges the Treaty faces. Our principal focus at the RevCon
will be on nonproliferation noncompliance, citing Iran and North Korea
as current challenges. We will urge others to recognize the gravity of
noncompliance with the Treaty's nonproliferation obligations, press all
states to insist on full compliance by all Parties, and move to
strengthen collective tools against proliferation.
If I am confirmed, I plan to remain closely involved as the
administration completes its preparations for the RevCon. While the
administration has not yet determined who will head the United States
Delegation in New York, you may be certain that the President's
eventual designee will enjoy his full confidence and provide the
necessary leadership to promote effectively the nonproliferation
objectives of the United States at the RevCon.
(b). The U.S. aim for the 2005 Review Conference (RevCon) is an
outcome that strengthens the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT). Our priority is the challenge to the NPT posed by non-
nuclear-weapon state noncompliance with their NPT nonproliferation
obligations. The RevCon can reaffirm the NPT's contribution to
international security, the need for strict compliance with all its
provisions, the need for parties promptly and firmly to address cases
of noncompliance, and the need to strengthen the Treaty to avert future
cases of noncompliance. The proposals to strengthen the international
nonproliferation regime that the President outlined in his address to
the National Defense University (NDU) last February will be at the core
of the initiatives that the United States will pursue at the RevCon.
In addition to noncompliance, the RevCon should also consider the
threat to international security posed by non-state actor interest in
acquiring nuclear weapons and non-state actor involvement in
trafficking in nuclear materials, technology, and equipment. We will
pursue support for the President's NDU proposals to address these
challenges from noncompliance and proliferation involving non-state
actors. Among the key tools in addition to restraint on enrichment and
reprocessing are the universality of the Additional Protocol,
aggressive pursuit of the Proliferation Security Initiative,
implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and
expansion of the Global Partnership.
In the spirit of promoting full compliance with all of the
provisions of the Treaty, the United States also intends to demonstrate
its strong record of achievement in nuclear disarmament efforts in
conjunction with NPT Article VI.
The State Department leads a strong interagency team, which meets
regularly to discuss, refine, and determine ways to advance these NPT
policy positions at the upcoming RevCon. The United States routinely
consults before, during, and after each review process meeting with key
NPT Parties, particularly U.S. allies, with the leadership of the
various Preparatory Committee meetings and RevCons, with officials in
the UN Secretariat, and with the relevant non-governmental
organizations. United States officials also conduct frequent travel
abroad to consult with foreign governments, and to represent the United
States at international workshops, conferences, and seminars to advance
U.S. policy positions and learn the policy priorities of other NPT
Parties.
__________
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted by
Senator Russell D. Feingold
Non-Proliferation
Question. Developments in Iran have exposed problems in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty regime that need to be addressed. Some have
suggested that the U.S. work with others to reform the NPT, so that
countries cannot legally go right to the brink of producing a nuclear
weapon, making it a bit late for enforcement action once they finally
do cross the line. Some have also proposed changing the regime so that
countries that reject inspections or withdraw from the NPT without
addressing previous infractions must dismantle their nuclear
capabilities to come back into the fold, and one could achieve
agreement that nations which the IAEA cannot find to be in full
compliance should no longer receive any nuclear assistance from others.
What is your view of such proposed reforms? Are you satisfied that the
U.S. can effectively work with other members of the international
community to address Iran's nuclear ambitions under the current
nonproliferation regime?
Answer. President Bush and other world leaders have recognized the
problems you mentioned and work is under way in several fora to address
them. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is being tested as
never before. Without stronger measures, confidence in the security
benefits of the NPT could erode.
Certainly, the Additional Protocol is essential in verifying
compliance, as it allows the International Atomic Energy Agency greater
access to sites and to information and can give the international
community more warning time. But of course much more is needed. Efforts
to limit enrichment and reprocessing technology are critical or we
could see more countries like Iran that exploit and violate the NPT to
advance their nuclear weapons potential. Stronger export controls and
the Proliferation Security Initiative can help to halt or interdict
clandestine nuclear commerce.
Violations of the NPT and withdrawal from the Treaty to acquire
nuclear weapons and avoid its consequences are serious threats to the
NPT and should, at the very least, result in a cutoff of nuclear
assistance to the state in question. The elimination of nuclear weapons
programs in these states should be pursued relentlessly. These states
must see that they face a dim future, and isolation from the
international system, unless they abandon their nuclear weapon
ambitions.
We will continue to work with our friends and allies--and the
entire international community--to persuade Iran, in particular, to
make the right choice, and to vigorously pursue the reforms necessary
to improve enforcement of the NPT.
Human Resources Requirements in Africa
Question. After 12 years on the Subcommittee on African Affairs, I
have traveled widely enough to know that understaffed embassies in
Africa are more the norm than the exception. We have wonderful,
capable, deeply committed Foreign Service officers working in Africa. I
admire them and I am deeply grateful for their service. But they are
too few in number--particularly when it comes to seasoned, expert
people. Tiny embassy staffs are trying to cover huge, complex
countries--too often without adequate effort or capacity to get out of
the capital city. We have no permanent presence in northern Nigeria or
eastern Congo, despite the fact that the stability of whole swathes of
the continent can hinge on events in those areas. We have no permanent
presence in Zanzibar or in Mombassa. We need more people on the ground.
The 9/11 Commission points to parts of Africa, including the Horn and
to West Africa as areas deserving of special focus. What steps are you
prepared to take to match our personnel resources to our needs?
Answer. Engagement with Africa is very high among President Bush's
foreign policy objectives, from resolving conflict in Sudan and the
Great Lakes to fighting terrorism in the Horn and limiting spread of
HIV/AIDS under the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR).
We are promoting democracy, expanding trade and investment
opportunities, and strengthening health care, environmental protection,
and efforts against trafficking in arms, drugs, and people. We also
face substantial new staffing requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
a number of other high priorities.
With the significant difficulties faced by our employees who serve
in Africa, we continue to face challenges in meeting staffing needs,
and the Department is making progress.
Through the Department's recent hiring efforts, we created 135
additional positions in our 48 posts in the Bureau of African Affairs
\1\ in FY 2002 to 2004, including those for consular and
diplomatic security personnel, bringing the total number of State Dept.
Foreign Service positions at the 48 African posts to 893 (an 18%
increase). Even with the new positions, small to medium sized African
posts often have little staffing depth and must be augmented by
temporary personnel to cover gaps when staff members transfer or take
annual leave. Additional positions are necessary to add depth and
address future challenges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Note that all figures regarding positions and posts in Africa
do not include those for Egypt, Tunisa, Libya, Algeria and Morocco,
which are part of the Department's Bureau of Near East Affairs, not the
Bureau of African Affairs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Difficult living conditions at many posts make them a challenge to
staff. Given the security situation, three posts in Africa currently do
not allow any family members at post and another three allow only adult
dependents, making the one or two year tours there particularly
difficult for employees who are also being asked to staff other
``unaccompanied'' posts such as Baghdad and Kabul. Many of the African
posts are among the hardest to fill because of concerns about security,
health, education, and other hardship conditions. Thirty of forty-eight
posts in the Bureau of African Affairs receive the highest hardship
rating of 25 percent. Many of these places long ago hit the 25 percent
ceiling for hardship differential (the compensation employees receive
for the extraordinary hardship conditions at post). Due to the pay cut
that non-senior Foreign Service employees take when serving overseas
from the loss of locality pay, employees in many places like Abuja,
East Timor, Guinea, and the Congo receive only 9% more pay than their
colleagues in Washington (since their 25% hardship differential is off
set by 16% locality pay in Washington), hardly a significant monetary
incentive to serve there.
We are in the process of formulating career development plans,
which will include both incentives and requirements for hardship
service to ensure staffing at our most difficult posts.
Democratic Republic of Congo
Over 3.5 million people are thought to have died from war related
causes in recent years in DRC. Countless others have been victims of
brutal assaults and continue to live in fear. Yet despite the
horrifying human costs of the conflict, despite the questionable
efficacy and astronomically expensive nature of the peacekeeping
mission on the ground, and despite the fact that the future of Congo
has serious implications for the future of many African countries, the
administration has not made stabilizing central Africa a priority.
Question. What steps will you take as Secretary of State to help
create a context in which MONUC can succeed and the Congolese people
can realistically hope for a better future?
Answer. MONUC remains one of the primary tools to achieve peace and
stability in DRC. The United States will continue to work with the UN,
specifically Special Representative Swing, to ensure maximum
effectiveness of MONUC's activities within its current mandate and
within the current authorized troop ceiling of 16,700. We are
supportive of the recent increase to MONUC's authorized strength of
5,900 troops. As these new troops arrive in the region over the next
two months they will be positioned in eastern Congo to directly address
the issue of armed militias.
Since May of 2004, the United States has facilitated Tripartite
talks between the governments of DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda. During these
talks all three nations agreed that the greatest threats to Great Lakes
stability are the armed militias that roam uninhibited throughout
eastern Congo. The United States, in coordination with the UN Security
Council, is discussing how to assist MONUC to meet fully and completely
the various parts of its mandate, specifically the issue of support for
DRC government efforts to disarm, demobilize and repatriate or resettle
``negative forces'' in eastern Congo.
Our direct diplomatic effort with the Tripartite Commission has
been instrumental to keep communication open on all sides, so that
differences can be aired between all nations of the Great Lakes region.
North Korea
Question. The last four years of U.S. policy toward North Korea
have failed to address the threat posed by a nuclear-armed and
potentially a proliferating North Korea. Is this administration
prepared to tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea? If not, what changes
in policy will you pursue?
Answer. The United States is not prepared to tolerate a nuclear-
armed North Korea. But the problem is not the United States or our
policies. The problem is in North Korea. That said, we have succeeded
in establishing a regional consensus that the Korean Peninsula must be
nuclear free. We have continued to coordinate closely through the
trilateral process with our allies, South Korea and Japan. We have
established the first multilateral security forum in Northeast Asia,
the Six-Party talks. All of the parties to the Six-Party Talks have
agreed on the objective--a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula. And
the five parties at the first Plenary, in August 2003, all told North
Korea very clearly that they will not accept North Korea's possessing
nuclear arms.
We believe the Six-Party process offers the best opportunity to
resolve this issue through peaceful, multilateral diplomacy.
The U.S. is working within that process to achieve the
dismantlement of all North Korean nuclear programs in a permanent,
thorough and transparent manner, subject to effective verification.
We have repeatedly made clear to the DPRK that the Six-Party forum
is the way to end its international isolation, and that we and other
parties are prepared to take corresponding measures as the DPRK
dismantles its nuclear programs in an effectively verifiable manner.
We met in New York in November and December with the North Korean
Permanent Representative to the United Nations to make clear that we
are ready to resume talks at an early date and without preconditions.
Our partners in the Six-Party Talks--Japan, the Republic of Korea,
China and Russia--are also urging the DPRK to rejoin and participate
seriously in the talks. We remain in close contact with them on this
issue.
As the President has stated, the Six-Party process is the way
forward. We and our Six-Party partners are keeping the focus on getting
the talks going again, so that we can make real progress on the agreed
objective. At the next round of talks, we will be prepared to give a
detailed presentation on the proposal we tabled at the talks in June,
and to respond to questions the DPRK may have as well as to raise
concerns we have about their proposal.
Africa: Charles Taylor
Former Liberian President Charles Taylor continues to reside in
Nigeria, despite the fact that he is wanted by the Special Court for
Sierra Leone to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity.
As I understand it, it is the policy of the United States to support
the Special Court.
Question. How will you work with the Nigerians, the Liberians, the
Sierra Leonians and the Court itself to resolve this issue and ensure
that Charles Taylor is held accountable for his crimes?
Answer. We strongly support the work of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone and its efforts to bring to justice those who bear the
greatest responsibility for serious violations of international
humanitarian law. Ensuring accountability for these crimes will also
contribute to reconciliation and to the restoration of peace in Sierra
Leone and all of West Africa.
The administration and the Congress share a common goal of seeing
Charles Taylor held accountable to face the charges pending against
him. We must remember that by accepting Taylor, Nigeria saved hundreds,
if not thousands of Liberian citizens who were determined to fight a
civil war in Liberia while Taylor remained in power.
The United States is in frequent contact with the Governments of
Nigeria and Liberia on the issue of Charles Taylor. We have made clear
to Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, Liberian Chairman Gyude Bryant
and othersthat our mutual goal must be for Charles Taylor to appear
before the Special Court for Sierra Leone and face the charges pending
against him. We also continue to urge Nigeria at the highest levels to
take steps to further contain and confine Taylor and eliminate his
ability to endanger the peace both of our nations have worked so hard
to establish. We have made clear to President Obasanjo, Liberian
Chairman Bryant and others that our mutual goal must be for Charles
Taylor to appear before the Special Court in Sierra Leone and face the
charges pending against him. We will continue to work with them to
ensure that this happens.
__________
Responses to Questions for the Record Submitted by
Senator Bill Nelson
Iraq
Question. From time to time there are whispers that the Iranian
presence in Iraq is pervasive. What are your views on the role of the
Iranians in Iraq? How widespread is their presence and how effective
can they be in securing an Iraqi government they can influence? Without
diplomatic relations with Iran, how effective can we be at competing
with their wider influence?
Answer. We have made clear to Iran that we will oppose actions that
undermine Iraq's stability. Senior officials of the Iraqi Interim
Government (IIG) have publicly voiced their concerns about Iranian
interference in Iraq. We have also made clear to Iran that we will
oppose actions that undermine Iraq's stability. Our policy remains that
we are willing to engage with Iran on specific issues of mutual
concern, in an appropriate manner, if and when the President determines
it is in our interest to do so. Iraq is clearly one of those issues.
Afghanistan
Question. The growing and pervasive threat of drug trafficking to
the security and stability of Afghanistan is frightening and dangerous.
We have ignored this problem for far too long and allowed the illicit
opium economy to re-develop across the country. I am concerned that any
reaction at this point will be a case of too little too late,
particularly with such a small presence of American troops who are
already focused on the task of capturing OBL and other Al Qaeda
leaders. I noticed that the majority of the money being used for anti-
narcotics programs in Afghanistan is from accounts controlled by the
State Department. How will you effectively coordinate with DOD to
ensure that these funds are spent properly and effectively? How will we
effectively fight the cultivation of opium poppies without alienating
the Afghan people, threatening support for their nascent government?
Answer. We have an important opportunity to leverage USG resources
to support President Karzai's determination to rid Afghanistan of the
scourge of illicit narcotics and we have developed a comprehensive USG
counternacotics plan.
We are also closely coordinating our efforts with the U.K. who are
the lead international nation in the counternarcotic fight. The Afghans
themselves will be the deciding factor in this war on drugs. They are
determined to win this battle and we are ready to lend them a
hand.Working closely together in Kabul, all USG agencies are focused on
ensuring a coordinated, cost-effective and successful counter-narcotics
effort. An Embassy Interagency Planning Group (EIPG), reporting to the
Ambassador, facilitates coordination. General Barno, the commander of
U.S. forces in Afghanistan, maintains an office with dedicated staff at
Embassy Kabul that is literally steps from the Ambassador's office.
The Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement (INL) is responsible for implementing the eradication
component of the USG's five-part counternarcotics plan in Afghanistan,
and plays a substantial role in coordinating and/or implementing the
other four parts: public information, alternative livelihoods, law
enforcement, and interdiction.
INL officers in Washington and Kabul work closely with the
Department of Defense (DOD) and other agencies that are involved in
Afghan counternarcotics, including USAID, Department of Agriculture,
Drug Enforcement Agency, and Department of Justice, through regular
discussions and communications. In Washington, substantial interagency
coordination occurs through the Afghanistan Interagency Operations
Group (AIOG), which meets several times a week. It is co-chaired by the
State Department's Afghanistan Coordinator and an NSC senior staff
member, and includes Defense and other interagency representatives.
There are also periodic interagency meetings at more senior levels in
Washington.
The Afghan Government understands that a nation based on the
cultivation of opium poppy is not sustainable. As one of his first acts
following his election, President Karzai made a dramatic call for the
elimination of the illicit narcotics trade in Afghanistan, calling it a
direct threat to the development of a stable, democratic society that
respects human rights and the rule of law. We believe that the Afghan
people and their government understand the need to address this problem
quickly.
One of the key parts of our counternarcotics plan is an aggressive
alternative livelihoods program, which will provide Afghans with short-
and long-term sources of income to encourage their movement out of the
poppy economy. Through employment, business and infrastructure
creation, Afghans in affected areas will receive short-term cash for
work as well as longer-term opportunities to produce, process, and sell
marketable crops other than poppy. Alternative livelihoods programs
will also assist the central government in working through its
provincial ministry representatives and governors to bring legitimate
government services to the major poppy-producing provinces.
Another component of our plan is a robust public information
campaign in Afghanistan. Posters and radio messages in local languages
are already informing the Afghan public of the danger and immorality of
narcotics cultivation and trafficking, and President Karzai has been
speaking out forcefully against the drug trade.
The Department looks forward to continued close consultation and
cooperation with Congress as we support the Afghan Government's fight
against poppies. We appreciate your continued support for the resources
necessary to implement programs for all parts of our counternarcotics
plan.
North Korea
Question. What have we accomplished with our North Korea Policy
over the past four years? Kim Jong Il remains in power and his people
continue to suffer an arduous daily existence. We believe that he
increased the number of nuclear weapons in his arsenal and the six-
party talks occur in fits and starts. Keeping in mind the events of the
past four years, how are we going to alter this policy moving forward?
Answer. North Korea has for decades pursued a nuclear weapons
program, which threatens the entire East Asia region and the integrity
of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The President has
repeatedly made it clear he seeks a peaceful diplomatic resolution to
the North Korea nuclear issue. The United States has adhered to three
basic principles to achieve that outcome. First, we seek the
dismantlement of all DPRK nuclear programs in a permanent, thorough and
transparent manner, subject to international verification. We cannot
accept another partial solution that does not deal with the entirety of
the problem, allowing North Korea to threaten others continually with a
revival of its nuclear program. Second, because North Korea's nuclear
weapons threaten the international community, multilateral diplomacy is
the best approach to resolving the issue. Third, we will not reward
North Korea for coming back into compliance with their international
obligations. To do so would only incentivize their bad behavior, and
would send exactly the wrong signal to other rogue regimes.
In April 2003, we held a round of trilateral discussions in
Beijing, with China and the DPRK. We made clear future talks would need
to include the ROK and Japan, and we welcomed the participation of
Russia as well.
The Six-Party Talks were launched in August 2003, with China as
host. The five parties all told North Korea very clearly in plenary
session that they will not accept North Korea's possessing nuclear
arms.
At the Second Round of talks, in February 2004, the parties agreed
to regularize the talks, and to establish a working group to set issues
up for resolution at the plenary meetings. The ROK offered fuel aid to
the DPRK, if there were a comprehensive and verifiable halt of its
nuclear programs as a first step toward complete nuclear dismantlement,
and other non-U.S. parties subsequently expressed a willingness to do
so as well. Also subsequent to the Second Round of talks, two sessions
of the Working Group were held, running two to three days each.
The United States tabled a comprehensive proposal to North Korea at
the Third Round of Talks, in June 2004. The ROK and DPRK also tabled
proposals. The U.S. met directly with all of the parties over the
course of the talks, and held a two-and-a-half-hour discussion with the
DPRK delegation. We signaled our willingness to respond to any
questions about our proposal the DPRK might have, and have indicated
that we have a number of questions for the DPRK about its proposal.
Despite the agreement of all six parties in June to resume talks by
end-September, and the willingness of five parties to hold to that
commitment, the DPRK has not yet agreed to return to the table.
North Korea's rhetoric notwithstanding, the U.S. leadership has
said repeatedly that we have no intention of attacking or invading the
DPRK. If the DPRK is prepared to give up its nuclear weapons ambitions,
the U.S. remains ready, as we sought to convey in the third round of
the Six-Party Talks in June, to work in the context of the Talks to
resolve the issues between us.
Diplomatic contacts among the Six Parties are continuing. We met
with the North Koreans in New York twice late last year, and made clear
we remain ready to resume the talks at an early date, without
preconditions, and asked that they return to the table. We have also
met with our partners in the talks, in Seoul, Tokyo and Beijing. All of
us agree that the Six-Party process is the way forward and that the
only acceptable outcome is the complete, verifiable and irreversible
dismantlement of all nuclear programs in North Korea.
The door is open for the DPRK, by addressing the concerns of the
international community, to vastly improve the lives of its people,
enhance its own security, normalize its relations with the U.S. and
others, and raise its stature in the world. The United States, working
with our allies and others, remains committed to resolving the nuclear
issue through peaceful diplomatic means. We have laid out the path to a
peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. The only thing that is
missing is a strategic decision by Pyongyang to recognize that its WMD
programs make it less, not more secure and to negotiate in earnest.
Haiti
Question. Haiti remains a country teetering on the edge of
disaster. A small contingent of peacekeeping troops is all that
prevents Haiti from once again descending into chaos. Bearing this in
mind, why is the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti still undermanned
seven months after its initial authorization by the UN Security
Council? Haiti is short 1,910 military personnel out of a total
authorization of 6,700 and 352 short of a total authorization of 1,622
for civilian police. In other words, the military personnel are only at
70% strength and civilian police only stand at 78%. Do you find this
acceptable? What are the specific steps that will be taken to rectify
this situation, recruiting the necessary forces and ensuring that they
are effectively supported on the ground?
Answer. The UN Stabilization Force in Haiti (MINUSTAH) now has
6,334 of the 6,700 troops and 1,398 of the 1,622 civilian police
authorized by the Security Council. We continue to work with the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations to ensure that additional and
appropriate police and troop personnel are assigned to Haiti.
The Brazilian-led UN Mission has begun to establish a presence in
the hardest-hit areas of Port au Prince. Security remains a major
challenge and we fully support the UN in its job of providing security
and training and vetting new and existing HNP so the Haitians can take
responsibility for their own security. To that end, we have provided 25
US CIVPOL to the MINUSTAH mission, and are providing over $6 million in
bilateral support to build the capacity of the HNP.
Question. What specific countries were contacted by our government
to encourage their participation in this mission? Are you satisfied
that the U.S. has contacted an appropriate number of countries to
encourage and support their participation in the UN peacekeeping
mission in Haiti?
Answer. The United Nations has the primary responsibility to
request that Member States contribute forces and personnel to UN
peacekeeping operations. Working closely with the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, the U.S. separately contacted Jordan, Brazil,
Argentina, Nepal, Uruguay, Canada, France, Italy, Chile, Peru,
Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Ecuador, the Philippines, and
Paraguay to encourage their participation in the UN Stabilization
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).
We are satisfied that we contacted the appropriate number of
countries that we believed would participate. MINUSTAH's force level is
now close to the maximum authorized strength of 6,700.
Question. The tragic storms and subsequent flooding in Gonaives
resulted in a terrible loss of life and subsequent dislocation for many
Haitians. What was the U.S. commitment to supporting the rehabilitation
of these communities? What is our current commitment? Are you satisfied
with results that have been achieved in recuperating these communities?
Answer. We have made $46 million in assistance, including $38
million from the supplemental appropriation, available for the
rehabilitation of areas affected by flooding during Tropical Storm
Jeanne. We greatly appreciate the bipartisan support we received from
Congress to assist the Haitian people recover from this disaster.
We have signed contracts for rehabilitation of irrigation systems,
hillside stabilization, road repair, and other infrastructure projects.
Over 5,000 Haitians are employed by USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance in a clean-up program that has removed 15,300 cubic meters
of mud from the city of Gonaives. Food is being provided to
approximately 80,000 people and we have repaired ten pumps that are
being used for irrigation and drinking water. Silt is being removed
from the primary canals to further increase water availability and ten
tons of bean seeds have been distributed to farmers.
We have made a long-term commitment to the affected area and are
focused not only on repairing the damage, but the environmental causes
for the flooding.
Question. What is the goal of U.S. policy towards Haiti? I suggest
that it is long-term support to establish a stable democratic
government that guarantees the security and economic well-being of its
people. But U.S. policy over the last several years was a series of
fits and starts, which has not fostered the profound changes that can
be achieved through a deep and steadfast commitment. What are the
specific steps as Secretary of State that you will take to ensure that
we create a stable and safe Haiti?
Answer. Our goals in Haiti are to give the Haitian people the tools
they need to create a democratic government, stable institutions and a
viable economy. To achieve this, the international community and we are
first working to stabilize the security situation. This is accomplished
through the UN Stabilization Mission, which along with the Haitian
National Police has primary responsibility for security, and through
the promotion of economic growth and the development of sound political
institutions. Elections this fall will be vital to the establishment of
a democratic government that, with broad popular support, can build on
the momentum of the Interim Government to address the vast social and
economic challenges Haiti faces. One of the lessons learned from prior
interventions in Haiti is the need to proceed steadily and for the long
haul, which the UN and we are prepared to do.
Haitians face serious and daunting challenges to establishing a
viable democracy and the rule of law. Haitians are the first to concede
their history has been too often characterized by violence,
authoritarianism and criminality. Former President Aristide's
administration sadly followed that model. The Interim Government of
Haiti has begun the process of establishing the rule of law to give the
Haitian people the quality government they deserve. Aristide's lawful
resignation and departure opens the door for this in the first time in
a decade.
The job of building Haitian democracy is up to Haitians themselves,
but the U.S. and the international community can and will help them
build viable institutions and institute good governance.
Question. Why has the administration not come out in support of the
HERO act introduced by my colleague Senator DeWine? This legislation
provides Haiti with economic advantages that would attract industry and
create jobs for the Haitian people. We must restore a sense of hope to
the Haitian people. This legislation offers only the first small step
in that direction. But it appears that the administration is not even
committed to this step, casting our overall commitment into question.
Answer. We strongly support the people of Haiti. We continue our
efforts to help the Interim Government to build a more prosperous
economy. Clearly, Haiti's economic development is in the U.S. interest.
Creating economic opportunity in Haiti will make Haitians less
dependent on foreign assistance for survival. It will help deter
illegal migration and provide alternatives to drug smuggling as a
source of income. It will increase the government's revenue base and
the country's overall stability.
The United States has taken broad steps to assist Haiti, including
a pledge of $230 million at the World Bank Donors' Conference, which
included $22 million to support economic growth and job creation. While
the Senate passed the HERO legislation in the last Congress, the House
took no action and the administration has not taken a position on the
HERO legislation. If confirmed, I want to work with the Congress to
fashion legislation that will find the right balance between job growth
in Haiti and maintaining jobs here at home.
Colombia
Question. Please provide an update on the status of the three
American hostages, Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes, and Keith Stansell,
held by the FARC in Colombia. How regularly are their families
contacted and updated on the situation? I want to ensure that you will
personally raise this issue at every opportunity with the Colombian
government to make certain that these men are brought home safely and
as soon as possible.
Answer. In Colombia, there is no higher priority for the United
States Government than the safe return of Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes,
and Keith Stansell, whose captivity will reach two years on February
13, 2005.
Our continued efforts to locate the hostages include employing all
assets of national power: diplomatic, financial, intelligence, law
enforcement, military, and public diplomacy. In Washington, Miami, and
Bogota, dedicated U.S. Government officials are working daily to bring
them home.
We are working closely with the Colombian government and other
governments. We have and will continue to raise this issue at the
highest levels. President Bush and President Uribe most recently
discussed the situation during their Cartagena meeting in November
2004. Ambassador Wood is in frequent contact with President Uribe and
his cabinet about the three Americans. The Government of Colombia is
providing the fullest cooperation possible.
The Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs (State/CA) has been the
principal point of contact with the hostages' families on behalf of the
U.S. Government since February 2003. An officer in the Consular
Bureau's Directorate of Overseas Citizen Services calls family members
every week to keep them updated. The State Department hosted each
family for a day of briefings from interagency representatives in
February, March and April 2004, as part of our continuing efforts to
keep them informed, respond to their questions and concerns personally,
and remain in close touch with them. The Department is preparing to
hold another round of meetings soon. The Department of Justice and FBI
have also had direct contact with the families.
If confirmed, you have my commitment that the State Department and
I personally will continue to utilize every opportunity to raise the
issue of the safe return of Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell, and Thomas
Howes and to work for their safe return.
Latin America
Question. In Latin America there are troubling trends in both
security and democracy. We see frightening movements of Al Qaida and
other international terrorist organizations that indicate an expansion
of their operations in Latin America. We also see democratically-
elected leaders govern in undemocratic ways, while others are too weak
to govern properly and in some cases are forced to resign because they
are ineffective. How do we balance these critical but sometimes
competing interests? We must tread carefully to ensure that we do not
jeopardize our interests in strengthening democracy as we work to
secure these countries from the threats of international terrorism.
Answer. Enhancing security and promoting democracy must go hand-in-
hand. For example, our efforts to strengthen the rule of law help Latin
Americans to tangibly feel the benefits of the rule of law. In turn,
this renewed faith in their governments provides a critical buffer
against support for illegal groups active in the region.
We will continue to support justice and law enforcement programs
that create the environment necessary for democracy to thrive. At the
same time, we will help our partners develop the necessary capacities
to combat terrorists within their national territories We will also
assist them in protecting critical infrastructure such as the Panama
Canal, as well as strengthen regional mechanisms that address
terrorism.
Multilaterally, we will support OAS efforts to both strengthen
democracy and build effective counter-terrorism capacities, focused on
increased border and financial controls, transportation security
(aviation and ports), and cyber-security. In pursuing our goals, we
will diligently promote adherence to the principles of democracy,
including respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental
freedoms, and shine a light on activities of leaders who govern
undemocratically.
Question. President Bush made the Western Hemisphere one of his top
priorities at the beginning of his first administration. After
September 11, his attention naturally refocused to other areas of the
world. After three years, we have seen the troubling results of turning
our backs too strongly on this region. Latin America continues to face
difficult issues of security drug trafficking, poverty, disease, and
instability. As Secretary of State, how will you make Latin America
again a priority?
Answer. While events elsewhere in the world have demanded increased
attention and resources, President Bush has continued to recognize the
strong economic, political, security, and cultural ties that inexorably
link together the countries of the Western Hemisphere. Our policy
toward the Western Hemisphere focuses on bolstering security,
strengthening democracy, promoting prosperity and investing in people--
all within a multilateral framework.
We will have two unique opportunities in 2005 to reinforce and
demonstrate the high priority that we place on the Hemisphere: the
General Assembly of the Organization of American States scheduled for
June and hosted by the Secretary of State in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida
and the November Summit of the Americas in Argentina.
Building on the recent successes in the Hemisphere and the strong
bipartisan support in Congress for our policies in the region, we will
continue to focus our efforts on reducing drug production and
trafficking, combating poverty, and confronting instability in the
region. Our successes in Colombia, from counterterrorism operations and
coca eradication to alternative development, strongly demonstrate how
U.S. support can make a critical difference.
In a similar vein, the U.S. has committed to improve health and
reduce infectious diseases through the Global AIDS Initiative and the
Summit of the Americas process. Our free trade initiatives, including
trade capacity building, are eliminating trade barriers, opening new
markets, and committing countries to modern trading rules. These
efforts demonstrate the importance the U.S. places on such an important
region.
Russia
Question. The situation in Russia becomes more troubling every day.
President Putin appears determined to dismantle the democratic
institutions that were created in Russia over the past decade. I am
troubled that the administration has not taken a more vocal stand in
criticizing President Putin's actions. As a student of Russia, you must
be troubled by this situation. As Secretary of State how will you
approach this problem?
Answer. The consolidation of democracy in Russia is in our
strategic interest, as we believe it is in Russia's. A stable, healthy,
democratic Russia will make a stronger partner internationally. We must
first recognize that the Russia of today bears little resemblance to
the Russia that emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union. Progress
has been made on the path towards a free market-based democracy.
However, progress has not been even, and recent trends show
considerable backsliding. We need to remain engaged with Russia.
Efforts to isolate it would only further encourage the domestic trends
we find most troublesome. As part of that engagement, we need to share
with our counterparts at all levels of the Government of Russia our
questions and concerns regarding the detrimental impact backsliding on
democracy will have on our relationship. We must also continue to
maintain close relations with those individuals and groups in Russia
that are advocating for democratic values and institutions. We must
continue to provide robust support for programs that strengthen the
rule of law, help fight corruption, and defend democratic values in
Russia. We must continue to support linkages between American and
Russian institutions and individuals that focus on these issues. In FY
2005, we plan to spend over $43 million for democracy programs in
Russia--about a third more than we did in FY 2004. And we need a robust
program of public outreach to show Russians how democratic institutions
and practices have helped the United States meet the challenges we both
face in the 21st Century. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
the Congress to ensure continued strong support for democratization in
Russia.
__________
?
APPENDIX II--ADDITIONAL MATERIAL INCLUDED IN THE RECORD AT THE REQUEST
OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
Prepared Statement Submitted by Senator Russell D. Feingold
(Submitted as part of the 1/19/2005 Business Meeting Prior to the Vote)
I cast my vote in favor of the confirmation of Dr. Rice to be
Secretary of State because I believe that the president has the right
to appoint cabinet officers who share his ideology and his perspective.
Barring serious concerns about a nominee's qualifications or ethical
record, and in keeping with Senate practices and precedents, my
inclination is to give the President--any President--substantial
deference in his cabinet choices.
However, I want to be clear that I was troubled by some of Dr.
Rice's statements in the hearing. Our most senior diplomat, our
emissary to the entire world, should be able to represent our core
values. Dr. Rice's failure, and the failure of the administration, to
categorically reject tactics that the average American would
acknowledge to be torture is more than disappointing. It is dangerous,
and it is unacceptable.
I also want to state, as I have before, that the President's
foreign policy over the last four years has been, on many fronts,
misguided and self-defeating. I am troubled by the damage done to our
image around the world; I am concerned by our loss of focus in fighting
terrorism; I am angry about the use of shifting justifications and
faulty information to sell the war in Iraq; I am angry about the
failure to plan for the fact that overthrowing a regime leads to
disorder and disorder leads to looting; I am angry about the official
insistence on grossly underestimating the bill that would be handed to
the American taxpayer and then declining to budget for this massive
expense once its parameters became more clear; I am angry about the
mismanagement of efforts to put a competent Iraqi security force in
place; I am angry about the woefully slow pace of reconstruction, and I
am angry about this administration's failure to ensure that our troops
were adequately equipped for the circumstances in which they found
themselves. Many people in this country and in this Congress are
troubled not only by the mistakes, but by the fact that there appears
to be no real accountability for these failures.
At one point in the course of the hearing, Dr. Rice expressed some
indignation regarding questions or remarks that she felt impugned her
credibility. Her credibility is a legitimate question. Dr. Rice made
sweeping, public characterizations about aluminum tubes sought by Iraq
before the war began that were, quite plainly, misleading. She
permitted a reference to Iraq seeking uranium from Africa, a reference
that she knew the intelligence did not support, to be included in a
major Presidential address. She has a credibility problem, not just
among skeptics in this country, but around the world. And to explore
that issue in this forum was entirely appropriate.
The American people elected President Bush, and, like any
President, he is entitled to a cabinet that reflects his views. But I
will continue to oppose every bad policy, to question every baseless
assertion, and to advocate for a wiser course that will make our
country more secure. The stakes are far too high for me to do anything
else.
__________
(273)
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, D.C. 20520,
August 11, 2004.
The Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The Department supports the purposes of S. 2127 and the
Administration has been leading a similar effort as recently notified
to your committee. The Secretary has established an Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the
Office of the Secretary. S/CRS will oversee and coordinate intra-
Departmental and interagency civilian post-conflict and crisis response
efforts. This Office's vision is largely in line with the vision in
your bill.
The Department is currently working to secure necessary interagency
involvement including details from key agencies to provide requisite
expertise in specialized areas of reconstruction, stabilization, and
humanitarian assistance. The Department is also developing an
Operational Readiness Reserve concept to enable and test methods for
agile and responsive mobilization of staff to meet these needs.
Experience gained in the formation and initial operation of S/CRS will
inform Administration decisions that could lead to creation of a more
robust Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations. As
currently envisaged, this office would have many of the attributes
called for in S. 2127.
During this formative stage, sufficient authority exists to
establish S/CRS and develop the concept to mobilize agency resources.
As we move forward, we will work with you and provide more detailed
comments on the entire bill. However, of greatest immediate benefit
would be the provisions set forth in Section 5 of S. 2127 that
authorize the President's request for a $100 million account to meet
immediate needs in a complex crisis and provide other special
assistance authorities including waiver of certain transfer and
drawdown limitations. The ability to reallocate resources from a broad
range of accounts in a time of crisis is essential if there is to be an
effective and timely response to the situation in the affected country
or region. We would appreciate your support in securing appropriations
and authorities in Section 5.
The Department greatly appreciates the willingness of your
Committee to address how best to respond to failing, failed, or post-
conflict states. The Department looks forward to working with you on
creating the resource framework for the new Office in the near term and
on future efforts that could lead to building a robust operational
capability in sequence.
The Office of Management and Budget advises that there is no
objection to the submission of this report from the standpoint of the
President's program.
Sincerely,
Peter N. Petrihos,
Acting Assistant Secretary,
Legislative Affairs.
__________
Charts Detailing U.S. Trade Deficits Submitted by Senator Sarbanes
__________
The Right Call
By L. Paul Bremer III,
The Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2005; Page A10
Recently some Monday morning quarterbacks have questioned the
Coalition's decision to ``disband'' Saddam's army and bar senior
Baathists from government jobs after we liberated Iraq. These were the
right decisions. They served an important strategic purpose and
recognized realities on the ground after the war.
The Coalition's objectives in Iraq went beyond ``regime change.''
President Bush made clear that we were going to help Iraqis create ``a
New Iraq,'' an Iraq freed from Saddam's unparalleled cruelty toward his
own citizens. For more than three decades, the dictator had used the
army and intelligence services to inflict misery, torture and death on
Iraqis and their neighbors. The Baath Party was another important
instrument of Saddam's tyranny. Saddam explicitly modeled his efforts
to control Iraqi society on the Nazis. ``Mein Kampf'' was required
reading for members of his intelligence services.
In the north, Saddam repeatedly used his army to repress the Kurds,
once employing chemical weapons to kill more than 5,000 in a single
day. In the South, after the 1991 uprising, Saddam ordered his army to
sweep up Shia men, women and children indiscriminately. They were
transported to nearby fields on flatbed trucks, machine-gunned en masse
and thrown into open pit graves. So far, almost a hundred of these mass
graves have been found, monuments to Saddam's army's brutality toward
Iraq's citizens. Conservative estimates are that Saddam's security and
intelligence forces killed at least 300,000 of their fellow countrymen.
The true number of victims will never be known because over a million
and a half Iraqis are still missing.
After Liberation, the Coalition felt it was vital to reassure the
Iraqi people that in the New Iraq these organizations would no longer
be used as instruments of repression. And so the Coalition prohibited
the top 1% of the Baath Party from continuing in government service and
``disbanded'' what was left of Saddam's military and security forces.
The political importance of these decisions cannot be exaggerated.
During my time in Iraq, Iraqi citizens from all over the country, from
every sect, religion and ethnic group, repeatedly praised the de-
Baathification and disbanding of Saddam's security forces as the
Coalition's most praiseworthy decisions. An opinion poll in early July
2003 revealed that over 94% of Iraqis agreed that top Baathists should
not be allowed in government.
Kurdish leaders told me that the decree on the security services
convinced the Kurds that the Coalition was serious about creating a
united Iraq. That reassurance, they explained, was the decisive factor
in the Kurdish decision to remain inside a united Iraq. If instead the
Kurds had seceded, civil war would have followed. And a civil war in
Iraq would have quickly become a regional war. The Shia, victims of
wholesale slaughter by Saddam's army, delighted in the prospect of a
New Army no longer dominated by Saddam's henchmen. They welcomed our
promise that Shia men would be able to play an important role in that
New Army.
There was a practical side to our decision, too. By the time
Baghdad and Tikrit fell, the Iraqi army had already disbanded itself.
There was not a single organized Iraqi military unit intact after mid-
April 2003.
The majority of Saddam's soldiers had been young Shia conscripts.
These enlisted men were subjected to brutality and abuse by their
mostly-Sunni officers. Conscripts who were not killed or captured
during the war not surprisingly took advantage of the war's end to
desert. Grateful to be alive, hundreds of thousands of enlisted men
simply went back to their farms and families. Trying to get them to
return voluntarily would have been a brutal undertaking. Do critics
seriously propose that the Coalition should have gone into Iraqi homes
and farms and forced these conscripts back into the hated army?
Critics also ignore the political turmoil which would have resulted
from reviving Saddam's armed forces. Last April, there was widespread
outrage when a few hundred former army officers were brought back by
the U.S. Marines in an effort to create a ``Fallujah Brigade.'' Imagine
the reaction if at Liberation we had tried to recall tens of thousands
of officers. The former army men did not go home empty-handed. Many of
them, and looters, stripped their bases and barracks clean. They took
not only anything which would move, but a lot that was nailed down--the
sinks, faucets and toilets and even the tile and piping in the
bathrooms. In many military bases at Liberation not a single brick was
left standing on another. No base was usable without major repairs.
So not only was there no Iraqi army left. There would have been no
place to put an army if we had wanted to recall it. It has taken a year
and billions of dollars just to reconstitute the facilities and
equipment necessary for the New Iraqi Army. Nonetheless the Coalition
understood the need to provide a future for the former army members. We
immediately began recruiting the New Army and announced that members of
the old army, with the exception of its top officers, would be welcomed
into it.
Today, more than three-quarters of the enlisted men in the New Army
and virtually all of the officers and NCOs served in the old army.
Moreover, in July 2003 we began paying a monthly stipend to all but the
most senior former officers. These payments continue to this day. So if
any former army officers are involved in the insurgency, it is not for
money. Their objective is simply to retake power and to return Iraq to
its horrible past. The fact that Iraq's new security forces are still
not performing well enough to take full responsibility for Iraq's
security underscores that creating a well-equipped, professional army
cannot be done over night. The problems those forces face today would
be even worse if, instead of a fresh start, we had tried to restore
Saddam's old system.
The decision to ``disband'' the Iraqi security forces was approved
by the military commander on the ground and by America's senior
civilian leadership. It was the right call. This decision, coupled with
the prohibition of the top 1% of the Baath Party from government
employment, signaled to the Iraqi people the birth of a New Iraq, one
in which the security forces would no longer threaten their freedoms.
Mr. Bremer was administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority
from May 2003 to June 2004, when sovereignty was returned to Iraq.
__________
Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq's WMD,
30 September 2004
[The information below is from the complete report which can be
accessed at:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004
nuclear
Key Findings
Iraq Survey Group (ISG) discovered further evidence of the maturity
and significance of the pre-1991 Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that
Iraq's ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively
decayed after that date.
Saddam Husayn ended the nuclear program in 1991 following
the Gulf war. ISG found no evidence to suggest concerted
efforts to restart the program.
Although Saddam clearly assigned a high value to the nuclear
progress and talent that had been developed up to the 1991 war,
the program ended and the intellectual capital decayed in the
succeeding years.
Nevertheless, after 1991, Saddam did express his intent to retain
the intellectual capital developed up during the Iraqi Nuclear Program.
Senior Iraqis--several of them from the Regime's inner circle--told ISG
they assumed Saddam would restart a nuclear program once UN sanctions
ended.
Saddam indicated that he would develop the weapons necessary
to counter any Iranian threat.
Initially, Saddam chose to conceal his nuclear program in its
entirety, as he did with Iraq's BW program. Aggressive UN inspections
after Desert Storm forced Saddam to admit the existence of the program
and destroy or surrender components of the program.
In the wake of Desert Storm, Iraq took steps to conceal key
elements of its program and to preserve what it could of the
professional capabilities of its nuclear scientific community.
Baghdad undertook a variety of measures to conceal key
elements of its nuclear program from successive UN inspectors,
including specific direction by Saddam Husayn to hide and
preserve documentation associated with Iraq's nuclear program.
ISG, for example, uncovered two specific instances in which
scientists involved in uranium enrichment kept documents and
technology. Although apparently acting on their own, they did
so with the belief and anticipation of resuming uranium
enrichment efforts in the future.
Starting around 1992, in a bid to retain the intellectual
core of the former weapons program, Baghdad transferred many
nuclear scientists to related jobs in the Military Industrial
Commission (MIC). The work undertaken by these scientists at
the MIC helped them maintain their weapons knowledge base.
As with other WMD areas, Saddam's ambitions in the nuclear area
were secondary to his prime objective of ending UN sanctions.
Iraq, especially after the defection of Husayn Kamil in
1995, sought to persuade the IAEA that Iraq had met the UN's
disarmament requirements so sanctions would be lifted.
ISG found a limited number of post-1995 activities that would have
aided the reconstitution of the nuclear weapons program once sanctions
were lifted.
The activities of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission
sustained some talent and limited research with potential
relevance to a reconstituted nuclear program.
Specific projects, with significant development, such as the
efforts to build a rail gun and a copper vapor laser could have
been useful in a future effort to restart a nuclear weapons
program, but ISG found no indications of such purpose. As
funding for the MIC and the IAEC increased after the
introduction of the Oil-for-Food program, there was some growth
in programs that involved former nuclear weapons scientists and
engineers.
The Regime prevented scientists from the former nuclear
weapons program from leaving either their jobs of Iraq.
Moreover, in the late 1990s, personnel from both MIC and the
IAEC received significant pay raises in a bid to retain them,
and the Regime undertook new investments in university research
in a bid to ensure that Iraq retained technical knowledge.
__________
The White House Regular Briefing,
April 10, 2003, Thursday \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ A transcript of the complete White House Briefing will be
maintained in the committee's permanent files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Briefer: Ari Fleischer, White House Spokesman
Location: White House Briefing Room, Washington, D.C.
* * * * * * *
Questioner. Ari, on weapons of mass destruction, British Prime
Minister Blair said a couple days ago in Belfast that after the regime
fell, that we, the coalition, would be led to them. That was his words.
Yesterday Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was offering rewards for Iraqis to
prevent the regime from either destroying documents or destroying
materials or shipping them out to the country. So, I mean, what's the
bigger picture here` Are we in a position--is the United States in a
position where we have to rely on people on the ground to ultimately
get to the very weapons that we say Iraq has and that we've been after?
Mr. Fleischer. Well, I think there are two principal things that
involve the Iraqi people in the efforts to determine where their
weapons of mass destruction are. One is the people who are involved in
it and want to do everything they possible can to destroy all the
evidence of their involvement in it. Obviously, those people are the
problem. And then there are other people who may have knowledge about
it who want to provide that knowledge to the United States or to
coalition allies so that evidence of mass destruction can indeed be
unearthed or found. And I think we'll see both on the ground in Iraq. I
think it is something that will be found We've always that we have
information that they have weapons of mass destruction. The precise
location of where it is is information that the Iraqi people can be
helpful with.
Questioner. Well, but--okay. But you're saying now that--I mean, it
appears that we really are relying on people to lead us to them rather
than knowing where these materials are. And if we don't have that sort
of cooperation, I mean, are we going to come up empty here?
Mr. Fleischer. I think you've always heard and you continue to hear
from officials a measure of high confidence that indeed the weapons of
mass destruction will be found. What we have is a regime that was a
master at hiding it, that have set up a very large and elaborate
infrastructure for the sole purpose of hiding it. And the military
conflict goes through its various phases and we turn the corner from
actual military conduct, military operation, to more of a pursuit of
where the weapons of mass destruction are, then I think additional
information will come in. And we don't rule out that it can come in
thanks to the help of the Iraqi people.
And I think additional information will come in, and we don't rule
out that it can come in thanks to the help of the Iraqi people.
Questioner. But I'm trying to nail this down. You're--either the
bad actors are going to slip and tell you about it, lead you to it or
present it to you, or people who are as the good actors are going to
tip you off, you know, once you're there and lead you to the materials,
that right now the government forces on the ground are not in a
position independently to get to where the major caches----
Mr. Fleischer. No, you can't rule out that the coalition forces
might find something along their travels on the ground.
Questioner [continuing]. ----because you know who it is.
Mr. Fleischer. Well, they're involved in military operations. And
Iraq has been hiding it. But what we have is intelligence about their
having it. Whether it was specific location or not is often not the
case. But keep in mind the rescue of Jessica Lynch, for example. That
was developed as a result of information provided to us by an Iraqi
citizen. And so we of course were on the lookout for our POWs. We had
our antenna up doing everything we could to find them. We have means to
be able to do certain things. But there's a limit to these means. The
more that there is help from the Iraqi people, the easier the effort.
Ron?
Questioner. I'm not asking for specifics, but I want to know
specifically if the United States knows where a cache of WMD is?
Mr. Fleischer. Well, we have----
Questioner [continuing]. ----(inaudible)--if the site was
(cleaned?), they could go to it again.
Mr. Fleischer. What we have always said is that we know that they
had it, and they are expert at hiding it.
Questioner. Do you know where any of it is?
Mr. Fleischer. Ron, we have always said we know they have it; they
are expert at hiding it. I can't discuss all intelligence
information,and this is something Secretary Powell talked about when he
went to the United Nations and talked about their abilities to hide.
But make no mistake, we maintain high confidence that they have it and
it will be found.
David?
Questioner. Do we know where any of it is?
Mr. Fleischer. David?
* * * * * * *
Questioner. Ari, part of the reason for the war was WMD. Now, well
into the war, WMD has not been found. The American public is going to
the television every morning, listening to the radio every morning,
trying to find out if indeed WMD was found. Does the administration
feel there's some awkwardness right now with these statements of
``they're professional at hiding'' and ``we know it's there?'' I mean,
is there some sort of awkwardness about the fact that this has not been
found as of yet?
Mr. Fleischer. No. We know Saddam Hussein is there, but we haven't
found him yet either. I mean, the fact of the matter is, we are still
in a war, and not everything about the war is yet known. But make no
mistake; as I said earlier, we have high confidence that they have
weapons of mass destruction. That is what this war was about and is
about. And we have high confidence it will be found.
* * * * * * *
__________
Correspondence from the White House Regarding H.R. 10/S. 2845
(Intelligence Reform Legislation)
The White House,
Washington, DC.
October 18, 2004.
The Hon. Peter Hoekstra,
United States House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C. 20515.
The Hon. Susan Collins,
United States Senate,
Washington, D.C. 20510.
Dear Representative Hoekstra and Senator Collins:
As the House-Senate conference on intelligence reform legislation
(H.R. 10/S. 2845) meets, the Administration urges the Conferees to
reach agreement on an effective bill to strengthen the nation's
intelligence capabilities that both Houses can pass and the President
can sign into law as soon as possible to meet the nation's security
needs. There are many good provisions in both bills and the President
endorses the best of each as outlined in this letter to strike a
reasonable compromise that will best reorganize our intelligence
capabilities and will make the country safer and stronger. The
Administration appreciates the significant efforts of the House and
Senate to date in passing H.R. 10 and S. 2845, and looks forward to
continuing to work closely with the Conferees on this historic
legislation.
The Administration is pleased that a majority of the provisions of
the President's legislative proposal, dated September 16, 2004, are
included in either the House or Senate versions of the legislation.
America is a nation at war, and the Conferees have an opportunity to
contribute to the passage of a bill that takes another important step
forward as we do everything in our power to defeat terrorism and
protect the American people. These provisions include creating a
National Intelligence Director (NID) with full budget authority,
providing important statutory authorities for the newly created
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), preventing the disclosure of
highly sensitive budget information to our nation's enemies, especially
during wartime, and preserving the chain of command.
This letter addresses a number of important provisions in H.R. 10
and S. 2845 that the Administration supports, as well as a number of
provisions that the Administration opposes, for the reasons generally
described below. This letter does not purport to address the
Administration's comprehensive position on all of the provisions
contained in H.R. 10 or S. 2845.
National Intelligence Director
Budget Authority. The Administration supports the strong budget
authority provided to the NID in S. 2845. To be effective, the NID must
have clear authority to determine the national intelligence budget,
strong transfer and reprogramming authorities, explicit authority to
allocate appropriations, and the ability to ensure execution of funds
by national intelligence agencies consistent with the direction of the
NID. S. 2845 would provide such budget authority.
The Administration is pleased that H.R. 10 would prevent disclosure
of sensitive information relating to the intelligence budget.
Disclosing to the nation's enemies, especially during wartime, the
amounts requested by the President, and provided by the Congress, for
the conduct of the nation's intelligence activities would harm the
national security.
Chain of Command. The Administration again stresses the importance
of section 6 (``Preservation of Authority and Accountability'') of the
President's proposal; the Administration strongly supports the
inclusion of this provision by the Conferees. Inclusion of this section
is essential to preserve in the heads of the executive departments the
unity of authority over, and accountability for the performance of,
those departments (including accountability for implementing the NID's
statutory-based guidance). The section also recognizes that the
authority of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget is
unaffected. In addition, the Administration notes that many of the
specific concerns with the NID provisions noted below relate to
ensuring that the legislation does not interfere with clear lines of
authority within the Executive Branch and does not, by excessive
specification of management structures, confuse lines of authority or
interfere with areas in which the Executive should retain discretion.
Management Structure. The Administration is gravely concerned about
the excessive and unnecessary detail in the structure of the Office of
the NID included in both the House and Senate bills. The voluminous and
bureaucratic requirements create confused chains of command, diminish
accountability, and foster a risk-adverse culture. Such a structure
will undermine rather than promote the ability of the national security
community to carry out its responsibilities. The provisions of S. 2845
would, in the aggregate, construct a cumbersome new bureaucracy in the
Office of the NID with overlapping authorities and responsibilities.
This legislatively mandated bureaucracy is inconsistent with the final
report of The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States (``9/11 Commission'') and will hinder, not help, in the effort
to protect the national security and preserve our constitutional
rights. Many of the details contained in these provisions overlap with
standard authorities of an Inspector General and a privacy officer. The
bill should not create additional layers of investigative offices and
staffs that will harm national security and prevent these officers from
carrying out their duties. The Administration opposes creation of the
Ombudsman of the National Intelligence Authority and the Analytic
Review Unit, and also opposes provisions that allow a subordinate
officer to oversee or otherwise supervise the work of his superior. The
Administration opposes the requirements in S. 2845 that the General
Counsel for the NID be appointed from civilian life; this requirement
interferes with the President's ability to pick the best qualified
candidate. We urge the conferees to adopt the President's proposal
relative to the structure of the Office of the NID.
The Administration also notes that in August the President
established a civil liberties board ``within the executive branch'' (as
called for by the 9/11 Commission) to further safeguard the rights of
Americans (Executive Order 13353 of August 27, 2004). The
Administration therefore opposes as unnecessary efforts to duplicate
our ongoing efforts to protect civil liberties and privacy by the
creation of another executive branch board. One of the most significant
findings of the Commission Report is that agencies need to act more
flexibly, rapidly, and together to protect national security. America
needs an Intelligence Community that is focused on protecting America,
while ensuring necessary protections for the rights of Americans as
reflected in the President's Executive Order.
The Administration is also concerned with the conforming amendment
in H.R. 10 (section 1079) that designates the existing Community
Management Staff as the Office of the NID in all statutes and
legislation. The duties, responsibilities, and authorities of the CMS
and those granted the NID in proposed legislation are not entirely
consistent. This inconsistency further complicates the NID management
structure and introduces more confusion into the chain of command.
Instead, the NID should be given statutory authority to provide for a
transition in an orderly fashion of CMS personnel and assets into the
office of the NID, as appropriate.
Responsibilities and Authorities. The Administration believes that
the responsibilities and authorities of the NID should be described in
a single provision that is both internally consistent and consistent
with the goal of establishing a strong, effective NID. In addition, the
Administration recommends that new sections 102(b)(3) and 102A(a)(1)(D)
of the National Security Act as proposed in H.R. 10 be deleted. The
Administration also believes that the NID should have the authorities
set forth on pages 12-14 of the President's proposal in order to ensure
that the NID is effectively empowered to operate the Office of the NID.
Appointments. The Administration supports giving the NID a role in
the appointment of key individuals in the Intelligence Community. The
Administration supports the provisions in S. 2845, which are based on
the President's proposal. The Administration also notes that certain of
the provisions regarding the appointment of the NID are
constitutionally problematic and looks forward to working with Congress
to correct these provisions.
Personnel Management. The Administration supports strong personnel
management authorities for the NID similar to those set forth in
sections 112(a)(8), 113(g), and 114 of S. 2845.
Collection, Analysis, and Tasking. The Administration supports
intelligence collection, analysis, and tasking authorities for the NID
similar to those set forth in section 102(f) of H.R. 10.
Acquisition Authority. The Administration supports the Senate's
approach to granting the NID milestone decision authority, which will
help ensure that the NID has full and effective budget authority. The
Administration supports modifications to the language of section 162 of
S. 2845 to limit the likelihood of duplicative bureaucracy.
Coordination with Foreign Governments. The Administration would
support the provisions in section 113(i) and the proposed new National
Security Act section 103(f) in S. 2845 that assign to the NID and CIA
Director complementary responsibilities with respect to relationships
with foreign intelligence and security services, subject to the
addition of the phrase ``or involving intelligence acquired through
clandestine means'' before the period in section 113(i) and section
103(f). Section 1011(a) of HR. 10 fails to grant the NID sufficient
authority to coordinate these relationships and also fails to specify a
role for the CIA Director in implementing this authority by
coordinating contacts with foreign services.
HUMINT Collection. The Administration supports granting
responsibility for the overall direction and coordination of human
intelligence operations overseas to the CIA Director. Section 301(a) of
S. 2845 would ensure that overseas operations involving human sources
will be coordinated and executed according to consistent standards.
Section 1011(a) of H.R. 10 does not clearly establish the CIA Director
as the coordinator of overseas HUMINT activity, and risks disrupting
ongoing collection operations in the War on Terror.
Alternative/Competitive Analysis. The Administration opposes
section 146 of S. 2845. A new bureaucracy that duplicates the work of
the National Intelligence Council is both burdensome and unnecessary.
The need for independent, competitive, or alternative analysis is
appropriately acknowledged in section 102(c)(l2) of the President's
proposal of September 16, 2004, and section 1011(a) of H.R. 10.
Protect Sources and Methods. The Administration supports provisions
of S. 2845 that make explicit the NID's authority to protect
intelligence sources and methods. At the same time, the Administration
believes that the head of each element of the Intelligence Community
should be explicitly charged with carrying out this critical authority
according to the NID's guidance.
Joint Intelligence Community Council. The Administration supports
the establishment of a Joint Intelligence Community Council to ensure
that heads of Departments containing elements of the Intelligence
Community are held accountable for carrying out their statutory
responsibilities to the NID and conversely, that the NID is held
accountable for meeting the intelligence needs of the Council members.
The Administration prefers section 1031 of HR. 10 over section 203 of
S. 2845, but believes that the Administration-proposed provisions for
the Council should be adopted.
Reserve for Contingencies. The Administration believes that the NID
and CIA each should have a Reserve for Contingencies. Section 118 of S.
2845 would create a Reserve for Contingencies for the NID and the CIA,
but would transfer the unobligated balance in the CIA Reserve for
Contingencies to the new Reserve. The House bill does not establish a
Reserve for Contingencies for the NID and would preserve the CIA
Reserve for Contingencies (see, e.g., section 1071(a)(5)). Creating a
NID Reserve and at the same time maintaining the CIA Reserve would
enhance the NID's ability to deal with exigencies, while also
preserving a key source of the flexibility CIA needs to meet its unique
mission requirements.
Location of Office of the NID. The Administration opposes section
121(e) of S. 2845 which would bar the Office of the NID from being co-
located with any other Intelligence Community element, as of 1 October
2006. It is imperative that the NID have the ability and flexibility to
begin carrying out the reorganization and any new functions and duties
that would be directed by intelligence reform legislation, while
ensuring that all current intelligence activities within the purview of
the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Community are
continued in an effective and productive manner. The NID therefore
should have the opportunity and the discretion, subject to direction
from the President, to determine the optimal location for the Office of
the NID in light of resources, security, efficiency, and other
operating and management factors.
National Counterterrorism Center
The Administration supports legislation to provide statutory
authorities for the National Counterterrorism Center established by the
President in Executive Order 13354 of August 27, 2004. The
Administration strongly prefers Section 1021 of H.R. 10 over section
143 of the S. 2845, except that the Administration believes that the
Director of the NCTC should be appointed by the President.
National Counternroliferation Center/Other Centers
The Administration favors waiting until the Commission on the
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of
Mass Destruction completes its study before creating additional
intelligence centers. The Administration looks forward to receiving the
Commission's recommendations. Mandating creation of a National
Counterproliferation Center (section 144 of S. 2845) or other similar
organization with insufficient study is premature and risks disrupting
ongoing efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
The Administration opposes section 145 of S. 2845, which legislates
the structure and authorities of other centers. Such a provision poses
an unnecessary risk of interfering with the rapid organization of
flexible centers to respond to new and emerging threats, limiting the
flexibility to rapidly organize centers designed to respond to new and
emerging threats.
Security Clearances
The Administration opposes provisions in S. 2845 and H.R. 10 that
would restrict the President's ability to manage the security clearance
process. The President and the NID should retain the authority to
tailor standards and procedures to agencies if necessary to protect the
national security. The Administration is committed to improving the
security clearance process, but is concerned with unrealistic time
limits that could compromise national security. The Administration
supports language contained in the President's proposal requiring the
NID to prescribe standards for common personnel clearance policies.
Information Sharing
The Administration commends and supports the provisions in H.R. 10
that promote the development of a secure information sharing
environment under the direction of the NID, while also providing
flexibility concerning its design and implementation. The
Administration also supports the language in H.R. 10 that preserves the
information sharing responsibilities assigned to the Department of
Homeland Security under sections 892 and 893 of the Homeland Security
Act and Executive Order 13311, and urges the Conferees to ensure that
those responsibilities are preserved in the final legislation. In
contrast, S. 2845 is overly prescriptive and contains excessive detail
that will restrict the ability to adapt rapidly evolving technologies
to changing circumstances. Similar flexibilities should also be
provided with respect to the House provisions regarding an
interoperable law enforcement and intelligence data system.
Definition of ``National Intelligence''
The Administration supports the definition of ``national
intelligence'' contained in H.R. 10. This definition will further
strengthen the NID and help to promote greater information sharing
inside and outside of the Intelligence Community. The Administration is
very concerned, however, about sections 221-225 of S. 2845 that raise
significant constitutional issues.
Foreign Language Skills
It is important in the War on Terror that intelligence agencies
recruit and retain as many people as possible who are fully qualified
in the foreign languages these agencies need. The Administration
supports the provisions of the House bill that would advance foreign
language education and training, and requests that those provisions be
clarified to ensure that service payback obligations are enforceable.
Declassification Board
The Administration supports the extension of the Public Interest
Declassification Board but opposes section 226 of S. 2845, which would
rename the Board as the Independent National Security Classification
Board and create a Congressional right to appeal classification
decisions made by an executive agency with respect to national security
information. The authority to make such decisions is clearly vested in
the President and his designated subordinates under the Constitution.
Moreover, this provision is not germane to the 9/11 Commission's
findings or recommendations.
Congressional Oversight
The Administration is concerned that neither bill addresses the
critical need to reorganize congressional oversight, including
intelligence oversight and oversight of the Department of Homeland
Security. The 9/11 Commission concluded that the creation of a NID and
NCTC ``will not work if congressional oversight does not change too.''
Similarly, the 9/11 Commission recommended that ``Congress should
create a single, principal point of oversight and review for homeland
security.'' Accordingly, the 9/11 Commission specifically noted that,
of all their recommendations, reorganizing congressional oversight may
by ``among the most important.'' The Administration strongly urges the
Conferees to address this critical omission.
The Administration is concerned not only with the omission of
congressional oversight reform, but the vast expansion of oversight by
additional legislative agents contained in S. 2845. This is a
significant step in the wrong direction and will hinder the ability of
the House and Senate Intelligence Committees to perform their oversight
function. The Administration opposes these provisions, including
sections 207(1) and 335 of S. 2845.
* * * * * * *
In addition to provisions concerning the NID, the NCTC, and other
core issues responsive to the Administration's proposal, both bills
contain a number of additional provisions that will help ensure that
the Intelligence Community and others in the War on Terror have all the
necessary tools which are needed to prevent terrorist attacks. Some of
the most important of these provisions are discussed below.
Terrorism Prevention, Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Community
Additional Tools for the Intelligence Community. The Administration
strongly supports and looks forward to working with the Conferees to
enact those provisions of Title II of H.R. 10 that seek to ensure that
the Intelligence Community and others in the War on Terror have all of
the necessary tools that are needed to prevent terrorist attacks, and
which help address 9/11 Commission recommendations such as those
concerning weapons of mass destruction terrorism financing, and
facilitators of terrorist travel and other material support for
terrorists. The most critical of these include enhanced provisions to
deny material support to terrorists (section 2043), including
addressing military-type training by terrorists (section 2042, as well
as section 3035); to ensure that communities are protected from
suspected terrorists prior to trial and arrested terrorists are unable
to launch attacks afterwards (section 2602, and the related post-
release supervision provision in section 2603); to prevent attacks by
``lone wolf'' terrorists (section 2001); to prevent attacks using
weapons of mass destruction (subtitle K); to further eliminate sources
of terrorist financing (sections 2111-2115, and 2121-2124); and to
ensure that the death penalty is available for all terrorist murders
(e.g., section 2502, and the air piracy amendments in section 2503).
These and other anti-terrorism tools in Title II would help keep
America safer and help to address the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations.
Terrorist Travel and Border Security. The Administration also
supports those provisions of Titles II and III of H.R. 10 that will
better protect our borders from terrorists, while maintaining our
tradition as a welcoming nation, and further address the 9/11
Commission's recommendations concerning such efforts as border
security, terrorist travel, and related vulnerabilities. In particular,
the Administration strongly supports efforts to enhance our ability to
utilize efficient, flexible tools to keep out or remove convicted
criminals and suspected terrorists who cannot be charged with Criminal
violations and those who have had their visas revoked (including the
enhanced tools in sections 3009, 3010, and 3033), and our ability to
share information about terrorist threats and crimes with foreign
governments (section 2191).
The Administration supports the provisions in section 3001 of H.R.
10 designed to close a security gap by eliminating the Western
Hemisphere exception for U.S. citizens. But the Administration intends
to work with Congress to ensure that these new requirements are written
and implemented in a way that does not create unintended, adverse
consequences.
The Administration strongly opposes the overbroad expansion of
expedited removal authorities in H.R. 10 (section 3007), and has
concerns about the provision addressing asylum (section 3008); these
sections should be modified or dropped altogether. The Administration
also believes that any changes in the asylum program must include
removal of the annual asylee adjustment cap. The Administration also
has concerns with the overbroad alien identification standards proposed
by the bill (section 3006). The Administration welcomes efforts in
Congress to address the 9/11 Commission's recommendations concerning
uniform standards for preventing counterfeiting of and tampering with
drivers licenses and birth certificates, but believes that additional
consultation with the States is necessary to address important concerns
about flexibility, privacy, and unfunded mandates. The Administration
generally supports sections 1026-1029 of S. 2845, but recommends that
the responsibility for establishment of the standards be assigned to
the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with other
officials as appropriate, and that the development and issuance process
be by means other than negotiated rulemaking.
With respect to Section 3032 of H.R. 10, the Administration looks
forward to working with the Congress on the detention-related
paragraphs to ensure that the provision applies to the appropriate
categories of dangerous aliens; that all of such aliens are provided
with the appropriate procedural safeguards; and that it does not
inadvertently interfere with Executive Branch efforts to find other
countries to accept such people. The Administration is also opposed to
the ``seek assurances'' provision of section 3032 as it is inconsistent
with the President's constitutional authority.
Counterterrorism Assistance. The Administration opposes section
3087 of H.R. 10 because it unduly constrains the provision of
counterterrorism assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act.
Strengthening foreign countries' counterterrorism capabilities is an
important line of defense in protecting the United States from
terrorist attack. Like a number of other provisions, section 3088
raises constitutional concerns and should be made precatory.
International Cooperation and Coordination
The Administration does not support adding Title IV of H.R. 10 or
Title X, Subtitle A, of S. 2845 to the final legislation as a number of
its provisions are inconsistent with the President's constitutional
authority with respect to foreign relations, diplomacy, and
international negotiations. Furthermore, many of the provisions may
adversely impact the ongoing War on Terror.
The Administration also opposes section 1014 of S. 2845, which
provides legal protections to foreign prisoners to which they are not
now entitled under applicable law and policy. Section 1095 of the
proposed National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (H.R.
4200) already addresses this issue.
Other Government Restructuring
The Administration opposes provisions in H.R. 10 that would
encumber the Federal rulemaking process with duplicative and burdensome
new requirements and significant potential litigation risks (section
5091).
Burdensome Reporting Requirements. The Administration is very
concerned about the dozens of new reporting requirements contained in
the bills. The Administration will continue to work with the Congress
to eliminate or reduce the burden created by unnecessary or duplicative
statutory reporting requirements and divert resources from critical
national security tasks.
Responding to Attacks. The Administration commends the provisions
of H.R. 10 that add to the Secretary of Homeland Security's flexibility
in providing first responder grant funds to certain high-risk areas,
but has concerns about border state funding mandates that reduce that
flexibility. The Administration opposes any provision that would unduly
limit the Secretary's ability to allocate funds to high-risk areas. In
addition, the provision authorizing letters of intent for multi-year
interoperability grants may complicate homeland-security planning
efforts by creating unrealistic expectations of long-term funding.
Personnel. The Administration is concerned about a number of other
provisions in Title V of H.R. 10, including, as referenced above,
Subtitle F on security clearances. For instance, the Administration
opposes provisions in Title V that would create inequities in personnel
policy between the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, and looks
forward to working with the Congress on a separate and comprehensive
reform of law enforcement pay and benefits. While appreciating the
intent behind it, the Administration also opposes section 5041 because
of its harmful ramifications. The section would prevent officials from
exercising delegated Presidential functions and from serving in agency
lines of succession.
Ethics Laws. The Administration opposes section 5043 of H.R. 10,
which would eliminate the level playing field established for all three
branches of government by the Government-Wide Ethics Reform Act of
1989, creating a new regime of non-uniform ethics laws. The financial
disclosure process should be modernized to reflect changed
circumstances. The Administration strongly urges Congress to adopt the
bill to modernize government-wide financial disclosure submitted by the
Office of Government Ethics to the Speaker on July 16, 2003.
Market Preparedness. As currently drafted, subsection 2(E) of the
proposed amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 in
section 5085 of H.R. 10 weakens the Treasury's longstanding
responsibility for the orderly functioning of the market for government
securities, by providing the SEC with unilateral authority to suspend
or restrict the operations of clearing agencies for government
securities in the event of a national emergency. Control by the
Treasury over this market is critical because of both the special
characteristics of the market and the independent need of the Treasury
to be able to provide for effective funding of the government of the
United States at all times. The problem created by the current draft
can be solved by deleting paragraph (E), which would have no effect on
the remaining provisions.
Public Safety Spectrum. The administration is dedicated to ensuring
that adequate spectrum exists for public safety. The Department of
Commerce has released a series of specific recommendations as part of
the President's Spectrum initiative to accomplish this goal. The
Administration opposes the inclusion of the ``Digital Transition
Consumer Assistance Fund'' under Title X, Subtitle F of S. 2845.
Creating a billion dollar fund to subsidize consumer electronics such
as digital converter boxes, high-definition televisions, and the
installation of cable and satellite services is not necessary to
achieve the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. The Administration has
proposed an analog spectrum fee on broadcasters to encourage faster
return of analog TV spectrum. This proposal would facilitate public
safety access to spectrum in a timely fashion without generating
budgetary costs.
Conclusion
The Administration also has concerns with a number of other
provisions in the House and Senate versions of the legislation and
notes that a number of provisions in the legislation could be applied
only to the extent consistent with the President's constitutional
authorities. We look forward to working closely with the Conferees as
you craft a final bill to strengthen the nation's security that the
President can sign as promptly as possible.
Sincerely,
Joshua B. Bolten,
Director, Office of Management and Budget.
Condoleezza Rice,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
cc: All House and Senate Members of the Conference
__________