[Senate Hearing 109-474]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-474
SECURING AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY: A REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES'
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WTO
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION, AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 15, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
Michael D. Bopp, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Trina D. Tyrer, Chief Clerk
FEDERAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION, AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska THOMAS CARPER, Delaware
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Katy French, Staff Director
Sheila Murphy, Minority Staff Director
John Kilvington, Minority Deputy Staff Director
Liz Scranton, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Coburn............................................... 1
Senator Levin................................................ 15
Prepared statement:
Senator Carper............................................... 41
WITNESSES
Friday, July 15, 2005
James E. Mendenhall, Acting General Counsel, Office of the United
States Trade Representative.................................... 3
Claude Barfield, Ph.D., Resident Scholar, and Director, Science
and Technology Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute... 23
Robert Stumberg, Professor of Law, Harrison Institute for Public
Law, Georgetown University Law School.......................... 26
Robert Vastine, President, Coalition of Service Industries....... 28
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Barfield, Claude, Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 54
Mendenhall, James E.:
Testimony.................................................... 3
Prepared statement with attachments.......................... 42
Stumberg, Robert:
Testimony.................................................... 26
Prepared statement........................................... 59
Vastine, Robert:
Testimony.................................................... 28
Prepared statement with attachments.......................... 63
APPENDIX
Questions and responses for the Record from:
Mr. Mendenhall............................................... 52
SECURING AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY: A REVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES'
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WTO
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FRIDAY, JULY 15, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management,
Government Information, and International Security,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in
room SD-562, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Tom Coburn,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Coburn and Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COBURN
Senator Coburn. Good morning. Thank you all for being here
today. Today's hearing will focus on the direction of the World
Trade Organization and examine the relationship between WTO
rulings and American sovereignty.
Unlike other international institutions in which the United
States participates, the WTO links its adjudication process to
an enforcement mechanism. Using this mechanism, international
diplomats determine if U.S. laws and regulations are acceptable
or unacceptable, according to the political trade standards of
the international community. That is probably as it should be.
If nations don't change laws that WTO rules against, WTO can
and does impose punitive damages on that nation's taxpayers,
and trade sanctions.
Since WTO inception 10 years ago, the United States has
lost half the cases brought against it by other WTO members--25
out of at least 50 cases. Already, Congress has repealed two
laws by WTO dictate. These include the foreign sales
corporation provisions that were provided a tax benefit for
U.S. exporters--the modification to that law is presently being
challenged as well; and the Anti-dumping Act of 1916. Both laws
were created to protect U.S. financial interests and were
modified to accommodate the interests of foreign countries and
their trade positions.
I would say that I believe in free trade. I believe in fair
free trade. Americans run and work for the most innovative,
efficient, and competitive businesses in the world. On balance,
free and fair trade with every nation benefits every American.
It is an onerous process to negotiate bilateral trade
agreements with every other Nation in the world. This process
could result in confusing and conflicting standards or create
burdensome consequences on American industry. That is why we
are in the WTO, and that is why there is marked value to our
participation.
When the United States has brought complaints against other
countries through the WTO, the United States has, for the most
part, prevailed. But when other countries have brought
complaints against us, we do far less well. So we need to be
careful. With adverse rulings from the WTO on the rise,
Congress must exercise its appropriate oversight authority and
make sure that the WTO does not cross the line into threatening
U.S. national interests.
We need to ensure that the WTO does not misinterpret U.S.
membership as a license to dictate to democratically elected
Federal and State legislatures how to govern the affairs of the
American people. Americans rely on our trade representatives,
who serve as watchdogs of the WTO, to ensure that the WTO's
adjudication process does not overstep its mission and impose
unwelcome and un-voted-on changes in our national affairs.
Unfortunately, as with other international organizations,
some of the WTO leadership seem to have higher ambitions for
this trade body beyond its purpose as a forum for resolving
trade disputes. WTO leaders pay a lot of lip service to the
notion of consensus, but we have seen how elusive global
consensus can be on fundamental matters of right and wrong. Let
me give you an idea of what I mean. This is a portion of a
statement given by a former WTO director general in his
farewell speech entitled ``Beyond the Multilateral Trading
System.'' The former WTO director general stated:
``Not too long ago, the idea of a global system of
governance would have seemed utopia, no less utopia than the
fall of the Berlin Wall without a war, the creation of a single
European currency. Cold War rivalries, ideologic conflicts,
North-South differences all created an international system
that was defined by its divisions, not by its shared interests.
``The trend in today's international system is very
different. All around us and across many issues, we feel more
and more the need for global cooperation, multilateral
agreements, and the international rule of law. The WTO's
emergence as a leading rulemaker in the global economy is a
powerful example of this trend, but is not alone. From human
rights to climate change to capital flows, our globalizing
world demands global solutions, and these solutions must be
increasingly by shared agreements and rules.''
What he means here is that the idea of a perfect world
consists of a WTO paving the way for an order that is involved
in everything from human rights, climate change, to capital
flows. This is the type of agenda that I see as a problem. It
suggests that WTO sees itself more than just trade dispute-
resolution body, but an ideologic instrument, where it swings
an economic hammer to impose a U.N.-driven, consensus-based
ideology.
Tying the economic well-being of the United States to its
submission to international notions of right and wrong is the
worst type of blackmail. We all remember when Libya was elected
the chair of the U.N. Human Rights Commission only a couple of
years after the United States had been kicked off the Human
Rights Commission. Currently, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Cuba, and
China--a literal Who's Who in human rights violators--are on
that same commission. Is that the kind of consensus we want? I
think not.
WTO tentacles reach not only to Congress here in
Washington, but to many State legislatures forced to change
their laws in response to an adverse ruling. When an
organization in Geneva requires a struggling entrepreneur in
the middle of America to change how he does business or imposes
new standards on entire industries, Congress cannot be derelict
in exercising oversight. The balance between costs and benefits
of U.S. participation in WTO must be constantly monitored. We
need to tread carefully, because the WTO does carry a very big
stick.
Let me thank each of our witnesses for being here. Senator
Carper was unable to attend. He will offer a statement for the
record.
We have before us today two panels. The first is James
Mendenhall, Acting General Counsel for the Office of the United
States Trade Representative. And we will have a second panel
consisting of Claude Barfield, resident scholar, American
Enterprise Institute; Dr. Robert Stumberg, professor of law,
Harrison Institute for Public Law, Georgetown Law School; and
Robert Vastine, president, Coalition of Service Industries.
Mr. Mendenhall, first of all, thank you for being here. I
want to say something and I want you to take it in the proper
perspective. It is very difficult for me to prepare for this
hearing when I get your testimony at 8 o'clock last night. That
is when it was delivered to my office. And I know that is not
necessarily your fault. But at every hearing, I want the
message to go back through the OMB that we have to have more
timely availability of testimonies with which to be prepared to
conduct the hearing. So if you would do that.
I thank you for your testimony. Your written testimony will
be considered a part of the record, and I recognize you now.
Thank you so much.
TESTIMONY OF JAMES E. MENDENHALL,\1\ ACTING GENERAL COUNSEL,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Mr. Mendenhall. Thank you, Chairman Coburn.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Mendenhall with attachments
appears in the Appendix on page 42.
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I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today about
the relationship between the United States and the WTO. It is
obviously a critical issue for all of the reasons that you
highlighted in your own statement.
The specific title of today's hearing is ``Securing
American Sovereignty.'' I would suggest an equally appropriate
topic would be ``Securing American Economic Strength,'' for
those two complementary objectives together form our guiding
principles in negotiating and implementing the WTO agreements.
U.S. participation in the WTO and the world trading system
is absolutely critical to our continued economic growth. At the
same time, the safeguards that are built into the system, which
I will describe in my testimony, fully preserve our sovereign
right to regulate as we--the U.S. Government, State and local
governments, and the people of America to whom we answer--see
fit.
Since 1994, when the WTO agreements were completed, the
United States has experienced an extraordinary period of
economic growth. USTR's Annual Report, issued in May of this
year, details those benefits at great length. Highlights also
appear in my written testimony, and I won't go into the details
of them here. But in summarize, they demonstrate dramatic
increases over the past 10 years in production, productivity,
incomes, and jobs throughout the United States.
In short, the benefits of U.S. participation in the WTO are
large, tangible, and widespread, as recognized by the House of
Representatives last month when it voted overwhelmingly--338 to
86--to defeat a resolution calling for U.S. withdrawal from the
WTO.
During the WTO negotiations--the Uruguay Round
negotiations--and in the current round, U.S. trade negotiators
have been ever mindful of the need to protect U.S. sovereignty.
It is absolutely critical that at the same time we work to
integrate the global economy and maximize opportunities for
U.S. workers, farmers, and businesses, we fully preserve our
sovereign prerogatives.
To better explain how we have sought to achieve those
objectives, I will break my testimony into three parts: First,
a discussion of the substantive rules; second, a discussion of
the administrative structure of the WTO; and third, a
discussion of the landmark dispute settlement mechanism
negotiated during the Uruguay Round, including a summary of how
we have fared under that system.
The predecessor to the WTO, the GATT, or General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, lasted for about 50 years and covered
only trade in goods. Since the negotiation of that agreement,
though, the global economy has evolved and it now looks much
different than it did 50 or 60 years ago. The services sector
now accounts for 60 to 80 percent of the U.S. economy. It is
the one area where the United States actually has a trade
surplus. Protection of intellectual property has come to play a
central role in U.S. economic growth. The value of innovation,
creativity, and branding, covering everything from movies and
music to software to pharmaceuticals to basic trademarks, is a
key driver of U.S. competitiveness.
As a result, we negotiated new rules in the Uruguay Round
to cover services and intellectual property and break down
trade barriers. We also modernized and elaborated on the old
GATT disciplines, so that they now cover in greater detail
issues such as standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
and trade remedies. Yet, all these rules share the same
hallmarks as the previous GATT system. They set general
parameters to eliminate protectionist measures and liberalize
trade, while at the same time they allow ample flexibility to
regulate in the public interest.
Outside general guidelines prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of nationality, promoting transparency and the like,
the GATT and the GATS--the services agreement--impose few
constraints on a country's ability to regulate as it sees fit.
In the context of the GATS, a country may agree to open, for
example, its markets to foreign firms seeking to provide legal
and architectural services, but governments will retain their
right to regulate admission, licensing, and disciplinary
standards and the like.
As another example, WTO rules require that governments base
their food safety standards on science. At the same time,
though, governments are free to adopt as high a standard of
protection as they want, provided those standards are in fact
science-based. The GATT and GATS also contain explicit
exceptions for measures taken to protect health and safety,
national security, and the like.
When it comes to intellectual property, the rules we
negotiated in the Uruguay Round codified, elaborated on, and
made consistent 100 years of international practice and
rulemaking, and at the end of the day, the agreement that we
negotiated, the TRIPS agreement, effectively obligated other
countries to meet standards that the United States by and large
already met.
But perhaps the most important safeguard with respect to
the substantive rules is the way the United States, in
accordance with our constitutional procedures, has chosen to
implement them. The rules negotiated in the WTO, in and of
themselves, have absolutely no domestic legal effect. Instead,
the United States implemented the WTO agreements by statute,
through the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Any and all changes
to U.S. law necessary to implement the WTO agreements are
contained in that act and in subsequent amendments to U.S. law
that the Congress may choose to adopt. If the Congress chooses
not to amend a law that conflicts with a WTO rule, the domestic
law prevails.
Other protections are built into the statute as well. For
example, there is no private cause of action that may be
brought in U.S. Federal courts on the basis that a particular
measure--State, local, Federal--is inconsistent with the WTO
agreements. And State laws are given similar protection. The
WTO agreements don't automatically preempt State laws, and the
statute contains provisions establishing procedures for
consultation between the Federal and State governments
regarding implementation of the WTO rules, including when it
comes to dispute settlement.
Turning to the administration of the WTO, it is important
to recognize that the WTO is a member-driven organization.
There is a secretariat that administers the organization, which
is based in Geneva, but it has virtually no independent
decisionmaking ability. Decisions are generally taken by
consensus, that is, by unanimous consent, which means that any
member may, in theory, exercise a veto, including, of course,
the United States. Now, countries with stronger economic and
political clout--which of course includes the United States--
can effectively use this threat to motivate other members to
reach compromises that are acceptable to all.
Special rules are spelled out in the WTO Agreement for
taking particularly important decisions, such as amendments or
binding interpretations. For example, core provisions on most
favored nation treatment, the amendment process, the
decisionmaking process--those rules may only be amended by
consensus. No substantive amendment to the WTO agreements can
apply to any member that doesn't agree to its application.
Turning to dispute settlement: The dispute settlement
system that existed under the GATT was overhauled during the
Uruguay Round, and the new rules for dispute settlement are set
forth in the Dispute Settlement Understanding, or DSU. The DSU
is in turn administered by something called the Dispute
Settlement Body, which is a subsidiary body to the WTO General
Counsel.
The Dispute Settlement Understanding, and the process that
is set forth therein, provides a forum for resolving disputes
over a member's compliance with the rules. But dispute
settlement is only available to governments, not to private
parties. Private parties can't go to the WTO and bring a claim
against any other member, including the United States.
The dispute settlement process begins with consultations,
and if that fails to produce a resolution, the complaining
member may submit the dispute to a formal panel for resolution.
The panel is composed of three members chosen by the disputing
parties, so there is party control over the process. And if no
agreement is reached, the WTO director general will choose the
members of the panel. The panel will then issue findings as to
whether the responding member has acted inconsistently with its
obligations. If such a finding is rendered, the panel may
recommend that the member bring its measure into compliance.
Either member may appeal the panel's decision to the
appellate body, which is a standing body of seven members, one
of which is from the United States. The appellate body will
then issue its findings and correct errors in the report.
The DSB will then automatically adopt the panel or
appellate body report, unless it agrees by consensus not to do
so--which effectively means that all reports are adopted. It is
important, in fact critical, to recognize, however, that
regardless of any decision that may be rendered by a panel or
the appellate body, the WTO has absolutely no authority to
require any member to change a law, regulation, or practice.
If a member fails to bring its measure into compliance,
there are other options available. It can offer compensation to
the complaining member, which may mean, for example, that it
lowers tariffs on imports from the complaining member. It
doesn't have to do that. If it chooses not to offer
compensation, or if no agreement on compensation is reached,
the complaining member can retaliate, which means it can impose
higher tariffs, for example, on imports from the member found
to be acting inconsistently with the rules.
But again, the WTO cannot force any member to change a law
or regulation or practice. And if a country refuses to comply
with a finding, it can't be forced to do so.
In a sense, this is no different than what would happen if
the WTO never existed in the first place. In such a world, any
country could impose sanctions for whatever reason it deemed
appropriate. There are, of course, significant differences,
which are important. The complaining member, if it goes through
the process and sanctions are its only alternative at the end
of the day, it receives a stamp of approval from the WTO, and
that is important from the perspective of the international
community. And the international community may bring pressure
to bear on the country that was found to be acting
inconsistently with the WTO rules and try to persuade, on that
basis, the member to bring its measures into compliance. But
diplomatic pressure is vastly different from a system that
could compel a government to comply. And again, the WTO cannot
compel the United States or any other member to comply with a
ruling.
The United States has fared fairly well under this system.
Since the start of the WTO, we have initiated 75 cases, of
which we have settled 24, we have won 24, we lost four, and the
remainder are in litigation or being monitored for progress or
otherwise inactive. We have been challenged 84 times. As you
noted, 52 of those cases have been completed, and of those we
have settled 15 and won 12.
The number of cases filed by the United States and all WTO
members combined has declined over time, as countries in the
beginning of the system, back when the WTO first began,
essentially picked the low-hanging fruit and there was a pent-
up demand that was exhausted during the first few years of the
WTO. That, combined with the fact that the WTO dispute
settlement system works to deter new breaches, has resulted in
a gradual decline in cases over time, but there still is a
steady stream of them, as there has been over the past few
years.
The system isn't perfect, and we recognize that, and part
of the negotiations that are going on now are to improve the
system. The United States has played a critical role, central
role in that process. We have advocated, for example, increased
transparency in the dispute settlement process by opening
proceedings to the public, opening up the hearings,
facilitating public access to documents, and urging members to
consider establishing guidelines for accepting, for example,
amicus curiae submissions so that members of civil society and
others who wish to voice an opinion on the interpretation of
the agreements may do so.
We have also suggested that WTO members provide additional
guidance to panels and the appellate body to help ensure that
the process better serves its primary function of facilitating
settlement of disputes rather than merely rendering legal
decisions. And we have recommended the development of new
mechanisms to improve flexibility and member control over the
process.
In conclusion, I return to where I began, that
participation in the WTO has benefitted the United States
tremendously. We recognize, however, that efforts to strengthen
integration and open foreign markets for U.S. farmers, workers,
and businesses must at all times be balanced with appropriate
safeguards to protect our sovereignty. As in the past, we will
continue to ensure that we preserve this balance as we continue
with the current round of negotiations. Thank you.
Senator Coburn. Thank you very much for your testimony. Let
me ask a few questions of you, if I might.
The people who actually make the decisions is from a list
of what I understand is experts in the area. Is that right?
Mr. Mendenhall. You are talking about dispute settlement
panels?
Senator Coburn. Yes.
Mr. Mendenhall. That is right.
Senator Coburn. Who are they? Where is the list? Who makes
the list?
Mr. Mendenhall. Right.
Senator Coburn. Where do they come from? Where is the
transparency to know who is making the decisions? Do we know
who is--when the dispute settlement body is undergoing a
decision, and there is this list of experts that they choose
from, who makes the choice of who the experts are that see
that; and does the general public, are they aware of who made
the decisions?
Mr. Mendenhall. Right. The particular panelists in a given
case are chosen by agreement of the disputing parties--so the
complaining member and the responding party. If they can't
agree, then the WTO director general chooses the panelists in
close consultation with the parties and others that have----
Senator Coburn. Does that happen, in fact, often that they
can't agree?
Mr. Mendenhall. It does happen quite frequently that----
Senator Coburn. Let's go behind that. Why is that? Because
certain experts will rule one way and certain experts will be
deemed to--thought to rule another way? Or we don't believe
that they are experts?
Mr. Mendenhall. Well, there may be concerns about a
particular member having conflicts. There may be concerns about
a particular panelist, or proposed panelist, who has rendered
decisions that one of the disputing parties may not approve of;
it doesn't agree with the approach that has been taken, and so
on. So they have the ability to take that into account in
deciding whether or not they would agree to a particular
panelist.
Senator Coburn. Is this all transparent? In other words,
anybody anywhere in the world could find out who the list of
experts are and who is the experts on each panel?
Mr. Mendenhall. There is a roster that is maintained, which
is included in our annual report. And that is available. It is
available on our Web site--we publish it in hard copy as well.
So, yes, the roster itself is publicly available. The
particular panelists in a given case are, of course, known, as
the ones who are presiding over the dispute are of course known
as well.
Senator Coburn. You say that WTO rules have no domestic
legal effect. That is your testimony. Isn't it true to say that
if the United States chose not to comply with these rulings,
there will be serious implications about our trade relations?
Mr. Mendenhall. I think it is fair to say that if any
country doesn't comply, they will face pressure to comply. I
think that is true. Now, at the same time, though, that doesn't
mean that every country complies in every case. If there is a
particular issue that is particularly sensitive for a member,
that member may not comply. That has happened. The United
States has not complied with several rulings that----
Senator Coburn. Can you give me some examples of those?
Mr. Mendenhall. We haven't complied yet with the Byrd
Amendment, the finding against the Byrd Amendment. We haven't
complied with the ruling against us on a particular
intellectual property matter dealing with Irish music. By and
large, we have complied, and we have sought to do so. But it is
recognized that the Congress, if a law needs to be changed, has
the final say on whether or not that law is changed, at the end
of the day.
Senator Coburn. I am sorry, I didn't hear the last thing
you said.
Mr. Mendenhall. There are times when the United States, as
with other countries, has not complied with a given ruling. And
it is recognized in the United States, as with all members,
that the final say, if legislation needs to be changed, the
final say on whether to do that lies with the legislature. So
it lies with the Senate and the House of Representatives
whether to implement or not, if a law needs to be changed.
Senator Coburn. So the WTO allows countries to impose
punitive damages and sanctions if a country does not come into
compliance with a WTO ruling.
Mr. Mendenhall. Right. They are not punitive. They are
capped at the level of economic harm that the inconsistent
measure has caused to the complaining member.
Senator Coburn. Well, let's talk about France and beef,
then. How did we get to the dollar amount that we got on
hormone beef going into France?
Mr. Mendenhall. We calculated--I don't know if we did
France specifically, but we calculated the value of what our
trade would have been absent the EC measure that was found to
be inconsistent, and that was the level of retaliation that we
were allowed to impose.
Senator Coburn. OK. And so we collect that?
Mr. Mendenhall. Yes.
Senator Coburn. We collect a payment from them because they
don't allow us----
Mr. Mendenhall. We collect a payment by virtue of
increasing our tariffs on certain imports from the European
Community.
Senator Coburn. Do you happen to know specifically what we
responded to in terms of--we had a favorable ruling with the
WTO on beef, and where did we increase tariffs?
Mr. Mendenhall. That is a public list. I would be happy to
provide it to you. I don't have the list in my head.
Senator Coburn. Have we complied--other than the two you
mentioned, all the other WTO rulings we have complied with?
Mr. Mendenhall. We have complied with the vast majority. I
would be happy to get you more information on the specifics of
that. But we have complied with the vast majority.
Senator Coburn. In your testimony you state WTO decisions
are taken by consensus, which means that any member may, in
theory, exercise a veto. Later in your record, you go on to
state that any interpretation of the rules--that is, a type of
WTO decision that involves binding trade rule interpretation--
requires the agreement by three-quarters of all members.
Mr. Mendenhall. Right.
Senator Coburn. Can you explain the difference to me there?
In other words, we can exercise a veto, but it can still be
binding. How can it be binding?
Mr. Mendenhall. Right. Interpretations, that is right. The
interpretation rules are slightly different from the general
rule. There is a general rule in the WTO that consensus is
needed for decisionmaking. That is made explicit or reinforced
elsewhere in the WTO agreements when it comes to particularly
important procedures, such as the amendment procedure, such as
particularly important substantive rules like
nondiscrimination, MFN treatment, and the like.
The interpretation procedures are a bit different. You are
right, they require three-quarters, which I believe, although I
would have to double-check it, was increased from--I believe it
was increased from a majority in the GATT, although I would
have to double-check that. So that is not consensus.
Now, I can tell you as a matter of practice that there has
never been a vote in the WTO. Members try extremely hard to
only take decisions by consensus, regardless of what the rule
written on paper may be. If we ever did go to a vote, it would
be a landmark event, and we have never done that. In fact, on
the interpretation procedure that you cite specifically, I
don't believe it has ever been invoked since the beginning of
the WTO. I don't think it has ever been invoked even in the
GATT, although, again, I would have to double-check that
history.
So it is theoretically possibly to have a three-quarter
vote on an interpretation--but practice is consensus.
Interpretation, though, is vastly different than amendment. And
the rules make clear that an interpretation cannot go beyond,
cannot amend the rules and should not be used as such. And I
think members are cognizant of that cautionary rule.
Senator Coburn. Is it not a fact that rulings are not
supposed to be precedent-setting, but in fact many times
precedents are used to justify new rulings?
Mr. Mendenhall. They are--you are correct that they are not
formally precedent-setting. There is no formal rule of stare
decisis in the WTO as there would be in a common law system,
like the United States. At the same time, you are also right,
and as I said, I think, in my written testimony, that panels
and appellate bodies do look to previous decisions for
guidance.
Senator Coburn. Has that been harmful or helpful for the
United States?
Mr. Mendenhall. I think it is helpful--by and large, it is
helpful for the United States and the system as a whole. It
improves the stability, predictability of the system and helps
ensure that people understand, countries understand how the
rules will be interpreted and applied. So it has been helpful.
Which isn't to say that every decision has been in our favor,
or that we have agreed with every single finding that any panel
and appellate body decision has rendered. But by and large, it
has been helpful.
Senator Coburn. I understand that the United States has
proposed to the WTO body at least two resolutions that would
modify the WTO's judicial system and allow for greater
transparency and flexibility for disputing parties to work
things out through bilateral negotiations. Can you tell me what
the outcome of these resolutions are and if these were resisted
or accepted by the WTO, and what are in the impact of these
outcomes?
Mr. Mendenhall. There is no outcome as of yet. Those
negotiations are continuing. I think people are taking the
proposals seriously. There is an interest by, certainly, a
large number of countries in improving transparency and
control. But those discussions are ongoing, so I can't tell you
what the outcome will be.
Senator Coburn. Can you educate me as to why somebody would
be resistant to transparency at the WTO?
Mr. Mendenhall. Sure. I don't think they should be, of
course, but there are a lot of countries in the world--some
countries in the world, anyway, that don't have domestic legal
systems that operate in the same way as the United States
system does, which is highly transparent. It is a concept that
they aren't necessarily familiar with. They need to get used to
the idea of opening up the court proceedings and opening up the
submissions and so on.
So in many cases, it is simply an education process more
than anything else, that it is new and different, and there are
some who may feel that, on top of that, that international
proceedings of this sort should be between governments and not
open.
Now, the United States obviously disagrees strongly with
that, and so we have pushed for greater transparency.
Senator Coburn. One of the problems CAFTA is facing is the
difficulty in Congress being informed prior to decisions being
made and, to quote the chairman of the Agriculture Committee,
is ``it is not going to happen again in terms of the lack of
input. The complications over sugar could have been handled had
the Congress been involved.''
The other thing I spoke with Representative Portman about
was enforcement of intellectual property rights. And it is my
opinion--it may not be a correct opinion--that we lose all the
time, even though people are ``in compliance,'' as China
supposedly is in compliance. But then they don't carry out the
effect of their own internal laws.
How is the WTO helping us on the intellectual property?
Because that is the only thing that we really have an advantage
on today. And where are we going with that in terms of them
enforcing? In fact China agrees with WTO rulings on
intellectual property rights and yet they don't enforce the law
in their own country, what are our options?
Mr. Mendenhall. Right. Yes, I think we have an advantage in
a lot of areas in addition to intellectual property--services,
and certainly a lot of our manufacturing sector, and others.
Agriculture is highly competitive. But obviously intellectual
property is critical. It is a growing part of our economy. It
is an area where we do have a very marked comparative
advantage. And so we do need to do all we can to protect the
value of our innovation and create incentives to continue
innovation in the future.
To determine what the benefit of the--let me break your
question into two parts. One is the progress we have made so
far, and then next steps, where we go from here.
On the first part about where we are now and how we got
there, I think it is important to look back where we were 10
years ago, when the WTO was first put in place. At that point,
a large number of countries in the world didn't have very
developed laws on intellectual property, even apart from
enforcement. We were in a sense in Phase I of the IP rulemaking
world, where we just needed to put the rules into place so at
least they had them on the books.
We did that through the TRIPS agreement. There has been a
dramatic improvement in the rules in the books around the
world, including in China, but also in other countries as well.
And we are continuing to ensure that happens when countries
accede to the WTO, including Russia, for example. We are
seeking to do that. The rules in the TRIPS agreement are by and
large designed to improve the rules on the books.
Enforcement is much harder. I call this Phase II, which is
the challenge that is now facing us: How to develop enforcement
rules that work. Because as you implied, you can have all the
rules on the books that you want, but if you don't enforce
them, they are not worth the paper they are written on. So we
do need to focus now on enforcement. There are rules in the WTO
on enforcement. Unfortunately, they aren't as precise as they
could be. They say the enforcement procedures have to be
deterrent, sufficiently severe to be deterrent. That standard,
we all know, in some degrees is not met in countries like
China, and we know that.
What we are now in the process of doing on China is working
closely with our industry to gather all the information that we
can, and evidence that we can, and working closely with our
trading partners and with their industries as well to gather
all the information we can to demonstrate that we have tried
the system, it has been tested, and it hasn't worked, and here
is why it hasn't worked, and as a result we have 90 plus
percent piracy rates in the country. We could then move forward
and demonstrate that in fact there is an inconsistency.
The WTO dispute settlement process--which a lot of folks
are asking us to use and which we are willing to use if we are
confident we can move forward successfully--it is a judicial
process, or it is a quasi-judicial process, at least, and we
need to prove our case. So even though we all know that it is a
huge problem, we need to gather the evidence to do it. And that
is a complicated process and that is a time-consuming process,
but that is what we are doing. And we are working very closely
with our industry to do it. And once we have gone down that
road, if we have not seen a significant improvement in China,
we have signaled quite strongly that we are willing to go
forward and use all the options available to us in the WTO.
In the meantime, we intend to use the procedures short of
formal dispute settlement in the WTO to see what we can do to
pressure China to move forward, including utilizing the
transparency rules in the WTO that allow us to go to China and
say give us all of your information on your cases so we can see
exactly how your court system works and whether it has worked
or not, whether it is effective or not. We are going to go
forward with that. And we are working with our allies to see if
they will join us in that effort.
And then even outside the WTO process we are working
through a formal bilateral dialogue with the Chinese, through
the Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade, to improve IP
enforcement in China, including setting benchmarks, setting
standards, specific objectives that we would like them to meet.
If we don't see dramatic improvement, then, as I said, all
options remain on the table.
Senator Coburn. I am trying to understand how the WTO helps
us in intellectual property. You have the software
manufacturers who are hesitant to go forward with a sanction
against China, or a case, because they are being blackmailed,
in essence, that if you do this, you are going to have worse
problems participating in China.
The very advantages that you list that we have are
dependent--other than agriculture--on our intellectual
properties, whether it is manufacturing techniques. We know
things are reverse engineered in China, from patented items in
this country, and then they are duplicated and the intellectual
property is totally ignored.
So how is WTO helping us at this time? Ten years from now
may be too late for most of our software, most of our drugs,
most of our copyrighted music and other things. Once that is
gone down the road, then the advantages that we have in these
other areas--manufacturing, service industries, and everything
else. My question to you is why have we not filed through the
WTO for an enforcement action on intellectual property in
China? Are we afraid that we are not going to be able to
continue the sales growth of our exports there through a
blackmail process?
I am having trouble understanding how the WTO is working
effectively to control and protect American intellectual
property. Even though we have the TRIPS agreement, if you have
no enforcement, you have no law.
Mr. Mendenhall. Right, I agree with everything that you
said. It is absolutely critical that we act and we act quickly
to address the problem of IP piracy and counterfeiting in
China. I couldn't agree more. What we are doing now is trying
to find the most effective way to do that. There are several
tools that are available at our disposal, but they are not----
Senator Coburn. What are they?
Mr. Mendenhall. Well, I went through a number of them in my
last statement. We have the ability to work with them
bilaterally, which we are doing through the Joint Committee on
Commerce and Trade, to address--to reach agreement on specific
IP benchmarks and objectives for them to obtain. Now, we did it
last year, and we did it just recently--last week, I believe,
in China. They haven't fully met all of those objectives. We
recognize that. But we are working with them closely----
Senator Levin. May I just interrupt for one second? What is
the ``it'' that you did? You said you did it recently.
Mr. Mendenhall. The ``it'' is setting forth common
objectives with the Chinese----
Senator Levin. Proposing. Excuse my interruption, but be
real clear. The ``it'' is proposing benchmarks. Is that what
you are saying?
Mr. Mendenhall. Proposing specific objectives, including
significant reduction in piracy and counterfeiting.
Senator Levin. Not achieving them, just proposing them.
Mr. Mendenhall. We have reached with China agreement on
obtaining a set--or reaching a set of objectives, including
significant reduction in piracy and counterfeiting. Have they
met those objectives, all of them? No, they have not. They have
not significantly reduced piracy and counterfeiting to the
level that we would wish them to do so. It is an ongoing
process. We are continuing to work with them.
But getting back to the question about what the tools are
that are available and how we are utilizing them, this is one
but not the only tool that we are utilizing. So we are using
the Joint Committee on Commerce and Trade to enter into a
serious bilateral dialogue with the Chinese to try to set forth
a set of common agreed objectives that the Chinese should meet
with respect to reducing piracy and counterfeiting.
There is a general objective of significantly reducing
piracy and counterfeiting in China as well as a series of
specific objectives dealing with, for example, accession and
implementation of the WIPO Internet treaties to bring their IP
laws--to modernize them, allow them to address digital piracy
online. We are also working on software procurement issues,
working on a variety of other issues. We can provide more
information on the specifics, if you would like.
That is one tool. It is not the only tool. And it hasn't
yet produced the dramatic and necessary results that we would
like to see.
So that is one tool. Another tool that we have is working
through the WTO, and there are a number of procedures that are
available to us on that front. One is working together with our
allies through the TRIPS Council in the WTO, which is an IP
forum, to bring pressure on the Chinese to--international
pressure to bear on the Chinese to try to get them to comply.
We have done that. Again, and I am not saying we have achieved
all the goals we would like to achieve, but these are the tools
available to us.
Third, we are using the transparency procedures in the WTO
to demand that China provide us information on why they
believe, if they can put their money where their mouth is and
prove to the world that in fact their system is effective in
enforcing intellectual property.
The last option available to us is dispute settlement, and
that is an option that is certainly on the table. We have said
to the Chinese that is a very serious possibility, and we are
working closely with our industries, all segments of our
industry who are interested in having us move forward on a
case, to gather all the appropriate information, test the
system, have a comprehensive program to make sure the system
works in China. If it doesn't work, to provide the evidence to
us so that we have a very compelling dossier of evidence that
we can go to the WTO and say they failed in the following ways,
their court system doesn't work, we have 90 percent piracy
rates, or whatever rate it is that we are able to glean from
the information that we are collecting, and prove our case in
court, essentially, through the dispute settlement mechanism,
that in fact the enforcement procedures are not deterrent.
Those are all the options that we have available to us, and
we are working hard. We are working to utilize all of them to
maximize their potential and to ensure that they will actually
succeed at the end of the day.
Senator Coburn. I am going to defer to Senator Levin here
in just a minute. Can you give us a time frame? In other words,
the risk to U.S. intellectual property over a period of time
not being enforced creates more and more damage to us as a
Nation in terms of our future economic model. Because we really
don't have a tool, or we refuse to use a tool to enforce this
in China. How long can we wait until we bring them into
compliance?
Mr. Mendenhall. How long can we wait? Well, obviously we
need to get them into compliance as soon as we can. That almost
goes without saying. But we do need to be able to have all the
evidence before us. Now, we have been working very hard over
the past several years to gather what we can to demonstrate the
case.
And just to give you an example of what we have done, last
year we submitted, or issued, a survey to all--an open survey
to anyone who wanted to respond. We sent it to every Member of
Congress, we put it up on the Web site, we sent it directly to
companies, every company and trade association that came to us
and said they have a problem with IP in China. We sent it to
all of them, asking for information on the particular problems
they have, how they have sought to enforce their rights,
whether it worked, whether it didn't work, and so on. And we
have done that. We conducted a special out-of-cycle review
under our special 301 process--which is a tool I forgot to
mention--to continue that process, gather additional
information. We put China in a special category this year. We
indicated that they are back on the priority watch list in
addition to being under what we call Section 306 monitoring,
which I can explain if you want. But they are in a category of
their own, indicating that this is a matter of critical
importance to us. We set out a work plan in that OCR and we are
continuing to work with our industries now to gather any
remaining information that we can.
Now, obviously we need to move as quickly as possible. But
we can't move unless we have all the information that we need.
And to a large degree, it is up to our industries to work with
us to do that. So we are in the process of doing it. I can't
give you a precise timeframe, but we are working with all due
haste to try to get it all together and be prepared to move
forward, if that is where we need to be at the end of the day.
Senator Coburn. All right. Thank you.
Senator Levin, you are next for an opening statement and
questions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, most importantly
for holding this hearing, and you are, it seems to me,
performing an extraordinarily important function in terms of
trying to weed out what is the wheat and what is the chaff when
it comes to WTO.
I must tell you, when it comes to trade enforcement, I have
seen talk as a substitute for action for so many years around
here that I am not surprised to hear more talk this morning.
What does this mean, ``all due haste''? It sounds like ``all
deliberate speed'' to me.
Mr. Mendenhall. What I mean by that is we are----
Senator Levin. The Chairman asked you for a timetable.
Mr. Mendenhall. Right. And I gave the best I can give.
Senator Levin. ``As quickly as possible.'' That is not a
timetable.
Mr. Mendenhall. Would you like me to respond?
Senator Levin. Yes. I would love you to respond, but with a
timetable. This year? Next year? This decade? I mean, China is
absolutely not only continuing to close its country to our
products, violating our intellectual property agreements,
violating WTO, running up a huge trade surplus, manipulating
currency, and what we hear is ``we're gathering evidence.'' You
have told us they have not even complied with agreements, and
that is true. You know it. You have said this again here. What
more will it take, and when do you contemplate we are going to
get to the WTO if they do not shape up--which they are not
going to do. They will enter into an agreement and break it.
When are we going to the WTO? Will it be this year? Do we have
a commitment that you will go this year to WTO?
Mr. Mendenhall. I can't give you a commitment. I can tell
you that we are working extremely closely with our industries,
all industries that are interested in bringing a case. And it
depends in large part on their ability to pull together all the
information that we are going to need. Now, I can't speak for
industry and tell you when they are going to do that. But they
are working on it. And I know they are working on it, so I
don't mean this as a criticism of them. But it is in large part
dependent upon them. And we are working with them to try to
design a program to ensure that we get the information that we
need. And that is the rate-limiting step here, if you will.
Senator Levin. At the rate you are going, when will we file
a case?
Mr. Mendenhall. I am not sure what more I can add to what I
have said already.
Senator Levin. You talk a little too fast for me, I am
sorry. Just a little slower on that. At the rate we are going,
the current rate--you know what the rate is--gathering
information, when will we be in a position to file a case?
Mr. Mendenhall. I can't give you an answer to that. I can't
foresee everything that is going to come up over the next few
months. I don't know the answer to that. I can tell you we have
pulled out all the stops to try to move this. It is one of our
highest priorities to try to ensure that in fact we are moving
forward on this.
Senator Levin. Agreements have been violated. Is that
correct? Did you not just say that again this morning? We have
entered into agreements; they haven't lived up to them.
Mr. Mendenhall. What I said was----
Senator Levin. Is it true, they haven't lived up to our
agreements that we have reached with them?
Mr. Mendenhall. It is true that they have not significantly
reduced piracy and counterfeiting to the levels we would like
to see them to do so, that is correct.
Senator Levin. Is it true that they have not lived up to
agreements we have reached with them?
Mr. Mendenhall. It is critical for us, if we are going to
move forward in a dispute settlement case, that we be able to
demonstrate it with all of the evidence as if this were a
court. Now, we may all know it to be true intuitively, because
we have all heard the horror stories, whether it be--largely
anecdotal, but widespread anecdotal evidence that in fact there
is a serious problem with IP enforcement in China. We know
that. We know that it hurts small businesses, we know that it
hurts large businesses. It is a top priority of this
Administration to deal with this problem.
However, knowing it intuitively is different from proving
it in dispute settlement. I think we can--we will be able to
prove it in dispute settlement, but we are in the process of
gathering all the information we need to do that.
Senator Levin. And when you say ``proving it,'' are you
talking about proving violation of WTO or proving breach of
agreements that we have already reached with China?
Mr. Mendenhall. I was talking in the context of dispute
settlement, but the same would be true otherwise, for any other
reason.
Senator Levin. You are talking about proof of both or proof
of WTO violations? Is it agreements that have already been
reached, or violation of WTO rules? Or both?
Mr. Mendenhall. Well, I suppose it is both. But what I had
in mind was WTO dispute settlement, since that was the context
of our discussion.
Senator Levin. OK, now, we have also entered into
agreements with China. Is that not true?
Mr. Mendenhall. We entered into an agreement in the mid-
1990s on intellectual property enforcement. We reached common
objectives last year, not as a formal agreement, but common
objectives last year in the context of the JCCT, which provided
further elaboration.
Senator Levin. And the agreement that was reached on
intellectual property in the mid-1990s, have they complied with
that agreement?
Mr. Mendenhall. That agreement is now 10 years old. Hard to
say which of those commitments are now applicable and which are
not. When the agreement was first reached, there was a
significant reduction in export of pirated materials, which was
a key objective. We have seen recently an increase in that. To
say that they have definitively breached it or not, if you
parse through that agreement, would be difficult to say.
Clearly, though, if the overall objective of that agreement,
under the TRIPS Agreement, is that they reduce piracy and
counterfeiting to an acceptable level, they haven't done that.
That is true.
Senator Levin. Is part of the agreement that we have
reached with China that they will comply with the WTO standard
procedural norms, respond in writing to requests for
information?
Mr. Mendenhall. We are going to----
Senator Levin. No, is that part of the agreement? Is that
part of the WTO requirement, that they respond in writing to
requests for information from other member countries?
Mr. Mendenhall. They are supposed to do that, yes.
Senator Levin. Have they?
Mr. Mendenhall. We haven't made the request yet. We are
doing that--well, let me--I don't know which specific provision
you are talking about, but there are a couple of provisions
that pertain to transparency. There is a process called the
Transitional Review Mechanism developed under the TRIPS Council
which is a review mechanism which is done periodically. IP is a
prominent part of that. We have requested information, as have
other countries. They have provided responses to those
requests. There is a separate provision in the TRIPS agreement
that allows countries to ask for specific information on
specific cases. We are working with our industry on this
request. They are happy with the results, with the working
relationship we have, to put together that request, and we are
working now with our trading partners to see if we can work
jointly on that. We expect that request to go in soon. And then
China will then have a period of time to respond thereafter.
Senator Levin. The transitional review mechanism, is that
called ``trim''?
Mr. Mendenhall. T-R-M, yes.
Senator Levin. It is called T-R-M. Have they abided by
accepted WTO procedures relative to that transitional review
mechanism?
Mr. Mendenhall. Have they responded to questions?
Senator Levin. Yes.
Mr. Mendenhall. Yes, they have responded to questions.
Senator Levin. So we don't have any cases where they have
not responded to questions?
Mr. Mendenhall. Not that I am aware of, although I can get
back to you if there is a specific problem there.
Senator Levin. And what does USTR mean when it says it is
going to take more forceful action aimed at enforcing China's
implementation of those WTO commitments? What do you mean when
you say it?
Mr. Mendenhall. I mean what I explained earlier. There are
a number of procedures available in the WTO that are available
to us.
Senator Levin. Are there instances where China has not
carried out its WTO commitments, in your judgment?
Mr. Mendenhall. I think there is a very strong sense that
there is a problem that they have on enforcement, that they
have not lived up to the standard on enforcement in the WTO.
Again, that is much different than saying we have all of the
evidence that we need to gather to bring a case. Now, I think
we can gather that evidence, but we are in the process of doing
that now.
Senator Levin. I am way over my time. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Coburn. I just have a couple more questions for
you, if I might, and then we will be free.
First of all, thank you for your candor. I understand you
can't say something here that puts us in a limited negotiating
position by what you testify here, and I understand that and I
am appreciative of your position and recognize that.
The National Conference of State Legislatures wrote to U.S.
Trade Representative Rob Portman in March of this year and
expressed concerns with the implications of WTO decisions on
States rights, which are in fact major in many instances. What
is the USTR doing to remedy the current problem of State
lawmakers being out of the loop even though trade negotiations
will affect their laws? In what stage of a trade dispute does
USTR typically reach out to the States?
Mr. Mendenhall. I will answer the latter question first and
get back to the former.
If there is a dispute that implicates State laws, we begin
consultations immediately with the State, particularly the
Attorney General's Office and others who have an interest in
that. We did that, for example, in the gambling case, which
prompted in part, I think, that letter. So we fully consult
with the States who are implicated with any dispute all along
the way. In fact, I think we are required to by statute, and we
would do it anyway because it is absolutely critical that they
be involved in the process throughout the time if any of their
interests are implicated.
So on dispute settlement, that is what we do. On
negotiations, we have a similar process, where we have State
points of contact that we work with in each individual State.
We work with the Governor's Office. We of course have formal or
informal dialogue with anybody, including State legislators,
that individually or collectively want to ask us questions. We
are happy to answer them at any time.
But when we put forward negotiating positions, for example,
as in the services context, that implicate State laws, we
consult fully with the States on them. They have a chance to
review the content of the submissions that we would make, the
negotiating proposals we put down. They consent or not--in most
cases they do. We work with professional associations,
including State bar associations if we are talking about legal
services, or whatever the appropriate association would be in a
given case.
So we have extensive contacts with the States at all times.
And we will continue to do all we can to improve those lines of
communication if a particular problem arises.
Senator Coburn. Mr. Barfield is going to be on our second
panel, and I read his testimony yesterday or the day before.
And he seems to have some pretty good ideas or recommendations
for us in terms of changing the WTO. I would consider it a
personal favor if both you and Representative Portman would
look at some of the recommendations in terms of--actually it is
more in terms of transparency and solutions to problems that
don't take us down some of these other paths. So I would
consider it a great favor if you all would look at his
testimony, because I found it very insightful.
Do you have additional question, Mr. Levin?
Senator Levin. I do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, just a few.
First, on the currency evaluation issue, Article 15 of the
GATT prohibits WTO members from using currency exchange action
to frustrate the intent of GATT. Has China manipulated their
currency, in your judgment? Currency exchange?
Mr. Mendenhall. My judgment isn't the determinative
judgment.
Senator Levin. I know that. But in your judgment, have
they? I know it is not determinative.
Mr. Mendenhall. I am going to have to defer to the Treasury
Department on that.
Senator Levin. Well, is it not true that the Treasury
Department has said that current Chinese policies are highly
distortionary and pose a risk to not just their economy but to
trading partners and the global economic growth? Does that
sound familiar?
Mr. Mendenhall. I am assuming you are quoting a document.
They could very well have said that. I would defer to them.
Senator Levin. Do you accept that?
Mr. Mendenhall. Again, on currency policy, I am going to
have to defer to the Treasury Department.
Senator Levin. Well, who challenges that policy at WTO?
Mr. Mendenhall. Who challenges the policy?
Senator Levin. Is that the Treasury Department, or you?
Mr. Mendenhall. We would work in close consultation with
the Treasury Department, as we do on all issues. We have an
extensive interagency process on any matter that may implicate
any agency's interest.
Senator Levin. But who would actually file the document?
Mr. Mendenhall. Yes, USTR would actually file it.
Senator Levin. Are you considering filing such a case?
Mr. Mendenhall. Well----
Senator Levin. Given their finding and you work closely
with them, are you considering filing that case?
Mr. Mendenhall. I don't believe they found manipulation.
Senator Levin. No, they found current policies are
distortionary.
Mr. Mendenhall. But they didn't find manipulation.
Senator Levin. OK, so you are not prepared to file a case
at this time?
Mr. Mendenhall. It is not currently under consideration.
Senator Levin. Would you be willing to file a case if you
found manipulation?
Mr. Mendenhall. If we found a violation of the WTO
agreements, it would be something that we would always
consider.
Senator Levin. And if there is an artificial undervaluation
of their currency through manipulation, would you file a case?
Mr. Mendenhall. I can't commit to filing a case.
Senator Levin. Even under that circumstance?
Mr. Mendenhall. You are asking me a hypothetical question
on whether we would bring a case if particular findings were
made. I can't answer that question. It is a hypothetical
question.
Senator Levin. I think it is a very real question,
actually. It is not hypothetical at all. If you can't say you
would file a case if you find a violation of WTO, I don't know
why you can't answer that case. Why isn't that ``of course you
would''?
Mr. Mendenhall. The question is whether or not the facts
are out there to support----
Senator Levin. No, I didn't. I said ``if you found''.
Mr. Mendenhall. If we found it a violation of the WTO, it
would be something that we would always consider. I can't speak
definitively as to whether or not we would bring a case, since
this is a request you are making to me in a hearing. I can't
answer that.
Senator Levin. OK. Just a couple of questions on auto
policy. China's distribution registration system does not
appear to allow for imports to be sold in China on a
nondiscriminatory basis. For instance, China requires to sell
cars in China you have to be a registered manufacturer in
China. Is that legal under WTO?
Mr. Mendenhall. If you are asking me specific questions
about specific cases, we would be pleased to answer those in
writing. So if you would like to ask me those questions, that
would be fine. We will be happy to respond to them. The topic
of the hearing was sovereignty.
Senator Levin. It was--I am sorry?
Mr. Mendenhall. Protecting American sovereignty. I would be
happy to answer questions you may have in that regard. If you
have questions on specific cases, specific potential cases, we
would be happy to answer them, but I am not prepared today to
talk in depth about potential cases.
Senator Levin. Well, we talked about intellectual property.
Was that American sovereignty?
Mr. Mendenhall. I was trying to be as responsive as I could
to the questions that you asked. I don't have all the facts
available to answer all of the questions that you have on
issues that are outside the topic.
Senator Levin. I will just conclude, then, by asking you
will you, for the record, review China's auto policy and report
to the Subcommittee as to whether, in your judgment, there is
violations of WTO involved in those policies?
Mr. Mendenhall. I will certainly take that back and I will
discuss it with my folks, and we would be happy to get back to
you and discuss it with you.
Senator Levin. As to whether you will do that, is that what
you will get back to us? In other words, you are not going to
commit to review the China auto policy and tell us whether in
your judgment there are violations in that policy of WTO? Is
that what you are--you are not committing to do that.
Mr. Mendenhall. To tell you whether or not there is a
violation?
Senator Levin. In your judgment. What I am asking you to
do, would you be willing to review China's auto policies and to
report to this Subcommittee as to whether, in your judgment,
those policies contain violations of WTO? Are you willing to
make that commitment?
Mr. Mendenhall. I am willing to look at it and see what is
available, what the answer is.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Coburn. Mr. Mendenhall, I am sorry we moved off of
the subject. I know you did not come here prepared to answer a
lot of questions on specific trade functions between us and
China. So for that, thank you for being forbearing.
One last question on our anti-gambling cases through the
WTO, in terms of sovereignty. We won three of those, I believe,
out of the four. The final outcome of the WTO ruling, there is
a particular note because the first time the WTO cited a
``moral exception clause'' in its rules and said the United
States had a moral right to restrict marketing access to
gambling. Allowing the WTO to discern whether U.S. laws can
stand on their moral basis if not their economic raises the WTO
to a whole new level.
Will other U.S. laws, such as child pornography bans, be
subject to the same moral examination? What about Internet
child pornography? And what if the WTO rules against us on
that?
Mr. Mendenhall. Sure.
Senator Coburn. Using this moral definition. And I am going
back to sovereignty, because we do have the right to do that.
Mr. Mendenhall. Sure. Absolutely we do. And it is not the
WTO's role to second-guess whether or not our standards of
morality fit with any particular panel or appellate body or any
other country's standards of morality. And they don't do that.
It is up to each country to decide what its standards of
morality are.
The question that the WTO was trying to answer in the
context of a specific exception that allows us an ``out'' to
act inconsistently with the WTO for seeking to protect morality
is whether or not the measures that we have adopted in fact
achieve the ends that we have sought. So we set whatever
standard of morality that we would like, whether it be gambling
or pornography or what have you. And the WTO doesn't second-
guess it. But what it looks to see is whether in fact the
measures that we have sought to protect our moral values are
truly designed to meet those goals or whether they are an
arbitrary protectionist measure.
They certainly would not second-guess child pornography and
say that is something that ought to be permitted. They didn't
say gambling is something that ought to be permitted. We are
perfectly within our rights to say it is not.
Senator Coburn. But their actual decisionmaking process
makes a value judgment on whether or not we as a Nation have a
right to set a certain moral standard and whether or not we
were using that appropriately?
Mr. Mendenhall. No. Sorry if I didn't explain myself
properly. It is entirely up to the United States to decide what
moral standard it seeks to achieve, and that is across the
board, whether we are talking about pornography or gambling or
what have you. They do not second-guess that.
Senator Coburn. Well, if they are making an evaluation if
we were using that properly, is that what you are saying, too?
For example, let's talk about the gambling case. They
obviously--three out of the four. There is some dispute whether
we won all that or not. But three out of the four, if they
could prove that our laws on Internet gambling were
protectionist instead of we don't want Internet gambling, then
its moral purpose is then presumed allowed, or not allowed? In
other words, if it is their judgment that we did it from a
protectionist standpoint instead of from a moral standpoint,
and they rule against us, and they don't allow us to use the
moral exception, then in fact they are making a judgment on our
sovereign law. Is that not correct?
Mr. Mendenhall. Let me respond to that in a couple of
parts. The way they would analyze it is they would say--whether
it is pornography or gambling of what have you, they would say
the United States has authority, ability under the WTO rules to
decide for itself whether or not to permit gambling, whether or
not to allow child pornography, or any other moral value we
would seek to vindicate. What they would then say is, is there
a particular reason that you--the United States or another
country is, for example, singling out foreigners and saying--
what they said in the gambling case is we singled out for a
particular type of Internet services, we had different rules
for domestic and foreign operators. And the question is why
would you do that? It is not that you can't prohibit gambling,
or permit it, whatever you want to do, but why would you
differentiate between the U.S. and foreign nationals? If truly
you are trying to vindicate a moral value, why would you
discriminate?
That would be the question that they would ask. They
wouldn't be questioning the underlying moral judgment that the
United States put forward.
Senator Coburn. Thank you very much. I appreciate your
testimony and I would hope somebody from your staff will hang
around to hear our second panel.
Mr. Mendenhall. Thank you.
Senator Levin. Just on the gambling issue, could I follow
that up? What you are saying, then, is they are saying they are
not going to interfere with our moral judgment, they want to
make sure that it is applied equally to domestic and to foreign
services, gambling services? Is that the heart of their
judgment?
Mr. Mendenhall. The way the exception is established is it
says you can discriminate in certain--they realize that in some
cases you may have to discriminate in order to vindicate
whatever it is that you are trying to vindicate. But it can't
be arbitrary. There would have to be a reason why you would
need to discriminate between foreign and domestic individuals--
--
Senator Levin. Does that reason have to relate to the
underlying moral purpose?
Mr. Mendenhall. It would have to--yes. Well, it would have
to--the discrimination that you would seek to be justifying,
you would have to argue that in fact the discrimination was
necessary to vindicate the moral value.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Senator Coburn. Mr. Mendenhall, thank you so much for being
here.
Mr. Mendenhall. Thank you. I appreciate it.
Senator Coburn. Panel number two will please come forward.
We have Claude Barfield, resident scholar at the American
Enterprise Institute; Robert Stumberg, professor of law,
Harrison Institute for Public Law, Georgetown Law School; and
J. Robert Vastine, president, Coalition of Service Industries.
Mr. Barfield will begin our testimony. Your written
testimony will be made a part of the record. If you could,
limit your initial comments to 5 minutes.
Mr. Barfield.
TESTIMONY OF CLAUDE BARFIELD, PH.D.,\1\ RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AND
DIRECTOR, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY STUDIES, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Mr. Barfield. Thank you very much for inviting me today.
You have my written testimony, and so I am just going to hop,
skip and jump around. I would like to make three preliminary
points.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Barfield appears in the Appendix
on page 54.
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One is that despite the criticisms that I level in my
testimony about the dispute settlement system, I am a strong
supporter of the World Trade Organization.
Second--and we can come back to this--often, and I think
sometimes this is true, the critics of the dispute settlement
system, of them it is said that they are kind of sore losers,
that they somehow represent interests that lost a case or some
cases, for instance, of the anti-dumping case or whatever. I
should say that in my own case I have this odd dysjunction. I
am a very strong critic of the U.S. anti-dumping system, and
yet I think the decisions that went against us are wrong. I
think the FSC legislation was terrible, but I think the
decision that went against us was also terrible. I think the
Byrd amendment is a terrible piece of legislation, but it is in
the Congress prerogative to pass bad pieces of legislation.
So I do not come at this as someone who thinks just because
he lost cases that we ought to change things. I am in favor of
the outcome, I just did not like the way it----
And then finally, I would say that in my own case, what my
position represents today is a change of my own views about the
WTO and how it works, and how it works particularly with
national systems, with national democracies. I would say as
late as 10 years ago, 5 years ago, in my judgment, when you
looked at trade negotiations, more is better, and that is, the
deeper you went, the farther you went, the better you are. I
also thought that the Congress really was an organization of
mischief, basically often represented protectionist groups, and
that the Executive really was the place one had to look for
salvation, as it were, in the trade area.
I no longer think that. That is, I still think that
Congress can do, in my judgment, make some bad judgments,
whether it is Byrd or whatever, but I think the problem we face
is that the international rules--and I will come back to this
because this is really the theme of what I would be saying--
really have a dramatic impact on the domestic priorities and
the domestic rationale for individual nation-states, and
particularly they have an impact, I think, and we have to look
more and more in terms of impact on the legislative and the
representative system of governments in individual nation-
states I am talking about.
Let me just go more specifically to the WTO, and to take
you back to a history here. From the beginning of the GATT and
then the WTO, there were two traditions that kind of were
juxtaposed against each other. On the one hand, there were
those who looked at the GATT as an inter-governmental
organization that was an extension of diplomacy, and that if
you had disagreements among nations, between nations, you ought
to really try to handle it diplomatically, not really worry so
much about legal principles or international law principles,
but just do what you needed to do to settle the issue.
Europeans tended at that time to have that view of the
international trading system. The United States was always on
the other side, and that is, given our highly legalistic
society, we always pushed for strong legal rules, legal
interpretations. And the old GATT, I think, was much more
European, the new WTO is much more, I think, in what had been a
traditional U.S. point of view. I guess in my own case I would
say that in terms of the change, be careful what you wish for.
And let me just go back to what happened with the move to
WTO. Two things happened, and what I think was playing out are
the unintended consequences--and any generation would have to
go back and look at what you had done. Two things happened in
the Uruguay Round. One, there was the creation of the WTO with
a new, much more at least quasi-legal if not totally
international legal system, international legal rules of trade.
At the time you changed the way the system operated, and that
is, you went from a system in which when you had a complaint
under the GATT, you could not really get--you did not get a
resolution in favor of the complainant unless you could get
consensus from everyone. That is, a panel could rule, but the
United States could overrule that.
Now, the United States and other countries were quite
restive with that system, and let me be very clear because of
where I am coming out. It was the United States who pushed for
this change, that you would go in another direction. So the
system was changed actually in the WTO so that it went from
where you had to have a consensus to reach a ruling, to where
once a panel in the appellate body in the new WTO ruled, you
had to have a consensus, in other words, unanimous virtually
against that in order for that to change.
At the same time we kept a system where--as you asked Mr.
Mendenhall--in order to have new rules you had to have
consensus, or if you had to interpret old rules, three-
quarters. In other words, what we set up was a very efficient
judicial system, and it continued a very inefficient
rulemaking, as it were, or legislative system. In terms of the
analogy in the United States, it is as if when the Supreme
Court ruled--forget about, I am not talking about things about
the first 10 amendments now--when it rules on an issue of
commercial, or the Federal courts ruled, it was as if that
ruling could only be overturned by the Congress if you had
virtual unanimity in the House and Senate.
Now, one other thing happened to complicate matters. In the
Uruguay Round, for the first time--you had seen this before in
other rounds--but really in the Uruguay Round, you had the
construction and the implementation of rules that went far
beyond the border and deep into the national regulatory
systems, or at least in their potential of telecommunications,
of financial services, of health and safety, in other words,
issues would have been before counted as domestic issues, and
in some ways still were domestic issues.
And so you put up a fairly rigid new legal system, which
would be very difficult to change, juxtaposed against a
rulemaking system that you could not change, and the authority
of the WTO going deep into matters that had been counted as
matters of the nation-state. That I think is the problem that
we face. I do not think that there is a conspiracy in the WTO
or the panel----
Senator Coburn. Let me get you to sum up, if you would,
please.
Mr. Barfield [continuing]. To go into or second guess
national governments. But I think inevitably what has
happened--and we can talk about this in individual cases and we
could argue individual cases--what has happened is, is an all
too human trait that if somebody asks you a question, there is
the temptation always to answer it, even if, as it is widely
known, that in many cases the rules that are negotiated by
diplomats in the WTO are unclear, they are contradictory. They
sometimes are in opposition to each other. And so there is the
temptation when that happens to answer the question even though
you cannot.
I have suggested a variety of ways of fixing this. You
could have some sort of blocking mechanism, whereas you have
some minority, a substantial minority does not agree with the
system, you block it until you can negotiate it out, or you
could have--without getting technical in international legal
terms, the panels in the appellate body invoke the doctrine of
``non liquet.'' In other words, what they would be--the Latin
term means ``it is not clear,'' and to send it back to the
negotiators. Or you could put in what we have flirted with in
the United States, a so-called political issues doctrine, in
which the panel would say, look--I would put the FSC to some
degree in that--this is a volatile political issue that we are
not comfortable in answering, and you should negotiate this
yourselves, and not put it to a dispute settlement system.
I will leave it there.
Senator Coburn. Thank you. Mr. Stumberg, thank you for
being here.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT STUMBERG,\1\ PROFESSOR OF LAW, HARRISON
INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC LAW, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER
Mr. Stumberg. Thank you very much for inviting me. Senator
Levin, good morning.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Stumberg appears in the Appendix
on page 59.
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I have provided a written statement with four points. Let
me just frame those points and then spend the rest of my time
responding to some of the questions you raised about the
gambling case, Senator Coburn.
My first point is that trade agreements have a
constitutional character, and if, as Members of this
Subcommittee, you are familiar with domestic constitutional
debates about preemption or about privatization or about
takings, you will quickly recognize these debates in the
international context. You will see some of the same language
in the actual text of trade rules, and you will see the same
issues basically argued before the WTO and other fora.
Trade agreements are constitutional in the sense that they
are designed to limit governing authority, even in areas where
discrimination against foreign goods or services is not an
issue, and they are also constitutional in the sense that the
rules are very general, even vague in the way they are
formulated.
My second point, which I will return to, is that a good
case study to see all these things at work is the WTO's
decision on Internet gambling.
But before I return to the gambling issues, let me also
mention that there has been a developing dialogue between USTR
and State and local governments on the so-called sovereignty
issues. USTR has made a number of very clear statements on its
web page. You can view them there. I have spoken to a number of
State and local officials who feel like the responses just are
not attentive to their concerns. In other words, you have two
groups that are coming from very different cultures and
perspectives, and the kind of consultation that is necessary to
avoid problems like the gambling case presented has really not
taken hold yet.
There is no traction yet in terms of any meaningful,
Federal-State consultation, and that is really my fourth point.
Congress can play an important role by creating a forum to
encourage people to come together and have a public dialogue
about such issues as you raised about the gambling case.
So let me just spend the rest of my time making a few
points that I think are responsive. Even when the United States
wins a case, there is a lot you can learn from it. This is one
of the very few cases on the services agreement, the General
Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS). Mr. Vastine's coalition
has worked very hard to GATS put in place in order to promote
American exports of services abroad.economy.
What the gambling case says to me is that making a
commitment in a sector like gambling services is like hugging a
porcupine; it can be done, but you have to do it very carefully
if you do not want to get hurt.
Among the lessons we have learned from that case are, first
of all, as the WTO appellate body recognized, the U.S.'s
commitment on gambling services, which was made back in 1993
and 1994, was essentially a mistake. It was a mistake that
could have been avoided had there been effective consultation
between U.S. trade negotiators and the legions of State-level
officials who regulate this industry on a day-to-day basis.
Second, the GATS rule that the island Nation of Antigua
used to challenge the United States was interpreted very
expansively by the WTO appellate body. It is a rule called
``market access.'' What is interesting about that rule is that
it has nothing to do with discrimination against foreign firms.
It is a rule that has to do with whether or not governments at
any level may impose quantitative limits such as licensing
monopolies or a limited number of service providers or imposing
a quota. The WTO ruled that in this case, a ban on Internet
gambling amounted to a zero quota.
That is a very controversial decision. You might say it is
a bad decision. But that is the job of the Appellate Body, to
interpret language that is so vague and open-ended. They did
their job, and used the role to find the United States in
violation.
The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) effectively defended
the United States with respect to all but one measure, the
Interstate Horse-Racing Act, which permits remote betting for
horse races.
What is interesting about the public morals exception, as
interpreted by the WTO, is if the USTR persuaded the Appellate
Body that there were public morals concerns that were specific
to remote gambling. In the Internet gambling context, these
include accessibility to children through the Internet or the
potential for money laundering or other connections to
organized crime through Internet financial transactions. But
those rationales do not apply to the kind of economic
regulation that State and local governments have in terms of
creation of monopolies, tribal casino concessions, State
lotteries, and other sorts of quantitative limits that are
common in the United States.
Finally, one of the most interesting things about the case
is to anticipate the end game. If the Congress does not move
expeditiously with respect to amending the Interstate Horse-
Racing Act, the WTO dispute process provides sanctions that
include alternatives even for a small country like Antigua,
which I think has about 90,000 residents. It is a country which
is obviously too small to have any meaningful options in terms
of a trade sanction when it comes to imposing tariffs on
imports from U.S. goods and services. We would not even notice.
The academic literature suggests that Antigua will follow the
lead from Brazil, which just this past week has published its
blueprint for how it will apply sanctions in a cotton case
which Brazil recently won against United States with respect to
a number of commodity subsidies and export promotion credits
for cotton exports.
Even a tiny country like Antigua can decide to withdraw its
trade commitments with respect to honoring U.S. intellectual
property rights. And the list of property rights that Brazil
used, and which Antigua can use as a model, include copyrights,
trademarks, industrial designs, patents, and protection of
undisclosed information. That is a significant sanction stick,
and it raises important questions about how the United States
should make its future GATS commitments.
Senator Coburn. Thank you, Mr. Stumberg. Mr. Vastine, thank
you.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT VASTINE,\1\ PRESIDENT, COALITION OF SERVICE
INDUSTRIES
Mr. Vastine. Thank you very much. I am Bob Vastine,
President of CSI. Under another hat, I am Chairman of the
Inter-Agency International Trade Committee on Services, an
official advisory body of the U.S. Government, created in the
1974 Trade Act.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Vastine with attachments appears
in the Appendix on page 63.
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I appreciate the opportunity to be here today. This is the
first time I have had the pleasure of testifying to a committee
of which I was once the staff director. Since Senator Levin has
left the room, I'll confess I was a Republican staff director.
I want to say that my testimony is mainly focused on U.S.
commercial stake in the WTO, though I am going to try to ad lib
about regulation.
First of all I want to make the point that CSI's member
companies include virtually every aspect of U.S. services,
tradeable services. We operate in more than 100 countries. Our
global sales are over 800 billion. We employ about 2.2 million
people globally. These companies are absolutely committed to
the WTO and to the Doha Round as the best means of obtaining
global trade liberalization to expand their foreign markets and
create more jobs here.
U.S. services trade consists of two elements, cross-border
trade and sales by U.S. foreign affiliates to foreigners. The
total of this trade, cross-border and affiliate trade, is $740
billion, more than the GDP of Canada. Cross-border trade, is
like financial services that are traded electronically, but it
also means trade conducted by people, people who travel, who
come here to buy health services, who come here to buy
education services. Every time a foreign student matriculates
at a U.S. university, that is an export. We are very good at
this. We are also very good at sending our experts, our
lawyers, our accountants, our computer consultants, abroad to
other countries to provide their services personally. All of
this amounts to total cross-border exports, as I said, of $338
billion, where we have a $50 billion annual surplus.
We are also the most competitive country in sales from
foreign affiliates, $402 billion in sales in 2002. By the way,
since you are the Governmental Affairs Committee, responsible
for oversight of our statistics programs, I would love to talk
to somebody on this Subcommittee about needed changes in the
government's programs for compiling these statistics. We are
dealing with 2002 data. It is too old.
As I said, we are committed to the WTO. CSI was created in
1982 because there was at that time no mechanism, no legal
framework, for conducting trade in services, for creating rules
for free trade in services, and CSI had a great deal to do with
the writing of the General Agreement on Trade and Services
(GATS).
We believe that GATS is essential, because, Senator, it is
the only way we can obtain legally binding commitments as to
the treatment of our foreign investments and our export
industries. In order to invest millions, sometimes a billion or
more dollars in a foreign affiliate, a U.S. company needs legal
certainty. The best way to get that legal certainty under the
WTO is commitments in the GATS which are legally binding and
therefore subject to dispute settlement.
So in spite of the flaws, the discussion we have had today
about dispute settlement, it is really an essential part of the
post-Uruguay Round world, and very important for our member
companies. Achieving legally binding commitments subject to
dispute settlement is very important.
I am going to skip a lot of my text, and I wanted to tell
you how the Doha Round is in crisis, and ask your help in
dealing with that, but I want to talk a little bit about
regulation from my standpoint as having observed closely, the
trade negotiations process really since 1965.
The U.S. Trade Regulation is acutely aware of the need to
preserve the right to regulate federally, State and locally. We
know that USTR is very aware of these State regulation issues,
for example, insurance. Insurance is regulated State by State
under the McCarron Act, there is no Federal regulator for
insurance. There are State commissioners. There is no common
standard of State regulation insurance. It is bad for U.S.
insurance companies operating nationally. It is very bad as
well for foreign insurance companies that have to operate with
a 50-state regulatory system.
Other countries have asked in the Doha Round that we change
that system. We cannot change that system. We are not going to
be able to change that system. We are not going to be able to
override the States. The best we can do is try to urge on these
commissioners the need to consult among themselves and create
harmonious, sensible regulation. But for now the whole
insurance industry is held back domestically and globally by
this system of State regulation, which is not going to be
changed by the WTO.
The Federal system creates equally complex problems for the
law profession, for the engineering profession, for the
construction profession. So we are very aware that in the areas
where State regulation--and it is a big piece of our services
trade--prevails, we have problems.
Now, in my experience, in no case has the United States
obligated any State to regulatory rules that a State has not
voluntarily accepted. We just made a new offer in the WTO. We
revised our previous offer. That offer included some changes in
regulation that States had voluntarily adopted in the last 2
years. Before including those changes in our offer, the USTR
went to every single one of those States and got their
permission to do that. Now, that does not mean that the
professor is not correct. I would say the greatest crying need
right now in this era of when some State legislators are
rebelling against the WTO--based often on hearsay, innuendo and
frankly, wrong-headed stories about the evils of the WTO--the
best thing USTR could do would be to beef up its state-wide
operation. They need a former governor, a former noted head of
assembly or Senate or the State legislature to come be a
counselor to the USTR, to be at Portman's right hand, to be a
main point of contact for the States, to call the 50 States
Attorneys General, the Supreme Court Justices, etc.
Senator Coburn. Let me get you to sum up, if you would.
Mr. Vastine. So I think I have made my point. I think we do
have an issue with State regulation. In my own experience, the
USTR is extremely sensitive to the need not to tread on the
States, but we need to do a lot more work with the States
themselves.
Thank you.
Senator Coburn. Thank you.
Mr. Vastine, you just said we need the legal certainty of
the WTO, and let me bring a case to you: Zippo lighter. Total
piracy, there is no legal certainty for them. There is no
enforcement mechanism. There is no punitive action that is
going to be taken against the Chinese because the Chinese did
not enforce it.
So tell me what the legal certainty is when you have laws
that are not enforceable, or we will not through our own
political benefit enforce the sanctions that are available to
protect intellectual property or piracy. I do not know if you
have read the article on that. The Chinese make three or four
times the number of Zippo lighters than Zippo makes, and with
Zippo's lifetime guarantee, they all started coming back in
because they were junk. Here is an American company whose
intellectual property--i.e., a quality product with its name
brand on it--was pirated, and yet we have done nothing about
that.
So tell me what you mean by ``legal certainty.''
Mr. Vastine. I will try to do that. It is difficult not to
get caught in the China problem, which is a vast problem. But
let me give you some background.
We worked very closely with the USTR in writing the
agreement with China, the bilateral agreement between China and
the United States, which laid out most of the rules that China
is now supposed to be implementing. And we worked very hard for
PNTR passage in Congress because we felt that agreement was a
very good agreement.
Now, we have a large number of industries and companies
that have been having adjustment problems working with the
Chinese to get them to implement their agreements. I don't know
anything about Zippo, so I can talk to you only----
Senator Coburn. You know zippo about Zippo. [Laughter.]
Mr. Vastine. Thank you. But I can talk to you about our
service's experience. Some of these companies are software
companies, and some are entertainment companies, and they are
all acutely aware of the IPR problems. And we join them in
bringing constant expressions of concern to bear on USTR and on
the Commerce Department about these violations.
Senator Coburn. Let me interrupt you for a minute. Is it
not a fact that the software manufacturers chose not to push
for enforcement of the very laws that the Chinese were
violating in terms of intellectual property?
Mr. Vastine. Well, that is what I am getting to. The
decision to go to the WTO and file a case is a complex
decision. It is a difficult decision for a company. We have
companies in, say, express delivery who, on the one hand, are
doing extremely well. Their sales in China have vastly
increased. On the other hand, they have unfair competition with
the local Chinese postal office, which is giving them a hard
time in a number of ways.
What does a company do in a situation like that? You have
to put yourselves in the shoes of the company, and you can
understand that they want to protect their position. They are
doing well. On the other hand, they need to continue to argue
for fair treatment vis-a-vis the China post or whatever entity
may be in competition with them; the same thing in the
insurance sector. It has taken years to get the insurance
regulators in China to come around to beginning to implement
their commitments in insurance services.
Senator Coburn. Let me get you to answer my question.
Mr. Vastine. So I am having a hard time answering your
question.
Senator Coburn. Is it true or not?
Mr. Vastine. Is what true?
Senator Coburn. That the software companies felt
intimidated for their future market to not file a complaint.
Mr. Vastine. I do not know that, Senator. I do not know the
facts. I just do not know.
Senator Coburn. Well, the problem I see with your
statement, legal certainty, is there is no legal certainty when
it comes to China. I am just talking about China. I am not
talking about all of it because I know we have wonderful
trading partners that do protect our intellectual property.
But, in fact, if you have a system where the leverage is such
that even if you have a legal remedy, the leverage is such by
the country that is working it will not carry out the proper
factors of that, you really have no legal certainty. We do not
have that in terms of intellectual property.
Mr. Vastine. There was a case--and maybe Mr. Barfield knows
the case.
Senator Coburn. Mr. Barfield----
Mr. Vastine. We brought a dispute settlement case 6 months
ago to the Chinese. We took it to Geneva. They settled
immediately.
Senator Coburn. Which case was that?
Mr. Barfield. I do not know the case.
Senator Coburn. Mr. Barfield, would you like to comment?
Mr. Barfield. My only point is that I do not--the answer to
your question is yes. But I do not think we can limit this to
China. We can take up an issue that is about to maybe got to
the WTO, very much, I am sure, on Congress' mind and the
Administration's mind, and that is the Boeing-Airbus. For a
decade, at least, the United States did not bring that case
because the Boeing Company had reservations about what it would
do with its markets in Europe, a sort of open secret. So I
think you are right in terms of what is happening in China, but
that is part of a calculation, as Mr. Vastine was saying. When
you bring this case, a company or the government has to think,
well, how does it fit with--this or any other case, how does it
fit with our overall trade relations and, in some cases,
diplomatic relations or security relations.
We ought to admit that all of these things work as a piece
of that decisionmaking process. But it is not just China. It is
true with our other trading partners, too. It would be true
probably with--we have relations with Brazil. We are
calculating what we would do there.
Senator Coburn. For example, the recent negotiations with
Merck where they told them that they would reproduce the drug
themselves unless Merck dropped the price.
Mr. Barfield. That ended up--I think the U.S. Government
did not get involved in it, but----
Senator Coburn. No, we settled it.
Mr. Barfield. Merck had to calculate what does this do
about in this case Merck's overall international corporate
strategies, and Merck decided that it would be better to fold
on this. In other cases, if you take, let's say, the
pharmaceutical companies in terms of Canada, for instance, and
cross-border, they are holding the line. But these are--in each
case----
Senator Coburn. My point is there is no legal certainty.
Mr. Barfield. That is true--well, the legal system is
embedded in a larger political system.
Senator Coburn. Right. So it is not a legal certainty
because if, in fact, I make XYZ product and I have to make a
way, not on a legal basis but on an economic basis, an
international relations basis, diplomacy basis. So, in fact, we
are to a position----
Mr. Barfield. Well, legal----
Senator Coburn [continuing]. Where the purposes of the WTO
are good and long term maybe very positive. The real fact is
there are a lot of other players, things that play into whether
or not we get enforced trade law as to whether it is, and we
turn a blind eye when it is not necessarily in our total
national interest.
Mr. Barfield. That is right. And I would hope--and I would
agree with this or the Clinton Administration or whichever
Administration it was that did it. The President has to look at
this in terms of not just our trade policy but our total
diplomatic and security----
Senator Coburn. Let me come back to you. I asked Mr.
Mendenhall this. How many years can we afford to continue to
lose in the international markets the very intellectual
property that Mr. Vastine represents through his service
industry and continue to be able to compete?
Mr. Barfield. Well, I actually think we could go for a long
time, because I think actually what is happening is that other
countries are kind of chasing their tail and we are--the aim
that we--I think, as I would have said 10 years ago about Japan
or others, I would look internally as to how we are handling
our own innovation system. This is not to say that I do not
think at some point the United States should not bring a set of
cases on intellectual property. You were hammering Mr.
Mendenhall correctly, but what he is dancing around is that the
Administration basically thinks that if you look at our total
relations with China, if you look at the way they are at least
attempting to live up to their WTO obligations, which were far
beyond the obligations that any other big country has ever
undertake, just for membership, they figured--and this is true
with the Europeans--we do not want to inundate the system. We
could hammer the Chinese with a number of cases, but their
worry has been--and maybe we are coming to the end of that--
that this would really overload the system. If you really just
sort of--a dozen cases against Chinese and, you could second-
guess that or say that is an incorrect judgment. But I think
that--he could not say this, but I would say it, that, yes,
they are calculating a number of political things beyond just
intellectual property and beyond trade. They are probably
looking at Korea. They are looking at other things.
Senator Coburn. Let me get back to sovereignty for a
minute, our sovereignty as we have patent laws, we have
internationally negotiated both through bilateral agreements
and WTO the recognition of intellectual property and patent
laws. Let's say I am Merck and I spend $1 billion a year
researching HIV drugs. And then wherever I go around the world,
because of our lack of trade sanction enforcement, all the
companies say we are not going to allow you the return on
investment to pay for the research that you had on this drug.
Why is Merck in the future going to invest capital in
research and the production of intellectual property if, in
fact, they cannot get a return and we will not reinforce or
enforce the very agreements that we have? Let me just
background that for a minute. In this country, we pay 50
percent more than anybody else in the world does for
pharmaceuticals. Part of the reason is because we have not
enforced our intellectual property rights because we have been
blackmailed to say, well, we will just allow somebody else to
make it under your patent and we will not honor your patent.
And they know that will be a long fight, and it will come
through WTO. But, in fact, we are being blackmailed.
So, consequently, the American people are paying, they are
subsidizing the rest of the world's pharmaceuticals through the
prices they pay. We are getting ready to have Medicare D, which
is going to, again, subsidize the rest of the world's
pharmaceuticals, because we do not have a cogent trade policy
because we have fixed in this overall parameter of things that
maybe it is better for us not to.
The costs of not recognizing that are weighing a tremendous
burden on this country, and it is very short-sighted for us to
not look at that.
So the very consequences--and this gets back to the
sovereignty of our intellectual property, i.e., the sovereignty
of a patent of rationalizing that it is in our best short-term
interest to not enforce it, but it ignores our long-term
interest. Who is going to invest the capital in our drugs in
the future if, in fact, our intellectual property is not done.
And there you are challenging our own sovereignty because we
undermine our sovereignty because we will not enforce it.
Mr. Barfield. Well, I would say that, in general, whether
it was--I could be bipartisan. I think it was the Clinton
Administration and it is true with the Bush Administration. We
are enforcing it in the big markets, and I think we will
continue to do that, and I think we will back our companies--I
hope we will back our companies, for instance, in the whole--I
mean, you may be on the other side of this, the whole--the way
they are reacting to parallel imports from Canada, because you
have got to maintain the price structure. And, indeed, I fully
agree with you that the proponents of just giving away all
these pharmaceutical products in terms of let's take AIDS, the
market signal you are giving to the pharmaceutical companies is
do not invest in AIDS drugs because they are going to hammer
us, we will not be able to get our return. And that is a
terrible signal, and I think the Administration and previous
Administrations have been cognizant of that.
I think where it gets complicated is with--I do not know
anything about Brazil, but with African countries, for
instance, where there is no infrastructure and indeed the price
is probably not the question. But you at least have to do
something about that. The key to the answer--and we are off the
subject, I think, of sovereignty. The key answer here is that
we have got to enforce parallel import restrictions. It is
perfectly good to allow our companies and encourage our
companies to send drugs at much cheaper prices to lower
economic developing countries in Africa, as long as those drugs
don't come back to Sweden, because that is what will really
kill Merck, that it is the developed country markets, and that
I think is the answer.
Senator Coburn. Well, but that subsidy--that is not a real
market. What you are saying is we are going to allow, through
the international----
Mr. Barfield. No, we--Merck is producing at market rates.
They are pricing for the world. If we undercut that--and the
biggest way you would undercut that would be to have--we are
not saying----
Senator Coburn. We are not----
Mr. Barfield [continuing]. To Merck you have got to send
those drugs to Africa. They are not----
Senator Coburn. We are pricing----
Mr. Barfield [continuing]. Protecting Merck from----
Senator Coburn. We are pricing for the United States and
subsidizing the world with pharmaceuticals.
Mr. Barfield. We have a worldwide pricing----
Senator Coburn. Mr. Stumberg, do you agree with Mr. Vastine
that the States are voluntarily changing laws, or are they
feeling pressure to change laws?
Mr. Stumberg. Probably neither, sir. Most State
legislatures and State officials are not in the loop
whatsoever. They are continuing to make their decisions like
they used to. Some of them wake up in the morning, read the
newspaper and are surprised to learn that a kind of law they
have been making for years is now the subject of a trade
dispute or at least it is being negotiated for the first time.
I think that is perhaps a more realistic description of what is
really going on.
If you look at the U.S. schedule of GATS commitments, which
is the progeny of the Coalition of Service Industries work in
partnership with USTR over more than a decade, you will see
that there are a number of specific sector commitments that
represent the priorities of the United States in terms of those
big markets.
Within that big schedule, you will see that there are some
States that are--I am using jargon here--listed as limits on
U.S. commitments; in other words, some specific State laws are
being carved out because USTR talked to those States.
I will give you one example because Oklahoma is on the
list, I believe. There are a number of States that have
explicit limits on who may actually own land, including ranch
land. By my count, there are 17 such States. USTR intended to
carve out those States with respect to a GATS commitment on
access to real estate for purposes of commercial wholesale and
retail distribution services. There are only seven States
listed on the U.S. schedule, which does not reflect the 17 that
actually have these kind of laws, two of which are actually
constitutional. I think Oklahoma and Nebraska are the ones that
actually have constitutional provisions.
Senator Coburn. This is corporate farming prohibitions.
Mr. Stumberg. Right, exactly. I interviewed a number of
lawyers who worked for Western State governors just to see
whether these turn-of-the-century--the prior century--laws
really were a priority of the governors, and somewhat to my
surprise, the answer was ``yes.'' These are laws they want to
safeguard.
So I cite this just as an example that there sometimes is
consultation. Even when there is an attempt at consultation, it
is often incomplete because the process is so complex and so
hurried. I think your point, Mr. Vastine, that USTR does not
have the person power to effectively manage its relationships
with States is well put. But I would go farther. I would say it
is not just a matter of perhaps making a mistake with respect
to reserving State authority about regulation of land use or
ownership. And it is not just about making a mistake with
respect to a gambling sector. It is a much deeper question of
managing that complexity but at the same time appreciating that
the bottom-up perspective of American federalism, which
champions laboratories of democracy and local experimentation,
is a very different and in some ways conflicting idea with the
essential purpose of the WTO trade rules, which is to make for
a more uniform set of rules by which the global economy can
operate. Both are positive values----
Mr. Vastine. And I think we have been accommodating them,
and I hate to hear you say that there is some sort of effort to
undermine the States.
Mr. Stumberg. I did not say that there was an effort to
undermine the States. I am saying that the system appears not
to be working very well, and I have given you an example. The
example is that in the context of gambling, where there appears
not to have been effective consultation in 1993, which 10 years
later led to a major trade dispute. That is the time frame--you
have to plan your legal moves anticipating something that might
happen in 10 or 15 years. Now we are on the cusp of another
decision. Should the United States withdraw its commitment to
gambling or not? That is a big strategy question in terms of
the current round of GATS negotiations. Are Attorneys General
being consulted by USTR with respect to the strategic tradeoffs
on that very important decision? And according to the Attorneys
General, just a month ago, the answer is ``no.''
Senator Coburn. They are not being consulted.
Mr. Stumberg. They are not.
Senator Coburn. So are there specific recommendations other
than the ombudsman position that Mr. Vastine--that you would
make to the USTR in terms of how to make this more fluid,
competent, and consistent with States so that we can negotiate
reservations, if that need to be the case, for State positions?
Mr. Stumberg. Well, let me start with something safe, and
then venture out from there. The USTR's own advisory committee
called IGPAC, the Inter-Governmental Policy Advisory Committee,
which USTR appoints (these are hand-picked State and local
officials), wrote a report this spring which called for much
deeper and broader consultation with States. Their point was
that USTR needs to be talking not to the governor's policy
adviser for trade, who wears a lot of hats and is basically a
political agent for the governor, but rather, the people in the
State governments who actually make decisions about protecting
State sovereignty: The lawyers in the Attorney General's office
and people such as utility regulators, whoever is the relevant
agency.
That level of consultation has only occurred in rare
circumstances, for example, insurance and accounting. It has
not occurred across the board, and that leads to a second
obvious need, which is capacity.
But I would argue that while USTR is obviously understaffed
to take on meaningful consultation with State and local
governments, the real step forward will come when the State and
local governments themselves organize in such a way that they
can bring their issues to USTR, just like the Coalition of
Service Industries brings its issues to USTR.
You cannot make USTR big enough to handle a country as
complex as the United States and its Federal system; rather, I
think the movement has to come from the bottom up. But if you
think about the role of Congress--and this is the final point
in my testimony--Congress I think could play not only a
catalytic role with hearings like the one you called today,
Congress could provide a friendly forum, a neutral forum, where
State officials and USTR are encouraged to come and have a
public dialogue where it has not happened before. And the kind
of close questioning that you showed earlier with respect to
USTR and its China policy, if applied to American federalism,
would open some eyes and help USTR understand that federalism
is a priority in trade negotiations.
Remember, the USTR's job description is set by the
President of the United States and the Congress when you
authorize negotiations every several years. If federalism is
not spoken from either branch of government, then----
Senator Coburn. You are referring to the fast-track
legislation.
Mr. Stumberg. I am.
Senator Coburn. Thank you.
Mr. Barfield, are you concerned that WTO may become a
mechanism for political international activists, that we look
at this--what can potentially come out of this gambling, like
the Kyoto treaty or something like that? Is there a potential
for it to move to a position where the implication of other
policies outside trade implicate and influence trade decisions?
Mr. Barfield. Yes, there is that possibility, and this is
not sort of Henny Penny, the sky is falling, but let me walk
you through the way another new character of the WTO beginning
in 1995 was that in legal terms, without getting heavy into
legalese, the WTO much more became a part of what is called
public international law. And there are certainly legal
scholars who argue that precepts of public international law
now cover the WTO, that is, outside of trading rules.
There are articles, for instance, in legal journals and
some governments have commissioned pieces about, well, could we
bring the United States to heel because they have not signed
the Kyoto treaty through some Article 20----
Senator Coburn. Would you be kind enough to reference those
to the Subcommittee?
Mr. Barfield. Sure.
Senator Coburn. Thank you.
Mr. Barfield. And other, the so-called morals clauses that
Mr. Mendenhall talked about, the escape clauses, that is, that
nations can implement particular--and then enforce them,
particular policies and then try to enforce them with trade
sanctions, so that there are also discussions about how human
rights would come into the WTO.
Now, let me be very careful here. That is something that I
would hope that the Congress of the United States and other
countries would be very careful to watch. The United States has
to decide what it wants to do here. But to pick up on this
discussion that was talking about State versus Federal, I think
the same thing is true at the congressional level.
The truth of the matter is I am in favor of fast track, but
I have to say that I know the reasons from the trade side that
is important. You are not going to get people to come to the
table. That is what Mr. Vastine would say. It is what I have
said. On the other hand, the truth of the matter is Congress in
the Uruguay Round was presented with a mass of new rules,
which, again, no conspiracy here, it was just impossible, even
with much larger staffs than you had, much larger staffs than
the government had, the implication which you could not
particularly fathom, particularly, as I say, in services and
health. This is all inside the border.
The other thing is true that, again, when you look at the
way negotiations are handled, USTR is being asked to make
judgments about telecommunications policy or financial services
policy. Now, they often depend on the other agencies, but these
are issues that I think should be front and center with the
Congress as it goes forward. And I say this as a supporter of
the system. But these rules do have an impact on what we have
counted as domestic issues. And we should be very careful--I am
not suggesting that we should stick our head in the hole and
say there are no international rules. But we need a better
system of judging where you will give up--``you'' being the
Congress--will give up authority to some international body,
and you in speaking for the States will give up authority to
some international body. And I think that system is
increasingly, it seems to me, under challenge.
As I say, it is the way of the world today that for a lot
of reasons, because of globalism, there are a lot of people who
are arguing for particular rules that we need across the board.
Industry, by the way, just as you find in the Federal
system of the United States, will at some point sometimes be
tempted to say, gosh, instead of going to the States, 50
States, let's go to the national government and settle it that
way. You will find that same translation, I think, sooner or
later--in the international level. Why do we have to deal with
the rules of the United States versus the rules of the
Europeans versus the rules of the Brazilians if you are--take
the name of a company, if you are a multinational. But from the
point of view of the elected representatives of United States
democracy or the European Union evolution or Brazil or
whatever, I think that ought to be a very much more careful
process than we have had so far. And in my judgment, the
dispute settlement system kind of adds to that.
Mr. Mendenhall was not, I think, purposely being evasive or
disingenuous when he said, yes, the Congress can--correctly,
yes, the Congress--nobody can overturn the congressional rule.
A WTO rule, the Congress does not have to agree to it.
The problem with that is the way the system works. Your
only alternative would be to withdraw from the WTO, and so you
get these--you get a FSC case or another case, and it is kind
of individual cases, none of which add up, in my judgment, to a
decision the United States should pull out of the WTO. But your
alternative is to swallow the case and say, all right, well,
and we will negotiate it. And then the problem there is that
once you have won a case in the WTO today, it is very difficult
then to get somebody to go back and--if the European Union--
they won on the FSC. Do you honestly think the European Union
will go back and then negotiate a rule that allows us--it is
just not in the cards for that to happen?
Senator Coburn. So, in fact, there is significant impact.
Mr. Barfield. Sure there is.
Senator Coburn. Yes. Any other comments?
Mr. Vastine. Senator, I cannot let you--well, you wanted to
make the point about----
Senator Coburn. I want to make a broader point, so go
ahead.
Mr. Vastine. I will make my broader point, too. Senator,
our companies care deeply about obtaining legal commitments to
the WTO. I cannot let the hearing end with you thinking that
the Chinese accession and the membership in the WTO does not
have legal value. We would not be discussing the potential for
a dispute settlement process if it did not. At least China's
accession gives us the ability to come to the Chinese in a
number of forums and try to enforce our rights. It gives us
rights to enforce which we did not have previously.
So China's accession to the WTO and its membership there
are very valuable. We are very lucky that the Chinese did it
when they did and that leadership was willing to take the
extraordinary bold step of subjecting that very rigid state-
owned economy to market discipline. And it is a difficult
process for them. It is a difficult process for us to adjust to
globalizing the Chinese economy, but at least if they are in
the WTO, at least we have these avenues to approach them.
As to legal certainty, I hear your point. But our companies
do believe----
Senator Coburn. Those were your words, not mine.
Mr. Vastine. I know.
Senator Coburn. I was quoting back your words.
Mr. Vastine. I accept that, and I stand by them. They do
want the legal--they want it in writing. They want to see that,
for example, the Saudis in the negotiation that is going on
this very minute do not have the right to mandate sessions,
insurance sessions to internal parties. I mean, we fight these
agreements down to the last word.
Senator Coburn. I recognize their value.
Mr. Vastine. OK.
Senator Coburn. But a right not exercised is a right not
used----
Mr. Vastine. And there are----
Senator Coburn [continuing]. And a right not used is a
right lost. And when we choose in the short term, on a short-
term economic model--and that is the whole question. The real
thing that is in front of Congress that is worrying us about
the Chinese, just to be--it is not that we are not sitting up
and that we are not progressing. It is will we progress to the
place where they are a legal, aboveboard player in time to save
our own economy.
Mr. Vastine. Yes.
Senator Coburn. And that is the real question in front of
the Members of the Senate and the Members of the House. They
are not playing by the rules now, period. Even though they are
in the structure and on the team, they are like the bully that
does not play by the rules. They go behind the barn and change
the rules and then come out. And that is on intellectual
property. That is on reverse engineering. And it is happening
routinely.
Now, maybe it is less. Maybe it is not. And the Congress is
for them being a part of that. That is not the issue. The issue
is whether or not you use the tools that they have agreed to to
enforce the very outcome rather than make a short-term
situation that we are better off now for our business, but we
lose the business in the long term.
So it is about a short-term view versus a long-term view. I
just happen to think that we ought to be thinking about the
long term. And it ought to cost them something now for
stealing. And that is what it is. It is theft of intellectual
property and future for the companies of the United States.
Mr. Vastine. It is infuriating.
Senator Coburn. I want to thank you each for being here. We
have gone over our time. I appreciate you waiting for the long
time that we had Mr. Mendenhall. And I thank you for your
contribution.
We will have some questions, and, Mr. Barfield, if you
would give us those references, I would very much appreciate
it.
Thank you all very much. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today to discuss
the important role that the World Trade Organization plays in
arbitrating and enforcing international trade rules and agreements.
This work protects American businesses' access to foreign markets and
ensures that foreign producers do not engage in unfair trade practices
in the United States, such as dumping, that can undermine our domestic
goods and service providers. This is the very essence of free trade.
We, in the Senate, recently passed the Central America Free Trade
Agreement in an effort to liberalize trade with Central American
countries and in doing so promote reform in these developing nations.
In fact bilateral agreements, particularly with developing countries,
provide us an essential tool to press for such change. But we often
overlook the role that the World Trade Organization plays in laying the
necessary groundwork for our bilateral trade agreements.
One hundred and forty-eight countries currently belong to the World
Trade Organization and close to thirty countries are seeking admission.
To gain entry, these countries must negotiate bilateral agreements with
other World Trade Organization members, leading to specific
commitments--such as judicial reforms, government transparency, patent
protections, labor and environment standards, etc.
The United States is currently negotiating bilateral trade
agreements with several countries seeking membership in the World Trade
Organization, including Russia, Ukraine, and Saudi Arabia. In these
bilateral agreements and through the World Trade Organization we hope
to secure the enforcement of intellectual property rights, tax reforms,
improving food health and safety standards, and more.
The World Trade Organization also provides the only multilateral
dispute settlement mechanism for international trade. In fact, this is
an important tool that the Bush Administration has not used
proactively. Whereas the Clinton Administration brought an average of
11 cases per year in World Trade Organization, the Bush Administration
has filed only 12 in their first 4 years. We are not adequately using
this important resource to protect our nation's businesses.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today and discussing
ways to better use the World Trade Organization and the ongoing Doha
Round negotiations to encourage reforms in developing nations and to
even the playing field for American goods and services both at home and
abroad.
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