[Senate Hearing 109-282]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-282
PORT SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 17, 2005
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Co-
CONRAD BURNS, Montana Chairman
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas Virginia
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada BARBARA BOXER, California
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia BILL NELSON, Florida
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire MARIA CANTWELL, Washington
JIM DeMint, South Carolina FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
Lisa J. Sutherland, Republican Staff Director
Christine Drager Kurth, Republican Deputy Staff Director
David Russell, Republican Chief Counsel
Margaret L. Cummisky, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Samuel E. Whitehorn, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and General
Counsel
Lila Harper Helms, Democratic Policy Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on May 17, 2005..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Inouye...................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 56
Statement of Senator Lautenberg.................................. 53
Prepared statement........................................... 53
Statement of Senator Bill Nelson................................. 76
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 50
Statement of Senator Stevens..................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 56
Statement of Senator Vitter...................................... 75
Witnesses
Godwin, Jean, Executive Vice President/General Counsel, American
Association of Port Authorities................................ 57
Prepared statement........................................... 58
Hereth, Rear Admiral Larry, U.S. Coast Guard..................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Jacksta, Robert, Executive Director, Border Security and
Facilitation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection............... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Koch, Christopher L., President/CEO, World Shipping Council...... 60
Prepared statement........................................... 62
Ruppersberger, Hon. C.A. ``Dutch'', U.S. Representative from
Maryland....................................................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Skinner, Richard L., Acting Inspector General, Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 18
Prepared statement........................................... 20
Wrightson, Margaret T., Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office.................. 24
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Appendix
Collins, Thomas H., Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard, letter, dated
February 25, 2005, to Hon. Harold Rogers, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Appropriations Committee.... 94
Koch, Christopher L., letter, dated June 14, 2005, to Hon. Ted
Stevens........................................................ 79
Response to Written Questions Submitted to Jean Godwin by:
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye........................................ 81
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 81
Response to Written Questions Submitted to Rear Admiral Larry
Hereth by:
Hon. Maria Cantwell.......................................... 85
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye........................................ 91
Response to Written Questions Submitted to Robert Jacksta by:
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye........................................ 92
Hon. Bill Nelson............................................. 82
Response to Written Questions Submitted to Richard L. Skinner by:
Hon. Daniel K. Inouye........................................ 80
Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg..................................... 81
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye
to
Margaret Wrightson............................................. 82
PORT SECURITY
----------
TUESDAY, MAY 17, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
The Chairman. Let me open by saying this hearing was at the
suggestion of Senator Inouye, and we're trying to find ways to
improve security and all modes of transportation. I'm pleased
to have an opportunity to review these issues.
Just a week ago, I spent the major part of the day at the
Los Angeles Port, which has grown so large that it's hard to
realize. Their terminals are out in San Bernardino for the sort
of freight that's coming off of vessels, and they're building
three railroads to move that freight to those terminals,
because of lack of space right in the area of the port itself,
so that means that the security in that port is about 100 miles
wide. We have an enormous problem with security.
I welcome the interest of my great friend from Hawaii.
Senator Inouye?
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much. I have
a statement here, but I'm just concerned that, when we speak of
security, I think the average American thinks of airports. They
don't realize that we spend less than 10 percent for ports; 20
percent of the global trade is maritime, and, of that amount,
we have about 4 percent; but, whatever it is, our ports are
always filled, and yet I don't think that our security there is
sufficient, just like our borders.
But I'd like to know what we should be doing. The Coast
Guard is overwhelmed. They're doing a great job. All of the new
security agencies are trying their best, but their best may not
be sufficient, so we're here to listen, believe me, sir.
The Chairman. Let me say that we have a series of votes
that are going to start, so we do hope that the witnesses will
recognize that timeframe and limit their statements so that we
can go through the list. We have a list of six people who are
going to testify between now and 11:10, so may I urge the
witnesses--all the statements will be put in the record in
full; if we're going to have a chance to ask questions and to
get your responses to our questions, we'll have to limit the
statements.
Mr. Ruppersberger?
STATEMENT OF HON. C.A. ``DUTCH'' RUPPERSBERGER,
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND
Mr. Ruppersberger. Yes, OK. Well, thank you, Chairman
Stevens, Co-Chairman Inouye, Members of the Committee, Senator
Rockefeller, Senator Lautenberg.
I'm honored to be here today to participate in this
critical discussion. And with your consent, Mr. Chairman, I
have prepared a summary of my complete testimony to read into
the record today, and I would ask that my entire testimony be
submitted into the record, as well.
The Chairman. All of the statements that have been
submitted will be in the record, as well.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you.
Now, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my main
point to you today is that America's first-responders should
not be Congress's second thought. Whether you call it port or
maritime security, each of us understands three very
fundamental principles:
Number one, securing our Nation's more than 359 sea, river,
and land ports is a broad, varied, and complex goal.
Number two, it is simply not possible, nor do I believe it
is practical, to protect all of our ports against every
possible threat. The reality of limited resources and over
95,000 miles of coastline means we must focus on good
intelligence for credible threat information and prioritize our
spending accordingly.
Number three, our ports are absolutely critical to our
Nation's economic security. In the world of just-in-time
commerce and the global marketplace, our ports are attractive
to terrorists to either import weapons for destruction or to
shut down the global supply chain and cripple our economy.
Either possibility makes port security a high priority for this
Congress.
The best example of this was in the fall of 2002, when the
shippers and dockers went on strike at the West Coast ports.
That cost our United States economy $1 billion a day.
Port security is broad and a complex issue, largely due to
the reality that ports are sprawling commercial hubs, usually
centrally located in geographically diverse areas. Our working
ports stretch across coastlines, riverways, and harbors, moving
agricultural, mineral, petroleum, and paper products to connect
with highways and railways for transport. Tons of goods are
imported and exported through our ports every day in bulk in
containers as well as roll-on/roll-off vehicles. Our ports are
also home to some of our most beloved recreational activities,
such as boating, fishing, and cruises, all of which contribute
to our economy and our every way of life.
With so many distinguished experts in port security
following me on the other panels, I would like to focus my
discussion today on one key piece of the security puzzle: the
issue of security clearances, both in the general national-
security sense and within the specifics of the port-security
realm.
From my many roles in the local government as a county
executive during and after the aftermath of 9/11 as a former
prosecutor, to my current roles at the federal level, as a
Member of the House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee, as
Co-Chair of the Congressional Port Security Caucus, and as the
Congressional Representative to both the Port of Baltimore and
NSA, National Security Agency, I believe a modernized, working,
security-clearance system is vital to defending our homeland,
including our ports.
The Federal Government needs to take further action to
ensure that the ability to share information is neither
obstructed by a lack of clearance nor by bottlenecks that
persist today. Our current security-clearance system is not
working. The problem is not just jeopardizing our port
security, it is also jeopardizing our national security. Many
of the state, local, and business interests, and even some
federal officials, do not have the information they need to
keep our country safe because they don't have the proper
security clearances. The problems stem from basic situations,
where workers don't know how to fill out an application, to the
more complicated, where one department is not sharing
information with another. We're still using a security-
clearance system set up to fight the Cold War, even though the
Iron Curtain fell years ago and we are now fighting the war on
terror. The process is fragmented, confusing, cumbersome, and
long.
There are approximately three million individuals at the
federal, state and local, and private-sector levels with some
level of security clearance. It is estimated that 480,000
clearances are stuck in some sort of a backlog. The average
security clearance takes over 1 year to complete. If there is
any sort of problem along the way, it can take months, or even
years, longer. There are inconsistencies within investigations,
polygraph analysis, levels of security, and criteria
considerations.
In the 108th Congress, Congressman Waxman, former
Congressman Bell, and I asked GAO to look at two critical
questions regarding port security specifically, and homeland
security in general. The report is being released today.
First, we asked them to look at the issue of information
sharing within the port-security domain, and investigate how it
is working. Second, we asked them to look at port security as
it relates to businesses that are connected to the port, and
how funding is prioritized. Specifically, we asked them to
investigate the risk-management approach being employed by the
Department of Homeland Security in funding and grant decisions.
The GAO report is entitled ``Maritime Security: New
Structures Have Improved Information Sharing, but Security
Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention.'' It is the
first report GAO is delivering on that request. We asked GAO to
review the processes set in place to improve information
sharing within maritime security following in our post-9/11
world with the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and
the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002.
The Coast Guard has an awesome task of protecting our
waterways and securing our Nation's ports. For over 200 years,
the Coast Guard has patrolled and protected our coastlines,
which totals today over 95,000 miles. The Coast Guard is doing
a good job based on their massive jurisdiction and the funding
it has received, but more needs to be done.
After the passage of the MTSA, the Coast Guard reorganized.
Each of the country's 359 ports created Area Maritime Security
Committees and Interagency Operational Centers to coordinate
multiple local, state, and federal agencies, along with
private-sector shareholders. This is a good thing. This is
about sharing information with local, state, and the private
sector. The goal is to facilitate the meaningful necessity of
information sharing which is so important to protect our ports.
Each committee designated one member, who is expected to have
the proper clearance to be able to analyze classified
intelligence information, one member of the 359 ports.
The GAO report found that only 28 of the 359 members had
submitted the proper paperwork to get a security clearance.
That means less than 10 percent of our Nation's ports have
access to critical information to keep us safe. Even if all of
the remaining 331 members applied for clearance today, it would
take at least 1 year to get them cleared. Al Qaeda is not going
to wait until workers get clearance to attack our country and
our way of life.
We've identified the problem. Now let's address one of the
many solutions. These solutions could not be achieved
overnight, but they are some initial steps that will start a
long journey to fix this problem.
To start, and as a result of the hard work GAO is reporting
today, I have introduced a bipartisan amendment with Chairman
Tom Davis of Virginia, to the Homeland Security authorization
bill expected on the House floor this week. Mr. Chairman, I
have brought a copy of that amendment, submitted to the House
Rules Committee today, and I would ask that it be inserted into
the record, as well.
[The information referred to follows:]
Amendment to H.R. 1817 Offered by Mr. Ruppersberger of Maryland and Mr.
Tom Davis of Virginia
At the end of title V, insert the following new section:
SEC.___.IMPROVING THE SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCESS FOR STATE AND LOCAL
FIRST RESPONDERS.
(a) Establishment of Assistance for Security Clearance Desk.--
Section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (Public Law 108-458; 50 U.S.C. 435b) is amended by redesignating
subsection (i) as subsection (j) and by inserting after subsection (h)
the following new subsection (i):
``(i) Establishment of Assistance for Security Clearance
Desk.--
``(1) Not later than 90 days after the selection of an
agency pursuant to subsection (c), the head of the entity selected
pursuant to subsection (b) shall, in consultation with the Department
of Homeland Security Office for State and Local Government
Coordination, direct the establishment, within any federal department,
agency, or entity, of an Assistance for Security Clearance Desk (in
this subsection referred to as the `ASC Desk') to assist State and
local personnel referred by any federal departments, agencies, or other
entities for the purpose of obtaining personnel security clearances.
``(2) The ASC Desk shall provide information, assistance,
and guidance on the processes by which State and local personnel apply
for personnel security clearances; initiate and process personnel
security investigations and periodic reinvestigations; have personnel
security clearances adjudicated; and access information related to the
database established and maintained pursuant to subsection (e).
``(3) The ASC Desk shall publish the information,
assistance, and guidance required under this section on a Government-
maintained website, shall present such information, assistance, and
guidance in a format that is easily accessible to State and local
personnel, and shall operate a live, in-person, toll-free telephone
service to answer questions about the information, assistance, and
guidance provided.''.
(b) Incorporation of State and Local First Responders Into Federal
Security Clearance Processes.--Section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 50 U.S.C.
435b) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(6), by inserting ``, and any State
and local personnel,'' before ``to access classified information'';
(2) by adding at the end of subsection (a) the following
new paragraph:
``(9) The term `State and local personnel' has the meaning
provided in subsection 892(f)(3) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
(6 U.S.C. 482(f)(3)).'';
(3) in subsection (c)(1)--
(A) by adding ``, as well as State and local
personnel,'' before ``who require access to classified information'';
and
(B) by striking ``security clearances of such employees
and contractor personnel'' and inserting ``such security clearances'';
and
(4) in subsection (e), by inserting ``, and State and local
personnel,'' after ``or government contractor personnel''.
Mr. Ruppersberger. This amendment creates a Help Desk,
called the ASC Desk, which stands for the Assistance to
Security Clearance Desk. This Help Desk is for state and local
individuals applying for security clearances. It will guide
individuals through the application, investigation, and
adjudication process. While agencies still retain the power and
authority they have under current law, the ASC Desk will help
our first-responders on the front lines having so much trouble
getting through our complicated security-clearance process.
This security-clearance issue is a problem not only facing the
maritime industry, but also facing many federal agencies. All
will benefit from this solution.
It is also important that Ambassador Negroponte, the new
Director of National Intelligence, and his office have the same
tools to keep our families and communities safe. Terrorists do
not care if we are Republicans or Democrats when they target
us, so we, as Members of Congress, must work together to solve
this problem. It is our responsibility to oversee these changes
and to ensure that we fix this problem to protect our country
from a terrorist attack.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ruppersberger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. C.A. ``Dutch'' Ruppersberger,
U.S. Representative from Maryland
Thank you Chairman Stevens, Co-Chairman Inouye and Members of the
Committee. I am honored to appear before you today to participate in
this critical discussion. With your consent Mr. Chairman, I have
prepared a summary of my complete testimony to read into the record
today and I would ask that my entire testimony be submitted into the
record as well.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, my main point to you
today is that America's first responders should not be Congress's 2nd
thought.
Whether you call it port or maritime security, each of us
understands 3 very fundamental principles:
1. Securing our Nation's more than 360 sea, river and land
ports is a broad, varied and complex goal.
2. It is simply not possible nor do I believe it is practical
to protect all of our ports against every possible threat. The
reality of limited resources and over 95,000 miles of coastline
means we must focus on good intelligence for credible threat
information and prioritize our spending accordingly.
3. Our ports are absolutely critical to our Nation's economic
security--in the world of ``just in time'' commerce and the
global marketplace--our ports are attractive to terrorists to
either import weapons for destruction or to shut down the
global supply chain and cripple our economy. Either possibility
makes port security a high priority for this Congress.
Port security is broad and a complex issue largely due to the
reality that ports are sprawling commercial hubs usually centrally
located in geographically diverse areas. Our working ports stretch
across coastlines, river ways and harbors moving agricultural, mineral,
petroleum, and paper products to connect with highways and railways for
transport. Tons of goods are imported and exported through our ports
every day in bulk and containers as well as roll-on/roll-off vehicles.
Our ports are also home to some of our most beloved recreational
activities such as boating, fishing, and cruises--all of which
contribute to our economy and our very way of life.
With so many distinguished experts in port security following me on
your other panels, I would like to focus my discussion today on one key
piece of the security puzzle--the issue of security clearances both in
the general national security sense and within the specifics of the
port security realm.
From my many roles in local government (as a County Executive
during and in the aftermath of 9/11, as a former prosecutor) to my
current roles at the federal level (as a Member of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence, as Co-Chair of the Congressional Port
Security Caucus, and as the congressional representative to both the
Port of Baltimore and NSA), I believe a modernized working security
clearance system is vital to defending our homeland, including our
ports.
The Federal Government needs to take further action to insure that
the ability to share information is neither obstructed by a lack of
clearance nor by ``bottlenecks'' that persist today. Our current
security clearance system is not working. This problem is not just
jeopardizing our port security. It is also jeopardizing our national
security. Many of the state, local, and business interests and even
some federal officials do not have the information they need to keep
our country safe because they don't have the proper security
clearances.
The problems stem from basic situations where workers don't know
how to fill out an application . . . to the more complicated where one
department is not sharing information with another. We are still using
a security clearance system set up to fight the Cold War even though
the Iron Curtain fell years ago and we are now fighting the War on
Terror. The process is fragmented, confusing, cumbersome, and long.
There are approximately 3 million individuals at the federal,
state, local and private sector levels with some level of a security
clearance. It is estimated that 480,000 clearances are stuck in some
sort of a backlog. The average security clearance takes over one year
to complete. If there is any sort of a problem along the way, it can
take months or even years longer. There are inconsistencies within
investigations, polygraph analyses, levels of scrutiny, and criteria
considerations.
In the 108th Congress, Congressman Waxman, former Congressman Bell
and I asked GAO to look at two critical questions regarding port
security specifically and homeland security in general. The report is
being released today. First, we asked them to look at the issue of
information sharing within the port security domain and investigate how
it is working. Second, we asked them to look at port security as it
relates to businesses that are connected to the port and how funding is
prioritized. Specifically, we asked them to investigate the risk
management approach being employed by the Department of Homeland
Security in funding and grant decisions. The GAO report entitled
``Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information Sharing,
but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention'' (GAO-05-
394) is the first report GAO is delivering on that request. We asked
GAO to review the processes set in place to improve information sharing
within maritime security following in our post-9/11 world with the
passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002.
The Coast Guard has an awesome task of protecting our waterways and
securing our Nation's ports. For over two hundred years, the Coast
Guard has patrolled and protected our coast lines--which today totals
over 95,000 miles. The Coast Guard is doing a good job based on their
massive jurisdiction and the funding it has received but more needs to
be done.
After the passage of MTSA, the Coast Guard reorganized and created
359 Area Maritime Security Committees and Interagency Operational
Centers in ports across the country to coordinate multiple local, state
and federal agencies along with private sector stakeholders. The goal
is to facilitate the meaningful necessity of information sharing to
protect our ports. Each committee designated one member who is expected
to have the proper clearance to be able to analyze classified
intelligence information.
The GAO report found that only 28 of the 359 members had submitted
the proper paperwork to get a security clearance. That means less than
8 percent of our Nation's ports have access to critical information to
keep us safe. Even if all of the remaining 331 members applied for
clearance today, it would take a least a year for them to get cleared.
Al Qaeda is not going to wait until workers get clearance to attack our
country and our way of life.
We've identified the problem. Now let's address one of the many
solutions. These solutions can not be achieved overnight but there are
some initial steps that will start a long journey to fix this problem.
To start and as a result of the hard work GAO is reporting today, I
have introduced a bipartisan amendment with Chairman Tom Davis of
Virginia to the Homeland Security Authorization bill expected on the
House floor this week. Mr. Chairman, I have brought a copy of that
amendment submitted to the House Rules Committee today and I would ask
that it be inserted into the record as well.
This amendment creates a help desk called the ASK Desk, which
stands for the Assistance to Security Clearance Desk. This help desk is
for state and local individuals applying for security clearances. It
will guide individuals through the application, investigation and
adjudication processes. While agencies will still retain the power and
authority they have under current law, the ASK Desk will help our first
responders on the front lines having so much trouble getting through
our complicated security clearance process.
This security clearance issue is a problem not only facing the
Maritime Industry but also facing many federal agencies. All will
benefit from this solution. It is also important that Ambassador
Negroponte, the new Director of National Intelligence, and his office
have the same tools to keep our families and communities safe.
Terrorists do not care if we are Republicans or Democrats when they
target us so we as Members of Congress must work together to solve this
problem. It is our responsibility to oversee these changes and ensure
that we fix this problem to protect our country from a terrorist
attack.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.
Senator Inouye. Congressman, did you say that the average
time span required for security investigation is over 1 year?
Mr. Ruppersberger. Over 1 year. That's the information that
we have.
Senator Inouye. And that we----
Mr. Ruppersberger. And sometimes even longer.
Senator Inouye.--that we have over 480,000 waiting?
Mr. Ruppersberger. That's an estimate, but that's--about
480,000. Complaints from all aspects. You know, one of the key
elements in fighting terrorism is good intelligence, and it's
also the relationship between our intelligence agencies and our
private sector, some of the larger and smaller corporations.
And wherever we go--and I think Senator Rockefeller would
confirm this, and he's a Member of the Senate Intelligence
Committee--that it's constant complaints about how they can't
get the clearance, it just takes so long. It's an antiquated
process, and, until we fix that process----
My staff just handed me some information--450,000 backlog,
850,000 waiting. So that's a serious process, not only with
respect to our ports, but for the safety of our country. I
mean, that's why we have a new Director of Intelligence. And
hopefully that will be one of Ambassador Negroponte's high
priorities.
Senator Inouye. And did you say that only 10 percent of our
ports have personnel who have been cleared to----
Mr. Ruppersberger. Well, no, what you have is, the Coast
Guard, who has an awesome responsibility, and they have put
together what they call Maritime Security Committees in each
one of their ports. And these committees are really the local,
and state governments, and people involved working within the
port. And that's almost like a strike-force concept. The main
focus for the Coast Guard is information sharing. And what
happens is that, with respect to information that the Coast
Guard has, if it's classified, they have this information that
could help protect the ports, but if the members on that
committee, especially a designated member, do not have their
clearances, they cannot share that information unless the
clearances are there. That has to be fixed. Information sharing
is one of the most important aspects of intelligence.
Ten percent of Coast Guard identified committee
stakeholders, that's all that has been cleared. And then, when
they start the clearance process today, if we would go with the
way it's working now, it would take 1 year. As I said in my
testimony, Al Qaeda is not going to wait for us to get cleared.
Senator Inouye. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Any questions?
Thank you very much.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Thank you.
The Chairman. The first panel is Robert Jacksta, Executive
Director of Border Security and Facilitation, in Customs; Larry
Hereth, Rear Admiral in the Coast Guard; and Mr. Skinner,
Acting Inspector General of the Office--in Homeland Security;
and Margaret Wrightson, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, GAO.
Let us proceed in the order in which I've announced them.
And we'll have--I think if you'd wait until the time the GAO
witness is before us before you put up those panels, it'll be
better.
Senator Rockefeller. You can't read them, anyway.
The Chairman. Mr. Jacksta, then Mr.--then Admiral Hereth,
then Mr. Skinner, then Ms. Wrightson. Let's have your
statements, and then we'll ask questions.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT JACKSTA, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, BORDER
SECURITY AND FACILITATION, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION
Mr. Jacksta. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye,
and distinguished Members of the Committee.
Thank you for this opportunity to update the Committee on
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP, efforts to strengthen
maritime security.
CBP, as the guardian of the Nation's borders, safeguards
the homeland foremost by protecting the American public against
terrorism and instruments of terror. Today, trained CBP
officers, technology, automation, electronic information, and
partnerships with trade and foreign governments are concepts
that underpin CBP's port security and antiterrorism
initiatives. These concepts extend our zone of security outward
and reinforce the components of our layered defense strategy.
My remarks today will focus on progress related to the
Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, C-TPAT, the
Container Security Initiative, CSI, our non-intrusive
inspection technology, and implementation of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act.
As the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism has
evolved, we have steadily added to the rigor of the program. In
order to join C-TPAT, a participant must commit to increasing
its supply chain security to meet minimal supply-chain-security
criteria. Perhaps most importantly, participants also make a
commitment to work with their business partners and customers
throughout their supply chain to ensure that those businesses
also increase their supply-chain-security. Moreover, CBP has
worked towards addressing a number of areas, as recommended by
GAO. Today, CBP validation is based on risk, using a
quantitative risk-assessment tool to identify certified members
with high-risk supply chains.
In addition, CBP has published a C-TPAT strategic plan
clearly articulating program goals and strategies. CBP has also
completed a C-TPAT human-capital plan, which addresses
recruitment, training, and workload issues.
Finally, steps have been taken to automate key processes
and implement the records-management system to document key
decisions and operational events, including decisions made
through the validation process and tracking member status.
Within 3 years, our experience has grown greatly with the C-
TPAT program, and we continue to work very diligently to ensure
member compliance.
To meet our priority mission of preventing terrorism and
terrorist weapons from entering the United States, CBP has also
partnered with other countries on our Container Security
Initiative. Almost 26,000 seagoing containers arrive and are
offloaded at United States seaports daily. In Fiscal Year 2004,
that equated to 9.6 million containers. Under CSI, we are
partnering with our foreign governments to identify and inspect
high-risk cargo at foreign ports before they are shipped to our
seaports and pose a threat to the United States. Today, CSI is
operational in 36 foreign ports.
In January 2004, CBP partnered with four C-TPAT importers
to incorporate a container-security device into the container
sealing-device process. This enhances container security. The
initial phase of this initiative was designed to evaluate
logistical and operational aspects, evaluate the technology
being utilized, and collect and analyze technology-related
data.
Currently, CBP is conducting a second phase of activities
in cooperation with the C-TPAT members. This expansion utilizes
an enhanced version of the container-security device evaluated
during previous activities and will incorporate additional
sensing capabilities. The second-phase test will incorporate 16
different trade lanes, touching three continents, and seven CSI
ports.
Non-intrusive technology is another cornerstone in our
layered approach. Technologies deployed to our Nation's ports
of entries include large-scale X-ray and gamma-imaging systems,
as well as a variety of portable and handheld technologies, to
include our recent focus on radiation-detection equipment. CBP
has 166 large-scale NII systems deployed to our Nation's ports
of entry. There are 59 of these large-scale systems deployed to
our seaports.
CBP is also moving quickly to deploy nuclear and
radiological-detection equipment to our ports of entry. CBP has
deployed over 400 radiation-isotope-identifier devices, and
nearly 500 radiation portal monitors (RPMs). CBP is also
implementing the deployment of RPMs in the maritime
environment, with the ultimate goal of screening 100 percent of
all containerized imported cargo for radiation.
Additionally, CBP has deployed personal radiation detectors
in quantities necessary for ensuring that there is 100 percent
coverage at primary inspection sites, where the final point of
contact with CBP takes place.
CBP, in concert with our sister agencies, continues to work
toward maritime security, as mandated by the Maritime
Transportation Security Act. Efforts include the establishment
of the DHS Commercial Operational Advisory Committee (COAC), a
subcommittee to assist DHS with the trade perspective on cargo
security-performance standards under the MTSA. The COAC
recommendations have assisted CBP with understanding the trade
community's concerns and priorities. Further, recommendations
are assisting CBP's development of a proposed rule requiring
that loaded containers be appropriately secured.
CBP is also supporting the implementation of additional
MTSA-related issues in coordination with TSA and the Coast
Guard. These include the U.S. Coast Guard International Port
Security Program, Area Maritime Security Committees, port
vulnerability assessments, and the Transportation Worker
Identification Credentialing.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I believe CBP has
demonstrated, and will continue to demonstrate, its leadership
and commitment to maritime security efforts. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify. I will be happy to answer any questions
you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jacksta follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert Jacksta, Executive Director, Border
Security and Facilitation, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye, and distinguished
Members of the Committee. Thank you for this opportunity to update the
Committee on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) efforts to
strengthen maritime security.
CBP, as the guardian of the Nation's borders, safeguards the
homeland--foremost, by protecting the American public against
terrorists and the instruments of terror; while at the same time
enforcing the laws of the United States and fostering the Nation's
economic security through lawful travel and trade. Today, trained CBP
Officers, technology, automation, electronic information, and
partnerships with the trade and foreign governments are concepts that
underpin CBP's port security and anti-terrorism initiatives. These
concepts extend our zone of security outward and reinforce the
components of our layered defense strategy.
My remarks today will focus on progress related to the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), the Container Security
Initiative (CSI), Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) and Radiation
Detection Technology (RDT), and the implementation of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA).
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
As the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) has
evolved, we have steadily added to the rigor of the program. In order
to join C-TPAT, a participant must commit to increasing its supply
chain security to meet minimal supply chain security criteria. Perhaps
most importantly, participants also make a commitment to work with
their business partners and customers throughout their supply chains to
ensure that those businesses also increase their supply-chain-security.
By leveraging the influence of importers and others on different
participants in the supply chain, C-TPAT is able to increase security
of United States bound goods to the point of origin (i.e., to the point
of container stuffing). This reach is critical to the goal of
increasing supply-chain-security.
Moreover, CBP has worked towards addressing a number of areas as
recommended by the General Accountability Office. Today, CBP initiates
validations based on risk, using a quantitative risk assessment tool to
identify certified members with high-risk supply chains. CBP's new
validation objective identifies and validates high-risk supply chain
components, while engaging C-TPAT members with the greatest leverage
over their foreign components of the international supply chain. This
refined validation objective allows CBP to direct resources
accordingly, where they can have the most impact in meeting the overall
objectives of the C-TPAT program. In late October 2004, in discussions
with the trade community, we began drafting more clearly defined,
minimum-security criteria for importers wishing to participate in the
C-TPAT program. After months of constructive dialogue, we developed
minimum security criteria designed to accomplish two important goals:
first, to offer flexibility to accommodate the diverse business models
represented within the international supply chain; and second, to
achieve CBP's twin goals of security and facilitation. The minimum-
security criteria for importers became effective on March 25, 2005.
In addition, CBP has published the C-TPAT Strategic Plan, clearly
articulating program goals and strategies, and completed the C-TPAT
Human Capital Plan, which addresses recruitment, training and workload
issues.
CBP recognizes the need for effective measures to determine the
success of the program. While new measures are under development, C-
TPAT currently uses quantifiable workload measures, but gauging
deterrence and prevention remains a challenging task. We continue our
efforts in this area, focusing on effective measures that help gauge
the success of C-TPAT partnership.
Finally, steps have been taken to automate key processes, and
implement a records management system to document key decisions and
operational events, including decisions made through the validation
process, and tracking member status. With 3 years' experience in the
program, C-TPAT has successfully increased supply-chain-security
through the voluntary enrollment and enhancement of supply-chain-
security by the private sector, and learned much about the program and
its participants.
The Container Security Initiative (CSI)
To meet our priority mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States, CBP has partnered with other
countries on our Container Security Initiative (CSI). Almost 26,000
seagoing containers arrive and are off loaded at United States seaports
each day. In Fiscal Year 2004, that equated to 9.6 million cargo
containers annually. Because of the sheer volume of sea container
traffic and the opportunities it presents for terrorists, containerized
shipping is uniquely vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. Under CSI,
which is the first program of its kind, we are partnering with foreign
governments to identify and inspect high-risk cargo containers at
foreign ports before they are shipped to our seaports and pose a threat
to the United States and to global trade. Today, CSI is operational in
36 ports. CBP is working towards strategically locating CSI in
additional locations focusing on areas of the world where terrorists
have a presence. CBP will continue expanding the CSI security network
by using advanced technologies while optimizing resources such as the
National Targeting Center as a communications hub coordinating domestic
and international communication. Through a framework for security and
facilitation of global trade, endorsed by the World Customs
Organization, CBP intends to strengthen trade data and targeting by
promoting harmonized standards for data elements, examinations and risk
assessments. Further, to inspect all high-risk containers before they
are loaded on board vessels to the United States, CBP plans to continue
fostering partnerships with other countries and our trading partners.
CBP Smart Box Initiative
In January 2004, CBP partnered with four C-TPAT importers to
incorporate a Container Security Device (CSD) into the container
sealing process, along with sealing standards and techniques, in order
to develop and implement a Smart Box designed to enhance container
security. The initial phase of the initiative was designed to evaluate
the logistical and operational aspects, evaluate the technology being
utilized, and collect and analyze technology-related data. Data
collected during the initial phase, as well as subsequent phases, will
be used to assist CBP in developing minimum standards for a Smart Box.
Currently, CBP is conducting a second phase of activities in
cooperation with a total of 14 C-TPAT members. This expansion utilizes
an enhanced version of the CSD evaluated during previous activities and
will incorporate additional sensing capabilities. This second phase
test will incorporate 16 different trade lanes touching 3 continents
(North America, Europe and Asia) and 7 CSI ports.
Other efforts include participation in the evaluation of technology
designed to incorporate additional sensing capabilities with the goal
of providing six sided container security. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate lead this
effort. CBP personnel are active members of an Integrated Process and
Product Team (IPPT) and are working in coordination with DHS S&T to
identify and evaluate future technologies.
Non-Intrusive Inspection and Radiation Detection Technologies
Non-Intrusive Inspection Technology (NII) is another cornerstone in
our layered strategy. Technologies deployed to our Nation's sea, air,
and land border ports of entry include large-scale X-ray and gamma-
imaging systems as well as a variety of portable and hand-held
technologies to include our recent focus on radiation detection
technology. NII technologies are viewed as force multipliers that
enable us to screen or examine a larger portion of the stream of
commercial traffic while facilitating the flow of legitimate trade,
cargo, and passengers.
CBP has 166 large-scale NII systems deployed to our Nation's air,
land, and sea ports of entry. There are 59 of these large scale systems
deployed to seaports on both coasts and the Caribbean. The systems
include the Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System (VACIS), Mobile VACIS,
Truck X-ray, Mobile Truck X-ray, Rail VACIS, Mobile Sea Container
Examination Systems, and the Pallet Gamma-ray system. CBP is also
moving quickly to deploy nuclear and radiological detection equipment,
including Personal Radiation Detectors (PRDs), Radiation Isotope
Identifier Devices (RIIDs) and Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) to our
ports of entry. CBP has deployed over 400 RIIDs and nearly 500 RPMs.
CBP is also initiating the deployment of RPMs in the maritime
environment with the ultimate goal of screening 100 percent of all
containerized imported cargo for radiation. A variety of configurations
have been developed and CBP is working with stakeholders to ensure that
radiation screening does not significantly impact operations within a
port. During the upcoming year CBP looks forward to working with the
new DHS Domestic Nuclear Detection Office to couple these varying
configurations into a cohesive global architecture to greatly increase
the Nation's radiological and nuclear detection capability.
Additionally, CBP has deployed PRDs in quantities necessary for
ensuring that there is 100 percent coverage at primary, the first point
of contact. Currently, over 10,000 PRDs have been deployed. Used in
combination with our layered enforcement strategy, these tools
currently provide CBP with a significant capacity to detect nuclear or
radiological materials.
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) CBP, in concert
with our sister agencies, continues to work towards maritime security
mandates as outlined in the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002 (MTSA). Efforts include the establishment of a DHS Commercial
Operational Advisory Committee (COAC) subcommittee. As requested by the
Border and Transportation Security Directorate (BTS), a COAC
subcommittee was formed to assist DHS with a trade perspective on cargo
security performance standards under MTSA.
The COAC's recommendations have assisted CBP with understanding the
trade community's concerns and priorities. Further, under the direction
of BTS, recommendations are assisting CBP's development of a proposed
rule requiring that loaded containers be appropriately secured by use
of an International Organization for Standardization (ISO)-compliant
high security seal and verified by the carrier prior to being
transported by vessel to the United States. CBP is also supporting the
implementation of additional MTSA related issues in coordination with
BTS, USCG, and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). These
include:
USCG International Port Security Program--CBP CSI teams work
in concert with USCG to conduct joint assessments of foreign
ports.
Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC)--CBP senior field
office managers are participating in the USCG led AMS
Committees.
Port Vulnerability Assessments--CBP field offices
participated in the USCG port assessments addressing cargo
security operations.
Transportation Worker Identification Credentialing (TWIC)--
CBP is coordinating with TSA and USCG to assist their efforts
to develop this program.
Conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I have outlined a broad
array of initiatives and steps towards enhancing maritime security. I
believe CBP has demonstrated and will continue to demonstrate its
leadership and commitment to maritime security efforts, and we
anticipate that working with our sister agencies under the Department
of Homeland Security we will further these efforts.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I will be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Admiral.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL LARRY HERETH,
U.S. COAST GUARD
Admiral Hereth. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and
distinguished Members of the Committee.
I look forward to discussing the Coast Guard's role to
secure our ports and ensure the safe and efficient flow of
commerce.
The Coast Guard's overarching security goal is to prevent
terrorist attacks within the U.S. maritime domain. Doing so
requires a risk-based approach to identify and intercept
threats, ideally before they reach our shores. Our Nation's
maritime transportation system, as mentioned before, is
extensive. Protecting this system is a significant challenge. A
maritime terrorist attack, with its associated ripple effect,
would have a severe impact on the Nation's economy; so,
clearly, this is a system we must protect.
Since trade is global, and terrorism is global, we felt
obligated and necessary to build a global security regime. Our
domestic and international efforts have focused on
implementation of MTSA and the corresponding International Ship
and Port Facility security code, or the ISPS Code, as it's
known. We've collaborated with 147 other countries at the
International Maritime Organization to build a new and
substantial security code that applies to vessels and to port
facilities around the entire world. The international
requirements mirror the domestic standards set forth in MTSA.
To complement the new security standards, we worked in
parallel with the International Standards Organization to
develop an implementation guide to aid companies as they put
this--into practice this major change. The IMO and ISO have
been key allies in developing the requirements and practical
standards that lead to consistency and greater compliance. This
international approach provides an efficient and effective
security regime that can be checked by all our trading
partners, not just the United States.
Implementation, however, has been a big challenge to all
the stakeholders. With over 9,000 U.S. vessels, 3,200 U.S.
facilities, and 8,000 foreign vessels that trade with the
United States, we have a huge challenge before us.
I am pleased to report, however, that the compliance rates
are near 99 percent across the board. This was due, in large
measure, to the collaboration and excellent relationships we
have with industry and with trade associations. You will hear
from two of those trade associations in the later panel. The
efforts of the AAPA and--American Association of Port
Authorities and the World Shipping Council are representative
of the helpful advice and support we received throughout the
standards-development phase, and are to be commended.
I also note that, as required by MTSA, we have established
an International Port Security Program that works in concert
with other federal agencies to identify foreign ports posing a
potential security risk to the international marine
transportation system. To date, we have visited 23 countries.
Five countries are currently on our Port Security Advisory
List, because they have not implemented the new international
standards.
There are, however, long-term challenges ahead. In the
post-MTSA ISPF period, we realized the Coast Guard was planning
or beginning work on numerous additional security projects.
Those efforts were spread out amongst many various offices, and
there was also a lot of interagency coordination underway in
those efforts. To address this, we developed an inventory of
projects to help us refine, align, and coordinate our efforts.
Taken together, this list of projects represents the next wave
of improvements to maritime security.
Cargo security is another challenge, a long-term challenge
that deserves comment. Customs and Border Protection has the
lead role in cargo security, and the Coast Guard works to
coordinate with our sister agency to align respective agency
roles and responsibilities.
When cargo is moved on the waterborne leg of the trade
route, the Coast Guard has oversight of the cargo's carriage
requirements and the care needed for that cargo while it's in
transit, both on the vessel and at the port facility. Customs,
CBP, has authority over the cargo contents and the container
improvements. Using the information provided through the Coast
Guard's 96-hour notice-of-arrival rule and Customs' 24-hour
cargo-loading rule, we can act to control vessels, and, thus,
their cargoes, that pose an unacceptable risk to our ports.
With Coast Guard officers posted at Customs', CBP's, National
Targeting Center, we have improved agency coordination, and our
collective ability to quickly take appropriate action exists
when notified of a cargo problem.
Identity security is another vulnerability that must be
addressed. Domestically, the Coast Guard is now supporting TSA
to implement the Transportation Worker Identity Credential, and
we'll do everything we can to expedite that process.
With regard to foreign seafarers, we presently have a
multi-agency workgroup tasked to define the potential
improvements possible and provide a proposed course of action.
That involves a number of different agencies, including
Justice, State, Transportation, and a variety of elements from
DHS.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify today. I
will be pleased to answer any questions at the appropriate
time.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Hereth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Larry Hereth, U.S. Coast Guard
Introduction
Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
Committee. It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the Coast
Guard's role in securing our ports in order to facilitate the safe and
efficient flow of commerce.
On September 10th, 2001, our primary maritime focus was on the safe
and efficient use of America's waterways. However, as a result of the
events of 9/11, we have made great progress in securing America's
waterways, without impeding commerce. The men and women of the U.S.
Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security remain committed to
improving maritime homeland security each and every day through
continued interagency cooperation and assistance from our partners at
the local, state, and international levels as well as maritime industry
stakeholders.
Reducing Maritime Risk
The Coast Guard's overarching security goal is to prevent the
exploitation of, or terrorist attacks within, the U.S. maritime domain.
Doing so requires a threat-based, risk-managed approach to identify and
intercept threats well before they reach U.S. shores. The Coast Guard
accomplishes this by conducting layered, multi-agency security
operations nationwide; while strengthening the security posture and
reducing the vulnerability of our ports, with the initial focus being
our militarily and economically strategic ports. As we seek to reduce
maritime risk, we continually strive to balance each of the Coast
Guard's mission requirements to ensure minimal degradation in service
to the American public. Looking at their accomplishments, it is clear
that Coast Guard men and women continue to rise to the challenge and
deliver tangible and important results across both homeland security
and non-homeland security missions.
Today's global maritime safety and security environment requires a
new level of operations specifically directed against terrorism without
degrading other critical maritime safety missions. Most importantly,
the Coast Guard must exercise its full suite of authorities,
capabilities, competencies and partnerships to mitigate maritime
security risks in the post-9/11 world.
In terms of threat, vulnerability, and consequence, there are few
more valuable and vulnerable targets than the U.S. maritime
transportation system.
Threat: While the 9/11 Commission notes the continuing
threat against our aviation system, it also states that
``opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in
maritime or surface transportation.'' From smuggling to piracy,
suicide attacks to the threat of weapons of mass destruction,
the threats are many and varied.
Vulnerability: The maritime transportation system annually
accommodates 6.5 million cruise ship passengers, 51,000 port
calls by over 7,500 foreign ships, at more than 360 commercial
ports spread out over 95,000 miles of coastline. The vastness
of this system and its widespread and diverse critical
infrastructure leave the Nation vulnerable to terrorist acts
within our ports, waterways, and coastal zones, as well as
exploitation of maritime commerce as a means of transporting
terrorists and their weapons.
Consequence: Contributing nearly $750 billion to the U.S.
gross domestic product annually and handling 95 percent of all
overseas trade each year--the value of the U.S. maritime domain
and the consequence of any significant attack cannot be
overstated. Independent analysis and the experiences of 9/11
and the West Coast dock workers strike demonstrates an economic
impact of a forced closure of U.S. ports for a period of only 8
days to have been in excess of $58 billion to the U.S. economy.
Lingering and new maritime safety and security gaps continually
present themselves and it is these risks we will continually work to
reduce. The Coast Guard guides its efforts by implementing policies,
seeking resources, and deploying capabilities through the lens of our
maritime security strategy.
Implement the Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security
Considering the vast economic utility of our ports, waterways, and
coastal approaches, it is clear that a terrorist incident against our
marine transportation system would have a disastrous impact on global
shipping, international trade, and the world economy, in addition to
the strategic military value of many ports and waterways.
The elements of the Coast Guard's Maritime Strategy for Homeland
Security are in direct alignment with the DHS' strategic goals of
Awareness, Prevention, Protection, Response and Recovery. These
elements serve as guiding pillars in our efforts to reduce America's
vulnerabilities to terrorism by enhancing our ability to prevent
terrorist attacks and limit the damage to our Nation's ports, coastal
infrastructure and population centers in the event a terrorist attack
occurs. A brief overview of the core elements of that strategy with
particular emphasis on creation and management of a robust security
regime is presented here in the following paragraphs.
Enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
First, we seek to increase our awareness and knowledge of what is
happening in the maritime arena, not just here in American waters, but
globally. We need to know which vessels are in operation, the names of
the crews and passengers, and the ship's cargo, especially those
inbound for U.S. ports. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is critical to
separate the law-abiding sailor from the anomalous threat.
The core of our MDA efforts revolve around the development and
employment of accurate information, intelligence, and targeting of
vessels, cargo, crews and passengers--and extending this well beyond
our traditional maritime boundaries. All DHS components are working to
provide a layered defense through collaborative efforts with our
interagency and international partners to counter and manage security
risks long before they reach a U.S. port. There are two hallmarks to
today's security environment; complexity and ambiguity. Improving MDA
will help us to simplify the complex and clarify the ambiguous and
prove invaluable to facilitating effective resource, operational, and
policy decision-making.
Create and Oversee Maritime Security Regime
Second, to help prevent terrorist attacks we have developed and
continue to improve an effective maritime security regime--both
domestically and internationally. This element of our strategy focuses
on our domestic and international efforts and includes initiatives
related to MTSA enforcement, International Maritime Organization
regulations such as the ISPS Code, as well as improving supply chain
security and identity security processes.
Before 9/11 we had no formal international or domestic maritime
security regime for ports, port facilities, and ships--with the
exception of cruise ships. Partnering with domestic and international
stakeholders, we now have both a comprehensive domestic security regime
and an international security convention in place. Both have been in
force since July 1, 2004. In executing the requirements of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and the International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) code, the Coast Guard has:
Reviewed and approved over 9,600 domestic vessel security
plans and 3,100 domestic facility security plans;
Overseen the development of 43 Area Maritime Security Plans
and Committees;
Verified security plan implementation on 8,100 foreign
vessels;
Completed all domestic port security assessments for the 55
militarily and economically strategic ports;
Visited 22 foreign countries to assess the effectiveness of
anti-terrorism measures and implementation of ISPS code
requirements. An additional 10 countries are scheduled for
visits by June 2005 with the goal of visiting all of our
approximately 140 maritime trading partners; and
Oversaw the continuing development of the National Maritime
Security Plan.
Aside from the statistics, MTSA and ISPS are truly landmark
achievements within the maritime industry. Through a variety of
measures, or layers, of regulatory requirements, these two regimes
complement each other and have gone far to reduce vulnerabilities
within the global maritime transportation system, the general framework
of which includes:
Physical Security: The first pillar of this framework is
physical security. Through the implementation of the MTSA, we
have significantly hardened the physical security of our ports.
Roughly 3,100 of the Nation's highest risk port facilities have
implemented mandatory access control measures to ensure that
only authorized persons are able to gain access. They have
established designated restricted areas within the facility
gates and facility owners and operators are now required, under
federal regulations, to implement screening protocols for
ensuring that cargo-transport vehicles and persons entering the
facilities are inspected to deter the unauthorized introduction
of dangerous substances and devices. At the facility gates,
containers are required to be checked for evidence of tampering
and cargo seals are checked.
Identity Security: Identity verification is the second
critical element of port security, recognizing that we must
know and trust those who are provided unescorted access to our
port facilities and vessels. The 9/11 Commission report noted
that the September 11th hijackers obtained and used government-
issued identification cards such as driver's licenses. The
Commission recommended that forms of identification be made
more secure. Congress partially addressed this issue in the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 with the
requirement for the Transportation Workers Identification Card
or TWIC. However, merchant mariner documents are, by statute,
identification documents, yet they contain virtually no
security features. This, among other reasons, is why the
Commandant, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
President have proposed a complete update of the merchant
mariner credentialing statutes. We cannot, and must not,
continue with business as usual in the area of mariner
credentialing. The specter of a terrorist obtaining and using a
merchant mariner credential to access and attack vital areas of
a strategic port is one that is very real. The changes we have
proposed will enable the Department to heighten the security of
all mariner credentials in partnership with the mariners
themselves and the maritime industry.
The Coast Guard is also working very closely with the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the lead for
implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification Card
(TWIC), to assist in the implementation of this new
credentialing program. Just over six months ago, TSA approached
the Coast Guard and asked for assistance in implementing the
TWIC in the maritime mode through a regulatory project. The
Coast Guard is fully supportive of this regulatory effort and
will do everything within our ability to assist TSA in the
development of this rulemaking.
Cargo Security: Cargo security encompasses the process of
ensuring that all cargo bound for the U.S. is legitimate and
was properly supervised from the point of origin, through its
sea transit, and during its arrival at the final destination in
the U.S.
Since Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has the lead role in
maritime cargo security, the Coast Guard has worked in concert
with our sister agency to align respective agency roles and
responsibilities regarding international trade. When a cargo is
moved on the waterborne leg of the trade route, the Coast Guard
has oversight of the cargo's care and carriage on the vessels
and within the port facility. The Coast Guard also oversees the
training and identity verification of the people who are moving
the cargo. CBP has authority over the cargo contents and
container standards. Using the information provided through the
Coast Guard's 96-hour notice of arrival rule and CBP's 24-hour
cargo loading rule, we can act to control vessels, and thus
their cargoes, that pose an unacceptable risk to our ports.
With Coast Guard officers posted at CBP's National Targeting
Center, we continuously improve agency coordination and our
collective ability to quickly take appropriate action when
notified of a cargo of interest. As a further improvement, the
trade community can file required passenger and crew
information via an electronic notice of arrival and departure
system. This streamlines the process for industry and improves
our ability to apply targeting and selectivity methods.
The Coast Guard has worked hard to align all of our regulatory
and policy development efforts with CBP. We meet regularly to
discuss policy, we participate on inter-agency regulation
development teams, and we sit on the Operation Safe Commerce
Executive Steering Committee. Between DHS, CBP, and the Coast
Guard, we coordinate the work of our various Federal Advisory
Committees so that we all understand the trade community's
concerns and priorities. Now that MTSA and the ISPS Code are
fully implemented, we are monitoring compliance and carefully
noting issues for future improvements to the regulatory
framework.
Looking at specific cargo-related initiatives, the Coast Guard
fully supports the Container Security Initiative and the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism. We look forward to
the results of Operation Safe Commerce, which will highlight
technologies and business practices that will bring improved,
layered security throughout the supply chain. We also agree
with CBP's view that international compliance and the
establishment of international standards are needed to help
gain global compliance. In this way, the International
Standards Organization and the International Maritime
Organization have achieved great success in institutionalizing
both safety and security standards, many times incorporating
industry standards by reference. A multilateral approach
provides a more efficient and effective security regime.
Compliance with a common, acceptable standard is checked by all
our trading partners, not just the U.S. The evidence of success
can be directly measured in the level of compliance. A prime
example is the success of the ISPS Code implementation
evidenced by the 98 percent compliance rate achieved by foreign
vessels arriving in U.S. ports.
Culture of Security: Finally, and perhaps most importantly
we have been able to take important steps to instill a culture
of security within a system previously focused almost
exclusively on efficiency. Reducing the vulnerabilities of our
vessels and ports required a cultural shift to put security at
the top of the agenda rather than as an afterthought. It is
centered on the people who must implement the new security
measures. Under our MTSA regulations, facilities and vessels
are required to designate individuals with security
responsibilities, including company security officers, facility
security officers, and vessel security officers. These
individuals must have knowledge, thorough training and
equivalent job experience. They must be familiar with, and
responsible for, implementation of the specific security
measures outlined in their facility/vessel security plans and
they must be knowledgeable in emergency preparedness, the
conduct of security audits, and security exercises. In
addition, facility security officers must have training in
security assessment methodologies; current security threats and
patterns; recognizing and detecting dangerous substances and
devices, recognizing characteristics and behavioral patterns of
persons who are likely to threaten security; and techniques
used to circumvent security measures.
Increase Operational Presence. Third, we seek to better protect
critical maritime infrastructure and improve our ability to respond to
suspect activities by increasing our operational presence in ports,
coastal zones and beyond,--to implement a layered security posture, a
defense-in-depth. Our collective efforts to increase operational
presence in ports and coastal zones focus not only on adding more
people, boats and ships to our force structures, but making the
employment of those resources more effective through the application of
technology, information sharing, and intelligence support.
Improve Response and Recovery Posture. Finally, we are improving
our ability to respond to and aid in recovery if there were an actual
terrorist attack. Understanding the challenge of defending 26,000 miles
of navigable waterways and 361 ports against every conceivable threat
at every possible time, we are also aggressively working to improve our
response capabilities and readiness. While many of the increases in MDA
and operational presence augment our collective response and recovery
posture, we must also incorporate initiatives that will increase our
ability to adequately manage operations and coordinate resources during
maritime threat response or recovery operations.
The Coast Guard is implementing the new National Response Plan
across all operations. The Incident Command System is our mandated
crisis management system, and we have years of practical experience in
its use. At the local level, each port is ready with port-specific and
even sub-area specific, response plans. All law enforcement agencies,
public service providers, and port stakeholders have participated in
the plan development process.
The Coast Guard has confidence that if a maritime transportation
security incident (TSI) should occur in one of our ports, the local
responders (Coast Guard Sector Commander or Captain of the Port, other
federal agencies, state and local authorities, and partners in
industry) will immediately react with mitigation, response, and
recovery activities in that port and region. At the same time, we are
continuing to refine tools and analysis to aid senior leadership in
their ability to rapidly respond to a crisis, minimize damage, and aid
in recovery operations.
Conclusion
After experiencing the most horrific act of terrorism on U.S. soil
on 9/11, all sectors of the maritime community rallied together to
strengthen the security of the maritime transportation system. The
tremendous successes in this endeavor is due, in large part, to the
cooperation and prompt measures taken by government and industry
working together as partners. Much work remains to be done to reduce
America's vulnerabilities to terrorism and other maritime security
threats but with the continued support of the Congress and
Administration, I know that we will succeed in delivering the robust
maritime safety and security America expects and deserves well into the
21st Century.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I will be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Skinner?
STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. SKINNER, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Skinner. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Co-Chairman,
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to be
here today.
I would like to summarize three issues from my prepared
statement that I have submitted for the record. One, the
Department's effort to detect radioactive material in cargo
security; challenges facing the Coast Guard; and the
Department's Port Security Grant Program.
Concerning the detection of radioactive materials, as this
Committee knows, ABC News reported that twice it successfully
smuggled depleted uranium into the country. The depleted
uranium arrived in ocean-going cargo containers that were
shipped from Indonesia and Turkey. In both cases, the
containers were targeted as high risk for additional screening,
but, nonetheless, were allowed entry without detection.
In September of 2004, we issued a classified report. We
cited several weaknesses that allowed this to happen. The
Department has since enhanced its ability to screen targeted
containers for radioactive emissions by deploying more
sensitive technology at its seaports, revising protocols and
procedures, and improving the training of its personnel.
At the request of four congressional committees, we
initiated a follow-up audit to determine whether the Department
had implemented our recommendations and to examine other
technologies that could increase the Department's radiation-
detection capability.
Concerning Coast Guard challenges, in September 2004 we
reported that the Coast Guard's willingness to work hard and
long hours, use innovative tactics, and work closely with other
departmental components allowed it to achieve its mission-
performance goals. However, to sustain its mission performance,
the Coast Guard faces significant barriers; most importantly,
the deteriorating readiness of its fleet vessels.
The workload demands of the Coast Guard will only continue
to increase as it implements the Maritime Transportation
Security Act, MTSA. It must conduct risk assessments of all
vessels and facilities on or near the water, develop national
and area maritime transportation security plans, and improve
port facility and vessel security plans. In addition, growing
homeland security demands, such as added port and coastal
security patrols, increase the Coast Guard's operating tempo.
The Coast Guard reported that mission sustainment is at risk
due to the cutters and aircraft that are aging, obsolete, and
require replacement. Currently, the Coast Guard has experienced
serious cracking in the hulls of its 110-foot cutters and the
engine power loss on its HH-65 Dolphin helicopters. These
problems adversely affect the Coast Guard's mission readiness
and, ultimately, mission performance.
Finally, concerning Port Security Grants, today the
Transportation Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard,
and the Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration
have collaborated to award over $560 million for over 1,200
projects. This does not include, however, the most recent round
of grants, totaling $141 million, which the Department
announced this past week.
In January of this year, we reported on several important
issues relating to strategic direction, priority-setting, and
general administration of the program.
First, the program's strategic effectiveness is hindered
because it is attempting to reconcile three competing
requirements or approaches: the competitive program mandated by
Congress through its appropriations, MTSA's grant authority,
which was not funded through appropriations, and risk-based
decision-making. These competitive approaches were clouding the
direction of the program.
Second, the program did not have the benefit of critical
infrastructure-protection information now being developed by
the Department's Information Analysis and Infrastructure
Protection Directorate. Consequently, Port Security Grants were
awarded without basic data about our national port-security
priorities.
Third, grant award decisions were made with the intent of
expending all available funding and spreading funds to as many
applicants as possible. The Department funded projects despite
dubious scores by its evaluators, raising questions about the
merits of many of the projects. It appeared that headquarters
and field reviewers did not always share a common understanding
of program objectives or eligibility criteria. In addition, the
program transferred 82 projects that were not funded, valued at
$75 million, to the Department's Urban Area Security
Initiative, despite previously determining that those projects
did not merit funding.
Another dilemma for the program related to the
circumstances under which private entities might obtain grant
funding. DHS did not have a formal policy to govern financial
assistance to private entities, including those that own and
operate high-risk port facilities. Some of the grants to
private companies were within their financial means, and many
were for basic security measures that should have been
considered as normal cost of doing business.
Furthermore, grant recipients had spent only a small
portion of their awards. Of the $515 million awarded between
June 2002 and December 2003, including the $75 million provided
under the Department's Urban Area Security Initiative, grant
recipients had expended only $107 million, or 21 percent of
their awards, as of September 30th, 2004. We determined that
many of the recipients were simply not prepared to put their
grant funds to use. Furthermore, we determined that the
Department did not have sufficient resources to monitor the
progress, or lack thereof, of individual projects.
The Department generally agreed with our recommendations to
improve the design, management, and oversight of the program.
The Department advised us that it intended to use a new risk-
based formula to award the $150 million budgeted for Port
Security Grants during 2005.
We are now studying how the Department has modified the
program, particularly the criteria that it would use to make
grant award decisions and whether those modifications satisfy
our recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Co-Chairman, Members, this concludes my
remarks. I'll be happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Skinner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard L. Skinner, Acting Inspector General,
Department of Homeland Security
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Co-Chairman and Members of the Committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the work
of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) regarding port and maritime
security. I would like to address three areas related to security:
preventing terrorist weapons from entering the United States, maritime
security challenges facing the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and the Port
Security Grant Program. These areas involve major components of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its wide-ranging operations.
Each has been the subject of oversight by the OIG and my comments are
drawn from our reports, which are available on the OIG website at
www.dhs.gov/oig.
Preventing Terrorist Weapons From Entering the United States
Since September 11, 2001, the Department of Homeland Security's
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) priority mission is
detecting and preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering
the United States. A major component of its priority mission is to
ensure that oceangoing cargo containers arriving at the seaports of
entry are not used to smuggle illegal and dangerous contraband. To test
controls over importing weapons of mass destruction, ABC News was
successful in two attempts at smuggling depleted uranium into the
country. On September 11, 2002, ABC News reported that a 15-pound
cylinder of depleted uranium was shipped from Europe to the U.S.
undetected by CBP. On September 11, 2003, ABC News reported that the
same cylinder was smuggled to the U.S. from Jakarta, Indonesia, again
undetected.
In the first smuggling event, ABC News reported that a steel pipe
containing a 15-pound cylinder of depleted uranium, which was shielded
with lead, was placed in a suitcase and accompanied by ABC News
reporters by rail from Austria to Turkey. In Istanbul, Turkey, the
suitcase was placed inside an ornamental chest that was crated and
nailed shut. The crate containing the suitcase was then placed
alongside crates of huge vases and Turkish horse carts in a large metal
shipping container, and then loaded onto a ship that left Istanbul.
Based on data contained in the Automated Targeting System, the crate
was targeted as high-risk for screening by the U.S. Customs Service
(Customs). ABC News broadcast on September 11, 2002, that Customs
failed to detect the depleted uranium carried from Europe to the United
States.
During the second smuggling event, ABC News placed the same
cylinder of depleted uranium into a suitcase, and then placed the
suitcase into a teak trunk. The trunk, along with other furniture, was
loaded into a container in Jakarta, Indonesia, and then transshipped to
the U.S. from Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia. This shipment was also
targeted as high-risk for screening and subsequently inspected by CBP
personnel, but was then allowed to proceed from the port by truck.
In a classified September 2004 report, Effectiveness of Customs and
Border Protection's Procedures to Detect Uranium in Two Smuggling
Incidents, we cited several weaknesses that occurred at the time of the
two incidents that made the container inspection process ineffective.
The protocols and procedures that CBP personnel followed at the time of
the two smuggling incidents were not adequate to detect the depleted
uranium. CBP has since enhanced its ability to screen targeted
containers for radioactive emissions by deploying more sensitive
technology at its seaports, revising protocols and procedures, and
improving training of CBP personnel.
At the request of four congressional committees, we recently
initiated a follow-up audit to determine the status of CBP's
implementation of the recommendations made in our September 2004
report. In addition, we will review other relevant technologies and
implementation plans recommended by entities associated with CBP's
efforts to increase the detection capability of the radiation portal
monitors that are deployed domestically and internationally.
Maritime Security
The Coast Guard's willingness to work hard and long hours, use
innovative tactics, and work through partnerships in close inter-agency
cooperation has allowed it to achieve mission performance results
goals. However, to improve and sustain its mission performance in the
future, the Coast Guard faces significant barriers, most importantly
the deteriorating readiness of its fleet assets. The Coast Guard faces
three major barriers to improving and sustaining its readiness to
perform its legacy missions:
1. The lack of a comprehensive and fully defined performance
management system impedes the Coast Guard's ability to gauge
its performance, allocate resources effectively, and target
areas for improved performance.
2. The workload demands on the Coast Guard will continue to
increase as it implements the Maritime Transportation Security
Act of 2002 (MTSA). This complex work requires experienced and
trained personnel; however, the Coast Guard has in recent years
suffered from declining experience levels among its personnel.
3. Sustaining a high operating tempo due to growing homeland
security demands, such as added port, waterway, and coastal
security patrols, will tax the Coast Guard's infrastructure
including its aging cutter and aircraft fleet.
The lack of a comprehensive and fully defined performance
management system impedes the Coast Guard's ability to gauge its
performance, allocate resources effectively, and target areas for
improved performance. The Coast Guard has yet to define a performance
management system that includes all the input, output, and outcomes
needed to gauge results and target performance improvements, balance
its missions, and ensure the capacity and readiness to respond to
future crises or major terrorist attacks. For example, for search and
rescue, the number of mariners in distress saved is a good indicator of
outcome; however, resource hours under-represent the effort put into
this mission by omitting the many hours of watch standing at stations.
Without more complete information, the Coast Guard has limited ability
to identify and target cost effective improvements to mission
performance.
The workload demands on the Coast Guard will continue to increase
as it implements the MSTA. Under MTSA, the Coast Guard must conduct
risk assessments of all vessels and facilities on or near the water;
develop national and area maritime transportation security plans; and
approve port, facility, and vessel security plans. This complex work
requires experienced and trained personnel, presenting a major
challenge for the Coast Guard, which has in recent years suffered from
declining experience levels among its personnel. Since the Coast Guard
largely relies on experienced senior personnel to coach and train
junior personnel and new recruits on the job, mission performance is at
risk.
In addition to implementing MTSA, growing homeland security
demands, such as added port, waterway, and coastal security patrols,
result in a continued high operating tempo. Sustaining this high
operating tempo will be a major challenge for Coast Guard personnel and
will tax its infrastructure, especially its aged cutter and aircraft
fleet. The Coast Guard reported that mission sustainment is at risk due
to cutters and aircraft that are aging, technologically obsolete, and
require replacement and modernization. Currently, the Coast Guard is
experiencing serious cracking in the hulls of the 110 foot cutters and
engine power loss on the HH-65 Dolphin helicopters, resulting in
operating restrictions. These problems adversely affect the Coast
Guard's mission readiness and ultimately mission performance.
The Port Security Grant Program
The Department's Port Security Grant Program is designed to reduce
the vulnerability of American ports to potential terrorist attacks by
enhancing facility and operational security. The Transportation
Security Administration, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the Department of
Transportation's Maritime Administration have collaborated to award
over $560 million for over 1,200 projects. My office reviewed the
design and goals of the program, the roles and responsibilities of
participating agencies, and the grant evaluation and selection process.
The bulk of our analysis focused on grant award decisions in rounds two
and three. The results of our review are discussed in our January 28,
2005 final report, Review of the Port Security Grant Program (#OIG-05-
10). We identified several important issues relating to the strategic
direction of the program, the program's support of national
infrastructure protection priorities, and the general administration of
the program. I would like to briefly talk about those results.
First, the program's strategic effectiveness is hindered mainly
because it is attempting to reconcile three competing approaches: the
competitive program mandated by Congress, MTSA's grant authority, and
risk-based decision making. These competing approaches are clouding the
direction of the program. The program is under pressure to help defray
the costs of the MTSA security mandates that broadly affect the
maritime industry. MTSA included a grant authority intended to
equitably distribute funds for this purpose, but the appropriations
legislation did not fund the MTSA port security grant program and
required a competitive grant program focused on securing national
critical seaports. However, the resulting program must base award
decisions on the universe of applications submitted--which may or may
not include the most critical needs. In addition, the evaluation and
selection process emphasized awarding funds to as many applicants as
possible. Hence, the program attempted to balance the competitive
program that objectively evaluates the quality of the applications with
the need to broadly disperse funds to assist with MTSA compliance,
while at the same time incorporating risk-based eligibility criteria
and evaluation tools to prioritize projects.
Second, the program did not have the benefit of national key asset
and critical infrastructure protection information now being developed
by the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP)
directorate. Program administrators and IAIP, which is responsible for
developing strategies for protecting the Nation's critical
infrastructure, did not collaborate to integrate the program with
broader national security initiatives. Thus, port security grant award
decisions were made without sufficient information about our national
priorities.
Third, grant award decisions were made with the intent of expending
all available funding and spreading funds to as many applicants as
possible. The program funded projects despite dubious scores by its
evaluators against key criteria, raising questions about the merits of
258 projects costing $67 million. It appeared that headquarters and
field reviewers did not share a common understanding of program
objectives or eligibility criteria. Frequently, they did not agree
about the eligibility or merit of projects and did not consistently
document their rationale for recommending or not recommending funding.
We pointed out the need for the program to look more closely at the
first three criteria (whether the grant proposal was in an area of high
risk, addressed a critical security need/vulnerability, and provided
high risk reduction), which were well conceived and should have carried
more weight.
In addition, the program forwarded an additional 82 projects to the
Office of Domestic Preparedness to be funded at a cost of $75 million
under the Urban Area Security Initiative, despite previously
determining that these projects did not merit funding.
Another dilemma for the program is the question of where the
private sector's responsibility for preventing terrorism ends and where
the Federal Government's responsibility begins. At the time of our
report, DHS did not have a formal policy to provide financial
assistance to private entities, a group that includes those that own
and operate high risk facilities. Even though private entities have
applied for and received substantial funding, we did not conclude that
the program should limit funding to the private sector per se. However,
some of the grants to private companies were within the financial reach
of the applicants and many were for basic security measures that should
have been considered normal costs of doing business. For example, some
of the projects were for anti-theft purposes and not related to
terrorist attack prevention or deterrence.
Furthermore, after three rounds, recipients spent only a small
portion of the entire amount awarded. Of the $515 million awarded
between June 2002 and December 2003, including $75 million provided
under the Office for Domestic Preparedness' Urban Area Security
Initiative, grant recipients had expended only $106.9 million, or 21
percent of total program awards as of September 30, 2004. As a result,
the majority of projects had not been completed and the program had not
yet achieved its intended results in the form of actual improvements to
port security.
This brings us to the status of our recommendations. In response to
our draft report, DHS concurred with 11 of our 12 recommendations. In
our final report, we strongly encouraged DHS to fully implement our
recommendations before proceeding with the next round of port security
grants. DHS' Office of State and Local Government Coordination and
Preparedness (SLGCP) received $150 million in the FY 2005 budget for
round five of the Port Security Grant Program. SLGCP officials informed
us that they were going to make substantive changes to the design of
the program to make it more risk-based, and while it appears they have,
we have not evaluated the effect of these changes.
We recently received DHS' action plan, which discusses corrective
actions taken and planned in response to our recommendations. The
action plan generally appears to be responsive to our recommendations.
For example:
We identified numerous projects within ports not on the list
of strategic or controlled ports. The program developed and
implemented a funding distribution model that targeted 66 ports
as eligible under the program.
We noted the lack of a policy for funding private sector
projects. The action plan refers to a decision by the Secretary
that private entities may apply for a grant, but must provide
matching funds of 50 percent.
Program administrators did not collaborate with IAIP on
broader national security initiatives. SLGCP is taking steps to
improve information sharing with, and participation of, IAIP in
the selection and evaluation process.
However, we are also reviewing additional information supporting
the action plan. In addition, we have not had the opportunity to review
guidance that will be issued for those SLGCP, USCG, TSA, CBP, IAIP, and
MARAD personnel who will be evaluating projects. The revised grant
application package was just released this past week. We are studying
how DHS has modified the program--particularly the criteria program
administrators will use and how they will apply it during the
evaluation process--and whether those modifications satisfy our
recommendations. We expect to communicate this information to SLGCP in
the near future.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Co-Chairman, this concludes my prepared
statement. I will be pleased to answer any questions you or the Members
may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Skinner.
Ms. Wrightson? Now, I know that you have some charts you
wish to put up. What are those?
Ms. Wrightson. Actually, I--we prepared the charts so that
my remarks can be as short as possible so that we can leave
time for dialogue, so, while they're putting them up, I'm just
going to go ahead and start.
The Chairman. Well, tell us. I can't read them. I don't
know about the rest of----
Ms. Wrightson. Oh, goodness. They are about as big as we
thought we could get in the car.
The Chairman. They are all in your testimony?
Ms. Wrightson. Yes, they are.
The Chairman. Yes, I think you can take them down, then.
Thank you very much.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Wrightson. OK.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I am pleased to have your statement and understand your
study.
STATEMENT OF MARGARET T. WRIGHTSON, DIRECTOR,
HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Wrightson. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye,
and other distinguished Members.
I'm pleased to be here today to discuss the Nation's
efforts to improve maritime and seaport security.
Since the terrorist attack of September 11th, GAO has
responded to numerous requests for reports and testimonies on
this issue. In fact, in the past few years we've issued more
than 20 products, all of which contained recommendations.
My statement today covers a wide range of that work, but,
in the interest of time, I'm going to highlight only our major
findings and conclusions.
First, since September 11th, the Federal Government and
port stakeholders have taken extensive actions to improve port
security. Together, these actions have helped to improve
security in three ways: identifying and reducing
vulnerabilities of potential targets, helping to secure the
flow of containers to port gateways, and improving maritime
domain awareness so that stakeholders have an informed view of
port activities through intelligence, information sharing, and
new technologies to identify and respond to threats.
Second, while it may have been necessary to move quickly at
the outset, attempting so much so fast has resulted in a range
of problems that should be corrected, and soon. These problems
can be grouped into three main categories: concerns about
faulty program design and implementation, concerns about
inadequate coordination, and concerns about maintaining the
financial support needed to continue implementing the security
enhancements.
Last, as it becomes clear that the price of improved port
security will be measured in billions, we must develop better
mechanisms for assessing progress and assuring that resources
are focused on the most important priorities. Approaching 4
years after the terrorist attacks, performance measures to
define outcomes and measure progress have not been implemented,
nor is there a robust framework for systematically managing
risk. A sustainable strategy for maritime security requires
both.
Turning to our detailed findings, given the scope and
complexity of the programs, and the speed with which they were
rolled out, it is not surprising that we have found a host of
problems. While some of these may be resolved with time as the
programs mature, others are more challenging.
The first challenge is the failure of many of these
programs to incorporate necessary planning. For example, our
review showed that TWIC, C-TPAT, CSI, Megaport, AIS, and the
Port Security Assessment and Compliance Program all experienced
major planning problems, ranging from inadequate or nonexistent
human capital, projects, or strategic planning, to faulty
project management, such as a lack of clear timeframes,
milestones, and risk mitigation. Until such planning elements
are incorporated, there will be too little assurance that
program results will be delivered on time and on target.
Inadequate coordination is the second area to highlight.
Unfortunately, the list of programs with coordination problems
is as long as the list for planning problems, yet establishing
a viable port-security regime cannot be accomplished with
agencies at the federal level that are working in stovepipes or
by the Federal Government alone as Congressman Ruppersberger
ably stated earlier.
There is perhaps no better way to highlight what can happen
when coordination breaks down than the delayed attempt to
develop the Transportation Worker Identification Credential.
TSA began TWIC in 2002, while it was part of DOT. At that
time, TSA said the first cards would be issued in 2004. We are
now nearly halfway through 2005, and TWIC is still in the
prototype phase, with critical policy decisions still to be
made that are as basic as who will be eligible to receive the
card.
Part of TSA's problems can be traced to breakdowns in
coordination between TSA and DHS. Moreover, outside DHS, TSA
has failed to sustain the support of port stakeholders who feel
excluded. Without internal and external support and agreement,
and, I might add, a comprehensive plan for managing this
program, which does not now appear to be in place, the program
is at risk of further delays, increased costs, and less-than-
satisfactory outcomes.
Before concluding, two additional matters are worth
mentioning. First, notwithstanding the effort and resources
represented by these programs and the people at this table, it
is difficult, if not impossible, to know how far we have
progressed in making ports more secure.
One reason is a lack of overall goals and measures. For
example, although the Coast Guard regularly reports how well it
is doing rescuing mariners in distress, it is still struggling
to develop and implement a performance measure for port-
security activities.
Second, we cannot afford to protect everything against
every risk. More care must be taken to prioritize resources
toward the greatest risk.
Notwithstanding some progress, much remains to be done
before a common framework for risk management is systematically
applied to policy and resource allocation decisions in DHS, let
alone the Federal Government.
In conclusion, urgency in the wake of 9/11 may help to
rationalize the mistakes and missteps described today; however,
the need for quick action at the start should not be used to
justify poor planning and management today. In the final
analysis, the race to better security must be run as a
marathon, not a sprint. In port security, as in homeland
security, we're ready for midcourse corrections, including, we
hope, the expeditious implementation of GAO's recommendations
and a closer focus on goals, measures, and risk management.
This is because lasting success depends less well on how
quickly the programs were begun than on how carefully they are
carried out.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I hope we engage
in a dialogue about these really important issues.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Wrightson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Margaret T. Wrightson, Director, Homeland
Security and Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Nation's efforts to
improve seaport security. More than 3 years after the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, seaport security continues to be a major concern
for the Nation. For example, many seaport areas are inherently
vulnerable, given their size, easy accessibility by water and land,
large numbers of potential targets, and proximity to urban areas. Also,
the large cargo volumes passing through seaports, such as containers
destined for further shipment by other modes of transportation such as
rail or truck, also represent a potential conduit for terrorists to
smuggle weapons of mass destruction or other dangerous materials into
the United States. The potential consequences of the risks created by
these vulnerabilities are significant as the Nation's economy relies on
an expeditious flow of goods through seaports. A successful attack on a
seaport could result in a dramatic slowdown in the supply system, with
consequences in the billions of dollars.
Much has been set in motion to address these risks in the wake of
the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Both Congress and the
Administration have been active, through legislation, presidential
directives, and international agreements, in enhancing seaport
security. Key agencies, such as the Coast Guard, the Customs Service,
and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), have been
reorganized under the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
tasked with numerous responsibilities designed to strengthen seaport
security. Many of these tasks were required by the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA).\1\
My testimony today draws primarily on the work we have done in
responding to congressional requests for information and analysis about
the Nation's homeland security efforts (see app. I for a list of recent
reports and testimonies we have issued). We conducted our work in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, and
the scope and methodology for this work can be found in the respective
products. Over the course of completing this work, we have made a
number of recommendations for specific agencies, which can be found in
appendix II. While this body of work does not cover every program or
action that has been taken, it does encompass a wide range of these
actions. My testimony will (1) provide an overview of the types of
actions taken by the Federal Government and other stakeholders to
address seaport security, (2) describe the main challenges encountered
in taking these actions, and (3) describe what tools and approaches may
be useful in charting a course for future actions to enhance security.
Summary
Seaports are vulnerable on many fronts and the actions taken to
secure them can be divided into three main categories: reducing
vulnerabilities of specific targets within seaports, making the cargo
flowing through these seaport gateways more secure, and developing what
is called ``maritime domain awareness''--a sufficiently informed view
of maritime activities by stakeholders involved in security to quickly
identify and respond to emergencies, unusual patterns or events, and
matters of particular interest. Within each category, several actions
have been taken or are underway. For example, assessments of potential
targets have been completed at 55 of the Nation's most economically and
militarily strategic seaports, and more than 9,000 vessels and over
3,000 facilities have developed security plans and have been reviewed
by the Coast Guard. Customs inspectors have been placed at some
overseas seaports and partnerships struck up with some private sector
stakeholders to help ensure that the cargo and containers arriving at
U.S. seaports are free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or a
radiological ``dirty bomb.'' New assets are budgeted and are coming
online, including new Coast Guard boats and cutters and communication
systems. Finally, new information-sharing networks and command
structures have been created to allow more coordinated responses and
increase awareness of activities going on in the maritime domain. Some
of these efforts have been completed and others are ongoing; overall,
the amount of effort has been considerable.
The efforts we have reviewed over the past 3 years, many of which
were quickly implemented to address pressing security needs, have
encountered challenges that could significantly affect their success.
Some of these challenges are likely to be resolved with time, but some
reflect greater difficulty and therefore merit more attention. The more
complex challenges take three main forms:
Program design and implementation: Some agencies have failed
to design programs and planning components, such as human
capital plans and performance measures, that are necessary to
successfully implement their programs and ensure they are
effective. For example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) started implementation of two key container supply-chain-
security initiatives before taking adequate steps to develop
plans and strategies to effectively manage critical aspects of
the programs such as human capital and achievement of program
objectives.
Coordinating security efforts with stakeholders: Many
private sector companies and governmental agencies are involved
in seaport security efforts, and in some cases progress has
been hampered because of difficulties in communication and
coordination between parties. For example, deadlines in the
development of an identification card for transportation
workers have been missed due in part to a lack of communication
and coordination between TSA and DHS.
Funding security improvements: Economic constraints, such as
declining revenues and increased security costs, make it
difficult to provide and sustain the funding necessary to
continue implementing security measures and activities by
maritime stakeholders including the Federal Government.
Consequently, many stakeholders rely heavily on the Federal
Government for assistance, and requests for federal grant
funding far outstrip the funding amounts available. For
example, although more than $560 million in grants has been
awarded to seaport stakeholders since 2002 under federal grant
programs for implementation of security measures and
activities, this amount has met only a fraction of the amount
requested by these stakeholders.
As actions to enhance homeland security continue, and as it becomes
clearer that the price of these actions will be measured in the
billions of dollars, it is likely that increasing attention will turn
to assessing the progress made in securing seaports and determine where
future actions and funds should be allocated to further enhance
security. Although there is widespread agreement that actions taken so
far have led to a heightened awareness of the need for security and an
enhanced ability to identify and respond to many security threats,
assessing the degree of progress in making the Nation more secure is
difficult. Thus far, seaport security actions--and homeland security
activities in general--lack performance measures to define what these
activities are intended to achieve and measure progress toward these
goals. As Congress and the Nation continue to evaluate how much
security is enough, more attention on defining these goals and measures
will likely be needed by stakeholders. Doing so is all the more
important because, as groups such as the 9/11 Commission have pointed
out, no amount of money can totally insulate seaports from attack by a
well-funded and determined enemy. These realities suggest that the
future focus in applying resources and efforts also needs to
incorporate an approach to identify and manage risk--that is, on
assessing critical infrastructure, determining what is most at risk,
and applying sound measures designed to make cost-effective use of
resources and funding.
Background
The vast U.S. maritime system contains more than 300 seaports and
3,700 cargo and passenger terminals. These seaports dot not only our
seacoasts, but also major lakes and rivers (see fig. 1). Much of the
Nation's commercial maritime activities, however, are concentrated in
about a dozen major seaports, such as Los Angeles/Long Beach, New York/
New Jersey, and Houston.
The Nation's seaports are economic engines and a key part of the
national defense system. More than 95 percent of the Nation's non-North
American foreign trade (and 100 percent of certain commodities, such as
foreign oil) arrives by ship. Cargo containers, approximately 7 million
of which entered the country in 2002, are central to an efficient
transportation network because they can be quickly shifted from ships
to trains and trucks and back again. Because of these efficiencies, the
U.S. and world economies have become increasingly reliant on cargo
containers to transport their goods. With regard to national security,
the Departments of Defense and Transportation have designated 17 U.S.
seaports as strategic because they are necessary for use in the event
of a major military deployment. Thirteen of them are commercial
seaports.
While the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, did not involve
seaports, they called attention to ways in which seaports represent an
attractive and vulnerable terrorist target. Various studies have
pointed out that significant disruptions could result from a seaport-
related attack. For example, the Brookings Institution has estimated
that costs associated with U.S. seaport closures resulting from a
detonated weapon of mass destruction could amount to $1 trillion. The
firm of Booz, Allen, and Hamilton studied the potential cost of
discovering an undetonated weapon of mass destruction at a U.S. seaport
and placed the cost of a 12-day closure of seaports at approximately
$58 billion. An actual closure of seaports along the West Coast
occurred for 10 days in 2002 due to a labor dispute. According to one
estimate, the cost of this closure to the national economy for the
first 5 days was estimated at $4.7 billion and increased exponentially
after that.\2\ Similarly, if one or more of the 17 strategic U.S.
seaports (or the ships carrying military supplies) were successfully
attacked, not only could massive civilian casualties be sustained and
critical infrastructure lost, but the military could also lose precious
cargo and time and be forced to rely heavily on already burdened
airlift capabilities.
Many Actions Have Been Taken or Are Underway To Address Seaport
Security
Since September 11, 2001, a number of actions have been taken or
are underway to address seaport security by a diverse mix of agencies
and seaport stakeholders. Federal agencies, such as the Coast Guard,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and TSA, have been tasked
with responsibilities and functions intended to make seaports more
secure, such as monitoring vessel traffic or inspecting cargo and
containers, and procuring new assets such as aircraft and cutters to
conduct patrols and respond to threats. In addition to these federal
agencies, seaport stakeholders in the private sector and at the state
and local levels of government have taken actions to enhance the
security of seaports, such as conducting security assessments of
infrastructure and vessels operated within the seaports and developing
security plans to protect against a terrorist attack. The actions taken
by these agencies and stakeholders are primarily aimed at three types
of protections: (1) identifying and reducing vulnerabilities of the
facilities, infrastructure, and vessels operating in seaports, (2)
securing the cargo and commerce flowing through seaports, and (3)
developing greater maritime domain awareness through enhanced
intelligence, information-sharing capabilities, and assets and
technologies.
Identifying and Reducing the Vulnerabilities of Facilities,
Infrastructure, and Vessels
Seaports facilitate the freedom of movement and flow of goods, and
in doing so they allow people, cargo, and vessels to transit with
relative anonymity. While seaports contain terminals and other
facilities where goods bound for import or export are unloaded and
loaded, or where people board and disembark cruise ships or ferries,
seaports also often contain other infrastructure critical to the
Nation's economy and defense, such as military installations, chemical
factories, powerplants, and refineries. The combination of assets,
access, and anonymity makes for potentially attractive targets. The
facilities and vessels in seaports can be vulnerable on many fronts.
For example, facilities where containers are transferred between ships
and railroad cars or trucks must be able to screen vehicles entering
the facility and routinely check cargo for evidence of tampering.
Chemical factories and other installations where hazardous materials
are present must be able to control access to areas containing
dangerous goods or hazardous substances. Vessels, ranging from oil
tankers and freighters to tugboats and passenger ferries, must be able
to restrict access to certain areas on board the vessel, such as the
bridge or other control stations critical to the vessel's operation.
Given the wide range of potential targets, an effective security
response includes identifying targets, assessing risks to them, and
taking steps to reduce or mitigate these risks. An essential step in
this process is to conduct a security or vulnerability assessment. This
assessment, which is needed both for the seaport as a whole and for
individual vessels and facilities, identifies vulnerabilities in
physical structures, personnel protection systems, processes, and other
areas that may lead to a security breach. For example, this assessment
might reveal weaknesses in an organization's security systems or
unprotected access points such as a facility's perimeter not being
sufficiently lighted or gates not being secured or monitored after
hours. After the vulnerabilities are identified, measures can then be
identified that will reduce or mitigate the vulnerabilities when
installed or implemented.
Most actions to identify and reduce the vulnerabilities within
seaports were specifically required by the Maritime Transportation
Security Act of 2002 (MTSA). Passage of MTSA was a major step in
establishing a security framework for America's seaports. This security
framework includes assessment of risks, access controls over personnel
and facilities, and development and implementation of security plans,
among other activities. Table 1 shows some of the actions that have
been taken and programs that are in the process of being implemented to
carry out this framework.\3\
Table 1: Examples of Actions Taken and Programs Underway to Identify and
Reduce Vulnerabilities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Action or program Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conducting security assessments MTSA and its implementing regulations
and developing security plans require designated owners or
for facilities and vessels operators of maritime facilities or
vessels to identify vulnerabilities
and develop security plans for their
facilities or vessels. The plans
were reviewed and approved by the
Coast Guard. Since July 1, 2004, the
Coast Guard has been conducting
inspections of these facilities and
vessels to ensure the plans have
been implemented. The Coast Guard
completed inspections of the
facilities by December 31, 2004, and
is scheduled to complete inspections
of the vessels by July 1, 2005.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conducting security assessments To meet another MTSA requirement, the
and developing seaport-wide Coast Guard led efforts to conduct a
security plans seaport-wide security assessment of
each of the Nation's seaports and
develop a security plan for the
seaport zone. In carrying out these
efforts, the Coast Guard worked with
a wide variety of stakeholders, such
as state and local governments, law
enforcement, owners and operators of
facilities and vessels, and trade
and labor organizations.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Development of the Transportation TWIC is designed to respond to
Worker Identification Credential various statutory provisions
(TWIC) relating to transportation related
worker identification including
MTSA, which requires a biometric
identification card be issued to
individuals requiring unescorted
access to secure areas of seaport
facilities or vessels. This
credential is being designed to be a
universally recognized
identification card accepted across
all modes of the national
transportation system, including
airports, railroad terminals, and
seaports.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Port Security Assessment Program Separate from MTSA requirements, the
Coast Guard established a program
after September 11, 2001, to assess
vulnerabilities of the Nation's 55
most strategic commercial and
military seaports. The program has
changed considerably since its
inception and now includes a
geographic information system (GIS)
to help identify and provide up-to-
date information on threats and
incidents, as well as provide
accessible information to help
develop security plans.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard and TSA data.
The amount of effort involved in carrying out these actions and
implementing these programs has been considerable. For example, after
following an aggressive time frame to develop regulations to implement
the requirements of MTSA, the Coast Guard reviewed and approved the
security plans of the over 3,000 facilities and more than 9,000 vessels
that were required to identify their vulnerabilities and take action to
reduce them. Six months after July 1, 2004, the date by which the
security plans were to be implemented, the Coast Guard reported that it
completed on-site inspections of all facilities and thousands of
vessels to ensure the plans were being implemented as approved. In
addition to its work on the security plans and inspections, the Coast
Guard completed security assessments of the Nation's 55 most
economically and militarily strategic seaports.
Securing the Cargo Flowing Through Seaports
While the facilities, vessels, and infrastructure within seaports
have vulnerabilities to terrorist attack, the cargoes transiting
through seaports also have vulnerabilities that terrorists could
exploit. Containers are of particular concern because they can be
filled overseas at so many different locations and are transported
through complex logistics networks before reaching U.S. seaports. From
the time the container is loaded for shipping to the time the container
arrives at a seaport, the containers must go through several steps that
involve many different participants and many points of transfer. Each
of these steps in the supply chain presents its own vulnerabilities
that terrorists could take advantage of to place a WMD into a container
for shipment to the United States. A report prepared by the National
Defense University's Center for Technology and National Security Policy
stated that a container is ideally suited to deliver a WMD or a
radiological ``dirty bomb.'' While there have been no known incidents
yet of containers being used to transport WMDs, criminals have
exploited containers for other illegal purposes, such as smuggling
weapons, people, and illicit substances. Such activities demonstrate
the vulnerability of the freight transportation industry and suggest
opportunities for further exploitation of containers by criminals,
including terrorist groups.
In general, the actions taken thus far are aimed at identifying,
tracking, and scrutinizing the container cargo shipments moving into
the country. Most of these actions are being done by CBP, the DHS
agency responsible for protecting the Nation's borders and official
ports of entry. CBP uses a layered approach that attempts to focus
resources on potentially risky cargo containers while allowing other
cargo containers to proceed without disrupting commerce. This approach
includes the actions and programs shown in table 2. Several of these
actions involve a strategy of moving primary reliance for security away
from control systems at U.S. seaports of entry and toward improved
controls at points of origin and along the way.\4\
Table 2: Examples of Container Security Actions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Action Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Automated Targeting System (ATS) A computer model reviews
documentation on all arriving
containers and helps select or
target containers for additional
scrutiny.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Supply Chain Stratified Supplements ATS by randomly selecting
Examination additional containers to be
physically examined. The results of
the random inspection program are to
be compared with the results of ATS
inspections to improve targeting.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Container Security Initiative Places staff at designated foreign
(CSI) seaports to work with foreign
counterparts to identify and inspect
high-risk containers for weapons of
mass destruction before they are
shipped to the United States.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Cooperative program between CBP and
Terrorism (C-TPAT) members of the international trade
community in which private companies
agree to improve the security of
their supply chains in return for a
reduced likelihood that their
containers will be inspected.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operation Safe Commerce Begun by the private sector and now
administered by DHS's Office of
Domestic Preparedness, efforts
center on (1) ensuring that
containers are loaded in a secure
environment at the point of product
origin, with 100 percent
verification of their contents; (2)
using such technology as pressure,
light, or temperature sensors to
continually monitor containers
throughout their overseas voyage to
the point of distribution in the
United States; and (3) using cargo-
tracking technology to keep accurate
track of containers at all points in
the supply chain, including
distribution to their ultimate
destinations.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Megaports Initiative In 2003, the Department of Energy
(DOE) initiated the Initiative to
enable foreign government personnel
at key seaports to use radiation
detection equipment to screen
shipping containers entering and
leaving these seaports for nuclear
and other radioactive material that
could be used against the United
States or its allies. Through the
Initiative, DOE installs radiation
detection equipment at foreign
seaports that is then operated by
foreign government officials and
port personnel working at these
seaports.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of CBP and DOE data.
The table also shows Operation Safe Commerce, initiated by the
private sector and now administered by DHS's Office of Domestic
Preparedness, which employs a similar strategy. This action, in pilot-
project form that was initially funded by $58 million appropriated by
Congress, is intended to help strengthen the security of cargo as it
moves along the international supply chain in containers.\5\ In late
2004, the second of two initial phases of the project was concluded.
This phase involved identifying the security vulnerabilities of 19
separate supply chains and trying out technologies, such as container
seals or sensors, and their integration with governmental policies,
logistic processes and procedures that could mitigate those
vulnerabilities. The project has received additional funding of $17
million that has been targeted to conduct a third phase in which the
best technologies and practices identified in the first two phases will
be further tested on a high number of containers for their
effectiveness and tamper resistance on three separate supply chains. A
report on the best practices identified in the first two phases is
expected to be issued in June 2005, and completion of the third phase
is expected by October 2006.
The other actions taken to enhance the security of cargo and
commerce have been substantial. In 2002 CBP quickly rolled out the CSI
and C-TPAT programs shown in table 2 and enlisted the participation of
several countries and companies. By April 2005, CSI was operational at
35 seaports, located in 18 countries. Similarly, C-TPAT membership grew
from about 1,700 companies in January 2003 to over 9,000 companies in
March 2005. Given the urgency to take steps to protect against
terrorism after the September 11, 2001, attacks, some of the actions
were taken using an ``implement and amend'' approach. That is, CBP had
to immediately implement the activity with the knowledge it may need to
modify the approach later. For example, in August 2002, CBP modified
the already developed Automatic Targeting System with new terrorism-
related criteria.
Developing Greater Maritime Domain Awareness
The third main area of activity to enhance seaport security--
maritime domain awareness--is the understanding by stakeholders
involved in maritime security of anything associated with the global
maritime environment that could adversely affect the security, safety,
economy or environment of the United States. This awareness is
essential to identify and respond to any unusual patterns or anomalies
that could portend a possible terrorist attack. To be effective,
maritime domain awareness must be comprehensive and include information
on vessels, seaport infrastructures and facilities, shipping lanes and
transit corridors, waterways, and anchorages, among other things. It
must also identify threats as soon as possible and far enough away from
U.S. seaports to eliminate or mitigate the threat. By effectively
identifying potential threats, this awareness can be used as a force
multiplier to position resources where they are needed most to respond,
instead of spreading out limited resources to address all threats, no
matter how unlikely they are to occur. In addition, when shared, this
awareness has the potential to facilitate the coordination of efforts
of local, state, federal, and even international stakeholders in
responding to potential threats.
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard took steps
such as increasing the number of security patrols conducted within
seaports and waterways that helped contribute to increased maritime
domain awareness. Although maritime homeland security duties are not
new to the Coast Guard, the number of hours the Coast Guard used
resources (such as ships, boats, or aircraft) to carry out seaport,
waterway, and coastal security activities during Fiscal Year 2003
increased by 1,220 percent from their pre-September 11, 2001, level.
Relative to the rest of the Coast Guard's responsibilities, this
represented an increase from 4 percent of the Coast Guard's total
annual resource hours being used for seaport, waterway, and coastal
security activities before September 11, 2001, to 34 percent by
September 30, 2003. These activities provide an important input to
maritime domain awareness as it places Coast Guard personnel out in the
seaports where they can observe, report, and respond to suspect
activities or vessels. In addition, these patrols provide the Coast
Guard with a visible presence out in the seaport that may deter a
potential terrorist attack from being carried out.
As the lead federal agency responsible for protecting the U.S.
maritime domain, the Coast Guard has spearheaded an interagency
approach for establishing maritime domain awareness. Within this
approach are several activities and actions intended to collect
information and intelligence, analyze the information and intelligence,
and disseminate the analyzed information and intelligence to
appropriate federal, state, local, or private seaport stakeholders.
Some of these actions were required under MTSA, such as the
establishment of an Automatic Identification System to track vessels,
as well as creation of area maritime security committees of local
seaport stakeholders who identify and address risks within their
seaport. In addition to these actions, the Department of Defense and
DHS formed a Maritime Domain Awareness Senior Steering Group in 2004 to
coordinate national efforts to improve maritime domain awareness. Under
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13, issued in December 2004,
this steering group is required to develop a national plan for maritime
domain awareness by June 2005. According to the head of the Coast
Guard's maritime domain awareness program, a draft of this plan is
being reviewed before it is submitted to the President. Table 3 shows
some of the actions currently being taken or underway to enhance
maritime domain awareness.
Table 3: Examples of Activities to Develop Maritime Domain Awareness
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maritime Domain Awareness
activity Example of activity
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Collection of information and Automatic Identification System: AIS
intelligence uses a device aboard a vessel to
transmit an identifying signal to a
receiver located at the seaport and
other ships in the area. This signal
gives seaport officials and other
vessels nearly instantaneous
information and awareness about a
vessel's identity, position, speed,
and course. The Coast Guard intends
to provide AIS coverage to meet
maritime domain awareness
requirements in all navigable waters
of the United States and further
offshore. As of May 2005, the Coast
Guard has AIS coverage in several
seaports and coastal areas.a In
addition to this system, the Coast
Guard is also working with the
International Maritime Organization
(IMO) to develop functional and
technical requirements for long-range
tracking out to 2,000 nautical miles.
The Coast Guard proposed an amendment
to the International Convention for
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) for
this initiative, which is currently
under consideration by the
international body. However,
according to the Coast Guard, the
issue of long-range tracking is
contentious internationally and it is
uncertain whether the amendment will
be adopted.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Analysis of information and Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers
intelligence and Field Intelligence Support Teams:
Centers have been established by the
Coast Guard on the East and West
Coasts to provide actionable
intelligence to Coast Guard
commanders and units. The teams also
conduct initial analysis of
intelligence in coordination with
federal, state, and local law
enforcement and intelligence
agencies.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Dissemination of information and Area Maritime Security Committees: The
intelligence committees serve as forums for local
seaport stakeholders from federal
agencies, state and local
governments, law enforcement, and
private industries to gain a
comprehensive perspective of security
issues at a seaport location.
Information is disseminated through
regularly scheduled meetings,
issuance of electronic bulletins on
suspicious activities around seaport
facilities, and sharing key
documents. The committees also serve
as a link for communicating threats
and security information to seaport
stakeholders.
Interagency Operational Centers: These
centers provide information 24 hours
a day about maritime activities and
involve various federal and
nonfederal agencies directly in
operational decisions using this
information. Radar, sensors, and
cameras offer representations of
vessels and facilities. Other data
are available from intelligence
sources, including data on vessels,
cargo, and crew. Unlike the area
maritime security committees, these
centers are operational in nature
with a unified or joint command
structure designed to receive
information and act on it.
Representatives from the various
agencies work side by side, each
having access to databases and other
sources of information from their
respective agencies. These currently
exist in three locations: Charleston,
South Carolina; Norfolk, Virginia;
and San Diego, California.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.
a The Coast Guard currently has AIS coverage in the following areas:
Alaska (Anchorage, Homer, Nikiski, Seward, Valdez, and Juneau); Puget
Sound (Seattle, Tacoma, Everett, Port Angeles, and Olympia); the
Columbia River entrance; San Francisco Bay and approaches; Los Angeles/
Long Beach Harbor and approaches; San Diego and approaches; Hawaii
(Honolulu and Pearl Harbor); Gulf of Mexico (Houston/Galveston, Port
Arthur, Berwick Bay, and Lower Mississippi River--New Orleans--Baton
Rouge); South Florida (Key West, Miami, and Port Everglades);
Charleston, South Carolina; Norfolk, Virginia; New York, New York;
Long Island Sound (New Haven and New London); Boston Harbor and
approaches; and Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan.
While many of the activities to develop maritime domain awareness
are still underway, some progress has already been made. One activity
in this area that we have recently looked at concerns the process of
information sharing between federal and non-federal seaport
stakeholders participating on area maritime security committees.\6\ The
Coast Guard organized 43 of these committees, covering the Nation's 361
seaports. While a primary purpose of the committees is to develop a
seaport-wide security plan for their respective seaports, the
committees also provide links for communicating threats and security
information to seaport stakeholders--links that generally did not exist
prior to the creation of the committees. The types of information
shared among committee members with security clearances included
assessments of vulnerabilities at specific seaport locations,
information about potential threats or suspicious activities, and
strategies to use in protecting key infrastructure. Our review found
that the committees improved information sharing among seaport security
stakeholders, including the timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of
information shared.
Another aspect of improving maritime domain awareness involves
having the assets to communicate and conduct patrols, and in this
regard, the Coast Guard has budgeted for and is in the process of
receiving substantial new resources. In 1996, the Coast Guard initiated
a major recapitalization effort--known as the Integrated Deepwater
System--to replace and modernize the agency's aging and deteriorating
fleet of aircraft and vessel assets. The focus of the program is not
just on new ships and aircraft, but also on newer, more capable assets,
with improved and integrated command, control, communications and
computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
capabilities. Although the program was started before the attacks of
September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard plans to leverage these
capabilities of the 20 year, $17 billion dollar program to enhance its
maritime domain awareness and seaport security operations such as
patrols and response.
Challenges for Improving Maritime Security Take Three Main Forms
Propelled by a strong sense of urgency to secure the seaports,
federal agencies, such as the Coast Guard, CBP, and TSA, accomplished a
considerable amount in a short time. At the same time, these actions
have also shown the strains that often occur when difficult tasks must
be done quickly. We have not examined every action that has been
started or enhanced regarding maritime security, but our work to date
has covered a number of them. It is not surprising that we have found,
besides the progress made, a number of missteps, false starts, and
inefficiencies. These represent challenges to overcome.
While some of these challenges will be resolved with time,
analysis, and oversight, there are other challenges that bear even more
careful watching, because they may prove to be considerably more
difficult to overcome. I would like to highlight three of those
challenges, providing examples from our recent work. These three
challenges involve (1) design and implementing programs, (2)
coordinating between different agencies and stakeholder interests, and
(3) determining how to pay for these efforts.
Challenges in Program Design and Implementation
I will discuss today two illustrative examples related to
challenges in program design and implementation that we have identified
from our work. These include the (1) lack of planning and performance
measures for program design and (2) lack of experienced personnel for
program implementation.
Lack of Planning and Performance Measures for Program Design
One effect of having to design programs quickly is that they may
lack such elements as strategic plans and performance measures needed
to set program goals and monitor performance. The lack of such tools
can create problems that need to be resolved as the program unfolds.
For example, we have reviewed CBP's actions to establish a system meant
to reliably identify potentially risky cargo containers.
Our work has shown that a need exists for additional efforts in
several homeland security activities, including securing cargo, in
order to help ensure the effectiveness of the approach.\7\ As we noted
in a July 2003 report, the former U.S. Customs Service, part of which
is now CBP initiated the Container Security Initiative (CSI) in January
2002 in response to security vulnerabilities created by ocean container
trade and the concern that terrorists could exploit these
vulnerabilities to transport or detonate WMDs in the United States.\8\
During the first year, program officials quickly designed and rolled
out the initiative, modifying operations over time. The service
achieved strong initial participation among the countries that it
sought to enroll in the initiative, reaching agreement with 15
governments to place U.S. personnel at 24 seaports, and placing teams
in 5 of these seaports. However, CBP had not taken adequate steps to
incorporate human capital planning, develop performance measures, and
plan strategically--factors essential to the program's long-term
success and accountability. We noted, for example, that:
More than 1 year into the implementation of the initiative,
CBP had not developed a systematic human capital plan to
recruit, train, and assign the more than 120 program staff that
would be needed for long-term assignments in a wide range of
foreign seaports, some of which could require language
capabilities and diplomatic skills.
CBP lacked performance measures for the initiative that
demonstrated program achievements and established
accountability. For example, the service lacked measures that
assessed the impact of collocating U.S. and foreign customs
officials in foreign seaports to determine which containers
should be targeted for inspection.
CBP's focus on short-term operational planning in order to
quickly implement the program impeded its ability to
systematically carry out strategic planning. We noted that the
service did not have a strategic plan for the initiative that
describes how it intends to achieve program goals and
objectives. As a result, CBP lacked elements of strategic
planning that would improve the management of the program and
allow CBP to establish accountability for planned expenditures.
As also reported in July 2003, another program that did not take
adequate steps to incorporate the human capital planning and
performance measures necessary for the program's long-term success and
accountability is CBP's Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT) program. Initiated in November 2001, C-TPAT is an initiative that
attempts to improve the security of the international supply chain. It
is a cooperative program between CBP and members of the international
trade community in which private companies agree to improve the
security of their supply chains in return for a reduced likelihood that
their containers will be inspected.
During the first year, more than 1,700 companies agreed to
participate in the program, and most received the key benefit--a
reduced likelihood of inspections for WMDs. However, we noted similar
kinds of problems to those in the CSI program. For example, we found
that:
Even as it rolled out new program elements, CBP lacked a
human capital plan for increasing the number of C-TPAT staff
from 10 to more than 160.
CBP had not developed performance measures for C-TPAT that
would establish accountability and measure program
achievements. For example, CBP had no performance measure to
assess the impact of C-TPAT on improving supply chain security
practices, possibly resulting in benefits being granted to
undeserving companies.
CBP lacked strategic planning in rolling out C-TPAT, failing
to communicate how it planned to implement critical program
elements designed to verify that companies have security
measures in place and follow through with recommended changes.
We are currently reviewing both the CSI and C-TPAT programs and
will soon be issuing reports to update our earlier evaluation of these
programs.
Lack of Experienced Personnel for Program Implementation
One major challenge in program implementation is the lack of
experienced personnel, which is to be expected given the rapid increase
in newly hired personnel since September 11, 2001. Agencies such as the
Coast Guard expect to see large increases in the number of staff over
the next few years to help meet new and expanded responsibilities.
Consequently, they also face a challenge in absorbing this increase and
training them to be fully productive. We pointed out early on that this
would be a challenge for the Coast Guard,\9\ and subsequent work has
shown this to be the case. For example, after a Coast Guard internal
review found that readiness of its multi-mission stations--the shore-
based units whose responsibilities include finding and rescuing
mariners in danger--had been in decline for an extended period, the
Coast Guard began efforts to improve the readiness of the stations.
This effort was complicated by the new homeland security
responsibilities the stations assumed after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. In a recent review of staffing and readiness at
these multi-mission stations,\10\ we found that the Coast Guard was
still in the process of defining new standards for security activities
and had yet to translate the impact of security-related mission
responsibilities into specific station readiness requirements, such as
staffing standards. Consequently, even though station staffing had
increased 25 percent since 2001, the Coast Guard was unable to align
staffing resources with mission activities, which resulted in a
significant number of positions not being filled with qualified
personnel and station personnel working significantly longer hours than
are allowed under the Coast Guard's work standards.
We also identified personnel or human capital challenges such as
lack of experienced personnel related to the Coast Guard's program to
oversee implementation of MTSA-required security plans by owners and
operators of maritime facilities and vessels. These security plans are
performance-based, meaning the Coast Guard has specified the outcomes
it is seeking to achieve and has given seaport stakeholders
responsibility for identifying and delivering the measures needed to
achieve these outcomes. While this approach provides flexibility to
owners and operators in designing and implementing their plans, it also
places a premium on the skills and experience of inspectors to identify
deficiencies and recommend corrective action. Because the Coast Guard
had to review and assess for compliance more than 12,000 security plans
for facilities and vessels, it had to rely heavily on reservists, which
varied greatly in the level of their skills and experience in this
area. For example, some reservists had graduate degrees in security
management while others had no formal security training or experience.
In June 2004, we recommended that the Coast Guard carefully evaluate
its efforts during the initial surge period for inspections.\11\ The
Coast Guard has adjusted its inspection program to make its compliance
assessments more relevant and useful, but it has not yet determined the
overall effectiveness of its compliance actions.
Challenges in Coordinating Actions
Coordinating massive new homeland security actions has been an
acknowledged challenge since the events of September 11, 2001, and
seaport security has been no exception. On the federal side alone, we
have for several years designated implementing and transforming the new
DHS as a high-risk area.\12\ Since the agency's inception in March
2003, DHS leadership has provided a foundation to maintain critical
operations while undergoing transformation, and the agency has begun to
put systems in place to operate more effectively and efficiently as an
agency. In managing its transformation, however, DHS still faces such
issues as forming effective partnerships with other governmental and
private-sector entities.
We have made numerous recommendations related to information
sharing, particularly as it relates to fulfilling federal critical
infrastructure protection responsibilities. \13\ For example, we have
reported on the practices of organizations that successfully share
sensitive or time-critical information, including establishing trust
relationships, developing information-sharing standards and protocols,
establishing secure communications mechanisms, and disseminating
sensitive information appropriately. Federal agencies such as DHS and
the Coast Guard have concurred with our recommendations that they
develop appropriate strategies to address the many potential barriers
to information sharing. However, as of January 2005, many federal
efforts to do this remain in the planning or early implementation
stages especially in the area of homeland security information sharing,
including establishing clear goals, objectives, and expectations for
the many participants in information-sharing efforts; and
consolidating, standardizing, and enhancing federal structures,
policies, and capabilities for the analysis and dissemination of
information. In this regard, the issue of information-sharing across
agency and stakeholder lines has emerged as a significant enough
challenge that we have also designated it as a high-risk area. Here are
three examples that illustrate the kinds of problems and challenges
that remain related to seaport security.
Obtaining Security Clearances
While coordination of information-sharing at the seaport level
appears to have improved, seaports are experiencing challenges with
regards to non-federal officials obtaining security clearances. For
some time, state and local seaport and law enforcement personnel have
reported problems in obtaining federally generated intelligence
information about their jurisdictions because they did not have a
federal security clearance. However, as of February 2005--over 4 months
after the Coast Guard had developed a list of over 350 non-federal area
maritime security committee participants as having a need for a
security clearance--only 28 had submitted the necessary paperwork for
the background check. Local Coast Guard officials told us they did not
clearly understand their responsibility for communicating with state
and local officials about the process for obtaining a security
clearance. After we expressed our concerns to Coast Guard officials in
headquarters in February 2005, officials took action and drafted
guidelines clarifying the role that local Coast Guard officials play in
the program.
Sharing Information about Security Exercises
In a January 2005 report,\14\ we reported that improvement in the
coordination of state, local, and federal entities during seaport
exercises was needed. While it was still too early to determine how
well entities will function in coordinating an effective response to a
seaport-related threat or incident, we identified four operational
issues that needed to be addressed in order to promote more effective
coordination. We found that more than half of the seaport exercises and
after-action reports we examined raised communication issues, including
problems with information sharing among first responders and across
agency lines. We also found that over half of the exercises raised
concerns with communication and the resources available, including
inadequate facilities or equipment, differing response procedures, and
the need for additional training in joint agency response. To a lesser
extent, we found concerns with participants' ability to coordinate
effectively and know who had the proper authority to raise security
levels, board vessels, or detain passengers.
Developing a Transportation Worker Identification Credential
Beyond information-sharing, a host of challenges remain in
coordinating across agency lines and in resolving issues that cut
across a wide range of stakeholder perspectives. In this regard, there
is perhaps no better example in our recent work than the delayed
attempts to develop a major component of the security framework
envisioned under MTSA--an identification card for maritime workers. The
transportation worker identification credential (TWIC) was initially
envisioned by TSA before it became part of DHS to be a universally
recognized identification card accepted across all modes of the
national transportation system, including airports, seaports, and
railroad terminals, using biological metrics, such as fingerprints, to
ensure individuals with such an identification card had undergone an
assessment verifying that they do not pose a terrorism security risk.
TSA initially projected that it would test a prototype of such a card
system in 2003 and issue the first of the cards in August 2004. After
TSA became part of DHS, testing of the prototype was delayed because of
the difficulty in obtaining a response from DHS policy officials who
also subsequently directed the agency to reexamine additional options
for issuing the identification card. In addition to coordinating within
DHS, TSA has had to coordinate with over 800 national level
transportation-related stakeholders. Several stakeholders at seaports
and seaport facilities told us that, while TSA solicited their input on
some issues, TSA did not respond to their input or involve them in
making decisions regarding eligibility requirements for the card.\15\
In particular, some stakeholders said they had not been included in
discussions about which felony convictions should disqualify a worker
from receiving a card, even though they had expected and requested that
DHS and TSA involve them in these decisions. Obtaining stakeholder
involvement is important because achieving program goals hinges on the
Federal Government's ability to form effective partnerships among many
public and private stakeholders. If such partnerships are not in
place--and equally important, if they do not work effectively--TSA may
not be able to test and deliver a program that performs as expected.
Until TSA and DHS officials agree on a comprehensive project plan to
guide the remainder of the project and work together to set and
complete deadlines, and TSA can effectively manage its stakeholders'
interests, it may not be able to successfully develop, test, and
implement the card program. We issued a report on TWIC in December 2004
\16\ and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs has asked us to review the program again.
Challenges in Providing Funding for Seaport Security Actions and
Initiatives
Our reviews indicate that funding is a pressing challenge to
putting effective seaport security measures in place and sustaining
these measures over time. This is the view of many transportation
security experts, industry representatives, and federal, state, and
local government officials with whom we have spoken. While some
security improvements are inexpensive, most require substantial and
continuous funding. For example, a preliminary Coast Guard estimate
placed the cost of implementing the International Maritime Organization
security code and the security provisions in MTSA at approximately $1.5
billion for the first year and $7.3 billion over the succeeding decade.
This estimate should be viewed more as a rough indicator than a precise
measure of costs, but it does show that the cost is likely to be
substantial.\17\
At the federal level, more than $560 million in grants has been
made available to seaports, localities, and other stakeholders since
2002 under the Port Security Grant Program and the Urban Area Security
Initiative. The purpose of these programs was to reduce the
vulnerability of seaports to potential terrorist attacks by enhancing
facility and operation security. The programs funded several projects,
including security assessments; physical enhancements, such as gates
and fences; surveillance equipment, such as cameras; and the
acquisition of security equipment, such as patrol vessels or vehicles.
Awardees have included seaport authorities, local governments, vessel
operators, and private companies with facilities in seaport areas.
Interest in receiving port security grants has been strong, and, as
figure 2 shows, applicant requests have far exceeded available funds.
We are currently examining the Port Security Grant Program at the
request of several Members of Congress, and we are focusing this review
on the risk management practices used in comparing and prioritizing
applications. Our work is under way, and we expect to issue our report
later this year.\18\
Note: Figure 2 does not include $75 million that was awarded to
14 high-risk seaport areas under the Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) by the Office of Domestic Preparedness. This
program is separate from its basic UASI program, which provided
formula grants to 50 urban areas for equipment, training,
planning, exercise, operational needs, and critical
infrastructure.
Where the money will come from for all of the funding needs is
unclear. In our 2002 statement on national preparedness,\19\ we
highlighted the need to examine the sustainability of increased funding
not only for seaport security, but for homeland security efforts in
general. The current economic environment makes this a difficult time
for private industry and state and local governments to make security
investments and sustain increased security costs. According to industry
representatives and experts we contacted, most of the transportation
industry operates on a very thin profit margin, making it difficult to
pay for additional security measures. Budgetary and revenue
constraints, coupled with increasing demands on resources, makes it
more critical that federal programs be designed carefully to match the
priorities and needs of all partners--federal, state, local, and
private--and provide the greatest results for the expenditure.
Setting Performance Goals and Measures and Assessing Risk Are
Important Next Steps
The final purpose of my testimony today is to offer observations,
based on the work we have done to date, about important next steps for
decision makers in charting a course for future actions. The terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, evoked with stunning clarity the face
and intent of enemies very different from those the nation has faced
before--terrorists such as al Qaeda, willing and able to attack us in
our territory using tactics designed to take advantage of our
relatively open society and individual freedoms. The amount of activity
in response has been considerable, and although there have been no
serious incidents in the United States in the interim, the threat of
terrorism will likely persist well into the 21st century. Thus, it is
important to continue to make progress in our efforts. Beyond
addressing the kinds of challenges discussed above, however, two other
matters stand out. One involves developing a better understanding of
how much progress has actually been made to secure our seaports; the
other involves developing a better strategy to manage risk and
prioritize what areas need further progress and how resources can be
best allocated.
Lack of Goals and Measures Makes Determining Progress Difficult
Although there is widespread agreement that actions taken so far
have led to a heightened awareness of the need for security and an
enhanced ability to identify and respond to many security threats, it
is difficult to translate these actions into a clear sense of how far
we have progressed in making seaports more secure. One reason is that
seaport security efforts, like homeland security efforts in general,
lack measurable goals, as well as performance measures to measure
progress toward those goals. As others such as the Gilmore Commission
have stated, a continuing problem for homeland security has been the
lack of clear strategic guidance about the definition and objectives of
preparedness.\20\ For example, the Coast Guard has a set of performance
indicators for each of its non-security missions. It regularly reports
on how well it is doing in rescuing mariners at sea, interdicting
foreign fishing boats attempting to fish in the U.S. exclusive economic
zone, or maintaining aids to navigation on the Nation's waterways.
However, although it has been more than 3 years since the September 11,
2001, attacks, the Coast Guard is still in the process of developing a
performance indicator for its seaport security activities that can be
used to indicate what progress has been made to secure seaports.
Completion of this indicator and careful tracking of it over the long
term is essential to help ensure that taxpayer dollars are being spent
wisely to make seaports more secure. Similarly, as discussed earlier in
describing the actions taken to secure the cargo transiting through
seaports in containers, performance measures are needed to determine
the progress such actions are making to reduce vulnerabilities of the
international supply chain.
A challenge exists in measuring progress in this area, because
seaport security, like many aspects of homeland security, relies upon
the coordinated actions of many stakeholders and, in many cases, upon
``layers'' of defenses. In this regard, we have pointed out that
systems and service standards--which focus on the performance, design,
and overall management of processes and activities--hold great
potential to improve coordination across such dimensions and enhance
measurement of continued preparedness.\21\ While such standards are
already being used in many parts of the private sector, creation of
performance and results measures for national security in general, and
seaport security in particular, remains a work in progress.
Risk Management Is an Essential Tool for Focusing Efforts Effectively
Even with clear goals and effective performance measures, it seems
improbable that all risk can be eliminated, or that any security
framework can successfully anticipate and thwart every type of
potential terrorist threat that highly motivated, well skilled, and
adequately funded terrorist groups could think up. This is not to
suggest that security efforts do not matter--they clearly do. However,
it is important to keep in mind that total security cannot be bought no
matter how much is spent on it. We cannot afford to protect everything
against all threats--choices must be made about security priorities.
Thus, great care needs to be taken to assign available resources to
address the greatest risks, along with selecting those strategies that
make the most efficient and effective use of resources.
One approach to help ensure that resources are assigned and
appropriate strategies are selected to address the greatest risks is
through risk management--that is, defining and reducing risk. A risk
management approach is a systematic process for analyzing threats and
vulnerabilities, together with the criticality (that is, the relative
importance) of the assets involved. This process consists of a series
of analytical and managerial steps, basically sequential, that can be
used to assess vulnerabilities, determine the criticality (that is, the
relative importance) of the assets being considered, determine the
threats to the assets, and assess alternatives for reducing the risks.
Once these are assessed and identified, actions to improve security and
reduce the risks can be chosen from the alternatives for
implementation. To be effective, however, this process must be repeated
when threats or conditions change to incorporate any new information to
adjust and revise the assessments and actions.
Some elements of risk management have been incorporated into
seaport security activities. For example, to meet the requirements of
MTSA, security plans for seaports, facilities, and vessels have been
developed based on assessments that identify their vulnerabilities. In
addition, the Coast Guard is using the Port Security Risk Assessment
Tool, which is designed to prioritize risk according to a combination
of possible threat, consequence, and vulnerability. Under this
approach, seaport infrastructure that is determined to be both a
critical asset and a likely and vulnerable target would be a high
priority for security enhancements or funding. By comparison,
infrastructure that is vulnerable to attack but not as critical or
infrastructure that is very critical but already well protected would
be lower in priority. In a homeland security setting, possible uses of
data produced from risk management efforts include informing decisions
on where the Federal Government might spend billions of dollars within
and between federal departments, as well as informing decisions on
grants awarded to state and local governments.
As the Nation moves ahead with seaport security efforts, there are
plans to incorporate risk management as part of the Nation's larger
homeland security strategy. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7,
issued in December 2003, charged DHS with integrating the use of risk
management into homeland security activities. The directive called on
the Department to develop policies, guidelines, criteria, and metrics
for this effort. To meet this requirement, the Coast Guard has taken
steps to use risk management in prioritizing the protection of key
infrastructure within and between seaports. We are currently in the
process of assessing the progress the Coast Guard has made in these
efforts. In addition, we are reviewing the extent to which a risk
management approach is being used by other DHS agencies, such as the
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate, to
evaluate the relative risk faced by key infrastructure within seaports
and across broad sectors of national activity, such as seaports and
aviation, to help ensure funding and resources are allocated to where
they are needed most. Our work is still under way and not far enough
along to discuss at this time. It is likely, however, that attention to
risk management will be a key part of the ongoing dialogue about the
Nation's homeland security actions in general, and its seaport security
actions in particular.
Concluding Observations
Managing the risks associated with securing our Nation's seaports
involves a careful balance between the benefits of added security and
the potential economic impacts of security enhancements. While there is
broad support for greater security, the national economy is heavily
dependent on keeping goods, trucks, trains, and people flowing quickly
through seaports, and bringing commerce to a crawl in order to be
completely safe carries its own serious economic consequences. Striking
the right balance between increased security and protecting economic
vitality is an important and difficult task. Considering this, three
things stand out as important from the work we have conducted:
Seaports are not retreating as a homeland security issue.
They are an attractive terrorist target and are likely to
remain so, because by their nature they represent a
vulnerability that is always open to potential exploitation.
Seaport security has lived up to its billing as an area in
which security measures can be difficult to implement. The
range of activity in seaport areas can be extremely wide, as
can the range of stakeholders and the fragmentation of
responsibility among them. Many of the problems we have
identified with individual programs and efforts can likely be
overcome with time and effort, but success is not assured. We
are already seeing some efforts, such as the TWIC
identification card, becoming deeply mired in problems. These
activities will thus continue to demand close attention.
The national dialogue on this issue is likely to focus
increasingly in trying to determine what we are getting for our
efforts and where we should invest the dollars we have.
Therefore, it is critical that federal programs be designed
carefully to try to match the priorities and needs of all
partners--federal, state, local, and private--and use
performance measures to effectively allocate funds and
resources. On this point, there is work to do, because agencies
such as the Coast Guard currently lack a systematic approach
for explaining the relationship between the expenditure of
resources and performance results in seaport security, limiting
its ability to critically examine its resource needs and
prioritize program efforts. Providing answers also requires an
ability to carefully assess what the key vulnerabilities are
and what should be done to protect them. Only by doing this
will we have reasonable assurance that we are doing the best
job with the dollars we have.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
pleased to answer any questions that you or other Members of the
Committee may have.
ENDNOTES
\1\ Pub. L. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002).
\2\ Zeigert, Amy, et. al. ``Port Security: Improving Emergency
Response Capabilities at the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach.''
California Policy Options 2005. University of California Los Angeles,
School of Public Affairs (Los Angeles, Calif. 2005).
\3\ None of the listings in this testimony is meant to be
exhaustive of all the efforts under way. The Coast Guard has a range of
activities underway for reducing seaport vulnerabilities that extends
beyond the actions shown here. Such activities include, among others
the use of armed boarding officers, formerly known as sea marshals, who
board high-interest vessels arriving or departing U.S. seaports and
stand guard in critical areas of the vessels; the establishment of
Maritime Safety and Security Teams (MSST) to provide antiterrorism
protection for strategic shipping, high-interest vessels, and critical
infrastructure; and the underwater port security system, which uses
trained divers and robotic cameras to check ship hulls and piers and an
underwater intruder detection system. We have not evaluated the
effectiveness of these activities.
\4\ Another program to help secure the overseas supply chain
process is the Coast Guard's International Port Security Program. In
response to being required under MTSA to assess antiterrorism measures
maintained at foreign seaports, the Coast Guard established this
program in April 2004 to protect the global shipping industry by
helping foreign nations evaluate security measures in their seaports.
Through bilateral or multilateral discussions, the Coast Guard and the
host nations review the implementation of security measures against
established security standards, such as the International Maritime
Organization's ISPS Code. To conduct the program, the Coast Guard has
assigned officials to three regions (Asia-Pacific, Europe/Africa/Middle
East, and Central/South America) to facilitate the discussions. In
addition, a Coast Guard team has been established to conduct country/
port visits, discuss security measures implemented, and develop best
practices between countries. Each year the Coast Guard seeks to visit
approximately 45 countries that conduct maritime trade with the United
States.
\5\ The Nation's three largest container port regions (Los Angeles/
Long Beach, New York/New Jersey, and Seattle/Tacoma) are involved in
the Operation Safe Commerce pilot project.
\6\ GAO, Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved
Information Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further
Attention, GAO-05-394 (Washington, DC: April 15, 2005).
\7\ GAO, Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will
Require Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770
(Washington, DC: July 2003); and GAO, Homeland Security: Summary of
Challenges Faced in Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers for
Inspection, GAO-04-557T (Washington, DC: March 2004). In addition, we
have additional work underway regarding the Container Security
Initiative Program and expect to issue our report in May.
\8\ GAO, Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will
Require Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770
(Washington, DC: July 2003).
\9\ GAO, Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Coast Guard as It
Transitions to the New Department, GAO-03-467T (Washington, DC:
February 2003).
\10\ GAO, Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource
Challenges and Management Concerns Remain, GAO-05-161 (Washington, DC:
January 31, 2005).
\11\ GAO, Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate
New Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security, GAO-04-838
(Washington, DC: June 30, 2004).
\12\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, DC:
January 2005).
\13\ GAO, Homeland Security: Information Sharing Responsibilities,
Challenges, and Key Management Issues, GAO-03-1165T (Washington, DC:
September 17, 2003); and Homeland Security: Information-Sharing
Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management Issues, GAO-03-715T
(Washington, DC: May 8, 2003).
\14\ GAO, Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned
from Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention, GAO-05-170 (Washington,
DC: January 2005).
\15\ Of the facilities testing TSA's prototype, we visited ports
and facilities in the Delaware River Region, including Wilmington Port
Authority, the Philadelphia Maritime Exchange, and the South Jersey
Port. We also visited ports and facilities on the West Coast, including
those in the Port of Seattle, Port of Los Angeles, and Port of Long
Beach as well as ports and facilities in Florida, including Port
Everglades and the Port of Jacksonville.
\16\ GAO, Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and
Operate Maritime Worker Identification Card Program, GAO-05-106
(Washington, DC: December 2004).
\17\ GAO, Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate
New Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security, GAO-04-838
(Washington, DC: June 2004).
\18\ DHS has proposed consolidating homeland grant programs into a
single program. Known as the Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program
(TIPP), the program would lump together grant funding for transit, port
security and other critical infrastructure, and eliminate specific
grant programs for port, rail, truck, intercity bus, and non-
governmental organizations security. In its Fiscal Year 2006 budget
request, the Administration proposed $600 million for TIPP, a $260-
million increase in overall funding from Fiscal Year 2005 for the
specific transportation security grant programs. In Fiscal Year 2005,
funding for port, rail, truck, intercity bus, and non-governmental
organizations security totaled $340 million.
\19\ GAO, National Preparedness: Integration of Federal, State,
Local, and Private Sector Efforts Is Critical to an Effective National
Strategy for Homeland Security, GAO-02-621T (Washington, DC: April
2002).
\20\ The Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities
for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, V. Forging
America's New Normalcy (Arlington, VA: December 15, 2003).
\21\ GAO, Homeland Security: Observations on the National
Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-1075T (Washington, DC:
September 22, 2004).
Appendix I: Related GAO Products
Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on the Condition of Deepwater
Legacy Assets and Acquisition Management Challenges. GAO-05-307T.
Washington, DC: April 20, 2005.
Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information
Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention.
GAO-05-394. Washington, DC: April 15, 2005.
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in
Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign
Seaports. GAO-05-375. Washington, DC: March 31, 2005.
Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006
Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, DC: March 17, 2005.
Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from
Seaport Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170, Washington, DC:
January 14, 2005.
Port Security: Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime
Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, DC:
December 10, 2004.
Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an
Effective Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington,
DC: September 30, 2004.
Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and
Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System.
GAO-04-868. Washington, DC: July 23, 2004.
Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New
Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838.
Washington, DC: June 30, 2004.
Coast Guard: Deepwater Program Acquisition Schedule Update Needed.
GAO-04-695. Washington, DC: June 14, 2004.
Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year
2005 and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, DC: April 7, 2004.
Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting
Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington,
DC: March 31, 2004.
Coast Guard Programs: Relationship Between Resources Used and
Results Achieved Needs to Be Clearer. GAO-04-432. Washington, DC: March
22, 2004.
Contract Management: Coast Guard's Deepwater Program Needs
Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight. GAO-04-380.
Washington, DC: March 9, 2004.
Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target
Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington, DC:
December 16, 2003.
Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security. GAO-
04-315R. Washington, DC: December 12, 2003.
Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime
Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T.
Washington, DC: September 9, 2003.
Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require
Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,
DC: July 25, 2003.
Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland
Security in Balancing Its Border Security and Trade Facilitation
Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, DC: June 16, 2003.
Coast Guard: Challenges during the Transition to the Department of
Homeland Security. GAO-03-594T. Washington, DC: April 1, 2003.
Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-
Term Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, DC: April 1, 2003.
Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor
Resource Use and Measure Performance for All Missions. GAO-03-544T.
Washington, DC: March 12, 2003.
Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Coast Guard as It
Transitions to the New Department. GAO-03-467T. Washington, DC:
February 12, 2003.
Container Security: Current Efforts to Detect Nuclear Materials,
New Initiatives, and Challenges. GAO-03-297T. Washington, DC: November
18, 2002.
Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of
Effort for All Missions. GAO-03-155. Washington, DC: November 12, 2002.
Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New
Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, DC: August 5, 2002.
Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in
Force Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports. GAO-02-
955TNI. Washington, DC: July 23, 2002.
Appendix II: Previous GAO Recommendations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agency/program GAO recommendations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Coast Guard GAO Recommendations to the U.S. Coast Guard
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Automatic Identification System To seek and take advantage of
(AIS) opportunities to partner with
organizations willing to develop
AIS systems at their own expense in
order to help reduce federal costs
and speed development of AIS
nationwide. (GAO-04-868)
Deepwater acquisition Take the necessary steps to make
integrated product team (IPT)
members effective, including (1)
training IPTS in a timely manner,
(2) chartering the sub-IPTs, and
(3) making improvements to the
electronic information system that
would result in better information
sharing among IPT members who are
geographically dispersed. (GAO-04-
380)
Follow the procedures outlined in
the human capital plan to ensure
that adequate staffing is in place
and turnover among Deepwater
personnel is proactively addressed.
(GAO-04-380)
Ensure that field operators and
maintenance personnel are provided
with timely information and
training on how the transition will
occur and how maintenance
responsibilities are to be divided
between system integrator and Coast
Guard personnel. (GAO-04-380)
Develop and adhere to measurable
award fee criteria consistent with
the Office of Federal Procurement
Policy's guidance. (GAO-04-380)
Ensure that the input of contracting
officer's technical representatives
(COTR) is considered and set forth
in a more rigorous manner. (GAO-04-
380)
Hold the system integrator
accountable in future award fee
determinations for improving the
effectiveness of IPTs. (GAO-04-380)
Establish a time frame for when the
models and metrics will be in place
with the appropriate degree of
fidelity to be able to measure the
contractor's progress toward
improving operational
effectiveness. (GAO-04-380)
Establish a total ownership cost
(TOC) baseline that can be used to
measure whether the Deepwater
acquisition approach is providing
the government with increased
efficiencies compared to what it
would have cost without this
approach. (GAO-04-380)
Establish criteria to determine when
the TOC baseline should be adjusted
and ensure that the reasons for any
changes are documented. (GAO-04-
380)
Develop a comprehensive plan for
holding the system integrator
accountable for ensuring an
adequate degree of competition
among second-tier suppliers in
future program years. This plan
should include metrics to measure
outcomes and consideration of how
these outcomes will be taken into
account in future award fee
decisions. (GAO-04-380)
For subcontracts over $5 million
awarded by Integrated Coast Guard
Systems LLC (ICGS) to Lockheed
Martin and Northrop Grumman,
require Lockheed Martin and
Northrop Grumman to notify the
Coast Guard of a decision to
perform the work themselves rather
than contracting it out. (GAO-04-
380)
To update the original 2002
Deepwater acquisition schedule in
time to support the Fiscal Year
2006 Deepwater budget submission to
DHS and Congress and at least once
a year thereafter to support each
budget submission, which should
include the current status of asset
acquisition phases, interim phase
milestones, and the critical paths
linking the delivery of individual
components to particular assets.
(GAO-04-695)
MTSA security plans Conduct a formal evaluation of
compliance inspection efforts taken
during the initial 6-month surge
period, including the adequacy of
security inspection staffing,
training, and guidance, and use
this evaluation as a means to
strengthen the compliance process
for the longer term. (GAO-04-838)
Clearly define the minimum
qualifications for inspectors and
link these qualifications to a
certification process. (GAO-04-838)
Consider including unscheduled and
unannounced inspections and covert
testing as part of its inspection
strategy to provide better
assurance that the security
environment at the Nation's
seaports meets the Nation's
expectations. (GAO-04-838)
Multi-mission station readiness Revise the Boat Forces Strategic
Plan to (1) reflect the impact of
homeland security requirements on
station needs and (2) identify
specific actions, milestones, and
funding needs for meeting those
needs. (GAO-05-161)
Develop measurable annual goals for
stations. (GAO-05-161)
Revise the processes and practices
for estimating and allocating
station personal protection
equipment (PPE) funds to reliably
identify annual funding needs and
use this information in making
future funding decisions. (GAO-05-
161)
Obtaining security clearances Develop formal procedures so that
local and headquarters officials
use the Coast Guard's internal
databases of state, local, and
industry security clearances for
area maritime committee members as
a management tool to monitor who
has submitted applications for a
security clearance and to take
appropriate action when application
trends point to possible problems.
(GAO-05-394)
Raise awareness of state, local, and
industry officials about the
process of applying for security
clearances. (GAO-05-394)
Port security assessment program To define and document the
geographic information system (GIS)
functional requirements. (GAO-04-
1062)
Develop a long-term project plan for
the GIS and the Port Security
Assessment Program as a whole
(including cost estimates,
schedule, and management
responsibilities). (GAO-04-1062)
Resource effectiveness To develop a time frame for
expeditiously proceeding with plans
for implementing a system that will
accurately account for resources
expended in each of its program
areas. (GAO-04-432)
Ensure that the strategic planning
process and its associated
documents include a strategy for
(1) identifying intervening factors
that may affect program performance
and (2) systematically assessing
the relationship between these
factors, resources used, and
results achieved. (GAO-04-432)
Seaport exercises To help ensure that reports on
terrorism-related exercises are
submitted in a timely manner that
complies with all Coast Guard
requirements, the Commandant of the
Coast Guard should review the Coast
Guard's actions for ensuring
timeliness and determine if further
actions are needed. (GAO-05-170)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department of Energy GAO Recommendations to the Department of
Energy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Megaports Initiative Develop a comprehensive long-term
plan to guide the future efforts of
the Initiative that includes, at a
minimum, (1) performance measures
that are consistent with DOE's
desire to install radiation
detection equipment at the highest
priority foreign seaports, (2)
strategies to determine how many
and which lower priority ports DOE
will include in the Initiative if
it continues to have difficulty
installing equipment at the highest
priority ports, (3) projections of
the anticipated funds required to
meet the Initiative's objectives,
and (4) specific time frames for
effectively spending program funds.
(GAO-05-375)
Evaluate the accuracy of the current
per port cost estimate of $15
million, make any necessary
adjustments to the Initiative's
long-term cost projection, and
inform Congress of any changes to
the long-term cost projection for
the Initiative. (GAO-05-375)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Customs and Border GAO recommendations to the U.S. Customs
and Protection Border Protection
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Container Security Initiative Develop human capital plans that
(CSI) and Customs-Trade clearly describe how CSI and C-TPAT
Partnership Against Terrorism (C- will recruit, train, and retain
TPAT) staff to meet their growing demands
as they expand to other countries
and implement new program elements.
These plans should include up-to-
date information on CSI and C-TPAT
staffing and training requirements
and should be regularly used by
managers to identify areas for
further human capital planning,
including opportunities for
improving program results. (GAO-03-
770)
Expand efforts already initiated to
develop performance measures for
CSI and C-TPAT that include outcome-
oriented indicators. These measures
should be tangible, measurable
conditions that cover key aspects
of performance and should enable
agencies to assess accomplishments,
make decisions, realign processes,
and assign accountability.
Furthermore, the measures should be
used to determine the future
direction of these Customs'
programs. (GAO-03-770)
Develop strategic plans that clearly
lay out CSI and C-TPAT goals,
objectives, and detailed
implementation strategies. These
plans should not only address how
the strategies and related
resources, both financial and
human, will enable Customs to
secure ocean containers bound for
the United States, but also
reinforce the connections between
these programs' objectives and both
Customs' and the Department of
Homeland Security's long-term
goals. (GAO-03-770)
Use its resources to maximize the
effectiveness of its automated
targeting strategy to reduce the
uncertainty associated with
identifying cargo for additional
inspection. (GAO-04-557T)
Institute a national inspection
reporting system. (GAO-04-557T)
Test and certify CBP officials that
receive the targeting training.
(GAO-04-557T)
Resolving the safety concerns of
longshoremen unions. (GAO-04-557T)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transportation Security GAO recommendations to the U.S.
Transportation Administration Security
Administration
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transportation worker Develop a comprehensive project plan
identification card (TWIC) for managing the remaining life of
the TWIC project. (GAO-05-106)
Develop specific, detailed plans for
risk mitigation and cost-benefit
and alternatives analyses. (GAO-05-
106)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Did you examine the Port of Los Angeles?
Ms. Wrightson. We have been to Los Angeles numerous times
in the course of working on various requests for this Committee
and others. Los Angeles/Long Beach represents an incredibly
critical seaport, and it suffers from a lot of the problems
that are described generally in our reports--from those of TWIC
to those of securing facilities and providing adequate patrols.
Overall, Los Angeles, like other ports, has both security
accomplishments and security gaps.
The Chairman. Did you write a separate report on it?
Ms. Wrightson. We have never issued a separate report on
Los Angeles. And if we did, it probably would have to be
classified. We wouldn't be able to present it publicly.
The Chairman. All right. Are you aware of their secure zone
versus this working zone?
Ms. Wrightson. Absolutely.
The Chairman. Are you critical of that?
Ms. Wrightson. Well, we would--in order to make an informed
judgment about it--we would need to audit it to see what risks
are mitigated and what problems remain. And we haven't done
that.
The Chairman. Well, it was pointed out to me that no one
goes into that secure zone unless they're known personally by
about five other people.
Ms. Wrightson. All ports--which Admiral Hereth is very able
to tell you--have security zones around critical
infrastructure. So, for example, there's a security zone around
Logan Airport, there are security zones around most, and they
are, to various extents, patrolled and protected. But the--I
must say, in general, the efficacy--we have a lot of effort--
the efficacy of these efforts, be they for domestic security or
internationally, still remain to be determined. I think it
would be an excellent area for your future oversight and
investigation if we were to look at those.
The Chairman. Before he left, Senator Lott told me that we
have appropriated a total of $515 million from June 2002
through December 2003. Of that money, only $107 million had
been spent by December 2004. Are you familiar with those
figures, Admiral?
Admiral Hereth. I presume you're talking about the grant--
Port Security Grant Program, sir?
The Chairman. Right.
Admiral Hereth. It may be because of--the constraints on
the contracts haven't been met by the grantees. But I'm not
specifically familiar with the details of that. I can certainly
give you some feedback, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Lott had to go to another meeting,
but he's very critical of the rate of spending, in terms of the
security aspects of the grants we've already made. Would you
have someone contact him and see if we can get an answer for
him of why the rate of spending for security, specifically
appropriated for that purpose is so low?
Senator Inouye?
Senator Inouye. Recently, a report was issued that nearly
$8 billion worth of security equipment and devices used by the
airports are non-functional or don't serve the purpose, and
will have to be thrown away. I presume you use similar
equipment in the ports, Mr. Jacksta.
Mr. Jacksta. Yes, sir. We have--as I indicated in my
opening remarks, we do have large-scale X-ray systems at the
port of entries, at the seaports, somewhere in the area of
about 56 actually there, to do the VACIS examination--that's an
X-ray of the container as it comes off. We also use equipment
such as personal radiation detectors, which are carried by the
inspectors, and indicate whether there's any type of
radiological signature coming from any of the containers.
We also have, and we're deploying right now, radiation
portal monitors to the major seaports. We already have them
installed at Newark, Jacksonville, and Boston. And this summer
we'll be putting them at the L.A./Long Beach seaport area.
Senator Inouye. And you will continue to employ them,
notwithstanding the fact that the airports find them non-
functional?
Mr. Jacksta. Well, sir, I don't know whether the equipment
that CBP is utilizing at the airports are basically the same
type of technology--X-ray systems. We use that equipment. And,
from our knowledge, the equipment is working well in helping us
examine containers and luggage, that are coming into the United
States.
Senator Inouye. I would suggest you check them out.
Mr. Skinner, in your testimony you indicated that--in your
grant program--that there are a considerable number of grantees
who are not prepared, or don't know how, to use these funds.
Did I hear correctly?
Mr. Skinner. Yes, sir, you did. Although we did not go to
each of the grantees to validate why, individually, the funds
were not being spent in a timely manner, we did note, during
our review, when we questioned program officials about this,
that there was a slow rate of expenditure because there were
considerable negotiations going on between the Department and
the grant recipient trying to further define what the grant
funds were to be used for. In other words, the grants were
awarded before we were clear as to exactly what we intended to
accomplish with those funds.
That, coupled with the fact that, at the time we were doing
our review, there was only one individual that had
responsibility for providing oversight and monitoring of those
grants, and, as a result, the slow spending rate was never
brought to light until late 2004, early 2005.
Senator Inouye. Over the years, I've learned that just
about every department, bureau, and section provides some sort
of grant program, and it's not easy to get these grants. Very
competitive. And most of them are highly qualified. How is it
that, in your area, you say most of them don't know how to use
the funds or have no experience?
Mr. Skinner. No, sir. What we were saying was that the
grantee was not prepared to use the funds. In other words,
their grant application was not specific enough to allow the
Department to determine what we were going to get for our
money. So, once the grant was then awarded, negotiations took
place.
Senator Inouye. And not withstanding that, the grant was
approved?
Mr. Skinner. That's correct, sir.
Senator Inouye. Did someone evaluate the grant application?
Mr. Skinner. Yes, sir. It went through a very intensive
evaluation process, both at----
Senator Inouye. But with that intensive----
Mr. Skinner.--the field and headquarters level.
Senator Inouye.--you didn't see this.
Mr. Skinner. I beg your pardon, sir?
Senator Inouye. You didn't see the shortcoming. With the
intensive----
Mr. Skinner. Evidently not. This was not universal. There
may be other reasons why the moneys were not spent. We did not
go down to the grantee level. What we did identify, however,
like I said, was, the fact that there was considerable
negotiations going on which delayed the actual expenditure of
funds.
Senator Inouye. Well, did you find when these funds were
not properly used, that they were taken back? Did the agency
seek a return----
Mr. Skinner. It's not that they were not properly used;
they just were not used at all. They were still available for
use. And once the Department was satisfied how the funds would,
in fact, be used--after the award, after the fact--then I would
suspect that they would then apply those funds and expend them.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
Just prior to your testimony, the Congressman testified,
indicating that it takes over a year to get the security
clearance, and that there are 450,000 awaiting clearance. Is
that the situation in the ports?
Mr. Jacksta. Well, I'd like to begin by saying that, from
CBP's perspective, we have our officers and the supervisors
that are engaged with the examination and making decisions on
what to inspect. They have that type of clearance. We ensure
that the intelligence and information that's required to get to
the CBP officer is getting to the actual location and to the
officers who need to have that information. So, although we
would like to have more individuals with security clearance,
the agency does have people available who get that information
and look at it.
Senator Inouye. Admiral?
Admiral Hereth. Yes, sir. I can add a little bit to that.
We, since 9/11, have set up our own security center. We process
our own security clearances for all the members of the Coast
Guard and our employees. That's going fine. We've also taken
the step to go back to the Department and get authorization to
get up to 800 clearances for members of industry and/or trade
associations. And, as the Congressman pointed out, we think
that's a key feature that needs to be implemented quickly. And
we have distributed authorizations around the country. We have
43 Area Maritime Security Committees, and we've asked our
Captains of the Port to serve as the focal points to identify
people in the Area Committees appropriate industry-segment
representatives that we could communicate with, that could
get--you know, get clearances, authorized security clearances,
so we can talk to them about secret information and pass
current information in an appropriate, timely, and transparent
fashion. We believe that's a hugely positive step.
We can process those clearances in a timely fashion. I
don't think it would take anywhere near a year, but it's going
to take a month or two to get them through the system, but the
challenge is getting the members who want the clearance to fill
out the--I think it's a 17-page form. We struggle on that
front. But we're trying to push through that. We're trying to
do that as quickly as we can, because we think that's an
important part of the communication process that needs to
happen between the regulatory agencies--Coast Guard, in
particular--and the industry segments that we work with in the
maritime.
Senator Inouye. Ms. Wrightson?
Ms. Wrightson. Thank you, I want to add to Admiral Hereth's
comments that--to shed some light on this--in terms of what's
going on at ports with Area Maritime Security Committees,
that's the group Congressman Ruppersberger was talking about--
these were the 361 people that the Coast Guard immediately
designated as in need of clearances. Of those 361, only 28 had
applied, 4 months after the fact. When we went in and audited
it, we found three things as key explanatory factors. First,
there was an insufficient understanding of what they were
supposed to do by--by they I mean these private parties and
local officials. Second, there was confusion on the part of
Coast Guard onsite, as to what their roles and responsibilities
were. And, third--and this is very important, going forward--we
found limitations in the management information system that the
Coast Guard had to troubleshoot problems.
As it always does, the Coast Guard is very nimble and has
been very responsive to the recommendations that we've made to
correct these problems, so one would anticipate improvements
there. However, it appeared--correct me if I'm wrong--that the
Coast Guard may be getting this as larger responsibility for
DHS. Has that changed, or is there still talk of that?
Admiral Hereth. There must be still talk of that. Our focus
has been getting the--in the instant, getting those 800
clearances in position so we can actually talk, at the secret
level, with industry representatives, along with a handful of
representatives inside the beltway. Because the trade
associations--and I think there's 32 that we're linked with
here inside the beltway--provide a key role in linking back to
their members. And the credibility and the timeliness of
getting information out hinges on getting those clearances in
place, we think. It will be a much more effective system and a
very--and a step forward for all of us.
Ms. Wrightson. And if DHS piggybacks on the Coast Guard's
better efforts in this area, it'll return us to the other
issues I raised, which is the sustainability of the resources
the Coast Guard has to do this work, and that is a very large
list of requirements. And whether or not the Coast Guard has
the resources--they always have the will--to do it is a
different question.
Admiral Hereth. One other add-on item, sir, if I might? We
envisioned an Internet portal available to industry segments,
password-protected, appropriately secure, to pass sensitive,
but unclassified, information. That's another important link,
to share information in a continuing basis with our industry
representatives so that we get information quickly about
threat--changing threats, threat advisories, threat bulletins
that might be useful to various industry segments. And we've
done a beta test now in eight ports, and the response has been
very positive, so we're going to move ahead and implement such
a system. That's part of the Homeland Security Information Net,
but it's an Internet portal that will be accessible to
industry.
Senator Inouye. Well, I thank all of you for the service
you're rendering to the Nation. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Rockefeller?
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A couple of thoughts, questions. You have, on the--Mr.
Skinner, you have--on the first page of your GAO highlights,
you have this interesting statement, ``This testimony makes no
recommendations, but cites several reports in which
recommendations were previously made.'' In view of what I've
been hearing this morning, I find that very worrisome.
The--I would understand, I guess, that inspectors general
are meant to, sort of, comment on the state of matters, but the
state of matters strikes me, in all of this discussion, as one
of the more depressing conditions of moving forward toward
homeland security at the port level that I could have possibly
imagined. And I wonder why it is that you--Ms. Wrightson, you
referred to having made recommendations to one of the
panelists, but you can't make recommendations to the public----
Ms. Wrightson. Oh, no, that is an incorrect interpretation.
Senator Rockefeller.--or to the Congress.
Ms. Wrightson.--OK. That's a very good question. But what
the sentence really means is that there are no recommendations
contained in this written summary statement; however, on page
32 of the statement, there follows three pages of detailed
recommendations that we have provided in prior reports and are
publicly available in the backs of each of the individual
reports we used to prepare my statement and they are
recommendations for improvements in all of the problem areas I
cited.
So, for example, in the program that the Admiral and I were
just talking about, GAO recommended an--to take better
advantage of the management-information system, to develop
clearer guidance to the ports, and to facilitate--adopt DOD
practices that might assist in facilitating stakeholders to
fill out their applications. So----
Senator Rockefeller. Previous----
Ms. Wrightson.--there's a huge----
Senator Rockefeller.--GAO recommendations----
Ms. Wrightson.--list of recommendations, and they're
public.
Senator Rockefeller. Previous.
Ms. Wrightson. Well, some of them were issued very
recently; all are outstanding and need to be completed by the
responsible agencies.
Senator Rockefeller. All right.
Ms. Wrightson. And you would consider these to be----
Senator Rockefeller. Well, let me----
Ms. Wrightson.--recommendations I'm making----
Senator Rockefeller.--let me----
Ms. Wrightson.--today.
Senator Rockefeller.--I'm just--I'm just a little struck,
frankly, by the sort of calmness at the table--at yours, that
is, all of you.
Mr. Jacksta, you started out with, kind of, a list of all
the good things that are being done. You, sir, were very
pleased with what the Coast Guard is doing. And you both talked
about what you talked about. But I just----
West Virginia is not a large state, but we have the
seventh-largest inland port in the country, and I think that
you're about to shift most--a lot of our workers to Louisville.
I don't know whether that's true or not. I don't get a--I never
have had a feeling about Homeland Security that there was any
coordination.
And it may have been that the President was right when he
had--his first instinct was not to do it at all, but to somehow
figure out another system, that the melding of 22 agencies, or
27, or whatever it was, Mr. Chairman, just wasn't going to
work. I--well, I know we finally did it, and then--and he
agreed to it. But it may have been that he was right to be
skeptical.
I'm on the Intelligence Committee, as the Congressman was
who testified earlier, and it's nothing but a litany of total
lack of preparation wherever we turn. And we have this
fascination with anything that goes wrong in Afghanistan or
Iraq or anywhere else, and, obviously, 9/11 and things that go
on even not of that magnitude here, but the concept of
preparedness is a uniquely American one, where everybody waits
on everybody else. I really believe that. That's not to be--to
pick out--on you, in particular, but I think that, generally
speaking, people wait for others.
I mean, I don't--this whole question about why grants
aren't being used and--well, maybe they're not ready to use
them, or they're not cleared to use them, and the waiting
lists, and all the rest of it--it just--I'm just struck by the
calmness of all of you, and by the, sort of, satisfaction you
have as you describe what it is you're doing, even though on
your end you're describing some of your frustrations, and then
you have, I guess, two pages--32 and 33--of recommendations,
some of them being previous.
Are you all hooked up onto the same computer system?
``You,'' 27 agencies? Are you interoperable?
Mr. Jacksta. There is the exchange of information, yes. CBP
exchanges information with the Coast Guard on a regular basis.
We have people that are working together, both at our National
Targeting Center, as well as at the Coast Guard Intelligence
Center, to make sure that the information is, first of all,
getting--being looked at and making sure that it's getting out
to our offices in the field. We have information provided by
other agencies at our NTC. We have the FBI. We have TSA. We
have ICE. We have a number of Coast Guard. So, there's people
sitting there 24-by-7, working together, exchanging
information.
So, I think, sir, there is a sense of urgency that--here,
in the sense that we feel that it's important for us to
continue to work, to exchange information, to get the equipment
out there as fast as possible so that we can do the screening
of the cargo and containers. We have systems in place that have
the----
Senator Rockefeller. But you can be--but what is it? I've
always thought it was about 5 percent of cargo that was getting
screened. What did you say it was?
Mr. Jacksta. Right now, in Fiscal Year 2004, sir, for the
seaport-side-of-the-house containers, we screen approximately
5.5 percent of the----
Senator Rockefeller. Yes, 5 percent. I mean, how do you,
kind of, live with that? In other words, do you have a chart in
your mind which tells you how you get to 15, then to 50, then
to 75 percent, then to 100 percent? I mean, do you have a clear
idea of what has to be done? In other words, if you're all
getting shafted by OMB or--were any of your testimonies cleared
by OMB before you gave them?
Ms. Wrightson. We didn't clear ours with OMB.
Mr. Skinner. No, sir, ours was not.
Senator Rockefeller. You understand the little problem with
that, right? In other words, even if you had different
thoughts, you couldn't say them, because OMB has to clear them.
So, how do you--before you go to sleep at night, how do you
figure out how you're going to get to 25, 50, and 100?
Everybody knows Homeland Security is underfunded. Everybody in
the world knows it's underfunded. Do you ever take it higher
up? You're acting--you're Deputy Director, right?
I'm finished. I'm just--I'm angry. I'm angry, Mr. Chairman.
You occasionally get angry; not very often.
The Chairman. The gentleman on your right is, too.
Senator Rockefeller. Is he? OK.
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you very much.
[Laughter.]
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I ask that my opening statement be included in the
record as if read.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lautenberg follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg,
U.S. Senator from New Jersey
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on this important
subject.
I served on the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey before
coming to the Senate in 1983. So I have long been aware of the vital
role our ports play in our Nation's economy . . . as well as potential
security risks at our ports.
Obviously, the importance of port security increased exponentially
after 9/11. The 9/11 Commission warned that we must not make the
mistake of assuming that the next attack on our Nation will be the same
as the last one. We have invested billions of dollars to improve the
security of our commercial aviation system. But I worry that we have
not done enough to secure other potential targets--especially our
ports. To put it bluntly: we still haven't gotten serious about port
security.
Mr. Chairman, our Nation has more than one thousand harbor
channels, and 25 thousand miles of waterways serving 360 ports.
Obviously, we cannot monitor everything that happens on every one of
these waterways 100 percent of the time. But if we were serious about
port security, we would focus on the ports and waterways that are most
at risk.
Unfortunately, this hasn't been the case. According to the FBI, a
two-mile stretch between Port Newark and the Newark Airport is the
Number One potential target for terrorists in the entire country.
Despite this high risk, New Jersey received only three percent of the
port security grants distributed by the Department of Homeland Security
last year. This was not nearly enough for a state that has two of the
largest ports in the country.
Mr. Chairman, I realize that every Senator always fights for
resources for his or her state. But when it comes to Homeland Security,
we should place the safety of the American people above pork-barrel
politics. The Maritime Security Act that the Senate unanimously
approved last year included my legislation adopting a strict risk-based
standard for port security grants. Unfortunately, the House never acted
on that bill. The DHS Inspector General has confirmed that the Port
Security Program did NOT award previous grants on the basis of risk
assessment.
DHS recently announced it is accepting applications for a new round
of port security grants totaling $140 million. I strongly urge DHS to
follow the recommendations of its own Inspector General, and use a
strict assessment of risk in determining which requests are granted.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you once again for this hearing. I also thank
our witnesses, and I look forward to hearing what they have to say
about the urgent issue of securing our Nation's seaports.
Senator Lautenberg. I make a note there that I was
Commissioner of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
when I came to the Senate, and I'm very much aware of what the
significance is of our ports to our general well-being, $740
billion a year added to our gross domestic product as a result
of that. I'm very much aware. Also I want to commend each one
of you for your excellent testimony. I may view things a little
differently, because I supply the freneticism and you don't
have to, but you do have to supply the facts, as you did, and
they were wonderfully constructed, and I commend you.
And one of the things that the group at this table have in
common is that, we're all very much supportive of the Coast
Guard, the work that you do, Admiral, and the number of
assignments that continue to grow. Yet we heard from Mr.
Jacksta that the fleet is aged. I'm aware of that, since I'm
aged and I have seen a lot of these boats around for a long
time. But the fact of the matter is that I don't think that
we've given enough resources to this--to our needs.
Mr. Chairman, I think that when we look at where we are,
that we fail to recognize that the other front from the Middle
East is right here at home, and that we have to spend according
to our needs. And we've spent 250--we've appropriated $250
billion so far for the war effort in Iraq--and I'm for it, all
the way, in order to do the best we can for our troops and to
conclude the task we've taken on there--additonally we're about
to add $50 billion in the Defense bill to help the war in Iraq
be pursued.
When we look at the home front--and I am reminded--we're
fortunate to have distinguished Chairman/Co-Chairman of this
Committee, people who have experienced war up front and know
what you need to protect yourself, and how you fight. This is
the second front. And I remind the distinguished Senator from
Hawaii, who wears the Congressional Medal of Honor, that at the
time of Pearl Harbor, who lost, I think it is, Senator Inouye,
2,400 people, and on 9/11, almost 3,000 people. This tells us
something about where the risk is. It's at home too.
So when we look at what the Coast Guard recommended, Mr.
Chairman, for our security needs, we talked about something
over $7 billion for the decade. And we're talking about $140
million to be distributed, of which my State of New Jersey,
with one of the busiest ports in the country, will likely get 3
percent, $4 million. It just isn't enough money to do the job.
And I think Senator Rockefeller indicated that it isn't. We
don't recognize the significance. We don't recognize the risk.
As a matter of fact, if you look out here and you see the
railroad tracks, and you know that some of those cars carry
toxic chemicals; enough, it's said, to endanger thousands of
people here; an attack on a plant, a chemical plant in New
Jersey, could endanger 12 million people. What if chlorine gas
was involved? If chlorine's involved, that's going to be the
effect.
And so, Admiral, I ask you, What's the status of your
personnel levels now?
Admiral Hereth. We've been about--since 2001, focused on
MTSA implementation--port-security work, specifically. We've
increased our numbers by about 800.
Senator Lautenberg. That's from where? What was the base?
Admiral Hereth. I can't quote you the specific base, but,
at our Marine Safety Offices, we probably had 2,500 people; in
our group offices, we had another 2,500 people. So, we're now
in the process of homogenizing those to gain some synergy in
terms of performance. So, we have a number of folks in the
Coast Guard focused specifically on those missions area.
Senator Lautenberg. Right. But on the total personnel in
Coast Guard, are you familiar with that figure--the total
requirement that are being met now by Coast Guard, fully, with
its navigation, pollution control, refugee interception, et
cetera, et cetera? What----
Admiral Hereth. I can't quote you a figure, sir----
Senator Lautenberg. OK.
Admiral Hereth.--we'll get----
Senator Lautenberg. I know that you're short, and I know
that you've got these old vessels. And I see the guys on the
Hudson River patrolling in rubber boats--in rigid-hull boats
out there in all kinds of weather.
Mr. Chairman, it's just--we're not doing enough to protect
our people in this second front, as I call it, at home, where
we see the possibility of disaster all across our country. But
we look at it particularly in places that are most obvious.
Aviation, we spend a ton of money, and don't do it quite as
good as we ought to. And that's part of growing pains. And if
one doesn't understand what the transition is from a relatively
peacetime structure into the kind of security needs we have,
then one is kidding oneself. And we ought to be finding ways to
finance the war at home in sufficient terms.
$7.2 billion recommended by the Coast Guard for port
security over the next 10 years, and we don't come anywhere
near it with $140 million proposed for this year. And we
spend--and we're spending over--will have spent at least $300
billion defending Iraq, trying to help them get their
institutions, their infrastructure together. Over $300 billion.
And what about the ports of New York and Louisiana and across
the ocean in Hawaii and Alaska?
Mr. Chairman, we have to look at these problems. These
witnesses were excellent. I appreciate your presentations. I
thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing.
The Chairman. Senator Inouye, any further comments?
Senator Inouye. No, sir.
The Chairman. Gentlemen, we thank you all very much, and
appreciate your--as Senator Inouye said, appreciate your
service. I think you're doing a marvelous job with what you
have. I didn't agree with Homeland Security, but we have to pay
for what is there now, and the gentlemen are right about that.
But it's one of those things. Thank you very much.
We'll now turn to panel two: Ms. Jean Godwin, Vice
President, American Association of Port Authorities; and Mr.
Christopher Koch, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
World Shipping Council.
All of the statements that were filed this morning will
appear in the record as though read. And, as a matter of fact,
I forgot, I would put my opening statement in the record, as
well as Senator Inouye's.
[The prepared statements of Senators Stevens and Inouye
follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ted Stevens, U.S. Senator from Alaska
Thank you, Senator Inouye, for requesting to chair this important
hearing and for your commitment to the security of our Nation's ports.
I welcome the witnesses who are here today and I thank you for your
willingness to appear to discuss the security of our Nation's maritime
system. Today's hearing is one in a series of hearings that the
Committee has held and will hold to fulfill its oversight
responsibilities with respect to port security. The Committee will
continue to exercise its jurisdiction over these matters as we work to
develop ways to further improve the security of all modes of
transportation, including the security of our ports.
While the Coast Guard and TSA have made progress since September
11th to bolster port security, including this Committee's work on the
Maritime Transportation Security Act, much more remains to be done. To
date, the Department of Homeland Security still has not yet fully
implemented the requirements of the Act, and some programs have lagged
behind for a variety of reasons. The challenge that we face in securing
our ports is assessing vulnerabilities and allocating limited resources
in an effective and efficient manner to mitigate those vulnerabilities.
We must also do a better job of developing and utilizing technologies
to reduce labor costs and to improve our ability to detect cargo that
threatens our national security.
Senator Inouye.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, U.S. Senator from Hawaii
I would like to thank my friend, Chairman Ted Stevens, for calling
this hearing today and for allowing the Committee to exercise one of
its most essential duties: oversight of the nation's seaport security
system.
Port security is of particular importance to us because our states
are entirely dependent upon the uninterrupted flow of maritime
commerce. Many still do not realize that the entire Nation's economic
livelihood depends on the continuous flow of cargo as well.
Maritime commerce is the lifeblood of international trade, and the
United States is the world's leading maritime trading nation,
accounting for 20 percent of global trade. Ninety-five percent of our
Nation's cargo comes through the ports. Our economy is dependent on our
seaports, and whether you live on the coasts or in the heartland,
maritime commerce affects the daily lives of every American.
I commend the U.S. Coast Guard, the Transportation Security
Administration and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, on
their progress over the past 3 years in implementing the Maritime
Transportation Security Act to make seaports more secure both here and
abroad. There is much more that needs to be done, and we must move
ahead. We cannot become complacent. We have built a foundation, and now
it is time to build the house.
The terrorists that seek to do us harm are cunning, dynamic, and
most of all, patient. While they have not successfully struck our
homeland since September 11, 2001, it does not mean that they are not
preparing to do so. They work 24 hours a day, studying what we do and
how we do it. It is imperative that we stay ahead of them. That means
we must constantly anticipate, innovate, and plan.
We must continually research and implement the most effective
technologies. We must recruit, train and deploy the most skilled
security force.
Later today, Senators Stevens, Rockefeller, and I will be
introducing the Transportation Security Improvement Act of 2005, and
port and cargo security improvements are central elements of this
legislation.
Among its port security provisions, our legislation seeks to
improve interagency cooperation with the further development of joint
operation command centers. It clarifies the roles and responsibilities
for cargo security programs, while establishing criteria for
contingency response plans to resume the flow of Commerce in the event
of a seaport attack.
By setting a minimum floor for research and development funding
related to maritime and land security, the bill further encourages the
development of effective technologies that detect terrorist threats.
Finally, we make the port security grant program more risk-based and
allow for multi-year funding of port security projects.
Today's hearing on port security will be the first in a series of
hearings on transportation security broadly, as we evaluate ways to
further strengthen the security of our ports, our aviation and rail
systems, our economy, and our Nation.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how we can
continue to strengthen our maritime security system.
The Chairman. We'll proceed first with you, Ms. Godwin.
And we're pleased to hear your testimony. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF JEAN GODWIN, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT/GENERAL
COUNSEL, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PORT
AUTHORITIES
Ms. Godwin. Thank you. Chairman Stevens and Members of the
Committee, we appreciate the invitation. And, more importantly,
we very much appreciate the leadership and the support that
this Committee has shown for security needs and the Port
Security Grant Program.
I noticed a lot of passion in your questions. I appreciate
Senator Inouye's note at the beginning about the funding
disparities, the amount that's going to airports versus
seaports. And we know that the Members of this Committee have
our interests in mind and are always out looking to try to help
us.
As you know, the Port Security Grant Program was
established to provide financial assistance to protect our
vital ports of entry from terrorism. Since 9/11, ports have
invested hundreds of millions of their own dollars to increase
their security. While the grant program has provided much-
needed support to reimburse ports for some of their security
costs, in the first four rounds, as you've heard, federal
funding has amounted to only $565 million, which was a sixth of
what was requested. The fifth round, announced last week, will
provide $141 million, but actually limits eligibility to only
66 designated port areas. I encourage you all to look at the
most recent round. I know some of that was done in response to
the report criticizing the way that the program was funded.
But, essentially, what they have done is decided to say some
port areas are not even eligible to try to compete, not even to
try to make their case that they deserve funding; and only
those who are eligible to even submit applications will be
judged.
Through the first four rounds of grants, funds have been
provided to coastal states, including Alaska and Hawaii, but
the value of the program, of course, is not just to coastal
states. With 95 percent of our overseas trade flowing through
our ports, all states and all citizens would be negatively
affected by a shutdown of our seaports.
This program's been bounced around among various agencies.
It started at MarAd. It was moved to TSA. And then, actually,
exactly 1 year ago today, May 17th, it officially became part
of the DHS Office of State and Local Government Coordination
Preparedness. I know that Members of this Committee joined AAPA
in raising concerns in the context of that move, to make sure
that the Port Security Grant Program would remain a separate
line item. And we were all assured at the time that it would.
Unfortunately, fast-forward months later, and we've seen the
Administration's 2006 budget proposal, which would eliminate
our grant program and combine us into a critical infrastructure
program, along with trucks, trains, buses, public transit, and
energy facilities. This is a proposal that we strongly oppose.
We think it's contrary to what this Committee intended last
year in the Coast Guard reauthorization bill, which authorized
a separate grant program for port security based on MTSA. Just
last week, the House Appropriations Committee voted to reject
lumping these together and said that they want to see the Port
Security Grant Program remain a separate line item. And we
certainly would ask for your support in making sure that that
is a Senate decision, as well.
Our economy, our safety, and our national defense depend
largely on how we can protect our seaports. According to the 9/
11 Commission report, opportunities to do harm are as great, or
greater, in maritime as they are at airports. And I've heard
several of you reiterate that this morning. We must focus on
protection at all seaports, since ports serve as an
international border, and an incident at one would surely
impact all. Rather than limiting the eligibility, to certain
geographic areas--we urge DHS to refocus the program on MTSA
while including a cross-check to the critical infrastructure
plan.
We also urge this Committee to take a leadership role in
advocating for stronger funding for the current Port Security
Grant Program in the 2006 appropriations process. The Coast
Guard did originally estimate we'd have to spend about $5.4
billion over a 10-year period to comply with MTSA for facility
security, and we have urged a funding level of $400 million for
FY06.
With cargo volumes expected to double over the next 15
years, seaports across the country are expanding to meet the
growing demand for their services, necessitating huge
expenditures in infrastructure, equipment, and personnel that
top $3 billion a year. Unfortunately, in order to pay for
security enhancements, ports may have to divert funds needed to
make capital investments to handle this future trade growth. We
need the Federal Government to provide its share of security
costs--this is a partnership--to make sure that our ports are
secure today and will be able to meet the challenges and
opportunities of accommodating the world trade needs of
tomorrow.
Finally, we'd also like to voice our support for the TWIC
program, which you've discussed earlier. We urge increased
funding for the program, and also encourage DHS to enact the
program quickly. We share some of the frustrations you heard
earlier.
We appreciate your leadership. We stand ready to do our
part in protecting America. And, again, we urge you to voice
your support for a stronger appropriation in 2006 and a
separate line item for the Port Security Grant Program.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Godwin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jean Godwin, Executive Vice President/General
Counsel, American Association of Port Authorities
Good morning. I am Jean Godwin, Executive Vice President and
General Counsel for the American Association of Port Authorities
(AAPA). I thank you for inviting us to testify before your Committee on
the implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act and
vulnerabilities that remain in the maritime transportation sector. AAPA
is an alliance of the leading public ports in the Western Hemisphere
and our testimony today reflects the views of our U.S. members.
Prior to 9/11, security was not a top concern for most ports. 9/11
changed that and Congress and the Administration took quick action to
help focus ports on this new risk. Enhancing maritime security and
protecting America's seaports from acts of terrorism and other federal
crimes is now a top priority for AAPA and U.S. port authorities. Much
has been done since 9/11, but more is needed. Protecting America's
ports is critical to our Nation's economic growth and vitality, and is
an integral part of homeland defense. Ports handle 95 percent of our
overseas cargo by volume, enable the deployment of our military, and
serve as departure points for millions of cruise passengers.
Protecting our international seaport borders is a responsibility
shared by the federal, state, and local governments, seaports and
private industry. The Department of Homeland Security takes the lead in
protecting America's ports. This includes programs of the U.S. Coast
Guard, the Border and Transportation Security Administration, Customs
and Border Protection Service, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and
plant and animal inspection. Ports, for their part, focus on protecting
the facilities where this international cargo enters and exits the
country. The security blueprint for these facilities is the MTSA and
its regulations.
AAPA commends the U.S. Coast Guard for its excellent job in
developing regulations and reviewing all facility and vessel plans
within a very short timeline. All port facilities were required to have
operational port security plans by the end of 2004. These plans
established a baseline to protect ports from terrorist threats. As we
learn more and start to look at the vulnerabilities identified by the
area maritime committees and DHS's intelligence programs, we understand
more what needs to be done and make improvements to plans. More
sophisticated technology can also help us harden these facilities and
enhance communications with first responders. Ports also hope
technology will provide a mechanism to decrease the number of personnel
required to secure our ports, and enhance productivity in the movement
of cargo.
Key to enhancing physical security of ports is the Port Security
Grant Program. It was established after 9/11 through the Appropriations
process and provides much-needed help to port facilities to harden
security to protect these vital ports of entry from acts of terrorism.
The program has been authorized in several bills--MTSA and Coast Guard
reauthorization--although the program, as implemented, is a bit
different from the current authorization bills.
Since its inception, the program has provided $565 million in
grants for 1,200 projects, with Congress providing an additional $150
million in FY05. Overall, only one-sixth of all projects have been
funded. With 95 percent of our overseas trade flowing through our
ports, all states and all citizens would be impacted by a shutdown of
our seaports. Agriculture as well as oil are two commodities that are
heavily dependent on ports to ensure these products get to market.
Imagine the impact of a shutdown of the ports in South Louisiana that
handle much of the oil imports and grain exports for this Nation.
The level of funding and policy decisions from DHS have made this
program less effective than it could be. The need is great, and in the
last round, especially, DHS gave small amounts to numerous projects.
Some ports had to wait to finish projects because they did not have the
necessary funds to fully complete the project. The Port of New Orleans,
for example, got partial funding for four gates rather than full
funding for one. The MTSA states that the funds will be distributed in
a fair and equitable way. However, DHS is also trying to balance risks
and protect critical national seaports (as noted in the Appropriations
bill). DHS faced a dilemma--if it funds only the top risks, it leaves a
soft underbelly of smaller ports. If it gives a little to everyone,
little gets done. The problem seems to be one of historic underfunding.
We must have funds to do both--provide the needed resources for big and
small ports alike.
These complaints were also echoed by DHS's Inspector General and
others. In an attempt to make the grants more risk-based, in the fifth
round ODP is expected to focus more on high-risk and vulnerable ports.
But the funding level, and partial funding of projects, continues to be
a huge constraint to progress.
There is also an inconsistency over what the grants pay for. The
MTSA stated grants can pay for salaries, operation and maintenance of
security equipment, and the cost of physical improvements and
vulnerability assessments. But the program allowed only reimbursement
of the last two items. This is due to the low level of funding. The
Coast Guard estimated the cost of facility compliance with the MTSA
regulations would be $5.4 billion over 10 years. AAPA supports a
funding level of $400 million a year, which is significantly higher
than the current budget.
And there is a new threat to this vital program. In the proposed
FY06 budget, the Administration recommended eliminating the Port
Security Grant Program and merging ports into a broad targeted
infrastructure protection grant program. This runs counter to the
intent of this Committee. Last year, this Committee included a
provision in the Coast Guard Reauthorization bill to update the
authorization of the program. The Act maintained that there would be a
separate program specifically for port security to be based on the
MTSA.
The new Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program would lump port
security into a program with trains, trucks, buses and other public
transit, and chemical companies and ties these grants to the goal of
protecting critical infrastructure based on relative risk,
vulnerability and needs. This move would pit an underfunded border
protection program (port security) against underfunded domestic
protection programs. AAPA has great concerns, and encourages your
Committee to voice opposition to this new structure.
Our economy, our safety and our national defense depend largely on
how well we can protect our seaports. According to the 9/11 Commission
Report, opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime
as they are at airports. Ports are also the only industry within this
new Targeted Infrastructure Protection Program that has a statutory
mandate to comply with--the MTSA--and the only one for which there is a
congressionally authorized grant program, which was also created by
this Committee. A separate line item is essential to ensure that ports
continue to be a targeted priority in our country's war again
terrorism. Cargo doesn't vote and it is often not fully recognized for
the value it provides to this country in state and federal
infrastructure plans. While critical infrastructure protection is
important, using it as the sole criteria for making decisions on
funding for port security is a bad idea. DHS proposes to do this so it
doesn't have so many separate grant programs. We don't oppose merging
other programs together, just the lumping of ports into this program.
Seaports, like airports, are key targets and deserve a separate
program.
We must focus on protection at all seaports since ports serve as an
international border, and an incident at one would surely impact all
ports. The MTSA has a system established to identify risks and
vulnerabilities, and while some may question some of the DHS decisions
on certain grants, the overall move to tying the grants to the MTSA is
one that AAPA supports. This was not done in the first few rounds
because the MTSA was not in effect yet. We urge DHS to refocus the
program on the MTSA, while including a cross-check to the critical
infrastructure plan and to keep this as a separate program, like the
firefighter grants.
We also urge this Committee to take a leadership role in advocating
for stronger funding for the current port security grant program in the
FY06 appropriations process. As noted above, the Coast Guard has
estimated that ports would have to spend $5.4 billion over a 10-year
period to comply with the new MTSA. AAPA urges a funding level of $400
million in FY06. Recently, the House Appropriations Committee approved
only $150 million, which is level funding. There is still much to be
done to continue our progress in securing America's ports.
Ports are currently planning for a huge increase in trade in the
future. Adequate federal funds will help us avoid an infrastructure
crisis in the future. Industry analysts predict that within the next 15
years the approximately two billion tons of cargo that U.S. ports
handle today will double. But ports are also challenged by the new
security mandates of the MTSA and the need to continue to make
improvements. Therefore, ports are using current dollars to pay for
security, rather than capital investments needed to handle the future
growth in international trade. We need the federal government to
provide its share of these improvements now, so that our ports are
secure today and will be able to meet the challenges and opportunities
of accommodating the world trade needs of tomorrow.
Finally, AAPA would like to voice its strong support for the
Transportation Worker Identification Credentialing (TWIC) program,
which was authorized in the MTSA. We urge increased funding for this
program and encourage DHS to make the necessary policy decisions to
implement this program quickly. The MTSA required all ports to control
access to their facilities, but our U.S. member ports are still waiting
for the TWIC requirements before installing new technologies.
Thank you for inviting us to testify on this critical
transportation security issue. Ports stand ready to do their part in
protecting America. We urge your Committee to voice your support for a
strong appropriation in FY06 for a separate line item for the Port
Security Grant Program.
Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions.
The Chairman. Mr. Koch?
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER L. KOCH, PRESIDENT/CEO, WORLD SHIPPING
COUNCIL
Mr. Koch. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inouye, thank you for the
opportunity to be here.
As we look at the question of maritime security, we find it
helpful to break it out into its different components. There's
ship security. There's port-facility security. There's people--
personnel security. And there's cargo security.
The Coast Guard's really done a very good job in dealing
with the ships, and with the port facilities. On the people
piece, there's been certain restrictions applied. All seafarers
coming into the U.S. now have to have their own individual
visas.
Mr. Chairman, you started this hearing by asking, ``Well,
what is it we should do, going forward, that we're not doing
today,'' and I'd like to offer a couple of suggestions.
First is the Transportation Worker Identification Card
(TWIC). It's been legislated as a requirement for the maritime
sector. Coast Guard and TSA are working on that right now. We
understand from the Coast Guard that they expect to have a
rulemaking out in July of this year. And this is a necessary
element to move forward.
The last piece of the puzzle really is cargo, cargo
security, and it's a multifaceted strategy the government has,
as you heard from Mr. Jacksta. But the starting strategy here
is risk assessment. Customs today screens 100 percent of all
containers before they're loaded in a foreign port, before
they're put on a ship to be brought to the U.S. That is the
strategy we've used, 100 percent screening. They then inspect
100 percent of all boxes they have questions about. As you
heard, that's slightly over 5 percent. So, if the core strategy
we're using is risk assessment, we have to look at what data is
being used to make those risk judgments.
Today what we're using is what's been mandated under the
``24-hour rule,'' the ocean carriers' bill-of-lading
information, our manifest. It was a good start. Commissioner
Bonner was right to do that. We support that strategy 100
percent. Our observation would be that the ocean carriers' bill
of lading is a limited source of information for undertaking
effective risk assessment.
Today the foreign exporter or the U.S. importer is not
required to give the government any information about the goods
they are bringing into the U.S. until after the goods are here.
It's our belief that what really ought to be done is, for risk-
assessment purposes, the importer should provide its data to
Customs before vessel loading, just like the ocean carrier
does, so that the National Targeting Center in Northern
Virginia that screens all these shipments has the benefit of
better, more robust, and more accurate information on those
shipments.
Also, as you heard today, the strategy is to inspect 100
percent of all containers coming in, with radiation-inspection
equipment. The goal for Customs is to have that done by the end
of this year, and they're making very good progress on getting
that done. There are some problems in some ports with on-dock
rail, as you would have seen in L.A., but, overall, they're
making very good progress on that.
Finally, there's the in-transit security piece of the
issue. The biggest security vulnerability for containers is
when they're stuffed at the foreign origin, but we also have to
recognize that we need some measure in place to verify whether
containers coming through the system have been tampered with in
transit. We have proposed that the government establish a
rulemaking to require seal verification on inbound containers,
and DHS and Customs are working on that. We expect that to be
out as a rulemaking sometime during the course of this summer.
It'll be complicated. It'll be very expensive. But we think
it's an appropriate measure, moving forward.
When that's in place, it'll also stimulate and advance
technology. We're spending a lot of time looking at technology
issues for containers. It's quite complicated. But we do
believe that when there's a seal verification requirement, it
will, in fact, accelerate technology development, particularly
RFID technology, that would or could make some significant
improvements, going forward.
So, in terms of answering your question, Mr. Chairman, the
three things that we would offer for your consideration that
ought to be done: first, get better data for risk assessment
for the screening process of the cargo coming in; second,
support DHS as it moves forward with the TWIC initiative; and,
third, recognize that a seal-verification rule will be in place
in the near future, which is also going to be a big step
forward.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Koch follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher L. Koch, President/CEO, World
Shipping Council
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today. My name is Christopher Koch. I
am President and CEO of the World Shipping Council, a non-profit trade
association of over 40 international ocean carriers, established to
address public policy issues of interest and importance to the
international liner shipping industry. The Council's members include
the full spectrum of ocean common carriers, from large global operators
to trade-specific niche carriers, offering container, roll-on roll-off,
car carrier and other international transportation services. They carry
roughly 93 percent of the United States' imports and exports
transported by the international liner shipping industry, or more than
$500 billion worth of American foreign commerce per year. \1\
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\1\ A list of the Council's members can be found on the Council's
website at www.worldshipping.org.
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I also serve as Chairman of the Department of Homelands Security's
National Maritime Security Advisory Committee, as a member of the
Departmental Advisory Committee on Commercial Operations of Customs and
Border Protection (COAC), and on the Department of Transportation's
Marine Transportation System National Advisory Committee. It is a
pleasure to be here today.
In 2004, American businesses imported 10 million loaded cargo
containers into the United States. The liner shipping industry
transports on average about $1.5 billion worth of containerized goods
through U.S. ports each day. In 2005, a projected 11 percent growth
rate means that the industry will handle more than 11 million U.S.
import container loads. In 2006, containerized trade growth is
forecasted to increase another 10 percent, and we will need to be ready
to handle more than twelve million import containers. And these trade
growth trends are not expected to stop after 2006.
Consider the requirements of one customer of our industry. Wal-Mart
will import roughly 360,000 FEUs (forty foot containers) this year. If
you were to place that volume on trucks bumper-to-bumper in a single
line, it would stretch 3,750 miles. And those volumes have to be moved
efficiently at the same time as L.L. Bean's, Target's, Home Depot's,
Ford's, K Mart's, Procter & Gamble's, McDonald's, Hewlett Packard's,
General Motors', General Electric's, Whirlpool's, Nike's, Becks Beer,
Joe's Hardware Store, and thousands of other shippers.
The demands on all parties in the transportation sector to handle
these large cargo volumes efficiently is both a major challenge and
very important to the American economy.
At the same time that the industry is addressing the issues
involved in efficiently moving over 11 million U.S. import containers
this year, we also must continue to address the unfinished task of
enhancing maritime security, and do so in a way that doesn't
unreasonably hamper commerce.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has stated that there are
no known credible threats that indicate terrorists are planning to
infiltrate or attack the United States via maritime shipping
containers. At the same time, America's supply chains extend to tens of
thousands of different points around the world, and the potential
vulnerability of containerized transportation requires the development
and implementation of prudent security measures. Like many parts of our
society, we thus confront an unknown threat, but a known vulnerability.
What is the appropriate collection of measures to address this
challenge?
The Department of Homeland Security's maritime security efforts
involve many different, but complementary pieces, including
implementing the directives of the Maritime Transportation Security Act
(MTSA).
It includes the establishment of vessel security plans for all
arriving vessels pursuant to the International Ship & Port Facility
Security Code (ISPS Code) and Maritime Transportation Security Act
(MTSA).
It includes the establishment of U.S. port facility security plans
and area maritime security plans pursuant to the ISPS Code and MTSA,
and the establishment by the Coast Guard of the International Port
Security Program (IPSP) pursuant to which the Coast Guard visits
foreign ports and terminals to share and align security practices and
assess compliance with the ISPS Code.
The Coast Guard's efforts to implement these initiatives are well
developed.
It includes the Maritime Domain Awareness program, under which DHS
acquires enhanced information about vessel movements and deploys
various technologies for better maritime surveillance. The challenge of
effectively patrolling all the coasts and waters of the United States
is obviously a large one.
The MTSA directives and DHS efforts also include enhanced security
for personnel working in the maritime area, from the requirement that
all foreign seafarers have individual visas if they are to get off a
ship in the U.S., to the imminent promulgation of proposed rules on the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC). Regarding the
TWIC, DHS officials have indicated their intent to issue a proposed
rulemaking on this issue this summer. At the request of DHS, the
National Maritime Security Advisory Committee, after intensive, open
and constructive dialogue amongst diverse industry and government
officials, approved last Friday a detailed set of recommendations to
the Department for their consideration in the development of this
ambitious initiative.
And last, but certainly not least, MTSA directives and DHS efforts
include an array of initiatives to enhance cargo security, which the
Committee staff has requested that I discuss. There are several
elements and programs that comprise the government's cargo security
strategy, and each has a role. This morning I'd like to briefly address
the following cargo security issues:
Cargo Security Risk Assessment Screening
Radiation Inspection of all Containers
Enhancing In-Transit Container Security
The Container Security Initiative
The C-TPAT Program
The World Customs Organization
Container Security Technology
1. Cargo Security Risk Assessment and the National Targeting Center
The stated and statutorily mandated strategy of the U.S. Government
is to conduct a security screening of containerized cargo shipments
before they are loaded on a U.S. bound vessel in a foreign port. The
World Shipping Council fully supports this strategy. The correct time
and place for the cargo security screening is before the containers are
loaded on a ship. Most cargo interests also appreciate the importance
of this strategy, because they don't want their shipments aboard a
vessel delayed because of a security concern that could arise regarding
another cargo shipment aboard the ship.
In order to be able to perform this advance security screening,
Customs and Border Protection (Customs or CBP) implemented the ``24
Hour Rule'' in early 2003, under which ocean carriers are required to
provide Customs with their cargo manifest information regarding all
containerized cargo shipments at least 24 hours before those containers
are loaded onto the vessel in a foreign port. The Council supports this
rule. Customs, at its National Targeting Center in Northern Virginia,
then screens every shipment using its Automated Targeting System (ATS),
which also uses various sources of intelligence information, to
determine which containers should not be loaded aboard the vessel at
the foreign port, which containers need to be inspected at either the
foreign port or the U.S. discharge port, and which containers are
considered low-risk and able to be transported expeditiously and
without further review. Every container shipment loaded on a vessel for
the U.S. is screened through this system before vessel loading at the
foreign load port.
The Department of Homeland Security's strategy is thus based on its
performance of a security screening of relevant cargo shipment data for
100 percent of all containerized cargo shipments before vessel loading,
and subsequent inspections of 100 percent of those containers that
raise security issues after initial screening. Today, we understand
that CBP inspects roughly 5.5-6 percent of all inbound containers (over
500,000 containers/year), using either X-ray or gamma ray technology
(or both) or by physical devanning of the container.
We all have a strong interest in the government performing as
effective a security screening as possible before vessel loading.
Experience also shows that substantial disruptions to commerce can be
avoided if security questions relating to a cargo shipment have been
addressed prior to a vessel being loaded and sailing. Not only is
credible advance cargo security screening necessary to the effort to
try to prevent a cargo security incident, but it is necessary for any
reasonable contingency planning or incident recovery strategy.
Today, while the ATS uses various sources of data, the only data
that the commercial sector is required to provide to Customs for each
shipment for the before-vessel-loading security screening is the ocean
carrier's bill of lading/manifest data filed under the 24 Hour Rule.
This was a good start, but carriers' manifest data has limitations.
Cargo manifest data should be supplemented in order to provide
better security risk assessment capabilities. \2\ Currently, there is
no data that is required to be filed into ATS by the U.S. importer or
the foreign exporter that can be used in the pre-vessel loading
security screening process, even though these parties possess shipment
data that CBP officials believe would have security risk assessment
relevance that is not available in the carriers' manifest filings, and
notwithstanding the fact that the law requires the cargo security
screening and evaluation system to be conducted ``prior to loading in a
foreign port.'' \3\ Today, cargo entry data is required to be filed
with CBP by the importer, but is not required to be filed until after
the cargo shipment is in the United States, often at its inland
destination--too late to be used for security screening purposes.
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\2\ See also, ``Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in
Targeting Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection,'' General
Accounting Office Report and Testimony, March 31, 2004 (GAO-04-557T).
\3\ 46 U.S.C. section 70116(b)(1). Section 343(a) of the Trade Act
also requires that cargo information be provided by the party with the
most direct knowledge of the information.
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Last fall, the COAC Maritime Transportation Security Act Advisory
Subcommittee submitted to DHS a recommendation that importers should
provide Customs with the following data before vessel loading:
1. Better cargo description (carriers' manifest data is not
always specific or precise)
2. Party that is selling the goods to the importer
3. Party that is purchasing the goods
4. Point of origin of the goods
5. Country from which the goods are exported
6. Ultimate consignee
7. Exporter representative
8. Name of broker (would seem relevant for security check)
9. Origin of container shipment--the name and address of the
business where the container was stuffed
The Council agrees with this recommendation. The government's
strategy today is to inspect containerized cargo on a risk-assessment
basis. Accordingly, the government should improve the cargo shipment
data it currently uses for its risk assessment. An ocean carrier's bill
of lading by itself is not sufficient for cargo security screening.
These cargo entry shipment data elements would improve cargo security
screening capabilities. If a risk assessment strategy is to remain the
core of the government's cargo security system, the government needs to
decide what additional advance cargo shipment information it needs to
do the job well, and it must require cargo interests, and not just
carriers, to provide the relevant data in time to do the advance
security screening. While this is not a simple task, a next step
forward requiring shipper interests to provide more data on their cargo
shipments before vessel loading is appropriate. CBP and DHS officials
are currently reviewing this issue.
2. Radiation Screening
A particular security concern is the potential use of a container
to transport a nuclear or radiological device. While there is no
evidence that terrorists have nuclear weapons or devices, or that a
shipping container would be a likely means to deliver such a device,
the consequences of the potential threat--including those from a low
tech ``dirty bomb''--are sufficiently great that, in addition to the
targeted inspection of containers discussed above, CBP is deploying
radiation scanning equipment at all major U.S container ports, with the
objective of being able to check every container entering the U.S. for
radiation by the end of this year. CBP and the Department of Energy are
also working with foreign ports to encourage the installation of
radiation scanning technology abroad as well.
We understand that the Government Accountability Office is
currently reviewing the effectiveness of the radiation detection
equipment being used, which is clearly an important issue.
3. Enhancing In-Transit Container Security
While the most important and challenging container security issue
is ensuring that containers are loaded with cargo securely in the first
place, it is also important to have a system that can help determine
whether a container may have been tampered with while in-transit. In
September 2003, the Council, together with the National Industrial
Transportation League and the Retail Industry Leaders Association,
recommended to DHS that the government promulgate a container seal
verification rule as the most practical way to address this issue in
the near term. The Maritime Transportation Security Act Advisory
Subcommittee of COAC made the same recommendation to DHS last fall. CBP
and DHS are currently in the process of drafting proposed regulations
on this issue. This will be a costly and challenging rule to implement,
but we recognize the need to address this issue and the need for a
container seal verification rulemaking.
Some of the more important issues that will need to be addressed in
this rulemaking will be: the reporting process to CBP when a seal
anomaly is identified, the consequences to the shipment when a seal
anomaly is identified, where the seal verification is to take place,
and a reasonable implementation time frame that will allow port
facilities around the world to develop implementation measures.
4. Container Security Initiative
No nation by itself can protect international trade. International
cooperation is essential. For ships and port facilities, the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), a U.N. regulatory agency
with international requirement setting authority, has responded to U.S.
leadership and created the International Ship and Port Security Code
(ISPS). These IMO rules are internationally applicable and are strictly
enforced by the U.S. Coast Guard. There is no comparable international
regulatory institution with rule writing authority for international
supply chain security. For a variety of reasons, the World Customs
Organization (WCO) has not acquired such an authority.
At the WCO, CBP is working diligently with other governments on a
supply chain security framework that can be used by all trading
nations. This framework will be useful, but will remain at a fairly
high level and will be implemented on a voluntary basis by interested
governments. Consequently, U.S. and foreign customs authorities must
also create a network of bilateral cooperative relationships to share
information and to enhance trade security. This is the Container
Security Initiative. The Council supports this program and the strategy
behind it.
In March, Dubai became an operational CSI port, and Shanghai and
Yantian are expected to become operational soon. When they are, more
than 60 percent of U.S. containerized imports will be passing through
operational CSI ports, with further program growth expected. The liner
shipping industry is fully supportive of these efforts by Customs
authorities and hopes the program will continue to expand as
expeditiously as possible. \4\ A listing of operational, and soon to be
operational, CSI ports follows:
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\4\ On May 9, the Argentine government signed a declaration of
principles to become involved in CSI. The expansion of CSI to Buenos
Aires will be the first CSI cooperative agreement in Latin America.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total CY 2003 U.S. Total CY 2004 U.S.
Port Name Import TEUs (000) Imports TEUs (000)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hong Kong 1,885.41 1,866.32
Yantian (Shenzhen) 1,603.83 1,982.79
Shanghai 937.34 1,278.50
Busan 891.38 971.49
Singapore 478.73 494.30
Rotterdam 420.90 427.75
Bremerhaven 415.99 392.18
Antwerp 262.21 304.60
Tokyo 250.77 267.53
Laem Chabang 186.68 201.06
Nagoya 169.04 174.94
Le Havre 154.93 139.67
Genoa 153.92 144.57
Le Spezia 143.69 159.67
Kobe 111.13 119.97
Hamburg 110.93 150.01
Algeciras 109.09 81.75
Gioia Tauro 103.96 104.48
Yokohama 82.781 109.02
Livorno (Leghorn) 80.15 92.33
Felixstowe 69.54 69.51
Tanjung Pelepas 64.71 45.96
Durban 41.57 43.94
Port Kelang 41.10 39.26
Naples 40.34 29.88
Southampton 40.28 38.62
Liverpool 38.85 39.37
Thamesport 31.49 32.34
Halifax 26.39 24.38
Gothenberg 17.46 18.81
Piraeus 10.92 11.58
Vancouver 5.74 13.59
Tilbury 5.23 2.56
Marseille 4.40 1.07
Dubai 1.20 1.11
Montreal 0.27 0.72
Zeebrugge 0.08 0.02
------------------------------------------------------------------------
37 CSI Ports listed: 9,875.63 TEUs (thousands) to the U.S. in 2004
Total U.S. Imports: 15,805.48 TEUs (thousands) in 2004
37 CSI Ports = 62.48 percent of total U.S. imports
One of the issues that the recent Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report on CSI identified was that foreign Customs authorities are
not inspecting at the foreign load port all of the containers that CBP
has identified for security inspection. There are a number of relevant
issues with respect to this finding, but I would note a couple of
points.
First, understanding why these containers were not inspected at the
foreign ports is very important. For example if it was because local
Customs intelligence had good reasons to determine there was not a
significant security risk, that fact would be obviously relevant.
Second, building cooperative Customs relationships requires time,
commitment and mutual trust. In order for the CBP officials stationed
in CSI ports to build trust and relationships with foreign customs
authorities, the CBP program must be supported with professional
personnel that have long-term assignments to these positions. Foreign
customs authorities would have a difficult time building cooperative
relationships if the CBP personnel must rotate out of their CSI
positions after a short period of time. We understand that this has
been an issue in the early phases of the CSI program, and hope that any
difficulties CBP may have had in getting qualified, full time people
stationed to these positions is being or has been resolved. CBP will
need the full support of DHS and the Department of State to ensure an
effective and robust CSI program.
Third, we note that the supply-chain-security framework that is
being developed by the World Customs Organization (WCO) and is expected
to be approved next month, provides an important reinforcing principle
that should help the CSI program, namely that the Customs
administrations of exporting nations should conduct outbound security
inspection of high-risk containers at the reasonable request of the
importing country. This is an international affirmation of the CSI
program's principles.
Finally, if CBP ever encounters a foreign customs authority that is
unwilling to inspect a container that CBP believes is high risk, it can
and should issue the ocean carrier a ``Do Not Load'' message and that
container will not be loaded aboard a vessel destined for the U.S.
There is no reason why any container that CBP has identified as ``high
risk'' can't and shouldn't be stopped and inspected before it is loaded
aboard a vessel bound for the U.S. If the container is not high risk
but still one that CBP wishes to inspect, it can use its discretion to
inspect it at the U.S. discharge port.
5. C-TPAT
C-TPAT is an initiative intended to increase supply-chain-security
through voluntary, non-regulatory agreements with various industry
sectors. Its primary focus is on the participation of U.S. importers,
who are in turn urged to have their suppliers implement security
measures all the way down their supply chains to the origin of the
goods. This approach has an obvious attraction in the fact that the
importer's suppliers in foreign countries are beyond the reach of U.S.
regulatory jurisdiction. In return for participating in the program,
importers are given a benefit of reduced cargo inspection. The C-TPAT
program invites participation from other parties involved in the supply
chain as well, including carriers, customs brokers, freight forwarders,
U.S. port facilities, and a limited application to foreign
manufacturers.
C-TPAT has improved the security of importers' supply chains. How
much it has improved security is difficult to determine or measure. GAO
has produced a critical study of C-TPAT, entitled ``Partnership Program
Grants Importers Reduced Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved
Security.'' The program is currently under scrutiny by both Congress
and DHS. It is facing both fair and unrealistic criticism.
C-TPAT needs to be understood for what it is and what it is not. C-
TPAT is a set of voluntary partnerships between CBP and willing
industry members. C-TPAT is not a regulatory program. It should not be
confused as being one. Nor should it be a substitute for regulations
when the government has clear, specific things it wants industry to do
to enhance security. The difficulty is that the program is in some
respects ambiguous, and perhaps unavoidably so.
It is not a regulatory program, yet critics want specificity,
strict enforcement, and penalties for non-compliance--features that
characterize regulatory programs.
Its costs can be significant, but its benefits are necessarily
limited; parties that are not importers receive no direct benefit from
the program.
Its principal purpose is to try to affect the conduct of parties
outside U.S. regulatory jurisdiction, yet some expect it to have an
effect similar to what would occur if these parties were subject to
U.S. regulatory jurisdiction.
It is a program that relies on participants' own risk assessment
and allows participant's discretion and flexibility in application of
the security standards. At the same time, the program tries to promote
uniform and common standards of behavior through generalized ``minimum
standards.''
When COAC posed questions that, in essence, asked what importers
should do when some of their suppliers are compliant with C-TPAT
standards and some are not, CBP responded in their Frequently Asked
Questions that all of an importer's suppliers should be compliant or
that the importer must demonstrate an ongoing commitment to get all
suppliers compliant. Importers will face situations where they cannot
require or ensure that all their suppliers are compliant. On the one
hand, one can sympathize with the way the issue is being addressed,
because CBP wants to keep pushing for full compliance, and because the
program would become much more complicated if each importer's supply
chain had to become divided into various levels of compliance or non-
compliance. On the other hand, by not differentiating within importers'
supply chains, one must either accept or not accept the proposition
that each container shipment of a C-TPAT importer is likely to obtain
an equivalent lowering of its risk assessment.
C-TPAT is a program that other nations' customs authorities and the
WCO are examining and find conceptually attractive, yet its definition,
its application and the extent of its utility are still in development
and not yet settled here in the U.S. A common, global C-TPAT, ``trusted
shipper'' type system might be a very good idea. At the same time, if
many trading nations were to implement C-TPAT type programs in ways
that significantly differ from each other, very significant
complexities for international commerce could emerge, including the
possibility of redundant and duplicative, or even inconsistent,
efforts.
These are difficult issues, and one should temper criticism of the
program with an appreciation for the fact that CBP has been trying very
hard to make the program effectively address significant concerns in
supply-chain-security in areas where it has no regulatory jurisdiction.
The program is a voluntary, non-regulatory, evolving initiative.
Voluntary Partnerships: C-TPAT tries to provide general guidance
for enhancing security with respect to some, but not all, aspects of
supply-chain-security. It recognizes that flexibility in application is
unavoidable when applied to the tens of thousands of different supply
chains around the globe. For example, the new C-TPAT Importer Security
Criteria have standards for fencing, facility lighting, and employee
background checks and credential checking. C-TPAT importers can agree
to communicate this to all their foreign suppliers and to urge their
suppliers' compliance, but obviously not every business in the world
involved in shipping goods to a U.S. C-TPAT importer is going to have
compliant fencing, lighting, etc. This doesn't mean C-TPAT is a
failure, or that a C-TPAT importer is a failure if one or more of its
suppliers don't conform to the standard, and it doesn't mean that C-
TPAT doesn't provide security enhancement. It means that there is an
unavoidable degree of variability, imprecision and ambiguity in the
program when it comes to its implementation.
Not a Regulatory Program: Many maritime and supply-chains-security
issues can be, should be, and are addressed through regulatory
requirements, not C-TPAT. For example, vessel security plans and port
security plans are regulated by Coast Guard regulations implementing
the ISPS Code and MTSA. The data that must be filed with CBP to
facilitate cargo security screening must be addressed through uniformly
applied regulations. Seafarer credentials and the Transportation Worker
Identification Card must be addressed through uniformly applied
requirements. Requirements to verify seals on import containers need to
be addressed through regulations.
C-TPAT is a program that can try to address matters that are not or
cannot be addressed by regulations, such as supply chain enhancements
beyond U.S. regulatory jurisdiction, or matters that aren't covered by
regulations, such as cooperating with CBP in providing access to
information in support of investigative inquiries. C-TPAT may also be a
platform from which CBP and program participants can analyze security
vulnerabilities and problems and jointly develop plans that could more
effectively try to address such situations. C-TPAT, however, should not
be used in lieu of regulations when regulations are the more
appropriate method to enhance security.
Validation: CBP has a C-TPAT validation program to confirm that
participants are doing what they have said they would do, during which
identified shortcomings can and should be discussed and remedial
measures developed. However, the GAO report has criticized the program
for conferring benefits to importers before validation has occurred and
noted that the agency does not have adequate trained personnel to
validate all C-TPAT participants in a timely manner.
This criticism is certainly welcomed by the private commercial
security consulting business, which sees a substantial business
opportunity if they can become government sanctioned security
validators for C-TPAT type programs in the U.S. and around the world.
Whether C-TPAT participants or the government would accept this role,
how such a role would be defined and overseen, what the standards would
be, whether validation by commercial parties would be required or
voluntary--are all issues that are undetermined at this time.
Compliance: C-TPAT is not a regulatory regime, with specific
criteria that must be applied to everyone at all times. Some of the
program criteria are very general, and its criteria do not cover all
aspects of security. Further, a security failure in a specific case may
not involve a lack of due care and may not involve a breach of the
terms of the participant's C-TPAT Agreement.
Nevertheless, CBP has recently taken the position that it can
suspend a C-TPAT participant from the program--
a. Without advance notice, without discussion, and without an
opportunity to cure the problem.
b. For matters that are not covered by the terms of the C-TPAT
Agreement signed by CBP and the carrier (i.e., you can be
kicked out of the C-TPAT program even if you have complied with
the C-TPAT Agreement's terms).
c. For any violation of law or significant security breach
(e.g., drugs in a container, stowaways in a container).
d. For an undefined duration.
Ocean carriers, which receive no direct benefits from CBP for
participation in the program but have written their C-TPAT
participation into many of their transportation contracts with
shippers, have found this to be a surprising and troubling development
at best. Carriers had believed that under a ``voluntary partnership''
program with CBP, specific security concerns would be jointly assessed
to determine what measures could reasonably be taken to address any
specific security shortcomings. To face no-notice suspension from a
voluntary program that provides no direct benefits for events that may
be highly unpredictable and under the control of third parties will
significantly change the program and how it is perceived.
Evolving Initiative: C-TPAT is an evolving initiative, and industry
and government will learn and adapt as it matures. For example, when
the Sea Carrier portion of C-TPAT was formulated, there was no ISPS
Code or Coast Guard MTSA regulation regarding vessel and port facility
security plans, so C-TPAT carriers recognized the regulatory void and
agreed to undertake a number of voluntary measures in this regard.
Today, there are comprehensive Coast Guard regulations on these issues,
and it is no longer appropriate for CBP to use C-TPAT to address the
issues that the Coast Guard is addressing through its regulations.
Similarly, carriers agreed in C-TPAT to participate in the electronic
Automated Manifest System (AMS) for transmitting manifest information
to CBP; at the time, paper manifest filings were possible. Now,
electronic filing in AMS is required by regulation.
The future role of ocean carriers in C-TPAT will require further
consideration and analysis. Carriers, unlike importer's foreign
suppliers, are regulated parties, and CBP and the Coast Guard can and
have established clear, uniformly applicable rules for them to follow.
Furthermore, C-TPAT program benefits, which are basically less frequent
cargo inspections, are importer benefits. Ocean carriers do not receive
direct benefits from CBP for C-TPAT participation. How and where ocean
carriers may fit in the program going forward remains to be seen.
As regulated entities, ocean carriers have a preference for clear,
uniformly applied security regulations when an issue can be addressed
through regulations. At the same time, we wish to continue to work with
CBP and other DHS agencies to determine if there are appropriate ways
to supplement the regulatory security regime. This will continue to
require a partnership approach, clear communications, and mutual
benefits.
Looking Ahead: C-TPAT is not the supply-chain-security strategy for
the government--it is one layer and one piece of the evolving strategy.
At the same time, the program's critics have points that won't be
ignored. For example, it is difficult to believe that C-TPAT is
presently sufficiently developed to actually be used as a determining
criteria for what cargo would be allowed to be transported if the
government had to respond to a terrorist incident involving a
containerized cargo shipment, because, among other things, there is
uncertainty about whether all the suppliers in an importer's supply
chain comply with adequate standards that warrant such confidence.
However, it is conceivable that the program may be able to attain
this kind of result if the foreign suppliers that actually stuff the
containers were included in the program. The fact that foreign
manufacturers (except some Mexican manufacturers) and the parties
stuffing the containers are not in the program means that the most
important parties in container security aren't C-TPAT program
participants. Could this be addressed by adding foreign manufacturers
to the program?
Perhaps so, if C-TPAT were to be able to evolve from a program that
gives benefits to U.S. importers if they undertake certain actions, to
a program that would give those benefits to shipments where both the
U.S. importer and a foreign manufacturer or container stuffer were
certified as compliant with the appropriate standards. Is there a way
for a program that is constrained by resources to achieve this
additional extension? Perhaps yes.
CBP, under Commissioner Bonner's leadership, has been diligently
developing international supply chain security standards at the World
Customs Organization, and has undertaken discussions with the European
Commission and various national governments. There is a possibility to
develop these efforts into a more advanced, agreed internationalization
of supply-chain-security improvements
6. The World Customs Organization
In some respects, the issues surrounding the C-TPAT program are
similar to those that the World Customs Organization (WCO) has been
grappling with since it established a special Task Force on Security
and Trade Facilitation in 2002.
Currently, the WCO is finalizing a Framework of Standards to Secure
and Facilitate Global Trade that is expected to be approved at the WCO
Council next month. This initiative intends to establish international
standards for Customs-to-Customs cooperation concerning cargo risk
assessment, advance cargo information filing and common risk criteria,
and for Customs-to-business partnership programs, like C-TPAT.
The establishment of international security standards and criteria
for international supply chains and international cargo shipments is a
sound and logical objective. The challenge, however, continues to be
how to obtain implementation of such agreed-upon standards and criteria
in the absence of a binding international instrument. The framework and
its supporting documents are expected to be approved by the WCO Council
through a recommendation that invites WCO members to implement it in
accordance with individually established timeframes and each member
country's capabilities. Thus, rather than early international
acceptance and implementation of the framework, we could see the
framework serve as a inducement for the establishment of bi- and
multilateral Customs agreements where individual Customs authorities
agree to cooperate on the establishment of joint risk assessment
programs, the advance filing of common cargo information and perhaps
also on the mutual recognition of each other's partnership programs. To
the extent such individual Customs agreements were to cover a
``critical mass'' of global trade, they could eventually establish the
minimum standards that all trading nations would have to implement or
risk seeing their export opportunities being curtailed.
Such a development would not happen over night. Nor would the
attendant benefits for business in terms of mutual recognition and
simplified and uniform filing requirements. But absent an international
regulatory mechanism for supply chain and cargo security, it appears to
be the only currently available option internationally for creating
uniformity and commonality.
As noted earlier, however, it may also be a way for the C-TPAT type
system to be extended to foreign manufacturers in those nations that
make a serious commitment to establish and oversee C-TPAT type
programs. Today, a U.S. importer is expected to ``ensure'' that a
foreign supplier is following C-TPAT criteria--a pretty tough
challenge. If reliable foreign authorities were to certify foreign
manufacturers according to standards and procedures equivalent to CBP's
certification of importers, confidence in enhanced security and shipper
compliance could be greatly enhanced. This may not work in all nations,
but it is certainly not inconceivable to see the U.S. accepting other
responsible government program certifications of their manufacturers,
and foreign governments' accepting U.S. certification of theirs. This
model works for ships, where foreign government certifications are
accepted (but also buttressed by strong U.S. port state enforcement),
and it could be considered for supply-chain-security.
7. Technology and ``Smart'' Containers
Technology clearly has a role in increasing the efficiency and
security of containerized cargo shipments. X-ray and gamma ray non-
intrusive container inspection equipment is being deployed at U.S. and
foreign ports, as are radiation portal monitors and radiation
detectors.
In addition to these developments, there is a discussion of
``smart'' containers. What makes a container ``smart,'' however, and
what the appropriate technologies may be for such an objective remain
unclear.
The Council and its member lines have been working within the
International Standards Organization RFID container technology working
group on standards for electronic container seals, container tags and
shipment tags. We expect that, once a seal verification requirement is
imposed by U.S. regulation, these technologies will be seriously
considered as an automated, efficient way to determine if containers
have been tampered with while in transit.
There is also a discussion about the possibility of the application
of shipper-applied ``container security devices'' (CSDs). The CSDs
currently being tested by CBP only indicate whether one of the
container doors has been opened. A properly applied e-seal may provide
equivalent functionality. Explanations of what a CSD should accomplish
vary, and a clear definition has not yet emerged. Furthermore, other
issues about CSDs that have not been adequately addressed, including
the radio frequency to be used and whether it would be compatible with
the emerging ISO standard's frequency for e-seals, who would read the
devices, how would they know which boxes have CSDs to be read, where
they would be read, who would be expected to build and operate the
reading infrastructure, what would be done with the information, the
devices' reliability and accuracy, and what would be done with
exception reporting.
There is also discussion of a ``next generation'' or ``Advanced
CSD'' with more sophisticated sensors that DHS is researching, which
will also need to address a number of issues, including what
specifically is it that needs to be ``sensed,'' the accuracy and
reliability of the device, its cost, who applies the device, the
reading infrastructure that would be needed, who would read it when and
where, and the protocols for how different readings would be addressed
by whom and when.
The idea of transforming containers into ``smart,'' impregnable
fortresses clearly has an appeal. Reality, however, requires addressing
issues of: technology definition and standards; false positives from
sensor technologies and their consequences; questions about device
reliability; maintenance complexity; device failures and equipment out
of service time; power needs and failures, including battery life
issues; device costs; and labor issues and costs. In addition,
technology can bring new security vulnerabilities that have to be
considered. For example, permanent or reusable container security
technology devices would require a capability to ``write'' new
information into the device or amend existing information in the
device. Such a capability would require a wide range of parties around
the world to be given the capability of writing new information into
container security devices, which would create troubling security
vulnerabilities of third parties becoming capable of ``hacking'' into
the devices. It is for this very reason that the ISO electronic seal
standard will require that e-seals be one time use seals without the
capability to write or change the information in the seal.
As different technology vendors jockey for position, some things
are becoming clearer:
1. Industry and government need to cooperate and agree on what
the security requirements are, and what the respective
implementation roles of industry and government would be.
2. Cost does matter. A decision to invest in a particular
technology applicable to the global container industry will be
expensive and will require assurance that government is not
likely to abruptly change requirements.
3. Whatever technology is chosen for application to
international containerized cargo shipments, it will need to be
a common, universally deployable technology.
4. Proprietary solutions that require a particular
manufacturer's product or reading system will not be
acceptable.
5. Technology vendors who push products that involve the vendor
capturing, managing, and profiting from all the data generated
from the device--and there are a number of these--are likely to
encounter hard questions, if not strong resistance, from
industry.
Cargo shipment data is the data of the carrier and the shipper,
and with consent, their agents. It is appropriate for the
importing and exporting nations' governments to have access to
this data, but it is not appropriate for third parties to try
to use technology to capture it and resell it to other
commercial interests. Vendors who try to do this will need to
address a number of policy and legal issues.
Summary
When addressing the issue of international supply-chain-security,
we find ourselves dealing with the consequences of two of the more
profound dynamics affecting the world today. One is the
internationalization of the world economy, the remarkable growth of
world trade, and the U.S. economy's appetite for imports--a demand that
fills our ships, our ports, and our inland transportation
infrastructure, a demand that will result in more than 11 million U.S.
import containers this year, and more than 12 million next year, and a
demand that will increasingly test our ability to move America's
commerce as efficiently as we have in the past.
The other dynamic is the threat to our way of life from terrorists
and the challenge of addressing the vulnerabilities that exist in the
free flow of international trade, even when the specific risk is
elusive or impossible to identify.
Finding the correct, reasonable balance between prudent security
measures and overreacting in a way that impairs commerce is a tough
challenge.
We are making real progress in addressing these challenges, but
that the effort to address them more effectively must continue. In
particular, it would be helpful to develop a blueprint or framework
that identifies the specific security gaps and security requirements in
the supply-chain-security system, so that government and industry can
all understand, target and prioritize the development of appropriate
solutions needed to address the appropriate, correct, and agreed
requirements.
DHS continues to refine and extend its maritime and cargo security
regime. This year we expect to see major rulemakings dealing with
container seal verification requirements and with the issuance of
Transportation Worker Identification Cards, a Departmental
determination of what additional cargo shipment data needs to be given
to CBP to enhance the cargos security screening system, and a continued
review of the C-TPAT program.
Mr. Chairman, the World Shipping Council and our member companies
believe that there is no task more important than helping the
government develop effective maritime and cargo security initiatives
that do not unduly impair the flow of commerce. We are pleased to offer
the Committee our views and assistance in this effort.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much.
One of the things that was of interest to me when I went to
Los Angeles was the enormous growth of waterborne imports into
the U.S. I understand the economic analysis of that, it's about
$40.5 billion a year coming into our ports. But, contrary to
the passengers on airlines, and contrary to any other system
that we've got, that is entirely free from any contribution to
the security aspects we're talking about. I'm told that a 4.3
percent fee, similar to one this Committee has imposed upon
airline passengers, of twice that much, would bring in at least
$1.7 billion annually.
Now, what do you say about that? Why shouldn't these
imports contribute to the cost of this security? Why should we
constantly take it from tax money? That's what we're talking
about, these additions, these amounts that each witness has
asked for this morning, in effect, more money. But why not get
it from the fees on these imports, like we tax the American
passengers as they fly on the airlines?
Ms. Godwin. There are fees assessed at--by ports at the
local level. You're correct, there is no national or federal
fee imposed on cargo that's specifically dedicated to security.
There are a lot of other federal fees and taxes, obviously, on
maritime----
The Chairman. Those fees that----
Ms. Godwin.--cargo that go into the general treasury, and
Customs duties attributable to maritime commerce. But a number
of ports have assessed fees individually at the port for
security enhancements at that particular location. And----
The Chairman. Yes, I understand they're starting that in
L.A., but I don't think they've reached that magnitude, and I
don't think many of the costs involved, even in the Los Angeles
port, are federal costs. Having the local areas increase their
revenue does not help us meet the demands that we've heard here
today.
Ms. Godwin. That's true. But when the port is collecting
fees they are using it to reimburse their own costs, in terms
of operations and maintenance and personnel costs, which aren't
even eligible for the Port Security Grants at this point. But
there are a number--as I said, a number of other federal fees
and taxes attributable to maritime commerce. No amount of that
funding is dedicated to security. It's just not set aside for
security. I know there have been proposals discussed to take a
portion of Customs duties, for example, that's collected on
maritime commerce, and to set that aside to pay for security
enhancements.
The Chairman. The Customs inspection fee on a cruise ship
is $2 per passenger. I know of no similar fee paid to the
Federal Government from imports coming into the United States.
Mr. Koch?
Mr. Koch. Mr. Chairman, it's a fair question, but I think,
really, here's where I would propose you start the analysis.
The Coast Guard's analysis of what its vessel and port-facility
regulations were going to cost the industry was $8 billion over
10 years, so industry will be spending $8 billion to comply
with the MTSA regulations. That cost estimate does not include
the cost of the foreign flag vessels' compliance with the Coast
Guard regulations. It does not include foreign ports'
compliance with the ISPS Code regulations. So, there are many
billions of dollars already being spent.
When looking at what additional federal funding needs to be
done, I think there really needs to be some clarity as to: What
would we be spending the money for? And that has been a debate
that has been vaguer than it should be. It's easy to talk about
how much money should be given to ports. The real question, as
you heard from GAO earlier today, is, What is the money
actually needed for? All port facilities today are compliant
with the ISPS Code the MTSA regs. So if we're going to go ahead
and look to tax commerce an additional amount, I think there
really needs to be clarity given to specifically what is it
that the money is going to be spent for and is there a way to
make sure that the money that would be collected actually is
spent on those things?
The Chairman. Well, as you know, the money that comes from
air cargo, domestically, is taxed at 6.25 percent. And that
goes into the FAA trust fund. We could very easily, on this
Committee, create a similar trust fund. These aren't taxes,
these are fees paid on cargo, and it goes into the FAA trust
fund created by this Committee. I'm seriously thinking about
asking this Committee to create a trust fund for port security.
That would be augmented, I'm sure, by federal expenditures,
augmented by other expenditures made by the ports themselves.
But I--there's no question that the system needs more money,
but when we faced that problem with air commerce, the
passengers and the cargo paid the fee, a substantial part of
it.
Senator Inouye?
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, you are absolutely correct.
Right now the Administration is requesting a huge sum of money
based upon passenger security fees.
My question is a very broad one. You have given us some of
your problems and some of your suggestions. You have now been
working on this since September 11th. Are we in better shape
today, or no change at all, or worse?
Mr. Koch. I think we're clearly in better shape. Are we
where we want to be? No. I think the programs Customs has
launched, in terms of the risk assessment, CSI, C-TPAT, have
all enhanced security. The Coast Guard's missions in dealing
with vessel security and port-facility security clearly have
enhanced security. Access control is much better.
Our improvements must also recognize the volumes of
containers we are moving. Last year it was 10 million import
containers; this year, it'll it be over 11 million; next year,
it'll be over 12 million. So, we see this enormous expansion of
world trade and all the cargo moving, and we have to figure out
how to improve security efficiently.
We're trying to deal with this tension between efficiently
handling huge volumes of cargo and dealing with the terrorist
risk to free trade and free societies. It's a very interesting
cross-section of conflict.
I think we're doing well. I think we clearly need to do
better. I think both AAPA and ourselves have offered
suggestions to the government on how to do that, and it's going
to be an ongoing effort. But improving risk assessment,
improving CSI, improving overseas inspections, further
deployment of the radiation inspection equipment, not only
here, but abroad, all are things that will be helpful. It's
going to take a little time to get there, but we are making
clear progress.
Senator Inouye. Following up on the Chairman's questioning,
when we improve our security, and when we improve our process
and expedite movement, a major beneficiary would be those
foreign shippers. Don't you think they should pay a little fee
that could bring this about?
Mr. Koch. Well, my observation is, they are paying more
today for security. A number of ports are charging security
fees. Carriers are trying to pass on their costs to shippers
through higher rates. The terminal operators are passing on
their higher costs. So the market already is building in
increased costs that are being passed on to shippers.
And, as the discussion we've had with Senator Stevens, if
there are specific things that the government needs to assess a
fee on for enhanced security, I think shippers would look at
that. I think the frustration that has existed in this debate,
up to this point, has been a generalized discussion of, ``Let's
spend more money,'' without tying it clearly to, ``Spend it for
what?'' And it's the ``spending it for what'' that is the
harder question, because everybody understands we need to
enhance security, but the question is--let's not just create a
trust fund that's a generalized trust fund that doesn't have
specific needs that there's a consensus should be funded
through that kind of mechanism.
Senator Inouye. I believe it would be very helpful to the
Committee if you could provide us with a report on what sort of
fees that these others are paying. Because I have no idea. And
what the load is like. If we did, we might think differently.
That would be extremely helpful.
And, Ms. Godwin, what did you think of the Inspector
General's report, the fact that it takes so long for security
clearance and that some of the grantees were really not
prepared to receive grant funds?
Ms. Godwin. I think there are some very legitimate points
that came out in the report. Our members have been concerned
about the security-clearance issue, as well. In terms of the
time lag for the grant money to be spent, I know one of the
issues is that when you fill out an application to receive a
grant, it's essentially an outline of what you might propose to
do. You type it in on the computer. There's a limited amount of
space. It's not a very detailed proposal. Once you are approved
to receive a grant, there's a period of time, over months,
where the sponsor--the Port Authority, in this case--might be
negotiating with the Department of Homeland Security to refine
that proposal, to get some specific amounts, how the money
would be allocated, to really get a more definitive grant
proposal approved. And once that is approved, they start the
process of bidding out contracts. So, there is a fairly long
time lag before the money is actually spent.
Senator Inouye. Have you been called upon to provide an
input on the process itself?
Ms. Godwin. We've been consulted by DHS off and on in a
number of different areas. I can't say that we are at the table
when these decisions are being made, but they have reached out
to us.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Senator Vitter?
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Godwin, I have some concerns about the process and how
those funds are distributed. Am I following things right and
under-standing under that new program 66 ports are eligible and
there for small ports are pretty much excluded.
Ms. Godwin. Sixty-six port areas are eligible. It depends.
There may be more than one port that's within a mile of a
navigation channel. But, yes, it is a limited universe of
potential applicants. Their initial starting point for creating
that list was based on volume, they started with the largest,
in terms of volume, 129 ports in the country, based on the
Corps of Engineers' data. There are a lot of ports that have
less volume that are left off that list. That's correct.
Senator Vitter. From a Louisiana perspective, what I'm
particularly concerned about is this focus on volume, which
leaves out a lot of oil-and-gas service-related ports--for
instance, in south Louisiana. Now, one of those ports that I
can think of--literally one, Port Fourchon, accounts for
servicing 20 percent of the Nation's oil and gas production.
Ms. Godwin. Right.
Senator Vitter. Do you think that's a little skewed, the
fact that there is this focus on volume that doesn't take into
account the significance of the port activity, like that
related to energy production?
Ms. Godwin. I think that would be a good example, that
would illustrate why cutting off those who can even apply in
the first place is probably not the best way to look at risk--
you know, risk-based decision-making. People ought to be able
to come in and file an application and make their case on why
they should be eligible for funding, and explain the risk-based
factors about that port. Looking strictly at volume, as a
starting point, and then applying a formula to that, you may
see some ports left off the list that don't make any sense if
you actually had the specific facts about that port.
Senator Vitter. Well, I would agree with you. And I think
Fourchon, in Louisiana, is a great example, because it will
never be ranked high in volume, because it's not a cargo, sort
of, volume-based port; it's a port that services the oil and
gas sector. And if it were shut down tomorrow, we would feel it
the next day, in terms of energy availability and prices.
More broadly, could you comment on the FY05 application
process as it relates to the Inspector General's findings and
the 9/11 Commission Report?
Ms. Godwin. I think they've tried to make an effort to
address some of the issues that came up in the Inspector
General's report. I know one of the criticisms was having more
clearly-defined criteria of how the local Captain of the Port
would assess a project versus how the National Review Team
would assess a project, and trying to resolve some of those
areas of confusion. But we were, to be honest, caught by
surprise at the idea of limiting the applicant pool in the
first place.
Senator Vitter. OK. And that fundamental limitation, would
you consider that basically an unfunded mandate for everybody's
who's off the list?
Ms. Godwin. It's definitely an unfunded mandate. And I
remember, when I was here for the hearing that this Committee
had in February, a number of Senators spoke very eloquently
about the need to protect all airports in this country, not
just the largest airports. And certainly the same case could be
said for ports. We do not want to leave a soft underbelly
somewhere in this country by a kind of arbitrary ranking. That
doesn't mean that risk-based decision-making isn't perfectly
appropriate, but you have to look at it in the entire context,
and not prevent people from being able to at least compete for
the funding and make a case.
Senator Vitter. OK. And the last question for both of you,
What are your comments about the proposed consolidation of the
port-security program into an overall infrastructure-security
grant program?
Ms. Godwin. As I'm sure you heard in my statement, we are
adamantly opposed to it. We are thrilled that the House
Appropriations Committee has taken a stand, and we strongly
encourage the Senate to do the same.
Senator Vitter. Right.
Mr. Koch. Sir, we don't really have any comments on that.
Senator Vitter. OK.
All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator. Glad to see
you.
Senator Rockefeller?
Senator Bill Nelson. Oh, he's not here.
The Chairman. Pardon me.
Senator Bill Nelson?
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Bill Nelson. For me to be mixed up with Senator
Rockefeller is, indeed, a privilege, Mr. Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Chairman, having grown up in
Florida on the tales and the stories of the swashbuckling days
of pirates of the Caribbean, unfortunately we're starting to
see a reoccurrence of those pirates of the Caribbean. We're
seeing several instances that have happened off of Brazil, off
of Venezuela, and off of Colombia.
And Jane's Defence Weekly, is indicating to us that new
evidence shows that terrorist organizations are entering the
fray with terrorists and insurgents using the sea as a
launchpad for brutal acts to move operatives and to smuggle
drugs and counterfeit goods to fund their operations. And it
goes on to say international terrorists are now operating in
piracy areas, adopting the techniques and acts of pirates or
franchising their cause to local insurgent groups.
The Caribbean's an area that I have considerable concern
about port security, from the standpoint of several of the
ports that I've visited in the Caribbean, and that they are
supposed to be secure ports, and, in fact, they are not.
Now, with the added dimension of piracy adding to our
question of defense of the homeland, I'd like to have your
comments.
Mr. Koch. Senator, I don't have direct information that
would be terribly insightful on specific countries. I do know
the Coast Guard has established the International Port Security
Assessment Program, whose purpose is to go to these foreign
countries, do assessments of the foreign port facilities,
determine if they're complying with the international rules and
the Coast Guard's expectations, and trying then to help them if
they are not meeting them. You might want to ask the Coast
Guard what their assessments have been throughout the Caribbean
and at their particular places there.
I know, from the liner-industry perspective, I'm not aware
of particular acts of piracy that our members have encountered
in the Caribbean. There are certainly the drug cartels and
cargo theft in some parts of Central America, which has clearly
been a problem in the past, and it's one we're always vigilant
about. But in terms of the port-security piracy issues, I
suspect the Coast Guard may be able to give you some data that
would not be something I could.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I'm interested in the answer
from your standpoint. How about the port authorities, Ms.
Godwin?
Ms. Godwin. The ports in the Caribbean? I mean, they're
supposed to all be in compliance with the ISPS Code. I am not
aware of any that have been found not to be in compliance.
Senator Bill Nelson. OK. I can tell you they're not. And if
the American Association of Port Authorities doesn't know that,
then I'm concerned about it. And if the World Shipping Council
doesn't know that, I'm concerned about it. Because with as
little that we inspect the inbound cargo containers, and if
these foreign ports are not in compliance, it seems like we've
got a big hole right there.
Mr. Koch. The Coast Guard, at the present time, has
identified five jurisdictions that do not have adequate port
security. I believe they're African ports. To the best of my
knowledge, they have not identified any in the Caribbean, at
this point. If they are not compliant, then the Coast Guard
needs to put them on the list saying that they are not
compliant, and that needs to be put into the Customs Targeting
System so that cargo coming through those ports is targeted
appropriately, as well as the vessels.
Senator Bill Nelson. OK. And then, on the basis of your
answer, Mr. Chairman, what I'm going to do is proffer a number
of questions to the Department of Homeland Security on this
issue, because of the lack of compliance, why they're saying
that these ports have complied, when, in fact, there's a huge
hole in the safety net that we're supposed to be extending out
beyond.
All right, let's talk about tamper-resistant containers.
You know we're trying to put seals on containers. Why don't you
give me the value of your opinion there?
Mr. Koch. We have advocated a seal-verification rule. One
is being drafted at the present time by Customs and the
Department of Homeland Security. Our expectation is that that
rule would require that, before a container is loaded in a
foreign port for the U.S., that we will have to go verify the
seal on that box. We support that, support the elements that
will have to go into that rulemaking, including defining the
standard of the seal and the various responsibilities of the
parties to do all that. It's a big challenge, but we think it
does make a lot of sense.
When that is in place--that obligation is in place--we will
expect technology to be coming forward rather rapidly to help
us implement that. We have been spending a lot of time
investigating RFID electronic seals for containers. We don't
have, yet, a standard for that technology in place that can
identify the frequency and the various parameters to make it
work, but we expect, by the end of this year, that that
standard should be in place, and, with a seal-verification
rulemaking, we'd start seeing electronic seals being put on
boxes sometime in the foreseeable future.
Senator Bill Nelson. Ms. Godwin?
Ms. Godwin. I'm not sure I can add anything to that. That's
certainly an important component of cargo security, and we're
hoping to see progress in that area.
Senator Bill Nelson. OK. And I will send those questions to
the Department of Homeland Security, as well as questions with
regard to their progress under a new law on cruise ships, that
they would have to check the manifest before the cruise ship
leaves the port. They had 180 days in which to implement this
new law that I had a little bit to do with. We are now at day
151 of the 180 days, and I will--would like to have a written
response on how they are progressing, since it's getting near
the time for implementation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Inouye [presiding]. Thank you very much.
Before I call this adjournment, I'd like to announce that
the record will be kept open for 2 weeks. If any of the
witnesses wish to provide addendum or corrections, please feel
free to do so. Some of the Committee Members are not here, but
they have submitted questions, which we will forward to you,
and we hope that you will be able to respond to them.
Our next hearing will be held tomorrow morning at 10
o'clock. At that time, we will receive testimony on the
nomination of senior officials of the Department of Commerce.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
World Shipping Council
Washington, DC, June 14, 2005
Hon. Ted Stevens,
Chairman,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify before the
Commerce Committee on May 17th regarding port, maritime and cargo
security issues. The World Shipping Council, which represents the
international liner shipping industry serving America's international
trade, appreciates your continued oversight and leadership regarding
enhancing maritime and cargo security while facilitating the free flow
of legitimate commerce into and out of the United States.
One of the issues that was briefly discussed during the hearing was
port security funding. As you know, during the last Congress, Senator
Hollings proposed a port security container tax as an amendment to the
2004 Maritime Transportation Security Act (S. 2279). This amendment was
opposed by 76 organizations, including the World Shipping Council.
representing virtually every facet of U.S. maritime commerce, and the
amendment was rejected during committee markup of the bill. We very
much appreciated your support in opposing that amendment.
During the May 17th hearing, you asked the industry panelists,
namely myself and Ms. Jean Godwin of the American Association of Port
Authorities, to comment on the concept of establishing a new tax or fee
on import cargo containers to pay for port security expenses. While I
commented briefly on this issue during the hearing, I would like to
offer the following additional comments, for inclusion in the hearing
record, which I hope will assist the Committee in considering this
issue.
In my oral response to your question during the hearing, I noted
that, although some interests have advocated for increases in the total
amount of annual Port Security Grant monies dispersed by the Federal
Government, no one has yet clearly or specifically defined what it is
that additional federal port security funds should appropriately pay
for.
U.S. port facilities and the vessels that call on them are in
compliance with the International Ship & Port Facility Security Code
(ISPS Code) and the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA)
security regulations promulgated by the U.S. Coast Guard. Port
facilities and vessels have developed and implemented approved security
plans. In fact, we are not aware of a single, major U.S. port or port
facility that is not currently in compliance with the Coast Guard's
maritime security requirements.
The costs of implementing these security requirements have been
significant. The Coast Guard has estimated that it will cost U.S. port
facilities and flag vessels $8.8 billion over 10 years; however, these
compliance costs are already being borne by the industry. There is no
need for a new tax and a new federal funding program to address these
costs.
The Coast Guard's cost estimates are the costs that would be borne
by the industry to comply with its maritime security requirements, not
the cost the Federal Government would bear. These cost estimates were
actually on the low side. as they did not include the costs incurred by
the thousands of foreign-flag vessels that were required by the Coast
Guard's regulations to become certified under the International Ship
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code or the costs incurred by foreign
ports and port facilities in becoming compliant with the ISPS Code.
In addition to the costs to comply with required vessel and port
facility security requirements, the maritime industry and its customers
have expended substantial sums to comply with the requirements of the
U.S. Government's cargo security programs. U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) estimated that the cost to industry to comply with the
Trade Act advance cargo information filing requirements would amount to
over $4.7 billion. Those estimates did not, however, include the
millions of dollars of costs incurred by ocean carriers to implement
the agency's 24 Hour Rule advance manifest filing requirements. Second,
U.S. importers, ocean carriers, truckers, railroads, air carriers,
brokers, and freight forwarders, among others, have expended millions
of dollars each year to voluntarily implement the security requirements
of the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) program.
And third, later this year, the maritime industry will face another
very expensive security requirement when CBP issues rules requiring
installation and verification of high-security seals on all import
cargo containers.
The purpose of stating this is not that the liner shipping industry
is complaining about these costs. We understand the need to develop and
implement prudent, enhanced maritime security measures in the fight
against terrorist threats. It is important to recognize, however, that
substantial costs are already being borne by the maritime industry to
address and improve maritime security, and we see no basis for imposing
a new, additional federal security tax on the industry.
Today, Federal agencies levy 127 taxes and fees on the maritime
industry, collecting roughly $22 billion per year. Approximately $20
billion of this amount is collected in Customs fees that are not
earmarked for specific purposes and are deposited in the General Fund
of the Treasury. We believe that creation of an additional federal tax
or fee on maritime cargo containers would be unjustifiable given the
substantial revenue generated through existing taxes and fees and given
the substantial expenditures the industry is already incurring to
comply with new security rules.
In short, port, vessel and cargo security requirements, are
currently being met and their costs borne by the maritime industry. We
have seen no explanation of what unmet port security costs would
justify a new federal tax. Furthermore, we note that ports have the
authority, and are using their authority, to impose additional charges
at the local level when such measures are needed to cover additional
security costs. For example, the ports of Charleston, Savannah,
Portland (Oregon), Hampton Roads, New Orleans, Houston, Mobile, Los
Angeles and Long Beach have increased the fees on commerce in their
port to raise additional revenues for security measures. There is no
need or justification for a new federal tax to cover costs already
being paid for by the industry.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment further on this important
issue.
Sincerely yours,
Christopher L. Koch,
President/CEO.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Richard L. Skinner
Question 1. I understand you are currently conducting work on CBP's
Automated Targeting System (ATS). When do you expect to have that
report completed? Would you be able to testify before this Committee on
that report when it is completed?
Answer. Our report, ``Audit of Targeting Oceangoing Cargo
Containers'' (OIG-05-26), which is designated FOUO, will be released to
the Congress on July 26, 2005. A public summary will be released on
August 2, 2005. We would be happy to testify on our work.
Question 2. I appreciate the work your Department did on the Port
Security Grant Program as it provided many insights into some of the
program's problem areas that we continue to conduct oversight of and
are working in consultation with the Department to rectify. I realize
the guidance for this year's round of port security grants was just
released last week. Have you had an opportunity to review the
Department's guidelines and assess if your recommendations are being
implemented?
Answer. We are reviewing the Department's FY 2005 Port Security
Grant Program Guidelines and Application Kit, and evaluating the
complex funding allocation model for the program, which we received
earlier this month. We are encouraged by the substantive changes to the
design of the program reflected in these documents. However, while it
appears that substantive changes are imminent, we have not evaluated
the effect of these changes--the criteria program administrators will
use and how they will apply it during the evaluation process--and
whether those modifications satisfy our recommendations.
We are awaiting additional details from the Department supporting
its action plan in response to our recommendations. The Department has
not yet provided its internal guidance that SLGCP, USCG, TSA, CBP,
IAIP, and MARAD representatives will use to evaluate projects, namely,
the field evaluation criteria and the National Review Process guidance.
We intend to discuss the revised port security grant application review
process with program officials after reviewing this information. Upon
completing our analysis, we will communicate the status of the
recommendations to SLGCP.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Richard L. Skinner
Question. Your office found major problems with the port security
grant program, mainly that funds are not being distributed on the basis
of security risk. Have you performed any follow-up to ensure that the
$140 million DHS will distribute this year won't have the same
problems?
Answer. In our final report transmittal, we requested that DHS
advise our office within 90 days of its progress in implementing our
recommendations. In its action plan, DHS outlined steps already taken
and other significant changes planned for the next round of port
security grants. In addition to the Department's action plan, we are
reviewing the FY 2005 Port Security Grant Program Guidelines and
Application Kit, and complex funding allocation model for the program.
We are encouraged by the substantive changes to the design of the
program reflected in these documents. However, while it appears that
substantive changes are imminent, we have not evaluated the effect of
these changes--the criteria program administrators will use and how
they will apply it during the evaluation process--and whether those
modifications satisfy our recommendations.
We requested additional documentation in order to better understand
how DHS is modifying the port security grant application review
process. The Department has not yet provided its internal guidance that
SLGCP, USCG, TSA, CBP, IAIP, and MARAD representatives will use to
evaluate projects, i.e., the field evaluation criteria and the National
Review Process guidance. We intend to discuss the revised port security
grant application review process with program officials after reviewing
this information. Upon completing our analysis, we will communicate the
status of the recommendations to SLGCP.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Jean Godwin
Question. Do you have any concerns with the recent guidance
announced by DHS to award this year's appropriations of port security
grant funds?
Answer. Yes, AAPA is very concerned over the recent changes in the
program. Of most concern is the change to limit eligibility to the
largest risk ports. DHS pre-selected 66 ports which are eligible for
this 5th round. Nearly half of the U.S. port authorities that AAPA
represents are no longer eligible for this program. The Port Security
Grant (PSG) Program was established to help ports harden their
infrastructure and to comply with the improvements required under the
Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA). The language in the law
call for a ``fair and equitable allocation'' of funds. AAPA believes
that limiting eligibility is in conflict with this provision of the
law. All port authorities must comply with the MTSA, and continual
improvements at some ports will stop without federal help. All should
be eligible.
While AAPA agrees that the program should be risk-based, we believe
the definition of risk must be broadened from what we see this last
round. A group of underprotected ports is also a risk to this Nation,
especially in terms of importing weapons of mass destruction or
smuggling in terrorists. These facilities are all international
borders. The program should take into account national economic,
strategic defense, regional transportation systems, availability of
alternative systems to deliver critical cargos, the importance of a
port's mission to federal agencies such as the Department of Defense
and Department of Energy, the proximity to other terrorist targets and
loss of life. The grants should go to fund security improvements to
implement Area Maritime Transportation Security plans and to make
improvements to facility security plans, and should not limit
eligibility.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Frank R. Lautenberg to
Jean Godwin
Question. Given the President's budget cuts and fiscal restraints,
how are we going to effectively protect our ports, particularly with
respect to the port security grant program?
Answer. Each year only a small part of the homeland security
federal spending is devoted to help port facilities increase security.
In FY05, Congress appropriated only $150 million for the Port Security
Grant Program. AAPA recommends a funding level of $400 million. In
terms of priorities, maritime security is a very high priority, but far
more funds go to state and local program for response and training
programs. While these are important programs, prevention should be this
country's first job. And maritime security, because of the economic
impact of ports, their cruise and ferry passengers, and national
defense assistance, should be a high funding priority. A re-allocation
of priorities within the budget is the best way to address this issue.
Some have proposed a fee on maritime commerce. However, the maritime
industry already pays billions of dollars in user fees and taxes to the
Federal Government, including $17.5 billion Customs duties collected in
fiscal 2003. If a dedicated source of funding is required, AAPA
believes that Customs duties should be used as a source.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Margaret Wrightson
Question. In your report on the Transportation Worker
Identification Credentialing Program, you found several problems with
implementation to the program, not the least of which was the lack of a
comprehensive project management plan. Do you know if TSA has satisfied
this recommendation?
Answer. In July 2005 DHS provided us with an update on the actions
that had been taken to implement the recommendations contained in our
December 2004 report on TSA's efforts to develop the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC). In this update, DHS stated
that TSA had ``significant program management controls in place for the
prototype program'' including a Program Management Plan, a Project
Quality Assurance Plan, and Risk Assessment and Mitigation Planning
among other things. However, DHS did not provide any supporting
documentation for us to determine whether these controls and plans
collectively constitute what could be considered a comprehensive
project plan for managing the remaining life of the project.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to
Robert Jacksta
Question 1. Last year, I successfully got included a provision in
the Intelligence Reform bill that applies to cruise ships the same
standards that we apply to airlines with respect to terror watch lists.
My provision requires that the Department of Homeland Security check
all passengers and crew manifests against the consolidated passenger
watch list before they board the ship. This is vital to the security of
our cruise passengers as well as to the security of our ports and the
surrounding areas. It will take only one incident to cripple the cruise
industry. Similarly one incident, no matter how small, can severely
interrupt international commerce. I would like to know how the
implementation of this cruise ship watch list requirement is
progressing. The law gave DHS 180 days to implement this program. We
are going on 151 days as of today. Will DHS comply with this deadline?
When can I expect a briefing on the full implementation of this law?
Answer. The Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS) Final Rule
(70 FR 17820 April 7, 2005) requires vessel operators to provide
passenger APIS. Under the Rule, operators must submit passenger
information according to the following criteria: 96 hours prior to
arrival at a U.S. port for voyages over 96 hours; 24 hours prior to
arrival at a U.S. port for voyages less than 96 hours; prior to
departure from foreign for voyages less than 24 hours; and 15 minutes
prior to departure for vessels departing the U.S.
Vessel Crew and Passenger APIS manifests are vetted against law
enforcement databases maintained within the TECS/IBIS mainframe and
against the anti-terror watch list, which is exported to the TECS/IBIS
mainframe from the Terrorist Screening Center. In lieu of an automated
notification mechanism, the CBP National Targeting Center (NTC)
actively vets APIS lists to identify passengers or crew who are
arriving or departing aboard commercial sea vessels. The NTC
coordinates the identification, interception and examination of
targeted passengers with the U.S. Coast Guard.
The vessel time requirements within APIS reflect Coast Guard
regulations and were written to establish continuity between agency
reporting requirements. Commercial cargo and passenger vessels board
passengers and crew several hours in advance of departure. Due to the
extended time needed to board a passenger vessel or prepare the vessel
to sail, CBP has determined the time requirements published within the
Coast Guard regulations serve the purpose for targeting suspect high-
risk passengers and crew.
CBP would welcome the opportunity to discuss the implementation of
this program in greater detail. Please have your staff contact Thaddeus
Bingel, Assistant Commissioner for Congressional Affairs at (202) 344-
1760 to arrange a briefing on the implementation of APIS for passenger
vessels.
Question 2. It is crucial that we stop dangerous cargo from
reaching our shores at all. Once the cargo gets here our chances of
stopping a catastrophic event are greatly reduced. We need to push our
borders out and catch dangerous cargo before it leaves the home ports.
However, odds are high that we will not catch everything. So we need to
be able to track cargo and know as quickly and efficiently as possible
if the containers have been tampered with en route. What technology is
DHS looking into to maintain and ensure the integrity of the seals on
the containers?
Answer. DHS is currently exploring technology designed to enhance
the integrity and security of oceangoing containers, rather than the
seals that are affixed to such containers. The majority of seals
currently used by shippers and importers are mechanical and are not
able to interface electronically with the verification process. As the
technology incorporated into electronic seals (e-seals) is developed
and matured, it is anticipated that such e-seal capability could be
used to maintain the integrity of not only the seals but also the
containers to which they are affixed. The International Organization
for Standardization (ISO) is in the process of developing the accepted
standards for e-seals and their use.
Question 2a. Are GPS tracking systems part of the technology?
Answer. DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is working
with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to identify and evaluate
technology designed to enhance the security of ocean going containers.
Such Advanced Container Security Devices (ACSDs) shall be designed to
integrate with the Marine Asset Tag and Tracking System (MATTS), a
tracking and communication system that would provide container-tracking
capability. This technology has application to assist CBP in tracking
in-bond shipments and is extensible to rail and truck transport.
Question 2b. What are the expected costs to the private industry to
employ any new technologies?
Answer. Based upon current technical capabilities and rate of
maturation, the cost to private industry to employ new technology that
is presently under evaluation is, on an average, no greater than 50
dollars per trip over the projected 10-year average life of the
container. As technology continues to develop and mature, however, it
is anticipated that such costs would decrease significantly.
Question 2c. What is the time frame for deploying the next
generation of container seals?
Answer. CBP is working in conjunction with DHS/S&T on the
development of next generation container security technology. S&T
recently issued a Broad Agency Announcement for its Advanced Container
Security Device Program. This effort will result in the issuance of
DHS-wide standards for next-generation Container Security Devices that
provide:
six-sided intrusion detection and alerting,
a means for increased visibility of stuffing and transit
history,
enhanced data and information for the CBP's National
Targeting Center (NTC) and the port of arrival, and
timely reporting and communications.
Additionally, as a part of the ACSD Program, S&T has a parallel
Research and Development effort for capability integration into the
container, to optimally push container security development to the
container manufacturers.
In managing this process, S&T has established an Integrated Process
and Product Team (IPPT), which includes representatives from DHS,
Department of Defense, and the Department of Transportation, to ensure
a wide voice among federal agency stakeholders and to prevent
development of a solely S&T solution.
A development period of approximately 3 to 5 years may be required
to produce an operationally suitable and technically robust ACSD
solution fulfilling the above objectives. As an immediate step, CBP has
launched the ``Smart Box'' initiative to evaluate the logistical and
operational aspects of using container security devices for intrusion
detection. The Initiative's near term goal is to approve a device that
would monitor and log door activity for inclusion in CBP cargo security
programs. The Smart Box focuses on the testing of ``off the shelf''
Container Security Devices (CSD) to help address the current threat of
container tampering en-route.
Question 3. I am very concerned about the Caribbean Basin area and
port security. The safety and security of ports in the Caribbean Basin
have a direct impact on Florida and the rest of the Nation. A
significant amount of trade goes back and forth between ports in
Florida and Latin America and this trade is only expected to increase
in the coming years. It is crucial that the seaports that are closest
to our own borders are secured. This is a particular challenge in this
area because of the well-established drug trafficking routes throughout
Latin America. We need to do something to address this issue and we
need to do it now. We need to ensure that goods originating from these
ports are safe and secure and do not pose a threat to the U.S. One way
to do this, as you all at DHS have shown, is through programs like the
Container Security Initiative. Many don't think about the Caribbean
basin as a real security risk. In this week's Jane's Defense Weekly,
however, there is an article about piracy and it maps the number of
acts of piracy by region. In 2004, there were 14 reported acts of
piracy just off the shores of Columbia, Venezuela, and Brazil. That is
a significant number of incidents. Piracy not only poses an immense
threat to the safety of the crew aboard these cargo vessels but can be
an avenue for terrorists to get to our shores with deadly weapons
without being detected and without having to go through the normal
Customs channels. We cannot forget about the Caribbean Basin ports--
these ports that are so close to our own shores. How many and which
Caribbean Basin ports are currently out of compliance with the MTSA
regulations or the ISPS Code?
Answer. Federal regulations to ensure the security of domestic
seaports is governed by the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA)
and the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code
addresses the security of international seaports. Information regarding
specific port compliance with MTSA and ISPS regulations is the
responsibility of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). It is the practice of
USCG to advise CBP regarding MTSA non-compliant ports. CBP incorporates
this information into the Advanced Targeting System (ATS); the ATS
evaluates the risk associated with all U.S.-bound shipments to
determine appropriate screening and inspection responses.
CBP has long-standing institutionalized relationships with U.S.
trade operations, such as the Port and Terminal Operators through the
Business Anti-Smuggling Coalition (BASC), in the Caribbean Basin. BASC
is endorsed by the World Customs Organization (WCO) and is active with
the Organization of American States (OAS) on Port Security and Supply-
Chain-Security Initiatives. Although BASC initially had an anti-
narcotics focus, terrorism has now been incorporated into their profile
and security standards. At present, BASC has expanded to include:
Mexico; Guatemala; Jamaica; Ecuador; Panama; Venezuela; Peru; Uruguay;
the Dominican Republic; Costa Rica; Haiti and El Salvador. In each of
these countries, Port and Terminal Operations remain vital segments of
the supply chain that actively participate in BASC.
CBP is exploring further expansion of the Container Security
Initiative (CSI) with Latin America and the Caribbean, namely in
Argentina and in Brazil, with plans to conduct assessments in the
Bahamas, Colombia, Jamaica. Honduras, and Panama.
Question 3a. What is DHS doing to ensure the integrity of goods and
containers coming into the U.S. via the Caribbean Basin ports other
than just penalizing shippers who do not comply with our regulations?
Answer. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is looking at expanding
the Container Security Initiative to Central America and South America.
In South America, CBP has signed Declarations of Principle with
Argentina (May 9, 2005) and Brazil (May 24, 2005) to become the first
two South American ports to participate in CSI. CBP has scheduled a
capacity assessment for Cartagena, Colombia for the first week in
August 2005. In Central America and the Caribbean Basin, CBP has
completed capacity assessments in Puerto Cortes, Honduras; Kingston,
Jamaica; and Freeport, Bahamas to determine their viability in being
able to support CSI. CBP will be scheduling a capacity assessment of
Colon and Balboa, Panama in the near future. CBP will determine by
these capacity assessments if any of these ports would be able to
support a CSI program.
As part of DHS's multi-layer cargo security approach, the Science
and Technology Directorate (S&T), in coordination with Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), is developing technologies the ensure the
security of intermodal shipping containers, such as the Advanced
Container Security Device (ACSD) and the Marine Asset Tag and Tracking
System (MATTS), which will actively monitor the integrity and track
containers globally.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to
Rear Admiral Larry Hereth
Question 1. The Port of Seattle in my state is one of the Nation's
largest and most diverse port complexes. It is a major container and
cruise ship port, home to the Alaska fishing fleet, supports tens of
thousands of ferry riders each day and the city is one of the most
sought-after tourist destinations in the world. The port is also
located only blocks away from a bustling downtown. Do you believe the
Coast Guard has enough resources to adequately protect a thriving port
city like Seattle?
Answer. The Coast Guard does not individually possess the resources
to protect an entire port such as Seattle, but works in concert with
other federal, state and local authorities, as well as the port
community, to protect the port. Even so, risks to any port cannot be
completely eliminated. The Coast Guard is working with the port
community to focus resources on reducing the greatest risks to the
port.
The Coast Guard has built a strong foundation of effectively
working with the maritime industry through our historical enforcement
of safety and environmental protection regulations. Our Captain of the
Port activities and local enforcement of regulations resulted in many
well established relationships in the port community, and many venues
in which to engage local stakeholders such as Port Security Committees,
Port Readiness Committees, Harbor Safety Committees and OPA 90 Area
Committees.
The Coast Guard also implemented regulations from the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of 2002 on July 1, 2004. These
regulations require, among other things that industry have in place
vessel and facility security plans, which are tested and approved in
accordance with established Coast Guard standards. These efforts have
been enhanced through Congress's funding of 791 FTP in the 2005 budget
for nationwide MTSA implementation.
Since 9/11, the Coast Guard has also created or acquired new or
enhanced Maritime Homeland Security Capabilities including:
12 Maritime Safety and Security Teams.
15 Additional Coastal Patrol Boats.
80+ new Response Boats.
The Navy has agreed to transfer five Patrol Coastal boats
(PC-170s) to the Coast Guard this FY05. The Navy has agreed to
continue most maintenance responsibilities on these Patrol
Coastal boats for four years (through FY08).
8 Canine teams trained for explosive detection.
30+ Field Intelligence Support Teams (FIST) deployed to
better collect and disseminate maritime threat information.
Before 9/11 we had no mandatory ship-tracking requirement;
we have recently forged an international agreement to
accelerate the requirement for Automatic Identification System
(AIS) capability. Simultaneously, we have initiated a major
acquisition project for AIS. This project will allow us to
deploy immediate capability, including AIS shore stations in
VTS ports and aboard Coast Guard Cutters, outfitting NOAA buoys
offshore and testing AIS receiving capability from a low-flying
satellite. The Coast Guard has also fielded AIS at nine U.S.
VTS ports and persuaded the world maritime community to
accelerate AIS installation on ships.
Specifically, in Washington State
MSST 91101 was stood up, consisting of 74 active duty and 33
reserve personnel.
9 Additional billets were added to conduct Port State
Control and MTSA Implementation.
4 Additional Coastal Patrol Boats (4 of the additional 15
acquired) were homeported in the Puget Sound area.
Deployed FIST.
Question 1a. What has the Coast Guard done since 9/11 to ensure its
homeland security and other missions are accomplished in this bustling
hub of commerce for the Pacific NW and the Nation?
Answer. Since 9/11, we have made great progress in securing
America's waterways, while continuing to facilitate the flow of
commerce. The improvements in Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security
(PWCS) that are currently evident are, in large part, attributable to
the passing of the watershed Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002 (MTSA) legislation and its swift implementation by private
industry and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This has vastly
changed the security posture of the Nation's maritime critical
infrastructure and key assets (MCI/KA) and the overall preparedness of
federal, state, local and private security forces. The Coast Guard is
committed to a course that improves our maritime security with the
ultimate goal of preventing the exploitation of, or terrorist attacks
within, the U.S. Maritime Domain. Doing so requires a threat-based,
risk-managed approach to identify and intercept threats before they
reach U.S. shores. The Coast Guard accomplishes this by conducting
layered, multi-agency security operations while strengthening the
security posture and reducing the vulnerability of MCI/KA, with an
increased focus on the Nation's most militarily and economically
critical ports. As the Coast Guard seeks to reduce maritime risk, it
must strive to balance its PWCS mission requirements with other Coast
Guard non-security missions to ensure no degradation in those missions.
The Coast Guard must exercise its full suite of authorities,
capabilities, competencies, and partnerships to accomplish its full
spectrum of missions in the post-9/11 world.
The Coast Guard is continuing to meet the challenges of our legacy
missions in the Puget Sound region, as well as meeting the new
challenges presented by our integration into the Department of Homeland
Security and new homeland security mandates. Implementation of expanded
security responsibilities is being built on the foundation provided by
our existing marine safety, port security and maritime law enforcement
missions, and broadens our efforts to reduce risks in the U.S. Marine
Transportation System and to enforce laws and treaties. Although much
work remains, we are progressively improving maritime homeland
security.
The diversity of Puget Sound's maritime industry presents unique
challenges that require daily cooperation between industry and
government to balance the needs of commerce with those of homeland
security. The security net vital to limiting vulnerabilities in Puget
Sound ports consists of layered security measures that rely on the
successful implementation of the MTSA and the International Ship and
Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. Implementation of MTSA and the ISPS
Code were major activities during 2004. Security measures are in place
for domestic and foreign vessels, domestic waterfront facilities and
Puget Sound as a whole. We also maintain a Maritime Safety and Security
Team (MSST) in Seattle. It was the first MSST established, and provides
an expanded capability for port safety and security operations.
One of the foundations for improving maritime security is the Area
Maritime Security Committee (AMSC) required by MTSA regulations.
Facilitated by the U.S. Coast Guard, the Puget Sound AMSC consolidated
existing port security committees and a committee that had been formed
to represent Washington State Ferries and their unique concerns. The
AMSC has established communications links across law enforcement and
emergency response entities, identified public and private sector
capabilities and responsibilities, and established a regular schedule
of meetings, training and exercises to foster maintenance and
continuous improvement of security measures in place to protect the
port.
The AMSC is coordinating all federal, state, local and private
sector maritime security efforts in Puget Sound. The 25-person AMSC
encompasses a wealth of maritime knowledge, and draws talents from all
aspects of industry, police and fire departments and from components of
the Department of Homeland Security. Collectively, they advise the
Federal Maritime Security Coordinator on security concerns and critical
commercial interests unique to Puget Sound. We continue to build upon
these efforts to provide rigorous maritime security for the Puget Sound
region.
Question 2. There is talk about imposing fees on imports to cover
the cost of port security. My concern is that some import ports are
located near Canada or Mexico where infrastructure is either developed
or being developed to compete with the U.S. ports for import goods. I
am concerned that any fee will simply drive import goods to these other
countries, especially Canada, which has a well-developed shipping and
rail infrastructure. Once the cargo is diverted, it will enter the
U.S., possibly by rail, and not receive all the protections it may have
been subject to had it come through a U.S. gateway. This obviously
undermines our security and our economic mission. In addition, as our
economy in the Pacific Northwest finally is overcoming years of
recession, this is not the time to cause important port business to be
diverted to Canada. How do you purpose to address a scenario where U.S.
security fees might send U.S.-bound import goods to these other
countries causing them to receive less security scrutiny?
Answer. CBP does not propose to add any additional fees for
security or regular cargo exams.
Question 3. There has been talk since shortly after 9/11 about
requiring shipping containers from overseas to be equipped with
mechanisms that verify that they were securely loaded and not tampered
with before reaching U.S. shores. My colleague and friend, Senator
Murray has implemented pilot programs to determine the best technology
to accomplish this. What needs to be done to ensure these containers
are safe before entering the U.S.?
Answer. Container security is multi layered and cross-functional
and requires the commitment and resources of not only the U.S.
Government but also the importing community. The addition of technology
designed to ensure the integrity of containers bound for U.S. shores is
but one facet in securing containers. Such technology must work in
conjunction with mechanical seals and sealing processes to be utilized
at the point of stuffing through trusted, vetted partners such as the
C-TPAT members.
Manifest data provided by the shippers and importers are a critical
component to this layered approach in order to conduct targeting of
potentially high-risk containers. The Container Security Initiative
(CSI) provides an additional layer as such targeting is conducted at
overseas locations prior to containers being laden aboard U.S. bound
vessels.
The use of Non-Intrusive Inspectional (NII) equipment, such as
large-scale non-intrusive inspection imaging technology and radiation
portal monitors is also critical to both ensuring the integrity of
containers as well as in expediting the inspection and movement of
legitimate freight.
Question 3a. What more can be done in this regard and what
specifically does the CG, or other branches of the Department of
Homeland Security, have planned in this regard?
Answer. The Coast Guard is an active participant in Operation Safe
Commerce. which is a DHS grant program testing a host of technology
solutions for intermodal container security in the international supply
chain. The Coast Guard is a member of the Executive Steering Committee
for that project. The results of Operation Safe Commerce will help
determine which technologies are mature enough to be considered for
mandatory use on containers bound for the United States.
The Coast Guard is also working closely with Customs and Border
Protection on the development of a proposed rule that would require the
mandatory use of high security mechanical seals on containers bound for
the United States. The rule is being drafted to allow the introduction
of advanced technology to be incorporated with the mechanical seals as
those technologies develop.
The Coast Guard is a member of the Container Security Integrated
Product and Process Team (IPPT), co-led by the Science & Technology
Directorate (S&T) and the Border and Transportation Security (BTS)
Policy & Planning Office, which provides oversight to the development
and evaluation of advanced technologies for intermodal shipping
containers, such as the Advanced Container Security Device (ACSD), and
for the development of the Container Security Systems Architecture.
Question 4. In your testimony to the House Transportation
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Marine Transportation on June 4, 2004,
you had stated that all Area Maritime Security Plans were approved by
June 1, 2004 and they would be fully implemented on or before July 1,
2004. Has this happened? If not, what is the current status of
implementation and how many plans have yet to be approved?
Answer. Yes, all of the Area Maritime Security Plans have been
completed, approved and implemented.
Question 5. At the time of the testimony you provided to the House
Transportation Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
on June 4, 2004, the Coast Guard had completed Port Security
Assessments at 19 of the 55 most significant military and economic
ports in the U.S. Today you state that all 55 have been completed. Can
you please provide a list of any Washington State ports that were
included in this figure and any other information as it relates to
their respective assessments?
Answer. Port Security Assessments (PSAs) have been conducted in
Seattle, Tacoma and Vancouver, Washington. These PSAs included waterway
assessments of Puget Sound, Elliott Bay, Blair Waterway, Rich Passage,
Budd Inlet and the Columbia River. In these areas 16 facilities and
vessels were assessed from a Terrorist Operations Perspective,
identifying vulnerabilities and recommending mitigating strategies. The
assets visited included cruise ships, passenger ferry terminals and
vessels, oil terminals, chemical terminals, bulk cargo terminals, locks
and bridges. The results of the assessment are categorized as Sensitive
Security Information and not public record information. However, the
information is appropriately shared with those that have a need to know
in law enforcement agencies, select members of the port's Area Maritime
Security Committee and each individual owner/operator of the facility
or vessel.
Question 6. In your testimony to the House Transportation
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation on June 4,
2004, you state that, ``In implementing the Maritime Transportation
Security Act (MTSA), the Coast Guard identified approximately 3,200
marine facilities that could be involved in a Transportation Security
Incident. Nearly all of these facilities have since conducted a self-
assessment and submitted a facility security plan to the Coast Guard
for approval.'' Has the Coast Guard completed review of the remaining
facility security plans? If not, how many have yet to submit a facility
security plan to the Coast Guard for approval?
Answer. All required facility security plans were approved by the
target date of December 31, 2004. After a detailed review for content
at the National Facility Security Plan Review Center (NFSPRC), local
Coast Guard Captains of the Port (COTPs) approved the plans
individually following compliance verification examinations of each
applicable facility. In all, approximately 3,200 facility security
plans were reviewed and coordinated by the Coast Guard's NFSPRC.
Question 7. What is the status of the Coast Guard's schedule to
have Automatic Identification System (AIS) capabilities at each Vessel
Traffic Service and when do you think that this long-term goal of
nationwide AIS coverage will be completed?
Answer. The Coast Guard has installed the Automatic Identification
System (AIS) in all Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) as of
November 2004. This capability provides AIS coverage within each VTS'
area of responsibility. The Coast Guard has also a chartered Major
Systems Acquisition project to establish a nationwide AIS surveillance
network to support all Coast Guard missions. Eventually, the entire
coastline, the Great Lakes and the Western Rivers will be covered by
AIS under this project. The current schedule calls for nationwide AIS
coverage to be fully complete in 2010.
Question 8. As you know, ensuring the security of our Maritime
domain is a critically important component of our economy. Securing the
Maritime domain is an effort that must be orchestrated with each and
every one of our Nation's trading partners. We must be assured of the
contents and security of shipments as they leave foreign ports destined
for the U.S. In your testimony, you state that the Coast Guard
continues to assess the effectiveness of antiterrorism measures and
implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security
code requirements. You state that ``10 countries are scheduled for
visits by June 2005 with the goal of visiting all of our approximately
140 maritime trading partners.'' Which countries are included in the
list of 10 to be visited by June 2005? When does the Coast Guard
estimate that an assessment will be conducted on all 140 maritime
trading partners?
Answer. As of July 2005 the Coast Guard has visited 29 countries
including: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Chile, Columbia,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guatemala,
Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand,
Panama, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Trinidad
and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela.
The Coast Guard estimates that an assessment will have been
conducted on all 140 maritime trading partners by December 2007.
Question 9. As you know, the Transportation Workers Identification
Card has played an important role in port security by enhancing
identity verification. In your testimony you state that the Coast Guard
is working with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to
develop new credentialing for Merchant Mariners. What is the current
status of this effort?
Answer. The Coast Guard continues to update the merchant mariner
credentialing statutes, which include provisions that will allow the
future harmonization of mariners' credentials and TWIC. The Coast Guard
is not developing entirely new credentials for mariners, but will
continue to build upon existing security features that have already
been incorporated into mariners' credentials until full integration
with the TWIC is achieved. The Coast Guard is currently in the final
stages of drafting a Legislative Change Proposal (LCP) that will
accomplish many of the needed updates to its merchant mariner document
statutes and is also working closely with TSA to ensure the efficient
and effective integration of the TWIC and mariners' credentials. The
two efforts, though related, are progressing under different timelines.
The LCP is solely a Coast Guard effort and expected to be published in
early 2006. TSA is the lead agency on the TWIC effort, with the Coast
Guard providing assistance.
Question 9a. In what capacity is the Coast Guard assisting the TSA
to develop a new identification system for merchant mariners?
Answer. The Coast Guard has partnered with TSA to develop and
implement the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) in
the maritime mode, which will satisfy the mandate of 46 U.S.C. 70105,
requiring that certain mariners carry a biometrically enhanced
``transportation security card.'' The TWIC will build upon and
integrate with the current mariners credentialing system rather than
implement an entirely new identification system. The National Maritime
Center (NMC) is fully involved in advising TSA of mariner credentialing
requirements and existing Coast Guard processes, and is leading the
effort to ensure that the MMD process is integrated into the TWIC
process to the fullest appropriate degree.
Question 9b. What role can this Committee play to assist in this
endeavor?
Answer. The Committee's oversight will continue to be very
important. The task of creating a uniform, biometrically enabled
credential that is to be implemented across all transportation modes is
a hugely complex endeavor that requires considered, careful planning to
effectively implement. While the Coast Guard is involved in
implementation of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) within the maritime mode only, almost every mode of
transportation other than the airlines, will be impacted to some degree
in its rulemaking. To ensure that the rule which results is intelligent
and effective, the Coast Guard is careful to rely upon experts in the
field who fully understand the intricacies of implementing for the
first time this type of technology at the proposed scale. While
thoughtful, measured regulations will achieve significant improvements
in the security of our ports, a rushed implementation is unlikely to
achieve any significant security enhancements, and could potentially
wreak havoc with the Nation's economy while placing unfounded burdens
upon workers, employers and the Federal Government.
Question 9c. What timeline, if any, has been established for
completion of a new identification system for merchant mariners?
Answer. The merchant mariner identification system and supporting
statutes were designed in a far different threat environment than
today. As such, the Coast Guard is examining the full scope of
necessary changes to the identification documents and requirements in
order to modernize the system, as well as to put in place appropriate
safeguards. Some of these changes will no doubt require legislative
proposals. The Coast Guard is in the final stages of examining those
needs now and any needed legislative changes will be proposed by the
Administration in the course of the 2007 authorization cycle.
Question 10. In your testimony, you state that the Coast Guard is
continually looking for ways to improve its ability to respond to
suspect activities by increasing Coast Guard operational presence in
our maritime domain and improving the Coast Guard's capacities for
response and recovery. The Coast Guard's responsibility to defend and
secure 26,000 miles of navigable waterways and 361ports is a
challenging task. What are some initiatives that the Coast Guard is
considering to expand its operation presence and enhance its ability to
respond to a terrorist incident?
Answer. Coast Guard efforts to increase operational presence in
ports and coastal zones focus not only on adding more people, boats and
ships to force structures, but also on making the employment of those
resources more effective through the application of technology,
information sharing and intelligence support. Since 9/11, we have:
Established 13 new Maritime Safety and Security Teams,
Deployed over 100 new small boats and boat crews,
Provided radiation detection capabilities to many of our
boarding teams,
Deployed field intelligence support teams to better collect
and disseminate maritime threat information,
Acquired fifteen 87-foot Coastal Patrol boats and four 179-
foot coastal patrol craft to increase operational presence in
our ports.
The FY 2006 budget focuses resources toward increasing both the
quantity and quality of Coast Guard operational presence by providing
funding for:
Integrated Deepwater System--Continued investment in
Deepwater will greatly improve the Coast Guard's maritime
presence starting at America's ports, waterways, and coasts and
extending seaward to wherever the Coast Guard needs to be
present or to take appropriate maritime action. Deepwater
provides the capability to identify, interdict, board and,
where warranted, seize vessels or people engaged in illegal or
terrorist activity at sea or on the ports, waterways or coast
of America.
Airborne Use of Force (AUF) capability--deploys organic AUF
capability to five Coast Guard Air Stations, increasing the
ability to respond to maritime security threats.
Enhanced Cutter Boat Capability--replaces existing obsolete
and unstable cutter boats throughout the entire WHEC/WMEC fleet
with the more capable Cutter Boat--Over the Horizon and
replaces aging, unsafe boat davit systems on 210-foot WMECs.
Increase Port Presence and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
Transport Security--provides additional Response Boat-Smalls
and associated crews to increase presence to patrol critical
infrastructure areas, enforce security zones, and perform high
interest vessel escorts in strategic ports throughout the
Nation. Provides additional boat crews and screening personnel
at key LNG hubs such as Cove Point, MD and Providence, RI to
enhance LNG tanker and waterside security.
Enhanced Maritime Safety and Security Team (E-MSST)--
Reallocates existing Coast Guard resources to immediately fill
an existing gap in national maritime Law Enforcement and
Counter-Terrorism (LE/CT) capability. Full operation of E-MSST
Chesapeake, VA will provide an offensive DHS force able to
execute across the full spectrum of LE and CT response in
support of homeland security and homeland defense objectives,
including CT response capability for scheduled security events
out to 50 nautical miles from shore and augments to interagency
assets in high visibility venues such as National Special
Security Events (NSSEs).
Question 10a. Has Congress provided the Coast Guard with the
resources it needs to meet its current mandates, including those set
forth in the MTSA?
Answer. The FY 2005 Budget provided approximately $101 million and
791 personnel to support the implementation of MTSA. This support has
been instrumental to executing the implementation of MTSA requirements
and sustaining its ongoing enforcement. Much has been done to enhance
port security and while more clearly remains to be done, the Coast
Guard will continue to work with the Administration and Congress to
pursue additional resources as needed to mitigate the highest maritime
risks.
Question 10b. What additional resources can Congress provide that
are necessary to allow for the enhancements that you reference?
Answer. The FY 2006 budget request, now before the Congress,
represents the highest priority needs of the Coast Guard. Fully
supporting the President's request for FY 2006 will make significant
enhancements to Coast Guard capability and readiness. As for additional
resources, the next highest unfunded priorities are represented in our
FY 2006 Unfunded Priorities list that was provided to Congress on
February 25, 2005, and a copy of which is attached.
Question 11. As you state in your testimony. ``Cargo security
encompasses the process of ensuring that all cargo bound for the U.S.
is legitimate and was properly supervised from the point of origin,
through its sea transit, and during its arrival at the final
destination in the U.S.'' However, it is clear that the supervision and
checking of cargo arriving at U.S. ports is woefully inadequate. I
understand that as little as 5 percent of cargo arriving at our ports
is checked. While the Coast Guard works with Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) to provide oversight and check cargo arriving at our
ports, can you provide this Committee an update on the varying levels
of screening being conducted to ensure the safety of these cargos as
well as an update on current efforts to increase screening of cargo?
Answer. CBP meets its goal of inspecting 100 percent of high-risk
people and cargo, while allowing legitimate commerce and passengers to
proceed unimpeded, through effective risk management and its Cargo
Security Strategy. Approximately 10 million sea containers and 11
million trucks arrive in the United States annually; inspection of
every vehicle would likely damage the U.S. economy and would be
counterproductive to CBP's dual mission of securing the borders while
facilitating trade. Because the vast majority of shipments are low-
risk, CBP must use risk management techniques to identify and screen
the relatively few high-risk shipments.
Rather than simply increasing the percentage of random inspections,
CBP employs a layered cargo security strategy that is built on five
interrelated initiatives. First, under the 24-Hour Rule, all containers
bound for the U.S. are required to submit manifest data to CBP 24 hours
before lading at the foreign port. Next, the National Targeting Center
(NTC) provides CBP with tactical targeting capability for all
oceangoing cargo and cargo shipped by all other transportation modes 24
hours a day, seven days a week. The NTC uses manifest information
provided by the 24-Hour Rule and will eventually include data from
Advanced Container Security Devices to perform its targeting functions.
Additionally, screening with Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology,
including some physical exams, is required for all high-risk sea
containers and other cargo conveyances arriving in the U.S. NII
technology is a critical component of CBP's Cargo Security Strategy
aimed at preventing terrorist groups from smuggling a Weapon of Mass
Effect or its components into the United States. Under the Container
Security Initiative (CSI), cargo security is pushed beyond the borders
of the United States. Currently, there are 38 operational CSI ports
that are staffed with specially trained CBP targeting teams. CSI ports
utilize NII and radiation detection technology to facilitate
examinations performed on high-risk containers. While examinations are
conducted by CBP's host nation counterparts, the CBP teams have the
ability to observe these exams.
Additionally, Automated Targeting Systems (ATS) at CSI ports are
linked to the NTC to immediately identify any high-risk containers
bound for the United States. Finally, under the Customs-Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), CBP has established
partnerships with the private sector to implement minimum standardized
security requirements and concepts throughout the entire supply chain,
back to and including the foreign manufacturer's loading docks.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Rear Admiral Hereth
Question 1. In the Coast Guard's report to the Commerce Committee
on implementation of Joint Operation Command Centers, you failed to
discuss any common standards, best practices or lessons learned from
any of the existing command centers and how those standards can be used
to develop additional units throughout the country in strategic ports.
Rather, the report discussed the Coast Guard's current development of
Sector Command Centers that are part of the Departmental directive to
co-locate the regulatory and operational assets into one location for
all of the Coast Guard's missions with the capability to expand and
work with other agencies should an incident occur. I would contest
approaching port security from a reactionary perspective is not in the
best interests of national security. And further, in meetings I have
had with the Commandant. he has described a very different vision than
what is contained in this report. What does the Coast Guard hope to
achieve with the further development of Joint Operation Command
Centers?
Answer. Our primary goal is to enable our federal, state and local
forces to be more proactive. The limited sensor and coordination
capability present in most ports must be improved to make that happen.
We will greatly enhance the ability to be proactive by:
Developing a robust Common Operational Picture that will be
fed by sensors (cameras, radars, etc.) placed according to a
risk-based methodology that ensures surveillance of critical
infrastructure and waterways.
Sharing the Common Operational Picture with port partners by
providing them a view via a web client service or, if they
wish, by including their personnel as a permanent or ad hoc
part of the command center staff.
Coordinating federal, state and local enforcement efforts by
developing and implementing technologies to track all assets,
providing 724 monitored maritime communications
capability and leading regular, collaborative planning and
execution efforts.
Question 2. MTSA required the Coast Guard to develop a National
Maritime Transportation Security Plan (46 U.S.C. 70103) to assign
duties and responsibilities among federal agencies, establish
procedures to prevent an incident from occurring, and plan for ensuring
the flow of commerce is resumed as quickly as possible in the event of
an attack. When will the National Plan be completed and made available
for comment for our maritime stakeholders?
Answer. The review draft of the National Plan is being edited to
prepare for distribution for initial review by federal agency
stakeholders, which is expected to begin in mid-August. The Commandant
intends to use the National Maritime Security Advisory Committee as one
of the primary forums for comment on the plan by stakeholders in the
maritime industry. The schedule of availability for other maritime
stakeholders must be established in consultation with cognizant
authorities in the office of the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Question 2a. Will this serve as the basis for the President's
National Maritime Security Strategy requirement in HSPD 13, due to be
released in June of this year?
Answer. No, but the National Plan has linkages to certain plans
developed under HSPD-13.
In accordance with the MTSA, the National Plan is focused on
ensuring the security of assets and infrastructure in the Maritime
Homeland domain of the United States. In addition to fulfilling the
requirements of MTSA, the National Plan will also serve as the sub-
sector plan for national maritime transportation security, within the
family of 17 sector security plans established under HSPD-7, including
the Transportation Sector Security Plan (TSSP).
In contrast to the MTSA and HSPD-7, HSPD-13 is universal in scope,
extending completely across both the international and homeland
maritime domains. The National Plan under MTSA has natural linkages and
relationships with certain plans developed under the President's
National Maritime Security Strategy requirement in HSPD 13, such as the
Maritime Infrastructure recovery Plan (MIRP).
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to
Robert Jacksta
Question 1. What are the ``minimum-security standards'' the bureau
has put into place for the C-TPAT program?
Answer. The minimum-security criteria for C-TPAT Importers,
promulgated in March 2005 is based on a program assessment of the
processes, procedures and best practices extrapolated from CBP's review
of security profile submissions and C-TPAT validation visits. The
security criteria provide an effective benchmark for C-TPAT companies
to continue to build upon their security processes and procedures and
focus on foreign manufacturers and container point of stuffing, through
the CBP clearance process. The security criteria provide a meaningful
expectation of what is required to enroll in the C-TPAT program.
Question 2. How many RPM's have been deployed at seaports?
Answer. As of July 27, 2005, CBP has deployed 88 radiation portal
monitors to our Nation's seaports.
Question 3. I understand you are proposing regulations on cargo
locks and seals this summer to satisfy the requirements of MTSA. What
requirements are you proposing in your regulations for the domestic and
international verification of cargo seals?
Answer. At the request of the Department of Homeland Security, the
Departmental Advisory Committee on Commercial Operations of Customs and
Border Protection and Related Activities (COAC) established a
subcommittee to provide advice on this issue. Specifically, DHS
requested recommendation in three areas: standards for physical
security for inter-modal containers; secure system of transportation;
and quantitative performance metrics to measure the success of specific
DHS cargo security programs and to guide future efforts. In response to
this request, COAC recommended a regulatory requirement for the sealing
of loaded containers.
DHS has reviewed the COAC recommendations and agreed that there is
a need for a seal regulation. CBP has drafted the Notice of Proposed
Rule Making (NPRM) which will require the sealing of loaded containers
being transported by vessel to the United States. At a minimum ISO-
compliant high security seals (ISO/PAS 17712) must be affixed to the
container at the last point where the container is loaded.
Electronically readable mechanical seals and seals that perform other
functions, such as electronic seals (e-seals), may also be used if they
meet or exceed the high security specifications in ISO/PAS 17712 or are
accompanied by a mechanical seal meeting or exceeding the ISO/PAS 17712
high security seal specifications. Verification of this sealing
requirement must be performed by the carrier or their agent prior to
lading on a vessel departing for the United States. The Department is
currently reviewing the draft NPRM.
Question 3a. Aren't you aware that Coast Guard regulations require
facilities to routinely check seals for evidence of tampering? (CFR
105.265) How is this being enforced?
Answer. Coast Guard enforces 33 CFR 105.265 during periodic and
random cargo facility exams. As noted, 33 CFR 105.265(b)(1) requires
facilities to routinely check cargo, cargo transport units and cargo
storage areas within the facility prior to, and during, cargo handling
operations for evidence of tampering. 33 CFR 105.265(b)(4) requires
facilities to check seals and other methods used to prevent tampering
of cargo entering the facility and during storage within the facility.
Operational MTSA facilities are required to hold Coast Guard
approved Facility Security Plans. Each facility's plan explains the
measures and procedures that the company uses to comply with the
specific MTSA regulations. In general, facilities check cargo,
transport units and loaded containers with a combination of random
visual and physical examinations, employment of scanning/detection
equipment, mechanical devices and dogs. Per the regulations, the
security measures are scalable, and they must increase in frequency and
intensity when the Maritime Security (MARSEC) Condition is raised.
Coast Guard facility inspectors verify that each facility is
conducting the security measures as specified in its Facility Security
Plan. This is especially important when the MARSEC Condition is raised,
and Coast Guard inspectors perform spot-checks to verify the enhanced
measures are in place.
Question 4. What percentage of entry data is received 24 hours
prior to loading in a foreign port for evaluation and screening by the
Automated Targeting System?
Answer. Currently, CBP receives trade data via manifest and entry
filings. This data is essential for basic risk management and trade
facilitation. However, a significant amount of additional information
can be gathered during other phases of supply chain operations. New
sources and types of data can be used to enhance and strengthen the
effectiveness of CBP screening and targeting efforts. Some of these
points in supply chain operations where data can be gathered include
the purchase order process, staging and shipment, and cargo
transportation. By collecting more and different information throughout
the supply chain, greater visibility and transparency can be achieved
and true risk better understood within the international supply chain.
The CBP Advance Trade Data Initiative (ATDI) is currently a
prototype program researching and analyzing data available in today's
global supply chains. ATDI seeks to enhance CBP's risk management
practices through earlier collection and analysis of business-to-
business information used by commercial supply chain participants. This
information is available in advance of and in addition to the manifest
and entry data currently collected by CBP. ATDI is a fact-finding
prototype that seeks to gain greater visibility into supply-chain-
security.
The ATDI prototype has been developed with significant
participation from members of the trade community. A supply-chain-
security committee has been set up within the Trade Support Network as
a forum that works with the trade community to identify and leverage
advance information early in the supply chain. This advance information
will build upon existing CBP security measures to add value to ongoing
targeting initiatives in order to secure our Nations borders, as well
as our efforts to facilitate legitimate trade. The committee's goal is
to identify, discuss, document, and submit the trade communities'
supply-chain-security requirement recommendations for CBP's Automated
Commercial Environment--ACE, which in partnership with CBP should
result in an information requirement plan for the best dataset
available to CBP.
Through partnering with the carriers, portals, importers, shippers
and terminal operators, CBP is gathering supply chain data, studying
what it means, discovering where it can be most effectively obtained in
the supply chain, who has it, how the pieces fit together and
determining how it can improve our targeting programs. All of this data
will assist us to zero in on suspect movements and perform any
necessary security inspections at the earliest point possible in the
supply chain.
Question 5. Is the Bureau in the process of working with the
Department of State on developing human resources that are trained, not
only on cargo handling and inspection processes, but that are language
and culturally proficient in the host country? If not, how are you
addressing the shortfalls in your human capitol for managing existing
programs?
Answer. CBP coordinates with Department of State and other
applicable parties to train CBP officers who are detailed to overseas
locations in support of The Container Security Initiative. These
officers assist host countries in the examination of containerized
cargo. As part of their training officers are instructed in cultural
awareness, security awareness, living overseas, pre-deployment and
continued, post-deployment foreign language training, and specific job-
related skills.
Question 6. How do ocean-going carriers fit into the C-TPAT
program?
Answer. Under the C-TPAT program, ocean-going carriers must not
only analyze and increase security practices in their own operations,
but also verify the security of their service providers and business
partners. Because ocean carriers transport high volumes of ocean going
containerized cargo, C-TPAT plays a vital role in ensuring the
effective implementation of security during the ocean transportation
phase. In fact, C-TPAT ocean-going carriers transport approximately 95
percent of all the U.S.-bound maritime container carrier traffic. While
CBP has had partnerships with ocean-going carriers since 1984 through
the Carrier Initiative Program, C-TPAT has enabled ocean-going carriers
to significantly impact and improve their security practices.
Question 7. GAO's statement refers to two programs to improve
supply-chain-security, the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). GAO's July 2003
report said that these start-up programs were not designed with a
longer term strategic focus and recommended that both programs needed
to have strategic plans, human capital plans, and performance measures.
CBP agreed to implement these recommendations. Since GAO's July 2003
report, what progress has been made in implementing GAO's
recommendations related to strategic plans, human capital plans, and
performance measures?
Answer. CSI has developed a series of strategic and human capital
plans to measure the Initiative's outcome, information and efficiency.
Outcome is evaluated by the percent of worldwide U.S. destined
containers processed through CSI ports and the number of foreign
mitigated examinations. Information is measured by the number of:
intelligence reports based on CSI foreign sources; operational CSI
ports; positive findings; and investigative cases initiated due to CSI
activity. Finally, efficiency is appraised by the average cost per CSI
port to achieve operational status.
The C-TPAT Strategic Plan was completed and distributed in December
2004 and the Human Capital Plan was developed in February 2005. CBP has
recognized the need for outside assistance in the development of
performance measures beyond general workload measures and has
contracted with an outside firm to assist in the collection and
development of performance measures. The development of these
performance measures is expected to be completed in 8 to 10 months.
Question 7a. Whether these recommendations have been implemented or
not, what other problems or challenges is CBP facing with the CSI and
C-TPAT efforts to improve the supply chain?
Answer. As the C-TPAT program has grown, CBP has taken steps to
more clearly define minimum security criteria, or baseline security
standards, for membership in this voluntary, incentives based program.
Additional personnel resources have been added so that members can be
more timely validated against these security criteria. Validations are
routinely taking place in countries throughout the world, with the
exception of China, which has not allowed CBP C-TPAT Supply-Chain-
Security Specialists entry into the country. CSI has not been
confronted with any problems or challenges in implementing the GAO
recommendations.
______
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard
Washington, DC, February 25, 2005
Hon. Harold Rogers,
Chairman,
House Subcommittee on Homeland Security,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Pursuant to your request, attached is the Coast Guard's Unfunded
Priorities List (UPL). The Fiscal Year 2006 budget currently before
Congress represents my highest priorities.
As mentioned in the President's signing statement on H.R. 4567, the
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2005, to the extent
that provisions of the Act (Public Law 108-334), including section 514,
call for submission of legislative recommendations to the Congress, the
executive branch shall construe such provisions in a manner consistent
with the President's constitutional authority to supervise the unitary
executive branch and to recommend for the consideration of the Congress
such measures as the President shall judge necessary and expedient.
However, I am providing this list to you as a matter of comity.
The Coast Guard is extremely grateful for and has benefited from
the increased resources provided by the President and Congress over the
past several years. Since September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard has
enjoyed a substantial increase in funding. Specifically, the Coast
Guard's FY 2006 discretionary budget would provide nearly $3.2 billion
more than the comparable FY 2001 level, growing the Coast Guard's
annual appropriation by 85 percent since the attacks of September 11,
2001. These additional resources have enabled the Coast Guard to
establish 13 Maritime Safety and Security Teams across the Nation,
deploy over 80 new small boats and accompanying crews, expand our
intelligence capabilities. and implement the 2002 Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA). Each of these initiatives, among
many others, have been critical to allowing the Coast Guard to meet
post 9/11 mission demands, while ensuring no degradation in other
performance areas.
The President's FY 2006 budget request also represents an 11
percent increase over the comparable FY 2005 discretionary funding
levels, and demonstrates extremely strong commitment by the
Administration to ensure the Coast Guard is adequately funded. The
resources contained in the budget continue to implement the core
elements of the Department's Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security.
For example, robust implementation of organic Airborne Use of Force
(AUF) capability and additional Response Boat-Small allowances will
greatly increase operational presence and response posture. The
President's budget also includes several Maritime Domain Awareness
(MDA) initiatives; such as implementing the Coast Guard Common
Operational Picture (COP), continuing the nationwide Automatic
Identification System (AIS), and augmenting maritime patrol aircraft.
These capabilities are of foremost importance to early detection,
identification. and interception of threats; and reducing America's
homeland security risk, including terrorist attacks, migrant smuggling,
or drug trafficking.
An identical letter has been sent to Chairman Cochran. Senator
Byrd, and Representative Sabo.
Thank you for your interest in the Coast Guard. I am happy to
answer any further question you may have, or your staff may contact my
House Liaison Office at (202) 225-4775.
Sincerely,
Thomas H. Collins,
Admiral, U.S. Coast Guard
______
U.S. Coast Guard FY06 Unfunded Priorities List
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount
Priority Program/Project Approp ($K) FTP Recurring Requirement
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Deepwater AC&I 637,300 -- No Funding required to
complete design/
production of the
first FRC,
production of first
WMSM, six MPA,
continued recap of
HH-60 radar/FLIR
systems and HC-130
avionics and radar
systems, and
continued
development of the
COP and C4ISR
upgrades.
FRC Design and Development AC&I 57,500 -- No
Maritime Security Cutter-Medium AC&I 217,000 -- No
(formerly OPC)
Maritime Patrol Aircraft AC&I 225,000 -- No
HH-60 & HC-130 Legacy Sustainment AC&I 47,500 -- No
C4ISR Upgrades AC&I 70,300 -- No
Systems Engineering and AC&I 20,000 -- No
Government Program Mgmt
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 Cutter and Aircraft Legacy AC&I 62,669 -- No USCG operational
Sustainment requirement as
identified in the
Coast Guard's
Integrated Near Term
Support Strategy.
110/123 WPB Mission Effectiveness AC&I 35,417 -- No
Project (MEP)
378 Mission Effectiveness Project AC&I 9,452 -- No
(MEP)
HH-65 Sliding Cabin Door AC&I 5,800 -- No
Replacement
HH-65 Landing Gear Replacement AC&I 2,884 -- No
HH-65 Tail Rotor Blade/Tail AC&I 2,936 -- No
Gearbox Replacement
HH-60J T700 Engine Upgrade AC&I 6,180 -- No
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
3 Additional Maritime Patrol Aircraft OE 4,000 8 Yes Reduces USIC MPA
(MPA) Hours program flight hour
gap consistent with
National Strategy
for Homeland
Security, National
Security Strategy,
National Drug
Control Strategy,
and HSPD 7--Critical
Infrastructure
Protection. Provides
500 C-130H flight
hours, which will
primarily be used in
support of Joint
Interagency Task
Force South/West
operations.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
4 Airborne Use of Force AC&I 8,600 -- No Capability required
to implement guiding
security strategies
including the
National Strategy
for Homeland
Security, National
Security Strategy
and HSPD 7--Critical
Infrastructure
Protection. Outfits
approximately 12
aircraft @ up to
three air stations
for AUF in addition
to the capabilities
already provided in
the FY 2006 budget
for approximately 34
aircraft at 5 air
stations.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5 Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) OE/AC&I 31,000 11 Partial--Se Further implements
e Below MDA consistent with
National Strategy
for Homeland
Security, National
Security Strategy,
and Maritime
Strategy for
Homeland Security.
Specific system
requirements
provided below.
Ports & Waterways Safety System AC&I 17,000 -- No Completes recap of
(PAWSS) Vessel Traffic
Services in San
Francisco, CA and
Puget Sound, WA
consistent with the
Coast Guard's
statutory
responsibility under
the Ports and
Waterways Safety Act
of 1972 (PWSA),
Title 33 U.S.C. Sec.
1221 to ensure the
safety and
environmental
protection of U.S.
ports and waterways.
High Frequency Communications AC&I 10,500 -- No Completes HF
System Recap recapitalization
faster than proposed
in the FY 2006
budget. Operation of
the HF comms system
is required to meet
International Safety
of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) treaty
requirements.
Inland Rivers Vessel Movement OE 3,500 11 Yes Permanently
Center (IRVMC) establishes IRVMC--
improving the
ability to track
Certain Dangerous
Cargoes per 33 CFR
Part 165.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
6 Enhanced Maritime Safety and OE/AC&I 70,000 245 Yes E-MSST Chesapeake on
Security Team (E-MSST) call capability.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
7 Merchant Mariner Licensing and OE 26,700 118 Yes Improves merchant
Documentation Centralization mariner
credentialing
consistent with
Sections 102
(Chapter 70105) and
324 of the Maritime
Transportation
Security Act of 2002
(Pub. L. 107-295)
through
centralization
screening/evaluation
of applicants,
production of
credentials and
records.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
8 Sector North Carolina AC&I 4,000 -- No Beach erosion forcing
re-location of Group
Cape Hatteras. Funds
re-location.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
9 Shore Facility Recapitalization AC&I 59,370 -- No Coast Guard shore
facility readiness
requirements.
Group Seattle--Construct Admin/ AC&I 3,000 -- No
Ops Sector Building
Station Galveston--Rebuild AC&I 6,600 -- No
Waterfront
Sector San Francisco--Establish AC&I 12,200 -- No
Command Center
AIRSTA Elizabeth City--Recap AC&I 8,700 -- No
Aquatics Training Facility
AIRSTA Elizabeth City-- AC&I 5,300 -- No
Consolidate Facilities
Group Port Angeles--Construct AC&I 1,400 -- No
Supply Building
Station Coos Bay--Renovate AC&I 1,400 -- No
Covered Mooring
Station Fire Island--Rehab AC&I 1,400 -- No
Waterfront
TISCOM--Construct Building AC&I 1,450 -- No
Addition
Station Cordova--Replace Housing AC&I 15,000 -- No
Base San Juan--Renovate Support AC&I 1,450 -- No
Building
Station Ocracoke--Replace Station AC&I 750 -- No
Facilities
ISC Alameda--Construct New WPB AC&I 720 -- No
Mooring
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 Towing Vessel Inspection Program OE 13,750 203 Yes Section 415 of The
Coast Guard and
Maritime
Transportation Act
of 2004 (Pub. L. 108-
617) authorizes the
Secretary of DHS to
implement mandatory
inspection
requirements and a
safety management
system for towing
vessels to reduce
casualties/mishaps.
This line item
reflects the annual
resource requirement
to implement this
program.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
11 Response Plan for Non-Tank Vessels OE 1,845 4 Yes Section 701 of The
Coast Guard and
Maritime
Transportation Act
of 2004 (Pub. L. 108-
617) requires owners
and operators of non-
tank vessels to
submit spill
response plans to
the Coast Guard for
review. This line-
item reflects the
annual resources
required to
establish this
program.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Unfunded Priorities 919,234 589
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------