

**SOMALIA: U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY AND
CHALLENGES**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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TUESDAY, JULY 11, 2006

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:09 p.m., in room 419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Mel Martinez, presiding.

Present: Senators Coleman, Martinez, and Feingold.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN

Senator FEINGOLD. Senator Martinez will be here shortly. We will either pass the—I'm Senator Feingold and I certainly appreciate the chairman's tremendous courtesy in scheduling this hearing on this important topic. I'll begin with my opening remarks and then we will start with the testimony if the chairman has not arrived. If he has arrived, obviously, we'll turn it back in for his conference.

I'm glad that we have this chance to explore United States Government policy toward Somalia with our witnesses at this critical time. I think we all share a sense of frustration about Somalia. We are facing the same challenges in Somalia that we faced for over a decade, including lawlessness, terrorist safe haven, illicit power structures, dire humanitarian conditions, criminal activities, and other symptoms of the lack of a functional central government for over 15 years. In fact, I chaired a hearing of this committee in February 2002 on this exact topic. We discussed policy options. We discussed setting up an international contact group. We discussed terrorism and al-Qaeda. We discussed the absence of a transitional government. We discussed the need for a more robust, comprehensive U.S. Government policy. Most importantly and most troubling to me now, in today's context, we also discussed how important Somalia was to our national security in a post-9/11 context and how we needed to do more.

And here we are, July 2006. Somalia is still a haven for terrorists. The Transitional Federal Government can't move out of Baldoa and has very little capacity to govern. Islamic extremists have taken Mogadishu and are expanding their control throughout the south and central parts of the country. Extreme poverty grips the entire country and most troubling, the U.S. Government was "surprised." That is what Ambassador Crumpton, the State Depart-

ment's Counterterrorism Coordinator, said a few weeks ago in front of the full Foreign Relations Committee about the Islamist Court's Union seizing of Mogadishu. Should we be surprised that one Action Officer in Nairobi and a half an Action Officer here in Washington within the State Department isn't enough to handle such a wide-ranging and crippling series of political and economic challenges that face Somalia. Should we be surprised that the U.S. Government has been unable to react in a coordinated fashion without a broader strategy? Should we be surprised that after years of asking, we still haven't seen a comprehensive strategy, or that we hear from a variety of officials within and outside of the U.S. Government than in fighting, a lack of leadership and a lack of policy are crippling our response to Somalia. We shouldn't be surprised but we should all be disappointed that 13 years after we lost United States Rangers, we are no further along in establishing a form of lasting peace and stability in Somalia than we were in the early 1990s and this needs to change. We need to recognize that Somalia is a front line in the broader fight against terrorism and that it needs more than just intermittent attention. Then Assistant Secretary of State, Walter Kansteiner, one of Secretary Frazer's predecessors, was with us at that hearing in 2002. He outlined the need to form an international contact group. He talked about a three-prong strategy that sounds almost identical to the strategy that the administration has been talking about over the past few weeks. He outlined the importance that Somalia plays to our national security. He talked about the need to think regionally and to address the issue of Somaliland. All things, I'm sure, we're going to talk about today.

This is what I think we all agree we need: A comprehensive strategy for Somalia that establishes a robust framework for dealing with the full range of challenges facing Somalia and the region. This framework needs to be led by the Department of State and should include all other agencies involved in relating to or thinking about Somalia. It needs to deal with the complex political, economic, humanitarian, and security related concerns in Somalia and the region and must take into account the complexity of conditions on the ground. It also needs to reflect the fact that our efforts to date haven't been sufficient and that if we're going to heed our own advice and warnings about Somalia, we need to recalibrate and strengthen our efforts. This is precisely why I introduced, and the Senate passed, a bipartisan amendment to the defense authorization bill 3 weeks ago that calls for a comprehensive Somalia strategy. It is a reflection of the fact that we've been asking for a comprehensive strategy for years and haven't received one. It is a reflection of the fact that there remains confusion within the United States Government about who is responsible for our policies and activities in Somalia. It is a reflection of the fact that we need a strategy that brings together all of our capabilities to address the root causes of instability throughout Somalia, while also addressing the current crisis. The strategy needs to be clear and it also needs sufficient energy behind it. We need to spend more time on this at senior levels in Government. This is a problem that has to be managed daily by officials who are senior enough to wrangle with the interagency, the international community and re-

gional players. I'm very glad that Secretary Frazer is here. I believe she will answer our questions honestly and clearly. I'm also glad that Mike Hess is here representing USAID and finally, I'm looking forward to hearing from our second panel, composed of individuals who have been working with us on this committee, and on this issue specifically, for a number of years. I hope we can gain a better understanding of where U.S. Government policy has been over the last few years, where it is going and what we can do to help establish peace in this critical region. This is an issue that matters for the people of Somalia, for stability in the region and above all, for our own national security. I notice the chairman is not here, but I am pleased to see my friend and colleague, Senator Coleman, who has worked closely with me on this issue of Somalia and I ask him if he'd like to make any reply.

STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Senator Feingold. The chairman should be here just momentarily. We were just finishing up something together, so he's going to be right behind me.

I understand we have some time constraints here and I would very much like to hear from the witnesses and then follow up. Obviously, this is—the instability in Somalia is of deep concern. From a personal level, Minnesota has a very large Somali community but just generally, in terms of the prospect of centers of terrorism that could have a very destabilizing impact on the entire African Embassy, in content and beyond that, so I'm going to reserve my comments. The chairman is right here but I do want to say, we have some time constraints and I want to respect the time of the witnesses.

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Chairman, I've made an opening statement and Senator Coleman made some remarks. Both of our witnesses, distinguished witnesses, have very limited time. I'll obviously turn the chair back to you.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you very much and I apologize. We were delayed at a policy lunch but I would like to go ahead and allow the witnesses to begin their testimony and I'll reserve my opening remarks for after we're finished under your time constraints.

Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. JENDAYI E. FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. FRAZER. Thank you very much, Chairman Martinez, Senator Feingold, and Senator Coleman for calling today's hearing. I appreciate having the opportunity to discuss Somalia-U.S. Government policy and challenges. Somalia is one of the most pressing challenges facing the United States within sub-Saharan Africa today and I look forward to exploring how we can work together to address our multiple interests in Somalia and the Horn and with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will submit my longer, written testimony for the record.

Senator MARTINEZ. It will be accepted.

Ms. FRAZER. Thank you. Continued instability in Somalia has exacerbated already poor humanitarian conditions within Somalia and threatens regional security more broadly throughout East Africa. Moreover, terrorists have been given sanctuary in this uniquely failed state.

A common theme that was reinforced during my recent trip to the region—I went to Ghana, Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia to discuss Somalia, is that to address the challenges posed by the country, we must work in coordination with our international partners and Somali leaders to achieve our common goals to restore peace and stability in the country by strengthening the Transitional Federal Institutions assisting the Somali people, preventing Somalia remaining a haven for terrorists and building regional security and stability.

Among the realities that we have faced since September 11, are several that are germane to Somalia. First, civil conflict and war in another country cannot be safely ignored. Second, the United States faces a global network of terrorists who seek to harm Americans. Last, failed states often become breeding grounds for terrorists permeability and arms trafficking that spread chaos beyond the borders of a single country and without an effective central government, nations are vulnerable to exploitation by violent extremists. The continued existence of a failed state in Somalia poses such a threat. For all these reasons, President Bush and Secretary Rice have made it a priority to confront the ongoing turmoil in Somalia with a multilateral, coordinated strategy. One of the priorities of the International Somali Contact Group is engaging the parties in Somalia to encourage dialog and inclusion or broad participation as the basis for establishing a stable and legitimate government. The United States, with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD, the African Union, the United Nations, the European Union, and the Arab League, view the Transitional Federal Institutions and Charter as a legitimate governing body in Somalia. We will work to strengthen their capacity to Transitional Federal Institutions and continue to urge dialog between the TFI and Islamic Courts Council.

Clearly, the situation in Somalia is very fluid. Developments on the ground are constantly changing. We view the June 22 meeting in Khartoum that resulted in a seven-point agreement that recognized the legality and legitimacy of the Transitional Federal Institutions as the governing institutions in Somalia, yet also recognizes the reality of the Islamic Courts' presence in Mogadishu as a very positive development. While there still must be follow-up actions to demonstrate both sides' commitment to working to reestablish effective governance in Somalia, we hope this dialog will continue at the next meeting in Khartoum on July 14.

In addition, it is imperative that Somali leaders reach out to key stakeholders, such as the business community, clan leaders, civil society, and religious leaders to broaden the level of participation and legitimacy in the TFIs. In our efforts to make Africa both safer and better, the administration will continue to engage the African Governments in the region in an effort to support their efforts in Somalia and the Horn. Leaders in the region are urging stronger U.S. engagement. They understand it is especially important to ad-

dress the political stability and security situation because of its implications for the entire Horn. Hundreds of thousands of refugees and economic migrants have fled into neighboring countries and continue to flee conflict, drought, and persecution. The terrorists' attack on United States embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam killed more Kenyans and Tanzanian citizens than Americans, as did the attack on the Mombasa Hotel in 2002 that was planned from Somalia. Given all of these moving pieces, U.S. policy will encourage and support regional leadership, especially IGAD and the A.U. There is no resolving the situation in Somalia without taking its neighbors into account. We speak with one voice, I believe, except Eritrea, in opposing an extremist Jihadist takeover of the Government in Somalia. American policy remains holistic. While making sure to address counterterrorism concerns, U.S. policy also focuses on governance, institution building, humanitarian assistance for the Somalia people, and a general improvement in regional security and stability. Taken together, this multipronged approach will require Congressional support and funding to achieve. We believe with your support that we are on the right course in both the short term and in the years ahead. Thank you again for calling this hearing today and I am happy to take any questions that you may have.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Frazer follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JENDAYI E. FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Thank you, Chairman Martinez and Senator Feingold for calling today's hearing. Somalia is at the top of the sub-Saharan African portfolio. I appreciate the opportunity to appear here to discuss the challenges and the way forward for the United States in Somalia.

Instability in Somalia has exacerbated humanitarian conditions inside Somalia and threatens regional security more broadly in East Africa. Policy makers in Washington, DC, must work with our international partners and Somalia's leaders to coordinate our common efforts to restore peace and stability in Somalia.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that this country was lulled into a false sense of security during the 1990s. Following the bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the attack on the U.S.S. *Cole* in 2000, and the horrific events of September 11, 2001, the national discourse shifted. American policy makers now understand dynamics overseas through a new prism; decisions are tinged with the knowledge that brutal regimes and nonstate actors allowed to operate within those regimes are a threat to us all if they acquire destructive technology.

Among the lessons learned from September 11 is that another country's disharmony cannot be safely ignored. Regardless of physical distance, in this age of international connectivity, we are all within harm's reach. Second, we are faced with a global network of individuals who oppose liberty in all its forms; the United States is anathema to their very being and inspires ghastly plans intended to harm. Last, failed states can be the very breeding ground for those plans and terrorist acts. Without an effective central government, nations are vulnerable to the exploitation of violent extremists.

The continued existence of a failed state in Somalia poses such a threat. For all of these reasons, Secretary Rice considers it imperative to confront, rather than ignore, the ongoing turmoil in Somalia. The Department of State recognizes the need for an orchestrated, multilateral, whole-of-systems approach, and has reached out to other concerned parties to form an International Somalia Contact Group to help coordinate a comprehensive response. We are actively working with our international partners to support the reestablishment of an effective government in Somalia, capable of addressing the international community's concerns regarding ter-

rorism and the humanitarian needs of the Somali people. The lack of effective and legitimate governing structures in Somalia is a main source of its humanitarian strife, conflict, and instability. The Transitional Federal Charter and Transitional Federal Institutions represent an ongoing transitional political process that provides a legitimate framework for reestablishing governance in Somalia. We need to seize that opportunity to encourage inclusive dialog between Somali parties and to incorporate these key stakeholders into the Transitional Federal Institutions.

THE PRESIDENT'S VISION

Shortly after his inauguration, President George W. Bush instructed his foreign policy staff that their primary goal would be to make the world "safer, freer, better." Since 2001, that has been our goal statement, and it continues to be the guiding principle of the administration's Africa policy.

Over the last 5 years, the United States has actively engaged to end conflict in six African hot spots, including Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the North-South element of the Sudan crisis. The United States has supported democratic elections throughout Africa, including parliamentary elections in the self-declared "Republic of Somaliland" in September 2005. More than two-thirds of sub-Saharan African countries have had democratic elections since 2000. From Senegal to Tanzania, from Ghana to Zambia, power peacefully changed hands.

We are working to make Africa safer, freer, and better through sustained engagement with local, regional, and international partners. This means not only supporting Africans as partners using local knowledge to solve local problems, it also means supporting the formation and cohesion of the institutions that constitute a free society, namely a vibrant civil society including free media, independent judiciary and legislature, political parties, and an impartial, independent electoral commission to oversee elections. We are working, both regionally and bilaterally, to help build government institutions that can deliver security and essential services like health and education.

The United States is contributing generously toward improved democratic governance, health and economic growth in Africa, and we are actively engaged in denying safe haven to terrorists with the help of African partners. The African continent finds itself involved in the global war on terror and Somalia, in particular, is a critical element of our broader efforts to fight global terrorism. The continued absence of an effective central government has resulted in a safe haven for terrorists and a humanitarian crisis for the local population. But this is not just a national problem. The instability within Somalia's borders and among its numerous neighbors negatively impacts the Horn of Africa and Yemen more generally as hundreds of thousands of refugees and economic migrants have fled and continue to flee conflict, drought, and persecution.

ENGAGING THE HORN OF AFRICA IN A REGIONAL STRATEGY

On June 26, I returned to Washington, DC, from East Africa. The Secretary dispatched me to the region to seek the counsel of neighboring nations, and offer suggestions on how the United States can best address the changing dynamics in Somalia and the region in the weeks and months ahead. Over the course of several days, I visited leaders from Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti—Somalia's neighbors and members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—as well as representatives from IGAD and the African Union (A.U.), and the Arab League.

While in Kenya, I also had the opportunity to meet with the leadership of the Somalia Transitional Federal Institutions, including the Speaker of Parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, President Abdullah Yusuf, and Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi. Collectively, this trip contributed to a more complete understanding of the situation in Somalia.

REFLECTING ON POLICY AND PROGRAMMATIC IMPLICATIONS

The situation in Somalia and the region more broadly is incredibly dynamic. There is a great deal of movement and fragility. We continue to closely monitor developments in Somalia and efforts toward dialog between the Transitional Federal Institutions and representatives from the Islamic courts. The first meeting in this dialog took place in Khartoum on June 22 and resulted in a seven-point agreement that recognized the "reality" of the Islamic courts and the "legality" of the Transitional Federal Institutions.

While the outcomes from the meeting in Khartoum represented a positive first step, follow-on actions must demonstrate both sides' commitment to working together within the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter to support the re-

establishment of effective governance in Somalia. The International Somalia Contact Group intends to encourage these developments in a way that promotes respect for the Transitional Federal Charter and inclusion of the Islamic courts into the Transitional Federal Institutions. The next meeting is scheduled to take place in Khartoum on July 15 and will provide a clear indication of both parties' willingness to engage in constructive dialog. This dialog must also be broadened as soon as possible to include other key stakeholders in Somalia, such as regional authorities, religious leaders, civil society, and the business community.

While political dialog continues to take place, ongoing civil strife, interclan conflicts, and the lack of a functioning central government further complicate the humanitarian situation and limit access to affected areas in Somalia. Access to basic services remains a key friction point between communities in Somalia. The presence and intensity of conflict will continue to be a key factor in the humanitarian situation and affect how the international community can best respond to dynamics in Somalia.

Despite these rapidly changing dynamics, the goals for United States policy remain clear—address the threat of terrorism, support the reestablishment of effective governance and political stability, respond to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people, and promote regional security and stability. While counterterrorism remains a core concern for the United States, it is not the only tenet of our strategy. To address Somalia's instability, we must focus on governance and institution building, humanitarian assistance for the Somali people, and improving regional security and stability. These issues are, of course, mutually reinforcing and also provide support for our counterterrorism efforts.

CONCERNS ABOUT TERRORISM

In pursuing these key policy objectives, the Department of State remains cognizant of the challenges the United States Government faces in Somalia. Foreign terrorists are able to exploit the continued lack of governance and find a safe haven in Somalia, while the continued flow of arms and criminality into and out of the country threatens the security of the broader region.

This reality compels American policy makers to develop a regional approach to engagement; no approach can succeed without accounting for Somalia's neighbors. Toward that end, the Department of State is working with East African countries to build their capacity to counterterrorism and the criminality that originates in Somalia. Our efforts will promote increased stability and safety within the Horn of Africa through new funding and the development of specific follow-on measures to the President's East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), which was announced in 2003.

In addition, we remain deeply troubled that foreign terrorists have found safe haven in Somalia, including some of the individuals who perpetrated the 1998 bombings of two United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, as well as the 2002 attacks against an Israeli airliner and hotel in Mombasa, Kenya. These individuals—Abu Talha al Sudani, Fazul Abdullah Mohamed, and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan—pose an immediate threat to both Somali and international interests in East Africa and the Horn of Africa subregion. American counterterrorism concerns are directly related to the presence of these foreign terrorists and individuals willing to offer them safe haven within Somalia. We must therefore take strong measures to deny terrorists a safe haven in Somalia—we must deny them the ability to plan and operate.

While the broad policy goals outlined above will remain constant, we are always reviewing and updating our approach to reflect the fluid dynamics inside Somalia. The United States Government remains committed to neutralizing the threat that al-Qaeda poses to all Americans, Somalis, and citizens in neighboring East African countries.

Somalia cannot continue to serve as a safe haven for terrorists. The United States Government will continue working with Somalis, regardless of clan, religious, or secular affiliation. We have called upon the leaders within the Islamic courts to render foreign terrorist operatives currently in Somalia to justice. Such affirmative steps would improve security inside Somalia and support efforts to stabilize the region. Consistent with United States policy globally, there has been an effort to reach out and develop relationships with individuals who can provide useful data with regard to locating terrorists. The primary, guiding imperative for all of these interactions is combating terrorism.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

In addition to the immediate concerns regarding terrorism, the situation in Somalia poses a range of challenges to international actors. Concerns remain about humanitarian and socioeconomic conditions in Somalia, as well as governance structures, human rights, domestic security, and regional stability.

These are sizable, and possibly daunting, goals. We recognize that there are no easy answers and seek to ensure that our engagement can adapt to the constantly changing dynamics in Somalia. This challenge has been compounded by long-standing insecurity, which limits the presence of foreign diplomats and other outside actors inside Somalia. For these reasons, outside actors must exercise a great deal of caution in our engagement. Our prospects for success are greatest if we are first transparent in our objectives, and second, fully engaged with international and regional actors. In this regard, we are working to cultivate and utilize the existing international and regional consensus on the way forward in Somalia through continued close engagement with our international partners. We can and should work closely with our constructive partners, while seeking to deter any state or nonstate actors that are playing damaging roles.

The formation of the International Somalia Contact Group, as a means of greater policy coordination among members of the international community, is a positive step. At the first meeting on June 15, the members of the International Somalia Contact Group reached agreement on our common policy goals and objectives in Somalia. This group includes representatives of the African Union (A.U.), the United Nations (UN), the European Union (E.U.), the United States, Sweden, Norway, Italy, and Tanzania. The Arab League and IGAD have been invited to participate in future discussions. The international community is now galvanized and has begun working toward sustainable solutions in Somalia.

The goal of the International Somalia Contact Group's ongoing discussions is to form a multilateral coalition that can engage the parties in Somalia and encourage stability and movement in a constructive and positive direction. This is not an executive grouping. Rather, the focus is on sharing information, coordinating our common policy objectives, and forging workable solutions. The international community is united by shared concerns about the local and regional ripple effects of Somalia's internal dynamics.

The next meeting of the International Somalia Contact Group will be held in Brussels on July 17, in an effort to build upon successes from the first meeting and create sustained momentum. By coordinating common policy objectives and sharing information on political developments in Somalia, the International Somalia Contact Group will become a vehicle to encourage positive developments, while offering support for the implementation of the Somalia Transitional Federal Charter and Transitional Federal Institutions.

THE WAY FORWARD

The Transitional Federal Charter and Transitional Federal Institutions offer Somalia a way forward, following the Somalia National Reconciliation Conference in Kenya from 2002–2004, through a transitional political process leading to a transfer to an elected, representative government by 2010. The Charter and Institutions provide a viable framework for continued progress based on the consensus of the Somali people.

The existence of the Charter and Institutions does not obviate the need for inclusive political dialog and the inclusion of key stakeholders into the ongoing transitional process. The dialog that has already begun to take place between the Islamic courts and Transitional Federal Institutions must continue to take place and, as soon as possible, be expanded to include the broader elements of Somali society, including civil society leaders, business leaders, regional authorities, religious leaders, clan elders, and other key stakeholder groups.

The Transitional Federal Institutions currently lack any administrative and institutional capacity, making the need for mid-level capacity-building and technical assistance an immediate priority for the international community. At the next meeting of the International Somalia Contact Group in Brussels on July 17, we will discuss concrete ways for the international community to encourage greater participation from key stakeholders in the political process and help build the mid-level capacity of the Transitional Federal Institutions.

In the weeks ahead, I expect to participate in further discussions with international partners. After my recent trip to the region, it is clear that instability in Somalia has worsened the humanitarian conditions for the civilian population. Since the beginning of the year, over 11,000 new Somali refugees have fled from these

worsening conditions into Kenya alone and there are reports of smaller flows into Ethiopia.

The international community now stands at a crossroads. The outcome is dependent on our will, our ability to work cooperatively, and the quality of our joint decisions. Thank you again, Chairman Martinez, for convening this important hearing. It is important that United States Government policy makers discuss the pressing issues at hand and find a workable plan for moving ahead in Somalia and in the Horn of Africa.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Secretary Frazer. At this time, why don't we—I'll call on you, Mr. Hess, for your remarks.

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL E. HESS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. HESS. Thank you, Chairman Martinez, Senator Feingold, Senator Coleman. It is an honor to be here and a privilege to talk about this important subject and we appreciate your calling this hearing so that we can testify. I would also like to submit my written testimony and just highlight a few facts.

Senator MARTINEZ. Your testimony will be accepted as part of the record.

Mr. HESS. Thank you, sir. In late 2005, when it became clear through our Famine Early Warning System and through partners that we have in the region, that the long rains were not going to be successful. This followed a pattern of three unsuccessful rainy periods in the Horn of Africa. Therefore, we began in October and November of last year, to start to divert resources to the region, particularly to Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya because we knew that the areas were going to be severely affected by this lack of rains.

If you look at the map, here, that I've presented. You can see the orange area highlighted. That shows the most affected region. I'll talk a little bit about that. But in Somalia in particular, we estimated that there were about 1.7 million people who would be affected by this lack of rain and their pastoralists' livelihoods and the agropastoralists in the region coupled with about 400,000 displaced personnel within the region. We estimated there were somewhere around 2.1 million people who need some sort of humanitarian assistance in the region. Therefore, we began diverting resources into the region such that by this time this year, we have committed over \$90 million in humanitarian assistance and other developmental funds to Somalia. That includes over 121 thousand metric tons of food that have been delivered to Somalis in the region. Water sanitation help, which we worked through our partners, Nutritional Assistance Education, to try to build civil society and conflict mitigation.

Today, we have just—our organizations that we support there have just finished nutritional surveys in Southern and Central Somalia. The initial indications are that the Global Acute Malnutrition Rate in Gedo is about 23.9 percent and in the middle Juba region, runs somewhere between 16 percent and 21.9 percent. Fifteen percent is considered a humanitarian disaster so you can see that all of those Global Acute Malnutrition rates are way above those levels. Based on those levels, we have engaged our partners to continue community therapeutic feeding programs throughout the

southern and central regions. But Fred Kuny taught us a long time ago that drought does not cause a famine. It is a lack of governance that leads to famine. And so while we are trying to alleviate the suffering and stop the dying, we are also looking at the long-term conditions that lead to these disastrous conditions within the region, not just in Somalia but in the whole region. Therefore, we are looking at markets, roads, livelihoods, alternative livelihoods, and some support for governance as Secretary Frazer has indicated.

In closing, I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you about our work today. As you know, I was not able to visit Somalia on my last visit there. They don't let us in. They don't appreciate our visits. But I did go to Kenya and Ethiopia, the Somali region, where we saw some of the Somali people and I actually met with some of the Somali people in Mandara. That was very helpful. These are strong people who have suffered a great deal over the last number of years and they appreciate what we are doing for them in their region. We have done our best. We will continue to do our best and anticipate that we will deliver the assistance that they need to strengthen local capacities, build community resilience and plan sustainable gains.

Sir, that concludes my testimony. I would be happy to take your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hess follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL E. HESS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to participate in a discussion on United States Government policy and challenges in Somalia.

BACKGROUND

In late 2005, the international community began to see ominous signs indicating that the previous months' failed rains were going to have disastrous consequences for about 1.7 million pastoralists and agropastoralists in the central and southern regions of the country if immediate actions were not taken. Thanks to a robust humanitarian response, adequate rains, and a fragile but permissible operating environment, famine has been averted.

To date, in fiscal year 2006, USAID has committed more than \$90 million to the ongoing complex emergency in Somalia. This assistance includes 121,760 metric tons of emergency food assistance, the provision of water, sanitation, and nutrition interventions in the most affected regions of the country, as well as education, civil society building, and conflict mitigation activities.

Malnutrition rates remain critically high. The long rainy season from April to June brought only limited relief. Large areas in Gedo, Bakol, and Hiran, as well as parts of Bay, Lower Shabelle, Lower and Middle Juba, Galgadud, Togdheer, Sool, Sanaag, and Bari regions received below-average rains. Experts predict the overall cereal crop harvest to be below normal due to poor rains in key cropping areas, army worm outbreaks, localized flooding, and insufficient agricultural inputs. Global Acute Malnutrition rates range from 15 to 24 percent in the most affected areas of southern and central Somalia—15 percent is generally considered the emergency threshold. Gedo region has some of the highest malnutrition rates of 23.4 percent Global Acute Malnutrition and 3.7 percent severe acute malnutrition.

Cyclical drought and years of conflict have decimated pastoralist livelihoods, and experts predict emergency humanitarian conditions will continue in Southern Somalia through December 2006. I'd like to qualify this point. We use the term "emergency humanitarian conditions" when the lack of an immediate response could result in loss of life. Our partners tell us that household coping mechanisms—particularly in the south, have eroded to the point that it will take at least 6 months of "good" conditions—sufficient pasture, food, water, and rain—to stabilize the situa-

tion. For these conditions to exist there must be an environment of security. The challenge of ensuring these good conditions over the next 6 months is just as great as the crisis we've worked so hard to avert. We can't do much to ensure that the October rains succeed, but we can work to increase the scope of our assistance, and to support efforts to establish a stable, secure environment in which recovery may occur.

I'd like to stress this point: "Stabilizing the situation" means that the population is no longer at immediate risk, but it does not mean a more complete recovery—or a return to "normal." In fact, it is not obvious that there is truly the possibility of such a return. Traditionally, after a severe loss of animals—like the 50–80 percent of herd loss we have witnessed this year—it could take a pastoralist community 6 to 7 years to reestablish herds. However, with increasing variance in rain cycles, as well as increasing environmental degradation, this longer-term recovery is far from certain. In addition, ongoing insecurity and lack of rule-of-law perpetuate an environment of risk and work against household and community attempts at recovery. The desperate need to acquire livestock—in the face of severe depletion of household assets—will translate into conflict between clans and individuals, and will increase strain on the volatile network of alliances that constitutes order in this society. Nowhere else in the Horn of Africa are destitution and competition for scarce resources more obvious drivers of conflict.

To improve the lives of Somalia's pastoralists and agropastoralists in a sustainable way requires—like in northern Kenya and southern Ethiopia—roads, markets, trade . . . and above all else, good governance. Somalia is a ways away from being able to absorb this kind of assistance—but I feel it is important to emphasize that there is nothing short-term about the vulnerability that underlies the current humanitarian situation, and that until the space exists to address this vulnerability, I believe we will see hunger and security crises occurring at ever shorter intervals in Somalia.

ACCESS

To continue life saving activities, aid agencies must be able to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance to all areas of need, regardless of who is in control. Their careful planning and engagement in Somalia—both formal and informal—has resulted in tremendous success in getting aid to those who need it.

Early in this response, there were several pirate attacks on food shipments coming into the ports and on truck convoys coming over the Kenyan border. Neither threat, however, has turned out to have a decisive impact on aid. More recently, inland access throughout Somalia has improved following the end of fighting between Somali warlords and the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), which was recently renamed the Somali Supreme Islamic Courts Council (SSICC). Aid agencies report the UIC/SSICC has removed most road blocks, resulting in a more stable operating environment and reduced transportation costs.

Nevertheless, pockets of insecurity remain a major concern. On July 3, in the Lower Juba region, a World Food Program (WFP) convoy escorted by armed men of one militia was attacked by a rival militia, apparently unhappy about not being awarded the private security contract to escort the convoy. Three people, all combatants, were killed in the skirmish. No food was looted, and the convoy was diverted to a nearby village until a compromise was reached. This is just one example of the complexity and danger of operating in southern Somalia.

IMPACT OF CONFLICT

We know from the past few months that if fighting breaks out again in southern Somalia, displacement will be significant—both inside Somalia and out of the country. Any internal displacement risks destabilizing the fragile process of recovery for most communities in the south, and places the lives of the most vulnerable at risk. USAID is working closely with our partners to develop contingency plans for widespread displacement; however, conflict greatly increases the difficulty of negotiating the access upon which the delivery of humanitarian assistance depends.

USAID STRATEGY

For now the provision of emergency assistance to vulnerable Somalis affected by the recent drought and the evolving conflict will continue to be the primary focus of USAID activities. Through Title II support to the food distribution programs implemented by the World Food Program and CARE International, the USG is currently meeting 40–50 percent of all emergency food aid needs in Somalia, which currently are near 23,000 MT per month. The recently approved supplemental will enable us to maintain this level of support over the next critical months. Just as

important, we support nutritional surveillance throughout the country, and bring specialized nutrition interventions and life saving vaccinations to Somali children in their communities. Our emergency programs incorporate small-scale livelihood activities, and our water interventions are designed to build local capacity to manage this scarce resource and to mitigate water-related conflicts.

With development assistance allocations of over \$5 million in both fiscal year 2005 and fiscal year 2006, our partners have begun implementing a number of activities aimed at building civil society, mitigating conflict, providing access to drinking water, and improving access and quality of basic education through interactive radio programming. The recently launched education radio program is already having an impact in Somalia. I heard about 8-year-old Najmo who couldn't attend school during the recent fighting in Mogadishu. However, because of her school's participation in the radio education broadcast, she was able to tune into the radio education program and continue her lessons from home.

We will use part of the fiscal year 2006 International Disaster and Famine Assistance funds identified for famine prevention and mitigation to build on both our emergency and our development assistance funded activities—expanding our use of radio, developing community health and veterinary services, and helping to rebuild livelihoods.

My staff is doing everything it can to increase our access to reliable and timely information. We continue to work with our partners to improve and expand reporting. We are also discussing the establishment of an independent monitoring unit capable of identifying gaps and weaknesses in our humanitarian response.

In closing, I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you today about our work. As you know, I was not able to visit Somalia during my recent trip to the region, but I talked to people at the border in Kenya, and I saw the conditions there and in the Somali region of neighboring Ethiopia. These are strong people who have suffered much, and they appreciate what we are doing for them. We've done our best, and we will continue to do our best, to anticipate and deliver the assistance they need, to strengthen local capacities and community resilience, and to plan for sustainable gains, even as we continue to meet emergency needs.

Thank you again.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you very much. At this time, I'm not sure whether you had an opportunity—you gave your opening statement already. Did you have your remarks as well? So we'll go to questions.

Senator MARTINEZ. Secretary Frazer, I wanted to ask you about the Islamic Courts Union and whether, in fact, they are actively pursuing the enforcement of Sharia law in Somalia and whether you believe that this is having a serious impact in the situation on the ground as well as the character of this group, whether they are a monolithic group or whether you believe that perhaps they are composed of factions within the group.

Ms. FRAZER. Thank you, Senator. Thank you. The Islamic Courts Union are certainly a heterogeneous group and I understand that they were developed very much by various clans and subclans, often supported by the business leaders trying to establish some degree of law and order in basically a failed state. The Islamic Courts range in their orientation from groups pragmatically trying to assist the public, to individuals within the Courts who perhaps have more of a political Jihadist orientation. So I think there is a broad range. Those who simply are providing services, those who maybe are Islamicist but not necessarily of a violent nature, who have an orientation to establish an Islamic Government to those who are actually out to attack Western interests and have a Jihadist orientation.

Senator MARTINEZ. How it is possible for the U.S. Government to distinguish who we can work with within these groups and who we cannot, who are potential to a—would be a part of terrorist or-

ganizations and who are those who are a force for a more stable and secure future?

Ms. FRAZER. Thank you. We are looking at certainly gathering information. Part of my going to the region was to consult very closely with the leadership in the African countries as well as IGAD and the Arab League. We are also consulting with our partners in the International Somalia Contact Group. We have information on individuals that we've been gathering over years, so we are doing intelligence gathering but I think the more basic question is—are we reaching out to these Courts. And I think that what is important and what we are emphasizing is that the Courts and the TFIs reach out and have dialog together, more so than we establish direct communication with them. That's not to rule it out, but it is not the priority at this point. The priority is for the Somali people themselves to come together. And so we, with our partners in this International Somalia Contact Group, at our very first meeting, called for this dialog to take place and as I said, we had dialog on June 22. We hope it will be followed up with further accommodation on July 15. So we are urging that. What we are trying to do, in terms of our strategy, is to allow what we believe is the majority who are more of a moderate nature to come forward, whether they remain part of the Islamic Courts or not but for the moderates across Somali society, in the business community, in civil society, moderates within the Islamic Courts itself, to come together with the Transitional Federal Institutions to create a stable polity for the people and for our, I think, common interests, which are obviously to support the people, to make sure that it doesn't remain a haven for terrorists and to promote regional stability and a stable government.

Senator MARTINEZ. One last question before I turn it over to the distinguished ranking member, is the area of Somaliland and we know that they have applied to the African Union for recognition and obviously understanding the delicate nature of that issue, I wonder if you could tell us what you think the ramifications are of ratification or recognition of them as a separate entity and they do seem to provide a certain amount of stability to the people living within that region. So I just wondered if you could comment on that.

Ms. FRAZER. I agree that they have provided stability and the United States has engaged with the Somaliland officials, including supporting their elections. I met with the foreign minister when I was in Djibouti. So we've reached out to the officials in Somaliland. I think the first step before we should consider U.S. recognition is again for the region to decide. I think that Somalilanders must put their case before the African Union and then the African Union can make a decision and then that decision should be reviewed by the United States and internationally. So I would urge us to wait to find out what the region itself views in terms of Somaliland but in any case—

Senator MARTINEZ. How long would you wait, though?

Ms. FRAZER. Well, I think that the issue of the timing of that is up to the foreign minister and the A.U. They can bring the case immediately before the body. There is some concern that this could play both ways in terms of the dynamics in Southern Somalia. On

the one hand, clearly we need to bolster and support a region of stability, which is what Somaliland represents. On the other hand, there are some who feel that the Somalian people may oppose a decision on Somaliland's independence at this point and this could further radicalize them. But there are any number of these external decisions could play either way. It is a very dynamic situation. The timing of it is entirely up to the A.U. and the officials in Somaliland putting their case before the A.U. They can do that at any point.

Senator MARTINEZ. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Chairman, first let me again, in your presence, thank you very much for this hearing. It is very kind of you to allow me to have this kind of input. Secretary, thank you for appearing in front of the committee on short notice. I have many questions for you but I also know that you have to go to see the secretary, I'm told, on this very issue, shortly. So, somehow we have to balance that.

Let's start with, if you can articulate who has the lead role in executing and coordinating the administration's strategy that you have talked about? Would you map out for me a little bit, who is in charge of each of the elements of the strategy and what the coordination mechanisms to manage the strategy look like?

Ms. FRAZER. Well, Somalia policy is no different than our global foreign policy. Our State Department is indeed a diplomatic element. We coordinate our policy through the National Security Council, particularly the Africa Policy Coordination Committee, which is cochaired by myself and the Senior Director for Africa, up through the Deputies Committee, chaired by the NSC to the Principles Committee, chaired by, obviously, the National Security Advisor, then to the President, chairing the National Security Council. So we have a coordinating mechanism that includes State, DOD, CIA, Joint Staff in an advisory capacity, Treasury, and other relevant agencies, depending on the particular issue. That coordination body is responsible for developing our Somalia policy.

Senator FEINGOLD. This relates to your answer, but who would you say then, is monitoring whether or not all parts of the strategy are being executed effectively? What person or persons?

Ms. FRAZER. The Interagency, Africa PCC, has the primary responsibility for making sure that all elements of the policy are being carried out effectively.

Senator FEINGOLD. Who is the individual in charge of that?

Ms. FRAZER. Myself, and as I said, I—most PCCs are chaired by the Assistant Secretary for the region. I also share that with the Senior Director for NSC.

Senator FEINGOLD. Are there specific objectives and benchmarks laid out in the strategy that will help determine whether or not progress is being made?

Ms. FRAZER. I think that that is a good question. Clearly, we do this as a matter of course on the humanitarian side. On the political governance side, it is a bit more difficult. What we need to do, as a measure, for example, of success that we were putting as a benchmark, was getting the Transitional Federal Institutions, the government, into Somalia. It is a fairly low benchmark but they went in January. So that, we saw, was a major point of progress,

on the governance side. Another major benchmark will actually get them, at some point, to be in Mogadishu. But we think the priority measure right now is to broaden the participation of the Transitional Institutions so that they can be seen as more legitimate as well as to strengthen the administrative capacity.

Senator FEINGOLD. I don't disagree with some of the immediate objectives. But what I'm trying to get at here, and you have indicated it is not the easiest thing to do, obviously, is are their benchmarks beyond what the next priority is? And are there timelines, at least a sense of plan as to ideally what we want to achieve. In other words, I'm not sure it is efficient just to say the next thing we have to do is to get the transitional government in there. Obviously, that was important. What we need is a public plan so that people can see what the overall picture is. I'm having some concern that what I'm getting from you, that that really hasn't been done yet.

Ms. FRAZER. No, I think that clearly, our plan is—this is a Transitional Federal Institution, so the plan is 20–10 that we have actual elective government, because that is when the mandate of the TFIs expire. So it is not unlike Liberia, where we had a transitional government but we had a plan and a date in which we needed legitimate elections to take place. What we have tried to do—and this is I think, perhaps some of the frustration is that we've tried to push the Somalia people to come together. There was even disagreement, as you know, within the TFIs. We think we are beyond that. Now we need to get the TFIs with the Islamic Courts but the instate clearly is this is a transitional government, it needs to be an elected, democratic government.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, and I respect the stating of the end goal and the time frame. What I am suggesting and we'll pursue this more later—you can obviously tell I'll be staying involved in this, is the need for the benchmarks and the timelines within that context, leading to that date, that will show me and others that there is a comprehensive strategy. Many of us believe that a special envoy or senior-level State Department official should be appointed to manage the development and execution of a comprehensive strategy. We've talked about that, to be able to be a liaison with the international community and work with Somalia's regional neighbors to establish stability there. We spoke about this even before the recent, very disturbing events. This person could also serve as a center of gravity in all Somalia-related policy issues, much like we've had in the past for Sudan and Haiti and other places. Is there any reason why you wouldn't support the creation of such a position now, given the increasing instability and tensions in the region?

Ms. FRAZER. Senator Feingold, I think that our foreign policy system works well with the officials that are in place now. I know that there is often, when there are these types of issues globally, and call for an envoy. But we have assistant secretaries, regional assistant secretaries, undersecretaries, deputy secretaries, secretaries, and the President himself, who carry out our diplomacy, who are our envoys. More importantly, I think, on the ground, we need to look at how we carry out the operations. It has been carried out by our Embassy in Nairobi. I think that they are doing a great job.

I wouldn't say that we are opposed to any envoy or senior-level person, but that responsibility resides in the officials in our foreign policy process. The problem in Somalia, obviously, is that whereas we would normally have an embassy base, we don't have an embassy there and more importantly, because of the insecurity in Somalia, it is more difficult to actually go there. An envoy who is sort of circulating around European capitals, I don't see as any value added. What we need is the ability to get into Somalia, to engage directly on the ground there and to beef up our capacity there, not just circulating.

Senator FEINGOLD. Madam Secretary, I appreciate your response and I'm going to defer to the chairman in a second. I just want to respond to that. I do feel there is some movement in your response. I think you were more opposed to the notion when we last spoke. I heard you say you didn't necessarily oppose it. I would urge you to consider supporting it. Under this administration, Ambassador Danforth did what I think was an admirable job as a special envoy to help achieve the peace between the North and South in Sudan. I agree with you that it is a general rule you use the people in place. But we are overwhelmed. I mean, Ambassador Crumpton told me that we've only had one full-time person working in Somalia, operating out of Kenya. This is a country of enormous significance to us, enormous significance to the history of the fight against terrorism and I would urge you and others to consider the value of having somebody who would be fully consumed by the goal of trying to advance this issue. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the time.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you. Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to actually thank my colleague, first, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing and then I want to associate myself with the words of my colleague from Wisconsin on this issue. I can't tell you that a Special Envoy is the answer but we don't have folks on the ground. We—and I guess that's the question. Were we surprised by the strengths of the ICU? Did we have intelligence to kind of sort out how this was playing out or did their strength come as a surprise to us?

Ms. FRAZER. Senator, I'm not sure how strong the ICU are. As I said, the situation in Somalia is very dynamic. It is constantly changing. What we know is that they had—they had gained popular support because of their delivery of service and because of providing some law and order, based in the clans themselves. The ability for them to move out of their clans and unite into something broader is still an unanswered question. The situation is very dynamic so I'm not certain how much hold they actually have in Mogadishu. What we're trying to urge is for them to take that positive—that positive disposition to work with the TFIs but there is concern about the imposition of extremists, Sharia law, in which you can't watch the World Cup and other such developments. So, this is a very dynamic entity at this point. Islamic Courts based in the subplans had more of a presence, something beyond that we're not sure.

Senator COLEMAN. And part of the problem is again, is we're not getting the information that we need. I would suggest, as you are well aware, it's not just the imposition, sure, but the people who

are some of the key leaders, Hassan Dahir Aweys—these are identified terrorists who are at the center of a group that now has significant control in Mogadishu. I would suggest and one of my concerns has been our focus and the amount of aid. And I understand, who are we're going to give money to and if you look, periodically, where we've been in terms of aid to Somalia, it has development, it has been decreasing. If it were not for the intervention of some of my colleagues in this committee, I think it would be significantly decreased. We pushed to say that we need more aid. I was interested hearing Director Hess's figures. But that is food aid. That \$90 million—we're talking a lot about, but aside from food aid, there is a development aid. If anything, it seems that we've had less of a focus on what is a critical region and as you indicated in your own testimony, we run the risk of becoming centers for terrorism when there is instability in the area and Somalia, right now, it's clear that that's a huge concern. My concern is and I think my question is, does Somalia have our attention now? Are you coming before this committee and saying they have our attention? We are focusing on the situation. We have committed to doing those things that need to be done, working with others, working with our council and others, to try to provide stability, to try to deal in a stronger way, with the humanitarian crisis that we've done in the past?

Ms. FRAZER. Yes. Yes, Senator.

Senator COLEMAN. I would again urge you to reflect upon the Special Council issue and I just—I'm not sure if there are answers to the questions I have. That's my frustration in looking at Somalia and I'm just not sure where we get them, absent people, absent folks on the ground. Director Hess, in terms of the humanitarian crisis there, what else can Congress be doing, what can we be doing to assist you and others in making sure that the right thing is being done?

Mr. HESS. That is obviously a good question. Certainly on the humanitarian side, we have a number of people focused on Somalia directly. They work out of Nairobi where they are—we have a team that focuses primarily and solely on Somalia because it is such a big issue and our partners there, most of whom operate out of Nairobi as well. When you look at the major non-governmental organizations and the U.N. organizations, while they can go in and out of Somalia, their headquarters are in Nairobi and that's why we have a team there that are focused on humanitarian relief. When you mentioned our money, the over \$90 million we have spent so far, you're right. About \$79–\$80 million of that is going for food aid because it costs a lot to get the food in there. However, we've also spent about \$10 million in programs like education, conflict mitigation—I visited a group in the Mandara markets in northeast Kenya where they were working on conflict mitigation and we do that, looking at areas of extremism and areas of conflict. The education is done, interestingly enough, through radio broadcasts and that helped school children even in Mogadishu who couldn't get to school. We were able to broadcast educational programs so that they could still continue to take their classes even though they were at home. We've done some working on building civil societies and while we work on the humanitarian relief, we

work on local organizations and institutions because this is part of the capacity building I was referring to. If we continue to provide the aid and we don't build the local capacity, we're going to be there forever and that's not what we're about. Even in Gedo, we have built local humanitarian organizations and networks, specifically in nutritional and health care that are able to get relief out. So we're working in a number of areas.

Senator COLEMAN. And my concern, Mr. Hess, is that aside from the food aid, I have not seen the commitment of resources to build what has to be built on the ground in order to have a long-term effect. I just don't see it. I would suggest that—we saw the tragic consequences of the Taliban in Afghanistan and we are perilously—that is a perilous situation in Somalia right now, that if not fully addressed, I think, could have very tragic consequences in terms of our effort to fight global terrorism.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Senator. Do you have additional questions for the panel? I'm going to ask a couple of them myself. Mr. Hess, one of the things that is obvious is with a lack of a central government, it seems like a very difficult task in getting aid in and obviously we're not on the ground. How are we doing that? How is that happening? And how much have we been able to put on the ground?

Mr. HESS. When you talk about the food, it is 121,000 tons just this year. We need to get around 23,000 metric tons a month into Somalia, the international community does. And that's what WFP's appeal calls for. We use a number of mechanisms to do that, CARE and WFP are our primary implementing partners. CARE gets about 7,000 metric tons a month into the country and they do that through Mombassa, up the roads into Mandara, and then across the borders into Gedo. They mainly have the Gedo region and that corner of Somalia. WFP covers the rest of the country, which is primarily south central right now. They go into the ports at Alem and Areka, where they are able to ship food in through those ports and then distribute it through local networks out to the regions where they have the most affected. We will occasionally use other NGOs and other partners, but those are the primary partners through whom we distribute the food. The last month, we had 17,000 metric tons of food that went into the country. Our other implementing partners include Catholic Relief Services, World Vision International, who do our nutrition programs, water, sanitation. We also work through UNICEF to do educational programs, water sanitation, and nutritional programs as well. It is mainly through our implementing partners that we are able to do these functions. They have very good reporting systems, interestingly enough. You have better cell phone conductivity in Somalia than you do in any other region in the Horn or any part of the Horn. So we get pretty good reporting out of there. They have very good Internet conductivity as well. So we're getting good information flow from our partners there and we're increasing that as we can.

Senator MARTINEZ. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Hess, has USAID contributed to the strategy that Secretary Frazer discussed as head

of the democracy conflict and humanitarian assistance bureau, USA Idea, have you been part of the development or the strategy?

Mr. HESS. Absolutely, sir. We have a team that meets on the working group all the time.

Senator FEINGOLD. As I understand it, USA Idea funded a few important studies on Somalian policy and planning in 2005. These studies include policy recommendations, conflict management strategies, regional considerations, analyses of key sectors and needed assistance, and a range of other important things. Were these studies distributed throughout the U.S. Government?

Mr. HESS. Yes, sir. We have distributed those pretty widely and I ought to check back and make sure they are on our Web site but I know that we distributed them pretty widely. I have personally given them to General Abazad, at SIN COM so that SIN COM and our partners down there have them. I also gave them to the commander of CTF ORH so that they have it as well. But we work through a lot of—because it has to be a team effort.

Senator FEINGOLD. Do you know if this work has been taken into account by the State Department?

Mr. HESS. Yes, sir.

Senator FEINGOLD. You do know that they have taken it into account?

Mr. HESS. Actually, I can't—I'll have to check on that.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well—

Mr. HESS. I'll check with Jendayi.

Senator FEINGOLD [continuing]. Well, I'll let her answer but I would think that if USAID was funding a study on Political Economic Regional and Social Issues in Somalia, the State would want to be reviewing that. Have you had a chance to review this?

Ms. FRAZER. No, no.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, let's try to link that up.

Ms. FRAZER. Yes, certainly.

Senator FEINGOLD. That's one thing we could do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MARTINEZ. Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Just one, just a line of questioning. There was a lot of concern, a lot of questions raised about U.S. support of the warlords in the battle with the ICU. I guess I'd ask you, Secretary Frazer, what message can I communicate to my Somali constituents back in Minnesota, to reassure them that the United States is working toward kind of an overall resolution of the situation, peaceful, democratic resolution in Somalia?

Ms. FRAZER. Senator, many of your constituents call me on a daily basis. [Laughter.]

So they are part of helping to develop our understanding of what is going on and how we should approach this issue. So I think that you can assure them that we are fully engaged and we've heard their voice to try to allow space for the Somali people themselves to emerge because they are—what they say to us is that extremists don't have a place in Somaliland. It is not—it is counter to their culture there. It is counter to even the expression and the practice of Islam. So we have taken that into consideration in developing our strategy. I think that you can let them know that we do hear them; we hear them very clearly and very loudly. We are working,

trying to, as you say, bring about that peace and stability and to support the Somali people.

I just wanted to say, Senator Feingold, there are many studies that my team at the State Department works on and are part of that I may not have read immediately. So when I said that I personally hadn't read it, I was not, by that, saying that the African Bureau at the State Department has not been involved in this process. It is just that it hasn't hit my desk at this point.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Secretary, thank you, Chairman.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you both very much and I think at this time we will excuse the first panel and thank you both very, very much for your appearance here today, on short notice and also for the work that you are doing in these very, very difficult circumstances.

Ms. FRAZER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you very much.

[Recess]

Senator MARTINEZ. Let me now welcome our second panel this afternoon and thank all of them for being here and participating in this very important hearing. We have the Honorable David Shinn, adjunct professor at the Elliot School of International Affairs at the George Washington University, here in Washington. We are also very pleased to welcome Dr. Andre Le Sage, the assistant professor and academic chair for Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in Washington, and Steve Morrison, director, Africa Program for the Center for Strategic International Studies, here again, in Washington. So we welcome all of you and would like for you, at this time, to feel free to make your opening statements, understanding that if you want to make a fuller statement part of the record and summarize your remarks, that certainly would be acceptable. We'll begin with you, Mr. Morrison.

STATEMENT OF J. STEPHEN MORRISON, DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. MORRISON. Thank you very much, Senator Martinez and Senator Feingold, and thank you for holding this very timely hearing, and I appreciate the opportunity to be here today with you. I have concentrated my remarks deliberately on the question of what are the predicaments or the constraints that are at play today, with respect to the United States policy on Somalia and what are the immediate, concrete actions that need to be taken to move us forward. Let me just summarize very briefly, and if I may submit the full report to the record, I would appreciate it.

Senator MARTINEZ. It will be accepted as part of the record.

Mr. MORRISON. There are several key constraints that we need to keep in mind in looking at the question of how we would devise an effective U.S. policy. The first, of course, is that there are very serious threats in Somalia in the form of the three high-value targets that we've identified there and these cannot be downgraded or

ignored. It requires us to communicate our demand directly to the Counsel of Islamic Courts as to what we expect of them. I'm disturbed at the thought that we would eliminate direct engagement and communications to the CIC, particularly given the gravity of this particular threat. Second, we have to admit to ourselves that by contrast with Afghanistan or other conflicts, there is no realistic option for introducing an external force, military force into Somalia at the moment that would shape the security situation on the ground. I can explain that in greater detail but we have to admit to ourselves that that option simply does not exist today and is not likely to exist in the near future. Third, it is not realistic for us to engage directly on a consistent basis diplomatically inside Somalia, however, we should be putting a focus on building up our capacities in the immediate surrounding region and giving that greatest emphasis. Fourth, most importantly, I would argue, the United States is operating from a tremendous deficit on the basis of its 12-year absence from Somalia. That is a deficit in terms of policy, institutional capacities, and credibility. We have no full-time, senior-level leadership in Washington or in the region focused on directing policy. We have no serious funding to leverage our aims, other than the very important humanitarian flows that we heard about from Michael Hess. At a popular level among Somali, is we suffer from a lack of credibility and support and within the United States domestically, there is only a weak constituency for an enlarged engagement and there is a persistent negative constituency that we need to deal with. We have an emergent policy that Assistant Secretary Frazer has outlined but no functioning interagency process and no implementation plan. Rather, we have persistent fissures. A fifth constraint is the wild card of Ethiopian military. We know there is a strong possibility of the military intervening unilaterally on a significant scale, which could alter the situation on the ground immediately. Sixth, we have no reliable internal partners. The TFG is weak and ineffective. The Islamic Courts are in an uncertain state and are preoccupied with vanquishing the warlords. My last constraint is really the one focused on those powers that are sustaining the warlords and the Islamic Courts: Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Emirates, Eritrea, and potentially support that could be derived from Egypt. We do not have a strategy for engaging them effectively in support of our goals. The Contact Group is a welcome step but does not have full regional membership yet. We need to, in my estimation, focus on a couple of immediate steps, grounded in realism of caution and patience. The first thing we need to do is really test and engage directly the Islamic Courts in the TFG, communicating clearly to them what we expect from them in terms of concrete actions and what we are prepared to do positively and negatively in response. We should not—we should take special care neither to embrace nor to reject out of hand our dialog with these two entities. The second is, we need to create, on a crash basis, United States capacity on Somalia that does not exist today. We need a senior-level figure to head our efforts. We need a United States-Somalia policy group centered in Kenya. We need an expert advisory group and we need a strategy and an implementation plan and money. These are all absent today. Third, this U.N. Security Council can do much more than it has done up to now in tightening

enforcement of the existing arms sanctions. We can introduce an international maritime initiative and we can encourage Secretary General Kofi Annan to become more directly engaged on a sustained, high-level, senior basis. We can intensify United States bilateral pressures on those parties that I identified earlier: Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Emirates, Egypt, Eritrea, to curb material support into the CIC and the warlords, and we can work to enlarge the Contact Group toward these ends.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Morrison follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. STEPHEN MORRISON, DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

Senator Martinez, Africa subcommittee chairman, and Senator Feingold, ranking minority, I commend you both for holding this timely hearing, and I thank you for the opportunity to contribute to the discussions here today.

I have chosen to concentrate my brief remarks here on the specific acute predicaments that United States policy makers face with respect to Somalia and immediate concrete options for moving forward. I hope they are helpful. Ambassador David Shinn has provided ample background on Somalia's history and recent developments which I will not duplicate.

Somalia has surprised and exasperated us with the sudden, recent turn of events. This happened earlier in 1993, has now happened again, and calls for an exceptional response. By contrast with the early 1990s, Somalia cannot today be simply ignored and forgotten. Realities in the Horn of Africa and the world have changed too profoundly since 9/11 to permit us simply to change the subject or follow a business-as-usual approach. The question this then begs: What realistically can be done by the United States and others under present circumstances? The short answer is we have to confront the multiple acute constraints at play and carry U.S. diplomacy to a higher level, grounded in realism and patience; a determination to create new U.S. capacities on a crash basis; and a commitment to strengthen multilateral bodies and systematically test the Somalis.

From 1994 to 2001, the United States was content to allow Somalia to disappear into oblivion, following the tragic deaths of 18 rangers in Mogadishu in October 1993. After 9/11, Somalia only resurfaced marginally in official United States consciousness, confined to the shadows of the global war on terror. There was no U.S. policy of any consequence. Occasional suggestions that the United States should enlarge its engagement beyond nominal containment of the terror threat were rejected out of hand. That was certainly the case when we advocated, at Senator Feingold's suggestion, heightened United States engagement on Somalia as part of the African Policy Advisory Committee report, commissioned by the United States Congress and issued to then-Secretary of State Colin Powell in July 2004.

Today, quite remarkably, Somalia suddenly again demands high-level United States foreign policy attention. The stakes for the United States have become conspicuously larger, following the embarrassing setback in May when an alliance of Somali warlords backed by the United States in its counterterrorism efforts was vanquished by Islamist militias. That failure is now compounded by mounting concern both for stability within the Horn and the humanitarian toll borne by Somali citizens.

The United States has been caught by surprise, ill-prepared for the multiple quandaries that Somalia now poses.

CONSTRAINTS

Several acute constraints are at play.

First, the three "high value targets" thought to be in Somalia, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Saleh Ali Salih Nabhan, and Abu Taha al-Sudani, are serious threats with a proven track record of doing harm to United States national interests. They cannot be downplayed or ignored. Dealing with them will remain a central U.S. policy concern, and that will require communicating our demands directly to the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC). But that will also likely require dealing with murky outcomes. And at some point it may be necessary but difficult to verify if or when these terrorists are no longer based in Somalia.

Second, there is at present no realistic option for an external force to shape the security situation on the ground inside Somalia. That is because there is no stomach

on the part of the United States, any other major power, or any international body to introduce armed troops into Somalia. Moreover, there is no feasible proxy option, nor a feasible option to invest in the creation of a new force under the auspices, for instance, of the Transitional Federal Government.

Third, while the United States might be able, eventually, to engage diplomatically inside Somalia on occasion, it is not realistic or advisable for the United States to establish a presence on the ground in Somalia anytime soon. For now, we are confined to operating diplomatically from the outside, on the margins. That does not rule out, however, that we can have significant impact from within the surrounding region, if we choose to make that kind of commitment.

Fourth, the United States operates from a tremendous deficit, in terms of policy, institutional capacities, and credibility. Disengaged for 12 years, it lacks real-time knowledge and relationships. It has no full-time senior-level leadership in Washington or the region charged with directing policy, and has no serious funding to leverage its aims. At a popular level among Somalis, the United States lacks credibility and support. At home, the United States domestic constituency pressing affirmatively for enlarged engagement in Somalia is weak. The constituency, arguing the opposite based on the negative experiences of 1993–94, remains active.

While the outline of a U.S. policy has recently become clearer, the three-pronged focus on counterterrorism, governance, and humanitarian need, outlined by Assistant Secretary Frazer—no credible implementing strategy has yet been put in place, and no functioning interagency process exists to back the formulation and execution of a strategy. Rather, there are persistent internal fissures within the administration that pull policy in divergent directions and impede a coherent response.

Fifth, the Ethiopian military is a wild card which neither the United States nor any other power controls. If the patterns of the mid-1990s apply today, 10 years hence, the Ethiopians could very well intervene unilaterally on a significant scale and rearrange the Somalia playing field, for better or for worse.

Sixth, there are no reliable internal partners. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is weak and ineffective, the leadership and the intentions of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) are uncertain, and for now the latter remains preoccupied with vanquishing the warlords and consolidating its control of the ground in southern Somalia.

Seventh, we do not yet have an effective strategy for engaging Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Emirates, Egypt, and Eritrea to staunch financial, materiel, and political support to the CIC and opposing warlords. U.N. Security Council sanctions have up to now been ineffectual. The recent revival of the Somalia Contact Group is a welcome step, but that body does not yet have the full regional membership it requires, and is only just beginning to focus on how to bring effective external pressures upon the CIC, TFG, and opposing warlords. (Britain, Sweden, Italy, Tanzania, and the European Union joined the United States and Norway in the Contact Group. Kenya, which assisted in forming the TFG, was not invited, but the African Union, the Arab League, the East African Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the United Nations were invited as observers.)

DIVERGENT FUTURES

There are now two divergent narratives of where Somalia may be heading. Each calls for a fundamentally different U.S. approach. Yet we are called upon to prepare simultaneously for both.

Since the bungled U.S. effort to support the warlord coalition backfired in May, there has emerged the possibility that a nascent radical Islamist regime might consolidate its control under the control of Hassan Dahir Aweys. Further, this regime might continue to harbor “high value” terrorists and, in addition, invite yet another Ethiopian putsch that would threaten to scatter the parties and push the situation back into violent chaos. With this scenario looming, the United States has felt compelled to announce it cannot engage in direct dialog with the CIC. The U.S. posture has instead concentrated on containment and threat.

Side by side with this scenario, there has emerged the opposing, benign possibility, favored by the European Union envoy, Mario Raffaelli, and regional governments, that the Islamic Courts might break the power of predatory warlords and negotiate a pragmatic transitional governing arrangement with the TFG, under the auspices of the Sudanese Government. That presumes the “high value” terrorists are quietly spirited out of the country and that the CIC leadership concludes it is in its best interest to compromise with a transitional government that has no capacity, administratively or militarily, and low legitimacy.

U.S. POLICY

For the Bush administration, the current scramble to devise an effective policy toward Somalia involves an uncomfortable reunion with the same failed state that dealt the Clinton administration its first major foreign policy defeat. Given the constraints and uncertainties outlined above, it is clear that any effective U.S. policy needs, above all, to be grounded in realism, caution, and patience; to test the CIC and TFG directly; to give priority to strengthening and operating predominantly through multilateral channels; and, perhaps most important for our discussions here today, to put a premium on creating elementary U.S. capacities (now absent) on a crash basis. The latter will be essential, if the United States is to better understand and shape Somalia and its environs, and if it is to see United States credibility enhanced.

Critical concrete next steps include:

(1) *Test-engage the CIC and TFG*: There is an immediate need to communicate, directly and clearly, to both the CIS and TFG what we need to see from them, in terms of concrete actions, and what we are prepared to do, positively and negatively, in response. The United States has to take special care neither to embrace nor to reject out of hand these two entities. With the CIC, we need to be very clear on our security demands.

(2) *Strengthen U.S. capacity*: Appoint a senior-level figure to head U.S. efforts; create an adequately staffed United States-Somali policy group, based in Kenya; create an independent outside expert advisory group; accelerate interagency efforts to formulate a flexible U.S. strategy that mitigates tensions between the Department of State and U.S. intelligence operations; assemble a robust emergency package of bilateral and multilateral assistance to support expanded international humanitarian operations and transitional reconstruction of critical infrastructure in Somalia, including within Somaliland.

(3) *Step up engagement by the U.N. Security Council and the U.N. Secretary General*: Press within the U.N. Security Council for a tightening of the enforcement of existing arms sanctions on Somalia. As part of that effort, press for an international maritime initiative to combat piracy and enhance maritime security. Encourage the U.N. Secretary General to become more directly engaged on Somalia at a sustained, senior level.

(4) *Intensify United States bilateral pressures and expand the Somalia Contact Group*: The United States needs to press Ethiopia to join a broader international dialog on Somalia; at the same time, the United States needs to engage directly and more aggressively with Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the Emirates, Egypt, and Eritrea to curb materiel and financial support to the CIC and opposing warlords. It also needs to take steps to incorporate these states into the activities of the Somalia Contact Group.

In conclusion, the United States faces a score of formidable barriers to an effective approach to Somalia, in the midst of a rapidly changing situation. But given what is at stake, for United States national interests, Somalia, and its neighbors, and given the potential the United States possesses to help avert worst outcomes and move Somalia toward a better future, it is critical that the United States strive to do more, smarter, and at a higher level of effort.

Thank you for the opportunity to present here today.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, sir, for your comments.
Dr. Le Sage.

**STATEMENT OF DR. ANDRE LE SAGE, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR
AND ACADEMIC CHAIR FOR TERRORISM AND COUNTER-
TERRORISM, THE AFRICA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUD-
IES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC**

Dr. LE SAGE. Mr. Chairman, Senator Feingold, thank you for the invitation to speak at this hearing. Let me say at the outset that my remarks will reflect my views as an academic and do not reflect any U.S. Government policy.

Somalia is critical to United States national security interests in two respects: First, it has become a bastion for terrorists to strike against American interests in East Africa. Second, the Somalia crisis continues to destabilize neighboring states such as Kenya, and may draw competing regional powers such as Ethiopia and Eritrea

into a proxy war. These concerns are obviously in addition to the humanitarian and governance crises that undermine the future of the Somali people. I wish to use my remarks to briefly address three critical areas where I believe an accurate situation assessment is required.

First, terrorist threats in Somalia. It is now regularly stated that a limited number of al-Qaeda militants are using Somalia as a rear base for their East Africa operations. These are wanted terrorists responsible for the 1998 embassy bombings, the 2002 attacks near Mombasa and for subsequent unrealized plots against other American targets. However, the threat to regional security has broadened beyond the foreign al-Qaeda operatives. The terrorist cell in Mogadishu only functions there with assistance from a network of Somalia Jihadis, associated with the old Al-Itihad movement and militant leaders, such as Hassan Dahir Awyes, Aden Hashi Ayro, Abdi Godane, and Ibrahim Haji Jama. On their own, this group is responsible for multiple attacks targeting Somali peace activists and secular leaders, as well as foreign aid workers. A few years ago, this group may have been so inexperienced or opportunistic that removing the al-Qaeda elements from Somalia would have led the local Jihadis to disband. However, following years of cooperation, training, and funding, it is now a near certainty that even if left to their own devices, this group would continue to pose a threat, both inside Somalia and across the subregion.

Second, the nature of the Supreme Islamic Courts Council. Despite this terrorist presence, the Islamic Courts operating in Somalia today are not synonymous with al-Qaeda. They are a complex Somali phenomenon and do not currently represent a Taliban style of government. The new Courts Council is composed of over a dozen local clan-based courts that have garnered public support by provided a modicum of security on the streets of Mogadishu. Although a known militant is now in charge of one arm of the Islamic Courts Council, he is not in charge of its executive arm led by a more moderate preacher or its 88-member parliament. Those in the local courts are composed of mixed interests, including conservative Sheikhs who may have rejected Sufist tradition but do not support terrorism. Further, the Islamic Courts are not on the verge of overtaking all of Somalia. They derive entirely from a single Somali clan, the Hawiye and particular subclans within it, such as the Habar Gidir, which feel underrepresented in the Transitional Federal Government or TFG. The dominance of these particular groups makes many Somalis highly suspicious of the Islamic Courts and it inhibits them from making aggressive moves outside of their current territory, for instance, toward the TFG's temporary capital in Bidoa, a Rahanweyn clan town.

The extent of Islamic Courts' territorial control may appear more significant on a map than it is in practice. In fact, they do not even control all Hawiye areas. Neither of the authorities in the strategic towns of Merka or Kismaayo has brought their administrations under the Court's authority, nor have they tried to create Islamic administrations of their own.

Finally, although the Islamic Courts came to power with a degree of public support, there is no certainty that they will succeed in governing. It remains to be seen how the Courts will confront

persistent Somali challenges of internal leadership feuds, clan disputes over land, demands that social services be provided, and that the capital's main airport and seaport be reopened. Draconian legislation to prohibit so-called un-Islamic practices will also breed dissent.

Third, prospects for the Transitional Federal Government or TFG. In response to the rise of the Islamic Courts, many, particularly America's partners from Europe and IGAD view increasing material support for the TFG as the best response. However, I believe that this view is overoptimistic on a number of counts. The TFG is a remarkably weak entity. Its main strengths are the Transitional Federal Charter, which provides a broad road map for establishing a permanent, legitimate government and the Transitional Federal Parliament, which is a relatively representative cross-clan body. Nonetheless, the TFG currently controls and administers no territory. Even in Baidoa, it remains the guest of a faction of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army. Efforts to establish district councils outside Baidoa have proven highly controversial. The TFG's executive branch cannot achieve a quorum for cabinet meetings and has no staff. The TFG's judiciary exists in name only and it is highly unclear where police forces, once they have been trained, can or will be deployed. As for the military, no serious integrated or disciplined force exists. Rather, individual leaders remain in charge of competing subclan-based militia. As a result, caution is needed before relying too heavily on the TFG. While the transitional process elaborated in the charter provides a useful framework for advancing dialog and negotiations, it is unclear that the TFG will be able to garner control of much of the country in the coming years or months. In terms of counterterrorism in particular, the TFG will be hamstrung over the short- and medium-term unless some of its members can return to Mogadishu to establish information and law enforcement capacities independently of the Islamic Courts.

In conclusion, any government or international organization dealing with Somalia should finally balance its approach. On the one hand, the TFG must be supported to use dialog and negotiation to conclude the process of peace building. Yet aggressive efforts to support the TFG, for instance, lifting the U.N. arms embargo, deploying an A.U. or IGAD peacekeeping force, or unilateral Ethiopian military intervention are already a source of dispute within the TFG and will likely do far more harm than good. On the other hand, the Islamic Courts and their leaders must come under consistent pressure to disassociate themselves from terrorism. However, actions that are overtly provocative will radicalize the Courts, empower the hardliners in their midst, and give them legitimacy in the eyes of the Somali public. They would also close any existing opportunities to attract moderate, nonviolent Islamic leaders away from the militants. Achieving this balance will not be easy and it will take time. It will require sustained, well-informed and well-resourced engagement in order to achieve a solution to the Somalia crisis before al-Qaeda can use the country as a rear base for another terrorist attack. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening remarks. I look forward to your questions.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you very much, sir. I appreciate your sobering remarks. Mr. Shinn, we'll hear from you now, sir. Thank you very much.

**STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID H. SHINN, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR,
THE ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, THE
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. LE SAGE. Thank you Mr. Chairman and Senator Feingold. I would also like to associate myself with the remarks that were made by my two predecessors. I have no significant substantive differences with anything they said. As far as the area that we are talking about, if I could just lay out a couple of assumptions about Somalia before beginning and I will discuss both Somaliland and Somalia, primarily Somalia.

As far as the government is concerned, I agree fully with what Andre Le Sage just said, in terms of the Transitional Federal Government being exceedingly weak. Nevertheless it is the only game in town from the standpoint of a legitimate government. I also agree with his comments about the limited geographical impact, so far, of the Council of Islamic Courts. They basically are still a Hawiye organization and there still are some areas of Hawiye territory where they have not taken full control.

Since this committee held a hearing on this topic more than 4 years ago, the U.S. Government has marginally improved its understanding of what is going on in Somalia, but the information remains highly flawed as of this day.

On the issue of terrorist links, the most serious problem that the United States has dealt with over the years, which actually precedes 9/11, are the role that Al-Ittihad A Islamiya, also known as Unity of Islam, has played. That organization, by and large, has become dormant. But it was highly active in the mid- and even the late-1990s in carrying out terrorist acts in Ethiopia, and conducted some nefarious activities inside Somalia itself. It probably has had links of some nature with al-Qaeda. What the nature is, I don't think we have a really good understanding. The belief is that terrorists have used Somalia to carry out acts in Kenya, both the United States Embassy bombings in 1998 and against Israeli tourists in 2002. They may well have had the aid and support of an organization like Al-Ittihad. It is also a fact that Hassan Dahir Aweys, who is now chairman of the Consultative Committee, which is roughly analogous to a parliament of the Council of Islamic Courts, was a member of Al-Ittihad's executive committee back in the 1990s.

As sections of Somalia have become increasingly subject to the influence of extremist elements, the prospect increases for linkages to terrorism. But, this does not mean that Somalia is going to become a major al-Qaeda base, nor does it mean Somalia is headed toward a Taliban-type government. Somalis generally follow a rather moderate form of Islam and the situation is still exceedingly fluid, and in spite of all the media attention suggesting the coming of the Taliban to Somalia and the transfer, possibly, of al-Qaeda there. One should be very skeptical of that.

Any unilateral effort that the United States tries to undertake in Somalia is doomed to fail. There also is, of course, the problem of

scarce U.S. resources. But unfortunately, since this subcommittee held a hearing on Somalia in 2002, the amount of development resources that have gone into Somalia have actually declined. They have not increased. PL-480 may have gone up or at least it goes up and down like a yo-yo. But development aid has not gone up, and in fact, in fiscal year 2002, according to the USAID Web site, the dollar figures for development aid were \$2,000,000 and slated to rise to just over \$2.5 million for fiscal year 2007, according to a report that USAID issued in June 2006. There just has not been, in my view, a policy decision to make a serious effort in Somalia.

I'm going to skip all of the analyses that I included in my extended remarks and I would, Mr. Chairman, ask if you would enter my full remarks into the record.

Senator MARTINEZ. They will be received.

Mr. LE SAGE. For the sake of time, I would like to mention a few things about regional issues that Steve Morrison talked about. The regional implications of these recent developments in Somalia, that is, particularly the rise of the Islamic Courts, are huge. Ethiopia, obviously, feels the most threatened by it. But frankly, it goes beyond Ethiopia and it dates back to the greater Somalia concept and Somali irredentism and the feeling, at least by the extremist side of the Council of the Islamic Courts, that they would like to revive the concept of Somali irredentism. That brings Kenya into the issue because you have a large Somali population community living in the northeastern part of Kenya. It even brings Djibouti into the question, where 60 percent of the population is Somali. Other important regional players in all of this are, in addition to Kenya and Djibouti, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, and Sudan. If you have any questions about those countries, I'll be happy to get into it. I would like to end by just talking a bit about policy suggestions. I think that's the most important part of what we can do here today. All of Somalia's neighbors, also Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia UAE, the Executive Director of the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development, and representatives from the Africa Union, the Arab League, and the European Union need to be brought into this process of consultation if not actual membership in the contact group, which is a much more limited organization. It is important to encourage the dialog that has begun between the Transitional Federal Government and the Islamic Courts as Assistant Secretary Frazer suggested. In the final analysis, the Somalis themselves will decide, for better or worse, their own future. The immediate focus, in my view, ought to be on discussions between the TFG and the Islamic Courts. The United States should not close the door to possible direct contact with the Courts but I think for the time being, it would be better to put the TFG into that role. I fully subscribe to the idea of establishing a Special Envoy for Somalia, on the grounds that there is no one in the U.S. Government today, in all due respect to the Assistant Secretary, who has the time and I underscore time, and the expertise on Somalia, to deal with the issue. The issue has become too big. It requires far more time than any single individual can do who is responsible for 47 other countries on the continent.

I would make a plea for reinforcing U.S. Government ties with Somaliland. This does not mean diplomatic recognition. That

should come in the first instance from the African Union. But Somaliland has proved its commitment to democratic governance. It has avoided conflict with all of its neighbors. It has generally maintained peace and security and it deserves more support. I argued in 2002, before this committee, that the United States ought to establish a small liaison office in the capital of Hargeisa. I would again make that argument.

I would urge that USAID increase its development assistance to both Somalia and Somaliland. I realize that aid is not a panacea for the problems, but it is an important part of a comprehensive policy toward the region. It particularly needs to focus on the building of social and governance institutions. It probably only can do that in Somalia, as opposed to Somaliland, by working through indigenous and international nongovernmental organizations and groups like UNDP and UNICEF. Until there is a policy decision, however, to give a higher priority to Somalia and Somaliland, there will not be any significant increase in USAID funding. I would also make a plea, as I have done in the past, for the Voice of America to establish a Somali language service. It had one back in the time of UNOSOM and UNITAF. That disbanded when U.S. troops left. And if the United States is really serious about doing something in Somalia, VOA ought to be able to come up with the funding in order to put this into effect. They've been talking about it for 5 years. Obviously, anything the United States can do to help shut down piracy off the coast of Somalia is a positive thing. The international force in the region is doing that at the moment. I commend them for that. But it is also important to keep in mind that the piracy is essentially a commercial activity. It is not, for the most part, connected to terrorism. There is another problem that Saudi Arabia has posed for Somalia and Somaliland by banning the importation of livestock, the primary export from the region. This is an issue that should have been solved many, many years ago but for whatever reason, it hasn't. I think it is also time to draw on the expertise of regional experts. There aren't very many in the United States who deal with Somalia but I think a brainstorming session involving these people, together with U.S. Government personnel is very timely. And by way of conclusion, I would say that the policy suggestions in this paper constitute simply a point of departure for further discussion. They do not meet the criteria of a comprehensive policy toward Somalia and Somaliland but these steps and others will, I believe, contribute to reducing the threat of terrorism posed by continuing instability in Somalia. The urgency has become greater in recent weeks and I think the time has come to take this on as a serious issue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to speak.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Shinn follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID H. SHINN, ADJUNCT PROFESSOR, THE ELLIOTT SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY. WASHINGTON, DC

I thank the subcommittee for inviting me to participate in this hearing. I had the pleasure of appearing before this subcommittee on February 6, 2002, when it held a hearing entitled "Somalia: U.S. Policy Options" chaired by Senator Feingold. I opened my comments more than 4 years ago with several assumptions that remain essentially valid today. I wish to reiterate and update them for this hearing.

ASSUMPTIONS

Geographical scope

I include both the southern two-thirds of Somalia known prior to independence as Italian Somalia and the northern third known previously as British Somaliland as constituting the territory covered in my remarks. In order to distinguish between the two areas, I refer to the southern two-thirds as Somalia and the northern third as Somaliland. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), now based in Baidoa, exercises nominal control over parts of Somalia. The Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) controls most of greater Mogadishu and most territory from Jowhar to the north, the Lower Shebelle to the south and Beled Weyne to the west. A democratically elected government in Hargeisa rules Somaliland, although its control is contested in Sool and part of Sanag regions, which Puntland also claims. Somaliland declared its independence from Somalia in 1991 but no government has extended official recognition.

U.S. comprehension of region

The United States has been absent from Somalia since 1994. United States Government personnel make occasional visits to Somalia and Somaliland, mainly to Hargeisa and Baidoa. The difficult security situation in Mogadishu has not permitted the assignment of Americans there. Although the United States Government has improved marginally in recent years its understanding of the situation in Somalia and Somaliland, its knowledge remains highly flawed.

Terrorist links

In the mid-1990s, a Somali organization known as al-Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI), or Unity of Islam, publicly acknowledged that it carried out terrorist attacks against Ethiopia. Its direct terrorist activity seems to have been confined to Ethiopia. AIAI became largely dormant about the turn of the century. Under Executive Order 13224, the United States listed AIAI on 23 September 2001 as an organization linked to terrorism. Hassan Dahir Aweys, now Chairman of the Consultative Committee (roughly analogous to a parliament) of the Council of Islamic Courts was a member of AIAI's executive committee. Under the same executive order, the United States designated on 7 November 2001, Hassan Dahir Aweys and a number of other Somalis as persons linked to terrorism.

It is widely believed in western counterterrorism circles that al-Qaeda personnel transited and perhaps operated out of Somalia in the 1998 attacks on the United States Embassy in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and the 2002 attack on Israeli tourists outside Mombasa, Kenya. It is also widely believed that there was some kind of contact between AIAI and al-Qaeda. The United States Government has alleged that three persons complicit in the attack on the United States Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam took refuge in Somalia. I am unable to shed any light on their possible continued presence there. There were several terrorist attacks in recent years against non-Somali targets in Somaliland. Authorities in Somaliland believe the attacks originated in Somalia.

As sections of Somalia, especially greater Mogadishu, have become increasingly subject to the influence of extremist elements, the prospect increases for linkages to terrorism. This does not mean, however, that Somalia is likely to become a major al-Qaeda base or that it is headed toward a Taliban form of government. The vast majority of Somalis follow a moderate form of Islam and they are highly suspicious of foreign influence. Although there are some worrying developments coming from some of the Islamic courts, the situation is much too fluid to jump to conclusions.

Need for central authority

Until a semblance of the rule of law and some modicum of central authority are reestablished throughout Somalia, it will be virtually impossible to create viable institutions that give Somalis any hope for the future. Likewise, it will not be possible to implement successfully long-term policies aimed at eliminating or even reducing the terrorist threat from Somalia.

Unilateral effort doomed to fail

A unilateral United States policy in Somalia is almost guaranteed to fail or achieve little. The only long-term strategy that has any hope for success must be coordinated carefully with key countries in the region, European allies, the African Union, Intergovernmental Authority for Development, United Nations, and the Arab League. The recent reconstitution of the Somalia Contact Group was a good first step.

Scarce U.S. resources

It will be difficult to mobilize significant United States resources in support of a comprehensive policy toward Somalia. There are just too many competing demands on limited resources. Some in Congress and the executive branch will argue that the United States spent billions, primarily for two peacekeeping operations, in Somalia in the early- and mid-1990s, question whether it was worth the cost, and be reluctant to reengage. Since my testimony in 2002, USAID development assistance to Somalia has actually declined. Development aid levels, excluding PL-480 food assistance, were about \$4.5 million in fiscal year 2002, \$3.4 million in fiscal year 2003, and \$2 million in fiscal year 2004. The total bumped up to \$5.1 million in fiscal year 2005 due primarily to the intervention of a member of this subcommittee. Development aid dropped back to about \$2 million in fiscal year 2006 and according to USAID's Operational Plan dated 2 June 2006 is slated to rise to just over \$2.5 million in fiscal year 2007. The levels have dropped so low, however, that they cannot be explained solely by competing priorities. There has simply not been a policy decision to make a serious effort. Somalia is admittedly an exceedingly difficult place to implement an aid program; this argument does not hold true for Somaliland. Although more United States development aid alone may not do a great deal to improve the situation in Somalia, it must be an important part of a comprehensive United States policy toward Somalia.

ANALYSIS OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Although there have been brief periods of relative calm, sustained peace and security never returned to the greater Mogadishu area following the collapse of the Siad Barre Government in 1991. Except for occasional conflict in Sool region, Somaliland has been peaceful for more than 10 years. Northeastern Somalia, also known as Puntland, declared its autonomy a number of years ago and generally has been quiet. Its former leader, Abdullahi Yusuf, is now the President of the TFG. Even the southernmost part of Somalia has experienced long periods during the past 10 years without significant conflict. Most of the difficulties that you have read about in the media since the departure of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in 1995 have occurred in the greater Mogadishu region. This is where the population is concentrated, the warlords competed for power, the Islamic courts began their rise, and Somali businessmen backed whichever group they thought would be most useful to them. The business community is an important part of the equation as it funds the militias.

The Islamic or sharia courts have been around since the early 1990s. They have long been given credit for creating a semblance of law and order in the areas where they exercise control. In some cases, drawing on funding from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and the Somali diaspora, they have established clinics and Islamic schools. This has helped to ingratiate them with ordinary people. Many Somalis also welcomed the forced departure from Mogadishu several weeks ago of most of the bickering warlords by the Islamic court-supported militias.

The court structure is highly decentralized. Some of the courts are led by extremists, others by moderates. They all agree on their goal to create an Islamic state. It is not clear, however, that they have the same vision for that state. Puritanical Salafi and Wahhabi beliefs imported from the Gulf have become popular in many of the courts. An important part of that theology is intolerance toward all non-believers. But others in the court leadership draw inspiration from Egypt's Islamic scholar, Sayyid Qutub, who was more moderate and advocated engagement and compromise. It is also clear that some leaders in the CIC, certainly including Hassan Dahir Aweys, wish to reenergize the Greater Somalia concept by incorporating into Somalia those Somali-inhabited parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti.

Perhaps most important, the courts have developed so far largely on a clan and subclan basis. Their power resides in the Hawiye clan, one of Somalia's five major clans. It remains to be seen if their authority will extend significantly to other clans. Their support among the Hawiye seems to be broad, but not especially deep. At least one Hawiye warlord in Mogadishu continues to hold out against the court militias. In the final analysis, clan loyalty will probably prevail over a particular brand of Islamic theology. There could well be a significant push back by Hawiye leaders against the extremist theological views of some of the CIC leaders.

The TFG is unable, for security reasons, to locate in Somalia's traditional capital—Mogadishu. It initially tried to establish a capital in Jowhar, now under the control of the CIC, and then moved to Baidoa in south central Somalia. But it has minimal control in Baidoa and little prospect of establishing authority in other parts of Somalia outside Puntland. The TFG is, nevertheless, the only governing organiza-

tion recognized by the African Union, United Nations, and Arab League. It is legally constituted and still has about 3½ years left in its term.

Sudan's President Bashir is the current Arab League chairman. To the surprise of many, he brokered on behalf of the Arab League on June 22 in Khartoum an agreement between the TFG and the CIC. Both parties accepted mutual recognition and agreed to begin negotiations on a reconciliation process that is scheduled to begin on July 15 in Khartoum. The subsequent ascendance to power within the CIC of extremist Hassan Dahir Aweys puts in jeopardy the future of these talks.

Operating from a position of weakness, President Abdullahi Yusuf and the TFG have called for an African Union peacekeeping mission for Somalia. The TFG sees such a force as protecting it from the CIC and any remaining hostile warlords. The prospects for an African Union peacekeeping mission are bleak. It would be unwise for military forces from any contiguous country to take part in such an operation. Ethiopia volunteered to send troops when the idea first came up. It seems to have concluded subsequently that this would be a mistake because of the historical animosity between Ethiopians and Somalis. The presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia will only reignite Somali nationalism. The African Union identified Uganda and Sudan as the source of troops for Somalia. Uganda has said it would only send troops after peace has been achieved. That is not very helpful from the standpoint of timing. Sudan has been notably silent concerning a contribution of troops. One must wonder, however, if Sudanese troops are a possibility in view of its problems in Darfur. The CIC has stated categorically that it will not accept a foreign peacekeeping force.

Al-Qaeda stepped into the breach on July 2 when it released an audio tape by Osama bin Laden that denounced the TFG and called on Somalis to support the CIC. Bin Laden condemned any peacekeeping mission to Somalia, stating it would be an agent of American "crusaders." The head of the CIC executive committee, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, immediately disassociated himself from bin Laden by stating that he was expressing his "personal opinion." Even Aweys said that the CIC has no connection with bin Laden.

REGIONAL ISSUES

The regional implications of these recent developments in Somalia are huge. Ethiopia feels the most threatened along its 1,000-mile border with Somalia and Somaliland. The southeastern part of Ethiopia, known as the Ogaden, is inhabited by Somalis and has been subject for many years to dissident activity by the local Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). Extremist members of the CIC have made known their desire to revive Somali irredentism in the Ogaden. It would be no great surprise if the CIC has supported the ONLF. Ethiopia has also charged Eritrea, which is angry at Ethiopia for not implementing binding arbitration in a border dispute, with supporting both the ONLF and the CIC. Ethiopia has long supported Abdullahi Yusuf and the TFG. It also has good relations with Somaliland. The CIC charged recently that Ethiopia sent troops into Somalia to protect Abdullahi Yusuf. Ethiopia denied the charge.

Extremist representatives of the CIC have carefully left out of the dialog possible irredentist claims to the Somali-inhabited part of northeastern Kenya and to Djibouti, whose population is 60 percent Somali. In any event, Somaliland stands between Somalia and Djibouti. This makes highly unlikely any revival of the irredentist issue in Djibouti, at least for the time being. But if the CIC is able to consolidate power throughout Somalia and if the extremists take complete control of the organization, it will only be a matter of time before Kenya becomes subject to Somali irredentism.

Other important regional players, in addition to neighbors Kenya and Djibouti, are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, and Sudan. Egypt has a long historical interest in Somalia and has in the past used Somalia as a pawn to distract Ethiopia. Egypt, for example, supported Somalia during its war against Ethiopia in 1977. Saudi Arabia was the major importer of livestock from Somalia and Somaliland but has stopped the trade on grounds that the animals cannot be properly certified as disease-free. Saudi money has also been instrumental in the development of Salafism and Wahhabism in Somalia. Yemen is a frequent destination for Somali refugees seeking a better life. Dubai in the United Arab Emirates has become the major financial center for Somalia and Somaliland. Sudan has long maintained relations with Islamic groups in Somalia. As current chair of the Arab League, it could play a positive (or negative) role in bringing the CIC and TFG to the negotiating table. The Intergovernmental Authority for Development, which represents the five countries in the Horn of Africa and Kenya and Uganda, is also central to the peace process.

POLICY SUGGESTIONS

Continue contact group and widen consultations

The Contact Group should meet on a regular basis and expand its membership to include all of Somalia's neighbors, Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, the executive director of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development, and representatives from the African Union, Arab League, and European Union. If it is not feasible to include all of these countries/organizations in the Contact Group, the United States should engage all of these parties in regular bilateral consultation concerning Somalia and Somaliland.

The United States has maintained regular contact with representatives of the TFG. This should obviously continue. It is also important to encourage the dialog that has begun between the TFG and the CIC. In the final analysis, Somalis themselves will decide, for better or worse, their own future. The international community can cheer from the sidelines, reward positive developments with tangible assistance, and express displeasure when there are setbacks, but they cannot decide the future for Somalis. Although the immediate focus should be on discussions between the TFG and CIC, the United States should not close the door to direct contact with appropriate members of the CIC.

Establish a special envoy for Somalia

I am normally not enthusiastic about the naming of special envoys to deal with country-specific crises. Special envoys sometimes create more problems than they solve by working at cross purposes with ambassadors on the ground. Somalia is an exception. For good reason, there is no United States ambassador in Somalia. In fact, there are no United States personnel assigned to Somalia. A special envoy for Somali, supported by a small staff, would for the first time since 1994 permit United States policy toward Somalia to rise to the level required for adequate interagency coordination in Washington and the field. The assistant secretary of state for African affairs or one of the deputies just do not have the time to devote to an issue as complex as Somalia. Perforce, the issue is relegated to the desk officer for Somalia and occasionally the director of East African affairs. This system works well for most situations. Somalia has risen above this level.

Reinforce ties with Somaliland

This is not a plea to extend diplomatic recognition to Somaliland. I have argued for years that the African Union or, at a minimum, key African governments should be the first to take that step. Although Somaliland authorities are warmly received in a number of African countries and the African Union recently issued a complimentary report on the situation there, no country has recognized Hargeisa.

Somaliland has proved its commitment to democratic governance, avoided conflict with all of its neighbors, and generally maintained peace and security. It has particularly strong support from the Somaliland diaspora, which has become the overwhelming source of most of its income. I suggested at the 2002 hearing that the time had come to increase United States assistance and to establish a small American liaison office in Hargeisa. The focus should be on the provision of aid and the sharing of information on terrorism. The American presence might consist of two State Department officers and one or two USAID staff. The security situation is no worse in Somaliland than in many other countries around the world where the United States has a large presence.

Increase USAID development assistance to Somalia and Somaliland

Foreign aid is not a panacea for the problems of Somalia and Somaliland, but it is an important piece of a comprehensive policy. As noted above, USAID development assistance to Somalia and Somaliland has actually been declining in recent years. The time has long passed to reverse this trend. The focus of the small USAID program—mitigating conflict, strengthening civil society, and improving access to basic education—is sound. It is just too little and USAID should begin to add other project areas. It is particularly important to support the building of social and governance institutions. USAID should expand its support for the growing number of Somali professional organizations. One innovative program that has been tried in Somali region of Ethiopia and has promise throughout the Somali-speaking region is interactive secular primary education by radio. The lessons are broadcast from a central location by Somalis in Somali to schools throughout the region. Somali teachers undergo a brief training period at a central location so that they can make the most efficient use of the material. Somalis constitute an oral society; radio is an ideal teaching medium.

Because it is easier to work in Somaliland, most of USAID's assistance has actually gone there. Hargeisa is deserving of the aid, but it is also important to find

ways to have more active programs in Somalia, probably by making greater use of indigenous and international NGOs and working through international agencies like UNDP and UNICEF. Security conditions do not yet permit the stationing of American personnel in Somalia or even visits to parts of the country. Until there is a policy decision to give a higher priority to Somalia and Somaliland, there just will not be any significant increase in USAID funding.

Fund a voice of America Somali service

The Voice of America (VOA) had a Somali-language service during the United States-led and U.N. peacekeeping missions to Somalia in the mid-1990s. With the departure of international forces, the service became a victim of United States unhappiness with events in Somalia and other budget priorities. Resumption of a Somali service has been under discussion at VOA for at least the past 5 years. It has never crossed the budget priority threshold. There are about 10 million Somalis in Somalia and Somaliland, more than 4 million in Ethiopia, and smaller numbers in Kenya and Djibouti. If the United States is serious about having an impact on Somalis it will fund this language service.

Help prevent off-shore piracy

There is an international naval task force with strong American participation that operates throughout the waters of the region. It has already contributed to efforts to reduce piracy off the shores of Somalia. This should continue and, to the extent there are not higher priorities elsewhere, increase. But it is also important to understand that Somali piracy is essentially a commercial undertaking; it has little to do with the problem of terrorism.

Make Somali livestock acceptable for importation in Saudi Arabia

The single most important export from Somalia and Somaliland has traditionally been livestock. Saudi Arabia, the biggest buyer in earlier years, periodically stops imports because no organization can certify that the animals are disease-free. This has been a problem for at least 10 years and should be susceptible to resolution. A solution would have a major positive impact on the economies of Somalia and Somaliland.

Make greater use of the Somali diaspora

Somali-Americans have become an increasingly important part of American society. Although many are recent arrivals and still finding their way, others have become significant contributors to American institutions such as local government, business, and education. Minneapolis-St. Paul boasts the largest Somali community in the United States with Columbus, OH, in second place. But you can probably find Somali communities in every State and every large city. Remittances to Somalia and Somaliland have become an important part of national income in both countries. Many of those Somalis who have become well established in the United States would like to contribute in other ways to improve life in their country of origin. An American foundation or NGO, possibly with United States Government funding, should be encouraged to assemble representatives from these communities in the United States to determine if they have ideas for contributing to the establishment of stability and development in Somalia and Somaliland.

Draw on the expertise of regional experts

There is not a great deal of expertise on Somalia and Somaliland in the United States Government. U.S. understanding of neighboring countries is much better. It would be useful to assemble the handful of American experts, explicitly to include several Somali-Americans, to brainstorm the kinds of policies that might most effectively further American interests in the region. Such a session should include representatives from United States Government agencies that follow events in Somalia and Somaliland or conduct programs there. They could provide a reality check. Representation from the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa based in Djibouti would also be helpful. But to serve any purpose, the brainstorming session needs to be a free-flowing discussion with most of the comments coming from those who are not part of the U.S. Government.

CONCLUSION

The policy suggestions in this paper constitute a point of departure for further discussion. They do not meet the criteria of a comprehensive policy toward Somalia and Somaliland. I have made all of them previously, either before this subcommittee or in other written analyses. These steps, and others, will, I believe, contribute to reducing the threat of terrorism posed by continuing instability in Somalia. I ended my remarks before the subcommittee more than 4 years ago with the following

statement: "The urgency is in launching the dialog and gaining support from allies and countries in the region." The urgency has become even greater because developments in Somalia now have the potential to inflame the entire region.

Again, thank you for inviting me to this hearing.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you very much for your very thoughtful remarks and for being here with us today. I want to pick up on that very last point that you mentioned because I've heard—some of the comments suggest that perhaps the terrorism threat may not be as great as reported. And perhaps it is not a question of if we agree but on the immediacy so if either one of you would care to clarify on that, I would appreciate it because I've heard it, some encouragement that perhaps there is no immediate concern regarding the terrorism, no relationship necessarily to al-Qaeda but at the same time, obviously, a failed state is the breeding ground for the potential for that to occur. So I just wondered if Dr. Le Sage, you might want to.

Dr. LE SAGE. Sir, thank you very much. I think this is a critical issue. We don't want to generalize about the terrorist threat. At the same time, I do think it is an immediate concern. The immediate concern that comes from the small number of al-Qaeda operatives that are in the country and from the Somalis linked to the Al-Itihad network that are immediately associated with them. But the danger comes if we generalize from this very specific and immediate threat to the entire Islamic Courts establishment. The Islamic Courts contain some militants and extremists amongst them but they also contain a diversity of other actors, nonviolent, conservative individuals and the ability to separate away these nonviolent actors from the militants to isolate those militants, will provide a better basis for counterterrorism but that small group does pose an immediate threat in my view, both to Somalis, to actors around the region, and to United States interests.

Mr. MORRISON. Yes, sir.

Senator MARTINEZ. Mr. Morrison.

Mr. MORRISON. I want to add my support to what Andre said. The three high-value targets that are thought to still be sequestered in the Mogadishu area, they have a proven record of launching sophisticated operations against American interests and they were directly implicated in the August 1998 Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, which left 224 people dead and over 4,000 gravely wounded. They were involved in the November 2002 operations, some of these parties in Mombasa, the attack on the Israeli tourist hotel and the attempt on the airliner. The modus operandi that was used in all of those operations was consistent. It had back linkages into Mogadishu. This is a Swahili Coast Network that operates with sophistication and has been able to elude a crackdown from a number of different directions and we should not underestimate the significance of that. I also agree that we shouldn't be drawing the conclusion that because they are in proximity to others in Somalia, that they are embraced by them. However, if the CIC are going to govern this environment, they have a responsibility to eliminate from their midst, these players and that is what I meant when I said we need to be very clear in what we communicate and we shouldn't be shy about direct communication with them around these security concerns.

Senator MARTINEZ. Well, there doesn't appear to be any—well, go ahead, sir.

Mr. LE SAGE. I agree with the statements that were just made. The distinction I would make is that I don't see Somalia becoming a Taliban-type regime at this point in time. In fact, I would be dubious about it happening as far as I can see into the future, nor do I see it as replacing the mountains of Pakistan and Afghanistan as an al-Qaeda base. I just don't think that is feasible. But certainly there are terrorist connections with Somalia. This is worrisome and the situation becomes more worrisome in the view of developments over the last several weeks. There have been proven terrorist incidents involving Al-Ittihad, which in the mid-1990s, publicly took credit for attacks against Ethiopia. Al-Ittihad seems to have become dormant in recent years but the people who were in that organization are still around.

Senator MARTINEZ. But is the failure of what you don't see happening, is the fact that it is not occurring in terms of a Taliban-type entity, just the mere fact that there is no one in complete control? Or is it a desire not to head in that direction?

Dr. LE SAGE. If I could, I believe—

Senator MARTINEZ. The chaotic situation may be perhaps, is the impediment, not the lack of a desire to.

Dr. LE SAGE. There are certainly extreme elements within the Islamic Courts. We mentioned Hassan Dahir Aweys, who is head of the Sharia Consultative Council. He and his supporters have publicly stated that they want to see a Taliban-like state occur. Whether or not they can accomplish that, however, is a different thing. There are a great array of actors, Somali actors that do not want to see that happen. However, the confusion that exists and the insecurity that exists across Southern Somalia in particular, creates an opportunity for the terrorist elements to take action, even if a full Taliban-like state is not realized. And I agree with Professor Shinn that this is unlikely to happen in the near future.

Senator MARTINEZ. Yes sir, Mr. Morrison.

Mr. MORRISON. I think it is important to see what is happening in Somalia as not the formation of something that resembles the Taliban but rather the creation of opportunistic alliances among a number of different armed groups that are able to cooperate today in ways that they could not cooperate earlier. You have Al-Ittihad coming back. You have it at the center of the Islamic Courts. You have linkages with the Ogaden Liberation Front, the Aromo Liberation Front and the Eritreans meddling in terms of provision of material and trainers. When we had a cojoining of these kinds of interests 10 years ago, it resulted in the training of hundreds of people who were exported around the region and committed terrorist acts. That is what is getting under the Ethiopian skin, is that threat where they see the reformation of these alliances that are opportunistic, they are odd bedfellows, they have different agendas but in the environment in Somalia today, they are thriving and that is one of the core challenges that we face.

Senator MARTINEZ. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I think your thoughtful question is a very important one and so were the answers. I think it is very important to realize that looking for an ab-

solute similarity to the Taliban is not a sufficient question. We know that individuals who have perpetrated attacks on Americans and killed Americans are still present in this place. We know that there are a variety of forces there, that even though might not be the same type of hiding place as Afghanistan or Pakistan, that still can use this kind of environment and it is so juxtaposed in a region a few miles from Yemen and right near Sudan and Kenya, that it is exceptionally dangerous, not just in the potential sense, not just because people are disaffected, not just because they have problems, but because of the actual presence of people and movements and others that to me, Mr. Chairman, make this one of the most critical places in the world in the fight against terrorism and I hope that is clear to people coming out of this hearing.

Thinking broadly, could each of you talk briefly about why you think we are in the position we are in as it relates to Somalia, seeing that we've been down this road before? Why is the U.S. Government rehashing the same questions over and over again and what will it take to break this cycle? Let's start with the Ambassador.

Dr. LE SAGE. I think that first, there is the legacy of the United States involvement in Somalia in the 1992–1994 period. It is a legacy that most Americans don't want to remember. It is a legacy that was largely a negative one. Unfortunately, it is also forgotten by the vast majority of Americans that that effort did stop famine in Somalia. It stopped it and you never hear about that now. You only hear the negative things. Nearly everyone saw "Black Hawk Down" and they know that Americans were killed there. They think that the Somalis should have been grateful for what the United States did. Mistakes were made. Mistakes were made on all sides of that operation. But that legacy has so soured the atmosphere in terms of dealing with Somalia that people tend to run in the other direction when you even mention the word. It's unfortunate because the time has come when they should hold their ground and deal with the issue, not run the other direction.

The other problem, I think, that Somalia faces is simply trying to compete on the priority list of problems that exist around the world today. There obviously are some that have a higher, and rightfully so, priority. It's really tough to get very busy people to focus on something like Somalia when they are being pulled and tugged on other issues that are on the front pages of the press, not page 19 each day. Unless that changes, and I hope it doesn't change, because I don't particularly want to see Somalia on the front page of the press again, at least for negative reasons, it is going to be very hard to get people to focus on it. It's a pity because this is still an issue where it may be possible to prevent bad things from happening, rather than waiting until Somalia completely collapses. Then it is too late.

Senator MARTINEZ. Dr. Le Sage.

Dr. LE SAGE. Sir, I think that there have been two objectives in Somalia for a long time. One is the long-term peace building objective and there is a strong realization that a stable, sustainable Somali Government that reflects the interests of the people is required in the long term to make sure there is no safe haven for terrorism.

At the same time, because of the immediate terrorist threat, we have short-term counterterrorism objectives that need to be accomplished. These efforts are obviously linked but I think the challenge for policy makers in the Somali context is to make sure that these short- and long-term objectives do not conflict with each other. We have heard from Secretary Frazer about the policy approach to Somalia and we have heard about the need also, for an implementation plan for those policy approaches. I think this effort to de-conflict the short- and long-term strategies is what is required now in the implementation plan to make it clear how the United States is going to go about addressing these dual objectives.

Senator MARTINEZ. Mr. Morrison.

Mr. MORRISON. Let me offer a few thoughts on why we've had this very, very long, decade-long hangover effect from the Mogadishu debacle of October 1993. One is the Clinton administration paid a huge price as the White House took a huge hit on Somalia and people have not forgotten that. Those lessons were passed over. There is a deep phobia against getting engaged in Somalia. There is a large, negative constituency among foreign policy advocates. There is a very weak constituency—the leadership on this issue has really fallen to activists like Senator Feingold and Senator Coleman in keeping a perspective and revisiting this. Sudan has attracted a much larger, sustained domestic constituency base. So those are two factors. The third factor with Somalia—we learned to live with Somalia. Somalia was able to, in some degree, restabilize through remittances, through restored market arrangements, cock trade, bananas, small stock export. The counterterrorism anxieties that came up right after 2001 and into early 2002 were not realized. The memories of the 1998 bombings were old and predated 2001. If those bombings had happened after 2001 and it had been demonstrated that they were linked back to Mogadishu, it would have been a different set of consequences. If the Mombasa operation had succeeded and taken down an Israeli airliner with 200 people on it or killed the 125 that were the target in the lobby of the hotel, you can bet we would have taken a different perspective on Mogadishu and the back linkages and the fact that the guys that did those operations scurried back across the border into Somalia within a few hours by public transportation, carrying their weapons with them. So, there are some accidental factors. There are some structural economic factors. The fact that the region itself and the international community could never pull together an effective peace process that could be sold here to Washington, as this is really going to be the one that works. So you had the Liberia-like experience. A dozen efforts that fail, cynicism settles in. What can you do? Let the region take care of it. The Ethiopians went in and cleaned out Al-Ittihad in the mid-1990s. They took care of the problem. We didn't nearly need to think about that until we got to the 1998 bombings and the 2002 bombings.

Senator FEINGOLD. Those were all very penetrating answers and I just—

Senator MARTINEZ. Can I just excuse myself? I want to thank the panel for being here. I have to be at another matter at 3:30, so I am going to have to excuse myself but I'll leave the hearing in the

hands of the distinguished ranking member. But very much thank you for this important testimony today.

[In Unison.] Thank you, Senator. Thank you.

Senator FEINGOLD. I thank the chairman again for allowing this hearing and let me just pursue a few more things. First, I particularly appreciated Mr. Morrison's remark about Sudan. I have been a member, chairman, or ranking member of the Subcommittee on Africa for 14 years and I have been as supportive and moved by the situation in Sudan as anyone and continue to be. But the reality is, our attention concerning Sudan has a great deal, in the first instance, to do with the fact that Christians were being persecuted in the southern part of the country and that, of course, led to interest on the part of the members of this committee. Of course, when it comes to Darfur, our former Secretary of State called it genocide. It is hard to imagine two things more compelling but the fact is we were attacked on 9/11 and that has to do with a terrorist threat and one of the great ironies is that our attention, of course, goes to a place like Sudan for the reasons I just identified but we are sort of unable to see what is right in front of us, that the Somalia situation is at the very core of the greatest threat to America, which is potentially or to some extent, actually the role of al-Qaeda in affiliate or sympathetic networks that may grow in places such as Somalia. So I think it is very important somehow, get this through to Members of Congress that this needs more attention, just as the Ambassador was suggesting.

As you know, the Senate passed the amendment I offered to the defense authorization bill. Could you each comment on this amendment and on other suggestions you may have concerning legislation or resources.

Mr. Morrison.

Mr. MORRISON. We had the opportunity, all three of us have had the opportunity, to review that and to engage with your staff and others who were involved in preparing that and personally, I want to thank you and commend you for putting that through. The call for an interagency process and a strategy and an implementation strategy is long overdue and is welcome, and I think the type of pressure that comes out of congressional action of this kind can help overcome and mitigate many of the chronic tensions between our intelligence services versus our diplomatic services who are not on the same page, who are not coordinating, who are not talking to one another and do not have a common agenda or a common plan and I take it that is your primary intent is to nudge an implementation strategy and an interagency approach that does not exist today and to that end, I commend you and I hope this works in helping move that forward.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.

Dr. Le Sage.

Dr. LE SAGE. Thank you. I will just simply say that the need for the implementation plan, the need for a concrete method by which we will achieve our clear policy objectives in Somalia, that seems to me to be the outcome that is desired from the legislation and in that sense, is a very positive development. I'll leave it there.

Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Shinn.

Mr. SHINN. Senator, it was not coincidental that in both my oral remarks and written remarks that I used the term, "the need for comprehensive policy" on quite a number of occasions, as I have done with the media in recent weeks. This frankly has been lacking. There is an ad hoc policy. There is a policy for dealing with humanitarian concerns. There are stopgap measures from time to time to deal with the terrorist question, but there really is no comprehensive policy that covers all of the issues. I tried to lay out a number of them in my remarks. I don't purport to have covered all of them. I'm sure that a lot of smart people can sit down and come up with a dozen more that I've missed. That is what is lacking and is a little bit discouraging. It has been lacking since 1994. This is not something that crosses a single administration, it crosses two administrations and one would hope that the time has come to finally sit down and come up with something comprehensive that goes beyond the two or three or four immediate ad hoc issues that the United States is dealing with. So I commend the amendment. I thought it was an excellent amendment.

Senator FEINGOLD. The last thing I want to do before I conclude the hearing is just to go back a little bit to talking about this in comparison to Afghanistan. I recognize the distinction. The distinction is with regard to the Taliban. I recognize Mr. Morrison's direct remark that we can't look at the same sort of military option. Nonetheless, I see my job as a Senator of the State of Wisconsin as being able to sort of articulate these threats to my constituents. Help me put on the record what I should tell my constituents about Somalia as it relates to the type of thing that happened in Afghanistan. Obviously, we were all quite taken by surprise on 9/11 and people, I think, have a hard time understanding how something as threatening as occurred on 9/11 could be generated from a place like Afghanistan. There are distinctions, obviously. But are there lessons that we could talk about to help get people to realize and to focus on a situation like Somalia when compared to Afghanistan?

Mr. Morrison.

Mr. MORRISON. Well, I think the most compelling evidence that you can point to is to say, this has occurred with respect to the embassy bombings in 1998 and the Mombasa strike. Those operations had backward linkages into Mogadishu. The operations were too significant to be planned and executed. They also had backward linkages into South Asia and those linkages remain alive today and there are multiple targets. We have—we continue to have very grave security concerns within the Horn of Africa for American interests. I do not see evidence of operations being planned that would strike Americans on American soil coming out of Mogadishu but I think it is wholly conceivable to imagine airliners coming under attack that are British or American airliners operating in or out of Nairobi or Addis Ababa or other places. I think it is conceivable that there could be direct attacks upon American NGO or diplomatic or business personnel. I think that is conceivable. I think that connects to your average American citizen in a real way. We have made a huge commitment to the stabilization and meeting the humanitarian requirements of this region. We have made a huge commitment in promoting peace in Sudan and attempting to turn

the tide. We are very projected within this region and that puts us at risk.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Morrison.

Dr. Le Sage.

Dr. LE SAGE. Thank you. I would like to turn the lens back on Somalia. The decision about the future of the Islamic Courts and the future of governance in Somalia is largely up to the Somali people themselves. They have influence. Admittedly, the Islamic Courts, the warlords, they have weapons but the Somali people have influence if they are ready to use it, through their clans, through influential businessmen, through their political leadership. They have an influence on who in the Islamic Courts is going to succeed, the moderates or the extremists that are associated with terrorism. Somalis consistently say to the media, to any foreign visitor, that they are pleased with the security that the Courts have been able to provide in the short term. They are pleased with a religious belief system that brings Somalis together rather than splitting them apart along clan lines. But at the same time, they are fearful for their own future and that of their children, if the Somali Courts succeed and are overtaken by extremists. They do not want to see the Courts implement Draconian vice legislation or change what is the tradition of Somalia behavior. So one of the key messages, I think, that we need to bring back to the Somali people and to Somalis across this country, is that they are going to need to take some responsibility at the local level, not just look for United States policy or international community policy toward Somalis to be the answer to the problems.

Senator FEINGOLD. Dr. Shinn.

Dr. LE SAGE. Senator, the way you posed the question, in a sense, poses a dilemma for me. On the one hand, one wants to emphasize the whole threat of terrorism in order to get attention to the problem because that certainly does get attention. On the other hand, one doesn't want to overstate it for fear of carrying the argument too far and making more out of the situation from this terrorist standpoint than what really exists; so I find myself walking a rather delicate line on this. Obviously, the key to the immediate future is monitoring what happens on these Islamic Courts. The Courts have been around since the early 1990s. They are not new. They were doing relatively benign things before. I think virtually everyone in the Court system has stated from the beginning that they want to have an Islamic state. Well, that is nothing new. There are a number of countries around the world that do that. The question is how do you constitute that state? How do you implement Sharia? What vision do people have for that state, and unfortunately, this is where you have extremists and you have moderates. I don't know who is finally going to win that argument within the Court structure itself. I certainly hope it is going to be the moderates who win. In trying to explain all of this to the American people, it is probably more difficult than even explaining it to Somalis. Somalis have of an inherent understanding of some of these issues. Americans obviously don't. There is no reason why they should, particularly. I think on the one hand, it is important to underscore the potential threat to western friends and our friends in the region. We must be careful not to carry it too far so

that the issue is overstated. And that's where I find myself on the fence here. I want more than anyone to deal urgently with the issue but not to the extent of flying the terrorism flag so high that it takes us beyond the reality of the situation.

Senator FEINGOLD. I think that is a very fair comment. If we all the sudden all just talk about potential terrorist threats from Somalia and all the resources go there, then we are not thinking about what might be—what could happen if things got out of control in terms of the Thai Government's treatment of the people in Southern Thailand or what is happening in the Sowsi Sea in Indonesia. This is the tricky part of all of this, when we are dealing with a threat that has been reported to exist in 60–80 countries and another 20 countries, potentially. This is where your expertise and work is so valuable—is that people may see this as esoteric, to spend so much time on a place like Somalia. But the reality is, if we don't have people like you, who are ready with the information and the type of knowledge that you've shown today, then we are threatened. So I do want to express not only my gratitude for your being here today but for your excellent testimony and your work in this area. It certainly gives me more confidence going forward as I try to make sure attention is paid to this issue. Again, I want to thank the chairman for being willing to have this hearing. Thank you very much. That concludes the hearing.

[Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]