

110TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 770

To prohibit the use of funds to carry out any covert action for the purpose of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any military action against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, in accordance with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements for congressional authorization.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 31, 2007

Ms. LEE (for herself, Ms. WOOLSEY, Mr. KUCINICH, Mr. CONYERS, and Ms. WATERS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services and Select Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

A BILL

To prohibit the use of funds to carry out any covert action for the purpose of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any military action against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, in accordance with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements for congressional authorization.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

1 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

2 This Act may be cited as the “Iran Nuclear Non-
3 proliferation Act”.

4 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

5 Congress finds the following:

6 (1) Numerous bi-partisan commissions and
7 study groups, including the Iraq Study Group co-
8 chaired by James A. Baker III and Lee H. Ham-
9 iltan, a 2004 working group established under the
10 Council on Foreign Relations and co-chaired by Rob-
11 ert Gates and Zbigniew Brzezinski, and a 2001 At-
12 lantic Council of the United States Working Group,
13 co-chaired by Lee H. Hamilton, James Schlesinger,
14 and Brent Scowcroft have called for various forms of
15 dialogue and engagement with Iran in order to
16 achieve United States strategic interests in the Mid-
17 dle East region.

18 (2) Implementing effective strategies to deflect
19 or deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, or
20 pursuing the development of nuclear weapons capa-
21 bilities, is an important United States strategic in-
22 terest.

23 (3) Establishing a diplomatic dialogue with the
24 Government of Iran and deepening relationships
25 with the Iranian people would help foster greater un-
26 derstanding between the people of Iran and the peo-

1 ple of the United States and would enhance the sta-
2 bility and security of the Persian Gulf region, includ-
3 ing by reducing the threat of the proliferation or use
4 of nuclear weapons in the region, while advancing
5 other United States foreign policy objectives in that
6 region.

7 (4) The Iraq Study Group Report states
8 “Iran’s interests would not be served by a failure of
9 U.S. policy that led to chaos and the territorial dis-
10 integration of the Iraqi state”, and therefore, the
11 Government of the United States should build upon
12 this mutual interest to develop a diplomatic dialogue
13 with the Government of Iran concerning deterio-
14 rating conditions in Iraq, which can become a basis
15 of broader future United States-Iranian engagement.

16 (5) Given the dispersal of Iran’s nuclear pro-
17 gram at sites throughout the country and their prox-
18 imity to urban centers, the use of military force
19 against Iran would be extraordinarily difficult and
20 probably ineffective, the immediate consequences
21 and loss of life would be drastic, and the long-term
22 instability generated would be against long-term
23 United States interests in the region.

24 (6) Any military action designed to eliminate
25 Iran’s capacity to produce nuclear weapons would

1 run the significant risk of reinforcing and accel-
2 erating the desire of the Government of Iran to ac-
3 quire a nuclear deterrent and compounding nation-
4 alist passions in defense of that very course, and
5 would most likely also generate hostile Iranian ini-
6 tiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan.

7 (7) Together, the ongoing efforts of the Inter-
8 national Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) along with
9 corresponding multilateral sanctions recently adopt-
10 ed by the United Nations Security Council offer a
11 viable path for steering Iran's nuclear efforts along
12 peaceful lines, provided that there is close multilat-
13 eral coordination and steadfastness in the adherence
14 to the sanctions and firm United States leadership
15 in support of the multilateral effort.

16 (8) According to the most definitive United
17 States intelligence reports, Iran is likely a decade
18 away from acquiring the know-how and material to
19 have an option to build a nuclear weapon, and even
20 the most pessimistic analysis by outside experts puts
21 the timeline at least three years away, assuming
22 Iran suffers no setbacks during development, which
23 would be unprecedented.

24 **SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.**

25 It is the sense of Congress that—

1 (1) full diplomatic, political, and economic rela-
2 tions between the United States and Iran cannot be
3 normalized unless and until enforceable safeguards
4 are put in place to prevent weaponization of Iran's
5 nuclear program and the Government of Iran ends
6 its support for international terrorist groups, but the
7 attainment of these policy objectives should not con-
8 stitute preconditions for any diplomatic dialogue;
9 and

10 (2) no congressional authorization for the use
11 of military force in any Act of Congress enacted be-
12 fore the date of the enactment of this Act con-
13 stitutes, either implicitly or explicitly, an authoriza-
14 tion for the use of military force against Iran or its
15 nuclear program.

16 **SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.**

17 It is the policy of the United States not to enter into
18 a preemptive war against Iran in the absence of an immi-
19 nent threat, and then only in accordance with inter-
20 national law and constitutional and statutory require-
21 ments for congressional authorization.

22 **SEC. 5. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.**

23 No funds appropriated or otherwise made available
24 to the Department of Defense or any other department
25 or agency of the Government of the United States may

1 be used to carry out any covert action for the purpose
2 of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any mili-
3 tary action against Iran in the absence of an imminent
4 threat, in accordance with international law and constitu-
5 tional and statutory requirements for congressional au-
6 thorization.

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