

110TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 1018

To address security risks posed by global climate change and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 28, 2007

Mr. DURBIN (for himself, Mr. HAGEL, and Mrs. FEINSTEIN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence

A BILL

To address security risks posed by global climate change and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Global Climate Change
5 Security Oversight Act”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) According to the National Oceanic and At-
9 mospheric Administration, in 2007 the average an-
10 nual temperature in the United States and around

1 the globe is approximately 1.0 degree Fahrenheit
2 warmer than at the start of the 20th century, and
3 the rate of warming has accelerated during the past
4 30 years, increasing globally since the mid-1970s.
5 The fourth assessment report of the Intergovern-
6 mental Panel on Climate Change has predicted that
7 the Earth will warm 0.72 degrees Fahrenheit during
8 the next 2 decades with current emission trends.

9 (2) The annual national security strategy report
10 submitted pursuant to section 108 of the National
11 Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404a) for 2006
12 states that the United States faces new security
13 challenges, including “environmental destruction,
14 whether caused by human behavior or cataclysmic
15 mega-disasters such as floods, hurricanes, earth-
16 quakes, or tsunamis. Problems of this scope may
17 overwhelm the capacity of local authorities to re-
18 spond, and may even overtax national militaries, re-
19 quiring a larger international response. These chal-
20 lenges are not traditional national security concerns,
21 such as the conflict of arms or ideologies. But if left
22 unaddressed they can threaten national security.”.

23 (3) According to the fourth assessment report
24 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
25 average temperature increases of between 2 and 4

1 degrees Celsius over preindustrial levels are pro-
2 jected to cause the sea level to rise by between 2 and
3 4 meters by 2100 due to melting of the Greenland
4 and Antarctic ice sheets.

5 (4) In 2007, more than 200,000,000 people live
6 in coastal floodplains around the world and
7 2,000,000 square kilometers of land and an esti-
8 mated \$1,000,000,000,000 worth of assets are less
9 than a 1-meter elevation above sea level.

10 (5) An estimated 1,700,000,000 people in the
11 world live in areas where water is scarce and in 25
12 years that population is projected to increase to
13 5,400,000,000. Climate change will impact the
14 hydrological cycle and change the location, time of
15 year, and intensity of water availability.

16 (6) The report of the World Health Organiza-
17 tion entitled “The World Health Report 2002: Re-
18 ducing Risks and Promoting Healthy Life” states
19 that “Effects of climate change on human health
20 can be expected to be mediated through complex
21 interactions of physical, ecological, and social fac-
22 tors. These effects will undoubtedly have a greater
23 impact on societies or individuals with scarce re-
24 sources, where technologies are lacking, and where

1 infrastructure and institutions (such as the health
2 sector) are least able to adapt.”.

3 (7) Environmental changes relating to global
4 climate change represent a potentially significant
5 threat multiplier for instability around the world as
6 changing precipitation patterns may exacerbate com-
7 petition and conflict over agricultural, vegetative,
8 and water resources and displace people, thus in-
9 creasing hunger and poverty and causing increased
10 pressure on fragile countries.

11 (8) The strategic, social, political, and economic
12 consequences of global climate change are likely to
13 have a greater adverse effect on less developed coun-
14 tries with fewer resources and infrastructures that
15 are less able to adjust to new economic and social
16 pressures, and where the margin for governance and
17 survival is thin.

18 (9) The consequences of global climate change
19 represent a clear and present danger to the security
20 and economy of the United States.

21 (10) A failure to recognize, plan for, and miti-
22 gate the strategic, social, political, and economic ef-
23 fects of a changing climate will have an adverse im-
24 pact on the national security interests of the United
25 States.

1 **SEC. 3. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON GLOBAL**
2 **CLIMATE CHANGE.**

3 (a) REQUIREMENT FOR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
4 ESTIMATE.—

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in para-
6 graph (2), not later than 270 days after the date of
7 enactment of this Act, the Director of National In-
8 telligence shall submit to Congress a National Intel-
9 ligence Estimate on the anticipated geopolitical ef-
10 fects of global climate change and the implications
11 of such effects on the national security of the United
12 States.

13 (2) NOTICE REGARDING SUBMITTAL.—If the
14 Director of National Intelligence determines that the
15 National Intelligence Estimate required by para-
16 graph (1) cannot be submitted by the date set out
17 in that paragraph, the Director shall notify Congress
18 and provide—

19 (A) the reasons that the National Intel-
20 ligence Estimate cannot be submitted by such
21 date; and

22 (B) an estimated date for the submittal of
23 the National Intelligence Estimate.

24 (b) CONTENT.—The Director of National Intelligence
25 shall prepare the National Intelligence Estimate required
26 by this section using the mid-range projections of the

1 fourth assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel
2 on Climate Change—

3 (1) to assess the political, social, agricultural,
4 and economic risks during the 30-year period begin-
5 ning on the date of enactment of this Act posed by
6 global climate change for countries or regions that
7 are—

8 (A) of strategic economic or military im-
9 portance to the United States and at risk of
10 significant impact due to global climate change;
11 or

12 (B) at significant risk of large-scale hu-
13 manitarian suffering with cross-border implica-
14 tions as predicted on the basis of the assess-
15 ments;

16 (2) to assess other risks posed by global climate
17 change, including increased conflict over resources or
18 between ethnic groups, within countries or
19 transnationally, increased displacement or forced mi-
20 grations of vulnerable populations due to inundation
21 or other causes, increased food insecurity, and in-
22 creased risks to human health from infectious dis-
23 ease;

24 (3) to assess the capabilities of the countries or
25 regions described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of

1 paragraph (1) to respond to adverse impacts caused
2 by global climate change;

3 (4) to assess the strategic challenges and oppor-
4 tunities posed to the United States by the risks de-
5 scribed in paragraph (1);

6 (5) to assess the security implications and op-
7 portunities for the United States economy of engag-
8 ing, or failing to engage successfully, with other
9 leading and emerging major contributors of green-
10 house gas emissions in efforts to reduce emissions;
11 and

12 (6) to make recommendations for further as-
13 sessments of security consequences of global climate
14 change that would improve national security plan-
15 ning.

16 (c) COORDINATION.—In preparing the National In-
17 telligence Estimate under this section, the Director of Na-
18 tional Intelligence shall consult with representatives of the
19 scientific community, including atmospheric and climate
20 studies, security studies, conflict studies, economic assess-
21 ments, and environmental security studies, the Secretary
22 of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Administrator of
23 the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administra-
24 tion, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and
25 Space Administration, the Administrator of the Environ-

1 mental Protection Agency, the Secretary of Energy, and
2 the Secretary of Agriculture, and, if appropriate, multilat-
3 eral institutions and allies of the United States that have
4 conducted significant research on global climate change.

5 (d) FORM.—The National Intelligence Estimate re-
6 quired by this section shall be submitted in unclassified
7 form, to the extent consistent with the protection of intel-
8 ligence sources and methods, and include unclassified key
9 judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate. Such
10 National Intelligence Estimate may include a classified
11 annex.

12 **SEC. 4. RESPONSE TO THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTI-**
13 **MATE.**

14 (a) REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.—Not
15 later than 270 days after the date that the National Intel-
16 ligence Estimate required by section 3 is submitted to
17 Congress, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the
18 Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed
19 Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
20 Senate and the Committee on Appropriations, the Com-
21 mittee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Com-
22 mittee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a
23 report on—

24 (1) the projected impact on the military instal-
25 lations and capabilities of the United States of the

1 effects of global climate change as assessed in the
2 National Intelligence Estimate;

3 (2) the projected impact on United States mili-
4 tary operations of the effects of global climate
5 change described in the National Intelligence Esti-
6 mate; and

7 (3) recommended research and analysis needed
8 to further assess the impacts on the military of glob-
9 al climate change.

10 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEXT QUADREN-
11 NIAL DEFENSE REVIEW.—It is the sense of Congress that
12 the Secretary of Defense should address the findings of
13 the National Intelligence Estimate required by section 3
14 regarding the impact of global climate change and poten-
15 tial implications of such impact on the Armed Forces and
16 for the size, composition, and capabilities of Armed Forces
17 in the next Quadrennial Defense Review.

18 (c) REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE.—Not
19 later than 270 days after the date that the National Intel-
20 ligence Estimate required by section 3 is submitted to
21 Congress, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Com-
22 mittee on Appropriations, the Committee on Foreign Rela-
23 tions, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Sen-
24 ate and the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee
25 on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee

1 on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report
2 that addresses—

3 (1) the potential for large migration flows in
4 countries of strategic interest or humanitarian con-
5 cern as a response to changes in climate and the im-
6 plications for United States security interests; and

7 (2) the potential for diplomatic opportunities
8 and challenges facing United States policy makers
9 as a result of social, economic, or political responses
10 of groups or nations to global changing climate.

11 **SEC. 5. AUTHORIZATION OF RESEARCH.**

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense is au-
13 thorized to carry out research on the impacts of global
14 climate change on military operations, doctrine, organiza-
15 tion, training, material, logistics, personnel, and facilities
16 and the actions needed to address those impacts. Such re-
17 search may include—

18 (1) the use of war gaming and other analytical
19 exercises;

20 (2) analysis of the implications for United
21 States defense capabilities of large-scale Arctic sea-
22 ice melt and broader changes in Arctic climate;

23 (3) analysis of the implications for United
24 States defense capabilities of abrupt climate change;

1 (4) analysis of the implications of the findings
2 derived from the National Intelligence Estimate re-
3 quired in section 3 of the Act for United States de-
4 fense capabilities;

5 (5) analysis of the strategic implications for
6 United States defense capabilities of direct physical
7 threats to the United States posed by extreme
8 weather events such as hurricanes; and

9 (6) analysis of the existing policies of the De-
10 partment of Defense to assess the adequacy of the
11 Department's protections against climate risks to
12 United States capabilities and military interests in
13 foreign countries.

14 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 2 years after the date
15 that the National Intelligence Estimate required by sec-
16 tion 3 is submitted to Congress, the Secretary of Defense
17 shall submit to Congress a report on the results of the
18 research, war games, and other activities carried out pur-
19 suant to subsection (a).

20 **SEC. 6. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

21 There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as
22 may be necessary to carry out this Act.

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