[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 744 Introduced in House (IH)]
110th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 744
To enhance congressional oversight of Operation Iraqi Freedom by
requiring the President to transmit periodically to Congress a
consolidated, comprehensive report to detail the terms of completion
for Operation Iraqi Freedom and by requiring the President to seek to
enter into a multilateral agreement to help provide for the completion
of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
January 31, 2007
Ms. Bordallo introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed
Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in
each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the
jurisdiction of the committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To enhance congressional oversight of Operation Iraqi Freedom by
requiring the President to transmit periodically to Congress a
consolidated, comprehensive report to detail the terms of completion
for Operation Iraqi Freedom and by requiring the President to seek to
enter into a multilateral agreement to help provide for the completion
of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Iraq Policy Revitalization and
Congressional Oversight Enhancement Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) On October 31, 1998, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998
(Public Law 105-338) was enacted into law.
(2) On October 16, 2002, the Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-
243) was enacted into law.
(3) On March 19, 2003, the President, pursuant to the
authorities provided to the President by Public Law 107-243,
committed United States Armed Forces to combat operations in
Iraq.
(4) On April 9, 2003, Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime
fell to Coalition Forces.
(5) On April 16, 2003, the Emergency Wartime Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 108-11) was enacted into
law, which included $2,500,000,000 for the relief and
reconstruction of Iraq.
(6) On May 12, 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA) subsumed the Organization for Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), and citing United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) and the laws of war,
vested itself with executive, legislative, and judicial
authority over the Iraqi government until such time as the
Iraqi government gained its sovereignty.
(7) On November 6, 2003, the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of
Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (Public Law 108-106) was enacted
into law, which included an additional $18,400,000,000 for the
relief and reconstruction of Iraq.
(8) On June 8, 2004, the United Nations Security Council
adopted Resolution 1546 (2004), endorsing the transition of
sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the
Interim Government of Iraq, reaffirming the responsibilities of
the interim government, and detailing the duration and legal
status of Coalition Forces in Iraq, as well as authorizing a
Coalition component force to protect United Nations personnel
and facilities.
(9) On June 28, 2004, the new Iraqi government gained its
sovereignty.
(10) On January 30, 2005, the Iraqi people successfully
elected their first interim National Assembly, and 18
provincial and various local government councils.
(11) On March 16, 2005, the 275-member interim Iraqi
National Assembly convened to appoint an interim national
government and to begin the drafting of a constitution.
(12) On September 18, 2005, the interim Iraqi National
Assembly completed negotiations on the draft constitution.
(13) On October 15, 2005, the Iraqi people approved the
draft constitution by a national referendum.
(14) On November 8, 2005, the United Nations Security
Council adopted Resolution 1637 (2005), extending the Coalition
Forces' military mandate, pursuant to United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1546 (2004), in Iraq to December 31, 2006.
(15) On November 18, 2005, the House of Representatives
failed to agree to H. Res. 571, expressing the sense of the
House of Representatives that the deployment of United States
forces in Iraq be terminated immediately, by a vote of 3 to
403, with six members voting present.
(16) On November 30, 2005, the President, through the
National Security Council, issued the National Strategy for
Victory in Iraq.
(17) On December 15, 2005, the people of Iraq voted to
elect the first permanent National Assembly in accordance with
the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq.
(18) On March 16, 2006, the newly-elected National Assembly
convened for their first session.
(19) On May 20, 2006, the Iraqi Prime Minister-designee
named a cabinet, except for the posts of Minister of Defense
and Minister of Interior, and the Prime Minister-designee and
the cabinet received a vote of confidence from the National
Assembly.
(20) On June 7, 2006, Iraq's National Assembly approved the
individuals that the Iraqi Prime Minister nominated for
Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, and National
Security Advisor, completing the formation of Iraq's first
permanent democratic government.
(21) On June 15, 2006, the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and
Hurricane Recovery, 2006 (Public Law 109-234), was enacted into
law, providing $400,000,000 for civil-military Provincial
Reconstruction Teams, composed of members of the United States
Armed Forces and Coalition Forces and personnel of the
Department of State, United States Agency for International
Development, Department of Justice, Department of Agriculture,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and contract personnel.
(22) On June 16, 2006, the House of Representatives agreed
to H. Res. 861, declaring that the United States will prevail
in the Global War on Terror, the struggle to protect freedom
from the terrorist adversary, by a vote of 256 to 153, with
five members voting present.
(23) On June 25, 2006, the Iraqi Prime Minister released a
24-point plan for national reconciliation.
(24) The Iraq Study Group was formed at the urging of
Congress, and the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Defense, the Global War On Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006
(Public Law 109-234), provided $1,000,000 for Iraq Study Group
operations.
(25) Members of the Iraq Study Group were appointed in
March 2006 and were responsible for providing a forward-
looking, independent assessment of the strategic environment in
and around Iraq, the security of Iraq and key challenges to
enhancing security within the country, political developments
within Iraq following the elections and formation of the new
government, the economy and reconstruction, and how the
situation in Iraq affects the surrounding region as well as
United States interests.
(26) On July 27, 2006, the Government of Iraq and the
United Nations, with the support of the World Bank, announced
the formal launch of a five-year international compact with
Iraq that, with the participation of other multilateral
organizations and countries, including the United States,
aims--
(A) to achieve a national vision for Iraq as a
united, federal, and democratic country;
(B) to consolidate peace and pursue political,
economic, and social development within Iraq, including
enhancing political inclusion and consensus-building
among its various demographic groups;
(C) to establish professional security forces to
serve the Iraqi people;
(D) to combat corruption within Iraq;
(E) to create a transparent and efficient oil
sector within Iraq;
(F) to develop a solid budgetary framework for the
Government of Iraq; and
(G) to improve governance by building and
consolidating effective national institutions for Iraq.
(27) On December 6, 2006, the Iraq Study Group released its
report titled, ``The Iraq Study Group Report''.
(28) On December 30, 2006, Saddam Hussein was executed by
the Government of Iraq.
(29) On January 10, 2007, the President addressed the
American people and provided a plan entitled ``The New Way
Forward in Iraq''.
SEC. 3. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.
Congress makes the following statements of policy:
(1) Congress recognizes that Operation Iraqi Freedom, the
deteriorating situation within Iraq, and the situation in the
Middle East region in general have become a significant test
of, and strain on, United States military, diplomatic, and
financial capacities, and United States national interests and
prestige.
(2) Congress remains supportive of and inspired by the
service and sacrifice made by and dedication and commitment to
the establishment of a democratic, stable, and prosperous Iraq
displayed by members of the United States Armed Forces and
civilian personnel in Iraq and by personnel serving world-wide
in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
(3) Congress remains supportive of and inspired by the
service and sacrifice made by and dedication and commitment to
the establishment of a democratic, stable, and prosperous Iraq
displayed by the military and civilian personnel of Coalition
countries serving in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and by
Iraqi patriots working toward a better future for their country
and the children of Iraq.
(4) Congress recognizes the achievements to date made by
the United States Armed Forces, Coalition Forces, Iraqi
Security Forces, and civilian personnel toward the political,
security, infrastructure, and economic development of and
governance capacity development at and between the various
levels of government in Iraq.
(5) Congress recognizes the efforts on the part of the
United States, Coalition countries, and the Government of Iraq
toward the establishment and maintenance of stable, peaceful,
productive, and conciliatory relations between Iraq and its
neighboring states, regional states, and the international
community.
(6) Congress recognizes the complex and interdependent
nature of the challenges associated with the political,
security, infrastructure, and economic development of and
governance capacity building at and between the various levels
of government in Iraq.
(7) Congress recognizes that, in order to aid the efforts
of civilian, United States Armed Forces, and Coalition Forces
personnel to establish a democratic, stable, and prosperous
Iraq and to address the complex and interdependent nature of
the challenges associated with the political, security,
infrastructure, and economic development of and governance
capacity building at and between the various levels of
government in Iraq, the civil-military Provincial
Reconstruction Teams were established in the various provinces
in Iraq to be the primary interface between United States and
Coalition countries and provincial governments throughout Iraq
to assist local Iraqi governing institutions, such as the
provincial councils, provincial governors, and local national
ministry representatives--
(A) to develop a transparent and sustained
capability to govern at the provincial level of
government in Iraq;
(B) to promote increased security and rule of law
within Iraq's provinces;
(C) to promote political and economic development
at the provincial level of government in Iraq; and
(D) to provide provincial-level government and
governance administration assistance necessary to help
meet the basic needs of a particular province.
(8) Congress supports the establishment and maintenance of
a democratic, pluralistic, federal, and united Government of
Iraq.
(9) Congress recognizes the importance of facilitating the
fullest participation practicable of Iraq's eligible voters in
national, provincial, and local elections to determine the
composition of provincial and local governing bodies necessary
for the establishment of good governance practices, peace, and
reconciliation in Iraq, and a stable and united Iraq.
(10) Congress urges elected Iraqis to renew their
commitment to establishing, preserving, and strengthening a
national unity government for Iraq and to govern in accordance
with the principles of a national unity government for Iraq.
(11) Congress is gravely concerned by the prospect that the
Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq may desire to declare
independence from Iraq.
(12) Congress is gravely concerned that, as a result of any
declaration of independence from Iraq made by the Kurdish
Regional Government in Iraq (or any future regional government
in Iraq), certain neighboring states may react to such a
declaration of independence with military force against Iraq.
(13) Congress notes that the provisions contained in
Article 140 of the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq require
the process to ``normalize'' the situation in the province of
Kirkuk to be completed by the end of calendar year 2007, but is
gravely concerned that the process called for by the provisions
of that Article cannot be implemented in an unbiased, uniform,
and equitable manner during calendar year 2007.
(14) Congress recognizes the importance that implementing,
in an unbiased, uniform, and equitable manner, the provisions
contained in Article 140 of the Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq has toward the establishment and maintenance of--
(A) peace and reconciliation in Iraq;
(B) stable, peaceful, productive, and conciliatory
relations between Iraq and certain neighboring states;
and
(C) a stable and united Iraq.
(15) Congress is gravely concerned about the extent to
which the process called for by the provisions of Article 140
of the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq can be implemented
by the Government of Iraq in an unbiased, uniform, and
equitable manner during calendar year 2007, to include a
description of, and justification for, actions needed to be
taken by the United States, Coalition countries, the Government
of Iraq, the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq, and the
provincial government of Kirkuk, neighboring and regional
governments, and the international community to ensure that
such process proceeds in an unbiased, uniform, and equitable
manner during calendar year 2007 or during future years.
(16) Congress is gravely concerned that continued violence
in Iraq could, or the division of Iraq along notional ethnic,
religious, or sectarian lines would, result in the heightened
ethnic, religious, and sectarian violence within that country,
to include incidences of ethnic-cleansing, and result in the
further destabilization of the Government of Iraq.
(17) Congress is gravely concerned by the possibility that
a divided or failed Iraqi state could form the keystone of a
geo-political bridge across the Middle East region, from which
a heightened incidence of acts of violence or acts of
intimidation against allies of the United States in the region
can be conducted, or otherwise financially or materially
supported, by certain states within the region, violent
transnational entities, or partnerships between certain states
within the region and violent transnational entities.
(18) Congress is gravely concerned by the potential
detrimental impacts a geo-political bridge formed by a failed
or divided Iraqi state would have across the Middle East region
if such a bridge is exploited by certain states within the
region, violent transnational entities, or partnerships of
certain states within the region and violent transnational
entities, as evidenced by reports that indicate that members of
Jaish al-Mahdi trained with members of Hezbollah in Lebanon and
fought together against Israeli Defense Forces in July and
August 2006.
(19) Congress is gravely concerned that certain states
within the Middle East region, violent transnational entities,
or partnerships of certain states within the region and violent
transnational entities could exploit a geo-political bridge
across the region to the detriment of national and economic
security interests of the United States and those of the
international community as a whole, including--
(A) disrupting the unimpeded access to hydro-carbon
resources essential to the functioning of modern
economies globally; and
(B) disrupting the unimpeded access to the
strategic lines of communication in the region across
and along which international commercial activity is
conducted.
(20) Congress is gravely concerned that a failed or divided
Iraq could provide a stronger base of operations for terrorists
who seek to act regionally or internationally.
(21) Congress is concerned about the fractured and
factional domestic political environment present today at and
between the various levels of government in Iraq.
(22) Congress finds that the fractured and factional
domestic political environment present in Iraq is the result,
in part, of the conflicting policies, priorities, and biases of
the various prominent ethnic, religious, and sectarian-oriented
political parties and elected and appointed leaders at and
between the various levels of government in Iraq.
(23) Congress is concerned that the development of
alternative, moderate political parties and leaders in Iraq,
that can represent broadly the interests of Iraqis from
multiple demographic groups and govern according to that broad
perspective, is impeded by the dominant influences of the
various ethnic, religious, and sectarian-oriented political
parties active in Iraq today.
(24) Congress affirms that the fractured and factional
domestic political environment present today at and between the
various levels of government in Iraq--
(A) contributes to incidences of violence against
United States Armed Forces, Coalition Forces, and Iraqi
Security Forces;
(B) creates a significant political barrier to the
establishment and maintenance of peace and
reconciliation in Iraq, that is necessary for the
establishment and maintenance of a stable and united
Iraq; and
(C) impedes the completion of Operation Iraqi
Freedom.
(25) Congress is concerned that various elected and
appointed officials, to include judicial branch officials,
within the various levels of government in Iraq, are not
fulfilling, to the extent possible, their chief responsibility
to conduct public business in an unbiased, uniform, and
equitable manner, in accordance with law, and for the public
good.
(26) Congress is concerned by reports that indicate that
government offices, the national ministries systems, and
independent agencies are unable or unwilling to resist
dominance by, and are divided between, beholden to, and guided
by the conflicting priorities, policies, and biases of, the
various prominent ethnic, religious, or sectarian political
parties in Iraq.
(27) Congress is particularly concerned by reports that
indicate that elected and appointed Iraqi Government officials,
acting upon direction from, and to benefit and promote, the
various prominent ethnic, religious, or sectarian political
parties and affiliated entities in Iraq--
(A) may abuse the budget authority of the various
offices, ministries, and agencies, to include the
direction of public funds to certain political parties
or certain individuals;
(B) may abuse personnel hiring practices of the
various offices, ministries, and agencies; and
(C) may abuse the contracting practices of the
various offices, ministries, and agencies.
(28) Congress recognizes that the inability or
unwillingness of elected and appointed officials within the
various levels of government in Iraq to deliver public sector
goods and services to all Iraqis in a unbiased, uniform, and
equitable manner--
(A) contributes to incidences of violence against
United States Armed Forces, Coalition Forces, and Iraqi
Security Forces;
(B) creates a significant political barrier to the
establishment and maintenance of peace and
reconciliation in Iraq, that is necessary for the
establishment and maintenance of a stable and united
Iraq; and
(C) impedes the completion of Operation Iraqi
Freedom.
(29) Congress is deeply concerned about the continued and
heightened incidence of violence and threats of violence
against United States Armed Forces, Coalition Forces, Iraqi
Security Forces, civilian personnel, and Iraqi civilians in
Iraq.
(30) Congress is gravely concerned about the increase in
ethnic, religious, and sectarian violence in Iraq following the
February 22, 2006, bombing of the Askariya mosque in Samarra,
Iraq, and about continued ethnic, religious, and sectarian
tensions across Iraq.
(31) Congress is gravely concerned about the increasing
power that unauthorized politically-aligned militias wield in
Iraq, their destabilizing effect on security in Iraq, and the
challenges they present to the development of professional
Iraqi Security Forces.
(32) Congress is gravely concerned that the various
prominent ethnic, religious, and sectarian political parties
active in Iraq today, through unauthorized, politically-aligned
militias, suborned or sympathetic elements of Iraqi Security
Forces, and suborned or sympathetic vigilante or criminal
groups, fight for the control and dominance of the various
levels of government in Iraq and aim to, and with the effect
of, separate governorates, cities, and neighborhoods along
ethnic, religious, and sectarian lines.
(33) Congress is concerned that the purposeful internal
separation of Iraqi society by violence, threat of violence, or
other means of intimidation pursued by the various prominent
ethnic, religious, and sectarian political parties in Iraq,
forces the Iraqi people into increasingly apparent ethnic,
religious, and sectarian divisions, or is in part the impetus
for significant emigration of Iraqis (particularly members of
the educated and professional classes of Iraqis essential to
the establishment and maintenance of civil society in Iraq) to
states within the Middle East region or the provinces within
Iraq governed by the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq.
(34) Congress is concerned that the continued and further
violent, internal separation of Iraqi society, pursued and
effected by the various prominent ethnic, religious, and
sectarian political parties abets and strengthens the extremist
elements of each party and destabilizes the security situation
countrywide.
(35) Congress considers that the various prominent ethnic,
religious, and sectarian political parties in Iraq are
complicit in the operations of the various politically-aligned
militias operating in Iraq today, and that the political
parties have the power and influence necessary to, and the
responsibility to, disarm, disband, and reintegrate such
militias into Iraqi society.
(36) Congress recognizes the importance that establishing a
political and governance compromise and reconciliation between
the various prominent ethnic, religious, and sectarian
political parties active in Iraq has toward--
(A) the successful recruitment, training, and
maintenance of professional, unbiased Iraqi Security
Forces;
(B) the effective administration of certain
national security oriented offices and ministries
systems; and
(C) the defeat of foreign terrorist organizations
operating in Iraq.
(37) Congress is gravely concerned that the uneven state of
readiness, capability, and willingness of Iraqi Security
Forces, led by the national security oriented offices and
ministries systems, to provide internal security for Iraq in an
unbiased, uniform, and equitable manner may require United
States Armed Forces and Coalition Forces personnel to remain in
Iraq for an extended period of time to provide both extensive
internal security training and assistance and the minimum of
unbiased internal security within that country.
(38) Congress is gravely concerned that a prolonged
commitment of United States Armed Forces to Iraq may adversely
affect the overall readiness of United States Armed Forces and
hamper its ability to provide adequate resources to United
States efforts in Afghanistan and its ability to adequately
respond to other contingencies around the world.
(39) Congress affirms that the absence of a lasting and
meaningful political compromise reached between the various
prominent ethnic, religious, and sectarian political parties in
Iraq and the uneven state of readiness, capability, and
willingness of Iraqi Security Forces, led by the national
security oriented offices and ministries systems, to provide
internal security services in Iraq in a unbiased, uniform, and
equitable manner across that country--
(A) contributes to incidences of violence against
United States Armed Forces, Coalition Forces, and Iraqi
Security Forces;
(B) creates a significant political barrier to the
establishment and maintenance of peace and
reconciliation in Iraq, that is necessary for the
establishment and maintenance of a stable and united
Iraq; and
(C) impedes the completion of Operation Iraqi
Freedom.
(40) Congress recognizes reported macroeconomic improvement
of Iraq's economy, but remains gravely concerned by reports
noting the prevalence of corruption in Iraq, the uneven
distribution of income, and high unemployment rates at and
between the various levels of government in Iraq.
(41) Congress is gravely concerned by reports that indicate
that the various prominent ethnic, religious, and sectarian-
oriented political parties active in Iraq exercise significant
control of Iraq's national revenues and expenditures to benefit
and promote the conflicting priorities, policies, and biases of
such political parties.
(42) Congress is gravely concerned that the significant
control of Iraq's national revenues and expenditures exercised
by the various prominent ethnic, religious, and sectarian-
oriented political parties active in Iraq impedes general
economic development at and between the various levels of
government in Iraq, limits economic opportunities for the Iraqi
people, and forces Iraqis into increasingly apparent ethnic,
religious, and sectarian divisions.
(43) Congress is gravely concerned that the national level
economic decisions on key issues, including the development and
modernization of Iraq's national energy industry,
infrastructure, resources and the utilization of the resultant
revenues, may result in unstable economic policies and
agreements that reflect the fractured and factional nature of
Iraq's current political environment and the ethnic, religious,
and sectarian bias present in governance in Iraq.
(44) Congress notes that the majority of United States
economic and infrastructure development assistance for Iraq has
been expended and has produced uneven economic results
countrywide and an uneven ability for the Government of Iraq to
operate and maintain both existing and newly constructed or
refurbished infrastructure.
(45) Congress further notes reports that indicate that the
Government of Iraq requires significant and sustained, but not
necessarily United States Government provided, economic
development and infrastructure in order to achieve vital
economic and infrastructure development.
(46) Congress urges the Government of Iraq to pursue, in an
unbiased, uniform, and equitable manner, policies to promote
the development of--
(A) a market-based economy in Iraq that increases
private-sector employment opportunities for Iraqi
workers;
(B) private-sector investment opportunities for
domestic and international investors; and
(C) a government budget process that reflects an
appropriate level of investment in the development of
and the continued operations and maintenance for Iraq's
national infrastructure and that provides for the
delivery of public goods and services to all Iraqis in
a unbiased, uniform, and equitable manner.
(47) Congress is gravely concerned that impeded general
economic development in Iraq, limited economic opportunities
for the Iraqi people, and increasingly apparent ethnic,
religious, and sectarian economic divisions within Iraq abets
and strengthens the extremist elements of each party and
destabilizes the security situation countrywide and--
(A) contributes to incidences of violence against
United States Armed Forces, Coalition Forces, and Iraqi
Security Forces;
(B) creates a significant political barrier to the
establishment and maintenance of peace and
reconciliation in Iraq, that is necessary for the
establishment and maintenance of a stable and united
Iraq; and
(C) impedes the completion of Operation Iraqi
Freedom.
(48) Congress recognizes the influence possessed by the
governments of Iraq's neighboring states, regional states,
states among the international community, and regional and
international multilateral organizations, toward facilitating
the establishment and maintenance of stable, peaceful,
productive, and conciliatory relations between Iraq and its
neighboring states, regional states, and the international
community as a whole.
(49) Congress recognizes the importance of engaging the
governments of Iraq's neighboring states (where appropriate),
regional states, states among the international community, and
regional and international multilateral organizations, toward
facilitating the establishment and maintenance of stable,
peaceful, productive, and conciliatory relations between Iraq
and its neighboring states, regional states, and the
international community as a whole.
(50) Congress recognizes the importance of the formation of
an international compact reached between the United States,
Coalition countries and the governments of Iraq's neighboring
states (where appropriate), regional states, states among the
international community, and regional and international
multilateral organizations, to help establish and maintain
stable, peaceful, productive, and conciliatory relations
between Iraq and its neighboring states, regional states, and
the international community as a whole, and to help establish
peace, reconciliation in, and to assure the stability of and
unity of, Iraq.
(51) Congress notes the recent formation of the
International Compact for Iraq between the Government of Iraq
and the United Nations, with the support of the World Bank, and
in which the United States and Coalition countries participate,
as evidence of the need and importance of regionalizing and
internationalizing solutions for Iraq's continued political,
security, infrastructure, and economic development of and
governance capacity building at and between the various levels
of government in Iraq.
(52) Congress notes that the vital measures and other
benchmarks identified by the President as necessary and
possible to achieve in order to complete Operation Iraqi
Freedom pursuant to the reporting requirements of section 4 of
this Act would establish a strong foundation for a multilateral
agreement with Coalition countries, the Republic of Iraq,
appropriate states in the Middle East region, and appropriate
multilateral organizations to help establish and maintain
stable, peaceful, productive, and conciliatory relations
between Iraq and its neighboring states, regional states, and
the international community as a whole and to help establish
peace, reconciliation in, and to assure the stability of and
unity of, Iraq.
(53) Congress finds that a prolonged absence of a
multilateral agreement with Coalition countries, the Republic
of Iraq, appropriate states in the Middle East region, and
appropriate multilateral organizations based on the vital
measures and other benchmarks identified by the President as
necessary and possible to achieve in order to complete
Operation Iraqi Freedom and pursuant to the findings of the
report required by section 4 of this Act and subject to
adjustment or other amendment, as provided for by subparagraphs
(A) and (B) of section 4(b)(2) of this Act--
(A) contributes to incidences of violence against
United States Armed Forces, Coalition Forces, and Iraqi
Security Forces;
(B) creates a significant political barrier to the
establishment and maintenance of peace and
reconciliation in Iraq, that is necessary for the
establishment and maintenance of a stable and united
Iraq; and
(C) impedes the completion of Operation Iraqi
Freedom.
(54) Congress is concerned that the United States and
Coalition countries will not be able to achieve their goals of
the establishment of a democratic, pluralistic, federal, and
united Government of Iraq that can provide security, good
governance, and improved economic opportunity for the people of
Iraq and maintain peaceful, productive, and conciliatory
relations with neighboring states, regional states, states
among the international community, and regional and
international multilateral organizations without the United
States and other countries simultaneously working toward
solving certain long-standing and ongoing conflicts elsewhere
in the Middle East region.
(55) Congress declares that the National Strategy for
Victory in Iraq as transmitted by the President to Congress on
November 30, 2005, is not specific regarding the vital measures
and other benchmarks in Iraq's political, security,
infrastructure, and economic development and governance
capacity development at and between the various levels of
government in Iraq that need to be met to signal to Congress
and the American people that victory in Iraq has been achieved
and the majority of United States Armed Forces currently
deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom can be redeployed to their
peacetime duty stations.
(56) Congress declares that the plan entitled ``The New Way
Forward in Iraq'', as presented to the American people by the
President on January 10, 2007, is not specific regarding the
vital measures and other benchmarks in Iraq's political,
security, infrastructure, and economic development and
governance capacity development at and between the various
levels of government in Iraq that need to be met to signal to
Congress and the American people that victory in Iraq has been
achieved and the majority of the United States Armed Forces
currently deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom can be redeployed
to their peacetime duty stations.
(57) Congress notes the findings of the reports submitted
to Congress pursuant to the section entitled ``Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq'' of the Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Committee of Conference accompanying
Conference Report 109-72 of the bill, H.R. 1268 (the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on
Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005; Public Law 109-13), that
identify security, economic, and Iraqi Security Force training
performance standards and goals, accompanied by a notional
timetable for achieving these goals.
(58) Congress notes the findings of the report submitted to
Congress pursuant to the United States Policy in Iraq Act
(section 1227 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006; Public Law 109-163), that identify the
current military mission and the diplomatic, political,
economic, and military measures that are being or have been
undertaken to successfully complete or support that mission.
(59) Congress notes the findings of the report submitted to
Congress pursuant to section 9010 of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2007 (division A of Public Law 109-289),
that include specific performance indicators and measures of
progress toward political, economic, and security stability in
Iraq, but also notes that the report is not a comprehensive,
single-source of content, information, data, and analysis about
the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United
States, Coalition countries, or the Government of Iraq that
Congress requires to fulfill its constitutional oversight
responsibilities.
(60) Congress is concerned that the findings of the reports
described in paragraphs (57), (58), and (59) do not provide
sufficient content, information, data, and analysis for
Congress to comprehensively evaluate the mission in Iraq.
(61) Congress notes the advantages of consolidating the
reports described in paragraphs (57), (58), and (59) into a
single report to be transmitted to Congress pursuant to section
4 of this Act.
(62) Congress urges that the reports transmitted pursuant
to section 4 of this Act be organized and written to provide
content, information, data, and analysis on the mission in Iraq
as it pertains to the political, security, infrastructure, and
economic development of and governance capacity building at and
between the various levels of government in Iraq.
(63) Congress further urges that the reports transmitted
pursuant to section 4 of this Act be organized and written to
provide content, information, data, and analysis on United
States and Coalition countries efforts to establish maintain,
stabilize, and conciliate relations between Iraq, neighboring
states, regional states, and the international community.
(64) Congress moreover urges that, if the President decides
not to adopt and implement some or all of the recommendations
offered by the Iraq Study Group in the Group's report, the
reports transmitted pursuant to section 4 of this Act should
include content, information, data, and analysis to explain and
justify the rationale as to why such recommendations were not
adopted and implemented.
(65) It is the duty of Congress under Article I, Section 8
of the United States Constitution to ``raise and support
Armies,'' and that by requiring the President to report to
Congress on Operation Iraqi Freedom, Congress is better able to
carry out this constitutional duty.
(66) Congress declares that satisfactory compliance with
the letter and spirit of the reports required to be transmitted
pursuant to section 4 of this Act, and compliance with the
intended quality of such reports, will provide Congress and the
American people a firm basis for which to consider and evaluate
the utility of continuing current, or providing for future,
economic, reconstruction, and other assistance to, or for the
benefit of, the Government of Iraq.
SEC. 4. REPORT.
(a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the President shall, in accordance with, in support of,
and to more clearly define the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq
and the plan entitled ``The New Way Forward in Iraq'', transmit to
Congress a report that--
(1) consolidates the findings of the reports required by--
(A) the section entitled ``Measuring Stability and
Security in Iraq'' of the Joint Explanatory Statement
of the Committee of Conference accompanying Conference
Report 109-72 of the bill, H.R. 1268 (the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005; Public Law
109-13);
(B) the United States Policy in Iraq Act (section
1227 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2006; Public Law 109-163); and
(C) section 9010 of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 2007 (division A of Public Law 109-
289);
(2) identifies the specific or vital measures or other
benchmarks that define the terms of the of completion of and
conditions for victory for Operation Iraqi Freedom and their
correlation with the strategic objectives and lines of action
outlined in the appendix of the National Strategy for Victory
in Iraq and the information provided in the plan entitled ``The
New Way Forward in Iraq'';
(3) describes the nature and substance of the programs
implemented to achieve such strategic objectives and lines of
action; and
(4) analyzes using metrics the effectiveness of such
programs toward achieving the specific vital measures or other
benchmarks required to be identified by paragraph (2).
(b) Update.--
(1) In general.--The President shall transmit to Congress
an update of the report required by subsection (a) not less
than once every 90 days after the date on which the President
transmits the report required by such subsection until such
time as Operation Iraqi Freedom has been completed.
(2) Contents.--Each update of the report--
(A) may reflect adjustments to the specific or
vital measures or other benchmarks identified pursuant
to subsection (a)(2), or to the nature or substance of
the programs described in subsection (a)(3), as
realties, circumstances, and events in Iraq change or
evolve;
(B) shall include detailed justifications as to why
adjustments to such specific or vital measures or other
benchmarks, or to the nature or substance of such
programs, were made; and
(C) shall include detailed information regarding
the progress toward implementing the multilateral
agreement required by section 5 of this Act.
(c) Additional Requirements.--The report required by subsection (a)
and updates of the report required by subsection (b)--
(1) shall be organized and written to provide content,
information, data, and analysis on the complex interdependent
nature of the challenges associated with the political,
security, infrastructure, and economic development of and
governance capacity building at and between the various levels
of government in Iraq, and to include efforts on the part of
the United States and Coalition countries to establish,
maintain, stabilize, and conciliate relations between Iraq,
neighboring states, regional states, and the international
community;
(2) shall be accompanied by a comprehensive all-source
intelligence analysis of Iraq that includes information by and
from the various levels of government in Iraq, and to include
efforts on the part of the United States and Coalition
countries to establish, maintain, stabilize, and conciliate
relations between Iraq, neighboring states, regional states,
and the international community;
(3) shall be accompanied by an analysis of the extent to
which the process called for by the provisions of Article 140
of the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq can be implemented
by the Government of Iraq in an unbiased, uniform, and
equitable manner during calendar year 2007, to include a
description of, and justification for, actions needed to be
taken by the United States, Coalition countries, the Government
of Iraq, the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq, and the
provincial government of Kirkuk, neighboring and regional
governments, and the international community to ensure that
such process proceeds in a unbiased, uniform, and equitable
manner during calendar year 2007 or during future years; and
(4) shall, if the President decides not to adopt and
implement some or all of the recommendations offered by the
Iraq Study Group in the Group's report, include content, data,
information, and analysis to explain and justify the rationale
as to why such recommendations were not adopted and
implemented.
(d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) and updates of the
report required by subsection (b) shall be transmitted in unclassified
form but may contain a classified annex.
SEC. 5. MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT TO HELP PROVIDE FOR THE COMPLETION OF
OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.
(a) Multilateral Agreement.--Not later than 45 days after the date
on which the report required by section 4(a) of this Act is transmitted
to Congress pursuant to such section, the President shall seek to enter
into a multilateral agreement with Coalition countries, the Republic of
Iraq, appropriate states in the Middle East region, and appropriate
multilateral organizations to help provide for the completion of
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
(b) Terms.--It is the sense of Congress that, to the maximum extent
practicable, the terms of the multilateral agreement referred to in
subsection (a) should--
(1) be based upon the findings of the report required by
section 4 of this Act; and
(2) be subject to adjustment or other amendment, as
provided for by subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 4(b)(2) of
this Act, if appropriate and agreed to by the signatory
parties.
SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Coalition countries.--The term ``Coalition countries''
means those countries identified by the Department of State and
Department of Defense as contributing military forces,
materiel, diplomatic support, and economic, technical, and
training assistance to the Government of Iraq in support of
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
(2) Coalition forces.--The term ``Coalition Forces'' means
the military forces of Coalition countries operating in support
of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
(3) Unbiased, uniform, and equitable manner.--The term
``unbiased, uniform, and equitable manner'' means without
regard to religion, race, ethnic identity, gender, age, or
geographic location.
(4) Various levels of government in iraq.--The term
``various levels of government in Iraq'' means the national,
capital city, regional, provincial, provincial capital city,
and strategic municipal levels of government in Iraq.
(5) Violent transnational entity.--The term ``violent
transnational entity'' means a global, regional, or local
entity that threatens the national security of the United
States by acts or threats of violence, terrorism, illicit
trafficking of arms (to include nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons and technology), piracy, or international
organized crime (to include financial transactions, the
smuggling of narcotics or persons, uncontrolled refugee
migration, and environmental damage conducted across
international borders).
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