[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 787 Introduced in House (IH)]
110th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 787
To state United States policy for Iraq, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
January 31, 2007
Mr. Thompson of California (for himself and Mr. Patrick J. Murphy of
Pennsylvania) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committees on
Foreign Affairs and Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined
by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as
fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To state United States policy for Iraq, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Iraq War De-Escalation Act of
2007''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Congress and the Nation honor the courage, sacrifices,
and efforts of the members of the Armed Forces of the United
States and their families.
(2) In his speech to the Nation on January 10, 2007,
President George W. Bush said that ``I've made it clear to the
Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's
commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi government does not
follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the
American people. . . . The Prime Minister understands this''.
(3) In that speech, President George W. Bush also told the
Nation that ``America will hold the Iraqi government to the
benchmarks it has announced. . . . [T]o take responsibility for
security in all of Iraq's provinces by November. To give every
Iraqi citizen a stake in the country's economy, Iraq will pass
legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis. To show
that it is committed to delivering a better life, the Iraqi
government will spend $10,000,000,000 of its own money on
reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new
jobs. To empower local leaders, Iraqis plan to hold provincial
elections later this year. And to allow more Iraqis to re-enter
their nation's political life, the government will reform de-
Baathification laws, and establish a fair process for
considering amendments to Iraq's constitution''.
(4) In that speech, President George W. Bush also told the
Nation that ``only Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and
secure their people''.
(5) On December 18, 2006, former Secretary of State Colin
Powell stated: ``[s]o we have tried this surge of troops over
the summer. I am not persuaded that another surge of troops in
Baghdad for the purpose of suppressing this communitarian
violence, this civil war, will work''.
(6) On November 15, 2006, General John Abizaid, Commander
of the United States Central Command, stated before the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that ``I met with
every divisional commander, General Casey, the corps commander,
General Dempsey. We all talked together. And I said, in your
professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American
troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve
success in Iraq? And they all said no. And the reason is,
because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's easy for the Iraqis
to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more American
forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more
responsibility for their own future''.
(7) In testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate on January 11, 2007, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice stated that unless the Government of Iraq has
met certain benchmarks and reestablishes the confidence of the
Iraqi people over the next several months, ``this plan is not
going to work''.
(8) In a statement on January 11, 2007, Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates stated ``[a]nd we will probably have a
better view a couple of months from now in terms of whether we
are making headway in terms of getting better control of
Baghdad, with the Iraqis in the lead and with the Iraqis
beginning to make better progress on the reconciliation
process''.
(9) The bipartisan Iraq Study Group headed by former
Secretary of State James Baker and former Representative Lee
Hamilton reached a bipartisan consensus on 79 separate
recommendations for a new approach in Iraq. Among those
recommendations were calling for a new diplomatic offensive in
the region and conditioning American economic assistance to
Iraq on specific benchmarks, with the expectation that ``by the
first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in
the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not
necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq''.
(10) In reaction to the speech of President George W. Bush
of January 10, 2007, former Secretary of State Baker and former
Representative Hamilton wrote that ``[t]he President did not
suggest the possibility of a transition that could enable U.S.
combat forces to begin to leave Iraq. The President did not
state that political, military, or economic support for Iraq
would be conditional on the Iraq government's ability to meet
benchmarks. Within the region, the President did not announce
an international support group for Iraq including all of Iraq's
neighbors. . .''.
(b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are as follows:
(1) To formulate and provide for the implementation of an
effective United States policy towards Iraq and the Middle East
region that employs military, political, diplomatic, and
economic assets to promote and protect the national security
interests of the United States.
(2) To provide for the implementation of a responsible,
phased redeployment of the Armed Forces of the United States
from Iraq in a substantial and gradual manner that places the
highest priority on protecting the lives of members of the
Armed Forces and civilian personnel of the United States and on
promoting the national security interests of the United States
in the Middle East region.
(3) To urge the political parties and leaders of Iraq to
reach the political solution necessary to promote stability in
Iraq and enhance the safety of innocent Iraqi civilians.
(4) To condition future economic assistance to the
Government of Iraq on significant progress toward the
achievement of political and economic measures to be taken by
the Government of Iraq.
(5) To provide for the initiation of a wider and sustained
diplomatic strategy aimed at promoting a political settlement
in Iraq, thereby ending the civil war in Iraq, preventing a
humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq, and preventing a wider
regional conflict.
(6) To provide, through sections 4 through 7, for the
implementation of key recommendations of the Iraq Study Group,
a bipartisan panel of experts co-chaired by former Secretary of
State James Baker and former Representative Lee Hamilton.
SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE FORCE LEVELS FOR UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES IN
IRAQ.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the levels of the Armed
Forces of the United States in Iraq after the date of the enactment of
this Act shall not exceed the levels of such forces in Iraq as of
January 10, 2007, without specific authority in statute enacted by
Congress after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 4. REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES FROM IRAQ.
(a) Redeployment.--
(1) Deadline for commencement of redeployment.--Except as
otherwise provided in this section, the phased redeployment of
the Armed Forces of the United States from Iraq shall commence
not later than May 1, 2007.
(2) Scope and manner of redeployment.--The redeployment of
the Armed Forces under this section shall be substantial, shall
occur in a gradual manner, and shall be executed at a pace to
achieve the goal of the complete redeployment of all United
States combat brigades from Iraq by March 31, 2008, consistent
with the expectation of the Iraq Study Group, if all the
matters set forth in subsection (b)(1)(B) are not met by such
date, subject to the exceptions for retention of forces for
force protection, counter-terrorism operations, training of
Iraqi forces, and other purposes as contemplated by subsection
(g).
(3) Formulation of plan with military commanders.--The
redeployment of the Armed Forces under this section should be
conducted pursuant to a plan formulated by United States
military commanders that is developed, if practicable, in
consultation with the Government of Iraq.
(4) Protection of united states forces and civilian
personnel.--In carrying out the redeployment of the Armed
Forces under this section, the highest priority shall be
afforded to the safety of members of the Armed Forces and
civilian personnel of the United States in Iraq.
(b) Suspension of Redeployment.--
(1) In general.--The President may suspend, on a temporary
basis as provided in paragraph (2), the redeployment of the
Armed Forces under this section if the President certifies to
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives that--
(A) doing so is in the national security interests
of the United States; and
(B) the Government of Iraq--
(i) has lifted all restrictions concerning
non-interference in operations of the Armed
Forces of the United States in Iraq and does so
on a continuing basis;
(ii) is making significant progress in
reducing sectarian violence in Iraq and in
reducing the size and operational effectiveness
of sectarian militias in Iraq;
(iii) is making significant progress
towards removing militia elements from the
Iraqi Army, National Police, Facilities
Protection Services, and other security forces
of the Government of Iraq;
(iv) has enacted legislation or established
other binding mechanisms to ensure the sharing
of all Iraqi oil revenues among all segments of
Iraqi society in an equitable manner;
(v) is making significant progress towards
making available not less than $10,000,000,000
for reconstruction, job creation, and economic
development in Iraq, with safeguards to prevent
corruption, by January 10, 2008;
(vi) has deployed at least 18 Iraqi Army
and National Police brigades to Baghdad and is
effectively ensuring that such units are
performing their security and police functions
in all Baghdad neighborhoods, regardless of
their sectarian composition;
(vii) has enacted legislation or
established other binding mechanisms to revise
its de-Baathification laws to encourage the
employment in the Government of Iraq of
qualified Iraqi professionals, irrespective of
ethnic or political affiliation, including ex-
Baathists who were not leading figures of the
Saddam Hussein regime;
(viii) has established a fair process for
considering amendments to the constitution of
Iraq that promote lasting national
reconciliation in Iraq;
(ix) is making significant progress towards
assuming full responsibility for security in
all the provinces of Iraq by November 30, 2007;
(x) is making significant progress towards
holding free and fair provincial elections in
Iraq at the earliest date practicable, but not
later than December 31, 2007;
(xi) is making substantial progress towards
increasing the size and effectiveness of
Ministry of Defense forces as described on page
11 of ``Highlights of the Iraq Strategy
Review'' published by the National Security
Council in January 2007;
(xii) is making significant progress in
reforming and strengthening the civilian
ministries and other government institutions
that support the Iraqi Army and National
Police; and
(xiii) is making significant progress
towards reforming its civilian ministries to
ensure that they are not administered on a
sectarian basis and that government services
are delivered in an even-handed and non-
sectarian manner.
(2) Period of suspension.--A suspension of the redeployment
of the Armed Forces under this subsection, including any
renewal of the suspension under paragraph (3), shall be for a
period not to exceed 90 days.
(3) Renewal.--A suspension of the redeployment of the Armed
Forces under this subsection may be renewed. Any such renewal
shall include a certification to the officers referred to in
paragraph (1) on the matters set forth in clauses (i) through
(xiii) of subparagraph (B) of that paragraph.
(c) Disapproval of Suspension.--
(1) Disapproval.--If Congress enacts a joint resolution
disapproving the suspension of the redeployment of the Armed
Forces under subsection (b), or any renewal of the suspension,
the suspension shall be discontinued, and the redeployment of
the Armed Forces from Iraq under this section shall resume.
(2) Procedures for consideration of joint resolutions.--
(A) Joint resolution defined.--For purposes of this
subsection, the term ``joint resolution'' means only a
joint resolution introduced not later than 10 days
after the date on which a certification of the
President under subsection (b) is received by Congress,
the matter after the resolving clause of which is as
follows: ``That Congress disapproves the certification
of the President submitted to Congress under section
4(b) of the Iraq War De-Escalation Act of 2007, on
_______.'', the blank space being filled in with the
appropriate date.
(B) Procedures.--A joint resolution described in
paragraph (1) shall be considered in a House of
Congress in accordance with the procedures applicable
to joint resolutions under paragraphs (3) through (8)
of section 8066(c) of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1985 (as enacted by section 101(h)
of Public Law 98-473; 98 Stat. 1936).
(d) Reports to Congress.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the
President shall submit to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a report
describing and assessing--
(A) the progress made by the Government of Iraq on
each of the matters set forth in subsection (b)(1)(B);
and
(B) the progress of the redeployment required by
subsection (a).
(2) Form.--Each report under this subsection shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(e) Sense of Congress on Location of Redeployment.--It is the sense
of Congress that, in redeploying the Armed Forces from Iraq under this
section, appropriate units of the Armed Forces should be redeployed--
(1) to the United States;
(2) to Afghanistan, in order to enhance United States
military operations in that country;
(3) elsewhere in the region, to serve as an over-the-
horizon force to prevent the conflict in Iraq from becoming a
wider war, to reassure allies of the United States of the
commitment of the United States to remain engaged in the
region, and to position troops to strike directly at al-Qaeda;
and
(4) elsewhere, to meet urgent United States security needs.
(f) Political Solution in Iraq.--The United States should use the
redeployment of the Armed Forces under this section, and the possible
suspension of such redeployment if the benchmarks set forth in
subsection (b) are met, as a tool to press the Iraqi leaders to promote
national reconciliation among ethnic and religious groups in Iraq in
order to establish stability in Iraq.
(g) Retention of Certain Forces in Iraq.--
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding the requirement for the
redeployment of the Armed Forces under subsection (a) and
subject to the provisions of this subsection, personnel of the
Armed Forces of the United States may be in Iraq after the
completion of the redeployment of the Armed Forces under this
section for the following purposes:
(A) To protect United States personnel and
facilities in Iraq.
(B) To conduct targeted counter-terrorism
operations.
(C) To provide training for Iraqi security forces.
(D) To conduct the routine functions of the Office
of Defense Attache.
(2) Certification.--Personnel of the Armed Forces may not
be retained in Iraq under this subsection unless the President
certifies to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives that--
(A) the retention of the Armed Forces in Iraq is
necessary for one or more of the purposes set forth in
paragraph (1); and
(B) the utilization of Armed Forces positioned
outside Iraq could not result in the effective
achievement of such purpose or purposes.
(3) Disapproval of retention.--If Congress enacts a joint
resolution disapproving the retention of personnel of the Armed
Forces in Iraq under this subsection, or any renewal of the
retention, the retention of such personnel in Iraq shall be
discontinued, and such personnel shall be redeployed from Iraq.
(4) Procedures for consideration of joint resolutions.--
(A) Joint resolution defined.--For purposes of
paragraph (3), the term ``joint resolution'' means only
a joint resolution introduced not later than 10 days
after the date on which a certification of the
President under paragraph (2) is received by Congress,
the matter after the resolving clause of which is as
follows: ``That Congress disapproves the certification
of the President submitted to Congress under section
4(g)(2) of the Iraq War De-Escalation Act of 2007, on
_______.'', the blank space being filled in with the
appropriate date.
(B) Procedures.--A joint resolution described in
subparagraph (A) shall be considered in a House of
Congress in accordance with the procedures applicable
to joint resolutions under paragraphs (3) through (8)
of section 8066(c) of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1985 (as enacted by section 101(h)
of Public Law 98-473; 98 Stat. 1936).
(h) No Permanent Bases.--Congress hereby reaffirms section 1519 of
the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
(Public Law 109-364; 120 Stat. 2444), and related provisions of law,
that prohibit the establishment of military installations or bases for
the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States
Armed Forces in Iraq.
SEC. 5. INTENSIFICATION OF TRAINING OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES.
It shall be the policy of the United States to immediately
formulate and implement a plan that--
(1) with the Government of Iraq--
(A) removes militia elements from the Iraqi Army,
National Police, and other security forces of the
Government of Iraq; and
(B) puts such forces in charge of maintaining
security in Iraq;
(2) focuses and intensifies United States efforts on
training such forces; and
(3) presses the Government of Iraq to reform the civilian
ministries and other government institutions that support the
Iraqi Army, National Police, local police, and judicial system.
SEC. 6. AVAILABILITY OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQ.
(a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), after May 1,
2007, economic assistance may be furnished to the Government of Iraq
only if the President submits to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a certification
that the Government of Iraq--
(1) is making measurable progress toward providing not less
than $10,000,000,000 of Iraqi funds for reconstruction, job
creation, and economic development in Iraq, with safeguards to
prevent corruption, by January 10, 2008;
(2) is making progress toward meeting the conditions set
forth in the International Compact for Iraq and in the stand-by
agreement with the International Monetary Fund; and
(3) is making progress toward reducing sectarian violence
and promoting national reconciliation.
(b) Exceptions.--The limitation in subsection (a) shall not apply
to assistance for Iraq as follows:
(1) Humanitarian assistance.
(2) Assistance to address urgent security and employment
needs.
(c) Assessment of Progress.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction shall submit to Congress a
report describing the progress of the Government of Iraq on each matter
set forth in subsection (a).
SEC. 7. REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES ON IRAQ.
(a) Policy of the United States.--It shall be the policy of the
United States to undertake comprehensive regional and international
initiatives, involving key nations, that will assist the Government of
Iraq in achieving the purposes of this Act, including promoting a
political settlement among the Iraqi people, ending the civil war in
Iraq, preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq, and preventing a
regional conflict.
(b) Special Envoy.--The President should, not later than 60 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, appoint a special envoy
for Iraq to carry out the policy set forth in subsection (a).
(c) Strategy on Preventing Wider Regional War.--
(1) Strategy.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives a report setting forth a strategy for
preventing the conflict in Iraq from becoming a wider regional
war.
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
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