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**EXECUTIVE SESSIONS OF THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
TOGETHER WITH JOINT SESSIONS WITH THE
SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
(HISTORICAL SERIES)**

VOLUME XIX

NINETIETH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

1967



MADE PUBLIC 2007

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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PREFACE

“You certainly are getting more than your share of crises,” one senator commiserated with Secretary of State Dean Rusk during an executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee in 1967. Although national attention necessarily focused on the war in Vietnam, where the United States had sent a half million troops and spent billions of dollars to fight a war that had come to seem endless, foreign policy crises were erupting around the world that year at an alarming rate.

Members of the Foreign Relations Committee displayed mounting skepticism about Vietnam, discounting the overly optimistic reports they received from the State Department and from U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Elsworth Bunker. Increasingly, committee members looked toward a negotiated settlement as more likely than a military victory in Vietnam. Because of such attitudes, the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson kept the committee at arm’s length on anything related to the war. Secretary Rusk cancelled scheduled appearances to testify so often during the year that Senator Albert Gore, Sr., complained of seriously impaired communications between the committee and the State Department. Instead of Vietnam, therefore, the committee devoted its hearings to the state of the world, from a coup in Greece to a war in the Middle East and a rebellion in the Congo. However, members always kept in mind the potential connections between the Vietnam war and events occurring elsewhere.

Committee members worried that America’s preoccupation with Vietnam could serve as an invitation to troublemaking in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe. Committee chairman J. William Fulbright cited involvement in Southeast Asia as having hindered the United States’ response to the “Six-Day War” between Israel and its Arab neighbors. “I do not hesitate to make a decision that the Middle East is far more important to the security of this country than Vietnam,” Senator Fulbright lectured Secretary Rusk—who earlier that year had assured the committee he did not foresee a war in the Middle East. In his own explanation of the world situation, Secretary Rusk insisted that the United States was fighting communist aggression where it existed, not communism as an ideology in the abstract. He wanted to assure the committee that despite the war, the Johnson administration sought detente with the Soviet Union, but committee members remained dubious. By the year’s end, Senator Claiborne Pell chided an assistant secretary of state that the administration seemed to see everything that happened anywhere as “one vast Communist plot, and that what went

on in any part of the world had its effect in any other part of the world because the strings are all being pulled from one place.”

Through its hearings, the committee also demonstrated concern over the “militarization” of U.S. foreign policy. Subcommittees devoted a great deal of time to examining arms sales in the Middle East and in the Indian-Pakistani territorial disputes, and followed closely the development of anti-ballistic missile systems and the negotiations for nuclear non-proliferation. Senator Eugene McCarthy complained that the Johnson administration had embraced an arms sales philosophy that unless the United States sold arms to other countries it would lose its influence over the policies of those countries.

Vietnam and its larger implications caused committee members to ponder the Senate’s constitutional responsibilities over foreign policy. When President Johnson sent planes to the Congo, Senator Fulbright raised the possibility of the president sending as many troops as he wanted without congressional authorization. “I do not see that it would be entirely inconsistent with Vietnam or any other place,” the chairman said to Secretary Rusk. “How many did you send to the Dominican Republic? You sent 22,000. You could have sent 100,000 if you wanted. I do not know why you could not send 100,000 or 200,000 into the Congo if you thought it desirable.” He added, “I do not know where you draw the line here.” During another closed committee meeting, Senator Fulbright complained to his colleagues: “I get fed up with being told we are committed to something all the time,” simply because the president said the nation is committed. That was not what he meant by commitment, Fulbright asserted: “I think the commitment is something that is taken by the Congress and the Executive, not just a unilateral action.”

Committee members of both parties agreed that a Republican Policy Committee report had asked the single pertinent question of the year: what is our national interest in Southeast Asia? For all their efforts, the committee could never get a satisfactory response from the Johnson administration. Admitting his mistake in supporting the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and his assumption that President Johnson had not intended to widen the war, Fulbright lamented that the war had “grown so gradually that we never have been able quite to get the full impact of where we are going.” That sense of drift and helplessness pervades these hearings.

The selection of transcripts for these volumes represents the editor’s choice of the material possessing the most usefulness and interest for the widest audience. Subheads, editorial notes, and some documents discussed in the hearings, are added to bring the events into perspective. Any material deleted (other than “off the record” references for which no transcripts were made) has been noted in the appropriate places, and transcripts not included are represented by minutes of those sessions, in chronological sequences. Unpublished transcripts and other records of the committee for 1967 are deposited at the National Archives, where they are available to researchers under the access rules of that agency. Some transcripts may require further declassification procedures.

In accordance with the general policy of the series, portions of the volumes were submitted to the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency for review and comment.

The Foreign Relations Committee extends its appreciation to the Senate Committee on Armed Services for its cooperation in approving the release of those sessions in which its members participated.

This volume was prepared for publication by Donald A. Ritchie of the Senate Historical Office.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.

FUTURE HEARINGS

Wednesday, January 11, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:20 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Church, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Mundt.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Henderson of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the committee will come to order. We have a quorum here.

Congratulations to everybody and the committee in particular. We have a quorum the first morning.

REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE

Well, gentlemen, the main purpose of this is just to discuss a variety of things. One of the letters I suppose we ought to take up first is Senator Mansfield's. I have a letter here signed yesterday addressed to me about Senate Resolution 300 which was introduced last summer regarding how a substantial reduction in U.S. forces permanently stationed in Europe can be made without adversely affecting either our resolve or agreement to meet our commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty.

This letter was addressed to me personally, asking if I wished to join in its sponsorship, but the reason I bring it up here—

Senator MUNDT. Who wrote the letter?

The CHAIRMAN. Mike Mansfield. He introduced the resolution last summer.

The reason I am bringing it up here is not whether I should sign it or not but is about its procedure. He proposes, I think, to take this up on the floor without any committee dealing.

Now, when this matter was considered before on increasing from two to six, we had extensive hearings. This committee and Armed Services.

As a procedural matter it seems to me very bad not to send this kind of resolution to some committee because, well from your point of view, no Republicans participated. This came out of the Democratic Policy Committee. If we start the precedent of resolutions going direct to the floor from the Policy Committee, it seems to me it is very objectionable.

What I thought, if the committee thought well of it, was for the committee to authorize me to write a letter requesting that it be submitted to this committee.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a very brief comment that I have prepared on this matter. It is my hope that we can confirm the Mansfield resolution relative to troop assignment to NATO—

The CHAIRMAN. Speak a little louder. I cannot hear you.

Senator MORSE. It is my hope that we can confirm the Mansfield resolution relative to troop assignments to NATO and that it will be referred to this committee. Since the committee held extensive hearings last year on NATO, additional hearings may not be necessary although there have been rather dramatic changes in Germany and in German attitudes toward Eastern Europe since our hearings. In any case, I think the resolution should be referred to this committee and reported out before it goes before the Senate.

ROLE OF THE POLICY COMMITTEE

The Party Policy Committee should not become a substitute for a standing legislative committee, and I agree with the Chairman that I think that a resolution of this importance should be submitted to the committee first and not go to the floor of the Senate.

As you know, that has been my position for many years in the Senate, that committees should not be by-passed. You always have the protection, if it becomes necessary, of sending a legislative matter to a committee under instructions and you always have the protection of discharging a committee if the committee seeks to bury the legislation.

But I speak respectfully, I think if this is still the position of the majority leader, and I am surprised it is, because I thought I read in the paper some time ago a statement attributed to him that he was not insisting on the matter going directly to the floor.

The CHAIRMAN. I make it clear this letter does not insist on it. But I thought it was his idea before that it do that, and I was anticipating this question and that is why I brought it here. He did expect it to be taken up, I think, last summer without going to the committee.

Senator MORSE. He did. He made this argument, but I only want to say, and I close, that I would support the suggestion of the chairman that the letter be sent to the majority leader advising that it go to the Foreign Relations Committee to hear it.

In fairness to the Armed Services Committee, I want to say it may very well be that it should go to the Foreign Relations Committee and then to the Armed Services Committee or possibly that we have joint hearings on it, but I do not think that the Foreign Relations Committee should give up what I think is its right to pass on this resolution because of its clear foreign policy import.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I fully agree with what has been said, with what you say and what Senator Morse says.

PROBLEMS WITH JOINT HEARINGS

Personally, I would just like to see it referred to this committee with the idea that we could act on it and then refer it to the Armed

Services Committee, if we felt proper, rather than having joint hearings. Those hearings were pretty painful proceedings.

The CHAIRMAN. There are too many people.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, and if it is authorized I will make a motion to the effect that the chairman be instructed to follow that course.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is in order.

Is there any further discussion?

Senator Hickenlooper?

MILITARY V. FOREIGN POLICY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have some reservations on this. First, I thoroughly agree that under no circumstances should this—if we can prevent it—resolution go directly to the floor from a strictly party committee such as the Republican Policy Committee or the Democrat Policy Committee, or anything else. I think it is a terrible practice.

Number two, I would like to hear a little bit more justification why it should go to this committee rather than the Armed Services Committee. I think maybe it should, at least we should have something to say about it, but it seems to me that the question of the reduction in force in Europe under an alliance agreement, and that is what it is over there, that is primarily either a professional area or a top executive area discussion on national defense.

Senator MORSE. Would you yield, Bourke, on that point?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I just want to have some discussion, I am not committed.

Senator MORSE. I only make a one sentence comment. The original commitment came from this committee. The original NATO commitment was a Foreign Relations Committee matter.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We do not handle the military conduct of the war; we may sign a treaty.

Senator MORSE. But there is no question of military under this treaty because it is the relationship to foreign policy.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think this is wrapped up in foreign policy implications.

A POLITICAL MATTER

The CHAIRMAN. I think so, too. To me this is not a war. This is political judgment as to the relationship between Western Europe, ourselves, and Russia. The reason for NATO really was fear of invasion of Western Europe by Russia and this entails, in my view, essentially a political judgment as to what those relations are now and whether or not there is justification for the continuation of, well, NATO as such, and certainly how much you do in pursuance of NATO.

I would think as between the two this is far more a political matter at this stage than it is military.

Frank was the NATO man last year. What do you say?

Senator CHURCH. Well, I would agree with that, Mr. Chairman, particularly inasmuch as the level of troops to be maintained there turns on political considerations fully as much as military considerations. In fact, the major arguments for retaining so large a force had been based in recent years not upon a military assessment, but

rather upon the political consequences of reductions, particularly West Germany, and of course the whole Gaullist attitude toward the disposition of American forces is a political one.

It seems to me that it is all inextricably bound into foreign policy considerations.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Pennsylvania.

INTERNAL SENATE POLITICS

Senator CLARK. I would certainly support this motion, but I am a little bit concerned about the internal Senate politics of this and wondering whether we cannot get off on perhaps a little better foot in this session than we have sometimes in the past. Whether it would be desirable for the chairman before he writes a letter to sit down with Dick Russell and Senator Mansfield and see if some amicable arrangement agreeable to all three could be worked out.

Now, Stuart is not here; he wants to come. Maybe I am not as good a mind reader as I think I am, but he is on both Armed Services and this committee, and I suspect that he would be a little bit upset if we were to assert sole jurisdiction.

John Sparkman will remember that at that meeting of the NATO Parliamentarians in Paris in November, which he and I both attended, there were a couple of pretty belligerent fellows from the House of Representatives who really kind of took the point of view that NATO is primarily a military alliance. They were not much in favor of any efforts to get a better relationship either with de Gaulle—you remember at that briefing, John, those fellows gave Chip Bohlen and Cleveland such a bad time, and I know that the NATO Parliamentarian group is kind of split on the political committee which would rather switch than fight and the military committee which wanted to relieve tensions. I believe it might be worthwhile to see if we cannot work out an arrangement with the Armed Services.

I agree that joint hearings are kind of rough. There are too many people. But maybe some sort of genius can come along which would work out a friendly relationship, either refer it here first and there second, or get some kind of an agreement that a committee of the two committees should sit, just in the interests of hoping that the 90th Congress will not get off on yackety yack between the Armed Services and the Foreign Relations Committees which we are going to have on Vietnam anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a good suggestion. I would like to work it out, and I do not think you meant to be exclusive.

Senator MORSE. Not at all. I made the point maybe we ought to have joint meetings.

The CHAIRMAN. I would object because they are unwieldy and difficult to conduct when you have got that many people. And I would think it would be better to have it here and then Armed Services.

What do you think about that? I think Joe has a point.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think it is a good idea.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to have a row and have a contest right off the bat. Do you think it would just be better I talk to Mike Mansfield about it? But I would like to be able to say the committee feels it ought to come here.

Is there anybody who does not feel that way?

ADVISE THE LEADERSHIP

Senator MORSE. I think, Mr. Chairman, that you ought to talk to Mike and also talk to Everett Dirksen and probably the two of them together. I am sure they do not agree but nevertheless I think that it is important that the minority leader be advised, too.

Senator CLARK. Do you not think you ought to talk to Dick, too?

Senator MORSE. I think that was agreed.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you feel about that? I do not want to say. Do you feel they ought to come here?

USURPATION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I feel we have an interest in it, but I feel that probably 60 percent of the interest is in the Armed Services Committee or should be, and I go a step further. We have noticed in the last year or two or three the usurpation of certain fields of activity that ought to be in the Foreign Relations Committee taken up by other committees, and we get our tail over the dashboard a little bit on that. I guess there is not much we can do about that. But we can, of course—this may be the committee's area of responsibility, but we are getting into other fields, I suppose. I just feel that 40 percent of it is probably here and 60 percent belongs to Armed Services Committee. I think both committees ought to take a look at it, but not with a joint meeting. I agree it is almost impossible to get any satisfactory results.

CREATE TWO SUBCOMMITTEES

Senator MORSE. It is possible, Mr. Chairman, to have one of Joe's suggestions where you can have two subcommittees or a subcommittee of each of the two committees hold the hearings and report to their full committee.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a possibility. What does the committee think about that?

Senator CLARK. Why do you not explore it with Mike and Dick?

The CHAIRMAN. I will be glad to explore it. I wanted an expression of how you feel about it. Do you all, Karl, do you think we have an interest?

Senator MUNDT. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think in this particular instance we have a better claim to jurisdiction than the Armed Services Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I wondered.

Senator MUNDT. What Frank says is exactly right. It is the political implications we are going to listen to mostly. They are not going to talk about the fear of an immediate invasion from Russia. If there have been any military affairs implications it must be connected with the war in Vietnam in some way, about the deployment of troops. But I do not want to get into a quarrel with the other group either.

I would think we could pass some kind of a resolution saying that the Foreign Relations Committee feels that there should be hearings, whether we want to have participation or something, and

I do not know how far we have to go in nursemaiding the Armed Services Committee on these matters.

It is perfectly all right to consult, but I think you would be fortified if you went there and said, "We are going to have them. We didn't want to have a quarrel. Do you want to have subcommittees, joint committees?"

Do you want them to come in tandem or how, but I definitely feel we ought to have a hearing.

Senator CARLSON. I agree with the chairman on it.

Senator AIKEN. We ought to look it over. The military aspect, as Karl says, will probably relate to deployment of troops that might be taken out there.

The CHAIRMAN. It is just more what you do with the troops, whether or not you go here or over to Vietnam. That is a matter which is military.

Senator AIKEN. We have a political and economic situation involved.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think this idea of having two subcommittees could work, but I think it would be preferable to have it before the full Foreign Relations Committee, although that could be explored.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, if I understand it correctly I will take it up and talk to the majority leader about it, and I assume we will probably then talk either with him or separately with Dick Russell and the Republican leader.

Well, that disposes of that.

TESTIMONY OF SECRETARY RUSK

I think you have already had notice that the Secretary, Secretary Rusk, has agreed to come in executive session on January 16 and in open session on January 23. He called me and asked, requested, that our hearings not go longer than a full morning, that is when it is in open, because of the strain and the lights and so on. He is assuming there will be television—I do not know whether there will or not. I guess there will; there usually is when he appears. And I said that I thought that was a reasonable request. He said he would rather, because of the strain and the lights. So I said we would agree to have it run one day up until 1 o'clock, say.

Mr. Marcy brings up a question that is always a difficult one. He says that Senator Symington cannot come on the 16th. He wishes it to go on the 17th, and this creates a problem that if we wanted to run over in executive session—what I said about going in the afternoon applies only to open session with lights and all that. It does not apply to executive session. He would not be free on the afternoon of the 17th.

Senator PELL. Excuse me, I would like to bring up a point here, too, if I can.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator PELL. And that is I realize it is a good idea for a few people questioning because it goes through with greater ease, but when meetings are scheduled for Monday morning at 10, it is very difficult sometimes for those of us who, if we have a speaking engagement—I may be in the minority on this, I do not know if anybody else shares the same view, and as a matter of routine when

we have the choice and initiative, could not meetings be scheduled for Tuesday mornings and not Monday mornings?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Tuesdays are our regular meetings for the conduct of our regular business such as I have got—I have got several other items I am coming to; for example, the consular agreement mentioned last night. Katzenbach came and said he wanted us to take it up, and we have hearings. If you mean we will not just utilize Monday, it is going to make it very difficult. That means Friday, too.

Senator PELL. Fridays it does not mean because people do shove off, they shove off in the afternoon but maybe I am the only one, in which case I withdraw my point, but—

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to accommodate the members. How do you members, all of you, feel about Monday? We are going to have an awful heavy schedule because there are a number of things I am going to mention in a minute.

Senator MUNDT. I would rather have Monday than Friday.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We have other meetings and it could be Tuesday.

Senator AIKEN. Get it over with.

Senator PELL. I am in a minority so I withdraw.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not live far away so you cannot get back on Monday.

Senator PELL. I made two speaking engagements that day.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not speak on Sunday, do you?

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator PELL. So I am in the same condition on the 23rd where I probably will not be able to be here.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you know, as big a committee as this is, there is going to be somebody, I think, nearly every day, and we just almost have to proceed in some way.

Senator PELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. With that understanding, the executive is on the 16th and open on the 23rd.

SIZE OF THE COMMITTEE

By the way, did the Steering Committee take action on the size of the committee?

Senator CLARK. Yes; this has to still be off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

APPEARANCE BY SECRETARY MCNAMARA

The CHAIRMAN. McNamara, we have contacted McNamara. His position is simply that he would like to appear before Armed Services before this committee, and I wrote to Russell and he feels that way. So he will appear there first and the date has not been set, has it, Marcy, you have not heard any further about it?

Mr. MARCY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not that he does not want to come, but simply he would like to appear in public before that committee and then we will have him as it is agreeable after that.

I mentioned the consular agreement. The President, as you know, mentioned it last night. Katzenbach has already—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He mentioned so much last night I must have missed that.

The CHAIRMAN. It was buried down——

Senator SPARKMAN. With east and west trade.

The CHAIRMAN. But Katzenbach came up and said they are anxious to proceed with it.

The question is what do you think about hearings? We have had some hearings. It is my understanding that—in fact, I have some letters here, limited to official use, from Douglas MacArthur referring to Mr. Hoover's attitude toward this, and I understand Mr. Hoover feels that his former testimony may have been—I do not know whether you would say distorted a bit. He is not adamant against this at all. If I understand it correctly he simply made the observation that it would entail additional surveillance, I guess you would say. But he is not of the view that it should not be done is the way I understand it. You can look at it if you like.

MISINFORMATION ON CONSULAR TREATY

Senator CARLSON. I want to say on this consular treaty, our people may be getting misinformed. I am getting a lot of mail and we ought to have some additional hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. The Liberty Lobby has mounted a strong campaign against it, relying I think primarily on the former testimony of Mr. J. Edgar Hoover.

Senator CARLSON. If we have a hearing, it may clear up some of this.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we should, too. Does everybody believe that?

Senator SPARKMAN. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Any objection?

Senator CLARK. If I may make one very brief comment, when I was in Russia in November and before I went, when I talked with Dobrynin¹ in a briefing, the Russians really could not care less about this consular treaty because they think it is so much more to our advantage than it is to theirs, with which I agree, that they are not pushing particularly hard. I think it is very much to our advantage.

The CHAIRMAN. I do, too. I think it is to our advantage.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think it would ease a lot of pain if you could get a modification of Hoover's statement because it has been——

Senator DODD. Is this on the troop commitment to Western Europe?

The CHAIRMAN. We have discussed that. We wanted to bring it up after you got here. We discussed that at some length.

SENSE OF THE POLICY COMMITTEE

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I almost mentioned in the caucus yesterday but I did not, the Democratic caucus, that I am fairly certain that it was the sense of the majority, if not all of the members of the Policy Committee, that this should be referred to a joint committee of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations

¹Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin.

Committee, and when the majority leader did not bring it up, I mentioned it to somebody who was sitting there, who was on the Policy Committee, and he said he understood Mansfield was going to take it up with you as to what would be the preference. But I know that my feeling, as the only member of both committees, was that it should go before a joint committee of Armed Services and Foreign Relations.

It is clear that it involves both committees very fundamentally and very definitely, and in their mission, you might say, so I hope it would be agreeable to this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. We have just discussed it. It is agreeable, I mean in the sense of jurisdiction. There was quite a strong sentiment if you got both full committees together it is unwieldy. We suggested that it either go to the committees successively, one and then the other, or a joint subcommittee so you do not have so many people at one time where it is unsatisfactory.

Senator SYMINGTON. I only wanted to report to you the way it was left in the Policy Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. What would you think of it going to this committee first and then that committee?

Senator SYMINGTON. I think that would be wrong. I would rather see a joint subcommittee.

The CHAIRMAN. You would rather have a joint subcommittee.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, because there is so much work involved.

The CHAIRMAN. Take eight or ten of this committee and join with them together.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is right; this committee has a tremendous amount of work and we have this draft law, as well as appropriations and authorizations. There was some resistance, I think it is fair to say, to doing it at all because of the amount of work involved. This time I think we ought to either fish or cut bait, because of these tremendous expenses abroad. They are absolutely incredible under the circumstances in the amount of money they are asking for in the Far East and the amount of bodies they are asking for.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIER

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, may I say—Tom and Stu were not here—I would much prefer the joint subcommittee to going to one committee or the other first because, let us face it, there is a psychological barrier there, people being what they are, and if it comes here first, people on the Armed Services Committee, some, will psychologically be disturbed. If it is the other way, there will be some here. I think a joint subcommittee would be much better than going to one committee first and then the other. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, that having a joint hearing of the two full committees is very unwieldy. I do not think it is necessary.

After all, each full committee will take it up on the basis of the report of their subcommittee.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, can I put in a plug, in passing, for a more frequent use of subcommittees, either ad hoc or the standing subcommittees, in order to expedite our work?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Marcy and I have been talking about that and we will talk about it further, I mean with the committee. I think you are right, we ought to use that more. If I understand it and everybody is agreeable to the Senator from Missouri's suggestion preferring the joint subcommittee meeting.

Senator MORSE. On Joe's subcommittee comment, I would like to say that later in the morning I have on my agenda to raise with the committee a subcommittee matter. I will cover it then, and I quite agree with Joe.

RESCHEDULING SECRETARY RUSK'S TESTIMONY

Senator SYMINGTON. Can I bring up something you passed on? I have a very important engagement next Sunday, almost as important as the U.N. organization in 1945, when the Kansas City Chiefs are going to show the National Football League they have got the thing sewed up as much as they think they have. With that premise, I was hoping that perhaps Secretary Rusk could come on Tuesday. I talked to Carl about it and I talked to the Secretary about it, because it is impossible for me to get back here in time in the morning. I just thought, I would hope, that you could because there is no way I can get back at 10 o'clock on Monday morning. I could get back in the afternoon, but I would hope—the Secretary said it would be all right with him if it would be all right with you. He did on the 17th. I spoke to him and he spoke to Carl, and I asked Carl to speak to you.

Senator PELL. I subscribe, for the reason I already said, to what Stuart said. Monday morning at 10 is very difficult. Friday mornings at 10 we are around. But Monday morning is very difficult.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am going to try to hold all my engagements to weekends the way this thing happened last year, but this makes Monday morning difficult.

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me any member of this committee who cannot be here Monday morning can afford to buy a Sunday paper and learn everything that we will be told Monday morning.

Senator SPARKMAN. Did you see Bart Starr's picture, you know, big color?

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to ask this question. If it is going to be a question that he could come back in the afternoon on Monday but he could not do it on Tuesday, then if I can get here in time for Monday afternoon, could we have an agreement that he will be back Monday afternoon?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, sure.

Senator SYMINGTON. I withdraw my objections.

The CHAIRMAN. That was one of the main reasons we preferred Monday was the fact he could be here in the afternoon because it is likely we would not get through with him in any case.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, could I be the devil's advocate for just a moment?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

SENATORS ACCOMMODATING THEMSELVES TO COMMITTEE SCHEDULE

Senator MORSE. I am very fond of the Senator from Missouri, as he knows. I am talking now of any relationships to any requests

that have been made. It is my opinion that the efficiency of this committee was greatly interfered with last year because of the generosity of our chairman in trying to accommodate the personal requests of members of the committee. I think this is the time for us to adopt a procedure policy at the beginning of the session as follows: Namely, that although we would like to have people at our meetings that cannot be there, we have just got to accommodate ourselves to the committee schedule, and, if we cannot be there, we cannot be there. But I do not see, Mr. Chairman, how you can run this committee if you never knew whether or not a date you have set is one that you are going to be able to carry out.

I would like to suggest that as a matter of policy, we decide this morning that if we cannot be at the meetings, that if just too bad, but we are going to have to accommodate ourselves to the schedule.

Senator SYMINGTON. There is one point about that if the Senator will bear with me, because a great many of this committee are members of the Finance Committee on both sides of the aisle, which I am not, and I find there is a great deal of adjustment of the dates on the Finance and Foreign Relations Committees. Inasmuch as I am the sole member on Armed Services, I hope my beloved friend from the State of Oregon will not object to working it out. Even when I am here, I get badly stuck between two—

Senator MORSE. You missed my point. My point is that the chairman has got to work out what should be our schedule of hearings. He has to do it with other committees and find out what our membership and conflict is with other committees. But my point is he has to work out a schedule and we have to follow the schedule.

Every time you get an exception, may I say, for X or Y on this committee, you inconvenience A and B. They may not say anything, but every time you change it A and B are discommoded and I think we have to have a schedule to follow.

CONFLICTS WITH OTHER COMMITTEES

The CHAIRMAN. May I say I talked to Marcy at length about this. One reason for Monday is that it is one of the days where practically no other committees meet and we thought—Tuesday is a favorite day for all committees, and you run these conflicts you are talking about, membership in other meetings.

Take Senator Gore. He is a very high ranking man on Finance. He likes to be there, and I like to have him there because I cannot go to it. They always meet on Tuesday, is that not correct, practically always, on other days. Mondays was one of the reasons why it looks inconvenient from your point of view. It is free from those other conflicts more than most days of the week.

Senator PELL. The only question that comes to my mind is the planning ahead. Sometimes you want to make one day in your home area; should it be a weekday, should it be a Monday, or should it be a Friday? We have to weigh these things. As a rule I thought—I have always got the feeling that Monday was probably the better day to choose as opposed to Friday. Monday morning, as happens in Senator Symington's case, is the earliest to get back.

The CHAIRMAN. He is only going to be out there once. He will be very disillusioned about that.

Senator PELL. Friday, on the other hand, people may leave but they always leave in the afternoon.

Senator MORSE. We have to cancel some meetings. I canceled a meeting up in George Aiken's state. I was supposed to lecture up there in the university. I notified them I could not do it and I canceled it.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to do the best I can with the committee. I need guidance. We thought this was an idea. I will do anything that the consensus believes in.

Senator CARLSON. I just want to say this. I want the chairman to set the meetings. I am going to have to miss some. But I do not want anything to interfere with this meeting next Sunday in San Francisco. I want the Senator from Missouri to be there and bring back the bacon.

PROBLEMS TRAVELING TO THE WEST

Senator MUNDT. I think what Wayne said makes a lot of sense. I would like to add one little codicil. If you will follow the practice of what you have done here of giving us a little advance notice, like a week, we can adjust to your schedule. I agree you cannot change your schedule for an individual member without interfering with some other member. We have an altogether different problem out West from what Clay has. He cannot be back Monday morning. I cannot get back home unless I leave Friday morning, so it varies. Set it and give us a week or so notice and we will adjust, like Wayne canceled a meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. I am certainly open to suggestions, and Mr. Marcy has been around here a long time. He sort of thought Mondays and Tuesdays—Tuesdays are our regular days and Monday would fit in as well as any day with anybody. But I do not want to be arbitrary about it. As far as I am concerned, it is about half dozen of one and six of the other.

Senator SYMINGTON. One more point I have following Karl's point, too. If we do try to go out on weekends, which is what I am going to do this year, then I respectfully say because of the problem of getting back from your state and my state that Tuesday and Wednesday would be better than Monday and Tuesday. If you come back Sunday, you fly all day Sunday night which cripples you a little bit and you can get back sometime Monday, and then Tuesday and Wednesday it gives you a chance to get out Friday. It takes you a little longer than it does me.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are you establishing a Tuesday to Thursday club?

Senator SYMINGTON. Thursday is Armed Services.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. I will talk to Mr. Marcy further. Personally, it does not make much difference to me. I am perfectly agreeable to any way. I would just like to accommodate as many as possible and get as many people here. We did pretty well last year.

THE SPACE TREATY

Let me go over a few other things. The space treaty is one which we anticipate will be signed this month and they will, I know, they have already mentioned it, want it acted on quickly because of

their—they think it is psychologically important. Katzenbach has mentioned it, and so that is another matter which I am sure we will have hearings on. This is what I meant a moment ago. We are going to have to utilize more than Monday and Tuesday. This is just starting with Rusk. I think we are going to be Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday very likely when you get into these other matters that I mentioned.

[Discussion off the record.]

HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

The CHAIRMAN. Then we have a few other things. These things bother me, no end. I wonder what you all think or should we just forget about them. I get these letters all the time. They come here you know, there are—I mean on the human rights things, what do you all think about those? Should we forget them or should we act on them? You have been to the U.N.—by the way, I think we ought to have a time set aside—I want to hear what the Senator from Idaho has to say about his experience in the U.N. But this is a matter particularly relating to the U.N. What do you think about it?

Senator CHURCH. Of course there is a good deal of feeling up there that is adverse to the United States on this matter because although we have voted finally for the approval of these conventions, we have never ratified any of them. As time has passed, more and more comment, adverse comment, has developed against us on the ground that we are not really for these conventions and the proof of it is that, although we go through the motions in the U.N. where they have been approved by very large majorities, we have failed to ratify these conventions and make them a part—make them binding treaties.

I have not studied the conventions very carefully, but I think with the possibility of certain reservations that may be necessary, we could proceed with hearings, obviously secure the ratification of some of the conventions without any difficulty.

Senator DODD. Is the Genocide Convention one of those?

Senator CHURCH. Yes, it is one of those. But I think if we were to move on any one, perhaps the one that would encounter the least difficulty, it would be helpful to us with the U.N. We really do not care about these and we know the African and Asian countries are quite—they put a lot of store in these conventions.

Senator SPARKMAN. When you refer to the human rights convention, is that an old one or was it passed in the U.N. either this or last year?

Senator CHURCH. This relates, it relates back several years.

The CHAIRMAN. It is an old one, the one I had in mind.

Mr. MARCY. There are three of those that have been up here since, in the Kennedy regime—yes, they came July of '63. There is one on the convention of political rights for women. There is another one, the convention concerning the abolition of forced labor. There is a third, a supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, an institution of practices similar to slavery, and then there is the genocide convention, which has been with us since 1949.

Senator SPARKMAN. Those three that you mentioned specifically though, they are relatively new.

Mr. MARCY. They are, yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think they were adopted in that preceding session of the General Assembly. The genocide is old, and I think there is a human rights with it also, adopted way back in '57.

DIFFICULT FOR OTHER NATIONS TO UNDERSTAND U.S. POSITION

Senator CHURCH. Just a reading of these, particularly reference to slavery and women's rights and that kind of thing, it is very difficult for many of these countries to understand why the United States with all our talk of democratic rights and individual liberties and equality and so forth cannot find it possible to ratify conventions against slavery.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One reason they do not understand some of those things, they do not understand the American system of government. They do not understand these treaties can abrogate or replace under certain conditions some of the provisions of our Constitution.

Senator CHURCH. I know.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. For one I am not for letting the African countries run this country through emotion or otherwise. They have been doing it for a little while, and I think it is time we stopped letting them be influential on these things.

May I say most of these conventions, I think, can be worked out, as Frank said, and made satisfactory.

Senator SPARKMAN. I was going to ask if we should act favorably on these last three, and I understand or from what I have heard about them, they are more or less—they are more or less unobjectionable. Would that ease your situation?

Senator CHURCH. John, I think anything that would break the ice to show that we are prepared to follow through, and we will hold hearings, and I think ratification of one or two of these would be extremely helpful to the United States.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think a couple of them could be done, maybe three of them if I heard correctly about them. But so far as the old human rights and the genocide, those old ones, there are about three of them are there not, two or three, I just do not believe there is any chance.

Senator CHURCH. Forget the old ones and take the three most recent ones.

Senator CHURCH. We have some constitutional problems, as Bourke said, and we have to look at them. But there is a possibility of ratification of some of them.

THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION

Senator PELL. I would like to also, Mr. Chairman, having had some contact with the U.N., put in a strong plug of support for Frank's view, and I would like to particularly hope we would not put out a hand on considering the genocide convention because I think it is the most important one in the whole crowd. I think the genocide convention is as important as it was when it was considered in the late forties, and I would hope very much indeed we would consider it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have you studied what it will do to the Federal Constitution?

Senator PELL. I studied it, I read it, and I realize the problems.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is what has been holding it up all these years.

Senator PELL. I am well aware of it.

SUBCOMMITTEE SITUATION

Senator MORSE. I think here is the place where you could assign to a subcommittee the consideration of this matter to report to the full committee, for example, under the direction of Senator Church. Let us face it, you cannot begin to handle all the things that are going to come before this full committee, if the full committee retains jurisdiction over all of them. I think this is as good a place as any for me to renew my proposal of last year that the full committee should approve and authorize a program of activity for its subcommittees. The Mansfield resolution, the Vietnam hearings, the outer space treaty are items that will occupy the full committee, along with others. The final report of the Committee on the Reorganization of Congress shows this committee held far more full committee hearings in the 88th Congress than any other Senate committee. We held 196. The next high number was the Commerce Committee with 127. But Foreign Relations had only 33 subcommittee meetings in the 88th Congress whereas Commerce had 116.

The full committee will have a heavy schedule of major business in 1967. But I do not think our activity should be limited to what the full committee can handle.

The arms races in Latin America and the Middle East are possibilities for such a subcommittee. So is a full review of the Alliance for Progress and many other items that could be handled either under existing subcommittees, or special ad hoc committees.

Mr. Chairman, let us face it with the kind of a setup we have in this committee for your subcommittees, they are going to be appendages, in my judgment, with very little effectiveness. I speak most respectfully because of my high regard for our staff, but this staff cannot handle full committee business and subcommittee business.

This committee has, in my judgment, unlike most committees in the Senate, never sought to get the financial support, the staff support, that a Foreign Relations Committee ought to have. I renew my suggestion that you take these subcommittees, you recognize that their staffs be enlarged, that they be given staff, under the supervision of the chairman and the professional director of the staff, Mr. Marcy.

LATIN AMERICAN SUBCOMMITTEE

But let me as a special pleader tell you about my problem in the Latin American subcommittee. I cannot possibly carry on what needs to be done on the Latin American subcommittee if I am going to have to rely on the existing staff. Carl Marcy and Pat Holt and Lowenstein and the rest of them cannot possibly give to me the professional assistance that I need to conduct the kind of hearings

that ought to be conducted on Latin America. Alliance for Progress ought to be gone into.

I want to say that I have already had two conferences with Assistant Secretary Sol Linowitz, who by the way, has made a tremendously favorable impression on me. He talked to me before the President sent him to Latin America. He talked to me after he came back. I want to have an early meeting of the subcommittee in the late afternoon in which I would invite the full committee, to which I would always invite the full committee if I am given jurisdiction to conduct some of these things, and have him brief us. I think he is terrific in his understanding already of Latin American policy.

But I want to say, Mr. Chairman, we are just kidding ourselves if you think that these subcommittees of this committee are more than facades. We have no real jurisdiction. We have no staff, we have no financial resources, and I would propose a complete reorganization of the subcommittee setup, under the control of the Chairman, but with authority for us to go ahead and conduct the studies that the full committee will never get around to conducting.

I think what is needed, Mr. Chairman, we cannot do it this morning, but you ought to get Carl Marcy and his staff to work with some of us on various plans for a reorganization of subcommittees. I would like to see not only my committee, but I would like to see the NATO committee, I would like to see the other subcommittees, start subcommittee hearings this year that amount to something.

Senator CLARK. Would you yield for just a second?

Senator MORSE. I am all through. I yield.

COMPARISON TO LABOR COMMITTEE

Senator CLARK. I would like you to comment to the chairman about the experience you and I both had with the Labor Committee where we could not possibly get through the workload.

Senator MORSE. That is probably why it makes me a biased witness. We have on the Labor Committee real jurisdiction given to the subcommittees. We have our staff, and I think, for example, you check them for security, you approve of them on this committee, but you give these subcommittees the needed staff they need to do this job.

Let us face it. Marcy and his associates just cannot be of service to these subcommittees and be of service to the full committee to the degree that we are going to need their service unless you are willing to make the fight to enlarge the subcommittee staffs with some jurisdiction given to the chairman of each subcommittee under your direction, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman asked to comment. He has to go. Did you want to comment on it?

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, I merely say this. I have always inclined toward as many meetings by the full committee as possible for the consideration of matters. But I realize there is a lot of truth in what the senator says, particularly with reference to the time element and also with this problem that we have of getting a quorum present because of conflict with other committees.

But any way we go at it we are going to have our hands full.

Senator MORSE. Sure.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is all I care to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

THE DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

Senator GORE. I wanted to raise a question about a subcommittee, the Disarmament Subcommittee, of which I happen to be the chairman. The most interesting and entreating paragraph in the president's speech last night was the one which seemed to me to be addressed directly to the Soviet Union rather than to us, and that is on the antimissile program. Here is a disarmament question *per se*, and if it would be agreeable with the subcommittee, with the full committee, I would propose to have some hearings on this. However, it is matter of such overweening importance, I would not wish to go into it if the full committee wishes to do so. If the full committee can find time to do so, fine. But it seems to me here is something of mutual interest to the United States and to the Soviet Union, the two countries being the only ones with the technological competency to create such systems, and yet this has been a decision that has been procrastinating now for many, many months. How long it can safely be postponed without reaching some agreement is a matter, I think, of urgency.

Of course in my view it would be far preferable that the United States and the Soviet Union mutually agree to abstain from such a costly and wasteful expenditure, but it is very dangerous to this country, in my view, to procrastinate until the Soviet Union may suddenly have a fait accompli and we are left second.

So it seems to me this is a subject which either the full committee or the subcommittee should examine. I am willing to see either done, and I want to submit it to you.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to support Albert as a member of this subcommittee. I think this is probably the most important single foreign policy matter that confronts us today, a good deal more important than things that are considered to be vital.

ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

If we get ourselves into another escalation of this arms race by the placement of antiballistic missiles around Moscow, Leningrad, and Washington, and New York, the total cost is going to be well over 20 billions of dollars.

Senator SYMINGTON. Eight months of the Vietnamese war.

Senator CLARK. It is absolutely and fully for either country to do it, and I think a skillful agreement pushed by this committee could get us off the hook because it is not outside of the Soviet's interests either.

The CHAIRMAN. That is one thing that pleased me last night because he decided two things. From the intelligence community it is my best information they do not believe that the Soviets are very far along on this ABM at all. The only one that is being currently pushed is around Moscow. It has very limited possibilities and it is the only one, and I think he is quite right in taking a further look. It is my impression that is what he has in mind in the meantime, to do the best he can diplomatically to try to—

Senator GORE. I raise no critical comment. I say this is just a matter of such overweening importance that either this committee or the subcommittee should go into it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I say a word?

THE AMOUNT OF WORK

First I agree without any reservation of any kind with the position taken by the Senator from Oregon. In fact, the Chair will remember I presented this to him sometime back.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Because in my opinion this is the most important committee, so long as it does not get subordinated to the executive branch, in the Congress of the United States.

Now knowing Senator Gore, I think it would be a wonderful thing if he could really get his teeth into this disarmament thing.

You can do it as well as anybody around, but you have so dog-gone much else to do.

The Armed Services Committee is a very important committee, especially because it authorizes well over 60 percent, I think, now of the budget, the United States budget. We could not do anything that really meant anything if we did not have some major subcommittee like Stennis's Military Preparedness Subcommittee and Jackson's Military Construction Committee. The Military Preparedness Subcommittee has a complete staff, with a great many members, and they are all excellent people.

Now, everything is done just like when we testified. I used to testify from the executive branch to committees. The chairman of the committee is always the chairman of any subcommittee, if he wants to be there. At times the chairman would come in. If Mahon has a meeting and Cannon would come in, he immediately would chair the meeting.

But from your standpoint, your health, the amount of work, the way the world is today, I just do not think you can take it and at the same time do a good job without impairment to your health. I just could not be more serious about this.

One other point; just before I left, Doug MacArthur came down to see me, and he was very upset about the Middle East. That is the little subcommittee I happen to be the chairman of, and he told me all about it and he said he felt that the Israelis made a very serious mistake.

VISIT TO THE MIDDLE EAST

Well, I came back from the Far East last week through the Middle East, and putting it mildly, in my opinion, they sure did make a serious mistake. I spent a couple of days with Luke Battle in Cairo, who is a very bright fellow and seemed to be fully up on it, and has an excellent staff and then I went up and had a long talk with Hussein in Jordan, who in my opinion fully expects to be assassinated. He is our one great friend we have out there.

I talked to Levi Eshkol and I did not pull any punches, and I said, "This is going to hurt you a lot more than anything you have done since the state was formed in 1948."

I talked to Abba Eban, I talked to General Moshe Dayan who is out, the military hero.

I then stopped to talk in Athens—I spent a good many hours with Walworth Barbour, the ambassador to Israel.

I went to Athens, and I had another break. In Athens is an ambassador, a seasoned fellow who was formerly an assistant secretary of state. Phil Talbot, our ambassador, and I spent a good many hours with him, and he said, “You see, the story going around the Middle East and based on my experience is just plain murder,” he said. “The Israelis attacked Jordan because they knew Jordan was a friend of the U.S., but they did not attack Syria or UAR, especially Syria, because they felt they were friends of the Soviets,” and also my impression was very definitely that the UAR is moving quietly but definitely into, further into, the Soviet bloc.

Well, these things are the kind of things, just thinking out loud, if you could have some hearings on and just to get information, because I noticed since I have got back that everything that I did in Israel was very well covered by the press, pictures in my own home town paper and that kind of stuff, whereas there was none of it, you might say, on the Arab side.

I am not choosing up sides. I do think they made a bad mistake on this and their arguments are very specious as to why they did it. I do think if we have any friend in the Arab world, it is Hussein, and I do think he is in very serious trouble.

So these are the kinds of things that if you held some hearings, I think you could bring out and get a better grasp of.

Just like I would sure like to see Albert get into this disarmament thing and have some hearings about this situation, because actually, without violating any security or anything, the hearing that you, Bourke, and I went to the other day, I was impressed with the fact that the information we got was not coordinated or was not the same as the information released recently by the Secretary of Defense to the American people on that particular subject.

So you just have a lot of information floating around, and if you do not fragment this committee into subcommittees with some authority and some staff, always subject to the approval of you and the full committee, I just do not think you can do the job the way the world is today. End of statement.

COMMITTEE'S USE OF SUBCOMMITTEES

Senator MORSE. I would like to have further discussion of it at our meetings after the evidence is brought in. I want to stress what Stu said in his last statement. My proposal does not involve any independence of the subcommittees. My proposal involves your approval in your capacity as chairman, and it involves the approval of the full committee with regard to the subject matters taken up. But once assigned to the subcommittee, then the subcommittee will do what it does in other committees, it acts for the full committee and reports back to the full committee.

You know I never have hearings without sending each one of you a letter inviting you to come to the hearings. I have not talked to the staff. I have my information from other sources, so I do not think it would be proper for me to involve the staff in the inquiries that I have made. But I would like to get all sides of it and all the facts.

I think you will find that of the major committees of the Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee is the most understaffed. The Foreign Relations Committee in a sense has sort of a closed staff, a very small number of people, highly qualified. There is no reason why a subcommittee should not be authorized to select a subcommittee staff of two or three people representing—serving both the majority and the minority of the subcommittee as qualified as the people on the full committee staff, with an expertise on the work of that subcommittee, in the jurisdiction of that subcommittee.

SIZE OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF

My question to you is: Why is it that the Foreign Relations Committee maintains as small a staff as we maintain when we are up against the State Department and the Pentagon building with almost unlimited staff to draw on? Why have we kept this staff as small as we have kept it in comparison with other staffs? Take the Labor Committee. We far exceed this committee, Armed Services Committee, Stu has already stated.

I just want to say part of our problem is we do not have the assistance that we need as members of this committee to do our job, and I think we ought to change the staff policy of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am very glad to hear this discussion. What do you think over here on this side about it, Bourke and George?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think you run a tremendous danger just like other committees have run. I think a lot of these committees have run just clear out of the reservation on their subcommittees, vast staffs that they have set up, and they become autonomous subcommittees practically. I think it is hard to justify it except to give a lot of jobs to a lot of people and a lot of autonomy to a lot of folks.

That is just the practical answer. You have asked me and I tell you.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to know—

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you feel that way about it if you had a Republican President and were chairman of this committee?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I had thought about it during eight years of the Eisenhower Administration.

The CHAIRMAN. George, what do you think?

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I try to practice what I preach. I find in my own office that if they pushed up a little bit to get their work done, they do a whale of a lot better work than they do if there are too many people in the office. Nobody wants to do it if they have one too many. But if they are pushed up they take it and go and do it.

REPORTS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN SUBCOMMITTEE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What Senator Morse said about his Latin American Subcommittee, I have been on that subcommittee. I have been on it ever since it was set up. I read every report Pat Holt has put in about the investigations of these countries in Latin America. I think they are more profound and more penetrating

than any subcommittee hearing that we could have here on that subject.

Now, I don't mean to say we should not—

Senator MORSE. But those very reports ought to be the basis for a thorough and intensive study and investigation of the subcommittee.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He is very thorough and his observations over the years have been very accurate.

Senator MORSE. With all due respect to Pat Holt, he is no substitute for the Senatorial responsibilities of the members.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No.

Senator MORSE. That is what you are going to make it if you are going to turn the investigation over to the staff members.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Not until there is reason to think the staff member is inaccurate.

Senator MORSE. But the point is he doesn't begin, his reports don't begin to cover the type of study I am talking about.

BACKGROUND ON STAFF AND SUBCOMMITTEES

Mr. MARCY. Senator, I might just remind the committee on a little background on this.

In 1958, a subcommittee was created, of which Senator Sparkman was chairman, to look into the whole staff problem. At that time the committee, that is the subcommittee, recommended to the full committee, that the present structure continue to exist. At that time, it pointed out that the staff had six professionals and eight clerical employees. The final conclusion, except insofar as the subcommittee recommended the addition of one employee to assist in the coordinating functions in connection with the visits of distinguished foreign visitors, that is Miss [Milrae] Jensen, it did not believe that there should be any additions to the staff at the present time.

Now, that was in 1958.

Senator CLARK. Nine years ago. The world has sure changed since then.

The CHAIRMAN. May I say, last year we utilized, I thought very effectively, five ad hoc subcommittees, assigning certain jobs to them, and they did a lot of work and reported a lot of bills. The tax conventions, in particular, and claims convention, legislation under Senator Sparkman.

I think we have got to move in some degree in this connection. It is a question of how much, in my opinion, and also it is not easy to get good qualified staff people. You look around here and it is hard to get them, the ones that are really qualified for this kind of work like our professional staff.

Senator Pell?

BRINGING STAFF TO COMMITTEE MEETINGS

Senator PELL. There is another problem here along the line of what Wayne said, which is that this is the only—it maybe a very good idea, I haven't made up my own mind—but this is the only committee, I believe, in the Congress where you can't bring your own staff people in with you, and so when you have a continuing responsibility on a specific subject that you are following it leaves

you a little scattered, because there is no staff man you can talk to.

The CHAIRMAN. Harry Byrd never allowed one of my staff to go to the Finance Committee. I don't think they do under any circumstances.

Isn't that right?

Senator DODD. We don't in Judiciary.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the custom.

Senator DODD. We don't do it in Judiciary.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not?

Senator DODD. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think it is peculiar at all.

Senator PELL. I am sorry.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd?

FOCUS ON BIG PROBLEMS AS A TOTALITY

Senator DODD. I don't know whether it is improper or not but I would like to hear from the staff, what they think about this.

The CHAIRMAN. Sure, it is not improper. We have talked about this before.

Go ahead.

Mr. MARCY. Well, Senator, this, as the members know, comes up about every two or three years and it seems always to boil itself down to a very fundamental question as to whether the committee wants to focus on fairly big kinds of problems as a totality, which is the way the committee has generally done, or whether it wants to break up into sort of a series of subcommittees, each going in sort of a different direction.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is not so.

Mr. MARCY. I might say that the staff has for some time thought that it might be advisable to set up one or two, we thought mostly in terms of one, one subcommittee which would be kind of a continuing thing with a separate staff. It would be assigned to specific kinds of things.

I think, for example, the problem would be illustrated if we tried to hold hearings during the next two months on, say, the subject of the Middle East, disarmament and the Alliance for Progress. I think they need to be approached in sort of separate way.

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEES HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFUL

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, I am generally in sympathy with the position of the Senator from Oregon and the Senator from Missouri. I think the experiment of the ad hoc committees has been a rather successful one.

Furthermore, I don't think this committee is getting its work done functioning as it has been functioning over the years. I think that is quite evident in terms of the things we haven't taken up, and in terms of the extravagant amount of time we have had to spend on foreign aid and that sort of thing.

So that we are not really penetrating many of these questions as thoroughly as we should.

I think that in light, and this is no reflection on the staff, I think this is the finest professional staff that I know anything about, but in light of our experience with the ad hoc committees, I don't see

why we couldn't retain for the full committee the most important things that we want to look at as a whole committee, and give some of these subcommittees assignments of a substantive character. Let them conduct hearings; let them bring in their recommendations, and print hearings for the full committee to review.

Senator MORSE. Certainly.

Senator CHURCH. And the full committee has the final say. Set it up in such a way that we won't proliferate all over the place. Establish the limits and give the chairman of the full committee the final say concerning the work of the subcommittees which they would take up.

Senator MORSE. That is all I have asked for.

Senator CHURCH. I mean this is a perfectly reasonable request.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

COMMITTEE HAS GAINED IMPORTANCE

Senator GORE. I think we are picking ourselves to pieces here. I think introspection is good, but I would like to call attention to one thing. We had a quorum this morning. Two years ago the Chairman was complaining nobody ever attended meetings. This committee has attained an importance in the last year that it hasn't had in a long time. I think hearings before the American people not only rehabilitated this committee in its importance, but did more than anyone thing has done in a decade to restore the co-equal status of the Legislative Branch with the Executive. The public hearings we had, whether you agree with what was said here or there or disagree, had an impact on the American people no other committee of either house of Congress has done since I have been a member of the body, which has been 28 years now.

So I think that while we are finding fault with ourselves, let us recall that what the committee as a whole did last year was the single most important thing that this or any other committee, in my opinion, has done in a long time.

So let us improve through ad hoc, through subcommittees, through staff, but let us not forget that the most important thing is this committee as a whole, playing its constitutional function in the open before the American people.

Senator CHURCH. I agree with that.

HAVE A SUBCOMMITTEE HANDLE NATO MATTERS

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say one thing. Last year I was more than willing to have a subcommittee handle NATO and we got to talking about it and it looked like we were downgrading NATO if we don't have a full committee.

Remember that?

Should it be a full or subcommittee? I was for it and I intended it for it. You went over there and when we got down there they put it up to me, "If you do that, it will look as though you are not really interested in NATO," so they put the pressure on me. I had to do it. That is what happened. I was all for it.

Senator CHURCH. That may have been a subject——

The CHAIRMAN. I mean this is what you often run into. On these other things, the things I mentioned, there were five subcommit-

tees. No one thought those were so important that it had to be full, and they went off very well and you did the work well.

We can do that more. I am perfectly willing to do it. We have already talked about this morning a subcommittee to meet with Armed Services on these troops in Europe. I am all for it. I think it would be a good idea.

Senator CHURCH. I just wanted to say one thing. I should think some of these U.N. conventions, for example, could be taken up by a subcommittee.

The CHAIRMAN. I do, too.

Senator CHURCH. And hearings held and printed hearings distributed.

The CHAIRMAN. I do, too. I am all for this.

I do think if we move in this direction—last year I said we will try these ad hoc and see how they work and if they work well, we will do more of it.

I am all for it. I think we do have a couple of more staff men, but they are hard to get. The committee did look over a lot of them and you would be surprised how difficult it is to get good ones.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make two points.

EXERCISE OVERSIGHT FUNCTION

First, I would thoroughly agree the committee is not getting its work done as expeditiously as it could and I think the ad hoc device is an excellent thing, two or three members well-informed and then report to the full committee for action. So, as Senator Mansfield pointed out to all committee chairmen including you, he believes this is a session where we ought to exercise our oversight function, and a large part of this committee is not legislative but oversight—Vietnam. NATO hearings are an example.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an example.

Senator CLARK. You cannot carry on more than one or two of those things a year if you are going to have the full committee do it, if you, Mr. Chairman, have to be the fellow out there in the front all the time.

Now, it is true, the argument is made and to some extent it is downgraded. But I call on my colleague from Oregon to point out whenever they have a problem involving education they go to the Senator from Oregon and not to the chairman of the committee, Senator Hill, who is a wonderful magnificent committee chairman I serve under. When they went to go to the man on manpower problems, they come to me. But in the course of a not too long period of time, you get the press oriented to the fact the committee is organized so that most of the committee work is done at a subcommittee level.

When you come to the full committee you have the most gracious and able man in the Senate, of course present company excepted, but we have to break down so the subcommittees can have more status than they have now. It won't be done overnight.

INACTIVE SUBCOMMITTEES

I have one more point. I serve on three subcommittees—Disarmament, Economic Institutions and Tom Dodd's economic aid problem. Those subcommittees have been pretty darned inactive during

the last two years I have been on the committees and why have they been inactive—to some extent because the chairmen have been too busy, but to a very large extent they have no staff to organize witnesses, to handle it.

I think if you take those three subcommittees, International Institutions, Disarmament, and Financial and Economic Interests Overseas, one good staff man could start off serving those three subcommittees as a start.

Now, Mr. William Bader has competence in that particular area, and if we find that he can't do it by himself with those three subcommittees maybe we ought to get more staff.

I don't have a shadow of a doubt that Wayne Morse has got to have at least one man and maybe more to handle this Latin American problem because Pat Holt can't do it.

GIVE FOREIGN AID BILL TO A SUBCOMMITTEE

The CHAIRMAN. Let me make one observation. You know the Foreign Aid bill is long with this committee. What percentage of those hearings were on foreign aid, you mentioned a great number. About 30 or 40 percent. And it has disrupted this committee for years. You know how much time it takes.

Senator DODD. Couldn't you give that to a subcommittee?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it has always been considered so controversial and so difficult that the full committee handles it. I would be perfectly willing to try a subcommittee.

Does everybody think that could be done with a subcommittee?

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say, first, my remark to Bourke was pretty fresh and I didn't mean it that way and I regret saying it that way. I think he knows how I feel.

I want to apologize for that crack. It really wasn't a crack.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then there is no need to apologize for it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, bless your heart.

The thing that worries me is, I am not a lawyer and nearly everybody else here is, but I used to have a lot of experience in management. For a good many years of my life, I went into sick businesses and tried to work them out and they are still going, if I may make that immodest remark.

ORGANIZATIONAL GROWTH

There comes a time when anything you do grows to a point where you have to make major basic changes in organization, and I say organizational structure along with it, functional structure. You have to have an organization, reorganization of your chart, and then you have to have a functional reorganization. I know that they put a book out, the Metropolitan Club had its 100th Anniversary and it said all the members of the State Department were founders of it, and I think 37 was the total members of the State Department in Washington.

When my wife's grandfather was Secretary of State, John Hay, at the turn of the century, there were just over a hundred people in the State Department at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. The whole department?

Senator SYMINGTON. The whole department.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They did pretty well.

Senator AIKEN. That is good.

Senator SYMINGTON. We had the two greatest allies the world has known, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, too.

But to me it just seems as we watch the growth by hundreds and hundreds of thousands, I think millions would be fair, of the administrative branch and nobody has more respect for this staff than I do and I always get a good rapid answer from Carl Marcy or anybody else on the staff. It isn't that at all to me. It is just a case of getting organized to handle the workload which is infinitely more today, plus what Albert said about the interests of the people.

THE COMMITTEE GOT PEOPLE INTERESTED IN FOREIGN POLICY

The one great thing that this committee did last year, it got the people interested in the foreign policy of the United States to an extent that they never even dreamed about, in my opinion, that is when I get back to the hustings. It is going to be much more, it is not going to be less, because now the people are really interested in it and there is a lot of doubt about this tremendous ground war in Asia, and a lot of nervousness about this situation in the Middle East, and a lot of work which has been done incidental to our occupation in Europe and so on.

I know it is hard to get staff people, but I would say it is a lot easier to get staff people into this problem today than three or four years ago because there is a lot of interest in it and good people follow where the interest goes. And I hope this could be considered not as a criticism of the staff and not as a criticism of the committee and, above all, not criticism of you because you are the one more than anyone else in the United States who has gotten the American people interested in foreign policy.

A MANAGEMENT PROBLEM

I would hope it would be recognized on a management basis. There is nobody I respect more than Bourke. He is your ranking member, people like George Aiken next to him, nearly all over there feel the way you do about most of these problems, the senior members of the committee. We just have a management problem on our hands and it was the kind of thing I was deep in, it was my life's work 20 years ago, and I think we have got to face up to the management problem.

The staff situation, a lot of things that could be done, you could approve, have people, final approval, you could have the top of your own staff consulted with your own final decision on members of the subcommittee staff. Just thinking off the top of my head it might be an excellent idea not to put the subcommittees on television. God knows I wouldn't like to try to get some real facts and dig in on the Arab-Israeli problem on television and so forth and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be explosive.

Senator SYMINGTON. There are a lot of ways that you could bind this thing and the way the thing ran. This isn't the committee with the least staff by any means, with all due respect to my friend from Oregon.

The Agriculture Committee is a committee that has got for my money much the least staff as against the money involved and so forth and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. Finance has had no staff until this year.

Senator SYMINGTON. My experience on the Agriculture Committee, I mean on the steering committee, and I know, Joe, they spend their time up there, instead of fighting to get on the committee, they spend their time fighting not to get on the Agriculture Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. George wanted to say something. He has been waiting here.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am all through now. But I think it is a management problem here we are discussing today at least as much as anything else.

The CHAIRMAN. George?

AD HOC VERSUS AD INFINITUM

Senator AIKEN. I have been listening very attentively to the discussion relative to ad hoc committees and the staffing of ad hoc committees, and I am sure if they were well staffed they would have some very interesting staff meetings.

But I also have a great regard for the intelligence and education of my chairman and I wanted to ask him what is the distance between ad hoc and ad infinitum.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, getting back to the overall thing—

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know.

Senator GORE. I guess you assigned me more ad hoc duties last year than anyone.

The CHAIRMAN. I think more individual bills you handled than any of them.

Senator GORE. Well, some of them we reported and the committee acted upon in the Senate and some of them we reported on unfavorably, and I think events have sustained us. I am willing to do whatever you want me to do in that regard.

PROVOKING PUBLIC DISCUSSION

But, again, I repeat, the overall function of this committee, as Stu Symington said, touched the American people. It stimulated an awareness and a study. It provoked study and discussion groups all over the United States.

I would like to see us conduct another hearing of a level that would challenge the intelligent and public spirited people of the country.

For instance, what are the valid indices of the great decisions today of a preeminent world power. Are we stuck with shibboleths, are there abstractions that have emotional and political appeal on which we should not base decisions? Where are we? What is our position in the world, and why?

It seems to me if you could get some of the eminent scholars of the country once again, not to examine whether we should or should not be in Vietnam, that is past, but to examine the position of this country in the world of today's technology, that we could once again play an important role in public education and once again assert the constitutional importance of the Senate.

STATE DEPARTMENT OPPOSITION TO AN EFFECTIVE COMMITTEE

Senator MORSE. I want to say the Senator from Oregon is not going to take the rap that he gets from certain quarters because the subcommittee on Latin America is not conducting the hearings it ought to be conducting. They should be conducted and conducted under your jurisdiction. I am not asking the subcommittee appoint staff but asking that you and the full committee appoint them. I am pointing out that nothing I have heard this morning justifies keeping the staff at its small number. We can get people. Sure it is hard to get them. Sure we can enlarge the staff by getting qualified people and we should do it.

I want to say no member of this staff in my judgment can serve as a substitute for the responsibilities of the committee. Pat Holt makes very fine reports, but those reports ought to be conducted under the direction of the subcommittee and they ought to be subject to review by the subcommittee, and we ought to be able to call people in and determine whether or not they stand up.

I think they will stand up. But the State Department would love to have some of these subcommittees continue to be ineffective.

The last thing Rusk and Rostow and Gordon want is a vital working effective subcommittee on Latin America, but you had better keep your eyes on Latin America, may I say to this committee, because you have got great problems and trouble stirring themselves up in Latin America, and the subcommittee should do the job on the subject and not Pat Holt, in effect operating somewhat independent of the subcommittee. All I am asking for is that you enlarge your staff, that you can take complete jurisdiction over the subjects that will be taken up by your subcommittee and that we get on with the job of doing what—let's face it, this full committee is never going to do in regard to the Latin American problem because you haven't got time to do it, but the subcommittee can.

You would know when we would have our meeting, we wouldn't be interfering with your jurisdiction. I would have them at night, if necessary, but we would do the work.

But I only want to say as chairman of this subcommittee that the full committee is letting down the subcommittee, in my judgment, speaking as its chairman. I don't care how many members on the subcommittee want to let the present arrangements continue. It is not a good arrangement, and you are not going to do the job on Latin America and you either get a new subcommittee, if you want to get a new chairman, go ahead and get him, but I want to say I am going to continue to express why this subcommittee is not doing its job. It is not doing the job because it isn't properly staffed.

AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITIES AS A GREAT POWER

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I certainly am glad to have this discussion, and I will talk with the staff and see if we can come up with some concrete suggestion and maybe look into the matter of getting some more.

I don't want to go too far, but I certainly think we ought to move in this direction and we will do it better.

I want to make a comment here, Senator Gore brought up a question which was the last item on my agenda and the time is almost running out.

The staff and I have been discussing this during this interim and I think you are quite right. We had a general subject that we are talking about called American responsibilities as a great power, a general subject to survey in some open hearings—of course we expect to start out in the usual way with whatever the administration wishes to say on this with Secretary Rusk and McNamara and others, that is the foreign policy prospects for '67. In that anything may be discussed, and this subject, general subject would be involved.

I wanted to raise this question with you, a subject, for example, of this which we kicked around here at some length, the nature of our commitments, this nature of our being committed all the time.

A number of these treaties, the President last night referred to them, and he is going to live up to all of them. We made a great many treaties during the 50's, a review of this as a part of this overall review of our relations as the greatest power in the world today and what that means.

Another one was this man Edwin Reischauer is back. I have been thinking about, I would certainly personally like very much to have him. He ought to be as well qualified as anybody, for example, to discuss our relations with the whole Pacific area, not just Vietnam but he is especially qualified, it seems to me, to testify about our relations with Japan, China, the whole area of which Vietnam is simply one part.

Senator SYMINGTON. I couldn't agree with you more.

AN EXAMINATION FOR OUR OWN EDUCATION

The CHAIRMAN. This is the way we have been thinking about it and it is what I wanted to bring up.

What does the committee think about it?

I think it is on all fours with what the Senator from Tennessee stated. I completely agree with that. This is an area in which the full committee—

Senator GORE. But an examination—

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. My own view is not at all we are attacking anybody. This is an examination for our own education, our own benefit as well as the public as to what kind of a role should the United States play under these present circumstances, and this is a complicated matter. It sounds vague but it is very real.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, could I make one brief comment?

The CHAIRMAN. Does this appeal to you?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Senator CLARK. It appeals to me very much.

I would like to make one brief comment to my very good friend Carl Marcy for whom I have the most profound admiration as a magnificent chief of this committee, but I hope when he starts to look around for a new staff man, Carl, we won't have as one of the criteria a timid little Ph.D. who is prepared to wipe the dandruff off the shoulders of members of this committee. I think that is what you mean.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know what you mean. Maybe Mr. Marcy does.

[Discussion off the record.]

A COMBINATION OF ACTUAL EXPERIENCES

Senator SYMINGTON. I think it would be a wonderful thing to get Reischauer. I stayed twice with him in Tokyo.

The CHAIRMAN. He is an example. I hope we can get other people.

You necessarily, when you get outside of the government, are going to be confronted with the difficulty of getting people who have a combination of actual experiences, as he has, plus a sufficient historical, political, social background and so on, and that he can relate it to us. This is difficult to get those people.

Senator CLARK. We have no finer fellow on the staff than Jim Lowenstein, with whom I spent a month with in Europe who is absolutely terrific. He came to this committee from a good spot in the State Department because he thought he could be more useful here.

The CHAIRMAN. We have a new one we haven't used much who will turn out the same way, and he is Bader. He was in the State Department and it was partly because of Jim Lowenstein and everyone seemed to agree.

Senator PELL. I came in and became a Senator. [Laughter.]

TESTIMONY FROM LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS

Senator MORSE. Bill, I don't know whether you can get—whether protocol stops you or other restrictions do, but I wish we could get in Edward E. Rice, who is our consul general in Hong Kong, if our State Department will come and let him testify in executive session.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a great problem.

I would like to have some of these lower level people. The State Department seems to take the view the Secretary ought to talk for them. They don't want their underlings to testify. I hate to embarrass the underlings because they might fire them. I would like to do it, personally. I agree with you.

Senator MORSE. Carl Marcy can tell you if you get a briefing that we got in Hong Kong from Rice, it is far different from what the Secretary tells you when he comes in here.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I have the same feeling.

What can we do about it, as a practical matter?

Senator SYMINGTON. I can tell you what we can do about it. We ran into exactly the same thing in the Armed Services Committee, and I think I was the one who suggested first that we put the witnesses under oath. Then we had the Preparedness Subcommittee, under John Stennis, an able, fair, efficient fellow, and these fellows come in and we tell him who we want as witnesses. We don't let them tell us who we want as witnesses, and we pull in two or three fliers in Vietnam and they are under oath so they can go right back and say, "You don't want me to perjure myself, do you?" And they come up there and they give us more information in less time as against all this stuff that we get from the Joint Chiefs, you see.

We really begin to cut the mustard as to what the facts are.

DOVES AND HAWKS

One thing I don't know and that worries me a very great deal, based on my relationship with this government, is whether there is any accuracy in the fact that essentially McNamara is a dove and essentially Rusk is a hawk and the degree of it. I do know that when I talk to Walt Rostow who is now in a protective position as part of the Executive Branch that he was pretty darned hawkish, you see.

Well, I think it might be, I certainly would subscribe to what Neil Sheehan wrote in the New York Times the other day after this last trip of mine, not a dove but no longer a hawk.

When these fellows come down like the JCS they can't cross a "t" or dot an "i" that isn't approved by higher authority.

So it seems to me if we had a subcommittee operating on the theory of getting the facts from less important people, and you come in and run the committee any time you want to handle it and call the people in here, I think to call in some of these ambassadors from outside this country and if necessary put them under oath.

TESTIMONY FROM JOURNALISTS

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you—I am glad to have this angle. The other angle that bothers me—I would like to have newspapermen. We went over this in the Dominican thing.

Does the committee feel that this is unfeasible?

Some of these people have more experience.

Senator SYMINGTON. I don't know, but I know one thing. You have the right as chairman of this committee to ask anybody in this government because we put the money up.

Senator PELL. I think you have the right to ask foreigners, too.

The CHAIRMAN. We have never done it. These are the precedents which this committee has had long before I came here. It seems to me that we ought to have a little greater freedom to ask anybody who appeals to us.

Senator SYMINGTON. I couldn't agree with you more.

The CHAIRMAN. These have been traditions, and I thought it ought to be the decision of the committee.

Do you think we ought to contemplate, I will certainly submit any of these changes to the committee, but shall we investigate it, for purposes of discussion?

Senator MORSE. I think so because we are entitled to give the American people the facts they are entitled to receive from any source.

JEOPARDIZING SUBORDINATE OFFICIALS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This is the old story with this committee and other committees to try to get in subordinate officials to try to get them to testify when their own necks are out eight feet. If they offend their superiors, they will get their heads chopped off and you just put them there and put them under the guillotine.

Look at [Otto] Otepka, sitting there in the State Department being there for two years because he told the truth to the [Thomas] Dodd committee and they just, they have got him sitting over

there, nothing to do and they are trying to get rid of him, but they don't have a case against him.

You have got—

Senator SYMINGTON. In 1948, I bucked the Secretary of Defense as Secretary of the Air Force. In 1949, Mr. Truman had a meeting in the cabinet room and he said, "I want everybody here to support this budget whether they like it or not and if they don't want to support it I want them to say so now."

A lot of people in the room, but he looked at me the whole time he was saying it, and I said, "I just want to ask you one question and then I will make up my mind. Are you asking me to go up on the Hill and perjure myself?"

And he looked at me for about 15 seconds and he said, "Will you give me your word of honor you didn't instigate the question?"

And I said, "I will," and he said, "Go up there and tell them what you believe."

If you get these fellows and put them under oath and put them—it is pretty tough if anybody above them, and we will know about it soon enough if they are castigated for perjuring themselves before this committee in order to follow a party line.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Stu, nobody knows better than you do it doesn't happen the next week after they do it. It happens two years later when they find themselves going down the hall and pretty soon the door opens and they fall off and you can't go back and prove it.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator GORE. That has been a helpful session.

[Discussion off the record.]

PROSPECTIVE WITNESSES

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to ask Mr. Marcy to try to contact these people along these lines, if you have any suggestion about it. Some of them I mentioned, if this meets with your approval, the Communist world in '67, some hearing on this subject. I would like to have men like George Kennan and Schulman who are the recognized authorities on that subject.

Does that suit you?

Senator GORE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And Asia, the Pacific.

Senator GORE. We not only need to examine ourselves in this world, but we need to examine our adversaries in this world.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator GORE. In order to determine our place.

The CHAIRMAN. And our relations to them, what they are like and our relations.

Senator GORE. What are our dangers, prospects and limitations.

The CHAIRMAN. For example, this subject has been suggested, Asia, the Pacific, and the United States, that type of thing may have a man like Reischauer, he is the best type of man I can think of to best describe what is presently the situation in Japan, the Far East. He is a long time scholar of China. If anybody could interpret that situation, it seems to me he would be as good as anybody.

But that is the type of hearing.

This is strictly educational, not intended to attack anybody at all, simply the information of what it is like out there, what these people think and what our relations to them ought to be.

Does that make sense to you?

Senator GORE. Yes.

CHANGING AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD FOREIGN POLICY

The CHAIRMAN. And on down, the changing American attitudes towards foreign policy. I mean what is going to here, our attitude, what we are afflicted with, what limitations and so on, and the nature of U.S. commitments.

We talked about this last year. It seems to me we ought to clarify this matter.

I get so fed up with being told we are committed to something all the time, which I don't think is so. What makes the commitment is having the President say we are committed, and I don't think that is what I mean by commitment. I think the commitment is something that is taken by the Congress and the Executive, not just a unilateral action.

Senator GORE. SEATO committed us to confer.

The CHAIRMAN. I think they absolutely misrepresent what SEATO is. He repeated it again. Of course that is what Rusk has been saying over the past couple of years. He didn't say it in the beginning, but he is saying it now.

When you read what Dulles said SEATO meant it isn't what they now say it means.

Senator GORE. It isn't what Rusk said at the beginning.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if I understand it, that is the way we will proceed. Who can we get on some of these? I would like to have James Gavin again on that—

Senator PELL. Matthew Ridgway maybe.

The CHAIRMAN. And Ridgway. Who we can get.

Senator PELL. I think Ridgway is more coherent in his arguments.

SCHOLARS AND GENERALS

The CHAIRMAN. Gavin we had, and I thought he did a very good job. It is perfectly all right to have them both. The reason I do is we naturally have to have so many scholars because they are available and I would like to use whatever generals we can to offset the attitude we are stacking these hearings and not having generals.

Whatever generals that are called at all reasonably I would like to have them not because I have such respect personally, they are wiser than others, but to offset the emotional prejudice in some quarters against the scholars.

Does that make sense to you?

Senator PELL. Perfectly.

The CHAIRMAN. The same with this fellow Griffith. He is a scholar. He was as good as you can find among the generals, and lived

in China and he has a reasonable attitude. It offsets the criticism they offered toward people like Fairbank and Bartlett and others.²

Mr. MARCY. Do you want to mention—

The CHAIRMAN. Did either one of you see Alf Landon's speech that he made in Kansas three months ago?

Well, it is a remarkable speech. I couldn't believe it, and I am all for having him. I never dreamed of having a fellow like that but he made a speech I think you would thoroughly approve of, and I think it would be very good politically to have him sandwiched in among these scholars. The speech is available if either one of you have time to read it. I am sure you would approve it, and coming from that quarter it absolutely knocked me out of my chair.

It is amazing, he is quite a fellow, at least from this speech.

INVITE SUGGESTIONS FOR WITNESSES

Senator GORE. Why don't you invite all members of the committee to suggest possible witnesses. We would not be obligated to invite all, but out of the suggestions might come a very helpful suggestion?

The CHAIRMAN. I have no objection other than the personal relations. They have a feeling if they submit some, we have 19 members and if you don't take them they will be offended.

Senator PELL. I think you are right.

The CHAIRMAN. If they put in a friend or a fellow—

Senator GORE. I withdraw it.

In other words, I am asked to submit a man and then you didn't invite him. I withdraw the suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN. You can get into awful serious trouble.

Last year the way we did it was this way, Albert, after thinking about it. The way that was done—I didn't know a lot of the people—I asked Carl and the fellow Robertson who is the China expert in the Library, Far East, and Barnett of Columbia who is a recognized authority. I didn't have anything really to do with it. I didn't know most of those people. They got together, surveyed the situation and tried to fit the man to the subject and that is the way they were selected until the very end when Bourke said to me, "I think we ought to have somebody on our side," and I said, "These aren't on my side, they are supposed to be the best there are."

Well, anyway, that is the way we got the other three. It didn't work too bad in this sense, Albert, because after we got through these, then Bourke, we satisfied—he submitted those three names and he was satisfied.

If we started out, I imagine we would have had 15 names, Mundt's and various ones, all of them had submitted them and we hadn't got them, I am afraid they would be mad.

But those three satisfied him.

What we want is not quantity but quality if we can get it, the very best that we can get. I don't want to get just one point of view. I would like to get people who have had experiences who can give both points of view or whatever points of view there are.

²John K. Fairbank, Professor of Asian History at Harvard, and Ruhl J. Bartlett, Professor of Diplomatic History at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

A NEW POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE

Senator GORE. Well, just as last year, as more or less of a tangential effect of our Vietnam hearing, the hearing created a new political atmosphere in which the administration had some maneuverability with respect to China, it seems to me if we could get the proper erudition on the subject many of the World War II dogmas could be examined and I have an idea many of them are not very valid any more.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you, I am sure.

Senator GORE. And yet we need the study ourselves, but perhaps even more importantly for the American people.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. That is what I meant. We ought to be the forum for, the sounding board for these scholars and thoughtful people who have no other way of reaching the American people. I mean these people we had, Fairbank, nobody ever heard of him. He could write a book or article or write a speech and he wouldn't get beyond the 200 people who read him but with this forum, in a way he reached millions of people, and that is what I think we can do. It is a question of getting people who really know this subject. I thought we did pretty well: we had darned good people.

BUSINESSMEN AS WITNESSES

Senator PELL. In this connection, most of the witnesses we had were scholars. I was able to get a passport validated for an American businessman from Textron, a friend of mine, a businessman. If he succeeds in getting in, somebody who can speak firsthand as a man with considerable intellectual curiosity, a lawyer, and he believes in opening up contacts there, that would have even more of an impact.

The CHAIRMAN. You remember this man Blackie who was head of Caterpillar? We had him on East-West Trade. He was smart and he made a good witness. That is a top businessman in this country.

Senator PELL. Even better than a general.

The CHAIRMAN. He is one of the most successful businessmen in the country with worldwide business and he made a good witness on East-West trade. That is a thing which I think could well be involved.

EDUCATING THE ADMINISTRATION

Senator GORE. Not only do we educate the American people and ourselves but again referring, adverting to the China hearings, I think the Administration got a little light on it as much as we did.

The CHAIRMAN. The Administration needs it as much as we do.

Senator GORE. I believe they welcomed the effect and reacted to it.

The CHAIRMAN. They do on China. They got miffed on Vietnam because they thought it challenged their policy.

Senator GORE. I mean China.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is correct.

TRIP TO CAMBODIA

Senator PELL. Speaking on firsthand knowledge, too, is there any more on the trip to Cambodia? I talked to Carl about it. I don't think there was. As I understand it, we are waiting now a little bit on our dignity. Shouldn't we reactivate it?

Mr. MARCY. The latest on that was that the Cambodians advised that we not press it, not respond affirmatively to their invitation to come until Prince Sihanouk was back from some medical treatment in Paris.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

He went to France.

Mr. MARCY. He is still in Paris. They expect him back some time in February.

Senator PELL. Late January.

Mr. MARCY. I am sure we really can't get a reply from them until he really does get back, but in late January or early February it would be appropriate either for us or for them, I think, to open the question again. We can do it simply by telephoning New York.

Senator PELL. The reason I wanted to raise it is just simply to get three senators to make plans to go two or three weeks. The best time would be in January during a slack period, and I didn't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Can I try out another idea?

Senator PELL. Couldn't we agree on this before leaving this? Would it seem agreeable about making a phone call before the end of the month?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, inquire as to when.

Mr. MARCY. I think we ought to wait until the Prince is back, because what they will do is to fire off an inquiry to Cambodia.

Senator PELL. Let's find out from the State Department so we will know when he is back.

The CHAIRMAN. State Department when he is back, and then put the inquiry. Sure, that is right.

HAVE A HISTORIAN TESTIFY

We had a subject here, changing American attitude toward foreign policy. This is kind of a historical thing, what do you think about a man like [Henry Steele] Commager or [Arthur] Schlesinger?

Senator GORE. Change and the need for change.

The CHAIRMAN. In connection with it. If it is not changing enough, how it ought to change. This is more or less a historical review type of thing in which I think is the process of self-analysis along the line you are thinking that in order to change, in order to see we have to analyze what we have thought as to how relative it is to present conditions and how it originated, the kind of a forum of self-analysis.

Senator GORE. May I make a suggestion? Does this appeal to you—

[Discussion off the record.]

JUSTIFICATION OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Let me try another thing on you.

I say this if we have these hearings you can't keep from appealing our involvements, and I think the issue for the justification about our involvement is still the crucial one. What bothers me and a lot of the people who don't like this is I don't feel there is valid justification for our ever having become involved and, therefore, the way they pursue it and so on just doesn't go down with me. I think we are in a false position, and the quicker we liquidate it in a reasonably dignified manner the better. I don't think it is a matter purely of manners, you might say, and dignity of a great country. You just drop it and get out. You have to have an acceptable form of negotiation to get yourself out, to extricate yourself. As far as the hearings, Albert, I don't want to announce them and don't want to say this is just another Vietnam hearing. I want that to be developed as a part of an overall examination of our relations and our responsibilities as the most powerful country in the world to the rest of humanity, is more or less the way I want it to come up.

Does that make sense?

Senator GORE. Yes, you can't ignore it. It is a part.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a part but I don't wish to have it said we are just again attacking this problem because the administration will get its back up and the people will say I am trying to pursue an old vendetta.

A LITTLE SELF-CRITICISM

Senator PELL. Couldn't we do it with a little bit of modesty and criticism and self-criticism by suggesting we are doing now what we should have done five years ago as far as Thailand goes by doing that saying we should have done this in Vietnam in '61 and didn't but we are going to do it, by God now?

The CHAIRMAN. I have tried to be as contrite as I can in the Tonkin Gulf and others. I didn't realize what we are getting into, and I am quite willing to say I was shortsighted. I had no idea that we were going to go this way.

Senator PELL. This would be a good opening.

The CHAIRMAN. That is honest with me. I had no idea. I thought when I was on this and with this President, I thought he was just as determined as I was to keep out of a major war out there. That is what I believed in 1964.

Senator GORE. I assume that what the President said last night—since we decided to send troops to Vietnam he was using an editorial "we."

The CHAIRMAN. I think so. [Laughter.]

Does that meet with your general idea of how we should proceed on this, on the people? I have got some others here. Hutchins is very outspoken on this. These are people. Bob Hutchins. This Eric Fromm has written a lot on this. Some people think he is a Communist, I don't think he is, but I don't know whether it would be safe to have him or not. He lives in Mexico.

Senator PELL. Hutchins.

The CHAIRMAN. We will try to see what we can do.

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to call of the chair.]

THE WORLD SITUATION

January 16, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Lausche, Dodd, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.

Also present: Senator McGee, Assistant Secretary Douglas MacArthur III, Deputy Assistant Secretary H.G. Torbert, Jr., Mr. Ernest Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Major A.B. Outlaw, Department of Defense.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Tillman, Mr. Jones, and Mr. Lowenstein of the committee staff.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Well, we will come to order.

We are very pleased this morning to have the Secretary of State, but before we proceed, I want to welcome the new member, Senator Cooper, from Kentucky.

We are very pleased, indeed, to have you on the committee, and we are sure you will make a great contribution to the deliberation of the committee.

Senator CARLSON. We are delighted.

The CHAIRMAN. After seeing the new Republicans yesterday, I am bound to congratulate them on the quality of their new crop.

Senator AIKEN. We accept the congratulations.

Senator COOPER. I am glad to be on the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we are very glad to have you and assume you would like to give us a kind of a rundown of the general situation before we have questions, if that is agreeable.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. I would like to start by paying my personal compliments to Senator Cooper. Not only has he had a very distinguished service as a Senator, but he was one of our great ambassadors in an earlier day, and I am proud to be associated with him on this committee.

If it is agreeable, Mr. Chairman, I might comment fairly briefly on certain important developments that have occurred since the Congress adjourned and then go as promptly as possible into comments and discussions and questions.

TURMOIL IN CHINA

First, I think perhaps the most important single thing that is happening in the world today is happening in mainland China. We believe that it is very important even though we do not know exactly what is happening there. It is the kind of ignorance which does not embarrass us too much because it seems fairly obvious that the leadership in China is not exactly clear on what is happening.

But the combination of a struggle among individuals with regard to the succession to Mao and some ideological debates within the top leadership that occurred last summer that we are gradually becoming aware of, and perhaps some revival of regional difference and regional influences in China have created a situation of considerable turmoil.

I would caution members of the committee about drawing too many conclusions too rapidly about the news, that is, the normal press dispatches, particularly those that are based upon posters in Peking, but we do know that there seems to be a considerable struggle between the apparatus of the Communist Party in China, or considerable elements of the apparatus of the party, and the so called Red Guards under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, with the army playing a somewhat equivocal role, perhaps in between.

SHIFTS IN CHINESE LEADERSHIP

Just to indicate the confusion that exists there reflected in our own lack of understanding of exactly what is happening, Lin Piao has not been heard from for about two months, since November, even though Mao had nominated him to be his successor and had highlighted his role up to this point. He has dropped out of the picture temporarily. I can be incorrect by the end of the day because he may reappear.

There was a report this morning that Liu Shao-chi, who was demoted in the party, the chief of state, so-called, is out in western China. If this is so, this could be of some importance because we have had some indication that the regional armies are playing something of an independent role here. We are keeping this point in mind because Lin Piao has his army around Peking and presumably he would have had a considerable advantage in the Peking area. But Chen Yi, who was under attack by the Red Guards, has long connections with an army which is in the southwest of China, and the supposition is that he has at least some independence of position because he has the support of his own former army in another part of the country.

We do know that Chou En-lai seems to be trying to play a mediating role among the different elements, and he is a fairly key figure to keep your eyes on in this situation. If he is able to bring Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi and some of these different elements in some standdown on hostilities, then it may be that the regime could be reconstituted, perhaps somewhat weakened, on the basis that it existed say two weeks ago. But the leadership, undoubtedly they are eyeing each other among themselves.

We do know that there have been considerable acts of violence in different parts of the country, that railways have been inter-

rupted, that factories have been shut down because of strikes, that very large numbers of workers seem now to be moving into Peking itself with divided loyalties, and almost anything can happen.

POSTPONEMENT OF WARSAW TALKS

The most immediate impact upon us is that they have asked us to postpone our next talk in Warsaw for two weeks for what they call administrative reasons. It may be that the ambassador there is going back to Peking or has gone back for a visit. It may be there is some difficulty about what line he is to take in issuing his instructions.

It is interesting to note that Peking's diplomats in about 25 countries have been going home in considerable numbers in the last two weeks, indicating that they expected to be back in their post in about 60 days. We, of course, are watching this very carefully to see whether it might in any way be connected with some foreign adventure somewhere. But the pattern does not seem to indicate that, and it looks more like something connected with the cultural revolution, perhaps indoctrination of the diplomatic corps or purge of the diplomatic corps. We just cannot yet say. But we would expect to have our next talk with Peking in Warsaw in February. If that is postponed again, I think that perhaps will be a reflection of the disturbances going on in China.

Senator AIKEN. When was the last talk?

Secretary RUSK. The last talk was, I think, in September.

NO ROLE FOR NATIONALIST FORCES

There is one point that has come into public attention I would just mention in order to discount completely. That is, any suggestion that the Nationalist forces on Taiwan have any role to play here, or intend to play any role here, or have any capability of moving onto the mainland to interfere in this situation. This talk out of Taiwan is talk, and they have now said publicly in the last few days that they acknowledge the requirement of an agreement with us before they make any move under the security and arrangements we had with them in the middle of the fifties. They know we are not going to give them that commitment, and I think that that situation is more talk than anything else.

We have not yet seen any direct connection between the events in China and in moves outward from China. There is always the possibility that people who are in that kind of trouble at home might try to unify themselves or try to divert attention from their own problems through some international adventure, but we do not see the displacement of military forces or other indications suggesting that they plan to intervene in South Vietnam.

RISK OF CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM WAR

I noticed over the weekend a report from a French editor that there was some sort of an agreement between Peking and the United States on the basis of which they would stay out of Vietnam, that is, if we would not attack China, that we would not ourselves invade North Vietnam and we would not bomb the dikes. I

do not know of any such agreement. There has never been any exchange on that between ourselves and Peking.

We have assumed that, of course, if we attack China we would be at war with China. We have assumed if we were to move land forces north of the 17th Parallel that that would raise very substantially the risks of a Chinese intervention, but for reasons of our own, including humanitarian reasons, we have not had the intention of bombing those dikes in the Red River Valley. They could cause very, very heavy flooding and ruin a great many civilians up there.

But we have had the impression from time to time through third parties that Peking's basic attitude was if we leave them alone, they will leave us alone, and that certainly is all right with us, but we do not know to what extent we can rely on that.

All I am saying on the merits is there is something in those three points mentioned by the French editor, but we are not aware of any agreement or any communication from Peking to that effect.

The closest thing to it was a comment passed along by a third-country diplomat shortly after a press conference in which I had said that the idea of a sanctuary is dead. I was referring there to North Vietnam, but Peking said—told a third-country diplomat, in essence, that if the United States leaves Peking alone, they would leave us alone, but that was about a year and a half ago, and coincides somewhat in time with the events allegedly spoken about by the French editor.

EFFECT OF CHINESE EVENTS ON HANOI

Now, on Vietnam, Mr. Chairman, we do not see that the events in mainland China have significantly affected the Vietnam situation with possibly two exceptions. One is that there seems to be some reaction in Hanoi against the events in China. The speculation is to the point as to whether events in China are giving Hanoi any larger freedom of action in this situation, whether that might open up possibilities for contacts that did not exist before.

Secondly, we do have contacts and—

[Discussion off the record.]

Secretary RUSK. I cannot report—

HANOI'S READINESS TO TALK

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask the Secretary, has it not been characteristic of wars in the past when one side is losing and feels it is on the verge of collapse, then it wants to talk and is willing to talk? Is there anything significant in the fact that the rumblings out of Hanoi seem to be a little more conversational than they were in the past?

Secretary RUSK. I would not want to leave the impression, Senator, that the contacts that have existed lately really are pointed toward a readiness or desire to talk. There are a good many things that have been put to the other side from our direction that have had no response. That might change at almost any time.

There are those who think they may be somewhat more willing to talk, but we have not been able to dig that out in any fully satisfactory way, and, in general, the answer to your question is yes.

WHETHER THE UNITED STATES REFUSED TO TALK

The CHAIRMAN. How about our situation, we were told two years ago that you—we refused to talk because we were losing. It was just the opposite.

Secretary RUSK. That is not correct, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Which is not correct, that we were told it or it was not true?

Secretary RUSK. I mean what you were told was not correct. The full story of that is not on the record, and one of the key witnesses there is now dead, Adlai Stevenson. There were contacts before, during, and after that particular episode with the other side. We were misled as to the channels that were being used during that period.

I was told, for example, that the Soviet Foreign Office knew nothing about this, that this was not known to the Soviet ambassadors and Mr. Gromyko and so forth. Then a year or so later I was told this had been actively discussed with Mr. Andrei Gromyko during a period when I was regularly in touch with him and the matter did not come up, and I was told under no circumstances should we raise it. Further, we did tell the Secretary General if he had a channel to go back and explore it and try to develop it further and see more about the situation with whom one talks and what about. Insofar as I know, he never did that.

Adlai Stevenson, the week before he died, on the BBC in London said that he was never very clear about with whom the talks were supposed to be held and on what subject.

Now the problem about surfacing that whole business is that it would get in the way of contacts through the Soviet Union. Hanoi has flatly and categorically denied it. The possibilities of channels of the sort that were discussed at that time have been further explored without results, and we prefer to deal with this kind of a question with regard to the future rather than trying to just rehash the past.

But the story, as I knew it, is not the one that is generally talked about in regard to that episode.

CESSATION OF THE BOMBING

The principal point that is being raised now in contacts is the question of a—is an unconditional and permanent cessation of the bombing. I point out those two words because this is rather different from what was said last autumn. Last autumn the suggestion was made in a number of quarters, including Communist quarters, that a suspension of the bombing for a period of time might make it possible to develop the basis of discussion of some more toward negotiations, and we suspended the bombing for twice as long as had been suggested to us by key elements on the other side, and without result.

Now, the price has gone up very considerably. They are saying unconditional and permanent or they say unconditional and definitive or, in that Harrison Salisbury view, unconditional and for good. That is a rather different problem than a temporary suspension.

The other side has told us that the temporary suspension is nothing but an ultimatum; that this matter has to be taken up on the basis of a complete and permanent stoppage.

At the same time we are not able to get anything from the other side at all about what they would do if the bombing stopped, and we have been probing on that point, continue to probe it, are doing so now, as to what the effect would be.

U THANT'S THREE POINTS

Secretary General U Thant has his three points. The first that we stop the bombing. The second, there be a mutual de-escalation, and the third, there be negotiations with the Viet Cong.

We have said so far as the first point is concerned, okay, what about the second point? On that there has been nothing, Hanoi has rejected U Thant's second point, mutual de-escalation of the violence, and has said with regard to U Thant's third point that the Viet Cong, the National Liberation Front, is the sole spokesman for the South Vietnamese people.

Those who call upon us to accept U Thant's three points usually do not take into account the fact that Hanoi has already categorically rejected points two and three. We continue to try to find some sort of an indication or suggestion, informal or otherwise, private or public, as to what the result will be if we stop the bombing and no one yet has been able or willing to tell us what that could be.

FIVE YEARS SUSPENSION

The fact that they are calling for a permanent stoppage of the bombing makes it a very serious problem, because we have had now, experiences with three periods in which there was no bombing, five years, five weeks, five days, and we know that the infiltration simply continued.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary—Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. What do you mean five years suspension?

Secretary RUSK. Well, there was no bombing for five years from 1960 when they announced publicly they were going to seize South Vietnam. They moved the entire 325th Division of the North Vietnamese Regular Army into South Vietnam before we started the bombing. During that five-year period when there was no bombing of North Vietnam, we went to the Laos Conference, we made major concessions, as some persons saw it, took the Soviet nominee to be prime minister of Laos and accepted the coalition government worked out among the three elements there. We got no exchange for that, no performance whatever on the other side with respect to North Vietnamese troops in Laos or the use of Laos as an infiltration route to the south, or ability of the coalition government to function in Laos or the ability of the ICC to function in Laos. During all that period there were literally hundreds of contacts with the—in South Vietnam and there we did not see any peace in South Vietnam.

Senator MANSFIELD. MR. Secretary, I think you are going back a long way and stretching it pretty thin when you use the five years, five weeks, and five days analogy, because in 1960 how many troops did we have in Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. We had——

Senator MANSFIELD. Very few.

Secretary RUSK. We had about 600 and a military aid mission there.

Senator MANSFIELD. We had no air forces of any kind, and I am not at all sure we were even instructing the South Vietnamese air force. If my information is correct, and it is from the Defense Department, the organized cadres did not come down from the north until 1964. At that time they were identifiable, and I think I can reinforce those figures and that fact.

Secretary RUSK. You mean organized units of the North Vietnamese Regular Army?

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. Well, that is different than cadres, I think, Senator, because they were infiltrating cadres including North Vietnamese long before 1964. Organized elements of the North Vietnamese Army, I think I would agree with you.

Senator MANSFIELD. Cadres and organized units and, if my memory is correct, the figure was 400 at the end of 1964, and that figure was supplied to me by the Department of Defense.

U.S. ACCEPTANCE OF SOUVANNA PHOUMA

I note that you call Souvanna Phouma the Soviet nominee for prime minister of Laos who we decided to accept after we had rejected and kicked him out two years previously, which was a serious mistake on our part, as a result of the Geneva Accord on Laos.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator MANSFIELD. Was Souvanna Phouma not our nominee, too?

Secretary RUSK. He came to be when we accepted him, but there was another prime minister that the Eisenhower Administration had recognized in 1960.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is true, and during that time I think we had a very large part to play in ousting Souvanna Phouma, undermining his position, and helping to create the situation which developed in Laos in those years, is that correct? I think your ambassador had something to do with it at the State Department.

Secretary RUSK. I think there is something in that, yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is all, Mr. Chairman. I will have something else later.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, Mr. Secretary.

STEPS TOWARDS NEGOTIATIONS

Secretary RUSK. Well, the key question in Vietnam at the present time is the question of whether we can get steps taken by both sides to move this matter towards a peaceful solution either at the conference table or through negotiations or de facto. And at the present time I cannot report to the committee we have had any indication from the other side what any reciprocal step might be, although there are many opportunities, many ways, many channels by which that could be taken up.

FRANCE AND NATO

As far as that is concerned, there is a pretty clear understanding now between the 14 on the one side and France on the other as to where the dividing line is and those NATO matters in which France will participate and will not participate. The 14 have constituted themselves into a defense planning committee. France does not attempt to interfere in the activities of the 14, or to veto or obstruct what the 14 feel that they must do.

France, on the other hand, does take part in the political discussions that go on in the council of the 15, and there seems to be a pretty clear understanding now as to just where one starts and the other leaves off.

At our last NATO meeting it was a good business-like meeting, and I think we transacted our business more efficiently than we have for some time, the 14 dealing with the military and the 15 taking up the political matters.

I think the most interesting thing is the full exploration which is being made by practically all of its members on relations with the east.

We had before us at our last NATO meeting a report, I think, that has been made available to the committee, a report of contacts between members of NATO and Eastern European countries of a period of about six months, and there were about 185 of those contacts in terms of exchanging visits or exchange of visits or exchange of delegations and things of that sort.

GERMANY AND EASTERN EUROPE

It is quite interesting to see that the new government in the Federal Republic apparently has decided it is going to explore the possibilities of improved relations with Eastern Europe. There are delegations in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland to look at that situation. They apparently have come to the conclusion that 20 years of harsh confrontation has not moved them any nearer reunification or settlement of the German question, and they are prepared now to explore the possibility of improved relations to see whether that might not reduce the fear of the Germans among some of the small Eastern European countries, open up better contacts between West and East Germans and perhaps bring about a political situation atmosphere in which some movement can be made in the direction of reunification.

SOVIET ROLE IN VIETNAM

Let me say as far as we are concerned, we were interested that when Gromyko came to the United Nations Assembly last year and visited Washington briefly, as well as from contacts we have had with him since then, is that the Soviet Union has not taken the view that because of Vietnam there is nothing to discuss. They have been prepared to sit down and talk about particular issues with us despite Vietnam.

[Discussion off the record.]

Secretary RUSK. If you want to refer to this problem on the public record, you can go back to the Bucharest communique of the Warsaw Pact countries in July in which the Eastern European

countries called upon the U.S. to comply with the 1954 and 1962 agreements. Our answer to them was, "all right, we agree to that, let's get going."

The difficulty is that Moscow does not feel that it is in a position to take a public political initiative with Hanoi in such things as calling a conference or authorizing the ICC to take up some of the chores that we would hope it would take up, because it seems to be immobilized by the problem with China and also somewhat handicapped by its relative lack of influence in Hanoi itself.

So we have felt that we ought to go ahead and try to discuss other subjects with the Soviet Union, to see whether we find other points of agreement.

CONSULAR AGREEMENT

As you know, we did conclude a civil area agreement, We hope very much that the Senate will find it possible to approve the consular agreement during the present session. In passing, Mr. Chairman, let me repeat here, from our point of view at the present time what is important about that treaty is not the possibility that we might open up consulates. That we could do today under existing legislation, one consulate in one place and one consulate in another. Ninety-five percent of our interest in this treaty is in those provisions providing consular access and protection for American citizens traveling and living in the Soviet Union. I told the committee when we were discussing that earlier that as far as consulates are concerned, we would be prepared to consult further with the committee before moving to establish the consulates, but we do have need for consular access to American citizens. They are traveling in the Soviet Union in larger and larger numbers. Many of our tourists, despite certain education we try to give them before they go, do some of the things in the Soviet Union that tourists do in many countries such as manipulating currency and picking up souvenirs and things of that sort, and it makes it very difficult for us to give them reasonable protection without the formal agreements of a consular convention.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. At that point, Mr. Secretary, if you would care to comment—

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir?

GIVING RUSSIA MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. With me, the one hurt under the saddle of this consular treaty is why do we have to give the Russians under the Most Favored Nations clause extend to all other countries, 20 or whatever it is, immunity from prosecution for crime by the employee nationals of a country. I could go as far as the consular official, something of that kind, although we do not do it to any other country. We will have to extend it under the Most Favored Nations clause, as I understand it. Why do we have to do it with the Russians?

Secretary RUSK. I think the point on which a judgment will have to be made, Senator, is whether our interest in the reciprocal privilege is not stronger than their interest on this point. You see, our problem with our own employees in the Soviet Union is a far more

severe one than problems we would have here, but this is one of those questions on which—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is the thing that is unclear to me. I cannot rationalize that in my own mind nor can I quite understand the reason for it. Go ahead.

Secretary RUSK. That is right. Let me get some material down on that in the terms of numbers and in terms of our interest on—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think we have numbers on it. I think I have numbers in my files on the thing and that is what mystifies me. The more information I get, the more I am confused, so I do not know, maybe I had better just stay as I am.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I do think he ought to provide the rest of us, however, with the memorandum, because I do not have the figures.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We had some figures, but maybe we ought to be brought up to date. We had some.

Senator MORSE. In the committee file?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, about the number of Americans going there and Russians here, showing in my view we had much more to gain than they did by giving this protection.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Also the number of immunities we grant. It is my understanding that there would be 400 and some. I do not mean to get into an extended discussion of it, but there would be 400 and some other employees.

The CHAIRMAN. That could be mutually controlled.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. By other countries which we would have to extend to consulate officials and employees who are nationals of the sending country.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, the point—I realize you do not want to go into that in great detail, but on the matter of Most Favored Nations treatment for other countries, that would only occur where they would be prepared to give us reciprocal arrangements. We know some of these other countries are not interested in giving us that privilege. Therefore, this would not come into operation. So, we will have to try to find out informally if we can—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Perhaps some of them would not ask for it.

GERMAN RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

The CHAIRMAN. Were you going to say something more about the Germans?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you were going into this recent meeting of Kurt Kiesinger and Charles de Gaulle. What is your interpretation?

Secretary RUSK. Our interpretation of that is that the new German government wants to find out whether it can get a more relaxed relationship with President de Gaulle. They felt that they were caught up—the Germans felt they were caught up in some sort of special bilateral issue between Paris and Washington. There probably were some feelings on President de Gaulle's part about the role of the United States in Europe as well as in other world

affairs, but basically the issue was between President de Gaulle and the other 14.

It is our impression that the new German government will try to move on those points where it can move with France, but within the limits of a basic commitment to NATO, and without creating a big gap between Bonn and the United States and some of the largest issues.

We ourselves have told the Germans and the French that the United States has a basic interest in good relations between Germany and France. After all, two world wars came about because these two countries started fighting each other.

We do believe that it is important that Germany improve her relations without going down the same route as President de Gaulle in certain subjects, particularly, for example, NATO, but we will have to see.

I think the atmosphere at this last meeting was good, but I do not have the impression that the Germans changed underlying basic policy toward NATO.

What was important, I think, Mr. Chairman, is that de Gaulle, as well as we, have encouraged the new German government to explore the possibilities of improved relations with the East on the ground that we have tried over a period of 20 years another approach, the Adenauer approach in effect. Now another approach might be more promising for the longer range future, depending a good deal, of course, on what the reaction of Eastern Europe would be.

I would like to come back to that from two or three different points of view, if I may, and I am going to try not to take too much of your time, but I think the committee would be interested in the present state of play of the nonproliferation treaty.

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

The parliamentary situation is that there is no agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union as yet on particular language for a nonproliferation treaty. However, there is some language which we think the Soviet Union would probably accept which might be acceptable to us, depending upon the consensus we might reach among allies. It is very important that you understand that we have not agreed with the Soviet Union, but that we are discussing this language with our allies.

The language itself, and I will pass this around the table for anyone to see, the language itself stems right out of our own national legislation in this field. Each nuclear weapons state, party to this treaty, undertakes not to transmit to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly.

As I say, that is what our national legislation at present says.

I think it is quite important that if this language becomes acceptable to note that a good deal of underbrush has been worked out and cast aside. For example, the Soviets agree that we are talking about warheads and we are not talking about delivery vehicles and that is a very important advance. Secondly, they agree that they are not talking about what happens in case of war, in which event a treaty of this sort disappears. The Soviet allies in Eastern Europe

have delivery vehicles and, in the event of war, presumably war-heads would be made available to them. The same thing would happen in NATO if that terrible situation ever came about. Third, they are not talking about how an alliance makes the overriding political decision to go to war, which seemed at one point to be part of the problem.

A METAPHYSICAL POINT

We have discussed centering around an almost metaphysical point. Mr. Gromyko illustrated it with a little diagram in which he said that a nuclear power should not transfer nuclear weapons to a non-nuclear power.

All right, no difficulty about that.

Secondly, that a nuclear power should not transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers through an alliance.

No problem on that.

Then we got into difficulty when he said and cannot transfer weapons or control over them to an alliance itself, that is stopping there. And this got into all sorts of metaphysical problems about just what is the alliance apart from its members, and got confused with the question of the political decisions of an alliance, about whether to go to war or not and matters of that sort.

This language here that I just mentioned seems to cut through that and concentrate on the hardware, the actual nuclear war-heads.

Now, we have discussed this and I would appreciate it very much if members of the committee would make no reference to this outside because we have discussed this with the four members of NATO who are members of the Geneva Conference, that is, the other three, Britain, Italy and Canada.

We are also discussing it with the Germans, and we are also discussing it in a preliminary way with the Japanese.

We will shortly be discussing it with the rest of the NATO members.

ACCEPTABLE TO GERMANY

I am encouraged to believe that at least as far as the NATO countries are concerned, including Germany, this is probably going to prove acceptable and, therefore, I think we can assume——

Senator LAUSCHE. Did you say it will be acceptable to Germany?

Secretary RUSK. That is the present indication. They have had some problems about such things as the European Clause, reserving a right for a unified Europe to have its own nuclear force. But it now seems clear to them that if a unified Europe comes about through the political consolidation of the present European members that it would be a nuclear power through direct succession from France and, say, Great Britain. That if there are other arrangements which may come 10, 20 years in the future that they could invoke the review clauses that would be in such a treaty or if necessary, actually withdraw from the treaty.

Let me say, that we will be in consultation with the appropriate committees of the Congress on this before any agreement is given to any language that might be developed here.

But I just wanted to let the committee know we think there has been some movement.

PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES

But there are two other problems that are of major importance in the nonproliferation matter that you should know about. One is that the non-nuclear countries, such as India and Japan, are going to raise or likely to raise some very, very difficult problems. For example, both of them say, "Well, now, it is all very well to get rid of nuclear weapons or for us to foreswear nuclear weapons, but we need to reserve the right to have nuclear explosives available for peaceful purposes."

Nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes is a bomb for all practical purposes. We hope to be able to work out among the nuclear powers, at least some of the nuclear powers, a procedure by which we can make peaceful uses of explosives available to non-nuclear countries, under some arrangements by which you make a judgment on its feasibility and desirability and so forth. So, if Mauritania wants a harbor and applies to the nuclear powers to explode a device there and dig them a harbor, there will be some way in which this can be done. Otherwise, some of the non-nuclear countries are likely to use this at least as a pretext for not coming into this treaty.

Secondly, there is a very difficult question about safeguards. We feel ourselves that this non-proliferation treaty would be a very important instrument which to deal with the safeguards problem. When you look ahead over the next several years, with the rapid developments of nuclear power, there is going to be enough fuel lying around to make a considerable number of bombs a day within the next decade or so, or by 1980, and so a general application of a safeguard system is extremely important.

The Soviets are more or less disinterested in safeguards in this situation. But they, I think, would take it, provided we could all take the IAEA safeguard, the Vienna safeguards.¹

THE EURATOM PROBLEM

Then we run into the Euratom problem because the five members who are members of Euratom are unwilling to accept IAEA rather than their own safeguard, worked out among them. In that matter France has a veto. So, I want to alert you to the fact even though we got agreement on Article I, there are tough problems remaining. We need to do something about.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Secretary, are all five of those countries strongly opposed to IAEA?

Secretary RUSK. No, Senator, you are quite right. I think four out of the five would probably accept IAEA safeguards.

Senator CLARK. Are you sure France would not?

Secretary RUSK. This is being tested, now. But the trouble is their attitude toward a non-proliferation treaty is frigid.

[Discussion off the record.]

Secretary RUSK. The present indication is they would not now sign a non-proliferation treaty although they might do it at a later

¹International Atomic Energy Agency.

stage. They tell us they won't get in the way of a non-proliferation treaty, but that is about as far as we can go along this line.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. I talked a little longer that I had planned to.

SITUATION IN ISRAEL

The CHAIRMAN. Just one other subject before you go on. I wonder about Israel. There seems to be, from this morning's press, a very dangerous situation there. Could you say a word about it?

Secretary RUSK. The issue at the present time centers along the Israeli-Syrian border. There are three elements in the problem in terms of repose in the area. One is the activities of a Fatah organization of terrorists, who we think are not directly and actively supported by any of the governments concerned. Particularly not by Jordan, who has been trying to operate against them but who use Syrian and Jordanian territory for acts of sabotage and terror over the Israeli border.

On that particular point, Jordan and Israel have greatly increased their police action on their respective sides of the border to try to deal with that activity as a police matter.

There is a more complicated matter between Israel and Syria. At the time of the armistice, Syrian forces were occupying a strip within the historical boundaries of the mandate. Under the armistice, Syrian forces withdrew from that strip under demilitarized regulations. Israel claims since this was territory within the mandate and is Israeli territory, and they claim to exercise sovereignty over the subject as to demilitarized regulations.

The Syrians claim this has never been legally established, and so you have both Israeli and Syrian farmers in this strip. Arms are fired into the area from the Syrian side typically, with response from the Israeli side. Israelis patrol on occasion in this area with their own armored vehicles, so you have a continuation of this particular kind of struggle.

DO NOT EXPECT A MAJOR WAR

I don't myself, think, sir, that this is likely to lead to a major war.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not?

Secretary RUSK. Although—because I don't think, for example, the Syrians are particularly interested in it. We know the Israelis are not interested in a major war in this situation, but it is a very troublesome problem as to how you handle these repeated acts of terror back and forth across the border, particularly in that area.

General Bull, the head of the U.N. force out there, is trying to make some arrangement—the Arabs would say, "Let the U.N. forces take charge in this demilitarized area and provide the police forces," while the Israeli and Syrian farmers go ahead with their agricultural work. As a matter of fact, farmers on both sides apparently get along pretty well until somebody from outside the demilitarized zone starts shooting in from outside the area.

But that is about the situation, Mr. Chairman. It is tense, but we don't—

The CHAIRMAN. You don't expect a major war?

Secretary RUSK. We don't expect a major war.

U.S. OBJECTIVES REGARDING CHINA

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder, you started out on China and you said you thought it was probably the most important matter at the moment, I wonder if you could briefly say what our attitude or policy is toward China. What is our objective with regard to China at the moment or to put it another way, is our policy to continue non-intervention and to continue all possible means to exclude them from the U.N. and so on? Would you say just very briefly what our attitude is?

Secretary RUSK. I think our principal problem we have with China is the one which a foreign minister of an eastern European country described as moving Peking to peaceful coexistence and the issue we have in trying to organize a durable peace in the Pacific Ocean basin.

But as far as Peking is concerned, the key question turns out to be always the attitude toward Formosa. In our bilateral talks with them, as I have indicated to the committee, before they start and end with a statement by the Peking representative that "There is nothing to discuss unless you are prepared to surrender Formosa," and when we say we can't surrender these 13 or 14 million people contrary to their will, then nothing else happens. That is, we have tried to talk about disarmament, tried to talk about Southeast Asia, exchanges, exchange of plant material, for example, relevant to the food problem and things of that sort, scientists, scholars, newsmen, and so forth.

The same issue remains in the United Nations. The question of what to do about Peking is coupled with the question of what to do with the Republic of China. If we are not prepared to surrender Formosa, then Peking is not going to talk to us bilaterally about serious matters in any responsible sense. If the United Nations is not prepared to expel the Republic of China, then the problem remains about where it is.

We are continuing our contacts with Peking, but it comes back to that question as to what you do about the 13 or 14 million people there, as well as in the longer run, what their attitude is going to be toward what the Soviets call peaceful coexistence.

The CHAIRMAN. You sum up there is no change in that situation, no movement?

Secretary RUSK. No present change indicated.

The CHAIRMAN. No present change.

Secretary RUSK. For the reasons I stated.

U.S. OBJECTIVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The CHAIRMAN. Could you restate for the record the objectives of our policy in Southeast Asia? What is it we are seeking now to achieve there?

Secretary RUSK. We should like to see an accord with our treaty commitments there through a situation in which in the first place our allies are safe and secure, in which the smaller countries of Southeast Asia are free to live their own national existence under what policies they wish, but living in peace with their neighbors across their frontiers. We have said many times we consider that as far as what used to be Indo-China is concerned, we consider the

1954 and 1962 agreements to be an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia. That if the movement of men and arms from North Vietnam to South Vietnam would stop, we could work out the peace very quickly, and we do believe those '54 and '62 agreements do provide such a basis.

But that the countries with whom we are allied in Southeast Asia, that means the Philippines and Thailand, ought to be free from molestation.

We have no objection to their being non-aligned if that is their wish. We supported the non-alignments of Laos and of Cambodia, of Burma, any of those countries that want to be non-aligned, but we are concerned about the stability of peace in the area.

THE FOURTEEN POINTS

I have, Mr. Chairman, made a few notes on the so-called 14 points that were used last year as they have developed during the course of the year, and I will be glad to pass those around for anyone who wishes to have a look at them.

We have not released these to the press in their present form, although I think everything that is on these three pages has been said publicly at one time or another, but Mr. Marcy might want to have these.

SEATO OBLIGATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. One reason I asked you that was because I heard a part of your appearance on that early morning show, I think a week or maybe ten days ago.

Secretary RUSK. Today Show.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps, and you correct me if I misstate this, you said one of the reasons we are there is in accordance with obligations in the SEATO Treaty. But beyond and above that is the necessity for stopping the, I think, tendency or inclination to aggression. Was that a correct statement or not? Do you remember how you put it?

Secretary RUSK. I don't recall that I put it just that way. I did point out—

The CHAIRMAN. You put it correctly.

Secretary RUSK. I did point out that we ourselves have a very important stake in the organization of a durable peace in the Pacific. We have alliances with Korea and Japan and the Republic of China, Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand. And our interest in a stable peace in the Pacific compares to our interest in such a peace in the Atlantic.

I would be glad to get—I don't happen to have a transcript with me, Mr. Chairman, but we have not set ourselves up to play the role of general policeman in the world. I think the last time we gave an account of various crises there were about seventy, and we took an interest in about six of them over the various years, but we do have specific commitments and we do feel these specific commitments are very important to the possibility of organizing peace.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought perhaps I misunderstood you, that there was something beyond those specific commitments in the way of aggression that was, I thought you gave in detail. I could be wrong about that.

SECRET REPORT ON BOMBING POLICY

Mr. Chalmers Roberts recently had a story from which I quote:

There is a top secret report by the Central Intelligence Agency and Pentagon Defense Intelligence Agency casting doubt on the military efficacy of bombing.

Is there such a report?

Secretary RUSK. Well, that—there are many examinations of that question. I don't think there is a report that is looked at frequently.

The CHAIRMAN. A recent report.

Secretary RUSK. I think the key points that are made in these examinations is that the bombing has not stopped the infiltration, that it has not brought the other side to the conference table, but that from an operational point of view in terms of lines of communication and the capacity of the other side to sustain his effort, the expense to him of sustaining his effort, shows that the bombing does impose upon him a very substantial additional burden.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the principal reason for maintaining the bombing, the burden it imposes on the North?

Secretary RUSK. Well, that is an important reason. I think, also, Mr. Chairman, that if you look at a situation where North Vietnam could be safe and comfortable, and undisturbed while it sends its armed forces and arms into South Vietnam, that the prospect that this war would last a long time is greatly strengthened.

I don't know what the incentive would be for North Vietnam to stop doing what it is doing if it could be completely comfortable.

The CHAIRMAN. It is an ideal situation for it to occupy, sit there safe without being afraid of any damage being done to them while our men and South Vietnamese men are being killed.

NOT FIGHTING COMMUNISM AS AN IDEOLOGY

This question has been asked me on one or two occasions along this line: In the State of the Union Message the President used the word "Communist" six times in discussing the situation in Vietnam. But in talking about the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China he did not use the word once. If it is United States policy to fight communism as an ideology in Vietnam, what is the position with regard to building bridges with Communists in Eastern Europe?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think the point is that we are not fighting communism as an ideology. We are not undertaking a world crusade to do that. What we are doing, as we have done before, is resist aggression by these Communist countries against those with whom we have commitments and/or in whom we have a vital stake. I said that because we did go to the aid of Greece without a treaty obligation. We went to the aid of Korea without a treaty obligation.

But this point arises, for example, in connection with the question as to whether we are at the front edges of a detente with the Soviet Union and eastern Europe. We think we well might be, we hope we are, and we will explore every possibility of contributing to that detente.

But we didn't get there, we didn't get to this present position by giving away Azerbaijan or Greece to the guerrillas or the eastern provinces of Turkey or Berlin or Korea or the Congo and some of

these other situations. It has been a long and difficult path to the point where there is considerable prudence on both sides.

What we would hope to see is a corresponding prudence of the eastern wing, the Asian wing; of the Communist Party, which has isolated itself even within the Communist world, largely because of its excessive militancy, and there is some possibility of that when we see the shape of the second generation of leadership in Peking, and this may come sooner than sometimes we think, there may be a little more prudence there.

NEW GENERATION OF SOVIET LEADERS

We do have a second generation now present in the Soviet Union. There is no longer an old Bolshevik in the government of the Soviet Union. Mr. Mikoyan was the last one.

There seems to be some prudence there.

I don't want to exaggerate that because when we look at what the Soviets are doing in Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Somalia, we still have some problems, but we are prepared to contribute to that possibility of detente if we can manage it. So, this is not a general question of ideology. These are specific acts taken against countries with whom we have treaty commitments.

COMMUNIST AGGRESSION

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to say if the North Vietnamese were not Communists that we would have intervened in this case? Do you think we would or would not?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think when you gentlemen approved the Southeast Asia Treaty, when it was signed, it was made clear by the government at that time that treaty referred only to Communist aggression. I think the thinking behind that was that neighborhood quarrels across frontiers are not the problems that are going to inflame the entire world. We didn't get involved when Algeria and Morocco were shooting each other, and we haven't gotten involved in a lot of these neighborhood disputes, but where you have pressures outward from a regime which proclaims that it is going after the world revolution and supported by militant minds, then you have the possibilities of a momentum of aggression that deeply threatens the possibilities of the peace of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that this is realistic to apply to a country of 14 million people that were about to take over the world or even planning to?

Secretary RUSK. It is not just these people. Their big brothers to the North have also announced they are going after some of these other countries, like Thailand.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it is the Communists—what I am trying to clarify is, is this the overshadowing reason because they are Communists or not? Is this in your opinion, and the Department, or the government's opinion, the principal reason we are there because they are Communists and part of an international conspiracy?

Secretary RUSK. That is what the SEATO Treaty—

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think? I was trying to pick your brains.

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think, sir, there is a difference between those quarrels which have a built-in insatiable appetite on one side, and there is a world revolution—

The CHAIRMAN. Is that characteristic of North Vietnam in your opinion?

Secretary RUSK. And Peking, yes. I mean—

The CHAIRMAN. Then, if you change it a little, then it is Peking, is this Peking's aggression we are dealing with? I am just trying to take one step at a time.

Secretary RUSK. Well, we haven't made a special point that this is Peking's aggression, but Peking's support of Hanoi in this matter is crucial to Hanoi's position, and if Peking showed the slightest interest in peace in this situation my guess is that peace could be arranged rather quickly.

CONFUSION OVER U.S. INTERVENTION

The CHAIRMAN. But this is the point that I think is behind much of the confusion and perhaps the dissent that you—I think, the government objects to. If we can clarify it, I think it would be very useful to those of us who are called upon to clarify it nearly every day. To our constituents and otherwise, as to just why it is we are there, what makes this quarrel so important.

You have already said you didn't intervene in these other areas, Tunisia, Algeria. You didn't intervene in other places, but you did here.

Now, why is it that this is so peculiar?

First, let me, let's eliminate it, it isn't because North Vietnam is so powerful that it threatens the peace of the world in itself as a country, is it?

Secretary RUSK. It threatens the peace of Southeast Asia, Vietnam, Laos and Thailand.

The CHAIRMAN. But if it wasn't Communist, what in your opinion would we have done, would we have intervened?

Secretary RUSK. My guess is if it were not Communist it would not be doing what it is doing. If you look at the actions—

The CHAIRMAN. Why would you guess that? I don't follow that at all. I mean, the Germans haven't resorted to force, but they certainly are eager for reunification of their country, and there are very substantial reasons. But here I think it would be natural that these people would want to reunify their country. Every country seems to want to do that.

Secretary RUSK. And if the people themselves deciding these questions freely on their own in the two parts of the countries involved were to agree on reunification, we would not object to that.

It is the attempt to impose reunification by force that we objected to, we would in Germany and we would in Korea.

U.S. OPPOSITION TO VIETNAMESE ELECTION

The CHAIRMAN. We did object to an election in '56, didn't we? We objected to an election being held at that time, and I understood from what people have written about it because we thought if you had an election it would be reunified under Ho Chi Minh.

Secretary RUSK. Incidentally, I have not been able to find in the record instructions to our embassy saying that we opposed elections

out there. I have been trying to find what the instructions were during that period. But at that time, Mr. Chairman, it seemed to be obvious to everybody that there was no possibility of a free election in the North and, therefore, the question was do you have free elections in the South only with everything rigged in the North?

General Vo Nguyen Giap in 1956, I think it is in your committee report, I have brought up at a public hearing last year, General Giap in 1956 described what was happening in the North during that period and the mistakes they made in terms of terror and intimidation and torture and things of that sort. He was very frank about it. And it was the judgment at that time in Saigon that under those circumstances a free election was simply not possible, apart from the problems they might have had in South Vietnam about free elections.

The CHAIRMAN. That makes free elections, I guess—I don't know any other way, however, to bring this to issue.

GRADUAL NATURE OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT

Senator LAUSCHE. Will the chairman point out to me so that I will be able to better understand what he is aiming to prove, is it your position that we should pull out?

The CHAIRMAN. No, I don't think that is feasible. I wish we never had been involved.

Mr. Max Frankel said the other day, he is one of the people more or less sympathetic with our position there. He says if the matter was up today for our sending five hundred thousand troops from ab initio—from the beginning—to save Saigon, we wouldn't do it. The reason we are there is because of the very gradual nature of the involvement, a little at a time, a little more and a little more and finally we find ourselves there.

This is his theory, and I was trying to really see if the Secretary could give me information that is better able to answer questions as to why we are involved here.

Is it fear of Vietnam? No. Is it because of China, and if so, is there evidence China is a very aggressive nation, and should we be fearful of China and try to destroy her now? I don't know what we want to do with her. I just wondered.

A LARGER CONTEXT

Secretary RUSK. I don't want to take up an undue amount of time, but I would just like to pull back a step or two and take a look at this in a somewhat larger context.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is good.

Secretary RUSK. President Kennedy, President Johnson and their Secretary of State have not come to the Senate with additional alliances. President Kennedy came down here with a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. President Johnson has concluded the Civil Air Agreement. He presented you the consular agreement, and he hopes we can present you with an East-West Trade Agreement. He presented you with a space treaty, and we hope we can present you with a nonproliferation treaty.

But after the war during the 50's at a time when the Communist world was pressing almost on all fronts, and resorting to armed

force and a number of circumstances, we made some alliances in the interest of building a stable peace in the world.

Now, in the case of the SEATO Treaty, the administration at that time, and the Senate said that each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area would endanger its own peace and safety and agrees it will in that event act to meet the common danger and so forth.

Now, if this matter were presented afresh today, I mean if, say, yesterday there was the kind of an invasion of South Vietnam that occurred in Korea by organized divisions publicly and formally coming across the demarcation line, I am not at all clear that Mr. Frankel is right in saying that we couldn't do it. I think that is something that the President and the leadership would have to look at and look at in terms of what happens in the world if we fail to meet one of these solemn treaty commitments in the organization of peace.

WORKING TOWARD DETENTE

I point out since 1947, we have spent something on the order of \$900 billion in defense budgets and fantastic resources. And we have only barely by the skin of our teeth been able to come to a position where there may be some possibility of enough prudence on both sides to work toward some sort of a detente, say, between ourselves and eastern Europe. We are only four or five years away from a major crisis over Berlin and only five years ago from a most horrible crisis over Cuban missiles. It only has been a very narrow thing that we begin to see the possibility of something like peaceful coexistence with some sort of real content in the expression opening up here.

I think the overriding question is how do you organize a durable peace. And it is not for me to be presumptuous, Mr. Chairman, but I think it is worth your committee's considering whether it might wish to address itself to that problem, taking into account such changes as might have occurred since 1945, since the United Nations Charter was signed, to see what the changes are, if any, what they mean and how these changes bear upon the general problem of organizing a durable peace in the world.

APPREHENSIONS ABOUT ESCALATION OF THE WAR

The CHAIRMAN. Well, of course, what bothers me is I think we are more apprehensive, I am today, than at any other time. I am more apprehensive than 20 years ago. I am apprehensive about this war and its escalation. I don't want to prolong this.

I want to call on Mr. Mansfield. I want to again recall for the record in your own Department of State memorandum of March 8, 1965 which was entitled "Legal basis for U.S. action in Vietnam," that your own statement refers to the U.N. Charter and the Geneva Accords and didn't even mention the SEATO Treaty. This is what causes so much trouble with us, trying to understand it.

It wasn't until recently that the SEATO Treaty has been given in justification for this involvement, and I am still very puzzled about it.

Mr. Mansfield?

THE SEATO TREATY

Senator LAUSCHE. Will you re-read that SEATO Treaty declaring why these nations have joined in the compact? That is considered as a challenge to their own security.

Secretary RUSK. In the preamble they said, among other things:

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy and individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well being and development of all peoples in the Treaty area, intending to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that any potential aggressor will appreciate that the parties standing together in the area, and desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security.

But there was added by the United States the understanding in the treaty, that the United States, in executing the present treaty, does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to communist aggression.

The reason for that was that it was not the desire to become involved in other kinds of neighborhood disputes, particularly, for example, the Pakistan-India dispute and I gather Senator Mansfield may recall this better than I. And I gather when Mr. Dulles made it clear that this was the interpretation of the United States, that there was a period of 24 hours or more when the Pakistan representative was very uncertain about whether Pakistan would sign it or not. That is my recollection of what the record shows.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think it was contemplated that we would intervene in a civil war on account of this, either.

Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I have been in and out.

I noticed some other items we have on this suggested agenda here,² I don't know whether you have seen them or not.

Secretary RUSK. I haven't seen it.

Senator SPARKMAN. That I might ask you rather briefly about.

First, have you asked questions about Thailand?

The CHAIRMAN. No, I did not.

Go ahead.

²MEMORANDUM

Suggested Areas of Questioning for Secretary Rusk, January 16, 1967

1. *Vietnam*

- a. Effectiveness of bombing in North Vietnam;
- b. Indications of willingness to negotiate on part of North Vietnam and National Liberation Front;

- c. Progress of pacification;
- d. Political developments in South Vietnam;
- e. United States military activity in the Mekong Delta;
- f. Basis for statistics on incidents, casualties, desertions, etc.

2. *Thailand*

- a. Scale and targets of counterinsurgency efforts;
- b. United States role in counterinsurgency;
- c. United States military buildup on Thailand;
- d. Are Thai troops being sent to Vietnam?

3. *Significance of Current Uproar in China*

4. *Prospects for a Non-Proliferation Agreement*

5. *Soviet Deployment of a Limited Anti-Ballistic Missile System*

6. *Preliminary Findings of the Tripartite Working Group on NATO Force Levels in Europe*

7. *Reasons for Delaying Food Shipments to India and Estimate of Future Indian Requirements*

8. *Situation in Rhodesia and Southern Africa Generally*

9. *Implications of Military Aid and Sales in Latin America.*

THE SITUATION IN THAILAND

Senator SPARKMAN. I wonder if you can give us something about the Thailand situation, first of all. Just what are we up against there and what are the prospects?

Secretary RUSK. At the present time, there are several hundred, rather than several thousand trained guerrillas operating in the northeastern part of the country. This is a rather remote area, and has been difficult for the government to organize its police and security forces on as tight a basis as would be necessary to deal with such small numbers of guerrillas.

We also know in North Vietnam there is a training camp for Thais who have been trained in North Vietnam to enter Thailand. We know that Thailand is under pressure from its north and northeast, but we feel unless there is a major increase in the effort made by the North Vietnamese or the Chinese coming directly down from China that the Thais seem to have the capability of dealing with this. They have been very careful themselves not to have U.S. soldiers involved in their activities in the villages. We have helped them with transportation into the general areas on occasion through helicopter lifts. But beyond that, Thailand is a member of the SEATO Treaty, is supporting the effort in Vietnam, has made certain of its facilities available to us and to our armed forces, and is contributing certain forces to South Vietnam.

On the internal side, they are doing reasonably well on the economic side. They are now working on a constitution acquisition that is led by Prince Huan, who served here once as ambassador. In the months ahead, it is possible they will promulgate that constitution and move toward a more elected government than they have at the present time.

HANOI'S OPPOSITION TO U.S BASES IN THAILAND

Senator SPARKMAN. I notice the New York Times had quite an article in a recent issue, as did the Washington Evening Star. The New York Times article is entitled "Hanoi Demands Thai Ban on U.S. Use of Bases." Just how strong is their demand and do they threaten action in the event that—

Secretary RUSK. Well, they are taking action at the present time within the limits of these guerrilla operations that I mentioned.

Senator SPARKMAN. Are they under the direction of Hanoi?

Secretary RUSK. Well they are being trained in North Vietnam.

There is a Thai training camp there. We have taken pictures of it. We have prisoners who tell us where it is and what goes on there.

They then apparently infiltrate through the northern part of Laos into the northeastern part of Thailand.

THE MEKONG VALLEY

Senator SPARKMAN. Just as a matter of curiosity, I saw somewhere reference to that northeast section of Thailand along the Mekong River saying it was the poorest section of the country. I thought that was a very fertile valley.

Secretary RUSK. The Mekong Valley itself is reasonably fertile. They were damaged by the heavy floods that occurred along that

part of the Mekong this past year, both in Laos and in northeast Thailand. But I think one of the principal reasons for the backwardness of northeast Thailand when you look at it, is more generally, rather than just in the river valley where there is communication by river, is lack of communications and mountain jungle, undeveloped in the usual sense. I think it's the lack of communications that is the principal problem in terms of both development and security. It is somewhat like the northeast corridor of Cambodia in that respect where we know the Viet Cong are using Cambodian territory. We don't think with the approval or the permission of Prince Sihanouk but yet it is remote and rugged terrain into which his own security forces can't go to monitor the situation in any way.

PRESS COVERAGE OF A HUSH-HUSH OPERATION

Senator SPARKMAN. In that same issue of the The Star there was a headline "14 million dollars annual savings possible by the B-52 use of those bases," Is that a pretty reasonable evaluation?

Secretary RUSK. Well, there are some operations advantages in the short run compared with the several hours from Guam. The bases there are not at the present time fitted for B-52 operations. This is a question for the future. No decision has been made. The Thais apparently would be agreeable but we ourselves have not made a final decision on that point.

Senator SPARKMAN. Why have we had such little discussion publicly of what we are doing in Thailand? Is it a hush-hush operation? The papers seem to get hold of it somehow.

Secretary RUSK. Well, there are two or three reasons. One is that we do not wish officially to talk about which particular operations go from which bases, but more importantly the Thais themselves feel that the settlement of the situation in Southeast Asia would be facilitated if these matters are not made major matters of public prestige and things of that sort. We are in Thailand. The Thai Government has a veto on that. We think they themselves will say more about this fairly shortly. But they have been very insistent upon not going into details because they say that in the Southeast Asian situation it is better to try to keep the Vietnam situation from a political point of view in as narrow channels as possible in order not to be get the problems of a settlement too complicated.

These are open secrets. The only problem is how far we go in confirming officially what goes on.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. In order to avoid the Thai sensibilities.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have lots of questions but everybody around the table wants a chance to ask, so I will pass.

The Chairman. Senator Hickenlooper?

RESTRAINTS ON BOMBING

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, with reference to the question which Senator Fulbright asked you and which was discussed with respect to the bombing, whether or not that had any effect of lessening or diminishing the activities of the North Vietnamese, does the fact that we don't bomb a lot of military targets up there lessen the probability of quieting them down? In other

words, the stories we get here are that Russian MIGs sit on the airfield up there and our pilots are forbidden to bomb those airfields or destroy those Russian MIGs sitting there.

Then we get the argument which doesn't appeal to me very much, if we bomb these they will just move into the air bases in China and if we bomb those then the fat will be in the fire. Is it not a fact we are not bombing many targets in North Vietnam which would really hurt their military efforts?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the list of important targets that could be called military targets that have not been bombed is really relatively small, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Quite important, though, aren't they?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I suppose in one sense the most important of these would be the Haiphong harbor and there are one or two plants inside the perimeter of Hanoi. For example, there is a steel plant, a cement plant which would have some direct relationship to their operations.

We have kept the airfields outside of the immediate Hanoi area out of our operation because it takes a great deal of striking to do it, and the repair of an airfield is not too complicated a matter.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But the destruction of MIGs would be.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. Actually, the MIGs have not been all that much of a problem in terms of our own forces. We have felt that, and I don't want to preclude what the future might hold in this in either direction, but we have felt we ought to try to keep the situation within certain limits, if we can find some possibility that the other side is prepared to talk sense about peace in this situation.

You know we have had some recent MIG 21 engagements in which I think some nine MIGs were shot down. Which were at least about half of what they had there. The MIGs have not given us much trouble nor indeed have the SAM sites in the main. The principal problem has come from the conventional anti-aircraft scattered all over the place. There are other factors to be taken into account about the airfields. They are very, very heavily protected by anti-aircraft. The prospects of substantial losses on our side are pretty good, and the question is as to whether the losses would be larger if we held our hand and took on these fellows in the air. But, again, these are tactical decisions the Commander in Chief would have to make at the end of the day, and I wouldn't want to foreclose the future.

TARGETS ARE AUTHORIZED FROM WASHINGTON

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are those decisions made in South Vietnam or are they made over here at the pentagon?

Secretary RUSK. The principal fixed targets are authorized from Washington.

Now, there are certain areas in what is called route reconnaissance authorized for the purpose of hitting trucks and barges and other things that are moving supplies to the south. But the principal fixed targets are authorized from here in light of the recommendation from the field and from the Joint Chiefs.

One of the factors, I might add that are taken into account in regard to those fixed targets is the prospect of civilian casualties and one of the columns in which you take up these questions shows the

probable civilian casualties, and there have been some targets which have been taken off the list because of the prospect of significance of civilian casualties.

IMPACT OF VIETNAM WAR ON INDONESIA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me ask you this question. I want to hurry on because I have a good many questions to ask here: Would you care to venture an opinion as to what would have happened by now in Indonesia under Sukarno's leadership if we had not stood fast in South Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. It is very hard to be precise about that—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I know you can't—

Secretary RUSK. I am inclined myself, Senator, to think that there was a connection but not a decisive one, that in the event of October a year ago, in Jakarta this was a PKT operation with some Chinese help, that did not expect to rely upon the presence of Chinese armed forces from China. They almost succeeded and came within a gnat's eyelash of succeeding. They got six generals and had they gotten two more the thing would have been over.

But I think the presence of U.S. and British forces in Southeast Asia, a combination of them there, did lead these generals to believe they at least would not be subject to major intervention from China. Now, saving Haidah—

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you say if we had not been in South Vietnam, communism would have made tremendous strides in Indonesia.

Secretary RUSK. That would be the implication of what he said, of his remark; but I would be inclined to discount his remarks somewhat.

I do feel, Senator, that what is—that the stand we have taken in Vietnam has made a considerable difference to all of those free countries in Asia, the ten, for example, who met in Korea this past year and affirmed their support of South Vietnam and expressed their appreciation for those giving help, both Asian and non-Asian, and from Korea and Japan right around through, all the way to India, there is a confidence that, I think, would not have been there, that is making some difference as to how they comport themselves.

THE RHODESIAN SITUATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I want to move on for just a quick question or two here: As you know, and I have talked to you about this, the Rhodesian situation troubles me very greatly, and I was greatly disturbed when the President signed the executive order of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia on January 5th.

I fail to agree with him in my own mind. I suppose I can rationalize it if I go way-round rationalization, as to why did he undertake to attempt to destroy one of the most progressive and successful governments and economies in all Africa by this kind of action. I understand the sovereignty theory and all that that is being advanced. I don't happen to agree with it, but I understand it, I understand what it is. What are we trying to do there?

Secretary RUSK. Well, first, Senator, we feel that this is, in the first instance, a problem for the Commonwealth, Britain—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why did we get into it?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we didn't buy into it ourselves, on our own initiative. We didn't go around drumming up business on this one. It was presented to us in the first instance by joint action and joint position by some 18 members of the Commonwealth, and a reference of this question to the Security Council by the Commonwealth.

Now we are sitting in the Security Council, and when it comes before the Council we have to ourselves decide what attitude we take. The United Kingdom introduced a resolution. We had to vote yes or no or abstain. We did help to fend off much more extreme resolutions in the Security Council, for example, the use of force, but we have felt that basically, quite frankly, that the attitude of the Commonwealth is sound in this situation, that the Rhodesian question is, in fact, a threat to the peace in the longer run unless there is some modification of view. What we have been hoping all along was that discussions would lead to a peaceful settlement of the situation. They came very close in the conversations on the cruiser Tiger between Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Ian Smith, but it broke down apparently on the issues as to which side was going to trust the other during the interim period of about three months.

Now the hope is that when the present Rhodesian leadership looks down the longer range of the future, that they will become convinced that further negotiations and talk are required, and that the British would also take that view, although both sides have become very grumpy about further talks at the present time.

This is not a matter which has to be settled overnight, but there surely has to be some movement toward a settlement with which the 4 million Africans in Rhodesia can live and with which their neighbors can live. Otherwise you are going to have a situation in which all sorts of people would be mobilizing themselves to try to prevent the movement into this part of Africa of an apartheid approach.

The Communist world will seize these issues and exploit them to a very considerable extent. So we feel that the Ian Smith regime must make some adjustments here in order to get this on the track of peaceful settlement that its own 4 million majority can live with.

THE DESTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The net result of the British position and ours would seem to me to be—or would seem to me to be the destruction of Southern Rhodesia, that is, in other words, for a viable going economy to be turned over to the natives over there, who mentally are not capable of running a government with the same success that it is being run now.

Secretary RUSK. Excuse me—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Go ahead.

Secretary RUSK. Well, please.

In the first place, Senator, I do not believe that the Africans either in Rhodesia or outside Rhodesia would require that the gov-

ernment of Rhodesia be required to be turned over overnight all of a sudden to blacks.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That has been the case in most other countries in Africa, has it not?

Secretary RUSK. Well, that has been true—well, they have a white member of the cabinet in Tanzania; I think they have white members in Kenya, and Liberia, they have worked out relations between the races in a rather constructive fashion.

One of the problems in the Rhodesian matter is that it is the kind of an issue that could destroy the working relationships between the whites and blacks in that government even in those countries where the working relationships are sound and in reasonably good order. But we do feel that—and this is the Commonwealth view—that there needs to be some movement in this matter. There are many interim steps to be taken which would bring more repose in this situation.

Now, if Ian Smith were to permit some of those interim steps, the stake could be worked out.

Again let me say that the Tiger agreement represented some of those interim steps and apparently the key point on which that broke down was the question of who would be responsible for law and order in the country during an interim period when a new constitution would be promulgated and on the basis of which Rhodesia would become independent. That constitution itself would itself have included interim steps rather than a final solution and apparently the cabinet in Salisbury would not agree to let the Governor General have control of the security forces of the country during that brief interim period before a new constitution might be promulgated and that is where it broke down.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think my time is up.

LEGAL MEMORANDUM

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I have a brief memorandum here on some of the legal aspects and charter aspects. I might give this to Mr. Marcy in case any members of the committee might wish to have a look at it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

Senator LAUSCHE. Could copies be provided of that legal memorandum?

Senator MORSE. The committee can provide them.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee can make copies if you want one.

The Senator from Oregon.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, I shall confine my questions to certain problems that I think have arisen as a result of U Thant's proposals. I shall read this legal memorandum that you have just referred to with great care.

DISAGREEMENT OVER SEATO

I only want to say in passing, by way of a caveat, of course, I do not share in any degree the State Department's position on SEATO. I think that the chairman has pointed out here the March 8, 1965, memorandum as to the administration's legal justification for its involvement with North Vietnam. It does not even whisper about SEATO within the realm of sound international law.

I think all the rationalization, in my judgment—that is my characterization of the State Department on SEATO in recent times—is an afterthought, and I think completely unsound in international law, but I shall discuss that in further detail elsewhere.

CONFIDENCE IN U THANT

But what does bother me, Mr. Secretary—and you can be very helpful to us in what I think is a growing confusion in the country in regard to our relations to U Thant, I do not sit here holding any brief for him. I want your help on it, however.

We certainly took the position that we wanted him to be continued as Secretary General. We were one of those who urged it upon him, some would say did more than urge, but we urged it. He has been proposing variable formats for trying to pave the way for negotiations and every time he does, it seems that we get into controversy with him. It seems that we are the ones that get into controversy with him. I do not find any other nations that have been in controversy with him, at least it has not been reported. Perhaps you can tell us if they do, and that is one of the things I want to find out.

If we have the confidence that we expressed in him when we urged his reappointment as Secretary General, why do we not take the position that if he will set up a procedure for triparty negotiations, we will look with great favor on it. Why do we take the position that, as you expressed again this morning, that we will not stop the bombing unless he can come in and give us assurance of some kind of reciprocal action on the part of North Vietnam? Is that a price that we should exact until we have first found out what he can do with cessation of bombing? I do not know whether he can deliver anything or not. But I seriously doubt whether a continuation of our bombing is justifiable on the basis of the argument you make this morning when U Thant is telling the world that the United States ought to stop bombing first.

U Thant is telling the world now that he disagrees that Vietnam is of vital security interest to the United States. It seems to me he has put us in a pretty bad light in the world, and I wonder if the proper response is for us to simply reject him or reject his ideas rather than make a plea here again through the procedures of the United Nations for a United Nations' manifestation backing him up and assuming their peacekeeping obligations under the Charter.

That is broad outline. I only want to raise—

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator MORSE [continuing]. The question so you can talk to this committee about why we are taking the attitude toward U Thant that the public statements of you and our Administration have been taking.

U THANT'S POSITION ON THE BOMBING

Secretary RUSK. Senator, first, on the question of stopping the bombing, bear in mind that the other side is now very specifically saying that this must be unconditional and permanent, and this is a major step. There are three divisions in and just north of the demilitarized zone today.

Senator MORSE. Does he agree with that?

Secretary RUSK. Agree with that?

Senator MORSE. Does U Thant agree with that? Is that what U Thant means when he says we should stop the bombing?

Secretary RUSK. We have said—but U Thant is not the man who makes this judgment. It is the other side who has to make the judgment.

Senator MORSE. He is the one who is making the proposals to both sides, and we immediately reject his proposal about stopping the bombing which I have not understood. If it is true, I would like to have you tell me.

Secretary RUSK. I beg your pardon, we have not rejected his proposal of stopping the bombing. We have said, "Okay, that is possible, what about point two," which is the mutual de-escalation of the violence on both sides, and on that he has not had anything whatever from the other side.

Senator MORSE. I understand that.

Secretary RUSK. And the other side says, "It is none of your business."

Senator MORSE. I understand that. But my point is you have to have a starting point here, and my point is when we say we are not going to stop the bombing until U Thant delivers reciprocity, we give the impression—I understand our points—but we give the impression that we are the ones that right off the bat throw in a block that makes it impossible for him to act.

OPPOSITION TO U THANT'S PROPOSALS

Secretary RUSK. You mentioned one point about other countries. The ambassadors of seven Asian nations, including Japan, Malaysia, Laos, called on him the other day to take strong exception to what he said in his press conference about the security significance of Vietnam in this present situation. I might say they did that without any encouragement from us. We did not stimulate them to do that, and I gather that Australia and New Zealand are also doing the same thing when they heard about the Asian move.

But Hanoi has rejected strongly U Thant's second and third points, second point, mutual de-escalation of the violence, and, third, on U Thant's point about the Liberation Front they have said the Liberation Front is the sole spokesman for the South Vietnamese.

Now, Senator, it seems to me there are two, as far as peace is concerned, as it affects the United States. There are two most elementary facts in this situation. One is substantial numbers of the North Vietnamese regular forces in South Vietnam and our bombing in North Vietnam. All right, why can we not get rid of both of those at the same time, why can we not get rid of both of those together? We have not been able—and I can assure you, sir, we have scoured the earth on it—to get anybody to give us any indication as to what would happen. They do not even say they would come to a conference without doing anything on the ground. They do not—let me illustrate the point.

THE CHRISTMAS TRUCE

Very recently, during the two-day Christmas truce, when the hour arrived, hundreds of vessels, most of them small, but about

18 of them fairly good sized, suddenly made a dash along the coast of North Vietnam to resupply their forces north of the DMZ. They were all loaded and ready to go, just as Olympic dash men at the starting point. They came down, they unloaded several thousand tons of supplies and then scattered again before the truce is over, you see.

Now, we need to have some indication that that is not going to be the effect of stopping the bombing, that something is going to happen on the ground that moves this toward peace. Otherwise, we simply give them an unlimited and an indefinite capability of doing it the comfortable way of sending their people south and taking their time and being safe and secure and not have anything to worry about at home.

This, I think, would be a very serious thing.

Now, we are trying to find out the answer to a secondary question. If people cannot tell us what Hanoi would do if we stopped bombing, they at least can tell us what they would do. Moscow, Eastern Europe, U Thant and the rest of them, India, what they would do if we stopped the bombing. There is no response from the other side.

I would be interested in your own view as to whether this would make any difference to your own position, Senator, if we stopped the bombing and there was no response. Quite frankly, we have not—

U.S. SHOULD NOT BE FIGHTING U THANT

Senator MORSE. You ought to take judicial notice that would make a difference with me. You ought to know me well enough for this. My difference with you is we are laying down conditions precedent that are not going to be accepted apparently even by U Thant, and if we are going to try to work through U Thant, we ought to give—make some attempt to see what he can deliver. If we have made a bad bargain on U Thant, if we are now already discovering that he cannot give us the leadership because of the conditions he imposes, then let us face up to that.

I think we are getting a bad image created around the world in regard to our relationships with U Thant. I think we should not be fighting with U Thant at the present time.

Secretary RUSK. Well, when U Thant says, for example, that he does not believe that the security of Southeast Asia is of strategic importance to the West, there is nothing in his present responsibility or his background of experience that makes his judgment on that matter of very much importance. He is not responsible for the strategic interests of the West.

Senator MORSE. He certainly comes from a country that sits on the front door of China, and Burma does not seem to be as concerned about China as we are.

[Discussion off the record.]

THE DOMINO THEORY

Secretary RUSK. Mr. U Thant also said that he does not believe in the domino theory. I do not believe in the domino theory myself, and I have said that many times. The theory is the theory of the world revolution pursued by militant means. He mentioned coun-

tries X, Y, and Z. Hanoi, with the help of Peking, has already named the countries X, Y, and Z. Vietnam is X, Laos is Y, and Thailand is Z. So, I personally do not feel when Mr. U Thant makes a statement of this sort by silence we indicate that somehow we agree with him. We supported him for Secretary General not because he and we would agree on every one of the hundred or more items that might be on the agenda of the U.N. or on an item like this which is not on the agenda of the U.N. and he opposes putting it on the agenda of the U.N., but because he has on the whole done a good job as Secretary General and the prospect was that he would be a considerably better Secretary General than any of the alternatives that seemed to be around.

ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Senator MORSE. I will not take more time other than to make a comment on the last observation you made. Sure he is Secretary General of the United Nations, but he is not independent in his responsibilities to the organization, to both branches of the organization, and I repeat, I would like to bring this before the Security Council. After all, I think the Security Council ought to sit down and go over his proposals, because they relate to the image of the United Nations, but I think we, on the other hand, ought to insist that that Security Council stand up and be counted, either with a veto or with a vote, an affirmative vote. I want to get ourselves out of the position where we seem in many quarters to be giving the impression that we are holding the United Nations off. I would like to put the heat on that Security Council and get a vote up or down, and I think the Secretary General ought to be asked to sit down with that Security Council and go over these proposals of his. He sits there as Secretary General and makes these announcements that are going to affect the members of the organization, and then a nation individually and unilaterally, the United States in this instance, takes him on. I do not think we should be in that position. I think the United Nations, to whom he is responsible and of whom he is an agent, ought to be taking him on.

Secretary RUSK. You know, I would not dispute that point with you too much, Senator. There is pending before the Security Council a resolution by which the Security Council would call upon the parties to engage in negotiations for a peace in Southeast Asia. It does not have the votes on the Security Council for a variety of reasons. The Soviets would veto. But there are others influenced in part by U Thant who say—

Senator LAUSCHE. Why not let the Soviets veto?

Secretary RUSK. But there are others who say that since Hanoi and Peking say this is not the business of the United Nations, that if the Security Council takes up this question, and tried to get into it, that this would get in the way of a use of the machinery which Hanoi and Peking say is the appropriate machinery, namely, the Geneva machinery.

When this point was made by the Soviet delegate, Mr. Arthur Goldberg said that is fine with us, let us use the Geneva machinery, in which case the Soviet ambassador said, "No, no, we can't use that."

This matter has been one way or another before the United Nations at least a dozen times, and I have an up-to-date memorandum on this point which I will be glad to furnish Mr. Marcy for the committee.

A PERMANENT PRESENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield for one clarifying thing?

You said no one would be more alarmed than Burma, unless it be Thailand, if we pull out of Southeast Asia, which seems to imply that you feel we have a permanent presence there.

Secretary RUSK. No.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the interpretation of it.

Secretary RUSK. No, I meant under present circumstances. I am not saying what you would do if we have peace. Our Manila declaration on that is quite specific on that point.

FORMAL ACTION RATHER THAN BACK SCENE NEGOTIATING

Senator MORSE. You must not take more time on that, and if you will only pardon me, I want to make this observation. I just do not buy the argument that Hanoi and Peking should be telling the United Nations what to do. The Charter makes perfectly clear if there was a threat to the peace by a non-member, the members, the signatories, have the job of enforcing the peace. It is the primary purpose of the Charter. All the other things that the United Nations do are ancillary to it. The real reason for it was to enforce the peace.

I would put France and Russia, as the Senator from Ohio said—with a veto, if they want to veto it, let them do it. But the important thing is it would help clarify the situation. Instead of giving the impression that the United States is doing a lot of back scene negotiating, which isn't what the Charter calls for—the Charter calls for formal action under the juridical process thereof, and we ought to insist on it.

Secretary RUSK. I have some sympathy with that point.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

Senator MORSE. The sad part of it is if we could closet ourselves longer we might find ourselves in more agreement.

Senator AIKEN. First, let me say I agree with the Secretary that not only would Burma but every other country in Southeast Asia be alarmed if we pulled out completely from that area.

My questions will be short and along a different line.

U.S. TRADE WITH CAMBODIA

Mr. Secretary, to what extent is our trade with Cambodia—to what extent has it been increasing?

Secretary RUSK. I do not have the trade figures. Our tourism has been more or less holding up. I would have to get the figures on trade.

Senator AIKEN. And we are now supplying some oil to Cambodia?

Secretary RUSK. American companies—

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. Provide oil in Cambodia and up the Mekong River to South Vietnam.

CHINESE STEEL

Senator AIKEN. That is right. But in that connection I read last month the United States, through Bombay, had purchased a very substantial amount of steel manufactured in China for use in South Vietnam.

Then about two weeks ago there was another news item to the effect that a freighter carrying steel from Bombay to the United States had gotten into trouble or been sunk or something.

Are American companies buying Chinese steel through Bombay for use in this country?

Secretary RUSK. No. We tried to look into that. I think the allegation was that this was a transaction through Singapore.

Senator AIKEN. No question—no one questions that.

Secretary RUSK. But the information we have is that this did not occur; that the steel was resold at Singapore to known customers; these were not in Vietnam. I can't find any substance to that.

Senator AIKEN. The ship that got into trouble was reportedly headed toward the United States. I did not know that India had a surplus of steel.

Secretary RUSK. This sounds—I had not put my attention on this shipping from Bombay to the United States.

Senator AIKEN. But isn't it true that Communist countries and Western countries do conduct considerable business with each other through third parties?

Secretary RUSK. I think that is true.

Senator AIKEN. There is no question about that, and that—

Secretary RUSK. Let us leave this off the tape.

[Discussion off the record.]

ESTABLISHING A BASE IN THE DELTA

Senator AIKEN. I notice there was quite a lot made in the news lately about establishing a base in the Delta. Is that being constructed as a permanent base?

Secretary RUSK. I saw a report this morning that one of the amphibious operations was off-loading to go back to its main base. I think there may be some U.S. forces at some point in the Delta.

Part of the Delta is in the immediate Saigon area. For example, Long An Province, we have had some forces there for some time. But I think the major effort at the present time is in the Saigon area and particularly northwest of Saigon to try to break the flow of men and supplies that might be coming from the Delta up into the Third, Second and First Corps.

I just do not know what the future will hold on this. There is no policy problem in my mind about doing in the Fourth Corps what we are doing in the First, Second and Third. But there are practical problems of how you best use your forces, under what circumstances.

GUANTANAMOS IN VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. Isn't it quite likely when the situation over there quiets down—I do not mean comes to an end, but quiets down—or phases out, fades out somewhat, that we will have one or two Guantanamo along the Coast of Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, no. On that, sir, we have no interest in maintaining a permanent position in South Vietnam.

This Cam Ranh Bay facility is a very substantial facility, but David Lilienthal is on his way over there now to help work out plans for conversion to civilian use in case of peace.

We have no desire, and we publicly have committed ourselves to this many times, to maintain neither bases or troop presence in South Vietnam if there is peace there.

Senator AIKEN. We have presence in Cuba. The difference is we do not try to run the Cuban government from Guantanamo.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator AIKEN. But why isn't a permanent base at Cam Ranh Bay or some other place just as logical as Guantanamo?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we have bases in the Philippines and in Okinawa, and we thought this might be a contribution towards the possibilities of peaceful settlement to make it clear we were not looking for a permanent position, a permanent presence, military presence, in South Vietnam.

RUSSIAN ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS IN NORTH VIETNAM

Senator AIKEN. Another thing that puzzles me somewhat is the fact that while the President is trying to get on friendlier terms with Russia, that we are furnishing the Russians with the most beautiful target practice they ever had in perfecting their new anti-aircraft weapons, as I understand it. We have had nearly 600 planes shot down over North Vietnam. Don't we ever talk to the Russians about that?

Secretary RUSK. Not very much about that precise point. The SAM missiles have been fired over 1,000 times, and I think that only 30 of them have effected a hit.

Purely in military terms, I am not drawing any political implication from this at all. I think that technical or the tactical advantages, perhaps, are on our side in terms of learning how to handle surface-to-air missiles.

Senator AIKEN. Of course, if they only get a missile out of a thousand shots—

Secretary RUSK. They have sent their top missile men out of Vietnam to find out what is the matter, and we know this is a major discovery they have made, and that is that their SAM missiles are not very effective.

Senator AIKEN. They must have fired 600,000 shots to get those 600 planes.

Secretary RUSK. No. Most of the planes that have been lost have been lost to conventional anti-aircraft fire as the plane goes in for particular targets.

Senator AIKEN. Have the Russians been furnishing anti-aircraft guns to them?

Secretary RUSK. Some of it, and some come from China.

Senator AIKEN. And they have been perfecting their anti-aircraft weapons without any risk themselves.

Secretary RUSK. Possibly.

Senator AIKEN. I thought it might be well to speak to them about it quietly, in a soft tone of voice, maybe of what they will be doing wrong.

Secretary RUSK. If they could translate their position there into influence on Hanoi, to get going on the 1954 and 1962 agreements, there would be very substantial advantages to us.

INCREASE IN NATIONALISM

Senator AIKEN. There really is an increase in political nationalism throughout the world, is there not? Aren't the countries really more nationalistic than they have been for some time?

Secretary RUSK. If you would look at the world as a whole, perhaps slightly, but I do not think it has changed too much over the decades.

Senator AIKEN. In most cases where it puts up barriers, international economics have a tendency to knock them flat, do they not?

Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir.

Senator AIKEN. In other words, trade is important, and the greatest potential wealth of the world, the trading area of the world, is Southeast Asia, assuming that their purchasing power can be developed.

Secretary RUSK. There has been a pretty steady growth in regional economic arrangements, not just in the Common Market, but in Central America particularly. Now they are talking very actively about a broader Latin American free trade. You get that same movement now among the free countries of Asia, so that you have that over against the national feelings.

Senator AIKEN. I have no more questions, but I have an idea it is going to take a while to get out of Southeast Asia as it did in the Philippines, and that was some time. We were there 50 years officially.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

THE THINKING BEHIND SEATO

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Secretary, I want to explore through questions and your answers what the predominating thinking in the fifties when we signed the various treaties related to Southeast Asia in inducing us to sign those treaties.

Secretary RUSK. I think the most succinct statement—pardon me, excuse me.

Senator LAUSCHE. I begin with the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty signed September 8, 1954. I understand, of course, my colleagues understand, that the President of that year, Eisenhower, sent that treaty to the Senate to be approved; is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that treaty contained Article IV which reads:

Each party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against any State or Territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agree that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Senator DODD. Is that the SEATO Treaty?

Senator LAUSCHE. That is the Treaty.

Secretary RUSK. Article IV, paragraph 1.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. In other words, when that treaty was signed, the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and the Senate declared to the world that our security was involved whenever armed attack was made upon any one of the nations that subscribed to that treaty, is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And the nations that signed the treaty were the United States, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, Cambodia, Laos.

Secretary RUSK. Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam were protocol states. They did not sign the treaty but were covered by the special protocol.

Senator LAUSCHE. I see, there is a note there.

ANZUS TREATY

Now then, I go to the next treaty, and that is ANZUS, that is a treaty made with Australia, I suppose, New Zealand, and the United States?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. That treaty was signed in September 1951, and at that time Truman was President?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you recall who was Secretary of State?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Dean Acheson.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that treaty came up to the Senate for confirmation.

Now, I read from Article IV of that treaty:

Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

In other words, in 1951 on September 1, it was the firm thinking of the Senate, President Truman and Secretary Acheson and, I suppose, the government in general, that our security was involved if any one of the signatories to that treaty were attacked. Am I correct in that?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

MUTUAL COOPERATION TREATY WITH JAPAN

Senator LAUSCHE. I now go to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan signed January 19, 1960, at which time Eisenhower was President. Who was Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Christian Herter.

Senator LAUSCHE. Herter.

Secretary RUSK. In 1960.

Senator LAUSCHE. Article V of that treaty reads:

Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

That was again a declaration of our interest in Southeast Asia and the relationship that it had to our own security.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, pardon me just a moment. I think in the Japan treaty, that was limited to attack on Japan. I do not think that treaty got into Southeast Asia, did it?

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, whatever it is——

Secretary RUSK. I think so.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is the language. You are familiar with it.

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH TAIWAN

Now then, here is the next treaty, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China. Article V reads:

Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

That was signed December 2, 1954; Eisenhower President, Dulles Secretary of State.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. I suppose the Senate, made up of members who are at this table today—and I will want the staff to put in the record how the votes were cast at that time——

Senator MORSE. I voted against it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Then you are consistent.

Senator MORSE. I did not want to put the staff to work.

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY WITH KOREA

Senator LAUSCHE. I now go to the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, October 1953, Article III:

Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in territories now under their respective administrative control or hereafter recognized by one of the Parties is lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety, and declares that it would act to meet the common danger.

THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

Now, I ask you, has there been a single treaty entered into with Asian nations and Southeast Asia that did not declare that our security was involved and that, therefore, we entered into those agreements?

Secretary RUSK. That underlying concept is in each of the treaties we have in the Pacific Ocean area, in Asia.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, Eisenhower was President under most of them. When Truman went into Korea, what was the motivation for going into Korea at that time? Did it have underlying it this same principle about the security of the United States being involved?

Secretary RUSK. The basic view as to where the security interests of the United States lay was the same. It had not been put in treaty form at the time of the North Korean attack on South Korea.

Senator LAUSCHE. It was put into the treaty, in treaty form, after Eisenhower took office.

Secretary RUSK. In 1953, yes, sir.

KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION AND VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. Now we have Truman and Eisenhower, and I now come to Kennedy.

When Kennedy became President, how many troops were in South Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. There were about 650 U.S. military there as a part of the military assistance mission.

Senator LAUSCHE. How many were there when he tragically lost his life?

Secretary RUSK. Approximately 20,000, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did he, by expanding the number of troops that were there, give indication of his judgment that we could not allow South Vietnam to be taken over by the Communists through aggression?

Secretary RUSK. He did, sir. The first thing he tried to do, if I might take a moment, is to explore fully the possibilities of a peaceful settlement. He talked about this with Mr. Khrushchev in Vienna in June 1961. It appeared that the two of them had reached agreement on Laos on the basis that everybody get out of Laos and leave this small land-locked country to take care of themselves.

He was unable to get agreement on South Vietnam at the Vienna meeting, and you remember he sent some special missions out there, among them General Maxwell Taylor, to take a look at the situation to see what needed to be done in the light of the situation, and so when he examined it fully and he had on the one side no prospect that there was agreement with the Communist world on Vietnam, and on the other side our commitment, and the situation, he moved substantially to strengthen our participation there.

Senator LAUSCHE. So you have Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson of the belief that our security and safety is involved in what happens in Southeast Asia.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And you have Acheson, Dulles, Herter—was there any other Secretary of State—

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And yourself.

THE POSSIBILITY OF DETENTE

Now then, that goes back 15, 20 years ago, what has changed since that time that should induce us to believe that our nation's security and safety have no relationship to what happens in Southeast Asia?

Secretary RUSK. I think the principal changes in this regard have not yet been fully developed. But I would say there are the beginnings of the possibility of a detente and peaceful co-existence with the countries of Eastern Europe. That is one element of the situation which affects the problem.

Secondly, the authorities in Peking are coming to the watershed of the transfer of power to the next generation, and have found that a policy of extreme militancy has isolated them within the Communist world, and that has had its repercussions inside China.

Third is the development of nuclear weapons by Peking and, therefore, the increasing importance of stabilizing the situation and

trying to organize a peace in the Pacific and to induce there some of the same prudence that we begin to see with our relations toward Eastern Europe. Those are the principal changes since that period.

UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES UNCHANGED

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. But with those changes can you take those changes as the basis of saying that all that was declared in these treaties by the Senate and by the President and the Secretaries of State was erroneous and that those reasons no longer exist for our being in Southeast Asia?

Secretary RUSK. No, I do not think so. I think the underlying principles remain the same. They would, over time, Senator, be reduced in importance if there were some peace. In other words, the way not to have an alliance to come into operation is for nations to leave each other alone in situations of this sort.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

CHINA'S POLICY ON VIETNAM

Now I go to just one more question and then I will close. I have the four points that have been submitted by Mao. Point number four:

The internal affairs of South Vietnam should be settled by the South Vietnamese people themselves in accordance with the program of the NFLSV.

I suppose that is the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Has there been any yielding on that point four by Mao?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think it might be avoiding confusion if we referred to that as Ho Chi Minh's point three, however it might have appeared there in what you have.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Secretary RUSK. We have not seen a revision of that, and if I could say this off the tape—

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator LAUSCHE. This final question.

Senator MUNDT. Will you yield? What has happened?

Secretary RUSK. We have not had a reply on that particular point. We have offered them alternative language, and we have had no reply.

THE LAOTIAN AGREEMENT

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, the Laos Treaty or protocol, whatever you call it, was signed in 1962?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. The agreement provided for the withdrawal of all troops of all foreign nations?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Specific points were designated where the departure was to be made so that the three countries, I assume Canada—

Secretary RUSK. India and Poland.

Senator LAUSCHE [continuing]. Poland and India would be able to tell whether they had left.

Have United States troops left Laos?

Secretary RUSK. They left as soon as that agreement was concluded, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Have the Communists complied with that agreement?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. Our estimate is that the level of North Vietnamese forces in Laos never dropped below 6,000.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is all.

Senator PELL. May I just interpolate to clarify the record. Aren't there still elements of American activity in Laos that are not of a formal military nature, that would balance that 6,000?

Secretary RUSK. As a matter of fact, we now carry out certain military operations in Laos, but the point is that we complied with that agreement and would be prepared today to comply with it 1,000 percent if we can get anybody else to.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you give the alternative language to point three that the Senator asked you about?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; I did not, and I would prefer not to, Senator, if I may. As a matter of fact, what we suggested was very much like—

[Discussion off the record.]

Secretary RUSK. I call your attention, Mr. Chairman, to point six at the bottom of the first page where we have added to the original point, "We will be prepared to accept preliminary discussions to reach agreement on a set of points as a basis for negotiations."

I think that is all we should say about that at the present time in order to keep open the possibilities they just might come back.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson?

WHEN THIS WAR IS OVER

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, I shall be brief. I was interested in your comments in response to Senator Aiken's question about at the end of hostilities this war is over and our boys are coming home; we are moving out of Southeast Asia. Based on the past in Korea and Cuba, and our great investment in this area where we have now probably the finest docking facilities of any place in the Southeast Asia area except Japan—we have great airfields; great air bases, do you think the surrounding countries would permit us to move out any more than they would permit us to move out now?

Secretary RUSK. The seven nations, Senator Carlson, which have forces in South Vietnam, said in the Manila communiqué that allied forces shall be withdrawn, after close consultation, as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the level of violence thus subsides; that those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled.

We have since World War II, or including World War II, had very large and important military facilities in connection with various enterprises that we have gone into, and we have demonstrated a capability of withdrawing from those facilities at the end of the period when they were needed.

Our hope is that Cam Ranh Bay, for example, which is a spectacularly effective and beautiful natural harbor, could become a major port for the service of the upper two-thirds of South Vietnam, and it should be converted to civilian, industrial and trading purposes.

Mr. David Lilienthal is going to be helping us on developing those plans. I think the seven nations who are most directly involved in this situation have agreed among themselves on this point.

Now, if at some time in the future the assault on South Vietnam were renewed, then the governments at that time would have to decide what to do about it. But we want to make it clear that we are not after any special military position in Southeast Asia as far as we are concerned.

MAINTAINING U.S. FORCES IN VIETNAM

Senator CARLSON. With that last statement I fully agree, and I can see that we are not. But also I can see, looking further into the future, if we do not maintain substantial forces in that area, what is there to prevent the Red Chinese from going down and taking over the greatest facilities ever constructed in that area, and they could do it very easily?

Secretary RUSK. The prospect that the United States would once again meet its treaty commitments and would join with others to prevent that occurring.

Senator CARLSON. That is the point I am making. We do not want to get committed to a position here where after a few years, after terrific loss of life and great expenditures of funds, we have to get back, and some day soon I trust we will reach agreement when that war will end, and whenever it does end, that decision is going to have to be made despite your Manila agreement.

I think we have to look that one over because we have invested men and material in this operation, and it just looks to me, I think we are making a big mistake if we go out and tell the people of the United States—I know it was made, I read your Manila declaration—that we will soon move out of there. I do not think we should do that.

Secretary RUSK. Under certain conditions.

Senator CARLSON. Well, those conditions, I think, will develop very rapidly after the conclusion of this war. I hope they do not, but I think we have again assumed the responsibility in Southeast Asia, I don't say whether we should or should not, but I think we are going to have to meet that issue, and I hope the administration and the government itself does not lead our people to believe on the day this war is over, six months after, the declaration says we are coming home. I hope we do, but I can see another issue.

You know, I have been interested in the tone of the Hearst publications on this war, and they have been in thorough support of the President and in its operation. But in this last issue—and I assume you may have read it—they said they were fearful that world opinion is having too much influence on the operation of this war.

U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA

I think there is some danger of world opinion, NATO—we have discussed all these projects, NATO, Rhodesia—I think we are in Rhodesia because of the African opinion, not because of Great Britain. I do not think we are obligated. I think we made a mistake, and I think if world opinion enters into this Vietnam situation we will be caught in a bind. I hope we are not.

I cannot help but bring it up this morning because I am fearful of the future.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, perhaps what I said earlier was too broad on the Rhodesian matter. I believe that in the U.S. national interests and our own interests in the entire continent of Africa, as to what happens in that country, I think it was necessary for us to take a stand as we did on Rhodesia. I did not want to—

Senator CARLSON. I appreciate your position, Mr. Secretary, but you and I and the Commerce Department have had about 14, 16, 18 months of discussion on some of our problems in South Africa when it comes to selling airplanes. I know you are familiar with it, selling planes for dollars to the Republic of South Africa, and it was finally resolved in favor of the United States, but only after, I would say, 18 months of bickering and discussions, and it was resolved because Great Britain was going to sell those planes and use U.S. engines.

I appreciate the Secretary's action in this. I think it was right, but I know this situation, if we get involved and too carried away by pressure from other countries and forget our own nation, I do not like to say that, but we get carried away in this world opinion matter. I shall conclude, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NORTH VIETNAMESE CONDITIONS

I have two questions, Mr. Secretary. I thought I heard you say that North Vietnamese had proposed three different sets of conditions, unconditional with respect to the bombing, unconditional and for good, unconditional and definitive, but the third one escaped me.

Secretary RUSK. These were three different ways of what appear to us to be saying the same thing, permanent, definitively, and for good. Whether these are differences in different translations of the same Vietnamese words I am not quite sure. Harrison Salisbury said in an interview unconditionally and for good. Another statement put in definitively. But the word "permanently" is the most frequent word they use in that regard. At all times they say unconditional.

Senator DODD. I see.

THE INDONESIAN SITUATION

The second question I would like to ask is with respect to the Indonesian situation. I am not clear what your position is. I understood you to say that you would not go so far as to say our presence in Vietnam was decisive.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I would quite frankly be very comfortable about saying to you that what we are doing in Vietnam was the decisive influence on the events in Indonesia. I cannot in candor say that.

Senator DODD. Would you say—

Secretary RUSK. But what I said was that I thought it had some influence. How much I am not quite sure. I did say that prominent officials of Indonesia said to us that it did have a decisive influence, but it is hard to answer that question accurately and specifically.

I did not want to be in a position of exaggerating that particular point as far as we look at the situation. I have no doubt that it had some influence, and it might have had even more influence if the Chinese had attempted to send their own armed forces by sea to reinforce the PKI during that period, you see.

The fact that the Seventh Fleet was there and the British Fleet was there, and so forth, this could have made quite a difference, of course.

Senator DODD. Would you say that a long term effort to help Indonesia in our aid program, in, I assume, other respects certainly helped those or, Ices in Indonesia to compel the efforts to overturn the government?

Secretary RUSK. I think it proved in hindsight to have been very useful for the United States over the years to keep some sort of contact going and alive even though there were times when it was painful to do so.

Senator DODD. Yes, I was critical of it, so I am giving you an opportunity to get even. But I take it that it did pay off and that with our presence in South Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. I think it is just not on the military side, although that turned out to be useful, but our labor unions have had very important and constructive relationships with some of the labor unions in Indonesia, and our university people in the same way. There were times when it was very difficult to keep those going for reasons on both sides, some of which you will remember.

But I think, on the whole, it has demonstrated that in that instance certainly patience and a little persistence turned out to be a good thing.

INFLUENCE OF VIETNAM WAR ON INDONESIA

Senator DODD. I put it essentially that it seems to me our policy with respect to Indonesia, and in continuing to try to give them assistance in all of the respects you have mentioned and others, and our presence in South Vietnam, did have a very strong influence on the outcome of the struggle in Indonesia between the Communist forces or pro-Communist forces, and those other forces more friendly to the West, is that right?

Secretary RUSK. I think it has an important influence, Senator.

I think it had an important influence.

Senator DODD. It certainly did appear to the people in that respect.

Secretary RUSK. I think I ought to say when the moment of truth came in Indonesia, as it did, between these opposing troops, we were not involved in that in any way. Maybe these people would

ask the question, "If you were not, why weren't you?" But there was a wholly Indonesian problem here, and we were not involved in it surreptitiously or otherwise, except for these overt reasons, the public reasons, we were in Vietnam and had maintained the contacts, and everybody would know we would be sympathetic if the Indonesians found a way to fend off the attempt of the PKI to seize power.

Senator DODD. It certainly would be fair to say, would it not, that all of the things we did do and tried to do in Indonesia itself, and our presence in South Vietnam, certainly influenced the thinking of the Indonesian people in this critical hour.

Secretary RUSK. I think that is fair, sir.

Senator DODD. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams.

U.S. AND BRITISH POLICIES TOWARD RHODESIA

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Secretary, in general, I have been supporting your positions that you have taken in South Vietnam. It is a little hard for me to understand why we have just joined Great Britain in imposing economic sanctions on Rhodesia, but I noticed in the press the other day that Great Britain is selling fertilizer and chemicals to Castro, going to finance a plant, and also continuing to trade, as we understand, with both North Vietnam and China. How can we reconcile those two positions, particularly when Great Britain itself is one of the members of SEATO?

Secretary RUSK. First, sir, on the Rhodesian matter, this is not a matter which was purely bilateral between us and Britain, a commitment by the United States in support of Britain because it was Britain. We have, in fact, at times had some margins of difference with Britain over the Rhodesian question, both in the direction of pursuing the talks more and in the direction of being careful about the general attitude of the African countries.

We were acting in the Rhodesian thing as a matter of national interest in respect of the total continent there, as a factor over and above different from the attitude of Britain.

FLAGSHIPS OUT OF HONG KONG

Secondly, Britain is not itself trading with North Vietnam, with the exception of an occasional flagship out of Hong Kong controlled by a company in Hong Kong.

Senator WILLIAMS. Isn't that to a certain extent like some of our American companies owning under a Panamanian flag?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, it is possible, sir. But they do not feel they have the kind of control in that situation in the colony there and, Senator, one reason, since this trade is almost minuscule, one reason that I personally feel somewhat relaxed about it, is I do not want to have the question put to us if we do those things to Hong Kong which causes the people on the mainland to go after Hong Kong, is the U.S. going to help them in Hong Kong, and I do not want to have anything to do with that problem.

Senator WILLIAMS. To the extent we understand, and I have seen this excuse before, but Great Britain has control over the ships going into Hong Kong.

Do I understand these same ships, using the flag from Hong Kong, British-owned ships, can continue to trade with Rhodesia and not be subject to this blockage and Great Britain has no control over those companies and cannot stop them?

Secretary RUSK. No, I do not think so.

Senator WILLIAMS. It has stopped them in Rhodesia.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator WILLIAMS. And they would stop them in North Vietnam on the same basis if they wanted to, couldn't they?

Secretary RUSK. It would require legislation, I believe.

Senator WILLIAMS. It did not require legislation in Rhodesia.

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, it was an Order in Council with respect to Rhodesia.

Senator WILLIAMS. Now, the fertilizer plant which she is financing for Mr. Castro.

Secretary RUSK. We do not like that and other countries in this hemisphere do not like it and have expressed our views very strongly in London. Britain has a different policy than we do on this, and we haven't been able to prevail. That is the way it is. Here is a point in which we and they simply disagree on.

CHINESE STEEL SHIPMENTS

Senator WILLIAMS. One final question. I notice it was first reported in the London Observer, in which these steel shipments to which another member referred——

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator WILLIAMS. I read that story and, as I read the story, we gave the official explanation that this steel was in short supply and that it had been purchased and we were going to stop it. Did we——

Secretary RUSK. No.

Senator WILLIAMS. Did we completely deny there was any such transaction at all and that story was false?

Secretary RUSK. When something like that comes in we first try to find out what the facts are. We investigated this. The Singapore Government has denied it and has accounted to us for the steel shipments that they got out of China through Hong Kong, and where that steel went, and the record shows that the steel went to places other than Vietnam. So that my answer to you today is, to the best of our ability to proceed to find out, there was nothing in that story.

Senator WILLIAMS. And it did not ultimately end up in South Vietnam at all?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir. I am not suggesting that all the trading that goes on there may not be some things brought out of China through Hong Kong that may not turn up anywhere, including this country, through a third or fourth country trading. But we did look into the steel matter, and we have been able to locate where that steel went. It did not go to Vietnam.

Senator WILLIAMS. Thank you.

Secretary RUSK. I will get the committee the details.

Senator AIKEN. It did not go to Wilmington.

Secretary RUSK. Not to Wilmington. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark.

THE ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SITUATION

Senator CLARK. Mr. Secretary, I would like to get your comments on the antiballistic missile situation with respect to the policy of the Department. Also, how much can you tell us about what Ambassador Thompson is up to, what you and Mr. Dobrynin have been able to achieve, and generally speaking whether you have read Roswell Gilpatric's article in the New York Times of yesterday, and whether you are generally in sympathy with the point of view he expressed, which is we ought to do everything feasible to prevent an escalation of the arms race by either Russia or ourselves of the ballistic missiles.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, could we, perhaps, leave this part of it off the tape?

[Discussion off the record.]

TAKING OVER THE WAR FROM THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Senator CLARK. I would like to move into one more question. What is the rationale, Mr. Secretary, behind or, perhaps, are the press reports true, that we are committed to moving in force into the Mekong Delta in order to take over the responsibilities in that area that South Vietnam has hitherto attempted to carry on? What is the rationale behind the search and destroy massive maneuvers in the Iron Triangle? Are we still committed to an increasing policy of taking over from the South Vietnamese the conduct of the war in Vietnam, and what is our own view as to whether this will not result in casualties far beyond any productive results?

Secretary RUSK. First, on the Iron Triangle, this has been an area near Saigon which has been a major Viet Cong headquarters and supply center for a long time, and out of that come raids and operations against communications as well as against the city itself.

It is a relatively lightly populated area. As you know, we are moving the civilians out as the operation proceeds. But as far as the U.S. taking over the main battle is concerned, I just noticed in the daily military report this morning that I see every day, that the operations of battalion size or larger going on yesterday, I have the figure here exactly, I think there were 11 U.S., 2 allied, other allies, and something like 18 or 20 South Vietnamese.

The South Vietnamese are engaging in full operations. We are trying to get them moved toward pacification, which is something of a misleading term in this sense, that does not mean the South Vietnamese are going to take fewer casualties. This pacification effort is a very mean part of the war, but it is something the South Vietnamese may be better able and fitted to do than we in working in the villages and rooting out the Viet Cong from the rest of the population.

The Mekong Delta, part of this is immediately adjacent to Saigon. We are interested very much in securing the Saigon area. The Delta is a source of rice and men for the Viet Cong in Corps One, Two and Three. I think it is a tactical matter as to which of the 43 provinces our forces operate in primarily, and which are primarily for the South Vietnamese forces.

A 100 PERCENT AMERICAN WAR

Senator CLARK. I would suggest, Mr. Secretary, it is much more strategic than tactical, and it is another obvious indication, if it is true we are moving in for the first time in force in the Mekong Delta, that we are slowly but surely making this a 100 percent American war, and I would like your comments on that.

Secretary RUSK. Well, the record of operations, the record of casualties, the missions performed just do not show it, Senator. As I say, I have the figure here—

Senator CLARK. Well, they certainly did a few months ago, Mr. Secretary, when American casualties increased, and they have drastically increased all through 1966, and the South Vietnamese casualties for several weeks were less than ours.

I would find it a little surprising if you would deny that we have been more and more involved in search and destroy operations in South Vietnam with an ever-increasing list of American casualties—that is true, is it not?

Secretary RUSK. I did not say that. I was saying yesterday in operations of battalion size or larger there were 11 U.S. and 22 South Vietnamese. They were carrying on twice as many operations in numbers.

U.S. SUFFERING MORE CASUALTIES

Senator CLARK. I do not want to get into an argument with you. I have this map here. You remember the fuss I made about this matter a year ago. It looks like we have not any more ground, and we have suffered many casualties. The casualties are what bother me. We talk an awful lot about the strategic value. What gets me down is we are not really paying enough attention to how many American boys are getting killed.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, you are not more concerned with casualties than I am. I belong to that generation of young men who were betrayed into World War II because the governments refused to face the problem of organizing a peace in the world. I hate these casualties just as much—

Senator CLARK. Would you mind if I give my entire attention to you, and let your staff assistant postpone his comments?

Secretary RUSK. I say you are not more concerned with casualties than I am. I belong to that generation of young people that was betrayed into World War II with tens of millions of casualties all over the world because the governments of that day, including the Government of the United States, refused to face the problem of organizing a peace in the world.

Now, we have taken 190,000 casualties since 1945 all over the world, and it is bloody and difficult and burdensome, but the effort has been, and is beginning to show some signs of paying off that we can organize a peace before we let this go down the chute-the-chute to World War III. This is what it is all about, and these casualties being undertaken out there are highly relevant to the question of whether we are going to organize some peace, or whether most of the world is going to go up in flames one of these days.

Senator CLARK. Well, I think that is where you and I find ourselves in disagreement, and I do not think it desirable, Mr. Chair-

man, to pursue it any further at this point. I think we can organize the peace without getting all these Americans killed.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Senator CLARK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

NUCLEAR WARHEAD DELIVERY SYSTEMS

Senator MUNDT. Did I understand you to say in this proposed proliferation or non-proliferation treaty, it would not include the delivery systems?

Secretary RUSK. It concentrates on the nuclear warheads and does not try to deal with the question of delivery systems.

Senator MUNDT. Why not?

Secretary RUSK. Because the effect is to prevent the spread of warheads, whereas delivery systems can be everything from ordinary aircraft to artillery, to anything else, and it would be awfully hard to combine a delivery system into a non-proliferation treaty.

Senator MUNDT. From our standpoint vis-a-vis, China isn't there a problem of getting a delivery system? They have got the bomb.

Secretary RUSK. Well, we would be interested in finding a way to keep them out of the ICBM business or IRBM business. But they have got delivery systems now, ordinary aircraft or the most shortranged missiles or presumably they will eventually develop atomic capability with artillery. So the delivery problem is a different problem from that of the warhead.

Senator MUNDT. The problem is they do not have a delivery system from their standpoint, but they are going to get one.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. And I think a non-proliferation treaty that ignores that is good for others but no good for us.

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think the problem of delivery systems is a special and, in some respects, a more complicated question. For example, if you get into the delivery system business, should we go back to the Baruch proposals or not? This sounds these days like a rather wild idea, but would the security of the United States be enhanced if the world went completely conventional again? Now, if we say, no, we have got to have missile deterrence ourselves, then getting some control of these on the part of other countries is going to be extremely difficult.

Senator MUNDT. Don't you think we have to say yes to that question?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think we ought to think about it more than we have thought about it in the last few years because we sort of have taken it for granted that somehow we have to have a nuclear force ourselves.

I think one of the great tragedies myself was—well, so much has happened since—that the Baruch proposals were not accepted.

Senator MUNDT. I agree.

NO QUID PRO QUO WITH BRITAIN

Like most of others who have commented on Rhodesia, I am rather completely disenchanted with the way we have been sucked into the situation over there. Let me ask you this direct question: Before we yielded so quickly to the persuasiveness of Great Britain,

as if we were still a colony of theirs as we were before 1776, have we ever tried to make an agreement in which we would obtain a quid pro quo with her relative to this business in Cuba, with respect to the trouble in Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we did not make a condition with respect to a quid pro quo. We have discussed this in relation to other questions where we would hope to get some more cooperation from them, and one reason for it is there are nineteen members of the Commonwealth involved in this, and the general membership in the United Nations, so a quid pro quo by a particular member would not be responsive to our national interests in dealing with problems in Africa or our problems relating to the very existence of the Commonwealth, or our interests as expressed in the United Nations.

Senator MUNDT. Except that they needed us for the sanctions program.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think if we had taken the other view on this that, perhaps, some of our friends in Britain would have simply used that to say, "Well, you see, we were prepared to do this, but the Americans are not going to back us up," and they would have used it to get them off the hook.

Senator MUNDT. Do you really think in your own mind a program of sanctions, short of a military blockade, can ever bring Rhodesia to its knees?

Senator MUNDT. Well, I think, sir, the problem is not so much bringing them to their knees in that sense.

Senator MUNDT. Trying to get them to do what we want.

Secretary RUSK. So much as bringing them into a discussion where they would be willing to make more sense than they have thus far.

ROLE OF SOUTH AFRICA

Senator MUNDT. It seems to me the most you can hope for if our sanctions proceed is bringing a consolidation of South Africa and Rhodesia into a compact or making them one country, and then you magnify the problems.

[Discussion off the record.]

Secretary RUSK. I do not believe South Africa is going to substitute itself for the rest of the world in Rhodesian trade. This is a very serious problem for South Africa. I do not think the Portuguese will do it. The Portuguese do say, if sanctions are applied, that they must apply them at the source and not try to use Portugal as the policeman simply because they have an adjacent territory.

Senator MUNDT. Do I interpret your statement that you believe South Africa is not going to send oil to Rhodesia?

Secretary RUSK. The question is whether they will send oil in quantities additional to the normal flow, which was not particularly large, and that is the question.

We had hoped South Africa would stay out of this so there cannot be raised the fairly serious problems of sanctions against South Africa. We objected to those at the United Nations.

Senator MUNDT. Do you think South Africa is going to continue or discontinue shipping oil?

Secretary RUSK. I would be surprised if they cut off the oil below the levels which were going in before the sanctions were applied. I would be somewhat surprised on that. What I do not know the answer to is whether they would increase that supply of oil.

Senator MUNDT. If they continue at the same rate this is OK with Rhodesia. They got by before this.

Secretary RUSK. Rhodesian oil is coming in through other channels, Mozambique as well.

SOME REDUCTION IN TENSIONS

Senator MUNDT. Let me ask you a hypothetical question. Just how do you define, let us say we have got countries A and B—I do not have to identify them—any particular countries who have been quarreling and are suspicious of each other, and you have a detente. What do you have?

Secretary RUSK. I got trapped on that one in a press conference. They asked me that, and I said I did not think we could see a detente, but I can see some reduction of tensions, and one of the reporters looked it up in the dictionary and said that detente means reduction of tensions.

But I think, in the first instance, the notion of detente—to pull away from each other on those matters—that could mean war. That is in connection with which it was intended, and I think we are beginning to see some more prudent attitude in Eastern Europe, and I am speaking of the thinking of the smaller Eastern European countries, some.

It takes a good many swallows to make a summer, and you have to probe this pretty carefully, but we would like to keep up with the possibilities on our own side—

Senator MUNDT. Let me put it this way: Suppose country A is at war with country C, and we are trying to get a detente with country B. Country B is hoping that country C defeats country A or kills country A's boys. Can we conceivably have a detente under those circumstances?

Secretary RUSK. Well, it is applying that specifically to the Soviet Union and to North Vietnam—

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. And the United States.

Senator MUNDT. And the United States.

Secretary RUSK. Because if, as I think it would be true—I think the Soviet Union would be satisfied to see this South Asian matter settled on the basis of the 1954 and 1962 agreements—then we have a more complicated situation than a more harsh all-out—I hope myself that attitude on the part of the Soviet Union can be translated into some effective influence or effective international action to help to bring this matter to a peaceful conclusion.

SOVIET AID TO NORTH VIETNAM

I do not think we ourselves on our side should say that because the Soviet Union is giving assistance to North Vietnam and—

Senator MUNDT. She is supplying every sophisticated weapon they use in Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. Whatever sophisticated weapons they have, such as SAM missiles and MIG 21, radar—

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. Those things particularly. I think it would be to our advantage not to let this get into a completely black and white, implacable hostility kind of situation and thereby reduce our room for some maneuver and, indeed, some assistance when the time comes. When the time comes—

Senator MUNDT. You have got, on the one hand, the theory, how well-grounded and how firm you never told us, that the Russians would really like this thing settled on the basis of the time before it started. That is the theory. How well-documented it is I do not know.

But the fact that they are continuing to supply every sophisticated weapon, that needs to be stubborn to the fulfillment of that theory. If the theory is sound, it seems to me, the Russians have it so easily available to sort of talk to Hanoi saying, "We are about fed up supplying all these sophisticated weapons, we are going to reduce the supply or cut it off," and I see no support for the theory in terms of the action. I do not know where you get your theory. Maybe it is whispered in your ear by some diplomat, maybe he is sincere and maybe not. But I see no overt evidence at all.

Secretary RUSK. Well, it is hard to get the overt evidence, Senator, and in dealing with these people one has to recognize that you can be wrong tomorrow morning at nine o'clock on a proposition like that.

But one of the questions to which we have not got a full answer to is this pause in the cessation of bombing. If these people cannot deliver Hanoi and say what Hanoi can do, perhaps they can at least tell us what they can do, so it is in this context that your question comes up, and we have not found out what the answer to that is yet, but this is the kind of question we are working on all the time.

DIVIDENDS FROM THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Senator MUNDT. One other point. Speaking as a supporter of the State Department's foreign policy, I have been a little bit disappointed in your testimony today on two points. You have sort of shot out of the saddle two of the justifications which I have made publicly at home, which are in my own mind reasons for supporting the foreign policy and the war in Vietnam, and I was a little bit disappointed when you said that you did not believe that one of the dividends from our efforts in Vietnam was the rather salutary developments which have been occurring in Indonesia. I have said I thought they were connected.

You have been very careful to point out you feel if there is any relationship it is very remote.

The other disappointment is I supported reluctantly the plea that you made when you came into the Senate and to the House and said that Sukarno says, "The hell with American aid," and they voted against it in the House, and you came here and said that we have to continue some of our aid to keep certain government functions going if we were either to prevent a Communist takeover from China or to get a good leader who would be more neutral from the standpoint of isms, Americanism and communism, if something happened to Sukarno and he died or was replaced.

Now, you have told us that you do not believe that that aid that you induced us to give you—the Senate wrote some nice ambiguous language—could be continued.

Now you tell us you do not think that was very important in building up the stable elements over there enabling them to survive and get some kind of government which is not controlled by Sukarno.

You shot out of the saddle two of the bases of my support. I may not be as enthusiastic—

Secretary RUSK. There may be some misunderstanding on your second point. I did not want to diminish the second point at all. I did add the comment that it was not in the military channels that these relations are productive, but through the trade unions and the universities.

Senator MUNDT. All of which could have gone on without your coming here and pleading with us to override the House of Representatives, that we were going to save the situation, we had better support it, and we did.

Secretary RUSK. I had not supposed I had minimized in my discussions—

Senator MUNDT. I am sure you minimized it in my mind when you put it to what the labor unions and the cultural exchanges had done. You certainly minimized it to me.

A QUESTION OF EMPHASIS

Secretary RUSK. On the first question, there is a question of emphasis. My own inclination on most of these questions is to be a little moderate about claiming direct results from particular things, particularly when the situation in Indonesia was very complicated.

There was a connection. I am sure there was a connection. I am sure the present Indonesian leaders felt there was a connection. I just did not want to say to you that because—I do not believe that our being in Vietnam played a decisive role at the key time in Indonesia. There were good Indonesian explanations for much of this. I am sure that had a constructive and helpful influence, but at least as Secretary of State I ought to feel that I ought not myself to exaggerate this.

Now, look at the possibilities. Sukarno is still there. We think that he is under control. We think that the new government will remain in power, but if that should change—

Senator MUNDT. Do you think our pulling out of Vietnam would enhance or decrease Sukarno's chances?

Secretary RUSK. I think it would greatly enhance it; it would enhance it. Let me go back to my mood of moderation.

Senator MUNDT. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

U.N. ROLE IN RHODESIAN SANCTIONS

Senator PELL. I think I sympathize with you when I see all the foreign policies represented around the table here.

Is not our imposition of sanctions in Rhodesia basically the result of our membership in the United Nations?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator PELL. I think this is a point which should be on the record. We have received many benefits, including the avoidance of civil wars through the U.N., and it involves certain responsibilities, too.

I understand from press reports that a new Under Secretary of State for Administration will be appointed, and I would like to leave with you the thought, obviously in this executive session it can be said but not in the open session, perhaps—that I would hope that the appointment would be a man of very broad gauge, not a professional administrator or a man in that line, but a man who could give to whatever changes are necessary the internal direction rather than relying for external direction.

I did not know that that or if that would coincide with your views. I realize it may be a little premature to discuss this.

Secretary RUSK. This is a matter that is under consideration by the President, and presumably a nomination will be coming forward in due course.

Senator PELL. I would hope a broad gauge non-professional administrator would be chosen.

RESULTS OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

Next, if we get to the conference table in Vietnam and reach an agreement with the North, and follow out our present, which I think are correct, intentions, withdrawing from Southeast Asia, would it not be a problem of fact that in several years Vietnam would be unified, probably under a nationalist, technically Communist leadership, and would that not be the probable result through peaceful means?

Secretary RUSK. I would not think so, Senator.

Over this period of time, the last twenty years, North Vietnam has become thoroughly consolidated as a Communist system. South Vietnam has rejected the Communist system for itself. You have the same problems in the two parts of Korea and the two parts of Germany.

I think North Vietnam is not going to be interested in reunification on a non-Communist basis and, by and large, I say that may be an oversimplification, but I think that is true, and I think South Vietnam is not going to be interested in reunification on a Communist basis. These Buddhists and Catholics and Montagnards and Cambodians and northern refugees, apparently while disagreeing among themselves on many other things, seem to agree on that. So if this is left to the free choices of the people in the two parts of Vietnam, I think it is rather unlikely that there will be reunification any time soon.

LET PEOPLE DECIDE THROUGH ELECTIONS

Senator PELL. You would not think some sort of government like that in Yugoslavia, where each side gives in the other direction, would probably emerge, and to my mind it would not be a bad thing from the viewpoint of American national interest.

Secretary RUSK. Well, time factors, I can think if there is moderation of Communist organization and techniques and peace coexistence coming out of Mainland China and that sort of thing, that in the longest run you may have some drawing together, just as we

hope that somehow the West Germans and the East Germans can find ways to draw together despite these large ideological conflicts. But I do not see that as anything that is going to contribute to the settlement of this present situation other than the willingness, as we have expressed it, to let that question be decided by the people themselves in their own way through free elections.

THE ADVANTAGE OF NEGOTIATING

Senator PELL. Then would you believe there is any validity to the theory that the North Vietnamese really do not wish to come to the conference table, that they would see the possibility to achieving the objectives becoming, but that they consider their achieving the results of world revolution better by continuing the military level of activities, and it is to our advantage to get them to the conference table more than theirs?

Secretary RUSK. Well, clearly they do not see much advantage to them in coming to the conference table because they have had hundreds of chances to and have consistently said no.

Senator PELL. Excuse me, and also at least in my own view, the possibility of attaining success in coming to a conference table, from what their overt objectives are?

Secretary RUSK. That is right. I do not believe they make the judgment if they came to the conference table they would get what they said they wanted to get in 1960. I think that is right.

DANGEROUS SITUATION IN CHINA

Senator PELL. Do you believe the situation is extra dangerous in Vietnam now where we see in China the opposing forces struggling with the Mao forces, of an effort being made to divert the attention of the Chinese people from internal difficulties and to attempt external intervention such as they did in India several years ago?

Secretary RUSK. This is a possibility one has to watch. Quite frankly, we do not see the situation in China developing that way at the present time, but we are keeping a very close eye on it. We do not see troop movements. We do not see statements from leaders, either privately or publicly, indicating that that is what they have in mind. But it is theoretically a possibility, and we are watching very closely.

NORTH VIETNAMESE MANPOWER

Senator PELL. What would be the present proportions of new increments of manpower on the opposition side in South Vietnam of local recruitment versus infiltration? Would it be about 60-40 ratio?

Secretary RUSK. For the most recent three or four months, I would have to check the figures on that. I would think that probably 60-40 is not too far off.

Senator PELL. Sixty local, forty from the North?

Secretary RUSK. Probably.

Senator PELL. And the weapons we have captured, are they divided up what percent between West and East?

Secretary RUSK. I would have to check the latest figures on that. Most of the weapons we are getting now are Chinese manufactured, but I would have to check that.

Senator PELL. The substantial majority would be, you say?

Secretary RUSK. That is right. You see, the Liberation Front Forces and the North Vietnamese Forces unified their weaponry about a year ago, went to the same caliber. It happened to be caliber for which our ammunition is not suitable, so they not only brought in the weapons buy they have to continue to bring in the ammunition to keep them supplied. These are submachine guns, the rifles, the carbines, light machine guns, things of that sort.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Senator PELL. As you know, we have had some interest for some time in this question of civilian casualties, and I am well aware of the horrible tortures, murders of our friends in South Vietnam.

Why has it proved so difficult to get anywhere near so general an estimate now for a year and a half, where we have been sparing on this question, as to the real extent of the civilian casualties in South Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Well, one of the problems is we do not have exact information on who might be in a particular place when it is struck. For example, on a POL dump, there are no houses around it, and that kind of thing, who happens to be there at the time.

Another problem is whom would you classify as civilians for this purpose? The truck drivers in a convoy coming down the road toward the South, a line of coolies bringing in packs on their backs, coming into the—toward the—South? If you hit a railway bridge and there are people there working on the bridge, are they Chinese construction engineer soldiers or are they civilians? There are some very difficult questions of classification.

But I would comment, Senator, that I do not know that there has ever been any struggle anywhere in which such extraordinary efforts are made, both in the field and back here, to try to minimize or eliminate what might be called innocent civilian casualties.

Now, they have occurred. But on the fixed targets, that is as compared with the route reconnaissance along the routes of infiltration, the fixed targets have produced a surprisingly small number of civilian casualties.

Senator PELL. I would agree with everything you have said, but I think those of us who have been pressing this question really wanted education.

COUNTERPRODUCTIVE ACTIONS

I noticed the latent hostility in Germany, what hostility there is to the United States, which is based on the effect of civilian casualties from raids, and it still remains a certain amount. It is never expressed.

I am wondering if these casualties are large, as they would seem to be, if, perhaps, some of our actions are counterproductive, and to arrive at that, that we press for an estimate, merely in terms of thousands. But when we get a figure of 100 civilian casualties in a six-month period, there is obviously something a little off.

Secretary RUSK. The only figure of that kind I heard was identifiable civilian casualties inflicted by operations of our own forces.

Senator PELL. In South Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. In South Vietnam.

Senator PELL. Even that seems modest.

Secretary RUSK. That you can be somewhat more accurate about than what is happening in North Vietnam.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

A REFERENDUM IN TAIWAN

One final question, trying to see a way out of our present impasse in our relations with China: In your view, and you have much knowledge in this area in the light of your previous responsibilities and work—what would be the result of a referendum in Formosa or Taiwan between—an open referendum between—the Chiang Kai-shek government and some other government?

Secretary RUSK. Some other government in Formosa?

Senator PELL. A local Taiwanese government, Taiwan candidates. You know, the figures are about ten percent of the Taiwanese are represented in the Parliament, whereas they make up about 80 percent of the people, et cetera, 90 percent or 80 percent.

Secretary RUSK. I would think at some point such a plebiscite might indicate that the Formosans would like to have more of a Formosan control over their own affairs.

As you know, the theory of the present government there is based upon the theory that it is a Mainland, an all-China government, in which the Formosan Province is one of the provinces.

But my impression is that the purely Formosan Nationalist feeling, on the one side, and in its relation to the Mainlanders, on the other, is somewhat more relaxed in the ten years certainly than it was at the very beginning when there were some pretty harsh feelings there.

I suppose about 80 to 90 percent of the enlisted personnel of the present armed forces, the present army, of the Republic of China are now Formosan personnel.

Senator PELL. Might not this be one of the eventual approaches to getting us off our present wicket when the time comes, and there is need for a change of administration there anyway?

Secretary RUSK. I do not think it would make the slightest difference to Peking.

Senator PELL. It would not?

Secretary RUSK. No. They want it and they just say, "It is ours and we have got to have it." There never has been any—and they won't even renounce the use of force in the Straits of Formosa. You remember the Eisenhower Administration in the mid-fifties began talking with the Chinese and tried to get a mutual declaration of the renunciation of force in the Straits of Formosa. We continued that ever since. Never the slightest indication of Peking that they would be interested in that

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

QUESTIONING THE CONTAINMENT OF CHINA

Mr. Secretary, following Senator Pell's suggestion implicit in one of his questions as to whether the North Vietnamese and, presumably, the Chinese might be quite uninterested in negotiations because they expect to get more out of continuing their current operation than through any negotiations. It seems to me there is a relation between that possibility and the possibility that I have not heard our policy contemplate, that in the end it may not be what we hoped, Russia and the U.S. against China, but rather Russia and China against the United States, and that we are falling into, unfortunately—I am thinking of the broadest terms now—maybe a trap, if you will, maybe nothing as explicit as this, but this may be the consequence, and I am not at all sure that we are right.

Even those liberals who say the ancient antagonisms between China and Russia are going to make everything all right for us, I am not at all sure that they are concerned about destroying the only obstacle to world Communism, the United States of America, that that may not override these things, at least in the short run or in the middle time.

I wonder if you would just talk a little about this. Maybe we, in our own interests, including, of course, the interests of world peace, too, are on the wrong track here in thinking that containment of China, which I have supported, as you know, up to now, is a desirable thing, on the analogy to the position in Western Europe, defense against—I mean standing, creating the bulwark against expansion of Russia, believing as you have suggested too, with you, if we had done something about Hitler we would not have had World War II and all the rest of it.

I wonder if I am right about this, and whether we may not be getting bogged down and trapped into doing a thing which is going to take more and more of our strength and render us in a position where we will be really vulnerable to this other combination which we do not contemplate.

RECONCILIATION BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA

Secretary RUSK. One of the real possibilities is an eventual reconciliation between China and the Soviet Union.

Senator CASE. I do not mean to just be happy with each other, I mean they would be after us.

Secretary RUSK. I understand.

The key point would be on what general basis of policy would that reconciliation occur. There are a good many in Eastern Europe who insist it would not be possible because of the dynamics between the Communist world for that reconciliation to occur on the basis of the militancy of Peking; that the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would not and could not move in that direction. I am not so sure of that. That is a possibility.

The other would be a reconciliation on the basis of what might be called the peaceful co-existence. Now, we just have no way of knowing these things.

I do feel, Senator Case, that if Hanoi and Peking could demonstrate to the Communist world that the policy of militancy is the way to get ahead successfully with the world revolution, that we

are in greater danger of having the combined Communist world getting together directly and fundamentally opposed to the interests of the free world. That would be a very dangerous situation.

No, I limited my own remarks to what I believe to be the present attitude of the Soviet Union on Vietnam, and to a somewhat moderately optimistic view as to the possibilities of some further improvement of relations with Eastern Europe.

But these other possibilities are very much there and very much in our minds.

It seems to me that the possibility of a combination that is militantly hostile to the United States would be encouraged by a demonstration by one or another of these members of the Communist world that an aggression in the face of a security treaty of the United States can successfully be carried out.

Senator CASE. This is an effect.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I know.

GETTING INVOLVED IN A PERIPHERAL AREA

Senator CASE. I just wonder if we are taking into account the other possibility sufficiently as to get ourselves more and more involved in this particular area that is rather peripheral to them and really not at all hurting them at all, not hurting Russia one bit. They are not much involved.

Secretary RUSK. Well, we have had some of the same considerations to deal with in connection with the Greek guerrillas and the Berlin blockade and other such issues where the combined weight of the Communist world posed a threat that we had very much in mind at that time.

Senator CASE. Indeed we have. But we never have gotten ourselves involved with a half million men or whatever the numbers.

ANTAGONISM WITH THE TWO COMMUNIST POWERS

The CHAIRMAN. Would the Senator yield there on that question of their policy. Wouldn't the obvious reason be their antagonism to us? That is the policy they could get together on, not on one of these ideological reasons.

Senator CASE. Yes indeed, and I think the Secretary understood that was the thrust of my remarks.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Will the Senator yield? Isn't their antagonism toward us generated by their political philosophy, that is, the international Communist philosophy? I do not think it is a personal antagonism generated from anything except their ideology.

Senator CASE. This is my belief. This is my concern, based on their desire to destroy the only real block in their way.

Secretary RUSK. You see, if all the countries lived between us and these two Communist powers, were genuinely secure and were not living under fear, and some of them have not been subjected to attack by these countries, we would not have anything to fight these two countries about. We are not going to fight the Soviet Union over polar bears in the Arctic, and we are not going to set off missiles against each other merely because there are missiles over there.

The principal issues on which we and the Soviet Union could get into a war under present circumstances have to do with the security of Western Europe.

There are some in Western Europe who think they are somehow part of a third world that unfortunately has been caught up in a great controversy between us and the Soviet Union. To me, this is a great misunderstanding of the situation.

If Western Europe were secure—Western Europe is the issue—if Western Europe were secure we would not have put \$900 billion in the defense budgets since 1947, and the same thing will be true of Mainland China.

If Korea and Japan and the Philippines and these other countries had a reasonable chance of living peacefully next door to this giant there without being subjected to the pressures of the world revolution, and they are there, I think we ought not to decide prematurely that they are not there, they could live peacefully there and then we have no problems out in that part of the world except trade and other kinds of relationships.

WORLD REVOLUTION

The CHAIRMAN. I get lost on that phrase “world revolution.” You tried to describe detente. What is the world revolution?

Secretary RUSK. The Communist doctrine that the world should be and is going to be reorganized on a Communist basis under the leadership of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Now, you see a very primitive form of this out of Mao Tse-Tung. It is getting to be more sophisticated in Eastern Europe, but these fellows still are pretty serious about this business.

Now, this revolutionary force has lost, perhaps, some of its clan in Eastern Europe. They are a little more middle-aged, and have got more of a stake in what they have been able to build up, and they may be getting a little tired with the more military aspect of what they have been doing.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You mean they have two pigs?

Secretary RUSK. They have two pigs. [Laughter.]

But this is not true of the others, apparently these veterans of the Long March in China, although one would have to take into account they have been more prudent in action than they have been in their words and doctrine.

IS WORLD REVOLUTION ACTIVELY THREATENED?

The CHAIRMAN. What have they done to support your theory that the world revolution is actively threatened? What do you consider the Chinese have done? I do not wish to interrupt you, I do not know—

Senator CASE. I think we are probing really the same purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just trying to probe what this world revolution is that you have in mind. Is there any doctrine or any actions which have been taken in support?

Senator CASE. I would not want to take a chance that there is not. Frankly, I think there is. In general, I have a somewhat different view than you do as to the desirability of protecting ourselves about a Russian treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not what you are thinking about it, but it is what the Secretary is thinking about it.

Secretary RUSK. You are not asking questions about the doctrine, at the moment, I mean—

The CHAIRMAN. If I understood you, the world revolution here is a major reason for our involvement, that is the way the Senator put it. I was very intrigued by the way the Senator put it. We might be falling into a trap. This has occurred to us when we saw that article out of China some time ago in which it was said, "We are very obliged to the U.S. for bringing their men and treasure. We couldn't get at them if they stayed at home. It is the only way we can get at them, their coming here and getting bogged down. We should be very appreciative to the government of the United States for giving us the opportunity to destroy it."

That is what reminded me of what the Senator said.

Secretary RUSK. Is this Hanoi or Peking?

The CHAIRMAN. That came out of Peking. It was a very long article which came out a couple of months ago. You saw it?

Senator PELL. No, I did not. Who wrote it?

The CHAIRMAN. It came out of People's Daily. It was picked up in the usual way. Don't you have that, Mr. Marcy? Anyway, I know we can find it.

Senator PELL. I would like to see it. This is exactly the theory I was advancing.

The CHAIRMAN. It was picked up from the People's Daily and reprinted in the New York Times. I thought that is exactly what you had in mind.

Senator CASE. I had this in mind.

AMERICAN OVERCOMMITMENT

The CHAIRMAN. It has occurred to me. Are we being drawn into one place where we can be destroyed? This is what some of our witnesses said last year. Are we becoming overcommitted to where our great wealth and manpower are being bogged down in an area which, as the Senator so well said, is not costing the opposition any substantial manpower or money? It is a very serious question.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, when one looks back to some of these other crises, when the guerrillas were thirty miles from Athens in great strength from Athens, Greece, and the winter weather fell in on the Berlin airlift, and we were in that tiny perimeter in Pusan or even in the first week of the Cuban missile crisis, the situation is more manageable.

Senator CASE. It was said we only won that one because Yugoslavia took a turn.

Secretary RUSK. Well, it took a turn. Maybe this one is going to be influenced by the presence of the problems in Mainland China.

The CHAIRMAN. It did not take a turn by bombing but for entirely different reasons.

Senator CASE. I know. This is the only reason firmness suggests. I must profess that I am for all this. I want to be reassured we are not getting in so deep that we are in a bog.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you asked a very pertinent question.

Secretary RUSK. I do not believe Peking is glad to see us in Southeast Asia. I do not believe that for a minute.

Senator CASE. In one sense, no.

NOT HAVE TREATIES DISRUPTED BY A BLUFF

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure in one sense, no. But if they must have it out this is the way. If they are convinced we are going to attack them any way, this is a good way.

Senator CASE. I am sure what you did, Mr. Secretary, in answering this man from South Dakota, upset this man, and it upset me, too. I have regarded what we have done as pretty important to our success in holding the line all over the world, taking a stand here and making your position more credible with the Russians and with everybody else, and also in having some rather specific effects and giving tone to the whole free effort in an effort to keep the world free in Southeast Asia.

Secretary RUSK. I hope I did not detract at all from that view. I certainly—

Senator CASE. Say it again because, you know, if you did detract.

Secretary RUSK. No. I was commenting specifically about its relation to Indonesia.

Senator CASE. You mean just cause and effect, one, two, like that?

Secretary RUSK. No. On the larger question as to what these great security treaties mean in terms of keeping the peace, to me the greatest danger in the world would be to have these treaties be interpreted by the other side as a bluff, because we have been tested at times when had they judged we were bluffing great catastrophe would have resulted. The Berlin crisis of 1961-1962, the Cuban missile crisis were two recent examples of this.

The most utter dangers are involved in that problem, and we are all—we all have to approach them, it seems to me, on our knees because it is awfully hard to be absolutely certain on such questions.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper?

Senator COOPER. Am I allowed to ask questions?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

NORTH VIETNAM'S TERMS ON BOMBING CESSATION

Senator COOPER. Mr. Secretary, my question goes to the declaration of North Vietnam that there must be a cessation of bombing of North Vietnam. I am not clear as to the exact wording of the declaration, if it is an exact wording. Did North Vietnam expressly state that there must be a permanent cessation of bombing or did it just state that there must be a cessation of bombing without the fixing of any limits upon the cessation of bombing?

Secretary RUSK. The most—the usual phrase there is unconditional and permanent. Now in the phraseology that you get in different ways, public and private, the permanent part—unconditional was always there. The permanent has been described another way as definitively which, I suppose, is permanent; and, as Harrison Salisbury in his interview put it, for good, which is the same thing, I suppose, as permanent. In other words, this framing of the issue has been put to us as unconditional permanent, and this is coupled with the excuses that were given to us when the thirty-seven-day

pause was finished earlier this year, when nothing happened, when we paused for twice as long, as had been suggested to us that we pause.

They said, "Well, a suspension is an ultimatum. You can't expect people to pick up the question of peace under an ultimatum of that sort," and the general attitude now on the other side seems to be that unless it is unconditional and permanent, anything less than that as a stoppage of the bombing would be interpreted as an ultimatum.

Now, of course, one can look at the question as to whether you simply stop without saying, but they would either insist upon a clarification of that point or would interpret for themselves as unconditional and permanent, and then if we found we had to resume the bombing for military reasons, then we could carry the burden of having acted in breach of faith, you see.

So we feel that these are issues of such importance that we ought to have some indications on the other side as to what would happen if we stopped the bombing, and thus far we have not been able to get any.

VIETNAMESE REUNIFICATION BY ELECTION

Senator COOPER. I will be brief on this question because I am sure you have developed it in sessions at which, of course, I was not present. But, as I understand it, the United States has said it would accept this basis of negotiation, the adherence to the 1954 Geneva Accords.

As I remember, those accords called for general elections throughout all Vietnam two years later and, I assume, with the idea that a government would be established for all Vietnam.

Beginning with the French and then with the United States, it seems to me, our course has been to establish a separate government for South Vietnam, and for many reasons. But how would the United States resolve that question when it now states that it would not adhere to the Geneva Accords? How would it resolve the question of the government for all of the South Vietnamese as distinguished from what would seem to have been our policy and the French policy before to establish a government in South Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. I think we have two elements there. First, we have said the South Vietnamese ought to have a chance in free elections to determine what their own government should be, and that the question of reunification should be decided by the peoples of the two parts of Vietnam through free elections or free choice.

The 1954 agreements, by providing for elections on that issue, presumably meant that this was to be by consent of the peoples concerned.

The same issue arises both in Korea and in Germany, where you have other divided countries.

I do not myself think, Senator, that in terms of settling the problem that we now have in Vietnam that the question of reunification by peaceful means is likely to be the great obstacle to a possible settlement. The problem is whether we can get the other side to hold its hand in trying to bring about reunification by force.

Senator COOPER. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. I have one or two questions.

THE QUAKERS IN CANADA

Do you know, Mr. Secretary, about a case that was sent to me involving the Quakers in Canada, that the Treasury of the United States issued a circular to all the banks in the United States directing them not to honor a check payable to the Quakers of Canada? Are you familiar with that?

Secretary RUSK. No sir; I am not. I had not heard of it before.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it came to me with a photostat of the order, and I wondered if there is any authority for such an order from the Treasury.

Secretary RUSK. It sounds to me as though this might be one of the foreign assets control problems. If the Quakers were using these funds to send assistance to North Vietnam—

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. Is there such authority that the Quakers—well, the Quakers state they are sending it North and South. They do this—they are not involved in this political thing. They are doing humanitarian work, and a friend sent me the letter. I don't have the letter anyway. I forgot how it went—I wrote a letter to the Treasury, but have had no response. Is that as far as you know, within the power, the authority of the Treasury?

Secretary RUSK. I would think so, sir, under the foreign assets control legislation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What kind of a check?

The CHAIRMAN. I did not send a check. Anyway this person, an American citizen, writes a check on the First National Bank of Washington, sends it to the Quakers in Canada, and the bank here is directed by the Treasury not to honor a check payable to the Quakers of Canada.

Secretary RUSK. I would have to look into the specific case because I just am not informed about it.

The CHAIRMAN. I was a little surprised that we had that authority. I thought you could donate money to the Quakers.

Secretary RUSK. I believe donations outside the United States are not income tax deductible in the usual case.

Senator PELL. That is absolutely correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they are to Israel, aren't they?

Secretary RUSK. That is a legal sense, that is to the organized charities organized in this country under the laws of this country.

DRAWING THE U.S. INTO A LAND WAR IN ASIA

The CHAIRMAN. In response to Senator Case's question—he has disappeared—but the staff just handed me an article² which I had not seen, from the War/Peace Report of October 1966 which says:

It is frightening as well as paradoxical that almost identical political assessments are being made in Peking and Washington concerning the war in Vietnam.

I won't read it all. It says:

On the other side, well-informed U.N. Eastern European diplomats report the perception of the same reality is quite different when viewed from Peking. These observers state Maoist Peking has had, from the beginning, a three-fold strategy based upon the assumption of an ultimate inevitable war with American imperialism: First to draw the U.S. into a major land engagement in Asia, preferably not on Chinese soil (these observers believe Korea was China's, not the Soviet's initiative); sec-

²"Peking and the U.S. Are Both Winning."

ond, to shift the American-Chinese confrontation to an American-Soviet confrontation; third, to use Vietnam and the underdeveloped world as a vehicle to change Russian foreign policy, or failing that, to discredit it.

I had not seen it but it is on all fours with this other idea that this——

Secretary RUSK. They said that Korea was on China's initiative and not the Soviets'?

The CHAIRMAN. Just the opposite.

Secretary RUSK. These observers believe——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the observers believe that Korea was China's not the Soviets' initiative. I also had thought it was the Soviets'.

Secretary RUSK. I do not believe that at all.

The CHAIRMAN. But in any case, the first point, they feel since a conflict is inevitable, this is the best thing for them on the same theory as the Senator from New Jersey advanced.

DULLES ON SEATO

The CHAIRMAN. I want to come back to one thing, one very interesting thing, you said. But before I do that I want to read a very short statement of Mr. Dulles.

You had, and the administration, correctly I think from its point of view, is now dwelling upon SEATO, but this is what Secretary Dulles said to us, and it has some bearing on our interpretation of it, and I think the way you should use it now is saying what the Senate did. Here is a quote from Secretary Dulles.

Secretary RUSK. Is that from your committee report?

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Secretary RUSK. What page?

The CHAIRMAN. Page 8.

We do not intend to dedicate any major elements of the United States military establishment to form an arm of defense in this area.

He is speaking about SEATO.

We rely primarily upon the deterrent of our mobile striking power. That we made clear to our associates in the treaty and that is our policy.

It would involve in the opinion of our military advisers an injudicious over-extension of our military power if we were to try to build up that kind of an organization in Southeast Asia.

We do not have the adequate forces to do it, and I believe that if there should be open armed attack in that area the most effective step would be to strike at the source of aggression rather than to try to rush American manpower into the area to try to fight a ground war.

I always put it in the record to show that some of us who were here and voted for those treaties voted for them in view of the interpretation given to us by the Secretary of State at that time which, I thought, and I know others must have been influenced by the idea, that it was not an engagement to put in a land army in a big war on the land. This was about the same time that some of our leading military authorities were also saying, such as Gen. Douglas MacArthur, that the last thing we ought to do is mount a big land war on the Continent of Asia.

So I would submit that the conditions are very different today in what we are doing from what many of us legitimately understood was involved in that treaty.

ALTERNATIVE TO MASSIVE RETALIATION

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, may I comment briefly on this?

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Yes, you may. I was just trying to put another point of view, but go ahead. You may comment.

Secretary RUSK. Well, that discussion, it seems to me, goes to the point as to whether, as in NATO, it was proposed in SEATO to build up standing forces of the alliance in the area in time of peace, and it was pointed out not.

Secondly, I would point out that at that time the alternative defense notion was massive retaliation, and had that been explored more fully at the time, I would suspect that the alternative Mr. Dulles had in mind as to the kind of thing we were doing here was massive retaliation, which we have stayed away from in this present situation.

The CHAIRMAN. That may be, but the point is to me that those of us who were here in voting for this, our judgment, I feel, certainly mine, was influenced by the representations as to what we were engaged in, what undertaking we were actually making.

COMPARISON TO TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION

I would say the same way with the Tonkin Gulf thing. I think the changes, as today, the circumstances are very different from what they were then. We had a very small group. Today we have nearly approaching, I guess, 400,000 to 500,000 men in the area. It is costing \$20, \$25 billion, and so forth. I think the change in the circumstances today as of the time of the Tonkin Gulf are very dramatic indeed, and I, for one—I have already confessed my error—was influenced very greatly by the political situation at the time, and I was supporting the President, who was the then candidate for 1964, and that he was then advocating a policy of not enlarging the war and, therefore, I supported his recommendation on the Tonkin Bay.

You are legitimately correct in saying, yes, you supported it. It is legitimate to respond that I certainly did not anticipate doing what we are doing. I do not particularly like to have this always thrown up, "Well, look, you voted for this." I do not consider we did vote for what we are doing now at all. The circumstances were very, very different.

U.S. TROOPS TO NATO

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If the Senator will yield to me, I will call his attention to the fact when we were considering the NATO organization we were told very emphatically, and the word "emphatically" was used in the testimony, that we were not going to send any troops to Europe or anything like that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Within four months, we had four divisions on the way.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. But we did right after that, the very question of whether we should send additional forces was submitted to the Senate, and the Senate had a long and thorough and acrimonious debate on the subject and specifically authorized it. You remember that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. After the troops went.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they at least paid some attention to the constitutional idea that we participate in these things.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am just saying these things happen at times.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON DID THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT WAS EXPECTED

The CHAIRMAN. I do not particularly like the Tonkin Bay being thrown up at this time that that is the authority for you to do what you are now doing. In fact, I thought in supporting the President as of that date in August of 1964, that I was supporting a man who was going to do exactly the opposite. Now he is doing precisely what his opponent said he would do, and this is a very curious turn of fate. There is not much I can do about it publicly, at least, but anyway that is a fact of the matter.

Secretary RUSK. One of the key elements, of course, in that problem is what the other side is doing all the time. These fellows keep marching down from the North. At some point somebody has to make a decision that "You get out of the way," or you shoot them.

A GENERATION BETRAYED BY WORLD WAR II

The CHAIRMAN. These are interesting subjects you brought up. I think the one Senator Case brought up is very interesting and worth further thought. Here is one you make. I think this is what you said a moment ago. You belong to a generation that was betrayed into World War I—

Secretary RUSK. World War II.

The CHAIRMAN. World War II, I am sorry, because the governments refused to organize the peace of the world.

The question, however, it seems to me, is, the big question, does this war, as we are now prosecuting it, does it obstruct or does it promote the organizing of peace. You assume that this war is an essential and important part that is designed to organize the peace of the world. Well, my own feeling is in view of developments that were beginning to take place when this war got really hot, that it more likely would prove in the light of history to obstruct the detente that you mentioned, certainly with the Russians, and detente generally in Europe as between Western Europe and the Russians, not just between us, and the very question is, you assume it, I think the question at issue is, does this war, as we now prosecute it, does it help organize the peace.

You say the reason you are so interested in pursuing this is you felt betrayed, and you do not want to do that again. I think you are assuming the question at issue.

Secretary RUSK. I do not think it is an assumption that was just pulled out of the air. In 1961, Chairman Khrushchev said to President Kennedy, in effect, "Get your troops out of Berlin or there will be war," and President Kennedy had to say to him, "Well, Mr. Chairman, then there will be war," and it was extremely important that Mr. Khrushchev believe the President of the United States on that point, otherwise we might well have had war.

The same thing at the time of the Cuban missile crisis where it was necessary to say to Chairman Khrushchev, "The missiles will

have to go, Mr. Chairman. We hope they can go by peaceful means, but they must go.”

If the Chairman, if Chairman Khrushchev had not believed President Kennedy in that situation, we could have had an even greater catastrophe than in the Berlin matter.

Now, it is a very serious thing to create the impression that our mutual security treaties are bluffs.

HOW ARE CUBA AND BERLIN RELEVANT TO VIETNAM?

The CHAIRMAN. But there are two cases that I think most of us—I never did question your correctness in both cases because there was a valid reason for it. Now, go ahead, here is South Vietnam. Why is it relevant? Why is what you did in Berlin relevant as to the case in Vietnam? I do not see the relevancy. I believe they do not believe you because you are in there on a false basis. They respected what you said in Cuba and in Berlin. Why is it they do not do it in Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. The relevance, the first instance, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that if you make a commitment like the SEATO Treaty, and then demonstrate that it is a bluff, there is a great risk that they will consider as bluffs your attitude in these other crises.

The CHAIRMAN. You see, you are assuming the question at issue again. The Senator from Oregon and myself and a lot of other people do not believe the SEATO Treaty covers this case, and neither did you until the last two years.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I beg your pardon. If you want the full record on this—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the State Department did not. I just gave you the reference.

Secretary RUSK. I am talking about what was said at every SEATO Ministers meeting since I have been Secretary of State and the communiques of the SEATO Ministers and the statements made by President Kennedy. I have not looked at that memorandum that you referred to of March 1965.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a State Department memorandum, not mine.

Secretary RUSK. I understand. There were a good many other memoranda in which the SEATO Treaty was talked about along the way and in public statements and in communiques, and in press conferences of President Kennedy, and so forth, and there was certainly no possibility of doubt that in the case—

CLIENT STATES IN SEATO

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't it odd that the other SEATO Members do not agree with you as to its applicability here? None of them have felt obliged because of this SEATO Treaty to come and discharge their duties. Are we the only people who have respect for our international—

Secretary RUSK. Five of them are there, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I admit outside of our clients, I mean the independent countries.

Secretary RUSK. If you call the clients those that agree with us, and non-clients those that do not agree with us—

The CHAIRMAN. I call a client the ones you put so much money in them that you dominate their policies and they will do anything to continue to get enormous aid from you, that you buy. That is what I call a client.

Secretary RUSK. We have not bought Australia and New Zealand. They are not client states.

The CHAIRMAN. They are not paid very much either. I am talking about Korea in which you paid vast sums, and I am speaking of the Philippines in which you not only gave them very large commitments but I was told two days ago you are now coming up for a new item for the Philippines in the AID program and, of course, Thailand, in which you are simply covering them up with gold. Those are the client states, and they are the ones that are doing most of the burden.

Secretary RUSK. But they are also the states that live under the gun of danger out here and have the greatest interest in resisting what is being done there by Hanoi.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose India and Japan are not interested. They are not in danger, if there is a danger.

Senator AIKEN. I do not understand why you call them clients. They do not pay us for our services. We pay them. I would say they are beneficiaries instead of clients. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is both ways. They dominate our policy, I guess. We are the captives of the government of the Philippines, Thailand and Formosa.

HOW TO ORGANIZE THE PEACE

Well, I wanted to get to—I got diverted—what is your idea of how to organize the peace today?

Secretary RUSK. Well, that is a very long subject, but in essence I would say look at Article I of the United Nations Charter where it talks about the necessity for suppressing acts of aggression and breaches of the peace, settling disputes by peaceful means. Article II, the next paragraph, goes on to talk about self-determination. Surely, if we draw anything at all from our experience in the last decade, it is that those who start a process of aggression develop the momentum of aggression if it is not checked. And no one has been able to demonstrate to me that the things which these events have in common are irrelevant.

Now, everyone knows that every human action has its unique aspects. One burglar is John Doe, and another burglar is Richard Roe, and each action is unique in some respects. But it is what they have in common that puts them in prison.

The CHAIRMAN. I was hoping you would say the U.N., and I would hope that we would rely on the U.N. But what we are really doing is going on our own. These are our own programs. It is not the U.N. The U.N. has nothing to do with it. This is a big difference between this and Korea.

One reason, I think, there was little dissent about Korea is that it was a collective action. It is true we furnished most of the sinews because we had it, but we had the support and approval of the United Nations. That is the only idea I have about organizing the peace is the U.N. But this does not seem to be in accord with that policy. That is one of the things why I asked that question.

Secretary RUSK. Well, again the Korean matter was unique in the U.N. system because of the accident that the Soviet Union was absent from—they were absent from the Security Council when the decisive decisions were taken there.

The CHAIRMAN. But the Soviet Union has not vetoed any action here.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SEATO AND NATO

Secretary RUSK. But NATO is not subject to formal action by the United Nations. If there is an attack on a member of NATO—

The CHAIRMAN. But, Secretary Rusk, Mr. Dulles specifically distinguished this from NATO. He said it is not like NATO.

Secretary RUSK. But not in every respect. It was distinguished from NATO in the formulation that was used for these later treaties, and I think you will find in the record that he says that the differences are insignificant; that the difference in the wording arose out of the issue raised, I think, by Senator Taft and others as to whether the language of the NATO treaty itself would, in effect, repeal the constitutional processes here, that an attack on one is an attack on all, and in order not to have that occur, they went to the formulation, which Senator Lausche read in these other treaties, which was somewhat different from the NATO language. But Secretary Dulles in one of these hearings indicated that the difference was insubstantial.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I will stop with one last thing. I wondered, because I am always asked this, and I am always asked by the press, what is the response to the question, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the situation? They will ask it. They always do, nearly the first question, when they say was the Secretary optimistic or pessimistic. How did he feel about this?

Secretary RUSK. Usually at press conferences when that question is put to me I usually do not answer it in those terms.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you say?

Secretary RUSK. Because it is much too complicated a situation altogether.

A REQUEST FOR PUBLIC INFORMATION

Senator MORSE. I have one question and one request for information and, Mr. Secretary, it may involve a matter of policy and, as you know, if it does I follow your decision on policy.

Before I make the request, we can certainly have it on a secret basis, I would like to get it on a public basis, if possible, because we cannot avoid the fact that in public discussion among our people in this country these days great concern is expressed over whether this is becoming predominantly an American or an Asian war. In fact, there are certain political points of view within the ranks of the Republican Party that it ought to be turned over to the Asians.

I have not taken that position completely, but I do think the American people are entitled to the information that I now would like to have you supply for public discussion, but if you decide after consultation with the administration that it cannot be supplied publicly, at least I would like to have it made a part of this record, and I would like to use it for the public, if possible.

STATISTICS ON CASUALTIES

What were the Vietnamese casualties in 1964, 1965 and 1966, including their fatalities and their wounded?

What were the U.S. casualties during the last three years?

Supply the number of Vietnam infiltrating in 1964, 1965, 1966.

Four, the number of Viet Cong recruited in South Vietnam in 1964, 1965, and 1966.

Five, the desertion rates from the South Vietnamese army in 1964, 1965, and 1966, compared with the Viet Cong's desertion rates.

Now, we have some of these figures provided to the committee by the Defense Department, but they are classified. They show that in 1966, and this is the point Senator Clark was talking about, that the number of Americans killed in action quadrupled while the number of Vietnamese killed in action was less by way of 20 percent, and that despite bombing North Vietnam infiltration almost tripled in 1966.

Of course, these figures also have to be compared in relationship to the number of personnel in the American forces and the South Vietnamese forces, and what is known about the number of personnel in the Viet Cong forces.

The thrust of my request is obvious. I would like to have the statistical material bearing on the question of great public concern these days as to whether or not the United States is taking over the war and the South Vietnamese, as far as fighting is concerned, are being let out more and more of responsibility, because if we are going to have a drive for the war to be taken over by Asians, an all-Asian conference, as has been proposed by some, I think the American people ought to have the statistical material that I asked for.

Secretary RUSK. We will see what we can do on that. I think we have much harder information on certain of those points than we have on the others. For example, on the defections from the Viet Cong, we can count somewhat more than 20,000 in 1966 who come in to get their cards in the Chiu Hoi program and go on to get resettled and get jobs.

They tell us for every one who comes over officially, maybe three or four others simply go off to their farms, and the desertions are not desertions from the South Vietnamese to the Viet Cong, but simply people who go back to their farms, people, like people in this country during the Civil War at frequent intervals. But we will try our best to get you the figures and see whether we can make them public. I think a good many of these figures can be made public. Some of them are public, but I will try to pull them together for you.

THE U.N. AND RHODESIA

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question: If I understand when we were talking about Rhodesia you were stating that was not a bilateral action, that we were pulled into Rhodesia because of our obligations under the U.N. charter; is that right?

Secretary RUSK. I said it was not just a bilateral matter, that we had important national interests of our own involved in this ques-

tion under the charter in relation to the United Nations structure, in relation to our own interests in Africa, as well as our interests in the Commonwealth.

Senator MUNDT. How do you respond to Dean Acheson's statement—I know you have read this—in which he said that such a situation in the U.N. charter is plain. Chapter I, Article II, paragraph 7 applies unequivocally that the United Nations shall not intervene in matters which are within the internal jurisdiction of any state.

Secretary RUSK. I gave—did I give you that, Mr. Marcy—that memorandum on the legal—I think the key point here is that Article II, paragraph 7, the charter provision does not brand as illegal intervention. The action of the Security Council taken at the request of a member state concerned, in this case the United Kingdom—from a legal point of view, the responsibilities for Rhodesia continue to rest with the United Kingdom. No one has recognized Rhodesia. I do not think any country in the world including South Africa has recognized Rhodesia as an independent state, and Article II, paragraph 7—

Senator MUNDT. It says any member state or does he say any state?

Secretary RUSK. Article II, paragraph 7—do you have a copy of the Charter—expressly provides that the principle of non-intervention contained in that article shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under chapter 7. So from the Charter point of view there seems to be little doubt about that, but I will leave this memorandum for you to study, Senator. You may not agree with all of it.

Senator MUNDT. I hate to see student and teacher disagree.

Secretary RUSK. Well, it is a matter of some pain to me, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. Probably more to you than to me. It has raised a lot of questions in my correspondence, but I cannot answer them.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other question?

Senator MUNDT. No.

Secretary RUSK. I am talking about the last sentence.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess that is all.

INDONESIAN VIEWS ON BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM

One thing I did have, I do not know whether it is important. Maybe you can clear it very quickly. You mentioned a prominent official of Indonesia. Did he express himself on the bombing in the north? What was it you said about him?

Secretary RUSK. It had to do with whether our being in Vietnam had any bearing on the situation in Indonesia.

The CHAIRMAN. You said he did.

Secretary RUSK. He said it was a very important thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Didn't I see where he thought it would be very wise to suspend the bombing in the North? Is that correct or not? I thought he did.

Secretary RUSK. It is possible. I have not noted what he said.

The CHAIRMAN. He denied that he said it. It was reported, was it not, in the press?

Secretary RUSK. Could we check that point, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. That is all, unless you have anything further to say.

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

I believe you are scheduled to come in open session next week, Monday, is that right?

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 2:35 o'clock p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

SUBCOMMITTEES AND HEARINGS PROCEDURES

Tuesday, January 24, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:00 noon, in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J. W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Lowenstein of the committee staff.

CONFIRMATION OF NOMINATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

First, is there any motion on the people we just heard,¹ that is—

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move that from small a to small f inclusive be recommended for confirmation.

Senator MORSE. Second it.

The CHAIRMAN. You heard the motion and the second. Is there any discussion? Any questions? All in favor of the motion say "aye."

[Chorus of "aye."]

The CHAIRMAN. Opposed, "no."

[No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. The "ayes" have it.

As I said, we will take the other two tomorrow. We have Mr. William S. Gaud. I will announce that the committee will meet tomorrow at 10:30. We do not think it will take too long, but we had already agreed. Mr. Gaud has a matter to present to the committee.

There are two or three other matters.

ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE STAFF AND EXPENSES

First, on the committee.

Mr. Marcy, will you present the bill. It has to be approved and get on its way to go through the procedures.

Mr. MARCY. Yes.

¹The Committee heard in open session the following nominations: Clarence A. Boonstra to be Ambassador to Costa Rica; John F. Henning to be Ambassador to New Zealand; David S. King to be Ambassador to the Malagasy Republic; Robert L. Payton to be Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Cameroon; William B. Buffum to be Deputy Representative to the U.N.; and Arthur E. Goldschmidt to be Representative to the Economic and Social Council of the U.N.

Normally at this time of the year the committee approves a sum for additional staff and expenses for the balance of this year.

Last year, the committee approved and the Senate approved \$200,000 for committee expenses. Of that \$200,000, the committee spent \$144,289, so we have a balance of \$55,000 left.

This would mean that the committee could get along next year on the same amount, \$200,000, but if there is any inclination for special kinds of activities to be undertaken, the committee might want to request \$250,000.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason for that was the discussion that took place at the last meeting where there were several people who desired that we try to find some extra staff members. They do not have to spend it, but if you want to leave it, I mean make available an amount we could use, and if we possibly can find somebody, why, we will.

Senator LAUSCHE. Carl, was the full appropriation for the whole fiscal year \$200,000?

Mr. MARCY. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. And we got along with \$200,000?

Mr. MARCY. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now you say we can get along the next year unless we expand our staff and services.

Mr. MARCY. That is correct.

Senator MUNDT. Did I misunderstand your word, Carl, I thought you said we got along with \$160,000.

Mr. MARCY. That is correct. We have \$55,000 unexpended at the end of the year.

Senator LAUSCHE. Where do you get the money for the next six months of the fiscal year?

Mr. MARCY. We do not operate on a fiscal year.

Senator SPARKMAN. We are on a calendar year, January 30 to January 30.

Senator LAUSCHE. You have \$50,000 left?

Mr. MARCY. That is correct.

MONEY TO HIRE ADDITIONAL STAFF

Senator CHURCH. You mean by that, Carl, there is room in the present budget to hire additional staff people without enlarging it over the amount we spent last year?

The CHAIRMAN. It depends on the hearings and the travel. It was lower last year than usual, but there was such vigorous complaint the other day that I said if the committee means what it said we would give them some leeway. We do not spend it anyway. Mr. Marcy, I think, has been extremely careful. I do not know of any major committee that spent as little as this one.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, could I raise two questions?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator MORSE. Carl stated we had some left. We do not have any left, do we? Didn't that revert?

Mr. MARCY. That reverts.

The CHAIRMAN. That reverts. What he meant is we did not expend it. That is correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, there is going to be an effort—

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse. He was about to say something.

EXPANDING THE SUBCOMMITTEES

Senator MORSE. I want the attention of Senator Clark and some others who expressed to me an interest in expanding the programs of some of our subcommittees.

I have pending—I won't have time to take it up this morning—my first draft of a proposal for doing some work on the Subcommittee on Latin America that I think we have got to do or we are going to be open to two problems.

One, you have got other committees of the Congress doing it; you have got a jurisdictional problem here. I do not want to go into that now, but we have some other committees in the Congress that, in my judgment, are invading the prerogatives of the Foreign Relations Committee in Latin America; and, second, I think we ought to do it as a matter of Senate duty.

I do not think you can let this Latin American area go without more interest being expressed in it by the Foreign Relations Committee, and I certainly would not favor our spending any money that we do not need to spend.

On the other hand, whatever you ask for now is the maximum that you are probably going to get. I do not think we ought to come in later supplementarily, and asking for more money, and I would suggest that to play safe we ask for \$250,000.

The CHAIRMAN. It does not commit us to spend it. We have not spent it for last year or any year previously, but if we need it, it is there. There is no commitment that you have to spend it.

Senator MORSE. No.

A REASONABLE PRESENTATION TO THE RULES COMMITTEE

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, Senator Pell and I are on the Rules Committee, and these money appropriations come up there.

Senator PELL. Senator Cooper also.

Senator CLARK. Yes, Senator Cooper. I thoroughly agree with Senator Morse, but before we go in for \$250,000, which we may not spend, Carl ought to have a reasonable presentation to the Rules Committee as to how we spend it, otherwise there will be criticisms.

Senator MORSE. My only feeling is we can probably do it on \$200,000 in view of what we did not spend last year. We probably could do it on \$200,000.

At the same time, I would not want to ask for \$200,000 and then in the next few meetings of this committee, the committee agrees there ought to be increased staff of the subcommittees.

Senator CLARK. would like to see Mr. Marcy make up a presentation which can be presented to the Rules Committee.

Senator MARCY. I do have such a budget here, but it will not deal with the particular investigation. For example, last year of the full amount of \$200,000, the committee budget showed \$163,000 for salaries; employee contributions \$21,000; reimbursement payments to agencies \$4,000; travel \$6,000; witnesses for hearings \$6,000; office expenses \$4,600; and another amount of \$3,000.

That was for the full amount of \$200,000.

Now, actually, the way the amounts were expended, I will just give you a few illustrative amounts here. While we asked for \$163,000 for salaries, we spent \$118,000. While we asked for \$6,000 for travel, we actually spent \$17,000. That was because at the time that the committee appropriated the funds or authorized the amounts last year, the committee had not decided to hold hearings on Vietnam, NATO, and China.

AREAS FOR INVESTIGATION

Senator CLARK. Of course, Mr. Chairman, we really ought to make the basic decision as to what we want to do with the committee this year before we prepare the bill, which is probably going to be impossible to do in this meeting in ten minutes.

I would certainly like to strongly endorse the position of the Senator from Oregon that we ought to have a pretty comprehensive look at Latin America. I believe Senator Gore, the chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee, and I certainly agree with him, think we ought to take a good hard look at the Disarmament Agency, and I have no doubt there are other areas of countries as a result of my trip to Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Some Senators will feel we ought to be conducting much more effective oversight than we do at present. But my own point is we ought to make this policy decision and then ask Carl to make up a budget. We have the cart before the horse, and since we have to do it this way, I would rather see us ask for \$250,000, and if we do not have to spend it, we will not spend it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I say just this: It may be the cart is before the horse, but it is just something that cannot very well be avoided because this present fund expires January 30, and we need to get action before the end of the month.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman.

CAREFUL HANDLING OF FUNDS

Senator SPARKMAN. Wait a minute.

Now, the experience of this committee in the past, I think, and Carl will bear me out on this, has been one of very good husbanding of the funds that we have gotten. I think it will show that some years we have turned back a very large amount. Other years it has been a lesser amount. You cannot predict it with any precision. But what we do not spend goes back into the Treasury, so it seems to me that certainly we can trust the careful handling of the funds, but that we ought to allow ourselves elbow room so that we can do what we decide we ought to do in this committee and, therefore, I would recommend the larger amount. If it is in order, I would like to make a motion to agree on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

SUBSTITUTE MOTION

Senator LAUSCHE. I offer a substitute, and that is that the amount be kept at \$200,000. We are faced with the responsibility of answering to the people of the United States whether we are going to keep expenses at present levels or reduce them, on the one hand; or extend them, on the other, and impose new taxes.

When the time comes for imposing new taxes, the probability is that there will be a wave of opposition to it. My belief is that we ought to begin with the committee's indicating that we are exerting every effort possible to escape the obligation of imposing new taxes, or if we have to do so, impose them in the least amounts possible.

We had \$200,000 last year; we spent \$150,000. That would indicate to me that there is a latitude of \$50,000 with which to do the work that might be in excess of what was done last year.

I make this proposal also because it has become thoroughly apparent that if there has been neglect, and I am not saying that it prevails in this committee, because another committee on which I serve has increased its amount by \$200,000 in the last three years. We should begin here, and that is where I propose to begin.

The CHAIRMAN. You heard the motion. The substitute motion is to ask for \$200,000. Is there any further discussion?

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I was late for this committee because I was detained in the committee presided over by your distinguished colleague from Arkansas, Mr. John McClellan.² The staff had prepared a proposed spending program, and by unanimous action our committee there, operating pretty much on the philosophy that Frank Lausche has mentioned, cut it down.

Senator MORSE. How much is the total?

Senator MUNDT. It is a big committee, a quarter of a million dollars. They asked for about \$1,250,000, and we cut it down.

Senator MORSE. It is the very committee, may I say most respectfully, which, in my judgment, is planning some work in Latin America that ought to be subordinated to the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator MUNDT. Not that I know of. They never mentioned it. You are thinking of Vietnam.

Senator MORSE. You have the Judiciary Committee with \$2,600,000 plus, with some of the subcommittees with \$500,000.

Senator MUNDT. I am talking about Government Operations.

Senator MORSE. I know, but I also bring in the other Committees.

Senator MUNDT. So far as I know, they are not talking about Latin America. There is a possibility of investigating AID in Vietnam.

WHOSE OX IS BEING GORED

Senator COOPER. Mr. Chairman, you remember—I am rather reluctant to give my views on this—but serving on the Rules Committee we do have this experience: when the committee chairmen come in for additional funds, if they are supported by a plan of what is intended to do, I think the Rules Committee is very generous in approving their request. But I think if some budget is not made out, there will be a tendency to cut it out somewhat, and that has been our practice in the Rules Committee. So I would say if you are going to ask for \$250,000, it ought to be supported by some plan.

²Government Operations Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you members of the Rules Committee, are you likely to cut back? If he only asked for \$200,000, are you going to cut it back along with everybody?

Senator COOPER. Not \$200,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Because this committee asked for very little. For example, the committee he mentioned was \$1,000,000.

Senator CLARK. I would like to say something about the tactics, if you do not mind. It depends on whose ox is being gored. There are certain committees which are absolutely sacrosanct, and they get whatever they want, and other committees do not get what they want. This does not represent my philosophy, but it does that of the Rules Committee. I think this committee's requests are extremely modest.

The CHAIRMAN. I think so, too. The Judiciary Committee is \$2,670,000. And they have subcommittees: the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly asks for \$560,000; Constitutional Rights, \$205,000; Internal Security, \$437,000; Juvenile Delinquency, \$260,000.

Senator CLARK. Which is not within their jurisdiction.

The CHAIRMAN. They total \$2,670,000. I do not want to do anything outrageous.

CONDEMNING OTHER COMMITTEES' EXTRAVAGANCES

Senator LAUSCHE. The weakness of our position is that in this room we condemn this, but when we go to the floor nobody utters a word. I think that we can justifiably and honestly defend our position. I think that that expenditure is completely unjustified, and it sort of corroborates the extravagance in the committees.

Senator PELL. No one had the gumption to say so.

Senator LAUSCHE. No one complains. We consider each committee sacrosanct. Allen Ellender goes up on the floor and makes the argument, and only the walls listen to him.

Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, the question here is how much money should this committee have. I think that it is perfectly clear that we did not have the kind of staff help we could efficiently use in the various subcommittees, and we are not getting the job done that we should get done. I mean there is no reason why we should limit ourselves with a staff that is inadequate.

The CHAIRMAN. If the committee will have order. I was sorry to arouse such a big controversy. I did not know there would be such a big row. We did not spend the \$200,000. Obviously we have room there. If people feel so strongly about it, I would rather go on \$200,000, and if we need it, why, we can ask for a supplemental. I think the Rules Committee people—I am perfectly willing to abide by what your advice is because we can ask for more. I have asked the staff to try to follow out what was suggested here the other day to look for some people and see—we have already appointed two new subcommittees, and we are going to try to staff them and get some people. We are moving in that direction. If you think this is outrageous, I am perfectly willing to stay with it.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, let us vote.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, let us vote.

SUBCOMMITTEES NEED A COMMITMENT FROM THE FULL COMMITTEE

Senator MORSE. One minute, before you vote. I would like to have one minute.

We have started a discussion, and a very fruitful discussion in this committee about expanding the work of the subcommittees.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator MORSE. Because we feel they ought to be expanded. You cannot expand the work of the subcommittees unless the chairman of the subcommittees can get some commitment from this full committee as to what the budget is going to allow them. You are not going to be able to do that on the basis of the old judgment, in my opinion, because your \$153,000 expenditure last year was low for the reason we did not undertake the type of program in the subcommittees that ought to have been undertaken. I certainly think that if you just ask for \$200,000 you are going to encourage encroachments upon the jurisdiction of this committee from other committees, and I think we ought to ask for \$250,000 or \$225,000. You ought to go before that committee and make the case before the Rules Committee. This is what we intend to do that we have not been doing, and that ought to be done. If you do not do that, you are going to be in a position where they would be justified in cutting back on your budget.

If you say you were going to ask for no more money, and we are going to do a larger program, the Rules Committee would have a basis for cutting back. I think you ought to ask for the \$250,000 and make your case before the committee.

DEFEAT OF THE SUBSTITUTE MOTION

The CHAIRMAN. All right, let us vote on it.

Senator COOPER. Let me say this, if I can.

I am on both committees. If this committee does appear and sustain its request for \$250,000, of course, I will vote for it today. I just will say that.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to call the roll?

Senator PELL. What are we voting on exactly?

The CHAIRMAN. The substitute of the Senator from Ohio. He wishes to stay at \$200,000.

Senator PELL. If you want it \$250,000, you vote no.

The CHAIRMAN. You vote no.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Senator LAUSCHE. And when you do that you are mistaken.

Senator PELL. I often am.

The CHAIRMAN. Call the roll.

Mr. KUHL. Mr. Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. No.

Mr. KUHL. Mr. Mansfield.

Mr. Morse.

Senator MORSE. No.

Mr. KUHL. Mr. Gore.

Mr. Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. Aye.

Mr. KUHL. Mr. Church.

Senator CHURCH. No.

Mr. KUHLM. Mr. Symington.
 The CHAIRMAN. I will vote Symington no. He did leave his proxy.
 Mr. KUHLM. Mr. Dodd.
 Mr. Clark.
 Senator CLARK. No.
 Mr. KUHLM. Mr. Pell.
 Senator PELL. No.
 Mr. KUHLM. Mr. McCarthy.
 Mr. Hickenlooper.
 Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.
 Mr. KUHLM. Mr. Aiken.
 Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.
 Mr. KUHLM. Mr. Carlson.
 Senator CARLSON. No.
 Mr. KUHLM. Mr. Williams.
 Mr. Mundt.
 Senator MUNDT. Aye.
 Mr. KUHLM. Mr. Case.
 Senator CASE. No.
 Mr. KUHLM. Mr. Cooper.
 Senator COOPER. No.
 Mr. KUHLM. Mr. Chairman.
 The CHAIRMAN. No.
 Mr. KUHLM. Ten nays and four ayes.
 The CHAIRMAN. The substitute failed.

ADOPTION OF THE MOTION

Now can we vote. Do we need a roll call or can we go by a voice vote?

Senator LAUSCHE. I wanted to be registered as voting no.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, in view of my vote, I want to state this. The Post Office and Civil Service Committee, which really is a small committee, and I am a member of it, is asking for \$225,000, and I just could not conceive that this committee should get less.

The CHAIRMAN. We won't spend it unless we need it.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will you assign someone to work for me especially with this extra \$50,000 as the chairman of the Southeast Asia Subcommittee, a very important one?

Senator MORSE. You bet it is.

The CHAIRMAN. I have some other questions here now.

Ambassador Goldberg—

Senator CLARK. We did not vote.

The CHAIRMAN. All in favor of the motion of the Senator from Alabama say aye.

[Chorus of "aye."]

The CHAIRMAN. Opposed, no.

Senator LAUSCHE. No.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The record will show the Senator from Ohio votes no.

INVITATION FOR THE COMMITTEE TO VISIT THE U.N.

Ambassador Goldberg—let me go back. Mr. U Thant sent me an invitation inviting the committee to come to New York and have lunch with him, and so on.

Goldberg came here right after that and we had a conversation about it. He strongly recommends that it be enlarged rather than just go for a luncheon with U Thant. He would like for the committee to agree to come up there and he, if I understood him correctly, offered to make the arrangements for transportation, and to spend a day and to meet with a series of delegations or people from various parts; in other words, perhaps two or three from Western Europe, and two or three or more.

He is going to undertake to set this up, if we agree. He is going to manage this for us, with the idea of giving us an opportunity to hear the views and exchange views with people from various parts of the world. Latin America would be a group; one from Western Europe; one from Eastern Europe; the Middle East, and so on. I cannot give you all the details.

What I wanted to do today is to find out whether or not the committee is interested. It would entail going up and spending the day, all day, in these various meetings, among other things, as I understand it, a luncheon with Mr. U Thant.

The suggested period would be—and this has got to be subject, of course, to negotiation, but I could not be very specific because I had not had an opportunity to ask you—March 15th to 16th or the 22nd and 23rd. I just wanted to know whether the committee is interested or not. I do not want to get out on a limb and say we are, and not have but one or two go.

What is the sentiment of the committee?

Senator MORSE. I think we ought to have the advice of Case and Church first.

The CHAIRMAN. It is purely for our information.

A USEFUL TRIP

Senator CHURCH. I am strongly, I am very favorably, disposed. I think that the more this committee can learn as a committee about the situation in New York, the more familiar we are with the U.N. and with our own mission, and with the Secretariat and with U Thant, with the views that are so pervasive there on matters that are critical to our own national interest, the better. Since I think this is the most appropriate way to do it and the most effective way to do it, I would hope that the committee would be interested in Goldberg's invitation.

I have told Goldberg I am strongly in favor of this. I would hope that as many members of the committee as possible would go. I think it would be useful.

The CHAIRMAN. I sort of felt that unless as many as ten wanted to go it would not look right. If as many as ten wanted to go—not everybody has to go.

Senator CLARK. I wonder if we would not want to ask the members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee also.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you get too many if they all went.

Senator CASE. They will take care of that.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think about the idea? Do you wish me to work out a day, and would you say as many as ten would go?

I would like all of them to go, but I do not want to just have three or four go and have all this sort of trouble.

INVITATION FROM U THANT

Senator LAUSCHE. From whom is the principal invitation? Is it from U Thant?

The CHAIRMAN. It started with U Thant. I had a letter over there. It came some time ago. He would be glad to have a luncheon, invite us all to luncheon, and this kind of grew out of it.

Senator LAUSCHE. I do not want to dignify U Thant, and especially on the basis of what Senator Morse said the other day, of his statements around the world, and if we are going to go—

Senator MORSE. What statements?

Senator LAUSCHE. The other day in our discussions you pointed out that U Thant is our choice and he was making attacks upon us.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I cannot hear what you are saying, Frank.

Senator CASE. He is everybody's choice, Frank, is what you are saying.

Senator LAUSCHE. U Thant has been making statements that are not helpful to our cause in the world as it stands today, and I do not want to dignify him by going to New York with him being the principal inviter. I look upon it differently if the principal invitation comes from Goldberg.

Senator CHURCH. May I say something on that?

My understanding on that is the principal invitation comes from our Ambassador to us.

Senator LAUSCHE. If we go there we ought to put U Thant in the background.

Senator CHURCH. Yes. During the fall, a group of Congressmen did come up at Goldberg's invitation. They did come to the American Mission for briefings. They then lunched with U Thant, and went through the Secretariat and visited the principal U.N. buildings, and this is what Goldberg has in mind.

The CHAIRMAN. That is my understanding, that it would be one of a whole series of meetings that would take place practically all day. My guess would be we would want to leave, we will say, around 8:00 or 8:30. We would come back that night. We do not spend the night there. You do not have to register in hotels or anything else is the way I understand it is to be done.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. CHAIRMAN, I have to leave. I am in favor of the idea, and I will go.

Senator PELL. So am I.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me have a show of hands of who would be willing to go who are here.

[There was a showing of hands.]

Senator CASE. Could I just say one thing. I suggest we keep down the social side of it.

Senator MUNDT. You are going to have to adjust to the Senate schedule.

THE TEN-MINUTE RULE FOR QUESTIONING

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, I move that in the open public hearings that there be applied the ten-minute rule. I will not discuss the issue, and let this whole body act upon it.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I am perfectly willing for the committee to act on it. We tried it last year and we have also had two meetings this year without it, and in my view it worked better without it than it did with it. Yesterday the total time consumed was less than an average of ten minutes for everybody there. Now practically everybody was there yesterday, and I would prefer to try it without it. If it becomes intolerable, why, we can revert to it.

We also tried it when the Secretary was here and it went very smoothly, which is the normal way. But if you wish—

Senator LAUSCHE. What did you mean yesterday when you said to me in private that you had so many complaints about the application of the ten-minute rule—

The CHAIRMAN. You were one who complained last year about how unsatisfactory it is in circumstances that you only have ten minutes.

Senator LAUSCHE. No, I never complained about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Last year you did and so did others.

Senator LAUSCHE. No, I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. But anyway if you wish to vote on it—

Senator MORSE. I think we ought to have discussion on it. I am a great believer in self-discipline.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what we tried yesterday, and I would prefer to go that way.

THE MINORITY NEEDS MORE TIME

Senator CASE. I think, as a matter of fact, Frank, you spoke to me about this before. There are times when you are in the minority and you would need and require more than the ten minutes that would be attributable to one member to present that minority position fairly, and I think this is a good idea.

Senator LAUSCHE. I will not argue the matter. Each one knows how he has—the juniors how much they sit back and finally leave the meeting because they never get to them.

Senator CASE. Sometimes we ought to start at the bottom. That is the only change.

Senator PELL. Maybe we could have a compromise. The chairman could present a little bell to us and ring it after ten minutes. We do not have to stop, but at least we would not forget that ten minutes had gone by.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought yesterday everybody was very, very—

Senator LAUSCHE. Yesterday there was self-imposed adherence to the rule.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right. So was their—

Senator LAUSCHE. Are you recommending a substitute?

Senator PELL. No. I was being flip.

Senator MCCARTHY. What is the substitute?

Senator LAUSCHE. Let us have the question.

Senator PELL. Do you want a vote, really?

TABLE THE MOTION

Senator CASE. I move the motion be tabled for the time being.
The CHAIRMAN. The Senator moves it be tabled for the time being.

Senator MORSE. Second.

The CHAIRMAN. All in favor of the tabling say "aye."
(Chorus of "aye.")

The CHAIRMAN. Call the roll, Mr. Kuhl.

Mr. KUHL. Mr. Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Aye.

Mr. KUHL. Mr. Mansfield.

Mr. Morse.

Senator MORSE. Aye.

Mr. KUHL. Mr. Gore.

Mr. Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. No.

Mr. KUHL. Mr. Church.

Senator CHURCH. No.

Mr. KUHL. Mr. Symington.

The CHAIRMAN. No—aye, I mean.

Mr. KUHL. Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Clark.

Mr. Pell.

Senator PELL. No.

Mr. KUHL. Mr. McCarthy.

Senator MCCARTHY. Aye.

Mr. KUHL. Mr. Hickenlooper.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aye.

Mr. KUHL. Mr. Aiken.

Mr. Carlson.

Senator CARLSON. No.

Mr. KUHL. Mr. Williams.

Mr. Mundt.

Senator MUNDT. No.

Mr. KUHL. Mr. Case.

Senator CASE. Aye.

Mr. KUHL. Mr. Cooper.

Senator COOPER. Aye.

Mr. KUHL. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Aye.

Mr. KUHL. Eight yeas and five nays.

The CHAIRMAN. The motion is tabled.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right, you poor junior, weep.

INVITATION TO JOURNALISTS TO TESTIFY

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask the guidance of the committee on this.

There have been two members who raised this question, and I have raised it, too, about having some witnesses in Executive Session.

What would be the committee's view about asking one or more of the three Americans, Harrison Salisbury, Harry S. Ashmore and

William C. Baggs, who have been in North Vietnam, to come to executive session and answer questions and brief the committee?

Are you interested or not? I can have them with coffee, without it, or does the committee wish to have it as an informal executive session without any publicity?

Senator PELL. As one member I would strongly support it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who are the three?

The CHAIRMAN. The three who have been there—Salisbury, Baggs and Ashmore. One is a former editor who is now working for the center, but Baggs is the editor of a Florida paper. Salisbury is on the New York Times. Ashmore has been on various papers, but is not presently on a paper. They are all newspapermen.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why do you want them in executive session?

Senator MORSE. Why in executive session?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not care, but if you want it in open—

Senator MORSE. If you want them in executive session for security reasons, that is something else.

The CHAIRMAN. I was personally curious to hear their reports and details, and minor details that they have not had in their reports. I have read what has been in the paper, but these are the only Americans of this caliber—there have been Women's Strikes for Peace, and so on, that I thought they might not have quite the same attitude.

Senator COOPER. A minister.

The CHAIRMAN. These people are trained observers. Regardless that their views may be on policy, they are observers, and I would be interested in hearing them. I want to know if the whole committee is interested, and should I ask for a—I can have either kind, whatever the committee wishes.

WITNESSES SCHEDULED TO APPEAR

Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask what witnesses you have scheduled to appear.

The CHAIRMAN. In open?

Senator LAUSCHE. There are certain witnesses that will take one side. Those names I have seen scheduled. Now, what witnesses do you have other than the State Department representatives who will take the side affirming what is being done in South Vietnam now?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I don't know what side these people are going to take on that. The only two that are firmly set are for next Monday and Tuesday, Kennan and Reischauer.

Senator CASE. George Kennan?

The CHAIRMAN. George Kennan, and former Ambassador Reischauer. They are both former ambassadors.

Senator LAUSCHE. Outside of the State witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. We have asked the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State agreed to come yesterday, but then, you know about that, he wrote a letter and requested it be changed from that hearing to the one we had. He still is in the position of coming at a later date, and McNamara has asked to be delayed until after he had finished his other hearing.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is not an answer to my question. You have outsiders. Kennan, I know how he will testify.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I do not.

DO THEY SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION?

Senator LAUSCHE. But what outsiders are there that you can know in advance they are supporting the government's position? We have not—

The CHAIRMAN. I do not ask them, any of them, are they going to support the government's position. In fact, Mr. Reischauer is not testifying directly. I cannot control what he testifies to because I cannot control the committee's questions, but it is generally on our relations with the Far East, Japan and—well, the Far East. He has been a long-time scholar of China.

Senator LAUSCHE. Bill, may I suggest that you hold this over until tomorrow's meeting, the decision on these three men.

The CHAIRMAN. On Salisbury, Ashmore and Baggs?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. I may want to offer other names to come in.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this is certainly not intended to be exclusive. These are just people who have been there.

Senator LAUSCHE. We can decide the whole thing tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, these other hearings, there are several other names that are under consideration that have not been invited yet.

Senator LAUSCHE. Who are they?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Alf Landon is one of them who I think might be—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When did Alf come back from South Vietnam?

A BROADER SERIES OF HEARINGS THAN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. This is not on South Vietnam alone. These hearings, as I have tried to make very plain in the paper, are not just hearings on South Vietnam. They are on the overall general position of the United States in the present world.

Now, some of them will be asked questions about Vietnam. But yesterday, much to my surprise, nobody asked the Secretary of State any questions on Vietnam, and it might be the same with other witnesses, but it is much broader, a much broader series of hearings than just Vietnam.

But, as I say, I cannot guarantee that people won't ask about Vietnam. If they want to they can ask anything they like.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think it was a good thing nobody opened the thing up.

The CHAIRMAN. It was all right with me. But when you say Vietnam, the subject matter with Kennan is not Vietnam. Now, you may ask him about Vietnam. The subject matter is the relations of this country with the Communist world. He has long experience in this area, and if you want to ask him about Vietnam, all right. But you do not have to.

My main interest with Kennan is what is his attitude about how our relations with Russia, in particular, and the Communist world in general as they are developing, and what is our policy. Is it promoting it or not.

OTHER WITNESSES

Senator LAUSCHE. You mentioned Alf Landon. Who else?

The CHAIRMAN. He is one who Senator Carlson—

Senator CARLSON. I want to say this for Alf Landon. We had a lecture series started under his name at Kansas University. We are going to have some outstanding people following him in the last two or three months. Alf made an excellent statement, and some day I want to put it in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. I read it, and I want to endorse what you are saying. I thought it was a remarkably intelligent piece.

Senator CARLSON. I have asked Governor Landon about coming back here, and he called me just before I came back to Washington that he has had a bad back problem. I hope the Chairman won't invite him until later.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course it would have to be at his convenience.

Senator CASE. I would like to ask for one more. I would like to hear McGeorge Bundy.

Senator PELL. How about General Curtis Le May, to get another view, and an extreme view. I think it might be interesting.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He is no more extreme on his side than some of these people.

Senator PELL. That is what I am saying.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We are asking a bunch of extremists to come in here.

The CHAIRMAN. I sent a letter the other day asking the ranking minority member for suggestions of who he wanted for witnesses.

Senator LAUSCHE. Who else?

FORMER CIA AGENT

The CHAIRMAN. There is another who came to see me. This is in the Executive record—I would just throw it out for your consideration. An unusual fellow as far as I am concerned, and I never heard of him before, but he was born in Korea. He came here in 1930. He is a naturalized American, and he spent 20 years as a CIA agent largely in research, but he is in the CIA, or he was in the CIA, from 1946 to 1965. I have never before run into a man with this kind of particular experience, and he is a Korean by birth, but an American by naturalization.

I was going to raise him just because I thought you would find him interesting; I did, because I never had seen a fellow with this kind of experience.

Senator MCCARTHY. Can former CIA members talk to this committee?

The CHAIRMAN. I asked about this. He asked to see me; I never heard of the fellow. He wrote me a letter a month ago and asked to come and talk to me. His name is Chowe.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is his name?

The CHAIRMAN. Chowe. Anyway, there are a number of people of this kind. I think the fellow was very interesting. He can give you a different slant on many different things. He does not undertake to say you are right or wrong in Vietnam. I did not ask him about that. I asked him about a lot of other things. He volunteered them.

As a matter of fact, he came and volunteered the story about a great deal of information I had never heard about in the CIA.

Senator LAUSCHE. Hold these over until tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. These are not final decisions. I am asking for guidance. What I really wanted to know is, because the staff has to get in contact, whether the committee generally is interested in Salisbury because, if not, I do not want to invite him to the committee. If we have him at all I will have him to tea or lunch or something of that kind. That is all in the world I want to know. If you want him in open session and the committee feels that way, that is also possible.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move that we have these witnesses that the chairman has mentioned, and that the chairman and Senator Hickenlooper do as they did last year, serve as a screening committee for any additional witnesses that anyone may suggest, and that you two decide on the type of people to have and set the time.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not exclusive. If you want someone else, all you need to do is suggest him, Frank.

Senator LAUSCHE. I challenge the right to act on this at this time. We do not have a quorum.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know if that takes action, but that is all right. I was simply seeking the sentiment of the committee on these people.

[Whereupon, the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JANUARY 24, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:04 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Morse (subcommittee chairman), Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Cooper.

The meeting was held to discuss proposed amendments to the OAS charter and the current treaty negotiations with Panama, and also to discuss the prospects for the OAS summit meeting. Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary for American Republics Affairs, accompanied by John N. Irwin, Special Ambassador for negotiation of Panama Canal Treaty; Sol Linowitz, Ambassador to the OAS; and Robert F. Woodward, Assistant to Ambassador Irwin, appeared before the group.

For a record of the proceeding, see the official transcript.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 5:55 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 25, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 12:30 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.

The committee discussed whether to hold further hearings on Ex. D. 88/2, the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union. It was agreed that Mr. J. Edgar Hoover would be asked to come before the committee and also that time would be set aside to hear public witnesses.

William S. Gaud, Administrator of AID, accompanied by Daniel Steiner, William C. Gibbons, and Charles D. Paolitto, testified on the subject: "Presidential determination to increase the number of countries receiving development and technical assistance."

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.

[The committee adjourned at 1:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m. in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Gore (chairman of the subcommittee), Clark, Pell, and Aiken.

The subcommittee discussed the content of hearings to be held and possible witnesses.

For a record of the proceedings, see the official transcript.
[The subcommittee adjourned at 10:55 p.m.]

THE SITUATION IN INDONESIA

Monday, January 30, 1967

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—On September 30, 1965, junior level military officers staged a coup against the Indonesian high command, killing five generals and wounding the chief of staff, Gen. Abul Haris Nasution. Other military forces under Gen. Suharto suppressed the coup, blamed the uprising on the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), and set about eliminating it in a bloody counter-coup. President Achmed Sukarno, who had ruled Indonesia since 1945, remained in office following these events, but in January 1967, the Armed Forces Information Center published an article accusing Sukarno of complicity with the Communist plotters. The Provisional People's Consultative Congress investigated the charges and on March 12, 1967 removed Sukarno's executive and ceremonial powers, making Gen. Suharto the acting president.]

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:05 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Frank Lausche (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lausche, Fulbright, Sparkman, Mansfield, Gore, Pell, McCarthy, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, and Case.

Also Present: Senator McGee.

Carl Marcy and Norvill Jones of the committee staff.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think we might as well get started.

Mr. Green, this is a meeting of the members of the Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs, and such other senators who will appear.

We want to hear from you your observations on what the conditions are in Indonesia. If you will proceed with the presentation of your views, and later open yourself to questions, we will appreciate it.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE MARSHALL GREEN, UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO INDONESIA; ACCOMPANIED BY H.G. TORBERT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS

Ambassador GREEN. Thank you very much, Senator. I understand I am speaking in closed session or executive session.

Senator CARLSON. Yes.

Ambassador GREEN. Because I want to speak with candor.

Well, I think as Senator McGee will testify—he has just been out there—there has been a tremendous change around in the past year. I was confirmed in the next room here in June, 1965. I went out there the next month and at that time the whole country was slipping towards the Red camp. Some people thought it already had joined the Red camp.

Senator LAUSCHE. When was that?

Ambassador GREEN. That was July 21st that I arrived in Jakarta.

This was a time when they were stoning our consulates and Embassy and we were harassed at every turn. The communist power was growing. Sukarno on August 17, 1965, spoke about the Jakarta-Peking-Pyongyang-Hanoi axis. That is how far this thing had gone.

GREAT CHANGE IN ONE YEAR

Well, the whole situation, of course, as you know, has changed in the course of this past year due to events which I will come back to, and today the Communist Party in Indonesia has been banned. The relations with Peking are almost at a breaking point. In other words, they share our assessment of Peking's menace to that part of the world. They have ended the confrontation. They have rejoined the United Nations. They have rejoined all of these specialized agencies of the United Nations. They are participating actively in the new regional community in Southeast Asia and they are looking for good relations with all the countries that can help them.

Now, that means Eastern European countries as well as, of course, the Western countries and Japan. This has not been very easy in terms of their relations with the Soviet Union because they have banned the Communist Party. But the Soviets have helped them in the past, particularly in military assistance, and they hope to receive that assistance.

So this has been the great change that has taken place in one year.

I suppose that there is no place in the world in modern times where there has been such an abrupt shift around as there has been in Indonesia in the last year and a half. Certainly I say that on the basis of 23 years of working in the Far East.

Now, the big event that changed all this, as you know, was the abortive coup that was launched by the Communists and some of their friends on September 30, 1965.

COMMUNIST ALLIES

Senator LAUSCHE. When you say by some of the Communists, whom do you mean?

Ambassador GREEN. By the Communist Party, and I said some of their friends who were working on the outside.

Senator LAUSCHE. Who were they?

Ambassador GREEN. Well, for example, Subandrio, who is not a declared member of the Communist Party but, according to the trials that have taken place now, he was involved in this plot.

Senator LAUSCHE. Were there any other outside nations involved?

Ambassador GREEN. No. Well, Communist China may well have been involved. We have not proved it, But there is circumstantial evidence that points to involvement.

ABORTIVE COUP

Now, what happened in this abortive coup was that the PKI, which is the Communist Party, moved swiftly in an effort to kill the top seven generals. They succeeded in killing five of them two of them escaped, General Nasution and General Suharto. That was a mighty lucky thing because these two surviving generals moved fast and brought in the Siliwangi Division which is the local division up there in Bandung, and they suppressed the coup in the Jakarta area within a matter of days.

They then faced a tremendous task of how to move against the Communists who were all over the country. It was an enormously powerful party, as you know, the largest in the world outside of the Communist bloc or the Sino-Soviet countries, with the possible exception of Italy.

They face an enormous task, but they have proven themselves capable of meeting that challenge.

Now, in the course of the next month, month and a half, there now appears to have been a very bloody aftermath to this abortive coup. The pictures of the killed generals and how they were killed; the accounts of how they were tortured by the Women's Communist Organization; how their bodies had been heaved into the crocodile hole, which is up near the air base. These bodies then being exhumed. They were photographed and the photographs were sent all around the country and this touched off a very sharp wave of reaction in the local communities.

BLOODY AFTERMATH OF THE COUP

As a result of this, the Moslems and others moved against the local Communist organization, the farm levels and villages, not so much in the cities and towns. This all happened in the countryside and I estimated when I came back here in February that 300,000 people had been killed in this bloody aftermath, which had been many times the number that have been killed in South Vietnam since the war started. Since that time, I think we would up that estimate to perhaps close to 500,000 people that have been killed in this aftermath. Of course, nobody knows. We merely judge it by whole villages that have been depopulated.

The Island of Bali, for example, which is a small island, 4,000 square miles, there were about perhaps 100,000 people that were killed there alone. There was something of a holy war reaction. In the case of Bali, it is not Moslem. It is Hindu. But they had a religious way of life. The Communists tried to secularize it and this was the reaction of the people once they realized the Communists were on the run and the army was on their side.

In the case of East Java, it was the reaction of the Moslems more than any other religious group that resulted in this decimation. So the military had definitely gained the upper hand. It squashed the Communist coup effort and by November and December they were really in a position to take over the reins of government.

THE PROBLEM OF SUKARNO

However, they had counted on President Sukarno moving over either on to their side or keeping quiet, moving into the background.

But Sukarno at that time more or less thumbed his nose in their face and has been doing it ever since. So they were then faced with the problem, are we going to move against Sukarno and all the people that support Sukarno—you know, he has been called the George Washington of Indonesia—or are we going to move against him with all the consequences that might be entailed in a civil war?

They decided they would not do so. They still hoped that the President could be brought around. Well, he wasn't. And the minute that Sukarno realized that Nasution and Suharto were not going to move against him, he was then emboldened to come back and begin to get back some more of his friends into the top places of government. As a matter of fact, in February of 1966, he dismissed Gene Suharto and he named one of the worst cabinets in Indonesia. Of course, there are no Communists, but it is nevertheless one of the worst cabinets that has ever been named in Indonesia. This started off, touched off, the large scale student demonstrations. Where there have been hundreds and thousands before, you know, there were tens thousands that were out on the street and that atmosphere.

SUHARTO GIVEN SPECIAL POWERS

Then Suharto went to President Sukarno and said: I cannot be held responsible for the security of this country unless you give me broad responsibilities for handling all security matters in this country. He was given those special powers by Sukarno who had no choice.

Since that time, Suharto has broadly interpreted these powers to run the country and he has done it just that way. The only thing he hasn't done is that he has not moved abruptly against President Sukarno. He has pressured him. He has reduced his powers. He has chipped away his power base and he has done it very successfully, but he hasn't totally eliminated it.

Well, we are faced today with I would say two principal problems, one on the political side and one on the economic side.

POWER STRUGGLE CONTINUES

On the political side is this power struggle that continues, or you could rephrase it, the problem of what to do with President Sukarno. His power is going down and down and I just saw a news ticker that indicates that the palace is surrounded with students at this moment. What they are going to do, I don't know. They apparently have switched the guards. This may be for the President's own protection rather than they are going to take any sudden movement against him. I do not think that General Suharto will move abruptly against the President, to arrest him or to exile him or to shoot him or anything like that. I think he will continue to pursue what he calls the constitutional course of action to get the MPRS, which is their super Parliament, to pass some kind of law against the President or to take some action against the President by impeachment, but he is not going to act outside the constitutional framework.

The reason I think partly is because he wants to avoid civil strife. He doesn't want to start a tradition of coups and counter-

coups. He wants to establish as far as possible the constitutional base and preserve that tradition in his country.

SUKARNO IS A COMMON TARGET

But also I think that Suharto has been very wily. He realizes that as long as the President is around, that he becomes the target of the students, of their army, of the intelligentsia, of the commercial groups. He is the common target and this keeps the new order, as we might call the group around General Suharto—it keeps them together with a common focus. He can also make a scapegoat of the President. As long as he is around, everybody is critical of Sukarno for being responsible for the economic chaos of the country and this, of course, has happened. So he has his reasons for handling the job the way he does.

In any event, the retention of Sukarno, although it does involve a number of problems, has not prevented the new government from moving ahead and doing the things that are required in the circumstances. He has been a drag. He has pulled the clock back sometimes, but the clock nevertheless has moved forward and a lot of things have been changed in Indonesia, almost all of them for the better.

QUESTION OF STABILIZATION

This raises the second major problem that is facing Indonesia today, and that is the question of stabilization. The economic chaos left by 10 or 15 years of Sukarno's jingoism was one of the worst that I know of in modern history. They were left with a debt of \$2.7 billion, about half of that owed to the Soviet Union, about \$200 million or so owed to the United States.

Of course, there are a lot of other creditor countries as well. The infrastructure of the country had deteriorated during this time. The roads, railroads, airlines are in miserable shape. Only about 30 percent of the shipping tonnage is operable today. Meanwhile, the cost of living has shot way up under runaway inflation.

Between mid-1965 and mid-1966 the cost of living went up 20 times, 2,000 percent.

Senator LAUSCHE. Since when?

Ambassador GREEN. In that one year's time, between the middle of 1965 and the middle of 1966, the cost of living went up 20 times. The money inflated in that same period by 7½ times. The exports which had been \$800 million a year back in 1965 had all slumped down to about \$500 million a year in 1965, over that 10-year span. Everything was running downhill. It was one of the few countries in the Far East, that and Burma, I guess, where there has been a deterioration in the per capita or GNP over the last 10 years.

So this is the situation that General Suharto inherited.

Now, he had the wisdom to turn to a group of first-rate economists who worked in the University of Indonesia. All of them I would say had been trained in the United States, three of them at the University of California, one at Harvard—he overcame that handicap. I went to Yale. And one from MIT.

Now, these men are all first-rate economists. They gave him sound advice on how to approach the problem. One of the things they urged was that Indonesia should rejoin the International Mon-

etary Fund and IBRD. They should get a team of IMF men out there to help out with their problems. This would be a sure way to restoring some confidence in Indonesia in the international banking and governmental circles.

So Suharto turned to these people. They drew up a stabilization plan and I say that plan has been a first-rate plan in every sense of the word.

STABILIZATION MEANS HARDSHIP

Now, this is not easy to accomplish because stabilization means hardship. It means stringencies and it always is accompanied by a certain political risk, particularly with Sukarno around, where he might be able to take advantage of the objections and feelings of the people and their political leaders. But that has not happened. The stabilization plan that calls for a balanced budget in calendar 1967 has passed the Parliament without any objections. They have instituted the plan now and, as a result of it, prices of foodstuffs have been level for the last 3½ months, even though—

Senator LAUSCHE. I think we had better go upstairs.

Senator SPARKMAN. This is a roll call. We will be back in just a few minutes.

[A short recess was taken.]

WILL SUKARNO BE TRIED?

Senator SPARKMAN. Is there any likelihood that Sukarno will be tried?

Ambassador GREEN. He will be tried in a certain sense. He may be tried in a certain sense by the MPRS which is sort of the super parliament, constituent assembly, in March. Whether, as I say, it will be impeachment proceedings or censure, whether it will be calling for the resignation of the President, whether it will be a call for his exile or not, no one knows. Nobody knows what action will be taken.

A SOUND PLAN FOR STABILIZATION

Senator LAUSCHE. You were discussing the economic situation, I think when we left.

Ambassador GREEN. Yes, I am not sure exactly at what point I broke off, but I was describing the fact that General Suharto had turned to a group of good economists as well as to the International Monetary Fund for advice. They came up with a sound plan for stabilization. They moved ahead with their plan, as a result of which the cost of food has stabilized. The cost of textiles has actually gone down. Some other costs have gone up. But that was anticipated because they were withdrawing subsidies—electricity, transportation—and, of course, that was passed on to the consumer. That was all part of the stabilization plan.

Anyway, we think they are doing very well on this plan, moving ahead in a determined way, and obviously this relates very directly to whether or not other countries are going to be able to assist Indonesia, because people do not want to put money into any economy where it just goes down the rat hole of inflation.

INDONESIANS NEED DEBT RELIEF

Now, assuming that the Indonesians continue to manage their economy well and there is the right managerial follow-through, which is always uncertain, they are still going to be dependent upon whether or not they can get adequate debt relief because, as I said, they built up this huge debt of \$2.7 billion. If you service that debt in one year, that would be almost as much as their total foreign exchange earnings for that year. Therefore, they obviously have got to reschedule the whole debt.

They have had meetings now, in Tokyo, in Paris, another one in Amsterdam. There seems to be general agreement among the Western creditors' group—that includes the United States, Japan, Holland, Germany, France, Italy, a number of other countries—that Indonesia should be given rather sweeping, almost standstill debt relief this coming year.

Senator AIKEN. Private creditors, too?

Ambassador GREEN. The private credit has not yet been resolved, but presumably it will be along the same lines. Then at the end of this year, calendar 1967, there will be another meeting to see whether or not it has to be extended. It probably will. Meanwhile they will resolve the future long-range debt by rescheduling over a longer period of time.

Now, no one knows what the East European group will do, but it looks as though they will be giving them liberal debt relief as well. Therefore, if all goes according to Hoyle, as it seems to be going, that problem will be satisfactorily resolved.

In addition to that, even if they get virtually total debt relief this year, this calendar year, they are going to need something between \$170 million and \$300 million—let us say \$225 million of new net foreign aid in order to balance their budget. And our approach to this problem is that we want to be sure, first of all, that there is a liberal debt relief and, secondly, with regard to net aid, that other countries do their fair share.

Now, what fair share is I don't know. But we will be talking in Amsterdam at the end of February about the general principles of future assistance. We will not probably go into a pledging session with them, but we will talk about the general principles that will guide us.

So those are the two main problems—the political and the economic problems.

THE COMMUNIST MENACE IN ASIA

I think sometimes that our focus is so much on the immediate problem, let us say on the Communist menace in some countries, or in the case of Asia, how you deal with Sukarno, that if you were to remove that immediate problem you would have beyond it another range of mountains. It would be a big and vast one and, in the case of Indonesia, once this problem of Sukarno is out of the way and stabilization programs move ahead satisfactorily, there will still be a lot of problems.

The whole question of how you bring a traditional society into the modern age is involved here, problems of corruption and nepo-

tism, what we call baptism, which is the adulation of a man like Sukarno, a charismatic personality.

The problem of how to reach agreement—*mushiwara*—people talking back and forth and reaching a consensus, which is fine in the village council, but in the modern state is a rather painstaking, lengthy process. All those problems.

THE CIVILIAN-MILITARY MIX

How is the new government going to establish a political base when two or three of the major parties now outlawed—how are they going to get back on the political scene? Will they become a part of the political base of this new government under General Suharto? The problems of how—what kind of a mix between civilians and military should you have in the government? These are all parts of this overall problem of moving from the traditional into a modern state.

Now, if I could just touch on one of those problems, the problem of the civilian-military mix, this is a military government in many ways. General Suharto is the First Minister and he is obviously calling the signals. But he is drawing on the advice, as I just pointed out, now in the economic field of these economic specialists at the University of Indonesia and on outside consultants.

General Suharto also turns to Adam Malik who is the Foreign Minister and head of the political section of the government. Adam Malik is in my opinion one of the outstanding leaders in East Asia today. There are other good civilian leaders, too.

So what we have today is the best carburetorization between the civilian and military, just about the right mix, because the military are just enough involved in the government—it is not a junta government—just enough involved so that they take a responsible attitude towards the total operations of the government. Yet they are not so far in the government that they have taken it over and monopolized it themselves and have excluded good civilians which, of course, would lose for them the support of the students, the intellectuals, and some of the commercial types.

Now, there are nevertheless problems, of course, for a government made up of civilians and military this way when you run into difficulties in the economic front, or when some of the politicians talk out of turn that oppose you. There is a natural temptation for military leaders to try to suppress the civilian segments. I don't think that General Suharto will do that. I think he recognizes the importance of maintaining this kind of mix that I just referred to now. So far these three leading men—we call them the *Triumvirate*—made up of General Suharto, General Nasution and Adam Malik, and the Sultan of Djogjakarta, make a good team indeed and General Suharto has the wide respect as a leader. Malik commands widespread admiration for his tactical brilliance and for how to get things done as well as for his general views and philosophy. I think the Sultan of Djogjakarta is widely liked if not beloved because he comes from central Java where indeed most of the resistance to the modernization takes place and where President Sukarno has most of his strength.

Senator AIKEN. He speaks for industry.

Ambassador GREEN. He does, indeed, and he is a very nice gentleman and I think anyone here would agree. Together they make up a very good team, I think.

QUALITIES OF THE NEW LEADERS

As far as our overall—I must just say one more thing about this team. One of the qualities that seems to me that they all have in common is that they are working for the country and not for themselves. In general, President Sukarno, if he is ever held up in the judgment of history, it will seem to me his greatest failing was that he was out for his own glory, a policy of self-glorification, and the people were the victims of this policy. These people are approaching their tasks not for their own personal gain, but for the gain of the country.

Another thing about them is determination. Because there had been so many people killed in this last year or two in Indonesia, and because in a way there is a terrible retribution if the Communists or their friends ever get back again, they are more determined that they have to succeed. Human survival is at stake here.

Another quality it seems to me is moderation, pragmatism. I have seen the same thing throughout East Asia in the last few years. It has been the movement from the ideological attachment of the first generation of revolutionary leaders to the modernists who are basically pragmatists and are concerned with the problems of modernization and development as opposed to the problems of a country winning its independence. This country has gained its independence now.

These are qualities of leadership and to me they are very important ones. They are men we can talk with and deal with reasonably.

U.S. POLICIES TOWARD INDONESIA

Now, as far as our own policies towards Indonesia are concerned, basically we believe exactly what the Indonesian leadership believes in. We believe in the unity of Indonesia. I started right out with that because there has been some question in the past. We believe in the unity. We believe in the progress and stability, political-economic stability, of Indonesia. These are basic policies. Those, of course, are the policies of the new government, too, and when we say why do Indonesians and Americans get along, it seems to me one of the basic reasons we get along with the new government is we are basically attached to the same objectives and principles.

I think if I may say so, as a matter of personal judgment, very privately, of course, I think they appreciate what we are doing in Vietnam. Certainly they are deadly opposed to the Communists and they are opposed to Peking's policies. As far as the policies for carrying out these broad objectives are concerned, obviously they need assistance badly as I have just said.

It falls principally in the economic sector. And also I think certain civic actions support, not with lethal weapons, but for certain spare parts and other things to help them get with the civic action program. These are going to be involved.

Now, we have a great opportunity in Indonesia because we started with the tabula rasa—all the aid was practically wound up—of trying to approach our problems on as broad a multilateral basis as possible. This may not be possible the first year or the second year, but because we are already talking with these other creditor group countries in Tokyo, Paris, now Amsterdam, and since you have to approach the whole problem of the debt rescheduling and further assistance, really it is one single problem. We are getting more and more agreement on the principles involved in assistance to Indonesia and we want Indonesia to come up with the help of the International Monetary Fund, again part, you might say, of a multilateral approach, with what are indeed their most urgent needs, have these things carefully reviewed by the INF, and then these things put up to the other countries so they can decide in what ways they can assist Indonesia in the most meaningful way possible.

I am very hopeful that this approach will work. If we do, I think we can avoid lots of the troubles and pitfalls of the past.

A SENSE OF MISSION

I mentioned specific action just now. It seems to me that there is particular relevance to the needs for civil action programs in Indonesia because the military have all this knowhow. They have all this equipment, and, of course, they have the authority as well.

Meanwhile they have ended confrontation. They had to mothball almost all this fleet they have got from the Soviet Union and a result of all that is that a lot of officers are without jobs. It is important that they have a sense of mission and that the mission relates the needs of the people, and they have turned to us and asked us for help in that regard. I have discussed this thing in Washington. I think there is increasing recognition of the importance of helping them out on a low-cost, high-impact program, especially in central and Eastern Java where most of the people live.

I might say that 70 percent of the Indonesian people live on the island of Java which you can see is but a small slice of the geography of the vast sprawling country, larger than the rest of Southeast Asia put together. And I think that we will have other advantages as well, tactical advantages, in our personal relationships with the military and of helping preserve the same kinds of approach and attitude.

Well, if I could just wind up because I know you have lots of questions, Senator. I just wanted to end up by saying, as I said to you in the beginning before some of your colleagues arrived, it has been a tremendous year and a half of transition and the transition in my opinion has been almost uniformly for the good: the confrontation over; the rejoining of the United Nations; the launching of what so far has been an effective stabilization program; the banning of communism from Indo-China and, of course, it has problems, as I said, with their relations with the Soviet Union and for the overall; the new leadership and qualities of the new leaders; for those things I think we have much to be thankful. I think we have a good group we can work with. I don't think there is any group we can expect on the present scene or in the predictable future that will be as good as this one. I hope we will be able to give them the

requisite help, along with other countries, doing it as much as possible with this multilateral approach that I know you have discussed in this committee.

AMBASSADOR'S ARRIVAL IN INDONESIA

Senator LAUSCHE. Thank you. I just want to put a few questions to inform those members who were not present when you began to testify about what you said.

What is the significance of July 21st that you mentioned?

Ambassador GREEN. That is simply the date I arrived in Indonesia, having been confirmed in the next room.

Senator CASE. What could be more pertinent?

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, then, you stated there was a tremendous and miraculous change between what you saw when you came and what the condition is now.

Ambassador GREEN. For which I bear no responsibility.

CHINESE-INDONESIAN AXIS

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, then, you spoke about an axis. The Peking-Hanoi—

Ambassador GREEN. Pyongyang-Jakarta axis.

Senator LAUSCHE. And that was in the making.

Ambassador GREEN. Sukarno announced this on August 17, 1965. He said that we had this axis. I am not sure it was ever worked out in any formal way, but he was boasting that there was such an axis.

Senator LAUSCHE. Peking-Hanoi,—

Ambassador GREEN. The axis actually had five countries involved. Indonesia, China, Red China, North Vietnam, North Korea, and Cambodia. But I might say he never consulted Cambodia and Monsignor was quite angry when he heard about it.

Senator LAUSCHE. That was the axis that was being discussed.

Ambassador GREEN. He announced it when Chen Yi was there as his distinguished advisor.

INDONESIAN COUP

Senator LAUSCHE. When did the coup occur?

Ambassador GREEN. September 30, in the wee hours of the morning. Actually, October 1st.

Senator LAUSCHE. And the object of the coup was to eliminate the seven military leaders.

Ambassador GREEN. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. They eliminated five, but two survived?

Ambassador GREEN. Correct.

Senator LAUSCHE. And the survival of the two produced this encouraging situation that now prevails.

Ambassador GREEN. If two generals had not survived, Nasution and Suharto, it is possible that no one would have moved rapidly and quashed the coup.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, then, after that they took pictures of the hideous brutalities that were committed upon these five.

Ambassador GREEN. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And the nation became informed about it and with that there was seething indignation and a purpose to eliminate the Communists. You estimate 300,000 were killed. The present calculation is that there were 500,000.

Ambassador GREEN. Some people think there were 500,000. Some think there were more. Some think less. But I would up my estimate from 300,000.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, there was economic chaos produced by Sukarno leaving a debt of \$2,700 million.

Ambassador GREEN. Right.

Senator LAUSCHE. The nations who are creditors have extended the time of the payment of debts, but in addition to that, there is need of \$225 million of new foreign aid.

Ambassador GREEN. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. And it is a purpose that that foreign aid may be provided by us and other nations of the world.

Now, all right. Mike?

Senator MANSFIELD. I have no questions.

U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA

Senator SPARKMAN. Just a question. Is there any military included in that request? Military assistance?

Ambassador GREEN. In that figure of \$225 million? No, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Does Indonesia look for military assistance?

Ambassador GREEN. It does.

Senator SPARKMAN. Ought we to give it?

Ambassador GREEN. Now, I must correct my statement. When I said \$225 million, if you are including in that figure assistance from the Soviet Union as well, which I believe it would be, the Indonesians would like to get some spare parts for military equipment that they had already received from the Soviet bloc. So that would be part of it. But not a major part, a small part.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, let me ask you—

Senator CASE. In this \$225 million calculation—is that overall or just for—

Ambassador GREEN. That is overall. And that \$225 million, as I say, I was hitting between two outside figures of \$160 million to \$300 million, something in that range. But \$225 million would be acceptable.

ROLE OF GEN. NASUTION

Senator SPARKMAN. We used to hear a good bit about a man named Nasution.

Ambassador GREEN. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. What has happened to him?

Ambassador GREEN. General Nasution, who was one of the two surviving generals—

Senator SPARKMAN. Is he one that you named?

Ambassador GREEN. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. He and Suharto were the two that survived.

Ambassador GREEN. That is right. But Suharto has moved out into the No. 1 position and General Nasution is the president of this MPRS, constituent assembly, or super Parliament, whatever you want to call it.

Senator LAUSCHE. John, may I ask him to redescribe what they showed to the people of the country that infuriated them into taking the lives of these 300,000. You spoke about the bodies and the alligator pits and so on.

Ambassador GREEN. Yes. What had happened was that these murdered generals—there were five of them—one or two had been shot and killed right at the beginning, but three of them at least were not dead when they picked them up. They took them up to the Halim Air Base and there these three surviving generals were tortured to death, slashed slowly to death by Gerwani, which is the Communist women's organization. When their lacerated bodies, which meanwhile had been dumped into the crocodile hole which is the name of sort of a pit down there, when they had been exhumed three or four days later, the army saw to it that pictures of this grisly scene were widely publicized all around the country. Meanwhile, in the countryside where the village folk had been living under the increasing pressures of the Communists, the atmosphere was already one of dry tinder and this was the spark that lit the whole thing and sent it into such violent conflagration.

Senator SPARKMAN. Some of General Nasution's children were killed.

Ambassador GREEN. His daughter was killed, and this is very material, Senator, because this produced something of an emotional reaction. This little girl was an innocent victim, shot to death.

Senator LAUSCHE. Frank?

FOREIGN AID TO INDONESIA

Senator CARLSON. Just one or two questions. How much foreign aid are we giving now, if any?

Ambassador GREEN. We are.

Senator CARLSON. Grants in aid and loans?

Ambassador GREEN. We are giving the Indonesians about \$48 million or \$49 million in P.L. 480, Title V assistance. These are dollar sales.

This represents mostly cotton, 225,000 bales plus 100,000 tons of rice. This already has been agreed to. All of it hasn't arrived yet, but most of it is there by now.

In addition to that, there is \$10 million in a spare parts loan again, to be repaid in 20 years, I believe.

In addition to that, maybe there is a million dollars or so in grant assistance for educational purposes as well as for a food-for-work program which is really grant in aid, although it is provided in the form of cracked corn and vegetable oil.

REASONS FOR SOVIET AID

Senator CARLSON. In view of the fact that so many of the Communists were killed during the blood bath, how can we expect the Soviet Union to give aid or continue to give aid?

Ambassador GREEN. Because they have put such a tremendous investment in Asia I suppose they want it covered. It is a terribly important country, the fifth largest in the world. Some people say the third richest in the world. And the Soviets have, as I pointed out, invested \$1.4 billion in aid. They want to cover that.

Also I think they are hopeful that in the long run there will be a recovery of the Communist Party. Meanwhile they damn the Chinese for having driven the Communist Party in this direction and they sort of damn us in a very faint way for being imperialists, and maybe we are getting in too close with the new government. They keep making rumbles on this from Moscow, but I think if I were in the Soviet position, I would be acting very much the way they do.

Now, they are obviously deeply perplexed. It is not easy for them to give assistance to Indonesia when Indonesia is banning the Communist Party.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT WELCOME

One thing I would like to mention, Mr. Chairman, is that one of the things the new government is welcoming is foreign investment. This is another 180 degree change in policy. The first conversation I had with General Suharto on May 27, 1966, he raised the question of how they were going to develop the outer islands. I said I felt private investment, foreign investment, was the soundest way. There wasn't that kind of money. The government didn't have that kind of money. Well, not as a result of that, but I merely mention it, this was the first time the subject was discussed with the General. Now they have changed their foreign investment policy to attract foreign capital investment, as a result of which the Hotel Indonesia is jam packed with potential foreign investors out there looking into the possibilities.

Meanwhile, the law has been changed to favor foreign investment and protect foreign investors, and they have discovered, they think, oil in the Java Sea, no point deeper than 180 feet, and if this oil finding turns out to be what they think it is, maybe a second Gulf of Mexico.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mike.

Senator MANSFIELD. Nothing.

Senator LAUSCHE. Karl?

RELATIONS BETWEEN SUHARTO AND NASUTION

Senator MUNDT. Curiously enough, of all places, we have a lot of South Dakota businessmen out in Indonesia. How they ever found it I don't know, but I have been in close touch with them and they are pretty high on this Nasution. They seem to feel that if elections were held, he might wind up as the President, as the best counter against the Communists rather than Suharto, a fine fellow and honest, but who doesn't seem to have the outgoing personality that appeals to the masses.

Would you comment on that?

Ambassador GREEN. General Nasution has a bit of this charisma quality maybe, and certainly Mrs. Nasution does, too. They are both highly popular. But I think there is no question that General Suharto is very much the man the people are looking to these days for leadership, that General Nasution has been in charge of the army many years and he is senior in the army ranks. The relation between Suharto and Nasution is good. Nasution comes from Sumatro for one thing, and Suharto comes from Java. Since 70 percent of the people come from Java, this is an important factor.

I would hope very much that Nasution and Suharto could continue their harmonious relationship. It is productive, helpful. One thing Nasution has lost a bit of standing with students for is because in November–December, 1965, when he was in charge, he stood back from facing down Sukarno. Then Sukarno dismissed him in the cabinet shift of February 23, 1966, and that was quite a blow to his prestige. He recovered a good deal of that prestige. He is more outspoken in his opposition to Sukarno than is Suharto.

COULD SUKARNO RETURN TO POWER

Senator MUNDT. Can you envision any contingency whereby Sukarno might get back into power?

Ambassador GREEN. Oh, I could. It is conceivable that he could come back if their whole stabilization program should go on the rocks and they couldn't make a go of things, and if the new order, as they call the group around General Suharto, was not able to maintain the unity, which is terribly important. If things began to slip up, then Sukarno might look pretty good in retrospect. So that there is a possibility of coming back.

I think the chances are definitely against him, but I don't think we should rule it out.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will you tell Senator Mundt what you stated a moment ago about there being a bit of craftiness in the operation of Suharto in allowing Sukarno to still remain in the picture.

Ambassador GREEN. Yes. His reason for keeping Sukarno on is partly this. He doesn't want to risk civil war, although I don't think that that would be the result of moving sharply against Sukarno today. Nevertheless, that has been one reason, partly because Sukarno was the old commander-in-chief, the George Washington of Indonesia, as they always say.

But I think it is also because he wanted to use Sukarno as a scapegoat, to have him there so that he could be the focus of resentment. After all, he is the man who is responsible for this mess. Leave him on and people are reminded of that fact. If he goes in exile, by this time people might be criticizing the new government for some of the problems which really are described as Sukarno's folly.

Also you maintain better unity in what you call the new order, which is made up of rather disparate forces like the military and the students, the business community, if they have a common target and they are all against Sukarno, most of them. This helps to make unity.

So I think in his rather clever Javanese way Suharto has handled this thing quite well. But, you know, you can't go on playing that game forever. There comes a time when your administration can suffer, you might say almost from tired—when you have to spend so much time putting out the fire Sukarno lights, hand-holding, going to palace functions which are interminable, and also because students begin to get pretty angry if you haven't moved against him in a final way.

It is also confusing to the outside world—I have been around the country just now talking with a lot of people—that Sukarno is lingering on this way. It does confuse a lot of people as to what the new Indonesia adds up to.

Senator MUNDT. That is all.
 Senator LAUSCHE. Al.

STUDENT ORGANIZATIONS

Senator GORE. Well, Mr. Ambassador, you speak of the students in the sense of organization, of unity. Is this a rabble or is there some organization in this?

Ambassador GREEN. The students are extremely well organized, not throughout the country but in the West Java area and some of the other main population centers of Indonesia. They are very well organized. There are two principal organizations, the Kami—not our kind of Commies—these are the university students, and the Kappi which are the high school students.

These two groups are very violently anti-Sukarno and anti-Communist, and so forth. You will find slogans put out by the students that are the same throughout the country on the same day, which shows you how well they are organized.

They are in close touch with General Suharto and the military. They have been working very closely with him. They haven't always agreed. Sometimes they are restrictive, but I would say they had acted in a very responsible way so far. They haven't been a rabble.

Now, there are other students that aren't members of these groups, particularly in a place like Surabaya, Eastern Java, that are under the domination of other elements that are against the Kami. But the Kami and Kappi, these two huge student organizations, nevertheless represent the increasing view of the student population of Indonesia and today command good slice of the student population's support.

A VOLATILE ELEMENT

Senator GORE. The reason I asked the question, we see "the students" in many parts of the world being propagandized and utilized. It seems to be a very volatile element and might be a source of danger as well as strength.

Ambassador GREEN. Suharto recognizes that very point. He doesn't want to have Parliament in the streets. He recognizes the students' feelings, on the other hand. This is one of the reasons why Suharto has wanted to move in a constitutional way. This is a very important consideration, that he wants to have enough forward motion against Sukarno and his ilk to chip away from their power and debase them eventually, but he wants to do it in a constitutional way, partly so that the students don't get the idea that this is the way to change governments.

Senator GORE. Of course, we see another example of students, youth, in the Red Guard in Red China. Now, they can be put to evil as well as good purposes.

About two or three years ago, Mr. Ambassador, we were told in executive session that we had continued small amounts of military aid to the military leaders largely to keep liaison with them, that several of this group that were liquidated had received their military education in the United States, and that this aid at the proper and crucial time might prove to have been very valuable to us.

Can you shed any light on that now?

PARTICIPANTS TRAINING PROGRAM

Ambassador GREEN. I think our Participants Training Program in the past has been very useful. There were about, oh, I guess, 8,000 or so Indonesian students in the United States, and this included several thousand of the military. And I do think this had a very important result. As I look back over our old aid program, it wasn't so bad after all. In fact, we did a pretty good job, I think. And there were some scatteration projects and all that kind of stuff. But one area where we did the best of all is in the human resources field, training of people.

Senator SPARKMAN. One of those—

Ambassador GREEN. This would be the Participants Training Program bringing people under either our AID program, or under the State Department Cultural Program, or under the Military Assistance Program.

Senator SPARKMAN. One of those hangover programs was also one of communications which I believe served a good end with the Armed Forces.

Ambassador GREEN. Yes, that is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. During the revolution.

PHILCO COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM

Senator LAUSCHE. Speak on that because they came before us specially in this room—

Senator SPARKMAN. To continue it.

Senator LAUSCHE [continuing]. Urging that we provide them with money to install a communications system which was presented to us as being essential to keeping a line in Indonesia. You know of what I speak?

Ambassador GREEN. I know exactly what you are referring to. You are referring—you are talking about the Philco Troposcatter System. Well, this system—I am not enough of a specialist to judge this one. This is up to the Indonesians to judge on their own account.

The trouble with Philco was it was very expensive and it would take a long, long time to build it. There may be cheaper and better ways of building a communications network for Indonesia. I grant that the building of a good communications network is essential and it is true that the link that was already established under Philco between Jakarta and Bandung was a fairly important factor in the quick reaction of these two surviving generals.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is the point.

Senator GORE. Yes. So overall you say—

Ambassador GREEN. But I think you have to be careful on this one because there are other kinds of communications networks. Some of them may be considerably cheaper and more within the means of the Indonesians to support.

CONTINUATION OF U.S. AID

Senator GORE. To come back to the overall question of aid, is it your conclusion that the continuation of U.S. aid programs even in miniscule amounts had considerable significance ultimately in the showdown?

Ambassador GREEN. I think that the aid program which we had of \$800 million of U.S. assistance—maybe in the 10 or 12 year period up until 1965—I think it was a good aid program by and large. There were some things that obviously weren't as good, but by and large it was a good aid program. The Indonesians knew it and today in retrospect it looks darn good because out of the \$800 million that we gave Indonesia at that time, only 29 percent of it was repayable in dollars. So that we didn't leave them saddled with a debt the way the Soviet Union did, for example.

Therefore, that is one factor.

Our training program, as I said before, left a long term good result. The turnkey plus projects we had for helping to build a factory with another one of our loans, and then we saw to it that that factory was managed by our people until they were prepared to take it over. Then they took it over, and when they took it over, they were able to operate it as indeed they are today.

The two big projects that we helped them with in fertilizer and cement are operating at almost 100 percent capacity and they are the only two big factories in the country of that size operating anywhere near 100 percent capacity because of the way this thing was handled.

MULTILATERAL AID

Senator CASE. Mr. Ambassador, I don't know whether I missed something coming in late or not, but have you laid out a specific program or is this general background on the role of foreign aid?

Ambassador GREEN. What I was talking of was in just general terms, but we haven't reached a point of setting out specifically what we will do in this calendar year of this next fiscal year. We are talking about it still in the Department, but as you can see from my remarks, I think it is very important that we lend a helping hand to Indonesia, but we do it as far as possible in consultation with other countries, other creditors, and that we do our share, but we see to it that other countries do theirs as well.

Senator CASE. This is an ideal time, isn't it, to get multilateral operations going because we are doing nothing now.

Ambassador GREEN. Yes, it is. To the extent that it is possible to do.

Senator CASE. We have to realize—

Ambassador GREEN. We are already discussing these things with other creditors and we don't want, for example, a country to give Indonesia short term credit because that is just going to compound the problems of the debt rescheduling two or three years from now. We want to be sure that the terms of assistance other countries give to Indonesia comports with their overall debt problem and rescheduling problem and our own assistance, and we are hopeful that the Soviet bloc will give Indonesia the kind of debt relief that we are giving. I think they will from what I have heard.

Senator MUNDT. If they don't, are you going to change your mind about giving relief?

Ambassador GREEN. Well, I think this is going to raise a very serious problem obviously, and I think the Indonesians know that.

INDONESIAN SELF-SUFFICIENCY

Senator CASE. How close are they to being self-sufficient in food?

Ambassador GREEN. Well—

Senator CASE. Is this one of the—

Ambassador GREEN. The growing population of Java is the reason why they are in a food deficit position today. The population increases there over 2½ percent every year. It is one of the most overcrowded bits of real estate in the world today. And they live in the illusion that people can move to these outlying islands. They don't figure the tremendous cost of resettlement which makes this prohibitive. Also people that go to these islands find it forbidding and they tend to come back.

Senator CASE. You mean cold?

Ambassador GREEN. No. They find that there is no rice—other kinds of food. They miss their old homestead, rather typical.

Now, as the population of Java increases, it has moved from a position of at one time exporting rice to the outlying areas to a position where it exports nothing except officials and problems. And obviously there is a major problem in facing up to family planning, or whatever you want to call it.

The Indonesians are too preoccupied with other questions right now that they really haven't done much in this field.

Senator CASE. This is a good time to get going on that, too.

Ambassador GREEN. That is right.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Cooper?

COMMUNISTS KILLED DURING COUNTER-COUP

Senator COOPER. You said an estimate of 300,000 to 500,000 were killed. Is it correct that 25 percent of the population in Indonesia is Communist?

Ambassador GREEN. You could argue that at one point there were as many as 25 percent of the Indonesians who in one way or another supported either the Communist Party or one of its front groups.

Senator COOPER. The Communist Party at one time did have support of many peasants, people in the countryside, also the army.

Ambassador GREEN. The Communist Party itself had 3 million at one time. It now appears that some of those members weren't very strong members, but anyway, it had 3 million membership, and then outside that 3 million, there were about 22 million or so who supported these different front activities.

Senator COOPER. Java was one of the chief seats of Communist strength.

Ambassador GREEN. Yes, sir.

SUKARNO IS DISCREDITED

Senator COOPER. What you said a while ago, they couldn't hold up the fact that Sukarno still had some strength, that plus the large number of Communists remaining—would you say there is still some danger of a return of Sukarno?

Ambassador GREEN. I doubt the danger of Sukarno's return is very great. I would say that the odds were almost overwhelming

against Sukarno getting back on the scene again. He is very widely discredited and the very fact that things were so bad in the past—he let things run so badly down hill and they are suffering so much as a result. It has tended to discredit his image even further.

He has refused to denounce the Communists and this, of course, has affected him even more.

Now, these 25 million people who supported the Communists one way or another, a lot of those were people just sort of being on the bandwagon for their own safety. They were anticipating a slide into the Communist camp and they wanted to protect themselves come the events.

PROBLEMS WITH MALAYSIA

Senator COOPER. Has the problem with Malaysia been settled?

Ambassador GREEN. I think it has been settled. There are some things, loose ends that have to be tied up. They don't have normal diplomatic relations now with Malaysia, but the relationships between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur are I must say very, very close indeed. They are fellow Moslem countries and in a way they are two brothers who have discovered the folly of their having been at each other's throats for so long.

Senator COOPER. You think the present government is making progress economically and in a fiscal way to give some strength to Indonesia.

Ambassador GREEN. Yes.

Senator COOPER. To correct some of the chaos that you described.

Ambassador GREEN. Very definitely. And better than I would have anticipated three or four months ago.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you have another question?

DEFINING INDONESIAN COMMUNISM

Senator CASE. Just one question. You used—you use it all the time—what do you mean by Communist? I am not being funny. I really mean when you say this you have a specific thing in your mind. Are you talking about the influence of China, the influence of Russia?

Ambassador GREEN. Well, each time I use it it might be in a little different context, but when I was talking about PKI, the efforts to seize power, I was referring to the organization, the leaders. The leaders in Indonesia, but operating I think with the aid and comfort and fiscal support in some ways from Communist China.

Senator CASE. Pretty much Chinese? Is Russia in there at all?

Ambassador GREEN. No, I do think Russia has been disillusioned, became increasingly disillusioned with the PKI, the Communist Party of Indonesia, because it came very definitely under Peking's influence and Russia therefore moved from a position of supporting the PKI to a position of supporting the Indonesian government. This happened in about 1963, 1964, 1965, in that period.

Senator CASE. Was Russia involved in the coup?

Ambassador GREEN. No, in no way.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

WAS THE U.S. INVOLVED IN THE COUP?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Were we involved in the coup?

Ambassador GREEN. No, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Were we involved in the previous attempt at a coup about four years ago?

Ambassador GREEN. No. I don't think so.

Senator FULBRIGHT. CIA played no part in it?

Ambassador GREEN. You mean 1958?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Ambassador GREEN. Well, I think there was definitely some sympathy for the break-away group.

Senator FULBRIGHT. We had no part in that?

Ambassador GREEN. I was not involved in the events and I am afraid I cannot answer.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You don't know about it. You haven't heard about it?

Ambassador GREEN. I don't know for sure what happened.

Senator FULBRIGHT. They don't tell you about any of the past history in these places when you are assigned to a country?

Ambassador GREEN. Well, I can glean a number of things, Senator.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You don't know whether CIA was involved or not. And we were not involved in this coup.

Ambassador GREEN. No, sir. Definitely not.

Senator FULBRIGHT. We have been told that this would not have taken place had we not been doing what we were doing in Vietnam. Is that correct?

Ambassador GREEN. Oh, I wouldn't say it is correct to say it wouldn't have taken place. I think that as I was saying perhaps before you came in—

Senator FULBRIGHT. I'm sorry I was late. I had another engagement and I couldn't be in on time.

A FORWARD FLOW OF A RED TIDE

Ambassador GREEN. I think when these two surviving generals faced this tremendous Communist menace, several days after the abortive coup, that they had a tremendous problem because not only did you have this important Communist Party and all these sympathizers we were just talking about here, too but the Communists had infiltrated into the armed forces. As a matter of fact, one of the first things that the military had to do was to relieve several battalions in central Java and put them into obscure locations where they couldn't be in harm's way. And, of course, the air force commander was involved in the coup. And so was all of that, and Sukarno's feelings being what they were suspected of being, sympathetic to the Communists, the new emerging government, Suharto and Nasution, were faced, as I say, with a tremendous problem. Had there been at that point a forward flow of a Red tide which might have been the result of our not being firm in Vietnam, then I think events could have developed in a somewhat different way.

I think for one thing the generals might not have been so determined and I think the Communists might have been more emboldened to resist.

Senator FULBRIGHT. What do you mean by the forward flow of the Red tide? That is very colorful language. What is the Red tide?

Senator CASE. You have to write books if you are going to use language like that.

CHINA AND RUSSIA IN VIETNAM

Ambassador GREEN. I don't write books, but what I meant was that if there hadn't been any interposition of American strength between the Communist pressures from the north and Indonesia itself, if the Indonesian leadership had felt that there was no protection and in fact China was the wave of the future and that there was a threat from the north—

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is it China you believe that is occupying Vietnam?

Ambassador GREEN. I don't think it is occupying Vietnam, but I think it is supporting North Vietnam.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes, it is. And so is Russia. Russia is supporting them more than China now, isn't it?

Ambassador GREEN. I don't know.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Wouldn't you say the Russian support today is greater, more valuable to Vietnam than the Chinese?

Ambassador GREEN. I don't know the answer to that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You said a moment ago the Russians had shifted from supporting the Chinese in Indonesia to supporting the government, is that right? Didn't you say a moment ago that the Russians had shifted their position from support of the PKI to the support of the government?

Ambassador GREEN. That is right.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Or did I misunderstand?

Ambassador GREEN. That is correct.

CHINESE OBJECTIVES IN ASIA

Senator FULBRIGHT. Don't you consider the Russians part of the Red tide, or is it only the Chinese?

Ambassador GREEN. Not the way I was using the words Red tide then—figuratively.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Are only the Chinese Communists bad and not the Russians?

Ambassador GREEN. I look upon the Russian and the Chinese objectives in this part of the world as quite different. I look upon the Chinese purposes as more expansionist than Russia in this part of the world.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Why do you?

Ambassador GREEN. Because I don't see any evidence that the Russians are on the move to take over any of this part of the world.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, what is the evidence that the Chinese are moving to take it over?

Ambassador GREEN. I think that they are supporting directly or indirectly, for example, the troubles in the Northeast Thailand front and their broadcasts and statements are all of an incendiary

nature to support the so-called wars of liberation in this part of the world.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think that broadcasting statements are in themselves aggression?

Ambassador GREEN. Well, if they say it and if they appear to mean it, why wouldn't it be so, particularly since they are giving aid and comfort to the so-called Thai liberation movement?

Senator FULBRIGHT. The Thai liberation. You shifted to the Thais. How many Chinese do they have in Thailand in this attack?

Ambassador GREEN. I don't know of any Chinese that they have.

Senator FULBRIGHT. No.

Ambassador GREEN. But this is the question of giving support by radio broadcasts, propaganda, and I don't know what kind of agents they have operating down there. It is because this Thai—this group that they have in Hunan Province, the Thai liberation group there, that has been under the Chinese Communist wing for some time now and have intentions for taking over Thailand.

NO USE OF CHINESE TROOPS

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you know of any Chinese troops that are outside of their border in this area?

Ambassador GREEN. No.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Outside of their border in any area?

Ambassador GREEN. Well, they have been in the case of India but they came down—

Senator FULBRIGHT. Presently?

Ambassador GREEN. At present, I don't know of any Chinese.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, I don't know what you mean by the Red tide is slowing over their area.

Ambassador GREEN. Well, I didn't say that the Red tide was just China. I said that the Red tide was Hanoi, Peking. I didn't—I said I didn't think it was Russia.

IS VIETNAM A THREAT TO INDONESIA?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, then, leaving out China and Russia, do you think that Vietnam as such, either North or South, is a threat to Indonesian security?

Ambassador GREEN. Indirectly. I think if North Vietnam were to take over by force South Vietnam, have success in that endeavor, that it would have an impact upon—

Senator FULBRIGHT. What would—

Ambassador GREEN.—Indonesians.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think there would be a threat to Indonesia?

Ambassador GREEN. Well, it is hard to say. It is a speculative situation.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, if you can't say—

Ambassador GREEN. I can't say in exactly what way.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I can't either, but you leave the impression that there is a great threat. I am just trying to develop why you think so. Do they have any navy or air force? Could they attack Indonesia?

Ambassador GREEN. I think if they succeed in their aggressive efforts and take over South Vietnam, if this is the condition which

you propose to me, if they get away with it, I think that other countries in the area will feel that much less secure, that is all. They will not act with the same degree of determination that in the case of Indonesia your Communists, pro-Communist groups there, would be the more emboldened and it will have a certain sapping affect.

BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL AID

Senator FULBRIGHT. On the aid, you are advocating a bilateral program with Indonesia? Direct aid from the United States?

Ambassador GREEN. I said I believed that to the maximum extent possible we should approach this problem on a multilateral basis. I didn't think we would be able to achieve that maybe this year or even the next, but we should make every effort to do so. I therefore thought this year we would have to approach it on a bilateral basis, but to pursue a policy of maximum coordination of our information; disclosure of what we intend to do and other countries are intending to do, and to try to bring multilateral organizations like the Asian Development Bank, the IMF, into the act as far as possible.

Senator FULBRIGHT. How much are you advocating? Do you know what they are asking for?

Ambassador GREEN. They haven't asked us for a specific figure, but I said that their requirements might run in the range, let us say, of \$225 million in net new foreign aid this calendar year and that I thought we should do our fair share, and I didn't attempt to say what that would be. And we should approach the problem in such a way to try to maximize foreign contributions.

Senator FULBRIGHT. How much military aid? Is that economic or both?

Ambassador GREEN. I was talking there about economic aid. I am not recommending any military hardware; that is to say, any lethal weapons, but I do think a modest support of their civic action program would be desirable.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LAUSCHE. Any other questions?

REIMBURSEMENT OF AMERICANS FOR PROPERTY

Senator AIKEN. I would like to ask one question.

To what extent has Indonesia reimbursed Americans for expropriated property?

Ambassador GREEN. Well, there has been no reimbursement of expropriated property simply because they haven't claimed to have expropriated any property. There were certain American companies that were forced out and in the case of the rubber companies actually they bought those assets of Goodyear and U.S. Rubber. They forced Goodyear out of the Bogor tire factory, but now Goodyear is talking about resuming management of the factory.

They have established a board, interagency board, to discuss claims of any American investor who claims that his property has been forced out of his hands either with a view to compensation or with a view to restoration.

Senator AIKEN. Is the oil finding a ready market? Does what oil they produce find a ready market now?

Ambassador GREEN. Yes, it does.

Senator AIKEN. Produced by American companies for the Indonesian government?

Ambassador GREEN. That is right.

Senator AIKEN. What do the oil people mean when they say they felt they could handle that business better than the government could?

Ambassador GREEN. Well, the American oil companies—there are two big ones, Caltex and Stanback—they have been studying operations now although they were almost forced out of business the year before last, and they are operating as a private company. They give the Indonesians 60 percent of the profits.

Senator AIKEN. And they are quite optimistic about not extending any serious loss, aren't they, in the long run?

Ambassador GREEN. That is right. I think they were very worried at one time, one of our principal problems.

USE OF U.S. AID

Senator AIKEN. I was just wondering if we give the government their material aid, cash aid, whether that would be used to pay off, to pay for some of the expropriated property.

Ambassador GREEN. No. I think that—

Senator AIKEN. You think it wouldn't. Not even the rubber people.

Ambassador GREEN. No.

SUKARNO'S PLAN FOR AN AXIS

Senator LAUSCHE. To get the record complete, you began to state earlier the statements made by Sukarno about this axis of Indonesia, Hanoi and Cambodia, Peking and a fifth.

Ambassador GREEN. Pyongyang, North Korea.

Senator LAUSCHE. What did Sukarno say on that subject? Did you say that he had made a statement?

Ambassador GREEN. Oh, yes. He made it on August 17th. He merely announced where the country was going and that now they are establishing this axis. He mentioned those five capitals as being partners working together. He said it in the presence of hundreds of thousands of people, tens of thousands, in the physical presence, and over the radio and television to the whole country.

Senator LAUSCHE. That was a statement made—

Ambassador GREEN. By him.

Senator LAUSCHE. Over the radio to all of the people of his country.

Ambassador GREEN. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. That this axis was established.

Ambassador GREEN. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. Identify the countries again in the axis.

Ambassador GREEN. Communist China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia, Cambodia.

Senator LAUSCHE. Five countries.

Ambassador GREEN. But he did it without ever asking Cambodia.

Senator LAUSCHE. Anything further?

Senator COOPER. No. I think it was very fine to hear from you, so clear, so helpful.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thanks. Thanks very much for a very thorough report, and I am grateful to you.

U.S. POSITION IN VIETNAM

I would like to put this question. In your opinion, would our position in Southeast Asia, if we pulled out of south Vietnam, be as formidable as it is now in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan and Japan?

Ambassador GREEN. I think that it would be. Our strong stand in South Vietnam has provided a kind of shield behind which these countries have felt capable, emboldened to move ahead with trying to put their houses in order the way in fact this happened in Indonesia. Had there not been this interposition of American strength—people may not like this term—the Red tide, but I still do, I do not think that it is likely that the Indonesian leaders, the new military leaders, would have acted in as determined a way as they did.

Now, I think it is very important that we not say this publicly because Indonesia wants to take credit for its own actions. We don't want to look as though we are always taking credit. That is why we haven't said it, but that is the way I feel.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, and I think you have exactly stated the position that we are in. But to me it seems that to claim that our presence did not give courage and strength to those people is absurd and cannot be maintained.

Thanks very much.

[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

BACKGROUND BRIEFING ON DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS

Friday, February 3, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Gore (presiding), Fulbright (chairman of the full committee), Sparkman, Mansfield, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Aiken, and Cooper.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl and Mr. Bader, of the committee staff.

Senator GORE. The committee will come to order.

This afternoon the Subcommittee on Disarmament begins a series of hearings on the current disarmament and armament problems. It would appear that we have come to a critical moment in this general area. The country has before it enormously important decisions affecting not only our national security and allocation of our resources, but the whole organization of our economic and national life. I refer specifically to the immediate anti-ballistic missile question, but there are also important issues developing in the non-proliferation area as well as the sale of conventional arms.

Chairman Fulbright shares the belief of the subcommittee that the subjects I have mentioned are of great importance and that it might be useful for the subcommittee to hold hearings.

Because these issues are extremely complex, I believe it would be useful to explore the question of what we know—that is, what our government knows and what we do not know about what others are doing as a necessary background of knowledge to an examination of the policy implications of the decisions now under consideration. In order to ensure that we have a sound and accurate base of information on which to base our discussions and possible judgments, I have invited Mr. Helms of the Central Intelligence Agency to give to the subcommittee a thorough briefing.

Mr. Helms, we are pleased to have you here this afternoon. Please be assured that we appreciate the sensitivity of the information you bring. Please proceed in your own way.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD HELMS, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY CARL E. DUCKETT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND JOHN S. WARNER, LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to introduce Mr. Carl Duckett, who is the Deputy Director for Science and Technology in the Central Intelligence Agency, who has come with me in the event you desire to ask me any highly technical questions about missiles and weapons and so forth.

Senator GORE. Maybe for the sake of the record, he should give his full name and title.

Mr. DUCKETT. Yes, sir. Mr. Carl Ernest Duckett, and I am the Deputy Director for Science and Technology of the CIA.

Senator CLARK. D-u-c-k-e-t?

Mr. DUCKETT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Chairman, I understand you wish me to discuss today the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and Communist China, touching on the related economic and political considerations. I would also like to cover in very brief form some of the problems of nuclear proliferation in other countries.

I want to give the general thrust of the present situation and also to cover what we believe to be the future trends.

Now, we all recognize that we could spend an entire day on a detailed discussion of the strengths and the hardware of the Russian and Chinese military establishments. So I will attempt to cover this in the briefest compass I can and I hope will give it enough information so that it will enable you to ask the kinds of questions that will be of interest to you.

SOVIET STRATEGIC ATTACK FORCES

First, I would like to cover the Soviet strategic attack forces.

ICBM's

I. The new Soviet ICBM's—which we call the third generation—are coming into operational status now at a rapid rate.

A. At this time last year, the count had been stable at about 225 for a good year and a half.

1. The Soviets at that point had completed their deployment of the first and second generation missiles.

2. In 1964, however, they began their new program, comprising two new missile systems.

B. One of these, we call the SS-9. It is a large and accurate missile which can carry a [deleted] megaton warhead 5,000 miles, or a [deleted] megaton warhead about 7,000 miles.

C. The other, the SS-11, is less accurate and smaller. We estimate the maximum yield of its warhead at [deleted] megatons.

II. The silos for these new ICBM's become operational, at present rate of construction, two years or little more after they are started. As a result, the estimated number of operational launchers has already moved up from that plateau of 225, which I just mentioned, to about 385.

A. Our current National Intelligence Estimate, issued about 60 days ago, concludes that by the middle of this year the Soviet

Union will have about 425 to 485 ICBM's ready to launch. By mid-1968, the figure should be 670 to 765.

1. These short-term estimates, of course, can be based on the number of silos already under construction, making allowance for acceleration or delay in the pace of completion.

B. At longer range, we estimate that the Soviet ICBM force will have somewhere between 800 and 1,100 operational launchers four years from now, in mid-1971 to be specific.

CHANGING CHARACTER OF SOVIET ICBM FORCE

III. The numbers, however, do not tell the whole story. The present deployment is also changing the character of the Soviet ICBM force.

A. First, it is going to be harder to knock out. All of the new launchers are in hardened silos with each silo at least three miles from its nearest neighbor.

1. Two-thirds of the first and second generation ICBM's were exposed on launching pads. [deleted]

The new mix means that by the middle of next year, about 80 percent of the operational launchers will be hardened, and there will be [deleted]

B. Secondly, the main emphasis of the new deployment is on the SS-11 system. By mid-1968, there may be as many as 400 of these, making up more than half of the Soviet force.

1. The SS-9 system has the accuracy and the big warhead needed to attack hardened military targets.

2. The contrast, the SS-11, with less accuracy and a much smaller warhead yield, is more suitable for large, soft targets. In other words, it has been referred to as a city buster.

The Soviets, by putting their missile force in silos and concentrating on the SS-11, are working for what we call "assured destruction"—that is, the capability to destroy a significant portion of the population and resources of the United States even if U.S. missiles should strike first.

IV. This improvement of strategic attack capabilities is bound to give the Soviet leaders greatly increased confidence that they have achieved a sufficient "assured destruction" capability to serve as a deterrent.

A. We do not believe, however, that between now and the mid-1970s the Soviets themselves expect to be strong enough to consider the deliberate initiation of a war against the United States.

SOVIET CAPABILITY FOR ATTACK

V. Let me review briefly the status of the remainder of the Soviet capability for strategic attack.

First, Medium Range and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles:

A. There have been no major changes during the past year in the Soviet Intermediate-range and Medium-range ballistic missile force.

1. There are about 100 intermediate and 600 medium-range operational launchers.

2. About 90 percent of the sites are in the Western USSR, constituting a massive threat to Europe.

3. We do not expect much change over the next 10 years in the size of the MRBM/IRBM force, but, again, the character will probably change.

4. As the existing systems become obsolete, launchers on soft pads will be phased out. Present research and development also suggests that the Soviets are working for mobile systems, and solid fuel. They have paraded prototypes of mobile missiles, including one which they called a mobile ICBM, and they have tested a solid-fueled missile to about 3,000 miles, which is right on the borderline between Intermediate and Intercontinental range.

Now, for the Soviet Submarine Force:

B. It has a growing missile capability.

1. A nuclear-powered submarine now under construction is the first unit of a new class which will apparently carry eight or more tubes for submerged launch of a new missile with a range of 1,000 to 2,000 miles, and this is a brand new submarine.

Senator GORE. Is this single head or multiple head?

Mr. HELMS. Single head. We know of no multiple warheads in the Soviet Union inventory.

2. A few operational submarines have been converted to fire a 700-mile ballistic missile while submerged.

3. The rest of the missile units have to launch from the surface.

4. There are 36 submarines, with about 100 launchers altogether for ballistic missiles, in the Soviet submarine inventory. Most of these missiles have a range of 350 miles.

5. Another 47 submarines carry a total of about 250 cruise missiles, with the primary mission of attacking naval task forces. This missile has a range of about 450 miles.

6. About 45 of the 360 Soviet submarines are nuclear-powered. The power plants are noisier than ours, and Soviet skippers slow down to less than 10 knots they want to try to avoid detection.

SOVIET BOMBER PROGRAM

Long Range Aviation:

C. As for strategic air threat, Soviet Long Range Aviation now consists of 950 to 1,000 bomber and tanker aircraft. The number is declining slowly, and there has been no evidence of any new Soviet heavy bomber program.

1. The Soviets have about 200 heavy bombers, some of which are used as tankers. We estimate that they could mount a strike of about 100 aircraft on two-way missions against the United States.

2. The rest of Long Range Aviation consists of medium-range aircraft, featuring the super-sonic-dash BLINDER medium bomber. We expect the mediums would be used primarily to attack U.S. and allied targets on the Eurasian landmass.

3. The Air Force, however, has two major reservations—that is our Air Force. One is that we believe that long range aviation is likely to have a new heavy bomber in the next few years. The other is the Air Force calculation that in all-out

war, 300 medium bombers could be used to supplement the 100 heavies in an attack on targets in the United States.

I cite this because this is an Air Force disagreement in the intelligence estimates, and I wanted you to be aware of it.

4. The Soviets have developed air-to-surface missiles to extend the operational usefulness of manned aircraft. They appear to be having trouble, however, with the missiles designed for the BLINDER. The principal operational missile at present delivers a nuclear warhead about 350 miles, with a terminal speed approaching twice the speed of sound.

SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE

Now, may I turn to Soviet strategic defense.

I. The status of Soviet strategic defense is the subject of a sharp difference of opinion in the intelligence community over Soviet anti-missile capability. So that we can have a clear understanding of the controversy, let me point out that it involves two separate missile systems.

The first system is referred to as the Moscow System.

A. Around Moscow, the Soviets are indeed deploying an array of missiles and radars conclusively demonstrated to be an ABM system.

B. Part of the system should be operational this year and the entire complex by about 1970.

C. When it is finished, Moscow will be protected by about 100 solid-fuel missiles that can reach out several hundred miles and explode a nuclear warhead above the atmosphere.

1. We think the system would have a good capability against a limited number of existing missiles, but it doesn't have what it takes to cope with a major attack, or with the penetration aids that incoming missiles will have in the future.

2. The intelligence community is agreed on this evaluation of the Moscow System.

EARLY WARNING RADARS

D. The system starts with early warning radars in northwestern Russia that cover the avenues of approach for missiles coming from the continental United States. They can probably detect a missile as much as 1,600 miles away.

1. These radars are now being calibrated, and should be operational this year or early in 1968.

E. Nearer Moscow, there is a big radar which acquires the incoming missile from the early warning facilities, tracks it, and probably assigns targets if there are a number of them coming in.

F. Finally, at a dozen sites forming a ring about 50 miles from the center of Moscow, are the engagement radars, which aim the missiles on their nearby launchers and track them to the target.

G. We have recently calculated that this system—including all of the radars but not the developing and testing—will have cost the Soviets the equivalent of about three billion U.S. dollars, from the start of construction through 1970.

H. This system I have just described is unique to Moscow. You only have to think for a minute about what Moscow has meant in Russian history to realize that the Soviets will defend Moscow with

any system that might help, regardless of cost, effectiveness, or feasibility.

I. We have seen no indication that this system will be used anywhere else in the Soviet Union.

THE TALLINN SYSTEM

Now, let us leave Moscow and look at the other defensive missile deployment.

This one is being deployed extensively. We call it the Tallinn System after the city in Estonia where the first such complex was built.

The Tallinn System is the object of controversy that I have just mentioned because so far there just isn't enough hard evidence to be positive of its purpose.

A. CIA believes that this system is more likely to be a defense against high-flying, high-speed aircraft and other aerodynamic vehicles. This is the conclusion of the current estimate.

B. The other view is that the weapon is basically an anti-ballistic missile, with a secondary mission against aerodynamic vehicles. This is the view of DIA, the Army, and the Air Force.

Senator GORE. Would you read that sentence again?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

The other view is that the weapon is basically an anti-ballistic missile with a secondary mission against aerodynamic vehicles.

This is the view of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Army Intelligence, and, Air Force Intelligence.

C. Both views rely on inferences drawn from deployment patterns, the nature of associated radars, Soviet requirements, and, other similar factors.

1. Neither side can line up enough evidence to disprove the other view.

II. So far we have evidence of 26 complexes for the Tallinn System. Some of them form a forward defense against the northwestern Soviet Union, while others are situated for local defense of specific targets.

We think that more than 20 of these complexes can be operational this year. At the present pace of deployment, the Soviet Union would have about 75 of them by 1972—I say could have.

A. Most of the complexes have three sites, with six launchers at each site. The 26 complexes now under construction will apparently have a total of about 550 launchers.

B. On the basis of the evidence at hand we believe the Tallinn System missile will probably reach to a ceiling of about 100,000 feet, with a slant range of as much as 100 nautical miles.

It could engage manned aircraft flying at three-and-a-half times the speed of sound.

Further, some of the Tallinn System locations do not have the early warning and long range radar coverage that an effective anti-ballistic missile system would have to have.

REST OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PICTURE

III. The rest of the Soviet strategic defense picture is relatively static.

A. New jet fighter aircraft which are now becoming operational will give the Soviet Union improved all-weather capability, and greater interceptor range.

B. There are about 1,000 sites in the Soviet Union for the SA-2 surface-to-air missile system. Performance in North Vietnam has not been particularly impressive—more than 1,500 missiles have been fired to bring down a maximum of 44 manned, American aircraft. The SA-2 has an inherent blind spot against aircraft operating below 1,000 feet.

C. The SA-3 system is supposed to be more effective at low altitudes, but the Soviets have deployed it to only about 110 sites in the Soviet Union. This suggests that it has not come up to expectations.

General Purpose Forces:

About two thirds of Soviet military manpower—some 2 million men—are in what we call general purpose forces: the ground forces, tactical air, and tactical navy.

A. The number of divisions has remained fairly constant. There are 109 divisions almost completely equipped and ready for early commitment to battle.

1. Their manning ranges from about 60 percent of wartime levels in the Soviet interior, to 90 percent in Eastern Europe

2. Another 32 cadre divisions have only about 20 percent of full strength.

B. The Soviets are gradually but steadily improving the ground forces weapons.

C. They are also making a start in developing strike forces which they could use for action at distant points—a Soviet shortcoming until now.

1. Airlift is being improved, a marine corps has been created, and there has been an increase in airborne and amphibious maneuvers.

D. The Soviets continue to help the modernization and improvement of the East European satellite forces. The East Europeans can now contribute about one million men in 42 divisions for Warsaw Pact needs.

SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING

I. [deleted]

A. The Soviets have run their underground test program at a leisurely pace—slightly over one shot a month over the past two years. [deleted]

C. In early 1965, the Soviets conducted the first test in a program to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear explosions.

1. This test, the most spectacular of the series, was a [deleted] explosion which dammed the Shagan River near the Semipalatinsk test site.

D. [Deleted.]

E. There were underground shots at Ufa, just west of the Urals, in 1965, and at Azgir, north of the Caspian, in 1966, which probably tested a technique for stimulating the flow from oil and gas deposits.

II. [Deleted.]

Senator DODD. Mr. Chairman, is it orderly to ask a question?

Senator GORE. Yes, sir.

Senator DODD. Should we wait until the end?

Senator GORE. I believe it might be better to wait until the end.

Senator DODD. I did not want to make notes because then I will forget.

Senator GORE. I think it might be well to make notes with the understanding of the staff that the notes will be destroyed after the briefing.

Proceed.

PROBLEMS OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY

Mr. HELMS. The Soviet Economy.

I. The Soviet economy continues to have problems, notably with the allocation of critical resources. Over the next few years we do not expect that the growth of the Soviet GNP will match the performance of the 1950's.

A. The Soviet GNP and total Soviet industrial production are each a little less than half of ours,

B. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union virtually matches our defense effort, mainly because the Soviet consumer is way down in the pecking order when it comes to allocating output.

C. Military and space spending remained fairly constant between 1962 and 1965, but we estimate that outlays in 1966 were up about 7 percent.

1. The state budget for 1967 includes an admitted increase of 1.1 billion rubles for defense, and hidden allocations elsewhere in the budget may make the actual increase considerably larger.

D. For our purposes today, let me just say that we conclude that the Soviet economy will come up with whatever expenditures are considered desirable for defense, no matter what the condition of the rest of the economy.

SOVIET POLICY

I. In the Kremlin today, the General Secretary of the Party, Leonid Brezhnev, seems to have the most important voice in making key assignments, and he is getting more and more of the spotlight.

A. The Soviet leadership, however, was brought into power in reaction to Khrushchev's erratic personal leadership, and it is still functioning by and large as a collective government.

B. That means that it is a relatively cautious government, not given to radical departures from established policies and procedures.

C. The present leadership stands better with the military, as far as we can judge, and this is largely because it has dropped Khrushchev's attempts to cut back on military spending.

II. Domestic pre-occupation centers on the economy. It has been so hard to reach decisions on resource allocations that the Soviets are in the second year of their present Five-Year Plan, and the plan itself has not received final approval yet.

SOVIET DISPUTE WITH CHINA

III. In foreign affairs, the overriding concern right now is the dispute with Communist China.

A. Tension between Moscow and Peking has intensified markedly in recent months, as you all have seen in the newspapers. The Soviets feel they have gotten the upper hand in the world Communist movement, and they are beginning to behave somewhat more boldly.

1. For instance, they are again trying to convoke an international meeting to condemn the Chinese.

2. The Soviets have exploited Peking's rejection of appeals for united Communist action in support of North Vietnam.

3. Peking's retort has been that Moscow is secretly conspiring with the United States against the Asian Communists.

4. Moscow, to avoid giving any substance to the Chinese charges, has been taking the line publicly that there can be little advance in U.S.-Soviet relations until the Vietnam conflict is settled.

B. The Kremlin has made it clear in private, however, that the Soviet Union wants to keep lines of communication with Washington open, despite the strains and constraints imposed by the Vietnamese fighting and sensitivity to charges of Soviet-U.S. collusion.

1. If it were not for Vietnam, the Soviet leaders would probably prefer to resume the dialogue with Washington on matters which are of greater concern to Soviet national interests, such as European security, arms control, and East-West trade.

2. The agreements recently reached on civil air routes and the peaceful use of outer space showed that limited cooperation is still possible.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks on the Soviet weapons systems, on their economy and political approach, and I would now go over to China.

CHINESE COMMUNISTS' NUCLEAR WEAPONS

I would first like to talk about Chinese Communist advanced weapons.

I. The Chinese Communists are making a concerted effort—on their own and with overriding priorities—to develop modern weapons for strategic attack. They are devoting increasing resources to missiles and nuclear weapons.

A. [Deleted.]

B. We estimate that they could begin to deploy a medium-range ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead this year, and their first crude ICBM's in the early 1970s.

II. [Deleted.]

C. The tests indicate that the Chinese can manufacture nuclear bombs which can be carried by their medium bombers—about a dozen old TU-4 BULLS similar to our B-29, and two TU-16 BADGER jet bombers.

1. [Deleted.]

2. Their likely immediate goals, however, are probably warheads for short- and medium-range missiles, and possibly a

weapon for the IL-28 BEAGLE light jet bomber. The Chinese have about 250 of these aircraft, which have a better chance of reaching a defended target than the BULLS.

D. In the present state of Chinese technology, any weapons they might make now would be crude and inefficient by our standards. By Far Eastern standards, however, they are a significant addition to Chinese military prestige.

CHINESE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

III. The Chinese probably started their missile development by test-firing Soviet MRBM's given them before the Sino-Soviet split in 1960.

A. They may have begun testing their own native versions as early as 1963.

B. Now they are apparently working on several surface-to-surface missile programs.

1. The pace of activity at Shuang-cheng-tzu has increased sharply since the fall of 1965. They apparently are conducting more MRBM firings, and they recently built a new launch complex, possibly for training troops in the launching procedures.

C. During the past year they have also built a very large launch complex, which we call Complex B. The reports we have on the size of the facilities indicate that this complex is for a large missile, probably an ICBM. This missile could also be used as a space booster.

1. Complex B probably will be ready for firings by the latter part of 1967, but we have no evidence that the Chinese have any ICBM components so far. Therefore, we cannot say whether an ICBM vehicle will be ready for test flights that soon.

2. If the Chinese inaugurate a reasonably successful flight test program, within the next year or so, they probably could have a few ICBMs deployed by the early 1970s.

3. These probably would be inferior in reliability and accuracy by U.S. standards, and also by Soviet standards, but they could—in Chinese eyes—constitute a limited inter-continental deterrent.

D. The Chinese Communists have built one copy of the Soviet G-class submarine. In the Soviet fleet, this class is armed with three ballistic missiles 350-mile range. We have to assume that the Chinese are working on a missile to fit the submarine.

CHINESE CONVENTIONAL FORCES

I would like now to turn to Chinese conventional military forces.

I. Despite Chinese progress in advanced weapons, the military power of Communist China for some years to come will derive primarily from the numerical strength of its enormous ground forces—about 2,300,000 men—and great reserves of manpower.

II. There are more than 100 infantry divisions and about a dozen armor and artillery divisions in the Chinese Communist Army, concentrated in the heavily populated regions of eastern China.

A. The Chinese Army has the capability to overrun any of its mainland neighbors in short order, provided it does not run into significant opposition from a major power.

1. It has demonstrated its ability to move and fight with primitive transportation and rudimentary logistic support.

2. If it should come to all-out war, however, the Chinese will be badly hampered by shortages of armor, heavy ordnance, mechanized transport, and fuel.

III. The Chinese Air Force and Navy are oriented primarily toward defensive missions.

A. The bomber force at present consists of 250 jet light bombers, which I mentioned a few moments ago as BEAGLES. We believe the Chinese will start producing BADGER jet mediums about 1968.

B. The bulk of the jet fighters consist of about 1,900 MIG-15s and MIG-17s, obtained 10 or more years ago.

1. Over the past two years, the Chinese have begun assembling supersonic MIG-19s in an aircraft plant at Shen-yang, known better as Mukden, in Manchuria which was provided by the Soviets before 1960. The Chinese inventory of MIG-19s has risen from 150 to about 350, and they have been able to supply another 50 to Pakistan in 1966.

2. The Chinese have about 35 of the Mach-two, delta-wing MIG-21s, supplied by the Soviet Union in the early 1960s.

IV. Peking's Navy is the weakest element of the Chinese armed forces.

A. It has the world's fourth largest undersea fleet, with 34 submarines, most of them medium-range torpedo attack boats. They have no experience in extended operations, however, and most of their training appears to take place within 20 miles of the coast.

B. The Chinese are building submarines, destroyer escorts, and guided-missile patrol boats. They have four obsolete destroyers, six new DEs, and 11 patrol boats.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA

I would like now to turn to Chinese political developments.

I. Communist China is being racked by the greatest political convulsions since Mao Tse-tung took control in 1949.

A. Mao, at 73, is aging, sick, and more and more inflexible.

1. He is clearly concerned that his Communist Party is losing the revolutionary zeal of its early days, and cannot be relied on to keep China on the right track after he is gone.

2. The teenaged millions of the Red Guard are supposed to rekindle that zeal with their youthful and unbridled enthusiasm.

3. When Mao reappeared last summer after a protracted absence from public view, he passed over the men who had been the heads of the party hierarchy and named Defense Minister Lin Piao as Number Two Man—in effect, Mao's designated successor.

B. To Mao Tse-tung, the cultural revolution is probably primarily a drive to reshape the Communist Party, or replace it with a more reliable, more fanatical, and younger version.

C. But for the men who aspire to succeed Mao, it has become a naked struggle for power and for survival.

II. It is difficult to determine from day to day where the cultural revolution stands, who is on which side, or who is going to come

out on top. The struggle seems to have entered a critical phase in January.

A. The most dramatic development has been Mao's call for the Red Army to back up the Red Guards and eliminate resistance to the cultural revolution.

1. We had been speculating when the resistance first developed that the army would have been called in even earlier if there had been no doubts about its reliability.

2. Now there is evidence that the armed forces are considerably less than monolithic in their loyalty to Mao and Lin.

III. When and how will the turmoil in Peking finally be resolved?

A. We have no idea. The opposing forces, judging by the protracted struggle, must be quite evenly matched. If the clash between workers and Red Guards spread—particularly if the army's loyalties are divided—then we may soon see something for which there is no other term but Civil War.

1. Some days, it looks as though the opposing elements are digging in for a long winter of political trench warfare.

2. The next day, a war of movement and a showdown appears imminent.

3. I would say it is still too early to speculate usefully on the outcome.

B. There are two points, however, which we can make.

1. First, as long as China's leaders are pre-occupied with this internal wrangling, they will find it difficult to reach agreement on any new policy lines. So, we do not expect any radical departures from existing policies.

2. Second, whoever wins, we can see no reason for suspecting that there will be any dilution of Peking's implacable hostility to the United States.

CHINA'S ECONOMY

I would like to now turn to the Chinese economy.

A. China has regained only part of the ground lost when the Great Leap Forward collapsed in 1960 and Soviet aid was withdrawn.

1. Prospects to regain the momentum of the 1950's appear remote, even without the disruption of the "cultural revolution."

2. The longer the political upheaval lasts, the greater the likelihood of severe damage to the economy.

3. There have already been extensive strikes, shutdowns, and disruption of transportation.

B. It has taken an overriding priority on defense to permit the progress China has made in advanced weapons.

1. One of the ministries hard hit by the waves of political purges and poster denunciations has been a ministry directly related to the missile effort.

C. Stagnation in agriculture remains the chief obstacle to a resumption of adequate economic growth.

1. Peking claims a record harvest in 1966, but actual grain production was somewhat lower in 1966 than in 1955.

2. It was not much above the level of 10 years ago, when there were almost 150 million fewer people to feed.

3. There were localized ration cuts, and it was only thanks to grain imports that the average ration could be kept above the lean levels of the poor year of 1960.

4. China imported more than 5 million tons of grain from the Free World in 1966, and will probably have to import substantially more this year.

I now would like to turn, Mr. Chairman, to the subject of nuclear proliferation.

[Deleted.]

INDIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NUCLEAR WEAPONS

II. The Indian attitude toward development of nuclear weapons has been complicated by Peking's nuclear capability.

A. Prime Minister Gandhi has maintained the government's "no bomb" nuclear policy despite criticisms in Parliament.

1. Both the Prime Minister and the new Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Dr. Sarabhai, have stated that India's present economic and industrial position does not permit launching a nuclear weapons project, particularly from the viewpoint of developing delivery systems.

B. [Deleted.]

1. An agreement with Canada, however, stipulates that plutonium produced in the one reactor now operational will be used only for peaceful purposes.

2. Two other reactors which will be operational in 1969 and 1970 are covered by safeguards.

Other Countries:

ISOTOPE SEPARATION

III. I would like to end the discussion of proliferation with a brief mention of isotope separation.

A. [Deleted.]

B. U.S. experience has shown that for the production of moderate quantities of uranium-235, the centrifuge process is economically attractive in comparison with the gaseous diffusion process.

C. [Deleted.]

D. We believe however, that none of the countries working on the process has yet developed a centrifuge to the point where an economical plant of production size could be built.

CHINA'S SUPPORT OF NORTH VIETNAM

Mr. Chairman, I have, or I am prepared, to discuss two other matters, if you choose, these having to do with the Chinese contribution to North Vietnam and the possibility of Chinese intervention in North Vietnam. It is not strictly the topic that we have agreed that I would discuss, but if you had any interest in this, I would be glad to cover it.

Senator GORE. What is the pleasure of the committee?

I would like to hear it. Yes, we would.

Mr. HELMS. We estimate that there are 26,000 to 48,000 Chinese Communist military personnel in North Vietnam.

Senator GORE. What is the figure?

Mr. HELMS. 26,000 to 48,000. There is a wide spread there because we have no way of actually counting the number of individual Chinese. We simply know the units that are there and what the units are for, and these units are of a kind that do not have a very specific table of organization and personnel. They can be larger or smaller, depending on how you want to use them. And we have been trying to narrow this figure, but the only thing we can say now is that the range is between 26,000 and 48,000.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question in context?

Senator GORE. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are they, Mr. Helms, logistic or combat troops or both?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir. This is what I wanted to cover, Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am sorry.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Mr. HELMS. As far as we can determine, there are no ground combat formations.

B. Evidence shows that there are two anti-aircraft artillery divisions and possibly elements of two more, manning the 85-millimeter and 100-millimeter guns defending some of the key targets.

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

C. The rest of the Chinese personnel are mainly railway, engineer, and logistic units, building airfields, bridges, and the like, laying track, and keeping the supplies moving. In other words, there are no combat personnel, I repeat.

Senator GORE. You would not regard the manning of anti-aircraft guns as combat?

Mr. HELMS. Well, not in the sense that it is used in the military technology.

Senator GORE. I understand.

Mr. HELMS. In other words, these are not fellows manning guns shooting at other soldiers. They are fellows manning anti-aircraft guns.

Senator GORE. Shooting Americans down.

Mr. HELMS. That is the idea, but they are not combat forces in the way the military uses the terms.

EFFECTIVENESS OF SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES

Senator AIKEN. Our witness stated yesterday, that what he could learn from the time he was there, Russian SAM's are comparatively ineffective, and most of our planes are brought down by conventional weapons.

Mr. HELMS. That is correct.

Senator AIKEN. If that is correct, I have to reverse my opinion.

Mr. HELMS. The reason for this, Senator Aiken, if I may take just a moment, is that by having a mix of surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns, the surface-to-air missiles are quite effective at certain altitudes. Therefore, our planes, to avoid them, go in on the deck, and in that way they just run into the anti-aircraft fire. And there is enough of it so there is just no way of missing it, and this

is why so many have been brought down by AA rather than surface-to-air missiles.

Senator AIKEN. But you do not think I am too far wrong in not crediting the Russians for their firing.

Mr. HELMS. I do not.

Senator GORE. It is for the purpose of avoiding the SAM fire that they come in on the deck, so to speak.

Mr. HELMS. That is right. So, I think the question comes down as to who is manning the anti-aircraft guns, and they are being manned by a variety of personnel.

POSSIBILITY OF CHINESE INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

Now, may I discuss just a moment our beliefs about the possibility of Chinese intervention in Vietnam.

VI. We believe that there are three situations in which Peking would feel obliged to intervene in force in the Vietnamese fighting.

A. One of these would arise from U.S. air strikes against targets in China. In May 1965, Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi asked the British Charge in Peking to pass along a warning to this effect.

B. The second circumstance which would trigger Chinese intervention would be a major U.S. invasion of North Vietnam. Chinese leaders passed this word to a visiting delegation from Ghana, shortly before Chen Yi talked with the British.

C. In addition, if the collapse of the Hanoi Government should seem imminent, China might probably move into North Vietnam to "restore order."

VII. It is always dangerous to assume that the Chinese are going to be guided by rational decisions, but we believe that Peking is bound to feel that the domestic political turmoil and the intensification of the dispute with Moscow leaves China less ready than it might otherwise be to engage in direct hostilities with the United States.

A. Another factor which would contribute to increased Chinese caution would be a growing belief in Peking that the United States is determined to persevere, over the short run at least, in the Vietnamese war.

THRESHOLD OF SENSITIVITY HAS BEEN RAISED

B. We think, therefore, that the threshold of sensitivity—the level at which Peking would feel forced to fight—has probably been raised a degree or two.

1. For example, a shallow incursion by U.S. troops into the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Vietnam might be less likely today to trigger a Chinese reaction than it would have in 1965.

C. Chinese statements concerning the "inevitability" of war with the U.S. now appear only infrequently.

1. Peking has made no mention of "volunteers" for Vietnam since the fall of 1965, except for brief flurries last summer and again in December, after bombings in the area of Hanoi and Haiphong.

2. Peking has always said that the Vietnamese must bear the primary responsibility for fighting; in recent months this theme has been given additional emphasis.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GORE. Thank you very much, Mr. Helms.

SOVIET ADVANTAGES IN ANTI-MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

Beginning where you began, with a few questions, will you or your assistant give us an estimate of the lead or advantage which the Soviets may have over the United States in the development and deployment of anti-missile missiles at this time? I would want to know the extent of the tests of anti-ballistic missiles which they conducted before entering the test treaty, concluding the test treaty, and also if you think their underground tests, particularly the last ones, had some bearing upon anti-ballistic missiles.

Now, this is a big question. Divide it into about three parts.

Mr. HELMS. I understand and I would like very much to have Mr. Duckett answer it.

But, before I do, sir, may I explain one thing. We in the Agency are not competent to talk about the United States forces. In the first place, we have never kept track in the Agency of what the United States has in its arsenal. We have not made what are referred to as net estimates—in other words, a comparison of where the Soviets stand and where the United States stands in various weaponry, for the very simple reason that our charter is to take care of countries outside of the United States and not to involve ourselves in these comparisons in the United States.

That is for the Department of Defense or the State Department or for somebody else to do, so I would like us, if we may, to confine our remarks to the Soviet systems rather than the U.S. systems.

Senator GORE. I agree.

Mr. DUCKETT. Sir, if I could discuss the Soviet anti-ballistic missile capability in two contexts.

First, the development or the technical capability of the system; and secondly, its development status, because both are pertinent and are different.

From a developmental standpoint, the test program has been a long one, starting certainly by 1960.

VULNERABILITY TO ATTACK

The components which we can now identify in that system we described as around Moscow, are components which we feel limit the system in two key ways: One, it appears there will be a rather limited number of interceptor missiles involved, at least in this initial deployment, and that means by definition, therefore, only a limited number of targets can be attacked.

So this would make it vulnerable, if you will, to what you would call a saturation attack.

Secondly, we believe that the kinds of radars we see are the types which cannot contain much of the sophistication which the United States has felt would be desirable to handle a complex type of attack, and by complex here I mean an attack including decoys, penetration aids, and other devices to make the radar have a difficult time separating out the actual bomb.

We do not believe the system has any appreciable capability to handle that type of attack.

Senator GORE. You mean when you refer to separation out of the actual bomb, the incoming missile being fired at Russia?

Mr. DUCKETT. Yes, sir, that is correct.

In other words, if there are in that attack, not only bombs, but also various penetration devices to attempt to hide, if you would, or to prevent the radar determining which is the real bomb, we think this system would have difficulty handling that type of attack.

So, those are the limitations. The limitation with regard to number of interceptors, and its apparent lack of ability to handle what we would call a sophisticated attack.

DEPLOYMENT OF THE MOSCOW SYSTEM

Now, as to deployment status, it is difficult to pick particular dates here and the reason is that the deployment of the Moscow System has not gone at a steady pace. As best we can determine, and for reasons we cannot determine, possibly technical, the deployment has not started and proceeded at a steady rate from the beginning. Rather, there have been periods when there was relative inactivity around these installations suggesting that there was some modification or change taking place.

You see, therefore, sir, until we know that one of these sites is totally operational, we cannot say that there will not be other delays or changes in the pace of construction.

We do recognize, however, that at least the first of these Moscow installations will probably be ready, if there is no further disruption, by sometime during the latter part of the year.

HOW AN ABM DEFENSE WOULD WORK

Senator GORE. Now, just here. Senator Aiken and I have some small advantage over other members of the committee in that we have heard the technicians in the Atomic Energy Commission describe the manner of operation of an anti-ballistic missile defense.

Would you, for the benefit of the committee, describe theoretically how this system will operate? First, I think you would perhaps agree that this system was tested by the Soviets in perhaps 1961.

Mr. DUCKETT. Yes.

Senator PELL. Also, how classified is this?

Mr. HELMS. As far as the classification is concerned, Senator Pell, what we are talking about now has about the highest classification we have.

Senator PELL. Thank you. I was wondering if some of these theories have been in the press.

Mr. HELMS. But when we are talking about this anti-ballistic missile system, it involves all the collection devices at the disposition of the United States Government and some of these we are trying very hard, at least as to their quality, to keep as secret as we possibly can, so nothing can be more highly classified than what we are talking about now.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Mr. DUCKETT. Sir, I think if I may, I could best treat the question of how the systems work by giving a very brief description and then being most happy to amplify on any part of that that I could.

May I again remind the chairman that I am referring to the Moscow System only in this conversation.

That system we are certain employs a very large, long-range type of missile. Although we cannot give precise numbers as to range and altitude, we do believe its range and altitude both are measured in hundreds of miles, and that would say that one of the characteristics of this system would be that it would intercept the incoming missiles well outside of the atmosphere.

THE MEANING OF INTERCEPTION

Senator GORE. When you use the word "intercept" many people have an idea that they are going to have a head-on collision. You don't mean that at all?

Mr. DUCKETT. No, sir. Obviously, the question of the relative closeness that is required for killing the incoming missile is a function of the type of kill mechanism which this missile will employ, and my honest answer is we do not know the precise kill mechanism and thus cannot describe precisely how close an intercept would be required for a kill.

KILL MECHANISMS

Senator GORE. Well, what are the possible kill mechanisms?

Mr. DUCKETT. The possible kill mechanisms which we have studied are what I would call normal nuclear effects, meaning gamma rays and other forms of radiation. X-rays have caused more concern, I believe, because X-ray effects are far more pronounced outside of the atmosphere.

Senator GORE. In terms of distance, say their radar detects an incoming missile, and they wish to fire an interceptor missile, and it explodes in the projected trajectory of the incoming missile. By use of gamma and ordinary nucleonic rays, what would be the range of destruction?

Mr. DUCKETT. Sir, I will say in all honesty I don't believe that we in the United States know from our own measurement programs a very precise answer to that question.

I think there is a considerable uncertainty based on the advice we could get from the experts, but certainly if one is talking about the gamma radiations, the kind of numbers that we are advised by our experts are, in fact, measured in ones, or at most, tens of kilometers for any of these effects. In other words, a fairly close intercept is required for these types of mechanisms.

DEFENSE AGAINST THE POLARIS

Senator AIKEN. I was going to ask whether you would estimate that the defense against the ICBM was more effective than the defense against the Polaris.

Mr. DUCKETT. I see.

Senator AIKEN. I think that is important. I have had a feeling that the Polaris can hit them if they get too bold.

Mr. DUCKETT. Yes, sir, I believe I can answer, Senator, in this way: The radar systems which I have referred to, that are part of this Moscow System, and also the radars which are situated to the north of Moscow, are not situated in such a way that they could cover more than a small part of what we would call the Polaris threat zone. That is, there are no radars which we have identified which are pointed, for example, towards the Mediterranean or towards Spain, and thus if Polaris were fired from that area today, we do not have identified, at least, any Soviet radar which would be likely to detect them.

Thus, I would have to say that our best evidence today is that the Moscow system is deployed primarily, if not entirely, towards the ICBM threat.

Senator AIKEN. And the Polaris is possibly our major deterrent to avoid a war?

Mr. DUCKETT. Yes, sir. We do not see what we would identify as a capability against Polaris.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

DEFENSIVE AREA AROUND MOSCOW

Senator GORE. Well, proceeding with the possible mechanism, do I deduce from what you say that if the defending missiles' detonation depends upon gamma, and for want of a better word orthodox nucleonic rays, you would have a defense area ranging from a four to a hundred square mile area?

Mr. DUCKETT. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire, sir, if you are referring to the entire area around Moscow defended—I am not sure that I understand.

Senator GORE. Now, here is the detonation—

Mr. DUCKETT. Around any detonation.

Senator GORE [continuing]. Of the anti-missile missile in the calculated trajectory of an incoming missile.

Mr. DUCKETT. I understand.

Senator GORE. How large an area is created by a ball of fire, a ball of rays? Would this be, you say, a mile if you go a mile in all directions—

Mr. DUCKETT. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Or if it is 10 miles in all directions?

Mr. DUCKETT. Mr. Chairman, again here I would re-emphasize that I don't believe that we have agreed figures even in the United States on these kinds of questions. But I know of no one who believes that what I think we are both agreeing we could refer to as conventional radiation, would be likely to afford a kill of an incoming weapon for any distance greater than, say, one mile. And that would be a one-mile sphere, actually, one mile in any direction.

Senator GORE. A sphere two miles in diameter?

Mr. DUCKETT. Two miles in diameter, correct, sir.

Senator GORE. All right.

EFFECT OF X-RAYS ON WEAPONS

Now, if they depend upon X-rays, what would be the area?

Mr. DUCKETT. All right, sir.

I think, again, Mr. Chairman, this is an even more controversial figure, and may I say that certainly I am well aware we feel that

it is an important thing to be aware of, that there are figures by various U.S. scientists that extend out to hundreds, to literally thousands of miles with various theories of how X-rays might affect a weapon.

So, we simply do not have from the advice we have been able to acquire any number which I can quote to you as a figure representing X-ray effects.

I would add, therefore, that we do not believe today that we have any mechanism available to use that allows us to state with any certainty what kill distance the Soviets might achieve with X-rays.

I believe it is accepted, however, by most U.S. scientists that this would be, in fact, a distance measured in tens and possibly even out to a hundred miles or more, and it is certainly a far greater distance than the conventional kill technique.

Senator SPARKMAN. You mean in diameter or radius?

Mr. DUCKETT. Senator Sparkman, I am referring here to the actual distance from the burst to the actual warhead.

Senator SPARKMAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. DUCKETT. And that distance, as I am saying, and in some people's minds, is tens of miles and in others it is in hundreds of miles, and we don't know the answer.

Senator GORE. So, within the order of estimates, you would have a ball of X-rays with estimates of its extent ranging from a ball of X-rays with a radius of 20 miles up to a radius of two to three hundred miles?

Mr. DUCKETT. Yes.

Senator GORE. Of course, if this were perfected, why then, the defense is calculated to come within the proximity of an incoming missile much more readily.

Mr. DUCKETT. Yes, sir.

SOVIET MISSILE TESTS

Senator GORE. Now, I don't want to ask too many questions myself, but I think a very crucial question here is whether or not the Soviets tested X-rays or gamma rays in their tests in 1961. They did, as I understand it, fire a missile through the ball of rays with radar observation.

Can you give us a description of that?

Mr. DUCKETT. Mr. Chairman, there were tests conducted in the fall of 1961 and again in the fall of 1962 which did involve nuclear explosions in the area where the developmental work on the antiballistic missile program has been conducted. Those tests involved a series of bursts. However, our best information is that all of the nuclear bursts were, in fact, on the missile that was fired into the area rather than bursts that were on the interceptor missile coming out of the antiballistic missile combination. So, I would like to express first that we have no knowledge of any tests where, in fact, an interceptor missile carrying a nuclear warhead has been conducted by the Soviets.

However, in these tests, it is true that in addition to the missile which was on the actual warhead, which did burst, it was followed in some cases by one additional missile and in other cases by two additional missiles, which were simply following along the same

trajectory so as to pass through, if you will, the area where the detonation had occurred.

[Deleted.] We believe that the most likely reason for these tests was to determine the effect of this nuclear explosion on the radar equipment on the ground.

I base that on——

TESTING THE BLACKOUT EFFECT

Senator GORE. In other words, the test may have been testing the blackout effect?

Mr. DUCKETT. Precisely.

Senator GORE. Interference with communications?

Mr. DUCKETT. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I refer specifically to the testing to determine if, in fact, the radar on the ground could see through the nuclear cloud and pick up an incoming missile through that cloud.

I stress here, however, that whereas we state we believe this is the most likely purpose of these tests, we certainly much accept that depending on how extensively they monitored and measured these tests, it is certainly possible effects data could have been acquired even though this would not have been the primary purpose.

[Deleted.]

U.S. NEWS ARTICLE ON SOVIET TESTING

Mr. HELMS. Mr. Chairman, may I point out for just a moment, that in the February 6 issue of U.S. News and World Report, there is an article on this subject which starts on page 36 and runs across the top of the page and which is rather a scary article. We have examined this very carefully and can find no evidence that anyone has in support of this article which says the Soviet know about the X-ray effects, and they were testing it and so forth. We have analyzed it very carefully and we believe what Mr. Duckett has just told you and not what appears in this article and other publications.

Senator GORE. I certainly don't want to over-step my time. I suggest that we first conclude our questions with respect to the Soviets and take them up topic by topic as Mr. Helms presented them.

Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. No questions right now.

Senator GORE. Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

Mr. Helms, I want to ask one question. I was rather shocked to see the size and caliber of the United Arab Republic Air Force, the number of first-class MIGs they had, et cetera.

I was also surprised to see their relatively heavy development in submarines, especially because of their getting closer to the Communists and, therefore, the availability to their submarine developments, two Russian submarines, et cetera.

With that premise, it looks to me as if there could be some trouble there. [Deleted.]

As far as the aircraft are concerned, they figure they can stand off what the Egyptians have now and also on the ground.

KEEPING INDIA FROM BUILDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Senator SYMINGTON. There is only one other question that interests me. And I am very interested in these hearings that Senator Gore is conducting because if you do not put the cork in this proliferation, I think we are going to blow ourselves up in due course.

When we continue to feed those cows in India, do we have any specifications about what they should or should not do in nuclear fashion? Do we discuss it with them? Do you know of any discussion in your agency or in the State Department about it, letting us know what they are doing if we continue to feed them and their cattle. I say that in a somewhat snide manner, but I see 2 million more tons going out today and so forth.

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, this is probably not my proper field, but I do sit in meetings in the executive branch. And you do know that the Administration is very conscious of this problem [Deleted.] and doing everything they can to keep track of any activity in this field, and I think we are pretty well informed, Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. When do you think they will have some nuclear weapons that they could deliver on their friends, the Pakistanis, or the Chinese?

Mr. HELMS. I do not think they have started to build them.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

U.S. ABM SYSTEM

One more question, which if you do not want to answer, I would be regretful, but understanding, perhaps—there is quite a discussion going on now in a good many different places among a good many different experts about whether we should build an anti-ballistic ballistic missile or whether we should proceed on it. Based on your knowledge of what you have been testifying about, would you think we should go ahead now or do you think we should wait until these discussions are over, which is the position of Dr. Foster, or do you think we should not go ahead or do you think it is beyond your province? There are four of them.

Mr. HELMS. Senator, I believe that is beyond my province. I beg your indulgence.

Senator GORE. Senator Clark.

COLLAPSE OF THE HANOI GOVERNMENT

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have to go. I wonder if I may ask this rather quick and rather innocuous question.

I was interested in your giving the three conditions under which China might enter the Vietnam war.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think it was Harrison Salisbury yesterday, was it not, who gave three conditions. I noticed a little variation, but not very much. You said, or I believe he said, an attack on the Chinese territory, invasion of the north, or an effort on the part of Hanoi to stop the war. Were those not the three that he gave, as I recall?

Senator GORE. Mr. Helms gave as the third one the imminent collapse of the Hanoi regime. Maybe, they were about the same thing.

Senator SPARKMAN. I said there was very little difference. I just wondered whether you meant the same thing. I think he related it to an effort on the part of Hanoi to stop the war.

Mr. HELMS. Senator Sparkman, to me it is not the same thing.

Senator SPARKMAN. Not the same thing.

Mr. HELMS. When we talk about the collapse of the Hanoi government, we mean it's going out of business, the collapse of order and government and all the rest of it in Hanoi. In other words, that they have had it, to use the vernacular. I do not think the Chinese would come in because Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh decided he wanted to alter the course of the war, change its character or stop it.

Senator SPARKMAN. He said an effort to make Hanoi continue the war.

COLLAPSE OF MAO'S GOVERNMENT

Talking about the collapse of the Hanoi government, is there any likelihood that Mao's government might collapse?

Mr. HELMS. We do not know, sir. There is always that possibility.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you.

Senator GORE. Senator Clark.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, Senator Clark said he would yield to one more question.

EFFECTIVENESS OF BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM

When I was out there a year ago, Mr. Helms, I talked to everybody in the windows, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, above all Hong Kong, Mr. Wells, et cetera. I could find nobody in the State Department or military or the Agency that felt any amount of bombing including civilian bombing of Hanoi would bring in the Red Chinese into North Vietnam and, therefore, I have been especially intrigued with all this—well, I will not use the word, because we are on the record, but about the dangers of the bombing.

On the other hand, I found about half of the people who felt they would come in if we went into North Vietnam, and all the people felt they would come in if we went into North Vietnam with ground troops, around Haiphong or Hanoi, because that would show we were trying to take over a government, instead of taking over land.

Is there any change in that position now as far as your Agency is concerned?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir. The way you gave this, I am not sure which was Agency position, and which was State, and which was Defense and so on.

Senator SYMINGTON. I want to be sure. I do not want in any way to have a trap question. I found nobody, either in State or the military, who felt any amount of bombing or any amount of air attack would bring in the Chinese.

Mr. HELMS. That is our belief, unless it collapsed the Hanoi government.

Senator SYMINGTON. Your last answer is the reason I asked the question.

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.
 Senator GORE. Senator Clark.

U.S. WEAPONS COULD DESTROY MOSCOW

Senator CLARK. Mr. Helms, I have drawn a tentative conclusion from what you and Mr. Duckett have testified to, and I wonder if I am right, that despite the Moscow system the various United States weapons systems could today destroy Moscow.

Mr. HELMS. That is correct.

Senator CLARK. That is right.

CHINA'S MILITARY CAPABILITY

Now, you spoke of the Chinese conventional threat, and if they had a capability outside their borders to attack successfully their neighbors unless a military power, such as the United States, intervened. In your judgment, does the present political turmoil in China affect their external military capability, or is it likely to, if that turmoil continues?

Mr. HELMS. Senator Clark, until now we have not seen any evidence that it has affected their military capability. I think it has—it could. I do not think there is any doubt about it. I think the extent to which the army gets involved in domestic matters with the Red Guard and other things could very well affect their capacity to move in an assertive and an aggressive way. We rather have the impression that the Chinese are inward these days. That does not mean they are not manning their radars, flying their aircraft, marching their troops, and all the rest of it. They are. That goes on as it always has. But it could be affected over the long term by this increasing amount of disorder.

Senator CLARK. But do you think at the present time, and I am thinking more of logistics than I am of their firepower, do you think they have a logistical capability of moving successfully pretty far outside their own borders in the absence of resistance from a major military power?

I was thinking about the Indians.

Mr. HELMS. I would not like to leave that impression, because the Chinese army has a very limited truck park, and when they extend their logistic lines as far as Tibet and over into the area where they would have to go down into India, they are stretched pretty thin, indeed. I think there is a very real question as to how far they could go in India and maintain their forces.

Senator CLARK. How about northeast Thailand?

Mr. HELMS. That is a different problem. They could walk down there rather than in India.

CURTAILING INFILTRATION FROM NORTH VIETNAM

Senator CLARK. Our friend, Mr. Joseph Alsop, from day to day expresses his views about the situation in the Vietnamese war. What can you tell us as to the accuracy of his recent views that the rate of infiltration from North to South Vietnam has been very seriously curtailed as a result of various steps which we have taken? And what can you also tell us as to the accuracy of his view that, I think it is his view, by implication at least, that we have

so successfully curtailed that rate of infiltration that our enemies in Vietnam are going to have to rely from here on in primarily on Viet Cong guerrillas who, in turn, are becoming younger and younger and less and less effective, and they are running out of troops?

Mr. HELMS. Senator Clark. I want to answer your question as forthrightly as a man can answer it. So, let me step back just a minute and say that we in the administration have permitted a situation to develop in which the same sets of figures are used by different people in different ways by adding them up and subtracting from them and so forth to the point where there is such a confusion about infiltration rates that an honest man has a very hard time laying his hand on anything that makes very much sense.

So, rather than answering Mr. Alsop's contention, I would like to answer your question this way: We believe that the North Vietnamese have the capability of infiltrating into the South the number of troops that they need, require, or think they need to maintain their forces there.

Senator CLARK. Just a couple of more questions.

ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

I am just as concerned as Senator Symington about the danger in the arms race in the Middle East. I, too, have just come back from there, although I did not go into the matter in nearly as great a depth as Senator Symington.

I got the general impression based on conversations I had with politicians, and with one conversation I had with the Israeli chief of military intelligence, that the UAR does not presently want to go to war with Israel because they are afraid they would get licked. The Israelis know this. And that the balance of power for the foreseeable future, as between the Arab states, which more or less ring Israel, and the Israelis, is such, that there is no present danger of an Arab attack on Israel. How would you explain that?

Mr. HELMS. I think that is correct. I would subscribe to that. I do not think there is any doubt that the Israeli army is far more competent than the Egyptian or any combination of Arab armies. Their air force is much better and much better manned.

I recognize that one should be very careful in using characterizations, but the Egyptians have not shown any great capability to man very well the sophisticated equipment which the Soviets have given them. The Israelis are far better at this and, therefore, I do not believe that any single Arab state or probably any combination of them intends to attack Israel these days.

RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN MIDDLE EAST

Senator CLARK. I also got the view over there that the Russians, as a political matter, were looking with rather covetous eyes on the other end of the Red Sea, the Aden area and the Somalia area. And that their support of the UAR in Yemen and their view that the British pretty soon are going to get out of Aden, and the thought that de Gaulle was shortly going to conduct a plebiscite to see whether he should give up French Somaliland, posed a pretty considerable threat that the vacuum thus created might be filled, not

directly by the Russians, but by Russian—if at least not satellites, at least allies who would be Russian oriented.

Would you comment on that?

Mr. HELMS. We agree with your assessment.

SUBCOMMITTEE'S JURISDICTION

Senator GORE. With due apologies to my colleagues, could we not stay a little more along the line of the jurisdiction of this subcommittee.

Senator CLARK. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, if you will excuse me saying so, and I hope you would agree with me, that the conventional arms race in the Middle East is a problem for the Disarmament Subcommittee of a high order of priority. These questions of mine were intended to develop what could be done to terminate an arms race in the interests of arms control and disarmament.

Senator GORE. All right, proceed.

Senator SYMINGTON. Maybe it is my fault, because I was trying in the conventional—this growing conventional danger of the UAR with the reaction on the part of the Israelis [Deleted.]

Senator GORE. Well, I certainly do not mean to imply that the arms race in the Middle East is not of great importance. I guess I had just overly anticipated that we would stay on the ballistic and antiballistic development today. But if members desire to go elsewhere, proceed.

Senator CLARK. No, I only had one more question.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is probably my fault.

[Deleted.]

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GORE. Senator Cooper? Senator Pell?

JET AIRCRAFT TO JORDAN

Senator PELL. One question, along the line of Senator Symington and Senator Clark, is we were informed by the committee, and I am sure everybody else knows, that we were giving a rather large supply of brand new jet airplanes, I think, to Jordan. Would that not very much upset the present balance from an intelligence viewpoint? Is Jordan at the low end of the balance of terror, or whatever it is called, in that part of the world?

Mr. HELMS. The jet aircraft that we give to Jordan is not going to upset the balance of power in the Middle East in a way that would be dangerous in our opinion. In the first place, the Jordanians have been one of the Arab countries that has taken a rather moderate road, as you know, and has stood for peace and quiet in the area. These jet planes, obviously the Israelis object to it, and come in and make comments about it, and put all the pressure on our government they can about it, but they are not fearful of them.

Senator PELL. Thank you. No further questions.

MOSCOW MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

Senator GORE. Well, I have a few more questions on the question of ballistic defense before going to the Chinese situation.

Now, you have indicated your judgment that, even with the operational deployment of the Moscow System, that with a multiple at-

tack of sophisticated weapons without question the screen could be successfully penetrated. Do you mean sufficiently to destroy Moscow?

Mr. HELMS. We believe so, sir. Yes.

Senator GORE. You believe so.

Now, if the Soviets successfully deployed one system around Moscow, to what extent would this imply that the deployment of additional systems or a multiplication of that system, or an integration of that system with others, could possibly neutralize or minimize the effect of an offense against them?

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, as I mentioned, we do not see any evidence whatsoever that this Moscow System exists anywhere else in the Soviet Union, or that they intend to install it anywhere else in the Soviet Union. Therefore, we are of the opinion that in the year 1967, if the United States were to attack the Soviet Union, we would obliterate the Soviet Union.

Senator GORE. Well, that is not the purport of my question.

THE TALLINN SYSTEM

My question was, is the nature of this system such that if it, in fact, should be multiplied—

Mr. HELMS. I see.

Senator GORE [continuing]. What would be the defense potential?

Mr. HELMS. Well, it would be better than the Tallinn System that they are presently installing. It would do a better job than the Tallinn System which they are installing, but we believe it would have the same defects that the Moscow System presently has and that, therefore, we would be able to penetrate it.

Senator GORE. Yes.

Now, coming to the Tallinn system, I have heard scientists express the view that it is primarily for ballistic defense. Others, as you say, including your judgment, say that it is primarily for high defense against high, fast-flying planes.

Now, assuming that it had both capabilities, which I think from all I have heard is likely to be the case, to what extent it has capability is a matter of disagreement. But assuming that it has dual capability, to what extent would it serve as an initiation or a beginning of deployment of more so-called Moscow Systems? Are they radically different, or are their radars and other components, computable and supplementary?

Mr. HELMS. They are sufficiently different that we do not believe that they would be interchangeable and that you could mix one with the other.

Senator GORE. Then, to bring this to a conclusion, you do not now foresee a sufficient deployment of either the Moscow System or the Tallinn system, or a multiplication or merging of these two which would compromise seriously our strategy of deterrence, our ability to destroy?

Mr. HELMS. No, sir.

Senator GORE. Before going to the Chinese situation, are there other questions with respect to the Russian?

Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. No, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GORE. Senator Cooper?

IF RUSSIA MADE THE FIRST STRIKE

Senator COOPER. Would it be the same answer if Russia made the first strike?

Mr. HELMS. I beg your pardon, sir?

Senator COOPER. Suppose Russia made the first strike, would your answer be the same?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, it is my understanding of American capability that we could still do the job even if they made the first strike. That is the basis on which our forces are deployed at the present time.

Senator COOPER. With the added factor of the installation of this system?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Now, going—

Senator SYMINGTON. Just one point. I think the questions that you have raised are terribly pertinent because our problem is to gauge, as the ABM decision comes up for decision by people—Senator Gore, as you know, serves on the Joint Atomic Energy Commission—the nature and the degree of the anti-ballistic development in the Soviet Union, correct?

Senator GORE. Yes.

FRIGHT-MONGERING ABOUT ABM

Senator SYMINGTON. With that premise, what you say to us today, as I understand it, is that they have a very high degree of development, very possibly around Moscow, but it is not carried out in the rest of the country.

Mr. HELMS. Correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is that correct?

Mr. HELMS. Correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. And that does not bear out a lot of the fright-mongering that has been going on.

I am not saying we shouldn't have an ABM system, but I am saying you cleared that completely to me this afternoon, that their very highly developed unit is only around one city, is that correct?

Mr. HELMS. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator PELL. May I ask a question?

Senator GORE. Yes.

RUSSIAN DEPLOYMENT AIMED AGAINST U.S.

Senator PELL. Are there any signs of any development vis-a-vis China or is the whole defense to ICBM's launched from the Continental United States?

Mr. HELMS. So far the deployment looks to us as though it was designed: (a) against the United States, in other words, the normal missile path over which we would fire our missiles; and (b) to defend certain particular industrial complexes inside the Soviet Union.

We see no deployment thus far that we believe is directed specifically at China.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

GANTRY DEVICES

Senator GORE. Now, coming to the Chinese situation, you gave some adjectives, which I don't recall, in describing the size of the complex for missile firing and weaponry development. Would you break this down into gantry size? What size thrust, what size launching pad, what size gantry do you find?

Mr. HELMS. May I ask Mr. Duckett to answer that? I have forgotten the numbers.

Senator PELL. The what?

Senator GORE. Gantry.

I believe ours at Cape Kennedy run to—what height?

Mr. DUCKETT. Mr. Chairman, the gantry device involved for the Saturn V, which, of course, is the very monstrous space launcher, is something over 500 feet in height. However, the more conventional missile associated or weapon associated gantries would be customarily in the two to three hundred foot height for our, say, Titan-Atlas type systems.

Senator GORE. In other words, if we were going to test an ICBM of five to seven thousand miles, we would use a gantry of in the order of 200, 250 feet?

Mr. DUCKETT. Yes, sir. I would add, Mr. Chairman, however, that that in itself wouldn't, we would feel, be a guide of good criterion because the Minuteman is launched with little, if any, sort of a gantry at all. But I believe if I have captured the sense of the Chairman's question, that I could best answer the Chinese one this way. [Deleted.]

Senator GORE. In other words, to elaborate this point—

Mr. DUCKETT. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Do you think insofar as the gantry device is concerned, or the launching pad complex, that they are now constructing or have constructed such facilities to test an ICBM?

Mr. DUCKETT. We do believe, sir, that is the most likely function for this new launch facility, [deleted.]

[Discussion off the record.]

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Senator PELL. Wouldn't it be sound psychological warfare for the Chinese to build at very little expense a bamboo illusionary gantry to make us think they have this capability when they really didn't?

Senator GORE. Again, off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator GORE. Back on the record.

Will you proceed?

You said that there were two measurements that you were undertaking to determine. One was the size and height. What is the other one?

Mr. DUCKETT. Mr. Chairman, if I may go off the record again for just a moment.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator GORE. Back on the record.

NUCLEAR THREAT FROM CHINA

In the committee hearings earlier this week, I felt it necessary on two occasions to express some reservation to the statements of two eminent elder statesmen of the country, whose statements seem to me to downgrade the nuclear threat from Red China.

From what you gentlemen have said to us, they are nearing the test stage of an intercontinental ballistic missile. They have had several tests of nuclear devices. Have those devices been equal to the device with which we destroyed Hiroshima?

Mr. HELMS. You answer that.

Mr. DUCKETT. Mr. Chairman, certainly the devices, and particularly the last one, are well beyond the capability of our Hiroshima bomb.

Senator GORE. That ran to the order of [deleted] as powerful?

Mr. DUCKETT. Yes, sir. My understanding of the Hiroshima bomb was on the order of 20 kilotons and in the case of the most recent Chinese tests we believe that its yield was on the order of [deleted].

Therefore, more than a factor of [deleted] in terms of yield.

Senator GORE. Then, if China had one intercontinental ballistic missile, with a warhead equal to [deleted] the weapon that obliterated Hiroshima, and it should be trained on Tokyo or New Delhi or even toward a Soviet city, it would surely be something that could not be ignored.

Mr. HELMS. It could not be ignored in any sense.

Senator GORE. Or for that matter on Saigon.

Mr. HELMS. Or on Saigon.

CHINA'S NUCLEAR STOCKPILE

Senator GORE. Now, what is your projection of the nuclear stockpile which China has now or will have two, five, seven years from now, in that order?

Mr. HELMS. Would you answer that, Carl, if you can.

Mr. DUCKETT. I would like to answer part of the question and then I will have to get the specific projections.

I would answer that part of the question dealing with today's stockpile, and, that is, that we believe that it is most likely that [deleted].

Senator GORE. How large a gaseous diffusion plant do they have?

Mr. DUCKETT. This part, sir, I am willing to check some documents or offer to give you the numbers because I would hate to have those wrong. I don't trust my head to give you that, so I would prefer either to give you this later or attempt to dig it out of my material.

I don't have that clearly in hand.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave. May I ask one question?

Senator GORE. Yes, indeed.

CHINA AS A SERIOUS NUCLEAR MENACE

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Helms, in a very broad way, when do you think the Chinese will be a serious nuclear menace to the security of the United States? What time period, very broad guessimate.

Mr. HELMS. Well, sir, as best we can estimate it, and I want to say I am terribly anxious not to mislead you, and I am making these estimates with the information we have available. But it is not adequate, in my opinion. We are talking about the middle 1970's, but I don't know whether that is a good estimate or not.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is what I wanted to know.

Senator GORE. Excuse me, I was talking to somebody else.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator GORE. Well, back on the record.

DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

The Chinese are giving top priority, are they not, to the development of a nuclear capability?

Mr. HELMS. This they are certainly doing.

Senator GORE. [Deleted.]

Senator GORE. Do they have reactors to make plutonium?

Mr. HELMS. Yes.

Senator GORE. When would they have—

Mr. HELMS. [Deleted.]

Senator GORE. Yes.

Now, just in a general way, when would you estimate that the Chinese would have a stockpile of weapons in the order of a number, say, from one to 500?

Mr. DUCKETT. Mr. Chairman, we have to date been unable to actually estimate that they will stockpile numbers in the hundreds. I say that not to infer that we do not think they will at some date stockpile numbers such as that. Rather, to illustrate that we believe that into the, well, into the 1970's, they will be forced to use those facilities which we now know about. We do not see those facilities producing numbers in the hundreds of stockpiled weapons as far ahead as we can project from those with reasonable confidence.

So, I would simply say that our estimating to date is on much lesser numbers. And we will certainly provide to you, preferring to do it in a more precise way, those numbers in this nearer term period up into the early and mid '70's. But this does not include the hundreds of weapons in any case, sir.

THE DANGERS OF GUESSING

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, if you will forgive me, I would just like to congratulate the witnesses on the conservation of their statements and their bearing upon on what is really known. We have seen in the past the temptation to make real guesses into guesstimates, and I congratulate you on not guessing. This is one of the greatest dangers on which decisions are somewhat untenable.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, sir.

THE U.S. IS LIGHT YEARS AHEAD OF EVERYONE ELSE

Senator COOPER. What are the factors which inhibit an early developmental capability to strike the United States?

Mr. HELMS. Sir, they just have got to develop the industrial equipment and the knowhow and all the rest of the things to do

these things, and they are in a pretty primitive state. I think it is important that we realize that the Soviets and the United States are light years ahead of anybody else in the world in these fields, particularly when it comes to the industrialization that is necessary to do this. The Chinese are just going to have a very difficult time catching up.

But we believe that they have the capacity, the manpower and so forth to do it, and they will get there eventually.

Senator GORE. Of course, this is a factor, it seems to me, which may be a very troublesome and perhaps a limiting one upon the Soviets in reaching the feeling of freedom to conclude an agreement with us with respect to ABM vis-a-vis the United States and Russia. That is why I was particularly interested in developing this at this point, not so much as to when it would be a threat to the United States, but as to its immediate effect upon this drive by our government to conclude an agreement with the Soviets.

Mr. HELMS. Of course, this is quite possible, Mr. Chairman. I mean what is going on in the Soviet mind on this problem is very hard to get at, but I think you put your finger on something that may turn out to be the case. They may say this isn't directed at you, but we still have a problem, and that is on our landmass, and we don't have the Pacific Ocean protecting us.

Senator GORE. Yes. In other words, if they have a hundred weapons aimed at the cities of Russia, and if they set up a deterrence of their own vis-a-vis China and Russia, then all this will be in addition to their huge land army.

Obviously, we haven't gone into the proliferation negotiations at all.

AN ABM MORATORIUM

Now, if the United States and the Soviet Union do agree to a moratorium on ABM, what assurances could we have, what verification, what type of verification could we have that they were complying with this?

Mr. HELMS. Well, Senator Gore, I think that this verification problem, as you know, has been about as controversial in the disarmament field. I confidently feel that we could in the intelligence community tell whether or not the Soviets were complying about an anti-ballistic missile system. This is the kind of system, in order to operate, that has to have some exposure, and I think we could keep track of that pretty well. This is not to say, if I may say so, that I would necessarily like to go into a meeting of the executive branch of the Government and put my hand in the fire for this because there are certain problems which could develop in our lives that might make this difficult for us. But in the state of the art in 1967 we could verify it.

Senator GORE. You think you could verify it?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, I believe so.

Senator GORE. Particularly the installation of a system of the sophistication of the Moscow System?

Mr. HELMS. Yes, sir, because these radars are big, and they are exposed.

Senator GORE. They have to be exposed to operate.

Mr. HELMS. That is right, and they have to be big.

Senator GORE. Well, it is 25 until 5 and I suppose—Senator Cooper, do you have a question before we conclude?

Senator COOPER. No, thank you.

Senator GORE. We want to thank you. It is entirely possible that other members of the subcommittee would have some questions, and, in fact, we will want to talk with you about the non-proliferation situation a little further.

We will have to call you when we can arrange a date.

Mr. HELMS. Thank you, sir. I would be glad to appear at any time.

Senator GORE. Thank you. You have been very helpful.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, subject to call of the chair.]

**STATUS OF DEVELOPMENT OF BALLISTIC
AND ANTI-BALLISTIC SYSTEMS IN U.S., AND
BRIEFING ON NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY**

Monday, February 6, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC

The, subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Gore (presiding), Lausche, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, Case, and Cooper.

Also present: Lt. Col. E. L. Harper, USAF; Lt. Col. A. B. Outlaw, USAF; Col. Wm. B. Arnold, USAF; Maj. Christopher, ACDA, Congressional Liaison; Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Herbert Scoville, Jr., Assistant Director, Science & Technology Bureau; and Charles N. Van Doren, Deputy General Counsel.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Bader, of the committee staff.

[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN S. FOSTER Jr., DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

* * * * *

CONTROVERSY OVER VALUE OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE [P. 4]

The first controversy arose around the question, "Could a bullet hit a bullet?" This phase passed, first when calculations showed the feasibility of such an intercept, and later and most definitely when successful intercepts of actual ICBM targets fired from Vandenberg AFB were accomplished by the old NIKE ZEUS system in 1962-63. We had 10 out of 14 successful intercepts with the average miss distance less than 470 feet—a distance at which destruction is assured from a nuclear burst.

After this "simple" problem was solved, it was realized that the offense would replace the easy-to-intercept single warhead with clouds of objects, or take other deceptive measures. Examples of these objects were decoys designed to look like warheads to the

radar, and chaff designed to conceal the warhead in a cloud of light objects. Against those more sophisticated targets there was a necessity for the defense to discriminate among them so as to know which objects to take under fire. Hence, many objects might have to be tracked and observed simultaneously. Also, it might be necessary for the defense to wait for atmospheric reentry of the targets and rely on slow-down and burn-up of the lighter objects before this discrimination could be accomplished.

If you turn to the page and then turn the whole assembly sideways, you will see a figure which depicts the kind of things that go on under the worst conditions during an attack.

Up in the right-hand corner, you see a cloud. This is intended to represent the situation when there are large numbers of objects coming in a very large distribution of chaff. The radar, and looking at it at a distance of several hundred miles, sees it merely as a cloud, and can acquire and track that cloud as it comes into the vicinity of the target.

When the cloud has reached a distance of about a hundred miles, it then is possible for the radar to distinguish different objects within the cloud, and to make a designation on several of them.

Subsequently, however, if you get to the lower left-hand, you will see that the cloud itself stops, and at ranges of 25 to 50 miles one would expect to see individual objects penetrating through the atmosphere toward the target. As you see in this case, some of them are indicated as radiating.—radar jamming—and others are merely decoys looking like reentry vehicles. Still others must be considered to be reentry vehicles including thermonuclear war heads.

DEFECTS OF NIKE-ZEUS SYSTEM WERE REMOVED

Turn now back to the middle of page 2. The old NIKE ZEUS system, when confronted with these more sophisticated targets, had two fatal defects. One was that it used what are now considered to be old-fashioned mechanical radars, which had to be mechanically slewed or pointed at each target in turn. This required a matter of seconds.

One practically had to have a radar for each target. The ZEUS missile could not be delayed in firing until atmospheric reentry of the targets took place, because it was too slow. Hence, discrimination could not be aided by atmospheric filtering.

Because of these defects, the NIKE X concept was born. First, the mechanical radars of NIKE ZEUS were replaced by phased array radars, which by varying the electrical phase of the power over the face of a fixed antenna array could change the direction of the radar beam in a matter of microseconds (Figure 2). This imparted a capability of tracking many objects simultaneously, and thus removed one of the ZEUS defects. Second, a very high-performance short-range interceptor missile, the SPRINT was introduced, capable of flying to 80,000 feet in 10 seconds. It was smaller, cheaper, and had much higher acceleration than ZEUS, and thus could afford to wait until reentry of the targets before being committed to fire. Atmospheric filtering was now feasible, and the remaining targets could be attacked with the high firepower SPRINT.

The old ZEUS interceptor was retained in the system for long range attacks on simple targets. We now had two interceptors—the ZEUS weighing 24,000 pounds, three-stage, carrying a nuclear [deleted] warhead, and designed to intercept out to about 75 miles; and the SPRINT, 7,400 pounds, two-stage, carrying a [deleted] warhead, and designed to intercept out to about 20 miles.

The NIKE X development, initiated in 1963, was thus much more effective than the old ZEUS system. It must be noted, however, that it was essentially a “terminal defense” system. The SPRINT effective radius was about 20 miles, which meant that it could only defend cities or selected sites. Hence, since it is obviously impractical to deploy terminal defenses at every small city or village in the United States, it was subject to a by-pass attack. That is to say, an enemy could always target the undefended cities and obtain high casualties. This option was available even to unsophisticated opponents. The sophisticated opponent, by concentrating his firepower, could overwhelm the defense at any selected defended site.

DEVELOPMENT OF “AREA DEFENSE”

The next important development in defense effectiveness came with the introduction of “area defense” in the period 1964–65. I would like to define the term “area defense.” The concept is presented pictorially in Figure 3.

The detection sensor is the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) which detects ballistic missiles at long ranges of approximately 1,600 n.m. This is about the range at which an incoming missile appears above the horizon. The PAR radar tracks the incoming missile and predicts its future path. To intercept the incoming missile, we employ the SPARTAN missile which is a long range interceptor developed from the old NIKE–ZEUS. Once the PAR radar has predicted the future path of the target, a SPARTAN missile is fired so as to intercept it.

Senator CLARK. Well, it is a missile, isn't it? It is also a target.

Dr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Senator GORE. It is your target.

Dr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Senator CLARK. It is their missile.

Dr. FOSTER. Well, their missile is a complete system on the pad. Shortly after boost the re-entry vehicle and multiple object if there are to be multiple objects are severed off.

Senator CLARK. It is semantics, but I want to clear what you are talking about. What you mean is that the object which is intended to explode on American target is what you are talking about when you say you are going to intercept it at 1,660 miles.

Dr. FORSTER. Yes, that is correct. Acquire at 1,600 miles and subsequently intercept it at some shorter distances.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Dr. FOSTER. This interceptor has a range of over 400 miles, and intercepts the incoming missile well above the atmosphere. Because of its long range, the SPARTAN can intercept incoming missiles directed at targets several hundred miles from the SPARTAN battery location. Thus, because each SPARTAN battery can defend a fairly large area, it requires only about 14 batteries to provide

coverage of the entire continental United States. The SPARTAN missile is guided by a missile site radar (MSR) which is associated with each battery. The PAR radars would be defended with short range high performance SPRINT missiles to prevent their being targeted first to blind the defense.

CHANGE IN CONCEPT OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS

The advance which made area defense feasible was a change in the concept of the nuclear warhead. The SPARTAN warhead is a high-yield nuclear warhead with a high-energy X-ray output ("the hot bomb"). Such a warhead, and particularly a large-yield warhead, substantially increases the kill radius of the interceptor at altitudes of, say, 300,000 feet.

Senator CLARK. When you say kill radius, you are talking about killing the missile and not killing a lot of people?

Dr. FOSTER. That is correct. It is the radius at which we can be confident of killing—

Senator CLARK. Destroying?

Dr. FOSTER [continuing]. An incoming warhead.

Senator GORE. Well,—

Dr. FOSTER. Destroying it.

Senator GORE. Since Senator Clark has made this interruption, I wonder if you could indicate here just what would be the kill radius from X-rays?

Dr. FOSTER. The kill radius from X-rays takes place above a hundred thousand feet as the major mechanism for kill of enemy warheads, and above these altitudes the kill radius is assumed to be about 10 miles against hardened Soviet warheads.

Senator GORE. When you say, let's understand what you mean. If we are speaking of the same term when we are saying radius, are you speaking of five miles each way from the detonation?

Dr. FOSTER. I mean 10 miles each way.

Senator GORE. Then you are speaking 20 miles radius?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, sir, I am speaking of a sphere 20 miles in diameter. If there are any objects within that sphere with our explosion at the center, then we would believe that they are destroyed.

Now, in actual fact today the community would agree that we would destroy the existing—the system we are talking about, could, if it were deployed destroy the existing Soviet warheads at much greater distances.

Senator GORE. When you reduce your diameter of the sphere to 20 miles you think that would be the minimum of any foreseeable sophistication of incoming weapons?

Dr. FOSTER. Well, Mr. Chairman, I believe that it is possible in time to configure re-entry vehicle and the thermonuclear warheads within them so that they could sustain even greater x-ray intensities than those I have indicated. The number of 10 miles I associate with the kind of hardening that can be achieved by the Soviets during the few years after our initial deployment of such a system.

Senator GORE. What do you mean a few years, just an order?

Dr. FOSTER. Five years.

Senator GORE. And say it would take us three years to deploy.

Dr. FOSTER. We could have a system, say, by 1973 and I would claim that the effectiveness of the U.S. ballistic missile defense would be about 10 miles against Soviet radar—excuse me, Soviet reentry vehicles in the field through until 1978.

LENGTH OF TIME TO IMPROVE U.S. OFFENSE

Senator GORE. A very pertinent question here is the time element with respect to our own improvement of reentry of our own missiles. The Soviets are now deploying a system, the Tallinn System, over some 26 other areas. How long will—if we proceed upon the tactical philosophy of improving our offense as the best defense, in what period of time will we be able to accomplish this hardening and improvement which you think it would take the Soviets five years to accomplish?

Dr. FOSTER. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have, as you know, been working aggressively on this general area ever since 1961, and currently have in our missiles the products of the program. We are, however, continuing to increase the hardness of the reentry vehicle so although the systems deployed by 1969 will be harder than those currently deployed and those by 1971 will be still harder. I believe I may have given the committee some misunderstanding with respect to your earlier question.

It is not so much—the kill radius that we talked about for the U.S. high-yield warhead associated with SPARTAN is not so much to make sure that we can kill the object we are aiming at. We can surely do that because, as I indicated, we had been able in 1962 and '63 to bring a missile to within a few hundred feet of an incoming ICBM.

It is important, however, because it forces the enemy, if he wishes to attack with many objects coming in simultaneously from one missile, to put each of these objects a large distance from its neighbors, and so in trying to kill them all at once we can only be sure of killing things out to a radius of 10 miles.

Senator CLARK. From where?

Dr. FOSTER. From the point of detonation. All of the other objects, if they are to still survive, must be outside of that.

That then forces the enemy to either use lighter warheads, lighter objects that he can throw to larger distances, or more propellant to throw them to larger distances, or more propellant to throw them to larger distances.

Well, to continue—

DEVELOPMENT OF PERIMETER ACQUISITION RADAR (PAR)

Senator AIKEN. May I ask you one question there? Is it possible to change direction of a missile at specified distances from the target?

Dr. FOSTER. During flight, Senator?

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, it is.

Senator AIKEN. And have you developed a PAR so that it will adapt itself to change in the direction of the missile?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, we have, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. Our defenses, will they change with the direction?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, that is a particular feature of the PAR radar.

Senator AIKEN. That is a particular feature of PAR?

Dr. FOSTER. That it can track essentially instantaneously over a large volume of the sky.

POSEIDON MISSILE

Senator GORE. Doctor Foster, as I recall it, the C.I.A. was unable to verify that the Soviets had accomplished a multiple warhead missile such as our Poseidon. How far are we along in the development of a multiple warhead missile?

Dr. FOSTER. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know, we have already deployed in the Polaris system the A-3 missile—excuse me, the A-3 contains three separate warheads.

Senator GORE. Yes. But the Poseidon has—

Dr. FOSTER. The Poseidon could have as many as 14 separate warheads.

Senator GORE. That is what I thought. When will this be—

Dr. FOSTER. That is to be deployed beginning 1970.

Senator GORE. And our nuclear submarines will be redesigned to carry the Poseidon instead of the Polaris?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Senator CLARK. Is this a big job of redesigning?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, it is a fairly thorough redesign.

Senator AIKEN. You want to change the design of the submarine?

Dr. FOSTER. No, it is not so much—

Senator AIKEN. Torpedo tubes or what?

Dr. FOSTER. It is not so much the redesign of the submarine. The boats are essentially the same.

One uses new equipment in the control of the missile.

Senator AIKEN. I see.

Dr. FOSTER. And, of course, a brand new missile that is to go basically in the same tubes.

Senator GORE. There are, of course, some differences in assessment of our intelligence units. I wonder in this instance if the Armed Services intelligence would agree with the C.I.A. that there is no hard evidence that the Soviets have developed a multiple head.

Dr. FOSTER. I believe the intelligence community is in agreement that there is no hard evidence that the Soviets have developed a multiple warhead capability.

Senator GORE. Has their science academy announced such? Have the Soviets made claims of such?

Dr. FOSTER. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to draw your attention to a terribly important difference between multiple warheads and the so-called MIRV. Multiple warheads as it is used in the A-3 missile simply means three, in this case, three warheads on a single missile. And a plan—

Senator GORE. Will you say that again?

Dr. FOSTER. The current missile aboard Polaris submarines—

Senator GORE. You are speaking of our missiles now?

Dr. FOSTER. That is correct; yes—has three warheads on the top of the missile.

Senator GORE. YES.

Dr. FOSTER. The design is such that after the missile is fired and the reentry vehicle section is separated from the rest of the booster system the separate warheads and their reentry vehicles are directed to separate trajectories in space, such that they would fall on the ground at different times but make approximately an equilateral triangle with their aim point, with their impact points around the central aiming point. This separation—

Senator GORE. In other words, they would arrive on the same target but with different trajectories and, therefore, different times?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, that is correct. They burst with a separation distance of about two kilometers on a side.

Now, that separation, that deployment arrangement, is designed in at the factory, so to speak.

Now, there is a quite different system to be aboard the Poseidon and the Minuteman III. This system involves an entirely separate propulsion system after the burnout of the last stage. This propulsion system has guidance and a program to take each of its payloads to a different target that is put on the guidance by the commander of the vehicle.

Senator GORE. This is the MIRV?

Dr. FOSTER. This is the MIRV.

Senator GORE. Yes.

Dr. FOSTER. This propulsion system, then, under the direction of guidance, orients the whole vehicle on a trajectory which will lead to impact on a specified point. At that stage, it eases off one of the payloads, which will then subsequently go to that impact point. The propulsion system, then, again under the direction of the guidance, reorients the remainder of the payload on to a new target. When it is on the course toward the new target, it eases off a second payload, and so on, until it is discharged, in the case of Poseidon, as much as 14 different reentry vehicles.

Senator GORE. One of the 14 is discharged?

Dr. FOSTER. That is correct. But not at high velocity.

Senator GORE. Yes.

Senator COOPER. May I ask a question?

The A-3 then is directed toward one target?

Dr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Senator COOPER. The other systems you talk about, the Poseidon and the Minuteman—

Dr. FOSTER. Yes.

Senator COOPER [continuing]. The payloads, as you call it, could be separated and they could be directed to—

Dr. FOSTER. Different cities.

Senator COOPER [continuing]. As many targets as it is desired.

Dr. FOSTER. That is correct.

MISSILE ACQUISITION

And continuing, Mr. Chairman, this high yield warhead in the SPARTAN has a substantially increased kill radius for the interceptor at altitudes about 300,000 feet. The lethal range increases from a few hundred feet to several miles.

Consequently, the offense is unable to rely on relatively small clouds of confusing objects a few miles in radius.

To carry this warhead, a larger interceptor—
 Senator GORE. What do you mean clouds? You don't mean natural clouds?

Dr. FOSTER. No, sir.

Senator GORE. The cloud created by the—

Dr. FOSTER. A dispersal of the large mass of tinfoil. Call it chaff.

Senator GORE. In other words, artificial clouds?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes. Artificial.

I believe you can see it on Figure 1.

Senator GORE. I saw that. But I wanted to be sure—you are not speaking of any sort of possible natural phenomenon?

Dr. FOSTER. No, sir, I am not.

Senator GORE. No matter how intense it might be?

Dr. FOSTER. That is correct.

Senator GORE. Okay.

SPARTAN REPLACED THE ZEUS

Dr. FOSTER. To carry this warhead, a larger interceptor than the old ZEUS missile was required. The SPARTAN missile weighs about 35,000 pounds, is three-stage, carries a [deleted] warhead, and is designed to intercept at about 300 miles or more.

With the introduction of SPARTAN, the ZEUS interceptor was no longer required—in effect, the SPARTAN replaced the ZEUS.

Figure 4 shows the “footprint” on a map of the U.S. defended by a SPARTAN battery. A footprint is the area defended by SPARTAN from a specific direction of attack. The SPARTAN might intercept directly overhead an ICBM aimed at a point several hundred miles away.

Comparatively few SPARTAN batteries can defend the whole United States from simple attacks. Figure 5 shows an example of 14 SPARTAN batteries, with four PAR radars located across the northern U.S. border, defending against an ICBM threat from the Chinese Peoples Republic.

Senator CLARK. That is what CPR means?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes.

You will note I said simple attacks. It is still possible for a sophisticated opponent, by warheading hardening and by separating his incoming clouds of objects into widely separated clumps, to confuse the defense and make the firepower demands on SPARTAN too high. In this case, terminal defense SPRINT's must be relied upon if we are to furnish a defense.

Senator GORE. I am violating my own suggestion, but maybe we had better reconsider. I find this so difficult that it may be helpful to others as well as me to ask a few questions as we go along.

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

DEFENSE AGAINST A SIMPLE ATTACK

Senator GORE. Now, do I correctly understand that this defense against a so-called simple attack described here on Figure 5 that that would be roughly what is referred to in the press, otherwise as the thin defense?

Dr. FOSTER. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GORE. That is the system, the cost of which would be anticipated, say from four to six billion dollars?

Dr. FOSTER. For the defense of the United States only would be in the vicinity of three to four billion.

Senator COOPER. How much?

Dr. FOSTER. Three to four billion.

Senator GORE. That is the defense against the relatively unsophisticated weapons which the Chinese are now developing?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes.

Senator GORE. Thank you.

Senator CLARK. Would you yield, Albert?

Senator GORE. No, anybody. Let's just ask some questions as we go along.

COST OF CITIES' DEFENSE

Senator CLARK. The thing that bothers me is he says on page 6, which he hasn't got to yet, that the cost of the 25-city defense would be \$10 billion of the 50 cities defense \$20 billion. So, I wondered how that correlated with the very much lower figure which you just mentioned.

Of course, he has not gotten to it.

Dr. FOSTER. Mr. Chairman, if I may I would like to read that point and then answer the question.

DEFINITION OF A BATTERY

Senator COOPER. May I ask a question here? Will you define battery?

Dr. FOSTER. A battery, Senator, is a site. A location where one has a radar and a number of defensive missiles.

Senator COOPER. I notice in your first drawing on page 4, what you call the SPARTAN footprint.

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, sir, that indicates—

Senator COOPER. Would it need more than one battery to protect that footprint area?

Dr. FOSTER. No, sir. Rreferring again to Figure 4, you see an area outlined there in the central portion, in the northeast portion, of the United States. In the upper region of that area, you will notice a dark triangle. That is intended to indicate the point at which the radar and the SPARTAN missiles are located.

Senator COOPER. Yes.

Dr. FOSTER. From that point then the missile can defend the area indicated by the surrounding line.

Senator CLARK. What do those little plus signs mean?

Dr. Foster. I believe, Senator, those are the intersection of the lines of longitude and latitude.

Senator COOPER. Would a battery have several missiles?

Dr. FOSTER. Oh, yes. It could have, for example, 20 or 30 missiles.

Senator COOPER. To protect an area such as designated on the map, do you have any idea how many missiles would be required?

Dr. FOSTER. We would plan on 20 to 30.

Senator COOPER. Twenty to thirty?

Senator CLARK. Looking at Figure 5 which you mentioned, would you define what the phrase at the top of the figure means "Minimum Energy (23) Attack from E. China." What does that mean?

Dr. FOSTER. It refers to an attack coming from the eastern portion of China, attempting to get maximum range from the missile, which, in turn, would amount to a reentry vehicle coming into the United States at an angle of 23 degrees from the horizon.

Senator CLARK. What does minimum energy mean?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, I am afraid I forgot to take that—

Senator CLARK. I thought it meant 23 missiles.

Dr. FOSTER. I forgot to take that technical designation off the graph.

Senator GORE. I hope that my colleagues will now see why twice last week I felt the necessity of raising a reservation at the hearing with Ambassador Kennan and Ambassador Reischauer who tended to downgrade the importance of the Chinese development.

When the Secretary of Defense tells us that he anticipates, and the C.I.A., and the Atomic Energy Commission tell us that they expect the Chinese to test an intercontinental ballistic missile of from five to seven thousand mile range this coming summer, and that we see from satellite pictures that their laboratories for nuclear development are as large as ours, in some cases larger, than it is anticipated that the Chinese will have the capability of making just such an unsophisticated nuclear ballistic missile attack on the United States as this defense in Figure 5 is calculated to provide a defense against.

It that true?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The defense position as indicated by Figure 5 as designed to provide defense of the United States against Chinese attack amounting to tens of missiles successfully reaching the area of the United States.

Senator GORE. Well, for the benefit of my colleagues, the Atomic Energy experts estimated that within five years the Chinese would likely have both missile and warheads in the order of hundreds.

I don't know that—now, the C.I.A., may I say, the other Friday did not agree with that estimate. They did not exactly put an estimate upon time, and since you—

Dr. FOSTER. Mr. Chairman, I will check for the record. I believe we cannot give you hard evidence to support several, to report a statement, saying that, to the effect that the Chinese could have several hundred warhead in five years.

Senator GORE. I didn't say several!

Dr. FOSTER. A hundred.

Senator GORE. They were asked the question, not by me but I think by Senator Pastore, whether in five years their stockpile would be termed in dozens and hundreds or in thousands. There were three experts there and, as I recall it, they conferred among themselves and thought it more nearly would be measured by hundreds rather than dozens or thousands. That is a very inexact estimate, but if this is designed to protect, say, against tens—

Dr. FOSTER. Successfully reaching the United States.

Senator GORE. YES.

Dr. FOSTER. That means one would have to multiply by two or three to take care of reliability, lack of reliability.

Senator GORE. I am not trying to specify the danger, but I am trying to indicate to my colleagues this certainly is not something that can be taken lightly.

TESTIMONY OF INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS

Senator CLARK. Albert could you clarify for the record who these experts were; were these Atomic Energy employees?

Senator GORE. Yes.

Senator CLARK. And not CIA and not Pentagon?

Senator GORE. One of them is the head of the Los Alamos Laboratory, and the other was Dr. Brandbury. I can get that for you, if you would like.

I think we should have them here, too.

Senator CLARK. I think so, too. Because I take it from what you say, and I didn't know it, that the Atomic Energy Commission has its own bunch of intelligence experts who may not agree with either DOD intelligence or CIA intelligence. Is that correct?

Senator GORE. Well, I think—well, the Atomic Energy Commission has a great deal of intelligence work which they have done with respect to detonations by any country. They play a very little role in the intelligence effort with respect to proliferation.

Senator CLARK. Which would overlap the covering of the same subject by DOD intelligence and CIA intelligence.

Senator GORE. I think that is a reasonable statement.

Do you agree with that, Doctor?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

[Deleted.]

Senator CLARK. But sometimes don't agree. At least, I gather from what you said—

Dr. FOSTER. That is correct, yes.

Senator GORE. But, by and large, [deleted].

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, when Mr. Helms or Mr. McNamara gives a statement on what the community's position is, it has always included a full treatment of the opinions and thoughts and ideas of the technical members of the Atomic Energy Commission's laboratories.

Senator CLARK. Were those the only three who do this detailed technical intelligence work for our Government—DOD, CIA and the Atomic Energy Commission? For example, nobody over at ACDA does any of this?

Dr. FOSTER. No, sir, I believe the answer to your question is correct.

Senator GORE. What about NASA?

Dr. FOSTER. They do not generally get into this work.

Senator GORE. You have then these three agencies.

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, that is correct.

Senator GORE. If it is agreeable with the subcommittee, since we have had the CIA and the DOD, it might be well to have the AEC.

Senator CLARK. I would think so.

Senator GORE. Would you agree, Senator Cooper?

Senator COOPER. Yes.

MINIMUM ENERGY ATTACK

Senator CLARK. Before you leave this, Dr. Foster, I wonder if you could define a little more in layman's terms than you have so far what this phrase on figure 5, "Minimum Energy (23) Attack from East China." means. I have particular reference to what you mean

by minimum energy, and again because I did not get it the last time, what 23 stands for.

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, Senator. Imagine stepping back 5,000 or 10,000 miles from the earth and see what is happening from a point on earth. One can launch a missile and have it cover a trajectory of a few thousand miles and land at another point. One has the option of deciding just how the missile reentry vehicle reenters the atmosphere. One can, so to speak, loft the missile. One can point it up to a very high angle, and have it go rather far from the earth, and then come in to the target very steeply.

Senator CLARK. Like a lob in tennis as opposed to a drive.

Dr. FOSTER. Exactly. However, if you wanted to get maximum range, you would not lob it quite so highly. So this refers to angles that are of a trajectory that are set to give you the maximum range, and hence—or to reach those targets, use minimum energy. That is what the minimum energy refers to. 23 degrees refers to the angle between the line left by the reentry vehicle and the horizon, horizontal.

Senator CLARK. And your opinion is, I think I have got it right, you opinion is that such an attack is a definite possibility from the Chinese People's Republic with a total of missiles in the general vicinity more or less of a hundred within how long a time?

Dr. FOSTER. I do not recall the intelligence estimates on this for a hundred missiles.

Senator CLARK. Just give us a wide range.

Dr. FOSTER. For example, I will correct this for the record if I may. I recall that one could have—the estimate is that one could have about ten missiles by 1972 to '73, and 30, a significant number of missile, by 1974 to '75.

Senator CLARK. That is good enough for me.

* * * * *

Dr. FOSTER. Mr. Chairman, I believe Mr. McNamara's posture statement treats that subject very, very carefully. Let me try to help here.

From the point of view of providing assured destruction of the Soviet Union, that is to say from the point of view of having enough military capability in the United States so that our strategic forces could absorb an all-out attack by the Soviet Union and to, in turn, deliver destruction that we would consider totally unacceptable to them on to the Soviet Union, it is Mr. McNamara's position, and I agree, that the deployment of ballistic missile defenses by the United States is not required.

Senator GORE. That is vis-a-vis the United States and the Soviet Union.

Dr. FOSTER. Or for that matter China.

Senator GORE. Well, China's power of defenses as of now is nowhere in the order of the Soviets.

Dr. FOSTER. So, from that point of view of maintaining assured destruction capability of the United States, there is no need to deploy new or for the foreseeable future ballistic missile defenses.

DEFENSE SECRETARY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD ANTIBALLISTIC DEFENSE [P. 10]

Senator GORE. What you are really saying here, it seems to me, is that the Soviet deployment of the Moscow and Tallinn systems do not compromise our power of retaliation. Therefore, it does not compromise the strategy of deterrence.

Dr. FOSTER. The Soviet deployment of ballistic missile defensive systems does affect the ability of equipment to penetrate and so as we see them deploy—

Senator GORE. You said that.

Dr. FOSTER [continuing]. Initiate whatever changes are necessary to make the penetration.

Senator GORE. I understand. But you say that we are capable of making such improvement in our missiles that regardless of the defenses now envisioned within their capability—

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, that is correct.

Senator GORE [continuing]. That we will continue to have an assured capacity of sufficient destruction in the Soviet Union that we would have a retaliatory threat, even after the Soviets made a first attack, of sufficient magnitude that it would not seriously compromise our strategy of deterrence.

Dr. FOSTER. Yes. That is correct.

Senator GORE. Now, what I am trying to understand is the position of the Department of Defense. As you know, of course, Mr. Vance will be here and you referred to him before. What I am trying to get at is what is the position of the Department of Defense, or what is your own view of the necessity of building at some appropriate time a defense against a Chinese threat such as is contemplated within that possibility of your figure 5? Do I make myself clear?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

* * * * *

ADEQUACY OF U.S. SILOS [P. 11]

Dr. FOSTER. Well, Senator, the ballistic missile defense system—excuse me, components that we have developed over the last several years can be used to protect the United States population, as I have indicated, against Soviet attacks, if they are light, and they can be used to protect us against Chinese attack.

They, however, can also be deployed to protect our MINUTEMAN-silos.

The reason we might want to do that is simply because in the last two years the Soviets have concentrated on increasing the number of their hardened and dispersed ICBMs. As a consequence, they can soon—could soon have the capability to destroy a large number of U.S. MINUTEMEN if they chose to put accurate guidance in their current designs. They do not at the moment have accurate guidance. So the Soviets cannot, in my opinion, have any substantial effect on MINUTEMAN deployment.

If however, in the future they were to get an accurate delivery capability, then they could indeed begin to take out substantial numbers of our MINUTEMAN force.

Our response to this degradation could take a number of forms. One that is being seriously considered is the deployment of a ballistic missile defense system of those silos.

Senator GORE. Another are submarines.

Dr. FOSTER. Yes. We could put in additional or improved submarines.

Senator GORE. Another possibly would be a moveable launching pad?

Dr. FOSTER. On land.

Senator GORE. On land?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GORE. Are there others?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes. We could deploy a larger missile in or near the current fixed MINUTEMAN sites and provide defense again for that.

Senator GORE. I do not understand.

Dr. FOSTER. One of the concerns about the current MINUTEMAN in the event of a substantial increase in Soviet capabilities is its limited payload, and so one might think of an improved capability involving a 5,000 to 10,000 pound payload missile installed essentially in the current MINUTEMAN network. Such a missile would have a substantially higher value than the current MINUTEMAN, and hence would—the defense of such missile would be far more attractive

Senator GORE. I understand. You said larger missiles with better defenses.

Dr. FOSTER. Yes.

Senator GORE. Okay. So you have these four ways in which you might react if the Soviets developed or perfected a guidance system which would give them the capability of taking out MINUTEMAN silos.

Dr. FOSTER. Yes.

Senator GORE. Any further questions, Senator Cooper?

Senator COOPER. No.

* * * * *

Dr. FOSTER. Penetration aids program.

You will note that I have described a flexible set of building blocks consisting of PAR and MSR radars and two types of interceptor missiles, SPARTAN and SPRINT. We also have a very large, sophisticated radar called TACMAR, designed specifically against sophisticated attacks. They can be put together in various ways to provide varying levels of defense against different threats.

For example, if we wished to defend the United States against a large Soviet attack, we would provide an overlay of an area defense such as I have described. As I mentioned earlier, however, it would be necessary to depend primarily on terminal SPRINT defenses, including TACMARS, at selected cities. A 25-city defense (including the area component) would cost about \$10 billion. A 50-city defense would cost almost \$20 billion.

TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE [P. 12]

As a matter of technical judgment, I believe that these larger deployments carry with them technical risks. The likelihood of large

and sophisticated attacks with the deployment of significant U.S. defenses increases the technical uncertainty of the defensive system. In the absence of atmospheric nuclear tests, we simply cannot calculate all the effects of many simultaneous nuclear explosions. We would have to expect that in an all-out exchange, dozen of their warheads would likely explode in our cities.

By the way—this is likely whether or not we have atmospheric tests.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that sums up the technical assessment of BMD. It has changed greatly in recent years and no doubt will continue to change. That is why, even in the absence of a deployment decision, a high-priority R&D program is so necessary.

BIOLOGICAL DAMAGE RESULTING FROM DETONATIONS

Senator GORE. I would say to the subcommittee that Dr. Foster has requested, if possible, he would like to be excused pretty soon. How urgent is this, Doctor?

Dr. FOSTER. It is not very urgent, Mr. Chairman. I am at your convenience.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Doctor.

I would like explore one question with you and then yield to my colleagues. At our last tests in the atmosphere over Johnson Island, communication was knocked out for a period of hours. I realize that this communication may not have been at frequencies which our signal system in the missiles may operate at, but it does raise a very serious problem, a very serious danger, it seems to me, that the detonation of a nuclear explosion designed specifically to conglomerate communication might compromise our own radar signal systems. Do I sufficiently describe the problem to elicit an answer?

Dr. FOSTER. You certainly do, Mr. Chairman.

We were aware in the 1958 period and subsequently that detonations at high altitudes could give rise to electromagnetic signals of rather high intensity and hence we planned those experiments in 1962.

As a result of the measurements that were taken, all of the subsequent studies of our assured destruction forces, as well as our ballistic missile defense examinations, have included a thorough consideration of these effects. Specifically, for example, we have chosen the frequencies of the ballistic missile defense systems in the NIKE-ZEUS program so as to minimize these effects. Our communications program involving satellites is designed in large measure to avoid disruption of the service because of this effect. In our offensive forces, the MINUTEMAN and POSEIDON are being configured so that warheads in those missiles can be burst at very high altitude so as to maximize the difficulties that are inherent in any Soviet systems.

Senator GORE. Let us see if I understand what you said in your last statement. Our own offensive missiles are being configured and designed so as to explode at varying altitudes, thus complicating, if not compromising or minimizing, the effect of the Soviet antiballistic missile defense system.

Dr. FOSTER. No, Mr. Chairman. I am afraid I was not sufficiently clear on that point.

Senator GORE. Is that true? Are we seeking to?

Dr. FOSTER. Mr. Chairman, to maximize the disturbance on communications, one must burst the warhead not near the ground but near the top of the atmosphere. To do so, however, requires that you have the necessary command mechanisms in the missile system, and what I indicated was that in our advanced POLARIS and MINUTEMAN systems we are going to have a procedure and a configuration such that if desired we can burst the warheads at the optimum altitude to cause the greatest electromagnetic disturbance to communications in the Soviet Union.

Senator GORE. Well then, the answer is yes.

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Now, turning it again to our defense problem, will you describe the possibility of the Soviets and possibly later the Chinese utilizing electronics in the same way to disturb our own detection defense, if we relied upon such a system?

Dr. FOSTER. All right. This is in the event we deployed a ballistic missile defense.

Senator GORE. Yes.

Dr. FOSTER. What measures are we taking, have we taken, or would we take, to minimize the possibility of disruption.

Senator GORE. With what possible success or failure.

Dr. FOSTER. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have recently, on considering the NIKE X system, changed the frequency of the PAR radar, the perimeter acquisition radar, which I described earlier, so as to minimize the difficulty from this particular tactic.

At the very outset the frequencies of MSR and TACMAR radars were sufficiently high so that the disturbances that could be caused by such tactics were very temporary.

Senator GORE. Well, very temporary—if it is a matter of seconds it might be fatal.

Dr. FOSTER. Well, Mr. Chairman, the whole engagement takes place over 5 to 10 minutes on any one threat, and the blackout to our high frequency radars occurs over a few tens of seconds to a minute. It is that kind of a time scale.

Senator GORE. I know on one of your tables here we are able to—the missile, a possible hostile missile, would appear over the horizon at, say, 300 seconds from the time of our earliest possible interception. If you have say in the case of a multiple warhead, and there is this cloud of tinfoil or chaff as you refer to it, and then there is a period of detecting which is the decoy and which is the real McCoy, you have a matter of seconds, very few seconds involved. That is why I asked you the possible duration of this electronic blackout.

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

I do not want to try to predict the final tactical solution that we will have for this threat you describe. One of the solutions is as follows:

If we see coming over the horizon at a range of 1,500 miles a steady stream of chaff and even possibly can see objects within the chaff, one tactic we have is as follows: We wait for two or three minutes until the chaff has come perhaps halfway, and if we are attempting to—and then we might attempt to attack the whole length of the chaff simultaneously. So, we would first send a missile that would go out to, perhaps, 500 miles range, and then sub-

sequently others at shorter ranges all timed to burst at once. So, it would be in a sense like Bunker Hill, and the whole threat, volume would be taken out at one time. We would then wait for—

Senator GORE. Is this going to be a human decision sitting at a key or is this going to be an electronic decision predetermined?

Dr. FOSTER. I think a bit of each, Mr. Chairman. You are however, describing an extremely advanced threat.

Senator GORE. I understand—

Senator AIKEN. They depend on computers, Mr. Chairman. It probably will get there three months late like social security checks.

Senator GORE. I hope not.

Dr. FOSTER. Any objects which remain, the hard objects would subsequently then come and reach the atmosphere and would have to penetrate. Those that appeared as real objects would then be attacked by SPRINT. The SPRINT has a nuclear warhead.

Senator GORE. Yes.

Dr. FOSTER. The warhead, however, has a very low yield and is mainly fusion and so there is little blackout and, as a consequence, there is essentially no blackout associated with this aspect of the engagement.

Senator GORE. Well, I am overstepping my allotment of time. I wanted to ask one perhaps less technical question, but one which has disturbed me a great deal in thinking about this, and yet I have not heard anyone discuss it for a long while.

Another result of I believe our last atmospheric test in the Pacific was that it blinded rabbits hundreds of miles away. We are speaking here of a possible defense system of SPRINT missiles which have a maximum range of 20 miles and if we are defending our cities with SPRINT missiles, and a multiple attack comes in, and we have this series of nuclear explosions overhead, just coming to the biological question, what is the danger of blindness or other effects of blast and radiation?

Dr. FOSTER. Mr. Chairman, I think we have to be concerned with two kinds of effects. The first, as you indicate, is blindness. There, I believe, the problem was not SPRINT but the SPARTAN explosions.

If the SPARTAN missile were to be commanded to detonate its warhead at altitudes above 350,000 feet, we have no serious problems. If, however, for some reason, and this is not in the general plan, it is forced to detonate it, at, say 100,000 feet, then we could have some serious cases of blindness, although, of course, that difficulty would be minor compared with the consequences of having had the enemy warhead penetrate to the ground. So in the current use—

Senator GORE. It would be a hard choice between being killed or blinded.

Dr. FOSTER. I do not believe so, Mr. Chairman. The individual—

Senator GORE. I would choose to be blind for a while.

Dr. FOSTER. Yes. The individual would have to be looking up at that time in about the right direction to cause serious trouble.

Senator GORE. How did it happen that these rabbits were looking up? Did they not—with the detonation instinctively flicker in that direction?

Dr. FOSTER. Mr. Chairman, the damage is caused substantially before the eye can close, and we arranged to have the rabbits despite their desires, looking up in that direction.

Senator GORE. That is a technical question.

Dr. FOSTER. In summary, Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that in the normal deployment and tactics of the NIKE X system that there would be any serious damage either to our population or to the Canadians north of us in the event we had SPARTAN detonations, detonations of the SPARTAN warhead.

The other question, of course, is the fallout, and in this case also the bursts are at heights well above the ground, so that there is no problem with fallout at least in the nearterm. It would nevertheless raise the activity in the atmosphere. It would be subsequent activity, and radiation damage.

Senator GORE. Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK. Dr. Foster, how far away are we from deployment of both SPARTAN and SPRINT if we were to make a decision right now to go ahead and deploy them?

Dr. FOSTER. I believe, Senator, that with an orderly deployment, that is to say doing it right, and that being the guiding rule in the deployment, we would not have an initial operating capability of the first battery until 1971.

Senator CLARK. And in order to create the situation revealed by your figure 5, how long would that take?

Dr. FOSTER. That could be completed by mid-1973.

Senator CLARK. And could you state precisely what the cost of deployment of the SPRINT and SPARTAN would be on that time schedule to the extent indicated by our figure 5?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes. That would be \$3 billion to \$4 billion, and then if one wanted to, in addition, deploy, extend the equipment to give the necessary coverage of the MINUTEMAN system, that would take, extend it, another six months and would increase the costs another billion dollars.

FALLOUT SHELTER PROGRAM

Senator CLARK. This is exclusive of any fallout shelter program, is it not?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes that is correct.

Senator CLARK. Would you recommend such a fallout shelter program if we decided to deploy?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, I believe I would, and that amounts to about \$800 million above the current plan.

Senator CLARK. For the entire country.

Dr. FOSTER. Yes that is correct.

Senator CLARK I take it from the answer to the questions addressed to you by Senator Gore that you are not particularly disturbed about the radioactive fallout aspect of a deployment and actual use of SPARTAN and SPRINT. Is that correct?

Dr. FOSTER. That is correct, Senator. However, I would be very disturbed with the fallout associated with the all-out thermonuclear exchange.

Senator CLARK. Of course, I assume that would be devastating.
 Dr. FOSTER. Yes. To be more specific, I do not believe that blindness or fallout are aspects of our current concept of NIKE X which should be considered in any way as a serious limitation.

DEPLOYMENT OF NIKE X'S

Senator CLARK. Have we deployed any NIKE X's yet?

Dr. FOSTER. No, sir. We have not. We are in the process of deploying prototype models to Kwajalein so that we can check out a system. That will not be completed until 1967.

* * * * *

ESTIMATED U.S. DEATHS IN EVENTS OF ALL-OUT ENEMY ATTACK [P. 14]

Senator CLARK. If you would turn to page 6 of your statement and the last sentence on page 6 which I quote: "We would have to expect that in an all-out exchange dozens of their warheads would likely explode in our cities." With what estimate of human casualties?

Dr. FOSTER. Tens of millions.

* * * * *

Dr. FOSTER. Let me try to start anew. In the event of no defense and an all-out attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, 150 million could be killed.

If we deployed a very large ballistic missile defense system—
 Senator CLARK. Including SPARTAN and SPRINT.

Dr. FOSTER. Including SPARTAN and SPRINT and all the radar and so forth—let us say it involved \$20 billion so that we would have 7,000 or 8,000 SPRINTS and 1,000 or more SPARTANS, and if the Soviets took no measures to penetrate that defense of ours, then we could cut our losses to a few tens of millions.

* * * * *

TESTING OF INCOMING MISSILES [P. 23]

Senator GORE. I have one question about research and development that I can just hardly resist asking here. I realize that even though we decide against the deployment of—I say we, the government, decides against the deployment of an ABM system, it is absolutely necessary to continue research and development both with respect to ascertaining as much as possible of what improvements in ballistic defense the Soviets may be able to make, and what hardening and improvement of our own offensive capability is necessary, and also this latter about which I wish to ask a question.

What would be within our technical capability by way of deployment of ballistic defense in the event that we later decided upon such an installation? Now, with that background to my question, how do you test, how do you measure, say, over Kwajalein and over Johnson Island you have the firing theoretically of incoming missiles, and from another island or from another location you fire an interceptor missile. I realize or I think I realize that by telemetry of the various kinds you can measure the proximity of the exchange. But how would you measure the possibility of X-ray or gamma ray penetration of the incoming missile when you neither

generate the X-ray or gamma ray by your interceptor missile nor have the effect of such on the theoretically attacking missile?

Dr. FOSTER. Mr. Chairman, that is an extremely critical question. As you indicate, we do plan to direct against Kwajalein Minuteman and Poseidon missiles configured so as to represent the most effective means of penetrating ballistic missile defenses. We will be able to see on the radar, with several radars, just how that attack looks.

We can, at the same time, direct one or more SPARTANS and SPRINTS into the general area and simulate an attack, the intercept of an attack, at several altitudes.

That, as you indicate, however, is not enough because we do not know the effectiveness of these defensive warheads without actual nuclear explosions.

It is for that reason that a fair fraction of our current underground test program involves the detonation of specially-tailored nuclear warheads so as to provide the X-rays and the gamma rays and the neutrons of the various types for radiation of our hardened reentry vehicles, and for that matter our own SPARTA and SPRINT warheads, so as to make sure that they do not destroy one another.

In the last three years we have had a whole series of very complicated experiments which prove, first, that our offensive warheads will work and, second, that they are as hard as we say or if we find them to be vulnerable we fix them, and then measure to see that they are, indeed, repaired.

So, this underground program is a very vital part of maintaining the effectiveness of our offensive force to provide a sure destruction.

Senator GORE. Can you measure underground the potentiality for generating X-rays and gamma rays and also measure the deposition of those X-ray on various types of missiles?

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We can and we do.

SOVIET ATMOSPHERIC TESTING

Senator GORE. Now, one question leads to so many. The Soviets in 1961 did conduct, and with multiple radar observation, the actual atmospheric detonation of a nuclear weapon and the penetration of that sphere of influence, for want of a better word, by another missile with radar observation in it in 1961.

Now, to what extent do those atmospheric tests on ballistic defense which they conducted give them an advantage over what we can do with underground tests?

Dr. FOSTER. One cannot know what the Soviets learned in detail from their atmospheric experiments. We can only form a judgment. In my judgment what they learned in those tests is very small compared with what we have subsequently learned in our underground program.

We, ourselves, had a number of experiments in the atmospheric series, as you know, and we learned some things which have turned out to be of great importance in the design not only of our offensive but our defensive systems. I suspect it is the same way with the Soviets.

Senator GORE. Senator Clark?

Senator CLARK. May I ask one question that will take only thirty seconds?

Senator GORE. Yes.

Senator CLARK. Would I be justified in assuming that a comprehensive test ban between ourselves and the Soviet Union, adequately policed and enforced, could bring further research and development into antiballistic missile system pretty much to a halt on both sides?

Dr. FOSTER. I cannot speak for the Soviet Union. However, I do not think it would bring ballistic missile defense research and development to a complete halt in this country.

Senator CLARK. Would it cripple it?

Dr. FOSTER. It would have a very serious effect on it, yes.

Senator CLARK. Presumably, it would have the same effect on the Soviets.

Dr. FOSTER. Yes; and, of course, it would seriously affect our confidence in its effectiveness particularly against sophisticated attack.

Senator CLARK. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GORE. Well, rather arbitrarily we must say thank you.

Dr. FOSTER. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. I do not want to leave that last question without—

Senator GORE. Let the record show that you were excused, but were unready to go.

Dr. FOSTER. No, Mr. Chairman, I am worried because the question of complete cessation involves to my mind, not so much its effect on a ballistic missile defense program, but its effect on the maintenance of our assured destruction capability.

Senator CLARK. Yes. But at that point, we turn to reliance on international cooperation, adequately policed, as opposed to conflict, as evidenced by further research in lethal weapons of destruction.

Dr. FOSTER. Yes, I understand. If one can be sure that we are no longer relying on an assured destruction capability, then my concern would disappear.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course, you would have a very interesting section to your question, adequately policed.

Senator CLARK. That is what we are going to ask Mr. William Foster about.

Senator GORE. The committee thanks you very much. You have been very forthright, and I think very able. There are many, many unresolved questions. I dare say before we finally conclude, we will request you to come back for a return engagement.

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UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

STAFF MEMORANDUM

Suggested Questions for William C. Foster, Director of the Arms Control & Disarmament Agency

Non-Proliferation Treaty

1. How will a non-proliferation treaty help to keep those nations you believe closest to the threshold of nuclear weapons from deciding to build a bomb? In other words, why do we want a non-proliferation treaty?

2. In 1965 the Indian delegate to the ENDC said that it is an “unrealistic and irrational proposition that a non-proliferation treaty should impose obligations only on non-nuclear countries while the nuclear powers continue to hold on to privileged status or club membership by retaining and even increasing their deadly stockpiles . . .” How would you answer this charge that a non-proliferation agreement without other disarmament measures is an unrealistic and irrational proposition? Do you think India will sign a non-proliferation treaty?

3. What is the Germans’ problem with a non-proliferation treaty? How could we meet their objections?

4. What are the prospects for denuclearized zones—such as in Africa or the Caribbean? There are reports that the United States is insisting on the right to transit nuclear weapons through the Panama Canal in any such zone. Is this true?

Comprehensive Test Ban

1. Would you agree that the most meaningful way to stop the spread of nuclear weapons is a comprehensive test ban?

2. Has the United States or the Soviet Union technically violated the partial test ban by spreading debris from an underground test beyond territorial boundaries? If so, why haven’t such charges been brought by one side or the other?

Conventional Arms Sales

1. A recent study of conventional arms sales done by the staff of the Committee said that ACDA did not have a significant role in the arms sales process. Do you agree?

2. Do you agree with another conclusion of the study that policy coordination in the arms sales field is weak?

3. The Senior Interdepartmental Group, as I understand it, is the forum established by the Secretary of State for the coordination of major foreign policy decisions. Last week this group discussed a

major arms sale to Morocco. Did a representative from ACDA attend that meeting?

4. How many professionals in the Arms Control & Disarmament Agency work full time on conventional arms control?

Anti-Ballistic Missiles

1. What effect would an ABM arms race have on arms control measures now under consideration, such as a non-proliferation treaty or an underground test ban?

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA

Monday, February 6, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLIC AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:05 p.m., in room S-116 the Capitol, Senator Wayne Morse (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Morse (presiding), Sparkman, Gore, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, and Cooper.

Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Holt of the committee staff.

Senator MORSE. Gentlemen, this is a long standing tradition in this committee. We meet informally. We take a record, but it is an executive record, and it is available to you and to us only from the point of reference. No announcements are made as far as this committee is concerned. I have found—I don't know what Frank would say—that I would rather have one of these meetings than three or four formal meetings. This is where you learn what is really going on in the executive branch. As far as I am concerned, we will do more of it this year, Frank, when we get together with the AID people.

I met a scientist down at the White House this afternoon. They are going to send up his name and a memorandum to me, Pat—a man who will be in charge of the agricultural program in AID in Latin America. He has had a long and distinguished service in the Department of Agriculture. I think his last name is Wilcox.

Senator CARLSON. We had Wilcox over here in the Congressional Library for years, and he moved down to the Department.

Senator MORSE. No, not that Wilcox. This man used to be a professor in Minnesota. It is this kind of a meeting that helps us. That is why we thought that you ought to chat with us first about whatever you care to in regard to the great Panama experience you had, and then the command that you have no. What you think of this military aid program in Latin America. What you think the problems are. We have one or two questions to ask you later, but I would rather have you visit with us first.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL ROBERT PORTER, SOUTHERN MILITARY COMMAND, ACCOMPANIED BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT S. SMITH, PLANS AND POLICY OFFICE, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND, AND ROBERT R. CORRIGAN, POLITICAL ADVISOR TO COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

General PORTER. First, I think I should tell you a little bit about my background. I have heard of Senator Morse, and I have known Senator Carlson over the years.

I went to West Point in 1926 from Nebraska, and I have been on military duty since that time. I have lived in every part of the world except Southeast Asia. That is the part I don't know anything about. Most of my time was either in Europe or in the Middle East, until I was sent down to Panama two years ago. I have just finished two years in Panama. I have traveled a great deal, studying the problem, getting acquainted with our people, the ambassador as well as the local people. I guess we have clocked altogether over 250,000 miles of travel in the last two years.

The thing that has startled me about Panama and about the whole area was, frankly, how little I knew about it from having worked here. I thought I knew the problem from the military point of view because I had working plans and policy in the Pentagon, and I worked in the National Security Council Planning Board for two years when President Eisenhower was the President, and have seen things. I thought I knew what was going on. I didn't realize that these countries are so different. It is just astounding.

SITUATION IN VENEZUELA

The situation is—dynamic isn't a very good word, but the situation is changing so rapidly in these countries that the situation today, I know, for example, in Venezuela, will be different in three or four months.

Just as an example, the Minister of Defense was up here as a guest of Secretary McNamara the first of November, Minister Gomez from Venezuela. He told McNamara, "We have no problem as far as internal security is concerned. Well, within ten days all hell had broken loose again.

Of course, this time it culminated with them going into the university, and they found in the university that this was really the headquarters for the guerrillas. The arsenal was there. I had heard a joke on this Venezuelan situation from an educator friend. I have two brothers who are professors, and I met this man through my brother. He said he was in Venezuela, and he saw a sign indicating an art class. He was lost, and he had little time anyway. He went up to the top floor to see where this art class was, and found that they were painting "Yankee Go Home" signs, and they were actually getting credit in the university.

Senator MORSE. It is a public scandal.

General PORTER. And they were teaching commercial art there.

Well, this was last year that this happened. But it just shows the situation. Well, of course, Gomez had said that he had no problem.

I think a lot of this problem is what the head committee that is working for the guerrillas, if they decided they are going to stay in

the background, or whether they are going to go into an act of insurgency.

CUBANS IN VENEZEULA

Senator MORSE. Pat points out to me that ten days or two weeks ago, a group of Cubans was alleged to have landed in Venezuela, and they haven't been apprehended yet. Apparently, it is pretty reliable that they landed, isn't it?

Mr. HOLT. So I am told, but the general would know a little better than I do, I am sure.

Senator MORSE. Why wouldn't the military establishment of Venezuela, I suppose this is possible—you would think they would get some trace of them, wouldn't you?

General PORTER. No, I am not certain. With the size and the long coastline of Venezuela—people can come ashore in Oregon, and you wouldn't know about it. Actually with our Coast Guard, we are as well organized if not better than the Venezuelans. I made landings on beaches where we had gotten supplies in time of war. If you come in at night, you can just disappear, particularly if you have got friends there that have things organized.

Senator MORSE. Yes, they could have advance agents there.

General PORTER. And right now, from what I can understand about the situation in Venezuela, the Cubans are supporting Douglas Dravo and his faction of the FALN,¹ and if the thing has all been taped, and where I read, things that have been said at the Havana conference, there is extensive coordination beginning to come from Cuba.

This could well have been worked out, and they would know where they were coming.

Senator MORSE. General, this is Senator Gore of Tennessee, General Porter. The general has just started to chat with us. We started with Panama, but we got off and were talking about the Venezuelan situation. He thinks it will have its effect.

ATTITUDE OF THE PANAMANIAN PEOPLE

What do you think about the general attitude on the part of the Panamanian people as different from their government toward the United States? Do you think the conditions have improved over what they were a couple of years ago?

General PORTER. Well, of course, I am still learning in Panama. I do feel that the Panamanian people as a people, the little man, has a tie with the Panama Canal, and he has a lot of good image of us and of Americans because of his tie with the Panama Canal.

For example, the President started out as a truck driver, President Robles. He was a truck driver. That was his first job. The first money he got was as a truck driver. Well, he is really one of the best friends we have got down there. He is having a hell of a time now because he is trying to hold the coalition government together, and most of the people in the coalition think they would make a better President than he is.

Senator GORE. You know we are afflicted with a little of that now and then here.

¹Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional.

General PORTER. But his instincts are good. He is a religious man, and he thinks the students ought to be responsible. He backed Zaguardia law and order.

Senator MORSE. Senator Hickenlooper, this is General Porter.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Hello, General. Nice to see you indeed.

General PORTER. We were just talking a little bit about Panama. It is a tricky situation, because the press is hostile to us.

Senator MORSE. Senator Cooper, this is General Porter.

THE RIOT IN PANAMA WAS PLANNED

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, I was in Panama. I left about 7 o'clock on the morning that bloody riot broke out down there.

General PORTER. This was in January '64?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. I came on to Washington.

General PORTER. It looked spontaneous. It was planned by someone, and this is part of the problem, particularly with the university down there, and the group in the university planning these things to take advantage of what well could be a legitimate grievance.

MILITARY AID TO LATIN AMERICA

Senator MORSE. Am I correctly advised, General, that it falls under your jurisdiction to make recommendations to the administration regarding the whole question of the military aid program to Latin America? Does that fall under your bailiwick?

General PORTER. Yes. I am sort of the field man, I guess you would say, for the Department of Defense in the Latin American area. I am the senior military man in the area, and we get the country programs together as they come out of each of the countries, put them into a package and send them to Defense with our recommendations.

Now, of course, there are guidelines which are provided not only by the Congress, but by the administration as to how we are going to proceed, but I tried to make a program out of these.

Senator MORSE. That is why we would like to have your frank appraisal of the situation. Within the committee, I think this is a fair statement to say, there is a division of point of view in regard to military aid to Latin America, in these general respects. Not that there is any difference of opinion that aid isn't needed.

There is a difference of opinion as to the type of aid, and as to the amount of aid, and as to whether or not the governments themselves are doing all they can for themselves. For example, we have been cutting aid on this committee less than the House. It works out as a compromise in conference with the House each year. We got it down to \$85 million, didn't we, Carl?

Mr. MARCY. That was the cash amount.

Senator MORSE. One of the questions they suggested I ask you, that you are free to discuss, is where are the cuts to be made to come within the \$85 million statutory ceiling on sales and grants. Are all sales handled from Washington, or does the General have a voice in them?

General PORTER. Well, you have asked me about four questions.

Senator MORSE. I know. I just wanted to throw it out on top of the table. You kick it around in your own way.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE VARIES FROM COUNTRY TO COUNTRY

General PORTER. Okay. Let me begin by saying that as far as the Military Assistance Program is concerned, it took me about a year to make up my mind on the Military Assistance Program as to just what it was doing and what it could contribute in Latin America, because there the situation varies so from country to country.

I can see a country like Colombia, where there is an active insurgency which has been going on actually as a result of the Bogatacia in 1948. It has been going on and originally you couldn't tell whether these were bandits or people that were just outside the pale, because of the acts that they had committed in the early fifties, or just what it was.

But in the two years I have been down there, it is very obvious that much of this so-called banditry throughout the countryside in Colombia, and most of these countries, has been stopped. And what we are dealing with are actually groups that are trying to pull the government down and get the support of the people to begin bringing communism into these countries.

Now, also, as I have gone around and looked at the countries and gotten acquainted with the military, these people are quite different from the men that I knew when I was a young lieutenant at Reilly, and the Chileans would come up and go to school with us and so on. The playboy is gone from the younger military people, and the impression, as I have gotten acquainted with senior commanders, they are really in the twentieth century. They are working very hard and are very much interested in the nation-building problems that they have got in their countries.

DISCIPLINED MILITARY OFFICERS

Now I had always thought of the Latin American military, based on what I had read and what I had been taught when I was in school, that they were a bunch of parasites and were really beyond the pale. This isn't the case at all, and particularly the younger officers, the officers that have been through our school here during the last twenty years. They think pretty much the way an American military man does.

They are a disciplined group, and their interest is in supporting their country. They have many of the same instincts I have when somebody says something about the United States which I don't like. Why my blood pressure goes up. They have that same instinct.

In these countries where their literacy rate is low, they are hard at work teaching the youngsters that come in. And most countries have the draft, teaching them to read and write, and they are working now, most of the countries are beginning to have a program where they are teaching the man a trade, so when he finishes, he has a trade and can go back to being a plumber, electrician, carpenter.

Otherwise when they get out of the service and they haven't anything to do, they have been taught to fire a rifle. Of course, they probably knew how to do that, or at least throw a machete or a knife, as a youngster, because the law of survival is pretty much the rule down there.

But they are teaching these people a useful trade, so that they aren't suckers for somebody that has some money who is going to recruit a private gang or get themselves involved, and it turns out he is in a guerrilla action too. So, I think this is a constructive thing that I didn't know existed when I went down to Panama two years ago.

Senator MORSE. May I interrupt you. This is Senator McCarthy, General Porter, and Mr. Corrigan and Colonel Smith.

MOTIVATION AND EQUIPMENT

General PORTER. One of the problems that we face in all of these countries is to give these men, if they have gone into the military service, they must have the same motivation I had when I went to West Point in 1926. I wanted to be a soldier, and I have really never quite gotten over it. I can't explain quite why. Some people become ministers, and I sometimes wonder why they do that.

They have a motivation in this regard, but unless they have the equipment with which to train, and they have had the basic education and technical knowledge that can teach men to stand and be shot at in time of struggle and strife, you haven't got much to deal with.

One of the problems that I have seen down there is that unless these youngsters are motivated to train their men, they are going to become a bunch of bums eventually. From what I have seen and heard—

Senator MORSE. Senator Sparkman, this is General Porter.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, sir, General. Glad to see you again. I am not going to be able to stay long. I wanted to come in for such time as I could.

General PORTER. The motivation of these people has to be kept in mind, particularly if you are trying to deal with them as the senior commander. And all of these people are now having problems with equipment which they bought from us, either at the end of World War II, or which was given to them at that time, or it came in under the Military Assistance Program after we had such a program, because it is getting to be about twenty years old.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are you talking about the people in Panama?

General PORTER. I am talking generally.

Senator MORSE. About Latin America.

General PORTER. Now I trained at the beginning of World War II with a broom in a Jeep. That was an anti-tank gun. It worked all right out on maneuvers, but when you tried to fire, assuming you were firing with it, you are in trouble. I am just using that as an illustration.

It is a question of getting these people on motivation more than anything else. All these countries have problems now of trying to hold a high quality man in the military. The next few years are going to be very critical.

Senator MORSE. Come up here, Senator. Senator Aiken, this is General Porter. Behind you is Colonel Smith. You know the secretary across from you.

Senator AIKEN. I have seen him around.

QUESTIONS THE EQUIPMENT SENT TO LATIN AMERICA

Senator MORSE. One of the things that we kick around up here, and I have discussed frequently, is the type of equipment that we are supplying. Questions are raised why tanks, why late model military aircraft, why so much heavy equipment? Why submarines and destroyers?

Why not the type of equipment that they need for maintaining internal disorder rather than the type of equipment that it is alleged we supply them which is used between nations? Everybody knows they are not going to war against each other down there, for many reasons, and that the type of our equipment is subject to question.

The argument is made, take the Argentine Military Establishment there, is all out of proportion as to the number of officers to the rank and file. That is typical of some other military establishments, it is alleged.

Now it is questions such as that that you could help clarify very much, because we don't claim to have the expertise that qualifies us to say. But, nevertheless, it gets into your debates on this whole matter of military aid. You get the argument that if we don't supply the equipment, they will go to Russia, France or Czechoslovakia. Some take the position, well, let them go. Let us supply them with the things that will help develop them economically rather than militarily.

SITUATION IN PERU

The charge is made that some of the countries like Peru, the Indians fill the rank and file, and the sons of the families of the wealthy fill the officership. You know the argument. But I have the job as chairman here of throwing them out on the table and you commenting on them.

General PORTER. Let me take this last one first. Actually the Minister of Defense, General Arbelu, is a full-blooded Indian. Now there was a time in Peru when what you say was true, but there is great change taking place in all of these countries, and right now in Peru the Indian is beginning to be brought into the fringes of the money economy.

For example, up at Cusco, where I was in August, the Army is running an experimental farm where they have 60 families teaching them agriculture, and they have some men who were doing their service up there, and they are training them in the trades courses. It is potato country, but also they are teaching them to handle livestock, chickens.

In two years, they have taken these Indian families—cocoa was one of their sources of getting through the day, and of course it has a numbing effect. It is a form of drug. Cocoa, liquor and beans were pretty much all they had to eat. Now these people are beginning to wear the clothes that they wear down in the low countries. In other words, they are beginning to get away from the Indian clothes and are beginning to wear western clothes.

They are going into a protein diet. And this hacienda, which is a big one, and it never paid its way in the last 25 years, is in the black, through methods that are being taught these people.

It is interesting that as they come in, all of them, whole families are learning to read and write. So that these are things that are taking place.

Now the officer corps in all of these countries is no longer from the oligarchy. It is coming in from the middle class, and this Indian I am telling you about, who is the number one military man in Peru today, he worked his way up through the ranks. But what you say was true 15 years ago.

SITUATION IN BRAZIL

We are in a state of change down there, great change. This is one of the encouraging things to me, that the officers are beginning to come up from the ranks, or they are coming up from the middle class, or the lower middle class, and they have the interests of their people very much at heart.

For example, in Brazil, I was in Northeastern Brazil last spring. We were up in the area where the sugar plantations are, and these big land holdings, and the most critical people of the slowness of Castelo Branco with his land reform program were the military officers. We were going out to see a road project. We had an engineer building a farm-to-market road, so they get their produce out of the interior.

“YOUR FORCES ARE TOO BIG”

When you look at all of the projects, everybody has his pet project that he wants to get pushed to the front. There is about 25 or 30 years' progress, and they are trying to get it all done in one or two years. It is a question of how much you can force things like this, and come out without anything besides chaos and strife.

Now on the side of the military establishments, I have worked with foreign military forces before I went down there. I was out in the Middle East and worked with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan for two years in this organization, and I know pretty much the problem in that area, and you hear these criticisms there too. The threat, as we see it, to these countries, and the reason they need forces, and what they say the threat is, and why they have forces, is quite different.

I haven't been able to rationalize with them to the extent that I can come right out and say, “Your forces are too big.” I have brought out this subject several times. But I am really not in a position, in spite of the fact I can see the threat to them pretty well, to say move over, and I will tell you how to run your Army, or I will tell you how to run your Air Force or your Navy, because my usefulness is done if I did that.

When you look at the problems in Argentina and the communications problem they have in areas between Corrientes and Mendoza, and when you go down to the south country, it is a hell of a big country. Communications are not too good. And by our standards of what would be required if we had mobile reserves and transports to get them around, and what they need are quite different.

Then in Brazil, I brought up this matter of size of forces, and they said, “Well, these men that we are getting into the Army, we are teaching them to read and write. If they weren't in the Army, where would they be? They would be unemployed, and they

wouldn't be learning a trade. They wouldn't be learning to read and write."

AN ALTERNATIVE TO MILITARY SERVICE

Senator MCCARTHY. General, could I raise a question at that point. This is one of the questions that bothers me. You make the Army really the best profession in the country. You said earlier that if you didn't give them advanced equipment that the best men would be lost.

Where would they go, to other professions? If so, would that be bad? Do you have to put them in the Army in order to teach them to read and write? I think this was one of the basic questions that concerns those of us who are really looking at this thing. You say they wouldn't learn to read and write if we didn't put them in the Army.

General PORTER. You have three questions here. Let's take one at a time.

Senator MCCARTHY. I know it. They are all questions you made. I just wanted to back you up on it to see if there isn't an alternative.

General PORTER. And your questions are darn good questions, and I am not sure whether I can answer to your satisfaction. All these countries have something like a draft law, and they will get the men. Now the men that normally they are drafting into the Army, if they are already students, they have exemptions the way we have in our country, and they are not going to be drawn into the Army.

Senator MCCARTHY. Of course, we are doing the same thing in our draft now.

General PORTER. That is right.

Senator MCCARTHY. Teaching them to read and write.

General PORTER. And I worked that a hell of a lot of my time.

Senator MCCARTHY. That is right.

General PORTER. But a lot of these people are outside of the money economy. A lot of them have never worn shoes. Their basic habits of sanitation and so on are very primitive.

Now if these people aren't drawn into the Army and pulled out of their farm community, they would probably never get out of it, because the school situation in a country like Brazil is really quite discouraging. You have been down there. You have seen it. Wouldn't you agree with that, Bob?

Now what we are doing with a lot of these boys that are coming out, we are bringing them into the twentieth century. In the coastal country I would agree with what you say. When you get into Sao Paulo, the Rio complex, and up to Belo Horizonte, I think that in that area, yes, they would have an opportunity. But you get into the northeast, up into the back country of Recife, they are just going to exist there all their lives. This is one way of helping prime this pump. Teach them a trade and bring them along.

TEACHING SOLDIERS TO READ AND WRITE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. General, is it fair to say that when they go into the Army, they are under a discipline to read and write?

General PORTER. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And if they are not in the Army, their own discipline is not sufficient to give them any stimulus to learn to read and write?

General PORTER. That is absolutely right. Not only that, but when they began to get hope, and a lot of these people, you look at them, they are not well when they are small, and they grow up and have been undernourished all their life. I was talking to people down in the Amazon about this. I was asking a doctor in Peru about the health of the people in the Amazon Basin. She said a lot of these people endemically, by the time they are old enough to live and do a man's work, haven't the strength to do it because of the ailments that they have got.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you know Dr. Popano who ran that agricultural farm? He died here a short time ago.

General PORTER. I have read about him.

Mr. CORRIGAN. Yes. I knew him very well.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. When I was down there I stayed all night at the farm, just about that very thing you are talking about. He ran that school, getting these youngsters in from all over Central America theoretically. He had some from Colombia. He said a startling thing. He got them in there; they would come in as freshmen. It would take them about four to six weeks to get the worms out of them. That is number one.

Then he said within three months they would gain 40 to 60 pounds just by getting a reasonable diet. Then he said they were ready to learn. He said before that they were indolent. They didn't have the stimulus.

General PORTER. To go back to Senator McCarthy's question, I feel that probably, and this is just off the top of my head, 15 or 20 percent of the people that go into the Army might go ahead and get a third grade education or a fourth grade education anyway. The group that is being called into the Army. But the rest of them would not, and they would have less than a 50/50 chance of meeting a decent wage during their lifetime unless they could learn to read and write.

LENGTH OF SERVICE

Senator COOPER. What is the length of service in these countries? What does it average, and what do these men do when they get out of the Army? Does what they learn there carry on in civilian life?

General PORTER. It varies. The minimum tour is a year. In some countries it is two years.

For example, in some of the countries, if a man shows an interest in getting a trade, they will extend his service until he can become a plumber or a bricklayer or a carpenter. The Army has vocational schools where they are training them to do this. They are getting ready to do this in Guatemala, for example. They are doing this in Peru. They are doing this in Colombia. But it varies, Senator, from country to country.

Now these people will normally go back to their village initially. How long they will stay there depends on whether they can make a contribution when they get back. But if they have a trade and can do such things as bricklaying, they are short of people that can

do this all over the country or if they can fix a radio set or do primitive electrical wiring.

So the chances are better that they are going to stay and work in the countryside and make a decent living there, or begin to, if they have the trade. Otherwise, their having seen the city, they are going to drift back.

MILITARY SALES PROGRAMS

Senator MORSE. I think it would be helpful to the committee, if you gentlemen of the committee agree with me, if the general would explain to us how the sales programs are handled.

You have got an \$85 million ceiling, so-called. How are the sales programs handled? Are they handled in Washington? Does the General Staff handle them? Who makes the selection? To what extent do we turn down their requests for purchase? I think we are pretty ignorant about that up here, at least I am. I wish you would explain that to us.

General PORTER. Well, the sales program is handled pretty much out of Washington. We are just in the throes of changing now actually, and I think Mr. McMillan is coming over here to testify tomorrow. At least, I was told that. He is to come over here tomorrow.

Senator MORSE. Before Armed Services.

General PORTER. I think that is right. The sales program has been handled directly from Washington. It has been that way for a long time, principally because from the very beginning, when the Latin American countries wanted to buy something in the United States, the military attache went over to State, talked to them in State. Then referred them to people in defense, and passed on the shopping list of the things that they said they needed. Then they would indicate encouragement or discouragement. I will be very honest and say that in the two years I have been down country, I have felt that the Latin Americans felt very discouraged about trying to buy from us, feeling that we did everything we could to slow down selling them anything, even spare parts for equipment they had.

It has come about in part because of the procedures we have. They have to get an export license, and they come up. They go over to the Pentagon and get a quotation if they want to buy from the military. Then they send that down country. At that time, we are notified in Panama, my headquarters, that they are going to buy or want to buy. Normally then we make a comment as to whether we think that is needed or not. There are cases where I have found out about it afterwards.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Don't they submit it to you first?

General PORTER. No.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They don't say, "We have the recommendation"?

General PORTER. No, because it comes in through their attache, you see. Now this is in a state of flux, and they are beginning to draw our people in country into it, but this has been handled this way in the last 40 years, and we are just in the state of trying to change it.

\$85 MILLION CEILING

This \$85 million ceiling that the Senate put on this year is forcing us to do that. You see the policy that Mr. McNamara has announced is that if they will buy, we will take it out of the grant program. So this is an oversimplification of the ground rules. It would take 15 minutes with a prepared paper to give you an accurate statement. But this is pretty much the intent.

That anybody who has the money and will buy, they would take priority. Well, this is throwing my programs for these countries, making them damned complicated, because I am not certain as to just how much of this money is going to be available to buy spare parts and to buy weapons and the things that I need in these 20 programs.

I will say this: That every request to buy that has come in here in my 20 years down country has really been looked at carefully by both the people in State and Defense, to see whether it was in our interests to sell.

A LOT OF LOST MOTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It seems to me there is a lot of lost motion in that—probably there is a good reason for it, I don't know. It would seem to me that the best way to do it is if Country X wants certain equipment, they should submit it to the local people, and there should be a recommendation that this is either excessive or it has utility, or if available and if compatible with other programs, it should be granted. Then come up here and get the job done, instead of rushing up here and back three or four times, and so on.

General PORTER. I think that the procedure you are suggesting is one that is under consideration now, but we haven't had this fully established.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We haven't abolished the Commission for the widows of the War of 1845, I guess. It takes a long time to get these things done.

General PORTER. You run into additional things. There are a number of purchasing missions, for example, here in Washington from these countries. I feel that people down country would prefer to come in, the military people would be very happy and prefer to come in this way, but this is the way they have been doing it for 25 years.

GRANTS CAN BE A WINDFALL

It would be useful to us, because we could get a better fix on what the requirements were, and our people in country would know about them too. But in some of these countries where they have limited means and they get a windfall of \$100,000, the equivalent of that in foreign exchange, they are going to get it spent and committed before the end of the fiscal year, just the way some of our people do here, particularly when you have crying needs. They are going to get the first thing that they can.

Senator MORSE. They come up here from State and the Pentagon Building through their officials. The State and the Pentagon Build-

ing get in touch with you then to get your recommendation before you go ahead and make any arrangements with them?

General PORTER. That is right. Normally I know about it. There have been cases where I haven't, but I think this is the exception.

Senator MORSE. I think it is so important if you are going to do it, as Senator Hickenlooper says, it is the cart before the horse. If you are going to do it that way, they certainly ought to get back to you for your recommendation.

General PORTER. Actually, what I have found out in my two years down there is that the Latin American is not a program or a plan, whatever he is, whether wearing a civilian or military suit. They sort of live from hand to mouth. One of the things I have been trying to do is get these people working, and I know they are working through the Alliance for Progress to do the same thing, to try to get them to chalk out where they are going to be in five years, and how they will get there in the most economical way. We are just beginning to make some progress.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They can always do it mañana.

A NEW BREED OF MILITARY OFFICERS

General PORTER. But we are getting a new breed down there now. Truly there are a lot of people that are beginning to see that unless they program ahead, they are going to be blown by the wind, and they are never going to get to their destination.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think they have a lot of capable people in each of these countries, but the question of the percentage of the influence and control that those capable people have realized, what you are saying, how much authority they have from time to time.

General PORTER. Well, it has been encouraging in the two years I have been down there to see that the military are doing better now than they were two years ago, and not so much through anything I have been able to do except to just beating away on them. And this matter that unless you know where you are going, how you are ever going to get there. You just start out in a certain direction, and you wander and are blown around by the winds.

SITUATION IN ARGENTINA

For example, in Argentina, we had just gotten the Argentine military to develop for themselves a five-year program to try to improve their forces. In doing that, it was interesting to see from the beginning what they needed.

They were beginning to cut back in the size of forces and equipment. For example, this A4B deal. They were going to retire, as I recall, two planes for each A4B that they were to get, and they were to get 50.

Actually, we began to show them that they could do better than that, because the maintenance problems in trying to train the pilots, they do the same training program and keep their pilots proficient with less planes than what they planned to buy. But they had never faced up to these things until we began talking to them and getting this sort of thing worked out.

Going back to my life as a young lieutenant in the early days here, we were pretty provincial in those days too. When you face up to the fact that most of these countries are about 50 years be-

hind us in planning and programming techniques, and in their sense of responsibility and in their schooling, it is pretty hard to bring them up to 1967 when they are in 1920 or 1927 in a lot of their thinking and in a lot of their activities.

FORMULA FOR CUTTING OFF FUNDS

Senator MORSE. When Congress put a ceiling on, speaking hypothetically now, like the \$85 million ceiling, and State and the Pentagon have to cut under that ceiling, is there any particular formula that is followed as to whether the cut will be taken off of grants or taken off of sales?

General PORTER. Well, let me explain how our programs are put together.

Senator MORSE. That is what we need.

General PORTER. We have a table that shows the money amount under the \$55 million ceiling that was on before the \$85 million was put on. We had a table which showed the amount. They put in what was called defense articles for each country under that \$55 million ceiling. Added to that was a certain amount for training. And then the overhead and administrative costs and the program were involved.

At that time under the \$55 million ceiling on defense articles, there was no ceiling on sales, you see, the amount of credits that could be developed. I want you to listen to this, Bob, because he helps put the programs together in country. I am explaining how we put the program together.

Now under that table 36, as they call it, that is showing what money could be available, based on programs and discussions that come out of the countries. Then we go ahead and put a program together.

Now with the \$85 million ceiling that had been put on, this actually was about a 60 percent cut in each of these programs, if you took it right across the board, because of the sales that would have to be accommodated under this \$85 million ceiling. So, we went back to work and began to see what we would do, what programs we would defer, based on the programming ahead.

TRAINING PROGRAMS

Mr. McNAMARA requires us to have a 5-year program for each of these countries. The only thing we could do would be to take certain types of equipment that weren't as much needed for modernization, and looking at the threat that was in the country and the state of training of people, and people that had gone into the program, get them trained. Start training, for example, on communications equipment or something like that, so it wouldn't create complete chaos in these countries due to this change in policy, which came from the \$85 million ceiling.

For example, it takes about 50 weeks' training to get a radio operator trained to run a military radio these days. We have to put him in training far enough ahead so that when the equipment gets there, we can marry him up with this piece of equipment.

Now in doing that, we fixed up some articles or lists from each of the countries to get a deferred list of items that would not be funded in each of these countries until we could see how the sales

program worked out. It is pretty difficult 18 months ahead of time to see what foreign exchange they are going to have available in country, and what the credit is going to be from country to country.

This list is being held together intact over in the Department of Defense now, but it is not being funded under the '67 program until we see what money is available for grant aid. But the Pentagon agreed, I pushed them, to go ahead with the grant program higher than the sales figure in that the material that was in the grant program was so important, particularly during this year, to the continuity of operations in country. For example, where there are spare parts; some replacement vehicles; communications vehicles; certain aircraft that are needed; batteries, a lot of things. Batteries, for example, for a submarine which needs to be fixed. If we just stop this in mid-stream, it would do nothing but create chaos in all twenty countries.

My interest is in trying to get in any change of policy to get an orderly change so that we don't completely wreck their military establishments in one or two years. Now this list that we have now, that we have what, \$11 million?

Colonel SMITH. \$11.1 million. Yes, sir.

General PORTER. In checking today and talking to the people in the Pentagon on what the military purchasing commissions here are talking to them about, it looks as if we are going to have to go back into our grant aid programs again to try to see what more we can get out of them. In other words, the grant program is going to take another beating. I don't know whether I have answered your question.

THE LOAN PROGRAM

Senator MORSE. It helps very much. Before I call on Pat for a supplement, there is another facet of this that I would like to have you explain to us. You have got the grants, and you have got the purchases, grants and sales.

Now, we have the loan program. That is causing some confusion up here. Last year at the last session a bill was offered for the calendar, and went over, and it will be up shortly. As I recall, Pat—Carl, this is that loan bill that came out of Armed Services—it was three destroyers for Brazil, two for Argentina, one for Colombia, and a submarine for Chile and a submarine for—it was Colombia, I guess.

Mr. HOLT. Three destroyers for Argentina, two for Brazil, one submarine for Chile, one destroyer for Colombia, two destroyer escorts for—

Senator MORSE. No airplanes?

Mr. HOLT. This is just naval.

Colonel SMITH. This is what?

Mr. HOLT. This is the '66 bill that didn't pass.

Senator MORSE. It didn't pass. It was held up. We took the position it ought to get into Foreign Relations for review too. They got it on the calendar the last week as I recall, and it raised some questions. Now I understand that there is a proposal, based upon the 1965 Loan Act, for a destroyer to be loaned to the Argentine.

Mr. HOLT. If I understand it correctly, there was legislation passed in '64 or '65.

Senator MORSE. Sixty-five.

Colonel SMITH. That is correct.

Mr. HOLT. Authorizing the loan of destroyers for Argentina.

Colonel SMITH. Three for Brazil, two for Argentina. Chile was cut out and so was Peru.

Mr. HOLT. Right. But this has never been fully implemented, and it is not proposed to do so.

Colonel SMITH. It has never been fully implemented, and it is being considered for implementation. As a matter of fact, they have gone for the one destroyer for Brazil as of today. The situation is about halfway through the rebuild for Brazil.

General PORTER. These destroyers, the U.S. offered the Brazilians and Argentina destroyers which were of early World War II vintage, and the cost to them of repairing these destroyers was how much, Bob, a couple of million dollars?

Colonel SMITH. About \$5 million.

General PORTER. I know, but between the A, B and C type, there is about \$1 or \$2 million more to repair a C type than a B type.—

Colonel SMITH. That is right.

General PORTER. To get it so it would be of any use to them. Of course they were trying to get C and O to give them, make D type available. And he said no they are out in Vietnam. So there has been a lot of study of this type C destroyer on the part of both Brazil and Argentina, to try to find the destroyers that are in the best condition.

They have been studying these ships for six to eight months, trying to find a ship that they thought would be worth rehabilitating, you see, because we have taken out of mothballs naturally the best and put them back in the fleet to use them out in Vietnam.

Colonel SMITH. Senator, it doesn't cost the taxpayer now on these loans. The country receiving the loan, for example, Brazil, pays this rehabilitation activation cost. In fact, on the \$85 million ceiling—a few words about title X. The value of the hull itself is charged against this ceiling. There is no U.S. money spent on these destroyers when they are loaned, and we have a recapture clause at any time.

WHAT TYPE OF EQUIPMENT IS NECESSARY

Senator MORSE. What can we say about the nature of this equipment in answer to the charge that this is the type of equipment that we shouldn't be making available? That we should make a different type of military equipment available to them?

Who am I to say? I don't know what type of equipment they ought to have. The argument is that this kind of equipment isn't necessary to maintain internal order. It isn't necessary to protect them from a Communist coup. They need helicopters and light equipment for that, and personnel for that, rather than this heavy equipment constantly building up the military establishment.

It goes back to the first point, however, that the General made very early here in the day. If we are going to get the class of personnel that you want, referring to what you say, you have got to have training in all the various aspects of military operation.

General PORTER. Let's just talk a minute about the Navy problem in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. They are the

countries that are the leaders down there as far as the Navy is concerned.

These countries live by the sea. When we started in with this, under the Rio Treaty—and are talking about Western Hemisphere defense—this was going to be a partnership, and all of our bilateral with them back in the early fifties was to be a joint effort.

SWITCHING INTERNAL SECURITY

Now we started during the Kennedy administration, right after Cuba, we began switching over to internal security. But we never really went down to renegotiate these bilaterals.

In some of these countries, they still are thinking in those terms. But actually you look at the situation in Brazil, or Argentina, with their long coastline and the responsibility that the Argentina navy has for the south country in Argentina. I don't say that the destroyer is what is actually needed. I am not sure what they need because they are doing all sorts of things. They are the administrators for that southern area of Argentina.

But they need destroyers to deal with the policing of their maritime provinces in the south. The seas are bad. Their Navy is something like ours. They have Air, they have Marines, they have pretty much a complete force, but they are trying to police these maritime areas principally with their forces.

THE PANAMA CANAL PROBLEM

From where I sit in Panama looking at the Panama Canal problem, we have taken the Panama Canal as a commerce route that will always be open. If anything did happen there, and I should probably cross myself and knock on wood because hopefully we will never get into this situation, then all of our shipping between the east and west coasts is going to have to make that long route down there. The smaller craft are going to go through the Magellan Straits and the big craft are going to go around the Cape. Then because of the weather, Navies of Argentina and Chile are going to have to lead a lot of these merchant ships by the hand, because there is no coast guard as such.

The Navy handles the coast guard operations for the whole country, and then destroyers are about the smallest craft that can live in some of the high seas you get down in the south country there around the Cape of both sides.

NAVAL ROLE IN CHILE AND ARGENTINA

Yet, for example, in Chile, down in the straits of Magellan, I was down in December and studied that thing because of its strategic position. You have 49 knot winds. That is the ordinary, day in and day out blow that they have down where the Straits of Magellan exit into the Pacific Ocean. There are terrible storms there all the time.

I really feel, and I didn't feel strongly on this until I went down there on this and studied these problems, that there is a deep water role for the Navy of Argentina and Chile.

That doesn't mean they need aircraft carriers or cruisers, but they need destroyers. They need craft that will stand up in bad

weather because merchant ships get into distress and they have to police the southern waters.

Brazil with its big coastline and its problems is really a maritime power because of overseas trade. The same way with Peru. Between 95 and 100 percent of their trade goes by ship, and the other less than 5 percent by air.

That is the only way they can get the stuff out. These countries have a tradition, a naval tradition. As a soldier it is sort of hard for me to explain what a Navy tradition is, but they have very capable people, and Peru is probably the best. Chile comes next. But these destroyers are really needed by these countries, not for the guns on them, but for the role it permits them to provide as far as their country is concerned.

BAD STRATEGY

Senator MORSE. What are we going to say to the argument—and I am just putting this out in our own executive session before it goes to the floor—that if we expand the loan program, which is what this '66 bill allegedly attempts to do, and therefore was a run-around the \$85 million—and there was a demand to block it until we looked at it longer—what are we going to say to the argument that if you are going to put a ceiling on for grants and sales, then subsequently come around with a loan program that loans a great deal of equipment, whatever its value is, that amounts in fact, to increasing the ceiling. Therefore, the legislation ought to put one ceiling and say to the Pentagon Building that this covers loans, and it covers grants and it covers sales.

I think it was bad strategy, just giving you my opinion. Carl, you listen to this. You were in on this discussion we had at the end of a year when they brought up at the last minute this loan bill, and it stirred up such a hornet's nest around here.

General PORTER. This is on the Navy ships?

Senator MORSE. Yes, on the Navy ships. What are we going to say to meet the argument that the Pentagon Building should come in with one package, and that legislation in a given session shouldn't wait until after the foreign aid bill is passed. Then they lose out, say, in the foreign aid bill by getting a lower ceiling than they wanted, and then subsequently give us an end run play with a proposal for a lot of loans of equipment, which in effect breaks the ceiling? How are we going to meet this next year?

Mr. MARCY. Let me add one thing, Senator. The other fact that is added there is sales. You see, in effect, when you make a sale of military equipment, you are using part of the economic strength of that country to buy the military equipment which in turn means perhaps you have to increase the economic aid. So sales, grants and loans are all combined.

Colonel SMITH. I don't believe Senator Morse's point here is that your present, the last Fulbright amendment, included grants, sales and these ship loans.

Senator MCCARTHY. It didn't include the ships.

Colonel SMITH. They all counted under your \$85 million ceiling. You must be referring to a bill with which we are not familiar.

Senator MORSE. This is a question of fact that I didn't cover. I am glad I raised it. The \$85 million also included the loans.

Colonel SMITH. It included ship loans unless there is wording in this new bill that exempts it from the ceiling.

VALUE OF SHIPS COUNTED AGAINST THE CEILING

Senator MCCARTHY. I thought the ships were granted by a separate act that had no relationship to the ceiling.

Colonel SMITH. They are granted, Senator, by Title 10 code as a separate act. However, by the Fulbright amendment, their value counts against the ceiling.

Senator CORRIGAN. And their rehabilitation.

Colonel SMITH. The rehabilitation would count if the U.S. does it. If they do it, it does not count.

Senator MORSE. The Colonel says they must do it.

General PORTER. We are telling them they must do it, but this is still being worked out because they are so short of money.

Colonel SMITH. If they borrow money to do it, it counts under the ceiling or even if we guarantee the loan.

Senator MCCARTHY. You mean if the Defense Department does.

Colonel SMITH. That is correct, sir.

EXPORT-IMPORT LOANS

Senator MCCARTHY. Are the Export-Import loans guaranteed by the Defense Department or are they separate?

Colonel SMITH. No, sir. Export-Import guarantees certain reverse loans.

Senator MCCARTHY. They don't count, the Export-Import loans, for the shipment of military equipment would not be included.

Colonel SMITH. If it is military equipment sponsored by DOD, it counts against the ceiling.

Senator MCCARTHY. I see, but if it were an entirely private sale?

Colonel SMITH. Private sales do not count.

Senator MCCARTHY. Approve it, you would still have to approve the private sale.

Colonel SMITH. If they were to get an Export-Import loan without Defense Department guarantee, which is almost impossible, it would not count. But that has never happened. Export-Import will not touch this normally.

Senator MCCARTHY. Didn't they buy some arms from this fellow over in Alexandria because it was cheaper to buy from him than from the Defense Department, last year, Venezuela did?

Colonel SMITH. Venezuela? If they did, and they didn't get a loan through the DOD—

Senator MCCARTHY. That would be outside the scope.

Colonel SMITH. It would be outside the scope.

SALE OF AIRPLANES TO CHILE AND ARGENTINA

Senator MCCARTHY. Let me ask about a specific sale or transfer. The 50 airplanes, what are they getting, 25?

Colonel SMITH. Twenty-five.

Senator MCCARTHY. They asked for 50, and they will probably get the other 25. You don't think so?

Colonel SMITH. I don't think so.

General PORTER. We don't see where they are going to come from.

Senator MCCARTHY. We originally approved 50 though. So the reason we are not selling them 50 is that we don't have them?

General PORTER. That is right.

Senator MCCARTHY. At the time, the Chileans argued that anything you could do to cut it down was good from their point of view. They said, "If they get 50, we have got to have 30 just for political purposes." Now why couldn't we have said 25 in the first place instead of 50, so the Chileans could then say, "They got 25, we have to buy 15." We went for 50, and now we say they really don't need 50, 25 will do. This is the kind of game they play, and I don't understand.

General PORTER. This interplay between Argentina and Chile, from where I sat, didn't look the same way to me.

Senator MCCARTHY. That is what the Ambassador told me.

General PORTER. He was trying to make a case and make a name for himself by using Argentina as a lever to get us to go ahead and sell F-5's.

Senator MCCARTHY. His first position was don't sell to Argentina; we won't buy any.

General PORTER. He was speaking for himself.

Senator MCCARTHY. I thought he was speaking for the Christian Democrats. He is the number two man.

AIRCRAFT FOR PILOT TRAINING

General PORTER. I know, but actually the military had to have replacement aircraft to keep their pilots in training. They were so short of aircraft that they had to find aircraft from some place. General Rosavitz, when I first went down to Chile, was talking about trying to find an aircraft that he could use for pilot training, and we offered him an F-86. Well, the F-86 has some wing problems. By the time they got through with the wing modification, they would have a lot of money tied up in those aircraft, more than he felt they were worth.

Now this was the reason that the Argentine went to the A4B, instead of the F-86.

Rosavitz, though, was prepared to take an aircraft that would keep the pilot training going. But Tomich up here got into the act. The first thing you know, this had political overtones, and we had a so-called arms race, competition between Argentina and Chile. This would never have happened had this been handled only on the military circuit, and had we been able to say, "Look, come 1970 there will be a new aircraft that you can go ahead with, put your money in for 10 or 15 years available, so you can keep your pilots going."

A lot of these pilots go into civil air work down there, and they have used the military as a recruiting ground for their civil air fleet which makes sense. We are doing it here if we can. We are having trouble keeping military pilots in the Air Force now, flying DC-6's and 7's.

ARMS RACE WAS JUST A DEVICE

I will be very honest with you, and please don't ever use this. But this whole business of an arms race between Chile and Argentina was a device used on the part of the Chileans, hoping that they could shake us loose from F-5 earlier. It was picked up by the newspapers because the newspapers down there are pretty much hostile to Frei, and the first thing you know, it is taken from one country to another and the thing just snowballs.

Senator McCARTHY. Who wanted to shake loose the F-5's, the government or the military?

General PORTER. These Air Forces in South America would like very much to have the F-5 because they see it as an airplane that is easy to maintain over the long term, in the next 15 year. They feel that within 15 years a propeller-driven airplane in the commercial world is going to be pretty much a thing of the past. They are looking to their pilot training, as General Rosavitz said to me, trying to keep the seed alive.

Also we are working to try to get some sort of a counter-insurgency aircraft going, which would be a propeller-driven job. But that hasn't been coming along too well, and we couldn't offer them and suggest that they put their money into an F-5 or something like that because we didn't have anything we could promise them.

HOW THE FIGURE WAS REACHED

Senator McCARTHY. What about the question of the number, 50 as against 30 in Chile, which was the Chilean number they insisted they would need to offset 50 advanced jet aircraft in Argentina? Why not 25 and 15? I mean what are they worth, \$2 million a piece roughly?

General PORTER. Here is the way the 50 figure was arrived at.

There were certain squadrons of aircraft in Argentina that needed to be replaced. In doing that, they had a certain number of aircraft, and I can't recall the exact figure, I think something like 80, that they were going to replace, either 100 or 80, that they were going to replace with these 50 aircraft.

They figured with the pilots, if they stood down from these 80 aircraft, they could keep their training going with the 50 aircraft.

Senator McCARTHY. I want it clear I don't think there is danger of military action between Chile and Argentina.

General PORTER. No, and the military down there knows this is not going to be.

A QUESTION OF APPEARANCES

Senator McCARTHY. It becomes a question of appearances and of politics and of the economic consequences of this sort of thing. You talk about training in these F-5's and whatever other jets they have got. The word I get is that the experience of these pilots in these hot fighter planes doesn't qualify them for commercial use. Our airlines are short of pilots, but they are saying they are not getting the kind of men out of these hot jets that they used to get out of the military. They don't make good pilots on a commercial jet.

General PORTER. I think that is a matter of opinion. As a soldier I am not qualified to answer that sort of question.

Senator MCCARTHY. I don't know whether that is true or not, but that is what I am told. Then they say we go to South America and they want to train them on hot jets so they can transfer them to commercial flying. It would be better to transfer them to jet transports or something like that.

General PORTER. This speed of aircraft, this A4B is below Mach 1, so it really isn't a supersonic plane. The F-5 is just over. So we are not talking about these really advanced jets, and so on. This 30 versus 50, this is the first time I have heard that, Mr. Senator.

Senator MCCARTHY. That was the Tomich ratio as I heard it the first time. That if it was cut down they wouldn't need as many.

General PORTER. I really think this ploy on the part of the Chileans shows how desperately they want us to sell them aircraft. They would have bought the A4B. They would have bought anything that would fly if it would get them a reasonable aircraft, but we didn't have it, you see, and with procedures and our policy, the F-5 was not in sight for at least five years.

BRITISH PLANE

Senator MCCARTHY. How good a plane is this British one they are buying now?

General PORTER. Well, our people say it is a pretty good plane. It won't do the things actually that the F-5 will do for them.

Senator MCCARTHY. It is supersonic?

General PORTER. No, it isn't. It is subsonic. In a dive it will break the sound barrier.

Senator MCCARTHY. You can do that with most any airplane, can't you? You mean it can go supersonic and come out of it?

General PORTER. That is right. It has to go into a dive to do it, but it isn't truly a supersonic plane. We haven't got any down there. Now going to newspapers, the Peruvians have been looking at some that the British have, this Electric.

Senator MCCARTHY. The lightening? That is what they sold Saudi Arabia.

Colonel SMITH. The aircraft is good, Senator. The question is how long they will continue support of the aircraft.

General PORTER. This is a problem. Now on this particular thing of support, the thing that the Latin American military is concerned about, they feel if they can't come to us and buy and they go to Europe and buy, they are going to pay more to begin with. Then there isn't the assurance that there will be the spare parts, and they know that they are going to have to tool up again to get the spare parts, which means another contract. The maintenance of it will be much higher than it would be if they can get into our market.

MC NAMARA'S HARD-NOSED POSITION ON GRANTS

Senator MORSE. You have been very generous with your time. I only have three quick questions to ask now.

It has been reported to us, though not reliably, that the Secretary of Defense has recommended against the continuation of the grant program for the military equipment to Latin America. I

would like to know whether or not that is true. Second, has the State Department agreed with him?

General PORTER. I am not certain that you should ask me that question.

Senator MORSE. All right. That is all I need to know.

General PORTER. Because I am a subordinate over there. I could tell you what my view was as to the importance of the military program down there, but I am not in the policy-making business. I make recommendations.

Mr. CORRIGAN. Could I say—I am with the State Department, and I am Political Advisor to General Porter. I think I can merely tell you that I have been in the State Department for the last few days talking with some people about a lower level over there in the Latin American section, and they tell me that this is true.

That apparently Mr. McNamara is taking a hard-nosed viewpoint that grant military assistance should stop rather precipitously within a year or two. ARA, the Latin American section, Mr. Lincoln Gordon, is taking very strong exception to this. He thinks that such abrupt stoppage of the grant military assistance program would be mischievous and counterproductive at a time when we don't know exactly where we are going in our relationship with Latin America. He thinks eventually that perhaps there should be a diminution of it, but it should be more orderly and not a meat-ax approach.

I understand that last Friday there was a meeting on this, a so-called interdepartmental regional group meeting, IRV, and there Mr. Lincoln Gordon did take a strong position that he disagreed with the McNamara position, which was expounded at that meeting by a representative of Mr. McNamara's office.

I understand Mr. McNamara's representative, on the other hand, did hold to his guns, and that this matter is being referred up to what we call the senior interdepartmental group, which is chaired by the Secretary of Defense. If they don't come to an agreement there, the matter would be referred to the President.

GRANTS VERSUS CREDIT

Senator MORSE. This is a hot one up here you know, this grant versus credit.

General PORTER. You know from where I sit I think the grant program is terribly important to us down there, because the only way we really are going to influence and control the introduction of weapons into South America in my judgment, considering the nationalistic attitude of the people and their Spanish temperament, is through collaboration, where we are working together and we can give them advice, and say "Look, we will help you get this equipment if you need it and if you can justify it."

Now the way we are going to go, the way things are developing now, we are not going to be able to do this. Venezuela is a good case in point.

In Venezuela now where there are advisers, when they ask us our views, we can tell them, but we are not privy to what is going on in Venezuela. But if you look at the grant aid program and look at how much budget in most of these countries is available for modernization, replacement of old rifles with the M-1 and things like that, you will find that the 5 percent or so of their budget that

our military assistance grant program provides is over 50 percent of what they have for modernization of their equipment. When you look at the trends, what this does in the way of giving new radios to them, new equipment of that nature, and the vehicles that will carry the radios so you can use them out in the field, helicopters and things like that, this is the difference between having a force which will be able to do the job and not having it. They are pretty well mixed up. Their budget is pretty well tied up to about 85 or 90 percent in all of these countries on fixed charges of cost of personnel, maintaining their plant, or civic action activities, if they are committed to road building, these educational programs, and it is hard to smoke these things out.

NON-MILITARY COSTS FOR CONSTRUCTION

For example, in Brazil, it shows if you just look at their budget, about 60 percent of the Brazilian budget goes into the military. But if you actually could break out the non-military cost of the Brazilian forces, you would find that less than six percent of the money, looking at their overall budget, actually goes for internal security, pure internal security or national defense projects. About ten percent of that is going into roadbuilding, railroad building, and other civil action projects that they are in.

Senator MORSE. Airfields.

Mr. CORRIGAN. And running the service up and down the Amazon. The Navy does that, you see, and going into the back country, the airfields and the air service, running the medical service into those back areas. One of the most difficult things that I have gotten into is trying to figure out just exactly what goes into their defense appropriation and how much is used.

It varies from country to country. In Argentina quite a lot of the budget goes into civil action type stuff there, but the Argentine has never admitted it was civic action, but it is up in the northwest.

MILITARY ADVISORY GROUPS

Senator MORSE. Senator McCarthy, we have one other question, as you know, that we discussed here that I thought the General could help us with. That deals with the military advisory groups in these various countries.

I wanted to discuss with him if he would from the standpoint of Nicaragua. First, what do you think is the situation down there, and how large is our military advisory group? To what degree, if any, do the critics which are attributed to the military getting involved in military coups, working with an American military advisory group. And I think we ought to have ammunition to answer those criticisms.

Senator MCCARTHY. Are there any other countries that have military advisory groups in major countries in Latin America, or is it only United States groups there?

General PORTER. In Paraguay, there is one from Argentina and there is one from Brazil. But they are working on specific things.

Senator MCCARTHY. These are Latin American countries?

General PORTER. That is right.

EUROPEAN ADVISORS

Senator MCCARTHY. Any of the European countries?

General PORTER. No. Up until World War II, yes. Germany and France had all of them. We started in 1940 or '41.

Senator MCCARTHY. What is the tradition of the Brazilian Army? Was that German-trained or not? Do you know?

General PORTER. Bob, can you answer that?

Mr. CORRIGAN. Prior to World War II, it was. Since World War II, it has not been.

Senator MCCARTHY. What about Argentina? That was German, wasn't it?

General PORTER. Bolivia was German; Chile was German.

Senator MCCARTHY. I know Chile was German. I thought Argentina was not German. I wondered whether you noted any difference in the way in which their army responded in political crisis on the basis of whether they were German, French or British trained.

General PORTER. I think actually in Argentina the French were there, because they are still sending French—

Senator MCCARTHY. I think so. Generally, where the French are, the army is a little more political.

General PORTER. Peru is French also.

Senator MCCARTHY. Chile was German.

General PORTER. Chile is German.

Senator MCCARTHY. They are loyal to any administration, aren't they?

General PORTER. Yes. Bolivia was German also. But the reasons that the Chileans are loyal to their administration is for other reasons.

Senator MCCARTHY. You don't think it has anything to do with being trained by Germans?

General PORTER. No.

Mr. CORRIGAN. So was Brazil. They weren't too loyal when they kicked out Goulart.

Senator MCCARTHY. I was thinking of that. You think most of the army there is becoming Americanized?

General PORTER. Oh yes. The German Ambassador in Panama, who had been in Bolivia, told me he was sorry the Germans didn't leave Bolivia sooner, because there were still some bad effects in the Bolivian Army.

Senator MCCARTHY. German tradition?

General PORTER. From the days of German tradition. He was getting after me because we hadn't been able to change all of these things. I don't think that is a very good analogy.

Senator MCCARTHY. It isn't analogy, but a question. Sometimes the things run deep. But the point is now, so far as the military advisory groups, they are either from other Latin American countries or they are all from the United States.

SITUATION IN NICARAGUA

Senator MORSE. That last ticker was that the election had gone better than three to one for Somoza.

Senator MCCARTHY. Where did they get that one third?

General PORTER. I think Nicaragua. This is probably as difficult an area for me to understand as there is. I frankly, from what I have seen of the situation there, feel that we are dealing with probably the most backward country. I put this and Bolivia as the two most backward countries in the area.

I think that things are much more limited there than they are in the other Central American areas, even Honduras included. I say this because the rule of the machete is still pretty much the rule in Nicaragua. For example, I think I told you this, Colonel Francisco was coming back from inspecting a unit on the coast here about four months ago, and about 40 miles from Managua, he ran into a road jam. He got out of the car and went walking to find out why these cars were stopped. There were over 50 cars that were halted.

He got up at the head of the column and discovered that there were two families that were shooting it out across the road. This had been going on for about six hours. This was a private feud, the Hatfields and McCoys or something like that. By dark there were well over 100 cars that were waiting there until dark came and the people went home and they went to Managua.

I don't know just how you deal in our terms, in our political life, with this sort of going on in the countryside, you see. From what I have seen of Nicaragua, it is pretty much a peculiar place from the word go. I just don't know how to rationalize what goes on there.

I will say this. That La Guardia is pretty well-trained by our standards. But when you take a Nicaraguan who is used to this sort of life I was just telling you about, and you give him a life, and he is provoked, up to a point he is pretty well-disciplined. He is not going to take the brickbats on his helmet. He is going to use his bare bayonet much more quickly.

ASSESSMENT OF GEN. SOMOZA

I really feel from what I have seen that Somoza will probably give them a good administration. This is just my own judgment. I don't know Somoza well. The president that had died of a heart attack was a very, very fine man. He was loved by the people. Aguerro, I don't know him. I don't know whether you know him or not. He ran last time and withdrew. Do you know Aguerro at all?

Mr. CORRIGAN. No. But only this morning, General, I was reading at the State Department an analytical telegram from our Embassy in Managua, where, reporting the results of numerous conversations Embassy people had had with people of different political beliefs and opinions, and even among the conservative people of substance like in the professions and whatnot, a number of people, these conservatives, of course, are very unhappy about Somoza.

They feel that Somoza has exaggerated and insisted on keeping power too long, and they are sorry that Somoza decided to run. They would rather see the thing evolve in a way from where maybe the Somozas would let people like Schick, who are good people not associated with the family, but nevertheless did move ahead and insist on running for the presidency. These people said therefore they were not too sanguine about the way things may develop in Nicaragua, particularly because they felt that this fellow Taucheau

is a bit of the Aryan side, that he may be more suppressive than his brother Luis. But they all went on to say, these opponents of Somoza, talking of the political party who is the opposition party, they all went on to say Aguerro would be terrible.

The point I wish to make is that apparently these people of substance feel that this wasn't the time. They didn't have the fellow of sufficient stature and ability to move in and change the situation.

Senator MORSE. This hotel episode would show that.

Mr. CORRIGAN. It was scandalous and outrageous.

Mr. HOLT. You know the old saying. You can't beat somebody with nobody. This is a lot of what is involved in Nicaragua. This Aguerro is nobody—

Mr. CORRIGAN. This situation that is evolving has to evolve, and I think this situation in the past two days will temper this, rather than the reverse. I am inclined to hope that he will become a little more politic, a little more bland and a little more clever in building up his relationships than being oppressive. This is the question. We have to see how he evolves with power once he has power.

EXERCISING INFLUENCE

General PORTER. In our military advisory group, we have between 25 and 30 people in our mission there, Army, Navy and Air Force total, and they are dealing with advising the military academy.

They are working, trying to teach them how to use communications. Teaching them to maintain their equipment. They are working on training to try to teach them how to train soldiers so they will stand when people are shooting at them without running. And it is a minimum number there. I really feel it is a benefit to us because these people are talking to the military people, and are feeling their pulse, and it gives us a way of restraining them.

Senator MORSE. Exercising influence.

General PORTER. That is right.

Senator MORSE. General, you have been very, very generous. You have too, Mr. Corrigan, and I appreciate it very much.

[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

**Strategic Implications of Antiballistic Missile
Defense Deployment**

**Limitations on Use of Chemical and
Bacteriological Agents in Warfare**

**Sales of Military Equipment by the United
States**

Tuesday, February 7, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Gore, Sparkman, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, and Aiken.

Also present: Senator McGee.

Captain Hibler; Mr. Knaur; Jack Stempler, Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense; Mel Christopher, Congressional Liaison to ACDA.

[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

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**STATEMENT OF CYRUS R. VANCE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE**

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DR. FOSTER'S CONCLUSION ABOUT NIKE-X BEING READY FOR
PRODUCTION [P. 35]

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, before you go further, I wonder if I may break in. What was Dr. Foster's conclusion about Nike-X being ready for production?

Mr. VANCE. He indicated that we had components which would permit us to commence the production and deployment of a Nike-X system at this time, but he also came to the very strong conclu-

sion that from a technical standpoint he did not believe that the deployment of a Nike-X system to protect against Soviet attacks upon our population was a wise and sound course. He thought it presented grave technical difficulties.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you.

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DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SOVIET UNION [P. 35]

Senator GORE. So as of now your decision is to defer any deployment but to continue with research and development.

Mr. VANCE. That is correct, and we have also asked this year, Mr. Chairman, that the Congress appropriate \$377 million for FY 1968 which, together with the \$168 million already appropriated in FY 1967, could be used for production should the talks with the Soviets fail. If they failed, the issue could then be reconsidered and a new decision would be possible at that time should the President choose to make it.

Senator GORE. What is the status of those discussions?

Mr. VANCE. Communications have started between our two countries. No substance has as yet been discussed between the two countries. They have indicated an interest in such discussions.

Senator GORE. No actual conference has occurred on it.

Mr. VANCE. There has been one or, I believe, two preliminary discussions.

Senator GORE. I see. Of reasonably high officials?

Mr. VANCE. Of high officials, in which there was an indication that they were interested in further exploring this problem with us.

Senator GORE. Fine.

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ESTIMATED COST OF TOTAL DAMAGE-LIMITING PACKAGE [P. 38]

Mr. VANCE. To test the contribution that each of these Nike-X deployments might make to our damage limiting objectives, we have projected both the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces (assuming no reaction by the Soviets to the U.S. ABM deployment) to fiscal year 1976, by which time posture B, the heavier defense, could be fully in place. These forces are shown on the tables.

With respect to another table in my classified statement, there is one very significant number—that is the total number of ballistic missile warheads, which is the third item on this table. That shows that in 1976 the total number of ballistic missile warheads which the U.S. would have is 7,328. In contrast, it is estimated that at that time the Soviets, assuming no reaction on their part to an ABM deployment by the United States, would be between 1,133 and 1,598.

Senator AIKEN. What size warhead?

Mr. VANCE. They would vary.

Senator AIKEN. What is an average, would it be mostly small?

Mr. VANCE. They would be, primarily, small. I can give you that in terms of megaton equivalents if you would like; it would be 1,825 equivalent one megaton weapons.

Senator AIKEN. Medium range or ICBM?

Mr. VANCE. These are all ICBM's and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Senator AIKEN. Never mind.

Senator GORE. Now in your estimate of 7,000 plus for the United States—

Mr. VANCE. Yes, sir?

Senator GORE. [continuing] In the event of the Poseidon missile, are you counting that as one warhead or 14 warheads?

Mr. VANCE. 14 warheads, sir.

Senator GORE. So you are really in many respects, so far as actually the ballistic missile is concerned, the number would be smaller.

Mr. VANCE. Quite right, sir.

Senator GORE. Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Does that mean the 400 would be 5,600 out of that 7,328?

Mr. VANCE. There are 400 large submarine-launched ballistic missiles (Poseidon class)—

Senator SPARKMAN. 14 times that would be—14 times 4.

RUSSIAN POLARIS DEVELOPMENT

Senator SYMINGTON. Following the chairman's question, Mr. Secretary, have you made any provision for the logical development of a 14-headed tube on a Polaris submarine by the Russians in your figure?

Mr. VANCE. Yes, sir. We have made computations which I will come to later on.

Senator SYMINGTON. My point is you have 1,133 and 1,598 here. Does that include 16 times 14 in it?

Mr. VANCE. This assumes no reaction on the part of the Soviet Union to a U.S. ABM deployment, which I think, as I said before, is a most unrealistic assumption. I believe they will react, Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not mean to be short about it, but actually these figures do not mean a lot if they have a lot of Polaris submarines with 14 in each tube.

Mr. VANCE. I am going to point out later on that I do not think this is the posture the Soviet Union will be in if we deploy an ABM. I think they will be forced to react and will have substantially more warheads than shown on this table.

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not mean to labor it. But certainly you do not mean they will develop a 14-weapon Polaris missile just because we do not put up an ABM, do you?

Mr. VANCE. They may develop a multi-warhead Polaris-type missile. Whether it would be able to have 14 warheads or not, I do not now know, Senator Symington; they might decide instead simply to proliferate land-based ICBM's which also could have multiple warheads.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Senator GORE. As I believe the CIA told us, as of now we have no information that they have developed or are developing, attempting to develop a multiple warhead.

Mr. VANCE. That is correct. We have no information at this point in time which leads us to believe that they are developing multiple warheads. They may be, but we have no information at this point.

Senator SYMINGTON. It was not too long ago that we did not have information that they were developing Polaris submarines.

Senator SPARKMAN. May I ask this one question, sir?

Mr. VANCE. Yes, sir.

RUSSIAN SAM DEFENSE SITES

Senator SPARKMAN. SAM sites, we have 112 and they will have between 1,360 and 2,006. Why that great difference?

Mr. VANCE. It is a difference of emphasis which they place, as opposed to us, on defense. They have always been very, very strong on defense, as you may know, Senator Sparkman. We feel that they have wasted billions of dollars on their SAM defense. Both the military and the civilians in the Defense Department agree that despite the Soviets' massive deployment of surface-to-air missiles, our bombers could still penetrate and that at least 85 percent of them would get through. So that we feel that this vast expenditure of billions of dollars by the Soviets on SAMs in the past has been essentially a waste of money on their part.

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ESTIMATES OF SOVIET AND UNITED STATES FIRST STRIKE FATALITIES

[P. 41]

Mr. VANCE. We believe that even if we struck first they would still have the capability to come back and inflict that amount of damage upon the United States. And we have reviewed, not because we ever intended to do so, the question of whether or not the United States could ever launch a pre-emptive strike on the Soviet Union and receive an acceptable level of damage in return. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and we are all in agreement that we could not do so, even if we struck first.

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Senator GORE. You and Secretary McNamara take the position that the best, most fortuitous balance of terror so far as we are concerned is to pay relatively small attention to defense and maximize our power of assured destruction.

Mr. VANCE. That is correct, sir.

Senator GORE. Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think it was Winston Churchill's analysis that the development of atomic and nuclear weapons would prevent a third world war; was it not?

Mr. VANCE. I believe he did comment to that effect.

Senator SPARKMAN. Because of the horror and terror of it.

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not think that is quite right. The development of nuclear weapons, according to a conversation I had with him in 1954, made him feel that the British were helpless in the future against an all-out attack. He also felt it gave greater advantages to Russia because of the size of their land mass, and the time involved if there was ever another war. Therefore, it was important for us—he always classified himself with us—to be sure that we never lowered our deterrence.

I am inclined this morning to support the decision not to have the ABM. I did not have the privilege of hearing Mr. Foster yesterday. But I did hear him before the Armed Services-Appropriations Joint Committees, and, based on his position, I am inclined to support it. But in supporting it, I am in no way reducing my conviction that the best way to prevent a future war is to be sure we have adequate deterrence against Russia, so that they know they would be destroyed if they attacked us.

Mr. VANCE. I am absolutely in agreement with that. We must assure our destruction capability.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am given a quote by the staff, "Security will be the sturdy stepson of terror."

Mr. VANCE. Will be the what, sir?

Senator SPARKMAN. "Will be the sturdy stepson of terror." I am sure that he advocated the maintenance of the deterrent forces. But he said the maintenance of that deterrent force would prevent World War III. I am sure he said that.

Senator SYMINGTON. An equally famous quotation is his characterization of the "balance of terror." The word "balance" is the important one.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Senator GORE. I would like to put a question here that has been troubling me. Suppose we are convinced that despite whatever defense systems the Soviets install, we can still wreak this havoc in such horrible proportions as described here. Suppose that they are convinced that their system is impregnable. Then has not our strategy of deterrence been compromised?

Mr. VANCE. Mr. Chairman, during the last several years we have released more information of a formerly classified nature than ever before, because we wanted the Soviet Union to know our capability so that they would not misinterpret our power, and our capability to destroy them as a viable nation should they attempt to attack us.

We have been criticized for releasing so much information, but I think it is vitally important that the Soviet Union should know what our capability is so they do not miscalculate.

Senator GORE. I was not referring to their information about the number of our warheads and even the nature of the improvements. But suppose that they have a confidence in their defense which we do not share but which they hold? Is not the crucial question their conception of our power of retaliation rather than our conception of it?

Mr. VANCE. It is, sir; no question about it.

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, what the Chairman is saying, as I understand it, it is better for us not to have the deterrence and have them feel we do, than to have it, and have them feel we do not.

Mr. VANCE. I think it is better that we have it and they know it.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is best.

OUR STRATEGY OF DETERMENT [P. 44]

Mr. VANCE. I think that this is one valuable thing that can come out of discussions with the Soviet Union. If we can sit down and

go through these matters with them and sit down and very frankly discuss our capability to penetrate such system.

Senator GORE. We are going to tell them that we have 14, multiple, 14-head warheads that can go different directions and different trajectories.

Mr. VANCE. Exactly what we would tell them I cannot say precisely at this point. But we would be making it as clear as clear could be that we have that capability to penetrate.

Senator GORE. Okay.

Senator SPARKMAN. If they have been reading our papers and listening to radio, they would know it anyway.

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COSTS OF AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE SYSTEM AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM
[P. 44]

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand. But it worries me. The cost of the project is so heavily emphasized in the defense of the civilians, it might cost—for example, a figure given us was \$40 billion in 10 years. At the same time the civilian heads are so determined to pursue a war that is costing us, according to the staff of the Appropriations Committee, \$30 billion a year chasing these little people around the woods over there in Vietnam. So if it comes down to a question of price, I am perfectly willing to consider the civilian heads probably better informed and better in a position to make a decision. But it is hard for me to see why the ABM system is so heavily defended in not being put up because of the price, \$40 billion over 10 years, when we are spending somewhere between \$2 billion and \$2.5 billion a month in this little country over in Southeast Asia. That is the one thing that runs through my mind as I read these details of the heavy costs.

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INCREASE OF SOVIET SECOND STRIKE POTENTIAL [P. 45]

Mr. VANCE. If the Soviets are determined to maintain an Assured Destruction capability against us and they believe that our deployment of an ABM defense would reduce our fatalities in the "U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate" case to the levels shown in the table above, they would have no alternative but to increase the second strike damage potential of their offensive forces. They could do so in several different ways, by deploying a new large, land-based ICBM (either mobile, or hardened and defended), or a new submarine-launched missile like our Poseidon, or by adding large numbers of hardened but undefended SS-9s or SS-11s. They have the technical capability to deploy any of these systems with MIRVs (or single warheads) by the mid-1970s. Shown in the table below are the relative costs to the Soviet Union of responding to a U.S. ABM deployment with a land-mobile ICBM system. I think the table is self-explanatory.

U.S. Programs	Number of Fatalities in an All-Out Strategic Exchange (in millions) (ASSUMES SOVIET REACTION TO U.S. ABM DEPLOYMENT)			
	Soviets Strike First, U.S. Retaliates		U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate	
	U.S. Fat.	Sov. Fat.	U.S. Fat.	Sov. Fat.
Approved (no response)	120	120+	100	70
Posture A	120	120+	90	70
Posture B	120	120+	90	70

If the Soviets choose to respond to our ABM deployment with MIRVs, penetration aids, and such a system (200 missiles against Posture A and 650 against Posture B) the results would be as shown below, and this is a very significant table. It shows very simply—

Senator GORE. We are back where we started.

Mr. VANCE. [continuing] That we are back where we started.

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SOVIET INCREASE OF SECOND STRIKE [P. 46]

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, if I may, before we go to the next subject; these assumptions can be very wrong. For example, several years ago some of us were criticized, including President Kennedy, about a missile gap.

The fact is, if there was a missile gap it was created by Mr. Dulles and destroyed by Mr. Dulles; eliminated would be a better word.

Senator GORE. You mean Allen?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Between December 1959, the record will show, and August 1961, the Central Intelligence Agency, at both times under the direction of Mr. Dulles, in four separate reductions, reduced the number of ICBMs on launching pads in Russia 7.5 percent.

Therefore, sometimes I always worry, regardless of the efforts made, as to the ability of any of us to know exactly what is going on behind the Iron Curtain, although I understand we have better results now because of satellite information.

Mr. VANCE. That is correct, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. But when you say that they would have no alternative but to increase the second strike, which they would do, for example, by developing new missiles for their Polaris-type submarines, surely you do not mean to imply they won't do that anyway, do you?

Mr. VANCE. No, I do not mean to imply that. They might very well.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would say that they would do it on any basis, wouldn't you? They would make the best weapon they could for their new Polaris submarines.

Mr. VANCE. I think what they will do is assure themselves that they maintain a sufficient capability for Assured Destruction, so that they feel that we will not strike them first. I think that they will do whatever is required to put themselves in that posture, in the same fashion that we have done in the past and will continue to do.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

DEFENSE AGAINST CHINESE CAPACITY

Senator GORE. In my view, Mr. Secretary, if we could succeed in dissuading the Soviets from deploying their system, this would be a very great accomplishment. I have wondered if they were in a position to do so or would be willing to do so in view of the Chinese—the very rapid strides they are making. You are coming to that later?

Mr. VANCE. I am coming to that, but I would be glad to comment on that now.

I think that in any discussions we have with the Soviet Union, both of us would reserve our rights to do what each of us might have to do with respect to China.

Senator GORE. Could I ask a technical question right here?

Mr. VANCE. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Now, the deployments that are being made in the Soviet Union now, we have been told, are aimed at or instrumented—I have difficulty in talking in this field—designed, I guess is a better word, to protect them against missiles that would be coming in on trajectories which the United States would be calculated to use in case of an attack.

Mr. VANCE. That is correct. That is the way their present system appears to be designed.

Senator GORE. Now, my question is to what extent is it feasible and, if feasible, at what cost, for the same systems to be designed or redesigned to provide protection against missiles coming from the land mass of China?

Mr. VANCE. I do not have an exact cost figure, but the Soviets would have to change the placement of their radars, they would probably also have to change the placement of some of their missile sites, and the small missile site radars that go with them.

I do not have an exact cost figure, but I think it would be quite low because, as I will indicate later on, for us to build a system which would be quite effective against the Red Chinese would cost, we estimate, only about \$3.5 billion.

Senator GORE. That is a light defense?

Mr. VANCE. That is a light defense; that is right.

Senator GORE. But this does not, as I have understood this estimate, contemplate a submarine capacity on the part of the Chinese.

Mr. VANCE. We would take care of any submarine capacity of the Chinese through our regular antisubmarine warfare components.

We know that they have at this point only one missile submarine. There are no indications that they yet have any missiles for that one submarine. They may be working on missiles for it. But we feel confident that we could take care of that one submarine with our current ASW forces, and we are also confident that if they move to a bigger submarine program that we would be able to take necessary steps to contain that particular threat.

But, as I say, we have made no final decision with respect to whether or not we should deploy an ABM system against the potential Red Chinese threat because the lead time is such that we do not have to make the decision now.

SOVIET MISSILE AND RADAR SYSTEMS

Senator GORE. One other question that is so elementary but, nevertheless, those of us who are elementary in our level of knowledge can only ask elementary questions. Are the silos, the hardened silos, in which the Soviets are placing their interceptor missiles, perpendicular or are they slanted toward the trajectories of the missile lanes it is anticipated the United States will use? Do the missiles take off perpendicularly? This will give some measure of how difficult it would be, some measure of the difficulty, if they wanted to redesign, replace their radars and use the same missiles that are now being installed as a defense against ours for defense against the Chinese.

Mr. VANCE. I think the determining factor is the way their radars are placed.

Senator SYMINGTON. You have to go out of the ground vertically.

Senator GORE. I thought so. This is what I would want to know. This would have a bearing, this could have a bearing, if they could use the same silos or same missiles by changing the direction of their radars and the telemetry.

Mr. VANCE. I think the critical thing is the placement of their radars, and they would have to change the placement of some of their radar facilities to reorient their system against the Chinese and away from the United States.

Senator GORE. How difficult would this replacement be? I know this must be a big installation.

Mr. VANCE. It is a big installation, sir, and it is quite a costly installation. They have two of these so-called Hen House radars up in the northwest section of the Soviet Union, giving coverage to the threat corridor of ICBMs coming in from the United States, and they have one under the process of construction called the Dog House down southwest of Moscow.

One would expect that they would have to put either Hen House or Dog House types over to the east to take care of the threat corridor for missiles coming in from China.

Some of the radars, such as those emplaced around Moscow, essentially protect the city from any direction and consequently would not have to be changed to defend against the CPR. But the large Hen House radar, for example, essentially covers a sector. If the Soviets were defending against China we would expect such a radar to be oriented in that particular direction.

Senator GORE. Now, this committee would be concerned in the case of, including myself, of the question of the verification.

Mr. VANCE. Yes.

Senator GORE. Supposing the Soviets said the silos they were constructing, supposing they said, "The defenses we are deploying are safeguards against the Chinese whose hostility is increasing toward us."

Now, could we be reasonably certain that this would be true or untrue?

Mr. VANCE. As you know, we have a considerable and growing unilateral capability through our satellites to determine both the deployment of missiles and the deployment of radar systems.

As to whether or not it would be necessary to have some form of on-site inspection in addition to our unilateral capability is not yet clear, and this is probably one of the issues we will have to discuss with the Soviet Union in any talks we have with respect of a moratorium on or a cessation of ABM deployment.

Senator GORE. One other question and then I will let you proceed with your statement.

PROTECTION AGAINST THE EAST OR WEST

What is the relative time element in deployment of the construction of the missile and the silo, the launching mechanism, on the one hand, and the radar installations which you say would be necessary to change as to location if this cellar be, silo be, in which a missile is on station, is to be used as protection against the East or against the West?

Mr. VANCE. Are you asking me how long it would take the Soviets or how long it would take us?

Senator GORE. Well, I am trying to get some idea, just for my own satisfaction, if we reach such an agreement as is being sought, which I hope we can conclude, how much reliance could we safely place upon the Soviet word that they were deploying as a defense against China if, in fact, the silo and missile could be used for either, and it would require a shifting of the radar from here to there. What I am trying to get at is what time element would be involved in re-installation of the radar or the necessary facilities to use this silo and this missile as an antiballistic defense against us?

Mr. VANCE. I will give you my best estimate, and I would like to correct it for the record. I believe it will be two to three years.

Senator GORE. Two to three years?

Mr. VANCE. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. If the deployment of the entire, the overall, system runs from five to seven.

Mr. VANCE. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. That is what I wanted to get.

Mr. VANCE. I would like to get that for the record.

New radars and interceptor missiles, if already in production, could probably be installed in 2-3 years.

Senator GORE. So this will be an extremely important part of the negotiations.

Mr. VANCE. I would think it would be an extremely important part.

Senator GORE. Thank you.

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RED CHINESE NUCLEAR THREAT [P. 49]

Mr. VANCE. With regard to the Red Chinese nuclear threat, an austere ABM defense consisting, for example, of four PAR and 15 Missile Site Radars, together with some 400 Spartan and 200 Sprint missiles (the latter to protect the principal radars), might offer a high degree of protection to the nation against a missile attack, at least through the 1970's. The total investment cost of such a program might amount to about \$3.5 billion, including the cost of the nuclear warheads.

The effectiveness of this deployment in reducing U.S. fatalities from a Red Chinese attack in the 1970's is shown in the table below:

U.S. FATALITIES
(In Millions)

	Chinese Strike First (Operational Inventory)	
	25 Missile	75 Missile
Without ABM5	10
With ABM	0+	1

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SENSE OF URGENCY REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS [P. 50]

Mr. VANCE. It is very hard to give any precise figure on this, Senator Symington. I wish I could. I think it all depends on how the discussions seem to proceed.

If we are making progress then we would be willing to wait longer than otherwise. But if it becomes obvious that nothing is going to come out of these discussions, then I think that we would have to reconsider our position more promptly. It is just very hard to put any precise time on this.

Senator SYMINGTON. Within a year?

Mr. VANCE. I think that there would be a good chance that within a year we could know one way or the other on this.

Senator GORE. Well, that is giving us an order of time.

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PRACTICABILITY OF ABM SYSTEM AGAINST ENEMY SUBMARINE ATTACK
[P. 52]

Mr. VANCE. Antisubmarine tactics are to get the submarine before it can fire, in other words, to track it and be on top of it so that when it gets ready to fire, why, you can kill it.

Senator GORE. Do we know where the Soviet submarines are all the time?

Mr. VANCE. We do, with a few exceptions, We have really extremely good information with respect to Soviet submarines.

Recently one submarine did get in close to the U.S. coast without our knowing it was there. We had one similar case in the Pacific where we lost one of their submarines for a while and then picked it up. But, by and large, we have really excellent information with respect to where Soviet submarines are. This is done by a number of different procedures.

We have our so-called SOSUS stations, which are long-range listening stations which can detect things hundreds of miles away under the water. [Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Will the Senator yield? But it is much more difficult to track a nuclear submarine than a non-nuclear submarine, is it not?

Mr. VANCE. The answer to that is no, quite frankly, Senator, because the Soviet nuclear submarines are really quite noisy. The most difficult ones to track right now are the Soviet submarines

which are diesel and battery powered. When they go down to three knots on battery, then it is virtually impossible to hear them.

Senator SYMINGTON. When I was out at Guam two months ago, I went out on a Polaris and they tell me they are dead for sixty days. They receive but they do not broadcast, and that they were practically impossible to detect.

Does that mean our nuclear submarines are much easier to—

Mr. VANCE. Our submarines are much quieter than the Soviet submarines.

Senator SYMINGTON. But then following their development of the art, they will be more quiet.

Mr. VANCE. There is no question but we must plan on them becoming more quiet. But at the same time we are trying to increase our capability to detect either kind of submarine. We are devoting a lot of effort to this.

U.S. ACTION IN EVENT OF ENEMY SUBMARINES POSITIONING OFF OUR COASTS

Senator GORE. What would we do if we discovered that a significant number of Soviet or Chinese submarines were taking suspicious positions off our coasts? We would become quite alarmed and might just provoke an exchange.

Mr. VANCE. If we saw such a situation developing, we would deploy the necessary forces to contain such a threat.

Senator SYMINGTON. But if the Senator will yield, if they want to hit you they do not have to have submarines. They could put twenty different ships in our harbors with false bottoms, and drop them and disappear, and nobody would know, and they would all go off at the same time, and they would destroy twenty ports the same as if they had dropped a delayed fuse in the water. It is interesting from the stand-point of attack, but it does not have to be done that way, if we want to get technical.

Senator GORE. This is a frightening world.

Mr. VANCE. It is a frightening world, Senator; I agree.

Senator SPARKMAN. It becomes more so as we move along.

Mr. VANCE. It does indeed.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask one question, talking about the ABM: Where would it fit in with the defense of Western Europe or would it fit in? Could it be made to fit in?

Mr. VANCE. It would have, in my view, a limited capability.

On the other hand, I doubt that it would prove an effective defense just as it would not prove an effective defense here. They could saturate it and, therefore, I think it would be an unwise move on the part of our European allies to expend the funds trying to protect their population, just as I feel it would be an unwise move on our part. It just simply would not do it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Then we are to regard this as a defense of our continental nation?

Mr. VANCE. Yes.

The deployments I have been discussing this morning are protections for the continental United States, designed to protect the continental United States.

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CHINA AS A NUCLEAR POWER BY 1980-85 IS QUESTIONED [P. 53]

Senator SYMINGTON. To me it is a pretty tricky sentence.

Senator Gore knows more about this than I do. But, as I remember it, the Russians were four years behind us, roughly, on the explosion of the hydrogen weapon, and had a more sophisticated hydrogen weapon than we did and I do not think you can talk in any sense of the term today, the theory of it anyway, about 1980-85 before China is a full nuclear power.

Mr. VANCE. I would be the first to say that predictions more than five years in the future are extremely risky, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. I thank you for that. That was my only point, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. VANCE. I was trying to present it as we best saw it at this time on the basis of the intelligence estimates which have been made in the government.

FUTURE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY COULD ALTER BALANCE OF POWER

Senator GORE. Now, I have heard CIA, the Atomic Energy, and your own experts on this subject. My impression of the consensus is that by the—and indeed, Secretary McNamara said by the mid-1970's say 1975, that the Chinese will have a significant nuclear and intercontinental ballistic capability. It is estimated that they will test their first ICBM this summer in a range from 5,000 to 7,000 miles.

Should that test be successful, then one would assume it is a question of building more of what they are testing. They have tested nuclear weapon to the extent of 10 or 20 times in power of the one with which we destroyed Hiroshima.

So if they, say, if by 1975 they have 100 capable of attacking the United States, this is, it seems to me, a significant alteration of the balance of power in the world. We then face a threat which we have not previously faced, and they have a deterrence not only against us but against the Soviets, and they have a power of intimidation over their neighbors that they had not previously had.

Would this not be a significant alteration of the balance of power and have a significant effect upon the whole strategy of deterrence?

Mr. VANCE. It might well have a significant effect on the balance of deterrence, and that is why I have carefully differentiated between a system designed against the Soviet threat and one designed against the Chinese threat.

I have merely said that as of this time, the lead times are such that we do not feel that we have to make a decision this year with respect to the deployment of a system oriented against the Chinese threat.

Senator GORE. But you are holding all options with respect to the Chinese.

Mr. VANCE. We are indeed, sir.

Senator GORE. And you would expect in the negotiations the Soviets to do the same thing.

Mr. VANCE. I would, sir.

Senator GORE. Is this not possibly one of the most complicated factors which makes it really impossible for Russia, and more impossible, I guess, than the United States, to negotiate and reach an

agreement vis-a-vis the United States and the U.S.S.R.? Here is this third complicating factor which both powers must take into account and, perhaps Russia with her proximity and her existing hostility, I do not know that the hostility is any greater than against us, but it is certainly an immediate thing with their border troubles and their history of hostilities between the Chinese and the Russian people?

Mr. VANCE. It is clearly a complicating factor and one which would be a very delicate one in connection with the discussions which we expect to have with the Soviet Union.

Senator GORE. Senator McGee, would you like to have a question before we go to another phase of his testimony?

Senator MCGEE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say, inasmuch as the chairman put the elementary questions because of his elementary school understanding of this, I am at pre-school, and maybe getting into the kindergarden today. I appreciate your courtesies in letting me attend.

Senator GORE. Senator Aiken?

FRANCE'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY

Senator AIKEN. I have not heard France mentioned at all.

Mr. VANCE. In what respect, sir?

Senator AIKEN. In regard to achieving capability, ICBM or anything else. Do you write them off?

Mr. VANCE. I think that in time they will achieve a limited capability. I do not think that this limited capability will really be a credible deterrent to the Soviet Union, and I really do not think that the French nuclear force can be anything but, quite frankly, a destabilizing influence in the whole world.

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STATEMENT OF DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CYRUS R. VANCE BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE FEBRUARY 7, 1967 [P. 55]

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5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reaffirmed their recommendation that a decision be made now to deploy, with an initial operational capability in FY 1972 a NIKE-X system which would provide for area defense of the continental U.S. and local defense of 25 cities against a "low" Soviet threat.

* * * * *

	POSTURE A		POSTURE B	
	Number	Invest. Cost (\$ Billion)	Number	Invest. Cost (\$ Billion)
Radars:				
MAR	0	0	8	\$2.8
TACMAR	7	\$1.9	3	0.6
PAR	6	0.8	6	0.8
MSR	26	3.8	95	8.4
Invest. Cost		\$6.5		\$12.6
Missiles:				
SPARTAN	1200	\$1.7	1200	\$1.7

	POSTURE A		POSTURE B	
	Number	Invest. Cost (\$ Billion)	Number	Invest. Cost (\$ Billion)
SPRINT	1100	0.7	7300	3.1
Invest. Cost	\$2.4	\$4.8
DoD Invest. Cost	\$8.9	\$17.4
AEC Invest. Cost	1.0	2.0
Total Invest. Cost (ex-R&D)	\$9.9	\$19.4
Annual Operating Cost	\$0.38	\$0.72
No. of Cities w/Term. Def:	25	50
IOC with Decision 1/67:	FY 72	FY 72
Deployment Completed:	FY 75	FY 76

It is worth noting, in connection with the costs shown in the foregoing table, that had we produced and deployed the NIKE-ZEUS system proposed by the Army in 1959 at an estimated cost of \$13 to \$14 billion, most of it would have had to be torn out and replaced, almost before it became operational, by the new missiles and radars of the NIKE-X system. By the same token other technological developments in offensive forces over the next seven years may make obsolete or drastically degrade the NIKE-X system as presently envisioned. We can predict with certainty that there will be substantial additional costs for updating any system we might consider installing at this time against the Soviet missile threat.

The deployment of a NIKE-X system would also require some improvement in our defense against manned bomber attack in order to preclude the Soviets from undercutting the NIKE-X defense; and we would want to expand and accelerate the fallout shelter program. The investment cost (including R&D) of the former is estimated at about \$1.5 to \$2.4 billion and would provide for a small force of F-111 or F-12 type interceptors (e.g., 48 F-11s or 32 F-12s) and about 42 airborne warning and control aircraft (AWACS). The expanded fallout shelter program would cost about \$800 million more than the one we are now pursuing. We would also need some of our anti-submarine warfare forces for use against Soviet missile submarines, but we are not yet clear whether these ASW forces would actually have to be increased over the currently planned levels. In any event, the "current" estimates of the investment cost of the total Damage Limiting package would amount to at least \$12.2 billion for Posture A and at least \$21.7 billion for Posture B.

To test the contribution that each of these NIKE-X deployments might make to our Damage Limiting objectives, we have projected both the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces (assuming no reaction by the Soviets to the U.S. ABM deployment) to FY 1976, by which time Posture B, the heavier defense, could be fully in place.

PROJECTED U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, MID-1976
(Assuming no reaction by the Soviets to U.S. ABM deployment) *

	U.S.	USSR
ICBMs (Hard Launchers).		
Large (TITAN II/SS-9 Class)	0	276-249
Small (MINUTEMAN/SS-11 Class)	1000	500-950
Mobile	0	50-0
SLBMs.		
Large (POSEIDON Class)	400	0
Small (POLARIS/SSN-5 Class)	128	307-399
Total No. of 8M Warheads	7328	1133-1598
Bombers (for Intercontinental Attacks).		
Heavy	255	70-110
Medium	210	300-500
ABM (Anti-ballistic Missile Defense).		
Area interceptors	800-3250
Terminal Interceptors	300-1500
Air Defense.		
Fighters	697	1700-2400
SAM Sites	112	1360-2006

*The Soviet forces are based on extrapolation of the latest intelligence estimates.

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If the Soviets are determined to maintain an Assured Destruction capability against us and they believe that our deployment of an ABM defense would reduce our fatalities in the "U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate" case to the levels shown in the table above, they would have no alternative but to increase the second strike damage potential of their offensive forces. They could do so in several different ways, one of which is reflected in the table below: by deploying a new large, land-based ICBM (either mobile, or hardened and defended), or a new submarine-launched missile like our Poseidon, or by adding large numbers of hardened but undefended SS-9s or SS-11s. They have the technical capability to deploy any of these systems with MIRVs (or single warheads) by the mid-1970s. Shown in the table below are the relative costs to the Soviet Union of responding to a U.S. ABM deployment with a hand-mobile ICBM system:

LEVEL OF U.S. FATALITIES WHICH SOVIETS BELIEVE WILL PROVIDE DETERRENCE ^a
(Millions)

Cost to the Soviet of Offsetting U.S. Cost to Deploy an ABM	
40	\$1 Soviet cost to \$4 U.S. cost
60	\$1 Soviet cost to \$2 U.S. cost
90	\$1 Soviet cost to \$1 U.S. cost

^a U.S. fatalities if U.S. strikes first and Soviets retaliate.

If the Soviets choose to respond in that way to our ABM deployment with MIRVs, penetration aids, and such a system (200 missiles against Posture A and 650 against Posture B), the results would be as shown below:

U.S. Programs	Number of Fatalities in an All-Out Strategic Exchange (in millions) 1976 (Assumes Soviet Reaction to U.S. ABM Deployment)			
	Soviets Strike First, U.S. Retaliates		U.S. Strikes First, Soviets Retaliate	
	U.S. Fat.	Sov. Fat.	U.S. Fat.	Sov. Fat.
Approved (no response)	120	120+	100	70
Posture A	120	120+	90	70
Posture B	120	120+	90	70

In short, the Soviets have it within their technical and economic capacity to offset any further Damage Limiting measures we might undertake, provided they are determined to maintain their deterrent against us. *It is the virtual certainty that the Soviets will act to maintain their deterrent which casts such grave doubts on the advisability of our deploying the NIKE-X system for the protection of our cities against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack they could launch in the 1970s. In all probability, all we would accomplish would be to increase greatly both their defense expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to either side.*

2. Defense Against the red Chinese Nuclear Threat

With regard to red Chinese nuclear threat, an austere ABM defense consisting, for example, of 4 PAR and 15 Missile Site Radars, together with some 400 Spartan and 200 Sprint missiles (the latter to protect the principal radars), might offer a high degree of protection to the nation against a missile attack, at least through the

1970s. The total investment cost of such a program might amount to \$3.5 billion, including the cost of the nuclear warheads.

The effectiveness of this deployment in reducing U.S. fatalities from a Red Chinese attack in the 1970s is shown in the table below:

U.S. FATALITIES
(In Millions)

	Chinese Strike First (Operational Inventory)	
	25 Missiles	75 Missiles
Without ABM	5	10
With ABM	0+	1

This austere defense could probably preclude damage in the 1970s almost entirely. As the Chinese force grows to the level it might achieve by 1980–85, additions and improvements might be required, but relatively modest additional outlays could probably limit the Chinese damage potential to low levels well beyond 1985.

It is not clear that we need an ABM defense against China. In any event, the lead time for deployment of a significant Chinese offensive force is longer than that required for U.S. ABM deployment; therefore, the decision for the latter need not be made now.

3. *Defense of Our-Land-based ICBM Forces Against a “Higher-Than-Expected Soviet Threat”*

As I indicated earlier, our Assured Destruction capability is of such crucial importance to our security that we must be prepared to cope with Soviet strategic threats which are greater than those projected in the latest intelligence estimates.

The most severe threat we must consider in planning our Assured Destruction forces is an extensive, effective Soviet ABM deployment combined with a deployment of a substantial ICBM force with a hard-target kill capability, in the form of highly accurate ICBMs. To date, Soviet missile accuracy has been substantially inferior to our own, and we expect it to remain so. However, if the Soviets develop accurate Multiple Independently-Aimed Reentry vehicles (MIRVs), they might, by equipping their SS–9 boosters with 6 MIRVs (each with a CEP of 0.3 n. mi. and a yield of 3 MT), be able to destroy large numbers of our Minuteman missiles. An extensive, effective Soviet ABM system much better than the one we consider probable) might then be able to intercept and destroy a large part of our residual missile warheads, including those carried by submarine-launched missiles. (The Soviet offensive and defensive threats assumed here are both substantially higher than expected.

Under the assumption that the Soviets have started the development of highly accurate reentry vehicles (including MIRVs) a reasonable upper limit on the build-up in their threat would be the following:

GREATER-THAN-EXPECTED SOVIET THREAT

Soviet Threat to Minuteman ^a	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
SS–9	180	180	180	150	100

GREATER-THAN-EXPECTED SOVIET THREAT—Continued

Soviet Threat to Minuteman ^a	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
SS-9 MIRV	0	50	100	150	200
(Six 3-megaton. RVs/Missile).					
SS-11 (improved accuracy)	160	260	360	460	660
Total No. of BM Warheads	340	740	1140	1510	1960

^aThe older Soviet ICBMs, the current SS-II and the submarine-launched ballistic missiles are excluded because they do not have sufficient accuracy to post a threat to our hardened and dispersed Minuteman force.

The effect of such a deployment could be to reduce the number of U.S. Minuteman surviving attack to the levels shown below:

	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
Minuteman Surviving ^b	800	590	390	245	160

^bIn addition, the Polaris and Poseidon force would survive.

To hedge against the possibility of such a threat to our landbase missile forces, we have authorized the development and production of the Poseidon. Should still additional offensive power be required, and such a requirement is not now clear, we are considering the development and deployment of a new Advanced ICBM (a large payload missile with an as yet undetermined basing system designed to reduce vulnerability to such a Soviet threat.

The deployment of the NIKE-X as a defense for our Minuteman force, however, would offer a partial substitute for the possible further expansion of our offensive forces. The contribution one illustrative NIKE-X deployment might make to the survival of our Minuteman force against the greater-than-expected Soviet threat, compared with the "No Defense" case is shown below:

	FY 70	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74
No Defense Case					
MM Surviving	800	590	390	245	160
NIKE-X Defense					
ABM interceptors	0	55	395	475	475
MM Surviving ^a	800	590	515	465	390

^aThe number of Minuteman "surviving with NIKE-X Defense" assumes the Soviets attack the defended Minuteman silos first. They might attack our radars first if they felt they had enough information on our defenses and were willing to gamble that we would delay launching our Minuteman for at least 15 minutes while their attack proceeded. In that case, the number of surviving Minuteman might be 100 fewer.

But I want to emphasize that we have absolutely no direct evidence that the Soviet Union is developing MIRVs with such low CEPs, or, in fact, that they are developing MIRVs at all. Indeed, the tests we have seen to date indicate a far lower order of accuracy for Soviet ICBMs. Nevertheless, the intelligence lead time would be relatively short—about two years between the first indication of such a development effort and the start of deployment of the systems. Therefore, in examining the worst case, we have assumed that they could have such an operational capability as early as FY 1971. But even against this higher than expected combined Soviet, MIRVed missile/ABM threat, and even without a NIKE-X defense of Minuteman, our proposed strategic missile and bomber forces could still inflict 40 percent or more fatalities on the Soviet population throughout the 1969–1976 period.

More extreme threats are highly unlikely. In any event, the changes we are now proposing in our strategic offensive forces

would make it dangerous and expensive for the Soviets, to move in the direction of more extreme threats to our Assured Destruction capability. If we assume, as I believe we should, that the Soviet Union would want to reduce the vulnerability of their own offensive forces against the possibility of a first strike by our very accurate forces in the FY 1972-73 period, they must further disperse and harden their strategic missiles, which is exactly what they appear to be doing now. To do so is expensive and for the same budget outlay results in reduced missile payloads. Not to so would leave the Soviet force highly vulnerable to a first strike.

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ESTIMATED EXPENDITURES [P. 63]

Mr. VANCE. Let me give both 1967 and 1968.

Senator SYMINGTON. Fine.

Mr. VANCE. I will give them to you in terms of new obligational authority. For research, development test and evaluation concerned with chemical and biological warfare, there is \$103 million in the 1968 budget; there is also \$248 million for procurement and \$12 million for operations and maintenance, for a total FY 1968 program of \$363 million.

Now, let me give you some breakdowns.

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not care about that unless you wanted to do it. I was just thinking, I think I am right in saying, that on chemical and biological warfare, just a quick mathematical interpretation in my head, that you are spending between one-fifth and one-tenth of one percent of your total in that field.

Mr. VANCE. I think that is correct. I can give you the figures for 1967 on that.

Senator GORE. I would like to have it, if you don't mind.

Senator SYMINGTON. I just want to develop the thought. Let me finish. I think it was about 1955 that I got a briefing on this subject. It was not covered in the committee, and we were spending about \$50 million. I think the figures will show in 1955, or a little less, maybe \$48 million in this field. I am glad to hear we have doubled that, although we have more than doubled our military expenditures. I am very glad this subject has come up here this morning because I think it is one thing that, we have gotten so interested in nuclear problems that then the problems of a general limited war we may well have sloughed this off a bit, and yet it seems to me that it is terribly important, especially in the fields of killing animals and killing people.

* * * * *

FISCAL YEAR 1967 AND 1968 BUDGET FIGURES [P. 64]

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you give us those figures.

Mr. VANCE. Yes. With respect to 1967 the total funds are as follows: For research development, test and evaluation, \$109 million; for procurement, \$169 million; and for operation and maintenance, \$12 million—for a total of \$290 million.

I would like to point out one other thing if I might, and that is the distribution of these procurement funds in the FY 1968 budget. I think it might be interesting to you. They have gone up quite sub-

stantially this year, and the reason is that they break down as follows: For smoke, flame and incendiary, \$160 million; for riot control agents, \$7 million; for defoliants, \$46 million; for defense materiel, \$15 million; and for other chemical and biological, \$20 million.

But the big increase is the result of the smoke, flame and incendiary category which is caused by our operations in Southeast Asia.

Senator GORE. I would like to ask a question about a somewhat related matter here, and that is the possible use of radioactive agents, radioactive metal pellets.

As you know, a city can be depopulated as well with radioactivity as it can with blast.

Mr. VANCE. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. What is the status of that art? What are you spending on that or is this in the Atomic Energy field?

Mr. VANCE. There has been some work done in the past on very clean bombs which would have little blast effect but a very heavy short-term radiation effect.

As to the amount of money which is being expended on such weapons at this time, I simply do not know, sir. I think that the best thing for me to do would be to supply that figure for the record.

Senator GORE. Very well, I wish you would. It may be just a wild dream or nightmare, but is it not technically possible to shower a city with radioactive agents, and that any person who stayed in the city over a period of twenty-four hours would have a lethal dose. Therefore, if the people were adequately warned and notified, once such city is showered with such agents, the whole place could be depopulated; however, it might be important industrially.

Mr. VANCE. I am not an expert in this field. I know that there are people who have done a good deal of work and who hold a theory somewhat similar to that which you have expressed.

I hesitate to speak on how effective this could be because I simply do not know what the state of the art is with respect to such weapons at this point.

Senator GORE. Of course, we know that the armed services bought some watches, wristwatches, that they had to discard in large numbers because there was a little too much radioactivity on the dial, but if you are not prepared on this, why, it is a part of the whole armament and the threat today.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to continue on that if I may.

Senator GORE. I did not mean to break in.

Senator SYMINGTON. The thought I wanted to express, at first I was excited about those figures, but then when you read them I got less excited because of the tremendous additional effort that is being devoted to chasing these little people around the woods. You will pardon the expression, but I am getting a little apprehensive about the price.

I believe about twelve years ago when we had a briefing on this, a special briefing for me and my legislative assistant at that time, we were very interested in certain diseases, anthrax, I remember, for cattle; tularemia, whatever the name of that rabbit disease was.

Mr. VANCE. Tularemia.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is that right?

Mr. VANCE. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And you had great hopes for that type and character. But from what I have read we are only spending around \$20 million a year as against a possible hedge in a multi-billion nuclear picture in this chemical and biological warfare. Am I correct, based on figures you read?

Mr. VANCE. Yes, sir; on that type of thing. However, we have substantial stocks in many of these items. If you would care to I can go through the various types of stocks we have.

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not want to take too much time on it but, Mr. Chairman, may I respectfully suggest that some time in the future, that some time we might have a hearing on chemical and biological warfare.

Senator GORE. Maybe we had better set a time for that.

Mr. VANCE. Fine.

Senator SYMINGTON. On anything that could be lethal delivered by a missile or any other way, suitcase, that would not be nuclear.

Senator GORE. Is that agreeable with you, Senator Aiken?

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

I was wondering about the neutron bomb, wondering what Dr. Teller's progress is, what progress he is making with that.

Mr. VANCE. That is what I was talking about before.

Senator AIKEN. That is what you were talking about.

Mr. VANCE. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Is he making any progress with it?

Mr. VANCE. I do not know where he stands on the neutron bomb.

Senator AIKEN. I know his eyes used to shine when he mentioned that.

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STATEMENT OF JOHN T. McNAUGHTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS [P. 66]

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3. Military sales to developing countries have amounted to about 10 percent of the total. I should underline the fact that the Department of Defense does not respond independently to requests from countries of the Middle East, Latin America, Africa or other underdeveloped areas for the purchase of arms. These requests are subject to the most intensive review and debate within the U.S. Government; usually, serious efforts are made to reduce the requests in either quantitative or qualitative terms; non-U.S. alternative sources of supply are often sought for foreign policy reasons, Mr. Chairman; that is when the U.S. does not want to be involved in the case.

Senator McCARTHY. Is that when you have the Germans ship the tanks for you to Israel?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Senator McCarthy, we did not do that. I beg your pardon. I thought you were talking about Iran—the Iran case.

Senator McCARTHY. No.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. The German case to Israel about two years ago, this was involved in that case, yes. This attempt, this desire not to have the United States as a source of supply, and later on,

Mr. Chairman, I am sure you will want to have questions about this delicate situation in the Middle East, and the extent to which the United States is involved.

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TANK AND AIRCRAFT SALES TO ISRAEL [P. 67]

1. The first is our recent tank or aircraft sales to Israel (1964 and 1966) were concluded primarily to prevent the development of an arms imbalance in the area which would have had a seriously destabilizing effect. The imbalance was being created by a heavy infusion of modern Soviet equipment (principally tanks and MIG 21's) to the U.A.R., Syria and Iraq. Our negotiations with Israel were protracted, and a serious American effort was made to have them meet their requirements from European markets. In the end, however, and especially with respect to aircraft, available European equipment proved either too sophisticated or too expensive; we at length acceded to Israel's request [Deleted.] assurances from the Israelis.

[Deleted.]

SALE OF SMALL AIRCRAFT TO JORDAN

Our recent, 1966, sale of a small number of aircraft to Jordan was the result of a similarly protracted and reluctant process. The United States Command had levied on Jordan a requirement to acquire three squadrons of supersonic aircraft as Jordan's contribution to the all-Arab military posture. The U.A.C. would provide a limited sum of money (contributions from member states); Jordan could buy western aircraft if it chose, but the U.A.C. showed a clear preference for MIG 21s, which were available at a cut-rate price. The pressures in the Arab world were such that Jordan was compelled to comply. The pressures were such that Jordan asked the U.S. to sell suitable aircraft on generous credit terms. Over a period of 18 months, we repeatedly insisted that Jordan explore all possibilities in the U.K., France, Sweden and other markets; but European prices and the credit terms proved far too severe—far beyond purchasing power of the limited funds available from the U.A.C. In the end, when it appeared that Jordan would be forced to accept MIG 21s, and thus to open its country to a large Soviet training mission and also to U.A.R. military influence—a move which we regarded as inimical to the integrity of Jordan and a grave danger to stability in the Middle East—we agreed to sell Jordan a small number of F-104's from our MAP inventory. In concluding the arrangement, we successfully reduced the Jordanian request from 60 to 36, and consummated ultimately an initial sale of only 12 of the 36.

MILITARY SALES TO IRAN

[Deleted.]

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AMOUNT OF ARMAMENT GERMANS HAVE SOLD OR RESOLD [P. 69]

Senator GORE. The Germans say they cannot afford to buy more arms from the United States, as I understand it, unless they are able to sell their own surplus of old used equipment.

The question I wanted to ask you is how much armament have the Germans sold or resold?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. I do not have the exact figures on that, Mr. Chairman. Let me see, I have—they both grant and sell, Mr. Chairman. Germany both grants and sells. They also have a grant program, and I have the figures for Turkey, for example, and I do not have any further figures on what they have done by way of transfer of equipment. I can get this for you.

Senator GORE. Fine. Will you supply that to us.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. I will submit it for the record.

The information requested is classified and was furnished separately to the committee:

MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF U.S. ORIGIN SUPPLIED TO A THIRD COUNTRY BY THE FRG, 1954-1966

3rd Country Receiving	Item Description	Quantity	How Originally Acquired from US?	How Provided by FRG?	Estimated Transfer Value (\$Millions)
CHAD	Submachine gun, cal.45, Thompson	500	Nash List ¹	Sales	
	81mm Mortar	30	Nash List	Sales	0.8
	Transceivers PRC 6	48	Nash List	Sales	
GREECE	VRC 7	24	Nash List	Sales	
	F-84F Aircraft	69	Nash List	Grant	
	Machine gun, .50 cal, Browning	Unk	Nash List	Grant	
	Communications Equipment	Unk	Nash List	Grant	9.5
	F-84 Spare Parts	Unk	Nash List	Grant	
INDIA	Prime Mover, M-4, 18-ton	91	Nash List	Grant	
	Trainer a/c, T-6G (Harvard)	34	Nash List/Sales	Sales	1.5
IRAN	F-86 Sabre VI Aircraft ²	90		Sales	
	Machine guns, cal.30	858	Nash List	Sales	
	Submachine gun, .45 cal	4,092	Nash List	Sales	
	Rifle, Recoilless, 75mm	339	Nash List	Sales	14.5
	Rocket Launcher, 3.5"	658	Nash List	Sales	
	Ammunition	Misc	Nash List	Sales	
	Machine gun, cal.50, Browning	200	Nash List	Sales	
	Anti-aircraft guns, 40mm	54	Nash List/Sales	Grant	
	Tanks, M-48	60	Sales	Grant	20.0
	Helicopter, H-34	30	Sales	Grant	
JORDAN	Ammunition	Misc	Nash List	Sales	
	Rifles, M1	30,100	Nash List	Sales	
	BAR's	1,412	Nash List	Sales	1.1
SUDAN	Mortars, 81mm	250	Nash List	Sales	
	Rifles and Carbines	32,600	Nash List	Sales	
	Rocket Launcher M1A3	1,200	Nash List	Sales	2.0
	Mortars, 81mm	380	Nash List	Sales	
TURKEY	Ammunition	Misc	Nash List	Sales	
	Aircraft, Fighter, F-84F	116	Nash List	42 Grant & 74 Sales	
	Rocket Launcher, 3.5"	5,000	Nash List	Sales	
	Mortar, 4.2"	100	Nash List	Grant	
	Howitzer, 105mm, SP	50	Nash List	Grant	
	Tank, medium, M48	108	Sales	Sales	25.0
	Tractors, Bulldozers, etc.	115	Sales	Grant	
Commo Equipment	Unk	Nash List	Grant		

MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF U.S. ORIGIN SUPPLIED TO A THIRD COUNTRY BY THE FRG, 1954-1966—Continued

3rd Country Receiving	Item Description	Quantity	How Originally Acquired from US?	How Provided by FRG?	Estimated Transfer Value (\$Millions)
VENEZUELA	Machine gun, .30 cal, Browning	2,250	Sales/Nash List	Grant
	Ammunition	Unk	Sales	Grant
	F-86K ³	74	Sales	Sales	2.2

¹The Nash List comprises all the military equipment and services which the U.S. has supplied the FRG under grant aid. This equipment was provided as a part of 1954 US/FRG agreements to organize and equip German forces. Eight years later, in 1962, U.S. reversionary rights to this equipment were sold to the FRG for \$75 million. Conditions of this sale require the FRG to coordinate and obtain U.S. agreement in the transfer (sales or grant) of any equipment to non-NATO third countries. For NATO countries, sales or grant must be coordinated for selected major items and, by subsequent agreement, FRG aid for Greece and Turkey is coordinated to assure integration of U.S. and FRG support.

²These planes were manufactured in Canada under U.S. license. Prior to provision to Iran, the FRG obtained assurance from GOI that the aircraft were solely for Iranian use. In late 1966, it was reported that some of the planes were in Pakistan. Both the FRG and Canada protested. Iran stated that the aircraft were in Pakistan only for repair.

³Produced under U.S. license in Italy for U.S. MAP use subsequently paid for by the FRG.

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DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUR COMPETITORS [P. 72]

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. Senator Symington, you had asked why we draw a distinction between our competitors.

When it comes to balance of payments, of course, the difference may not be so great, but if you are talking in terms of whether, for example, a determined Chile, which wants jet aircraft, is going to get aircraft from one country or another, there is no, so far as I know, there is no real push for Soviets sales, for example, in Latin America, although the committee has learned there is some intelligence that there are some overtures in this regard recently. But we do not mind much having the British fill that need for an inexpensive aircraft in Latin America, which is under the level that we are trying to keep Latin America to with the Hawker Hunter in Chile.

We are trying to keep Latin America below the supersonic aircraft at an economic level, and we have so far succeeded, and the Hawker Hunter, in effect, was sold to Chile. We could have had that business easily. It would have been easy to have the business in Chile by selling more expensive F-5s which were exactly what Chile wanted.

Saudi Arabia is a case in which the balance of considerations, everything taken into account, we, in effect, allowed part of that deal with Saudi Arabia to go to the United Kingdom.

Senator MCCARTHY. Wasn't it on condition that they buy \$300 million of F-111 from us?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. It was more than that. I mean——

Senator MCCARTHY. I mean the British bought from us and you let the British sell in Saudi Arabia.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. \$400 million worth of business in Saudi Arabia.

Senator MCCARTHY. \$300 million.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. No, it was more than that, \$2 billion.

Senator MCCARTHY. Saudi Arabia?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. No, the whole deal was, the British deal——

Senator MCCARTHY. I mean you let the British sell to Saudi Arabia.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. About \$400 million worth.

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. Phased over a ten-year period it comes to over \$400 million.

Senator MCCARTHY. How much would they pay for the F-111?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. They actually have not paid, but the deal, as I recall it, runs in the neighborhood of \$2 billion, including the phantom and C-130 aircraft.

Mr. VANCE. Approximately \$2 billion, the F-111 and the followon spares.

Senator GORE. \$2 billion.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. It is broken down into several pieces. There is a total deal of which the F-111s are a piece.

Senator MCCARTHY. How much?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. Which adds up to \$2.5 billion.

Senator MCCARTHY. How much are they?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. The F-111 part of this I have listed as about \$725 million.

Senator McCARTHY. That is quite different.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. Of the \$2.5 billion package, there is a \$2 billion package with the British, and this \$2 billion package they wanted some business running the other way. We ultimately agreed that provided they could meet competitive terms on price, delivery, quality, that we would buy from them or find things to buy from them, \$325 million, and the \$400 million, Senator McCarthy, that was part of that package.

Senator McCARTHY. And the Hawker Hunter is part of it, too.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. No, it is not.

Senator McCARTHY. Well, you said you could have gotten the business if you wanted to.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. All we had to do was sell F-5s.

Senator McCARTHY. Why did you not?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. We do not want Latin America to have that airplane.

Senator McCARTHY. Well, you said the F-5 was no worse than the Hawker Hunter.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. No, it is a supersonic plane.

Senator McCARTHY. I thought you said it was the same.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. It is hotter.

Senator McCARTHY. I thought you said it was roughly the same kind. We have some subsonic planes.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. The subsonic planes are wearing out, Senator McCarthy.

Senator McCARTHY. I think the point is that you do let some of our allies sell, don't you, when you really could get the business away from them if you wanted it.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. That is correct.

Senator McCARTHY. Saudi Arabia is a clear case.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. That is a case for one reason. Chile is a case for another reason.

MILITARY DETERMINATION OF FOREIGN POLICY

Senator McCARTHY. What I am concerned about is the manipulations concerned in the Defense Department. We sit around here trying to be foreign policy experts, and all of this kind of stuff is going on

[Deleted.]

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POWER IMBALANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST [P. 73]

Senator SYMINGTON. Right. There was a question of balance.

I want to make this point to you. I have just come back from the Middle East. The situation in Jordan is extremely serious. I personally hope we do everything and anything we can to help this fellow in his problem in Jordan, but in my opinion there is a tremendous imbalance out there as a result of what has been going on, and I think it is operated on too classified a basis from the Congress. I am not talking about from the people.

For example, there is no question about it, you check it when Mr. Battle comes back, because he briefed me at length on it, and he is a very brilliant fellow and is coming back here as assistant secretary. Now, today the quality of the U.A.R. air force is fantastic as against the number and quality of the Israeli air force.

They bought their airplanes from France because we were too high toned to sell them, for various reasons that I have never been able to figure out, and get the business over here. So they buy the Mystere from France, and the new plane, whatever it is, the Mirage, and the Russians, who are, our embassy tells us in the highest classification, moving very rapidly into the U.A.R., they now ship there just as an illustration. The U.A.R. today has over four times more MIG's than the Chinese and the North Vietnamese combined, and sixty of those MIG's are considered the most modern that they have. This is the information I got only last month.

Now, it is all very well to say that the Israelis can handle the U.A.R. because of pilot security, et cetera, but any day that the Soviets really get annoyed or there were any other mercenaries who really knew how to fly came in to run those U.A.R. airplanes, in my opinion, Israel is dead.

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[Whereupon, at 12:45 o'clock p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC

The committee met in public executive session at 10:00 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, and Case.

William M. Roth, nominee to be Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, and William B. McComber, nominee to be Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, were heard in public session and then ordered reported. William S. Gaud, to be U.S. Alternate Governor of the Inter-American Development Bank, and Maurine B. Neuberger, to be a member of the General Advisory Committee of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, were also approved.

S. 623, the International Bridge Act of 1967, was discussed and carried over.

The following treaties were ordered reported: Customs Conventions: Ex. J, 89/2, on Containers; Ex. K, 89/2, on the Temporary Importation of Professional Equipment; Ex. L, 89/2, on the A.T.A. Carnet for the Temporary Admission of Goods; Ex. M, 89/2, regarding E.C.S. Carnets for Commercial Samples; Ex. N, 89/2, on the International Transport of Goods under cover of T.I.R. Carnets.

Fisheries Conventions: Ex. H, 89/2, Exploration of the Sea Convention; Ex. T, 89/2, notes Amending the Convention on Great Lakes Fisheries; Ex. U, 89/2, International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas.

Maritime Conventions: Ex. Q, 89/2, Inter-American Convention on Facilitation of International Waterborne Transportation (Convention of Mar del Plata); and Ex. R, 89/2, Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Tariff.

Discussion followed on whether or not to hold public hearings on the Foreign Aid Bill.

[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

Tuesday, February 28, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC

The committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.

Ex. D, 88/2, the Consular Convention with the Soviet Union was discussed and ordered reported, with minority views, by a vote of 15-4.

S. 990, to establish a United States Committee on Human Rights for International Human Rights Year-1968, was considered carried over.

Discussion on educational trip to Vietnam by some members of the committee.

[The committee adjourned at 11:15 a.m.]

MINUTES

Tuesday, February 28, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC

The committee met in executive session at 2:25 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Gore (chairman of the subcommittee), Fulbright, Mansfield, Lausche, Symington, Pell, Case, and Cooper.

General Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, accompanied by Captain Louis L. Meier (USN), appeared to testify on the development of the Nike-X Antiballistic missile system.

[The committee adjourned at 4:00 p.m.]

MINUTES

Wednesday, March 1, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol. Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Gore, Fulbright, Lausche, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Case, and Cooper.

The subcommittee heard testimony from Gerald F. Tape, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission; Dr. Norris E. Bradbury, Director of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory; and Dr. Michael M. May, Director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 12:10 p.m.]

SALES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY UNITED STATES

Thursday, March 2, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in Room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Gore (presiding), Fulbright, Morse, Lausche, Symington, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Bader, of the committee staff.

[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

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STATEMENT OF JOHN T. MCNAUGHTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT'S MILITARY SALES PROGRAM [P. 134]

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. I want to double check this figure because our total sales program runs about one and a half billion per year, and how it could be a billion dollars in profits out of one and a half billion dollars of business is a little difficult for me to understand. I will double check that number.

But, on the question of Senator Morse's proposal, you cannot discuss the question of, for example, sales to Jordan, sales to Israel, sales to Pakistan or India in open session without risking very serious problems with the countries involved. This is why we have requested a closed hearing on the subject. The State Department would feel even stronger than we do about this.

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Senator FULBRIGHT. I just did not want you to leave the record, in answer to Senator Lausche, as if CENTO amounted to something. The way he asked it, and you said yes, there is CENTO, it sounded as if it was of some significance, and it really is not.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, the fact is it was at one time, and I was going to follow up with the question whether or not the significance

did exist when Russia was trying to move in on the Congress or sometimes by press reports of speeches by my deputy, Mr. Kuss. Generally, by the critics of the sales program.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. The image that is given, for example, all the way through the committee staff report, is one of the United States energetically seeking business.

Senator FULBRIGHT. The same way right here.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. This is untrue, and I think it should be fully understood that this is untrue.

The efforts that we put into this program by a factor of five to one are efforts to avoid selling.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I can guarantee that is not true here.

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ARMS SALES TO HELP BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS SYSTEM [P. 137]

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. I can guarantee that it is true in fact. It is my program, and this is where most of our efforts go—such as the Iranian program, trying to find—ways to keep a country from spending its resources on things it should not spend them on. This is not always the case, but in no case do we practice the hard sell, and I think that should be fully understood.

Almost 90 percent of our sales are to the industrialized nations anyway where the problem on the first sale it does not arise, but we do not press sales.

EXAMPLE OF A CERTAIN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRY

Let me read you what happened just two, three days ago when the Air Minister Gomez from Brazil was here. Brazil is a perfect case of what Senator Fulbright refers to where I think almost a half billion dollars of economic grants or loans may go in a very short period of time.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. The Air Minister was here, and he told me that Brazil is the largest country in South America. It has the largest Air Force, but it has old and outclassed fighters and aircraft. He wants to upgrade his Air Force, to keep it current. To improve the morale of his pilots, he wants just 12 F-5's, the supersonic light Northrop airplane, to be delivered within one year. He wants them by the middle of next year, and he told us, he said, "I don't want your grant, I don't want your credit. All I want is an agreement that Northrop can sell them to us," and the implication is, "If you don't sell them to us we are going to get them somewhere else."

What I told him was, here is an extract from the memorandum of conversation:

"When Mr. McNaughton joined the group the Minister recounted his reasons for early acquisition of the F-5. Mr. McNaughton stressed the following points: (a) We place emphasis on economic and social development and were against the diversion of resources from this important sector at this time.

"(b) That the acquisition of the F-5 by Brazil would inevitably lead to a chain reaction demand for it by other Latin American countries who are not able to afford such expenditures at this time."

This morning I find the pressure is still on. He is still in town. The question is what do you do about it. Now, this gets into the whole policy question of our relations with Brazil, the State Department, AID—

Senator FULBRIGHT. It does.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON.—DOD, who are all dealing in this problem trying to slow down, to prevent, these proud people from buying something they do not need, they have no business having, and this is where I spend my time to avoid selling them and, hopefully, to avoid having them drooling their money off somewhere else buying Mirages or Lightnings from the British—Mirages from the French or Lightnings from the British. This is where the effort goes, and I would like to point out—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is your point that if we do not sell, leaving aside entirely the aid we put into Brazil, they will find the money some place and buy from the British and the French. It looks like we are giving to them on the one hand, and taking away with the other.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. Senator Hickenlooper, this is a part—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That money might as well come back home as to go to Britain or France.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. This is entirely correct.

What is going on there obviously is an internal political fight within the country.

We had the same thing happen in Chile where they ended up buying the Hawker Hunters from the British. You have an internal fight going on there where for political reasons the government decides they have to allocate something for this purpose, and then the question comes up of one of restraint, trying to hold this thing down, and Chile wanted F-5's. We refused to sell them F-5's. We tried to sell them something that they considered too antiquated, which would have been a non-upgrading of their present force, and they eventually went to Hawker Hunter.

Venezuela ended up buying aircraft from Germany. We did not veto this. It is an F-86, not a great step forward.

Senator LAUSCHE. Can you veto sales by Germany?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. Well, we have a veto over resales by Germany to non-NATO Countries.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is our equipment that sold to Germany?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. That is right. But one point I think you should understand, that these efforts, imperfect as they may be, Senator Fulbright, are paying off in Latin America, for example. In Brazil—

Senator GORE. In dictatorships?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON.—they are paying off in terms of military, the size of the military establishment.

By using restraint, for example by agreeing to allow them to have 25 A-4B's in Argentina they are replacing two squadrons of Meteors of 50 aircraft.

In Brazil, for example, we gave them 54 T-33's to replace 50 plus 33 aircraft. They have smaller Air Forces.

There is a human, psychological, political, internal problem that these governments have a deal with, just as you have a deal with who sits where around the table or who is where in the Pentagon.

These problems are important to these people and, therefore, we move slowly to contract their expenditures on sophisticated types of equipment which, in our view, are unnecessary to the Latin Americans.

The figures I wanted to give you, in Brazil, for example, in 1961, they had 165 combat aircraft. The 1967 figure shows 122—165 down to 122.

Argentina has reduced combat aircraft from 275 to 125 combat aircraft.

Bolivia, from 15 down to 8 in that period.

Chile, from 57 to 48.

Now, what we have is a case in which the old Mustang, the P-51, which used to be the airplane—well, when we finally sold these to Latin America, they kept them for a long time. And then they moved to the F-80, the F-86. They are now looking for the F-5, how long can we postpone the F-5? They do not need it at all.

Senator GORE. Why does Chile need an F-5?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. Chile does not need an F-5.

Senator GORE. Why does Argentina need one?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. Argentina does not need one. No one in Latin America needs one.

Senator GORE. Why should we either give or sell them one?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. Because you have got the French, the British—Senator Hickenlooper's point, at some point when the F-5 is—their old equipment, in effect, has worn out, it becomes more expensive even to maintain the old equipment than to buy new, there will be a break point, and this could come in 1969.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. Because you have got the French, the British—Senator Hickenlooper's point, at some when the F-5 is—their old equipment, in effect, has worn out, it becomes more expensive even to maintain the old equipment than to buy new, there will be a break point, and this could come in 1969.

Senator LAUSCHE. If I may interrupt, the principle which Senator Gore is now enunciating, that is, why should we sell it to them, in trade with Red Russia, the proponents of trade argue that unless we engage in trade with them, other nations will, and that is about the same principle that you are up against.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. But not in Latin America. The Soviet problem is not a problem in Latin America.

Senator LAUSCHE. But if we do not help them along in this internal contest, they will go to France or they will go to the United Kingdom to acquire their planes.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. That is correct.

Now, Frei in Chile obviously had a very serious problem, and he ended up having to decide that something of this nature had to be done, some sophisticated aircraft had to be purchased. His Air Force had to be upgraded to some extent in order to maintain the political fact of balance the way he would like it.

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PUBLIC HEARING ON MILITARY EXPORT SALES [P. 140]

On the question of public hearings you, of course, should address this question to the Secretaries involved, but my own view is that

it would be very difficult to answer the specific questions that come up as to why sales in this case, why not in that case. What were the other agreements that the country made that made this a more sensible deal than appears by just a transfer of arms, this sort of thing. This can hardly be done in public session without gravely injuring our relations with the countries involved.

[Deleted.]

Senator GORE. Aren't we?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. We are in fact, but there is an explanation for it that cannot be given in public.

What we are trying to do is to keep this Jordan separated from the Nasser group which is being, in effect, subsidized by the Soviets. We are trying to keep Jordan, which is trying to behave vis-a-vis Israel; we are trying to keep them from falling into the grasp of a Nasserite group and, therefore, we have to provide some arms to Jordan under various circumstances. Israel then finds herself surrounded by the Nasserite group, and, likewise, needs arms.

Senator GORE. Meanwhile, Jordan will not cooperate in solving the Palestine refugee problem to which we have provided subsidy all these years. Jordan, has no prospect of ever becoming a viable economic state. It will be a permanent American subsidized entity. What is its justification?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. Do I gather that—

Senator LAUSCHE. May I interrupt here? I was in Israel in November of 1955. Please take this off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

MILITARY SALES BY RUSSIA

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you have full information to what extent Russia is selling military equipment to the different nations of the world?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. We have. I do not have it with me, Senator Lausche.

Senator LAUSCHE. But you have it?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. We have, I think, fairly reliable information on this.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is Russia restraining itself from selling to countries that want to buy from her?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. It is hard, just as it is difficult for the Senators to see from the data, that the United States is restraining itself, I cannot say that we can see from the evidence we have that Russia is restraining herself for political reasons.

All we can see are the items that show up, and it runs into \$2 billion just around the Mediterranean, the southern edges of the Mediterranean.

Senator LAUSCHE. It has been selling to Pakistan, has it not of late?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. I do not have information on that in my mind.

Senator LAUSCHE. Maybe I am confused.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. Let me check on that for you, Senator Lausche, on Pakistan.

Senator LAUSCHE. Ayub was talking about going to Russia, was he not?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. He was talking about going to China.

Senator LAUSCHE. China?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. We do have information of his getting equipment from China.

Senator LAUSCHE. You do not have to check it. My thought is that while we are reviewing the military equipment we are selling, we should also obtain detailed information about what Russia is doing.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. Senator Lausche, we could do that.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am talking about our committee.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. Not only Russia and China, but we would be glad to make available to you what we have on this.

Senator LAUSCHE. The issue is we do not sell whether someone else will.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. In some cases.

Senator LAUSCHE. In some cases others have sold.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. That is right.

Senator LAUSCHE. And they are prepared to sell?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. And in some cases we do not care, and in some cases we do.

Now, the Pakistan case is a case of getting equipment from China, not from the Soviet Union.

Senator LAUSCHE. I see.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. One hundred and seventy medium tanks and 60 MIG-19's from China to Pakistan.

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EFFORTS AT BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS [P. 146]

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. The second point I want to make, though, is one I think you might discuss with witnesses from State. Not this question about ACDA or State participation, but the question of whether any efforts have been made to get bilateral deals with the Soviets to cut out arms races.

Senator CLARK. I think you know that my interest in affairs of this kind. We have tried on one or two occasions to make some progress in having them stop these sales, and we stop the sales.

They just get incredibly linked together, and they say, "Well, if you will take everything out of Turkey", or something of that nature, and where our national interest cannot permit this to happen, so they become very, very difficult.

Senator CLARK. You agree this is a State Department and not a Defense Department responsibility to negotiate with the Russians?

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. That is correct. But I made a statement in response to your statement that nothing has been done, and I want you to know that we have made efforts along this line, and the Committee might be interested in talking to State about it.

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COPRODUCTION ARRANGEMENTS [P. 146]

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. I would like to confirm that this is the specific legislation which applies to Senator McCarthy's question, but I suspect that is the root of the authority from Congress.

Senator McCARTHY. It is probably right. [Deleted.]

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DEFENSE DEPARTMENT POLICY ON ARMS SALES AND GRANTS [P. 147]

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I am prepared to answer the question, Senator McCarthy. In cases in which we have given grant assistance, for example, Nationalist China, if we had given grant assistance, the country comes along, the time arrives, when we can shift the sales along the line that Senator Symington was talking about, then we maintain the same relationship that we had with that country but instead of granting equipment we sell equipment.

This will begin to happen in Greece, perhaps soon. Maybe in 3 or 4 years from now in Turkey; maybe some time in the future in Korea. It is already happening in the Republic of China; in Iran we see it happening.

These are cases where this shift is taking place, and the last time I testified, Senator McCarthy, you will recall I pointed out that the total involved of the two is remaining about the same.

Senator McCARTHY. Well, he says this has to be maintained through the sales media.

Now, couldn't we maintain these if we simply granted the arms to them?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Certainly.

Senator McCARTHY. Why does he say you have to do it through the sales media?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Because we assume that the grants will be reduced as the countries become more able to pay for what they use.

Senator McCARTHY. We might be better off giving granting them. This makes a formal commitment. Where would Nationalist China go, for example, if we did not maintain this relationship? Through the sales media? It is just a kind of a wild statement, it seems to me, that does not stand up under any kind of testing.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I can tell you where China would go, Senator McCarthy. They would dig down into their socks and take it out of their development program.

Senator McCARTHY. I am talking about Nationalist China.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. I am talking about that.

Senator GORE (presiding). What would be wrong with that?

Mr. McNAUGHTON. Because we are interested in the economic development of Nationalist China. This is an argument against buying more.

Senator McCARTHY. If they are going to buy it from somebody else or not from us—

Mr. McNaughton. Or anybody.

Senator McCARTHY. Anybody.

Mr. McNAUGHTON. This is one reason why in Nationalist China we do not insist that the whole program be sales, Mr. Chairman.

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PUBLIC HEARINGS ON ARMS SALES PROGRAM [P. 148]

Senator GORE. The Secretary expressed the view from his standpoint it would be inadvisable for the Executive Department to tes-

tify publically on many matters. I take it that if the full committee, insisted upon a public hearing, this would be a matter which would address itself to your superiors and, perhaps, even to the President.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. I would think so, Mr. Chairman. I hope you would consider very seriously the impact on our relations with every country mentioned today if the whole—the deals that had to be arranged in each of these cases, which almost necessarily would have to be surfaced to give the full picture in each case, were brought out in public session or if a person had to take the Fifth, so to speak, with respect to half of each of these pictures, because the inferences could be drawn from that as well, I just hope you consider this, Mr. Chairman, before you make this recommendation.

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ARMS SUPPLIES TO RIVAL NATIONS [P. 149]

Senator MCCARTHY. What really saved us in India and Pakistan is that the British were supplying most of the Indian equipment and we were supplying arms to Pakistan. We did not have to prove our superiority or they prove theirs over ours. But if you had had Russian equipment in India and American equipment in Pakistan, we would have said we have got to test our equipment, we have got to prove our weapons are better than theirs.

I think the British claimed their Centurion tank did prove to be better than our tanks in the India-Pakistan War.

Our explanation, I understand, was that the British tank crews were better trained. But if it had been Russian equipment against American equipment, you would have had a hard time settling it.

So now you get this thing up. I think you are better off if Morocco and Algeria both were supplied by the French, or by the Russians, or maybe both supplied by the United States, so we do not have to prove anything if there is a border incident between Algeria and Morocco. But we are giving airplanes and tanks and American equipment right there today, so when the test comes who is going to prove out to be, to have, the better equipment or the better ally.

The test is going to be between the Centurions and the Pattons.

The Defense Department seems to feel this is all good. With this policy we have political control, they say. And without it, we would lose everything.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make clear for the record that I disagree with Senator McCarthy's interpretation of the defense Department's position—

Senator MCCARTHY. I just read it.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. I am shocked at the suggestion that we would encourage a war to test equipment.

Senator MCCARTHY. I did not say a war.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. Or a continuation of a war.

Senator MCCARTHY. I did not say a war.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. In order to prove our equipment is better than someone else's.

Senator MCCARTHY. I did not say that. I said there is a temptation to do it. It would be much harder to draw off.

Mr. MCNAUGHTON. I am shocked at the suggestion that we would be tempted to encourage a war or continue a war.

Senator MCCARTHY. I did not say we would. I said we would be tempted to prolong it in order to prove the superiority of weapons and even to test them.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator GORE. I suggested a few days ago that in my view you would not succeed in persuading the Russians to limit the deployment of defensive systems so long as we were rattling our offensive missiles and bragging about having superiority.

It seems to me if we are going to succeed in preventing this intensification of the arms race we must negotiate some modification of our own offensive stockpile; that offensive and defensive measure must be taken together.

To what extent this can be accomplished, I do not know. But I personally welcome this response from the Soviets that I just read off the record. I want to say that.

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., subcommittee adjourned.]

POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS

Friday, March 3, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Gore, Fulbright, Mansfield, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Cooper.

Also present: Senator McGee.

Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.

[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

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STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY ADRIAN S. FISHER, ACTING DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

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SERIOUS THOUGHT NOT GIVEN TO A NONPROLIFERATION TREATY [P. 152]

Now that we are getting to a point where there might be a treaty, they are having to face the fact that they may be expected to close off the nuclear option by formal treaty indefinitely into the future and, therefore, some of the misgivings which we might have known about earlier are now coming to the surface, because this is a major step for certain countries in certain situations, and in this regard I would refer to India, for example.

Here is a country looking across the mountains on Mainland China, which is building nuclear weapons, and so the Indian Government recognizes that this step would be for it a very major and important decision.

We think it will make the decision in favor of the nonproliferation. I do not think we ought to underestimate the importance of it to them.

So it is not, I think, surprising that, when you get up to the hurdle, there is some hesitancy about taking the hurdle. We saw that in a minor way in the Latin American discussions of the Latin American nuclear-free zone. When they finally got up to the point of say, "Let us put it on paper and signing it," then there were two or three countries that just were not sure they wanted to close off this option indefinitely into the future. They all did, but it was an illustration here in this hemisphere of a phenomenon that is going to be observable in other parts of the world.

POSSIBLE PEACEFUL APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES

A second point has been the reluctance of some governments to forgo the possible peaceful application of nuclear explosives. Let us put aside for the moment whether in some cases this might be a pretext rather than a reason, and accept the fact that there is a valid concern about being denied the possibilities of the use of peaceful explosions for peaceful purposes, for civilian purposes, indefinitely into the future.

Senator AIKEN. May I ask you: Is that covered in the Inter-American Agreement?

Secretary RUSK. It was quite frankly not covered fully to our own satisfaction because in the Inter-American Treaty they did have some language which seemed to say if peaceful explosions can be developed in a way that does not produce weapons through some technical advances in the future, we do not wish to close off that option.

In the present state of the art, we do not see that distinction coming along. But I would like to emphasize that, as we see this problem, peaceful explosions are, in fact, weapons, and explosions that can dig a harbor can destroy a city. So we do not see how you can stop proliferation by leaving open the possibility of developing explosive capabilities for engineering and civil purposes.

The state of the art theoretically, I suppose, could change some time where there might be certain types of explosions that would not have anything to do with weapons, but we do not see it at the present time. So we feel that we cannot except peaceful explosions from such a treaty.

However, this is a valid interest on the part of a good many countries. We ourselves, as you know, are contemplating the possibility of using such explosion for an Isthmian Canal.

It might well be that a country like Mauritania might wish to have a harbor dug. It is short of a good harbor. It may be that a good many things in many parts of the world might happen in this connection.

We have discussed with the Soviet Union and with a good many other governments, the possibility of trying to make some international arrangement under which existing nuclear powers could furnish the services of a nuclear peaceful explosion in situations where it would be feasible from an engineering point of view-but to do that either through IAEA in Vienna, or perhaps, through the Security Council of the United Nations, or through some other international arrangement, which would make it possible for us to say to the non-nuclear countries around the world, "If the time comes when you need an explosion for peaceful purposes, we would

ensure that you have this service available to you." That is what we would like to do.

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TECHNOLOGICAL SPINOFF FROM THE WEAPONS FIELD [P.154]

Senator RUSK. Those of you on the Joint Committee, I think, would probably agree with that. The gadgetry of weapons introduces very little into industry as such, and has any peaceful or industrial or commercial application. So that we think that that is a concern that can be met on the merits, and the German attitude seems to be reasonably relaxed on that at the present time and in the light of technical explanations, which have been provided.

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PROBLEM OF SAFEGUARDS PROVISIONS IN TREATY [P. 154]

Secretary RUSK. There is a major complication at the moment in Euratom because Euratom has set up its own safeguards. Those safeguards are, from a technical point of view, comparable to the IAEA safeguards and, from the point of view of inspection alone, would be satisfactory.

But the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, for example, and possibly some others, take the view that inspection of allies by allies is not adequate and, therefore, there ought to be more general international safeguards in order that all could have equal assurances about the non-use of these materials for weapons purposes.

The Euratom countries are divided on this at the present time. It is now being studied in Euratom, and they will be having discussion of this at a ministerial level, I understand, later this month.

There are two or three possibilities in which this matter might be solved. One would be for the IAEA to put in effect a Good Housekeeping stamp of approval on the Euratom safeguards.

Another might be for the IAEA to safeguard the safeguard system, to test it periodically to be sure that the Euratom safeguards are working adequately.

A third might be for the members of Euratom to approach this from a national point of view, rather than from a group point of view, and each one of them, the non-nuclear—this would exclude France—the non-nuclears to say, "Well, we are in Euratom, but where there is a Euratom facility in my country we will accept the IAEA safeguards for that facility," even though there may not be unanimity in Euratom itself.

Now, we do not exclude the possibility that France will vote with the others and accept IAEA safeguards in Euratom, but if France does not there still is that possibility.

I would like to raise with the committee for thought, and I will be doing it also with the joint committee, one point that could make some difference in the attitude of other governments in this matter because there is a sense of discrimination if the IAEA safeguards are to be applied solely to the non-nuclear countries.

Now, if we, for example, were in a position to say that we ourselves will accept IAEA safeguards on the peaceful uses installations in our country, this could relieve the political situation considerably with respect to this sense of discrimination, and it might

encourage some of the others to move more forthrightly in this field.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Our only trouble there would be inspection, would it not? Do we consider our safeguards more stringent than those of IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency?

Secretary RUSK. Nevertheless, if IAEA had access to all of our peaceful uses installations—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say that is the trouble, which is inspection. There is the access.

Secretary RUSK. My understanding of the IAEA safeguards is that they are so constructed as not to get into such things as industrial secrets. Our Atomic Energy Commission has no difficulty with this so far as our peaceful installations are concerned. Now, weapons installations would be another matter.

But we will go into that in some detail because it has some technical aspects. But my understanding is that the character of the safeguards is such that you apply them at a critical point to determine what is being done, and you do not have to get into the question of how it is being done from a technical—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think there are some technical difficulties if we do get into industrial operations that violate the rules.

Secretary RUSK. I will get Dr. Seaborg and others to consult.

Senator GORE. In any event, the existence of the IAEA is, despite its limitations, a definite plus. We have something agreed upon with which to start.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Now, it is most unlikely that the Soviet Union would accept IAEA safeguards instead of its own country, or that France would accept it. Britain has a special problem and, perhaps, this could be left off the tape for just a moment.

[Discussion off the record.]

Secretary RUSK. The Soviet Union would be prepared to see a treaty go forward without a safeguards article.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I make a respectful suggestion that the Secretary complete his statement before we question him, if possible, so that we will be sure we can all be here.

Senator GORE. The Chair thinks it is a very pertinent suggestion and agrees with it. Is there objection on the part of the committee?

Proceed, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. Well, my remarks are quite informal at this point, Mr. Chairman. I will bring them to a conclusion on this matter of the nonproliferation treaty.

I was just saying that the Soviet Union would probably accept a treaty without a safeguards provision.

We feel that a safeguards provision is very important, and we understand that the committees here in the Senate feel that it is very important, so we have a good deal of work to do still on that point.

EFFECT OF TREATY ON POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF EUROPE

On another subject, which is potentially a source of very great difficulty, is the effect of a nonproliferation treaty on the political unification of Europe. Now, this involves a matter which we have been talking with the Soviets about for literally four or five years.

It has to do with political arrangements in Western Europe that may or may not have anything to do with the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I think our friends in Western Europe would be unwilling to sign a proliferation treaty which barred the possibility of a political unification of, say, the six states now in the present EEC.

We ourselves do not wish to bar European unity through such a treaty.

Senator LAUSCHE. Who does?

Secretary RUSK. But the attitude of the Soviet Union is likely to be very severe on this point.

Looking at it from their point of view, they would say, "Look, how do you expect us to accept the notion of a politically-unified Europe in which there would be Germans and the Unified Europe would be a nuclear power by succession," say, from France or France and Britain if Britain is a part of it by that time?

This is a very serious question, and one that we are likely to have to face fairly soon now because we are getting to the point of making clear what our respective interpretations are on the language which your subcommittee has already had, if, indeed, that language survives the present discussion, that is, the present international discussion.

There are theoretically two or three ways of dealing with this. One would be to say if you do not have a common interpretation on so fundamental a point, then you go back to the drawing board because you have not had a sufficient meeting of the minds to claim that you have a treaty.

A second would be for us and other signatories to make clear our own interpretation of that point publicly, as we would in any event have to do in presenting such a treaty, say, to the Senate, and then hope that the Russians would at least be silent. We do not know whether they would be silent or whether that would be a satisfactory solution, but it is this point which we have had in mind when we have said to you and to our allies that we do not have an agreement with the Soviet Union yet on the text of a nonproliferation treaty, because the words which you have in front of you, perhaps, conceal the possibility of a basic misunderstanding of what the words mean.

Now, it is true that political unity of Europe is some distance off, at best. It is possible that it may never come into existence for other reasons entirely. It seems at this stage to be a rather hypothetical obstacle, but we may be faced with the problem: Do you have a treaty if the words can be agreed at a time when beneath the surface there is a major difference of interpretation by at least a number of the principal signatories?

I do not want to minimize the difficulty of that problem, and I do not want to pretend that we can see any answer at the present time until we explore further what the Soviet attitude on that point is likely to be. If they are willing to gamble, this is a hypothetical question long in the future, and sign the treaty with the full knowledge of the interpretation which the rest of us put on it, this point, then there may be no great difficulty.

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ASSURANCES AGAINST NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL [P. 155]

Secretary RUSK. A further point that has come into the discussion is the question of assurances, assurances to non-nuclear countries who may think they will be subject to nuclear blackmail. This is not so much a problem with those who are allied, say, with the United States, countries like Japan or our NATO allies. It is more of a problem with countries who do not have such an alliance, such as India living next door to a nuclear China.

This is very troublesome because for us to give anyone, for example, the kind of assurances which might give them complete comfort would involve a very far reaching extension of American commitments. It could only be done by a treaty, and it would have to be done almost on the NATO formula, that an attack on one is an attack on all.

If a country like India is to feel that it is the beneficiary of iron-clad guarantees—and I am not at all sure that we ourselves want to entertain the idea—that if there is to be a nuclear exchange anywhere, from anywhere in the world, that we insist on being a part of it.

So, this is a major problem, and it may be the key question upon which the Indian decision would be made as to whether or not to sign.

I do not want to suggest to this committee that we ought to go racing down the track of providing these assurances to individual countries in connection with a nonproliferation treaty, but it is something which is very much worth considering, very much worth consideration.

REVIEW AND AMENDMENT OF TREATY

On the question of review and amendment, the duration of a treaty is a matter that has been discussed. I believe you, Mr. Chairman, have suggested a possible ten-year duration clause. There have been suggestions from other quarters that there might be a five-year duration clause.

One of the advantages of a shorter term—that is, some term such as five or ten years—would be that it would tend to eliminate certain of these hypothetical problems such as what do you do about explosions for peaceful purposes; what do you do about the European unity clause, and things of that sort.

But, on the other hand, if there is a termination date there is considerable prospect that a number of countries would race during that period—perhaps I could amend this language on the tape—race during that period to become eight months pregnant, and that you then might find that at the end of that period you would have an epidemic of nuclear powers, new nuclear powers, arriving on the scene. So, it is a troublesome question.

It seems to me that there will be some advantages in our having an open-ended treaty subject to periodic review. In the present text we are talking about a review every five years. But it may be difficult to achieve a permanent treaty, and at some stage we may have to come back and discuss with you whether it is better to have a treaty for a period of years than no treaty at all, given the attitudes of a considerable variety of governments on this subject.

At the present time, the momentum is toward a permanent treaty, but there are one or two problems that do point back to the possibility of, to the possible desirability of, a shorter term treaty.

We will ourselves favor an open-ended treaty as far as time is concerned.

Mr. Chairman, those are the key issues that are under discussion at the present time.

PROCEDURES OF DISCUSSIONS

Procedurally, we are now discussing these matters closely with our allies. We should hope during the course of the next two to three weeks to bring those allied discussions to a conclusion soon, test the allied interpretation of this language with the Soviet Union, and then table, if possible, a treaty in Geneva for the consideration of the Geneva Conference, and then submission to other governments.

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ABM MATTER TIED IN WITH NONPROLIFERATION TREATY [P. 157]

Senator RUSK. You know that the President yesterday announced that he had received from Mr. Kosygin a letter which said that the Soviet Union is prepared to discuss both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons, and was prepared to enter into negotiations with us to see whether steps of disarmament could be taken in both fields.

There was no detail in the letter. It is our impression that the Soviet Union is working on these matters within its own structure. It, too, may have some interdepartmental negotiations underway on this, and that they are in the process of preparing a position on which they would enter into any detailed discussions with us.

But we do have some impressions, not spelled out in Mr. Kosygin's letter which was very short, and said, "We are ready to have discussions," not spelled out in his letter but nevertheless a present picture.

You remember they rejected the notion of a freeze on offensive and defensive weapons which we proposed in Geneva last year.

I suppose the reason they rejected the freeze was because they considered the existing situation unfavorable to them. They, at the present time, seem to make it clear that they are not interested in talking about freezes, but in mutual limitations to an agreed level on both sides.

It is my impression—although we have no specific proof of this—that they would expect numerical equivalence between the Soviet Union and the United States in such negotiations. That is a pretty difficult and complicated thing for us to accept or to bring about or to inspect because if you get into the questions of that sort, you get into questions of what kinds of warheads, what kinds of megatonnage, what kinds of deliveries, what types of missiles, a great deal of fine print which is almost impossible to monitor in any event inside of a society which does not accept inspection.

So that I do not want to leave any false optimism before the committee on this matter.

We are encouraged to know that they are prepared seriously to discuss the matter, and we will be discussing it with them. But we do not have any reason at this point to suppose they will think about it in terms of a freeze, nor do we have any clear indication as to what they would do about the ABM's which they have already deployed in the Soviet Union, in the Moscow area.

So all that I can report on this point is that they have agreed to talk in a more systematic and official way than had been communicated to us earlier.

They have asked us to make any further proposals that we might have on this matter, and those are being now prepared in the executive branch.

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PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF OUR STOCKPILE [P. 158]

Senator GORE. It seems to me that with the superiority which we have publicly asserted, which may be more apparent than real, it would be unrealistic to expect the Soviets to agree to stop their defensive buildup. The first question I would like to ask you relates to the public disclosure of our stockpile.

We have been informed in the committee that megaton-wise the stockpile vis-a-vis the US and the USSR is roughly equal. In the number of warheads and missiles we have about a three or three and a half to one superiority. Secretary McNamara has publicly announced our stockpile of missiles.

I can understand he thought he would impress the Soviets that no matter how much they deployed a defensive system our missile offensive stockpile was so great that their defense would be overwhelmed.

But, on the other hand, it seems to me that this gives a weapon to the Soviet military to insist upon a defense because we are waving our bombs and bragging about our superiority.

I wonder if you would give us your views with respect to that.

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that in the course of NATO discussions it was felt necessary to go into these matters in considerable detail with our allies, and under those circumstances the matter of—these things do tend to become public in general orders of magnitude.

We have no doubt that the Soviet Union has known for a long time the general order of magnitude of our stockpiles and our weapons situation, and the fact that they have added certain new information-gathering techniques, with which members of the committee are familiar—some which we also have—we do not think that this is a matter of disclosing information to the Soviet Union, but rather telling our own people and other peoples in the alliances the approximate situation. I doubt that that would influence very seriously the actual negotiating position because they know that.

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DECISION TO DEPLOY ARMS DEFERRED UNTIL FURTHER DISCUSSIONS
WITH SOVIETS [P. 160]

Senator GORE. I seem to detect from your statements this morning that the essence of the Administration decision now is to per-

haps defer a decision to proceed with deployment. I have understood Secretary McNamara to be in opposition to deployment even though the Soviets did not agree. Has the administration reached a decision in that regard?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that, as you know, there are substantial funds in the present budget for continuing with an active research and development program for ABM's, but no final decision has been taken with respect to deployment until we can test a little more fully the possibilities of some agreement with the Soviet Union.

I would not want to leave the impression that a final decision has been made that come what may we should not deploy anything. It may well be that in any event certain light deployments may be felt required, for example, to protect the strategic strike force and to maintain its deterrent capability. But those are matters on which the executive and the appropriate committee of Congress will be in full touch with each other.

I think what has been done thus far is to defer a final decision on that point until we can find out where we are in our discussions in this matter with the Soviet Union.

Senator GORE. Senator Fulbright.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Secretary, I think it has been a very interesting statement. I will ask a few questions pertinent to this matter.

I understood from our briefings with the CIA and the military that there is some difference of opinion about the character and effectiveness of the ABM system around Moscow. The CIA gave me the impression they did not think anything very serious—that it was not very advanced, and that they doubted its effectiveness. Do you have any view about this?

Secretary RUSK. My own impression, and I do not have the exact technical reports in front of me, is that as far as the Moscow system is concerned, it is a first generation system which is likely to become operational within the next year or two and that there is no doubt among the different members of the intelligence community that this is an ABM system.

There are some other installations in other parts of the Soviet Union about which there is some discussion as to whether those are, in fact, serious ABM systems, or whether they are an anti-aircraft or other type system.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is right. I understood that, too. But even as to the Moscow one, I gathered from Mr. Helms he was not too upset. He left the impression with me it was a difference in view as to its importance between him and the military, and it could be, it is kind of a utilitarian concept around Moscow, it could be very effective or effective against planes but also has some capability against missiles, but they were not too excited about it in contrast to the military.

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DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL ABROAD
[P. 161]

Senator FULBRIGHT. In addition to that, you might give us information—if you do not have it immediately, perhaps, you could supply it for the record—on the CIA, and AID, State Department, Agriculture, Labor employees abroad. In other words, I think it is significant if there is going to be any agreement either on ABM or nonproliferation or almost any field that the Russians feel there is some degree of equivalence. We must realize that they are not going to sign an agreement if they think we have an insurmountable advantage. Do you agree with that on principle?

Secretary RUSK. I think that is probably correct, Mr. Chairman. I think that there is another possibility. Let me contrast two situations.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. The one would be a formal agreement signed by the two sides on this question. That is going to be extremely difficult and complicated, in my judgment, because that sort of an agreement has to be written against the prospect of violation, and the fine print becomes extremely complicated, and we run into the difficulty of inspection straight away.

It is not inconceivable that there is an alternative, and that is we both proceed by mutual example, with neither side giving up its freedom of action, but each side acting in relation to what the other side is doing.

Now, we did that during a period of about two years on the Defense budgets until the situation in the Far East brought that process—

Senator FULBRIGHT. And you were making some progress.

Secretary RUSK. We were making some progress on that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am inclined to think for the preliminary stages this is the area where you are most likely to make progress.

Secretary RUSK. In view of the capabilities of both sides to keep a general eye on the situation, something like a mutual example may be a way to get started. But I do not want to prejudge the results. If we can work out something with the Soviet Union, maybe it should be more precise.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I understand.

I wonder if you would undertake to do what the military has already done, to give the committee an estimate of the number of persons included in these activities abroad in all of these fields. Is there any reason why you cannot say how many CIA agents we have abroad?

Secretary RUSK. There is some problem on that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Even in view of the revelations that have been made recently?

Secretary RUSK. Yes. [deleted]

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, I will abide by your judgment.

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THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY [P. 163]

Secretary RUSK. Well I think you are right, Mr. Chairman. On the nonproliferation matter, for example, the IAEA ought to play

a major role in regard to safeguards, perhaps in regard to the provision of explosions for peaceful purposes.

Whether the Eastern Europeans would cooperate on a basis that would be generally acceptable—in other words, what would they do about a veto. We do not know what that would do. We are prepared to go a long way in this ourselves.

Senator FULBRIGHT. For example, when you were speaking of the blackmail problem, of what a terrible problem it was, and I agree with you, I would certainly hesitate about the United States unilaterally making any assurances on protection, because this, in a sense, puts you up as a kind of antagonist to the Soviet Union. It seems to me in this case that some utilization of the U.N., an agency in which both the U.S.S.R. and the United States are influential members, will be required. I do not see how you are going to get around those very dilemmas you already mentioned if you do not utilize some form of international machinery.

I was told in Sweden that there was very strong feeling about this proliferation treaty.

There would be some public feeling against an agreement in which the nuclear countries maintain their status quo. They want an agreement, but they want us and the Soviet Union to at least make some undertaking for the gradual transfer of responsibility to an international organization.

Secretary RUSK. That is, to me, a reasonable attitude on the part of a good many non-nuclear countries. It is a very hard objective to achieve.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Very.

Secretary RUSK. And, therefore, the question is do you wait until the nuclear powers find some way to begin some nuclear disarmament before you try for a nonproliferation treaty. What we have tried to do with that, Mr. Chairman, we are trying to take that problem somewhat into account in a preambular declaration in which we all repeat the commitments we have made to make the effort, in the United Nations resolutions and elsewhere, and we will be sure that you have, if you do not already have, the text on it. We are trying to work something out on that. This is a reasonable concern of the non-nuclear countries.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It seemed so to me and being reasonable they are in a position to thwart us if we do not make a gesture by simply not signing. There is no way for us to make a country like Sweden sign if we do not do something in this case.

Secretary RUSK. You remember in the case of Sweden, Mr. Chairman, when they signed the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty they reserved the right to have nuclear weapons in the future. In other words, they said, "We won't test, but we want the right"—

Senator GORE. Who said that?

Secretary RUSK. Sweden.

Senator FULBRIGHT. They are capable of making it, too. They are very ingenious people.

Secretary RUSK. I am not sure whether it is a completely real argument on their part. It is a good idea, but I am not sure it is a real argument or a little defensive apparatus as they come up to the hurdle of making a final commitment that they won't go nuclear. I am just not sure in their particular case.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I imagine others though—you already mentioned the Indians—have the same, but I expect they are not unique among the non-nuclear powers, are they, in this attitude?

Secretary RUSK. I think that is correct.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I was told that several others had exactly the same view.

I do not wish to occupy the time, although there are many other aspects of it that I am sure can be discussed.

In conclusion, I do want to urge you to use all the ingenuity you can, to determine whether some kind of international organization could participate; perhaps a new committee, within the U.N. in which the U.S.S.R. and ourselves can have confidence. I can understand the difficulty of involving too many countries and the difficulties that have resulted from such large membership. But surely some devices within that organization can be developed in which there is not that problem, to which some of these functions can be given.

I really do not see any alternative to it. I cannot imagine that the rest of the world will sit by idly, and even if the Russians are not disposed to agree with us entirely at the moment, they appear to be coming along.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that the subcommittee has been told, and I may have to take this off the record when the time comes, the Soviets have agreed to hold technical talks with us on PLOWSHARE type activities.

Senator GORE. At Geneva?

Secretary RUSK. Bilaterally, and we would hope that, perhaps, this might be an additional way in which we could get into the question of how they and we, and maybe Britain, could provide PLOWSHARE type services to—

Senator FULBRIGHT. Jointly.

Secretary RUSK. Through non-nuclear countries, jointly, through some joint arrangement.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I would urge you to go as fast as you can in this direction, with the least important and least difficult step to begin with, if there is one. I had the same thought about the importance of the Antarctic Treaty, not that it in itself solved a lot, but a start in the right direction was made, and I hope we will do something in this case.

Senator GORE. Senator Hickenlooper.

HAVE SOVIETS EVER MADE ANY CONCESSIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, do you know of any time in recent history that the Soviets have agreed to anything that in any way stood in the way of their advancing to at least full equality or superiority over the United States? In other words, have they made any real concessions of any kind? I am not talking superficially.

Secretary RUSK. No, I understand, Senator. It was the judgment of our experts at the time that the conclusion of the atmospheric test ban treaty would, in fact, work to our advantage relatively. Now, that is an arguable and debatable point.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is so far as I am concerned.

Secretary RUSK. But this was the view that we had in front of us at the time.

I think, broadly speaking, the answer to your question is, No.

Senator SYMINGTON. What was the question?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It was a rather long-winded and complicated question, and I do not know that I can repeat it, but I will try to.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would appreciate that. I could not hear you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I asked the Secretary if he knew of any occasion in recent history, since the Soviet Union has come to major world power, when they have made any concessions of any kind other than superficial ones for incidental accommodations, where they in any way impaired their ability to at least come equal, or superior, to the United States in various major fields.

I understood his answer to be in the main, no, with the exception of the Test Ban Treaty, and I have argued that point with him. I do not quite agree with the fact that it was of any advantage to us.

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REASONABLE PARITY ASSUMED [P. 165]

Secretary RUSK. We would have great difficulty in accepting arrangements which we felt were putting us at a disadvantage. What we are trying to work on in these matters—and differences of views can differ on it—is to try to get some sort of ceiling and downward turn in the arms race in a way that does not change the relative position of either side.

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EFFECT OF BOMBING PAUSES ON NEGOTIATION EFFORTS [P. 166]

Secretary RUSK. We sent the North Vietnamese a message which was returned to our embassy on the first day as though it were unopened. On the first day Peking said that even if we stopped bombing there would be no negotiations. I happened to be in Vienna with Mr. Gromyko at the tenth anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty on the third day of that suspension and he told me that the pause was an insult, that it was an ultimatum.

So that was our experience at that particular time. We did send the other side a message, which was returned to us, trying to elicit some response from them.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, then the pause was intended definitely to lead toward an understanding that we would go to the negotiating table.

Secretary RUSK. That was the hope at the time.

Senator LAUSCHE. And there were communications between the two countries in which North Vietnam completely rejected the efforts which we made.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, they returned the communication.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, they returned it without opening it.

Secretary RUSK. I have no doubt they took off a copy before they sent it back, but they gave it back to us in the same form in which we had given it to them, sealed in the envelope.

Senator LAUSCHE. Am I correct that in the beginning of 1966 there were 37 days of cessation?

Secretary RUSK. Running from Christmas, 1965, through—

Senator PELL. Will the Senator yield for a moment on this?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Senator PELL. There is one further point, and, as you know, I have been very reticent of any discussion of this subject. But it has since come out in the press; and that is in connection with the '65 short cessation. I think the record should show, because as I say it has been in the press, that there was a communication, it may have been meaningless—the Secretary and I have discussed this privately—it may not have been meaningless, but there was a communication from the North Vietnamese Government at the end of that cessation of bombing period, would that not be correct?

Secretary RUSK. In the five day?

Senator PELL. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. No.

Senator PELL. In Paris.

Secretary RUSK. Are you not perhaps thinking of the 37 day?

Senator PELL. No, I am thinking of the five-day period in Paris when it was in the press afterward. I have never said anything about it, but I read it in the press later.

Secretary RUSK. I know of the discussion of this subject in connection with the 37-day suspension, but I do not recall that this happened in the five and a half day. I will look this up.

Senator PELL. We had phone conversations, one phone conversation or two, and the question was the communication at the end of the period which came a few hours before the end of the cessation of its bombing, which was resumed by the time we got it. It had already resumed, but we were concerned about this matter. I have never discussed this matter.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, let me check back on this. I think we are talking about two different pauses.

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HO CHI MINH COMMUNICATION TO THE POPE [P. 167]

Senator LAUSCHE. Was there anything essentially significant that happened with respect to this last stoppage, and that is by way of a statement made by the ambassador of North Vietnam to France, and a communication sent by Ho Chi Minh to the Pope.

Secretary RUSK. That came at the end of this period of six days. You recall, Senator, that the two countries who are the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference were then in conference in London; Mr. Kosygin was there with Prime Minister Wilson, and they took certain initiatives, communicating with the parties to see if they could move the situation off center, but without success. The Hanoi response was as contained in President Ho Chi Minh's message to the Pope on February 13, and I will be glad to put the text of that in the record if the Senator wishes.

DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN ABM SYSTEM [P. 169]

Senator WILLIAMS. If we decide to deploy them, how long would it take us to get them actually installed?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Fisher tells me—I am not familiar with this point myself—that to deploy these missiles in suitable arrays, with all the facilities that would go with them, would require four to five years.

Senator WILLIAMS. What I was trying to determine is, how far ahead in deployment are the Russians at this point, two or three years?

Mr. FISHER. My understanding, Senator Williams, is they have about a year to go before the initial operational capability of a limited system around Moscow. There is considerable argument what the other systems are. They have about a year to go around Moscow. We have four to five to go before our system would reach an operational capacity. That would put them three or four ahead of us with the qualification on it that the system around Moscow is not considered effective against the totality of U.S. missiles. It does not provide adequate radar coverage to protect against POLARIS missiles, and that automatically starts an argument in the intelligence community of what have they done it for if it is not any good, but there is an understanding that it would not be effective against POLARIS missiles because the radar coverage now existing just does not cover certain segments from which POLARIS missiles will come.

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REPORTS OF U.S. "CRISIS" FOR WEST GERMANY [P. 175]

Secretary RUSK. Senator Symington, I think the committee should know from the beginning of the Geneva Conference we have had the most intimate consultation among the four NATO members who are part of that conference, plus the German liaison representative who is present in Geneva, that this matter has been discussed frequently in NATO itself, and that at the present time we are consulting with our allies before there is an agreement with the Soviet Union.

Now some of our allies doubt what I just said. Some of them seem to think there is an agreement under the rug we are not disclosing. Now, for reasons that I explained to the committee earlier this morning, this just is not true. There is a major question of interpretation still outstanding between us and the Soviet Union, so this is not a case of our having an agreement with the Soviet Union under the rug on which we are consulting with our allies in the spirit that nothing can be changed. We are, in fact, now in process of consulting our allies prior to—we hope to be—a final stage with the Soviet Union, and before a treaty text is actually presented in Geneva.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, this article worried me.

Secretary RUSK. There have been, Senator—and I may have to deal with the record a little bit on this—there have been certain kinds of resistances in Germany to the whole idea of a non-proliferation treaty. First, they say that they have already renounced the manufacture of nuclear weapons, therefore they do not need a treaty. Secondly, some of them say that "In any event, we are prepared to take these obligations to our allies, but we do not

want to undertake obligations of the Soviet Union and thereby give the Soviet Union a right to interfere with our affairs here.”

Some of them have said that this would sentence them to permanent inferiority to France inside the alliance in Europe. Some of them have hoped that maybe this issue could be used as a card to play in bargaining with the Soviet Union with respect to a settlement of the German question. There have been a combination of ideas on this subject.

Now, Chancellor Kiesinger and Foreign Minister Brandt have brushed aside most of these problems in their own views about a nonproliferation treaty, but they do have some internal political problems with respect to it.

We will do our best to satisfy them on the fair question such as effect on industry and peaceful uses and questions of that sort, but there is built into a nonproliferation treaty—there is inherent in such a treaty—a discrimination between nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers.

The whole purpose is not to let further countries become nuclear powers. So there is not much we can do about that, but I think it is quite clear, Senator, that within NATO itself, and within European NATO, leave out the United States, if the Federal Republic of Germany should become a nuclear power, NATO would disintegrate because the other European allies in NATO would not be prepared to see this happen. I think the Germans understand that, and my guess is that at the end of the day they will sign, perhaps grumpily, but I think they will sign.

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MUTUAL INTERESTS EXIST WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION [P. 176]

Now, there are some people who forget about that when they raise questions about why we are trying to probe for points, even small points, of possible agreement with the Soviet Union.

Now, in the case of trade, for example, Senator, basically what we are doing, if the Congress will give us permission, is to agree with our friends in Europe.

You will notice that for 15 years we were in a minority of one in COCOM.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, sir.

Secretary RUSK. And our friends in Europe kept pushing down the COCOM list and trading and so forth, and we were resistant to it and finally we said, “We will agree with you then.”

EAST-WEST TRADE

Well, that immediately created a what does this mean, you say. In the case of trade, Eastern Europe has 24 percent of its foreign trade with Western Europe, 1.6 percent of its trade with us. When we say to our Congress, “Will you give us permission to enter into agreements where we can change our arrangements somewhat,” then some of our friends in Europe say, “Well, you are going way out of our way to make overtures to Moscow,” when in fact all we are doing is agreeing with our friends in Europe.

Senator SYMINGTON. Several years ago the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce both testified in open

hearings the United States was the last developed country in the world not doing its best to sell everything it could behind the Iron Curtain, except in most cases sophisticated war materials.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. And yet when we try to improve our position through trade, as I understand your point, we are criticized by a die-hard group over here as being in effect overly friendly with Moscow.

Secretary RUSK. I have added another point, Senator. I have said to some of our friends in Europe of course what you would really hope is that we continue our policy of no trade while you continue to develop the Eastern European market without our competition, and they have and sometimes they will say, "Yes, I expect that is right."

Senator SYMINGTON. I will correct my use of the word there, but we understand each other.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

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ROLE OF ACDA IN ARMS NEGOTIATIONS [P. 177]

Secretary RUSK. The Committee of Principals is made up of those whose advice the President inevitably will want to have and have to have before the President makes decisions on these very important questions. That includes Defense for obvious reasons; CIA is heavily involved because some of these issues turn crucially on our ability to be assured that arrangements we may propose can be monitored and inspected and verified.

So that I do not believe that the composition of the Committee of Principals creates any distortion. The Committee of Principals are those whose advice any president would feel he would have to have before he made any final decision.

On the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, Mr. Foster is carrying the principal negotiations on those. He is in Geneva now, and I am not sure that I should put this on the record, he will shortly be visiting certain of the capitals in Europe to go into these matters further to try to bring the NATO matter to a conclusion.

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[P. 178]

Senator CLARK. Now, when you say the people at the top level, will Ambassador Thompson stop at the Gromyko level or will he move right up?

Secretary RUSK. No, he has talked—we would certainly think this would certainly go to Mr. Kosygin, and, as a matter of fact, Senator, I would probably want to take this out of the record—

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, this record will be closely held, and, so far as any public release is concerned, you will have complete discretion to change it.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, sir.

The real people on this subject, Senator Clark, are probably in the back room of the Kremlin, those people who almost never expose themselves internationally, but who really join the Presidium in the actual determination of policy on important subjects.

Senator CLARK. I imagine that would include their own equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, that would include them—

Senator CLARK. Their intelligence sections.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. And key members of the Presidium, who are represented publicly by Kosygin and Brezhnev.

[P. 178]

Senator CLARK. You will remember the very strong recommendations in that regard made by Mr. Wiesner's committee.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator CLARK. During the ICY.

Secretary RUSK. And we pressed the regional representatives to consider coming forward with proposals affecting their regions; for example, Mexico and Brazil for Latin America; Egypt and Ethiopia for the Near East and Africa and otherwise.

Very little has been done on that. But, more importantly, Senator, I myself have discussed this on more than one occasion with Mr. Gromyko, hoping that we and the Soviet Union quietly—and I must take this out of the record—hoping that we and the Soviet Union quietly could begin to concert our policy to level off and turn downward this unfortunate neighborhood arms race in the Near East.

Unfortunately Mr. Gromyko has said that action in the nuclear field is the limit of their interest. They have not been willing seriously to take up the race in conventional arms. As you know, they are supplying substantial arms to Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and now—

Senator CLARK. Iran.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. And now selling arms to Iran.

We regret this very much because we think this is an arms race that ought to be unnecessary and that something ought to be done about it.

If we could get some help from the Soviet Union on that, I think we could make some headway.

AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS ON NUCLEAR MATTERS

Senator CLARK. This might be worthwhile taking up at Geneva at that level to start with. We would at least like to see the Russians join with us in halting that arms race in the Middle East.

Secretary RUSK. There may be some point in our making some public proposals along these lines so that everybody understands what the situation is. We would be prepared to encourage and cooperate in any such effort, but there are others who will not.

Senator CLARK. I understand you want to get out of here by 12.

Secretary RUSK. It is up to you. It is up to you.

Senator CLARK. It occurs to me that this business of the political union of Europe as an objection to the nonproliferation treaty might be handled, might it not, by an escape clause and will you not have an escape clause in the treaty anyway so that if political union became a pragmatic matter of some urgency, they could, if they want to, get out from under?

Secretary RUSK. A withdrawal clause.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. They could utilize a withdrawal clause.

We would like to be able to find an answer that is somewhat better than that because that makes the proliferation treaty itself somewhat fragile in theory anyhow.

But, Senator, I think there is an understanding among all concerned that the political unification of Europe is quite a distance ahead, and I hope we can find some way not to let that presently hypothetical question bar present advance on nonproliferation.

Senator CLARK. Would you agree that if we can make some progress with respect to the ABM discussion between the USSR and ourselves, including the discussions for some curtailment of offensive weapons and missiles, this might well remove the major objections by the non-nuclear powers to the nuclear proliferation treaty because then the presence of ourselves would have made those concessions in terms of reducing their own capability, which I understand India and Sweden and some others have been asking for some time.

Secretary RUSK. I would think if we and the Soviets could make any progress at all either in putting a ceiling on the nuclear race or turning it down somewhat, that this could have a very stimulating effect on the non-nuclear areas, no question about it.

Senator CLARK. This, of course, is a matter in which the ACDA is very much interested.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator CLARK. The final question—how long, in your judgment, can we make—this is a diplomatic and political matter guided, of course, by proper military advice with respect to deployment of ABM's. I could hope we could wait long enough for a negotiation with the Soviets along the lines of the Kosygin letter to proceed at the usual leisurely pace with which the Soviets always engage in such negotiations.

Secretary RUSK. I do not want to be categorical about the decision that the President will have to make in consultation with congressional leaders. But it is my present view that we would be able to wait during a very, very substantial period of active and promising negotiations. In other words, I do not think we are going to hurry if there is any possibility that we can reach some result with the Soviet Union on this.

Senator CLARK. I am happy to hear that. The chairman will recall that General Wheeler testified that there was enough money in the budget, which is coming up, to enable them to go as far ahead as the Joint Chiefs thought they needed to with the development and even perhaps the initial deployment of an ABM without making a public fuss about it.

Secretary RUSK. I think that is true for the present and under the budget that is now before the Congress.

As you know, it is now publicly known there is a difference of view on this matter between General Wheeler and the Secretary of Defense, and General Wheeler has spoken about the ABM's on television, for example.

This has been a friendly disagreement, but it is an important disagreement on that particular point. But this is a matter where the President and the civilian leadership will make the decision at the end of the day.

ATTITUDE OF NON-NUCLEAR POWERS TOWARD NONPROLIFERATION
TREATY

Senator CLARK. What is your view as to the diplomatic desirability if India gets too difficult, giving a bilateral guarantee to India because of the possible Chinese threat which would seem to be a good deal greater than that against any other country?

I can see this might cause a lot of diplomatic flap, but I am concerned that India may balk on this nonproliferation treaty.

Could you comment on that?

Senator GORE. He commented on that while you were out.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think this is one—

Senator CLARK. Do not repeat what you said.

Secretary RUSK. It is a very, very serious question for us, quite apart from this question for India. I do not think, first, that India would be interested in a unilateral guarantee by the United States alone in this matter. They would, I think, say that it would have to be at least by the United States and the Soviet Union acting together.

Senator CLARK. This should not be too difficult for the Soviet Union point of view.

Secretary RUSK. That could create some problems. Apparently they have discussed that with the Soviet Union apparently without much encouragement. But for us, Senator, there is also a very, very major problem as to whether we ourselves want to extend our own commitments that far. Do we pledge the lives of a hundred million Americans in the first two hours to this end?

Senator CLARK. I certainly think not.

Secretary RUSK. It is a very grave decision for us to take.

Senator CLARK. Just let me interrupt, and I would think that the Indian guarantee, if it came forward at all, would be merely against China and not with respect to the Soviet Union, which hopefully would join with us.

I do not think you have to worry about France and Britain attacking India, but if the Soviet Union and ourselves were prepared to guarantee against China, in my opinion, maybe I am wrong, this does not confront you with the difficulty you spoke of because, as I understand it, China has no effective air force and our manned bombers could destroy the Chinese nuclear capability overnight.

Maybe it raises the question of first strike.

Secretary RUSK. I would hope, Senator, that some way could be found for the United Nations to strengthen what has been said on this subject in such a way that countries like India would feel sufficient reassurance to be willing and able to go ahead with a nonproliferation policy.

Senator GORE. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, first I regret not having been here when Mr. Macomber's name was up for confirmation, and I am delighted to see such an old friend and competent officer as he is accompanying you for the first time. The record will show what is said even though he is out of the room.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Senator. I am delighted to have Mr. Macomber with me.

ABM NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW

Senator PELL. Secondly, in connection with the ABM's, I am delighted to hear that Ambassador Thompson will be occupying a leading role as a negotiator.

Do we intend to move right into those discussions, or will there be a time lag?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that we would like to begin them soon rather than late. We have the impression that the Soviets are still in the position of preparing their own position. I do not think I said this a little earlier, but this latest communication we had from them was an invitation for us to present some additional views on the subject. We do not yet have from them any that gives us a real feel of what their approach to it is going to be, except that offensive and defensive weapons will have to be discussed together; and, secondly, this should be in the framework of disarmament rather than in terms of freezes.

Senator PELL. Right.

Secretary RUSK. So that is about the only major clue we have at the present time.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL

Another question I had here was in connection with the disarmament subject, and this is, do we ever intend to ratify the 1925 Geneva Protocol on which I believe the U.N. Assembly passed a resolution calling on all nations to refrain from the use of gaseous warfare and bacteriological materials in warfare? What is our position on that?

Secretary RUSK. May I ask Mr. Fisher to comment on that?

Mr. FISHER. Yes, the U.N. resolution, I believe the term was, invites people to ratify the 1925 protocol. We voted for it, in the explanation of the vote considered by various countries through their own constitutional structures. That convention is not now before the Senate. It was recalled, I believe, shortly after World War II, in sort of a review by the Foreign Relations Committee of things that had been up here for a long while.

The real consideration, Senator Pell, is whether or not it is best to invest the substantial effort that would be required to get that through on the basis of the 1925 convention or whether we should consider the problem of bringing it up to date, try to negotiate an up-to-date treaty which takes into account many developments since 1925, which, for example, deals with all forms of biological warfare which are not by its terms covered in the 1925 convention.

Senator PELL. But to interrupt for the moment, the only thing on the table in a multilateral matter would be the 1925 convention, would it not?

Mr. FISHER. That is correct, and our feeling would be, however, we have discussed this frankly with 5,000 scientists who visited the President's science adviser and myself two weeks ago, that perhaps it might be better to consider undertaking a major study in this context looking at all the control problems of BW and CW in a 1967 context rather than the context of ratifying the 1925 convention.

Senator PELL. I would hope the reason that is inhibiting you is not the fact we are occasionally using tear gas in Vietnam.

Mr. FISHER. No. We would be perfectly clear in our own view that incapacitants, nonlethal incapacitants, are not covered by the 1925 convention, and any ratification, if they would have taken place, would have made that perfectly clear.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

In connection with the words in Senator Lausche's colloquy—

Senator CLARK. Would the Senator yield for one moment?

I would like to supplement in the strongest possible way the view Senator Pell has expressed about the high degree of desirability of moving into the problem of arms control, in radiological, chemical, and biological warfare. I think we have neglected it.

Mr. FISHER. If I can comment, we have had to put the cart—the horse research before the cart, because in many people's minds there has been the view that this was an insoluble problem because of the difficulties of control that the theretofore 1925 convention was a mere paper promise and therefore forget about it.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, MARCH 6, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 2:40 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore, Church, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper and Case.

Michael Wood, former Director of Development, National Student Association, and Phillip Sherburne, former President, National Student Association, testified on the National Student Association and the C.I.A.

[The committee adjourned at 5:45 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, MARCH 13, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson and Case.

Arthur Goldberg, Ambassador to the United Nations, accompanied by Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser, Department of State, testified further on Ex. D, 90/1, the Treaty on Outer Space.

The proposed Latin American Resolution and the question of staff members going on trips while the Senate is in session was also discussed.

[The committee adjourned at 12:10 p.m.]

Arms Sales to Iran

Tuesday, March 14, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN
AFFAIRS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Symington, Fulbright, Gore, Clark, McCarthy and Hickenlooper.

Also present: Peter Knauer, Assistant for Congressional and Special Projects, Office of the Director of Military Assistance, Department of Defense; and Lt. Col. Albertus B. Outlaw, Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs).

Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.

[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

STATEMENT OF MR. HENRY J. KUSS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS NEGOTIATIONS; ACCOMPANIED BY MR. W.B. LIGON, DIRECTOR, NEAR EAST NEGOTIATING DIRECTORATE AND ECONOMIC PLANNING-COORDINATION OASD (ISI) FOR ILN

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EXECUTIVE BRANCH DECISION IN IRANIAN CASE [P. 4]

Mr. KUSS. First of all, this machinery included intensive and detailed discussions with the country itself. For several years, we have agreed with the Government of Iran that military supplies will not be sold or bought by them, by any country, without clear analysis of their need and the economic capability to support the impact of such purchases.

Secondly, a U.S. military team bringing in our unified command and joint staff machinery, worked with the Imperial Iranian forces in analyzing the threat and recommending the types of equipment which would be desirable.

Simultaneously, our State Department and AID machinery, at the embassy level, worked with the Central Bank, not just with their defense ministry, but with the Central Bank of Iran, to determine financial resources which would be available to meet total

Iranian development and consumption requirements as well as the effects of contemplated military procurement on such resources.

Both these military and economic analyses were reviewed by the Shah, and his prime minister and other governmental agencies of Iran, and discussed with our ambassador.

All of this information was then made available in Washington to the State Department, AID, and Defense machinery for further consideration.

There were many adjustments made in the application of this machinery. Needless to say, they didn't all adopt my recommendations. There were many changes.

On the basis of these views, a decision was made at the highest level in the United States Government concerning the program which we would be willing to undertake.

From the time that the Shah gave indication of his first need for additional equipment, to the time that my office was informed of the program to be specifically negotiated, over nine months elapsed with consultative machinery operating in Iran and the United States.

In the final analysis, the most surprising thing to me is that the Shah waited nine months since he was financially independent; certainly he is politically independent and had achieved the approval of the Majlis in November 1965 for the purchase of \$200 million outright from any source.

This waiting period only proves to me to some extent that he really preferred the United States to continue as principal military supplier even though he had to wait through all of the time for the machinery to be processed, and even though he did not get all that he was capable of purchasing in the process, in the first analysis.

I should like to conclude my opening remarks with a highlight summary of the situation taken from reports by people in our AID, Defense and political machinery, who are a lot closer to the situation than I personally can confess to be.

These statements from our AID, political, Defense people on the scene are as follows:

1. While Iran's economic situation is basically sound, the United States would greatly prefer that it limit the expenditure of further resources on military equipment. This is an important element of what was the basis for our final decision.

The impression is that we wished to limit the amount of military supply that we provide.

However, there is no prospect of convincing the Shah that Iran need not develop what he considers an adequate defense establishment to protect his fully exposed vital oil installations in the south. Moreover, it is in the United States interest to maintain a close military relationship with Iran in order to protect our interests and to enable us to maintain a dialogue with the Shah on the broader issues of Iranian economic development and their relationship to military expenditures.

The United States has made significant progress in the last two years in stimulating the Government of Iran to examine this relationship.

ECONOMIC GROWTH IN IRAN

For its own part, the Government of Iran has made great strides in promoting economic growth in Iran, whose GNP increased nearly 10 percent last year. Iran is credit-worthy and, given its inability to rapidly absorb large amounts of foreign financing for its development program, there is room for additional military credits on reasonable terms.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Given its inability?

Mr. KUSS. Yes. In other words, it can't grow up overnight. All revenues are coming in faster than it can really spend them on development projects.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Therefore, they have some extra money left over to buy arms?

Mr. KUSS. Yes, sir. That is the point I am making here.

The United States government has constantly tried to apply brakes to Iranian military spending. Last year, although the Shah planned \$200 million in just one year from us in purchases, in accordance with the requirements as confirmed by the special U.S. military survey team, the U.S. government limited the Shah to \$50 million a year, with the possibility of similar tranches over the next three-year period.

Limitations upon limitations have been placed on what he can do with military programs.

2. Recent months have seen the steady—and I am quoting now—continuation of a clearly visible trend toward a more independent Iranian posture on the world scene. Developments affecting Pakistan, one of Iran's closest allies, have reinforced the Shah in his conviction that Iran must be prepared to stand on its own feet. In setting his twin goals of economic development and national defense, the Shah has linked military security to economic and social progress, and believes that he cannot have the latter without the former. Partly also because of a deep-seated Iranian Nasserist antagonism and partly because of the USSR's new policy of friendliness toward Iran, Iran has shifted the focus of its major concern from the threat of communism in the USSR in the north to Nasser and Arab nationalism in the south. The Shah is acutely aware of the vulnerability of his oil lifeline in the south to surprise attack and the susceptibility to subversion of the Arab minority, in Khuzestan.

The Shah feels compelled to maintain an adequate defense establishment in face of a large-scale Soviet arms supply to UAR, Iraq and Syria. He believes strongly that it is in the interest of the United States, as well as Iran, that Iran be in a position to deter or cope with regional threats rather than calling on us a la Vietnam.

Egypt has several times Iran's arsenal.

The reason for the Shah's insistence on aircraft of the type of F-4, and he did insist, was that even neighboring Iraq already has delivered 18 of the all-weather Mach 2.3 MIG-21's, whereas Iran has nothing better than day-flying Mach 1.3 F-5's.

SHAH'S MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

He has expressed his desire to meet his military requirements from the United States, but he has made it abundantly clear also that if the United States is unwilling or unable to meet his major military requirements, he is determined to go elsewhere to acquire what he needs.

3. The Shah's arms purchases from the Soviets are in relatively non-sensitive areas such as trucks, armored personnel carriers and ack-ack guns; his payments are primarily in natural gas which for 60 years have been flared off. The Shah's purchasing from the Soviets seems to him, and I am reporting, seems to him, to be not without some value. He is convinced that it will undercut Soviet propaganda about the United States being solely arms merchants to Iran, and about Iran's being an American puppet.

He also believes it will cause difficulties in the Soviet relationship with Nasser and other radical Arabs.

Gentlemen, I deliberately didn't try to answer all the questions in my opening statement but that poses a lot of questions, I am sure.

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END-USE AGREEMENT WITH WEST GERMANY [P. 7]

Mr. BADER. While you are getting that—let me ask you a question. As I understand it, we include in our military sales or grant agreement with West Germany a so-called end-use agreement. Is that correct? That is, we have total veto, as Mr. McNaughton said, over the final disposition of American military equipment.

Mr. KUSS. That is right.

Mr. BADER. Is that correct?

Mr. KUSS. I negotiated them; yes, that is correct.

Mr. BADER. Fine.

So in the case of the these F-86, if they are not in Iran—if they actually belong to Pakistan—then the West German government and perhaps the Iranian government, if they were the middleman in this case, have turned aside what was American desire and policy with regard to Pakistan. Would that be correct?

Mr. KUSS. I believe that would be correct.

May I continue my answer?

Mr. BADER. Certainly.

Mr. KUSS. To supplement what you said, let me put it in the record that the United States was supplying military equipment through grant and sales to Iran at the time that this circumstance arose.

The United States approval of the German sale to Iran was influenced by the fact that there appeared to be legitimate requirements and the experience of the purchase would not unduly upset the Iranian defense budget.

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Senator MCCARTHY. I just want to know, what is the game? Why do the Canadians do it for Germany under our license? The Canadians don't have a serious balance of payments problem with Germany. We do.

What are the politics of it?

Mr. KUSS. The Canadians have—I am not sure the balance of payments is the consideration at all.

Senator MCCARTHY. Why? That is the question.

Mr. KUSS. The Canadians have as serious a balance of payments problem as ourselves, if one is to talk balance of payments, and the Canadians having financed a production line for F-86's for themselves were in a position to provide F-86's for Germany during the build-up period.

Senator MCCARTHY. Is that because we couldn't do it?

Mr. KUSS. We could have done it.

Senator MCCARTHY. Why didn't we? I want to know why the Canadians with our license produced and sold it to Germany. Who arranged this? Did this involve cooperation on the part of the Defense Department and our manufacturers of F-86's? What I want to get at is the process by which these complicated decisions are made, like the one involving the sale of Lightning fighters to Saudi Arabia, for example. We sell F-111's to England and they in turn sell Lightning fighters to Saudi Arabia. Northrop Aviation, however, says really what the Saudis should have are F-5's, but, in the end, the Saudis are told: "You really can't go out and do the kind of thing you are urging them to do, compete in the open market really for arms sales because somebody just said you have got to take Lightning fighters and we are in turn going to supply F-111's to England."

Mr. KUSS. My answer to the first question, to start with, first of all, the North American Aircraft Corporation has the right to license foreign manufacturers to produce F-86 aircraft in this case.

Senator SYMINGTON. F-86 is a North American; not Northrop?

Mr. KUSS. North American, right.

I understood the question to be F-86—has the right to—this was some years ago, of course, with the F-86—they have the right to license other countries to produce the F-86 aircraft with the approval of the United States Government. They obtained that right through their contractual arrangements with the Defense Department.

They then obtained the approval of the Office of Munitions Control, who would also check it out with Defense, to license Canada to produce, not only for themselves, but for other countries as they were able to work out mutually-agreeable sales arrangements.

TOTAL U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN [P. 8]

The United States Government, in reviewing that license, approved it but insisted that the license itself contain a clause that if the Canadians were to sell those airplanes to any other country that they must get the approval of the United States Government, specifically for that other country, number one.

And, further, in that particular agreement, that if the other country were to ever sell it to any other country, they must also get the approval in succession of the United States government.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you will yield to me a minute, Senator—as I understand it, then, some 90 F-86's were sold by Canada to West Germany, correct?

Mr. KUSS. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. And those were sold by West Germany—
 Mr. KUSS. Maybe more, sir.
 Senator SYMINGTON. All right, we are talking about these 90.

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MOVEMENT OF F-86'S FROM IRAN TO PAKISTAN [P. 8]

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand about the initiation; I am just talking about these planes.

They moved from West Germany into Iran, then from Iran to Pakistan. Did we know that they had moved from Iran to Pakistan when they did, or did we find out later?

Mr. KUSS. When we knew, and we consulted with the Government of Canada, both the—

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me ask the question again to be sure you understand my point.

Did we know at the time the planes moved from Iran to Pakistan that they were going from Iran to Pakistan, after they were sold to Iran by West Germany? Did we know it at the time?

Mr. KUSS. No.

As a deliberate plan of our own. No, we did not know.

Senator SYMINGTON. We did not know.

Senator MCCARTHY. I think he is saying that we didn't know it was going to be through these three stages when we first licensed them in Canada.

Senator SYMINGTON. Just bear with me.

Mr. KUSS. We expressed no objection to a sale to Iran, not Pakistan.

Senator SYMINGTON. We licensed the sale to Iran.

Senator MCCARTHY. You approved that one, not the next one?

Senator SYMINGTON. When did we discover Iran had moved them into Pakistan by sale, barter or gift?

Mr. KUSS. I don't have a date here. I will be glad to supply it for you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Roughly how many weeks or months was it—was it some months after they went into Pakistan that we found out that they had gone to Pakistan?

Mr. KUSS. It was some months, and after consultation with Germany and Canada, both countries protested. Iran stated that the aircraft were in Pakistan only for repair. Action was taken to try to influence the return of the aircraft to Iran. The Federal Republic of Germany held up further sales which they had pending at that time to Iran as a result.

At the moment on this transaction we have two points of information which I believe that you have seen, sir. The Washington Daily News had indicated that the aircraft had been returned as a result of strong U.S. pressures. This return of the aircraft is generally confirmed by DIA but we are still waiting for specific confirmation.

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BRITISH SALE OF AIRCRAFT [P. 10]

Mr. KUSS. The Lightning is a British air defense aircraft and solely usable for that purpose and no other purpose.

Senator SYMINGTON. Right. And that plane went from Britain—

Mr. KUSS. To Saudi Arabia.

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SALE OF F-86 AIRCRAFT BY WEST GERMANY TO IRAN [P. 11]

Mr. BADER. Is this also the case, as I have heard reported, of some 200 to 400 M-47 tanks that have gone through Merex to Pakistan via Iran.

Mr. KUSS. There have been no M-47 tanks that have gone from Iran to Pakistan, to my knowledge.

Mr. BADER. Fine.

The West German Government has—

Mr. KUSS. As a matter of fact we have had that under discussion with the West German Government, and we both have held up any sale to Iran for the very purpose that we thought they might—

Mr. BADER. They might go there.

Mr. KUSS. That they might go there.

Mr. BADER. Thank you.

F-4 SALE TO IRAN

I would like to go to the F-4 sale, Mr. Chairman, with your permission.

Senator SYMINGTON. Very well.

Mr. BADER. Mr. Kuss, as I understand it, there are two basic agreements between the United States Government and the Iran Government with regard to military assistance, that is agreements to talk about what you call in the Defense Department hardware. First is the September 1962 memorandum of understanding, and the second is the July 1964 memorandum of understanding, is that correct?

Mr. KUSS. That is correct.

Mr. BADER. Now, in the memorandum of understanding of 1962, we—in the major grant items there were 52 F-5's, is that correct?

Mr. KUSS. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. BADER. That is roughly correct.

Now, would you explain to the subcommittee the terms of this July 1964 memorandum of understanding? As I understand it—and I must say I am quite confused about it—it has been amended in August of 1966, is that correct, to allow for the F-4 sale? Am I correct in the information that the July 1964 memorandum of understanding, as amended in August of 1966, permits the sale to Iran of roughly \$400 million of military equipment, including the supplemental \$200 million that covers the F-4 sale?

Mr. KUSS. That is right.

Mr. BADER. That is right.

Mr. KUSS. May I say, there is one basic sales agreement and that is the 1964 agreement. In that agreement we acquired promises from the government of Iran that they would not proceed at any independent pace on the purchase of this military equipment, but that it would be subject to an annual review of the economic availabilities of foreign exchange to their development program as well as for other purposes. And we did not wish to destroy that arrange-

ment that we had achieved from them in 1964. Thus, when we came to the conclusion that it would be necessary to add \$200 million of credit to the 1964 agreement, we thought it best to add it to an agreement under which we had far more links, controls, reviews, analyses, if you will, agreed to by the Government of Iran than if we were to establish an entirely new agreement.

Mr. BADER. When did the Shah of Iran first approach the United States about his requirement for an aircraft with the capability beyond that of the F-5?

Mr. KUSS. From my personal knowledge, he was talking about aircraft well beyond the F-5 before the 1964 agreement was established.

Mr. BADER. With direct reference to the F-4's, was this in the beginning of 1966?

Mr. KUSS. F-4s, and other aircraft, well beyond the F-5.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me ask what counsel is interested in, and what we are interested in: Was there mention in any of these agreements of the F-4, the ones that they eventually got?

Mr. KUSS. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. When was the decision made to ship F-4's? When was the decision made and why was it made?

Mr. KUSS. May I review that—

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. KUSS—For the record?

As we have pointed out on numerous occasions, there is a tremendous amount of machinery in existence.

Senator SYMINGTON. We understand that.

Mr. KUSS. In the executive branch. One part of this machinery was the military machinery, the joint staff machinery, that we sent to Iran to review with the Iranian armed forces what they stated as their requirements.

Mr. BADER. This is the so-called Peterson mission.

Mr. KUSS. This is the so-called Peterson report.

Mr. BADER. When was that issued?

Mr. KUSS. The Peterson report was issued in approximately early '65.

Mr. BADER. The Peterson report was the basis of the military justification for F-4's.

Mr. KUSS. Excuse me, early '66.

Mr. BADER. That was the basis for the military justification.

Mr. KUSS. March 1966.

Mr. BADER. March 1966.

Mr. KUSS. March 1966, and in the Peterson report they recommended that it would be necessary for F-4D aircraft, D aircraft, be provided to combat the Mig 21's that were available in the southern regions that the Shah was—to meet the threat that was established.

Mr. BADER. And this was in March of 1966.

Mr. KUSS. This was in March of 1966, right.

Mr. BADER. Did the Peterson report recommend two squadrons of F-4s which we have now sold to Iran?

Mr. KUSS. I do not recall; I would have to check.

Mr. BADER. According to the Peterson report, as I read it, they recommended six squadrons of F-5 aircraft and one squadron of F-4C aircraft during the fiscal year '67-'71 time frame.

Mr. KUSS. You have got to read the Peterson report in two ways. First of all, we were anxious to keep things as restricted as possible. The Peterson report not only gave a report on what was within, shall we say, a constricted level, but it also indicated that many hundreds of millions of dollars more worth of equipment could have been justified if one were dealing with the kind of threat that the Shah was talking about in Iraq, Syria, and the U.A.R.

Mr. BADER. When was the decision made to go from one squadron of F-4's, which the Peterson report recommended, to two squadrons of F-4's which was the final agreement?

Mr. KUSS. This decision was communicated to the Shah on the 10th of August.

Mr. BADER. On the 10th of August.

Mr. KUSS. The decision was made, of course, within our own executive branch shortly before that at the highest levels of government.

Mr. BADER. Will we also deliver to Iran the original—

Senator SYMINGTON. Excuse me just a second. You say the highest levels of government. By that, do you mean the President?

Mr. BADER. Yes, sir. I do.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is it true that Secretary McNamara opposed this sale?

Mr. KUSS. Proposed?

Senator SYMINGTON. Opposed it.

Mr. KUSS. Opposed the sale?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. KUSS. No, not to my knowledge, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Not to your knowledge. Thank you.

Mr. BADER. Will we also deliver to Iran the 13 squadrons of F-5's that were called for under the 1964 agreement?

Mr. KUSS. I would have to check that.

May I put that in the record? There is a substitution of F-4 squadrons for F-5 squadrons, and I just want to be sure about the numbers, and I would like to insert them.

F-5 AIRCRAFT PROVIDED BY THE UNITED STATES TO IRAN

Mr. BADER. It was the decision of the highest levels, that is the President, that this would be F-4D's rather than F-4C's, as well, that would be the latest and most sophisticated—

Mr. Kuss. F-4D's

Mr. BADER (continuing). Models coming off the line and later models coming off the line.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who is the one who knows about these sales?

Mr. KUSS. It all depends on which question you ask, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see.

Mr. KUSS. If you want to ask the question about the model of the F-4, I can answer that.

Senator SYMINGTON. What was the day the decision was made to ship the F-4's?

Mr. KUSS. I believe I said it was communicated on the 10th of August.

Senator SYMINGTON. Fine.

CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATION ABOUT SALE TO IRAN

Now, when was the Congress notified that F-4's were going to be shipped to Iran?

Mr. KUSS. I do not believe the Congress was notified, Senator, until Mr. McNaughton spoke on the subject.

Senator SYMINGTON. That was after it was in the press.

Mr. KUSS. Correct, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And we talked about governmental machinery.

Is it the policy of the Defense Department to tell the press before it tells the Congress about these sales?

Mr. KUSS. As a matter of fact, I do not believe we told the press. I believe the British leaked it because of competition. It was not our doing.

Senator SYMINGTON. So the British leaked it to the American press.

Mr. KUSS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know who first published it in the United States?

Mr. KUSS. No, I do not.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you not think that, if we sell the most sophisticated fighter to a foreign country, that information should be supplied to the Congress?

Mr. KUSS. I would like to answer that question this way: The F-4D, as we sold it to the Iranian Government, was not the most sophisticated fighter that we were dealing with in terms of sales to other countries. For example, it is not the same airplane we sold to the British.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well then, let us say the second or the third or the fourth most sophisticated airplane.

Mr. KUSS. I would like to answer that question by saying that in addition to considering the problem, there were many security meetings held at which we reviewed the switches, the panels, black boxes of the F-4D, which related to nuclear capability. They were taken out. We reviewed the missile which was related to the F-4D and substituted SIDEWINDER missiles which had been released already.

We eliminated the SHRIKE which is used on the F-4D. We eliminated the WALLEYE missile which is used there. We retrofitted some of our F-4D's with CORDS and DCM and eliminated that.

So on balance we took a decision that we felt that this would not be a security lapse here or any sensitivity, if things went wrong.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me repeat my question, please.

Mr. KUSS. All right.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you not think, if you make a sale of a sophisticated, modern airplane to a foreign government, the Congress should be informed of that?

Mr. KUSS. I think I can best answer that question by saying it is not my function to determine that answer, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, then you could say this also, could you not; that you did not inform the Congress?

Mr. KUSS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And you do not know anybody who did inform the Congress.

Mr. KUSS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And to the best of your knowledge it would have remained a secret unless a foreign country had not leaked it to the press.

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FOREIGN AND MILITARY POSITION CHANGED BY SALES [P. 14]

Senator SYMINGTON. So you knew that the sale was going to be made before you agreed to sell them the F-4's.

Mr. KUSS. Yes, sir, and we protested against it considerably. We made a major point of it in our negotiation, and made sure that the Shah was clear that our willingness to sell sophisticated and sensitive equipment was conditional pending clarification of Iran's position with respect to the purchases from the Soviet bloc.

Now, the Shah responded to us on that and noted that he wanted to reaffirm that if it came to Soviet equipment, he would limit it to nonsensitive equipment. He went on further in our discussions with him on the subject to note that he had declined to send Iranians to the U.S.S.R. for training—

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand those points.

Mr. KUSS. I think these are important.

Senator SYMINGTON. We have had that information given to us in great detail.

Mr. KUSS. I do not think the last group were.

He has limited the Soviet technicians, only a few, to go to Iran to instruct Iranians on maintenance. The Soviets wanted the team to remain two years. He gave them six months. And, as a consequence, it was on balance when you consider the tremendous position we have there, the number of technicians we have there, the large predominance of \$1.4 billion, I think, that it will add up to, of the military equipment that we have provided, that we still maintained our position in a changing world, a world in which he was growing more independent, and in a world in which he had gas to sell that he could not sell anywhere else.

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STEEL MILL SALE BY U.S.S.R. TO IRAN [P. 15]

Senator SYMINGTON. If they are building a \$280 million steel mill and a \$400 million pipeline plant, and they are purchasing over \$100 million in military equipment, would you not say, inasmuch as all this has happened in recent months, that the position of the Russians from an economic standpoint was rapidly moving at least into an equilibrium with our own in Iran?

Mr. KUSS. No, sir, I do not believe so. I have certainly pointed out very clearly on the military side that it is not anything like an equilibrium. It is a man trying to dart in through the armor with a little pin.

On the economic side, I can only say that when in 1962 we decided, the Congress, along with the Executive Branch, to eliminate development aid for Iran, it was inevitable that Iran was going to turn to business means in the area to find its way. And that in 1964, the 1964 military agreement was essentially an agreement to phase out military assistance as well, and when you move into a situation where you no longer are giving it away, you find that you have got to find different ways and means of handling your problem, and you no longer have the absolute control that we had when we were in the position of largesse to everybody giving it away.

Senator SYMINGTON. At any time did we suggest to the Iranians that they purchase what they needed in the way of additional military equipment somewhere else?

Mr. KUSS. Absolutely not. We, number one, opposed the Russian program, made a major point of this.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, you answered the question, if it is no, and you explained to us that you did oppose the Russian plan.

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EVENTUAL AIRCRAFT SALES TO IRAN AND PAKISTAN [P. 16]

Mr. KUSS. We expressed no objection to a Canadian-German arrangement which would get them to Iran for the use of the Iranian armed forces.

Senator SYMINGTON. Right.

How did they get to Pakistan?

Mr. KUSS. We found out through intelligence channels that some of the airplanes were in Pakistan.

Senator SYMINGTON. You are going to let us know how many.

Mr. KUSS. And we are going to let you know how many, and we also have found out that upon remonstrations on our part, the Canadian part, the German part, the newspapers have reported that they have been returned. DIA has reported they have been generally returned, but they are not sure about the number.

Senator SYMINGTON. Returned from where to where?

Mr. KUSS. From Pakistan to Iran.

Senator SYMINGTON. To Iran.

Did we ask the Iranians for an explanation of how they got from Iran to Pakistan?

Mr. KUSS. We dealt, since our arrangements were with the Canadians and the Germans, through the Canadians and the Germans.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did we ask the Canadians and/or Germans how they explained how the planes got from Iran to Pakistan?

Mr. KUSS. Yes, that is where the Germans stopped selling any more equipment to Iran.

Senator SYMINGTON. What did the Germans say as to how they got from Iran to Pakistan?

Mr. KUSS. The Germans indicated that the first Iranian explanation was that they were in Pakistan for overhaul. As you know, Pakistan does a great deal of overhaul for most countries in that area. This was not satisfactory to anyone, and that is why we have been pursuing this further.

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RESPONSIBILITY FOR ARMS SALES [P. 17]

Senator FULBRIGHT. But who makes the decision to sell arms? Who determines the country's capacity to purchase without endangering their economy? Do you as an official of the Defense Department?

Mr. KUSS. It is my responsibility since the management for funds must be put somewhere to see to it that that is managed in a viable way.

But we have a government that has many elements to it and in almost every case, and particularly in the Iranian case, the machinery operated from the Teheran Embassy, economic aid people, with the Central Bank people, to the AID people in Washington, and it was as a result of their actions that the program was reduced, the Shah requested, to a much, much smaller program.

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RATIONALE BEHIND SALE TO IRAN QUESTIONED [P. 18]

Mr. KUSS. Well, as you say, I probably wouldn't agree with you. Senator FULBRIGHT. I don't think you would.

Mr. KUSS. But only because it is the machinery, the very machinery that you propose to exercise which came to the conclusion to provide the kind of arms and to eliminate economic aid in 1962, to eliminate military assistance in 1964 on a phased basis, to provide arms on a very stringent basis, and to not supply everything that the Shah wanted. It is this very machinery that you speak of that came to that conclusion.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am sure Iran wants it.

I was there with Mr. Douglas Dillon in 1959. I suggested to the Shah that if he spent money on the improvement of the ordinary citizens, he would be more secure than trying to protect himself with arms. But there is nothing I can do about it, and I don't know that it does any good to bedevil you about it. I realize you are an official in the Department of Defense. I only hope you do not go too far in loading everybody down with arms that can't afford it.

Mr. KUSS. Let me repeat again, Senator, that as far as the underdeveloped country, arms sales are fairly meaningless to us. They amount to 10 percent of our total program. My office is occupied with doing things with people with whom we used to be giving billions in foreign aid in our alliances.

When it comes to the application to these non-developed countries, my responsibility is to see to it that if we do extend credit they have got the money to repay it, that we manage it on an appropriate basis.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am not arguing about their having the money for purchases. I expect you will get it.

What they are doing is taking it out of the hides of poor peasants. That is what is creating a politically explosive situation.

The Shah will get the money from the Majlis. You don't dispute that?

Mr. KUSS. Let me make that clear. The Majlis has, as you pointed out, voted \$200 million that he could spend in one year. We didn't agree with that. We didn't agree with that at all. We dealt

with the Central Bank, Mr. Sami, whom you probably know is a very capable man there.

Next we dealt with our economic mission in Teheran; next with the AID group. What we dealt with was a situation which compared what each tranche of military equipment would involve in the way of debt pre-payment against any balance of foreign exchange that was left over after all of the feasible projects could be administered for the economic development program. We dealt with that as a given factor by our AID people who did not take the Shah's estimates of all revenues, reduced them and who did not take all of the Shah's estimates on what his economic programs were feasible, and the programs that we are dealing with here, all through it have a ceiling something like this, and this curve here is the debt pre-payment capability which our economic advisers told us was possible after covering the other programs.

Senator SYMINGTON. If the chairman will yield.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I will.

Senator SYMINGTON. It would seem clear from your testimony that you felt the Shah had a right because of danger to his country to make arrangements to obtain these airplanes. Is that correct?

Mr. KUSS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right. Now, in the Peterson report—

Senator FULBRIGHT. Danger from whom?

Senator SYMINGTON. I was going to get to that. In the Peterson report it says, and I quote: "The combined forces of these latter three countries represent a overwhelming military capability vis-a-vis Iran. But for the foreseeable future the possibility of their making such a combined assault on Iranian forces seems quite remote. A unilateral attack of Iran by UAR forces is unlikely. But if it should come, it would be limited to naval action unless the Israeli issue were first resolved or unless the UAR achieved hegemony over the minor states of the area, a circumstance not readily foreseen."

Now, as I understand it, therefore, you believe that the threat comes from Syria, the UAR, and Iraq primarily, is that correct? The Pentagon feels that way?

Mr. KUSS. That is a result of the Peterson report, yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right. How many Mig 21's has Iraq got roughly? I think this is very important.

Mr. KUSS. They have 18 on hand, and I believe another 18 coming.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is 36. How many has Syria got?

Mr. KUSS. Actual order of battle on hand, 18 for Iraq, Syria 26, 102 for UAR.

Senator SYMINGTON. Wait a minute, you are ahead of me. How many has Iraq got?

Mr. KUSS. Eighteen.

Senator SYMINGTON. And how many do you say they are going to have?

Mr. KUSS. My records indicate they will have 18 more.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is 36.

Mr. KUSS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. How many has Syria got?

Mr. KUSS. The order of battle indicates 26 here.

Senator SYMINGTON. Twenty-six. That is a total of 62, correct?

Mr. KUSS. Right.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now how many did you say Egypt has?

Mr. KUSS. 102. Those are just Mig-21's.

Senator SYMINGTON. But the SU-7 is an improved Mig-21, is it not?

Mr. KUSS. Yes, sir. That is 38 additional SU-7's in the UAR.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I mean do you not want to include the best they have got? The figure I got in Cairo last month was 60 SU-7's. But you have got 38; you have 102 and 38.

Mr. KUSS. Yes, sir. I would like to check.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is 140 and 62. That is over 200 of the latest model fighters that those three countries have. Why do you not sell more F-4's to Iran if you want to put them in a balance of power position against these three countries? In other words, what do you really do for the Shah by giving him one or two squadrons of F-4's if your premise is correct that these three countries are enemies and they have over a hundred of the most modern Russian fighters. I am following Senator Fulbright's thinking on this.

OUR MILITARY POSITION IN IRAN

You have been to Iran and so have I. It is a country where there are very rich people and very poor people. What good does it do to let them take their resources, and buy these airplanes from us, if they get them at all, as against what they could do with that money for the betterment of their economy because the number of planes that you have agreed on does not make them safe against these countries. Incidentally, all these latter countries are really satellites of the Soviet Union, are they not?

Mr. KUSS. They certainly are.

Senator SYMINGTON. Therefore, if the Soviet Union wanted to move against Iran, the military imbalance is still stronger, is it not?

Mr. KUSS. It certainly is. May I answer the question?

Senator SYMINGTON. I am just asking a few as we go along.

As I understand it, we are selling military equipment to them, sophisticated military equipment; and the Soviet Union is selling them unsophisticated military equipment, plus a tremendous steel mill, for which they are going to be paid in natural gas, and in oil. Is that correct?

Mr. KUSS. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you say that in our effort to preserve a military position which is at best theoretical, we are passing over the economic control of the country to the Soviet Union?

Mr. KUSS. I do not see it that way. With a few projects, I do not see it at all. I would believe that the relationship of our western influence in both the economic area and the military area is probably about on the order of the \$1.4 billion military to \$100 million Soviet.

SOVIET INFLUENCE IN IRAN

Senator SYMINGTON. But we are putting the Soviet Union in about equilibrium when it comes to economic control.

Mr. KUSS. I do not believe so.

Senator SYMINGTON. You do not think so?

Mr. KUSS. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. You think we still control the economy of Iran?

Mr. KUSS. First of all, I do not believe that the word "control" is one that the Soviets use.

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you think the word should be?

Mr. KUSS. I believe that the good influence, if you will, that we have in Iran is sufficiently great, in a preponderance, in a majority, to warrant the course of action that we took, and that was the on balance decision of both our economists, our political people, and our military people.

Senator SYMINGTON. You told the subcommittee this afternoon that we did our best to prevent the sale of the Russian military equipment to Iran, but we were unsuccessful. Is that correct?

Mr. KUSS. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And at the same time you also told the committee that the Iranians are working out with the Russians a big steel mill, and that they are going to have, with the help of the British and the Russians, a \$400 million gas pipeline with which they are going to pay for this military equipment, along with gas. Is that correct?

Mr. KUSS. That is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. So there is a major recent economic influx of the Soviet Union into Iran, and also a major and unprecedented movement of military equipment into Iran from the Soviet Union, correct?

Mr. KUSS. Not in proportion to our influence.

Senator SYMINGTON. But there is a major influx.

Mr. KUSS. Yes, sir; there has been a change.

Senator SYMINGTON. And all told, the operations of the Soviets, economic and military together, for say the last 18 months, is greater than our own; so in effect we are moving more out of the picture with our grant-in-aid and our military sales, and our economic sales; and the Soviets are moving more into the picture.

Mr. KUSS. We are——

Senator SYMINGTON. Is that correct?

Mr. KUSS. No, sir. We are hardly moving out of the picture militarily. We have found other monies have been given away to substitute for the military side of the equation.

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ARMS SALES TO WEST GERMANY [P. 21]

Senator FULBRIGHT. You said the decision to sell in Teheran was made at the highest level after considering all aspects. I assume you mean the relative need of their domestic economy, and you finally came up with a decision that they needed these arms, is that correct?

Mr. KUSS. As well as the politics of whether we can stand the Russian situation.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Politics.

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[P. 22]

Mr. KUSS. All of these have to be considered. It has to be required, must be more economically purchaseable in the United States. Then they will endeavor to do it. Now, the problem today is not in meeting the basic part of that agreement. The problem today is essentially the basic internal German economic problem, a budget that cannot be changed materially because of a revenue system that is dependent upon revenues from the States, a requirement for a complete tax reform system.

Today the German armed forces have one-half the procurement budget in 1967 that they had in 1963. So you can imagine just that kind of a change. Why? Because they have not been able to go along with the increases that would have been necessary to keep up their total establishment because of the revenue limitations in the total federal program.

Now, this is something we cannot control. It is something that they must control, and I want to make clear that our agreement with them is that yes, they will balance, they will endeavor to procure equipment, if it is required, and if it is economical to do so, and for five years they have done so.

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[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MARCH 16, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 2:10 p.m., in Room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, and Case.

Eugene Groves, President, National Student Association, accompanied by Richard Stearnes, International Affairs Vice President, testified on the association of the National Student Association with the C.I.A.

[The committee adjourned at 4:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, MARCH 20, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in Room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Case and Cooper.

S. Con. Res. 16, extending greetings to Canada on the occasion of its Centennial, was ordered reported favorably.

S. 623, International Bridge Bill, was ordered reported favorably.

S. 1029, to improve certain benefits for employees who serve in high risk situations, and for other purposes, was discussed and no action taken.

Ex. E, 89/1, 90/1, Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, was ordered reported favorably.

Ex. O, 89/2, International Telecommunication Convention, was discussed and carried over.

Ex. D, 90/1, Treaty on Outer Space, was discussed and it was decided to have some items clarified by someone from downtown before further consideration.

S.J. Res. 53, recommending increased assistance to Latin America, was discussed and a hearing set for Thursday p.m. was moved up to Tuesday, March 21, p.m.

[The committee adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]

BRIEFING ON AFRICA

Tuesday, March 28, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 3: 10 p.m. in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Eugene J. McCarthy (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators McCarthy and Hickenlooper.

Also Present: Senators Symington and Carlson.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.

Senator MCCARTHY. Do you want to just talk to us, Mr. Palmer? This is kind of a new committee, and we have no policy with reference to Africa. If you do not have one, why we are in good shape.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH PALMER II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY: FRED L. HADSEL, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS; AND WILLIAM E. LANG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (AFRICAN AND FOREIGN MILITARY RIGHTS)

Mr. PALMER. Maybe between the two of us we can devise one, Mr. Chairman.

Senator MCCARTHY. We ought to hear what it is. If you would like to talk to us generally about two or three items that we have indicated in the letter, why I think that would be a good beginning.

Mr. PALMER. Fine.

You had mentioned that you would like to discuss the military programs in Africa. Would you like to start on that, Mr. Chairman?

Senator MCCARTHY. I guess that is as good as any.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There are only two things I want to discuss in Africa: Rhodesia and South Africa.

NORTH AFRICAN MILITARY PROBLEM

Senator MCCARTHY. Why do we not do a quick one on the North African military problem, and then we will go to South Africa.

Mr. PALMER. Well, I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, of course this situation in North Africa has been one of continuing concern for us. As you know, there have been tensions in the area in the past, but they have been kept under fairly manageable control, with the exception of one clash between the Algerians and the Mo-

roccans back in 1963. On the whole, our military program in North Africa until just a couple of years ago was a fairly modest one. We have been supplying both Morocco and Tunisia for some time since independence with military assistance.

Mr. Lang can give you the figures if you would like them.

But what has given the problem increased importance in the last two or three years has been the very massive Soviet buildup, supply of arms to Algeria. This again, of course, during the Ben Bella regime. It has continued on under Boumedienne and has achieved very, very substantial proportions, about \$180 million worth of military assistance to Algeria since 1963.

It is not only the quantity of it, but it is the types of weapons that have given both the Moroccans and the Tunisians concern—jet bombers, fighters, surface to air missiles and other very advanced types of equipment—with the result that quite an imbalance has been created between the armed forces of Algeria and those of Morocco on the one side, and Tunisia on the other.

Now, we have done a lot of skull practice to try to get our best estimates as to why this has come about and how it has come about.

ALGERIA AND EGYPT

I think our best estimate involves a number of factors. First of all, under the Ben Bella regime Algeria was, of course, committed to export revolution. They were training guerrillas. We have good reason to believe they trained them for the Congo and for other areas, and it was a very revolutionary government. Boumedienne—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And an ally of Nasser.

Mr. PALMER. I am sorry.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And an ally of Nasser.

Mr. PALMER. Yes.

When Boumedienne came to power he downplayed this, and the direction of his policy has been much more toward trying to develop Algeria internally. Nevertheless we think that most of these commitments were made during the Ben Bella period and have been continued during the Boumedienne period.

As you know, Algeria emerged into independence with a Maqui type force, and the Algerian government was faced with the necessity of converting that into a more traditional and modern standing army.

There was a certain amount of speculation that what may well have happened is Ben Bella took a look at what the Soviets were doing for Egypt and said, "I don't really know what I need, but you tell me what I need." The Soviets used this at a time when their relationships with Algeria were extremely favorable to try to put in a lot of equipment hoping to ingratiate themselves and buttress their influence that really was over and above Algeria's needs.

Then, of course—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you mind if I interrupt?

Mr. PALMER. No, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is it possible that this is a squeeze play on the part of the Russians with Egypt on the one side and Algeria on the other, to squeeze out Libya and Tunisia.

Mr. PALMER. I think this may have been one—an original part of the strategy.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And eventually isolate Morocco and so on.

Mr. PALMER. I think this could have been an original part of the strategy, Senator. However, I think that Boumedienne's relations with the Soviets have not been nearly as close as Ben Bella's were, and I doubt if it is—nor Boumedienne's relationships with Egypt, with Nasser are as close as Ben Bella's were, although Boumedienne will be attending a meeting in the next few days in Cairo along with some of the other so-called progressives in Africa.

But thus far—

Senator MCCARTHY. What are the cultural differences between Algeria and Egypt? They are considerable, are they not?

Mr. PALMER. They are considerable, yes. There is, of course, very great, strong Berber influence on the Algerians.

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes.

Mr. PALMER. They do consider themselves as Arabs, but as a different type and a different part of the Arab world.

I think there are other factors, too, that led to this massive Algerian buildup. First of all, the fact they did get a rather bloody nose in this 1963 conflict with Morocco and also the fact that the government in Algeria is a military regime, and the man in power has to be in a position of reasonably satisfying the military commanders to continue to get their support.

So that I think the rationale, I think, and the explanation for all of these things is found in this combination of factors.

NO AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS

Now, we do not really think that the present government of Algeria has any aggressive intentions with respect to either Morocco or Tunisia.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why are they building up their military forces?

Mr. PALMER. Well, as I say, I think this is partly an inheritance of the past from the Ben Bella regime, partly transformation of their military forces into a more traditional army. I think it is partly an overreaction to the beating they took in 1963. I think it is generally part of their suspicions as a revolutionary regime that somebody may try to take their revolution away from them. I think it is partly because they are a military regime in and of themselves.

As I say, we do not really think that Boumedienne—who is quite different, we think, from Ben Bella—really has any present intention of taking a crack at either Morocco or Tunisia, nor do I think that the Moroccans or the Tunisians really think this is a serious present possibility. But what worries them very much is the future.

Algeria is still not an entirely stable government by any means. There is internal dissidence within the country. One cannot be sure that there may not be further changes within the country.

Furthermore, about 2,000 Algerians have gone to the Soviet Union for military training, and although I think there is good reason to believe that not too many of these have been indoctrinated, nevertheless it may well be and could easily be that a number of

them have been. In the event that there was a change of government, and given this huge military machine that is being built up, this is what really concerns the Moroccans and the Tunisians and has caused them to look to their own weaknesses and to come to us in terms of assistance.

There is, of course, always the danger in the meanwhile, too, that there may be a mishap. The border between Morocco and Algeria is, of course, a disputed border. There has been trouble there in the past, but since 1963—and particularly since Boumedienne came to power—they have usually found a peaceful means of reconciling their differences.

Moreover, the OAU, the Organization of African Unity, has set up a commission to try to deal with this problem and to try to bring about a reconciliation between the two. I think this has had a deterrent and helpful effect in minimizing the possibility of mishaps.

CONDITION OF THE MOROCCAN KING

Nevertheless, the problem of an arms race is very much there. As you are all aware, I know, when the King of Morocco was here very recently, he did again reiterate to us a request that he had made some months before, which we had tried to resist at that time, for further defensive weapons. At the time we were resisting, of course, the full extent of the Algerian buildup was not clear, but in view of the intervening period and greater clarity about the extent and the quality of this buildup, we felt that there were legitimate defensive requirements.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It seems I saw a story in the paper that he had a heart attack just recently.

Mr. PALMER. I do not believe it was a heart attack. This is Bourguiba, I think, that you are talking about.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, both of them.

Mr. PALMER. Well——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The story I saw.

Mr. PALMER. In Hassan's case, I do not think it really can be characterized as a heart attack. It was apparently a circulatory ailment, and they say it was short of a heart attack but enough to constitute a warning, so——

Senator SYMINGTON. It was an attack on the blood that did not reach the heart.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Only the red corpuscles.

Senator SYMINGTON. They do not believe in integration. [Laughter.]

A FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM

Mr. PALMER. So this is essentially the program that we have at the present time. We have agreed to sell \$14 million worth of arms to the Moroccans. The Tunisians have also made requests on us for additional assistance to build up a minimal deterrent force in Tunisia. Their armed forces are extremely weak at the present time. At their request, we have under study a program of about \$25 million spread over five years, to build their armed forces up to give them a minimal, as I say, deterrent.

We have only committed ourselves to one year's tranche of this, the first year for \$5 million.

Senator SYMINGTON. You say "tranche," that lovely little word. You give them five years to draw on.

Mr. PALMER. No, we have only said that we would supply them \$5 million worth of equipment this year.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the tranche aspect of that?

Mr. PALMER. Well, as I said, it is a five-year program, but the only thing we are committed to is the first year of that at the present time.

Senator SYMINGTON. Can I ask a question there?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Go ahead. You are chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. When you have a first year commitment and only agree to come through with the money for the first year, how do you define the rest of the four years? Semi-commitment, or is there some tricky word that describes that?

Mr. PALMER. Tranche was perhaps not a good word for me to use.

Senator SYMINGTON. I was not thinking of tranche so much, but I was thinking of how can you have a five-year agreement if you only agree to give them the money for one year?

Mr. PALMER. No, we have not got a five-year agreement. We gave them a report that would provide them with a minimal defense capability over a period of five years.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who made the report?

Mr. PALMER. We did.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who is "we"?

Mr. PALMER. Well, the Department of Defense—Bill, do you want to speak to this?

Mr. LANG. Yes, Mr. Senator.

MILITARY TEAM IN TUNISIA

A military team went to Tunisia at the request of President Bourguiba to see what changes or modifications of the Tunisian armed forces would be needed to give them the best defensive capability they could have taking into account their limited resources.

Senator SYMINGTON. When was this?

Mr. LANG. This was a year ago last November.

Senator SYMINGTON. What was the name of the general who headed it up?

Mr. LANG. It was not a general, but a colonel by the name of Clowes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, while you were gone I took the liberty of asking a couple of questions, and I would like to pursue them a minute.

Senator MCCARTHY. Go ahead.

Senator SYMINGTON. The question was a five-year agreement with Tunisia, as a result of an investigation made by the Department of Defense presumably, Mr. Secretary, at the request of the State Department.

Mr. PALMER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. By a Colonel Clowes, and he went over and told Tunisia they need \$25 million to have a modern—

Mr. LANG. If I may complete the discussion, Mr. Senator—

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me just see if I got it straight up to this point: at his request we tell him he needs \$25 million, which we are going to give them on the basis of a five-year agreement. But we only put up the money for the first year, \$5 million for the first year; is that right?

Mr. LANG. I think it might be helpful, Senator, to go into a bit more detail as to what happened to the report.

The study was made, as I said, at the request of President Bourguiba. Colonel Clowes headed a military team which stayed in Tunisia about three weeks, prepared a report which was reviewed by headquarters EUCOM, Commander, European Forces, also by the Joint Staff, and was endorsed by both.

Colonel Clowes' report made a number of recommendations that the Tunisians should follow or carry out in reorganizing their forces, increasing the size of their forces to a relatively small extent, but also changing the size and composition of their units.

The report also indicated that Tunisians would need additional equipment which they could absorb best over a five-year period. This was not equipment that should be poured in at one point in time.

PLANES TO LIBYA

Senator SYMINGTON. Are you in the State Department or Department of Defense?

Mr. LANG. I am in the Defense Department.

Senator SYMINGTON. Whom do you work for?

Mr. LANG. John McNaughton.

Senator SYMINGTON. You work for Mr. McNaughton.

Mr. LANG. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. You also sold some planes to Libya, have you not?

Mr. LANG. Not as yet, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. But you plan to.

Mr. LANG. The negotiations will be begun fairly shortly. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. I thought we decided we were going to sell F-5s to Libya.

Mr. LANG. The decision has been pretty much made, but the negotiations not.

Senator MCCARTHY. Is this part of a general strategic plan for North Africa? I mean Tunisia and Libya?

Mr. LANG. When you speak of a strategic plan, sir—

Senator MCCARTHY. What you have recommended for Tunisia, did you conduct the same kind of study in Libya and make these recommendations?

Mr. LANG. No. The Libyan sales agreement is not the result of a survey team report.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is it the result of?

Mr. LANG. The request of the Libyan government, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. You see, some of the people in the Department of Defense were very glad this committee was getting into this because they did not know what was going on themselves. So by golly, if people in your own building do not know, then I think we are entitled to find out. I say this with great respect, but it gets pretty complicated. At any rate, Mr. Chairman, would it be in

order, as long as we are discussing the north littoral of Africa, that you give us a report on what you plan in Libya?

Mr. LANG. Fine, sir. We have completed the discussion, I take it, on Tunisia.

Senator SYMINGTON. No. I think they are all together. Exactly. What you are doing on Libya, the information that was volunteered to my office was that you had agreed to sell the F-5's to Libya. So I would like to find out whether the information I got from Mr. McNaughton's department is correct. Would you check that out and let me know?

Mr. LANG. Yes. I can recount now.

Senator SYMINGTON. No, that is all right, but it seems to me you said we were planning on doing it. I understand we have done it, so I would like to have that point checked for the record and we can supply that.

On Tunisia, as I understand, there is a team in Tunisia; in Morocco, I have been listening to—

I am almost through, Mr. Chairman. I just want to try to understand. We are running right across here now. It looks like Rommel. We are moving right over here now to get this thing organized.

ROLE OF THE FRENCH

The Algerians, when de Gaulle let them go, were French citizens; were they not? Is that correct?

Mr. LANG. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Algerians were French citizens before their independence.

Mr. PALMER. Yes.

Senator MCCARTHY. They were eligible for French citizenship.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think they actually were.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Part of Metropolitan France.

Mr. PALMER. The northern departments were part of Metropolitan France.

Senator SYMINGTON. My last question or group of questions: We are discussing what has been done in Morocco; we will skip Algeria for the moment anyway. We are discussing what is being done in Tunisia. We are discussing—what is being done in Libya. Have we discussed with the French at the diplomatic level what we are doing in the north littoral of Africa?

Mr. PALMER. Yes, we have. They are aware—

Senator SYMINGTON. Are they aware of what we are doing in Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya?

Mr. PALMER. I think they understand the reasons for it. Of course, their relationships with Morocco are not good at the present time. They have not been good with Tunisia although they are improving, and I think the French have been understanding of the reasons why we have given assistance to these countries.

Senator SYMINGTON. How are they with Libya?

Mr. PALMER. So far as Libya is concerned, I do not think they have professed any interest in this.

Senator SYMINGTON. How about Algeria?

Mr. PALMER. Well, of course we have not been giving assistance to Algeria.

Senator SYMINGTON. I just wondered what their relationship with Algeria was.

Mr. PALMER. Oh, I see. Their relationships are clouded by a number of financial problems at the present time. They have not had since independence much of a military relationship with Algeria, although they are now resuming the training of Algerians at St. Cyr, which is the beginning of a renewed French interest. They have sat back—we have thought somewhat too much—and watched this Soviet buildup going on. We have talked to them very frankly about it.

They have professed not to be concerned about it. I have talked several times in the Quai about this myself. The last time I talked in January, I had a feeling they were becoming increasingly concerned about it.

FRENCH OPINION OF AMERICAN POLICY

Senator SYMINGTON. One final question. I do not want to take too much time, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to get sort of the package feel of this part of the world.

You say the French have understood what we are doing. Well, I understand what we are doing, I think, especially after the testimony. At least I understood most of what we are doing, but do they agree to this? Do they think we are following the sound course there? Do they approve of our arming Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya against Algeria?

Mr. PALMER. I am not aware of any objections that they have interposed. Are you Bill?

Mr. LANG. No.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are they putting anything up themselves in order to help along a little bit? It is closer to them than it is to us.

Mr. PALMER. If I can say, Senator, I would like to come back to the Tunisian one again, too, because, as I said, we have encouraged the Tunisians to look elsewhere for assistance as well. We would like to spread this. We do not want to become the sole suppliers, and so forth, and the Tunisians are talking to both the French and the Turks. We are hopeful that they may obtain assistance in those directions.

We would hope very much, too, the Moroccan-French relationships would improve to the point that the French would find it possible to do more in Morocco as well.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SOVIET INFLUENCE

Senator MCCARTHY. Mr. Palmer, I do not know if you can do this under two or three general concepts, but do you look upon the arms buildup down there primarily as kind of a North African problem, probably psychological and traditional and at least contained in the North African context? Egypt, Algeria, Morocco—I believe this is the old game they have played for a long time. You are just using slightly more sophisticated instruments of war instead of horses and rifles.

Mr. PALMER. I would say so, yes.

Of course what is giving it an alarming dimension are the types of equipment that the Algerians are acquiring.

Now we have got a similar sort of situation, of course, in the horn of Africa where again the Soviets are building up the Somalia forces in that area. This again gives us concern, although there, of course, the disparities are on Ethiopia's side, but of course Ethiopia is a much larger and more complex country.

The question that arises is what the Soviet motivations are in all of this. I think they are probably the obvious ones of influence. I think it may also suit their purposes very well to create pressures on the adjoining states. This is one reason we have been so anxious to minimize U.S. supply of arms to the adjoining states so that they will not fall in the trap, and they recognize the trap here, too, I think.

Senator MCCARTHY. What do the Algerians give in exchange for arms or the people in Somaliland?

Mr. PALMER. I am sorry, sir.

Senator MCCARTHY. What do they give in exchange for Soviet arms? Are these pretty much grants? The Algerians do not have much, do they?

Mr. PALMER. I think in the case of Algeria it is half.

Mr. LANG. It is either half and half or two-thirds, two-thirds cash. When I say cash, credit, two-thirds credit and one-third grant.

Senator MCCARTHY. How about Somalia? They do not have anything, do they?

Mr. LANG. I think perhaps the terms are roughly the same. We do not have really too much information on the terms.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What kind of credit is it? This credit that is used is a loose term. And the cash, what kind of credit? Is that foreign exchange, acceptable foreign exchange, international foreign exchange such as dollars? What is the credit?

Mr. LANG. It may be barter arrangements, sir. As I mentioned earlier, Senator, we really do not have that much hard information about the terms of the agreement between the Soviets and the Algerians.

Senator MCCARTHY. They do not have much to give in exchange, do they?

Mr. PALMER. Somalia does not.

Senator MCCARTHY. Somalia does not have anything.

Mr. PALMER. Algeria has somewhat more because there is a considerable amount of petroleum.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They get exchange out of oil.

Mr. PALMER. Yes.

Senator MCCARTHY. But the Russians do not need that kind of oil.

Mr. PALMER. No, but it does in hard currencies.

WHEELUS AIR BASE

Senator MCCARTHY. What about the overall strategic plans? You said we made a study in Tunisia and made these recommendations. Is this simply in terms of this North African complex or do our recommendations there and our concessions with reference to Libya

involve somewhat more comprehensive strategic planning than just this self-contained North African complex?

Mr. PALMER. Well, in the case of Tunisia, of course, we are interested in stability in the area. We are interested in the very prowestern orientation of Tunisia. Bourguiba has been extremely courageous in speaking out on a great many political issues of importance to us. He supported us on Vietnam. He has taken a very forward stance. This put him at odds with the rest of the Arab world with respect to the Arab-Israel conflict, and he has stood for a great deal in Africa and the Middle East.

In the case of Libya, of course, our interests there are much more direct. We do have an extremely important facility there in Wheelus.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is important about the Wheelus airbase?

Mr. PALMER. In the Wheelus airbase?

Senator MCCARTHY. Is it just a base or is it more than that?

Senator SYMINGTON. I have been there, and I would like to hear the modern version.

Mr. PALMER. As the Senator knows, the importance of the facility right now, it is supporting all of our U.S. NATO-committed air forces in Europe, in terms of year-round gunnery training.

Senator SYMINGTON. So if we decided to reduce our forces in Germany, for example, that would reduce the need for the Air Force base, would it not, at Wheelus, because that is where they do the staging?

Mr. PALMER. In terms of the percentage that it would be used, but you would still have the requirement of forces in Europe that would need that type of facility.

Senator MCCARTHY. Fleet support, in the Mediterranean.

Mr. PALMER. No, these are basically in support of the U.S. Air Force units in Europe.

Senator MCCARTHY. Is that right?

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, as I got the story when I was in Germany, Wheelus was very important because they could fly to Wheelus and fly around the desert when the weather would not let them fly in Germany.

Mr. PALMER. Precisely.

Senator SYMINGTON. You wonder, inasmuch as the weather in England is not as good as Germany, why they built about the greatest air force in the world in their day, but I suppose it is more comfortable this way.

Senator MCCARTHY. When they decided peace will stay for a while, they decided to establish places in good climates.

Senator SYMINGTON. The thought occurs to me very seriously to see it all ties in together if you are going to maintain this picture over there, keeping these troops in Germany to the extent that we are keeping them and not following what President Eisenhower recommended years ago, pulling a lot of them out, and to the degree that you do not pull them out, Wheelus is important.

When we had the staging base complex, which was long before the intercontinental ballistic missile, then these bases were terribly important. They were militarily important. Now I understand you say they are logistically important, but if there is nothing over

there to support, then they become relatively unimportant. Is that not correct?

Mr. LANG. If there were no forces in Europe to support.

Senator SYMINGTON. Right. And we have spent a good many hundred million dollars in Spain where we are behind the Pyrenees. The bases there are great and the weather is just about as good. The bases are better as a whole; more bases there than one base at Wheelus and so forth.

So this really ties into the whole operation over there.

THE PRIMARY THREATS

I would like to ask this question: Based on what you are saying about Somaliland, and what we really are doing is, Mr. Chairman, we are arming all the countries that we think are for us in case they get attacked by Somalia or Algeria—or the UAR, of course—that is about the long and short of it, is it not?

Mr. PALMER. What we are hoping there to do is to assure a minimal defensive posture.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me repeat my question.

We are arming these countries in order to help them defend themselves in case they are attacked by Somalia, Algeria, or the UAR. Is that not correct?

Mr. PALMER. Those are the primary threats to them, yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Or anybody else that wants to attack them.

Mr. PALMER. Yes. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. Even France.

Mr. PALMER. Yes, sir. But when we say arming them, Senator, I would like to point out that we have held back and held down very much the quantities of arms that we have made available to these countries.

Senator SYMINGTON. We are only arming——

Mr. PALMER. To assure that they were minimal just to give them a deterrent capability, a defense capability so they would not be overrun before the matter could get to the U.N.

OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT

Senator SYMINGTON. How do you know whether an F-5 airplane, which is a supersonic fighter and extremely able, can be used offensively or defensively? That is what I do not understand. Do you have anything in the contract that says the plane cannot go out of Tunisia?

Mr. LANG. All of the military assistance agreements, sir, do specify that the equipment will be used only for internal security or self-defense.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, suppose they figured they were pretty confident that Libya was going to, that Algeria was going to attack them. Does the contract say they cannot attack Algeria unless Algeria attacks them?

Mr. LANG. Self-defense, sir, usually means that you are attacked first.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I know, but you are going to arm all these countries, and every time that happens we end up in a war.

SOVIET ARMS IN ALGERIA

Mr. LANG. Senator, it may be helpful to give some dimensions to the Soviet buildup or the buildup of Soviet arms in Algeria.

Senator SYMINGTON. I will tell you what I wish you would do for the record, Mr. Chairman, if it is in order.

I wish you would give the details of the agreements and the wording of the agreements, if that is agreeable.

Senator MCCARTHY. That would be fine. Also, if we could get a kind of total really as to what the Soviet has in this area in contrast with what we have got here.

Mr. LANG. Would you care for some of that now, sir? I have some of the statistics.

Mr. PALMER. I think it would help.

Senator MCCARTHY. I think it would. I do not know, maybe you ought to swing it on around what we have got in other Arab countries. So far as Egypt is concerned, it plays both ways, does it not?

Mr. LANG. Let me speak briefly, sir, to the buildup in Algeria and compare it to what the Tunisians and the Moroccans now have.

Senator MCCARTHY. All right.

Mr. LANG. In the case of Algeria and Morocco, the size of the armies are not too far apart; Morocco about 50,000 and Algeria 60,000. The Tunisians have 18,000.

In terms of tanks, the Moroccans have 75. The Algerians have 429. The Tunisians have 17.

In terms of artillery, the Moroccans have 191. Algeria 681. I do not have the statistics for Tunisia.

Armored vehicles, Morocco 120. Algeria 535.

Jet bombers, IL-28s. Algeria 27. I think close to 30 now, and we think they are going to 36. Morocco, none at all.

Algeria, 97 Migs including the Mig-21 series.

Senator SYMINGTON. How many?

Mr. LANG. At least 25 or more.

Senator MCCARTHY. Twenty-five of the 21s.

Mr. LANG. That is right. There are 97 Migs in total.

Senator SYMINGTON. Any SU-7s?

Mr. LANG. No, sir. The Moroccans now have a grand total of 13 aircraft, nine of which are Migs. You recall the Soviets had a program in Morocco in the late fifties and early sixties, so this is the type of imbalance that exists in Morocco.

AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE AGAINST ALGERIA

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to make this comment on the basis of that plus the figures you have given like \$25 million. It is just a spit in the ocean what you are doing so far as giving them an adequate defense against Algeria, especially if the Soviets continue to build up in Algeria. Is that not a fair statement?

Mr. LANG. The objective, Mr. Senator, is to give the Moroccans and the Tunisians a defense capability which they could employ taking into full account the advantages they have, given their defensive terrain, which would enable them to hold a major thrust for a period of some days until the U.N. or another international body could consider the problem.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me be straight on this, because I do not think there is anything more important in our foreign policy than what we are discussing today. It certainly has been an awfully ignorant subject around the Armed Services Committee.

I do not know how much the Foreign Relations Committee knew, but we knew little or nothing about it on the Armed Services Committee. Are you saying that with these amounts that we are giving these countries that over a period of days or weeks, whatever is necessary, that they would defend themselves against the buildup in Algeria that you have just told us about.

Mr. LANG. It is the judgment of the Joint Staff, sir, that with the type of equipment and the quantities which we have been speaking of, that the Moroccans and the Tunisians would be able to hold against an Algerian thrust for a period of days.

Senator SYMINGTON. For how long?

Mr. LANG. This would vary, sir, where the attack would take place. The minimum estimates are four to seven days.

Senator SYMINGTON. So we are giving them four to seven days of hold until we can get to the United Nation. Is that it?

Mr. LANG. Yes.

Mr. PALMER. Until they can get to the U.N.

Senator SYMINGTON. When you say the Joint Staff, you mean the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. PALMER. The joint organization which supports the Joint Chiefs. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And these are the figures they have approved now to make it possible for these countries to defend themselves against Algeria, is that correct?

Mr. PALMER. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is the comparative strength in hardware between Algeria and Morocco?

Mr. LANG. If I can just—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As of now as against the time when the Algerians were not successful against the Moroccans.

Mr. LANG. I do not have the statistics, Senator, with me, but I would say—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I mean the balance. Is the balance about the same now as it was then?

Mr. LANG. No, because the Soviet buildup has taken place in Algeria since 1964. There have been large—huge quantities of arms going into Algeria from '64 through the present.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thanks.

COMMITMENT TO TUNISIA

Mr. PALMER. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I can clarify just one other statement that related to Senator Symington's summing up. We do not have a five-year commitment to Tunisia. What we have given the Tunisians in response to their request is a report that is based upon a five-year buildup of the Tunisian armed forces. The only thing that we have committed ourselves to is one year's assistance to them, and, as I say, we have encouraged them to look to other countries to assist in supplying equipment for the remainder.

Now, that is not to say we would not do something more in subsequent years. But I just wanted to make that clear. We do not have a five-year commitment to Tunisia at the present time.

NO DEFENSE PACT

Senator MCCARTHY. Mr. Palmer, could I ask, back eight or ten years ago when we were bent on working out treaties like CENTO and SEATO, there was some talk about an African arrangement of some kind, as a kind of a southern tier which would have involved what, Ethiopia, Libya, and kind of close off Egypt, the Sudan. I think we were talking about that. Is that idea still around?

Mr. PALMER. No. The idea is not current, Mr. Chairman, at the present time, and I think that the nonaligned posture of all of these countries—

Senator MCCARTHY. No plans for the Sudan then at the present time.

Mr. PALMER. No, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What were you about to say about the nonaligned posture?

Mr. PALMER. I think the nonaligned posture of these countries would not make such a defense arrangement possible, even if we wanted to assume additional obligations which we have not wanted to in that context, in that area.

Senator MCCARTHY. Frank, I do not know whether we need to press this North Africa.

Senator CARLSON. I have been very interested in this. I just see a picture on this map, and I can see these countries where the Soviet Union has been building up. I can see also where we have our military posture.

It gets back to when, I think it was Secretary Rusk was before our committee, he talked about the balancing of arms between nations. In other words, if one country got a little ahead, it was our policy to build up the neighbors. I do not know how far we can go. Maybe we should be going more extensively than we are, I do not know. It is a problem.

Mr. PALMER. Well, it is a difficult problem, Senator. We do not want to see them lose their independence. At the same time, we do not want to see them dissipate resources that should be going into economic development, and I should add to that that the countries themselves do not want to. Both Bourguiba and Hassan have given very high priority to their economic development programs, but both of them do feel that this imbalance does threaten their security.

COMPARISON TO VIETNAM WAR

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me ask this question, if I may.

Mr. PALMER. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. You have heard of the Vietnam war.

Mr. PALMER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And we put in heaven knows what, great tens of millions of dollars, and the people supplying the Viet Cong have put in not even a small fraction of what we have put in money and equipment. For example, they put in no air forces at all

really to speak of, except in North Vietnam. They have nothing in South Vietnam.

If these people want to be independent down here, is it necessary for us to supply them with these—with all this equipment? Is there not a little Viet Cong in their hearts, too, that they want to be independent and they are willing to fight and die for what they think is right in those countries?

Mr. PALMER. I think there is that feeling, but I think that they feel that they need a minimal capability in order to do this. I think what we have been supplying, Senator, is a pretty minimal capability.

Senator SYMINGTON. If we want to support the regimes in this country, for example, as I have told the full committee already and the Armed Services Committee, the biggest shock I think I have ever had in armaments is the degree of the armament of the United Arab Republic by the Soviets.

I was just in Cairo a few weeks ago, and I was surprised the same before. They have tremendously increased their arms. I do not think there is any remote chance if they made an all-out attack there that anybody has the ability to defend themselves. I would stake that on everything I have learned, assuming they can operate the equipment.

If we are going to arm these people, and we have got a much bigger gross national product than the Defense Department is always talking about and justifying the budget, why do we not really arm them?

I am only asking. Why just give them a little minimum business to make them last a few days and then go down the mine?

Mr. PALMER. Of course that involves a lot of recurrent costs, Senator, that we had thought that our best posture here was to give them a minimum capability. That is the best judgment of our people. They should place their real reliance on the United Nations.

EVALUATING THE EGYPTIAN BUILDING

Senator McCARTHY. How do you evaluate the Egyptian buildup, Mr. Palmer, and the Algerian one? Is this the Soviets showing off and saying "These are our friends," and saying "Look what we give to them"?

Mr. PALMER. Yes, I think that is a large element.

Senator McCARTHY. They do not anticipate they will be used.

Mr. PALMER. Yes, I think it is a large element.

Senator McCARTHY. So we take a calculated risk that this power will not be brought into action, or, if it is, why we can hold long enough for the U.N. to take some action.

Mr. PALMER. Yes.

Senator McCARTHY. Is the U.N. concerned about this? Is there any special action there?

Mr. PALMER. Yes. I started to say that King Hassan, when he was last here in the United States, did have a talk with the Secretary General of the United Nations in which he followed up with a letter asking the Secretary General to intervene with both Morocco and Algeria to see if it would not be possible to reach some sort of an understanding to hold the level of armaments down.

I would have to say in all confidence that I do not think that this was handled as skillfully as it should have been by the Moroccans because before the Secretary General had an opportunity to explore this at all with the Algerians, where the Moroccans published the letter, and this inevitably resulted in a reaction from the Algerians who have taken the position that there are a number of differences between the two of them.

It is not only the level of armaments, but there is the question of the disputed border. The disputed border is in the hands of the O.A.U., and therefore—

Senator SYMINGTON. O.A.U.?

Mr. PALMER. Organization of African Unity, which is the continental organization of African states. And that, therefore, they did not think the United Nations was a proper place for this.

We have been hopeful nevertheless, that at some point, if it is not in the U.N. forum maybe in the O.A.U. forum or some other forum, that some means can be found of trying to reach some sort of an agreement, some sort of an accommodation with respect to levels of forces, not only in this area but in the area of the Horn.

But it will not be an easy thing to bring about or to encourage.

Senator MCCARTHY. Well, I think maybe for today we probably ought to leave this stand as it is. A request has been made for additional information which I am sure you will supply.

CASH AND CREDIT

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one thing more, just for a minute?

What are the terms of the deal with Morocco and what are the terms of the deal from the standpoint of what Senator Hickenlooper was referring to? We talk about credit. Could we have the details of the deal language?

Mr. PALMER. Fine, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. As to what we agree to take in the way of credit terms and how much cash is involved and whether we are using counterpart funds and whether the loans, if they have any incident to the materials, bear an interest rate and if so how much?

Mr. PALMER. I can give you details on the Moroccan arrangement now, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. You go right ahead and put it in the record if you want, because the Chairman would like to go.

Mr. PALMER. The Moroccan package, 1965, involved 12 F-5s, spare parts and AGE, totaled \$11 million.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What? How much?

Mr. PALMER. \$11 million, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

Mr. PALMER. Of that \$11 million, the United States made a grant for components of \$5 million; \$6 million is extended in credit. Terms, 3 percent, ten years, repayable in hard currency, 20 semi-annual payments of the same size, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And Tunisia?

Mr. PALMER. Tunisia the negotiations have not been completed, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And Libya?

Mr. PALMER. Libya the negotiations have not started, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Senator MCCARTHY. Do you want to start on South Africa with a statement or just a question? Do you want to give us a kind of review on that Rhodesian sanction problem and where it is leading and what we really have in mind?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. South Africa, if I may interject—first I would like to have an explanation for the fiasco of the Enterprise or whatever it was in Johannesburg or in Capetown.

Mr. PALMER. Capetown.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. To me that is the most unconscionable thing we have done in a long time. I would like to have an explanation that makes me feel more kindly toward our own people for pulling that kind of a thing down there.

Mr. PALMER. Well, as you know, Senator, in 1965 the aircraft carrier Enterprise was due to put in to South Africa for refueling.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. 1965?

Mr. PALMER. Yes, just to give a piece of background on this.

At that time, the government of the Republic of South Africa imposed certain racial restrictions on certain operational aspects of the visit.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They did that at the time the visit was proposed.

Mr. PALMER. Yes, in 1965.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. At the time the visit was proposed.

Mr. PALMER. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is right.

Mr. PALMER. Specifically they required that the flight crews that would be operating planes from the ship to shore and so forth would have to be subject to South Africa's apartheid regulations.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I understand that.

Mr. PALMER. As a result of that, a decision was made at that time not to put Enterprise in, but to refuel at sea.

This year or last year, when the question of the FDR transiting from Vietnam to the United States came up, the Department of Defense took the position that there was an operational need to go into Capetown for refueling at that time.

I believe, and Mr. Lang can confirm this, that there were Atlantic maneuvers going on at the present time and tankers were not readily available to refuel at sea. Moreover, there would have been a cost of some \$250,000, I think, to refuel at sea.

Now, at that time we made inquiries of the South African Government as to whether or not they would impose racial restrictions with respect to the operational aspects of the FDR visit.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Operational aspects. What do you mean by operational?

Mr. PALMER. Flights from the carrier to the shore.

Senator SYMINGTON. What about those flights? What is the apartheid significance of those flights?

Mr. PALMER. That they would have had to go into South African airports, airfields, and so forth, and that any crews on board, if there were Negroes on board, would have to use the African facilities and would not be allowed to use the white European facilities.

SOUTH AFRICA'S APARTHEID POLICIES

Mr. LANG. If I might, in '65, the South African Government in effect placed a condition on us that we could not have Negro crew members aboard the aircraft coming from the carrier to the airfield facilities.

Senator McCARTHY. Oh, the problem did not arise.

Mr. LANG. Because they did not have the apartheid facilities for them.

Mr. PALMER. Yes.

In any event, on the basis of those assurances that they would not attach such conditions, the FDR was authorized to go in. But shore leave was only authorized on the basis that it would be for integrated activities, and quite a range of integrated activities had been worked out by our embassy down there and with various people in the community.

The commanding officer of the vessel, however, felt—and there many other arrangements that were worked out by local citizens and so forth that would have been segregated.

Under the circumstances it was decided that shore leave would only be authorized on the basis of integrated activities.

The commander of the ship, with the concurrence of our ambassador, felt that this was not really practicable and that he could not give—if he authorized shore leave on this basis, one could not be sure that certain members of the crew would not be subject to South Africa's apartheid laws. Consequently, he decided, with the ambassador's concurrence, to cancel shore leave.

A CALCULATED INSULT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Therefore, it seems all the blame for this—the buck is being passed to the commander of the vessel.

I have had some information from South Africa, not only from Americans but others, who said that some of the newspaper stories said it was an absolute and astounding surprise to these people who went on board to welcome them to find out, when they went on board for the first time, the commander of the vessel had to tell them that all leaves would be canceled. That was after several days of preparation, several days of discussion, several days when the arrangements were made.

I do not care whether they landed at South Africa or not, or went into Capetown. That is beside the point. But to go through all of this and then do what to me appears to be—and I would like to be straightened out on it—a calculated insult to South Africa. I think it has all the earmarks of an actually calculated insult.

Mr. PALMER. No, sir. It was not a calculated insult. I can assure you categorically.

Senator HICKENLOOPER.. It has that appearance to me.

Mr. PALMER. Senator, the problem arose from the fact, I think, that the instructions were sent to the captain of the vessel. I do not think the captain of the vessel should be blamed. I certainly do not blame him—pretty much at the last minute.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thought you said it was his decision.

Mr. PALMER. It was his decision.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What were the instructions sent to him?

Mr. PALMER. But I think what gave rise to his problem, Senator, was the fact that it was rather late notification to him that the crews should only go ashore under integrated circumstances, and he felt that this was too difficult. He felt that this was impossible really to carry out.

Senator MCCARTHY. So they never told him not to put them ashore, but merely told him if they go ashore they would have to be integrated.

Mr. PALMER. That is correct. They could only go ashore for integrated activities.

REACTION TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION

Senator MCCARTHY. Why was that order so late in coming?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is the point.

Senator MCCARTHY. Was it after the congressional resolution or whatever it was that was introduced up here? What set it off? Anything in particular, or was it just slow in coming downtown?

Mr. PALMER. Well, Bill, do you want to say anything?

I think it was—I am trying to reconstruct something that took place while I was not here. As a matter of fact, I was overseas.

Senator MCCARTHY. There was an earlier incident similar to this. There was a congressional protest against landing.

Mr. PALMER. There is no doubt about it.

Senator MCCARTHY. Two or three years ago.

Mr. PALMER. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is what he was talking about.

Mr. PALMER. There is no doubt about it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The Enterprise.

Mr. PALMER. There was a lot of concern expressed in this country about the possibility of men who had been fighting together in Vietnam being placed in a position of then having to subject themselves to the practices of apartheid in South Africa. And, as I say, the decision that they should only go ashore on an integrated basis was a rather last minute decision. It put the captain, there is no doubt about it, in a difficult position. He had a judgment to make. He made it with the concurrence of our ambassador.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could I ask a question why this was not thought out before?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is the whole burden of my concern about this thing.

Mr. PALMER. Well, there were two things: there was this aspect of it; and there was the operational aspect of it. The fact that the tankers were not available; the fact that there was a considerable sum of money involved here in refueling at sea.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But if you say it cost \$250,000 not to refuel there, have you figured out what it cost as a result of what we did, aside from what the cost in good will was?

Mr. PALMER. No, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You might get that up sometime.

Where did we ultimately end up by refueling?

Mr. PALMER. We refueled there, but the crew was kept on board.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So we saved the money.

Mr. PALMER. So we saved the money. Yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And set back relations between our two countries and the possibility of settling the apartheid business by several years, I think.

Mr. PALMER. Well, we are now reviewing, as we have indicated, the whole question of port facilities in South Africa.

DIVERSION OF OTHER SHIPS

As you know, subsequent to that, we did divert another vessel to Mombasa while this review is going on. We are undertaking this with the Department of Defense and will be reaching some policy decision.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where is Mombasa?

Mr. PALMER. In Kenya, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you could divert one to Kenya without any danger of trouble, why could you not divert the Enterprise to Kenya?

Mr. PALMER. The FDR?

Senator SYMINGTON. Or the FDR.

Mr. LANG. The port facilities were not adequate, sir, to handle a ship the size of the FDR.

Senator SYMINGTON. It was the size of the ship.

Mr. LANG. Yes, the draft of the vessel.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could you not run a line out, keep her in deep enough water to refuel it? You do not have to bring a ship to port to refuel it.

Mr. LANG. They do not have that type of facilities in Mombasa, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see.

PROMOTING BETTER UNDERSTANDING

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I still do not know. I still say that my whole inquiry goes not to the point that we did not have them land at Capetown. It is the fact that for days ahead of time they made arrangements, I am told by people who were on the ground down there. They said the South Africans had bunting and welcome groups.

Mr. PALMER. That is correct; they did.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It was going to be a great thing for them. And the idea around in that area was that this would do more to get a little better understanding between South Africa and the U.S. They tried to treat the colored people right, and they would not isolate them off in compounds and all this sort of stuff. Yet they just had a wet sock thrown in their faces, not the day before or the morning before, but at the time when they went on board the carrier to welcome them. That is the first time they heard.

Mr. PALMER. That is correct. It happened when some of the officials were on board.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. On the deck of the ship.

Mr. PALMER. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. To me it was the most outstandingly boorish thing I heard of from an international standpoint. In other words, if they wanted to pass up Capetown or just go in there to

fuel and have it known in advance they were not going to let anybody have shore leave, that is a matter of decision.

Mr. PALMER. I think all of us would agree, Senator, that the matter was not handled as well as it should be.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think it is utterly inexcusable, and I would like to go on a little bit also, if we are all through asking about it. I do not want to stop this. I want to go on to Rhodesia and find out some of the things we are doing in Rhodesia. I did not want to interfere with any other question.

U.S. FAVORS MAJORITY RULE AND SELF DETERMINATION

Senator MCCARTHY. That is the same question everybody is going to ask. I will put it in these terms. Do we have a policy of our own there, or are we really kind of riding out the British position now hoping somehow or other this will work out?

Mr. PALMER. In Rhodesia?

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes, in South Africa, in that area.

Mr. PALMER. Yes, I think we have very much of a policy of our own on this, Mr. Chairman.

I think that we have historically stood for certain values and for certain principles, including majority rule and including self-determination, including the genuine independence of states, including government by consent of the governed.

Senator MCCARTHY. How do we implement it?

Mr. PALMER. Well, we implement it in such ways as we can. It is certainly not uniform. Different situations call for different means of trying to realize these objectives, I think.

Senator MCCARTHY. We are not prepared to go beyond the British position, are we, on anything in this area now?

Mr. PALMER. We are not simply prepared to go beyond an effort to resolve the situation in Rhodesia by peaceful means. This much is very clear, and we have made this very clear to everyone concerned, I think, Mr. Chairman.

What we have here is a declaration of independence that has not been recognized by any country in the world, by those who represent, say they represent, 220,000 whites in opposition to 4 million Africans. The whole thrust of the British effort in the negotiations that have gone on now for quite some time is to try to assure that there will be orderly and sustained progress toward majority rule.

The British have never said that there must be, or had not said until after the Tiger talks, that there had to be immediate majority rule, that there could not be independence before majority rule. But what they have said is that there must be an understanding, there must be arrangements that would assure that there would be unimpeded progress toward majority rule.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is majority rule more important than economic and social progress in a country?

Mr. PALMER. I think that they are all important, Senator. I think that when we have economic and social progress in Rhodesia, we have it in South Africa. But when it results, I think, in the denial of the ability of the vast majority of the inhabitants to be able to

have some prospect of being able to conduct their own affairs, then I think it does become a very grave moral issue.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are they in any degree—

Mr. PALMER. And political issue.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are they in any way capable of conducting their own affairs?

Mr. PALMER. No, not at the present time. I want to make this clear again, Senator, that what we are talking about is not immediate majority rule, but unimpeded progress toward majority rule. This has been the issue that has been at stake. It is not immediate majority rule. Of course there would have to be a transition period before there was majority rule, and the question that has been at issue here has been the return to legality, the return to British rule in a very light sense, to something akin to the previous arrangements until such time as it is assured that there will be unimpeded progress toward majority rule.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to ask one question on this, if I might, Mr. Palmer.

U.S. INTERVENTION IN RHODESIAN AFFAIRS

Secretary ACHESON had a letter that impressed me a great deal in the Washington Post in which he said that under the United Nations Charter, as I remember it—I have not read the letter for some weeks now—but we had no right to interfere with the internal affairs of Rhodesia.

Has that letter ever been answered by the State Department?

Mr. PALMER. Ambassador Goldberg answered that letter and I think answered it very effectively, Senator, in a letter that he wrote to the Washington Post on January 8.

Senator MCCARTHY. He used the Civil War, did he not, as the principal defense?

Mr. PALMER. Ambassador Goldberg?

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes.

Mr. PALMER. I do not recall.

Senator SYMINGTON. Which civil war?

Senator MCCARTHY. Our Civil War.

Senator SYMINGTON. The one in Rhodesia or the one in the U.S.?

Mr. PALMER. One of Mr. Acheson's main arguments ran, of course, to Article 27 of the Charter, the Domestic Jurisdiction clause. Ambassador Goldberg, in replying to this, pointed out that this is not intervention in the internal affairs of a state because Rhodesia is not a state. It has not been recognized as a state by anybody in the international community.

Senator SYMINGTON. Just a rebellious colony.

Mr. PALMER. I am sorry.

Senator SYMINGTON. Just a rebellious colony.

Mr. PALMER. Just a rebellious colony.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did he quote George III, too?

Senator MCCARTHY. Secession.

Mr. PALMER. Yes, but at least we were recognized by people as being an independent nation.

Senator SYMINGTON. Not by a lot of people.

Mr. PALMER. Not by a lot, but we were recognized—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What would be wrong with us recognizing Rhodesia?

Mr. PALMER. But we were recognized by quite a number, Senator, and in this case nobody has recognized Rhodesia.

U.S. AS POLICEMAN OF THE WORLD

Senator SYMINGTON. One other question I would like to ask here. Do you think that the mantle has fallen on the United States now to be the policeman of the world, of the free world?

Mr. PALMER. To be what?

Senator SYMINGTON. To be the policeman of the free world.

Mr. PALMER. No, sir, I do not.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know of any country that we are not defending or protecting that is supporting us and our policies in Vietnam?

Mr. PALMER. Do I know of any country—

Senator SYMINGTON. That we are not either defending or financing that is supporting us in Vietnam? I am just wondering. I looked the map over and we are apparently taking on the defense of all these countries with either money or troops or both. I just wondered if there was any internal paper that we have not seen like the F-4s to Iran, for example, that there has been some decision made that we are going to be the defenders of the free world and that we are going to finance them as much as possible through various international organizations and so forth.

Have there been things written on that that is established, an American policy in this field that we do not know about?

Mr. PALMER. Not that I am aware of, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, sir.

SPECIAL SUPPLY SHIPS

Senator MCCARTHY. Could I ask on that point, the Senate Armed Services Committee turned down a proposal for these special supply ships last week. I think there were three of them that were being proposed, but the overall plan called for 30. Do you know whether it was planned that any of the 30 should lie adjacent to any of these areas in Africa?

Mr. PALMER. I do not know.

Do you know?

Senator MCCARTHY. Maybe you would know.

Mr. LANG. No.

Senator MCCARTHY. You know the ships we are talking about.

Mr. LANG. I do, sir. I know of none that were intended for the African area.

Senator MCCARTHY. Are they all related to Europe?

Senator SYMINGTON. 30 to Europe?

Senator MCCARTHY. I understand there were about three ships to supply a division which would mean ten divisions somewhere around the world that was going to be supplied when the full plan—I assume when the full plan became operative, and I am sure we did not plan to have ten divisions in Europe.

We do not have to press this, but when we were talking 30 ships, was it three to supply a division or was it more than that?

Mr. LANG. I do not know, sir.

Senator MCCARTHY. I thought it was three was my recollection. Was it three or was it more than that?

In any case, they were asking for three, and I assume they had to supply divisions somewhere because we do not move——

Mr. PALMER. I would like to make it clear in this connection——

Senator MCCARTHY. In any case there was no plan to have these ships lie off the coast of South Africa or Somalia.

Mr. PALMER. No, sir. Our basic policy remains as stated by Secretary McNamara when he appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Subcommittee on the Department of Defense Appropriations. He said that "We have made it clear that our policy is to avoid active military involvement in Africa, and we will exert all our influence to achieve peaceful resolution of these problems."

This remains very much our policy in this part of Africa and all over the continent. We do not want to get militarily involved.

SANCTIONS AGAINST RHODESIA

Senator CARLSON. Getting back to Rhodesia, press dispatches and reports from overseas, at least, indicate that the sanctions of Great Britain are not bringing any results, that they are going to fail. Have you any plans as to what we should do if they do fail because we are committed to them?

Mr. PALMER. Well, I do not think it is demonstrable yet, Senator, that they will fail.

Senator CARLSON. I see.

Mr. PALMER. The program of voluntary sanctions that preceded the program of mandatory sanctions has had considerable effect. Granted that it is difficult to get good large figures. Nevertheless, I think the indications are that exports from Rhodesia dropped from about \$400 million to about \$224 million in 1966, which is about a 40 percent drop. It is expected that under the mandatory sanctions program they will probably drop another \$55 million in the first five months of this year.

It is estimated that the gross domestic product of Rhodesia has fallen by about 15 percent in 1966, and there will probably be a further drop of about 10 percent this year.

I would say the two key products really are tobacco and sugar. So far as tobacco is concerned, about 60 percent of last year's crop remains unsold. The government has had to buy this and has to store it, and this has created considerable financial strains on the government.

As this year's crop, which is already being reduced as a result, comes in and does not find a market, this will increase the pressures.

The hope is, of course, that this will bring the Rhodesian Government back to the negotiating table again and that it will be possible to obtain a peaceful resolution of this problem.

Senator CARLSON. Are efforts being made to do that?

Mr. PALMER. To negotiate?

Senator CARLSON. Bring them back to the negotiating table.

Mr. PALMER. I do not think there are any active efforts right at the moment, but it is certainly in everybody's mind.

SETTLING RHODESIA MATTER THROUGH THE U.N.

Senator MCCARTHY. Could I ask Mr. Palmer just on this one point, Senator Hickenlooper, and I will recognize you next.

Is there any reason why Acheson's position was answered by Goldberg and not the Secretary of State or the State Department?

Mr. PALMER. Yes, because I think that the major argumentation that was adducted by Mr. Acheson really ran to positions that were taken in the United Nations.

Senator MCCARTHY. Does it mean we want to try to settle it through the United Nations rather than by direct intervention?

Mr. PALMER. That is correct.

Senator MCCARTHY. This does not reflect a division in the State Department which could not be presented in a statement by the Secretary?

Mr. PALMER. No, sir. These are positions which Ambassador Goldberg had taken as our representative.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What was the reason given or the reasons taken by the United Nations in this—granting that Rhodesia was recognized as a dependency or a colony of Britain—what business have we got in there in Britain's internal affairs or the United Nations either?

Mr. PALMER. Well, I think Britain does bear certain responsibilities to the United Nations under Article 73 of the Charter with respect to nonself-governing territories, and so that there is a U.N. interest.

Secondly, the British themselves took the program to the—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In the first place, Rhodesia was self-governing for all intents and purposes over the years.

Mr. PALMER. Yes. Was self-governing until such time as it declared itself independent and at that time, at that point, the United Kingdom, through orders in council and so forth, reasserted their authority over the country. So—

DID THE U.S. PRESSURE BRITISH POLICY?

Senator SYMINGTON. Always the British all over the world have been willing to approve the caste system of a country in order to control it up until they began losing countries. They have no basic color problem like we have in this country. Were their policies in Rhodesia originally formulated or developed under our coaching while the pound was in very serious trouble as in Henry Brandon's book, "In the Red," for example, showing how twice we fished them out?

Did we put any pressure on Great Britain with respect to her policies in Rhodesia, or were they all Mr. Wilson's ideas as to how they should be handled?

Mr. PALMER. They were not only Mr. Wilson's ideas but his predecessors, I guess, as well, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. There has been no pressure on our part.

Mr. PALMER. There has been no pressure on our part. The whole concept of the Central African Federation, the federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, when that still was in being, was a British concept.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am just being educated. I have no criticism, no implied criticism in any sense.

One other question.

Mr. PALMER. We approved that.

THE STABILITY OF AFRICA

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think, based on your saying in answer to Senator Hickenlooper it is not going too well, do you think the British are going to bring Rhodesia to their knees in due course?

Mr. PALMER. I could not say that with any confidence, Senator. I think only time is going to prove whether this happens or not.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think it would be a good thing for the stability of Africa if they do?

Mr. PALMER. Yes. I think it would be a good thing if they came back to constitutional rule.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If the Rhodesians came back to constitutional rule.

Senator SYMINGTON. My question was will it bring Rhodesia to their knees.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What do you mean by constitutional rule?

Mr. PALMER. Not to their knees, Senator. If they came back into constitutional rule, and if they would agree to guarantees that would result in unimpeded progress toward majority rule.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not understand what you mean by constitutional rule. There was no constitutional rule in Rhodesia about one-man one-vote business down there at all, was there?

Mr. PALMER. No, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What constitutional rule do you want them to come back to?

Mr. PALMER. When I say constitutional rule, I mean come back into their association with Great Britain.

DUAL FRANCHISE IN RHODESIA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see. Well, the only two viable economies, really progressively developing viable economies in all of Africa, I do not care where you go, are Rhodesia and South Africa. It seems to me we are doing everything we can to alienate them, to discourage them and to discourage their further development, and I think both of them are trying to make progress with some success.

They do not have apartheid in Rhodesia by law. They have franchise, as I understand it, which anybody can qualify for, black or white. It does not make any difference what it is.

Mr. PALMER. Yes, but it is a dual franchise, Senator, whereby the Africans can only qualify. In practice the great bulk of Africans, because of educational and income qualifications, can only qualify for the B roll.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is right, but when they get the income and educational qualifications, they qualify just the same as the white man qualifies with education and income qualifications. Is that not true?

Mr. PALMER. Yes, they can theoretically, but the qualifications—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not talking theoretically, but legally.

Mr. PALMER. But the qualifications are put pretty high.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, \$300 a year income or something like that, and certain minimal level of education, and it really applies to the white man.

I am told that more land in South Africa is owned by blacks than white, or in Rhodesia, is owned by blacks than white.

Mr. PALMER. It is about evenly divided there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They have a land reform program going there, and as fast as these people will take the education and the training, they get land, and so on.

Mr. PALMER. Well, Senator, a lot of these things, I think, get lost in what the Rhodesians say and in what they do.

MISINFORMATION ABOUT RHODESIA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not going on what the Rhodesians say. I am going on what citizens from Iowa who have been down there say. We have had several of them down there, and some other places, and the most recent one was a man who is not connected with government, and not connected with my state, but has spent a great deal of time in Rhodesia and Zambia. He said it is just unbelievable the misinformation which we get here in this country about that situation, and nothing about the slaughter in Zambia, that is the murders and the mass killings in Zambia and the revolts there. Also, for instance, he said in Rhodesia for 60 years the policemen have not carried pistols or guns. They have got peace there, and people are satisfied. They are making progress, and yet we kick them in the teeth.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I have to leave now.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have to, too.

Senator SYMINGTON. If the Senator would yield, I would like to ask a couple of questions.

MILITARY SALES IN AFRICA

Mr. Chairman, if it was in order, I would like to ask unanimous consent that we have the amount of military sales and/or gifts that we have made on the continent of Africa in the last five years. Could we have a listing of that so we get a feel for it?

Mr. LANG. Certainly, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. That would include such countries as Nigeria and Liberia; some of it I am sure is small, but I think it might be interesting to note how it has been handled on that basis.

Mr. LANG. Fine, sir. This for the past five years?

Senator SYMINGTON. We will make it ten years if you want. That will cover the whole development.

Mr. LANG. Yes, sir.

UNREALISTIC PROGRAMS IN AFRICA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I feel we have been undergoing for some years a calculated and a definite program—I may be wrong about

this—of what we call liberty in Africa which is just as unrealistic as it can be. But we have it on our hands now, and all these little tribes with two huts and four yak tails have gained independence.

Mr. PALMER. Well Senator, there is no doubt about it, the continent is going through an extremely difficult period.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We have to live with it and try to solve it.

Mr. PALMER. A difficult period of time.

I would like to say, if I could, just in response to several things that you have said, that I think that there are black African states also who are making good progress towards economic development and social development. I think the Ivory Coast is certainly a good example of this. Tunisia, I think, is a good example.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, you cannot say Tunisia is black Africa. It is Arab.

Mr. PALMER. No. But I am just saying of independent Africa. Kenya is making good progress.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So long as Kenyatta stays in there maybe we have some hope, but the old man is going to die some day.

Mr. PALMER. But only a few years ago a lot of the Europeans in Kenya were saying, "You know we can never stay in Kenya because of Kenyatta." Now these same people are saying, "We are worried about what is going to happen if something happens to Kenyatta."

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, we were going to have a great time in Tanzania with Nyerere, too, but it has gone about as far left as it can go down the drain and it is a most disappointing place.

The Congo is a chaos and still is.

Mr. PALMER. Well, Senator, I would like to speak to the Congo, if I could, because I think there are some encouraging developments that are taking place.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, everything is always encouraging, I realize that, when we are projecting ourselves into the picture.

Mr. PALMER. No, we have lots of discouraging ones, and I would be delighted to talk about those, too.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Nigeria is having its troubles.

Mr. PALMER. Nigeria is having terrible troubles, and it is a very anxious situation.

THE BASIS OF U.S. POLICY IS COLOR

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We are trying to chase the Portuguese out of Angola, and so far as I can find out the Angolans do not want them to be chased out. But we may chase them; we may prevail there.

Mr. PALMER. I think it is very difficult to ascertain what the Africans want in Angola. It is very difficult to find out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We are going to teach them what they want. I do not know.

Of course Ethiopia is a great self-determining country. I think they have one man—one vote there. One man is the emperor.

Senator MCCARTHY. I think they only have one vote.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One vote, a great ally of ours.

Mr. PALMER. But I think the fundamental difference here is, Senator, none of the distinctions are drawn on color except when you get down into this area.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think it is drawn on color. I think the basis of our policy in Africa is color and probably to affect American elections.

Mr. PALMER. No.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think there is an awfully lot to that. I think there is a lot of humanity in what we are trying to do, too.

Mr. PALMER. There is.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think there is a lot of it, but I think there is an awfully lot to influence American elections based on color. Otherwise, there are a lot of things that we would not need to do if we wanted to really promote these things on the basis of long-range, sound, progressive policies.

I am not blaming you for this, do not misunderstand that.

HARDENING OF ATTITUDES IN RHODESIA

Mr. PALMER. I would like to send you, Senator, if I may, a copy of a recent speech that I have given on Rhodesia that will, I hope, explain some of our concerns about the internal situation in Rhodesia. I have lived there for two years, Senator, and I must say I saw just one tremendous gap in what people professed and what people did, such things as the Land Apportionment Act. It does divide the land almost equally between 220,000 whites and 4 million Africans. This is not the whole story either, because I saw European grazing land being burned off because of the fact that it was excess to the grazing requirements, and just across the road saw African cattle being slaughtered because the land could not support them.

Now, believe me, I am not a revolutionary on matters of this kind, and I know perfectly well that there is capital and skills and so forth that have gone into these European enterprises that are extremely important to the development of that country in that part of the world.

To my mind, the important thing in that part of the world is to try to create an atmosphere that is going to enable the European to stay there and to continue to play his part in the development of the country. I think this is vital in South Africa, too.

But I am convinced, too, Senator, that unless there is more movement, and again let me emphasize I am not saying immediate independence by any means—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is what we are moving toward. Is that not the whole connotation of what we are doing instead of working along with these people to bring them up to the point where there will be some responsible government there?

Mr. PALMER. But this is the problem, Senator, in Southern Rhodesia, that the trend has not been in that direction. The trend has been entirely in the opposite direction.

If you go back to Garfield Todd when he was prime minister about eight years ago, ten years ago, I guess it is now, they were trying to work on a policy of partnership. He was too liberal for the white Rhodesians, and he was replaced by Edgar Whitehead. Edward Whitehead again tried to do something about the Land Ap-

portionment Act, and he was replaced because of this effort by Winston Field who was further to his right.

Winston Field in turn was replaced by Ian Smith.

Again the whole trend in Rhodesia has been toward the right and not toward cooperation amongst the races, but to a hardening of attitude among the races.

Now it is quite true——

TROUBLE IN ZAMBIA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is happening in Zambia?

Mr. PALMER. In Zambia there is trouble on the Copper Belt, but a lot of this trouble arises from both communities. It is not only from the black community but it is from the white community. A lot of the problem in Zambia is that in the Copper Belt a great many of the whites come from Rhodesia and come from the Union of South Africa. So that——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How many whites have they got in Zambia?

Mr. PALMER. They have got about 70,000 or 80,000, I think, at the present time. And I do not think that the fault all lies on one side or all lies on the other, but Kaunda has had as a basic tenet of his policy to try to encourage, to try to promote good race relations in Zambia. He has tried just as hard as Kenyatta has in Kenya.

One of the great dangers——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Does he not claim he is the captive of the revolutionary group in——

Mr. PALMER. No, sir. I think Kaunda is still very much of an independent and very much devoted, both in words and in actions, to good race relations in Zambia.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think so. I do not mean that.

Mr. PALMER. Yes. But the problem is that on both sides, because of the Rhodesian problem, relationships amongst the two races in Zambia are beginning to polarize, and this is one of our great concerns about this. If this continues in Zambia, it continues in Tanzania. It goes up further into East Africa, and the same thing happens on the other extreme in South Africa. You will have a polarization along racial lines that will result increasingly in the thing that is to be avoided, I think, at all costs, and that is a racial confrontation in Africa. This is what the direction of our efforts and I think the direction of the British efforts have been intended to help prevent.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have taken too much time.

Senator MCCARTHY. I think probably we will have another session on these in-between countries we have not taken up.

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION

What about Tanzania? What is the situation? Do you see the Communist infiltration there as significant in terms of other countries?

Mr. PALMER. In Tanzania?

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes.

Mr. PALMER. It is significant.

Senator MCCARTHY. Beyond that country or just within the country itself?

Mr. PALMER. Well, I think the influence is strongest in Zanzibar, less strong, I would say, on the mainland, but I would like to add to that that I think that Nyerere is still very much of an independent African, and I do not think that he is under any sort of control or likely to allow himself to be placed under a position of control.

He does have certain ideas, certain concepts that I would be critical of. He is a socialist. He wants to move Tanzania in a socialist direction. I do not think he wants to move it in a Communist direction. He has resorted to extensive nationalization of the banks, of export-import houses, and to other enterprises, particularly in the agricultural field, and I think there is no doubt about it. He has, however, promised to pay compensation for these.

It remains to be seen what—how this is going to work out in practice, whether it will be—whether it will accord to our criteria of being full and fair and prompt.

Senator MCCARTHY. He sat right in that chair shortly before independence, this one right there, that spot, with a few of us in here talking to him—in fact he was here twice, and he gave the most stirring private enterprise discussion you ever heard of in your life. He has apparently changed his mind 180 degrees.

Mr. PALMER. Well, there are—

Senator MCCARTHY. And I just think basically he believed what he said when he was here, but I think that he possibly was taken into camp with this fellow from Zanzibar or whoever it was who took him over.

Mr. PALMER. Senator, I know that this is a theory, and—

Senator MCCARTHY. Well, somebody took him over from Zanzibar.

Mr. PALMER. Well, I think a lot of it derives from the fact that resources have been slow in coming into Tanzania. I think he has been struck with the great disparity between the civil servants and people who live in the urban areas, and those who live in the rural areas.

Incidentally, all of his program of nationalization has also been accompanied by some very stringent measures to place restrictions—to cut down government salaries, to place restrictions on ownings by civil servants, and other steps of this kind, and I think—I am sure he is taking an ill-advised step here. But I think he has done it essentially for Tanzania and reasons that this is the path to take and that Tanzania has got to look increasingly to its own resources for its development and less to external aid.

Senator MCCARTHY. I think we had better finish up this hearing.

MILITARY TROOPS IN AFRICA

Could you submit for the record a list of the countries in which we have military aid troops in Africa and the extent of those missions if they are not classified?

Mr. LANG. Right, sir.

Senator MCCARTHY. And also that aid program as it is now contemplated and recommended. I assume it is all in the budget some-

where. If you can take it out and send it up to us for the record, I would appreciate it.

I appreciate very much your coming up. I do not know whether you feel better now that there is an African subcommittee which has been reactivated here or not. We probably will have to wait and see, and maybe worry along with you. It may be worse instead of better.

Mr. PALMER. Well, Senator, we have a lot of problems, and I myself greatly welcome the fact that this committee is active again. I think it is terribly important that we talk about our mutual concerns, and I do want you to know that I am always at your disposition and delighted to have these opportunities.

CONFUSING INFORMATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think it is a highly complicated political, economic, and social problem. There is no question about that. But I am not so sure that what we are doing in Africa, that is the whole pattern, the whole complex, is necessarily bringing us out on the right road. It may and it may not. We have to rely upon two different sources of information, those who are on the ground and see it and who are not connected with government, and very often those who are connected with government on the other side, and sometimes the information does not quite dovetail.

Mr. PALMER. No, I know that.

Senator MCCARTHY. It is very, very confusing. I have some letters in my file from people, as I say, in my own state who have been over there.

Mr. PALMER. Yes, I know.

Senator MCCARTHY. And I have letters from others, and so on. Some of these people I know personally. Others, I do not. But these are good people; they are honest people. Maybe they are not trained observers, but they simply cannot understand it. They know what the problem is in a way. They know there is a racial problem involved, but they seem to have the feeling that if we gave as much patience to some of these as we do to others we might be able to work it out.

Mr. PALMER. I think, Senator, if I would say so, I would hope in—and in some cases I know this has been done—but I think to understand South Africa and to understand Southern Rhodesia, somebody also has to have some exposure to the other states in the area in East Africa and West Africa. The reverse of this is equally true.

I have had experience. I had four years in East Africa, and I have two years in Rhodesia. I had three and a half years in West Africa, in Nigeria, and I think that, as you quite rightly say, people who are in government oftentimes get a limited point of view.

Senator MCCARTHY. They may be right. I do not say they are wrong.

Mr. PALMER. I know that. But many of these problems do tend to merge, and what happens one place inevitably affects another, and you do have a problem of integrity of policy and you cannot profess certain things in some areas and not in other areas. So all of this does present a very complicated mosaic, I quite agree, and there are no easy or ready answers to any of these problems.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I just ask one more question?
 Senator McCARTHY. Right.

SURROUNDING RHODESIA AND SOUTH AFRICA

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you have any sensing that there is a long-range policy in this country to surround Rhodesia and South Africa by other states such as taking over Southwest Africa and, Mozambique, and Zambia and so on, and squeezing out South Africa?

Mr. PALMER. I can——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And Rhodesia.

Mr. PALMER. I can assure you categorically, Senator, that there is no such thought or no such effort within the United States Government that I am aware of. There may be individuals in the United States. I am sure there are.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Oh, probably.

Mr. PALMER. I am sorry.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Probably. We had the reconstruction people right after the Civil War that wanted to kill everybody.

Mr. PALMER. But as I indicated earlier, I think one of the major tasks here is to assure things develop in that part of the world so that everybody in the society plays their full role in the development of the society.

Senator McCARTHY. We will make the whole record classified. If there is anything that you want to send up——

Mr. PALMER. I am sorry.

Senator McCARTHY [continuing]. We will be glad to classify the whole record if you want it that way.

Mr. PALMER. Yes.

Senator McCARTHY. Anything else you might send up will be subject to that reservation.

Mr. PALMER. Thank you.

Senator McCARTHY. We will not call you in two or three weeks. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MARCH 30, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLIC AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 10:25 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Morse (presiding), Hickenlooper and Carlson.

Discussion with Pat M. Holt of the committee staff regarding a survey of the Alliance for Progress.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 11:25 a.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, APRIL 3, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:25 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case and Cooper.

S.J. Res. 60, an original resolution regarding the Latin American Summit Conference, was ordered reported by roll call vote, 9-0. It was decided by a voice vote to make public the proceedings of the meeting.

[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

ADDITIONAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—In 1965, when India and Pakistan clashed over their claims to Kashmir, the United States suspended arms shipments to both countries. The next year, it resumed shipment of "non-lethal" equipment. Concerned over an escalating arms race, the State Department announced on April 12, 1967 that the U.S. would cease shipping military weapons to both countries, except for spare parts for weapons already in their possession. However, lifting the ban on spare parts aided Pakistan, whose armed forces were largely supplied with American-made weapons, in contrast to India, which relied on British- and Soviet-made weapons.]

Wednesday, April 5, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN
AFFAIRS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol. Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Symington, Sparkman, McCarthy, and Cooper.

Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.

Senator SYMINGTON. We will call the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs to order.

Mr. Handley, your first name is William, is it not, sir?

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE WILLIAM J. HANDLEY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And your title?

Mr. HANDLEY. Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Near East and South Asia.

Senator SYMINGTON. We wish to ask some questions about aid to India and to Pakistan, primarily Pakistan.

As I understand it, all aid to India and Pakistan was suspended in December of 1965 as one means of bringing the war between the two countries to a halt; is that correct?

Mr. HANDLEY. September of 1965, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. September of 1965. And following the Tashkent Agreement, however, which I believe was January 10, 1966—

Mr. HANDLEY. That is correct, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. [continuing]. The President authorized a relaxation of the total ban of military shipments to both India and Pakistan, permitting some commercial and MAP credit sales of non-lethal military equipment; is that right?

Mr. HANDLEY. That is correct, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. John, any time you would like to interrupt, please do.

Senator COOPER. Thank you.

NON-LETHAL EQUIPMENT

Senator SYMINGTON. You may interrupt at any time or you may comment as you would like.

As I understand it, the Department of Defense defines non-lethal as follows: Trucks, trailers, miscellaneous wheeled vehicles and spares; communications, radar and signal equipment; transport, observation and trainer aircraft; unarmed helicopters, support equipment and spares; engineering equipment and machine tools; medical and quartermaster equipment; and training equipment. Is that correct?

Mr. HANDLEY. That is correct, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Those are lethal?

Mr. HANDLEY. Non-lethal.

Senator SYMINGTON. Non-lethal; I meant non-lethal.

Suppose you furnish a helicopter without any armament. You could make it lethal by putting armaments on it after you received it, correct?

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes, sir. As you could with a Jeep, which we consider non-lethal.

Senator SYMINGTON. So the term is fairly technical, is it not?

Mr. HANDLEY. Well, it excludes fighter aircraft; it excludes ammunition.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. HANDLEY. It excludes guns, armored personnel carriers, tanks, things of that kind.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right.

LETHAL EQUIPMENT

Now, lethal items, as I understand it, are defined as combat aircraft and armed helicopters, armed or armored vehicles, such as tanks and armored personnel carriers; infantry weapons, artillery and ammunition; and spare parts in support of all the foregoing items; is that correct?

Mr. HANDLEY. That is correct, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Of course, you could have an unarmed personnel carrier, and all you have to do is arm it, and it becomes lethal, is that it?

Mr. HANDLEY. Actually we have defined armored personnel carriers as being lethal.

Senator SYMINGTON. What I am thinking of is you could buy one unarmed, and they could buy the guns from Russia and put them together, and you would have a lethal weapon, right?

Mr. HANDLEY. Except we are not selling that type of equipment.

Senator SYMINGTON. You sell an unarmed personnel carrier though, do you not?

Mr. HANDLEY. I'm afraid I might be a little bit out of my depth on the defense side, but I do not know what an unarmed personnel carrier is. They usually are called armored personnel carriers.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right.

Just for the record, I want the record straight as we pursue this subject.

PAKISTAN REQUESTED RELAXATION OF BAN

Operating under these restrictions, it is our understanding that Pakistan asked to buy transport aircraft and spares, unarmed helicopters, communications equipment, hand tools and trucks, and that the further relaxation of the President's ban on military equipment to Pakistan lifts the restriction on spare parts for so-called lethal items listed above.

Mr. HANDLEY. That is correct, but it is broader than that.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right.

Mr. HANDLEY. May I—

Senator SYMINGTON. You say it any way you like to.

Mr. HANDLEY. Since September 1965, when Secretary Rusk told the House and Senate that new economic aid and military aid shipments to India and Pakistan would be suspended, we have gradually resumed economic aid as you pointed out, sir. We have resumed the sale of non-lethal equipment as has been defined on a case-by-case basis, every case being specifically examined.

We find at this particular moment, after having studied and pondered this problem for a very long time, that perhaps the best thing that the United States could do in the interest of arms limitation, limitation of the expenditures on the defense side, relaxation of tensions in the subcontinent, and a better application of resources toward economic and agricultural development, would be to modify somewhat our present extremely restrictive arms policy.

The policy we are proposing will still be restrictive and will be scrutinized most carefully.

REMOVAL OF FORMAL MILITARY MISSIONS

This policy has the following elements in it: We will at the appropriate moment in the next few weeks pull out our formal military missions in India and Pakistan. In their place, we will have a small team working with the Ambassador, but not as a formal military mission, which will carry out requirements for inspection, advice to the Ambassador and advice to the government in terms of procurement of items.

Senator SYMINGTON. When you say you will pull out a military team and put somebody in its place, will the people you put in their place be military people?

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes, they will be military.

Senator SYMINGTON. How many military people have you got in India now?

Mr. HANDLEY. We have moved from about a hundred in each country down to about twenty, and we see something probably in the neighborhood of ten in each country, officers and men.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the highest rank of the ones you have got there now?

Mr. HANDLEY. The highest rank we have there is a major general.

Senator SYMINGTON. What will you have in the future?

Mr. HANDLEY. I would think a one star general as a lead man for prestige purposes, for contact purposes, supported by two or three officers and several enlisted men.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Sparkman, if you have comments or questions at any time, please interrupt. I just want to make this record, and please interrupt at any time.

Senator SPARKMAN. Go ahead.

Senator SYMINGTON. Not interrupt, just please ask any time.

Mr. HANDLEY. We have—

DEFINING MILITARY MISSIONS

Senator SYMINGTON. Let us get back on track. You are making a statement, and we appreciate it. But, as I understand it, you are talking about reducing the number of military people in India and Pakistan, and I was talking about selling spare parts of lethal weapons to Pakistan.

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes, that is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you tie them together?

Mr. HANDLEY. I will tie them together, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right.

Mr. HANDLEY. One of the first steps we will take is to change our military missions in India and Pakistan to very small advisory groups under the Ambassador.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well now, clear me up.

Mr. HANDLEY. A military mission—

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the difference between a military mission and a smaller military group?

Mr. HANDLEY. A military mission has a special role with the local government in terms of training; it is accredited to the local government. The government provides quarters for them, and the rest.

Under the setup that we envisage, which still has to be worked out in all the details, we will no longer have what is known as a military mission. In other words our physical military presence in both India and Pakistan will be substantially reduced.

Senator SYMINGTON. The way you plan this in the future, is all of this planning, you have sold yet no spare parts or given—

Mr. HANDLEY. No, sir.

A PROPOSED CHANGE

Senator SYMINGTON. This is just a proposed change, is that it?

Mr. HANDLEY. It is a proposed change which we hope to inaugurate within the next few days.

Senator SYMINGTON. And you are discussing that with us, is that right?

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And the proposed change is to ship spare parts for lethal equipment, is that correct?

Mr. HANDLEY. May I put it another way, sir. We are going to continue to take the most restrictive view of the sale of spare parts for previously supplied American equipment in India and Pakistan. And there will only be sales. There will be no grants.

Senator SYMINGTON. Lethal?

Mr. HANDLEY. Lethal.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have we sold much lethal equipment to India?

Mr. HANDLEY. Not very much, sir. We have sold guns, recoilless rifles, and machine guns, but it has been largely communication equipment, transport equipment, and the like.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right.

Mr. HANDLEY. But, as you know, since 1954 we have been the major supplier of across-the-board military equipment to Pakistan, and ever since 1954 it probably has amounted to \$720 million, \$730 million total.

Now, as I was saying about spare parts, our policy will be to entertain on a case-by-case basis requests for the sale of spare parts for previously supplied U.S. military equipment. We will approve these only where we are convinced that the sale of these spare parts will not add to the defense expenditures of the country and will, in the larger sense, be helpful in arms limitation. So that is the second point of our proposal.

SALES BY THIRD COUNTRIES

The third aspect is that we have up to now attempted to enforce a plan—I would not say we have been completely successful on this—on the sale by third countries of surplus American equipment to India and Pakistan.

We will continue to discourage the sale by third countries of surplus American equipment to India and Pakistan, but we will examine special cases where we believe that the sale of this equipment might, in fact, result in arms limitation or reduction of defense expenditures.

Let me give you a hypothetical case.

Senator SYMINGTON. Don't give us a hypothetical case; give us a case that has resulted in your change of policy.

TANKS FOR PAKISTAN

Mr. HANDLEY. Well, we are facing at the moment the question of tanks for Pakistan. It is quite clear that Pakistan has been seeking in the last few months through third countries, through Iran, through sales, purchases, the possibility of purchases in Germany, to buy a number of tanks which are surplus in Germany.

The figures here have ranged anywhere from 50 to 600 in terms of requests. At the same time, we know that Pakistan is also shopping for tanks elsewhere in Western Europe, new tanks.

If it is possible to sell Pakistan X number, what it is I do not know at this point, which in fact would be accompanied by a phasing out in Pakistan of old tanks, and if this would discourage Pakistan from going out and paying a lot of money for new equipment, then we might look somewhat favorably on such a transaction.

Senator SYMINGTON. On what kind of a transaction?

Mr. HANDLEY. A transaction permitting the sale by Germany, let us say, of a certain number of tanks to Pakistan if in our judgment this would be accompanied by a resulting phasing out in Pakistan of old tanks, and would be enough of an incentive to Pakistan to prevent it from going out into the open market and buying new expensive, and perhaps even more modern tanks, such as might in fact escalate the arms race in the subcontinent.

Senator MCCARTHY. May I ask a question?

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator McCarthy, will you, please, at any time.

COMPARISON OF INDIAN AND PAKISTANI TANKS

Senator MCCARTHY. Is the Indian tank considered superior to the Pakistan tank?

Mr. HANDLEY. The Indians are making their own tanks. They have a line of tanks and they have, of course, Soviet tanks, as well. It probably, of course is, Senator McCarthy, that the Indians have in their inventory a variety of tanks, but they have been moving more towards making their own tanks, which is a Centurion type which would be the equivalent of the Pakistan tank.

Senator MCCARTHY. Did they find the Centurions were superior to the tanks the Pakistanis used in the war?

Mr. HANDLEY. I do not think—

Senator MCCARTHY. At least the Pakistani fighters came off well.

Mr. HANDLEY. I think it was a matter of tactics to a large extent, although I hope the other side would never hear me say this.

Senator MCCARTHY. I have heard some of the military people explain that. If that is the case, why would we want Pakistan to have better tanks, if they have better tanks, even as incompetent as the operators were of the Indian tanks, and—

Mr. HANDLEY. What we were talking about in the case before us are some M-47 tanks which are not even as good as the M-48 tanks. The Pakistanis have the most modern Pattons in their inventory, but these would be better than some of the M-4 tanks that date back many, many years, which might be replaced.

Senator MCCARTHY. You think with good operators this inferior tank would be more than a match for—

Mr. HANDLEY. You know the Indians did pretty well with some of their old Sherman tanks, too.

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes. How do you equalize this thing? I mean, how do you explain why the Pakistanis with our tanks and with our tank instructors were not able to stand off the Indians with inferior tanks and British instructors, I assume?

Mr. HANDLEY. Well, I am not that much of a military man, sir, to explain that. It sure happened.

Senator MCCARTHY. It sure happened.

SALE OF GERMAN TANKS TO PAKISTAN

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me ask you then what we are talking about now is the sale of German tanks to Pakistan, is that correct?

Mr. HANDLEY. That is the specific case that is before us at the moment.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is there going to be a sale by the German government to Pakistan or a private corporation?

Mr. HANDLEY. That is a good question. The Germans approached us on this back last year, and I discussed this with the Germans. They had a team over here and I discussed it, and I told them our policy was not to supply, to give permission for tanks to be shipped to the subcontinent at that time, and this coincided pretty much with the way the German government was feeling.

Senator SYMINGTON. You lost me. My question is are you going to sell it through the government or are you going to sell it through a private company?

Mr. HANDLEY. I do not know.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is what I want to know.

Mr. HANDLEY. I do not know because the first request we had was the German government came to us and asked us to do this. In the meantime——

Senator SYMINGTON. To do what?

Mr. HANDLEY. To permit the sale of a number of M-47 tanks to Iran.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. HANDLEY. Now, in the meantime, we have found, of course that——

Senator SYMINGTON. The Germans came to you and asked that you sell some 47 tanks to Iran.

Mr. HANDLEY. That we permit Germany to sell.

Senator SYMINGTON. Permit Germany to sell.

Mr. HANDLEY. M-47 tanks to Iran.

Senator SYMINGTON. Right.

Mr. HANDLEY. And based on the experience we had, the Canadians and the Germans had, with the sale of F-85's to Iran, there were reasonable grounds for belief exactly as to where these tanks would go.

Senator SYMINGTON. Right.

SALES TO IRAN

Mr. HANDLEY. We have now in the Office of Munitions Control a request from a firm for permission to sell spare parts for tanks to Iran up to 600 of these tanks, and we have had reports—this is through a private organization.

Senator SYMINGTON. What private organization?

Mr. HANDLEY. This particular one is called Levy.

Senator SYMINGTON. How do you spell it?

Mr. HANDLEY. L-e-v-y.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is it owned in Germany?

Mr. HANDLEY. This is a Canadian owned company, as I understand, which is tied in, as I understand it—I am not completely sure because it is very difficult to sort out some of the relationships with the arms people of the world—with the Merex Company.

Senator SYMINGTON. I hope it is as difficult for them to sort it out as it is to us.

Senator MCCARTHY. Is that the same company that sold the F-86's?

Mr. HANDLEY. The Merex Company.

Senator MCCARTHY. Is that a real company?

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes, it is.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is that a Canadian company?

Mr. HANDLEY. Levy may have a connection with Merex. As of this moment I cannot tell you exactly what this is. I am still trying.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Canadian company is Levy?

Mr. HANDLEY. Levy.

Senator SYMINGTON. And they may have a connection with Merex?

Mr. HANDLEY. They may have a connection with Merex.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you know who owns the stock of these companies?

Mr. HANDLEY. No.

Senator SYMINGTON. You do not know whether Canadians or Germans or Americans or who own any of the stock?

Mr. HANDLEY. I do not. Merex, I assume, is a German company.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, but you do not know who owns the stock.

Mr. HANDLEY. No.

Senator SYMINGTON. It could be owned by the Swiss or the Greeks or anybody.

Mr. HANDLEY. It could be. I really do not have—I do not know, sir.

Senator MCCARTHY. Could someone in the State Department give us a line?

Mr. HANDLEY. I am digging into it as best I can. It is a cobweb.

Senator MCCARTHY. It gets pretty interesting.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, it certainly does.

While we are on this, as I understand it, Iran has bought 600 M-47 tanks from a private U.S. firm exporting through Canada. Do you know about that?

Mr. HANDLEY. No, sir. I believe, to my knowledge, they have not bought. To my knowledge, they are seeking to buy.

Senator SYMINGTON. To buy.

Mr. HANDLEY. And right before us at the moment in, as I said, the Office of Munitions Control is a request to sell these tanks, and one of the—

Senator SYMINGTON. A request from whom?

Mr. HANDLEY. A request from the Levy Company.

Senator SYMINGTON. In Canada?

Mr. HANDLEY. In Canada, but they went to Canada first—

Senator SYMINGTON. Levy is a Canadian company.

Mr. HANDLEY. That is right, but there is an American affiliate, as I understand it.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see. I asked is this an American firm. I asked you whether it was Canadian or American.

Mr. HANDLEY. It is an American affiliate of a Canadian firm.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is it a separate corporation from the Canadian?

Mr. HANDLEY. I will have to check.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then the question would be have they got a sales office in this country or is it an incorporated subsidiary or co-partner in this country? I'm just speaking for the record. And who owns the stock of the Levy Company.

Mr. HANDLEY. I do not know, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. You do not know that?

Mr. HANDLEY. I do not.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who approached you from Levy?

Mr. HANDLEY. They did not approach me personally.

Senator SYMINGTON. Whom did they approach?

Mr. HANDLEY. There is a request now before the Office of Munitions Control of the Department of State.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who made the request?

Mr. HANDLEY. The Levy Company.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, but who is the Levy Company?

Mr. HANDLEY. I do not know, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Give us a name, will you do that?

Mr. HANDLEY. I will do that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Supply it for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

The record should indicate that the Office of Munitions Control, Department of State, now has pending an application of Levy Auto Parts, Inc., Dupont Circle Building, 1346 Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C. for the sale to Iran of spare parts for 600 M-47 tanks, and not for the sale of tanks themselves. The application is dated March 29, 1967 and was signed by Fred Williams.

Senator MCCARTHY. Give us the whole procedure of how Levy comes from the Canadian government. Why does it have to come to the U.S. Government, and also who owns Merex.

Mr. HANDLEY. Merex is a German company.

Senator MCCARTHY. How does the Canadian company come across here to get permission to sell? Do they have patents that somehow are affected? Let us have the story on it.

AMOUNT OF SILVER HELD IN PAKISTAN

Can I ask two questions because I have got to go to another committee meeting?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, indeed, please do.

Senator MCCARTHY. Could you for this same record check out what is the best estimate that we have about the amount of silver or how much is held in Pakistan?

Mr. HANDLEY. Silver in Pakistan?

Senator MCCARTHY. Since we are giving them credit, we are giving them wheat for nothing, the estimate of India and Pakistan is together they may have 7 or 8 billion dollars.

Senator SYMINGTON. In India, they estimate they have 6 billion ounces of silver at \$1.29 an ounce.

Senator MCCARTHY. And Pakistan has got, I think, about a third of that, if you can find out whether this is the case.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you do that?

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Gene, is it all right if we have the estimated amount of gold that is in hoarding, too?

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes.

[The information referred to follows:

The Indian Government's official gold reserves are relatively modest—about \$240 million at the present time. No information is available on the official silver holdings. Various guesses have been made regarding the quantity of gold and silver (bullion or otherwise) in private hands in India, but we are not aware of any estimate by the Indian Government or of any reliable estimate by any other source.

It has been traditional for the people of India to put their private savings into one form or another of precious metal. The Indian Government is trying to channel savings out of precious metals and into banks. Progress is being made and, as banks become more popular, the private demand for gold and silver should one day decrease.

The Government of Pakistan has official gold holdings of \$52.9 million. As in the case of India, we have no information from any source on official silver holdings, nor any reliable estimate of private holdings of either gold or silver.

PRESSURE ON GERMANS

Senator MCCARTHY. The other question is how does this tie into the announcement that we are not pressuring Germany to buy additional arms from us? Does it mean the Germans sell off these old tanks, and will we replace them with superior tanks? They announced the withdrawal of 150,000 troops. What do you have in mind as to selling weapons to Germany to make up for that withdrawal?

Mr. HANDLEY. I cannot say offhand whether there is any connection.

Senator MCCARTHY. I do not want you to answer that now.

Mr. HANDLEY. I see. But offhand I would say so far as my particular headaches are concerned, these are quite apart, because my headaches are how to find some way to control the arms situation between India and Pakistan.

Senator MCCARTHY. We will give you something else to explain to us, what they are going to do with Germany.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let us put it this way: When we ask a question of you that has to do with State, that does not have to do with you, then you can say that you simply do not know, and you can supply it for the record, because we figure when we are talking with you we are talking to the State Department.

Thank you, Gene.

[The information referred to follows:]

The degree of U.S. control over military materiel of U.S. origin in Germany which is excess to FRG requirements depends upon the manner in which the FRG acquired the materiel and the proposed ultimate destination of the materiel. One category includes the military equipment acquired by the FRG through grant military assistance from the U.S. The FRG purchased the residual or reversionary rights to this materiel by agreement with the U.S. in 1962. By the terms of the agreement, the FRG must consult with the U.S. Government and secure our approval for disposition of materiel to other than NATO countries. The tanks in question fall in this category.

Another category of military equipment of U.S. origin is that purchased by the FRG under the terms of our foreign military sales arrangement, which require that the FRG obtain USG concurrence prior to disposition to a third country, whether NATO or non-NATO. The ultimate destination and end-user country must be approved by the United States Government even when the FRG decides to make sales to a third country through a private munitions dealer or organization. The FRG obtains assurances from the third country that no transshipment will be made across national boundaries without consultation with, and consent of, the FRG; in turn, the FRG is under obligation to obtain the agreement of the U.S. Government in such cases.

The FRG has agreed to purchase certain of its military equipment requirements from the United States to help offset the foreign exchange cost of maintaining U.S. military forces in Germany. However, there is no requirement that the FRG buy any particular equipment; it itself determines what it should purchase. Furthermore, we have no agreement with the FRG to sell or otherwise supply equipment to replace any U.S.-origin equipment which may be disposed of by the FRG.

DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING SPARE PARTS

Mr. HANDLEY. May I continue with the general line of our supply policy as we see it?

One is pull out the military missions in India and Pakistan. Two is to continue to take a very negative view of spare parts for lethal equipment unless we are quite convinced that this will not add to the problem.

Senator SYMINGTON. You have mentioned that three times, at least, and it inspires me to ask a question. You say unless you are convinced. How do you obtain that conviction?

Mr. HANDLEY. Well, we will have to look into each case.

Take the case of Pakistan which has 104's and B-57's for which they cannot really get spare parts anywhere, so far as we can tell. For their F-86's or for some of their tanks we have been able to, but for the 104's and the 57's, it is extraordinarily difficult to get spare parts except directly from the United States.

If it reaches the point where it seems to us that the Pakistanis may consider just junking their 104's and 57's, and then going on to a new expenditure of money for new aircraft, and maybe more aircraft and more sophisticated aircraft, it might make sense to sell spare parts.

Senator SYMINGTON. It might. But then you have a lot of things to consider in a case like that. For example, we are flying 104's today against Vietnam, so it is not an obsolete aircraft in any sense of the word. The question would be what you would get that would be more sophisticated, and the 104 is a major aspect of all European holdings.

Mr. HANDLEY. It is a temptation to get them.

CHANGING POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN

Senator SYMINGTON. What it looks to us is that you are changing your military sales policy toward Pakistan, and inasmuch as India does not get this type and character of equipment from us, that you may not be changing it toward India. Is that a fair surmise?

Mr. HANDLEY. May I go around the line?

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, just answer the question.

Mr. HANDLEY. I do not think so.

Senator SYMINGTON. We do not sell India any aircraft.

Mr. HANDLEY. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Therefore, there is no question of whether they would buy a more sophisticated aircraft if they did not buy from us.

Mr. HANDLEY. But India has had access to Britain, to the Soviet Union.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. But we do not sell them any aircraft, so it would not be a question of spare parts.

Mr. HANDLEY. But what we have in mind for India in terms of this military supply policy, I think, is compensating in terms of what India needs.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well now, are you saying that you would sell spare parts to India of the things that India has bought from us?

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes, but in fact it is not the same dimension.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, that is right; that is right. I know a little bit about this, too. I have been out there in both countries and looked at it in great detail.

Mr. HANDLEY. That is right. What India might want from us is much more on the credit sales side of certain equipment, and we would plan to continue the credit sales program that we have had.

A DECISION HAS BEEN MADE

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not want to labor it with you, understand me, but the point is what you are doing, inasmuch as we have not sold any sophisticated military equipment to India and have sold a great deal of very sophisticated military equipment to Pakistan, is that you are going to sell lethal spare parts to keep the Pakistani sophisticated lethal equipment going and it does not mean very much to India whether we do or whether we do not do it. That is the only—

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes, I understand your point, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is the only inference you can draw from it.

What you are doing is you have decided that you are going to sell spare parts to Pakistan for their sophisticated lethal military equipment, that you either are or are not. That is what is up now.

Mr. HANDLEY. That is the particular thing that is up now, yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me go on here just for the record a bit. We have just had a few points we wanted to present to you here by the staff which they brought up.

In September of 1965, the Secretary of State made the following commitment in a message read to the House of Representatives:

The United States has suspended military aid shipments to both India and Pakistan, in keeping with its announced policy of full support for the efforts of the Security Council and of the Secretary General. The executive branch will consult fully with appropriate Members of the Congress about the situation in the subcontinent and the conditions under which military aid might be resumed.

Do you feel that is what you are doing now; you are telling us that military aid might be resumed?

Mr. HANDLEY. Actually the military aid part has been the credit sales for non-lethal equipment, and we consulted earlier on that.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right.

Mr. HANDLEY. In fact, the sales, cash sales for dollars, cash on the barrel head for spare parts, are not aid in the strict sense. There are no aid funds, military aid funds, that will be used in that, but since it is an important policy, sir—

Senator SYMINGTON. Right, I understand that. I think this is an important hearing. I want to make the record here and just so we understand what it is we are getting at.

Secretary Rusk renewed this commitment to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 13 and October 13, 1965.

On April 20, 1966, Secretary McNamara told the Senate Appropriations Committee that the United States had decided to renew aid to Pakistan and India of "non-lethal military equipment on a case-by-case basis." That is April 20, 1966.

Now, during the September 13, 1965 briefing of the Committee on the Indian-Pakistan war, Secretary Rusk said that Pakistan and India had violated the law and were no longer eligible for assistance under the Mutual Security Act of 1954.

Secretary McNamara testified in 1966:

Well, I think it should be conditioned primarily on an understanding that Pakistan would live at peace with her neighbor, India, and secondarily, upon understanding that Pakistan would devote the majority of her own resources to what is

and can be the only permanent foundation to stability in her own country—economic development. I think those two conditions should take priority over any others.

RED CHINA'S AID TO PAKISTAN

Now, some questions we would like to ask here. According to the press, Pakistan has received from Red China 200 tanks and 125 aircraft, including MIG-19's and IL-28 bombers. Do you know anything about that?

Mr. HANDLEY. On the tanks I think the figure given as far as our intelligence tells us is essentially accurate. I have a range of 170 to 230, something like that, so 200 is a fairly good figure.

On the planes, I think that is high. Our figure is somewhat lower than that. It is a combination of IL-27's, I think. This is one squadron, I believe, 12, however you figure it. It may be two squadrons, but 12, and I think around 60 MIG-19's, 60, 70 MIG-19's. So it is somewhat less than the total you have given there. But the tank figure seems essentially to correspond with our intelligence figures.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, we also understand that since the India-Pakistan War, Pakistan has acquired around 100 F-86's. Is that roughly right?

Mr. HANDLEY. I understand that it is around 90 that they presumably were able to obtain through this arrangement between Iran, Germany, and Canada.

CORPORATE INTEREST

Senator SYMINGTON. That is the one where the Merex Corporation comes into it?

Mr. HANDLEY. The Merex Corporation comes into it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is the Levy Corporation in it, too?

Mr. HANDLEY. I do not know. I am still not sure. I go back again to the relationship between the Levy Corporation and the Merex Corporation. They may, in fact, be competitors.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes. But you are going to find out about the Merex Corporation.

Mr. HANDLEY. We will do the best we can, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Those airplanes were sold by Canada to Germany?

Mr. HANDLEY. That is correct—no, Canada to Iran, sir. I beg your pardon, they were sold by Canada to Germany, and then Germany sold them to Iran after—

Senator SYMINGTON. But Merex was in there, was it not?

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did the Canadian government buy them from Canada?

Mr. HANDLEY. The German government bought them from Canada originally.

Senator SYMINGTON. I mean the German government.

Mr. HANDLEY. The German government bought them from Canada originally.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who did they buy them from in Canada? Did they buy them from the Canadian government?

Mr. HANDLEY. The Canadian government. It is a NATO arrangement, and I suppose that is how—

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to know. But they could have bought them from a Canadian corporation, could they not?

Mr. HANDLEY. They could have, but my impression is that this was a part of the establishment in Germany of an air capability supplied by the government of Canada under a NATO arrangement, and that these planes became surplus, and that the Germans got permission from the Canadians to sell them to the Iranians.

Senator SYMINGTON. But then the Germans sold them to Merex, is that right?

Mr. HANDLEY. Through Merex, as I understand it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I mean, what is Merex?

Mr. HANDLEY. To Iran.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is Merex a company?

Mr. HANDLEY. M-e-r-e-x.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is it a company to make a profit, or is it just a screen? In other words, when the German government sold them to Merex—

Mr. HANDLEY. Merex bought them, was the intermediary between Iran and the German government.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did Merex pay the German government for them?

Mr. HANDLEY. I do not know. I presume so.

Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, is Merex an agent of the German government or is it a corporation separate from the German government?

Mr. HANDLEY. As I said, I'm not quite sure of the exact corporate structure.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right. Then you find out about that for us.

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

MEREX AG Rheinstrasse 156-158, 5302 Bonn-Beuel, West Germany is a private corporation established in 1963, and is controlled by MEREX AG of Vevey, Switzerland. The major shareholder of the Swiss corporation is reported to be Mr. Gearhard Mertins, who is also head of the German firm.

Levy Auto Parts Company, a division of Levy Industries Limited, 1400 Weston Road, Toronto 15, Ontario, Canada, is a limited company and was established in 1927.

A U.S. affiliate of the Canadian parent firm, Levy Auto Parts, Inc. of 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., was incorporated in the State of Delaware on June 16, 1949, and is registered with the Office of Munitions Control of the Department of State. Fred Williams, of the same Washington address, represents the firm here.

Information is not available as to any direct corporate ties between MEREX AG and Levy Auto Parts.

TRANSFER FROM IRAN TO PAKISTAN

Senator SYMINGTON. When Merex sold them to Iran, did they sell them at a higher price than they bought them from the German government?

Mr. HANDLEY. That I do not know.

Senator SYMINGTON. You do not know that.

When Iran sold them to Pakistan, did they sell them for a higher price than they bought them for?

Mr. HANDLEY. Of course, the Iranians would not admit that they have been transferred to Pakistan. In other words, we have no un-

derstanding of what kind of arrangement, who has the title, etc., between Iran and Pakistan.

Senator SYMINGTON. They may be rented by Iran to Pakistan.

Mr. HANDLEY. They may be, whatever the arrangements are, but we assume the Pakistanis feel that they have some kind control over these aircraft.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well then, in other words, they could be sold—what we would like to know is the nature of the sale and/or the lease between Iran and Pakistan.

Mr. HANDLEY. That, sir, would be extraordinarily difficult. I just do not see—

Senator SYMINGTON. The Iranians would not tell us that?

Mr. HANDLEY. Well, that opens up a wide range of diplomatic questions. This began with the Canadian sale, the Canadian permission to Germany. From Germany, then it was sold to Iran and, presumably, from Iran, transferred to Pakistan.

U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN

Senator SYMINGTON. But don't we have any sort of relationship with the Iranians? We were very close to them at one time, the last time I had been out there. If we have given them nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars of military equipment, would it not be in order for us to ask what kind of a deal they made with Pakistan on 100 F-86's that "We wouldn't sell you and that you bought from Canada through Germany."

Wouldn't that be a fair question to ask, being partners in the business of protecting freedom?

Mr. HANDLEY. I think it would be a very difficult question to put across.

Senator SYMINGTON. Wouldn't it be a fair question, don't you think, to ask them? Here we are giving them—

Mr. HANDLEY. An interesting question.

Senator SYMINGTON. Here we are giving them hundreds of millions of dollars in airplanes and equipment, and we thought we had an arrangement worked out. We told the world and the Indians, too, and then they are violating that agreement by letting planes slide into Pakistan from Iran on terms that we do not know about. Wouldn't it be fair to ask them what the terms were?

Mr. HANDLEY. Well, I think in the process of doing so you break quite a bit of crockery, Senator, with the diplomatic relations.

Senator SYMINGTON. All they would have to say is, "No, we won't tell you."

Mr. HANDLEY. All right. They could say, "No."

Senator SYMINGTON. Why would you have to break any crockery?

Mr. HANDLEY. That then if you happened to believe that they are not telling the truth, there is a certain kind of problem there. You understand the difficulties.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are you saying you do not think they would tell us the truth?

Mr. HANDLEY. I do not know, sir. I would just hate to speculate on exactly how you go through that particular kind of diplomatic exchange.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think you lose me on this. I do not quite follow you on it.

Mr. HANDLEY. Let me say this, Senator. We will do the best we can to find out through every possible means exactly what has gone on in this transaction.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right, fine, sir.

DISCUSSIONS AT SENIOR INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

When this matter came up of changing the policy incident to the sale of lethal spares to Pakistan, was this discussed at all with the Senior Interdepartmental Group?

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Was it gone over extensively by them?

Mr. HANDLEY. The whole policy has been gone over thoroughly.

Senator SYMINGTON. And their decision is to do it?

Mr. HANDLEY. The decision is to carry out, among other things, our total policy which we hope is aimed at giving us control, some influence, I should put it, over arms procurement in the subcontinent.

Senator SYMINGTON. Under the terms of the Foreign Assistance Act, do you feel that Pakistan is now eligible for assistance of this character?

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Does the United States intend to move from supplying Pakistan with lethal spares to supplying some of this lethal equipment? Is there any plan?

Mr. HANDLEY. New lethal equipment?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. HANDLEY. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Just spares?

Mr. HANDLEY. Just spares.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand.

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes, sir.

REPLACING PLANES ACCIDENTALLY DESTROYED

The one qualification I would say is that we have no case of this kind before us at the moment, but should there be an accident, and one plane be totally destroyed, we would consider replacing that plane, but we have no case of that kind before us. We preserve that for the future.

Senator SYMINGTON. How do you know you would consider that?

Mr. HANDLEY. We have considered that possibility, and should it come up—

Senator SYMINGTON. Suppose the Iranians told you they had lost a plane to Pakistan, but they had actually moved it into Pakistan. How would you decide that?

Mr. HANDLEY. You mean not Iran, sir. We are talking about Pakistan.

Senator SYMINGTON. I know. But I meant suppose Pakistan slides a few back to Iran and said they had lost them.

Mr. HANDLEY. But I am talking we would have to verify it. We would have to see it. We would have to see the wreckage.

Senator SYMINGTON. The reason I asked that was you did not know how many Iranian F-86's had gone into Pakistan or how many had gotten back.

Mr. HANDLEY. I see. There is going to be a tough one there, but I want to be absolutely candid with you. Our policy is not to sell new lethal equipment. We have no case of this kind before us at the moment, but we can see a possibility of this.

Senator SYMINGTON. What you are really saying is you would be willing to consider maintaining the Pakistan air force, etc., at the same level it is today but not increasing it, is that correct?

Mr. HANDLEY. At the same level as we know to be U.S.-supplied equipment.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. But not increasing it.

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. So if they drop 10 planes, they all had been caught in a storm, we would consider replacing those 10 planes?

Mr. HANDLEY. I think unit by unit we would take a look at it.

BALANCING THE SITUATION

Senator SYMINGTON. I am only asking. I just want to get the feel of it, you see, because we have been told here we are balancing the situation. We balanced the strength against Israel against the strength of the UAR, and we balanced the strength of Pakistan against the strength of India. We balanced the strength of Nasser against the strength of Iran, and we are doing a lot of balancing. You all are; we are not. We are just trying to follow the act, and I just wondered if that is what was in your mind, that we, at the U.S. supply level of sophisticated lethal military equipment, it is your understanding that we will consider maintaining it at that level.

Mr. HANDLEY. That is essentially correct; yes, sir. I am not quite sure that you can make a 100 percent statement of that kind, but that is generally—

Senator SYMINGTON. But not increasing its sophistication.

Mr. HANDLEY. At this stage, no, sir. We have no intention at this particular moment to sell any new equipment, much less more modern equipment in terms of lethal equipment to either India or Pakistan.

Senator SYMINGTON. To either India or Pakistan.

Mr. HANDLEY. That is right.

Now, on the non-lethal side, it would be different.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand.

A CO-SUPPLIER OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT

As in the Iranian case, have we now put ourselves in the position of being a co-supplier of military equipment to a country also receiving military aid? I guess the answer is yes.

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes, because they received equipment from Communist China. But obviously it is totally different from what it was between 1954 and 1965 when we were the major suppliers.

What we would like to do, Senator, and this is part of our policy here, is to try to get Pakistan in a position to maintain what it considers to be its legitimate security needs that it will buy from the West.

Senator SYMINGTON. What you consider their legitimate security needs they do not consider their legitimate security needs, you see. What impressed me is, first, Nehru says that he is never going to be an armed country, and so we ship him blank billions of dollars of wheat. Then he goes and buys the biggest air force in the Middle East from Britain. Then Pakistan milks us, and I think that is a fair term after listening personally to Ayub Khan many times, for all they can get out of us in the way of military equipment. They then buy a lot more of it from behind the Iron Curtain; and then Iran, who I have been so fond of that I hardly would like to use the word "Milk," but they do the same thing. They bought all they could from us, and then they buy a lot from behind the Iron Curtain.

So what interests me from my limited military background is the balancing act that the State Department puts on with the Department of Defense as to what is the balance. Where is the balance and, as I understand it, from what you have said today, we intend to maintain this balance. I get very interested in the rules as to what is balance, you see.

For example, if we sell a lot of 104 airplanes, which today is a very good, modern interceptor fighter, to Pakistan in order to balance with India, and then Pakistan buys a great many more or a good many more MIG planes from China, if we agree to replace what we sold them after knowing that they bought planes from Russia or China, aren't we increasing automatically the balance against India?

Mr. HANDLEY. We are not going to sell any 104's. We sold them—

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me be sure you understand my point. We put 100 104's into Pakistan.

Mr. HANDLEY. No, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then we put 10 in.

Mr. HANDLEY. Twelve.

Senator SYMINGTON. All right. We put a squadron in, I remember. So we put 12 in there to balance against India.

After we put those 12 in there, then they buy or are given or get on some basis, some more fighter planes. If we agree to replace any of the lost F-104's, don't we automatically increase by the replacement the balance against India as to what we thought was the balance when we sold them the original 12?

Mr. HANDLEY. Senator, that point I made was to tell you everything exactly, the last thought that we had as to the total range.

Now, I can assure you that all the people I have been talking to in the State Department, including myself, would take a very limited view of how this would be applied. But to think of every possible contingency where you might have a situation come up where there was—

Senator SYMINGTON. I just want to be sure we understand each other. We say the Indians have 20 of something, and we say, therefore, we are going to give the Pakistanis 12. That makes a balance, right? And after they have milked us for all they can get, and I was in on those negotiations, which were 12, then they buy six MIG's, which gives them 18. So they are in balance right away. They have got 18 as against India's 20 unless India gets some more.

Mr. HANDLEY. But India has been buying from the Soviet Union and has a production line, a MIG production line.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is what I am getting at. Are we trying now to equalize Pakistan's balance?

Mr. HANDLEY. Not in that sense, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Not in that sense.

THE TEMPTATION TO ACQUIRE A NEW SQUADRON

Mr. HANDLEY. Not in that sense. The idea would be this, if there is a principle behind it: If there were a plane lost, and you could not make a wing or a squadron, then there might be a temptation to go out and get a new squadron from some place else. If by replacing one plane we could sort of keep this phased down for a year or two—

Senator SYMINGTON. You mentioned that temptation several times. I know if I want a drink, it is a temptation to see the bottle. But I am not quite sure how you define a temptation to them. What do they say, "Either you give us another plane or we are going out and buy another squadron?" How would that temptation work out?

Mr. HANDLEY. Well, there is pressure, any time you have a military situation, on the politicians, and in this particular case the politicians, at least the top politician, happens to be a military man, too, and I think it is not—

Senator SYMINGTON. The top politician, the Shah and his brother-in-law, have the Air Force. I guess that is right.

Bill, have you any questions you would like to ask?

Mr. BADER. No, sir; I think you covered them all.

Senator SYMINGTON. John, have you any questions you want to ask?

Senator SPARKMAN. No. This thing is a great puzzle to me. It is hard to follow.

Senator SYMINGTON. I think it is one of the greatest balancing acts I have ever seen, and I want to get in on it to understand how you balance it.

Mr. HANDLEY. We are going to try our best.

Senator SPARKMAN. You are going to do what?

Mr. HANDLEY. To try our best to do what we can to encourage restraint in the military expenditures of the subcontinent, using every device we can, diplomatic device, with our allies, with the World Bank or economic aid, our own policies, so that the resources go into food, economic development, and not into this type of hardware. This policy gives us that much more flexibility.

TRAINING MILITARY PERSONNEL

Now, there is one point I did not cover, sir, which I think I should cover. We have no grant money. We are asking for grant money except in one area, and that is to provide, if they want it, continental training in the continental United States for a limited number of military personnel from India and Pakistan. That might run \$100,000 a year, \$200,000.

Senator SYMINGTON. Training pilots?

Mr. HANDLEY. Officers, military people.

Senator SYMINGTON. Train pilots?

Mr. HANDLEY. I do not know, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Train pilots or mechanics or electronics?

Mr. HANDLEY. Electronics; that is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. You do not know what kind of training?

Mr. HANDLEY. I do not know yet, but we are putting this aside as a possibility.

Senator SYMINGTON. As long as you are putting this aside as a possibility, let me put this aside as a possibility. How do you think some of the people who beat on us for being merchants of death for supplying these arms to Pakistan and India would feel if the Dallas News busted out that we are training 50 Pakistan pilots in Texas? How would you feel about that?

Mr. HANDLEY. Frankly, I do not think that problem will arise that way.

Senator SYMINGTON. But you brought it up, that is the only reason. You "arose" it, so I would like to "arise" it with you.

Mr. HANDLEY. I just do not know what kind of training that will be. But obviously it will be infantry training, intelligence training, engineering training.

Senator SYMINGTON. Infantry, intelligence, engineering. That leaves everything aside. They have no navy, so you are saying it will be everything except air.

Mr. HANDLEY. It could be all of these things, but I do not know what it will be at the moment.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. HANDLEY. But as we sketch out rather than nibble here and there, we are trying to frame an overall approach, too—

Senator SYMINGTON. When you say "we," who do you mean?

Mr. HANDLEY. That is the U.S. Government, the State Department, the Defense Department, the policy of the U.S. government.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Handley, who do you work for?

Mr. HANDLEY. My new boss is going to be Mr. Battle. I used to work for Mr. Raymond Hare, who was Assistant Secretary of State.

Senator SYMINGTON. You are in State. You are going to work with Mr. Battle?

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes, sir.

RATIONALE FOR TRAINING MILITARY

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me ask this question: Why would we train at our expense military officers and personnel of India and Pakistan? We sell them the materials, do we not?

Mr. HANDLEY. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Hard money. Then why should we establish a grant to train their officers for them? What obligation is there from us to them in how they might use their trained personnel?

Mr. HANDLEY. Well, I think, sir, this is as much on the political side as it is actually on the training side. The contacts between the officers of India and the United States, and contacts between U.S. and PAKISTAN. India has, I suppose, the second largest army in the free world at the moment. Certainly—

Senator SYMINGTON. But what is the answer to the question?

Mr. HANDLEY. Well, the answer to the question, I think, is contacts between the Indian Armed Forces and the United States Armed Forces.

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to me our interest over the past several years is to keep them from fighting each other, and we cut off the arms aid with that in mind.

Mr. HANDLEY. That is right.

Senator SPARKMAN. Now, if we start building up trained forces, isn't that an incentive to fight rather than discouragement?

INDIA, PAKISTAN AND CHINA

Mr. HANDLEY. Senator Sparkman, I take it that India's major apprehension today is still Communist China.

Senator SYMINGTON. So?

Mr. HANDLEY. That there is a partial interest here.

Senator SPARKMAN. If we give training to India looking toward the Chinese frontier, then we have to give a similar amount to Pakistan to balance the act, is that right?

Mr. HANDLEY. I do not know how much of this training they will really want, but I am—

Senator SYMINGTON. That is not the answer to the question. What is the answer to the question?

Senator SPARKMAN. It seems to me it is not a question of what they want, but it is a question of what obligation is there on our part.

Mr. HANDLEY. It is in our interest, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. To give them training.

Yes, in what way does it serve our interests?

Mr. HANDLEY. Our interests, as I said earlier, are in contacts with the officers corps of India and Pakistan, opportunities for them to be in the United States, to train in the United States, opportunities in the case certainly of India to think about the possibility of what might happen if the Chinese came over the border.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me ask the question again that Senator Sparkman just asked because I am not clear on the answer.

Senator Sparkman asked you if India increased their army, or we agreed to help train their army in order to fight Communist China, which you said you felt was their primary enemy, would they then feel obligated in balancing off a situation to do the same for Pakistan? Could you give us an answer, "Not necessarily," or "Yes," or "No," on that one?

Mr. HANDLEY. I would say that you have to offer training to both sides if you are going to—

Senator SYMINGTON. There is your answer.

Mr. HANDLEY. If I may qualify that after I have made the yes answer, I think we are talking about actually a very small range of training. But there is just this possibility that I mentioned.

Senator SPARKMAN. So far as I am concerned, I could see justification in helping India train officers aimed at the Chinese attack. But I do not see that that would require us then to train that number of Pakistanis, and I do not see that it would get away from the old problem of greater danger for war the stronger we make them.

Senator SYMINGTON. John, if I may go off the record a minute. [Discussion off the record.]

Senator SYMINGTON. John, have you anything else?

Senator SPARKMAN. Nothing more. It has been interesting.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you very much. All we wanted to get is information. We are not looking for any trouble.

Mr. HANDLEY. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, APRIL 6, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS
CONVENTIONS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:00 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Dodd, Pell, Hickenlooper and Cooper.

Ex. J, 88/1, Convention on the Political Rights of Women; Ex. K, 88/1, Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor; and Ex. L, 88/1, Supplemental Slavery Convention; were discussed and it was decided to wait until the American Bar Association could express themselves before taking action.

[The ad hoc subcommittee adjourned at 10:30 a.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMBINED SUBCOMMITTEE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES ON THE
SUBJECT OF UNITED STATES TROOPS IN EUROPE,
Washington, DC.

The combined subcommittee met in executive session at 9:40 a.m., room S-208, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Mansfield (Chairman), Fulbright, Sparkman, Church, Hickenlooper and Aiken, representing the Committee on Foreign Relations; Senators Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Miller and Pearson representing the Armed Services Committee.

The first order of business was to elect Senator Mansfield as chairman, and Senator Stennis as vice-chairman.

The group discussed when the first subcommittee meeting should be held and who should be heard.

[The combined subcommittee adjourned at 10:00 a.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, APRIL 13, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN
AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 3:00 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Symington and Fulbright.

Samuel Cummings, President, International Armament Corporation (INTERAMCO), accompanied by Richard S. Winter, vice president, testified on Additional Military Assistance to Pakistan.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 4:15 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, APRIL 14, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:00 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, and Cooper.

C. Hoyt Price, Department of State, answered questions of the committee on Ex. O, 89/2, International Telecommunications Convention, and it was then ordered reported favorably by voice vote.

The routine Foreign Service Lists dated March 9, 22, and 23 were discussed and carried over.

Ex. D, 90/1, Treaty on Outer Space, was ordered reported unanimously by a roll call vote.

The following nominees were ordered reported favorably: Rutherford M. Poats, to be Deputy Administrator, AID; Claude G. Ross, to be Ambassador to Haiti; and John C. Bullitt, to be Assistant Administrator for the Far East, AID.

The committee also discussed the following: hearings on foreign aid; hearings on the U.N.; further hearings on Vietnam; a briefing by Vice President Humphrey on his recent trip; letter re: appointment of ambassador to Hungary; and the IMG.

[The committee adjourned at 11:20 a.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.

The Foreign Service Lists of March 9, 22, and 23 were ordered reported by voice vote.

The nominations of Arthur J. Goldberg, William B. Buffum, Richard F. Pedersen, Mrs. Eugenie Anderson, and Samuel C. Adams, to be representatives of the U.S. to the Fifth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and Garland R. Farmer and Michael Iovenko, as alternates, were ordered reported.

S. 624, providing for increases in annuities payable from the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund, was ordered reported with amendments, subject to the approval of Senator Williams.

S. 1029, providing for increased benefits for government employees serving in hazardous areas, was ordered reported with amendments.

S. 1030, Informational Media Guaranty Bill, was considered but held over for further hearings.

[The Committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 19, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMBINED SUBCOMMITTEE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEES
ON THE SUBJECT OF UNITED STATES TROOPS IN EUROPE,
Washington, DC.

The combined subcommittee met in executive session at 12:35 p.m., in room S-208, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Mansfield (Chairman), Fulbright, Sparkman, and Hickenlooper, representing the Committee on Foreign Relations; Senators Jackson, Miller, and Pearson representing the Armed Services Committee.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss trying to get Secretary of Defense McNamara to appear alone before the subcommittee next week.

[The combined subcommittee adjourned at 12:45 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, APRIL 20, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN
AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:35 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Symington, McCarthy, Pell, Aiken, and Cooper.

Townsend W. Hoopes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, accompanied by Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Regional Director, Near East and South Asia, Department of Defense, and Lt. Col. John Black, Department of Defense, testified on military assistance to Pakistan and India.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 3:45 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, APRIL 21, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN
AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:05 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Symington, Sparkman, Pell, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, accompanied by John Owens, Greek Desk, and Kay Folger, Special Assistant for Congressional Relations, briefed the group on the Greek situation.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 4:50 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, APRIL 24, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:05 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Sparkman (presiding), Fulbright, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Mundt.

Briefing on the meeting of American Chiefs of State at Punta del Este by Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; Sol Linowitz, U.S. Representative to the Council of the OAS. Joseph W. Barr, Undersecretary of the Treasury, and Winthrop Knowlton, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, testified on the Inter-American Development Bank.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 5:20 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, APRIL 25, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN
AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:10 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Symington and Hickenlooper.

Townsend W. Hoopes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, accompanied by Colonel Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Regional Director, Near East and South Asia, Department of Defense, and Lt. Col. John Black, Department of Defense, continued discussion of military assistance to Pakistan and India.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 4:55 p.m.]

UNITED STATES TROOPS IN EUROPE

Wednesday, April 26, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMBINED SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON THE
SUBJECT OF UNITED STATES TROOPS IN EUROPE,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Mike Mansfield (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present representing the Committee on Foreign Relations: Senators Mansfield, Fulbright, Sparkman, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

Representing the Senate Committee on Armed Services: Senators Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Miller, and Pearson.

Also present: Senators Lausche and Cooper.

Mr. Marcy and Mr. Lowenstein of the Committee on Foreign Relations staff; Mr. Braswell of the Committee on Armed Services staff; and Miss Stabler of the Library of Congress.

[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

* * * * *

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

* * * * *

[P. 5]

The trilateral discussions were precipitated, as you recall, by the difficulties encountered last fall with the German-U.S. and German-U.K. offset arrangements. For the past six years, the United States and the Federal Republic have had military offset arrangements of approximately \$675 million a year covering the foreign exchange costs of U.S. deployments in Germany. I provided details of the arrangement in my letter to you, Mr. Chairman, in my letter of last week. The net of the situation is that, after fulfilling the 1961-62 and 1963-64 agreements, the Germans ran into serious difficulties in the 1965-66 two-year period: They met only a little more than one-half of the contemplated level of orders by December 31, 1966, the end of the two-year period for orders; and, for the payments period, which ran for the two fiscal years ending June 30, 1967, they are as of now approximately \$335 million short in

payments. They have assured us they will make up that shortage by the end of the period before July 1. But, because their payments to the U.S. Treasury will have outpaced disbursements required to U.S. manufacturers on account of their orders, the Federal Republic will find itself with pre-payments on the military account, or "overhang," of perhaps \$950 million on July 1 of this year. The "overhang," combined with a serious budgetary situation in Germany, has led them to predict only minimal new payments to us in our fiscal year 1968 and not much more in our fiscal year 1969.

This obviously has created a serious problem for us.

WEST EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

At the same time, we were faced with what appeared to be a slackening of effort by our Allies. (Germany, for example, after increasing her military budget 50 percent between 1961 and 1963, then leveled off its defense budget.)

* * * * *

BURDEN SHARING IN THE ALLIANCE [P. 6]

In this environment, the question of burden-sharing in the Alliance had to be examined. The United States has a per capita gross national product at least 50 percent higher than that of any of its European NATO allies; still, that taken into account, our allies appear to ask less of themselves than they do of us. They devote a much smaller percent of their gross national product to their armed forces and they have fewer men per thousand in uniform. Their forces are weaker in firepower, weaker in endurance, and less ready than ours.

* * * * *

U.S. PROPOSALS FOR ROTATION OF TROOPS [P. 7]

Regarding the Army, we have, as you know, 5 division forces, or 224,000 men, in Germany. The one division involved in the rotation plan is the 24th Infantry Division. At least one brigade of that division and some divisional command and control units—some 4,000 to 5,000 men—will be in Germany at all times. The other two brigades and an appropriate share of divisional and non-divisional support units—totaling approximately 28,000 men, about two-thirds of a U.S. division force—will be removed from Germany to the U.S.

Once a year, all three brigades will be in Germany for exercises involving the entire division. The rotation plan provides that the three brigades will succeed each other in Germany—each brigade in turn remaining in Germany, on temporary duty status, for a period of six months. The forces redeployed to the U.S. will be maintained in a high state of readiness, and equipment will be maintained in Germany in sufficient quantity and readiness to ensure that the forces can be redeployed to Germany within 30 days.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SAVINGS

I expect this plan to save the United States more than \$70 million in balance-of-payments costs annually.

On the Air Force side: We have 676 fighter, reconnaissance, and air defense aircraft in Europe; and, of those, 486 are tactical fighters. The Air Force units involved in the rotation are the three tactical fighter wings, totaling 216 aircraft, now based in Germany. Five squadrons of each of the wings, or 72 of the 216 aircraft, will be in Germany at all times, (they will be located on two or three bases, with the remainder of the four bases maintained as dispersed operating bases); 144 of the aircraft and up to 6,500 men will be redeployed to the U.S. All 216 of the aircraft will be together in Germany once a year for exercises. The aircraft in the U.S. will be at a high state of readiness to assure their rapid deployment to Europe, within five days, if necessary.

We estimate the balance-of-payments saving resulting from the plan to be \$16 million a year.

First movements under the Army-Air Force rotational program are planned to take place soon after January 1, 1968. We expect to have the plan fully in operation by June 30, but we shall do so only to the extent that we can return the units in the times I have described.

The ground and air units affected by the move, whether at their U.S. or German bases, will remain fully committed to NATO.

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RECOMMENDATION

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended against any redeployments now, including those I have just outlined, emphasizing their belief that in some contingencies the warning may not be sufficient to permit the forces to be returned to Europe in times I have specified.

The Germans have expressed concerns about our proposed rotation plan, which we are now discussing with them. These concerns stem from the combination of a number of their views. They tend to give the Warsaw Pact forces more credit, and NATO forces less credit, than we do; they tend to expect less warning time than we do; and they associate physical presence of U.S. forces with the U.S. political commitment and therefore fear that the redeployment of some of these forces implies reduction in the U.S. commitment. The Germans are particularly concerned about the Air Force aspects of the plan, and that part especially is still under active discussion.

My own view is that—because of the political warning time and the speed with which reinforcements can be made—we can operate under the rotational plan I have described without significantly reducing our military effectiveness. It is possible that, if we left critical political factors aside—which we of course cannot—but if we can, it is possible that a rotation plan of perhaps twice the magnitude I have described could be put into effect without reducing the effectiveness of our military forces. I feel confident that adjustments going beyond that level of magnitude, twice, that I have outlined, would result in cutting U.S. combat power—a move that would be dangerous because I am convinced that one of the main reasons East-West relations have improved is the strength of the West and the demonstrated will of the West to use that strength if necessary in defense. It is the Secretary of State's judgment that a redeployment of a magnitude greater than the one-division three-

air wing rotational plan could not be made at this time without traumatic psychological impact in Germany and, as a matter of fact, throughout NATO. Therefore, putting together the political and military factors involved, the Administration cannot now recommend more than the rotation plan that I described earlier.

Any redeployment of U.S. forces involves a risk of Soviet misinterpretation. There is a possibility, however, that a small redeployment of the kind that I proposed might be used to help induce a corresponding Soviet move, in line with the suggestion in the President's speech of October 7, 1966. Some experts believe that for political and military reasons the Soviets will not be willing to reduce their military presence in Eastern Europe in the near future no matter what we do. But the first move on our part in the direction of troop reductions would be politically significant in itself, as a step away from the cold war atmosphere. And it would give the Soviets some incentive to respond.

These, Mr. Chairman, are the ingredients of the package being discussed in the trilateral talks. We do not now have any plans for any redeployment beyond those I have described today; we do not consider that the international situation justifies any further redeployments at this time. We would, of course consult with the Congress as well as our NATO allies before any further redeployments.

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POSSIBILITY OF TROUBLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST [P. 16]

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, in addition to the possibility of the Soviets making, say, a limited move in Western Europe in light of developments in Asia, isn't there also the possibility of trouble in the Middle East?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, Senator Jackson. I think that we should be sensitive to the possibility that the Soviets would move on any one of several different fronts for a variety of reasons, among them, perhaps, being the desire to put greater pressure on us at the time we are involved in Southeast Asia.

Senator JACKSON. Well, the reason I mentioned the Middle East—I was not excluding, of course, other areas of the world—but I had in mind the possibility of having to move troops from Europe as we did in the Lebanon crisis.

My recollection is that we moved troops from Germany by airlift into Lebanon during that particular period, was it 1959? Therefore, the fact that we have a good force in Europe is of equal importance to problems that might occur on the flanks, is it not?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, although I think that we might prefer in that situation to move troops from the United States, and we are seeking to maintain our readiness to do so if required.

Senator JACKSON. I was thinking of airlift problems and other matters that might, from a time point of view, necessitate the movement of some forces from Germany to the Middle East should that situation arise.

WISDOM OF RESOLUTION ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS AT PRESENT TIME

In your judgment, would it be wise for the Senate to take action on a resolution calling for a reduction of forces in Europe at this time in light of present conditions?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I believe it would be unwise, Senator Jackson.

I think there is such a ferment in Europe at this time that such action by the Senate might well be misconstrued.

The foundation of the defense of Europe is, of course, the political commitment of the United States to that defense. For either the Western Europeans or the Soviets to begin to doubt the force of that political commitment, I think our own security would be impaired, and it would be almost as serious for the Western Europeans to doubt it as it would be for the Soviets to doubt it.

Let me read to you a cable that I brought with me, which just came in a day or two ago. This is a report of a German Cabinet meeting of a week ago, and to show you the mood in Europe today as it might be affected by a Senate Resolution, I read these sentences. This is reporting the German Cabinet meeting itself:

There was vociferous and, at times, emotional debate over the proposed withdrawal of U.S. aircraft.

This is a proposal I just read to you.

Kiesinger, the Chancellor, contended that American motives behind this move which would entail the withdrawal of a limited number of personnel, and only a limited savings, had little to do with the American offset problem but was more likely part of a scheme to denuclearize Europe. That is the scheme they have charged me with before.

This analysis by the Chancellor found nearly unanimous support in the Council and encouraged some of those present to voice misgivings of the American intentions and the general dependability of the Americans as an ally. It was agreed to inform the Americans that the massive withdrawal of American fighter-bombers from Germany was totally unacceptable.

I mention this simply to indicate that they are very much concerned by our actions, and they are concerned not only as to their military impact but as an indication of our political decision. I think, therefore, that a resolution by the Senate at this time urging withdrawals substantially larger than those we are proposing would have serious political disadvantages to us.

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BURDEN-SHARING OF EUROPEAN NATIONS [P. 19]

Senator JACKSON. Are some European nations paying more of their part than some Americans give them credit for?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, I think they are. And I said, in general, their contribution as a percentage of GNP is a measure of their general contribution to defense. But having said that, I must say that, in my opinion, the Europeans are not contributing their own fair share, and in making that statement I know I provide ammunition to those of us who wish to reduce our support of the common defense.

But I make that statement not on the basis of the percentage of GNP contribution that they are making but the percentage of our men in uniform. I think this is, perhaps, a more valid measure of our individual contributions to our joint defense, and here we find that the major European countries such as the United Kingdom

and France and the Federal Republic, have roughly half as many men in uniform per thousand of population as we did before the expansion of our forces associated with Southeast Asia.

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SOVIET STRATEGY AND TACTICS [P. 24]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you consider that our presence in Europe in strength, as at present, is an integral part of the Southeast Asia situation, or is it a separate and unrelated matter?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think they are linked together by the Soviet strategy which is to put pressure on the West wherever it perceives weakness.

In this particular situation there is a further problem brought about by the pressure on the Soviet Union by North Vietnam and China to relieve the U.S. pressure on Southeast Asia by a diversionary move some place else in the world.

So that we have the normal Soviet strategy of probing for weakness wherever they find it in the West, accentuated in this case by pressure from their own allies to relieve the pressure of the U.S. military forces on them by diversionary political or military attacks against us elsewhere.

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MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS OF INDIVIDUAL WEST EUROPE COUNTRIES
[P. 27]

Secretary MCNAMARA. I do not believe there is any significant move under way by any major countries to reduce their military establishments.

I think there is great pressure on the defense budgets to try to reduce them as a percentage of gross national product. But I do not believe that need entail, nor do they plan that it will entail, a reduction in the actual military force.

Now, that is a general statement. There are a few, perhaps, exceptions to it. I think, perhaps, Belgium, a very small power, is planning a possible reduction in strength. But there is no major reduction in military strength planned by any of the major NATO countries that I know of.

Senator SYMINGTON. The table of defense expenditures as a percent of GNP for NATO countries you have submitted to the combined subcommittee shows that taking the figures from 1950 to the present of GNP devoted to defense reached a new low in 1966 for Belgium, France, Greece, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Canada, and was within 0.3 percent of a new low in the case of Denmark and Norway.

Doesn't this trend indicate a diminishing desire within NATO to maintain troop strength at the present level?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir; I do not think so, because troop strengths can be maintained at the present level without maintaining defense expenditures at a constant percentage of gross national product and, I think, by the way, that article overstates the reduction of defense expenditures as a percentage of gross national product.

Roughly they have been constant in recent years. They have not been increasing as we have thought they should. There are some indications of some of the nations, Germany included, who would like to reduce the percentage of defense as a percentage of gross national product, but not reduce the strength of their forces.

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CHANGE OF NUCLEAR POWER BALANCE [P. 28]

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would like two or three points in response. First, it is true that at the time we entered NATO we did not have the strategic nuclear forces that we have today. We did not have the Polaris missiles and we did not have the intercontinental ballistic missiles.

But, of course, at that time we had a near monopoly of strategic nuclear power, a monopoly we no longer possess, because while we have increased the efficiency of our strategic nuclear forces during this 15-year period the Soviets have actually acquired a strategic nuclear force. This significantly changes the military utility of our force and narrows the extent to which that force is both a deterrent and a response to potential Soviet aggression, and increases, therefore, the requirement for conventional forces of the kind we presently have in Western Europe.

Furthermore, I think the point that Senator Fulbright made a few minutes ago is very important. It is essential that we recognize it today, that the operations in Southeast Asia do put pressure on the Soviet Union because of their interest in and support for North Vietnam, and possibly China, to engage us in operations elsewhere in the world, and to apply political and/or military pressure against us to that end, and beyond all that, as we know, the Soviet basic strategy does not appear to have changed and as recently as my tenure as Secretary of Defense, they applied military pressure against us in Western Europe.

So for all these reasons I think the force that we have there today is not only required today but I think it will be required in the near term future as well.

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GERMAN ARMS SALES TO THIRD COUNTRIES [P. 28]

It has now been determined that much of this equipment has been resold through an international arms broker to countries such as the Chad, Iran, Israel, the Sudan, and Pakistan. These countries have apparently paid a great many times more for this equipment than the price the United States received from West Germany.

Most of these surplus arms have been sold through the Merex Corporation, a German company operating out of Bonn. Merex operations extend around the world. They have been closely connected with Interarmco, a large American arms dealer. In addition, it is believed by some that Merex serves as part of the West German Intelligence apparatus. It would appear that Germany uses this private corporation for two reasons: (1) to spare its government the embarrassment of selling arms of American origin directly to countries where the United States is telling its people it is attempting to control the arms race; and (2) to prevent the United States

from knowing what actually happens to the arms after the sale to Merex so the Germans can live up to their agreement with us to let us know of ultimate disposal.

As but one example of Merex operations is the sale of some 90 F-86 aircraft to Pakistan. The sale was arranged at a time when the United States was trying to prevent arms from entering Pakistan. The West German government told the United States that these aircraft were going to Iran. Nevertheless, people in our government are confident that the West Germans knew these aircraft were actually going to Pakistan; hence it would appear deliberate deception on West Germany's part.

The evidence suggests that the West German government, in its desire to make a profit off its surplus equipment, has acted and is continuing to act in a way that is against the United States' efforts to dampen arms races. With its great reservoir of surplus military equipment of American origin, West Germany has the means to stimulate arms races throughout the underdeveloped world. The irony is that the East Germans are making a heavy profit on the sale of U.S. equipment, not only that sold to them but also that given to them.

Would you care to comment on those observations?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. May I do so for the record, Senator Symington? I am not familiar with the operations of the Merex Corporation to which you refer. I do know something about the alleged sale of F-86 aircraft to Pakistan. I do not believe any such sale did occur in the form in which you outlined it or in which the statement refers to it.

But I would like to check the details and respond fully for the record.

I will say simply one thing in passing. I know of no effort by the German government or no evidence of any effort by them to mislead us as to sales of arms to other nations. There is at times a difference of opinion between us, perhaps, as to whether such arms should be sold to other nations, but this difference of opinion results from their discussion with us of potential sales and from our exercise of our right to prevent such sales.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, maybe it is because I used to be in business, but I hate to be badly outtraded, and I think we have been in this case.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I do, too.

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REDEPLOYMENT OF TACTICAL FIGHTERS [P. 33]

Senator MILLER. Though what you are proposing would reduce the number of our tactical fighters by about 30 percent, do you think it is still consistent with not reducing our military effectiveness?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I do, indeed, because those fighters can be returned to Europe within five days, which is less time than the estimated period of military warning estimated at between 11 and 15 days.

Senator MILLER. One thing that bothers me about the redeployment is that if the Soviet Union wishes to harass us, all they have

to do is start building up some pressure which would mean probably calling back these redeployed forces. We would have the lead-time necessary to have them ready, and then the pressure or the tension could be relaxed. But I can visualize an on-again off-again situation which would be very harassing and very expensive.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Of course, it would be equally harassing and expensive to the Soviets.

It would be negligible. It would not be a major military operation, and it would not involve major costs, and we would be prepared to do it at such times as it appeared necessary.

Senator MILLER. I understand that the JCS are opposed to your plan.

Secretary MCNAMARA. That is correct; on military grounds, that is correct.

Senator MILLER. I mean they are not in favor of this redeployment of 30 percent of our fighters, and I think this 28,000 members of the brigades.

Secretary MCNAMARA. They do not recommend it.

Senator MILLER. What is their reason for it?

Secretary MCNAMARA. They believe, particularly with respect to the ground forces, that the period of warning may be less than the time required to redeploy the forces to Europe.

We have stated that we will be capable of redeploying them to Europe within 30 days. The Joint Chiefs state that the period of warning may not exceed 11 to 15 days. In that case, I think their statement is subject to question because while the period of military warning may be only 11 to 15 days, almost surely there will be political tension over an extended period in excess of 11 to 15 days, and this constitutes warning as well.

So from my point of view, I think we can redeploy the forces within a period of political and military warning. They do not, and they, therefore, do not recommend the rotational program I have outlined to you.

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PRACTICAL POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPE [P. 35]

Senator PEARSON. What effect did the British withdrawal have upon their idea—of their psychology, and so forth?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think that they will recognize it for what it is, a very, very small change in a very small force, thereby not affecting in any fundamental way the balance of power between the East and West.

In any case, the political leaders of Western Europe have just very practical political problems. There is great pressure on them to meet these unfulfilled demands of their people.

It is recognized their contribution under any reasonable set of assumption of our common defense will be small. It is believed that the period of relative peace over the past five years will continue and, therefore, that they can avoid increasing their budget in proportion to their gross national product.

I am not supporting this. I am simply trying to explain it, because, quite frankly, for those of us who have to deal with it every-

day, and who are charged by the President with trying to change those attitudes, it is a very frustrating role.

But I would point out we have made some progress. It is a fact that the effectiveness of the non-U.S. divisions in Western Europe has increased dramatically in the past six years. Norstad said it increased 50 percent between 1961 and 1964. It is a fact that the Germans increased their budget 50 percent between 1961 and 1963. It is a fact that the Germans bought from us \$3 billion worth of new equipment in the last six years, so they have made progress.

Senator PEARSON. I think so.

Secretary MCNAMARA. The military strength has increased, and I think it would be very shortsighted were we, in a fit of pique, and I recognize the basis for the fit of pique, but were we in a fit of pique to begin to tear down our common defense.

CONVENTIONAL RATHER THAN NUCLEAR WARFARE

Senator PEARSON. Let me ask you just this: Incidentally, the commander of the Seventh Army in Heidelberg, probably in February some time, indicated to me that it was his judgment that any military action would open with a nuclear shot in a race to the sea across the traditional invasion boundary across the North. But he also said something else that really set me back, and that was the maintenance of a large conventional military force in Western Europe might be necessary because a nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States would destroy the industrial capacity of both nations, leaving only Western Europe as the industrial prize of the world.

Would you comment on that?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, I would. May I say, first, that his view that—

Senator PEARSON. I think he is retired now, incidentally.

Secretary MCNAMARA. He would have been retired earlier if I had ever heard that, I can tell you that. But may I say that his view as to the most probable form of initiation of military contact between East and West is not shared by the Joint Chiefs. They do not believe that conflict between East and West will break out initially by a nuclear exchange. They think quite the contrary, that non-nuclear action will almost surely precede nuclear action, and we must be prepared to deter such non-nuclear action by the maintenance of adequate conventional forces.

Secondly, I never heard a more absurd statement than his statement to you that a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the West would preserve Western Europe unscathed. I think that is the least likely of the series of possible outcomes.

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IMPACT IN GERMANY AND NATO OF U.S. TROOP REDEPLOYMENT [P. 36]

Senator PEARSON. Just for the record, I take it that, Mr. McNamara, you agree with the Secretary of State's estimate that any redeployment beyond that which is presently contemplated would, as I take it, as a direct quote, "have a traumatic psychological impact in Germany and in NATO."

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, I do agree with that at this time. I do think, however, and I think he would agree, we should begin to move in our conversations with our allies so that over a period of time they will find politically-acceptable moves that we think are in our common military interest.

The problem is they attach a political significance to the move that it is not intended to have, and that makes it militarily unacceptable as well as politically unacceptable, and it is that misinterpretation of a potential military move, I think, we must seek to overcome in the months and years ahead.

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REQUESTS TO THE GENERAL [P. 38]

Senator MANSFIELD. Senator Miller, you had a question?

Senator MILLER. Just one brief one.

I notice that you say the Germans are particularly concerned about the Air Force aspects of that plan, and that part is still under active discussion. Is it your evaluation that possibly the plan might be modified to eliminate the Air Force aspect?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I do not see any reason why it should not be from a military point of view. These discussions are going on. I do not try to anticipate their conclusion. So I really cannot give you an answer, but militarily it is sound.

Senator MILLER. Thank you.

Senator MANSFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NICHOLAS DeB. KATZENBACH, ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY EUGENE V. ROSTOW, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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IS THERE A DANGER IN PURSUING WAR IN VIETNAM? [P. 48]

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think there is a danger that, if we pursue the war in Vietnam to a military victory, this might precipitate China—

Mr. KATZENBACH. I think the Administration has recognized the fact that Communist China is right there supporting the government of Vietnam, and Soviet Russia has been throughout supporting the government in Vietnam, and those are considerations which have to weigh importantly on decisions to be made. In answer to your prior question, Senator, I think I understand what you mean. I have no indication that the Soviet Union would stand aside if China came in. I would be rather surprised if they stayed aside. I think they would stay where they are.

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MUTUAL RESPONSE FROM THE SOVIET UNION [P. 52]

Senator MILLER. Mr. McNamara testified first, and I quote him now: "A first move on our part in the direction of troop reductions"—and by that he was referring to the recommended redeploy-

ment figures—"would be politically significant in itself, and a step away from the cold war atmosphere. And it would give the Soviets some incentive to respond."

Then he went on, in my colloquy with him, and indicated that he did not have much confidence that there would be such a response from the Soviet Union.

Do you agree with that assessment?

Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, Senator, I do agree with it.

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MEANS OF EFFECTING A MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTION [P. 53]

Mr. ROSTOW. There is very active work and thought and preparation going on in NATO, Senator Miller, both in the context of these talks and the next stage of these talks in the Defense Planning Committee, and in the re-thinking about the future tasks of NATO and of the procedures for carrying out those tasks. We are now actively discussing whether bilateral approaches or collective approaches to the subject of Soviets in this regard are better, whether discussions with them of troop levels should come first, second, or third in connection with other activities toward achieving a detente in Europe. It is an extremely active area on the whole Alliance front and when we say here that studies are going on, we don't mean to brush it under the rug. This is something to which we and our allies are giving intense consideration, and I think rather hopeful consideration.

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RISK OF GIVING THE SOVIET UNION AN INCORRECT SIGNAL [P. 55]

Senator MILLER. One last question, Mr. Chairman, and I will be brief.

While Mr. McNamara and you shared the belief that you did not have much confidence that the plan that he set forth was going to result in some kind of a mutual reduction, at the same time he expressed confidence that there would not be a reverse response, such as a probe. Do you share that assessment?

Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, I do. I agree with him that a rotational system of this type despite some reservations of the Joint Chiefs would not be sufficient to permit the Soviet Union to miscalculate on this. I would go further on this and say in terms of just what you were asking, Senator, to establish some capacity, to experiment with a movement of troops of this type, I would regard as an affirmative step that even could be helpful in terms of looking at it down the road as another measure with respect to withdrawals as far as the Soviet Union and we were concerned without losing the essential capacity.

So I am interested in it because I think it is an interesting experiment from which we can learn a good deal about the movement of troops and how long it does really take and how effective this is, and what public attitudes towards this may be.

I think it would be good to adjust the European thinking to the fact that we could move rapidly in this way, where they can visibly see our capacity, to move in this way. I think it would be helpful on the political and psychological problems.

[Whereupon, at 1:00 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene on Wednesday, May 7, 1967.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 26, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 4:00 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Symington, Clark, and Pell.

Informal briefing from Vice President Humphrey on his trip to Europe.

No transcript was made of the meeting.

BRIEFING ON YEMEN AND GREEK SITUATIONS

FRIDAY, APRIL 28, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN
AND SOUTH ASIAN
AFFAIRS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m. in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Fulbright, Gore, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Cooper and Javits.

Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee staff. Senator SYMINGTON. The subcommittee will come to order.

The Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs is meeting this morning to hear the Assistant Secretary of State who is charged with that part of the world, to discuss the latest developments in Yemen, Greece and other aspects of his domain that he would like to talk about.

We are very glad to have you with us this morning, Mr. Secretary. Have you a prepared statement, or would you care to discuss this orally?

STATEMENT OF HON. LUCIUS D. BATTLE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, NEA, ACCOMPANIED BY H. DANIEL BREWSTER, COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR GREECE; WILLIAM D. BREWER, COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR ARABIA; AND MISS K. FOLGER, SPECIAL ASSISTANT, CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, I have no prepared statement, as I understand that this is to be an executive session, to be very frank with you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Nothing will be published that you do not want to have published.

Mr. BATTLE. I wish to be very frank with the committee, as I always try to be.

As mentioned in my confirmation hearing, at our last session, I told you that I was deeply disturbed about the number of problems in the Middle East. I would like to particularly emphasize this morning the new serious situation in Yemen and, secondly, to bring you up to date on the Greece situation that I discussed in detail a week ago today.

As far as Yemen is concerned, we have had a series of developments over the last few days that are very disturbing. For many months there have been harassments of the Americans in Yemen of various kinds, some of them trivial, some thoroughly irritating. Occasionally, we have had serious developments, such as beginning the night of the 25th, two nights ago, in which there was a charge that a bazooka was fired into an ammunition dump near Ta'izz, and as stated in the later press statements, that it practically destroyed the city.

We have in Ta'izz an AID Mission—that is not the capital of the country—and military officers and men came over to the compound which had been closed for several hours under the curfew, and all of our people had checked in. They came with dogs, and went directly to the house of one of our Public Roads Bureau men named Stephen Oppalous. They then arrested four of our people. A mob formed—a very large mob, numbering at its height about 3,000 people. They went to our embassy, sacked the place, pulled out the plumbing, destroyed automobiles, and broke windows. They did everything that you could think of.

Our four people were detained——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do we have Marine guards there?

Mr. BATTLE. Have we?

Mr. BREWER. This is the branch office, in Ta'izz. We only have one embassy proper in Sanaa.

WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. PERSONNEL

Mr. BATTLE. Last night, we had a news ticker that the Yemen Republican Government wanted to terminate the AID agreement under which we were operating there, and a departure of our AID Mission; that there was a plan to bring charges against these people—to try two of the four people that they had arrested. And this, obviously, created a very serious situation.

We have concluded that we must move as quietly and as quickly as we can to withdraw our people from the area. And we must, I think, do this. Of course the problem now is to try to assure that these two men who are still under arrest—two have been released; there are two still under detention—and there is not complete clarity as to the intentions with respect to them. Public statements are that they are to be tried. The statements that we have had are that it is something less than that. It has been said that they will be retained for further investigation. We have been given a notice which is in the process of translation, and we do not have the note, so this is not completely clear whether they are to be tried or not. But the evidence would certainly point to their intention to humiliate us. Justice in Yemen is a fantasy—it could not be more ridiculous.

I think we have a very delicate situation to protect our people. I think it is our first and primary concern at the moment. We have approximately sixty official Americans there. The total Americans in the country are around 100, including a few missionaries, 94 to 95, and we are doing——

Senator SYMINGTON. There are 100 Americans including missionaries. What about the 94 and 95, just to be sure?

Mr. BATTLE. As nearly as we can give that to you; they are not absolutely clear for the following reasons. There are a few Yemeni board people who have American passports. We do not know exactly how many. There are no clearly stated facts. One, for example, some time ago came back here, and changed his mind at the airport. There are a few in that category. We have nine Baptist missionaries, a few miles north of Ta'izz. There are one or two Catholic missionaries. There may be a few others in this area. These are the approximate numbers, as best as I can give them to you.

We will try to give you a complete breakdown, but I doubt if we can.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the total number of Americans?

Mr. BREWER. The total is of the order of about 160 or 165.

Mr. BATTLE. That is including the missionaries. This is in Yemen.

I think that we must maintain enough of a staff in our embassy to do what we can to protect our own people.

Our instructions last night—we got them in the middle of the night—were to begin to prepare to get them out of there, and we are trying to arrange transportation as best we can. We are not saying that we are evacuating. We are simply withdrawing as rapidly as we can.

I think it is our hope, of course, that Yemen will let us withdraw people peacefully without any difficulty. It is a highly volatile situation. They are very unpredictable people.

We are considering several ways of getting them out. The most desirable and the most likely is to charter an airplane, probably one of the Ethiopian airplanes, if the Yemenis will let it in. We are also checking ships. Over the night we tried to locate American shipping in the area that might have come through the canal heading south, or either way, for that matter. There is, for example, an American destroyer in the vicinity. There are other ways in which we might be able to offer assistance.

EGYPTIAN INVOLVEMENT IN YEMEN CRISIS

Let me talk a little bit about the background of this and give you as much of an assessment as I can.

I think there is absolutely no doubt that the local Egyptians are back of this. I think that there is room for uncertainty as to whether it is Cairo-directed or not. I had the Egyptian Ambassador in yesterday morning and informed him that it was absolutely clear that these people were in the hands of the Egyptian military. There could not be any argument about this; this could not be argued. Both the Egyptian, the civil and the military in Ta'izz are engaged in this.

We have had several conversations in Cairo. We have several bits of information on this. It is not clear whether it was directed by them or not. They are both in Yemen and in Egypt, those who would like nothing better than to have the United States thrown out of both places, for that matter. There are others who have tried over the past to try to keep us in Yemen with the hope that we would not withdraw our recognition of Yemen and would stay there.

At this stage, the evidence is about 50–50, according to our intelligence people. I think we have to be very careful, to deal very firmly with the Egyptians, whether they have directed it or not. They alone have the authority to bring about a change in it, and I think that we must take a very firm position with them.

Our charge d'affaires, under instructions from us, informed the foreign minister last night that this would have a very direct bearing on our relations with the Egyptians for years to come. We are not trying to deal with whether they started it or not, but I think that without any doubt they have the authority—they have sufficient leverage there to help us deal with the situation effectively and to permit our people to leave.

CONDITION OF KING SAUD

King Saud is in Cairo. As you know, it is a rather ridiculous situation. King Saud is old and has pretty well had it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He is nowhere near as old as I am. [Laughter.]

Mr. BATTLE. I apologize for the comment. [Laughter.]

Senator AIKEN. He has had it—that is the difference. [Laughter.]

Mr. BATTLE. He is much, much older than you are. He did not even remember where he was, who had him there. He forgot the name of the Vice President of Egypt who took him down there. He is nothing. He has no status with the Saudi Arabians. He has for years fought with Nasser. They threatened to assassinate each other at various times, but they have made up now. It is a very cold, calculating kind of relationship. And that is all it is.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is the Middle East.

Mr. BATTLE. It is the Middle East, yes, sir. But for the moment, I think that what we want to try to do is do what we can to protect our people there, to withdraw as quietly and with as little sensation as possible, to try to get out those people that we have there, to try to keep this from getting out of hand.

We must not, I think, break relations at this point, because it is important that we have somebody there to protect our own people. Our people have diplomatic immunity. If anybody will be safe in the country, I am certain that our charge d'affaires and one or two people protecting him will be protected. I feel that we cannot at this stage walk out of the situation.

I would like to withhold my judgment on whether it is wise for us to break relations in the days ahead. Clearly at this moment we must try to pull out all of these people whose lives may be in danger. The situation is such that it may be very, very difficult. But to break relations, no.

Obviously, aid is finished. It has not amounted to a great deal. It has been \$2.4 million for this current fiscal year. It is completing a road project begun some years ago, and various water well diggings, sanitation, things of that sort.

That, sir, is it in a broad sense.

AMERICANS ARRESTED IN YEMEN

Senator SYMINGTON. They arrested four people?

Mr. BATTLE. They arrested four. They released two. Their public statement says that they are going to try them. I do not want to ask for that public statement.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It says what?

Mr. BATTLE. That they will try these two. That is what came on the ticker last night, but this is not the phrase that is used in the message that we have so far. Before we respond publicly, I do not want to get them in the position where they have to charge them. The phrase they used in the telegram that we received this morning indicates that these two, that is, their cases, will have to be studied further. If this is an effort on their part to withdraw from the trial, I should think it likely, because a trial there would be a mockery and a disgrace. I hope that we can avoid having our people go through with it.

Senator COOPER. Who are the two?

Mr. BATTLE. One is named Hartman and another Liapis, both Bureau of Public Roads people.

This is the most obviously trumped up charge that I have seen in a long time. These people, according to the telegrams that we have, were locked in our own campsite in the compound, under the curfew law. They brought a dog in, and it went directly to the house that they wanted. There was something there. It is pretty malicious and ridiculous. It is even more ridiculous, because in the interrogation of this man, they brought in what was obviously a moron, an idiot, who was said to be in the last stages of some kind of disease. They asked him if he could identify the two people whom he had seen engaged in bazooka firing, and he pointed to Liapis and then he pointed to the general who was holding the investigation which, I think, pretty clearly proves that he did not know what was going on.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He probably was right.

Senator AIKEN. Anyway, in that respect.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have you any questions that you would like to ask, Senator Fulbright.

EXECUTIONS IN GREECE

Senator FULBRIGHT. First, before I ask any questions, let me say that I received in the mail at seven o'clock a special delivery, this communication from a resident of the Twin City area, and I thought that I would convey this to you. These are people who are disturbed about the execution of people in Greece. So I could not think of anything better than to give it to you.

Mr. BATTLE. Thank you, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It came from the vicinity of Minneapolis-St. Paul.

Mr. BATTLE. I hope very much to deal with this problem when we finish with Yemen.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I might follow that up. I had telephone calls the night before last, about 10 o'clock, from a lawyer who said that his wife was acquainted with Papandreou who taught at the University of California. They were extremely concerned that he was going to be executed for having tried to maintain a democratic government in Greece, and asked if there was anything that I could do. I said that I could not do anything other than to put it up to

the State Department; I have no possible way of influencing that government. He said that he was sending this to me in the morning mail, material which, I believe, is sufficient so that they can make a plea to their government. It seems to me that they are preparing to execute him. That is all I know. They sent it to me for the reason that I am the chairman of the committee. And that is the same reason why I am giving it to you this morning. This man feels that maybe just because of personal vengeance it will be done.

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, if I may comment on that, sir. We have been very concerned about all of these things. Obviously, if Andreas Papandreou is executed, there will be a tremendous problem both here and in Greece. He is very widely known here. He has many friends here. We have on eight occasions sent messages to our embassy there. We have taken this matter up with various people in the top structure of the government. We have been assured, although not specifically said—as to Andreas—we have been assured that no harm will come to either of them. To our best knowledge he is clearly under arrest, but we have no reason to believe at the moment that he is being mistreated.

U.S. PREOCCUPATION WITH VIETNAM

Senator FULBRIGHT. What has happened as to Yemen and in Greece to me has a bearing on Vietnam. I think that our preoccupation with that and our concentration of forces of all kinds on Vietnam will be an invitation to many people—not just Russians, but anyone who has resentment or a problem against our interest—to take steps, because they feel that there is nothing that we can do about it. I think that this is a perfect illustration of what Gavin told the committee last year, that this will expose us in any number of places around the world, to provide occasions for people of various kinds. I would recommend to the high echelon in our government that they might possibly reconsider our war in Vietnam and to consider what influence you have and means you have available to do something.

Mr. BATTLE. May I respond to that?

Mr. Chairman, in my confirmation hearing you will recall I told you and told the committee that I was very disturbed by many things going on in my area. I am very hopeful of getting as much time from this subcommittee and the full committee as possible to look into this. I have been very pleased to have the opportunity to get up as quickly as I was permitted to do on the Greek situation, and again, this morning, the Yemeni situation, so that we can work together on the problem.

I would like to bring the committee up-to-date on Greece, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. OVER-COMMITMENT ABROAD

Senator SYMINGTON. Before you do that, I want to associate myself with what the chairman has said. I want to state that after being in Japan and in Europe in April, that I am completely convinced that we are over-committed. I would like to leave this comparison with you.

It looks like the United States was in the ring, let us say, in a fight, and everybody says, "This is the greatest fighter that the

world has ever known." Round after round, he is totally ineffectual, after putting in one-half million people and a giant fleet, and a good many billion dollars. As the rounds go on you feel, "Heh, we thought that this fellow was the champ. We are beginning to think"—and I do not want to use the expression about my country, and I got a very definite impression of that in Europe a year ago—I got a more definite impression when I went to Greece in January that they cannot figure out why we cannot do better if we are going to stay out there, after all of these people and all these gigantic sums of money are being spent. So here it is.

I think, if you will look at the report that I made to Senator Fulbright and to Senator Russell last January—a report that is not yet declassified—you will find that I predicted that this would happen. I think that we have just got to get ready for it.

If I may respectfully say so, I think that we have got to figure out where we are going to get the additional people and equipment to handle these additional problems. We have not got much left, unless we truly go on a mobilization basis, to take care of many more of these.

FIGHTING WITH ONE ARM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not want my silence to mean that I agree with everything that has been said here. I think that your illustration of the champ in the ring is a very apt one, but I do not think that the champ can fight with one arm taped to his back. He can only fight contenders if he has both hands, but not with one hand.

I believe that Senator Fulbright was there, if I remember, when we were talking about Laos—that meeting with Senator Kennedy.

We are there. The trouble there is that we are not allowed to win it. That is not the champ's fault, necessarily; somebody has bound his ankle.

Senator SYMINGTON. They do not know all of those things. They just see him working at it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I know that.

There is the fact that we cannot attack the harbors, and the like.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You can. They can attack anything that they want to. He can bomb Peking.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The military arm cannot use what they have got.

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not think that we have any difference here about what is happening to the so-called champ. Maybe it is because they have bound his arms; maybe because they bound his nose; maybe it is because he is not much good fundamentally anyway against people who want to fight in their own country. I do not know what the reason is. I think it ought to be considered. One of the things that I would like to have asked General Westmoreland is why out of the five bases they attacked, they attacked the regions first and left the big base for the last, which means that they will have a great many more aircraft and small arms around if you have a policy that you are not allowed to attack. Now we have broken the policy and maybe in a certain number of days or weeks, we will attack these places. It will cost us just that many

more American planes, because of the nature of the way the operation is being conducted.

I just wanted to associate myself with the general unhappiness about accomplishments. I did not want to get into a dialogue.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If we do not do something pretty quickly about Yemen we will be in the same kind of a position there where we can be justifiably criticized.

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you think we should do?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not know, from all of the information that is available. We sit here at this great distance and try to mastermind this, these military and sea operations. There was a time when we could send a couple of cruisers over there and would say, "Look, you violated all of the comity of all international conduct here. You either put up or shut up."

Now I do not know whether that is justified, but I do not know whether it is overall feasible in a general operation, once we sit around and let these people kick us all over the place and do not do a thing about it. We talk, talk, talk, talk. They keep running right over us, and expect to continue doing so. They can do it next week, and the week after.

FORTRESS AMERICA

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to ask the Chairman, what would you do?

Senator FULBRIGHT. In Yemen?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I am not at all sure, because I do not know what we can do. What do we have available to do it with? If we send in cruisers, I do not know why the Russians cannot do it, too. This is not like it was in the old days. I think I do not know right off the bat what to do, preoccupied as we are.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just succumb to the Reds and the subversives and everybody else in the world and retire into the fortress of America, and build a wall around here and say, "Let the rest of the world go any way they want to."

OTHER MISSIONS HAVE WITHDRAWN

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you think that we should do?

Senator AIKEN. I said a year ago to fight a war with restrictions and regulations and things that go with fighting and winning a war. If those who sell materials want profits from the war, they do not want to pay for the war in any way, it seems.

Senator SYMINGTON. I meant specifically on Yemen.

Senator AIKEN. Oh, Yemen.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, sir.

Senator AIKEN. Well, there are a lot of people there today, I know.

Mr. BATTLE. There are only a few missions there. The Italians are there.

Senator AIKEN. Have they just gotten out?

Mr. BATTLE. The Germans and the British have gone. Who else is there now? There are a few left there. The French are not there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They have more sense than we do.

Senator AIKEN. We are the only ones in the whole area there.

Senator SYMINGTON. What would you do?

Senator COOPER. How many are there? Are we doing all we can to get them out?

Mr. BATTLE. May I tell you one thing that we have done? I must be very careful about this.

Senator SYMINGTON. We will go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Back on the record.

U.S. OVERTURES TO EGYPT

Mr. BATTLE. Our efforts in Egypt at this time are limited. There are still things they want from us.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They are not yet hungry, but they will be hungry.

Mr. BATTLE. They will be hungry, right, but they are looking for some things. They would like to see us at this stage help them on a few things. They are particularly eager to get this stabilization agreement with the IMF.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We have pressure on it right now.

Mr. BATTLE. Through some oil companies, because of contracts, they want some concessions. That is American enterprise, the American system. There are a lot of other things that are necessary to support industrial contracts.

The oil is a possibility. They are in a very vulnerable situation there. Because Egypt needs them and they will let them go on operating. They will let them stay, I believe they will, for the time being.

The only hope I have, the thing that troubled me when I first got to Egypt, was that I could not see an end in sight to the Public Law 480 program, an artificial relationship which we did not like. And the Egyptians did not like it. But when the oil was struck, that is the first time that it could see a natural tie to us based on economic factors of trade rather than aid. I hope that the oil project has and will in time tie more to the West by natural trade processes and give them the money to buy their own food. This is to me the only hope that I can see to normalize our relationship.

I do not think that the oil at the moment is quite enough to solve their economic problems, but it will help. It may come very close to equalling what our food was worth at the maximum point that we put it in there, in the neighborhood of \$100 million a year.

SITUATION IN ADEN

Senator SYMINGTON. The purpose of this meeting is a report from you in Yemen. I think that we are clear as to what the situation is in that sector. We are also clear what you plan to do about it.

Now as to the question of Aden being very important in this whole picture, could you explain that before we get out of this subject and turn to Greece for a minute?

Mr. BATTLE. Well, Aden, as you know, the British have been there. They are pulling out. Their departure, I think, is projected and that departure has created a vacuum that both Faisal and Nasser are concerned about, Faisal with very good reason. I have some doubt that Nasser wants to make a direct military effort in Aden. I think he wants a government there that is friendly to him,

responsive to him and as nearly in his direction as possible, but he hopes to achieve it through other than military means, if at all possible.

In the last analysis, I do not know what will happen. This is my view on the situation as of this time.

The only hope that I have been able to see if the British pull out—I agree that is a sad thing—but if the British go—and I am told that they are going—I think that we have got to try to work in an international presence, if we can possibly do it.

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN THE REGION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If something does not happen the Russians will move in, as sure as the sun will come up.

Mr. BATTLE. Or the Egyptians under the direction of the Russians.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He has been under their control for a long time.

Senator AIKEN. Have they not some provision at Djibouti?

Mr. BATTLE. They have not followed that. I have not followed the geographical problem there. I am not familiar with the area.

Mr. BREWER. I think that it is true that Djibouti can provide some bunkering facilities that were formerly provided by Aden, but they get their own bunkering in Djibouti from the refinery, a substantial portion of it. This could be changed over time, but if there is a serious situation?

Senator AIKEN. They can go through there.

Mr. BREWER. In a sense, that is something that Djibouti cannot meet.

Mr. BATTLE. To continue on Aden, Mr. Chairman, I see the chance of chaos there, which is very great, once the British withdraw. There are many elements there. There are various political forces at work there, which make it very confusing. It is very difficult to be sure who is backing whom at any given time. For example, I just heard yesterday of an anti anti-terrorist group which shows how many groups there are there working. The most important one, and the most active one, is the Egyptian one. They have been, I think, as much as anyone group responsible for the terrorism and for the difficulty. The relationship of Ta'izz to Aden is fairly close. It is closer to the south. Ta'izz is to the south of Aden. And in the presence of some of these groups that have been responsible for some of the actions taken is one of the reasons that we had hoped to maintain a place there. This obviously is going to be a long and, I think, tedious one, and if we have to get out of there, we will, unless we do something very quickly—we will not have anything there shortly otherwise.

We are going to lose a little bit in terms of our development in what is going on there. This is an important center of the Egyptian activity.

Senator SYMINGTON. In Aden?

Mr. BATTLE. Ta'izz where we have these people.

APPEALS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What about these other affiliations?

Mr. BATTLE. You mean in terms of what?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. These affiliations in the whole complex—what about that?

Mr. BATTLE. Well, sir, the Saudi Arabians—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I mean the South Arabians.

Mr. BATTLE. The South Arabians. There is no agreement on what ought to happen. There is a split between these various protectorates and various groups throughout the south portion there, but we have hoped that we could get some kind of a coalition with the United Nations to pave the way for free elections and some kind of United Nations presence that would keep these various forces that you are concerned about from moving in and trying to take over.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is up to the United Nations?

Mr. BATTLE. It is not up to us. We have supported every action that has been taken. The recent United Nations mission that was sent out accomplished nothing, sir. I went out. It was an absolute fiasco.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They were there about three days.

Mr. BATTLE. After an incredible series of places.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They were supposed to be in there for quite a while, but they left in three days.

Mr. BATTLE. It is so complicated that it is hard to say. I think that everybody feels badly. One issue was whether they would get—

Senator SYMINGTON. Are you talking about the United Nations mission?

Mr. BATTLE. The United Nations mission that went there about three weeks ago.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who were they?

Mr. BATTLE. They are still in being.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who was on the mission?

Mr. BREWER. Venezuela, Mali and Afghanistan. Venezuela is chairman.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mali and who?

Mr. BREWER. We had a very great difficulty in getting anybody.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me get that. I want to remember that. They represented Ambassador Goldberg and Secretary U Thant. What were they going to do when they went there?

Mr. BATTLE. They were there under a United Nations resolution that had almost unanimous agreement. I think that there were two or three abstentions. Egypt bought it. Everybody bought it. They were to go there to study the situation and to make recommendations to the United Nations with respect to the future of that area. Nothing came of it. They got into a series of incidents, in some cases over trivial matters, for example, the inspection of their baggage—the question of whether they could go on television came up. There were all sorts of ridiculous things.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They got out in three days?

Mr. BATTLE. They went to Geneva and stayed there for a few days, I think, 13 hours with George Brown who told me. I happened to see him when he was here for the SEATO Conference there. He said it was in terrible fashion. He spent 13 hours. They are still in existence.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let us go off the record for a moment.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Back on the record.

Senator AIKEN. Why do we not turn some of them over to Russia?

OFFICIAL DATE OF WITHDRAWAL

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you continue?

Mr. BATTLE. It is the intention of the Executive Branch of the government, through a series of meetings with all agencies, to see what we can do about Aden. I have no cure-all for it, Mr. Chairman. I wish I could tell you that I did. We are working on it. I have been deeply disturbed about it before I left Cairo. I think it is a very serious problem and closely related to Yemen, but I do not know what the answer is.

Senator SYMINGTON. What is the date for getting out?

Mr. BATTLE. The official date is by 1968. There is a possibility of advancing this.

Senator SYMINGTON. There is no intention on our part of getting in there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We could get in there by furnishing a little money to keep the people there.

AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE

Senator SYMINGTON. We have just come up with \$35 million to keep the people in Yemen. Let me ask you this question: Is it possible for the United Nations to put a team in there of some sort?

Mr. BATTLE. This has been my hope, Senator. I thought that the presence of an international force, even an entire Arab force, would help. This is what we have to consider. I think a United Nations presence is the only thing that I can think of, but given the experiences that we have had with that distinguished mission that has just been out there, I am discouraged. It is not over yet. I think that we still have to point to the United Nations. We still have to try to build an international presence that will permit a coalition government of some kind on an interim basis with the United Nations presence in the hope that in time we can have free elections. And if we can, if a coalition government can be created that has any chance of interim survival—if we can recognize a United Nations-blessed coalition government, with the weight of the international community behind it, I think that we can keep ourselves from a direct commitment but to back up such a structure as we are able to get in these which, I hope, will keep it from having chaos after the British withdraw.

It is a hope. I can give you no guarantee of it myself. But I have the hope, as you know, by Monday or Tuesday—this is completely a hope—we will have some ideas that we have not had yet.

Senator SYMINGTON. Does anybody have any comments or questions further with respect to Yemen or Aden?

We will go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Back on the record.

Mr. Battle, I share your comments. I think that we have to be for something. If we can put an interim thing in there with the United Nations blessing and hold the line and try to keep chaos

from developing, even the chances of a free election at the moment are very slim—we have got to point a direction.

Senator AIKEN. I think that King Faisal possesses a good share of common sense.

Mr. BATTLE. And common sense is a rather rare commodity.

Senator SYMINGTON. Keep us posted on this, Mr. Secretary. Do you have a question?

Senator COOPER. When did this government come into being?

Mr. BATTLE. In December of 1962.

Senator AIKEN. It was the United Nations before that.

Mr. BATTLE. We recognized fairly soon after the revolution.

Mr. BREWER. We recognized it, that is, the earlier royalty government.

Mr. BATTLE. That is right.

AIR MILES FROM CAIRO TO TA'IZZ

Senator SYMINGTON. How many air miles is it from Cairo to Ta'izz, roughly—200 miles as a guess?

Mr. BREWER. It is more than 500 miles. I would say around 1,000.

Mr. BATTLE. I would guess that it would be about that, because it is a four-hour air flight.

Mr. BREWER. It is three hours from Yemen.

Mr. BATTLE. I can find out exactly, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is not that important.

Senator AIKEN. That is quite a substantial distance.

What is the present force that is there from Egypt?

Mr. BATTLE. It is down now to around 37, 38 thousand—a reduction from 70 thousand down to around 30 thousand, but this does not mean that he is withdrawing his troops. He has consolidated them. That is better from his point of view. They are not spread out as much as they were.

Senator COOPER. It is the same distance from Cairo to Rome—about the same distance.

Mr. BREWER. About 1,500 miles.

Mr. BADER. It is about 1,500 miles.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you want to say some more about Greece?

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you keep us posted on this?

Mr. BATTLE. I will.

Senator SYMINGTON. On the developments in Yemen. All right, now, will you tell us about—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. 1,500 miles?

Senator SYMINGTON. Is that not amazing, these distances. It is hard to believe.

COUP IN GREECE

We will leave the subject of Yemen and Aden. Tell us a little bit about Greece.

Mr. BATTLE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I met with this subcommittee a week ago today, which was the morning after the coup occurred in the afternoon. I gave you a number of statements that were based then on the situation as we knew it. They have proved fairly accurate, as I told you.

In a general way, at that time as to the situation these statements have been proved to be correct. Those factors are the following: This is a coup of the Colonels and a Brigadier General. They are oriented to the right politically. They have had little experience in government.

The coup occurred. It was very carefully planned. They executed it in a very effective manner from their point of view.

It is absolutely clear to us now that the King did not know anything about it, and, in fact, until recent days has been rather critical of the proposition, the way it was handled and many other aspects of the coup. The coup group have affirmed most vigorously in public and in private statements its desires to continue its relationship with NATO, which is the cornerstone of its policy. It is pro-western. In fact, one member of the government said, "We are with you whether you want it or not."

The King's situation in this is as follows: He has not yet signed the decree suspending various provisions of the constitution. He has refused to sign the decree, putting into effect martial law.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thought that he had.

Mr. BATTLE. It has been claimed from the beginning that he did do this, Senator, but up until the last conversation that our Ambassador had with him he said that he still had not signed the decree, even though they had said publicly, "I have done so." He made a great point as to two or three articles that were suspended, one regarding capital punishment. We are assured by him that he has not done it. It was done in his name. However, they tried to put the entire coup efforts as originally done in the name of the King. However, in the statement yesterday, Papadopoulos admitted publicly that this was arranged by them and without the King's knowledge; that there was no foreign element involved in it.

As far as our position in this is concerned, here is what we believed. The coup was obviously accomplished, and any resort to any other constitutional process is very disturbing to us. The coup has occurred, however.

The first few days, I cautioned this committee when I talked with you last week that any statement by us criticizing the coup or appearing to lend support to any dissident elements within the country could well bring about an effort towards a countercoup, and even possibly a civil war which would be very bloody. It would result, in my judgment, in either an extreme left wing dictatorship or an extreme right wing dictatorship.

I think the chances of that occurring lessen each day as time goes on, but it is still present.

THE KING SHOULD REMAIN IN GREECE

As far as our position on this is concerned, we believe that the King's position is that he remain in Greece and in a very, very difficult situation. In the initial stages, we have taken the position that the King is the most stable element we have there. We have felt that he must try to exercise his own impact on the situation as rapidly as possible to get this stamp on the government and its actions and composition.

For example, we have had in mind a civilianization of the cabinet which he has succeeded in doing. The cabinet is not a distinguished

one. There is very little reason that it is particularly good, but it looks a little bit better as time goes on.

He has brought in a wider representation of the country. It is made up of a combination of military figures, a few senior civil servants, including the Supreme Court Justices who are less important than they are in this country, but one of them, at least, has a certain popular following and a certain distinction.

We believe that the coup group needs the King. We believe the coup group needs us, if it means what it says publicly. We believe that we must try to exercise caution, without taking such actions as to bring about these dangers of a civil war in the situation.

The suggestion was made to more and more representatives of the country, hopefully, to get a return to the constitutional process as soon as possible.

The King has made a statement that he hopes that there will be a return to constitutional processes.

There has been one press report that Papadopoulos has made a similar statement. It's probably not true, or we would have known about it by this time.

U.S. COOL TO COUP GOVERNMENT

So as far as our own actions are concerned, we have been extremely cool towards the coup government. We only yesterday—I think we have done it—I authorized yesterday the Embassy to respond to a routine note from the Foreign Ministry simply informing us that they were in business. That is the first official communication that we have had with them, but the British and others are going ahead. We felt that this was no question of recognition involved, from the legal point of view; that we are better staying there, trying to maintain such efforts as we can and to hope that we can influence the situation.

It will be noted that in the two or three days which have elapsed, we made a statement that we were reviewing the question of the military assistance program. What we have actually done is that we have stopped all major equipment shipments.

Senator FULBRIGHT. How large is that?

Mr. BATTLE. \$65 million, sir.

Mr. BREWER. \$65 million, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And what does that amount to? In what kind?

Mr. BATTLE. The kinds are the major equipment. We are trying to locate all of the equipment that is about to go there. We have not made a basic decision with respect to military assistance. For the information of the committee, the practical effect is that the reason we have said that I wanted to do as much as we can—I want to keep dangling the question of what we are going to do. The effect, so far as we are concerned, is that we have stopped tanks, we have stopped the airplanes, to the extent that we control that.

U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN GREECE

Senator FULBRIGHT. How large a military presence do we have there—how many military personnel?

Mr. BREWER. There are over 6,000, including families.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I mean military personnel—3,000, are there?

Mr. BREWER. Just about.

Senator SYMINGTON. The military themselves. Not the people who are civilians, but the military—is it 3,000?

Mr. BREWER. I can get you the exact figures. [Note: 3,285]

Senator FULBRIGHT. How many [deleted] would that be?

Mr. BATTLE. I do not know.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Are you sure they have nothing to do with this?

Mr. BATTLE. I am. I am absolutely sure.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I was thinking about the takeover. Is there any indication there?

ROLE OF PAPANDREOU

Mr. BATTLE. I would not put it in those words. As you know, an election was called for May 28. The largest party is the party headed by George Papandreou, who has been a moderate. He has not been an extreme moderate. He has not taken an extreme position. His health, however, is not good. He is not a young man. His son, Andreas, around whom much of the center of the storm has centered, has been exactly, well, what his political thoughts are no one can be sure. He has, however, based on the view of those people who know, been drifting steadily to the left for some time.

Senator GORE. Who is that?

Senator FULBRIGHT. You named Andreas.

Mr. BATTLE. He has been drifting steadily to the left.

Senator FULBRIGHT. He is anti-American.

Mr. BATTLE. Also, anti-American.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you equate anti-American with being a Communist?

Mr. BATTLE. What I am trying to say, Senator, is that at least as to the question of what he is doing, in the eyes of the conservative party—in the eyes of the King—he is their enemy. Now Communist, I hate to say that—I do not think that he was.

Senator FULBRIGHT. At least, in the views of the King?

Mr. BATTLE. He was in the eyes of the conservatives and in the eyes of the King there, he was their enemy.

ROLE OF THE QUEEN MOTHER

Senator FULBRIGHT. Is the Queen Mother in Athens?

Mr. BATTLE. To the best of our knowledge she is there.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you know anything about whether she was in this?

Mr. BATTLE. We have no knowledge about anything whatever. We have heard very little about her in any of the official telegrams or communications that we have had about the Queen Mother.

Mr. BREWER. She has been standing well away from it. The inference we have gotten is that her influence over the last few years has been certainly on the downgrade.

SPLIT BETWEEN GEORGE AND ANDREAS PAPANDREOU

Senator SYMINGTON. When I was there in January, I am almost certain that the Ambassador told me that there was a major split between George and Andreas.

Mr. BATTLE. There was, indeed, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. With both of them in jail. Did they meet in the van or what happened? As I understand, George is as opposed to the King as anyone, but that there was a great deal of respect for him in the country.

Mr. BATTLE. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. Andreas was supposed to be opposed to his father, because his father was not enough opposed to the King. There was not much respect for him in the country.

Mr. BATTLE. Your statement is generally correct, sir. As George over recent months has become more defiant, the two have tended to make up and they have come together both personally and politically over recent months. It was generally believed that if the Center Union won an election, that while George may be the head—the titular head of the party—Andreas would be the leader of that party.

Senator FULBRIGHT. And try to get rid of the King, is that it?

Mr. BATTLE. That is what they suspected. Was there ever a flat statement about that?

Mr. BREWER. The campaign took the form in the last few days of stating, "You are not King of the Hellens—you are King of the Conservative Party." This was stated both by George and Andreas in the last week.

Senator SYMINGTON. What this really gets down to is that the military coup was to prevent an election, does it not?

Mr. BATTLE. To prevent an election of what they thought would be a clearly anti-monarchist and very left wing group in their opinion.

Senator GORE. Which they thought would win.

Mr. BATTLE. Which they thought would win, yes, sir. The Center Union Party is the largest party. We think, probably, they would have won.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me ask a very delicate question. I mean it very sincerely, however. If it looked as though they were going to lose this election, it would be smart for the King to approve clandestinely the overthrow and have it appear that he did not want it.

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, yes, it would have been, but we do not think that is what happened. If you will let me go off the record here.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

ROLE OF TURKEY

How about the Turks?

Mr. BATTLE. The Turks have been very cool and detached, waiting to see. They are obviously concerned about this. At the first blush of this thing, we got off a message to our ambassador to caution them about doing anything that would exacerbate the situation. We have been watching the situation. We have found no effort of any kind of move in on top of what is happening in Greece. There are rumors, of course. But there is no indication. We suspect that everybody is a little nervous. We expect that the coup in Greece does not want to take on any more than it has. It has ahead

of it economic and political problems. We doubt that they want to get into the Cyprus thing.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have you any questions, Senator Gore?

U.S. AMBASSADOR CALLS ON THE KING

Senator GORE. I have a high regard for Phil Talbot. I would expect him to add to the coolness and the discretion.

Has there been any publicity in Greece of his calling upon the King? I saw something about it in the press.

Mr. BATTLE. There have been numerous accounts here of his calls on the King. The press in Athens is completely under the control of the coup group.

Mr. BREWER. He has made three calls on the King. That fact is known, but the contents of his calls, if any reports have gotten out, is pure speculation.

Mr. BATTLE. I have not seen any report in the press as to his calls—any attention to it in Athens.

Mr. BREWER. Other than the fact that he has made the calls, nothing further.

Mr. BATTLE. The foreign press has reported it, but the Greek press has not.

Mr. BREWER. It is a censored press and they are not talking about it.

Senator GORE. Have we maintained any contact through [deleted] or otherwise with Papandreou?

Mr. BATTLE. No, sir, not to my knowledge.

Mr. BREWER. Margaret Papandreou has been herself to the Embassy on a number of occasions. She is an American citizen. She came in with her father and her son on the very first morning. We have been in touch with her repeatedly about what the status is of Andreas. She has been sending him clothing. He has asked for sunglasses and she sent those out to him. We have been in close touch that way, but otherwise not.

KEEPING CONTACT WITH BOTH SIDES

Senator GORE. We may be fortunate to have this contact, because obviously there is widespread support for this majority party, and for this leader who is now, I suppose, out. In the event that they have a civil war it might be well that we keep some contact with both sides.

Mr. BATTLE. I agree thoroughly. The thing that we want if possible is to have something to obviate a civil war and a great upheaval there. The consequences of that would be disastrous.

Senator GORE. It could be a touchstone for a war.

Mr. BATTLE. Yes. I think that we have to be very cautious about this. We do not want to go too far in either approving or disapproving the current regime. If we are too disapproving of it we will stimulate reaction which will be an excuse for somebody to try to do something.

Mr. BREWER. We have had contacts with George Mavros, who is a member of the Center Union Party, one of the co-leaders of this group, who came to the Embassy and gave us his idea of what we should do about the coup and so on. So we are constantly in contact with both sides.

Senator GORE. What were his ideas?

Mr. BREWER. Well, they were much like the ideas that were expressed by the King; namely, that we have got to work from here—maybe we can get participation of all sides and make what would be called an ecumenical government. He would like to be Prime Minister of that.

RESISTANCE TO THE COUP

Senator GORE. Has the Embassy had any indication from any of the leaders of the party that hostile, physical military action was contemplated? Do we have any information of any organized resistance to the coup?

Mr. BATTLE. No.

Senator GORE. Does the military have a monopoly on weaponry in the country.

Mr. BATTLE. The bulk of it certainly is in their hands. I am sure, however, there are guns in caves and what have you in typically Greek way, but the bulk of the military weaponry is controlled by the coup group.

Senator GORE. Are any of the deposed military, senior military leaders of a political bent that might encourage them to supply a movement with weapons, sufficient for such a proposed movement?

Mr. BATTLE. I am not aware of any.

Mr. BREWER. The military, by and large, those who have been deposed, are just as conservative as the others. I do not think that they would go to the Russians for support for arms.

Senator GORE. In the event that someone like Albania, or some other group—I do not want to rule out another function of the Communist Party moving in—in the event that the Communists saw fit to exploit this, do we have any indication of any leadership through which they would do such?

Mr. BATTLE. I would imagine, Senator Gore, I would judge that over the period that led to this you will find a polarization of the right and the left. And you would feel the effects of this. What group, if any, could emerge as the leader of this counter-effort, if it was made, whether it would be supported by Communists or not is anybody's guess. We know who a great many of the top leaders are, and as we have said, they are under arrest. Do you have any comment?

POPULAR SUPPORT FOR MILITARY

Mr. BREWER. Maybe the answer to this is that the military can be identified in their vote in any national election. In the last election the military vote nationwide was 12 percent, with 1.3 percent among the 180,000 being military. That was the vote. The rest was divided between the Center Union Party and the Conservative Party. The Conservative Party ran about 65–66 percent, and the Center Union 35 percent, at a time when the Center Union won the national election it was 53 percent. So that gives you the relation in the army of the people who are trained in that respect.

At one place there have been a couple of shots fired. Reportedly, there was very little resistance and that was put down immediately.

Without making any guess, Crete is the place, the center of the Republican forces; that is, the center of the anti-monarchist forces. Most of the deputies from Crete are close Andreas and George Papandreou supporters. That is the island where you have the vote running about 75 percent for that group, and if someone were to get something started—if I were picking a mountain top like this one, that is the island.

Senator GORE. When you say "force," you mean political force?

Mr. BREWER. That is right. On the military side, I do not see it in the army as such.

SOVIET REACTION TO GREEK COUP

Senator GORE. One other question. What has been the reaction of the Soviets to this?

Mr. BREWER. So far as we know—I will check this out further—it has been very quiet. They do spread the sort of stuff that we had last night that Glezos was about to be shot. This is the Communist type of thing. He is a pro-Communist Deputy who was liberated and won a seat in Parliament. His name is the only Greek Communist name that means anything worldwide. In East Berlin about six years ago they were carrying signs to free him from jail. This is a name that has international stature. They have started that campaign.

I am sure that the Soviets are in on that.

Mr. BATTLE. The Russians have put out the charges that we were behind the coup—not the Embassy in Athens, to my knowledge.

Mr. BREWER. The Moscow Radio is saying it all of the time and this is one reason that I think that Papadopoulos met this head-on by saying the King is not involved—nobody is involved—I did this on my own.

Senator SYMINGTON. He is the head man?

Mr. BREWER. He is the head one.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is he a military man, and how old is he?

Mr. BATTLE. He is about 48, I believe.

EGYPT, THE U.S. AND YEMEN

Senator GORE. One more question. Do you think that they want our AID officials out in Yemen? Is this because of Nationalism or is this Cairo, or is this anti-Americanism? How about AID officials becoming persona non grata? Is it for some particular involvement or some activity?

Mr. BATTLE. We know of no reason whatever for this particular incident. It is the most clear-cut case of a trumped up charge. The direction from which this came we do not know. It is perfectly clear that the local Egyptians, both military and civil, are involved in this in Yemen. Whether this is Cairo-directed, we cannot be sure. However, as I said before you came in, Cairo has leverage to do something about this with Yemen. In my talks yesterday with the Ambassador and in the follow-up talks with the Foreign Minister in Cairo, we have made it very clear to them that we look to them to try to help us in this situation, and that if they fail to do so this is going to have a very bad effect between them and us. We cannot pin anything down but we know that locally they are involved. I

have some doubt that they have directed it from Cairo. I think that the Cairo government itself, however, is divided and has been for many months. I have had many talks with them as to whether they want us in Yemen or not. One faction would like nothing better than to see us thrown out of there. Another faction, I think, is the faction that would like to see relations between Egypt and us improved.

They are more cautious and would not want to see us forced out of there. They are split in Cairo. I think they are split in the same lines in Yemen, but without any doubt local Egyptians are involved and without doubt Cairo had the leverage, if they wished to use it, to bring about help.

Senator GORE. Thank you.

DIFFERENCES WITH THE BRITISH

Senator SYMINGTON. In reviewing the staff's analysis of Yemen, as I understand it, we are on a different side than the British, so far as governments are concerned?

Mr. BATTLE. The British have never recognized the Yemen Government that came into power.

Senator SYMINGTON. No, according to this memo I have the Argentines, Belgium and Canada. Why is that—why is that? Tell me why would we recognize along with the Red Chinese, the Ethiopians, Iraq, and so did Russia? Why did we recognize the government and have this split? Therefore, we are supporting the republicans, and the British are supporting the royalists. Is that not a strange situation because of the Aden situation right next to it?

Mr. BATTLE. It goes back almost five years. At the time that recognition was made, the thought was that this was a truly liberal response to an unpalatable regime, and that there were reasons for the change—that the Republican regime was a truly liberal government that was going to try to respond to the needs of the people and help a very bad situation. The British never agreed with it, and many others did not.

Senator SYMINGTON. In this case, we are on the side of Nasser, and the British are opposed to it.

Mr. BATTLE. I would not say on the side of Nasser. We recognize them, but I think that our goal and purpose there is very different. We are not on the side of Nasser.

Senator SYMINGTON. I may have over-simplified it. We are supplying materials and aid to the same government that Nasser is supplying soldiers to.

Mr. BATTLE. That is right. Our aid has, however, been primarily, as I said, \$2.4 million in this fiscal year, mainly in the completion of a road project begun a long time ago and well digging, sanitation help and things of that sort.

Mr. BREWER. These are all prior to the revolution.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ROYALISTS

Senator SYMINGTON. I have three staff questions that I would like to ask:

Which Middle East countries were giving military assistance to the royalists in Yemen?

Mr. BATTLE. The military assistance—the bulk of it, comes from Saudi Arabia. There have been reports of the Iranians putting in equipment there. There have been so many cases that the Jordanians were helping one degree or another. Is there anybody else?

Mr. BREWER. No.

Senator SYMINGTON.

Which Arab countries are giving military assistance to the republicans?

Mr. BATTLE. The bulk of it is very largely coming from Egypt, and I think it is fairly clear that the Russians have underwritten part of it.

Senator SYMINGTON. It is absolutely amazing the way that these are cork-screwed around.

The second question:

Is any sizable amount of American-made military equipment being used by either side in the conflict? Is the Shah of Iran sending American equipment into Yemen?

Mr. BATTLE. Sizable, no, sir. I do not think that there have been reports or, rather, I do believe that there have been reports at various times of individual rifles and things of American origin popping up, but not, certainly, in sizable amounts.

SUPPORT FROM THE SHAH OF IRAN

Senator SYMINGTON. Now the second part of the question which I have already read—

Is the Shah of Iran sending American equipment into Yemen?

Mr. BATTLE. I have had no reports of that. Will you answer that?

Mr. BREWER. This is very obscure. There have apparently been caches of equipment which originated in the United States which have been taken from royalist caves. The republicans have said, and the allegations have been made that it was from Iran, but there has been no substance to show that.

Mr. BATTLE. It has been small—it has not been large. There have been many rumors that the Shah was becoming increasingly interested in this, was helping it. Perhaps, that might be.

Senator SYMINGTON. This is extremely important, and I know that many of the senators are interested in this, as well as the Chairman. Just what is going on in Iran from the standpoint of arms. But as I see it now it is getting to be a real crossword puzzle, because the Shah is receiving \$100 million of Russian military equipment because he is afraid of Nasser, yet he is slipping him some military equipment into Yemen in support of Nasser.

Mr. BATTLE. No, in support of the Royalists.

Senator SYMINGTON. He supports the Royalists—he and the British are on one side in Yemen?

Mr. BATTLE. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And we and the Egyptians are on the other side in Yemen.

Mr. BATTLE. I do not like to put it on the side of the Egyptians. We are not.

Senator SYMINGTON. We are giving them help, supporting the same people that they are giving arms to.

Mr. BREWER. We are not giving them.

Mr. BATTLE. The only aid project is the one I mentioned.

Senator SYMINGTON. What do we give them in the matter of aid?

Mr. BATTLE. \$2.4 million for this fiscal year which will, obviously, over now, which is the completion work on a road that we started some years ago, some well digging equipment, sanitation equipment, health, that kind of thing.

Senator SYMINGTON. We are giving them a road so that they can move fast and making them healthy, and the others are giving them guns that shoot, but we are not supporting them. I am being a little sarcastic on purpose.

RUSSIAN AND CHINESE EFFORTS IN YEMEN

Mr. BATTLE. Let me make one other point. This is a terribly complicated situation. The Russians and the Chinese have been making quite an effort in Yemen. The Chinese and the Russians we think may be competing with each other.

Senator SYMINGTON. And us.

Mr. BATTLE. And us, yes. The reason that the Soviets have been interested in keeping the Egyptians in there is for their own interest, obviously. Over recent weeks they have been evidencing a desire to deal directly with the Yemeni government, rather than through the Egyptians, which the Egyptians appear not to have liked and have gone along with them. One of the reasons that we have thought that we ought to stay in there in a modest way is to keep from abdicating the situation to the Chinese and the Russians. That is our aid program; it is in that modest way. It was to counter and not walk off a situation where we thought for a lot of reasons it would be better to be off-stage there and not abdicate completely to either the Soviets or the Chinese domination. We are coming off awfully close to having exactly that now.

Senator SYMINGTON. With the committee's permission, I would like to insert as part of the record this excellent statement made in the staff memorandum as to the situation in Yemen which verifies this as being accurate and of major importance. I will not bother you any more at this time, Mr. Secretary, it getting closer to the time for adjourning. There are nine questions here about Greece. Would you be good enough to answer those for the record. I think we have covered many of them. I know that we have covered some of them. I am not sure that we have covered all of them. They are very well put together.

Mr. BATTLE. I will do that.

Senator SYMINGTON. That is all I have. We will make this a part of the record then at this point.

[The staff memorandum referred to follows:]

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

April 28, 1967

Subcommittee on Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs

STAFF MEMORANDUM

The Political Situation in Greece

The leaders of the military coup, which took place on April 20, 1967, seem to be in full control of the Greek Government. King Constantine presided over a cabinet meeting on April 26, 1967, thus giving the regime an aura of constitutional legitimacy.

The military junta is reportedly led by Colonel George Papadopoulos. There is no evidence of dissension within the ranks of the armed services.

According to Colonel Papadopoulos, the King was unaware of this coup. The King now seems to be in a position somewhere between the military on the one hand and the conservative civilian opposition on the other. How much influence he has in either directing the present government or guiding political events in the near future is not clear.

Most of those arrested on political charges last week have been released. Former Prime Minister George Papandreou and his son, Andreas, are still in prison, along with about a thousand people considered to be left wing.

Questions

1. Were American officials in contact with any members of the new military government immediately before the coup? Did we have any indications that the King was going to move against Papandreou but was beaten to the punch by the new military rulers?

2. The statements of the new government as to what is wrong in Greece—such as corruption, and unrest among the farmers—sound very much like the complaints of Andreas Papandreou. What is the difference between what this military government thinks is wrong with Greece and what the Papandreous think?

3. Now that the military government is installed, what are the major problems with which it must deal?

4. What will the United States reaction be if the new Greek government sends delegates to the NATO Parliamentarian's meeting or the Interparliamentary Union?

5. Greece has been in a state of political crisis for 22 months. Has there been a major policy review of our relations with Greece during that time?

6. What is the status of our military aid program at this covered time?

7. What consultation over the Greek situation has taken place to date in the North Atlantic Council? Do you expect the subject to be brought up?

8. How will we react if the King is removed or becomes a puppet of the junta?

9. Since the military men who staged the coup are mostly American trained and the equipment they used of American origin, isn't our silence on Greece generally taken as a sign that we support the new leaders?

Senator SYMINGTON. Is there anything that you would like to ask, Senator Pell?

OPPOSITION TO ALL COUPS

Senator PELL. Just one particular point.

Senator SYMINGTON. You go right ahead.

Senator PELL. I do not think that this has been covered.

There was another situation that I think should be covered. Some years ago, I remember that there was going to be an election held in a certain country, and when the election was held that you wished to have held—I made this prediction at that time—that they would go ahead and have their putsch, which they did. And it seems to me that this is a very real analysis of what happened in Greece. Now there will be a very real analogy of what has happened in Greece. Now there will be an election in a month or two and as a result in the probable election is the attitude on the part of some would not have affected but very few votes of the majority of the people.

I cannot get through my dull brain what the difference is between these two. We protested the one to the high heavens, and are not intended to protest the other. I think we should protest it. We are up to the point that we are against a coup either way.

If it had resulted in blood being shed, blood is being shed all over the world equally for other reasons. Why are we not making a protest here?

Mr. BATTLE. In the first instance, we did not want the coup to occur. I reviewed it just before you came in.

The second point is that our response is contained in the information that you asked the last time we were here to check where coups have been had. I have a list of those. We have had the historian working on this since you raised the question. In many instances we have refrained from statements, depending on what we thought about the situation. I have that list for you. I have the statement for the record. That will list the number of cases where we failed to respond.

The reason I feel that we do as we do, particularly in this, in the first stages of this if we had, in fact, said that we did not like the coup, we ran the risk of being the reason for a counter effort with a coalition of liberal and leftist forces which could have caused great civil unrest and have resulted in a civil war in Greece. That is the reason. We do not like it. The desire to simply say something that reflected our own thoughts on it was very great, but if we had

made such a statement I think that the consequences of it in the initial stages might very well have been the means of civil war in Greece with the possibility of a dictatorship of the left or of the right emerging from this, neither one of which we wanted.

Senator SYMINGTON. You might have gotten some Turkish interest in the situation.

Mr. BATTLE. I think as to Cyprus, the consequences of this were very bad. I think that we have had some success on this. I am in no way saying that I am happy with any of it. We have tried to get the King to take the lead. We have tried to get the King to broaden the government and the cabinet. The King has stood up to the coup by refusing to sign the original papers, the decrees that would have suspended the constitution and declared martial law. He still has not signed them. The press says that he has. Yesterday the coup admitted publicly that this was not known to the King—it was not backed by the King—they went ahead by themselves.

I think we have managed to distinguish the King's position from the coup's position.

Senator SYMINGTON. As I said, also, what the Secretary told us this morning is that the position is completely fluid. We are not taking any firm position, we are just waiting and watching. It is a very good question, a very logical question.

NEED FOR U.S. STATEMENT

Senator PELL. I do not like Russia. I do not like the situation in some places. But the reason that we are willing, apparently, to shed blood and to shed other people's blood is so that we can produce a government that can presumably have the capacity to perform effectively in the area. If we are faced with civil war and blood being shed or a right-wing dictatorship, do we prefer the right-wing dictatorship and not having blood being shed for it?

Mr. BATTLE. I prefer this, too.

Senator PELL. Should we not make a statement?

Mr. BATTLE. They have written two or three statements. I do not prepare how we say this without having effects there that would be unknown and we could see the end of the line.

Senator PELL. It might be extremely possible to do so.

Mr. BATTLE. Not if it brings about a civil war and a left-wing dictatorship.

Senator PELL. You believe that a left-wing dictatorship is worse? We might not have a sheer democracy?

Mr. BATTLE. We are perfectly certain that the King has made a statement calling for a return to the constitutional processes. I think we can endorse that statement. We have been pressing them to make their own statement. Instead of saying that the coup is bad, we have come out and said or will say that we are for the constitutional processes, which, in effect, to anyone who reads carefully would be about the same thing.

I think that the dangers of a counter coup, the thing that I talked about, will lessen each day, but, particularly as long as the King is making his own effort to get the government moving in the direction that he wants it to move and that we want it to move, I think that we have made some progress. I do not find it very attractive just sitting and saying nothing, either. On the other hand,

the consequences seem to us worse than the statement. The statement relieves us of, perhaps, a desire to comment on the situation. I hope that we are going to be able to endorse the very specific steps they take which will affect them, and that we will say that we are in favor of constitutional processes, not coups, rather than taking the risk of a statement, the consequences of which we did not see.

We can make an argument for that.

Senator PELL. Just one more question.

I would hope that the administration could express its views.

I would request that the historian also, if you would, dig up a collection of the right-wing coups that the United States has refrained from publicly criticizing, and if you will, to submit that statement to us.

Mr. BATTLE. It will take a few weeks.

Senator PELL. I thank you for it.

Mr. BATTLE. I will feel free to make this statement when I see that.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Javits would like very much to talk with you. That is all for today.

Senator PELL. That is all I have in my mind.

Senator SYMINGTON. The hearing is terminated subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 o'clock a.m., the subcommittee recessed, subject to the call of the chair.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MAY 2, 1997

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Pell, McCarthy, and Hickenlooper.

S. 1029, to improve certain benefits for employees in high-risk situations, came up for further consideration and was carried over.

An original resolution (S. Res. 115) authorizing members of the Senate to respond to official invitations was considered and ordered reported without objection.

H.R. 3399, to authorize the extension of the life of the Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission to November 6, 1968, was ordered without objection.

Ex. G, 90/1, Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961, was ordered reported by voice vote.

S. 1030, the Informational Media Guaranty Bill, was discussed and carried over.

Ex. G, 88/1, Conventions Concerning International Exchange of Publications and Documents was ordered reported.

Ex. A, 90/1, Amendment to Article 109 of the United Nations Charter was also ordered reported.

Ex. C, 87/2, ILO Convention No. 116; Ex. G., 89/2, ILO Convention No. 122 concerning employment policy; and S.J. Res. 71, were all carried over.

Senator Gore asked and received permission to print the hearings of the Disarmament Subcommittee.

The committee discussed the nomination of Rutherford M. Poats before adjourning.

[The committee adjourned at 11:30 a.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MAY 2, 1997

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 2:30 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Lausche, Symington, and Cooper.

Asian Development Bank affairs briefing by Eugene R. Black, Special Advisor to the President, accompanied by Joseph W. Barr, Under Secretary of the Treasury.

[The committee adjourned at 4:25 p.m.]

UNITED STATES TROOPS IN EUROPE

Wednesday, May 3, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMBINED SUBCOMMITTEE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
AND ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON THE
SUBJECT OF UNITED STATES TROOPS IN EUROPE,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Mike Mansfield (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present representing the Committee on Foreign Relations: Senators Mansfield, Fulbright, Sparkman, Church, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

Representing the Senate Committee on Armed Services: Senators Stennis, Symington, Jackson, Miller, and Pearson.

Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Lowenstein of the Committee on Foreign Relations staff; Mr. Kirbow and Mr. Braswell of the Committee on Armed Services staff; and Miss Stabler of the Library of Congress.

[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

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STATEMENT OF HON. DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY EUGENE V. ROSTOW, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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IMPORTANCE OF A CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY [P. 58]

Secretary RUSK. The first has to do with the matter of deterrence. By the middle of the 1950's a nuclear exchange became an operational possibility. President Eisenhower in his second term, and President Kennedy and President Johnson, have had to think about problems that no other President has ever had to think about.

Now both we and the Soviet Union understand a great deal about what a nuclear exchange would mean. We are not sure that other governments, including many governments in NATO, have really entered deeply into that question, but I am convinced—and, as I say, who knows what the right answers are—I am convinced that nuclear power alone is not a deterrent to less than all-out war,

because moving promptly to nuclear war is so irrational that none will believe it. The Russians won't believe it, we won't believe it, and our allies won't believe it.

Therefore, unless there is a conventional capability to deter the less than all-out nuclear war, we run the risk of not having a deterrent at all. So that is one point I just wish to suggest for the subcommittee to think about.

The second has to do with a point that was mentioned briefly, I believe, in your earlier hearing with Mr. Katzenbach and with Mr. McNamara that I would like to emphasize very strongly, and that is that in the event of a crisis, it is extremely important for the chiefs of government of their time to have a number of options open to them.

The problem of managing a crisis is much more crucial today than ever before in our history, and it would be most unfortunate if in a matter of hours or even in a matter of a very few days the chiefs of government of NATO were faced with a choice between nuclear war on the one side and surrender on the other.

Now, U.S. forces in the central front of NATO are 20 percent of the ground forces. It is very important, it seems to me, to preserve for the President of the United States some options in the opening stages of a crisis, to gain some time to find out for certain what the purposes of the other side are, to give the processes of contact and consultation some chance to resolve the crisis before it is too late.

These two points mean to me quite frankly that those who talk about a "plateglass" doctrine are just not really in touch with reality. I do not believe that the chiefs of government of NATO would move to nuclear war in the first 48 hours if there were a conventional clash for then it means the last decision they will make. It will mean utter destruction of their countries, and it would mean the loss in this country of probably 100 million people in the first hour or so. Chiefs of governments simply are not going to rush into that decision.

So I would hope that we would relate the conventional—we and our European friends—would relate the conventional forces of NATO with, first, deterrence, a realistic view of deterrence; and, secondly, maintaining the options so that crises can be managed without the destruction of a good part of the Northern Hemisphere, if possible.

PROPOSED TROOP ROTATIONAL PLAN

Now, we have been consulting, as the Members know, about the possibility of utilizing mobility and testing the dual basing concept in order to bring back to this country certain ground and air units.

As the chairman has pointed out—and, Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate your comments on that subject—we have in mind, as Secretary McNamara expressed here the other day, that we would rotate back to this country roughly two-thirds of one division element of strength. That includes the brigades themselves plus certain support, comparable support units, and rotate back a portion of our fighter-bomber air wings.

Since that meeting we have had further discussions in the tripartite groups, and because of the high proportion of our fighter-

bombers to NATO total fighter-bomber strength, we did think that it was wise, in view of the political and military reactions among our allies, to reduce the number of aircraft that we expected to rotate back to this country from 144 to 98, and to make comparable upward adjustments in the ground force rotation. The total rotational plan would be approximately the same, but the mix between ground and air would be somewhat different.

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(The prepared statement of Secretary Rusk follows:)

For political and military reasons, we have therefore concluded that substantial, balanced NATO forces, including United States forces, are still required. I believe this proposition is generally accepted in this country as elsewhere.

The question, therefore, has arisen not in terms of whether American forces are still needed on the ground in Europe. The question has been posed in terms of whether the present levels of those forces could not be safely reduced.

The Administration seriously examines this question each year. Last year it undertook a special and intensive review in the Trilateral discussions among the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic. Those Trilateral discussions ended last week in London. They were successful in providing a good basis of understanding. The matter will be discussed further, as it should be, within NATO. We believe it important that the final agreement be reached in this Allied framework.

Our own redeployment plan has been explained in detail by Secretary McNamara. What he told you of the Army and Air Force rotation plan—the units and men involved, the timetable—still holds with one exception.

The German authorities were concerned about the redeployment of a substantial portion of the three tactical fighter wings now based in Germany, and as a result of further discussion with them, we have amended that portion of the plan.

It is now agreed that 120 of the 216 aircraft involved will remain in Germany. 96 of the aircraft will be redeployed to the U.S. All 216 of the aircraft will be together in Germany once a year for exercises. A compatible adjustment will be made upwards in the redeployment of the ground forces which Mr. McNamara described.

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LEVEL OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES DEPENDS ON SOVIET RESPONSE [P. 63]

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Secretary, as I understand now, your position is to stop where you are now after you have covered this 18,000 plus the 21,000 dependents, 35,000 additional military, as I get your figure.

Secretary RUSK. Well, we think, sir, that this level of conventional forces in NATO is about where we ought to be. When you say stop now, this depends upon one very important factor, and that is what the response, if any, of the Soviet Union will be on this issue.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I will submit to the committee a statement which Mr. Kosygin made in London on this point which seemed to harden their position on the question of mutual withdrawals of forces from Central Europe because he seemed to connect the withdrawal of Soviet forces with the final confirmation of the existing boundaries in Central Europe, meaning particularly the stabilization of the German Democratic Republic and the consolidation of the status quo.

If that is their position then this is somewhat of a retreat from some of the impressions we have had before.

Now, quite frankly, I do not know at this point whether the Soviets will react either by a direct approach, as one or another member of NATO will almost surely make in the weeks and months ahead, or by the process of what has come to be called mutual examples.

We will watch that very closely. I am inclined to believe that the Soviets will not negotiate at this point on mutual withdrawal of forces because they are apparently nervous about being charged with negotiating a mutual withdrawal in Central Europe in a way that would release U.S. forces for Vietnam and bring them under the fire of China.

My guess is that if there is any prospect of any movement on this it is likely to come without agreement, but through what is called mutual example, that they simply take certain steps. We have had one or two intelligence rumors that there might have been some movement of Soviet forces out of East Germany. We are trying to check that. We have no confirmation of that at the present time. But I think, sir, that if the Soviets were to show some real interest in this problem this could, in turn, be taken into account by NATO as to what forces are required in NATO.

BASIS OF DECISION TO REDUCE TROOP STRENGTH

Senator STENNIS. I have not had much to say about this matter. Frankly, I have felt for some time that perhaps we could reduce some of our supply troops over there and a lot of the dependents and help this balance and payments situation. You could perhaps withdraw some of the military. But I have been opposed to the idea of just going in and doing it arbitrarily, particularly with this war going on. As I see it, it is getting worse, and I have thought, with the greatest deference, that it is a mistake to bring up a resolution, to go any further than you gentlemen have gone. But I am glad that you have seen fit to do what you have because I know you thought it was safe to do it.

Now, how much of your decision though was based on saving money and how much was based on lessening tensions, if I may put it that way? You have already mentioned both.

Secretary RUSK. There was a mix. There were a good many elements that went into the picture.

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WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH TROOPS FROM ADEN [P. 69]

Next to Yemen is Aden, and in Aden when the British pull out in 1968, there is going to be nothing left but the Communist countries.

My point is why isn't it much more important for us, if we support British troops anywhere, if we are going to continue this subsidizing of British troops somewhere, to subsidize them in Aden instead of Germany?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we are very much disturbed about Britain's pulling out of Aden before there is some stability in that area. I do not have the impression that this is a matter that the British are treating solely as a financial problem. They have not indicated

to us that financial help would solve the problem as far as they are concerned.

We would hope that they would not pull out in the middle of this order and pressures against Aden from the Yemen. We continue to consult with them on that, to emphasize that point to them.

Secondly, we do believe that the other members of NATO, the European members of NATO, ought to get more interested in the Near East, which is immediately adjacent to their own NATO European area, and the resources of which are important to Europe, even though we ourselves have major investments there.

So I would not quarrel with your concern about what is happening in the Middle East in that particular spot right at this moment.

Whether we can get the British to continue to pack the load there until there is some assurance of real stability, very frankly today I cannot say.

On the European side, what we have tried to do is to come to a trilateral arrangement which would make sense among the three governments involved.

Now, in this package, for example, it has been very important for us to be told by the Bundesbank that it will continue its practice of not converting dollars into gold as a part of a policy of international monetary cooperation.

Senator SYMINGTON. I saw that statement this morning.

Secretary RUSK. And working with our own Treasury in trying to do something about the whole question of monetary liquidity. These things all merge into each other.

I would suppose that the trilateral discussions would stand on their own merits both on the financial side and on the military side.

But, Senator, I wish I could give you some comfort about the Middle East this morning. But I just cannot, quite frankly, and that question is not resolved.

We ourselves would not want to be called on to fill a vacuum.

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BASIS FOR BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM ADEN [P. 71]

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think the British would stay in Aden if the United States offered to offset the foreign exchange cost of the British presence in Aden for the purchase of military equipment?

Secretary RUSK. I would doubt it; I would doubt it very strongly.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why is that? Their economy could fold up if they lose their Middle East oil.

Secretary RUSK. We have made that argument to them very strongly.

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U.S. STATURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST [P. 71]

Secretary RUSK. On the matter of the Yemen: Again I would not want to argue with you very hard on that point, but I would urge you to consider withholding such a resolution until we see whether we can get these two fellows out of the pokey whom the Yemenis

are holding, because we ourselves have this point very much under consideration as to whether we ought to try to maintain relations with the Yemen. But we have not said anything about it. And I think it would be rather dangerous to say anything about it until we get these two men out of jail because we would like to rescue them.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You had better get them out very quickly because I am going to file the resolution before very long. I considered filing it today.

Secretary RUSK. As you know, our relations with Egypt have been deteriorating pretty badly because of the attitude of Nasser himself. In his speech yesterday it was about as bad a speech as he has made in two years.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was going to suggest that speech yesterday was just a continuation of the vituperation.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

RUMORED IMF LOAN TO EGYPT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is there to the rumor that the International Monetary Fund is going to make Nasser an \$80 million loan, or something like that, to tide him over.

Secretary RUSK. May I ask Mr. Rostow to comment?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Mr. ROSTOW. We have been approached over a period of months by the government of the UAR for improvement of relations and indeed for preparing a list of conditions that we would think appropriate on the basis of which we could encourage private investment, private American investment, in the UAR, and to get their debt situation—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would any private investing companies be foolhardy enough to invest there as long as this situation exists?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, I mean there are two American oil companies that have contracts and are proceeding for the development of oil there, but we have told them in the last few days that the developments in Yemen and the change in the situation now precipitated by this new speech of Nasser are very serious indeed and would require us to reconsider all the steps that have been considered so far, and we have just stopped working on those.

The fund—they have resisted negotiations with the fund for a long time. We urged—we said it was inexpedient for improvement of relations, and the fund has worked out tentatively a deal with them and some of the other European creditors which was by way of preparation for a program of encouraging private investment in Egypt.

Of course these things are all superseded now by the political development to which you and Senator Symington have referred, but the government of the UAR seems to have been proceeding on two paths and the two paths were totally inconsistent.

We were perfectly willing to talk with them about the possibility of improving relations on terms we regard as fair. But now, of course, we are taking a totally different line. At the same time we are in active consultation with other governments about the possibility of joint concerted diplomatic action in that whole area in the interest of containing these dangers to which you refer.

Secretary RUSK. I would have to report, Senator, that there has been a curious inattention on the part of our European friends in NATO to this area even though it is right next to them. At the last ministerial meeting of NATO, I proposed there be an immediate meeting of the North Atlantic Council on the Near East. The response was, "Well, Christmas holidays are coming and then New Year's holidays are coming and maybe we can have a meeting sometime maybe a month from now," that kind of thing.

We are trying to stir up our Western European friends to this problem because they have at least as much interest in this as we have and perhaps more in the longer run.

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RUMORED SOVIET DIVERSIONARY MOVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST [P. 74]

Senator JACKSON. What do you see as the most likely thrust which they might get us engaged in in the Middle East at this point? Like my colleagues around the table, I am terribly concerned about the Middle East, and I think this is a likely area in which they could move with some profit, as well as a diversion.

Secretary RUSK. I would think it is rather unlikely, Senator, that they would move with their own armed forces in the Middle East. I think they might support or encourage Nasser. That has some complications in it. Nasser is not all that reliable from their point of view. There seems to be some rivalry within the Arab world between Algeria and Egypt although both seem to be reasonably friendly with the Soviet Union.

I think the situation is much more volatile than that. We know that there are differences of view among some of the leaders in Cairo as well as differences of view among leaders in the Yemen, and there is one possibility, and one does not rely on this, that Nasser will find that those leaders who neglect their own people and the economies of their own countries to go adventuring abroad to get in trouble. He is in a very desperate situation from an economic point of view and will have to be very careful about the conditions on which the World Bank or anybody else, the Monetary Fund, would bail him out.

So I think the likelihood is that the problem is going to be primarily Egyptian policy supported by the Soviet Union rather than overt moves by the Soviets themselves.

Senator JACKSON. Are the Soviets gaining more and more influence within the United Arab Republic?

Secretary RUSK. I would think as far as Nasser is concerned, yes, and there are a good many others in Egypt that we hear from from time to time who are very much concerned about this. One of the problems is to get access to Nasser and to get moderate voices heard by Nasser.

There are a number of people who have talked to us, top Egyptians who have talked to us—and I would have to take this off the record—

[Discussion off the record.]

WISDOM OF RESOLUTION ON TROOP REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE

Senator JACKSON. Do you think it would be wise, Mr. Secretary, at this time for the Senate to pass a resolution calling for a substantial reduction of American forces in Europe?

Secretary RUSK. I would think, sir, that a resolution which would go beyond the measures that have already been discussed could be quite disadvantageous and could get in the way, for example, of the possibility of getting comparable steps taken by the Soviet Union.

About a year ago I would have said that there was some possibility that the Soviet Union would get seriously interested in a mutual reduction of forces in Central Europe. Some of their own Warsaw Pact countries were getting restive about the costs of some of these forces. You know, Rumania has quit paying their share of those forces, at least that is my understanding.

But I think the combination of pressure from China and the charge that they would be reducing forces to relieve pressure on American forces so that we could move them to Vietnam, and the idea that if they just sit tight we will be reducing our forces anyhow, has put the Soviet possibility somewhat in the background.

Senator JACKSON. They have been on notice for this event for a long, long time.

Secretary RUSK. And I would think that a resolution, for example, that went beyond what we are doing would greatly reduce the chances of getting any serious interest in the Soviet Union in reducing their forces.

Senator JACKSON. Well, the example problem is a difficult one. You will recall that we did suggest to the Soviets that they cut back on their fissionable material production after we made our announcement about the cutback on the fissionable material and the closing of certain reactors. The fact of the matter is, as I recall, Mr. Khrushchev had announced that there would be a cutback because they were not going to complete certain facilities in the Soviet Union. Instead, they went ahead and finished their facilities and actually increased their production of fissionable material.

I would agree with you. It would seem logical at this point in time, with the ideological feud between the Soviets and the Chinese, that if they do move any troops from Europe, rather than agree to any kind of a mutual bilateral understanding, the Chinese are causing so much trouble that they had to move some of their troops to that area.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, we understand that they have moved some of their forces to the Far East along the China border, with limited numbers still, but those have come from within the Soviet Union and not out of East Germany.

Senator JACKSON. Not from Central Europe.

Secretary RUSK. But we are trying to check on occasional rumors we get about some occasional forces out of East Germany. Whether these are simply reduction of forces or just what they would be, we just do not know. We have not been able to confirm it as yet.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND UNIFICATION OF
GERMANY

Senator JACKSON. There is one other point I wanted to allude to. Is it not true that if we get ourselves into a situation where the West Germans are making too large a contribution of forces in Central Europe that the opportunity of improving relations with Eastern Europe will be somewhat jeopardized and any hope of trying to work out any unification of Germany will be likewise jeopardized?

Secretary RUSK. I think that will be true, sir, if the West German forces were to go significantly beyond the general level of 12 divisions and forces of that order of magnitude.

We do not expect that despite the slowdown that the Soviet Union and East Germany have recommended to other countries of Eastern Europe, that in the months ahead there will be some additional agreements between the Federal Republic and certain of the other Eastern European countries along the lines of the Rumanian agreement.

But this is not only a problem for Eastern Europe, Senator, it would be a real problem for Western Europe.

Senator JACKSON. It would be a problem within NATO.

Secretary RUSK. It would be a problem within NATO because there are a good many members who would be nervous about Germany having the dominant position inside NATO.

Senator JACKSON. There are two aspects here.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator JACKSON. The impact on Eastern European countries as well as on the NATO community.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. The idea of an integrated force was in substantial part to deal with the German problem.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator JACKSON. And it was in this way that Germany could make a contribution of forces to Europe's defense yet avoid the ancient fears of the German General Staff. Is this not correct?

Secretary RUSK. It is a very important political fact in NATO that all German forces are assigned to NATO. This is a very important political fact with NATO quite apart from Eastern Europe.

ROTATION OF DIVISION RETURNING FROM EUROPE

Senator JACKSON. As I understand it, and this point has been raised a couple of times there during the hearings, is it not correct that the division coming back to the States would be available for Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. It is not correct, sir.

Senator JACKSON. As I understand the situation, all we are really doing is bringing the division back here, with one brigade in Europe at all times, and instead of having them located and housed in Germany, they will be in the United States. In that way there will be a continuing commitment to NATO, with the ability to move them literally overnight into the pre-positioned areas with the supporting elements available.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, to be confirmed by my defense colleague, my understanding of the arrangement is that the brigades would succeed each other in periods of about six months.

Senator JACKSON. Rotated.

Secretary RUSK. There will always be one brigade there, and the Division Headquarters, once a year the entire division would be together, but because this six-month period is at least that short, it is possible for all of the dependents to be back in this country. Naturally under those circumstances the other two brigades must be always available to return immediately to NATO if required.

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DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN TRILATERAL AGREEMENT

Senator SPARKMAN. Was there any difficulty inside the three countries in arriving at this agreement or was it pretty well agreed to?

Secretary RUSK. Well, there were times when it was difficult in detail, particularly on the financial arrangements between the Germans and the British. They were bargaining with each other pretty hard just where they would come out on that situation and each moved substantially toward each other before it was over. The gap was rather wide.

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MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS WITH WEST GERMANY [P. 79]

Senator CHURCH. This then is an abandonment of what had been our position that the Germans ought to pay for the out-of-pocket costs—that is, for the gold drain costs—of the maintenance of American forces in Europe.

Secretary RUSK. Well, the problem was never whether they would pay as a budget matter, but whether they would deal with the foreign exchange ramifications of it.

Senator CHURCH. But we did have an agreement with them, did we not, in which they said they would do this?

Secretary RUSK. For a period of 6 years we had an agreement on that. They now have a backlog of what, \$900 million of deposits here in this country under those arrangements from which they are taking steps in the monetary field to assure that the balance of payments is not loaded on the United States under these arrangements.

Senator CHURCH. Well, although I am trying to follow your argument, nonetheless it seems to me to be the truth that the Germans have receded from a position that they had heretofore taken concerning taking care of our gold drain costs.

Secretary RUSK. By purchases of hardware.

Senator CHURCH. Right, by purchases of hardware.

Secretary RUSK. By purchases of hardware, that is right.

Senator CHURCH. And we are now entering into a new arrangement which is less advantageous to us in terms of the gold drain. If the Germans believed that the maintenance of any army of this size was really essential to their security, they would be willing to continue it to pay for the gold drain costs of the United States. That is the point I make.

EFFECT OF THE ARRANGEMENT [P. 80]

Secretary RUSK. Well, they have some problems too about the other side of this, you see, as to whether they can, in fact, both as a budgetary matter and as a matter of utilizing the hardware reasonably efficiently, continue indefinitely on the two-year arrangement that we had which was frankly very favorable to us.

Do you want to comment additionally on this, Mr. Rostow?

Mr. ROSTOW. We regard, and the Treasury regards, the monetary arrangements that have now been made by way of modification of the old offset plan as extremely advantageous to us, and to our general monetary position in the world.

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DETERRENT VALUE OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS [P. 86]

Senator MILLER. I do not believe I would categorize the Cuban missile crisis as one of the greatest crises facing mankind. I heard President Kennedy make a statement that one nuclear missile alighting on the United States would mean a nuclear missile would land on the Soviet Union. I thought he handled the situation very well. Because he handled it that way and indicated our resolve, I frankly did not think it was an earth shattering crisis as some people have said, because I never felt that the Soviet leaders were about to commit suicide. I give them credit for being rather cool, calculating, logical people. They understood loud and clear President Kennedy's statement that that is exactly what would happen if they pressed the situation into a nuclear exchange.

Senator RUSK. Senator, it turned out that that was the way it was. We were very conscious of the possibility of irrational action on the other side. There was a moment there when Mr. Krushchev appeared to be very distraught, and you always have to leave some room for irrational conduct on the other side. These are things which they have to emphasize as well as we on our side.

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ENCOURAGEMENT OF A MUTUAL RESPONSE [P. 87]

Senator MILLER. Assuming there is no overt act as to willingness to negotiate, and I am sure you have considered this very carefully and given this your evaluation, would it not be a practical step to provide that within one year these forces will be returned to let the Soviet Union know that if they have a mutual reduction then we will let it stay here; if they do not, then we are back over there, and a sort of a one-year invitation for this mutual response from them.

I am thinking in terms of the long-range results, not so much from the standpoint of preserving the NATO military capability as encouraging a mutual response that you talk about, and here we give them one year, and if they do not respond, then back to Europe go these forces.

Then maybe six months later we might try it again, the idea being to encourage the mutual response showing that if they do not respond then we are back where we started.

I am wondering if you might have pursued this.

Senator RUSK. Senator, I am sympathetic with the idea of trying to find ways and means of stimulating mutual response. I am not at all sure that two-thirds of a division, for example, would pack enough weight to make this difference in Soviet policy. There are some 26 divisions of NATO in Central Europe; there are very large Warsaw Pact forces.

If we were talking of five divisions or something, it is conceivable this might have that kind of negotiating weight. But we will test the Soviets in the next several months and see what happens.

I do not believe this will pack enough weight to make a difference with it.

Senator MILLER. Perhaps you could bring this out in discussions with the other NATO states or ministers. If the Soviets do not make a response, then we will consider bringing back rather than just leaving alone, so they will know or have the assurance that if there is no response, then we may even bring them back over.

I recognize if we have a large reduction this might provide for more of a mutual response than a smaller one, but we can still try a smaller one.

I have nothing further.

Mr. RUSK. It is an interesting idea, and we will mull over it a bit.

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[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, MAY 4, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Gore and Carlson.

Also present: Senator McGee.

Jack Hood Vaughn, Director, Peace Corps, accompanied by Mr. Brent Ashabranner, Acting Deputy Director, and Mr. Eric Stevenson, General Counsel, testified on S. 1031, the Peace Corps Authorization Bill.

[The committee adjourned at 11:35 a.m.]

DISCUSSION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Friday, May 5, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN
AND SOUTH ASIAN
AFFAIRS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:55 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol. Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Aiken, and Carlson.

Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.

Senator SYMINGTON. The meeting will come to order.

We have convened the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs this afternoon to continue our inquiry into some of the most difficult problems facing the United States in that troubled area of the world. As these hearings have progressed, it has become apparent that the illicit flow of military equipment of American origin into the area is a serious problem. We have discovered that information on how these arms get to the Middle East, who profits from these deals, and where the equipment eventually winds up, is very hard to find. We have therefore asked Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to join us this afternoon in the hope that he can enlighten the subcommittee on these matters.

General Carroll, it is a special privilege and pleasure for me to see you again, sir. We have been friends for about 25 years, and we all know of your superb record in this and other fields.

I might add General Carroll was formerly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and perhaps is the only person who Mr. J. Edgar Hoover approved leaving the agency permanently, which was to the benefit of the Air Force.

Have you a prepared statement?

STATEMENT OF LT. GENERAL JOSEPH F. CARROLL, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; ACCOMPANIED BY CAPTAIN FRANK M. MURPHY, U.S.N., CHIEF OF WESTERN AREA OFFICE, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; AND CHARLES H. FORE, JR., MIDDLE EAST ANALYST, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

General CARROLL. No, Mr. Chairman, I do not. I was not cognizant exactly of what it was that the committee might like to question me about.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I ask my senior colleagues here, would it be in order if I asked some questions, Senator Aiken?

Senator AIKEN. I would think so. I like to have him come up without a prepared statement and then he does not have to clear it with any security officers.

Senator SYMINGTON. I believe we will leave that remark right on the record.

MILITARY SURPLUS IN EUROPE

General Carroll, can you give us the details on the numbers and kind of surplus military equipment of American origin now in the European surplus market?

General CARROLL. Mr. Chairman, I can present to you the estimate which we have in DIA relative to this surplus, and our estimate is predicted upon our cognizance of the kind of equipment which is required in the tables of organization, and equipment of the forces of the particular countries concerned.

West Germany has a considerable amount of U.S. military equipment, which it considers surplus, and which incidentally it is anxious to sell.

I could list the major items for you, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. If you would just run through them and then furnish any details for the record.

General CARROLL. All right, sir.

106 105-millimeter howitzers; 55 155-millimeter howitzers; 16 8-inch howitzers; 193 light tanks, 76-millimeter guns; 200 medium tanks; 90-millimeter guns; 300 recoilless rifles; 75-millimeter; 14,200 rocket launchers, 3.5-inch; and, in the Air Force items, 47 F-86K fighters; 41 F-84F fighter bombers; 48 RF-84F fighter reconnaissance planes.

As to France, France has a considerable amount of military equipment of U.S. origin, but only the following is believed to be surplus: In Army equipment, 100 120-millimeter and 4.2-inch mortars; 252 light tanks, M-4; and 7,000 trucks, two and a half tons and over.

In Air Force items, 50 NIKE missiles; 47 F-84F fighter bombers; and 15 RF-84F fighter reconnaissance planes.

Belgium has approximately 25 to 30 F-84F aircraft which are believed surplus.

The Netherlands is believed to have had about 20 surplus F-84F aircraft. All, however, are believed to have been redistributed to Turkey.

A former U.S. PC-468 subchaser was loaned to Nigeria and subsequently sold to it.

Norway has about 30 F-86F aircraft believed surplus and about 30 more, we believe, will become surplus when sufficient numbers of F-5s are received.

Portugal has about 38 F-86Gs in storage due to lack of spare parts but, so far as we know, has no plans to sell them.

Spain has 40 F-86Fs in storage as logistic backup. All of its 130 F-86s are to be phased out by 1971. But no evidence is available concerning their eventual disposition.

Italy has 40 F-86Es which are nonflyable and being cannibalized; 8 F-84Fs are inactive. About 65 F-86Ks will be phased out in 1969, and at this time would be considered surplus.

Those represent the major items as known to us which we feel fall in the surplus categories.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

How much additional equipment can we expect to flow into that market over the next five years? Would you like to furnish a figure for the record on that?

General CARROLL. I believe that I could come up with an estimate of it, Senator.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you do that? Furnish it for the record.

[The material referred to follows.]

ESTIMATE OF ADDITIONAL SURPLUS MATERIAL

Additional military equipment of American origin that is estimated to become surplus to West European needs over the next five years follows:

BELGIUM

Army: 503 Medium Tanks (5 M-4, 150 M-26, 8 M-46, 340 M-47)

Air Force: 141 Aircraft (85 F-84F, 20 RF-84F, 25 C-119g, 5 C-47, 2 C-54, 4 C-118)

FRANCE

Air Force: 72 F-100 Aircraft

ITALY

Air Force: 240 Aircraft (66 F-86K, 40 F-86E, 74 F-84F, 20 C-119J, 40 C-119G)

THE NETHERLANDS

Air Force: 75 F-84F Aircraft

PORTUGAL

Air Force: 50 F-86F Aircraft

SPAIN

Air Force: 150 Aircraft (125 F-86F, 25 T-33)

WEST GERMANY

Army: 407 Light Tanks, M-41; 600 Medium Tanks, M-47; 356 Tank Recovery Vehicles, M-47; 2,150 Armored Personnel Carriers HS-30; 500 80-mm Mortars; 331 Howitzers (216 105-mm, towed M2A1; 64 105-mm, SP M-52; 41 155-mm, SP M-44)

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FLOW OF ARMS TO PAKISTAN

Senator SYMINGTON. How much equipment of American origin has been sold, to the best of your knowledge, by private firms to Iran over the last two years, and who handled the sales?

General CARROLL. The largest sale that I know of that was made to Iran by private firms over the past couple of years was the sale of the 90 F-86 Sabre aircraft to Iran.

As I know you are aware, Mr. Chairman, these F-86 aircraft which were surplus to the German inventory were Canadian-manufactured aircraft, and the sale was consummated on the basis of an end use agreement certification which was given by Iran through a lieutenant general of the Supreme Iranian General Staff to the Federal Government of Germany.

I know you are also aware of the fact that Iran was merely the ostensible purchaser and recipient and that the aircraft flowed rather rapidly through Iran to Pakistan.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do we know anything about the details of prices on these sales?

General CARROLL. All I know about that, sir, is that it was supposed to be a \$10 million sale [deleted].

Senator SYMINGTON. You do not know what General Toufanian received, if anything.

General CARROLL. My information is that General Toufanian was to receive 5 percent of the sales price, which would have amounted to \$500,000. It is also my understanding that he received \$60,000 of this amount and was pressing for the remainder, but Merex was rather slow in responding on the grounds that they had lost money on the sale, that actually they had underestimated their costs in conjunction with it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is General Toufanian still with the Iranian armed forces?

General CARROLL. So far as I know, yes, sir.

SOVIETS AND CHINESE IN YEMEN AND ADEN

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to skip a minute now and go down to the question of Yemen and Aden. Would you have any thoughts when the British move out of Aden in 1968 about what the Soviets and the Chinese would do?

General CARROLL. Well, I would feel, first of all, that the prime frontrunner in endeavoring to capitalize upon the moveout of the British from that section of the world at that point in time would be the UAR, with the Soviet Union rendering a combination of support and instigation to them.

So far as the Chinese are concerned, thus far they have not been active in Yemen from a military assistance standpoint, although they have to a limited economic extent, and I feel that they would endeavor to flow into the vacuum that would be created, but I feel also that they would be maneuvering in an area where the UAR and Soviet Union, through the UAR, would have an opportunity to predominate.

Senator SYMINGTON. We are talking about Yemen now.

General CARROLL. That is correct, sir. Yemen and Aden.

Senator SYMINGTON. Both.

General CARROLL. Both.

Senator SYMINGTON. Just as a matter of interest, how did it come that we were backing, with the Chinese and Nasser and the Russians, one government in Yemen, and the British were backing the other, with the Canadians?

General CARROLL. I am afraid that is a question that involved political consideration, Mr. Chairman. That would be beyond my ken competence to judge.

AMERICAN MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN YEMEN

Senator SYMINGTON. How much military equipment of American origin is being used in Yemen now?

General CARROLL. Well, first of all, the Yemen-Arab Republic forces have, so far as I know, no U.S. origin military equipment since in the main they are being supplied by the UAR, and arms and munitions available to the UAR in the main are supplied by the Soviet Union.

Insofar as the royalist forces are concerned, I do recall that some time ago the Egyptian commander in Yemen exhibited to our embassy personnel, including our defense attache there, a 50-caliber machine gun and some boxes of ammunition which bore a MAP insignia and indicated an off-loading at a Saudi Arabian port. The purpose of this, of course, was to contend that U.S. equipment was finding its way via Saudi Arabia into the hands of the royalists for sabotage and other purposes.

[Deleted.]

About a month after the arrival of an Iranian port, this equipment was transshipped to Saudi Arabia. I do not know the amount, but we have reports to the effect that a certain amount of this ultimately found its way into the hands of the royalists in Yemen. That is about all, sir.

SOURCE OF EGYPTIAN EQUIPMENT

I do know that in Yemen the Egyptians are currently training a liberation force of the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen and that they are supposed to have some 81-millimeter mortars of U.S. origin. Where they were acquired, I do not know, although there has been a substantial amount of that kind of equipment available in various places in the world.

Senator SYMINGTON. So what it amounts to is that Merex would sell it to either side, finance, anywhere they wanted to.

General CARROLL. No, sir, I am sorry if I conveyed that impression.

[Deleted.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Where did Nasser get the—where did the Republic army get the American 81 equipment?

General CARROLL. I do not know, but I would doubt very, very much that it was associated in any way with the sale of surplus equipment out of Germany.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see.

Well, I have one final question, and then I am going to ask if you could excuse me, if Senator Aiken would chair this a little longer, or Senator Carlson. If not, would you answer questions for the counsel for the record, because I promised that I would be at his

hearing at 3:30 because he had something he had to do and if I would chair that for him.

TANKS TO IRAN

But I would like to ask this question: One other thing we have not covered are the tanks to Iran, but I would like to ask, the idea, as I understand it, is that the State Department, the Pentagon or both together tried to balance this situation, and I was terribly shocked to find how magnificently modern the UAR air force was when I went through there in January 1966. That was nailed down and verified in January 1967.

For example, they have 49 of the new SU-7, which is better than the best Migs.

General CARROLL. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. There are none of those in the Far East at all, and they had over 101 Migs which are as good as those in the Far East.

Under these circumstances, who does this balancing act, because I am convinced they are much superior to the equipment of the Israelis, who, as you know, are having trouble with the other countries.

Who is the one who does the balancing, is that done in State, to the best of your knowledge, or is that done in Defense, or do you not know?

General CARROLL. This involves policy determinations that I do not participate in, although I do make contributions to the information being considered insofar as order of battle is concerned.

SOVIET MILITARY AID TO EGYPT

It has been well known, of course, in the past ten years that well in excess of a billion dollars' worth of military assistance has been provided to the UAR by the Soviet Union, and they are being provided by the Soviets with very modern equipment in air as you have just mentioned, sir, also in their naval forces as well as in their ground forces.

On the other hand, I think one should bear in mind that the Egyptians have not demonstrated a capacity to utilize the equipment in a manner proportionate with the performance characteristic effectiveness of the equipment as is demonstrated by the 71,000 troops which they have had in Yemen, without—

Senator SYMINGTON. Of course they could always get people to operate them for them on a lend-lease basis, as happened in North Korea.

General CARROLL. That is correct.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to mention, if I may, to you, Senator Aiken and Senator Carlson, that our next step is to State Department—correct, Mr. Bader?—as we want to pursue this to find out some of these questions.

In the meantime Senator, I promised John Stennis I would go over to this hearing and chair it, and if you or Senator Carlson could stay here, I would appreciate it, and Mr. Bader, will you ask any questions that you want to in order to make the record clear as long as we have the good fortune to have General Carroll with us.

Senator BADER. Yes, sir, I would be delighted to.

Senator AIKEN. This is all Greek to me, Stu.

Senator SYMINGTON. You handle it any way you want to.

HOLDING OF HOSTAGES

Senator AIKEN. There are political philosophies which I would be more interested in.

Do you have any information on Tai'zz, in regard to our two hostages? I assume they were hostages.

General CARROLL. They have still in detention, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

General CARROLL. And ostensibly they are to be tried. On the other hand, we do receive indications to the effect that the powers that be in Cairo have urged caution on the part of their military commander in Yemen in the treatment of these prisoners.

[Deleted.]

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

General CARROLL. At this time, I believe 3,500 Egyptians over the past ten years have been trained in the Soviet Union, and this training is continuing. Soviet instructors also head up the staffs in the armed forces academies, and so there are substantial efforts underway to improve the level of training of the Egyptian forces.

Senator AIKEN. Do you see anything to indicate that the British may not pull out of Aden?

General CARROLL. On the contrary, so far as my understanding is concerned, they intend to.

Senator AIKEN. Fast, I would suppose.

General CARROLL. I suppose so.

Senator AIKEN. I would not blame them.

What about Djibouti?

SITUATION IN SOMALIA

Senator AIKEN. The situation over around Djibouti in Somalia and in there. Have you followed that? Is there trouble brewing in that area, too?

General CARROLL. Well, since the election in French Somaliland has come out the way that it has, the situation has quieted to some extent.

Senator AIKEN. It has not been fully accepted though, has it?

General CARROLL. Not by all parties concerned, no, sir.

Senator AIKEN. No.

General CARROLL. Of course the Ethiopians are most happy with the manner in which the election evolved. As for the rural population in French Somaliland, I believe the solution which has been arrived at thus far is acceptable to them. However, a substantial portion of the population in the main city is not particularly happy.

MILITARY JUNTA IN GREECE

Senator AIKEN. Have you had any recent information on Greece? It seems almost like a disturbing quiet at present.

General CARROLL. I believe that is attributable to the firm grip that the military junta has on the country at this time.

Senator AIKEN. But every Greek in this country seems to be disapproving, and it seems to me if they are disapproving, their relatives back home are equally upset.

General CARROLL. I am sure this must be true because there must be substantial segments of the Greek population who feel the coup was a blow to the democratic philosophy of Greece and the democratic aspirations of that country.

On the other hand, the source of trouble to the present rulers would be expected primarily to stem from some of the more radical groups, and particularly the leftists, and they have undertaken to remove from current circulation those that they could identify as representing a current danger to the regime.

Senator AIKEN. Frank, have you any questions?

Senator CARLSON. Just one or two questions.

VALUE OF SURPLUS EQUIPMENT

In this illicit movement of all these arms material and equipment, where do these folks who are in this business [deleted] secure this type of weapons? Is some of it U.S. surplus material that has been disposed of and given to other countries, sold, or is this other countries' surplus?

General CARROLL. Well, surplus equipment, Senator, happens to represent a very desirable source of supply not only because of its availability but generally because of its less costly aspects.

The kind of equipment which is surplus today would not be sought with any special effort by countries with advanced military capabilities.

In the main, it is the relatively under-developed countries that are most desirous of acquiring equipment which is surplus to other nations, bearing in mind that it is surplus to other nations primarily because of the fact that they consider it obsolete. But everything is relative in this field, and it happens to represent highly desirable equipment to the underdeveloped countries.

It so happens that the spotlight tends to be focused at this point in time on surplus materials because a substantial amount of it is generating especially in Western Europe at this time, because of the modernization of the forces there. A substantial amount of the military equipment which comprised the equipment of the forces had been provided to them by the United States during the buildup of NATO under the military assistance program. It is this equipment which is now becoming surplus because of the modernization of the forces of these nations.

At the same time, because of the interregional disputes and conflicts, which the chairman mentioned when we first started, there is sort of an arms race particularly in the Mid East, and certain countries are casting covetous eyes on this equipment which appears to be available in Western Europe.

However, surplus equipment is only one of the sources of such equipment, and the purchasing country as well as the arms brokers who might be used, seek to make purchases of newly manufactured equipment from other countries, although in such instances frequently one has to wait perhaps a protracted period of time because of manufacturing lead time requirements.

SURPLUS TANKS

Senator CARLSON. You mentioned, for instance, that Germany—you mentioned several European countries, but Germany, I made some notes here, 193 tanks were, you said, surplus.

General CARROLL. It must be—

Senator CARLSON. Did I write it down wrong?

General CARROLL. A good deal more than that. The 193 referred to one particular type of tank.

Senator CARLSON. Was this German?

General CARROLL. But Germany has many more tanks than that in surplus.

Senator CARLSON. The question I wanted to ask now, were those surplus American tanks, German tanks, or what?

General CARROLL. The ones I was referring to, sir, are surplus U.S. origin tanks.

Senator CARLSON. U.S. origin tanks.

General CARROLL. In addition to that, they well could have many more which are of German origin.

Senator CARLSON. I see.

Well, my thinking was these tanks, while they may call them surplus and they may be outmoded, they are still probably very good, useful pieces of equipment for certain places.

General CARROLL. They certainly are. That is why they are sought after so persistently.

Senator CARLSON. Well now, you mentioned—and I believe that I would be interested in it—that these people who traffic in the sales of military equipment, they also sell new equipment. I assume they can get people to buy them.

General CARROLL. That is correct.

For example, Interarmco has exclusive sales rights to newly manufactured equipment produced in a couple of the Scandinavian countries and Holland.

Senator CARLSON. And out of the United States?

General CARROLL. No. I doubt that they have any such exclusive rights out of the United States, but I do not know.

INTERNATIONAL ARMS DEALERS

Senator CARLSON. I had an interesting experience along this line a few years ago. I was down at the Dominican Republic when we placed limitations of shipments of weapons into that country, and I spent about a week down there at the sugar operations. I was out to a beach on a Sunday afternoon and here comes an American citizen—of course everything was so secretive down there they said do not talk in an automobile because it may be bugged, and you had to be awfully careful—and this American comes along with one of the classiest dames you ever saw on the beach, and she was French they told me. They said, “Well, he is in the Dominican Republic selling arms from Czechoslovakia.” I just wondered how general that was over the world as you run into it, where we try to put limitations on it.

General CARROLL. I would say it is quite active all over the world.

Senator CARLSON. I believe that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AIKEN. I thought the Dominican Republic had its own small arms plant.

General CARROLL. That is right, sir.

Senator AIKEN. General, I have no more questions. I am here trying to learn a little. I am not even a member of Senator Symington's subcommittee.

Senator CARLSON. I am not either.

Senator AIKEN. Because my interests happen to be the Western Hemisphere, but I realize there is a very short distance around the world now.

General CARROLL. That is right, sir.

Senator AIKEN. And when we get the supersonic, it will be even shorter.

I have nothing further.

Do you have anything, Carl?

Mr. MARCY. Mr. Bader, just to make the record complete.

Mr. BADER. Senator, I have just three questions.

TANKS TO BECOME SURPLUS

Senator Symington wanted to make the record clear on certain points, and I thought I might ask this just for the record.

General, we have heard estimates as to the number of 5,000 tanks of American origin which would be on the international market by 1970. I wonder if you might verify that. The question has been raised before early in the testimony.

Senator AIKEN. You are speaking of surplus.

Mr. BADER. Surplus in Europe alone.

General CARROLL. I am not in a position to respond to that question at this time. I could undertake to see if I could accumulate that kind of data.

Mr. BADER. Could you, sir, for the record? I think it would be of interest.

[The material referred to follows.]

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF TANKS TO BECOME SURPLUS

Of the approximately 7,500 tanks of American origin in the inventories of West European nations, 646 are now believed to be surplus and 1,510 more are expected to become so within the next five years. Thus, a total of 2,156 tanks are expected to be surplus by 1972, and of this number only about 1,500 tanks are expected to be surplus by 1970.

[Deleted.]

INSPECTION TEAMS APPRAISING TANKS

Mr. BADER. I have a contract here dated 19 January 1967 between the Levy Autoparts Company, which has been mentioned, and General Toufanian, who has just been mentioned as the 5 percenter in Iran. This is for 600 M-47 tanks to be sold to Iran through General Toufanian.

[Deleted.]

Mr. BADER. So if this contract were fulfilled, it would mean that 600 tanks of American origin would go from West Germany to Pakistan.

General CARROLL. I would feel that it is the U.S. government's surplus tanks that this contract is referring to because the Iranians

were endeavoring at the same time to acquire the M-41 and M-47 tanks out to German surplus.

I do not know if a particular source is specified in the contract. I would assume that it is not.

Mr. BADER. It is not.

General CARROLL. The particular type tank—

Mr. BADER. Just a particular type tank.

General CARROLL.—would of course in the main represent U.S. origin tanks in the surplus West German inventory.

Mr. BADER. According to your figures, just one last comment.

If that deal is consummated, General Toufanian will receive \$400 for his—

[Deleted.]

CANADIAN ROLE IN ARMS SALES

Senator AIKEN. Now, I think you have helped me more than I thought at first. Some of us are going to Ottawa next week with Canadian officials and all members of the legislature, too, and they are likely to be a little critical of us, our army's disposal and so forth.

[Deleted.]

General CARROLL. Yes sir.

Senator AIKEN. The Canadian government, as a whole, is not a big supplier of arms anywhere.

General CARROLL. I do not believe so, sir.

Senator AIKEN. They are not. I am glad to hear that so we will not misjudge them if they criticize us. They are likely to criticize us in our sales of arms, though.

PAYMENTS TO THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT

[Deleted.]

General CARROLL. Usually the arms broker, either by taking the initiative himself or on the basis of being contacted by a prospective buyer, will undertake to formulate an agreement with the buyer and thereafter go out to get the equipment.

Senator CARLSON. Well, this is, of course, I assume, part of our equipment we have given Germany in order to build up their defenses. Am I right?

General CARROLL. I am sorry, sir, I missed that point.

Senator CARLSON. I am wondering if this some of the military equipment we have furnished the German government or their defense administration in order to strengthen them militarily? I mean we have given it to them or have we sold it to them or have they bought it—

General CARROLL. First of all, this is equipment which the United States government did furnish under the Military Assistance Program to the West German government, and I believe the committee has previously been advised that a few years ago, I believe it was 1962, the United States government sold its reversionary rights in that equipment to the West German government.

Senator CARLSON. I see.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AIKEN. Anything further?

We thank you, General Carroll—

General Carroll. Thank you, Senator.

Senator AIKEN.—For talking to at least one rank amateur.

Senator CARLSON. That is right. That is true here, too, but it is interesting, and I want to say many thanks.

General CARROLL. Well, thank you, Senator. It is a pleasure to see you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]

THE SITUATION IN POLAND

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—In November 1966, Poland's representative on the International Control Commission, Janusz Lewandowski, proposed to U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge that Poland serve as an intermediary to set up a meeting between U.S. and North Vietnamese officials. In early December, Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki reported that Hanoi had agreed to hold discussions in Warsaw. However, after U.S. warplanes bombed an area near Hanoi on December 13-14, North Vietnam withdrew its acceptance.]

Monday, May 15, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS,
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:40 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator John J. Sparkman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman (presiding), Fulbright, Symington, McCarthy, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Mundt, and Cooper.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Lowenstein for the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. The subcommittee will come to order.

The Subcommittee on European Affairs this morning is holding an informal session with the Honorable John A. Gronouski, United States Ambassador to Poland. Ambassador Gronouski has been in Washington for consultation and he kindly expressed his willingness to meet with interested committee members.

Mr. Ambassador, we are very pleased to have you here with us today. I expect that you already have in mind the kinds of topics for discussion which you believe will be of most concern to us. And I certainly have no intention of trying to restrict your operating freedom in this regard. At the same time, I am sure that all of us will be particularly interested in your views in connection with the much advertised, but futile efforts last December to arrange contacts with the North Vietnamese through the Warsaw mechanism. You will, of course, have noted Mr. Hightower's Associated Press article of May 9, and quite possibly the letter of Richard Hudson of the New York Times of May 12. We would welcome any clarification of this episode which you might be able to provide for us.

Beyond that, we would be glad to have your views on the current scene in Poland, with particular reference to Polish policies toward the Soviet Union and toward developments in other Eastern European countries. In addition, we would expect to discuss such elements of our foreign policy as the East-West trade issue and the encouragement of an atmosphere leading towards detente between the United States and the Soviet Union.

With this very general guidance, Mr. Ambassador, I hope that you will launch into these subjects in any way you please. You handle it in your own way. We are very glad to have you come here.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE JOHN A. GRONOUSKI, UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO POLAND; ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR H.J. TORBERT; AND WILLIAM A. BUELL, JR., EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I am very glad to be here, Senator. Being an old Postmaster General, being on the Hill in that capacity, and this is a different problem.

Senator SPARKMAN. A new setup of cooperation.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Which, by the way, is a good idea.

I do not have any prepared statement. I will try to cover these things that you have raised in an informal way. There are a lot of elements. I am very glad to be here. I will come to the Vietnam business a little later, if that is all right.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is all right.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. There are a lot of elements in the whole Eastern European situation that I think we ought to continue to try to develop. It has almost become a truism to say now that things are not quite so monolithic as they once were. But I hasten to add that they are not quite so independent as some people hopefully wish and think they were. Yet I think that there are some very fundamental changes going on, particularly in Poland and Czechoslovakia and in Hungary, which is regarded as the old bloc area, that is to say, and not to say anything about Yugoslavia which, I understand, you are leaving out of this discussion—except to say that they have gone so far beyond anything of the rest of Eastern Europe that they are a separate subject unto themselves.

I will intersperse, however, a comment on Yugoslavia, only insofar as it has an impact on Eastern Europe. One of the things that is of continual interest and discussion in Poland, particularly among the younger groups and the people working for the planning authorities, foreign trade, the younger economists—

Senator SPARKMAN. Did you say “younger economists” or “Communists”?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. The younger economists, yes.

Senator AIKEN. Economists?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Economists, yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who are also Communists?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Also Communists.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is what I was trying to understand.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Actually only five percent of the people of Poland are members of the Communist Party. Whether they are Communists or not is academic. That is one thing in that they are part of the bureaucratic structure, and they support it.

FRUSTRATIONS OF THE POLES

The other side of the coin is that among many of the younger Poles who are well-trained in this generation, that have gone to college since the war, et cetera, there is not the same ideological commitment that you find with most of the older ones. And you find a wide variety of people who are basically existing with frus-

trations for the lack of progress in the economic area and who see opportunity for change and look across to the other side, who are, in fact, pushing some changes, but who recognize that there are other men up in the Politburo who are very conservative and that those like Gomulka, that his ideology is regarded as ultrareactionary in contrast to the others, and in turn are being imposed to change, and yet imposed with the necessity for change in order to make the economy viable at all, that there must be change. There are a good many people who are certainly not in control, but in junior positions in that part of the operation who are very anxious for very substantial changes and are pushing for them and are doing this. They have not been terribly successful, but it is highly interesting to see them there, to see them pushing for the change that I have spoken of.

LOOKING TO YUGOSLAVIA AND MOSCOW

What I wanted to mention about Yugoslavia is that I do not regard Yugoslavia in the area as being that which is categorized as the Eastern European countries. Part of them are looking to Yugoslavia, hoping that Yugoslavia will fail, and part of them are hoping that Yugoslavia will succeed. And I think that—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is the rationale of those who hope that Yugoslavia will fail?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Those are the conservatives who do not want to see the kind of liberalization of the economy that the other group wants to see. And I think that one of the things which I always have in mind is important in terms of the long-term impact on Eastern Europe of the success in the kind of changes that are going on which are very fundamental in Yugoslavia.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Excuse me for having interrupted.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Surely.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If I may continue, do these people who want to see Yugoslavia fail—do they want to see them reoriented towards the Moscow discipline?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Not necessarily. Not towards Moscow discipline, but rather they are very concerned about the decentralization of not only the economic control, but other controls that are going on there. You do not quite get the feeling that you did before in Poland or in any of these other countries, that they want countries to be Moscow oriented. They are Moscow oriented, but they are very concerned about their independence.

Senator AIKEN. By Moscow, you mean Moscow as the decision-making center, the Lenin Moscow, pure communism?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. It has gone beyond that. They use Lenin as the symbol.

Senator AIKEN. Lenin as the symbol?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. A symbol for the movement. Lenin is a symbol of goodness. But there is talk about the procedures that are going on.

Of course, what they have come to realize in the Eastern European countries—and I presume to some degree in the Soviet Union—but I see it more in the three countries that I have just mentioned, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary—they have come to realize that the economic system that they have is not a very

viable system. It does not work very well. It has worked well in the post-war period because this was the period of building up after the war. Poland was literally destroyed. They could not make an error during this period—and they put their resources, their transportation, their utilities, their apartments or their factories, all had a high marginal rate of return and, consequently, represented a move towards high growth—8 or 9 percent growth rate in the last twenty years in Poland which is a very successful rate of growth.

The productivity of labor is very low. Interest in trading with the West is very high with them. And the output is such that quality output is very difficult for them, to enable them to sell in the West. And they recognize, at least a good many of them, the inefficiencies that are developing.

COMPARISON TO WEST GERMANY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How do they reconcile the difference between the development of their system and that of West Germany and West Berlin?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Partly because in Poland—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What is the rationale there?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Partly because they started from scratch.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So did West Germany and West Berlin.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Probably not as much from scratch as they did—as it was in Poland—not as much destruction in Germany. Poland had one out of five killed. Their people in engineering and the professions, all of the educated categories were pretty well wiped out. Warsaw was about 80 percent destroyed.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Also, very definitely in West Germany, highways and everything else were destroyed.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Secondly, they sustained losses. They make the point that the Marshall Plan and United States aid made contributions, plus the fact that the Marshall aid was turned down by them. That is something that they do not talk about, but nonetheless it is a fact.

Senator SPARKMAN. Poland tried to take it.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Poland wanted to take it.

Senator SPARKMAN. And Czechoslovakia.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. And the Soviets did not want them to do so.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is true. The Russians turned it down.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. They cannot make a case for it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not think they can make a good case for doing that, but I just wondered how they rationalized it.

SLOW PROGRESS IN POLAND

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. There was the destruction of the population by the war. And there were those who wanted to move towards reconstruction and the like, who wanted to move ahead. Beyond that, your younger people, to make it very clear, they feel that it is the lack of incentive—it is the lack of authority at the plant level—it is, in effect, political rather than technical management of the economy. And so you find that in the last few years, that is,

the last couple or two or three years, they are slowly moving forward—some think much too slowly. Obviously it is much too slowly, but they are adopting some of the ideas that we have had over here for many years. For instance, profits used to be a dirty word, but profits are now the basis for judging the effectiveness of a program. It is pretty much the same type that we have, except that it is a public enterprise. They have introduced the whole concept of interest rates. And they talk about bankers controlling, whether or not they can invest or not.

They realized a great deficiency, but they have not done a whole lot in the pricing system. That is actually idiotic. Therefore, it does not contribute much towards the total organization. It does not contribute. It rather holds back the efficient organization of the economic system, because the management of a firm or an industry is dealing with quite an unreal prospect. It is administering the price structure that goes back over the years, that has a pricing structure which has very little relationship one to another. They have not done much in Poland to improve the pricing structure. But nonetheless, in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, they are officially now taking the position that they have got to move to greater incentives for labor and management. They have to decentralize economic controls. They have to give more to the firms and the industries engaging in national trade. They have got to reorient their economy in the direction of quality, rather than quantitative measures that were set, because they have come to realize that it does no good to produce 100,000 pairs of shoes that people will not buy—that just making 100,000 pairs of shoes does not help.

EAST-WEST TRADE

Senator AIKEN. What about trade between the East and the West—what does that amount to?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. About 35 percent West.

Senator AIKEN. 35 percent West?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. It is a little higher than the average.

Senator AIKEN. Yugoslavia is nearly 70 percent.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Yes. One of the figures I was trying to bring up. There is a great desire to move. That is one of the problems that they have.

There is a great interest in western technology as there is through all of Europe. There is great interest in Poland in greater effort right now towards that.

Senator AIKEN. What percentage of the grain is required to be sold to the government now? At one time it was 80 percent. It went down—it went down to about 15 percent, did it not?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Yes. It is something between 10 and 15 percent.

Senator AIKEN. That is about where we are.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Actually, Poland is unique in that they do have 85 or 90 percent of agriculture that is private agriculture.

Senator AIKEN. Any government operations in agriculture were given up voluntarily?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. After 1956, yes, that is right. After 1956, when Gomulka took over, there was an entirely new policy to sell off the farms.

Senator AIKEN. They did not have to go in and take it.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Actually we do not find anybody in the government who is interested in state ownership or anybody in the party who is.

CLOSER RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Ambassador, in the May 13 newsletter it was written, "We are trying now to save something from the ruins by promoting closer relationships between Warsaw, East Berlin and Prague."

Would you care to comment on that?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Well, the so-called West German moves toward the East which culminated in relations with Romania. At this point in time it looked like it would include Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but it was very much slowed down in terms regarded as nationalism. Poland played a big role along this line at the Warsaw meeting in February, on the 8th, 9th, and 10th. Poland took the lead in that meeting, with Soviet backing and at the insistence of Ulbricht of East Germany, to put a halt to the rather rapid movement that was happening in that part of the world. They never did expect that Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania would long remain away from relations with the Germans. They explained it on the basis that these three countries have a concern for Germany that Poland did not have in the war, that it was a question of survival on the part of Poland. But in a sense, that the southern tier, these three southern states, even Czechoslovakia, are becoming very interested in relations with West Germany in developing along these lines. I suppose that there is something to that judgment on the part of Poles, because of their inherent fear of West Germany and the Soviets, because Poland and East Germany are acting as buffers as to West Germany and the Czechoslovakians, partly because their border is common with Germany. They have problems with Germany, and they have developed a little bloc within the bloc at this point in time. I think there is something, therefore, to the point that was made.

POLISH VIEWS OF U.S. POLICIES

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you detect any feeling on the part of the Poles that the United States in its policies toward Europe places undue emphasis on our relations with West Germany?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Oh, yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is this a sore spot with them?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. It is a sore spot with them. It is a burning question with them. They feel very strongly that the United States has a policy that does not put pressure on Germany but on them. I tried to convince them from time to time that sometimes when one country tries to impose its will directly on another country publicly, that sets back a development that might happen if the pressure was not there. It is not at all certain that the United States will be in that position to be of help to the German and Polish situation. But, basically, they feel that we have been much in supporting the Germans and the rearmament, and this sort of thing. That is understandable, because, after all, Germany has gone in that direction before.

POLAND AND EAST GERMANY

Senator SPARKMAN. What distinction, if any, do you make between the policies of Gomulka in Poland and Ulbricht in East Germany in reference to the domestic political situation in our relationships with Moscow?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Unfortunately I have never been in East Germany to go into that, so I do not have any first-hand feeling about it. You will find in Poland, more so, I think, than any of the Eastern European countries, a considerable relaxation ever since 1956 in the attitudes towards this in personal expressions of an individual. We have no difficulty, for example, associating with anybody that we want to associate with and in asking any questions or in having to confine any dinner conversations or cocktail party conversations with the people. There are various expressions and viewpoints on a variety of many issues without any concern. Everybody feels, of course, that they may have bugs all over the living room. They assume that. And yet you will find Poles, rather responsible government people, in responsible government positions, expressing freely attitudes that are quite different.

Senator AIKEN. There are some very good anti-Communist jokes.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. There are millions of them. You hear them all over.

Senator AIKEN. They are about the best I have heard anywhere.

POLISH AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

Senator SPARKMAN. What about Poland's position in regard to the ambassadorship to the United States? Is there likely to be any change in their attitude?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. They have appointed an ambassador.

Senator SPARKMAN. They have now?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Yes. There is a technicality in Poland. It has to go to the council to be finalized, but they have appointed, a month or so ago, one of the most able diplomats to Washington, the Director General of the Foreign Office, who was the Ambassador to the United Nations. This is something that we cannot talk about publicly until they announce it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Very good.

Are there any other questions before we move to the Vietnam matter?

TAKING TROOPS OUT OF EUROPE

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to ask a question and to present a view to you, sir. What is your position with respect to the growing problem that we have with regard to such matters as that of Mr. Ashmore,¹ having come back from North Vietnam saying that they say that they could handle two million Americans if necessary in this war. I think that if we are going to utilize the technological expertise that we have, they might be right, that is, unless we do so. We need trained people very badly. That is consistently brought up in the Armed Services Committee. We have been cannibalizing heavily equipment all over the world in order to take

¹Arkansas journalist Harry Ashmore had visited North Vietnam in January, 1967.

care of Vietnam. We are very short, for example, in Germany and in Europe of the required number of helicopters. Therefore, some of us have felt that if that point developed within the cold war that it might justify taking troops out of Europe. We have so many other places that we have to cover. We have 85,000 Americans in Japan and over 60,000 troops in Korea. We have over 900,000 total people in Europe. That is a heavy financial drain. But the main thing is that we need certain types of people very, very badly if we continue the war in its present stage.

There are some of us who have felt that we could take troops out of Europe. When we do that, we run into the Europeans.

What is the reaction in Poland, behind the Curtain, for that matter?

There are two angles. First, would there be any change, some Senators talk about, commensurate reduction of Russian troops. Secondly, is it of great interest over there whether we do it on any basis in Poland?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. It is of great interest, but the most constructive conversation I have had on the reduction happened about a week ago. I went into this whole discussion with some of the foreign office people. It was stated that, really, they are very interested in this kind of thing to get the Soviets and United States to pull back. While Vietnam is going on it was stated, "We really cannot do this sort of thing. And the reason we cannot do it is that if in any way we let the United States withdraw troops from Germany, then in a sense you are using the withdrawals of more troops for Vietnam, and Hanoi is very upset with us because we are taking the pressure from Europe off the United States and providing the United States with more troops available for Vietnam—for the Vietnam situation."

So they conclude that this is not the time to talk about these things, because they cannot do it in terms of their relationship to Hanoi. It was an interesting proposition.

REDUCTION OF SOVIET TROOP LEVELS

Senator SYMINGTON. I will ask one more question. Do you think that they would do it if it was not for the Vietnam war—that they would not have any objection and that they might actually take troops out themselves?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I do not know, because they are very capable in talking about the possibility of what they might do, and then when the situation arises, they do not do it. I am not at all sure that they would. I am not at all sure that the Soviet Union's best interests would be to reduce the twenty-two divisions they have in Germany, because I think that they feel very strongly that they have got to maintain a pretty large troop concentration next to West Germany. I am not sure that they would. I think that there is a possibility that it would be much greater with the Vietnam thing out of the way, but I would not predict that they would.

IMPROVING TRADE WITH POLAND

I want to make one other observation, if I may. There is a whole series of legislation, proposed legislation or idea, which I think is of vital interest to our national interest in all of Eastern Europe.

I am talking about the matter of a week or two or so ago on the Import-Export Bank which was voted out, and the issuance of trade credits bill which was voted out, something that probably is not as big as others. From the point of view of Poland, however, it is tremendously important. We were very pleased to see it was voted out of this committee last week. It is the program which is vitally important to Poland where we will have something like \$1.5 million a year in the field of news media, magazines, movies, books, and the like, books which can be read and seen and understood and discussed by the Poles. They could not have without this program which I think is fundamentally a program which is as good as we have in terms of improving the situation and in moderating their views. It is something that ultimately comes up for appropriation again, and I think it is of critical importance.

We have just negotiated with the Poles \$500,000 for English language teaching, which requires an appropriation which I think is something that has been as good as anything in the last ten or fifteen years having to do with Poland. It is just now that we have been successful in getting the program started, and I think it will be vitally important over the next ten years. There will be a great demand for the English language there.

All of these programs, it seems to me, aim at giving fundamental support to the kind of measures that are developing in all of these countries towards liberalization of their economic aspects of their society.

When you talk about liberalization of their economy, it is only economics that we are talking about. But as I think we can see in Yugoslavia, it has gone considerably further than anywhere else. As the economy is liberalized, there is the change in everything that is going to occur in the whole fabric of their society. It develops a concept of being a manager who is a technical man, who is not an ideological man, and thus he is given authority. And these kinds of leadership help. I think it is vitally important in terms of our own long-term national interests to develop programs such as evolved in the East-West trade policy which does not affect Poles particularly, such as the favored nation treatment. It will affect the rest of Eastern Europe, in the availability of export-import guarantees to American manufacturers in many areas in developing trade in Eastern Europe.

Senator AIKEN. Are there any manufacturers who have any branch plants which have opened up there?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. No, none at all. But I think that the development of the trade connections would be tremendously important, because it orients the whole trading pattern towards the West. It has a tremendous impact on their trade.

Senator SPARKMAN. Are you through?

Senator SYMINGTON. I was just going to ask another question.

TRADE AND THE WARSAW PACT

Senator SPARKMAN. What effect would that have upon the Warsaw Pact?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Poland will continue to be a key member of the Warsaw Pact.

Senator SPARKMAN. That involves the trade situation, too, does it not?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. The Eastern trade?

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. The point is that so many of these countries have found that they are competing rather than being complementary. There is a great interest, even though they give all kinds of lip service to it and work towards it—and the Poles do more than most to try to encourage it—nevertheless they are aware that their system is not enough for them and they are tremendously interested in looking westward. It seems to me that we ought to help them look westward. I think it is not just good in our relations to Eastern Europe that this is important, but in terms of our leadership role in West Germany. I think that this is important, because if the United States does not take the lead in this area, somebody else will. Western Europe is not going to keep the wall up in this area. I think Western Europe is wise in not doing it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you.

Go ahead.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Ambassador, I could not agree with you more. You have answered my questions. For years around here I have been saying more trade for many different regions would help.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. What strikes me is that every businessman who comes over to Poland has this same impression.

Senator SYMINGTON. We had the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce before this committee, let me say, two or three years ago. I asked both of them if there was any developed country in the world except the United States that was not doing its best to develop to the best of its ability to buy and sell behind the Iron Curtain. Are we not the only ones who do not? We are defending most of them and financing a lot of them. And the answer of Secretary Dillon and of Secretary Hodges was, "Not one." Whether it be Communist or otherwise, some day we will need the volume to get the price and to improve the market that these people can offer once developed. And if so, we are going to have contributed something that is going to be helpful. Otherwise, it will be very damaging to capitalism if we do not.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I think what is so important in this whole thing is that it is sometimes overlooked in our relations with Western Europe that it is important to move in these directions, not just in Eastern Europe but otherwise.

TRADING WITH COMMUNISTS DURING VIETNAM WAR

Let me raise one more point, if I may. This is a question that I often get—very often. How can we talk in the terms of trade and development with Eastern Europe when Eastern Europe is helping Vietnam and sending munitions, killing our boys, and so forth. My answer to that, I think, is pretty simple.

Basically our policy is aimed or should be aimed certainly at the long-run problem of avoiding World War III. It sounds mundane, but it is a fact, to avoid that—reducing the tension. And the real fundamental strain is still centered in Europe. If we are going to have World War III, it will be one way or another in Europe.

Senator SYMINGTON. You can give them another reason. We have increased the sale of arms to anybody who will pay for them or has a reasonable good credit standing, or even if they do not. We have increased it from \$300 million to \$1.7 billion in the last five years all over the world. So any criticism by Americans that the Russian stuff is being shipped into Vietnam can be pretty easily answered by the policy of this administration and the previous administration, which is to sell all of the war materials they can get their hands on, providing they can make a profit on it.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. At any rate, if because of the Vietnam war we build a wall and create tensions and try not to reduce the chances in Europe, what we are doing, ultimately, is creating a condition for something that is going to be much more damaging and much more explosive and more costly in lives than Vietnam happens to be today. So it is a very short-sighted notion, it seems to me, to think in terms of forgetting this whole power concentration in Europe because of the Vietnam war that is going on. It is a self-defeating proposition.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Pell wants to ask you some questions.

ODER NIESE BOUNDARY

Senator PELL. What is the reaction now in Poland that the Eastern Frontier is up for grabs by the West?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. You are talking about the Niese Oder boundary?

Senator PELL. Yes.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. There are two things that I can say about that.

In the first place, despite the fact that they really do not expect any of the nations, even the United States or anybody else, to permit any change right now in that boundary, they certainly think that the Soviet Union would not permit it if anybody did. Nevertheless, they look towards the future. Until the Germans flatly assure them that there is no change contemplated, they are concerned that in the future the whole pattern of the world relationships may change. They remember the 1939 pact between Hitler and Stalin. They are not at all ultimately confident that the Russians would—they would not say this publicly—but they have a latent fear that it may change, even though at the present it doesn't look like it might. They have a genuine fear of Germany. It is not all public relations and propaganda. Every family has lost something in World War II—some five or six million killed out of 30 million. So there is a genuine fear. But beyond that, if Gomulka did not have the Niese Oder line, he would have to invent something, because it is the one area where he gets a very real rapport with the church, with the Polish people, with the American Poles—with the Poles around the world—and it is the one area that he has that he uses all of the time. In every speech, it is the Niese Oder or Germany fascism. Had this been recognized by the Germans, say, ten years ago, I am convinced that there would not be the present situation. Gomulka would have had a lot more difficult time selling himself, selling his relationship with the Soviet Union which is ba-

sically sold to the Poles on the basis of the defense against the Germans.

I think that the whole situation would be a lot more untenable for Gomulka at this point.

GEOGRAPHIC FACTOR

Senator PELL. As you may recall, I am not the only one who felt that we must keep this line. Would you agree with my view that this is probably the cement that keeps the Soviet Union and Poland under Soviet Union domination in foreign relations more than any other single factor, that they are the sole guarantor of the Western Frontier?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Well, there are two things. That is, in itself—but, also, even among Poles who are anti-Soviet and there are a lot of Poles who do not like the Russians—actually, there are jokes on that—I will not take the time to tell them, but the Poles are not terribly keen on the Russians. They do not say it publicly, but they say it privately.

I think there are two things. One, the Oder Niese line itself; and two, the long-run concern of the revival of militarism in Germany.

Even if the Niese Oder line was settled it would not destroy the whole fear, because they have had two recent occasions, in World War I and World War II, which they remember very vividly, especially World War II.

I do not think that the Niese Oder line would resolve this thing, but it would lower the level.

Senator PELL. Would you or would you not agree with my thought that it is the biggest single factor keeping the Poles under Soviet domination in foreign policy?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I do not think I would. I think that it is an important factor, but I think that the boundary between Poland and Russia—

Senator PELL. What would be a greater factor that would keep them under Soviet foreign policy?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I think that the geography is concerned—they are sitting right next to each other.

Senator COOPER. What was the answer?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I think it is a matter of the geography. They are sitting right next to each other.

ROLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

Senator PELL. Along the same line, with reference to the Catholic bishops, with the Catholic dioceses being redrawn so that the bishops in the Niese Oder part now report to Wyszynski, and the others to Germany, do they still have the confusion with the new bishops reporting to Germany?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. The condition is not in this respect, because the bishops in the Western territory report to Wyszynski, but the real thing is that of the Vatican, that the Vatican has not made them permanent. I cannot remember the terminology here, but they are kind of temporary bishops. They do not have the permanence of a bishop in the old Polish territory. And it would be tantamount to Vatican recognition of the Niese Oder line if they changed the status of it. They do report to Wyszynski, but they do not have

technically the same status as the bishops throughout the Western part, and this is part of the argument that is going on between the Vatican and Poland.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Senator MUNDT. Do you have any unanswered questions?

Senator SPARKMAN. I suggest that we later go into this other program.

Senator MUNDT. How much of a military establishment do they have?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. They have a very substantial military establishment. The equipment is quite modern. This is integrated with the Warsaw Pact.

Senator MUNDT. Is it completely controlled by the Polish government?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Oh, yes. It is controlled by the Poles, but nonetheless it is integrated with the Russians and the others in the Pact.

Senator SPARKMAN. It is led by a Russian General, is it not?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. He was thrown out in 1956. That was one of the Gomulka changes.

POLISH SUPPORT FOR NORTH VIETNAM

Senator MUNDT. What is the extent of their aid to North Vietnam, that is, by Poland?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. It is pretty hard to nail it down. Basically, from all I can gather it is relatively small. The reason for that is that they talk a lot more than they do. Every speech they give, they talk about helping Vietnam in the North. I think it is easier said than done. It is a rather poor country. They have tremendous development problems internally. I think that they give as little as they can get away with. That does not mean to say that they are not doing it, but I do not think that it has any effect.

Senator MUNDT. It is an issue.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I have tried to nail it down. I have been told point blank by them that it is not military. I do not necessarily believe it. I do not think it is anything big. It has been said it is so and so. As I say, I do not take that at face value, but I am convinced, nonetheless, it is very small.

IMPROVEMENTS IN U.S.-POLISH RELATIONS

Senator MUNDT. In connection with the understanding to establish more East-West trade, have you noticed any lessening of resistance to such East-West relationships?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. We have a good program. Two things happened in the last six weeks that no one predicted would happen during this period of Vietnam.

One, they have agreed to use Public Law 480 currency for the language program, a very major program which will be run jointly by American universities and Polish educational people. This is going to have an extraordinary impact in Poland. And, as I say, it was greatly unexpected. I was sort of pessimistic myself. They agreed to it.

Secondly, the Ford Foundation program in Poland was ended in 1964. It was broken off. A month or so ago, the Ford Foundation

revived it and there will be about 60 Poles coming to the United States every year on this program, something that I think is quite striking in this period of time.

Senator MUNDT. How about the USIA exchange program?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. The only limitation that has happened is that our cultural exchange budget has been cut. Last year, we had 274. This year, it has been cut down to 74. The problem really is that we are lessening the program, not them. We have a lot of students both ways. We have three professors full-time, three major universities in Poland. We have lecturers coming over all of the time. One was the Council of Economic Advisers, the chairman under President Eisenhower—I cannot think of his name.

Senator SPARKMAN. Arthur Burns.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Burns was over there. The Professor of International Law from Harvard was there a while back. There is a continuous stream coming over. Every day I get a checklist of Poles coming to the United States for one reason or another. I get a list every day that long (indicating).

USIA LIBRARY IN POLAND

Senator MUNDT. Do you have the USIA there? That is, any of their libraries?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. We have a library there. We show many films. We have a big film library, and a quarter of a million students borrowed these last year.

Senator MUNDT. How do you go into that?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. They come into this library of ours, which is open ten hours a day, all day long. It is used. We show films about once a week, both in Posen and in Warsaw. They are standing in line there. Under the IMB program, we have one-half million American books of all kinds.

Senator MUNDT. The IMB program was put into operation when I was in the House. I think it was primarily operated in areas where we did not have information libraries, so that they could get books, American newspapers and the like.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. We only have a library. It is very limited. All over the country there is about one-half million dollars worth of books, newspapers and magazines. "Dr. Kildare" is very much liked. Maybe he is not the head of it, but the fact is that he is a favorite with them, and that is very important.

We had someone go up to a little town and he heard rumors that it was going to be cut off. We had not already notified them. This little guy said to Fisher, one of our attachés, "You are not going to take that out, are you?"

These have tremendous impact. There is no program at all that I can think of that is more important than this.

Senator MUNDT. Have you made a study of the USIA programs?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. They are very widely used. The IMB and all of them. In fact, I am always intrigued by the fact that despite, for instance, the fact that there was just a little line in our English language program in the newspapers, everywhere I go people know about it.

I had a newspaperman explain to me that we should not worry so much about what is in the paper, for the simple reason that the

Poles have become sophisticated and they know that they have only one line in all of the papers, and they listen to all of these other sources, and they make up their minds. You see it all of the time.

Senator MUNDT. One final question.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. If I may, I might say, by the way, that I talked with Leonard Marks about this. I think that it would be more effective if he had a little more power to get in.

RADIO TRANSMITTERS

Senator MUNDT. How about the transmitters—from what transmitter do you get this?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. It comes, I think, from—I am not sure.

Senator MUNDT. If they would have more power it would help.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It comes in from North Carolina, I believe.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I am not sure where it comes from. I have never gotten into the technical side of it.

GOVERNMENT RELATIONS WITH THE CHURCH

Senator MUNDT. What experience, if any, or knowledge have you, if any, as to the church and its relationships?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Cardinal Wyszynski does just about what he pleases. There are a lot of churches. They are filled every Sunday, with a good mix of ages. There is a continual battle going on between the Cardinal and the government, but basically it is pretty vigorous.

Senator MUNDT. Does the government per se operate any antichurch programs to discourage church attendance and the like?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Not obviously, no.

Senator MUNDT. No?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Their big fight with the church is as to certain things. You heard it back here, the thousand years of Polish history that the church celebrated. They got into a big conflict over there about it.

When the Polish Bishops last December sent a letter to the German Bishops, there was a big flap over that. Why? Because the government officials took the position that this was interfering in politics.

There is a continual harassment operation going on, but the church survives very well. It is the biggest church in Eastern Europe.

DUPLICATIVE SERVICES

Senator FULBRIGHT. There is one other thing. I did not get your answer to Senator Mundt's question. Why can they not do under the USIA whatever they are doing under IMB? The reason I ask is that Senator Ellender in the Committee on Appropriations had voted to stop the IMB. They have not voted to stop the program under USIA for the supplying of books and magazines. In fact, they make the point that you are duplicating—that the USIA is authorized to do anything that the IMB can do. What is the answer to that?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Where do they duplicate? The IMB is quite a different program.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I know it is a different program, but it is a matter of money that they are asking for now, for \$10 million in a revolving fund. If you gave the USIA the equivalent amount of money, why can they not do it?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Because the Poles deal with the publishers here. They buy the books for their normal distribution channels. The USIA has no access to those channels and could not possibly get access to those channels. We do not act as a purchaser of books and put them in the stores and the like.

Senator MUNDT. You put out book programs in many instances.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. The Poles, I am sure—

Senator FULBRIGHT. They buy books.

Senator MUNDT. They have subscriptions.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I am sure that the Poles would not let the USIA operate in this way. It is one thing for the book dealers to do it and the people in the theater to buy playwrights, et cetera. They deal directly. And in what except for the financial arrangements in a kind of commercial-like deal.

GOVERNMENT VERSUS PRIVATE INDUSTRY

If the USIA came in and tried to replace this, you have the United States government agency trying to dominate the reading that is going on in Poland. The government would not buy it at all. Yet we are getting the thing across.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Offhand, since they do everything through the government, they do not have private industry, why do they prefer to do business with private companies here, rather than the government? It has not occurred to me that it was the real reason. Well, why, if that is the case, I do not care about it.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Also, if we did it we would have to appropriate the money.

Senator FULBRIGHT. We are appropriating the money anyway. We are asking now to appropriate about \$10 million in a revolving fund to be kept at that level by an appropriation of dollars. This figment that it is done otherwise is not going down so well. It has not been accepted by the people. It is just a dollar appropriation that they are asking for. Senator Ellender appeared before the committee. He was very much concerned about it. The committee has voted. Rather than precipitate a big squabble about it, I wonder if it could not be done in any other way. If you say it cannot, all right.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I am sure that the program does not operate in this kind of way, that is, if it does not, it will not operate. The USIA will not be permitted to do it. I think it is the better way, at least it gets them the books, their plays in these various areas, developing the kind of contacts with American publishers, American firms which, in the long pull, may well have a real effect.

Senator COOPER. They buy direct?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. They buy direct. We give them the outlets. The USIA people in Poland manage this program and negotiate the areas in which they can buy. So it is in terms of the broad outlook something that is done between the USIA and the govern-

ment, but in terms of the specifics it is done by the people. There is a teacher who wants a planning book of the United States, and we put in an order for it. It is a diversified thing among all of the people who are involved in this sort of thing. It is not shoved down their throats. They get the book.

We are going to have a book fair going on at the end of this month. There will be over fifteen publishers there to display their books. They have these teachers come in and they get ideas for textbooks.

The writers can see these novels and what-have-you. It is a very diversified approach. I think it is the best approach.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That was one thing. Does anyone wish to proceed with this other matter?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. The chairman raised a question earlier.

POLISH ROLE IN VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS

Senator SPARKMAN. Have you read Hightower's article?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I have not read the other one.

Senator SPARKMAN. The letter in the New York Times takes a different tack with this. I think the principal difference is that it was on December 3rd and 4th—whereas Hightower does not mention that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. The main difference is that he mentions the bombing on the 2nd and the 3rd—let me read—

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Actually, the bombing on the 3rd is the question that was raised.

Let me get at the beginning of this. I was not involved in all of the pieces of this whole Vietnam affair, but I think that it is in December from the things that occurred.

The Lodge talks were in Saigon. I will tell you my impressions of that. I think that the Secretary is going to talk about this whole picture later in the week with you. I am not competent to talk beyond what I participated in. By the way, the Hightower story, except for a certain degree of details, covers pretty well what happened.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It is fairly accurate?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. It is fairly accurate. I quarrel with the details, but in terms otherwise it is all right. Essentially, I got into the act on a Saturday night, on December 3rd, I believe, when I got a wire from the department indicating that the Poles, Mr. Lewanowski and Mr. Lodge, had been talking about a meeting on the 6th of December between the North Vietnamese and a representative in Warsaw which would be myself. It began, approximately, to talk about negotiations. And they said that I should expect a call from the foreign office. I did get a call on Monday morning and met with Mr. Rapacki who is the Foreign Minister. In the meantime, I got a whole lot of stuff briefing me on what the conversations had been that had gone on in Saigon. Mr. Rapacki then simply recounted to me the conversations that they thought had gone on and raised two questions.

BOMBING OF HANOI

One, what we had said in Saigon were the basis that we expected to draw the principles, the ten points that Lewanowski had pre-

sented to Lodge, that is, when he came back from Hanoi. We made the point that this, of course, is to have negotiations until some of the points would have to be interpreted and clarified.

Either that day or the next day, in talking about the bombing, the bombing of Hanoi had occurred, and that Hanoi had received a bad effect in the situation—at any rate, we talked between the 3rd and the 4th, and after that we had a whole series of talks up to the 10th or the 12th.

I think I satisfied them that the question of clarification or interpretation was something that we always have to do—that we tend to generalizations that would be interpreted differently by any two people, and that we were entering it in good faith and that, inevitably, I used the example from our past conversations about it, I pointed out that the same thing does not mean the same thing to people at any time. This is what negotiations were all about, one of the things.

I was very disappointed during that period ten or twelve days after the 3rd, because there seemed to be a kind of feeling that we were going to have this meeting, and we had many conversations about it, and yet nothing was materializing. The body had not been produced. And the bombing had not been reduced.

Each time I tried to pin them down, “If there are any problems, we can start talking about them. And you and I can never solve this in doing this.” He put me off. And I so reported to Washington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Who put you off?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Rapacki. I could never get him pinned down.

Senator MUNDT. For what reason—what did he say?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. He mentioned the bombing clarification. At one point he seemed to be resolved with the clarification and that there was no bombing going on. He probably thought that was not the problem at that time, at any rate.

He had made the point very strongly that we ought to be very careful on the bombing at this time—Hanoi gets very nervous and is not likely to look upon this as conducive to carrying this out, or the talks.

There was a period after that when we had—I do not know how many conversations, but I am sure it was at least one a day—we almost lived together—and I kept trying to pin him down. I tried to get him to say, “What has Hanoi said?” I could never get him to say it. He is a diplomatic artist. I like him. But doggone, I never could get him pinned down. He is an expert in circumlocution. You never quit or you never walk away saying, “He answered my question.” He is very, very adroit.

At any rate, this went on until the 13th. Of course, the bombing happened on the 13th which resulted in him calling me the next day and saying, “This breaks off our conversations.”

POLES WERE TALKING WITH THE VIETNAMESE

Of course, we have not been very close to him up to then. I could not get to him. I kept wanting to know, for instance, “Just what is Hanoi saying so that maybe I can interpret it to my government and maybe we can get a better answer.”

He was never where he would tell me, or what Hanoi was saying. He never did at any point in the whole conversation tell me directly that he ever talked to Hanoi. I felt that he was talking to Hanoi. I do not know it for a fact. It was very difficult in this whole series of conversations.

I felt that he was talking to Hanoi. I felt that he was trying to do something with the good-will. I could see a lot of reasons why ending the Vietnam war was useful to the Poles in terms of their own diplomatic position. They are really concerned with Central Europe. They do not want the Soviet Union distracted from Central Europe. They even want us involved in Central Europe, really, when it comes right down to it. They do not want this kind of distraction. During that period of long meetings every day, from the 3rd to the 13th, I was never successful in getting him pinned down on any one of these various questions. He would allude to the attitudes of Hanoi. He would allude to the possibilities of the meeting, but I could not get him to say, "Well, this is exactly what Hanoi said. This is Hanoi's position." I could not get him, of course, to produce the body. I pressed it very hard, because I repeated many times that, "If we are going to get moving, we have got to get the ground work laid. Let us have one meeting to see if it will work. What can we lose? We have gone this far, let us move on."

It never happened.

On the 14th he called me in and said that he would break—that this was the last with Hanoi and the Poles agreed with him. The situation was very bad.

TEN-MILE BOMBING LIMIT AROUND HANOI

Subsequently, after discussing it telegraphically with the department—I did come home on December 23rd to discuss it; I was here one day—I came back from Washington feeling that I really needed to get this thing off dead center, because there was this bombing of Hanoi where they lived that was continually emphasized that I got from Rapacki. So I arrived in Warsaw at six o'clock—that was in the evening—and got a meeting with him at seven o'clock. I told him that afternoon or the afternoon I had left, yes, that afternoon I had left Washington—this was Christmas eve—that we had already put in orders not to bomb within a ten-mile limit surrounding Hanoi. We had a very good hour and a half discussion. I walked away from that meeting thinking, "We are on track."

Senator SYMINGTON. Ten miles?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Ten miles, circle.

Senator COOPER. A radius of ten miles?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. A ten-mile radius. I walked away from that meeting feeling very good and so reported to Washington that Rapacki made it very clear to me in many ways, including the fact that he thanks me for going to Washington and everything—he said, "Now, this is really something I can go to Hanoi with and talk to them about."

I felt at the time that Rapacki was very optimistic, that the thing was on the road; at least that was my impression—that is what I reported back to Washington.

I did not hear anything until the 20th. That was when Mr. Michalowski, who is going to be the Ambassador here and is very

much involved in the Vietnam question, called me and asked me if it was statute or nautical miles. I told him nautical miles. I think I felt that, "We are now on the track."

Then I waited until the 30th, I believe. I think it was the 30th of December when, at six o'clock in the evening, I was called in by Rapacki. I never saw Rapacki and Lewanowski so crestfallen in countenance as they were. They started out by saying that the Polish government would have no alternative but to withdraw from the discussion and expressed the thought, perhaps, that this will be helpful anyway, in the future. But he gave me the clear feeling that while they have felt that this was an out, it was not. He also gave me some talk about if we had done this on the 3rd, maybe it would have happened. I felt that Rapacki was very much disappointed, that he had thought that we had enough now to convince Hanoi. Publicly, you will never get this out of them, but this was my genuine feeling after I walked out of that meeting. I was crestfallen myself.

Other things happened at this time that we do not know about. I think that there was some contact in Moscow in this period, but I only know this kind of second-hand. I did not get any report on it.

POLISH SINCERITY

Senator COOPER. Can you give us any specific reasons why at this time?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. He said that Hanoi just said stop.

Senator COOPER. He did not say why Hanoi asked him to stop?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Except he did talk about the bombing and the clarification situation.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think that he was insincere anytime in negotiations, or he was trying to get us to stop the bombing?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I felt that there was a degree of sincerity on the part of the Poles. These things are always mixed. They are not with us, either, you know. I thought that there was a degree of sincerity by the Poles, but the Poles probably had a very thin thread to rely on in their talks with Hanoi and that there really was not—that they were better that they were hoping that if they could get a good enough package and nail this down well enough from the point of Hanoi, that they had enough contact with Hanoi that they could convince them to meet. I do not think they had it, but, again, you never know. I have a feeling that the Poles were hopeful, but did not have much to go on, but they were trying.

Senator COOPER. He had been to Hanoi?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Who?

Senator COOPER. Lewanowski.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. He was the Commissioner. In fact, he is just leaving there now. But Lewanowski back in the Harriman days, in the bombing pause, Lewanowski was the foreign officer who was delegated to the Vietnam situation, and he is going to be the Ambassador here. He had gone to Hanoi for about seventeen or eighteen days during the bombing pause. I was convinced then that they were doing their damndest to talk Hanoi into meeting with us. I do not know what this is worth, but I met Lewanowski

the day he came back, on a Saturday, and the first thing he said to me, "Goddamn those Chinese."

Senator COOPER. What?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Lewanowski.

Senator SPARKMAN. Go ahead.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. "Goddamn those Chinese."

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Rapacki did not go to Saigon.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. No, not at any time.

Senator SPARKMAN. Or his intermediary—it was the commissioner?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. All right. Do you have some more questions?

Senator COOPER. I have some more questions, but I have to leave.

A FORTUNATE APPOINTMENT

Senator FULBRIGHT. Before I forget it, I just want to say that everything that I have heard from the people, newspapers and other places, it is to the fact that you have done a very good job in Poland. One does not always have that opportunity to say that. I want to compliment you on your work. It has been a very fortunate appointment.

What you said earlier I thought was extremely good. At this point I do not think there is much more that we can do, unless you can read their minds.

VIETNAMESE IN WARSAW

So far as you know, there were never any representatives of Hanoi in Warsaw during this time?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. The Ambassador was there all of the time, the North Vietnamese Ambassador. The two ambassadors were going to meet.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Who was that?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I cannot remember his name.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That was the plan?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. That was the plan. I was standing in the wings and he was, as I was.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You never had met with him?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I never have, no.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You have never seen him?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I have seen him at cocktail parties.

Senator FULBRIGHT. But never officially?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Never officially.

Senator FULBRIGHT. The most surprising thing that I do not understand is why they would have made the move. If I understand it correctly, the Polish diplomat, Lewanowski, was in Saigon together with, I believe, the French Ambassador.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. It was Orlando, the Italian.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Orlando called and discussed this matter with Lodge, is that it?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Yes. In fact, my recollection is that Orlando really got Lodge and Lewanowski back together in June.

Senator SPARKMAN. You understand that the Polish gentleman was a member of the Commission.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Yes, of the Commission.

AMBASSADOR LODGE'S BLESSING

Senator FULBRIGHT. And then as I understand it, if I do correctly, Lodge gave his blessing and said to the Pole, "Why, yes, if you can do anything, do it. We would be interested." Is that about correct?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Yes.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Then he went to Hanoi?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Prior to that Lodge explained in a fairly long conversation what our attitudes were and answered a lot of questions. I cannot remember the specifics of it now, but it is the so-called ten points. Lodge did not present ten points. He discussed them, but Lewanowski summarized these into ten points. He went to Hanoi.

Senator FULBRIGHT. He went to Hanoi?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. And talked to Hanoi, and came back and told Lodge that there was a possibility of this meeting in Warsaw.

NEGOTIATING A SECOND STAGE

Senator FULBRIGHT. At that time they laid down those conditions about stopping the bombing?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. No, no. One of the propositions of the ten points which was appealing to both the Poles, and I thought to Hanoi, too, was that there would be a two-stage proposition, the A and the B stages.

The "A" stage would be to stop the bombing of Hanoi and, consequently, in terms of face and all of that. And previous commitments, statements that Hanoi had made this would happen without any necessity of saying "This is it." But in these negotiations we were going to carry out in Warsaw, this two-stage proposition would be developed where we would agree ahead of time what this second stage would be which would be that both sides would pull back, which was rather indeterminate. But we would negotiate some way to indicate maybe two or three weeks after the bombing stopped that something else would happen and both sides would pull back.

The action that Hanoi made would be what we did with regard to the bombing on the ground. I think this was the thing that was very intriguing to the Poles. I thought it was a good thing, because it would avoid Hanoi which has become so committed to this. "We will not do anything until the bombing is stopped"—the bombing is stopped unilaterally and, therefore, we have agreed to take these two steps. It was very clearly pointed out to them that this would be a highly secret thing and there would be no leaking of the proposition ahead of time.

Senator MUNDT. Was this bombing all over or what?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. The bombing of the North.

Senator MUNDT. Rather than the ten-mile radius or all of North Vietnam bombing?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. All bombing in the North.

Senator SPARKMAN. May I bring this up? I have to leave. In your talks with the Chinese has this matter ever been discussed? Have they ever thrown any light on this regarding North Vietnam?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. The Chinese, unfortunately, I think it is important to say, that they go on. I enjoy the talks; we have good conversations with them. It is kind of fun for me, but not much happens in these talks. They are even tougher than Hanoi, because they say that all troops must leave before we even start talking.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am sorry that I have to leave, but I have a matter here that I have to attend to on the floor.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I have enjoyed having met you.

Senator SPARKMAN. I join with the chairman in what he said about the reports regarding your excellent work. Thank you very much.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Thank you.

WHY THE U.S. BOMBED HANOI

Senator FULBRIGHT (presiding). One last point on the meeting while you are on that point. Did Rapacki tell you, after we had bombed Hanoi—was it on the 3rd or the 2nd—that while there was no condition that we would stop bombing, they certainly understood that it was not an escalation of the bombing. Is that what he told you?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. That is right. He said that certainly this is not going to do you any good in getting these negotiations going, and—

Senator FULBRIGHT. What did our government tell you? Why did we bomb Hanoi at that time?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Essentially that it was unrelated to the peace talks; that this area had been bombed some time before—I think it was back in April or May or June—somewhere in there; that there was positively the pattern of bombing—it has not gotten in there before—but it was certainly unrelated to the peace talks; and also—or I may have interjected this myself—I made the point that we must realize on both sides that things are going on. The war still continues. Let us get the meeting going and we can stop all of this very quickly, because some were worried about that time that there was a bridge blown up near Saigon. There was a bomb thrown into some barracks or a theater or something. I said, “This is something that inevitably happens. The war is going on and both sides are going to be irritated.” There certainly was no attempt, no notion that this was an attempt to throw cold water on the negotiations. That is absolutely wrong. Let us get the meeting on the 6th going and I am sure that we can in a day or two get all of the bombing in North Vietnam stopped.

BOMBING UNRELATED TO NEGOTIATIONS

Senator FULBRIGHT. When you say it was unrelated to it, what that means is that our government did not do that intentionally in order to stop the bombing talks, is that it?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. That is right. It was part of a general military plan which had been in effect for some time, because there was a suggestion raised—Rapacki made the point that he felt personally that Johnson was very well intentioned in this. He won-

dered if maybe some military commander did not want the talks to go on, which was not the case, that this was a target that had been put in the general plan for some time, that this happened—conditions were right to bomb it at that particular date.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Was it on the 16th?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. On the 13th.

Senator FULBRIGHT. The next bombing, that is the same attitude?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. After that bombing it broke off the talks with Rapacki.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Our attitude was that that had no relationship?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. That is right.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That may or may not be hard to take. They had no relationships to these two?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I went back on my own at the 15th or so to see Rapacki again and I told him that—Rapacki and I have pretty good personal relationships—I told him that in every kind of situation like this things are fouled up in the process, but that they had no point—and I was in discussion with Washington. I was hopeful that we could make some progress along some of the lines that he suggested, to keep cool for a while, and let us go back to this thing. Then I did get the message from Washington very shortly thereafter indicating that we would not bomb around Hanoi, but that we should get some assurances from Hanoi that they would not be blowing up shops in Saigon, so that the whole series of discussions thereafter—we finally ended up, as I said, on the 22nd, when I was back here the 23rd, unilaterally, which would not go beyond the—

INSTRUCTIONS FROM U.S. GOVERNMENT

Senator FULBRIGHT. Did our government ever supply you with any minimum or with any instructions as to what to talk about in case you did have conversations?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. They supplied me with instructions on several of the ten points in the event that we had the first meeting, that I should discuss about four or five or ten points and schedule further meetings. I did not have discussions beyond that, but I had plenty to talk about the first several meetings. There were about four points that they gave me, very detailed run-down, for the clarification process. In that Hightower story, there is a minor point, but when we talked—every time we talked about interpretation and clarification I made the point that this is what these meetings are all about, to get them going and we will do it in the meeting. Hightower seemed to think that we wanted to clarify it before the meeting started, which is wrong. We were talking in terms of clarification during the first meetings.

WORK DONE DURING BOMBING PAUSES

Senator SYMINGTON. I have seen some pictures of what has happened in Hanoi and down through South Vietnam in the four days of the holiday season which are the most outstanding things that I have ever seen in my life.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. All of those ships.

Senator SYMINGTON. The way the steel mills, the pictures of the steel mills show some of the new steel barges that they have built, under construction—it was interesting to me that in the last two days that they did nothing, just clean as the day before they started the holiday. It showed that they made all of that preparation. Possibly they are killing Marines right now with the stuff that they brought down.

I do not agree with my colleagues that we ought to stop the air bombing. If we hit them on their military targets that will bring success to us. I have been there three times in eighteen months and in my own opinion we are getting absolutely nowhere. The slight military advantage that we may be getting, I think, is more offset than what we are losing politically and economically. The only chance we have is doing the same that so many Americans want us to do or to stop doing. I want to be very frank about it. That is my position.

What I would like to know from you is there anything that would lead you to feel that there was any sincerity in the North Vietnamese approach, or was there any approach to you. In other words, that we merely stopped for four months because they were looking for something or they were not?

Maybe that they thought that we cheated them, but we stopped six times and nothing has ever come out of it. It gives them a tremendous opportunity to resupply themselves which is the guts of all good movements of armed forces.

WAS THE BOMBING A MISTAKE

Is there anything in your opinion that would lead you to feel that a mistake was made to a point where we did bomb on the 13th of December, or was it just the start of a charade, in your opinion, from the beginning, without the Poles—I am not talking about the Poles, I am just talking about Hanoi?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I think that we have a period there of 7 or 8 days where we had a very calm reasonable discussion with Rapacki. I feel that during these 8 or 10 days he would like to have gotten something going. I do not think that he could.

Senator SYMINGTON. You think that extended back to Hanoi?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I was the greatest wishful thinker in the world. The hope was father to my thoughts. I thought that maybe we had it. But two things make me think not.

In the first place, we had about 8 or 9 days before the 13th when something could and I thought should have happened. There was not any bombing of Hanoi in this period, and it did not happen.

I got all kinds of circumlocution on this.

The other thing is that I thought the two stage proposition was a magnificent out for Hanoi where we would actually unilaterally stop the bombing. Of course, there would be prior agreements privately that something would happen in a couple or three weeks, but it would happen on both sides. And, therefore, that Hanoi would be off the hook in terms of reacting to the stopping of the bombing and that business. It seems to me that this should have been tremendously appealing. I felt it was tremendously appealing to the Poles, but nothing happened.

So despite all of my wishes and hopes—and I will have to admit that some of my telegrams were wishful thinking—I have come to the conclusion that I really do not think that there was a lot of sincerity from Hanoi's side. I think there was less from Hanoi's side than the Poles hoped there was.

Senator SYMINGTON. That was the thrust of my question. Let me ask you one more question.

MERITS OF ANOTHER BOMBING PAUSE

Senator FULBRIGHT. Before you get off that. Does he think anything can be done?

Senator SYMINGTON. I was going to ask that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Okay.

Senator SYMINGTON. From your standpoint, based on your background, you know what this war is doing to the American people—from the standpoint of our political conditions around the world and our economy and from the standpoint of the division in the country—I had a letter the other day from my good friend General Gavin—I do not agree with some of his thinking—in which he said that this country was more divided than it has been since the Civil War. I think he is right from what I get in my own State. In any case, I would like to ask of you this question. Do you yourself feel that another bombing pause voluntarily on our part would have some quid pro quo and that it would be in the best interests of the United States?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I have explored this over and over again with the Poles.

Senator SYMINGTON. I ask with the greatest sincerity.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I have told the Poles in the past many times. I said, "I cannot guarantee anything." I have done this on my own. I have said, "I cannot guarantee anything, God knows I do not make foreign policy but, at least, I can talk to people who do. And if you can give me an indication of some reciprocal action that will be taken by Hanoi, I think that I can get the bombing stopped in 24 hours. And I, certainly, will get in an airplane and fly home and try to convince the President. So give me some reaction—just give me something to talk about."

I said, "There are all kind of pressures in the United States on the President. There is some for stop and some for continuing. Give me a little ammunition to support those who want to stop it. Do you have the contacts with Hanoi—get something from them."

POLES CANNOT EXPLAIN HANOI'S POSITION

And it was disappointing. With regularity I would get the reaction, "We cannot do this—nothing will happen unless you stop. We cannot tell you what will happen if you stop or if anything will happen."

I did get that. I had this statement from every level, from Rapacki on down for at least 50 times since I have brought it up since the time of the visit in last June. I have got nothing to indicate that the Poles have any confidence in anything happening. All they do is say, "Nothing will happen unless you do this," but they cannot throw in the other half of it and they will not and they say it. My own feeling is that the best of both worlds is represented by

the A and B proposition in the 10 points. I hope sometime we can go into that.

Senator SYMINGTON. The only reason I asked the question, I am a neophyte on this diplomatic proposition. The fight in the air is the only thing that is hurting them. We are not doing very well, because of the limitations on us—maybe that would not do well even if we took the limitations off. My personal impression is that they put in these tremendous concentrated efforts to stop the air affair, because it is the only thing that hurts them. They do not have very much respect for human life, any more than for a dog—probably less than for a good milk cow.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. We cannot get to an intermediary. I have stayed awake nights thinking about it—why we cannot get at least some indication on their part. I told Rapacki, “Do not tell me what Hanoi will do—give me something very specific what you think Hanoi will do.”

Senator SYMINGTON. According to some good writers they are trying to put us on the ground which I think would be disastrous. Thank you very much.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Senator Pell has some questions.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PROBLEMS OF TRANSLATION

There are just two questions. One, are you familiar with the round robin letter sent about January 24 to—

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Yes.

Senator PELL. Are you familiar with the expression *droit reconnaitre*, concerning its translation?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I sure am, but I cannot remember what the words are now.

Senator PELL. *Droit reconnaitre*. Now the question here is as you know that the Vietnamese translation into English gave the hard version of it, and they said that we must accept it. We went back to Vietnam on that and said, “Is this really what you mean?” Or, “Do you mean the alternative? What do you consider it to mean?”

Did it come to you in Warsaw?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Rapacki raised that question. He thought that there was a difference. We so reported it to Washington. They checked it with the British. I do not know all that went on here, but I do know that the British were asked to investigate it. They investigated it with Moscow—that would be the North Vietnamese Ambassador in Moscow. I do not know where else we might have checked. I know that there was a lot of query about that. The answer we got which I went over Monday—this was on Saturday—I went over Monday and talked to Rapacki and I said, “All of our indications are that this distinction that you draw is not considered a distinction by the North Vietnamese.”

Senator PELL. Did the North Vietnamese come back to you, to Rapacki or to the Polish delegate in Hanoi, indicating that you ought to consider it, that it would be acceptable?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Nothing happened in Warsaw with the North Vietnamese. Simply Rapacki expressing his own views.

Senator PELL. But it ought to be considered?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. We ought to look at this as the softer one. I, frankly, do not think—I thought it was a mountain made out of a mole hill. I do not think either formulation—I mean, when you read the whole context of the letter, I did not feel that it made that much difference in the letter. Perhaps it did. So that we did investigate. I do not know how far we went. I know from the British Ambassador who was in Moscow at the time that he was the one who went to check with the Ambassador—I know from him that he is the one that called on the North Vietnamese late that Saturday night to find out officially which interpretation was correct. And Grimelow, who I regard as one of the most able British diplomats I have met, reported back to London, which went to Washington. “What you have termed the hard language was the proper language to use.”

Senator PELL. I am not sure that I would agree with you on that, in this letter—that the single guiding point from the American standpoint—

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. There is another section in that letter. Do you have the whole letter there?

Senator PELL. Yes.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. There is another section to that letter.

Senator PELL. I would like to put it into the record, if you will permit it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes, you may do so. It will be made a part of the record.

[A related document follows:]

A Probe for Peace That Failed

BY JOHN M. HIGHTOWER

Associated Press Staff Writer

For more than four months, from mid-December to late April, President Johnson held U.S. bombers away from the North Vietnamese capital of Hanoi in an effort to find out whether President Ho Chi Minh would open secret peace talks or take steps to scale down the war.

North Vietnam was informed of what Johnson was doing and was invited to respond.

The story of what happened, beginning last November with a Polish maneuver, now can be told as it is known in official Washington. It has been pieced together in a weeks-long check of various sources. It can be told now because the episode is closed, although officials believe some of the work done may contribute eventually to peace in Vietnam.

Through Polish and other diplomatic channels word was sent to Hanoi last December that if Hanoi would take some parallel step to de-escalate the fighting, the United States would be prepared to make other moves, Hanoi, campaigning to halt all bombing of North Vietnam, never accepted the offer.

STRUCK AGAIN 2 WEEKS AGO

The gambit thus failed and two weeks ago U.S. bombers struck again inside the previously forbidden Hanoi circle—10 nautical miles from the center of the city.

The last previous time the bombs exploded so close to Hanoi's center, it was during a peace probe initiated by Poland. Polish diplomats claimed that that bombing, Dec. 13–14, wrecked one of the most hopeful approaches to peace in the recent history of the war. U.S. officials refute the claim, but can't be sure.

Out of that failure, however, arose the four-month Hanoi bomb limitation.

Events began with Januz Lewandowski, a Polish diplomat on the International Control Commission in Vietnam.

Late last November Lewandowski went to Hanoi and spent 10 days talking with diplomats and North Vietnamese officials. When he returned to Saigon about Dec. 1, he met secretly with U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in the Italian Embassy.

10 POINTS PROPOSED

Lewandowski told Lodge he believed North Vietnam was prepared to open secret exploratory discussions with the United States. He did not interpose the condition that the United States would have to call off unconditionally the bombing of the North.

The Polish diplomat gave Lodge a 10-point statement of topics and principles for the proposed talks. The statement constituted a Polish summary of what the United States would be willing to talk about, presumably based on published declarations and previous talks Lewandowski had with Lodge. Lewandowski said the North Vietnamese were also willing to talk about these points.

The 10 points covered such topics as halting hostilities, the independence of South Vietnam, the principle of U.S. willingness to withdraw its forces when that independence was assured and the role of elections in organizing the government in the South.

There was also provision for discussing Hanoi's terms for a peaceful settlement as well as any other peace terms that might be thrown into the talks.

President Johnson and his advisers, quickly notified by Lodge, were interested in the possibility a serious opportunity for negotiations might be at hand. Polish diplomats had already told Americans they believed Hanoi was about ready to hold secret exploratory talks even though the bombing continued.

President Johnson decided that with some clarification the 10-point statement could serve as a basis for talks with North Vietnam.

In about 48 hours Rusk instructed Lodge to inform Lewandowski that the United States was ready to talk and was interested in clarification. He also told him the United States was prepared to shift the contact to Warsaw and to meet there with a representative from North Vietnam.

One point stated the United States would not insist that North Vietnam acknowledge publicly the presence of its forces in South Vietnam. The Johnson administration decided this should be clarified to require that if the troop issue was to be covered up for facesaving purposes, then the North Vietnamese forces should be withdrawn from the south."

GRONOUSKI MADE CHIEF CONTACT

Lewandowski was informed of this and other clarification points. The others seemed mainly matters of wording. But this one was obviously substantial.

In Warsaw, President Johnson's ambassador, John A. Gronouski received instructions making him the U.S. representative and briefing him on U.S.-Vietnamese policy.

Gronouski met with Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki and found Rapacki strenuously objected to any clarification on any of the 10 points. Rapacki warned against wrecking the whole action at the outset.

Between Polish and U.S. versions of the incident there is some difference at this point. The Polish view has been reported to be that the United States wanted to get its clarification before the secret talks opened. The Washington version is that the United States was making known its desire for clarification in the talks.

RESISTANCE CAUSED CONCERN

Rapacki's strong resistance to the clarification proposal caused some concern in Washington where officials were not sure the Poles had any commitment from North Vietnam to go into the talks. Some high officials here doubted that Rapacki was in fact relaying U.S. views and readiness for talks to Hanoi.

So far as can be determined from responsible informants, President Johnson sometime earlier approved air strikes close in to Hanoi with raid and truck centers as targets. Generally the United States had avoided strikes at the city.

Informants now say an important element in the administration decision not to suspend the bombing plan was an attack by Communist forces on Saigon's main airfield and an unsuccessful try to blow up a major bridge in Saigon.

Officials said diplomats are always moving about on one peace hope or another and that lack of a firm commitment for talks also was influential in the bombing decision.

INFLUENCED BY BASIC STRATEGY

Furthermore, Johnson administration policymakers presumably were influenced by their own basic strategy of keeping heavy military pressure on North Vietnam.

Before any North Vietnamese representative showed up for the meeting, U.S. planes carried out the Dec. 13-14 raids on the outskirts of Hanoi. Some planes, at least, flew directly over the heart of the city. Antiaircraft fire was heavy and North Vietnamese fighters rose to the defense. Some explosives fell in the city proper.

Thereupon, North Vietnam raised a protest—which stirred up angry demonstrations in many countries—that the United States had deliberately bombed the civilian population of Hanoi. U.S. denials fell on skeptical ears and did little to quiet the worldwide uproar.

HANOI NO LONGER INTERESTED

It later became known in Washington that one or two planes had in fact jettisoned their bombs over the city when they were attacked but officials insisted heatedly that no civilian bombing was ever deliberate.

Shortly after the Dec. 13-14 incident, Rapacki reportedly told the United States that North Vietnam had made clear it no longer was interested in the planned talks because of the bombing of Hanoi. Soon afterward this Polish version of the collapse of the plan was made public informally by diplomats of the United Nations.

U.S. officials publicly refuted the charge but privately said that while the attack at Hanoi might have collapsed the Polish plan, it also might have presented Hanoi or Warsaw with a convenient excuse for not going through with it.

FELT CHANCES WERE OVER-RATED

Some officials here felt the Warsaw government had overrated the chances of Hanoi's agreeing to talk.

At that point President Johnson had two obvious interests so far as further attacks on Hanoi were concerned. Assuming he still hoped the Polish plan might work he needed to get it active again if possible. He also needed to avoid fueling further worldwide indignation.

The United States sent word to Rapacki through Gronouski, according to diplomatic sources, that it would not bomb inside the circle of 10 nautical miles around Hanoi and that this should get the Polish plan back on the track. According to these sources, Rapacki went back to Hanoi, but Hanoi said no.

Here again U.S. officials are skeptical that Warsaw ever had a firm commitment or Hanoi a serious intention to open secret talks.

JOHNSON SENDS NEW WORD

Johnson decided to make the Hanoi no-bomb ring something more than simply an effort to revive the Polish plan. He sent word to North Vietnam through various channels that the United States was not only interested in opening peace talks but also was interested in practical steps to scale down the war.

No responsive action was asked of the North Vietnamese. But they were informed that if they wished to make any move in any area of the war to curtail military operations, the United States would be alert and responsive. U.S. officials say North Vietnam never picked up the offer.

The Hanoi bomb limitation extended over the most intense period of peace probing in which the United States had engaged since the long bombing pause during the Christmas-New Year season of 1965-66.

There were truces at Christmas and New Year but the real focus of peace hopes was toward the lunar new year holiday in February. Beginning in January the United States sent four messages to Hanoi containing peace proposals.

The climax came in early February when President Johnson personally sent to Ho Chi Minh a letter making a new proposal for secret talks and offering to halt all bombing of North Vietnam if Ho would stop infiltration and military supplies from north to south.

The President's letter constituted a personal rejection of Ho's demand for unconditional stoppage of the bombing. Ho, in reply, renewed his call for an unconditional halt in the bombing of the north.

EFFECT OF BOMBINGS ON WARSAW TALKS

To the Editor:

The Washington news dispatch of John M. Hightower of the Associated Press published May 9 throws new light on the events of last November and December, when the United States and North Vietnam seemed the closest yet to direct, secret negotiations.

I have also written about these events, on the basis of very well-informed sources in and around the United Nations. However, in some important respects the story I got is different from Mr. Hightower's.

There is agreement that on or about Dec. 1 Polish Ambassador Janusz Lewandowski informed U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in Saigon that Hanoi was ready to hold secret talks with the United States in Warsaw without demanding prior cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam. But Hightower does not mention the bombings in the Hanoi area of Dec. 2 and 4, and leaves the impression that only the bombings of Hanoi on Dec. 13-14 caused the North Vietnamese to lose interest in the talks.

MAJOR ATTACKS

As I got the story, on Dec. 3 Lewandowski complained strongly to Lodge about the bombing of Dec. 2, stating that although Hanoi would talk while the bombing was going on, it would not accept escalation at the same time. (The Times reported on Dec. 3: "Waves of United States fighter-bombers made their second closest strike to Hanoi. * * *") Lodge replied that such attacks were planned long in advance.

On Dec. 4 another major attack was made on the Hanoi area. During this period the first talk between United States and North Vietnamese representatives, which had been set for about Dec. 6, was postponed.

In Warsaw, in a series of talks between Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki and U.S. Ambassador John Gronouski, two main problems were discussed: Hanoi's protests over the Dec. 2 and 4 bombings and Washington's request for clarification of the tenpoint statement which the Poles said Hanoi would accept as a basis for the U.S.—North Vietnamese meetings.

Hightower's account indicated that only the latter problem was at issue, and he reported, "Officials commented that diplomats were always involved in pursuing one peace hope or another and said that lack of a firm commitment for talks also was influential in the decision to go ahead with the bombing."

But since, according to my information, Hanoi had agreed to talk but was protesting against escalation, it is hard to believe the Dec. 13-14 bombing of Hanoi was not closely connected with the negotiations. One can speculate that the bombing was carried out either deliberately to disrupt the talks or to bring pressure on North Vietnam to accept some pre-condition to the talks.

TROOPS IN SOUTH

The most important new element in Hightower's account was on the nature of the clarification sought by the United States. He reported: "One of the ten points provided that the United States would not insist that North Vietnam acknowledge publicly the presence of its forces in South Vietnam. The Johnson Administration decided this should be clarified to require that if the troop issue was to be covered up for facesaving purposes, then the North Vietnamese forces would be withdrawn from the South."

Such a "clarification" was in reality a demand that the North Vietnamese cease aid to the Vietcong, without in any way limiting United States action in the South. Thus it may well be that the Dec. 13-14 bombing of Hanoi was an effort to force North Vietnam to accept this "clarification." As of now, this seems the most logical explanation of this strange episode.

RICHARD HUDSON,
Editor, War/Peace Report, New York, May 10, 1967.

RECOGNITION OF THE NLF

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Where are we looking for this? I kind of lost this a little bit.

Senator PELL. It is about the recognition of the National Liberation Party.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. What was the other item?

Senator PELL. This is the hard line what was considered.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. That is the single guiding point in that letter.

Senator PELL. Here is another one that ought to be considered. My understanding was that Hanoi had come back and said, "We can take the soft translation" or, maybe, in view of the situation, we can take it either way you want—should we not then have taken the softer one is what is really meant.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. The talks definitive on this, and that is, to be able to do so, I would have to review my notes. I do not have them here. They are in Warsaw. I, particularly, the conversation that I had with Ambassador Brimelow, who was the guy in London who actually went to call on him—

Senator PELL. He went to Hanoi?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. No, no, Brimelow was the Minister in Moscow. He is now the Ambassador in Poland. I have gotten to know him personally.

Senator PELL. Is he Polish or British?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Brimelow is the man who will get his instructions from London to talk to the Ambassador or the Embassy in Moscow for clarification on that terminology. And my recollection—and God knows it is a long time ago—but my recollection is that Brimelow reported back that it was the proper interpretation out of the Moscow Embassy of Hanoi. I do not want to swear by that. I want to check on it first.

NO DIRECT QUERY TO HANOI

Senator PELL. Do you have any recollection that Rapacki went out to check this out?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. No, I do not believe they did. After the bombing resumed they asked us why didn't we ask Lewanowski to do it, but they did not do it on their own hook.

Senator PELL. Right. So that there is no further light that you can shed on this particular incident?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. No. I do not know what all went on after I sent this telegram in on Rapacki asking us to consider this.

Senator PELL. I sort of come back to this point, because the information I had was a little different. I may be informed incorrectly. I had understood that a direct query went back to Hanoi.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. No. I remember very specifically that after the whole thing was over and the bombing had been resumed on Tuesday morning, I saw Rapacki, and he said—I must have raised the question with what their people said, and he said, "Why did you not ask us to ask them?"

Senator PELL. A good question. And to repeat the question that you got out of Moscow, it was the hard line?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I will check my records on that, if you prefer.

Senator PELL. I am very much interested.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I will send it back when I get back to Warsaw—I will go through it and send it back to the department. I cannot remember specifically now.

Senator PELL. It disturbs me, because we have had other incidents where it seemed that if we wanted to follow the softer interpretation it might have been different.

KEEPING CHINA OUT OF THE WAR

My other question is much more specific. What action do you think it would take to bring the Chinese into the war in Vietnam, in the light of your conversations?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I frankly think that I am about—I do not even feel embarrassed by saying I do not know, because I do not think that anybody else knows. Certainly, there is nothing in my conversations that I have had that would indicate either that they would come in or not. They talk about that they will support them all the way. I think it is really polemic.

Senator PELL. You have given them certain assurances which they have you feel kept them out?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Not as many as the newspapers say we have. We have had no agreement with them over in Warsaw that people talk about. I do not know anything about that. It must have happened when I was not there.

Senator PELL. Would you hazard a guess that a land invasion would bring them in—would you hazard such a guess?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I believe that would be a calculated risk. I would be worried about it.

Senator PELL. Do you think that complete annihilation of Hanoi would bring them in?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I do not want to guess on that.

I do not think that I have the basis for judging that. I really do not know.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I do get the notion that the land invasion might bring them in.

NORTH VIETNAMESE INTEREST IN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you get the notion that they do not wish to make any compromise and that there is not much point in having negotiations?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. I do not know. Let me tell you a conversation that I had about two weeks ago with Lewanowski. I went over and asked him to intercede on the prisoner business when they were parading prisoners through their streets. They have in the past interceded in time of trial. They agree with us and flatly say that they agree with us, that Hanoi ought to abide by the Geneva Convention, but this last time I talked to him he said, "Look, we would like to do it, but I cannot tell you whether we will, because we have to judge whether we ought to use our good offices with them for the purpose when there might be a possibility that we can engage ourselves in a larger question, which is resolving the war itself."

The Poles are, interestingly enough, even after the two times they have tried, last January and this December, they have indicated that they have tried and nothing has happened. They still leave open the door to participate as one does not always know what they mean by the things, but, certainly, they have given every impression to me that if they thought that there was any possibility that they would be involved in this again themselves.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Did they give you the impression that after the bombing on the 13th they would believe that North Vietnam, that they, the Poles, would believe that North Vietnam is not really interested in further efforts to negotiation because they do not believe that the United States seriously wishes to negotiate—that they only expect a surrender—is that why they bomb?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Well, I think that you will get—I do get that line of thought from the Poles very often. I do not think that they fully agree with it themselves, but I think that in terms of their relationships with Hanoi they must maintain their relationships in what they regard as necessary in maintaining the credibility with them. I think that they must go along a certain line. And I think that this line is one that presents itself. I do not believe they feel it. I think that the Poles do.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you think that they do?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Yes. I am absolutely certain.

Senator PELL. What about terms?

Ambassador GRONOUSKI. Well, I think that is a little uncertain because it seems to me that if we do not want to negotiate entirely on their terms, as I said a little while ago, I think that the proposals contained in the ten points are a logical and reasonable approach to negotiation where we would solve their problems with respect to a unilateral cessation of bombing, but have an understanding earlier than that, that something will happen later, after a time has passed. And when you say on their terms, on our terms—I do not know any terms that we can offer them, because I do not even know that we can stop bombing as they ask for. And the Poles will not in any way tell me that. This is what flusters me.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do you have anything further? We could go on. There is much more to try to understand, although I think that we would be rehashing it.

Thank you very much for coming here. I think that you have done a good job with the Poles. It is too bad that we cannot do something about Hanoi. Maybe we can.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

DISCUSSION REGARDING THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S TESTIMONY

Tuesday, May 16, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m., in Room S-116, the Capitol Building, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Gore, Church, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, Mundt and Cooper.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Holt of the Committee staff.

[S. 1030, the Information Media Guaranty bill was again reported.]

The CHAIRMAN. Any other votes?

I wanted to bring up another matter. I have already explained to most of the people about Rusk withdrawing this morning. He has offered to come back on Friday or Monday. Monday is out because of a unanimous consent on another matter of the Senator from Connecticut. I don't know about Friday. I am a little inclined to feel he is so reluctant to come and so on. What does the committee wish to do?

Senator MCCARTHY. Tell him to send up that tape recording.

The CHAIRMAN. This is perhaps the second or third time that he has this year agreed to come and then very near the last minute said he couldn't come for one reason or another of his own choosing. So that is the situation. Is it the sense of the committee that we will not urge him to come any more?

It is understood. I have written him a letter we would be glad to hear him any time.

Senator WILLIAMS. Is that Secretary Rusk?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator WILLIAMS. He is in another room along the corridor.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is the Kennedy Round report.

The CHAIRMAN. The morning paper had a very thorough briefing.

Senator MCCARTHY. The whole thing is of no consequence anyway.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is this what he was going to talk to us about?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Senator MCCARTHY. He would rather talk about the Kennedy Round.

Senator SPARKMAN. Was there a Kennedy Round discussion this morning at 9:30?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One at 9:30 and one at 10:30.

COMMUNICATION IS SERIOUSLY IMPAIRED

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, for whatever it is worth, I think the communication between this committee and the Department of State is seriously impaired and I don't wish the committee further demeaned. If the Secretary of State has something which he wishes to communicate to us, let him request a time when he can appear, at the pleasure of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, of course, I don't like this situation. I suppose I or others may think it is due to my disagreement with his policy, but I have tried not to go beyond that, and I say as politely as Marcy knows how to write a letter for him to come.

Senator SPARKMAN. Does that raise a question?

Senator MCCARTHY. Why don't you try Pat Holt on the next letter? [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. I really have and we have tried to give him an opportunity and he has accepted it twice.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Milrae [Jensen] writes pretty good letters. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. He himself suggested today, in response to another proposal that he made, he would be available today. We said okay, and then he comes up—it disrupts our plans; you can't schedule something else on it.

FOREIGN AID BILL

I wanted to bring up another question. We don't have much left on our schedule except foreign aid. We will try to get some—we hoped, I hoped, that the House would do something about that bill. There was such a difference between the House's idea and the administration that we hoped that the committee, at least, would report a bill to see where we stood.

The staff wasn't a bit pleased with the complete rewrite of this bill. They preferred the way the House has undertaken to do it which is simply amending the existing bill.

In any case we will have that before us.

HEARINGS ON THE VIETNAM WAR

Now, about other hearings, if the Secretary isn't coming what does the committee think about having some other hearings, general hearings, on particularly the war and its implications, the economic situation or anything else we would like.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, usually I agree with Albert. In this case I think the issues are far too important for face and dignity over what our function is, for those of us who disagree with the Administration have even a greater responsibility to be brainwashed. I really believe we should stay in communication with him and ask him to come up as frequently as he will and for us to say "you are wrong". But you have got to ask him to change our mind if that is incorrect. I think we should keep pressing the Secretary to show us where we are wrong.

I would also like to suggest that as a committee, we now, it seems to me, have become a majority of us where we disagree with the course of the country, of the administration. Can't we somehow coalesce this majority around a minimum point expressing committee disapproval with the resolution, because I think this would precipitate a real debate and might precipitate an actual withholding of funds at some point.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Which resolution is that?

Senator PELL. To come up with one which meets with the approval of the majority of the committee expressing our disapproval of Asia.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You may have some difficulty with that.

Senator PELL. But in the committee we would have a majority to get it out and I think this would have an effect in holding down policy. I may sound as if I am talking at odds to the maximum exposure of the Administration, maximum brainwashing, but we should in our own responsibility, and I also would like to see us as a result of our exposure come out with a majority positions, instead of this business of writing letters, round robin letters, or taking individual positions. I think this could have an effect on policy.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to reply to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Gore.

AN AFFRONT TO THE COMMITTEE

Senator GORE. I think Senator Pell has taken a view that has much merit and ordinarily I certainly would agree with that. But, frankly, it seems that the occurrence of today is an affront to the committee, and I am not at all sure it isn't intended to be an affront to the committee.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would have to.

Senator GORE. I beg your pardon?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I would have to respectfully disagree.

Senator SPARKMAN. So do I.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't know anything about it. But this review on the Kennedy Round was suddenly called. I assumed it was called at the direction of the President who doesn't brook any interference with his programs, and he has told the entire cabinet to be there this morning for this review by the Vice President. I am not supporting the Democratic party, don't misunderstand me. But I think that probably that is what happened, and I think Rusk was told to be there this morning as Secretary of State in connection with the Kennedy Round explanation to these people in Congress. I would guess that he didn't have any choice nor did any of the rest of the cabinet members. That would be my interpretation, Albert.

Senator GORE. I am not sure the President feels any more kindly toward the committee than Secretary Rusk does.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then we might direct some of this criticism at the President, too, but personally I just feel that Rusk should not get the entire blame for this.

RUSK'S BUSY SCHEDULE

Senator SPARKMAN. I agree with Senator Hickenlooper. I think we ought to keep this in mind. Secretary Rusk is probably the busi-

est man in government. I don't see how the man lives under the job that he has, and I think he has respect for this committee. I think he has shown so in the past, and I don't believe that he would have stayed away if he could have been here.

The CHAIRMAN. It could be coincidence. I don't know why. Really what puzzles me, Bourke, is the reason for this morning, I mean this briefing, when everything, I think, that happened you read in the morning paper. But that is neither here nor there. I agree with Senator Pell's idea. I don't want to break off this, if possible. If it is agreeable with the committee, we will send word he will come on Friday. Will you all come on Friday if he will come? I don't want to be the only one here.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have something set for Friday.

Senator WILLIAMS. I will tell you a simple solution off the record. [Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. What do you think about it? You won't be here Friday?

Senator GORE. I can't; I am sorry.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I will be in town, but I have set it for something else. I think it may be Friday afternoon that I have set it. I leave the Capitol at 10 o'clock, and I won't be back here until late in the afternoon.

ATTENDANCE OF SENATORS

Senator CHURCH. I think one thing that Rusk objects to is not coming to this committee and testifying, but as I have understood him correctly in the past in conversations I have had with him, he does resent coming to testify before this committee and having only three or four Senators, and I can't blame him. His time is very valuable and he doesn't reach us because we don't show. I think that if we are going to put an invitation over until Friday under circumstances which mean that only four or five Senators are going to be here, we ought not to do it. We ought to find a time when most of us are here.

The CHAIRMAN. He has made this point, and I think with some justice.

Senator SPARKMAN. I agree with you and unless we can get a fair attendance Friday, we ought not to have him.

REHASHING FAMILIAR POSITIONS

Senator MCCARTHY. I don't think we ought to invite him for general briefings until he knows what his general position is, and we know what his is, and he doesn't tell us anything that he hasn't told the press. If we wait until we get specific legislative material before us, then he could come up anyway and give him something to talk about. We don't want to listen to him and he doesn't want to talk to us.

Senator CHURCH. He is going to rehash his position and is so familiar with us and we are so familiar with him.

Senator GORE. I don't want to dismiss this situation this morning quite so lightly. Maybe it is a coincidence, but certainly with the whole cabinet there, the President must have been advised that Secretary Rusk had an appointment before this committee to discuss the situation in Southeast Asia. With war clouds with China

certainly looming, I don't know why a briefing, why the whole cabinet must be at a briefing with select members.

KENNEDY ROUND DISCUSSION

Senator WILLIAMS. Secretary Rusk was the only member of the Cabinet at the meeting. Yes, I just left there.

The CHAIRMAN. You had been down there?

Senator WILLIAMS. He had some undersecretaries.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he telling you anything that wasn't in the paper about the Kennedy Round?

Senator WILLIAMS. Yes, he did tell us this. He didn't know what they had done and the paper indicated that they did.

Senator MCCARTHY. That is pretty helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. That is pretty frank.

Senator WILLIAMS. We couldn't get any information as to any of the statistics—

Senator GORE. Was there any particular reason why this briefing had to occur this morning on the date that he was supposed to be at this committee. Was the information given to you of that urgency?

Senator WILLIAMS. I agree with what Gene has just said here. I think it is just a propaganda movement to have us all around there and give the idea that they achieved something great when in reality neither they nor any who attended the meeting know what they have achieved yet.

The CHAIRMAN. This is a very frank statement which I think is true.

Senator WILLIAMS. I was there and if they wanted me to tell you what they achieved over there, I would know less than I did before. I read the paper this morning and I think I learned more than I did there.

Senator SPARKMAN. What did the corn and wheat people think?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They don't know.

Senator GORE. Yet this is given priority over a scheduled hearing before this committee on the question of war or peace.

VICE PRESIDENT SPONSORED THE MEETING

The CHAIRMAN. This is what irritated me, but I still think there is a lot Mr. Pell has in his favor regardless of his feelings about it, and I think you are both right in the sense I don't think there is any justification for this reason that has just been described that cancels this meeting here after the long time we have had setting it and at his suggestion.

Senator WILLIAMS. Of course, the Vice President was the one who sponsored the meeting and if he told the Secretary to be there he would feel obligated to be here.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the only thing; they probably overrode him. They said, "This propaganda value is too great and we can't let it not create the impression we did a great thing." They may have overridden him.

Let me put it this way: There is a valid point not asking him to come to three or four people and it does make him mad. Shall I ask Mr. Marcy of the staff to poll the Senators and unless at least

8 or 9 of them promise to be here on Friday, we not ask him. Or shall we just drop it?

Senator McCARTHY. Let it go for this week.

The Chairman. All right. Let it go.

How about some other hearings—

SCHEDULE OF FOREIGN AID BILL

Senator CHURCH. When do we finish our hearings on foreign aid, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Next week is going to be on Dodd and then comes the Memorial Day. It will be right after Memorial Day.

Mr. MARCY. The House does not expect to finish the foreign aid until about the middle of June.

The CHAIRMAN. But the committee will finish it.

Senator CHURCH. Do we have to wait until the House finishes?

The CHAIRMAN. No, we are not going to wait that long.

Senator SPARKMAN. We decided to wait until the committee reports.

The CHAIRMAN. We decided to wait until the committee acted because there was such a divergence between what the committee over there had in mind and what the administration wanted.

Senator CHURCH. My only question is because we usually start too late and it goes too long.

The CHAIRMAN. It hasn't been because of our hearing, but it has been over the controversy over our bill.

Senator CHURCH. It has gotten to be quite late.

The CHAIRMAN. We have reported it far in advance of the action on the floor, isn't that right, Mr. Marcy, practically every year. We haven't been late on the completion of our hearings and reporting it.

Then we will have those probably scheduled as soon as we get back from Memorial Day, that is about the earliest time. Next week is practically out because you know what the situation is on the floor next week.

That is the only major legislation.

FURTHER HEARINGS ON VIETNAM

Is the committee interested in hearings with outsiders, any further hearings particularly on Vietnam and also on the economic situation and so on?

If we are going to have any more we ought to begin thinking about them and have the staff contacting people. I personally would like to have some further hearings. I would like to keep some kind of discussion going. I am not at all satisfied with what I read about the Administration's views about the war and the statement that somebody just related if the Chinese continue to be hard-nosed why we can't avoid confrontation. I don't know what this means. It is in the nature of a threat, it strikes me, and if the Secretary doesn't wish to come, I think we ought to explore it with other people.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

TAKING A POSITION ON ESCALATION

Senator PELL. I wondered what you would think or would it have merit to have a couple of sessions in Executive Session where we could coalesce. I realize it would not, as Senator Hickenlooper suggested, it might well not go through. But whether we could arrive at a committee majority position obviously without regard to party lines, and whether a majority of the committee really opposes escalation. I think it would have a good effect on the country if the majority of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate actually passed out a resolution of that sort. It may be a rather difficult thing to get out or it may be rather dangerous to the national interest. I throw it out as an idea, knowing your views, and wondering what you thought both in your responsibility as chairman of the committee with the responsibility of the national interest and, at the same time, with your own personal views with regard to what is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is a very difficult matter. I have thought about it a great deal. A resolution unless there is a fairly good agreement on it, it strikes me, would not be of much value, you know, if we just exhibited to be what we know to be differences of view. If you think there is a formula that you have in mind or could be developed, I would be glad to explore it. I think it is our duty and I would like to perform it as best I could to understand where we are going out there, and to try to influence it if there is any view in the committee. I have tried to do it as an individual and I would also like to do it as a committee if there is any feeling in the committee that it goes in one direction. If we are split nine to ten—

Senator CHURCH. That is the split.

The CHAIRMAN. It isn't going to be very impressive.

Mr. MCCARTHY. On what?

The CHAIRMAN. On a resolution or a statement.

Senator PELL. I am saying if we could come out with a majority position opposing escalation. No more than that, but something that would be a method of blowing a whistle on the administration.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why don't we wait until Katzenbach gets back from Africa? I don't know what he is doing over there. But we had Soapy Williams over there.

Senator WILLIAMS. There is an idea if we got Soapy—

Senator MCCARTHY. That is my continent now, be careful. [Laughter.]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am on that committee, too.

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes, but I am the chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. I don't believe that this committee can very well claim for itself the right to determination on the power to determine the conduct of the war, and that is what it amounts to. Furthermore, there are all kinds of definitions on escalation, whether or not there should be more manpower, whether there should be stepped up activities or not. Those are military questions that I don't think we are qualified to pass on. I can have my own individual opinion, but I certainly would not want to feel that I was called on to set policy.

REPUBLICAN POLICY COMMITTEE STATEMENT

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I wish to promote another great debate, so I move that we adopt the Republican Policy Committee statement as a policy statement of this committee.¹

The CHAIRMAN. Well now——

Senator PELL. I second that motion.

Senator MCCARTHY. Bourke, do you want to make a statement?

Senator GORE. I will write “be it resolved” at the beginning.

Senator WILLIAMS. I will second that motion and I think it is wonderful.

The CHAIRMAN. You second the motion that we adopt that as the policy of this committee.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There are no more copies available.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that the document be inserted in the record at this point.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is already in the Congressional Record twice, once in the House and once in the Senate.

Senator PELL. I withdraw my request.

Senator MCCARTHY. I think it ought to be printed every week so that people read it. Why take official action, maybe some kind of a commendation.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe you ought to put that as a motion of commendation to be voted.

Senator MCCARTHY. To the authors.

Senator GORE. I will not press for a vote this morning. Let’s wait until the Secretary appears. May we have that the pending business and let him testify.

Senator CHURCH. Make that the pending business and he will be up here very quickly.

EDUCATIONAL HEARINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Let me come back to this other question. I think maybe what you have in mind may be premature. What I would like, my own idea, would be to have some further hearings. I have found them very educational both last year and this year because we brought people that have spent their lifetime studying these things, some of them did and others had experience. At least it was educational for me. I would like to put some others in along with the other hearings that we have. About the only serious hearings on legislation are on foreign aid and I would like to have some other hearings. What is the feeling of the rest of the committee? Then after that, maybe, if there is any coalescing of any views at all you might offer some kind of a motion. That would be the idea of having the hearings. If there is anything to come out of it it would be an expression of opinion if the people succeeded in creating an opinion.

¹On May 1, 1967 the Senate Republican Policy Committee staff released a white paper on Vietnam that urged Republican senators, before deciding to support or differ with the President’s policies, to question “what precisely is our national interest in Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos and to what further lengths are we prepared to go in support of this interest?”

A CHANGE IN OBJECTIVES

Senator SPARKMAN. Is there anything new and fresh available or are we going to have just a rehash of the same thing? Won't it be cumulative?

The CHAIRMAN. The developments there, I would say, are fresh. I mean they are going on every day. The significance of these statements of the executive, I think, ought to be considered. I read them here and there and one reason I wanted to have the Secretary here, I don't know that he would tell us, was to find out if there is a change in their ultimate objective there.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did you see that statement in the speech in New York yesterday?

The CHAIRMAN. About the confrontation with China and we are going to be there a very long time.

Senator SPARKMAN. Whose speech?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Until the end of this century. Wheeler and Rusk.

Senator GORE. I suggest we start with General Wheeler on a matter of his own statement of what the policy is about.

The CHAIRMAN. John, it seems to me this thing is going through a change in objectives. I don't think there is any more—

Senator SPARKMAN. I think it is perfectly all right to explore those, but I would hate to see a list of witnesses brought in that would just say what the others said before, why we are in there, how we happen to be in there. It would be a mistake to be in there and we had to be in there and so on and so forth. To discuss these things, fine.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think these demonstrations are perfectly legal, except for those burnings and all that. The demonstrations are a form of a substitute for the discussions that ought to be going on before the committee and in the Senate.

Now, the discussion yesterday, I thought, was useful. The Senator from Kentucky raised a question and several chimed in and I think this is all a good thing in our kind of government to have a discussion going on about a matter which is as dangerous as this is.

You say there is nothing fresh—

Senator SPARKMAN. No, I asked a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Another thing, you saw this morning, I think it was this morning, they are now prophesying a \$20,000,000,000 deficit.

Senator GORE. \$24,000,000,000.

The CHAIRMAN. It wasn't, but a few weeks ago, two or three, that Senator Stennis said he thought they had underestimated it by \$4 to \$6,000,000,000,000, I believe, wasn't it, but this thing, I don't know where I am. I think it is worthwhile giving that some discussion.

MILITARIZATION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Senator MCCARTHY. I think there are two things that are new that we could get some testimony on. One is the militarization of our foreign policy. This Wheeler thing, this is putting everything in Vietnam under Westmoreland. There is the Kuss, the arms sale

philosophy going on saying if you don't have our arms there and if you don't have us supplying the people who are using our arms we lose our position in influence on the policy of the country. I think this is an issue that ought to be talked about publicly. It goes back to Eisenhower warning of an industrial-military complex.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thought he was responsible for all this.

Senator MCCARTHY. No, he warned us. And the only thing is, I think we could hold some hearings and help educate ourselves and the public.

The CHAIRMAN. I think such hearings along this line, while they are not directly on foreign aid, they are related to it.

Senator MCCARTHY. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And they wouldn't be irrelevant to that even though we wouldn't bill them as being just foreign aid. In other words, the kind of policy you are talking about does have a barge upon the size of the foreign aid program, particularly in military assistance or support assistance.

CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SENATE

Senator MCCARTHY. The other thing is this whole conception, even Senator Mansfield said it yesterday, the sole burden for foreign policy is the President's. This is not true. I think we ought to get somebody in talking about the constitutional responsibility of the Senate, and the way in which you change the procedure so this can have some influence on policy, not after the Act, but in the process of policy formation. Get in some of the constitutional experts, Richard Neustadt and these people, and let's talk about it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is a good idea. I would like to. I noticed that myself when he said it was the sole responsibility.

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Constitution doesn't quite read that way.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who said that?

The CHAIRMAN. Mansfield on the floor yesterday.

Senator SPARKMAN. It is primarily his responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Mansfield said it was sole.

STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY RUSK AND GENERAL WHEELER

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, in line with Gene's suggestion I would like to read here what the Secretary is quoted as having said. I do not know whether this is an accurate quotation. If so, it would seem to be—to confirm the charges of the enemies of this country that we are bent upon imperialism. Let me read you: "Rusk said it will be useful for some time to come for American power to be able to control every wave of the Pacific if necessary. If Communist China stays militant and hard-nosed, he added, it is difficult to see how a confrontation can be forever avoided."

Wheeler was quoted as saying he finds the present situation in Thailand which the United States is committed to defend highly reminiscent of South Vietnam in 1960 and 61.

Here is another quote from Wheeler: "We will be involved out there to the end of this century."

REQUIRE SECRETARY RUSK TO TESTIFY

When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of State make these kinds of statements publicly, it is time for the committee to examine the policy. If the Secretary wishes to appear then fine; if not, maybe we should require his appearance.

The CHAIRMAN. We can't require it. However, if we started to discuss these things in hearings, just along the line you are saying, I think, are the only things that will cause them to want to testify to give their views about it.

Senator PELL. Excuse me, I don't really understand the question of protocol. If we really want the Secretary, why don't we send for him. Don't we have that constitutional right?

Senator MCCARTHY. He doesn't have to come.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not so sure about that.

Senator MCCARTHY. He has every right to say "no," as the President has.

Senator PELL. Certainly otherwise he has to come.

The CHAIRMAN. If that is what you mean, but ultimately he can say, "no." When you say can you compel him to go, that is what I thought you said.

But I think those statements are ominous, they strike me as being so. He makes those publicly, and this is what bothers me: Why wouldn't he come before this committee and make them publicly and explain just what he has in mind. He does it in public in New York or he writes it in an article. But he does not wish to come before this committee, as I read you the letter he said, he wrote, because it involves specific countries. Well, he talks about specific countries here in a rather threatening way, I would say.

TESTIMONY ON THE ROLE OF THE SENATE

Before we get away from it, I think that question you raised is extremely interesting and I would like to have two or three experts on the question of the role of the Senate and this committee in this area because I think it is confusing to many people. Some people think we have a lot of authority, and others think we don't have any at all, and I am not so sure just how much we do have. I think it is primarily educational, and on certain specific cases of treaties where you have a specific thing, we have a power of obstruction which has been demonstrated many times.

But to play a role in the formulation of policy is another matter. I don't know how you can do it other than through educating the public. That is, you can't make the President do anything you want him to do.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, do you think we should be as reluctant as we are, I probably sound naive in this thought, but shouldn't we be more forthcoming in our own advice? It can be taken or not. The function, our constitutional function is advice, and yet as we know the other day in the question we discussed about Hungary, the administration said "don't give us advice because the President will do just the opposite," and therefore we don't do it as a committee action. Shouldn't we do this as a function?

The CHAIRMAN. What was that?

Senator PELL. It was whether we were trying to get a really good man to go to Budapest, and they said if we do it as a body that will make the President send somebody absolutely the opposite.

Senator MCCARTHY. Get another lawyer from Dallas.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, we couldn't get many worse than a lot we have got already in many places in the world.

The CHAIRMAN. Well now, let me bring this down, that what you had in mind.

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Some hearings on that. Does everybody agree they would be interesting or at least a majority?

Senator GORE. I would.

COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR

The CHAIRMAN. So we can give some guidance to the staff. This will be over a considerable period, but they have to have some guidance and I want some guidance myself.

In response to what you say, Senator Pell, I think it is our duty, and that is why I make speeches and public statements. The only reason I hesitate is because the committee is so split. I am perfectly willing if the committee is willing, if it can develop any statement that the committee wishes to make, why, of course. I am assuming we agree, have to agree with it if I am going to join in it and everybody else has to. I am perfectly willing, there never has been a case, at least on the part of the chairman, that I didn't think it was a proper role. It simply was we couldn't play that role under existing conditions because the committee is split wide open and is unable to agree upon any statement I can think of.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, I think we have to be careful about not setting up a Committee for the Conduct of the Civil War.²

The CHAIRMAN. I don't want to conduct the war. I think the distinction is between conduct of the war and broad policy, while it is hard to draw sometimes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say we must be careful not to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that. The thing about the conduct of the war, if he has got to have more men, I am not about to say he shouldn't have more men. But I certainly think it is my duty and opportunity to say I don't wish to be there until the year 2,000, or that I don't think it ought to be escalated, that I don't believe we ought to have a confrontation with China. These are policy matters, I think. I don't think we should press this to a point—

WHAT IS THE NATIONAL INTEREST?

Senator PELL. Even more to the point, isn't it up to us determine whether we have a true national interest responsibility in South-east Asia. I think we all would agree probably on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly.

The question raised in the report of the Policy Committee is a darned good question. What is our national interest in what we are doing?

²The controversial Joint Committee on Conduct of the War (1861-1866) that scrutinized the Union army's tactics and second-guessed the Lincoln administration.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think the first thing that I would like to know, I don't like Wheeler's statement as it appears in the press. I don't know what might have been wrapped around it. I would like to know what his definition of involvement would be. Certainly we shall continue to have an interest there, but I would like to know what he meant by involvement.

Senator GORE. I agree, John, and you know I said I didn't know whether they were quoted out of context or not, but these are ominous statements.

Senator SPARKMAN. Standing alone.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

I think coming back to the Policy Committee report. I think they really asked the crux of the matter: What is the national interest of the United States in Vietnam?

Senator GORE. Maybe we should have a hearing on that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we should. I thought of that when I first read that. What is the national interest there?

Senator MCCARTHY. I think we ought to find out what it is because if you are going to pledge the national interest that is pretty serious, and the national honor.

The CHAIRMAN. And the national honor in support of it. Well, the next two questions asked there are what is it and how far are we prepared to go defending it?

Senator MCCARTHY. Once you put the national honor on the scales you have to declare war to preserve it.

A HEALTHY NATIONAL DEBATE

The CHAIRMAN. I think it would be healthy to have a discussion and a public debate about it. I think it might even help some of the people demonstrating. If we had a discussion it might clarify it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You can't help some of the people demonstrating.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, some of them.

Senator PELL. Why couldn't we have a discussion in the committee where we might find some would go one way or some another.

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely you could have it.

Senator PELL. But a committee with 16 of us you would be sure that Senator Hickenlooper's ideas are not different from some of my own.

The CHAIRMAN. He says he is bothered about Wheeler's statement. Supposing we have Wheeler and he says, he backs up along the line that we think he may have in mind, that he is staying there, this is going to be a colony and so on. That might influence a lot of people.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think we ought to ask Wheeler about it, but I don't think we ought to put television cameras and everything else and have a three ring circus about it and confuse the public all over the place.

Senator PELL. What I am thinking about is 16 or 18 men on problems we could take privately. Could we not come out with a sensible point of view since we are all starting with the same facts and have the national interest in mind?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think we ought to have them in Executive Sessions.

The CHAIRMAN. I would be perfectly willing to make it in executive. But he makes this statement publicly. It seems to me if after having him in executive, well whatever your understanding is, it ought to be publicly ceased because that is one of the functions of the committee.

Senator PELL. These are two different thing. Wheeler's statement is a public statement that should be answered publicly. But what I am talking about is a private discussion except the Senators arguing back and forth trying to convert each other.

The CHAIRMAN. I would be delighted to have those exchanges particularly when we have a full meeting here and they are very useful and they can take place at any time the committee is ready, willing and wants to.

Senator PELL. And we can get bodies.

The CHAIRMAN. If you get the bodies here. But I think those questions raised are very important.

WAR HAS GROWN GRADUALLY

John, I think what has happened, at least from my point of view, is this thing has grown so gradually that we never have been able quite to get the full impact of where we are going. Generally speaking, you don't oppose the hearings.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, if you are going to have some Executive hearings first and then decide.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't mean Wheeler. I mean on the matters that Senator McCarthy suggested, on what our role is, and also the broad policy with Wheeler. I am not insisting that Wheeler be open, but I think at some point he ought to explain.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think Wheeler made the statement and we ought to have him in Executive Session and see what he meant by it.

Senator SPARKMAN. You said a while ago that you couldn't do anything for these demonstrators and so forth. Chuck Percy told me he was out in Berkeley last night and spoke to 5,000 students and he said they booed him time after time. Regardless of what he said they booed him.

Senator MCCARTHY. I spoke at Berkeley six weeks ago and didn't get booed. [Laughter.]

Senator SPARKMAN. You must be labeled; you had better look out.

Senator WILLIAMS. They thought you were one of them. [Laughter.]

Senator SPARKMAN. I go along with any hearings you want to set up. I always believe in hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. I think discussion is healthy. Very often if the people who are not in the Senate, if somebody is saying what they think ought to be said, it is a safety valve. It is part of our system.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think it would be well to start off with Wheeler and in Executive Session.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the new one.

Senator SPARKMAN. And, of course, we could talk with him about escalation of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. I am embarrassed, not only with the Secretary, I am embarrassed when we insist on someone coming and then we only have four or five. It looks bad.

Anything else?

The committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon at 11:20 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:10 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, and Case.

Also present: Senator McGee.

The committee heard from Eugene Groves, president of the National Student Association, and Richard Stearns, International Affairs vice president, concerning National Student Association ties with the Central Intelligence Agency.

[The committee adjourned at 4:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:35 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Morse, Aiken, Carlson, and Copper.

Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; accompanied by Charles R. Burrows, Country Director, Central America; and Richard A. Frank, Assistant Legal Adviser for Inter-American Affairs; testified on the subject of the Swan Islands.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 5:05 p.m.]

BRIEFING ON DEPLOYMENT OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILES AND NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Thursday, May 18, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 p.m., in room 8-116, the Capitol, Senator Albert Gore (chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Gore and Cooper.

Also present: Mel Christopher, ACDA, Congressional Liaison, and Herbert Scoville, Jr., Assistant Director, Science & Technology Bureau.

Mr. Marcy of the committee staff.

Senator GORE. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Fisher, would you give us a report or bring us up to date on two things: One, the status of communication in our negotiation, if there has been some, with respect to the deployment of antiballistic missiles; and second, the nonproliferation conference that is underway.

STATEMENT OF ADRIAN S. FISHER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. FISHER. Well, Mr. Chairman, with respect to the first, the problem of the antiballistic missiles discussions, following some presidential discussions Ambassador Thompson presented, whether it was in the form of a working paper or talking points I am not clear, but presented to the Soviet Union at the end of March of this year, a suggestion that we might want to begin talks dealing with the limitation on the deployment of fixed ballistic missiles, offensive character, and defensive missiles that had a substantial antiballistic missile capability.

He indicated in this communication that what we were thinking of was something that could be verified primarily by unilateral intelligence. He indicated further that while we were prepared to consider the mobile offensive missiles, that raised verification problems that would have to be the subject of the exploration.

He indicated further that whether what came out of this was a formal treaty, a *modus vivendi*, just each taking action based on what the other was doing, would depend on what discussions took place, but at the moment it was purely exploratory.

In an explanatory instruction to Ambassador Thompson, it was indicated that we thought it unlikely that the Soviets would agree to the dismantling of their present system and that he, Ambassador Thompson, should know that we maintained flexibility as to whether we would want to have a limited deployment.

Senator GORE. Was this said to the Soviets?

Mr. FISHER. It was not. This was just Ambassador Thompson—what he had in the preliminary discussions, what he had in the back of his own mind, whether we wanted to retain flexibility.

EMPHASIS ON LAUNCHERS RATHER THAN MISSILES

There was extensive consideration but no resolution going into the problem as to what the various counters might be, as to how you would deal with the problem of what we call MIRV, the multiple independently guided re-entry vehicles, whether we would or would not deal with maintaining an option to have a light ABM system and a variety of things we have discussed within the executive branch and reached no resolution on.

This was merely a request that talks take place on the limitation of deployment of the offensive, fixed offensive, missiles and defensive missiles with a substantial ABM capability, relying on unilateral intelligence with an indication that if some other way could be worked out to verify it, we would be prepared to consider the mobile offensive as well.

Would you care to—am I correct on it?

Mr. SCOVILLE. The only point I might make, it was launchers we were talking about rather than missiles.

Mr. FISHER. That is right. We emphasized launchers rather than missiles because when one speaks of deployment, what you are really aware of by our unilateral intelligence is the launcher which is a rather complicated thing. The missile might be in a warehouse or something else, and I stand corrected on that.

SOVIETS STUDYING THE PROPOSAL

Now, there has been no answer to that. Once or twice, Ambassador Thompson has said, "What about it? When are you going to answer this communication?"

The response has been, "This is a very serious matter, and we are studying it."

One does not know—one cannot continue this, obviously, forever, but this has been approximately two months since the suggestion was made. It does seem at first blush like a fairly longer period of time, but when I consider the amount of time occasionally in the executive branch that people spend making up their mind whether to make a proposition like this, two months assumes a somewhat shorter look in that perspective.

Senator GORE. Have there been any questions for clarification?

Mr. FISHER. No, sir, not to my knowledge.

Senator GORE. In other words, nothing has been said except, "Thank you. We have received it."

Mr. FISHER. Well, a little bit more: "We are looking at it, and we are studying it."

Senator GORE. Well, tell us exactly what has been said in regard to that?

Mr. FISHER. Just that, "When can we expect an answer." I cannot give you the precise date, it was three, four weeks ago, and the reply was, "This is a very serious matter, and we are giving it very deep and intensive study."

Senator GORE. You do not have the impression it is being thrown down, shelved.

Mr. FISHER. No, sir. In the context of the way the Soviets move, I think we ought to give them a little more time before we decide that they are stalling because from their point of view this is a very serious thing to undertake discussions of this kind, and I think they might want to study it pretty heavily.

QUESTIONS ABOUT TERMS

Senator GORE. Would you have anticipated that in the ordinary course of consideration that by now there may have been some questions as to meaning of certain terms?

Mr. FISHER. I would think the questions, since this was very exploratory and merely suggested we start talking, if there were to be questions, I think the questions would be, "Send over your delegation and let's talk."

I am frank to say, Mr. Chairman, that the initial suggestion was for a discussion to begin sometime in April, I forget the precise date. I think it was somewhere around the middle of April. A date was given. That date has obviously passed and the talks have not begun.

I would have expected about around now that they would have said, "If you want to talk about it, let's talk."

FORMAL AGREEMENTS AND UNILATERAL DECISIONS

These talks are conceived of as leading to a variety of possibilities. At one end of the spectrum would be some kind of a formal agreement limiting deployment not just of ABM, but we have never considered it except offensive and defensive linked together and so have they. They have always made it clear that any limitation on defense would have to be offered by a limitation of defense.

On the other end of the spectrum would be each making its own unilateral decisions with hopefully a somewhat better understanding of what the other fellow was up to.

One of the things we would hope to discover in these talks would be to persuade them that it is not in their national interests to keep us in the dark as to what is the capability of the so-called TALLIN System. If there is substantial doubt as to whether or not it really is an ABM system, they should know that we will probably have to react on the assumption that it is.

Now, precisely how we would assume we could clarify our own minds on this without having them think this is purely a fishing expedition—as they would say, "This is espionage"—is one of the problems that will face the delegation if at some unexpected date the reply comes: "Send them over."

NOT HEARTENED BY DEVELOPMENTS

Senator GORE. I know it is difficult and at best inexact to use terms like "encouragement" and "discouragement," and I do not

wish to have you take a hard and fast estimate one way or the other. But I gather from what you say at least you are not overly heartened by developments.

Mr. FISHER. Well, put it this way, Mr. Chairman, since the middle of April has come and gone, I have not felt it necessary to keep my suitcase packed. I would have hoped for some reaction prior to this of a more definite nature, and we have not gotten it.

Senator GORE. I guess the fact that it has not been thrown down would lead to the conclusion that the door is open and possibly that the matter is being considered. But there is not much upon which we can base encouragement.

Mr. FISHER. Well, I find it hard to disagree with that, sir, and my estimate of time has to be tempered by the fact that the communication in March was not the first this has been discussed. There had been some quite generalized discussions, "should we talk about this general problem on a one-level higher communication," that is a head of state communication earlier. So this was not the first time they had thought about it as the bolt out of the blue when Mr. Thompson talked with them in March.

So it is hard to say whether you are encouraged or discouraged, as you have indicated, sir. I would have hoped for a response prior to this time.

Senator GORE. Senator Cooper.

PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES WITH SOVIETS

Senator COOPER. Have you had any experience in a similar situation where proposals in this field have been made to the Russians and you got no discussion at all?

Mr. FISHER. No, sir. The only similar proposal was the limited test ban when it was proposed in August of '62. Formerly, it was one of two alternates. Kuznetzev said, "No, absolutely no." He did not give it the silent treatment. He just said, "No, never, never, never."

And then, well this was in August of '62, and in July of '63 we were all sitting around in Moscow initialing just almost the same document.

But usually their ability to turn quickly is not—if they can turn quickly when they have said "never."

Senator COOPER. In that case, how long was it before the Soviets indicated their willingness to talk?

Mr. FISHER. To talk on this subject?

Senator COOPER. Yes, the test ban.

Mr. FISHER. It was either late May or early June, 1963. There had been active discussions of a comprehensive test ban in the meantime and they had come to nothing.

There had been considerable senatorial discussion of the test ban on a rather, not terribly—encouraging in the comprehensive, but there had been an introduction of a resolution dealing with the atmospheric test ban, and I think they interpreted that perhaps as a signal.

Senator COOPER. The reason I ask this, it is not entirely strange that you would not get an earlier answer.

Mr. FISHER. No, sir, it is not.

CONSIDERATION OF OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS

Senator COOPER. Was it Kosygin who made a statement in England or some place earlier in which he said he did not consider a defensive system one which should be limited or controlled?

Mr. FISHER. I am not sure whether Kosygin had said that. Many Soviet political and military people have said that, and in this context, in one of the previous exchanges, they have said defensive systems should not be controlled alone—they should be controlled only in connection with the control of offensive systems. They hinted with something that was not in a letter, but was accompanied by a personal statement of the foreign minister when delivering a head of state letter, that what they really meant was the abolition of all offensive systems, but if we wanted to settle in the meantime for a Gromyko umbrella, that might be all right too, and in that case the defensive problem would cease to exist.

But they are traditionally—Dr. Scoville has followed this longer than I have—but traditionally they have been defense minded, and many of the intelligence community have many statements of them of what is wrong with defense.

Senator COOPER. Senator Gore, do you remember that? I think it was—

Senator GORE. Kosygin was quoted in London.

Mr. SCOVILLE. Kosygin did say—

Senator GORE. Kosygin in London.

Mr. SCOVILLE. I think the context was that he was defending defensive systems and they wanted things to be planned by the offensive.

Senator GORE. And he was drawing a distinction between defensive and offensive.

Senator COOPER. Yes.

TWO INCREASINGLY NERVOUS SYSTEMS

Mr. FISHER. I am not sure that part of the discussion which we had hoped take place—it is hard for me to see—I have not explained it fully to my family yet—that defensive systems per se are bad. It is what follows from them, that a decision to deploy might lead to both sides reacting against that decision to deploy and would end up with two increasingly nervous systems, so to speak, against each other. Neither of us having the defense but just all of us in a jumpier frame of mind and another trigger of the arms race with all that would involve, with the Europeans saying what about our ABM system. One would hope that if the discussion ever were to get going, the full implications of this kind would be explored.

I do not think you would ever get a Soviet to say there is anything wrong with defense per se. In fact, I do not think there is myself. It is what it leads to that is bad and also the other things that might have to accompany it. You might have a shield that you think is a shield but has got an awfully lot of holes in it in the sort of sense of false security that might be involved.

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Senator GORE. Will you go to the question of the nonproliferation conference?

Mr. FISHER. Yes, sir, I can be quite brief on that.

You have a text in front of you, a text of a nonproliferation treaty given the Soviets on April 25, 1967. The Soviets have also given us a text that they gave to us in Russian which is quite fair as we gave ours to them in English. We just got our own translation of it a few days ago and we can make that available to you.

[The documents referred to follow.]

DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

1. Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

2. Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war,

3. In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of further dissemination of nuclear weapons,

4. Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

5. Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear-explosive devices, shall be available for peaceful purposes to all States Parties to this Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

6. Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all Parties are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other States to, the further development of the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

7. Declaring their intention that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions shall be available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon Parties to this Treaty, on a non-discriminatory basis,

8. Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

9. Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

10. Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, thus facilitating the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

11. Noting that nothing in this treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices, either directly or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to produce or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices, either directly or indirectly; not to produce or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to accept the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency on all its peaceful nuclear activities. Each State Party to this Treaty further undertakes not to provide source or fissionable material, or specialized equipment or non-nuclear material for the processing or use of source or fissionable material or for the production of fissionable material for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon State, unless such material and equipment are subject to such safeguards.

ARTICLE IV

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depository Governments, which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one third or more of the Parties to the Treaty, the Depository Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to consider such an amendment.

2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. The amendment shall enter into force for all parties to the Treaty upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by a majority of all the Parties to the Treaty, including the instruments of ratification of all nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty.

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view of ensuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being carried out.

ARTICLE V

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State that does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of _____, which are hereby designated the Depository Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty, and _____ Parties to this Treaty and the deposit of their instruments of ratification.

For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has produced and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to the date this Treaty became open for signature.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depository Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification and instrument of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depository Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Each Party to this Treaty shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extra-ordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty, the Russian, English, French, Spanish, and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depository Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depository Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof, the undersigned duly appointed Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done in _____ copies, at _____ on the _____ day of _____, 1967.

TEXT OF NON PROLIFERATION TREATY GIVEN SOVIETS ON APRIL 25,
1967

(Revised Provisions Have Been Underscored)

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Parties to the Treaty,

(1) Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

(2) Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously enhance the danger of nuclear war,

(3) In conformity with resolutions of an agreement on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,

(4) Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

(5) *Expressing their support for research, development and other efforts to further the application of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,*

(6) Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

(7) Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

(8) Desiring to further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States, thus facilitating the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

(9) Noting that nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories,

(10) Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

(11) Declaring their intention that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should be available through appropriate international procedures to non-nuclear-weapon Parties on a non-discriminatory basis, *and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development,*

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

ARTICLE II

Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

ARTICLE III

For the purpose of providing assurance that source or special fissionable material covered by this Article is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices:

1. *Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty undertakes to have international safeguards meeting the requirements of this Article on all source or special fissionable materials for peaceful purposes within its territory or under its jurisdiction. In cooperating with any non-nuclear-weapon State with respect to peaceful nuclear activities within the territory or under the jurisdiction of such State, each Party to this Treaty undertakes not to provide*

(a) source or special fissionable material unless the material shall be subject to such safeguards; or

(b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material unless the special fissionable material shall be subject to such safeguards;

2. *After the original entry into force of this Treaty, each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to this Treaty which has source or special fissionable material subject to any international safeguards system other than that of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and each other Party to the Treaty which is a member of that Agency, undertakes to facilitate agreement, as provided for in this Article, on verification by that Agency of the effectiveness of the international safeguards system applied to such material;*

3. *To meet the requirements of this Article, international safeguards (a) shall be either those of the IAEA or such other international safeguards generally consistent therewith as are accepted by the IAEA under verification procedures mutually agreed by the authorities of the IAEA and the authorities of the other international safeguards system concerned, and (b) shall be applied as soon as practicable but no later than three years from the date of the original entry into force of this Treaty;*

4. *Agreement on the implementation of IAEA verification of another international safeguards system, as provided for in this Article, shall be reached as soon as practicable but no later than three years from the date of the original entry into force of this Treaty; and*

5. *The international safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties having them. Nothing in this Treaty shall prejudice the rights of the Parties, in conformity with this Treaty, (i) to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in particular for their economic development and social progress, (ii) to participate in the safeguarded international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes, and (iii) to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in cooperation with other states or international organizations to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.*

ARTICLE IV

1. Any Party to this Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Depository Governments which shall circulate it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested to do so by one third or more of the Parties, the Depository Governments shall convene a conference, to which they shall invite all the Parties, to consider such an amendment.

2. *Amendments shall enter into force for each Party to the Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining Party to the Treaty on the date of acceptance by it.*

3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes and provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

ARTICLE V

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of _____, which are hereby designated the Depository Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratification by all nuclear-weapon States signatory to this Treaty, and _____ other signatories to this Treaty, and

the deposit of their instruments of ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has *manufactured* and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to *January 1, 1967*.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depository Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening a conference or other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depository Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depository Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depository Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

MIRRORING CHANGES BY CONGRESS

Mr. FISHER. There are a series of standard conforming changes and some things are in the preamble in one that are in the articles in the other, but reduced to its essentials, they are different in only two particulars. These two texts represent—for their difference, what their similarity is. They represent vast changes from the texts that were on the table at Geneva when the Geneva Conference resumed, broke up, in August of last year. As far as the U.S. is concerned, the basic articles, 1 and 2, really mirror U.S. domestic legislation under which the executive branch is committed by the Congress not to give U.S. weapons to anybody or transfer control of them to anybody, but keep them in our own hands. The Soviet language on that is the same. We and the Soviets are not apart on the basic obligations of the nuclear weapons states or—and this is not in our full power to control—what we think the reciprocal obligations of the non-nuclear weapon states ought to be.

VERSIONS OF EURATOM

Where we are apart are in two particulars, and I will deal with the important one first. That is the article dealing with safeguards, and you will find that on page 4 of the document in front of you, going over to the top of page 7. We have a provision under which we would propose that basically the peaceful activities of the non-nuclear weapons states, and that would include exports to them by the nuclear states, would be safeguarded either by the IAEA or any other international organization under arrangements agreed to with the IAEA as being adequate verification.

Now stripped of diplomatic gobbledygook, this really means Euratom, and it means also the possibility—it recognizes the possibility that there might be mirror images of Euratom among the Warsaw Pact countries who would play a role in—

Senator GORE. What do you mean, “mirror images”?

Mr. FISHER. Well, the Warsaw Pact countries if they desired would be able to create versions of Euratom.

Senator GORE. And it would be assigned—

Mr. FISHER. It would be assigned a role of verification only if it could come to an agreement with the IAEA, the truly international body, under which the IAEA with such inspection as it felt was necessary and agreed to, which the organization could accept as involving adequate verification.

Senator GORE. Would this contain assurances of safeguards that the Iron Curtain counterpart to Euratom would have a comparable competency and reliability?

Mr. FISHER. We would assume that the IAEA would not give it its seal of approval, so to speak, unless it were satisfied that it did.

A RECIPROCAL TYPE OF TREATY

Now, the reason I raise this mirror image point is not to poke holes at a U.S. proposal, but this is a reciprocal type of treaty in which we and the Soviets are jointly sponsoring it, and we cannot say our regional organizations are good per se and theirs are bad per se. We have to say that both of them would, if they—we do not know that they would create one, but if they were to—it would have to stand the test of acceptable procedures agreed to by the IAEA, and three years to work those out.

This is not as complicated as it sounds because the IAEA does not verify any country without entering into a bilateral arrangement with that country, and that would be the same even say in the case of India or in the case of Peru or anybody else. The IAEA does not have extraterritorial power to come in Peru and say, "Let's take a look at your reactors."

Now, the Soviet Union, on the other hand, has a provision that provides for IAEA safeguards on all the peaceful activities of the non-nuclear weapons countries and on all things exported by the nuclear weapons countries to any non-nuclear weapons country whether or not party to the treaty.

But the only difference between us and the Soviets really is that we have a provision under which the other international organizations can play a role in the verification process if they do so in a way which is satisfactory to the supervisory body. This is not unrelated, although the responsibility for this is on the executive branch. This is not unrelated to the type of safeguards outlined in the speech by the chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Senator Pastore, a few months ago.

Now, this is one difference.

MANNER OF AMENDING THE TREATY

There is one other difference, and this represents the Soviet concept of the way the treaty is amended. The Soviet treaty, and we initially concurred in this and we changed our minds, we concurred in this on an ad referendum basis and indicated second thoughts on it, as we reserved the right to do since the negotiations are exploratory. It is based on the Limited Test Ban Treaty which says if the three principal powers—U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R.—decide to amend the treaty, and a majority of the parties, including those three, in counting of a majority agree, the amendment is effective, bang, that is all there is to it. No ands, ifs and buts.

Now, I would, Mr. Chairman, not be critical of that clause in the Limited Test Ban Treaty for two reasons: One is, at the risk of

sounding vain, I helped negotiate it. But, secondly, it fit the problem of the Test Ban Treaty which was primarily an inhibition on the nuclear powers, and it made it possible for those powers either to extend the treaty in some way or to relax it as had been suggested in covering the peaceful explorations if they agreed and could persuade enough countries making up a total majority to go along. It is quite a different problem when you are dealing with a treaty whose preliminary impact is upon the non-nuclear weapons powers.

Senator GORE. Yes.

Mr. FISHER. And the non-nuclear weapons powers, particularly those concerned that this treaty might in some way affect their peaceful activity, say, "Look, you can't possibly expect us to sign a treaty in which the prime article affects us. Then you, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom get together and get a majority, and the nature of our obligations has changed."

And that seemed to us in the consultative process to be a good, sensible approach.

MODELED ON OUTER SPACE TREATY

So we then are suggesting to the Soviets, and I think we can work this one out—this should not be too hard—a treaty language based on the outer space treaty which you will find on page 7 of the material before you which says that amendments enter into force on the basis of a majority, but are only effective as to those who accept them.

So you cannot ram an amendment down anyone else's throat, so to speak.

The Soviets have agreed to that in the outer space treaty. The language is taken from the outer space treaty.

Now, so much for the areas of disagreement.

We have suggested, and have been over the last couple of weeks on an exploratory basis and firmly recently, to the Soviet Union that "Let us table the articles on which we have agreed and say that there are sections where we have not agreed, and the two co-chairmen, the U.S. and U.S.S.R., are negotiating out their differences."

SOVIETS PREPARED TO REJECT LOOPHOLE

This morning at 10 o'clock Geneva time—which I regret to report is 5 o'clock Washington time—and I am afraid I am sufficiently far away from Shelby County so I am not used to getting up at that time any more—the Soviets said that they had no instructions authorizing them to proceed along this line. So when the conference opened this afternoon at 3 o'clock Geneva time, both the statements made by both parties were, shall we say, somewhat general indicating that we are still working on trying to get an acceptable treaty, and in a sense stick with it. At 10 today we had to knock down, with a little assistance from the Mexicans, a Brazilian proposal that they should in no way be prevented from developing explosive devices so long as they were solely peaceful, and the Soviets are with us on this. They are prepared to say no.

Senator GORE. Good.

Mr. FISHER. For a long period they took the position that since—they agreed with us that this would be a loophole, but they were prepared to have us carrying the laboring oar in saying so. Now they will say so in partnership, so to speak.

Their statement today was surprisingly mild. The usual complimentary references to the Federal Republic of Germany—surprisingly mild, sir, and although I think the general press reports may be a disappointment, if one analyzes the problems we are really very close to an agreement with the Soviets on this.

PROBLEM OF POTENTIAL NUCLEAR POWERS

Now, this does not mean that we have a generally acceptable worldwide nonproliferation agreement since the agreement with the Soviets on a joint table is merely another one of a series of rivers that have to be crossed. The whole problem of dealing with potential nuclear powers such as the Indians talking about the peaceful nuclear explosions with the Brazilians, all those have to be crossed still.

Senator GORE. As a matter of fact, they are the important ones.

Mr. FISHER. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. After all, there is nothing to be signed really from a purely bilateral treaty between the United States and the U.S.S.R. We have got to get these. If nonproliferation is effective, it must include these others.

Mr. FISHER. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Because it is they we wish not to proliferate.

Mr. FISHER. That is correct, sir. So there still remains a river to cross but I think we are very close to having crossed this one, that is the one of a joint recommendation with the Soviet Union. The differences between us are amazingly small.

FORESEEABLE DIFFICULTIES

There are two things: The role which regional organizations have to play with respect to the Euratom—should they play any role, even though Euratom has to be satisfied with what that role may be? The Soviets say no; we say why should they not play a role just like national systems play a role.

The second is what seems to me to be a cultural lag so far as the mechanics for an amendment. I cannot imagine the latter of any extended difficulty if we are this close. I can imagine some problems with the former and we will have to see whether we can reach a compromise, persuade the Soviets to accept IAEA inspection or drop safeguards. Those are the alternatives we have, and then we will have the problem of addressing the non-nuclear countries. As you say, Mr. Chairman, that is by far the most important of this task, but it is the earliest one to deal with if you do it with the more or less united U.S.—U.S.S.R. approach, particularly where the countries you are dealing with are countries that maintain a policy of nonalignment and would find it difficult to enter into any particular arrangements with us that they would not enter into with the Soviets at the present time. That is the present status, sir.

There are those who think that the failure of the Soviets to have an answer to this problem may be due to broader based differences

with us. They may perhaps be assessing the whole relationship with us or trying to give us that impression.

REFERENCE TO VIETNAM

Now, I cannot look into their minds, but I could only say if that is the case, they have not advised Ambassador Roschin to act that way because his statement today was within the four walls of the treaty itself. There was a reference to Vietnam, but a one-sentence statement that regrets that Vietnam might have a harmful effect on this type of negotiation.

Compared to what is usually said on this subject, if they are trying to give us any signal of broader basis there, they have changed their method of signaling, because they are not usually understaters on this sort of thing.

A RELAXED SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS

Senator GORE. How long do you think this conference will be underway?

Mr. FISHER. Well, it is hard to say, sir. I would hope, even though it may be frustrating, that we could stay with it until August, until the end of August, and—

Senator GORE. Are meetings being held almost daily now?

Mr. FISHER. No, sir. It is now a somewhat more relaxed schedule, and I say this with a modest amount of shame in the face of one who used to write a speech a day. They are primarily Tuesdays and Thursdays, with co-chairmen meetings in between. But they are not being held almost daily. They are held twice a week, and I think the prime subject is going to be this: I would hope that the Soviets would agree to tabling the treaty with the two disagreed sections left blank because we have a great deal of work to do with respect to the non-nuclear weapons states that are not related to those two sections. The notion that we keep our tentative agreement purely a U.S.-U.S.S.R., NATO-Warsaw Pact matter, and keep it secret—of course it is not possible first—I mean this entire treaty has been discussed in the North Atlantic Council. That means sooner or later its contents are going to get out, and I would hope that the Soviets would agree, we could persuade them, that it was in the interests of getting on with it to table what we have agreed to and continue private discussions on the two unagreed articles. I think we should be able to settle the amendments one on a fair basis. They have incidentally indicated some give on the amendments clause, not in terms of giving up their veto, but they say, "Look, we do not mind giving other people vetoes as long as we have got one ourselves on amendments," and that might indicate they are going to come off the test ban clause and come to some formulation that amendments not affecting people that do not agree or some other thing of that kind which I think should be negotiable.

Somehow with all the treaty technicians that this government has got if we cannot tie up a decent amendment clause, we ought to go back to the showers, so to speak; that is, turn in our uniforms.

Now the question of IAEA, Euratom arrangements, is a little bit different for one reason because of the deeply-held views of some of our NATO allies.

NATO SUPPORT FOR TREATY

One final thing, Mr. Chairman, at least on this subject, outside of any other questions you might have, there has been a good deal of discussion about support of NATO for the treaty, and I would like to say this proposal that we put to the Soviets has been discussed exhaustively with our North Atlantic Treaty allies, and a consensus that we should go ahead on this basis was obtained quite freely as a result of these discussions.

Now, there are varying degrees of enthusiasm. Strangely enough, the one that is making—in NATO the one that seems to be making the most “why do you do this” type noises is Italy, and not the Federal Republic of Germany. We received a message from the foreign minister of the Federal Republic of Germany a couple of days ago saying as far as he was concerned he was satisfied with the method we were proceeding by, and he thought we were taking his considerations adequately into account.

But we still have the nut we have to crack before a complete treaty is arrived at: the IAEA regional arrangements.

But again—I am afraid I am repeating myself—we hope we can persuade them to solve that by tabling the treaty without that, while we work on it and then work with the Indians, the Brazilians and others on these other large treaty issues at the same time we and the Soviets work on their other.

Senator GORE. You have to cross this stream first and then get to the more difficult one.

Mr. FISHER. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Thank you very much, Mr. Fisher.

Mr. FISHER. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY WITH RESPECT TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND VIETNAM

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—In June, 1967 Israel won a six-day war against its Arab neighbors, seizing the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank of the Jordan River, and Syria's Golan Heights. The crisis started on May 5, when El Fateh terrorist raids into its territory caused Israel to threaten military retaliation against Syria, where the terrorists were based. On May 14, Egyptian and Syrian troops began amassing on Israel's borders. On May 19, the U.N. Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip withdrew at Egypt's request, a move that Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol protested as increasing the danger of war. The U.N. Security Council met in emergency session from May 24 to 30, but reached no decision other than appealing to all sides for peace.]

On June 5, Egypt, Jordan and Syria simultaneously launched military attacks on Israel. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser declared that they fought to "eliminate the shadow of Zionism from Palestine and restore it to Arabism." However, Israel's ability to destroy the Arab states' air forces permitted Israeli troops to win swift and sweeping victories on the ground. Israel took the Gaza Strip and then the entire Sinai Peninsula, the Jordanian portions of Jerusalem and other territories on the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the high grounds from which Syria had bombarded Israeli territory. Although the major powers stayed out of the conflict, the United States supported Israel while the Soviet Union sided with the Arab nations.]

TUESDAY, MAY 23, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright (presiding), and Senators Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, and Mundt.

Also present: Senator Javits.

Mr. MARCY, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, Mr. Tillman, and Mr. Jones of the committee staff.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We will try to move along because the Secretary has a luncheon with the President, and there are so many things happening.

Mr. Secretary, I am very glad to have you with us this morning. I want to, just for the record, put in the record an exchange of letters with the Secretary regarding open hearings. I still wish to urge once more on the Secretary that he try to arrange for some open hearings on both what we are speaking about today which, I assume, will be the Middle East primarily, and Vietnam, not so much for the benefit of myself or the committee, but to try to allay the difficulties and the dissention or misunderstanding of the public, because I have to spend lots of time trying to enlighten them,

as I am sure you do. But in any case I will put in the record, Mr. Reporter, an exchange of letters with the Secretary.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. I will say the Secretary has said he has to go to see the President. What time do you have to leave, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. Perhaps twenty minutes to one, that sort of thing.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Then at 12:30 we will want to adjourn, at least 12:30.

Secretary RUSK. That will be fine.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Secretary. We have plenty to talk about.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEAN RUSK SECRETARY OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM MACOMBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS

Secretary RUSK. Yes, Mr. Chairman, unfortunately we do.

I would like to take up immediately the Near East situation because that is in a very dangerous position, and I should go into considerable detail here in executive session.

The present chapter really starts with a stepped-up series of raids along the Israeli frontier primarily by the Fatah organization, a terrorist group organized basically in Syria, but these raids were also delivered across the Lebanese territory into Jordanian boundary.

I might say that our information is that both Jordan and Lebanon have taken very severe measures in an attempt to stop these Fatah raids, but we cannot say the same thing about Syria.

These raids themselves led Israel, the Israeli government, to make a statement that if they continued Israel would take action against Syria. That, in turn, stimulated the Syrians to a high state of excitement and caused Nasser or, at least, was the occasion for Nasser to move additional forces into the Sinai Peninsula.

Normally he has about 30,000 troops in the Sinai area. At the present time he probably has about 50,000 there, so he has reinforced his troops and moved them forward up toward the Israeli frontier.

That itself created a situation of tension because Jordan, Syria and Lebanon called up their forces and alerted their armed forces, and seemed to indicate that the Arabs would act together if Israel attacked anyone of them.

NASSER DEMANDS WITHDRAWAL OF U.N. FORCES

The next step in the episode was Nasser's demand that the United Nations Emergency Force withdraw from the Egyptian-Israeli border. That force had been established, you will recall, by action of the General Assembly. We ourselves have supported it for a period of about ten years. Nasser based his position on the notion that a sovereign country has the right to require that foreign forces leave and that the United Nations forces could not remain there without his consent, and he was withdrawing his consent.

U Thant, acting on which he considered to be the authority of the Secretary General, precipitately accepted this demand from Nasser.

Senator SYMINGTON. What was that demand? I did not catch that.

Secretary RUSK. That the United Nations Emergency Force withdraw from Egyptian territory.

Now, we took strong exception to that. We did not think that was a wise thing to do under those circumstances. We did not think it was necessary for U Thant to move that rapidly.

We felt that he should have instead gone to the General Assembly and, if not to the General Assembly, then at least to the Security Council to refer that question to the Assembly or the Council before he issued instructions to the United Nations force to withdraw, and the situation on the ground was delicate in the sense that the United Nations force was not capable of fighting. It could not defend itself; it was lightly armed. It did not have a mission of waging hostilities, so that there was no question they could have been pushed out if Nasser decided he was going to use his own armed forces to push them out or to force them to concentrate in a particular area pending evacuation.

Nevertheless, we thought that the General Assembly, at least, could bring pressures to bear on the situation, could use procedures such as sending a commission into the area which would tend to put a poultice on the fever, and try to resolve the matter without further inflammation.

Israel was, of course, very much disturbed by the action taken by U Thant, and by the removal of the U.N. forces.

ISRAEL PROHIBITED U.N. FORCES ON ITS TERRITORY

You will recall that Israel has never permitted U.N. forces on its own territory. It took that view back after Suez on the ground that Israel was a sovereign state and that foreign forces should not be permitted to locate themselves there. That original position of Israel tended to strengthen Nasser's argument that as a sovereign state he had the right to require them to withdraw.

But we felt that U Thant's handling of it was much too quick and inept, and that he would have been better advised to take the matter up with one of the two constituted bodies of the U.N. dealing with such questions.

The most recent development—

The CHAIRMAN. Were they there at the invitation of the U.A.R.?

Secretary RUSK. By agreement with U.A.R., Hammarskjold-Nasser agreement, in fact, worked out on the basis of a General Assembly resolution.

A HIGHLY PROVOCATIVE STEP

Then yesterday, President Nasser was up in the Sinai making a speech to his troops, and in his speech he declared that the Strait of Tiran was being closed to ships carrying the Israeli flag.

This is a highly provocative step because the support of Aquaba is a major port for Israel; it is a principal supply port. It is their principal contact with Africa and Asia.

It is a thriving city. Several hundred ships a year come in there from all over the world, and Israel has made it known privately that this was, and indeed in the Knesset just two days ago, that this is a Casus Belli, that Israel would have to resist this by force.

We are not completely sure that Nasser's speech to his troops was a considered judgment of the Egyptian government as such. It

might have been, he might have been moved by the occasion to go beyond what he might have done had he given it more considered thought. But nonetheless he has done it, he has said it, and this precipitates the issue in a very important way.

Looking at the general situation there, it is our view that no one of the governments involved there, with the possible exception of Syria, seems to want a major military engagement. We are not at all that certain today about Nasser because of his action on the Strait which is, as I said, a very provocative matter.

We are quite sure that Lebanon and Jordan do not want any part of an engagement here, and it has been our view up until last night that, on the whole, this situation could be kept under control unless some major incident by irresponsible elements triggered something which the governments could not feel they could take or accept without some sort of counter action. In other words, the situation was subject to action by the Fatah organization or by elements of the Palestine Liberation Army, who are present in such places as the Gaza Strip.

THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY

Shukairy, the head of the Palestine Liberation Army, has been making very inflammatory speeches lately, and on one occasion he had the Chinese Communist Ambassador with him, and referred to him as being his companion.

Now, we have been in close touch with—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Excuse me, where does the Palestine Liberation Army get its supplies?

Secretary LAUSCHE. I did not hear your question, Bourke.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I said where does the Palestinian Army get its supplies and equipment?

Secretary RUSK. I would suppose primarily from Egypt.

Senator MANSFIELD. He said from China. How he gets it I do not know.

Secretary RUSK. It may get it from China, but I would think the small arms come from Egypt. They are not a heavily armed group, but they could be a nuisance.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where are they located?

Secretary RUSK. Chiefly in the Gaza Strip. They are spread among the Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip, Jordan and Lebanon. We estimate there are about 8,000. But we have been in touch with all of the governments concerned, including the Soviet Union, Britain, France, the other members of the Security Council, the states with troops in UNEF and, of course, with Israel and Arab capitals in the area.

SOVIETS ARE TAKING A MODERATE VIEW

The CHAIRMAN. What response did you get from the Soviet Union?

Secretary RUSK. There is a very great interest to us as to the attitude of the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN. What response did you get?

Secretary RUSK. I would have to say, Mr. Chairman, that in their discussions with us they seemed to take a moderate view. But two of the Arab states, Syria and Egypt, are saying that they have been

told by the Soviets that the Soviets would support them against the imperialists. So now we are talking with them further to date.

By the way, I hope we can keep some of these procedural steps private because it could affect what happens on the other end.

We are seeing the Russians again, both in New York and in Moscow today. At the moment, the members of the Security Council are meeting informally at the Danish Mission in New York to consider the situation and the possibility of a Security Council meeting perhaps later today or in the morning.

I think U Thant would prefer that the Security Council not meet until he has had a chance to talk with Nasser. But the situation is so inflammatory that it may be that the members of the Security Council would feel that they ought to begin to meet before U Thant gets back or before they hear from U Thant. That is our own view, by the way, and I think the British and Canadians feel that way, and I think some of the others are of that inclination.

ISRAEL COULD TAKE CARE OF ITSELF

Senator LAUSCHE. What is our government's appraisal of Nasser's honest judgment in the matter?

Secretary RUSK. We have thought that he would realize, unless he has some major secret weapon or military capacity of which we are uninformed, that he would be in deep trouble at least in the short run in an all-out engagement with Israel.

Our own estimate is that in a short engagement the Israelis would take care of themselves very handily against the forces that are now opposed to them, but we are not sure that Nasser thinks that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Up until now Nasser has been pictured as not wanting to become involved, but probably being coerced by the Syrians.

Secretary RUSK. I think there is a good deal to that, Senator. I think that in terms of the Israel-Arab issue as such over a period of time he has been one of the more moderate in terms of wanting a military engagement. But, of course, he probably also feels that with the challenge to Syria, which is the way they interpret the Israeli statement that Israel would attack Syria if these terrorist raids continued, he may feel that his position as head of the Arab world, as he sees it, is at stake here and that he would have to demonstrate that he is prepared to make good on that Syria-Egyptian alliance.

The most immediate question, of course, is the Strait. My guess is that Israel would use force to keep that Strait open, and the international maritime countries will have to consider among themselves what their attitude is toward it.

Our view has been all along, and this has been true since the settlement of the Suez affair, that that Strait is international waters, and that it should be opened to shipping of all countries.

CONTACTS WITH BRITAIN AND FRANCE

Senator LAUSCHE. Secretary Rusk, I interrupted you. You were talking about your contacts with the different nations at this time.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. I do not think you finished your thought.

Secretary RUSK. I think that the British, for example, are very much concerned about the use of force to close that international waterway and, further, they feel themselves committed to the support of Israel if there is a clear aggression against Israel, working primarily, in the first instance, through the United Nations.

France follows the same general policy, reflected in the tripartite statement, although they prefer to deal with this question not on a tripartite basis, hopefully on a quadripartite basis, including the Soviet Union and the Security Council. But in any event not restoring the tripartite declaration of 1950.

I think at this point—

The CHAIRMAN. I did not get that last. What did you say?

Secretary RUSK. Let me remind you, Mr. Chairman, of what the tripartite declaration of 1950 said:

The three governments, the United States, the U.K. and France, take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area, and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three governments, should they find that any of these states, was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistent with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.

MACMILLAN AND KENNEDY STATEMENTS

Now, just yesterday, George Brown said on television in Britain that he felt that the tripartite declaration had been substituted for by—

The CHAIRMAN. Substituted for by—what do you mean?

Secretary RUSK. By Prime Minister Macmillan's statement of 1963. In other words, that it had been replaced by Prime Minister Macmillan's statement in 1963.

Senator MANSFIELD. Applicable just to the U.K. or to the tripartite group?

Secretary RUSK. The U.K.'s participation in the tripartite declaration had been overtaken by Prime Minister Macmillan's declaration of 1963.

Senator MCCARTHY. Which said what, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. That was based upon a May 8 statement by President Kennedy. The question was:

Mr. President, do you consider the situation in the Middle East, the balance of power there, to have been changed as a result of recent developments, and what is the U.S. policy towards the security of Israel and Jordan in case they are threatened?

President Kennedy said:

I don't think that the balance of military power has been changed in the Middle East in recent days. Obviously there are political changes in the Middle East which still do not show a precise pattern and on which we are unable to make any final judgments. The United States supports social and economic and political progress in the Middle East. We support the security of both Israel and her neighbors. We seek to limit the Near East arms race which obviously takes resources from an area already poor, and puts them into an increasing race which does not really bring any great security.

And this is his conclusion on that:

We strongly oppose the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East, and we also seek to limit the spread of communism in the Middle East which would, of course, destroy the independence of the people. This government has been and remains strongly opposed to the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East. In the event of aggression or preparation for aggression, whether direct or indirect,

we would support appropriate measures in the United Nations, adopt other courses of action on our own to prevent or to put a stop to such aggression which, of course, has been the policy which the United States has followed for some time.

Now, that was on the 8th of May. On the 14th of May Prime Minister Macmillan was asked—

Senator AIKEN. What year?

Secretary RUSK. 1963.

Prime Minister Macmillan was asked whether he will publicly associate Her Majesty's Government with the recent officially declared United States policy to the effect that, should Israel or any of the Arab States appear to violate frontiers or armistice lines, the United States of America would take immediate action both within and outside the United States to prevent such violation.

And the Prime Minister said:

Yes, sir. I am glad to endorse the President's statement. Her Majesty's Government is deeply interested in peace and stability in this area, and is opposed to the use of force or the threat of force there as elsewhere in the world. We are equally opposed to the interference by any country in the internal affairs of another whether by the encouragement of subversion or by hostile propaganda. I cannot say in advance what action we would take in a crisis since it is difficult to foresee the exact circumstances which might arise. We regard the United Nations as being primarily responsible for the maintenance of peace in the area. If any threat to peace arises, we will consult immediately with the United Nations, and will take whatever action we feel may be required.

TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT NOT AN OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENT

Senator LAUSCHE. How does that differ from the tripartite agreement?

Secretary RUSK. In the first place, it would mean that Britain and France do not look upon the tripartite declaration as an organic three-power operational instrument at the present time. After all, that came before the Suez, and there have been some complications.

Senator AIKEN. Do we?

Secretary RUSK. I beg your pardon?

Senator AIKEN. Do we?

Secretary RUSK. I think again the policy which President Kennedy announced or reaffirmed in May 1963 is, for all practical purposes, identical with the policy of the tripartite declaration:

In the event of aggression or preparation for aggression, whether direct or indirect, we would support appropriate measures in the United Nations, adopt other courses of action on our own to prevent or to put a stop to such aggression which, of course, has been the policy which the United States has followed for some time.

A DECLARATION RATHER THAN A COMMITMENT

Senator AIKEN. If one party of a tripartite understanding disagrees with the other two, the one party goes ahead representing the whole?

Secretary RUSK. I think the policy situation is that France, Britain, and the United States have since the tripartite declaration or since Suez reaffirmed the underlying policy of the declaration. But I do not think that the British and the French are prepared to operate on this policy simply as a tripartite matter.

The CHAIRMAN. This morning's paper—

Senator MANSFIELD. It appears to me that a declaration is quite different from a commitment, very different. I see no commitment there. It is just a declaration of what might be done.

Secretary RUSK. I think it was a declaration of policy, and I think that is what I called it.

Secretary MANSFIELD. But no commitment.

Secretary RUSK. There was no treaty commitment.

Senator CLARK. But you do not foresee the British or French troops going in there, do you, under any circumstances? Maybe U.N. That is pretty remote.

Secretary RUSK. This is a problem which everybody has got to think hard about. It depends, of course, on the circumstances and who does what to whom and how the matter develops.

AN AGREEMENT THE RUSSIANS WOULD ACCEPT

Senator CLARK. Do you think there is any possibility of persuading Israel not to attack Syria and to permit a U.N. force to go back in the Gaza Strip, perhaps half on their side or half—let me finish—

Secretary RUSK. Excuse me, Senator.

Senator CLARK [continuing]. If Egypt would agree to leave the Straits open? What, in your judgment, would be the Russian reaction to something like that?

Secretary RUSK. I think if Egypt were to agree to leave the Straits open, and Israel were to agree to accept U.N. or international forces in Egypt, I think the Russians would probably accept it.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, we have a meeting of the Central Intelligence Agency committee, as you and Senator Mansfield know, and I would like to get over there before the meeting is over. I have questions I would like to ask as chairman of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over that area, and I would like to request the regular order until the Secretary finishes.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe we had better. If the Secretary would wind up his preliminary statement on this subject. Should we proceed to questions after the Middle East and leave Vietnam for later?

Senator SYMINGTON. I would hope so.

POSITIONS TAKEN BY AMERICAN PRESIDENTS

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything more to volunteer before we have questions on the Middle East?

Secretary RUSK. I think, Mr. Chairman, I might say on what has been said as a matter of policy since President Kennedy's press conference of May 8, 1963, that President Johnson said in a joint communique with Prime Minister Eshkol:

He (President Johnson) reiterated to Prime Minister Eshkol U.S. support for the territorial integrity and political independence for all countries in the Near East and emphasized the firm opposition of the U.S. to aggression and the use of force or the threat of force against any country.

Again, on August 2, 1966, he said:

As our beloved, great, late President John F. Kennedy said on May 8, 1963, as a declaration of the leader of this country and as spokesman for this land: 'We support the security of both Israel and her neighbors * * * We strongly oppose the use of force or the threat of force in the Near East * * *

We subscribe to that policy.

So what I have read to you this morning has been the essence of what the different Presidents have said.

I have some statements here that I could put into the record, including President Truman's, President Eisenhower's, during that period. But the most recent ones are the statements by President Kennedy which President Johnson reaffirmed.

THE SITUATION COULD GET OUT OF CONTROL

I think the key question here for us to be thinking about, and I do not come here today with recommendations on it but in hopes that we can get some expressions of opinion in the committee, as to what the attitude of the U.S. and other countries in the West ought to be if there is a major onslaught by the Arab countries against Israel. I mean, that is the most serious contingency and one which we cannot completely brush aside although, as I said earlier, some of you were not here when I said it, I do not think that the governments of the area, as governments, are particularly hankering for large-scale military operations.

I have the impression they are prepared to have their coattails pulled and held in position. But they are the victims of possible incidents and emotions, and the situations could move out of control.

I will be glad, Mr. Chairman, to stop at this point because I know members have comments or questions they might wish to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. I think maybe we will move along on that. I only have two or three questions.

GOING IT ALONE

I want to make it, I want to try to be very precise about our policy with regard to this tripartite agreement. Would we today enforce that if the British and the French are not willing to, by our own forces? I want to ask later about the U.N., but first on that subject, is this our policy?

Secretary RUSK. I would not be able to tell you what the President's decision on that would be. You see, our policy has been stated on the public record. We have spent all of our time thus far urging calm upon everybody, Israel, the Arab States, the Soviet Union, and have been working very strongly in the Security Council—they are meeting now, as I told some of you who were here earlier—in an informal meeting to take up this question.

That is a question on which I am sure the President will be in touch with the leadership if any decision had to be made on that point. We are hoping to avoid that question if we possibly can by holding the situation under control in the Near East.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, just as a comment, if we should undertake to do that we would be hard put to find forces to go it alone in this area at the present time, wouldn't we?

Secretary RUSK. I do not think the question of going it alone would come up. My guess is that—

The CHAIRMAN. If it did.

Secretary RUSK. This would have to be a matter of general action by a considerable number of countries, not ourselves.

THE NEED FOR INVOLVING THE U.N.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to take much time—I would like to urge that here is a case that if ever the U.N. should be brought in, this is it. It does not directly involve the major countries. You intimated you would like some advice or at least you would not resent any advice from this committee—that this is an example of where you should go the limit in involving the U.N. as far as you can.

Secretary RUSK. We would agree to that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All the way.

Secretary RUSK. I would say we do not know how much of a need we have to lean on as far as the Secretary General is concerned because he has not been very staunch in supporting the position and the action of the U.N. in a number of these situations.

The CHAIRMAN. Much more important, I think, are the Russians, what their attitude would be.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And I do not know what they replied to you either. I imagine they would be willing if they get any kind of consensus.

Secretary RUSK. Could I leave this off the tape, Mr. Chairman?
[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield?

AVOID UNILATERAL ACTION

Senator MANSFIELD. I am pleased with the reaction, Mr. Secretary. I certainly hope that this country does not act unilaterally in the Middle East. We have enough troubles in Vietnam now, more than enough.

Is there an agreement between, a security arrangement between France and Britain with Israel in addition to anything you have mentioned so far?

Secretary RUSK. We do not know of any specific and direct tripartite agreement between Britain, France, and Israel. It might have come after the Suez affair. We just do not know of one, if one exists. I would doubt it.

Senator MANSFIELD. I am pleased to note that you place the emphasis on the U.N., and the U.N. is taking it up; that you are carrying on conversations with the Soviet Union, and I would place more credence in what you have been told than what the Egyptian newspapers carried.

MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION

What is the status of the Middle East resolution of 1961?

Secretary RUSK. That is so far as I know still law, but its applicability here, I may have to say something different later if we examine it further, but on the face of it, it would seem that its applicability here is somewhat fuzzy because that resolution was applied to countries under Communist domination.

Senator MCCARTHY. When you went into Lebanon there was no Communist domination in there.

Secretary RUSK. That is right; in Lebanon and Jordan.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Which Middle East resolution?

Senator MCCARTHY. The Eisenhower doctrine.

Senator MANSFIELD. 1961. The Middle East resolution.

Secretary RUSK. The Middle East resolution was under President Eisenhower. That was the resolution on the basis of the——

Senator MANSFIELD. I mean 1957.

Secretary RUSK. That was the resolution on the basis of which we put some forces into Lebanon.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, if I can go on, and I am just going to be brief. I would express the strong personal feeling, and that is all I can express, that the President does not act unilaterally in this area. Pressure is exerted on the U.K. and the French, who have vital interests there in one form or another, to take the lead outside the United Nations. We should do all that we can to simmer this down because I think that basically the statements made by Colonel Nasser are provocative and inflammatory. Morally he is in the wrong, that he made a mistake in requesting that the United Nations Emergency Force be withdrawn from the Gaza Strip, and I would hope that something could be done to bring about an accord on the suggestion made by Prime Minister Eshkol of Israel to the effect that they both withdraw their forces back——

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I cannot hear the Senator.

Senator MANSFIELD [continuing]. From a certain area from the border.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us have order, please.

Senator MANSFIELD. The one thing I want to emphasize, speaking personally, is I hope we do not become involved unilaterally.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to associate myself with those remarks.

Senator MORSE. So do I.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

Senator MANSFIELD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

Bourke, do you want to ask a question before you leave?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have to go to this other meeting.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any questions?

NO COURSE OF ACTION PRESENTED

Senator AIKEN. What you have been suggesting, Mr. Secretary, is a suggestion for unilateral action if it is desirable?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; I have not presented anything.

Senator AIKEN. I missed the first ten minutes.

Secretary RUSK. I have not presented any course of action this morning. I am consulting with the committee; trying to bring the committee up to date on the situation; to give you a feel of the various governments we are in touch with; to tell you that this is being discussed right at the moment by the members of the Security Council at an informal meeting; and also to let you know that about an hour ago U Thant was supposed to have arrived in Cairo to talk to Nasser, and we feel that it would be useful to spread the situation out in as much detail as possible and get the reactions of members of the committee to it.

DISMAY OVER REMOVAL OF U.N. FORCES

Senator AIKEN. Why was U Thant in such a hurry to get the U.N. forces out of the area?

Secretary RUSK. Quite frankly, we do not know. I think that he was advised that as a legal matter—

Senator GORE. What was the question? I could not get that question.

Secretary RUSK. The question was why was U Thant in such a hurry to get the forces out.

Senator GORE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I expressed earlier our dismay that he did act with such speed here. But I think he was advised as a legal matter if Egypt wanted those forces out of Egypt they had a right to request that they go out. They were the host country, a sovereign country, and that these forces could be there only with Egypt's consent.

Our view was this was action that should be taken by the General Assembly. It was just not a unilateral action by Egypt. Those forces are there by agreement with Egypt, and this agreement should not be broken unilaterally by the country, the host country, without full opportunity for the United Nations to act on its side of the agreement.

Senator AIKEN. It almost looks as if he had advance information that this demand was going to be made.

Secretary RUSK. I would be inclined to doubt that, but I cannot be sure of it; I could not be sure of it.

Senator AIKEN. Or else he was a very fast thinker.

Secretary RUSK. I have the impression that his Soviet Deputy strongly urged him to accede to Nasser's request immediately.

Senator AIKEN. The Soviets never did approve this peacekeeping force there.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct. This is the only peace-keeping force established by the Assembly. As you know, the Soviets have taken a strong view in any event they should not do this.

Senator AIKEN. Yes, and Yugoslavia took the lead in asking to have the force maintained.

Secretary RUSK. So did Canada.

Senator AIKEN. Against the opposition of Russia.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator AIKEN. Yugoslavia and Canada.

Secretary RUSK. And Yugoslavia has some troops there as part of the force.

IF ISRAEL SHOULD FALL

Senator AIKEN. However, if Israel should fall, her entire interests in the Middle East would be jeopardized, wouldn't they, sir?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that the picture of the Israelis being driven into the sea is a picture that I just think people just cannot contemplate.

Senator AIKEN. No.

Secretary RUSK. The whole world cannot contemplate that.

I agree with Senator Mansfield on the unilateral aspect of this. But this is not a phenomenon that the world can sit for, it seems to me.

Senator AIKEN. You get any indication that France and England would consider it their problem?

Secretary RUSK. We are in touch with them now. I can tell you that their own views are pretty strong at the present time on this matter. But I would not want to try to be precise about it because we are talking further with them today, this morning. There is a cabinet meeting in Britain going on, I think, at the present time.

Senator AIKEN. Strong in what direction, that they want to put their own forces in there or they want the United States to do that for them?

Secretary RUSK. No, this is a matter that everybody has to be interested in.

Senator AIKEN. You think they would be——

Secretary RUSK. I think the chances are that they would be, but I do not want to speak for them on that point because our own President has not fully been informed, and does not himself have a conclusion to recommend to you at this time. This is an opportunity for me to be able to reflect to the President at lunch today the views expressed at this table by this distinguished committee, and I would be very glad to have any views anyone would wish to offer on this because this is on a day-to-day basis, maybe even an hour-to-hour basis.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?

U THANT'S ACTIONS

Senator MORSE. I will be very brief. I have three or four very brief questions I want to get your comment on.

George's question covers the first one, as I was going to bring up, but I wanted to expand a bit, and that deals with U Thant's action.

I am at a complete loss to understand why he acted so parentally. It is true it is a United Nations matter, but being Secretary General does not relieve him of the responsibility on this General assembly. Being Secretary General does not relieve him of the responsibility and the obligation to move through the General Assembly and seek advice from the General Assembly.

Furthermore, under the charter there not only is there anything to prevent him, but I think clearly it was his obligation when you have got a matter of war or peace at stake to have sought advice from the Security Council, too.

I am at a loss to understand why he acted so parentally. Had he not done it, that would have given us more time, too, and time is so important. Therefore, I think he has got to take a long, hard look at the jurisdiction prerogatives of the Secretary General because this is not the only time that U Thant, in my judgment, has gone off, may I say politely, giving the image he is the United Nations, when he is only, after all, but a servant of the United Nations in this procedure.

Senator LAUSCHE. I concur.

Senator MORSE. And, therefore, I shall not be at all surprised if you have got here a considerable amount of influence from that Communist Deputy of his. I am not going to take the time now, but I think you also have some of the same influences involved in his attitude in Southeast Asia. I have not shared the view that this man is impartial.

MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION AND SOVIET INTERVENTION

Now I come to the 1957 resolution which has been mentioned here which says:

“Furthermore, the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism,” as you pointed out, Mr. Secretary, “Provided, that such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the Constitution of the United States.”

I think it takes that resolution out of the applicability to the instant case, because you are not involved here, unless Russia gets in, you are not involved here, in my judgment, with the Communist aspect of the resolution.

Senator McCARTHY. Will the Senator yield at this point? But this was used for the Lebanon intervention, and there was no threat of intervention of international communism there.

Senator MORSE. I know. But I am only citing what the other countries will say what the purpose was and what it was other countries particularly approved of there.

But now I come, and you may have talked on it before I got here, and if you did I am sorry to be redundant. You do not know it, but I am in this very serious railroad emergency here that somehow we still have got to face up to a lot faster than we are facing up to it here on the Hill. That is why I was late.

TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT INOPERATIVE

But am I correct in my recollection that Great Britain and France and the United States have not a security pact but we have an agreement among the three of us in which if there is a threat of war in the Middle East we will act in concert against the aggressor. Is there such a thing?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think it would be saying too much to say that Britain and France look upon the tripartite declaration of 1950 as still being operative. As a matter of fact, the Foreign Minister of Great Britain said on television just last night that he thought that the tripartite declaration had been supplanted by Prime Minister Macmillan's statement of 1963 which I read to the committee.

Senator MORSE. Which I missed.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I see that?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator MORSE. There is no obligation on the part of France or Great Britain to act in concert with us in case—

Secretary RUSK. Senator, let me say that the tripartite declaration was a joint declaration of policy, as Senator Mansfield pointed out.

Now, the question is does their policy remain approximately the same. I think it is very important that matters of this sort not be

commented upon or quoted outside by anybody because we are in a very delicate situation, and I do not want to speak for other governments.

It is my present view that the policies of Britain and France are in accord with the tripartite declaration of 1950; that is, they consider this is a very serious matter.

As you know, France and Israel have had very close ties, and Britain has given their support to Israel and is very much concerned as a maritime power about the attempt to close the Strait of Tiran leading to the Port of Aqaba. So I would have to shade it a little because I cannot speak for either one of those governments.

My impression is today, after a week of intensive consultation, as a matter of policy they still are in the framework of that policy which was announced in the tripartite declaration.

NOT A CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION

Senator MORSE. Do we consider we are under any international understanding, obligation other than the tripartite understanding of 1950 to help Israel or any Arab state that might be attacked?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, if you could borrow from Senator Lausche at some stage the statement in the press conference made by President Kennedy in May 1963, he, as late as 1963 reaffirmed the underlying policy of the tripartite declaration, and President Johnson later referred to the May press conference and said that he supports that policy.

Senator MORSE. That was my understanding.

Secretary RUSK. For this is a matter of policy. It is not a matter of treaty commitment. It is not a matter of contractual obligation.

Senator MORSE. It is not a treaty. It is really not a matter of signed agreement either, going back to 1950, but it was a restatement of a commitment there that linked with France and Britain at that time.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Wayne, would you yield so that I could read into the record what the operative words are of the 1950 declaration?

Senator MORSE. Yes.

Senator Lausche. The three governments, should they find that any of these states was preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation.

What those words mean I will not try to interpret at this time.

Senator MORSE. That is what I am talking about, around this question that I am asking, and I have got my answer that France and Great Britain as of now apparently will not consider themselves bound by the 1950 agreement, but we do not know.

Secretary RUSK. But seem to be pursuing the same attitude or policy reflected in that agreement.

Senator MORSE. That is right.

But as far as we are concerned, based upon the Kennedy statement of 1963 and the subsequent Johnson statement, we still consider that we have some obligation to try to get a war stopped by

some joint action on the part of England and France if they would join us.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I think it might be worth, since we are putting certain things in the record—this is the mid-fifties—President Eisenhower stated in a press conference:

I would recommend that the U.S. join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

That is November 1955.

Then in January 1957 he said in a speech to Congress, in a State of the Union Message:

We have shown, so that none can doubt, our dedication to the principle that force shall not be used internationally for any aggressive purposes and that the integrity and independence of the nations of the Middle East should be inviolate.

A MORAL OBLIGATION

Senator MCCARTHY. Will the Senator yield at this one point? I accept that we have a moral obligation and we have four or five statements by a series of Presidents. But the only formal obligation that you still think is our obligation is within the United Nations.

Secretary RUSK. The general treaty obligations of the United Nations Charter.

Senator MCCARTHY. No other treaties.

Secretary RUSK. Of course, they apply here, but no other treaties apply to this problem.

Senator MCCARTHY. Just Presidential statements and the Eisenhower doctrine which is our unilateral obligation, and there is nothing left of the tripartite agreement except our statement we would support it.

Secretary RUSK. And the enunciations of policies by what amount to four Presidents.

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes.

CONVERSATIONS WITH GOLDA MEIR

Senator MORSE. I will ask, Mr. Secretary, to be permitted to make this statement. The last official contact I had with the tripartite agreement was in December 1965 when, under the President's request, I took my delegation home by way of Israel. We had a series of conferences over there, and two of those conferences were with Golda Meir. Frank will recall that in our conference with Golda Meir, a very long conference, both of them long conferences, we were talking about the criticisms we were getting from Israel concerning military aid in the Middle East.

She expressed quite a bit of concern, as I remember. It is my recollection, I remember Frank Lausche said to her very frankly—these were not his exact words, but I paraphrase him, and I think he will agree, accurately, he said, "Mrs. Meir, I am at a little loss to understand your concern because you know that you have our pledge that we will come to your assistance if you are attacked."

She said, "Yes, Mr. Senator, I know." This, of course was in reference to the tripartite agreement. She said, "Yes, I know," but, she said, "I am not so sure that there would be any Israel left by the time you came to our assistance."

What Frank was talking about was we have taken this position in the Middle East. We are not going to stand by if either the Arab countries or Israel is attacked. Is that a fair recollection of the conversation?

Senator LAUSCHE. No. I think my point was, I said "Why are you complaining because our government has fully informed you about the aid that we were then sending into Jordan at Eilat, Aqaba, we were there, and it was said, 'Look across the bay and you will see ships unloading equipment.'"

Well, I had been previously told that our government told Israel that we were giving this aid and that Israel knew about it, and the excuse for giving it was that unless we gave it Russia would. I cannot confirm—

Senator MORSE. I do not want to take the Secretary's time other than in that conversation you were also—and I thought you made a very good point—you also told her that you did not see why she was so concerned because she knew that if a war did break out that under existing international understandings that we would come to her assistance in case they were attacked.

Senator LAUSCHE. I do not think I went that far.

Senator MORSE. She said, "My concern there wouldn't be an Israel left by the time the attack took place."

Anyway, I will exonerate my friend from Ohio from being the one that raised the point. I know the point was raised in the discussion.

But my point is at that time she was then still foreign minister. At that time she recognized, she thought they had an understanding with us, and I think with Great Britain and France, too, that we were not going to be letting her be attacked, aggressed upon, but she was concerned with whether or not we would get to their assistance fast enough. I just cite that point.

The last point I wanted to ask you is, you know, that this matter will be a matter of discussion all over the entire Senate. Have you any advice to us as to how we can be of greatest help to the State Department and to the White House in any public discussions that may break out on the floor of the Senate this afternoon?

U THANT NEEDS STIFFENING

Secretary RUSK. There is one point that occurs to me, Senator, and that is to emphasize the responsibilities of the United Nations for peacekeeping in this area, because U Thant may need some stiffening on this point, and I may know before the meeting is over whether they agreed to actually call a formal meeting of the Security Council.

Mr. Macomber, would you be in touch with the office when Ambassador Goldberg calls back?

So I would think that would be one point that could be very helpful.

Secondly, general advice to all hands to keep calm in this situation. You see, Israel is in a very, very difficult geographic position, and Mrs. Meir's comment to you in that conversation is relevant here. They are surrounded by Arab States who declare periodically or publicly their hostility towards Israel.

They have not got much wriggle room in there. Therefore, they feel that they have got to bristle like a porcupine to fend off these neighbors if anything ever starts, so they tend to be a little jumpy. This is partly because of the military problem of space.

We have urged them to be extremely cautious and patient here in regard to these boundary incidents in this situation, and that Israel make it quite clear that if anything happens here it is not Israel's responsibility; that this is a clear aggression from the outside.

Just yesterday the Prime Minister proposed that there be a neutral withdrawal of forces between the Israel-Egyptian frontier. That was a most sensible and sober suggestion to make.

CLOSING THE STRAITS OF TIRAN

But again I am concerned about this morning, about the effect on Israel by the announcement by Nasser that he was closing the Straits of Tiran. That is an extremely serious thing.

Senator SYMINGTON. Doing what?

Secretary RUSK. Closing the Straits of Tiran that lead up to Aqaba. That is a very serious step, and we are concerned about that.

Senator MORSE. We have never said at any time that we considered those international waters the closing of which would involve our rights?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, we have said we consider them international waters and that is our view on that. There are four countries that were served by that Gulf of Aqaba.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson?

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, I have two or three questions.

Secretary RUSK. Excuse me, Senator, may I just read into the record here a portion of an aide memoire handed by Mr. Dulles to Prime Minister Eban:

With respect to the Gulf of Aqaba and access thereto—the United States believes that the gulf comprehends international waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto. We have in mind not only commercial uses but the passage of the pilgrims on religious missions, which should be fully respected.

So our view has been that the Gulf of Aqaba is international waters and the passage through the Straits is an international right.

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you want to read the next paragraph in that statement?

Secretary RUSK. I do not have it with me.

Senator SYMINGTON. I will give it to you.

The United States recalls that on January 28, 1950, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the United States that the Egyptian occupation of the two islands of Tiran and Senafir at the entrance at the Gulf of Aqaba was only to protect the islands themselves against possible damage or violation and that 'this occupation being in no way conceived in a spirit of obstructing in any way innocent passage through the stretch of water separating these two islands from the Egyptian coast of Sinai, it follows that this passage, the only practical one, will remain free.

In the absence of some overriding decision to the contrary as by the International Court of Justice, the United States, on behalf of vessels of the United States registry, is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.

That sounds like a pretty firm commitment at that time—
Secretary Rusk. Right.

Senator SYMINGTON [continuing]. By Mr. Dulles.
The Chairman. Senator Carlson?
Senator SYMINGTON. This is dated February 11, 1957.

NASSER'S THREATS TO THE U.N.

Senator CARLSON. I have just two questions. The press dispatches have carried the story that U Thant, the Secretary General, was advised by Mr. Nasser that if he did not withdraw the troops they were going to be disarmed. Does the State Department have any views on that?

Secretary RUSK. We do not have the text of what Nasser might have said to U Thant. At least, if so, they might have escaped my attention. I think I probably would have seen them. It would not surprise me if Nasser did say that.

Senator CARLSON. I was going to ask if you do not think he might have done that.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I think it is possible.

BRITISH POSITION

Senator CARLSON. Second, the last official statement we have from Great Britain, outside of the statement by Mr. Brown¹ yesterday in London, would be the Macmillan statement of 1963 which you read into the record. I gathered from your reading of that statement that they pretty much withdrew and left it to ourselves, at least they were in position where they could move either way based on the statement. What is your view of that?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think, sir, that it depends on what weight you give to the opening words of Prime Minister Macmillan's statement because it was based upon President Kennedy's press conference statement. Senator Lausche, I believe, has that exchange.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, right here.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, sir. The Prime Minister began his statement by saying—remember the question was “Would you publicly associate Her Majesty's Government with the recent officially declared United States policy?” That was referring to President Kennedy's press conference statement. He said:

“Yes, sir. I am glad to endorse the President's statement.” Then he goes on to put heavy emphasis on the United Nations aspect on it. Then, of course, he said as far as specific action was concerned that would require examination of the situation at the time.

REASONABLE RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS AND ISRAEL

Senator CARLSON. Are you implying this morning that our nation does not have any formal obligation or commitment, but merely implies these commitments are tripartite treaties we have been into?

Secretary RUSK. We do not have a treaty obligation directly except to the extent the United Nations Charter is applicable. We do not have a specific treaty obligation.

Over the years I think that question has been raised from time to time, but it was concluded that such a treaty would not be in the interests of peace in the general area nor in our interests be-

¹British Foreign Secretary George Brown.

cause it was important for the West to be able to have reasonable relations with both the Arabs and with Israel, if possible.

Now, this is a policy question which was posed to four Presidents, and it goes back to the day when the United States played a major role in the creation of the State of Israel.

OPERATING FROM DAY TO DAY

Senator CARLSON. Then we get to a place—and I think everyone must be concerned about the unilateral agreements—would you say that we do not have any unilateral agreements in this field?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we have some unilateral declarations of policy by the Presidents.

Senator CARLSON. And these policies imply a great deal more than just what is in the written word.

Secretary RUSK. I think the statements stand by themselves. I think they should not be looked upon as empty statements. I think they do have some content. But how and when and in what way we give effect to such a policy is something to be considered in the circumstances.

Senator CARLSON. In other words, we are operating right now from day to day. Do you, as the State Department, have any contingency plans? In other words, this situation to me based on your statement this morning, is very critical. What are your plans? Do you have plans that you could divulge as to what you are going to do tomorrow?

Secretary RUSK. At present, quite frankly, no decisions have been made about actions to be taken by, say U.S. forces. But we have been consulting with all of the governments involved in the area, in the Security Council, those with the United Nations Emergency Force troops, the Soviet Union, and specifically with the British and the French on the situation and, of course, one has to think about various contingencies, but no decisions have been made.

Senator CARLSON. In other words, you are looking forward to if one thing happens tomorrow, that you have something serious, you would at least have in mind something you might be trying to do?

Secretary RUSK. Well, yes, sir. But that depends upon what happens tomorrow and what the President's judgment in consultation with the leaders and others will be.

CONSULTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Senator CARLSON. You mentioned consultation with the Soviet Union. I think we all agree around the table that they, no doubt, are deeply involved. They are practical international politicians.

Have you analyzed what their stake would be, whether they should be with us as a nation; whether they should stay with us or go with the Far East internationally. Have you got any thoughts on that?

Secretary RUSK. As to the Soviet Union?

Senator CARLSON. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I think before you came in, Senator, I said that in our own consultations with them we get the impression that they would like to moderate the situation, but we get a different impression from Syria and from Cairo as to what the Soviet attitude is.

Senator CARLSON. They play both sides against the middle.

Secretary RUSK. So either the Arabs are overstating what the Soviets have said or the Soviets are saying something rather different to them than they are to us. But we are talking further with them and we will try to clarify that point.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

Senator Lausche?

Senator LAUSCHE. Here is Senator Gore.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you had gone.

Senator GORE. I changed my seat the better to hear what the chairman was saying.

The CHAIRMAN. I looked down and I thought you were gone.

SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, I share many of the feelings expressed by members, but I would suggest there would be danger in any equivocation on our part. I do not wish to elaborate upon it except to say that because of the tripartite agreement, because of the statements of the President, because of the domestic political pressures in this country, the chances are overwhelming that this country would not see Israel destroyed. I doubt if it would be in the interests of our Executive to leave any question about that open to conjecture. That is all I wish to suggest.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams?

UNILATERAL ACTION

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Secretary, in the event the worse developed, and they did invade Israel, would we act unilaterally or would we wait for the United Nations, insist upon France and Great Britain joining us?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, you understand that this is the most serious of all questions in this situation, and I am a little reluctant to try to anticipate what the President would feel we ought to do in a particular situation of that sort.

One thing that I can assure you of and that is that every possible effort will be made to see that any action that is taken or becomes necessary will be taken by a maximum number of countries, and we fully supported what Senator Mansfield said earlier about the very serious disabilities and difficulties of unilateral action by us in this situation.

Senator WILLIAMS. That is all.

Secretary RUSK. There are a considerable number of—just to illustrate the point, Senator, there are a considerable number of maritime nations who have tremendous interests in the principle of the international character of the Straits there, the Straits of Tiran, and they certainly ought to be interested in that if anybody is going to have to do anything about it.

Senator WILLIAMS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?

CREATION OF ISRAEL

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Secretary, I would like to set down in chronological order the statements made by the Presidents and Secretary Dulles, the resolution of 1957, so that the record will show what has been done in the past with respect to this problem.

It looks to me that the material that was discussed today, attempting to show what our obligations are, begin with the tripartite declaration regarding security in the Near East dated May 25, 1950. Am I correct in that understanding?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think, sir, in order to complete the record one would need to refer back to President Truman's very strong role in assisting in the creation of the State of Israel and certain things that he said at that time.

For example, in a speech at Madison Square Garden on October 28, 1948—

Senator LAUSCHE. October 28, 1948?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. What did Truman say?

Secretary RUSK.

I wish to speak now upon a subject that has been of great interest to me as your President. It is the subject of Israel. Now, this is a most important subject and must not be resolved as a matter of politics during a political campaign. I have refused consistently to play politics with that question. I have refused—as a matter of fact, there was at that time campaign sort of an agreement between the two sides to try to keep this out. I have the impression it sort of broke out into the campaign in the last few days, but I remember that very well because Mr. Foster Dulles who was also involved in it on the other side. But to resume:

I have refused, first, because it is my responsibility to see that our policy in Israel fits in with our foreign policy throughout the world; second, it is my desire to help build in Palestine a strong, prosperous, free, and independent democratic state. It must be large enough, free enough, and strong enough to make its people self-supporting and secure.

Now, there may have been other statements, but I think we should refer to the Truman administration's role.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is that date?

Secretary RUSK. October 28, 1948.

HIGH STATE OF TENSION

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, then follows the tripartite declaration of May 25, 1950, and at this point I want to read into the record the substantive language embracing the declaration of the three countries:

The three governments take this opportunity of declaring their deep interest in and their desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area and their unalterable opposition to the use of force or threat of force between any of the states in that area. The three governments, should they find that any of the states was preparing to violate the frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistently with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take action, but within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violations.

What was the background with respect to which this declaration was made?

Secretary RUSK. That had to do with the high state of tension that existed with the state of Israel in relation to its frontiers and the attempts by the Arabs to upset the de facto frontiers that had been established at the time of the creation of Israel.

Senator LAUSCHE. I now go to the next item that has been mentioned here this morning, and this is dated February 11, 1957. It is an aide memoire handed to Israel's Ambassador Abba Eban by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, if you are establishing a little chronology it might be useful to insert here a section from a radio address by Secretary of State Dulles on June 1, 1953, in which he reaffirmed the tripartite declaration of 1950.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

OCCUPATION OF TIRAN AND SENAFIR

I want to read here what material was already read:

The United States recalls that on January 28, 1950, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the United States that the Egyptian occupation of the two islands of Tiran and Senafir at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba was only to protect the islands themselves against possible damage or violation and that this occupation being in no way conceived in a spirit of obstructing in any way innocent passage through the stretch of water separating these two islands from the Egyptian coast of Sinai, it follows that this passage, the only practical one, will remain free as in the past, in conformity with international practice and recognized principles of the law of nations.

In the absence of some overriding decision to the contrary, as by the International Court of Justice, the United States, on behalf of vessels of United States registry, is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of its right.

Are these two islands the ones that are now occupied by Nasser to block ingress and egress?

Secretary RUSK. Yes. But, you see, the United Nations force had a contingent of Swedes on the mainland just opposite the straits in order to prevent the possibility that the Egyptians might emplace artillery there and try to stop passage through the Straits. That United Nations force has now been withdrawn.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes. All right.

THE MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION

Now I get down to the Middle East resolution as amended, which was passed on March 9, 1957. Am I correct that this resolution, under date of March 9, 1957, follows all of the other declarations and resolutions which we, you and I, have thus far discussed?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. This particular one—

Senator LAUSCHE. I think it does.

Secretary RUSK. This particular resolution was aimed at aggression by countries under Communist domination.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is correct.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. After the statements by Dulles, after the tripartite declaration, after the statement by Truman, this resolution was passed by the Congress of the United States.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. And in this resolution of March 9, 1957 it was stated, among other things:

"To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international com-

munism," and the important aspect is to assist against aggression by any country controlled by international communism.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, Senator. But I think also the introduction to what you have just read does contain a declaration of a vital interest to the United States.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right; okay. Let me put the whole section in there.

Has there been any other action taken by the Congress of the United States on this Middle East subject subsequent to this resolution of March 9, 1957?

Secretary RUSK. Nothing comparable in terms of a specific resolution that I am aware of, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. So the last congressional declaration with respect to the Middle East is this resolution of March 9, 1957?

Secretary RUSK. Yes. I would not want to overlook the possibility that there is a good deal of preambular material in other legislation that has a bearing on the issues that could arise in the Near East, declarations—

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S POSITION

Subsequent to March 9, 1957 we have had statements by Eisenhower and by Kennedy and Johnson.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, the pertinent one discussed here today was the statement made by President Kennedy in—

Secretary RUSK. May 8, 1963.

Senator LAUSCHE. As a consequence of Kennedy's statement dealing with Israel and the Arab Republic, and the tripartite declaration, Prime Minister Macmillan was asked in the Parliament a certain question, and I will read:

To ask the Prime Minister whether he will publicly associate Her Majesty's Government with the recent officially declared United States policy to the effect that, should Israel or any of the Arab States appear to violate frontiers of armistice lines, the United States of America will take immediate action both within and outside the United Nations to prevent such violation.

That, in substance, what I have just read, is Kennedy's statement?

Secretary RUSK. It was a summation. There is a slight difference in wording, but in substance, yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Summation.

Now, the United States Government received the following written reply from the Prime Minister.

Secretary RUSK. No. This was an answer to a question—this is a question in the House of Commons.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. And the Prime Minister answered the question in the House of Commons.

Senator LAUSCHE. And this is how he answered.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, sir. I am glad to endorse the President's statement. Her Majesty's Government are deeply interested in peace and stability in this area, and are opposed to the use of force or the threat of force there as elsewhere in the world. We are

equally opposed to the interference by any country in the internal affairs of another whether by the encouragement of subversion or by hostile propaganda.

Now:

I cannot say in advance what action we would take in a crisis since it is difficult to foresee the exact circumstances which might arise.

A STATE OF UNCERTAINTY

My question is: Doesn't this last sentence leave the matter in a state of uncertainty because Macmillan says that he cannot say in advance what action "we would take in a crisis since it is difficult to foresee the exact circumstances which might arise."

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I would not attach too much policy importance to that. I think any chief of government would be very reluctant to say in advance exactly what steps he might take.

For example, in a NATO crisis, I think the President would be very reluctant to pin himself to a particular action even though the commitments of the treaty are to treat an attack on one as an attack on all.

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it correct to conclude that there is only one piece of direct legislation dealing with the subject, and that is the Middle East resolution of 1957? There may be, however, some preliminary statements in other official documents that may have a bearing upon it.

Secretary RUSK. I will have this examined to see whether there are any direct references to the Middle East in other legislation which would have a bearing on the present situation.

HAVE THE UNITED NATIONS TAKE CONTROL

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, then, I want to conclude. In my opinion, every effort imaginable should be made to have the United Nations take control of this subject. No efforts should be spared toward the achievement of this end. This item is one peculiarly fitted for disposition by the United Nations.

Two, our government should not, under any circumstances, take unilateral action in the matter.

Three, we have to explore the ability to become involved beyond our already existing involvement in South Vietnam where we now have 425,000 men, I believe.

Secretary RUSK. Somewhat more than that.

Senator LAUSCHE. 450,000.

Senator GORE. Will the Senator yield; with a much less specific commitment than we have in Israel. I do not know how we can act unilaterally in one case and then say we will not act otherwise.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, would you repeat what you said? We ought to explore—

[The statement of Senator Lausche was read by the reporter, as requested.]

Senator LAUSCHE. Four, I cannot approve the speed of U Thant and his failure to consult with the principal agencies of the United Nations in his action in withdrawing the United Nations troops from the area.

I think that concludes it.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt?

U THANT'S ABILITY TO ACT UNILATERALLY

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Secretary, I am glad that you came here to discuss our problems with us in advance of action being taken. I hope this becomes a precedent.

I recall what happened in Vietnam. I was not here when you came before the committee, but I think this is a proper function of the advise and consent constitutional responsibility which we have.

We are in a war now, and all foreign wars are bad. A two-front war is always bad no matter where you fight it, and it seems to me a two-continent war at the same time is almost beyond the power of the mind of man to comprehend as to the status of his country. So I share Senator Lausche's conviction that you should proceed with all force and vigor to put before the United Nations the moment of truth. If there ever was a controversy which it can solve, this ought to be it.

Up to now they have done a very commendable job, I think, in maintaining this peace force. I do not know enough about the Constitution of the U.N. to know whether U Thant can, by a simple statement of one man, pull out this peacekeeping group properly as he did or whether it was actually beyond his authority. It seems to me there must be some authority in the U.N. greater than U Thant that could put it back into being by some kind of action.

Am I right or am I wrong?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we have had a very sharp discussion with him on just this point. He claimed, on the advice of his lawyers, that he had both a duty and a responsibility to act as he did. We felt he had an obligation to bring this to the General Assembly or the Security Council before he answered.

Senator MUNDT. Assuming he is right—I doubt that he was right—but assuming that he was right, isn't there some plenary power in the U.N. that is stronger than his that can put them in by a United Nations act?

Secretary RUSK. I think there is undoubtedly power under the charter. The Security Council clearly has such authority of action. That is vulnerable to the Soviet veto.

It is our view, as you know the Soviets disagree with this, that the General Assembly also has such power if the Security Council is unable to act. That could bring a direct clash between the U.N., as such, and Egypt as such if Egypt said, "No, you are not going to have your troops on our territory," so they are going to have to fight for themselves if Egypt should resist.

But all things exist in between, and did not give U Thant a chance to search for it, and this is our strong complaint. There are things in between.

IS A DEMILITARIZED ZONE POSSIBLE

Senator MUNDT. I would assume correctly that there was some claim, a valid claim by the U.N., that it should not be on one side of the border. Is it possible to have a demilitarized zone, so to speak, to include part of the Israeli border and part of the Egyptian border and part of all neighboring borders?

Secretary RUSK. Prime Minister Eshkol proposed just yesterday that the two armies withdraw from the border, and I would suppose he would have no objection if U.N. observers and inspectors were able to insure that this, in fact, occurred.

Senator MUNDT. Why was this curious arrangement made in the first place that the peace force should be on one side of the border?

Secretary RUSK. This was part of the settlement of the so-called Suez affair, and this was worked out that way because, as a part of the settlement, Israel withdrew its very substantial forces from many places deep in the Sinai Peninsula. So this was part of the settlement at the time, and if there was any inequity about it in a theoretical sense, the fact is it was a part of a settlement of the Suez business.

Senator MUNDT. Were we in on the settlement?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, as a member of the U.N., and worked out in the U.N., as you will recall.

Senator MUNDT. Wouldn't it have been better, looking forward and learning from mistakes in the past, if we are going to have a peace patrol, is it not better to have it on both sides of the border so that one cantankerous fellow cannot throw them out, just throw out the part on his side and have a shield there?

Secretary RUSK. I think as a general proposition there is some merit in that idea.

AMERICAN OPTIONS

Senator MUNDT. What are our options in this? Are we committed, obligated, by specific treaties to go in and handle this thing alone if the worst comes to worse?

Secretary RUSK. No, there is no treaty.

Senator MUNDT. Are we obligated by any other—

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I would say this, that the United Nations Charter, Article 51, clearly says that "Nothing in this charter prevents the exercise of individual and collective self-defense," and that would give any nation the right to exercise its self-defense and to call upon others who are willing to help in that self-defense.

Senator MUNDT. I understand that. But do we have any moral, specific or legal commitment by treaty or any other device, administrative or legislative, which obligates us to go in alone if worst comes to worst?

Secretary RUSK. That is a matter of how this nation would respond to the policy declaration made by four Presidents pointing to our interest in the security of the states of the Near East, both the Arab States and Israel, and we have said these things rather specifically about Israel.

Senator MUNDT. Have we ever said if trouble breaks out and nobody else comes to the rescue, the United States will get up an expeditionary force and send them in alone?

Secretary RUSK. No, we have not.

Senator MUNDT. Then the answer is negative.

Secretary RUSK. The answer was read by Senator Lausche. We would take action within and outside the U.N.

Senator MUNDT. Which we certainly are prepared to do.

IF WORST COMES TO WORST

This committee would be prepared to support with the U.N., or with the British and the French, and a reasonable number of associate members of the U.N. But the question we confront, it seems to me, the only place where we have got a real problem to solve, is what do we do if worst comes to worst? That is the question; that is where we are—you, the President, and us. We have not had much success with the British and French fighting communism in Asia.

Secretary RUSK. I hope the gentlemen of this committee will be thinking and worrying about that question because that contingency could arise. We are doing everything we can to prevent that question from arising. But that question could arise, and so everyone ought to be thinking about it, certainly everyone in the Executive Branch is.

Senator MUNDT. You ought to be thinking about it now because it is happening awfully fast. You pick up the newspaper and see that Egypt has gone into this area, or Syria, which seems to be even more irresponsible than Egypt, might go in, so there you are confronted with a snap judgment.

Is there something we are going to read about in the newspaper that the President has decided that troops are on their way, or are you coming back to Congress, or what are our obligations? As I understand your answer, and I want to be sure I am right, we have not any moral, legal obligation to go on our own.

Secretary RUSK. I am not sure—

Senator MUNDT. We have an option to make.

Secretary RUSK. I said we do not have a precise treaty commitment on this situation other than, say, in the United Nations Charter. I would not be prepared this morning to say we do not have a moral obligation or we might not have other kinds of obligations in view of the role played in the establishment of Israel and the statement made by four Presidents. Those are things you will have to weigh. I would not say we do not have a moral right.

CONSULTATION WITH CONGRESS

Senator MUNDT. What I am trying to get at, are we having a discussion for the fun of it because we already have some obligations that you are going to act on as an administration regardless of what the attitude is, or are you really consulting?

Secretary RUSK. My understanding of the President's view is that he would, of course, be in touch with the leadership if any action were required in the situation, and he and the leadership would then discuss this problem as far as the Congress was concerned. But since I had the privilege of being before this committee today, I am sure the President is going to be extremely interested in knowing what the reaction of the members of the committee is.

I would not look upon this as the President's formal consultation with the Congress.

This is a fast-moving situation, and we have to move fast and do whatever such consultation suggested we ought to do. But this is not the last chance of the Congress to consult.

Senator MUNDT. This is not the last incident to break out. We may find the same kind of thing coming up with Rhodesia, and there are other troubled areas. I think it is kind of interesting to sort of hammer out the rules of the game now. There are a lot of people around the Senate who have been arguing about the rules of the game surrounding Vietnam. That is five years old. I happened to have participated.

THE USE OF FORCE

But here now we are looking ahead, and we ought to have the rules of the game, in my opinion, clearly understood between the Congress and the administration. That is why I am pressing to see whether or not the door is already closed. Certain contingencies trigger off certain actions initiated by the President, and then we are told about it in a message 24 hours after the troops are in a war.

Secretary RUSK. I think perhaps that occurred in the Dominican Republic affair because of the time period. But I think in these other matters we have had a lot of consultation.

Senator MUNDT. Do you and your studies—

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if the Senator will allow, before he leaves that, if the Secretary would be willing to give us what his recommendation was on this point.

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. You mean on the question of consultation?

The CHAIRMAN. No, on the question of the use of force. You said, and I am only trying to clarify what you do, you are making a very important point, just what is our obligation. You finally said a moral obligation, you believed, and not a treaty obligation. Is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. I said I did not want to say today we did not have a moral obligation.

The CHAIRMAN. I assume it may be said that we have a moral obligation; is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What your own recommendation will be if it comes, as he says, would you be willing to go that far?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I really think I owe that to the President in the first instance. I really do not think I ought to go into that at this point.

The Chairman. I only wanted to go as far as we could. Okay.

Secretary RUSK. I understand.

CONSULTATION WITH BIPARTISAN LEADERSHIP

Senator MUNDT. When you say the President would consult with the leadership, are you talking about the Foreign Relations Committee? Secretary RUSK. We have not, the President has not told me what his own thoughts would be. He is—

Senator MUNDT. You could tell us what your thoughts would be.

Secretary RUSK. I would think that the consultation with the bipartisan leadership, the question of what action, if any, what kind of further consultation with members of Congress, the House and the Senate, would be indicated in a situation of this sort. The lead-

ership would want to take into account the prime factors, the nature of the action.

I could imagine, for example, if a large number of maritime nations said that "We are not going to accept closing of the Straits of Tiran," the likelihood would be or the possibility would be that that particular situation would be isolated from the rest of the area, and that would be one thing.

But if the situation looked as if it was moving into general hostilities that would be quite another thing. So I think this is a matter on which the President would be in touch with the leadership, and in that consultation would be the question of how to consult with the Congress in an appropriate way as the situation develops.

SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING

Senator MUNDT. Do you in your rationale see any connection between this action inspired, I believe it is, by Russia, a Communist complex in the Middle East, and the situation in which we are involved in Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Quite frankly, I do not see any connection myself. We do not have any evidence that the Russians were at the bottom of this. There are enough obvious and good reasons in the area to—

Senator MUNDT. Then they should not veto Security Council action.

Secretary RUSK. What is important here—Mr. Chairman, may Mr. Macomber tell the committee what he just told me about the informal meeting of the Security Council members?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Mr. MACOMBER. This informal meeting was attended by all members of the Security Council except the Communist members.

Senator MUNDT. This morning.

Mr. MACOMBER. This morning, an informal meeting, and Ambassador Goldberg has just called Secretary Rusk's office to report. The non-permanent members, the non-Communist members that were present urged that a meeting take place attended by the U.S., U.K., France, and the Soviet Union. Ambassador Goldberg said we were prepared to attend such a meeting and the British said they would be prepared to attend such a meeting. The French representative said he would be prepared in principle to attend such a meeting. He is checking with Paris, but he assumed he could come.

At that point the non-permanent members of the Security Council took off to go consult with the Russians to urge that they come and they are hoping to set up this quadripartite meeting at 12 noon today.

We have not got final word back from the French or word back from the Soviets yet, but they are hoping to have a meeting at 12 o'clock up there of the Soviet Union, France, U.K., and United States to discuss this situation.

WHAT THE RUSSIANS ARE SAYING TO THE SOVIETS

Secretary RUSK. It is my impression from Paris, the talk we had in Paris, they would welcome a quadripartite discussion.

Senator MUNDT. If by noon, if the Soviets come into the meeting, you might be correct there is no relationship. If they do not, I think it could be.

Secretary RUSK. They may not come for a variety of reasons. In the first place they may not be able to get instructions by noon. So he may not wish to do anything without instructions.

Senator MUNDT. Allowing for time.

Secretary RUSK. But the real answer to your question will come from what the Russians are really saying to the Syrians and the Egyptians. For example, both Syria and Egypt have sort of indicated the Russians have said that they would support them. But it would be very important to know whether that would be in the event of an Israeli attack, or would support them for the so-called "Holy War" against Israel.

There is a tremendous difference between those two situations and we may have something more during the course of the day on what the Russians are saying to us directly on this subject.

Senator MUNDT. I do not want to take any more time. Let me just cap it off by saying, as far as I am concerned, I think this is a multilateral challenge.

The CHAIRMAN. Speak the least bit louder, please.

Senator MUNDT. This is a multilateral challenge which should be met multilaterally and we should not move in on our own precipitously getting ourselves committed and then come in with a fait accompli without a chance to look at the whole picture.

THE ROLE OF FRANCE

Senator AIKEN. You do not believe France would desert Israel completely, do you Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. Beg pardon, sir?

Senator AIKEN. France would not desert Israel at this stage, would they?

Secretary RUSK. If I were speaking for the corporate body called France, I would think, I would say, that I cannot imagine that France would. But when you ask me precisely about what President de Gaulle as an individual would do, which is France now for all practical purposes, I cannot be all that sure, Senator, quite frankly at that point.

Senator WILLIAMS. He would have no objections to our taking the burden alone if we were foolish enough to do it.

Secretary RUSK. I would have serious objections?

Senator WILLIAMS. No, de Gaulle.

Secretary RUSK. France. I am not sure of this in this case. France and Israel have been very close to each other in a variety of ways. Some of you on the Joint Committee will understand some of the ways in which they have been close to each other. So I am not at all sure of that.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

NASSER'S INTENTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Could I ask one following question? You said you did not see any connection with Vietnam. Do you think really Nasser would have acted as he has if we were not pre-occupied with Vietnam? Would he have dared do it?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, I think—in the first place I am not sure what he has in mind doing. If he is moving his troops up to the frontier and this is a rather exaggerated and pretty dangerous game of bluff, that is one thing. If he is talking about real hostilities, he has got plenty of problems with the forces facing him right there in Israel, quite apart from what we do.

I do not believe Nasser—well, I will be surprised if Nasser underestimates what Israel could do, say in the first 30 days in this situation. I just do not believe this is a major part of it, Senator, quite frankly.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.

Secretary RUSK. I can be wrong, of course. I have been wrong before.

UNITED STATES IS OVEREXTENDED

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, first I want to thank you for your assistance and your courtesy and constant method of keeping us informed on this rapidly developing situation. I, in turn, have been very grateful for it.

Naturally I am more interested in this part of the world inasmuch as I am chairman of the subcommittee, and I would just like to report that after coming back from Europe a year ago I said as a result of this more recent trip to Europe these observations and conclusions I reached last January appear at least as sound today.

It may be difficult to decide whether or not the United States is overcommitted politically or overextended from a fiscal standpoint. But if military commitments are an important part of political and economic commitments, then this nation is overextended in all three categories.

Rich and powerful though we are, the U.S. cannot continue indefinitely to both finance and defend the so-called free world with such little support from our friends and allies. They should live up to their commitments as we have to ours.

In addition, unless we change the normalcy approach now characteristic of our policies and programs incident to handling these worldwide commitments, there should be a reduction in the nature and scope of these commitments, and even some reductions would be desirable.

Under current plans and programs there is little chance of maintaining adequately trained personnel, military personnel, to handle our present world commitments even if those commitments do not involve us in further trouble in some other parts of the world.

That was a letter that I sent to Chairman Fulbright and Chairman Russell upon returning from Europe about a year ago.

I would like to ask just a couple of questions here. I would just like to make this statement: Based on the recent activities of Mr. U Thant, I am somewhat surprised at the tremendous effort that we joined in keeping him in as Secretary General of the United Nations. For what it is worth, I would like to just present that observation.

U.S. NAVAL STRENGTH IN MIDDLE EAST

Now, do you know, is any of the Seventh Fleet south of the Suez Canal?

Secretary RUSK. The Sixth Fleet.

Senator SYMINGTON. Sixth Fleet, I mean.

Secretary RUSK. We have—

Senator SYMINGTON. The Seventh is in Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. We have some destroyers in the Red Sea area.

Senator SYMINGTON. In the Red Sea area.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. How many have we got?

Secretary RUSK. I would have to double check that. I think three.

Senator SYMINGTON. Any submarines?

Secretary RUSK. I would have to look. But our principal forces are the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

Senator SYMINGTON. We have cannibalized some of our equipment of the Sixth Fleet because of Vietnam. Has that been taken into consideration? Presumably it would be.

Secretary RUSK. I am sure it would be. I am not familiar with the facts on that, Senator.

ANTICIPATION OF A BLOCKADE OF HAIPHONG HARBOR

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you feel that there might be, inasmuch as we have been kicking around the question of blockading the Haiphong harbor, where some people feel we should, other people believe we should not. It is now on the record publicly the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe we should take the harbor out on some basis—blockade it, bomb it, mine it—and the Administration does not. Do you think there is any chance that the Russians have got a ploy going on with Nasser so that a position we take in what we do with respect to this port they can put back on us with respect to Haiphong?

Secretary RUSK. We see no evidence of it, Senator, but since we do not see any evidence one way or the other, I just do not know. This is a matter of what maybe a half dozen people in the Kremlin say to themselves, and that is the crucial information which is so difficult for us to get. No one has mentioned this to us. There has been no indication by the Soviets they are linking this in any way with Vietnam, so I just cannot answer your question, quite frankly, sir.

RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF VIETNAM AND ISRAEL

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, now my final question, which I might want to expand on: We know that we have a limited number of trained military personnel, at least in some categories, that comes up time and again before the Armed Services Committee and the Preparedness Subcommittee. If you had to make a choice as to which country, from the standpoint of the interests of the United States, is more important to defend, Vietnam or Israel, which country would you say was the more important?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I would not want to assign a priority between those at this point. I do feel we have a great interest—the Congress has declared our vital interest in both the Near East and in Southeast Asia. I think that priority between the two would not be for me to assess at this point.

HAWKS VS. DOVES

Senator SYMINGTON. The question behind the question is if there was a boat that was going to be built, or a ship I should say if there are any Navy people present, Senator Pell, and it was going to sort of be a boat, a ship, that we could put around the world and tanks and Marines would pour over anywhere, a police action, and it was recommended by the Defense Department.

In this case, both the so-called Hawks and their leaders and so-called Doves and their leaders united and said, "The hell with this. We have had enough with this. No such ship shall be built because, in effect, it guarantees that the United States wants to police the world," and that was the position taken by the Senate and it was stricken out of the bill, and there was surprisingly little support for it on the part of the House when it came up in conference.

So that to me is the first time that I have seen, you might say the Hawks and the Doves or the various grades of those two birds together as saying, "In any case, let's not go any further in this concept of unilateral policing of the world by the United States," because probably one reason is we have not got enough trained people.

Another might be we have not got enough money. In that case, let me put the question to you in a different way: Is there not an excellent possibility that even though you would not want to make that choice because of the nature of our commitments, no reserve call-ups, no guard call-ups, no arbitrary limitations of wages or prices, no recognition of the fact that we are in a major war, whether we like it or not?

The Senator from Ohio brought out we have 450,000 troops or thereabouts in Vietnam; we have killed over 10,000 Americans; over 60,000 have been wounded. This is a major war, in addition to which we are very badly short—this is an executive hearing, I am sure—of certain types and character of trained military personnel that are essential to the successful prosecution of any war anywhere regardless of terrain. So might it not be necessary for you to make this choice, unless you want to get into a nuclear war which, of course, would bring up other problems?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I do not believe that it is important for the United States to be the world's policeman and I have tried to emphasize that on a number of occasions. We do have some specific commitments and any president or future president, secretary of state, secretary of defense, and the future congresses may be faced from time to time with situations in different parts of the world in which simply as a matter of prudence and national interest we will do one thing rather than another.

I think this pre-disposes any secretary of state to hope that we could have maximum mobility in our Armed Forces in order to give the United States in the future some choices, some options.

VIETNAM RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT U.S. POWER

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand that, but this LDL ship, nobody could see why it was being built at very heavy cost unless it was to police the world or the concept of it. And, secondly, you yourself have been very frank with the committee. You have told

us that we have got, I think your figure was, 40 military commitments around the world.

For many months now I have been saying look out about Vietnam. I am not one of these playboys and never have been—either we should shove this war ahead or get out of it. As long as we are in the ring with 200 million people, a \$750 billion year gross national product, spending \$2.5 billion a month chasing these little people around the woods, the longer we are in this ring, the audience, which in this case is the world, is beginning to doubt we have any real power. Therefore, when the question is asked, as I believe it was, do you think that Vietnam is the reason for Nasser—I know that you have little respect for my opinion just as you know I have great respect for yours—I would think it is a very pertinent question.

It is my personal impression after having spent a considerable time in Jordan, Israel, Greece and Egypt, in South Vietnam, the question is pertinent and true. I happen to think it is, because of the way we control our power in this war, and I am not talking about any bombing of civilians or nuclear weapons. I am just talking about trying to obtain success by a full application of our power. A lot of the countries in the world, I hate to say this about my own country, they are the audience with ringside seats, and they said, "We thought this was a great powerful country. Throw the bum out. He has been in the ring now for years and he is not getting anywhere." The result is that you have got this simmering all over Europe and all over the Middle East. You have got the Iranian situation. We have had some very interesting testimony on that in this subcommittee.

NATO SHOULD PLAY MORE OF A ROLE

So I ask with great sincerity: First, do you not think we have got to make a choice between Israel and Vietnam, unless we have very hearty support from the other members of the tripartite agreement? Secondly, which one is the most important to the security of the United States, because I know we will both agree you should not send American boys now especially when we draft them and they fight and die, unless you believe in your heart, as I believe you do, that it does involve the security of the United States?

Secretary RUSK. As I indicated, Senator, I would not want to try to make a choice between the two, but I would add one postscript to what you said, because it also fits some comments made here this morning.

We feel that the NATO countries on the other side of the Atlantic ought to take a much more serious interest in these places that are 20 minutes jet flying time away from NATO Europe, and a good many of them are now doing so. I pressed this very hard at the last ministerial meeting of NATO and still there is some reluctance in NATO to get concerned about the Near East and even Africa, this huge continent, just across the water there from NATO, Europe.

Senator SYMINGTON. Is that not because they feel it is better to not let George do it but let Uncle Sam do it, based on the record?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we have been trying to disabuse them of that in those places where one or more of the western countries are pulling out.

Senator MUNDT. Will the Senator yield?
 Senator SYMINGTON. I will be glad to yield.

IMPORTANCE OF RESTRAINT

Senator MUNDT. The Senator from Missouri brought up a point which has been troubling me increasingly in the last several months. I think he expresses a concern which I have when he implied that since we have made the decisions as a country that we are not going to accept defeat in Vietnam, and I have supported that fully, are we not reaching a stage in five years of indecisive fighting where the longer we delay defeating the enemy the less significant our victory is going to be in terms of the world. That is what concerns me.

If finally we, as the greatest country in the world, cannot succeed in stopping the fighting in half a country which is completely non-industrialized, are we going to win any credits from the world if we delay this victory interminably?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we have tried in all administrations since 1945 to deal with crises in such a way that it would result in a peace and not lead into a general conflagration. There was restraint at the time of the Greek guerrillas, the Berlin airlift, Korea, Lebanon, an attempt to get the Suez matter under control very quickly.

We kept the doors wide open for the peaceful removal of missiles in Cuba.

It is true in Southeast Asia we waited five years before we bombed North Vietnam. It is not entirely clear that enlarging in any significant way the level of violence would bring it to an end sooner.

You might have a much larger conflagration on your hands, and this is something on which a judgment has to be made and the greatest issues ride on it, of course.

ECONOMIC ISSUES IN MIDDLE EAST

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to be on the floor to say something. But I would like to make one more observation on this, if I may: As I see it, the security of the United States and its well being has three legs to that platform—one is military, one is political, and one is economic. The economic is not talked about much. It is dismissed quite casually by the Defense Department. However, at Bretton Woods we tied the pound in just as tight with gold as we did the dollar.

Whether it was right or wrong, it was done. Based on my knowledge of it, I do not see how the British economy could survive without its Mid East oil income and, therefore, it is very difficult for me to think that you all in the State Department in our relationship with Great Britain and with all that is involved in Europe today incident to the Common Market and EFTA, it is very difficult for me not to think that the Middle East is not considerably more important than Vietnam as far as the basic security involving the United States is concerned.

However, I would like to associate myself with the chairman of this committee and other members who are anxious not to pursue this one unilaterally. I think we have a choice to make.

Secretary RUSK. I see. Thank you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your patience.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark.

RUSSIA IS THE KEY TO PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator CLARK. Mr. Secretary, you have been kind enough to ask us for our advice and our consent in this difficult matter, and I would like to make the following comments which I have incidentally written out and given to Bill Macomber.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator CLARK. In the first place, I concur with the views of the chairman and Senator Mansfield, Senator Lausche and Senator Mundt, and, perhaps, a number of others, that by all means we should take this to the United Nations and not act unilaterally.

In the second place, while I do agree that U Thant acted precipitously and possibly even unwisely in pulling the U.N. peace force out of Egypt, I do not share your possible disillusionment with him. I think he is our one peace force in this situation if we are going to rely on the United Nations at this time.

In the third place, in my opinion, Russia is the key to peace in the Middle East, and I would hope that all the force of our most skillful counseling can be brought to bear not only at the United Nations but Moscow and Washington to persuade Russia, with almost the same urgency we did at the time of the missile crisis, that they should cooperate with us in stabilizing the situation to bring about peace.

In my opinion, France and England, noble allies though they are, are going to be weak reeds in this situation. Their military power is pretty eroded, and their zeal and interest in this area may be keen enough, although I do not believe it will be effective. While I am sure we need their votes in the Security Council, I would not feel that they were reeds that we could rely on with much hope of having anything very successful come out of it.

LEGALITIES ARE UNIMPORTANT

Next, in my opinion the legalities are relatively unimportant. I do not think it is the kind of a situation where you make a good legal case before the International Court of Justice or anywhere else. Having been a lawyer myself, I say that with some hesitation, but I think pragmatically the legalities are relatively unimportant.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, would you illustrate that last point a little bit as to an example or two?

Senator CLARK. Well, some have gone back to the 1950 agreements.

Secretary RUSK. I see.

Senator CLARK. Some have talked about the tripartite agreement.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator CLARK. Sure, I know if you are going to make a case for posterity that is important. But pragmatically it seems to me it would be mildly ineffectual.

Secretary RUSK. I see.

Senator CLARK. Next, it seems to me that the American people will not permit the Israelis, to use the old cliché, and I know it is a cliché, to be driven into the sea. This is a pragmatic political fact we have to take into account, whether we agree with it or not, and I happen to agree with it.

Next, I would think that our objectives, which in a situation where obviously our reach may exceed our grasp, but our objective should be, first, to get the U.N. force back into the Gaza Strip, if possible, on both sides of the frontier. I have no patience with Israel for having refused to let the forces on their side of the frontier.

Secondly, we should try to persuade the Israelis not to engage in any reprisals against Syria in return for the Egyptians reopening the straits.

Then I would work very hard to create an effective U.N. peace force of the same magnitude as the force that is in the Gaza Strip to move between Israel and Jordan and between Israel and Syria in the hope that its presence there, considerably more force than what has been there before, would be in a position to seal the border against these raids, full well realizing they could not seal it a hundred percent, but maybe they could seal it 85 percent.

Then, I would hope, and there is—

Secretary RUSK. This is on the Syrian, Jordan and Lebanese borders as well as Egypt.

Senator CLARK. I do not know about Lebanon, but certainly Syria and Jordan and I would hope—and maybe this is just a pious hope—that we could maybe persuade the Russians to guarantee maybe with us, hopefully through the Security Council and the U.S., the existing Israeli borders.

I know that Bill Macomber has read and perhaps you have seen my report on war or peace in the Middle East. I remain convinced that the long-range objective must be, first, to get rid of Nasser and try to refurbish the Egyptian economy with an international consortium which hopefully could rely on some less belligerent Egyptian. Whether they will or not I do not know.

My own view is that the Egyptian economy is on its way to disaster.

STOP THE ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

And finally, in order to do any of this, we have got to persuade the Russians to stop the arms race in the Middle East, which I imagine they are very reluctant to do. But it does seem to me we ought to make it clear to them that they are playing with fire.

Thank you.

Secretary RUSK. We have taken up that last point with them on a number of occasions. They have shown no interest in discussing the conventional arms race. They would be interested in a denuclearization of the area. But we have gone at them many times on that and it is a great shame they have not been willing to join. I agree with you.

Senator CLARK. We just have to keep trying, Mr. Secretary.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will you yield to a question?

Senator CLARK. I am all through.

U.N. FORCES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE LINE

Senator LAUSCHE. Does your statement suggest that U.N. forces be placed on both sides of the line?

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. In Israel, in Syria, and in Jordan and the Gaza Strip.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Senator Clark.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

NAVAL RIGHTS IN THE STRAIT

I find myself in agreement very much with Senator Lausche and Senator Clark and others that we should not get ourselves in a unilateral position, whereas we recognize the special relationship of the United States with Israel and this is on the horns of a dilemma on which we are, and there is nothing much we can do about it except do as much as possible to push it towards the U.N.

One question here in connection with the closing of the strait, international law does come into this, and I believe that the width of that strait is more than the six nautical miles. I do not see how we can possibly accept the fact that the Egyptians say they can close the strait, because then many other waterways around the world could then be closed. I would think this in itself would be action to put ships in there.

Secretary RUSK. I have asked for a further report on that factual matter, and my first report was that the territorial waters of Saudi Arabia and Egypt converge at the point where ships have to go through. It is somewhat a little bit like one part of the Strait of Malacca. You do have to go through waters as an international passageway which otherwise would be territorial waters, but I cannot confirm that at the moment.

It may have to do with those islands and extension of territorial waters beyond the islands.

Senator PELL. This is a point that can open up in many other parts of the globe if you once permit any nation to do that which has a strong naval power.

Secretary RUSK. This would be a strong power internationally if Egypt would be able to establish this was not an international waterway.

Senator PELL. We would have to close up some waters in Indonesia and the Malay Peninsula. We would justify sending our own ships into it.

A U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE

Another question of the Security Council, has any request been made to hold a session of it and be seized of the problem?

Secretary RUSK. Did you hear the report of Mr. Macomber just a few minutes ago?

Senator PELL. No, I did not.

Secretary RUSK. The non-Communist members of the Security Council met informally this morning, and the non-permanent members strongly urged the Big Four to meet. We agreed, the British

agreed, the French agreed in principle, they are getting instructions, and then the non-permanent members left the meeting to go off and talk to the Russians to see if they would agree.

They were hoping to have a meeting by 12 o'clock. My guess is the Russians would not get instructions by then.

Senator PELL. One thought is if we do not get Security Council action, would you be inclined to the view to get it under articles 42, 43, and 44 of the Charter, the Military Staff Committee, where these forces should be rather than as a special separate force?

This would be true particularly if the Soviet Union were willing to bear with us.

Secretary RUSK. The articles you refer to, Senator, I believe anticipate that there already would have been worked out formal agreements bringing forces under the jurisdiction of the Security Council and, as you and I can remember from the old days, our negotiations on that in 1946 and 1947 failed to produce any result.

I think the Security Council could ask U.N. members to contribute forces within a framework that is different than articles 42, 43, and 44 if it chose to do so. It is not restricted to those particular articles.

So that I think if we were to lean on the concept of a formally established United Nations force the Military Staff Committee and so forth, we would probably find that was impossible in the time-frame we are talking about.

VIETNAM AND THE PACEM EN TERRIS MEETINGS

Senator PELL. Then finally, speaking for myself, and there are others of us who will be abroad next week at this Pacem En Terris meeting; this will undoubtedly come up. Vietnam will come up.

I for one certainly do not intend to be critical publicly of our foreign policy outside the United States in Vietnam, but I would hope that the Administration would have somebody, not relying on us, to defend those aspects of it with which we may disagree in this environment because there may be people from all shades of opinion, right and left and center, in Geneva.

My understanding is Arthur Goldberg is not going now, and I would hope somebody was.

Secretary RUSK. We are trying to send a substitute for him now.

Senator PELL. You are?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator PELL. I think it is terribly important. It is too much to ask us to defend it.

Senator CLARK. I would support Senator Pell. Those of us who are going tend to be critical of our position in Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. I understand that.

Senator CLARK. It seems to me we should not be put under the burden of defending it over there within the limits of our obvious national loyalty.

Secretary RUSK. There will be, quite apart from Americans who might be present, Thanat Khoman of Thailand and the foreign minister, Tran Van Huong. But there will other voices present at Pacem En Terris.

REEMPHASIZE THE MULTINATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Senator PELL. Is there anything we can do to be of help in this Near Eastern problem, because this again will take the focus of attention which is probably good from the viewpoint of American interests, will center toward the near East for a change?

Secretary RUSK. I would think if the U.N. responsibility could be emphasized and re-emphasized, if the multilateral responsibility should be re-emphasized, and the necessity for calm in all the capitals of the area—I mean those are the three things that are most important at this point it seems to me.

Senator MUNDT. Will the Senator yield?

Senator PELL. Certainly.

BRITISH INITIATIVE

Senator MUNDT. Now that Bill is back in the room, I would like to inquire about the genesis of this meeting this morning of the non-Communist members of the Security Council. My question is: One, who called this morning's meeting? Secondly, why were not the Communist nations represented? Did they refuse to come or were they not invited?

Secretary RUSK. I think this was an informal consultation in which happily the British took the initiative. They had a cabinet meeting this morning before we got up. They asked Lord Caradon to meet us at the crack of dawn to see if we would join in getting such a meeting together, and so I was encouraged by the fact that the British were taking some initiative on this.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator MUNDT. I think it is important to establish whether the Communist countries were invited, otherwise it would look like a de facto recognition of the fact that Communists are in this thing on the Egyptian side which makes it more difficult to get to go later.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. Until Mr. Macomber reported to us, Senator, I did not have any information on that point.

Senator MUNDT. I think it is very important.

Secretary RUSK. Do you know whether they were invited or not, Bill? I just do not know.

Senator MUNDT. I think it is important for the purpose of having it for the record.

The CHAIRMAN The Secretary can supply it for the record.

Secretary RUSK. We can supply it for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

Senator PELL. I have no more questions.

U.S. ARMS SHIPMENTS TO MIDDLE EAST

Senator MORSE. When we talk about the refusal of Russia to engage in talks, we are talking about a nuclear engagement in the Middle East, not with regard to conventional arms. Have we not shipped about as much conventional arms into the Middle East under sales as the Russians have?

Secretary RUSK. I would not think so, sir.

Senator MORSE. You would not think so.

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. If you put Egypt and Syria and Algeria together, those have been very large shipments, and we have tried to become, tried to be, a very junior supplier of arms. As a matter of fact, we have helped Jordan, as you know, over the years. Israel has had most of its supplies from Western Europe rather than from this country, and the problem for us arose when these very large shipments of arms to Egypt created a great imbalance between them and their Arab neighbors quite apart from Israel. We are interested that Saudi Arabia and Jordan not be completely overwhelmed by fear and we have tried to keep a delicate balance there by some assistance to Jordan and some assistance to Israel.

[Discussion off the record.]

Secretary RUSK. So I think Lebanon, Jordan and Saudi Arabia are elements of certain calm and stability in this situation. Syria is just as jittery as it can be, and Nasser is playing a game that he may not have fully disclosed as yet.

Senator MORSE. How about Iraq and Iran, have we supplied some there?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I think Iran has; yes.

DANGER IN VACILLATION

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, since I asked no questions—I confined myself to a very brief statement—I would like to take the time to express appreciation to the Secretary for this hearing and consultation. I particularly do so because at the last meeting I expressed some impatience, if not criticism, of what I interpreted, perhaps erroneously, as reluctance on the part of the Secretary to keep the committee currently and fully informed. So with a background of that, I particularly want to express appreciation.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator.

Senator GORE. And I want to add this, Mr. Secretary. Although I share the sentiment that has been so generally expressed around the table as to the inadvisability of unilateral action, I know that one error does not justify another, this being one of the possible consequences that I have envisioned of our deep involvement in Vietnam. Nevertheless, the practicalities are such that I think and wish not to reiterate, after all I have heard, that there would be very grave danger in vacillation. The United States in my view must take the firmest possible leadership here to possibly avoid a conflict in which we would inevitably be involved if it occurred.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, that is a very important and very strong point. We have tried to be very clear privately with governments that we consider this a most serious situation, and the problem is how far do you go publicly in the absence of a particular factual situation to work on, and how far do you go in raising such questions of prestige. The prestige factor makes it more difficult to keep the thing under control, which in effect is deterrence, is a very powerful one and we are giving that a deal of attention.

A MORAL OBLIGATION TO ISRAEL

Senator MORSE. That is what I want to stress, Mr. Chairman, and I will stop with this. I share Albert Gore's comment just now, and the Secretary's too. We know what we are skirting, what we have to face up to.

As far as I am concerned, I want the record to show if you get to a point where these Arab states really do make war on Israel, and start trying to demolish Israel, let us face it, we do have a moral obligation and a very important moral obligation to come to her assistance. We can give her assistance under those circumstances, but I pray it is not going to be on a unilateral basis. We have to make the other free nations understand the relation of freedom in this matter because if they do get into a war, then you have got totalitarianism seeking to drive this country into oblivion.

If they get by with it there, and other free nations do not join through United Nations action, we are going to force the withdrawal ourselves, because they are going to attack freedom elsewhere in the world, and we cannot do that unilaterally. But I think here we were more responsible than any other nation in the world in creating a climate that permitted the establishment of Israel in 1948. This is pretty much a United States move; we got other nations to come along, but we took the initiative.

We are dealing here with totalitarian nations, and if they—I am inclined to think they are closer linked to Russia than they may surmise at the present time.

If we get to that precipice where it is these totalitarian nations against Israel, I think there are various forms of aid we are going to have to supply Israel to keep her in a position to do most of the fighting, but give her whatever she has to have in order to fight back.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. One further request of the Secretary. I gave to Bill Macomber a little speech and some suggestions with regard to Vietnam. I would like very much when I am over there to try them out either on Mai Van Bo in Paris or whoever is amongst our adversaries in Geneva. I would like to have you give me a reading and tell me whether they are all wet or will be acceptable. I do not think they will be acceptable from the other side's view, but I thought it would be interesting to have your reaction.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCarthy, do you have any questions?

Senator MCCARTHY. No.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. I want to say one word

THE KENNEDY ROUND

Secretary RUSK. Before other senators leave, I might just tell you, I do not know whether Ambassador Roth has been in touch with you.

Senator PELL. Who?

Secretary RUSK. Ambassador Roth, ambassador at the Kennedy Round. He will be in touch with you and he is available before the committee if you want to hear about the Kennedy Round.

NOTIFICATION OF THE COMMITTEE

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if we could have an understanding that you would notify the committee and come to see the committee before any really serious step is taken. I think you have seen the interest this committee has in this matter, and I hope we can have at least an informal understanding to try to keep

the committee as such advised of developments because the committee is deeply interested in this matter.

Secretary Rusk. Yes, I would do my best to do so, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all I want.

Secretary RUSK. It may be necessary to have a meeting at some odd hours in order to permit that consultation.

Senator GORE. He will be ready.

The CHAIRMAN. One thing purely on my own, I have already said I hope you get to the U.N. I would entreat you to perhaps re-appraise our Vietnam situation because I join the Senator from Missouri and some others here in believing that this is all part of an overall ball of wax, as they say. It may not be directly and specifically the cause of this, but I am quite sure it contributes to the attitude of those involved as to the effectiveness of this country.

I think everybody, because of this historical basis that you discussed at length here, everybody knows that, the countries know it, and they know about this moral commitment. They feel fairly sure in their bones that we will react. I believe they do. We do not have to talk too much about that. That is a matter that has been said time and again.

THE MIDDLE EAST IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN VIETNAM

But they feel if we are preoccupied elsewhere, it puts us in a terrible bind, makes it very embarrassing to us, and it is embarrassing to me, I know, and I think it is embarrassing to the country, to be caught now, preoccupied as we are, in a place which at least I do not hesitate to make a decision that the Middle East is far more important to the security of this country than Vietnam. I do not think there is any comparison, not only because of strategic bases, but because of our own investments if for no other reason. That is one of the reasons; but because of our cultural relationship, political relationship, all these relationships that have been mentioned this morning, speeches by Truman and others and so on, and various tripartite agreements. To me they are far more persuasive than anything that has ever been revealed with regard to Vietnam.

All I am trying to say is I do hope the administration will perhaps reconsider its attitude toward stopping of the bombings and effort toward bringing Vietnam to a close.

I agree with what the Secretary said about enlarging that war. I do not go along with the idea that you can bring it to a quick conclusion by destroying North Vietnam. I believe that is the way you will have a third world war. That is one part of your policy I agree with, and I am not for a third world war over that or any of these other places if we can possibly avoid it.

So I would like to recommend at least, for whatever it is worth, that this is an example of what we are going to be confronted with, we are now and may otherwise, if we do not liquidate that war in some reasonable way, and within the reasonable future.

The only way I can see is a compromise. We cannot expect to get a victory. I know you know what I think, and I will not burden you with a reiteration of my attitude toward that situation. I do not think it is too late to still perhaps consider this proposal about stopping the bombing without making any agreement. Just stop it

and see what happens. Put it to a test without any announcement or anything else, the theory that Kosygin and, well, others, members of this committee and others, have had—U Thant—that possibly it would create a condition for negotiation.

I realize that at this particular moment it might look as if we are scared to death if you did it precipitately, but you would have to do it with some reason in spacing. I do not know what will happen in the next few days. I only urge that.

You seem to give us the feeling this morning that you welcome some suggestions. So I come back to that one. I am feeling very sad about things.

Senator Carlson—this is nothing directed to that, but he just whispered in my ear as he was leaving, early this morning, one of his secretaries was murdered in her apartment. It just sort of highlights how we have neglected the conditions here at home that this can happen right here in the capital of the country, of our country, and we know how this has gone on. It does not have any direct relation to this, but underneath all of my concern, all of this, is that our preoccupation with Vietnam and others has caused us to neglect things that absolutely must be done here in the United States.

That is a little lecture, but anyway I do hope you will consider possibly a reappraisal of this policy of continued bombing.

SHIFT OF PACIFICATION PROGRAMS TO MILITARY CONTROL

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to, since we are on Vietnam, I would like to ask a question about the pacification because today you were supposed to come and talk about that, and you were to have talked about the Kennedy Round. You may have explained this to the satisfaction of all other members of the committee. At the time it was made I wanted to reserve my judgment until I got more information. I have not got any more information and I really have—am going this week to say something about it. I wish you would tell us, for me and perhaps the rest of the committee, specifically what were the reasons why you felt the pacification program had failed under civilian control and you moved it under the military control and what the indications are.

Secretary RUSK. I think, first of all, Senator, it is important to keep in mind that this reorganization of pacification is solely a reorganization of the U.S. participation in pacification. It is not a substitute of the U.S. pacification operations for the South Vietnamese.

The change was made for two or three purposes: One, the key necessity for pacification is local security, and the coordination of the security operations in the military forces on the one side and the pacification teams on the other are a very high priority and we thought it had better be done after experimenting with the other and if both were the responsibility of the military commander.

Secondly, there was a very important logistic reason why the military—that this was a direct responsibility engaging their serious attention, would be able to remove supplies, move people at the right place, at the right time to give maximum momentum to the program.

And, third, in a good many of the outlying districts our own little AID teams and other support operations were running short of personnel, civilians recruited on a civilian basis, and the Army can assign its people to do some of their jobs for which no civilians were available and it makes it possible to expand somewhat in that direction.

But this is basically a reorganization solely within the U.S. structure. It is not in any sense a taking over by us of the pacification effort of the entire country.

ROLE OF AMBASSADOR BUNKER

Senator MUNDT. Does this mean that the Vietnamese aid program appropriation will come to us now as a part of the military budget?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir; no, sir. The support from here through the normal civilian agencies, AID, P.L. 480, things of that sort, would be as here, and a civilian office out there was put directly under General Westmoreland. That is a civilian office with Mr. Komer as General Westmoreland's deputy for pacification.

Senator MORSE. Also the Ambassador over all.

Secretary RUSK. Also the Ambassador over all.

Senator MUNDT. Over Westmoreland you mean.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. Ambassador Bunker is the No. 1 man in the country for all.

Senator MUNDT. He is determining the military maneuvers.

Secretary RUSK. Oh, no, he does not determine the direct military moves, but if there are military operations on which he has any problem from his general responsibilities, he is not only free to comment but he frequently is invited to comment so that his judgment can be taken into account along with the President's, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.

Senator MUNDT. In case of a military maneuver like the recent entry into the demilitarized zone—

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator MUNDT [continuing]. Does that mean that Ambassador Bunker, had he thought it unwise.

Secretary RUSK. He could have said so.

Senator MUNDT. He could have. He would have been the top man.

Secretary RUSK. That is right. On a matter of that sort, the Commander-in-Chief has the full responsibility, and—

Senator MUNDT. Somebody has to be the top man. Who finally has the veto? In this country, the Ambassador has?

Secretary RUSK. No, I did not say he had a veto on a matter for the President to decide.

Senator MUNDT. If he thought General Westmoreland should not go into the demilitarized zone, would the ambassador—would the General not have gone?

Secretary RUSK. I need a little better example on this matter.

Senator MUNDT. Well, I mean, supposing—

Secretary RUSK. If Ambassador Bunker, for example, felt that it would not be a good thing to put an American battalion down in the Cao Dai sect's area in a given circumstance he could advise General Westmoreland of that and advise us of that. If General

Westmoreland wanted to refer that back to Washington, he could do so and we would look at it with the judgment of both brought to bear. But the Joint Chiefs—the Commander-in-Chief sends his military orders through the Joint Chiefs to General Westmoreland, but Ambassador Bunker is expected and required to keep us alerted at all times to any factors in the military operations that affect his responsibilities for the country as a whole and particularly the political side of it and those have to be continually matched. This is no different from World War II or Korea or anything else in that respect.

THE GENERAL AND THE AMBASSADOR

Senator MUNDT. World War II? What ambassador could have told Eisenhower what he could do?

Secretary RUSK. Beg pardon?

Senator MUNDT. In World War II what ambassador could have told Eisenhower what to do with troops at the time of the battle?

Secretary RUSK. The Government of the United States said a good many things to General Eisenhower about what he would do with his troops and alternatives.

Senator MUNDT. The President of the United States.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. But you said the ambassador had the same position. I cannot think of who he will be.

Secretary RUSK. Maybe I am not being very clear about something on which I do not feel confused, Senator; if I confuse you, I apologize.

Ambassador Bunker is the top representative in Vietnam of the President of the United States. Obviously he is not a military man and does not have the responsibility for the deployment of forces as a military matter, whether we have this particular operation today or that particular operation tomorrow.

But his judgment is regularly consulted on everything affecting Vietnam including the character and the general shape of military operations. The ambassador and General Westmoreland work very closely together as a team. They are constantly talking about these things with each other locally, and we have not had friction or difficulties arising from this.

But take, for example, on a mission such as how you deal with these Vietnam forces just across the Cambodian border. Naturally the American ambassador is a major, major factor.

Senator MUNDT. Because that goes into international things.

Secretary RUSK. I do not want to leave the impression that Ambassador Bunker is trying to be a military man running the military part of the war. But also it is just as equally true that the military forces in Vietnam are there for a political purpose to protect Vietnam from this thing, from going to the north and to assist in the political reconstruction of the country in a period of elections and things of that sort. So that we need both judgments brought to bear at both times.

TRANSFERRING PACIFICATION

Senator MUNDT. Back to the question that generated this: Specifically can you tell us whether it was Ambassador Bunker's origi-

nal recommendation that we switch the pacification responsibility or was that suggested by Westmoreland?

Secretary RUSK. This was discussed for some time before Ambassador Bunker got there. We thought that the decision on it ought not be made until he got there and that he would recommend on what seemed to him to make the most sense after he saw the situation. He recommended that this transfer be made. General Westmoreland was just a little reluctant because it was an additional considerable responsibility, but he accepted it in good heart and is proceeding to go ahead with the operation.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the Senator through?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, may I see you just a moment?

The CHAIRMAN. The meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m. the committee recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON,
May 30, 1967.

Hon. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.

Dear Mr. CHAIRMAN: During his testimony before the Committee on May 23, Secretary Rusk was asked to obtain further information in response to questions from several Members. I am pleased to submit the requested information below. For convenience, the inquirer and the question are also shown.

1. Senator Carlson: Did Nasser threaten to disarm the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) if the Secretary General of the United Nations did not agree to remove them?

Reply: (Confidential) Nasser said in his speech on May 22 that, had the UNEF not been withdrawn, they would have been forcibly disarmed. However, we have no evidence that the United Arab Republic made this threat directly to the United Nations, or indeed that it was even necessary to do so.

2. Senator Symington: Are there any United States submarines in the area east of Suez?

Reply: (Confidential) As of May 29, there were no United States submarines in that area.

3. Senator Lausche: Asked the Secretary to see if there were a preambular or other statements in existing legislation which might have a bearing on our commitment to Israel other than the Middle East Resolution of March 9, 1957.

Reply: (Unclassified) There are no such preambular or other statements known.

4. Senator Hickenlooper: Who is supplying equipment to the Arab (i.e., Palestine) Liberation Army (PLA)?

Reply: (Unclassified) Most of the PLA's equipment is of Soviet bloc manufacture, and has been supplied by the UAR, Syria, and Iraq, from stocks received by these countries from the bloc. There have been reports of weapons supplied by Communist China (though not necessarily of Chinese manufacture); but we have no solid information to confirm such reports.

I hope the foregoing information will be of use to the Committee, and invite you to call upon me any time you believe we can be of service to you.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

BRIEFING ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

Thursday, June 1, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:35 a.m., in Room S-116, The Capitol, Senator John Sparkman presiding.

Present: Senators Sparkman (presiding), Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.

Also present: Vice President Humphrey.

Senators Hayden, Russell, Stennis, McClellan, Byrd of West Virginia, Dirksen, Kuchel, Smith, Javits, and Thurmond.

William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations; Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; Kathryn N. Folger, Legislative Management Officer; and John Reilly, Assistant to the Vice President.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let the committee come to order, please.

We are very glad to have the two Secretaries with us this morning and, Secretary Rusk, I understand you are to lead off. We will be glad to hear from you at this time.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY HONORABLE ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; AND LEONARD C. MEEKER, LEGAL ADVISER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Senators.

Let me make two preliminary remarks. One is that I would hope that this could be considered a secret consultation. There is a tinderbox in the Near East. We have, on the one side, a Holy War psychology. We have, on the other side, an apocalyptic psychology, and it is particularly important that discussions with an official like the Secretary of State be held very private in this situation.

Secondly, I would like to express the President's and my own very deep appreciation for the restraint which has been shown in the discussion of this matter here at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue. It is a highly dangerous matter, and we very much appreciate the soberness of the discussion thus far.

One of the problems about the Near East is to know where to begin when one discusses it. The Arabs would like to begin with the birth of Israel.

U.S. SUPPORT OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Let me make an introduction by calling your attention to a simple proposition that President Johnson had in his statement of May 23, in which he quoted other American Presidents that the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of that era.

When we look at the history of this post-war period, it is interesting to note that in 1956 and 1957 President Eisenhower strongly objected to the attack by Israel, Britain, and France on Egypt. In 1958 he put troops into Lebanon to protect Lebanon against threats from Syria and Iraq.

President Kennedy has continued the support of Jordan whose principal threat came from Egypt. President Kennedy put a squadron of fighter planes into Saudi Arabia at one point as a demonstration of solidarity against a threat from Egypt.

We intervened very heavily in Cairo diplomatically to try to bring about a cessation of subversive and propaganda attacks by Egypt against Libya and, at that time, were reasonably successful in that effort.

We have tried to encourage and support Tunisia and Morocco against a buildup of threat, as they saw it, from Algeria.

In other words, our policy in that area has not been simply a pro-Israel, anti-Arab policy. It has been a balanced attempt to assure the territorial integrity and the independence of the states of that area.

When Israel has been subjected to terror raids from across its borders, we have again intervened in capitals and expressed our strong view of that in the Security Council of the United Nations.

When Israel, on the other hand, delivered what we considered to be a much heavier than necessary retaliatory attack on the Jordanian village of Samu in November of last year, we criticized Israel severely for that in the U.N. So we have tried to make good on that simple declaration policy in an even-handed way.

THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS

Now, the present chapter I think opens with the increase of terrorism along the Israeli frontiers with Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

We suppose—we have ourselves known that these terrorist attacks were organized by an organization called the Fatah. We know that the Lebanese and Jordanian governments have been acting vigorously within their means to try to eliminate such attacks from their territory, although we know the Syrian government has not acted with similar restraint. In any event, there was a buildup of those terrorist raids into Israel in March and April. In early May certain Israeli statements were made by the Air Force Commander, and news accounts appeared of statements by high Israeli sources the first ten days of May, that if these raids continued Israel would have to take action against Syria.

That, in turn, prompted Syria to call upon their defense agreement with Nasser. Nasser started moving forces into the Sinai Peninsula, and on May 17 requested the United Nations forces to withdraw from Egyptian territory.

As you know, the Secretary General, we think much too precipitously, agreed to that withdrawal.

Secretary General Hammarskjold said that it would be for the General Assembly or the Security Council to take up the matter of, whether they should take up the question of their withdrawal.

The Secretary General agreed to the withdrawal and, perhaps, agreed in broader terms than the requests, particularly with regard to the Gaza Strip.

In any event, within the next few days, on May 22, while the Secretary General was on his way to Cairo, Nasser announced the closing of the Strait of Tiran.

That is the present shape of the immediate crisis.

THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION

The role of the Soviet Union: We know that the Soviet Union has been supporting and encouraging what the Soviets call and the Arabs call the progressive states—Egypt, Syria, Algeria—over against the more moderate and conservative Arab states.

We think that the Soviet Union would encourage the political response to the Syrian-Egyptian reaction to the Israeli threat.

We suppose that they might have also agreed to the request for the removal of United Nations forces. As a matter of general policy, the Soviet Union has always strongly objected to the creation of U.N. forces by the General Assembly, saying that that is a monopoly of the Security Council, where they have a veto.

We have reason to believe that they were not informed in advance of Nasser's announcement of the closing of the Strait of Tiran.

I would state that much more categorically except for always the possibility of some misinformation or error on a point of that sort, but it is our strong impression that the Soviets were not consulted by Egypt on the closing of the Strait of Tiran.

U.S. AND U.S.S.R. USING INFLUENCE FOR MODERATION

I would like to tell you in the utmost secrecy, and I am relying very heavily on you on this, that we ourselves, in a very short message to the Soviet Union, suggested to them that they would use restraint in this situation. Their reply to that was a longer reply, pleading with us to use our influence in Israel, and promising that they themselves would use their influence in Syria and in Cairo for mutual restraint, so that neither side would start the shooting.

We have—

Senator GORE. I did not get that last remark.

Secretary RUSK. Both would use their influence in the area, we in Israel and they in Syria and in Egypt, to insist that neither side start the shooting.

We have ourselves advised moderation in Israel—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Excuse me, did the Kremlin agree in that?

Secretary RUSK. Well, now, they came back and proposed to us—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I see.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. That we undertake this diversion of labor in terms of counseling moderation.

We have done so on our side and have kept the Israelis fully informed about our conversations with the Russians, and we have good intelligence reasons to believe that the Soviets have, in fact, counseled moderation upon Egypt and Syria.

Senator DIRKSEN. When was that reply received?

Secretary RUSK. That has been in the last eight days.

I am going far beyond my brief in telling you the Soviet exchange, but I believe it is highly relevant in this situation.

IMPORTANCE OF THE STRAIT OF TIRAN

Now, we think that there may be the possibility for a breathing space here as far as major hostilities are concerned, subject to one very specific problem, and that is the Strait of Tiran.

A breathing space raises a problem of what the status quo is during the breathing space, and if Nasser insists that the status quo involves the closure of the Strait of Tiran, then we have a major crisis indeed. If he would agree that the status quo should be that prior to his statement about the closing of the strait, then more time is available and people can litigate the problem and discuss differences and perhaps, keep the boundaries of the Israeli-Arab states under some control.

This is a major issue of principle with Israel, and is one which they take with the utmost seriousness.

The strait itself has been open to international shipping, as a matter of general principle, since 1957.

About 120 ships a year go through that strait, about half of them tankers, about half of them dry cargo ships.

Practically all of Israel's import of oil comes through the strait from Iran. What comes in and out of their port of Eilat on the Gulf of Aqaba represents three to four percent of their exports and imports, but it is their principal contact, their only contact with the Afro-Asian world looking toward both the present and the future, and in a trade which has been growing and is particularly important to them because the Suez Canal has been closed to them during all this period.

Nevertheless, despite the fact that the right has been there since 1957, the Israelis have not utilized it very fully with regard to their own flag ships.

For example, since 1955 only one Israeli flag merchant vessel has gone through, and there are four or five Israeli fishing trawlers that go in and out, have gone in and out, fishing in the Red Sea, and returning to Eilat for supplies, water and things of that sort.

PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Senator LAUSCHE. What was the status prior to 1955 and 1957?

Secretary RUSK. As far as Israel was concerned, there was no access through the gulf.

Mr Meeker, what about international shipping prior to that period. Do we have much information on that?

Mr. MEEKER. There was a small amount of cargo going to the Jordanian port of Aqaba in that early period. Israel had not yet developed the port of Eilat, and that development really came after 1956.

Secretary RUSK. Now, in terms of where we are in this situation, I think it is of some significance that the Soviet Union has not stated a categorical position on the Strait of Tiran.

I say that with some caution because when we leave this room we may hear one. We cannot guarantee it, but they, as a maritime power, have some interest in the general principles involved here.

The territorial waters, the combined territorial seas, of Saudi Arabia and of Egypt across that strait meet in the middle of the strait.

The combined territorial waters of Malaya and Indonesia similarly would cut off the Strait of Malacca, of Denmark and Sweden access to the Baltic Sea.

We believe that it is a firmly established principle of international law, confirmed by the Convention of the Law of the Sea in 1958, that where two bodies of international waters are joined by narrow waters of this sort, there is an international right of passage through that strait.

Mr. Len Meeker, the Legal Advisor to the State Department is here and can develop that in some detail for you if you would wish to go into that.

So we feel that it is important that Nasser acknowledge whatever the territorial water situation is, that there is an international right of passage for shipping through that strait.

We do not accept the view that Nasser or, for that matter, Israel, is entitled to call upon rights of belligerency in order to refuse such rights of passage.

Secretary General Hammarskjold made it quite clear that those rights ought not to be available. We have not accepted the exercise of rights of belligerency between Arab states and Israel since the armistice agreements were entered into.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, let me interrupt you.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, please.

BASIS OF EGYPTIAN CLAIM

Senator SYMINGTON. That language is a little too hightone to me. Does that mean that we do not believe the Israelis should go to war if they are stopped from using the Port of Eilat?

Secretary RUSK. No sir; I am not commenting on that particular point at the moment. I am saying we do not believe in this instance, for example, that Egypt can rely upon the fact that it is in a technical state of war with Israel to close the strait to international shipping going through there.

Now, there are certain obscurities—

Senator SPARKMAN. While you are talking about that—

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN [continuing]. Does Egypt claim—there is an island out six miles from the coastline—this map does not show it.

Secretary RUSK. We will have a large-scale chart down here, hopefully before our discussion is over. I tried to bring one with me, and we lost it in the corridors of the department on my way down here.

EGYPTIAN OCCUPATION OF ISLAND OF TIRAN

Senator SPARKMAN. There is an island about—

Secretary RUSK. The island which is offshore from Egyptian territory is actually owned by Saudi Arabia.

Senator SPARKMAN. It is?

Secretary RUSK. The Egyptians occupied it for the time, but told us in 1950 at the time that they occupied it, that they were occupying the island solely for the protection of the island, and that their occupancy would not interfere in any way with international rights of passage through the strait. But those islands are Saudi Arabian islands, and we understand at the moment they are not occupied, although it is possible that the Saudis may put somebody ashore.

Senator SPARKMAN. The large Island of Tiran.

Secretary RUSK. The nearest one is Tiran.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is there no passage between Tiran and Sanafir?

Secretary RUSK. No. The waters are too shallow, and it is a very widening and dangerous passage.

Senator SPARKMAN. In other words, this is the only passage?

Secretary RUSK. There are two passages between Egypt and the Island of Tiran. One is the Enterprise Passage, which is about a mile off-shore from Egypt, and it is very deep and is one customarily used.

The second is Grafton Passage which is adjacent to the Island of Tiran, which also is some 260 feet deep, but it is somewhat more hazardous because of certain rocks, and it is much narrower. But there are two passages there, one wholly within Egyptian territorial waters; the other, its state is somewhat obscure because of its location, probably in Saudi Arabian territorial waters.

Senator CLARK. Didn't Egypt lease the island from Saudi Arabia?

Secretary RUSK. Not so far as we know.

Mr. MEEKER. Not so far as we know.

Secretary RUSK. I think they occupied it, even though it wasn't Saudi, did not claim it to be Egyptian territory at the time they occupied it.

WHAT NASSER MEANS

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Secretary, is Nasser claiming two things or one only? One, that is, this is an inland waterway, and it is within the jurisdiction—it is within their jurisdiction and, two, that a state of war exists, and even though it is an international sea-way, in a state of war he has the right to blockade it?

Secretary RUSK. Well, yes, Senator, in general.

But I would like to call your attention to the fact that there are certain points that are still obscure, and there may be some advantages in obscurity pending further clarification and negotiation.

In the first place, we do not know exactly what it is he is saying he is going to do in closing the strait. He has talked about barring Israeli flag ships and ships carrying strategic goods, for example.

Now, the only material that goes through that strait that comes close to being a strategic good is crude oil.

The Egyptians have referred to application of the items under our Battle Act.

Our Battle Act does not include crude oil. So, query: Is he saying that he will blockade only Israeli flag ships for all practical pur-

poses or is he saying that he would blockade it with respect to all other ships including tankers, and what kind of material is he prepared to let go through?

I want to distinguish this de facto situation from the issue of principle, which is very, very important indeed, and is of greatest possible importance to Israel in this situation.

We are not completely sure that he is talking about both channels that I mentioned. In their public statements they have concentrated on the Enterprise Channel, the one that is a mile off Egyptian territory. We are not completely sure that they are also talking about the Grafton Channel, which, perhaps, in a technical sense, is outside of Egypt's territorial waters, but where joint action by Saudi Arabia and Egypt might bring about the same result.

NASSER'S CALL FOR A HOLY WAR

I would like to point out that Nasser has called upon the only issue on which all Arabs can be united. This has cut through some of the major differences between him and the more moderate and conservative Arab states. But, at the same time, he has mounted a tiger.

The man in the street in the Arab world is inclined to think that the Holy War is here and, secondly, the man in the street has heard nothing but that he has closed the Strait of Tiran.

That has given Nasser a great boost of prestige within the Arab world at this point.

Now if, in fact, the Tiran Strait can be opened, and it becomes apparent that the Holy War is not on, then he faces the possibility of very serious disillusionment among the men in the street in the Arab world, and he perhaps knows that. So this is one of the elements that makes it a more difficult situation to handle.

MODERATING PRESSURES

We ourselves have tried to engage the Soviet Union in a specific discussion of the Strait of Tiran. Thus far they have not replied on that particular point, because some of us feel if the strait issue can be resolved, that the other aspects of the problem can be brought under some control; that is, some sort of U.N. presence along the borders, some possibility of demobilization of some of the forces that have been called up.

We know that there have been moderating pressures put in on Syria to do a better job in cutting down on these terrorist raids coming out of Syria either directly into Israel or through Jordan and Lebanon into Israel.

We do not believe that most of the Arabs want a war in this situation; in fact, it may well be that none of them want a war. We believe that Israel would prefer not to have war if its vital interests are properly protected.

I would like to emphasize that I am not here this morning to talk about the problems that might lie at the end of the road. I assure you that the President will be in fullest touch with Senators and the Congress along the way.

We are not here contemplating, that is, we are not here deciding to take the particular step of action involving the use of armed force.

DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE

As you know, the President's view would be that the Executive and Congress move together on a matter of that sort. But I would like to consult with you about a step which reflects the attitude of the maritime powers back in the late fifties with respect to the right of international passage, and if Mr. Macomber would pass out to you a copy of a brief declaration we would contemplate consulting among governments to get the maximum number of governments to join in issuing such a declaration with respect to the right of passage.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION DECLARATION

The Governments of maritime nations subscribing to this Declaration express their grave concern at recent developments in the Middle East which are currently under consideration in the United Nations Security Council. Our countries, as Members of the United Nations committed to the Purposes and Principles set forth in the Charter, are convinced that scrupulous respect for the principles of international law regarding freedom of navigation on international waterways is indispensable.

In regard to shipping through the waterways that serve ports on the Gulf of Aqaba, our Governments reaffirm the view that the Gulf is an international waterway into and through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage. Our Governments will assert this right on behalf of all shipping sailing under their flags, and our Governments are prepared to cooperate among themselves and to join with others in seeking general recognition of this right.

The views we express in this Declaration formed the basis on which a settlement of the Near East conflict was achieved in early 1957—a settlement that has governed the actions of nations for more than ten years.

These views will guide our policies and action in seeking to assure peace and security in the Near East.

This declaration itself does not commit anyone as to the means by which they individually or collectively assert the right of international passage.

When one asserts a right one can use diplomacy, one can assert it in the U.N., or one can do it through protest; one can do it through various retaliatory economic measures or, as a possibility, through the use of armed force.

But the issue of the use of armed force does not itself pose specifically in this declaration.

We want very much to go over this declaration with you and get any observations or comments which any of you might have.

Perhaps Mr. Len Meeker could just comment on the two principal paragraphs here from a legal point of view. Mr. Meeker?

Senator SYMINGTON. Before you do that, Mr. Secretary—
Secretary RUSK. Yes, Senator.

MARITIME NATIONS

Senator SYMINGTON [continuing]. Just so we can get it in context, what governments are we referring to when you say "the governments of maritime nations?"

Secretary RUSK. We would hope to have as many governments as possible on this. I think there are twelve, for example, who made a similar statement in 1957, was it?

Mr. MEEKER. 1957.

Secretary RUSK. At that time there were individual statements in the General Assembly and elsewhere.

If there were fifteen to twenty nations that might be included in such a group, we feel that this would, could make a very useful

contribution and give some of those who are trying to work between the parties something to work on in terms of leverage, and the attitude of the maritime countries.

Now, on the issue of force, I remind you we would hope very much that Liberia and Panama would sign this declaration. It is obvious that they are not in any event going to use any force to assert the rights exerted here.

But, and it may well be, you see, that the issue here is one which could be subject to negotiation, mediation, arbitration, litigation, provided there is a satisfactory status quo established pending such litigation or diplomatic action.

I want to again remind you that the key question here is what is the status quo in the strait pending or during further discussion of the direct international issue involved, and that is the most sensitive, the most dangerous, and most serious question which we are not now discussing with you in terms of practical action other than diplomatic and political at this point, but one which you should be fully aware of as the really explosive element in this situation.

PUTTING THE DECLARATION TO THE BRITISH

Senator SPARKMAN. This is now just a proposal, is it not, sir?

Secretary RUSK. Well, this is a declaration which, I think I should tell you, we have discussed this declaration with the British as one of the alternatives.

We have in mind putting this to a good many other governments—the British, the Dutch and others—and there may be some counter proposals from some of them about particular wording. We do not know.

But we want you to know that we have in mind the issuance of a declaration by the maritime powers on this international right that is involved in this situation.

Mr. Meeker, would you comment on the underlying—by the way, may I say because of the sensitive nature at this point, that this is a secret paper. I would appreciate having these papers back. There will be copies here in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for you to consult, but it is very important that this be considered secret at this point.

Senator SPARKMAN. Is this in line with what Prime Minister Harold Wilson said to the House of Commons yesterday?

Secretary RUSK. As far as the declaration is concerned, he pointed further toward the future as far as some armed action than we are prepared to go today in terms of consultations with the Congress.

He hinted at it and, of course, we are looking at all contingencies here. But the President himself would want very much to explore fully the possibilities of the U.N. Security Council as well as some private diplomacy that is going on to see whether those alternatives are necessary or whether we have to get to that point at all. We just do not know yet, quite frankly.

Senator McCLELLAN. Mr. Secretary, is your assistant now going to discuss this?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

ORIGINS OF THE WORDING

Senator McCLELLAN. May I ask, I would like to have some emphasis on this aspect of it—I note, and I quote: “Our governments will assert this right on behalf of all shipping sailing under their flags.” I would like an interpretation of what you mean by that.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Meeker?

Mr. MEEKER. The essence of this declaration is contained in the second paragraph. The first statement there says:

In regard to shipping through the waterways that serve ports on the Gulf of Aqaba, our governments reaffirm the view that the gulf is an international waterway into and through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage.

I would like to say just a word about the origin of that. This statement, in content, is based directly on what the representatives of some fourteen United Nations members stated in the General Assembly on March 1, 1957.

Now, those countries included, besides the United States, Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and Costa Rica.

That first sentence is a statement about the view of the declaring governments as to the legal status of the strait; namely, that it is an international waterway, and there is a right of passage throughout for the vessels of all nations.

The second statement in the paragraph is the one to which you just referred, Senator:

Our governments will assert this right on behalf of all shipping sailing under their flags, and our governments are prepared to cooperate among themselves and to join with others in seeking general recognition of this right.

I would like to say a word about the origin of that language as well.

This is based almost word for word on the statements which were made by Ambassador Lodge and by the representative of the United Kingdom in the General Assembly at that time.

ASSERTING THE RIGHT OF PASSAGE FOR ALL

The statement that we would assert the right of passage on behalf of all shipping sailing under flags of the two countries, that statement was made both by Britain and the United States to the United Nations General Assembly in March of 1957.

What it meant was that in regard to both British vessels registered in Britain, and in regard to United States vessels flying the United States flag, we would assert that those ships of our own would have the right to go through the strait and the gulf to ports at the head of the gulf.

Now, the second paragraph goes on in that sentence to make one further statement, which is that the declaring governments, in addition to making this assertion of a right for their own ships, would cooperate among themselves and also join with other states who might not be signatories to this declaration, in order to seek a general recognition of the right.

This declaration, as the Secretary has already stated, does not indicate what particular means would be employed. Indeed, that question is one which lies in the future. It has to be considered as the governments go along.

The purpose of this declaration is to set forth, first, a legal view as to the status of the strait and the gulf and, secondly, to make the general declaration that we would assert that right of passage for ships of our own flag and would join with others in trying to secure a general recognition of the right.

Senator McCLELLAN. Then the word "assert" does not carry with it any implication of enforcement of the right, just merely to say it is our right?

Mr. MEEKER. It carries no implication at all. It is neither a commitment to use force nor does it exclude it. This is a subject that simply is not covered, not dealt with, by the declaration.

CLARIFY MEANING BEFORE OTHER COUNTRIES SIGN

Senator McCLELLAN. Now, the thing that strikes me—and I do not know much about diplomacy—but you get fifteen or twenty countries to sign this, and then they disagree on what is meant. That is why I think these things should be settled before we sign them.

Senator STENNIS. Spelled out.

Senator McCLELLAN. We are going to sign something here that I would interpret one way and fifteen other countries, governments, interpret another.

Secretary RUSK. I would assume, Senator, that that matter would be clarified in discussions among governments because they will be asking the same questions which you have and, as Mr. Meeker has pointed out, it is our view that the assertion of a right does not itself prescribe the means.

There are many means. It does not require the use of force, but it does not exclude the use of force. There are many ways in which one can assert a right.

Yes, sir, Senator?

FUTURE TENSE

Senator CASE. Mr. Secretary, why do you use the word "will"? Why don't you just assert it if that is what you are doing, assert it now and not say threaten to do something in the future? I think that would clarify somewhat the Senator's point about it.

Senator McCLELLAN. Then I have another question.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. What about that?

Secretary RUSK. That is an interesting point, Senator. This was based on the language used in 1957. From a legal point of view it probably does not make any difference. But we will certainly take that under advisement as a suggestion.

OTHER NATIONS DRAG THEIR HEELS

Senator McCLELLAN. Now, one other question. This is what concerns me about these international agreements. We are over here fighting a war now, where some other folks ought to be there with us, if we should be there at all. I do not want to get ourselves in a position in this where again we are going out and taking the lead and the others drag their heels and let us do all the fighting. That is what concerns me. And before I subscribe to something, I want

to know what the others are going to do, and not leave it up in the air as this does.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, this does not get to the question of who would join in using force to assert this right.

I had a long and very useful discussion with the Foreign Relations Committee a few days ago, and reported back to the President the practically unanimous view of the Foreign Relations Committee and, I gather this has been held very widely in the Congress outside the committee, that we should give maximum weight to the effort in the United Nations; that we should in any event emphasize the multilateral character of this problem; and that we should do our very best to avoid the unilateral action by the United States in this situation.

The President is very much concerned with that, and very much persuaded that that is the right course. Before any forceful action would be seriously contemplated, he would be back here consulting with the Congress on that issue.

He has made it very clear that our action in this is within our constitutional processes, and there is no question about the fact that on that point there would be further, most serious consultation with the Congress.

Senator McCLELLAN. I am not in disagreement about that at all. Secretary RUSK. I understand.

DOES ASSERTION MEAN ENFORCEMENT?

Senator McCLELLAN. What concerns me is that sixteen nations or fifteen nations join in this phrase "We will assert," and does it mean to them or does it mean to the world, does it give the impression that when we say we assert we mean to enforce it? In asserting a right do we mean to enforce it, and that is one of the troubles with diplomacy in my book today, it leaves so much uncertainty.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think one would not want at this point to, quite frankly, clarify that point, because to make a declaration now saying that we are going to assert this right by force if necessary would greatly impede the possibilities of settling it by other means.

Senator McCLELLAN. I am not arguing that this is not right. I just point out to you—

Secretary RUSK. I understand, sir.

Senator McCLELLAN. What gives me concern, because I think in the past we find ourselves today in positions where we have gotten into situations without the assistance and cooperation that we had a right to anticipate from agreements of the past, and I do not want to find ourselves in that situation in this crisis.

Secretary RUSK. Well, I can assure you that I certainly would not want to find ourselves in that situation.

NATIONS WITH MAXIMUM INTEREST IN MARITIME RIGHTS

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Secretary, why was it that you only had fourteen signers at the time this was originally brought up? This is a pretty small minority of the rest of the nations of the world. Did the rest of them refuse to sign it or say they were going to go it alone?

Secretary RUSK. It was my understanding those were the ones who had the maximum interest in maritime rights.

Mr. Meeker, would you comment on the relevant article of the Convention of the Law of the Sea?

FLAGS FLOWN IN THE GULF

Senator CLARK. In that connection, could I ask, while he is answering, how many flags were flown on those 120 ships? How many flags were there?

Secretary RUSK. I have it here.

Mr. MEEKER. I do.

Secretary RUSK. There has been almost a total absence of Israeli flags, except Israeli trawlers. One Israeli merchant ship visited Eilat during the period from January 1965 up to the present. Four or five visits a year are made to Eilat by Israeli flag fishing trawlers which operate in the Red Sea.

Secondly, we do not have any Communist shipping going in there.

Third, dry cargo shipping accounts for something less than fifty percent of all calls made since January 1965. Nine countries, Greece, Liberia, the U.S., the Netherlands, Panama, the Philippines, Sweden, Norway, and Italy. There have been very, very few U.S. flag ships going there.

Senator CLARK. Are those the tankers?

Secretary RUSK. No. The tankers are primarily under Panamanian and Liberian flags. They account for between 60 and 70 percent—I am sorry, they account for practically all of the tanker tonnage going in there.

As a matter of fact, tankage has now been pretty well concentrated in five or six large tankers operating under Liberian and Panamanian flags.

Senator CLARK. They get the oil from Iran?

Secretary RUSK. They get the oil from Iran. By the way, this is not something that is generally publicized because Iran claims that it is the consortium that sells the oil, and Iran does not acknowledge that it is selling oil to Israel. There is a little fuss going on now between Egypt and Iran on just that point.

But these are large tankers, 20,000 to 30,000 gross tons, and about a half dozen tankers are involved in that trade.

Then there are some Israeli-owned vessels flying under foreign flags that are encompassed in the numbers I have already given you.

Senator CLARK. Well, from that it would appear that very few of the maritime nations that you are asking to sign this declaration have ships under their flags that use the gulf.

Secretary RUSK. There are about nine or ten of them which are directly involved to one degree or another.

Senator CLARK. One or two ships each.

Secretary RUSK. But then there are other, there are maritime nations which have a great stake in the principle involved here.

For instance, Japan brings huge tankers to the Straits of Malacca that have a draft of one foot less than the draft of the strait, and they get all of their oil from Iran, practically all of it.

Senator CLARK. Okay. Just one more question and then I will subside. Are there any British or French registered vessels using the gulf or the strait?

Secretary RUSK. The U.K.—I do not see France on the list. The United Kingdom certainly.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will you again identify—

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I did not come anywhere near getting an answer to my question when I got diverted.

Secretary RUSK. I am sorry.

AN EXCLUSIVE CLUB

Senator MUNDT. My question is why, back in 1950-something, fourteen nations signed this declaration, such a small minority even of the maritime nations signed it? Did a group of fourteen get together and were doing this as an exclusive club. Did they ask the others and did they reject it?

Secretary RUSK. I would think those that signed it, excluding the Communist countries, would represent a very, very high percentage of the maritime shipping.

Now, Japan—Japan was not—

Mr. MEEKER. Japan was not a member.

Secretary RUSK. Japan was not a member of the U.N.

Senator MUNDT. Read those fourteen again.

Mr. MEEKER. Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Costa Rica, the United Kingdom, France, and the U.S.

I might just say a word about the origin of those statements made to the General Assembly which will, perhaps, in part, answer your question, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I interrupt at this point? Was that a written declaration signed by people or were they oral statements made—

Mr. MEEKER. Individual oral statements made on the floor of the General Assembly.

Secretary RUSK. But parallel statements.

NEGOTIATIONS AT END OF SUEZ CRISIS

Mr. MEEKER. There have been in the preceding few days, and concluding on February 28, very active consultations between the U.S. government, the government of Israel, and others as to exactly how the peace settlement and armistice would be arranged at the end of the Suez conflict.

At that time it was agreed that there should be a series of statements to this effect concerning the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as part of the overall set of arrangements under which forces would be withdrawn and under which the United Nations Emergency Force would be put in its positions, both in the Gaza Strip and also at the entrance of the Strait of Tiran.

The United States made a statement on that day—Ambassador Lodge was our representative in the Assembly—and we, and I think also the government of Israel, spoke with a number of other countries asking them whether they would be prepared to make parallel statements.

I am not aware that we approached any countries who said they disagreed with this point of view and, therefore, declined to make a statement.

I think the shortness of time may be responsible for the fact that there were not more than fourteen. But I think that it is noteworthy that among this group are some of the principal shipping nations of the world.

Senator SPARKMAN. May I ask this question?

HOW WILL RIGHTS BE ASSERTED?

Senator McCLELLAN. If I may have this one other question, and then I am going to quit. I just want to satisfy myself.

When you say that these governments will assert a right, the right is presumed to make that claim without any reservation. Now you propose to assert it. That means we are going to take some action; assert means to act. How are we going to assert it except for the ships to go up there and demand to pass through? How do you assert it?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, there are many—I am not a lawyer, and I will ask Mr. Meeker to comment on this. But my understanding is that there are many ways to assert a right. If a trespasser comes on your land—

Senator McCLELLAN. I know there are other things, but when you—

Secretary RUSK. If a trespasser comes on your land you try to talk him off it; you can call a cop in certain circumstances; you might even shoot him. But there are many ways to assert a right, and there are a good many possibilities open here as to how the right can be most effectively asserted. This is silent on the question of how.

DECLARATION DOES NOT EMBODY A COMMITMENT

Senator McCLELLAN. I know it is. That is the point. Is it going to be interpreted by Israel that we are going to assert it, we are going to see that these ships get through, or are we leaving her open to that hope or expectation?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Meeker, would you read the Senator that sentence of interpretation which we would propose to use if other governments—some of them undoubtedly will ask us the same question that you just asked.

Senator McCLELLAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. Do you have that sentence there with you?

Mr. MEEKER. Yes, I do.

What we would say in answer to this very question from other governments is roughly the following: That the language of the declaration in itself does not embody a commitment as to the particular means by which the right would be asserted in order to give effect to the purposes of the declaration.

The declaration starts with two things. First, an assertion of international status in the waterway and, second, a statement that the governments participating in the declaration will assert this right and will seek to gain general recognition for it.

Now, the question of how these purposes are going to be effectuated, that is simply not covered in this declaration, and it is a

question which the governments themselves are going to have to continue to consider as they proceed.

As the Secretary has said, there are many different ways of proceeding: in the United Nations; through diplomacy; by indeed sending one or more ships through the strait for the purpose of entering the Gulf of Aqaba. There are many different ways, and those will all have to be considered.

USE OF FORCE IS A SEPARATE QUESTION

Secretary RUSK. Senator, may I just add one word of clarification on this?

Senator MCCLELLAN. I am going to quit.

Secretary RUSK. We ought to be clear around this table on this point.

The Executive Branch is not going to come back to you gentlemen at any time in the future to say that this word, this declaration commits us to the use of force. That is a separate question which the President and you would have to talk out among yourselves and make a decision on it.

Senator MCCLELLAN. That ought to be made very clear. I appreciate your saying that.

Now, one other thing. You said there are different ways to assert it. Is not the most direct way to assert this right to move your ships out there and demand passage through?

Secretary RUSK. Well, that might be the most direct way.

Senator MCCLELLAN. I said direct.

Secretary RUSK. It might be the most direct way.

Senator MCCLELLAN. And if shooting starts over there would we not expect a direct effort made?

Secretary RUSK. Well, this, it might be the most direct way. It may not be the most effective way or the wisest way under certain circumstances.

Senator MCCLELLAN. I apologize, and I thank you. I am through.

Secretary RUSK. I understand.

STRAITS AROUND THE WORLD

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Secretary, will you reidentify the straits around the world where this principle becomes involved. You mentioned the Malacca Straits. Which are the places? I do not have—in the Baltic?

Secretary RUSK. I do not have it. Perhaps Mr. Meeker has it, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. I want it for information.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. Here is a list that I will be glad to—

Senator LAUSCHE. Is it a large list?

Secretary RUSK. Yes. It involves two pages with two or three lines each.

Senator LAUSCHE. It ought to be placed in the record.

Secretary RUSK. We will put it in the record of the Foreign Relations Committee. But the Strait of Dover, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Magellan Straits, the Straits of Malacca, the Martinique Channel. The two most dramatic ones, I would suppose, would be the Straits of Malacca, the Singapore Straits, and what do you call this between Denmark and—the Sound between Denmark and Sweden

where territorial waters come right up and occupy the entire passage.

Senator CLARK. You have the case in Corfu.

Secretary RUSK. The Corfu case in the World Court is very opposite here with respect to the principle involved.

SOVIET INTEREST IN THE PROBLEM

So we feel—and, by the way, the Soviet Union might have some real interest in this problem. The Bosphorus is covered by the special convention, Montreux Convention, but the Soviet Union, as a maritime nation, has got a tremendous interest in this. This may be one of the reasons why they are just being a little careful about this issue of the Strait of Tiran.

Secretary SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, why didn't Russia have to ask Turkey for permission to go through the Dardanelles?

Secretary RUSK. That is under the regulations of the Montreux Convention. By the way, on that point, Secretary McNamara might wish to comment, but the movement of these vessels into the Mediterranean brings their forces about where they were—about two or three ships more—about June a year ago. This may or may not be connected with the Middle East crisis, but it is not a major naval movement.

Bob, do you want to comment on it?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think they are trying to make it appear that it is connected with the Middle East crisis and to give the peoples of the world the impression they are moving forcefully to support the Arab position. But the fact is that the movement was planned separate and apart from the Middle East crisis and, as Secretary Rusk pointed out, brings their total fleet in the Mediterranean to slightly more than the strength that it had a year ago.

ISRAEL'S OIL RESERVES

Senator CLARK. Mr. Secretary, could you comment on how much time, in your opinion, we have got in this area. I have particular reference to how much reserve oil Israel has got, and how long can we reasonably expect them to cool it.

Secretary RUSK. Well, there is not a lot of time here, because this is a major issue for Israel, and Israel has made it clear, both in 1957 and since, that they would protect their own rights of access through the Strait of Tiran.

Senator CLARK. As long as they have got some oil you can probably cool them. But if they are running out of oil they are going to act. Is this not a fair assumption?

Secretary RUSK. I would hesitate to ask Israel to give, to specify the number of days. But their patience is going to run out pretty fast.

Senator CLARK. I would ask then how much oil they have got.

Secretary RUSK. I do not know what their stocks are. If we have that information—

Mr. BATTLE. We do not have it.

ESTABLISHING THE STATUS QUO

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to infringe on the rights of any Senator, but we have the Secretary of State here and the Secretary of Defense, and I would hope that we would make a reasonable effort to preserve the regular order. There are many questions I would like to ask.

Senator SPARKMAN. Well, Senator Symington, I appreciate that. I have been trying for some time to get in a question myself.

If I may ask it now, and ask Mr. Meeker to explain—no, to ask this general question about page two of this proposal: The views we express in this declaration formed the basis on which a settlement of the Near East conflict was achieved in early 1957—a settlement that has governed the actions of nations for more than ten years.

Now, is that borne out by facts and documents and historical records or is that just a statement of opinion?

Mr. MEEKER. No, I think that is borne out by the record very clearly.

In 1957, at the end of the Suez conflict, one of the things that was done to resolve the conflict and to deal with this issue about navigation through the Strait of Tiran, was to station an element of the United Nations Emergency Force at a place called Sharm el-Sheikh in Egyptian territory at the southern-most tip of the Sinai Peninsula.

The stationing of that force was for the very purpose of seeing to it that navigation through the strait and into the gulf would be unimpeded. This was agreed to by Egypt and it was also accepted by Israel as a satisfactory set of arrangements under which they would withdraw their forces from certain territory which they had occupied.

Now, in fact, for the next ten years from that time until very recent days when Egypt again occupied Sharm el-Sheikh, there was no interference with navigation through the waterway.

We thought that it would be useful in this declaration to point out that there had been a status quo undisturbed for ten years, and that any effort to block navigation through the strait and gulf now was an effort to upset something, upset a set of arrangements, which have lasted for more than ten years.

Secretary RUSK. And a status quo based upon an agreement of ten years ago.

REMOVAL OF THE PEACE FORCE

Senator SPARKMAN. What effect did the removal of the peace force from there have upon this agreement?

Mr. MEEKER. We do not think that it has any legal effect whatever because the right of passage was one which we asserted and believed to exist quite independently of the stationing of an element of UNEF at Sharm el-Sheikh.

1958 AGREEMENT ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

I should mention that one year after the settlement of the Suez conflict, there convened at Geneva a conference on the Law of the Sea in the spring of 1958, and this very issue was addressed by the conference. The Netherlands made a proposal for a provision to be

inserted in the treaty and, in fact, it was inserted in the treaty. It reads as follows—this is Article 16, paragraph 4 of the Treaty on the Territorial Sea:

There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state.

Now, that fits just perfectly the situation on the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Secretary RUSK. And the Soviet Union acceded to this convention without entering a reservation on this particular article.

Senator KUCHEL. Have we approved this treaty?

Secretary RUSK. We have, and Egypt has not.

Senator LAUSCHE. When was that approved?

Secretary RUSK. 1958.

Senator McCARTHY. 1958.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION

Senator SPARKMAN. I think here is something that might be well to put into the record. This is General Assembly Resolution 1125 of February 2, 1957, operative paragraph number three:

Considers that, after full withdrawal of Israel from the Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza areas the scrupulous maintenance of the armistice agreement requires the placing of the United Nations Emergency Forces on the Egypt-Israel armistice demarcation line.

It seems to me that would be well to put in the record at this point.

ATMOSPHERICS OF THE U.N. DEBATE

Secretary RUSK. By the way, just to comment a little bit on some of the atmospherics in the U.N. debate, the Arabs in New York have called for complete compliance with the armistice arrangements. One of the problems about this is that they want to be selective about it.

Under the armistice arrangements Israel could use the Suez Canal, but they do not mean that. So they are trying to be quite selective about which arrangements it is that they want to have maintained.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

EGYPTIAN FOOD SUPPLIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, as a corollary to the question about the amount of oil in Israel, how much food does Egypt have for the future? How long can Egypt feed itself?

Secretary RUSK. We believe they usually run from six weeks to two months' stocks in the country. As you know, they have not been receiving food from us for some time.

We understand they have made arrangements with the Soviet Union that will probably take them to the first of the year.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Hayden, do you have any questions of the Secretary?

Senator HAYDEN. No.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. Well, I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I feel like I ought to pass in favor of members of your own committee. Thanks very much.

Senator SPARKMAN. We are all meeting together.

Senator STENNIS. I pass for the time being.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Kuchel?

Senator KUCHEL. No questions.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Mundt?

ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Secretary, if I understand your opening statement, the nature of this document is something which you propose to circulate among maritime countries—

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator MUNDT [continuing]. Without handling it through the United Nations.

Secretary RUSK. Well, let me say—

Senator MUNDT. That is within your program.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. This is a very early consultation with the Senators on this particular document.

We undoubtedly will have from some governments some suggestions for amendments or some additions or something of that sort. Nor has there been a final decision as to just when and how to use it. In any event, if it is used it would presumably be referred in the first instance as a declaration to the United Nations.

But there is a great deal of discussion going on in the corridors. We have a new President of the Security Council for the month of June, a Dane, who is not under the same limitations that the representative of China was under there because he was not—he has no contact with a good many members of the Security Council, and so we do not—I cannot tell you today exactly who would adhere to this declaration, nor when and how it would be used.

But we feel that this is a matter of some urgency to pull together a maximum group of countries who have an interest in this maritime right we are talking about here.

NEED FOR MULTILATERAL ACTION

Senator MUNDT. If I might follow up what I have in mind. I am a little bit dubious about going around the United Nations to contact these countries and get them to sign it, because historically every time we have proceeded in some area of the world without the sanction of the U.N., it has gotten to be an American task, an American job.

Korea, while we did it legally, we went around the Russians because they were not there, and it was our war. In Vietnam, we edged into it without the U.N., and it has become our war.

It seems to me in this kind of thing, if we do agree upon it, it should in the first instance be submitted for U.N. action instead of something that is promoted outside. That was the purport of my original question about the fourteen countries, because that does not even represent a fraction of the U.N. support.

Secretary RUSK. That issue is right now before the Security Council because yesterday Ambassador Goldberg put in a resolution calling on the parties concerned to comply with the Secretary

General's appeal. The Secretary General's appeal was to urge all the parties concerned to exercise special restraint, to forego belligerence; that is, the exercise, attempted exercise of belligerent rights; and to avoid all other action to increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and seek solutions.

Now, that resolution, which involves the same principle as this declaration, is right now before the Security Council.

There is also an Arab resolution which takes another view. So this issue is before the Security Council now.

Senator MUNDT. Then where does this fit in? Is this proposed to be done if the Security Council does not act? I am just not clear. You started out by saying you would circulate this to as many countries as would be willing to sign it.

Secretary RUSK. It would be a multilateral support of the assertion of this right which we are now asserting in the Security Council.

Senator MUNDT. Well, I do not want to take any more time, but I want to reiterate my skepticism about the United Nations by running around it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Mansfield?

FRANCE'S DETACHED ROLE

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, I note that France is hardly even mentioned. What is its position vis-a-vis the situation in the Middle East.

Secretary RUSK. France has been trying to play a detached role. It has taken two steps which are relevant. We are consulting with them now and, as you know, consulting with France is rather difficult until other Frenchmen know exactly what one man has in mind, and that is sometimes hard to ascertain.

France has been giving, expediting its arms assistance to Israel. France has been the principal supplier of Israeli arms.

Senator MANSFIELD. Still?

Secretary RUSK. Still, And they have been expediting those shipments. We should keep that very quiet.

Secondly, they publicly as well as privately called upon the Soviet Union, ourselves, and the United Kingdom to join in quadripartite consultations on this matter.

The Soviet Union has turned that down, although we just hear this morning that the Soviet Union is apparently prepared now for the first time to discuss these matters within the framework of the Security Council. So that there will be discussions with Fedorenko and Seydoux and Caradon at the Security Council. Ambassador Goldberg is pursuing that today.

POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT MEETING

Senator MANSFIELD. One more question. Referring to the French suggestion, could the United States and the U.S.S.R. issue a call for a summit meeting of the maritime states to include, one, consideration of the declaration which has been laid before us today for an immediate decision and, secondly, consider an agreement based on the Montreux Convention to illustrate indirectly the situation which the U.S.S.R. finds itself in in the Bosphorus?

Secretary RUSK. That is a possibility, Senator. I would think that that would be a little premature at this time until we explore further with the Soviets what their view is on the strait.

I think if we came to a summit where the court of last resort is in session, only to break up in severe disagreement, that would set everything back.

We would hope very much that the Soviets will show some flexibility on this question of the strait insofar as their support of the Arabs is concerned. However, that is something we will keep very much in mind as a possibility.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Dirksen?

SHIPS UNDER FOREIGN REGISTRY

Senator DIRKSEN. I would like to ask Mr. Meeker a question. I notice on the last part of page one where you say:

“Our governments will assert this right on behalf of all shipping sailing under their flags.” What about governments whose vessels are under foreign registry, Israeli vessels, for instance, flying the Liberian flag or the Panamanian flag?

Secretary RUSK. If I may comment first on that, Senator, on these matters the government of the flag has the overwhelming predominant role.

Now, I do not know whether this has been made public or not, but President Tubman, for example, of Liberia, has asked his flag ships to come around Africa into Haifa rather than run through the strait and have them sunk before this question is clarified.

But you have two different authorities operating in a matter of this sort: The government of the flag in the first instance and, secondly, the owners.

Now comes Lloyds of London. They have cancelled insurance on ships going through the strait, and so owners simply as a matter of ownership prudence are reluctant to challenge the situation until it is clarified further. That is the principal reason why, perhaps, there have not been actual ships going through there in the last few days, that is, to Eilat.

Senator DIRKSEN. Using the word “their” you really limit this, don’t you, to their flags?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, in that particular phrase. But the second phrase “to cooperate among themselves and to join with others in seeking general recognition of this right” broadens it somewhat.

Senator DIRKSEN. That is all.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Gore?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Meeker, do you want to add anything?

Mr. MEEKER. No.

PARALLEL WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, well, I shall confine myself to a very brief statement.

I wish to commend the administration for its prudence and caution in this matter, but also its firmness, and to express appreciation for the close consultation with the Senate.

I would add one word of caution with respect to the use of the present tense which Senator Case suggested. If you speak in the

future, you reserve the right to future assertion, you leave more options, more choices open.

The most encouraging thing you bring is, however secret it is, that there is close communication, mutual effort, on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I would like to emphasize the secrecy of that because that would disappear——

Senator GORE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. If from our sources this got to be known.

Senator GORE. I accept.

Now, my one question is: Since there is a possibility of a parallelism with respect to this gulf and this port and Haiphong, and since you report to us this does encompass a matter of major importance, a mutuality of effort to cool a dangerous situation in the Middle East, if that in any way could be coupled with a mutuality of effort in Southeast Asia. I do not wish to divert you particularly into that, but it seems to me that this might be a major break in cooperation between the two great powers. I would hope that we would not lose the opportunity, if such existed, in extending this cooperation to an effort of deescalation in the Far East.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, there is nothing we would like better.

I would doubt the wisdom of trying these two questions together organically, because it is hard enough to sort out conflicting interests in each question standing alone.

However, we are in pretty regular contact with the Soviet Union on Vietnam. I think the big problem there is that their influence in Hanoi does not put them in a position to negotiate seriously about it.

I do not believe Vietnam at this stage can be settled between Washington and Moscow because Moscow cannot deliver Hanoi. I think myself there is a basis for agreement between us and the Soviet Union on Vietnam, based upon our recognition of their stake in North Vietnam and their recognition of our stake in South Vietnam.

We have had many, many long discussions with the Soviet Union along these lines.

I would hope that given the parallel action that we and they showed during the India-Pakistan fighting and, indeed, at the Tashkent Conference, where we encouraged all three of them to go ahead with the Tashkent Conference, that if there could be some parallel action here this might encourage a little more parallel action on some other problem.

Senator GORE. The whole purpose of my question was to entertain such a hope.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. Yes Mr. Chairman.

MINING OF THE STRAIT

Mr. Secretary, Nasser has been quoted as saying that the strait, the entrance of the strait or the gulf, I do not recall which, was mined. You referred to continuing shipping. How can shipping be continued if the mining has taken place without a lot of trouble?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we doubt very much—and the Secretary might wish to comment on this—would you comment and take that one, Bob?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. We have no indication that they have mined the strait itself. As a matter of fact, we have some indication that they have not. They may have mined in a defensive way the entrances to their own naval facilities near the strait. We think that is what he might have alluded to.

But the mining of the strait itself would be extremely difficult because it is very deep, some 900 feet deep, and the current passing through it is quite swift. We doubt that he has the capability to mine waters of that kind.

We have no evidence he has. There have been a number of ships that have passed through since he was alleged to have made that statement, and it is our firm conclusion that the strait is not mined as of today.

Secretary RUSK. Apparently shipping goes through normally to the Jordanian port of Aqaba through the strait, so it is unlikely that the strait itself is mined in a way that would close it.

AUTHORITY FOR WITHDRAWING U.N. TROOPS

Senator SMITH. One other question, Mr. Secretary. On what authority were the U.N. troops or forces withdrawn?

Secretary RUSK. The Secretary General felt on the basis of legal advice he had from his own Secretariat that he, as Secretary General, had authority to withdraw those forces basically on the ground; that the forces were there with the consent of Egypt, and if Egypt, as a sovereign country, withdrew that consent, the forces had no right to be there.

Now, we might not have contested the right which might have existed at the end of the day, but we did think that the Secretary General would have been much wiser, indeed had an obligation, to consult the General Assembly or the Security Council before taking that action, because the force was established by the General Assembly.

But he used that. He exercised what he considered to be the executive and the legal power of the Secretary General as sort of the commander-in-chief of the U.N. forces.

Senator SMITH. Have we protested?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, indeed we have, very strongly, both publicly and privately. The President's statement on May 23 said that we were dismayed about that action.

Senator SMITH. Could he return the U.N. to that area then without action by Colonel Nasser?

Secretary RUSK. He probably could if he and the parties were willing to as a matter of law. My guess is that he would not make the attempt, and also my guess is that Egypt would not accept it. But it is not completely outside the possibilities that some sort of U.N. presence, less than the United Nations force, more than just a handful of commissioners, might be put along that border before this matter is finished.

Senator KUCHEL. On what side?

Secretary RUSK. On both sides, perhaps.

Senator SMITH. Such action then makes the United Nations rather useless, does it not?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator Smith, this is a personal view. I do not want to speak for the entire administration on this, but I have felt that the Secretary General has on three occasions, on three issues, not supported the U.N. and supported the charter in a way that one would expect the Secretary General to do so: On the article 19 issue; on his great resistance to consideration of the Vietnam situation by the United Nations; and now on this particular matter of the U.N. forces in the Middle East. We have been disappointed in all three of those.

Senator SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Lausche?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

COMPARISON TO BOSPORUS STRAIT

Are France and Great Britain signatories to the convention defining international waters?

Mr. MEEKER. The United Kingdom is a party to the 1958 convention; France is not.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why didn't France subscribe to it?

Secretary RUSK. They have never indicated any reasons.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did either France or England make statements on the floor of the United Nations comparable to the ones that were made by the nations that you identified a moment ago?

Mr. MEEKER. Both of them did, and those statements were along the lines of this very draft declaration.

Senator LAUSCHE. Why is the Bosphorus Strait considered different than all other straits which are mentioned as being parts of the high seas in the convention?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Meeker?

Mr. MEEKER. There is this difference, what a treaty has been concluded among a number of countries, the Montreux Convention governing passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

Now, there is not any comparable treaty addressed specifically to this strait.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, was the treaty on the Bosphorus Strait executed before the convention?

Mr. MEEKER. Long before, yes.

Senator LAUSCHE. I see.

Secretary RUSK. The 19th Century at first, wasn't it?

Mr. MEEKER. I think it was 1924.

Senator LAUSCHE. Looking at the map it would seem that the body of water that is connected by the Bosphorus Strait with the Mediterranean has more of the attributes of an inland body of water.

Is there any rationalization for keeping the Bosphorus Strait out of the general principle declared in the convention?

Secretary RUSK. It is subject to a special regime of international law based upon a treaty. The same issues might arise if there were no special treaty governing it.

Senator CLARK. You still have the Dardanelles.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, both together.

Senator CLARK. Both under one?

Mr. MEEKER. Yes.

REACHING AGREEMENT WITH SOVIET UNION ON VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Secretary, you stated that Russia recognizes our interest in South Vietnam as well as we recognize their interest in North Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. No, Senator, excuse me, I did not go quite that far.

I said there ought to be the makings of an agreement between us on Vietnam based upon our willingness to recognize their interest in the security, and so forth, of North Vietnam, and their recognition of our interest in South Vietnam.

Senator LAUSCHE. What is the basis of that interest? How do we conclude that it is in their interest to have North Vietnam and in our interest to have South Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Well, they have very close relations with other socialist countries, and we have a treaty involving South Vietnam. It is a protocol state to the SEATO Treaty.

LANGUAGE USAGE

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, you recognize the importance of the words "will assert" as indicated by the memorandum which you have already prepared containing your explanation of those words. Did you give consideration to the use of some other word than "assert" in preparing this declaration?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Meeker?

Mr. MEEKER. The reason that we chose that particular language was that it is the very language used by both the United States and the United Kingdom in their statements to the General Assembly in 1957. We felt that the wording was expressive of what we meant to say.

It is also the same wording that was used in the aide memoire given to the government of Israel explaining our position. Secretary Dulles a few days before in February had given to Israel, the Israeli Embassy in Washington, an aide memoire which contained these very words as expressing a part of our attitude toward the Strait of Tiran. It has a good deal of history, and we thought we would probably maximize the support for this declaration by expressing a declaration in terms that are familiar, that would be recognized by other governments as something that they had already subscribed to earlier.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, I observe in the declaration, you say that we affirm—"In regard to shipping through the waterways that serve ports on the Gulf of Aqaba, our governments reaffirm the view that the gulf is an international waterway into and through which the vessels of all nations have a right of passage."

Did you think of using the word "reaffirm" instead of the word "assert" in the second sentence of the second paragraph: "our governments reaffirm this right on behalf of all shipping." Did you give any consideration to that? You use "reaffirm" in one instance and "assert" in the other, and my question is why.

Mr. MEEKER. I think perhaps the two words are used in a slightly different context. In the first case, the governments are stating, and in some cases restating, a view that they have expressed be-

fore; and in the second sentence what the governments would be doing would not be stating a view but saying that they would pursue, they would assert, they would maintain, they would do things to make effective their right of passage.

I think the two words are used in a slightly different sense, and that is why we used "reaffirm" in one case and "assert" in the other.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was the word "will" instead of "shall" used advisedly?

Mr. MEEKER. "Will" is exactly the language that was used in 1957; "will assert."

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, "shall" in this context would mean a determination and a purpose. "Will" has a different connotation when used in connection with the third person.

Now, my question is was the word "will" instead of "shall" used advisedly?

Mr. MEEKER. It was used because it was the exact same expression which governments have used before, ten years ago.

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, then—

MANY WAYS TO ASSERT RIGHTS

Secretary RUSK. Senator, may I just intrude for a second here? I am sorry Senator McClellan left—oh, Senator McClellan, you are here. I made the point that this language neither commits us to nor prohibits the use of force here, and that I told you that the Executive would be back with you later if that situation should arise.

But I want to be completely frank on this. The language "will assert" does not mean that we will do absolutely nothing. There are many ways to assert rights, and so that if there is anyone who feels that we ought to pay no attention to this right in the Gulf of Aqaba or the Strait of Tiran, we ought to treat it with indifference, we ought not to lift a finger on that, then this language goes beyond that.

Senator McCLELLAN. Will you yield?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, Senator.

Senator McCLELLAN. You mean by "assert" you will assert it in one instance and if you are not successful in achieving your objective you will assert it another way. Does it not imply, I get the implication from it, that when you say "assert it" you mean to assert it to the point of gaining the objective?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the assertion of the right itself is not a final obligation to go all the way, but it is not trivial language, Senator. I do not want to be—

Senator McCLELLAN. I know it. I just wanted everybody else to be—

Secretary RUSK. And you are quite right to want to know what it means.

What I am saying is we will assert it in every way we can—in the first instance without the use of force, but on the question of the use of force, it is not a commitment here. The President will surely be in consultation with the Congress before we get to that point.

Senator McCLELLAN. What I was concerned about, Mr. Secretary, was that we all agree to "assert." We give one interpretation to what we mean by "assert."

Someone else signing it, some other government, gives another. Therefore, when we say "assert" we mean we are going in there to gain this right; to make it secure and to exercise this right. The other government might say, "Well, we didn't mean that. If that is what you meant, go ahead." We will get out again on a limb with nobody supporting us. That is what concerns me, because I think we are there in Vietnam now, assuming we are there, and have a right to be and it is our place to be there, we have an obligation to be there, I think there are many others who have a greater obligation to be there than we have who are not there.

THE PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL WATERS

Senator LAUSCHE. I want to conclude. Based upon my own observation of the high seas and supported by the convention which has been described, to me it appears clear that these waters, this strait leading into the Gulf of Aqaba, connects two bodies of international waterways. I subscribe fully to the rationalization given by Senator Rusk. [Laughter.] Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, by Secretary Rusk.

Demonstrating that a principle is involved there dealing with many straits throughout the world.

I have no hesitation about declaring by myself as a member of this committee that these straits are international waters. That is my view at the present, and I now conclude my questioning.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Cooper?

INTENTION TO ENFORCE PASSAGE

Senator COOPER. Some of the questions I have perhaps have been asked. But I think it is important that we consider every facet of the declaration. I think it is important to say that, if these straits are not opened, it is our intention to enforce the passage. I think that is the position.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. From your information and knowledge, would this declaration inhibit or prevent Israel from attempting to force a passage because if they attempt, I think we all have to think there is going to be a war.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think there is nothing in this declaration which in itself would prevent that, particularly action by Israel to protect or defend the passage of its own vessels through a strait of this sort.

I do believe, if there are a substantial number of maritime powers that assert this principle, this might have a delaying effect upon a cataclysmic decision which the Israeli government may feel it has to make because of the vital importance of this strait to it. In that sense, I think this declaration provides a little more moderation because there is a sense that the international community is interested in it and is trying to make good on the rights which are so vital to Israel and, for that matter, to Jordan, if the Nasser-King Hussein affair were to flare up in a hostile way at some point.

AN ASSURANCE TO ISRAEL

Senator COOPER. I can understand that. It might for the time being inhibit Israel from taking action to open the strait. But if Israel accepted that, it goes along that Israel would expect the governments who might sign this declaration at some point to open the strait, isn't this an assurance to Israel that if the strait is not opened by action of the United Nations or some diplomatic means that these governments who then signed the declaration will take action to open the strait?

Secretary RUSK. In that sense, sir, the situation is no different from what it was ten years ago in 1957 when the basic agreement was made on these arrangements. Israel at that time understood that it had the right, just as other countries did, with respect to their own ships going through these waters. I do not think that situation has changed, although at the moment it is more enflamed.

Senator COOPER. My point is that I think the key to Israel's position now is that the strait would be opened. If it does not take action to open the strait itself, then it will assume that those who signed this declaration have implied, if not promised, to open the strait.

Secretary RUSK. I think Israel will be prepared to see a maximum effort made by the maritime nations on this issue before they made a final decision with respect to self-help on a unilateral basis.

Senator COOPER. I notice in the second paragraph, the second sentence: "Our governments will assert this right on behalf of all shipping sailing under their flags, and our governments are prepared to cooperate among themselves and to join with others in seeking general recognition of this right."

Would Israel be asked to sign this declaration?

Secretary RUSK. That matter has not been finally decided. There are some pluses and minuses on that. At the present time, I cannot give you a final answer on that, Senator.

CONSULTING CONGRESS

Senator COOPER. I went through those documents in 1957, and I noticed the Secretary of State at that time said that the United States, of course, considering this to be international waters, would assert its own right to put ships of our registry through the strait, but it would not assert them in favor of other ships except by resolution of the Congress.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator COOPER. Now, this declaration would go farther. That would say there that we assert this right not only on behalf of the United States, but we are prepared to cooperate among themselves and to join with others in seeking general recognition of this right.

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think if a matter of the use of force arose, the President would be in full consultation with the Congress, and we have very much in mind the constitutional processes here throughout this situation.

SENDING A TEST SHIP

Senator COOPER. One other question. Of course, the best way to test it would be to send a ship up there, and if that ship passed

without any difficulty, why, at least it has been asserted as to that particular country and ship.

But suppose the United States sends a ship up and it is stopped; it is fired upon. The United States would then have to make a determination to go through against hostile action or withdraw. It would be a pretty difficult question.

Now, it was said that the President would consult, you have said that the President would consult with the Congress before using force. Well, under the situation I have indicated, you might be using force simply—you would have to use force or back off if the ship is up there. Would the government consult with the Congress before sending a ship up to test such a situation?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I will certainly—

Senator COOPER. Because you would be—

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. Take that question under advisement.

I think I am not able today to give a final categorical answer, because we are talking here about giving merchant vessels which are at the disposition of their owners, and the movements of which are not necessarily under our control; quite frankly I do not anticipate, we do not know of a U.S. flag ship at the present time that is planning to go into that strait, do we, Bob?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, we do not.

Secretary RUSK. We do not have many in there because I do not think this contingency is likely to arise. I do not think this will be the first contingency to arise in this situation.

Senator MCCLELLAN. Would you yield?

Senator COOPER. Yes.

CLARIFY MATTERS IN ADVANCE

Senator MCCLELLAN. Would you not think generally, there might be exceptions, that you would make your determination about what you intended to do before you sent the ship up there?

Secretary RUSK. What we are intending to do, Senator, in connection with U.N. business is to get these things clarified well ahead of time and avoid the problem because some of the statements President Nasser has made have indicated that, except for Israeli flag ships, he may not change what has been happening here over the past years.

Now, the principle involved—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Does he assert the right to do it, however?

Secretary RUSK. Well, he has talked about closing the strait to foreign flag vessels carrying strategic goods. Now, in fact, strategic goods have not been going through that strait other than the possibility of considering crude oil. But in doing so he has also referred to the Battle Act list of strategic goods, and crude oil is not on the Battle Act list.

So these are elements of obscurity here which need to be clarified, and we are trying to find out exactly what it is that Nasser says he will and will not do, so we will know what—how we proceed from there.

Senator MCCLELLAN. I was not pressing the thing except—

Secretary RUSK. I understand.

Senator McCLELLAN [continuing]. Except before we send a ship up there we ought to know what we intend to do—

Secretary RUSK. I agree with you.

Senator McCLELLAN [continuing]. Before we send it up there. We might agree to send it up there and to do nothing. I do not know. But I do not think that a decision should be made generally—at least there might be an exception—before we send a ship up there, as to what we intend to do.

Senator SPARKMAN. Any more, Senator Cooper?

Senator COOPER. One more question.

DANGER OF EXACERBATING THE SITUATION

As I understand it, the U.S., through its resolution in the Security Council, is proposing a dampening down of the situation.

In your judgment, would this declaration, if issued, have any effect upon exacerbating the situation, knowing Nasser's disposition, in view of his declaration that he would not let any of the ships through?

Secretary RUSK. I think, Senator, in terms of the timing of the declaration, we want to take into account the then state of discussion at the Security Council and through private diplomacy.

Certainly the Arabs will not like this, but if you have twelve to twenty countries signing it, it has considerable weight, and in those, such as the President of the Security Council or, perhaps, the Secretary General, would have more muscle in their talks with the other side, with the Arabs, to try to get an answer to this question of the strait, because this will have, I think, very considerable weight in any such discussions.

POSSIBLE CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Senator COOPER. I will ask one more that goes beyond this. Do you anticipate in any way or believe that this situation there could bring the United States into a confrontation with the Soviet Union?

Secretary RUSK. I think it is possible, sir.

I did indicate to the Senators earlier, I think you were here when I said that we had had certain exchanges with the Soviet Union.

One cannot reply upon anything absolutely in matters of this sort, but it is our impression that they are not themselves now reaching out for a military confrontation; that they do not want major hostilities in the area. Although we should be under no illusion about it, they would like to make as many Brownie points as possible in supporting the so-called progressive states, Egypt, Syria, Algeria, against the more moderate Arab states, against Israel, and undoubtedly they hope to pick up prestige in the Arab world.

Now, let me say on that, sir, I mentioned earlier that President Nasser has climbed on the back of a tiger here. If when we get through with this thing the strait is opened, and the Holy war has not occurred, then there is going to be a rebound from there as far as the Arab man in the street is concerned.

Senator COOPER. I do not think he can back down. That is the problem.

CLOSING OF STRAITS MAY BE SELECTIVE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Will the Senator yield for one question? Going to a very important part of this, has it been determined that Nasser asserts the right in his complete discretion to close the strait to anyone, any shipping, all shipping?

Secretary RUSK. He has not yet said that categorically.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Or selectively closing it.

Secretary RUSK. I think that the Arab answer to that would be selectively; that is, it seems that their attitude—and Mr. Meeker, will you check on this—it seems to me they are talking about closing it to Israeli flag ships and the flags of other nations carrying strategic goods.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If he can close it selectively, then he asserts complete sovereignty over the strait.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How does that affect Jordan's rights?

Jordan's only outlet to the sea is by way of Aqaba.

Secretary RUSK. It could affect Jordan's rights if Cairo wished to exercise themselves against Jordan.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And Saudi Arabia fronts on the sea.

Secretary RUSK. That is right. There are four riparian countries involved in this Gulf of Aqaba thing, plus the general international rights of maritime nations.

Now, three of those riparian countries are together because the issue is Israel, but they may not be together next time when this question comes up.

VALIDITY OF THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT

Senator KUCHEL. Senator, may I ask one quick question, please? Senator SPARKMAN. Bearing on this? Because I wanted to call on Secretary McNamara.

Senator KUCHEL. Just one quick question.

Mr. Secretary, does the department consider that there is any validity in the old tripartite agreement? Is there any obligation to the three signatory countries?

Secretary RUSK. The principle under the tripartite agreement has been restated by American Presidents, and was essentially the language used by the President in his statement of May 23.

As far as Britain is concerned, and there are—you should look over the record of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in my last appearance, Senator Kuchel—

Senator KUCHEL. Okay.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. As far as the British are concerned, they consider the tripartite declaration has been overtaken by a press conference statement by President Kennedy, reaffirmed by the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons in 1963.

The French are very uncertain on this point. I would think we would have to assume, though, as far as the organic tripartite character of that declaration is concerned that Britain and France would think that was overtaken by the Suez affair.

Senator KUCHEL. Thank you.

Secretary RUSK. Although the policy may be continued by all three.

LANGUAGE OF THE AIDE MEMOIRE

Senator SPARKMAN. I want to ask Secretary McNamara to make some comments.

Senator MCNAMARA. I only wanted to comment on one question raised by Senator Cooper, Mr. Chairman.

He asked: Does the proposed declaration go beyond the statement of 1957, specifically with respect to stating that the U.S. government is prepared to join with others in seeking general recognition of this right. I think the answer is, no, it does not, Senator Cooper.

The specific language of the aide memoire delivered by our government to Israel on February 11, 1957 is, and I am going to leave out one or two clauses, but the essence of it is, "The U.S. is prepared to join with others to secure general recognition of this right." I think, therefore, the language of the declaration parallels that of the U.S. government's statement to Israel in February of 1957.

Senator COOPER. I do not want to get legalistic, but I think this ought to go in the record. Later on February 19, 1957, the Secretary of State, commenting on that aide memoire, said, as I read it, that it only applied to the United States, that it would assert that right for vessels under its own registry, but it had no right to assert it for any other country.

Senator MCNAMARA. I think this specific language was that—this was on the 19th of February:

The President has inherent power to use the forces of the United States to protect American ships and their rights all over the world, but he has no power, in my opinion, to use the forces of the United States on behalf of vessels of another flag unless he is given that authority by some congressional resolution or by a treaty.

The distinction between the——

Senator LAUSCHE. Whom are you quoting?

Senator MCNAMARA. I am quoting Secretary Dulles speaking to a news conference on February 19, 1957.

I think this is the language that Senator Cooper was alluding to, and the distinction between that language and the aide memoire language of February 11, 1957 related to the use of force in support of the recognition of the right as opposed to joining with others in seeking general recognition.

I only wanted to point out the language of the declaration parallels that of the statement to Israel on February 11.

Senator COOPER. I think that is a correct interpretation.

Senator SPARKMAN. Secretary Rusk is going to have to leave within a few minutes.

Senator Case?

IN CASE ISRAEL TAKES ACTION

Senator CASE. I have one question.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am sorry, I thought you were still out of the room when I called on Senator Cooper.

Senator CASE. Mr. Secretary, what will the United States do if Israel moves by land or sea or by air? Have we got a contingent plan?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, quite frankly we are trying to look at all of the contingencies in the situation. But I think it would be quite irresponsible for me to try to come up with an answer to that question. It would be for the President to make a determination in that situation and to discuss the situation with the leadership to decide what the attitude of the Congress will be.

I just think that is much too far-reaching and serious a question for me to try to answer casually, quite frankly.

Senator CASE. It is a serious question, very serious.

Secretary RUSK. And it is a question we have very much in mind, of course.

You might want to review, if you have not done so, a good deal of the record here that is in the Foreign Relations Committee on the occasion of my last appearance in executive session on what has been done and said in the past on this point.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Thurmond?

SOVIET GOALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Secretary, I want to ask if you are of the opinion or partially of the opinion that I am, that one of the causes of this trouble in the Middle East is the desire of the Soviets to possibly cause us to lose our contacts with the Arabs. I just started to say, knowing that the Soviets desire to stir up trouble over the world, and their goal is still to dominate and take over the world, if they can create an incident there and get the Arabs all together, it seems they have been very successful from what has happened with King Hussein and Nasser have been at odds and now are joined together. All the Arab countries it seems are consolidating and working together now, and if they do, and throw Israel on the other side, then they may feel we will defend Israel. That will cause the Arabs to go against us, causing them to cancel our oil contracts with them. I just wonder if you have any information on that.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think there is no question but that the Soviet Union has been working for some time to increase its own position in the Arab world by supporting these, particularly these four progressive states, and that the confrontation between Nasser and the more moderate and conservative states has been a part of that controversy.

This has been enhanced because Nasser has now been able to pose an issue with Israel on which all Arabs apparently have to speak together. This is a matter for internal survival for most of them on this particular issue.

But I would point out that this is the only issue on which they can speak together, and although the Arabs publicly are saying a good many things these days in terms of unity on this point, I do not believe the moderate and conservative Arabs are under any illusion about some of the other elements involved in this situation.

I think that is true of Hussein. I think it is true of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, and I think it is true of Tunisia, Lebanon, Morocco.

So I would not take too tragically a view at this point of the possibility that the entire Arab world suddenly is going to move into the arms of the Soviet Union over this particular issue.

It is very important for us to get this straight, this situation straightened out, so that the other issues in the Arab world will come to the surface again.

DENYING THE WEST ARAB OIL

I think the Soviet Union is more interested in perhaps denying the West the Arab oil than it is in getting the oil for themselves. But that is very much a two-edge sword. It would cause some major disruption in the free world if Arab oil were denied, say, to Western Europe. But it also means that the Arab countries themselves would lose their basic resource. They cannot drink the oil. They cannot do anything else with it but sell it, and the Communist Bloc is not—does not need it in terms of oil supply.

It would cause great disarrangement for all the rest of us, but it certainly would have a large effect on the Arab world if they lose world markets in the sale of their oil.

Senator THURMOND. If they can deny the West that oil they would certainly accomplish a big objective they have in mind.

Secretary RUSK. I suppose perhaps in the short run. I do not quite see reducing the Middle East, even from their point of view, to subsistence and complete dependence upon their support in lieu of Arab sales of oil to the entire world. I think there are some limitations on their side as well as on ours in that situation.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, on account of the shortness of time I will not ask any further questions.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, may I have one minute?

Senator SPARKMAN. Okay, Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. I was going to take but one minute.

U.S. PEOPLE WILL NOT SUPPORT UNILATERAL ACTION

I want to thank you for being among those invited here. Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you for trying to get some kind of agreement and committal from other nations.

I judge you think that nothing effective is going to come out of the U.N. on it. So I think we ought to reach someone else. I do not believe our people—I want you to remember, at least one Senator thinks our people are not going to support another undeclared war, a shooting war, alone, of us going in alone. I just do not believe that it can be over.

I think, therefore, you ought to tell England and France and others that is the situation. That they need not think that they can stand by and wait for us to go in alone. I believe, though, that is in the back of a lot of their minds, at least, that they will hold back until they are convinced of that fact.

Senator MCCLELLAN. Exactly what I was trying to determine about this word “assert.”

Senator STENNIS. Yes. I think I ought to say that here.

I do not want to say it on the floor, not yet, because I think you are working hard and making some headway. I was glad to see you are trying to get these other nations.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, may I say just a word about the U.N. security aspect of this.

Senator STENNIS. I was not trying to discredit them. I think you—

Secretary RUSK. I think it is unlikely that this matter is going to be settled by a resolution of the Security Council, that is, a formal resolution, because there are vetoes and there are voting problems and things of that sort.

But if you will remember the Cuban missile crisis, it proved to be very important that that question was officially before the U.N. because that helped to take certain of the prestige factors into custody, to the ice box, for a period, while other processes reached a solution.

Now, the same thing may well be true here, the fact that it is before the Security Council gives other processes of discussion a somewhat better chance to operate. So we just do not know.

Senator STENNIS. I was not suggesting that you abandon them. I am just glad you are going another route.

Secretary RUSK. I understand.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Secretary, when Israel—

Senator SPARKMAN. Wait a minute.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you.

That is all, Mr. Chairman. I just want to make that statement.

IF ISRAEL QUESTIONS THE MEANING

Senator LAUSCHE. If and when Israel asks what is the meaning of the words "will assert" what answer will be given to them?

Secretary RUSK. As far as this declaration is concerned, the same answer Mr. Meeker read that we will give to all other governments.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Javits?

ASSESSMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, I am a guest of the committee. I appreciate it very greatly. If the chair allows me to ask one question I will, but only because it has not been covered. It is essentially a question of Secretary McNamara, and the question is this. Is there any reason to revise the U.S. appraisal of either the valor, the capacity or the fidelity of the forces of Israel in this situation?

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir; there is not. We believe they are well-equipped, well-trained, well-led and highly motivated.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

ATTACKS ON U.S. FLAG SHIPS

Senator LAUSCHE. This further question, and I wish it would be put following the last one. Do I understand that before any affirmative action having the relationship to actual shooting, the administration will come before this committee or before the Congress?

Secretary RUSK. That is my clear understanding, sir.

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Now, then, what would the attitude be of the administration about sending a ship up there and not knowing what is going to happen and if it is shot at?

Secretary RUSK. A U.S. flag ship?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. We do not have a U.S. flag merchant vessel scheduled there for the indefinite future.

We would like to avoid that situation again by getting the question settled before we get there. But I cannot give you a precise answer to that question at the moment, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, I would assume that you would not undertake to do that while you are aiming toward negotiations and some amicable way—

Secretary RUSK. A similar incident may arise by some other flag ship going through there. The owners have been rather skittish in the present state because they do not see clearly what would happen to their ships, and Lloyds has taken the insurance away.

Mr. Chairman, if I may say so, I greatly appreciated the invitation of the Foreign Relations Committee on my last appearance here to feel entitled to call upon the committee at any time of the day or night for further consultation. I hope, perhaps, that invitation can remain because we may need to consult with you very promptly on very short notice.

Senator SPARKMAN. It certainly does remain.

PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH ABBA EBAN

Senator LAUSCHE. Are you able to tell us what the President said to Eban in the meeting the other day? If you are not, just say so.

Secretary RUSK. May I just have a word with the Vice President? [Discussion off the record.]

IN THE HIGHEST INTERESTS OF THE NATION

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, may I just say one word with reference to the administration. I think what they have done so far has been in the highest interests of our nation, and for one senator I would like to say so privately and publicly.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Senator Javits. Secretary McNamara? [Laughter.]

Secretary MCNAMARA. I feel privileged and complimented.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is the result of what somebody else did. Senator Lausche, I believe.

Well, we appreciate the attendance of both of you gentlemen. May I say this, that speaking on behalf of the committee, and I am sure for the Chairman, we stand ready at any time—I am sure Secretary Rusk remembers back during 1950 and 1951 when we were trying to work up the Japanese peace treaty, our Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs was ready, and we held meetings, morning, noon, and night.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, at the risk of being boring, I want to emphasize that I am trying to be frank today, and that we have to exercise discretion in what we say.

[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m. the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, JUNE 5, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
AD HOC HUMAN RIGHTS SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The ad hoc subcommittee met in executive session at 10:55 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Dodd, Clark, Hickenlooper and Cooper.

Executives J, K, and L, 88th Congress, 1st session, the Human Rights Conventions, were ordered reported to the full committee.

[The ad hoc subcommittee adjourned at 11:15 a.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, JUNE 5, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 4:10 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Symington (presiding), Morse, Gore, Lausche, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Williams and Cooper.

Also present: Senators Allott, Anderson, Baker, Bennett, Boggs, Brooke, Byrd of Virginia, Byrd of West Virginia, Cotton, Dirksen, Dominick, Fannin, Griffin, Harris, Hatfield, Holland, Hollings, Hruska, Javits, Jordan of Idaho, Kennedy of Massachusetts, Long of Louisiana, McClellan, McGee, McIntyre, Metcalf, Miller, Monroney, Montoya, Morton, Moss, Murphy, Muskie, Pastore, Pearson, Prouty, Proxmire, Scott, Smith, Spong, Thurmond, Tydings, Williams of New Jersey, Yarborough, and Young of North Dakota.

Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; accompanied by William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State, briefed the group on the Middle East situation. All members of the Senate were invited.

[The committee adjourned at 6:30 p.m.]

BRIEFING ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

Wednesday, June 7, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 5:10 p.m., in room S-207, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.

Also present: Senators Allott, Baker, Bennett, Boggs, Byrd of Virginia, Byrd of West Virginia, Cannon, Cotton, Dirksen, Dominick, Fannin, Fong, Griffin, Hansen, Harris, Hatfield, Hayden, Hruska, Javits, Jordan of Idaho, Kennedy of New York, Kuchel, Magnuson, McGee, Miller, Mondale, Monroney, Montoya, Morton, Moss, Murphy, Muskie, Pastore, Percy, Prouty, Randolph, Ribicoff, Russell, Scott, Smith, Spong, Stennis, Thurmond, Tydings, Yarborough, and Young of North Dakota.

William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. We will come to order. The Secretary has another meeting at 6:30, and we have to start on time. Close the doors, Mr. Kuhl.

The briefing this afternoon on the situation in the Middle East for all members of the Senate was arranged at the request of the administration. In view of the widespread interest of members of the Senate in developments there, the administration thought it would be helpful for this briefing to take place at this time.

For those members of the Foreign Relations Committee who are present, I want them to know that I am seeking to arrange for the Secretary to meet with us tomorrow or Friday for consultation and an examination in greater depth of our policies in the Middle East. I am sure all members of the Senate appreciate the fact that a briefing of the kind we have arranged for today does not permit the free exchange of ideas and the examination of policy in depth which is essential if the Senate as an institution is to handle its business in such a way as to discharge its constitutional responsibilities in the field of foreign policy.

Mr. Secretary, we are very glad to have you. I hope you will proceed as you wish.

If you are willing and have time to entertain questions after your statement, I shall do my best to recognize members of the Senate in order of their seniority of that body.

Mr. Secretary, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Senators.

I do not come today with a prepared statement, but rather notes on the basis of which I want to bring you up to date on where we are at the moment, and to invite your questions and comments on the situation as it may unfold.

The Security Council of the United Nations has just held its meeting, called for by the Soviet Union today, and it has passed a second resolution on the cease-fire designating 4 o'clock today Eastern Standard Time as the time for cessation of firing and all military activities.

Upon the cease-fire, the situation as we understand it is that Israel has said it would welcome a cease-fire, but for that, with the exception of Jordan, we do not have a clear expression from the other Arab governments as to whether they are willing to accept it.

We do have resistance, publicly expressed by countries like Iraq, who are not in direct touch with Israeli forces. But the situation is somewhat obscure on the Arab side.

That itself is of some interest because the Soviet Union, beginning yesterday, has been pressing for an immediate cease-fire, and has not been able to produce Arab agreement to the cease-fire. Indeed, the general Arab view, expressed in the corridors last evening at the end of that long evening session, was that the unanimous resolution of the Security Council was a sellout to Israel, and that the Soviet Union's support for that resolution was a betrayal of their support for the Arabs.

THE MILITARY SITUATION

As far as the military situation is concerned, for all practical purposes I think we can assume that Israel has established military superiority throughout the Sinai Peninsula, that it has gained complete air supremacy, and that it is on the verge of having full military control of the West Bank of the Jordan river as far as that portion of Jordan is concerned.

We have heard reports during the day that Eastern European countries are rushing equipment to Egypt. We do not see mass movements of equipment. We doubt very much that such equipment will make much difference in the present military situation.

The report of flights of aircraft from Algeria to Egypt are not likely to change the military situation substantially. So, in terms of assessing the situation, I think it is a reasonable assumption as a factual matter that the Israeli forces have succeeded up to practically the canal itself, have seized Sharm el-Sheikh at the Straits of Tiran, and are in command of the West Bank.

I would like to comment briefly on the costs to us thus far in terms of our situation in the Near East.

We have now had breaches of relations from nine countries. Those are Egypt, Algeria, Syria, the Yemen, the Sudan, Iraq, Mauritania, Lebanon and, I believe, Burundi down in Central Africa.

I think we need not at the moment try to speculate as to how far this diplomatic action goes and how long it is likely to last because the situation in the different capitals seems to be somewhat obscure.

LIMITING THE BREACH

On the assumption that this is a very private meeting, Mr. Chairman, and what I am saying here will not be quoted outside, a number of these governments which are breaking relations have discussed ways and means of limiting the breach.

For example, Egypt has talked about our leaving behind a number of diplomatic and administrative officers to carry on functions under the technical supervision of a protecting power.

The Sudan has talked about finding arrangements to continue economic, cultural and business relationships, and we think that there are other ways in which they can translate this into what has now come to be called a soft break rather than a hard break in diplomatic relations, somewhat the way they did in Germany over the recognition in Israel, somewhat in terms of the break, breach, where Great Britain holds Rhodesia.

Nevertheless it is true that we are suffering at the present time significantly as far as Arab public opinion is concerned.

This is related to the general view that Israel committed aggression in this situation, and that the United States is in sympathetic support of Israel. More specifically, it has been radically inflamed by the direct charges which have been widely circulated throughout the Arab world that U.S. aircraft participated in the attacks on Egypt, and from Damascus that U.S. infantry forces are involved in the operations.

We do not know anyone who believes it except—that is as far as governments are concerned. We know the Soviets know better. They have their own vessels alongside practically our own carriers, and they know perfectly well that our aircraft have not taken part in these operations.

The Libyans know we have not used Wheelus Airfield for any such purposes. But as Arabs have explained it to me in the last 24 hours, President Nasser has felt that it was necessary for him to make a case that he was defeated not by Israel but by a combination of Israel and two great powers, the U.S. and the U.K.

But the cost to us in Arab public opinion in the short run is, of course, substantial.

THE OIL PROBLEM

As far as oil is concerned, the situation at the present time is fluid. Some of the production has been stopped as a means of protecting the actual production facilities themselves.

For example, at Bahrain, the facilities are closed for protective purposes.

ESSO Libya has stopped production in exports.

Saudi Arabia has joined those who stopped exporting to the U.S. and the U.K.

Oil sanctions applied just to the U.S. and U.K. are not likely to have very far-reaching effects because if they continue to send oil into Western Europe generally we and the U.K. can get along reasonably well with other arrangements and shifting sources.

But, nevertheless, the oil problem remains touchy, and we have a full-time team working on that with the oil industry, both our own and international oil industries, in order to keep the situation under review and take the protective steps that may be necessary.

The closing of the Suez Canal, of course, affects the shipment of oil into Europe, adds about 16 days to the passage of oil tankers. But the fact that in recent years tankers have gotten to be very large has reduced the impact of that problem upon supplying Western Europe.

A STUNNING SETBACK TO NASSER

The costs to others also are high. Nasser has had a stunning setback. We already see signs of considerable disillusionment in the Arab world about the predicament into which Nasser has led them.

Quite apart from the question of who might have started this affair, the Arabs, including many in Cairo, now apparently are saying, "Well, in any event, he should have own better in terms of the military situation or should have known more about the attitude of the Soviet Union or more about the dangers which might have been created by action taken over against Israel."

We have nothing to confirm the newspaper report out of London this morning that the general of the forces in Sinai has taken over command of the armed forces, and that Nasser is expected to be finished.

We just have nothing pointing in that direction at all, and it is the kind of newspaper story that could be written out of an arm-chair in London without any special information to go on.

SOVIET INEFFECTIVENESS

The Soviet Union has, I think, in the longer run suffered a considerable setback here. There has been a considerable Arab reaction against the, what they consider to be, support, encouragement and pledges from the Soviet Union which, in the showdown, did not prove to be effective.

I might say to you very privately that we do not see indications thus far from our Watch Committee that the Soviet Union is engaging in any military moves that might indicate a military intervention in the situation. Of course, we would be extremely interested in that if any such indications came along.

But, in looking at the situation, we are puzzled as to whether the Soviet Union had quite a different military estimate of the situation than we and other governments in the West have had for some time about the relative capacity of the armed forces as between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Indeed, I think the speed with which the Israeli forces prevailed surprised their own estimators, as well as our own. But we are puzzled about whether the Soviets really thought that in this kind of a clash the Arab forces would be able to prevail.

You would suppose that they felt that they knew a good deal about the Arab forces since they had equipped many of them with

a lot of their equipment, and had trained a lot of them to fly in airplanes and run their tanks.

But if this did arise out of a miscalculation, then I suppose that somebody in Moscow is in some difficulty at the present time.

PRIVATE EXCHANGES WITH SOVIET UNION

We also are somewhat puzzled by the fact that the tenor of the private exchanges which we have had from the Soviet Union over the past 10 days or so are quite different from the public attitude of the Soviet Union as reflected in their broadcasts and their statements even in the United Nations.

Their private exchanges have shown a much better, a much greater, degree of moderation in terms of an interest in restraining the two sides, in terms of bringing the fighting to a conclusion when it started than one would read from their public broadcasts.

So we cannot ourselves yet make a very good judgment about just what the Soviet Union considers its gain to be.

We do know they are giving advice to the Arabs at the present time which the Arabs are not yet prepared to accept in terms of how to bring the situation to a close.

ISRAEL'S STUNNING SUCCESS

As, far as Israel is concerned, if Nasser has had a stunning setback, the Israelis have had a stunning military success.

We, I think, can expect Israel to take a very strong position on a very simple notion put forward by Foreign Minister Eban when he said that Israel will not withdraw to a state of belligerence, but will withdraw to a state of peace.

I think we can expect Israel to insist very hard that just the restoration of some temporary arrangements, supervised by the U.N., is not good enough.

I think we can expect them to take the position that they, too, are one of the 122 members of the United Nations; that they are a sovereign state; that their existence will have to be acknowledged; and they will have the prerequisites of any other sovereign state. I think we will find that they may be very resistant to any kind of U.N. supervisory machinery, as indicating some discrimination against Israel among the 122 members of the U.N.

I think we can be very sure the Israelis will insist upon a permanent solution to the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba situation.

I think they very well might insist upon an opening of the Suez Canal, in other words, the attributes of everybody in this situation.

Of course, what Israel has in mind is going to be extremely difficult for the Arab side to take, at least under the present governments of the Arab countries.

Now, whether there will be changes among some of these governments we cannot at the present time know for certain. But you all know the deep feelings on both sides in the situation, and the problems which the Arab governments have had in making sense in certain occasions, given the attitude of the mobs in the street and the ease with which high passions can be whipped up in connection with the relationships with Israel.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROBLEM SOLVING

Now, we hope very much that out of this crisis, which we tried to prevent, that there can come an opportunity for some much more far-reaching solutions to some of these problems than have thus been achieved.

It may well be that this is a time to make some real headway on the Arab refugee problem. It certainly is the time when this question of standing people apart with rights of belligerence will have to be dealt with.

The claim of the Egyptians that they could close Straits of Tiran because they were in a state of war with Israel and can exercise rights of belligerence is the sort of claim that just cannot endure in the future if there is to be peace in that area.

We would hope that out of this could come a more solid, regional approach to economic and social development in the area, and under such cooperative ventures, such as transportation and water developments, things such as that.

We would hope at long last the Soviet Union might be willing to talk some sense about getting the arms suppliers together in getting some limitations on the race in conventional weapons.

As I have told some of you before, we have had occasional contacts with the Soviets on that subject. They have been willing to cooperate with respect to nuclear weapons, but have never been willing to talk seriously about finding some limitations on a level of conventional arms. It may be that rather than spend an additional billion dollars to try to restore what has been lost in the fighting in the last three days, in reequipping, say, Egypt, that they might be willing to let the Geneva Conference, for example, get together a group to talk seriously about some sort of arms limitations in the area as a whole.

WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES

The most immediate next question for the Security Council, if the Arabs do come in and accept the cease-fire, will be to work on the problems of withdrawal, and that will immediately involve us in the nature of a permanent settlement.

I would not want to predict that it is going to be easy to get a quick withdrawal of Israeli forces unless they see more clearly than they do now the picture of the eventual settlement which will come out of this present situation.

We can expect considerable instability and fluidity in the area. I would hesitate to try to predict today how many of the Arab governments can survive this situation.

I do want you to know that behind the scenes there is a good deal more moderation in the Arab world and among Arab governments than would appear on some of the broadcasts, and that very much behind the scenes there is a considerable satisfaction that President Nasser, who has caused so much trouble among the Arabs themselves, has had a very significant setback in this situation.

Mr. Chairman, that is a very brief summary of where we are at the moment. I will be glad to take questions and try to elaborate any particular points that might come up.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
If it is agreeable, I would like to call on members in order of seniority.

Senator Hayden, do you have any questions?

Senator HAYDEN. No.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Senator Russell?

Senator RUSSELL. Yes, I have one or two.

IMPACT OF OIL SANCTIONS

Mr. Secretary, I happen to have been in France in 1956 when they closed the canal, and it was very disagreeable with the French. Even the hotels broke down in cooking and heating.

Do the French have adequate oil from Algeria and other places without coming through the canal now?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the French are at the present time not being specifically subject to oil sanctions by the Arab countries.

Senator RUSSELL. I know. But how about the canal, is it closed?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the canal is closed. They have important oil resources in both Algeria and in Libya.

Senator RUSSELL. And they are adequate?

Secretary RUSK. So we think as far as France is concerned they will be in reasonably good shape.

There will have to be some readjustment involving ourselves and the United Kingdom.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, we have been getting certain of our Far Eastern oil out of there, out of some of those countries. But we think that adjustments can be made without causing us any trouble.

U.S. AID TO THOSE WHO BREAK RELATIONS

Senator RUSSELL. You are talking about this soft breaking of relations. If they break relations and withdraw their ambassadors and, I assume, make ours come home, and yet they still want to stay on the dole and the aid program and all that, it would seem to me to be a rather gentle way to run a breach of relations.

Secretary RUSK. No. I would think, Senator, in the case of those who break relations with us that the U.S. Government aid programs would not go forward under the rug. But I do bring to your attention the fact that we do participate, for example, in the FAO's world food program, and I think there might be some very serious difficulties if we were to drop out of the FAO's world food program, which is somewhat limited in scope, because a particular country has broken relations with us.

There is a more—there is a second problem we will have to think about, and I do not want to—we do not have a final decision on this, and that is in those countries where there is a breach of relations but where American private citizens are welcome to remain, and where some of our voluntary agencies such as Church World Services or missionary groups, and things of that sort, remain behind, whether they should be permitted to go ahead with their own relief work based on Title III of P.L. 480. That is a rather complicated problem in relation to our longer range interests in those countries.

Senator RUSSELL. We stopped it in Egypt without any difficulty.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. I am not now suggesting an answer. I am just saying—

Senator RUSSELL. Frankly, I do not think if a nation severs relations with us that we ought to go out of our way to ship them anything.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator RUSSELL. I do not think that should be just considered a kind of subject that does not really mean anything, because that is one of the things that gets the world into too many troubles, because we gloss over these things.

Secretary RUSK. I want you gentlemen to know that this is a problem we will have very shortly, and that is what we do about our church charitable groups which have been operating privately in these countries and have used relatively limited amounts of food in connection with our work in these countries.

I do not disagree with the feelings you express, Senator, but I am just saying it is somewhat complicated.

U.S. PRESSURE ON ISRAEL FOR A CEASE-FIRE

Senator RUSSELL. Apparently we have put a good deal of pressure on Israel with respect to the cease-fire. Why do we do that when they were gaining a great victory over people like Nasser, to whom we say we do not owe any obligations at all? Did the Israelis ask us to intercede?

Secretary RUSK. I think the Israelis were very pleased with the resolutions passed by the Security Council, and you will notice also that the Arabs called the resolution of the Security Council a sell-out to Israel.

Senator RUSSELL. Yes, I am aware of that. But I cannot believe that Russia would have gone so far if they had not had some intimation from Nasser that he was about to call it quits.

Secretary RUSK. What we were not able to agree upon in the Security Council was the idea that the Security Council would order a withdrawal on the basis of a status quo of June 5 that would have been—

Senator RUSSELL. The Israelis have not indicated any willingness to do that. If they do, they ought to have their heads examined.

Secretary RUSK. Nor do we because we have, as a maritime nation, an interest in the straits of Tiran, and some of the other countries—

Senator RUSSELL. And so with the Suez Canal.

Secretary RUSK. The withdrawal of the forces is necessarily going to get caught up in the nature of the settlement. It is going to take some time, and I hope—

Senator RUSSELL. If the Israelis gained a more complete victory, it would be more simple, would it not?

Secretary RUSK. Well, they have a complete victory now unless they crossed the canal. I do not know whether they want to try that or not.

Senator RUSSELL. They may not want to over-extend themselves.

PROTECT ISRAEL'S INDEPENDENCE

The CHAIRMAN. I may overlook somebody, but according to my estimates, next is Senator Magnuson.

Senator MAGNUSON. I wanted to ask the Secretary this. Naturally a lot of us have been contacted by many people interested in this whole matter since this happened, particularly the Jewish people in America, who have done so much to help Israel become what it is, which you and I know so well, and I would hope that we would not be a party to any kind of withdrawal, number one, to the status quo.

Number two, I would hope we would not become a party to withdrawal and leave something hanging, but we ought to now make as much permanence as we can for the independence of Israel for a long, long time, and get all maritime nations in concert on this old, real serious problem, leaving out the political, ideological problem of freedom of the seas.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. I think that—

Senator MAGNUSON. I hope—I was going to ask you—are we pretty much not formally, but are we pretty much committed to that generally?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think we ourselves have got an interest, as we have explained in earlier briefings down here, in this problem of the Straits of Tiran, and I myself have no doubt that that question is going to get settled in connection with the present situation.

Senator MAGNUSON. Yes. I think the Israeli people have got to know there is some kind of permanency of Israel.

Secretary RUSK. But I think, sir—

Senator MAGNUSON. In other words, I would go right on to Cairo if I were the Israelis.

ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT

Secretary RUSK. There would be some advantage in letting the President of the Security Council, a Dane, Mr. Tabor, and the Secretary General, have the first whack at negotiations between the two sides on the basis of a final settlement.

There are some reasons why it is better for us not to ourselves take on that job as a volunteer.

Senator MAGNUSON. I understand that.

Secretary RUSK. Although we have vital interests in many of the questions concerned, and we would be following it very closely with the Security Council. But we are not a very good party now to talk to the Arabs.

Senator MAGNUSON. No.

Secretary RUSK. And Mr. Tabor, President of the Security Council, probably is in a better position to do so.

Senator MAGNUSON. Yes.

Senator RUSSELL. How long will he be there?

Secretary RUSK. I beg pardon?

Senator RUSSELL. How long will Tabor be there?

Secretary RUSK. Throughout the month of June.

Senator RUSSELL. That is what I thought. Who succeeds him?

Secretary RUSK. Then Ethiopia, and I think in the case of Ethiopia they have interests very close to ours. They have relations with both Israel and the Arabs, and again, very privately, the Ethiopians have let it be known to us if this Straits of Tiran issue was not settled, Ethiopia was finished as a Red Sea owner, and they

have a vital stake in this question of freedom of navigation in there.

Senator MAGNUSON. I just want to say it seems to me a meeting point for a great number of people in the world would be this maritime problem, the freedom of the seas.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. I think there is no question about that.

Senator MAGNUSON. Bring them in.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

RUSSIAN ULTIMATUM TO ISRAEL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, reports have come over the air since the 4:00 o'clock meeting this afternoon indicating that Russia has sent some kind of a notice in the nature of an ultimatum that if Israel or if the Israelis do not stop shooting, Russia will withdraw recognition, with no mention of the fact that the Egyptians should stop shooting, too.

Now, can you verify that or give us any details on that?

Secretary RUSK. I saw a press ticker, Senator, that the Russians said to Israel if they did not cease fire immediately that Russia would break relations.

Well, in this day and age that is not a very severe sanction, and I do not believe that Israel is going to be too upset about that particular kind of threat.

We have not seen thus far signs of any action that the Soviet Union might take on the ground in this situation, with the possible exception of sending in some additional supplies, military supplies, if they can find anybody to give them to when they get there.

I should think that sending in more military supplies in this situation would be a rather unattractive project right now.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is interesting.

A SPECIAL OBLIGATION TO ISRAEL

Well, I do not know, I would not dispute your view on this, but I think we have a great opportunity to do something with the Arab world now, and I do not agree that we have a special obligation to serve Israel. But I think we have a special obligation to serve the integrity of Israel, along with every other country over there. I would not single Israel out against any other country, if we can save the peace of the world there.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, in that connection, if you look back over the last decade, the U.S. in a variety of ways has taken action on behalf of Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco in pursuance of this notion that we are committed to the independence and the territorial integrity of all the states in this area.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I think that is our proposition, and I think we make a tragic mistake if we choose up sides for any one country unless our own vital interests later indicate that we have to do it of necessity. I do not think we have come to that point yet.

Secretary RUSK. We are inclined—and I think I ought to mention this because if there are those who have a strongly different view it would be helpful to know it—we are inclined in this matter of the breach of relations to let these other countries determine the extent of the breach in the sense that if they want to maintain con-

sular, cultural relations, we will do it. Let us exclude aid from that, because breaking diplomatic relations and maintaining aid programs—but consular relations or cultural relations or those who say in the case of Egypt “We want your officials and people running the oil companies to stay,” we are inclined to do so on that basis.

But we are inclined to let them set the level of the breach and proceed on that basis in order to make it easier to restore the situation exactly.

Senator RUSSELL. As long as there is any quid pro quo, that is all right. But if it is one-sided—

Secretary RUSK. No, they would have the same type of relationship that we would have there.

CHANGE OF TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Just one question in the nature of an observation. I think it is entirely possible in the settlement of this situation that there may have to be certain territorial rearrangements, at least so far as claims are concerned, involving the freedom of the seas in the Gulf of Aqaba, and the freedom of the use of the canal, and things of that kind, which might be considered to be territorial alterations.

But I, what I meant was a massive or substantial change of territorial sovereignty.

Secretary RUSK. At the beginning of this recent fighting, Prime Minister Eshkol and General Dayan both said Israel did not have territorial ambitions.

My guess is that they are going to want to have some pretty hard guarantees on the Straits of Tiran, and that this is not necessarily their last word on this particular point.

But if they were to go for larger territorial changes in that area, the problem would be there that they probably would be sowing the seeds for another conflagration at that point.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Young?

ISRAELI CONTROL OF WATERWAYS

Senator YOUNG of North Dakota. Is Israel in about a position to take over the Tiran Straits or to control the Suez Canal? I would think after having gone this far it would be possible for them to do so, and in their own interest they would go to take control of the Tiran Straits, and then they could dictate—

Secretary RUSK. Well, they have occupied Sharm El Sheikh, which is the position opposite the Straits of Tiran on the southeastern corner of the Sinai Peninsula. So as far as the Gulf of Aqaba is concerned, they control it at the present time.

Senator YOUNG of North Dakota. And they are pretty secure and would be hard to dislodge?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, yes. I think they are very secure from a military point of view.

Senator YOUNG of North Dakota. I mean, the Arabs do not have any sizable force?

Secretary RUSK. No. The truth seems to be, gentlemen, that the Arab Air Forces have been, for all practical purposes, destroyed,

and that for the last twenty-four hours, the Israel Air Force has been able to operate not against Arab air, but against Arab ground forces, tanks and things of that sort.

Senator YOUNG of North Dakota. How near are they to controlling the Suez Canal?

Secretary RUSK. Well, they are on the east bank of the canal. They probably could deny the use of the canal. But in terms of seizing it and operating it, that is quite another matter.

SEEKING A CEASE-FIRE

Senator YOUNG of North Dakota. How would you get a nation like Israel to stop now, to get them to have a cease-fire when there is such bitter hatred?

Secretary RUSK. They are prepared to cease fire if the Arabs will. But the question of cleaning up afterwards in terms of a final settlement is another question.

Senator YOUNG of North Dakota. They could agree to it. Whether they would do it or not—

Secretary RUSK. No. We are a long ways away from a final settlement of this yet, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. I do not believe I will ask any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams of Delaware?

Senator WILLIAMS. I will skip.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stennis?

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Secretary, you said that Israel was ready to cease fire. But to what extent are they continuing to advance militarily, territorially?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, they are continuing right straight along in the absence of a cease-fire with the Arabs.

Senator STENNIS. I see.

Secretary RUSK. Now again, I can tell you that we have for 48 hours had some part in contacts between Israel and Jordan with respect to a cease-fire, because both sides apparently would like to have one. But it has broken down because local commanders, probably local Jordanian commanders, have not, in fact, stopped shooting, and the question was whether the Jordanian command had control of all of its own forces.

But while the other side is still shooting the Israelis are going ahead. Now they are prepared to cease fire if the Arabs will.

ISRAEL'S MILITARY OBJECTIVES

Senator STENNIS. Do you expect them to physically take the Canal, all of it? You say they have a negative on it now. But do you expect them to—

Secretary RUSK. I do not have any information on what the Israeli military objectives are. They have been pretty close-mouthed on this situation. The situation is quite different than in Vietnam where everybody is able to report anything they want to report out of there, and put it all on television. Both sides in this situation put a censorship on it immediately, and both sides have been rather close-mouthed in talking to other governments about their military plans and purposes.

MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM EASTERN EUROPE

Senator STENNIS. Quite briefly, what was that you said about the equipment coming out of Eastern Europe, the military equipment or supplies? You said that that was vague and uncertain.

Secretary RUSK. Well, we have heard some reports that additional military supplies were being sent from Eastern Europe to Egypt. But whether they, in fact, unload or will arrive, I should think is qualified somewhat by the very fast-moving situation on the ground.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

COMPELLING A CEASE-FIRE

Senator MUNDT. I think you said, Mr. Secretary, that the cease-fire is to begin at 4 o'clock today.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. But that turns upon the willingness of both sides to take it.

Senator MUNDT. Right.

Secretary RUSK. And they do not have anything very hard from the Arab side on this point, with the exception of Jordan.

Senator MUNDT. My question is, assuming the possibility of no cease-fire today or tomorrow at 4 o'clock, have we any other suggestions to propose to the Security Council such as, perhaps, economic sanctions against Egypt to compel them to cease fire and, if so, would the Russians join us?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, quite frankly we have not gotten to that point yet. We think the President of the Security Council and the Secretary General ought to be in touch with both sides to try to work out a cease-fire.

We think if they did that they would have the cooperation of the Russians in the present situation, but query whether some of the Arab governments could feel they could accept a cease-fire and survive.

I am not sure what the situation is in Cairo at the present time, for example. I just do not know.

Senator MUNDT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Smith?

Senator SMITH. No questions. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson?

Senator CARLSON. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, in relation to the remark you made about the Foreign Relations Committee, I will be very happy to come tomorrow at a time, a mutually convenient time, so we will try to get a further briefing tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine.

Senator Monroney.

REESTABLISHING RELATIONS WITH ARAB NATIONS

Senator MONRONEY. Mr. Secretary, what gain would we have to make any hastening or rushing the re-recognition of the Arab countries that broke off relations to justify apparently their story that our planes were attacking them?

Secretary RUSK. It is not a question of our rushing, but the question is simply not pressing the gap any further than they themselves insist upon pressing it at this time.

We do have important interests in these countries. We would like to have a presence, if one is feasible, and representation there.

My own guess, Senator, is that there is going to be a considerable revulsion against the Soviet Union in the Arab world here during the next several months, and if we have a presence there it would come in rather handy for us to be there.

Senator MONRONEY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pastore?

ISRAEL AND THE SUEZ CANAL

Senator PASTORE. I am a little concerned with the possibilities of our involvement in that part of the world. You have already said that there may be a cease-fire.

I would assume if that did happen the Israelis would stay pretty much in Egyptian territory that they now occupy, is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. Until there is the shape of a final settlement which is known.

Senator PASTORE. Then you went on to say that you would suppose that the Israeli government would want to assert itself as a sovereign state like all the other nations of the world, and that they would want free and innocent passage in the Straits of Tiran and, at the same time, would want the same concession made with regard to the Suez Canal.

Now, my question is this: Let us assume, as you have said, that the present rulers of the Arabic world will not agree to this for political reasons. What is the possibility of Russia beginning to assert itself, and then what would be our position in that respect, and what are our commitments with regard to that?

I would assume, before you begin answering, I would assume that Israel would be a darned fool at this time if it did not assert its rights to go through the Suez Canal like other nations of the world. They are there now.

Secretary RUSK. That was a part of the armistice arrangements which they were never able to collect on.

Senator PASTORE. That is right. And now they are there.

Secretary RUSK. They are the Canal, that is right.

Senator PASTORE. They are the Canal, and I would assume that they would insist upon that.

Now, let us assume they do insist, and the Arabic world won't agree. What is the possibility of any further assertion on the part of Russia and what does that mean to us?

Secretary RUSK. There is that possibility, Senator, that the Russians may take much more action practically than they have thus far. We do not see signs of it, and we do not believe they intended to back the present play by force in this situation.

I think the principal problem there would be between the mediators for Israel and the Arabs to try to find an answer that both Israel and the Arabs would be willing to accept. It is going to be tough because at the present time it is hard to see exactly where this point is going to be reached and when.

But I think you would expect Israel to be pretty forthright in demanding its full rights as a power to access to these passages.

Senator PASTORE. In your secret diplomacy, has Russia indicated any inclination as to the right of Israel to go through the Suez Canal?

Secretary RUSK. We have not, quite frankly, talked about the Suez Canal. We do believe—

Senator PASTORE. I mean in the past.

Secretary RUSK. I think they would recognize an international right in the Straits of Tiran. But, for heaven's sake, gentlemen, please no one say anything about this kind of question because it would be just murder. But I do not think the Straits of Tiran are going to be a problem when this thing is wound up.

Senator PASTORE. I would not suppose that, but I am worried a little bit about the Suez Canal.

THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL

Now, another question: Have you been approached at all by the Jewish-American community?

Secretary RUSK. I have not myself, but I gather there are a good many letters. But no one has asked to see me.

Senator PASTORE. Well, groups are coming to see us, and they are insisting that America live up to its commitment. If you were in our position what would be your answer to that?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think we have to talk about which commitments and what it is we are talking about.

I do think—quite frankly, if you go back over this record since 1947, there is a whole basketful of understandings and U.N. resolutions. You find, generally speaking, that each side has tended to pick and choose out of those resolutions those things which they wanted at one time or another, and that there are a good many things on both sides which have been rejected out of these U.N. resolutions.

Now, at the time of the original resolution creating the State of Israel or on the settlement of Palestine, the Arabs bitterly rejected that resolution and fought against it, in fact.

Their present position is there is nothing they want more than that original U.N. resolution. There was a resolution from which the Arabs got certain benefits, which gave the Israelis passage through the Suez Canal, but they have never gotten passage through the Suez Canal.

President Eisenhower made a specific commitment in the General Assembly at the time of the 1957 settlement about the Straits of Tiran being international waters. That was done at a time when he was acting on behalf of Egypt to get Israeli troops out of the Sinai Peninsula. Egypt did not formally accept that at the time as a matter of legal doctrine, but they got the benefits of the arrangements; namely, the withdrawal of Israeli troops.

So the past here is a jungle of resolutions which have in them many elements which each side along the way has refused to comply with.

NO OPEN-ENDED COMMITMENTS

Senator PASTORE. Well, they are having a big rally here at Lafayette Square, and I am wondering what it is all about, and what we, as elected officials, say to these constituents of ours on the enforcement of these commitments.

Secretary RUSK. Well, again, I think one ought to be precise about the commitments. The President's statement of May 23 is a pretty comprehensive statement of our commitments in this situation. There he reaffirmed the general commitment to the political independence and territorial integrity of all the states in the area, and the specific commitment on the Straits of Tiran.

But we do not have vague, unorganized, open-ended commitments to either side in this situation. We do not have a treaty commitment, for example, that spells these things out.

Now, we have a major involvement stemming from the role we played in the creation of Israel, and our support for various types of United Nations action and settlement, and some specific commitments on the Gulf of Aqaba.

But I think we need to be fairly precise, at least people in my position, in talking about what commitment it is we are talking about.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Senator Bennett?

RESTORATION OF RELATIONS

Senator BENNETT. I have just one question. Now that these Arab countries have taken the lead in breaking diplomatic relations, are we going to wait for them to take the lead in restoring them?

Secretary RUSK. Well, it would be normal for the country that took the original initiative to take the initiative to restore them. But I think our general attitude ought to be that we are relaxed about having relationships with those countries that want relationships and are prepared to guarantee rights of legation, because we have relations with a good many countries with whom we are not in agreement on every point. I would think we would be relatively relaxed about that in the future, and some of this restoration of relations, I think, might come in a matter of weeks rather than in a matter of months.

Some of the local officials in certain of these countries have said to our people, "Well, we will see you in about 2 or 3 weeks' time," that kind of thing. So we do not know exactly what this means yet.

Senator BENNETT. Thank you.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

Senator GORE. I will defer until tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington?

COMPARISON TO VIETNAM

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, I have a few questions.

When I came back from Vietnam in early January this year, I reported that scores of our pilots were pleading that they be allowed to do what apparently Defense Minister Dayan instructed General Weitzman and his pilots to do.

One pilot said that four out of the last five missions he had flown over the airport at Fukien were to hit much less important targets

closer to Hanoi and, therefore, I carried their plea, and I find out that last week the military airfield at Fukien has never been put on the target list, let alone struck.

In the last 12 hours, in 12 hours, I think it is fair to say, that against much heavier opposition, although under different circumstances, General Dayan has really accomplished more against three or four countries, and in one sense more than that, than we have in two years in Vietnam, and I see it.

My question would be, as a result of staving off this, to me and a number of my growing number of my colleagues, denigration of airpower, and this almost unbelievable success that they have had through the right use of airpower, the saving of lives and treasure. Do you think this is going to have any effect on the way we are handling the situation in Vietnam or do you think we will continue to make it a major land war without the use of our naval air, our seapower, I mean of Air Force air and our seapower? We are just going to go ahead to the tune of \$2 billion a month or whatever it is, a very heavy cost, or will this perhaps almost unprecedented military success in modern times affect the way we are handling the Vietnamese War?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, if we were fighting primarily tanks and aircraft in open desert, the pattern of war would, of course, be different.

It is not quite the same problem in Vietnam. I can talk about that further. I think you know some of the problems we feel we are involved with there. But I think the situation is quite different from a military point of view, and I would doubt that any of these airfields in Egypt are as heavily defended as this particular airfield is up in Hanoi.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, airpower is airpower regardless of the nature of the terrain underneath it, and it seems to me unfortunate that if we are going to use it at all, we do not use it properly.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Senator Ervin has gone.

Senator Kuchel, you just came in?

Senator KUCHEL. No, I have been here, but that is all right.

USE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Mr. Secretary, I watched the Security Council last night, and I think everyone is most proud of the fact, even at the last minute, the Security Council passed a resolution.

Apparently it passed another one today, and I assume, therefore, that our policy has been to use the machinery of the United Nations to a maximum extent possible.

Now, if there is going to be a cease-fire, which I assume there will be, if not this afternoon, tomorrow afternoon or the next, there is no victor and no vanquished, so the problem of territory, of free access to any waters of egress and ingress along any land is going to have to be the result of an agreement between the Arabs and the Israelis which, I guess, is not going to take place or there are going to have to be additional decisions made in the Security Council.

Will it be our policy to bring to the Security Council such resolutions as clothing the President or U Thant with the responsibility

of asking, of making decisions to bring about a peace rather than a truce?

Secretary RUSK. I do not believe that the matter of decisions on these matters will be turned over to the Secretary General, and I doubt very much that a resolution could pass the Security Council that has not already been agreed to by the two sides.

The situation in the Security Council is such that unless you got agreement on the two sides, there is not a majority vote. That sounds contradictory to what has happened in the Security Council last night when the Security Council was unanimous on a ceasefire, even though the Arabs were not prepared to step up and say, "We accept it."

But in the terms of the long-range settlement, I do not believe that the Security Council can legislate and impose upon the parties a settlement which has not been worked out by negotiation.

Senator KUCHEL. So what would our policy be with respect to negotiating a peace? Would our policy be to participate in the negotiation unilaterally, in concert with other nations? I mean, if you could help us on that point, I think it would be most valuable.

Secretary RUSK. Well, we would very much hope that the Security Council would be the principal forum in which these things are dealt with.

Now, quite obviously there are going to be a lot of consultations in capitals behind the scenes, as there was all day yesterday and the day before.

But we think there would be great advantage in keeping this matter in the framework of the Security Council just as much as possible.

In our earlier consultations down here it was my strong impression that that was almost the unanimous view of the people at this end of Pennsylvania Avenue.

U.S. WAS NOT MILITARILY INVOLVED

Senator KUCHEL. One more question. Are we going to pursue what Arthur Goldberg raised last night, and nail the Arabs to the cross on that falsehood of our military participation?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we have been trying to do that with all the means at our command.

The Arabs, however, continue to circulate this story 8, 10 hours a day.

As you know, we invited U.N. observers aboard our carriers, and urged them to investigate the whole thing and look at our logs and talk to pilots.

The Syrians added an item to that today and they charged U.S. infantry were involved in these operations.

Senator RUSSELL. I thought you said the Jordanians.

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. It was Damascus, Syrian radio. Damascus had charged us with having infantry.

Senator KUCHEL. Will we follow through, however, and request the President of the Security Council to appoint an impartial board?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we would like to see them do it, but the trouble is that nobody believes these stories and, therefore, they think it is undignified to accept our invitation.

You see, it is almost humiliating for the Security Council to send observers in the face of such outrageous lies.

Senator RUSSELL. I thought you did a good job, Mr. Secretary, on television.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse?

Senator MORSE. I have a couple of questions.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

SUPPLIES TO ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES

Senator MORSE. The first one relates to the reference you made twice in response to a question about some information that supplies were being sent into the Arab countries.

Let us assume that they are not, but there is a probability they will be, say, from Russia or from Eastern European countries and others. What is our position with regard to supplies to Israel? We already have some outstanding commitments in regard to the sale of airplanes, and we are not talking here about commitments, but there is no question about what the understanding of Israel has been for quite some years that they can rely on the United States to come to their assistance in protection if they tried to drive her into the sea. There is no question, but this was a movement to do that.

Are we going to stand by while Arab countries get their supplies replenished from Russia and other countries, and not proceed to provide Israel with supplies? Because if we do not supply her, she is not allowed to get supplies; she cannot hold out against a replenished supply if you are going to give the opposition breathing time, and I happen to disagree with some of what I think are the connotations brought in this conversation this afternoon in regard to our obligations.

I think we have very definite obligations, and we have assumed them, and restated them over and over again, including not only moral obligations but statements of our public officials to Israel that we are not going to stand by and have her driven into the sea.

My question is what are we going to do if the Arab countries are resupplied? Are we going to wait for further negotiations and further talk, or are we going to deliver some supplies?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we have not interrupted our own shipments to Israel.

As far as Soviet shipments to the Arab countries are concerned, we have not ourselves taken action to interrupt them.

Now, my guess is that if there is not a cease-fire, that any aircraft, for example, coming into any Arab countries will be subject to Israel air attack.

The situation after a cease-fire is, of course, different.

We, at the present time, are not considering using military action to stop arms from going from Eastern Europe into the Arab countries, to answer your question directly, Senator.

Senator MORSE. Well, it is an answer, but I still do not know what the supplies are that we are going to send in to meet the needs that are created by this war.

She lost a lot of equipment. She lost a lot of planes. What I want to know is, is it going to be the policy of my government that we are going to stand by and see the Arab countries replenished and

we are not going to proceed to supply Israel with supplies that she is going to need for replenishment to keep her military force going?

Secretary RUSK. All I said thus far, Senator, is we have not stopped our shipments to Israel, and the question of further aid or resupplies has not come up yet. It has not been brought up to us yet by Israel.

OPPOSE TERRITORIAL ENLARGEMENT

Senator MORSE. I quite agree, and this will be my last point. I quite agree that we should not be involved in participating in territorial enlargement or encouraging territorial enlargement by Israel.

I understand they themselves do not seek manpower, that they may seek support. But certainly I think we have a clear duty now to get established once and for all these questions in regard to international waters, including the Straits of Tiran, and certainly made perfectly clear we are going to be on the side of those that recognize that this Suez Canal ought to be operated without discrimination against any country, including Israel, and these are some of the troublesome problems that are involved in the settlement of peace.

But, Mr. Secretary, I think it would be very unfortunate for us if we did not make clear at all times that now we are going to insist on a peace settlement, not on a truce settlement, because the truce settlement simply means we are going to postpone another war for two or three or four years. I think it is very important, for whatever it is worth, and I speak most respectfully, as you know, but I think the State Department has got to make much clearer statements than have been made yet in regard to what we are going to do in insisting that the existing procedures of international law be used to bring about peace over there and not a truce.

Secretary RUSK. I had the impression we had done that in the Security Council, Senator, but we will go from there.

Senator MORSE. I listened to it, and I do not form that impression.

Secretary RUSK. But in terms of detailed desiderata, the parties have not come in with theirs at the present time.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, this is a question where we have got to exercise clear leadership in giving news to the world as to exactly where we stand in regard to negotiating a peace.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Senator Cotton?

ISRAELIS MAY REQUEST A DECLARATION OF U.S. INTENT

Senator COTTON. Mr. Secretary, as you have said, our own unilateral commitments to Israel are of a rather informal nature, statements of the President and of his predecessors. Certainly there is a basketful of declarations, but no formal treaty.

If Israel, victorious, is going to be insistent on some safety and security of her rights in the future and does not feel disposed to accept, to rely on the U.N. for safety, and regards us with some satisfaction as, in a sense, a patron, isn't it likely that before the Israelis relinquish the ground they have won, that they may expect from us, by formal treaty, a real declaration of just exactly what

our commitments are to them so that it will no longer be nebulous or vague? I am not asking what we would do.

Secretary RUSK. It is possible that they might raise that question. They have not put that to us in connection with the present crisis. That has come up from time to time over the years, but it has not been a part of the conversation during this present—during this year.

Senator COTTON. But if we were sitting where they are sitting before we withdrew, it would not be unlikely, would it, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. We have acted at various times in a variety of ways to support the security and the territorial integrity of a number of these states in the area.

Our general statement of policy there has applied for all of the countries in that area, including Israel and, of course, we have had a very close tie with Israel.

I would suppose that the attitudes and statements of four Presidents in this matter have been pretty well supported in the country, and whether you want to get into an additional alliance, treaty or alliance, at this point is something on which your views would be of interest. But I rather had the impression that alliances were not particularly popular these days.

Senator COTTON. The only reason I presume to raise the question, Mr. Secretary, was that at the last briefing I tried to find out what our actual commitments, either legal or moral, unilaterally were with Israel.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. I would be very glad to—

Senator COTTON. And I had some difficulty in finding out what they were.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we had a meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee in which I tried to review those, and Senator Morse and Senator Lausche and others helped prepare a record on that. I do not know whether you had a chance to look at the transcript of that executive session, but you might ask Mr. Marcy to make that available, because we tried to spell those out in some detail.¹ If not, I would be very glad to see that you get a special briefing on that point, sir.

Senator COTTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Senator Hruska?

Senator Bible?

Senator Allott?

ACHIEVING A PERMANENT PEACE

Senator ALLOTT. Mr. Secretary, what I have to say I say with all respect. But the situation in the Near East, as all of us know, has been coming to a boil for approximately two years.

Secretary RUSK. Excuse me, Senator Allott.

Senator ALLOTT. Has been coming to a boil for approximately two years, and I have attended what briefings we were able to, and it appears that the United States was completely surprised.

We found ourselves in an absolutely untenable position when the UAR closed the Straits of Tiran.

¹See transcript of May 23.

Now, fortunately for the United States, a courageous people, with guts and foresight, have saved our bacon, and I might say also Great Britain's, in the eyes of the world.

I am very interested that in these next few weeks we do whatever is necessary to get a permanent peace there, and in my present thinking it amounts to three things: Suez, Tiran, and borders, and in this same connection with the remarks that Senator Monroney made, it would seem to me that there would be a definite advantage since the Arabs are distinctly disenchanted with the Russians, in being a little reluctant and in just going back into complete diplomatic relations with these people.

The situation of their thinking at the moment, because of the Russian vote last night, is not going to change their feelings toward the Russians overnight. It seems to me that at this time we should show some reluctance and not go back in there and say, "All right, boys, this was fun while it lasted, but now let us go back to where we were before."

That is a comment. You may have a comment to make to both of them, but I think that we have to take somewhere down the line a much firmer and definite position than we have with the Israelis, and I would hope that we would make the resumption of diplomatic relationships a little bit difficult to procure, not that I say we should refuse, but we should make them a little more difficult.

Secretary RUSK. Well, our attitude in certain other situations like Cambodia and the Congo Brazzaville, where they have broken relations in the past, has been not to resume unless there is a full and bonafide resumption, and we have no intention of begging for restoration.

But, on the other hand, if there is an opportunity to restore them on a full and reasonable basis, with full rights of legation, it has been our tradition to do so. But I certainly will keep your remarks in mind, Senator.

Senator ALLOTT. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case?

Senator CASE. Not today.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper?

Senator COOPER. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morton?

Senator Javits?

PUTTING THE CHIPS ON THE TABLE

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Secretary, I will make two statements of fact and then ask you a question based upon them.

The first statement is that I detect a certain satisfaction and, perhaps, even elation in the President and the Secretary of State that the Israelis have done as they have.

The second point is that unlike Vietnam, here is a tough army, well able to look after itself.

Now, I think the question that is troubling many of us is what is the United States prepared to do to back it up? What risks is it prepared to take?

Now, we know the Russians have said they will give the Arabs all-out support, and we know that the United States has fuzzed around with the words "neutral in thought, word and deed" which

you have done your best to explain, and bless you, and the President has, and I am not even complaining about what you say. But what are you going to do? Are we prepared to match the Russians, in fact, if they begin to put their chips on the table, notwithstanding what they have said or done in the U.N., or are we not?

Are we going to pussy-foot around with this one, too?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, on that question, putting the chips on the table is something that involves a consultation with the Congress and the President and the Congress acting together. That is the point I told you we were not here to discuss in our earlier consultations, but that would be a matter of the Congress and the President acting together in a situation of that sort.

Secondly, I would say that I would not value the chips that the Russians have put on the table very highly at this point.

Senator JAVITS. May I just ask one follow-up question?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

ISRAEL'S LINES ARE VERY EXTENDED

Senator JAVITS. I agree with you thoroughly. I think you have every reason for satisfaction, and I am all with you. I am only asking for the future, because if we are going to play this very cozy and very safe, then we are going to go one way. I think we are going to get the pants trimmed off of us. But if we are going to take a few risks here, where we have a great army, and when we are taking enormous risks in Vietnam where we have a very, very weak reed to lean on—

Secretary RUSK. Senator, you do not have any indication that the Russians are preparing to intervene in this, do you?

Senator JAVITS. No, sir. I am not saying this, but you have got enormous problems of supply which Senator Morse has raised, and that is a big thing for the Israelis. The Secretary knows they are immobilized, which means their country can get very poor very fast. All the fellows who work are away, and so these are going to be very real problems. Their lines are very extended. This knifing through is by no means the whole ball game. The Secretary knows that at least as well as I do, and that is the point of my question.

We are going to be called upon to evidence some implementation of our statement about the presentation of the territorial integrity and political independence of the only state who is being threatened really on that score, and that is when performance will really count.

Now, the will to perform is going to be just as important as the deed.

Secretary RUSK. I am supposed to be at a meeting at 6:30 at which some of these questions will be discussed.

Senator JAVITS. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Yarborough?

ISRAEL'S CONTROL OF THE WEST BANK

Senator YARBOROUGH. Mr. Secretary, this is a question of to what extent has the Jordan territory west of the Jordan River been occupied by the Israelis?

Secretary RUSK. They have for all practical purposes military control of the West Bank. They are not completely occupied—they have not yet completely occupied every neighborhood in it.

The Jordanian army is in complete disarray on the West Bank.

There are a million inhabitants on the West Bank, a good many of them refugees from the other part of—from the territory that is now Israel. So it is a very large population which the Israelis now have, for which they now have administrative responsibility.

REESTABLISHING RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES

Senator YARBOROUGH. My other question was properly a statement as much as a question. I want to approach what the Secretary said about the reestablishment of relations with the Arab states if they ask for it. I am very sympathetic to Israel, as I think nearly all Americans are. Most of us are either of the Jewish or Christian faith, and we feel very close ties, and we have sympathy with Israel.

But these Arabs have been so completely defeated and are so down, that my experience is that when a person is down psychologically, and the whole world is looking down at them, that we ought to pat them on the back, and not pull them down further. I do not think it is any time to kick them when they are down.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, despite all the problems that Nasser has caused, and perhaps some others have caused, looking ahead here for the next twenty-five years, there are going to be 200 million Arabs in this part of the world. This area is adjacent to NATO. It is a vitally important area, and I think that we have a great interest in the prosperity and the safety of Israel. But we cannot neglect this vast area that is inhabited by the Arabs, and be consistent with the long-range interests of our own country.

So we are interested in having a settlement here with which both sides can live permanently. That is the important thing.

To put it into Mr. Eban's own words, you do not withdraw to a state of belligerence, you withdraw to a state of peace.

Senator YARBOROUGH. I agree, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. So we have no problem with that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Prouty?

ARAB REFUGEES

Senator PROUTY. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned earlier that this might be an opportunity for us to do something with respect to the Arab refugees, which has been a great irritant, of course, to the Arab nations, even though they have done nothing to help.

Were you suggesting that there be the possibility of a financial confrontation for property loss?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, if we could get a settlement of that problem between the parties at the expense of paying a substantial amount of money for winding it up we would be down here very fast asking for it.

I personally believe that there is a basis for settling the question on the basis of the individual secret choices of the individual refugee as to where he wants to live, and if a way could be found to give them that secret choice, the practical result would be one with which Israel could live.

I doubt very much that many of these refugees are going to say they want to live in Israel. There will be a fraction of them who would, and Israel will take a fraction of them. But the theory is such that the Arabs won't accede to the fact that anything less than a million of them must have the right to live in Israel, you see. So the theory has complicated the practical arrangements.

THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND VIETNAM

Senator PROUTY. I won't ask you to comment on this, but I think it is something you should be thinking about. The rumor is becoming somewhat widespread, I think it was even reported on a broadcast or TV from Vietnam, that Russia's cooperation and the buildup by this action in the Security Council might be attributable to the fact that we are trying to work out some arrangement with them vis-a-vis Vietnam and the situation there.

Secretary RUSK. No. These two situations have not been linked at all in our discussions with the Russians.

Senator PROUTY. Thank you.

Secretary RUSK. Those rumors were just sheer speculation with no basis.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cannon?

SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN ARAB NATIONS

Senator CANNON. Mr. Secretary, do we have reports of any assaults on American citizens in the Arab world other than the two men who were hospitalized in Libya yesterday?

Secretary RUSK. There have been a good many stonings of embassies and consulates. In one place in Benghazi, our embassy personnel locked themselves in their own vault overnight until a company of British troops came in and got them out.

We have not had, I think, deaths to report other than those that you have seen reported publicly about people who got caught actually in the cross-fire.

We have a very large-scale evacuation of Americans going on, and our principal problem at the moment is in Amman because of communications. Elsewhere it seems to be going reasonably well.

Senator CANNON. Have you recommended that Americans who were in those areas evacuate?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, we have.

Senator CANNON. Is that true in Libya?

Secretary RUSK. Libya is—well, we have about 8,500 people at the Wheelus Base, and they will be taken out by the Air Force if required. But we are not making an emergency evacuation of those people at the present time, at the present moment.

Senator CANNON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Muskie?

Senator MUSKIE. No question.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Fong?

Senator FONG. Yes.

THE EGYPTIAN AND JORDANIAN FRONTS

Mr. Secretary, do you have any intelligence on the material and personnel at the various fronts?

Secretary RUSK. On the what?

Senator FONG. The various fronts. It seems in just the Egyptian sector and the Jordanian sector there is fighting, and the Syrian and Iraq sectors have been quiet.

Secretary RUSK. There has been very little shooting along the Lebanese front. There has been some cross-frontier shooting along the Syrian frontier that has not amounted to very much.

There has been a good deal of fighting between the Israeli and the Jordanian forces, the Jordanians being under the command of an Egyptian general or until very, very recently, and major fighting with the Egyptians.

Lebanon, Syria and Jordan have not been the prime problem. The prime problem has been between Israel and Egypt.

Senator FONG. Have you any intelligence as to the amount of material and personnel involved on the Egyptian front and the Jordanian front?

Secretary RUSK. Quite frankly, I do not have it with me. I can get that information to you if you would like, Senator, but I just do not happen to have it with me.

Senator FONG. Another question: The question of volunteers. I notice there are 3,000 people already ready to go to Israel. What is the State Department's policy on that?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we have barred travel of citizens into that area unless they get special permission with a valid passport. That applies to all the countries in the area, right?

Mr. MACOMBER. Except the newsmen.

Secretary RUSK. Except newsmen and certain special categories.

Senator FONG. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Senator PELL. Mr. Secretary, the world is a pretty small place. The Soviet Union is in a position now of seeing its friends and allies in the Near East getting defeated, and it also involves North Vietnam, seeing its friends and allies taking a bit of a pasting.

Has any thought been given to, one, following up the cease-fire with sort of a degree of good feelings if we work with the Soviet Union in this part of the world and settle our problems in other parts of the world, and, two, has any thought been given as to how we can avoid pushing the Soviet Union into a corner where it can lash back, such as in Berlin and in other places?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the second point, there is not much we can do about that in this situation.

We did not encourage the Arabs to create this critically dangerous situation or make some rather extravagant public promises to the Arabs about support.

We have not been out of contact with the Soviets on Vietnam at any point during this period.

But whether this situation in the Middle East will have an effect on the possibilities of a settlement in the Far East we just do not know yet. My guess is that they still are looking at these two things rather separately.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Miller?

DANGEROUS EUPHORIA OVER ISRAELI VICTORY

Senator MILLER. Just a couple of comments, Mr. Secretary.

I would hope that diplomatic relations would be preceded by some kind of a revocation of these false charges.

Looking down the road and thinking of our relations with the Arab people, unless those charges are eventually revoked, I think we are going to have a difficult time of it. So I would hope that that would be a sine qua non in these diplomatic relations.

The second point is that—I may be wrong—but I detect a sort of a euphoria going around Washington with respect to the success of the Israeli army.

Now, I think that we had better be pretty careful that we do not count our chickens before they are hatched. Senator Morse has raised a very valid point.

I would hope that we would be very careful that we not assume that everything is all over right now.

Thank you very much for coming down.

Secretary RUSK. Right, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Dominick?

U.S. COMMITMENT TO TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

Senator DOMINICK. Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding that we have a commitment to support the territorial integrity of the countries in that area.

Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir.

Senator DOMINICK. Now, Israel at the present time is on Egyptian-Jordanian territory. Suppose Israel says that in order to withdraw to a peace—this means the West Bank of Jordan or it means Gaza Strip—what do we do then?

Secretary RUSK. Well, they have not said that yet, and I would have to reserve on that, if that situation comes up.

They announced when the fighting started that they would not—they did not have territorial ambitions. But I would not want to answer that one in advance, Senator.

Senator DOMINICK. Let me put it another way. Is that commitment that we have so binding that this administration would feel it would have to honor it if Israel took that position or can't you—you obviously do not want to answer that at the moment either.

Secretary RUSK. That would be a very serious question, Senator. I think I will not try to answer that one off the cuff.

We have supported the existing territorial arrangements in that area for a long time. That would create some very, very serious problems for the future and would almost guarantee there would be another round of conflict at some point, I would think. I do not know. But I am not trying—I would not want to try—to give you an answer on that one today, sir.

Senator DOMINICK. My difficulty on this is to see how the Israelis can legitimately feel that they are going to withdraw to a peace unless they do make some substantive changes in their strategic and tactical decisions.

Secretary RUSK. Well, looking ahead they have got the problem to live with 200 million Arabs in 25 years, so they have got to think about a lot of things. Reconciliation with the Arab world is a vital

matter for them at some stage, and they have been ready for it during all this period when the Arabs would not even sit down with them at a table.

But I think we should not suppose that they would think that their answers are going to be found by simply boundary adjustments in a major way that would guarantee the lasting enmity of the Arab world.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Robert Kennedy?

REPLENISHING ARMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator KENNEDY. Mr. Secretary, assuming that the cease-fire does not come immediately, or assuming that we have a cease-fire in the period of the next 2 or 3 days, and during that period of cease-fire time goes by, a week goes by, two weeks, or three weeks go by, and we still have not reached a permanent peace, what will we be doing during that period of time to replenish the arms and the materiel of Israel, for instance, which, I suppose, would be in desperate need.

The second part of that is if the Soviets really sent in some of these arms and goods at the present time—if there is a cease-fire, of course, the situation changes in the matter—at that period of time they might decide they wanted to replenish at least some of the arms that have been lost by some of the Arab countries, and perhaps regain some of the stature which they lost over the period of the last 2 or 3 days. What would we do?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think, in the first case, we do expect to have some requests from Israel in the direction of replenishment, and we will certainly take a look at those when they come in, yes.

Senator KENNEDY. Could I just ask what that means exactly?

Secretary RUSK. Well, you are familiar with the way these things go, where is the money, what sort of things is it that they want, have we got them, how—

Senator PERCY. Can we just assume we will have everything they ask for?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I do not know, Senator. I do not know anything—I do not know any government that is in that position.

Senator KENNEDY. I just think that question is going to arise for everybody.

Secretary RUSK. We expect to see them reasonably soon.

SYMPATHETIC VIEW OF ISRAELI ARMS NEEDS

Senator KENNEDY. All of us would like to make a responsible decision on it in the Senate. Where would we be on that?

Secretary RUSK. You mean on the first one?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I think we would take a pretty sympathetic view toward their essential requirements.

Now, we have not been their major arms supplier, and this problem may be complicated by President de Gaulle's attitude. The French have given them most of their sophisticated weapons or sold them, and cut off spare parts or things of that sort right in the middle of this situation. But we will just have a look at it and see what is required.

Their losses, quite frankly, have not been heavy. They have used a good many consumables and ammunition, but their actual loss of equipment has not been all that heavy.

Senator KENNEDY. But I suppose even they will have shortages of ammunition if the fighting continues for another ten days.

Secretary RUSK. Oh, yes, yes, and we have already taken that into account in our own arrangements, that possibility if this thing should go on.

On the other matter, on the Russian side—

Senator MUSKIE. On that question, Mr. Secretary, does that mean you are going to try to work out assistance for them?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

RUSSIAN AID TO ARAB NATIONS

On the other side, what the Russians will do, I do not know that we will get into military prevention of some supplies going from the Russians to those countries. But my guess is that they would have to supply a lot more than equipment at this time to recoup the situation in certain of these Arab countries.

Senator KENNEDY. If they did take that kind of a step, if they decided they were going to furnish more planes or whatever it might be, if they decided that they were going to furnish some kind of equipment, would we be in opposition to that? Would we be prepared to offset whatever they do?

Secretary RUSK. You mean in Israel?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. I thought—do you mean we would interrupt the Russian supply?

Senator KENNEDY. No.

Secretary RUSK. We would take that into account, and what we would do so far as Israel is concerned, we have tried to strike that balance all along. There have been a good many who felt we were underestimating Israeli requirements. Our feeling has been that Israel was in pretty good shape in relation to its neighbors, and I do not believe the events in the last few days have disproved that.

So that we feel we have an interest in the security of the countries out there in relation to each other, and we won't be at all indifferent to the Israeli needs in this situation.

Senator JAVITS. The Secretary said he is going to a meeting at 6:30 on this very subject. Is that going to be discussed?

Mr. CHAIRMAN. I wonder, Senator Percy is the only one who has not asked a question. Do you have a question?

ISRAEL'S ACCESS TO THE SUEZ CANAL

Senator PERCY. You have indicated it would be dangerous in speaking about negotiating terms with Israel. I have already taken a position with some of my constituents that it would be reasonable for Israel not only to insist on access to the Straits of Tiran but also access to the Suez Canal.

Secretary RUSK. I did not mean by that that I was suggesting that any of you are limited to expressing your own views on this matter.

Senator PERCY. I see.

Secretary RUSK. It would be very difficult to quote me on the subject or attribute news to me at this point.

Senator PERCY. I think the question also as to whether there is any change in the State Department's attitude on bridge-building and East-West trade, and things of that type, will come out before us very quickly, whether you are going to continue, if it is proven the Soviets have been a little mischievous in this area, whether you will have the same attitude or not. Perhaps we need not talk about it now, but at some time it would be helpful to discuss that phase of it.

Secretary RUSK. Well, I would say my own present view on that, sir, is we ought to continue to try, and I would also add that the Soviets were more—have been more—restrained in this situation than we thought they might be.

Senator KENNEDY. Can I just finish the last question? Is our policy in the Middle East still to maintain the territorial integrity of the countries?

Secretary RUSK. Yes. How you do it depends on the circumstances.

[Whereupon, at 6:30 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:35 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.

The following nominations were ordered reported favorably: Covey T. Oliver, to be Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs; William J. Porter, to be Ambassador to the Republic of Korea; Benigno C. Hernandez, to be Ambassador to Paraguay; and the Routine Foreign Service List of May 24, 1967.

S. 1577, a bill to complement the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, was ordered reported, with an amendment.

S. 624, to provide certain increases in annuities payable from the Foreign Service retirement, and S. 1688, the Inter-American Development Bank Act amendment, were carried over.

The Human Rights Conventions: Executives J, K, and L, 88th Congress, 1st session, were discussed and carried over. S. 990, a bill to establish a United States Committee on Human Rights, was ordered reported with an amendment.

[The committee adjourned at 11 a.m.]

BRIEFING ON VIETNAM

Thursday, June 8, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:35 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright (presiding), and Senators Gore, Symington, Clark, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Tillman, and Mr. Jones of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. If the committee will come to order.

Mr. Ambassador, we will take up where we left off before, which I suppose is a good enough place to start, because you already have noticed that it is a repetition of the question that I gave you which you deferred.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE WILLIAM J. PORTER, AMBASSADOR TO KOREA

Mr. PORTER. I hope I have the article.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember it?

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir; I think so.

It was the paragraph—

The CHAIRMAN. I will read the paragraph if you would like.

Mr. PORTER. If as much effort and money were put into the training of ARVN, etcetera, reforming the bureaucracy, forcing the generals to prosecute corrupt colleagues as are put into dropping bombs in the country, there is more than a fair chance that the Americans could pull it off. But in Vietnam the Americans have a leadership problem.

I agree with the statement.

The CHAIRMAN. You do agree?

Mr. PORTER. There is a very pronounced pervasive leadership problem, principally because we must rely on Army officers, or we have had to rely on Army officers, to provide leadership since the fall of Diem, and those officers—

WHAT AID OFFICIALS ARE DOING IN VIETNAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What are we doing with the thousand or so AID people we have got out there?

Mr. PORTER. The AID people, of course, are not dealing primarily with the Army officers, Senator. They are dealing with the civil administration, and while there are Army officers in that, too—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What do you mean by leadership?

Mr. PORTER. I mean the Army officers who compose the top elements of the government, the national leadership council, is composed almost entirely of Army officers, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thought you meant out in the people.

Mr. PORTER. No, sir. I refer to all Army officers, both those at the head of the government and those in the field.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Mr. PORTER. At the head of their units.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They are all bad, are they?

Mr. PORTER. They are not all bad. There are some brave and dedicated men among them.

But the problem with the Army and the officer class there is that a man becomes an officer or at least eligible for the officer training school simply by going to a university.

The enemy does not worry about that. They take boys, train them, size them up, see if they have leadership qualities. The man who has what it takes, who will lead his soldiers well on his side, any time of day, follow his orders, is the man who will rise in their ranks. There is no question of having a diploma. In fact, in my view, on the enemy side it is a disadvantage to have one in Vietnam.

We have not done a great deal about this system. We have accepted it. We have tried to train, through these officers, an Army in the image and likeness of ours and of Korea days, and we have not sufficiently struggled against a set of habits as well as attitudes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What are we doing with all the AID people out there? The woods are full of them out there.

Mr. PORTER. The AID people, in my opinion, there are lots of them, of course, are extended. Their numbers are great.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I agree something is wrong out there, don't misunderstand me.

Mr. PORTER. No, sir; I do not misunderstand you. But the AID people and the civil element in that country represent possibly one half of one percent of the total Americans. They are scattered throughout, doing their best to further various programs of pacification and reconstruction in 236 districts and 44 province capitals.

They are dedicated men, many of them living in isolated areas, with considerable danger to themselves, and I really think, sir, that there is very little need to defend the effort on that side.

Certainly there has been slippage, certainly AID has encountered problems both with individuals and problems of substance.

But in my view, those men, all of them practically volunteers, are exposing themselves to great dangers and doing good work.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you. I did not mean to interpose.

Senator CASE. I am sorry, you were just commenting on what? What was the comment on?

Mr. PORTER. The Senator inquired what were the AID people doing in Vietnam.

Senator CASE. I see.

Mr. PORTER. There are a great many of them I pointed out, and I explained how widely dispersed they are, and my view of their performance.

VIETNAMESE OFFICER CORPS

Senator GORE. Could I ask a question, Mr. Chairman, about the officer corps?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator GORE. You say that the officers, one becomes eligible to be an officer or a member of the officer corps, in the South Korean Army—

Mr. PORTER. South Vietnamese.

Senator GORE. South Vietnamese, I see, merely by attendance at the university.

Now, is attendance at the university open to all or is this an aristocratic sort of privilege?

Mr. PORTER. It tends to be aristocratic and urban. It is not everybody who can get to the university regardless of his brains.

Senator GORE. Thank you.

Mr. PORTER. Position is required, family position, in many Cases.

Now, in recent years, the last two or three years, an effort has been made to create officers through field promotions of enlisted personnel and from the ranks of the noncoms.

But while some lip service has been, or there has been some performance in that connection, I think that the scale is unsatisfactory. I do not believe that the rural elements, the families, the peasant boys, have the possibility of getting to the armed forces and into responsible positions on our side to the same degree or anything like it that they have on the VC side.

Senator GORE. Thank you.

THE WAR CAN ONLY BE WON BY THE VIETNAMESE

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Porter, he goes on—I may say to those who came in late, these are a few paragraphs, a couple of paragraphs, taken from Ward Just's article on Sunday. Most of you, I expect, read that. I was just asking his comment on it.

Senator CASE. I think it is very important.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the first one.

The next one, he says:

In the final analysis the war can only be won by the Vietnamese, but it is still the Americans' to lose by misapplication of power or by impatience or sheer unwillingness to do what needs to be done.

Do you think that is an accurate statement?

Mr. PORTER. Yes. The Vietnamese have to win the war. The great struggle on our side and on the military side—when I say our side I meant the civil side, the civilian side—is to get the Vietnamese to do for the Vietnamese the things that have to be done if the war is to be won. This is one reason why, in developing the present concept of pacification, I refused to let any Americans go into the villages with the teams.

The Vietnamese must perform the service required for their fellow countrymen in the villages, and the Vietnamese must protect the villagers while the pacification process is under way.

Now, some people, and some of the civilians, too, involved in the program, point with pride to the fact that in a certain province in Vietnam pacification has proceeded very well. That is the province of Binh Dinh. This is not an acceptable concept to me because pac-

ification has proceeded there under the protection of foreign troops, principally those of the Korean Republic and our own.

Were we to take those troops out of there, the process would certainly slow down, and we might have retrogression, probably would have retrogression.

I am convinced that certain things of that kind must be done by the Vietnamese, and should not be done by the Americans.

Senator COOPER. May I interject there?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me finish, and then I will go around. Let me finish this one.

Do you believe that a military victory is possible or would that achieve our real purposes?

Mr. PORTER. May I preface my final sentence on the subject by recounting a little bit of my own experience. I have been with guerrillas, close to them, sometimes with them physically, over many, many years in various countries.

I have never seen a guerrilla movement beaten if it had national support. I do not believe that we, on our side, have the training, brave as our people are, to cope with the kind of guerrilla movement on the scale that it exists in Vietnam, even though I do not believe that movement on the guerrilla side, the VC, have support on the scale which the nationalist movements of North Africa and the Near East enjoyed in their struggle against the French and the British.

I therefore believe that we cannot win the war by military means alone. That is the answer, Senator.

But I would like to go on for just one moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

COMPONENTS OF U.S. EFFORTS IN VIETNAM

Mr. PORTER. As I see our effort in Vietnam today, it is composed of five elements:

The bombing of the North, which I consider necessary if done with restraint and care because for morale and for reasons of interdicting the flow of supplies connected with that, it is necessary to undertake such action. Additionally, the North Vietnamese are delivering very large weapons, powerful weapons, to the South by means at their disposal.

The second element of our effort is, of course, the military campaign in South Vietnam itself.

The third element is the pacification effort which is designed to meet the VC where he was strongest, and that is in the villages of South Vietnam. They were never an urban movement.

The fourth element is the psychological warfare effort, which is producing results and brings in at times as many as a thousand or more VC a week, at least since the beginning of this year after the application—

Senator CASE. That is to create defectors on their side.

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir.

And the fifth element which I consider to be the most promising of all in this array, is the return to constitutional government, although that is at the moment beset with difficulties and dangers.

MILITARY EFFORT IS NOT THE DECISIVE ASPECT

The military effort is a necessary part of the overall effort. But it is not the decisive aspect, because I have always felt since I went to Vietnam that we could win by acquiring their minds, by bringing them over to us, but that we could not win simply by killing them.

I have seen massive power applied to other guerrilla movements. It won't do by itself, careful as we are to try to hit the enemy only. The French had 600,000 men applied to a much smaller movement when I was in Algeria. It did not work.

Of course, the French were facing a totally hostile population, and we are not in Vietnam by any means.

But those are the elements of the struggle, as I see them.

The military element would not be sufficient by itself, and I personally place more reliance on the last three: the returning to constitutional government, provided we can emerge with a useful and representative government; pacification, to give the villagers something worth living for, to get them security, which is what they want more than any other ideology; and psychological warfare to reach the minds of these boys in VC units.

Military, yes it is very necessary. It won't win by itself.

WINNING THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE PEOPLE

The CHAIRMAN. I find it difficult to believe that any white, rich, powerful Western country can ever be very sympathetic to these people and winning their minds and their feeling that we really are their friends and their benefactors. Not only here—it is not peculiarly Americans, I mean it was the same with the French or the British or the Germans.

The whole picture seems to me utterly unfeasible, not because of any defect or inefficiency or any kind of thing on our part, it is just in the nature of things.

Mr. PORTER. May I comment on that?

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. PORTER. I, perhaps, used a phrase inadvisedly if I talked about their minds, bringing them over to us.

I never sent a team into a village with that thought in mind.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. You said that.

Mr. PORTER. To reach their minds you first begin with their security and their family well-being, and you create conditions.

Eventually, certainly not immediately, they would not know what you are talking about. The target eventually is their minds, so that if you get something that is representative of them in Saigon, you can begin the work of educating them about values.

Now, you hear lots of phrases such as "winning the hearts and the minds of the people." The hearts and the minds of the people are won initially, at least, if you provide them security and some degree of well being; their minds to the extent that they are with you, and their hearts, and their minds also, because they understand you are doing something for them.

FRENCH EXPERIENCES IN VIETNAM AND ALGERIA

Mr. CHAIRMAN. You have mentioned you have had long experience in Algeria and now in Vietnam. Before the revolution started,

and for many years, at least since about 1885, the French gave them, I would think, a high degree of security. They were not being slaughtered and murdered, and so on, but still they wanted to get rid of those French, and they did get rid of the French, both in Algeria and there.

The French are civilized people. Maybe they are not as good as Americans—nobody is—but next to us they are civilized people, we thought.

Why is it that these people do not accept them?

Mr. PORTER. The French gave them very little security—

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Really?

Mr. PORTER [continuing]. In the rural areas, and certainly security against the kind of movement which had its origins and its birth out there in the rural areas, and they gave them practically no social justice. That is the answer there.

These people crave, and even those boys to whom I talked—

Mr. CHAIRMAN. How about Algeria? There was no security there? I had read prior to the revolution there was some degree of prosperity and normalcy, and so on in Algeria, but they still wanted to get rid of the French.

Mr. PORTER. Here again it is a question of time. The French gave them security as long as they were willing to accept French protection—

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. PORTER [continuing]. Or as long as they were forced to accept it. But they gave them very little social justice.

Senator SYMINGTON. Will the Chairman yield?

Mr. PORTER. If I may say, sir, the term “an Algerian election” was coined in French days as the proverbial something crooked. It is the measure of something crooked, and the Algerians knew it. So you had a kind of security imposed which people did not want, but you had no social justice alongside it, which might have brought people, perhaps eventually, to accept this system. But in the meantime it would have, of course, forced the French to evacuate the country.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They had two classes of citizens in Algeria.

Mr. PORTER. Yes.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. In all this colonial era, the British are said to have had some degree of social justice in places like India and some of their other colonies, and yet they wanted to get rid of the British. This does not add up to me.

Mr. PORTER. There are degrees of this.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Unless you think Americans have some special quality of kindness and consideration and empathy which no great powerful nation in the history of the world ever exhibited, I do not see how you think we are going to have a different response.

WHITES CANNOT INFLUENCE VILLAGE ELECTIONS

Senator SYMINGTON. Before you answer that, I want to ask you this question. I had a talk with Moshe Dayan in Tel Aviv, who had just come back from Vietnam, and I know you saw him out there—

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. And, based on my experiences out there—I met him coming back from Vietnam—he said not less than three times in a couple of hours that we talked: “Remember this. Don’t ever forget it.” He talked as a man experienced in guerrilla fighting.

He said, “No white man is ever going to sell their candidate for village chief to the villagers in Vietnam or anywhere else.”

This he said after he had been there and, of course, naturally, it worried me because since I last had the privilege of seeing you, the whole pacification program has been turned over to the military.

What do you think—everybody knows of his vast experience in this field, and what would be your reaction to that comment? He emphasized it and re-emphasized my words.

Mr. PORTER. He is absolutely right; he is absolutely right.

But, may I say that, Senator, the pacification program has been turned over to the military primarily because of the feeling here of course, I do not mean in the committee but in Washington—that our military would not or could not or did not make the effort to invoke the necessary effort by the Army of Vietnam on the protection side of pacification, and would not do so until our military were totally responsible for the pacification program.

Now, last September this was about to happen, and I came home and argued against it, but the ground, the approach, then was different. It was claimed it would be more efficient to put it under the military.

This time when the change was made it was done so, as I understand it, on the ground that with complete responsibility our military would put their shoulders a little more heavily against the wheel, and get the necessary performance out of the people they had trained. Those people, of course, are the Army of Vietnam who must, as I was saying a while back, protect their people in the villages and the pacification teams while the process is going on.

Now, let us hope for everybody’s sake that this is going to work out. I hope so. Many of my civilian colleagues did not think it would, but they have to keep trying and accept the new state of things.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

USE OF MARINES IN AID PACIFICATION EFFORTS

Senator CASE. What do you think, if I may just interject there, of the effort they have been making around Danang, that is, the Marine idea of having a detachment of perhaps 12 of our soldiers join the team?

Mr. PORTER. I like that. The marines, in fact, in my view—the Senator has been out there and perhaps has his own view of things which are perhaps different than mine—the Marines have shown a great deal of imagination in trying to cope with this problem. They have unfortunately been drawn off by the influx of North Vietnamese across the demilitarized zone and, as a result, the effort by these combined companies, those to which you referred, sir, have suffered—but it is a good idea.

Senator CARLSON. May I say they have been under the command of a great Kansan, General Lewis W. Walt.

Mr. PORTER. Walt, and, in fact, I obtained the services of several of the Marine officers, and brought them into my organization wearing civilian clothing, because they do have that sensitivity and feel, which is not to say the other services do not. But the Marines did show a particular talent, I think.

GREATER USE OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY

Senator CASE. In this connection, can we use more of the Vietnamese Army more effectively not only in pacification protection programs, but also on a larger scale fighting? May I just throw this on the table? I do not think it is much of an idea to put another 150,000 Americans in an overloaded country already. This I just do not believe. Have you got a comment on that, too, in connection with this whole thing?

Mr. PORTER. I have an opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, go ahead and express it.

Senator CASE. Well, bless your heart. You know—

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir; I have an opinion.

I would have to be shown before I would put more troops in there just what they are supposed to achieve.

There are about 1.1 million men under arms. Another 100,000, ten percent, does that mean we are within ten percent of victory? Of what? This is what worries me. I worry about this, and I do not want to criticize the generals with whom and alongside of whom I worked. But what is not needed—I do not believe it is needed there—are more troops.

I would like to see a good deal of retraining. What is basically needed in that country to alter the situation dramatically is a night fighting force. The night fighting force is what is needed. We have not trained the Vietnamese to do this job. Maybe we cannot, maybe we are not trained ourselves for it.

But after sundown, as the Senator knows, there is a different state of affairs there. In the daytime we can go anywhere, and our victories are real when we can detect the enemy or when he attacks us. But when night must fall, if you have the tanks out or you have the choppers out, you have to pull them back. Why? Because there is a different state of affairs, and you have an enemy who knows every inch of his terrain and who works best at night.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS WILL FIGHT

Senator SYMINGTON. Can I ask you a question right there?

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. How many more men do you think we need to put into Vietnam to get a really tight hold, a really tight handle, on the guerrilla problem?

Mr. PORTER. I do not know that we need to put any in.

Senator CASE. Americans?

Mr. PORTER. Senator, I do not know that we need to put any in. I would like to see—perhaps it would require a miracle—something done to retrain, say, 50 percent of ARVN to move out, say at 5:30 at night instead of everybody moving in and holding up.

We know they will fight at night if they have proper officers. We have some units on the civilian side which react to specific intelligence. There are men who know the terrain as well as the VC.

But we have only a few of them because we cannot set up an army in competition with the Ministry of Defense in Saigon.

But they are good boys. They are just as good as the VC if they are properly led.

Senator COOPER. Who are you talking about, the South Koreans?

Mr. PORTER. No, sir. I am talking about the Vietnamese, the Vietnamese elements.

Senator COOPER. I mean the South Vietnamese.

Mr. PORTER. We know they will fight.

Senator GORE. Didn't you say a moment ago there were one million men under arms?

Mr. PORTER. There are 1.1, I should think, which is a nearer estimate, sir.

Senator GORE. With only 15 million South Vietnamese, it seems that is one soldier, more than one soldier, to every 15 men, women and children.

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Gosh.

Senator CASE. There are different kinds of soldiers. There are daytime soldiers and part-time soldiers.

Mr. PORTER. Yes. There are approximately, I think if I recall the figures of the Army of Vietnam in its three categories of the Regular Army, the Regional Force and the Popular Forces, they number 630-odd thousand, and we have pretty close to a half million ourselves. Then there are 30 ROK's, and smaller units, of course, from the other troop contributors; yes, sir.

THE WAR IS NOT HOPELESS

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper, do you want to ask a question?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not know whether I get the right impression or not, but I take it you think we ought to get out of there. It is a hopeless thing; we cannot win?

Mr. PORTER. No, sir. I do not think it is hopeless if we do the right thing. But I do not agree with Ward Just, my friend here, who says it is probably unwinnable or some such phrase. I think we are doing—we have a program, and if we persevere and do the things which have to be done on our side and, more important, induce the Vietnamese and especially the Vietnamese Army, to do the things which must be done by them, and should only be done by them—protection of the villages, the work in the villages, and the various other things I have mentioned—we have got a pattern here which will win for us.

Senator CLARK. What do you mean by win?

Mr. PORTER. I mean it will achieve at least temporarily, and I will explain the use of that word in a moment, sir, it will bring about a cessation of hostilities.

Now I say temporarily because it will only be temporary unless there is a very great deal done on the side of social justice, and if it is permanent, if institutions are built to take advantage of what might otherwise be a temporary cessation of enemy activity. There has to be—institutions have to be developed in that country.

RIVALRY BETWEEN THIEU AND KY

One of the most worrisome things at the present time is the fact that the two men, Thieu and Ky, are now vying for the presidency. This could split the army which, after all, is a relatively stable institution. It would endanger the stability that we have had for the past two years instead of moving us toward the kind of situation we want to see exist there, a constitutional government, representative government.

We knew about the risks when we urged them to do this. We thought there might be rivalry. Well, it is developing and it is very serious.

If, however, the process goes well, and we get a representative government, preferably civilian in nature, which the military are willing to serve as protectors of the constitution and the country, then we could really move forward because such a government resulting or emerging from an honest election, observed by newspapermen and officials from all over the world, who are supposed to be invited to this next one, will effectively deal with the VC claim which the Communists push night and day, to be the sole representatives of the people of South Vietnam.

CHANCES OF AN HONEST ELECTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you think there is any chance of getting a satisfactory election according to what we call honest standards or reasonably honest standards down there in the next two decades?

Mr. PORTER. We did it last September in the elections for the Constituent Assembly.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There are a lot of claims——

Senator CASE. There was a selected group of candidates, but the election itself was——

Mr. PORTER. The election itself was honest and above board between candidates.

Of course, you go into this kind of thing——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Didn't somebody sort of ride herd on that election down there, hold them within the fence in some way?

Mr. PORTER. Mainly by insuring the presence of a great many observers, press and others, sir.

Senator CLARK. How about the franchise though, isn't that a real problem? How about who is being allowed to vote?

Senator GORE. To seek office.

Senator CLARK. No, to vote.

Senator GORE. And vote. A man who is neutral is not allowed to run.

Senator CLARK. Or allowed to run, isn't that right?

Mr. PORTER. They have progressed beyond the neutrality aspects. They have under our encouragement adopted a program of what they call national reconciliation.

Senator GORE. I saw Marshal Ky this morning, Mr. Porter, on television in a U.S. helicopter out shaking hands with the children, campaigning. I wonder if anyone can come to any conclusion except that he is our candidate?

Senator CASE. He has got a helicopter. I think it is a good idea he is campaigning. He now is beginning to realize you have to pay enough money for the soldiers——

Senator GORE. Are we going to provide a helicopter for his opposition?

Senator CASE. Look, the President of the United States takes the presidential plane and goes campaigning. [Laughter.]

NORTH VIETNAM COMMANDS OBEDIENCE

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me ask you this question—I have to go. I cannot stay much longer and I would like to finish a couple of questions I have. But why is it that the North Vietnamese fight like the devil, and the South Vietnamese seem to run around at loose ends like chickens when a thunderstorm comes along? I know they will fight on occasions. I do not say they are not brave when properly stimulated. But what stimulates the North Vietnamese to keep coming in in waves and waves and waves? Ho cannot line them all up on the chopping block.

Mr. PORTER. I can only guess at it, Senator. In the North there is a system which commands obedience and punishes severely if it is not given.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is very true.

Mr. PORTER. And in the South it is not as rigid nor as compelling a system.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If people love liberty so much, I do not mean to say people do not love liberty, but if people love liberty so much, and these people get a chance, why don't they go into a system that is not so rigorous? A million of them did come down at the time of the French.

Mr. PORTER. And, in my opinion, would do so again if that frontier were open.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, they are down in South Vietnam.

Mr. PORTER. When you have the kind——

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are they there for loot?

Mr. PORTER. No, they are down there, I think, because the southern elements, the VC, NLF, the military arm, at least, is now in considerable trouble because of pressure. Things are not the way they were, and while they are holding on, and they are punishing us at night, they have suffered heavy losses. I think that is the reason the northerners came down in such force or at least are turning on the pressure up in the northern provinces of South Vietnam. This is purely a personal guess.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, thank you. I have to go. I appreciate your coming here. I wish you well.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad you have gotten so much encouragement that you are glad about it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I did not get any encouragement. I do not feel any better, but I thank the Ambassador for coming.

Senator CASE. I think this has been the most useful session I have had since I have been a member of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington, do you have any further questions?

Senator SYMINGTON. I have some.

THE SPIRIT OF SOUTH VIETNAM

First, let me say what a privilege it was talking with you in Vietnam. I left my discussions with you feeling I understood a lot of things I had not understood before.

I do not believe, I want to tell you this and just present it to you. After thinking over all the discussions I had with all the people there, I do not think that Premier Ky represents a majority of the people of South Vietnam, if you add the Viet Cong to the non-Ky South Vietnamese.

It seems to me we have learned a lesson in the last few days in what people with a heart as well as a head can do in two and a half million people making this fantastically successful operation in that part of the world in which you are a true expert, against 80 million, take on everybody, and the next thing you know obliterate their military power to the point that they have done to date.

With a premise of that type and character of thinking, do you remember when I was out there, two weeks before I got there. They assassinated perhaps the leading civilian opponent to Premier Ky. I remember I called you up to confirm our first date, and you said they have just nearly killed the second leading opponent. Do you remember?

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Now, also when those 30 people hit the TonSonNhut Air Base there right in town, they knew they were dead. Whether they were successful or not or worse than dead, they would be tortured if they were caught. We would turn them over to the South Vietnamese. Isn't it true that the spirit of South Vietnam is more truly represented in the Viet Cong than it is in the majority of the South Vietnamese? That is my question.

ZEALOUSNESS OF THE VIET CONG

Mr. PORTER. You mean are the VC more representative of the people of South Vietnam than—

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I will put it to you this way: Aren't the Viet Cong, looking back to what has happened in the Middle East in the last few days, aren't they the people of dedicated courage as against the South Vietnamese?

Mr. PORTER. There is no question about the courage of certain of their units.

Senator SYMINGTON. Zealous, aren't they more willing to die for a cause, let us put it that way?

Mr. PORTER. Yes, Senator, some of them. But if they were solid in that respect we could not peel off a thousand a week as we are doing now from their units. It is not a solid organization.

My own opinion is, and here again I am giving opinions, I am not—

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think a thousand a week is worth \$2 billion a month?

Mr. PORTER. I paid for each of those 1,000 the sum of \$125. That was my overall cost per head for these people as I walked them out. That is all I can say.

Senator SYMINGTON. I am not going to pursue it any more.

Mr. PORTER. It is not a very expensive thing.

FACELESSNESS OF THE VIETCONG

Senator CASE. What you really mean is there is not in South Vietnam, except for certain highly organized units and disciplined and trained people, there is not any great passion for the Viet Cong or for the Communists.

Mr. PORTER. I was about to say in an open election today, if it could be controlled, that is to say, in the sense of being protected from pressure, armed pressure, my own judgment would be that the VC might get 15 percent of the vote. I have tried to reach out to this movement.

Senator MUNDT. Is that all of Vietnam or South Vietnam?

Mr. PORTER. South Vietnam.

I have tried to reach out to this movement, as I have to others in other places, to see who is what, and what astonishes me about them is their facelessness. There is nobody who stands out there who amounts to anything in the community. They are not led by the respected elements of the community as were the nationalist movements of North Africa and the Middle East that I knew.

It is a very odd business. They do not seem to have any control over the workers. We could be harassed in North Africa building the bases in Morocco by a single order from the underground movement.

The VC have tried a general strike. They would obviously like to hamstring our effort there in construction of the base, and so forth.

They tried that tactic twice, a complete failure, zero. Nobody responds. I have not ever encountered a movement quite like this before."

VIETCONG INFRASTRUCTURE

Senator CASE. They talk about the Viet Cong infrastructure, and then they do not mean a head man and the village chief and all the rest of it sitting down somewhere behind the screen somewhere, and if they do not, what do they mean?

Mr. PORTER. They mean the chap who is with them. He might be a member of a village council. There might be two members. There might be another man in the village, a regular farmer, carrying on intelligence functions, notifying them of this. This is what they mean by the infrastructure. This is what we have to try to get at after we start the pacification of the village.

FAILURE OF STRATEGIC VILLAGES

Senator GORE. When I was out there ten years ago we were spending vast sums of money on the strategic villages. This was going to be the salvation for pacification.

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. They were utter and complete failures.

Mr. PORTER. That is correct.

Senator GORE. Ten years later we have other innovations. What will it be ten years from now, in your view?

Mr. PORTER. When I was told to take over pacification, Senator, I found no precedents except those of failure, the kind of thing you mentioned, the strategic hamlet program and others.

Senator MUNDT. Is that what Roger Hilsman told us about at that time?

Mr. PORTER. Possibly. I am not sure what Hilsman said.

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

Mr. PORTER. But the strategic hamlet, we found the error. People were coerced into living in it. They were taken out of their villages and they were given arms to defend what? Nothing. And even if they were inclined to, say it was a Catholic village and they wanted to oppose the VC or the Viet Minh, it was a principle or a religion or what have you. First, in the case of those who did wish to oppose them, the reaction was, the protective reaction by the government was often delayed, and frequently non-existent; the reaction force too far away, no choppers in those days, no planes, no guns or what have you that could be brought to bear.

The VC set up their sand table. They figured how far away the reaction force was, how many people were in this resisting hamlet. They devoted the force, they applied the force, required to reduce the hamlet. They posted, as they still do, their ambush force between the objective and the reaction element, and simply cut it down.

As you said, sir, you are quite right. The ruins of these hamlets are strewn all over the place. We decided that we would expand only from secure areas, already secured; that nobody would be forced to leave his village and live in a barbed wire entanglement. We tried to take advantage of those errors.

A WINNING CONCEPT OF PACIFICATION

I am convinced that we have emerged with a concept of pacification which will work if all of the elements, the ingredients, are in the package, and those ingredients can be simply stated.

You must first have a well-trained team which knows what it is about, and which must be from that village or district area.

They must be known in there to help the economic improvement, security and general training, and reparation of civil functions in the village itself.

You must then have the understanding of the province and district officials' support. Without that the things that are needed from on top won't come down to the village, the lumber for the bridge or the pigs or whatever is needed to start up life again.

You must then have your economic wherewithal in position to insert into the area once you go in to support the team.

Then you have got two things that are intangibles. You must have your prospective force of the Vietnamese Army somewhere in the neighborhood on a 24-hour basis, not holing up at half past five, and not waiting until eight o'clock in the morning when the village is struck at midnight.

And, finally, if you get your protective force acting properly in that sense, they must have the right attitude with the villagers. They can be a good protective force, but if they go in there and grab the girls and steal the chickens and do all this other stuff, which has been all too common, the people say to their friends, us and others, "Take them away. We would rather have the VC."

But when you have got all those things going on in a village area, we know from experience it can be done, but you must ex-

pand from secure areas. You cannot pick and you must not force people into so-called strategic hamlets.

CURRENT STATUS OF VILLAGES

Senator MUNDT. What percentage of the villages do we have with all these ingredients operating now?

Senator CASE. Ten percent?

Mr. PORTER. I would say—no, sir; more than that. We have a goal of taking 1,100 hamlets, not villages but hamlets, this year with 1.3 million people in them.

We have not yet applied teams and the other elements to all of the 1,100, but I would say that in possibly 40 to 50 percent of the villages or the hamlets where we are, where pacification is underway, the ingredients are there in sufficient quality to further the process.

It shifts. You know, some time or other a province chief or district chief is on his good behavior, and he puts up quite a show for a few weeks. But you have to keep watching or there will be some backsliding. This is a fluctuating process. The movement is forward.

In 1966, if I may continue for a minute, sir, in 1966, which was really a year of organization, we were putting this concept together. We took over about 500 hamlets, and we are now moving, as I say, up.

The teams are being refined, the leadership improved, etcetera. It will go. But what has been lacking up to now is that required around-the-clock protection. Too many teams in villages cooperating with us have been struck at midnight with no reaction until eight a.m. A team or village cannot stand up against a company of VC.

This is what is missing, and this is what the new team in Saigon is supposed to try to evoke from the Army of Vietnam.

We have been trying, of course. Being aware of the problem, we managed to get 60 battalions of their 120 battalions of the Army of Vietnam allocated to the job of protecting those villages.

Senator GORE. But they are still a daytime Army.

Mr. PORTER. They are still a daytime Army all too often. We were hit 25 times, last year. Villages in which teams were working were hit 25 times by the VC last year.

But by the end of this year the pacification threat became so great, the enemy, that is the VC, raised it to top priority. Up to the time I left Saigon in May we had been hit this year about 400 times, and there are special decorations now announced by the VC. They fear this process, and I am glad they do, in a sense, because it tends to prove that we now have something that might work.

But we are still evolving. Nobody has got all the answers, and I can only hope that the new team—

INSPIRING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY

Senator CARLSON. What you are saying, Mr. Ambassador, is that for some reason we cannot inspire the Vietnamese Army, the Southern people, who should be doing it. Why aren't they inspired? They just serve in the Army and draw their salaries, and don't we try to encourage and try to help the people? Is that the idea?

Mr. PORTER. Well, sir, the officer class is the key to it all. Now, General Westmoreland, for whom I have great respect, has a different opinion of them than I.

Senator CARLSON. I see.

Mr. PORTER. He thinks they are good. He came back here and made a speech and devoted part of it to praising the Vietnamese Army, and there are good men in it.

But as far as I am concerned, in this pacification thing there have been some glaring deficiencies.

Now, everybody is trying to get this thing changed.

Why we cannot inspire them, why we have not been able to, is because there is an officer class which has acquired bad habits. The war is over at 5:30. There is no war on Sunday, you know, that kind of thing.

It is just not applicable to this kind of situation. Now maybe if you had a fixed line with a lot of trenches and great defenses there would be no problem except the enemy coming at you from one direction, and you could maybe take a little time off to do this. But you cannot. You have to fight right around the clock in Vietnam, and nobody can fight at night.

Senator GORE. Senator Cooper.

Senator CASE. Are we getting anywhere in correcting this; are we starting?

Mr. PORTER. We are trying. Our military and everybody out there are doing their damndest to get it. Please don't feel from what I have said that there are not good units and not good Vietnamese. The Vietnamese trooper on our side is just as good as the VC, but he is not operating in his own territory very frequently. He cannot get out at night. He is not setting booby traps for the enemy at night or ambushes, and he has got a different kind of training. He is a conventional trooper, brave as they come, when the enemy is coming across the field at him perhaps. But at night it is a different business.

Senator CARLSON. Is this a fixed bad habit or is it bad morale on the part of these people? What do you think?

Mr. PORTER. I think it is just a bad habit. I do not think it is anything that is unchangeable, except that it is going to take time, Senator, to do it.

Senator CARLSON. I am through.

Senator COOPER. Might I ask a couple of questions, Senator Gore?

Senator GORE. Go ahead.

IMPLAUSIBILITY OF MAKING OVER SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator COOPER. I certainly appreciated hearing you, Ambassador Porter. But it seems to me in a way what you have said, one could say that it brings into question the very premise upon which we are operating in South Vietnam.

We would say we are there to help the people fight for their freedom and help them resist aggression. But from what you said they do not seem to be doing very much, and if you extend your suggestion, it seems to me, what we are saying, we have to make over the whole country. We have to make over the military forces. You have to, the people themselves have got to believe there is social

justice. You say you have got to get the government in the attitude of providing social justice. It seems that the Americans are stimulating or trying to inspire the making over of a country economically, militarily. I just wonder if a country can do that to another country? No colonial country has ever been able to do it. The British did very well in India and did very well in other places, but they could not do it.

I think it questions the very premises which we are there for. I want to ask you two or three very specific questions.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY'S LACK OF MOTIVATION

Take the Army, I read this—of course you have made it clear—they do not fight at night.

I can remember four or five years ago when we heard one of the purposes of our advisers out there, as stated on the floor a number of times, was to train these South Vietnamese in night-time fighting and guerrilla fighting. Apparently we never did.

Then you say they cannot even protect the security of the hamlet; they are driven off.

Well, it does go back to what is the reason—part of it may be training—but isn't it also the fact that it is lack of motivation?

Mr. PORTER. Motivation in many cases, yes.

I did not say, I do not think I said, Senator, that they won't protect a hamlet. What I said is that the reaction is delayed beyond reason. That a hamlet, after a signal goes in, should not be expected to wait eight hours before the local force or the force in the vicinity reacts.

GET THE VIETNAMESE TO DO THINGS FOR THEMSELVES

Senator COOPER. You changed your system now to put Americans in there or with Americans and South Vietnamese to provide the security. It is evident that they would not secure the hamlet at night; is that correct?

Mr. PORTER. To put Americans in to react instead of South Vietnamese?

Senator COOPER. Yes.

Mr. PORTER. But then we would be changing our basic philosophy. You mentioned the British and what they tried to do, and so on. But they tried to do it directly to these people or for these people; make them do things. We are trying to get the Vietnamese to do things for Vietnamese.

Senator COOPER. The fact is we have not been able to get them to do it. We have not been able to get them to do the fighting that they ought to do.

Mr. PORTER. That is right.

Senator COOPER. It is their country, to protect the villagers, to engage in night fighting. The Viet Cong engage in night fighting, but these people have not, and part of it must be because they will not. Do you agree with that?

Mr. PORTER. Yes.

ATTITUDE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE

Senator COOPER. Then I think it is a question that they are not fighting for something in which they believe.

Now, what about the people themselves? You said, first they must have a feeling of security, and that has been answered by your statements about the failure of their own people to protect them, the Army people.

Second, they must have a belief that this social justice will be accorded them. Then that goes for their government. It would follow then their government has not taken any large steps to accord them what you call and what we generally understand are the elements of social justice. Is that correct?

Mr. PORTER. They have taken some steps, but there is a very great deal to do in that field. It is hoped that many things will be done under a constitutional form of government which would be representative and would give the people a chance to raise their voices against injustice.

Senator COOPER. I am going to quit. But if I may pursue my line for just a moment, following Senator Gore's observation, I have seen time after time long lists of things that have been provided to the people of South Vietnam through our money and our effort. Only this year the President, in one of his speeches, one of his messages to Congress, had a tremendous list of things that have been done because of our aid and our money—schools, roads. I just cannot name all of them. But that has not accomplished very much, has it?

Mr. PORTER. I think it has in the areas that are secure.

Senator COOPER. It has?

Mr. PORTER. Yes, I think it has. The program has produced in the secure areas a feeling on the part of the Vietnamese generally that they would like—outside those areas, too—that they would like to have the same benefits and security. Security brings with it tangible benefits.

Yes, I do believe there has been a definite and good reaction to these programs.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE LOYALTY

Senator COOPER. Is there any feeling of loyalty or attachment on the part of the people in South Vietnam toward the government?

Mr. PORTER. Yes, in many cases, there is.

What we have noted is the willingness of the people throughout South Vietnam to cooperate with the government provided the security is not transient.

Too many times in the past the VC have been swept from a village area, and then the military unit went off to do something else, and the VC came back to punish the village for cooperating during the brief period when it was secured. They have learned. They have had many bitter lessons in that connection.

Now, we find they want to be sure that that security is in as a basic ingredient of the program. It must be there; must stay there. Once they are sure of that, it takes about two or three months to calm their fears. Then the intelligence about the VC begins to come

in, not quickly, because of the history of it, but they do cooperate. In that sense they are loyal.

They will respond despite VC threats to participate in the election appeal. We have seen that definitely on several occasions, now, and there is no particular loyalty to a government in a party sense. But there is a feeling that there are great advantages to be derived if only peace and security could be achieved, can be achieved.

DISLIKE BETWEEN SOUTHERNERS AND NORTHERNERS

Senator COOPER. One other question: What is the attitude of the people toward North Vietnam? When I was there I was told that there was a great feeling toward Ho Chi Minh, but they did not like the North, and it was chiefly the basis for being willing to continue to make such efforts as they could fighting.

Mr. PORTER. There is a disease called regionalism in that country. The southerners and the northerners do not like each other, and the Centrists do not like either.

Senator CASE. It goes back for centuries.

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir; and that is one cause of the friction.

There is then, of course, a big Catholic element which dislikes the North for other reasons, although many of them, Catholics in the South are foreign, are of northern origin.

On the other hand, many officers came down from the North because they were afraid of Communists and did not like them, or their families had suffered, people like Ky himself. That is his weakness in this forthcoming election as a northerner. He will run, and will have great difficulty unless he finds a strong southerner to go with him.

Senator COOPER. I thank you.

IF THE ELECTION SPLITS THE ARMED FORCES

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, you said earlier that if—there are a lot of ifs—if the election went over well, if they got a civilian who did a good job for social justice, and then maybe a constitutional government and election which was to be held in September, it would alleviate the situation.

You did not discuss the other contingency, except to say there is a rivalry between the two popular military leaders that might split the Army.

Mr. PORTER. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. So if that happens where are we? If that is in the realm of possibility, and I gather it could be, what happens?

Mr. PORTER. There could be considerable dissension. There is a feeling by many of us that what is required at this point is a civilian government with the support, loyal support, of the Army.

Ky and Thieu, young men, have been in power now for a couple of years, and have gotten to like it. Neither wishes to yield to the other, and both will be candidates apparently.

If this splits the armed forces, we may have a tendency to revert to the business of a coup d'etat, which were frequent before Lodge and I went in there.

Somebody is going to have to be pretty firm somewhere, it seems to me, because the coup d'etat was bad enough in the old days. But now with 500,000 Americans in the country, the rules of the game

have got to be changed accordingly, and I think somebody is going to have to tell them.

PERILS OF AN ELECTION IN WARTIME

Senator MUNDT. Is this a contingency? Is it going to provide any loyal support on behalf of the South Vietnamese if we superimpose on them an American-made selected government? Wouldn't that antagonize them right off the bat?

Mr. PORTER. Senator, we have been backing away from doing just that despite everybody, all kinds of people, approaching us saying, "You have to say what you want and then people will know." That is a very dangerous position to get into.

Senator MUNDT. I was a little concerned in my own mind when I first heard we were going in there in the middle of a war and holding an election. We might be creating a fracas. We might go from bad to worse, because it is a little unprecedented in our American wartime history to have elections and wars going on at the same time and at the same place, and we having instigated it. We have got to assume some responsibility for the results. And what could happen, seems likely to happen, to me, and I am not an authority on Vietnam because I have not been there, but it seems to me what could very well happen is that the split that you mention between these two charming and rather successful military figures who have a loyal following in their sub-officers, if they split up, and the one who loses is not going to support the one who wins, there is no alternative but just to superimpose a "made in Washington" government. I think that is the worst of all eventualities.

Mr. PORTER. Yes, or to act in time and reason firmly with them.

My own tendency would be not to wait, to get at this thing sooner rather than later, because the effect in the country will be very bad.

We have a lot to gain by a good election, and a respected figure, preferably civilian, emerging. The whole image of Vietnam throughout the world will change, and we will feel easier with them, I think, as a result.

THE AMERICAN CANDIDATE

Senator GORE. It seems to me from all that you have said, particularly with respect to Senator Cooper's observation, that Ky here is a key to success, which must be motivation. The French were unable to motivate these people to defend themselves. We have been trying, since 1954, and we have not been very successful.

You agree with the observation of General Dayan that no white man's candidate will succeed as village chief. What reason do we have to believe that the white man's candidate would be accepted? How much is this yellow man against white man's exploitation?

Mr. PORTER. Sir, I would never propose a candidate as such.

Senator GORE. Well, this man is our candidate. He comes to Honolulu; he comes to the Philippines. He campaigns in an American helicopter. He has a plane with a bar in it. He wears a baseball cap he got over here. How can he be more a white man's candidate than he is?

Mr. PORTER. Well, I tend to think that the trip to Honolulu and the plane, etcetera, are the perquisites and trappings of office. I do not know—

Senator GORE. They are our trappings though. We provided the trappings.

Mr. PORTER. I know. But any soldier—we had them there, Big Minh had them, and others had them before Ky showed up, because we were supplying these kinds of items.

But the mission has been extremely careful to make it clear to everybody in Saigon that there is no American candidate. This has been said to Ky himself; it has been said to all the others.

Now, in exerting our influence in the place, I think it should be in the direction of getting them, as we have done on sort of a minor scale from time to time, to pull together; to get together again, and pull together, and make up their minds on a course of action that will not split the country or split the armed forces.

Maybe they could compromise now that both are candidates or have announced their candidacy in favor of a civilian.

You know in Vietnam there is no foregone conclusion that Ky can win. Ky is a northerner; he is a young fellow. He has not got any southerner of prominence to run with him that I know of yet. He is opposed by a couple of respected but not outstanding personalities, and it is just barely possible that he and/or Thieu would be beaten, despite the advantages which accrue from being in office.

Senator GORE. Let me make this observation. If I were his public relations officer, the first thing I would do is to take the American baseball cap off him and give him one of these little round hats that goes up to a peak.

THE SITUATION IS INTOLERABLE

Senator CASE. Tell me how do we exercise influence? We ought to influence them to eliminate corruption or cut it down. We ought to influence them to pay the civil servants and the army more. We ought to do a thousand things. How is this done? Do we go in and say, "Ky, you little jerk, will you get some sense in your head or else we will get the hell out of here"?

Now, how can you—I understand, I have seen papers from downtown or to each other downtown, that we have such a great stake in this place, and we are absolutely at the mercy of the Vietnamese because we know we cannot pull out.

Well, I say we can pull out, although I am against it. I think that the effect, except on the basis of the South Vietnamese demonstrating to the world that they are not worth saving, I think it would be a disaster if we pulled out as far as the periphery goes and as far as many of the people in South Vietnam who have come along with us and all that.

But this is intolerable, to have American boys killed while people get rich, etcetera, etcetera, for very much longer.

Tell us how it works. Do you talk to Ky? Did Cabot talk to Ky?

Mr. PORTER. Oh, yes; yes, sir. We do not have any hesitation about taking up delicate matters or problems that might be delicate in other countries with people like Ky.

In the matter of corruption, we had some frank discussions and conversations with him. He did manage to remove two of the highest ranking generals in the country from office as a result.

Senator CASE. One guy is still in there though.

Mr. PORTER. Well, there are several other characters around, but at least the Minister of Defense was taken out, and the commander of the Fourth Region, the Delta.

In matters pertaining to an army raise or pay raise or civil servants, much the same process goes on. Ky is not difficult about that kind of thing.

ELIMINATING KY AS A CANDIDATE

Senator CASE. Well, what I mean to say specifically now, you were just talking with Senator Gore and Senator Mundt about the matter of the desirability of eliminating Ky as a candidate. Can you talk to him about this kind of thing? You do not select a candidate, but can you persuade Ky and the military to put in a responsible civilian figure who will himself add a little legitimacy to the government, which is the main thing that Ky lacked because he is regarded by most people still, as I understand it, as one of a bunch of thugs who have come down from the North and except for Big Minh, who had a little standing because he was the instrument to overturn a dictator and a tyrant, the rest of these people have had no—they inspire no loyalty or no affection. They are in no way a force to draw a country together, this kind of thing.

Mr. PORTER. That is why I said, sir, a civilian candidate might well win.

Senator CASE. What can you do to help this?

Mr. PORTER. But in the matter of what do you say to Ky, and so on, I do not know what is being said at the moment. I have been out of touch.

The pitch when I left was for Ky and Thieu to settle between them, and this was being made directly to them, to settle between them which of them would be the candidate, since they seemed to be both talking about running if a split in the armed forces was to be avoided.

They gave assurances that no split in the armed forces was going to happen, but no more than that. Since they have announced their candidacy, this has weakened both.

The conversations are straightforward and frank when we have reason to talk to them.

Senator MUNDT. Have you ever tried to talk an American politician out of running for office? It is not easy.

POSSIBILITY THAT A CIVILIAN MIGHT WIN

Mr. PORTER. There is something in that sense, Senator. But they will split their support, and I would not be unhappy to see a civilian emerge, provided he has some kind of a working arrangement with the military. The military make a hell of a lot of difference.

Senator CASE. Of course, of course. But it might happen that way.

Mr. PORTER. Ky, I sense in Vietnam, naturally perhaps on the part of the people, some hesitation about backing military candidates, and I don't—he is too young, he is northerner, and he has

not got a good southerner to run with him so far, and there are great weaknesses.

If a respected southern figure emerges from the Delta, the Delta will vote southern, and that great conglomeration outside Saigon is unmanageable but probably would not vote military.

Senator MUNDT. Let me ask you this. You were in such a position, you and Cabot who were there, and your successors who are there. Couldn't you call in Ky and this other fellow in the same room and say, "Look, fellows, we are trying to win this war. Will you agree on a civilian?" That kind of thing, might conceivably be withdrawn, you might get either to withdraw for the other. It is my inclination to believe in a war-time situation that one or the other is more likely to win than a civilian.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the way you are going to do it in the Republican convention in the back room. [Laughter.]

Senator MUNDT. Yes. "Look, agree on some civilian and everybody will pitch in and help."

NEED FOR A RUN-OFF

Senator CASE. Up to now it does not look too good. When you left, the assembly had just defeated the effort some of the civilians had been making to provide for a minimum vote in order to win on the first election, and—

Mr. PORTER. This was at the behest of the Ky elements. This is a very troublesome aspect.

Senator CASE. That is right.

Mr. PORTER. Very troublesome. Because, we have pointed out to Ky, if there is no run-off and there are four or five candidates, and a man emerges with 15, 20, or 25 percent of the vote, where will be his prestige domestically or internationally? We are hoping for something here that will look like a national mandate, whoever is put into office.

Senator CASE. They turned this down.

Mr. PORTER. They turned this down, and Ky later said—well, we took this up with him again, and it seemed to us to be a good procedure. But he said he thought that he probably would get, or that the winner would probably get 40 percent of the vote, which would not be bad, of course, in a field of five candidates or so. But it is not a healthy business that way.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark, have you posed any questions?

VIETNAM CLOSE TO A STALEMATE

Senator CLARK. I would like to ask a couple.

Mr. Ambassador, I came in late, and I hope I won't be going over ground that has already been covered. But I understand you did not have any serious quarrel with Ward Just's article in The Washington Post on Sunday. Am I wrong about that?

Mr. PORTER. No. Ward reflects, or the article reflects a number of incidents primarily. He is a very sensitive man, and in certain respects I can agree fully. I am not sure—I do not go along with him when he says the war is probably unwinnable. This was printed in the paper, and this was not my thought. I think it is winnable if, and then, of course, the ifs come into the picture.

Senator CLARK. Yes. But I get the impression at the present moment we are pretty close to a stalemate. Is that wrong?

Mr. PORTER. Well, you are right in the sense that we can do what we like in the daytime and damned little at night.

Senator CLARK. Yes. But I mean if we are close to the stalemate we finally got in Korea, maybe it is a good time to start talking.

Mr. PORTER. No, because there is no line, you see. It is not like Korea. It is quite different, sir. If there were a line you got stalemate on that would be great.

Senator CLARK. I understand that, but it does not seem to us it makes sense. So many die. We kill so many of them and they kill so many of us. This goes on and on. We do not take any more territory; they do not win. I do not want to argue with you, but it seems to me whether there is a line or not is not important.

VICTORY BY ATTRITION

Mr. PORTER. Westmoreland is counting on pure attrition. You kill enough of them and it eventually will quiet down. I have a different approach.

Senator CLARK. He also says five or six years.

Mr. PORTER. I do not know. The military do their own figuring.

The CHAIRMAN. How many years do you say?

Mr. PORTER. Well, I could not say. At the present time I would want to see how this election turns out, because I think, sir, after this election, if we get something reasonable with a good image, world image, as a result of a popular mandate and all that, I think they ought to be pushed to open negotiations with the other side. They are Vietnamese. We are locked in.

We have said we won't negotiate with the VC. We cannot stop the bombing unless we get a gesture, all these other gestures. They are not locked in by anything. They can and should, it seems to me, after the election, say to the VC. "Now, look, there is no question this has been a decent election. Everybody in world opinion says so. Now, what do you want to do? Do you want to talk or not?"

I also believe that this is what we are very likely to see because the spirit in the constituent assembly tends to reflect or indicates this possibility. This may be the way to go.

The CHAIRMAN. That is providing Ky is not elected.

Mr. PORTER. Well, if a soldier is elected—

Senator CASE. You are going to have a congress; you are going to have a legislature, which is going to be a factor.

Mr. PORTER. If a soldier is elected it would take rather more urging on our part to make this direct contact. But I would not want to give up.

FAILURE TO PRODUCE A STRONG MILITARY FORCE

Senator CLARK. Do you know a Japanese reporter from the Christian Science Monitor whose name is Takashi Oka?

Mr. PORTER. Yes, I have met him.

Senator CLARK. So far as you know, is he fairly reliable?

Mr. PORTER. Yes. He is an interesting reporter. Sometimes he tends to write things without checking them.

Senator CLARK. This letter which Carl Marcy has handed me, written on May 20, has some interesting observations in it. I would like your comment on one. One of them is:

It is pertinent to ask why, with all the material help provided by the Americans, the non-Communist Vietnamese so far have not been able to create a military force half as good as that of their Communist compatriots.

Is that a fair comment? Is that a fair question?

Mr. PORTER. Yes, it is a fair question, but it is not entirely a Vietnamese fault. We have been training them for ten years.

Senator CLARK. He comes to the conclusion it is the fault of their officers.

Mr. PORTER. That what, sir?

Senator CLARK. He comes to the conclusion that it is the fault of their officers, which bears out something which you said earlier about the nine-to-five hours, and also something I saw in the paper that in three years there has only been one field grade officer in the South Vietnamese army wounded in combat.

Mr. PORTER. I am seriously concerned about the officer corps for a number of reasons. But I think there have probably been a few wounded.

I must say the civilian elements in Saigon seem to be much more the object of—the police particularly whom we on our side trained—much more the object of VC attack than the officers of the army.

Senator CLARK. Which would seem to indicate they are happy with the officers of the army.

Mr. PORTER. Well, there is something there.

Senator CASE. They do not expose themselves.

Mr. PORTER. We get hit much harder, our officers.

A CORRUPT ARMY LED BY POLITICAL GENERALS

Senator CLARK. I won't detain you much longer. But here is another one that Takashi Oka says:

Promotion in the Vietnamese army still depends on a complex of personal family, regional, religious and educational ties on the generals and wives an officer knows, on his behavior during the innumerable coups and purges that have shaken the army during the past several years. The result is an army led by political generals willing to accept American advice only at the most technical level of logistics, new weapons, and sometimes of strategy. The corrupt and creaky, clubby structure of the Vietnamese army itself remains a sacred cow. Foreigners fiddle with it at their peril. Even the well-intentioned members of the Vietnamese military fraternity hesitate to touch it, and so the Americans fight the war.

Is that unfair?

Mr. PORTER. It is harsh, but it is not unfair. The first part of it, yes, the list of factors.

REORGANIZATION OF PACIFICATION PROGRAM

Senator CLARK. Now, Joe Kraft, who is a pretty controversial figure, I happen to like him and respect him, but others do not, had an article in the Post—and this is my last question, Mr. Chairman—on the 12th of May, in which he is talking about the reorganization under which the American army took over the pacification thing, and he says:

Reorganization is bound to work a subtle change in mood of the pacification effort. Originally the program was conceived as a means for winning over people in the

villages, including people on the other side, by meeting their needs. As an adjunct to the military, however, pacification will be inextricably intertwined with the goal that comes so naturally to soldiers, victory. The dominant theme will shift from winning over those on the other side to killing them.

That is a little rough. Do you think the army can do a better job than the civilians in pacifying the Vietnamese, whom I would be afraid are not going to permit themselves to be pacified by white men?

Mr. PORTER. Well, I assume you were speaking of our army. Could our army do it?

Senator CLARK. Yes, I was speaking of our army.

Mr. PORTER. I happen to feel and believe strongly that this must be done by civilians.

First of all, to begin with, the technical aspect, the army tour of duty, is too short. The civilian, the American civilian will live in and observe the village and its environs for two, three, or four or more years. The army man is in there perhaps for six months, because the feeling is that this is sort of secondary, the advisory work is of a secondary character, and he wants to be, for his own good if he is a career man, even if not an officer, he wants to be in a battle unit.

This is a question of sensitivity. I have—I think that the army boys would have as much as civilians if they were devoted entirely to that kind of work for the same length of time.

Senator CLARK. Well, I spent—

Mr. PORTER. Then, of course, there are problems of command.

Senator CLARK. Sure.

Mr. PORTER. The civilian is given, at least was, a great deal of flexibility, and he can use his own judgment as to what is needed, and a civilian is generally convinced of the need to keep an American presence out of those villages. I am not sure that that is the case with the army.

Senator CLARK. Well, I was in the Air Force for four years many years ago, during World War II, and I had the most enormous high regard for the West Pointers and the professionals that I worked for. They were really magnificent military men.

But, boy, when they got to military government, they did not know which end was up.

RATIONALE FOR THE SWITCH

Senator CASE. I guess, Joe, perhaps, you were here, perhaps you were not here, when the Ambassador was saying that he understood the rationale for this switch, which I have very great doubts about, was primarily the providing of security for the program in the hamlets.

Senator CLARK. I am sure it was.

Mr. PORTER. The rationale at the time the switch was made, if our army, if it had complete responsibility for the pacification army as carried on under me previously, would then feel the compulsion or greater compulsion to evoke the necessary protective attitudes and actions out of the army of Vietnam.

Senator CASE. By the Vietnam, and we would see that this was done.

Mr. PORTER. And now we have people in there who are charged with evoking that Vietnamese action.

THE LINE COMMAND

Senator CASE. When I was over there they had not worked out this line of command really, the integration side of it.

Mr. PORTER. No sir.

Senator CASE. We have, what is his name, Bob Komer, who is Deputy for Westmoreland for this purpose, a civilian.

Mr. PORTER. Yes.

Senator CASE. But it has not really been very clear as to what the chain of command was going to be.

Mr. PORTER. Komer was in effect to take over that part of my job which was concerned with the structure and operation of pacification, the training of teams, the choice of the villages to be pacified, etcetera.

No, General Abrams, as I understand it, is to be the one who evokes from the army of Vietnam, as Westmoreland's other deputy, the proper protective action and the right attitudes, etcetera, toward this process.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, could I go off the record for just half a minute?

The Chairman. Yes.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. On the record.

FIGHT INDEFINITELY OR NEGOTIATE

Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if I can ask you one or two questions. Probably in the interest of time I will over-simplify them.

It seems to me in a very broad way we have two possibilities.

One is to continue the fight indefinitely, some say six years, some say ten, some say twenty, however that may be.

The other is to negotiate.

Why is it impracticable to seek negotiation? At one time, our own government, and certainly others, have said a return to the essentials of the Geneva Accords could be an acceptable starting place to see if some basis for a non-military solution can be found.

Would you care to comment on that?

Mr. PORTER. I think there will be a more propitious moment during which we can move toward negotiations if these elections come off properly.

Now, there are problems, and I suppose this government, in moving toward a direct contact with the MLF-VC, in view of the things we have said, would not do this. Those problems do not apply to the upcoming new government of Vietnam next September.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. The reason I raise that question—

Mr. PORTER. It seems to me they have more liberty of action, Mr. Chairman. Excuse me.

ELECTIONS WILL NOT BE SEEN AS FAIR

The CHAIRMAN. I hope I am wrong about it, but this election, it cannot possibly be considered by the world as a fair election because everyone won't be out voting.

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir; everyone who is not bearing arms will be allowed to vote; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is going to supervise it?

Mr. PORTER. There will be, of course there will be great dependence on the presence of the world press, and they are inviting official observers from many countries, as I understand it, to observe, not to supervise, but everyone can vote provided he has not got a gun in his hands.

We have managed to get to the VC to come into the VC center, and within two months he will be integrated if he wishes into the Vietnamese society, and he may vote. More recently they have accepted the thought that the higher-ups in the VC may also reenter society, resume their professions and take part as individuals in the political process.

What they have not accepted is the thought of VC-MLF participating as a party nor, of course, have they accepted the idea that armed units of the enemy side may come in to vote. That, of course, would not happen anyway. But they may vote. They have done so.

CHANCES OF THE COMMUNISTS WINNING AN ELECTION

The CHAIRMAN. Then you do not think it is feasible to return to the Geneva Accords—just supposing, just for speculation, to try to make the point I am trying to make, if you did have a cease-fire and you had an election supervised by the ICC instead of the American army, whoever the officials are, that this would make—do you think that the Communists are bound to win such an election?

Mr. PORTER. I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. If not, why don't we take that route and make it more in accord with the concept of the Geneva Accords?

Mr. PORTER. Elections supervised by the ICC would require, of course, the agreement of the Communist element.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. PORTER. And I think there is good reason to believe that they would themselves not agree, and that on the Vietnamese side the Ky government might not agree.

We would not know about the latter point until we exerted our influence and pressure. But it is not an easy route to take by any means. It is not easy.

FACED WITH A SECOND WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The CHAIRMAN. What I am leading up to, I suppose, now we are faced with this second war in the Middle East which God willing is coming to an end as far as the violence goes. But the end is a long ways off as far as a real settlement is concerned.

You could tell in this body itself this last week there was a much higher degree of apprehension as a result of this war in the Middle East breaking out on top of another war which is a very major war. Some are considering the proposition that it may, time may be here that we ought to consider trying to bring about a settlement involving, of course, the Russians and the other interested parties, of both the Middle East and Vietnam; that if we cannot settle Vietnam the Russians are not going to be satisfied to just sit by and

be good and play ball in the Middle East while we are continuing to escalate and pursue the war in Vietnam.

I think there is some logic in that, a matter of psychology. I know the administration insists that there is no connection between these two.

I think, I sense, a great many of my colleagues believe there is a connection, particularly from the attitude of the Russians. They are still a pretty important element in the overall picture.

Now, you say it is not a propitious time. It may not be with looking only at Vietnam. But it seems to me, looking at the whole world situation and, particularly, our relations with the Russians, they have received a very serious setback now in their prestige and their allies in the Middle East, and possibly they could be disposed to consider a package agreement.

The reason I mention the Geneva Accords is simply because these governments—one common thread, I think, has been in the various pronouncements by Communists as well as our own government in the past, that this would be a reasonable place to begin. I am much more interested really in settling Vietnam than I am in the Middle East, not that we are not interested in both, but the one that is really hurting this country at the moment is Vietnam. I mean financially we are getting into very serious trouble. You saw where the House refused to up the limit. You know what that is. It is resentment against the distortion of our economy rising from the Vietnamese war.

CONSIDER A BROADER FRAMEWORK THAN VIETNAM

We had the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee saying in a speech the other day he anticipated there could be a deficit, on top of what we already have scheduled, of \$29 billion this coming year. That was from Wilbur Mills, the chairman of Ways and Means.

We are getting into very serious difficulties, I think, economically, domestically. We have the distortion of our domestic programs.

You read in today's paper about a riot, a racial riot, in Boston, which has not heretofore been particularly subject to that. Seventy people were injured, and so on.

Everyone feels that this summer we are going to be plagued with many more domestic difficulties in this area, all of which, I think, reflect the Vietnamese war, not just the monetary part, but the distraction of the attention of most of our political leaders. They are thinking the war. They are not thinking about the poverty program or the urban program, and so on. You know they cannot possibly be.

I was wondering if those of you, and particularly you, who have been so close to this out there, feel whether this should not be considered in a little broader framework than just Vietnam. Because if we are going to get anywhere with peace with the Russians or detente, I think we have to consider our doing something about Vietnam if they are going to be reasonable about other parts of the world.

This thing has blown up in their face in the Middle East. If we do not make any movement towards some kind of reconciliation,

they can also make it difficult in Berlin or a number of other places.

Is this unreasonable to try to bring these two in focus, whether or not, in the words of the Secretary, there is an organic connection. I think there is certainly a psychological connection between the two in the minds of the Russians.

Mr. PORTER. The package, Vietnam—

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. PORTER. [continuing]. And in the Middle East?

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. PORTER. And, of course, the matter of the people who will eventually have to give, not only to us in Vietnam, but perhaps we could find some means of doing that, but some very tough people I was associated with for many years, meaning the Israelis.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Mr. PORTER. I do not know.

In general appearance, of course, it seems attractive. The work seems very complicated.

The CHAIRMAN. It is complicated.

VIETNAM IS A PERIPHERAL AREA

What bothers me really, I know when you were there, and I know what I call good technicians and people, they are interested in accomplishing their particular job. But, honestly, I do not see in the overall picture if we spend five or ten years bringing about a democratic regime there, in the first place, it would be a very tenuous regime if we impose it or if we manage it, if it does not develop of its own roots there. It is not to me the kind of position that is nearly as dangerous to the peace of the world over a long period as the Middle East can be because of the juxtaposition of so many different interests.

I have always been impressed by [General John] Gavin's idea that while it is important, it is not the most important or most strategic area, and so on. It is a reasonably peripheral area.

I wonder, we pursue it with all this money and effort and manpower and the attention of our people, and the neglect—we are neglecting Latin America; we are neglecting our domestic programs; we are neglecting Africa because we do not have but one mind, and the President can think of only one thing at a time.

I do not know. I think we are riding for a very serious problem if we do not bring these two together in some focus, and get some kind of a detente and stop this slaughter. That endless slaughter, it seems to me, is very dangerous.

I was struck today, the Secretary was here this morning, and he left—there had been word that one of our ships had been torpedoed. Well, you know how it turned out.

Supposing by mistake they had torpedoed a Russian ship. Would they have accepted the excuse that it was a mistake? I do not know whether they would have or not. They are mad as hell about our bombing their ship in the harbor.

The Ambassador to Czechoslovakia came to see me and he said good-by, and he said the Russians were furious about our bombing their ship, and they do not begin to buy that we did not do it. They know we did, he said. These mistakes are very dangerous.

GIVING THE VIETNAMESE A CHANCE TO MAKE A CHOICE

Senator CASE. This is a very important question in our line of questioning. We all know you have concerns and have expressed them, and we all hold, and I think this is a real hard question, what would happen if we made the kind of a deal that we can make now? First of all, can we make a deal that does not involve turning over South Vietnam to the Communists, except by immediately or short steps? If that is desirable then we should do it. If because of all the things that have concerned—

The CHAIRMAN. I am not proposing we just turn it over to them. He is saying if they had a fair election he does not think they would vote for it. But I am saying it is up to them if we give them a fair opportunity that they make the decision.

Senator CASE. I think we are hoping that this will be regarded by the civilized world as, broadly speaking, a fair election.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not believe they will when it is under our control. I think you have to have more participation by outsiders.

Mr. PORTER. You mean, sir, the country, our control of the country, or the election?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I mean the means of communications. The fact of the availability of transport, and all of this. The part that is going to function in this election is bound to be attributed to our control.

Mr. PORTER. Well, whatever the case may be, communications or transport, we have made it perfectly clear to them that we will not permit our transport to be involved in any of their election.

The CHAIRMAN. You or somebody said Mr. Ky campaigns in his helicopter. Where did he get the helicopter?

Mr. PORTER. Well, there are helicopters there, and there are machines which belong to the Vietnamese government.

The CHAIRMAN. We made it available. We made available everything they have.

Mr. PORTER. Yes.

A PHONY ELECTION

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody is going to buy this kind of phony business. We are really running the show and Ky is our man. I do not think you can ever convince anybody he is not our man.

Senator CASE. I think it is really a hard problem for any civilian to campaign against him, don't you, with all the censorship and everything going on? We are constantly trying to help this out, but I think to get a civilian man in we probably would have to persuade Ky and his colleagues in the military that it is desirable in the long run. That is the only way we can get him out.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not mean to put you on the spot to answer this question or not.

Senator CASE. I am going to put him on a spot by sharpening it.

POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS

The CHAIRMAN. What I meant to do is this: You have the confidence of the administration, I know. Would it be feasible—I won't even put it in the form of a question, I would rather put it this way—I would appeal to you and plead with you, without your an-

swering yes or no, to inspire them to think about it, at least the possibility of private negotiations with the Russians and then with the French and British, before major powers, at least, who have an interest in this area, to consider under these present circumstances in which the Russians and the Arabs are humiliated, and it could be dangerous if we pushed this.

There is too much bragging. I regretted the statements made yesterday that this was a great victory for the West. This is the most infuriating way you can put this thing in the Middle East, but this was published as attributed to the Secretary.

I do not really think he ever said it, or certainly intended to say it that way, but these things happen.

I think during this interim if the Russians could be approached, if our government, and I certainly cannot do it, and it will have to be the administration, along this line, and they could see some prospect of a settlement in Vietnam, they would be greatly—their feelings would be helped a lot to go along in the Middle East and elsewhere if they thought they could get that off their back, because it is a burden to them, too. It is a burden and it is a dangerous one because of their relations with the Chinese.

All I am doing is appealing to you to inspire them to think about it along this way and not be too frozen in their attitude that this has nothing to do with the Middle East, and we do not want to consider it at all.

I think it is one of the things that might appeal to the Russians to consider seriously this approach.

COMMUNIST FEARS OF AN ESCALATING WAR

I had a conversation with some of the Europeans at Geneva last week, and this sort of thing came up, and by and large those people—some were Communists, some were non-Communists—felt that the time has come where something ought to break about the continuation of the escalation in Vietnam.

They are all very apprehensive about it, you know all the Europeans are, for fear that it will escalate into a war that involves them. They are genuinely fearful.

Everybody is worried about it is what comes out of this thing. Are we going to get into a war with the Russians, the Chinese and/or the Russians? It is always simple to say oh, no, that cannot happen. It is exactly what they said about Korea.

We do not know obviously, but it is possible. Anytime you are slaughtering people wholesale there is always a danger.

I was hoping you would, at least, plan to see that they consider it, whatever they do. I would hate for them to miss an opportunity if it is here. I do not know whether it is here or not, but it is worth looking into.

PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Senator CASE. Bill, do I understand you really—because I do not see as a matter of logic how the Middle East thing is in conjunction with Southeast Asia. How it makes it any more easy to make an agreement, unless what you have in mind in a way is that you get the Russians to ease off and to use their influence, whatever it may be, on the Arabs to ease off on Israel; settle that in a fair way, on

a fair basis for the long term which, you know, I am all for in connection with our agreeing to withdraw somewhat our support or put pressure on the South Vietnamese. Is this what you have in mind?

The CHAIRMAN. It is awfully late to try to do it.

Senator CASE. I just want to get some idea.

DAMPEN THE FIRES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe in a few words I will try to do it this way.

What I would propose to do, and this is, of course, very over-simplified. We are now engaged in the Security Council with the Russians.

They have agreed for the first time in a long time on this cease-fire. They supported it, all the Security Council did.

We are doing business for the first time in a long time in the Security Council.

Just to illustrate what I mean, I would propose to do with the Russians—they have joined now in this, and we welcome that assistance. This business in the Middle East has been very troublesome; it still is. The emotions are high, the resentment is bound to be terrible, and two or three things should be done.

Let us not first engage in rebuilding the armaments. Let us come to some understanding on conventional arms in this area and see if we cannot dampen down the fires.

REFER THE WAR TO THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

In addition to that, we have this other war over here that is very dangerous. Why can't the Security Council, with all of its prestige, unanimously recommend that the war in Vietnam be referred back to the Geneva Conference. That is where most of the parties, I think all of them, at one time or another have said it should go for reevaluation of the Accords of 1954 and see if they cannot find a basis upon which this matter can be brought to a negotiation.

This is the forum in which the North Vietnamese, China, the United States, de Gaulle and others have said is the only forum, not the United Nations. The Security Council does not attempt to deal with it, but they recommend that this be done with the prestige of that agency, with the participation of the Russians, and that the bombing in the North should be stopped, and we, of course, agree with this; pending this we will just agree to do this, to get some movement in this thing.

We are absolutely at a stalemate on this negotiation. After the last exchange of letters with Ho Chi Minh, everybody said, "Well, let's out. We are just going to fight it to the end now." That is the general attitude.

I do not think there is the slightest hope until the moment there are going to be any negotiations at all. It is going to be a military solution. Yet, at the same time, many of the most knowledgeable authorities say it is not subject to a military solution. You virtually said that yourself. You do not think the military can do the job. It requires a very complicated, long, drawn-out system of pacification.

The point would be to get some movement in it, a new approach, and a feeling that we are dampening down the fires of war instead of escalating them.

This is largely, I think, a psychological point that I am trying to make, that we get a movement into this terrible confrontation that seems to be building up.

USE THE UNITED NATIONS

The obverse of that, if we do not do it, it seems to me, the resentment of the Arabs is going to be very great. The Russians, after they lick their wounds, will say, "Well we can't be pushed around like this forever." They can think of other things to do to cause us trouble and to stir up trouble. They are quite capable of it, if they do not change their attitude that we want to cooperate. You either go one way or the other. They never stand still.

So this is a proposal, to use the U.N. to get it off dead center, and the U.N. would continue as the forum for the various details of the Middle East, such as what to do with Aqaba, the opening of the Suez, whatever readjustments of the withdrawal, and all the details of implementing a cease-fire, and bringing about a peace and, hopefully, a genuine treaty of peace rather than a truce.

This is all I am trying to explore. I think that it makes sense to bring the two together, because then it is a really important matter, if it could be done, and if the Russians were encouraged to take a part in this.

They reacted very favorably to their little experience in Tashkent, which was a minor matter compared to this.

You never know, it might appeal to their sense of history. They have been fairly restrained on the whole up to recently. They have been getting pretty tough recently, to me exhibiting a kind of impatience of, well, there is no hope of a negotiation with the Americans. I must say I felt that publication of the matter of Ho Chi Minh that his government had just given up all hope of any negotiations, that there has got to be a military victory, and I honestly do not think it is feasible.

POSSIBILITY OF CHINA ENTERING THE WAR

Before you get that I think the Chinese will come in, just as a matter of human knowledge, without any more knowledge than anyone else. I think it is a matter of human nature that before they surrender and give in they will come to the aid of these people, just as they did.

Senator CASE. I understand—I know it is late, but I have been waiting a few hours to say a few words myself, and I want to be sure I understand what you mean there.

Do you mean if we are at the point or it seems as though there is a real chance that the momentum in the South Vietnam war is going to carry us through to our objective, that of establishing a government and a society there that are independent and non-Communist, that then inevitably the Chinese will come in or do you mean if we attempt to defeat Ho Chi Minh in the North?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. Ho Chi Minh, if we continue to where we make him surrender.

Senator CASE. I do not mean surrender. I am talking about winning the war in the South. Do you think that will produce Chinese intervention so that we are just hitting ourselves, we are chasing our tail, because if we lose we lose, and if we win we lose?

AN UTTERLY UNFEASIBLE OBJECTIVE

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think we will win the war in the South as long as the North continues to support them. I do not see any change. I do not gather from this change there is any substantial difference in the military situation. We control it during the day and not at night.

Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir.

Senator CASE. This is because of the fact that we have not been very intelligent about it. Is this correct or maybe I misunderstood?

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I questioned that further. I indicated further I do not believe it is possible for a rich, white, American country to go over and give, manufacture a nice, democratic system for anybody, for these people. I do not think they are going to accept it at all. I think it is an utterly unfeasible objective. But I was not trying to argue that now. There is a difference of opinion on that.

Senator CASE. I would think this is the whole point, Bill. If we are engaged in something that is impossible—

The CHAIRMAN. I think we clearly are; absolutely clearly are. There is no doubt about it.

Senator CASE. Ambassador Porter does not agree with that.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Porter cannot possibly agree with that in his position. It would be utterly impossible for him to.

Senator CASE. He is a man who has got to the point in life where his only desire is to be true and honest, and even if that means his losing his career he will do it.

Mr. PORTER. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. I would not for a moment question his truthfulness and honesty.

Senator CASE. The way he has talked today he has been the most refreshing thing we have had this year, and it makes sense.

HOW ASIANS VIEW THE WAR

May I say this, Bill. You are a little bit arguing a priori, that is, you take an assumption that, you know, this is a war of the Americans, the white race against the yellow. I do not think this is the way in this context the thing is going.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think that is the way they look at it?

Senator CASE. I really do not. What do you think about it?

Mr. PORTER. I do not think they look at it that way at all. I believe the presence of other Asiatics in Vietnam—

Senator CASE. They hate the Chinese and Koreans much worse.

Mr. PORTER. One aspect—

The CHAIRMAN. How do you explain the constant repetition in people like Bernard Fall and De Villiers—

Senator CASE. He is a pro-French fanatic. Fall is absolutely—

The CHAIRMAN. You dismiss these people as of no consequence. I cannot argue with you.

Senator CASE. I know. But he suffered a trauma when the French were beaten, and he could not possibly be anything but anti-American. I think this is true. I am trying to be—

The CHAIRMAN. You cannot do anything but possibly be pro-American either, neither can I. But I do not happen to think Amer-

icans are God and able to do things no white man has been able to do in the history of the world.

Senator CASE. The last best hope of freedom is the United States. I happen to believe that, and I think it is, and it applies.

The CHAIRMAN.. That is in the United States.

Senator CASE. Abraham Lincoln was talking about the world.

The CHAIRMAN. What did Abraham Lincoln have to say about this kind of a war?

Senator CASE. Abraham Lincoln had plenty to think about.

But, seriously, I do not think this racial thing is the problem, that is one point.

The CHAIRMAN. What I mean, these people—I do not know whether you call it racial, maybe cultural is the better word—but I do not think they are sympathetic to the American concept of how to organize a society or of our sense of values. I do not know why they should. If they did they would be most unusual.

The Japanese and Chinese are not very sympathetic to that, and rightly so, in my opinion.

Senator CASE. Well, now, may I just start another—

The CHAIRMAN. I think you and I had better argue this some other time. It is 6:30, and the Ambassador has other things to do. You can do whatever you like.

PLAY THE HAND IN A SENSIBLE WAY

Senator CASE. Give me five minutes, or three minutes. I seem to sense not only in Vietnam but briefly in some of these other countries a very strong feeling that our presence in Vietnam had first come to be accepted as for real and for permanent.

The CHAIRMAN. Permanent?

Senator CASE. Not our presence but our resistance to the Communist take-over, that we meant it and that, as a result, a whole new tone in this whole area was going to be established, beginning to be established, of hope that it was possible to develop the area, to reconstruct nations in more modern fashion and what-not without falling into the Communist system.

Now, and that if we backed out now, whether we should have gotten into it in the first place or not, there was very grave danger that this whole thing would fall down, and that the consequences would be probably more serious. This is a kind of, I suppose, belief in the domino theory. And if we stay and attempt at least to play the hand out along the sensible way, that we are now refining and coming to do it, that that would be the better way. Do you feel that this is—is this your general feeling?

Mr. PORTER. That is certainly the sentiment in East Asia today.

Senator CASE. Do you think it makes sense? Do you think—well—

Mr. PORTER. Yes, I do. I think it makes sense. I believe that our departure from Vietnam in a humiliating or dishonorable circumstance would have a disastrous effect on those countries.

A DISASTER TO PULL OUT OF THE WAR

Senator CASE. Reischauer agreed with this, and he did not agree with our going in. He said that in an article. He would not have gone in. He would not have taken this on this way. He thinks it

was a mistake that we did. But having done it, it would be a disaster if we pulled out on any basis except, in effect, attempting to win the war in the South.

This, Bill, I just wanted to get down—this was confirmed by such observations as I made, and I did not just let myself listen to our military or even our ambassadors or whatnot. I made a point before, during or after the trip to talk to Ward Just, and to talk to Dave Halberstam up in New York or Moore, now in—

Mr. PORTER. Charley Moore.

Senator CASE [continuing]. In Hong Kong, but who was so long in Saigon.

I found only one of the whole bunch of them, and that was Stan, who thought we ought to get out. He had been out there for years, and he had seen frustration after frustration. But the great majority of all these people say—

The CHAIRMAN. They want us to stay there.

Senator CASE. They want us to try.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, have another colony on our hands.

Senator CASE. Again I would think myself once this gets started that it will have an accelerated effect, a cumulative effect. I would say I do not feel we should stay, if these guys are not going to do the right thing, make sense and work at corruption and work at building a government and whatnot. I would say no matter what happened, we ought to get out, and we have good reason to do it. I do not think there is any chance of a deal until after the next presidential election. That is my honest view.

Thanks a lot for coming up here.

Mr. PORTER. It is my pleasure.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. PORTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 6:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

BRIEFING ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

Thursday, June 8, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m. in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.

Also present: William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, Mr. Jones, and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we are very pleased to have you this morning.

There are a number here who say they will be late, but I hope we will get a much better representation. They did not know, of course, until late, that you would come this morning.

Do you have anything you would like to add before we have questions, anything more to add to our briefing yesterday, anything new or different? We all heard what you had yesterday.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I do not think I want to add very much to what was said yesterday.

I would like to have a good discussion this morning. If I could make one remark off the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

PROBLEMS WITH ACHIEVING A CEASE-FIRE

Secretary RUSK. Well, on the matter we discussed yesterday, the situation today still remains that Israel has announced that it would accept the cease-fire if the other side would. Egypt, Syria and Iraq have announced that they are not accepting the cease-fire, and it is our impression out of Cairo that they do not intend to.

We think this is going to complicate the situation a great deal because the Russians have been pressing us very hard to get the Israelis to accept the cease-fire, and they are not able to deliver the other side. So it does not look as though this thing is going to clarify very quickly except on a purely military basis along the Canal and the West Bank of the Jordan.

I did not yesterday, in view of the large attendance, I did not get into some possibilities that ought to dampen down any sense of general elation here in this situation.

We do not yet know what the effect of this situation will be on the governments concerned. It is hard to see how Nasser can survive this situation. We are not at all sure that King Hussein can survive it.

If there are changes in these governments, the possibilities of getting an enduring settlement would turn a great deal on the nature of the leadership that might come to power. The political situation itself is very flexible, fluid at this present time.

WATCHING SOVIET UNION ELSEWHERE

Further, we cannot assure that the Soviet Union is just going to cut its losses and take its lumps here in this situation. It may feel—

Senator MUNDT. You said what?

Secretary RUSK. I say we cannot assume that they will.

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. On the present basis they face a very serious setback, and they may feel that it is necessary for them to do something to try to recoup their position.

We are watching it very carefully, and we have not seen specific moves which they might possibly make. We are watching all situations, such as the Berlin corridor, to see whether there is any indication that the Soviets are likely to stir something up somewhere in order to take some of the pressure off of them on this particular situation.

There have been, so far as we know, no more breaches of diplomatic relations since the meeting yesterday afternoon. But the reiteration by Cairo of the charges that our forces have participated continues to inflame the mob in a number of places.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. At that point, might I interrupt?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, please, Senator.

JORDANIANS FIND NO EVIDENCE OF U.S. PARTICIPATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. At that point, I heard over the radio this morning a report, this is a radio report, that at a conference in Amman, either last night or this morning—afternoon their time, whatever time it is—that their military people said they agreed there was no evidence of any participation by American or British forces in this military action.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, that is quite right. Without prodding from us, the Chief of Military Intelligence in Jordan announced they had no information that any U.S. military aircraft were operating over Jordan. That will go a long way, because some of the Arab countries attributed this evidence from hard evidence they had from Jordan, and Jordan's denial will go a long way, I think, towards helping us at least on the propaganda side.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, may I just ask a question?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, please.

[Discussion off the record.]

THE SHAPE OF A GENERAL SETTLEMENT

Secretary RUSK. Because we are all thinking about the shape of a general settlement. But I want to emphasize the point that this is not something that can be ground out in Washington and imposed upon the other capitals. We certainly are not in a position to command Israel about a settlement, and it has become apparent to us that the Soviet Union is not in a position to command the Arab countries.

So naturally we ought to have some ideas of our own, and that is one of the reasons, Mr. Chairman, why I welcome this chance to be with the committee this morning.

We had a very good discussion here about ten days ago which was, I thought, extremely helpful to me because we had a general discussion in the committee about some of the policy issues involved.

STRAITS OF TIRAN MUST BE OPEN

Senator MUNDT. I take it that issue is no longer with us.

Secretary RUSK. The particular issue of the Straits, I think, is pretty well behind us.

We understand that the Soviets have told the Egyptians we have got to accept a cease-fire with the Straits of Tiran open.

Now, the Soviets, as I told you before, had not committed themselves on the Straits of Tiran, and we were very sure that the Egyptians had not consulted the Soviet Union before Nasser made his speech closing the Straits.

The CHAIRMAN. Had not consulted.

Secretary RUSK. Had not been consulted. As a matter of fact, Nasser probably did not consult anybody. I have seen a number of Arab foreign ministers in the last two weeks, and I have not found anybody that he consulted on that subject.

BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE SOVIETS

The CHAIRMAN. Could I ask in that connection—

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are the Soviets willing to talk to you frankly about this and other matters now? Are they being as standoffish or not? What are our relations?

Secretary RUSK. They are willing to talk to us bilaterally very frankly.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean.

Secretary RUSK. They are unwilling to go into that four-power discussion even at the U.N. that President de Gaulle asked for.

The CHAIRMAN. When you said they cannot command the Arabs and we cannot command Israel, I mean I can appreciate that. But if we could together, agree upon any line of action of things to get, I would think it would be pretty difficult to stand out against over a period, if we can agree with the Soviets.

Secretary RUSK. I think that would be true, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Individually they play each other off and all that.

Secretary RUSK. The difficulty is that at the moment everybody's nerves are very raw, the Arab nerves and the Soviet nerves.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. And so it is going to take a little time, I think, to get this back to a point where we and they can talk about a final solution.

AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DIPLOMACY

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be consistent with your policy to approach the Soviets that we are perfectly willing to be very reasonable in this area, to try to achieve our ultimate objective of the integrity of Israel—I think that is clear; they ought to know that is clear and combine it with some movement in Asia?

It seems to me it was a great shock that this has brought on everybody. It obviously shocked this country worse than Vietnam, that it would be an opportunity for diplomacy, quiet diplomacy, certainly between us and the Russians, to combine these two? They surely are interested in Vietnam, and we are interested in the Middle East. It seems to me the evidence is clear that this country emotionally and politically is more interested in Israel, the Middle East, than they are in Vietnam. I mean you watch the turnout here in the Senate, the great furor that has resulted.

I wondered if it is beyond reason to expect that there might be an opportunity for a general agreement in which you could work it with the Soviets privately, and if you could agree, I do not know why with a little patience this could not be made acceptable to both sides.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, we have talked to—and I would like to emphasize the top secret character of this tape.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you can take this particular thing off the record. It will be top secret.

[Discussion off the record.]

TIME FOR AN UNCONVENTIONAL DIPLOMATIC APPROACH

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I want to follow up what you said in this very brief colloquy with the Secretary, and I want to preface it, Mr. Secretary, by saying that we are all in this problem together. You and I have had differences on policy, but we have not had differences on a personal level. I want you to know that I not only have a very high regard for you, but the suggestion I am going to make is just not expecting acceptance of it necessarily, but I hope consideration of it bears out the feeling I have towards you personally.

I think we have got to get out of our stereotype channels of diplomacy in regard to this matter. I do not think they will resolve it because there are a good many things you yourself have said about this spot that Russia is in.

I do not think face should mean much to us if we are willing to go not half a mile or three-quarters of a mile, but all the way.

I think that now is the time with Russia in the position that she is in for us to resort to quite an unconventional diplomatic approach in regard to this matter.

You talk about bringing our ambassador back to Washington. My suggestion is that careful consideration be given by the President and by you and others and that you proceed without delay to Moscow yourself; that you announce to Moscow, our government announces to Moscow, that because of the problems that both great

powers have, and the responsibility of both great powers more than all the others combined to maintain peace in the world, you are going to Moscow for conversations with the Russian leaders, if they want to receive you.

You can say right away suppose they slap us in the face and tell us to stay home. All right. That is not going to hurt us. Those slaps do not hurt. The world will know what we are trying to do, and my confidence in you is such that I believe if you could sit down there, first with our ambassador for his briefing in Moscow, and then put these Russians really on the spot by demonstrating our good faith, and have that top level conference in Russia—we do not know what the result might be—but I cannot see any loss in trying it.

I just think we are going to make a mistake if we just wait for the passage of time that it is going to take—you yourself pointed out that we probably have got two weeks ahead of us. I do not think we can wait. I think we have the right and the duty for us to try to have some diplomatic intercourse directly with the Russians.

A CASE OF DIPLOMATIC AGGRESSION

You know the attitude of the Russians. If we go to Moscow, they will think that is some great concession on our part. It is no concession, in fact, because that leads me to the second point, and then I will be through—I raised it briefly in our colloquy yesterday upstairs. I may not understand it, but I am not too happy about what you said yesterday concerning our attitude in regard to reestablishing diplomatic relations with these countries that have broken diplomatic relations with us while they destroy our embassies and threaten our people and seek to coerce us.

I think we have to put handcuffs on them. I want to reestablish relations with them, but not on their terms but on ours, because here is a case of diplomatic aggression, at least on their part.

I think they have got to understand we are not going to stand by and have our ships sunk. We are not going to stand by and have them continue to threaten peace in the Middle East.

NEED FOR A PEACE TREATY

That brings me to the last point I made upstairs. I think we ought to make perfectly clear in this situation now, Russia has got to understand it, and one of the things you can talk about in Moscow is we are not going to let Israel have to survive from now on without a peace. We have to have a peace treaty and we have got to have an understanding that there is not going to be a repetition of this, and that our future relations by way of aid to them is dependent upon their working out a peace settlement.

I know the government does not like to hear me say it, but in my judgment if we had not given the aid to the Arabs or go along with aid to the Arabs while they were continuing to threaten the survival of Israel, I do not think we would be in the position we are today.

I never have bought the argument, if we do not do this, they would have gone to Russia. I think they realize now what it cost them to go to Russia.

It may be just a completely unacceptable idea, but I want to link it to what the chairman says. I made a very short statement on the floor of the Senate yesterday about Vietnam. I am sure the State Department won't like it, as they do not like much of what I say on Vietnam, but you cannot separate Vietnam from the settlement over here in the Middle East. The Russians are not going to let us, for one thing. I do not think it is in the cards. I think we have got to hitch them together, but not directly at first.

SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD GO TO MOSCOW

I think we need some dramatic and, you may not like the word "dramatic" but, after all, it is important, too, in times of crisis, some dramatic change in the format of our diplomacy.

I think, six, there is no one better qualified to do it than you. I hope you will understand that it illustrates my feeling toward you personally. I think you are the one to do it. I think you can do it. I think the President ought to send you to do it.

If you wait for two weeks, God knows what we are going to be faced with in two weeks.

I would like to see you go on to Moscow on a basis you can set it up, and put them on the spot. We cannot lose anything by it.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I do not in any sense rule out the possibility of my going to Moscow, and I certainly will give that further thought.

We are in very close touch with the Russians. The problem with the Russians is not, you know, lack of communication at very serious levels. But, nevertheless, if a trip of this sort would appear to be promising, I do not rule it out at all.

Senator MORSE. It may be something to their prestige. We do not have to worry about our prestige.

Secretary RUSK. They may be very sensitive at the moment about a thing of this sort. However, let me say, I think what I would like to do is to have a very long talk with Dobrynin when he gets back this week, and try to get some feel for it.

Ambassador Thompson is here now, our Ambassador to Moscow, and when their Ambassador gets back, Thompson and I will sit down with him and go over these things.

We are, I am, in touch with Mr. Gromyko very frequently, and we are in touch through other channels.

A COMMISSION TO GO TO HANOI

Senator MORSE. One more thing. I am not only thinking about the relationship of the U.S. and Russia, but I am thinking of the image that that would create with the rest of the world. That is important, that the rest of the world know that the two great powers, both great powers, recognize the seriousness of the crisis, and we are trying to find a basis on which we can reach an understanding.

I think it would have a terrific psychological offensive around the world.

I have another wild idea if you want it, if anybody wants to call it a wild idea. I think we ought to follow that also with an offer for an extraordinary commission of some kind to go to Hanoi, call

their bluff, to go to Hanoi, to send an extraordinary commission under the auspices of our government to Hanoi.

If they want to sit down, not with any authority to make any commitments at all, but to talk—and I think you would be applauded around the world.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, the contingency I have predicted has come, and they have asked me to come straightaway on this other matter, so if the committee will forgive me I will have to withdraw. Perhaps we can do it in the morning or some other time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We will consult, and the staff will be in touch with your office.

Secretary RUSK. I want you to understand the confidential character of what I said.

The CHAIRMAN. What are we going to say about why you had to go, just an emergency meeting?

Secretary RUSK. I think you had better say that I was called back to my office.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a good idea that we restore the program, that once in a while the Secretary comes and talks to us as a committee. I think it is all right to have a certain sponsoring group for the whole Senate now and then. I think that is good.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

[Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the committee adjourned to proceed to other business.]

BRIEFING ON THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

Friday, June 9, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:05 a.m. in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Gore, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.

Also present: William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Department of State.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We are resuming our discussion with the Secretary.

Mr. Secretary, just as I came in the press asked if I have heard there has been a renewed outbreak of fighting. Is that correct; have you heard anything?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE—RESUMED

Secretary RUSK. The information we have this morning is that along the Syrian frontier there is fighting. Each side has charged the other one with violations, and the Syrians have asked for an emergency meeting of the Security Council.

We do not have the facts in detail.

One of the complications might have been there is an Iraqi brigade on the Syrian-Jordan frontier, and Iraq has refused to accept a cease-fire.

We do believe that the Syrians have been throwing artillery shells across from the high ground to their side of the border into the valley of Israel territory and shelling some of those villages there.

But, quite frankly, we just do not know enough to give me a chance to take an official position on just what has occurred.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, on the boat incident yesterday, which brought our meeting to a conclusion, I may say that as soon as I found out the real facts, I came on back down, but the committee had adjourned.

The situation—the incident was extremely distressing, not only because of the dead and the wounded which were involved, but because it was a very reckless act.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It seems to me it was completely inexcusable.

Secretary RUSK. It was a vessel configured as a merchant vessel. It was a U.S. Navy ship flying the U.S. flag, relatively unarmed with 450 caliber machine guns. It was ninety miles off Port Said, 14 miles off of the Gaza Strip territory, and was attacked by six strafing runs by aircraft and by motor torpedo boats.

Now, when I left here, I thought that it might well be an Egyptian attack. You can imagine that would have raised the most serious problems. But suppose it had been an Israeli attack on a Russian ship.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

ISRAELI APOLOGY

Secretary RUSK. I called in the Israeli ambassador and protested in the strongest possible terms and pointed out to him the dangers that were involved in this kind of an operation in that area. He had no explanation. We have had nothing but an apology from the Israeli Government. But there it is, and we will be in touch with Israelis further about it.

After all, there are some damages and there are dead and wounded, and we will follow up on that with them.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, on that very point, one of the families in our state is affected, and, of course, that will be true of many others because of the dead and injuries. They are not happy with just an apology. They are really complaining. Is there anything more that can be done on this?

Secretary RUSK. I understand.

Senator CARLSON. It was, I imagine, as I understand, surface PT boats.

Secretary RUSK. Plus six strafing runs by aircraft.

Senator CARLSON. I cannot understand it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think we should file for reparations. We should press for them, for the families, the people that were killed, and I am not sure but what I am impressed with the cavalier attitude of—it looks like a cavalier attitude—of Israel on this thing. They can do that with impunity.

Secretary RUSK. Well, the next move is at the moment up to them to come back with a better statement of fact than they have given us thus far. I will say this. We were very pleased that Israel immediately notified us that they had done it, and here in this room I can say that we did use the "Hot Line" for the purpose for which it was invented on this one, to flash a message to Moscow to inform Cairo, because at that moment we thought that the probabilities were it was an Egyptian attack and we would take the steps necessary to defend the ship. We were able to use the "Hot Line" to cancel that, and inform the Soviets immediately that it was an Israeli attack, and that—but in any event, as far as the international side of it is concerned, it proved not to be the kind of crisis that could have caused far greater trouble, either Egyptian attack or a Russian victim.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Has the Israeli Government indicated any real sorrow about this thing, or is it a perfunctory apology?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, yes, they have been profuse.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have they said whether any disciplinary action will be taken against the stupidity of this crew or—

Secretary RUSK. I asked for that yesterday.

Senator HICKENLOOPER [continuing]. Or the commanding officers of the area or anything?

Secretary RUSK. We have not heard any more except what I have told you.

OUTSIDE POWERS CANNOT GIVE ORDERS

Mr. Chairman, when we were breaking up yesterday, we had gotten to the point of trying to look ahead a little bit as to the general structure and shape of a settlement in this situation. With feelings inflamed as they are, settlement is going to be extremely difficult and may take considerable time, and I want to emphasize the point I made yesterday that outside powers are not in a position to give orders in this situation. We cannot give final commands to Israel and be sure they will take our advice. The Soviet Union cannot give commands to the Arabs, and so the heart of the problem is to bring the two sides to a situation with which they are willing to live and that is going to be extremely difficult.

However, the general shape of settlement that emerges, I think, drawing both from the problems in the past, which have inflamed the situation, and from the prospect for the future—I emphasize this prospect for the future because Israel has a vital national interest in finding some way to live at peace with what are going to be 200 million Arabs in the next 25 years—so that their willingness to make their contribution to a reconciliation with the Arabs is going to be a very, very important element here.

Now, with the bitterness of the psychology of shocking defeat among the Arabs, and the exuberance of a stunning victory in Israel, it is going to take a little time, I suspect, to bring about a lasting settlement.

We feel that it is very important that the state of belligerence be removed. Now, whether one does that formally through peace treaties or in some other way, I would still leave open, a little flexible at this point. There is not much of a way to force people to come to a table and put their signatures on a piece of paper that will be enduring, and it may be that some of these governments simply will refuse to do that even though they may accept the situation contained in such document.

So I would concentrate on the policy point of eliminating a state of belligerency without at the moment emphasizing how that is done.

I noticed there is a good deal of speculation about putting emphasis on peace treaties as such. I do not think it is a treaty that is important. Look at Japan and the Soviet Union. They do not have a peace treaty, but they exchange ambassadors. They have normal relations. They have considerable trade between the two of them, and they are not challenging each other's territory.

I just mention that as a first point.

ISRAEL WILL INSIST ON USE OF THE SUEZ CANAL

Secondly, Israel is going to insist upon being treated like any other sovereign country without special derogations of that sov-

ereignty. My guess is that they will insist upon right of passage of the Strait of Tiran. My guess is that that question is already accepted as far as the other side is concerned. It certainly is accepted as far as the Soviet Union is concerned.

I am telling you this very privately. I think Israel will insist upon its normal right to put peaceful traffic through the Suez Canal. That will be more difficult for Egypt to accept, but that is a point that has already been covered in earlier United Nations resolutions.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Was that not covered in the armistice agreement?

Secretary. RUSK. Yes, that is right; that is right.

The territorial question could become a little tricky. Prime Minister Eshkol and General Dayan both stated at the beginning of this affair that they had no territorial ambitions. Generally we have supported the boundaries, the existing boundaries, in that area. If Israel raises far-reaching boundary claims, then that is going to be a very, very difficult element in any solution. I think Israel is entitled to some assurance that whatever rights are established in this settlement be a fact accorded to them and not be subject to unilateral action by the Arabs.

One of the things we will have to expect is that somewhere along the way there are going to be some demands for international guarantees of some sort. Whether the four principal permanent members of the Security Council can agree among themselves that the Security Council will guarantee X, Y, and Z in a way that is not subject to a veto remains to be seen. But in a settlement which, against the background of this particular history, and with a small country surrounded by potentially hostile countries, with all of the possibilities of pre-emptive attacks and all that sort of thing hovering over everybody, this question of how you stabilize the situation is a very important one.

LIMIT ARMS RACE IN MIDDLE EAST

Next, I do believe that there is a major opportunity here for the principal powers to get together on some sort of understanding about the levels of arms in this area. I have told the committee before that we have tried from time to time to open this question with the Soviet Union and although they are willing to work on it in the nuclear field, they have been unwilling to work on it in the conventional arms field.

Perhaps psychologically this is not the very best moment in terms of Soviet dismay at some of the things that have happened. But nevertheless they put very large quantities of arms into Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and we have some little reason to believe that they might have a new interest in this subject. If so, that could be very important.

But, you see, this arms race sort of took the form of large Soviet arms supplies to Egypt, Algeria, Syria. Hostility between Egypt on the one side, Jordan and Saudi Arabia on the other; hostility between Syria and Jordan, some necessity on the part of other suppliers, Britain, ourselves, to assist Saudi Arabia and Jordan to the extent necessary to give them some assurance against their own

Arab neighbors; the combination of Arab arms causing problems with respect to Israel's security—

SOURCES OF ISRAELI ARMS

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, may I just say—

Secretary Rusk. Yes?

Senator SYMINGTON [continuing]. We have been running hearings for a good many weeks, and we would have had one yesterday with Mr. Kitchen except for this.

It is a fact, is it not, that neither Soviet Russia nor the United States has given any material amounts of arms to Israel, and, if that is true, are they not relatively independent in their thinking at this point?

Secretary RUSK. No, we have provided tanks and Hawk missiles and certain other kinds of equipment to Israel, but their principal arms supplier has been France. And I am assuming that France, Britain, the Soviet Union, ourselves, would have to be involved in any discussion on this subject.

The Israeli air force is almost all French supplied.

Well, there is another element, if we could inject something on that into a final settlement it would be helpful.

TRAGEDY OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES

Then, there is the problem of the refugees, this intractable issue which has resisted settlement despite many, many efforts to do so.

The tragedy of the refugee problem is that some of us are convinced that there is a practical solution which would be acceptable to both sides, but which in theory is unacceptable to both sides. What I mean by that is that if you could get each refugee into the privacy of a confessional booth and let him make a personal and secret judgment as to where he wants to live, many of us believe, are convinced, that their own personal and secret choices would produce a practical result which Israel could accept.

I mean if the gentlemen around this table were Palestine refugees, would you all want to live in Israel? I doubt you would. But if one out of ten wanted to live in Israel, we could persuade Israel, I think, to accept that number, and we could find compensation and resettlement for those who are wanting to live in other places.

What has stood in the way of that, and we have tried this several times, is the political fact that if you have a machinery which is known, the Arabs pass the word among the Palestinians, "Now you go in there and tell them you want to go in Israel or you are going to get your throat cut," and the Arabs insist as a matter of principle Israel would have to accept how many would opt to go to Israel.

Israel can take 150,000, 200,000, but they are not going to take a million.

But Arabs insist as a matter of principle a million must have a chance to opt to go to Israel.

Now, it may be out of this will come some settlement of that problem.

I heard one report out of Tel Aviv that the Israelis are thinking about insisting that the West Bank of the Jordan be an autonomous province of Jordan and the home for the refugees. Well, that

will not settle the problem politically entirely, but some fresh thought can be—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It would be another Gaza Strip, would it not?

Secretary RUSK. It would tend to be if they go there simply as a way station on the way back to Israel, rather than accept it genuinely as a final solution.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could I ask one question here?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir, Senator.

U.S. HAS LIMITED LEVERAGE ON ISRAEL

Senator SYMINGTON. When the Israelis, as you know, were anxious to have declarations that we should go in with Israel unilaterally, Mr. Secretary, that we should support them unilaterally, I did not think we could do it because we were so heavily committed in Vietnam. I did not see where the trained people come from, especially if we are going to accede to more people in Vietnam, and, thereafter, after waiting to find out whether anybody would help them, in effect they have struck by themselves and have been markedly successful. Does it not mean we have relatively little leverage on what they want to do now that they have physically occupied these countries by utilizing their military equipment intelligently?

Secretary RUSK. We have some limited leverage on them. I told the committee earlier that we felt we had a commitment from them that they would not move during this time period in which they did move.

Now, the situation on the Egyptian side built up in such a way that it put great pressure upon the Israeli Government, and I have no doubt that on the day they decided to shoot the works that they felt that they were in danger of an imminent attack, based upon information that they thought they had in front of them.

But I think the real pressures on them, Senator, are going to be the necessity for their finding some way to live with these now hundred million, soon to be 200 million, Arabs, because if they try to remain a little armed camp there forever in a sea of bitter hostility, they have got some major problems for their own long-term survival.

SUBSIDIZING THE REFUGEE CAMPS

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, I realize that we do not have power, as Senator Symington has punctuated, to give instructions and directions there.

There is one problem, it seems to me, about which we can have a say, and that is continued subsidization of this refugee camp. I went there ten years ago and found it an impossible situation in which they have continued all the while to feed and clothe, support those people, and there are some 200,000 more than when they went into the camp. So surely we can have something to say about no longer continuing to subsidize this.

Secretary RUSK. Well, that constitutes some pressure on the Arabs. It does not constitute any pressure on Israel.

Senator GORE. Well, Israel has taken over some of them, in the Gaza Strip and also in Jordan. They are now claiming sovereignty. So it seems to me it might be a pressure on both.

Secretary RUSK. Well, I do think that the refugee matter should be raised and looked at wholly anew in connection with a settlement of this present situation.

Senator GORE. The point I am trying to make is this is one subject on which we can have a say, and that is how long we are going to continue to pay a very heavy cost of these refugees if they are not dispersed into the countryside.

Secretary RUSK. Well, I do not want to underestimate influence in this situation, but I just want to point out that it is not necessarily decisive when you are talking with countries about what they consider the life and death issues for them.

TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR DONATIONS TO ISRAEL

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do we not give tax forgiveness for monies contributed to Israel, which is rather unusual? We could stop that.

Secretary RUSK. I believe contributions to the UJA are tax exempt, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

The only country. Do you think you have the votes in the Senate to revoke that?

Senator CASE. Are you in favor yourself?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think we ought to treat all nations alike.

Senator CASE. That is correct. But are you in favor of it?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As long as we do not give it to other nations, I do not—

The CHAIRMAN. The trouble is they think they have control of the Senate and they can do as they please.

Senator SYMINGTON. What was that?

The CHAIRMAN. I said they know they have control of the Senate politically, and therefore whatever the Secretary tells them, they can laugh at him. They say, "Yes, but you don't control the Senate."

Senator SYMINGTON. They were very anxious to get every Senator they could to come out and say we ought to act unilaterally, and they got two, three.

The CHAIRMAN. They know when the chips are down you can no more reverse this tax exemption than you can fly. You could not pass a bill through the Senate.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not think you could.

The CHAIRMAN. Changing that tax exemption contribution to the UJA. I would bet you ten to one you could not begin to pass a bill. You do not believe they could under any circumstances.

Senator SYMINGTON. A bill to do what?

The CHAIRMAN. To revoke the tax exemption of gifts to the UJA. That is one of their major sources of income. You yourself have pointed out the money they paid for the French arms they got from the U.S.

Senator SYMINGTON. Each year the money we give annually for this is less than 1 percent of the cost of Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There you go.

U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS PAY THE ISRAELI ARMS

The CHAIRMAN. But you know very well, you said yourself, that the arms they buy from France are largely paid for by contributions that come from this country.

Senator SYMINGTON. Because we would not sell it to them, so instead of selling them the arms—

Senator GORE. Has the President recommended that this be repealed?

The CHAIRMAN. No, he has not. I do not wish to make the point except the Secretary is quite correct when he says his leverage on Israel is very limited because of the political situation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am sorry I brought it up.

Secretary RUSK. I did not say it.

The CHAIRMAN. If you did not say it, you do not disagree with it anyway.

Secretary RUSK. I think it should be pointed out though on this tax exempt matter that there are many other organizations, institutions, that would fall into the same principle, private foundations in their expenditures abroad, churches, the voluntary agencies; there are very large sums of money going to foreign countries that are tax exempt in this country as the origin.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I do not think it is analogous.

Senator GORE. It is tax deductible; you said tax exempt.

Secretary RUSK. Except the organizations are exempt. Contributions to them are tax deductible.

Senator COOPER. I suggest—it is possible after this that Israel may ask that this be removed as a sign of showing they are not absolutely dependent on the U.S.

IF ISRAEL KEEPS THE TERRITORY IT CONQUERED

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, I have just one other question I wish to ask. They have been hating the Jews ever since there was a country, and they are hating them, and they kept on saying they are going to drive them into the sea. Finally, when nobody else would come in, the Israelis said, "Well, we had better not let them drive us into the sea," so they hit them and knocked their brains out and they got a tremendous amount of additional territory.

Why on the basis of the way things are going, inasmuch as the Arabs still say that they are going to drive them into the sea and that they hate them, why should they not keep what they have taken, which will at least make it easier for them to support the refugees, etcetera, etcetera, and make their position as a nation more viable? Why should they not just keep what they have taken? Who has any right to tell them? They have done it by themselves against this steady hate that has been growing, and certainly we have not in any way done anything effective to block it or stop it. Why have we any right to tell them to give up anything unless they are getting something for what they give up?

Secretary RUSK. The point there, Senator, is that they can play that game on a geopolitics basis and prepare for themselves fantastic problems for the future.

Senator SYMINGTON. Have they not got them anyway? That is my only point. They have them.

Secretary RUSK. The alternative may be, and I would think that it would be, in Israel's vital national interest to try the other alternative. The alternative may be a reconciliation on the basis of Arab acceptance that Israel is there to stay and a condition of hostility need not exist between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

When you look ahead to 200 million Arabs, with the vast resources that are coming rapidly into that area, the oil and all the rest of it, the possibility that Eastern Europe may then wholly align themselves with all these people, and pour in stuff in a position there, over time, five years, ten years, 15 years, Israel will have to do it all over again, and under conditions that may be much more difficult next time because next time the Arabs will probably strike first.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are quite right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I agree with that thoroughly.

The CHAIRMAN. The only hope for Israel for the long term.

Secretary RUSK. As a matter of fact, we have a very difficult problem facing us right now, Senator.

[Discussion off the record.]

INDEMNIFICATION BY ISRAEL

Senator MUNDT. I would like to ask a question deriving out of phone calls as I was coming over this morning.

A friend of mine who believes that he had a son on this ship that was shot at, torpedoed or whatever happened, to the best of the information that we can get, he may be wrong, but he thinks he has, but he is pretty bitter. He said to me, and I say to you, What happened? What is the position of the United States when somebody shoots one of these ships down on the high seas? Do we just say, "Well, you are sorry, it's all right with us," or is there some indemnification?

Secretary RUSK. No problems of damage and indemnification have been raised. We do not have a report of the condition of the ship itself or the damage, but we have laid the basis for a very strong protest for going back to them on that kind of thing. We have not had anything by way of explanation from Israel, communications, that could explain that within 24 hours. They, too, I am sure, are investigating, but the only thing we have had from them is a flash report that it occurred. We are very glad they told us right away because if they just laid low on this situation and we did not know who did it, there would have been a strong inclination here to believe the Egyptians did it, you see. But we will be going back to that question when we get more facts.

Senator MUNDT. We just do not settle it at this point.

Secretary RUSK. No, it is not settled at this point.

U.S. INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL

Senator MUNDT. I was a little bit disturbed when I heard all this discussion around the table this morning that we do not control Israel, and Israel controls the U.S. Government and the Senate. I kind of hate to accept this philosophy. I do not believe it. I think

we have a lot of influence over Israel if we decided to exercise it in the present circumstances.

Put yourself in the Israeli's position. They found out that the Russians are not their friends; that is sure. They found out France would not even sign their little maritime declaration as I understand it. Where would they be next week if the U.S. took the same kind of attitude, and this trouble is not going to be resolved, the bitterness eliminated, no matter what kind of settlement.

So I think we are in a strong position to reason with them and to talk with them if in fact they are not running the United States, and I do not think they are. I would deny we have no influence with them. I think we can lead from strength in discussing the various settlements proposed. I am very fearful if we are going to support a guarantee of international borders of a whole new country of Israel spread out with all the lands picked up in the war, that we have sown the seeds of another conflict, like Alsace Lorraine and what is this little place in between India and Pakistan, Kashmir. So far as I know, they never settled the situation between Turkey and Syria.

Secretary RUSK. This is where I came in 20 years ago. I was Assistant Secretary for U.N. Affairs when the Palestine problem was before the U.N., and I would emphasize the importance, as this matter moves ahead, of developing a very strong bipartisan U.S. position on this problem.

Senator MUNDT. I think it is important.

Secretary RUSK. Because it is only on that basis that we can proceed with major influence in this situation.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Karl, I merely suggest that you take up the hearings on the Foreign Agents Registration Act if you want to find the 19 ramified, concealed and camouflaged Jewish organizations in this country that have their tentacles all through this whole situation. It is in there; it is in the record.

Senator MUNDT. That must have happened before I became a member.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I sat through these hearings.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH SOVIETS ON ABM DEPLOYMENT

Mr. Secretary, first I want to congratulate you, and through you the President, upon the handling of a very difficult and delicate situation in a commendable manner.

Next, it seems to me that the most encouraging thing that has come out of this tragedy is the equation between perhaps the maturing use of the equation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Perhaps it has some hopeful elements, both with respect to the Middle East and other places.

As a preface to my question, I would like to say that I have been shocked, and I believe the world was shocked, at the quick, dramatic results of the first strike. If that be true with conventional arms, then the subject on which the Disarmament Subcommittee held a hearing, the question of deployment of ABM, is certainly a very pertinent question now.

As you know, our committee held an extensive hearing. There were no leaks from the committee. In fact the subcommittee did not even attempt to reach any conclusion yet.

I wish now by question to reopen with you the question of negotiation with the Soviets on ABM deployment. It becomes a pressing matter in view of this demonstration of blitzkrieg warfare. Can you give us a report on the status of that?

Secretary RUSK. Yes. I think there is a very big difference between a first strike which has a reasonable chance of paralyzing the other side's armed forces and a first strike which cannot do so, and this is particularly applicable to the missile field. To the extent that the Israelis got the first strike against the Arab forces, they did succeed in establishing air superiority apparently in a matter of four hours because they caught most of the Arab air forces on the ground.

Now, with missiles we do not see any way in which a first strike by either side can deny to the other side a devastating second strike.

I think the ABM problem therefore is not necessarily affected by this particular situation in the Near East, although it raises the issue in general.

SOVIETS STILL DETERMINING THEIR POSITION

I might tell you, Senator, that we have been waiting for the Soviets to respond to our latest suggestion for serious talks on these matters. We have the impression that the Soviet Union is still in the process of determining its own position. Now this may be because it is a highly complicated matter and they may not have done the kind of depth studies that we have been doing over a period of a year. It may be that there are serious differences of view within their leadership. I have no doubt their military, for example, want to go for ABMs, and in that sense they are not much different from other military.

Now, we hope that they will come back and get into serious talks with us on this. They have not said no, but they have not yet announced a time. We have said, "We have our fellows who are ready to sit down with you at any time either in Moscow or Washington to go into this further," and they said, "Well, we are ready to talk about it, but we will let you know."

Our own impression is they are still trying to decide what it is they would say in these discussions, but we are trying to follow through on that.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, if you will permit, in view of Karl Mundt's statement—

Secretary RUSK. Yes?

The CHAIRMAN. Are you finished with that?

Senator CARLSON. I did want to get back to this ship again because of Karl Mundt's statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you finished with this?

Senator GORE. If you will wait just a moment until I finish.

Senator CARLSON. Yes.

DEVASTATING EFFECT OF A FIRST STRIKE

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, is there any way at your command or the President's to reach some conclusion or ask the Soviets if they either will talk or not talk before this session comes to an end.

I have said nothing publicly on this subject except that I did not think we ought to be strung along on this, and I am greatly impressed with this devastating effect of a first strike. I am not ready to accept that it will not be equally devastating, even more so, with missiles. I have the feeling that this Congress ought to know before it adjourns whether or not there are going to be serious negotiations on this subject. If not, I venture the guess that the Congress will want to make an appropriation to initiate deployment.

I only urge you to convey to the President, at least, my view, which I believe is concurred in unanimously by members of the subcommittee—although I am not sure unanimously, but mostly to—that we should either come to serious negotiation on this or proceed with our own deployment.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I will be glad to see that those views are given to the President and to Secretary McNamara.

Senator GORE. Now, in response to the question, do you see any way to elicit a more definite answer from the Soviets? Will they be impressed with the blitzkrieg character of this war over there?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that the world-wide strategic issue between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is so very large in size and so much more devastating in the stakes that I just doubt that the Soviets will draw any conclusions from this Near East situation on that particular point. I just doubt they will.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson.

LOCATION OF THE LIBERTY

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, just in view of what Senator Mundt has raised again—and I raised it at the beginning of this session because most every member of the Senate and many of Congress are going to have families involved as a result of the deaths and the casualties in this unfortunate situation about this ship. We are going to have to answer some questions.

I believe you stated it was 15 miles off the coast of Israel. Is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. And 90 miles north of Port Said.

Senator CARLSON. Was it there on the orders of the Defense Department?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator CARLSON. Did the State Department know about it, and were they familiar with its location?

Secretary RUSK. I am not clear, but I would not draw any distinction on that. This was a communication ship, and during the period in which our embassies and consulates were being closed down and we were having to resort to all sorts of improvised communications, it was there to help in the relay process of messages that our people wanted to go back and forth.

Senator CARLSON. Had it been there for a great length of time?

Secretary RUSK. No, it had moved in just very shortly before that.

Senator CARLSON. Were we intercepting or receiving messages for Israel on this ship?

Secretary RUSK. I do not think so.

Senator CARLSON. These are questions that have come to me from families—

TYPE AND CHARACTER OF THE SHIP

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, I would think pretty soon somebody had better talk about what type and character of ship this was. I think this is a rather important situation as far as—

Secretary RUSK. It has the capacity to listen, but we were not involved in transmitting messages from one side to the other, if that is what you have in mind.

Senator CARLSON. Well, the people out in the country are asking questions, and we are going to have to answer whether—this can all be off the record as far as I am concerned now—but we are going to have to have answers to those questions from the parents of those boys.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I think you should understand on the question of what it was doing there, it was there under proper orders, on behalf of the United States Government, in the high seas.

Senator MUNDT. International waters.

Secretary RUSK. And therefore, from our point of view, was not subject to attack by anybody.

U.S. CASUALTIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Has the casualty list been published?

Secretary RUSK. The last I saw was ten dead.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, I say has the list of names been published?

Secretary RUSK. No; I am not sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper.

Senator COOPER. Yes, I would like to—I have been wanting to ask a question. I have been waiting my turn.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, he is ready.

EASTERN EUROPEAN ARMS TO EGYPT

Senator COOPER. First, I would like to thank the Secretary for all the information he has given us, and I think it is very valuable.

Also I appreciate very much what you said, we are not out of the woods yet even as far as hostilities may be concerned. We talk about the possibility of replenishing Egypt by Eastern European countries. I read in the paper either last night or this morning, it said there was a rumor, but nevertheless there was a story that prior to yesterday—

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator speak up a little. I cannot hear.

Senator COOPER. I will do the best I can. I have difficulty with my throat.

The CHAIRMAN. Do the best you can. The Senators down at the end cannot hear.

Senator COOPER. What I was saying, there were stories in the papers yesterday and this morning that Egypt was being replen-

ished by arms from Eastern Europe. Does the Department have any information on that subject at all?

Secretary RUSK. We have heard reports and rumors. We do not have anything very hard about significant replenishment actually arriving in Egypt.

Senator COOPER. There were also stories that Russia had flown in some supplies.

Secretary RUSK. Well, I was thinking about replenishment from Russia. I do not know of any arms. Well, Algeria may be sending some planes to Egypt and some of the others may be. Iraq may be sending some planes to Syria. But we have heard the reports. We do not have very hard information at the moment as to what has arrived on the scene.

Senator COOPER. Is there any indication that Egypt was able to pull back and save a good deal, a good many, of its tanks?

Secretary RUSK. Yes. They will have undoubtedly several hundred tanks left. But they lost several hundred in the Sinai.

MANEUVER OF RUSSIAN VESSELS

Senator COOPER. One other question: On this possibility of some incident which might cause great trouble, particularly between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, is it a fact that—you said it has been—very difficult for Egypt to hit this vessel. What do you make out of this maneuver of the Russian naval vessels against which naval commanders there protested, according to the papers.

Secretary RUSK. The Soviet forces there at the present time in the eastern Mediterranean are about what they were in June of last year. They usually send out a few more ships in June.

Senator COOPER. I do not mean this ship, I mean the report that they have been moving in and out of our naval formation against which a protest was made by a naval commander.

Secretary RUSK. I have seen that. I have not had operation reports on just what they have been doing. This is something we would like to sort out sometime with the Soviet Union because that happens on both sides, quite frankly, and we are not in a very good position to be all that indignant about their having naval vessels in the vicinity of our naval vessels because we do that both ways. I can assure you, when Soviet ships go into the Gulf of Tonkin, they think they are being harassed pretty badly by our vessels nearby and planes buzzing them and taking pictures and things of that sort, so I would hope we would not get too excited over this particular kind of problem. We ought to sort it out some day with them, but it is a bilateral kind of problem.

Senator COOPER. You think our ships would be moving as close to this area as they seem to be, like 14 miles off this vessel, and the fleet is not too far away.

Secretary RUSK. Well, our fleet has been up south of Cyprus, at least portions of it, and other portions further to the west. Actually our carriers have been some distance away. But it is not abnormal at all for us to have this type of vessel in that kind of a situation.

Senator COOPER. Well, that is all I have.

I would like to say this for the record. I thank you, Mr. Secretary, and your associates, and I thank the President, in the re-

straint and patience with which you have worked in this situation, for which you deserve tremendous credit.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator.

RESCUING AMERICANS IN ARAB COUNTRIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. May I ask the Secretary—our nationals were practically ordered out of several of these Arab countries.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Egypt, and is it not perfectly natural that our ships would be in there, airplanes or something, to see if we could aid or to prevent undue damage to our nationals as they are being moved out?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we have had an extremely dangerous and difficult problem with regard to our nationals out there in this situation, some 25,000 in the area, and we could not be at all sure that normal rights of legation would apply against all these problems.

Our contingency plans for rescuing Americans who might be caught, even against the wishes of the local governments, had to be very extensive and it was very important for us to have the most immediately available information. Some of our communications equipment could not reach very far from the fellow who had a little pack on his back. So it was perfectly normal for us to have a ship of this sort in there.

Now, we still are not out of the woods yet on this question of taking care of American nationals in the area.

Senator CASE. Could you give us a little rundown on that?

Secretary RUSK. Yes. The most difficult problem has been in Amman because of the lack of easy communications to safe haven, but we think the situation is now under reasonable control with the other governments.

In the case of those who have broken relations with us, they are taking governmental steps to protect American personnel. We made it very clear to them on this matter we would apply the principles of reciprocity. We would expect to treat their people there with the same consideration we expected from them, and I think that that situation is clarifying.

But we still are not over the dangers of possible mob action.

Wheelus Airbase could be a little sticky. We have about 8,000 Americans that have been collected to the Wheelus base.

The CHAIRMAN. Civilians?

Secretary RUSK. And military and dependents.

Now, we think we can take care of that because we have a fair amount of local force of our own if the Libyan Government does not have enough force to do it itself. The Libyan Government has been trying, but it has limited capabilities against mobs. But in general, I am somewhat encouraged about the threat to American citizens in the area this morning.

TRANSCRIPT OF NASSER CONVERSATION

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Secretary, have you been able to prove or disprove that curious story in the Star last night, allegedly a transcript between Nasser and the king, about "Come on, get behind us and prove the British and Americans"—

Secretary RUSK. We are analyzing that recording and comparing it with earlier recordings of these two gentlemen to see how authentic it was. I have no reason at the moment to doubt the authenticity of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell, do you have any questions?

Senator PELL. One.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

SLOWDOWN IN FIGHTING IN VIETNAM

Senator PELL. Mr. Secretary, I would like also to say how much I admire the restraint which you and the administration have shown.

Secretary RUSK. Thanks.

Senator PELL. And also again advert to the point I mentioned before, and that is the slowdown in the fighting in Vietnam. You may not wish to enlarge on this, but it would seem to me there might be a relationship between the slowdown there and the improved relations, improvement of communications with the Soviet Union.

Is there any way, now that the Soviet Union has suffered a rebuff in the Near East, that we might be able to relate that to some part of de-escalation on our part in Vietnam and reach some kind of a solution there, too?

I am sure you were thinking about the whole picture, and I was wondering if you could tell us about your thoughts in that regard.

Secretary RUSK. We are in touch frequently with the Soviet Union on Vietnam. Their problem and ours is still with Hanoi. We keep a very close check on what happens on the ground in Vietnam to see whether any slowdown has a political significance.

Actually, in terms of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese initiative, there has not been a significant slowdown in the last week or ten days as sort of reflected in the press.

There has been some information indicating that they are—they continue to build up for that offensive, the June offensive, that we are expecting in the DMZ.

I think there is a slowdown. At the moment it is for some regrouping on the part of our own side and the absence of large-scale fighting, but not a slowdown in the rate of Viet Cong or North Vietnamese incidents or attacks in the countryside.

So we cannot draw political conclusions from it. But we are, and continue to be, in touch with the Russians, and will follow up on Vietnam with them. But their problem is that it is still with Hanoi.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCarthy, do you have a contribution?

Senator MCCARTHY. Not right now.

RUSSIAN ENCOURAGEMENT OF THE ARABS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I would like to go on and explore a little further this same question.

There was an interesting article this morning in the Washington Post. I do not know whether you had time to read it or not. I would like to read just a couple of paragraphs. It says:

In the early stages of the Middle Eastern crisis, the suspicion was freely voiced that Russia had encouraged the Arabs in order to get back at the United States for Cuba, Vietnam and other failures of Soviet policy.

Senator MUNDT. We cannot hear you.

Senator COOPER. I want to lodge a protest.

The CHAIRMAN. "But it is now clear that the Kremlin had no such intention. It has worked with the Western powers"—and I presume that means us—"behind the scenes to mitigate the conflict, at the cost of appearing to forsake its Arab allies, instead of issuing the kind of vociferous and saber-rattling promises of support which it gave so readily in the past."

As a sign of political maturity, this is much more convincing than the "Tashkent spirit" following the India-Pakistan war in the fall of 1965.

Then I skip over to another paragraph.

Support for the Arabs has been expressed in the most generalized and vague assurances. The Soviet Union has been aware of the dangers of the situation, and has not wished to encourage Arab recklessness by promises of support.

It is a rather long article. But that again leads me to ask you and again hopefully to suggest that the Department give very serious consideration to trying to use this occasion, which I am sure is a great shock to the prestige, the ego, of the Soviet Union, to enlist their assistance through the Security Council, where they have cooperated apparently in recent days, to open up Vietnam. If we are to get anything of any value out of this, it seems to me it could be to get a negotiation on Vietnam.

I cannot help but think there is a possibility of utilizing this. I think the Soviets have been extremely restrained in their promises.

You remember how Krushchev threatened everybody at the time of the '56—well, in nearly every occasion he was always threatening that he would not stand idly by. This calls attention to it, how Khrushchev said, "We won't stand idly by," and so on, which was absent in this particular instance.

But I would feel there is some parallel interest, and these present people, Kosygin in particular, being an engineer and a technician, I do not believe is nearly as interested in big political gestures as his predecessor was.

I would like very much to urge that this be explored, utilizing their present presence and interest in the Security Council, to see if the Security Council might not make recommendations.

I am not suggesting they can handle Vietnam because the other side has insisted, and I suppose still will, it has no jurisdiction, but to use it to perhaps reopen and reconvene the Geneva Conference, which the other side and ourselves have in times past said would be a proper forum for a negotiation.

You say the trouble is Hanoi. It has been the trouble has been Hanoi. But if that could be coupled with a recommendation to stop the bombing, that would ease our own political situation and might open it up.

BRINGING VIETNAM WAR TO A CLOSE

I just offer that as a suggestion, because I am very anxious and very interested in bringing the Vietnam thing to a close, because of the effect it is having on our domestic economy, our political situation. I think this is going to be most serious if this war continues through to the next election, and that is about the only benefit, affirmative benefit, I can see we can get out of this.

We have all the troubles here, and we will do what we can, and I join the others about what we have done so far in the Middle East.

Of course our problem has been made rather easy by the way the military thing went, up to this point. We still have some terrible problems. But do you not think there is a possibility that this might shake loose the frozen attitude that has grown up?

SOVIET ROLE EXAGGERATED

Secretary RUSK. Senator, first let me make a few comments on my own personal impressions of the role of the Soviet in this Middle East situation because I think that story you read from exaggerated it from both directions.

I do not believe that the Soviet Union was strongly encouraging what they called the progressive Arab states—Cairo, Syria, Algeria particularly—to move against the moderate and conservative Arab states, and to work against U.S. influence in the Middle East, and to support the U.S.S.R.'s influence there.

I think they encouraged the Arabs up to the request for the removal of UNEF.

Then I think Nasser jumped out ahead of the Soviet Union considerably when he announced the closing of the Straits of Tiran.

Now—

The CHAIRMAN. You think that was done without their approval.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Secretary RUSK. And we have very good reason to believe that Nasser did not consult the Soviet Union or indeed anybody else when he closed the strait.

Senator SYMINGTON. How about U Thant, did he consult him?

Secretary RUSK. No, he did not on the closing of the straits.

Now, I think what has happened, this sort of parallel action by us and the Soviet Union in the Security Council, from their point of view was an attempt to stabilize the situation as quickly as possible in the face of a prospective stunning defeat of Arab forces by Israel.

ARAB FAILURES IN DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS

One of the curious things about this situation over the last 20 years has been that the Arabs seemed to have a genius for just being too late to take care of their own interests. I will give the earliest example and the latest example.

At the instruction of President Truman and General Marshall during the mandate of Palestine, I was negotiating with the then Zionists and the Arabs about a military and political standstill so there could be at the termination of the mandate a further period in which a genuinely agreed solution could be found.

The CHAIRMAN. What year was that, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. That was 1947. I was up in the Savoy Plaza Hotel. I had the Arab delegation down one end of the hall and the Zionist delegation at the other end of the hall, and we got practically everything put together except the question of the number of Jewish immigrants that would be admitted into Palestine during the standstill.

We got the Jewish side to accept 3,000 a month, which was very small compared to the numbers that they thought and hoped would want to come in. It is 36,000 a year.

Then Prince Faisal, now King Faisal, who was the spokesman for the Arab side, refused to accept that 3,000 figure on the grounds that if you accepted 3,000 they would send in 3,000 pregnant women and that would make it 6,000.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is one way to do it.

Secretary RUSK. Now, you see, had they accepted that figure of 3,000, this whole thing might have taken a different shape over a period of time, you see. That is an early example of being too late.

Now, the big example is that they fought on the ground to oppose the basic U.N. resolution establishing Israel whereas now there is nothing they want more than the original resolution.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who?

Secretary RUSK. The Arabs.

The CHAIRMAN. The Arabs.

Secretary RUSK. You see, they want that original resolution which provides much less Israel territory than Israel has since then obtained.

Now, here in this, since the fighting broke out—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thought they were unalterably opposed to the recognition of sovereignty of Israel.

Secretary RUSK. But they are now demanding the application of the original U.N. resolution too late. Had they taken it at the time, they would have had it.

Now, when the fighting broke out, had they taken immediately the first Security Council resolution on a cease-fire, they would have been far better off than they are today. I think the Soviet Union understood that and tried to press them to take the ceasefire two days ago. Now, with 48 hours of fighting, they have lost the Sinai and the west bank of the Jordan, so I think that the Soviets were taking a practical view.

Now, from here on out, I think you can expect the Soviets to do everything they can to stimulate the most radical among the Arabs, through propaganda and otherwise, perhaps to try to find some basis on which they can recoup the situation.

So I am not sure we will not find that the Soviets and we are going to have real difficulties in the Security Council about a final settlement here. I think for very practical reasons—

[Discussion off the record.]

U.S. BALANCING ACT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Senator SYMINGTON. In 1953 when I first came to the Senate, Mr. Herzog was military attache, brother-in-law of Abba Eban, and he said to me, "If you give arms to Yugoslavia, who you know won't fight for you, why don't you sell them to us, who you know would fight for you?"

Nobody answered that question, and I have been following closely for 15 years this whole situation even before I came on this committee.

I would like to ask this question: You have this balancing of arms in this government. There are not many Americans who know, realize, that we not only had F-104s in Jordan but we had American pilots in Jordan when this business began to flare up. We have done a balancing act. I say this with great respect, but I would not say it if I did not think it was fair. But we have been very unfair to the Israelis the way we handled economic aid to Egypt, and at the same time, while they have gotten a lot of money from this country, it has gone to buy this air force from France.

Under all these circumstances, it seems to me that foreign policy, and Senator McCarthy and I have been very interested in this in hearings and we have got the chairman interested, and I think we ought to wrap the hearings up. It seems to me we have been setting foreign policy, at least as far as the Middle East is concerned, in the Department of Defense in a fairly low echelon.

INCREASE THE SALE OF ARMS

We have increased the sale of arms in the last five years from \$300 million a year to \$1.7 billion a year. We do this with a fellow who, to be honest, a few months ago I never knew existed. I never heard of him. He seems to be the biggest shot around these parts, and so forth and so on, and I think it is better if we are going to start talking about working out with the Soviets some arrangements. I think we just, Mr. Secretary, and I say this with great respect, to me it is just as clear as light the Defense Department at low levels has been setting foreign policy in this field.

I know and you know General Weitzman, who could not be more interesting and obviously a very able man, runs their air force. He has been promoted to deputy. He was over here pleading for the type and character of arms that we refused to give him and did give some of his enemies. Under these circumstances again, I say, I can see the hate angle and I can see the oil angle, and the future Soviet angle, but it looks to me like they have a country that they pretty well got this part of Jordan stuck in there. They have got the Sinai Peninsula and I do not see why we should be so anxious to see them give up a lot because they gave up an awful lot when we agreed and Nasser agreed to let them use the canal and the Gulf.

So we have been knee deep in this arms thing, and I think our record on the way we have handled it would be open to a lot of world criticism if it is to be opened.

But for what it is worth, I would appreciate your giving me your comments on these observations.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, first I think it is only in NATO that Mr. Kuss has practically a blank check to sell arms to help with the offset problems in NATO, within the general structure of NATO limits.

As far as other parts of the world are concerned, those come up to Cabinet level, and I will have to take the lumps.

ARMS SALES THROUGH IRAN

Senator SYMINGTON. Is Iran part of NATO?

Secretary RUSK. No, but those matters come up to Cabinet level.

Senator SYMINGTON. Did you know about the sale of F-86s to Pakistan through Iran and the German private corporation?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, and we have tried to pull a string on that.

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not say—

Secretary RUSK. No, but we have to follow this pretty closely.

In the case of the Near East, we have tried for years not to become a principal arms supplier in the Near East. But here with these massive Soviet buildups in Syria and Egypt, we knew that Nasser was out to get King Hussein. We knew Hussein had to have some sort of protection against Nasser. Now, that ramifies into a problem with Israel.

We have—

U.S. ARMS TO ISRAEL

Senator SYMINGTON. If Nasser was out to get Israel, we never would give any sophisticated war material to Israel. That is what I have never been able to understand.

Secretary RUSK. I think some of the stuff we have given to Israel has been very sophisticated. Our view was that Israel's defense establishment was in pretty good shape against the Arabs. They came in for some requests from time to time, they went far beyond some things we generally supplied them, but our general estimate was they were pretty reasonably balanced and this was far in excess of their requirements, and the last few days have not proved us wrong.

Senator SYMINGTON. They have a secretary of defense over there who happens to be a military man and listens to his chiefs of staff, so they did pretty well when they got rolling. They did more in four days than we have done with our air power and sea power in Vietnam. That is another matter. I did not want to get away from their capacity to handle a war brilliantly. All I am getting back to is the first premise, considering the way we have acted with them, I do not see where we have the leverage to tell the to go back from what they have conquered in order to protect themselves.

They are going to get the hate from the Arabs whether they do or do not. That is my only point.

USE OF U.S. ARMS AGAINST ISRAEL

Senator MCCARTHY. Will the Senator yield?

Is it not true that more of our arms, if they had been put into use, would have been used against Israel than would have been used against the Arabs, Saudi Arabia and Jordan?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, I would think not.

Senator MCCARTHY. We have not given much to Israel. We may have helped them buy French arms.

Secretary RUSK. They had tanks from us, and I do not want, you know, to brag about how much we gave to everybody, but the Saudi Arabian arms have not been involved in this situation.

Senator MCCARTHY. They did not get organized.

Secretary RUSK. Beg pardon?

Senator MCCARTHY. They were not ready.

Secretary RUSK. And for other reasons.

Senator MCCARTHY. If they had gotten those Hawk missiles in.

Secretary RUSK. And for other reasons I think Saudi Arabia was taking their time because of their relations with Nasser.

Senator MCCARTHY. I wanted to ask what does this mean in the general re-evaluation of the arms sale with Saudi Arabia?

FINDING A SOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Secretary RUSK. Before you came in, I was trying to indicate some of the elements we feel ought to go into a final solution here. One would be some agreement among the principal arms supplying countries including the Soviet Union about the level of arms in the area, and, if we could achieve something of this sort, it would be very important.

Senator MCCARTHY. Does this open a way to doing something real about the Arab refugees or does not a disturbance of this magnitude make a difference?

Secretary RUSK. We would hope so. I indicated earlier that if the Arab refugees could be given a chance to go into the privacy of a confessional booth and make a personal decision about where he wants to live ten years from now, that the practical effect of that secret consultation with the refugees would probably be something that Israel could accept because perhaps only one in ten would elect to live in Israel.

FUTURE OF THE SUEZ CANAL

Senator MCCARTHY. What about the canal? Are you going to let the Egyptians take it over again and give them a chance to shut it off any time they want to as they have done twice in ten years. Or is this the time to move in a way that President Truman indicated back in '45 about the Panama Canal, the Suez and all these things?

Secretary RUSK. I have no doubt that the opening of the Suez will be a major issue in the settlement of this affair.

Senator MCCARTHY. Continued opening, the question of how it would be kept open.

Secretary RUSK. It may be on this, you see, that some—instead of relying upon general rules of international law—it may be possible to work out a special regime of international law for these two waterways, roughly similar to the Montreux Convention affecting the Bosphorous. Yes, we are working on that pretty hard.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark has not had a chance. I wonder if he could be recognized.

Senator CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE NEED FOR DISARMAMENT

Mr. Secretary, I would like particularly to have Senator Gore and Senator Symington listen to this. Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that our government has an opportunity to do something which comes once in a lifetime, to do something effective about the disarmament, and I use the word "disarmament" instead of arms control advisedly, as a result of what has happened in the Middle East.

The Russians, as I understand it, have poured over the years something in the neighborhood of \$2 billion in armaments into the

Middle East about which around \$1 billion, Mr. Bader tells me, went to Egypt.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator CLARK. An awful lot of that has gone down the drain.

I would not think that a hard-boiled people like the Russians would be deeply interested in making the same mistake again.

Secretary RUSK. Add \$1 billion to Indonesia.

Senator CLARK. Yes, sure.

Now, the Israelis have always proudly boasted that they were very much in favor of disarmament in the Middle East, but they could not do anything about it because the Arabs would not go along.

Well, now, maybe with the Arabs significantly, although not certainly totally disarmed, with Russia disillusioned, this is a time when our government would move pretty rapidly in that direction. I am sure that Senator Gore, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Disarmament, and Senator Symington, as chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East, might look with favor on this suggestion.

SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Now, yesterday I think it was announced that you were the chairman of a special committee on the Middle East, and McBundy has been brought back out of the mothballs to be the executive director. I, frankly, am a little bit disappointed. In fact, I go further and say I am quite disappointed that there is nobody from the agency which has the statutory responsibility for dealing with arms control and disarmament, mainly the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, under that subcommittee.

I talked to my good friend and yours, Joe Sisco, at the White House yesterday at a luncheon, and he said, "You don't need anybody from that outfit on that committee. I am on it."

He said there is nobody from AID on it either. Well, I respectfully suggest to you that it may be that that point of view does deserve some upgrading. They should not be treated exactly like lackeys who are sent over to Geneva from time to time and gotten rid of, but that Bill Foster ought to be on that committee.

I was going to make another suggestion, which is one that I wrote for this committee not too long ago, that we ought to give this whole disarmament effort, or if you are going to downgrade it to arms control, a much higher priority in the Middle East than you have done. I would recommend to you, sir, that you ask the President to turn the Vice President loose on this. He used to be chairman of the Disarmament Subcommittee down here. This has been one of his babies for many a long year. I do not need to tell you the energy that he has got, the zeal with which he can approach this task, and I would suggest unhampered by some of your restrictions which might impede some of the rest of them.

I guess that is a question, isn't it?

Secretary RUSK. I will report back your views, Senator. I am not sure about the Vice President in this particular role.

Senator CLARK. He might get us disarmament.

Secretary RUSK. The functions of a Vice President are beyond my level.

It is true that this committee does not have on it the Director of ACDA, the Director of AID, the Secretary of Interior and a number of others who have a major stake in what happens here, and we expect to draft them when questions come up.

But ACDA has been working for some time on the possibility of conventional arms limitation in the Near East.

In the opening statement of the Geneva Conference I myself will be a recognition by the NATO countries that they have an important interest in the Near East, and will help out a little bit more.

I am going to have to go at least for a day or two to the NATO Ministers Meeting in the middle of next week, and for the first time in a long time the NATO countries are beginning to get interested in something outside of NATO.

LET THE MIDDLE EAST SETTLE ITS OWN PROBLEMS

The CHAIRMAN. Yesterday, some people called on me, and they thought that now—they did not put it that way—now that Israel has prevailed, that we ought to let them alone to settle this among themselves.

What should I say to them when they say that to me?

Secretary RUSK. I would think the best way to deal with that one at the present time would be to say that this is in the Security Council and it ought to stay there for a while.

The CHAIRMAN. The U.N. can do it. I said if they can do it, I am all for it.

Secretary RUSK. By the way, may I make just one brief remark. We have had some indication in the last three days, Senator Gore, that we are making some more progress on the nonproliferation treaty.

Senator GORE. Wonderful.

Secretary RUSK. So we may be able to table a joint draft in Geneva shortly.

Senator GORE. Good.

Secretary RUSK. But that is just—I cannot guarantee that yet, but we have been encouraged by what has happened in the last three days.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 o'clock p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JUNE 20, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLICS AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:00 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Morse (presiding), McCarthy and Carlson.

Fulton Freeman, Ambassador to Mexico, accompanied by Terence Leonhardy, Director, Office of Mexican Affairs, Department of State, briefed the group on the Dykes Simmons case.

(Reporter present at request of Senator Morse.)

[The subcommittee adjourned at 4:40 p.m.]

MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA AND PAKISTAN

THURSDAY, JUNE 22, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN
AFFAIRS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:15 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Stuart Symington (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Symington, Lausche, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, and Aiken.

Also present: Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.

[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

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STATEMENT OF JEFFREY C. KITCHEN, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH WOLF, DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS, POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS; AND H.G. TORBERT, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS

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SALE OF AIRCRAFT TO PAKISTAN [P. 85]

Senator SYMINGTON. Speaking of Pakistan, the subcommittee has been told by the Defense Intelligence Agency that there was no doubt within the intelligence community that the F-86's in question were going to Pakistan, and reports to this effect were circulated before the aircraft left Germany.

Did you see those reports?

Mr. KITCHEN. I saw some intelligence reports after the aircraft arrived in Iran. I did not see intelligence reports prior to their departure from Germany.

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Senator SYMINGTON. Well, may I repeat that the Defense Intelligence Agency said that it was clear to them that they were going to Pakistan. Without in any sense getting into controversy as to

whether we did or didn't know about it, when we found out they had gone, did we make any protest to Iran, or to Pakistan?

Mr. KITCHEN. Well, as far as Iran is concerned, the degree of protest centered around inquiries as to whether when they gave the certification that the aircraft were to be used in Iran, whether or not this really constituted Iranian Government policy.

There was never, to my knowledge, an approach to the Shah, who really determines Iranian policy, and no point-blank question to him as to whether or not they had in fact been turned over to Pakistani control.

POSSIBLE VIOLATION OF SALES AGREEMENT BY IRAN

Senator SYMINGTON. I am a great admirer of Iran, but wouldn't it be logical to ask them if they were violating the agreement that the U.S. Government had told the people of the United States they intended to carry out with Pakistan and India?

Mr. KITCHEN. Well, we did discuss this in the sense, Senator, that when we announced the new policy in April for Pakistan and India, we laid that before the Shah and made very plain what our policy objectives were and that included the element of control and our sincere desire that he cooperate in making a contribution to our policy in the sense of maintaining that control.

Senator SYMINGTON. Was it made clear to us that there was no intention to abide by our suggestion or without our knowledge until we found it out?

Mr. KITCHEN. Well, I think in reverting to what I immediately said with regard to our new policy, he indicated that he thought that our approach was not unrealistic, that it was a fairly good approach. He felt that if we, in fact, monitored it in terms of balance between India and Pakistan, that this was a reasonable proposition.

I personally believe that his action in permitting the aircraft to go on to Pakistan really centered around his personal persuasion that in effecting the cut-off at the time of hostilities we were in fact penalizing Pakistan.

He had certain relationships with Pakistan which allowed him to draw the conclusion that this was an unfair proposition at that stage.

I think he regards our policy now as a fair policy, and I think he would give it his general support.

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IRANIAN PURCHASES FROM THE SOVIET UNION [P. 86]

Senator SYMINGTON. The testimony that we have had, to the best of my recollection, to justify this policy is their fear of the United Arab Republic. Do you think Iran will continue to buy arms from the Soviet Union now that Nasser has been given his comeuppance, you might say, by the Israelis?

Mr. KITCHEN. My personal estimate would be, Senator, that he will continue to buy non-lethal equipment, generally non-lethal, and what I would call common user equipment from the Soviet Union.

It is my view that he saw that in our policy of cutting off aid to India and Pakistan in the event of hostilities, the dangers, as he sees them, of being dependent on a single source of supply.

I think that that was one of his strongest motivations for this purchase, as well as the fact that he was able to take a wasting economic asset, the gas which he was flaring, and trade it for this basic equipment.

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U.S. POLICIES REGARDING ARMS SALES ABROAD [P. 87]

Senator SYMINGTON. Do we consider there are any developed countries in the Middle East?

Mr. KITCHEN. The criteria here might go again back to the problem of Iran. Iran now has a surplus of income from oil. When I use the word surplus I mean it has a substantial income from oil that gives the government certainly a wider range of choice than it had up to the last three or four years. It has been our policy to try to persuade the Government of Iran to hold its defense spending down. We have, in fact, approved sales to Iran only about a quarter of what the Shah has requested. We work not only with the budgetary authorities in the Ministry of Defense but actually with the Central Bank and other experts to develop what we believe is a real economic picture of Iran and we have done our best to persuade the Shah that he should not go over certain levels in his defense spending.

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD GREECE [P. 89]

Senator SYMINGTON. What do you now plan to do about Greece?

Mr. KITCHEN. Well, Greece is still fulfilling a NATO commitment. Her military establishment is committed to NATO objectives. That basis commitment hasn't in any way been changed by the new regime.

The question is whether we should continue to provide certain heavy equipment to Greece more as a measure of our concern about the political nature of that establishment rather than any doubts about its military problems.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand.

What do you mean by heavy equipment?

Mr. KITCHEN. Well, at the present time certain artillery and, I believe, aircraft.

Senator SYMINGTON. What type of aircraft? F-5's, perhaps?

Mr. KITCHEN. Well, I believe it is F-5's.

Senator SYMINGTON. F-5's. What size artillery?

Mr. KITCHEN. I would have to check again. I think it is howitzers.

Tanks, as well?

Well, all right, tanks.

Senator SYMINGTON. What type of tanks?

Mr. KITCHEN. 47's or 48's.

Mr. WOLF. I believe it is 48 or modernization of their present holdings.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are we continuing to ship that to Greece now?

Mr. KITCHEN. Not those heavy items.

Senator SYMINGTON. And when did we stop?

Mr. KITCHEN. We stopped a few days after the coup.

Senator SYMINGTON. And we have not yet decided whether or not we will continue?

Mr. KITCHEN. We have not yet decided.

Senator SYMINGTON. I see. That clears that up.

Does this involve in any way our relationship with our other NATO partner, the Turks?

Let me put the question to you this way: Would we discuss this with the Turks, recognizing the Cyprus problem before we made the decision?

Mr. KITCHEN. To resume?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. KITCHEN. I don't believe we would. I think this, again, is a unilateral policy question with regard to the political nature of that government and not about the basic military situation.

AMERICAN CONTROL OVER RESALE OF SURPLUS MILITARY EQUIPMENT

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Kitchen, you mentioned the fact that you worked with Mr. McNaughton as well as Mr. Kuss and Mr. Hoopes in the Department of Defense.

Mr. McNaughton told this committee that the United States had complete control over the resale or other transfer of military equipment of United States origin. But when the subcommittee asked the Defense Department for a list of sales and commitments that the German firm, Merex, has made in reselling U.S. equipment, Mr. McNaughton replied, "This specific information is not available within the Executive Branch."

Can you explain this apparent contradiction?

Mr. KITCHEN. We are aware of some of the Merex transactions through intelligence sources. Merex has not been the only sales agent which the German government has employed once we indicated that we did not wish to recapture certain equipment. We have some knowledge through, as I say, intelligence sources of what the Merex transactions have been.

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CANADIAN SALES DESTINED FOR PAKISTAN [P. 91]

Senator SYMINGTON. And they were not going to send them to the Pakistanis?

Mr. KITCHEN. There was no such statement that they might send them, but the point was they were to be used properly by Iran.

May I go on and say, sir, when I was in Munich a month ago, I had a very full and frank discussion with representatives of both the German ministry of defense and foreign ministry, made very clear to them without citing specifics because most of our specifics came through intelligence channels that we were quite aware that there had been irregularities in their handling of American surplus disposal and we did not wish to run into those irregularities again.

Senator SYMINGTON. Why did the German Government throw over Merex and take over the new company whose name is so long I can't pronounce it?

Mr. KITCHEN. I don't know the real answer to that. It may be partly their recognition that we were quite aware of this and had had knowledge of it, did not want to see it repeated.

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FOREIGN FIRMS ENGAGED IN ARMS SALES [P. 96]

Senator LAUSCHE. Obviously, this Levy Company is of the belief that it can in some way get military surplus equipment, and it is telling its clients that it will get it for them through some manipulation. Is that correct?

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Kitchen would agree to that.

Mr. KITCHEN. I agree to that.

Senator LAUSCHE. It is a dangerous thing.

Mr. KITCHEN. Before you came in, sir, I said I had conversations with the German Government. Recently it was made very plain that we were aware of the irregularities that occurred in that transaction with Iran, and, as a matter of fact, I understand that Merex, as the Chairman has suggested, has been dropped by the German Government.

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JUSTIFICATION FOR SALES TO IRAN [P. 98]

Senator SYMINGTON. The nature of the job the man has does not make any difference. He can be a dentist, and then he begins to operate.

In any case, after they did buy it, after they did say they were going to buy this what-you-call unsophisticated equipment from the Soviets, we agreed to sell our most sophisticated airplane, minus some parts and so forth, but the frame was the F-4. Why would they not buy any military equipment from the Soviets unless we apply pressure to them to cut it out; and how can we apply pressure if we are selling them sophisticated equipment at the same time they are buying other military equipment from the Soviet Union?

Mr. KITCHEN. Well, sir, I would like to respond on the first part of this with regard to the explanation. They did not let Soviet technicians in. This was their own description of this and so far as I am concerned, I for one would not use this in justification of their move. I merely wanted to describe what they said.

I think there have been thousands of Soviets in Iran since the end of World War II, and I quite agree with your point of their being in there in connection with their other industry and so on.

The point is I think the Shah felt there was a real difference between having that and having them as technicians within his military establishment, to where he developed some dependency on Soviet technicians in terms of his ability to use his military establishment, and I think that that is of some consequence.

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Senator MCCARTHY. Did you people at the time you approved the A-4 transfer know that the Iranians were going to buy the Russian equipment, or did that come to you as a surprise after you approved the airplane transfer?

Mr. KITCHEN. I do not quite recall the sequence on that. I would have to check the record, Senator.

I would put it this way. I thought the knowledge of the Russian transaction actually preceded our decision to supply the F-4.

KNOWLEDGE OF IRANIAN-SOVIET ARMS DEAL [P. 100]

Senator MCCARTHY. I do not say McNaughton made any denial. As I remember, he made a general statement about our selling it from keeping the Russians from putting military equipment in Iran. There was no indication, as I remember his testimony, that this—because the public announcement of the sale of trucks and so on came after the hearing we held on this matter.

Mr. KITCHEN. I want to say that we felt the sale of the F-4's to Iran was less in a sense related to the provision on the Soviet equipment, the type of Soviet equipment that the Shah bought and the amounts, as it was to the fact that we had successfully held the Shah to a program of about \$50 million a year when he wanted about four times that.

The Shah came to us and said that he was rapidly, increasingly, concerned by the range of the MIG-21 operating out of Iraq. The equipment which we provided did not have the range of the F-5 and was not suitable to take off from his interior fields and engage them approximately at his national border. He wanted an aircraft that was capable of doing that.

Because of the \$50 million figure and because of the expense of this aircraft, we reluctantly concluded that this was not, in his terms, an unreal requirement or an unreal request. We made the sale in a sense on its own merits, and less connected with the Soviet transaction.

Senator MCCARTHY. The Soviets are being paid pretty much in oil, are they not?

Mr. KITCHEN. Gas, sir.

Senator MCCARTHY. How are we being paid?

Mr. KITCHEN. It is a transaction where we will be repaid—it is a credit arrangement.

Senator MCCARTHY. It is a credit arrangement.

Mr. KITCHEN. Yes, because of his royalties when they fall due and so on.

Senator MCCARTHY. It is not a direct sort of barter arrangement such as the Russians have.

Mr. KITCHEN. No, sir.

Senator MCCARTHY. What would have happened if the \$400 million worth of arms that we and the British are supplying to Saudi Arabia, in addition to what we were supplying to Jordan, had been operational, and used by the Jordanians and the Saudi Arabians in the recent Mideast crisis?

Mr. KITCHEN. You would like to have our views on how it might have been applied?

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes.

Mr. KITCHEN. Of course we are in an executive session. I think the Saudi equipment was and is being bought for protection against Nasser and had little to do with its relationships to Israel.

Senator MCCARTHY. It would not have been used.

Mr. KITCHEN. I doubt very much that it would have been used. A lot of that money for instance is in the Hawk system which is defensive. I think it has come largely out of the irritations and genuine concerns of the Yemeni conflict, the presence of the Egyptians in the Yemen.

As far as Jordan was concerned, sir, a dozen F-104's against what we say the Israelis dispose of, I think they would have tried to take the air. I think that would have been about it.

Senator MCCARTHY. What was the status of the agreement to sell F-104's?

Mr. KITCHEN. My understanding is, and I am subject to checking the record, that approximately only a third of them were there—four aircraft, some transitional training was being accomplished. The aircraft were removed from Jordan several days before hostilities, moved out at the request of the King.

Senator MCCARTHY. Where did the King put them?

Mr. KITCHEN. He simply turned them back to us and we moved them out. I do not know where they went.

Mr. WOLF. They were, as I recall, our aircraft on loan at that time.

Senator MCCARTHY. He did not have title to them. We got them out?

Mr. WOLF. We got them out. Where they are now, I do not know.

Senator MCCARTHY. I see.

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HEAVY ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AMERICAN POLICY [P. 101]

Senator MCCARTHY. Well, I think that is the danger, and I see principally it is coming in Europe.

Do you have any reasonable discussions or communications with the Russians now with reference to possible limitation on their arms sales in North Africa and the Middle East?

Mr. KITCHEN. We are attempting such communication right now. We are concerned that the Russians not be recommitted to programs of the size they were committed to. We feel that the amount of material which has been supplied quickly on a fill-in basis does not constitute any indication of such a deep commitment.

Senator MCCARTHY. You mean what they are doing right now.

Mr. KITCHEN. Yes. It is to keep some leverage with the Arabs during the U.N. phase and to perhaps fill the losses and we are very concerned that we get that communication.

Senator MCCARTHY. They have a problem as to what to do with their semi-obsolete equipment.

[Whereupon, at 10:20 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the chair.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JUNE 22, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, Case, and Cooper.

S. 1688, the Inter-American Development Bank bill, was discussed and it was decided to take an overall view of the AID bill, plus S. 1688, before making a decision.

S. 624, to provide certain increases in annuities payable from the Foreign Service retirement and disability fund, was ordered reported without the Pell amendment.

The committee heard James Pineo Grant, nominee to be Assistant Administrator, AID (Vietnam) and then ordered him reported favorably by a voice vote.

Short discussion on the Human Rights Conventions, before agreeing to begin markup on the AID bill on Tuesday, June 27.

[The committee adjourned at 11:40 a.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JUNE 27, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:25 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Lausche, Symington, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.

The committee began markup of S. 1872, the Foreign Aid bill. Roll call votes were taken on Senator Cooper's substitute (to limit development loans to 15 countries, with Presidential discretion to extend to an additional 8 countries if President reports to the Congress) to Symington motion to limit development loans to 15 countries, with authority to extend to additional countries only after passage of concurrent resolution. The Cooper substitute was defeated by a vote of 10 to 3, and the Symington motion was approved by a vote of 11 to 2.

[The committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

BRIEFING ON GLASSBORO TALKS

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J. William Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Gore, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, Mundt, Case and Cooper.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

We had originally scheduled a hearing on foreign aid, but in view of the very interesting activities that have been going on in recent days the Secretary thought he would like to brief us some on those activities first.

Of course if someone wants to ask foreign aid questions later on, he wouldn't mind, although he informs me he has a Cabinet meeting and has to leave at 20 minutes to 12.

Is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Secretary. I hope you will give us a little statement before we interrogate you.

Senator AIKEN. Where was he at 8:30 last night?

The CHAIRMAN. Talking with Gromyko.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thought I might try to draw together a good many threads here of the last two weeks to include what is going on in New York, the summit discussions, and to bring you up to date on my talk with Mr. Gromyko last evening which was the most recent of our exchanges with the Soviet Union.

Much of our time was spent on the Middle East, and I think we ought to keep in mind that there are three sets of issues in the Middle East which tend to merge, overlap, which tend to break up the notion that there is a solid community called "The Arabs," in which our interests vary from issue to issue.

There is the Israel-Arab issue, which involves very deep-seated emotions on both sides, emotions which were inflamed 20 years ago with the creation of the State of Israel, and which have not really

subsided—issues on which almost all Arabs speak with a single voice.

Then there is a very serious contest going on between the self-styled progressive Arab states, countries like Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and the moderate or conservative Arab states which comprise almost all the rest.

The third is a serious effort by the Soviet Union to penetrate the Middle East to establish an effective presence there at the expense of the West, which carries with it very heavy overtones affecting the total world situation.

At the fringe is a minor Chinese Communist effort in the area, but I haven't found anyone among the Arabs particularly that I have talked to in recent weeks who take the Chinese activity very seriously, although they have been busy with the Palestine Liberation Army and a few minor groups here and there.

MIDDLE EAST QUESTION IN SECURITY COUNCIL

I think the committee was briefed in great detail up to the point where the Middle Eastern question moved from the Security Council to the General Assembly. We had no enthusiasm for that transfer of the forum because in the first instance we felt that in the Security Council the voting situation was such that it required that any result be a negotiated result. It was not possible for the Security Council to pass a wholly one-sided resolution or a resolution which had not been at least in part negotiated between the two sides, and the Security Council had succeeded in passing four unanimous resolutions and had been able to bring about a cease-fire when the hostilities actually began.

Further, we anticipated that the Soviet Union would use the General Assembly for a major propaganda effort to reaffirm its support of the Arabs and cast the United States in the role of the enemy of the Arabs, partly as a part of its long range strategy and partly to recover from the very serious setback which the Soviet Union itself had suffered when, in the face of a striking Arab defeat, the Soviet Union was considered by many Arabs to have let them down.

KOSYGIN'S VISIT TO THE U.N.

It was against this background that we heard that Mr. Kosygin was coming.

Despite the fact that we were in regular touch with him on the "Hot Line" there for several days, he did not give us any private information that he was coming. It was simply announced he was coming to the General Assembly.

When we heard that, Mr. Christian, the Press Secretary for the White House, made a short statement indicating that he would be welcome and that we hoped that he would enjoy his visit to this country and that the President and he might meet while he was here.

After his arrival, we let it be known to him that the President would be glad to extend him hospitality in Washington or Camp David with whatever degree of formality or informality he might be able or willing to accept.

But he took the view that he was coming to the United Nations and not to the United States, that he could not visit the United States as such and, therefore, he did not believe it would be appropriate for him to come to Washington.

Well, that led to consideration of other places, and we finally decided upon Glassboro on the recommendation of the Governor of New Jersey.

Just before the announcement of the Glassboro meeting was made, I had gone to see Mr. Kosygin and told him there were a number of points which the President would be ready and glad to have a chance to discuss and if he, Mr. Kosygin, thought such a talk would be worthwhile the President would be glad to meet him in New York, in New York State or in New Jersey.

Those four points were: Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the ABM problem, the Middle East, and Vietnam.

KOSYGIN'S MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION

Now, as far as the Assembly is concerned, on the opening day, Mr. Kosygin not only made his speech but also put in a resolution which had in it three key points: One, a condemnation of Israel; secondly, a demand for the withdrawal of Israeli forces immediately and unconditionally; and, third, reparation or compensation by Israel to the Arabs for the damage inflicted and a return of captured property including captured arms.

I think it is worth noting that in recent days discussion of a condemnation of Israel and the matter of reparations has pretty well dropped out of the picture and the Soviet Union is concentrating now on an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces back to the so-called armistice lines.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S FIVE POINTS

The following day, Ambassador Goldberg put in a United States resolution built around the five points in the President's speech of June 19: The recognized right of national life, justice for the refugees, innocent maritime passage, limits on the arms race, and political and territorial integrity for all the states in the area.

We did that partly to broaden the agenda of the Assembly itself because up until that point the item on the agenda was Israeli aggression. But when we put in our resolution calling for steps to stabilize a general and more permanent peace in the area, then that was by arrangement with the Secretariat included on the agenda of the General Assembly.

The situation at the present time is that neither the Soviet resolution nor the U.S. resolution is likely to pass with the necessary two-thirds vote. What is likely to happen is that there will be some third resolution, still unsurfaced, around which some sort of consensus might build, combining the idea of withdrawal with some of these broader principles of stabilizing a permanent peace.

In our talks with Mr. Kosygin and two additional talks which I had with Mr. Gromyko, we took up the Middle East situation in great detail. I suppose 80 percent of the President's time with Kosygin was spent on the Middle East. Kosygin's very tough press conference on the subject is a pretty accurate reflection of what he said in private. He is pressing very hard for a simple and uncondi-

tional withdrawal of Israeli forces to the armistice line, and is unwilling to talk seriously about other issues until that question of withdrawal has been resolved.

AGREEMENT ON ISRAELI SOVEREIGNTY

Having said that, it is, I think, correct to say that there are important, indeed major points of agreement between ourselves and the Soviet Union on the Middle East.

For example, the Soviet Union accepts Israel as an independent national state. It voted for its creation, and Mr. Kosygin reaffirmed that in his speech to the General Assembly.

The Soviet Union, I think, would support the idea of an elimination of the state of belligerence.

Now, this is a very important, indeed a fundamental point involved in this present situation, because the Arab states, particularly those immediately neighboring Israel, have proceeded on the basis that they are in a state of war with Israel and have the right to exercise the so-called rights of belligerence in their dealings about or with Israel.

When President Nasser, for example, closed the Strait of Tiran, we were immediately in touch with him, and he based the closing of the Strait of Tiran on rights of belligerence stemming from the state of war with Israel. That raises some interesting points of a reciprocal character because the Egyptians tend to overlook the fact that if Egypt is in a state of war with Israel, Israel is in a state of war with Egypt. The Latin Americans have pointed out from a legal point of view, around New York, that if Egypt is in a state of war with Israel, Israel cannot commit aggression against Egypt, and that the question of withdrawal takes on a special and less insistent role if a state of war is insisted upon.

But I think the Soviet Union would agree to find some way to remove the rights of belligerence at some stage, after withdrawal has been accomplished.

END THE STATE OF BELLIGERENCE

Mr. Gromyko volunteered the interesting remark that whereas Japan and the Soviet Union do not have a peace treaty with each other, they did join 10 years ago to remove the state of belligerence between the two countries, and that is an interesting precedent for this kind of problem here in the Middle East.

I think also that the United States would have no particular problem with the Soviet Union on rights of maritime passage.

Senator AIKEN. Is that public knowledge, the state of belligerency?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, it is. Would you like to have the documentation on that?

Senator AIKEN. No, I just want to know whether it is safe to refer to it.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. It would be helpful.

Senator CLARK. It would be safer to refer to the fact that the Russians would approve ending the state of belligerence.

Secretary RUSK. No, I don't think you had better put words in their mouths on it. I think you can point out that Russia and

Japan removed the state of belligerence between them 10 years ago even though there is not a peace treaty between them, and I would urge out of this no one put words in the Russians' mouths because I would like to talk rather freely about the Russians' views on some of these things.

I don't think we will have much problem with the Russians on the question of maritime passage.

OPENING THE STRAIT OF TIRAN

I can tell the committee that Egypt has let it be known that the Strait of Tiran problem can be resolved; that the Strait can be opened. The sticking point is that they want to do it informally and as secretly as possible. In other words, it is not the kind of thing that you can handle secretly. Ships pass through, and unless there is some real assurance, an assurance would have to be public, it is very hard to see how this could be managed.

But I think we can assume that in all of this business the Strait of Tiran will be opened.

I don't believe the Soviets would object to Israeli ships going through the Suez, but we are a long way from having the consent of Cairo for the passage of Israeli flag ships through Suez.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have they started clearing the channel yet?

Secretary RUSK. I haven't had information that they have. I understand that there is about a 30 day job to clear the channel with three or four ships that have been in trouble there.

Senator AIKEN. Who sunk the ships?

Secretary RUSK. There was one with cement in it that I understand the Egyptians sunk. There is another one that ran aground, whether it was trying to dodge or something. I just don't know of individual ships, but at least one with cement in it was sunk by Egyptians.

ARMS RACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

We went into the question of the arms race with the Soviet Union, and I must say that I think I detect more interest among the Arabs in finding some limitation to the arms race than I do on the part of the Soviet Union. I think we ought to bear in mind that this question of arms in the Near East is not something which we are likely to be able to manage by our own unilateral efforts, particularly so long as the Soviet Union continues to send very large supplies of weapons in there, because it is a three-cornered problem.

With the massive Soviet arms build-up in Egypt, Syria, and Algeria, that creates problems in the first instance for their own Arab neighbors, the moderate or conservative regimes who feel under pressure from Cairo or in the case of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. So that we have in the past tried to make moderate amounts of arms available to Jordan, for example.

We have sold some arms to Saudi Arabia although the British are their principal supplier, and we have given some very modest assistance to countries like Tunisia and Morocco.

But that, in turn, creates a problem with Israel. We did have some well understood balanced arms supplies both to Jordan and

to Israel to the knowledge of both in a situation in which they were reasonably content on both sides with what was being done.

KEEPING AN HONEST CONTACT WITH BOTH SIDES

Senator LAUSCHE. At this point, Mr. Secretary,—

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator LAUSCHE.—May I state that when a delegation was in Tel Aviv, we were told by Mrs. Meir that they knew from the State Department that U.S. military equipment was going in there. That is, she corroborates what you have just said that Israel was fully familiar with what you were doing.

Secretary RUSK. Well, we have tried to keep in honest contact with both Jordan and Israel on this question, because I think each one of them knew that such arms as we were putting in there were not aimed at the country across the border, but in each case had a different purpose.

So that I think we should have in our minds if we withdraw completely from the area and leave the area completely to Soviet supplied arms to Egypt and Syria, then we expose a good many of these countries, Arab as well as Israel, to a build-up and dangers and threats which could work very much against our interests and those of the western world.

I don't want to get into that in any more detail than the committee wishes to, but I just wanted to mention it in passing.

The Soviets did not give us much encouragement, however, on the question of limitation of arms to the Near East. Our present information, and I think perhaps we could leave this off the tape at the moment—

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I have got to go to another hearing at 10:30 and I wonder as long as this subject has been brought up if I can ask the Secretary one or two questions.

Senator LAUSCHE. May I say, Mr. Chairman, I have another meeting to go to, too.

All right.

Senator CLARK. I have another meeting at 10:30.

Senator LAUSCHE. Go ahead. I have no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. You take two or three minutes, whatever you want.

THE BEST DEFENSE IS A GOOD OFFENSE

Senator SYMINGTON. There is just one question I have to ask. I have heard that the build-up is considerably more from another branch of the government than what you have stated, and my only single question is what will be our position if the Israelis decide that the best defense is a good offense again?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I was just given this information this morning. My information is that this is an all-department judgment at the present time.

Senator SYMINGTON. In any case, my question is, if they decide the best defense is the best offense again, what would be the position of the United States?

Secretary RUSK. I think we would advise strongly both sides here not to initiate another round of hostilities just as we did before this last round started.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, continue, Mr. Secretary.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

Secretary RUSK. Well, I have tried to summarize briefly the general attitude of the Soviet Union on the Middle East. As I say, that took up about 80 percent of the time in the discussions between the Chairman and the President.

On the question of non-proliferation, I think we did make some significant headway. On June 7, our two representatives in Geneva, the two co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, put their heads together and recommended to their governments ad referendum a joint draft which, if it were to be approved by the two governments, would be submitted to the Geneva Conference without Article III on safeguards.

We looked over that and were satisfied with it as a basis for further negotiation with the other members of the conference, and with governments not members of the conference, and authorized our man to proceed.

The Soviets have not yet authorized their man to join in tabling that resolution, that draft treaty.

We talked about that in some detail with Mr. Kosygin and Mr. Gromyko, and it is my impression, I cannot guarantee this, but it is my impression that within a very few days the Soviet Union will agree in Geneva to table the draft that has now been prepared, minus Article III on safeguards, leaving Article III blank for further negotiation between the two co-chairmen.

I think that represents some significant headway, and we can be, I think, reasonably pleased that that step may be in sight.

PROBLEMS IN ESTABLISHING SAFEGUARDS

On safeguards, the issue continues to be one not between the United States and the Soviet Union, but between EURATOM and practically everybody else on the issue as to whether EURATOM safeguards are to be accepted as a substitute for IAEA safeguards, the Vienna safeguards in effect, or whether all nations, including the EURATOM members, would accept a single set of safeguards under the IAEA system.

Our information on this point has been that France, particularly, was objecting to the acceptance of IAEA safeguards in EURATOM.

Mr. Gromyko tells me that is not what Couve de Murville said to him, so we are trying to clarify that particular point.

I think it is possible that the safeguards question can be resolved.

DISCUSSIONS ON ABM

On the ABM question, the President pressed Mr. Kosygin very hard on that to set a time and a place for discussions, this week, next week, because this matter has been pending now for three

months since the Soviet Union said they would be prepared to discuss offensive and defensive missiles with us.

Mr. Kosygin was not willing to set a time, although he indicated that they would be prepared to discuss the matter further at some stage. He rather indicated before too long, whatever that means.

He pretended to believe that one of the problems was that we were willing to discuss only defensive missiles, and he made a pretty strong case against that. But in fact for a very long time we have told him that we do want to talk about both offensive and defensive missiles, and I don't quite understand why even in his press conference after all of our talk he left the impression that somehow we were prepared to talk about only defensive missiles. He knows better in terms of the most direct statements by us over a period of the last several months, and by what the President said at Glassboro.

My guess is that there will be some further talks on that subject. I think it is entirely possible that the Soviet Union has not completed its own staff work, its own preparations. It is a very complex matter.

We had spent perhaps a year working on this matter among our departments before the proposals were made to the Soviet Union, so that we were pretty well along the way before we raised it with them.

If they have not gone through the same exercise, the more they get into it the more complicated they undoubtedly have found it, so I think there is a reasonable possibility that they simply have not completed their work and they may have some military views to take into account as the gentlemen around this table know we have had to do.

SOVIET UNION WILL NOT SPEAK FOR HANOI

On Vietnam, the principal problem there is the one we have long been familiar with. The Soviet Union either is unwilling or unable to try to speak for Hanoi and, therefore, is not able to sit down with us to do business on Vietnam. They are unwilling to commit themselves as to what they might do if by that it means going out beyond what they understand to be the position of Hanoi.

I think the discussion on that, however, was extremely useful in terms of clarifying the situation, and to make apparent to Mr. Kosygin a wide range, a very wide range, of possibilities for moving this matter toward peace if there is any way to get Hanoi to pick up any one of the possibilities and the alternatives and begin to move.

I don't know whether we will hear more from them on that subject or not. We would hope so.

CLOSING THE GAP ON IMPORTANT ISSUES

I would think that on the whole the talks were very much worthwhile on the simple point that the difference between having the talks and not having the talks was a very substantial difference. I think there would have been general disappointment if these two men had been that close to each other geographically and not been able to sit down and exchange views.

I also think that the talks helped to improve understanding, in the original sense of the word understanding; that is, it helped each side to get a fuller, more detailed understanding of each other's points of view.

I can't say that I think that the talks brought about an understanding in terms of closing the gap on some of the important issues which we have before us. But I must say that I think it also improved considerably the sense of contact between these two individuals, and may make it somewhat easier for them to be in direct touch with each other again when it becomes desirable and necessary to do so.

SOVIETS WARN OF RENEWED FIGHTING IN MIDDLE EAST

There were no polemics on either side. There were no threats. There was an indication by the Soviet Union that they thought fighting would break out again in the Middle East if there was not a prompt withdrawal of Israeli forces. But that was about as close as discussion came—

Senator CASE. Would you say that again?

Secretary RUSK. I said the Chairman, Mr. Kosygin, indicated that he thought there was a very high prospect of fighting in the Middle East if the Israeli forces did not withdraw promptly and unconditionally, but that was as close as the conversation got to a threat, and the meaning of that is a little hard to understand.

I think it was made quite clear if they got into it themselves that would be a very serious matter indeed. We would ourselves be much concerned about that, and we fully expected that they would not themselves get involved in the situation. I didn't get the impression that they were saying they were just about to.

ASSESSMENT OF THE ARAB SIDE

Whether the Arabs themselves are able to contemplate a further round at this point, I think is very doubtful. But there are additional aircraft that have been brought back in there lately. The Arabs have seen the value of a tactical first strike so one can't be sure as to exactly what would happen.

More generally in the area, we are not completely sure just what is happening in Cairo; who is really in charge; who is giving instructions.

I had two long talks with Dr. Fawzi myself in New York, preceded by a talk which Averell Harriman had with him. I did not get too much impression that he was acting under any clear instructions from his own government, and the talks proved to be rather tentative in character.

The government in Syria is very fragile at the moment and there could be political changes in Syria at almost any minute.

King Hussein of Jordan has increased his stature considerably during this period within the Arab world because, of all the Arabs, the Jordanians at least fought with considerable courage. The King himself was there and lost five members of his family. He gained additional respect among the Arabs for having, in effect, as they saw it, acted like a man compared to the way some of the others acted.

We are going to have a great deal of trouble in trying to bring together the various principles on which a permanent peace can be established there.

The Arabs are going to be extremely sensitive about making major concessions which appear to be made under the impact of a dramatic Israeli military success.

ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM

On the Israeli side, it is going to take them a little while longer, I think, for the second thoughts to take hold, and get them focusing on what is necessary to effect some sort of reconciliation with the Arabs for the long run.

I have to say that, from the national point of view, I think the action they seemed to be taking yesterday and today to annex the old city of Jerusalem is going to be deeply resented by many members of the United Nations who look upon that as presenting them with a fait accompli. I think that is going to cost the Israeli a good many votes up there before this present session is over.

We strongly urged the Israelis not to take any action of that sort that would present everybody else with a fait accompli, because the problems are difficult enough at best, but apparently they have gone ahead at least to the extent of electing a government for the old city.

On how permanent a basis, I am not quite sure. I haven't actually seen the details. But that action, I think, is going to cost them considerably in the General Assembly.

Mr. Chairman, I have wandered, rambled around quite a bit in order to open up a number of points that the members of the committee might wish to get into. I am at your disposal to pursue these matters in more detail.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, fine.

SUSPENSION OF BOMBING IN VIETNAM

Could I ask a little more about the Vietnam situation? Was there anything said by them about a suspension of the bombing or a standstill for any period of time? Did they encourage you to believe that if this could be done there might be a negotiation?

Secretary RUSK. They repeated, in effect, what Kosygin had said publicly in London, that a stoppage of the bombing could lead to a negotiation. But they were not able to say anything at all about what action would occur; what the effect would be on the ground; what would result in fact as distinct from what might be happening at the conference table.

The CHAIRMAN. They couldn't give us any assurance, I suppose, about what Hanoi would do?

Secretary RUSK. That is the problem. He was not able to speak for Hanoi.

For example, he was not able to say whether or not those three or four divisions in and near the demilitarized zone would attack our marines up there while such talks were going on.

POSSIBILITY OF A CONFERENCE

The CHAIRMAN. Did he express the belief that if we did have a standstill that they would have a conference?

Secretary RUSK. No, he didn't—well, he indicated if we stopped the bombing that there could be negotiations. He did repeat what he said in London on that matter.

The CHAIRMAN. It was my understanding that at one point he indicated that if we could get a conference, stop the war in Vietnam, everything else would fall in place. Is that an accurate statement of his attitude?

Secretary RUSK. I don't have that. I don't—I would have to review the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. The morning paper.

Senator LAUSCHE. In connection with this, he said that we should stop the bombing and pull our troops out of South Vietnam.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I think that is the standard public position.

Senator LAUSCHE. But that is not what he said—

The CHAIRMAN. That is the public position?

Secretary RUSK. That would be a retreat in fact from what he said in London on the subject, because in London he didn't say anything about pulling our troops out.

A MAJOR ESCALATION OF THE WAR

The CHAIRMAN. I understand we may be on the verge of sending one or two more divisions to Vietnam. Would this not be considered a major escalation of the war in a long term sense of a further determination, or sign of determination, to remain for a longer period. To put it another way, an indication we have given up any hope whatever of any kind of negotiation?

Secretary RUSK. I am not familiar with—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the rumor is in the paper that we are about to send either one or two more divisions; a hundred thousand men have been mentioned in some cases. Ky requested 140,000 men. So it is true that publicly at least we have variations of the amount.

Secretary RUSK. I haven't been in the discussions myself involved in that problem. It is my understanding that such questions in any event will not arise until Secretary McNamara has been out and talked over the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. These are figures that have been in the paper. What I was wondering is, I think this comment about if the war could be stopped, if we could get a negotiation, came from the briefing of the President to the leadership. He indicated he thought—of course, this is a theoretical way to put it, I don't think it was pinned down to something very specific—but that the real major problem was the war in Vietnam. Many other outstanding problems which you have mentioned, proliferation, arms control, etcetera, are influenced by this. Even the question which caused a little concern in the paper about whether or not there was arrangement for a further meeting is influenced by this, and it is obviously there.

I just wondered if you felt that this man has any inclination to go further.

KOSYGIN'S STATUS IN SOVIET GOVERNMENT

One thing I particularly wanted to know, what is your feeling about Kosygin's responsibility in this government? I mean compared to Brezhnev and Podgorny and as a triumverate, do they have any independence of action as a trio comparable to our President, for example? I mean was this man really free to take any initiative or was he just strictly following orders from the trio, and they were following orders from the Central Committee? Could you explain this a little bit?

Secretary RUSK. I have the impression that the three together make up the authoritative leadership of the Soviet government but that you have to take the three together, and I have the impression that the views which Mr. Kosygin presented here were the views which the three of them had agreed on.

The CHAIRMAN. He had really no discretion to depart from them, is that correct?

Secretary RUSK. No discretion to depart from them without consultation with the other two.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean.

Secretary RUSK. But I don't think that means Mr. Kosygin himself is just a mouthpiece. He is one-third of the leadership.

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Secretary RUSK. So he is just not repeating something that somebody else tells him.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

Secretary RUSK. These are positions which he and Mr. Brezhnev and Podgorny reached as a collective, as a committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. Now, to what extent he was in touch back home while he was there, I have no way of knowing, but I have no doubt that there was a lot of telegraphic traffic going back and forth while he was in this country getting ready for the meeting and also perhaps in between the two meetings.

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

SHARING THE TOP RESPONSIBILITY

Secretary RUSK. But I would think that Kosygin is a man who does share the top responsibility, but he only shares it. He is not like Khrushchev who would go off on his own.

The CHAIRMAN. Nor like our President.

Secretary RUSK. Not quite in the same constitutional position as our President.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I mean and he could be removed tomorrow if the Central Committee desired it; all three of them could.

Secretary RUSK. They could, although I think three of them together pretty well control the Central Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. But if they did something that fell out of sympathy with the Central Committee.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. They can fire them, just like a parliamentary body can kick out a prime minister at a moment's notice.

Secretary RUSK. Quite frankly, I had the impression the tone of his press conference was for home consumption.

The CHAIRMAN. That is—I had it, too, and that is why I asked the question.

Secretary RUSK. The tone was more rigid in its formulation. The tone in the press conference was more rigid in its formulation than the press talks.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?

I have a lot of other things, but I don't want to take up all the time.

HANOI'S DEMANDS FOR UNCONDITIONAL HALT TO BOMBING

Senator LAUSCHE. Why can't we accede to Kosygin's demands that we stop the bombing in the north?

Secretary RUSK. Well, so far as we know, we have not heard to the contrary from Hanoi. They are insisting that it be unconditional and definitive.

Now, there are various explorations going on to find out whether in fact that is their view. We have tried, as you know, on a number of occasions, short pauses, but on each of those occasions they come back and say the pause is an ultimatum.

"You have to have a commitment this is unconditional."

We are not going to say now talk and we will start the bombing again if we are not satisfied.

These are matters that can change from time to time. We have not yet seen clear signs of any change as far as Hanoi is concerned. Undoubtedly, they are thinking about these problems just as we are. But whether Mr. Kosygin will make any effort to ascertain whether Hanoi's position on any of these points has changed, I just have no way of knowing at the present time.

THE PERILS OF NEGOTIATING

Senator LAUSCHE. What are the dangers if we stopped the bombing of the North and went to the negotiating table. What perils are there in that course?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the principal problem on that is the practical problem that if they are relieved of bombing, they can rest there in safety and relative comfort and continue to supply men and arms into the South to carry on the war on their side full scale without any interference by us north of the 17th Parallel, and without any major incentive toward peace.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did Kosygin's statement imply that if we did stop the bombing and did go to the negotiating table that the war would still go on in South Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we have no indication to the contrary. In other words, no one thus far has been able to tell us what, in fact, would happen on the ground during a period of discussion. You see, we can't completely forget the experience at Panmunjom when we took more casualties after the talks started than before the talks started. There can be prolonged talks during that period, and we could not hit anything north of the 17th Parallel, and they could reinforce and supply and continue to infiltrate without interruption or even discomfort. I think the possibilities of peace would be postponed considerably.

OPENING THE SUEZ CANAL

Senator LAUSCHE. I have no further questions—by the way, has there been any talk about setting up some plan that would make the Suez Canal permanently open to all peaceful sea-moving vessels?

Secretary RUSK. Egypt thus far has been very resistant to the idea of opening up the canal to the flags of all nations, including Israel. However, if one could remove this state of belligerence, this state of war between Egypt and Israel, it is possible that in time, and perhaps not too long in the future as a practical matter, Israeli flag ships might go through the canal because the legal basis for keeping them out of the canal is the state of war.

Senator LAUSCHE. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have no questions on this particular phase of this at the moment.

ASSAULT ON THE LIBERTY

I did want to ask you if you are prepared to make any statement on it at the moment, it may be out of your bailiwick, about the assault on the Liberty Ship in the eastern Mediterranean killing the Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. Here is a letter about it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I didn't know about this letter.

The CHAIRMAN. This man wrote a letter—

Senator LAUSCHE. Are you two having a private conversation?

The CHAIRMAN. No, it is about a Liberty Ship. He started to ask and I thought maybe he would like to see it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He told me I had bad breath. [Laughter]

Secretary RUSK. I was just informed, Mr. Chairman, after my arrival back in Washington this morning, that the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry has now been received, and that the Department of Defense will make public this afternoon a summary of that report.

I have not had a chance, myself, to see it or to study it, but the two opening paragraphs of the summary are as follows:

A Navy Court of Inquiry has determined that USS *Liberty* was in international waters, properly marked as to her identity and nationality, and in calm, clear weather when she suffered an unprovoked attack by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats June 8, in the eastern Mediterranean. The court produced evidence that the Israeli armed forces had ample opportunity to identify *Liberty* correctly. The Court had insufficient information before it to make a judgment on the response for the decision by Israeli aircraft and motor torpedo boats to attack.

Now, we have given the Israelis a very stiff note on this subject. When we get the results of the inquiry and some estimates of the damage and the compensation required, we expect to be filing for full compensation as is customary in such cases.

It is my understanding that it is considered to be an accidental attack insofar as the intent of the Israeli government is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. The government, as distinguished from—

ISRAELI INVESTIGATION OF THE INCIDENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How about the people who ran the attacking ships?

Secretary RUSK. They are themselves conducting a companion inquiry into it, and the Israeli military advocate general is holding a preliminary judicial inquiry by a legally qualified judge who is empowered by law to decide on the committal for trial of any person.

So it looks as though that indicates that they think there may be some culpability on the part of individuals who might have been involved in this attack.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What does the investigation show? The rumor, and statements we have had thus far, indicate that Israeli planes made two or three passes over the ship as much as at least 30 minutes or more before the attack occurred at a low altitude apparently for the purpose of identification of the ship. Also that at least one torpedo boat of the Israelis came up very close to the ship before the attack was made, and then backed away, and then fired at the ship.

Secretary RUSK. Again, I don't consider myself a very expert witness on this point at the moment, Senator, but I do see here on the summary that I have in front of me: "The Court heard witnesses testify to significant surveillance of the Liberty on three separate occasions from the air at various times prior to the attack, five hours and 13 minutes before the attack, three hours and 7 minutes before the attack and two hours and 37 minutes before the attack. Inasmuch as this," that is the U.S. Naval Court of Inquiry, "was not an international investigation, no evidence was presented on whether any of these aircraft had identified Liberty or whether they had passed any information on Liberty to their own higher headquarters."

You see, we do not have in front of our own Naval Court of Inquiry Israeli personnel or officers or anything of that sort so the Court of Inquiry under those circumstances could not, I suppose, properly make a finding on that point.

SURVEILLANCE OF SHIP PRIOR TO ATTACK

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Anyway, they did establish from whatever testimony they had, they established the fact that the passes had been made over this ship?

Secretary RUSK. That there was significant surveillance of the Liberty on three separate occasions.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Three separate occasions as much as two hours before?

Senator WILLIAMS. Five hours.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Five hours; two hours.

Secretary RUSK. Five hours, three and two and a-half.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Over this ship, five, three and two and a-half over this ship.

Incidentally, this lad who gave this interview in the New York Post is from my home country, Palo, Iowa.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he bound to be a straightforward, honest virtuous fellow?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yeoman Brownfield is his name.

This is the first I have seen of this story.

Senator LAUSCHE. Was he a man on the ship?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, he is a yeoman on the ship.

Secretary RUSK. I think I should add here, I see also in this same paragraph this statement by the Court, our own Court:

“It was not the responsibility of the Court to rule on the culpability of the attackers and no evidence was heard from the attacking nation. Witnesses suggested that the flag,” that is the U.S. flag, “may have been difficult for the attackers to see, both because of the slow speed of the ship and because after five or six separate air attacks by at least two planes each, smoke and flames may have helped obscure the view from the motor torpedo boats.”

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, the time to identify the flag was before they shot.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. Whether the flag was out or limp on its mast, that is part of the point they were talking about here.

But I haven't had a chance to study it, Senator, and I wouldn't want to—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I hope we get a full report on this, because I can't help but draw the conclusion at this moment, subject to such evidence as may develop later, that all of the known facts, at least to me, indicate that they were either blind or utterly stupid, or they deliberately identified this ship and deliberately attacked it with the purpose of sinking it, and I think in any event, it is very bad.

DEFINING INDEMNIFICATION

Senator MUNDT. Will the Senator yield on that point?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. When you say you sent them a stiff note to ask for indemnification, in international parlance is that just asking them to restore the ship or pay some kind of indemnity to the families of the people killed?

Secretary RUSK. My understanding is it is indemnity of personnel as well.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You have not gone through that so I will not attempt to have you do it piecemeal on that.

Secretary RUSK. There will be a statement made by the Department of Defense today, and I have no doubt full information can be made available to this committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell, do you have a question?

Senator PELL. Yes.

TAKING THE INCIDENT TO THE WORLD COURT

Following up Senator Mundt's question there, you have no idea as to the amount of indemnity of people killed? I have a constituent killed there.

Secretary RUSK. No. I do not have any information on that at the present time. There is considerable practice on that point. I just do not know what it is. I am not sufficiently informed at the present moment.

Senator PELL. Another question in connection with the Israeli crisis: Would there be any possibility or any merit to the idea of advocating a position of referring these points of issue between Israel and the Arab nations to—some of them at least—to the World Court for an advisory opinion, to put it on ice for a little bit? It would give each side an opportunity to make its arguments and

give each side a face-saving excuse to accept retrenching to a degree.

Secretary RUSK. The possibility of referring the Strait of Tiran to the World Court was considered and discussed internationally before the fighting started, and the great difficulty there was that we could not get an agreement on the status quo during the appeal to the World Court. Would the strait be open or not while the matter was before the Court?

There is a second aspect to it and that is from a purely legal point of view, if Egypt went to the Court and said, "We are in a state of war with Israel, and the closing of the strait" is an exercise of our rights of belligerence," that would have been a very strong position in the Court as a matter of law.

So I think that on that particular point we are better off today than we would have been in referring it to the Court because I think we are going to get the strait open.

Senator PELL. Right.

Actually, from a conversation with the Department of Justice, I understand even if it is not a state of belligerency we are on thin ice so far as the straits.

Secretary RUSK. Quite frankly, our own estimate on that, given the composition of the Court, our own estimate on that is that a decision either way might be an 8 to 7 decision and that is not a very encouraging prospect in order to resolve a problem that is a *cassus belli* to one side and a very inflammable issue to the other.

Senator MUNDT. We have that every week.

The CHAIRMAN. Every Monday morning.

THE STATUS OF JERUSALEM

Senator PELL. From the viewpoint of the United States now, though, might it not be of merit to advocate this? Maybe it cannot be achieved, but it would be a position to advance, not just for the straits but for the question of the Jordanian land west of the Jordan or the status of the Gaza Strip, or the status of Jerusalem. Would this not have merit?

Secretary RUSK. I doubt the parties would permit such political questions to be settled by the Court.

Senator PELL. I would agree with you. But from the U.S. viewpoint, might it not have merit to advance it as a public position?

Secretary RUSK. The status of Jerusalem, under the original U.N. resolution, the entire city was supposed to have been internationalized, you will recall, and indeed we have not recognized the occupation of the new city of Jerusalem by Israel. We keep our embassy in Tel Aviv. But I am not at all sure that the issue would be considered by the Court to be justifiable as opposed to being a political question. I do not know. I would have to think more about that, Senator.

Senator PELL. I was just thinking under article 65 of the Court's mandate if we could advocate that an advisory opinion be given and secure acceptance of it, at least it would give us a good propaganda position in the world as advocating a juridical position.

Secretary RUSK. As I have talked to different sides in New York, I have the impression that the old city of Jerusalem is going to be the most difficult of the questions involved here and it is possible

that there could be some way to have some aspects of that considered in the Court at some stage. I do not believe that Israel has major territorial claims other than the old city of Jerusalem.

Senator PELL. And also it divides in the hills where they can throw the rocks down.

Secretary RUSK. Yes. But the U.N. truce machinery is now working on that, and we have had some encouragement to think they are getting somewhere with both sides on the Syrian hills on the border between Israel and Syria.

Senator LAUSCHE. Senator Pell, will you allow me to put a question?

What do you envision as involving the old area of Jerusalem? Is it the whole bulge that pushes itself into the main body of Israel?

Secretary RUSK. No, not the west bank as a whole. Simply the old walled city of Jerusalem.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

DEFINING THE BOMBING PAUSE

Senator PELL. One final point on Vietnam: As I read the press reports of Kosygin's statement, he emphasized publicly that a bombing pause need be unconditional and definitive. Unconditional, I think, was the word that was used. But never did he say it need be permanent. In other words, if in the course of some weeks nothing happened, and the fighting continued, we would be at perfect liberty to resuming it. Was this reflected in his private conversations, too, or not?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I hope I can be forgiven for not getting into that aspect of the conversation in detail. We noted that, and we would be interested in knowing whether there are any consequences. We will have to wait and see.

Senator PELL. Thanks.

Secretary RUSK. It is potentially an important point.

Senator PELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Williams.

ABM SYSTEM DEPLOYED NEAR MOSCOW

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the fact that they were willing to talk about the ABM programs, willing to postpone it. In the meantime, are they developing their own anti-ballistic missile program and rushing full steam ahead?

Secretary RUSK. I would have to get an up-to-date briefing as to what has happened in the last, say, 30 to 60 days on that. We know they have been deploying an ABM system in the general vicinity of Moscow. There has been some argument in our own intelligence community about whether there might be some additional ABM sites along the northern part of the country.

But I think we have to assume that they are proceeding with whatever it was they had planned to build, particularly in the Moscow area.

Senator WILLIAMS. Do you think it is possible they are going to just keep postponing these talks until they get theirs done and then agree that we will all stop it, or would they include dismantling their own then as a part of it?

Secretary RUSK. They have rejected—if you put together offensive and defensive missiles, I think they would not agree to a freeze. On several occasions we proposed a freeze. It would be in our advantage to have things frozen as they were, say, six months ago or even today. But they have rejected the idea of a freeze because of the considerable margins we have in the offensive weapons field, so I would be a little surprised if they came in and said,—“Let’s freeze them where they are.”

Senator WILLIAMS. How about freezing this particular program?

Secretary RUSK. I would be frankly surprised if they would dismantle whatever ABMs they might have put up around Moscow. So I think we have to give some thought as to what that means in terms of what we do.

DELAY IN U.S. DEPLOYMENT OF ABM

Senator WILLIAMS. Well, the question in my mind was whether or not we are, by delaying, we are getting caught in a box here. If we agree not to advance the program, they would be fully protected.

Senator CASE. It all depends on what kind of a system it is.

Senator WILLIAMS. That is right.

Senator CASE. I think that is the question.

Secretary RUSK. I do not feel fully qualified to go into this, but my understanding from Secretary McNamara is that we now have in our budget funds for what we in any event would be doing this next year in this field. In other words, somebody on the Armed Services Committee may have more details on this than I. Is there anybody here?

Senator CASE. Stuart is our expert.

Senator GORE. Stuart is not here.

Secretary RUSK. But it is my understanding if there was no agreement, Senator Williams—you see, it is my understanding if there were no agreement of any sort, or no prospects of any agreement and we were going to make certain deployments that we are doing in this next year’s budget, whatever it is that we would be doing under those circumstances. So we are not deliberately holding our own program back on the prospect that somehow we will have an agreement with the Soviet Union, as far as this year is concerned.

RUSSIAN RESPONSE TO A BOMBING HALT IN VIETNAM

Senator WILLIAMS. In return for us, if we would stop bombing North Vietnam, would Russia hold up some of her supplies, or was there any mention made about what we would do about the Port of Haiphong? Could we stop bombing and blockade that later?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the question of stopping and then resuming is, of course, at the heart of the matter. It would be extremely difficult for us to give up our freedom of action to do what is necessary in relation to what they are doing militarily on the other side, the North Vietnamese.

I think the question would be whether, if there were some talks, you could move promptly toward a settlement or whether it becomes clear at the early stages of talk that no settlement is possible, and we do not have information from the Soviet Union as to

what they would do if we stopped the bombing. We have asked them that question several times. We have said, "Now we understand that perhaps you can't speak for Hanoi, you can't say what Hanoi will do, but you can at least say what you, the Soviet Union, would do if we stop the bombing. Tell us what that is." They have never answered that.

Senator COOPER. About supplies or Geneva Conference?

Secretary RUSK. Supplies, or calling a conference, but they have not been willing to tell us what they would do, quite apart from what Hanoi would do if we stopped the bombing.

Senator WILLIAMS. That is all.

Secretary RUSK. We put that to them several times very hard over the period of the last year.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

CHINESE EXPLOSION OF HYDROGEN BOMB

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, in the discussion between the President and Mr. Kosygin or between yourself and Mr. Gromyko, or as a group, on the deployment of antiballistic missiles, was reference made to the Chinese detonation of a hydrogen bomb and the bearing this would have on the Soviet position and on ours?

Secretary RUSK.. There was relatively little discussion, direct discussion, about China. I think broadly speaking it is still true, as I have told the committee before, the Russians in general are pretty reluctant to discuss China with us.

NUCLEAR BLACKMAIL

I was interested, Senator—this is not quite an answer to your question, but it is related—in talking about the non-proliferation problem. Mr. Gromyko raised the desire of the Indians to have some sort of assurance in the event of a nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail directed against them if India signed the nonproliferation treaty.

The Soviets produced a draft which would anticipate that the Security Council would say, "We, the Security Council, will take action in the event that a nuclear power either attacks or uses nuclear blackmail against a non-nuclear country."

I pressed Mr. Gromyko pretty hard on whether he meant that the permanent members of the Security Council would act together if such a statement by the Security Council ever had to be faced and had to be acted upon, and he used some pretty categorical language on that point, which was the closest he came to saying that we—

Senator GORE. I think the chairman ought to hear it. If you do not mind repeating it.

Secretary RUSK. The question is to what extent we and the Soviets have talked about China in this exchange, and I indicated they are still reluctant to talk to us specifically and directly about China.

RETAINING A VETO THROUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Senator GORE. But in the case of our discussion about the non-proliferation treaty and India's request for assurances in the event

of a nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail which I believe you said Mr. Gromyko initiated.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, he brought this subject up, and referred to a recent talk he had had with Mr. Chagla, the Foreign Minister of India. The Soviets have a draft statement which they would contemplate making in the Security Council at the time of the signing of a nuclear test ban treaty in which the Security Council would commit itself to act as a Security Council in the event of a nuclear attack, nuclear blackmail against a non-nuclear country. I pressed him very hard about whether they were serious in supposing that the permanent members of the Security Council, particularly the four who have nuclear weapons, could or would, in fact, act together in that situation. For what it is worth, he was pretty categorical in his contemplation that they would act together.

Now that could only mean that China would be the problem.

Senator GORE. Well, this seems to me quite significant.

Did he propose—this statement which he drafted, which he submitted, was this merely a statement on the part of the Soviet Union or did he propose it be a statement of the Security Council?

Secretary RUSK. Well, he first—the Indians began by hoping that we and the Soviet Union would make separate but parallel statements, in effect of assurances. We have explained both to the Soviet Union and to India that assurances that have any substance in them are for us a treaty problem, and that we could not casually make a declaration of that sort without going through the treaty procedure.

We do have a legislative base for the Security Council to say as a Security Council, where we would retain a veto, along with the other permanent members, that the Security Council would act to support a country that is being attacked by nuclear weapons or subject to nuclear blackmail, you see. But none of this is going to happen without complete, full consultation down here. I am not—has your subcommittee seen this draft Soviet statement?

Senator GORE. No, we have not.

Secretary RUSK. I think, Mr. Chairman, the committee might want to have a look at that because we have not yet ourselves been prepared to go that far.

Senator GORE. This is the first we had heard of it.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

We have been told indeed by the Indians a few months ago that they were going to separate the question of assurances from the question of the nonproliferation treaty. But Mr. Gromyko told me last evening that the Indians have apparently now come back to this question of assurances for the non-nuclear powers in the event they signed the non-proliferation treaty. But it is an important point, and it is a very difficult point.

[Discussion off the record.]

PUBLIC OPINION PROBLEM REGARDING MISSILES

Senator GORE. Coming back to the ABM question, as you know the Disarmament Subcommittee had extensive hearings. We have delayed making a report, in fact delayed trying to reach a decision as to what the subcommittee would recommend, in the hope that somewhere, sometime, the Soviets would agree to initiate actual

talks and discussions. I understand that before I arrived you expressed the hope that discussion would begin. Could you be—would you mind repeating that and upon what you base your hope?

Secretary RUSK. Well, first, I think it is entirely possible that the Soviet Union simply has not completed its own interdepartmental work, if you like, its own staff work on the positions which they would take in these discussions. As you know, this is a very, very complicated business and we had at least had the benefit of more than a year of staff work behind us when we led off on this subject.

Secondly, I think that they run into the same problem that we run into in this country, and that is a kind of public opinion problem that it is hard for people to understand why you do not build a defensive missile if there is any possibility that that defensive missile can do any good whatever, and the notion that defensive weapons would simply produce a multiplication of offensive weapons to put you in a position to saturate the defense is a little sophisticated for the man in the street in their countries as well as in ours.

One of the Russians said to me, "It will be very hard for us to persuade our people that we should not have defensive missiles if there is any possibility that the defensive missile will hit an incoming missile." That is an understandable reaction, you see.

[Discussion off the record.]

RUSSIANS ARE TENDER FOOTED REGARDING CHINA

Senator GORE. In the exchanges between the President and the chairman on the ABM, I think it would be very significant if he recognized that they had a threat from both sides, a nuclear threat from both sides; if there was reference to China, they are bound to be aware of it, and I know you have told us several times that they are very tender footed to referring to China in any respect. But this reference to assurances to India is certainly an indirect reference to it, and I just wondered if there was any reference at all to the fact that China had now unexpectedly soon achieved a hydrogen weapon and a large one.

Secretary RUSK. No, that came up only in my own talk with Gromyko about the nonproliferation treaty and the Indian problem of assurances.

Senator GORE. What impression did you have of Gromyko's reference to it?

Secretary RUSK. That India's request for assurances—

Senator GORE. No, the Chinese achievement of a hydrogen weapon.

Secretary RUSK. That was not specifically discussed as such; the fact that they had exploded a hydrogen weapon was not discussed as much.

Senator GORE. Did Gromyko give you an indication more specific than Mr. Kosygin's to the President that they would be back in touch?

Secretary RUSK. No, this was Kosygin to the President.

Senator GORE. Gromyko did not add to it.

Secretary RUSK. No, because the President and Mr. Kosygin had talked at such length and in such detail about the ABM problem, I spent my time with Gromyko on the nonproliferation problem.

Senator GORE. Well, our Disarmament Subcommittee met this morning and we again agreed to defer coming to any report or conclusion until we had your report, and maybe we should wait some further. This is so important—

Secretary RUSK. I would suggest, Senator, that we might see whether in the next two weeks we get something further with them, and we can be in touch with you about that.

Senator GORE. All right, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We have about 20 minutes. Can we divide it up? Senator Mundt.

MEANING OF AN UNCONDITIONAL BOMBING HALT

Senator MUNDT. Many, many times, Mr. Secretary, we have talked about stopping the bombing in the north and you used a phrase that I cannot understand. Hanoi says that bombing has to be unconditional and definitive. The way I understand those terms they are self-contradictory. Will you tell us what you mean? You obviously do not mean that.

Secretary RUSK. Our understanding of what that means is: Unconditional is we would not require as a condition for stopping of the bombing that they take corresponding military moves on their side. For example, that those divisions at the DMZ would not attack our Marines while the bombing would stop. That is what I think they mean by unconditional.

Senator MUNDT. I can understand that. But when you say unconditional and definitive, definitive makes it some conditions apparently.

Secretary RUSK. They have used three different expressions having to do with the duration of the stopping. They have said definitively, they have said for good, and they have said permanently.

Senator MUNDT. Those are conditions.

Secretary RUSK. Well, but have to do with duration, you see. I am not sure that I get your point, Senator.

Senator MUNDT. Because when you say unconditional, that means open sesame, stop, sit down and talk. But if along with unconditional you say they are going to stop for two years or forever, for 15 minutes, that is a condition. It seems to me the two terms contradict each other. I do not see how you can have an unconditional arrangement which is definitive. As soon as you crank in definitive you put in a condition.

Secretary RUSK. I see. I suppose you could look upon the item of permanency itself as a condition which they put on it.

Senator MUNDT. Is it your phrase or their phrase?

Secretary RUSK. No, it is their phrase.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, that is a vote, and maybe someone can continue and can come back, but that is a vote.

Secretary RUSK. I will be here until 20 minutes to 12.

CASTRO'S CRITICISM OF THE SOVIET UNION

Senator MUNDT. To me, the most discouraging part of the whole summit was the fact that my reaction was that either side—he was going to thumb his nose deliberately by visiting Cuba unless he tried to figure out some way to insult us as it were, to have an affront. He knows this is our tender spot. This is our neighbor. Did

you get that reaction, or would you say that is another friendly gesture?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I would not quite interpret it that way because of a good deal of intelligence information we have which throws another different cast on it.

Senator MUNDT. I would like to hear the different cast.

Secretary RUSK. Castro has been publicly criticizing Moscow for not being vigorous enough about supporting revolutions in Latin America. Castro's public position is somewhere between Moscow and Peking. Castro has publicly acknowledged that Cubans were involved in that landing on the Venezuela coast 90 miles east of Caracas, and we also note that the Soviets are not very happy about the cost of this Cuban business and the relative nonperformance of the Cubans in their own economy.

[Discussion off the record.]

Secretary RUSK. We do know the reception in Havana was modest. I think he was anticipating at least some difficulties in Havana. I do not look upon it as an attempt to affront us as much as their having serious problems they wanted to discuss in Cuba. What they were I do not know.

On our side we pressed them very, very hard on this business of Cubans sending arms and men into other countries as in the Venezuela case.

Senator MUNDT. He gives you the old business that you give them on Hanoi.

Secretary RUSK. They say, "We don't have the same information that you have."

SOVIET INFLUENCE OVER NORTH VIETNAM

Senator MUNDT. Which leads me to my most important question and the part I cannot buy at all, and you seem to accept it as holy writ. "We are sorry; we have no control over Vietnam. We would like to help; we are not interested in continuing the war. We would kind of like to shorten it, but we have no influence."

Now, realistically you and I know and they know if they shut off the supply of arms the war is over because they have a lot of influence if they want to exercise it. I cannot get away from the facts of life on that.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I do not think that we are under that much of an illusion. We would not—you and I would not be that far apart on this point.

They do not have enough influence in Hanoi to deliver Hanoi to whatever it is that we and they would agree to.

Senator MUNDT. Unless they use their muscle in shutting off their supply.

Secretary RUSK. But using their muscle would simply mean Hanoi would squirt fully into the arms of Peking, and it is Peking that is furnishing the kinds of material that are actually being used in South Vietnam.

Senator MUNDT. Not the petroleum.

Secretary RUSK. But they do not use petroleum in South Vietnam in the sense of—

Senator MUNDT. They use it to get there.

Secretary RUSK. Sure, they use it in North Vietnam and in the line of communication, but that means more bicycles and more piggyback and that sort of thing.

I do not believe that the North Vietnamese would stop the war if they, the Soviets, cut off supplies. I may be wrong.

MOSCOW CANNOT GIVE ORDERS TO HANOI

Senator MUNDT. I just hope that in your talks with them you do not give them the impression that you give me, to say, "Well, that is certainly a valid argument. We realize you haven't got influence on Cuba although you are financing them and giving them the supplies that they need."

Secretary RUSK. I did not say that about Cuba.

Senator MUNDT. "The same way about Hanoi, they are a good friend of yours, they are doing well, you have given them anti-aircraft weapons," and you have to press them on this. I think in talking with them you have to assume my position.

Secretary RUSK. But that is not the way the talks go. On Laos, for example, we press them very, very hard on their commitment to us about Laos in 1961 and 1962, and that it is their problem to find a way to make Hanoi comply with that agreement. But I think that we would somewhat misunderstand the situation if we think that Moscow can give an order to Hanoi and Hanoi will obey it. That is not the situation.

Now, we have raised the point that you have just raised in terms of, "Well, if we stop the bombing what will you do? You can't tell us what Hanoi will do perhaps, but what will you do? Will you take some of these steps," such as you mentioned, and they do not answer.

Senator MUNDT. I have to go vote.

U.S.—U.S.S.R. NAVAL INCIDENTS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, there are two things that are not directly here, but I would like to have either your comment or some memorandum about it. Senator Church received a letter from a member of the S.S. *Walker's* crew indicating in his opinion that the—our destroyer deliberately bumped the Russian ship in the Sea of Japan. He is not here. I hoped he would be here, and I may be going further than he anticipated, but anyway he showed it to me, and I would like very much to have you, if you are not prepared to make a positive statement about it, to have a report on it.

The other was a report on the U.S. bombing of the Russian ship *Turkestan* in the Harbor of Cam Pha, whether that was deliberate. I think it is significant in trying to get a picture about how these either accidental or intentional acts take place in trying to reach an impartial or objective judgment as to just what our relations are.

Could you do that if you do not want to take the time now?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I will do that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we ought to have it in committee. I was going to bring it up anyway at some other time.

Secretary RUSK. Does the committee have the letter that was referred to?

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church has it. It came to him. It was like this man from Iowa on the Liberty. This fellow who wrote, it was a constituent and a member of the crew, and it is a very persuasive letter. I read it. I cannot imagine that it was a fabrication. In fact, it has a tone of great validity.

Secretary RUSK. I do know—

The CHAIRMAN. He is a little nervous about revealing the boy's name for the fear of retaliation from the services, you can understand that.

Secretary RUSK. Let me have a couple of the paragraphs out of the letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. But on that I do not have details in mind. I think what was happening there was that our vessels were in normal training exercises.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Secretary RUSK. And the Soviet vessels came in very close, and, as a matter of fact, I gather that on one of the bumpings our people thought that the Soviets had not intended to bump, but that winds and waves and so forth caused them to bump. Well, that is getting awfully close just as a matter of—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this letter is to the contrary, and that is why I wonder if you have a report because it is very clear that this fellow believed that we deliberately did it and prepared for it before it occurred.

Secretary RUSK. There was an argument about rules of the sea, rules of the road and things of that sort, and I will be glad to have an answer.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to delay the committee because Senator Cooper has not had an opportunity.

POTENTIAL OF RENEWED WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator COOPER. I would appreciate it if I can. I have about three or four questions.

The first I would go to is this question of any possibility of resumption of war in the Middle East. You said that Kosygin suggested war might break out again in two or three situations. If the Soviet Union is rearming Egypt and Algeria and Syria, do you think that carries with it any suggestion that at any time in the near future Egypt and Syria might start aggressive action and be supported by the Soviet Union other than just by the supply of arms? Is there any possibility?

Secretary RUSK. I think that is a possibility one cannot fully discount.

My own hunch is that they have had it for a while, and it would be very difficult for them to. We do not at the present time have information indicating that the Soviets contemplate a direct military intervention on their side.

ISRAELI COMPLIANCE WITH GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS

Senator COOPER. I know it is speculative. But the second point is growing out of any action in the U.N. Now in the event that the General Assembly called upon Israel to withdraw, would it refer

this to the Security Council or would the General Assembly try to establish its own enforcement procedures?

Secretary RUSK. The basic constitutional position is that the General Assembly recommends.

Senator COOPER. To the Security Council.

Secretary RUSK. To the parties or to the members or to the Security Council. My guess is if the General Assembly recommends a general withdrawal by Israel, Israel would not comply and it would go to the Security Council.

Mr. Kosygin indicated in his press conference he thought the recommendations of the Assembly would go back to the Security Council for implementation.

Senator COOPER. Russia does not accept the Uniting for Peace Resolution.

Secretary RUSK. Only for the purpose of bringing this matter to the General Assembly because they did use that procedure to get it to the General Assembly. But I would think that the recommendations of the General Assembly would wind up again in the Security Council.

Senator COOPER. Then if the Security Council agreed upon some method of, I would say, enforcement, to try to secure consent on the part of Israel, would there then be any possibility that Russia would say, "Well, the Security Council will not act. Then we are going to act. We are going to support the resolution." It has been indicated in statements they said if you construe them very liberally. This is a lot of speculation but everybody felt so fine a couple of weeks ago, the war, the possibility of war had ended, and in considering Kosygin's very strict position, I wonder if it has any holding of possibility of war.

Secretary RUSK. I think the dangers are not by any means completely ended. I think perhaps the guerrilla technique is a real possibility, and that might, in turn, start more normal operations by Israel, for example, if they ran into more guerrilla action.

But, quite frankly, we just have no way of being sure.

QUIET HARD NEGOTIATION

Senator LAUSCHE. John, what is our government to do if it goes back to the Security Council with the recommendation?

Senator COOPER. I suppose we will have to wait and see what it was. That would be the answer.

Secretary RUSK. My guess is, Senator, that what would come out of the Security Council would be based upon a lot of quiet, hard negotiation among the different sides, otherwise you could not get a resolution passed by the Security Council.

Senator CASE. May I just interrupt on this point?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, Senator.

CHANCES OF A RUSSIAN MILITARY OPERATION

Senator CASE. On this question that Senator Cooper asked, the chance of Russia taking it upon itself or the application of sanctions for the violation of the Security Council recommendation, have we made clear, or is it or would we make clear, that we would oppose, interpose ourselves in such a case so as to check Russia from any such adventures?

Secretary RUSK. I do not think the Soviets are in any doubt about that.

Senator CASE. That is all I wanted to be sure of.

Secretary RUSK. Let me point out, Senator Case—

Senator CASE. I am not talking about public posture.

Secretary RUSK. I understand. Let me point out that this is not a case where the Russians could put in a battalion or two. This is a major military effort if they made a military effort. In the first place, the support they would have from Arab assistance would be rather flimsy. That has already been demonstrated. This is a long way for them to operate in a major military operation with their communications as they are, their sea routes as they are.

So this is not a very attractive military expedition from their point of view.

Senator COOPER. I did want to raise a question—

Secretary RUSK. The more serious question would be some Russian pilots.

Senator GORE. Would be what?

Secretary RUSK. Russian pilots.

Senator COOPER. If the Security Council called upon Israel's withdrawal and perhaps they had some trouble in establishing some kind of enforcing agency, and Russia could say we support the U.N. under certain of those sections and we will take whatever action we think is necessary to support the U.N., of course that could lead to war with us.

RESTRICT BOMBINGS TO INFILTRATION ROUTES

There is one other question. We were talking about this question of bombing, and what you meant by unconditional and they definitive and whatnot. I did propose and have thought and still think that it would be worthwhile to restrict bombing to the infiltration route as they enter South Vietnam, and that unconditional to my mind would simply mean that we did it without requiring in advance any action on the part of North Vietnam, but always with the recognition that if nothing came out of it, of course our country, like any other country, has the right and duty to protect its people. But my point was, and has been, that I have thought that unconditional should mean that we do not exact or require any prerequisite, any prior requirement, and that has been my thought and I still believe it is worth a chance with all the things we have.

Secretary RUSK. We tried, Senator. I do not want to exclude any possibility or combination in the future, but you will recall we tried to do this by infiltration at one point. Last December we told the other side that we would hold our hand in a ten nautical mile area around Hanoi, 300 some square miles. We said, "We are not asking you directly for a quid pro quo. We will be impressed if you did something comparable in the south, Saigon or DMZ or somewhere else, that if this turns out to be a good idea we can expand this concept, we can build on it, let it grow." But we did not get any response, and waited for four months to see if we could get something back.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if Senator Case can be allowed to ask a question.

Senator CASE. I am interested in this.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, you will have a chance.

Secretary RUSK. When we look to the future, I do not want to be categorical about what can or cannot be done. I think we need to hear more than we have heard thus far about what the possibilities are, but we continue to explore these possibilities.

CHANGE EMPHASIS TO TRAINING OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Senator CASE. I would like to add my voice to Senator Cooper's and some others. I do not know what we have to define exactly the same limitation we think it is desirable to put on ours, but very close to it, not for the sake we get negotiations but because it is the wise and right thing to do.

I am not one of those who thinks we have failed to negotiate any possible chance, that we were not smart enough to catch a glint in somebody's eye of what was there, but because it makes sense to limit the war and give evidence of some limitation.

I think there are other things we want to consider limiting and one is a very serious question of whether we should put any more armed forces of our own in.

The CHAIRMAN. That is an immediate question.

Senator CASE. I think we ought to do a lot better in training the ARVN and insist upon things that they are going to have to do and not be so timid about throwing our weight around, because, after all, we are killing American boys. This is not going to go on very much longer, I would think, with impunity, and well, bless your heart, this the kind of thing I am going to be talking about these days.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Senator CASE. That is all.

WITHDRAWAL TO NATIONAL TERRITORIES

The CHAIRMAN. I have one other question before you leave. Do we have a position on the resolution requiring withdrawal to the armistice line? The reason I have asked that, the President has stated he believes in the territorial integrity of all states in the Middle East. What is our position on that in a resolution where you have to vote on whether or not they withdraw?

Secretary RUSK. We have taken a position that a single unconditional withdrawal to a state of war is not good enough. For example, it will make a difference if they would say withdrawal to national territories.

Senator CASE. What would that mean?

Secretary RUSK. Well, it would mean Israel exists and has some national territory. These are not just boundaries or armistice lines and a state of war, do you see?

Senator CASE. I see.

Secretary RUSK. Or if you could hook it on to a state of belligerence. But just to go back to armistice lines where Egypt considers itself at war with Israel, but Israel must not lift a finger because it is at war with Egypt is not going to bring peace.

Senator CASE. If you couple conditions with it you would support it, similar—

Secretary RUSK. We are not objecting to withdrawal. But what we are saying is you ought to withdraw to peace and not a state of war.

Senator MUNDT. Territorial is that difference.

Secretary RUSK. The territorial problem is going to be—the most difficult one is the city of Jerusalem.

Senator CASE. How about Syria?

Secretary RUSK. I think they are working on that in the U.N. machinery. Israel has no interests in Syrian territory.

INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JERUSALEM

Senator GORE. You will bear in mind, too, if you withdraw to conditions one of the conditions might be implementation of the U.N. resolution about internationalization of the old city of Jerusalem.

Secretary RUSK. This is a very, very serious problem because members of the Jewish faith feel very, very strongly about the city of David and Solomon; so do the Moslems for reasons stemming from their religion; so do the Christians, and feelings run very high on it.

I think this is going to be the most troublesome, inflammatory and difficult part to resolve of the whole business here—what happens in the old city of Jerusalem.

Senator LAUSCHE. What about the other part of the area west of the Jordan?

Secretary RUSK. I cannot speak for Israel and I am not trying to. My impression is that Israel is not too happy about the prospect of trying to annex the West Bank with a million Arabs in it. And I think they might well be ready for that not to be a part of Israel.

ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator MUNDT. I would like to ask one question about South Vietnam. I am very much disturbed by what I read and hear on television about the way this election campaign is going. Can you tell us anything about what is happening?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ky you mean.

Senator MUNDT. Well, Ky and the whole business. It seems to me we may come up with a pretty sour kettle of fish.

Secretary RUSK. Well, we were—

Senator MUNDT. This is our idea so we have got to try to make it work.

Secretary RUSK. We were very much disappointed that Thieu and Ky both elected to run.

Senator MUNDT. We read where Big Minh is coming in, too.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Big Minh is a further complication. Ambassador Bunker is working very hard on the question of free and fair elections and trying to insure that this does not involve a split within the military as such as far as the corps commanders and the organized divisions and things of that sort are concerned. But we are troubled, too.

Senator MUNDT. It is a real situation. Here you have 500,000 men who may come up with a government which is not with us.

Secretary RUSK. I think that is not so much the problem as the disorder and disarray among themselves and the turbulence of this

electoral period. I do not believe there will be a government that wants to throw us out or wants to accept Hanoi.

Senator MUNDT. Could they defer that until next year?

Secretary RUSK. I beg pardon?

Senator MUNDT. Could they defer that until next year?

Senator CASE. They are not supposed to campaign except for 30 days.

The CHAIRMAN. Ky is ignoring all the rules.

Senator CASE. Using the press, censorship.

The CHAIRMAN. Censored the press.

Senator CASE. This is another case where I think our influence ought to be very heavily used.

The CHAIRMAN. I was going to say Karl thinks the Russians ought to control Hanoi. Can we control Saigon any better? He does not seem to do anything we want him to do.

Secretary RUSK. Well, this is something we are working very hard on down there and Mr. McNamara and Mr. Katzenbach will get fully into that when they are there.

I am not going to say everything is fine on this one.

Senator MUNDT. Okay.

Secretary RUSK. We have got some problems.

U.S. FUNDS FOR MIDDLE EASTERN REFUGEES

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one question?

The CHAIRMAN. One last question while he is getting his papers together.

Senator GORE. I notice the President has made, according to the press, \$5 million available for refugees. Is this available to the United—UNEF—or available to Jordan, or to whom is it made available?

Secretary RUSK. It would be made available to the UNRWA organization or to the relief agencies working in the governments. One of the serious things that has happened here is that a new refugee problem is being created across the Jordan. Lots of the refugees from the West Bank have been pouring out of there. We have tried to get both Jordan and Israel to keep the people in place so that we do not create this new problem. But large numbers have been moving. I think perhaps as many as 100,000 have left the West Bank across the Jordan. So we thought that on the basis of humanitarian grounds we ought to chip in something on that.

Senator GORE. We already chipped in about \$400 million over a period of time.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

Senator GORE. And we are paying 60 percent. Will our \$5 million be matched by any other member of the United Nations?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, that you will find that that \$5 million will be more than matched by the time the other contributions that we know are underway get there. I mean a lot of people are sending in things. It is urgent. As a matter of fact, some of the Arab governments have more than matched the \$5 million and help to Jordan in this situation, but I have to get the details. I am not familiar with the details.

ISRAELI RELIEF EFFORTS

Senator LAUSCHE. Are there any more of the Arab troops in Gaza or out in the desert who have not been brought in?

Secretary RUSK. You mean from the point of view of relief suffering and that sort of thing?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, out there without food and in the sunshine and nobody seemed to be concerned about them.

Secretary RUSK. The Israeli armed forces—we went into that very hard because we had planes standing by that could drop food and water to these people. We got them as far as Athens ready to go. The Israeli armed forces and the Egyptian Red Cross put together joint teams, too, and used a lot of helicopters and things of that sort to scour over the desert. The problem turned out to be not half as large as it was feared, and when Nasser opened up the water under the canal to make water available in that part of the Sinai, it went a long way toward relieving that problem, so I would think that is reasonably under control.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I have to run.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, in view of the situation on the floor, I do not think we can have a meeting this afternoon. There will be a meeting in the morning now on the Panama Canal. Everybody knows that.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON JERUSALEM

Secretary RUSK. You might wish Mr. Macomber to inform you of a statement the President just made on Jerusalem.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

Mr. MACOMBER. It was just put out. There are two key sentences in it. First of all, he talks about the importance of this city to the three great religions. But the two operative statements just released from the White House, the two key sentences are, one, "First of all we assume that before any unilateral action is taken on the status of Jerusalem there will be appropriate consultations with religious leaders and others who are deeply concerned."

And then later in the statement the President in talking about the need for a fair solution says, "That," meaning the fair solution, "could not be achieved by hasty unilateral action, and the President is confident that the wisdom of good judgment on the part of those who are immediately involved will prevent this."

This is a statement which the press secretary put out in the White House on behalf of the President just about five minutes ago.

[Whereupon, at 11:55, the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, June 29, 1967.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON,
July 13, 1967.

The Honorable J.W. Fulbright,
Chairman, Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate, Washington, DC

Dear SENATOR FULBRIGHT:

Secretary Rusk has asked me to reply to your request to him during his appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 28, 1967 for a complete report on the bombing of the Soviet Ship TURKESTAN in Cam Pha Harbor, North Viet-Nam.

On June 2, 1967, a flight of US Air Force F-105 aircraft passing over the area of Cam Pha directed suppressive 20 mm fire against a North Vietnamese anti-aircraft site near Cam Pha. It appears that some of this fire may have struck the TURKESTAN. According to the Soviet Government, several crew members were wounded, one of whom subsequently died, and the ship was damaged.

A Soviet note dated June 2, 1967 protested the incident. Our investigation at that time revealed that two flights of US Air Force aircraft had operated over the Cam Pha area at the time and date of the allegation but pilots reported all ordnance delivered was on legitimate military targets. Thus, at this time, it appeared that fallout from intense North Vietnamese anti-aircraft fire was probably responsible. Our reply of June 3 to the note rejected the Soviet version and while expressing regret for casualties and damage also expressed regret for the hundreds of Vietnamese, Americans, and citizens of allied countries who die each week as a consequence of the aggression of North Viet-Nam against the Republic of Viet-Nam. We also pointed out that all possible efforts are taken to prevent damage to international shipping but that accidental damage is an unfortunate possibility wherever hostilities are conducted and that the Soviet Government must recognize that shipping operations in these waters under present circumstances entail risks of such accidents.

Subsequently, we received the information that a third flight of US Air Force aircraft possibly struck the TURKESTAN while delivering suppressive fire against nearby North Vietnamese anti-aircraft positions. By note delivered June 20, 1967 to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, we acknowledged this possibility and reiterated in the note the instructions to our pilots to avoid engagement with vessels which are not identified as hostile and assured the Soviet Government that we will make every effort to insure that such incidents do not occur. On June 26 Soviet Counselor Chernyakov made an oral statement to Assistant Secretary Leddy in which he stated that the Soviet Government reserved the right to return to the question of compensation in connection with the incident and repeated the Soviet demand for punishment of the guilty parties. Mr. Leddy took note of the Soviet points but expressed the view that it would be very difficult for the US Government to accept legal liability for any damage. On June 28 the Department spokesman stated that the US Government considered that its position on the incident was fully expressed in its note of June 20 to the Soviet Government and saw no merit in further exchanges on the matter.

A later Soviet assertion that United States aircraft damaged the MIKHAIL FRUNZE and other Soviet vessels in the vicinity of Haiphong on June 29, 1967 has also been examined. A Defense Department statement on June 30 noted the possibility that certain ordnance from two United States aircraft may have fallen on the MIKHAIL FRUNZE. These aircraft, which were assigned to protect bombing planes, attacked an actively firing air defense site approximately 500 yards from the location of the ships. Other reports indicate that damage may have been done to a British ship, the KING FORD, at the same time. All of these incidents are still under investigation.

I hope the above provides you with the information you desire.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
 WASHINGTON,
 July 19, 1967.

Honorable J. W. Fulbright
United States Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear SENATOR FULBRIGHT:

The Secretary has asked me to send you a report on the recent collisions of the USS WALKER with two Soviet ships in the Sea of Japan, which you requested during his recent appearance before the Foreign Relations Committee. I delayed my report to you until we had an opportunity to see an excerpt from a constituent's letter to Senator Church which you mentioned to the Secretary. The constituent states that he was aboard the USS WALKER at the time of the collisions and considers that broadcast accounts of the incidents were inaccurate.

The two collisions in which the USS WALKER was involved were obviously a matter of immediate and deep concern to the Department, and we requested at once full details from the Navy. The summary of the facts given below is drawn from information provided by the Navy concerning the circumstances in which the collisions occurred.

According to the Navy's report, the fundamental cause of the collisions was the persistent and close harassing surveillance by Soviet naval and air forces of a U.S.

anti-submarine task group. This task group of which the USS *WALKER* was a member was at the time of the collisions conducting routine training exercises in the Sea of Japan, more than 100 miles from the Soviet coast. While engaged in this activity the group was subjected for several days to continuous close surveillance by Soviet destroyers and aircraft, which on a number of occasions approached dangerously close to the U.S. ships and interfered with the exercises. On May 10 and 11 two different Soviet destroyers struck the USS *WALKER* glancing blows doing very minor damage and injuring no one.

The May 10 incident occurred when the Soviet destroyer 022, having come dangerously close to the USS *WALKER* a number of times earlier, approached her from astern and brushed her starboard side in passing. Under Article 24 of the International Regulations for preventing Collision at Sea, a vessel overtaking is obliged to keep clear. In this case the Soviet ship did not do so. On May 11 the Soviet destroyer 025, continuing the tactics of the 022 in repeatedly approaching too close for safety, suddenly turned across the *WALKER*'s bow and slowed down while being overtaken, rather than maintaining course and speed as required by the rules of the road. A glancing collision resulted.

Shortly after information about these events was relayed to the Department of State, Assistant Secretary Leddy made oral protests to the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Washington; these were followed by diplomatic notes calling attention to the serious consequence which could result if such activities by Soviet vessels are not stopped. Ambassador Thompson made a parallel protest on May 13 to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, and the Soviet Government simultaneously delivered a note of protest to him, maintaining that the U.S. vessels had violated the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. Ambassador Thompson made it clear that he could not accept the Soviet allegations.

You will note that the above account differs significantly from the views expressed by Senator Church's constituent. We in the Department of State are unable to judge the accuracy of his observations or the degree of his understanding of all that was happening during the exercises. There is nothing, however, in the Navy's report to support the opinion that the USS *WALKER* deliberately collided with either Soviet destroyer. On the contrary, the report indicates that the Soviet ships were at fault in both cases, and that in the second case the Soviet destroyer may have acted deliberately.

The issue raised by these events goes beyond the question of technical violations of the rules of the road. Judging from the information at our disposal, the incidents resulted from Soviet efforts not merely to observe but also to interfere with routine U.S. Navy exercises on the high seas well distant from Soviet waters. The dangers inherent in this sort of situation are obvious, and it is for this reason that we have emphasized to the Soviet Government the serious consequences which would flow from operations of this type. We hope that the diplomatic steps we took upon this occasion will help reduce the likelihood of such incidents in the future. At the same time we are fully cognizant of the need for mutual restraint in encounters between U.S. and Soviet naval ships at sea, and we are informed that our naval commanders are under strict orders to observe the international regulations involved and to exercise forbearance on such occasions.

If you need further details about the actions of our ships during these episodes you may wish to get in touch with the Department of the Navy. Please let me know if I can be of any further assistance in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JUNE 29, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:00 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Cooper.

Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special United States Representative for U.S.-Panamanian Relations, accompanied by Ambassador John N. Irwin, II, Special U.S. Representative for Interoceanic Canal negotiations, briefed the group on three proposed Panama Canal treaties.

[The committee adjourned at 11:45 a.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, JULY 10, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee and other members of the Senate met in executive session at 11:30 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Morse, Church, Carlson, and Mundt. Also Senators Allott, Dominick, Holland, Miller, Murphy, Pearson, Percy, and Young of North Dakota.

Ambassador John N. Irwin, II, Special United States Representative for Interoceanic Canal negotiations, accompanied by Edward W. Clark, Country Director for Panama, Department of State, returned to brief the members who were not present at the June 29 briefing, and other senators, on the three proposed Panama Canal treaties.

[The committee adjourned at 1:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JULY 11, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Church, Symington, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, and Case.

To continue markup on S. 1872, the Foreign Aid bill.

Senator Symington asked for and received permission to publish sanitized version of his Near East and South Asia subcommittee hearings on arms sales.

[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

BRIEFING ON THE CONGO SITUATION

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—On June 30, 1967, a plane carrying former Congolese Prime Minister Moise Tshombe was hijacked over the Mediterranean. Taken to Algeria, Tshombe remained there under arrest until his death two years later. Tshombe's capture triggered a revolt by the mercenary soldiers and gendarmes he had once employed in the Congo's Katanga Province. The Congolese government under President Joseph Mobutu eventually crushed the rebellion.

Expressing support for Mobutu's government, the United States sent three cargo planes for logistical aid and to be ready in case American citizens had to be evacuated. In response to congressional protests over American involvement in the Congo, the United States removed one of the planes on July 26 and another on August 3. The third plane was used to transport government troops.]

TUESDAY, JULY 11, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:00 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse, Church, Symington, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.

Also present: Senators Russell, Stennis, Jackson, Cannon, Young of Ohio, McIntyre, Byrd of Virginia, Smith, Thurmond, Miller, and Dominick.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, Mr. Henderson, of the committee staff.

Mr. Darden and Mr. Kirbow of the Senate Armed Services committee staff.

The committee will come to order.

We are very pleased to have the Secretary of State this afternoon to talk to us a bit about the recent activities in the Congo. He will give us a short statement of the factual background and then be prepared to answer questions.

Mr. Secretary, will you proceed?

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY JOSEPH PALMER, II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. It is a privilege to be here.

I think it might be worth bearing in mind at the very beginning we are talking about a country in the part of Africa which is as large as the U.S. east of the Mississippi, because the size of the country and its primitive communications have something to do with the questions before us today.

About July 4 we had information that a group of mercenaries, French, Belgian and Spanish, had seized positions in the Eastern Congo, particularly Bukavu and Kisangani which used to be called Stanleyville.

We might pause at this moment and speculate as to what was behind these mercenary movements, perhaps a total of 150 or 180 of them; we have no effective contact with them at the present time, and no real basis for making much of a judgment as to what their motivations might have been.

MERCENARIES' MOTIVATIONS

We have heard rumors that there were differences among the mercenaries themselves, and this caused certain groups to move contrary to the wishes or the views of other foreign mercenaries working with the Congolese forces.

We have heard rumors that they felt they were going to lose their jobs by the beginning of September and wanted to impress upon the central government for whom they had been working that they were needed, and that the arrangements should continue.

There have been reports that their motivation was primarily loot, that they had estimated that the safes and the cash registers had filled up again after the violence of a year or so ago, and that they might come in and make a haul.

We had not been able to confirm any political arrangement between them and Mr. Tshombe who was kidnapped on June 30, nor do we have any confirmed information that they were working specifically on behalf of any foreign governments.

But the seizure of these positions with some casualties, the number and the nature of which we have not been able to confirm, set off a very large wave of feeling throughout the Congo, and indeed among most of the officials of the Congolese government—public charges that they were trying to bring down the government of the Congo; that they were being backed by international high finance; that this represented a conspiracy on the part of quite a few governments to undermine the Congo. I think the most immediate result of the operation was to set off a wave of anti-white feeling throughout the Congo.

CONCERN FOR SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN THE CONGO

Now, we had a very serious interest in this because we have something over 3,000 personnel there scattered all over the country. More than half of them are in the general neighborhood of the capital, Kinshasa, plus several hundred others are scattered throughout the rest of the country on business activities, or as missionaries or teachers, or providing medical services, or in some posts representing the Government. There are a few Americans, I believe, in the U.N. organizations scattered around the country.

About the sixth and seventh of the month, our Ambassador there, Ambassador McBride, who is a very able and experienced professional officer—

Senator SYMINGTON. Where does he live, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. I beg pardon?

Senator SYMINGTON. Where does he live, his residence there?

Secretary RUSK. He is in the capital, in Kinshasa.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Secretary RUSK. He began to take up with us very urgently the great danger to the Americans in the country arising from the antiwhite sentiment that was rapidly building up.

There were reports that anti-white rallies would be held in what used to be called Elizabethville down in the Katanga; that there were some white killings by enraged Congolese.

PRESIDENT MOBUTU'S APPEAL FOR ASSISTANCE

The situation looked very murky indeed, and he strongly recommended that we take some action pending President Mobutu's appeal to other governments, including African governments, for assistance; that we take action to demonstrate publicly that this was not a conspiracy by white governments aimed at bringing down the Congo, but would tend to reinforce the efforts being made by the government to calm this kind of racial outburst.

The telegrams were very strong on the subject. He pointed out for all practical purposes all Americans in the country were hostages to the situation of rage, and that the morale among the American community there was very weak indeed; that they were terror-stricken and nervous and fearful of their own position.

We went back to him and pointed out that that was not a simple or easy thing to do; that this is not a matter that one can do lightly or for a temporary or transient reason, and we urged him to give the most serious consideration to the need before he pressed us for moving forward on the three C-130s.

He did come back on Saturday and pressed again very hard. He said that it was very important for purposes of reassuring the American population, and very important for the morale of the government of the Congo and its ability to go to its own people and reassure them that this is not an anti-white conspiracy against the Congo, and to reinforce a television and radio campaign throughout the country calling for decent and careful treatment of all foreigners.

There was scheduled for Sunday morning in what used to be Elizabethville in the Katanga a mass rally of local people aimed at—it was considered—the extermination of the whites, and a very, very dangerous and explosive situation developed.

He also pointed out that the problem was not purely psychological, and this gets us into one problem on which there is a conflict of interest between our requirements here in Washington and our requirements in the Congo, and that is that if it became necessary to evacuate the Americans from the Congo it was important to have some lift of this type immediately available.

Now, it is readily understandable here that the protection of American citizens abroad is an ancient, indeed one of the first obligations of the Department of State, and has been since Benjamin Franklin first went abroad to represent the Colonies of the United States, the American Colonies.

But he cautioned us and urged us not to make any particular point here about the possibility of evacuating Americans because he said if that became known to the Congo, or it was made a point of in the Congo, that it would inflame and make more difficult the very problem we were trying to avoid.

So we felt that we ought to provide three C-130's to carry out certain non-combat operations in support of the central government in a large country which has primitive communications.

U.S. WILL NOT BE INVOLVED IN COMBAT

We did make it very clear that we were not involving ourselves in combat; that we were not going to provide combat forces. We sent these three planes with 126 personnel on board. Forty of those were members of the air crews themselves; another 45 were an Army platoon to guard the planes themselves on the airfield; three planes, 45 men, 15 men to a plane, five men for three shifts of eight hours each.

Then, 33 men in general support, such as communications and medical aid personnel, and a few people of that sort, and a little headquarters group for these three planes made up of eight officers and men, a total of 126 men.

These planes seemed to us to be a continuation of a type of support which we have given the Congo over a period of many years. We gave very large transport support to the United Nations Forces when they were in there. In 1964-1965 we had, I think, four C-130's in the Congo for a year supporting the efforts of the central government to deal with the extreme left revolt over in this same area, where the Simbas, so-called, were armed.

You will recall the difficulties we had in Stanleyville at that time, and it did not appear to us that the return of the three C-130's to the Congo would be a major problem insofar as our major attitude and our major policies were concerned.

I would like to add that requests have gone to other governments. We think that in the next day or two there will be public announcements of certain assistance provided by other governments in the situation, including certain African governments, and we think that will be for the advantage of the total situation.

We are inclined to believe that this mercenary effort will be circumscribed. Our latest reports from Bukavu today have been that the situation there is relatively quiet. There is a very mean situation still existing at Kisangani, formerly Stanleyville, where the government forces are in command generally of the city, and the mercenaries, with a large number of hostages, both Africans and whites, are holding the air strip. An effort has been made to obtain a cease-fire to arrange evacuation of those not involved, particularly the women and children and the wounded.

The Red Cross is working on that and has sent their man from Rhodesia up to the Congo to try to make effective Red Cross contact with the mercenaries to work out the evacuation.

MERCENARIES HAD BEEN IN THE MILITARY

The CHAIRMAN. Could you describe who the mercenaries are? What is their origin? I am not clear who they are?

Secretary RUSK. These particular ones are Belgian, French, and Spanish nationals who have been employed from time to time by different elements in the Congo, but in more recent months these mercenaries were in the employ of the central government, President Mobutu's government.

The CHAIRMAN. They were part of the government's armed forces?

Secretary RUSK. Part of the government's armed forces, and then they apparently went off on this escapade of their own.

The CHAIRMAN. They are white people?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct; that is correct.

Senator MUNDT. Paid by whom?

Secretary RUSK. Up until recently paid by the government of President Mobutu. Unless there is some connection with outside forces that we do not yet know about, they appear to be acting pretty much on their own.

MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT U.S. MISSION

Now we are concerned about some misunderstandings which apparently occurred as to what this was all about. It was a favorable response to President Mobutu's request for long-range logistical support in a country that is very short of communications and transport capability.

It was not the supplying of combat forces, and everybody over there, as well as back here, at least among those officials who are responsible, are thoroughly aware of the fact that we do not intend to supply combat troops. We were not asked to supply combat troops, and the only combat elements involved are this platoon of security men for the planes themselves.

It is not the first step in a growing U.S. military commitment. My guess is that President Mobutu will not seek significant outside military assistance. If he were to go for any additional ground troops, he has about 30,000 already, he almost certainly would go to neighboring African countries for any additional ground troops that he would need. He may get countries like Ethiopia and Ghana to assist him in some fighter planes if the situation continues.

It is not an indication that the United States intends to leap into every problem that develops anywhere. We did not get into Indonesia or the Hong Kong or Burma or the India-Pakistan fighting or the Middle East, or a great many other situations with our own troops or by direct involvement of our own personnel.

This a continuation of a general policy which we have followed since 1960 when President Eisenhower first urged that this matter of the Congo be taken into the United Nations, and supporting the territorial integrity of the Congo.

It continues an effort which we have exercised in a variety of ways, both through economic assistance and by providing aircraft on different occasions, first, in support of the U.N., and then in support of the government of the Congo during the left-wing revolt of 1964, 1965.

We felt that it was a very important action for us to take.

I would say, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that again we are faced with a situation where the alternatives do not unfold themselves and what might have been is not readily apparent. We are not yet out of the woods. We ought to be rubbing our rabbits' feet about the situation in Kisangani, and whether the people there can be extracted without serious loss of life, because the fighting gets pretty bitter on both sides in these clashes in that part of the world. But I must say that if the anti-white wave had swept the

Congo, and there were large numbers of white people, including the Americans, killed off in that wave of high feeling, I think I would have found it much more difficult to come down here and answer the questions in that situation than I feel today in answering questions about why we did what we did.

So I will pause at this point, Mr. Chairman, for your questions and comments on the committee.

AMERICANS IN THE CONGO

The CHAIRMAN. Just a few points. The mercenaries, did you say about 150 rebelled?

Secretary RUSK. 150 to 180 so far as we can determine.

The CHAIRMAN. And they were troops of the government?

Secretary RUSK. They were employees of the government.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say there were 3,000 Americans there?

Secretary RUSK. My figures are—

The CHAIRMAN. I heard 500.

Secretary RUSK.—about 3,230; roughly 1,734 in the area of the capital, the general area of the capital, Kinshasa, which used to be Leopoldville.

The CHAIRMAN. How about Bukavu?

Secretary RUSK. 1,284 in Kisangani, that is Stanleyville. These are the areas surrounding these towns.

The CHAIRMAN. These are government employees?

Secretary RUSK. No. These are all missionaries, teachers, medical people, tourists, some alien residents, a number of press men apparently were caught in there as tourists; about 188 down in Elizabethville in the Katanga, and about 124 in Bukavu.

The CHAIRMAN. How many Americans have been killed?

Secretary RUSK. We have not yet had any report of Americans being killed.

The CHAIRMAN. Have any been molested?

Secretary RUSK. We think some have been caught in the struggle. We had one report that one sergeant who has been on a training mission on truck transport training in the Congo might have been wounded in the leg and might have been in a hospital, but we have not been able to confirm any numbers of that sort.

We think there have been perhaps up to 20 or so whites killed so far in different parts of the country during this particular episode.

The CHAIRMAN. But no Americans?

Secretary RUSK. No Americans that we know of.

CONSULTING THE UNITED NATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Was the United Nations consulted about this move?

Secretary RUSK. This was before the United Nations, the Security Council, on Saturday. They had adjourned to Monday. Ambassador Buffum reported to the Security Council yesterday afternoon on the provisions of these transports, and there was no question raised, no criticism or no adverse comment from any quarter when he reported.

POLICIES OF THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand you correctly that you feel this is a continuation of a commitment made by President Eisenhower to protect the territorial integrity of the Congo?

Secretary RUSK. No, it is not in that sense a commitment, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the significance of the Eisenhower action?

Secretary RUSK. When the Congo situation descended into complete anarchy in 1960, this Government was asked for assistance, along with other governments, and President Eisenhower urged that the matter go before the United Nations.

Then for a period of about 4 years this matter was in the operational hands of the United Nations, and you will remember the substantial amount of assistance, both in transport and in funds, which we provided to that United Nations effort.

That was phased out partly because of a great difficulty that had arisen in financing the United Nations efforts, except on economic and technical assistance, except on that side, where several hundred technical assistance people have been working up until the present in the Congo on behalf of the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, I wanted this Eisenhower aspect because in your testimony before the Committee in 1962, this is a quote to our Subcommittee on African Affairs, you said:

President Eisenhower rejected from the start any direct intervention by the major powers. In reply to the Congo government's request for United States forces, the United States stated that any assistance should be through the United Nations and not by any unilateral action by any one country, the United States included.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct as far as combat forces are concerned. And during the Congo affair you will recall that the five so-called great powers, the five—

The CHAIRMAN. It does not say combat forces. Is this a change in our policy, or isn't it?

Secretary RUSK. It is not a change over the last six years, Mr. Chairman. We put in transport capabilities in support of the United Nations, and then after the United Nations withdrew its forces, we put them in in support of the central government of the Congo in the face of that extreme left revolt and rebellion in 1964-1965. We had four C-130's there for a period of a full year in 1964-1965.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I do not wish to take too much time. Senator Russell brought this matter up, and I wish Senator Russell would ask questions.

Senator RUSSELL. I do not have many questions.

THE SPREAD OF RUMORS

What has happened to the plane that Mobutu sent up there to Stanleyville to see if he could get those newspaper men out?

Secretary RUSK. We have not been able to establish any contact with the mercenaries. The mercenaries have not been responding. What they are trying to do is to establish contact through the Red Cross. But unless there is some sort of response from the mercenaries on the ground it is extremely hazardous for any kind of a

plane to land there in the hopes that they can take people out rather than have the plane itself hijacked by the mercenaries.

Senator RUSSELL. Who spread this rumor that the white, some white power was going to take over down there? Did they designate what power it was, the United States, or what?

Secretary RUSK. There was very bitter criticism of the Belgians particularly, and of the French. I think this stems from the natural kind of reports that would come based upon the nationality of the mercenaries themselves, and also, as you know, the fair amount of tension that has existed from time to time between the Congolese and some of the Belgian economic interests in the Congo.

Senator RUSSELL. Of course, you never know about what you read in the papers. I am reading now from a newspaper article, the Associated Press, which says that the Katangese or the Congolese, I assume, mutinied against the regime of Mobutu, and the mercenary officers, heavily outnumbered, apparently had no choice but to join the movement. This is according to informed sources, it says.

Secretary RUSK. Well, it is true that there were some Katangese elements with these mercenaries. But I would not myself think that the mercenaries had no choice in the matter. I would think that they had freedom of action on their own and could have made their own decisions in that situation.

GOALS OF THE MERCENARIES

Senator RUSSELL. Just as a matter of curiosity, Mr. Secretary, what is your theory as to what these mercenaries could gain, 150 to 180 of them there in a country as vast as you say, as this country east of the Mississippi River, and in a nation of 15, 18 million population? You do not suppose they thought they were going to conquer the whole thing, do you?

Secretary RUSK. This is something that, as I indicated in the beginning, we can only speculate about because we do not have any firm information about what was in their minds.

Now, some of them did borrow a plane and go down to Rhodesia. What they took with them in terms of funds or anything of that sort, we do not know. Whether they were out to see what they could pick up by way of cash or valuables or whether they had some more far-ranging political purpose, we just cannot say at this point.

There were some indications that they wanted to put on a demonstration that would cause them to be employed by the Mobutu government for a longer period under more favorable circumstances, in other words, a little bit of collective bargaining they were putting on in this situation.

Senator RUSSELL. Pretty tough goon squads though from what you said.

Secretary RUSK. Pretty rough; pretty rough.

WHAT FIGHTING TOOK PLACE

Senator RUSSELL. But even at that the press accounts say, and I read again from the press, "The mutineers and mercenaries took over the town," that is Bukavu, "without firing more than a few shots and the Congolese garrison fled into the bush."

So there was not very bitter fighting there as you said took place. "Thursday afternoon, a little more than 24 hours later, the mutineers left Bukavu as suddenly as they arrived. Witnesses said the city was then calm and there was little damage." Then it goes on to recount that the Congolese soldiers in the bush heard that these mercenaries had left, and they came into town and proceeded to tear the town up and shoot people right and left, including women and children, and they are the people we are going down there to help. It is a little confusing to me.

Secretary RUSK. We have had reports of casualties on both sides. We have not been able to confirm them because, as I say, we do not have people on the spot who can give us reporting.

It is true, I think, that when the Congolese forces, particularly in the Kisangani area, engaged in heavy fighting there, that they themselves were pretty brutal. I think both sides have acted with considerable brutality here.

One of our concerns, quite frankly, is that if the fighting goes on and the mercenaries, who are now surrounded, are gradually sort of hemmed in and worn down, that the hostages, both black and white, which the mercenaries are holding, will be in very severe danger indeed from the Congolese armed forces as they move in, as well as from anything the mercenaries might do.

Senator RUSSELL. So the Congolese would kill the mercenaries and the hostages that we are fighting to recapture.

Secretary RUSK. That is one of the dangers we have to worry about, Senator.

Senator RUSSELL. I do not see how you ever possibly can hope to deal with a country of that kind. It is impossible for you to do anything about it, if it is that kind of a paradox.

Secretary RUSK. It is true that a cease-fire was arranged for a period of a couple of days in this Kisangani area in order to try to establish some sort of contact with the mercenaries in order to relieve these hostages. But how long that cease-fire can be maintained I am not sure.

ESTABLISHING A STRIKE COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

Senator RUSSELL. Mr. Secretary, you are not only distinguished in the field of state craft, you have an enviable military record. What was the significance of establishing a headquarters of the STRIKE Command there in the Congo? This press account here is referring to a STRIKE Command and says the command is comprised of Army and Air Force elements capable of rapid deployment, especially in Africa and Southern Asia.

Is the purpose of that statement to intimidate and frighten these mercenaries into surrender or are you ready to send people down there to support it?

Secretary RUSK. I think it is a case of misreporting or misinterpretation. The only people I know about are these eight members of a command group that went with these C-130's as the command group for the C-130s.

Now, they came, I suppose, from the STRIKE Command, because STRIKE Command is the general headquarters that would have responsibility for this kind of a military movement.

Senator RUSSELL. Primarily an Army organization.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. Whereas you sent the Air Force down there.

Secretary RUSK. But this in no sense is a first echelon of a deployment of combat forces to the Congo. I think that point ought to be made very clear because it has never been contemplated, and that is not involved in this situation at all, Senator.

Senator RUSSELL. This was certainly calculated to leave a different impression on the minds of anybody who knew anything about the Army.

Secretary RUSK. I think I should say that because again some misinterpretation might arise, that this force will be supplied, we expect it to be there, perhaps, between two weeks and a month. By that time, we expect the situation to have shaken down. It will be supplied for its special requirements by air while it is there.

For example, I believe that a C-130 is on its way now with certain propellers and other special equipment, but it will unload those in Kinshasa and come back. The force will be supplied by air. But I hope the people won't get excited that the three are becoming six or eight or ten.

There is a fourth C-130 on the way that carries supplies for these three, and it will come home when it delivers its supplies.

A VERY MEAN KIND OF A FIGHT

Senator RUSSELL. Frankly, I am concerned about any of them being there under these conditions with the implications of the composition of this unit, small though it may be. I am even more confused that we are concerned—those that we have gone there to help are going to kill the hostages, and are those we are going to try to eliminate. Apparently they are in no danger from people who have them as hostages, but the people we are going to help are going to kill them unless we do something about it. That is what confuses me.

Secretary RUSK. Well, this is a very mean kind of a fight there in the Stanleyville area. Whether there will be enough discrimination on both sides, or whether the mercenaries will take vengeance on some of the hostages they are holding, or whether the Congolese soldiers will be sufficiently disciplined to draw distinctions if they do close in on the mercenaries, these are the problems we just have to keep our fingers crossed on. It is a very tough situation.

Senator RUSSELL. You do not really believe these mercenaries, with all the vile implications that go with these words, are going to turn off and kill these civilians that they are holding as hostages, do you, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary RUSK. They have been very rough, and they are holding a good many Congolese hostages as well. So I do not know what they are going to do, Senator.

Senator RUSSELL. You do not know what the Congolese are going to do either.

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

U.S. TRYING TO CALM THE SITUATION

Senator RUSSELL. Are we just intervening in that kind of a position—we have no idea what is going to happen or who is going to kill who or why, but we have gone in here nevertheless?

Secretary RUSK. What we are trying to do is calm down the situation so you do not have an entire population aroused to do violence to all whites in the country, including 3,000 Americans.

Senator RUSSELL. If this country, as remote and as bad as communications are as you say they are, how are you going to get the word around if you are not going in to capture the country?

Secretary RUSK. They are going systematically on the radio and such television as they have. Sunday morning the Governor of Katanga—

Senator RUSSELL. How much television do they have?

Secretary RUSK. I think they have three systems altogether.

Senator RUSSELL. Do you know how many sets there are?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir.

Senator RUSSELL. Receiving sets.

Secretary RUSK. But Sunday morning they got the Governor of Katanga, personally at our urging, he went out in a sound truck around the city calling on everybody to be quiet; cancelled a rally the object of which was clearly anti-white in character; and did a good deal to calm the situation. This kind of thing was possible on the basis of some tangible evidence of support from us to get over the idea that somehow all the blacks were on one side and all the whites were on the other.

Senator RUSSELL. Well, it will take some time to try to unravel this situation as to who is killing who and why we are on the side we are on when that is apparently where the danger comes from.

U.S. POSITION IN NIGERIA

I do want to ask you some questions about another matter. Yesterday, I happened to be looking at the ticker and I saw where the press representative of your department had said that we had the same interest in Nigeria and would do the same thing there.

In a few minutes another statement came in saying that it was a different situation in Nigeria; that this was purely an internal war. Finally, at a much later hour, he said that we had refused to go into Nigeria. Just what is our position with respect to Nigeria?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think the first report to which you referred was a press interpretation of his effort to say as little as possible about Nigeria, and that was because he did not close the doors at that point, and speculation went off in the other direction.

We have not been asked for troops or assistance of this type by Nigeria. We would not be furnishing any if they did.

Nigeria has not been before the United Nations as an international matter. We do not have the same lines of policy with respect to Nigeria we have with respect to the Congo. Quite frankly, as far as the United States is concerned, we feel that if anyone else is to take any part there at all by way of assistance, this is clearly a British responsibility, and we are leaving this pretty much in the hands of the British. We are not getting mixed up in it.

LEAVING THE CONGO TO THE BELGIANS

Senator RUSSELL. We should leave this in the hands of the Belgians in the Congo. They have plenty of people to be able to handle it, and have shown beyond peradventure when they had the first terrible massacres there.

Secretary RUSK. Well, the Belgians are not able to handle this one, Senator. They are not able to take care of their own people, let alone these 3,000 Americans who are in the country. I do want to emphasize again our real concern and our responsibility for what happens to these 3,000 American citizens in the Congo.

HEATED SITUATION IN NIGERIA

There is another reason for saying as little as possible about Nigeria, because they are also in a heated situation.

We have got 6,000 Americans there; about 5,000 in the federal areas of Nigeria, and about 1,000 in Biafra. We are trying now to evacuate a number of these Americans, and anything that is said here about Nigeria could seriously endanger some of those people.

Senator RUSSELL. Did somebody tell them the white people are getting ready to take over Nigeria?

Secretary RUSK. That has not been the issue in Nigeria. That has not been the issue there.

MOBUTU'S EFFORTS TO DE-RECRUIT MERCENARIES

Senator RUSSELL. Well, have you got any agreement with Mr. Mobutu that he is not going to recruit any more of these mercenaries that caused this trouble and having you send some more Air Force people down there, paratroopers and headquarters? We did not put these mercenaries on him. He hired them himself.

Secretary RUSK. We have no agreement with him at all about putting more people, or planes, or anything of that sort in. We understand that his own plans were to steadily de-recruit these mercenaries, and as the training of the Congolese forces improved, as there has been improvement under Belgian, Israeli and Italian training teams, that he would steadily get rid of, cut down the mercenary involvement of his own forces. This may be one of the things that caused some of these mercenaries to take things in their own hands the other day.

Senator RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper.

PREVIOUS POLICY OF HIRING MERCENARIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary RUSK. Was Tshombe the first head of government in the Congo that hired a substantial number of mercenaries to put down the insurgents? Mobutu was not the first, was he?

Secretary RUSK. No, that is quite right. Before him, Tshombe had hired a considerable number drawn from a variety of countries. But before that the Belgians had provided a considerable number of officers for the Congolese armed forces. So there have been outsiders present with the Congolese armed forces almost continuously throughout this period.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, what do you sense to be the connection between the abduction of Tshombe, who is now in Algeria in jail, and the situation in the Congo under Mobutu?

Secretary RUSK. We have not been able to thus far establish any connection between these events. It is possible that there are—that

the kidnapping of Tshombe led to some reaction on the part of these mercenaries, but we have nothing at all to indicate that.

We have been very interested in press reports from Algeria today that the Algerian press is severely criticizing those, what they call, adventurers who were with Tshombe on the plane, and this tends to point in the direction that the Algerians may be reluctant to turn Tshombe over to the Congolese.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, what basis would they have, if they are reluctant to turn him over, what basis would they have for holding him? Has he committed any crime in Algeria?

Secretary RUSK. No. We do not know what the interaction on that will be. Other governments are working on that. As you know, we have no relations with Algeria at the present time. They do not have an extradition treaty with the Congo, and we just have no information today as to what the final disposition of him was.

I do not think they expected him there. This was a surprise to them. But when he got there, there he was; what to do with him.

We have all had problems of that sort.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They have got a bear by the tail.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

NO THREATS AGAINST U.S.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Has the Mobutu government threatened to prevent overflights of commercial and military aircraft if our assistance were not provided in this instance?

Secretary RUSK. No, sir. I think there were some regulations placed generally throughout the Congo on such things as border closings and things of that sort, applied to everybody including our own people. I am not aware of any threats to take any action against us, Senator, if we did not provide these planes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Aside from—

Secretary RUSK. May I just check that with Mr. Palmer? Do you know of any?

Mr. PALMER. No, I am not aware of it.

Secretary RUSK. No, I have had no impression of any threats on this.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Were there any conditions demanded either way by us or by the Mobutu government involved in the supplying of these planes down there?

Secretary RUSK. The principal thing that we—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I mean substantial conditions.

Secretary RUSK. No. The principal thing we insisted upon was that the government and all of its component agencies around the country would make a maximum effort to calm down this wave of anti-foreign and anti-white feeling that was going on, because this was a very important part of the whole purpose of putting these planes in there, and they have been performing on that, I think with some success. But this was the principal thing that we linked with the furnishing of these C-130's.

SPECIAL MEANING OF "LIBERATION"

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Now, doesn't it seem to have been the history of this situation in the last several years that looting and periodic murder and other crimes even worse have been char-

acteristic of both sides in this matter when they happen to win a village or take over an area?

Secretary RUSK. I think on the whole that is a fair statement; yes, sir.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So that—

Secretary RUSK. Of course, that is not unknown on the part of other armed forces in other wars. This term “liberation” has gotten to have a special meaning.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The poor people caught in the middle are between the devil and the deep blue sea when this happens.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONGO

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you have any evidence of any pro or anti-Castro Cubans involved in this fighting in the Congo now or in this disturbance there?

Secretary RUSK. None at the present time. There have been some Cubans from time to time flying for Air Congo and under contract with the Congolese government.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are those military planes?

Secretary RUSK. I think both civilian and military. The Congolese civilian and military planes. They had some T-28's, and then they also had the civilian planes of Air Congo, C-47's, and things of that kind.

One of them was reported to have escaped over into Rwanda, an adjoining country, out of the Kinshasa area—the Kisangani area, the old Stanleyville area, just recently. But we have very little on just what happened to those Cubans.

WHY AMERICANS RETURN TO THE CONGO

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why do these people go back into the Congo, 3,000 of them, after a bloody situation and history of murder and everything else in there? Americans and others rush back in there literally by the thousands.

Secretary RUSK. Well, I suppose there must be 35 or 40 thousand Europeans altogether, Europeans and Americans, outsiders, in the Congo of 15 or 20 nationalities. Many of our Americans are missionaries, and missionaries are very persistent about getting back into areas where they have been active. As a matter of fact, they are usually rather slow to take our advice about getting out of most places in the world. So they went back in. Then we have business people in there and many European origin personnel are there for the various investment companies.

A good many of them are actually working for the Congolese government, a great many technical assistance people in there, several hundred. They are there for the purpose of furnishing technical assistance, so they go back in.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I know they did.

Secretary RUSK. Just as people go back after a volcano has destroyed a place. They will go back and build.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes. But normally people who put their hands on a hot stove once, they do not put it on there for a while. But others seem to rush back in.

Secretary RUSK. Most of these Americans who have gone into these outlying places away from the capital apparently are American missionaries.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think I will desist. Thank you very much.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you.

U.S. TROOPS ON ALERT FOR CONGO SERVICE

The CHAIRMAN. If Senator Sparkman will pardon me, I had a question here, a very brief one. I was informed last night by the aunt of a member of the Armed Forces, who has been in Vietnam and is now at Fort Bragg, that he had been put on alert to go to the Congo at a moment's notice. Is that true?

Secretary RUSK. I have no way—if you want me to find out—

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know whether our troops, any troops in the Special Forces, in Fort Bragg—

Secretary RUSK. You mean after the dispatch of these? I do not know of any troops that are on alert to go to the Congo.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what she said. He was upset about that because he had already served his term in Vietnam and thought he was going to get out, and they put him on alert to go to the Congo. He was not very pleased.

Secretary RUSK. On Saturday, we alerted people in connection with the C-130's, but I do not know of any other alert.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. I will pass.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Smith.

Senator SMITH. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stennis.

Senator Mansfield.

Senator Symington.

U.S. PLANES DISPATCHED TO THE CONGO

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, how many planes were sent?

Secretary RUSK. Three C-130's.

Senator SYMINGTON. Where did they land?

Secretary RUSK. They went through South America over Ascension Island, and landed in Kinshasa, the capital. There is a huge, very large, international airport there in the capital of the Congo.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are they still there?

Secretary RUSK. So far as we know, yes, sir. That is, as of when I left the office. I believe they might have flown one mission to try to establish radio communication with these people at the airfield in Kisangani, although that might not have been a C-130. I think it might have been one ammunition drop about 500 miles away from Kisangani, but they are based in Kinshasa.

Senator SYMINGTON. Were there any other white countries that put in any planes besides ours that we know of?

Secretary RUSK. Not as yet. We know that some requests have been made, and that this is being now worked out with the Congolese government. We do not know what the result of that will be.

U.S. CITIZENS' RIGHT OF PROTECTION

Senator SYMINGTON. Based on the question that somebody asked, don't Americans in the Congo, with all this tribal unsettlement and instability, don't they realize that they are there at their own risk?

Secretary RUSK. I think they realize that there are some risks there, Senator. But we have over the last 190 years experimented from time to time with the idea of getting citizens to waive any claims to our protection. It does not work. I mean a sovereign government cannot waive its responsibilities for its own citizens, and once in a while over many years when somebody purports to waive our responsibility, and then he goes abroad anyhow and gets in trouble, that waiver does not amount to anything. He can still ask for help.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are the three United States aircraft there under our command?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. From Washington or from a commander in the field?

Secretary RUSK. The local operational command is with a command of the group itself. But they are under the Ambassador, and the Ambassador has very strict instructions about the kind of missions that they may or may not engage in. Any question on that would be referred back to Washington.

SENDING OF U.S. PARATROOPERS

Senator SYMINGTON. If the United States trusts General Mobutu enough to place three aircraft at his disposal, along with a presumed requirement that they not land in the areas of the fighting, why do we send 150 American paratroopers to protect the planes?

Secretary RUSK. These paratroopers are to provide guards for the planes themselves while they are, among other places, in the capital city.

When I take a plane abroad I take along guards with me and they keep a guard on the plane at all times. So this will be five guards per plane on three eight-hour shifts roughly. It seems to be minimum under those circumstances.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would like to just make one observation, Mr. Chairman, if I may, because it will come up later. It does not have to do with this particular subject.

U.S. ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL

But, getting back from the Middle East, I reported to Chairman Russell and Chairman Fulbright that I thought, based on the quality of the Egyptian Air Force, it was only a question of time before there would be a blow-up out there.

The Israelis saved themselves by hitting first. Their air force is 95 percent French. The French have refused immediately to sell them anything or work with them, just like they have done to us in the past, and the Russians apparently are rebuilding rapidly the Egyptian Air Force, and whoever hits first out there generally wins because of the nature of the terrain, et cetera.

I would hope that you would be considering what we would do if the French continue to refuse to send any military assistance to

Israel or, perhaps, if there are any friendly Arab countries left—sell planes would be better—and give what our policy will be towards Israel, if they have the ability to buy defenses from us if the French continue to run out on them.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, this is a question that is very, very much on our minds with the renewal by the Soviet Union of their substantial arms shipments to Egypt, Syria, and Algeria because—and I know the committee does not want to get into this in detail today—but we do have once again the problem which that posed for us before, because these three so-called progressive states heavily furnished with arms by the Soviet Union create threats not only to Israel as a possibility, but their own Arab neighbors—Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco.

We have tried in the past reluctantly because we have not wanted to become a major arms supplier in that part of the world, we have tried, with the help of some other governments, such as particularly France and Britain, to do a certain balancing there between the moderate Arab states and these three so-called progressive states, and then, in turn, to have some balance between the forces on the Arab side and Israel itself.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

FRENCH AND BELGIAN POLICY TOWARD THE CONGO

Senator AIKEN. What action have France and Belgium taken with regard to the Congo?

Secretary RUSK. The Belgians have made certain offers of assistance which are now being worked on in the Congo. There are some Belgians in the Congo who are being withdrawn from the country because they are considered to be potential trouble-makers and might be too much connected with the mercenary kind of interest.

However, I am not able to get into specifics today because this is a matter that is still under discussion between the governments concerned.

Senator AIKEN. So far as you know, neither France nor Belgium have sent any military assistance in there to help maintain order?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Belgium has had a substantial training force with the Congolese forces all along, particularly with their ground forces.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. Israel is training their paratroopers, and Italy is giving some help with their small naval forces, and things of that sort.

Senator AIKEN. France and Belgium, either or both, do they have material investments in the Congo now?

Secretary RUSK. Yes. Belgian investments are very substantial. Ours, by the way, are relatively minuscule.

French investments, Mr. Palmer, do you know about that?

Mr. PALMER. No, I do not think they have very much.

Secretary RUSK. I do not have the impression that the French investments there are very substantial.

Senator AIKEN. Well, do we, in effect undertake—have we, in effect, undertaken to protect the Belgian investments?

Secretary RUSK. That is not the purpose of the exercise here, Senator. We are primarily concerned about what would happen in that country if the country itself, with this government and its people, felt that the white world was opposed to it and trying to break it up, which would lead them to provide all sorts of elements into the situation; and, secondly, to make a reasonable response to the threat to our own people in the Congo and find ways and means of allaying the dangers which they face with this wave of anti-white feelings sweeping the country.

LENGTH OF STAY OF U.S. PERSONNEL

Senator AIKEN. How long do you expect to keep our 150 people there, the troops in there?

Secretary RUSK. The present thinking is somewhere between two weeks and a month.

Senator AIKEN. You had them in there once before to bring out refugees that were threatened with the—

Secretary RUSK. The Simbas.

Senator AIKEN. —cooking pot.

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

We had four C-130's there for a period of about a year in 1964-1965.

Senator AIKEN. Yes. It will take somewhere between two and four weeks?

Secretary RUSK. That is the present situation. We think the prospect is that the Congolese army is better trained and in better shape than it was three or four years ago. We think the prospect is that this mercenary affair will be wound up before too long.

Senator AIKEN. But if real trouble should develop, our forty-odd combat troops would hardly be sufficient, would they, sir?

Secretary RUSK. Well, these forty-odd combat troops are there just to guard the planes and the airfield. They are not there to fight.

Senator AIKEN. I thought you said there were some forty others besides the ones you designated.

Secretary RUSK. Well, forty Air Force crews and forty-five Army personnel to guard the planes.

U.S. INVESTMENTS IN THE CONGO

Senator AIKEN. How much investment do we have in the Congo?

Secretary RUSK. Relatively small, very small indeed.

Senator AIKEN. Do we have—

Secretary RUSK. In terms of economic investment.

Senator AIKEN. Is the Union Miniere, I believe that is what it was called, something like that, is that the big investment in the Congo?

Secretary RUSK. That is the, I suppose, largest single investment. They have reorganized that whole operation in recent months. But that is the copper operation.

Senator AIKEN. Are Americans heavy stockholders?

Secretary RUSK. I do not think so.

Mr. PALMER. No, not particularly.

Senator AIKEN. Then we are in there protecting our missionaries, and you would say what, about 40,000 other white people?

Secretary RUSK. How many Belgians would you estimate are there, Mr. Palmer?

Mr. PALMER. About 30,000.

Senator AIKEN. Why aren't they interested in protecting their people?

Secretary RUSK. About 30,000.

They have personnel with the Congolese armed forces.

Senator AIKEN. I see.

Secretary RUSK. And they—

Senator AIKEN. They do not apparently think it is wise to have a number of white Belgians in excess of the number of native troops then.

Secretary RUSK. I do not know that they relate these two, Senator.

Senator AIKEN. I think you get the idea. [Laughter.]

All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse. He is not here.

Senator Jackson.

THE MISSION OF AMERICANS IN THE CONGO

Senator JACKSON. Mr. Secretary, under what instructions is the commander of the three planes operating under?

Secretary RUSK. He is operating under the direction of the Ambassador, who is under the direction of Washington, and basically those instructions are that these planes are to be used for logistics purposes, and not for combat purposes; not to get into situations where combat is likely or to attempt to involve themselves in situations of violence.

Senator JACKSON. Is it clear, because I think it is important that we get this thing straightened out, that his overall mission is to protect American lives, or could that mission include the moving of Congolese troops?

Secretary RUSK. It could include the moving of Congolese troops from, say, the capital area where some of the better trained troops are over into the eastern part of the Congo, including into the country of Rwanda. Rwanda has made its air base available to receive troops. So that the movement of military supplies and, perhaps, even the movement of troops would be—

Senator JACKSON. For what purpose?

Secretary RUSK. For the Congolese forces.

Senator JACKSON. Yes. But to utilize Congolese forces limited to protecting American lives?

Secretary RUSK. No, for the general reestablishment of the authority of the Congolese government throughout the country.

Senator JACKSON. This is, you now, what seems to me to sort of contradict what was said at the outset; namely, I understood we were there to protect American lives. Now maybe you cannot say this publicly because that might offend the government.

Secretary RUSK. It is protecting American lives that we ought not to say much about publicly, Senator.

Senator JACKSON. I understand that.

Secretary RUSK. That is the difficulty.

AN AMBIGUOUS ROLE

Senator JACKSON. But now what they are doing here, as I understand it, it goes beyond that. The planes can be used in supporting the effectiveness of the government of the Congo.

Secretary RUSK. I wonder—

Senator JACKSON. I wonder if we can get this. This is the crux of this problem.

Secretary RUSK. Do you have the text of the announcement we made, Mr. Palmer? The announcement was made in terms of logistics support to the Congolese government.

Senator JACKSON. I think what the American people are disturbed about is that it is sufficiently ambiguous so that it can include our military involvement in the Congo without relation to the protection of American lives and property.

Now, I had the impression at the outset of your remarks that we were simply following the tradition established in Benjamin Franklin's time on up to protect American lives.

Secretary RUSK. We should have here—I am sorry I do not—the text of the announcement that was made at the Department of State. The announcement said that in response to a request from President Mobutu, the United States Government has dispatched three C-130 aircraft to Kinshasa, and that they will be in a non-combatant status.

Senator JACKSON. Yes. But if you move troops and you get shot at you are suddenly combatant.

Secretary RUSK. Well, the orders are that they not put themselves into combat situations, Senator.

The other side does not have—that is, these mercenaries do not have—means of going after this airfield in Rwanda, for example, and they do not have means of dominating the entire Eastern Congo. There are many things these planes can do that would not get them into a combat situation.

Senator JACKSON. Except we cannot get to Stanleyville where they have got the hostages.

Secretary RUSK. That is right, and they are not going there.

PUTTING DOWN A REVOLT

Senator JACKSON. Well, Mr. Secretary, I realize you have a problem here. But I think it is unfortunate that the American people cannot be told that the primary mission is to protect American lives. Now, the American people understand that, and I think this can be explained.

As you say, if you had not done that, why then, there would have been a disaster down there. They would be crawling all over you in the State Department for not having lived up to one of the No. 1 responsibilities of the State Department, to protect American lives and property.

But now I gather that actually the mission is beyond that. It goes to the support of the Congolese government and their ability to maintain law and order generally. Law and order meaning, of course, to put down a revolt.

Secretary RUSK. I think it would have been very hard to make full contribution to the first point had they not been available to

support the government on the second point because this was tied into a nationwide effort in the Congo to demonstrate that rumors were not correct that white governments in different parts of the world were in some conspiracy against the Congo to bring down the government. The fact that we had tangible support there in the shape of these planes made it possible, with considerable credibility, for the government to go to the people and say, "Look here, you see what has happened here, this is not the case. Let us take care of all of these foreigners. This is not an international conspiracy aimed at the Congo."

So that one purpose meshes into the other.

WHAT MOBUTU EXPECTS

Senator JACKSON. What is our understanding with Mobutu?

Secretary RUSK. Well, those planes are not under his command.

Senator JACKSON. No, sir; I understand that. But what is our diplomatic understanding with him? All orders, I gather, that are beyond what the commander in the field has been given emanate directly from the President.

Secretary RUSK. Presumably his people would request assistance from the C-130's, and our people would look at it and see whether it was within the terms of reference or the purpose for which the planes were put there and, if they are, grant or deny the request.

Senator JACKSON. Does he understand we are not, our forces are not to be involved in any combat type of situation?

Secretary RUSK. Absolutely, no type of combat situation; no question about that.

Senator JACKSON. What does he really expect from us?

Secretary RUSK. I think he wanted, in the first instance, a tangible representation of political support as far as his own people were concerned.

Senator JACKSON. It is more symbolic maybe?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator JACKSON. Somehow the powerful United States of America is with them as indicated by three planes that are out there.

Secretary RUSK. I mentioned earlier the matter of getting on radio and trying to settle down this racial feeling. This was a second requirement that I forgot, in answer to, I think it was, Senator Russell's question. That was that they continue to make maximum use of their own aircraft. They have some aircraft in the air in the Congo and in other resources, and we want them to take as much of this job, of course, as they can.

EVACUATION PLANS FOR NIGERIA

Senator JACKSON. How can we avoid, if the situation becomes as serious in Nigeria as it is in the Congo, coming to the assistance of Americans in Nigeria?

Secretary RUSK. Well, in all countries, in practically every country, outside of a few of the most stable, we have over time worked out contingency evacuation plans.

We are now trying to move, and we should not say anything about this outside because these things are awfully dangerous locally. We are moving some Americans out of Nigeria now. We have had a major movement of Americans out of the Middle East here

in recent weeks, and it went with remarkable efficiency, on the whole, including the use of American military aircraft to go in and get these people out.

AVOID BEING ACCUSED OF INTERVENTION

Senator JACKSON. It seems to me that if one of the, from our standpoint, at least, I take it—the primary mission is to protect American lives. If we are confronted with a political problem with the Congolese government in that you have to allow Mobutu to use the color of, at least, military strength as a psychological device to hold his government together in this crisis, that is about what it boils down to, is it not?

Secretary RUSK. I think on the matter of concern about Americans who might face a very dangerous situation, it is not unusual in these situations for us to have to be quiet for a period of time in order to think, in the first instance, about the safety of the people in some remote and difficult part of the world. I suppose that maybe on this point we simply have to wait for a period and let the American people understand it was involved at the end of the story rather than at the beginning of the story.

Senator JACKSON. Well, I can appreciate the need to avoid being accused of intervention, that is in a Yankee imperialistic way, just coming in to pull Americans out.

I think this creates some real political problems. But I am concerned especially with our problems in Vietnam and elsewhere, that we cannot tell the American people that, "Look, we are not about to follow the business of trying to be the gendarme for the world, but that we are carrying out a traditional policy of the United States to support its citizens."

This complicates our problem at home in order to save the face of the head of the government, General Mobutu, in the Congo; isn't that about it?

Secretary RUSK. And, perhaps, to save the lives of American citizens in the Congo.

BELGIANS OUGHT TO TAKE ACTION

Senator JACKSON. Just one last question, Mr. Chairman. How many whites are there in the Congo? You said there were approximately 3,230 Americans.

Secretary RUSK. About 30,000 Belgians. What others, Mr. Palmer, would you suggest?

Senator JACKSON. 30,000 Belgians?

Secretary RUSK. About 30,000 Belgians; I would think, perhaps, 10,000 or so of other nationalities.

Mr. PALMER. I would imagine there are quite a number of Greeks, 3,000 or 4,000 Greeks.

Secretary RUSK. Greeks, French, a few British.

Senator JACKSON. Why aren't they doing something? It is the old, old question that we get asked.

Secretary RUSK. As I say, the Belgian response on this is now being worked on in Kinshasa with the Congolese government.

Senator JACKSON. Certainly the Belgians ought to. I realize they may have special political problems because of the Tshombe situation. But, goodness gracious, with that many whites there, we only

have ten percent of what the Belgians have. They ought to be doing something. This is one place where they could certainly come in and help without having to get involved maybe directly in the kind of fighting that we are engaged in in Vietnam.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PLANES HAD NON-COMBAT STATUS

Mr. Secretary, let me clarify just a moment. Is the main purpose we went in there to protect American lives or to bolster the existing government there by sending in paratroopers in uniform. I guess they were in uniform, were they? Or were they wearing civilian clothes?

Secretary RUSK. I think they are in uniform, uniformed.

Senator THURMOND. Sending in paratroopers in uniform in planes which might indicate that we are going to give further aid, if necessary. In other words, was the real purpose to protect the Americans, to bolster the existing government or was it to play politics, give the impression to the world that we are going in to save this colored government from being taken over by white people?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the two purposes cannot be totally separated. Both were very much in our minds at the time that the decision was made. The position of the Americans there was very high in our minds. But there was no effort made to create the impression that this was just the impression of a first flight of American military who were on their way to the Congo to engage in combat operations in the Congo.

As a matter of fact, the announcement emphasized that these three planes were in a non-combatant status. These paratroopers that you referred to are guards for the planes on the airfield, nothing more than that.

Senator THURMOND. Couldn't the guards have worn civilian clothes and not given the impression that America was sending uniformed people over there, especially paratroopers?

Secretary RUSK. I would think that guards in uniform would be more suitable under the circumstances with the military aircraft on the field.

NO POLITICAL FACTORS INVOLVED

Senator THURMOND. As a matter of fact, wasn't the real purpose of sending these people over there either one of two things: To let the world know that we are bolstering that government and we are sending a contingent of troops, the implication being that we will send others if necessary?

Secretary RUSK. I would accept the first part of it but not the second. There is no implication we would send others.

Senator THURMOND. Or was it the fact, in view of our attitude toward the Ian Smith government, was it the fact that we are making a play for the colored vote here and we are sending troops and continuing over there to protect the colored government after being taken over by white mercenaries?

Secretary RUSK. I do not know about any political factor here. I do know that there is a broad political factor in the Continent of

Africa here in this situation, and if Mobutu should turn to the most radical and the wildest leaders in the African Continent for help on the grounds he could not get any help of any sort from anybody else, I think that would be very adverse to our interests here.

Mobutu has been one of the more moderate of the African leaders. He has worked with the moderates rather than the extremists. The Chinese in the Congo, for example, are Chinese Nationalists rather than Chinese Reds.

We have some stake, of course, in his general orientation toward the West rather than towards the more extreme Arabs or off to Eastern Europe.

Senator THURMOND. The general impression has been expressed, I might as well tell you in my State, and some of it around here, too, that we are intervening where we have no business, and either we are playing politics in this matter to make it appear to the colored people that we are going to defend a colored government against white mercenaries. Now, it turns out the white mercenaries were part of the colored government. They were soldiers under the colored government. I mean, after thinking this thing through well, if you had to do it again would you do it again?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, I think, I would indeed, sir, because of the very urgent considerations that were in front of us by one of our ablest and most experienced ambassadors on the ground, concerned about what was, what could happen in that country if it set off on a wave of anti-white feeling; if the Americans themselves were in jeopardy; if there was a total breakdown of confidence in the government; and creating a situation in which all sorts of people might come in and fish in troubled waters. I would have no hesitancy at all about the decision that was taken.

TREATMENT ON MOISE TSHOMBE

Senator THURMOND. Now, Moise Tshombe has been a friend to the United States. He is one of the most literate and best educated men in Africa, and we are treating him rather shabbily.

Was there any understanding with Mobutu or the Congolese government that by doing what we did they would not harm Tshombe, or was he discussed?

Secretary RUSK. We hope that situation will not arise because we hope that the Algerians will not go further with this kidnapping business.

I do not know that we have treated Tshombe shabbily. When he was the government of the Congo we gave him full support at a time when many African countries were rather critical of us for doing so. Our view was that his government was the government of the Congo and we supported the government of the Congo.

Mobutu became the government of the Congo, and we support this government of the Congo.

Senator THURMOND. What we did is a long story. But we did not have any understanding with the Congolese government that they would protect Tshombe or would not harm him?

Secretary RUSK. We have no understanding in connection with the C-130's; no, sir.

Senator THURMOND. In other words, Tshombe did not come into this picture at all?

Secretary RUSK. Not in our discussions with the Congolese government; no, sir.

Senator THURMOND. His name was not mentioned at all?

Secretary RUSK. So far as I know he was not.

Senator THURMOND. Although you know he is under sentence of death in the Congo if he returns there, and you know it is possible that he maybe turned over by the country where he is now.

Secretary RUSK. Well, if that happens, sir, we will try to get to that when it happens.

Senator THURMOND. Would you take steps to try to save his life?

Secretary RUSK. I think it would be important for the present government of the Congo not to take action against Tshombe and not to execute him because this business of regular and frequent killing off of political opponents is not a very profitable undertaking. It just keeps a country all stirred up.

Senator THURMOND. I am glad you feel that way. Will you express that to the Congolese government?

Secretary RUSK. If the occasion arises; yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. If the occasion arises?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church. He was here a minute ago.

Senator Church.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. AID PROGRAM IN THE CONGO

With respect to these three thousand Americans who are presently in the Congo, how many of these are there as our cadre to carry out our various AID programs?

Secretary RUSK. There are 303—1 think these figures are correct—303 U.S. official personnel; 276 dependents of American officials. The rest of them are residents, mostly missionaries, and some 117 or so tourists and alien residents and miscellaneous groups.

Senator CHURCH. Well, about 20 percent of them then, considering dependents, are there in connection with either the American Embassy or in connection with the American AID programs. The balance are not.

Secretary RUSK. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator CHURCH. How do these planes protect these Americans? I mean—

Secretary RUSK. I think the two principal things would be first, that their being there was of great assistance in calming down public opinion and the building up of a racist public opinion aimed at white people.

Senator CHURCH. I understand that part.

Secretary RUSK. That is the political factor.

Secondly, they are there, they could be used for prompt evacuation if evacuation should be called for. They have no combat capability in the event of any struggle occurring.

ESTABLISHING A U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE

Senator CHURCH. Well, the reason I ask this question is because it occurred to me that we may be talking about a doctrine that I am not familiar with regarding the responsibility of the American

Government to confer or extend protection to American citizens abroad.

I have understood the practice in the past to move in and to evacuate American citizens in a situation of danger abroad. But to move in and establish an American presence in a foreign country under the color of this doctrine seems to me to be at least an extension of the doctrine, a form of the doctrine with which I have not previously been familiar.

Secretary RUSK. I think the presence has been there with these 3,000 Americans we are talking about.

Senator CHURCH. What I mean is—no, no—what I mean is they are the citizens we have gone in to protect. In the past the United States and other countries have sought to protect their citizens abroad by moving in and evacuating them from dangerous situations.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator CHURCH. But here we have gone in and established a kind of military presence which may last two weeks or a month, or if a problem is not settled in that length of time, may last much longer, and that military presence in the Congo is justified on the theory that it is but an application of the doctrine of protecting American citizens abroad.

Secretary RUSK. It has more than one justification.

Senator CHURCH. I do not follow this.

Secretary RUSK. It has more than one justification in our minds. But we, on many occasions, put American aircraft or American ships into situations where evacuation of American citizens is called for, and sometimes we take precautionary dispositions in the event of possible crisis or possible danger to American citizens. We move aircraft or ships around.

We sometimes—we have done that on many occasions where evacuation did not become necessary, but we just got through, as I said, with a very large scale evacuation of personnel out of the Middle East, and in some of those situations in the Arab countries we used American military aircraft on a substantial scale.

Senator CHURCH. Well, I can see that aircraft of this kind can be used for the purpose of evacuating American citizens from a situation of extreme danger, and that we may be on the brink of that in the Congo. We have them there for that purpose.

But we could not just keep them there in the Congo indefinitely on the ground that American citizens might be in danger.

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

Senator CHURCH. And not have that an extreme distortion of the doctrine.

AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN THE CONGO WAS FRIGHTENED

Secretary RUSK. No. But, you see, our Ambassador reported, Senator, that the American community was in an acute morale situation. They were frightened; they were expecting anti-white demonstrations; they were expecting the possibility of massacre. There had been about 20 white people killed in this kind of situation already, roughly 20. They were expecting a big demonstration down in Katanga, for example, where they were calling for people to assemble, bringing their bows and arrows and machetes and things

of that sort to go after the white people. There is a very large white community down there, including a good number of Americans. It was to try to get that sort of a situation under control, that was one of the principal reasons why we put these three C-130's in there. The government, on the basis of knowing that this kind of political as well as practical help was coming, was able to get out and make a convincing case apparently to most of the population that these mercenaries did not represent a big white international conspiracy to do in the government of the Congo, and that had a good deal to do with settling down the atmosphere in the country.

Now we are not out of it yet, gentlemen. I want to make it very clear that the situation is still pretty touchy. It is touchy in Kisangani. It is touchy still in the Katanga to some degree, although that is pretty well under control now. There may be outlying areas where we can still run into—and if we run into this period without significant loss of American life we will be fortunate, and we are working on it day and night.

A POTENTIALLY LONG-TERM COMMITMENT

Senator CHURCH. With respect to the other aspect of the Americans, that is, to give logistical support to the Congolese government, suppose that your anticipations do not materialize and the situation does not grow better in two weeks or a month, but grows worse. Having made a commitment to give logistical support to the Mobutu government, if the Mobutu government calls upon us to extend that support and triple the number of planes in order to expedite the movement of Congolese troops, aren't we then in a position where it becomes quite difficult not to proceed with the commitment on the ground that we always keep our pledges?

Secretary RUSK. No, I think a request to other governments including other African governments, will begin to take effect here in some of these matters. In the case of troops, I would myself think that under the general practice which has been—we have seen examples of in the last six years in the Congo—they would certainly call on other African states for additional troops for assistance.

I do not anticipate that we will be getting requests for any significant buildup of our effort.

There was a very clear understanding there was a precise request for three aircraft. These have a very special capability in terms of logistics support. They have no combat capability.

Therefore, we certainly would not expect to commit them into any combat situation. But they are long range. They have short landing capability. They have large tonnage capacity. They can take large numbers of people. So they are very well adapted to this particular kind of thing.

Senator CHURCH. We have made no commitment, and you feel no obligation nor anticipation that we are going to enlarge the number of planes we have sent?

Secretary RUSK. Our expectation, Senator, is that this effort, which is primarily an effort of about 150 to about 180 mercenaries, is going to peter out either through a combination of its own lack of momentum and pressures from the government forces. If you think of a country as large as the U.S. east of the Mississippi, if you think of a raiding party of 150 people moving into, say, the

outskirts of Louisville one day, and then in two or three days getting on to Chattanooga, they are not going to take over the Congo. They are not going to take over the Congo.

Senator CHURCH. No. But in that situation one also wonders about the need of the Congolese government to rely upon us to effectively take care of a threat of that proportion.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, these are matters of judgment. We had a very severe situation portrayed to us by our Ambassador reflecting the views of the general American community there.

If we had waited two or three days, and these massacres had developed, substantial numbers of Americans had been killed, I would be down here answering another set of questions. I would prefer to answer the ones I am answering now rather than that other set which I would be answering in that circumstance, quite frankly.

Senator CHURCH. I think your answer to these questions is very able, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you.

Senator CHURCH. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson.

THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, in view of this discussion this afternoon, of course, everyone is obligated to protect our own citizens. But when it gets to dealing with another government, sending troops and planes to protect or preserve a government, I just ask this one question: If it is the position of the administration that the President can order U.S. forces to give logistics support to a government or to rebels, for that matter, without a treaty, legislation, or a commitment?

Secretary RUSK. I think, sir, from the internal constitutional point of view, the Commander-in-chief does have authority to use the armed forces of the United States within broad limits, and he has exercised that a hundred times.

I might tell you that the protection of the territorial integrity of the Congo has been of major concern to the United Nations. There continue to be outstanding resolutions in the United Nations calling upon all nations not only to refrain from interfering with the Congo, but also to give it assistance in maintaining its territorial integrity.

Those resolutions are still in force, and were the background for the meeting of the Security Council on the Congo Saturday, and again yesterday.

We reported these planes to the Security Council, and no one, including the Russians, raised any problems or objections to the dispatch of these planes there.

So I think that the Congo has been a matter of international concern for many years, and I think there is no question in my mind about both the international environment in which these planes went in there and the internal constitutional situation.

Senator CARLSON. Admitting that is correct from a U.N. standpoint, we still get back to the question of whether our Nation, whether the President of the United States and the administration

can, without a treaty or legislation or commitment, go out and take over the United Nation's obligations.

Secretary RUSK. It has not taken over the United Nations' obligations. All we did was to put in three planes.

Senator CARLSON. I know.

Secretary RUSK. And these questions did not come up two years ago when we put in four planes. They did not come up earlier in the same form when we were putting transport to support the U.N. efforts there at the earlier stage.

Senator CASE. Times have changed, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. So I gather.

Senator CARLSON. That is all.

NO RUSSIANS IN THE CONGO

Secretary RUSK. Any Russians in the Congo?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. The Congo does not have relations with the Soviet Union. There are three or four countries of Eastern Europe that have embassies in the Congo.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Stennis.

Senator STENNIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I came in so late that I have hardly warmed up to the subject.

Senator CASE. See what you can do.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want a little time?

Senator STENNIS. I am going to have to go, that is the trouble.

COMPARISON TO VIETNAM

I am concerned, you are talking about two years ago, Mr. Secretary—first, I want to commend you again, though, for your Middle East handling—the way you handled yourself.

Two years ago the war was not going like it is in Vietnam. We did not have all these men over there. We are supposed to be a little wiser than we were two years ago.

I do not object to going in there to bring out our people. But Senator Church brought out that we are going in there and we set up in a way. I do not know. You said, as I understood, there is no obligation, though, or any promise or anything to stay or to augment under conditions—

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. No commitment with respect to—

Senator STENNIS. Have you made any statement about your expectation of pulling out to the committee this afternoon, sir?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. I indicated to the committee, and we have indicated to the Congolese government, we expect these planes to be there for a period of from two weeks to a month.

Senator STENNIS. Well, I don't want to go over what you have already told. I thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Miller.

CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS

Senator MILLER. Mr. Secretary, how many paratroopers went on board the planes?

Secretary RUSK. Forty-five. Three planes; 15 men to a plane; five men to a ship on guard.

Senator MILLER. Now, when did Mobutu make the request?

Secretary RUSK. The request for these C-130's came up on the 6th of July.

Senator MILLER. Did he make the request of our ambassador?

Secretary RUSK. Of our ambassador which was referred back to Washington.

Senator MILLER. When was the decision made to dispatch the three aircraft?

Secretary RUSK. On late Saturday night. They had been alerted and displaced forward, but the decision was made late Saturday night.

Senator MILLER. And I presume by the President?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator MILLER. Was there any consultation with any member of Congress before that decision was made?

Secretary RUSK. We discussed it with some members of the Congress at the time that we displaced the planes forward to Ascension Island, and we notified a good many more at the time that they were ordered on in from Ascension Island to the Congo.

COMPARISON WITH NIGERIA

Senator MILLER. I note that you said that we would not have sent these planes to Nigeria. I believe you said something to that effect?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator MILLER. I cannot understand why we would not if we had 6,000 Americans in Nigeria, and there was a need to protect them, and we only have 3,000 in the Congo, why wouldn't we send three planes to Nigeria if the President of Nigeria asked us for them.

Secretary RUSK. He did not ask us.

Senator MILLER. But if he had.

Secretary RUSK. Well, that is—I do not want to confuse two circumstances. If a full-scale evacuation program from Nigeria had to be undertaken, it is entirely possible that we would use such aircraft and such ships as might be available to move out these 6,000 Americans over there.

Senator MILLER. But suppose there is not a full-scale evacuation, but just a comparable situation of some mercenaries and the President of Nigeria contacts our ambassador and says he would like to have three aircraft with guards. I understood that you indicated we would not furnish those aircraft.

Secretary RUSK. I am not sure that you were here at the beginning, Senator—

Senator MILLER. I was, yes.

Secretary RUSK. Well, I tried to distinguish between the two cases, first, on the basis of a very large international interest in and expressed interest in the situation in the Congo and, secondly, I indicated that we look upon Britain as having the primary role in any requirements of Nigeria in this situation.

NATURE OF THE AMERICAN ROLE IN THE CONGO

Senator MILLER. Well then, does that mean that we have a primary role—that Britain can look to the United States as having the primary role for the Congo?

Secretary RUSK. I think the problem is more generalized. I think there will be other countries giving assistance there. I suppose there must be 15 to 20 countries involved in the Congo at the present time giving assistance one way or the other. The Israelis have been training their paratroopers; the Belgians their ground forces; and the Italians some of their naval units. There are very substantial numbers of economic and technical assistance missions from various countries.

I think you will see in the next day or two some announcements will be made about other countries giving particular assistance in this situation that we are talking about today.

Senator MILLER. Well, we did not apparently think that it was prudent to wait until these other countries joined with us in this assistance.

Secretary RUSK. No. Our ambassador made it very clear during the day that there was a most urgent situation, based upon this rapidly growing racial feeling throughout the Congo and the real threat that that would get out of hand to the jeopardy of, among others, the American community there.

Senator MILLER. Well then, it gets down to where the timing of it, if not the act itself, the timing of it revolved around, the protection of Americans.

Secretary RUSK. I think the urgency and timing are very closely related to that; yes, sir.

SAYING AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE ABOUT NIGERIA

Senator MILLER. If there was a similar timing and urgency with respect to Nigeria we still would not do it. Is that correct? Do I understand you correctly?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, if we get into Nigeria—and again I am not going to try to foreclose whatever might have to be done in an evacuation situation in Nigeria—we have those evacuation plans for many countries in different parts of the world. I do not want to inhibit those in any way.

But I do point out that Nigeria is in a very delicate situation, and anything that we say from here about Nigeria one way or the other could endanger one or another group of Americans, and possibly both—

Senator MILLER. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. —who are in Nigeria. So we have tried to say as little as possible about Nigeria. We do not think Nigeria is in the same situation as the Congo, among other things because the territorial integrity of the Congo has been a major international interest in the last seven years.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NIGERIA AND THE CONGO

Senator MILLER. What I am trying to do is get the precise essential difference here, and I believe I would gather from what has been said this afternoon that the establishment or the reinforce-

ment of the Congolese government would tip the scales as distinguished from reinforcement of the Nigerian government.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, and there are other things that work in the Nigerian problem. The situation of the two sides is rather different than the situation in the Congo, to start with.

Secondly, there are those, including heads of African states, who are working with the Nigerian government and the head of the government in Biafra to see if they can get some palaver started to resolve this problem by peaceful means. You have got quite a different situation in Nigeria than you have in the Congo.

Senator MILLER. And a different situation with respect to our continuing commitment to reinforce that government.

Secretary RUSK. Well, there is another major difference, and that is that in Nigeria, although it is split into two parts at the present time, in both parts there is a responsible government which has general control of all elements of the areas within each part, whether in Biafra or in the rest of the Federation.

Here in the Congo you have a situation where there are two or three spots at the present time that are not under the control of the government, where nobody exercises control. This was one of our problems in the rescue operations in Stanleyville two years ago. There were wholly irresponsible elements there in Stanleyville holding a large number of hostages who were not responsive to any authority. No one could take responsibility in that situation. It was simply almost wild terrain in those circumstances.

You do not have that. You have responsible authorities in both parts of Nigeria to whom you can look to such things as protection of your Americans under present circumstances.

Senator MILLER. Did Mobutu request just three aircraft originally or did he ask for more?

Secretary RUSK. His specific request was for three aircraft.

Senator MILLER. One last question.

Secretary RUSK. You see, he had had—there were four back there in 1964–1965. This time he asked for three.

WHY THE U.N. DID NOT TAKE JURISDICTION

Senator MILLER. One last question: Senator Fulbright asked you if the U.N. had been contacted on this, and I believe that you answered that they had been notified and there was no stir about it.

But the question I would have would be why was not the United Nations asked to take jurisdiction over this?

Secretary RUSK. Well, the Security Council met on Saturday on the Congo situation, and put it over—was it Saturday or Friday? I think it was Saturday.

Mr. PALMER. I think it was Saturday.

Secretary RUSK. And put it over to Monday for a second meeting. I think it is just primarily a question of time, Senator.

Senator MILLER. You do not think the Secretary General could have undertaken to authorize the dispatch of three aircraft—

Secretary RUSK. No. This would have gotten into a great wrangle in the Security Council on the whole issue of peace-keeping and the question of financing and the question of whether the Soviet Union would insist upon its special view of the peace-keeping operations. I think this would have, by that time, meant the events in the

Congo could well have been completely out of hand from our point of view, from the point of view of the racial feelings that were building up.

Senator MILLER. This is a case where you, I presume, have preferred to go through the U.N. machinery, but because of the situation you really felt that you could not do it and meet the requirements.

Secretary RUSK. Well, we did feel that we could go through that process and meet the requirements.

Now, when you—

Senator MILLER. I mean in time.

Secretary RUSK. If there got to be a requirement, for example, on the part of the Congo for additional, say, ground troops, I think they would go direct to neighboring African countries for that assistance rather than go through the United Nations machinery, because the United Nations operations pretty well closed out, because of the almost impossible problems of financing and the problems of legislation in the U.N. I think they would do that bilaterally with their neighbors under the general rubric of the resolutions that are still standing on the U.N. books, and I think we will probably see certain African countries giving the Congo some help in the next few days on that very basis.

MOBUTU'S APPEALS TO OTHER NATIONS

Senator MILLER. Do you know whether or not Mobutu had requested such assistance from any other country before he came to our Ambassador?

Secretary RUSK. He addressed an appeal to the members of the Organization of African Unity, that is, all the African states. He also sent an appeal to the Security Council to try to get the Security Council to hold the line around the Congo and not have others taking part in a conspiracy against the Congo. That resolution was passed yesterday, so he has been asking other governments for that help.

Senator MILLER. Thank you Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

GREAT DANGER FOR ALL

Mr. Secretary, you certainly are getting more than your share of crises. My own views are pretty well expressed, my own concern has been expressed by Senator Stennis in his own words.

One query though. If there are 30,000 Belgians and 3,000 Americans, why aren't they in just as great a danger, and why was there not concern for all the white people there and not just our own people?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, there was great danger for all of them. As a matter of fact, the fact that the mercenaries were Belgian, French, and Spanish nationals created great dangers for all the whites, but perhaps especially for the Belgians.

Senator PELL. Then why should not the Belgians, who I am informed have similar type airplanes, why should they not also get involved and help us with these planes there, be ready to evacuate them?

Secretary RUSK. This was discussed immediately with them at the same time the questions came up with us, that the Belgians have offered certain help in the Congo in this situation, but it has not yet been worked out with the Congo government. This has to do with crews and things of that sort.

You see, there are a good many Belgian crews working in the Congo up to a point, and there is a question of sorting out which of these crews are thoroughly reliable and which of them might not do the job.

Senator PELL. I was struck by one point you mentioned which seemed to me to be of some use to the administration from the domestic side, and that is the fact that by having white people supporting Mobutu's government, it takes a little of the sting away from the fact that he is opposed by white mercenaries. I am wondering why this point has not been emphasized more by the Department? It seems a pretty valid point.

Secretary RUSK. I am not quite sure, Senator—you mean more emphasis ought to be put on the white mercenaries?

Senator PELL. What I was driving at, you said one of the reasons for sending our planes in there was to show that some people in the white world were supporting the legitimate government of Mobutu, and this was not part of a white plot to throw them out.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator PELL. This makes a great deal of sense from the world's viewpoint, and I was wondering why we had not made it harder.

Secretary RUSK. Well, I think this came out in the Security Council's discussions yesterday. Perhaps we ought to say more about it.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

MOBUTU'S RELATIONS WITH TSHOMBE

Senator MUNDT. Where was Mobutu when Tshombe was at one time a revolutionary and then head of the Congo government? Was he pro-Tshombe or anti-Tshombe?

Secretary RUSK. I think Mobutu was a part of the coup that unseated Tshombe. But what was his job during the Tshombe period?

Mr. PALMER. He was Commander-in-Chief of the Congolese forces.

Senator MUNDT. I thought they were on the same side.

Mr. PALMER. Yes, they were.

Secretary RUSK. They were during a period of two years during the Simba affair in the East. They were working together.

Senator MUNDT. What has Mobutu's record of friendship been in the U.N. and other places? Has he been a steadfast friend of ours?

Secretary RUSK. He has been very helpful internationally toward us. More importantly, he has worked with the moderate leaders of Africa in competition with the more extreme leaders of Africa, and has helped to increase the voice of the moderates in African affairs as well as in U.N. affairs.

Senator MUNDT. Where does he line up in the U.N.? Is he part of the Asian-African anti-American bloc or is he on our side?

Secretary RUSK. Well, he is a part of the Asian-African community. I do not think one talks about its being a bloc much more because they divide up on most issues now.

I would not call him, put him in an anti-American bloc; no, sir.

Senator MUNDT. You think he is a pro-American?

Secretary RUSK. He is pro-Western in his general orientation.

IF HOSTAGES ARE TAKEN

Senator MUNDT. I would like to take the question Jack Miller was asking and put it before you straight.

Secretary RUSK. Right.

Senator MUNDT. Assuming, as the ticker tape upstairs indicates, that the rebels are losing out in this contest—I do not know which side is right—but assuming they are losing out in accordance with the tape, and as they get squeezed into a narrower corner they get desperate, and seeing what we are doing over here, and they would pick up American hostages. What do we do on that? I am putting it on all fours.

Secretary RUSK. They got to that point before there was any whisper of C-130's to get out there. They have occupied an airfield at Kisangani which is old Stanleyville, and they have a large number of non-combatants there under their control, Congolese, Europeans. We do not have very good information about exactly who is there, particularly about how many Americans are there, if any.

We think there may be some. We think there may be some American news reporters who were out there on a tour when these things broke.

There may be a member of, a sergeant member of our ground transport training team that was there to show them how to run trucks and maintain trucks, things of that sort. We just do not have much information because we are not—

Senator MUNDT. All right. We have some. They get desperate and they get pushed into a corner and they announce to us and the world, "Either you come out there and pull the federal troops out of here and come to our assistance or we are going to blow the brains out of the Americans."

Then you have it squarely before you as to what you had in the Congo.

Secretary RUSK. Could I comment briefly on this off the record? [Discussion off the record.]

SUPPORT FOR THE MERCENARIES

Senator MUNDT. You have got a lot of irritation left in the Congo other than that between Mobutu and the mercenaries. It would seem to me incredible that a couple of hundred harum-scarum soldiers of fortune gathered together as mercenaries from four or five different countries could aspire to take over a country which is engaged in this kind of a venture unless they had some kind of support in the Congo. You said nothing about that. How about that? There must be some natives supporting them.

Secretary RUSK. There were some Katangese forces with two or three of these mercenary groups. I do not believe those are going to amount to very much. But again out there in that part of the world, and particularly in the eastern Congo, a handful of merce-

naries can go a long way from a military point of view, in the first instance.

Now, relatively few mercenaries succeeded in breaking the back of that extremely leftist revolt in the eastern Congo two years ago when the Simbas and others were at war there, getting help from Sudan.

Senator MUNDT. They were on the side of the government?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. Now they are on the other side. They have to have some native support, some indigenous support.

Secretary RUSK. Well, there are at the present time—we are not even sure that some sort of palaver might not solve the problem.

As I said earlier, I am not sure whether you were here, there were reports that this whole exercise was an exercise in collective bargaining for better pay for mercenaries, and we just do not know what their motives are, very frankly.

Senator MUNDT. What thought have you given though to the possibility that they are recruiting dissident indigenous people who do not like Mobutu for one reason or another or who may have been sympathetic to Tshombe or somebody else, so they have gotten together now, 500, and then 5,000, and then 50,000 supporters, and are we going to get into this war to put down that kind of revolution?

Secretary RUSK. I have not seen very much on that. My impression is that these people at Kisangani are surrounded by government forces. They do not have access to the countryside to do a lot of recruiting.

Do you have anything, Mr. Palmer, on this question?

Mr. PALMER. No. I think your impression is correct, Mr. Secretary. Most of them are in Kisangani and surrounded.

Secretary RUSK. This does not appear to be any major political move with any roots in the country or that sort of thing.

Senator MUNDT. Granted that is so, surrounded by government forces and only 200 of them, why doesn't the government go in and push them out? 200 people in an enclave cannot hold up an army very long.

Secretary RUSK. I suppose if nothing breaks on this shortly that is what will happen. But they have gone through a period of a couple of days of cease-fire trying to find a better answer because they are holding large numbers of people there at the airport as hostages, and that could be very rough on those people.

Senator MUNDT. Have they issued statements in the nature of a threat that "Either you come to terms with us or we are going to cut the heads off the hostages?"

Secretary RUSK. No, but they have not responded to a good many appeals being made to them to permit, say, aircraft to take out the hostages; take out the women and children and noncombatants who are there. So we literally do not know what their attitude is because they have not been responsive to efforts to communicate with them.

Senator MUNDT. But you do not think there is any possibility that they may be in charge of a developing revolution that can become a civil war?

Secretary RUSK. I cannot preclude any possibilities in that situation, but it does not look that way now.

Senator MUNDT. Okay.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Byrd.

NOT WHOLLY A UNILATERAL ACTION

Senator BYRD of Virginia. Thank you, Senator Fulbright.

Mr. Secretary, one question principally for clarification. A primary mission or, if not, the primary mission of the planes is to support the government of the Congo, including the movement of military supplies, the movement of troops, and even the movement of troops to a third country—Rwanda, I believe you mentioned.

Secretary RUSK. Rwanda as a part of its response to aid to the Congo has made its principal airfield available to the government of the Congo for transport purposes.

Senator BYRD of Virginia. No, my question is this: Is it your judgment that this Congo operation should be unilateral action by the United States rather than by United Nations action?

Secretary RUSK. I think that we will find that it is not wholly unilateral because there will be others who will be assisting in one way or another.

I think it is within the framework of United Nations policy and resolutions which, among other things, include requests to all members to be of assistance to the Congo in maintaining its territorial integrity. But in terms of administering an operation of this particular sort and providing three aircraft in a hurry for the purposes for which I have stated here today, I just do not think the U.N. was in a position to do it.

Senator BYRD of Virginia. Our government did not seek the approval of the United Nations?

Secretary RUSK. Not prior approval before the planes were put in there. We did report it to the Security Council yesterday and there was no objection by anybody.

Senator BYRD of Virginia. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

A WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESIDENT

Senator CASE. Mr. Secretary, I have been trying to—every one here has, as the colloquy on the floor indicated—has been trying to assert some ideas on the problem of arriving at some sort of working arrangement or understanding about a working relationship between the President, the Secretary of State, on the one hand, and the Congress, on the other, in matters of this kind.

What is your conception about the way this ought to be? You mentioned here, and you mentioned before a number of times, that the President has moved troops in without asking for Congress' agreement to a declaration of war.

What is your conception about that?

Secretary RUSK. Well, it is not easy to generalize on a matter of this sort.

But, in the first place, the Congress was not here when the decision had to be made. The committee was not available.

I had hoped—I had taken up the possibility of meeting with the committee yesterday on another subject, and the understanding

was there would not be enough members to make it possible; there would not be enough members present to make it possible—to schedule it that way.

Now, we, I think, probably what we did here, was to under-estimate what you refer to as changed conditions with regard to an action which seemed to us to be a repetition of an action we had taken several times before with respect to the Congo.

Senator CASE. I am not criticizing that.

Secretary RUSK. I understand, but we did not have a resolution of Congress, for example, when we put the four C-130's into the Congo in 1964-1965.

Senator MUNDT. You had a U.N. resolution.

Secretary RUSK. Well, this was after the U.N. period. Of course, we have the same U.N. resolution today, for that matter.

STATING AMERICAN POLICY PUBLICLY

Senator CASE. I think what I am groping at, if we can just have an informal back and forth here, you know, trying to get—I am not trying to write a doctoral thesis about it—but I think it is important. In all of these things, there is the insipient danger to American lives, the background of the United Nations interest and actions, the nature of the threat against a country. It seems to me that all of these things are things—and I put this to you—that could be said out loud and to the public and, at the time and in a way that—and again you have your own ideas as to what you can do without raising difficulties and that sort of thing—but it seems to me the American people would accept this. I accept what you did here. I think it makes sense for the reasons that you have given. Why can't most of these be stated publicly?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, the principal reason why our announcement on this was so terse and couched in the phrase in which it was couched, was that there was an extremely volatile and dangerous situation in the Congo. I hope the senators present and who have already left did not go before television out there and talk about these planes to evacuate Americans, because that is a very, very delicate situation in the Congo at the present time.

We had to act promptly but in low key, and without disclosing all of the elements in the situation. To disclose all of the elements would have contributed to the very problem we were trying to avoid and prevent. So it is that kind of a problem we were faced with.

Senator CASE. I think it is a question though as to how much people think information broadcasted generally is good or bad. I cannot think of anything much that you have said that would be strange or surprising to anybody. Isn't this the reason for an understanding of this by the members of the United Nations, the government themselves?

Secretary RUSK. I think the principal point that I had reference to was the relation to the possible evacuation of Americans. This is one of the greatest dangers and of great sensitivity.

Senator CASE. But the danger of a racial eruption.

Secretary RUSK. I think that can be mentioned, yes.

Senator CASE. Yes.

A STATE OF NEAR PANIC

Senator MUNDT. Tell us why. I accept your word, but why would it be dangerous to say that we are going to evacuate Americans to protect their lives if that is necessary?

Secretary RUSK. The judgment of our ambassador on the scene there was that the American community was in a state of near panic. If we had launched evacuation moves prematurely, this would have added to the panic and would have left the impression in the Congo that we were abandoning the Congo to whatever conspiracies of other white people they thought they were being subject to, whereas if we created the impression of calm, we were going to give the Congo government this tangible demonstration of our support and settle down the nerves of our own people. That, in turn, would help settle down the general situation and public opinion. It also gave the Congolese government and their officials something to lean on when they went to their own people and said, "Well, now, you see it is not what many people have said. This is not a general white conspiracy against the Congo and its government. Treat the foreigners well. We do not think the governments of the world are in support of these mercenaries. Go home and get your work done and treat foreigners correctly."

The CHAIRMAN. Wasn't the origin of this so-called panic the government broadcasts?

Secretary RUSK. At the very beginning.

The CHAIRMAN. They are the ones who stirred it up and created the atmosphere of panic.

Secretary RUSK. At the very beginning the government contributed to this because at that time they did not know what was behind this. They did not know whether a lot of people were waiting outside the country, waiting to come in behind these fellows, and they got very much disturbed about it when the affair first occurred.

They have calmed down considerably since and have gone the other way in trying to calm down the other people. You are quite right, Mr. Chairman. The government's original broadcasts did help stir this up.

Senator CASE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

PRESIDENTIAL USE OF ARMED FORCES

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, first I want to express my regrets in not being here all afternoon, but I was one of the conferees in a conference with the House on the railway case and, therefore, I missed the benefit of hearing your full discourse. Therefore I shall limit myself to the parts that I have heard.

My questions will be few. Do you believe that the President has the power, acting alone in his Executive capacity, to order five, ten, fifteen, twenty more C-130's to the Congo if he is requested to do so?

Secretary RUSK. I think if one looks back to these hundred instances in which Presidents have used the armed forces of the United States for a great variety of purposes, as a constitutional matter, I think he would have.

I think now that the Congress is here, he would keep in touch as this situation developed. But I think, as a constitutional matter, he would have.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Senator will yield on that——

Senator MORSE. I want to say good naturedly I do not think bad precedents ever make a good law. It would be bad precedent to give a constitutional right, nor does the practice of an unconstitutional course of action create a constitutional right.

Secretary RUSK. I do not pretend, Senator, to be a real expert on this particular point.

Senator MORSE. I am not either. I am just seeking information and enlightenment on it.

Secretary RUSK. I suppose that it varies greatly with the situation. We moved more planes than that into the Middle East to evacuate American citizens in the recent crisis, far more planes than that on the authority of the American President.

Senator MORSE. So far as I can read the record, although I hope we are going to have it, and you are quite right, we are entitled to make ourselves available to you for discussion of the Middle East. I hope we are going to have a detailed briefing on some of the aftermaths of that, which raises this very point. It is one thing to evacuate and it is another thing to say what we are going to do about the government.

Senator Fulbright, you asked me to yield.

AMERICAN FORCES ON STAND-BY ALERT

The CHAIRMAN. Before you came in, I had information that a number of Special Service troops at Fort Bragg had been put on the alert to be taken to the Congo in case of need.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, is your information—this is after the C-130's went there?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this call was yesterday, and this person said one of her relatives had called them and said he had come back from Vietnam and hoped to be getting out, and now had been put on the alert to go to the Congo, stand-by alert to go to the Congo, at a moment's notice.

Just for your interest, that is put out by the State Department. That is an expression of their policy as of that moment.

Secretary RUSK. I will be glad, Mr. Chairman, to look into that point you raised. I think it is possible since we have——

NOT INCONSISTENT WITH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. The only reason I raise it is that clearly the government does believe it has authority to send any amount of troops it wishes to the Congo if it so desires.

Secretary RUSK. No, not at all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not?

Secretary RUSK. Any amount of troops to the Congo?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Secretary RUSK. I do not understand that.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not see that it would be entirely inconsistent with Vietnam or any other place. How many did you send to the Dominican Republic? You sent 22,000. You could have sent 100,000

if you wanted. I do not know why you could not send 100,000 or 200,000 into the Congo if you thought it desirable.

Secretary RUSK. Well, it was not until seven months after the Tonkin Bay resolution that the number of troops in Vietnam were substantially above what President Kennedy had authorized to go in there.

We have had long discussions on that point before, but that was not, in my judgment, without authority.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not say it was without authority. You say you have authority. I do not know where you draw the line here. I do not want to interfere and take your time here.

A RULE OF REASONABLENESS

Senator CASE. If the Chairman would permit me to inject what I was trying to develop was a kind of rule of reasonableness or suitability that involves, among other things, close consultation with the Congress.

Senator MORSE. Might I suggest to my friend from New Jersey that if you have authority to pass the Tonkin Bay resolution granting power, you have the authority to pass a resolution restricting the power.

Senator CASE. Your last clause I did not hear.

The CHAIRMAN. Restricting the power.

Senator MORSE. Now, Mr. Secretary, I am going to limit myself to what I heard in the discussion.

I will ask you to co-sponsor my resolution, Senator.

Senator CASE. I am greatly honored to be asked. [Laughter.]

Senator MORSE. It would be a great honor to have you accept. [Laughter.]

CONSTITUTIONAL PREROGATIVES OF THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Secretary, I heard you talk about Nigeria. Suppose the President, instead of following the course of action that he apparently followed in regard to Nigeria, had taken the other route and decided to send some reinforcement into Nigeria.

If I understand you correctly you think he has the authority to do that. He would have had the authority to do that.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I do not feel that I am here to dispose of the constitutional prerogatives of the President without full consultation of the President and the Attorney General.

Now, I would suppose—

Senator MORSE. I made my point.

Secretary RUSK. To try to make it as precise as possible on one feature of it, I would suppose that if a situation in Nigeria got to a point where our evacuation plan, standing contingency plan for evacuation of American citizens become operative, that the President would, as he has done on many, many occasions before, all Presidents would have the authority to activate that evacuation plan.

Senator MORSE. Well, that raises the very point I want to raise. It is one thing for a President of the United States as Commander-in-Chief meeting an emergency that involves the protection of American lives to proceed, limiting his operation to the protection of those lives and the evacuation of the people, that is one thing.

It is quite another thing for the President to assume that he has the power to send American troops abroad to bolster a foreign government, without Congressional authority, and I think that is one of the great constitutional issues that is before the American people at the present time. It disturbs me because I really think it is so unnecessary to create the split that the President is creating in this Republic at the present time.

MOVING AWAY FROM CO-EQUAL BRANCHES

When Senator Stennis says things have changed in two years, they sure have, in regard to this split of opinion in our country as to whether or not we are moving in the direction not of three co-ordinate and co-equal branches of government, but one in which the Executive is step by step, and rather rapidly, taking on some of the characteristics of what, for want of a better descriptive term, we call government by executive supremacy.

I do not think it is necessary. I never have thought it was necessary, for us to get into this kind of a conflict. We cannot listen to the discussions around this body without knowing it is a very serious matter, and that is why I was not engaging in any jocularity when I said to the Senator from New Jersey that we have to start thinking of different types of resolutions than the Tonkin Bay Resolution because I think a case can be made for the power of the Congress to restrict the President by way of resolutions.

I do not think we ought to get into that kind of a hassle with the executive branch of government. I think you know me well enough to know that no matter what differences exist between me and the executive branch of government they are completely professional and derive only from my very sincere beliefs about what I think is a veering away from the true meaning of the separation-of-powers doctrine in this Republic.

I think we are dealing here with an administration, many emergency situations have given rise to it, I realize that, but I think we are dealing with an administration that has gone further than any administration in our history in the exercise of what I think is pretty much arbitrary power on the part of the White House.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I have the impression that this administration has tried to consult the Congress, not always successfully, more frequently than any administration I know about.

The last time I was involved in a colloquy of this particular subject, the issue was that some Members of the Congress felt we were trying to consult them too much. So it may be we need a little philosophy on both sides on this particular point. I can recall, too—

BRIEFINGS ARE NOT CONSULTATION

The CHAIRMAN. May I say at this point, since I think I am involved in that, that I do not consider briefings in which the committee, such as you have had this afternoon, briefings in which we have had no opportunity to talk is consultation. That is lecturing under circumstances where examination and discussion are not appropriate. That is what I had in mind.

I think you have reference to this kind of consultation which I consider to be the kind that was intended. I do not think there has been any undue amount of that. But we have had an awful lot of

briefings at the White House which I do not consider to be the equivalent of that at all.

Secretary RUSK. No. Frankly, I was referring to the discussion we had at the time of the Punta del Este Resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that was all right. It was very good.

Secretary RUSK. I can remember when Mr. Truman consulted the leadership at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War. He was advised to proceed on the basis of the power of the President, and then shortly after that, one of the leaders said he supported what he did but he did not support the way he did it. He should have come for a resolution. These are things that need sorting out, further discussion.

Senator MORSE. I agree.

The only purpose of my comment here is to raise a situation that I know exists up here. I am not alone in this point of view. That is why you are getting, I think, the kind of critical reaction up here, because we have, I think, not established the relationships that are necessary.

U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN BOLIVIA

I will ask you one question dealing with this indirectly, and I think I owe it to you to ask it, and I owe it to myself to get the information. Can you tell the committee what military personnel the United States has, United States military personnel in any capacity, as advisers or in any other capacity, in Bolivia?

Secretary RUSK. I will have to get the exact information. We have a small group there training, particularly a new battalion that is being organized for counter-guerrilla operations.

Senator MORSE. Guerrilla operations?

Secretary RUSK. That is right.

PRESIDENT DOES NOT HAVE UNLIMITED POWER

Senator MORSE. That gives concern to some—whether or not that should be done by executive action, or whether there ought to be not only consultation but advice and consent before we start sending American troops for any kind of military action into another country, be it Bolivia, the Congo or anywhere else. I think that what is developing here in this discussion this afternoon, and we are indebted to you for doing it, is the outlining of a framework of what I think is bound in the weeks ahead to open very important constitutional debate in the Congress as to how far the President should be allowed to go in exercising this discretionary power without a resolution passed by Congress approving it or without the Congress passing a resolution rejecting it if he attempts it.

Even in the Tonkin Bay Resolution we had the rescission clause in Vietnam in which he was to be granted the power only as long as the Congress continued it, subject to rescission.

Now, that seems to involve recognition on the part of both the Executive Branch and the Congress that this was not an unlimited power on the part of the President. That is all I wanted to raise, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, this is a very interesting point. I felt myself that President Johnson had wanted to consult the

Congress more frequently on major matters than most Presidents have done outside the framework of, say, normal legislation.

Now, in the case of the Food for India business, the President had authority under existing law, but because it was of a substantial size he said, "I want to be sure the Congress and we move together on this before we move, even though I have the legal authority under the law," and so he came down and asked for the Food for India consideration.

In the case of the Middle East, as you know, we were consulting pretty intensively on that situation as the matter developed, particularly prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

EXAMPLE OF THE STRAIT OF TIRAN

I would be interested in knowing whether you felt that if the President sent a ship through the Strait of Tiran—I believe you were in favor of that at the time—whether that should have been preceded by a resolution of the Congress?

Senator MORSE. I am very glad you raised it.

Secretary RUSK. You see, these are things which, by the time—this could make it very complicated, because if we were to expose that action ahead of time, there might be other ships waiting there and greatly complicate the issue on the ground.

Senator MORSE. I am very glad you raised the point. First, let me say that I do not know of anybody on this committee who, on the record, has praised President Johnson more than I have for the consultations that he has engaged in. I can give you Congressional Record citation after citation, as well as the records of this committee.

My high approval of consultation, Punta del Este was an example of it, the Middle East was an example of it, I have said many times that the President, based upon his experience up here as Majority Leader and his other senatorial capacities, always recognized what I think is the true meaning of the advice and consent clause of the Constitution. But it is advice and consent before the fact, not after the fact.

In regard to the Strait of Tiran, if you will read the entire speech I made on the floor of the Senate after a 3-hour briefing by you, and I take responsibility for the speech, but I want to say that as I listened to you, I thought the best service I could render was to make that speech on my own.

Secretary RUSK. I am not criticizing the speech. I am just thinking of the procedures involved.

Senator MORSE. I went up and made it. Part of the speech would have to be read in light of what I said about the Strait of Tiran. I said this was a violation of international law rights of maritime nations, including our own. We cannot let Nasser get by with a violation of our rights to the high seas. He should be notified that we are going to send a commercial ship in there, and if he seeks to block the commercial ship and, of course, we have to exercise our naval rights by sending a naval vessel through or attempt to send it through, I would take the same position now.

JOINT ACTION WITH CONGRESS

My direct answer to you is if the President had decided following that course of action, of course I think he ought to have consulted with the Congress, and given advance notice as to his plans to do that. You say there might be other ships waiting. I think just his announcement to the Congress of the United States that he was planning to do that if this blockade continued would have caused Mr. Nasser to stop blocking the Strait of Tiran. At least we ought to have tried it.

But my point is that would have been in joint action with the Congress and not on the basis of what I think is a too extensive exercise of the Commander-in-Chief's power of the President doing it at his own discretion.

I do not think he has the right to make war at his own discretion, and that could have led to making war.

I think the Congress has to be consulted in that matter so that they know the course of action.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Well, in any event these three transport aircraft in the Congo do not involve the business of making war.

Senator MORSE. Well, not yet, not yet. But if we go on, anybody can build up a hypothetical. If you go on to the point of supporting a government, and the government should be subject to attack, and you have to move in to defend the government, you are at war and American soldiers start dying.

I just happen to think that there is growing concern in this country about American soldiers dying abroad in carrying out the exercise of the Executive discretion. I think that is part of this issue.

This is all I have.

Secretary RUSK. I would not myself include Vietnam in that category.

Senator MORSE. I know you would not. But, of course——

Secretary RUSK. There is great concern about Vietnam.

Senator MORSE. I know you would not, but you know I would.

Secretary RUSK. I know.

AID TO ISRAEL

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, there was one other matter that the committee discussed this morning, but since most of them have gone, I would think it is inappropriate maybe to raise it. This morning in the discussion of foreign aid they did send word or authorized the Secretary to give us a full report on the Israeli sinking of our ship. The matter of aid to Israel arose and, perhaps, we will just say now that at a later date, particularly on Friday, I am sure some of the members will want to raise that question.

Secretary RUSK. All right, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Because they raised the question what about the aid in view of the attack on the Liberty ship.

Secretary RUSK. Well, I will be glad to discuss that.

I might just say at the moment that all the facts we are going to get, I think, are pretty well in, and we still have no satisfactory explanation of how it occurred.

We will be putting a bill in to the Israeli government for reparations and damages for both personnel and for damage to the ship, and that will be coming along as soon as we get all the data together. That will be a very substantial bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I just wanted you to know it was raised this morning.

Well, thank you very much.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, JULY 12, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Lausche, Church, Symington, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Mundt, and Cooper.

To continue markup on S. 1872, the Foreign Aid bill. The Church motion to reduce Supporting Assistance from \$720 million to \$600 million and one year was approved by a roll call vote, 9-2. Mundt motion to cut the Contingency Fund from \$100 million to \$50 million and one year was approved by a roll call vote, 11-0.

[The committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JULY 13, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, and Cooper.

To continue markup on S. 1872, the Foreign Aid bill.
[The committee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, JULY 25, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Morse, Gore, Symington, Clark, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, and Cooper.

The nominations of Benjamin H. Oehlert, Jr., to be Ambassador to Pakistan, and Kennedy M. Crockett, to be Ambassador to Nicaragua, were ordered reported favorably.

Ex. H, 90-1, Partial Revision of the Radio Regulations, was ordered reported favorably, and the Committee continued markup of S. 1872, the Foreign Aid bill. Senator Jack Miller testified on an amendment to the Aid bill.

[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1967

Wednesday, July 26, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Gore, Lausche, Symington, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.

[This hearing was published in 1967 with deletions made for reasons of national security. The most significant deletions are printed below, with some material reprinted to place the remarks in context. Page references, in brackets, are to the published hearings.]

* * * * *

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. McNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; ACCOMPANIED BY GEN. EARLE G. WHEELER, U.S. ARMY, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

* * * * *

BASE RIGHTS [P. 244]

Now, the total on the first page of \$596 million for military aid for 1968 is broken down into the six categories that you see there. The first category is base rights. For all practical purposes, these are rental payments. \$45 million for rent. These bases are important to us. We believe we should continue to occupy them. If you feel otherwise, we can cancel the rent. If not, we must pay that.

We think we have negotiated agreements that are as economical as practicable under the circumstances. Any significant change would, I think, lead to removal of our facilities from those particular base areas.

* * * * *

LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES [P. 244]

The next, category three, summarizes the military aid program for 18 Latin American countries—\$13 million of training and \$32.5 million of equipment. A total of \$45.5 million in grant aid for 18 countries in Latin America. That, too, is down from the average for '61 and '62 of \$63 million.

We hope by 1971 to further reduce that \$45 million to about \$15 million, and, at that time, we hope to have eliminated all materiel aid and to be providing training only.

* * * * *

POSSIBLE DEACTIVATION OF OUR BASE FACILITIES [P. 254]

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman, could I ask one question on category 1? Have we been requested by any of these countries who are in category 1 to disband or deactivate or move out?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Libya has asked that we enter into discussions possibly leading to removal of some or all of our activities from our Libyan base.

We believe that this was a move made for domestic, ie., Libyan political purposes. Since we received the request, we have entered into negotiations. We have been told privately that it is hoped we will move out of our facilities. I cannot tell you how these negotiations will conclude.

In the case of Portugal, they have expressed considerable resentment over the restrictions we have imposed on the use of military aid equipment in Angola, and at various times—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Why did we oppose that?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Because we felt the military aid equipment has been distributed to Portugal for use in the common defense under NATO auspices, and NATO command, and it would be a diversion from the intended purpose for it to be used in Angola.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. France used a lot of it in Algeria before de Gaulle got—went up in the luminous cloud in heaven.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Senator Hickenlooper, I am not familiar in detail with the use of French equipment in Algeria, and I do not want to comment on it, but I do know that we prohibited the use of military aid equipment in Angola by Portugal, and that this has raised some questions about the formal removal of our base rights in Portugal. This is in answer to Senator Carlson's question.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We seem to look with indifference on the use of Congolese equipment against Angola, as I read the papers, and that is about the only place I can get information.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I do not believe so, Senator Hickenlooper. I am not familiar with any failure on our part to restrict the use of Congolese equipment in Angola. I will be happy to look into it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think the equipment is used. I do not know about our restricting it. I do not know what we can do about it.

Secretary MCNAMARA. If it is furnished under military—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I just wonder whose ox is being gored over there is all. It is strange political—

Secretary MCNAMARA. We believe our ox will be gored if we furnish equipment to Portugal under a military aid program for use in NATO operations and it is diverted to use against Angola. In any case, I am answering Senator Carlson's question as to whether any of these countries asked us to restrict our occupancy rights. The answer is that, although the Portuguese were irritated by our position on military equipment in Angola, they have not asked us to deactivate our bases.

Senator CARLSON. How about the Philippines?

Secretary McNAMARA. The Philippines have not asked that we restrict our occupancy but that we provide joint occupancy of one base, providing on the base for Philippines military headquarters, for example, and other activities. We have resisted this because the base does not permit joint occupancy.

Senator CARLSON. Thank you very much.

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO THE PHILIPPINES

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to the Philippines, is not \$22 million all the aid we give them?

Secretary McNAMARA. The \$22 million is all of the aid programmed for the Philippines, Mr. Chairman, excepting the assistance to Philippine forces in Vietnam which is not provided for under the military aid bill but under the legislation passed by the Congress and funded by the defense budget. I can give you that amount.

The CHAIRMAN. How much is it?

Secretary McNAMARA. For fiscal '66 it was \$6 million. In fiscal '67, \$17 million, and in fiscal '68, \$4 million.

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BASE RIGHTS [P. 256]

Senator COOPER. The total of your category one shows \$45.3 million.

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes.

Senator COOPER. I have added the figures for 1967 and they indicate \$62.9 million. There is a reduction then in category one for fiscal year 1968?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, there is a \$2.5 million reduction in Ethiopia, and I think Libya is down.

Let me just check very quickly. Libya is down. Portugal is not. Spain is the big item which is down. It is really not a fair comparison, and that is why I did not show the '67 figure.

It is true that the total is down, but the Spanish figure for '67 in a sense paid part of '68, so you would have to average the two, I think, Senator Cooper, but you are quite correct in pointing out that the payments are down.

PHILIPPINE ENGINEERING CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that in June of this year, Mr. Bundy telephoned and said that when President Marcos was here last spring the President committed the United States to equip engineering construction battalions for domestic Philippine use. The President also said in due course we would consider whether to equip an additional five battalions. The first operation has gone so well that the President now plans to go ahead with his second five battalions at a cost of about \$9 million. He says he needs no new money as the administration is counting on saving from deobligations in the Middle East.

Is that your understanding of the situation?

Secretary McNAMARA. The first three battalions have been MAP-supported for a number of years. When the Philippines sent their

engineering unit to Vietnam, we agreed to fill out the equipment of these three construction battalions to help compensate for the loss of the engineers in the Philippines. The equipment was funded by the services as a Vietnam related cost. The fourth and fifth battalions were then squeezed into the FY 67 MAP by eliminating other items previously scheduled for Philippine military aid. Mr. Bundy's call referred to the President's decision to go ahead with the second ECBs. We recently increased the FY 67 Philippine MAP to \$26.6 million to begin financing this decision.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Senator GORE. If this is strictly for internal security, internal use, why is it not properly characterized as economic assistance? Is it not purely economic assistance?

The CHAIRMAN. I assume that this is part of the consideration for sending those 2,000 troops to Vietnam, but I do not know. I cannot prove it.

Secretary McNAMARA. Strictly speaking, not, Mr. Chairman. Let me give you my recollection. If it proves in error after I check the details, I will correct the record.

My recollection is that the Philippine president was very much concerned by the Huk threat—Communist guerrilla groups beginning to become active in the rural areas. He wanted to build roads into those areas using military construction battalions in order to open them up, both to advance the economic welfare of the people and also to permit security forces to operate in such areas more effectively.

He wanted the military aid program to be expanded by the amount necessary to establish the construction battalions, and when he came over here to discuss a number of items, including the movement of forces to Southeast Asia, he raised these issues. We were very reluctant either to add to his military aid program or to finance these construction battalions through any other source of funds. We had earlier agreed to fill out the TO and Es of the existing three ECBs using service "Vietnam related" to compensate for the loss of the Philippine engineering folks going to Vietnam. During his visit, we did agree that, from a purely security point of view and without any consideration of forces going to Southeast Asia, it was wise for him to activate two additional construction battalions and use them for the purpose for which they were planned.

We financed the 3rd and 4th ECBs from within the limits of the then-approved FY 67 Philippine military aid program of \$22 million.

We have planned the financing of battalions 6 through 10, for which we made only a contingent commitment, by raising the FY 67 Philippine MAP to \$26.6 million and by using 1968 funds.

I will want to check all this, but that is my recollection.

Senator GORE. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Chairman, I do not raise in this connection the advisability of the aid or inadvisability of it. It just seems to me from all the Secretary has said that it is almost purely economic aid, unless it was a quid pro quo for sending the troops to Vietnam. Whether good or bad, it seems to me that it ought to be characterized as eco-

conomic aid. This provides no military assistance to the western defense, it seems to me.

TOTAL U.S. AID IN FISCAL YEAR 1967 TO THE PHILIPPINES

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I do not know how to phrase these questions precisely, because I do not know as much about the program as you do. Is it feasible for you to give us a figure of the total amount of money that either you or that the United States government gave to the Philippines in fiscal 1967?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, surely, this goes far beyond my responsibility, Mr. Chairman, because it involves economic aid and distribution under P.L. 480.

The CHAIRMAN. It is very difficult for us to get the information. We have had a long experience with the Philippines, and my impression is that we have continued to support a very corrupt regime there. The wisdom of our program bothers me in the Philippines, because they have from time to time been able to milk us of many millions of dollars, hundreds of millions of dollars, and I am a little bit impatient about them continuing to get it in this fashion.

You are familiar with some of those past examples, are you not?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, I am familiar with the military aid portion of it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You are familiar with it.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would be very happy, if you wished to ask me to do so, to collect from the other agencies of the government the data on economic assistance and other assistance to the Philippines to add to the \$22 million of military aid that we are proposing.

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CRITERIA APPLIED IN TRANSFERRING PROGRAMS [P. 258]

Senator GORE. I can see where you anticipate an expansion in Thailand because you now have got them almost directly involved in the Vietnam war, but I do not see that has any application in Laos.

Secretary MCNAMARA. It is even worse in Laos.

Senator GORE. They are not involved in the action.

Secretary MCNAMARA. They are involved.

Senator GORE. In Vietnam?

Secretary MCNAMARA. They are involved.

Senator GORE. Not in Vietnam, however.

Secretary MCNAMARA. But they are involved in very substantial combat operations.

Senator GORE. Largely internal. It seems to me—I do not quite see that it would be directly related to the Vietnamese war and I can see the prospect of the expanding of it.

Secretary MCNAMARA. It is very directly related to the Vietnamese war.

Senator GORE. They will have trouble anyway.

Secretary MCNAMARA. The combat in Laos is affected by the volume of movement from North Vietnam to South Vietnam of men and materiel through the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The amount of am-

munition expended, for example, and the number of combat engagements is very directly related to the infiltration by North Vietnam into South Vietnam, and we found it almost impossible to predict accurately 18 months in advance the expenditures of ammunition in Laos. They became very, very heavy.

As you can see, expenditures of ammunition and equipment almost are running \$100 million in a year now. It was to take account of this unpredictable character of the Laotian expenditures that we suggested Laos be removed from the military aid program.

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F-111 SALE TO THE UNITED KINGDOM [P. 264]

Out of our \$11 billion of foreign sales and commitments between '62 and '67, the total involved in that single sale is on the order of \$800 million. I have forgotten whether it is \$800 million or \$1 billion, but it is in that area. And quite frankly, I recommended against it to the Prime Minister. He had Defense Minister Healy, Foreign Secretary Brown, as I recall, and the British ambassador at the meeting with me on the subject. It was a very delicate issue involving all of the British Cabinet and the British Cabinet which met on it several different times. The reason it was delicate was that it involved the potential cancellation of the TSR-2 aircraft on which they had already spent over \$400 million of development costs and on which, at that time, they had employed some 24,000 British citizens. The question was whether they should terminate that operation—the TSR-2—disemploy the 24,000 British citizens, and buy the F-111, or whether they should not.

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POSSIBLE FURNISHING OF ARMS TO JORDAN [P. 265]

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes. May I comment on three points. Who will approve it? What has been the past action? Where do we stand today?

First, there will be no military assistance, grant or sales, to Jordan that is not personally approved by the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. That has been the practice in the years that I have been associated with it, and it will be the practice in the future.

Secondly, what was the past policy? I want to speak on a very delicate matter and ask your cooperation in withholding this information from public forums.

The fact of the matter is that the recent agreements with Jordan—and when I say recent, I mean extending back, say, two or three years during which time agreements were made that totaled something on the order of 60 odd million dollars worth of supplies for an extended period of delivery—have, generally speaking, been made pursuant to the decision of the Israeli government. I want this clearly understood. There are some qualifications to this, and I do not mean to say that they approved every single transaction. But on the more important transactions, they were asked to make the decision. I personally negotiated with Eban and, as a matter of fact, I insisted that the Israeli government sign a statement indicating their approval of the supply of arms to Jordan.

Now, why did we do this?

Because we didn't want to feed the fires of an arms race in the Middle East. Our policy is quite the contrary. Nor did we want one of the parties publicly objecting to the supply to the other party.

Beyond that, we felt that the independence of Jordan and the character of its political life was a matter of primary concern to the Israelis, not to us.

As you pointed out a moment ago, we do have interests in the Middle East. Our private corporations have oil interests there and financial interests. The Western European nations depend on Middle Eastern oil to a considerable degree.

But, nonetheless, we felt that the primary interest was Israeli interest, and the primary responsibility must be that of Israelis.

So we said in effect to Israel, "You decide"—

Senator GORE. What do you mean by primary?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The primary responsibility for the decision as to whether we would or would not supply arms to Jordan must be Israel's and we said to them in effect, "You decide. We have been requested to supply arms to Jordan. Those arms might be used against you. If the arms are not supplied, almost surely the current government will be overthrown. It will be replaced by another government. The Soviet Union will be the arms supplier to Jordan and may have important influence in this country that is on your border."

And a very extended border indeed.

"But this matter is of so much greater importance to you than it is to us we are not going to act unless you certify we should act in a certain way. We want to tell you also that you must bear the responsibility for your decision. And if you decide we should not supply arms to Jordan, and King Hussein is overthrown, and the Soviets do become the primary supplier, and they do introduce military personnel or otherwise affect the security of your border, that is your decision and we don't want afterwards to have you claiming it is ours."

Quite frankly, we put it just that directly, and after it was all over I said, "Sign here." I don't want this discussed; and if it is to be discussed, I will deny it, because the very life of some of these people is involved.

Senator SYMINGTON. If the Senator will yield, you don't have to deny it. I want to completely confirm it with the gentleman in the room who was Ambassador to Jordan. I had asked the Israeli representative if he had any objection to selling the F-104's to Jordan and he said none whatsoever.

Mr. Macomber was in the room.

Secretary MCNAMARA. These are delicate matters and, as I say, I would have to deny it. These are extremely delicate and obviously cannot be carried out without the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.

Senator MUNDT. The same with Saudi Arabia?

Secretary MCNAMARA. That instance is different. And I don't recall that we asked Israel to pass on Saudi Arabian matters; but I do know Israel is interested in, I will say, driving a wedge between the moderate Arabs among whom one would sometimes classify Saudi Arabia, and the radical Arabian nations, which I would say

are Syria and Iraq and Egypt. So that I believe that Israel would favor the Saudi Arabian policy we followed, although I personally have not discussed it with any representatives of that government.

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ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE USS LIBERTY [P. 266]

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman—I hope from—the Secretary has misspoken himself a bit.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I hope not, but I may have.

Senator GORE. Because I can understand why in such delicate matters we would obtain the advice of the Israeli government. I don't really think we ought to relegate to them the decision-making on a matter of this delicacy, but I have used my time and Senator Symington is chairman of the Middle Eastern subcommittee, and I want to defer.

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ISRAELI ATTACK ON THE USS LIBERTY [P. 268]

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, there is no question but what we have more evidence here of lack of intent to consciously attack a U.S. vessel than we had there.

May I finish by taking just one second to say I would like to go back and examine the record of the Tonkin Gulf incident which occurred three years ago, and on which my memory is a little hazy, to determine the evidence of conscious intent of attack. I think it is very clear. I think the evidence is that our communications intelligence intercepted orders that indicated intent to attack.

There was no evidence of that in the case of the Liberty.

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U.S. MILITARY AID TO EL SALVADOR [P. 270]

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think this comes under the heading of a little international humor maybe, or military humor. In the period of 1950–1967, El Salvador, which has a total of 4,300 men in its armed forces, received \$5.3 million in military assistance, considerably more than a thousand dollars per man.

A research memorandum of the Department of State on the recent border hostilities between El Salvador and Honduras includes this statement:

The Salvadoran government displayed considerable understanding and tolerance of Honduran domestic problems, although it is somewhat red-faced by the performance of its army which, according to our Ambassador, would surely annihilate itself by starvation if it attempted to camp out for more than a week.

Has our military aid to El Salvador gone down the drain or what?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Senator Hickenlooper, the military assistance proposed for El Salvador in Fiscal 68 totals \$700,000. It would provide two light helicopters, certain training ammunition and miscellaneous minor supplies. Beyond that, I can't tell you what the \$700,000 is for.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am not going to make an issue out of it. Apparently they tried to get a quick battle and get back to the kitchen for meals. [Laughter]

Senator HICKENLOOPER Well, I think that is all. I will not take any more time.

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DEFENSE DECISION ON IMPORTANT ARMS SALES [P. 274]

Secretary McNAMARA. I, myself, had serious questions about each of them. I believe I am correct in saying that, in every instance, we substantially modified the request, and these were requests from foreign governments for these sales. I know that in the case of Iran, I personally cut the Iranian request back to the level at which it was ultimately settled contrary to the advice of our ambassador, who by the way was personally involved in this, and contrary to the advice of some other representatives of the government, but with the clear support of the Secretary of State.

In the case of F-5's to Morocco, my recollection is that we substantially reduced the number, again with the support of the Secretary of State.

In the case of A-4's to Argentina, there was a long, extensive negotiation and, I think, a very controversial one. The Secretary of State and Defense participated directly in that negotiation.

The sale of F-104's to Jordan, I alluded to earlier.

I personally handled this with the foreign minister of Israel, as well as with the King of Jordan and the official who serves him as both defense minister and chairman of the joint chiefs. I did so with the full knowledge and support of the Secretary of State.

These are typical sales agreements, every one of which, if it is of any importance, comes to my direct personal attention.

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SENDING OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO GREECE [P. 276]

Senator SYMINGTON. Did the Defense Department decide to keep sending light equipment to Greece after the coup?

Secretary McNAMARA. The Secretaries of State and Defense discussed the flow of military aid equipment to Greece after the coup, and agreed that it should be substantially reduced. We have since that time withheld deliveries of such items of equipment as tanks, combat aircraft, combat naval vessels, and other major items. We are continuing to deliver such things as spare parts and some items of light equipment such as radios and rifles.

I know that all the major items have been held up, but I am not entirely confident of what is moving in the way of light equipment other than spare parts.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, my memory is not too good, but I think that at one time Secretary Battle, for whom we have great respect down here, told us there had not been any tanks delivered, but then we found out or he found out, I forget which came first, the chicken or the egg, that some did. He was quite upset about it, but based on the previous testimony, I think we straightened it out. Did you know that heavy tanks were delivered after the coup, even though they had been loaded before the coup?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I do not believe I knew it, Senator Symington, and I am not absolutely positive of it even now.

My understanding was that we stopped all deliveries that we could. I happened to be in Paris a few days after the coup—I would say within four or five days afterward—at a NATO meeting attended by the new Defense Minister of the Greek government. I told him that we could not continue the military aid program as we had initially planned it, and as we had agreed to, unless we had assurances that the constitutional processes would be reestablished and the constitutional guarantees reaffirmed. This was the initiation of the program to restrict deliveries of what I will call heavy equipment or sophisticated equipment to Greece.

I believe that we took every action that was within our power to stop such deliveries. Whether or not a vessel that had been loaded was in transit, or then being unloaded, or about to go into dock to be unloaded, I frankly do not know.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could you have somebody on your staff give us the story?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I will check it and let you know. I do know we diverted vessels that were on the water already loaded and moving to Greece. I do not know that we diverted all, and I do not know whether there were some being unloaded at the time.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

MILITARY SALES AND AID TO LATIN AMERICA

Secretary MCNAMARA. There is one point not related specifically to the basic issues of the Export-Import Bank that I hope we can discuss later because I would like to comment on it, and that is sales and aid to Latin America.

As the committee knows, these are governed by a maximum limit established by the Congress which requires that we not deliver either through grant aid or sales, a total of more than \$85 million worth of equipment to the twenty countries of Latin America. That is a well-established limit that we, of course, adhere to.

Senator SYMINGTON. A question has been handed me by Senator Gore, presumably from the staff. It is understood that the Senior Interdepartmental Group has recommended to the President the present embargo on all shipments to Greece be lifted. Is that a matter of Executive privilege or—

Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, I guess it is a matter of executive privilege, but I won't stand on that, Senator Symington.

One of the problems involved in understanding the authorities for grant aid and sales was in the interpretation given in the testimony on the role of the senior Interdepartmental group. The senior Interdepartmental Group does not act independently of the Secretaries of State and Defense and the recommendation, if they made one, has not yet come to me. I will be quite frank to tell you that we have had continued resistance from the Greek government to our policy, and very recently some suggestion that we reconsider it by our Ambassador to Greece. But we have not made any decision on it yet.

I think it was Secretary Rusk's feeling, as it is mine, that we should use this as a lever to move them toward some program of developing a constitution and putting it before the people to be

voted upon, and some program for moving back toward constitutional government.

They are beginning to move in that direction. They have developed some tentative plans for preparing a constitution and submitting it to the people. Whether this should be sufficient basis for re-examination of our policy, I do not know. I will have to examine it some time in the next few weeks when these papers come to my attention.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

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MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES WITH TROOPS IN VIETNAM [P. 278]

Senator AIKEN. Would you say that military assistance programs in these other countries attest to the failure of the programs as South Korea attests to the success of it?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Senator Aiken, I think that is a reasonable question. In the case of the Taiwanese, the South Vietnamese have not asked the Taiwanese to provide military forces, because if they were provided, it would enlarge the conflict between Taiwan and Red China. It is that kind of action which has differentiated Taiwan from South Korea.

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CATEGORY 1 ASSISTANCE [P. 279]

Senator CARLSON. But I did want to mention one other thing. You brought up this morning this category one, and I would like to ask, because of these countries you mentioned, for instance, Libya. I heard reports that they would be very happy if we removed our operations in that country, and you stated that there had been some discussions which you thought were maybe political rather than actually their desire. But there is another problem there that enters into that, as I see it, and this is an executive session here, and I have a classified paper in which we are supplying them or selling them or through grants a substantial amount of military equipment this year; is that correct?

Secretary MCNAMARA. The grant program is \$3.6 million and the FY '68 credit sales program is on the order of \$12 million, Senator Carlson. I am giving you this from memory, and I may be somewhat off.

Senator CARLSON. My point was this—

Secretary MCNAMARA. I may have overstated it.

Senator CARLSON. I am going to read the first paragraph. This is an executive session. This is a letter dated April 6, 1967, signed by Mr. Gaud:

I recommend that you make the determination necessary to permit the furnishing to Libya of certain defense services on a grant basis. The defense services to be so provided are a portion of the maintenance services element of a proposed \$5.1 million sales transaction under which Libya, at a cost to it of \$43.1 million, would purchase on a cash basis ten F-5 aircraft, spares, training and parts of the maintenance services not covered by the grants.

I raise this question because here we have \$3.6 million for an air base and for gunnery training, and just looking at it from a country

boy's standpoint, you get the impression we are maintaining that base in order to sell aircraft.

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir; quite the contrary.

On the Libyan transaction, I said this was \$3.6 million in grant aid and \$12 million in sales in 1967. I think it may be \$14 million in sales in 1968. There is strong opposition to selling aircraft.

Secretary Rusk and I struggled with this for weeks before we approved the transaction. Not only do we have a question about the \$14 million, but we would like to hold it much lower. There is no feeling among any of us that we would maintain a base there to sell aircraft.

I would be absolutely frank with you. To turn it around, I would like to get rid of the base so we would not have to sell supplies to them.

Senator CARLSON. You did sell them, did you not, if you follow through—

Secretary MCNAMARA. The \$51 million does not strike a responsible chord. I do not mean to say it is in error, but I just do not remember that particular amount. The amounts I do have here are for 1967 and 1968. There was no credit sale in 1967, and a \$14 million credit sale is planned for 1968. It is possible, in fact I am sure, it extends beyond 1968.

I will be absolutely frank with you, if I knew any way to get rid of that base and operate without it, I would propose to do so and avoid the pressure that they put on us for either grants or sales aid.

There is, however, one other matter to consider in determining whether we should make sales to them, and that is the relationship of Libya to Egypt. At times Egypt has been quite hostile to Libya, and there has been indication that she was seeking to lay groundwork for military action against Libya, which would be, I think, contrary to our interests. Therefore, under certain circumstances it might, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, be desirable to provide either grant or sales assistance to Libya to allow her to protect herself against her neighbors. But short of that, I would like to see us try to work out of that base and avoid these pressures on us for both grants and sales assistance to Libya. I do not know when we can do that.

Senator CARLSON. Well, this paragraph I just read was dated April 6 and signed by Mr. Gaud to the President.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I am sure it is correct. I just do not happen to recall beyond 1968.

Senator CARLSON. On April 8, here is a Presidential determination, so this went to the very top, and the President recommends that this sale be made, and on that basis, as I understand it, this is a cash sale.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I believe it is a credit sale, Senator Carlson. I would be—

Senator CARLSON. Would that be through the Export-Import Bank?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Let me see if I can tell you—no, it is a cash sale.

Senator CARLSON. I bring this up for the very reason that here we have \$3.6 million to maintain the base and, at the same time,

following through on this letter and the President's recommendation of it—the President recommends it—it is signed here, that we sell them a total of \$51 million.

Secretary MCNAMARA. We have a clear policy of shifting from grant aid to sales where we can do so.

If it is decided that a country must have military equipment, and it is decided that it can afford it, to the maximum extent possible we shift from grant aid to sales. But, at the same time, we hold the total to the absolute minimum consistent with our other objectives.

In this instance, our other objectives are: one, to maintain occupancy of the base in the short-run; and, two, in certain circumstances to permit Libya to deter aggression by her neighbors.

Senator CARLSON. Just one question. You said there were great objections to the sale. Was that from the departments? Who were the objectors to the sale?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I would rather not comment on it.

[Discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. Back on the record.

Senator GORE. I just have a quick question. I understand you to say a few moments ago that you would like very much to be rid of the Wheelus Air Base.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, I would, Senator Gore.

Senator GORE. Then why do we stay there?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Well, it is a gunnery range, plus a communications facility, plus—

Senator GORE. Whatever it is we would like to get out; they have asked us to get out.

Secretary MCNAMARA. We have not been able to develop a satisfactory substitute gunnery range. Possibly, as the years go by and we change our equipment in Europe, we can exercise those planes elsewhere than in Africa. But we have not had planes, for example, that can fly from bases in Europe back to U.S. gunnery ranges, and the North African gunnery range has been of inestimable value in carrying out our training there. This is one of the major reasons why the Libyan base has been essential.

Quite frankly, I keep hoping that, if and when we replace the European equipment with F-4's and F-111's, we can find other gunnery ranges than the Libyan one. I must confess that the consensus of the experts in the department is against me on this, but I continue to hope that it may be possible; and I will guarantee you it will be in three to five years.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Senator Carlson.

Senator CARLSON. Would you put in the record, if it is not too classified, what this \$51 million is?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, I would be delighted to. I think an important element of it is F-5 aircraft. I have forgotten the number, something like twelve or twenty, some such number as that.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

Senator CARLSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt?

Senator MUNDT. Will you give us a little more information of what you were alluding to on page two when you said that the Lao-

tian forces are now constantly engaged in combat operations mostly associated with the free world effort in Vietnam.

How sizable is the Laotian force fighting on our side?

Secretary MCNAMARA. May I ask General Wheeler to comment on that?

General WHEELER. What the Secretary was referring to, Senator Mundt, is the fact that the North Vietnamese, in order to protect the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex that leads from North Vietnam to the Panhandle of Laos, have introduced combat troops there to protect these lines.

Furthermore, over a period of a number of years, they have been conducting an annual dry season campaign to take over the plain area contiguous to Luang Prabang, which would eventually lead them down to the Mekong. So, really, you have two activities going on. You have a defensive action by Laotian forces in the North—that is in the Plains area—where they are protecting their own territory. In the South, in the Panhandle area, they continue to hold under Laotian control about one-half of the Panhandle area—the western portion of it—and they are resisting the efforts of the North Vietnamese to expand that area.

Now, as to the number of Laotians that might be involved at any given time in actions directly related to the Vietnamese effort, this would be hard to say. I would say that probably today there are on the order of 6,000 or 7,000 Laotians who are engaged in the Panhandle area in hanging on to what they have.

Further to the North—

Senator MUNDT. Friendly Laotians now?

General WHEELER. These are friendly Laotians.

As I am sure you know, you have a combination of hostile forces, particularly in the North. You have what they call the Pathet Lao. These are the Communist-oriented Lao who are stiffened up by a sizable infusion of North Vietnamese battalions.

In the North, there must be something on the order of 20,000 troops involved at all times.

U.S. POLICY IN THE CONGO

Senator MUNDT. Tell us why the Congo, Mr. Secretary, is so important to our national security, our overall posture in the world. We have a little sizable contribution here, we have some planes over there, which are almost engaged in military activities now, and I guess you were not here when we had our colloquy with Secretary Rusk, manifesting some committee disenchantment over this idea of playing at war over there in the Congo.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think this is a matter of judgment, Senator Mundt. Perhaps we have a difference of judgment on it.

There were three transport aircraft, C-130's, moved to the Congo. The danger—

Senator MUNDT. We were told they would be out in two weeks. Are they out?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I cannot speak for what you were told. I never made that statement.

Senator MUNDT. Secretary Rusk said they would be out in two weeks.

Secretary MCNAMARA. One is out, and the other two are scheduled for removal in the near future.

In any case, there may be a difference of judgment, as there may be with respect to many matters of foreign and defense policy, and my judgment is very clear on this.

In retrospect, it was an excellent move. Our ambassador there believes it was the introduction of these three transport aircraft that deterred the murder of large numbers of Western Europeans and U.S. citizens. I believe there were ten to twenty individuals murdered as it was. There were large numbers of Americans whose lives were at risk.

It is said today that it was the introduction of the three transport aircraft that changed the plans of the opponents of the government and, particularly, the mercenaries. I can only repeat to you what I received through the intelligence services and through the diplomatic channels. My judgment today is that it was a very wise move indeed.

Senator MUNDT. I was not trying too much to interrogate you about the planes as to inquire as to what we are going to do with the \$3.5 million or \$3.6 million, whatever it is, that you plan to put into the Congo in this bill, because it looks to me like Mobutu is not the kind of fellow we would be supporting if he were the head of the government of Greece. You have got some pretty good criteria about that, but we do not seem to have any criteria about supporting him.

Secretary MCNAMARA. We are trying to provide a minimum of support to introduce some stability into that government. \$3.5 million, as you point out, is the amount involved. It provides vehicles and communication equipment, certain spare parts for the units that he has.

Senator MUNDT. Any weapons?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think there are some weapons, but it is primarily vehicles and communications equipment and spare parts.

I will be happy, if you wish, to examine the details and let you know whether there are any weapons involved.

Senator MUNDT. Are we going to look pretty bad before the world if we are supporting that kind of an administration, which then results in murdering Tshombe when he gets over there, without a fair trial?

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes, I think so. But I am not at all sure I know what the better policy is. I myself believe we have saved American lives by this policy.

Senator MUNDT. By the three planes.

Secretary MCNAMARA. By the three planes.

Senator MUNDT. There is no use arguing it. It is pure speculation.

Secretary MCNAMARA. By the three planes and past actions. I think we also prevent a coup from developing by our \$3.5 million program. But I am prepared to admit that the government of the Congo is in many respects an irresponsible government. Obviously, I would deny it, if it were stated in a public forum that I said so. I do not, however, know personally of a better policy to follow than the one we are following.

Senator MUNDT. No, but I would insist, as far as we possibly can, that Tshombe, if he goes back there, should have a fair trial—a man, as I understand it, who was a friend of the United States.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I can tell you that we certainly will insist as far as we can. But we do not control the government, and I do not want to predict what will happen to him.

Senator LAUSCHE. I concur with what you have said, Senator. It would be tragic to have Tshombe, who has definitely been our friend, deemed guilty.

Senator MUNDT. I feel like an accessory to the crime.

Senator LAUSCHE. Without a trial, tried in absentia.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I can only tell you that we will use every influence we have at our command to prevent it. But I cannot predict that we will succeed.

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PROPOSED FLAT LOAN FOR AUTOMOBILE PLANT [P. 289]

Senator MUNDT. I do not totally disagree with you. But it seems to me you have a great gap when you say an automobile complex like that has no military significance to Russia.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I do not believe it does, sir.

Senator MUNDT. That has not been our experience in this country.

Secretary MCNAMARA. It has in the sense that you cannot convert an auto factory to produce military equipment. You can stop production of the automobiles, with great resistance from the public, and take the people who produce the automobiles, and after a long time convert them to producing something else; but it is a long time indeed, as all of you know who have watched Ford Motor Company convert to B-24 production in World War II.

General WHEELER. May I add something?

Secretary MCNAMARA. General Wheeler asked if he might add something.

General WHEELER. Senator Mundt, this was a question discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff because we wanted to determine to what degree this might improve the Soviet capability. We came down to the view that the accretion of strength was not appreciable, and the reason is that the Soviets have plenty of industrial resources today to turn out all of the military equipment that they need.

In other words, they have no shortage, so far as we can determine, of a capability to produce tractors, and that means they can produce tanks because they have treads. They turn out all the artillery and all the trucks they need for military purposes, so our corporate judgment was that probably this would, as the Secretary said, in the long term, divert resources that would be available for military programs into domestic civilian programs.

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FUTURE TROOP LEVELS [P. 297]

Secretary MCNAMARA. Let me put this aside and comment on the more specific questions you have asked, as to what decisions have been made regard to future troop levels.

No final decisions have been made. General Wheeler, General Westmoreland and I have discussed possible troop levels with the President. I think it is clear that they will have to be increased above the levels that had been considered this spring. Exactly how much is not clear. Part of it depends on the actions of the South Vietnamese government and other allied nations.

Since we had these discussions with the President, you may have noticed that the South Vietnamese government has stated publicly that it plans to increase the size of its forces.

Senator CASE. It has made that announcement. The question of the adequacy, 600,000, and so forth.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes. I think that should be addressed.

But I want to point out, first, that one of the reasons no final decision has been made by the President is that the South Vietnamese government had not made a final decision. He felt, and I think rightly so—and certainly I recommended to him—that any final decision on U.S. troop strength should depend, in part, on what the South Vietnamese government was prepared to do.

They have since indicated they are prepared to raise their troop strength by about 65,000 men. This will require that they modify their draft, extend the terms of service, and that they take certain other actions.

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EFFECTIVENESS OF VIETNAMESE FORCES [P. 300]

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know what the truth is, but these private reporters certainly do not agree with you. That is not the only article I have read to the same effect, many of them.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, I do not know any private reporter that I have ever talked to who believes the South Vietnamese won't fight—none.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Ambassador Porter made a statement not so long ago that they are eight-hour soldiers. They won't fight at night.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I have never seen a statement such as that attributed to Ambassador Porter. He never made such a statement to me.

I want to distinguish between—

Senator CASE. Excuse me, I did not understand that.

Senator GORE. Daylight.

The CHAIRMAN. They are only daylight soldiers, and the implication of his statement was they are not very effective soldiers.

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EFFORTS TO INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OF VIETNAM TROOPS [P. 301]

Senator CASE. What are the desertion rates?

Secretary MCNAMARA. It was on the order of 125,000 annually a year ago, and at the present rate will reach about 74,000 this year.

The desertion rate is down almost 50 percent in the year and, in part, this reflects the improved compensations.

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[P. 302]

Secretary MCNAMARA. While we have not determined finally how many additional U.S. troops we will send, we know we will send additional U.S. advisors. I would say something on the order of 1,500 to 2,500.

General WHEELER. Between 1,500 and 2,500, and they are working on the exact details and the number of men.

Secretary MCNAMARA. These men will advise the popular force and the regional force, as well as the ARVN, but particularly the popular and regional forces.

I tried to say publicly, gentlemen, that I feel there is much room for increasing the effectiveness of those forces, that our action should be contingent upon the action taken to increase the forces. So I do not want in any way to mislead you on this, or deny the validity of your question or the implication that the forces are not fully effective at the present time.

But let me ask General Wheeler to comment further on this.

General WHEELER. The problem within the Vietnamese forces is primarily leadership, and it has been for several years.

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[P. 303]

General WHEELER. I visited with this one division when I was out there recently with the Secretary. I talked to the division commander; also, I got the report of Colonel Kelley, U.S. senior advisor, and Kelley says they are first class troops.

Now, they are under strength. Why are they under strength? Because they have lost people fighting the North Vietnamese. These are the reasons.

There are three divisions in the Delta, three South Vietnamese divisions. All three are well led, and all three are performing effectively against a pretty high level of Viet Cong strength down there.

The ratio of strength of government forces versus the Viet Cong in that area is just a little above the 2.5 to 1 ratio, and this is about as low as you can get and operate effectively.

There are other units, and I could name several of them by number, that are recognized by our U.S. personnel, General Westmoreland and his people, and by the South Vietnamese as not being fully effective, and General Westmoreland has means of improving their performance.

The first thing he does, of course, is advocate the removal of less than effective leadership and their replacement by good officers, and I might add that he constantly reviews the performance of units and makes recommendations to General Vien, who is both Minister of Defense and Chief of the Joint General Staff, to get better leadership in these marginal units.

The second way that he exerts an influence is that if a unit is rated by the U.S. advisors as being less than effective, he takes them off military assistance support. He writes a formal letter to General Vien and says that at such and such a date, such and such a battalion is no longer eligible for military assistance support and will not be placed back on, its eligibility will not be renewed, until such time as their performance is improved.

The Secretary has already mentioned these numerous actions to improve leadership. One course of action is to place combat tried veterans from the enlisted ranks into the junior ranks of the officer corps.

The program is progressing and they are getting a better infusion of experienced leadership at that level.

Another means to improve the quality of the output of their military academy is to make sure that these young officers, instead of being sent to some headquarters staff in one of the big cities, must go to a combat unit and perform combat service as their first assignment, very much the same thing as we do. They have a half dozen other programs along the same line.

General Westmoreland, when he was here, said that South Vietnamese leadership was so thin that he did not feel that they could expand and still retain their effectiveness.

During the past year, with this improvement in output of leaders, he now considers that a modest expansion of the South Vietnamese forces is possible, and he has so recommended, and his recommendations and proposals to the South Vietnamese are embodied in a recent announcement, Senator Case, regarding their upcoming action to expand their forces.

U.S. INFLUENCE WITH VIETNAM GOVERNMENT

Senator CASE. I do not think I have to tell you. You know pretty much my feeling with respect to this war. I have not opposed it on moral grounds.

I do think there is a very grave question as to the achievability, and I am sure that to withdraw now might result in disaster. But this is still an open question. I am only trying to find out whether this is an interval or whether we are engaged in something that ought to be stopped, and this relates to that question that is uppermost in my mind.

One of the things that troubled me more than anything that happened in the last year was that we get a government report which says, in substance, that we had no leverage on the South Vietnamese. Our prestige was so deeply involved that we could not tell them what to do, and that is, if they do not perform, that we are through, because there is no point in killing American boys in a hopeless cause. That is the only way to do it.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Senator Case, I think if the report said that, it was in error.

Senator CASE. The report that I am talking about was given to Dave Lilienthal for his planning purposes, and this is a high-level report.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I do not think I have seen the document. But in any event, I strongly disagree with the statement if that is the statement.

Senator CASE. But, Mr. Secretary, it has to be true not only in your mind and General Wheeler's mind, but it has to be true in the minds of everybody who deals with this matter.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I know General Westmoreland feels he has strong influence with the South Vietnamese, and I know Ambassador Bunker feels that way. That does not mean we can lead them to do everything that we ask. Many of the things that we ask

are probably in error. They may be beyond their capability. But in any event with respect to things that they are capable of doing, we have power of persuasion.

General WHEELER. The Port of Saigon is an example.

Secretary MCNAMARA. The Port of Saigon.

Senator CASE. There is a great improvement there.

Secretary MCNAMARA. It is now as good as the Port of New York.

Senator CASE. But it took a long time.

Secretary MCNAMARA. We met with Premier Ky, and we said to him, "You make up your mind to clean it up, or help us to clean it up, or the shipments are going to stop."

We have leverage, and General Wheeler and I personally did this last July or last September. It is one minor indication of our leverage.

Senator CASE. This is one issue of what I am talking about. This is again not—I am only critical in the sense that I am trying to get at the truth.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Surely. I understand your concern, and I think it is an appropriate concern. But I do emphasize that we have this leverage, and we exercise it. Maybe we have not exercised it enough at times; but we have it, and it is available in a number of subtle forms.

There are individuals there over whom we have the power of life and death and, occasionally, we choose to exercise that power, just by the degree of our association or our support. We make it perfectly clear we are not going to support—

Senator CASE. You more than anybody else know the answers to these questions.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I know the answers to some. Some of the others—

Senator CASE. I mean more than anybody else. Nobody knows them all.

Secretary MCNAMARA. The question of how this will develop, how long this will take, I cannot answer. I have nothing that I think I could add to your own judgment on the matter.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you exercise the power of life or death?

Secretary MCNAMARA. We won't support certain individuals under certain circumstances, and they know if we do not—

Senator CASE. They would be assassinated.

Secretary MCNAMARA. —they will be assassinated.

Senator GORE. Ky, for instance?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I am not speaking of particular individuals, and I would want to take this out of any published record, as I am sure you would want me to. I simply want to emphasize that the U.S. government should have power to influence the South Vietnamese government. We do have the power, and we do exercise it.

VIEWS OF OTHERS ON VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to take the time of the Senator from New Jersey, but I would interpret Ambassador Porter, who testified here only a few weeks ago—June 8—as not being very much in agreement with this view about the effectiveness of the South Vietnamese. I will put it in the record.

Senator CASE. I think so. Would you disagree with anything that he said? This is my impression; this is what I am——

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want me to read it?

Senator CASE. If you would.

The CHAIRMAN. I will not read it all, but I will have it put in here.

There are about 1.1 million men under arms. Another 100,000, ten percent, does that mean we are within ten percent of victory? Of what? This is what worries me. I worry about this, and I do not want to criticize the generals with whom and alongside of whom I worked. But what is not needed is—I do not believe it is needed there—are more troops.

Are you familiar with that sentiment on his part?

Secretary McNAMARA. I do not recall having seen that.

The CHAIRMAN. This is page 17 of our hearings here.

Secretary McNAMARA. I have not seen that particular one.

The CHAIRMAN.

It would like to see a good deal of retraining. What is basically needed in that country to alter the situation dramatically is a night fighting force. The night fighting force is what is needed. We have not trained the Vietnamese to do this job. Maybe we cannot; maybe we are not trained ourselves for it.

But after sundown, as the Senator knows, there is a different state affairs there. In the daytime we can go anywhere, and our victories are real when we can detect the enemy or when he attacks us. But when night must fall, if you have the tanks out or you have the choppers out, you have to pull them back. Why? Because there is a different state of affairs, and you have an enemy who knows every inch of his terrain and who works best at night.

Then Senator Clark was asking questions and he was reading to him a statement, and I am going to skip down to where Clark says:

He comes to the conclusion—he was quoting from a Japanese, I think Oka, the Oka Report—he comes to the conclusion that it is the fault of their officers, which bears out something which you said earlier about the nine-to-five hours, and also something I saw in the paper that in three years there has only been one field grade officer in the South Vietnamese army wounded in combat.

Mr. Porter: I am seriously concerned about the officer corps for a number of reasons. But I think there has probably been—there have been a few wounded.—

And he goes down—I am going to skip, but I would like the Reporter to put this all in, I do not want to take the time. He reads, Senator Clark reads, as a basis for a comment that I think is very significant. This is Mr. Oka's statement:

Promotion in the Vietnamese army still depends on a complex of personal family, regional, religious and educational ties and the generals and wives an officer knows, on his behavior during the innumerable coups and purges that have shaken the army during the past several years. The result is an army led by political generals willing to accept American advice only at the most technical level of logistics, new weapons and sometimes of strategy. The corrupt and creaky, clubby structure of the Vietnamese army itself remains a scared cow. Foreigners fiddle with it at their peril. Even the well-intentioned members of the Vietnamese military fraternity hesitate to touch it, and so the Americans fight the war.

That is the statement. Clark asks, "Is that unfair?"

Mr. Porter says, "It is harsh, but it is not unfair."

Secretary McNAMARA. He is absolutely wrong.

The CHAIRMAN. The first part of it, yes, the list of factors.

Nearly every single non-administration witness, such as this Taylor and others, concur in Mr. Porter's view. This is what bothers us.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that every non-administration witness will concur in that view.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the reporters who write about it—I do not know Frederick Taylor.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I just want to address myself to the statements made. I do not believe every non-administration witness will concur in that view. I know Ambassador Lodge and General Taylor won't. I know Ambassador Bunker won't.

May I disagree for just one second in order to comment fully on all the material put in the record, which I have not read?

The CHAIRMAN. I think so.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I want—

Senator CASE. This is in substantial accord with what I got from practically everybody except from the military, and the military briefing was correct but very formal.

Senator GORE. Did you get it from our own soldiers?

Senator CASE. Individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. I have had letters.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think we need to address ourselves specifically to what has been said. I do not have it in front of me, but I jotted down some language which said that the South Vietnamese are only willing to accept advice at the technical, logistical level. Now, this is just absolutely untrue, and I will tell us why. They actually function under our command in many, many circumstances. I do not know what you call it. I call it more than advice when they are taking commands from us.

Beyond that, General Westmoreland advises with their Defense Minister, advises on matters at more than the technical or logistical level—strategy, tactics, whatever you want to call it, but it is far more than the technical or logistical level.

This was about all I could write down, Mr. Chairman, but it just is not true.

The CHAIRMAN. I would have thought Mr. Porter is a competent witness, and he certainly is part of the team, so to speak. He has been recommended—

Secretary MCNAMARA. I do not know what part he was commenting on, and I say it is not true. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is here. Let him comment on it.

NUMBER OF VIETNAMESE OFFICERS KILLED

General WHEELER. In the first place, that is a generalization. Whoever wrote this article takes the worst elements in the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, and lumps them with the best, and assesses them as being equal to the worst.

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ESTIMATED SALES [P. 309]

Senator COOPER. The chief volume of those sales would be to India and Pakistan.

Secretary MCNAMARA. No, sir, although India and Pakistan might buy some, the chief volume in fiscal 1968 will be to Iran, to Saudi Arabia, and to Israel.

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NATURE OF DOD GUARANTEE [P. 312]

Senator COOPER. If these countries cannot pay, why don't you just list them in grants. Is it because you believe they can pay in time?

Secretary McNAMARA. Yes, sir. They very definitely can pay it back in time. Iran, for example, is one of the major countries which would receive this kind of guaranteed loan. Israel is another. I think it is very clear that both Israel and Iran can pay over a reasonable period—five, seven or ten years.

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EFFECT OF CANCELLATION OF REVOLVING FUND ON U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS [P. 312]

Secretary McNAMARA. In most instances, we have no treaty commitments to the underdeveloped countries. The amount of military equipment we are supplying them under sales agreements does not give them a capability to fight along with our side in any significant fashion. Here, the objective is quite different. The objective is in many cases to hold down an arms race, to avoid destabilizing relationships among nations such as would occur were we to deny military sales to Israel. I think that Israel represents, perhaps, a good example of the problem we would face if the revolving fund authority were cancelled, or if our use of Export-Import Bank credit for undeveloped countries is cancelled.

If that be the case, we cannot make military credit sales to Israel. If we cannot make military sales to Israel, the power balance between Israel and particularly the radical Arab countries will shift. This is a matter of concern particularly to our State Department and indirectly to the Defense Department.

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EFFECT OF ARMS SALES ON PURPOSES OF FOREIGN AID [P. 313]

Secretary McNAMARA. We have very rigid standards that we apply to determine the extent to which the resources of a country may be diverted from its economic development to its military equipment.

In the cases of India, I personally have put limits on the amount that we would accept from India in the way of diversion of resources from economic development to military sales.

The same thing is true of Iran, and of several other nations.

POSSIBILITY OF PROMOTING AN ARMS RACE

Senator COOPER. I will just make an observation on the sale of arms to Pakistan and India. If you provide arms to one country, the other will secure additional arms from another country, and the arms race goes on.

The CHAIRMAN. There is \$90 million in sales for that.

Secretary McNAMARA. Mr. Chairman, I think that when that was put in it may have been a proper estimate, but my personal estimate is that the sales will not, need not, and probably should not exceed about \$15 million to the two countries for fiscal 1968.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know where this came from.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think the schedule you have shows perhaps \$75 million.

The CHAIRMAN. It says \$90 million. I have it before me, for the two, India and Pakistan.

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P. 314

Secretary MCNAMARA. I have tried over the years to hold down diversions, and we have consistently urged the Indians to reduce their defense budget. I think it is too high at the present time.

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BASE RIGHTS [P. 314]

Senator COOPER. The money is provided by a MAP program. Does the United States have to contract for a term of years beyond the fiscal year 1968?

Secretary MCNAMARA. We do. Of course—

Senator COOPER. For the payment of these sums to these countries for the base rights?

Secretary MCNAMARA. We have a treaty with the countries giving us occupancy rights beyond fiscal 1968. But we do not have commitments to them for payments of this kind other than commitments made subject to action by the Congress. No commitment beyond fiscal 1968 is made for any purpose associated with military aid other than with this qualification—subject to action by the Congress.

Senator COOPER. This morning there has been discussion about the base in Libya, and some discussion about Portugal.

Can you supply to the committee some statement about Ethiopia, the Philippines, Spain, and your judgment about their importance to the security of the United States?

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Senator COOPER. And three Latin American countries.

Secretary MCNAMARA. Yes.

Senator COOPER. Military assistance and sales to Latin American countries.

It is always stated that our purpose is to provide funds for internal security. Would you say that this is correct with respect to all of the countries, that it only provides internal security or in some cases it would provide offensive capacity.

MILITARY SALES AND AID TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES [P. 317]

Secretary MCNAMARA. I think it provides an offensive capacity in some cases, Senator Cooper. May I supply for the record, because I do not want to take your time now, every major item of offensive equipment we have supplied in the last five years, and the number proposed for 1968—which is almost zero. I would also like to include both the military aid and military sales, because the Latin American military aid program and sales program is, I think, a

program that acts as a dampener on offensive weapons rather than as a supplier. I would like to lay that out for you.

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MILITARY SALES TO FRANCE [P. 318]

Senator COOPER. I see a notation of \$25 million of military sales to France. Is that a correct item?

Secretary MCNAMARA. I do not recall it. It may well be. Our sales to France were running a little under \$100 million a year, and I think they have recently declined to about \$25 million a year.

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ALLEGED RESALE OF TANKS BY WEST GERMANY [P. 319]

Secretary MCNAMARA. Except for one intra-NATO case, and a U.S. approved delivery in 1964 of tanks to Israel, we have not given our approval and no other transactions have been consummated. These were government to government transactions and no private firms were involved.

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[Whereupon, at 2:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, JULY 27, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.

To continue markup on S. 1872, the Foreign Aid bill. The Church motion to repeal the military credit sales authority (including elimination of revolving fund) was approved, 12-6, after the Cooper motion to provide \$75 million to guaranty total sales of \$150 million was defeated, 8-10. Church motion to cut military assistance from \$596 million to \$475 million was approved, 7-6. Morse motion to reduce military aid (sales and grants) to Latin America to \$50 million was approved, 10-5. Morse motion to limit military assistance (sales and grants) to Africa to \$25 million was approved, 8-7. Morse motion to add subsection on Central American Defense Council (requiring that all except \$1.5 million of the military aid funds for Central America be used for regional integration of military forces) was approved, 8-6. Morse motion to cut off assistance to any country following a military coup was defeated, 6-10. Sparkman motion to reconsider earlier action, cutting Vietnam administrative expenses (\$7 million out of Supporting Assistance) was defeated 7-7.

Sparkman motion to reconsider earlier action (reducing to 50% the coverage on extended risk guarantees) was defeated 6-7.

Sparkman motion to report the bill as amended passed 10-2, after Church substitute to report without recommendation was defeated, 7-7.

[The committee adjourned at 4:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, AUGUST 1, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Clark, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Cooper.

Leonard Unger, nominee to be Ambassador to Thailand and Sheldon B. Vance, nominee to be Ambassador to the Republic of Chad, were heard and ordered reported favorably.

S. 1688, the Inter-American Development Bank Bill, was ordered reported with an amendment on motion by Senator Sparkman, 14-2. Other votes taken were: Gore motion to postpone action lost 2-14; Lausche motion to cut to \$200 million per year lost 5-11; Symington motion for no loans for arms was approved 16-0; Lausche motion to cut to \$250 million per year lost 4-12.

[The committee adjourned at 12:35 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Church, Dodd, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Case, and Cooper.

Edward M. Korry, nominee to be Ambassador to Chile appeared before the committee and was ordered reported favorably. Short discussion on Ex. I, 90/1. The Human Rights conventions Ex. J, K, L, 88/1, were discussed and decision made to hold a hearing with the American Bar Association before proceeding.

The following nominees were ordered reported favorably: William B. Dale, as Executive Director for the United States, IMF; Livingston Tallmadge Merchant, as U.S. Executive Director of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Homer Daniels Babbidge, Jr., Abram Leon Sachar, and Robert Anthony Scalapino, as Members of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs for a term expiring May 11, 1970.

It was decided to hear Brent Ashabranner as Deputy Director of the Peace Corps before taking action.

Ex. P, 89/2, Treaty with Thailand was ordered reported.

H.R. 3399, to extend the termination date for the Corregidor Bataan Memorial Commission was also considered.

[The committee adjourned at 12:00 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLIC AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:30 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Morse (presiding), Church, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, and Case.

Sol M. Linowitz, U.S. Representative to Council of OAS; accompanied by Ward P. Allen, Director of Office of Inter-American Political Affairs and Richard A. Poole, Political Advisor, Office of Inter-American Political Affairs, briefed the group on the Foreign Ministers' Conference and the current situation in Latin America.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 5:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:40 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Lausche, Church, Dodd, Aiken, Case, and Cooper.

The committee approved the following nominees as United States Representatives to the Twenty-second Session of the United Nations—General Assembly: Arthur J. Goldberg, William B. Buffum, Lawrence H. Fountain, William S. Broomfield, and Adrian S. Fisher; with I.W. Abel, Robert S. Benjamin, Hector P. Garcia, Mrs. Patricia Roberts Harris and Herbert R. O'Connor, Jr., as alternates.

S. Res. 151, Relative to U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers, was discussed as to procedure.

[The committee adjourned at 11:15 a.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, OCTOBER 2, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN
AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:45 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Fulbright and Church.
Discussion of Military Assistance to Middle East and Greece with Townsend Hoopes, Under Secretary of the Air Force; accompanied by Henry J. Kuss, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Logistics Negotiations (ISA), Harry Schwartz, Peter R. Knaur, and Lt. Col. T.H. Tackaberry, USA.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 3:40 p.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON USIA PERSONNEL
LEGISLATION, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The ad hoc subcommittee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Pell (presiding), Mansfield, Hickenlooper, and Cooper.

Without objection, S. 633, a bill to create a career personnel system for the USIA, was considered and ordered reported with amendments to the full committee.

[The ad hoc subcommittee adjourned at 10:40 a.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLIC AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 4:35 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Morse (presiding), Fulbright, Sparkman, Lausche, Church, Clark, and Hickenlooper.

Covey T. Oliver, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, accompanied by Wymberly De R. Coerr, Ambassador to Ecuador, appeared to brief the group on the recall of Ambassador Coerr and a briefing on the sale of arms to Latin America.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 6:20 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Dodd, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Williams, Case, and Cooper.

Ex. L, 88/1, Supplementary Convention on Abolition of Slavery, was ordered reported favorably by a roll call vote, 19-0.

Ex. K, 88/1, Convention on the Abolition of Forced Labor, with a suggested understanding, was tabled by a vote of 13-4.

Ex. J, 88/1, Convention on the Political Rights of Women, together with an offered understanding, was tabled by a vote of 12-4.

S. Res. 151, Relative to U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers, was discussed and no action taken.

[The committee adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Lausche, Symington, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Mundt, and Case.

Idar Rimstad, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, Ambassador John M. Steeves, Director General of the Foreign Service, and James Hoffnagle, Deputy Director, appeared to discuss the lateral entries in the two Routine Foreign Service lists dated September 20, 1967. The two lists were then ordered reported without objection, Ex. B, 90/1, Supplementary Tax Convention with Canada, and Ex. F, 90/1, Tax Convention with Trinidad and Tobago, were considered and no action taken.

[No transcript of the session was made.]

MINUTES

MONDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH
ASIAN AFFAIRS, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met in executive session at 2:40 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Church, Pell, and Hickenlooper.

Lucius D. Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, accompanied by John F. Root, Country Directors, North Africa, Department of State, discussed with the group Military Assistance to the Middle East and Greece.

[The subcommittee adjourned at 3:35 p.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Case, and Cooper.

Ex. F, 90/1, Tax Convention with Trinidad and Tobago, and Ex. B, 90/1, Supplementary Tax Convention with Canada, were ordered reported by a voice vote. S. 633, a bill to establish a USIA Foreign Service Personnel System, was reported by a voice vote. The group discussed an appearance of Dean Rusk in open session. Ex. J, 90/1, Tax Convention with Brazil, was discussed and carried over. S. Con. Res. 49, commemorating the 50th Anniversary of Finland, was ordered reported by a voice vote.

[The committee adjourned at 11:45 a.m.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 4:10 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators McCarthy, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.

William M. Roth, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, accompanied by John A. Schnittker, Under Secretary of Agriculture, and William Starkie, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture, briefed the group on the proposed International Grains Agreement.

[The committee adjourned at 4:30 p.m.]

MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Lausche, Symington, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Case, and Cooper.

S. Res. 151, Relating to National Commitments, was discussed and no action taken.

[The committee adjourned at 12:25 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 9:35 a.m., in room 4219, New Senate Office Building.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Pell, McCarthy, and Aiken.

The group met early to have a preliminary conversation with Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative, United Nations, before he testified in public session on S. Con. Res. 44 and S. Res. 180, expressing the sense of the Congress that the Vietnam conflict should be submitted to the United Nations. He was accompanied in open session by Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

[The committee adjourned at 10:00 a.m. to go into public session.]

NEED FOR OPEN HEARING WITH SECRETARY RUSK ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHEAST ASIA

Tuesday, November 7, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J.W. Fulbright (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Williams, Mundt, and Case.

Also present: Senator McGee.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, Mr. Jones, and Mr. Lowenstein of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. For the record, I will start out with a very brief statement to start the matter off. We might as well come forward. They will come in.

The committee this morning is pleased to have the Secretary of State, who is appearing in executive session in response to our letter of October 31st as well as earlier exchanges. Committee members are aware that this session—as described in the letter—is “designed primarily to elicit and consider” the Secretary’s reasons for preferring not to accept the opportunity to meet with us in public on the subject of United States policy toward Southeast Asia.

Both in his letters to the committee, and specifically in his press conference of October 12th, Secretary Rusk has indicated his preference for what he terms “close consultation behind closed doors.” In the letters, he has roughly outlined the factors which influence his position. We welcome today a more detailed and profound explanation of the Secretary’s attitude.

I wish at the outset to express my personal belief that the issue we are considering together is of the highest importance to our representative form of government. Indeed, the question of whether or not a Cabinet officer in general should publicly respond to committee inquiries is a matter of constitutional significance. In this sense, the committee has a duty to uphold a legislative prerogative. For if it is not maintained and exercised, this power will be diminished and gradually eliminated, as have been so many functions of the legislature in this century.

At this juncture, I do not wish to take the time from the committee and the Secretary to elaborate my personal views beyond stating a few brief points.

THE COMMITTEE'S JURISDICTION

First, I believe the historical record fully supports the thesis that the senatorial powers of Advice and Consent to ratification of treaties and to presidential appointments have consistently been exercised in public as well as in closed session. These practices are so firmly established that I doubt that the Executive Branch would insist that this committee should consider an important treaty or examine a nominee for Secretary of State without an open hearing. I should think that the most important foreign policy issue facing us today would fall into that same category.

Secondly, I believe that the committee's actions must be consonant with the provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Not only does the Act enjoin the function of legislative oversight, which necessitates committee hearings, it also expressly provides that:

All hearings conducted by standing committees or their subcommittees shall be open to the public except executive sessions for marking up bills or for voting or where the committee by a majority vote orders an executive session.

Finally, I believe that the Secretary's press conference of October 12th has resulted in a change in the environment in which the public heretofore has considered the Vietnam War. While I recognize that the aim of the press conference was to clarify the arguments supporting United States involvement in Vietnam, the result would seem to have raised serious questions about priorities and the national interest.

The factor of China is not a new one, but the emphasis given to that factor by the Secretary appears to have changed our policy approach to Asian affairs. And it seems to me that the Administration would wish to test this revised approach before the electorate as a matter of sound public policy.

With these brief introductory remarks, Mr. Secretary, I invite you to give us your views about this issue as well as about the subject of public hearings.

We are very pleased to have you, and will you proceed, if you have an opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, SECRETARY OF
STATE**

Secretary RUSK. I have a very short statement, Mr. Chairman, on this particular point.

I am glad to discuss with the committee this morning the question of whether I should appear in public session for a discussion of Vietnam or whether such matters are better pursued in executive session.

Let me say at the outset that I am not today discussing this matter as a matter of constitutional principle in the first instance, but rather from a practical and pragmatic point of view and from the point of view of wisdom.

I think we all fully understand that the Congress as a whole plays an important and indispensable role in the determination of foreign policy in carrying out its constitutional functions, and this committee plays a very special role.

I regard it as particularly important that in discussions with this committee I have the opportunity to be completely candid so that the views of the committee and its individual members can be based on a full understanding of how the Administration sees the facts and the Administration's point of view.

I do not of course assume that such candor will necessarily result in agreement either between members of this committee and the Administration or among the members of the committee themselves.

But it does seem to me important that whatever disagreement there may be is based upon as full a knowledge as possible of the position of the Administration and the reasons for that position.

I do think that you will all agree that there are things the Secretary of State can say in private that he ought not to say in public, and that the more delicate the international situation involved, the greater the area of discretion. When the situation actually involves hostilities, the need for discretion is underlined.

PRECEDENTS FOR CLOSED HEARINGS

I think the general practice of the past is illustrative particularly in these recent decades.

Secretary of State [Cordell] Hull discussed problems of World War II in open session prior to Pearl Harbor. He did so in connection with Lend Lease and the arming of American flagships. But my information is that he did not discuss in public hearings the issues of World War II after Pearl Harbor. He did address a Joint Session of Congress on November 18, 1943, on the results of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Secretaries.

During the Korean conflict, my recollection is that the Secretary of State did not testify in open hearings about the conduct of the war. Some of you will recall that there were extensive hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee in executive session and that agreed-to transcripts were released as the hearings proceeded. It was this precedent which led me to suggest that we have as searching and as far-reaching discussion as the committee might wish in executive session and the release therefrom of a transcript on the basis of an agreement as to what would be consistent with the national interest.

Precedents also suggest that where Vietnam is involved in legislation before the Congress, such as the Foreign Aid Program these matters are touched upon in the course of public hearings of such legislation. I have appeared publicly eight times before the committees of the Congress during its present session. Questions involving Vietnam arose in some of these hearings. I recall, of course, I did appear with this committee in a public discussion on Vietnam on February 18, 1966.

CONSIDERATIONS OF WAR AND NEGOTIATIONS

There are some important practical considerations involved. We have substantial combat forces in the field engaged in a struggle with North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces. They are there for reasons which are familiar to you even though some of you may not now agree with these reasons. A public discussion of the conduct

of military operations, involving the Secretary of State, cannot help but be of some advantage to our adversaries. This would be particularly true with respect to intentions, future plans, estimates of the military situation and other matters bearing upon the conflict itself.

I am concerned lest such discussions hamper the Commander-in-Chief.

Second, It is not advantageous for the Secretary of State to be pressed publicly for details of positions which the United States might take in intergovernmental discussions or in negotiations to bring this situation to a peaceful conclusion. We need to be in a position to negotiate with those who can stop the shooting. It would seriously hamper such negotiations for us to be asked to disclose in advance many details which ought to be part of negotiation itself.

As the committee knows, North Vietnam has been unwilling to engage in negotiations in any forum, public or private. I will be glad to go into that in as much detail as you wish in an executive session.

Third, the Secretary of State faces a somewhat different problem than does a senator in discussing the policies, the performance and the deficiencies of other countries. Senators are free to say anything that is on their minds about other countries—and do so frequently on the floor of the Senate and in public speeches. But when this is done in the presence of the Secretary of State, then I am in a most difficult position. I cannot, at one and the same time, be completely candid with my colleagues in the Senate and carry out my public responsibilities as Secretary of State in discussing either the policies or the actions of other governments.

It may well be that I would agree with some of the sharp criticisms which could be leveled at other governments. But for me to engage publicly in such criticisms would greatly hamper the ability of the United States to work effectively and quietly to remedy the situations which are of concern both to you and to me.

It does not seem to me that the absence of a public discussion between the committee and myself represents any impairment of public discussion of the issues. Senators are free to discuss these matters on the floor of the Senate, on platforms throughout the country, in press conferences and on television. I myself take part in this public discussion in the press conferences which are expected of a Secretary of State, and in a limited number of visits to different parts of the country.

PRIVATELY EXPRESSED VIEWS OF MEMBERS

Finally, Mr. Chairman, one of the values of discussion in this committee derives from the considered views of the members of the committee. I have been told by members from time to time that they do not wish to have privately expressed views made public or given dissemination in the Executive Branch of the Government.

As you know, the committee has been very careful to keep to itself the transcripts of executive sessions. I wonder whether such consultations, in the best sense of the word, can occur in public session.

These are the considerations which have led me to suggest to the committee that we have a thorough examination of the Vietnam situation in executive session and that we release to the public the transcript of those things which can be released consistent with the public interest.

SECRETARY'S REMARKS ABOUT CHINA

I might add one brief comment, Mr. Chairman, one point to which you adverted in your opening remarks, and that is the reference to China in connection with my last press conference.

I will point out as a procedural matter that this press conference lasted for an hour rather than a half-hour. Had John Hightower closed the press conference at the usual half-hour, the question would not have arisen. It came up at the end of my press conference, but I said basically four things about China.

One was that there would be a billion people there and I do not know anyone who disputes that;

Secondly, that they will have nuclear weapons, and I have no doubt that that is true;

Third, that no one knows what their directions of policy are going to be in the next ten or 20 years, and I do not know anyone who does know;

And, fourth, that the other nations of Asia are concerned about this.

Now, I did call attention to the fact that we have alliances with Korea, Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of China, Southeast Asia, Anzus, and that these alliances are concerned with organizing peace in the Pacific and that undoubtedly China played a very large part in the formulation and negotiation and the conclusion of those alliances.

Now, I was startled and a little shocked, quite frankly, to have these remarks at my press conference picked up as though I were raising the question of a yellow peril. There is nothing to that at all. I did not discuss it in those terms, and this it seems to me, was a return to yellow journalism.

In any event, these are the reasons why it seems to me that with the precedents established during the Korean War, in the so-called {Douglas} MacArthur hearings, there would be a sound basis on which we can have an exhaustive and complete discussion in executive session and release the transcript except for those portions which we might agree are not in the public interest to release.

So basically, those are my thoughts on that subject, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary.

A PROFOUND DIVISION OF OPINION

Of course, I do not recall either personally or even from reading about former circumstances in our history outside of our own Civil War and Reconstruction period in which there has been such a profound division of opinion about the correctness of our policy, that is as to international interest, as there is now, which is one of the reasons that contribute to this.

Do you not think that is true?

Secretary RUSK. I do not know to what extent that would be true, Mr. Chairman.

I recall, I would have to look it up and furnish it to you, but I recall that in about February of 1951, a Gallup Poll showed that 66 percent of those polled wanted to pull out of Korea. We do not have policy like that today wanting to pull out of Vietnam. So I do not know.

I was in the Department of State during the Korean affair and I know it was a matter of considerable controversy around the country and I have no way of comparing it, but I think this phenomenon is not new.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think that the present conditions in the country are unprecedented?

Secretary RUSK. I do not think they are unprecedented, sir. I think there is wide division. There are very sharp differences of view about this situation.

PUBLIC CONCERN AND CONFUSION

The CHAIRMAN. I was under the impression there was a sharper division of view under present conditions than formerly, and I think the public is confused, I believe my own constituents are, as to the justification for the rising cost of the war in both lives and in money. I think that is being reflected in the situation in the Congress.

Maybe my memory is bad, but I have been here 25 years, and I have never seen such difficulties as have arisen presently over such things as the tax bill, the poverty program, you can almost name anything. There is a great difficulty and it is bad for the country and it is bad for the Congress. We are criticized, the Congress as such, almost daily.

I may be wrong about it, but it strikes me that we are in a considerable disarray within the country and the Congress, and it would seem to me that under such conditions public discussions would go a considerable way or help to resolve these differences and, hopefully, to allay the strife that is afflicting us both in the Congress and in the country. I may be wrong about it.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether in executive session it would not be possible to take up these sources of confusion and these points of confusion, and discuss them out thoroughly in the committee. I am not sure that it would be possible to remove this confusion in public discussion unless there can be a greater consensus here in the committee itself, and it may be that the range of disagreement can be narrowed and that there could be a wider range of agreement on some of the essential facts of the situation which itself might form the basis for a broader public understanding of what the issues are and where the differences properly lie.

GREAT POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I agree that executive sessions serve a purpose, but so do public.

It was only whether or not we should have public ones. There is no one, I think, who feels we should not have executive sessions,

which we do have and are willing to have at almost any time. But yesterday's was sort of an odd circumstance.

We asked one of the professional career men who was being examined, Mr. Miner, how many countries in Africa, I forget why it came up, have a parliamentary system and he could think of only three. The democratic system, it seems to me, all over the world is having great difficulty, and I would regret to see us have too many difficulties. We are considered the leading democratic country of the world, and it distresses me very much to see that continued friction that exists within our country.

I do not have to remind you of the difficulties in the House at the present time. There is much more in the House at the moment than there is here over domestic programs as well as foreign aid. We have struggled with foreign aid, finally reached an agreement with a conference, and the House has already taken action very drastically different from what we reached.

I only mention it, not for the substantive point of view, but as evidence that I think we are in great difficulties politically, and I thought public discussions of the source of these difficulties would be helpful, both to the Congress and to the public generally, because ultimately they do have some influence upon the course of our policies.

So that was really behind my own feeling that we should have it. But I do not wish to occupy all the time.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman I would be very glad—

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to respond?

Secretary RUSK. I would be very glad to hear the views of the members of the committee on this point. It is important.

Senator SPARKMAN. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

AN AURA OF CONFUSION

Secretary Rusk, I will say at the outset that I think it is very dangerous to have you appear in public session before this committee and I think past experience has shown it.

I think the questions that have been asked you, the statements that have been made, create an aura of confusion that contributes to the confusion of this country. While I think periodically you ought to appear before this committee on broad subject matters of policy, some of these meetings have been the occasion for some very confusing and rather caustic interrogations and statements with regard to your conduct of affairs, not by all members, I do not mean that, but those have not been of service to our country. I have been increasingly feeling that way.

Now, so far as this "yellow peril" business is concerned, I can see nothing in your statement that would give rise to any thought, that you raised the so-called yellow peril idea at all.

Certainly the Chinese are there and that is a fact of life. The Russians are there and we have talked about the Russians. But that did not raise any Oriental peril so far as I know, and with the Red Chinese having atomic weapons, of course it is a potential threat in the future, something we have to keep account of.

I saw nothing that would raise that old bugaboo for the so-called yellow peril which was not quite the yellow peril that was intended to be talked about in this context.

I feel very sorry that our country is being subjected to this kind of emotional and socio-political conflict in the very area where we ought to be a little more cohesive and so on.

I would be the last person in the world to say that people should not have their own ideas, they should not accept them, and should not discharge them, the responsibilities of their own; of course they should, and they do, and I respect those ideas. I may not agree with them, but I respect them. I may agree with some; I may disagree with others.

OPPOSED TO TELEVISED HEARINGS

But I can see nothing but difficulty for our country, increasing difficulty in a public television demonstration for any appearance of yourself in connection with any inquiries and intimate discussion of what our plans are in the future. I can see nothing but a hampering of future negotiations which are without doubt very delicate and very unsatisfactory, not only to you, but to everybody else from time to time because of the intransigence of the other side on these matters. I just want to make that very clear.

I think it is very helpful for you to appear here, and I would feel the same way about Secretary McNamara as head of the military. I do not always agree with everything that McNamara does. I do not always agree with everything that he says, but I do not think he ought to be put up in public and asked about the war plans of this government. While it is not couched in that term, nevertheless that is the effect on the public, and a denial of an answer and many things that can—the avoidance of an answer, or the statement, “Well, I would rather discuss those things in secret,” that gives a lot of answers to a lot of questions lots of times that the other folks would like to know. I just think it is a dangerous situation and I think we are treading on very dangerous ground.

There are many areas where I think the Secretary of State is obligated to come in public session and discuss broad fields of operation, but in the past the tendency to put the Secretary of State, and put the Secretary of Defense, in positions where they have to rather back and file in public, where they know they cannot say certain things that might be categorical answers to questions, I think is not serviceable to our country.

I do not have any questions to ask you at this moment. But I do want to make myself as reasonably clear as my limited ability will permit me. I do not want to furnish an excuse for a public official not appearing in public at all, but I think there are times and places and subject matters and conditions and circumstances. I think we are in difficulty at this time. So far as I know, the sentiment I get in my area is that the people are overwhelmingly for winning this war and they understand, they think, why we are in there.

There are a lot of people who feel we are not running the show quite like it ought to be run. That is very true. But I just got back yesterday, and the sentiment I get is that “For God’s sake, let us

win this thing." There are reasons why perhaps we cannot win it immediately, but the people want to win it rather than be defeated.

Be that as it may, I just wanted to express myself on that score.
Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Can I make one comment before I call on you, Senator?

APPREHENSIVE OF A WAR WITH CHINA

On this, we agree about the confusion, but I submit that since there has been no public session of this committee for some 18 months, February 18, 1966, that this difficulty or these conditions certainly do not arise from any public hearings the committee has had. The committee has not had any hearings in public. Whatever the reason may be, it is not attributable to any public hearings we have had for 18 months.

Your bringing up China reminds me of a situation which I— which is perhaps far-reached, but I know the original war that started the decline of China and I think contributes to the present difficulty with China grew out of the opium war in which Palmerston deceived the House of Commons for some eight months while he was preparing an attack on China. The House of Commons I doubt would have authorized it but it took place, and when he was asked about it in their question period in public he lied about it. I do not mean to say you are lying about it because you have not said anything to the committee for 18 months in public.

But many of us are very apprehensive, and I am one of them, that we may drift into a war with China just as they did and I think it led to circumstances of which we are reaping part of the benefit today. I think that if we are going to have a war with China the American people ought to know about it in advance before we get into it.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I am sure, I hope you will agree that although I can be wrong before this committee, I have not attempted to deceive this committee.

The Chairman. Well, I am not—I did not so state.

It is quite clear that Palmerston deceived the House of Commons. That is a matter of history. He lied to them in answer to public questions. He refused to answer and all the time he was preparing an attack on China which he brought about and which led to the Opium War and which I think led to the attacks of the West, including—we played a minor part but the British, the French—the French as a result of that really got into Vietnam later on, and the whole world is paying the penalty of a very unwise policy at that time.

Senator MORSE.

Senator AIKEN. That is where my credibility got strained. I do not think you can withdraw either politically or physically within six months, but it may be a worthy objective.

Secretary RUSK. It would depend upon whether these conditions had been achieved, I think, Senator. At any rate, that is what the chiefs of government at Manila said on the subject.

Senator, on the constitutional point, as I indicated earlier, I would hope that we could consult about this matter before we reached the constitutional issue as such.

Senator GORE. I agree; I agree.

Secretary RUSK. This is why I did not reply directly to the two questions asked by Senator Morse.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS

No one is more respectful for the Constitution than I am. But no one is more reluctant to reach the impasses of the Constitution. So I would hope that the committee would think carefully about the considerations I have advanced this morning and we certainly, I shall certainly think about what has been said in the committee. But I would, if we get to constitutional points I would need further counsel on that before I could, I would, attempt to make a statement with respect to the Constitution.

Senator GORE. But you agree it is a matter not solely for the determination of the executive?

Secretary RUSK. I think the constitutional problems are for all of the branches of the government whose prerogatives are involved in the Constitution.

Senator GORE. Thank you.

A CONTINUOUS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I would hope if this committee decides that it would request your attendance in public session that you would see fit to accept because I think that rejection would be misunderstood by a lot of people.

However, I think that it is important that a continuous exchange of views between the Executive and the Legislative Branch continues and I am not so concerned whether that is to be in executive session or in public session.

I do have a question in my mind that at a time when we are at war, and we are at war, whether or not any constructive purpose would be served by having a public session even though I recognize your right to refuse to suggest answering the question in executive session, which we would respect and which you have done. But I can picture a situation where I or some member of the committee unintentionally may ask a question which by the mere asking of the question itself would carry an inference which would be misunderstood by not so much the American people or by Congress but perhaps by the other side, and there is a question in my mind as to the wisdom of holding a public session at this time to explore all these factors.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to comment?

Secretary RUSK. I think not, sir; I think I have the Senator's view.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche.

OPEN HEARINGS WILL NOT FOSTER UNIFICATION

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman and my colleagues, it has been my belief that while our country and our people are so deeply divided on the course that we should follow in Vietnam, our primary objective ought to be to bring about a unification of thinking.

With divided thinking known by Ho Chi Minh, the ability to get him to go to the negotiating table is nil.

I have been turning over in my mind ways and means of analyzing the thinking of the people and, if possible, bringing them to a common judgment.

The achievement of a common judgment I suppose is impossible. But you cannot win a war with a division that we are suffering.

My judgment is that open hearings of the character suggested here will not tend towards a unification of judgment but will aggravate the disagreement that already exists.

We talk about a hearing. Now I put this question: What is a public hearing at which the Secretary of State appears as a witness? Is it a public debate? Is it a genuine public hearing where you are soliciting information from the Secretary on a specific issue?

If we are to assemble and generally debate, and the Secretary of State is silenced because there are matters which, if revealed, he believes will be hostile to the security of the country, can it even be called a debate?

My own judgment is that we have not had genuine public hearings. A public hearing would be one in which there was a specific issue, and the Secretary was asked questions what shall we do about this issue. Should we not differentiate what is a genuine public hearing from what has turned into a public debate, and I submit to you that public debates are not in the interest of our country if they are conducted in the manner in which our hearings have been conducted in the past.

If the so-called public hearing turns into a debate, and the Secretary is obliged to remain silent because the item discussed, if fully revealed, would not be in the best interests of the security of the United States, does the proceeding even fail to meet the true definition of a true debate?

A LONG DEBATE OVER VIETNAM

The debate about what our course in Vietnam should be has now been in progress since the Tonkin Bay resolution. When was that, August 1964?

Senator MORSE. Long before that.

Senator GORE. Long before that.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes, but that was the Tonkin Bay.

Senator LAUSCHE. For three years we have been arguing it, arguing for what purpose?

Has it been to repeal the Tonkin Bay resolution? Has it been to establish justification for pulling out?

In the three years, how many times has the Secretary appeared before us?

Those hearings, those debates, in my opinion, have fully explored all of the aspects that you are speaking about without dealing with any particular issue.

A RESOLUTION TO WITHDRAW FROM VIETNAM

Now, this is rather rash, I suppose: If our presence in Vietnam is wrong, it is believed that we should pull out, should not some one of us present a resolution to the Senate that we should pull out, and if that resolution is presented, the Secretary is called to

a hearing and asked to give his views on whether we should pull out. But then if that were one, we would have a specific issue. We would not be just sprawled all over the field, as we have been in the last three years.

Let us look to what we are coming. I do not know whether this is true or not, Mr. Secretary, but I have the Washington Post of November 6. Here is what it states:

Detailed instructions helped hecklers give Secretary of State Dean Rusk one of his roughest receptions at Indiana University last week. Order of battle instructions bearing the name of the Committee to End the War in Vietnam advised demonstrators that Rusk should be allowed to make his speech but with suitable heckling in the great American tradition.

The leaflet giving instructions to these college students contained this statement further:

At appropriate moments when Rusk says something objectionable to you shout "Lie" or "Booh". The shout of "Lie" or "Booh" will be effective. At the conclusion of Rusk's speech yell "Hell, no, we won't go".

I say to you that we are partly responsible for that type of conduct among the American students.

Senator MORSE. There are rightist groups who do the same thing. I can testify as to what they do.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think it is just beyond my understanding of what true Americanism is.

Senator GORE. Would the Senator yield?

Senator LAUSCHE. And, Mr. Secretary, I have the deepest compassion for you. You have the toughest job in the United States except that of the President, and I say do not yield. Hold your post. When history is written you will go down as a man who stood true to your word, fearless in the expression of your judgment, devoted to the cause of the United States.

Senator GORE. Will the Senator yield to me now?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, I yield.

PUBLIC EDUCATION

Senator GORE. Senator, before your peroration, it seemed to me that you had somewhat arrived at a conclusion not greatly dissimilar to mine, and that is that it might be possible to refine the subject matter and rules of procedure to fulfill the function of public education and public exchanges between the Executive and the Legislative. Am I correct in that?

Senator LAUSCHE. I think there is one way of bringing the issue before the public. I am prepared to join with any one of you to offer a resolution to withdraw from Vietnam. Then he will come in and testify.

Senator CASE. Would the Senator yield?

Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, I yield.

PROTESTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS

Senator CASE. I think you have, in another way, you have helped to point the way to what I think is desirable. I am not at all sure it is an excuse or desirable for the Secretary or the President or any public figure except a Member of Congress who is supposed to take a beating of this sort to go into certain situations in which

this kind of organized, not debate, but organized protest and demonstration is possible and is getting to be more normal.

I would keep out of that kind of thing. It does nothing help public understanding or anything else and it certainly does not help the country to have our Executive Branch upset by this kind of thinking and its strength and energy wasted.

But it is still necessary to have a place in which this debate can take place, and where is it more suitable than in the Senate of the United States. Under circumstances such as Senator Gore has suggested and in which it is properly controlled, not necessarily, we can decide whether we should have television cameras or not.

A BRIDGE OF UNDERSTANDING

Senator MORSE. Mr. Secretary, I want you to know that I am very pleased that you are here this morning, and I am pleased we are in executive session on this matter. This is the kind of subject matter that ought to be discussed—

Senator MUNDT. Wayne, we can't hear you.

Senator MORSE. I said I am very pleased the Secretary is here, and I am pleased we are in executive session, because I think this is the type of subject matter that ought to be discussed in executive session. I shall be just as brief as I can, but being one of those who has been a public critic of the Secretary because he hasn't appeared in public hearing, I think I owe it to him and I owe it to the committee to briefly express my point of view because what I seek is a bridge of understanding between this committee and this Administration. I don't think it is only between this committee and Secretary Rusk.

I think we need to do everything we can to build a better understanding between this committee and Administration.

As the Secretary knows, divisions of opinion exist within the committee. For example, I do not share many of the points of view expressed by my good friend, Senator Hickenlooper, this morning, probably more a difference in the emphasis that he places on this point of view than anything else. But, and I don't expect, don't ask you, Mr. Secretary, to agree to my point of view. I only hope that this kind of an exchange will give each a better understanding of the other man's point of view.

So I am going to say these things about why I think we should have both executive and public hearings. I think it is very important that in a democracy that the Cabinet officers appear in public hearings before a legislative committee. As I have said on the Senate floor, I think it is part of our checking system. I don't fear the people. They can judge if a Senator abuses a privilege in a public hearing. But we all know that any time you or any other Cabinet member are asked a question that you think involves the security of the Republic that you think should be better asked in executive session, it happens all the time, the Administration witness says, "Well, Mr. Senator, I would prefer to answer that question in an executive session."

PROTECTED BY EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

If a Senator at any time, and I take you back to the record, because it is replete with proof of what I now say, if a Senator

pressed for an answer in a question that the Cabinet officer says he would like to answer in executive session, he is protected by executive privilege.

I remember very well the MacArthur hearings where the Senator from Oregon several times on that occasion, as the record will show, when a Senator was insisting that the representative of, at that time of General [George C.] Marshall and General [Omar] Bradley, pressed for answers and they said they would prefer to answer in private, I arose and defended their right as a matter of executive privilege to answer in executive session.

I think that right will always be guaranteed, and I think that is good for the public, too. I think it is part of their education. I think these public hearings are of great educational value, not only for the committee but for the public.

You have never appeared in a public hearing, may I say, Mr. Secretary, in which in my judgment you didn't make a very constructive record; you came out of the hearing stronger than you went in, in my mind. I think you always will. I think a public hearing is a bridge between the committee and the Administration and the public.

You can't understand my position in regard to public hearings unless you also understand that I feel that the American people are entitled to have the two branches of our Government, the Legislative and the Executive, meet in common meeting before the public for a discussion of those things that appropriately can be discussed in public. I say, too, the third branch, the Judiciary, of course, is not involved in this phase of the checks and balances system.

I think the Administration has a clear duty to meet with a Foreign Relations Committee or an Armed Services Committee, or any other committee that has jurisdiction over the subject matter, and to discuss those things that can appropriately be discussed in public. I don't think the Administration is hurt by it.

ONE DEDICATED PURPOSE

I come to the point the chairman raises—it represents some difference that I have with Senator Hickenlooper. There is no question our being a divided nation. I don't think that executive sessions are going to promote unity if they are all executive sessions. I think you should welcome an opportunity to appear before this Committee in public and respect our judgment as we will respect yours as to what is appropriate.

But now let's take the negative side of it. Suppose you get into a session someday and members of this committee suffer lapses of good judgment, and violate what we can all agree is a reasonable course of conduct. How many members of this committee do you think will come to their defense? Almost all of them if there is any inappropriate course of conduct on the part of any member of this committee. This is not a case of a contest. This is not a case of two opposing teams fighting across the table. This is a case of where every man around the table, including yourself, on such an occasion has one dedicated purpose. We may have different sights as to how best to reach that purpose, but we have one dedicated purpose and that is to serve our country. There isn't any question

about that being the purpose of any member of this committee or of yours.

A CREDIBILITY GAP

I think it is a great mistake for us to let this notion spread that for some reason this Administration, with you as its spokesman, isn't willing to come before this committee for a public hearing. I don't think your offer by way of a substitute is satisfactory; namely, that we have executive sessions and then we release a censored transcript of what took place.

I think the American people are entitled to see and hear with their own eyes and ears and make their judgments with regard to what is going on in the field of foreign policy to the extent that they can be apprised.

Furthermore, Mr. Secretary, it happens to be my view, you may not agree, you probably don't agree, some of my colleagues don't, but it is true that there is a feeling on the part of many that they are not, of the public, they are not being told, that there is a credibility gap. I think a public hearing will help bridge that.

I think what we need is an increased confidence in the public at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue; an increased confidence of the public in their Congress, and they have got good reason to have some questions about the Congress; an increased confidence of the public in the Executive Branch, and I am sorry to say but it is my belief they have some reason to have a lack of confidence there, too. But we all have a common interest in eliminating that lack of confidence in respect to both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.

In a nutshell, this is my point of view. I think you are throwing away, if I may speak humbly and very respectfully, I think you are throwing away a great source of power that the Administration has in helping inform the public.

You have got nothing to fear in a public hearing before this committee, because of the safeguards that the record shows always are available to you.

I have heard you in some of our public hearings on many occasions say "Mr. Chairman, I would prefer to answer that"—I don't quote you but paraphrase you—"I prefer to answer that in executive session." And the chairman has always said, or the man who asked the question has always said, "Very well. That is perfectly satisfactory." That is what he should say. You have the discretion. It will be in public and the disclosure of information to the degree that you think is proper to disclose it. I think it is a healthy thing in a democracy.

THE RISKS OF DEMOCRACY

The last point I make is after all don't forget democracy has its risks. Its price is high, but it is worth both the risks and the price.

I just am greatly worried about this trend that is developing in this country on the part of the opposition. I happen to think it is much more serious than the Administration recognizes. Sunday night I lectured at Purdue University. Part of my thesis was to defend my position in opposition to conduct on the part of the college students and non-college students in exceeding the limits of the law in their manifestations of protests against the war. They know

that I have great reservations about this war. They also know that I never have countenanced and I never will violation of the law in respect to protests.

It is very interesting to see what happened; I didn't know what was going to happen. But I thought here was a place to again—I have done it many times on campuses—draw the line on this. Sure, I had some questions in opposition to my position but, on the other hand, the overwhelming majority of the students as well as the town people made very clear they agreed with that major premise.

Now I think we are throwing away, if we follow what I understand to be your position of not appearing in public hearings, a great educational force that the Administration can't justify.

A PRESIDENTIAL DECISION

So, I close with these questions. I ask them, Mr. Secretary, in the greatest of respect, but I think the record should show and I will state all three, one after the other, and then you can comment now or later. I would like to have you state for the record whether we are to understand that you are refusing to testify before this committee in a public hearing in regard to not only Vietnam but other foreign policy matters. For example, I think the Congo matter, which Mr. Macomber called me about the other day in Lafayette, ought to be discussed before the committee. Here is one that I think could be very appropriately discussed in executive session first and then maybe at a subsequent meeting make any public statement that ought to be made. But I would like to have the record show that you are refusing to testify before the committee in public hearings with regard to foreign policy, with particular reference to Vietnam.

Second, I would like to know whether or not this is a presidential decision.

And lastly, I would like to know if, for example, if you would object to making this transcript public, because there is going to be a great deal of interest as to what happened here this morning in regard to our discussion of public hearings. It may very well be that the committee decides that it shouldn't be made public, but nevertheless I would like to know whether or not the Administration through you would have objections to making it public.

RELEASE THE TRANSCRIPT

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, I can answer your first two questions together, I think. One is that I am not—I have not taken a constitutional position here of refusing.

What I thought I had been doing was consulting with the committee on this question. I had an invitation from the committee. I came back with another recommendation that we do it in another way. I understood we were going to talk about that in the committee here this morning, so, as I indicated at the very beginning of my remarks this morning, I do not feel that I am today involved in the underlying, or the possibly underlying constitutional point.

It seems to me that we ought, first, if the committee would wish it, to talk about the question of what is wise to do in this circumstance, in this situation. So the first two questions I would not

accept as the framing of the issue that is in front of us now as I see it.

On the third question, I would be glad to look at the transcript and certainly I don't think there is anything that has been said thus far that I would object to being released.

NOT A DISCUSSION OF FOREIGN POLICY AS A WHOLE

Senator MORSE. I do hope, and I finish with this, but I do hope, I agree with you that the subject matter is the broad subject matter. But I do hope at the conclusion of the meeting this morning that we can find out what your position would be in answer to my two specific questions as to whether or not you are standing on what you think, which I disagree with, but that is all right, you are refusing to testify as Secretary of State before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate at a public hearing on foreign policy, including Vietnam.

Second, I think we ought to know whether or not the position that you take is the position that is based upon a Presidential decision.

Secretary RUSK. I would like to have one further comment to your first question. I had not looked upon this discussion as involving foreign policy as a whole. I have been, as I indicated in my remarks, I have been in public session, what is it, six or eight times—several times this session, and I have—I thought the issue had arisen rather specifically with regard to Vietnam.

Senator MORSE. Of course, if we use Vietnam as a precedent, and we accede to your refusal, you extend it to any other foreign policy matter any time you want to extend it to, whether it is the Congo—

Secretary RUSK. Of course, in some of these other foreign policy matters, some of these same considerations would apply as you adverted to and as I did in my own remarks.

For example, you and I might—I might want to have to look at the transcript on this if we release this testimony, you and I might agree on the tragedy of recent events in Greece.

But my problem is not just to criticize but to find a way to help get Greece back on the track that other members of NATO would like to see them on. I can't do that by saying some of the things publicly that I may have in my own mind, that you may have in yours, in my particular job as Secretary of State. This is a real dilemma, not only for the Secretary of State in this country, but for foreign ministers in other democracies.

COMPARISON TO BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS

In the case of the House of Commons, they give notice of questions so that the answers can be carefully thought about and they can be, I think, taken to account, the responsibilities of the foreign minister. Of course, there are supplementary questions so they can be elaborated, but we don't have the custom here of giving notice of questions. So that sometimes it isn't easy for a Secretary of State on the spur of the moment, particularly before a great committee of the Congress, to respond. At a press conference you can brush the question aside or just give a platitude and that is the end of

it. But one doesn't do that with the committees of the Congress, not very readily.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through?
Senator Aiken.

A UNITED NATION

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, I didn't understand that the scope of this meeting this morning was limited to the question of whether the Secretary should appear in executive or public sessions. So far as I am concerned, I think he should appear for the purpose of giving us information as to the thinking and the operations and objectives of our government in the fields of foreign affairs, and it is immaterial to me how I get that information.

In the last few months we have been getting it largely from, as it relates to Southeast Asia, from people who have been there, from the armed services or otherwise and they come back and tell us what they know about it.

I can well understand the President's disappointment that he doesn't have a united nation back of him. I don't know what the percentages are. In fact, the way questions are put, they are very difficult to answer anyway, like that referendum taking place in San Francisco today; I believe it is worded, "Do you want an immediate withdrawal from Vietnam?" Well that word "immediate" would certainly kill it for me, because it is out of the question. You can't withdraw immediately.

But if the President wants unity in this country, he certainly would have it if the Vietnamese, North Vietnamese, or Cuba or France or Russia or anybody else started dropping bombs on Front Royal or Silver Spring, we would have unity in this country very, very fast and there is no question about it.

But, I regret that some speakers have by inference indicated they thought those who criticized their judgment in carrying the war 10,000 miles from home were not wholly loyal to the country. I don't go along with that. I agree, probably some of them have not, but the others you always have some of them, but I do think you can criticize the President's judgment and not oppose his policies.

As I said, I want to get the information and it is immaterial how I get it, whether it is a private or executive or public hearing.

I would say there are some things that ought not to be told in public hearings. But the question of China, and I think the public got the inference that perhaps our objective was to contain China and protect, certainly protect Southeast Asia from China. My own knowledge, I realize that every country in Southeastern Asia, including Cambodia and all the rest of them, are scared to death of being overrun by the Chinese.

WHEN THE U.S. WITHDRAWS FROM VIETNAM

But that leads me to question the statement which the Administration has made that when we defeat the Viet Cong and North Vietnam in no uncertain manner, we will promptly withdraw from Southeast Asia. I believe the term six months has been given.

The question I would like to ask is, if we withdraw immediately from Southeast Asia with our forces, how are we going to protect those countries from a billion Chinese Reds, assuming they are Red

by that time. We can't withdraw, can we? As long as we remain a strong military nation, how can we withdraw?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, it has not been in our thought that we would withdraw from positions that we have been holding for some time in the Pacific. We have bases in the Philippines, in Okinawa, Guam. We have forces in Korea. We have not contemplated from the very beginning of SEATO we would maintain standing armies in Southeast Asia in the SEATO area.

I think this would depend upon the solidity of the settlement there. We do have considerable mobility. I would think it would not be, at least the seven governments who have been carrying the battle there in Southeast Asia, felt that it was not necessary to maintain standing forces of other countries in South Vietnam, once certain conditions have been achieved.

Now, there is no contradiction, I think, between that and the maintenance of alliance arrangements and guarantees.

We have alliances in this hemisphere but we don't have standing forces in the countries that are protected by that alliance.

I think that the answer to that would be that we do not anticipate that we would maintain a standing force in Vietnam beyond the time that the governments indicated they would do so following a statement of settlement, but we would have in the background forces in the Pacific and a high degree of mobility in case they were required again.

Senator AIKEN. And arrangements for naval bases.

Secretary RUSK. No. We are not—

Senator AIKEN. None at all?

Secretary RUSK. We are not planning bases in South Vietnam itself.

ENDING THE WAR WITHOUT A FORMAL AGREEMENT

Senator AIKEN. Do you think it is impossible to end the war without the signed agreement between North Vietnam and the United States?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I do, Senator. That is one of the major alternatives which we not only have thought as a possibility, but we have experimented with it somewhat.

Senator AIKEN. As a probability?

Secretary RUSK. That is, it may be that this situation may terminate more like the Greek guerrilla situation terminated rather than a formal agreement.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Did you say it is impossible?

Senator AIKEN. Impossible to end a war, it is impossible to end a war without a formal signed agreement?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, yes, it is possible to end it without—

Senator AIKEN. It is possible, that is what I thought you said.

Secretary RUSK. It is possible without a formal signed agreement.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

A PROCESS OF DE-ESCALATION

Secretary RUSK. We have tried on a number of occasions to start a process of de-escalation. For example, in the first part of this year we did not bomb for a period of almost four months on a ten-

nautical mile radius of the center of the City of Hanoi, that is 300-something square miles. We said to the other side, "Now we are not asking you for an exact quid pro quo. We are going to do this. We will be impressed if you would do something comparable in the Saigon area or in the Demilitarized Zone or any other place where we could take notice of it, and if you think this is a good idea we can build upon that and increase the areas on both sides." But we didn't get any response from that.

And there have been other efforts to try to start the process of de facto de-escalation to see if that would be possible even though it might be difficult on all sides to have a formal agreement to that effect.

Senator AIKEN. Would you be surprised if along in the Spring you saw indications that the Viet Cong, the North Vietnamese reached a point where it might be possible to de-escalate? Would you be surprised?

Secretary RUSK. We don't see indications of that at the present time but that is one of the things to which we are completely alerted at all times. We watch the incident rates. We watch the number of attacks. We watch the location of the attacks to see if there is any trend that has a political connotation to it.

VIET CONG DEFECTORS

Senator AIKEN. I notice you make a point of the increased number of defectors from the Viet Cong now. When did we stop calling them refugees?

Secretary RUSK. Oh, the refugees are rather a different group. The so-called defectors, the Chu Hoi people, are people who were former Viet Cong and who come in and say, "I was a Viet Cong. Here I am and I want to rejoin the body politic, the society." Then they are given some schooling, they are put back into jobs.

I can tell the committee very privately that on Thursday the Saigon Government expects to announce a Cabinet and I think there is—I am told there may be an ex-Viet Cong member of that Cabinet in one of the Cabinet posts.

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

A WAR AGAINST IDEOLOGY

I don't want to use too much time and quite refer to your press conference because I think people have referred to that frequently to soothe their own thinking, but in the press conference you referred a number of times to Asian Communism, implying what this was all about, and the rhetoric of the Administration is replete with the words "communism" and "communist." Yet the Administration tries to convince the other side it is not fighting a war against the ideology. And here is the question:

Do you think the American people would support this war if Hanoi was not governed by a Communist regime. Would it make any difference to you if the North Vietnamese had a monarchy? Would we still be fighting them? That is more or less hypothetical.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I think if under the SEATO Treaty we had a commitment which covered South Vietnam and required us to take steps to meet the common danger in the events of aggression

by armed attack that would apply regardless of the ideology of the country delivering the attack.

Senator AIKEN. These questions I am asking are more or less in a sense spot-checking.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I understand, sir.

SOVIET ORBITAL MISSILES

Senator AIKEN. For the last one I would say: In your opinion, does the Soviet orbital missile violate the spirit if not the letter, of the existing agreement pertaining to control of nuclear weapons?

Secretary RUSK. Well, if the missile itself went into orbit and contained a nuclear warhead, this would be a clear violation of the treaty.

Senator AIKEN. But you would never know.

Secretary RUSK. But we would have a pretty good idea if they orbited such missiles as to whether the pattern of them indicated there might be missiles involved. But these suborbital missiles are not strictly in orbit in the sense of the space treaty.

Senator AIKEN. No, they are not.

Secretary RUSK. But I don't want to leave the impression that we are clapping hands about it or are thinking this is a good development.

Senator AIKEN. Well, as I remember—

Secretary RUSK. But thus far, our examination of it indicates there is not a violation of the space treaty.

Senator AIKEN. I think it would be far less dangerous to an enemy than our underwater nuclear fleet.

Secretary RUSK. Well, there are many technical problems that seem to me to impose some limits on such a capability. Orbiting nuclear weapons in space would open up the possibilities of technical malfunctions and all sorts of things that would add a new element of danger even from the point of view of the government that puts them there, and I would suppose that that would not be very far.

ASIAN COMMUNISM

If I might make a very brief comment on your reference to Asian Communism, there has been a rather sharp difference since about 1960–61 between Communists in Asia and Communists in Eastern Europe on the question of the strategy for pursuing world revolution.

In the case of China they have pressed a doctrine of militancy to the point where they are relatively isolated in the Communist world, and they have been doing something about it in a good many countries. It is this brand of militant Communism that we have sometimes referred to as Asian Communism in order to distinguish it from the peaceful co-existence doctrine with all its imperfections and qualifications that is being discussed in Eastern Europe.

We don't, for example, at least I don't, see anything in Hanoi that points toward Titoism. It is true that the North Vietnamese themselves would not like to be swarmed over by the Chinese. But, on the other hand, Tito's relations with Hanoi are just about as bad

as between any two countries in the capitalist world, not quite as bad as between Moscow and Peking.

Hanoi is moving on Laos and as been sending infiltrators into Thailand, so that to draw a closer analogy you would have to suppose that Yugoslavia was going after Austria and Greece before you could draw a parallel as to whether Hanoi might be another Tito.

So we don't see any connection, except for the point that the Vietnamese, they clearly do not appear to be ready to be absorbed by the Chinese.

CUBAN COMMUNISM

Senator AIKEN. The morning papers report that at a party in Moscow yesterday, the American ambassador attended and the Cuban ambassador refused to attend. Where does that leave that situation? Do you know why Cuba would not go? Is she joining the Chinese or the Albanians or who?

Secretary RUSK. There has been, we know, some argument between Moscow and Havana about the tactics to be pursued by Communist parties in Latin America, and there again the issue seems to be between militancy on the one side and a popular front technique which the Soviets rather supported in Latin America.

There are important differences between some of the Latin American Communist parties and Castro and this has given rise to some frictions. The Cubans were not invited to make a speech along with others in Moscow. This led the Cubans to stay away from the party, and we hope this will develop somewhat further.

Senator AIKEN. It might be that some of the delicate arrangements which I believe you referred to in your press conference are working here or there.

That is all; I have used my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

A MISTAKEN POLICY IN VIETNAM

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, you are not here to discuss Vietnam policy this morning and I shall not proceed upon that basis. Suffice it to say as a preface to my exchange with you on the subject of your appearance this morning, you are aware, I am sure, that throughout your incumbency and before, I have thought my country was involved in a mistaken policy in Vietnam. That policy has undergone a number of changes. I submit that your reply to Senator Aiken just a few moments ago about the retention of bases, of the removal of troops, appears to be considerably different from the statement from the Philippine conference in which the President referred to the removal of troops within six months. I won't go into detail but I just use that as a possible illustration of the fact, I believe, our policies there have undergone an enlargement, particularly since your last appearance before the committee in public session.

Now, I would like to come to that particular question for which you are here, about which you are here.

For your information, when we considered this in executive session alone a few days ago, I moved that the chairman be instructed to communicate to President Johnson the deep concern of this committee about the threat to public communication between the Exec-

utive and Legislative Branches on a subject so vital as war and peace, on a subject the cause for which American boys are sent to fight and die.

When Senator Mansfield suggested the meeting which we now have, I promptly withdrew the motion because I thought it was much better that you come, as you have done today—if you are looking for the Philippine statement, I have it here, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I am looking for the Manila, I am listening to you, Senator.

Senator GORE. Just to save you looking for it; I have it. Will you hand it to him over there?

I really didn't wish to make a point except it illustrated, I think, our whole program has been undergoing changes there. With each step of escalation there has been the broadening of the conflict and your recent statement about vital American interests being involved in Vietnam, it seems to me, is an enlargement of the policy and certainly enlargement of the issue.

A CONSTITUTIONAL PARTNERSHIP

But to come now to the question, if I may have your attention: You said right in the beginning that you were not dealing with this as a constitutional matter in your appearance this morning. The constitutional question is involved, and I wondered if the Executive Branch alone should arrogate to itself the determination of that question. It seems to me that both branches of government have constitutional responsibilities and rights.

The Senate has a limited constitutional partnership with the Executive, the President, with respect to the Nation's foreign policy. I am sure you concur in that.

Now, in pursuance of our responsibility of advice and consent, we have, this branch of the government has responsibility and particularly this Committee, and then Section Five of the Constitution, it is for the Congress to determine what sessions of its committees will be made public. There is not only a constitutional question involved here but also a statutory one to which the Chairman has already referred.

Then, Mr. Secretary, there is a third point I would like to make and that is our joint obligation in a democracy to public opinion, to public education, to public enlightenment. It is, after all, a government, as Abraham Lincoln described it, of, by and for the people.

Now, I wish to suggest that it might be wise for you to consider a public appearance and particularly if this committee, after this consultation, should determine that in its view its constitutional responsibilities required a public session. I submit this is a question on which both of us have the duty and right of position.

Now, if it be determined between the Executive and the Legislative that a public session is in the public interest, then I suggest, Mr. Secretary, that this committee, in my view, will be very reasonable, extremely reasonable, not only as Senator Morse has suggested, with every member refraining from pressing the point which you would prefer to answer in executive session but I think, and this is only an opinion of mine, the committee has taken no position so far as I know, I think it would be possible for your staff

and the committee staff, subject to your approval and the committee's approval, to work out areas of sensitivity, to work out methods of procedure, to work out the *modus vivendi* of a public appearance which would safeguard the interests which you rightly consider relevant and difficult if not dangerous.

Senator LAUSCHE. Al, would you yield for a question?

Senator GORE. I have finished.

ISSUES FOR HEARINGS

Senator LAUSCHE. On what issue would you hold the hearing? Would it be on pulling out of Vietnam? Would it be on stopping the bombing? On what issue would we hold the hearing?

Senator GORE. Well, I would think the involvement of the national interest and the policy with respect thereto. I would not want to confine it to particular issues such as pulling out or bombing. So far as I am concerned I have never had a word to say about bombing. I considered that a tactical matter. Not one time have I referred to that, ever. So I would think, to answer your question, if we are to have a review of policy in Asia, it ought to include the whole question—China, Russia, future equation between the major powers, Southeast Asia, the smaller nations and the bigger nations. I would not want to be restrictive in it.

I had concluded, Mr. Secretary. I just pass these views along for you to consider, and I think it is good that you come and I am delighted Senator Mansfield made the suggestion, because I consider it is a threat if you should finally, if this Committee should insist upon your appearance and you finally declined and the President supported you in that, then indeed, it would be a serious matter.

TROOP WITHDRAWALS

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, just one or two comments, if I may, on what Senator Gore has said.

In the Manila Communique the statement was made with regard to troop withdrawals that—and allied force troop withdrawals:

They shall be withdrawn after close consultation as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration and the level of violence there subsided. Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled.

I don't recall anything that I said to Senator Aiken that seemed to cut across that in any way. It seems to me those two are quite consistent. I will be glad to review the record to see if by any chance what I said to Senator Aiken was ambiguous on that.

Senator AIKEN. No cameras.

Senator CASE. I think, however, it is a matter for us and a very serious matter to keep this debate to put it in the high level and to have it because the public has to have these things discussed. And they are not being discussed at the Pentagon, and they are not being discussed at Indiana University in circumstances like this, but let us provide the forum.

A HEARING WITH A GOAL

Senator LAUSCHE. I will yield after I make this statement.

In my type of a hearing where you are wanting to reach decisions, it is essential at the very beginning to determine what the issue is. Then you have a hearing of affirmative or negative proof on the issue.

But these hearings that we have been conducting have been an exchange of arguments with no goal sought.

Now I yield to you.

Senator CASE. If the Senator would just yield once more, we could meet this point by having a series of questions presented ahead of time and I would not agree with your formulation of the issue; I think it is much too broad and provocative and what not. I do not think you meant it to be a final choice.

Senator LAUSCHE. What would the hearing be on?

Senator CASE. You can have your voice and I can have my voice. I have questions I would like to ask.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest the Senator from Ohio has had far more than his fair time.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am just going to conclude in half a minute.

A HORRIBLY UNJUST ATTACK

Now the matter of yellow peril, it was a horribly unjust attack made on you, and if the charge of yellow peril is to be made, is it not also to be directed at Truman, at Eisenhower and Kennedy?

Truman felt that the Communists should not be permitted to move into South Vietnam. Eisenhower succeeded in achieving a peace. But after the peace was achieved, huge numbers of troops were kept in Korea to stop the Communists from moving southward.

When Kennedy became President, there were 500 troops in Vietnam. When he died there were 19,000.

Senator CLARK. It is absolutely wrong.

Senator LAUSCHE. It is absolutely correct.

Do you challenge the number I have given?

Senator CLARK. I certainly do.

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, let's get the figure and put it in the record.

Do not squirm, Joe. I have the right to speak. If I am wrong in the figures, we will put them in and correct them.

That is all I wanted to say. I am for a public hearing but not a public harangue and a public debate where one man is before us and 19 of us are shooting at him.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, if I might have a brief comment.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

REGRETS FROM INDIANA STUDENTS

Secretary RUSK. I thank Senator Lausche for his generous personal remark, but I think I owe it to the students of Indiana to put a postscript on what he read from.

It is true that an instruction of that type was circulated. In the audience of about 4,000, there were about 150 who felt themselves subject to this instruction, and they did create, as some of you may have noticed on television, a considerable amount of disturbance in the course of my remarks. I am receiving a delegation of Indiana students on Thursday who have circulated a petition throughout

the student body to express the regrets of the students of Indiana University over this episode.

I think that ought to be in the record, because I do not think that this in any sense—

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Secretary, I do not think any type of apology is necessary. I saw you on television and you had my deepest sympathy. When you were finished with a sentence, they yelled, "Lie, lie".

Senator MORSE. I think the Secretary came out of it very well. Always that is the case when you deal with these extremists. Frank talks about this group of extremists. I have time and time again, I have been at least a dozen times in the three and a half years with this rightist student group parading through the auditorium while I was speaking, picketing outside, making all of these things; I came out stronger each time, stronger than I went in because the whole mass of the student body leaves them just as they did in Indiana. This is part of the price of freedom I talked about earlier today. That does not bother me.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will Carl get for the record the correct figures on the number of troops?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, he will get it.

STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT ON CHINA

Secretary RUSK. And finally, Mr. Chairman, I might just pass along for the convenience of the committee and its staff, not necessarily to be put in the record, a compilation of statements made by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson and their Secretaries of State on the problems of peace in Asia, including many references to China along the way.

Senator MORSE. They ought to be in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

SECRETARY'S VISITS TO COLLEGE CAMPUSES

Senator MUNDT. I think Senator Lausche made a very special point which may move us in the direction he suggested if we had a series of hearings on a very special point about the responsibilities of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate in world affairs, which I thought were very fruitful.

We had one dealing with the Chinese situation which I thought proved very fruitful and in which I think you made your best presentation that could ever have been made.

I am not convinced that just a public hearing on the war after we have been fighting it for five years would serve any public interest, although I must say that if it is going to be part of a package, to go to college campuses to subject yourself to a kind of dissention we have heard and get thrown at you questions which would be rougher to answer than the ones we would ask, I do not see how you figure out that the only place you can appear to answer questions would be the Foreign Relations Committee if you are going to do it publicly with them.

I think it is a mistake to go and get into that situation, not because of the impact on the student body—I am prepared to accept that you did some modicum of good at Indiana University, but I think you created a great wave of dissention across the country as

a whole, as a consequence of that, and I think you have to examine your whole card a little more carefully.

If you feel part of the job of informing the public is to get into these debates with college students, I do not think you have very strong grounds to say, "I do not want to do this with the Foreign Relations Committee."

I think perhaps you ought to get a new pattern of performance to carry this message that you should carry to convince conventions of people at formal meetings, of responsible people where you are going to get a tentative hearing, if the question is going to be asked would it be more circumspect than if you just subject yourself to what you know is a plant of a purposeful effort in order to create dissention across the country as a whole.

It is not just what happened on the campus, but ramifications all over the place. So I am not convinced that, one, public hearings of a general nature even before our Committee will be in the public good, but I see no reason why we should be blackballed if we are going to have them all over the country in front of college campuses.

I would like to say a word or two about this press conference which has been the subject of discussion before our Committee.

I sympathize with you. I think this was a shameful distortion of what you said, but as one who earned a considerable proportion of his living on the public platform a decade and a half before he came to Congress and has watched what happens when we give talks and hold press conferences since I have been here, I can realize what happened because I think you did leave a vulnerable point.

PAST EXPERIENCES WITH THE PRESS

I can appreciate the great difficulty. I had an experience in public life when I was acting chairman of the House [UnAmerican Activities] committee that was handling the Alger Hiss case, and one night the son of a dear friend of yourself and a good friend of mine, Larry Duggan, jumped or was thrown out of a high rise in New York City. I got called out of bed about 2:00 a.m. to come down to a meeting with detectives and policemen and FBI men and reporters at headquarters to see whether or not we had anything in the files about Laurence Duggan, which we did. He was on the list of five people we were expecting to call.

So I told them that, and the thing dragged on into the middle of the morning, in the wee hours of the morning, and some reporter said, "Give us the names of the other ones", and I said "I do not want to do that."

"When will you give them to us?"

I said, "When they jump out of the window."

Well, all hell broke out; I was pilloried in all the papers. A man wrote a book against me. Frankly, I should have said, "When we call them."

I suffered for a long time, not without embarrassment and not without criticism, but I survived and I am still here.

But I think you made an error. If that happened in a press conference, I do not criticize you for it, but you should have said in your opinion, in my opinion, not something which would let a pur-

poseful fellow distort what you said into yellow peril, but what you said this morning, as you said many other times, there are a billion Chinese under Communist control over there. You would have been a target, in my opinion, instead of letting the door open.

I do not say this in criticism, but I think we all learn from our mistakes and I think you would have been better advised to tell the story more precisely and certainly could have eliminated that particular problem.

A FIELD DAY FOR PROPAGANDA

I would like to say this, that I think our communication with the Administration is suffering not from public exchange, you are talking all the time and the President is talking all the time and we are talking all the time. This is part of the public exchange.

I think we are suffering from not having enough meetings of this type, executive sessions, in which we can get into the matters which need to be discussed.

I am not so much concerned about the fact that a public hearing might be divisive to the American public. I think it might or might not, but I do think that a public hearing might be very disturbing to the rest of the world. I think if we ask you a question and you have to duck it because it is not diplomatic to answer it, the mere fact that you cannot answer it conjures up for the propagandists to draw a whole opportunity to have a field day and make their own interpretation of what the situation happened to be.

I think this dialogue is useful.

SELLING THE PACKAGE

About 15 hours ago I was addressing a state meeting of bankers out in California which was also addressed by members of the panel, by three good friends of yours, so they said, and you would know better than I. The one was Mr. Foster, one was Mr. Prager, and one was Mr. Barnett; they did a tremendous job with these bankers of selling the administration position, and the national position, as to why I think we are in Vietnam, and why I think we cannot pull out of Vietnam. They put it not on the basis that we had some kind of commitment there, SEATO, or we had some kind of moral obligation. They did not get into that aspect. They did not get into the aspect that we were particularly concerned about trying to raise the standard of living by sacrificing tens of thousands of American lives over there or to have an election in which it would be appropriate to have the mayor of Saigon selected by American electoral standards.

They said this is basic to our security and they did a wonderful job of selling their package on that.

Senator MORSE. Karl, could I interrupt for a moment? Joe Clark has to rush to Philadelphia to vote. Would you permit him to intervene for just a moment and then you resume when he goes?

Senator MUNDT. We can establish rules of the game as to how long it will take as to whether it takes away from my time.

Senator MORSE. I just thought he ought to say what he wants to say.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE MILITARY

Senator CLARK. I appreciate what the Senator from Oregon has just said and the usual courtesy of my friend from South Dakota. I do have to go to vote for an important election in Philadelphia and I have appointments up there. I would like to say a couple of words and then I will be free.

Mr. Secretary, in your opening comments you referred to the fact that the conduct of the war was not discussed either in World War II or in Korea, and I have no doubt you are correct. Personally, I do not want to hear about the conduct of the war for I can get that from the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and if necessary from the newspapers. What I do want to hear about is our foreign policy: What it is; why it is that way; what is its justification; why has it changed so drastically since the election of 1964; what further changes can we expect almost week by week.

I believe that we have almost reached the state in this country where the influences of the military are slowly but surely becoming a danger to our democratic values.

One of the principal weapons of the military is secrecy. I do not like to see the Secretary of State contributing to what is essentially a totalitarian technique by refusing to appear in public session before this committee.

PACIFICATION PROGRAM IN VIETNAM

Among the questions I should think should be asked you in a public session would be some reference to the condition of pacification in the country. A very reputable reporter whose views I have a high regard for told me the other day that in his judgment the pacification was a mess. A group which I chaired had the opportunity to hear Mr. Luce discuss the problems of pacification and peace in Vietnam. What he had to say was disturbing to me and other senators who heard him.

Ambassador Reischauer has just written a book about the Asian policy.¹ I would like to hear the Secretary of State say what is his difference of points of view.

Finally, in my judgment there can be no unification of thinking about Vietnam nor is there any relevance to a discussion about a debate. We are not interested in debate. We seek information. We do not want to conduct a debate upon the forum of a public hearing. Nobody is suggesting that.

Senator LAUSCHE. That is not suggested.

Senator CLARK. I am not yielding. Nobody is suggesting we should pull out of Vietnam. This is a straw man only put up to be knocked down.

I would hope we could discuss these matters with some maturity and with a minimum of emotion.

Mr. Secretary, you know the high regard in which I hold you. I do hope you will decide to come down here in public session under the appropriate safeguards which we are prepared to set up.

Thank you very much.

Thank you very much, Senator Mundt.

¹ Edwin O. Reischauer, *Beyond Vietnam* (N.Y., 1967).

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY BEYOND VIETNAM

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, if there is a moment and I realize the Senator would not be able to stay, but I would like to make a very brief comment.

As to the matter of what is our foreign policy and what it is all about, I think it is interesting to take note of what is happening in 1967 despite the pain and difficulty of Vietnam.

The Kennedy Round was completed, the Monetary Funds agreement on liquidity was achieved, the Space Treaty was ratified unanimously by the Senate. The Consular Treaty was ratified with some difficulty, but nevertheless with a very strong vote. The Latin American presidents did decide to move to a Common Market in the next decade. The Asian Development Bank, thanks to the help of this committee—

Senator CLARK. Mr. Secretary, I know you make a darn good case but I have to go.

Senator CASE. You should do it in public before the committee.

U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, do you happen to know the military personnel in Vietnam when Eisenhower went out; it was around 700 instead of 900.

Secretary RUSK. Just over 600.

Senator Clark. At the time of the assassination it was 12,000.

Secretary RUSK. President Kennedy made the decision to increase those forces to the level of about 17,000.

Senator MORSE. That is 17,000?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. Were they there at the time of his death or on their way?

Secretary RUSK. That is true.

Senator MORSE. They were there?

Secretary RUSK. As a matter of fact—

Senator MORSE. I am sorry, I apologize.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt really has the floor and he yielded it only for a limited time.

Senator CASE. He is not going to talk for an unlimited time?

Senator MUNDT. No.

THE U.S. AS A PACIFIC POWER

It would seem to me, Mr. Secretary, if you are going to appear before our committee in public that you ought to concentrate on the basic objectives which we have. I do not know how you are going to eliminate this kind of debate to include that, but we are either there or we are not there because of the security interests of the United States. I think we are there for that reason. If we are not, you lose another supporter this morning.

But I have heard you say you are there for that reason and that to me is a prevailing argument if it is true.

I think we are there because, not, I do not care if there are a billion or ten billion people in China, if, they are under the Chinese Communist domination, and part of this whole movement of the

Communists to take in their neighbors, move out by encroachment on territory, we have a legitimate interest.

I think we are there because we have to maintain our position as a Pacific power and if we do I do not think you can isolate Southeast Asia.

I think you emphasized altogether too much the fact that we have an interest in Southeast Asia. I think we have an interest in the Pacific. Our 50th state sticks out there quite a way in the Pacific. I think if we do not maintain the right area of accommodation, friendship with Japan, and Japan goes in either with China or Russia, we are in one hell of a fix in that situation and that is in our interest.

We have a firm treaty obligation with Formosa in the Pacific. The greatest job of colonization in the world was done under the aegis of the U.S. in the Philippines, it is in the Pacific, and I think you should sell your argument that this is part of our responsibility as a Pacific power, and this is one of the areas but not the whole business, and not the whole thing to be concerned with. But if it is related to our being able to maintain ourselves as a Pacific power, that is my main point.

TRADE WITH THE ENEMY

Have two basic criticisms and I am not going to close without saying them because I deplore the way there have been so many civilian injections into the military decisions in Vietnam, and you are immunized from that.

I deplore even more completely the indefensible trade policies of supplying material to the enemy which is shoring up the capacity of Ho Chi Minh to fight, and I do not know whether it is your policy which you sold Johnson or Johnson's policy which you enunciate, but I think it is something we have and I have two questions.

CHINESE SOLDIERS IN VIETNAM

In the Pacific papers yesterday, the West Coast papers, and on the radio and television, I heard a lot of discussion in the last few hours that just recently they had found, some Chinese soldiers among the people who were killed in this last big, battle in Vietnam. I think if that is true we should know about it. If it is not true, we should be told it is not true.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, we have asked for clarification of any information they have out there locally. I heard those press reports. We do not have anything back officially. There are a good many ethnic Chinese, both in South Vietnam and in North Vietnam, and some of those are in the armed forces. We have never had any information that any personnel of the Chinese armies in China have been, in South Vietnam, but quite frankly, we do not have anything further on that.

Senator MUNDT. I know you have told us that before.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir. We do not have information on that.

PROPOSALS TO NEGOTIATE

Senator MUNDT. Secondly, how many times have we indirectly or directly requested to negotiate? I heard the figures 28.

Secretary RUSK. Earlier this year, just as a matter of reminder, I put together a list of some 28 proposals that have been made by ourselves or the other governments or groups of governments or other personalities to which we had given what we thought was an affirmative response, to which Hanoi—which Hanoi turned down. That does not include large number of private contacts.

So that the answer would be many dozens. I would have to count to be more precise. But the 28 are those that are on the public record.

Senator MUNDT. That is good enough for my final question. I want to ask that one based on my own experience based on a little I know about human psychology. I do not know very much about human psychology, but I know most of the fellow around this table have been in many political campaigns, some of them tough, some of them easy, usually in the process we have a series of debates. On some occasions my opponent halfway through the campaign has suggested to me directly or indirectly we call off the debates. He does not like the way they have gone.

What has been my reaction? To try to schedule more of them because when my opponent wants to call them off, I figure he does not think they are going well.

Is there a danger? I feel there is. A danger of going too frequently with cap in hand to Hanoi and saying, "Let's negotiate". Where the other fellow begins to feel, either because of a division of support at home or some other thing, he figures the tides of faith are going against us.

KEEP ALL CONTACTS OPEN

Are we defeating our position by going there too frequently?

Secretary RUSK. Senator, that is one of the factors that has to be taken into account by making judgment about these matters. We have felt that there are other considerations that would override that particular point. I would not deny that that is a point that has to be weighed, but we do believe that it is important to keep all the contacts open, to keep all forums open, to keep all channels open so that it will be easy and simple for us to hear the important signals when the signals are there to be heard.

I think we also owe it to our own people and to our own troops in the field and to our allies not to have inadvertence or inattention stand in the way of a peaceful settlement when the times comes.

This is a complex matter. The point you make is one that we have discussed. It is one that was expressed to me by a neutral Asian leader at one point in terms of the psychology of Asia. But I think these other considerations on balance point the other way.

Senator MUNDT. Well, I wanted to be sure you were giving it concern. The collateral thing is, even though you decide it is wise to continue it, there is some thought that should be given as to how wise it is to keep telling the world about it if we have a lot of uncommitted guys not on either side who also react with the psychology of human beings. I shudder to have you get up sometimes in front of Indiana University and say 45 times we have it or 50 times, but I think this is something you have to keep uppermost in your mind as far as the neutrals and the uncommitted and the

enemies that do not like us who are in the field against us. I think there is a danger that this will be interpreted as a weakness.

I am certainly in favor of keeping the lines or communications open, but I just utter a note or caution in that connection.

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON THE WAR

Secretary RUSK. I think, Mr. Chairman, it might be worth noting that the President made a very important statement in his San Antonio speech at the end of September in which he said—

Senator MUNDT. The best speech he has given on the war, by the way.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. That the bombing could stop when it would lead promptly to productive discussions, and we assumed during such discussions North Vietnam would not take military advantage of the cessation of or limitation.

Now, there is a public statement of an attitude which Hanoi knows about, knew about. Hanoi did not come back and say, "Well, now let's look at this. What does promptly and productive mean." They did not come back and say, "What do you mean by not taking advantage?" They simply rejected any such formulation out of hand because it was a condition on their condition, their condition being that we must stop the bombing permanently and unconditionally.

But I think this formulation, it seems to me, to be just as reasonable and fair as one could be expected to go in any situation in order to get talks started, and these were rejected both publicly and privately.

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the patient Mr. Pell.

U.S. PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, I have a note delivered to me from the Department of Defense.

December 31, 1960, personnel in Vietnam, 900. December 31, 1963, 16,300, and I ask that this discussion about the troops that just took place, Senator Hickenlooper's questions, be put in the record at the point where I was discussing the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Mundt.

SUBORDINATING U.S. INTERESTS

The Chair opened up with some references to Palmerston who is a great pragmatist, and I must say one of the quotations alluded to is when he said:

We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.

When you read English history, you will find his objective was to follow the interests of the British, and as those interests changed he changed policies.

The reason why this question has come up and the Secretary coming down here is that some of us believe that we are subordinating our interests to pre-established policies, and if we are wrong we want to find out why we are wrong and where we are wrong

and see why the interests may change; why the policies do not change with those interests.

Another historical point here that the Secretary raised was in connection with the question hour. Actually, as we all know, the real guts of the exchange in the Commons is not through the scheduled question that is submitted a week in advance, but the supplementary questions that come and everybody knows.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I referred to the supplementaries.

Senator PELL. I know you did and that is really the whole meat of the exchange here.

ADVANCES IN TELEVISED PROCEEDINGS

Another point to make it more pleasant, since you televise hearings for everybody, the Secretary and us, I have often wondered why we are not aware of the fact you do not have to have bright lights. Television equipment is such today that they can do it with this kind of lighting and they just need a little nudge from the appropriate committee chairman in order to avoid those bright lights that bore into the witness's eyes. He does not have the same privilege that the other men in the committee do have, being able to leave, at more frequent times.

I would hope if we did have televised hearings, this thought would be borne in mind.

RUNNING AGAINST HISTORY

The questions that I would like to see raised in such a hearing if it were held would be, one, the question of what are our real interests, and then, too, the thing that buffalos me completely is how it is that with the Soviet Union putting in two and a half percent of what we are in Vietnam, and China putting in .6 percent, basically this is a battle of Vietnamese versus Vietnamese and we have to overwhelm the opposition to the extent that we do. It would indicate that there is a certain lack of spirit on our side or lack of belief or dynamism, or whatever the word is.

In the long run when you run against dynamism, you are running against history, I think, and I would like to see why we cannot either instill the same dynamism on our side or if we will not have to eventually accept a working out of the two and live with it.

These are rather random thoughts. On balance, I had no closed view when I came into this meeting. I still think it is a close question. I would be inclined if it were put to a vote, I would support the idea there should be some kind of hearings with all the safeguards that can be set up.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you wish to comment on that?

Secretary RUSK. I wish to make a general comment before the committee concludes, Mr. Chairman. But I leave the timing of that to you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Senator Case had to go make a quorum and he said he would be right back. In the meantime, I will ask quite a few questions.

A GENUINE CONSULTATION

I am not quite clear what your attitude is about appearing in public, whether it is on a constitutional or pragmatic basis.

Just what is your attitude?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Senator, I think the members of the committee know my great regard for this committee, and I would hope that the committee would allow me to think further about what has been said at the committee this morning.

I am not—I did not come down here with a dictate. I did not come down here with a closed mind, and I wanted a genuine consultation with the committee on this problem. I think the nature of the problem has been thoughtfully and well explored here this morning from different points of view.

If I could express one point that I think is important. It seems to me there are a good many elements in this problem that could be clarified and that the range of differences could be narrowed if we had a quiet, thoughtful give-and-take around this table about some of those points which have contributed to confusion, and also some of these far-reaching questions such as Senator Pell and others have raised.

“NEGOTIATE NOW”

Now, I have not heard in this committee anyone who says that we ought to pull out of Vietnam. There may be such a view but it has not been expressed this morning, and I recall a letter written by a group of senators, including some members of this committee, that, or a statement that made the point that they did not wish to pull out of Vietnam.

Now, that is a very important point, and it causes some implications. We ought to examine, it seems to me, those implications and see where that brings us, where that leads us.

There is a widespread slogan around the country, “Negotiate now.”

Now that is something, it seems to me, that would be advantageous for the committee and the Secretary of State to examine in great detail on the basis of everything that has happened up to this point on the possibilities of negotiation and the attitude expressed by Hanoi and Peking and Moscow, and these are different—as we know them to be, or think them to be.

There are such questions as the chain reactions which might exist among treaties. What is the effect upon other countries of our conduct under one treaty?

This seems to me to be a very far-reaching question, and I would think that quite apart from this matter of a public session, and I would like to have a chance to reflect upon what was said and be in touch with the committee further about that, that there would be great advantage in a serious discussion, not just asking questions of me and listening to me, but genuine discussion around the table on some of these issues and see whether or not the matters can be pinpointed a little more specifically and some elements of misunderstanding eliminated.

I would hope we could have that kind of discussion.

We spent most of the time this morning on the problem of a public hearing rather than on Vietnam, and I would be glad to continue this discussion with the committee at the committee's convenience if it wishes to do so, or I will advise the Committee later as to reactions to what has been said here this morning about a session.

CONCERNS ABOUT THE REST OF THE WORLD

Senator MORSE. May I make a one-minute comment. I think the Secretary's suggestion that he needs further consultation with the Administration is very important. There are other things that I hope we can get into. I am very much concerned about the Congo. I think we need to be brought up to date. We talked to Bill Macomber over the telephone but we need an up-to-date briefing on that. But I want to say this, Mr. Secretary, again not asking for agreement but I am thinking about the President. I happen to think the President is in very serious difficulty in this country in many places over the very issue we are talking about this morning, whether or not this Administration is going to take the position that it is not going to have its chief spokesman, the Secretary of State, testify before the committee in some public hearing. We are not asking that all these hearings be public. I think the great majority of them will be executive. But I think that it is so important that we have some public hearings, and I do not think they should be straitjacketed hearings.

Going back to my earlier statement, I think after all, as senators from our respective states we have to be judged by what we ask, and you can handle the questions. You have never, as I said, come out of a hearing but what you came out stronger than when you went in, in my judgment. But I do think it is proper for you to have notice in advance that certain questions are going to be raised, but that should not limit anybody from asking any question that he thinks ought to be asked.

But I think we will make a great mistake from the standpoint of the President himself if we establish a policy here of no public hearings. That leaves, and you yourself have pointed out, I think, three or four times this morning, there is a basic constitutional question. If we cannot resolve it without getting into the constitutional question, the constitutional question is going to be raised, and raising the constitutional question on this point for whatever my judgment may be worth, I think will do the President further irreparable damage.

I do not think that millions of people in this country are willing to go along with what they will interpret, no matter how much you deny them by saying we can discuss it in executive session, what they consider to be a serious trend toward government by secrecy in time of crisis.

Senator MUNDT. Will the chairman yield at that point?

Senator MORSE. I am all through.

PRECEDENTS IN PREVIOUS WARS

Senator MUNDT. Let me raise this question. We are not exactly a new country, and this is not our first war. There must be some precedents, maybe you know them, maybe a study has been made

of the relationship of the executive to the Foreign Relations Committee in previous wars. Have we held public hearings?

Secretary RUSK. In my opening statement I pointed out that after Pearl Harbor, Secretary Hull had not appeared in public session.

Senator MUNDT. I remember that incident, but I am talking about the long precedent. What did we do in the Korean war? How about World War II?

Secretary RUSK. Secretary [Dean] Acheson did not discuss the war in public session during the Korean war.

Senator MUNDT. I quite agree with you when you say it is essential to understand that division in the country on the Korean war probably was as great or greater than it is now, and they are pretty much compatible, both of them we got into without a declaration of war. I think there would be some interest in precedents available as to what kind of disagreements the State Department had with the Foreign Relations Committee.

Senator MORSE. I might say precedents of violating a constitutional right do not create lawful precedents.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if we could allow Senator Case—I will return to this briefly. I will desist for a moment, but Senator Case has not had an opportunity.

Senator CASE. You are most thoughtful and I shall be very brief.

OPPOSED TO SECRECY

Most of the points I wanted to make have been made. But there is one thing I would suggest and that is there is a very great difference, in my judgment, that ought to be recognized by all of us between short-term operating matters and long-term policy. I think there is a tendency on the part of the Executive Branch to want to have secrecy for both, and I think we ought to insist that that not be done, not in our interest but in the interests of the country.

There is no way, in my judgment, that we can clear up the unhappiness in this country except by a full and free discussion of many things about South Vietnam. The people do not understand, I myself do not understand, the constant repetition of optimistic statements from downtown in contrast to the almost unanimous somber reports that come back from the reporters on the scene. Now this is just the plain fact.

They do not understand why a group like for instance the Ripon Society says that our present course can only be successful if we wipe South Vietnam from the map and create a nation of refugees, the scorched earth operation.

These things have to be discussed and they are not short-term, they are long-term.

[Adam] Yarmolinsky had a piece in the Post the other day on the anniversary of the Cuban missile business and he said he shuddered to think, I will get it right here, one shudders to imagine the cost of any national debate at that time, that is to say about decisions, about that immediate crisis "being carried on against a rising volume of bird calls from the assorted hawks and doves."

This makes a distinction. This is a short-term operating matter as to which secrecy is absolutely essential and I would defend it, but not long-term policy and not long-term operations, not the

facts, basic facts, as to how things are going, how we expect to win, what our broad policy is in Southeast Asia. I think that unless we do get in this committee the kind of discussion about this thing, there is likely to be no place where we can get it. We are not going to get it in public meeting.

Senator PELL. Will the Senator yield?

DEFINE OUR LONG-TERM INTERESTS

I would like to support very much what you are saying because, when you were out of the room, that is what I was saying. What we are trying to define here; what are our long-term interests. If we do not have a long-term interest remaining on the mainland of Asia, then are we right in maintaining the efforts we are at this point to make sure that the area does not go against us. I think these are the things that could be properly explored without getting into short-term numbers games or what is going to happen next December.

Senator CASE. I do think this is true, and I see no way of drawing the country together except by talking out these differences and these conflicts which I am not surprised the country is confused about. I am confused as to whether we are making any progress or whether we are not, and the way our arguments from downtown and from other places do not meet but go off on tangents from each other. I do think, Mr. Secretary, if there is some way we can work this thing out, the discussion of ground rules is absolutely in order. I think we ought to do it. It does not answer the kind of questions that I have had for months and years now to say we are in a good cause; that it is desirable to maintain a balance of power in Southeast Asia; that our friend Premier what is his name in Singapore, his life is in danger if we get out or as he says, we are going to have communism from the tip end of Indonesia through India up through the Middle East if we pull out. We are not arguing about that. Well, we just need a discussion of the facts as to what is going on on the long-term basis. The only other thing I would say is that there is a little bit of feeling that I have had that some people are trying to stir up opposition in order to get sympathy for the policies of the Administration. This is not a hard thing to do because you have got a bunch of jerks around who will come right up to the bait every time you tackle it there, and you will make them ridiculous and you will get sympathy. I do not mean you have done this, sir, but I think it is quite possible that unless we provide a dignified forum for thoughtful discussion, the thing is going to deteriorate into something which is going to lead to very bad trouble and greater division in this country.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

NEED FOR A SERIOUS DISCUSSION

Secretary RUSK. Senator, I do not know what might be involved in the suggestion that some people are trying to stir up opposition in order to create sympathy.

Senator CASE. I do not say it as a matter of intention, that may be the wrong way to put it, and you are right to correct it. I say the effect is this and the effect is to remove from serious discussion the matters that I think must be seriously discussed. It is possible

that the Administration is in error in certain matters, and I think it ought to meet serious criticism and discussion.

Secretary RUSK. Senator, yes, we are involved in questions here that we all ought to approach on our knees from time to time.

Senator CASE. That is correct.

Secretary RUSK. Questions that test the human capability to their limits, and that is why I made that suggestion that we have a quiet and thorough and sober discussion.

DELAYED RELEASE OF HEARINGS

Senator CASE. May I say one thing about the matter of executive hearings. I would be happy to come any time for any kind of hearings that anyone else wants, but I have felt in a sense this has added to confusion. We get Senate subcommittee hearings for instance on the bombing of North Vietnam. They buzz around each day about what was said. Then the matter goes into limbo for about two months and then the hearings come out as if it were said today, a lot of statements that have no bearing on current matters at all come in and further screw up the picture. This I think happens again and again when you have delayed release of executive committee hearings, and it is not your fault—it is not anybody's fault, but it does tend rather to confuse than to help clarify in the public mind facts that they should have.

CONTRADICTORY POLICIES

The CHAIRMAN. You remind me or you raise a very important question about what the purpose of this is. Senator Mundt said he attended a meeting and representatives of the Administration—I understood he said to be your men; I guess they were from the Department—did not sell the war, the justification, on any of the bases of treaties or commitments but it was vital to our security that we stay there, as I understood him, and to control this area. Yet only last week we had a hearing with Mr. [Arthur] Goldberg, speaking also for the Administration, that we were willing to go to Geneva and to urging—in fact recommend by the Security Council to go to Geneva to return the Geneva Accords and have an election, and if and whenever that election is held, it of course would mean the withdrawal of our troops and our manpower from the area, and I believe he suggested a neutralization.

Well it seems to me this is directly contradictory. You cannot both be there to restrain China and get out under the Geneva Accords. The Geneva Accords were designed to liquidate the war with the French and to remove the French and if we return, and if we should, and if he means what he says, and I assume he did, it seems to me you would have a direct contradiction of spokesmen of the Administration.

I do not know how you resolve these. Of course another basic question to me is about this matter of national interest. You raised, or someone did, the question of we are spending \$30 billion a year roughly. We are losing—and we all know how many men in casualties compared to what the Russians and the Chinese are doing, the major Communist powers. If this goes on very long it strikes me we are weakening ourselves very substantially and we are not promoting our national interests. On the contrary we are weakening

the United States relative to the Communists and that this role, if pursued long enough, would mean the demise of the United States as a great power.

These are basic questions as to the wisdom of the course we are pursuing, and I had always assumed that the function of the Senate and the Congress generally was to participate in the discussions to resolve which is in the national interest.

AN ASSUMPTION OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST

The assumption that it is in our national interest in the war is an assumption, that is just an assumption. And I cannot help believe that out of the 19 members of this committee or the hundred members of the Senate there could not be distilled a certain amount of wisdom.

I agree with you that all the wisdom and infallibility does not exist in the executive in this or in any other executive. I thought the distinguishing characteristics of our system was that the participation of representatives elected by the people with the Administration would reach a, more likely reach, a wise policy than just leaving it up to them directly.

If the Senate wishes to leave it up to the President, it can. Most of the countries in the world do that. The great majority today leave it up to what is the equivalent of the President.

Senator PELL. Excuse me, but the President is also a member of the parliament in many parliamentary systems.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the general basis, if we leave it up to the President, do we have a function to play or not? If we do not, all right. I think we do. But if the majority thinks we do not and we leave it up to the wisdom of the President, that is their privilege. Congress can abdicate its responsibilities if it likes.

Secretary RUSK. Senator—

The CHAIRMAN. There is this basic question of what is the national interest. Is it to pursue a war that is costing us roughly 30 times—leaving out the money, it is hard to calculate lives—or not, and the disruption that grows out of this—we all know what is happening here domestically, the conflicts that are going on right now in the Congress over domestic programs, some of which all of us or most of us only two or three years ago were supporting, are going down the drain.

My view is that it is not in our national interest.

Here is a little country, if you take Vietnam itself, we said originally at some time it was for self-determination and so on. My commitment is not to the people or South Vietnam, it is the people of Arkansas and the United States. That commitment overrides all the others. If I think it is against their interest I cannot see how I have a right not to say so. I think if we are doing something to the long-term detriment and safety of this country and of my own constituents, I think it is my duty, if I am the only one to speak out, I think it is my duty to say that I think you are undermining the long-term strength of the greatest democracy in the world and one of the few democracies left. That is the way I look at it.

THE SENATE'S ROLE IN SENDING TROOPS

Senator CASE. If the chairman will just yield here for one final observation, I have to go to the Appropriations Committee. I think this is a matter of the utmost importance and utmost seriousness.

The CHAIRMAN. I do, too.

Senator CASE. One of the reasons we are now told by a great many people who have doubts about whether you should have gotten into this in the first place is having committed so many people there, having put—strike that word “commit,” it is a terrible word—having put all the strength we have there, we have laid on the line the question of our prestige to the point where we cannot withdraw.

Now, who put them there in those numbers, and why did the Senate not have something to say about it. It is said, I have heard it said—I am not asking for comment, if it is wrong, fine—that the Security Council met on this question years ago and decided to go in with force in great numbers up to more than we have there now already. We were constantly told all during the period from then to now that something of this sort was never contemplated.

This is the kind of thing which is involved here, the long-term policies of the United States of America, not short-term military operations, are we going to bomb up there tomorrow and talking about it is going to endanger pilots' lives. I am against this entirely. But somewhere along the line we have got to call a halt to this kind of thing by which the executive branch, by itself, without reference to and in fact denying that it is doing so, is putting this country into the sort of position that we are in today, and this is all part of the background.

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, may I make a comment?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary RUSK. First, there was no such meeting of the National Security Council.

Senator CASE. I am glad there was not.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you mean recently?

Senator CASE. Years ago.

CONSIDERATIONS OF TROOP STRENGTH

Secretary RUSK. No, the question of troop strength required has been considered in relation to what the other side does, and those questions have been decided as the decisions—as decisions to send particular troops out there. There never has been any overall projection in the future.

Senator CASE. There must have been some thoughts as to how far you would go before you put U.S. military on the ground.

Secretary RUSK. Of course, President Kennedy faced that very directly, and he was the one who made the basic decision if we had to use military power in Southeast Asia we would do it in South Vietnam and not in Laos, Laos being a landlocked and difficult country, and this was a basic decision.

Senator CASE. I think it was, that was my impression.

Secretary RUSK. It was not until seven months after the Tonkin Gulf resolution that the level of U.S. forces in Vietnam increased substantially beyond the level established by President Kennedy,

and that was a very long time after the present President Johnson became President.

THE SENATE HAS EXERCISED ITS FUNCTIONS

Mr. Chairman, on your comment it seems to me that these are not questions that just arose afresh in the last weeks or last months. Surely the Congress, and particularly the Senate, has addressed itself to these questions in the past, all along the way, and has exercised its function. The Senate has approved with overwhelming votes these various treaties that we made in the Pacific Ocean area. It did so because these treaties were considered to be in the vital interests of the United States.

As far as the Secretary of State is concerned he must proceed on the basis that the security of Southeast Asia is vital to the national interests of the United States and to world peace because the Congress in 1964 declared that to be the case with two dissenting votes.

I have no other guide from the Congress as a corporate body. That is the Congress' view.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you speaking now of the Tonkin Gulf resolution?

Secretary RUSK. I am speaking now about the second paragraph of it which was not Tonkin Gulf but Southeast Asia. Senator Morse voted against it so I cannot direct my statement to him on this, but this idea is not a new idea. It underlay the making of these treaties in the Pacific. President Kennedy and President Johnson and their Secretary of State have not come down here to the Senate with new alliances. What we have been trying to do is work things out like the nuclear test ban, the space treaty, the consular treaty, and the East-West trade and questions of that sort, if you will give us a chance. We are not trying to promote the U.S. into being some policeman of the world under some dogma and far-reaching for power's sake, but we do have a very serious question on our hands if we let the word get around that our treaty commitments may not mean what they say.

KHRUSHCHEV AND KENNEDY IN VIENNA

I must tell you in all seriousness that I have in mind an exchange which eats on my soul.

Senator SYMINGTON. I beg pardon.

Secretary RUSK. Which eats on my soul. In Vienna in June in 1961 when Chairman Nikita Khrushchev said to President Kennedy in effect, "Get your troops out of Berlin or there will be war," it was necessary for President Kennedy to say to him then, Mr. Chairman, there will be war and it is going to be a very cold winter." and with that expression the two shook hands and took their departure.

Now if Chairman Khrushchev had said to him, "Don't kid me, Mr. President, because I know your people won't stand up to it if I put the pressure on," there would have been war.

Now the possibility of deterrence, the possibility of avoiding this notion of the credibility of the United States, it is true that we did not, and we perhaps ought to look back at the whole record in history of this. The alliance itself did not deter the efforts of North

Vietnam to move into South Vietnam and into Laos. But this is not the only place where this question of credibility is very important.

So these are things we ought to discuss around this table, it seems to me, as thoughtfully and as soberly as we can, to see where we are in terms of those underlying interests that Senator Pell mentioned and some of the other factors that are involved. But this is not a matter on which the Congress has not performed its function. It has performed its function in the key—when the key decisions were made, the key decisions were made along the way.

GULF OF TONKIN RESOLUTION WAS A MISTAKE

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Secretary, I regret you brought up Tonkin Gulf because I publicly apologized and stated I was mistaken. I think it is a great—Senator Case has also discussed this at length and I do not know that we have time to raise it again, but when I reviewed the record of the briefing we were given by the Secretary of Defense, in particular, and we spent, the combined committee spent an hour and 40 minutes considering it under an urgency that it had to be done immediately to have any effect, it is hard for me to believe, as the Senator from New Jersey has said in extenso, and I do not want to go over it all now, we do not have time, that that constitutes a deliberate judgment on the part of this committee and the Congress on the fundamental questions.

Just frankly between you and me, I think we were had, we were put under pressure of an immediate action. We spent an hour and 40 minutes with almost no questions about that matter, and we voted it out under the impression that this was an emergency, and that if we expressed the degree of unity immediately this would have some mysterious effect of restraining the North Vietnamese. I have already gone into it in great extent.

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to burden the record of why I did it. I am convinced I made a serious mistake not to oppose immediate action, to have had hearings at that time, to have gone through the kind of procedure that I have tried to follow and urged this committee to follow since that time, so that we do not take precipitate action under conditions that are represented to us to be of a great crisis nature by the leading spokesmen for the Administration.

I regret that this kind of question as to the vital interests of the United States is based upon that particular action which under any, it seems to me, common sense consideration, would not be considered a deliberate, thoughtful, serious consideration of what our interests were.

The debate on the floor only took place, I mean did not occupy but just a few hours. The Senator from Oregon, who, as you all have rightly said, has the clear record of being right on that occasion, was allotted almost all the time the second day. We had one day of debate in the afternoon. It did not last, I do not think, over three or four hours, and it was by unanimous consent the next day because of his position he was given, I think, two or three hours. He was entitled to it. That is all the debate was, if that is a deliberate decision of this body to judge the vital interests of the United States' staying in Southeast Asia, of controlling it, well, I think is

a distortion of its meaning, I do not consider we have had that kind of deliberation.

Yes, I will yield.

RECONVENE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE

Senator LAUSCHE. If you were wrong in August of 1964 and you believe you are right now, what do you propose affirmatively we should do to remedy the wrong?

The CHAIRMAN. I have proposed this in long written statements and in innumerable oral statements. Briefly what was proposed, as I had understood it the other day, and in the discussion by Mr. Goldberg, let us assume we are successful, just to illustrate what I would like to see happen, is that the Security Council would take affirmative action, as I would assume we have some influence with these people, and we would have to establish in their minds that we mean it, that they reconvene the Geneva Conference after recommendations of the Security Council because that would give it a prestige and an importance beyond anything we could do bilaterally. They would return to that. The President himself on past occasions has made statements that led me to believe he would be satisfied by returning to the Geneva Conference, and following the basic principles of that conference as to how to resolve our questions that have arisen in Vietnam and in which we in a sense have taken the position of the French, and that is the way—that is the procedure I would follow.

But basic to that, Frank, is the decision in the mind of our own government on this vital one. Is it vital to our interests to remain in Vietnam to protect Southeast Asia and India and so on from the possibility of Chinese expansion in the future? That is a very—it seems to me, the guts of the question.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you propose pulling out?

The CHAIRMAN. If it is, then of course we should not go to Geneva. We should do what we are doing. If it is not vital that we remain and maintain a physical military presence in the area, then we ought to follow Geneva, it seems to me. It is an oversimplification. You said pull out. To pull out has the implication that we just drop our arms and walk out.

AN ORDERLY WAY TO NEGOTIATE

What I am saying is that in an orderly way we negotiate through return to Geneva and accept the basic principles there of how to resolve it. In that sense we do get out of a physical presence on the mainland. This is by no means giving up any of your seapower or our airpower, the bases we have and and so on. This is, as I see it, the crux of the matter.

Personally it does not at this moment seem to me a physical domination of Southeast Asia or any part of it or South Vietnam is in our national interests because the cost of this is way out of proportion to what we get for it.

The Senator from Missouri has made the point time and time again that by our involvement there and by tying down our troops and the vast expenditures of funds and lives and money and especially attention, we are endangering other areas in the world of far greater importance to us. These are all matters you have to weigh

to balance one against the other, and the Senator from Missouri made that point on several occasions and I thoroughly agree with him. I think it is very pertinent to this kind of issue. You balance off what is the most important to the long-term strength and security of our country, and to assume that it is in the national interest to stay there you are assuming the very question at issue. I do not accept that as it is yet. It has not been proven.

Senator SYMINGTON. If I may—

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Missouri really came in late. He is entitled to the next if he wishes. I yield.

NEGOTIATING WITH THE VIET CONG

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, believe me, I have the most complete sympathy with your problem in every way. I do think that you have a problem yourself, if I may say so respectfully, as to how you cut the pie of our limited resources.

With that premise, there is just one question I would like to ask at this time. My impression from Ambassador Goldberg was that if we got to the Geneva Conference through the Security Council, which I would most earnestly hope we do with this continued unfortunate business, the U.S. Government would be willing to have the Viet Cong, which therefore would mean the National Liberation Front or vice versa, participate as a full negotiating member at that Geneva Conference. Is that the position of the Administration?

Secretary RUSK. Well, that is something to be negotiated in connection with the possibility of such a session because—

Senator SYMINGTON. But you see here is the point, if I may go on. If that is subject to negotiation—I came in on a plane; I apologize for coming late. I read in Time or Newsweek that this is the position of the United States based on the testimony of Ambassador Goldberg before our committee in open hearing. Now if it is, to my mind it is a long step forward. The little plan that I advocated has been conspicuous by lack of comment on the part of the Administration no doubt because it was premature. But I did suggest that we have the South Vietnam Government, which is a little inclining forward, agree to negotiate with the Viet Cong or National Liberation Front.

Now, the press through a weekly newspaper, not a morning report or the day after a hearing, feels, I read it this morning, that Ambassador Goldberg said that if we could get to Geneva that he would be willing that the United States, as our representative, would be willing to have the Viet Cong participate in the negotiations as a full participating member. One of the reasons why under the proper controls I think that an open hearing is now necessary because of the growing unrest in the country, is that if this is a matter for negotiation it certainly was not left that way with the Committee the other day by Ambassador Goldberg.

DIFFERENT WAYS OF NEGOTIATING

Secretary RUSK. Well, I would have to look at the exact language he used because as a full participating member is the point I would raise because no one—

Senator SYMINGTON. I just raise the point.

Secretary RUSK [continuing]. Not even on the Communist side recognizes them as a government. If they sit at the table as a government with a veto on the result, then I query whether this advances us toward a solution better than to find ways to have them suitably represented and heard.

Now, there are many ways of doing this. Remember the two Germans sat at a Foreign Ministers meeting with their table six inches behind or something of that sort. Now these are things we are prepared to talk about with those who can stop the shooting but we have not gotten Hanoi, Moscow, and Peking to that table yet. They have not raised this as a condition for coming to the table, and indeed the noises from the other side, and I may not be able to leave this if this record is to be—the part that might be released at some stage, there seem to be some indications that they believe there are two kinds of discussions that ought to take place, one between us and Hanoi with respect to the issues between us and Hanoi, because it is Hanoi that is responsible—

GIVING AWAY NEGOTIATING POINTS

Senator SYMINGTON. I have been in a good many negotiations in my day and a good many business trades. Why do we always hedge it? Why do we not first try to sell it and then hedge it if necessary in the trade?

What good is it for Ambassador Goldberg to tell the committee something in an open session that you have to say we have to negotiate.

I will carry it a little further than that. One thing that disturbs me a great deal was that there was an editorial in the New York Times last January 26 and it said one of the worst kept secrets in the country was the difference of opinion on the one hand between the Secretary of Defense and on the other hand the President, the Secretary of State and the Chiefs of Staff.

To me that was the most unfortunate comment. I think it is the type and character, as much as I believe the war has been badly plumbered from a military standpoint from the beginning, I believe this is the type and character of problem that shows, some way has to get before the people, under whatever rules would be advisable for a hearing. I have changed on that because I think the people are totally restless and have a great lack of understanding, and at least to some extent, I know this is not true of you. They are beginning to feel they are being misled.

Perhaps it is fair to say they feel they have only been given part of the truth and, as the lawyers say, partial truth is an evasion of truth. This disturbed me because I got the very definite impression from Ambassador Goldberg if we could fight this very difficult thing to do, which for me looks about impossible with the Russians having a veto on the Security Council, nevertheless if we could get it through the Security Council to the point where we did get to Geneva that we would let the Viet Cong come there. Yet you as the Secretary of State and a more important person in the Administration said this morning this would be one of the things to negotiate. So we get mixed up is my point.

WHAT AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG SAID

Secretary RUSK. May I make two points on that. My understanding of what Ambassador Goldberg said, the members of that conference could and would make the necessary decisions as to participation of the National Liberation Front and the form that that participation might take. He indicated—

Senator SYMINGTON. Somebody has given you some notes can you read them. All I know is my impression was we can do it and I know it is confirmed in the press. It is just an illustration of the general misunderstanding of what is going on between the various countries.

Senator SPARKMAN. Will the Senator yield to me very briefly?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. I want to say this: the record requires very careful reading.

Senator Gore is the one who put these questions, followed them up very carefully. Ambassador Goldberg gave a peculiar sort of an answer. He first said we will not stand in the way. He said it in a more or less negative way, and he never said anything more than, I believe, if it gets to the point that our vote is required, it will be available.

I believe those are almost the exact words that he used. I thought at the time that he was using rather peculiar language in answering, and I did not construe it as being our inviting, but if we are put up to it, put up against it, we would not refuse.

PUTTING YOUR CARDS ON THE TABLE

Secretary RUSK. Well, the President said two years ago that the presence and the voice of the Liberation Front is not an insuperable obstacle, but, Senator, surely in a negotiation in the business field you do not start a negotiation by putting all your cards on the table.

Senator SYMINGTON. You have not put any on in a couple of years. You have had a rigid position.

Secretary RUSK. There have been 14 points, elements of a peaceful solution. There have been 28 proposals made to get something started. There have been points by the dozens and dozens and dozens put forward on which we get no response from these fellows in Hanoi.

Senator SYMINGTON. My statement is overstated. But I know they gave had four positions in there—and stop the bombing was only one of the four.

But I also know we have had a very rigid position against negotiation with the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese, and the Viet Cong and the National Liberation Front as a separate entity. After my fourth trip there in recent months I am convinced we are not going to get anywhere unless we just pulverize this group, and then you are not sure what is left unless we do negotiate with the National Liberation Front and the Viet Cong.

Based on the questioning of the Senator from Tennessee my impression was just what the Senator from Alabama's impression was, that there was some give here and it is grabbed for by the people like thirsty people in the desert, as maybe there is some re-

laxation. I do not think we are going to get anywhere unless we did and that is why I put it in the suggestion that I made, and why I was so impressed with Ambassador Goldberg's remarks. If it was deliberately cryptic, I am sorry because I thought, he was being positive about it at least to some extent. But it is the type and character of the thing that I believe we have to clear up with the people if we are going to do anything about this increasing unrest.

PRESS HANOI ON NEGOTIATIONS

Secretary RUSK. I would offer one brief comment in regard to the comments last made by the chairman as well as by Senator SYMINGTON here.

It would be important for this committee to know, and I think we can go into that in great detail, whether the chairman's argument, for example, is with us or is with Hanoi. It will be very helpful for the chairman to say to Hanoi, here is what I think you ought to do in terms of coming to a Geneva Conference and trying to take some of these processes of peaceful settlement.

I think the letter which you signed at one stage did in fact press Hanoi on that point, but we do not object to a Geneva Conference or the Security Council's dealing with this or any of these things. But there is no chair there for Hanoi. Hanoi says they are not going to do it.

So we are still left with a problem.

THE HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. I cannot read Hanoi's mind but my impression is the uncertainty, it is in my mind, and I think in the minds of certain members of this committee who have already spoken, to what our real purpose is is one of the obstacles to a conference. They have had conferences before. They went to Geneva and they believe, and I think with some reason, that the conference, that they agreed to a settlement which was, it was, run out on, that was not carried out. That is ancient history.

They also had an agreement with the French in 1946 which clearly the French backed out on. I think if it is uncertain as to what our purpose is, I can see where they would not wish to go to Geneva or anywhere else. He would just have to fight it out, if our purpose is that our control, military control of South Vietnam is in our vital interests, therefore we are going to stay there, then there is nothing to negotiate about.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, may I read, just to make my point on this?

Secretary RUSK. But we have not said that.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know. I am uncertain about what this is.

Senator Mundt a while ago said some of your spokesmen convinced him that, leaving out all the resolutions and treaties and everything else, it is in our national interest to stay there and he sold the bankers in California on this, and they all approved of it.

Secretary RUSK. Well, to stay there while there is a fight, there is a question of security with the people coming in from the North, but that does not mean to stay there.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not what I understood him to mean.

As long as China is there and not in a friendly mood, which could be a very long time, depending upon how we treat China. I thought that is what he meant, not just during this fight.

AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S POSITION

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me just read this for the record, Mr. Chairman, the last two paragraphs in Time magazine of November 10. Under the heading "The War", "The Real Stalemate", is the heading:

On the Senate side, talk of turning the Vietnam question over to the United Nation rumbled on, with Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and Minority Leader Everett Dirksen both supporting such a move. The Foreign Relations Committee also heard UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg clarify for the first time in public the Administration's willingness to allow the Viet Cong to participate in Security Council peace talks.

While the UN to date has shown no interest in tackling the Vietnam dilemma, Goldberg said also that if the Geneva Conference is reconvened, the U.S. will not argue with the Conference Co-Chairmen, Russia and Britain, about invitations or agenda. Thus, the Viet Cong could participate in Geneva talks with no American objection—a significant softening of the U.S. position to date.

Reading that, I was pleased. If it is not right, then the people have been misled either by Time magazine or by Arthur Goldberg or by both, or by somebody, or they just made a mistake. It is hard to figure. But if this is not right, I think that ought to be corrected fairly promptly.

Secretary RUSK. I think the transcript of the Goldberg hearing is here, it is in front of you; in connection with the Security Council he referred specifically to Rule 39 of the Security Council under which they have in the past invited representatives of the Jewish Agency and representatives of the Arab Committee, and people of that sort. He was not specific in terms of the status either at Geneva or at the Security Council. That is something to be determined when we, if we, get that far. This has not been raised by the other side as the key that unlocks the door to a meeting of the Geneva Conference or to negotiations.

We are, you would be interested, we are listening now to see whether Hanoi is going to make any comment on what Ambassador Goldberg said. As of this morning they made no comment.

LOOK AT THE TRANSCRIPT

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask a couple of questions and I want to raise a couple of points of procedure here. I think the Secretary is right. Let's reread what Ambassador Goldberg said in the transcript. That speaks for itself.

I remember he made clear several times talking about nine votes needed to make a majority and what he said was if our vote—we are not going to initiate it. We are not going to compose it. If we get to a point where our vote is required for the ninth vote, we will not stand in the way.

I think I quote him exactly when I say, "We will not stand in the way", and that was brought out several times. So I know what it is to be quoted incorrectly by Time magazine as well as most of the other press of the country.

Senator CASE. Most of the people would give their right arm to be quoted at all.

Senator MORSE. I want to say first with Arthur Goldberg, we ought to look at the transcript.

PRESS THE UNITED NATIONS TO INTERVENE

I have two other points I want to make. I want to associate myself with the chairman, with your general thesis that you expressed here just a very few moments ago, although as I said at the hearings the other day and the Ambassador said he wanted to limit himself to discussion of the Security Council and not the General Assembly, I want to add for this record, of course I do not think you are going to get it through the Security Council.

You might, as I said in the hearing the other day, get them to refer it to the General Assembly, but suppose they do not even do that.

I still would press for General Assembly intervention and have them lead us into the reconvened Geneva Conference. But all I have ever been insisting on or you have been insisting on is we tried this approach which leads me to the last point I want to make before I bring up the procedural matter.

I am glad to have my memory refreshed again because I had heard it before, and I know it is a fact of that famous conference between Khrushchev and President Kennedy, and I think President Kennedy was exactly right. I think he made the correct reply to Khrushchev, because of the vital interests of the United States and because of what would be involved in connection with our position with Russia. But I do not think to argue analogously from that that the same situation is involved in Asia has any relevancy at all. That is where I leave the Secretary and the President.

I do not think we have ever had any right to take the position that we were going to unilaterally as a military policeman set up our military posture in Asia, and say, "We are going to enforce what we think ought to be the international policy in Asia." That is where I leave the Secretary.

It is why I think we need the kind of discussion we are having here this morning.

A CONSTITUTIONAL MATTER

I think in broad outlines there is a need for the Administration to explain to the American people its position in a public hearing. I just do not think you can possibly justify a continuation of the Secretary, and I think that is why I asked the question when I got up here, expressing a Presidential point of view, because I think, I do not know, I probably should strike the word "think" and substitute the word "suspect", that the Secretary's position that he has taken on public hearings is also the President's.

So that does raise the constitutional issue. We will have to fight that one out on constitutional grounds. It is not going to promote the kind of bridge-building that I talked about in my opening statement this morning. But I certainly think that we should not draw that line now.

The Secretary is absolutely right in saying that he does not want to get into the constitutional matter now. I do not think we should until there has been further consultation between the Secretary

and the President and further executive conversation with the Secretary and this committee.

I am not precipitous in these matters. I think you ought to do everything you can to find out if you can find a common ground of agreement and work from that ground if you can. I want to say very definitely, however, as a United States Senator, I will not stand by and not raise the constitutional issue in regard to a matter that I think is of vital concern to the welfare of the people of my country.

I do not think that the advise and consent clause, according to my sights, can be emasculated the way it will be emasculated, the constitutional rights of the committee, the rights of the committee to determine what kind of hearings it is going to have under the Constitution, I am not going to stand by and permit this Administration or any other to emasculate it.

I have already said to Clifford, he can cite all the precedents you want about Secretary of State Hull or Acheson or anybody else, that does not create a constitutional right. If it is a wrong precedent it continues to be wrong no matter what other Administration wants to make the same wrong.

But I think the Secretary is entitled to have an understanding with us now. He is going to have to go out and face the press and I think we ought to try to reach a procedural agreement in the closing moments of this session this morning. We owe it to him not only as a matter of courtesy and decency, but we owe it to him because he is Secretary of State and through him owe it to the country, that we have an understanding that he will announce, I hope that we can reach an understanding, that he is going to further pursue this matter with the full understanding of the committee at some appropriate time next week.

CANNOT LET MATTERS DRIFT

There is just one of these things that you cannot let drift. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that you can obtain from the Secretary, it was my suggestion to the Chairman and members of the committee that we agree when we break up this morning to meet again at a time convenient to him, but in the reasonably near future, for discussion of this and resolution of it where we can agree to public hearings; that he be given our assurance that we respect his problems in those public hearings and will continue to respect them, but they are going to be public hearings unless the President, who is his boss, says no. If the President says no, then it removes the conflict from the committee with the Secretary as far as I am concerned, with the individual senators, the committee does not want to do it in conflict with the President of the United States.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say a very brief word.

AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG'S APPEARANCE BEFORE THE COMMITTEE

Mr. Secretary, first I want to comment on Ambassador Goldberg's appearance before the committee last week. I think every member of the committee felt that it was a very fine appearance. I think it did more good to the morale of the committee than any-

thing we have had happen in a long time. I felt it was like a breath of fresh air.

Senator PELL. Amen.

Senator MORSE. Right.

Senator SPARKMAN. I believe that it met with approval throughout the country from various press reports I have seen, and so forth.

THE MAKE-UP OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

There is one thing that disturbs me and that is the difficulty of getting as many as nine votes. It appears we will be able to get eight, but there is difficulty about the ninth. When we look at the make-up of the Security Council and whether we consider some of them who ought to be some of our staunchest friends, it seems to me without arm-twisting but just with good moral suasion, we ought to be able to get that ninth vote which I think would have a terrific impact upon this whole situation. I hope that every consideration will be given toward an effort to get that ninth vote in the Security Council, and that this matter be pushed seriously and conscientiously in the Security Council. I think it would mean much, if we could get that resolution through.

The CHAIRMAN. If I might add to that, I think one of the reasons that would bar maybe a country like Ethiopia is the uncertainty as to what our real long-term purpose is there, it would be in my view.

But anyway, I think this is a matter that was helped if we really mean it. If we want Geneva, we have to clarify for their benefit, the members whose vote you are solicitating.

SOVIET EFFORTS TO BRING HANOI TO NEGOTIATIONS

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, under conditions of very great privacy, I would like to put my finger on what I think is the most difficult problem about this matter. We know that this year the Soviet Union has made at least two efforts in Hanoi to bring them into some sort of negotiation. We know they were rebuffed both times.

At the present time the Soviet Union is rather quiescent on this matter, presumably waiting to see whether some other situation will develop. You will have noted when President Johnson and I speak about Vietnam, we do not unlimber our blast on Moscow; this is for a reason.

The Soviets tell us that they hope very, very much that we will not press this in the Security Council and have a public eye-gouging debate there against this background. Now this is to me a troublesome point.

Now the President, I, Ambassador Goldberg are going to try to do what we can on this U.N. consideration of this, but I think it is important for the committee to know that this is a very troublesome point.

PRESSING THE SOVIETS TO CALL A CONFERENCE

The CHAIRMAN. What reason do they give for not wishing, because they have publicly announced they thought the Geneva Conference provisions were the proper way to do it?

Secretary RUSK. Their public problem is that Hanoi says this is not the business of the U.N., and the Soviet Union is very reluctant to go out publicly in advance of the position of Hanoi even though privately they may try to do a little something about it from time to time.

Senator MORSE. Does Hanoi say it is not the business of the Geneva Conference?

Secretary RUSK. No, but they will not come to a Geneva Conference. Hanoi continues to say as between the U.N. and the Geneva Conference, this is the business of the Geneva machinery.

Senator MORSE. But, Mr. Secretary, we cannot stand by though and let Russia control us with her so-called unofficial veto power.

Secretary RUSK. I understand.

Senator MORSE. We ought to get the Geneva Conference to go and she is co-chairman. She does not even join with Great Britain in calling for a Geneva Conference.

Secretary RUSK. We have pressed them over and over and over again to call a Geneva Conference, either on the whole problem of Southeast Asia or any part of it. We tried it on Cambodia, on Laos, on Vietnam, on the DMZ, on any part of it or all of it, and they have been unwilling to join in calling them.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you to say that Hanoi has positively said she would not attend a Geneva Conference?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. At all?

Senator MORSE. You mean Geneva or U.N.?

Secretary RUSK. Geneva.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the first time I heard that.

Senator SPARKMAN. Can not Russia influence them?

THE SOVIET UNION'S CHINA PROBLEM

Secretary RUSK. Of course, there is another matter while we are in a very private conversation here. There is some indication that the Soviets do not want a Geneva Conference as a machinery because Peking is there. Now this is not our problem, that is their problem, it is Peking's problem, but I think it weighs in the balance here as to their attitude on this situation.

Senator SPARKMAN. Why do they not work up some other conference such as France suggested?

Secretary RUSK. We have suggested that the two co-chairmen and the three members of ICC meet, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Bebler, the head of the World United National Association made that proposal. We would be glad to see these five countries. That gives them a machinery which does not have to include Peking, you see, or us, or Hanoi, see what they can do. We supported the idea that a group of Asian countries get together without us, without the Soviet Union, neutral Asian countries, to see if they could be in touch. We would be glad to see if these Nobel Peace Prize people could establish any contact that would lead to anything, but their initial

contacts were, in Moscow, the group that went there, without our Mr. Kink, was very discouraging indeed, were very discouraging indeed.

So we will fully explore this situation in the Security Council further.

Ambassador Goldberg has discussed that several times this year at different occasions with different members of the Security Council, so we are not going to cheat on the resolution that is before it, that the committee has in front of it at all. But there are some very complex problems connected with it.

HANOI'S UNWILLINGNESS TO GO TO GENEVA

The CHAIRMAN. Has Hanoi ever publicly stated she would not attend a Geneva Conference if it was reconvened?

Secretary RUSK. Well, she is unwilling to give a go sign to Moscow to convene it, and presumably also to Poland.

One intriguing—we reached one interesting point here about, when was it, two and a half years ago when a Hanoi delegation was visiting in Moscow, and in their joint communique they seemed to look with approval on a Geneva Conference on Cambodia and Laos. We said we thought this would be a very good idea. We understand that at that time Peking moved in in Hanoi and in Cambodia and broke up the possibilities of such a conference. So I suppose that Hanoi is also looking over its shoulder at Peking to a degree, although I would think Hanoi is now in a position to come to some sort of a conference without Peking's presence if Hanoi wanted to. I think they have that much independence at the present time.

A VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The CHAIRMAN. What would be wrong, however, with this being made public through a vote in the Security Council?

It seems to me it would clear the air a bit if we made a genuine effort and they refused, all of the Russians and their—others simply refused to do it, it would improve our position in the public mind if we made a genuine effort to do it.

Secretary RUSK. We sometimes have a dilemma as between those things which would strengthen our public position from the point of view of public opinion, and keeping certain things open as a means of solving the problem.

There are a good many private exchanges which have taken place, which, if we made public, would reinforce the view that we have made extraordinary efforts to try to find a way to bring this to a conclusion. But to do so would mean to let Hanoi know that any contact they have with us is likely to be made public and scare them away from some of the contacts that could be very important.

It is a dilemma we have had, one has in diplomacy, and it is not the first time it has arisen.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

A CHANGE IN EMPHASIS

Senator PELL. A couple of comments, just to clear the record on the colloquy between the Ambassador and Senator Gore when Senator Gore very sagely brought out a shift in emphasis in my view, what the statements were, "We would not stand in the way, we would not prevent it from happening", which would bear out the Symington reference from Time magazine, but it was never stated in an affirmative way and would support the position of the Secretary of it being no, from the viewpoint of the record there has been no change. There has been a change in emphasis.

The second point I wanted to make was that in connection with going to the United Nations, I was struck by the fact that all the witnesses except Ambassador Goldberg, and this includes those who had submitted written statements as well as those who came verbally, said there was no chance of the United Nations Security Council, General Assembly or anybody else taking up this resolution unless the bombing had ceased first. They were unanimous in that regard.

This, Ambassador Goldberg did not agree with in that respect and he thought it would have no effect upon the permanent members of the UN.

A CESSATION OF THE BOMBING

The question I wanted to ask the Secretary was whether he thought, and he is aware there have been exchanges on this subject, and I am struck by the strength with which the North Vietnamese predicate any move on a cessation of the bombing, and I was wondering if it is his view that Hanoi would not come, the answer that Hanoi would not come to the Geneva Conference was predicated in no change in our posture in this regard or upon a cessation of the bombing?

Secretary RUSK. Well, these are matters that we ought to go into great detail on, Mr. Chairman, in executive session when there is more time. But let me summarize a great deal of recent business on this.

Hanoi, in the first place, refuses to negotiate without conditions, that is just start talking as has happened in most of the crises since 1945 where the two sides made contact and talked about things to resolve the crisis. They have raised a condition of a permanent and unconditional stop of the bombing. They varied this word "permanent" a number of ways, sometimes they call it "definitively", sometimes they said "for good", sometimes they said "once and for all", sometimes they said "permanent".

No one has been able to get for us from Hanoi any interest in the stoppage of the bombing that is not permanent.

Now, it has been suggested that what we ought to do is stop the bombing without answering that question. But the trouble is that question will be put to us the next morning, and they will say, "Is this permanent or not?", and if we fail to say that it is permanent then we have the same problem.

Yes, please.

Senator PELL. Excuse me. I will not interfere.

Secretary RUSK. Let me continue just a minute further.

But even so, the President in San Antonio said we will stop the bombing when it will lead promptly to productive discussions and then we stated an assumption that during the discussions the North Vietnamese would not take military advantage of it.

We thought that might at least elicit some repartee, some examination, a counterproposal or some discussion as to what these words meant. This was not a condition on our side with respect to negotiations. It was a qualification of their condition.

Now, no one has been able to tell us, including—well Hanoi will not, therefore no one else can. Hanoi has not even said if we stop the bombing they will come to negotiations.

CREATING A SANCTUARY

Senator PELL. May I make one point here, Mr. Chairman?

I believe the Secretary would be inclined to agree with me that the point has been made to a representative of North Vietnam to the effect that if the cessation did not produce good results in a reasonable period of time, the bombing would be resumed and there was no denial of that fact, and that is accepted in their thinking. Would that not be a correct statement?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we tried to leave them the freedom of action of not addressing themselves to that question that they wanted to on the San Antonio formula, you see. Because we stated lead promptly to productive talks.

Now, the “promptly” is fairly important because we have a good deal of evidence, including documents and otherwise, they have been discussing among themselves what they call a fight and negotiate strategy. Obviously that creates very great problems if they sit there in a sanctuary safe and secure indefinitely into the future while they send their men and arms into South Vietnam while there is meaningless talk, but they did not come back to explore those expressions.

We were ready to talk about those things with them.

Secondly, when we stated the assumption we were prepared for them to ask us what this meant, we could have told them. Now let me say, could I leave this off the record, Mr. Chairman?

[Off the record.]

STATEMENT TO THE PRESS

The CHAIRMAN. Well, gentlemen, the time is going on. I am still puzzled about what to say. We have to say something to the press. Shall I say that the decision about public hearings will be a presidential decision; it has not yet been resolved? We will have a further meeting and at that time we will get an answer; is that it?

Secretary RUSK. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that you would not at this point point to the President on this matter. We have had, I thought, a very thoughtful and thorough discussion here this morning. There are different views on the committee. I have asked for the chance to reflect upon what has been said here in the committee. I wonder if we could not say we had a thorough discussion of the matter; that no final conclusion was reached; that the Secretary indicated that he wanted to reflect upon what had been said here, and the members of the committee will want to reflect upon

the discussion; and that the committee and the Secretary will be in touch again.

FOR FURTHER CONSULTATION

The CHAIRMAN. Then there is no conclusion was arrived at. We had a discussion of the matter but that resolution of whether or not there would be public hearings on Vietnam is left for further consultation?

Secretary RUSK. For further consultation.

Senator MORSE. I was going to say they will ask the chairman when and I do think we ought to have a time bracket.

The CHAIRMAN. We can say as soon as convenient, and probably if they press me I would say next week; is that too soon?

Secretary RUSK. Well, we hope promptly. But we do have—

Senator GORE. That is good.

The CHAIRMAN. Can I say this? They will ask me. I have to say something—whose next move is it. Will we hear from you? Will you notify us as to whether or not—what the decision is or shall we contact you?

Secretary RUSK. I think on that you can say the Secretary indicated he will be in further touch with the committee.

Senator MORSE. Promptly?

Secretary RUSK. Promptly.

Senator Pell, I wonder if it would be useful to say there is a difference between short and long term and if the Secretary did come up it would be on long term.

The CHAIRMAN. I might get mixed up.

The main thing this was announced for was whether there would be public hearings, and the whole point is I have to say something.

I will say this: We discussed the matter and the Secretary wishes further time to consider the matter and the Committee will of course consider the matter further and no action was taken of any kind this morning. We had a discussion, and in the future we hope promptly.

If they pin me down, I will say sometime next week; is that about right?

Secretary RUSK. Yes.

Senator MORSE. Fine.

Senator GORE. I think it has been very helpful, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary RUSK. I have enjoyed it very much this morning.

[Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:20 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, and Case.

S. Res. 180, expressing the sense of the Senate that the Vietnam conflict be brought before the United Nations, was ordered reported by a vote of 19-0.

S. Res. 151, relating to National Commitments, was considered and an original resolution was ordered reported by a vote of 17-0, Senators Dodd and McCarthy not voting.

S. Res. 1418, the passport bill, was considered and no action taken.

[The committee adjourned at 11:40 a.m.]

BRIEFING ON THE VIETNAM SITUATION

Thursday, November 16, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol, the Honorable J. William Fulbright (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright, and Senators Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, and Case.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Holt, Mr. Jones, and Mr. Lowenstein, of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

The committee is very pleased to have with us this afternoon Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, who is in Washington for consultation.

I know I speak for all the committee in expressing our thanks to you for coming here today. I know your time is short and the demands on you are very great and very heavy. We will be glad to have any observations you wish to make, Mr. Ambassador.

I believe you are accompanied by Mr. Robert Komer, your Deputy for Civil Operations.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have others, Mr. Philip Habib, a Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs, and John Negroponte, Executive Assistant to Ambassador Bunker.

Proceed sir.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELLSWORTH BUNKER, UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, ACCOMPANIED BY: ROBERT W. KOMER, AMBASSADOR BUNKER'S DEPUTY FOR CIVIL OPERATIONS AND REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT; PHILIP C. HABIB, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS; JOHN NEGROPONTE, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO AMBASSADOR BUNKER; AND WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS

Ambassador BUNKER. Mr. Chairman, I thought it might be useful if I should give first just a brief summary of the present situation, as I see it, in Vietnam.

Casting up the balance sheet is, obviously, a rather difficult, complicated undertaking involving as it does many factors, questions of judgment, some imponderables. I think in looking back no

one would deny that we had come a long way in the last two years. Certainly that is the opinion of my colleagues in the diplomatic corps who are there and have been there for much longer periods than I.

MILITARY SITUATION HAS IMPROVED

In the first place, the military situation has greatly improved. The North Vietnamese Army has not won a single major victory in the South. On the contrary, it has suffered heavy losses on the battlefield. At home, much of the infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed: An estimated half million people diverted to the repair of war damage; the movement of men and supplies made infinitely more difficult; food shortages have developed. It seems apparent that physically and materially the country has been badly hurt.

At the same time, Viet Cong recruitment has declined since early 1966 by perhaps more than half. Our estimates were at that time the recruitment was some 6500 to 7,000 a month, and now our intelligence estimates are that it is between three and four thousand a month.

The age of the draftees has declined. As an example, I visited a little while ago a hamlet in the delta which was attacked later by a battalion of Viet Cong who were beaten off by the popular forces. The Vietnamese Regulars responded quickly, caught up with them, killed 51 and captured 10 prisoners and weapons; three of the prisoners were 12 years old, two of them were 14, and five were 17. This is being repeated, constantly, as we are taking prisoners.

At the same time, the Viet Cong have progressively denied access to food, with the result that in areas they control they have extorted higher and higher taxes and thus are alienating the population.

PROGRESS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

By contrast, I think it is fair to say that South Vietnam has made substantial progress in a good many ways.

On the political front, there has been a stable government for two years; the constituent assembly elected; a constitution drafted and promulgated; village and hamlet elections held last spring and summer; some 14,000 village and hamlet officials elected. Presidential and congressional elections took place, as you know, in September and October of this year.

Thus, within a space of 14 months and under wartime conditions, five elections have been held.

A new government has been inaugurated.

From a statement made a few days ago by the Prime Minister, and by the president previously, vigorous action was in calling on the people for greater efforts and greater sacrifices.

It has already taken two important steps. A decree providing for partial mobilization, expanding the draft ages from 18 to 33, requisitions of specialists and technicians from 34 to 45 years of age and recalling to service men within the draft groups who have previously been demobilized and extending the service of those already in the service.

Secondly, and I think a very important step, was a decree, law, to become effective January 1st providing that all land and prop-

erty taxes will be administered by, and all the revenues collected for local governments, namely the villages, provinces and the municipalities and the prefectures.

Transferring, as the decree does, virtually all land tax authority to the local units of government, I think this represents really a giant step forward.

Inflationary pressures are severe, but have been kept under reasonably good control while prices have gone up; food supplies are ample.

The Vietnamese Armed Forces are being steadily improved and in many instances have turned in excellent performances. Pressure on the enemy has been stepped up by both the United States and the Vietnamese Armed Forces.

PACIFICATION GAINING MOMENTUM

Pacification has gained momentum.

As Ambassador Komer can tell you, it was somewhat slow in getting started. A vast amount of planning, organization, training was involved in it. The reorientation and re-training of the Vietnamese Armed Forces; part of the Regular Forces being diverted to pacification; and most of the regional and popular forces having responsibility, also, for it. The revolutionary development forces had to be trained. More than 30,000 individuals or cadres, as they call them, have been trained.

I think as of the end of August, there were some 611 teams then operating, and we expect to have 700 by the end of this year.

The roads and waterways are being opened up to traffic, another contribution to pacification. For example, in the Third Corps area, which includes Saigon, twice the mileage can be traveled during the day without military escort as could a year ago, and four times the mileage of two years ago.

Defections under the open arms program or Chu Hoi program, as they call it, are running maybe 50 to 75 percent ahead of last year, I think.

The population under the government of Vietnam has increased from January of '66 to date by approximately 13 percent, according to the Vietnamese government figures, to 70, with 14 percent under Viet Cong control and the balance, 16 percent, being contested. Our figures are a little more conservative. We estimate 68 percent under government control, 17 percent under Viet control, and 15 percent are being contested.

ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

I think one benchmark of progress are the elections which took place in September '66 for the Constituent Assembly, and those which took place September this year for the president and vice president and the senate.

Registration increased by 5,250,000 in 1966 to 5,850,000 in 1967.

Of those registered in 1966, a little over 80 percent voted, and in '67, 83 percent of the registered voters voted.

If you take the figure for the number of registrations in the September election this year, it represents about 75 percent of the total population, indicating that that many, that portion of the pop-

ulation felt self-secure to vote in spite of massive efforts by the Viet Cong to disrupt it.

Senator Hickenlooper would tell you, as he was there as an observer. The elections, I think, in the opinion of not only our observers but of observers from some 23 other countries, were carried out fairly, carried out extremely well organized, and, as I say, carried through in spite of efforts by the Viet Cong to disrupt them.

One interesting incident occurred. Senator Murphy of California and Governor Guy, of North Dakota, were halfway up the coast at Tuy Hoa on election day, and someone threw a grenade into a polling booth and killed three people, wounding 41. Someone said, "We are now going to vote," and many of those wounded came back to vote, an indication, I think, of the great interest on the part of the people in the democratic processes.

Perhaps another indication is the number of candidates. We had 11 presidential tickets. There were 480 candidates for 60 senate seats, and there were 1,075 candidates for 137 seats of the lower house.

ECONOMIC PROSPERITY

There is full employment today and in some cases a labor shortage.

While this does make the economy prone to inflationary pressures, it also means a fundamental change in the conditions of life for many millions of Vietnamese workers and peasants.

Prosperity is coming, too, to rural Vietnam. In the pacified areas and even in some that are contested, the standard of living is even higher now than it has ever been.

Means by which prosperity is coming are quite clear. There is an urban demand generated, of course, by the full employment. The roads and canals have been secured, making it possible to move products to market. Jobs are available in the local towns and cities for all who want them, and this combination in many sections has produced something really akin to a rural boom.

HANOI'S DETERMINATION

There are aspects, however, of the problem that one must consider.

As I have said, the enemy offensive has been blunted, but it has not been eliminated. The infiltration continues from the North at an estimated rate of about 6,500 a month. Because of the decline in Viet Cong recruitment, which I mentioned, and general morale, more and more of the war effort has been taken over by Hanoi.

Hanoi's determination does not seem to be affected by the severe punishment that it has taken. We have seen no apparent indication of its desire to enter into negotiations, and it seems apparent that the Soviets and the Chinese Communists are still willing to keep North Vietnam supplied with weapons and with materiel.

While the enemy, as I said, has been badly hurt, and the Viet Cong encounters increasing difficulties on the South Vietnam side, there are also problems. The first is the task of organizing the new government; setting up the organs of democratic representative government; the organization of both houses of the Assembly; establishment of a supreme court; inspectorate; security council; pas-

sage of press laws; the law establishing—the law for political parties, all of which have to be undertaken now.

GETTING THE GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM UNDERWAY

The second task is getting the government's program underway, especially pushing ahead on the shorter phase priority objectives.

As both Thieu and Ky have said to me, it is highly important that the new government should progress in the next six months to gain the support and enthusiasm of the people. Although the Vietnamese armed forces, I have said, have been greatly improved, there is still much to do. Leadership and ability to cope with the guerrilla warfare and security are areas where there are still deficiencies. Training is going ahead in many ways. New methods are being devised, particularly those of joint combat units where the United States and Vietnamese units are working together.

General Westmoreland will tell you it often makes a better operating unit than each one operating separately.

There still needs to be improvement in Vietnamese motivation, involvement, pacification, because in the last analysis this has to be done by the Vietnamese themselves. They must carry the main burden of the program.

In this connection, I think the village and hamlet elections are really just as significant as those for president and vice president, and the assembly, because it marks the beginning of the initiation of local government which was largely destroyed by the French occupation and Diem regime, involving the people in their own developments and their own well being and their own government.

As I mentioned, this first step of turning over the collection and administration of the land and property taxes is an important step in that process.

These 14,000 officials who were elected are being trained now, too, in local government and the process is getting underway. But the aspirations of the people for security, for social justice, for the elimination of corruption, for economic and social development and improvement in their standard of living, especially in the rural areas, are only beginning to be fulfilled.

There is obviously work to be done on many counts. There are many obstacles to overcome, but balancing out the pluses and minuses, I think none of the latter are insuperable.

The Vietnamese are intelligent and hard-working people, and properly guided, encouraged and well led, they have demonstrated that they can perform effectively.

GRADUALLY ACHIEVING OUR AIMS

It is my opinion that we have had a good measure of success, that we are making steady, not spectacular but steady progress, and that we are gradually achieving our aims in Vietnam.

I believe that we are also at the point where the steady progress I have referred to can be accelerated in all of these fields, in the military aspect of it and the evolution of the constitutional process, in pacification, a word which, I confess, I don't like because I think it has connotations of the French. What is really a better term for it, and a term which both Thieu and Ky prefer to use, is nation-

building or rural reconstruction. I think it much more accurately describes what the process is.

In my view, the political aspect of the problem, the evolution of the constitutional process, the nation-building, rural reconstruction, revolutionary development aspects are just as important as winning the war, in solving the problems of Vietnam as the military aspect.

In fact, I don't know that the war can be won militarily without success in either of these areas, and if it were, it might be meaningless.

But I believe that, because of what has been accomplished today, we are now at the point of being able to not only maintain the rate of progress, but accelerate it.

So I am convinced that if we stick with this problem and it is not a short-range proposition, we shall have success in achieving our objectives.

Mr. Chairman, this is a very brief summary of the situation as I see it at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Perhaps it would be useful to ask a few questions.

A RURAL BOOM

You indicate they are really having, if I understood you correctly, a rural boom.

Ambassador BUNKER. In some areas.

The CHAIRMAN. In some areas.

Ambassador BUNKER. Not generally.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you tell us how much rice you expect for us to supply to Vietnam this year?

Ambassador BUNKER. About 800,000 tons.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that expected to come from this country?

Ambassador BUNKER. Well—

The CHAIRMAN. Or purchased elsewhere?

Ambassador BUNKER. Most of it from this country.

U.S. SPENDING IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how much we are spending in Vietnam this year?

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, on the economic assistance and the aid side, or overall?

The CHAIRMAN. Overall.

Ambassador BUNKER. I do not know. I have not got that figure.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have an estimate to make?

Ambassador BUNKER. I would guess it is somewhere around \$21 billion, \$22 billion, including the military.

The CHAIRMAN. Including the military.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And the economic, overall.

Ambassador BUNKER. Overall.

THE OPEN-ARMS PROGRAM

The CHAIRMAN. Would you describe very briefly what you mean by the Chu Hoi program?

Ambassador BUNKER. It is what is known as the open-arms program, and that is the inducement to the Viet Cong to leave the Viet Cong and come in to the Vietnamese Government.

The CHAIRMAN. There is 75 percent more than last year.

Ambassador BUNKER. I think it will come out about that. Last year the total was 20,000. At the end of September, we had 25,000.

Mr. KOMER. 25,000. It is running about double last year.

Ambassador BUNKER. Roughly double last year.

The CHAIRMAN. Does this include refugees?

Ambassador BUNKER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. In neither year?

Ambassador BUNKER. No, neither year.

The CHAIRMAN. In this last election, I have forgotten, what was the percentage of the total vote that the present government received?

Ambassador BUNKER. Thirty-five percent.

A LONG-RANGE PROBLEM

The CHAIRMAN. You stated right at the end of your statement that this is not a short-range problem. Could you estimate how long-range problem you think it is?

Ambassador BUNKER. No, I could not, Senator. I do not like to put it in a time frame. I do not know. My own feeling is that we have been the victim in a way of over-optimism in years gone by. It is not a short-range program. I think that we are at the point now where in all of these phases which I have mentioned—military, political, constitutional, nation-building—we are at the point where we can accelerate these programs. I think that we may begin to show more rapid progress.

Certainly the situation with the Viet Cong has deteriorated. One never knows in these situations how close you may be to success.

DEFINING U.S. AIMS

The CHAIRMAN. Well, lastly, you said you thought we were gradually achieving our aims in Vietnam. I wonder if you would clarify for the record as much as you can what our aims are in Vietnam.

Ambassador BUNKER. First, they are a political settlement through a just achievement of a just and enduring and honorable peace through negotiations. Negotiations leading to a political settlement, acceptable to the Vietnamese, to ourselves, to North Vietnam, the Front.

Secondly, a chance for the Vietnamese people to choose freely the form of government under which they wish to live.

Third, to help them build their own political institutions and a viable economy, and to make credible our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and SEATO to resist aggression.

Eventually when peace is secured, to develop regional organizations through which the Southeast Asian countries can carry on joint undertakings in economic development and mutual cooperation.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mansfield, do you have any questions?

Senator MANSFIELD. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

WRITING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE CONSTITUTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think Ambassador Bunker certainly has covered any questions that I might have. I was very much impressed with the fact that there does seem to be an increasing amount of stability in South Vietnam. Certainly I can testify as to what he said about the elections. We told some of them over there if they wanted some tips on how to rig an election, come over and we will take you over to Chicago and a few other places in this country to give you some tips on how to rig an election, because we know how to do it. [Laughter.]

But there was one significant thing they told me while I was there going through the legislative building in Saigon. The man who was with me, who was there when they were hammering out this constitution that they have now, said if anyone tells you that that constitution was a cold deck affair, he said, "You should have passed this building every day for two or three months and heard them quarreling and shouting and yelling in their various attitudes, and everyone expressing his own opinion." He said, "They expressed their opinion, and they hammered out a constitution in which everyone had a right to express themselves." He said, "It was probably about as nearly a fair and equitable approach as anyone he had known."

I do not think it is perfect. Perhaps there might have been some places where there was some influence, but certainly when you go to almost any election booth or precinct voting place in the United States and see people out there importuning the voters, usually at a legal distance from a poll but nevertheless trying to put the pressure on them to vote their way, we did not see any of that in Vietnam. They might have been indoctrinated beforehand, but if they were it was very well concealed. It was not that evident.

Just one thing I wanted to ask you, Mr. Ambassador. Incidentally, I want to testify publicly to your great courtesy to all of us while we were there.

Ambassador BUNKER. It was a great pleasure, Senator, to have you all there and have a chance to see what was going on.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You were very nice to us.

RELEASE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL

Do you have any views as to the reason or the propaganda value or what may be behind the release of these three military people through this pacifist representative in Cambodia?

Ambassador BUNKER. No, we have not.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who came back with them? I wonder why some of the rest of them were not released.

Ambassador BUNKER. We have not really.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I know it is outside your bailiwick.

Ambassador BUNKER. No, it is not. But I just do not know. I do not think we formed an opinion about it. This happened just after I left.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I know.

Ambassador BUNKER. So far the embassy has not really, I think, come to any opinion unless Mr. Habib knows something about it. Do you?

Well, Mr. Habib says that what speculation there is is to the effect that there may have been, perhaps because of the death of Gustav Hertz, to—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Because of the death of who?

Ambassador BUNKER. Gustav Hertz. He was the AID man who was kidnapped, you know. They said he had died of natural causes and perhaps also to induce reciprocal action, the release of some of their own people on our side.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have we not made offers for some reciprocal exchange of prisoners?

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, we have.

Mr. HABIB. We have indicated willingness to exchange.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. And they have not shown any willingness.

Ambassador BUNKER. So far.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, this is all speculative, but one wonders whether or not they might have released these three people to this particular individual, this American that they released them to, in order to encourage the coterie of dissent in the United States which he represents, that is.

Ambassador BUNKER. It might be possible.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I say it is all highly speculative.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador BUNKER. We naturally hope this will lead to further exchanges.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, indeed.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Morse.

SEEDS OF HATRED IN ASIA

Senator MORSE. Mr. Ambassador, I was very interested in some of your statistics. I would waggishly say that apparently in some of the areas where the militant intend to fight down to the bitter end they are apparently willing to fight down to the last child if you are capturing 12 and 14 year olds. But, you see, the interesting thing about all your discussion is the assumption we are right. Of course there are many of us in this country who do not think we are right. You speak to Senator Hickenlooper about elections. We are having some in this country, too. We had one the other day in a very conservative Republican area of California, a very interesting election, having some polls, too. I do not see how anyone can take any Administration—could take any great enthusiasm out of the results of those polls, and so I must say quite frankly and respectfully I am not all impressed with your statistics nor with your rationalizations as to what we are doing in Vietnam. I think you despoil it when you point out that, in spite of all the very favorable accounts you give in the first part of your statement, you end up by bringing out about the problems, and we have no indication when it is going to be over.

I am talking now about the Viet Cong having a hard time recruiting—I am going to come to statistics on that in a moment—and that the North Vietnamese are continuing infiltrating about 6,500 a month. I noticed in your answer to Senator Fulbright bear-

ing upon the last point I made, no reference to Secretary Rusk, unfortunately, in my opinion, press comments that we may be in there to contain China. Do you have any concern as to whether or not if we were to get through slaughtering the infiltration from the north there would be further seeds of hatred in Asia because of this course of conduct? We might then be confronted with Chinese infiltration.

Does that concern you at all?

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, Senator Morse, my feeling is that if the Chinese, while they would probably like to see Hanoi keep on fighting as long as possible, I don't believe the Chinese themselves will intervene in the war unless we went to the extent of attempting to overthrow the Hanoi government. I think then they might come in, but we have made it clear that we have no designs against the Hanoi government. We are not invading North Vietnam and my feeling is that this will—we are fighting a limited war, and keeping the war limited, toward limited objectives. My feeling is also, quite strongly, that with the possible exception of Cambodia—and I am not even so sure of that—that if you talk with all of the countries surrounding the mainland of China, beginning with South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, South Vietnam, I say with the possible exception of Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, yes, India, too, they have a very real interest in seeing our efforts there succeed and, as I say, an honorable, just and durable peace secured.

WHAT IS SO LIMITED ABOUT THE WAR?

Senator MORSE. I am always interested in the use of the phrase "limited war" by you and other spokesmen for the Administration.

What is so limited about it? With the devastating bombing record that we have made in North Vietnam, with thousands and thousands of refugees we have created, at a great loss of civilian life in this area, what do you mean limited? You mean limited only to direct bombing of China?

When you speak about invasion, limited vis-a-vis Vietnam, is what you mean we haven't sent any troops in yet, a manpower operation in there yet? But how could you do more damage to North Vietnam than we are doing with this unbelievable bombing program?

Ambassador BUNKER. I think we could do a great deal more damage, Senator. We are bombing military targets in North Vietnam. We are not bombing cities.

Senator MORSE. Too bad that graves can't come to life and tell the American people how much damage you have done that isn't military damage in North Vietnam. Of course when you say that you believe China isn't going to come in, that is what creates the great disagreement among us. I think there is a great danger that China will come in. If you force a surrender, what else can she do but come in? I don't see how Russia and China can stand by and permit us to force a surrender, and that is the kind of risk that I think is so unconscionable on our part in our conducting of this war, and that is what this great debate in part is about over here, and the kind of rationalization we are getting here this afternoon, I think when it becomes public is going to intensify the debate and

the determination on the part of those of us who do not share the views of this Administration, that can be justified morally or any other way.

I don't intend to be silenced in carrying on this fight because I think you have got the public so split by this course of action that your killings over there are not going to unite us.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE POPULATION UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL

But the staff has prepared a memorandum here, and then I will be through, Mr. Ambassador. It is all right to talk here in closed session about a confidential report that the committee has received from the Department of Defense in reply to an inquiry that the committee made concerning handling the evaluation system. They set out the various categories, population control and hamlet control.

Let me read a portion to you from the staff memorandum. It points out, we made this inquiry on October 31, got a reply on November 1st. The staff points out that in a San Antonio speech in September, President Johnson said the proportion of population living under communist control has been reduced to well below 20 percent. Ambassador Bunker is quoted in today's New York Times as having said yesterday that the proportion is now 17 percent. Both statements are generally correct. According to the Defense letter, the percentage of the population which was VC controlled as of August was 16.5 percent, and the additional 2.2 percent of the population was found in Category E, which are hamlets in which Viet Cong military activities are affected, in which attacks and ambushes occur, and in which South Vietnamese administrative and political activities are freer and effective and present only in the daytime.

Then the staff adds:

However, it should be noted that the population control figure specifically, except the 20.8 percent of the population which does not live in hamlets, the claim that less than 20 percent of the population is under communist control, assumes that none of the population living outside hamlets is under communist control.

Do you think any of that 20 percent is under communist control?

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, 20 percent, of the city population, which is under government control.

Senator MORSE. Well, the figures that you have given make no reference to the 20 percent.

Ambassador BUNKER. The figure that I gave for government control includes the cities, Senator Morse, as well as the rural areas, you see. It is the city population. I mean Saigon, Da Nang, Hue and the cities, provincial capitals, and so forth, which are under government control.

HAMLETS UNDER COMMUNIST CONTROL

Senator MORSE. Isn't it true that the extent of Vietnam control is quite different if the figures on hamlet control as distinct from population control are examined?

Ambassador BUNKER. If you exclude the city population, and you take the population outside of the cities, the percentage changes, of course, but I am giving the figures for the total population.

Senator MORSE. I know. But the Defense Department figures show that 32 percent of the hamlets are VC controlled and an additional 3.8 percent are in Category E.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, that is true.

Senator MORSE. Thus the percentage of hamlets under hamlet control is about twice the percentage of population control under communist control.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes. Ambassador Komer can answer that because he is in charge of this hamlet evaluation survey.

Senator MORSE. Yes, go ahead.

Mr. KOMER. Senator, it is almost impossible to compare numbers of hamlets with amounts of population because the size of hamlets varies so considerably. There are some hamlets with only 75 percent in them. We found that there is another hamlet that has 13,000 people in it. So if you are talking about security of the people, we find that the population figures are much more useful than the hamlet figures because the hamlet figures sort of imply this is a symmetrical hamlet.

Now, the reason for the difference in those percentages which you have cited, sir, is because the President was using figures, I believe, as of 30 June, 1967. The Defense Department answer to you has included the figure as of 30 August. Ambassador Bunker was using the latest figures we got. We try to put them together each month to see what the trend line figures are, figures as of the end of September.

DIFFICULTY IN MAKING CALCULATIONS

Senator MORSE. We need to make clear, don't we, Mr. Komer, that the Ambassador's figure and yours, too, apparently really cover a very limited part of the country?

Mr. KOMER. No, sir, they cover the total population of the country, hamlet and non-hamlet.

Senator MORSE. Then I get back to my premise. How do you know that in the hamlets that the Defense Department is talking about the government controls the cities apparently but the Viet Cong controls what—a third of the area? How much of the land area of Vietnam, South Vietnam at the present time, is Viet Cong controlled and how much is controlled by the junta?

Mr. KOMER. We don't have very good figures on area control because that is pretty hard to calculate. You know, what percentage of the fields of a hamlet are tilled by people who are Viet Cong, and what percentage are tilled by people who are loyal to the government. Besides which about 40 percent of Vietnam is mountain, swamp and jungle, which is basically uninhabited. There aren't any hamlets there. So it is very hard to come up with a sensible figure on the amount of territory that is controlled by one side or the other.

So we decided we would stick with what is important in this war and that is the people.

PROBLEM OF REFUGEES

Senator MORSE. Of course my next one, I am through with this, but my next one is a hypothetical. It will probably never come to pass in the foreseeable future. I think it is perfectly obvious that

the State Department and the Pentagon Building and the White House intend to maintain a military presence for many years until repudiated by the American people, which may not be so many years. But what do you suppose would happen if we did remove ourselves as far as the refugees are concerned? Do you include the refugees within your figures?

Mr. KOMER. Yes.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, those are included.

Senator MORSE. I suppose they are controlled, all right. But are you of the impression that they are enthusiastic about their being refugees and enthusiastic about the support that—about the course of action we follow? The reason I raise this is that some of us around this table were briefed not so long ago by Mr. Luce and some others, and I understand that Mr. Bunker thinks that this organization ought to continue over there. We didn't get such a rosy picture, Mr. Ambassador, from Mr. Luce and his associates.

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, Senator, I may say that most of Mr. Luce's associates in Vietnam don't agree with them because most of them are there and are working there. He and 65 others resigned, but there are some 150 there now who have elected to stay.

Senator MORSE. It has always been true of the difference between leaders and followers.

Ambassador BUNKER. I talked to Mr. Luce in Vietnam. I think he felt very emotionally disturbed by the situation, that war is a tragedy as it is, obviously, and that the innocent suffer, too, along with the participants. And he felt so strongly about it that he felt he had to resign.

He did, unfortunately, give his letter to the President to the press, before he delivered it to me. I simply said to him, he is certainly entitled to his opinion. If he felt as strongly as he did, then he ought not to stay there. But the IVS has quite a large contingent there who are doing splendid work and who are determined to stay and to continue to do that sort of work, which is extremely valuable, in agriculture, among the refugees, and in education.

Senator MORSE. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the ambassador knows that it pains me to find myself in disagreement with him because for so many years we were in agreement on so many things.

But, on the other hand, I would be flying under false colors if I didn't say enough here this afternoon to leave no room for doubt in the mind of the ambassador, I happen to think that we are writing such a sordid record in Vietnam that it will go down to the everlasting discredit of American history.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken?

Senator AIKEN. Yes, not much.

A NEGOTIATED PEACE

Assuming that the war does end some day, is it your opinion that the war will be ended and the conditions of peace determined at the conference table?

Ambassador BUNKER. If it comes to negotiations, Senator, I would hope so.

Senator AIKEN. No. The question was will it come to negotiations. Will the war be ended and peace terms written at the conference table?

Ambassador BUNKER. Oh, well—

Senator AIKEN. What is your own opinion?

Ambassador BUNKER. I would—

Senator AIKEN. I have got your predecessor's opinion.

Ambassador BUNKER. I would say that as of now Hanoi has shown no inclination to come to negotiations. I think that is the present situation.

Senator AIKEN. I think you are right there. But if it does not come to the point of negotiations and the arriving at peace that way, how will the war be ended?

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, I think it can be ended in a number of ways. I think the development of the nation-building process and the constitutional process, of the continuation, and I believe acceleration, as the last for each year of the open arms process, will gradually, I think, wean away the Viet Cong from the other side.

If Hanoi withdraws its troops, as it may, the war can come to an end.

Another alternative would be the fact that, as my predecessor Cabot Lodge, said, "If they are played out, they may decide they have had enough and gradually withdraw."

THE SCALE OF HOSTILITIES

Senator AIKEN. How will we know when such conditions have been reached?

Ambassador BUNKER. I think we know by the scale of hostilities. As a matter of fact, I would say that now in three quarters of the country except in the north—and there are certainly some indications that the enemy has resorted to what they call phase 2 of warfare, which is a guerrilla type way, small unit warfare, and there has been no—our indication indicated quite clearly that they intended to start the monsoon offensive at the end of May this year. It has never gotten off the ground. It never got started, and consequently it may be that as pressure accelerates, as I think it will, militarily—

Senator AIKEN. With more forces.

Ambassador BUNKER. With the forces which are programmed—two things, I think: In the first place I think we ought to make a distinction between what happened before 1965 and from 1965 on. Before 1965 we were there only in an advisory capacity. It was in 1965 that we decided to send troops there in force.

Senator AIKEN. Well, we had 17,000 troops there before 1965.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, but they were not combatant troops, then, but in a training and advisory capacity.

Senator AIKEN. We didn't have them at Da Nang.

Ambassador BUNKER. We were not fighting.

When we came there in force we discovered the fact that there was no logistical base, and we had to spend more than a year building a logistical base. We had relatively few combat troops. About three out of four troops were support troops, construction battalions, engineer battalions.

The base took more than a year to build and it is only within the last year that I have been able to do more, and now the ratio is reversed and the ratio of combat troops to support troops is in balance. We are now not only maintaining pressure but to increase the pressure on the enemy, at the same time the performance of the Vietnamese troops is steadily improving in spite of what one reads in the press here, which I think is not fairly reporting the performance of the Vietnamese troops, and the combination, I think, is an indication that on the military side that progress certainly should accelerate.

FAILURE TO STOP INFILTRATION

Senator AIKEN. Well, we started bombing North Vietnam February 1965, as I recall it.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. The purpose being to stop infiltration of men and materiel from the North.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes.

Senator AIKEN. Yet I think you just said that infiltration was running about 5500 a month now.

Ambassador BUNKER. I said about 6500 a month.

Senator AIKEN. Which is the highest it has been.

Ambassador BUNKER. No, sir.

Senator AIKEN. How high has it been before that?

Ambassador BUNKER. It was up to 7,000, 7500.

Senator AIKEN. Well, that is the highest I have heard.

Ambassador BUNKER. No, no.

Well, Mr. Habib said some months it has gone over 10,000.

Senator AIKEN. Well, yes, that could be.

Ambassador BUNKER. Well anyway—

Senator AIKEN. But it hasn't been—

Ambassador BUNKER. It fluctuates, too.

Senator AIKEN. Sure.

Well, if there is no conference, no negotiation, if the North Vietnamese firmly are determined not to yield at any price, but are sending their 12-year-olds and even their 10-year-olds into action, who will determine when the war should end, if they don't give up, or will it never end?

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, my view is, Senator Aiken, that even if they do not come to negotiations the war will end. My belief is that if we continue on the course we are continuing now, as I said before, I think that, militarily, operations will become increasingly effective. I think on the political side this new government which has come in should be given a chance to show what it can do. Come in with, I think, a new feeling of confidence and determination and self-reliance. The government which preceded it for two years was in power for two years. The first year was spent in restoring order and stability. It has only been in the last year they were able to start any programs.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE POLICYMAKERS

Now, the new government has come in with, I think, a very excellent platform and program on what they want to try to do. I think we will see the country starting to change.

Senator AIKEN. Has there been a great change in the key personnel of the government?

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, there has been a considerable change. A considerable change.

Senator AIKEN. Well, who are the policymakers?

Ambassador BUNKER. There are only three military people in the government today.

Senator AIKEN. Thieu, Ky,—who are the others?

Ambassador BUNKER. No, I say in the cabinet. Thieu and Ky, who are president and vice president, but in the cabinet the minister of defense, the minister of revolutionary development, and the minister of the interior.

Senator AIKEN. Is Tran Van Do still in the cabinet?

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, sir.

BENCHMARKS OF SUCCESS

Senator AIKEN. Well, I don't want to take up too much time. I don't see that in your statement you indicated any improvement indicators or benchmarks or whatever you call them. Have you got any indicators that show there has been improvement? Aren't there any minus figures anywhere, or have we improved in every single phase of the war?

Ambassador BUNKER. No, I don't pretend, obviously, that we don't have setbacks. The Vietnamese Armed Forces, they are not always successful; neither are we for that matter. We can get ambushed and so do they.

I made up a list, however, at the time the Vice President came out, of performance of the Vietnamese Armed Forces simply because I felt that the record that came back here was entirely unfair and inaccurate.

Between October 20th and November 6th, there were some 43 engagements, some of them quite sizable, and in 35 of which they had a very great success. They had about three defeats and about five stand-offs.

MARINES' RELATIONSHIP WITH VIETNAMESE

Senator AIKEN. We get a good deal of unofficial information from many people who come back from Vietnam, and the reports I get are that the relationships between the American servicemen and the native population is much better in the territory occupied by the Marines than in other parts of the country.

Do you get any such reports as that?

Ambassador BUNKER. No, I don't think so.

Senator AIKEN. You don't.

Well, then—

Senator CASE. What was the point, George—I am sorry.

Senator AIKEN. That the relationship between the native population and our armed forces is better in the north than in other parts of the country.

Senator CASE. You mean where the Marines were?

Senator AIKEN. Didn't General Walt move the Marines out of the cities and Da Nang to a considerable extent, and aren't our forces concentrated in the other cities?

Ambassador BUNKER. No, it is our general policy to move them out of the cities everywhere.

Senator AIKEN. Everywhere?

Ambassador BUNKER. They are not all out of Saigon, no, but a great many of them are.

Senator AIKEN. I guess that is it.

Well, do you have any trouble getting volunteers for aid work?

Ambassador BUNKER. I don't know of any. I think they are recruiting all the time.

Senator AIKEN. Yes. Do you get enough?

Ambassador BUNKER. Get enough? Yes.

MARINES DOING AID WORK

Senator AIKEN. You do. You don't ever call on the Marines to furnish personnel for aid work?

Mr. KOMER. Can I answer it?

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KOMER. As a matter of fact, in the aid recruiting drives in the major cities, the number of recruits held up. The number of volunteers held up very well.

The Marines do try to help out on local security—

Senator AIKEN. They try, or they are told?

Mr. KOMER. No, they are not told.

Senator AIKEN. Yes, they are. They are told and you know it.

Mr. KOMER. I think—

Senator AIKEN. They are told, and you know it, to furnish men for aid work and do the work that you are supposed to do there.

I had not intended to say this, but I am saying it now, and you know it and I know it and the Marines know it. That they have to take their men right out of the ranks and put into the aid work.

Well, I shouldn't say it, anyway, but I have.

Ambassador BUNKER. Senator Aiken, if you mean they are engaged in some civic action activities, yes.

Senator AIKEN. Engaged in agricultural work to a considerable extent.

Ambassador BUNKER. It is news to me.

Senator AIKEN. If you get out on the farm and look around, you will find some of them there. I am not kidding; I know.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

HIGH LEVEL POLICY REASSESSMENT

Senator GORE. Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if you are at liberty to convey to the committee an assessment of the so-called high level review of policy and program which, according to the press, has been underway with you here, with General Westmoreland and the President and the Secretary of State, et cetera.

Are we to have another escalation which has followed all previous and reassessments—

Ambassador BUNKER. No, Senator Gore. In the first place, I may say that I have talked to the President, had two talks with the President since I returned, and Westmoreland has once. What we have reported on the situation as we see it today in Vietnam. That was the purpose of our coming back for normal consultation. I have

been there six months and I felt it was time to come back and to report on what I had seen; what I felt the situation to be; what progress we had made.

I think out of these consultations, and out of our mutual discussions and talks, we may then come to some conclusions, but we have not as yet.

Senator GORE. So far as you know, no conclusion different from continuation of present policy has been reached?

Ambassador BUNKER. No, sir.

MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS

Senator GORE. Mr. Ambassador, in your statement to Senator Aiken a few moments ago you said, "If Hanoi withdraws its troops, the war can end."

I find that extremely important, extremely interesting. It is somewhat akin to the statement that Secretary Rusk made in his press conference recently in which he said, "We put our combat forces in there because North Vietnamese forces moved into South Vietnam."

Now, my question is: If North Vietnam did, in fact, withdraw its troops from South Vietnam, would the United States be willing to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam and permit self-determination by the people in South Vietnam?

Ambassador BUNKER. We have said at the Manila Conference, there is the exact wording in here somewhere. I might read, in particular, paragraph 29. They declared that all allied forces are in the Republic of Vietnam because that country is the object of aggression, and its government requested support in the resistance of its people to aggression. They shall be withdrawn after close consultation as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration, and the levels of violence subside.

Those forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled.

Senator GORE. Well, this, if you will pardon me, this is not exactly clear. Throughout, our policy seems to have been based upon the fact or fancy that we are resisting aggression. I asked Secretary Rusk a few days ago about this six months proposition, and I will have his answer in a few moments. His answer, it seems to me, adds up that that didn't mean anything except it was a good propaganda phrase. What I am asking you now, if you know whether or not the United States would, in fact, be willing to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam within six months, if North Vietnam would withdraw her troops from South Vietnam.

Ambassador BUNKER. Senator Gore, I am not in a position to make that decision, obviously, and as far as I know the policy of the United States is still the policy based on the Manila Conference. I have not been informed of any other change.

Senator GORE. All right. I don't wish to press you at all. I just asked you if you know.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes.

NORTH VIETNAMESE TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator GORE. I would like to ask a question about this which you may know. What is the present numerical strength of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam?

Senator PELL. Excuse me, may I ask, interpolate here, do you mean North Vietnamese troops mean more than in North Vietnam?

Senator GORE. No, in units, North Vietnamese, military units now in combat in Vietnam.

Ambassador BUNKER. Our estimate is, Senator Gore, that there are 55,000 to 60,000 regular North Vietnamese Army troops in South Vietnam at the present time.

Senator GORE. Now, does that then—then we have some 500,000. What was the conclusion of the conference?

Mr. KOMER. I was just pointing out to the Ambassador the way we keep order of battle figures tends to understate the number of North Vietnamese regular forces in South Vietnam because we have been including in the figures only those North Vietnamese troops that are in North Vietnamese units.

Increasingly, North Vietnamese replacements have been going into South Vietnamese units, so that the Ninth Viet Cong Division up in Phuoc Long and Binh Duong provinces, while it is carried in military order of battle as a Viet Cong Division is, we believe, now about 50 percent or over North Vietnamese regular troops, you see. So this is a matter of the way order of battle people keep the books. We think there is an increasing proportion, no question, that an increasing proportion of the South Vietnamese, of the Viet Cong main and local forces are being filled up with North Vietnamese replacements because the Viet Cong recruiting rate is down so much. We are doing a survey of this now, and the figures will not be available, although it is simply a matter of adding them all up, for another couple of weeks. But it is possible that as many as two thirds or even three quarters of the total enemy organized units, now I would emphasize organized units, are now North Vietnamese.

Senator GORE. How many would that be in your estimate?

Mr. KOMER. Instead of the figures that we are carrying now of 50,000 to 60,000, it might be as many as 65,000 to 75,000.

Senator GORE. Sixty-five thousand to seventy-five thousand?

Mr. KOMER. Yes. My own personal judgment would be, and I have tried to study this very carefully, that the higher figures are much more accurate because we simply haven't been taking into account these replacements that have been coming down.

Senator GORE. Then, to combat this 65,000 or 75,000, we have approximately 500,000.

SHUTTING OFF INFILTRATION COULD END THE WAR

If they would withdraw 65,000 or 70,000 or 55,000, whichever it is, all of them, what portion of our 500,000 would the United States withdraw, if you know the answer to the question. You have just said, Mr. Ambassador, that if Hanoi would withdraw its troops, the war can end. How can it end?

Ambassador BUNKER. I think it can end because I think the problem will be completely manageable if the infiltration—

Senator GORE. Manageable by whom?

Ambassador BUNKER. By the Vietnamese and ourselves. I think we can end the war quite rapidly, because, as I have said previously, the Viet Cong itself is having more and more difficulty recruiting. Its morale is deteriorating. The population, the desertions, are increasing steadily. As Ambassador Kohmer says, it will be close to double this year what they were coming over to the government side.

If the infiltration is closed off, or choked off, or withdrawn or stopped, my opinion is that the situation becomes readily manageable.

Senator GORE. You say readily manageable by ourselves and the South Vietnamese. I am trying to draw your attention to a point of reciprocal action, reciprocal withdrawal.

AN AMERICAN COLONY

Now, of course, if the North Vietnamese give up the struggle, if they call all their men home, and we keep 500,000 there to, as you say, one of your objectives is to build political institutions, I take it, in our own image, then we are in fact really seeking to establish an American colony there.

What I am asking you is, will the United States be willing to withdraw from South Vietnam if North Vietnam will withdraw from South Vietnam?

Ambassador BUNKER. We have said so in the Manila Declaration which I have just read.

Senator GORE. Well, I would like to read you what Secretary Rusk said about that a few days ago before this committee.

In the Manila communiqué the statement was made with regard to troop withdrawals that allied force troop withdrawals. They shall be withdrawn after close consultation as the other side withdraws its forces to the North, ceases infiltration and the level of violence there subsides. These forces will be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions have been fulfilled.

He continues, but not reading from the Manila statement:

I don't recall anything that I said to Senator Aiken that seemed to cut across that in any way.

It seems to me those two are quite consistent. I want to find now what he said to Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. I told him he was nuts in saying they would get out of there in six months, or words to that effect. It would be physically and politically impossible.

Senator CASE. Well, if the level of violence subsides.

Senator AIKEN. That is what I told him. Maybe I will help him find it.

Senator GORE. Well the point is—I will go to another point, if I may, lest I overstep my time.

DEFINING SELF-DETERMINATION

Another one of the objectives you outlined to the chairman of our policy there, was self-determination on the part of the Vietnamese people.

Do you mean self-determination on the part of the Vietnamese people, or South Vietnamese people?

Ambassador BUNKER. I am referring to South Vietnam. I imagine that the North Vietnamese haven't much chance at self-determination as a tightly controlled communist state to expressing their views very freely. I do not know. I am not concerned with the political system in North Vietnam. Neither are we; we are not trying to upset it. That is their business.

What I am referring to is the situation in South Vietnam.

Senator GORE. Then would it logically follow that our aim is to establish another country in South Vietnam, another nationality, another nation, fully independent of and politically unrelated to North Vietnam?

Ambassador BUNKER. I would say that our objective is to enable or help the South Vietnamese to determine the kind of government under which they wish to live.

Senator GORE. You mean, then, by self-determination exclusively of South Vietnam?

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, sir.

UNIFICATION THROUGH FREE ELECTIONS

Senator GORE. Then, Mr. Ambassador, what is the meaning of the President's statement and the Secretary of State's statement that the Geneva Accord is an adequate basis for peace in Vietnam?

Ambassador BUNKER. I think the meaning is, Senator, that the Geneva Accords which provide for eventual determination of the status of both North and South Vietnam under free elections and under conditions which will permit free elections, it is my understanding—although I don't profess to be an expert on what happened at the Geneva Accords—is that the reason the South Vietnamese were not willing to enter into elections at that time was the obvious one that there were no provisions for free elections. That in a communist controlled state, where the vote is 99 percent, and where it is quite obvious that as Viet Minh had been left behind in South Vietnam, there was no question about free determination or how it would come out.

I think that is the reason why the provisions for voting on the question of unification didn't take place and neither—

Senator GORE. In other words, to put it another way, elections were not permitted because our side was going to lose?

Ambassador BUNKER. Because the conditions—well, the conditions didn't exist for free elections.

Senator GORE. Well, that is the way you state it.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, sir, I think so.

Senator GORE. But I wish to point out to you that the Geneva Accord is quite contrary to the description of self-determination you have given us. I don't, I certainly have no desire to belabor you with policy because, as you say, you are there as a representative of the President. But I thought it might be enlightening to you a wee bit to know that there are some of us who recognize a great many inconsistencies and uncertainties of policy. The Geneva Accord specifically proclaims against two political entities in Vietnam, the 17th Parallel is but a truce boundary, not in any sense to be a political boundary. There is no reference whatsoever, as you indicated, there might be much self-determination in South Vietnam. There is no reference to two countries; it is all one country.

Ambassador BUNKER. That is correct, Senator, but I think it also provides, if I am not mistaken here, I haven't got the words here, that the question of unification shall be carried out through elections under proper safeguards and under proper machinery, and certainly it is the view of the South Vietnamese government, and I think it was ours at the time, that that machinery did not exist and it was not possible to create it under these conditions.

I might give you a little sidelight on this off the record.
[Discussion off the record.]

THE SPIRIT OF THE ALAMO

Senator GORE. The reason I press the point is it appears to me that where the United States got off track was in going contrary to the Geneva Accords, and instead of trying to pursue a self-determination, whatever it may have turned out to be, by the Vietnamese people, set out on a course to establish something in our own image, a separate country in South Vietnam. We sought and now seek, from your information, to sever the country into two, not to accept neutrality of the country under some genuine self-determination, again whatever it may be. I doubt very much if we are going to get a quick peace there.

You might just find under those circumstances that the Vietnamese would have the same spirit that the men in the Alamo had, to fight to the last man. This is going to be a long time, maybe the last child.

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, Senator, let me make it clear, I do not pretend to set policy for the United States government. I am there to carry it out. But I do not mean to say, as we have said, we were willing to use the Geneva Accord as a basis, that we would take a position that there could not be a provision for unification and for a vote on unification in any settlement.

Senator GORE. But you are unable to say whether the United States would, in fact, be willing to withdraw her troops in South Vietnam if North Vietnam would withdraw all of her troops from South Vietnam.

Ambassador BUNKER. All I can say is I cite you the Manila declaration and that is as far as I can go.

Senator GORE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson?

RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Ambassador, this gives me an opportunity to again thank you for the splendid help I received and many courtesies extended when I was over there in July. I want you to know it was greatly appreciated and it was very helpful to me.

Ambassador BUNKER. I hope you will return again.

Senator CARLSON. I may do so. I want to ask you one or two questions about our refugee problem.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes.

Senator CARLSON. As I gather, when I was over there we had hundreds of thousands of refugees who were refugees no doubt as a result of our military operations and our defoliating program. How many do we have at the present time? You may have discussed this before I came in. If you have—

Ambassador BUNKER. No, I did not. I have the figures right here, Senator. Temporary refugees: 786,532 as of September 30.

Senator CASE. What was the figure; what did you say?

Ambassador BUNKER. Temporary.

Senator CARLSON. Temporary.

Ambassador BUNKER. 638,428 had been resettled, and another 638,000 returned to their original villages.

Senator CARLSON. In other words we have handled—

Ambassador BUNKER. Two million roughly.

Senator CARLSON. Yes, roughly 2 million refugees; 700 and some thousand presently.

Ambassador BUNKER. Presently.

Senator CARLSON. And—

Ambassador BUNKER. 786,000.

Senator CARLSON. What is the possibility of getting these people back into areas where they can become self-sustaining?

Ambassador BUNKER. That is exactly what we have been trying to do. Those who have returned to their original villages, for example, or those who have been permanently resettled—in each case 638,000—now this is what the objective is for all of them, the temporary ones as well. I think I would like Ambassador Komer to discuss that a little because he has been following it very closely and it is part of his—

Senator CASE. I wonder if you will, Mr. Bunker, indicate in the case of these resettled and returned people just where they come from and any broad categories so we will know just what the situation has been.

RESULT OF DEFOLIATION PROGRAMS

Senator CARLSON. While you are discussing that, Mr. Ambassador, tell us how many are refugees as the result of our own military operations and they are there for other reasons.

Mr. KOMER. That is very hard to say, Senator, but I think it is indisputable that most of the refugees have fled from areas of Viet Cong control. They have not been generated deliberately by us. This is not our policy, except in a few exceptional cases which are a very, very small fraction of this total number of refugees.

Senator CARLSON. Of course we defoliated great areas.

Mr. KOMER. But defoliation takes place, sir, in jungle areas; the whole purpose of defoliation, as I understand it, is to remove jungle cover.

Senator CARLSON. It does include hamlets, however, does it not, and probably some cities?

Mr. KOMER. No, sir, in no cities, and in very few populated areas. The purpose of defoliation is to get at the jungle areas where the Viet Cong had their bases and where they operate. So more and more defoliation operations are taking place. In fact we are reviewing that right now. Defoliation is taking place in the back country where people are not—

Ambassador BUNKER. I may state, Senator Carlson, that in each case of defoliation, that has to come to me to be approved. We look into it very carefully to see the least possible damage is done. As Ambassador Komer says, it is almost entirely in jungle areas, areas of heavy cover; that is the purpose.

Senator CARLSON. It was called to my attention when I was over there flying out to the 9th Division Headquarters that you did defoliate an area not far outside of Saigon which must have had population.

Mr. KOMER. This was probably the Hobo Woods, but if it was in the 9th Division, it was the Hop Sac Base area and that was all jungle; very few farming.

Ambassador BUNKER. The jungle comes very close to Saigon and very close to the seacoast actually.

Senator CARLSON. I see.

How much are we—

Mr. KOMER. Could I say something—

BULK OF REFUGEES IN THE NORTH

Senator CARLSON. Yes, I wish you would, sir, because it greatly disturbs me. First, how are we going to get these people back where they belong, and, secondly, how can we win the hearts and minds of people there when we have a program that creates two million refugees?

Mr. KOMER. That is since 1961.

Senator CARLSON. Yes.

Mr. KOMER. But as to the locale, Senator Case asked, the great bulk of the refugee problem is in the I Corps where the North Viet Cong are strongest and the operations are the heaviest against the Marines. Of these, only 500,000 are in I Corps. Most of the new refugees come in the northern I Corps and northern provinces. This is during—all during 1967, and really during the last six months of 1966, too.

It used to be that the bulk of the refugees came from down around Saigon and in the delta because then it was a VC war rather than a North Vietnamese war. But the trend in the delta, for example, in 1967 has been the other way. More refugees are being resettled or are returning to their original homes than coming in new, so the trend is the opposite down in IV Corps and III Corps and much more under control.

The Vietnamese government quite candidly did not pay too much attention to its refugee problem until about 1966, and, in regard to this, the refugees, as casualties of war. Since 1966 they established a refugee commissariat with a very able and energetic doctor at the head, and he is just now beginning to get on top of the problem. He still is not on top of the problem in I Corps, but he is trying awfully hard.

My own personal view is that there will be fewer refugees in 1968, substantially fewer, than we had in 1967, and the direction we are giving to our people who are in an advisory role is to give much greater emphasis to resettlement and to return to their villages because as the security extends to the countryside it is possible that more of the refugees go home.

U.S. SPENDING IN VIETNAM

Senator CARLSON. How much are we spending at the present time, this government?

Mr. KOMER. The figures are very hard to come by, sir, because what AID is spending on direct account is available, but then you

have to add in P.L. 480, Title II. Then you have to add in what our own military is providing in the way of refugee help through civic action. I have asked for the figures and they are being assembled now. They are substantially higher than I think the 25 million dollars that AID is directly spending.

Senator CARLSON. Did we not have about \$87 million in our AID program for refugee work last year?

Mr. KOMER. No sir; I do not think it was that high.

Ambassador BUNKER. No, not that much.

Senator CARLSON. Maybe my figures are higher.

Ambassador Bunker. Medical plus refugees. Also, Senator Carlson, I might say that the Vietnamese budget has also been very largely increased for refugees from \$2 million to \$5 million for the coming year.

Senator CARLSON. I was hoping we could take care of them, and I was hoping it would not increase.

Mr. KOMER. I think they will be. This is just my view. I think it will diminish substantially as we emphasize resettlement or repatriation in 1968. I might add that on top of what the U.S. government does there are about 30 voluntary agencies and their work is largely oriented toward helping refugees. You see there are so many people involved in the refugee assistance program and it is pretty hard to break down what the total cost is because they do not break it down.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington?

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE COST OF THE WAR

Mr. AMBASSADOR, it is a great pleasure seeing you again, sir. I want to thank you again for all your kindness and frankness with me when I was in Saigon a few weeks ago.

Ambassador BUNKER. A very great pleasure.

Senator SYMINGTON. As you can tell by some of the questions asked you by some of the members here, the Foreign Relations Committee is not in complete agreement with the policies and programs laid down in Washington that you are working on out there.

Senator MORSE. Did you say some?

Senator SYMINGTON. I am glad you mentioned the point to the committee that you are carrying out the policies and not creating them, and I do not mean by that any implied criticism on your part of that.

I was very glad this morning to have General Westmoreland tell us before the Armed Services Committee that he had not really started putting the pressure on militarily until this year. I only regret a good many billion dollars we lost when people thought we were putting pressure on. At least it did in this country, although those of us who went out there did not feel that way in 1965, 1966. My worries have to do with the political situation, sir, and above all with the cost, especially considering what is going on in the rest of the world.

I was glad to get your observations about the bombing because, one day after I left you, I went out on the Coral Sea. The weather was very bad so they were not flying. One of the pilots asked me

why some of my colleagues were more interested in preventing casualties in North Vietnam than they were in his life, or in that of Americans in South Vietnam. I thought that was a very good question based on the testimony of the ground general of the Marine Corps and the Army who pointed to us and to the pictures of how many additional casualties we had as a result of the bombing cessation, especially the one during the Tet holiday which resulted in the heavy mortars coming down.

So I hope you do continue, if we are going to continue fighting out there at all—about which I have doubt from a political and economic standpoint—I hope we do continue to realize that it is at least as important to save American lives as it is to worry about North Vietnamese lives. I resent bitterly some of the intellectuals who have never run for sheriff who criticize people who bring up that point as a criticism of those who make it.

I have been around this government one way or another, Mr. Chairman, for a good many years, and I have never seen anybody handling a situation, a delicate situation, with more courage and ability than Ambassador Bunker. It makes me very proud to be an American.

I want to thank you for all you have done for your country.

Ambassador BUNKER. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt?

TRAINING OF LOCAL OFFICIALS

Senator MUNDT. Some time ago in your statement you said there were 14,000 local officials who had been elected and are now being trained in their jobs. Being trained how, where and by whom?

Ambassador BUNKER. Being trained by the Vietnamese government in the various parts of the country, provinces where they are elected and being trained in the duties of carrying on the work as councils. There are councils that run from villages, 5 to 11, depending on the size of a village. They, in turn, elect the council chief, which would be in effect the mayor of the village. They then set up the various subcommittees for various functions of government—education, for example, public health and agriculture—all of the local governmental functions and duties.

The reason I say I think it is significant really in a way is that the elections for president and vice president and assembly, because I think the involvement of the people in their own government and subsequent political organization of the countryside is perhaps one of the best defenses against the Viet Cong that could possibly develop.

Senator MUNDT. I agree entirely with that point. I was curious to know whether they have the experience and competence in the business of local government to go out and give these people on-the-job training or call them in at some central place.

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, actually the Vietnamese government does come to us for advice on this and other administrative functions of government.

Senator MUNDT. We do not have the personnel.

Ambassador BUNKER. No, we do not.

Senator MUNDT. Either in numbers or experience to train them.

Ambassador BUNKER. No, but we can give overall advice as to procedures, policies. We are working with them on the community development projects which are going to start now in ten of the provinces. I think we are making very substantial headway.

A WEAK POINT IN THE OPERATION

Senator MUNDT. Well, it seems to me as I hear you, and Lodge before you, this is one of the weak points in our operation and that is somehow or another either we are going to step in and select the right people, which I would be inclined to doubt, but it seems to me that if we do not get them trained, we have to do it, and I do not know how you can do the job without training them.

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, I think, Senator, as I said, one has to remember that the government which has just been superceded, which was in power for only two years—the first year was occupied in restoring order really—it was only in the second year that we began these projects.

Now, and considering those, I think they accomplished a good deal.

As I say, the fact that five elections were held in the midst of a bitter war, it is quite a remarkable performance, and the fact—

Senator MUNDT. I agree with all that. That is not the point I am trying to make. The point I am trying to make, the result indicates that our military advisers have had pretty good success in operating the fighting of the South Vietnamese. They have performed rather creditably. I am just wondering whether we have put the intensive effort required in training these people who have had inexperience in the business of government to do the job.

Ambassador BUNKER. I think we are doing a pretty good job. I think we have to be careful not to overdo it because they are as a rule feeling now that they are a sovereign government and they want to do as much as they can of their own, too. But I think they are making good headway.

Senator MUNDT. 14,000 of them scattered in how many local governmental units?

Ambassador BUNKER. About, let us see, the elections took place in about a thousand villages and 2,500 hamlets.

Senator MUNDT. So you have 3,500 little local governments.

Ambassador BUNKER. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. Am I right in my assumption that most of the people elected are new to the business of government?

Ambassador BUNKER. No, not all of them. Some of them are; some were previously appointed officials.

PROVIDING EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL

Senator MUNDT. It would seem to me that the strength of our effort could be increased by providing you with the kind of experienced personnel who would be available upon request, not impose it upon them.

Ambassador BUNKER. We actually have experienced personnel who actually are working with them, not only in that but also in another phase of what we are proposing to do, which is reorganization of the civil administration. There we are working with them by giving them a great deal of advice which they are asking for.

Senator MUNDT. The central government.

Ambassador BUNKER. That is the central and provincial government.

Senator MUNDT. Can you give it in terms of figures how many people you have assigned to you that is your responsibility with it—maybe it is not—maybe it is the responsibility of the other ambassador—who handles the pacification program—that would include having stable, sensible, competent local government? 3,500 different locations. How many people do you have assigned to you who, if you got a request tomorrow for 500 people to 500 localities, would you have more than enough manpower or not?

Ambassador BUNKER. 500 of our people?

Senator MUNDT. Yes, trained in the field.

Ambassador BUNKER. No.

Senator MUNDT. If you had 100 requests.

Ambassador BUNKER. What about the corps situation?

Mr. KOMER. We have about 3,000 advisers in all in the pacification end of things, but of whom about a thousand are civilian and the other 2,000 are military.

VIETNAMESE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

Senator MUNDT. Of those 1,000, how many have the expertise and the experience to give them competence in training?

Mr. KOMER. That would be very hard to say, sir. One of the big problems in giving advice on local administration down at the grassroots to the Vietnamese is the problem of communication. Actually the Vietnamese have had a pretty good civil administration. Their special commissariat for administration, which is the key part of the interior ministry, is again under the interior ministry. It has some very good people in it. They have a tradition of local autonomy. The village used to have a great deal of autonomy. I believe half of the officials Ambassador Bunker said were elected have been elected officials previously—village chiefs, village council members.

The big problem is to get the authority back to them because the problems dealt with at the hamlet and village are pretty hard-headed problems of the town meeting kind.

I was very encouraged by this new decree which was just passed which provides that local taxes will go to the local administration, either to the municipality or to the village in rural areas. This is very encouraging.

When you have money to spend which you collect for your own constituents, then you have not only authority, but you have the ability to do something. This is going to be quite a desirable thing.

Ambassador BUNKER. Then in addition to that, Senator, as I described the organization, the village councils, subcommittees on agriculture, for example, if they want advice we have agricultural advisers; on health, public health advisers; on security and police, police advisers—so that we can supply assistance on these various aspects of local government.

Senator MUNDT. You feel then we are doing the very best job we are capable of doing.

Ambassador BUNKER. I do not say we cannot improve on anything we are doing.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY STRENGTH

Senator MUNDT. Among the critics of the Vietnamese war are some who say—and I keep reading it in papers; I do not know whether it is true or not—that the Vietnamese armed forces do not represent an adequate percentage of the Vietnamese population vis-a-vis the United States. I have a hunch it is not true, but I have not any facts and figures with which to answer it. I would like to have something.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, I will give you the figures, Senator, of the Vietnamese armed forces. The strength of the armed units is 757,000.

Senator MUNDT. You are talking now about soldiers, not village home guard people.

Ambassador BUNKER. Not the home guard, no. Including the national police.

Senator MUNDT. 750,000.

Ambassador BUNKER. 757,000 to which they will propose to add 65,000 this year, this coming year.

Senator MUNDT. Of the 750,000, how many would you say are really—

Ambassador BUNKER. How many what?

Senator MUNDT. Units would be fighting as contrasted with the policemen. You said that included the police.

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, the police are 66,000.

Senator MUNDT. So there are over 650,000 actually Vietnamese military people.

Ambassador BUNKER. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. The population is roughly 18 million.

Ambassador BUNKER. 17 million.

Senator CASE. Does that include popular, regional, and regular forces?

Ambassador BUNKER. The regular army is 290,300; the air force, 15,444; the navy, 16,000; marine corps, 8,100; regional forces, 143,000.

Senator MUNDT. Explain what is the marine corps.

Ambassador BUNKER. Those are forces largely used for defense and security of the—

Senator MUNDT. They are trained combat units.

Ambassador BUNKER. Oh, yes.

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

Ambassador BUNKER. The popular forces—

Senator MUNDT. That is what I mean.

Ambassador BUNKER [continuing]. 140,500.

Senator MUNDT. These are not—

Ambassador BUNKER. They defend the hamlets and the villages, and they are just as subject to attack as any regular force. And also do very good work, I may say.

Senator MUNDT. They are purely usable for defensive purposes.

Ambassador BUNKER. They are used for defensive purposes, yes.

ROLE OF THE REGIONAL FORCES

Senator MUNDT. So that what I call a fighting unit is used in defense in the case of attack and they are used in offense when attacked by others. That would add up to how many now, 500,000?

Ambassador BUNKER. Do what?

Senator MUNDT. Would there be 500,000 of those?

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, all these that I have mentioned except the police, the national police, are used in fighting one way or another.

Senator MUNDT. I know that. But the popular forces that surround the village and protect them, are they the kind of forces that are subject to fluid control? If you send them out on an offensive mission, they would be in the same category as our Americans to fight offensively and defensively depending upon the exigencies of the situation?

Ambassador BUNKER. That is right, yes. But I may say, too, you are quite right, the regional forces, the popular forces, perform an indispensable role because unless you have not only security, but a continuous security, you do not have pacification.

Senator MUNDT. I think this is right. But this does not give me what I need to answer somebody who asks how many troops have they supplied in the same category as Americans who fight in accordance with the needs of the occasion offensively and defensively. You have to take the popular forces out of that, whether you take the police out of it.

Ambassador BUNKER. Take the popular forces out of it, and the police. Popular forces are 140,000; the police are 66,000.

Senator MUNDT. You still come up with over 500,000 who are there for the same purpose that our people are. And they are brought in by draft, are they, by volunteers, conscription?

Ambassador BUNKER. Both, conscription, but everybody now aged 18 to 33 is subject to the draft.

UNFAIR CHARGES AGAINST VIETNAMESE

Senator MUNDT. The same people in the field of journalism say they go around Saigon and they see all kinds of able-bodied Saigonese, Vietnamese, who run around on motor vehicles.

Senator CASE. You can buy your way out, can you not? What is the volume. You cannot?

Ambassador BUNKER. Certainly there is no way of buying yourselves out; no legal way.

Mr. KOMER. There is a tough law.

Ambassador BUNKER. The law is tough.

Senator MUNDT. I really have to say from what you have indicated, I would think that this is a false charge that the Vietnamese are not supplying their fair share of the people.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, I think it is an unfair charge just as I think a great deal of the reporting that comes back here is not accurate. I feel very strongly about it.

AN EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS

Senator MUNDT. Two other questions. I share with Senator Symington the feeling that this idea of having a bombing pause

longer than it can be for Christmas day, but a bombing pause that certainly will be paid for by the American troops, I think, certainly had been demonstrated on the record. What would you think if instead of a bombing pause we made a suggestion we would make an exchange of X number of prisoners? Would that be conducive to the interests of this country in terms of saving American lives and putting the other fellow under an obligation to say yes or no? Would it be more helpful than just asking them to extend the cessation of bombing for 24 hours, or 48 hours?

Ambassador BUNKER. I think the exchange of prisoners would be highly desirable.

Senator MUNDT. You said we have offered it several times.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes.

Senator MUNDT. It certainly has not been as well publicized as the offers to stop bombing.

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, I think the bombing cessation has had more publicity.

Senator MUNDT. Have we ever offered it in a public proclamation, certain terms?

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, we have tried to do this through the International Red Cross and through other offers. Of course one problem is that the North Vietnamese do not deal with the International Red Cross. They do not accept the fact that our prisoners are really prisoners of war.

Senator MUNDT. I mention that because when I was home last week I was visited at the hotel by the wife of a prisoner who is someplace in Vietnam. She says, "Why doesn't our government make an offer to exchange prisoners?" I made a curbside guess and said we have.

Ambassador BUNKER. We have.

Senator MUNDT. She has not heard about it. It seems to me we should publish it and pick out a certain date. Christmas day would be a good day. If it is a bad day for the pagans, pick out some other day, but I think we ought to make it over even if for the propaganda effect.

Tell me, what is your estimate of how many American prisoners we have up there?

Ambassador BUNKER. We have about 400, is it not?

Mr. HABIB. We do not know exactly because they will not give us any lists.

Senator MUNDT. Have we got an estimate?

Mr. HABIB. We have estimate of several hundred.

Senator MUNDT. Well, tell them we will exchange 500 or something. I think it would be much wiser.

THE FATE OF THAILAND

My final question is, if we pull out or fail or lose this war, knowing the Oriental mind in that part of the world as you do, what do you think would be the fate of Thailand?

Ambassador BUNKER. It would be in an extremely difficult position. I think all of the countries in the area would be.

Senator MUNDT. Would Thailand not come in for special attack because she has given her all to be on our side?

Ambassador BUNKER. I would think so.

Senator MUNDT. We have occupied her territory and it would seem to me they are going to say here is a fellow who was a country that was a traitor to the cause, and the area, and color, and all the rest. I assume there would be tremendous vengeance to invade her country.

Ambassador BUNKER. Thailand already has her problems in the northeast.

Senator MUNDT. They would feel that in that part of the world that she had bet on the wrong horse.

Ambassador BUNKER. We are not going to lose the war.

Senator MUNDT. What?

Ambassador BUNKER. We are not going to lose the war.

Senator MUNDT. Not while we stay there, but if we pull out.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark.

TESTIMONY AT VARIANCE WITH THE NEWSPAPERS

Senator CLARK. Mr. Ambassador, I would like to make a few observations and then ask you to comment on them. I am sorry Ambassador Komer had to leave. I do not know—

Ambassador BUNKER. He can return again any time.

Senator CLARK. We do not want to harass you.

The CHAIRMAN. He had to go to the White House.

Senator CLARK. Yes.

I do not know of any two men in the service of our country for whom I have a higher regard than you and Ambassador Komer. Yet I find myself in a state of almost complete frustration. Ever since I came to the Senate almost 11 years ago, we have been told by our ambassadors in Saigon that we are winning this war. First it was General Taylor who was ambassador. Then it was Ambassador Lodge. And now it is you. I suppose they could not be wrong all the time, and maybe you are right this time. I hope to goodness you are.

Ambassador BUNKER. I hope so.

Senator CLARK. But what you tell us is at complete variance with what we read in the newspapers.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, quite so. I agree with you.

Senator CLARK. What we are told by people coming back here.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, I agree with you, Senator. I can give you a most recent example. What was said about the performance of the Vietnamese armed forces is to my mind inaccurately reported. There was a very substantial battle up about 80 miles near the Cambodian border, 80 miles north of Saigon, beginning October 27. I think the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese were trying to have a propaganda victory at the time of inauguration. The first attack came at 1 o'clock in the morning on the Vietnamese forces who repulsed the attack and did a tremendous job. Our forces did not show up until 7 in the morning. Attacks recurred four successive nights and the Vietnamese took their full part in it and did a splendid job according to our officers and generals. An article appeared in *Newsweek* about it and you would never know there was a Vietnamese soldier present.

Senator CLARK. Well, that is the sort of thing that bothers me. You tell us the morale of the South Vietnamese troops is good; they

are fighting better all the time. You just told us of an incident in which apparently they performed with some gallantry. Yet we are told they will not fight at night; they work a five-day week; the officer corps is poor and corrupt; most of the officers fought with the French against their own people; the AWOL rate is extraordinarily high; corruption is rampant and they do not have an effective conviction.

Who is right? You would have to say you are right and I would want very much to believe you, but can you explain—

Ambassador BUNKER. I will tell you, Senator. We had 22 observers out there, a broad cross section, very representative group of people who came out for the elections.

Senator CLARK. I am not talking about the elections.

Ambassador BUNKER. No, no, but I want to tell you about this reaction, talk about this reporting. Many of them said to the press, "We really don't understand the kind of reporting you are sending back here after what we have seen."

BRAINWASHING

Senator CLARK. Governor Romney says he has been brainwashed. I do not know who to believe.

Senator CASE. Leave that; strike that out; be serious about it.

Senator CLARK. I am being serious about it. He said it seriously, too. If I can just—

Senator CASE. This is the most crucial point I think we have been discussing all afternoon.

EVALUATING PACIFICATION

Senator CLARK. If I could make one or two more comments and I would be happy for you to reply. I would like to kind of get it off my mind, and I will be quite brief.

Mr. Komer told us that pacification was going reasonably well. It was largely handled by civilians. I talked to a very knowledgeable reporter and TV commentator who came back from there recently and he said pacification is a joke. We had lunch with Mr. Luce, who said he considered it a failure.

You say, Mr. Komer says, it is largely being done by well trained civilians. We had General Walt of the Marine Corps in for lunch the other day, and he was a marvelous man, and he was justifiably proud of the pacification I Corps. He told us it was all done by the Marines, such as Senator Aiken indicated a while ago.

Ambassador BUNKER. I think that is probably maybe slightly excess pride on the part of the Marines. I think they should be proud of their performance, and General Walt is very enthusiastic, of course.

Senator CLARK. He is a very great guy, but didn't they do a lot of pacification up in I Corps, the Marines, just the soldiers going out and pacifying these villages? That is what he told us.

Ambassador BUNKER. They did quite a little work there, yes, but they didn't do the major share of it, and the—

REPORTERS WITH PRECONCEIVED NOTIONS

Senator CLARK. I am going to cut this short because I don't want to harass you and I don't want to detain you.

Ambassador BUNKER. I am not harassed at all, and I will answer any questions. My own view is, and I will say to you very frankly, I had the same problem in the Dominican situation. We had reporters who came there with a preconceived idea. There wasn't anything I or anybody could say to change their mind, but only the facts changed their minds.

Senator CLARK. But they were wrong.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, they were wrong.

Senator CLARK. In my view.

VIET CONG STRENGTH

Senator CLARK. Finally, the Defense Department has just told this committee that there are 241,300 Viet Cong under arms, which is down 2,000 since the first of the year. Yet we hear about high diversion rates and people going AWOL. As far as one can read from the newspapers, the Viet Cong is going just as strong now as it was five, ten years ago. We hear, the Defense Department tells us, that there are only 50,000 North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam. Now, you tell us there are a lot more because replacements are going into Viet Cong regiments. But in the end, if the Defense Department is right, there is a total Viet Cong and Hanoi strength of 291,300, whereas the total strength of our forces and of the South Vietnamese is in the neighborhood of 1.2 million, and from the newspapers we are not doing any better from a military point of view than we were 10 years ago.

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, —

Senator CLARK. You don't agree with that?

Ambassador BUNKER. I certainly don't agree with it.

Senator CLARK. The *New York Times*, this is one of the most frustrating things, and I am through with it, the *New York Times* on Sunday had a front page account which quoted the dispatches from Saigon of our military people and the embassy, too, which is just about what you told us this afternoon. On the front page of "The Week in Review" section was a headline saying, "Tough enemy takes the offensive in Vietnam." The account was all about how our boys at Dak To were being blown up and ammunition dumps exploding and the siege at Con Thien. It looks as though the whole offensive was there on their side.

I am not for search and destroy, but one gets from reading the newspapers we are pretty much having our backs against the wall and I can't understand it.

Ambassador BUNKER. I can't, either. It is just in my view a very inaccurate picture of what the situation is.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case?

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

TALKING AT CROSS PURPOSES

Mr. Ambassador, I repeat for myself what has been said by many others, thank you for your hospitality and for your courtesy in Vietnam. I was there very shortly after you arrived.

The questions I have I am afraid are mostly repetitious of those which have been asked before. I am sure they are nothing new. You have heard them, and you have read them, and you know the newspaper fellows who say they doubt the war is winnable; it is not being won.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes.

Senator CASE. And Ward Just says, "Don't believe anything you hear about Vietnam," not because people mean to be deceitful, but because they are generally talking at cross purposes and there isn't much of a definition of what words mean.

I wish there were some way that you could try to help us in bringing the discussion of Vietnam down to the point where we talk to each other in the same terms and understand what the facts are.

I know the problem of doing that is just about as difficult a problem as winning the war.

The Ripon Society presents a diagnosis which was not accepted by the administration the core of which I gather is we are really only successful in pacification where it isn't necessary. Where the Catholic population is Catholic, they are pacified. Where the population or one of these various sects who formerly were not recognized by the Vietnamese regime but now are, who are anti-communists, who are now recognized just by an act of ours and using different words to describe them, but our general program, I don't mean ours but the South Vietnamese program of bringing new groups into the support of this government, a trite old phrase, winning the hearts and minds of the people, is not happening. I know it is hard to be specific. You have given us figures about the number of people under government control, and under Viet Cong control, and under mixed control, but without some definition or some description of what we mean by control, these statistics are not very meaningful.

When I was out there, I talked to one fellow who had been working in pacification for many years. He was asked by a group of newspaper people how long would it take and he said maybe 10 years at the present rate. But he said this would accelerate if it was going well, if it went well at all.

Then we get some of the generals come back here saying in a year and a-half, still saying within a year we are going to begin to withdraw our troops.

I didn't mean to make a speech. I want to get you talking about these things, but you probably said all your answers. You just disagree with the newspaper guys.

GOVERNMENT OPTIMISM VS. PRESS PESSIMISM

How in the world does this disagreement exist? These are not people, I am sure I would not think so, you know them—for the most part they are certainly not anxious to be proven to be correct that we are not getting anywhere out there. I should think most

of them would be wanting to be getting home and we would want to be winning this war. But I have never seen a situation in which there was almost a unanimous impression on the part of the newspaper reporters in the face of what has been more or less continuous, general optimistic reports by our agencies of government. This is something that people cannot understand and is the main cause of our difficulty.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, I am inclined to agree with you that one of the main causes of our difficulties is this kind of reporting that we get out of Vietnam, frankly.

There is a very big press corps there, as you know. Many of them are young and inexperienced people.

Senator CASE. Not all.

Ambassador BUNKER. No, not all, and I find the more mature people take a far more objective view of the situation than many of the people who are there.

I can answer that some of the people have been there so long that they seem to be—I get the newspaper people, journalists and reporters in. I have tried to make a point of getting in half a dozen of them every week. Tell them we will have dinner; sport shirt; informal talks; get everything off their chest and everything they want to say.

Senator CASE. I have never heard any criticism of the way they were treated or the fact—

Ambassador BUNKER. Because I want to find out what the problem is; how they see it. I want to try to be objective and realistic about the situation. As I said to my staff when I first went there, if all I hear are success stories I will be suspicious. I know it is not all going to be successful. I know we are going to have setbacks, and I know we are going to have problems.

A DISENCHANTED REPORTER

But, for example, when you get an article as we had once in Newsweek about the Vietnamese Armed Forces which began saying that one regiment had opted out of the war and supplied prostitutes to the American forces—I had Westmoreland run this down, and there was not one shred of truth in it. I mean, how do you account for this?

Senator CASE. I should be interested to know myself. What did the magazine say about it?

Ambassador BUNKER. This man, this fellow, I have had him for dinner at my house. He has been there a long time. He was completely disenchanted with the whole scene; it was a sick society and there is nothing you can do about it. That was the whole attitude.

Senator CASE. That wouldn't make it a lie.

Ambassador BUNKER. I don't know any more than you do, Senator, how we get what we do. But certainly as far as my objective view, as far as I can be objective, and I try to be, I just think the general impression that is created here about the Vietnamese Armed Forces, about pacification, gives a very distorted view.

Pacification, as I said, was slow getting underway because, in the first place, the first year the government was taking over, trying to restore order and create some degree of stability. The program got underway the second year of the administration. It required a

lot of planning, a lot of organization, a lot of training and the involvement of large numbers of people. It was slow.

Now, the program this year was the pacification of 1100 hamlets and we won't reach it because it was slow. We may get 900 to a thousand.

Next year we expect to do 1500 to 2000. So, as I say, in all these areas we are trying to be able to accelerate the rate of progress.

Senator CASE. Well, just on the question of pacification, again Komer would be the man we really should be asking the questions of, and I hope we will ask Mr. Komer to come up again when we can have some time, and especially the young fellows at the tail end of this performance—

The CHAIRMAN. I would strongly recommend for your convenience and his that you have a subcommittee meeting any time.

Senator CASE. I would like to because we are only trying to get the facts.

Senator CLARK. I think you ought to say junior instead of young.

Senator CASE. Did I say young?

Senator CLARK. Yes, you did.

Senator CASE. That is the way you feel. Ambassador Bunker and I are the two oldest men here, and Clark.

I do have questions about this matter, just a couple more, and then I will be finished with it.

HAMLETS PERMANENTLY PACIFIED

Apart from those areas where you have sectarian groups of one kind or another, or the Catholics, the mountain people, whatnot, is there any situation in which we have taken a hamlet or a number of them and permanently pacified them? Or is the situation during the time we have all the places saturated with troops they are going to be amenable, but when the troops get out, our troops get out, as they must to go on to the next one, then we have lost them?

I really would like to know about it.

Ambassador BUNKER. Where there is pacification, where there aren't these sects, you see, yes, there is, in Binh Dinh Province, for example, where there were no Catholics at all. And no Hao Hoa and mostly Buddhists, as far as I know.

Senator CASE. How many people are involved in this pacification; how many hamlets?

Ambassador BUNKER. I don't know how many of the hamlets. It is the second largest province. I think about 65,000–900,000 population.

Senator CASE. How many hamlets?

Ambassador BUNKER. I don't know how many hamlets, one of the priority areas.

Senator CASE. I wonder if we could have for the record the number of hamlets and the number of population in the pacified areas.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, indeed.

Mr. HABIB. We will get that for the record, Senator.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

STOP INCREASING AMERICAN PERSONNEL

Senator CASE. It is not fair to ask you and, therefore, I won't, but I will just throw out a suggestion which has been made by a great

many people that, if we had put as many people as we usefully should put into South Vietnam, then it is time to stop increasing the number of American personnel.

Is this your general opinion?

Ambassador BUNKER. I think we are pretty well there, yes. I think we need some more advisers with the regional popular forces. We haven't very many with them because they are doing a very vital job and doing it increasingly well. I think we can help there, but, no, I think we are at about the limit.

SLOWNESS IN PUTTING PRESSURE ON VIETNAMESE MILITARY

Senator CASE. This one last broader question, and this is not critical of you because I have sensed you are as tough a guy as has been operating for us out there, and I really mean this in the right sense, but a criticism of our slowness in putting pressure on the South Vietnamese military and the junta to do what they must do themselves in order to build an effective military force and a society and to develop a feeling for nationhood among the people and loyalty to the government.

Have you been able to put as much heat on as you personally felt you would like to do?

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, I have. Sometimes I think I may have overdone it, because it sometimes becomes counterproductive, as you know.

Senator CASE. Would you just explain why and in what way it becomes counterproductive?

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes. I think the outstanding characteristic perhaps of all of the Asian—this is not just confined to the Asian countries but the under-developed countries—is the question of pride, and I think that you can put pressure on to the degree where you get simply no results at all. There are many ways of putting pressure on: persuasion, urging, withholding of funds, and all kinds of things. All these methods have been used, and I think that I have put all that the traffic will bear on Thieu, Ky, and on the government. I think they have responded very well, frankly.

VIETNAMESE SHOULD NOT TAKE U.S. FOR GRANTED

Senator CASE. Is it your judgment that they, and by "they" this is a little imprecise, but I am trying to be provocative rather than precise, that they have a feeling that no matter how little they respond to our suggestion that we have no option but to support them?

Ambassador BUNKER. I don't think so. I made it very clear to them they can't take us for granted.

Senator CASE. And do you think that they have a fairly clear idea it is not inconceivable that in the event of their failure to do what we believe is necessary we could pull out entirely?

Ambassador BUNKER. I think they may have, yes, and I think they—

Senator CASE. You say may.

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, I can't answer this categorically, obviously, Senator.

Senator CASE. But I mean it is terribly important that we should know this, for some people in our government have said to me, and

I guess I said to you out there, that we have no option and in effect that the people out there know we have none and, therefore, they can go their merry way—

Ambassador BUNKER. I made it very clear to them they cannot take our assistance for granted; they can't expect the American public to support their efforts if they are not pulling their own weight behind them. I think the measures which they have adopted and are adopting in this new government are an indication of their responsibilities—the attack on corruption, the extension of the draft, the insistence on austerity, the reorganization of the Vietnamese armed forces, the organization of the civil administration—all of these things. Here is a new government, the former government having been in only for two years, and, as I said, only able to perform in the last year. I think they ought to have a chance of showing what they can do.

U.S. RICE SUPPLIES TO VIETNAM

Senator CASE. Just one factual question to be sure I understood you correctly. Did you say we were putting in 800,000 tons of rice this year?

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes; I think 800,000 tons. That is the estimate we will need.

Senator CASE. Unless I am crazy, it is a billion—no, a million—1,600,000,000 pounds, which is a hundred pounds per person. Is that right?

Mr. HABIB. Eight hundred thousand tons of grain; it is not all rice.

Senator CASE. But edible grain for human consumption.

Mr. HABIB. Yes.

Senator CASE. It is a tremendous amount of their food supply, isn't it? A tremendous proportion of their food supply?

Ambassador BUNKER. It is a big staple. Rice is the principal staple, of their food.

Senator CASE. What is their own production of grains and rice normally?

Ambassador BUNKER. What would it be?

Mr. HABIB. We would have to get the figure. I don't have the precise figure.

Senator CASE. Thank you. And we sell their for—

The CHAIRMAN. We give it to them.

Ambassador BUNKER. Piastres.

Mr. HABIB. P. L. 480.¹

Senator CASE. We are not able to pay on the market for our expenses.

Mr. HABIB. We do a portion of it.

Senator CASE. How much?

Mr. HABIB. I think we are up to 20 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. Before they used to export a large quantity of rice. This was an exporting nation until we occupied it.

Senator CASE. I just want to get roughly how much of the—

¹Food for Peace Program.

Mr. HABIB. I think we are up to 20 percent, but we will correct it for the record. We keep a certain portion for our own use and the proportion they use is, of course, used in their own budget.

Ambassador BUNKER. The last contract was 20 percent for our uses.

Mr. HABIB. Twenty percent.

Senator CASE. What do you mean by their own?

Ambassador BUNKER. For example, under P.L. 480, 15 to 20 percent.

Senator CASE. Yes, but we weren't in Indian spending hundreds of millions of dollars on the local market for our own military.

Ambassador BUNKER. It is quite true.

Senator CASE. We are not permitted to use that for any of our expenses except for this 20 percent.

Ambassador BUNKER. This last contract was 20 percent, I think.

We have had some contracts, the one before was, I think a hundred percent, if I am not mistaken. We can give that to you.

Senator CASE. Broadly speaking, they built up through these operations in South Vietnam something around \$350 million surplus in American dollars; isn't that right?

Ambassador BUNKER. We have an agreement with them. It is to be held to \$250 million.

Senator CASE. To be cut down?

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes.

Senator CASE. It is still above that.

Ambassador BUNKER. Presently it is about \$300 million.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

AN INVASION OF NORTH VIETNAM

I share the general admiration for you and your work and, obviously, my views on this are not intended as any criticism of you, but of our policy.

I was just wondering in your own mind if you would feel that a land invasion of North Vietnam, or the bombing of the population centers, or the dikes, would be quite likely taken by China as a threat to its own security, from your diplomatic experience, your own view.

Ambassador BUNKER. I would guess that an invasion would depend on where the invasion took place and how near it was to China or Hanoi itself. I would guess that if we went into north of the demilitarized zone, for example, I don't think—

Senator PELL. That is what I meant.

Ambassador BUNKER. I don't think it would draw in the Chinese. But if you went in near Hanoi I think it might be a different story.

Senator PELL. Would you be opposed to either of these two actions, as ambassador?

Ambassador BUNKER. I would be opposed to going in Hanoi; yes, yes.

Senator PELL. Or to the bombing of civilian centers, and the bombing of the dikes?

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, I don't think—I would be opposed to the bombing of civilian centers, yes.

Senator PELL. You would or would not?

Ambassador BUNKER. I would.

Senator PELL. The reason I am asking this question, we have pretty well exhausted in the north the targets of military opportunity. You read the hearings with Secretary McNamara and there are not too many targets that are important, and the Administration is going to be faced with the choice next. I am wondering what your recommendation would be.

Ambassador BUNKER. My recommendation would be the bombing of military targets, interdiction bombing, which we are doing.

AMBASSADORS ARE ALWAYS OPTIMISTIC

Senator PELL. One viewpoint, and I don't mean to press you too hard on this, but I would like to know, and it would be of great satisfaction to some of us, if civilian bombing were seriously contemplated as a means of additional pressure or the bombing of the dikes, or invasion considerably north of the demilitarized zone, would you feel strongly enough opposed to submit your resignation?

Ambassador BUNKER. I don't know, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a personal question.

Ambassador BUNKER. It is a hypothetical question.

Senator PELL. Very hypothetical. But this is what is in the back of the minds of myself, certainly, what happens at the end of a year or two, because I, as you can see from my position on the totem pole, is the last question to you, I have only been in this committee three years. I have never heard an ambassador who is not optimistic, and yet the problem remains that the course we are presently following, we will have followed that course, and what happens after it. This is why I am wondering what your views are. Or do you feel we will have victory, not victory, but peace before we reach the end of this present course?

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, my own view is that this present course can be successful and will be successful. I say I don't put it, I haven't put it in any timeframe. People have asked me how long, and I am not willing to say, because I don't know.

POSSIBILITY OF DE-ESCALATION

Senator PELL. I think there are very good views that could be advanced that we could have a 10 or 15 year operation there if we could lower the stakes, if we ceased the bombing in the north, if we adopted some of the de-escalation in the south. It would be to their advantage to negotiate us out.

The problem is where we are passing a bearable limit for an indefinite period. I was wondering what your views were.

Do you think that the de-escalating school would be a great mistake or not?

Ambassador BUNKER. I don't know how you get the other side to de-escalate, frankly.

I have heard—

Senator PELL. You just leave them alone in the areas where they are in South Vietnam.

Ambassador BUNKER. I certainly would be opposed to that.

Senator CASE. Would the Senator yield, because this is a question I would have liked to have developed just for a point.

Senator PELL. Certainly.

Senator CASE. Would you distinguish between de-escalation of the war which would be desirable, but I am more worried about de-escalation of American participation, and I think we could perhaps separate those two matters. I see no reason to think that the American public is going to stand still for a much longer indefinite prospect of the continuance, the present rate of casualties and expenditures, casualties mostly. I think this is going to have to be reduced if it is to go on or to be regarded as an indefinite prospect, and I wonder, therefore, whether there is any prospect, in your judgment, of reducing the extent of the American involvement, the casualties and expenditures as opposed to the overall de-escalation.

Ambassador BUNKER. Of course I think this is a question of time, Senator. As I say, if we are successful, as I think we shall be and will be, obviously this will involve a reduction in American casualties and American presence, of course. When and just how long it is going to take, I am not prepared to say.

Senator CASE. You don't think we should increase the size of the American personnel there?

Ambassador BUNKER. I think we have sufficient, myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Senator?

Senator PELL. I am not through.

Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

THE WAR SEEMS OUT OF PROPORTION

Another question where you, I am sure, have some thoughts, is this question of the drive. How is it that when what we contribute taking it as a total to be a hundred percent, the Soviets are putting in about two and a-half percent of what we are in weapons and money, nothing in men, and the Chinese are putting in about .6 percent. How do you account for the apparently increased momentum, the drive, urgency of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese over the South Vietnamese where the balance to keep it even has to involve this huge American contribution far outweighing that from outside Vietnam and the other side?

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, I think the nature of the war, Senator. I mean a guerrilla type warfare obviously takes a great many more. I think the British discovered that in Malaya. If you are fighting, opposing a guerrilla type war, it takes a great many more men, a great many more troops.

Senator PELL. Doesn't that seem a little out of proportion to you?

Ambassador BUNKER. I don't believe it is, compared to, as I understand, the ratio in Malaya. It is about the same as this, if not higher; higher, I think.

Senator PELL. What are the number of North Vietnamese divisions presently not committed; number of men in them. Do you have any idea of that?

We have heard the figure something like 15.

Mr. HABIB. About 350,000 men under arms, regulars under arms and, of course, they have a large militia they can draw on and they have a conscription system they can draw on.

Senator PELL. But it is still another 300,000 not committed.

Mr. HABIB. At least under arms.

PROMOTE SELF-GOVERNMENT OR RESIST AGGRESSION

Senator PELL. I was a little concerned earlier when you mentioned that the villages and the towns in South Vietnam had not had self-government since the French occupation, which is really more than, I guess more than a hundred years. Do you really believe it is this important that we should be fighting this hard to give these people who haven't had self-government for more than a century, to be giving them self-government?

Ambassador BUNKER. I think yes. I think they have to govern themselves if they are not governed by a colonial power.

Senator PELL. But isn't this a pretty large order to say that all areas that were under colonial domination before will be underwritten in their right to self-government by the United States?

I think it is a dangerous precedent we would be getting into.

Ambassador BUNKER. We are committed, aren't we, to the right to self-determination and if people have that they have got to learn to govern themselves somehow.

Senator PELL. I would question that. I think there are many countries in the world where the right of self-determination does not exist, and I would hope we would not go to war to bring it about.

Ambassador BUNKER. I don't think we are going to war for that reason.

Essentially, we are going to war to resist aggression.

Senator PELL. That is a different reason.

Ambassador BUNKER. I know, but in the process of building up the country and of helping it to become viable politically and economically, I think that—and the Vietnamese are doing this themselves. This is not our motivation. I mean this is their own motivation, and this is what they want to do in the way of developing a government.

Senator PELL. I know.

Incidentally—

Ambassador BUNKER. Because if there was traditionally in the country—there is an old Vietnamese saying, the law of the emperor stops at the village gate. They used to run their own affairs and it is a tradition of the country.

Senator PELL. I know that just as the Viet Cong had released three of our prisoners there that the South Vietnamese government is about to execute three of the VC. Doesn't that seem a little anomalous?

Ambassador BUNKER. They are not going to do it.

Senator PELL. Good. I am delighted to hear that and very glad indeed.

I think I will terminate my time on this happy note.

OTHER TROOPS IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Ambassador, you have been very patient. I regret we have taken so much of your time.

One or two questions that have occurred to me during the course of this: Are you aware of the terms on which Korean troops have been supplied to the war in Vietnam? Is that within your jurisdiction?

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, I am not completely, I think, aware of it.

Have you got any information?

The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen what is called the Brown letter setting out these terms?

Mr. HABIB. March 14th of last year.

Ambassador BUNKER. No, I have not.

Mr. HABIB. There is such a letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a copy of it?

Mr. HABIB. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could it be made available to the committee?

Mr. MACOMBER. Let me look into it, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The same on the Philippines, if you can give that to us.

The paper reported a few days ago that the Thai government has offered to send 10,000 troops.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that correct?

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, that is correct.

In addition—

The CHAIRMAN. To what they now have.

Ambassador BUNKER. To what they now have, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What did they request in return for that? Do you know?

Ambassador BUNKER. No, I don't know. I know they did request something, but how much or what, I don't know.

Mr. HABIB. The terms are under discussion.

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, still under discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you supply to us, Mr. Secretary, what the proposal is?

Mr. MACOMBER. Yes, sir, I will try to bring up to date that information that we supplied earlier.

AGREEMENT AMONG EMBASSY STAFF

The CHAIRMAN. Is it accurate, Mr. Ambassador, to assume there is no difference of views about this matter within the embassy staff, or is that a proper question to ask you?

Ambassador BUNKER. About what matter, Senator?

The CHAIRMAN. About the progress of the war and the prospect—

Ambassador BUNKER. No, I know of no difference.

The CHAIRMAN. They all agree as to—there is no real serious difference of views in your advisers?

Ambassador BUNKER. I know of none.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you said there is great pride in the underdeveloped countries. Am I to assume you don't think there is in the developed countries?

Ambassador BUNKER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the same; it affects everybody.

Ambassador BUNKER. I think there is a very interesting book, Eric Hoffer's *Ordeal of Change*. I think it is very worthwhile reading, it is not a very long book, about the attitude and sense of values of some of the developing countries.

THE NATURE OF THE U.S. OBJECTIVE

The CHAIRMAN. One last question: You said they could not take us for granted, and that it is very clear to the Vietnamese officials that they have to perform, I take it, a moment ago in response to a question—

Ambassador BUNKER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If it should turn out to be the objective of this country to contain China rather than to just give self-determination, it seems to me they can take us for granted. It depends a little upon what our objective is, doesn't it?

Ambassador BUNKER. Perhaps so.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if we are there to contain China it doesn't really matter whether they perform or not. We cannot leave until we have contained China for an indefinite period.

Ambassador BUNKER. Well, that may be, Senator. But I say that is a matter of policy that is beyond my competence.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right; you made that clear.

Ambassador BUNKER. And I simply report what I have indicated to them.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand, and I didn't wish to raise it again.

It has already been raised, but the answer to that question really does depend upon what our real objective is in this area, doesn't it?

Ambassador BUNKER. It goes beyond the situation in Southeast Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be a different answer.

Well, thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. We appreciate your coming here and giving us the advantage of your knowledge.

Ambassador BUNKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am always happy to come before the committee, as I indicated when I came up before I went to Vietnam, and I hope to come back periodically because I think it is important to report on what the situation is, at least as I see it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

That is a vote, I may say, for those present.

[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to call of the chair.]

MINUTES
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, Lausche, Clark, Hickenlooper, and Carlson.

George R. Jacobs, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Resources and Food Policy, Department of State, accompanied by Tom O. Murphy, Director, Sugar Policy Staff, A.S.C.S., International Sugar Agreement.

Robert F. Woodward, Interim Director of the Office of Water for Peace, Department of State, accompanied by Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, testified on S. Res. 155, relating to Desalting Plants in the Middle East.

[The committee adjourned at 11:15 a.m.]

MOTIONS REGARDING TESTIMONY BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Thursday, November 30, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met pursuant to notice, at 10:22 A.M., in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator J. W. Fulbright (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, and Case.

Also present: Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Holt of the committee staff.

[Ex. K, 90/1, International Sugar Agreement, was ordered reported unanimously.

H.R. 9063, to amend the International Claims Settlement Act, was ordered reported with an amendment, after receiving testimony from Dr. Edward D. Re, Chairman, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, accompanied by Andrew T. McGuire, General Counsel]

BREAKDOWN IN COMMUNICATIONS

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I have a motion I would like to submit.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, the Senator from Tennessee.

Senator GORE. I would like the staff to distribute some copies if they would. This is on Gore's motion. I believe I gave Carl the last copy I had. Will you bring me one?

Mr. Chairman, I move that the chairman of the committee be instructed to communicate to the President of the United States the concern of the committee about the breakdown in public communication between the executive and the Senate which arises from the refusal of the Secretary of State to testify before the committee in public session on United States policy in Southeast Asia. I would like to be recognized.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman, may I make my position clear? I anticipate making a motion to table this motion at a later date, but I do not want to make it now. I do not want to cut off any debate on this, but at the proper time I will make a motion to table. I only want to state that for information.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Tennessee is recognized.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a mild motion—
[Discussion off the record.]

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SENATE AND THE PRESIDENT

The CHAIRMAN. Could we have order? I want to hear what the Senator from Tennessee has to say.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I hope this motion, which I consider a very mild one, can be considered in the light of the relationship between the Senate and the President, rather than in terms of Vietnam or anti-Vietnam. A precedent is about to be established with the adjournment of this session which I think would be extremely damaging and of historic proportion.

The Constitution, it seems to me, places the Senate and the President in the position of limited partnership with respect to foreign policy, both concerning formulation and conduct.

What other meaning can be attached to the provisions of advise and consent, the provision relating to the raising and disposition of armed forces, ratification, confirmation, and so on? I will not get into a constitutional argument, except to conclude with that particular portion of my remarks by saying that, it seems to me, the Senate, this committee being the agent of the Senate, has a constitutional duty, right, and responsibility to the public and to itself to explore, and insofar as is consistent with the national interest, explore, in public, foreign policy issues, particularly those so important as war or peace.

For almost two years now, the committee has requested—I put in the Record a few days ago the series of letters exchanged between the chairman and the Secretary of State—the public appearance of the Secretary of State—on the general subject of United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia.

THE COMMITTEE HAS BEEN PATIENT

I have suggested that the committee has been extremely patient. It is more than three weeks now since the Secretary met here with us and told us he would promptly give us an answer on the request, which was further pressed at the committee meeting, regarding his public appearance.

It seems to me that such treatment, without being personally critical of the Secretary, which I don't intend at all, is nevertheless contemptuous treatment of this committee.

Further, if we do not press our point in this regard, I think it will further deny this committee and further establish the privacy of the executive in the formulation and the execution of the foreign policy of our nation.

Of course, this motion would not undertake to require his appearance. It has no such connotation. It merely asks, directs the chairman to communicate to the President of the United States, not just to the Secretary of State, who is the President's agent, but directly to the President, the concern of this committee over this breakdown in public communications between the executive and the Senate.

I hope that it has no partisan connotations, no political connotations. I certainly do not intend this. This is addressed purely to the subject of the equation which our constitutional forefathers undertook to provide between the executive and the legislative, specifically the Senate and the President, in this vital field. I do not wish,

Mr. Chairman, to make an extended argument. That is in brief my views and my purpose in presenting this motion.

THE PRESS CREATES INCIDENTS

The CHAIRMAN. If I may say one word, I have been, as you all know, in Arkansas quite a bit in the last two months, and I am very often asked why we do not have such discussions in public. This incident at the Bruton Parish Church which was widely publicized particularly attracted the attention of my constituents because that particular minister at one time was dean of the Trinity Cathedral in Little Rock, Arkansas. A lot of people know him down there, and so they asked me about it.

I wrote to the minister and got a full statement, which maybe I should have brought over in connection with this, I didn't think about it, of his whole sermon, and I must confess it is a good example of the press picking out of a very moderate sermon, as a matter of fact, much of it was most sympathetic to the difficulties of the President and the country. It was a very moderate statement, but there was that one sentence in it which they picked out which suggested that in effect he was saying that he thinks it would be good for the country, for the President, and for everybody, if there was a clarification of our purposes. I think he meant it to be helpful, however it was. He was very embarrassed about it. The letter he sent to me, in the first paragraph, there was a paragraph that was written in, but the rest of it was obviously a form letter he had prepared to send to everybody who had criticized him. He was greatly disturbed because I think he genuinely did not intend to embarrass the President.

He thought he was giving him good advice; that it would be very helpful to him and to everybody if he would clarify what our purposes are. They have asked me about it in Arkansas. Why doesn't the committee have the Secretary? I tried to explain as best I could just what have been the circumstances.

SECRETARY OF STATE SHOULD COME VOLUNTARILY

I wish he would come on down voluntarily, of course, without such a letter. The only thing that bothers me about it, I am thoroughly in accord with what the Senator seeks to obtain here, is whether or not this would be the way to do it. It might be, if the judgment of the committee is, and I think I would certainly support it if the clear majority of the Senate wished to do it. I would hate to have this kind of a matter just a very narrow decision after there having been very vigorous dissent against it. This may not be the best way to bring it about.

I would think it would be kind of embarrassing if we sent a letter and then a complete rejection and denunciation. It would only make matters worse. I am puzzled in my own mind as to how we can persuade the Secretary to come. He obviously now is in the position of awaiting the President's decision. We gathered from our liaison officer that this is a matter at the White House level now.

It is not just the Secretary personally any longer who is making the decision. It is a presidential decision. It has been discussed at the White House level; we were informed.

I do think it would be good for him. I agree with the minister that it would be very helpful, if it is possible, at least to precisely state what the objective of the present policy is, but I don't know how to go about it. This is one way to raise the question.

I would support it if the committee wishes to support it. I would like to hear the views of all the members as to what they think about it, because it is embarrassing to be told, "Well, why can't you get him" and so on. It looks as if the chairman is delinquent in not getting him. It is hard for the people down home to understand why I can't get the Secretary of State.

STILL WAITING FOR A REPLY

Senator GORE. Could I add one other thing that I had failed to call to the attention of the committee? I offered this motion more than a month ago, and it was at that time, you will recall, that Senator Mansfield suggested that the committee invite Secretary Rusk to appear in executive session to discuss the question of his appearance at a public session. Thereupon, I withdrew the motion. The Secretary came, and as I related a moment ago, told us some three and a half weeks ago that he would give a prompt reply.

Now, it was not specifically interpreted to mean the next week, but there was a discussion about the following week. But here it is now, the 30th day of November, the session nearing an end. So it just seems to me that either the committee is going to communicate to the man who is responsible or not. Now, if there is some better way to bring it about, my objective is to preserve and promote the equation of mutual responsibility in this field. I will desist from further remarks, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper.

NOT A QUESTION OF COMMUNICATIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't like to be in a position of disagreeing with my good friend, Albert Gore. He advises my son on how to raise black cattle and sell them for a good price, and I am sympathetic with him. It is better than I can do. We agree on a lot of things.

But I cannot agree that this is an advisable thing to do, and I so told him.

In the first place, this is not a question of communication in my judgment.

Senator GORE. I said public communication.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. This is a question of public appearance.

We have no trouble getting the Secretary up here. He has quite a few things to do. How many countries are there in the world, 117 and 120 in the United Nations?

Senator CASE. Over 120 now.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You know, it is really quite a little job to keep track of those things. He has something to do. But I don't know of any occasion where he has failed or refused to come up here in executive session and talk these things over with us, frankly.

Now, there have been a number of occasions when he has come up here and talked in executive session, and for some reason what

he said here has got in the papers the next evening or the next day, to the disappointment of all the members who are here. I am sure that they regretted it very much. But nevertheless he has come. So it isn't a question of information.

We are informed any time we want to be informed about any questions we want to ask him; he comes. The Lord knows, I disagree with Lyndon Johnson. I am not defending Lyndon Johnson particularly one way or the other. I expect to vote against him in the next election. And I suppose everybody knows that.

I don't defend everything Dean Rusk does. I am just not a follower of this thing at all. But I do feel that this would tend to create an emotional, psychological situation in this country that would add to the confusion that already is bedeviling us in the world and especially within this country.

Now, I feel strongly that it would.

RESPONSIBILITY LIES WITH THE PRESIDENT

Getting down to the thrust of this motion, which I am sure Senator Gore doesn't mean it this way, I probably have misinterpreted it, but this is a thrust right at the heart of Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State. I don't think that is where the responsibility lies. I think it lies with the President of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it does, too.

Senator GORE. This is addressed to the President, not Rusk.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I know, but this is what I am getting at, Albert. I want to explain what I mean by what I said.

I have no word from the horse's mouth. I have no direct or indirect second-hand communication one way or the other on this thing, but I put a few things together, over a long period of time. I don't think there is any question at all that if the President said for Rusk to come up here, he would come. But I think he is not coming, and, frankly, I am talking within this committee, I think he is not coming because the President tells him not to come.

Now, Senator Fulbright talked about this minister down at Williamsburg. Personally, I think that was a rather arrogant and illadvised thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you read the whole speech?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, but—

The CHAIRMAN. I would like for you to read it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't think that a person who singles out the President of the United States who comes there for worship should get into a political manipulation.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you get that and bring it over here?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I may be wrong, but, anyway, that is the way I feel about it. But if the press will pick out, out of context, something like that, what will the press do, out of context, on some kind of a public statement and a give-and-take question-and-answer business from the Secretary of State in a delicate situation such as we have in the world today?

And I think the same thing would apply there.

A DIRECT THRUST AT RUSK

I get back to the question of why I think that this could well be interpreted as a direct thrust at Rusk. It is directed to the Presi-

dent of the United States; that is, it says he should communicate to the President the concern of the committee about the breakdown in public communication between the executive and the Senate. Now here it is, "which arises from the refusal of the Secretary of State to testify."

Now, that is a direct dagger at the heart of the Secretary of State, I believe, as it will be interpreted in the papers, and I feel that it is not quite fair to him. He is a man of great capacity. I repeat again, there are a lot of things that he has done and said and positions that he has taken that I don't agree with at all.

I have had my disputes with him.

Senator GORE. What about failure instead of refusal?

The CHAIRMAN. Or you could say the administration's spokesman.

Senator GORE. I don't wish to aim anything at the Secretary of State.

Senator LAUSCHE. What if you would say his refusal to come before the committee in public to listen to the public diatribes of the committee members while few or no questions are asked of him on direct issues?

Senator CASE. Except by Mr. Lausche of Ohio.

Senator CASE. I had an important point to make and you took it right out of my hand here.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, okay.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was going to say this, Albert. The reason I said at the outset that I propose, whenever we are through talking, my plan is to make a motion to table this. I personally would prefer to do that rather than to make a motion just in diametric opposition. I think we are better off, the way I view it, we would be better off to table it, which means that we just don't act on it, rather than to vote it down, a negative vote. That is the reasoning behind my thought on tabling this thing.

Senator GORE. Could I ask a question?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

PRESIDENTS HAVE USURPED POWER

Senator GORE. Do you share my concern with the continued diminution of the power and influence of the legislative branch of the Government? Don't you think we should do something to assert the rights and responsibilities of this committee?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I think so, but there are ways of asserting it and ways of asserting it. Now, I have a fairly substantial history—I have talked a little bit too much about it in this committee, I guess—but I have a fairly substantial history of expressing my view on that subject that I think the President has usurped his power, beginning back when I first came down here, and that was with the NATO troops. I have been quite consistent on that since then. I don't think the President has any right to send NATO troops over there without congressional approval.

We later got around and approved it, and I will again repeat to ad nauseum, I think, but I will again repeat my question to Dean Acheson at that time, that were we expected to, or would we send any substantial number of troops over to implement the NATO program in Europe. We have been told that we would take care of the

sea and the air and all that. I asked him that specific question, and his answer to that was, "The answer to that, Senator, is a clear and emphatic no."

Now those were the exact words that he used. Within three months, we had four divisions going to Europe without any further authority of the Congress, and I have been on that little kick ever since. I mean, I think the President constantly goes under what he claims to be his Commander-in-Chief powers, which this Supreme Court may say he has, I don't know. They will say anything over there.

Senator GORE. Inherent powers.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But I don't think they are inherent powers. I don't think the Constitution conveys those powers. We do go ahead and we okay them afterwards many times, after he has done something. You go back into history, Franklin D. Roosevelt's fifty destroyers business. I think that was an utter giveaway of American property without any authority at all, but Congress went ahead and authorized it by implementing it at a later date. So that became a moot question. That is the way it usually happens.

But we are building up in this country, we are building up through the Meet the Press and these people that get on radio and say, "Oh, but the President has the inherent right under the Constitution to do these things." I don't think he has any such a damn thing. I don't think he has that right at all. His constitutional powers are very limited in the Constitution, and many of his powers that go for international affairs have to be cooperatively exercised, such as confirmation, or that is advice and consent of the Senate.

I agree with you. I don't go on the other side of the question. But I do think we are in a situation of tension at this present time. The question is whom do you believe? Do you believe Westmoreland, or do you believe some of these other fellows, or do you believe—

SECRETARY DECLINES TO TESTIFY IN PUBLIC

The CHAIRMAN. That isn't the question. These people who talk about their being busy. The Secretary makes speeches all over the country. He gives interviews in U.S. News and World Report. He prepares them or goes over them. He does it everywhere, except he doesn't want to come to this committee.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He comes here.

The CHAIRMAN. He doesn't want to come in public. These are all public appearances. He appears in public, in statements. He makes speeches; he goes out to Indiana. You know as well as I how often he goes. He takes plenty of time to talk to everybody but this committee.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. So does the President.

CALL FOR QUESTIONING

The CHAIRMAN. I think Frank, in a very subtle way, Frank's suggestion that this committee asks questions which he doesn't like, do you agree?

Senator LAUSCHE. No; may I state my position?

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is true.

Senator LAUSCHE. In my opinion, we have not conducted genuine hearings in which a witness is called to testify. This resolution says that he refuses to testify.

In the British Parliament, Cabinet members are called for questioning.

The CHAIRMAN. In public.

Senator LAUSCHE. Not to listen to speeches of twenty and thirty and forty minutes in length. Now, I would suggest that we clean our own house first, lay down rules of procedure. You call him to testify on a specific issue.

Issue: Shall we pull out of Vietnam?

Issue: Shall we stop the bombing?

Issue: Shall we increase the bombing?

We call him and we ask him to testify, and the members of the committee shall be permitted to ask questions and not to have Rusk as the public attraction for the committee members to make speeches on television and radio, and only for that purpose, while the poor Secretary has to listen, sit there and listen docilely to what is being said.

LIMITING TIME FOR QUESTIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I don't agree with that at all. The secretary usually starts out, and with the limited time, he often takes up so much time with the initial statement that almost invariably it is at least thirty minutes, sometimes forty-five minutes; that has been the usual practice in all public sessions.

It is occasionally true that one or two members may say, "I don't wish to ask a question," and make a statement, but I don't know how we are going to vary that. It would be a very drastic change to say members of the committee are not able to make a statement. I don't believe any of you are willing to do that.

Senator MUNDT. We can solve that problem by giving each member so much time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very difficult problem. With the Secretary, with any Secretary or any witness who is at all astute, he knows you haven't much time. He knows it is very easy to make a long answer that takes all your time, and he gets absolutely nowhere. He knows if you are operating under a five- or ten-minute rule. We have tried that, and I think those meetings don't get you anywhere because no one person is able to pursue any question to its conclusion because of the time.

I have asked the staff in the last several meetings we have had, not with him, but with other people, the average of everybody has run not over ten minutes, because there will be some people who won't ask any questions; they will skip by, but there are always two or three people who are interested in the subject particularly and pursue it for a longer time. But I think the staff will say this. I asked them to do that. I wanted to see the average time of so many members during a certain limit; how long it went. It worked out to just about ten minutes or a little less, although some would take as much as twenty; some would take only one or two minutes. Some would pass altogether. But I don't know how you make these hearings effective.

REFINING THE VALIDITY OF THEIR POLICIES

I have just been handed this which you may have seen, dated November 27. Here is a long interview that he gives to the *Reader's Digest* in the form of an interview. Well, of course, these are all created not to elicit what I think is the crux of the matter, but as a vehicle for the expression of his views without examination.

It may be that the Congress doesn't have any role to play, but I think it does. I think that the participation of this committee, with all its faults, could be very helpful to this or any other administration in refining the validity of their policies.

I agree with the minister. I think there is a great question in the minds of certainly my constituents as to what in the hell are we doing in Vietnam that justifies the cost. They are not all against it. They don't know. Some of them, they are divided like everybody else, but most of it is more confusion as to what it is rather than a positive view that it is right or it is wrong. They just don't know.

I want to put in the record for everybody, I wish I had copies—
Mr. MARCY. We will make some copies.

The CHAIRMAN. This sermon, I think it is a very innocuous sermon, in which there was only this one sentence that was picked out that appeared and it was presented as if it was critical.

It is a very moderate and nonpolitical approach based upon, I thought, one of the President's favorite prophets, Isaiah. I don't want to take your time to read it all, but I want to put it in the record, Mr. Reporter.

Senator MUNDT. Why don't you Xerox it and distribute it?

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is interesting to show how a distorted version can be made of a very moderate statement.

TEXT OF SERMON

The CHAIRMAN. This preacher starts out, he says, his theme, his text is, "The people who sat in darkness have seen a great light. They that dwell in the land of the shadow of death upon them hath the light shone. Isaiah 9.2. Moses explores, "Leading the children of Israel" and so on, and it goes on. It is a normal, what I call orthodox thing, except it gets down to this point. He talks about—I will read it, if you would like, one or two paragraphs.

Today we seem surrounded by insoluble problems. Irresistible forces appear to be approaching collision with immovable objects. The most immediate and demanding conflict arises from the insistence of racial minorities to be given all the rights and privileges that the majority have achieved. The race problem can no longer be evaded either in this country or abroad.

Seemingly impossible questions will require even more good will than brains. Probably the only effective way out will be to provide better schools for everybody and develop a more inclusive type of community life. The end result will benefit everybody. Our lives will be far richer as our society becomes more inclusive. Isn't this what our Lord Christ prescribed, love thy brethren, bear one another's burdens, to whom much is given.

Now we are seeing the pragmatic necessity of what we once thought impractical idealism fortifying us as it did Moses; getting Catholic and Protestant together appeared ten years ago as wild idealism. Today the Holy Spirit is leading us into an increasing number of intimate contacts and a united force for good is becoming a possibility.

Some deeply loved prejudices may have to be put aside, but God is working his purpose out, invalidating what seemed a stalemate.

The overshadowing problem before us is the international realm. The political complexities of our involvement in an undeclared war in Vietnam are so baffling

that I feel presumptuous even in asking questions. But since there is rather general consensus that what we are doing in Vietnam is wrong, a conviction voiced by leaders of nations traditionally our friends, leading military experts, and the rank and file of American citizens, we wonder if some logical, straight-forward explanation might be given without endangering whatever military or political advantage we hold. Relatively few of us plan even the mildest form of disloyal action against constituted authority. United we stand; divided we fall. We know the necessity of supporting our leader, but we cannot close our Christian consciences to consideration of rightness of actions as they are reported to us, perhaps erroneously, perhaps for good cause of which we have not been apprised.

We are appalled that apparently this is the only war in our history which has had three times as many civilian as military casualties. It is particularly regrettable that to so many nations the purpose appears as neocolonialism. We are mystified by news accounts suggesting that our brave fighting units are inhibited by directives and inadequate equipment from using their capacities to terminate the conflict successfully.

While pledging our loyalty, we ask humbly, why? And so on.

I won't read it all. But I think it is a very moderate one. Here is what he says in his letter. As I say, you can see there is one paragraph—here is what he says:

Perhaps some day it will be understood that my remarks in Bruton Parish Church November 12 were intended to give strength to the heart and the hands of the President. I felt the analogy of light shining in darkness, Isaiah 2.9 illustrated by ancient Moses and medieval Luther would be helpful. Religious and racial dilemmas apparently hopeless until recently are rapidly approaching solution because intelligent good will is being acted upon by God. All these seem to provide reasonable hope that when people are adequately informed as to rightness of our purpose and procedure in Vietnam, God will again resolve the impasse rapidly and honorably. The sermon was neither derogatory nor critical of Mr. Johnson, as many of those attending in a spirit of worship agree.

He is assuming, referring, I suppose, to the people actually there.

Deplorable misconstructions have been drawn from the occasion by lifting portions out of context, by impugning motives, and by imagining ideas which were never stated or inferred. My outline and intent was simple, kindly, and religious.

One, when things seem hopeless and man does his righteous best, God gives victory. Since I was incapable of making specific recommendations, I sought by example from Scripture and history to give encouragement. A clear reading of the entire address will, I believe, bear out my motives as those of a constructive Christian gentleman speaking appropriately from an intelligent pulpit.

Sincerely yours.

I think the fellow is correct, if you read the whole thing. I don't see how you can take offense to it except just by picking that sentence and saying this is what the whole sermon is about.

A FALSE PREMISE

Senator MUNDT. I think what he forgot, Bill, is that a preacher is not supposed to prevaricate from the pulpit. I think he started his whole discourse on a false premise when he said there was a dominant point of view in this country that the thing was wrong. After that, I don't see what is wrong with it, except for the misstatement of fact, if you are going to accept the Gallup poll and various polls I have seen on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN. He raises the question there in that connection.

Senator MUNDT. I thought he made a flat statement.

Senator CASE. I think he talks about the consensus being the consensus of nations rather than the consensus in this country.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think it goes beyond that.

COMMUNICATE WITH THE PRESIDENT

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, in the light of the very able remarks of Senator Hickenlooper, I would like to modify my motion so as to avoid any thought of any personal thrust.

I move that the chairman of the committee be instructed to communicate to the President of the United States the concern of the committee about the breakdown in public communication between the executive and the Senate, and that the committee respectfully suggest to the President the advisability of administration officials testifying before the committee in public session on United States policy in Southeast Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you mind reading that over?

Senator SPARKMAN. Mine, too.

Senator GORE. I strike out these words "which arise from the refusal of the Secretary of State to testify," and substitute therefor "and that the committee respectfully suggests to the President the advisability of administration officials testifying before the committee in public session on United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia."

I think that avoids anything except communication to the President whose responsibility it is, the advisability of continuing this mutuality of responsibility and also exercising our constitutional duty.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would you give that last part again?

The CHAIRMAN. Read the whole thing slowly, will you?

Senator GORE. All right.

I move that the chairman of the committee be instructed to communicate to the President of the United States the concern of the committee about the breakdown in public communication between the executive and the Senate, and that the committee respectfully suggest to the President the advisability of administration officials testifying before the committee in public session on United States foreign policy in Southeast Asia.

In what less offensive manner can it be put?

I wanted to make it as broad as possible.

MAKING THE ACTION PUBLIC

Senator CASE. Would this action be made public?

Senator GORE. If the chairman writes a letter; it would be up to him.

Senator SPARKMAN. Go outside there and look.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no practical way to keep it from being public.

Senator CASE. What I was thinking of, Al, I agree with this one thousand percent. I have made speeches about it myself on the floor and will continue to do it, whether it is wise for us to take any action, or whether we will be put in kind of a box in spite of the very, I think temperate, changes that were made in your resolution, Bill. The average newspaper editorial, whether it be the *Times* or the *Post* or hawks or doves or what, they all climb down on us, and we got nowhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Not all of them. The *Post* is the worst one, but some of them were very favorable.

Senator CASE. I know, but in general, everybody rushes to protect the President from being hurt by usurpers in the way of Con-

gressmen and what-not. I just don't think that it is going to do any good to squawk publicly, as a committee.

Now, I think individually, and I am going to continue more strongly myself to do it, Albert.

Senator GORE. Will you yield there?

Senator CASE. Yes.

A CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY

Senator GORE. I have no desire to be precipitous about it. If the committee would rather wait, I have no desire to press for action. It seems to me, though, Senator Case, that we simply cannot take this by doing nothing. We have been snubbed for nearly two years, and it is the constitutional duty of this committee, as I see it.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson.

COMMITTEE COULD DAMAGE ITSELF

Senator CARLSON. I want to say this. I rather concur in what Cliff Case has just stated. I don't like to vote for Albert's motion or for Hickenlooper's proposed motion. I think we damage ourselves if we come to a vote here today no matter what the outcome is. I regret this as much as any member of the committee.

I would hope that the Secretary of State would come up here and testify, and I agree with Bourke Hickenlooper. I think he is not coming up here, because the President is the one man that tells him not to come.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is true.

Senator CARLSON. And I regret it.

Senator SPARKMAN. Will the Senator yield there just for a comment?

Senator CARLSON. Yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. And the President will do that regardless of whether we adopt this or not.

Senator CARLSON. Yes, he probably will do it. I sympathize with the Secretary of State, and while I disagree violently with the President and have on many occasions, and the Secretary of State, they have gotten themselves into a position in this emotional period in our country where they can hardly appear in public without some emotional situation developing, such as developed with the Secretary at this school.

You mentioned the *Reader's Digest* and the *United States News and World Report*. I think the Secretary has got himself in such a position that that is about the only way he can communicate with the people now. He can't get out in these public meetings.

On this last tour of the country, the President went to military establishments. He would have been embarrassed even in Kansas had he not done so, and I think it is regrettable.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is.

Senator CARLSON. I think this situation will inflame it further. I would hope we take no action today, and if we get to a vote, I shall, of course, support tabling, but I don't think that is good. I just don't like it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If it is the consensus to continue this thing, I will not press the tabling motion. I would rather dispose of it.

Senator AIKEN. Hold it over for further consideration.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If it were for final consideration, then I would vote to table.

SETTING A HISTORIC PRECEDENT

Senator GORE. I see the majority will of the committee. It just seems to me, though, gentlemen, that we are setting historic precedent here or allowing one to be set that will plague us throughout history, not us, but others.

Senator LAUSCHE. Will someone answer my question—

Senator SPARKMAN. May I offer just this suggestion, Albert? I had to leave the room for a little while. Perhaps this has been suggested. Can we say that there is a failure of communication between the Secretary of State and the committee simply because he will not testify in public? Have we the right to insist that he testify in public? I personally—now you take on that series of hearings that we had last year that were televised. I thought they were good, and I endorsed them. But that was a general survey of the situation, including many outsiders that came in.

I don't think we have got the right to tell the Secretary of State that he must testify in public.

Senator GORE. Will the Senator yield?

Senator SPARKMAN. I broke in on somebody.

Senator GORE. The Constitution makes it very plain that it is for the Congress to decide which of its sessions shall be public and which shall be executive.

Senator SPARKMAN. And I want to go further and say that the President has the right to say whether he will testify at all or not.

Senator GORE. I think that is a dual responsibility.

COMMITTEE SHOULD INVESTIGATE THE WAR

Senator CASE. If I might just say this. I have been deeply concerned that we haven't as a committee been pursuing this as hard as we could. I have been trying to explore some way in which we could have our own investigation as to how the damn thing is going out there. The staff has not been favorable to this, as to whether it was feasible. But I am not happy about this. I think maybe what we ought to do is have a series of public hearings, have another series of public hearings on this and let anybody come who wants, and with our own careful selection of people. If the administration doesn't want to testify at those proceedings, then they will have to take their chances. I would like to go at it that way, Albert, rather than try to squeeze the President. We will not get anywhere, never will, trying to force the President into doing something.

The CHAIRMAN. If we did that, it might be that they would voluntarily come.

Senator CASE. I think they would.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am of the belief that if you lay down ground rules as I have suggested, that you would have no difficulty in getting the man to come before this committee. But if I were in his place, and were subjected to the imbalance of the ability to present

the picture, I would say to myself that the hearing is not conducive to the interests of the country.

PROCEDURES OF BRITISH PARLIAMENT

Am I correct that in the English Parliament, cabinet members are called, and that the members of Parliament are limited to questions and not to the right to make speeches?

Senator AIKEN. No.

Senator MUNDT. It didn't work. They liquidated the Empire.

Senator LAUSCHE. I didn't hear you.

The CHAIRMAN. They submit written questions, but in answer to the question, if it is not satisfactory or something, the member who submitted it has the right to make comment upon it at the time. They do submit, however, in advance, I think, written questions, and it is only if the question isn't satisfactory or for any reason, that is what happens, I think.

Senator CASE. They get a good heckling.

The CHAIRMAN. They can be heckled. You talk about being unruly; you have never seen such an unruly place. They shout at them and boo them and everything else in a way that I have never seen take place either in committee or on the floor. It is the most unruly body I have ever seen on occasion.

Senator LAUSCHE. We talk about acquiring information that is sound, but do I go to the committee hearings to listen to my colleagues make speeches, or do I go there to get information from the witness?

The CHAIRMAN. What do you go to the Senate floor for?

Senator LAUSCHE. That is why I go to the Senate floor, to hear my colleagues make speeches. But when a witness is called, I go to the meeting to hear the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't mean to say just hearing without any cross-examination.

INFLUENCE OF RADIO AND TELEVISION

Senator LAUSCHE. But I mean all I listen to is speeches, and especially when the television is there and the radio.

Senator GORE. Senator, I don't think you are quite fair in that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, that is my judgment.

Senator GORE. There has been some of that, perhaps too much of it. But I don't believe you can characterize all of our hearings in that manner.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, they become especially so when you have the television there and the radio. The meetings are attended with far greater representation when the television is there than when it is not.

Senator GORE. Including the Senator from Ohio.

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, this is all speculation that can be decided by fact. Just look at the abstract of the last hearings and you will see that the witnesses have more inches than do the senators.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, of course, on the initial presentation. Pardon me.

The CHAIRMAN. They take more time than any one senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You are talking about total.

Senator PELL. I am saying that the witnesses take more time than the total Senators.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. There have been some abuses of this in the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, there is no doubt but that is our system. I don't know how to control it. If you want to submit some guidelines, I would be interested to see what they were.

Senator CASE. Bill, we could start out with the bottom of the list instead of the top.

The CHAIRMAN. As far as I am concerned, if the committee wishes it that way, we will try it. I think that ought to be submitted to a vote of the committee.

NOT AN ANTI-WAR RESOLUTION

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest a course of action.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

Senator MUNDT. I must say that I think Albert has made a great case. While I am not quite prepared to vote for his new resolution, if he could just change the end of it a little bit so that those who would deliberately try to misinterpret it as an anti-Vietnam war resolution couldn't do it, I don't think it is intended to be that. It is an honest search for information. I must say that I am also distressed by the fact that the Secretary goes before universities and magazines and talks and answers questions, and the only group he blackballs is this committee.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No, he doesn't.

Senator MUNDT. Yes, he does.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. He appears here.

Senator MUNDT. In public he goes to every place except here.

Senator CASE. He goes before labor unions.

Senator MUNDT. I don't think he should have the unlimited opportunity to make statements which never are challenged and which are never examined in the penetrating way that we can do it. I think that is part of our function, and I think we are falling down on it through no fault of our own.

On the other hand, I don't want to get involved in passing a resolution which the press is going to pick up and say the Foreign Relations Committee has resolved to make a critical approach to the war in Vietnam, let the facts come where they will. I would like to see that last part somehow broadened so it isn't just targeted on Southeast Asia.

TRY TO REACH CONSENSUS

But I would say just this, Mr. Chairman, as a means of procedure. I agree with what you said earlier. It would be too bad to divide this up by a 7-to-5 vote, or however it goes. To try to bring about a consensus of the meeting, why don't we ask the chairman, let him do it on his own, to write a letter to Secretary Rusk, quoting what he said when he was here, when he pretty clearly indicated he would let us know very soon whether he would come or not. Just reminding him of that. Say we are running out of time; we are going to adjourn. The committee renews its invitation and hopes he will come in a public hearing, and would like a reply. He

will get that in a few days, and then let's reexplore it to see whether some resolution might be necessary.

I think possibly he might come. We have got a different ball game now. He can't avoid a public debate on foreign policy if what George Aiken says is correct, if one of our colleagues is going to run on the issue of Vietnam. It is going to be debated all over the country. Why should we just as the Foreign Relations Committee sit on the sidelines and not participate in the discussion?

I do sense in my mail a feeling that while it is true they have told us time after time what the objectives are, it is a kind of varying presentation. It isn't always the same. I wish they would make up their minds some place along the line and stick to it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Senator MUNDT. It would be a lot easier to defend or oppose it, but you have got a moving target. I would like to have him come before I go home and answer some questions. I don't object, Frank, except I get impatient, like you do, Frank, when the other fellow does it. But I think it is something to be said, to talk to the Secretary of State and say now here is what I think, present your viewpoint, and what is your reaction to it. That is one way of asking questions and getting information. I think, if Bill is right, if he just kind of keeps any of us from taking too much time, maybe we don't have to have a ten-minute limitation. I think a letter like that, without any publicity by the—

PRIOR COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT

Senator GORE. I think I agree with everything you have said, but I want to hear from Senator Aiken.

Senator AIKEN. I was just wondering how many members of this committee had communicated with the President about this matter.

Senator PELL. You mean about Vietnam or about Rusk?

Senator AIKEN. About the matter under discussion. He may just be waiting to hear from us.

Senator PELL. You mean about Rusk appearing?

Senator AIKEN. Aiken. Yes.

Senator PELL. Or about disapproval in Vietnam?

Senator AIKEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Which, George? I am not clear.

Senator AIKEN. The only man that can unite the sentiment of this country is DeGaulle. He has united it beautifully. We expect to have different opinions, but I was wondering, has anybody spoken to the President?

Senator CASE. About Secretary Rusk?

Senator AIKEN. About the situation.

Senator SPARKMAN. He said, "The matter under discussion." That is the Rusk matter.

Senator AIKEN. I don't think anybody has communicated with him. I don't think he communicates with anybody on the Hill.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know that anybody has.

Senator AIKEN. Perhaps he is waiting for us to call first.

Senator SPARKMAN. I have not.

A SIMPLE FOLLOW-UP LETTER

Mr. Chairman, if we are not going to have a vote on it, I need to go.

The CHAIRMAN. I have got to make a statement on the floor.

What do you think, Albert, about Karl's suggestion, just a simple follow-up letter?

Senator LAUSCHE. That is just as bad as passing on the other thing.

Senator PELL. Let it simmer.

Senator GORE. I am willing. There is nothing partisan in my view here. We have a duty, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there anything else on the agenda, Mr. Marcy?

Mr. MARCY. We would like to get these two nominations passed.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, are you willing to pass on this routine service list of November 20?

Senator MUNDT. I haven't heard your decision that you made on the other thing.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to hold it in abeyance and do nothing.

Senator MUNDT. Are you going to write a letter?

The CHAIRMAN. I understood not.

Senator GORE. I understood that you were accepting his suggestion and that this be held in abeyance.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper and others said let us do nothing for the moment.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Personally, I wish we would postpone it.

Senator MUNDT. You don't have to publicize it. Write him a letter.

Senator GORE. The chairman can do that.

Senator MUNDT. The chairman has a right to write a letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Without a motion or anything.

DEFER CONSIDERATION

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, since the Christmas season is approaching, and it is an era of good will, supposedly, I move that we defer consideration at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the routine nominations?

Senator AIKEN. No, no.

The CHAIRMAN. On the other?

Senator AIKEN. On Albert's resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee takes no action on this matter.

Senator AIKEN. I don't think this is the time. Let us have a truce for the next—what, 37 days?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. A bombing pause?

Senator AIKEN. A bombing pause for about 37 days.

Senator SPARKMAN. How about over Tet.

* * * * *

[The Routine Foreign Service list dated November 20, 1967 was approved by voice vote.

Paul G. Clark, nominee to be an Assistant Administrator of the Agency for International Development, was ordered reported favorably.

H.R. 3399, to extend the termination date for the Corregidor Bataan Memorial Commission was ordered reported with an amendment.

The committee adjourned at 12:15 p.m.]

MINUTES

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met in executive session at 10:15 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Senators Sparkman, Morse, Gore, Lausche, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, and Case.

Donald L. McKernan, Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for Fisheries and Wildlife, accompanied by Carl F. Salans, Deputy Legal Adviser, and Ernest Kerley, Assistant Legal Adviser for International Claims, testified on S. 2269, relative to the unlawful seizure of fishing vessels of the U.S. by foreign countries. No action taken.

S. 1418, to make changes in the passport laws, was discussed and put over until the next day.

William K. Miller, Director of the Office of Maritime Affairs, accompanied by Knute Malmbourg, Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, testified on Executive M, 90/1, Amendment to article 28 of the Convention of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. No action taken.

[The committee adjourned at 11:50 a.m.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Aiken, Carlson, Mundt, Case, and Cooper.

Ex. M, 90/1, Amendment to article 28 of the Convention of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, was ordered reported favorably without objection.

S. 2269, relative to the unlawful seizure of fishing vessels of the U.S. by foreign countries, was ordered reported adversely by a 13-5 vote.

S. 1418, to make changes in the passport laws, was ordered reported favorably by a 16-2 vote, after rejecting Clark amendment by a vote of 7-11.

S. Res. 155, relating to the construction and operation of nuclear desalting plants in the Middle East, was ordered reported.

[The committee adjourned at noon.]

MINUTES

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AMERICAN REPUBLIC AFFAIRS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met in executive session at 4:00 p.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

To consider the University of Wisconsin study on problems of agriculture.

[No transcript was made of the session.]

BRIEFING ON GREECE AND MIDDLE EAST

Thursday, December 14, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH
ASIAN AFFAIRS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m. in room S-116, the Capitol, Senator Stuart Symington (Chairman of the Subcommittee), presiding.

Present: Senators Symington (presiding), Fulbright, Sparkman, Clark, Pell, Hickenlooper, Case, and Cooper.

Also present: Sidney Sober, Director, Regional Affairs Bureau, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State.

Mr. Marcy and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, we know you are very busy, and, gentlemen, we will call the meeting to order.

Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your coming down to talk to us about problems incident to the Middle East, and may I suggest that you start off by running through the situation of recent developments in Greece, and then perhaps there are other parts of the world that you would want to talk about. But in the meantime, after you give the position as you have it on Greece, perhaps other members of the committee would like to ask you questions.

STATEMENT OF LUCIUS D. BATTLE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

Mr. BATTLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very happy to have a chance to be here with you today.

The situation in Greece at the moment is far from clear. There are many of the actual facts of the events of the past two days that are not known to us. I will tell you them as best I know them based on evidence as it stands at the moment.

The King has for some time been deeply concerned about his relations with the junta crowd. He has said in the past that he thought one of these days a confrontation between himself and the junta was probably inevitable. Our advice to him has never encouraged a confrontation. We have always said we felt that perhaps his leverage could best be used in trying to make this crowd move in the direction that he wanted, but we have added in various conversations with him that, if there should be a confrontation, there must be very careful preparation so he must know exactly what was to happen.

THE KING ACTED ON IMPULSE

Unfortunately, the confrontation occurred. It occurred, I think, without a plan and in a moment of emotion. If I can read a phrase that came in by telegram from the embassy today that their preliminary assessment is that the King acted on impulse rather than on a concrete plan, apparently with the full confidence that his mere presence in the north would rally support for his revolt.

He moved forward, he apparently had—if he had contact with the military leaders in the area, it was obviously inadequate to assure they were with him. He appears to have had the support of a large part of the air force, some of the navy, but very, very little else.

Even that support fell apart very quickly. It never came to any real meaningful group of meaningful support behind him.

We are not sure during the course of yesterday even where he was. He went originally to Larissa, and then was reported as seen in Kavalla and elsewhere in the area, but we were not sure where he was or what he was in fact doing.

He had issued this appeal. It was carried over the radio in Greece several times during the course of the day, but apparently brought little popular support and very little attention.

He had with him Kollias, who is the prime minister of the present government in the government in Greece, and Kollias has continued on with him to Rome to which he went last night, less than 24 hours after he started.

It is, I think, deeply regrettable that this came at the moment it did. I think we could attribute it perhaps to several things, although this is a guess. This is not based on any knowledge. I think that his relations with the junta had been strained. I might tell you very—since this is an executive session, I would not want this to leave the room—I talked to Fred Reinhardt in Rome just about an hour and a half ago. He said that the King had called him on the telephone. The King intended to have a press conference during the course of the day and to explain his actions.

A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT

As stated to Freddy on the telephone by the King, he became convinced that there was no intention to return to constitutional government. He also was pressed to take actions that he found impossible to take, and that he had no intention of returning. This is a telephone conversation, and I might point out a rather bad connection.

He said he would not return until there was a clear date for a constitutional government, and a date for elections. He also made the statement that the swearing in of a regent was illegal in several respects. First, that it occurred while he was still on the soil of Greece and, secondly, that the oath was illegal. That was not explained, nor were the acts that he was allegedly asked to take explained.

I am not aware that the press conference has occurred, but there may be one during the course of the afternoon.

In Athens itself, the coup crowd has formed a new government; Papadopoulos is now the new prime minister. They have sworn in

this little known agent whose name is Zoitakis, or that is as close as I can come. The exact legal position of the government is not yet clear. We are not in possession of full facts. Whether, for example, there is a new act of recognition necessary is not absolutely certain. We undoubtedly, I think, have ahead of us a very difficult period in terms of our relations with the junta. We have had not an easy time prior to this, but I think we have a most difficult period ahead of us.

We have not decided what we will do with respect to relations with them.

In the middle of the night, I received a message from Phil Talbot saying that he and several other ambassadors had been summoned to a meeting and he wondered whether he should attend this meeting with Papadopoulos. My advice was that he not attend; that we have pause for a day or two; reassess what our requirements were here. This would have constituted or could have been interpreted to constitute recognition. Whether a new act of recognition is required depends upon the ruling of the legal adviser of the Department of State, but it was my advice to him not to attend, and he joined with several others—the British, the French, the Germans—in staying away from that particular meeting.

We have instructed him not to have any—to have a minimum of official relationships with the new government, until we can sort out what the legal position is and what we should do in this instance.

U.S. LONG-TERM RELATIONS WITH GREECE

We still have before us the very searching questions we have had all the time. Our relations with Greece go back a long way. They are a member of NATO. We have important installations in Greece itself. I think the importance of Greece in the entire Middle East is very great, and we must not take lightly our own relations there. We must look upon it as a long-term thing and a problem as far as the Greek people are concerned, and I think that we must assess our interest in that light.

I know some of the members of this committee have been deeply concerned about the political prisoners there. One of the first things we did was to send a telegram saying that we hoped that the embassy would bring to the attention of the new government—the new, new government as we are now calling it—our deep concern about these political prisoners, our hope that they would not be pawns in this particular situation, and that nothing would happen to them.

We have had no response to that, but a message has gone forward to that effect from us.

I think we must look with real concern upon it, this new group in power. It is essentially the same elements of strength that were there before.

I think there is no doubt that they have very firm control over the country. As best we know it now, and it was perfectly evident in the course of yesterday and particularly into the night last night that the King had very little support, and, as I said, that this was an unplanned, an unarranged effort that he had made. It is very unfortunate, but I think we have got simply at the moment to sit

tight for a couple of days to decide what we can do, to do it in concert with our other NATO allies. I have been in touch with the British, for example, today. They have about the same attitude that we have. They are examining their legal situation, and I will be back in touch with them before the day is over.

I think we must go very slowly here. I do not believe that any rash effort to end our relations in Greece—I think that would be most ill-advised. I think we have got to be pretty calm about it. There is no doubt about it, this is an unfortunate development and one that I deeply regret.

FOLLOWING A MIDDLE COURSE

As you know, we have attempted over the past months to follow a middle course in terms of our relations with Greece, not to let our relations go completely sour with them, but neither in any way to give evidence that we approved of the junta crowd, which we most definitely have not. That problem is still with us and I suspect that this group will be with us for some time to come, and that we have to prepare for that eventuality.

The situation within Greece itself is calm. I have many details on it. I have just messages coming in very steadily to me. The last one that I received just before I left says that calm prevails in Athens with the public proceeding about their business in a normal manner. That is substantially what those many paragraphs say.

The people did not respond to the King's call. There has been a kind of apathy about the situation, and I think that is reflected in the total problem.

That, sir, I think, sums up where we are with respect to Greece. I will be happy to talk about—I have several other crises I hope very much to touch upon this afternoon, this being probably the last chance I will have to talk with you for some time.

AMERICANS IN GREECE

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, what do you think? Shall we ask him about Greece and then go to the others?

Senator FULBRIGHT. I would think so. It is much the most critical one.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, will you please go on.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Mr. Secretary, how many civilians and military Americans are in Greece?

Mr. BATTLE. It is around 20,000, Mr. Chairman. I have got it specifically.

Senator FULBRIGHT. How are they broken down?

Mr. BATTLE. As of the end of 1966, there were 7,167 military-connected U.S. personnel. That word I would have to define. 2,800 military personnel of which 2,150 are air force.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I lost you. 7,000, what is that?

Mr. BATTLE. 7,000 military-connected personnel. That would be military plus dependents, or civilian employees.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Military plus dependents.

Mr. BATTLE. Yes, sir, military-connected persons.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I see. How many civilians? I only want to get an idea of our people.

Mr. BATTLE. In my mind, sir, it is a total of around 20,000 Americans, business and everything, within Greece itself.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I see.

Senator GORE. It is a lot of people.

Mr. BATTLE. It is a lot of people.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You would not want to venture how many of those were governmental, aside from the military. You do not know how many CIA agents we have there. Is that a secret?

Mr. BATTLE. It would be a secret. I do not have the figure, Mr. Chairman. I would be glad—

Senator FULBRIGHT. 20,000?

Mr. BATTLE. Sir—

Senator FULBRIGHT. All right. I will not press that.

U.S. DID NOT ANTICIPATE GREEK COUP

Were you aware of the first coup last year before it took place?

Mr. BATTLE. No, sir, Mr. Chairman, I was not.

Senator FULBRIGHT. You mean our CIA did not know it either?

Mr. BATTLE. No, sir, Mr. Chairman. There were at the time—the first coup occurred the week I took office. There had been recurring rumors that coups would occur in Greece for some time preceding that.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well—

Mr. BATTLE. But this particular coup came as a surprise to everybody.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is what I was getting at. This particular coup was a surprise to you, but you knew that another coup involving the senior officers was underway, did you not?

Mr. BATTLE. No, sir, I did not. I knew there had been many rumors of coups, rumors that coups had occurred, but not of any specific, to my knowledge, any specific coup or any specific group.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I see.

ALLEGATIONS OF CIA INVOLVEMENT IN COUP

Do you know a man named Rousseas who has written a book just published?¹

Mr. BATTLE. I know he has written a book, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FULBRIGHT. A book on Greece. He is an American. He alleges that particularly our people, CIA, were cooperating with the senior officers in anticipation of a coup. What happened was that three weeks before that coup was to take place, the objective of which was to prevent the election, the junior officers got wind of it and, anticipating the senior officers, they had their own coup and took over. That is what he said.

Mr. BATTLE. I think, Mr. Chairman, that there was a plan for a coup, as I understand it, that had existed for some time. I assure you, sir, I was unaware totally of any plan—

Senator FULBRIGHT. You mean you personally.

Mr. BATTLE. As far as I know, our government.

Senator FULBRIGHT. But you would not necessarily know if the CIA was sponsoring it, would you?

¹ Stephen W. Rousseas, *The Death of Democracy: Greece and The American Conscience* (New York: Grove Press 1967).

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, I make every effort to know what goes on in the countries of my—

Senator FULBRIGHT. I said you would not necessarily know, would you?

Mr. BATTLE. I believe I would, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, this man makes it very positively; of course I do not know. He documents it. I have not talked to him; I am just asking you. This is his theory, and he lived there for a long time. He cites dates of meetings between people, names names, all of this. Of course, it may not be accurate. I was just asking you, but you are stating unequivocally that our government did not have anything to do with the design of trying to thwart the holding of the election on May 28.

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, I assure you that I checked immediately after I was awakened in the middle—I was called in the middle of the evening on the coup, the first coup, and I checked very carefully and I was assured at very high levels that we had absolutely nothing to do with it.

Senator FULBRIGHT. He says that. He confirms that, that you did not know about the first coup, that nobody did much because these youngsters, these colonels, anticipated that the old boys would take over and they would be left out.

But his story is that a coup—and he alleges, I would say, that this government did not want the election to take place in May, I think it was May 28, because they thought Andreas Papandreu would be elected.

U.S. WANTED ELECTIONS HELD

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, I would like on that point—you have to know about this one. I have not re-read this particular file. I have not had time the last few days. There was a discussion between our ambassador in Athens and the King some days before the coup in which we most emphatically said that we felt that the holding of elections was part of our—it was essential there, and most clearly, in our judgment, was an essential part of the—

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is what I want on the record.

Mr. BATTLE. That point was made.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That point was that the elections should be held regardless of who was elected.

Mr. BATTLE. Yes, sir.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is all I wanted to find out.

U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD GREEK JUNTA

Well, what is our attitude now toward this junta? Are we going to continue to give them aid? Are we going to continue the supply of ammunition or what else, or are we going to quit?

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, we have not really reached any basic decisions in these few hours since this current new development. I think we are faced with a very new situation. I think it is one that we have to examine very, very carefully.

Senator FULBRIGHT. May I say—go ahead. I want you to finish.

Mr. BATTLE. We have not had, as you know, any economic aid in there for some time, and immediately after the coup of April 21,

we cut off all major equipment that was going in at that time. We got up to the supplies of tanks and planes that were going in there.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Distinguish between "major" and "minor." What have we given this coup since that time?

Mr. BATTLE. A large part has been spare parts. There have been ammunition and other specifics, small arms, but it is not—

Senator FULBRIGHT. How much in value?

Mr. BATTLE. Thirty odd million dollars.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Since they took over. Is that about right?

Mr. BATTLE. It is about half what it would have been, if I am not mistaken.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I thought our total program—

Mr. BATTLE. The annual level has been \$65 million approximately, and it has been cut, was cut about in half. I can supply the exact figures for you, sir, if you would like to have them.

DANGER OF CIVIL WAR IN GREECE

Senator FULBRIGHT. Well, not exactly, but what I am really getting at is not the precise figures, but our policy. But I would gather from this we were not taking a position that we disagreed with the coup.

Mr. BATTLE. In their opinion, we took a position and they found it very hard to understand because it was so disapproving of it. This is one of the peculiar dilemmas of this thing.

Senator FULBRIGHT. They took the position they could not understand it.

Mr. BATTLE. They felt they had come in—they repeatedly stated in their earlier, the first days, that they were pro-American; they were pro-King; they were pro-NATO. They were going to straighten out Greece. Why did we not like them? The answer was that we did not like them because they had not come into power in a legal and constitutional manner, and we found this highly objectionable in that situation. We were deeply worried in the very beginning. The same worries that I have had over the last couple of days—the danger of civil war in Greece—and it was our belief at that stage that rather than have a total break with them that a middle course was a proper course.

I met with this committee about that time, and I remember saying I do not guarantee it is going to work, but I think we are better off trying to go the middle course than to let the totality of our relations really go downhill rapidly. We must try to see if we can bring this crowd around.

The alternative at that stage seemed to us very likely to be, and it was the view of almost every observer, that it could well have been a civil war in Greece and that we felt we had to try to avoid it if we possibly could.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Hickenlooper?

WHAT TRIGGERED THE KING'S ACTION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you have any idea as to what triggered this operation, I mean of the immediate moment? I understand he was dissatisfied and fearful of the military group.

Mr. BATTLE. I imagine, Senator Hickenlooper, and this is partly guess, we were very alert to this while he and the junta were signed on to the arrangement on Cyprus, they were both committed to it, that this represented a moment in which the King probably believed that the junta had less political support growing out of what the Greeks could well have considered a retreat on Cyprus and a defeat for them.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How much did his mother have to do with this?

Mr. BATTLE. I suspect she was advising him. That is sheer guess; I have no basis for that statement.

One other element is that Karamanlis, who is the former prime minister, made a statement in the middle of the Cyprus crisis in which he called for the overthrow of the junta crowd. That statement, I am sure, we are fairly certain that he and Karamanlis were not in touch with each other, still it was perhaps a political advantage that he thought flowed from that statement that he wanted to take advantage of it.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, the point of my question is not so much suspicion on each side over there but as to why it occurred yesterday, if there was anything that triggered the thing yesterday that you knew about.

Mr. BATTLE. I am not aware of anything.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. I gathered from reading what we have read in the papers the same thing that you brought out, that it probably was an act of impulse, strengthened, perhaps, by his mother. However, when he appeared before our Foreign Relations Committee sometime back, I think we could get the same reaction. I felt he was impatient. I thought he was rather bold in some of the things that he said. I think it is a rather tragic thing that he acted so soon, but at the same time I think you are exactly right. We must be careful. We must choose our steps very carefully.

U.S. NAVAL VESSELS LOANED TO GREECE

What about our naval vessels that we just re-loaned to them the other day?

Mr. BATTLE. Well, those vessels, Senator Sparkman, were—as you know, they were there. This was just an extension of the loan.

Senator SPARKMAN. I know it.

Mr. BATTLE. To have recalled them would have raised a lot of problems including a financial one. I think we have got to remember, and this has been one of our dilemmas, that we have an overall commitment to NATO, to NATO force goals, and we are working within an overall pattern of the military supply of Europe. You cannot separate one country out of it.

I think we are in a dangerous situation here now. I do not wish to be optimistic or in any way to lead this committee to think I know what the answers are. I do not know what they are. I think we have got to proceed very carefully, and I think we have to remember that NATO and the military commitment and the military structure is still a very basic part of our foreign policy. While I deeply regret what has happened in Greece, I do not think at this

stage that we must be cavalier about our total relationships here. I think we have got to be very conscious of it.

THE CYPRUS SETTLEMENT

Senator SPARKMAN. You mentioned the Cyprus settlement. Did you intend to leave the impression that he was unhappy over that, or did he just say it was an opportune time?

Mr. BATTLE. Senator Sparkman, I do not think he was happy at all. He endorsed what he was most eager to bring about. I think what he endorsed was that the junta had been blamed for the retreat on Cyprus and there was considerable speculation.

While we had no reason to suspect this thing would occur yesterday, we had thought there could be a political result from this Cyprus decision; that there could be a weakening of the junta's political position in Greece and I suspect the King felt exactly the same thing.

Senator SPARKMAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Cooper?

STATUS OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT

Senator COOPER. You said you wondered what our relationship would be to what you termed the new, new government. Is this not just another shake-up in the existing government? Why is it a new government?

Mr. BATTLE. This raises, Senator Cooper, two or three questions we did not have before.

Senator COOPER. Give us that.

Mr. BATTLE. I am speaking without a final legal opinion in our own department, but let me tell you sort of the range of it, if I may, Sir.

When the coup took power April 21, the King was still there. Our ambassador is accredited to the King, not to a government. Therefore, there was no question of recognition at all.

The question now is whether that has changed and whether we have a new requirement for an act of recognition. There is not a final legal view on it. But if the regent had been legally appointed, which, as I understand it, under the Greek constitution requires the act of a parliament, there would have been a continuity of accreditation of ambassadors to the person of the regent rather than to the person of the King.

The question now is whether the regent is legally appointed; whether the ambassadors are accredited to the regent; what the status of the King is. He has not legally abdicated. There are many legal uncertainties at the moment, but the best guess is it would take some sort of act.

Senator COOPER. The King has conferred certain legitimacy on the conduct.

Mr. BATTLE. That is right, sir.

Senator COOPER. It seems to me it may be a technical legal question. But practically it is the same group of people.

Mr. BATTLE. It is the same group of people substantially.

Senator COOPER. Following what Senator Fulbright was talking about a while ago, I do not know whether I heard it or read it, but I had heard, too, that this group of senior officers, supported by the

King, had planned to have a coup which was to take place later and which the young officers just anticipated, came into power.

NATO CONCERNS ABOUT GREECE

I would say this. You are talking about our difficulties with them and the necessity of being careful because of the NATO situation.

I just came back from this parliamentary group of NATO, and I admit they are just members of the different parliaments, I do not know how influential they are in their own parliament any more than I am in this one, but nevertheless they speak of the concern in their parliaments about Greece, and I would——

Senator SPARKMAN. By the way, Greece did not have a delegation.

Senator COOPER. No, they did not have any because they have no parliamentary representatives. I would say most of the people on the committee I was serving on were military people and are most conservative. They support NATO fully and want to keep it strong. But there is great distaste for this government in all these countries in Europe, and their concern was that if this government hangs on and does not take some steps toward elections and a parliament, they think it is going to shake NATO to the foundation on the southern flank and hurt NATO as a whole. It is very distasteful to them.

Not only that, I talked to officials of the government in England and in Italy. They are very concerned about that, Fanfani and others, so I take another—I think we ought to look at it from another viewpoint as to whether this—if the United States does not use some influence for a democratic development, you are going to have NATO weakened perhaps rather than strengthened.

Mr. BATTLE. Senator Cooper, I agree with that concern completely. The question is what leverage we have and how you can exercise it. I had hoped to go to Greece over the next weeks myself. I think the situation has now changed. I planned a trip there with a hope of having some really very firm talk with them about the need—they have a constitutional report due on the 15th of this month. This has been done by a distinguished group of jurists. I think what they do with that is going to be important. Whether this is the time framework which they have tentatively committed themselves to, to get back to constitutional government, whether they will adhere to this now remains to be seen.

I might point out to you, sir, that I talked with Secretary Rusk two or three times during the course of yesterday when he was in Brussels, and he was reflecting the same concern in NATO. He was at the NATO meeting that you just expressed. He called me a couple of times and he said most of the NATO countries were highly sympathetic to the position of the King and would like to know what to do to help him, but, of course, in the first hours we did not know what support he had or who was behind him. But he said it was rather difficult to support someone when you really do not know where he was or what he was doing.

There were rumors he left the country, all kinds of rumors in the course of yesterday afternoon, but the concern particularly on the part of the Scandinavians, the Dutch, have been evident for some time. It was discussed at great length with them.

Senator SYMINGTON. Are you finished, Senator?

Senator Gore?

Senator GORE. I am satisfied with the report. No questions.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Case?

NATO'S COOL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE COUP

Mr. Case. Would you just tell us what actions the other countries in NATO took in regard to recognition, the relationships with the junta up to now?

Mr. BATTLE. The relations, sir, of I think all the NATO countries since April have been about the same. It has been—while you say we may not have been as disapproving as you would have liked, most of us had had very cold, very cool relations with them since the coup crowd took over. There were political problems within the Scandinavian countries that I think made them particularly concerned, but they did not change anything until fairly recently and, over another issue of a month or two ago, they withdrew their ambassador.

At this stage I think the British, the French, the Germans and ourselves, we have approximately the same difficulty about the future.

My own view is we should not take any act of recognition. We must have a minimum of contact for a few days and see what happens, but I do not again think we ought to lightly break relations here. I think there may be a way we can stay there legally without an act of recognizing as long as they permit us to do so even if a new act of recognition is required.

Senator CASE. But we will keep in touch, I take it, with other countries in NATO.

Mr. BATTLE. Absolutely, sir. This is basic to what I think we have got to do.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Clark.

Senator CLARK. No questions. Thank you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

NO QUID PRO QUO ON CYPRUS

Mr. Secretary, just to get on the record a point that I know we talked about privately, would I not be correct in my statement that no quid pro quo was made by Mr. Vance in return for the acquiescence of the Greeks to their withdrawal from Cyprus?

Mr. BATTLE. You are absolutely correct, Senator.

Senator PELL. In any way or form.

Mr. BATTLE. No manner of any kind.

Senator PELL. Right.

SAFETY OF TRAVEL IN GREECE

Another question, I have a constituent who is in the travel business and he represents a travel association and they wanted to know what the attitude was of the U.S. Government in regard to travel to Greece. Is there any particular view on it or not?

Mr. BATTLE. During the Cyprus crisis?

Senator PELL. No, I mean as of now.

Mr. BATTLE. Now?

Senator PELL. Yes.

Mr. BATTLE. We have not taken a position on it. I do not think there is any at the moment. It does not appear there is any danger of civil war.

Well, I will get the advice of our embassy steadily on this particular point. I do not think at the moment there is any particular reason for discouraging it.

Senator PELL. Right.

BACKING A LOSING CAUSE

I must say I would agree with you about the importance of not moving hastily and not breaking relations even if one disapproves. In the end, you are cutting off your nose so often to spite your face.

As you know, we again talked a couple of times yesterday—I am still concerned that even though we recognized the fact that the King was on the ropes and did not know what he was doing, it seems to me we knew the King was doing the right thing, was doing what many of us had urged him to do, at least I as one individual had, and we had a certain responsibility here even if we came out backing a loser. To my mind there is a certain moral, I will not say bankruptcy, but a moral breakdown in that we who lecture the world so freely and easily many times came out with no statement of encouragement to the King for doing what we all wanted him to do.

Without going into your own personal position on this matter, how do you account for this, recognizing we might have been backing a losing cause?

Mr. BATTLE. The decision that was taken, Senator Pell, was based on the very great uncertainty of events yesterday. If it had appeared that there was a chance of the King having any support, or if we had even known he was going to remain in Greece and tried this, I think our attitude might have developed in a different way. But the attitude we took was the same attitude that Secretary Rusk reported the other NATO countries took. As he said, it is awfully hard to back something when you have not got anything to back. We could not find the King. We did not know where he was. We did not know who was supporting him. We were not even sure whether he remained in Greece. Therefore, it would have been a hollow gesture and we waited to find this out and it was all over. That is exactly what happened.

CONVERSATIONS WITH THE KING

Senator PELL. Has anybody from the American side talked with the King since this thing started?

Mr. BATTLE. Yes, sir, I told—I guess before you came in—this. I hope very much this will not leave this room. Ambassador Reinhardt called me a couple of hours ago, and he had had a telephone conversation with the King, and he is having a meeting with him perhaps now. He told me that he had had a telephone call from the King and the King had indicated he was having a press conference and would explain his own actions.

What has come out of the meeting with him I do not know, but I see no reason for us not to have—I do not think this ought to be publicized because I do not—for a lot of reasons, but I would assume we would continue to have contacts with the King, and I see no early reason for us not to do so.

Senator PELL. Do you feel the King feels let down by us in any way?

Mr. BATTLE. Well, I would imagine he may very well, Senator Pell. I think he may very well. But I think the King in many ways let himself down. I must say there was no preparation; there was no plan. He just did this on an emotional impulse as we understand it. Again I do not know all the facts, but from everything we have, this is what it appears to be.

Therefore, we have never encouraged him in taking on this kind of thing. Obviously, it is his own decision. We have believed that his own leverage in the country was of distinct advantage. There was a period when I think he considered once leaving. Our own view at that stage was it would have been bad if he had departed. This was many months ago.

I regret what has happened very deeply, but it was his own decision and not one that we wished to enter into in any way, shape, or form.

Senator PELL. Just to pursue this a little further, I realize we did not push him in it, but do you think he felt it implicit in the conversations he had with the Executive Branch while he was here that he might have received more encouragement and support than he received in fact?

Mr. BATTLE. That is conceivable. I do not think there is any basis for it because he did refer, as I said earlier, to the fact that there would one day be a confrontation. We always said, "You must be very careful to be sure your own plans are carefully laid if this is the case," and we had urged him, I did myself, because I felt his own leverage in the situation was very important in terms of keeping the group in power moving toward a constitutional government that he and we both felt and still feel important in the situation.

Senator PELL. Right.

But you say we were not forewarned of it.

Mr. BATTLE. I believe, sir, it was the spur of the moment. Perfectly clear there was no plan or at least if it was a plan it was a very bad one. Nobody joined. I just do not think the evidence that he had any plan in being is very great. I could be wrong and it may be as we learn more about it. But based on what we know now, it appears to be a formless decision on his part.

Senator PELL. Have you had a peak at the constitution or not?

Mr. BATTLE. No, sir.

Senator PELL. Thanks; that is all.

SYMPATHIES FOR THE KING

Senator SYMINGTON. I talked at length with the King, for several hours with the ambassador, and then had breakfast with Papadopoulos seemed to me it was just a case of playing chess with each other and which one moved. If he moved first, if the yellow moved before black, why then—white before black—then the ques-

tion was would white move successfully or if black moved if you call that, and apparently he moved too fast.

Based on what I learned from Ambassador Talbot and just in the room, my impression was that his sympathies were completely with the King as well as his hopes.

Mr. BATTLE. I think there is no doubt of this, Senator Symington.

INFLUENCE ON GREEK-TURKISH SITUATION

Senator SYMINGTON. There are just two questions I would like to ask: First, how, if in any way, will this affect the Cyprus and Turkish situation, and, secondly, what our future plans would be with respect to any form of aid including military aid.

Mr. BATTLE. The first question with respect to Cyprus, the Turks have told us since the events of yesterday that they still stand on the agreements. Our first act when we heard this had happened, I got in touch with the Secretary by phone immediately saying I thought it was very important that he tell the Turks to in fact keep their shirts on, not to take any action that would seize upon what appeared to be an opportunity. They appeared to go completely along with this and have reconfirmed their support of the Cyprus agreements.

Secondly, on the second point you made, Senator Symington, we have not addressed ourselves, having reviewed now everything that is in the pipeline, there is no thought of economic assistance. There has not been for a long time. We have got the very difficult problem of NATO. I still have some hope that this crowd will turn itself around, and I think there may be new pressures on them.

We were told in a telegram from Talbot that they appear to have considered instead of appointing a regent, announcing that they were now a democracy. This is the nature of the government. It shows the careful planning and the great experience that is brought to bear by this crowd. They are not a very good group, let us be honest about it.

I think there might be some international pressures on them to go on with the constitutional reforms they have stated. I think at the moment—again I see nothing ahead but difficulty for us. I do not think we ought to rush in the next 24 hours or so on a decision on it. I am rather bearish on any prospect of aid there, but I do not wish to say at this stage that is my final attitude and there has been no decision by the administration at the moment.

Senator SYMINGTON. Would you when you get a full report, even though we will probably be out of session, in case of that will you give to Mr. Marcy or anybody who is in charge of the staff here what you consider as much information as possible so if he wants to know what the information is he can be supplied unilaterally on a proper basis?

Mr. BATTLE. Yes.

JAILING OF PAPANDREOU

Senator FULBRIGHT. One more question. What is the status of Andreas Papandreou. Is he in jail?

Mr. BATTLE. He is in jail. We had one report which came in yesterday which was based with his wife who had talked either with Phil or an embassy officer, I forgot which. She was very upset that

this present situation could work to his detriment. She had taken him supper and had seen him at a distance. Many people have seen him over recent months. His health appears to be all right.

We have repeatedly—

Senator FULBRIGHT. He is alleged to have TB.

Mr. BATTLE. That is right, but there were reports he was in very serious health and was about to die several months ago, but that is not the case. I believe he has had TB in the past. How active is it, I do not know. As I said, one of the first things—I think I brought the telegram, no I did not—that we did was to inform the coup group we would view with very deep alarm any action on the political prisoners.

What is the future of Andreas Papandreou, Mr. Chairman, I could not tell you, but this is one we have acted on behalf of the political prisoners repeatedly, and we will continue to do so within the limits of leverage we have in the situation.

Senator FULBRIGHT. His father is also under house arrest.

Mr. BATTLE. His father was freed from jail, is under semi-house arrest. This may have changed over the last day.

Senator FULBRIGHT. That is all.

EFFECT OF CUTTING OFF U.S. AID

Senator SYMINGTON. Anybody else have any questions on Greece?

One more question. If we did not furnish military aid and we did not furnish economic aid of any kind, and if the King is over there saying he wants a constitutional government in Italy, would there be any chance, as you see it now, of that operating in favor of the fall of the junta or do you think that—

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, I doubt it.

Senator SYMINGTON. You see the thrust of my question.

Mr. BATTLE. I think it has been pretty evident that the King has not any basic popularity with the people. This is one of the weaknesses. I think our denial of the military, a complete break on military, I do not think it will bring the junta down. I was awfully glad during the Cyprus crisis we had a reasonable relationship with him. If we had totally cut off every relationship in April, we would have had a war over Cyprus a couple of weeks ago, and, therefore, I think we need a certain leverage. We need a certain influence.

I do not like this crowd any better than anyone in this room does, but neither can I take my responsibilities lightly of ending this relationship as important as this one is.

AVERTING A WAR

Senator SYMINGTON. What next would you like to talk about?

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, I have a whole chamber of horrors here—if the committee would like to hear it. I am just afraid I will not have another chance.

Senator SYMINGTON. Let us ask the chairman.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Have you got any good news?

Mr. BATTLE. I have a little in the sense we do not have a war in Cyprus.

Senator FULBRIGHT. O.K.

Senator SYMINGTON. If we passed that one, we all know that, and we will hear about that.

Mr. BATTLE. Just one word on Cyprus. I would only like to say while we have averted a war I do not think we have solved the problem. There is a lot more to be done. The issue is not removed and it will be before us again. That is the end of my comment on Cyprus if you followed it in the paper.

Senator CLARK. May I ask one? What was the relationship of Brosio Vance in the working out of the agreement which apparently has averted war?

Mr. BATTLE. On Wednesday before Thanksgiving, Senator Clark, we had very clear intelligence that the next morning the Turks were going to move. This seems absolutely certain. We felt that at that moment we had attempted to interest NATO and the U.N. in taking an action. At the same time we felt that NATO could not operate with respect to Cyprus because Cyprus is not a member of the organization.

We felt that NATO had a certain leverage with the Greeks and Turks over the NATO relationship.

SOVIET INFLUENCE IN YEMEN

Senator SYMINGTON. Before we lose too many people, I want to ask about the Soviet Union going into Yemen and Aden.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, I want to know about that. I think that is the most important thing before us right now.

Mr. BATTLE. This is what I wanted to particularly talk about this afternoon. First, let me review the situation with respect to Yemen and a few of the things you have said at a couple of these hearings before.

For a long time, the Soviets have had a role in Yemen, but an indirect role. Their role in Yemen has been expressed through the Egyptians. They have been supplying military equipment there for a very long time. It has been going on indirectly.

While I was still ambassador to Cairo on several occasions, I got little indications, I mentioned this in one of our discussions down here, I had indications that the Egyptians were a little nervous about the Russians making a direct effort to get into Yemen without going through them and supplying military equipment.

EGYPTIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM YEMEN

After the Arab-Israeli war and after the Khartoum Conference in which the moderate Arabs agreed—the oil rich countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya—agreed to pay part of the cost of the closure of the canal and the cost of the war to the Jordanians and Egyptians, King Faisal really had three purposes by that agreement, and he is paying a very large amount of money. He wanted three things: He wanted the Egyptians out of the Yemen; he wanted to get Radio Cairo off his back; and he wanted to establish himself as a good Arab because he had not fought in the Israeli war and he had no intention of fighting in the Israeli war, and he had no intention—

Senator SYMINGTON. Who is this?

Mr. BATTLE. Faisal. He did want to identify himself for political reasons as a member of the Arab club and he wanted to get Nasser out of Yemen which is a problem for him because it is so close to him.

The Egyptians needed to withdraw from Yemen. They had had 70,000 troops in there just before the Arab-Israeli war. They had about 25,000 reduced from a high of 70,000, had economic reasons for wanting to get out, and they began to withdraw and they are now out.

As they pulled out and lessened their own numbers in Yemen, they also found themselves being supplanted directly by Russians.

Now, as the Egyptians withdrew, and they had been steadily withdrawing since the Khartoum arrangement, they have been getting their money. Faisal has handled it very well. He has been handing it out to Nasser a little bit at a time and, as I might say, the Battle view of how to aid Nasser, he holds him—

Senator FULBRIGHT. So much a soldier. [Laughter.]

Mr. BATTLE. Just about, sir.

INVITATION TO THE RUSSIANS

So that the troops have withdrawn, and the last ones are now out. But at the same time the Russians have reinstated their own interest in a direct involvement there.

They had an invitation from the Yemen about two months ago. The Yemens said they would like to pay a military—send a military mission to Moscow, and the Russians said, “Don’t you come to us, we will come to you.”

They sent several people down. They stayed for some days, and we have begun to see the results of this very clearly.

Now, in the last weeks as the Egyptians have withdrawn, the royalists have also kicked up their heels. With some assistance from Faisal that they have had over the years, and from a few other assorted people including Iran, they have made it more difficult for the remaining Republican troops there. The Russians have responded to this very quickly. In the past month, the USSR has airlifted a number of MIG 15, 17 fighters as well as training aircraft in knock-down form into Yemen. These were being assembled by 40 Soviet technicians at Sana Airport, but the planes may have been moved to Hodeida to get away from this royalist shelling I mentioned a moment ago. There has been a crash program of small stuff going in NAN-12 for some days now; it is hard to move any vast amount of equipment that way, but it does not take a lot to have an impact in this situation.

SOVIET PILOT SHOT DOWN

What is disturbing is that a Soviet pilot was shot down there some days ago. We have gotten this pretty clearly established. There is no doubt, virtually no doubt, that this is accurate. This is the first time we had been aware of direct Soviet pilots in there.

Senator SYMINGTON. Excuse me. This is the first time that a Soviet military person has been known to have been fighting or working in that part of the world, is that not correct?

Mr. BATTLE. I think in direct fighting, yes, sir.

Senator SYMINGTON. Advisers in Syria but indirect fighting.

Mr. BATTLE. There were some reports of Russian officers captured during the Arab-Israeli war who were serving apparently as advisers. We have never had a complete confirmation of this, Mr. Chairman.

There is no doubt that the Soviets are putting equipment in. They have put in about 30 military people which would support roughly six or eight pilots. The planes that they put down there, I do not think the Yemenis are capable of flying them, so I think we must assume that this is more than a one-pilot thing.

They have also been pouring in technicians, pouring them in; they have got several hundred in there.

COMPETITION BETWEEN RUSSIANS AND CHINESE

I think the Soviet interest in this area is several—I have been over this with the committee before, but I would like to repeat it. The Chinese have been active in Yemen for some time.

I think there is a competition between the Chinese Communists and the Soviets over influence in that miserable place. There is only one reason for wanting to be there, and that is its location.

Another interest is, as the British withdraw from the area, and I think this is deeply regrettable from our point of view, and I have urged them officially and unofficially for two years to reconsider their decision, but they are withdrawing. As they have withdrawn their power from Aden, this entire area looks more attractive to the Soviets than it has in the past. I think they see a vacuum there into which they are willing to make a commitment.

I think the situation that exists with the new People's Republic of South Yemen, the Aden area and the immediate surroundings, is a very dangerous one.

I think there are a couple of somewhat brighter spots than we thought possible a few months ago. The group that is in power there, the national liberation force, it is a far, far left organization, but it is not the Egyptian FFLOS Y so-called, the Federation For the Liberation of South Yemen, which, I think, was even more radical in some respects and totally loyal to Egypt and would have created an Egyptian presence in that particular place.

I think we have a momentary calm in Aden. It is not going to last. This is going to be a pressure point for some time.

TRYING TO INVOLVE NATO

Now, your obvious question, I am sure, sir, is what are we able to do about it. The answer, sir, is not a great deal. We have tried repeatedly to involve NATO in this entire problem. The Mediterranean area and all this area seems to me a legitimate area for NATO to be concerned about. I went over to NATO in July and briefed the Council on our concern about this. Secretary Rusk has just been appearing before the Council this week. I have not had a full report on his talks, but we have been attempting to make them aware of the Soviet thrust in this area which I think is quite large, not just Yemen but throughout the Arab world.

Senator SYMINGTON. Could I ask one question there?

Mr. BATTLE. Yes, sir.

HOLD DOWN AN ARMS RACE

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you think that with the Russians warning us about going into Cambodia, that they would pay much attention to what we wanted them to do in Yemen or Aden?

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, I think we have to try it. I do not know how much attention they will pay to us, but we are now talking about another possible effort with the Soviets. We have tried several times over the last several years to reach some kind of understanding on arms limits in the area which is badly needed. So far it has had no effect, but I do not think we should give up on it. I think we have to keep on trying to hold down the arms race in that area. It is not easily done. I do not think they are going to—they may restrain themselves in Yemen, but I doubt if anything we say is going to make them reverse their course if you want an honest answer.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman?

Senator FULBRIGHT. I do not think I have any questions.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Hickenlooper?

COMMUNIST ENCIRCLEMENT OF MIDDLE EAST

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is there any question in your mind, Mr. Secretary, but that this is only the continuation of a farfetched and long-planned program to encircle the whole oil of the Middle East there and take over the Arabian peninsula? It seems to me it is so evident there is not any argument about it. When they get that, then Persia is gone. It is the encirclement puzzle and they will control the Red Sea, and all the approaches to that area, and in the meanwhile I do not know what we are doing about it.

Mr. BATTLE. Senator, we have just had a study made of this called a—Julius Holmes did a study on the whole Russian thrust in the area. It comes up pretty much with the same conclusion you just enunciated.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I never read Julius Holmes' study, but it seems apparent on the face of it.

Mr. BATTLE. You got the point without reading it, and I think it is quite true. I think their interests are several. I think it is oil; I think it is strategic location; I think it is political pressure.

Let us never forget that there are three wars in this Middle East that we are fighting now, that the Arab-Israeli one goes on and on, the cold war goes on, and the struggle between the moderate and the radical Arabs goes on.

TAKING SIDES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Of course we must be, I suppose, very careful about not taking too many sides but we have taken sides in the Middle East. We are supporting Israel a thousand percent, and we are kicking Faisal in the teeth. In that great area there is a chance that he, I think, would gravitate more and more toward a western orientation.

I am not for him or against him one way or the other. That is not it. But I think we are making a terrible mistake there that is going to rise up to haunt us and cause us trouble.

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, I am very concerned about U.S. influence in the modern Arab states, particularly Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Lebanon, Jordan. I think those are states in which we must not let our influence go.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. We are rolling them over just as fast as they stick their heads up, I think.

Mr. BATTLE. Well, sir, I assure you—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It looks to me that way.

Mr. BATTLE. There is nothing I am more concerned about. We have had problems growing out of the Arab-Israeli war in terms of our relations with the moderate Arabs, but I think we have a great stake here and we simply must not ignore the importance to us economically and politically of those countries.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, I could not agree with you more.

Mr. BATTLE. Iran—I know the Shah of Iran has been very much concerned. He has been worried to death about Nasser and he is worried about the same line you are, Senator Hickenlooper, in terms of the thrust into the area.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It is not without its problems. I do not mean to say it is an easy solution, but there are too many influences pushing us just one way in that thing and that is going to rise up to smite you.

PROTECTING TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

Senator FULBRIGHT. Do these Arabs ever remind you of our pledge to protect their territorial integrity of all the countries in the Middle East?

Mr. BATTLE. Senator, I could not tell you how many discussions I have had with them. I try very hard to keep in touch with all the Arabs, even those countries we broke relations with. I might tell the committee after they had broken relations and during the General Assembly meeting I had the word passed in New York. We had several official and unofficial points of contact; we did not want to lose touch with them. I got Bob Anderson, Jack McCloy, several others, businessmen who have been very active in the Arab world, and I put two of our people in New York and sent word they were available to talk at any time. We have talked about every aspect of it including the question of territorial integrity.

The general opinion of territorial integrity when defined in detail gets very complicated.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well, they are hysterically emotional about this thing, and emotionally unreasonable in terms of our rights. It complicates the problem, no question about that.

Mr. BATTLE. I think this mission that is out in the area now, Ambassador Goring is out there on behalf of the Secretary General of the U.N., and I am hopeful that not only will that mission be successful but that we can exercise such leverage as we have in two ways, well, both Arabs and Israelis, to bring about in time a settlement on this thing.

I am not optimistic that it is coming quickly, but I think we have got to keep on trying and looking towards a permanent one and not a temporary cease-fire.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Clark?

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN SOMALIA

Senator CLARK. Mr. Secretary, what evidence do you have of Russian penetration on the other side of the Red Sea either in French Somaliland or the Somalia Republic?

Mr. BATTLE. Senator Clark, those are out of my area completely. The Chinese made a real effort in there for a time. I know the Rus-

sians have tried, but how broad it is or how effective it is, sir, I will have to refer you to my AF colleague. I have only the UAR on the African Continent.

Senator CLARK. Is it not important in terms of the administration of the State Department handling this thing that you are as concerned as you appear to be, and I share your concern, as to what the Russians are doing on the northeast shore of the Red Sea if there has been some—

Mr. BATTLE. Well, I know a little bit about that. I am not quite as ignorant as I sounded. They have been active. I think the Chinese have not done awfully well in there, and the Russians continue to supplant them. They have tried to put in both aid and military assistance in there. I am not aware of any program at the moment that is active.

Senator CLARK. How about De Gaulle in Djibouti. I mean is he not in on the act?

Mr. BATTLE. Yes, sir.

Senator CLARK. That seems too bad.

One further question, Mr. Chairman.

ISRAELI REFUGEE PLAN

Have you had a look at the five-year Israeli refugee plan which was in the paper this morning?

Mr. BATTLE. I have discussed it generally. I have not seen that specific plan, but I had a long meeting with Comay, Ambassador Coman, last week on their attitude. I am generally familiar with what they have in mind, Senator Clark. I have not looked at that specific piece of paper.

Senator CLARK. Do you think it holds some hope for a basis for negotiation?

Mr. BATTLE. I think you have got to cope with some of the political realities on this scene before you get very far on the refugees.

There are some very deep-seated emotional problems that bring political problems. I think that unless you can get a basic understanding on a political settlement, it is going to be difficult indeed to get a real plan working on the refugees.

Senator CLARK. Is not the refugee problem one of the things that has to be solved as part of any political settlement?

Mr. BATTLE. I think it has to be and my own view is that we ought to be whacking away at it as opportunity permits without ever saying we are solving it.

This sounds like a non sequitur, but let me tell you specifically what I mean. If you talk about liquidating the problem of refugees, the Arabs get their backs up immediately because they have used it as a political weapon. They say there is only one solution and that is repatriation or compensation.

However, many of those people could be placed, and I think capital projects—I talked with Jim Linen of *Time* Magazine who has been the leader in this project for Near East Emergency Donations—it is called NEED—and it has been suggested that while he never said he is trying to liquidate the problem that such funds they could put into it for capital projects that gave employment that gave permanence ought to be instituted without ever saying we are trying to liquidate or removing it, but simply do it.

They have tried a certain amount of that. I hope the world can do a certain amount of this, but if you say we have a plan that is going to liquidate the problem, there is an immediate political difficulty, but you can go ahead with some projects.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Case.

KEEPING THE BRITISH IN ADEN

Senator CASE. Back to Aden. That is over the hill now, but I wonder was there ever any discussion of the possibility of the British staying there if we helped pay the bill?

Mr. BATTLE. Yes, sir, there was. I cannot tell you—the Secretary had one or two conversations with the Foreign Minister that I am not completely informed about. They had a combination of a political problem and an economic one. The British—I do not quite know why, but the problem of colonialism has become a problem internally for them, and the pressure somehow this became a kind of symbol in Great Britain of colonialist policy, and the government wished to withdraw, so they told me, in London, for political reasons as well as economic ones.

Moreover the cost was pretty heavy, and that was the main thing.

We did indicate, I think they would have stayed if we picked up the bill. We explored it, but it did not get very far.

Senator CASE. I ask because there are other places, as in Singapore, where this same thing may come up again and you run into the same British political problem and we have to think about something else.

Mr. BATTLE. Yes.

Senator CASE. I have no further questions.

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. No questions.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me ask along that line here. Has it not been pretty well bandied about that Britain has adopted a firm policy of getting out of everything east of Suez?

Mr. BATTLE. Yes, sir, or getting out bit by bit.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But that is their policy—disassociate themselves politically from everything east of Suez.

CONNECTION TO THE WAR IN VIETNAM

Senator FULBRIGHT. Just a general question. I am just curious what the Secretary's view would be, if there is any connection between the war in Vietnam and the Russian movement in this and other places.

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, I do not think so. I think the Russian movement in this area is not a new thing. This has been underway for quite a long time.

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes, but if I may interject there and in context, it is known that we are short of people. It is known we are terribly short of engineers. It is known we are terribly short of helicopters in the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. It is known we have 475,000 people today, and tomorrow we will have 500,000 in Vietnam. We have got the Seventh Fleet out there; the head of NATO and CincPac in Naples; SHAPE in the south—they call it CincPac South; the southern part of NATO is worried sick about

Mers-El-Kebir and the growing axis between France, Algeria, and the Soviet Union.

On the western side of the Mediterranean they have got the best naval base in Alexandria. They are going to get maybe soon the best naval base in the western Mediterranean. Do you think they would be doing this if they did not know we were so deeply bogged down in the Far East? That is the gist of the chairman's question?

Mr. BATTLE. They have had pressure on the UAR and Syria and Algeria for quite a number of years now.

BABYSITTING THE WORLD

Senator SYMINGTON. But for 200 years, as the Senator from Iowa said, this is—I have not read the Holmes' report, but we have known for 200 years the czars have wanted the warm water, that has been tremendously increased as a prize as the result of the development of oil.

Eighty percent of the oil for Europe comes from this part of the world. The British economy in my opinion is washed up, finished and done if they lose the Mideast oil based on what I have tried to find out about it, and therefore they certainly—you remember how fast they dropped paratroopers into Kuwait, and yet now they are getting out of Aden, and here we are loaded down in Korea, loaded down in effect in Japan, Formosa.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Vietnam.

Senator SYMINGTON. Above all in Vietnam.

Mr. BATTLE. Loaded down in Europe, and we are babysitting the world.

The question, as I see it, they wanted to do it for a long time; I think everybody would agree to that. But is it not the fact that we steadily get deeper and deeper mired down in Vietnam, in your opinion, the question is asked you, is that not one of the reasons why, when, what is it, when the cat's away, the mice will play or something. We think we are a pretty big cat apparently, and is there not a little more playing going on because we are down—

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, you can never entirely divorce one part of the world from another. The issue in one part of the world has an effect elsewhere. There is no doubt about that. I only was trying to say I think the Russians have been at this for some time and whether we had gotten involved in Vietnam or not, I think they would be going in in one degree or another.

DISASSOCIATING PROBLEMS FROM VIETNAM

Senator FULBRIGHT. Of course, I am afraid the chairman might have influenced your answer. I wanted to see what you would say. But because you do take the position these are disassociated—that is the official line, that these are quite disassociated, not only that it is disassociated from Vietnam but all of our domestic problems have nothing to do with Vietnam. That is the Administration policy line, is it not?

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, more or less. I am not responsible for Vietnam. I have got enough problems in my own area.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I know that. I was just speculating on what you would say.

Mr. BATTLE. I am not going to engage with you in debate on this.

Senator FULBRIGHT. I do not want a debate. I wanted you to put on the record what the administration's attitude is.

Senator PELL. Would the Senator yield there?

I thought the Administration's view was it was not disassociated but one vast Communist plot, and that what went on in any part of the world had its effect in any other part of the world because the strings are all being pulled from one place.

[Discussion off the record.]

ARMS FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, again because I may not be here, I would like to inform the committee of one other small problem because I do not want there to be any danger of the committee not feeling I did not tell them something.

As you know we enunciated a new arms policy for Pakistan and India some time ago. We have been trying very hard to adhere to that policy. The policy very basically is to supply spare parts. We closed the MAAG in both countries, and we have not put in any major tanks, planes, etcetera, in either country. We have been trying—we have been urging them to cut down their own defense expenditures. The only way in which we had any involvement with major equipment was through third country sales. I only want to inform the committee that the Pakistanis have been shopping around for some time for tanks. They have approached it, several other countries including the Italians who have been to us about selling, they wanted 200 M-47 tanks. In line with the policy that this committee has been informed of, we have said that major equipment would be supplied even in a third country situation with our approval only if it replaced obsolescent material. We have told them 200 tanks we felt were excessive. We would consider 100 provided several criteria were met. We had no intention of purchasing additional ones from China, and that they agreed these were replacements on a one for one basis. This deal has not gone through. It is still—they are talking not only—the Paks are talking with the Italians and with the Belgians, but I wanted you to know that this possibility is before us. We have made no decision that will be in line with that general policy and I was afraid if it happened while you were away you would wonder why I had not told you about it. I wanted you to know.

IRANIAN ARMS PURCHASES FROM SOVIET UNION

Senator SYMINGTON. Will you tell us now about the \$40 million in purchases by the Iranians from the Soviet Union?

Mr. BATTLE. Yes, sir. This is an extension of the earlier deal that you are completely familiar with.

Senator PELL. May I interrupt. As just one member of the committee, I would hope you would not even approve 100. I realize that would just be maintaining the status quo. I would hope gradually there would be an attenuation of the military equipment both countries have, and I realize that is not a majority view, but I wanted to express my view.

Mr. BATTLE. Senator Pell, we have tried to cut down their defense expenditures, and I can report that they reduced their budget by 3 percent since we instituted this policy. I have been talking

with both of them about it. The Indians told me the Paks are cheating. They have not really reduced it, but based on what they submitted to us and showed us. I assure you we have been over this step by step by step. There is no opening of all the arms arsenals of this country or any other country that we have control of. We are simply trying to hold down the arms race on a realistic basis.

Now, sir, on the question about the Iranians, in November of '67 we were informed of a \$44 million extension of the earlier arms deal with similar payment terms. Those terms are ten years at 2½ percent interest whereby the USSR would supply 500 armored personnel carriers, 40 tank transports, 2,200 trucks and jeeps, and six mobile maintenance shops. This is still not public knowledge. It is exactly the relationship to the original agreement we are not sure.

I would like to point out that as soon as we heard about this we informed the chairman—and I do hope to have an opportunity to be meeting with you soon so the committee would know it. We have tried to discourage this.

I would like to point out the Iranians have been very restrained in their acceptance of personnel which I think is the very great danger, and, from their point of view, this deal makes economic sense.

I also must point out to you that the Shah is deeply concerned about the same thing that we were talking about this afternoon, which is the Russian thrust in the area. I suspect we are going to have further appeals from him for additional military equipment over the next few years.

Senator SYMINGTON. If I may finally ask one question, please—
Mr. BATTLE. Yes, sir.

FRENCH REFUSAL TO SELL ARMS TO ISRAEL

Senator SYMINGTON. Senator Javits made a speech on the floor the day before yesterday about arms. Apparently General de Gaulle has refused to give, or sell rather, to the Israelis, at least to this point, arms that they have already paid for, tens of millions of dollars, \$42 million that France has taken. I read that he said that they disobeyed him. "Israel disobeyed me," is a quote.

There are only three countries making this kind of weaponry: one is the Soviet Union that is rearming the Arabs; one is General de Gaulle who is now rumored—and Senator Javits mentioned in his speech—to be sending to Iraq the planes he was going to sell to Israel; and the third ourselves. Nobody else, to the best of my knowledge, in production makes the type and character of sophisticated weaponry that the Israelis need.

For the record, and before we leave, I have seen figures which show that the total number of modern Israeli planes today, combat planes, is 75. I have checked it and rechecked it, and I believe that is about right, and they have no bombers. The total number already of Arab planes, fighters, is around 580. Bombers, the figures are not important—the bombers they have considerable of including new bombers they have given Iraq which are beyond the two-way range of Israeli fighters.

Their situation, therefore, according to Senator Javits, and I must say I have heard the same, I did not know he was going to

make the speech and I was not in town when he made it. But their situation, therefore, means that Israel could be subject any time now, especially with borrowed pilots, and the Algerians put 40 pilots into Egypt in the last episode in June, they could be subject any time to an attack from the air, which would be dangerous because of the size of the distances involved.

With the premise that these figures are reasonably accurate and the condition is reasonably stated, which was in the talk that I read that he made, what is our policy going to be about letting them buy military equipment from us?

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, let me make several comments on it.

THE CHURCH AMENDMENT

Senator SYMINGTON. Before you do it, I want to say this: People high in the Administration have been telling other people that because we passed the Church amendment that we made it impossible to help Israel with arms. I want to say for the record that is not true. I have investigated it very carefully. The Church amendment had primarily to do with undeveloped countries that were being sold arms in South America that we did not know about, despite the fact when they came up for economic aid they assured us that the military aid was not going to go. Perhaps that is one of the reasons that the Defense Department tried so hard to keep the names of the country involved in the country X deal from being known. Mr. Bader knows this story backwards and forwards because the Chairman let him work with me on it.

Now, the story has gotten around that because of what the Senate did, it is not possible for this country to supply arms to Israel.

We know, you and I know, that that is false. What I would like to do would be to find out why. What is the reason for not supplying these arms quickly in the interest of the United States?

So far as I know, with the possible exception of a few Australians, the Israelis are the only people who are doing any fighting at any place in the entire world for us unless they are paid—that is, against Soviet aggression, and if that is important.

ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL

Now, that is just a premise which is really not pertinent to the thrust of my question. What are we going to do if these people come and ask us to purchase arms from us? You have told us about Pakistan. We know about Iran. We know about the five countries in South America. What is going to be our policy with respect to Israel if they put up the money?

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make several comments.

As you said, the figures are less important than the basic issue.

I think the question of the accuracy of the figures depends upon your definition of "modern," but let us not argue that.

Senator SYMINGTON. I will say 155 fighters all told for Israel, and 75 of those I would consider, namely the Super Mystere and the Mirage, modern fighters against MIG 21's or SU-7's.

Mr. BATTLE. I would like to say, sir, we are following this issue. I spent a great deal of time on this in recent days. I expect to spend a great deal more time on it in the days ahead. I was author-

ized to say this afternoon only that no decision has been made with respect to the future, but I would like to comment on two or three of the points made.

First, as far as the French deal, the Israelis bought 50 Mirages. Their traditional supplier of planes, from the French pre-war, you are quite right. They paid not for all but a good portion of it, and the Israelis prefer the Mirage and wanted it. We also over the years have preferred not to be the only supplier, and the Israelis concur with that view, and therefore we hoped that they would continue to supply it.

Senator SYMINGTON. May I just in context—we preferred to be not a supplier. There are no modern American combat airplanes in Israel.

Mr. BATTLE. No, sir, I meant all kinds of military equipment. There are other kinds of equipment, too, so we have supplied military equipment.

SPECULATION ABOUT FRENCH MOTIVES

So far as the status of this order is concerned, it has been rather interesting to watch over the last few days. I talked with Mr. Eban in September when he was here. He told me then that he felt that the French would live up to the contract, having gone as far as it had including the money. Since that time, the Israelis have told us they had serious doubts that the French were going to live up to that arrangement.

A few days ago there was a statement made and a good deal of speculation that the French were playing around in Iraqi oil and were going to commit military equipment to the Iraqis. At that same time that story came out, there were two other stories that accompanied it. One was an intelligence report that there were a hundred Mirages about to be sold to Belgium and that those included the 50 for Israel, the destination of them after that not identified.

Second, the story was that 50 Mirages would go to Iraq of the group, of the ones that had been planned for Israel.

A debate then began in France and after the first—heavily involving the question of anti-Semitism and following that the French were forced to a rather strange and hard-to-understand statement. That statement said that they had not diverted 50 planes from Israel to Iraq. They did not say they were going on with the sale, however, but they made it very clear they had not diverted them.

Now, in checking into the matter, I found that we had authorized export licenses for Sperry gyroscopes for those planes. On the basis that it was a contract for the sale of those 50 gyroscopes to Israel through commercial channels rather than governmental ones, which I will explain in a moment, I sent a message that those had been authorized on the basis those planes were being delivered to Israel, and that if they were not sent there we would consider this a violation on the terms of the original arrangement.

At the moment our embassy in Paris believes—I am not sure this is not an overstatement—that probably the French will go through, after dragging their feet for a while, with their contract. The

Israelis do not believe so. It is an open question. It is at least a possibility that has changed in the last two or three days.

THE POSSIBILITY OF AN IMBALANCE

Now, we are concerned about the Israeli, the possibility of an imbalance. The military authorities in our country do not think there is an immediate threat. There is, however, a potential problem there.

Senator SYMINGTON. They are the same ones who have been giving us information on the other war.

Mr. BATTLE. I suspect pretty much the same, Mr. Chairman.

We have made no decision on this, but we are watching this very, very closely and including the possibility of the French and their arrangement.

We have talked in general terms with the French about arms policies, but they have not been very forthcoming so far. We are considering another demarche to them in the very near future.

As you know, I reported to the committee some weeks ago we were providing 48 A-4s to—that number is not public knowledge and I hope it will be handled with care—to the Israelis, deliveries to start this month. It would be at about the rate of four a month and would be completed at the end of the year. All I can say to you is we are watching this most carefully, and I assure you it will get very, very careful attention. I will be very happy during the next weeks to keep in touch with you about it, Mr. Chairman, if that is the wish of the committee, or with Mr. Marcy or with anyone you designate because I think this is an area in which you have a very legitimate interest and I would hope I would keep you informed.

U.S. ARMS POLICY TOWARD ISRAEL

Senator SYMINGTON. First, because my senior colleagues are interested in this, I wish any information you do get, you would give to Mr. Marcy so he could give it to the chairman, Senator Hickenlooper, Senator Gore, or any members of the committee.

As I understand it, what you are saying is (a) we are going to deliver the planes to Israel that we had already agreed to deliver to them.

Mr. BATTLE. That is right, which were held up after the war when all arms sales were suspended.

Senator SYMINGTON. And (b), despite the development in France or anywhere else, we have not yet reached a decision to sell them any additional arms. In both cases I should use the word "sale." We have not reached any decision to sell them any additional arms beyond what we agreed before the June war.

Mr. BATTLE. That is substantially accurate. That is certainly accurate on planes. I think there is additional small stuff, spares, things of that sort.

Senator SYMINGTON. But you know their problem—

Mr. BATTLE. Your concern, sir, is entirely legitimate. All I can do at this moment, I tried to see whether a decision could be made before I had this hearing. I did not obtain clearance for one. I assure you we are watching this most carefully, and I will be in touch with you.

THE PROBLEM OF JORDAN

I would also like to mention the problem of Jordan in passing. We have, I think, a very serious political problem there as well as a military one. Jordan is the only country that has had no additional equipment. While we had contracted for planes before the Arab-Israeli war, there is no thought at the moment of putting in planes. We do have before us a request for \$6.5 million in miscellaneous spare parts, some ammunition, some recoilless rifles that we will have to consider. The main issue here is whether we are going to be a supplier or going to have the Soviets be a supplier of Jordan.

Senator SYMINGTON. You decided, as I understand it, that you should give aid to other Arab countries if you gave the aid to Israel or rather sold—we should sell aid or give aid to other Arab countries if we sold to Israel what we agreed to sell to them before.

SALES TO ARAB COUNTRIES

So that has been done. What are the Arab countries that we are now selling arms or giving arms to?

Mr. BATTLE. Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, something for Lebanon, very little, but a little bit, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, but that is so small—

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman?

SALE OF TANKS TO PAKISTAN

Senator FULBRIGHT. I wanted to clear up about these tanks because this was a matter that Senator Symington had a good deal of hearings about. In this last hearing with Mr. Cummings, I read from it on page 40 in that Mr. Bader said, "There is a minimum of 5,000 tanks," Western Europe.

Mr. Cummings said, "Available—".

Mr. Bader said, "For resale around the world."

And Mr. Cummings said, "Right, and that ignores MAP material. In Belgium there are tremendous quantities of tanks. The exact number is classified and not really known to me, but Italy the same way. Italy is the largest holder of M-47s. Mr. Kuss is presently discussing giving these German tanks to Italy. If that happens, I guarantee you Pakistan will meet their requirements."

And Mr. Bader informs me that presently Mr. Kuss is in Italy making arrangements to handle these M-47 tanks for Pakistan. Is that correct?

Mr. BATTLE. No, sir, not to my knowledge.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Would you know?

Mr. BATTLE. Well, this could not be done without my approval.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Without your knowledge.

Mr. BATTLE. Yes, sir. I will tell you exactly where he is, Mr. Chairman. The Italian ambassador came in to me about a week or ten days ago asking what our attitude would be. I told him—on this sale he said they wanted 200 tanks. I said that we would consider that an unnecessarily large figure, that we would entertain a request for 100. We would have to know a lot of specific things. For example, the origins of the tanks, the state, condition of them, the cost of them, the financing of them, and we would have to—

we also have had talks in Pakistan. They have been on the trail of tanks for some time.

We would also have to have assurances that for each tank they bought that it was a replacement from one they had on hand, and it would have to be shown.

Senator FULBRIGHT. Would Mr. Kuss handle these tanks without your approving or knowing?

Mr. BATTLE. Sir, I do not see how it is possible. I have tried very hard to make sense out of this arms policy. It is difficult to do.

Senator FULBRIGHT. It sure is.

Mr. BATTLE. But we are watching it on a point-by-point basis, Mr. Chairman, and I am trying—I hope to keep this committee informed and I am making a very honest effort to do so. This is why I wanted you to know this deal was around before because, if something should happen on it, this is within the lines of the policy we described to you. But I do think that we should keep you informed on these matters.

Senator PELL. As a question of geography, Mr. Chairman, would it not be correct to say that tanks could only be used by Pakistan against India? They could not possibly be used against China because of the mountains.

Mr. BATTLE. Senator Pell, I do not know my geography that well.

Senator PELL. I think geography will show—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Because of the terrain.

Senator PELL. You cannot get the tanks over the mountains. I think geography will show these tanks are intended for India.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, before the chairman leaves, I want to say to you that this committee has complete confidence in you.

Senator PELL. Amen.

Mr. BATTLE. I appreciate that.

THE PENTAGON AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Senator SYMINGTON. We get more information from you in less time, in my opinion, than anybody around.

Now, what the chairman of this committee says is pretty fundamentally serious to me. Either Mr. Kuss is in Italy working on this deal and you do not know about it, or he is not in Italy, so then you should not know about it. If he is in Italy, without your permission or approval or knowledge, then I think that you have got a problem. There are going to be some changes, we understand, over in the Pentagon, and maybe this is the time—you know, this is a time you might move in there and say, "By the way, if it is all right with you, the State Department would like to have something to do with foreign policy being set through the sale of purchase or renting of arms."

For what it is worth, it is just something to think about.

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, he might be in Italy without my knowledge, but, so help me, if there is any arrangement made without my knowledge of these hundred tanks, there is really going to be an explosion.

There are other countries with whom the Paks have been talking, the Belgians among them. They mentioned Iran, which we

tended to rather discourage, and the only one I have had any direct talk with has been Italy along the lines.

FRENCH-ISRAELI RELATIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Let me ask you about this: What caused the change in the relationship between France and Israel? France was supplying Israel before the war. France worked with Israel on the secret atomic plant that Israel had, and so on, and now they seem to not be buddies so much.

Mr. BATTLE. Well, I think there are two or three factors in this. One, I think the French are playing the oil game here in several respects. Secondly, I think they have watched our own relationship with Egypt and others go into periods of decline and they would like to replace us as a major western influence.

Third, their relations with the Soviets in this area, I think, are at least interesting to speculate about. They continue to talk in terms of a Big Four arrangement, for example, on peace in the area that sort of thing. But basically I think they are trying to increase their own influence with a minimum of outlay and with the oil in mind.

As far as Israel is concerned, I strongly suspect that they have continued, at the same time they have denied it, the supply of small spare parts to them even though they publicly profess to have an embargo.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. You mean at the same time the Israelis deny it also.

Mr. BATTLE. The Israelis have not denied it to me, not the small spares. I think they have not denied it. I suspect that the French have gone on.

I suspect the dollar or the Israeli pound has a good deal of influence in France, and I would not rule out the possibility they will find out a way to make—at the same time they profess in an effort to establish a very warm relationship with the Arabs, they may still work out some third country deal. I would not rule it out.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Secretary, we are always rewarded by the privilege and pleasure of listening to your mellifluous words and sound logic.

Mr. BATTLE. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think you have fully explained and clarified everything.

Mr. BATTLE. I have not solved any of them. It is good to see you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

BRIEFING ON NEWS STORIES ON THE NLF IN SAIGON & THE U.N.

Thursday, December 14, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 o'clock a.m. in Room S-116, The Capitol, Senator J. William Fulbright (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators, Sparkman, Mansfield, Gore, Lausche, Clark, Pell, McCarthy, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Mundt, Case and Cooper.

Also present: Senator Young of North Dakota.

William B. Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations; Benjamin H. Read, Executive Secretary, State Department.

Mr. Marcy, Mr. Kuhl, Mr. Jones, Mr. Henderson, and Mr. Bader of the committee staff.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

There have been a number of news reports recently concerning an initiative made by the National Liberation Front to send representatives to the United Nations and of the arrest in Saigon of a Viet Cong agent alleged to be on his way to a meeting with American officials.

This committee would like to have an explanation of what actually happened in these two incidents, and obtain information on our general policy about contacts with the National Liberation Front.

We are very pleased to have this morning the Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach to give us any enlightenment you can.

Will you proceed, Mr. Secretary?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NICHOLAS DeB. KATZENBACH, THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary KATZENBACH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Much of the information that I am giving both in this brief statement and in answering questions is quite sensitive and is classified Top Secret.

You have asked for information with respect to recent news stories. The first of these has to do with the fact that it has been reported that the NLF has sought to send representatives to the U.N. The second with the fact that a representative of the NLF was ar-

rested recently while he was on his way to a meeting at the United States Embassy in Saigon.

Let me say at the outset that while news stories on these two matters broke at approximately the same time, there is absolutely no connection between them. With respect to the first, I think Ambassador Goldberg has already clarified the essential facts for the press, but I will give you what supplementary information we possess. With respect to the second, I will give you the essential facts, but I would like to caution you now and later that this matter still involves a possibility for the exchange of prisoners and for that reason should be treated with complete secrecy.

THE NLF AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The facts with respect to the NLF and the U.N. are simply as follows:

On September 22, 1967, a high-ranking member of the U.N. Secretariat gave Ambassador Goldberg the following personal oral message—

The CHAIRMAN. What was that date?

Secretary KATZENBACH. September 22, 1967. High-ranking member of the U.N. Secretariat gave Ambassador Goldberg the following personal oral message from the Secretary General. He said the Secretary General had received from an unnamed person an inquiry as to whether or not the United States would be agreeable to having "two or three NLF representatives come to the U.N. in a private capacity to attend the present session of the General Assembly." Ambassador Goldberg told the U.N. official that without further information as to the purpose of the trip it would be difficult to give even a personal reaction.

On September 26, the same official gave Ambassador Goldberg some additional information provided by the Secretary General. He said the NLF individuals had indicated they would need to know Washington's reaction to granting them visas, and if Washington would be receptive if the request were made through another government having relations with the United States. If Washington was negative, the NLF would wish the whole matter dropped without publicity.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

The next day Ambassador Goldberg told the U.N. official that before the United States could reach a final judgment in the matter we would wish to know (1) who the intermediary is and how reliable the Secretary General feels him to be; (2) what kind of passports would be used and what kind of visas would be requested and for what duration; (3) who the NLF individuals were; and (4) what is the exact purpose of their visit and does it embrace conversations with the United States Government? With respect to the last point Ambassador Goldberg observed to the U.N. official that if there was any serious desire on the part of the NLF to have conversations with the United States it was his view that coming to the U.N. would probably be the least desirable way of guaranteeing the security and secrecy of such discussions. Nothing further was heard until November 3, 1967 when the U.N. official provided Am-

bassador Goldberg with the following answers to the last three questions posed:

“1. *Number two*: One leading Central Committee member and an aide. (Names to be provided when agreement is forthcoming in principle.)

“2. *Passport*: Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) preferred. Diplomatic passport—”

Senator GORE. I didn't understand that word.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) preferred.”

The CHAIRMAN. What does that mean?

Secretary KATZENBACH. As to what kind of passport they would prefer, they would prefer to travel on a North Vietnam diplomatic passport (must). If it is not acceptable, will get a passport from a U.N. member state.

“3. *Duration*. One year but may consider six months stay. Would like some assurances for possibly two years.

“4. *Purpose*: Work principally at U.N. but would not refuse radio/TV/press interviews.”

The U.N. intermediary added that the SYG now assumed that the North Vietnamese were in fact aware of the request.

Senator LAUSCHE. What you are reading now, is that all in writing taken from documents or are these oral?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, the four points I gave you were a piece of paper that was handed on behalf of the Secretary-General by a member of the Secretariat to Ambassador Goldberg as the response given to the questions that he had asked.

Senator GORE. May I ask—

Senator LAUSCHE. Were Goldberg's questions in writing?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, Goldberg's questions were given—presented them orally. He may have put the four questions in writing. I would have to check whether he put them in writing—they were oral only.

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman?

ROLE OF RALPH BUNCHE

Is there any particular reason, Mr. Secretary, why you do not identify the representative of the Secretary General?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, it was Mr. Ralph Bunche.

Senator GORE. The reason I asked—

Secretary KATZENBACH. Simply because his name has not been entered.

Senator GORE. He is, the reason I ask, Bunche is extremely close to U Thant.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes. There was never, may I say, Senator, there was never any questions in my mind that he was actively representing the Secretary General's views.

Senator GORE. That is all I wish to clear up.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes.

The U.N. intermediary added that the Secretary General now assumed that the North Vietnamese were in fact aware of the request.

THE U.S. WOULD NOT OBJECT TO VISAS FOR NLF

On November 15 Ambassador Goldberg gave to the U.N. official the following response: This is in quotes and this was given in writing:

As the Secretary General is aware, Ambassador Goldberg has stated publicly that the United States would not object or stand in the way of NLF representatives Security Council discussion of Vietnam. We would be prepared to grant visas in connection with such Security Council proceedings.

We note that North Vietnam passport preferred. This would be acceptable to us under the circumstances noted above.

There are two footnotes to this story. On December 9 the Hanoi official radio stated that it had monitored the following statement from the NLF refuting a new lie of U.S. propaganda:

The U.S. propaganda machine recently spread rumors that the NLFSV had expressed the desire to send its representative to the United Nations to give its views on the Vietnam question. Liberation Press Agency is authorized to declare that this is sheer fabrication.

The NLF liberation radio finally broadcast the above statement forty-four hours after Radio Hanoi had supposedly "monitored" it. Second, yesterday at the U.N. a document was circulated by the Roumanian Government purporting to give the NLF case for its activities in South Vietnam.

And I will be happy to provide the committee copies of that document when I get it.

Senator COOPER. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

HANOI RADIO REPORTS

Senator COOPER. Did the Hanoi radio report that the NLF had rejected this story?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir, it reported it had monitored the NLF radio on this and it was quoting from what the NLF had said, only the NLF didn't get around to saying it until 44 hours later.

Senator COOPER. Then the NLF finally did make a statement?

Secretary KATZENBACH. The NLF made the identical statement 44 hours after Radio Hanoi had monitored it.

I go on, Mr. Chairman, either I can answer questions on that aspect of it now or I can go on with the Saigon matter, as you please.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe you should proceed. The real point is on this matter as you go along.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Okay.

RELUCTANCE TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCE

Senator GORE. One clarifying question, not that it is particularly important, but I just wondered if our government knows, and if it knows, if there is any reluctance to identifying the source of the communication to the Secretary General. That may have a bearing, if you know it.

Secretary KATZENBACH. We do not know it. I put my second footnote to this as a possible inference.

Senator GORE. Fine, thank you very much.

Secretary KATZENBACH. But I don't know it.

Senator GORE. Thank you.

Senator LAUSCHE. Did you draw any conclusion as to the genuineness of the purpose of the communists of South Vietnam based upon these different things that transpired? Was there a conclusion reached that this had no relationship to a purpose to discuss peace or that it was only intended to use the United Nations as a platform for its propaganda?

The CHAIRMAN. That ought to come at the end when he finishes, if I may suggest. He hasn't finished yet.

Secretary KATZENBACH. I finished on that particular one.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Secretary KATZENBACH. I finished on the U.N. contact but I will go on with the other and I will take your question, then, Senator Lausche, or whatever procedure you wish to follow.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right.

U.S.-NLF CONTACTS

Secretary KATZENBACH. I would like now to give you the basic facts of the so-called U.S.-NLF contacts in Saigon about which there has been so much speculation in the press. I would like to re-emphasize that this is a very delicate matter, not because it involves as has been said, important U.S.-NLF contacts, but because it involves a possible exchange of prisoners and therefore could be the means to securing the release of some of our sick and wounded in the hands of the VC.

In my judgment, the unfortunate publicity already given to this matter, has seriously jeopardized its success, but it is still an ongoing possibility.

The simple facts are these. Some time ago as a part of a routine police operation, a VC agent was arrested. On his person this agent had a message addressed to Ambassador Bunker. It suggested the possibility of U.S.-VC prisoner exchange, including the possibility of U.S. pilots held by Hanoi.

This message was promptly turned over to our Embassy by Vietnamese authorities [deleted].

In consultation and agreement with the high South Vietnamese officials we have made efforts to follow up this possibility [deleted].

As you can imagine, this process is not only a delicate one, but a slow one. The NLF now wishes the South Vietnamese Government to release its so-called "emissary" and a number of VC cadre of ranging importance as a necessary preliminary to an exchange of prisoners. Such a unilateral release—at least in the first instance—raises difficulties for the South Vietnamese Government since it would have to explain to its own knowledgeable officials, and perhaps to the public, why it released known VC prisoners. Unfortunately the present publicity, which includes wild rumors now floating around Saigon, have greatly aggravated this problem. Any release, unless in the format of an exchange such as the Rudolph Abel-Gary Powers exchange, would have to be kept secret. This has become harder to do since public revelation and speculation.

Despite these difficulties, we are still hopeful that this operation will become possible and lead to the release of some American prisoners.

This is our objective and it can only be prejudiced by further public speculation.

Let me add that no high-ranking American official has at any time during this operation had any direct contact or discussion with representatives of the NLF; that Ambassador Bunker has, of course, been in full charge on the U.S. side of the efforts towards a prisoner exchange; that throughout this operation high officials of the South Vietnamese Government have acted with us in seeking to forward the objective. The United States has not taken—and was not in a position to take—any action without the full cooperation and consent of the South Vietnamese Government.

IN SOUTH VIETNAMESE CUSTODY

The CHAIRMAN. Is this last statement to be taken that we have no influence with them? I mean, they have complete control of the situation?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, I don't mean we have no influence with them. I mean they are their prisoners. They are in the custody of the people—

The CHAIRMAN. Did they take these prisoners or did we take them?

Secretary KATZENBACH. They took them. And as far as the people they now want released and some other people that they would have an interest in, these are VC cadre that have been picked up in one place or another and they are in the custody of the South Vietnamese authorities.

PRISONER RELEASES NOT RECIPROCATED

The CHAIRMAN. I have not followed this as closely, of course, as I should have. I am told Newsweek said that these representatives of the NLF have been contacting us several times, frequently. Is that true or not, or is this the first instance?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, sir, this is the first instance.

The CHAIRMAN. We have never had one of this kind for exchange of prisoners or anything else?

Secretary KATZENBACH. We have made efforts in various places around the world to find out if there was any interest through the use of intermediaries in having any discussions with respect to prisoner exchange and we have always been turned down flatly. This is the first time there has been anything which indicated the possibility of prisoner exchange through any kind of work. There have been prisoners released, as you know.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary KATZENBACH. In the Christmas period, the Tet period, and this has been reciprocated by our releases.

The CHAIRMAN. Without any negotiations.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Without any negotiations or discussion or understandings or direct or indirect or anything like that.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore, do you have any questions?

ROLE OF THE CIA

Senator GORE. Yes. Pursuing the questions of contacts I notice you say—no high-ranking U.S. officials. Would you be a little more

explicit about this? Please understand my questions are not critical. I would be inclined to be critical if I did not think or if you did not have [deleted] as much contact as possible with the dissident elements within South Vietnam. So I preface this just to say I am not asking critical questions but I am asking for information. To what extent do we have contacts with NLF?

Secretary KATZENBACH. On the basis where we have knowledge of the fact that they are NLF members almost nothing.

Senator GORE. [deleted]

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, that is correct. I made the statement that I made here simply because obviously [deleted] we are not in position to say no, we have not had any contact with members of the NLF because we do have contacts with these people when they are picked up by Vietnamese authorities or as part of any kind of a joint operation or that kind of thing we have contact with. Beyond that, we simply do not.

The stories that Saigon had said this fellow was on his way to meet Ambassador Bunker and they were meeting at the American Embassy and so forth. So I emphasize that point because the truth of the matter is [deleted]

Ambassador Bunker and no other member of the Embassy staff has even talked with the fellow or seen him.

SECRET OPERATIVES WITHIN THE NLF

Senator GORE. Do we not have secret operatives within the NLF apparatus itself? [Deleted.]

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator GORE. Do you know whether it is true?

Secretary KATZENBACH. To the best of my knowledge, it is not true. We get information, we get information from third parties who have contact. We don't have any direct.

Senator GORE. Well, this is information which we can get from Mr. Helms.

ROLE OF AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

I notice you did not relate any answer to one of the questions of Ambassador Goldberg, to wit, did the proposed visit entail or involve, or I don't remember your exact words, discussions or attempts to have discussions with the United States Government.

Did they ever answer that question?

Secretary KATZENBACH. They did not respond to that question.

Senator GORE. What significance did you read into this, if any?

Secretary KATZENBACH. To the fact they did not respond to it?

Senator GORE. Yes, if any.

Secretary KATZENBACH. That that was not one of the purposes of their coming. If it was a matter of their seeking contact, Senator, as Ambassador Goldberg did point out to them, there are many places this could be done which could be more secure and less exposed to the glare of publicity than New York but he nevertheless asked, he expressed that observation, asked the question, got no response to the question or to the observation.

Senator GORE. Well, I thank you, Mr. Secretary. I have the impression that you have given us, told us fully, as you have it. If there is something else, would you volunteer it?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir. I have not given you operational details of this, but I have given you essential facts as honestly and as candidly as I can.

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hickenlooper?

AUTHENTICITY OF A RUMOR

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Katzenbach, I think Senator Gore raised this question a moment ago, he didn't pursue it in his question and if I may go ahead with it, what convincing proof is there of the authenticity of this rumor that has come through Bunche or something else have or is it like some of these other, just somebody in a drawing room making a lot of statements such as happened in Italy and so on? Apparently it was just somebody trying to be a busy-body.

Secretary KATZENBACH. We have no evidence of any authenticity on it. This was transmitted through the channels I indicated. We don't know who the person who spoke to the Secretary General was. I would have no reason to believe the Secretary General made this up out of the whole cloth.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I was not even suggesting that, no, no.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Whether that person was speaking on behalf of the NLF or not we have no—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. The authenticity of the person who allegedly carried this message and spoke to the Secretary General?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Are you talking about the New York incident?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Or the other one?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am talking about the first report that the Secretary General gave that somebody approached him or that he had been approached on this proposition. I would hope we would have some idea as to whether or not the person who approached the Secretary General was speaking with some authentic background.

Secretary KATZENBACH. We would not be in position to answer that since he has never said who it was.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ask him?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What did he say?

Secretary KATZENBACH. We got no answer. Originally Ambassador Goldberg asked what the Secretary General's views were as to the reliability of this, and we got no answer to that question, but by the fact that he pursued it, assumed that the Secretary General believed that the person he was talking to was a responsible and reliable intermediary on this. I think we assumed, without any facts to back it up, that it was a representative of an eastern European Government, but it might not have been.

UNCERTAINTY AND CONFUSION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then, of course, the NLF just comes and disclaims this and says it is nothing but trickery on our part. The North Vietnamese come out and say it is nothing but trickery on our part, propaganda.

Unfortunately, with our publicity media, we grasp at straws that apparently, and get everybody all excited about something, and we don't have any real proof about it, so far as the genesis of the matter is concerned.

Secretary KATZENBACH. That is correct. Of course, they did say in the initial message, Senator, if there was any publicity given to this, they would deny it.

Now, that is a two-edged sword.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. It all gets back to the point, I guess we are supposed to be righteous and the other fellow isn't. But I think there may be some exceptions to that rule. I think we are walking with a very thin reed here. I don't think you have gone overboard on this at all, but we don't know with whom we are dealing. It is sort of a domino operation down the lines some place. Maybe that is the path we have to take with these people, I don't know. It is a tribute, of course, to the uncertainty and confusion that is going on. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lausche?

THE UNITED NATIONS EPISODE

Senator LAUSCHE. Referring to the United Nations episode, was there anything whatsoever in the exchange of communications between Goldberg and the intermediary indicating that the National Liberation Front wanted to use the United Nations as a middle agency to discuss the war problem with the United States?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, sir, there wasn't. Both the NLF and Hanoi have repeatedly denounced the competence of the U.N. to deal with any of these problems, but, at the same time, they stated their own purposes on this as—

Senator LAUSCHE. Will you repeat them?

Secretary KATZENBACH. As work principally at the U.N. but would not refuse radio, TV, press interviews.

Senator LAUSCHE. From what you have said, it would seem that the National Liberation Front wanted to get to the United Nations not to discuss the war problem but to use that agency and the facilities that might become available to propagandize in the United States.

Secretary KATZENBACH. I would think that was their principal purpose. They may, as the press have speculated, wanted to do something on the line which the Algerian Liberation Movement did some years ago, which was essentially that purpose.

THE SAIGON INCIDENT

Senator LAUSCHE. Now, getting to the Saigon incident: Did our Ambassador, on the basis of what had previously happened, anticipate a visit from a Viet Cong representative about the exchange of prisoners?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, sir. Absolutely the first indication, knowledge, glimpse, glimmer, flicker or light, anything else was when the South Vietnamese police authorities came to the Embassy and said, "We found this piece of paper on the fellow we picked up and it is addressed to Ambassador Bunker."

We had no prior indication, knowledge of anything, and in Saigon or elsewhere. And it was at that point we went back and they

gave us permission to question the person with respect to this piece of paper and decided whether it had any authenticity or what it was and who he was and so forth.

Senator LAUSCHE. Can you say whether or not in the relationship with Saigon there has been a policy on the part of the United States of complete disclosure of what we are doing and in anticipation of a complete disclosure on the part of the Saigon Government of what it is doing?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, in terms of anything having to do with NLF that would be true, yes, sir.

NO PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF THE MISSION

Senator LAUSCHE. Some inferences are drawn that there was an expectation on the part of our government of a visit to be made by the representative of the National Liberation Front, but that the Saigon Government was not informed and then by accident arrested this man not having knowledge of an understanding of that visit between him and the Government.

What about that?

Secretary KATZENBACH. There is no truth to that, absolutely, Senator. We had no prior knowledge of this individual, his mission or purpose or anything of that kind, and as far as we have been able to ascertain the operation on which he was arrested was a perfectly routine police operation, and that is really the whole story. We had no prior knowledge of it.

He was arrested, there was no reason not to believe he was arrested just as they said he was arrested.

If I can make an editorial comment, he seemed to be rather clumsy about the way he was going about things, but that is the way it happened.

Senator LAUSCHE. [Deleted] was there any—were there any statements made by him indicating that he had any other purpose than to talk exchange of prisoners?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, sir. In the discussions they had with him he said this was the reason that he had come to Saigon was to deliver this message to the American Embassy. He said that was his purpose.

Senator LAUSCHE. I think that is all.

OBJECTIONS TO NLF EMISSARIES

The CHAIRMAN. With regard to his questions, I don't quite understand why you think it would be so dangerous if these two NLF people came to New York. How would that hurt us? Why would you object to it?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Well, I think the question is what their purposes are. We have taken the position, Mr. Chairman, that if they come in connection with anything, any U.N. activity, at the invitation of the U.N. or any of its agencies under the headquarters agreement, of course, they are entitled to visas or anything else.

We have not taken the position that if they are not coming in any connection with that kind this country should under the present statutes and visa and passport laws admit people on passports of, whatever passports it may be, and I guess they would tend to make them phony passports, with visas to engage in any

propaganda exercise that they want to engage in. We would have to make a finding in point of fact of people of this kind, that the Secretary of State and Attorney General would have to make a finding, that their admission was in the national interest and I think in the absence of some sincere purpose on their part other than what they have indicated, that it is not a question of danger but just a question of why should we let them.

EMISSARIES DID NOT WANT TO TALK

The CHAIRMAN. I understand the technicalities, you don't have to let them in. But we have made, and the President has made, very repeated statements: just give us a warm body and we will confer with them and we will talk with them anywhere, on a neutral ship or anywhere.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And here apparently two of them want to come to New York and we say, "No, we don't want you to come to New York."

Secretary KATZENBACH. They didn't want to come to talk, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you know they didn't want to come?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Because that question was asked them and it was quite, it seems to me, ostentatiously not answered, because they started off with our four questions and they said in their answer, One, and then Number Two, ignoring the first question.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I don't know. I have no knowledge at all of it.

Do you know who the leaders of the NLF are?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know whether they were coming or not?

Secretary KATZENBACH. They didn't give us any names.

THE PROPAGANDA VALUE

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know, but the propaganda of refusing them seems to me maybe to be as important as having them come, because we look as if we don't want to have any contacts with them.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Well, might I say as far as the propaganda value of it is concerned, Mr. Chairman, I would at least quote the Hanoi Radio and NLF Radio that says the whole thing was a plot on our part and a figment of our imagination which, it seems to me, says something about the propaganda value of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well propaganda is a very difficult thing to judge.

But, anyway, Senator Carlson?

ROLE OF ROUMANIA

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Secretary, I believe it was a part of your prepared text or else you orally stated that the last word on this was as of yesterday from Roumania, was that right?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, I said—I put it as a footnote. Whether it is connected or not, Roumania yesterday circulated in the United Nations as a UN document the NLF position with respect to the war in South Vietnam and with respect to the future which is—I have not read the document myself. I understand that this is essentially their September 1 platform which has just been reproduced in the United Nations.

Senator CARLSON. In other words, it is not something current. It is something that goes back to September 1, that they yesterday called attention to the United Nations?

Secretary KATZENBACH. The Roumanian government called attention.

Senator CARLSON. I mean they did?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes.

Senator CARLSON. Is it reasonable to assume it might well have been Roumania that had the original contact with the Secretary General in view of the fact the first information you had on this was September 22nd?

Secretary KATZENBACH. I think that is certainly a possible inference. I would guess it was an eastern European Government.

Senator CARLSON. Do you have any evidence it was Roumania?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, sir.

UNABLE TO FOLLOW THROUGH

Senator CARLSON. It seems to me that there is some undercurrent there that we don't seem to be able to ferret out, or maybe we do and we don't seem to get the information here as to who is or who is not trying to contact either a representative of the U.N. through the Secretary General or possibly our own government, there is a great deal of confusion and concern in this nation, that is all I can say. People are writing and they ask, "Why don't we make some contact? Why don't we have contacts?"

It looks like maybe the Roumanian government may have come in to the Secretary General and we haven't been able or he hasn't been able, or Ambassador Goldberg hasn't been able to follow through.

I don't know. I am at a loss.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Well, Ambassador Goldberg, as I said, asked explicitly was it their purpose to have a discussion with the U.S. government officials, and then volunteered if that was their purpose there would have been better places than in New York with all the publicity with somebody coming with North Vietnamese passports and so on and so forth.

But that question just floated out on the water, and it was never responded to.

Senator CARLSON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator McCarthy?

ROLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM

Senator MCCARTHY. Mr. Chairman, I think this question may have been asked.

The last sentence in your statement, "The United States is not in position to take any action without the full cooperation of the

South Vietnamese government," I understand your answer was that the prisoner you are talking about was taken prisoner by the Vietnamese.

Secretary KATZENBACH. In their control and custody.

Senator MCCARTHY. Do we capture and turn them over to them and lose any right—

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, sir, those were cadre.

Senator MCCARTHY. What about prisoners we negotiate about, can we negotiate without reference to them or do we have to get clearance from the Vietnamese government?

Secretary KATZENBACH. We don't need clearance from the Vietnamese government. We would be in position to release any prisoners we had captured in exchange for release of our people.

Senator MCCARTHY. To the NLF?

Secretary KATZENBACH. If this involved contact with the NLF or discussions with the NLF we would tell the South Vietnamese Government about it and discuss that with them.

Senator MCCARTHY. What if they said no?

Secretary KATZENBACH. I don't suppose that they would say no, Senator.

GETTING CLEARANCE FROM THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Senator MCCARTHY. The Vice President recently said it was high-handed of me to suggest for us to talk to the NLF without getting clearance from the Vietnamese government.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Certainly without consulting—

Senator MCCARTHY. He didn't say consult; he said clearance. Do you think we can negotiate with the NLF over there even though the South Vietnamese government said no to it?

Secretary KATZENBACH. On a prisoner exchange, with respect to our prisoners and prisoners of them that we held, I think—

Senator MCCARTHY. We have never done it, have we?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, sir, we have never been able to do it.

Senator MCCARTHY. Have we tried?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir, we have tried.

Senator MCCARTHY. Independently?

Secretary KATZENBACH. We tried to make contact in many places for the purposes of prisoner exchange with the NLF and have been turned down absolutely flat on each occasion we have attempted to do it. The current one I am talking about is the first time that they have shown the slightest interest in proceeding along these lines. That is why we were hopeful we could somehow or other keep that alive despite the difficulties we run into.

NLF SEEKING PUBLICITY

Senator MCCARTHY. What about other contacts? Why would the NLF have had to come to the U.N. through this very involved and roundabout sort of way to get its request to the United States with reference to the approval of visas?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Why would it do it?

Senator MCCARTHY. Yes.

Secretary KATZENBACH. First of all, I think you have to make the assumption on that which I am perfectly willing to make with you

although I don't know the fact, that the NLF did in fact want to do this, and this was not an intermediary going to the Secretary General and then proceeding in this way, but making that assumption, it would seem to me that their reason for coming there was that they thought, in view of some of the current opinion in the United States and in the U.N. that they could do some lobbying and perhaps get some publicity. There is no reason that I can see in that record, Senator, to indicate, one, that they wanted to have any serious talks about anything political, or secondly, that they had anything to do with prisoner exchange whatsoever.

Senator MCCARTHY. Well, I think that is probably right. I just am concerned about the process they followed. It would seem to me that unless they thought they would get more publicity this way than if they checked with the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon to see whether the United States would approve instead of going through three or four exchanges before getting to the State Department, on the question of whether the visa would be granted or not.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Well, I think at least one explanation of that, senator, is the one they gave from the outset, saying if this was not going to be done they wanted to deny it, that anything had occurred.

If you want to deny something, you usually do it through a channel which makes it deniable.

Senator MCCARTHY. It would seem to me it would have been easier to just stop it earlier, if they had gone through our Ambassador and gotten a turndown at that point instead of putting it through three or four exchanges. Maybe they didn't want it to go by that way.

Thanks very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mundt.

THE PRISONER'S MESSAGE

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Secretary, I read your statement, and I read it fast and I may have read it wrong, but I think I read it that the man arrested in Saigon was a Viet Cong heading for Bunker's office, is that right?

Secretary KATZENBACH. They do not know where he was.

Senator MUNDT. With a message.

Secretary KATZENBACH. He had a message on him at the time he was taken prisoner. How he proposed to have that message delivered or, I suppose even whether he proposed to deliver it is—

Senator MUNDT. In all events he was seeking, from the evidence, to convey a message to Bunker.

Secretary KATZENBACH. He was seeking to convey a message to Bunker.

Senator MUNDT. My question, this kind of disturbs me, if there are no ways in which we can get in communication with the government of Vietnam whether it is on peace—this was not, but on exchanges of prisoners which is also very important—if the Saigon government goes through an intermediary there and makes up that communication, I think that disturbs you if it—

Secretary KATZENBACH. I think the Saigon government behaved perfectly correctly in the situation. They had no knowledge as far—

Senator MUNDT. Arresting him, I agree.

Secretary KATZENBACH. As soon as they arrested him and searched him and found this communication, it was promptly turned over to the United States, and they then permitted us to question this man.

Senator MUNDT. They did?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. Well, that was my question. I understood they did not.

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, they did.

Senator MUNDT. They did allow us to question the man.

Secretary KATZENBACH. [Deleted.]

FURTHER COMMUNICATION

Senator MUNDT. Who now will make the decision whether the man can go back to wherever he came from with our reactions to the message?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Well, we have had further communication through another person, which I said in here, through another intermediary on this, and this is the question—so far as the decision what to do with this particular fellow this is a decision we have to arrive at in agreement with the South Vietnamese for the simple reason that they have custody of him. The great difficulty of releasing him is that this is known to any number of people in Saigon, it is known to all the prison authorities and police who had something to do with it, and he is an identified medium level sort of GS-14 VC type, and with the publicity that has been given to it, Senator, they have got a problem in suddenly releasing this man, and that will be all over the place when they do it.

RUMORS AND SPECULATION IN SAIGON

Senator MUNDT. What does the publicity in Saigon say, say we have arrested a Viet Cong spy? Does it say we have arrested a Viet Cong agent who is over here talking about release of prisoners? Do they tell the whole story?

Secretary KATZENBACH. It tells that also but there are also all kinds of rumors and speculations that the Americans have been dealing behind the government's back, this fellow was going to a meeting with Ambassador Bunker, and this kind of thing. So that with certain elements in South Vietnam who are mistrustful of the Americans, that has been used to expose that part of it.

Now, if this fellow were released I think it would be immediately known because there are so many people who know who he is and so forth. I am not putting that, Senator, I am not putting that out of the ball park and saying it cannot be done. It is just difficult to do while everybody's attention is focused on what is happening to this fellow.

RELEASING PRISONERS

Senator MUNDT. Were the prisoners involved in the message described as Vietnamese or Americans or not described at all?

Secretary KATZENBACH. The prisoners that they would release were described as Americans.

Senator MUNDT. That being the case——

Secretary KATZENBACH. The prisoners they wanted were political prisoners.

Senator MUNDT. Sure, we being partners in the war this is something we ought to pursue as diligently as possible.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. This business of releasing prisoners is vital to us, I suppose more vital to us because we place a greater premium on human life.

Secretary KATZENBACH. I could not agree with you more. But the reason I said the publicity which has been given to the matter has made it difficult and slowed it down—it is still alive and I am still hopeful we can work out a way to do it and certainly this is a matter which Ambassador Bunker has been personally concerned as a very high priority business, and it seems every time he tries to do something there are more stories in the Saigon press.

PRE-CONDITION TO PRISONER RELEASE

Senator MUNDT. We should stay in there, it seems to me, and not be pushed out. I do feel in a case like this we should exercise all the persuasion we can to call their bluff on this, if that is what it is, and let him go back, it is just one more Viet Cong, and go back and tell them, "Yes, we would be willing to exchange prisoners," and get the word out to the home folks, as I got a call from a wife of a fellow who has been established as being a prisoner over there, and I have been telling them, which I think is right, we have been doing everything we can.

Secretary KATZENBACH. We have.

Senator MUNDT. And we are going to do everything we can, but she could not quite understand the stories, after she heard the stories.

Secretary KATZENBACH. But the difficulties that appear in the statement there they have now set as a pre-condition to having any communications of the release of prisoners that there would be a unilateral prior release of a number of VC cadre, it is not of tremendous importance, but all identified as such, known to be held by the South Vietnamese, and this raises an additional problem as to whether you are going to release half a dozen people for the possibility of getting on with some discussions, and it does raise a political problem for the South Vietnamese to do it. But again I am hopeful we can work this out and we are working on it.

Senator MUNDT. Well, I hope we will lean over backward even if it involves releasing a couple of Viet Cong prisoners, not too many of them, but a couple of them and say, "Now what are you going to do next?"

It is no great loss to us if a couple more Viet Cong go home if there is a chance to open up the prisoner exchange because this is pretty serious, and I wish you could go out—I realize you cannot tell the whole story probably, but I wish you would get out something a little more reassuring from the Department of State than they have read thus far because they do not seem to understand and there is nothing we can tell them on the basis of secret testimony that helps them.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Senator, the importance of it and our efforts on it we could not be more in agreement with you. Of course what we say, we would love to be able to say more than we can, and I simply say if we do it is going to make more difficult what we are trying to do. We would rather sit and if we can achieve the end objective—

U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE SAIGON GOVERNMENT

Senator MUNDT. Our overall prevailing relationships with the new government in Saigon, are they so sticky and are we so suspicious of each other that we cannot sit down with them across a cup of tea and talk like we are talking here?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, sir. We talk with them this way: We have had good cooperation from them on this on the highest level. It does make it more difficult, just the mechanics of how you do this and how you explain it, and Thieu has the additional problem on there that he is getting a good deal of static in the press in Saigon right now that he is just a puppet of the Americans. If the Americans say release somebody and he releases them and if the Americans say jump and he jumps there.

PARENTS OF PRISONERS

Senator CASE. It is on this—I think you have already answered this, Mr. Katzenbach—on the question of how much we can say on what you are talking about because I as well as the Senator from South Dakota have received a letter from the parents of a boy who is presumably a prisoner of war and they write and are very exigent about this thing.

I feel as the Senator from South Dakota does we are not doing very much to help him and I just want to know whether there is anything you have said that we could pass along or not, frankly, to be specific.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Senator, I feel that we are doing everything we are able to. I can tell you as a fellow who spent a couple of years as a prisoner you could not get anybody more sympathetic to getting those guys out, wanting to do it, than I am. I see no reason why you should not say there are efforts being made—these things take time but they are being made—to try to get some sort of prisoner exchange.

Senator CASE. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

Senator Sparkman, do you have any questions?

MILITARY MISSIONS INTO CAMBODIA AND LAOS

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I do not think I will ask any questions because I am sure it would be repetitive. I have here a number of questions the staff has prepared. Have these, most of these been asked?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Senator SPARKMAN. There are one or two I think that I would like to ask. One of them is this: Currently the policy on "hot pursuit" of Viet Cong units into Cambodia is to be revised. Does this mean that search and destroy military operations will be carried

out in Cambodia and Laos? And if it is a new policy, would you explain it?

Secretary KATZENBACH. I do not think it is any new policy on it. There is nothing of that kind that goes on now.

Senator SPARKMAN. I heard over the radio this morning that you came within two and a half miles of the Cambodian border in bombing raids today.

Secretary KATZENBACH. We have gone—yes, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. Very close.

Secretary KATZENBACH. I do not know, that may well be true.

Senator SPARKMAN. And it was speculated by this commentator that that might urge a hot pursuit permission.

SPEECH BY SIHANOUK

Secretary KATZENBACH. The problem of sanctuaries in Cambodia is a perfectly real problem. We have made efforts, are making efforts, to see if that can be dealt with diplomatically. We have provided a good deal of evidence as to the use of sanctuaries to Sihanouk in the hope that either he will take some steps to the extent he is able to or, as you perhaps read in the paper yesterday in recent speech, to see if he can bolster up the ICC to do something to preserve that border and deny sanctuaries there.

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me get that straight. You mean he said—

Secretary KATZENBACH. He was quoted yesterday in the press, and that is really the source of the first part that I gave you was in fact true although there has been no publicity given to it. We would not want any given to it because he can be a fairly erratic fellow and he may react exactly the wrong way. We provided a good deal of evidence to him as to where bases are located, where we think they are located, and so forth in the hope he would do something about it. I took his speech—

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What can he do?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Well, he could, for example, ask the ICC to come in and he could expose this. He could do that kind of thing. I think that would make life a lot more difficult. They did get the heck out of the base that the newspaper reporters discovered in there, so it may be possible to do something.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. His army does not amount to much.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Not much, but something. I think if he could put some of his fellows in the right place I think it would cause some difficulties.

Senator MUNDT. John, will you yield?

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me make this comment. Certainly it would help things if he had a change in attitude.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Certainly it would.

NEED FOR HELICOPTERS

Senator MUNDT. But he is supposed to have said in a press conference that he would let the ICC look around if we would send him some helicopters to carry them.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir. That is what he is reported to have said, and I think that is something which we are now exploring to see how it is possible to do this.

Senator MUNDT. Would that not be worth the helicopters to us?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Oh, yes, sir, I personally think it would.

We now have to find where and how we could provide helicopters and whether or not the ICC is going to do it.

Senator CASE. You can take Senator Percy's.

Secretary KATZENBACH. What?

Senator CASE. You can take the one Senator Percy used. [Laughter.]

Senator MUNDT. The Canadians want to do it.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir, it is a question of whether the Indians and Poles would do it.

Senator SPARKMAN. I will not ask any more. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper—Senator Case.

AMERICAN PRISONERS HELD BY NORTH VIETNAM

Senator COOPER. Do you know how many American prisoners are held by North Vietnam, the Viet Cong?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir. I can give you those figures as of December 1. By the NLF, 20 confirmed. Missing, possibly prisoners, 209. So there is a total of possible prisoners of 229, but only 20 we have confirmed.

Senator COOPER. Are any of them held in North Vietnam that you know about?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes. I was going to give the North Vietnamese figures. Those are the figures. I do not know whether those people remain in South Vietnam or whether they are in North Vietnam. But the 20 we believe to be in South Vietnam.

As far as North Vietnam is concerned we know of 203, and missing and perhaps prisoners 435.

Senator COOPER. You said that the United States is making all possible efforts for an exchange of prisoners. I do not doubt that at all, but what means and pressures do you use to propose such exchanges? How do you go about it?

Secretary KATZENBACH. We go about it in different ways, try different ways of going about it, try to make direct contacts. We have made on one occasion a direct contact with Hanoi by a simple statement we would like to engage in this any way they want to do it.

We have also explored indirectly with both Hanoi and with the NLF in various places through third parties who inquired of us whether there was any arrangement in any way that they would be willing to go about arrangements, discussions, or other means of exchange of prisoners. This has been done on a number of occasions and we have gotten a flat rejection everywhere. It is—the only means we have that has been affirmative is the incident that is under discussion.

Senator COOPER. Is the Red Cross able to get into North Vietnam?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, they would not permit them. We have used, as an example of—whenever any person goes there, even if they are not a person you are very dearly in love with, we ask them to take this up and to discuss this and to try to check on the prisoners and to state our interest in doing this, any way whatsoever.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE HELD AS PRISONERS

Senator MUNDT. Do you have a reading in response to Senator Cooper's question about the American prisoners? Do you have any idea how many South Vietnamese prisoners are held up there?

Secretary KATZENBACH. I do not have any figures on that. We do not have any.

Senator MUNDT. This would have some bearing as to whether the Saigon government would be willing to exchange prisoners if they have got them up there.

Secretary KATZENBACH. They have some prisoners. There are not nearly as many in North Vietnam as our prisoners for the reason most of our prisoners in North Vietnam are air crews. So that—

Senator COOPER. How many prisoners—

Secretary KATZENBACH. In North Vietnam we have confirmed 105 Navy which is all off carriers, 93 Air Force, and 5 Marines which gives you an idea of where the prisoners are coming from.

Senator COOPER. How many prisoners does the United States hold?

Secretary KATZENBACH. I do not have those figures.

Senator COOPER. We do hold prisoners of war.

Secretary KATZENBACH. We hold prisoners of war, some we turned over and some we hold, is that right?

Mr. READ. Yes, we have a few.

Senator COOPER. About how many?

Mr. READ. We could supply that for the record.

Secretary KATZENBACH. I would have to get the information.

THE LEVERAGE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

Senator COOPER. The reason I ask this is we would have to have some leverage talking about an exchange, we would have to hold some prisoners and if we turn them all over to South Vietnam we would have to hold some.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Can I give at least a personal view on that? I think there is a difference of attitude and philosophy between the Americans and Vietnamese as to prisoners, as to the value and worth of human life and so forth. I think as far as the value to either Hanoi or the NLF of people held, the people that they are interested in are not soldiers, even to some extent officers that have been captured because we have not captured all that many. I think their interest is in the political infrastructure where these people have been taken prisoner.

The CHAIRMAN. Have we captured any P.T. crews?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Those crews of the P.T. boats, we sank some, did we not capture the crews or we reportedly sank some?

Secretary KATZENBACH. I do not know the answer to that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know. Go ahead.

Secretary KATZENBACH. I have no recollection of having any knowledge of it.

Senator COOPER. You were talking about political prisoners.

Secretary KATZENBACH. In terms of leverage they always indicate much more interest in the political people.

Senator GORE. I did not understand in terms of leverage.

Secretary KATZENBACH. They are much more interested in the political people, the VC infrastructure than in terms of the soldiers. We captured very few officers who had any significance to them at all.

Senator CASE. But the cadre.

Secretary KATZENBACH. But the cadre is what they are interested in.

Senator GORE. Senator Cooper, would you yield at this point?

Senator COOPER. Yes.

NLF'S PRELIMINARY REQUESTS

Senator GORE. I think Senator Cooper has put his finger on a sensitive item. You told us earlier that the NLF wished as a preliminary for further discussion of exchange of prisoners the release of the NLF man who was apprehended with a note to Ambassador Bunker. Now if they make this as a preliminary—

Secretary KATZENBACH. And more. They asked for more than that.

Senator GORE. Even more, and the Saigon government refuses to grant that then we are up against—face to face with the question that Senator Cooper proposes that we are without leverage to go further.

Excuse me, Senator Cooper, we are right at that.

Senator COOPER. That is the point I raised.

Senator GORE. Will you define the "release of this prisoner and more"? I know what you said earlier, define "and more."

Secretary KATZENBACH. Well, they want—

Senator SPARKMAN. Twenty, was it not?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Well—no, sir. It is very hard to say precisely what they want because they did not name the people that they wanted.

Senator SPARKMAN. You did have a number in your paper though, did you not?

Secretary KATZENBACH. I do not believe there is a number in there.

Senator PELL. There is nothing specific.

Senator SPARKMAN. I thought you said "wanted him and 20 others."

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, the only figure I raised was the 20 U.S. identified prisoners.

Senator GORE. I did not understand, I am sorry. In your answer to him I did not quite get it. You say you referred to 20.

The CHAIRMAN. No, he said no.

Senator SPARKMAN. He did not. That was 20 prisoners held.

Secretary KATZENBACH. I would like to make it clear that the Saigon government has not refused to do it. It is just that the current publicity is giving us some headaches on just how to go about not refusing to do it.

FEW PRISONERS FROM BATTLES

Senator MUNDT. While we are still on prisoners, the prisoners you have listed held by Hanoi, it would appear to me to be almost

all some pilots who have been shot down or navigators or people picked up at sea.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir.

Senator MUNDT. I cannot quite conceive how we fought these big battles along the DMZ and kill and wound a lot of people and nobody gets caught on either side as being a prisoner.

Secretary KATZENBACH. We take some prisoners, they do not take very many. They are a hit and run operation, and they simply do not take—

Senator MUNDT. No prisoners from all these battles that have been fought?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Very, very few, sir. We have five Marines listed as prisoners in North Vietnam that are confirmed. We have 11 Marines missing that might be prisoners. The rest are Air Force and Navy.

Senator SPARKMAN. Navy. How many Navy?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Navy pilots.

Senator SPARKMAN. Navy pilots.

Senator COOPER. May I just finish on that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Senator Cooper.

U THANT'S INTERPRETATION OF NLF INTENTIONS

Senator COOPER. To return to the U.N., I think you said Ambassador Goldberg asked one whether they wanted to talk to the United States, whether they wanted to appear before any organs of the U.N. Did they respond specifically to that question?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, sir, they did not to the question as to whether they wanted to have any relations, any talks with the United States. Their only response on that is what I quoted before, where it said purpose: "Work principally U.N. but would not refuse radio, TV, press interviews."

Senator COOPER. This message, I understand, came from U Thant. Was he in a position to elucidate any more on this issue?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, sir.

Senator COOPER. That is all he knows.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. Have there ever been any other efforts, similar efforts made, by the NLF to come to the U.N.?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, sir.

NLF REPRESENTATIVES IN WORLD CAPITALS

Senator COOPER. The NLF has representatives throughout Europe, has it not, in different capitals?

Secretary KATZENBACH. In some countries, yes, sir.

Senator COOPER. We read about some of them like Paris, Poland.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir, Paris.

Senator COOPER. Algeria.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Algeria.

Senator COOPER. Romania.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Cairo, two or three other places; Prague, New Delhi.

Senator COOPER. Has the United States any contacts with these representatives?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, sir.

Senator COOPER. Never?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Never been able to.

Senator COOPER. So far as you know have any of these representatives of the NLF ever made any proposition through an intermediary to the United States toward negotiations?

Secretary KATZENBACH. They have not, sir, no.

Senator COOPER. Has the United States tried to make contacts with their representatives in any way?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir, we have tried from time to time on the question of prisoner exchange. It has been our thought that that was the easiest thing to make some contacts on and if we had been able to make any contacts on it we would have, as I said before—

AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN'S VISITS

Senator COOPER. Now in the newspapers over the year stories about ambassador Harriman visiting countries rumored that they may have contact with the NLF—

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir.

Senator COOPER [continuing]. North Vietnam, is that all barren, there has been no contact?

Secretary KATZENBACH. That is right.

Senator COOPER. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary KATZENBACH. And whenever any approaches have been made in most really very indirect kinds of ways they have been very flat about an unwillingness to do anything.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD NEGOTIATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Is it our policy not to negotiate with the NLF or is it to negotiate with them or try to in order to possibly divide in some way at least temporarily from the Hanoi regime, divide NLF from the Hanoi regime?

Secretary KATZENBACH. I think we have felt that negotiations would have to be with somebody that as far as we were concerned, somebody that was speaking in some sense for Hanoi, and the President has made clear on a number of occasions that if such negotiations took place the NLF would have no difficulty having its views presented.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. Then it is we do not wish to negotiate with the NLF.

Secretary KATZENBACH. I think that the question of negotiations with the NLF is two-fold: In the first place we believe, with a good deal of reason to believe it, that the NLF is an instrumentality of Hanoi. We do not think that it is possible, even if one determined that it was wise policy, to do so, to negotiate with the NLF unless in fact they are capable of representing Hanoi and are doing so with the full authority of Hanoi in this.

Secondly, the NLF wants to be—inisted publicly and every other way in any negotiations with it, have to recognize it as a government, and that is something that the government of South Vietnam is quite unprepared to do. I do not think that all of this means that in terms of trying to get the negotiations and so forth that it means that the NLF cannot be a party to this.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Secretary KATZENBACH. But it largely, it seems to me, depends on attitudes towards this that the Hanoi government would have as to those negotiations and also as to time and circumstances and so forth as far as the South Vietnamese Government is concerned. It seems to me obvious, Senator, at some time, in some way, the government of South Vietnam has to find ways of settling its differences with those South Vietnamese who are fighting against it, who are part of the war, and I think that has been recognized by General Thieu and General Ky.

ROLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. Is it fair to say that our policy is not to negotiate or accept representatives for negotiations from the NLF?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Not without discussion with the South Vietnamese government and with working with them on this problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they have made it very clear that they will not, they stated that publicly. They will not.

Secretary KATZENBACH. They stated they would negotiate with Hanoi. They have not quarreled with the fact that Hanoi would have ways of having the NLF represented in that.

The CHAIRMAN. But haven't they said publicly and being printed time and again, they will not negotiate with the NLF, is that true or not?

Secretary KATZENBACH. General Thieu has made a number of statements on that. I think I can probably quote them to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think I have read them. I think that is true. As far as you know, it is true, isn't it?

Secretary KATZENBACH. In general terms. It seems to me he has been forthcoming as far as negotiations are concerned, as far as a willingness to negotiate. He has pointed out that negotiating with the NLF which is an instrumentality of Hanoi would raise difficulties for him as such if it were done that way.

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I haven't got an answer yet. Is it fair to say, for me to say, for example, that if I were asked that it is the policy of our government not to negotiate with the representatives of the NLF, is that a fair statement?

Secretary KATZENBACH. If they are representing the NLF as the legitimate Government of South Vietnam and so forth, we don't recognize them as that.

It is not fair, Senator, to say that we would refuse to negotiate with the NLF when the President has said repeatedly that in negotiations with Hanoi, the NLF could be represented, and I don't think it is fair to make the flat statement on this.

And you are talking here, I suppose, peace negotiations, you are not talking about trying to work out some way of prisoner exchange.

The CHAIRMAN. Talking about some possible way to settle the war.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE SHOULD SETTLE MATTERS THEMSELVES

Mr. CHAIRMAN. For example, this is a statement the staff just handed me. This is from the December 6 Washington Post, Chalmers Roberts:

The statement went on to say that "Our position toward peace talks is that one should talk to the aggressors, that is the North Vietnamese and not the Viet Cong. It is a matter, of course, that we should object to the Viet Cong going to the United Nations."

And does that mean, that is the attitude of the South Vietnamese Government, is that our attitude, too, on this matter?

Secretary KATZENBACH. I think with respect to negotiations among the South Vietnamese, our position has been that they should settle these matters themselves.

PRESIDENT THIEU'S PRESS CONFERENCE

Let me quote from Thieu's press conference so that it will be accurate in terms of what is said. This is from General Thieu's press conference of August 25:

"In what way might the future government open talks with the NLF?"

Thieu replied that "The position of the GVN is that there can be no talks with the NLF if they insist on terming themselves representatives of the people of South Vietnam. We cannot accept that," he said.

"Would they hold informal talks with the NLF?"

Thieu said, "If they come to Saigon, I will talk to them. Such talks could bring good results."

"Would he guarantee NLF members safe passage to Saigon?"

Thieu said, "Sure."

Senator MUNDT. Will the Senator yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

DEALING WITH HANOI AND THE NLF

Senator MUNDT. What is hard for me to understand, Mr. Secretary, is what kind of fruitful result might come of it. I can't just see how it is going to benefit the United States much to have a peace treaty with the NLF and a war with Hanoi, because you have got behind somebody you can't trust. It seems to me you have to bring Hanoi and NLF in together.

Senator GORE. Will you include Saigon in that?

Senator MUNDT. Yes, I will include Saigon, I don't see how Saigon is benefitted if you stop the NLF and you still have a war going on with Hanoi. It seems to me you have a greater advantage in negotiating with Hanoi and the NLF than just with the NLF alone.

Secretary KATZENBACH. I think there is. You can fudge up the situation. I mean just talking the U.N. instance, here are two particular people traveling with passports from Hanoi and saying they are prepared to speak and negotiate, they may be NLF members and presumably they will represent Hanoi, I suppose you will get mixed up in that kind of situation.

The basis point I would make on this is that the NLF is in our judgment not a truly separate entity from the Hanoi Government.

It is their instrumentality in the south. It was created to, if you go into the history of this it was created to be the instrumentality of this.

RELATIONSHIP OF VIET CONG AND HANOI

The CHAIRMAN. That is a question upon which there is a difference of opinion. Many people have said the NLF while it is allied with, supported primarily by them, that there are many more people, fighting people, in South Vietnam, who, that are members of the Viet Cong that are regular soldiers from Hanoi, are there not?

The figures we have seen would indicate there are far more members of the 200 or whatever it is thousands of communists in South Vietnam. As I remember, it was about 290,000, only about 50,000 are North Vietnamese, the rest are NLF people or Viet Cong, is that about correct?

Secretary KATZENBACH. I think that is about correct. Some of those people are people who came down from the north.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose, just for a hypothetical supposing they had had enough of it and wanted a cease fire and we would refuse to meet with them, if I understand you correctly, unless Hanoi joins and is the negotiating party, is that correct? Supposing they said, "We would like a cease fire," and you said, "No, we don't want it unless Hanoi joins."

Secretary KATZENBACH. The NLF can speak for Hanoi in this situation and I don't suppose that there is any great problem.

The CHAIRMAN. What if they just speak for themselves. They are the dominant people there in numbers.

Secretary KATZENBACH. There is, as you say, a difference of opinion on this. I am very clear in my mind as to who controls the NLF.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you are.

Secretary KATZENBACH. I think if you negotiated with one of these fellows on the NLF who came over under your hypothesis he would bring nobody with him. You would have another Chu Hoi.

A GENUINE REPRESENTATIVE

The CHAIRMAN. If he was a genuine representative of the NLF, he represents a major number of the fighting men in South Vietnam who fight our soldiers.

Secretary KATZENBACH. That is correct. Maybe he would end up being a genuine representative, in that—self designated in that capacity like some of these other people who then end up in exile. I mean I don't think it is possible, Senator.

A CIVIL WAR

The CHAIRMAN. I know you think that, but here they are taking the punishment, I mean they are getting killed lots more than the North Vietnamese, and it is possible that they have had enough of it and they would like to settle the matter regardless of Hanoi. It is possible, I know you don't agree with this because this doesn't fit your theory of the war, but not everybody agrees with your theory of the war, I guess you know that, as to how it started and what it is about.

There are people who think this was a civil war and before we intervened, and that these are the major fighting units and they have had enough of it, they have lost enough people and would like to stop it.

Assuming that, it seems to me what would be the disadvantage to us of meeting with them if you could get a cease fire.

Secretary KATZENBACH. I think if that were the situation and you were correct in that, that the government of South Vietnam would have no difficulty trying to settle matters of that sort.

WHAT IS THE U.S. ATTITUDE

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about the United States, you are always shifting over. What is the U.S. attitude? We are doing most of the fighting.

Secretary KATZENBACH. To make that very simple: I don't think that the United States is in a position to or should be in a position to tell the South Vietnamese just exactly, "By god, you are going to settle this war in this way, whether you like it or not."

The CHAIRMAN. You don't think so?

Secretary KATZENBACH. I don't think—if that is true, then we could turn the whole thing over to the NLF and say, "That is the way it is and we now insist on that." We have gone through the process, it seems to me, of trying to create a government there that can speak for South Vietnam, it represents many more people in South Vietnam than the so-called government of the NLF and it just seems to me that in terms of the solution there, as I said before, they are going to have to work out their differences at some period of time, but I don't know what right we have to say, "We are imposing this political system on you," that is what we are fighting for.

THE COST FOR THE UNITED STATES

The CHAIRMAN. The reason, we are paying the costs and we are losing the men, is a very practical reason. The cost is on the United States and that government wouldn't last very long; if it isn't a puppet government, I never saw one.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Let me say, Senator, that the bridge you want to know whether or not we want to cross has not yet been constructed, because every single indication from the NLF has been just as flat and negative as any indication from Hanoi.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman—

Secretary KATZENBACH. I say if that situation you talk about comes into being in fact then let's see what we would do if that situation comes into being.

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to ask—

The CHAIRMAN. Let me say you continue. I have another appointment.

Senator MUNDT. May I ask a question before you go?

NEGOTIATE WITH THE VIET CONG

Senator SPARKMAN. I wanted to ask a question right on there, but I wanted to ask the same question a little differently, but on a different premise.

The different premise is this. I agree, Mr. Secretary, as to the nature of the war. I don't agree with the chairman, as is well known, I presume. But it seems to me that the Viet Cong are in South Vietnam, and they are conducting the fighting there and, as a practical matter, if they ceased fighting North Vietnam, it seems to me, would have a pretty difficult time carrying on.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Right.

Senator SPARKMAN. So it seems to me that we probably ought to have a kind of a receptive attitude to any proposal on their part, to negotiate, and if the opportunity ever presents itself, I think we ought to be in an attitude to be willing to negotiate with them without asking. Let them ask permission of Hanoi, if permission has to be given, but don't let us predicate our proceedings on what Hanoi says to them.

Secretary KATZENBACH. I don't disagree with that. One of the great difficulties with this is that the NLF has constantly claimed to be the legitimate government, and so forth, and so on. And one of the problems that obviously Thieu has or that we have on this, is when asked these kinds of questions to say, "Oh, yes, we will negotiate with the NLF" assuming that were our position, is to build the NLF up and to build up the mythology of the independent NLF into a government and so forth so it becomes a political factor. They want to push for that kind of a statement not because they want to negotiate, but because they want that kind of public recognition. This is what makes life difficult for the government in Saigon.

So I would say if the facts that the chairman says are true, here are people who can speak for 200,000, 150,000 troops, who claim to do that, there is reason to believe that, they say, "We want to make peace," at that point, let's cross that bridge when we have that sincerity in those circumstances.

I don't think we have it now and I think it is very hypothetical and dangerous to try to answer it.

A SENSIBLE FORMULA

Senator MUNDT. You laid down in response to the chairman's question a sort of formula which to me sounds sensible, and that is that the United States against the opposition of the Saigon government could not very well negotiate with the NLF. If they said okay, yes, but if they said, no, no.

Now, it seems to me to be consistent you have got to apply that same formula to Hanoi. I don't see how the United States can very well go in and negotiate a peace with Hanoi over the opposition of the government of Saigon without first shooting the Saigonesse government out of the saddle.

Would you apply the same formula as well as the formula for the NLF and a different formula for Hanoi?

Senator CASE. Saigon doesn't object to that so much, is that the point?

Secretary KATZENBACH. I think all of our allies including Saigon we would want to consult before any negotiations occur. The basic reason we are in there is aggression by North Vietnam against South Vietnam. If that matter would be resolved then it would be possible to resolve our differences. We have differences with Hanoi

which would be capable of resolution in terms of how we got in there.

The government of South Vietnam has differences with the government of North Vietnam and with the insurgents that are in the south. These are going to have to be resolved sometime, by some mechanism, by some method.

I don't think we would in either instance negotiate behind the backs of the South Vietnamese government.

Senator MUNDT. Any more than we would expect them to negotiate behind our backs to set up the conditions.

Secretary KATZENBACH. That is correct.

MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING

Senator CASE. Karl, may I make just a little comment here? It seems to me this point which has itched and irritated and annoyed me a year ago, and a year and a-half ago by someone who thought he had said something when he said we ought to negotiate directly with the NLF, it was just a matter of bad handling.

If we said from the beginning we haven't tried to negotiate, we will cross that bridge when we come to it, we would have been much better off.

And this business now we have a thousand people who are thinking they are saying something and thinking we are intransigent.

Senator MUNDT. Think of your impact of that on your elected government of Saigon.

Secretary KATZENBACH. This is the problem even with that kind of statement.

Senator CASE. There is something, you know, I am not happy about the way this war is going, as I have said, and the way we are conducting ourselves, but this kind of thing always seems to me like making much ado about absolutely nothing at all, and I would be glad to say so again and again.

Senator COOPER. May I say something?

A VERY GLOOMY REACTION

It seems to me one problem about all this is, as you say, there has been no indication of any attitude on the NLF negotiating, I assume that is correct—is that correct?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Well, they have talked about negotiating on their terms.

Senator MCCARTHY. So have we, that is not a real fault.

Senator COOPER. Your attitude ought to have some weight as to whether or not they ever negotiate.

All I can say after listening to you, it is a very gloomy reaction. I don't see any, any hope of any kind except to crush them with military force, that is about it.

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, sir, I think—I am not hopeful that there will be any negotiation in the immediate future on this. It doesn't seem to me it looks as though there will be. But it is not—we have indicated we would be willing to negotiate with Hanoi on an open agenda, that is anybody could raise anything they wanted to raise. Neither Hanoi nor the NLF has ever indicated any interest in negotiations except after certain pre-conditions had been accomplished. That is the difference between the two positions. Hanoi

has put preconditions of bombing on it. It has varied from time to time, at least in the public statements as to whether you have to negotiate on the premise that the NLF was a legitimate government of South Vietnam, on the four points, the NLF five points.

If the position which the chairman indicated somebody wants to speak for the NLF, I don't believe we are separated in that kind of a way, if this came to pass, and said they could do it, I would assume under these circumstances that they were doing it with the authority of Hanoi, and I can see many different scenarios so far as negotiations were concerned if people wanted to negotiate.

The difficulty, as I emphasized a moment ago, and I think Senator Case, to some extent, the difficulty is what you are talking about, the very statements you make get into it, create political difficulties and it is very difficult to find a formula that doesn't serve the other fellow's political purposes when—I think you can appreciate the difficulty of that. Maybe bad handling or maybe it is just a tough problem to handle in a tough society.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator, Senator Pell has been sitting here rather patiently and hasn't engaged in any questioning. Let's recognize him.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am very glad I followed your advice last night and didn't go to Athens.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Tragic.

CLOSING THE CAMBODIAN BORDER

Senator PELL. Just going back to Cambodia for a moment, isn't it, my recollection is that once Sihanouk offered to maintain a tight border if we would pay for it. My recollection is not exact. I don't think he brought in the ICC. I think it was more a question if we would provide American soldiers, underwrite it, he would permit us to close the borders.

As you know, in international law a blockade to be legal must be effective and he is willing for the border to be closed if we provide the means.

Was that so, and if it was, what was our response, do you happen to recall?

Secretary KATZENBACH. I don't think—they were not talking about American soldiers, providing American soldiers to keep his border closed. He doesn't want that.

Senator PELL. What was his proposal, do you know?

Secretary KATZENBACH. The only proposal that I can recall that Sihanouk has ever made outside of negotiating the problem as he frequently does, was the one that appeared in the press yesterday where he talked about giving the ICC some equipment to do it. Have there been any others?

Senator PELL. I am sure there were. A couple of years ago, you could not recall it, but it was when you were still in Justice.

Secretary KATZENBACH. I don't recall any other offer.

Mr. READ. Nothing recent now.

Senator PELL. It was two or three years ago.

Maybe for the record it could be submitted, the proposal he made and our response at that time.

GIVING THE CAMBODIANS HELICOPTERS

Senator SPARKMAN. I am not sure your question embodied this. If we gave them those helicopters would they be piloted by their own pilots, Cambodian pilots?

Secretary KATZENBACH. I think we would have a problem finding compatible types and so forth. I think this is one of the things being looked at in view of his statement, we don't know what the ICC will do, we have to again, if we were going to give them helicopters we would have to find compatible types, for example, to be piloted by Canadians, Indians, or by Poles, and this is not easy to do, you know, before this time tomorrow. It gets complicated. Also, there are even some legal complications as to just how we provide, on what kind of a basis, you know, equipment to the ICC.

Senator SPARKMAN. You could lend lease it to them.

Secretary KATZENBACH. I am not sure the legislative authority, but how you go about doing this even as it now sits.

NLF COULD ATTEND SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATES

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, returning to the question of the NLF going to the United Nations, as I read the paper and as I understand it, we have never denied them and said they could not come.

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, sir.

Senator PELL. For the purposes, for any reason whatsoever. We said the reason they could come is still being left open, is that correct?

Secretary KATZENBACH. We have gone further than that. We have really said they could come in connection with any debate in the Security Council and if you read the headquarters agreement, or for any other purpose that—the United Nation's purpose. They have to have passports and so forth to come, but we have not tried to deny their coming if the U.N. wants them to come. That is a simple statement of it.

But if they just want to come on their own and nobody in the U.N. is asking them to come, we have taken the position that, I suppose, we haven't denied that.

They haven't applied for visas. I don't mean to mislead the Committee. I would think unless we found some legitimate reason for that we wouldn't have a great deal much reason to give them visas to appear on a national network and do this, that, or the other thing.

Senator SPARKMAN. I know they said they were willing to do that.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, yes.

COMPARISON TO ALGERIA

Senator PELL. What is the difference in handling, or has there been any difference in handling of the NLF delegates from Algeria or whenever it was '58 or '59, and the handling of these NLF ones from Vietnam?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Sure, some Algerians came into this country on passports. I think they were on Pakistani passports, I have forgotten, they may have been on other passports. But they

came in, they got visas to visit. I don't think there was any diplomatic status at all. They hung around New York and it was an Algerian freedom movement there and so forth. I think there is a slight distinction between Algeria's fight against France and what is presently going on in South Vietnam. I think that is a difficult case to make.

WHO CAN SPEAK TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Secretary, I can't quite get through my mind, if you let the NLF come, Number One, who do they represent, how do they obtain membership in the U.N.? Is the U.N. open to any rump group that wants to participate in debate, whether they represent anybody or not?

Could Stokley Carmichael go up there and say, "I represent Black Power," and make a speech?

Unless you recognize them as a government, how do they come?

Secretary KATZENBACH. That is my point. Under Rule 39 it does provide that the Security Council can hear persons——

Senator MCCARTHY. They could hear him if they wanted to.

Senator MUNDT. They could even invite him in.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, that could be.

Senator MUNDT. Not in the plenary session of the General Assembly.

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, he doesn't have a vote and in that kind of situation and doesn't involve recognizing him as a government of any kind because I think the language is representative of persons or groups, persons.

Mr. READ. The interested persons or groups.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Interested persons or groups.

Senator MUNDT. In other words, the only way the NLF could be would be by invitation by the Security Council, and then to appear only before the Security Council. Could they also appear before the General Assembly?

Secretary KATZENBACH. That would be true only under Rule 39.

Now, it is possible that other agencies of the U.N. could invite persons to appear before them, any of the specialized agencies, this is under the Headquarters Agreement. If they were invited that way, I think we would be obligated to invite them for that purpose, under the Headquarters Agreement which we do appear to have in effect.

A RESOLUTION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Senator MUNDT. Suppose the Asia-Africa bloc which is not favorable to our war should introduce a resolution in the General Assembly inviting the NLF and it passes. Does it mean they could participate in the speeches?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, I think if the General Assembly did it, I think it would be this kind of a fashion: The General Assembly would be similar to either one of its activities or committees or pursuant to a resolution there which said it wanted to hear from a representative of this group, and I think if the General Assembly said, although there is no explicit article of that kind, if they wanted to do it, they haven't crossed this bridge, I would be inclined to believe if the General Assembly voted it, they wanted to hear a

representative of this group and he wanted to make a speech and that was the view of the General Assembly, that the United States qua the United States under the Headquarters Agreement would be obligated to admit that person for that purpose whether they like him or not.

We wouldn't have to admit them to go on CBS or NBC or this or the other thing.

Senator KATZENBACH. We did that with Cuba.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, but Cuba is a member.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes, but if the U.N. votes to ask these people here.

Secretary KATZENBACH. We gave them a passport visa to come in for that purpose.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. For that purpose in the U.N.

AN OPEN SNOOKER GAME

Senator MUNDT. For that purpose, and if in the General Assembly the African-Asian bloc introduced a resolution tomorrow morning to have a representative of Red China come and give an address to the General Assembly, would it be covered by NBC and CBS? This is kind of an open snooker game, anybody can come in who gets invited and makes speeches.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. They did at one time, they had the Red Chinese.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes, he came there on the question of seating Red China in the U.N.

Senator MUNDT. Gave a speech on the podium.

Senator SPARKMAN. He was there and spoke.

Senator MUNDT. Being in New York is one thing, but being on the Floor of the Senate giving a speech or something is different.

U.S. OBLIGATIONS UNDER U.N. AGREEMENT

Senator GORE. Ambassador Goldberg answered that question at the same time he answered the question about the NLF. He said we would not interpose objection if they were invited.

Secretary KATZENBACH. We have obligations under our Headquarters Agreement for U.N. purposes.

Senator SPARKMAN. I think it might be well to cite that in the record right at this point, if I may. Article IV, Section 11, reads, I won't read the whole thing but it reads to this effect: "The Federal, State or local authorities of the United States shall not impose any impediment to transit to or from the Headquarters District of" five different classifications, the fifth of which is, "other persons invited to the Headquarters District by the United Nations or by such specialized agency on official business. The appropriate American authorities shall afford any necessary protection to such persons while in transit to or from the Headquarters District," and so forth.

And then the first sentence in Section 12 is the "The provisions of Section 11 shall be applicable irrespective of the relations existing between the governments of the persons referred to in that section and the Government of the United States."

Senator MUNDT. John, my question is, I recognize we have to let them come.—

Senator SPARKMAN. I recognize that but I thought we ought to have this in.

Senator MUNDT. Do they have the right to stand up on the podium of the General Assembly with the satellites covering for TV if they don't belong?

Secretary KATZENBACH. If the General Assembly so provides, I assume they would.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Pell hasn't finished his questioning yet.

Senator PELL. Let me finish up here, if I may.

NLF VIEW OF U.N. JURISDICTION

Why in your view did the NLF delegates who made the demarche or presumably made the demarche originally withdraw and not follow up and try to either press us in this and get us to specifically deny them entry or come, why did they back away, in your view?

Secretary KATZENBACH. I would suggest as one reason for this they have never admitted and have always denied that the United Nations had any competence whatsoever with respect to what they were doing. And, therefore, I think they did not want to be in the position of having their finger in this particular pie.

Senator PELL. You don't feel—

Secretary KATZENBACH. And, of course, the other thing, Senator, is that we don't, as I said earlier, we don't know whether this was somebody else's idea or theirs. We have got the three steps removed.

Senator PELL. Right.

Going to the man who was caught in Vietnam, the VC—NLF man, do we take any precautions with people in that position, political prisoners, trying to make sure they are not susceptible to the maltreatment, which is pretty customary there, or do we just presume that once we turn them over to the South Vietnamese, South Vietnamese rules apply?

Secretary KATZENBACH. One, we didn't turn them over to the South Vietnamese; they caught them.

Senator PELL. I mean prisoners of war.

Secretary KATZENBACH. But I will say in this instance, at least this fellow is not—he was interviewed by him, we didn't beat him and he had not been beaten up, maltreated in that way. But I don't want to give a clean bill of health to any government's treatment to all prisoners. I don't think it is something that we would be in a position to control certainly, or even to influence in all instances.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Senator Gore has some questions.

INTERPRETATIONS OF NLF ACTIONS

Senator GORE. Mr. Secretary, I find it intriguing that an answer was not provided to Ambassador Goldberg's interrogatory as to whether they wished to contact the United States government. One can read into that different things, an admission or a statement on their part that they did wish to contact and have a talk with the United States government might subject them to the interpretation that they wished to surrender.

There are various interpretations that can be put upon it.

I don't think we can rush to the conclusion that because they didn't answer the question that that operates as a denial. I would be inclined to think that their omission of an answer to that question might very well indicate that this was one of the purposes.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Senator, most respectfully, I think you have to put that together with their refusal in many other instances even to talk about such things as prisoners, to have any contact with any official of the United States Government or indeed any other person that they might possibly be speaking for the United States Government, and I think taken against that background in other places and against the observations of Ambassador Goldberg if this indeed was their purpose it would not be difficult to accomplish in a number of other places and with a greater deal of secrecy and security I would say certainly they had not affirmed it and they did answer it in a way to the extent they answered it by saying they wanted to lobby in the U.N. and not refusing invitations to appear on various communications media, and I think putting that altogether it is pretty hard to make an affirmative out of it.

Senator GORE. I would not attempt to make an affirmative but I don't think we can dismiss the possibility that an omission of an answer would indicate an interest in an affirmative. At least it is an unresolved question.

NOT ACTING BEHIND SOUTH VIETNAM'S BACK

Is there any way, has the United States sought any other way, to bring and find a resolution of that question?

Secretary KATZENBACH. In this particular context, no, sir, we have not pushed it beyond that. In other contexts we have gotten projections of this. My own view is that if there is any interest—let me put it differently. My own personal view, if you can't discuss directly or indirectly such a subject as prisoner exchange that it does not bode very well for discussing more important matters than that.

If it were possible to actually discuss prisoner exchanges there would have always been the possibility of discussing other matters on that, and let me be quick to say this is something we would do with the full knowledge of South Vietnamese Government and not behind their backs.

I keep repeating that because it is a matter on which they quite understandably are very sensitive and those who would like to divide allies constantly give rumors to the effect that the United States is selling them out from behind their back, and this is what is happening in the Hanoi newspapers, and I want to be very clear on that point.

Senator GORE. I am willing to leave it as an unresolved question, but I did wish to suggest that their omission of an answer cannot, in my view, be interpreted as a negative answer.

It might mean the other.

NOT A HIGH-RANKING REPRESENTATIVE

But, now, coming to the contact or attempted contact or alleged purported attempted contact in Saigon, can you give us some indi-

cation of the nature of the NLF official who was apprehended, was he lowly, was he a man of stature within their infrastructure?

Secretary KATZENBACH. I would say, if I wanted a rough equivalent, he was about a GS-14.

Senator GORE. Well, that really doesn't mean much to me. Could you give us—

Secretary KATZENBACH. I was trying to find an analogy. He is the kind of fellow that we would have—

Senator PELL. He is a lieutenant colonel.

Senator SPARKMAN. I started to say full colonel.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Well, lieutenant colonel, full colonel. He is the kind of fellow we would have over there, for example, as an assistant district representative. I have no question, let me be clear on this, we were satisfied, [deleted] as to his genuineness and that he had contact with people who were more important than that but he himself was not a person of great stature.

Senator GORE. He was not a high official?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, sir.

Senator GORE. But [deleted] a genuine emissary?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir.

THE NATURE OF HIS APPREHENSION

Senator GORE. Now, can you give us something of the nature of his apprehension? Was he near the embassy?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, he was in Saigon, and he was picked up as part of a raid on some various people suspected of being VC members and he was one of them. It was an ordinary police raid. In fact, of a type that goes on very frequently.

Senator GORE. Any indication of how long he had been in Saigon?

Secretary KATZENBACH. He had been in Saigon a few days. He said he had been there before and had been unable to make any contact. That is only his word on this.

I don't know whether it happened to him or not.

Senator GORE. According to him, he had sought to previously make contact.

Secretary KATZENBACH. According to him, he sought previously to deliver the message. I don't know why it can't be dropped in the mail.

Senator GORE. But was the message dated?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, I believe the message was not dated.

Am I correct in that?

I am fairly sure it was not dated.

TEXT OF THE MESSAGE

Senator GORE. Do you have the text of the message?

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Could you read it to us, or have your assistant?

Secretary KATZENBACH. I have been awfully hesitant in getting into operational details.

Senator GORE. Well, we will take this off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator GORE. You are very cooperative, Mr. Secretary, and this, of course, you understand, is for the information of the committee.

I have but a very few other questions to try to get really at the mechanics and in order to reach my own conclusion as to the importance of this.

FURTHER CONTACTS WITH NLF

You say that we have had further contacts via an emissary whom we regard as possessing sufficient contacts with the Viet Cong.

Secretary KATZENBACH. Yes, sir.

Senator GORE. Would you give us some indication of his stature, [deleted].

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator GORE. I have no further questions.

I want to thank the Secretary for being forthright with this committee in the matter.

Senator SPARKMAN. All of us.

UNWISE FOR THE AMBASSADOR TO MEET EMISSARY

Senator COOPER. May I ask this: Would there have been any value, in your judgment, for this man actually to continue his mission and talk to Ambassador Bunker? Because the papers have said they gave—

Secretary KATZENBACH. It would have played actual hell with the raised hell with the South Vietnamese Government. Because there are people there who want to separate us, who are not all on the left, Vietnamese strong nationalists who would say he would just do what the Americans say. It would be most unwise for Ambassador Bunker himself to do that kind of thing.

VISITS OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE TO U.S.

Could I make one point?

There are, I think—as you gentlemen know, in January and February a number of members of the Vietnamese Senate recently elected who will be visiting this country, and I think you will find this of considerable interest, and I wonder if I could be so bold as to hope that to some extent some of these people might be given some of the sort of courtesies that are given in view of the number of American senators and representatives who travel over there, I think it would be a helpful thing in terms of relationships between the two if this could be done and some of these people, I think you will find very interesting.

Senator SPARKMAN. I am sure it can be done.

Senator GORE. I am sure some of us will invite them.

Let me ask, are any of them permitted to come or are they a delegation chosen by the junta?

Secretary KATZENBACH. No, any of them will be permitted to come. I think you will find that the senators and representatives over there, particularly as things go along, are going to have their own views on how things are going to be done. That is a part of democracy and it will be helpful in some instances and it will not be helpful in others.

A BROADER VIEW OF THE SITUATION

Senator CASE. Just one point, Mr. Chairman. I don't say this is a call for that purpose, but I would like to suggest at some time the committee ask the Secretary or anyone the Department says is competent to talk with us about some of these broader matters, such as the memorandum that was circulated out there in the Embassy on discouragement and pessimism and whatnot; the differences between Thieu and Ky, the problems with the press out there, which may reflect in part those differences, and all the rest, and a broader view of the situation, perhaps, early in the term.

Senator SPARKMAN. Fine.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

You have got some people waiting to receive you outside.

I request that there be inserted in the record a newspaper article from the New York Times, dated Wednesday, December 6, 1967, and an item entitled, "Limited Distribution for Internal U.S. Mission Use Only, Provincial Attitudes, dated November 26-2 December 1967."

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee recessed, subject to call of the chair.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 15, 1967

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC

The committee met in executive session at 10:10 a.m., in room S-116, the Capitol.

Present: Chairman Fulbright and Senators Sparkman, Gore, Lausche, Church, Symington, Clark, Pell, Carlson, Case, and Cooper.

Charles E. Bohlen, nominee to be Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, was heard and then ordered approved by voice vote.

Discussion followed on miscellaneous committee business (making excerpt public of 1966 Bundy appearance; Secretary Rusk appearances, etc.)

[The committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m.]

APPENDIX A

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS PUBLICATIONS FOR 1967:

HEARINGS, COMMITTEE PRINTS, SENATE DOCUMENTS, AND REPORTS

HEARINGS PRINTED IN 1967

Jan. 23, Feb. 3 and 8, 1967	Consular Convention with the Soviet Union.
Jan. 30, 1967	The Communist World in 1967 (Kennan).
Jan. 31, 1967	Asia, the Pacific, and the United States (Reischauer).
Feb. 2, 1967	Harrison E. Salisbury's trip to North Vietnam.
Feb. 3, 6, 7, 28, and Mar. 1, 2 and 3, 1967.	United States Armament and Disarmament Programs.
Feb. 20, 1967	Changing American Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy (Commager).
Feb. 23 and Mar. 8, 1967	Human Rights Conventions.
Feb. 27, 1967	Nomination of William M. Roth, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.
Mar. 7, 13 and April 12, 1967	Treaty on Outer Space.
Mar. 14, April 13, 20, 25 and June 22, 1967.	Arms sales to Near East and South Asian countries.
Mar. 17 and 21, 1967	Latin American Summit Conference.
Mar. 21 and Apr. 25, 1967	U.S. Informational Media Guaranty Program.
Apr. 10, 1967	Nomination of Rutherford Poats.
Apr. 26 and May 3, 1967	U.S. troops in Europe.
May 4, 1967	Peace Corps Act Amendment of 1967.
May 9, 1967	Diplomatic Relations Act.
May 18, 1967	Inter-American Development Bank Act Amendment.
June 12, July 14 and 26, 1967	Foreign Assistance, 1967.
Aug. 16, 17, 21, 23 and Sept. 19, 1967	U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers.
Sept. 13, 1967	Human Rights Convention, Part 2.
Sept. 28, 1967	USIA Foreign Service Personnel System.
Oct. 3, 1967	Asian Development Bank Special Funds.
Oct. 5, 1967	Tax Conventions with Brazil, Canada, and Trinidad and Tobago.
Oct. 19, 20 and Nov. 17, 1967	Construction of nuclear desalting plants in the Middle East.
Oct. 26, 27 and Nov. 2, 1967	Submission of the Vietnam conflict to the United Nations.
Nov. 29, 1967	Governing the use of ocean space.

COMMITTEE PRINTS

Jan. 23, 1967	East of the Elbe: Report by Senator Clark.
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HEARINGS, COMMITTEE PRINTS, SENATE DOCUMENTS, AND REPORTS—Continued

Jan. 25, 1967	Arms Sales and Foreign Policy: Staff Study.
January 1967	Legislation on Foreign Relations: Joint Committee Print.
Feb. 16, 1967	Status of the Development of the Anti-ballistic Missile Systems in the United States: Statement of Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering.
Feb. 23, 1967	Study Mission to East Berlin, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia: Report by Senator Pell.
February 1967	The United Nations at Twenty-one: Report by Senator Church.
March 1967	Consultative Subcommittees.
Mar. 31, 1967	Twelfth NATO Parliamentarians' Conference.
Apr. 10, 1967	War or Peace in the Middle East: Report by Senator Clark.
April 1967	The United Nations Peacekeeping Dilemma: Report by Senator Case.
May 15, 1967	Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Group: Report on 7th Meeting.
June 6, 1967	A Select Chronology and Background Documents relating to the Middle East.
July 27, 1967	Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (3d revised edition).
Aug. 10, 1967	The Charter of the Organization of American States, as proposed to be amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires (Ex. L., 90th Cong., 1st sess.).
Sept. 18, 1967	Survey of the Alliance for Progress: The Political Aspects.
Sept. 25, 1967	Survey of the Alliance for Progress: Inflation in Latin America.
September 1967	The Rim of Asia: Report by Senator Mansfield.
Oct. 9, 1967	Survey of the Alliance for Progress: The Latin American Military.
Oct. 30, 1967	Survey of the Alliance for Progress: Foreign Trade Policies.
Dec. 22, 1967	Survey of the Alliance for Progress: Insurgency in Latin America.

SENATE DOCUMENTS

S. Doc. 42, Aug. 7, 1967	Canada-U.S. Interparliamentary Group: Report on 10th Meeting.
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SENATE REPORTS

S. Rept. 77 (S. Con. Res. 16) Mar. 20, 1967	The Centennial of the Confederation of Canada.
S. Rept. 80 (S. 623) Mar. 23, 1967	The International Bridge Act of 1967.
S. Rept. 83 (S.J. Res. 60) Apr. 3, 1967	Latin American Summit Conference.
S. Rept. 190 (S. 1029) Apr. 20, 1967	Benefits for employees in high-risk situations.
S. Rept. 207 (H.R. 3399) May 3, 1967	Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission.
S. Rept. 223 (S. 1031) May 11, 1967	Amendment to the Peace Corps Act.

HEARINGS, COMMITTEE PRINTS, SENATE DOCUMENTS, AND REPORTS—Continued

- S. Rept. 234 (S. 1030) May 16, 1967 Informational Media Guaranty Program.
 S. Rept. 235 (S. 1785) May 16, 1967 Benefits for employees in high-risk situations.
 S. Rept. 344 (S. 990) June 13, 1967 U.S. Committee for the International Human Rights Year.
 S. Rept. 346 (S. 1577) June 14, 1967 The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1967.
 S. Rept. 352 (S. 2003) June 23, 1967 Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Fund.
 S. Rept. 499 (S. 1872) Aug. 9, 1967 Foreign Assistance Act of 1967.
 S. Rept. 501 (S. 1688) Aug. 11, 1967 Inter-American Development Bank Act Amendments of 1967.
 S. Rept. 715 (S. 633) Nov. 1, 1967 USIA Foreign Service Personnel System.
 S. Rept. 734 (H.R. 6167) Nov. 7, 1967 Extension of Naval Vessel Loans.
 S. Rept. 797 (S. Res. 187) Nov. 20, 1967 National Commitments.
 S. Rept. 798 (S. Res. 180) Nov. 21, 1967 Submission of the Vietnam conflict to the United Nations.
 S. Rept. 832 (H.R. 3399) Dec. 4, 1967 Transferring to the American Battle Monuments Commission all authority of the Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission.
 S. Rept. 836 (H.R. 9063) Dec. 4, 1967 International claims.
 S. Rept. 919 (S. 2269) Dec. 11, 1967 Unlawful seizure of U.S. fishing vessel.
 S. Rept. 920 (S. Res. 155) Dec. 11, 1967 Construction of nuclear desalting plants in the Middle East.
 S. Rept. 926 (S. 1418) Dec. 12, 1967 Changes in passport laws.

EXECUTIVE REPORTS

- Ex. Rept. 1 (Ex. H, T and U, 89-2) Feb. 27, 1967. Fisheries conventions.
 Ex. Rept. 2 (Ex. Q and R, 89-2) Feb. 27, 1967. Maritime Facilitation Conventions.
 Ex. Rept. 3 (Ex. K, L, M, J and N, 89-2) Feb. 27, 1967. Customs Conventions.
 Ex. Rept. 4 (Ex. D, 88-2) Mar. 3, 1967 ... Consular Convention with the Soviet Union (with individual views).
 Ex. Rept. 5 (Ex. E, 90-1) Mar. 30, 1967 .. Amendments to the International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea.
 Ex. Rept. 6 (Ex. C, 90-1) Apr. 12, 1967 .. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents.
 Ex. Rept. 7 (Ex. O, 89-2) Apr. 17, 1967 .. International Telecommunication Convention.
 Ex. Rept. 8 (Ex. D, 90-1) Apr. 18, 1967 .. Treaty on Outer Space.
 Ex. Rept. 9 (Ex. G, 88-1) May 3, 1967 Conventions on the International Exchange of Publications and Documents.
 Ex. Rept. 10 (Ex. A, 90-1) May 3, 1967 .. Amendment to Article 109 of the United Nations Charter.
 Ex. Rept. 11 (Ex. G, 90-1) May 3, 1967 .. Convention on Narcotic Drugs.
 Ex. Rept. 12 (Ex. H, 90-1) July 27, 1967 Partial revision of radio regulations.
 Ex. Rept. 14 (Ex. P, 89-2) Aug. 25, 1967 Commercial Treaty with Thailand.
 Ex. Rept. 15 (Ex. I, 90-1) Sept. 13, 1967 Consular Convention with France.
 Ex. Rept. 16 (S. Ex. Res. 1) Sept. 14, 1967. Withdrawal of certain treaties.
 Ex. Rept. 17 (Ex. L, 88-1) Oct. 31, 1967 Supplementary Slavery Convention.
 Ex. Rept. 18 (Ex. B and F, 90-1) Nov. 1, 1967. Tax conventions with Canada, Trinidad and Tobago.
 Ex. Rept. 19 (Ex. K, 90-1) Dec. 4, 1967 .. Further Prolongation of the International Sugar Agreement.

HEARINGS, COMMITTEE PRINTS, SENATE DOCUMENTS, AND REPORTS—Continued

Ex. Rept. 20 (Ex. M, 90-1) Dec. 8, 1967 .. Amendment to Article 28 of the Convention of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization.

APPENDIX B

VOLUMES PUBLISHED TO DATE IN THE HISTORICAL SERIES

Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine.
Foreign Relief Act: 1947.
Foreign Relief Assistance Act of 1948.
The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty.
Military Assistance Program: 1949.
Extension of European Recovery Program: 1949.
Economic Assistance to China and Korea: 1949–50.
Reviews of the World Situation: 1949–50.
Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
 Volume I, Eightieth Congress, First and Second Sessions,
 1947–48.
 Volume II, Eighty-first Congress, First and Second Sessions,
 1949–50.
 Volume III, Parts 1 and 2, Eighty-second Congress, First
 Session, 1951.
 Volume IV, Eighty-second Congress, Second Session, 1952.
 Volume V, Eighty-third Congress, First Session, 1953.
 Volume VI, Eighty-third Congress, Second Session, 1954.
 Volume VII, Eighty-fourth Congress, First Session, 1955.
 Volume VIII, Eighty-fourth Congress, Second Session, 1956.
 Volume IX, Eighty-fifth Congress, First Session, 1957.
 Volume X, Eighty-fifth Congress, Second Session, 1958.
 Volume XI, Eighty-sixth Congress, First Session, 1959.
 Volume XII, Eighty-sixth Congress, Second Session, 1960.
 Volume XIII, Parts 1 and 2, Eighty-seventh Congress, First
 Session, 1961.
 Volume XIV, Eighty-seventh Congress, Second Session, 1962.
 Volume XV, Eighty-eighth Congress, First Session, 1963.
 Volume XVI, Eighty-eighth Congress, Second Session, 1964.
 Volume XVII, Eighty-ninth Congress, First Session, 1965.
 Volume XVIII, Eighty-ninth Congress, Second Session, 1966.
 Volume XIX, Ninetieth Congress, First Session, 1967.

